HOMERUS UBIQUE: LUCIAN'S USE OF HOMER

NICHOLAS WILSHERE, MA (Oxon), MA (Nottm), PGCE

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Abstract

It has been long acknowledged that Lucian employs various forms of allusion to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* across his writings. This thesis builds on previous studies — which have produced taxonomic analyses of allusion, (mis)quotation and parody — to explore more fully the intertextual richness and complexity of Lucian's writing that such approaches can paradoxically conceal.

Works such as *Charon*, *Hercules*, *Alexander* and several of the miniature dialogues are examined in depth, especially those which have received less attention previously and those in which Lucian can be most clearly seen engaging with the Homeric text, whether at the level of whole scenes, through quotation of short passages, by the construction of parodies and centos, or in drawing attention to lexical details. This examination reveals how such techniques are used to signal Lucian's close familiarity with the author who was the ultimate talisman of sophistic *paideia*. Lucian is revealed as re-reading and re-presenting Homer in clever, mischievous, even 'postmodern' ways to produce striking effects which make his work both accessible and amusing to ancient audiences across a range of levels of education, from those who knew the main features of Homeric stories and language to those who were intimately familiar with allegorical interpretations of Homer and Alexandrian scholarly controversies over textual minutiae.

This is complemented by analysis of Lucian's presentation of material from the biographical traditions about Homer as man and poet, a topic which has been less studied but which leads to consideration of the role played by Homer both in Lucian's reflections on truth and lying and in the examination, by this Greek-speaking Syrian, of cultural relations between Greeks and non-Greeks in the cosmopolitan Mediterranean world of the second century.

Acknowledgements

I first read Lucian in Turner's *Penguin Classics* translation at school, little suspecting that these delightful works would provide material for a doctoral thesis two decades later. To my teachers there I am indebted for introducing me to Latin and Greek, and in particular for my first experience of reading the *Iliad*. Thanks are also due to those who taught me Greek and Latin literature in Oxford — Peter Brown, Debra Hershkowitz, Michael Inwood, Gregory Hutchinson and especially the late Michael Comber, an exceptional man still much missed by his former students.

The Department of Classics at Nottingham has been a wonderful place of work for me for more than a dozen years; I owe special thanks to those of its staff and students who have read, listened to and commented on earlier incarnations of parts of this thesis and its *parerga*. In particular, my supervisors Judith Mossman and Patrick Finglass pointed me in many fruitful directions as well as saving me from errors, inelegancies and verbosities. The undergraduate, graduate, adult-education and school students whom I have taught, at Nottingham and elsewhere, have continually prompted me to reassess my ideas about the Greco-Roman world, its literature and languages.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 — Lucian's Homer and Homer's Lucian: two epigrams

> τὸ δὲ συμπόσιον ἔξω τῆς πόλεως πεποίηνται ἐν τῷ
> Ἠλυσίῳ καλουμένῳ πεδίῳ. … ᾄδεται δὲ αὐτοῖς τὰ
> Ὁμήρου ἔπη μάλιστα· καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ πάρεστι καὶ
> συνευωχεῖται αὐτοῖς ὑπὲρ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα κατακείμενος.
>
> They make their *symposium* outside the city, on the so-
> called Elysian Plain. … They sing the epics of Homer
> above all; he is there himself and feasts together with
> them, reclining in the place above Odysseus.[1]

The world to which Lucian transports his readers is a mixture of times and places,
from the realities of his own age and the Athenian glory days of the sixth and fifth
centuries BC to such extraordinary timeless and mythical locations as the rhetorical
'Sophistopolis',[2] the Underworld, and the Elysian Fields of *VH*, where Homer is able
to share with his own characters in the appreciation of his poetry. As Lucian self-
deprecatingly observes, the literary influences on this conceptual world are equally

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1.   *VH* 2.14-15. To avoid confusion I consistently refer to Lucian's works by a single Latin
title, as indicated in the bibliography.

2.   The fictional city-state afflicted with convoluted legal cases in which sophistic
declaimers imagine themselves to be speaking; it was memorably given this name and
explored in Russell (1983), esp. ch.2.

wide-ranging, so that he unexpectedly brings together disparate authors and genres (such as comedy and dialogue) in novel ways, earning him the appellation of 'a literary Prometheus'.[3] Yet by far the most significant author, in terms of both the number of explicit mentions and the amount of subject-matter he provides, is Homer — as concisely encapsulated in the index to MacLeod's Oxford Classical Text: 'Homerus ubique'.[4]

To begin my study of this use of Homer and to demonstrate how it can offer fresh insights, let us consider a pair of epigrams, on the subject of Lucian himself, which draw attention to his intertextual connections with Homer. They illustrate how not only the texts of the Homeric poems but also the 'facts' of the poet's life are integral to Lucian's work and can set the reader off down fruitful hermeneutic avenues.

The first poem, prefixed to *Cataplus* in some manuscripts, is also quoted by Photius.[5]

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3.   *Prometheus es*; the English title 'A Literary Prometheus' appears in Fowler & Fowler (1905: 7-11). At *Bis accusatus* 33, Dialogue complains of being joined with jesting, iambus, Cynicism, Eupolis, Aristophanes and Menippus.

4.   MacLeod (1987: 494, s.v. 'Homerus'). Householder (1941: Appendix I) identifies 488 instances, making up 41% of Lucian's total quotations, allusions and reminiscences from literary texts. Advertising his edition of selected dialogues, Leedes (1678: *ad Lectorem*) writes: 'Passages in Homer, with which our laughing author often plays, are invoked' ('loci in *Homero*, quibus non semel alludit ridibundus Autor, indigitantur').

5.   *Bibliotheca* 128 (96b). Rabe (1906) transfers it to the beginning of his text of the

Λουκιανὸς τάδ᾿ ἔγραψα παλαιά τε μωρά τε εἰδώς,
     μωρὰ γὰρ ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα σοφά.
κοὐδὲν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι διακριδόν ἐστι νόημα,
     ἀλλ᾿ ὃ σὺ θαυμάζεις, τοῦθ᾿ ἑτέροισι γέλως.

These things I, Lucian, wrote knowing both ancient and foolish things; for even things which seem wise to humans are foolish. And there is precisely no understanding among humans, but the same thing which you marvel at is a source of laughter for others.

This epigram might be by Lucian himself, or might be the work of an anonymous later writer.[6] Whoever composed it not only knew their Homer but also parodied him, since in the first line the phrase παλαιά τε μωρά τε εἰδώς adapts παλαιά τε πολλά τε εἰδώς ('knowing many ancient things'), which introduces Echeneus at *Od.* 7.157 and describes Nestor at *Od.* 24.51; these are two of the Homeric poems' most venerable and authoritative characters. Its application here to an author who, by contrast, might seem scurrilous (and apparently unworthy of inclusion as a 'proper'

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scholia.

6.   The manuscripts' vacillation between ἔγραψα and ἔγραψε implies nothing, since Lucian could have written of himself in either the first or third person. See further Baldwin (1975: 319-20), and Macleod (1967: 523): 'Some of these [epigrams] are without doubt the work of others; but those who reject all fifty-three as non-Lucianic are perhaps going too far, as at least a few are not un-Lucianic in the style and thought' and (1967: ix), with rather too much certainty on this poem: 'the epigram "*On His Own Book*" [is] certainly not by Lucian'. On this issue, and on the second epigram I discuss here, see Bowie (1989: 251-4); both poems are also discussed by ní Mheallaigh (2014: 179-81 & 176).

sophist among Philostratus' biographies[7]) plays on the ambiguity in the idea of 'knowing μωρά'. Lucian's work itself, in all its surface frivolity and especially in its treatment of myth, might appear 'foolish'; but the second line reveals that things are not so simple, since the line between mortals' stupidity and wisdom is a thin one, and perhaps does not exist at all. It is therefore significant that a similar phrase is used to describe Thersites, Homer's proto-satirist, who 'knew many disorderly things' (ἄκοσμά τε πολλά τε ᾔδη),[8] and that Lucian could be said to 'know' μωρά in the sense of satirizing the stupidities of mortals which he sees around him. Furthermore, the rare adverb διακριδόν in line 3 recalls the word's appearance in *Il.* 15.100-12,[9] where Hera laughs at the gods' own foolishness as she criticizes Zeus (107-8) for believing himself 'to be eminently the best among the immortal gods in might and strength' (ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι | κάρτεΐ τε σθένεΐ τε διακριδὸν εἶναι ἄριστος).

So this epigram's author has appreciated that an association of Lucian with formulaic phrases from Homer is particularly appropriate, since Homeric quotation,

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7.   Anderson (1986: 87-8) discusses the explanations advanced for Lucian's exclusion. Eunapius (454) does at least mention Lucian, as 'a man serious about raising a laugh' (ἀνὴρ σπουδαῖος ἐς τὸ γελασθῆναι).

8.   *Il.* 2.213. See also fr.3 West (= fr.2 Gostoli) of the 'comic epic' *Margites*, which plays with expectations about this diction when describing its stupid hero: πόλλ᾽ ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακῶς δ᾽ ἠπίστατο πάντα ('He knew many deeds and knew them all badly').

9.   It appears in only one other line of Homer, again with the line-end εἶναι ἄριστ(ος): *Il.* 12.103: οἳ γάρ οἱ εἴσαντο διακριδὸν εἶναι ἄριστοι (sc. Glaucus and Asteropaeus).

allusion and parody are found repeatedly in almost every work in the Lucianic corpus. The author also uses the original Homeric contexts to make a point about the nature of Lucian's intellectual project: the Homeric original of the first phrase, describing Echeneus, humorously draws attention to Lucian's broadly Cynic view of the world, since the supposedly wise Echeneus swallows the outlandish stories told by Odysseus to the Phaeacians.[10] But Lucian boasts, in the opening sections of *VH*, of being superior to the Phaeacians in his ability to see through these same tales. Hera too claims that she can see through Zeus and laughs at her fellow immortals' foolishness.

Likewise the Lucian of the epigram knows that the ancient myths he writes about are μωρά, and that mere antiquity is no guarantee of worth, despite claims, such as that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus that Homer is 'most credible and most ancient of witnesses' (μαρτύρων ἀξιοπιστότατός τε καὶ ἀρχαιότατος), which imply that credibility and antiquity go naturally together.[11] Lucian continually subverts assumptions that Homer is a source of ancient wisdom, by putting his words to humorous and incongruous use in a way that draws on the tradition of comic parody. Yet the epigram almost seems to turn this technique even on Lucian

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10.   See Parry (1994).

11.   *Ant. Rom.* 7.72.3, discussed with other 'historical criticism of Homer' by Kim (2010: 24-7).

himself, in a kind of parodic Cretan liar paradox: since he too is a mere mortal, how can we be sure that his own ideas of 'wise things' are not also 'foolish'?[12]

There is a second epigram involving Homer and Lucian, which has (at least *prima facie*) the best possible credentials. For in the second book of *VH*, Lucian (or rather the internal narrator who eventually turns out to go by the name 'Lucian') meets the shade of Homer himself in the Isles of the Blessed. At 2.28 the Lucian-narrator sets up an inscription, comprising two hexameters, to memorialize his own visit:

> Λουκιανὸς τάδε πάντα φίλος μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν
> εἶδέ τε καὶ πάλιν ἦλθε φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν.
>
> Lucian, dear to the blessed gods, saw all these things
> and went back to his dear native land.

However, his perennial debt to Homer here goes one step further, since 'even Lucian's supposedly autobiographical inscription is actually authored by Homer',[13] in a form of (quite literal) ghost-writing which marks 'a disintegration of the boundary between the two voices [sc. of 'author' and 'narrator'] similar to what happens in books 9-12 of the *Odyssey*'.[14] Goldhill takes this further, making this

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12.   Lies and truth are a major Lucianic theme, and Odysseus himself is the archetypal 'Cretan' liar in his repeated attempts to remain incognito by claiming to be a Cretan (as, e.g., in the story he tells Eumaeus at *Od.* 14.165-234). On the theme of, and sources for, Cretan mendacity, see McLennan (1977: 35-6). On Lucian's self-ridicule in *Icaromenippus* see Halliwell (2008: 430-1).

13.   ní Mheallaigh (2009: 22-3).

14.   Georgiadou & Larmour (1998: 3). On Lucian's narrators see Whitmarsh (2004).

'trashy pastiche' of the *Odyssey*'s opening lines a neat summary of Lucian's attitude to his own work and identity:[15]

> That Lucian immortalizes his name thus in a third-rate epigram by a fictionalized and untrustworthy poet on a monument in an unseeable afterlife, recorded in a work which boasts of its own falsehood, neatly summarizes Lucian's oblique and funny stance towards proclaiming and preserving the glory of his name.[16]

In this epigram Homer characterizes Lucian with reminiscences of the Homeric Odysseus (who also ventured into the afterlife while still alive), not only by borrowing virtually unaltered, from his own epics, the phrases φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν[17] and φίλος μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν,[18] but also in the twin themes of seeing strange

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15.   That Homer should compose an epitaph in hexameters, rather than the more common elegiac couplet, is an acknowledgement of his special area of expertise but perhaps also a dig at his generic limitations: if the lines are 'trashy' this is because Homer is writing in the 'wrong' genre. A decision is hard to reach, however, since we have no evidence for Lucian's view of the hexameter-iambic combination of the humorous *Margites* attributed to Homer (cf. Arist., *Poet.* 1448b24), which, perhaps surprisingly, he mentions nowhere.

16.   Goldhill (2002: 65). The poem also parodies tourists' often inept commemorative epigrams, such as 'the bizarre collection', including those of Julia Balbilla, on the statue of Memnon, as Bowie (1990: 61) observes, noting in particular (65) the hexameter poem made up of Homeric phrases (Bernand & Bernand (1960: 111-13)).

17.   Although the phrase appears more often in the *Iliad* (16 times, e.g., *Il.* 9.27 (Agamemnon, of the Achaean army) and 9.414 (Achilles, of himself)) than in the *Odyssey* (13 times), it is used almost always of Odysseus' return home in the *Odyssey* — see, e.g., *Od.* 5.37, 19.290, 19.298, 23.339. The exception is 15.65, where it is used of Telemachus.

18.   Used (only) of Odysseus' return home (in the neuter) at *Od.* 1.82-3.

places and *nostos*, which both appear in the *Odyssey*'s opening lines.[19] Kim draws attention to the way that Homer's composition of the epigram 'literally inscribed [Lucian] into Homer's poetic world', at the same time as producing a poem which the passer-by would assume was written by the Lucianic narrator himself.[20]

As the quotations above have shown, the Homeric echoes, and the implications of the identification of 'Lucian' and Odysseus which are implied by these phrases, have become a key part of the interpretation of *VH* as a whole, making this one of the most-discussed portions of Lucian's oeuvre, in what John Henderson is able to call (albeit with a little exaggeration) 'the True Histories monopoly'.[21]

However, there are three further features which add to this epigram's complexities. First, it is inscribed on a 'pillar of beryl' (στήλην βηρύλλου). This is a deliberately fanciful choice of material — rather as Lucian supplements the Homeric

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19.   πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα (1.3); ἀρνύμενος ἥν τε ψυχὴν καὶ νόστον ἑταίρων (1.5). On 'Lucian' as an Odysseus-figure (a 'zweiter Odysseus') here, see von Möllendorff (2000a: 412-25). For the belated revelation of the narrator's name as a reminiscence of *Od.* 9.19, when Odysseus is forced to reveal his identity to the Phaeacians, see Georgiadou & Larmour (1988: 212-3); they also discuss how epigram's funerary associations make it especially appropriate to the afterlife setting of this episode. For the significance of naming, in both epigrams presented here, see ní Mheallaigh (2010: 121-32, esp. 128-32). On such metaleptic play in *VH* and other texts, see Whitmarsh (2013: ch.4).

20.   Kim (2010: 172-3).

21.   Henderson (2010).

gates of ivory and horn[22] with two more, of the less impressive iron and earthenware, in *VH* 2.33. But there is still a purpose behind this choice, because Pliny the Elder singles out *berullus* as especially likely to be counterfeit:

> *Indi et alias quidem gemmas crystallum tinguendo adul-*
> *terare invenerunt, sed praecipue berullos.*[23]

> The Indians have discovered how to fake gems — and
> especially beryl — by dyeing rock crystal.

Thus the reader is confronted with the questions: Has the narrator been taken in by fake beryl? If the material on which a poem is physically inscribed is fake, what should one make of the poem itself? Is the pillar also pretending to be something it is not?[24] As Georgiadou & Larmour observe, the material of which Homer's gate of ivory is made was often believed to imply deception (ἐλέφας / ἐλεφαίρομαι);[25] Lucian is taking the idea of 'deceptive' materials in a slightly different direction. And what about the pillar's size? A big pillar is appropriate for a poet of big epics, but, regardless of its size, the (genuine or fake) gemstone of which the pillar is made seems especially appropriate to short epigrams such as Posidippus' *lithika*, so that

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22.   *Od.* 19.560-7.

23.   Plin., *HN* 37.79. On beryl in Pliny, and the contemporary prevalence of forged beryl, see Healy (1999: 202-3). On staining of rock crystal to imitate precious stones, Caley & Richards (1956: 97-8).

24.   This also fits with the general sense of hyperreality in *VH*, as discussed by ní Mheallaigh (2014: ch.6).

25.   Georgiadou & Larmour (219). Russo writes (Russo/Fernández-Galliano/Heubeck: 103) that the 'etymologizing connection … is probably intended by the poet'.

the pillar with its Homeric distich seems to instantiate the genre-confusion of the epic poet writing epigram.[26] As Squire has recently discussed in connection with the diminutive *Tabulae Iliacae*, incredible stories about the literal miniaturization of epic — through writing the whole text of the *Iliad* on parchment small enough to fit inside a nutshell, or else by engraving either the text of Homer's ἔπη or an abridged epigram-version, on a sesame seed — seem to have been of particular fascination in Lucian's era:

> The fact that Homer is the subject of such miniaturizing zeal is in and of itself significant. It is not just *any* text that ancient miniaturists like Callicrates and Myrmecides chose to synopsize. Their fragile little objects engage with the biggest and weightiest of all literary genres.[27]

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26.   'The jewels are metaphors for the poems and the poems are metaphors for the jewels,' in the formulation of Fuqua (2007: 291). On the delicacy of carving on very small gems see especially Posidippus AB 15; and on the connections of the *lithika* to Pliny and Theophrastus, Smith (2004). For suggesting the relevance of Posidippus here I am indebted to Richard Rawles. See too Cyrillus' opinion (*AP* 9.369): πάγκαλόν ἐστ' ἐπίγραμμα τὸ δίστιχον· ἢν δὲ παρέλθῃς | τοὺς τρεῖς, ῥαψῳδεῖς κοὐκ ἐπίγραμμα λέγεις ('A distich is an excellent epigram; but if you go beyond three lines, it's epic you're reciting, not epigram').

27.   Squire (2011: 8). He cites Plin., *HN* 7.85 (himself citing Cicero), Plut., *Comm. not.* 1083d-e and Ael., *VH* 1.17; he also discusses Martial's condensation (14.184) of the Homeric poems into an elegiac distich (2011: 279-83). In Aelian's version, what was inscribed was not the entire text of the epic but a condensed version in the form of what Squire calls (2011: 2) 'a light-footed epigrammatic distich'. Squire also notes (2011: 2 n.4) that what is meant by Plutarch's mention of Homer's ἔπη ('epic poems' / 'stories' / 'words'?) seems to be 'left inherently vague'. In the context of Lucianic *spoudaiogeloion*, note Aelian's view that such things are 'a waste of time' (χρόνου παρανάλωμα) not deserving of 'a serious-minded

Secondly, this pillar recalls the earlier pillar of bronze in 1.7, which bears an inscription commemorating the furthest point reached by Heracles and Dionysus.[28] The narrator discovers that the pillar bears an engraved text in 'faint and worn' (ἀμυδροῖς … καὶ ἐκτετριμμένοις) Greek letters:

> ἄχρι τούτων Ἡρακλῆς καὶ Διόνυσος ἀφίκοντο.
> Heracles and Dionysus reached this far.

The mortal Lucian-narrator has improved on these immortals' journey far into the unknown by crossing the very boundary between life and death. His achievement warrants a two-line poetic acknowledgement from Homer, while they have only a single, functional line of prose which they presumably wrote themselves. Or is it prose? In view of the second epigram, the reader might view this first inscription as an atrocious attempt by the two gods (or a local artisan) at writing a hexameter monostich: its beginning and end are reasonably metrical, but the name of Dionysus in particular is quite clearly not in a metrical position, even though both Heracles' and Dionysus' names could fit into a hexameter. Such metrical ineptitude is far from unknown in real-life epigraphic hexameters, especially those found, like this one, on the fringes of the Greek world:

> The metre is in some cases tolerably correct … ; in
> others it is crude in the extreme, and it is hard to

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person's approval' (ὁ σπουδαῖος οὐδέτερον ἐπαινέσεσται).

28.   On this episode see now ní Mheallaigh (2014: 209-10). Von Möllendorff (2009: 164-5) observes that the existence of such an inscription is *a priori* unlikely, since Heracles visited the westernmost, Dionysus the easternmost edge of the earth.

discover on what system, if any, the engraver has proceeded.[29]

As Petrie observes, parts of such inscriptions might be taken from a standard model-book, with names and other details left to be filled in by stonecutters with limited metrical skill. So the inscription of Heracles and Dionysus has the Homeric line-end ἀφίκοντο,[30] while ἄχρι would be a metrically acceptable opening word. Where Lucian's line becomes unmetrical it is when the actual details ('up to *this* point' and the two names) must be fitted in. Furthermore, dubious metre is not unknown in the compositions of characters elsewhere in Lucian.[31]

Any reader who is tempted by this interpretation on seeing the ending and length of this line[32] might feel that their conjecture is confirmed by the hexametric

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29. Petrie (1906: 133-4).

30. *Il.* 11.617, 21.208, 24.329 & 448; *Od.* 14.344, 17.205.

31. Discussed in Anderson (1976c). For another inscription left by Dionysus, again with a hexameterish ending, see *DDS* 16, with Lightfoot (2003: 367-8).

32. My own first reaction on seeing an epigraphic line of plausibly hexameter-length is to scan it for confirmation. The final syllable of Dionysus' name could acceptably be lengthened, being an -ος ending in arsis, which would yield two-and-a-half feet. To give an approximate modern comparandum, readers of William McGonagall know they are reading verse, since, despite his woeful scansion, there remains enough suggestion of poetic diction and rhyme. Indeed, there is great (albeit presumably unconscious) skill in his so consistently making these poems teeter on the brink without ever quite falling over, and it is perhaps this has contributed to his poetry's survival in the popular imagination when most other doggerel has been forgotten. For brief but sensible analysis of these aspects of McGonagall see Hunt (2006: v-xv).

inscription from a more competent poet in 2.28. Furthermore, it is at least suggestive of Homeric presence in this episode that the footprint which also provides evidence for Heracles' and Dionysus' feat (and indeed their feet) recalls how gods are particularly liable to being recognised from their footprints in Homer — so much so that Hermes even makes careful attempts to frustrate such recognition in *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* 342-53.[33]

Finally, the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod* recounts that during his own wanderings Homer composed dedicatory hexameter epigrams to order, among which was his own funerary inscription,[34] so Lucian's Homer is writing a kind of 'funerary' epigram to mark a departure from, not arrival in, the realm of the dead. Again, boundaries between living and dead, between departure and arrival, and between the genres of 'trashy' touristic graffiti and higher-quality literary epigram/ epitaph, are being elided. So Lucian is showing his familiarity with the biographical tradition concerning Homer, which he parodies, indeed ridicules, in other parts of

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33.   e.g. Poseidon at *Il.* 13.68-75. On this phenomenon see Vergados (2011: 83-4) and, for a list of passages, Janko (1994: 52). Georgiadou & Larmour (1988: 72) do not mention the Homeric passages, but present evidence for real-life 'footprints' of gods — esp. Hdt. 4.82, which Lucian probably also alludes to here: see further ní Mheallaigh (2008: 419-22) and Asheri/Lloyd/Corcella (2007: 641). Herodotus also claims (2.44.2) to have seen two ancient *stelai* in the temple of Heracles at Tyre, discussed by Whitmarsh (2013: 59-60), in the context of Euhemerus' *Sacred Inscription* and its 'fictionality'.

34.   *Certamen* 15 & 18; opinion on his authorship of his epitaph was divided, with the ps.-Herodotean *Vita* 36 and Hesychius' *Vita* 7 explicitly stating that the attribution to Homer was erroneous.

this account of their meeting, when Homer turns out not to be blind and claims to be a Babylonian originally named Tigranes.[35]

The cultural cross-fertilization implied by Homer's self-proclaimed Babylonian origins is not merely a humorous flight of whimsy, but it raises significant questions in the work of a Syrian author writing in a Greek cultural tradition under the Roman empire.[36] These are questions which have been much discussed in the re-examinations of imperial Greek literature over the past few decades,[37] while recent years have also seen reassessments of the place of laughter in Greek and Roman culture,[38] so this is a good moment to reconsider Lucian's humorous readings of the ultimate symbol of Greek *paideia*.

Similar questions are the subject of W.H. Auden's meditation in a 1946 essay on Henry James: in the modern world how ought one best to negotiate old cultural traditions against a backdrop of radically changed global politics? Writing in the

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35.   *VH* 2.20. Graziosi (2002: 128) writes: 'Given the tone of the whole passage, I think we would be justified in inferring that Homer's normal eyesight was meant to be as surprising and implausible as his Babylonian origin, or his "real" name Tigranes.'

36.   On this see especially ch.4 below.

37.   See in particular Swain (1996); Schmitz (1997); Goldhill (2001a); Whitmarsh (2001); Konstan & Saïd (2006); and Richter (2011). On Lucian's cultural contexts see now Bozia (2015), which appeared too late for me to take further account of it.

38.   Halliwell (2008); and Beard (2014), who writes (139): 'Laughter stood (or was imagined to stand) at the interfaces of power.' On 'le rire des anciens' see too Trédé & Hoffmann (1998).

year when he received US citizenship, this Englishman was clearly intrigued by the effects of dealing with a different literary culture, but here he expresses a view which represents the exact converse of Lucian's humorous response to his changed world:

> The task of overcoming mediocrity, that is, of learning to possess instead of being possessed, is thus different in each case, for the American has to make the Present *his* present, and the European the Past *his* past. There are two ways of taking possession of the Present: one is with the help of the Comic or Ironic spirit. Hence the superiority of American (and Yiddish) humor. The other way is to choose a Past, i.e., to go physically or in the spirit to Europe.[39]

In Lucian's case, in the (Syro-)Graeco-Roman context of the second century AD, this is a false dichotomy. For Lucian the 'Comic or Ironic spirit' identified by Auden as a means of 'taking possession of the Present' actually goes hand-in-hand with 'choos[ing] a Past' by going in spirit to the glories of Greek culture most clearly represented by Homer, and then, by means of playful and imaginative reinvention, creating from his text, and from nearly a millennium of Homeric 'cultural capital'[40] with which he is fully engaged, a fresh perspective on Greek literary culture. The

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39. Auden (1962: 321). On Auden's US citizenship see Carpenter (1981: 339).

40. The term is that of Bourdieu (1977); for its application to the Greek novel see Whitmarsh (2008), and, on 'symbolic capital', Whitmarsh (2001a: 19) and Schmitz (1997: 26-31).

themes we have identified in these two short poems therefore lie at the heart of my analysis of Lucian's use of Homer.[41]

1.2 — Receptions of Homer in antiquity

> σύ μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Μίκυλλε, κομιδῇ ἀπαίδευτος εἶναι
> μηδὲ ἀνεγνωκέναι τὰ Ὁμήρου ποιήματα.
>
> It seems to me, Micyllus, that you're altogether uneducated and haven't read the poems of Homer.[42]

It is not just interest in the 'Second Sophistic' itself which has seen a resurgence in the past few decades; there has also been a growth of research into the (approximately) eight centuries of Homeric reception which separate Homer from Lucian.[43] Scholars have drawn attention, in one way or another, to connections between ancient thought about the interpretation of Homer and themes of modern literary criticism.[44] These connections had previously received little attention, as

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41.   In Appendix 2 I discuss a further epigram which might be relevant.

42.   The cock addressing Micyllus in *Somnium (Gallus)* 2.

43.   See Lamberton & Keaney (1992); Graziosi & Haubold (2005); and, on (principally) the Homeric scholia, Nünlist (2009a).

44.   Whitlock Blundell (2004) on Lamberton & Keaney (1992): 'An intriguing aspect of this book as a whole is the various more or less explicit foreshadowings it offers of contemporary theoretical issues and debates.' See too Kennedy (1989), and Nünlist (2009b). Likewise ní Mheallaigh (2014: xi) speaks of Lucian's own postclassical 'literary-theoretical interests and his work's affinity with postmodern ideas'.

indeed had the ancient reception of Homer in general. Lamberton has recently written:

> It is rather surprising that the project of a history of the reception and interpretation of Homer in antiquity began to be realized only in the latter part of the twentieth century, encouraged by the widespread interest in reception theory and the history of reception that emerged at that time.[45]

Graziosi has examined the emergence of the ancient biographical traditions about Homer, with which Lucian plays so effectively and amusingly in *VH*, while Graziosi & Haubold emphasize the importance of understanding the biographical traditions: 'Altogether we may make more progress by asking why Homer was thought to be blind, rather than worrying about whether we think he really was'.[46] The questions of truth, deception and lying raised by that Lucianic meeting with Homer are not only fundamental to much of Lucian's own work[47] but also have a special association with Homer among other ancient readers. Bowersock has examined Lucian's *VH* alongside other works (principally Celsus' similarly titled *A True Discourse*, as discussed by Origen[48]) to trace Homer's centrality in such

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45.   Lamberton (2012).

46.   Graziosi (2002); Graziosi & Haubold (2005: 22).

47.   See Georgiadou & Larmour (1998: 1-4).

48.   Whether this is the Celsus to whom *Alexander* is addressed is a vexed question: the scholia (Rabe (1906: 180)) think so, but on what basis is unclear. For the modern debate see Victor (1997: 132), and, on the view that Celsus' work influenced Lucian, Mitchell (2007: 232-5).

discourse.[49] These themes excited particular interest among Greek writers of the imperial period, with several pieces by Dio in particular showing a keen interest in readings of Homer and the cultural significance and relative worth of his work.[50]

Alongside such concerns there was a further venerable tradition of making Homer appear to say things he never said, or rather to present things as though they were Homeric, through the parodying of his style and of scenes from his epics.[51] A focus of the following two sections will be how Lucian's use of Homer relates to the ancient understanding of parody, including the questions of how exactly we should define 'parody' in Lucian's case, and whether 'parody' (or other critical terms) can be felt to fully encapsulate the relation of Lucian to Homer.

In order to prepare for such a discussion, it is important to understand how the modern scholarly understanding of the mechanics of Lucian's borrowings evolved, so I first trace the approaches which modern analysts have developed.

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49.   Bowersock (1994: ch.1). On lies and fiction more generally see Gill & Wiseman (1993).

50.   See Kim (2010). Discussion of Homer's deployment in other authors can be found in Kindstrand (1973). For detail on Dio's *Borystheniticus*, see the commentary in Russell (1992); on *Chryseis* see Kim (2008); and on *Troicus*, Kim (2010: ch.4) and Hunter (2009). On inscriptions describing contemporary figures with such phrases as νέος Ὅμηρος see Schmitz (1997: 46 n.25).

51.   So Hall (1981: 78) speaks in particular of the 'Cynic fondness for Homeric quotation and parody' and the likelihood that Menippus' *Nekuia* was a parodic version of Odysseus' descent to the Underworld in *Od.* 11.

1.3 — Modern systematic analyses of Lucian's Homer

> Misquotation is, in fact, the pride and privilege of the
> learned. A widely-read man never quotes accurately,
> for the rather obvious reason that he has read too
> widely.[52]

The principal aims of this thesis are to examine as many places as possible where

Lucian shows off his reading by quoting, misquoting, parodying and alluding to

Homer, and to produce the kinds of analysis which have been applied to the

epigrams in §1.1 above. Some texts, in particular *VH*, have received a fair amount of

scholarly attention, so I have taken pains to examine works which have been much

less discussed, particularly in relation to their use of Homer. I cover a

representative cross-section and do not pretend to be attempting a comprehensive

discussion of every relevant passage. In this section and the next I explain why such

an approach makes sense and how it complements and builds upon earlier work on

the subject.

Previous studies on Lucian's use of Homer have aimed to collect every

reference, and to discuss the different methods which he employs in order to

incorporate them into his own work. This procedure resulted in two thorough

compilations of material — especially useful in the days before searchable digitized

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52.   Pearson (1934: 9), widely (and accurately) quoted: e.g. Knowles (2006: v).

texts — by Householder and Bouquiaux-Simon.[53] They nonetheless seem a little disappointing from the 21st-century point of view, as their interest is generally in the creation of lists and tables, and in the contruction of a taxonomy of different kinds of quotation and allusion,[54] so that they do not engage in much depth with the significance of Lucian's careful selection, mischievous presentation and deliberate misquotation of the Homeric material. Bouquiaux-Simon's arrangement of her material around key passages of Homer rather than passages of Lucian betrays that her interest, like Householder's, lies principally in what passages Lucian used, rather than in how Homer has been dynamically repurposed by Lucian in the course of creating new works. I discuss her own methodological manifesto below, explaining why analysis of Lucian's borrowings is best undertaken by giving special attention to the wider Lucianic context in which they appear and also by considering the context of the Homeric original. So in this section I outline how these earlier readers of Lucian's Homeric references approached their task, before I consider how we can build on this work to begin answering more fully not only their implied question 'What has Lucian done?' but also the supplementary question 'What is the effect of this?' which follows naturally from it but was rather more tangential to their projects.

A key concern of both Householder and Bouquiaux-Simon was to categorize each reference to Homer under such headings as 'Quotation', 'Allusion' and

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53.   Householder (1941); Bouquiaux-Simon (1968).

54.   Goldhill (2010): 'classicists have always loved formalist taxonomies'.

'Reminiscence', which are Householder's main categories, to which he appends the annotation 'parody' for those references which seem to involve parody.[55] Bouquiaux-Simon's more detailed analysis follows a similar procedure, most clearly set out in her Table 4.[56] The three principal headings there are 'citations textuelles', 'adaptations' and 'emprunts secondaires': this third heading is further subdivided into three types — 'allusions', 'paraphrases', and 'résumés'.

The use of such categories can be traced back to a *dissertatio inauguralis* of 1872, Ziegeler's *De Luciano poetarum judice et imitatore*, the published portion of which forms the second half of a dissertation on Lucian's use of poetry.[57] His procedure offers a taxonomic analysis of Lucian's approaches to the deployment of Homeric material, and therefore initiates the tradition of arranging the references into discrete categories, which I believe to be fundamentally unhelpful, since it focuses on *Quellenforschung* at the expense of considering the effect on the reader of an

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55.   Householder (1941: xi). He applies this principle to all authors referred to by Lucian.

56.   Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 389-411).

57.   Ziegeler (1872). His preface states that the published version omits the first part, in which he discussed Lucian's opinion of poetry as a whole, but that it does cover Lucian's opinions on individual poets and his use of quotations from them 'ad scripta sua condecoranda'. A work of only 51 pages, it proceeds at a canter, covering the whole of Greek epic in just five pages (7-11). There are two other roughly contemporary works, of less interest, which I follow Bouquiaux-Simon in not discussing further: Brambs (1888) and Buchwald (1874).

awareness of the presence of quotation, and the use of the Homeric context to invite further reflection from the reader.

Ziegeler first establishes that Lucian admired Homer for wisdom and *gravitas*, and concludes that Lucian had little time for scholarly questions about him. He further concludes that, although Lucian considered Homer and Hesiod to be great poets, he disapproved of the subject matter of their poems.[58] But it is in Ziegeler's appendices that the real interest lies. They offer a list of Lucian's Homeric references under three headings reflecting the degree of faithfulness to the original: 'Homeric passages cited by Lucian with metre intact' ('loci Homerici a Luciani *metro servato* citati'); 'Homeric passages cited by Lucian in a prose form' ('loci Homerici a Luciano *metro soluto* citati'); and 'Homeric verses twisted by Lucian into parodies' ('versus Homerici a Luciano in *parodias* detorti').[59] From these lists Ziegeler offers a very brief conclusion, offering some general observations, again in three parts:

1.   Lucian borrows both whole lines and individual words from Homer.

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58.   'Hoc igitur semper tenendum, Lucianum, ubicumque Homerum Hesiodumque castiget, nil de laudibus eorum poeticis detrahere, sed fabularum, quas praebeat Homerus, fidei sese opponere.' (10). See also Kim (2010: 140-1): 'Homer, naturally, is an essential element of Lucian's repertory, both as a source of quotations and examples, but also as the object of his ridicule. ... When he criticizes Homer explicitly, Lucian takes the standard Platonic line of censuring the morally questionable deeds the poet attributed to the gods ... or challenges ... Homer's supposed knowledge of divine affairs'.

59.   My emphases.

2. He either a) uses these lines 'to illustrate and ornament his speech' ('ad sermonem illustrandum atque condecorandum'), with or without preservation of the metre, or else b) turns them into parodies which are either 'simplices' or 'stitched together from several lines' ('ex compluribus versibus consutas') — i.e. a cento.

3. He uses the *Iliad* much more often than the *Odyssey*.[60]

Ziegeler's discussion of the question is not without problems: for instance, Bouquiaux-Simon rightly objects to his illogical tripartite division of the quotations, 'la parodie pouvant s'exercer sur tous les emprunts homériques'.[61] Perhaps because of the extreme brevity of his discussion, Ziegeler appears to have oversimplified his categories.

By adapting this procedure, Householder and Bouquiaux-Simon were able to produce more helpful tables indicating the precise extent of Lucian's debt to Homer, yet both scholars acknowledge that deciding where to draw the line between such categories can be hard. So Householder writes:

> The best classification of a passage is often difficult to determine, especially as Lucian frequently mingles direct quotation with loose paraphrase. Therefore

60. Ziegeler (1872: 51).

61. Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 56). This is an important point to which I return later in this introduction.

some passages indexed as quotation will have paraphrases of nearby lines in the immediate context.[62]

He divides his material into three classes, which do not correspond to Ziegeler's three:

quotation, which includes also close paraphrase and parody; allusion, which includes all recognizable references to passages or works of any author; and reminiscence, by which is meant the use of statements, opinions, words, phrases, or other matter which may be confidently supposed to be derived from a particular writer.[63]

As it relates to Homer, this procedure differs from Ziegeler's since it combines, under a single heading, quotation with the metre intact, 'close paraphrase' (which includes passages where the metre has not been conserved), and parody (including cento). It introduces the two categories of 'allusion' and 'reminiscence' which are more subjective and can lead to difficulty in the description of passages, as he acknowledges. Identifying a reminiscence can also be tricky: in a table such as Householder's it is not easy to discuss the likelihood that a

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62. Householder (1941: xii).

63. Householder (1941: xi).

passage is consciously or deliberately recalling Homer,[64] or indeed to assess whether it was included for any special purpose or simply as a sophist's rhetorical reflex.[65] As Julian Barnes' Geoffrey Braithwaite asks, 'How submerged does a reference have to be before it drowns?'[66]

This is reflected in Bouquiaux-Simon's ambivalence about such things as Lucian's use of Homeric epithets: 'Tout ceci prouve à quel point notre auteur, imprégné d'Homère, exploite spontanément sa source héroïque.'[67] How many English speakers, even in the days when the King James Bible was more familiar, were consciously aware that many everyday phrases derived from it? And if they were, could they give chapter and verse — for example, 'the powers that be' from

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64.   As I argue at various points below, the identification of whole scenes or passages which recall Homeric scenes or passages requires one to venture beyond the local context of one or two Homeric words in Lucian; in a table one can note the source of those words but one is less able to explain the extent of their significance in the wider context of the Lucianic text.

65.   In connection with *Icaromenippus*, Henderson (2010) writes of 'the heavy interlarding with sometimes telling, sometimes autopilot Homeric quotations, tags, and wordage'.

66.   Barnes (2009 [1984]: 17). In a pair of short notes, MacLeod (1974) and Baldwin (1977) use such vocabulary as 'echoes', 'parodying', and 'modelled' to describe what happens with passages of Theophrastus which Householder does not list but with which Lucian shows familiarity.

67.   Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 12). On the special difficulties of dealing with epithets, see my discussion of *Dearum iudicium* in §1.4 below.

Romans 13.1?[68] At the other extreme, a reader of an author so full of (self-)conscious allusion as P.G. Wodehouse can be fairly sure that anything sounding vaguely like an allusion is so intended, even if the source is not immediately identifiable. So the narratorial voice's parodic allusion to Shakespeare when Wodehouse writes 'the necessity of drinking his courage to the sticking-point'[69] constructs an audience which can easily recognise it, but the phrase's very oddity of expression is likely to alert even a less widely-read reader to its literary origins.[70] As Camerotto puts it in his study of Lucianic parody:

> In Luciano molti sono i modi per creare la specola satirica e uno di questi è l'adozione parodica della parole poetica, *parola inconsueta* contrapposta alla lingua d'uso, che trasporta l'osservatore satirico, il *porte-parole* dell' autore, in una dimensione diversa, la dimensione letteraria, un mondo distaccato dalla

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68.   On this phrase, see Crystal (2010: 165-6) with his more general discussion (2010: 4-10) of what counts as an allusion to the King James Bible.

69.   Wodehouse (1953 [1931]: 214), alluding to Lady Macbeth's 'But screw your courage to the sticking-place' in *Macbeth* i.7. Wodehouse's semi-punning change of 'screw(ing)' to 'drinking' exemplifies a relatively 'strict' parody of the sort that Genette says can only usually be used of 'des vers détachés de leur contexte, des mots historiques ou des proverbes'. Compare his stricter examples of 'Paris n'a pas été bâti en un four', Hugo's '*Veni, vidi, vixi*', and 'Dumas inscrivant sur le carnet d'une jolie femme ce (superbe) madrigal bilingue; *Tibi or not to be*': Genette (1982: 25). Since there seems no obvious reason for Wodehouse to have deliberately altered 'place' to 'point', this example also illustrates the kind of misquotation, particularly common in the ancient world, which easily results from quoting from memory.

70.   But note the point made by Machacek (2007: 527), that sometimes 'covert' 'phraseological appropriation' can nonetheless go unnoticed.

> normale realtà, quanto lo sono il cielo degli dei omerici
> e l'Ade di Minosse e Radamanto.[71]

Lucian, like Wodehouse, can put parodic quotation to simultaneously 'obvious' yet subtle use — even the apparently rather unpromising material of standard Homeric epithets[72] — in a way which caters to both the 'general reader' of Homer and the dedicated Homeric 'scholar'.

Machacek uses the example of Homer to discuss the broadness of the term 'allusion' itself: he identifies two types, 'learned or indirect reference and phraseological appropriation', giving instances from *Paradise Lost*.

> Milton's reference to Maeonides can be called an allu-
> sion (in the sense of a learned reference) to Homer
> (3.35). Similarly, the proem to book 9 of *Paradise Lost*
> speaks of 'Neptun's ire.../that so long perplex'd the
> *Greek*,' a roundabout way of saying 'the *Odyssey*'
> (18-19). We might call that too an allusion to Homer.
> But we use the term very differently when we say that

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71. Camerotto (1998: 11). Much of Wodehouse revolves around characters (Bertie Wooster, Lord Emsworth) of elevated social classes to which most readers have little access, so the use of literary parody helps to bridge the gap to a different 'dimension' detached from the reader's everyday life, in what one might call a 'democratizing' move.

72. Indeed, in considering Homeric epithets and formulaic phrases, Genette finds such features of the epic style especially suited to parody. He even goes so far as to suggest that within the Homeric poems themselves the repetition of such phrases, while not having any parodic intent, illustrates the fundamental principle of parody, because the same passage of text is being applied to a different subject: 'ne pourrait-on pas dire qu'il [= l'aède] a involontairement fait œuvre de parodiste? ... le style épique ... est constamment en instance, voire en position d'autopastiche et d'autoparodie involontaires.' Genette (1982: 22).

'from Morn / to Noon he fell, from Noon to dewy Eve'
alludes to Homer's description of Odysseus's slumber:
'I slept nightlong, and into the dawn, and on to the
noonday' (*PL* 1.742-43; *Od.* 7.288). The first two are
simply circumlocutions, while in the second case
Milton's very language is crafted on a Homeric
model.[73]

Both types of allusion are found in Lucian. Machacek goes on to say that
what they have in common is the need for annotation: they presume a reader of
'advanced literacy' who 'must share a tradition with the author' so that they can
identify 'minute detail' in certain highly prized texts. The uses to which minute
detail can be put are probably most familiar to classicists in Stephen Hinds'
influential exploration of intertextuality in Roman poetry.[74]

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73. Machacek (2007: 526). He adds (535, n.4): 'Dictionaries of allusion, incidentally,
themselves point up the difference between the two phenomena conflated under the name
allusion, for they are always dictionaries of learned references; a dictionary of
phraseological adaptation could not exist because it would have to reproduce the entire
literary canon. Not even a source like John Bartlett's *Familiar Quotations* can serve as a
reference work for verbal echoes, since poets do not always allude to the famous, pithy
statements that make up such compilations.' The *Oxford Dictionary of Allusions* defines
'allusion' narrowly as 'the name of a real person, historical event, or literary character
which is not simply a straightforward reference ... but [embodies] some quality or
characteristic for which the word has come to stand.' (Delahunty/Dignen/Stock (2001: vii)).
Compare Branham (1989: 48): 'It is [Bompaire's] "general principle" of renewal permitting
varied applications rather than specific allusions or borrowings that is most important for
gauging the relation between Lucian's literary practice and that of earlier comic or
philosophic literature.'

74. Hinds (1998). See too D.P. Fowler (1997).

But, methodological quibbles notwithstanding, Householder's tables strikingly prove the pre-eminence of Homer in Lucian's works, with over five times as many appearances as the runner-up Plato.[75] This is a considerably higher proportion than in the fourteen authors of Imperial date analysed as a group in Householder's Table Ia, where Homer's 2986 appearances are only about three-and-a-half times Plato's 855.[76] Householder attributes this popularity to Lucian's delivering his works as lectures, since a similar pattern can be observed in Dio and Maximus of Tyre: Homer, he suggests, was a crowd-pleaser, as 'anyone with any education at all had read Homer'.[77]

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75.   Table I in Householder (1941: 41). Plato is second if we exclude the anonymous comic fragments, which Householder groups together under a single heading.

76.   Householder (1941: 44).

77.   Householder (1941: 64). Homer's centrality in contemporary rhetorical education is illustrated by the space devoted to him by Quint., *Inst.* 10.1.46-51, far more than that given to any other author. See too Bertolín Cebrian (2008: 91-3), on the humorous 36-line Homeric cento attributed by Dio to one of the Alexandrians' 'rotten poets' (σαπρῶν … ποιητῶν) in his Alexandrian oration (*Or.* 32.81-86): 'Some of the passages chosen for the parody are very well known, those which most probably everybody would recognize.' Lada-Richards (2007: 110-11) observes the likely familiarity of the population as a whole with cultural basics, drawing on the concept of the 'mythological *koinê*' in Webb (2001: 307). On the audience's component parts see the *Typologie* of Korenjak (2000: 52-65) — 'Der ungebildete Hörer', 'Der gebildete Hörer', 'Die Experten: Sophisten und Rhetorikschüler'. Korenjak notes (53) that Lucian contrasts audiences comprising πεπαιδευμένοι, who are private readers, and the πληθύς present at the first performance (*Apologia* 3). On such questions of audience and performance see now ní Mheallaigh (2014: 144-51).

This is an excellent observation; indeed the widespread popularity of certain authors, and the guarantee that most of the sophist's audience will have at least a nodding acquaintance with the likes of Homer and Euripides, is vital to understanding Lucian's use of quotations and allusions.[78] At *Piscator* 6, Parrhesiades discusses the audience's reaction to his allusions to Plato: 'They applaud me and recognise where, from whom and how I gathered each flower' (οἱ δὲ ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ γνωρίζουσιν ἕκαστον τὸ ἄνθος ὅθεν καὶ παρ' ὅτου καὶ ὅπως ἀνελεξάμην). This is equally applicable to allusions to other authors, however: there is, after all, little point in making allusions if the audience does not have a fair chance of recognising them. As Sidwell observes on this passage, 'his firm intent appears to be for his audience to recognise, and in some detail, the source of his inspiration'.[79]

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78.   There is a parallel in modern audiences' (mis)quoting well-known lines from films. Even in our less oral culture, movie fans can have a whole script, and even associated movements and intonations, by heart; these can play a significant part in the performance of masculinity, just as the sophists' quotations do. See Gleason (1995) for a study of the connections between rhetorical performance and the policing of masculinity; and on these modern phenomena see Klinger (2008).

79.   Sidwell (2014: 265). However, Elsner (2007: 59) points out that, despite the need for audiences to to recognise such allusions, Lucian takes pains to make his work pleasurable: '[Lucian's] works are highly learned and full of allusions to the canon of earlier literature, but wear their learning lightly — so that they were accessible to his audiences and did not pall.' One might contrast the *Alexandra* of Lycophron, where the many mythological allusions, though obviously allusions, are treated in such a way that the work is a difficult read.

In discussing the data's indications of general trends in Lucian and comparing other authors, Householder does indeed suggest that the increased focus, in those whom he terms the 'popular lecturers', on authors such as Homer, Euripides and Aesop reflects the expectations and education of their audiences.[80] To this extent, as my discussion above showed, I agree with him; but it is then dubious for him to make the further claim, in support of the remainder of his investigation, that Lucian's divergences from the norm '*must* therefore reflect either differences in Lucian's education, the character of his writings, or his personal tastes.'[81] In particular, his attempt to reconstruct Lucian's reading-list in school is built on shaky foundations, and the reconstruction of Lucian's educational career and

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80.   On Euripides see Householder (1941: 59, 64), and on Aesop, Householder (1941: 65): 'he was unduly fond of Aesop, probably because he found fables effective with his audiences.' Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 40) observes that when Lucian says οἱ ποιηταί he means only Homer and Euripides. Korenjak (2000) analyses both the interactions between author and audience and the heterogeneity of the audience. On 'the crowd-pleasing aspects of [Lucian's] own marvellous new genre' see ní Mheallaigh (2014: 3-5).

81.   Householder (1941: 63). My emphasis. The suggestion that Lucian had an inferior education seems a hangover from uncomfortably negative assumptions such as those found in the opening pages of Hime (1900): 'his oriental imagination revelled in dreams of the figure he might cut and the fortune he might reap'; '[he] was unable to divest himself of the modes of thought of his race'; 'we may infer that Lucian was more or less self-educated'. But even the prejudiced Hime appreciates the importance of Lucian's audience in shaping his display of learning: 'in writing he had his eye chiefly upon his Greek, not his Latin, readers'. On such attitudes in nineteenth- and twentieth-century England and Germany see Goldhill (2002: 93-106) and, for further references, Whitmarsh (2013: 189), who writes of 'Lucian's status as a Semitic interloper' as 'a notorious theme of nineteenth-century German writing'.

biography exhibit too much credulity when it comes to Lucian's statements about his life.[82] On the one hand, it is quite reasonable to use the evidence of Lucian's Homeric references to show that he makes more use of some books of the poems than other books (and perhaps therefore that he had some books by memory better than others) — but that is not surprising, since some books contain more interesting, significant or memorable storylines than others, so offer more promising material. But on the other hand, one can use exactly the same data to argue for Lucian's evidently wide Homeric reading: he makes at least one reference to every book of the *Iliad* and, with the exception of Book 20, every book of the *Odyssey* — which is pretty good going by anyone's standards.[83] Indeed, the point is well made by Bouquiaux-Simon that in his construction of pseudo-Homeric lines Lucian demonstrates the same skills of formula-combination which are required by

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82.   See especially 94-7. For an instance of this tendency see the credulous and 'extraordinarily tenuous' (Hopkinson (2008: 2 n.11)) biographical treatment of Schwartz (1965). Note too Hall's arguments (1981: 593 n.94) against Anderson (1976b: 66), who writes that he is 'not convinced that we have proof that Lucian had ever read a single tragedy from cover to cover'. This is not, however, to criticise the wider project, in Appendix III of Householder (1941), of determining the extent to which aspects of the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία may be identified in Lucian's work; this appendix offers a good survey of the relevant passages and is rather more successful, as it sets out to identify what Lucian demonstrably had studied rather than hypothesising *ex silentio* about what he had not read.

83.   See MacLeod's OCT index, s.v. *Homerus*. For data on surviving papyri of each book of Homer, in 'literary hands' and 'schoolhands', see the tables of Morgan (1998: 308-9 and 320).

poets working within the oral tradition: this leads her to the conclusion that 'notre auteur était un grand intime de la matière homérique'.[84]

This raises an important point: the ability of an author simply to quote lines of a poet does not necessarily imply much about whether the author has or has not read that poet in any depth, far less that such reading formed part of their education. Likewise even crowd-pleasing public speakers such as Lucian will quote famous lines from Homer which might not form part of those books of that poet which their audience had read at school.[85] Familiar quotations can be exploited: although Anderson has identified some 'short cuts to culture' which suggest that authors of this period may not be as widely read as they imply, this somewhat misses the point of their rhetorical project.[86] As Cameron writes, in this cultural context

> it is not easy to draw a sharp distinction between first- and secondhand familiarity with classical texts ... . The fact that most of Lucian's direct quotations from Euripides are hackneyed need not (pace Anderson)

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84.   Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 359). See also the investigation of Lucian's evident awareness of the techniques of oral composition by Brillet-Dubois (2006); she too reaches the conclusion that his effects could only be produced through great familiarity with Homeric epic. On the procedures of cento more generally, and the intimate familiarity with the original that they demand from both composers and readers, see Salanitro (1997), Usher (1998), and Usher (2006).

85.   On the various parallel issues raised by epigraphic evidence such as the 62 (or 64) Pompeiian graffiti which quote lines of Virgil, see Horsfall (2001).

86.   Anderson (1976b).

lead us to doubt whether he 'had ever read a single
tragedy from cover to cover' ... . What mattered was
how skilfully and appropriately you used the material,
not where or how you found it.[87]

But familiar quotations can equally come from books commonly read at school in

full. Consider the modern analogy of Shakespeare: *Romeo and Juliet* is frequently read

in British schools in the course of compulsory English literature classes, yet some of

the most familiar of all Shakespearean quotations come from *Hamlet*, which is not.[88]

Or, to give a personal example, I read *Jane Eyre* as a set text for GCSE, and learnt

passages from it for examination purposes, but can nonetheless now recall no more

than the opening sentence, some character names and the outline of the plot. I have

never read *Pride and Prejudice*, but I can nonetheless quote the opening sentence,

some character names and the outline of the plot. I might well allude to both in

composing a literary work, but to use this as evidence that I had read them both in

the course of my formal education would be erroneous: indeed Bayard has recently

discussed at length the complexity of such issues in his work on 'how to talk about

books which one has not read'.[89] However, as Bouquiaux-Simon indicates, to create

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87.   Cameron (2004: 122).

88.   Note also, as Pearson writes (1934: 13), 'The common assumption is that *Hamlet*
provides more familiar quotations than any other of [Shakespeare's] plays. ... But the real
thing to note about *Hamlet*, *Macbeth*, and the other big tragedies, is that the famous passages
in them are known *as* quotations' (his emphasis).

89.   Bayard (2007).

effective *parody* of an author's style and content requires a certain level of detail in one's acquaintance with their work.

Turning to another example, I am uneasy with Householder's conclusion that

> Lucian's failure to quote Aristophanes almost certainly indicates that he had not read old comedy in grammar school, but at some later time, when there was no compulsion to memorize.'[90]

Of course, it could well be the case that Lucian did not memorise Aristophanes in school, but that is of little relevance to our study of his work; in comparison with quotation from Homer there is unlikely to be a vast amount of Aristophanic quotation anyway, as it would be contrary to Lucian's common practice of quoting 'serious' authors such as Homer with parodic or ironic intent. Indeed quoting Aristophanes, who is already setting out to raise a laugh, would be less effective, in the same way that a modern comedian who repeatedly quoted other comedians (even if parodying them) might risk being seen as unoriginal and little more than a plagiarist; quoting and parodying more serious genres is fair game,[91] and the focus

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90. Householder (1941: 64).

91. Consider the parody of Dickensian excesses in Mark Evans' radio comedy *Bleak Expectations* (BBC Radio 4, 5 series 2006-12), taking to its logical conclusion Oscar Wilde's criticism (Leverson (1930: 42)): 'To those who praised Dickens, he said, "One must have a heart of stone to read the death of Little Nell without laughing."' Conversely, since the 'biopic' is deemed a serious genre, it has almost become a cliché of televisual dramatisations of comedians' lives to present them as 'tragic' figures: McLean (2007).

of this kind of parody on targets such as Homer and Euripides is clear from the practice of Aristophanes himself.[92]

In any case, Lucian does show close familiarity with Aristophanes, without quoting or parodying in an obvious way, for the reasons I have just set out.[93] In *Somnium (Vita Luciani)* 2, he is sufficiently familiar with the text of Aristophanes that he can evoke the infant Pheidippides' model-making efforts in Aristophanes' *Clouds* (877-81).[94] The intertextual joke relies on the audience's ability to recall details of the passage. Here is what Pheidippides did:

> ἔπλαττεν ἔνδον οἰκίας ναῦς τ' ἔγλυφεν
> ἀμαξίδας τε συκίνας ἠγράζετο
> κἀκ τῶν σιδίων βατράχους ἐποιει.
>
> At home he moulded houses, he carved ships, he fash-
> ioned little wagons from fig-wood, and he made frogs
> out of pomegranates.[95]

But the young Lucian went one better:

> ἢ βόας ἢ ἵππους ἢ καὶ νὴ Δι' ἀνθρώπους ἀνέπλαττον.

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92. For a survey of Aristophanes' uses of tragedy, see Robson (2009: ch.6).

93. Lucian's penchant for Aristophanes is indeed acknowledged in Householder's conclusions about 'Lucian's independent reading', i.e. the authors he is deemed to have read after his schooldays: Householder (1941: 66).

94. This allusion has been much discussed: see Humble & Sidwell (2006: 217) and Hopkinson (2008: 99-100). The connection with Aristophanes is noted ('allusion discrète mais sans équivoque') by Bompaire (1958: 531), and by Turner (1961: 8) and Anderson (1976a: 80); however, it is (tentatively) dismissed by Baldwin (1973: 12 n.31).

95. Ar., *Nub.* 879-81.

I moulded cows or horses or even, by Zeus, humans.

The situations (a young child making things to his father's delight), the verbs (ἔπλαττεν ~ ἀνέπλαττον) and the lists of products (houses, ships, little wagons, frogs ~ cows, horses, humans) connect the two passages, while the oath marks a jump from non-human to human, recalling the jump from inanimate to animate in Aristophanes' original while emphasizing that Lucian had even greater ambitions. Whereas Pheidippides uses a variety of materials (clay(?), wood, pomegranates), the young Lucian restricts himself to just the wax from his writing-tablets, simultaneously indicating that he had little interest in writing at that age (which is his father's conclusion) and marking him out as a future practitioner of literature rather than more banausic kinds of *tekhnē*. In light of the comment which Lucian reports someone making in *Prometheus es* — that he is himself a 'Prometheus' — he is cleverly using the Aristophanic text as a way of similarly figuring his creation of literature, and especially a new genre of comic dialogue, as something not unlike Prometheus' fashioning of humans out of clay.[96] It is therefore suggestive that *Prometheus es* 6 also makes reference to Aristophanes' *Clouds* — one of the Aristophanic Socrates' scientific experiments (again involving wax).[97]

The most recent study focused specifically on Lucian's use of Homer is the fairly comprehensive Bouquiaux-Simon (1968). However, the author is still aware

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96.   *Prometheus es*, esp. 2; this point is made by Humble & Sidwell (2006: 223 n.17). See ní Mheallaigh (2014: 2-8) on Lucian's Promethean self-presentation.

97.   *Nub.* 144-52.

that there are omissions, and begins the preface by outlining what she is going to cover. She is concerned with 'l'analyse des emprunts que l'écrivain fait au poète', namely 'ce que Lucien connaît d'Homère, comment il le connaît, ce que l'original homérique devient chez lui'. She explicitly rules out discussion of such biographical information as Homer's name and blindness, the relative dates of his poems and questions of interpolation, summing up: 'Seules m'intéressent les réminiscences qui renvoient au texte même de l'*Iliade* et l'*Odyssée*.'[98] She clarifies this later, saying that she considers that '[les] analogies de situation dans tel ou tel épisode et dans ceux correspondants de l'*Iliade* et de l'*Odyssée*' are beyond her remit, giving as an example the broad similarities between Odysseus' voyage and the adventures narrated in Book 2 of *VH*.[99] She also excludes from consideration the oracles which Lucian constructs from hexameter verse (Homer, Hesiod, and the *Homeric Hymns*).[100] 'Les variantes rhapsodiques' are likewise not discussed, on the grounds that Lucian is sufficiently late for his evidence for the text of Homer to be of no interest.[101]

In what follows I address such omissions: I cover Lucian's presentation of Homer as a quasi-historical figure with a biography, as a character (occupying the same ontological plane as his characters) in the Lucianic *mise-en-scène*, and as an object of scholarly attention. I consider how whole scenes and situations from

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98.   All quotations from Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 7).

99.   Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 10).

100.   Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 9).

101.   Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 10-11).

Homer are reworked, even when the direct verbal reminiscence is minimal, and I show how the Homeric quotations interact with those biographical questions which Bouquiaux-Simon excluded. Finally, in light of recent work on the evidence for an ongoing fluidity in the ancient textual tradition of Homer[102] we ought now to pay more serious attention to Lucian's response to the Alexandrian critics, which is more significant than Bouquiaux-Simon evidently believed.

Despite her omissions, Bouquiaux-Simon's extensive volume covers plenty of ground, not least in the sections discussing each of the *loci aurei* and *loci minores* which Lucian uses from the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (53-309). Setting out each Homeric passage book-by-book, she follows a similar approach to Householder, and to similar ends,[103] so that she provides a useful compendium of every Homeric passage which is clearly used by Lucian, and the changes he makes; she also discusses related textual problems. But the disadvantage of this *modus operandi* is that it focuses too much on Homer and not enough on Lucian, allowing little opportunity for consideration of such questions as the effect of a Homeric line in its new context; how this creates its humorous effect; how this relates to the rest of the work in which it appears; and whether the same Homeric passages are employed for different rhetorical or satirical purposes in different works. Although in Chapter VI, *Matières de prédilection*, Bouquiaux-Simon identifies general trends, what is lacking is an in-depth case-by-case consideration of Lucian's techniques. The many recent

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102. e.g. Bird (2010).

103. Indeed, the first of her *Conclusions* (352-8) sets out 'Ce que Lucien connaît d'Homère'.

works addressing such topics as second-century literature in general, Lucian's reception of earlier literature, and the ancient reception of Homer have included analysis of Lucian's use of Homer in the context of a range of wider discussions. My aim here is to analyse what Lucian does through an extended study of this aspect alone.

So I set out to find a fuller answer to questions such as these, and to examine in as much detail as possible a representative selection of texts, to illuminate Lucian's many approaches. However, although we have seen the difficulties in earlier systematic approaches to this material, my aim is not to replace them — and certainly not to introduce a fresh attempt at a critical terminology or taxonomy of a 'subtle and variform literary device'[104] — but rather to present readings which acknowledge and complement this earlier work with the aim of producing a clearer picture of Lucian's 'use of Homer'. As Sidwell writes in his call for a reasssessment of Lucian's relationship to Comedy,

> we no longer think purely in terms of *Quellenforschung* when we look at the way earlier Greek literature is embedded in the fabric of his works. We think rather of a nexus of reference which links his writing back to its point of origin through the education of its readers:

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104. Machacek (2007: 523). Machacek argues that the study of allusion has been unfairly neglected and disparaged, and observes that, although the critical enterprise of spotting allusions goes back at least to Macrobius, the creation of new terms (and redefinitions of old terms) with which readers have tried to talk about this aspect of literature has not ameliorated the situation whereby 'discussion of the phenomenon is beset by limiting assumptions, conceptual murkiness, and terminological imprecision' (522).

in short, we think of intertextuality, rather than 'short cuts to culture'.[105]

The title of this thesis is phrased in such a way as to indicate that it concerns not merely 'allusions', 'quotations', 'intertextuality' and so on, but whatever I consider can be found in the places where the reader might reasonably judge that Lucian has Homer either in the front or the back of his mind, and therefore is 'using' him for his own purposes by encouraging readers to see connections. Bouquiaux-Simon entitles her work 'Les *lectures* homériques de Lucien' (my emphasis), which also studiously avoids the specificity of Householder's title. I offer my own 'readings' of Lucian's 'readings' of Homer.

To illustrate this let us begin by considering how we can think in more detail about the range of ways in which Lucian 'uses' Homer, from humorous parody and other forms of direct quotation to engagement with the more serious, scholarly discussion of Alexandrian critics.

1.4 — Parody, 'parody', allusion, and other engagement with Homer: *Dearum iudicium*

εὖ γε παρῳδεῖς, ὦ Χάρων
You're good at parody, Charon![106]

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105. Sidwell (2009: 109).

106. *Charon* 14, spoken by Hermes.

Oggi, qualsiasi cosa si manifesti appare innanzitutto
come parodia. Parodia è la natura stessa. Poi, con fatica
e con sottili accorgimenti, può darsi che qualcosa riveli
di andare *oltre* la parodia.[107]

To what extent is Lucian's use of Homer 'parodic'? This is by no means an easy question to address, and the answers we might give are complicated by the further question which it raises: to what extent is Lucian's understanding of 'parody' likely to have coincided with that of the 21st-century reader? A full survey of recent literature on parody (and its relation to allusion and intertextuality more generally) would require more space than is available here,[108] but I set out in this section some of the key issues relevant to this project, and illustrate my approach by means of a detailed examination of a single brief text, *Dearum iudicium*.

Three years after his work on Lucian's quotations and allusions, Householder published an article on the word παρῳδία,[109] which appears to have grown out of his interest in how Lucian treats material from other authors. It therefore forms a good

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107. Calasso (2001: 30).

108. But note in particular the recent volume of essays focusing on 'rewritings' of Homer: Acosta-Hughes/Cusset/Durbec/Pralon (2011). I discuss below the Lucian-focused Camerotto (1998).

109. Householder (1944: 1-9). There are problems with this article, addressed in Lelièvre (1954) and Rose (1993); but an examination of his categorisations is informative for understanding his own procedure in analysing Lucian.

starting-point. In this article Householder demonstrates that Aristotle's use of the term παρῳδία — the earliest attested[110] — refers specifically to narrative poems 'in epic meter, using epic vocabulary, and treating a light, satirical, or mock-heroic subject … The *Batrachomyomachia* is the only complete work of this type still extant.'[111] But he also notes: 'In general these works are merely amusing, sometimes satirical, but never critical of Homer's style.'[112] Specifically Homeric parody, then, has a long tradition before Lucian. But Householder also demonstrates that by the time the word is used in the Aristophanic scholia, it has developed a wider semantic range.[113] In relation to brief passages appearing in comedy, the scholia use the words παρῳδέω and παρῳδία to refer to four different techniques:

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110. *Poet.* 1448a12-13.

111. Householder (1944: 3). However, Bertolín Cebrian (2008) has challenged such a classification of works such as the *Batrachomyomachia*, arguing for a more complex relationship between 'mock-epic', iambic verse, fable and (to quote the book's subtitle) 'literature for youth and children'. Genette (1982: 149) calls the *Batrachomyomachia* 'un cas particulier du pastiche, ou plûtot de la charge'.

112. Householder (1944: 3). This is now not so clear as it seemed, however: see Kelly (2009) on the modern view that inconsistencies in the *Batrachomyomachia* are authentic features of the text, a reflection of Homer's 'nodding'. Note too the observations of Wright (2012: 145): 'Except in a minority of cases, it is not normally possible to say for certain whether parody is "positive" or "negative" in its implied judgement of the source-text, or indeed whether its purpose is to evaluate the source-text at all.'

113. Householder (1944: 4) considers that 'such writers as Lucian, Julian, Diogenes Laertius, Athenaeus, and Philostratus' understand parody according to 'the usage of polite society', which is closely related to that of the Aristophanes scholia.

the insertion in comedy of a brief tragic, lyric, or epic passage, either (a) substantially unchanged, (b) with substitution of one or more words, (c) in paraphrased form, or (d) so changed as to be little more than an imitation of the grammar and rhythm of the original.[114]

This is — as far as it goes — a good description of what often happens in Lucian, which should be no surprise considering his generic indebtedness to Old Comedy.

But it is not the whole story. When, at *Charon* 14, Hermes praises Charon specifically for his 'parody', he is in fact responding to what we would term a cento, since the hexameter Charon has just produced combines the beginning of *Od.* 1.50 with parts of other genuinely Homeric lines, to form a new hexameter without introducing unhomeric words of his own.[115] This is not covered by the four techniques identified by Householder in the Aristophanic scholia; nonetheless, it demonstrates a procedure similar to that of the virtuosic four-line Homeric cento in Aristophanes' *Peace* 1090-3. But here is a difficulty, since those four lines in Aristophanes are not explicitly signalled as a 'parody' by Trygaeus,[116] who instead

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114. Householder (1944: 5).

115. Lucian's uses of the technical term are discussed by Camerotto (1998: 19-36, esp. 20, where he makes this point about Charon's words here). On cento and parody, Lelièvre (1954: 75-6) writes: 'it is perhaps true that any attempt to differentiate between [centos] and parodies comes near to the splitting of hairs'.

116. Nor do the scholia use the term, saying rather 'he has urbanely woven together Homer's words': ἀστείως πάνυ παρέπλεξε τὰ Ὁμήρου (Σ ΓLh ad 1090). For the lines used in this cento-cum-parody see Olson (1998: 278).

simply tries to pass them off as a genuine passage of Homer: 'which Homer doubtless made most beautifully' (ὅνπερ κάλλιστον δήπου πεποίηκεν Ὅμηρος).[117] This, too, is characteristic of Lucian; although he sometimes signals his 'parody' quite explicitly, as Hermes does by using the literary-critical term here in *Charon*, on other occasions readers must use their wits to spot how, or whether, an allegedly Homeric passage has been altered.

Consider, for example, *Piscator* 3, where Plato and Parrhesiades trade Homeric lines. First Plato quotes *Il.* 22.262 without alteration; in response Parrhesiades produces a two-line cento καθ' Ὅμηρον;[118] finally, Plato quotes *Il.* 10.447-8 with alterations.[119] But it is up to the reader to realise exactly what is going on, because, in each of the two cases of non-literal quotation, the speaker is evasive about his procedure. Parrhesiades first exploits the ambiguity in his phrase καθ' Ὅμηρον, which can mean either 'according to Homer' or 'in the manner of

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117. *Pax* 1089; δήπου hints that something is not right. Discussing Roman Menippean satire, Conte (1994: 217) writes: 'The phrases *ut ait Ennius*, *ut ait Horatius*, and *Homerus dicit* are some of the many signs of ironic authentication; they are constantly suspect references — used for parody, pushed to the point of being absurd and nonsenical — that involve author, characters, and readers'.

118. *Il.* 10.378-9, with 1.23 and 11.131 and a newly-composed final clause. Du Soul (Hemsterhuis & Reitz (1789-93 [1743]: Vol.3, 460)) calls these lines 'cento', Heitland (1877: 104) 'free parody'.

119. They then abandon Homer and move on to Euripidean quotations.

Homer';[120] Plato then chooses to describe his own response using the adjective Ὁμηρικός as another way of glossing over the question.[121]

Returning to Householder, we find that he discusses Lucian as an example of 'rhetoric' and 'educated conversation', in which context he again identifies subdivisions of 'parody':

> a writer may (1) quote verse with a metrical substitution of one or more words; (2) quote part of a sentence exactly, completing the grammatical structure with some different words of his own, either (*a*) altering the original sense or (*b*) keeping it, with partial paraphrase; (3) imitate (*a*) the sound and form of the original or (*b*) the general sense of the original, without preserving any essential words.[122]

He then further divides heading 1 into 'three possible subtypes: (*a*) the surprise anticlimax substitution, (*b*) the punning substitution, and (*c*) the identical pun, or

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120. LSJ, s.v. κατά, B.IV.1: 'in quotations, *according to*'; B.IV.3: '*after the fashion of*'. Harmon in his Loeb translation understands the former sense (rendering 'I will quote Homer'), while Heitland (1877: 103) suggests 'in the manner of, or, as we, say, "after" Homer'. Parrhesiades deceitfully reinforces the impression that these are genuinely Homeric with his next sentence: 'Perhaps you will revere the verses and not ignore me when I have rhapsodised them' (αἰδέσεσθε γὰρ ἴσως τὰ ἔπη καὶ οὐ παρόψεσθε ῥαψῳδήσαντά με).

121. Plato: ὁρᾷς δὲ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ἃ λέγει. Parrhesiades: καὶ μὴν καθ᾽ Ὅμηρον ὑμᾶς καὶ αὐτὸς ἱκετεύσω. Plato again: ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ἡμεῖς ἀπορήσομεν πρὸς σὲ Ὁμηρικῆς ἀντιλογίας. An obscene pun on Ὁμηρικός appears in Ach. Tat. 8.9, and among the assorted puns in an epigram of Crates (*AP* 11.218): a 'follower of Homer' is also a 'uniter of thighs', so wherever this word appears in Lucian one should be alert to a possible additional meaning. See LSJ, s.vv. Ὁμηρικός, Ὁμηρίζω.

122. Householder (1944: 6).

substitution in sense only.' He also points out that 'except for the grammarians, no ancient writer ever refers to exact, verbatim quotation with the terms παρῳδία or παρῳδέω.' This raises the question, which he does not really discuss, of how the context can affect verbatim quotation, notwithstanding his category 1*c*, where 'the words are not changed, but the context suggests a different sense for one or more of them.'[123] It is somewhere in this intermediate zone that the boundary lies between the straightforward citation of Homer as an accepted authority and the exploitation, subtle or blatant, of the new context to undermine even verbatim quotation.[124] But must such undermining of verbatim quotation involve the context

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123. Householder (1944: 7).

124. Such undermining does not imply outright ridicule of Homer; as with the many philosophical schools he discusses, Lucian is instead inviting the reader to reassess the basis on which canonical writers are respected. No matter how one defines 'parody', it remains true that 'most parodies are written out of admiration rather than contempt' (Macdonald (1960: xiii)). On parody in (especially) *Dial. deor.*, see Branham (1989: ch.3).

'suggesting a different sense' for individual words?[125] In the case of Lucian in particular, the reader's expectations about the author's habitual way of engaging with earlier texts lead to a receptivity to possible subversive senses in which the quoted text might be read.[126]

Ancient and modern attempts to define 'parody' reveal just this sort of uncertainty about how to distinguish parody from other types of quotation or imitation. In her discussion of ancient and modern parody, Rose addresses in more depth the important question, already identified by Householder, of the differences between ancient definitions of παρῳδία and modern (mis)understandings of the English term 'parody', based on 'a largely eighteenth-century view of parody [as] a

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125. As Beard (2014: 112) notes, Strabo in Cic., *De or.* 257-8 implies that simply quoting a line of verse is, in itself, worthy of inclusion in an ancient list of different kinds of witticism — even though this is, for modern readers, 'not a familiar modern category of the laughable'. However, although we might not necessarily consider quotation of verse as a 'witticism', it does tend at least to raise a smile acknowledging the speaker's learning or ingenuity. See too Dentith (2000: 1) on the ridicule caused simply by the verbatim repetition of another's words; Power (2011) on the accidental humour caused by Claudius' penchant for quoting Homeric lines without considering their original context; and Whitmarsh (2013: 94) on the letters in the *Alexander Romance*, where 'quotation reframes meaning; recontextualization parodies, in the way that (for example) Aristophanes parodies Euripides through citation'.

126. I think too of such performers as Larry Grayson, who pretend to be unaware of double-entendres even as the very context of their own performance is what encourages the audience to look out for obscene subtexts.

"burlesque" poem or song'.[127] It is not surprising to find that Homer was one author so burlesqued: Thomas Bridges published *A Burlesque Translation of Homer* in 1762.[128]

The importance of parody in Lucian has been recently examined by Camerotto.[129] The complaint in Whitmarsh's review of the book is a familiar one in Lucianic studies:[130]

> If it has a flaw, that lies in taking Lucian (paradoxically) rather straight. The various talking heads presented in the text ... are unmasked as Lucianic surrogates rather too swiftly ... : if the *persona* represents the author, what is the point of the *persona*?[131]

This raises a question to which we shall keep returning: how does Lucian use different approaches to Homer in different texts to reflect the special concerns of each? As quickly becomes clear, the authorial persona in each work — not to mention the other characters — takes an attitude to Homer which best suits the

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127.   Rose (1993: 5). Much of Rose's opening chapter deals with ancient definitions of parody, Householder's article, and the response to it in Lelièvre (1954).

128.   Bridges (1762). The frontispiece shows a blindfolded 'Homer casting pearls before Swine', while the '*Iliad*' begins, with delightful pedantry, 'Come, Mrs. Muse, but, if a maid, / Then come Miss Muse, and lend me aid!'

129.   Camerotto (1998). Homer is the main focus of his ch.4; I discuss his analysis of *Charon* in my chapter 6 below.

130.   For a similar expression of frustration at taking Lucian (in this case *Anacharsis*) at face value see König (2005), a review article on books about ancient athletics.

131.   Whitmarsh (2003: 76). On 'Lucian's many masks' see Lada-Richards (2007: 152-4).

rhetorical purpose of the text, so that, despite Ziegeler's certainty, it becomes difficult to say anything much concerning 'what Lucian thought' about the poet.

So far I have focused, along with these earlier students of the subject, on Lucian's more-or-less verbatim quotations of Homer's text, but in several works the parody is of a much less specific kind, to the extent that one hesitates to give it that name. This kind of very general allusion is more in line with what Householder considers to be Lucian's 'reminiscence' of Homer, but the use of 'reminiscence' extends further than might be initially apparent, and this terminology nowadays seems rather inappropriate.[132]

The importance and variety of Lucian's intertextual use of Homer can be well illustrated through the example of the dialogue *Dearum iudicium*, in which Lucian presents his satirical version of the Judgement of Paris.[133] I therefore sum up what I have said so far by using this as my first case-study of a whole work and drawing from the experience some conclusions which will inform the content of the following chapters.

At first glance *Dearum iudicium* has little to do with the text of Homer, since the episode which it describes — the Judgement of Paris — happened long before

132. In particular Hinds (1998) draws attention to the problems inherent in thinking of intertextuality simply in terms of a later text recalling an earlier one.

133. A version of the following section was read at the annual conference of the Classical Association in 2014, and at Nottingham's research seminar in spring 2014; I am grateful to the audiences there for thought-provoking questions and suggestions.

the action of the *Iliad*, and is mentioned by Homer only once, in passing, at *Il.* 24.25-30.[134] The plot of Lucian's version seems to follow the story as told by the *Cypria*, since Proclus reports that in that poem Hermes was instructed by Zeus to take the three goddesses to Paris on Mount Ida.[135] Yet Lucian's characters are unmistakably Homeric, with the jealous, suspicious immortals acting just as one would expect from their appearances together in Homer[136] — as when (4) Athena objects to Hermes' private discussion with Aphrodite, or when Hera teases Aphrodite (2) with rumours about her discovery in a compromising position with

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134.   On this passage see Mackie (2013); there is also a vague allusion to the Judgement at *Il.* 3.100. Lucian may be playing with the question raised by Damisch (1996: 125): 'why would [Zeus] designate a man as arbiter, thereby making him responsible for a choice which the master of Olympus knew only too well would have repercussions among the gods and, consequently, among humans?' Wright (2007) demonstrates that the causes of the Trojan War — especially the Judgement of Paris — were of special interest to the comedians. On the Judgement in epigram, see Sistakou (2011: 195-201).

135.   Proclus, *Chrestomathia*, argument to *Cypria*, 1 (at West (2003a: 68-9)). Note the view of Brillet-Dubois (2011: 110) that 'it is more than likely that Aphrodite's preparation scene [i.e. *Cypria* frr. 4 & 5 Bernabé = 5 & 6 West, describing her adornment] precedes the Judgement of Paris'. Gumpert (2001: 64) notes that the golden apple (entrusted to Hermes by Zeus in Lucian) does not appear in extant literature before the second century AD, although it appears in art.

136.   Indeed this passage of Lucian suggests that he might agree with Reinhardt's reading (1999 [1938]: 55-6) of the three goddesses' less than cordial meeting at *Il.* 21.415-34, and the passage in which Athena (in cahoots with Hera) makes fun of Aphrodite's wound at 5.422-5, as allusions to the origins of their enmity.

'your Ares' (ὁ Ἄρης ὁ σός)[137] and suggests (5) that she must be familiar with the region 'because, as the story goes, you often came down to Anchises' (πολλάκις, ὡς λόγος, κατελθοῦσα πρὸς Ἀγχίσην).[138]

This culminates in a series of comments alluding to the goddesses' attributes as described by Homer. The first is aimed by Aphrodite at Hera (10): she says that she will undress first, 'so that you can discover that I don't just have "white arms", nor that I think a lot of my "ox-eyes", but I'm just as totally and equally beautiful all over.'[139] To this Athena responds by alluding to Hera's bewitching girdle, and Aphrodite attacks Athena for her allegedly unprepossessing γλαυκός eyes.[140]

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137. *Od.* 8.267-369. The episode is the subject of *Dial. deor.* 21 (=17).

138. This is evidently an allusion to the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite*, where Aphrodite first (53-5) sees Anchises tending his cattle on Mount Ida, then (68-9) visits him in his farmstead there. Significantly, the hymn is very clear that this is a one-night (or one-afternoon) stand, so Hera's hyperbolic πολλάκις here is a further example of her malice. This hymn is the most obvious intertext, signalled by the 'Alexandrian footnote' (ὡς λόγος). cf. *Il.* 2.820-1, 5.311-3; Hes., *Theog.* 1008-10. See Furley (2011: 220-1) on Aphrodite being 'shamed' in the hymn.

139. Hemsterhuis correctly assigned this speech to Aphrodite rather than Hera; the manuscripts' attribution to Hera obviously results from Lucian's application of the two epithets of Hera to Aphrodite here: see MacLeod (1991: 254).

140. This may not necessarily be (only) a reference to colour, but to poor sight through glaucoma or cataracts. See Boudon-Millot (2012: 562 n.47): 'Amongst Greek doctors, cataracts (ὑπόχυμα, from ὑποχέω "to pour under, into something") is [sic] not clearly distinguished from glaucoma (γλαύκωμα), since both designate quite similar complaints', citing Marganne (1979).

What is happening here is complex. The characters demonstrate the least appetising features of Homer's immortals, so that this dialogue is indebted to those, going back at least to Xenophanes, who criticised Homer for the behaviour of his gods;[141] but what is not expected of the reader in this instance is any recognition of verbatim quotations or deliberate manglings of the text of Homer's lines on the Judgement of Paris. Instead, Lucian uses several different techniques to recall various aspects of Homer in more or less humorous ways. Some of these jokes are immediately accessible to anyone with a nodding acquaintance with the main features of Homer's plot and style, whereas others require greater awareness of the *Iliad* (and even of scholarly debate about it), as we shall now see.

First, the teasing of one goddess by another repeats the less than decorous treatment these goddesses give each other in certain passages of the *Iliad*, so the many ancient readers who are familiar with those passages will readily appreciate an allusion.

Secondly, the goddesses' use of epithets as part of their squabble expects the reader to pick up on their standard descriptions in Homer, in the first case by a mild paraphrase 'I have white arms' (ἔχω τὰς ὠλένας λευκά, rather than e.g. λευκώλενός

141.   DK 21 B11-B12.

εἰμι), then by literal quotation (βοῶπις).[142] This is thrown into relief by the lack of any guile or malicious intent when Paris alludes to Hermes' own regular epithet ἀργειφόντης, saying (8), 'I am sad that I can't look at [the goddesses' beauty] with my whole body, as Argus did' (καὶ ἄχθομαι, ὅτι μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὥσπερ ὁ Ἄργος ὅλῳ βλέπειν δύναμαι τῷ σώματι). Again, most readers can be expected to be familiar with this common feature of Homeric language.

Thirdly, Athena and Aphrodite allude to specific passages of the *Iliad* — most obviously Hera's girdle (κεστός), familiar from its appearance in the *Dios apatē*.[143] Here the alert reader familiar with Homer will further recall that that passage implicates not just Hera (who uses the girdle) but Aphrodite (who provides it for her), so that Athena neatly uses a single Homeric allusion to attack both her rivals at once. Aphrodite responds by attacking Athena for wearing her helmet and thereby frightening Paris; she tells her to remove it. Here the whole situation (including the detail that it is the helmet's *crest* that is frightening) strongly evokes

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142. Compare the playfulness of *Concilium deorum* 10: Momus addresses Anubis as 'dog-face' (κυνοπρόσωπε), a form of abuse familiar from Homer but uniquely appropriate to the dog-headed Egyptian god — on this Homeric insult see Graver (1995). But, as with the allusions to epithets in *Dearum iudicium*, the phrasing in Lucian is a variation on the Homeric adjective (κυνῶπις, as at *Il.* 1.159, 3.180, 18.396 etc.); this veils the connection from those seeking only verbatim quotation. See also the non-literal verbal parallels between Moschus' *Europa* and Lucian's *Dial. mar.* 15, identified by Baldwin (1980). Note too Whitmarsh (2001a: 27): 'an "imitation" of a literary forebear is not simply a xerographic reproduction but also (and this applies even to the extreme case, literal citation) a transformation'.

143. *Il.* 14.214-20.

the famous scene in which Hector's helmet frightens the baby Astyanax,[144] making this at once a comic misappropriation by Aphrodite of the text of Homer and a poignant look ahead to the death of Hector, which will eventually result from Paris' imminent decision.[145] So this set of allusions requires a reader familiar with famous scenes from Homer; the emphasis on suspicions of underhand tactics makes explicit the subtext of *Il.* 24.28-30, that 'the contest has been perverted. Awarding the prize to Aphrodite ought to settle the question for good; but she has bribed the judge'.[146]

Next Aphrodite alleges that the reason for Athena wishing to conceal her eyes with the helmet is that they are γλαυκός in colour, another allusion to an epithet (γλαυκῶπις), but this time deliberately interpreting the word in a bad sense: 'The word with which Homer describes the eyes of Athena had an uncomplimentary sense in Lucian's time,' writes Harmon, and MacLeod suggests the translation 'the

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144. *Il.* 6.466-496. Lucian: ἐπισείεις τὸν λόφον καὶ τὸν δικαστὴν φοβεῖς. cf. *Il.* 6.469: ταρβήσας χαλκόν τε ἰδὲ λόφον ἱππιοχαίτην.

145. This also mirrors how Homer looks back to this origin of the conflict in the final book of his poem, after Hector's death.

146. Gumpert (2001: 64), noting that later tellings, such as Lucian's, pick up on this aspect of the story and 'tend to emphasize the way in which the contest was fixed'. He also observes (64-5) that Athena's complaint about Aphrodite in 9 'is in precisely the same terms' as Hecuba's condemnation of the persuasive techniques of Helen herself in Eur., *Tro.* 969-1032, which he discusses at 78-80. See too Furley (2011: 222) on Iris tricking Hera through secret negotiations with Eileithyia in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*.

steely grey of your eyes'.[147] Lucian and Aphrodite are clearly reflecting contemporary debate, since the D-scholia (*Il.* 1.206) are aware that the word could be taken either positively or negatively, glossing it as 'beautiful, or else with eyes that are gleaming and striking/terrifying' (καλή, ἢ γλαυκοὺς καὶ καταπληκτικοὺς τοὺς ὦπας ἔχουσα), a point slightly expanded upon (Σ D *Il.* 2.166) in the definitions '*glaukos*-eyed, beautiful, terrifying, with a striking appearance' (γλαυκόφθαλμος, καλή, φοβερά, καταπληκτικὴ τὴν πρόσοψιν). Here Lucian's joke seems to require awareness of the problems which accompany more serious study of Homer.

Finally, Lucian repeatedly emphasizes that Paris is a rustic,[148] especially in Paris' own admission (7), that he is 'rustic' (ἀγροῖκος), so that one of the 'town people' (ἀστικοί) would be a better judge, as well as by implication in his choice of an ἀγροῖκος and 'terribly mountain-haunting' (δεινῶς ὄρειος) wife (3). By emphatically making Paris a rustic, Lucian is taking a position on a serious issue of

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147. Harmon (1921: 399 n.3), citing parallels in *Dial. meretr.* 2.1.1 and *Dial. deor.* 13 (=8); MacLeod (1991: 254). See the overview of the problem by Stewart (2006: 327): 'The *poetic* interpretation of *glaukos* implies reverberations of "odd, uncertain, uncanny"'. This Lucianic moment is a good example of the 'synchronic intertexuality' identified by Machacek (2007: 525), when he analyses the effect of the changing meaning of the word 'world' in Levertov's mid-twentieth-century reworking of a Wordsworthian line.

148. Elsewhere, Zeus (1) says Paris is βασιλικός and related to Ganymede, but is also ἀφελὴς καὶ ὄρειος. He is referred to as βουκόλος by Athena (4) and Hermes (7); Paris protests (7-8) that he is good at judging between she-goats but not goddesses; Aphrodite (13) says that he should not be satisfied with marrying ἀγροῖκόν τινα καὶ χωρῖτιν, calling him (14) ἀγροῖκος.

Homeric scholarship;[149] the bT scholia record the athetization of *Il.* 24.23-30, noting an inconsistency between this passage and the earlier words of Paris' older brother Hector (3.39-57) which appear to indicate that Paris was brought up as an effete, *kithara*-playing ἀστικός.[150] So this is a more subtle point, and requires a reader fully familiar with Homeric scholarship.

Singling out this dialogue as an example of Lucian's use of parody to display his learning, Dentith writes:

> Parody here [i.e. 'in a period known as the Second Sophistic'] becomes almost a manner of learning; certainly this was a period which was very conscious of its belatedness in relation to a past golden age. ... What is perhaps remarkable is that the old Greek pantheon has survived long enough to give the demystifying spirit of parody some continued leverage.[151]

But it is perhaps just as much the survival of the *Homeric* pantheon, and the continuing ability of *Homer* still to be demystified, which is the point here. And while for Dentith, who is surveying parody up to the present day, this is a relatively early example of parody, it is important to remember that playfulness with Homer

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149. cf. Ov., *Ars am.* 2.369, where Paris is explicitly *non rusticus*.

150. This is just one of Aristarchus' concerns about these lines; he evidently failed to note that Hector is hardly likely to present a scrupulously accurate assessment in attacking Paris. Although Aphrodite's visit to Anchises is an obvious thing to tease her about, his presence in Lucian's dialogue could also subtly challenge such concerns, since at *Hymn. Hom. Ven.* 80 the emphatically bucolic Anchises is a *kithara*-player.

151. Dentith (2000: 49).

had by Lucian's time been 'almost a manner of learning' for centuries. After all, a consciously 'parodic' spirit can be found in the seventh-century Archilochus[152] and may even go as far back as the inscription on the early-eighth-century artefact known as 'the cup of Nestor'.[153]

Nonetheless, with the abundance of Homeric allusions I have just identified, some of them obvious, some more concealed, this dialogue is an excellent example of the lengths to which the *pepaideumenoi* of Lucian's age would go to signal their learning not only to the general public but also to those fellow-*pepaideumenoi* who were in a position to appreciate an allusion and understand that within it there could be lurking further polemical allusion to debate about details of the text.[154] The apparently scurrilous nature of Lucian's dialogue, which might lead one to dismiss it

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152. Rankin (1977) focuses on how Archilochus 'created from his own life and experience an idiosyncratic version, almost a parody of the heroic legend of *epos*' (1), and observes that 'he was acquainted enough with the *Odyssey* to parody it' (29, citing frr. 16 & 95 Tarditi). On Archilochus' relation to epic see Rankin's ch.3.

153. This text's significance is a vexed question; but Osborne (2011: 99) summarises what seems the currently accepted view: 'The sophistication of [this text] is striking: those at the drinking party are expected to recognize the allusion to epic tradition (probably not yet crystallized into the Homeric poems as we know them), recognize the discrepancy between Nestor's great cup and this ceramic vessel, and enjoy the use of a curse formula to wish a blessing.' For a more sceptical view see S. West (1994).

154. In discussing the various forms of Homeric 'parody' in the *Life of Aesop*, Karla writes (2011: 65): 'this interaction is realised in a tactful fashion that is at once discreet and playful as if the author were attempting simultaneously to hide his hypotext from his readers and disclose it to them.'

as one of the μωρά that the Lucian of my opening epigram knows, conceals great cunning in the deployment of serious Homeric study for cleverly calculated effects. I have just spoken of *pepaideumenoi*, but Whitmarsh has rightly pointed out the difficulties inherent in creating for ourselves a kind of inflexible Platonic Form of an 'educated reader';[155] as we have seen, readings of Lucian's Homer certainly suggest that many of the intertextual jokes can be appreciated as jokes of different sorts by audiences with varying levels of familiarity with Homer.[156]

Such numerous possible readings mean that this short dialogue is neither a fully 'specific' parody nor a fully 'general' one. It is specific to the extent that certain characteristic features from Homeric verse (individual epithets and the description of Hera's girdle) are clearly based on specific features of the Homeric text, but approached from a viewpoint which gives them different senses (so Homer's 'white-armed' is mischievously taken to be a kind of damning by faint praise, and γλαυκός is deliberately misunderstood in an anachronistic sense). But it is nonetheless general in the sense that this dialogue offers a humorous reimagining of a situation which forms a key part of the Trojan myth, while not being the subject

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155.   See the comments on Camerotto in Whitmarsh (2003: 75-6).

156.   To turn for a moment to another Homer: *The Simpsons* is frequently cited as a text in which the many intertexts and parodies are readable at multiple levels and can still provide satisfying material for a widely varied 'readership'. See Gray (2006), esp. ch.5, 'Parody and/ as interpretive community'; in Part III of the book Gray reports on responses to the show's parody and humour by 35 viewers 'in the chaotic realm of the audience' (120), each bringing their own 'DIY cultural citizenship' consisting of their personal experience of media texts.

of any specific work being parodied, Homeric or otherwise — as far as we are aware.[157] As a rewriting of a mythological episode in Lucian's own satirical mode it has at least some affinity with Genette's category of the *charge*, although it could also be described as a 'travesty', as it takes material appropriate for the high poetic style and puts it in the form of more everyday (prose) conversation.[158] But, as should now be becoming clear, Lucian's procedures really cannot be easily fitted into the categories of any theorist.[159]

The Homeric material packed into *Dearum iudicium* certainly highlights the difficulty of attempting to categorise Lucian's many different ways of dealing with Homer, in the same way that a project such as Householder's, which aims to identify

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157. Lucian's first readers would probably also find allusions to the *Cypria* which are no longer visible to us.

158. Genette (1982: 29): 'Le travestissement burlesque modifie donc le style sans modifier le sujet'.

159. For a different kind of play with Homer, consider Heliod., *Aeth.* 7.6, when Thyamis and Petosiris' single combat outside the walls of Memphis recalls that of Achilles and Hector outside Troy. This is not parody in any strict formal sense, nor is any explicit connection made — indeed the language at 7.6.4-5 is that of tragedy, not epic ('added a new episode' καινὸν ἐπεισόδιον ἐπετραγῴδει, 'beginning of the drama' δράματος ἀρχήν, 'as though *ex machina*' ὥσπερ ἐκ μηχανῆς). But it inevitably brings to mind the Homer passage so that these 'clear Homeric echoes' lead readers 'to expect that the former will be killed by the latter; when the outcome is paradoxically a reconciliation, [readers] realize they have interpreted the spectacle incorrectly' (Bartsch (1989: 138-9)). This frustration of expectation has the potential to cause readers amusement at their own willingness to identify intertextual allusion.

and pigeonhole every allusion, is doomed to failure: in particular, his project is unable to take account of the goddesses' use of Homeric epithets, precisely because they are not alluding to any specific passage of Homer. Indeed, this dialogue is a particularly striking example, since his analysis of (only) 'Direct Quotation' in Table II.I.C — a bald 'Dearum Judicium 0' — tells a very misleading story of what happens intertextually in the dialogue.[160] Homeric allusions of the kind that Householder aims to catalogue are therefore, in a very literal sense, uncountable.[161] This is by no means a problem unique to Lucian; as Hinds remarks in his discussion of allusion in Latin poetry,

> Modern scholarship on allusive relationships can be broadly divided … into studies of local contact (which tend to bracket out more systematic implications) and studies of systematic contact (which tend to bracket out details of local contact).[162]

A similar observation — precisely the point I have just been making about the analysis of Homeric passages at the level of words and phrases without looking at

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160.   Bouquiaux-Simon (1968), in her Table 3, identifies only two allusions, in the epithets γλαυκῶπις and βοῶπις (both in 10), although it is unclear why she does not include the other epithet. Note that she gives the traditional reference to this dialogue as *Dial. deor.* 20.

161.   See also Martindale (2012), reviewing Machacek (2011). Although he is discussing *Paradise Lost*, a work rather different from Lucian's, Martindale's point that 'Milton may be most profoundly "like" Homer when there is no obvious verbal echo at all' (2012: 853) identifies a similar difficulty.

162.   Hinds (1998: 101). See too his discussion (104-7) of how Ovid's *Metamorphoses* engages with Virgil's *Aeneid*, for a large-scale example of some of the same issues of foregrounding the 'incorporated' text's 'bit-players' which are raised by *Dearum iudicium.*

the wider Lucianic context — has been made in a review of Karavas' study on Lucian's use of tragedy:

> The analysis is rooted in the methodology of the tradi-
> tional 'word search' and makes little reference even to
> such concepts as intertextuality.[163]

But, while one does need to get beyond the restrictions introduced by tables or word-searches, one must still guard against this desire to pigeonhole uses of Homer in discrete categories: in fact the concepts covered by such critical terms as 'intertextuality', 'parody', and 'allusion' overlap considerably. For example, even when Lucian engages with the minutiae of Homeric scholarship in a very specific way, it is unclear to what degree the reader should consider him to be obliquely presenting his 'serious' or scholarly ideas about the Homeric text and how much this is merely a convenient way of adding a further layer of humour through the use of earlier work on Homer in a special and more complex kind of intertextual 'allusion'. He engages with serious issues of scholarship rather as he does with serious issues of philosophy — a troublingly elusive engagement which is nicely summed up in Bosman's article on Lucian's philosophy:

> The author's elusive self-positioning is crucial to the
> lasting attraction and fascination his work exerts, and
> any attempt to suppress it or to put him in a doctrinal
> strait-jacket would be futile. His preferred literary
> forms are evidently chosen for their ability to enter-
> tain and not to convey doctrine; extracting theoretical
> philosophy from his works amounts to generic abuse.
> On the other hand, the Protean aspect of his satire

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163. Larmour (2007), reviewing Karavas (2005). See too Schmitz (2010: 296 n.33).

should not be exaggerated to the point where all serious intent is seen to be subverted, deliberately contradicted and finally meaningless.[164]

The argument of this introduction has been that the questions of what counts as parody, and of how it relates to the rest of literature, are not at all so straightforward as they have sometimes seemed. But they are neatly addressed in the following two quotations, which guide my explorations of Lucian's wide-ranging, generally-humorous intertextuality. Dentith defines parody broadly as 'any cultural practice which makes a relatively polemical allusive imitation of another cultural production or practice'. Even if one accepts (with Ziegeler) that Lucian never had a bad word to say about Homer the man,[165] *every* Lucianic quotation of Homer is in a sense a polemical one, since, as Ziegeler himself acknowledges, the whole thrust of Lucian's work is one of sustained cynicism about the myths the poet relates.[166] However, Dentith's 'relatively' is of vital importance here, since, as we saw above, parody generally implies a belief that the author parodied is still worthy of the effort. Dentith goes on to say:

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164. Bosman (2012: 786-7). Lucian has been considered philosophical enough to merit inclusion in a 'Dictionary of Ancient Philosophers' (Fuentes González (2005)).

165. See above, p.31.

166. Whether this implies capital-C 'Cynicism' is a different matter. On the vexed question of Lucian's relationship to contemporary Cynicism see Nesselrath (1998) and Bosman (2012), who draws attention to the difficulty of pinning down an author whose 'various protagonists and narrators — even where he seemingly speaks in his own voice — hold a variety of views, among others, Cynic, Epicurean and Sceptic' (785).

> In my account, parody is to be thought of as a mode, or as a range in the spectrum of possible intertextual relations. The specific means by which the polemical purposes of parody are achieved needs to be described locally.[167]

'Local' description is, in one sense, what I seek to present in the following case-studies, so that each instance of intertextual allusion, parody, or whatever one might call it in its context, is addressed as thoroughly as possible. But 'local' also needs to be taken to include more than a restriction to obvious verbatim quotation or close parody.

It will be evident that Dentith is giving a very wide definition of parody, and such a definition is reflected also in my second quotation, from Jonathan Culler's general comments about what the definition of no less a concept than 'literature' itself might be:

> we should note above all the complexity and diversity of literature as an institution and social practice. What we have here, after all, is an institution based on the possibility of saying anything you can imagine. This is central to what literature is: for any orthodoxy, any belief, any value, a literary work can mock it, parody it, imagine some different and monstrous fiction.[168]

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167. Dentith (2000: 37).

168. Culler (1997: 39).

And what better definition of Lucian's *VH* could there be than 'some different and monstrous fiction'? So let us end this introduction as we began, with the visit to Homer in that work.

Discussing the similarly bizarre fictions of Lewis Carroll, Shires identifies a number of characteristics which apply just as much to many of the imagined worlds of Lucian, especially *VH*, as to the nonsensical fantasies of the nineteenth century. She argues that 'by inevitably putting the real into jeopardy, fantasy does overrun Victorian poetry as well as prose, as do parody and nonsense'. This leads her to a view which can be applied to even the apparently closely circumscribed question of how Lucian uses Homer, which, as has already been indicated in the case studies of this introduction, often raises questions about the biographical details of 'Homer' the man, about the authority of 'Homer' as a corpus of literary texts, about the place of his textual critics in creating those texts, and about truth, lies, and fiction more generally — but usually without providing a clear answer. Shires continues:

> All three modes [sc. fantasy, parody, and nonsense] may be considered similar in one respect: they explode or transgress the frame of 'the real' and thus open up a space of uncertainty. Pushing toward the realm of non-signification where nothing is stable, these forms open a gap between signifier and signified which makes a definite meaning or absolute reality impossible to attain.[169]

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169. Shires (1988: 267). She associates the combination of these modes with Carroll's accommodation of 'the spectre of death' in the Alice books' text and subtext; consider Lucian's similar fascination with Underworld *katabasis* and *anabasis*.

No doubt because of its 'science fiction' aspects, 'fantasy' is a popular term to apply to *VH*,[170] but is less often used of other works in the Lucianic corpus, though many of them are equally fantastical and rely on 'nonsensical' arguments. In particular the reincarnated talking cock of *Somnium (Gallus)* would not be out of place in Alice's Wonderland. In the same way that the figure of Homer the man, Homer's poetry, and Homer's characters are central to much of *VH* (in particular its second book), so the fantasy of the very existence of the speaking cock is delineated in part by the cock's own parodic mockery of the Homeric text, mythology in general, and the reliability of Homer in particular, in a way which confusingly, even 'nonsensically', manages to undercut his own earlier argument which used Homer to 'prove' the existence of talking animals.[171]

The existence of such wide-ranging 'fantastical' engagement — and especially engagement with interlocking aspects not just of the Homeric text but of the accompanying biographical, critical and cultural paraphernalia too — is what makes Lucian's readings of Homer susceptible to no clear-cut definition of 'parody', and is what makes it hard to categorize every instance in such a way that they can be easily sorted into different subsets of the concepts of 'quotation', 'allusion', 'parody', and so on.

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170. For *VH* as 'science fiction' see Hezser (2013: 411-15) and Keen (2015).

171. See *Somnium (Gallus)* 2, 3-4, 6. For more detail on all this, see chapter 3 below.

In his own introduction to *VH,* Lucian initiates the reader into his approach to parody and allusion in that work, saying that it will be amenable to readers for several reasons, and especially because:

> καὶ τῶν ἱστορουμένων ἕκαστον οὐκ ἀκωμῳδήτως
> ᾔνικται πρός τινας τῶν παλαιῶν ποιητῶν τε καὶ
> συγγραφέων καὶ φιλοσόφων πολλὰ τεράστια καὶ
> μυθώδη συγγεγραφότων.
>
> each of the matters I relate hints, in a way which is not un-comic, at one or other of the ancient poets, historians and philosophers who have written many prodigious and mythical things.[172]

While *VH* is a special case, this explicit invitation to the reader can still be applied to Lucian's whole oeuvre: the reader is constantly, though usually more implicitly, invited to spot 'hints' (as suggested here by the verb ᾔνικται). The reader's reward for successfully doing so is an added element of amusement (οὐκ ἀκωμῳδήτως). As is clear from the examples I have already discussed in other Lucianic texts, the reader is expected to do quite a bit of work to achieve a full understanding of the implications of the intertextual relations involved. As Richter puts it, 'Lucian is a master of intertextual play, and these sorts of references are never as innocent as they seem'.[173]

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172. *VH* 1.2, on which see Georgiadou & Larmour (1988: 22-3), with their bibliographical notes there on ancient parody; on parody and allusion throughout *VH*, see their whole section 22-44.

173. Richter (2011: 153), discussing the opening of Rhetoric's speech in *Bis accusatus* which cribs the opening of Demosthenes' Third *Olynthiac*.

The interpretation presented by Georgiadou & Larmour — that the whole of *VH* is a 'parodic' version of the *Odyssey* — represents an extreme case of what can be found in so many Lucianic texts where some Homeric features are foregrounded while others lie in the background to be discovered by the more intrepid intertextual adventurer. In a more recent examination of the 'formulaic art' of *VH*, Brillet-Dubois adds significantly to these insights by discussing not only direct 'quotation' of Homeric formulae (including the epigram of 'Homer' which I presented above) but also the ways in which Lucian draws on the example of Homeric type-scenes in his repeated description of the activities of embarkation, disembarkation, and exploration.[174] Again, this requires consideration of the effect made by an entire scene, rather than of very local verbatim borrowings of words and phrases.[175] I would argue further that the fussy repetition, in otherwise chatty prose, of such unexceptional, commonplace events as dropping anchor prior to disembarking (as at *VH* 1.10 and 2.6) becomes slightly absurd by that very repetition, in a way that it does not in the more elevated diction of Homer. This

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174. Brillet-Dubois (2006). To some extent this phenomenon is a feature of *periplus*-writing in general, but she shows convincingly that Homeric echoes are frequent.

175. On what she calls the prosification of Homer and the use of 'tics narratifs', see van Mal-Maeder (1992). Brillet-Dubois (2006) builds on this, arguing that the 'prosification' still involves 'formulaic' techniques of epic.

complements through its style the absurdity of dropping anchor on the Moon at all.[176]

So my approach involves a conscious avoidance of the kinds of pigeonholing that led Householder and Bouquiaux-Simon to focus narrowly on certain formal aspects of Lucian's procedure when he is dealing with Homer. Instead I consider a variety of case-studies in terms of Lucian's treatment of themes concerning Homer's narrative and later interpretations of it; and I focus not only on the question 'What is going on here?' but also on the neglected question 'What is the effect of what is going on?' In particular, I cast my net wider than those works which have received the most attention (such as *VH*), showing how this approach can be applied to the less familiar pieces, as we have seen with *Dearum iudicium.* Hinds observes of Ovid's 'incorporation' of Virgil that if the whole of the *Aeneid* were copied and pasted into Ovid's poem, the reader would read this interpolated *Aeneid* in a new way because of its context.[177] After reading even a small amount of Lucian the reader comes to have

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176. For a modern parallel, consider how Beckett raised the inconsequential use of detail to a true art-form of the absurd. He draws attention to this by using comically pedantic hyperverbosity in the incongruously 'scholarly' footnote of *Watt*'s sixth paragraph: 'Much valuable space has been saved, in this work, that would otherwise have been lost, by avoidance of the plethoric reflexive pronoun after say', despite this footnote's — and the main text's — obsessive over-clarifications. See Gibson (1985) and Winston (1977). Bolin (2013: ch.4) brings out the far-reaching implications of this ostensibly insignificant and absurd footnote.

177. Hinds (1998: 119-22), who cites (n.39) Macrob., *Sat.* 6.3.1 'on Homer as the rock which cannot be budged by intertextual buffeting'.

an expectation that any use of another text is likely to be ironised or to imply a more or less polemical reading, so that the reader will go out of their way to look for hints pointing to the kinds of playfulness I have been illustrating.[178]

1.5 — An outline of this thesis

Although Anderson has rightly emphasised the importance of tracing different patterns and motifs across Lucian's works,[179] I am principally concerned to consider each work individually as an illustration of Lucian's use of a theme or passage(s) from Homer. Hence I proceed largely through a series of case-studies, which are grouped chapter-by-chapter and section-by-section according to the Homeric themes which I feel are presented especially prominently or significantly in them. As will become clear, there is often little consistency in the way that Lucian uses Homeric passages in different works, so my concern is less to trace patterns than to analyse each separate instance of a Homeric theme or passage.

Each of the next five chapters approaches Lucian's work from a different direction, to show how he uses various aspects of Homer's biography, his poems, and their receptions. In chapter 2 I focus on Lucian's presentation of characters who

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178. Consider too Hinds' notion (1998: 133) of a 'subjectivist literary history', in which 'every allusion … mobilizes its own *ad hoc* literary historical narrative … , and a subjectivized literary history is the total of many such narratives.'

179. Anderson (1976a).

are most familiar from Homer — principally Achilles and Odysseus, as the protagonists of the two Homeric epics. In chapter 3 we move on to the 'real-life figure' of the poet Homer himself, especially Lucian's use of traditions about his life, death, apotheosis and afterlife.

The short chapter 4, which builds on the issues of ethnic identity raised by the figure of Homer, comprises a study of ethnic and cultural identity in the *prolaliae*, with its main focus on how Lucian uses Homer to define and cross cultural boundaries in *Hercules*.

In chapter 5 I consider the influence on Lucian of readings of Homer's 'hinting', from philosophers' allegorical readings of Homeric scenes and monsters to the implications of manifestations of Homer in Artemidorus' work on dream-interpretation.

Chapter 6 demonstrates how these different approaches can be brought together in the study of a single, complete work. For this purpose I have selected the dialogue *Charon*, which not only contains a significant number of Homeric references but also uses them in a variety of ways.

CHAPTER 2

Achilles and Odysseus[1]

> Wir haben oben ... gesehen, wie sich die Sophisten als homerische Helden stilisieren; hier kann man umgekehrt behaupten, daß die homerischen Helden als Sophisten verstanden werden.[2]

2.1 — Achilles and Odysseus after Homer

In this chapter I examine the protagonists of the Homeric epics in their Lucianic incarnations; as two familiar figures from Homer, they illustrate well how Lucian treats individual characters. In particular their complex interactions with other characters in Homer allow him to allude to various situations which reveal aspects of their personalities.

By Lucian's time both Achilles and Odysseus had undergone several centuries of reinvention in different genres, so that Lucian's view of them could hardly fail to be influenced by earlier literary authors, Homeric scholars and the

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1.   Parts of this chapter were read in 2009 to Nottingham's postgraduate research seminar *Oistroi*, to *AMPAL* at Birmingham, and to the conference *Reception Within Antiquity* at Nottingham; and in 2012 to *AMPAL* in Oxford. I am grateful to these audiences for stimulating discussions.

2.   Schmitz (1997: 145).

philosophical schools.[3] Let us therefore begin with a passage from Plato which illustrates the kind of use to which Achilles and Odysseus could be put:

ΙΠΠΙΑΣ	ἐν τούτοις δηλοῖ τοῖς ἔπεσιν τὸν τρόπον ἑκατέρου τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὡς ὁ μὲν Ἀχιλλεὺς εἴη ἀληθής τε καὶ ἁπλοῦς, ὁ δὲ Ὀδυσσεὺς πολύτροπός τε καὶ ψευδής· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα εἰς τὸν Ὀδυσσέα λέγοντα ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ	νῦν ἤδη, ὦ Ἱππία, κινδυνεύω μανθάνειν ὃ λέγεις· τὸν πολύτροπον ψευδῆ λέγεις, ὥς γε φαίνεται.
ΙΠ.	μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες· τοιοῦτον γὰρ πεποίηκεν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἐν Ἰλιάδι καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ.
ΣΩ.	ἐδόκει ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ὁμήρῳ ἕτερος μὲν εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀληθής, ἕτερος δὲ ψευδής, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ αὐτός. ...
ΣΩ.	τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον τοίνυν ἐάσωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἐπανερέσθαι τί ποτε νοῶν ταῦτα ἐποίησεν τὰ ἔπη.
Hippias	In these lines [*Il.* 9.308-10 & 312-14] he [= Homer] makes clear the character of each of the two men: that Achilles is true and simple, while Odysseus is 'a man of many wiles'[4] and false. For he makes Achilles address these lines to Odysseus.

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3.   On Achilles see King (1987); Michelakis (2002); Burgess (2009); and Fantuzzi (2012). On Odysseus: Stanford (1954) and Montiglio (2011). Achilles and Odysseus appeared together in Sophocles' *Syndeipnoi*, the plot of which is reconstructed in Sommerstein (2003); on Aeschylus' Iliadic and Odyssean tetralogies, see Sommerstein (2010: ch.10).

4.   On this equivocal use of πολύτροπος, see Mulhern (1968).

Socrates	Now at last, Hippias, I think I under-stand what you are saying. You mean that the man of many wiles is false, or so it seems.
Hipp.	Very much so, Socrates. For Homer makes Odysseus that kind of man in many places in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.
Soc.	It appears, then, that Homer thinks the one is a true man and the other a false man, but they are not the same. ...
Soc.	Then let us leave Homer to one side, since it is impossible to enquire of him what he was thinking when he composed the verses.[5]

Achilles truthful and straightforward, Odysseus wily and deceitful: so Plato's Hippias characterizes these two exceptional heroes. But, asks Socrates in a fashion of which the (post)modern literary critic would be proud, if one cannot summon up Homer and ask what he had in mind, has the reader any right to assume anything about how he intended these characters to appear? Indeed Socrates will eventually use *Il.* 9.650-55 to lead Hippias to a troubling and unforeseen interpretation, that Odysseus the habitual and deliberate liar is actually a 'better' person than Achilles:

ΙΠ.	ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ὑπὸ εὐνοίας ἀναπεισθεὶς πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα ἄλλα εἶπεν ἢ πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσέα· ὁ δὲ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἅ τε ἀληθῆ λέγει, ἐπιβουλεύσας ἀεὶ λέγει, καὶ ὅσα ψεύδεται, ὡσαύτως.
ΣΩ.	ἀμείνων ἄρ' ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς Ἀχιλλέως.

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5.   Pl., *Hipp. Min.* 365b-d. This fantasy of 'enquiring what Homer was thinking' is fulfilled by the Lucian-narrator of *VH*.

Hippias	Yet in this case too Achilles was led by goodwill to say to Ajax something different from what he said to Odysseus. But Odysseus, when he speaks the truth, always does so after making designs, and likewise when he lies.
Socrates	Then Odysseus, it seems, is better than Achilles.[6]

This reassessment of Odysseus is part of his rehabilitation by Socrates' followers; Montiglio suggests that Odysseus held special appeal for them, both because of their contrariness towards received opinion, which was prejudiced against him, and also because he demonstrated positive qualities reminiscent of Socrates' own:

> Odysseus' misleading appearance joint with his care to distinguish intellectual abilities from physical ones might have inspired Socrates' disciples to see in their teacher, ugly outside, full of treasures inside, an avatar of Odysseus.[7]

I suggest in §2.2.2 that Lucian is reading Homer with Plato in mind,[8] and the satirist's characterization of Achilles and Odysseus certainly gains in interest through his embrace of the approach found in the *Hippias Minor*. In Lucian the plain-

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6. 371d-e. This passage of *Hipp. Min.* is also discussed in connection with Lucian by ní Mheallaigh (2014: 78-9).

7. Montiglio (2011: 13).

8. The presence of Plato in Lucian is set out in Tackaberry (1930); and see now ní Mheallaigh (2005). I agree with Hall (1981: ch.3) in her rejection of Tackaberry's belief that Lucian was seriously 'converted' to philosophy; on 'conversion' to philosophy more generally see Whitmarsh (2001a: 6 n.18).

speaking Achilles (who himself takes on deceptive clothing during his sojourn on Scyros) is associated with, although not necessarily responsible for, 'Odyssean' dissimulation of various sorts, just as Odysseus comes to represent more deeply philosophical reflection than his pragmatic, rogueish wiliness might suggest.[9] In the course of these presentations, Lucian treats Homer's putative intentions, which Socrates deems inaccessible to later readers, with no special reverence, as he offers up non-canonical scenes and more or less polemical reinterpretations of Homeric episodes.

2.2 — Achilles

2.2.1 — Lucian's Achilles

> Artificium *Luciani* nostri laudatissimum est in alludendis veterum poëtarum locis: *Homerum* ita plerique literis humanioribus dediti terunt, ut vix effugere queant quae ejus loca respexit *Lucianus*: hic totos principis poëtae versiculos in suam transfudit orationem, quod ideo noto, quoniam et *Plato de Republ.* lib. III. iisdem utitur in re non prorsus dissimili.
>
> The skill of our Lucian is most praiseworthy in his sporting with passages of the ancient poets: most persons devoted to the humanities spend so much time with Homer that they are scarcely able to escape those passages of Homer to which Lucian has turned

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9.   These characterisations do not begin with Lucian: in particular, there was a long tradition of co-opting the 'philosopher' Odysseus by Cynics, Stoics, and Epicureans, as well as Plato and other followers of Socrates: see Montiglio (2011).

his attention. He has decanted whole verselets of the
prince of poets into his own speech, a fact of which I
make note since Plato also, in his *Republic*, book 3, uses
the same lines for a not entirely dissimilar purpose.[10]

Myths about Achilles fall into several approximate groupings.[11] First, the
most obvious material is that drawn from the plots of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, which is
therefore largely 'heroic' and has Homeric authority; second are the stories
concerning his death and burial, which fall into the space between his appearances
in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and seem to be alluded to in various prolepses in the *Iliad*[12]
as well as the more explicit summary by the shade of Agamemnon at *Od.* 24.35-98;
and third, the 'romantic' stories mostly dating from that part of his life which
precedes the *Iliad*, including his education by Cheiron and Phoenix, his concealment
in women's clothes on Scyros and his love for Deidameia, but also encompassing his

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10.   Hemsterhuis (1708: *Notae* 24), discussing *Dial. mort.* 26.1 (=15.1), the dialogue between
Achilles and Antilochus which I discuss below.

11.   Michelakis (2002: 7-8), sets out non-Iliadic 'episodes and character traits'. He writes:
'One of the most striking features of these episodes is their persistent exploration of
Achilles as a warrior and a lover' — and it is equally striking that these aspects are
persistently intertwined, with Troilus and Penthesileia among his 'love-interests', just as
Patroclus and Briseis have strong associations with both aspects.

12.   On such foreshadowings and the evidence they might provide for other epic
traditions, see Burgess (2009).

feelings for Briseis, Penthesileia and Patroclus as well as the erotic elements of the sinister story about his killing Troilus.[13]

This last type of story is perhaps better suited to more humorous writing, and there are several examples of such use. In Sophocles' *Lovers of Achilles* satyrs seem to have been presented vying for Achilles' affections, events which must take place at an early point in his life since Peleus and Cheiron both appeared as characters in the drama.[14] Fantuzzi writes that this play 'parodically synthesized and sharpened the two un-Homeric and typically tragic features of Achilles' sexuality: feminization at Scyros (Euripides' *Scyrioi*) and liaison in an *erastes* role with Patroclus (Aeschylus' *Myrmidons*)'.[15] And, in a curious little narrative which again imagines Achilles' youth, Dio Chrysostom recounts how the boy Achilles

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13.   Sommerstein presents the evidence for this story in Sommerstein/Fitzpatrick/Talboy (2006: 196-216). Fantuzzi (2012: ch.1, esp. 2-4), argues that such material was deliberately left out of the *Iliad*, using the terminology of undue 'novelization' and 'familiarization' employed by Bakhtin (1981: 15-17), who sees the epic past as being 'walled off absolutely from all subsequent times'. Fantuzzi (2012: 44-6) also discusses the opening lines of ps.-Bion's *Epithalamium*, noting the patronymic in the phrase 'the kisses of Peleus' son' (Πηλεΐδαο φιλάματα), seemingly an allusion to 'the rage of Peleus' son' (μῆνις ... Πηληϊαδέω) in the *Iliad*'s opening line.

14.   frr. 149-157. See Paduano (1982: 862-5) and Lloyd Jones (2003: 58-63), for the fragments and brief discussions.

15.   Fantuzzi (2012: 16).

argues with Cheiron, uppishly and amusingly lecturing his tutor on precisely the kind of military training he thinks he needs.[16]

Nonetheless Lucian derives humour from Achilles' later career too, making many brief references to both the 'heroic' and 'romantic' Achilles, which themselves fall into two types. First are those which use him as a standard example for physical beauty or martial prowess. However, this is rarely a mechanical application of textbook exempla, as Lucian undercuts them with suggestions that Achilles was not so great after all. In particular, Achilles is used as a prime example of mortality, appearing in the afterlife with other great heroes of the Trojan War as nothing more than a pile of bones.[17] Achilles is a particularly good example of this because he makes much the same point himself.[18] So in *Dial. mort.* 6.1-2 (=20.1-2), Aeacus shows Menippus the mortal remains of a long list of heroes — Agamemnon, Achilles, Idomeneus, Odysseus, Ajax, Diomedes, and the rest — prompting Menippus' wry description of them as 'truly strengthless heads' (ἀμενηνὰ ὡς ἀληθῶς κάρηνα),

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16.   Dio Chrysostom 58, on which see Schmitz (1997: 168-70). From the first century AD, Achilles' education and cross-dressing become popular themes in his iconography: Fantuzzi (2012: 21 n.3 & 92-4).

17.   Not all such descriptions involve a list of dead heroes: see *Dial. mort.* 1.3 (=1.3), where Diogenes sends a message with Polydeuces to warn two named living men who are strong and handsome but will soon be 'skulls denuded of beauty' (κρανία γυμνὰ τοῦ κάλλους). This opening dialogue programmatically raises this theme, and that of the levelling equality of the afterlife, which will persist throughout the set.

18.   *Od.* 11.487-503.

quoting the noun and adjective uttered by Odysseus himself,[19] and marking his allusion by apostrophising Homer by name. At *Charon* 23, Charon is sniffily unimpressed by the small size of Achilles' tomb: 'The tombs aren't big, Hermes' (οὐ μεγάλοι, ὦ Ἑρμῆ, οἱ τάφοι). The reader well versed in Homer will note a joke here, based on the Iliadic assertion that the men of the heroic age were larger, braver and stronger than in the narrator's own times.[20] But, to an immortal's eye, even they are insignificant.[21] But he may also be making the same point as the cock (*Somnium (Gallus)* 17) who says that Ajax was not actually as large, nor Helen as beautiful, as is generally believed.

So much, then, for Achilles' martial prowess, says Lucian — he still dies in the end. It therefore does not suit Lucian's purposes to make any reference to the *Aethiopis*' story that Thetis was able to obtain a special afterlife for Achilles and

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19.   *Od.* 11.29.

20.   So the Homeric narrator tells (*Il.* 5.302-4) how Diomedes easily lifted a rock which not even two men of the narrator's own time could lift. For this point I am indebted to Patrick Finglass. Bierce (1911: s.v. 'degenerate'): 'The contemporaries of Homer were striking examples of degeneracy; it required ten of them to raise a rock or a riot that one of the heroes of the Trojan war could have raised with ease. Homer never tires of sneering at "men who live in these degenerate days," which is perhaps why they suffered him to beg his bread'.

21.   *Charon* includes much Herodotean material, so there might also be an allusion to the Spartans' recovery of Orestes' oversized bones (Hdt. 1.67-8). On belief in gigantic heroes see Asheri on 1.68.3 in Asheri/Lloyd/Corcella (2007: 130-1). See Kim (2010: 200-2) on the disbelief in giant heroes at Philost., *Her.* 7.9-12.

transport him to a paradisiacal existence on the island of Leuke.[22] Indeed Lucian is

unusual in following so closely the Homeric version of Achilles' afterlife in Hades, in

contrast to his usual location on the Isles of the Blessed or in Elysium.[23] There is an

intriguing moment at *VH* 2.19 when Lucian seems to show awareness of this. He has

described the scene in the Elysian Fields, mentioning that Homer is there alongside

his characters (2.15), and that all those who fought at Troy were there, with the

exception of Locrian Ajax (2.17), before singling out Achilles and Theseus as the

recipients of special honours (2.19). Why these two are selected is unclear, and the

explicit mention of Achilles' presence in this location is certainly unexpected for

readers of *Dial. mort.*;[24] however, this seems a deliberate comment on the myth and

on Homer's reliability. Theseus' presence too may be a polemical contradiction, this

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22.   Proclus, *Chrestomathia*, argument to *Aethiopis*, 4 (at West (2003a: 112-3)).

23.   For references see Burgess (2009: 41-2) and, for the only other certain placements of
Achilles in Hades, Burgess (2009: 144 n.42). Georgiadou & Larmour (1988) observe that the
White Island (*VH* 2.3) may be an allusion to Leuke — but the fact that Achilles is not found
there suggests that the allusion is a 'correction' of the tradition which said he was.

24.   Nothing in *Dial. mort.* suggests that any of the dialogues are set anywhere other than
Hades; Georgiadou & Larmour (1988: 199-200) offer various possible explanations for
Achilles' presence. The question of the dead simultaneously being in two locations is played
with in *Dial. mort.* 11 (=16), in connection with Heracles' mortal and immortal parts, but the
issue is not raised with repect to Achilles. Diogenes ends that dialogue by laughing at
'Homer and this sort of ψυχρολογία'. In any case, Lucian is by no means scrupulous about
accuracy in these pieces: for instance, the Scipio of *Dial. mort.* 25 (=12) seems a conflation of
the Scipiones Africanus and Aemilianus (MacLeod (1961: 153)).

time of the story that Theseus and Peirithous were punished in Hades.[25] We should not necessarily expect consistency between works, so this is best taken as evidence that Lucian employs characters according to the special interests and exigencies of each situation.[26]

The second type of allusion involves Achilles' erotic aspects. As a remarkable specimen of physical beauty, he can be used again as a standard rhetorical example: so at *Pro Imaginibus* 20 a flatterer would not shrink from declaring Thersites 'more handsome' (εὐμορφότερος) than Achilles, which is emphasized when we learn (25) that Homer often describes Achilles as 'godlike' (θεοείκελος).[27] But this too is used in a more complicated fashion; at *Saturnalia* 24 Cronus' first letter to himself ends with a plan to make the pretty young slaves of the selfish rich suddenly lose their hair and grow beards. He gives examples of these slaves' names: Hyacinthus, Achilles, and Narcissus. As if Cronus' proposed joke were not humiliating enough, Hyacinthus and Narcissus make rather unseemly company for the best of the Achaeans, as the former is remembered chiefly for his undignified accidental end, the latter for his fatal case of 'narcissism'. These three also died young, which may be relevant to Cronus' plan here: it is almost as though he is making these youngsters grow up at top speed, which will not only make them less desirable but presumably also hasten

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25.   Apollod., *Bibl.* 2.5.12. On this story see Tsagarakis (2000: 30-2) and p.234 below.

26.   Most obviously, Lucian uses elsewhere some of the usages condemned in *Lexiphanes* and *Soloecista.*

27.   Achilles most handsome: *Il.* 2.674; Thersites' ugliness: *Il.* 2.211-23.

their deaths.[28] This list is repeated at *Dial. mort.* 5.1 (= 18.1), where Menippus asks 'Where are the beautiful men and women, Hermes?' (ποῦ δαὶ οἱ καλοί εἰσιν ἢ αἱ καλαί, Ἑρμῆ;) and Hermes points him to the remains of Hyacinthus, Narcissus, Nireus, Achilles, Tyro, Helen, and Leda. Nireus was not included in Cronus' list, despite being the second-best-looking of the Greeks at Troy.[29] This intrusion of Nireus has no obvious motivation, perhaps because we know so little about him; he is used interchangeably with Achilles in the comparison with Thersites,[30] so it seems that Lucian simply considered them two alternative stock examples for the same phenomenon. Lucian is not alone in providing lists of this sort — Chariton introduces Chaereas as being as handsome as depictions of Achilles, Nireus,

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28.   Conversely, at *Dial. mort.* 15.2 (=5.2) Pluto wants to make an old man young again to frustrate legacy-hunters; cf. the allusion at *Dial. mort.* 19.2 (=9.2) to Phaon, the ugly old ferryman made young and beautiful by Aphrodite.

29.   *Il.* 2.671-5. Nireus is not mentioned again in the *Iliad*, and his principal difference from Achilles is his weakness. See Kirk (1985: 227), and Lightfoot (2003: 474). In *Dial. mort.* 30 (=25), Nireus unsurprisingly refers only to 673, conveniently ignoring both his characterization as 'feeble' (ἀλαπαδνός, 675) and Achilles' greater beauty (674).

30.   The Nireus-Thersites competition has its most extended treatment in the grim parody of the Judgement of Paris at *Dial. mort.* 30 (=25). There is also flattery at the end of *Dial. mort.* 19 (=9) which makes an attractive young man 'more well-born than Codrus, more beautiful than Nireus, and more intelligent than Odysseus'. But see also *Menippus* 15 for a formula similar to that used to compare Thersites and Achilles.

Hippolytus and Alcibiades — so Lucian is probably reproducing a conventional grouping.[31]

In the present context, however, Lucian needs to use Achilles, because Cronus' inclusion of this character in the list of names for pretty slaves has a further significance: as Hyacinthus was the *erōmenos* of Apollo, and Narcissus was of *erōmenos*-age (Ovid puts him in his sixteenth year[32]), the implication is that Achilles also falls into that category. This is reminiscent of the list offered by Plutarch's Gryllus, the man who, having been turned into a pig by Circe, is telling Odysseus why he does not want to become human again. As one of his arguments, Gryllus comments on the unseemliness of the erotic pursuit of Achilles by Odysseus' men, on the ground that he had already fathered a child and was thus past *erōmenos*-age. The parallel with Cronus' list is reinforced by the appearance of Achilles as the clinching example in a group of three; Plutarch's list has already included Argynnus and Hylas.[33]

Lucian speculates on the nature of Achilles' relationship with Patroclus, which receives no explicit comment in the *Iliad*, so prompted later Greeks to ask whether it was an erotic relationship and, if so, how *erastēs*/*erōmenos* roles were to

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31. Chariton 1.1.3. The mixing of mythical and historical characters in Chariton's list connects with what Hunter (2008: 770) calls his 'overt concern with "being a historian"'.

32. Ov., *Met.* 3.351.

33. Plut., *Brut. anim. rat. uti* 7 [= *Mor.* 990d-e]. For the Argynnus myth cf. Ath. 13.603d.

be assigned.[34] So Aeschylus' *Myrmidons* has Achilles reflecting on his relationship with Patroclus in plainly erotic terms and performing lamentation (traditionally a female role),[35] while Phaedrus' speech in Plato's *Symposium*[36] equates the self-sacrifice of Alcestis with that of Achilles, who died to avenge Patroclus, and explicitly argues against Aeschylus that Achilles, being beardless, was the *erōmenos* of Patroclus.[37] Xenophon's Socrates uses Homer's silence to argue that the relationship was not erotic at all, but Aeschines presents this same silence as evidence for precisely the opposite.[38]

Such difficulties in interpreting the Achilles-Patroclus relationship are exploited in *De parasito* 44-7, where Simon, who is presenting the argument that there exists a parasitic art just like music and the other arts, claims that Patroclus was Achilles' parasite rather than his lover, even though he was the inferior of no other Greek, and (if one can judge from his deeds) the equal of Achilles himself. Indeed, Simon begins this section by saying that even 'the best of the heroes', such as Nestor, were parasites (τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν ἡρώων παρασίτους ὄντας). This being

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34.   Michelakis (2002: 41-53) examines fifth- and fourth-century sources for views of these issues, while Fantuzzi (2012: 214-5 & 226-31) assesses presentations of the relationship. The ancient evidence and modern readings of it are set out by Clarke (1978), with discussion of Homer's use of φίλος and ἑταῖρος.

35.   frr. 135 & 136 Radt.

36.   178a-180b.

37.   Homer is also clear that Patroclus is older than Achilles (*Il.* 11.786-9).

38.   Xen., *Symp.* 8.31; Aeschin., *In Tim.* 142.

an ironic text, the reader should not take all this entirely seriously,[39] and Simon's interlocutor Tychiades is sceptical, demanding evidence that Patroclus was a parasite rather than a φίλος (47). To Tychiades' surprise Simon is then able to quote lines from the mouth of Patroclus himself which, he claims, support his argument:

> μὴ ἐμὰ σῶν ἀπάνευθε τιθήμεναι ὀστέ', Ἀχιλλεῦ,
> ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ, ὡς ἐτράφην περ ἐν ὑμετέροισι δόμοισι.
>
> Do not put my bones apart from your own, Achilles,
> but together with them, as we were brought up
> together in your house.[40]

and

> καὶ πάλιν ὑποβάς, "καὶ νῦν με δεξάμενος," φησίν, "ὁ Πηλεὺς
>   ἔτρεφεν ἐνδυκέως καὶ σὸν θεράποντ' ὀνόμηνε."
>
> 'And now,' he says again a little later, 'Peleus took me
> in and brought me up kindly, naming me your
> servant.'[41]

Patroclus, Simon claims, was not a φίλος since being a θεράπων precludes that; when Simon does eventually concede that parasites, in this case Aristogeiton as parasite to Harmodius, might also be lovers (48), he shifts the vocabulary from the ambiguous φίλος to the more clear-cut ἐραστής ('lover') and παιδικά ('boyfriend'). The concept of φιλία recurs in *Toxaris* 10, the Scythian Toxaris complains that

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39.   Beard (2014: 150): 'Even if the plots of some of the [Roman] comedies encourage us to imagine the world from the point of view of the underdog, the word *parasite*, like *flatterer*, remains a loaded and hostile value judgment, not a self-descriptor.'

40.   *Il.* 23.83-4.

41.   *De parasito* 47, adapting *Il.* 23.89-90.

Greeks can far outdo Scythians in their tales of friendship, and cites as the two classic examples the φιλία of Achilles and Patroclus and the ἑταιρεία of Theseus and Peirithous.[42] The use of these terms complicates the issue, perhaps because the foreigner Toxaris has a limited understanding of a characteristically Greek kind of relationship; certainly φιλία and ἑταιρεία do not necessarily imply an erotic relationship. Similarly, the Homerically-literate reader will recognise a joke here, being well aware that θεράπων in Homer means 'companion in arms' — a more equal relationship than the later sense 'servant' implies.[43]

But Achilles and Patroclus are again discussed in *Amores* 54,[44] where Theomnestus argues that there can be little doubt that Patroclus did not just sit around 'waiting for Aeacides to leave off his singing' (δέγμενος Αἰακίδην, ὁπότε λήξειεν ἀείδων), a quotation of *Il.* 9.191,[45] but rather that 'pleasure was the mediator of their friendship too' (ἦν καὶ τῆς ἐκείνων φιλίας μεσῖτις ἡδονή). Theomnestus introduces this material as a direct comparison with Socrates and Alcibiades, rejecting the official Platonic line that Socrates' feelings towards Alcibiades were

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42.　ní Mheallaigh (2014: 44) compares Chariton's use of this theme.

43.　LSJ, s.v. θεράπων. On the implications of φίλος and ἑταῖρος, and Patroclus' 'prompt obedience', see Fantuzzi (2012: 194-5).

44.　On this work's authenticity see Appendix 1.

45.　There may be a scholarly joke in this: as Fantuzzi (2012: 196) observes, Homer's phrase could equally imply a 'relay performance', with Patroclus waiting to take up the song. Pralon (2011: 134 n.4) draws attention to the humorous potential of the episode.

entirely 'platonic'.[46] There is again some humour here; it is hardly an accident that one 'disputed' relationship is illustrated by means of another. And, while Alcibiades is not mentioned at *VH* 2.19, that passage presents a Socrates whose protestations of chastity despite everyone else's openness about sex are challenged by the predictable pair of Hyacinthus and Narcissus. This passage of *VH* immediately follows the mention of the special honours given to Achilles and Theseus, both warriors with warrior-lovers (Patroclus and Peirithous respectively).[47]

Then Theomnestus presents the clinching argument: it is when Achilles is lamenting Patroclus' death that his true feelings are revealed — but not, of course, in Homer. Theomnestus has to revert to Aeschylus' *Myrmidons*, quoting fr. 136 to show that Achilles recalls the 'communion of thighs' (μηρῶν ... ὁμιλίαν).[48] Here, then, is another example of Lucian drawing together the evidence for different views of the Achilles-Patroclus relationship, which he can deploy in arguments for or against the proposition that it was erotic.

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46. Pl., *Symp.* 215a-223d.

47. This is one of the possibilities presented by Georgiadou & Larmour (1988: 199-200), although they do not connect it, as I think one should, with the ensuing appearance of Socrates.

48. Fantuzzi (2012: 188): 'Pseudo-Lucian has his memory shift from Homer to Aeschylus, thus revealing that it was difficult to find relevant instances in Homer, yet proving how easy it was (due to the intensity of feelings present in both stories) to fuse Homer's and Aeschylus' different versions into a single synchronic picture'.

Having established these basic patterns in the use of Achilles, we can now undertake more detailed analysis of Lucian's three most involved allusions to stories about Achilles, in three of his short dialogues. The heroic Achilles of Homeric epic is very much in evidence in the first two; by contrast, the third is concerned solely with the more 'romantic', not to say titillating, material.

2.2.2 — Achilles has a post-life crisis: *Dial. mort.* 26 (=15)

Achilles appears as a speaking character in only one dialogue, *Dial. mort.* 26 (=15). There the reader comes upon the shades of Achilles and Antilochus in Hades a short while after Odysseus and Achilles' meeting during Odysseus' *katabasis*.[49] Antilochus is one of the companions mentioned there as accompanying Achilles in the asphodel meadow, which explains his presence here (the others being Patroclus and Ajax).[50] Lucian has evidently selected Antilochus as he is the best placed of the three companions to provide a reasonably objective foil to Achilles' despair. Patroclus would bring unwanted complications, both because of the special nature of his relationship with Achilles and also because Achilles' death was so bound up with his

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49.   *Od.* 11.463-540. On Odysseus (and Achilles) in Hades, see Dova (2012: esp. 1-69).

50.   467-70. Achilles, Patroclus and Antilochus were considered to be buried (in varying permutations) in tumuli on a headland near to Troy itself, as reported to the shade of Achilles by the shade of Agamemnon (*Od.* 24.80-4): see Burgess (2009: ch.8) and, on Achilles' tomb, Kim (2010: 189-90). On the nature of this asphodel meadow and its relation to other conceptions of the afterlife, see Reece (2007).

own,[51] while Ajax's antipathy towards Odysseus (clearly in evidence at *Od.* 11.541-67) would colour any discussion he might have with Achilles on the subject of Odysseus' visit.[52] By contrast, Antilochus is a minor character in the *Iliad*, whose interactions with Achilles are limited, though he is not without significance. When he takes part in the controversial chariot-race, he is described as Achilles' 'dear friend' (φίλος ἦεν ἑταῖρος)[53] and Agamemnon's shade says that Achilles honoured Antilochus above his other companions, with the exception of Patroclus.[54]

Antilochus also shares in two exceptional moments of Achilles' life. On the one hand he brings news of Patroclus' death — Agamemnon says he is most suitable for the job — and is thus present at Achilles' darkest moment, when indeed he restrains Achilles, fearing that he might kill himself.[55] On the other hand, he is also present at Achilles' lightest moment: Antilochus is the only character in the whole

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51.   Burgess (2009: 72) notes that there is no evidence that Achilles' motivation for killing Memnon was revenge for Antilochus' death.

52.   Ajax discusses the matter with Agamemnon in *Dial. mort.* 23 (=29), where his final words leave no doubt: τὸν δ' οὖν Ὀδυσσέα μὴ οὐχὶ μισεῖν οὐκ ἄν δυναίμην, ὦ Ἀγάμεμνον, οὐδ' εἰ αὐτή μοι ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ τοῦτο ἐπιτάττοι. That the quarrel was over armour which had previously belonged to Achilles is another complicating factor.

53.   *Il.* 23.556.

54.   *Od.* 24.78-9.

55.   Antilochus brings the news: *Il.* 18.1-34. Agamemnon's assessment: 17.652-5. Achilles covered by a 'black cloud of grief': 18.22 (τὸν δ' ἄχεος νεφέλη ἐκάλυψε μέλαινα). Antilochus' fear: 18.32-4.

of the *Iliad* who manages to make Achilles smile, so his appearance in Lucian's piece is particularly appropriate.[56] Yet by the end of this dialogue it is Antilochus who is laughing at, and definitely not with, Achilles, after his efforts to cheer him have failed.[57] It is perhaps also significant that Antilochus is Nestor's son, so can easily fall into a 'wise advisor' role, while Patroclus and Ajax do not demonstrate deeply thoughtful characters.[58]

Antilochus' first words in the dialogue are more reminiscent of Platonic openings than are many of the other *Dial. mort.* The second word, πρῴην, in particular, recalls dialogues which open with one character referring to some earlier conversation or event.[59] The use of this device helps set the tone for the lofty philosophical content of this conversation, which touches on such Platonic themes

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56.   23.555-6: μείδησεν δὲ ποδάρκης Ἀχιλλεὺς | χαίρων Ἀντιλόχῳ, with Fantuzzi (2012: 136 n.92).

57.   Antilochus himself smiles (*Il.* 23.785-6) as he speaks warmly of Achilles. Lucian perhaps has in mind Aeschylus' *Memnon* and *Psychostasia*, of which we know little. He is not alone in identifying Antilochus as a good foil for Achilles: King (1987: 112-3), notes that a fragment of Accius' *Myrmidones* (*Myr.* 1, Ribbeck, 137) is from a speech of Achilles to Antilochus, responding to his accusation of 'obstinacy' (*pertinacia*) by reconceptualizing it as 'steadfastness' (*pervicacia*).

58.   Indeed when Ajax does appear (*Dial. mort.* 23 (=29)), he 'turns out to be a bad-tempered misanthrope in the manner of Timon' (Anderson (1976a: 171)).

59.   e.g. χθές at *Resp.* 1.327a, *Ti.* 17a, *Soph.* 216a and *Euthyd.* 271a, but Lucian is also closely recalling πρῴ from *Cri.* 43a and πρῴην from *Symp.* 172a. As Nesselrath (2001) has noted, such vocabulary is also characteristic of comedy and appears in other texts; context, as he suggests, is vital, and these words' appearance at the opening of a work is significant.

as the soul, man's place in the cosmos, and the nature of courage and knowledge. These Platonic echoes are especially appropriate here, since Achilles' words at *Od.* 11.489-91, which form the basis of the criticism of Achilles in this dialogue, are the first to be excised from the bowdlerised Homer proposed in Plato's *Republic*.[60]

Antilochus begins by musing that Achilles, apparently the epitome of nobility and bravery, has expressed 'very shameful' opinions (πολλὴ αἰσχύνη) more appropriate for some cowardly Phrygian (so making him no better than the Trojans against whom he has been fighting). Antilochus thus articulates the difficulty which a reader of the *Odyssey* feels in reconciling Achilles' words there with the Iliadic character, explained thus by Heubeck: 'Now that Achilles is dead, his spirit yearns for life with the same vehemence with which it had once embraced death.'[61] Achilles being fundamentally a contrary character, suggests Lucian, he will never be happy and perhaps even secretly quite enjoys moaning. Lucian's Achilles lets the reader see his reasoning: now that he knows what Hades is really like, where everyone is equal in honour and all are the same, he sees that glory is ultimately useless, so that what we might call his complicated relationship with the 'heroic code' in the *Iliad* has been vindicated — and yet he is still not content. Achilles contrasts with others in Lucian who approve of the equality which prevails in Hades, such as the humble cobbler Micyllus (*Cataplus* 15) and Achilles' own tutor Cheiron elsewhere in the

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60. *Resp.* 3.386c-387a. For similar reminiscence of Platonic narrative situations (such as *Resp.*, *Chrm.* and *Lysis*) in *Demosthenis laudatio*'s opening see Nünlist (2009b: 73-4).

61. Heubeck & Hoekstra (1989: 106).

same dialogue collection, who says that he hated life and loves the 'total democracy' (ἰσοτιμία πάνυ δημοτική) of Hades — indeed he has chosen it in preference to immortality.[62] That dialogue's moral, voiced by Menippus, contrasts with Achilles' view here: the sensible man will be satisfied with his lot and not think any of it unbearable.

In the course of his opening speech Antilochus mentions each of the three role models of Achilles' youth — teachers Cheiron and Phoenix, and father Peleus, who appear here from the more 'romantic' tradition, yet are all mentioned in the *Iliad*, with Phoenix playing an especially important role. Antilochus claims that Achilles has let each of them down, and closely paraphrases Achilles' own words from the conversation with Odysseus, quoting one phrase directly:

> βουλοίμην κ' ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ,
> ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ, ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη,
> ἢ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν.
>
> I should wish, living on the earth, to be the serf of another, of some man without property, whose livelihood is not abundant, rather than to be king over all the dead that have perished.[63]

> ἠκροώμην γάρ, ὁπότε ἔφης βούλεσθαι ἐπάρουρος ὢν θητεύειν παρά τινι τῶν ἀκλήρων, "ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη," μᾶλλον ἢ πάντων ἀνάσσειν τῶν νεκρῶν.
>
> I was listening when you said that you wished to be a serf, living on the earth, of any man from among those

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62. *Dial. mort.* 8.2 (=26.2). On these two passages see Anderson (1976a: 99-100).

63. *Od.* 11.489-91.

without property, 'whose livelihood is not abundant',
rather than to be king over all the dead.[64]

He ends his first speech with the choice of which Achilles himself had spoken in the
Iliad:

ἐξὸν ἀκλεῶς ἐν τῇ Φθιώτιδι πολυχρόνιον βασιλεύειν,
ἑκὼν προείλου τὸν μετὰ τῆς ἀγαθῆς δόξης θάνατον.

Though it was possible to rule for a long time without
renown in Phthia, you willingly chose death with good
renown.[65]

This emphasizes that Achilles made his choice 'willingly' (ἑκών); he should have no
grounds for complaint. In reply Achilles quotes his own words from his speech in
response to the embassy in the *Iliad*:

ἐν δὲ ἰῇ τιμῇ ἠμὲν κακὸς ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός.

Both bad and good, we are equal in honour.[66]

ἰσηγορία δὲ ἀκριβὴς καὶ νεκρὸς ὅμοιος, "ἠμὲν κακὸς
ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός."

There is complete equality of speech and each dead
man is alike, 'both bad and good'.[67]

The context of the quoted passage is the speech which Achilles directs to Odysseus;
indeed it seems that his recent visit from Odysseus has reminded him of that earlier

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64.   *Dial. mort.* 26.1 (=15.1).

65.   *Dial. mort.* 26.1 (=15.1); cf. *Il.* 9.410-16.

66.   *Il.* 9.319.

67.   *Dial. mort.* 26.2 (=15.2).

conversation. He is still obsessed with 'honour': already he has used the term ὁμοτιμία, and has just said that the Trojans do not fear him, nor the Achaeans honour him. By quoting the Odyssean phrase, Lucian presents an Achilles who remains intransigent, and whose opinions have not been changed by Odysseus' underworld visit any more than they were by his contribution to the embassy.[68] In fact things have become worse, since he now has an additional complaint about ἰσηγορία. Achilles' speech shows him still obsessed with social standing, as is revealed by his extensive use of the vocabulary of equality and its opposite.[69] Within a single sentence he has used six such words or phrases: ὁμοτιμία, ὅμοιοι, οὐδὲν ἀλλήλων διαφέροντες, οὔτε … δεδίασίν με οὔτε … θεραπεύουσιν, ἰσηγορία, ὅμοιος.

Achilles' awareness of the text of the *Iliad* is reinforced by the final word of his first sentence: ῥαψῳδήσουσιν inevitably recalls the arch-rhapsode Homer, so that in speaking of 'the men above' he is making a sidelong allusion to the very poem in which he appears as a character. There is a reference to the κλέα ἀνδρῶν of which Achilles himself had sung[70] but also an anachronistic reference to Homer who

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68. Note Σ BQT *Od.* 11.574: 'he [=Homer] demonstrates that those in Hades act in the same kind of fashion as they did among the living' (ὑποτίθεται τοὺς ἐν Ἅιδη τοιαῦτα πράττειν οἷα καὶ ἐν ζῶσιν ἐποίουν), and Tsagarakis (2000: 108).

69. It is, however, curious that Lucian's Achilles uses none of the words identified by Griffin (1986) as Achillean. This would suggest that Lucian did not consider this vocabulary significant enough to use as a means of characterizing Achilles. For detailed examination of the 'language of Achilles' in the *Iliad*, see also Martin (1989: ch.4).

70. *Il.* 9.189.

cannot possibly have completed the *Odyssey* yet, as Odysseus himself has only just reached the moment which he will be recounting in Book 11 of that poem. So when Antilochus quotes Achilles' words from Homer he is indirectly vouching for the poet's verbatim accuracy rather than quoting from him.[71]

In an ironic reversal of the end of the *Iliad*, Antilochus' next speech urges Achilles to approach his situation with stoicism/Stoicism, just as Achilles had explained in his speech to Priam how Zeus dispenses misery, before urging the old man to end his mourning.[72] Antilochus refers not to Zeus, but, making the same point, to the decree of Nature (ταῦτα γὰρ ἔδοξε τῇ φύσει). Just as Homer's Achilles had done, he employs the themes 'others in the same situation' (Peleus at *Il.*

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71.   The translation by Dryden and 'several eminent hands' misses this subtlety, but, by naming Homer, it makes the reference explicit: 'I did not know that all the Glory of the World is nothing but Smoke, whatsoever *Homer* and the other Poets may say of it' (Dryden et al. (1772: 33)). Kim (2010: 159-60) draws attention to the way in which gods and mortals who appear in Homer are often aware of the Homeric poems when they appear in Lucian: e.g. Zeus' quotation of the *Iliad* at *Icaromenippus* 30. I discuss this phenomenon above (§1.4) in connection with epithets; there too the goddesses' 'quotations' are from an *Iliad* which cannot yet have been composed.

72.   *Il.* 24.518-551. My formulation here in terms of philosophy looks forward to Antilochus' mention of the 'decree of Nature', which also suggests a retrojection of Stoic ideas to the Homeric world. cf. Boys-Stones (2013: 124): what philosophers do in consolations is 'to challenge the griever to reconceptualise their grief as a different sort of problem, a problem of emotional susceptibility'.

24.534-542; Odysseus, Heracles and Meleager in Lucian[73]), and 'fruitless desire for resurrection of dead heroes' (Hector in *Il.* 24.550-1; Heracles and Meleager in Lucian):

> ὅμως τί οὖν ἄν τις πάθοι, ὦ Ἀχιλλεῦ; ... μετὰ μικρὸν δὲ καὶ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἀφίξεται πάντως. ... ὁρᾷς τὸν Ἡρακλέα καὶ τὸν Μελέαγρον καὶ ἄλλους θαυμαστοὺς ἄνδρας, οἳ οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι δέξαιντο ἀνελθεῖν, εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ἀναπέμψειε θητεύσοντας ἀκλήροις καὶ ἀβίοις ἀνδράσιν.

> Nonetheless what can one do, Achilles? ... In a little while Odysseus too will surely arrive. ... You can see Heracles, Meleager, and the other marvellous men; they, I think, would not choose to return if one were to send them up to be serfs of men without property or livelihood.[74]

Such consolation is usually addressed to the living, an irony which further emphasizes how Achilles is still trying to cling to life, as well as adding to the topsy-turvy humour of this scene. Furthermore, it does not work; Stoic belief recommended that

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73.   As with Achilles, Heracles' presence in Hades was also a bone of contention — see my n.24 above and Burgess (2009: 103). By mentioning Heracles here Lucian may well therefore be making a deliberately provocative point about the implications of excluding *Od.* 11.602-4. See Bolling (1925: 212) for our confused information about the athetization of these lines.

74.   *Dial. mort.* 26.3 (=15.3).

consolations should be delayed by a year, but by Book 11 of the *Odyssey* Achilles has been dead for longer than this, and the consolation is still badly received.[75]

When Antilochus attempts to make the best of this situation, saying that at least all Achilles' old friends are there to share the experience with him, Achilles tries to contradict his earlier claim that all are equal. Now he wishes to present himself as the superior of his companions, telling them that if they will not admit that they are pining for their old life above, 'you are thereby my inferiors, through your putting up with it in silence' (ταύτῃ χείρους ἐστὲ καθ' ἡσυχίαν αὐτὸ πάσχοντες). The Homeric Achilles' obsession with τιμή as a reward for valiant deeds has become corrupted by the language of social standing.[76]

But Lucian will not let him have the last word, and the dialogue ends with a denial by Antilochus. In an intertextual joke, Antilochus claims that the other

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75.   On the Stoic belief see Newlands (2011: 61). Alan Sommerstein has ingeniously suggested to me the possibility of further humour in the way that Achilles' language recalls Epicurean belief in post-mortem equality (cf. Lucr. 3.1090-4) — which takes as its premise the lack of any afterlife at all. On Lucian's own 'half-earnest take-off or send-up of consolatory literature' in *De luctu*, see Konstan (2013), and note the dead son who says that he is perfectly happy and does not miss life at all — the opposite of Achilles — at *De luctu* 16. On *De luctu* see Andò (1984).

76.   This recalls the role of class-conflict in *Il.* 2 when the common soldier Thersites is punished for making points not dissimilar from Achilles' own in *Il.* 1: for ancient and modern discussion of this point see Acosta-Hughes (2011: 1-2). It is therefore somewhat piquant when Quintus Smyrnaeus has Thersites rebuke Achilles (*Posthomerica* 1.723-40), on which see MacIver (2012: 75-9). On Thersites as 'mock orator' and 'parodist', see Halliwell (2008: 75-6).

shades are Achilles' 'betters' (ἀμείνους) — better, that is, than the character who declared himself 'best of the Achaeans'.[77] It is much preferable, Antilochus continues, for the others to keep quiet, to grin and bear it, for otherwise they will incur laughter just as Achilles has. There is nothing especially amusing to the living reader in what Achilles has been saying; nor did Odysseus react with laughter. It is to his fellow shades that Achilles has become a laughing-stock, and perhaps this is where the real humour of the dialogue lies. Achilles, so obsessed with his own position in the eyes of others in the *Iliad*, has now inadvertently ensured that his peers will dismiss him for eternity as an unheroic whiner.

We have seen that the dialogue has a Platonic air; this impression is reinforced by the appearance of these same Achillean motifs in works of Plato. Achilles' words in the Underworld top the list of passages singled out by Socrates in *Republic* 3 for deletion lest they spread fear of death (386c),[78] and the lines are repeated in Book 7 (516d). At *Apology* 28d, Socrates offers a précis of Thetis' and Achilles' words from *Il.* 18.88-121, a passage not included in Lucian's dialogue. But what is significant is Plato's use of the word καταγέλαστος, which does not appear in the Homeric text but is in Socrates' summary: 'so that I do not remain here looking ridiculous' (ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος). The words of Antilochus which also present the idea of being a 'laughing-stock' (γέλωτα ὄφλωμεν) in Lucian

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77.   ἄριστον Ἀχαιῶν, *Il.* 1.244.

78.   The connection was seen by Hemsterhuis, whose note appears as the epigraph to this section.

therefore recall how Achilles is presented in the Plato passage rather than Homer, with the Lucianic twist that Achilles now finds himself in precisely the same position in the Underworld as Socrates says he had on earth.[79]

2.2.3 — A *miles gloriosus*: *Dial. meretr.* 13

The world of *Dial. meretr.* is at first sight far removed from that of the Homeric heroes, with its courtesans drawing instead on the more humble genres of comedy and mime.[80] Yet in two of these conversations Achilles is mentioned, in each case when a character is compared to him. In dialogue 13 the courtesan herself speaks only a little, occasionally getting a word in while being chatted up by the garrulous soldier Leontichus. As the dialogue begins he is urging his companion Chenidas to tell the courtesan Hymnis of his numerous feats of bloody derring-do.[81] However, Leontichus cannot resist the opportunity to tell the stories himself, and Chenidas is left to play a subservient role, stepping in with the occasional reminder or

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79.   King (1987: 108 & 105) discusses these Plato passages. Another part of Achilles' speech to Odysseus in *Il.* 9 is quoted in Pl. *Cri.* 44a-b.

80.   Anderson (1976a: 94): 'He compiled the whole set by manipulating "typical" New Comic material rather than paraphrasing known plays'. Note Lucian's own claim at *Prometheus es* 6 to have brought together Comedy and Dialogue.

81.   For discussion of this dialogue, and bibliography on its links to Comedy, see Bompaire (1958: 205-7).

corroboration. But Chenidas does have an important function, explaining that people said that Leontichus looked just like Achilles.

Elsewhere in Lucian comparisons are made between Achilles and later generals: in praising those who combine theoretical knowledge with the practical ability to make constructive use of it, in the opening section of *Hippias,*[82] he names among his examples four generals, two from the Trojan War and two from historical times. The former are Agamemnon and Achilles, the latter Alexander and Pyrrhus.[83] The association of Achilles and Alexander is an obvious one, deriving from Alexander himself, who took the *Iliad* on campaign with him, and from the comparisons in Plutarch's *Life*.[84] Plutarch goes one step further in the *Life of Pyrrhus*, where

> Achilles and Alexander merge into one another as the paradigm of what a leader and hero should be ... . But there are also passages where Pyrrhus can be compared directly to Achilles; he is a man, we feel,

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82. On this work I agree with Bompaire (2003a: 32): 'Il n'y a pas de raison de le considérer comme apocryphe.' Indeed the Platonic feel of its opening (which boils down to a Socratic question 'Is one to be considered best at some *tekhnē* by being able to talk about it or to do it?') makes it similar to other works I am discussing in connection with Achilles. See further Appendix 1.

83. Alexander and Pyrrhus have suitably Homeric names, which may not be accidental.

84. Plut., *Alex.* 5.5 (Lysimachus as 'Phoenix', Alexander 'Achilles', and Philip 'Peleus'), 8.2 & 26.1 (reverence for the *Iliad*), 15.4-5 (reverence for Achilles). On these Homeric comparisons in Plutarch see Mossman (1988) and Mossman (2006). See further Whitmarsh (2002) and, on Alexander's association with Homeric heroes elsewhere, Lightfoot (2003: 475).

who comes very close to glory in the moments of crisis
to which these comparisons always refer.[85]

At *Adversus indoctum* 4 comes an allusion to the futility of what Hopkinson calls Alexander's 'hopes of osmotic inspiration' in having the *Iliad* under his pillow;[86] despite noting the parallel to Alexander, Hopkinson makes no further comment on the purpose of the allusion, which is presumably a contrast between Alexander's education by no less a figure than Aristotle and the book-collector's lack of *paideia*: Alexander had earned the right to keep the *Iliad* under his pillow because he had studied it. The knowledgeable reader will have been alerted to the significance of Aristotle by mention in the previous sentence of Sulla's purloining of a library, which supposedly included works of Aristotle.[87]

Leontichus' name is also attached to a character in *Philopseudes*, so Ogden suggests that 'Leontichus may be a name given to a liar-type'.[88] This *miles gloriosus'*

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85. Mossman (1992: 91-2).

86. Hopkinson (2008: 124).

87. Plut., *Sull.* 26.1-2, with a suggestive similarity between Lucian's victim and the 'careless and illiterate' people into whose care Plutarch says these books had come. The whole situation may also allude to Xen., *Mem.* 4.2.9-12, where Socrates says Euthydemus cannot learn virtue from his collection of books, even though he might think they make him educated.

88. Ogden (2007: 30), who observes further: 'This would fit neatly with the fact that he [i.e. Leontichus in *Philopseudes*] had until recently been tarrying amongst the company of the "liars" in Eucrates' house'.

name is perhaps inspired by the Athenian commander in the Corinthian War,[89] but there is no obvious reason why Lucian would be alluding to him, unless the joke is simply that a very obscure commander is pompous and vainglorious enough to liken himself to Achilles. In any case there can be no attempt at straightforward identification: Lucian's soldier cannot be a fourth-century Athenian, since he is fighting Galatians and is a peltast — he has a πέλτη — not a hoplite. He and Chenidas have speaking names, respectively 'Mini-Lion' and 'FitzGoose',[90] so that Leontichus

89. Xen., *Hell.* 5.1.26. In contrast to Chenidas' name — otherwise unattested and perhaps coined by Lucian here — 'Leontichus' is well attested (especially in Attica): see volumes 1-3B of the *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names*, s.v. Λεόντιχος. The name is not uncommon in literature: there is a carpenter of this name in Leonidas' epigram *AP* 6.205 (= *HE* 1992-2001), while a Leontichus buries a drowned man in Callimachus, *AP* 7.277 (= *HE* 1265-8). In more amatory vein, a Leontichus appears in ps.-Stesichorus, *PMGF* Spur. 278 Davies, according to Strabo 8.3.20. He falls in love with his cousin Rhadine: see too Paus. 8.5.13.

90. I am grateful to Alan Sommerstein for suggesting these renderings of the names. As Kanavou (2011: 2-3) writes: 'All Greek personal names are etymologically significant, and though their significance would often be little noticed in every-day life, it could come alive in literature and, usually in the case of main heroes, establish a deeper link between a name and the essence of a person.' But see also the caveats in Storey's review of this book (Storey 2011). A similar association of Achilles with an animal appears in a Pompeiian graffito (*CIL* IV 8873, which is 'lectu arduus'): line 3 reads 'The giraffe has a heart like Achilles, because of its clearness' (*came<l>opardus abet cor ut Acille<s> ob clarit[atem]*); i.e., the giraffe is like Achilles in its bravery and distinctive appearance. On this text see Woeckner (2002: 68-72), who emphasizes the irony in this characterisation since 'the Romans quickly discovered that [the giraffe's] appearance was more remarkable than its ferocity. ... So the giraffe is not brave because of its *claritas*, its distinctive appearance. In fact, it is quite the opposite of what it appeared to be at first glance' (71). This parallels Lucian's presentation of 'Mini-Lion's' Achillean appearance as contrasting with his crass buffoonishness.

is less formidably leonine than he thinks he is,[91] and Chenidas is fulfilling a kind of 'guard-dog' role.[92]

What is alleged to give Leontichus the air of an Achilles is his armour:

ΛΕ.	εἰπέ, ὦ Χηνίδα, τίνι με τότε πάντες εἴκαζον;
ΧΗ.	τίνι δὲ ἄλλῳ ἢ Ἀχιλλεῖ, νὴ Δία, τῷ Θέτιδος καὶ Πηλέως; οὕτως ἔπρεπε μέν σοι ἡ κόρυς, ἡ φοινικὶς δὲ ἐπήνθει καὶ ἡ πέλτη ἐμάρμαιρεν.
Leontichus	Say, Chenidas, to whom did everyone then liken me?
Chenidas	Who other than Achilles, by Zeus, Thetis' and Peleus' son? Your helmet suited you so well, your red cloak stood out so much, and your shield flashed so.[93]

This recalls in a general way the description of Achilles' new armour in *Il.* 18 and 19. However, since the divine origins and remarkable qualities of the shield of Achilles are especially prominent in the Homeric description, Leontichus' very shield — that less impressive πέλτη — bears silent witness to his un-Achillean character. There are further reminiscences of the *Iliad* in this dialogue: Leontichus fondly believes that his appearance in full armour would be sure to impress Hymnis, but the tales of

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91. Orators aim to appear 'lion-like', to express virility: see Gleason (1995: 73-4).

92. Geese, alongside dogs, guarded the Capitol: Livy 5.47, Prop. 3.3.12, Cic., *Pro Sext. Rosc.* 56, Verg., *Aen.* 8.655, Plut., *De fort. Rom.* 12 [= *Mor.* 325c] & *Quaest. Rom.* 98 [= *Mor.* 2.287b-d]. In a less (metaphorically and literally) elevated position, geese attack Encolpius in Oenothea's hut (Petron., *Sat.* 136.4).

93. *Dial. meretr.* 13.3.

his exploits have the disastrous effect of scaring her off.[94] In the 'post mortem' discussion after her departure (5) Chenidas identifies two problems: not just the telling of the gory stories[95] but the shaking of his helmet's crest (ἐπισείων λόφους). The use of λόφος recalls the word's appearance in the episode when Hector tries to embrace his son Astyanax before leaving to fight; Astyanax, however, is terrified by the crest of his helmet.[96] The tenderness of the scene with Astyanax contrasts with the boorishness — and the stomach-churning stories — of Leontichus' wooing. Hymnis' characterization as a 'young girl' (παιδίσκην) strengthens this association with Astyanax. After the choice of Antilochus (who made Achilles smile in the *Iliad*) as Achilles' interlocutor in *Dial. mort.* 15 (=26), Lucian has here homed in on another moment when Homeric characters temporarily lighten their mood: 'his dear father and lady mother laughed out loud' (ἐκ δ' ἐγέλασσε πατήρ τε φίλος καὶ πότνια μήτηρ).[97]

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94.   Note the Trojans' terrified reponse to Patroclus' appearance in Achilles' (original) armour (*Il.* 16.283), which, according to Σ T, caused Aristotle to declare the line Homer's 'most awe-inspiring' (δεινότατον τῶν ἐπῶν Ὁμήρου).

95.   The level of detail in these stories (impaling a rider and his horse with a single spear; splitting a head in two, helmet and all; being wounded above the knee; driving a lance through shield and chest; chopping off a head and sticking it on the end of a spear) recalls the detail and anatomical exactitude in the *Iliad*'s battlefield descriptions.

96.   *Il.* 6.466-71; for this theme see pp.63-4 above.

97.   6.471. On the laughter here, and Andromache's 'more ambiguous laughter' at 6.484 (δακρυόεν γελάσασα), see Halliwell (2008: 53-5).

The figure of Chenidas makes this double-act work, but also gives the dialogue extra depth. His second speech includes a self-characterization which seems applicable both to a parasitic and erotic relationship:[98]

> κἀγὼ ἔδεισα τότε, ὦ Λεόντιχε, καὶ οἶσθα ὡς εἰχόμην
> σου δεόμενος μὴ προκινδυνεύειν· ἀβίωτα γὰρ ἦν μοι
> σοῦ ἀποθανόντος.
>
> And then I was afraid, Leontichus, and you know how I
> held on to you, begging you not to bear the brunt of
> battle — for my life would have been unbearable if you
> had died.[99]

In either kind of relationship, Chenidas' enthusiastic 'help' of Leontichus can be interpreted as part of an attempt to make Leontichus appear as unappealing as possible to Hymnis lest she divert attention from himself. By suggesting that it was only Leontichus' armour that made him resemble Achilles, Chenidas is implying that without such armour the similarity is less marked. Compare *Adversus indoctum* 7, where if Thersites were to put on Achilles' armour, he would not become suddenly either καλός or ἰσχυρός, in both of which qualities he is Achilles' archetypal opposite.[100] Nor, Lucian continues, would he be able to perform all the deeds which Achilles performs in *Il.* 19. In fact, he would make himself 'a laughing-stock' (γέλωτα ἂν ὀφλισκάνοι — the same phrase Antilochus uses of Achilles in *Dial.*

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98.   In particular, the passage recalls Andromache's reaction when Hector departs for battle (*Il.* 6.409-13).

99.   *Dial. meretr.* 13.2.

100.   See Achilles' description at *Il.* 2.211-24.

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mort. 26 (=15)). The point of that mythological exemplum is that the incompetent bibliophile whom Lucian is attacking reads from his *de luxe* editions with such a lack of understanding that he offends against the work's beauty in just the same way as the ugly Thersites would offend both Hephaestus and Achilles by making a spectacle of himself in armour he has no business to be wearing.[101] Hopkinson points out that such an argument is often put in the mouth of Ajax in his contest with Odysseus over the armour;[102] Lucian has humorously taken this cliché one stage further in applying it to the man whom Odysseus himself treats with disdain and physical abuse.

Chenidas, then, seems to be using the comparison of Leontichus to Achilles as a means of exploiting the ambiguity in the Achilles-Patroclus relationship, presenting a parasitic relationship[103] in such a way that it could be understood as though it were also erotic. As we have already observed, the confusion and obfuscation in *De parasito* and *Toxaris* show that Lucian sees these kinds of relationship as potentially tricky to distinguish. In particular, the strength of expression in Chenidas' 'life would not be worth living' language recalls the uxorious Admetus in Euripides' *Alcestis*, in which the Chorus uses the same adjective

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101.   The vocabulary emphasizes this: καταισχύνων is used of the bibliophile and αἰσχύνων of Thersites.

102.   Hopkinson (2008: 127).

103.   The comic clever-slave character sometimes holds such a position: e.g. Phormio in Terence's *Phormio.*

ἀβίωτος to describe what Admetus' life will be like following Alcestis' death.[104] This connection is especially significant since Admetus and Alcestis are presented alongside Achilles and Patroclus in Plato's *Symposium*.[105]

Leontichus seems to have realized that Chenidas has been less than helpful, although he makes no accusation of sabotage (which he might not be quick-witted enough to notice), when he says

> ἀλλὰ καὶ σύ με προσαπολώλεκας, ὦ Χηνίδα, τὸ μονομάχιον ὑποβαλών.
>
> But you also did for me, Chenidas, by suggesting the topic of the single combat.[106]

Chenidas is quick enough to lay the blame firmly at Leontichus' door: it was all his fault for getting carried away and saying he stuck a head on a spear.

If the reader takes the route of understanding Chenidas to be an erotic partner, Chenidas 'stands for' Patroclus, since Leontichus is compared to Achilles.[107] So, after losing the girl (= Briseis), through his own stupidity rather than the interference of an Agamemnon-figure, Leontichus refuses to climb down

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104. Eur., *Alc.* 241-3: ὅστις ἀρίστης | ἀπλακὼν ἀλόχου τῆσδ' ἀβίωτον | τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον βιοτεύσει. The word refers at Eur., *Ion* 670 to the life Ion envisages for himself if he cannot find his mother; it also appears, somewhat parodically, at Ar., *Plut.* 969. See next note for Plato's connection Achilles/Patroclus ~ Admetus/Alcestis.

105. 179b-180a.

106. *Dial. meretr.* 13.5.

107. Whether Chenidas is *erastēs* or *erōmenos* is not relevant, since the roles of Achilles and Patroclus were controversial: see pp.93-4 above.

(= Achilles), by saying in his final speech that it was all lies, then dispatches Chenidas (= Patroclus) to carry on the 'fight' on his behalf, which is not against an enemy but in erotic pursuit. If Leontichus is as stupid as he seems, it is not so surprising as it otherwise might be that he is sending off Chenidas (who has perhaps already been sabotaging his efforts) to win over a rival for his affections, a job which Chenidas has no reason to perform with great diligence.

This identification with Achilles crystallises in the dilemma which Chenidas outlines at the end (6), in a comic version of Achilles' dilemma of long life or glory from *Iliad* 9:

> ἑλοῦ τοίνυν θάτερον ἢ μισεῖσθαι ἀριστεὺς εἶναι δοκῶν
> ἢ καθεύδειν μετὰ Ὑμνίδος ἐψεῦσθαι ὁμολογῶν.
>
> Choose, then, one or the other way — either to be
> hated while being thought valorous, or to sleep with
> Hymnis while agreeing to tell lies.

So here at the end of the dialogue a New Comedy-style plot develops, which fits neatly into the *Iliad*-template already prepared in the reader's mind by the earlier explicit comparison with Achilles. It makes Chenidas and Leontichus multivalent characters: as well as filling the epic roles of Patroclus and Achilles respectively, they are also acting in the New Comic roles of clever slave and dullard young master. At the same time, Chenidas is an Andromache to Leontichus' Hector, something emphasized by Hymnis' display of one noteworthy quality of Astyanax. Even if the reader does not view the Leontichus-Chenidas relationship as erotic they will still perceive the parallels in these story-types. Furthermore, the story-type of soldiers swapping armour, with the result that the wrong one is reported dead, is

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found in the plots of Menander's *Aspis* and *Misoumenos*, and is obviously indebted to Patroclus' wearing of Achilles' armour. Comedy itself can resemble *tragic* plots, as in Menander's *Samis* the grouping Demeas-Moschion-Chrysis recalls Theseus-Hippolytus-Phaedra,[108] and according to Aristotle, Homer is the archetypal poet of 'serious matters' (τὰ σπουδαῖα) and of 'the form of comedy' (τὸ τῆς κωμῳδίας σχῆμα).[109] Here, then, Lucian is bringing together Homer, comedy and perhaps also tragedy.

2.2.4 — The womanly man from Scyros and the manly woman from Lesbos: *Dial. meretr.* 5

This dialogue has excited more scholarly interest than the other *Dial. meretr.*, being one of the few ancient texts which treat female homosexuality in any depth.[110] It is relevant to a discussion of Achilles as it includes an allusion to an episode from the 'romantic' tradition, namely his concealment by Thetis among the girls on Scyros.[111]

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108. The correspondences (both general and more close) are set out by Sommerstein (2013: 36-40, with bibliography in nn.105 & 106).

109. Arist. *Poet.* 1.4 (1448b34-8). Pl., *Resp.* 10.607a describes Homer as the first tragedian.

110. On the whole dialogue see Gilhuly (2006), who does not discuss the Achilles question but argues that the primary intertext is Aristophanes' speech in Plato's *Symposium*. See too Haley (2002), and Bissa (2013).

111. See Apollod., *Bibl.* 3.13.8 and, for detail on the whole Scyros story, Fantuzzi (2012: ch.2).

This tradition competes with Homer's military explanation for Achilles' visit to Scyros.[112]

The Vinedresser of Philostratus' *Heroicus* (who alleges that he has information from no less an authority than Protesilaus) also offers a more heroic account, more detailed than Homer's, in which Achilles sacked Scyros to avenge Theseus' death at the hands of Lycomedes.[113] In the version in Statius' *Achilleid*, Achilles is hidden beneath women's clothing, but his innate manliness is revealed when he cannot repress his desire for the instruments of war which Odysseus has brought to tempt him.[114]

In Lucian's dialogue Clonarion questions Leaena on rumours that she is romantically involved with a rich woman, Megilla, from Lesbos. Lucian quickly establishes Megilla as a very butch woman, in contrast to the more feminine (and naïve) Leaena: he uses the phrases 'like a man' (ὥσπερ ἄνδρα), 'terribly manly' (δεινῶς ἀνδρική), 'masculine-looking women' (γυναῖκας ἀρρενωπούς), 'like men'

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112. *Il.* 9.666-8; cf. 19.326-7 and 24.467. See Heslin (2005), 202-7, and Dowden (1989: 53-5) for Homer's silence on the transvestism story. The episode is included at *De saltu* 46 among the themes which form the pantomime repertoire; it suits well a genre whose typical performers and audience members are repeatedly characterised by Crato as womanly, cinaedic (1-5) and even in danger of becoming women (3).

113. Philost., *Her.* 45.8-46.6.

114. Stat., *Achil.* 207-396.

(ὥσπερ οἱ ἄνδρες), and so on.[115] Leaena is eventually persuaded to tell the full story. After a drinking-party which they had organized, Megilla and Demonassa persuaded Leaena to join them in bed. Then Megilla took off her wig, revealing close-cropped hair, asked to be called Megillus, and claimed to be married to Demonassa. At this point comes the comparison with Achilles: Leaena laughed and suggested that Megilla had been hoodwinking people just as Achilles did among the maidens. But she has not quite understood, as she still thinks that Megilla must be a man in drag (3):

> οὐκοῦν σύ, ὦ Μέγιλλε, ἀνήρ τις ὢν ἐλελήθεις ἡμᾶς, καθάπερ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα φασὶ κρυπτόμενον ἐν ταῖς παρθένοις καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἐκεῖνο ἔχεις καὶ ποιεῖς τὴν Δημώνασσαν ἅπερ οἱ ἄνδρες;

> Surely, Megillus, you are a man and have escaped our notice, just as they say Achilles was hidden among the maidens, and you have that thing men have, and you do Demonassa as men do?

On discovering that this is not the case Leaena has two further suggestions: is Megilla a 'hermaphrodite' or has she suffered the same fate as Teiresias who was changed from woman to man? But none of this is correct: Megilla is not, nor has she ever been, anything other than female. Brooten writes:

> Thus, for Lucian, sexual love between women does not originate from women's having male genitals. For

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115. See further on this Brooten (1996: 51-3). For bibliography on attempts to locate Megilla within a butch/femme spectrum see Bissa (2013: 80 n.2).

Lucian, the mind seems to be the most powerful sex organ.[116]

And yet, as Luc Brisson notes in his discussion of this dialogue, nonetheless

homosexual women lose the natural characteristics of their sex. They are, as it were, caricatures of males and appear as one of nature's phenomena. They are, in fact, described as transvestites.[117]

Leaena's first guesses were therefore quite wrong, since the transvestite Achilles maintains his male identity and the 'natural characteristics' of his sex during his stay on Scyros, as he is easily tempted away to the male sphere of warfare and he still feels 'heterosexual' desire for Deidameia, so he is merely imitating a woman by dressing up.[118] This is unlike Megilla, whose female clothing and wig are concealing a manliness which she has assumed, making hers a double concealment, and it is this double aspect which Leaena finds hard to understand: in her conception the dressing-up is more straightforward than it really is.

This dialogue is just one example (albeit by far the most arresting) of Lucian's association of Achilles with dressing-up of various sorts. The reason for this is not hard to discover: in the course of his career Achilles is associated with putting

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116.   Brooten (1996: 52).

117.   Brisson (2002: 69).

118.   This sense of distancing from the idea that a character has 'become' a woman can be seen too in Ach. Tat. 6.1.3, when Clitophon, dressed in female clothing, is compared not to Achilles on Scyros, but to a painting of Achilles on Scyros; cf. Chaereas' being likened to *depictions* of Achilles (pp.92-3 above).

on new and distinctive dress not once but twice — female clothing on Scyros and new armour in the middle of the *Iliad*.[119]

Already in *Dial. meretr.* 13 we have seen how two characters can use Achilles' armour for their own purposes, and how a Thersites who tries to pass himself off as an Achilles by wearing 'Achillean' armour will not deceive anyone. In another example, from *Piscator*, we move to the stage, with Parrhesiades attacking the personified Philosophia by saying that those who profess to be lovers of philosophy/Philosophia are lovers of 'only the reputation of the thing' (δόξης μόνον τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος), and put on the outward appearance of philosophers — just like an actor who plays the part of Achilles, Theseus, or Heracles, but who is himself 'soft and effeminate' (μαλθακὸς ... καὶ γυναικεῖος), 'neither walking nor declaiming in a heroic manner' (μήτε βαδίζων μήτε βοῶν ἡρωϊκόν).[120] Contrast this reaction to

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119. His new armour in the *Iliad* replaces the divine armour which, according to non-Homeric accounts, either Thetis had obtained for him, or, following *Il.* 17.194-7 & 18.84-5, Peleus received at his wedding and passed on to Achilles: see Edwards (1990: 316-21). On the origins of this armour, and the 'hall of mirrors' which its changing ownership creates in the *Iliad*, see Burgess (2009: 16).

120. *Piscator* 31.

unheroic men dressing up as heroes[121] with *De domo* 4, where, alluding to *Il.* 19.16 and 19.384, Lucian shows how the speaker is inspired by a splendid location for his declamation just as Achilles was inspired when he put on his splendid new armour — in fact when he was merely trying it out, or even as soon as he saw it:

> ... τὴν ὄψιν τῶν ὅπλων ἐπιτεῖναι κατὰ τῶν Φρυγῶν
> τὴν ὀργήν, καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐνέδυ αὐτὰ πειρώμενος, ἐπαρθῆναι
> καὶ πτερωθῆναι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πολέμου ἐπιθυμίαν ...
>
> ... the sight of his armour heightened his anger against
> the Phrygians, and when he put it on to try it, he was
> elated and excited to enthusiasm for war ... .

Here it suits the speaker's purpose to have Achilles once more an uncomplicated archetype of godlike martial valour. Homer's Achilles can be straightforwardly Homer's non-transvestite Achilles when he needs to be, but if there is a joke to be made his dressing-up can become less heroic. Lucian's focus on Achilles as an archetype of changing dress obscures the degree to which Odysseus too has memorable changes of costume, whether to cover his nakedness when he receives new clothes after landing on Nausicaa's beach, or when he successfully conceals his identity by dressing in beggar's rags on his return to Ithaca. When this latter costume is alluded to by Lucian, it is in a context (*Hercules* 8) which celebrates

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121. Heracles is employed in similar fashion at *Adversus indoctum* 23, where if one of the book-collector's cinaedic friends should dress up as Heracles no one would be deceived; Heracles can easily be used rather than Achilles as Heracles also has an association with specific clothing and accoutrements — his lion-skin and club. Several of Lucian's characters dress up (e.g. Dionysus, Menippus), but in the case of Dionysus and Heracles, the earlier tradition has them dressing in recognisable clothes (Ar., *Ran.*), and probably this is true of Menippus too.

his cleverness and associates him with oratorical success,[122] which contrasts with his own ability to use a trick to 'see through' Achilles' disguise. Unsurprisingly, such Odyssean cunning will feature often in the following section, in which I examine how Lucian uses the figure of Odysseus.

2.3 — Odysseus

2.3.1 — Lucian's Odysseus

As Stanford has demonstrated, 'of all the characters in Greek mythology, Odysseus (as representing pure intelligence) is the most ambivalent'.[123] Ancient authors take full advantage of the opportunities for exploring the less palatable aspects of his wiliness. As with Achilles, Lucian's Odysseus is a predictable paradigm; for sharpness of wits he is the obvious choice at *Timon* 23, where Plutus describes how a nouveau riche surrounds himself with flatterers who call him better looking than Nireus, nobler than Cecrops or Codrus, 'more intelligent' (συνετώτερος) than Odysseus and richer than sixteen Croesuses.

Likewise Odysseus' loquacity is proverbial: so at *Bacchus* 7 an old man's increasing inebriation is described, at first causing him to become quiet (ἐπὶ πολὺ ἄφωνος) before he ends up as talkative as Odysseus, who is referred to as 'that

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122. He maintains the disguise even while uncovering his thigh and exciting comment on it at *Od.* 18.74, the line which Lucian quotes.

123. Davison (1956: 10), reviewing Stanford (1954).

orator of Homer's' (τὸν Ὁμήρου ἐκεῖνον ῥήτορα), and more closely identified by quotation of *Il.* 3.222 (νιφάδεσσιν ἐοικότα χειμερίῃσιν). This passage, being about oratory, is a favourite of Lucian's: he makes another reference to 'that famous orator of Homer's' (ὁ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος), quoting *Il.* 3.219, at *De domo* 17, and alludes again to *Il.* 3.222 at *Demosthenis laudatio* 5. The episode from which these two lines come is what Whitmarsh calls 'a cautionary tale': Antenor speaks of how Menelaus looked better, but Odysseus was much the better speaker, which brings to the fore the problems of appearance and reality, and of 'the person who strategically mismatches exterior and interior'.[124]

His vicious qualities of cunning and mendacity form a third characteristic, which appears at *Philopseudes* 1, albeit with acknowledgement that the 'mismatch' inherent in lying might be necessary for a virtuous purpose.[125] The example given is of Odysseus, 'striving to win his own soul and his companions' return' (τήν τε αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν ἀρνύμενος καὶ τὸν νόστον τῶν ἑταίρων), in a prosaic version of *Od.* 1.5. Less honourable are his feigning of madness to avoid going to Troy (a scene represented in one of the pictures at *De domo* 30), and his framing of Palamedes (*Calumnia* 28).

Lucian's references to Odysseus explore these aspects but also focus on comparisons of certain situations to specific episodes from his *nostos*. His filling of his companions' ears with wax is used three times: at *Charon* 23 ignorant people have ears which are metaphorically filled with wax, while a stingy host has wine-

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124. Whitmarsh (2004a: 48).

125. A Platonic idea — the 'noble lie' at *Resp.* 3.414c.

pourers who are deaf to calls for more wine, as though their ears were stopped with wax (*Saturnalia* 32); and sailing past temptations must be done in the manner of Odysseus, but with the important difference, according to Nigrinus, that one must neither be bound nor have ears filled but pass by 'truly contemptuously' (ἀληθῶς ὑπερήφανον, *Nigrinus* 19).[126] As one would expect from an author so interested in the afterlife and the Underworld, Odysseus' *katabasis* is referred to several times, most notably in *VH*.

As with Achilles, I base this discussion of Lucian's Odysseus around three Lucianic moments where he plays a key role. Odysseus' contest with Ajax for the arms of Achilles forms the background for *Dial. mort.* 23 (=29); his written words are quoted in *VH* 2.35; and although we hear nothing from him directly in *Dial. mar.* 2 (=2) the entire dialogue consists of a rival account, from his adversary's point of view, to his own telling of the Polyphemus episode.

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126.   For a fuller examination of the ear-stopping theme, see further §5.2 below.

2.3.2 Ajax on Odysseus: *Dial. mort.* 23 (=29)

This dialogue resembles *Dial. mort.* 26 (=15), where Antilochus and Achilles chat after Odysseus' visit to the Underworld.[127] Here the interlocutors are Ajax and Agamemnon, the subject matter the *Odyssey's* only reference to Ajax (11.542-64), again part of Odysseus' visit.[128] Agamemnon begins by asking the reason for Ajax's recent behaviour. His curiosity is primarily about why Ajax continues to hold Odysseus responsible instead of acknowledging that it was his own madness that caused his death. The reader then learns what the occasion is, with a mention of the *Odyssey* episode: why did Ajax walk past Odysseus without looking at him or

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127. This is one of several pairs of mini-dialogues that are perhaps to be read together; we shall see two other examples involving Achilles and Odysseus. The first two dialogues of *Dial. mar.* concern Polyphemus in, respectively, his Theocritean and Homeric incarnations, with the final speech of the first dialogue providing a bridge to the second (apparently the original arrangement, the manuscripts being unanimous in their ordering of the first four and last four dialogues: see Hopkinson (2008: 199)). In the first, Polyphemus is described as a cannibal, looking forward to Odysseus' visit outlined in the second. Likewise there are similarities between *Dial. mar.* 2, where Polyphemus describes his sufferings at Odysseus' hands, and *Dial. mar.* 10 (=11), where Xanthus describes his sufferings at the hands of Achilles and Hephaestus (*Il.* 21.211-327). On the links of *Dial. mort.* 26 (=15) and 23 (=29) with the *Odyssey* see Bompaire (1958: 367): 'Les deux chries ... s'inscrivent "en marge" de l'épopée; le lien est même expressément indiqué puisque elle est annoncée "la venue prochaine d'Ulysse".' He also (561) identifies 'un groupe homérique' of 26 (=15), 27 (=19), 28 (=23), 23 (=29).

128. On this dialogue see Anderson (1993: 174-6). He writes: 'The *eidōlopoiia* involves a slight alteration in time and speaker, and a less formal medium; but now Ajax has the air of a bad-tempered spoilsport instead of a tragic hero' (175).

speaking to him? But, as with Achilles, the main subject matter of the dialogue is not closely tied to this specific moment, instead covering the background to the scene and Ajax's subsequent reaction to it.

Here is Agamemnon's account of what happened:

> εἰ σὺ μανείς, ὦ Αἶαν, σεαυτὸν ἐφόνευσας, ἐμέλλησας δὲ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἅπαντας, τί αἰτιᾷ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα καὶ πρῴην οὔτε προσέβλεψας αὐτόν, ὁπότε ἧκεν μαντευσόμενος, οὔτε προσειπεῖν ἠξίωσας ἄνδρα συστρατιώτην καὶ ἑταῖρον, ἀλλ' ὑπεροπτικῶς μεγάλα βαίνων παρῆλθες;

> If you went mad and killed yourself, Ajax, when you meant to kill us all, why do you blame Odysseus and just recently didn't look at him, when he came to visit the prophet, and why did you not deign to address the man who is your fellow-soldier and comrade, but went striding past him contemptuously?

This gives more detail than the Homeric Odysseus' version:

> ὣς ἐφάμην, ὁ δέ μ' οὐδὲν ἀμείβετο, βῆ δὲ μετ' ἄλλας
> ψυχὰς εἰς Ἔρεβος νεκύων κατατεθνήωτων.
> ἔνθα χ' ὅμως προσέφη κεχολωμένος, ἤ κεν ἐγὼ τόν·
> ἀλλά μοι ἤθελε θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισι
> τῶν ἄλλων ψυχὰς ἰδέειν κατατεθνηώτων.

> So I said, but he answered me nothing, and went after the other souls of the dead into Erebos. He might still have spoken to me despite his anger, or I to him, but the heart in my dear breast wished to see the souls of the other departed ones.[129]

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129.   *Od.* 11.563-7. Ancient critics seem not to have suspected these lines as modern critics do (Tsagarakis (2000: 96 n.400)). Some did suspect 568-627: 'It is considered spurious, as far as [line 627]' (νοθεύεται, μέχρι τοῦ "ὡς εἰπὼν ὁ μὲν αὖθις ἔδυ δόμον Ἄιδος εἴσω", Σ Η *Od.* 11.568).

So the Homeric Odysseus claims to be not really concerned with reconciliation with Ajax, and has better things to be doing; in Lucian, Agamemnon continues the conversation which Odysseus did not, and also shows that he has been more attentive to Ajax's body language (ὑπεροπτικῶς μεγάλα βαίνων). The Homeric Odysseus seems particularly attuned to body language; in another tense situation it is Odysseus who is first to pick up on Ajax's silent nod to Phoenix to start speaking,[130] but in this interaction with Ajax he seems not to have felt it worthy of describing.[131] By showing how Agamemnon deals with the situation, Lucian prompts the reader to reconsider Odysseus' reactions from a more objective third-party viewpoint.

The end of the dialogue occasions the following observations from Murphy, in reference to *Od.* 11.547 (παῖδες δὲ Τρώων δίκασαν καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη ('The children of the Trojans judged, and Pallas Athena')):

> Homer, indeed, there gives no account how the Trojans and Pallas came to be judges … [Quintus Smyrnaeus] gives no account how Pallas was concerned in this affair; nor do I know how she came to have a hand in it (Homer and his commentators being silent upon the point), except that she might have interposed, as she was the patroness of Ulysses … , or might have swayed the opinions of her judges,

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130.   *Il.* 9.223.

131.   ὑπεροπτικός (LSJ: 'contemptuous, disdainful') implies avoidance of eye-contact. In *Od.* 11.84-9 & 152-3, Odysseus' mother also does not look him in the face: see D. Cairns (2005).

by virtue of her image, which Ulysses then produced.[132]

Murphy is puzzled because he is unaware of the version in the *Little Iliad*, which not only told how 'Odysseus [takes] the arms in accordance with Athena's wishes'[133] but also explained the reason for this: the Greeks sent men (at Nestor's instigation) who, by eavesdropping, overheard an argument between two girls, one of whom was inspired by Athena to argue for Odysseus to be considered braver than Ajax.[134]

Lucian seems untroubled by the question why the Trojans were the judges, since Agamemnon makes a point of telling Ajax that it was Trojans who judged Odysseus his superior,[135] using a noun cognate with Homer's verb (ἐπὶ Τρωσὶ δικασταῖς). But the unnecessary appearance of Athena in Ajax's final words at the end of the dialogue seems to allude to her mention in this Homeric line. The line was athetized by Aristarchus,[136] and the two allusions to it here suggest that Lucian

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132. Murphy (1804: 69-70).

133. Ὀδυσσεὺς κατὰ βούλησιν Ἀθηνᾶς λαμβάνει, as Proclus' summary puts it: Proclus, *Chrestomathia*, argument to *Little Iliad*, 1 (at West (2003a: 120-1)).

134. *Little Iliad*, fr.2 West.

135. There is also no suggestion in Sophocles' *Ajax* that the Trojans were involved.

136. Σ H *Od.* 11.547 says merely ἀθετεῖ Ἀρίσταρχος. Heubeck (Heubeck & Hoekstra (1989: 110)): 'The line was rejected by Aristarchus. Its content is too general to allow reconstruction of the form of the legend here alluded to.' cf. the explanations summarised in Merry & Riddell (1886: 492).

is aware of the controversy and is playing with the implications of including or excising the line.

Lucian plays two games when Athena is mentioned in Ajax's reply: 'I know who made the judgement against me — but it is not right to speak at all about the gods' (οἶδα ἐγώ, ἥτις μου κατεδίκασεν· ἀλλ' οὐ θέμις λέγειν τι περὶ τῶν θεῶν). First, one must remember the line of Homer to identify who lies behind ἥτις, as mention of her name is superstitiously avoided.[137] But the careful reader will also recall that Odysseus' speech had argued that another god, Zeus, was to blame for Ajax's death:

> οὐδέ τις ἄλλος
> αἴτιος, ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς Δαναῶν στρατὸν αἰχμητάων
> ἐκπάγλως ἤχθηρε, τεῒν δ' ἐπὶ μοῖραν ἔθηκεν.
>
> No one else is to blame, but Zeus terribly hated the
> army of Danaan spearmen, and brought your doom
> upon you.[138]

Odysseus had found himself having to try to shift the blame onto the gods, since he knew that it was his own entry into the contest which led to Ajax's humiliation and death,[139] and the best way to restore good relations with Ajax would be to say that matters were out of his control. The reaction of Lucian's Ajax suggests that he

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137. This recalls Sophocles' Menelaus talking vaguely of the frustration of Ajax's murderous attack by 'one of the gods' (θεῶν τις) at *Ajax* 1057 — although Ajax knows her identity perfectly well (ἀλλά μ' ἁ Διὸς | ἀλκίμα θεὸς | ὀλέθριον αἰκίζει 401-2): see Finglass (2012: 64-6).

138. *Od.* 11.558-60.

139. *Od.* 11.548.

knows that Odysseus is being deliberately vague when he talks of 'the gods' and Zeus, and when he omits any mention of Athena, who was actually behind what happened.[140] Ajax, in short, does not look charitably on Odysseus' attempts to evade his responsibility. This theme is taken even further in an anonymous epigram, which imagines Achilles trying to reconcile Ajax and Odysseus: Odysseus is not to blame, he says, but 'the strong hand of Athena killed you, and Zeus the father, and Fate, and the Erinys who walks in darkness' (βριαρὴ δέ σ' ἔπεφνεν Ἀθήνη, | Ζεύς τε πατήρ, καὶ Μοῖρα, καὶ ἠεροφοῖτις Ἐρινύς).[141] These Achillean attempts at metaphysical explanations can be traced back to the discussion between Achilles and Hector in *Il.* 22: Achilles says to Hector 'Athena will kill you through my spear', to which Hector responds that this was the plan of Zeus and Apollo from long ago.[142]

Moreover, since Ajax's interlocutor in Lucian is Agamemnon, the image with which the reader is left in the final sentence, of the mortal Ajax's defiance of Athena as she tries to prevent him from hating another mortal, recalls the famous passage in Book 1 of the *Iliad* where Athena grabs hold of Achilles' hair to stop him attacking Agamemnon,[143] but in that passage she nonetheless does not cause Achilles to end his hatred. Indeed, when Murphy writes that 'A friend hath observed that by Pallas may be meant, in Homer, the wisdom and judgement of the Trojans, in deciding this

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140. Athena is blamed by Sophocles' Ajax (*Aj.* 401-3 & 450-3) and Tecmessa (952-3).

141. *AP* 9.470.

142. 22.270-3 & 297-305.

143. 1.188-222.

matter',[144] he perhaps has in mind readings which interpret that incident in a 'psychological' fashion,[145] and also of Sophocles' play, where Odysseus is unable even to *start* hating Ajax, despite encouragement from Athena. Here Ajax concludes the dialogue: 'I could not stop hating Odysseus, even if Athena told me to'. This makes the dialogue both a response to the Homeric scene and an allusion to the Sophoclean heroes' psychology.

Discussion of this dialogue is made more difficult by our ignorance of other, non-Homeric sources for the suicide of Ajax. If, as seems likely, the *Aethiopis* and *Little Iliad* covered the story,[146] some of the arguments used by Ajax and Agamemnon here could derive from, and perhaps make play with, that source.

2.3.3 — Odysseus' letter to Calypso: *VH* 2.29-36

It is unsurprising that Odysseus features prominently in *VH*, Lucian's virtuoso display of mendacity. The narrator's prefatory remarks single out the tall tales which Odysseus spins for the Phaeacians and bewails the sort of people who fall for them:

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144.   Murphy (1804: 70).

145.   This was 'a notorious site for critical discussion' (Hunter (2009b: 195)); e.g. Heraclitus, *Quaest. Hom.* 17-20; Plut., *Quomodo adul.* 26d-e ('having become obedient to reason' (εὐπειθῆ τῷ λογισμῷ γενόμενον)).

146.   See Burgess (2001: 142-3), where the possibility of a Cyclic *nekyia* is also intriguing for the Lucianist.

ἀρχηγὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ διδάσκαλος τῆς τοιαύτης βωμολοχίας ὁ τοῦ Ὁμήρου Ὀδυσσεύς, τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀλκίνουν διηγούμενος ἀνέμων τε δουλείαν καὶ μονοφθάλμους καὶ ὠμοφάγους καὶ ἀγρίους τινὰς ἀνθρώπους, ἔτι δὲ πολυκέφαλα ζῷα καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ φαρμάκων τῶν ἑταίρων μεταβολάς, οἷα πολλὰ ἐκεῖνος πρὸς ἰδιώτας ἀνθρώπους τοὺς Φαίακας ἐτερατεύσατο.

Their originator and teacher in this kind of foolishness is Homer's Odysseus, who tells those in Alcinous' court about the slavery of winds, one-eyed men, cannibals, savage peoples, and even many-headed animals and his companions' metamorphoses under the influence of drugs — that man told many such amazing tales to the stupid folk of the Phaeacians.[147]

If the narrator had wished merely to demonstrate that Odysseus was a liar, he could have cited the Cretan tales and other stories he tells in Ithaca, which any reader can see are false, not least because the Homeric narrator says they are.[148] This Homeric acknowledgement of their untruth is a plausible reason why Lucian chooses to ignore the Cretan tales completely, not even offering them as corroborative material, but opting to rely entirely on another, stronger and subtler, argument.

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147.   *VH* 1.3.

148.   *Od.* 19.203: 'He feigned many lies, saying things similar to the truth' (ἴσκε ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα). Meanwhile, Alcinous says that he cannot imagine that Odysseus could possibly be a liar, despite the prevalence of such people (*Od.* 11.362-6). We can also see in this focus on the tales told to the Phaeacians a deliberate avoidance of the Cretan tales, since in the work as a whole the Lucian-narrator himself 'reincarnat[es] the Cretan paradox of Epimenides' (Bowersock (1994: 5)). On this choice of Phaeacian stories see Kim (2010: 151), and note (Laird (2003: 119-20)) that Lucian here recalls Socrates' disclaimer (*Resp.* 10.614b1) that the myth of Er will be unlike what Odysseus says to Alcinous.

If, as Lucian's narrator evidently does, one regards the tales told to the Phaeacians as untruths, they are unnecessarily extravagant untruths. Odysseus' Cretan tales can be justified: being told for sound practical purposes, they are generally kept within the bounds of necessity. But the hapless Phaeacians are subjected to a long and outrageous catalogue of the most audacious tall tales. These lies therefore lend support to the argument, but have the added benefit of tying in with precisely those kinds of story which Lucian is about to spend two books parodying. No possibility that Odysseus might have been telling the truth is entertained.

Lucian's reader might reasonably be curious why he refers to Odysseus in 1.3 as 'Homer's Odysseus' (ὁ τοῦ Ὁμήρου Ὀδυσσεύς): mention of Odysseus among the Phaeacians could hardly fail to recall Homer, so there must be some point to the inclusion of the poet's name. Is the implication that Homer is the liar, slandering Odysseus by putting these words in his mouth?[149] As Kim notes, Lucian is especially fond of describing Odysseus as 'the X of Homer';[150] for instance, Odysseus is 'Homer's orator' (*De domo* 17 — see pp.125-6 above), and 'Homer's Odysseus' (*De luctu* 5) but those phrases are not really comparable, since no moral judgement is being passed. We should therefore weigh carefully the comments of Georgiadou & Larmour, who write

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149. Note that the Homeric text does force one to make a decision on the question — see p.139 below.

150. Kim (2010: 153).

> Lucian's target is apparently Odysseus, not Homer, as if Odysseus the character has a life of his own. … Elsewhere [Lucian] attacks Homer (*J. Trag.* 39; *Philops.* 2; cf. *Zeus* 2), but here his purpose is to create a parallel between Odysseus and the narrator of the upcoming story which contains many allusions to the *Odyssey* ….[151]

That Lucian wishes to create such a parallel is indisputable, but I am not entirely convinced by the rest of this argument. If Homer is not to blame for Odysseus' falsehoods but merely, in Georgiadou & Larmour's words, 'among those who are simply "lovers of lies"', why does Lucian make a point of connecting Odysseus and Homer in this passage? It is specifically Homer's Odysseus who is the liar. Odysseus is also a *didaskalos* of lying, which recalls Homer's position as an educator of Greeks, an idea which Solon alludes to at *Anacharsis* 21.[152] Yet elsewhere in *VH* the narrator goes out of his way to show Homer's trustworthiness: when the voyagers arrive at Calypso's cave (2.36), it is 'just as Homer said' (τοιοῦτον οἷον Ὅμηρος εἶπεν). Nonetheless, Homer's descriptions of other locations are less reliable, such as the City of Dreams at 2.32: credit is given to Homer as the only author to describe this city (in the words of Penelope at *Od.* 19.560-8), but this is

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151. Georgiadou & Larmour (1998: 55-6). On the interrelationship between 'Homer', 'Homer's Odysseus' and 'Lucian', see Saraceno (1998).

152. For this trope see, among other passages, Xenophanes DK 21 B10; Pl., *Resp.* 10.595c1-2, where Homer is the 'first teacher' (πρῶτος διδάσκαλος); and Ar. *Ran.* 1030-6, where Aeschylus says that Homer χρήστ' ἔδιδαξεν. A similar notion lies behind Plato's *Ion.* See further Croally (1994: 17-18), and, on Heraclitus, Kim (2010: 5).

immediately undercut since he 'did not describe it entirely accurately' (οὐ πάνυ ἀκριβῶς συνέγραψεν). The simple answer might be that Georgiadou & Larmour are right and that *VH* portrays Homer as fundamentally truthful and too trusting, being led astray by what he has heard from the deceitful Odysseus.[153] Or, since Homer is not in fact blind, as it turns out (2.20), might he have accurately described the cave because he had seen it himself?[154] Kim argues that 'Lucian neither attacks nor defends Homer's reliability' (153), but I shall argue in the next chapter that *VH* presents a Homer who is gradually revealed to be truthful.

But this would be getting dangerously close to saying that Calypso therefore actually existed, which goes against the whole burden of *VH* that such tales of other-worldly creatures are lies. At this point one must face up to the big difficulty with the 'seemingly straightforward yet maddeningly difficult' *VH*: its narrator acknowledges that none of it is true.[155] So he never went to Calypso's cave, and therefore cannot declare whether Homer was right, which means that Homer could well have been blind after all. It is tempting to say that all the difficulties of the *VH*'s

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153. There is probably also an allusion to Pindar, who tells in *Nemean* 8 of Odysseus' slanderous and destructive lies about Ajax, while in *Nemean* 7 he suggests that Odysseus has a better reputation than he deserves because of Homer's 'sweet words'. Pindar contradicts Homer's (or rather Odysseus') version of events, saying that it was the Greeks who voted on the assignment of Achilles' armour: see Pratt (1993: ch.4). This connection is also seen by Kim (2010: 152).

154. The possibility that Homer was not in fact blind is entertained by Proclus (see p.194 and pp.230-2 below).

155. Kim (2010: 141).

logic can be explained away by this eternal merry-go-round of arguments. But the phrase 'Homer's Odysseus' could also be quite naturally interpreted to mean that Odysseus has been slandered by Homer, who has unfairly represented him as reporting these absurd tales.[156] After all, at 2.20 Thersites has brought a case in which he apparently claims that he has been slandered by Homer[157] for the words which had been put in his mouth — but Thersites' counsel was Odysseus! The whole issue of the reliability of Homer and Odysseus is complicated by the text of the *Odyssey* itself, since the narrator presents the Cyclops story as factual at *Od.* 2.19-20, suggesting that he believes at least some of Odysseus' 'lies'.

Georgiadou & Larmour show that *VH* is, both in its outline and in certain specific episodes, a parody of the *Odyssey*.[158] The next passage to consider — concerning the letter which Odysseus dispatches to Calypso — illustrates this connection clearly. For in this section the narrator not only meets Odysseus in person in the Elysian Fields, but also visits Calypso's cave, a location straight from the *Odyssey*. Moreover, the episode recalls other Homeric passages, so that it is one of Lucian's most densely packed engagements with Homer.

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156. Kim (2010: 152) observes that the same lies are credited to Homer, not Odysseus, in *Philopseudes*.

157. But note my argument (below, pp.237-8) that this ὕβρις is not necessarily 'slander'.

158. Georgiadou & Larmour (1988: esp. 5-10). For further discussion of parallels see Grossardt (2011).

As the Lucian-narrator puts to sea (*VH* 2.29), Odysseus secretly hands over a letter for Calypso, the content of which is not revealed until arrival on Ogygia (2.35), when the Lucian-narrator opens it.[159] Appropriately for such a deceitful fellow, he has no qualms about such interference with the mail. It has been argued that this episode alludes to two Homeric passages: first, it recalls *Od.* 5.29-31 when Zeus sends a message to Calypso via Hermes. Georgiadou & Larmour point out that 'a message from an immortal to free Odysseus becomes a message from Odysseus regretting that he was freed and that he gave up the chance of immortality.'[160] By the time of the Lucian-narrator's visit Odysseus has already achieved a privileged position among the great and the good in the Isles of the Blessed, which is beyond what he would have expected his post-mortem existence to be like when Calypso made her offer; what he is missing seems to be Calypso herself, just as he was missing Penelope so much that he left Calypso after weighing up his situation.[161] Odysseus,

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159. ní Mheallaigh (2014: 244-5) considers that his furtiveness here is because he is going behind the back of Homer, interfering with the literary tradition; see too her further discussion of the letter (251-4). Yet the point is perhaps also that, contrary to what he would like, the dead Odysseus is now impotent to make any change in his situation, in contrast to his opportunity to affect the progress of the plot when he is on Calypso's island.

160. Georgiadou & Larmour (1988: 221-2). Views differ on whether the Lucian-narrator should here be considered a 'Hermes' or 'Odysseus' in delivering this letter, but he certainly verges on becoming a 'Homeric' character: see Kim (2010: 171-2).

161. He explains his thinking to Calypso at *Od.* 5.215-8. Lucian is responding to scholarly debate over the reason for Odysseus' failure to accept the offer of immortality: Kim (2010: 172).

who spent so long travelling in the *Odyssey*, always has itchy feet; the grass is always greener somewhere else; indeed, this is why he had left Calypso.[162]

The episode reflects Odysseus' special weakness for women, which features in the attack on Homer made in a papyrus that provides sections otherwise missing from the end of the seventh ps.-Heraclitean letter. Included in this attack are the following accusations:[163]

> μετὰ γυναικῶν θηλυπαθεῖ, πα[ρ]ὰ Καλυψοῖ ἑπταετίαν,
> παρὰ Κιρ[κ]ηι ἐνιαυτόν· εἶτα κόρωι Πη[ν]ελόπη[ς]
> ἐπεθύμει. ... Οὐδ[ὲ]ν εὑρίσκω Ὀδυσσέα τὸν σοφὸν
> [π]οιοῦντα, εἰ μὴ ἐσθίοντα ἢ γυ[ν]αικοπαθοῦντα· ὅσα
> δὲ πλανᾶται, οὐ ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ πάσχει· ἄξιος τῆς
> κακουργίας μᾶλλον δὴ Ὁμήρου ψυχή.

> He indulged himself among women, for seven years with Calypso, for one year with Circe; then, through satiety, he began to desire Penelope. ... I find that the 'wise man' Odysseus did nothing, apart from eating

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162. Grossardt (2011: 128) writes, 'Odysseus befindet sich also zumindest aus subjektiver Perspektive noch auf der Heimatinsel Ithaka, und die Abreise "Lukians" und seiner Gefährten, bei der sie Odysseus' Brief an Kalypso mitführen, hat daher Ersatzfunktion und damit durchaus Züge einer Wiederaufbruchs von Ithaka, also einer zweiten Reise des Odysseus.'

163. Pap. Genev. inv. 271, col. XIV 45-8 & 51-5; I quote the text from Kakridis (1974), with my translation. I have also made use of the first publication (and translation) by Martin (1959), whose translation of ἄξιος in the second passage I follow: 'Le sens de ἄξιος «disposé à» est ici un peu forcé. Cf. Dem. 14,27, ἄξια τοῦ πολέμου τὰ χρήματα. Arist. *De caelo* 291 b 25, αἰδοῦς ἀξίαν ... τὴν προθυμίαν μᾶλλον ἢ θράσους.' (1959: 105).

and indulging his passion for women.[164] But during all his wandering/errancy he did not do things, but had things happen to him.[165] It is rather Homer's soul which was inclined to villainy.

We cannot tell whether in making Odysseus communicate through a letter Lucian is alluding to the epistolary form of this Cynic text; and yet, as Kakridis writes, 'his device probably presupposes a knowledge of our Cynic's accusations against the Homeric hero'.[166] There is also a link in the final sentence of this passage with the issue highlighted by Thersites' lawsuit in *VH*: that Odysseus is a character created by Homer, whose own 'villainy' (κακουργία) is really to blame.

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164.   LSJ s.v. γυναικοπαθέω give 'to be effeminate' as the sense of this verb at Ath. 12.523c; the context here requires a more literal meaning, since the author has just listed the women with whom he stayed. Martin (1959: 82) translates 'il fait la cour à des femmes'. There is nonetheless an implication that this is discreditably effeminate behaviour, and the author also uses the parallel verb θηλυπαθεῖ (col. XIV, 45), which LSJ coyly gloss 'muliebria pati': see Kakridis (1974: 364). The author alleges that it is Homer's own excessive love for women (φιλογύνης ἦν, 23) that lies behind all of this.

165.   i.e. this was out of his control, unlike his dealings with women. Martin (1959: 83): 'il n'agit pas, mais il subit'.

166.   Kakridis (1974: 373 n.44). The text is likely to be of interest to Lucian since it concerns the Ephesians' alleged efforts to expel Heraclitus by means of a law banning agelasts.

Secondly, there is also likely to be a veiled allusion to the letter sent with Bellerophon in *Il.* 6.167-70.[167] As Rosenmeyer argues, this provides a credible explanation for the Lucian-narrator's motivation for opening the letter:

> I would argue that the association of letters and erotic treachery, especially in the context of a married man writing to his mistress, is so strong that Lucian does not need to give an explicit reason in order for his actions to be understood. The narrator presumably recalls the example of Homer's Bellerophon and worries about his own fate at the hands of his hostess. Lucian playfully rewrites Homer here. The famously uxorious Odysseus deceives his unsuspecting wife with a 'special delivery,' but acts without malice towards the courier; the courier, in contrast, may dwell on Odysseus' epic reputation for many wiles, and suspect him of malice towards his fellow man; what he does not suspect is Odysseus' actual secret plot: to abandon Penelope, if he gets the chance, and return to Calypso.[168]

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167. Bellerophon appears as a comically exaggerated comparandum at *Adversus indoctum* 18, where the book-collector is imagined carrying a book of whose content he is ignorant, so that he cannot answer questions on it, leading him to wish for the earth to swallow him up (itself a Homeric idea, as Hopkinson notes (2008: 133-4)). One can also betray oneself with too much knowledge of Homer: Plutarch's Gryllus claims to have witnessed something made up by Odysseus in a Cretan lie (*Od.* 19.172-235) that does not occur until after the dialogue's 'dramatic date': *Brut. anim. rat. uti* 989e, with Russell (1993: 387).

168. Rosenmeyer (2001: 133-4). See too her more recent discussion of these two letters (2013: 66-8), where she points out that the Lucian-narrator initially misreads the implications of the letter, which, with 'honesty and transparency', turns out unexpectedly to be as harmless as it purports to be.

This secret plot again reveals how Odysseus the archetypal traveller is still itching to be on his way again. Stanford sees Odysseus, 'as conceived later by poets like Dante, Tennyson, and Pascoli', as having a centrifugal urge which draws him away from Penelope, who in Homer symbolizes the love for home. The only ancient source he cites for such an unconventional view of Odysseus' 'true' yearnings is this passage of *VH*.[169] Discussing Odysseus' dalliances with Circe and Calypso, he continues, 'The reason why Homer, Penelope, and the moralists of the later tradition, did not think ill of Odysseus for these infidelities was primarily because in both cases Odysseus was not acting voluntarily.'[170] Lucian's Odysseus cannot now rely on this defence, as he is acting voluntarily in his desire to get back to Calypso; however, it would be wrong to assume that this means Lucian is being moralistic or is suggesting Homer was naive to think that Odysseus was glad to return to Ithaca. Indeed, in the passage quoted above, ps.-Heraclitus makes plain that Odysseus' centripetal return to Penelope was in itself an attempt to escape — in this case to escape the tedium of life with Calypso and Circe.

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169. Stanford (1954: 50, with n.13). Such a counterintuitive idea is consonant with the interpretation offered above of Achilles' thinking in *Dial. mort.* 26 (=15), namely that Achilles continues after death in his urge to be dissatisfied with his present circumstances.

170. Stanford (1954: 51). As Whitmarsh (2004: 212) writes, 'counterbalancing [Greek culture's] centripetal emphasis upon ethical propriety — the "homecoming" reading of the *Odyssey*, if you like — stands a centrifugal pleasure in the indulgent, wandering play of sexuality'.

The factor which has changed in *VH* is that Odysseus is now dead, and his nostalgia is now no longer for his literal 'home' of Ithaca but for the whole realm of the living which he has left behind. His wording is significant, since he states in the letter that what he desires is not so much Calypso herself but 'life with you and the immortality that you offered' (τὴν παρὰ σοὶ δίαιταν καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ σοῦ προτεινομένην ἀθανασίαν), although the reader might wonder whether Odysseus is euphemistically glossing over his main, sexual, motive.[171] This leads to a paradoxical situation in which he is yearning to be transported right back to the beginning of the *Odyssey*, where he is sitting by the shore on Calypso's island and at his most despondent — and if he then never visited the Phaeacians or returned to Ithaca most of the text of the *Odyssey* could never exist.[172] The dead Odysseus seems to be reacting just like the dead Achilles, who wanted to return to life, even as the lowliest peasant; but Odysseus' desire to go back and accept Calypso's offer of immortality would involve a rewriting of the *Odyssey* that here seems just as impossible as Achilles' desire to rewrite the *Iliad*.

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171. This is the view of Bär (2013: 228), who says that Odysseus' argument 'sounds odd, even ridiculous (and therefore feeble)', with the result that 'we are led to suspect a purely sexual moti[ve]'.

172. Odyseus on the shore: *Od.* 5.151-3. This implied interference with the text of the *Odyssey* is emphasized in ní Mheallaigh's interpretation of this episode (see n.159 above). Odysseus' centripetal tendency is reflected in Giorgio di Chirico's painting *Il ritorno di Ulisse*, in which a youthful-looking Odysseus appears to have got no further than the sea in the middle of his own sitting-room.

So what should we make of Odysseus' proposed scheme to run away from the Underworld and live happily ever after with Calypso? The Lucian-narrator, following in the footsteps of the living Odysseus, can visit the Underworld and return unscathed, but can Odysseus also safely make it back 'alive' even after his death? Is he sadly deluded, and forgetting that he is not just visiting any more as he was in *Od.* 11? Is he planning to trick someone? What does his 'if I get a chance' (ἢν … καιροῦ λάβωμαι) mean? Or is he living in the world of Aristophanes' *Frogs*, where people can be fetched back?[173] However one answers these questions, Bompaire's assessment still stands, although one might wish to put more emphasis on the treatment of Odysseus himself, who is a much more pathetic character in Lucian than in Homer:

> [La lettre d'Ulysse] traduit moins le souci de rabaisser le héros au rang d'un don Juan d'intrigue bourgeoise, que le désir de tirer de certaines indications de l'épopée un chapitre supplémentaire. Lucien ne procède pas autrement que les rhapsodes interpol-ateurs. Seul le ton a changé.[174]

This reduction of the Homeric hero is reflected in Odysseus' use of prose rather than Homeric hexameters. Bär has observed that 'the letter … "gives proof" of the fact that Odysseus, a Homeric character, can speak not only in Homeric hexameters,

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173. Alan Sommerstein alerts me to the language used of Euripides at Ar., *Ran.* 80-1: κἄλλως ὁ μέν γ᾽ Εὐριπίδης πανοῦργος ὢν | κἂν ξυναποδρᾶναι δεῦρ᾽ ἐπιχειρήσειέ μοι. In those lines not only is Euripides πανοῦργος, as Odysseus is often described (see *Dial. mar.* 2.2 (=2.2)), but the same verb 'running away' is used as here (ξυναποδρᾶναι ~ ἀποδράς).

174. Bompaire (1958: 671).

but also, if necessary, in Attic prose'.[175] But, unlike Homer, who continues to compose hexameters, albeit of inferior quality, in the afterlife, Odysseus appears only to write prose. So although Bär sees the letter as an indicator of Odysseus' stylistic range, we can equally view it as an indication of his 'fall' from the lofty heights of Homeric verse to the prosaic world of *VH*, a work which itself presents an 'Odyssean' narrative in prose. Odysseus appears to have learned to write since Homer (although a story existed of Odysseus having a letter forged[176]) but without the assistance of Homer he cannot reach the heights of epic diction. By contrast, in presenting Homer as continuing to compose his hexameters, Lucian emphasizes the generic difference of this narrative from that of Homeric epic. Again, while Bär sees this as an indication that 'we can watch Lucian "proving" his ability to write an "*Odyssey*" in Attic prose and, at the same time, "proving" Odysseus' ability to cope with this new style',[177] it can also be read as an acknowledgement of the difficulties faced by both the Homeric character and the epigonic 'parodist' *littérateur* in living

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175.   Bär (2013: 236).

176.   Kim (2010: 180 n.16): 'the specific question of whether Homer's heroes were aware of writing exercised a number of ancient Homeric critics'. Apollod., *Epit.* 3.8: 'Odysseus took a Phrygian prisoner and forced him to write a letter concerning treason, as though sent from Priam to Palamedes' (ὅτι Ὀδυσσεὺς λαβὼν αἰχμάλωτον Φρύγα ἠνάγκασε γράψαι περὶ προδοσίας ὡς παρὰ Πριάμου πρὸς Παλαμήδην).

177.   Bär (2013: 236).

up to the standards of the past[178] — a difficulty which I have already shown even the post-mortem Homer himself to be wrestling with in his attempts to write hexameter verse.

The tricksy Odysseus becomes one of *VH*'s most confusing characters, not only because of his complicated relationship with Homer — simply a character? a 'real person' slandered by Homer? a deceiver of Homer? — but also because he wants to live a life, back in the world of the Homeric epics, that he thinks will be an improvement on his existence outside them.

2.3.4 — Having your stake and eating it? *Dial. mar.* 2 (=2) & *Pseudologistes* 27

Although Odysseus himself does not speak in *Dial. mar.* 2 (=2), it is all about him, comprising a retelling of the Cyclops story from Book 9 of the *Odyssey*, already retold from the satyrs' point of view in Euripides' *Cyclops*.[179] Lucian retells these events through Polyphemus, who complains to his father Poseidon about his ill-treatment at Odysseus' hands. Such a technique is by no means invented by

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178. Following von Möllendorff (2000a, 48-52), Bär (2013: 221 n.2) is rightly sceptical of attempts to pin down this work as 'parody' pure and simple, or to impose any other generic definition. On *VH* as 'prosified' *Odyssey* see van Mal-Maeder (1992) and the introduction to Georgiadou & Larmour (1998).

179. See Bartley (2009b: 64-6) on this and other sources for the blinding-story. He suggests that in this set's first two dialogues Lucian is drawing on the lyric pieces named *Cyclops* by Philoxenus and Timotheus of Miletus: *PMG* 814-24 & 780-3 respectively.

Lucian — indeed looking at a familiar scenario from the point of view of an unexpected character had long been a rhetorical school exercise[180] — but he really makes it his own in the four collections of mini-dialogues. However, as in *Dial. mort.* 23 (=29), this is frequently not a full retelling of the story known to the reader, but can be more of an exploration of the emotions which events have inspired.

As often, Lucian takes one scene from Homer and follows through its implications, a technique which applies also to the dialogues between Achilles and Antilochus, and Ajax and Agamemnon, discussed above. So Bompaire, writing of the three dialogues between Zeus and Hera,[181] observes:

> Ces dialogues font dire à Héra et Zeus ce qu'ils auraient pu dire, mais sans la moindre intention de pasticher le style ou les arguments du poète; il n'y a d'ailleurs pas de citation ou d'allusion précise à un passage d'Homère dans ces trois dialogues. De même l'entre-tien d'Agamemnon et d'Ajax, où celui-ci justifie sa haine d'Ulysse, est l'épilogue d'une scène homérique. ... L'Odyssée nous est encore une fois conté, et le public

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180. See the examples assembled by Russell (1983: 117-20), in which lawcourt speeches are put into the mouths of assorted more or less historical characters with grievances; this helps to explain why the characters of Lucian's dialogues are often complaining. Russell (115) also discusses Aristides' *Or.* 16, which possibly ventriloquizes Odysseus on the embassy to Achilles. Such exercises still play a part in modern creative writing classes; so, in a textbook which emphasizes the benefits of consciously intertextual approaches to composition, one finds the suggestion to 'rewrite a text from a point of view different from that presented in the original text', and the observation that 'the possibility of alternative points of view provides a writer with a powerful mode of invention.' Schwiebert (1997: 30 & 135).

181. *Dial. deor.* 8 (=5), 9 (=6), 22 (=18).

ancien (ou moderns) ne se lasse pas d'entendre la vieille chanson, toujours semblable, jamais identique.[182]

Poseidon's complaint resembles the Agamemnon-Ajax conversation, and indeed Achilles-Antilochus,[183] in that it imagines the sequel or coda to a famous passage of Homer, suggesting what happened once the narrator's attention was turned elsewhere. While the present dialogue is obviously based around the *Odyssey* scene, referring specifically to the material of Polyphemus' prayer (*Od.* 9.523-35), it also recalls Thetis' appeal to Zeus in the *Iliad*.[184] There Achilles had first to complain to his mother, who then relayed his message to the god; like Achilles, Polyphemus has lamented by the seashore but, being closer to the gods, is able to make the approach to them without intermediary.

Whereas Achilles and Ajax are responding to observations about their earlier behaviour, Polyphemus has already covered much of the same ground in the prayer quoted in Homer.[185] Unlike Achilles and Ajax, who are responding to questions, Polyphemus has to begin the conversation himself. Poseidon's first question 'Who was the man who dared to do this, Polyphemus?' (τίς δὲ ἦν ὁ ταῦτα τολμήσας, ὦ Πολύφημε;), when it comes, suggests that this is all news to him, which is contrary

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182. Bompaire (1958: 690).

183. *Dial. mort.* 23 (=29); 26 (=15).

184. *Il.* 1.493-530.

185. 9.528-35.

to Homer's — or rather, Odysseus' — assurance;[186] Poseidon was not really listening to the prayer so a further appeal is now necessary. Odysseus had been clearly named in the prayer directed to Poseidon, but Lucian makes Poseidon none the wiser about who is responsible.[187]

These inconsistencies between the Homeric and Lucianic scenes are vital for the understanding of this dialogue. They suggest that Lucian is presenting the *Odyssey* episode as inaccurately reported; after all, it forms part of the narration to the Phaeacians, whom he condemns in *VH* 1.3 for their gullibility. The main objection in that passage is to such obviously invented creatures as Cyclopes, so this dialogue plays with a different possible level of Odyssean veracity. Despite Odysseus' confidence in reporting Polyphemus' prayer, he cannot have any idea whether Poseidon heard it. Lucian's readers discover that the truth is more complicated. This point is apparently missed by Hopkinson, who writes:

> The conversation provides a sequel to the account in
> book 9 of the *Odyssey*: there the Cyclops begs his father

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186. 9.536.

187. 9.530. One might object that the absence of any reference to the prayer by Polyphemus or Poseidon implies that the scene presented by Lucian is understood in some sense to 'be' the prayer in Homer. While I do not find that interpretation convincing, its implication would be that Odysseus is being mendacious in reporting that the prayer was said (in the terms in which he reports it), and presumably that Odysseus is elaborating the story on the basis of a deduction about the origin of his subsequent misfortunes at Poseidon's hands.

to prevent or hinder Odysseus' return (528-35), and
here we see Poseidon undertaking to do so.[188]

The implication of this is that Poseidon is responding to Polyphemus' prayer as reported in the *Odyssey*, but this is not borne out by the text of the dialogue, where Poseidon gives no indication of having heard about these events already.

Hopkinson nonetheless makes many excellent points about the close verbal reminiscences of the *Odyssey* passage, not least the Cyclops' first utterance, referring to Odysseus as 'that accursed *xenos*' (τοῦ καταράτου ξένου).[189] He writes:

> the adjective has extra force, because Odysseus is
> literally 'cursed' (ἀράομαι) at the end of the Homeric
> Cyclops episode, when Polyphemus invokes Poseidon
> and prays that he will prevent Odysseus' homecoming,
> or at least delay it and let him find his home in turmoil
> (9.528-35).[190]

He makes no mention of the noun, though, beyond a reference to the theme of *xenia* in the Polyphemus episode of the *Odyssey* and in the poem as a whole. What strikes the reader is that when Polyphemus uses the term here he evidently intends the meaning 'foreigner' (so the Loeb translation) — but it can also be taken as 'guest', which would be still factually accurate from the point of view of Zeus Xenios, although in Polyphemus' eye(s) the men were not guests but people who could

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188. Hopkinson (2000: 204).

189. Bartley (2009b: 66-7) suggests that the non-Homeric κατάρατος alludes to Hecuba's lament at Eur. *Hec.* 714-20, which he well observes would gain added point from her later blinding of Polymestor. On this connection in *Hecuba* see Mossman (1995: 191-2).

190. Hopkinson (2008: 204).

justifiably be eaten (2) 'as they were robbers' (ληστάς γε ὄντας). It is a nice piece of characterization that the uncivilised Cyclops, having little concept of hospitality, seems not to realize that his use of the word ξενός reveals much about his attitudes.[191]

Of Poseidon's penultimate speech, where the god says that Polyphemus should have called for the other Cyclopes, Hopkinson writes: 'Poseidon seems almost to have heard the story before, and to be familiar with the Homeric account.' But Poseidon's immediately previous words 'I understand — they escaped your notice by going out underneath [the sheep]' (μανθάνω· ὑπ' ἐκείνοις ἔλαθον ὑπεξελθόντες) demonstrate that he is more intelligent than Polyphemus and has worked out Odysseus' ruse, so it is no surprise that he can work out the next, obvious course of action too.

In her discussion of Lucian's use of the Cyclops episode, Bouquiaux-Simon provides a useful catalogue of similarities and differences between the Homeric text and Lucian's echoes of it, but argues that

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191. Although I say below that Polyphemus demonstrates skilful speech, this example in particular shows that he is not such a carefully persuasive speaker as he could be. Bartley (2009b: 72) suggests that Polyphemus deliberately avoids reproducing the Homeric pun on μῆτις (*Od.* 9.406-8: μή τίς ... μή τίς ... Οὗτις ...); is Polyphemus sophisticated enough (or perhaps well enough versed in Homer), to comprehend the pun? Polyphemus himself says, 'he outwitted me with his name' (κατεσοφίσατό με ... τῷ ὀνόματι, 4), so, as Hopkinson (2008: 206) puts it, 'A verbal quibble or sophistry has defeated him.' Compare again Plutarch's Gryllus, who argues with Odysseus cleverly enough to defeat even him.

> L'absence d'une coïncidence exacte entre les détails chez Lucien et chez Homère relèverait plus normalement du fait que Lucien ne s'est pas appliqué à construire une comparaison épousant en tous points l'original homérique, mais il a simplement voulu évoquer l'attitude générale du Cyclope.[192]

Such an approach to Lucian enables one to explain away these inconsistencies rather too easily, perhaps in a belief that 'mistakes' in an author as late as Lucian must indicate a deficiency in education or memory, but it also runs the risk of missing subtle jokes. By way of example, I present a tiny issue which could indeed be a slip on Lucian's part, or a textual corruption, but could equally well be a pleasingly pointed piece of characterization.

Lucian's flirting with the characters' (and the reader's) knowledge or ignorance of the *Odyssey* might lie behind a problem at the end of section 2, when Odysseus sharpens 'the stake' (τὸν μοχλόν), words taken from *Od.* 9.375. Bouquiaux-Simon passes over it in silence, but Hopkinson rightly identifies a difficulty with the use of the definite article here since no previous mention has been made of this stake. He tentatively suggests reading τινα instead, but the transmitted reading could well be due to Lucian playing with readers who all know the story and therefore know about the stake already. *A fortiori*, Polyphemus knows the story and he will have particularly strong, not to say painful, memories about the stake, so he can be excused for forgetting whether it has been mentioned before. He is also forgetting that Poseidon has not already heard the details, and perhaps he cannot

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192. Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 243).

remember how much had been said in the prayer which he believes Poseidon has already heard.

Another example: Polyphemus' final speech ends with his report of Odysseus' mocking words while sailing away. Lucian's Polyphemus reports, 'He said, "And your father Poseidon will not heal you"' ("οὐδὲ ὁ πατήρ," φησιν, "ὁ Ποσειδῶν ἰάσεταί σε"). This is a misrepresentation of what Odysseus had actually said, at least according to his own account in the *Odyssey*: in response to Polyphemus' claim that Poseidon would cure the eye, Odysseus said that he wanted to go further and kill Polyphemus, ὡς οὐκ ὀφθαλμόν γ' ἰήσεται οὐδ' ἐνοσίχθων.[193] This can be understood either as a purpose clause with short-vowel subjunctive, meaning 'so that the Earthshaker cannot heal your eye', or as a 'since'-clause with future indicative, meaning 'since the Earthshaker will not heal your eye'. Bartley assumes the former meaning:

> at 9.525, Odysseus wishes that he could slay him so that Poseidon could not do the healing (ὡς οὐκ ὀφθαλμόν γ' ἰήσεται οὐδ' ἐνοσίχθων). Here, however, Lucian states that Poseidon will not be able to heal Polyphemus. It is difficult to state dogmatically why this change to the plot has been made.[194]

Yet both Aristotle and Antisthenes seem to have assumed that the verb-form is a future indicative, so Bartley is going against attested ancient understandings of

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193. *Od.* 9.525. Polyphemus said (520) that Poseidon 'will heal me if he wishes' (αὐτὸς δ', αἴ κ' ἐθέλῃσ', ἰήσεται).

194. Bartley (2009: 73).

Odysseus' grammar in line 525. Answering the question 'Why did Odysseus so mindlessly take little account of Poseidon when he said [*Od.* 9.525]?' (διὰ τί ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς οὕτως ἀνοήτως εἰς τὸν Ποσειδῶνα ὠλιγώρησεν εἰπῶν "ὡς οὐκ ὀφθαλμόν γ' ἰήσεται οὐδ' ἐνοσίχθων;"), the scholia provide the two scholars' interpretations:

> Ἀντισθένης μέν φησι διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐκ ἦν ἰατρὸς ὁ Ποσειδῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ Ἀπόλλων, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ οὐχ ὅτι οὐ δυνήσεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ βουληθήσεται διὰ τὴν πονηρίαν τοῦ Κύκλωπος.[195]

> Antisthenes says that it is through [Odysseus'] knowledge that it was not Poseidon but Apollo who was a doctor; but Aristotle says that it is not because he will not be able, but because he will not wish [sc. to heal him], owing to the Cyclops' villainy.

In both of these scenarios Lucian's Polyphemus is over-optimistic in his initial claim that Poseidon will cure his eye, and the punchline of Lucian's dialogue is that his confident prediction turns out to be wrong. When Poseidon says at the end of the dialogue, 'I cannot cure the maiming of eyes' (πήρωσίν μοι τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἰᾶσθαι ἀδύνατον), this supports the interpretation of Antisthenes — as Hopkinson puts it, 'Poseidon is not an eye-doctor'.[196] But Poseidon's conspicuous failure to suggest that Polyphemus could seek the help of a better-qualified god is an indication that the Aristotelian view might also be correct.

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195.   Σ HQT *Od.* 9.525; cf. Σ M ad loc. Aristotle's interpretation is presupposed by Σ BQ, which gloss the line: 'And the sense is, "Poseidon will not heal you as you are evil"' (ὁ δὲ νοῦς, οὐδὲ Ποσειδῶν ἰάσεταί σε κακὸν ἐόντα).

196.   Hopkinson (2008: 206).

Bouquiaux-Simon's comments on this passage are a good illustration of the limits of her approach. By going no further than to point out the differences she leaves the reader unsure about why they might have been introduced:

> Plutôt que son épithète caractéristique, Lucien préfère le nom propre (accompagné de l'article), Poseidon; il mentionne le rapport familial qui le lie au Cyclope, ce qui est étranger au contexte homérique. Enfin la forme ionienne du verbe devient naturellement ἰάσεται.[197]

One must of course address the question *what is the relationship between these texts?*, but this is of little use without also asking *why is it like this?* While Bouquiaux-Simon does address the first question in identifying Lucian's 'preference', she does not consider a reason for the choice that has been made. To take the second of these points first, the atticized verb-form does indeed need little explanation: Polyphemus is speaking in Attic, and Lucian will regularly keep Homeric forms only when quoting directly.[198] But this does prompt us to wonder why the words of Odysseus have not been quoted verbatim from the Homeric line — after all, Polyphemus is claiming to be relaying the *ipsissima verba* in *oratio recta*. Perhaps, in his anger, he forgets exactly what Odysseus said, but he could also be deliberately altering it: by replacing the rather formal Ἐνοσίχθων with not only the god's name, Ποσειδῶν, but also his kinship relation, πατήρ, he emphasizes his own closeness to

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197. Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 247).

198. Indeed, as Macleod spots (1961: 81 n.1), at *Dial. mort.* 15.2 (=5.2), the Homeric form of αἰεὶ θανέοντι ἐοικώς signals that this is a parody of Homer's αἰεὶ βαλέοντι ἐοικώς (*Od.* 11.608), so that editors' emendation θανόντι is misguided.

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the god.[199] There is no need for him to approach Poseidon through cult titles, because he is a relation — and therefore Poseidon has a very special obligation to hear and to help his son, an obligation which Polyphemus is exploiting. Why does Polyphemus make Odysseus speak of Poseidon's inability to heal σε, in contrast to ὀφθαλμόν in Homer? This can be explained again as Polyphemus' attempt to exploit Poseidon's feelings of obligation: it is not merely the eye which he cannot heal, but the whole of his son, so his efforts to help him ought to be all the more diligent.[200]

Polyphemus is therefore characterized as a speaker with a certain level of rhetorical skill.[201] Inevitably, like most people, he was no match for the wiles of Odysseus, as he himself realizes at *Od.* 9.511-6, saying that he was deceived by Odysseus' appearance. Odysseus' account had made Polyphemus a simple brute, but when he is viewed through Lucian's lens and his own words,[202] a more nuanced picture emerges both of the Cyclops and of the mendacious narrator from whom we

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199. Polyphemus forgets, however, to address Polyphemus as 'father' (πάτερ), the word used by all sons addressing their fathers in the works surveyed by Dickey (1996: 220-1).

200. Bartley (2009b: 69) sees in this rhetorical skill a sophistication closer to that of the Euripidean Cyclops. There is a joke in this, since the allegorical tradition viewed Polyphemus as representing the anger which takes away the power of reasoning: see Hunter (2009b: 53-4).

201. Note too Marshall (2005: 107) on Euripides' *Cyclops*: 'criticism regarding sophism in the play has often centered on the Cyclops' response to Odysseus' speech'.

202. He is characterised through the terseness of his words, as Bartley (2009b: 66) observes, but this does not preclude rhetorical skill, indeed leads to a 'splendidly concise' opening.

first learned the story. He again seems to be calculating carefully when he says that he was more pained by Odysseus' insult to Poseidon than by the blinding, which is not very believable but is something which he knows Poseidon will want to hear; he leaves out the appeal for help which Odysseus had made, and which Polyphemus had ignored, at *Od.* 9.259-71, knowing that it will not present him in the best light.[203]

I end this section by discussing another passage, *Pseudologistes* 27, in which the Cyclops story is an important intertext. Bouquiaux-Simon writes of it:

> La scène du Cyclope telle qu'elle est rapportée chez Homère est très librement interprétée par Lucien. Elle sert de point de départ à une grosse plaisanterie, de goût douteux.[204]

With that warning duly offered, let us proceed to a sordid tale in which the phrase τὸν μοχλόν reappears with an obscene double meaning. The adversary who is the victim of Lucian's extraordinary rant acquired 'that heroic nickname' (ἡρωϊκὸν ἐκεῖνο ἐπεκλήθης) of 'Cyclops' because of a drunken episode in which a young man, 'holding his very well-sharpened stake upright' (ὀρθὸν ἔχων τὸν μοχλὸν εὖ μάλα ἠκονημένον), thrust his μοχλός (i.e. 'penis') not into his eye but into his mouth. The little tale is further drawn out by the conceit that the *pseudologistēs* attempted, 'like Charybdis', to swallow this Οὖτις whole, together with his crew, rudders and sails,

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203. Bartley (2009b: 68) observes that this could also be another instance of the Homeric story being an inaccurate account on Odysseus' part. The reader is once again forced to make a choice about who to believe.

204. Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 245). Her queasiness leads her to avoid spelling out the details.

which suggests he treated the opportunity with great enthusiasm. For a similar application of the same myth to a less than heroic situation, consider Achilles Tatius 2.23, where Satyrus drugs Conops (whose name resembles 'Cyclops') and calls on Cleitophon to 'become a good Odysseus' (Ὀδυσσεὺς ἀγαθὸς γένῃ), an allusion for which the seed has been carefully sown (in 2.2) by the mention of 'Maro's Thracian wine'.[205] The implication, as Anderson has observed, is probably that Cleitophon is now free to apply his 'stake' to *Leucippe's* 'eye', not Conops'.[206]

The Lucian passage is not a helpful parallel for the puzzling use of the definite article in τὸν μοχλόν, since the whole story is narrated within an address to the *pseudologistēs* who already knows the story so does not need to have the presence of the stake explained. It is nonetheless a fascinating and inventive redeployment of the Cyclops story. No longer is there a first-person narration by Odysseus or Polyphemus, but a second-person narration. Lucian is not to be outdone by his opponent's inventiveness in thinking up the scenario, so, whereas the *pseudologistēs* was 'rhapsodizing Homer's material' (τὰ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ῥαψῳδῆσαι),

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205. Alluding to *Od.* 9.196-7.

206. This connection between Lucian and Achilles Tatius is noted by Whitmarsh (2001b: 152) and Morales (2004: 85 n.148). Anderson (1993: 76): the passage 'delicately implies that the young hero about to deflower his girlfriend has a sharpened stake for erotic purposes'. The Cyclops-story has good pedigree for such 'allegorical' use: Philoxenus of Cythera employed the story of Polyphemus and Galatea to present the tale of his own seduction of Dionysius' mistress, who was actually called Galatea, casting himself as Odysseus and Dionysius as Polyphemus (*PMG* 819, ap. Ath. 1.6e-7a); this work is parodied at Ar., *Plut.* 290-1.

Lucian's retelling of the story includes his own parody, a cento drawn from three Homeric lines.

To clarify what is going on here, I first present the text and translation of *Pseudologistes* 27, with probable double-entendres indicated by double inverted commas.[207]

> ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ δέ, βαβαί, ἡρωϊκὸν ἐκεῖνο ἐπεκλήθης, ὁ Κύκλωψ, ἐπειδή ποτε καὶ πρὸς ἀρχαίαν διασκευὴν παρ' αὐτὰ τὰ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ῥαψῳδῆσαι καὶ σὺ τὴν αἰσχρουργίαν ἐπεθύμησας. καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν ἔκεισο μεθύων ἤδη, κισσύβιον ἔχων ἐν τῇ χειρί, βινητιῶν Πολύφημος, νεανίας δὲ ὑπόμισθος ὀρθὸν ἔχων τὸν μοχλὸν εὖ μάλα ἠκονημένον ἐπὶ σὲ Ὀδυσσεύς τις ἐπήει ὡς ἐκκόψων τὸν ὀφθαλμόν·
>
> > κἀκείνου μὲν ἅμαρτε, παρὰ δέ οἱ ἐτράπετ' ἔγχος,[208]
> > αἰχμὴ δ' ἐξεσύθη παρὰ νείατον ἀνθερεῶνα.[209]
>
> (καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ὑπὲρ σοῦ λέγοντα ψυχρολογεῖν.) σὺ δὲ ὁ Κύκλωψ, ἀναπετάσας τὸ στόμα καὶ ὡς ἔνι πλατύτατον κεχηνώς, ἠνείχου τυφλούμενος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τὴν γνάθον, μᾶλλον δὲ ὥσπερ ἡ Χάρυβδις αὐτοῖς ναύταις καὶ πηδαλίοις καὶ ἱστίοις ὅλον ζητῶν καταπιεῖν τὸν Οὖτιν. καὶ ταῦτα ἑώρων καὶ ἄλλοι παρόντες, εἶτά σοι ἐς τὴν ὑστεραίαν μία ἦν ἀπολογία ἡ μέθη καὶ ἐς τὸν ἄκρατον ἀνέφευγες.
>
> And in Italy — goodness me! — you got that heroic nickname 'the Cyclops', since on one occasion, in accordance with the ancient arrangement of the story, you also took a fancy to doing your obscene 'perform-

207. I have borrowed and slightly adapted the rendering of Harmon's Loeb for the cento.

208. *Il.* 13.605; 11.233.

209. *Il.* 5.293. Macleod reads ἐξελύθη with ΓΕ.

ance' of Homer's poetry itself. There you were, already in a drunken state, holding an ivy-wood bowl in your hand, a lecherous "Polyphemus", when a young man (whom you'd paid for)[210] held his "stake" upright, which he had got well "sharpened", and came at you like some "Odysseus", intending to "knock out your eye",

> And that he missed; his "shaft" did turn aside,
> Its point burst through beside the jawbone's root.

(Of course it's not at all absurd, when speaking about you, to talk this frigid stuff!)[211] But you, the "Cyclops", opening your mouth and making it gape as wide as you could, offered yourself up to have your jaw "blinded" by him — or rather, like Charybdis, you were eager to "gulp down" that 'No-one', with his "sailors", his

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210. In the throwaway word ὑπόμισθος Lucian has brilliantly implied not only that this was a premeditated re-enactment rather than an 'accident', but also that no one had been willing to put his member anywhere near the *pseudologistēs* without payment.

211. The verb ψυχρολογεῖν is inadequately glossed by LSJ as 'talk nonsense'. The noun ψυχρολογία appears at *Dial. mort.* 11.5 (=16.5), to describe what Diogenes laughs at in Homer — unspecified but bracketed together with stories about Heracles' coexistent mortal and immortal parts. The Lucian-narrator of *VH* (2.20) describes Homeric scholarship as ψυχρολογία. The term is defined at Arist., *Rh.* 3.3: Aristotle objects to compound words, words that seem out of place, excessive or inappropriate epithets, and inappropriate metaphors. In Lucian, 'frigidity' is used as a critical term in *Quomodo historia* (4, 16, 19), alongside other passages which also criticise authors in whose work 'the selection of material and its expression in words are not appropriate to the genre chosen' (von Möllendorff (2001: 139)). See too Homeyer (1965, 216): the term ψυχρότης 'bezeichnet geschraubte und künstliche Ausdrucksweise, dem Gegenstand nicht angemessene Epitheta und ungeeignete, bzw. unrichtige Vergleiche'. In the present passage the point is that quotation of epic is laughably inappropriate to the situation.

"rudders"[212] and "sails" and all! And other people who were present saw this too. Then the next day your only defence was your drunkenness, and you beat your retreat to the unmixed wine.

This evidently describes an act of oral sex (the details of which I analyse further below), and is one of Lucian's most virtuosic reworkings of Homer. Not only does it carefully use the details of the Polyphemus episode of *Od.* 9, but it also combines that episode with a cento assembled from three lines from the *Iliad.* The similarities to, and differences from, the Homeric version are significant.[213]

First, there is the suggestion that, while the *pseudologistēs* knows his Homer well enough to be described as 'rhapsodising' (ῥαψῳδῆσαι), he is perverting his Homeric 'performance' in a way that is far worse than the minor lexical crime of which he has been accusing Lucian, since it involves not just words but actions too.

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212. Greek ships had two side-rudders (Casson (1971: 224-8)); here they must represent 'testicles'.

213. The themes of bodily penetration and cannibalism make the Homeric Cyclops-episode especially susceptible to obscene reinterpretation: on the ways in which *Od.* 9 is recalled in Petronius' *Satyrica*, see Rimell (2002: ch.6). She writes (103): 'we are continually encouraged to read sexual aggression and innuendo back into the *Odyssey*, to see it with completely new eyes', and (110), 'A rewriting that centres on the figure of Odysseus as sexual object rather than as food for Polyphemus is both funnier, more light-hearted than the Homeric story we remember, and at the same time grossly disturbing: it is based on the idea, reflected in society at Croton, that all sexual activity is at some level cannibalistic, that sex involves the incorporation of (bits of) another person; and conversely that sexual contact, whether the participant is active or passive, directly threatens the boundaries of the individual and the integrity of the self.'

It is not particularly relevant whether we assume that the *pseudologistēs* characterized himself as Polyphemus, or whether this is the observers' own notion. What is important is that he won a nickname from this very unconventional 'performance' of a Homeric scene, a performance which recalls the bawdy, parodic interpretations of mythological scenes found in mime.[214] There is strong irony in this nickname's description as 'heroic' — it admittedly comes from heroic poetry, but that only serves to point out the incongruity. The Homeric Odysseus mockingly describes Polyphemus' blinding as 'unseemly' (ἀεικελίην, *Od.* 9.503) — that is, something bringing shame on Polyphemus — and that sense of unseemliness and shame is what Lucian exploits here by describing a version of the scene that would be totally 'unseemly' as epic poetry. By contrast with Homer's Polyphemus, whose blinding is not seen by the other Cyclopes (who therefore disbelieve him and make no effort to help him), in Lucian's scenario many people did see the shameful goings-on, but this only served to make matters worse on the morning after.

What actually happened on this occasion? As in Homer, the 'Cyclops' got drunk, and his ivy-wood bowl is straight from Homer — the same word (κισσύβιον) is used.[215] But this is not the naïve Homeric Polyphemus who has been tricked into drinking too much strong wine by Odysseus: instead, he knows all about the effects

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214. Beard (2014: 168-9): '[some] mime plots were clearly mythological, even if they ended up as lusty parodies rather than straight renderings'. 'The dance of the shepherd Cyclops' is among the lowbrow entertainment of Hor., *Sat.* 1.5.62-4: see Lada-Richards (2007: 199 n.4).

215. *Od.* 9.346.

of unmixed wine, so he has no one but himself to blame for the state he gets himself into — something which is emphasized at the end of this episode. Indeed, the *pseudologistēs* has even gone so far as to arrange this whole performance in advance and pay for it.

The 'eye' which is the initial target of the young man's 'stake' might be a literal eye, but in light of what Lucian has already said at length about the *pseudologistēs*' sexual improprieties, it is more plausibly a euphemism for the anus,[216] with the content of the cento suggesting that the target then changes to the mouth. The verb in the phrase 'the shaft did turn aside' (παρὰ δέ οἱ ἐτράπετ' ἔγχος) from the cento leaves the agency behind this 'turning aside' undefined, which would allow the narrator the disingenuous excuse that he could hardly help this lack of clarity since the form of the Homeric line forced him to be unclear about whether the young man or the *pseudologistēs* made the change of plan.

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216. I am indebted to Tim Whitmarsh for this idea, which makes for a pleasing pair of equivalences, stake ~ penis / eye ~ anus. The meaning is attested in Ar., *Nub.* 193, on which Henderson (1991: 201) writes: 'The anus as a squinty eye is the image behind the joke'. Lucian has alleged that the *pseudologistēs* is a *kinaidos* at 17-18, repeated the accusation with more detail — 'you gave yourself up to' a soldier, you 'took aside' a youth from Tarsus and were caught *in flagrante* with your patron's cup-bearer, and you've learned new things about women here in Ephesus — in 19-22, and has added the details that he perfumes his grey hair and depilates his private parts in 31. Furthermore, in 27 the Athenians allege that he was worse than the Timarchus attacked in Aeschines' speech. This clear characterization of the *pseudologistēs* as pathic is used by Bain (1994) to argue against the view that the desiderative form βινητιῶν implies a desire to be penetrator rather than penetratee; on βινεῖν and βινητιᾶν cf. Henderson (1991: 152).

The young man's 'sharpened stake' is his own, rather than the one that Odysseus found among the Cyclops' belongings.[217] So up to this point Lucian has effectively reversed the Homeric scenario, with the exception that Polyphemus is still the one whose body is being penetrated by a 'stake'.[218] But even this is then modified with the cento stitched together from Iliadic lines. Their original context is not of special significance, but what is important is that they produce a comically inappropriate reimagining of sexual activity as military combat.

How should the reader interpret the content of the cento? One might imagine that, since the *pseudologistēs* is alleged to engage in similar behaviour regularly, even the young man who has been paid to attack his mouth is so revolted by the taint of *os impurum* that he cannot quite bring himself to do it and fails to enter the mouth, deliberately 'missing his mark' (ἅμαρτε) and instead aiming at 'the jawbone's root' from outside, which is the meaning of the Homeric line.[219] This appears to be the reasoning behind Bain's claim that what is described is 'a

217. Lucian presumably does not intend a similar double-entendre in *Dial. mar.* 2 (=2), so that the definite article could be explained by τὸν μοχλόν meaning 'his penis'; any metaphorical 'sharpening and warming up' of the stake is excluded by the presence there of an *actual* fire!

218. The association of 'penis' and 'stake' perhaps also implies an oversized penis, one supposedly the size of a giant's stake. If so, this would suggest that the young man in question here was lacking in control, since Greeks viewed a large penis as indicative of 'a man who has no sexual outlets or does not control access to them ... [or] the perpetually horny man', like satyrs or silenuses, as Nussbaum observes (2005: 160).

219. The *os impurum* has already been implied in 23, when Lucian says that people would rather kiss an asp or a viper than the *pseudologistēs*; in 25, when the tongue has been used

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frustrated attempt at fellatio'.[220] But I think Bain is probably wrong: it is more likely that the sense of the Homeric αἰχμὴ δ' ἐξεσύθη παρὰ νείατον ἀνθερεῶνα is being comically reversed, with 'the jawbone's root' approached from inside the mouth, so that it describes a successful oral penetration, after the original plan for anal penetration has been aborted (and ἅμαρτε therefore bears a different implication, indicating this change of plan). The effect of using the Homeric cento, in combination with all the other innuendo, is to introduce the possibility for confusion about exactly what happened (as Bain's interpretation illustrates), so that the reader is given free rein to imagine whatever they might consider the worst possible interpretation.[221]

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for purposes it was not intended for; and in 27 when a sailor nearly 'shut up' his mouth.

220.   Bain (1994: 30). Indeed, the young man's 'upright' stake is '*very well*-sharpened', which could be taken, in support of such a view, as an indication that production of the necessary tumescence had required rather more manual labour ('sharpening') than might be expected. But this strikes me as an overinterpretation.

221.   For a similar application of this technique, consider Martial 1.32, where the nature of Sabidius' indescribable unlikeableness is left so unclear that the reader can imagine absolutely anything: if even the serially obscene Martial cannot bring himself to analyse this 'ick-factor', the mind boggles. Although Howell (1980: 175) plays down attempts to see this as implying *os impurum*, the very absence of any explicit interpretation leaves open the possibility of all manner of impurity. cf. Eco (2006: 6-7): 'in Manzoni's *I promessi sposi* (*The Betrothed*) a phrase like "the unfortunate woman responded" does not tell us the lengths to which Gertrude has gone in her sin with Egidio, but the dark halo of hypotheses stirred up in the reader is part of the fascination of this highly chaste and elliptical passage.'

In Lucian's parenthesis about 'frigidity' the inappropriateness of this irruption of Iliadic material into an Odyssean setting is immediately acknowledged, but also justified: the very inanity and inappropriate behaviour of the *pseudologistēs* can hardly help inspiring this ridiculous and inappropriate use of Homer. When, at the end of this passage, the *pseudologistēs* is forced into ignominious retreat, there is again an echo of the military world of the *Iliad*, and this retreat is especially shameful as it is the result of his own actions (in getting drunk and organizing the performance), rather than his 'enemy's', so he has only himself to blame for the disapproval of those around him. Almost like Agamemnon, he seems good at scoring 'own goals'.

Finally comes a comparison with Charybdis (whom Odysseus will of course meet a little later in his journey) as both a vivid means of expressing the *pseudologistēs*' voracity and, through the mention of sailors being swallowed, an allusion to one of Polyphemus' other characteristics — his cannibalism in eating Odysseus' men. By wanting to take human flesh in his mouth, the *pseudologistēs* has become all but a cannibal.[222] The inclusion of this new ship-metaphor for the penis brings in the detail about the ship's rudders which creates an impression of the

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222. Unsurprisingly, cannibalism is not something that Lucian draws attention to when he himself bites Alexander of Abonoteichus's hand (*Alexander* 55 — see §3.2.2 below). However, at *De sacrificiis* 13 the priest who is bloodied as he pulls apart the sacrificial victim is presented as analogous to the Cyclops; the suggestion there is not of cannibalism, but barbarity.

pseudologistēs as such an enthusiastic *fellator* that he swallows not only the young man's penis but his testicles too.

In this remarkable passage there are not only the long-established slurs against those perceived to be *kinaidoi*, but also an interest in the way that a 'performance' of a Homeric scene is perverted into effeminate pantomime.[223] That this involves the body in a significant way reflects the sophists' obsession with the body, which

> was the principal site of the issues, and the anxieties,
> that clustered around sophistic performance. Not for
> nothing did Polemo cry on his deathbed 'give me a
> body, and I shall declaim'.[224]

Attacking the bodies of his bitterest enemies is something of an obsession with Lucian. At *Alexander* 2 he sees Alexander's type of fraudulent 'performance' in the guise of a prophet as antithetical to what an élite of educated people — the *pepaideumenoi* — should be exposed to. It is a form of attention-seeking[225] which Lucian considers more easily assimilable to that put on, for the entertainment of the

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223. On condemnation of pantomimic performance as feminine/feminising, in *De saltu* and elsewhere, see Lada-Richards (2007: esp. ch.5). The *Historia Augusta*'s life of Elagabalus alleges (5.4) that he staged an obscene version of the Judgement of Paris.

224. Whitmarsh (2005: 26), quoting Philost., *VS* 544. On connections between the body, body language and sophists' self-presentation, see Gleason (1995). Note the equation of speech and body in *Rhetorum praeceptor* 9.

225. I borrow this term from Garland (2006). He discusses Alexander of Abonoteichus at 98-100.

uneducated masses, by gladiators or criminals in the arena, than to that presented by respectable sophistic performers:

> ... ὃν οὐκ ἀναγιγνώσκεσθαι πρὸς τῶν πεπαιδευμένων ἦν ἄξιον, ἀλλ’ ἐν πανδήμῳ τινὶ μεγίστῳ θεάτρῳ ὁρᾶσθαι ὑπὸ πιθήκων ἢ ἀλωπέκων σπαραττόμενον.

> ... a man who does not deserve to have educated people read about him, but rather to have the motley crowd in a vast amphitheatre see him being torn to pieces by apes or foxes.[226]

But the desire to see Alexander torn apart by wild beasts is echoed in Lucian's own attempt to literally 'tear apart' Alexander by biting into his hand. It might seem odd that Lucian should associate himself with the savagery of apes and foxes, but (as often in Lucian) there is a hint of Plato behind the image, which leads back to Homer. It is an intriguing fact that the humorist and satirist Lucian never once explicitly compares himself to the Homeric humorist and satirist Thersites. But it could be significant that, in the myth of Er at the end of Plato's *Republic*,

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226. Harmon's Loeb translation, slightly modified.

Thersites chooses to be reborn as an ape.[227] The effect of the two passages describing bodily harm is therefore to tie together Lucian and Thersites, by means of the apes who tear apart those who abuse, respectively, their military command and the conventions of 'sophistic' performance.

2.4 — Conclusion

As I indicated at the end of my discussion of Achilles, one should not expect consistency in the way a satirist — or indeed a sophist — treats these well-known, multivalent characters. And yet, with Achilles, Odysseus, Ajax and Polyphemus, Lucian is also doing a more serious kind of literary criticism which has enjoyed a recent revival with the work of John Sutherland, who writes:

> Personally, I have always thought 'how many children
> had Lady Macbeth?' a perfectly good question ... I

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227. On Thersites, see Halliwell (2008: 69-77). Lucian, whom one might expect to have fellow-feeling for this Ur-satirist, toes the line of the Homeric narrator; Thersites is mentioned with approbation only when Lucian reports that Demonax spoke well of him, 'as a Cynic demagogue' (ὡς Κυνικόν τινα δημηγόρον, *Demonax* 61). Lucian *in propria persona* uses δημηγορῶν in an unfavourable sense (*Adversus indoctum* 7) — contrast Favorinus' encomium of Thersites (Gell., *NA* 17.12.2). Moreover, Lucian makes no other mention of Thersites' satire, and presents him as merely an ugly wastrel, so he does not even seem to see Thersites as a kind of proto-Hegelian Thersitist (Hegel (1961 [1837]: 62)). Keane (2007: 50) suggests that 'in the subsequent [i.e. post-Homeric] tradition, the satirists perform the roles of Thersites and Odysseus at once'.

would argue that however far my solutions are fetched
the problems which inspire them are not frivolous.[228]

Lucian engages with the genuine oddities of the Homeric text and its characters, and while he treats them in a frivolous way there are still serious points being made about the nature of Homer's relationship with the mythological 'outside world' lying beyond the confines of the Homeric text, in terms of myths which Homer does not mention, the reactions of characters who are left behind when Homer's story moves on elsewhere, and the logic of myth itself.

228.　Sutherland (1996: ix). On the Lady Macbeth question see Britton (1961). See Kim (2010: 160) on the miniature dialogues' '"filling in" and commenting on Homeric episodes'.

CHAPTER 3

Homer as man and poet

3.1 — 'Doubtless some facts exist'

> I thumbed well and skipped nowise till I learned
> Who was who, what was what, from Homer's tongue,
> And there an end of learning. Had you asked
> The all-accomplished scholar, twelve years old,
> 'Who was it wrote the Iliad?' — what a laugh!
> 'Why, Homer, all the world knows: of his life
> Doubtless some facts exist: it's everywhere:
> We have not settled, though, his place of birth:
> He begged, for certain, and was blind beside:
> Seven cities claimed him — Scio, with best right,
> Thinks Byron. What he wrote? Those Hymns we have.
> Then there's the "Battle of the Frogs and Mice,"
> That's all — unless they dig "Margites" up
> (I'd like that) nothing more remains to know.'[1]

The Emperor Hadrian, desiring to find the answer to a vexed question, asked where Homer was born and who were his parents, and received the reply that Homer was an Ithacan, son of Telemachos and Epikaste Nestor's daughter … . This cannot be considered an extraordinary statement of hidden knowledge, since at this time the Delphians could name who they pleased as Homer's parents and any place as his birthplace

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1. Lines 48-61 of Browning's 'Development', from *Asolando* (1889) [= Pettigrew (1981: 918-21)].

without fear of being proved wrong; it was certainly
not an expression of superhuman knowledge about
Homer's true parents and birthplace.[2]

Both the young Browning and the older Hadrian were interested in the unverifiable

details of Homer's life; their interest stems from ancient efforts to explain the

origins of the Homeric epics in the mysterious figure of Homer. The 'facts' of

Homer's biography found in the *Vitae* provide Homeric material not drawn directly

from the text of his poems:[3] Lucian introduces the poet as a character in *VH* and

Charon, and alludes to him as a more or less historical personage elsewhere. The

relevant passages of *VH* have been much discussed; indeed 2.20, in which Homer

himself answers these questions about his life and work, has a prominent position

at the beginning of Graziosi & Haubold's opening chapter on ancient controversies

about Homer's life: Lucian 'famously ridiculed his contemporaries' obsession with

the identity of Homer and the meaning of his work'[4] — but this is far from the only

Lucianic passage where these issues are important. This chapter focuses on

references to Homer's life and character in these works, which demonstrate that

Lucian himself makes use of that obsession with the identity of Homer for a variety

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2. Fontenrose (1978: 18).

3. On these lives see Graziosi (2002) and Lefkowitz (2012: ch.2). Texts and translations
are most easily accessible in West (2003b). The ps.-Herodotean *Vita* is discussed by Hägg
(2012: 134-47); for the ps.-Plutarchan *Vita* see Keaney & Lamberton (1996).

4. Graziosi & Haubold (2005: 15); see von Möllendorff (2000a: 367-73) on *VH*'s Homer-
episode.

of purposes. I examine first the views on Homer's life, appearance and poetic abilities of characters who have not met him, then the reports of characters who claim that they have.

3.2 — Homer's appearance, life and abilities

3.2.1 — What did Homer look like and what do we know about him? *Demosthenis laudatio*

In *Demosthenis laudatio* 9 one of Lucian's characters asserts that nothing can be known for sure about Homer, even supposedly well-established details about his poverty and blindness. Yet, paradoxically, Homer's life and achievement are being offered as comparanda for the much better-attested life and achievement of Demosthenes.

It has been argued that this text is spurious,[5] but I find unconvincing those arguments which assume that Lucian was unable to vary his literary style and that he could write in no mode other than the obviously satirical; these arguments are

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5.   See Baldwin (1969), Hall (1981: 324-31), MacLeod (1993: 1385-6).

demonstrably false.[6] Indeed, I should like to revive the case for its being both Lucianic and a parodic, satirical work.[7] For the internet has taught us that MacLeod's claim — 'It is a poor satirist who does not make his satire, however subtle, recognisable for what it is'[8] — is by no means so clear-cut as it might appear. On being presented with material from such a notoriously deceptive parody website as *ChristWire*,[9] readers will often plead that it is indistinguishable from the work of the genuine right-wing Christians whom it satirizes. Indeed, it is precisely the point of this satire that it is virtually unrecognisable as satire. The phenomenon, codified

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6.   Yunis (2007 [2000]: 375 n.4): 'one of the main reasons alleged for denying authenticity, that the satire is too inept for it to be accepted as a genuine effort of the great satirist, is mistaken'. Likewise Mossman (2012: 173 n.12). Lucian repeatedly demonstrates his ability to write in many styles and dialects; in particular, avoidance of hiatus is not so obvious a sign of inauthenticity as has sometimes been thought, being a conscious stylistic choice, unlike (e.g.) the marked difference in the use of *ac/atque* between chapters 1-21 and 22-78 of the *Bellum Alexandrinum*, which must reflect an unconscious tic of different authors: for that work's stylometrics see Gaertner & Hausburg (2013: ch.3), with analysis of the copulative conjunctions at 70-1. On authenticity issues see Appendix 1 below.

7.   For discussion of, and bibliography on, this question, see Rutherford (1992: 373-4), although I disagree with his characterization of the dialogue as 'rather amateurishly written'.

8.   Macleod (1967: 237).

9.   *ChristWire: Conservative Values for an Unsaved World*, http://www.christwire.org (consulted 7/5/15). The website is complemented by Gould, Bowers, et al. (2012).

as 'Poe's Law',[10] has been well demonstrated by a study which found that an audience's political beliefs affected their perception of whether a satirical comedian seriously believed the ideas he was propounding.[11] Certainly Lucian's *De astrologia* has been seen as both a genuine and a parodic defence of astrology.[12] In a similar fashion *Demosthenis laudatio* prompts the reader to reflect that the apparently sensible logic of the dialogue's premise — that one can compare Demosthenes' well-documented life with Homer's entirely 'mythical' life — is in itself ludicrous. Indeed, as Mossman observes, the dialogue actually ends up being rather a disappointment: it leads the reader to expect 'a clash of the titans between Homer and Demosthenes

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10.   Defined thus on the *TV Tropes* wiki: 'The core idea of Poe's law is that a parody of something extreme can be mistaken for the real thing, and if a real thing sounds extreme enough, it can be mistaken for a parody'. http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/ptitlehkm94ato (consulted 3/4/15).

11.   LaMarre/Landreville/Beam (2009). Likewise, Al Murray's satirical 'pub landlord' is sometimes taken at face value. Plato's dialogues abound in troublesome irony: consider the extended etymological section of the *Cratylus*, which Sedley (2003) argues is intended quite seriously, against the more common view that it is ironic and humorous.

12.   Barton (1994: 56-7): 'Lucian wrote one short work entitled *On Astrology* which seems to be a parody of a philosophical defence of astrology.' Harmon (1936: 347): 'The thing is so clever that it has duped almost everyone, including myself ... into taking it in earnest and proclaiming it spurious.' Hall (1981: 386): 'A believer in astrology might read the piece and find nothing in it to offend him. Lucian's public, however, who knew what to expect from him, would discern the true intent behind what was said, and appreciate the subtle and amusing game he was playing.' The tricky issue of irony, satire, parody and pastiche in *DDS* is addressed in detail by Lightfoot (2003: ch.2); *De astrologia* is 'an important point of reference in discussing the aims, methods and authenticity of *DDS*' (97). See too Bartley (2009a).

in the tradition of the *Contest between Homer and Hesiod*. But in fact this clash never happens.'[13]

The unnamed narrator encounters Thersagoras the poet at noon on Homer's birthday (the sixteenth of some unspecified month).[14] He has risen early, 'to dedicate the first-fruits of my poetic art in honour of Homer's birthday' (τοῖς Ὁμήρου γενεθλίοις τῆς ποιητικῆς ἀπάρξασθαι). The narrator responds that this is most appropriate, as 'repayment for the education' (τὰ τροφεῖα τῆς παιδεύσεως) which Homer has given him.

So Homer, just as much as Demosthenes, has a birthday which can be celebrated. Since Plutarch says that Demosthenes died on the sixteenth of Pyanepsion, the setting of this dialogue on the sixteenth day of a month seems

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13.   Mossman (2012: 173). Rutherford (1992: 374) writes: 'The thesis projected by the dialogue as a whole is that Demosthenes is at least as good a writer as Homer.' However it also becomes clear that Demosthenes is in Homer's debt, so the work is actually an encomium of both authors. This is significant since Thersagoras is arguing that an encomium of Demosthenes is easier to produce than one of Homer — which means that Lucian has 'accidentally' managed to achieve the harder task in the process of doing the easier.

14.   It may not be coincidental that a Lampsacan tyrannicide named Thersagoras appears in Demosthenes (*In Aristocratem* 142-3); considering Lucian's focus here on honorific statues, it is suggestive that Demosthenes speaks of bronze statues set up to such tyrannicides.

significant.[15] Nonetheless the narrator speaks of his oration as part of a birthday celebration, rather than an anniversary of death. Plato's birthday seems to have been celebrated by his followers in Lucian's time,[16] but there is no evidence for similar commemoration of Homer. The poet's birthday raises a troubling question in the reader's mind: how can Thersagoras assert its date with such confidence when the rest of the dialogue emphasizes the total absence of concrete facts concerning Homer's life? Since Diogenes Laërtius says that the date of Plato's anniversary celebrations was the same as Apollo's, it is possible that Demosthenes' birthday is being associated in the same way with that assigned to the 'mythical' or god-like figure of Homer, while simultaneously having some association with the anniversary of Demosthenes' death.[17] But Gesner may well be right to view the

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15.　Plut., *Dem.* 30.4. Caution is perhaps necessary, since Anderson (1976a: 49) has identified Lucian's apparent fondness for the number sixteen: he cites the debt paid sixteen days late (*Hermotimus* 81), and sixteen vultures attacking Prometheus (*Dial. deor.* 5.1 (= 1.1 — Anderson misidentifies this as *Dial. mort.* 1.1) and *Prometheus* 20. However, this evidence does not necessarily suggest that it is a 'typical "Lucianic" number': the debt is simply now one day past two weeks due, and the mention of Prometheus' sixteen vultures in two places suggests that Lucian is drawing on some 'authoritative' source for the number.

16.　Briefly discussed by Gooch (1982); for discussion of the place of Plato's, Socrates', and Artemis' birthdays in the calendar see Grafton & Swerdlow (1988: esp. 25-6). Both Plut., *Quaest. conv.* 717b and Diog. Laert. 3.2 attest to the celebration of Plato's birthday. On Roman birthdays see Feeney (2007: 154-8).

17.　See further on ancient birthday celebrations, both private and public, Argetsinger (1992) and *BNP*, s.v. 'birthday'.

whole thing as simply a joke at the expense of both characters, who naively believe

that one can be even remotely certain about such things:

> Cum mensem non nominet, nihil inde de natali die vel
> Homeri vel Demosthenis colligas. Et lusit, credo, auctor
> in hoc etiam, quod natalem inducit celebrantes poëtae
> & oratoris maximi, cum de neutro aliquid constaret.

> Since he does not name the month, you cannot
> thereby deduce anything about the birthday of either
> Homer or Demosthenes. And, I think, the author has
> made a joke in the following respect also: that he
> brings in men who are celebrating the birthday of the
> poet and of the greatest orator, although there was not
> any agreement concerning either.[18]

What happens next sets up another of this dialogue's themes: Thersagoras

points to a statue of Homer, and the narrator steps in to explain which statue is

meant. In so doing he indicates that Homer is recognisable from his physical

appearance, with his long hair singled out for special comment; this is at one level

an allusion to the Homeric formula 'long-haired Achaeans' (κομόωντας Ἀχαιούς).

The blindness of the statue's eyes is presumably taken for granted, although the

absence of this feature in the description could equally be pointed, since

Thersagoras says later (9) that it is better to leave aside such questions as whether

Homer was really poor or blind,[19] and the phrase 'suffering of his eyes' (πάθος

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18.   Quoted in Hemsterhuis & Reitz (1789-93 [1743]: Vol. 9, 403). He also argues in his
introductory note that the work's first half 'seems to be a satire on inept encomiasts'
('Satirica esse videtur, in laudatores ineptos').

19.   'But perhaps it would be better to let these things too lie unclear' (ἀλλὰ μὴν βέλτιον
εἴη καὶ ταῦτα ἐᾶν ἐν ἀσαφεῖ κείμενα).

ὀμμάτων) is mischievously vague. The archaic hairstyle is presented as a more noteworthy feature, but it is hard to tell whether this of itself would be sufficient to identify the statue as Homer.[20] Details of Thersagoras' physical appearance have already been mentioned by the narrator at the beginning of the dialogue — he was short, with hooked nose and salt-and-pepper hair — putting an emphasis on physical form which sets up the significance of this moment.[21]

But where is this statue? The narrator says, 'I'm sure you know the statue to the right of the Ptolemies' temple' (ἴστε δήπου τὸν ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ τῶν Πτολεμαίων νεώ) — but readers are certainly not able to, since it is not even clear from the text

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20.   Katharina Lorenz suggests to me (pers. comm. 31/7/10) that the long hair with which Homer is always depicted is a mark of venerability appropriate to philosophers and literary types in general; this therefore means that it is not something which specifically identifies Homer, nor, indeed, does it give any clues about his ethnicity or city of origin. On sculptural representations of Homer, his blindness and hairstyles, see Zanker (1996: 14-22 & 166-71), who points to Christodorus' description of a Homer statue at *AP* 2.311-49.

21.   The emphasis on physiognomy characterizes Thersagoras in a positive way: there is general agreement in the various manifestations of Polemon that a hooked nose indicates good character — see the Leiden Polemon, 34[a] ('The curved nose indicates much thinking' tr. from the Arabic by Hoyland in Swain (2007: 417)), ps.-Arist., *Physiognomy* 811[a], where aquiline noses indicate 'a proud soul' (μεγαλόψυχοι, tr. Swain (2007: 655)), and Adamantius the Sophist, *Physiognomy* 2.25 says γρυποῖς μεγαλόνοια πρέπει 'Great-mindedness is shown by hooked noses' (tr. Repath in Swain (2007: 529)), cf. Anon. Lat. 51 (Swain (2007: 591)). At ps.-Arist., *Physiognomy* 813[b], short stature indicates acuity: οἱ μικροὶ ἄγαν ὀξεῖς 'Men of abnormally small stature are hasty', though ὀξύς can equally have a sense of good haste, i.e. swiftness or keenness of thought (tr. Swain (2007: 661)). Furthermore, Thersagoras' greying hair perhaps contributes to an air of venerability.

which city the dialogue is taking place in. Homer's statue is associated with divinity, being situated close to 'the Ptolemies' temple',[22] in the same way that Homer is associated with a kind of divine poetic inspiration: the living poet feels that he has been inspired by Homer for the past night and morning. Homer is contrasted with Demosthenes, who, the narrator laments, has been unable to provide help to honour his birthday. The implication is that Homer has a divine power which Demosthenes lacks. Gesner, along with Graevius, assumes that the 'temple of the Ptolemies' is the temple to Homer which Aelian says Ptolemy Philopator built in Alexandria:

> Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Φιλοπάτωρ κατασκευάσας Ὁμήρῳ νεών,
> αὐτὸν μὲν καλῶς ἐκάθισε, κύκλῳ δὲ τὰς πόλεις
> περιέστησε τοῦ ἀγάλματος, ὅσαι ἀντιποιοῦνται τοῦ
> Ὁμήρου.

> When Ptolemy Philopator had constructed a temple to
> Homer, he set[23] him beautifully, and around the statue

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22.   Topographical faux-exactitude also opened the dialogue — 'as I was walking on the far side of the stoa, the one on the left as you go out … ' (βαδίζοντί μοι κατὰ τὴν στοὰν τὴν ἐντεῦθεν ἐξιόντων ἐν ἀριστερᾷ). This specificity recalls the openings of Plato's *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, works to which allusion is made elsewhere in this dialogue — *Phaedrus* at 1 & 5; *Republic* at 16 & 17. The placement directly outside the temple reflects a sense that Homer is an intermediary between men and gods: see Zanker (1996: 19-20) on the placement of Homer and Hesiod statues at Olympia.

23.   Wilson (1997) translates 'he set up' (and καθίζω is a *vox propria* for setting up a statue), but the lack of a word for 'statue' here perhaps also suggests a more literal 'sitting down' of 'him' (αὐτόν). Greeks often spoke of images of gods as though they were the gods themselves: see Renehan (1987: 241).

he put in a circle the cities which made competing
claims for Homer.[24]

But Gesner then offers an alternative interpretation which seems less likely, attempting to set the scene of the dialogue in Athens rather than Alexandria, in light of the Gymnasium of Ptolemy seen by Pausanias in the agora. Although Pausanias writes of statues in this area, the lack of any mention of a temple or statue of Homer makes Gesner's supposition dubious. MacLeod suggests Rhodes as a possible backdrop, on the grounds that the city was one of Homer's alleged birthplaces, that it had a square precinct surrounded by a colonnade and dedicated to Ptolemy Soter,[25] and that it was the subject of Demosthenes' *On the Liberty of the Rhodians.* Does τὴν στοάν in the opening sentence imply *the* Stoa?[26] And is it too fanciful to see in these confusing topographical problems an allusion by the narrator to the difficulty of ascertaining correct information on the birthplace of

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24.   Ael., *VH* 13.22; see too 9.15 on Argos inviting Homer along with Apollo to sacrifices. For a summary of evidence for Homer-cult, and its relevance to *Charon* 4 & 7 especially, see Charrière (2011: 46-8). On the worship of Homer see Brink (1972).

25.   Diod. Sic. 20.100.4.

26.   Athens' Gymnasium of Ptolemy: Paus. 1.17.2. Gesner's note: Hemsterhuis & Reitz (1789-93 [1743]: Vol.9, 404). The Rhodian precinct: Macleod (1967: 240-1), sensibly observing that Athens is unlikely, considering the reference to 'payment, as at Athens, for attending the assembly or doing jury service' (μισθόν, καθάπερ Ἀθήνησιν ἐκκλησιαστικὸν ἢ δικαστικόν (25)), which implies that Athens is somewhere else. This Lucianic passage is not considered as evidence for the Stoa in Wycherley (1957).

the real Homer who is the model for the statue — making this a more self-referential joke?

In any case, Thersagoras complains (9) that the poetry itself is all that one can know for sure about Homer, so that his encomium of Homer is twice as great an achievement as the encomium of Demosthenes. What follows is Lucian's clearest presentation of the issues at stake in discussion of various Homeric problems, which I summarise as follows:

i)   Apart from his poetry everything else is uncertain.

ii)   His country is unknown; countless cities are claimed as his native land (e.g. Ios, Colophon, Cyme, Chios, Smyrna, Egyptian Thebes[27]).

iii)   Some say his father was Maeon of Lydia, or else a river.

iv)   Some call him Melesigenes (i.e. the son of the river Meles).

v)   His mother was Crethis or a water nymph.

vi)   He lived either in the age of the heroes or in the 'Ionian age'.

vii)   It is unknown whether he lived at the same time as Hesiod.

viii)   There are claims that he was poor and blind.

ix)   His wisdom must therefore be deduced solely from the poetry itself.

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27.   The omission of Rhodes from this list could be used to argue both for and against Rhodes as the dialogue's backdrop. Also omitted, perhaps surprisingly, is Meleager's argument for a Syrian Homer (Ath. 4.157b), which explained why Homeric heroes abstain from fish (cf. Ath. 1.9d): see Isaac (2011: 495).

Later (17), the narrator returns to Homer's physical appearance and quasi-divinity. Drawing on his own experience, he suggests that Demosthenes might have appeared to him just as Homer had appeared to Thersagoras himself, as a light so bright it caused him to avert his eyes.[28] The reader will recall the appearance of Zeus to Semele here,[29] but Thersagoras was not burnt to a cinder, since he did eventually manage to look at the great poet. Again there is a lack of distinction between physical and metaphorical manifestations, with Thersagoras describing the challenge of emulating the Homeric model as barely possible for a mere mortal to meet. In the context of Homer's pseudo-biography, it is significant that Thersagoras associates with Homer the idea of a *blinding* light, since the *Vita Romana* (= Anonymus I) asserts that Homer lost his sight in a similar way:

28. In view of the embedded dialogue between Antipater and Archias which ends the work and purportedly comes from a book of ὑπομνήματα owned by Thersagoras, note that Appian (*Hist. Rom.* Pref. 10) refers to Alexander's empire as like a 'bright lightning-flash' (ἀστραπῇ λαμπρᾷ), which is more plainly metaphorical, referring to the man's achievements rather than his appearance; what is relevant is as much the lightning's brevity as its brightness. In this dialogue Archias says (29): 'I've brought Demosthenes along — as best I could. See, I've got his remains [i.e. cremated ashes] in this urn.' (ἤγαγον ὡς ἐδυνάμην· ὑδρίαν γὰρ κομίζω τῶν Δημοσθένους λειψάνων). Demosthenes did get burnt up, but not by a lightning-strike or a manifestation of Homer.

29. Semele's fate is discussed by Hermes and Poseidon in *Dial. deor.* 12 (=9), and Lucian has a special interest in this kind of immolation: see the passages given by Anderson (1976a: 55). The idea also recalls the fear of looking on God, such as Moses feels in the episode of the burning bush (*Exodus* 3.6). On connections between the burning bush in Ezekiel's *Exagoge* (described by Moses in lines 90-5) and the Dionysian 'miracles' of Euripides' *Bacchae* see Whitmarsh (2013: 218). On looking at gods, see Lovatt (2013: 78-85).

τυφλωθῆναι δὲ αὐτὸν οὕτω πως λέγουσιν· ἐλθόντα
γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχιλλέως τάφον εὔξασθαι θεάσασθαι τὸν
ἥρωα τοιοῦτον ὁποῖος προῆλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην τοῖς
δευτέροις ὅπλοις κεκοσμημένος· ὀφθέντος δὲ αὐτῷ τοῦ
Ἀχιλλέως τυφλωθῆναι τὸν Ὅμηρον ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν
ὅπλων αὐγῆς· ἐλεηθέντα δὲ ὑπὸ Θέτιδος καὶ Μουσῶν
τιμηθῆναι πρὸς αὐτῶν τῇ ποιητικῇ.

They say he was blinded in the following way: he went
to the tomb of Achilles and prayed that he might look
upon the hero as he was when he went forth into
battle arrayed in his second set of armour. But when
Achilles appeared to him, Homer was blinded by the
armour's gleam. Thetis and the Muses took pity on
him and bestowed on him the honour of poetic skill.[30]

Just as Thetis and the Muses imbued Homer with poesy after his exposure to this
blinding light,[31] so Homer himself imbued Thersagoras, in a kind of apostolic
succession — but, since Thetis takes pity on him and gives him a gift, Homer is also
conflated with Achilles as well, making him at once a hero *and* a god.

And moreover, because of his own ability to bear rays of Homeric light
without being blinded, Thersagoras considers himself a kind of honorary

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30. Anon., *Vita Romana* 5. The Myrmidons cannot look at Achilles' shield (*Il.* 19.14-15), a
passage in the background here: see Hägg (2012: 145 n.117).

31. See Beecroft (2011) on the ancient tendency to think in terms of such
'surcompensation' and 'the juxtaposition of sudden disability and sudden poetic or mantic
inspiration' (10), notably in the cases of Aesop and Tiresias, as well as on the patterns of
Stesichorus' temporary (Pl., *Phdr.* 243a2-243b3) and Homer's permanent blinding (the latter
being a subject of disagreement in the *Vitae*).

'descendant' of the poet.[32] The narrator does not respond to this point, so the reader does not know whether Demosthenes did indeed appear in this way to him, as Thersagoras is suggesting he might have done. Instead, it is Homer who continues to lie behind the remainder of the discussion.

With 18 comes the conclusion to which the whole discussion so far has been leading: one can talk about how well Demosthenes lived his life, because certain facts are known, but this simply cannot be done for Homer because of our ignorance about him. Indeed, no awareness is shown here of the specific details recorded in the *Vitae*, in particular the story about Homer's death following his failure to solve a riddle.[33] The narrator's difficulty, as described by Thersagoras, is the very opposite of the difficulty faced by the encomiast of Homer.

The abundance of facts about the orator's life is in fact an *embarras de richesses*, from which one must take a single feature — or else focus on the work rather than the life (20). The dialogue has now reached an unexpected moment, when Homer's disciple is giving advice on the subject of oratory, no less, to the disciple of the great orator Demosthenes. The very lack of evidence about Homer's life has become an inspiration for good literary composition. Furthermore, it turns

32. 'Proving myself an illegitimate member of the family of Homer's descendants' (νόθος τοῦ τῶν Ὁμηριδῶν γένους ἐλέγχεσθαι). The exact implication of νόθος here is not entirely clear.

33. *Certamen* 18, ps.-Plutarch I 4, Proclus 5, Anonymus I 6, Anonymus II 3, Anonymus III 5, all contradicted by ps.-Herodotus 36 — all refs. as in West (2003b).

out that this is an approach which Homer himself would have used (21), since he praised individual warriors or gods by focusing only on their feet, head, hair or paraphernalia, rather than attempting a complete picture. Homer's art seems to imitate his life's paucity of facts — which itself inspires art. This also reveals Homer as a careful, skilful rhetorician, a description often implicit or explicit in the scholia.[34]

The work as a whole, then, offers a double view of Homer, reflecting his semi-divinity: on the one hand it is possible to identify Homer in some physical form, either depicted in a long-haired statue or seen as an unbearably bright light of inspiration, but on the other hand he is as unknowable and mysterious as a god, both in his ability to provide that inspiration to orators and in the absence of hard facts about his life.

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34.   Indeed, he was viewed as rhetoric's inventor, with the varied styles of his characters' own speech offering a masterclass on the use of different rhetorical styles. 'Ancient scholars tended to credit Homer with the invention of all kinds of things, including rhetoric,' writes Nünlist (2009a: 220), who analyses the scholiasts' discussion of Homer's rhetorical effects. Quintilian's discussion of Homer inevitably focuses on rhetoric, yet it is remarkable that he devotes more space to discussion of Homer (*Inst.* 10.1.46-51) than of all the Greek rhetoricians put together (10.1.76-9).

3.2.2 — Where was Homer from? When did he live? *Alexander*

Both the Homeric text and Homer's disputed biography play a part in Lucian's exposure of the fraudulent prophet Alexander of Abonoteichus.[35] Drawing on the stereotype of Paphlagonians as gullible and superstitious, which goes back to Aristophanes' *Knights*, Lucian presents himself in *Alexander* as the exposer of this unscrupulous deceiver of the region's population, whom he characterizes as 'thick and simple', 'sheep-like', 'uneducated' (9, 15, 17).[36] *Alexander* therefore includes plentiful mockery of the prophet and of Paphlagonians as a whole, and it is unsurprising that Lucian bases this mockery around the figure of Homer, knowledge of whose work is a fundamental part of being educated. As Petsalis-Diomidis writes, 'Lucian's presentation of Alexander as a charlatan is heavily dependent on his manipulation of the concept of *paideia*.'[37]

Through a variety of tricks, such as purported oracles, the creation of 'supernatural' foam at the mouth, a fake serpent's head, a snake 'born' from a goose's egg, and meaningless 'magic words', Alexander convinces the locals of his

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35. On this work see Victor (1997), and, on its genre, Billault (2009).

36. See Mitchell (2010: 86-8). Indeed, Mitchell goes so far as to say (87) that 'the primary assassin [of the region's reputation] was Lucian'. It eventually becomes clear, however, that the inhabitants of Rome are also especially gullible (30, 36): on Lucian's opinions of Rome and Romans see Nesselrath (2009), and, on Lucian's 'satirizing Rome', Whitmarsh (2001: ch.5).

37. Petsalis-Diomidis (2010: 55).

supernatural powers, beginning a successful career of fleecing them, until the Lucian-narrator visits and, after proving Alexander a charlatan, is on the verge of prosecuting him.[38] At this point powerful supporters, including the governor of the province, step in to protect the prophet. The attempt is thus ultimately a failure, but the evidence presented in this account of events leaves the reader in no doubt about Alexander's character.

The Lucian-narrator claims to have personally tested Alexander; several of his own efforts are described in detail, as he records the questions he asked and the 'oracular' responses to them;[39] he is not alone, however, in this deception of the oracle, since many people used to set such traps (54). The concentration on Alexander's oracular pronouncements, in a savage attack on an individual who is misleading people for his own gain, is reminiscent of the oracles and the attack on Cleon in Aristophanes' *Knights*, while the presence of the 'Paphlagonian' in

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38.   The narrator names himself 'Lucian' (55), 'as it were as a *sphragis* to guarantee authenticity' (Humble & Sidwell (2006: 213)). As in *VH*, this identification comes late in the work; for both texts I refer to the 'Lucian-narrator'.

39.   The degree to which Lucian's account reflects genuine events is debatable: Petsalis-Diomidis (2010: 43 n.68) provides extensive bibliography illustrating the range of views. See too Bendlin (2011: 232-3). For an attempt to diagnose Alexander's narcissism, see Kent (2007). But for my discussion what is important is how Lucian deploys Homer as part of his invective, regardless of whether the questions were actually posed in the way that is claimed.

Aristophanes only serves to emphasize the connections.[40] The Lucian-narrator's main weapon is the presention of sealed written questions different from the questions which he claims to be asking in them.[41] So he reports (54) that he sent a scroll with a single question in it, but labelled it on the outside as containing eight questions. The oracle gave eight responses, none of them relevant to the actual (single) question, 'When will Alexander be exposed as a fraud?'

This is the second of the Lucian-narrator's tests, and takes to the next level what he had first done with a Homeric question (53), 'Where was Homer the poet from?', which Bompaire calls 'la question … la plus rabâchée de toutes'[42] and Robert considers 'embarassante et comme provocatrice'.[43] Although it is true that this question is clearly intended to be as unanswerable as the question in 54, the real point of the narrator's little experiment is again that the oracle never finds out what the real question was:

καὶ πάλιν ἐμοῦ ἐρομένου ἐν δύο βιβλίοις διαφόροις
τὴν αὐτὴν ἐρώτησιν, πόθεν ἦν Ὅμηρος ὁ ποιητής, ἔπ'

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40.   Demos' slaves plot to steal Paphlagon's oracles, and the Paphlagonians' 'garlic-breath' appears in the hexameter 'oracle' of 197-201, shortly before the appearance of Paphlagon himself (235); Lucian's focus on oracles may therefore be inspired by Aristophanes.

41.   Answering the question inside the scroll without opening the seal was a speciality of the oracle. Possible means are explained by which the scrolls might be secretly opened (19), although in the present cases Alexander does not need to do this, as the Lucian-narrator's helper 'reveals' the scrolls' alleged content anyway.

42.   Bompaire (1958: 129).

43.   Robert (1980: 419).

ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλου ὀνόματος, τῷ ἑτέρῳ μὲν ὑπέγραψεν
ἐξαπατηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐμοῦ νεανίσκου — ἐρωτηθεὶς γὰρ
ἐφ᾽ ὅ τι ἧκεν, "θεραπείαν," ἔφη, "αἰτήσων πρὸς ὀδύνην
πλευροῦ" —

κυτμίδα χρίεσθαι κέλομαι δροσίην τε κέλητος·

τῷ δὲ ἑτέρῳ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἠκηκόει ὡς ἐρομένου
τοῦ πέμψαντος, εἰ δέοι πλεῦσαι ἐπ᾽ Ἰταλίαν εἴτε
πεζοπορῆσαι λῷον, ἀπεκρίνατο οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν
Ὅμηρον·

μὴ σύ γε πλωέμεναι, πεζὴν δὲ κατ᾽ οἶμον ὅδευε.

And again I asked the same question — where Homer
the poet was from — in two different scrolls and under
different names; having been misled by my young man
(who was asked why he had come, and said 'To seek a
cure for a pain in the side'), to one of the questions he
wrote a response '*Cytmis* I urge you apply, along with
the foam of a courser'. To the other, having likewise
been told that the sender was asking whether he
should sail to Italy or whether it would be better to go
by land, he gave a response which was nothing to do
with Homer: 'Sail you should not, but travel on foot by
the roadway.'

Dauzat offers an analysis of this episode which draws on the earlier work of

Bompaire and Robert: these three scholars have proposed possible reasons for the

narrator's use of this Homeric question.[44] Bompaire suggests that it is simply a joke

about asking the most unanswerable of all questions; Robert notes that Hadrian had

(presumably in all seriousness) posed the same question to the Pythia; while Dauzat

himself sees it as a sly allusion to Amastris, where Alexander had received a

particularly hostile reception from the local Epicureans and Christians (25). This

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44.   Dauzat (2002: xxx-xxxiii); Bompaire (1958: 129); Robert (1980: 416 n.118).

theory is also outlined by Jones: the question 'reveals Lucian entering into the local rivalries between Abonuteichos and its neighbors',[45] since Amastris seems to have been one of the many alleged birthplaces of Homer, or at the very least to have made much of its mention (as 'Sesamus') in *Il.* 2.853.[46] Mitchell describes *Il.* 2.851-5 as 'for all intents and purposes the foundation charter of the Paphlagonians', which 'provided a skeleton around which Paphlagonian identity was constructed during the Hellenistic and early imperial periods'.[47] While Dauzat does not mention the contemporary exploitation of this connection, the city of Amastris certainly made much of it in the time of Lucian, to judge from its coins, on which, in common with the coins of other supposed cradles of Homer, the poet is regularly portrayed.[48]

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45. Jones (1986: 144-5). See too the second epigraph to the present chapter, and Caster (1938: 44): 'Peut-être aussi les Amastriens furent-ils inclinés, par jalousie, à décrier l'oracle de leur voisine Abonotique, et par là même se laissèrent-ils accuser d'épicurisme? On comprendrait mieux, dans cette hypothèse, la condamnation *collective* qu'Alexandre prononça contre Amastris et qu'il ne leva jamais (sauf une fois, en faveur d'un important personnage).'

46. Strictly speaking, Amastris' dependent settlement Kromna. See Victor (1997: 167-8). For the inscription Ὅμηρος Κρομνεύς see Mitchell (2010: 96), and Robert (1980: 418), who also discusses the coin legend Ὅμηρος Ἀμαστριαν(ός).

47. Mitchell (2010: 93-4).

48. Mentioned by Jones (1986: 144-5) and Robert (1980: 416-9); for further detail see Esdaile (1912: 317-21): 'The Homer types … are all of imperial date' (317), but note that the reference to Lucian's '*Imagg.* 24' at 305 should be to *Pro Imaginibus* 24. Graziosi (2002: ch.2), discusses coins depicting Homer, but not those of Amastris.

We can take Dauzat's argument further. For there is another, curious reference to Homer in this work (56): the Lucian-narrator and his companion Xenophon are put ashore at Aegiali 'of which good Homer makes mention' (ἐν Αἰγιαλοῖς, ὧν καὶ ὁ καλὸς Ὅμηρος μέμνηται, 56). There seems no very pressing need to include this piece of literary information, so this is perhaps part of the same attempt to provide Homer with some sort of physical location, and also to contrast one further city of good pedigree with the non-Homeric Abonoteichus. Homer is described as καλός, which is perhaps also intended as a slight on Abonoteichus; if Homer was a good, noble, honourable person, of course he cannot be associated with that city.[49] Further, one recalls in this connection the notion found in the biographical tradition that Homer must have had personal experience of the things he talks about, so for this reason Proclus claims that he must not have been blind.[50] This implies that the narrator wishes to suggest that Homer had at least visited Aegiali as well as Amastris (or indeed had been born there).

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49.   Strabo 12.3.10 'used almost exactly those words himself when he described the coastal settlements which had been incorporated into the territory of Amastris' (Mitchell (2010: 94)), but he refers to only 'the poet' (ἧς μέμνηται ὁ ποιητής).

50.   *Chrestomathia* 1.6 (West 2003b: 422-3): 'Those people who have declared that he was blind seem to me to be defective in their wits; for he saw as many things as no [other] man has ever seen' τυφλὸν δὲ ὅσοι ἀπεφήναντο, αὐτοί μοι δοκοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν πεπηρῶσθαι· τοσαῦτα γὰρ κατεῖδεν ἄνθρωπος ὅσα οὐδεὶς πώποτε. cf. Proclus' assumption (1.8) that Homer was personally familiar with places he describes.

But there is a further point to this question in the context of the *Alexander* as a whole. As Winkler has observed, the scenario in 33 is similar to that in some of the *Philogelos*' jokes about charlatan prophets, such as the following:

> ἀφυὴς μαθηματικὸς παιδίου γένεσιν λέγων εἶπεν· "οὗτος ἔσται ῥήτωρ, εἶτα ἔπαρχος, εἶτα ἡγεμών." τεθνηκότος οὖν τοῦ παιδὸς τούτου ἡ μήτηρ ἀπαντήσασα εἶπεν· "ὃν ἔλεγες ῥήτορα ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἄρχοντα καὶ ἡγεμόνα ἀπέθανεν." ὁ δὲ ἔφη· "μὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ μνήμην, ἐὰν ἔζησε, πάντα ταῦτα ἂν ἐγένετο."

> A dense astrologer cast a boy's horoscope and said, 'This boy will be a public speaker, then a prefect, then a governor.' So when the boy died, his mother came back and said, 'That boy has died, who you said would be a public speaker, a magistrate and a governor.' He replied, 'I swear by his memory, if only he had lived, he would have become all these things!'[51]

In *Alexander* the prophet advises his son-in-law Rutilianus to take Pythagoras and Homer as his son's 'tutors', only to be embarrassed a few days later when the son suddenly dies.[52] But Alexander gets away with it, because Rutilianus has reinterpreted the oracle literally — as saying that the son would soon be studying with these two tutors in the afterlife, rather than as suggesting a syllabus. Although

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51. *Philogelos* 202; see Winkler (1985: 162). Among the nine others described as 'dense' (ἀφυής) in this section of the work are 'prophets' (μάντεις) (201, 203, 205) and, as here, μαθηματικοί (202, 204) who make fools of themselves by giving wrong answers to those who consult them.

52. Caster (1938: 56) briefly discusses Pythagorean exegesis of Homer and draws attention to an epitaph of the first century AD which mentions a child's study of Pythagoras, Homer, and Euclid.

the jokes of this format in the *Philogelos* are seemingly told at the expense of the dodgy prophets, there is also implied criticism of the stupid people who are taken in by them. So here the joke is all the more at the expense of Rutilianus himself, since he saves the prophet the trouble of inventing a dubious explanation by coming up with one himself. This is emphasized when the narrator sums up: 'Why then should we blame Alexander, if he thought it fitting to play games with such paltry men (ἀνθρωπίσκοις)?'[53] The humour of this tale depends on the conflation of Homer as a man and Homer as his works, such as can be seen also in *Demosthenis laudatio* and in the coexistence of Homer and his characters in *VH*. Also reminiscent of *Demosthenis laudatio* is the long hair of Alexander (and of the snake), which is a characteristic of Pythagorean sages, but is also the feature singled out for special interest on the statue of Homer.[54] However, as Alexander's hair is actually a wig, 'simultaneously an affectation and a deceitful prop',[55] the implication is that he is merely feigning the

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53.   This 'paltry man' is amusingly and ironically flattered by the oracle in 34, which says that he was Achilles in his first incarnation, Menander in his second, and in his next incarnation will become a sunbeam — which, as Caster explains (1938: 34), citing Plut., *De fac.* 943d & 945c, represents pure intelligence! The appearance of Menander in the list perhaps also prompts the reader to think of Achilles in the previous incarnation as a literary character, so that the flattery involves both Achilles' heroic acts and his memorialisation in heroic poetry: see Karavas & Vix (2014: 188).

54.   Caster (1938: 9), comparing *Vitarum auctio* 2 and *Philopseudes* 29. The snake's long hair is clearly visible in the marble statue of Glycon from Tomis discussed by Petsalis-Diomidis (2010: 15-16) and Robert (1980: 397), as well as on some of Abonoteichus'/Ionopolis' coins (which I discuss shortly).

55.   Petsalis-Diomidis (2010: 57).

wisdom which rightly belongs to the likes of Homer and true Pythagorean sages.[56]
The deceit is continued with his prosthetic golden thigh (40), which imitates that of
Pythagoras.

Mention of Homer in the context of the Lucian-narrator's trick at 53 recalls
this incident, but now it is Alexander himself who is the victim of the deception,
and it is he who, by his own words, reveals his foolishness, just as Rutilianus had
done. The narrator therefore shows himself superior not only to the stupid
Rutilianus but also to the considerably more devious Alexander who was himself
able to hoodwink people.

This work's remaining quotations of Homer are used to mock Alexander. In
5, the line 'many drugs that are good when mixed, and many which are baleful'
(φάρμακα πολλὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ μεμιγμένα πολλὰ δὲ λυγρά)[57] draws attention to
Alexander's knowledge of 'bad' as well as 'good' drugs and effectively equates him
with a woman — for any reader who would not recognise the allusion, the narrator
carefully emphasizes the point by explaining that the line forms part of the
description of Thon's (Egyptian) wife Polydamna. While Alexander made much of

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56.   Caster also refers here to Reitzenstein's view that the physical portrait of Alexander
in *Alexander* 3 is a parody of some lost aretalogical text on the miracles of Alexander: 'Das
Urteil wird hier leichter sein: wir haben es mit einer ἀληθὴς ἱστορία, einer Parodie der
Aretalogie zu tun, welche genau dieselbe Technik verwendet, die in der echten Propheten-
Aretalogie gang und gäbe ist' (Reitzenstein (1906: 38)). Caster considers this 'bien subtile'
(1938: 10), but it is perhaps too subtle.

57.   *Od.* 4.230.

his being related to Machaon and Podaleirius, Lucian has avoided quoting any Iliadic reference to Machaon here, although material is available either at 11.505-9 or 4.219. In 11 Podaleirius is alleged by a fake oracle to be Alexander's father, but Lucian pours scorn on this idea — it is unreasonable to suppose that Podaleirius travelled all the way from Thessaly to Paphlagonia just to find Alexander's mother. Both Podaleirius and Machaon are mentioned in *Il.* 11.833-5, which may be a later interpolation; if so, this is an indication of the importance attached to this Homeric mention by Paphlagonian Greeks, and therefore signals both Alexander's canniness in having his pet oracle make this claim and also Lucian's exploitation of the lines to attack both Alexander and the locals.[58] Again (14), an allusion to *Od.* 12.22 is used to mock Alexander for claiming that Glycon was a rebirth of Asclepius.[59] In Homer, Circe speaks the line to Odysseus and his companions on their return from the underworld, but it is applied here to the snake which Alexander concealed within a goose egg and so caused to be 'reborn' in less heroic fashion.

As we have seen, Amastris issued coins showing Homer; could this lie behind the claim in 58 that Alexander petitioned the emperor to change Abonoteichus' name to Ionopolis and to issue coins showing Glycon on the obverse, with his vicar

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58.　Kirk (1985: 258-9) sets out the evidence on this: he concludes 'these verses do look like a learned interpolation of the post-Homeric era of Black-Sea colonization'. See Mitchell (2010: 94) on this, and on evidence for Homeric allusion in a Paphlagonian mine-worker's epitaph (95-6); he also discusses the locals' aspirations to *paideia* (106).

59.　Lucian: δὶς τεχθένθ', ὅτε <τ'> ἄλλοι ἅπαξ τίκτοντ' ἄνθρωποι. Homer: δισθανέες, ὅτε τ' ἄλλοι ἅπαξ θνήσκουσ' ἄνθρωποι.

Alexander on the reverse? However, coins of this type remain unknown, although those depicting Glycon alone are attested; this might suggest that Lucian made the detail up, or else that the petition was rejected in part, which would reflect badly on Alexander to anyone familiar with the local coinage.[60] Not to be outdone by the city's rival, Alexander makes up for Abonoteichus' non-appearance in Homer by renaming it, possibly after the mythological character Ion, and immodestly offering up himself as his city's answer to Homer, as a person suitable for commemoration on coins. In any case, one can see why the detail is significant in the context of coinage associated with a shady character, since the educated reader may feel an allusion to sentiments such as those of Euripides' Medea, who wishes that one could tell good men from bad by a mark on the body.[61]

All of this shows Lucian mischievously, indeed maliciously, using Homer, who 'was central to Paphlagonian self-esteem',[62] as a way of implying Paphlagonian inferiority by using the poet to draw attention to their petty disputes and their gullibility in being deceived by someone who 'answered' unanswerable questions about Homer. From this point of view it is irrelevant whether or not we view this work as a literal report of events and an accurate representation of what the cult of

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60.   'Contrairement à ce qu'affirme Lucien, on ne connaît pas de monnaie où figure Alexandre', as Dauzat notes (in Caster (2002: 71 n.88)). See too Caster (1938: 78) and Mitchell (2010: 96-7). On numismatic representations of Glycon see Petsalis-Diomidis (2010: 29-41) and Bendlin (2011: 233-5).

61.   Eur., *Med.* 516-9. See Cropp (2013: 182) for this *topos.*

62.   Mitchell (2010: 96).

Glycon was actually like, since the narrator's concern with Homeric material marks it out as a satire on Paphlagonians' efforts at *paideia* and the pitfalls of claiming, with too much certainty and not enough knowledge, to know the answers to Homeric questions. Both the Paphlagonians and Alexander himself, whose very name ironically recalls the arch-Homerist Alexander the Great, not to mention the disreputable Paris/Alexander of Homer,[63] fall into those traps.

In three other places Lucian alludes in some way to Homer's place of origin or whereabouts during his life — in each case with considerable certainty.

3.2.3 *Imagines* and *Pro Imaginibus*

> 'I suppose that if you painted the picture of your lady
> love —'
>
> 'I can't paint,' is the hasty interruption.
>
> 'That's your misfortune, and not your fault. You would
> if you could. But if you could, I suppose you would
> make her (no matter what she was in reality), Juno,
> Minerva, Diana, and Venus, all in one. Eh?'[64]

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63.   Petsalis-Diomidis (2010: 45 n.78) lists the various allusions to Alexander the Great, which demonstrate that the narrator guides the reader to make comparisons. Mossman (2006: 287-8) discusses Alexander 'determinedly associating himself with Achilles rather than Paris' during his sightseeing at Troy in Plut., *Alex.* 15.4-5 and (with a rather different emphasis on the lyre 'of Paris') at *De Alex. fort.* 10 [= *Mor.* 331d-e].

64.   Dickens (2002 [1870]: 75-6).

In both of these works Homer's birthplace is identified as Smyrna by Lucian's alter ego Lycinus, with no indication that such an identification is controversial. Both are fundamentally encomiastic speeches, with framing dialogue, praising Panthea the concubine of the emperor Verus.[65] They have caused some disquiet, as they appear to be exactly the kind of toadying which the author inveighs against elsewhere.[66] Sidwell answers such objections by arguing that the reader should take the works as satirical.[67]

In this context, the identification of Smyrna as Homer's birthplace has the rhetorical purpose of associating him with Panthea, herself a native of Smyrna; this explains why no doubt is expressed about this assertion, despite Lucian making so much of the problem elsewhere.[68] It is no surprise, Polystratus claims, that a lady from Homer's homeland should be a poetry-lover:

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65.   On Lucian's presentation of Panthea in these two dialogues, see Vout (2007: ch.5), who argues that 'Lucian follows Xenophon's example [in the *Cyropaedia*] throughout his description in drawing on Homer to give shading and decorum to his Panthea' (222). For detailed analysis of both dialogues see Cistaro (2009).

66.   Pithily put by La Croze (Hemsterhuis & Reitz (1789-93 [1743]: Vol.6, 415)): 'Here Lucian, the mocker of sycophants, outdoes all sycophants' ('Hic adulatorum derisor *Lucianus* omnes adulatores vincit').

67.   Sidwell (2002).

68.   Cistaro (2009: 131 n.232): 'Il fatto che in *Imagines* la contesa sia risolta decisamente a favore di Smirne è da ricondurre alle ragione del genere encomiastico.'

οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο θαυμάσαιμ' ἄν, εἰ καὶ ποιήσει
χαίρει καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταύτῃ ὁμιλεῖ, τοῦ Ὁμήρου πολῖτις
οὖσα.

Nor should I feel any amazement if she delights in
poetry and is well acquainted with it, since she is a
fellow-citizen of Homer.[69]

The reader has already learned that it is also 'no wonder' (θαυμαστὸν οὐδέν) that she is very beautiful, since she has come from the most beautiful of Ionian cities (13), so there is also some implication that Homer's origins in Smyrna contributed to his success as a poet. Indeed, throughout the oration which this sentence concludes, Polystratus has alluded to Homer, quoting at the beginning (13) the poet's descriptions of Circe and the Muse as descriptions of the speech that he hopes to produce.[70] The nightingale is brought in from *Od.* 19.521 at the end of 13:

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69.   *Imagines* 15. It becomes evident in the opening sections of *Pro Imaginibus* that this surmise is correct: her speech reported in 1-7 demonstrates that she is indeed familiar with Homer's poetry, alluding to Nireus (1), Penelope and Arete (7). Yet her story about a woman praised for her resemblance to a black poplar (4) apparently does not recall for her — as it is likely to recall for the reader — Odysseus praising Nausicaa by comparing her to a young palm tree on Delos (*Od.* 6.162-3); she knows that 'some poet' made the comparison, apparently unaware that the poet was imitating Homer. The Homeric narrator's own praise of Nausicaa (*Od.* 6.102) is among the similes adduced by Lycinus in his defence later (25) in this work. Panthea is perhaps recalling the poplars which do appear in Homer, however: in particular, at *Od.* 7.106 the Phaeacians' slave-women are 'as busy as the leaves of a tall poplar' (οἷά τε φύλλα μακεδνῆς αἰγείροιο), while Simoeisius falls to the ground like a poplar when he is killed by Ajax (*Il.* 4.482-7).

70.   *Od.* 10.136; 24.62. Furthermore, Goldhill (2001b: 189) notes that the word employed by Polystratus (10) to describe the (as yet unidentified) woman of their discussion is ἀοίδιμος, used in the *Iliad* only once (6.358), when it describes Helen.

Panthea's voice makes the nightingale sound untuneful. Finally, Panthea's song is like the Sirens', but surpasses them because it is able to make its way even into ears stopped with wax, like those of Odysseus' men (14). The connection with Smyrna brings all these references together, revealing that they were not merely reflex-quotations, but had a careful, overarching rhetorical purpose.

Again in *Pro Imaginibus*, which allegedly forms the reply written in response to Panthea's modest objections to the previous work's flattery,[71] her shared origins with Homer are recalled, albeit less emphatically:

> εἰ δὲ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστά σε αὐταῖς ἐκείναις εἴκασα, οὐκ ἐμὸν τοῦτο, οὐδὲ ἐγὼ πρῶτος ταύτην ἐτεμόμην τὴν ὁδόν, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ποιηταί, καὶ μάλιστα ὁ πολίτης ὁ σὸς Ὅμηρος, ὃν καὶ νῦν ἀναβιβάσομαι συναγορεύσοντά μοι, ἢ οὐδεμία μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν σὺν ἐμοὶ ἁλῶναι.

> And if I had compared you, in the highest degree, to those very [goddesses], it would not have been my responsibility, nor would I have been the first to open up that road; but many excellent poets have done so already, especially your own fellow-citizen Homer, whom even now I shall bring forward to speak on my behalf, or else there will be no means by which he can avoid being convicted along with me.[72]

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71.   This explanation should not be taken too seriously. The two works could have been conceived as a pair just as the two Phalaris pieces obviously were. On fictionality in these texts see Bretzigheimer (1992); on such pairings in Lucian, see Whitmarsh (2001: 291-2).

72.   *Pro Imaginibus* 24.

As before, mention of Homer introduces several Homeric quotations, this time selected to show how he makes only the most proper comparisons between mortals and gods. So Homer is not a flatterer, since he does not call Thersites more handsome than Nireus; instead he praises Erichthonius' horses, for their swiftness (*Il.* 20.227), and Menelaus' palace, in a simile comparing it to Zeus' home (*Od.* 4.74, spoken by Telemachus); further similes involve comparing the βάρβαρος Briseis to Aphrodite (*Il.* 19.282 & 286) and Agamemnon to three gods at once (*Il.* 478-9), and so on with five more examples.

By comparing different parts of him to different gods, Lucian implies Agamemnon's dismemberment, recalling what was being done when Homer was employed to 'paint' different parts of the initial εἴκων in *Imagines* (on which see below). According to *Quomodo historia* 8, it is acceptable for Homer to do this when describing Agamemnon in terms of dismembered parts of gods, but not for historians to use a similar procedure for the sake of flattery.[73] But is this acceptable for the pair of encomiasts here, or do they run the risk of 'frigidity' like the historians? In the absence of a narratorial voice, readers must make up their own

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73.   'And if [poets] want to praise Agamemnon, there is no one to stop him from being like Zeus in head and eyes, with a chest like his brother Poseidon's, and his belt like that of Ares' (ἀλλὰ κἂν Ἀγαμέμνονα ἐπαινέσαι θέλωσιν, οὐδεὶς ὁ κωλύσων Διὶ μὲν αὐτὸν ὅμοιον εἶναι τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ τὰ ὄμματα, τὸ στέρνον δὲ τῷ ἀδελφῷ αὐτοῦ τῷ Ποσειδῶνι, τὴν δὲ ζώνην τῷ Ἄρει). In *Quomodo historia* 'Lucian polices the [genre] boundaries with self-righteous certainty' (Whitmarsh (2013: 202)).

minds. Meanwhile, back in *Imagines* Homer is also praised for his skill in 'painting' a skin colour:

> μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν ἄριστον τῶν γραφέων Ὅμηρον παρόντος Εὐφράνορος καὶ Ἀπελλοῦ δεδέγμεθα· οἷον γάρ τι τοῖς Μενελάου μηροῖς τὸ χρῶμα ἐκεῖνος ἐπέβαλεν ἐλέφαντι εἰκάσας ἠρέμα πεφοινιγμένῳ, τοιόνδε ἔστω τὸ πᾶν.

> But we have Homer, the best of painters even in the presence of Euphranor and Apelles; for the colour which he gave to Menelaus' thighs by likening them to ivory tinged with red — let her be that colour all over.[74]

The allusion is to *Il.* 4.141-2,[75] which interested ancient scholars since the verb μιαίνειν is used there in a neutral sense without connotations of moral 'staining', so the question of making 'proper comparison' also lies behind this passage.[76] But Lucian seems carefully to avoid discussion of the issue, both by failing to quote the lines and by using πεφοινιγμένῳ in place of the Homeric language. Again, it would not help the rhetorical purposes of the work to get embroiled in debate about whether the colour used to depict Panthea's skin was to be associated in any way with negative senses of words. Equally, the question of whether a blind Homer could have achieved such descriptions of visual phenomena, let alone have been an

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74.   *Imagines* 8.

75.   ὡς δ' ὅτε τίς τ' ἐλέφαντα γυνὴ φοίνικι μιήνῃ | Μῃονὶς ἠὲ Κάειρα παρήϊον ἔμμεναι ἵππων ... .

76.   See on this F. Cairns (2005: 207-9), who cites Σ bT *Il.* 4.141 and Eustathius (I.721.4-5) on the same line.

actual painter, is avoided for the same reason. Here, then, we see Lucian ostentatiously choosing not to engage with Homeric scholarship, to emphasize his rhetorical strategy.

This praise of Homer as writer-or-painter[77] begins a series of allusions which draw on Homer's descriptions of characters (with a helping hand from Pindar): she will be 'violet-browed' (Pindar describing Aphrodite), and exemplify the epithets 'laughter-loving', 'white-armed', and 'rosy-fingered', so that the composite portrait will make a comparison to Aphrodite that is even more applicable to Panthea than to Briseis (at *Il.* 19.282). The use of language here is striking: Homer is spoken of as doing these things himself with an implication of personal agency, in a conflation of the poet and his poetry that keeps recurring in Lucian to bring intriguing rhetorical effects:

> καὶ φιλομειδῆ δὲ Ὅμηρος ποιήσει καὶ λευκώλενον καὶ ῥοδοδάκτυλον, καὶ ὅλως τῇ χρυσῇ Ἀφροδίτῃ εἰκάσει πολὺ δικαιότερον ἢ τὴν τοῦ Βρισέως.
>
> And Homer will make her 'laughter-loving', 'white-armed' and 'rosy-fingered', and, in short, liken her to

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77.   Lucian exploits the γραφ- stem's ambiguity in this literary description of the woman who becomes an 'artwork' — e.g. Polystratus says (23) that he has 'written-or-painted' εἰκόνες (ἐγραψάμην) — but this is especially noticeable here when Homer is τὸν ἄριστον τῶν γραφέων ('the best of writers-or-painters'). On the punning ambiguity, which is not unique to Lucian and which appears in the ps.-Plutarchean *Vita*, see Squire (2013: 274) and Zeitlin (2001: 218-33). Whitmarsh (2013: 125) discusses the use of the *Iliad* passage in Achilles Tatius. See n.80 below on the related ambiguity of εἰκών, and p.366-8 below on ποιεῖν.

golden Aphrodite much more fittingly than he likened
the daughter of Briseis.

Does this final point — that this will be done 'much more fittingly' than Homer's decription of Briseis — imply simply that Panthea is herself a more fitting subject for such poetic description? In the same way it is not absolutely clear whether the reader should understand that the three epithets, now attached to Panthea, but not attached to Briseis at *Il.* 19.282, form part of this 'likening to Aphrodite', or indeed whether Homer applies that phrase at all to Panthea. Is there a sense that Homer as man and poet (rather than 'Homer' conceived of as words culled from his work) can now actually make a better job of the comparison than the rather bald words of his original version in the *Iliad*? In other words, has Homer now somehow got better at similes? All these readings are left open in what begins to feel a rather Borgesian situation: the same words applied to different subjects in different historical moments can acquire new and richer meanings, becoming more appropriate when recomposed Menard-like and applied to a new subject.[78]

However, in Panthea's opinion there is a problem with all this, which she identifies in her opening speech in *Pro Imaginibus.* What she especially dislikes (7) is precisely this overegging of the description which was produced courtesy of the 'painter' Homer:

ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔλεγεν, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα
ἐπαινοῦσα τοῦ συγγράμματος, ἓν δὲ τοῦτο οὐ φέρουσα,
ὅτι θεαῖς αὐτήν, Ἥρᾳ καὶ Ἀφροδίτῃ, εἴκασας.

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78.   Borges (1996 [1944]). On the changing meaning of words see pp.64-5 above.

> She said these words and others of this sort, praising
> most of the composition but objecting to one thing,
> namely that you likened her to goddesses, to Hera and
> Aphrodite.

Note the second-person verb-form: when the Homeric description becomes inappropriate it is unambiguously presented as not Homer's fault.[79]

But even having reached this level of superlative 'painting', Lycinus goes on to give yet another Homeric description when he remembers her teeth (9), which are likened to 'sawn ivory' (*Od.* 18.196). Indeed, the very title of this work — εἰκόνες — recalls the literary-critical use of εἰκών as a technical term meaning 'likening', and thus roughly equivalent to 'simile'; Homer was praised by the ancient

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79.   Would likening to a statue of a goddess, as Leucippe is likened at Ach. Tat. 2.33.3 and 10.9.3, be different (cf. above, p.122 n.118)? Bartsch (1989: 165 n.4) makes a connection between those passages and *Imagines.* The comparison of Ariadne to a statue of a bacchante at Catullus 64.61 carries different implications, prompting the reader to imagine a sculptor capturing violent movement in a static piece.

scholars for his skill in this area.[80] The poets Homer and Pindar are here being included in the company of painters:

> The very idea of *Eikones*, the words Lucian chooses, and finally this introduction of poets into a list of artists drives home the intricate braiding of the verbal and visual that Lucian accomplishes in what may appear at first glance to be a simple work.[81]

Surely all Homeric parallels have now been exhausted, the reader might think — but Polystratus outdoes this by describing, with Homeric *enargeia*, the sound that one might imagine the 'portrait' making (13): so after the descriptions of visual appearance, off we go again with a catalogue of Homeric sound-descriptions. Her skill at speaking is comparable to that of Circe, the Muse, and Nestor, while in

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80.   On the connection between εἰκόνες in plastic and literary arts, see Steiner (2001: 295-306, esp. 304-5). She observes (2001: 296 n.2) that 'Lucian's play on the term recalls Alcibiades' own' in Pl. *Symp.* 215a. Further play on Platonic metaphors is found in *Imagines* 1, where Panthea 'will bind you and take you off wherever she wants, in just the same way as the Heracleian stone does to iron' (ἀπάξει γάρ σε ἀναδησαμένη ἔνθα ἂν ἐθέλῃ, ὅπερ καὶ ἡ λίθος ἡ Ἡρακλεία δρᾷ τὸν σίδηρον), recalling from *Ion* 533d this metaphor of the magnet as 'the interconnection between the various elements in the chain of poetic communication' in the composition and performance of Homeric poetry (Murray (1996: 10)). For analysis of the scholia's discussion of Homeric similes, see Nünlist (2009a: ch.14): 'εἰκών is unmarked, comparable to modern "imagery", which can include "metaphor", "comparison", "simile", etc.' (285). As Goldhill (2001b: 190) observes, 'the dialogue depends on [the word's] several senses — image, likeness, picture — in its construction of an image in words'.

81.   Francis (2003: 580), who also notes the famous quote attributed to Simonides, that 'a painting is a silent poem and the poem a speaking painting' (Plut., *De glor. Ath.* 346f = Simon. fr. 190b Bergk), for bibliography on which see Squire (2010: 609 n.92).

comparison with her the nightingale is a mere amateur;[82] as with the three Homeric epithets in the initial group of visual descriptions of beauty, this group of four sound-descriptions ends with a comparison to the natural world (rosy-fingered dawn; the nightingale) rather than a human or divine being.

It is now clear that this has become not just an encomium of Panthea, who is honoured by being given a composite of Homer's finest descriptions, but also of Homer himself, whose descriptive powers are celebrated not once but twice. The remaining Homeric quotations ensure that this impression persists through the remainder of the work, where come more subtle reminders of Homer's descriptions — of Theano, Arete and Nausicaa (19), of Penelope who was 'written-or-painted by Homer' (ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου γεγραμμένην, 20), of Ate (21), of Aphrodite and Athena (22), and finally, of Chryseis (22, quoting *Il.* 1.115, from the speech in which Agamemnon calls Chryseis 'not inferior' to Clytemnestra). Homer is the only poet (with the exception of Pindar, as noted above) whose powers seem up to the job of describing Panthea; this work therefore constitutes Lucian's most extended praise of Homer's poetical abilities, alongside praise of Homer's 'fellow-citizen' Panthea as a beautiful woman.

Finally, the focus in both dialogues on the abilities of Homer the man just as much as the pleasures of his poetry connects with the very subject of the dialogues themselves:

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82.   'Pandion's daughter': cf. 'Pandareus' daughter' at *Od.* 19.519-24 (from where πολυηχέα (521) is quoted directly here), and note the shared *Pan*-stems in these names and Panthea's.

> Panthea as a person is irrelevant ... . What did the emperor mean to a Syrian? For individuals like Lucian, who were not directly involved with him, he was as much the mistress he flaunted in public, as he was the campaigning he did on the borders.[83]

As the composite image of Panthea which Lucian's speakers construct is a way of understanding the reality of the emperor, so perhaps their examination and quasi-scholarly deconstruction of Homeric poetry is a way of understanding Homer the man, poet and supremely skilled 'painter'.

3.2.4 *Somnium (Gallus)*

Homer was reincarnated, and was not even human at the time of the Trojan War. These surprising claims are made in *Somnium (Gallus)* by a speaking cock, himself a reincarnation not of Homer but of the Homeric character Euphorbus, who was reincarnated 'some time later' (χρόνῳ ὕστερον, 17) as Pythagoras, and then as the very cock which speaks in Lucian's work.[84] Pythagoras himself made the claim for

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83.   Vout (2007: 234).

84.   See Halliwell (2008: 34 & n.89) on cocks as symbols of contemptuous 'crowing'. ps.-Arist., *Physiognomy* 2 describes cocks as 'timid' (δειλοί), while Anon. Lat., *Physiognomy* 131 describes the cock as 'useless' (*ineptum*) and with 'great faith in [his] own appearance and voice' (*speciei ac vocis suae gerens fiduciam magnam*, tr. Repath in Swain (2007)). Lucian's cock is far from timid, but has exceptional confidence in its voice. On Lucian's various uses of natural history see the useful (albeit too biographically positivist) survey of Stannard (1969). The speaking cock in Aesop (12 Chambry = 16 Perry) fails to argue well enough to avoid being eaten by the cat.

the former of these reincarnations,[85] although Lucian's cock is vague about exactly what other incarnations there were. The sage's previous incarnation as the Trojan Euphorbus, and his exclusion from the Eleusinian mysteries on the grounds that he was therefore a barbarian, are the subject of the speech of the *pseudologistēs* summarized by Elenchus at *Pseudologistes* 5.[86] So with Euphorbus' double reincarnation the boundaries between the mythic, literary world of Homer and the 'real' world of this dialogue, between animal and human,[87] and between Greek and barbarian, are being blurred in a way which is taken further in *VH*, where Thersites is able to sue Homer, where Homer is Babylonian, and where Plato can live in his own *Republic.*

The initial sense of boundary-blurring created by the cock's own reincarnation is enhanced when he claims to have knowledge concerning two facts about Homer's life — only two facts, but nevertheless explosive in their

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85. Diog. Laert., *Pythagoras* 5, where he in fact claims to have been originally Aethalides the son of Hermes, then Euphorbus, then Hermotimus (when he 'proved' his earlier Trojan existence by recognizing Menelaus' shield), then a fisherman Pyrrhus, and only then Pythagoras. If Diogenes Laërtius' version is canonical, then the cock's shortening of this sequence may cast doubt on his reliability.

86. Whether Pythagoras was indeed excluded in this way, or whether this is purely Lucianic invention, is unclear; Diog. Laert., *Pythagoras* 3, records that he was initiated into all mysteries, both Greek and barbarian.

87. See Ogden (2007: 214-7) on Lucian's melding of 'Protean animal transformations', and their Pythagorean connections, in the tale of Arignotus and the haunted house (*Philopseudes* 29-31).

implications.[88] First, being absent from Troy and existing as a camel in Bactria, he is not a reliable witness for the Trojan War.[89] Likewise, the cock claims that Homer knew nothing about anything, since he was blind. This claim is a development of a theme which appears in the Homeric scholia and the *Vitae*: Homer was not always blind, or he could not have known certain things about the world.[90] The cock's expression of Homer's unreliability raises a problem which is 'solved' by such works as the *Ephemeris belli Troiani* allegedly written by Dictys of Knossos, who took part in the Trojan War; apparently dating from during or just after Lucian's lifetime, the work presents 'a Phoenician account of the Trojan war presented as more ancient and more authoritative than Homer's itself'.[91]

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88. Kim (2010: 187): 'The encounter is reminiscent of that presented in the *Heroicus* [sc. of Philostratus]: a dialogue featuring a hero who claims superior knowledge to Homer on the basis of his own participant status, and an interlocutor eager to discover the "truth".'

89. This differs in kind from other accounts of Homer's ethnicity, which identify his birthplace — even if his later life is peripatetic, as with the Egyptian origin for Homer in the speech of Calasiris at Heliod., *Aeth.* 3.14.1-4. Nesselrath (2002: 154-5) observes that this Egyptian origin can be traced to Alexander of Paphos (Eust. *Od.* 1713.17). The cock is concerned only with Homer's whereabouts during the Trojan War. Diod. Sic. 1.96.2 mentions Homer's travels to Egypt.

90. Graziosi (2002: 126-32). In *Dial. mort.* 30 (=25), by contrast, Thersites happily argues that 'that blind man Homer' (Ὅμηρος ἐκεῖνος ὁ τυφλός) was in no position to comment on Nireus' handsomeness — nor, by implication, Thersites' own ugliness.

91. Romeo (2010: 82); cf. Kim (2010: 207). On the dating see Cameron (1980), Champlin (1981), and Merkle (1989: 243-6). On 'Dictys' more generally, see Merkle (1999) and ní Mheallaigh (2013).

Two other passages in this dialogue allude to Homer. First, on learning that the cock used in a previous incarnation to be Pythagoras, Micyllus jokes that, while formerly a Samian, the cock has become a Tanagrian. As well as forming a pleasantry based on the provenance of the best game-cocks,[92] this also looks forward to Homer's reincarnation, with Lucian chuckling at the folly of the cities who competed for the honour of being called his birthplace: perhaps Homer did not really come from any of them, just as the cock does not really come from Tanagra.

The cock's claim also implicitly addresses the question of when Homer lived, challenging the view 'as promulgated by the Homeridae and probably by Hellanicus' that the poet was a contemporary of the war,[93] instead aligning himself more with the view of Herodotus that Homer lived no more than 400 years before the historian,[94] a view which continued to be controversial, as illustrated by the shorter *Vita Plutarchea* 5:

> γενέσθαι δὲ αὐτὸν τοῖς χρόνοις οἱ μέν φασι κατὰ τὸν
> Τρωϊκὸν πόλεμον οὗ καὶ αὐτόπτην γενέσθαι, οἱ δὲ μετὰ
> ἑκατὸν ἔτη τοῦ πολέμου, ἄλλοι δὲ μετὰ πεντήκοντα
> καὶ ἑκατόν.

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92.   Pausanias 9.22.4, with further refs in Frazer (1898: 90-1).

93.   The quotation is from West (2003b: 313). Hellanicus' dating of Homer and Hesiod: frr. 5a-c in Fowler (2001: 157-8). On this and other interest in Homer's date and genealogy see Fowler (2013: 608-10). Graziosi (2002: ch.3) discusses the controversy. The cock's chronological reflections also lead him to consider the debated question of Helen's age: see Kim (2010: 187).

94.   Hdt. 2.53.

> Some say that the time when he lived was that of the
> Trojan War, and that he was an eyewitness of it; but
> others say that it was a hundred years after the war;
> and still others say a hundred and fifty years.

In a sense, Homer did 'live' during the Trojan War, therefore, but not in the most relevant sense of the term, so the cock is also relying on a linguistic quibble.

Finally, in a piece of revisionism of the sort that is taken to its extreme in Dio's *Trojan Oration*,[95] the cock claims that, in his incarnation as Euphorbus, he personally killed Patroclus 'without difficulty' (οὐ χαλεπῶς). But the reader knows from Homer that it was Hector who did this, and that Euphorbus only wounded Patroclus.[96] At this point we run into a version of the liar paradox which will be taken considerably further in *VH*:[97] Micyllus has been sceptical of the cock's claims, but if the reader is to accept that the cock is correct in his implication that Homer knew so little about the Trojan War as to get such a major plot point wrong, what is to be done about the cock's own appeal to Homeric authority to prove the very

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95. On which see Kim (2010: ch.4). Most notably for the present discussion, Dio maintains (93-110) that Hector killed Achilles — see Kim (2010: 127-31).

96. *Il.* 16.806-15. In his next speech (830-42) Hector will fail to acknowledge this contribution of Euphorbus, however.

97. Indeed the temple of the Cock on the Isle of Dreams (*VH* 2.32) is significantly situated near to the ivory gates through which deceptive dreams pass.

possibility of his own existence? Early in the dialogue the cock addresses Micyllus' surprise at encountering a speaking animal:[98]

σύ μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Μίκυλλε, κομιδῇ ἀπαίδευτος εἶναι μηδὲ ἀνεγνωκέναι τὰ Ὁμήρου ποιήματα, ἐν οἷς καὶ ὁ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως ἵππος ὁ Ξάνθος μακρὰ χαίρειν φράσας τῷ χρεμετίζειν ἔστηκεν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πολέμῳ διαλεγόμενος, ἔπη ὅλα ῥαψῳδῶν, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ νῦν ἄνευ τῶν μέτρων.

You seem to me, Micyllus, to be altogether uneducated[99] and not to have read Homer's poems, in which Achilles' horse Xanthus also said a great farewell to neighing and stood conversing in the middle of the battle, reciting whole verses, not speaking without metre as I am at the moment.[100]

Ironically, he uses one of the *Iliad*'s most fantastical parts to prove his own existence, while emphasizing the extra implausibility of a horse producing hexameters, and going on to deplore Homer's ignorance on much more straightforward and credible matters. Indeed he manages to imply that the major

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98.   On speaking animals see Heath (2005), esp. ch.1 on Homer, and Gera (2003: 207-12) on the challenge they pose to the Greek/barbarian polarity. Heath makes the important point (39) that Achilles' horse Xanthus is granted only a temporary power of human speech, so cannot speak whenever he chooses, something which the cock sneakily elides here. A talking cock is a feature of Callimachus' epigram 56 Pf (*AP* 6.149 = *HE* 1161-4), as a dedicatory object; Lucian's Cock's emphasis on Homeric precedent is therefore perhaps an attempt at self-aggrandisement from a creature that otherwise appears as speaker in the more humble genre of elegiac epigram. At *Dial. mort.* 4.1 (=21.1), Menippus correctly says that the immortal Cerberus must be able to use human language as well as barking.

99.   The phrase also appears at *Pseudologistes* 2.

100.   *Somnium (Gallus) 2.*

part of the *Iliad* is based on a mistaken premise, that it was Hector who killed Patroclus. As often in Lucian, the reader is left wondering whether it is a character or Homer who is lying, and what the implications of that lying might be.

3.2.5 — *Quomodo historia*

The date of Homer is taken up again, along with the theme of trustworthiness, in Lucian's handbook of historiography. This time, however, the possibility that the poet lived after the events he described is used to claim — at first sight paradoxically — that he is in fact a trustworthy witness. This scrupulously truthful Homer is constructed by means of a common-sense argument, just as Dio in his *Troicus* thoroughly 'proved' exactly the opposite, by 'treat[ing] what Homeric scholars praised as poetic virtues as evidence that he was a liar'.[101]

But there is a problem: Lucian does not vouch for this charitable interpretation. After noting (8) that poets differ from historians in their absolute licence (and giving examples from Homer), as well as acknowledging that Homer's stories are myth, Lucian still says that some people believe what he says, because, writing after Achilles' death, he had no motive to lie (40). These people are not alone in such a view; the same kind of argument is found elsewhere in ancient authors:

> ἀλλ᾽ ἐμοὶ Πτολεμαῖός τε καὶ Ἀριστόβουλος πιστότεροι
> ἔδοξαν ἐς τὴν ἀφήγησιν, ὁ μὲν ὅτι συνεστράτευσε

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101.   Kim (2010: 104); he also compares Lucian and Dio on this subject (132).

βασιλεῖ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, Ἀριστόβουλος, Πτολεμαῖος δὲ
πρὸς τῷ ξυστρατεῦσαι ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ βασιλεῖ ὄντι
αἰσχρότερον ἤ τῳ ἄλλῳ ψεύσασθαι ἦν. ἄμφω δέ, ὅτι
τετελευτηκότος ἤδη Ἀλεξάνδρου ξυγγράφουσιν αὐτοῖς
ἤ τε ἀνάγκη καὶ ὁ μισθὸς τοῦ ἄλλως τι ἤ ὡς συνηνέχθη
ξυγγράψαι ἀπῆν.

> But in my view Ptolemy and Aristobulus seem more
> believable in their telling: Aristobulus, since he served
> in king Alexander's expedition, and Ptolemy, since, in
> addition to his having served in the expedition, he was
> himself also a king and lying would thereby be more
> disgraceful for him than for the other. And both of
> them are more believable since they wrote when
> Alexander was already dead and neither compulsion
> nor payment was an inducement to write anything
> other than what took place.[102]

But such an argument is far from watertight; Lucian is hedging considerably when

he says '*some* people *nowadays tend* to believe him... they *can see no reason* for him to

tell untruths' (πιστεύειν τινὲς ὑπάγονται ... οὐ γὰρ εὑρίσκουσιν οὗτινος ἕνεκα

ἐψεύδατ' ἄν). As Lucian is attacking modern historians, he is being critical when he

says that people nowadays are unable to think of reasons why Homer might not

have told the truth. He also brings up the question of whether Homer was writing

'historical' fact at all.

This work, it turns out, is presenting a picture of Homer similar to the cock's;

he thinks that Homer's account is completely wrong because he did not personally

experience the events he describes. Although in *Quomodo historia* Lucian does not go

so far as to claim knowledge of Homer's previous incarnations, he approaches the

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102.   Arr., *Anab.* 1.1.2. This and the Lucian passage are discussed in Luce (1989: esp. 25).

issue from a more rational position to challenge the view that the poet's absence from the Trojan War itself makes him a more reliable witness. However, one thing is to be praised in Homer, 'even though he is a poet' (καίτοι ποιητὴς ὤν): unlike modern historians, he knows when and when not to indulge in extended description. He is 'great-hearted' (μεγαλόφρων) in resisting the temptation to describe in great detail such scenes as Tantalus' efforts to drink (57). How, then, do characters who have met Homer describe him?

3.3 — Meeting Homer: *Menippus, Charon, VH*

Three of Lucian's characters claim to have met Homer, in each case after his death. In *VH* the narrator recounts in some detail his own conversation with the shade of the poet.[103] And yet, 'for an epic poet, Homer seems to be a man of few words',[104] not only reflecting the fundamental unknowability of Homer the man, about whom so much doubt existed, but also recalling the reticence of the Homeric narrator, who

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103. Meetings between Homer and his characters are not restricted to Lucian: Philostratus' vinedresser recalls how Homer called up the shade of Odysseus (*Her.* 43.12-16), and the *Vita Romana* claims that he met Achilles' ghost: see Kim (2010: 208-10). The oracle in *Certamen* 3 says that Homer was Telemachus' son. The Herodotean *Vita* (6-7) claims that Homer himself played the role of 'interviewer' as he travelled around on Mentes' ship: in Lucian he takes on the role of interviewee.

104. Zeitlin (2001: 246-7).

contrasts with Hesiod in never identifying himself by name.[105] So Hesiod is the kind of author who can happily be made to have a more in-depth conversation with Lycinus in the short dialogue *Hesiodus*. But note Zeitlin's 'seems': in fact this is all an illusion, since (whereas *Hesiodus* is a dialogue) Homer's words are edited and reported by the Lucian-narrator, who claims that he had many other conversations with Homer which he does not record. In fact these characters all hear quite a lot from Homer.

3.3.1 — *Menippus*

Homer has only a brief mention in this dialogue, with a throwaway comment explaining a bit of silliness at the beginning. Menippus, dressed in a felt cap and lion skin (an obvious allusion to Dionysus' impersonation of Heracles in Aristophanes' *Frogs*), and carrying a lyre, begins by speaking in passages of verse borrowed from Euripides and Homer. He explains that this is because he has recently been in the very presence of these poets during his trip to the lower world, so that the experience has left him imbued with their verse. After four Euripidean quotations

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105.   Indeed Dio 53.10 views this authorial invisibility as a sign that Homer 'was liberal and magnanimous' (ἐλευθέριος ἦν καὶ μεγαλόφρων), the second term being also used by Lucian of Homer's narratorial restraint (see the end of §3.2 above). At *Quomodo historia* 14 a bad historian complains that Homer nowhere mentions his fatherland.

comes a modified quotation of *Od.* 11.164-5,[106] with the change in quoted author apparently a response to the interlocutor's request for plainer language:

> παῦσαι, μακάριε, τραγῳδῶν καὶ λέγε οὑτωσί πως
> ἁπλῶς καταβὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἰαμβείων, τίς ἡ στολή;
>
> My good chap, stop being tragic and, as I'm doing, say
> plainly, coming down from your iambics: what is your
> costume?

Note καταβάς, which simultaneously implies the 'high-flown' register of tragedy and recalls the *katabasis* which Menippus has just described. Although the verse in Menippus' reply now changes from tragic iambics, this question is not actually answered by the quoted lines, and the epic quotation represents the very opposite of a 'coming down' to prose from iambic verse:

> ὦ φιλότης, χρειώ με κατήγαγεν εἰς Ἀΐδαο
> ψυχῇ χρησόμενον Θηβαίου Τειρεσίαο.
>
> My friend, it was necessity that took me down to
> Hades to consult the spirit of Theban Tiresias.

These lines straightforwardly associate Menippus with Odysseus, since they explain that, like Odysseus, he had to go to Hades to consult Tiresias. Although Menippus spent time with Euripides and Homer, this seems not to have been the purpose of his visit; but again the existence of the poets alongside the mythical Tiresias shows the conflation of the mythic and historical in the afterlife, which is all the more pronounced in *VH*.

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106.   The only change is the substitution of ὦ φιλότης for μῆτερ ἐμή.

3.3.2 — *Charon* and *VH*

These pieces both contain more extended accounts of meetings with Homer, but I treat them briefly here, for different reasons. In *Charon*, which will be the subject of extended analysis in chapter 6, Charon reports his own experiences when transporting the poet in his ferry, including his own harvesting of verses vomited by Homer; again this imagery highlights the conflation of Homer's work and its physical manifestation in the form of the poet himself (or, in this case, in the form of his vomit). And it is Homer himself who is envisaged as deserving punishment for the 'boastfulness' (μεγαληγορία) of his poems (23). This contrasts with the assessment of Homer as μεγαλόφρων in *Quomodo historia* 57.

Meanwhile, concerning the figure of Homer in *VH*, the Lucian-narrator reports just a selection of the topics of their conversation, as we have seen. Homer is central to this episode when the narrator visits the Elysian Plain, as has been well discussed recently by Kim and ní Mheallaigh, whose chapters on Homer in this work offer convincing readings.[107] In the remainder of this chapter, therefore, I offer some additional points which illustrate further ways of reading parts of this text.

First, although the consultation of Homer in the afterlife is clearly an allusion to Odysseus' consultation of the shades in *Od.* 11, there is also evidently some connection with Apion of Alexandria, a grammarian who claimed to have called up the shade of Homer in order to discover answers to the vexed questions of

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107.   Kim (2010: ch.5); ní Mheallaigh (2014: ch. 6, esp. 235-40).

Homer's biography, but then refused to reveal the arcane knowledge which had been thus imparted to him:[108]

> *quaerat aliquis, quae sint mentiti veteres Magi, cum adulescentibus nobis visus Apion grammaticae artis prodiderit cynocephalian herbam, quae in Aegypto vocaretur osiritis, divinam et contra omnia veneficia, sed si tota erueretur, statim eum, qui eruisset, mori, seque evocasse umbras ad percunctandum Homerum, quanam patria quibusque parentibus genitus esset, non tamen ausus profiteri, quid sibi respondisse diceret.*

> Someone might ask what lies were told by the Magi of old, considering that Apion the grammarian (whom I saw in my youth) related that the plant *cynocephalia*, which is called *osiritis* in Egypt, has supernatural properties and is an antidote to all poisons, but that if it is pulled up in one piece the person who pulled it up dies immediately; he also said that he had summoned up the dead so as to make special enquiry of Homer about which country and which parents had given him birth. However, he did not dare to reveal what Homer had said to him.[109]

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108. Kim (2010: 163 n.81) suggests that 'Apion's teasing reticence ... is surely poking fun at the desire for origins and the investment in ancestry that surrounded the discourse about Homer in the Imperial period'. Kim calls this 'parallel to Lucian's interview', without suggesting that it provided a model. On this Apion story see Nesselrath (2002: 152), who supplements Georgiadou & Larmour (1998) and von Möllendorff (2000a) on the background of Homeric scholarship in Lucian's own time, especially Hermogenes of Smyrna's writings on Homer's wisdom and fatherland.

109. Plin., *HN* 30.18.

Already Ogden has discussed the possibility that Pancrates in *Philopseudes* could be based on Apion,[110] and it is quite plausible that such a figure from the relatively recent past could be alluded to not only in that work but also in *VH* — that is, in Lucian's two most extended studies of lying. Pliny is sceptical about Apion's claims, as Damon notes in her discussion of the 'first century success story' of this Homeric scholar-showman.[111] Without suggesting any direct parody of Apion, she floats the possibility (141) that when writing *VH* Lucian had in mind texts styled ἱστορίαι, a possible component of the title of Apion's work on Egypt. She even ingeniously (albeit speculatively) suggests that Apion's title may have been ἱστορία ἀληθὴς τῶν Αἰγυπτιακῶν.[112] Apion also claimed other arcane Homeric knowledge, allegedly derived from a (seemingly living) Ithacan informant rather than Homer himself, about the rules of a game played by the suitors (extrapolated from *Od.* 1.107).[113] The Lucian-narrator may well have discovered such things too, but like Apion he is reluctant to reveal all that he has learned, teasing the reader by saying that he

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110.   Ogden (2007: 248).

111.   Damon (2011).

112.   Damon (2011: 143). We should exercise caution, however, since both the common English title *True Histories* and the Latin *Vera(e) historia(e)* misrepresent the Greek ἀληθῆ διηγήματα ('true stories'), which was the title Photius knew and which is generally accepted as the authentic one (although ἱστορία replaces διηγήματα in the β-group and *recentiores*). See Kim (2010: 141 n.6).

113.   Ath. 1.16e-17b. Note Aristodemus of Nysa's claim that Homer was Roman (*Vit. Rom.* 2), based in part on this line: Lefkowitz (2012: 28).

chatted with Homer on many occasions other than the one he records, and mischievously failing to acknowledge that the reader might be interested in these conversations which perhaps settled all kinds of other Homeric problems.

Near the beginning of *VH* there is a textual question of importance for the prominence of Homer in the mind of the reader. If a suspect passage of the prologue is excised, removing references to two other authors, the narrator identifies only 'Homer's Odysseus', who is the *fons et origo* of the kinds of falsehood with which the work will be concerned. Sidwell expresses scepticism, which I share, about the authenticity of the passage in 1.2 which identifies Ctesias and Iambulus as two of the authors being satirised, since it has just been indicated that the narrator will only be hinting enigmatically at his 'sources', and it has also been stated explicitly that he will not be giving their names, as they will be obvious to any educated reader.[114]

Sidwell focuses on the logic of the argument here, but one can also argue that the language in which this passage is expressed would not be out of place in a marginal note which has found its way into the text. Furthermore, as Sidwell also implies, suspicion is aroused by the asyndetic ungrammaticality of the sentence as transmitted in the manuscripts, where an initial connecting relative is required.[115] A further cause for suspicion is the otherwise inelegant reappearance of Ctesias (this

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114. Sidwell (2004: 433). The text he and I would excise runs from Κτησίας ὁ Κτησιόχου ὁ Κνίδιος to συνθεὶς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. For a different view of this passage see ní Mheallaigh (2014: 172-4).

115. von Möllendorff (2000a: 31 n.3).

time along with Herodotus but without Iambulus[116]) among the liars being punished at 2.31.

In any case, this specificity about Homer's Odysseus, rather than any other incarnation of the character, has the effect both of helping to clarify which aspect of Odysseus' lying is intended — the stories told to the Phaeacians, rather than, for example, the stories which Odysseus makes Neoptolemus tell in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* — but also of appearing at first to condemn Homer for lying, although closer consideration will reveal that Homer is less blameworthy, something which will accord with his presentation later in the work. Here we must revisit points I made in the previous chapter. Kim observes:

> Lucian's use of 'Homer's Odysseus' does not, as some scholars have assumed, condemn Homer as a liar, even if it does strongly hint at an intertextual affinity between the *True Stories* and the Phaeacian tales in Homer's *Odyssey*. In fact, Lucian neither attacks nor defends Homer's reliability; by specifying that he is talking about the lies of Homer's Odysseus — that is, by treating Homer's character Odysseus as 'real' while simultaneously reminding us of his fictional status — Lucian succeeds in rendering the question of Homer's truth-telling or lying entirely moot.[117]

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116. Kim (2010: 146 with n.26) suggests that this may be because 'Iambulus' narrative somehow signaled its fictionality' — which would explain why the description of his work in 1.2 says all readers recognised the nature of its 'lies'.

117. Kim (2010: 153); this question is covered in 151-6.

However, it is important that at this point in the text the reader is unable to make this distinction for certain, and the work becomes a gradual revelation of Homer's truthfulness. The phrase does seem to give an initial impression of Homer's mendacity by associating Homer and Odysseus, but this is tempered when the narrator finally meets Homer himself, who is able to provide definitive answers to the Homeric questions he is asked. What definitely complicates 'the question of Homer's truth-telling or lying', however, is the implication of the statement in *VH*'s prefatory section that the whole narrative after 1.3 is a lie. This creates the paradox that, while it slowly becomes clear to the reader that Homer is, ironically, the character most explicitly signalled as truthful within the *VH* narrative, the narrator's own earlier confession of his own unreliability means that the apparent truthfulness of Homer's answers — and thus the apparently reliable evidence that the biographical traditions are wrong — are being viewed by the reader through the prism of a liar.

The inaccuracy of the traditions which Homer is here disparaging is implied by the observation of the narrator, without any need of corroboration, that they are wrong in calling Homer blind:

> ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τυφλὸς ἦν, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγουσιν, αὐτίκα ἠπιστάμην· ἑώρα γάρ, ὥστε οὐδὲ πυνθάνεσθαι ἐδεόμην.

> And that it was not the case that he was blind (something which people also say about him), I knew at once; for he could see, so I had no need to ask.

Again, when Odysseus writes his letter to Calypso later on, the narrator carefully avoids giving any impression that Homer is involved in the composition of the letter. I shall return to the meeting with Homer below, but first let us examine the references to Homer in the intervening chapters, where the appearance of this sighted (and therefore reliable) Homer is foreshadowed.

In 1.17 comes what Georgiadou & Larmour call 'the first direct allusion to Homer and the first hint that the narrator is an expert in Homeric criticism'. After the battle between the Sun-ites and Moon-ites:

> πολλοὶ μὲν ζῶντες ἡλίσκοντο, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἀνῃροῦντο, καὶ τὸ αἷμα ἔρρει πολὺ μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν νεφῶν, ὥστε αὐτὰ βάπτεσθαι καὶ ἐρυθρὰ φαίνεσθαι, οἷα παρ' ἡμῖν δυομένου τοῦ ἡλίου φαίνεται, πολὺ δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν γῆν κατέσταζεν, ὥστε με εἰκάζειν μὴ ἄρα τοιούτου τινὸς καὶ πάλαι ἄνω γενομένου Ὅμηρος ὑπέλαβεν αἵματι ὗσαι τὸν Δία ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ Σαρπηδόνος θανάτῳ.

> Many were taken alive, but many were killed too, and blood flowed in abundance over the clouds, with the result that the clouds were dyed and appeared red, just as they do in our world when the sun sets; and much also dripped down to the ground, so that I conjectured that it might have been something of the same sort which happened up above long ago, when Homer supposed that Zeus rained blood at Sarpedon's death [i.e. *Il.* 16.458-61].

Georgiadou & Larmour point out that the narrator's red sunset offers 'a supposedly rational explanation of Homer's poetic exaggeration', albeit one 'as far-fetched as

Homer's original poetic conceit'.[118] Heraclitus gives an explanation which is more pedantic than rationalising:

> τοῦτον δὴ τὸν φονέα ὄμβρον ἀλληγορικῶς εἶπεν
> αἰθέρος δάκρυα, Διὸς μὲν οὔ (ἄκλαυστος γάρ), ἐκ δὲ
> τῶν ὑπεράνω τόπων ὡσπερεὶ θρήνοις μεμιγμένου
> καταρραγέντος ὑετοῦ.

> He [sc. Homer] means this bloody rain allegorically as tears of the upper air; not the tears of Zeus (for he is tearless), but from the places above, as though they were the tears of rain falling mixed with lamentations.[119]

In *DDS* 8, Lucian gives another, more reasonable, rationalisation for a similar phenomenon, when the river Adonis turns red every year, either because of the wounding of Adonis, or because red earth is blown into the river by strong winds at a certain time of year.[120] The narrator reports this as the explanation given by a Byblian 'who seemed to be telling the truth' (ἀληθέα δοκέων λέγειν), but about whom the narrator appears at least a little sceptical:

> εἰ δὲ ἀτρεκέως ταῦτα ἔλεγεν, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκέει κάρτα
> θείη καὶ τοῦ ἀνέμου ἡ συντυχίη.

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118. Georgiadou & Larmour (1998: 114), who also have brief discussion of the *DDS* and Heraclitus passages which I cover here. Kim (2010: 155 n.56) calls this allegedly rationalising explanation 'even more fantastic and unbelievable'; yet within the fiction of *VH*, this explanation makes perfectly good sense.

119. *Quaest. Hom.*, 42.5.

120. Janko (1994: 377) suggests 'showers which deposited a red dust … from Saharan sandstorms'.

> But even if he was correct in saying these things, the
> timing of the wind seemed extremely marvellous.

But the emphasis placed in the *VH* passage on the narrator's own opinion (ὥστε με εἰκάζειν) implies that he has personally given the matter scholarly consideration.[121] However, the focus on visuality here might also the first intimation that this scholar-narrator takes a view on whether Homer was blind or not, which will become a significant point in the later meeting with Homer.

We have noted above (p.194) that in Proclus' account of Homer's life, it is considered self-evident that Homer was not blind, 'for he saw as many things as no [other] man has ever seen' (τοσαῦτα γὰρ κατεῖδεν ἄνθρωπος ὅσα οὐδεὶς πώποτε).[122] Combined with the evidence of other *Vitae* which clearly indicate that Homer became blind later in life,[123] it appears that there was a desire among ancient readers to have it both ways — to believe in a Homer who was blind but who must

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121. This emphasis on the narrator's personal showing-off, here and elsewhere, corresponds to his flattery of the second-person reader (αὐτῷ σοι) who easily identifies the authors 'enigmatically hinted at' in 1.2. On 'self-effacement and ... self-description' through first- and second-person expressions in 'technical' contexts see König (2011: esp. 183-4), who cites Hine (2009) on the use of first- and second-person expressions in Latin technical writers.

122. This point is also made by Velleius Paterculus (1.5.3), a fact which suggests that it has its origins much earlier than Proclus.

123. *Certamen* 2 has 'later, after becoming blind' (ὕστερον μέντοι τυφλωθέντα); at ps.-Herodotus 7 Homer became blind on Ithaca, recovered, then became blind again at Colophon; ps.-Plutarch I.3 says 'after he lost his sight' (ἐπειδὴ τὰς ὄψεις ἐπηρώθη), etc.

previously have been able to see the world around him because his visual descriptions are so strikingly vivid. This desire builds on the observation made in the scholia that Homer provides so much information and creates such ἐνάργεια ('vividness') that he at least gives the appearance of having been an eyewitness, a particularly striking example being Σ T *Il.* 13.597: 'As if he had seen <the scene>, he [sc. Homer] describes <it> graphically' (ὡς ἑωρακὼς διαγράφει γραφικῶς).[124] It appears from a 1st-century BC papyrus commentary that this view could be taken further, so that Homer actually became viewed as a real, literal eyewitness (αὐτόπτης), if not of the war itself, at least of the physical appearance of a hill:

> τοῦτο ὁ ποιη[τὴς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ λέγει, ἐκ] δὲ τούτου
> <ἑαυ>τὸν αὐτόπτ[η]ν ἐνδείκνυσ[ι].
>
> This the poet [says from his own angle; on account of]
> this he identifies himself as an eyewitness.[125]

A striking example of this kind of argument is found in Σ T *Il.* 13.654, which seems to be claiming that a simile in which Homer compares the appearance of a dead body

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124. Translation from Nünlist (2009: 189), as with the next scholion. As Nünlist (194) observes, ἐνάργεια is specifically a visual term, which the usual English translation 'vividness' somewhat obscures.

125. P. Oxy. 1086, on *Il.* 2.811 (p.172 Erbse). Nünlist (2009: 191): 'the crucial absence of a word such as ὡς ('as if') seems to indicate that ... this commentator considers Homer a real eyewitness. This need not make Homer a contemporary or even a participant in the Trojan war, which would create serious problems of chronology within the *Iliad* ... . The critic may simply envisage that Homer visited the ruins of Troy as a "tourist" then made use of his first-hand experience with the Trojan setting.'

to a σκώληξ worm stretched out on the ground provides evidence that Homer must have been able to see such phenomena at some point in his life:

> ἀκινητεῖ γάρ, ἢν θίγῃ τις αὐτοῦ· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ᾔδει ὁ ποιητής, εἴπερ ἦν τυφλὸς ἐκ γενετῆς.
>
> For it [sc. the worm] is motionless if anyone should touch it. But the poet did not know this if he was indeed blind from birth.[126]

So in this passage of *VH* the narrator may be implying that, in order to describe a 'shower of blood' so vividly, Homer had actually seen a real-life sunset, which he either deliberately allegorised or misinterpreted. This recalls the emphasis on the visuality of Homer's descriptions in *Imagines* and *Pro Imaginibus.* But the narrator does not explicitly commit to such a view, since the rationalising explanation is introduced obliquely within a simile which, in making a connection between the view from above and below, draws attention to the potential difference: the clouds 'appeared red, *just as they do in our world* when the sun sets'. With this simile the narrator emphasizes the Homeric flavour by explicitly pointing out the difference between the exceptional ('mythic') world of the Homeric narrative and the everyday world of the reader.

Soon after discussing this issue, the narrator offers another 'rationalization' of a meteorological phenomenon (1.24), offering a hypothesis about the origins of hail:

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126. Given as an example at Graziosi (2002: 131), who thinks that such scholia might have inspired the impassioned protestation found in Proclus and Velleius Paterculus; on the whole question of Homer's blindness see her ch.4.

ἀμπέλους δὲ πολλὰς ἔχουσιν ὑδροφόρους· αἱ γὰρ ῥᾶγες τῶν βοτρύων εἰσὶν ὥσπερ χάλαζα, καὶ, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, ἐπειδὰν ἐμπεσὼν ἄνεμος διασείσῃ τὰς ἀμπέλους ἐκείνας, τότε πρὸς ἡμᾶς καταπίπτει ἡ χάλαζα διαρραγέντων τῶν βοτρύων.

They have many vines which bear water; for the grapes on the bunches are like hailstones, and it is my opinion that when the wind strikes and shakes those vines, the hail falls down to us, when the bunches are torn apart.

This time there is no explicit mention of Homer, and indeed the reader's first thoughts are likely to be those of Georgiadou & Larmour — that this recalls the meteorological theories advanced in Aristophanes' *Clouds*.[127] But, bearing in mind the recent rationalizing mention of Homer and the repetition of the language of first-person expertise, the reader has been primed to consider how this explanatory account also recalls Iris flying down 'like hail' (*Il.* 15.168-71), although that is in a simile rather than an event in the narrative.[128] In both these accounts, however, the implication is that, even if Homer were wrong about the involvement of deities in

127. Especially 227-34 & 1115-30: see Georgiadou & Larmour (1998: 139-40), who also survey more serious theories. It is no accident that Aristophanes will appear shortly after this as an example of a rare truth-teller: at 1.29, the existence of Cloudcuckooland proves Aristophanes right, which suggests that the voyage into the sky described there is indeed true. Judith Mossman alerts me to the parallel in *Men In Black*, where Agent K describes the unlikely stories published in the likes of *Weekly World News* as 'Best investigative reporting on the planet': see Black (2000).

128. This is thus a reversal of the situation earlier, when the narrator's half-rationalisation of an event in the Homeric narrative was itself presented in the form of a simile, something emphasized by the use of simile-language (ὥστε με εἰκάζειν).

the story,[129] he gives the impression that he knows what they, and the phenomena they produce, look like; this sows a seed in the reader's mind that will bear fruit in the eventual appearance of the sighted Homer. For a reader familiar with the biographical trope of a Homer who was once sighted but became blind, the arguments that I suggest are in the background of these passages will seem sensible enough; but what will be striking and novel in *VH*'s eventual explicit presentation of the sighted Homer is that he can still see even after his death, which implies that he was never blind at any point in his life.

What of the character of Homer himself? In the Isles of the Blessed the most popular entertainment at the symposium is the recitation of Homer's poetry, despite the presence of several lyric poets, who might be expected to be more suitable for this setting, and he is honoured by having the place just above Odysseus (2.15).[130] Homer is nonetheless not the most popular person there, since it is the pleasant chaps Aristippus and Epicurus who are the life and soul of the place (2.18); meanwhile the most respected person is Achilles, then Theseus (2.19),[131] in a formulation which recalls Achilles' description in the *Iliad* as the best, with others

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129. Georgiadou & Larmour (1998: 140) point out the absence of gods as motivating forces in the narrative, despite the appearance of their temples.

130. Their continual feasting perhaps recalls a stereotype of Syrians: Isaac (2011: 493).

131. This mention of Theseus not only makes the Lucian-narrator do better than Odysseus, who was unable to find him (*Od.* 11.630-3) but also contradicts the story of his punishment in Hades (Apollod., *Bibl.* 2.5.12): see Tsagarakis (2000: 32).

second only to him.[132] So it is the poetry rather than the person of Homer which appeals most to his fellow-dead. This is a hint that the absence of concrete information about Homer's life makes him a rather distant, unknowable figure — even among the other dead who are strangely incorporeal in Lucian's description (2.12) — whereas his poetry is more straightforward to access and interpret. Indeed, Kim writes of the 'ghost-like status' of the Island's inhabitants and 'the indistinct sense of time': these phenomena, he says, create an impression of 'static existence' which 'parallels their situation as characters in canonized texts, who remain the same every time the text is read, never aging, never developing'.[133]

Even the Homeric expert Lucian-narrator, who observed the presence of Homer before anyone else (2.15), turns out to have other priorities: rather than conversing immediately, it takes a while for him to seek Homer out (2.20): 'Not two or three days had yet gone by when I went up to Homer the poet, as we were both at leisure … ' (οὔπω δὲ δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἡμέραι διεληλύθεσαν, καὶ προσελθὼν ἐγὼ Ὁμήρῳ τῷ ποιητῇ, σχολῆς οὔσης ἀμφοῖν …). Here the narrator takes on the role imagined by Plato's Socrates (*Apology* 41ab), a prediction now confirmed 'true' by Socrates'

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132. Nireus: 2.674, Ajax: 17.280.

133. Kim (2010: 160-2). This is in fact a logical continuation in the afterlife of the 'invented' classical Athens imagined by the sophistic performers, and discussed in Schmitz (2007); see his analysis (2011: 299) of the 'error' whereby Solon can watch theatrical performances in *Anacharsis* 22: 'To put it bluntly: in sophistic Athens, Solon, Themistocles, and Demosthenes were all sitting together in the theater of Dionysus, watching plays by Aeschylus in the morning and by Aristophanes in the afternoon.'

appearance at 2.17, in speaking to Homer and Homer's characters.[134] The questions asked by Socrates are not vouchsafed to the reader, but those of the narrator concern pressing issues of Homeric scholarship. Yet, although he has been indicating already that he is knowledgeable about such matters, when Homer tells him that the athetized lines are all genuine he reacts with a sudden change of heart: 'So I began condemning the grammarians in the schools of Zenodotus and Aristarchus, for their great amount of nonsense' (κατεγίνωσκον οὖν τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Ζηνόδοτον καὶ Ἀρίσταρχον γραμματικῶν πολλὴν τὴν ψυχρολογίαν).[135] Kim sees this as the narrator's aim (he 'seems delighted when Homer proves him right');[136] the enthusiastic Homerist has now been converted to the true path of Homeric reading, and he now feels a sense of liberation as he is unencumbered by scholarly obsession with detail, which had been previously spoiling his enjoyment. The reason that Homer replies 'with great enthusiasm' to the narrator's questions must be that he has now finally found a scholar who is keen to read his poems without the encumbrance of scholarship.[137]

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134.   Georgiadou & Larmour (1998: 196).

135.   Likewise *Hesiodus* 5 complains about scholars' nitpicking.

136.   Kim (2010: 164).

137.   Homer's enthusiasm perhaps argues against König's view (2009: 39) that Homer gives short answers because he finds the Lucian-narrator a bit of a bore — but of course the narrator is unreliable, so the question is ultimately tricky to decide.

Homer is more enthusiastic after he has won the lawsuit brought by Thersites, who, on the usual interpretation, had also been claiming, like the scholars, that the Homeric text was unreliable, in this case in the sense that it was defamatory. If the ὕβρις for which Thersites is bringing the lawsuit is indeed 'defamation', the implication could be that the 'real' Thersites was not ugly, just as the 'real' Homer himself is not blind. But although the γραφή could be for defamation, the narrator is vague about precisely what the alleged offence was:

> ἦν γάρ τις γραφὴ κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀπενηνεγμένη ὕβρεως
> ὑπὸ Θερσίτου ἀφ᾽ οἷς αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ ποιήσει ἔσκωψεν, καὶ
> ἐνίκησεν ὁ Ὅμηρος Ὀδυσσέως συναγορεύοντος.

> For there had been a *graphē* for *hybris* brought against
> him by Thersites, arising from those things for which
> he mocked him in his poetry; and Homer won, Odys-
> seus being his advocate.

There are two possible kinds of *hybris* involved here: the usual interpretation is that 'those things for which he mocked him in his poetry' refers to Homer's presentation of the physical appearance and disorderly behaviour of Thersites. But the legal term has a much wider range than simply 'defamation'.[138]

If this passage refers also to the mockery which Homer included in the soldiers' response to Odysseus' beating of Thersites, the *hybris* is just as much on the part of Odysseus and the other soldiers as of Homer himself — Odysseus in verbally and physically assaulting Thersites, and the others in delighting in his assault. As is clear from Aristotle and Demosthenes, *hybris* requires a specific state of mind or

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138. On the range of offences covered by the *graphē hybreōs* see Fisher (1992: ch.2).

motive: 'to get pleasure', as Aristotle summarises it.[139] So Homer was allegedly committing one kind of *hybris* by taking pleasure in describing what allegedly happened, while Odysseus and the other characters were taking pleasure in doing or watching it. 'Defamation' is therefore an unduly restrictive translation. If one focuses on the involvement of Odysseus in the alleged crime, his appearance as defence counsel is all the more ironic — Thersites is suing the wrong man and allowing the true perpetrator of the offence to defend that man. But in this Lucianic afterlife where characters and authors exist together, the confusion is inevitable:

> one cannot but suspect that the critic who passes judg-
> ment on the behavior of Homeric characters is at the
> same time implicitly condemning the poet himself,
> who, even if he has not invented all his heroes' repre-
> hensible actions, has nevertheless made a point of
> including them in his work.[140]

There is an important distinction to make here, however, as this is not in itself any reflection on the reliability or truthfulness of Homer.

When asked about his origins in 2.20, Homer is apparently aware of only three supposed birthplaces: Chios, Smyrna, and Colophon, but none of them is

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139. *Rh.* 1378b: '*Hybris* is doing and saying things which bring shame on the victim, not to get for oneself anything other than what one has, but to get pleasure' (ἔστι γὰρ ὕβρις τὸ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνη ἔστι τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γίγνηται αὐτῷ ἄλλο ἢ ὅ τι ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἡσθῇ). Fisher (1992: 37): 'The commonest view, and in my view the correct one, is Aristotle's, that the necessary criterion for *hybris* is the presence of an intention to cause dishonour.' Yet, as D. Cairns writes (1993: 229), 'it is far from certain that mockery of one's enemies would objectively be regarded as *hubris*'.

140. Kakridis (1974: 368).

correct, since he was of Babylonian origin. This has been seen as a parody of Zenodotus, who claimed Homer was Chaldaean.[141] The 'truth' turns out to be one step more bizarre and unexpected. When Homer replies to the narrator's question 'why on earth he had started with the word "wrath"', Lucian is clearly alluding to the apparently extensive debate on the subject documented in the scholia on the *Iliad*'s opening line.[142] But what is significant in Homer's reply is that he started thus because the word just came into his head randomly.[143] Is not just the programmatic first word but the entire subject of the most famous work of Greek literature based on nothing more than a whim, then? It is suggestive that there appears to be an

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141. e.g. Georgiadou & Larmour (1998: 201), but see too Nesselrath (2002: 153) on the sources for these three most common candidates, and (154) on this Zenodotus. Among the series of epigrams on Homer and his origins (*AP* 16.292-305), note especially the anonymous 299, in which Homer refuses to answer the question about his origins, lest he make enemies of the unsuccessful candidates. See ní Mheallaigh (2014: 258) on the special irony of Babylonian identity for a poet who was known for never mentioning Babylon.

142. Dio alludes to this debate when he says (11.24) that Homer started the *Iliad* 'from a random place' (ὅθεν ἔτυχεν), allegedly a characteristic technique of liars. Hunter (2009a: 53-4) connects the Dio passage with this moment in *VH*. Aristarchus claimed that Homer started the Catalogue of Ships with the Boeotians 'on impulse' (Nünlist's tr. (2009: 182) of κατ' ἐπιφοράν at Σ D *Il.* 2.494). Protagoras (DK 80 A28) objected to Homer's use of the feminine gender for μῆνις, though whether on the grounds that it was a masculine trait, or on some more straightforwardly morphological basis, is unclear: see Gera (2003: 139).

143. Anderson observes (1976a: 14) that this is the same defence as Hermes gives for Athene's question about Paris' marital status at *Dearum iudicium* 4, which he claims was simply an innocent piece of smalltalk that just happened to occur to her.

ancient tradition of referring to poetical works by the opening word or words,[144] so although I am not aware of any evidence that the *Iliad* was ever called The 'Wrath', the focus on the first word here might reasonably be felt to imply the whole poem, especially as Achilles' μῆνις is indeed the whole poem's subject.[145]

At 2.22 Hesiod wins the prize for poetry, even though Homer was better. This inevitably recalls the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod*, which Uden considers to have been compiled in its present form in a Hadrianic context.[146] Uden writes:

> when Lucian sees the two poets compete again on the Isle of the Blessed, he says that Homer delivered the superior performance, but Hesiod was made the

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144. Identification of works by their *incipit* perhaps originated in Callimachus' *Pinakes*: see Pfeiffer (1968: 129-30). This would be familiar from the use of the opening words as a roll's *index*, as described in Martial 3.2. There is evidence for the use of the first word alone to identify Latin poems: e.g. Propertius' *Cynthia* (King (1975-6: 108 n.2)); Catullus' *Passer* (Butrica (2007), who is unsure that this identifies the whole book, but acknowledges that Martial 1.7, and 4.14 suggest it at least refers to an individual poem). The *Aeneid*'s opening word was so recognisable that Ovid could mischievously use it as the first word of *Amores* 1.1 (with implied play on *arma* and *amores*), and this single word again signifies 'the *Aeneid*' at *Amores* 1.15.25: for a study of Ovid's uses of the allusion see Barchiesi (1997: 16-23). See too McKeown (1989: 11-12). The *Aeneid*'s opening is 'quoted at least fifteen times in the graffiti from Pompeii' (Milnor (2014: 240)) and several times in literature (Austin (1968: 108)).

145. Consider two epigrams by Palladas on grammarians: *AP* 9.168 begins μῆνιν οὐλομένην, 9.169 begins μῆνις Ἀχιλλῆος, clear allusions to the *Iliad*'s opening; cf. the same poet's *AP* 9.173 and 174. On these and other such epigrams see Nesselrath (2002: 159 n.42).

146. Uden (2010). See too my quotation from Mossman (above, pp.177-8) on the unexpected non-appearance of the *Certamen*-pattern in *Demosthenis laudatio*.

winner, in an obvious comment on their original contest.[147]

Furthermore, in the *Contest*, an oracle claims that Homer is the son of Telemachus — a character in his own epic — which is very much like what happens in *VH* with characters and poet coexisting, while another oracle is cited which rules out the concomitant claim, that his mother was Polycaste; Uden sees this as a deliberate irony which is 'self-evidently false', rather than evidence of incompetent compilation.[148] In the *Contest*, the victory of Hesiod is expressly an unpopular opinion, with the king overruling the wishes of the people (13), and the narrator has been on Homer's side. So too in *VH* it is Homer whose poetry is better-loved among the dead. Considering the context of lying in this work, the reason for Hesiod's victory here is likely to be his initiation by the Muses into how to tell false things as though they were true.[149] Georgiadou & Larmour consider that Homer lost because Lucian 'could hardly have Homer win after all the criticisms and parodies he has made',[150] but as we have seen, the blame for Homeric untruths can be laid at the door of 'Homer's Odysseus'. Homer, in fact, has been eminently honest with the Lucian-narrator in acknowledging his lack of prior planning when chosing the subject of his poem, while Hesiod's poetry positively celebrates his own ability to

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147.   Uden (2010: 131).

148.   Uden (2010: 127-8).

149.   *Theog.* 22-34.

150.   Georgiadou & Larmour (1998: 205-6).

deceive, even though he apparently speaks openly and honestly of his own 'real life' in his poetry in a way that Homer never does.

Although the narrator successfully delivers Odysseus' letter to Calypso, he fails to bring back to the land of the living Homer's account of the battle with sinners (2.24). He is able to quote the first line but says he has lost the rest.[151] This line is a cento; just as Lucian's description of the battle itself is a mash-up of epic and historical characters, so the form of the poem is a compilation of bits of Homer, which perhaps implies something about Homer's limitations — he has used up all his material, so all he can now do is recycle it in potentially endless restitchings.[152] After all, the next event in the narrative — Helen being stolen by Cinyras — revisits the opening of the Trojan War story, with one person being exchanged for another. So perhaps cento is the only form in which epic can be written in this Borgesian afterlife where time is eternally compressed and events get mixed in all kinds of new ways. Or is the narrator just pretending to remember even this line, so that its derivativeness is because this self-confessed liar is making it up himself while

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151. This teases the reader rather as *VH*'s final promise of more books does.

152. For ancient views (Σ bT *Il.* 24.804 & Longinus, *Subl.* 9.11-15) on the waning of Homer's powers in his old age see Heath (1998).

claiming it is by Homer? Or indeed, is this a comment on the formulaic nature of Homeric poetry?[153]

Finally, at 2.35 Sidwell considers there is 'a hint of criticism of Homer's account', since Odysseus is said to have travelled for 17 days before being shipwrecked and Tiresias tells Odysseus that his death will be gentle, whereas, in Lucian, Odysseus says he was shipwrecked 'as soon as' he left Calypso and recounts his own violent death. But again, this exculpates the Homeric narrator, since it is Odysseus who makes these new claims with no input from Homer at all — the same Odysseus who was held up as an arch-liar at the beginning of this work. After all, Calypso's cave turns out to be 'just as Homer said' (2.36).[154]

3.4 — Conclusion

What is evident from these various incarnations of Homer the man is that Lucian keeps changing from one work to the next in the answers he provides to key questions about Homer's life and work. This serves to illustrate their contentiousness, and the reader of Lucian's complete oeuvre is left with a clear impression that he takes no particular view on the answers to these unanswerable

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153.   See p.77 above for Lucian's evident awareness of formulaic composition. The line here signals its (weary?) derivativeness: von Möllendorff (2000a: 400-1) draws attention to the opening νῦν δέ, 'der ja impliziert, daß ,vorher' anderes besungen wurde', while ní Mheallaigh (2014: 243) writes 'not even Homer, it seems, can escape Homer'.

154.   See p.139 above.

questions;[155] the answers that he does give therefore become a means both of illustrating that any answers by a scholar or author are inevitably tendentious, and of demonstrating Lucian's own ability to use the debate skilfully for his own ends.

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155.   This is a specific manifestation of the phenomenon noted by Anderson (1976a: 2), that Lucian 'will change his viewpoint on any subject from one dialogue to another'.

CHAPTER 4

Barbarians and Homeric learning: *Hercules*

When Homer unexpectedly turns out to be Babylonian in *VH*, the reader can recognize this as one of the many untruths promised by the narrator. But it still illustrates Lucian's keen interest in non-Greek peoples, which is particularly prominent in the short introductory pieces (*prolaliae*).[1] These describe interactions with a great variety of barbarians — the locals on the river Eridanus (*Electrum*), Celts (*Hercules*), Indians (*Bacchus*), Garamantes (*Dipsades*), Scythians (*Scytha*), and a Carian (*Herodotus*); the interest in barbarians is also prominent in some longer pieces (*Anacharsis*, *Toxaris*, *Scytha*). I focus here on *Hercules* since the interaction involves extensive use of Homer on both sides.[2] But, in contrast to *Alexander*, Homer is here

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1.   It is not agreed which pieces should be so described, nor whether *prolalia* is the appropriate term: see Anderson (1977b: n.5), Branham (1985: 237-43), and Nesselrath (1990). There has been a recent flurry of interest in the *prolaliae*: see ní Mheallaigh (2014: ch.1) and three articles: Vix (2013), Popescu (2013), and Arantes (2013).

2.   Non-Greek speakers' knowledge of Homer is discussed by Dio (53.6-8). On issues of identity in *Hercules* see now Arantes (2013), who draws attention to Commodus' self-characterization as a 'Roman Heracles' in Cass. Dio 73.15: 'Luciano dialoga com essa apropriação da imagem de Héracles/Hércules pelos romanos?' (131). See Connolly (2003) for Heracles as 'an effective exemplar of manliness for the gender-troubled sophists to appropriate' (313). At *Dial. mort.* 25.3 (=12.3), Hannibal argues, on the ground that his own deeds were performed without the ability to recite Homer, that his barbarian achievements were thereby greater than Alexander's.

used not to mock barbarians for their stupidity, but to show some approval of their *paideia.*

At the beginning of *Hercules* the narrator[3] describes a picture of the Celtic god Ogmios, whom he says the Celts identify with Heracles.[4] He plunges straight *in medias res*, so that it only gradually becomes clear what situation the reader is to imagine. The narrator begins confidently, giving an appearance of expertise, and explaining that 'Celts call Heracles "Ogmios" in their local language' (τὸν Ἡρακλέα οἱ Κελτοὶ Ὄγμιον ὀνομάζουσι φωνῇ τῇ ἐπιχωρίῳ) and have an idiosyncratic way of representing him (τὸ δὲ εἶδος τοῦ θεοῦ πάνυ ἀλλόκοτον γράφουσι).[5] The initial description resembles the didactic style of ecphrasis typical of the sets of *Imagines*

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3.   I refer to the 'narrator' even for the *prolaliae*, where the speaker most obviously seems to 'be' Lucian addressing a 'real' audience; usually Lucian studiously avoids such explicit identifications. Goldhill (2002: 63) writes that even when the name 'Lucian' appears, 'it is disconcertingly hard to see it as a straightforward act of self-identification'. Sidwell (2014: 260) observes that Lucian, 'the acknowledged master of self-presentation', 'perfected the genre of the *prolalia* (introductory speech) with its titillating autobiographical details.'

4.   This *prolalia*'s literary aspects have not been much examined, in contrast to the extensive discussion of the likelihood that such pictures actually existed; for bibliography on that question see Elsner (2007: 60 n.34).

5.   On the term ἐπιχώριος ('local') see Goldhill (2010b). In particular (57): 'Lucian, typically, plays wonderful games with the insider/outsider logic of cultural identity through his pseudo-Herodotean othering of his own background in *De dea Syria*.' These questions — who is an outsider and how do they overlap with 'locals'? — are prominent in the *prolaliae.*

by the Philostrati, where the narrator presents himself as a teacher bestowing his knowledge on a youngster as they stand together before an image.[6]

But then doubt is introduced in the reader's mind, because it soon turns out (2) that Lucian's narrator is actually describing the specific occasion when he first saw such a picture.[7] This is when he was himself in the position of the Philostratean youngster — so that, in the absence of a learned interpreter, his initial reaction to what he saw was based on his personal assumptions rather than knowledge,[8] which is emphasized by the positioning of ᾤμην ('I thought') as the first word:[9]

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6.   On such scenes in Lucian and other Second Sophistic authors see Bartsch (1989: ch.1).

7.   The abruptness of this revelation parallels *Scytha* 9, where, after hearing of Anacharsis' visit to Athens, 'we suddenly surface from the past and find ourselves not in Athens, as we might expect, but in Macedon' (Richter (2011: 170)). Yet the situation is not exactly similar, since the story has been completed by that point, nor was the narrator personally involved in the events described.

8.   Contrast how confidently Aëtion's painting is interpreted in *Herodotus* 5. The narrator there similarly claims that his description is based on autopsy, but there was no need of a local interpreter, because the depiction of Roxana and Alexander is easily accessible to a Greek. The narrator makes a fair guess at an unlabelled figure's identity: 'Hephaestion is leaning on a very handsome lad — I think (for the name is not written) he is Hymenaeus' (Ἡφαιστίων ... μειρακίῳ πάνυ ὡραίῳ ἐπερειδόμενος — Ὑμέναιος οἶμαί ἐστιν (οὐ γὰρ ἐπεγέγραπτο τοὔνομα)).

9.   The undercutting of the narrator's initial appearance of easy omniscience adds to the effect noted by Bompaire (1958: 727), that Lucian's presentation of the material increasingly intrigues the audience. On the conscious elusiveness of *prolaliae*, see Elsner (2014: 13): 'some rhetorical *prolaliae*, which keep the listener guessing about what the topic actually is', singling out *Hercules* (n.30).

ᾤμην οὖν ἐφ’ ὕβρει τῶν Ἑλληνίων θεῶν τοιαῦτα παρανομεῖν τοὺς Κελτοὺς ἐς τὴν μορφὴν τὴν Ἡρακλέους ἀμυνομένους αὐτὸν τῇ γραφῇ, ὅτι τὴν χώραν ποτὲ αὐτῶν ἐπῆλθεν λείαν ἐλαύνων, ὁπότε τὰς Γηρυόνου ἀγέλας ζητῶν κατέδραμε τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἑσπερίων γενῶν.

So I thought it was to insult the Greek gods that the Celts were committing this kind of offence regarding the physique of Heracles, retaliating against him with the picture since he came to their land and drove off plunder at the time when he ravaged most of the western peoples in his search for the herds of Geryon.

In this attempt to explain the thinking behind the picture, the narrator has initially set up Greek-Celtic relations as antagonistic: Heracles ravaged these parts in his quest for Geryon's cattle, and the Celts responded by representing him unflatteringly. But the narrator's subsequent conversation with a learned Celt will reveal that he has been misinterpreting the situation, and that the key to fuller understanding is a more eirenic collaboration between Greek and Celtic worldviews.

Eventually the narrator reveals that, despite that initial display of his present state of factual knowledge, when he first saw the picture he was infuriated by his lack of understanding (4): 'I had stood for a long time looking in wonder at these things, feeling puzzled and annoyed' (ταῦτ’ ἐγὼ μὲν ἐπὶ πολὺ εἱστήκειν ὁρῶν καὶ θαυμάζων καὶ ἀπορῶν καὶ ἀγανακτῶν).[10] Finally, although it is never clear how

10.   Contrast Apelles' allegorical painting of Slander in *Calumnia* 5, where the unruffled narrator makes plausible deductions, even while signalling their provisionality: 'And standing around him are two women — Ignorance, I think, and Suspicion' (περὶ δὲ αὐτὸν ἑστᾶσι δύο γυναῖκες, Ἄγνοιά μοι δοκεῖ καὶ Ὑπόληψις).

much of the picture had been decoded by the narrator's own efforts, the reader is given fuller awareness of the whole real-life scene within which this *ekphrasis* is framed: a Celt eventually approaches the bemused Greek visitor and explains it to him. The use of a painting (initially described in detail) as the talking-point which launches a discussion with someone more knowledgeable than the first-person narrator is familiar from the opening of Achilles Tatius.[11] In that image the subject is again open to different interpretations from Greek and non-Greek perspectives, since the Greek narrator may well be mistaking a depiction of Astarte riding a bull (Baal) for one of Europa riding a bull (Zeus).[12]

The narrator, who speaks condescendingly about this Celt who is 'not uneducated in our culture' (οὐκ ἀπαίδευτος τὰ ἡμέτερα), has found himself in a situation where he is a cultural outsider, as a Greek among Celts, and who views Celts as people to be measured (and, as the litotes implies, found wanting) 'in our culture'. But although he initially viewed the Celts as 'Others', whose interpretation

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11.   On parallels between this narrative procedure in Lucian and those of Longus and Achilles Tatius, see Reardon (1991: 48-9), who is rightly more sceptical than Perry (1967) that this approach forms an 'academic' justification for writing prose fiction. See too, on *Hercules*, *Herodotus* and *Zeuxis*, Billault (2006).

12.   On the multiple confusions of identification in the opening sections, and possible connections with Lucian's efforts to identify Astarte with Selene (*DDS* 4), see Morales (2004: 37-48). But Friedländer (1912: 79) well observes that Lucian's inspiration is probably the *Tabula Cebetis* (which Lucian claims as inspiration at *De mercede conductis* 42 and *Rhetorum praeceptor* 6). However, although Nesselrath (1990: 133) describes the Celt as 'old and learned', nothing in the text indicates that the he is old like the πρεσβύτης of *Tabula Cebetis* 2.

of Heracles was 'totally weird' (πάνυ ἀλλόκοτον), he now realizes that he is himself the Other among the Celts.[13] He grudgingly accepts this in that same description of the Celt as 'not uneducated' and able to speak pretty good Greek, but he undercuts it by his next description of him as 'a philosopher, I suppose, in the local culture' (φιλόσοφος, οἶμαι, τὰ ἐπιχώρια (4)).[14]

In the ensuing conversation, as the Celt explains differences between Greek and Celtic representations of eloquence, he employs six quotations from Greek literature, including four from Homer. Not only does he thereby prove that he is

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13.   He is thus in the same position as the Indian messengers in *Bacchus*, which derives its humour from their naive description of Dionysus and his maenads, figures familiar to those with Greek preconceptions and cultural background, but quite unknown to Indians. See Branham (1989: 43-6), Nesselrath (1990: 136), and, on the 'Other' as 'that most useful of dialogic partners for delineating the edges of the defining subject's own world', Lada-Richards (2007: 125-6).

14.   Compare Favorinus' paradox (Philost., *VS* 489): 'to speak Greek, though a Gaul' (Γαλάτης ὤν, Ἑλληνίζειν) — and even if the verb here means 'to be Hellenized', as Goldhill (2002: 75) suggests, the sense of linguistic ability remains strong. Amato (2004) even argues that the Celt of *Hercules* is Favorinus, although Isaac (2011: 518 n.124) is rightly sceptical. But for a different notion of a 'barbarian philosopher', see *Piscator* 19, where Parrhesiades (self-identified as Syrian), addressing Philosophy, claims: 'in your opinion, it would make no difference if someone were of barbarian speech, just as long as his way of thinking were plainly correct and just' (καίτοι πρός γε σὲ οὐδὲν ἂν ἔλαττον γένοιτο οὐδ' εἰ τὴν φωνὴν βάρβαρος εἴη τις, εἴπερ ἡ γνώμη ὀρθὴ καὶ δικαία φαίνοιτο οὖσα). However, this suggests that such a man would be a philosopher by *any* standards (or at least those of the personified Philosophy, who immediately agrees with Parrhesiades' argument), not just 'local' ones. Isaac (2011: 500) describes this as 'a familiar cosmopolitan, cynic point, asserting the essential equality of human beings throughout the inhabited world'.

indeed 'not uneducated', by displaying knowledge of Greek epic, tragedy, and comedy, but he also shows that the apparently eccentric Celtic representation of eloquence by means of Heracles, more famous for brute strength than as a subtle speaker,[15] is actually founded on ideas similar to those in Greek authors.[16] The apparent differences in their allegorical representations of eloquence are therefore not as significant as they had seemed. This will become embarrassing for the narrator, particularly as he makes no face-saving protestation, for example about being a mere Syrian (assuming that the audience are to understand that this narrator 'is' Lucian himself): the Celt clearly has no doubt that he is talking to a Greek, as he indicates by explaining how he learned Greek literature 'from you

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15.   Hence, perhaps, the narrator's surprise that the men are being led along willingly, rather than being forcibly dragged.

16.   Anderson (1976a: 32) observes that Lucian 'is particularly fond of ludicrous attachments', comparing the fishing for philosophers (*Piscator* 47-52) and men 'led by the nose' (*Philopseudes* 23). He also discusses (33) the possible connection between gold chains elsewhere in Lucian (*Juppiter confutatus* 4; *Juppiter tragoedus* 14; *Dial. deor.* 21.1) and the golden chain of *Il.* 8.19-22; if this is correct, the imagery here combines the original Homeric idea with a material that feels more exotic (if ἤλεκτρον does indeed mean 'amber' — on which see p.280 n.42 below).

people' (παρ᾽ ὑμῶν).[17] Moreover, the identification of allegorical 'hinting' is vital to Greek interpretation of literature, especially Homer, as we shall see in the next chapter. On the one hand this is a means for the narrator to flatter himself — even a foreigner can see just what a fine product of Greek *paideia* he is! — but on the other hand it emphasizes his inability to understand an unconventional representation of conventionally Greek ideas which anyone with a good education in Homer should be able to see.

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17.   On the 'complex and confusing … linguistic and cultural backgrounds' of those identified as 'Syrian', see Isaac (2004: 335-51); note especially 341-5 on Lucian's 'ambivalence at his ethnic identity' and his choice to present himself as Syrian: 'We do not even know whether he would call himself a "Syrian" if he was not writing satire. He was a Greek by choice. His works are relevant for us insofar as they depict the position of a Greek-speaking Syrian in contemporary Greek and Roman society and in particular the attitudes of that society towards someone like Lucian, as he himself experienced them' (342). See also Swain (1996: 298-308) and Hall (1981: 292-7) on Lucian's Syrian origins; and, identifying 'more complex irony' than is usually detected in *Adversus indoctum*, Richter (2011: 138-76): 'Lucian's Syrianness, I argue, was more an authorial strategy than an ethnic self-identification' (146). Note too the complications of the narratorial voice (which, being unmarked for ethnicity, appears to be 'Greek') in *Alexander*: it associates Syrians with the other stupid barbarians duped by the charlatan prophet, on which Petsalis-Diomidis (2010: 62) remarks, 'In view of Lucian's actual Syrian origin, and of the question mark which he seems to be putting over the narrator's passionate expressions of devotion to Epicurus and his subsequent un-Epicurean behaviour in Abonouteichos, it is just possible that the narrator's scornful attitude to non-Greek languages is here being satirized.' On Lucian's Syrianness in general see Andrade (2013: ch.9 & 10), including brief discussion of *Hercules* (303-4); and, on its relation to his outsider-cum-insider performance of *paideia*, Whitmarsh (2001: 122-9).

The first of the Celt's quotations is *Il.* 3.108, which he combines with Euripides' *Phoenissae* 530 to contrast 'younger men', whose 'minds turn with the winds' (ὁπλοτέρων ... φρένες ἠερέθονται), and old age, which 'has something wiser to say than youngsters' (ἔχει τι λέξαι τῶν νέων σοφώτερον). So the logic of the Celtic portrayal of eloquence as old age is revealed through an argument which is entirely Greek. Next come two further lines from Homer repeating the same point, so that the Celt is now consciously showing off the breadth of his Homeric knowledge in the process of shoring up his argument; he can recite a full repertoire of useful quotations from Homer if necessary, not just one that he has carefully learned to give an appearance of knowledge.

These quotations are *Il.* 1.249, where honey flows from Nestor's tongue,[18] and 3.152, where the elderly counsellors of the Trojans have a voice 'blooming with flowers'. In this last case the Celt appears at first to be misquoting, but any suspicion that he has been caught out is immediately quashed, as he adds the detail that the 'flowers' in question are lilies, with a faux-modest 'if I remember' (εἴ γε μέμνημαι) — he is of course remembering correctly.[19] To drive the point home further, next come

18. The full line is τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων ῥέεν αὐδή, which the Celt slightly paraphrases as τοῦ Νέστορος ὑμῖν ἀπορρεῖ ἐκ τῆς γλώττης τὸ μέλι. This is a different situation from the prosified version of a line given by the 'Homeric' young man (which I discuss shortly), since the Celt recasts the line to fit the grammar of his sentence, whereas the young man appears to think he is quoting two lines verbatim.

19. *Il.* 3.150-2: ἀγορηταὶ | ἐσθλοί, τεττίγεσσιν ἐοικότες οἵ τε καθ' ὕλην | δενδρέῳ ἐφεζόμενοι ὄπα λειριόεσσαν ἱεῖσι.

'some iambic lines from comedy', which the Celt learned while visiting Greece,[20] and which show that even the apparently barbaric/barbarian idea of piercing the tongue as a way of representing eloquence is not totally un-Greek.[21] Finally, he argues, if Ogmios-Heracles' arrows represent words, that is hardly much different from Homer's regular description of words as 'winged'. So the Celt is aware of general features of Greek poetry, such as Homer's epithets, but is also able to quote verbatim several lines well selected to back up his points.

By this point the whole conversation has become an embarrassment for the narrator, whose initial preconceptions and prejudices about Celtic art led him to ignore the illumination which his own culture could shed on the picture's interpretation. It is therefore not surprising that he fails to report anything about his own (no doubt shame-faced) response to the Celt.[22] Instead he stops reminiscing

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20.   More play with the insider/outsider dichotomy. The lines are *PCG*, adespota 457 [= 398 Kock].

21.   Piercing of ears at least is usually seen as a mark of (eastern) barbarians: e.g. Petron., *Sat.* 102.14 (*pertunde aures, ut imitemur Arabes*), with Isaac (2004: 340). Piercing and rhetoric/education recur together in the confusion between literal and metaphorical at Dio 32.3-4, where Dio recounts a story about the Athenians piercing their sons' ears for gold earrings, because they misunderstood Apollo's command that they should 'put what was best' (i.e. *paideia*) into their ears (τὸ κάλλιστον ἐμβάλλειν τοῖς ὠσὶ τῶν παίδων). On 'barbarians' in Dio and Lucian, see Gangloff (2007).

22.   Contrast the conversation about Homer in Dio 36 (*Borystheniticus*), which presents a myth attributed to the Magi and told to the narrator during a leisurely discussion with the self-styled 'Homer-lovers' (Ὁμήρου ἐρασταί) of Borysthenes, whose spoken Greek, it seems, is not so good as Lucian's Celt's (οὐκέτι σαφῶς ἑλληνίζοντες (9)).

and returns straight to the present, reinterpreting the Celt's words for his own ends in the situation in which he finds himself now in his old age: he is like that old Celtic Heracles whose very age is a sign of eloquence and who has inspired him to take up public speaking again.[23]

In the process of doing this he sets himself up against an imagined young man fond of quoting Homer (7). Like the Celt, this young man can bring out just the right Homeric line to mock the narrator, producing a species of 'parody' by transferring the reference of a Homeric phrase about horses to the old man's feet. But the audience is now more aware that the hypothetical young man is created and kept in check by the narrator himself, so that these apparently humiliating words simultaneously serve to reveal his own continued quick-wittedness, exactly the opposite of what the quoted lines purport to show:

> τέως μὲν γὰρ ἐδεδίειν, μή ... τις Ὁμηρικὸς νεανίσκος
> ἐπιπλήξειέν μοι εἰπὼν τὸ "σὴ δὲ βίη λέλυται", καὶ
> "χαλεπὸν γῆρας κατείληφέ σε,"
>
> ἠπεδανὸς δέ νύ τοι θεράπων, βραδέες δέ τοι ἵπποι,
>
> ἐς τοὺς πόδας τοῦτο ἀποσκώπτων.
>
> Until then I had been afraid ... that some 'Homeric' young man might rebuke me, saying the line 'Your strength has gone' [*Il.* 8.103]; 'harsh old age has taken hold of you' [*Il.* 8.103]; and 'your squire is a weakling, your horses are slow' [*Il.* 8.104], casting this last jeer at my feet.

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23. This turnaround is similar to, but not as marked as, that in *Electrum*, where the narrator tells a story against himself and his ineptitude, but then turns it to his advantage: see §5.2 below.

The phrase χαλεπὸν γῆρας κατείληφέ σε seems to be a slightly prosified version of χαλεπὸν δέ σε γῆρας ὀπάζει, the second half of *Il.* 8.103; but there is sufficient uncertainty about the verb at the end of Homer's line that it is hard to say what the effect of this might be. It seems to be an instance where the misquotation is plausibly an accidental result of Lucian's awareness of an uncertainty about the text, but it is nonetheless possible that the reader should understand this metrical breakdown as representing the young man's imperfect recollection of Homer, which would make his description as a 'Homeric young man' lightly ironic.[24]

But whether the young man is a competent Homerist or not, it soon becomes clear that the narrator is reasserting his own cultural competence by doing throughout the remainder of this speech just what the Celt did in his. Elsner considers that 'the Celt is virtually a reverse portrait of Lucian himself, … with Lucian's eastern otherness by contrast with Greece swapped for the Celt's western otherness';[25] this impression is reinforced by the parallelism between the speeches of the narrator and the Celt. For the Celt's final words were an allusion to Homer, and the final words of the whole *prolalia* are likewise from Homer. Furthermore, the Celt alluded to Homer four times, to Euripides once, and to an unnamed comic poet

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24.   Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 192-3) sets out the variants, and identifies καταλαμβάνω as a favourite Lucianic verb for misfortunes. She sees Lucian's version as simply the result of a memory lapse. Deliberately poor versification is not unknown in Lucian: see further my discussions of the stele of Heracles and Dionysus (pp.15-20 above) and Charon's efforts at Homerizing (§6.4 below).

25.   Elsner (2007: 60); for such mirroring in the *prolaliae* see Branham (1985).

once, but the narrator caps this by alluding to Homer five times, to Anacreon once, and to Herodotus once.[26] This contestation and negotiation of cultural belonging uses Homer as the main means of its expression; what is more, the narrator, who began by associating himself with the Celtic Ogmios-Heracles' eloquence and old age,[27] concludes his speech with two Homeric quotations carefully chosen to associate himself with the archetypally eloquent Odysseus:[28] like Odysseus, he is embarking on the open seas needing a 'wind that fills the sails' (ὡς νῦν γε μάλιστα πλησιστίου τε καὶ ἐσθλοῦ ἑταίρου ἀνέμου δεόμεθα, alluding to *Od.* 11.7 and 12.149), and hoping that onlookers will say of him, as they said of Odysseus disguised as the beggar Irus, 'What a thigh the old man is showing from out of his rags!' (οἵην ἐκ ῥακέων ὁ γέρων ἐπιγουνίδα φαίνει). The line's Homeric origin is carefully made clear: it is introduced as 'that Homeric phrase' (τὸ Ὁμηρικὸν ἐκεῖνο).[29] This quotation — of a particularly striking visual moment in Homer, but in a different metaphorical sense of 'showing (off)' — ends the piece, and therefore seems designed to draw special attention to the association of narrator and Odysseus, who both unexpectedly pull something out of the bag (or, indeed, rags). The whole

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26. The scholia (Rabe (1906: 10)) identify the 'Tean poet' (8) as Anacreon; the proverbial expression 'Hippocleides will not mind' derives from Hdt. 6.126-31.

27. The god is 'extremely old' (γέρων ... ἐς τὸ ἔσχατον, 1).

28. Nestor, the other most notable Homeric speaker, was mentioned earlier (4).

29. *Od.* 18.74. The idea is reversed at *Somnium (Gallus)* 26, where rags appear from underneath an actor's sumptuous costume when he falls.

speech has become a display of the narrator's own skilful eloquence. Within its brief span he has reproduced the kind of 'clever(-clever) game' involving 'wittily self-conscious play with the strategies of self-justification' found in the more lengthy arguments set out in *Apologia*.[30]

But in any case, the narrator has recognized that, in the eyes of the hypothetical young Homer-enthusiast, his old age makes him the contemptible 'Other', rather as the narrator himself viewed the Celt. As Nesselrath observes, the purpose of Lucian's short introductory speeches is 'to come across as being intelligent, educated, and eloquent from the very first moment';[31] in *Hercules* the speaker begins by giving this impression, has something of a wobble when outsmarted by a Celt and abused by the hypothetical young man, but then re-establishes his credentials by overcoming these difficulties.[32] What enables both Celt

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30.   Goldhill (2002: 71). Nesselrath (1990: 135) observes the significance of the narrator's quotations in asserting his competence in old age, but does not discuss their equally important function of responding to the Celt: the narrator is in an antagonistic relationship with not only the possibly sceptical audience he is implying, but also the Celt and the imagined 'Homeric' young man whom he creates. These latter two, being his own creation, act within the narration as a foil for his own abilities in a way that the non-speaking audience cannot.

31.   Nesselrath (1990: 112). Branham (1985: 238) writes that 'it is the role of the prologue not only to cultivate a favorable response from the prospective auditors by putting them at their ease and whetting their appetite for the kind of entertainment that follows, but also to sketch for them the form of judgment appropriate to a successful performance'.

32.   This is not so far removed from the procedure in *Pseudologistes*, which Branham (1989: 32) calls 'self-advertisement posing as self-defence'.

and narrator to reposition themselves in the eyes of others is a combination of eloquence and the ability to produce apposite quotation of Homer. This makes *Hercules* one of Lucian's most explicit presentations of Homer's significance as a vital contribution to a sense of Greek cultural identity.[33]

33.   The same thing happens, more concisely, at *Scytha* 9, where the self-identified Syrian, who was awe-struck when first visiting a Macedonian city, and hence rather like the Scythian Anacharsis whose visit to Athens he has been describing, immediately counteracts this impression as he asserts his Greek cultural credentials by comparing himself to Telemachus and quoting *Od.* 4.71; it is no accident that the only Homeric allusion in *Scytha* comes at this point.

CHAPTER 5

Sirens and dreams: Homer's 'hinting'

5.1 — 'Enigmatic and mythic words'

> εἰ δὲ δι' αἰνιγμάτων καὶ μυθικῶν λόγων τινῶν ἐμφαίνεται τὰ νοήματα, οὐ χρὴ παράδοξον ἡγεῖσθαι· τούτου γὰρ αἴτιον <ἡ> ποιητικὴ καὶ <τὸ> τῶν ἀρχαίων ἦθος, ὅπως οἱ μὲν φιλομαθοῦντες μετά τινος εὐμουσίας ψυχαγωγούμενοι ῥᾷον ζητῶσί τε καὶ εὑρίσκωσι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οἱ δὲ ἀμαθεῖς μὴ καταφρονῶσι τούτων ὧν οὐ δύνανται συνιέναι. καὶ γάρ ἐστί πως τὸ μὲν δι' ὑπονοίας σημαινόμενον ἀγωγόν, τὸ δὲ φανερῶς λεγόμενον εὐτελές.

> And if [Homer] exhibits these ideas through certain enigmatic and mythic words, it must not be thought contrary to expectation; for the reason for this is the way of poetry and the custom of the ancients, which was such that lovers of learning, being allured by a certain musicality, might more easily seek and find the truth, and that the unlearned might not be contemptuous of those things which they could not understand. For somehow what is signified through hidden meanings is attractive, but what is said plainly is of low value.[1]

In the first three chapters we saw how sources such as the Homeric scholia reveal that Lucian's readings of Homer respond to interpretations by earlier readers displaying a more obviously scholarly approach. I now consider in more detail a

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1.   ps.-Plut., *De vita et poesi Homeri* 92.

subset of these interpretations: those deriving from a belief that the Homeric text could and should be read as concealing deeper philosophical and mystical truths than are apparent to the casual reader, as illustrated by this passage of ps.-Plutarch.[2]

When Lucian uses the verb αἰνίττομαι in *VH* 1.2 to introduce what he is doing in alluding to earlier authors, he employs a term which could also indicate the 'hidden meanings' to be found both in Homer, as interpreted by allegorists with philosophical agendas, and in dreams, as interpreted by oneiromants.[3] With this vocabulary Lucian 'deliberately appropriates the terms of a well-represented ancient account of Old Comedy, according to which the genre went through a stage where enigma was central and names were suppressed',[4] so he is combining the scholarly and philosophically serious with the comic in a very particular way. In the first part of this chapter I consider Lucian's engagement with philosophical interpretations of these hidden meanings, then I examine how similar techniques in

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2.   For such readings see Lamberton (1986: esp. ch.1 & ch.2). Camerotto (1998: 295-302) sees connections between *ainigma* and parody, both of which require an audience of *pepaideumenoi.*

3.   See Georgiadou & Larmour (1988) for *VH*'s relation to allegorical interpretation of Homer (5-22), and for Lucian's use of technical terms of allegory (53-4). αἰνίττομαι can also be used in a more everyday sense of 'riddling': cf. Soph. *Aj.* 1158. Allegory-vocabulary appears in *Hercules* 4 (αἴνιγμα) and Artem. 1.2, on which see below. On *philosophy* as 'riddling' in Lucian, see Schlapbach (2010: 252-6).

4.   Sidwell (2009: 113-14); cf. von Möllendorff (2000a: 50-1) for the background.

dream-interpretation can be seen to connect with Lucian's own commentary on Homeric dreams.

5.2 — Allegory and the Sirens

Lucian's interest in monstrous and chimerical creatures is most evident in *VH*, where his narrator claims to have seen many strange beings. They are inspired by the monsters in the tall stories Lucian is parodying, in particular Odysseus' narration to the credulous Phaeacians in the *Odyssey*.[5] However, Lucian repeatedly alludes to these Odyssean monsters in other works too. So let us first examine how allegorists understood these monsters, and focus on one noteworthy example, the *Odyssey*'s Sirens episode, which was of particular interest to allegorists and which Lucian — with other authors of the period — uses in various ways.

Heraclitus' *Quaestiones Homericae* offers a wealth of information on allegorical interpretations of Homer current in Lucian's time.[6] Especially interesting for the study of Homeric monsters is chapter 70, where Heraclitus argues that Homer uses Odysseus' wanderings to illustrate every kind of virtue. So Odysseus virtuously sails past the Lotus-Eaters who represent 'pleasure' (ἡδονή); his blinding of the Cyclops

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5.   1.3: '[Odysseus] telling of winds in bondage, one-eyed men, cannibals and savages, and also many-headed animals and his comrades being transformed by means of drugs' (διηγούμενος ἀνέμων τε δουλείαν καὶ μονοφθάλμους καὶ ὠμοφάγους καὶ ἀγρίους τινὰς ἀνθρώπους, ἔτι δὲ πολυκέφαλα ζῷα καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ φαρμάκων τῶν ἑταίρων μεταβολάς).

6.   For the dating (c. AD 100), see Russell & Konstan (2005: xi-xiii).

is a 'cauterizing' of his 'savage spirit' (ἄγριος θυμός); the episode of the Cattle of the Sun stands for his 'mastery of his belly' (ἐγκράτεια γαστρός), and so on.[7] Georgiadou & Larmour show how the Vine-women and Ass-legs parodically combine aspects of Odyssean monsters, in particular the Sirens:

> The Vine-women also recall the maenads of Dionysus, and the Sirens, both of which groups pose a threat to males who come in contact with them. ... According to Heraclitus *Hom. All.* 35, the 'nurses' attacked by Lycurgus in *Il.* 6.132-7 are actually the vines; this kind of allegory may lie behind the mixture of vine and human form here. ... The theme of entrapment runs through the *VH* (Endymion; the Whale; the Ass-legs) and the Sirens are archetypes of the dangerous lure: they also represent the attraction of poetic song (*Od.* 12.189-91), which has the power to 'bewitch'. ... If the Vine-women episode is an allegory of the life of the senses, it could allude to what Porphyry says about the Polyphemus episode in *Od.* 9: Polyphemus seems to represent the life of the senses in mythical form in *De Antr.* 11-13 ... In symbolic readings of Odysseus' adventures, figures like the Lotus-eaters and the Sirens represent vices which the ideal man shuns.[8]

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7. So Whitmarsh (2004a: 21) observes: 'Allegory offered a flexible technique whereby interpreters could map their own cultural and ideological agenda onto the prestigious originator of the Greek literary tradition.'

8. Georgiadou & Larmour (1988: 76 & 80-1).

Similarly, the Ass-legs 'owe much to Circe and the Sirens of the *Odyssey*, who threaten to entrap Odysseus, and whom he rejects and escapes'.[9]

Elsewhere in Lucian there are more direct references to the whole Sirens episode, similar to those which Lucian could read in Plutarch and Dio; but this is a different use of Homeric scholarship from the focus on single words and lines illustrated in various places in my earlier chapters.[10] It shows Lucian putting to rhetorical use a tradition of allegorical interpretation which is particularly prominent in relation to this Homeric episode: 'The Sirens, who are bird demons, are particularly varied in their allegorical instructiveness.'[11] So before discussing Lucian I survey other authors who display this variety of 'allegorical instructiveness', which can best be illustrated with the following digest from the

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9. Georgiadou & Larmour (1988: 229). Porphyry (*Pyth.* 39) writes that Pythagoras 'likened one kind of pleasure, which gratifies the belly and lusts through extravagance, to the Sirens' man-killing songs' (τὴν μὲν γὰρ γαστρὶ καὶ ἀφροδισίοις διὰ πολυτελείας κεχαρισμένην ἀπείκαζε ταῖς ἀνδροφόνοις τῶν Σειρήνων ᾠδαῖς), in contrast to the other, good kind of pleasure.

10. Nonetheless one should not overemphasize the distinction between 'textual' scholarship and 'allegorical interpretation'. Richardson (1992: 31) observes, in discussing Theagenes of Rhegium, who was perhaps the first to use allegorical interpretation to defend Homer against philosophers' attacks: 'It is interesting to find linguistic study closely linked to allegorical interpretation at this early stage.' This is because (33) 'Debate about the detailed interpretation of a text ... led naturally to the search for the *underlying* sense, the ὑπόνοια.' On these Xenophanes fragments (DK B10-12, to which Theagenes DK B2 responds), see Lesher (1992: 81-5).

11. Clarke (1981: 93).

relevant parts of Buffière's survey of interpretations of the Sirens (following his division into *exégèse historique*, *morale*, and *mystique*).

From the later ps.-Heraclitus comes the idea that the Sirens were musically talented courtesans, who devour not men but their money, before fleeing speedily: this supposedly explains their bird-like form in post-Homeric myth.[12] Meanwhile, the comment of the scholia begins with a similar rationalizing *exégèse historique* before proceeding to an *exégèse morale:*

> αἱ Σειρῆνες ἢ ὄρνιθες κέλαδοι ἦσαν ἐν λειμῶνι, ἢ
> γυναῖκες θελκτικαὶ καὶ ἀπατητικαὶ, ἢ αὐτὴ ἡ κολακεία.
> πολλοὺς γὰρ θέλγει καὶ ἀπατᾷ καὶ ὡσανεὶ θανατοῖ.
>
> The Sirens were either twittering birds in a meadow,
> or enchanting and deceptive women, or flattery itself.
> For [flattery] enchants, deceives and (as it were) puts
> to death many men.[13]

The knowledge which the Sirens claim to impart is 'whatever happens on the much-nourishing earth' (ὅσσα γένηται ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ);[14] so they resemble the divinely-inspired Homer, whom Plato's Ion believes to purvey knowledge about everything, and those other poets (such as Empedocles, Parmenides, Nicander or

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12. ps.-Heraclit., *Incred.* 14. Buffière (1956: 237) is keen to emphasize that this kind of interpretation, where the character is interpreted as 'un personnage réel, historique (et non pas un symbole)', is to be distinguished from their interpretation as personifications of various moral dangers. On the varying iconography of the Sirens see Buitron-Oliver & Cohen (1995: 30-4 & 178-81).

13. Σ B *Od.* 12.39.

14. *Od.* 12.191.

Theognis) who put useful wisdom into verse.[15] Odysseus could stay to listen to their wisdom, but as a man of action he cannot delay with either Calypso or the Sirens.[16] While Odysseus is always a philosopher, the allegorical value of the Sirens changes — pleasure, poetry, study — reflecting a range of interpretations in Greek and Latin authors.[17]

As for *exégèse mystique*, the most obvious is the music of the spheres which Pythagoras alone seemed able to hear; which appears in the myth of Er; and which Heraclitus the allegorist (quoting Plato on the Sirens) sees in the clanging of Apollo's arrows at *Il.* 1.46.[18]

This richness of allegorical interpretation explains why the Sirens are one of Lucian's favourite tropes. He uses them more often than Dio or Plutarch, and in more playful fashion, as we can see by comparing their approaches. Outside *VH*,

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15. These poets are singled out by Plutarch (*De aud. poet.* 2 [= *Mor.* 16c]) as having used metre and poetic style only so as to avoid τὸ πεζόν.

16. Buffière cites Maximus of Tyre (*Or.* 15 = Dübn. 21 = vulg. 5) for this view, where Odysseus is a sage but, like Heracles, lives a life of action rather than contemplation. Trapp (1997: 138 n.17) notes that Odysseus and Heracles 'appear together as ideals of practical virtue again in *Or.* 34.7-8 and 38.7'.

17. Buffière (1956: 384).

18. Iambl., *VP* 65; Pl., *Resp.* 10.617b; Heraclit., *Quaest. Hom.* 12. Heraclitus is supercilious about Plato, 'the man who banished Homer from his personal polity' (ὁ φυγαδεύων Ὅμηρον ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας πολιτείας), but who still used this doctrine in his own work. My summary is based on Buffière (1956: 473-81). Grossardt (2011: 132-4) discusses the possible significance of the music of the spheres and the number 7 in *VH*.

Lucian uses the Sirens episode in two principal ways: first, by explicit or implicit reference to Odysseus' men's ears being stopped with wax;[19] and secondly, by alluding to the enchanting power of the Sirens' song, for good or ill.[20]

Dio uses the ear-stopping theme once and the enchantment of the Sirens' song three times. In *Olympicus*, he argues that only foolish people abandon divine law in favour of pleasure:

> ὁπότε ἄνθρωποί τινες σοφώτεροι γενόμενοι τῆς ἁπάσης σοφίας, οὐ κηρὸν ἐγχέαντες τοῖς ὠσίν, ὥσπερ οἶμαί φασι τοὺς Ἰθακησίους ναύτας ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ κατακοῦσαι τῆς τῶν Σειρήνων ᾠδῆς, ἀλλὰ μολύβδου τινὸς μαλθακὴν ὁμοῦ καὶ ἄτρωτον ὑπὸ φωνῆς φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ οἶμαι πρὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν σκότος πολὺ προβαλόμενοι καὶ ἀχλύν, ὑφ' ἧς Ὅμηρός φησι κωλύεσθαι τὸν καταληφθέντα διαγιγνώσκειν θεόν, ὑπερφρονοῦσι τὰ θεῖα, καὶ μίαν ἱδρυσάμενοι δαίμονα πονηρὰν καὶ †ἄλυπον†, τρυφήν τινα ἢ ῥᾳθυμίαν πολλὴν καὶ ἀνειμένην ὕβριν, ἡδονὴν ἐπονομάζοντες, γυναικείαν τῷ ὄντι θεόν, προτιμῶσι καὶ θεραπεύουσι κυμβάλοις τισὶν ἢ ψόφοις καὶ αὐλοῖς ὑπὸ σκότος αὐλουμένοις ... .

> Certain men, who have become wiser than all wisdom, have poured into their ears not wax (as I think they say the Ithacan sailors did so as not to hear the Sirens' song), but a soft, lead-like substance impenetrable by the voice. And, I think, they have also set before their eyes great darkness and mist, by which, Homer says, the god was kept from being recognized after being caught. They despise divine things, and having set up one female divinity, worthless and (?)painkilling — a

19.   *Lexiphanes* 1; *Charon* 21; *Imagines* 14 & 29; *De saltu* 3-4; *Nigrinus* 19; *Calumnia* 8 & 30.

20.   *De domo* 13 & 19; *Imagines* 14; *Nigrinus* 3-4.

kind of wantonness or laziness and unrestrained *hybris* — which they called 'pleasure', truly a womanish god; they prefer her in honour, and worship her with sounds of cymbals and with pipes played under cover of darkness.[21]

This seems a sober account — Dio carefully hedges his words with a disclaimer 'as I think they say' — but he nonetheless relishes the opportunity to improve on Homer, by replacing the wax with lead, and by combining this with another Homeric notion, the mist of invisibility with which gods conceal themselves.[22] But men are using that mist, which should be the gods' preserve, in the same way as the lead, and again perverting the purpose of the Homeric story, by using it to conceal and keep out what should be seen and admitted. We shall see this conflation of aural and visual enchantment picked up in Lucian's passages on the Sirens.

Plutarch takes the idea in a similar but more obviously philosophical and allegorical direction. With Dio's 'soft, lead-like substance' compare the words of Plutarch's Platonist Ammonius, in the context of a discussion on the Sirens' song representing what is good:

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21.   Dio 12.36. Russell (1992: 186) objects to ἄλυπον, which 'cannot be right, … since ἀλυπία ("painlessness") is a good thing', but one could understand the sense to be that pleasure is a bad kind of 'setting free from pain', i.e. a lotus-like intoxication that alleviates painful symptoms without dealing with the cause — and this is what makes it πονηράν.

22.   Dio is alluding to Zeus at *Il.* 14.342. Russell (1992: 186): 'lead has natural associations with stupidity'.

τὰ δ' ὦτα τῶν μὲν πλείστων περιαλήλιπται καὶ καταπέπλασται σαρκίνοις ἐμφράγμασι καὶ πάθεσι, οὐ κηρίνοις.

But the ears of most have been smeared and plastered over, with obstructions of flesh and passions, not of wax.[23]

Here the stopping of ears is a bad thing, as the 'obstructions of flesh and passions' prevent most people from hearing the echo of the music of the spheres. Elsewhere Plutarch uses the image as a metaphor for protecting young men from the ill effects of poetry. While this is a good thing, Plutarch offers a better alternative:

πότερον οὖν τῶν νέων ὥσπερ τῶν Ἰθακησίων σκληρῷ τινι τὰ ὦτα καὶ ἀτέγκτῳ κηρῷ καταπλάσσοντες ἀναγκάζωμεν αὐτοὺς τὸ Ἐπικούρειον ἀκάτειον ἀραμένους ποιητικὴν φεύγειν καὶ παρεξελαύνειν, ἢ μᾶλλον ὀρθῷ τινι λογισμῷ παριστάντες καὶ καταδέοντες τὴν κρίσιν, ὅπως μὴ παραφέρηται τῷ τέρποντι πρὸς τὸ βλάπτον, ἀπευθύνωμεν καὶ παραφυλάττωμεν;

So should we plaster over young men's ears, like the Ithacans', with a hard and unsoftenable wax, and force them to hoist the Epicurean sail, to flee and sail past poetry? Or should we rather guide them aright and guard them by furnishing them with an upright reasoning and binding the power of judgement to them, so that they might not be carried away by delight towards their harm?[24]

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23. *Quaest. conv.* 9.14.6 [= *Mor.* 745e].

24. *De aud. poet.* 1 (15d).

As Hunter & Russell comment on this passage, Plutarch's 'hard and unsoftenable wax' is inconsistent with the Odyssean account, in which Odysseus explains in some detail the practicalities of using the wax; this 'calls attention to the boldness of Plutarch's transference and the mildly allegorical reading of the passage which he offers'.[25]

So how do these authors' uses of the theme relate to Lucian's? All three are responding to similar ideas, each with a place in the same cultural matrix. The ideas in the Plutarch passage lie behind the final section of Lucian's *Calumnia* (30-1): in response to slander one should stop one's ears and sail past its allurements. Here Lucian attributes such an idea to the ὑπόνοιαι of Homer's Sirens episode:

> ὅπερ, οἶμαι, καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν τῷ περὶ Σειρήνων μύθῳ ἠνίξατο παραπλεῖν κελεύσας τὰς ὀλεθρίους ταύτας τῶν ἀκουσμάτων ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀποφράττειν τὰ ὦτα καὶ μὴ ἀνέδην αὐτὰ ἀναπεταννύειν τοῖς πάθει προειλημμένοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιστήσαντα ἀκριβῆ θυρωρὸν τὸν λογισμὸν ἅπασι τοῖς λεγομένοις τὰ μὲν ἄξια προσίεσθαι καὶ παραβάλλεσθαι, τὰ φαῦλα δὲ ἀποκλείειν καὶ ἀπωθεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη γελοῖον τῆς μὲν οἰκίας θυρωροὺς καθιστάναι, τὰ ὦτα δὲ καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀνεῳγμένα ἐᾶν.

> [One should do], I think, what Homer too hinted at in his story about the Sirens, advising one to sail past these deadly pleasures of things heard, to stop up the ears, and not to open them freely to those who are prejudiced by passion, but to place reason as a strict door-keeper for all that is said, who can welcome and allow in worthy things, but shut out and repel inferior things. For it would be ridiculous to set doorkeepers

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25.   *Od.* 12.173-7; Hunter & Russell (2011: 79).

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for one's house but to leave the ears and intellect wide
open!

Not only is ἐν τῷ ... μύθῳ ἠνίξατο the language of the allegorists,[26] but in combining the Sirens allegory with the idea of setting doorkeepers, Lucian seems to be recalling Plutarch — or at least both authors are drawing on a common source. For Plutarch says that young people's reading matter should be carefully patrolled, like a city's gates, an idea which Lucian develops by an analogy with not the city but the house.[27]

   Yet these readings of the ear-stopping theme are less bold than some of Lucian's. At *Nigrinus* 19, a passage which again recalls Plutarch's dismissal of the Epicurean avoidance of poetry in *De audiendis poetis*, one must try to do even better than Odysseus, sailing past temptations not only with unstopped ears but also without the bonds which tied him to the mast. As these are specifically urban temptations, they recall Dio 32.47, a passage which could be described, like the Plutarch just quoted, as 'mildly allegorical'. Here Dio likens the entertainers of Alexandria to Sirens:

> καίτοι πόσοι διὰ ταῦθ' ὑμῶν ἀπολώλασιν; ἀδοξοῦσι
> μέν γε πάντες. αἱ δὲ Σειρῆνες ἄλλο τι ἐποίουν, ὡς ὁ
> μῦθός φησιν; οὐκ ἀπώλλυον τοὺς σφόδρα ἡσθέντας
> αὐταῖς;

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26.   Picked up again by Lucian in *VH* 1.2: see ní Mheallaigh (2014: 231-2).

27.   *De aud. poet.* 1 (14f). On the sources for this idea, see Hunter & Russell (2011: 74-5). They also draw attention to Lucian's metaphor of the 'gates' of the body, through which pleasure can enter if one is in Rome, at *Nigrinus* 16.

And yet how many among you have been undone through these allurements? Everyone, at any rate, is in ill repute. And what else was it that the Sirens did, as the story goes? Did they not destroy those who were exceedingly delighted by them?

Elsewhere, contemporary authors also emphasize how the powers of performers, orators or poets might be favourably compared with the Sirens. In Philostratus, the Siren atop Isocrates' tomb attests his power of persuasion; Aelian writes that Plato was overcome by Socrates' 'Siren voice'; and Dio says that Homer's powers surpass those not only of the Sirens but also of Orpheus.[28] In *Pro Imaginibus* Lucian comes close to doing this too, by associating rhetorical skill with the Sirens' power, but resists making an explicit connection. However, in *Nigrinus* 3 comes a claim that someone has outdone the Sirens; here, by including even more Odyssean allusion, Lucian goes further than Dio, although whether as a conscious response to

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28.   Philost., *VS* 1.17; Ael., *VH* 2.30; Dio 53.7. The *Life of Sophocles* (15) claims that Sophocles' tomb was also surmounted by a Siren. The Sirens claim to know, like Homer, the details of the Trojan War (*Od.* 12.189-91); nonetheless the Homeric narrator must call on the help of the Muses (*Il.* 2.485-6), who 'know everything' (ἴστέ τε πάντα), to achieve this. This prompts Buffière (1956: 382-3) to a burst of apostrophe: 'Etrange Homère! Mais ce sont d'abord tes propres chants — la guerre d'Ilion — que tu prêtes à tes Sirènes! à tes Sirènes qui perdent ceux qui les approchent ... Des dangers de la poésie, et de ta propre poésie, le premier tu as eu conscience. N'as-tu point d'avance justifié Platon, qui défendra d'écouter ta voix de Sirène?' Lamberton (1986: 7-8) argues that 'the identification of Homer with his own Sirens must have been a commonplace'.

the passage I have just quoted is unclear.[29] Dio had said Homer surpassed the Sirens and Orpheus; but when Nigrinus spoke,

> τοσαύτην τινά μου λόγων ἀμβροσίαν κατεσκέδασεν,
> ὥστε καὶ τὰς Σειρῆνας ἐκείνας, εἴ τινες ἄρα ἐγένοντο,
> καὶ τὰς ἀηδόνας καὶ τὸν Ὁμήρου λωτὸν ἀρχαῖον
> ἀποδεῖξαι.

> he poured upon me so much of a sort of ambrosia of words that he made those Sirens (if there ever were such things), the nightingales and Homer's lotus seem antiquated.[30]

The speaker did not try to keep the 'Siren' speech out of his ears, though, but 'received it in my intent and wide-open soul' (ἀτενεῖ καὶ ἀναπεπταμένῃ τῇ ψυχῇ δεξάμενος), as the philosopher, far from enticing him with blandishments, praised philosophy and ridiculed the enticements of wealth and power.

In several other places Lucian more or less inverts the whole idea. At *Calumnia* 8, the slanderer is presented as getting hold of the ears of his listener, in a way that is 'selfish' (πλεονέκτης), since by speaking first he prevents the argument for the defence from being heard. There is no explicit reference to the *Odyssey*'s

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29.   On Lucian and Dio, see Pernot (1994).

30.   *Nigrinus* 4. Like *Electrum*'s locals (discussed below), the speaker is doubtful about the myth's veracity — but still recognises that Sirens offer a useful metaphor. The nightingales are presumably those of *Od.* 19.518-20. The next words after this passage — an exclamation 'he has uttered things so divine!' (οὕτω θεσπέσια ἐφθέγξατο) — recall an etymology of the Sirens' name found a little after the passage from Plut., *Quaest. conv.* 9.14.6 [= *Mor.* 745f] which I cited above: 'But I think that Plato names the Muses "Sirens", since they "say" "divine things" and speak in Hades' (ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ Πλάτων ... τὰς Μούσας Σειρῆνας ὀνομάζειν, "εἰρούσας" τὰ "θεῖα" καὶ λεγούσας ἐν Ἅιδου).

Sirens episode or to stopping ears with wax, but the topos of making the ears impervious by filling them up recalls this mythological precedent. Here, though, it is the sound of the slanderer's voice itself — the evil 'enchantment' — which blocks up the ears, keeping out good advice. This is the reverse of events in the *Odyssey*, where the good advice of Circe to Odysseus, and of Odysseus to his men, can enter the ears, its purpose being to prevent the evil enchantment from entering if this advice is followed. The slanderer's words have a certain magic about them, since they can act just like the physical wax, yet they are also as 'enchanting' as the Sirens' song which Odysseus' men had to keep out of their ears.[31]

This rethinking of the metaphor reaches its logical conclusion in *Pro Imaginibus* 29. Here Polystratus has just listened to a speech from Lycinus which he must remember and repeat to Panthea. It was a long speech, but Polystratus promises to do his best to avoid forgetting it:

> καὶ ὡς ὁρᾷς, ἤδη ἀποσοβῶ παρ' αὐτὴν ἐπιβυσάμενος τὰ ὦτα, ὡς μή τι παρεμπεσὸν ἄλλο συγχέῃ τὴν τάξιν αὐτῶν, εἶτά μοι συρίττεσθαι συμβῇ πρὸς τῶν θεατῶν.

> And as you see, I am already hurrying off to her with my ears stopped up, for fear that something else might intrude and confuse their arrangement, and then I might end up getting hissed by my audience.

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31.   Note Zeus' words at *Timon* 9, where the Athenians are so noisy, with their speeches about 'virtue' (ἀρετή), 'incorporeals' (ἀσώματα) and other such 'nonsenses' (λῆροι), that he cannot hear prayers and his only solution is to block out this earnest philosophical talk by stopping up his ears.

Polystratus is deliberately blocking up his *own* ears, just as Odysseus did with his companions' ears. However, this is not done now to ward off enchantment, but to prevent anything entering to confuse the speech he is trying to remember — although Lucian leaves things vague enough that the reader is unsure whether Polystratus is speaking metaphorically or actually sticking his fingers in his ears. Whereas the slanderer tries to prevent the truth from contaminating his slanders, Polystratus is concerned with the 'good order' (τάξις) of the speech he is trying to remember: he is not stopping his ears because he fears malignant outside influence like the Sirens' song, nor because he fears that someone will fill them with discreditable words about Panthea and contaminate the praiseworthy speech he needs to repeat. Instead he is keen to keep the speech's structure fresh in his mind, so questions of morality and enchantment are less to the fore.

At *Electrum* 4-5 the locals are mightily amused at the questions which the narrator has asked them about tales concerning swans singing beautifully on the Eridanus.[32] The locals have already poured scorn on his previous question about Phaethon's fall to earth in that region and his sisters who became poplars and weep amber. Here the locals have gone beyond allegorizing and rationalizing

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32.   The whole *Electrum* drips with irony; as Nesselrath (1990: 126) observes, 'By putting so much ridiculous confidence in myth, Lucian cunningly hints that neither the seemingly straightforward presentation of the mythical story he is about to tell nor his own posturing as its faithful believer are to be taken too seriously; what Lucian in fact tries to do is to establish a tacit understanding with his audience (or at least the more enlightened part of it) that he is just play-acting.' For Greek beliefs about swans see Arnott (2007: 182-4).

interpretations of myth to a rejection of myth as fundamentally untrue and unbelievable, rather as Lucian does in *VH*. They offer an impressive argument against the belief that the trees in their region produce amber (3):

> εἰ δὲ ἦν τι τοιοῦτον, οἴει ἡμᾶς δυοῖν ὀβολοῖν ἕνεκα
> ἐρέττειν ἂν ἢ ἕλκειν τὰ πλοῖα πρὸς ἐναντίον τὸ ὕδωρ,
> οἷς ἐξῆν πλουτεῖν ἀναλέγοντας τῶν αἰγείρων τὰ
> δάκρυα;

> And if anything of this sort existed, do you think we
> would be rowing or towing boats against the current
> of the water for a couple of obols, we who could be
> rich by collecting the tears of the poplars?

Upset that the poets have lied to him, the narrator nonetheless continues with his question about the swans which had been Apollo's companions before they underwent their metamorphosis (4): 'I thought *that* story must be completely true' (ἐκεῖνο δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἀληθὲς ᾤμην).[33] The response comes 'with a laugh' (σὺν γέλωτι), because such swans as are occasionally seen are far from musical. It is now that the locals refer to the Sirens (5):

> ὀλίγους μὲν κύκνους ἐνίοτε ὁρῶμεν ἐν τοῖς ἕλεσι τοῦ
> ποταμοῦ, καὶ κρώζουσιν οὗτοι πάνυ ἄμουσον καὶ
> ἀσθενές, ὡς τοὺς κόρακας ἢ τοὺς κολοιοὺς Σειρῆνας

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33.   Presumably he finds this more credible since swans are less exotic and mysterious than amber. I wonder whether he is confused, however, since I am unaware of any source for this specific version of the story; the usual association of swan-metamorphosis with the Eridanus is the story of Phaethon's lover Cycnus (cf. Ov., *Met.* 2.367-80, Verg., *Aen.* 10.189-94). There may well be an allusion here to Alcman, *PMGF* 1.96-101, where, despite the fragmentary text, the Sirens and the swans on the Xanthus are evidently associated and contrasted: Hutchinson (2001: 100-2).

εἶναι πρὸς αὐτούς, ᾀδόντων δὲ καὶ ἡδὺ καὶ οἷον σὺ φὴς
οὐδὲ ὄναρ ἀκηκόαμεν.

We see a few swans from time to time in the marshes of the river; they croak in a completely unmusical, weak fashion, so that crows or jackdaws are Sirens in comparison to them. But as for the sweetness of their singing, and whatever you're talking about, we have heard not even a dream of it!

These are low-budget Sirens whose marshy habitat is far from the Sirens' alluring 'flowery meadow'.[34] Furthermore, the contrast with real Sirens is heightened by other parts of the locals' response. The narrator speaks of the putative singing swans as singing 'that clear song' (τὸ λιγυρὸν ἐκεῖνο), echoing in his vocabulary the description of the Homeric Sirens;[35] although the phrase suggests that the narrator expects the locals to be familiar with Homer, when they reply in bemusement they simply speak dismissively of 'the kind of thing you're talking about' (οἷον σὺ φής).

The first part of their response includes two implicit denials of the swans' possible Siren-like qualities, even before there has been any mention of Sirens. They have sailed up and down the river all their lives, unlike the Sirens' victims, who are unable to sail past even once. Swans are only 'occasionally' (ἐνίοτε) seen, and only 'a few' of them at that (ὀλίγους); how unlike the Sirens who 'did not fail to notice our

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34. λειμῶν' ἀνθεμόεντα, *Od.* 12.159; ἤμεναι ἐν λειμῶνι, 12.45. On the sexual undertones see Schein (1995: 21).

35. λιγυρῇ ... ἀοιδῇ, *Od.* 12.44; λιγυρὴν ... ἀοιδήν, 12.183. On λιγύς see Kaimio (1977: 231-3).

swift ship' (τὰς δ' οὐ λάθεν ὠκύαλος νηῦς) and who actively call out to entice sailors towards them.[36]

This passage involves a different inversion of the ear-stopping theme, since these sailors whose ears remained unstopped were unable to hear the Sirens' song; or at least the song which they could hear, that of crows and jackdaws, was not of a sort to enchant them even with unimpeded access into their ears. This lack of enchantment is emphasized when they say they have not even dreamed of such a song, dreams being a special point of contact with the supernatural, as we shall see in the next section. The bathos of comparing crows and jackdaws (and, indeed, swans) to Sirens has an added point for the educated Homerist, since the scholia raise questions about their number and nature.[37] Σ V and HQT on *Od.* 12.39 discuss the two stories of their parentage[38] and record how they were turned into birds by Aphrodite after embracing virginity. Σ HQT says that, as well as not providing their

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36.   *Od.* 12.182; 184-91.

37.   Σ V gives four names (Aglaopheme, Thelxiepeia, Peisinoe and Ligeia) but notes that Homer's Sirens are grammatically dual. At Lycoph., *Alex.* 712, the Sirens are 'three girls' (κούρας ... τριπλᾶς).

38.   Their father was Achelous, their mother either Sterope or Terpsichore.

genealogy, Homer gives no indication whether they had wings (thus failing to indicate whether he knew the story about their metamorphosis).[39]

The scholion offers two rationalizing interpretations and one of an allegorical nature. Although they reject absolutely the myths about Phaethon and Apollo's swans, Lucian's locals do appear to believe in Sirens and to associate them with birds, taking the first rationalizing possibility; they definitely reject the third, allegorizing, possibility. Or perhaps with their mythological parallel they are, as before, simply mocking the credulous narrator.

This narrator is complicit in the way he is presented as credulous: he is consciously telling a story at his own expense. But the audience might identify another embarrassment for him, of which he shows no awareness. Lucian will have been familiar with Herodotus' remarks about the Eridanus: the historian doubts that such a river exists in western Europe, while recording the belief that amber is found there, and he concludes that the Greek-sounding name was just a poetic invention, and that no sea exists to the north or west for it to flow into.[40] Lucian's narrator has

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39.   This problem is picked up by Σ B on the same line (discussed above, p.265). See also Σ H *Od.* 12.47: 'They were not, indeed, winged, since they also flew towards those who sailed by' (οὐκ ἄρα ἐπτέρωνται, ἐπεὶ καὶ προσεπέτοντο τοῖς παραπλέουσιν). The sense of this baffling statement must be that the Sirens were not literally 'winged', but came to be so considered because people spoke metaphorically of their song 'stealing over' people — the verb's meaning in tragic diction (LSJ s.v. προσπέτομαι).

40.   Hdt. 3.115. At *VH* 2.5, Lucian explicitly cites 3.113.1, so this seems a part of Herodotus with which he was familiar.

already expressed his disillusionment with poets, and the combination of this disillusionment with the Eridanus and its amber points to an intertext with the Herodotean passage.

Pliny the Elder likewise blames poets for making up stories about amber on the Eridanus and being confused about the river's location — he identifies it with the Po.[41] So, despite the Lucianic narrator's assurance (6) that his personally deflating trip has been for the greater good, having proved people wrong concerning the prevalence of amber and swans, his audience might suspect that he did not even visit the right river.[42] Maybe on one of the other 'Eridanus' rivers Apollo's singing swans do exist, and maybe they could be compared favourably with Sirens? For that matter, perhaps the Sirens themselves really exist.

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41. *HN* 37.31-2. Hannibal clearly means the Po when he talks of τὸν Ἠριδανόν in *Dial. mort.* 25.2 (=12.2).

42. Lucian makes nothing of the potential for humour in the terminological problem raised by Pausanias (5.12.7): 'This *elektron* of which the statue of Augustus is made, which is found spontaneously in the sands of the Eridanus, is extremely rare and prized by man, for many reasons; but the other *elektron* is gold alloyed with silver' (τὸ δὲ ἤλεκτρον τοῦτο οὗ τῷ Αὐγούστῳ πεποίηνται τὴν εἰκόνα, ὅσον μὲν αὐτόματον ἐν τοῦ Ἠριδανοῦ ταῖς ψάμμοις εὑρίσκεται, σπανίζεται τὰ μάλιστα καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ τίμιον πολλῶν ἐστιν ἕνεκα· τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἤλεκτρον ἀναμεμιγμένος ἐστὶν ἀργύρῳ χρυσός). At *Od.* 4.73, ἤλεκτρον could mean either amber or the metal electrum, but the silence of the Homeric scholia suggests that readers were unconcerned by the problem. See Heubeck/West/Hainsworth (1998: 197), and, on amber in the ancient world, Causey (2011). The cords/ropes (σειραί) by which the listeners are drawn in the painting in *Hercules* 3 are of gold and ἤλεκτρον, which probably is amber, considering both the exotic location and the use of amber for jewellery (to which the chains are likened).

These examples have each shown Lucian taking a Homeric passage well known for its allegorical possibilities and 'parodying' both Homer and the Homeric scholarship of which Homer himself disapproves in *VH* 2.20.[43] In my remaining examples he associates the Sirens with the Gorgons, who appear (as a single Gorgon) three times in the *Iliad* and once in the *Odyssey*, but with less prominence than the Sirens.[44] Gorgons are not discussed in Heraclitus' *Quaestiones Homericae*, nor are there allegorical interpretations of them in the Homeric scholia, although rationalizing interpretations exist in texts which do not explicitly advertise themselves as scholarship.[45] In contrast to the Sirens, there is no extended Homeric episode involving the Gorgon; Lucian's failure to exploit the Gorgon myth in the same variety of ways as he does with the Sirens suggests that it is specifically Homeric scholarship with which he most concerns himself. It is telling that the longest and most involved reference to the Gorgon in the Lucianic corpus is in the spurious *Philopatris* (8-9): attempting to imitate the Lucianic style, the author has given a rationalizing interpretation of the myth (claiming, as is standard with

43.   See above, p.236.

44.   *Il.* 5.741-2, the Gorgon's head on the aegis; 8.348-9, Hector's eyes resembling those of the Gorgon or Ares; 11.36, the Gorgon (with Terror and Rout) on Agamemnon's shield; *Od.* 11.634, Odysseus leaving the Underworld lest Persephone send the Gorgon's head after him.

45.   Indeed even Buffière's thorough survey omits the later reception of the Gorgon(s), presumably because he does not consider the myth to be properly a 'mythe d'Homère'. Relevant passages, ancient and modern, are collected in Garber & Vickers (2003), and include the sceptical, rationalizing interpretations of Palaeph. 31, and Paus. 2.21.5-6 [= Procles, *FHG* IV 483–4], as well as the relevant part of Lucian's *De domo*.

female monsters, that Medusa was only a courtesan), whereas Lucian himself only uses her in a more restricted and allusive way.[46]

Three passages from *De domo* illustrate how Gorgons might be used by the orator to counter an argument which uses the Sirens. First (13) the speaker, in his own persona, sets out his Siren-argument as follows, associating Sirens with the wryneck:[47]

> ἐς τὸν οἶκον ἐπὶ λόγοις παρελήλυθα ὥσπερ ἀπὸ ἴυγγος ἢ Σειρῆνος τῷ κάλλει ἑλκόμενος, ἐλπίδα οὐ μικρὰν ἔχων, εἰ καὶ τέως ἡμῖν ἄμορφοι ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι, καλοὺς αὐτοὺς φανεῖσθαι καθάπερ ἐσθῆτι καλῇ κεκοσμημένους.
>
> I have come to the hall to speak, drawn by its beauty as though by a wryneck-charm or Siren, having no small hope that, even though my words were heretofore misshapen, they may yet appear beautiful when adorned by its beauty as by a garment.

The connection of visual and aural seems a weakness in the argument, with the result that the opponent can jump in at this point and object to the synaesthetic conflation (14). He says that he is amazed that the hall's paintings and gilding are alleged to be beneficial to epideictic oratory.

Arguing that a beautiful hall does not inspire the orator to greater heights of rhetoric but dazzles and scares him (17), this opposing speaker lists mythological

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46. Buffière (1956: 236): 'Autre explication systemique: les monstres qui avalent les hommes symbolisent les courtisanes rapaces'.

47. LSJ, s.v. ἴυγξ: 'used as a charm to recover unfaithful lovers, being bound to a revolving wheel'. On ἴυγξ-spells see Faraone (1999: 55-68).

figures — Demodocus, Phemius, Thamyris, Amphion and Orpheus — whose prodigious control of the aural would still not be enough to overcome the hall's visual power. Then comes a more detailed mythological allusion involving the Sirens (19):

> ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ἀξιόμαχον λόγων ἰσχὺς ὄψει ἀνταγωνίσασθαι καὶ ὁ Σειρήνων μῦθος παρατεθεὶς τῷ περὶ τῶν Γοργόνων διδάξει ἄν· ἐκεῖναι μὲν γὰρ ἐκήλουν τοὺς παραπλέοντας μελῳδοῦσαι καὶ κολακεύουσαι τοῖς ᾄσμασιν καὶ καταπλεύσαντας ἐπὶ πολὺ κατεῖχον, καὶ ὅλως τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν ἐδεῖτό τινος διατριβῆς, καί πού τις αὐτὰς καὶ παρέπλευσε καὶ τοῦ μέλους παρήκουσε· τὸ δὲ τῶν Γοργόνων κάλλος, ἅτε βιαιότατόν τε ὂν καὶ τοῖς καιριωτάτοις τῆς ψυχῆς ὁμιλοῦν, εὐθὺς ἐξίστη τοὺς ἰδόντας καὶ ἀφώνους ἐποίει, ὡς δὲ ὁ μῦθος βούλεται καὶ λέγεται, λίθινοι ἐγίγνοντο ὑπὸ θαύματος.

> Comparison of the story of the Sirens with that concerning the Gorgons would teach you that the power of words is no worthy opponent for sight. For the Sirens charmed those sailing past by making melody and flattering with their songs, and held them for a long time when they came ashore. And, in short, their work caused only a delay, and perhaps someone sailed past them disregarding their music. But the Gorgons' beauty, being very forceful and affecting the soul's critical parts, immediately confounded those who saw it and rendered them dumb, so that (as the story has it and as is said) they were turned to stone by the wonder.[48]

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48.   This passage continues with comparisons to various birds (peacocks, nightingales, and swans), their visual appearances and songs, recalling the rhetorical move made by the locals in *Electrum.*

Comparing Sirens and Gorgons will reveal that powers of aural enchantment are insignificant compared to those of visual enchantment. But this argument, put by the speaker into his opponent's mouth, seems disingenuous, as though the opponent needs to spin inconvenient facts to his own advantage. He implies a different story from the Odyssean narrative, that the Sirens enticed men for only a temporary dalliance before letting them go again (whereas in Homer the meadow is strewn with men's bones), and the implication that 'no doubt' a few sailors made it past unscathed flies in the face of Circe's words, which imply that the Sirens' victims can never escape.[49] But Circe actually speaks of 'whoever comes close to them in ignorance' (ὅς τις ἀιδρείῃ πελάσῃ), which might be taken to suggest that some knowledgeable men have been able to escape their clutches. So is this imagined speaker's reading of the passage actually a careful 'scholarly' reading of Homer? The scholia do not record any disagreement among the Alexandrians over these lines, but the later tradition that the Sirens killed themselves following their outwitting by Odysseus seems to indicate a belief that Odysseus was the first man to

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49.   *Od.* 12.39-46.

escape them, so perhaps there was genuine controversy over the question.[50] When, at the end of the passage quoted, he discusses the Gorgons, this speaker implies a rationalized version of the myth, so that 'as the story has it and as everyone says' people 'turned to stone', making this a metaphor for the speechlessness caused by their beauty.

The other references to the Gorgon(s) are relatively straightforward,[51] with passing mentions in lists of the wilder poetic imaginings in which no one should actually believe. But in *Philopseudes* a straightforward reference is picked up later in the dialogue, and again seems to have a connection with the Sirens. At *Philopseudes* 2, Tychiades has first expressed his embarrassment on behalf of Homer and other poets, who tell of Uranus' castration, the binding of Prometheus, the Giants' revolt, the 'whole tragedy' in Hades, and Zeus' shape-shifting into a bull or swan.[52] It seems

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50.   For evidence of the later tradition see Hyg., *Fab.* 141: 'It was their fate to live for as long as no mortal had travelled past while listening to their song' (*harum fatum fuit tam diu vivere, quam diu earum cantum mortalis audiens nemo praetervectus esset*); cf. Lycoph., *Alex.* 714. In the Orphic *Argonautica* (1284-90), the Sirens' suicide results from Orpheus' outsinging them. The story-pattern can also be seen in the Sphinx's suicide following Oedipus' solution of her riddle, which reflects their similarity: '[The Sirens] are mantic creatures like the Sphinx with whom they have much in common, knowing both the past and the future' (Harrison (1922: 199)).

51.   I ignore *Dial. mar.* 14, where Triton and the Nereids discuss Perseus' killing of Medusa, since there is no connection with Homer's text, either directly or through the Sirens.

52.   On Lucian's metaphorical use of 'tragedy'/'tragic' here and elsewhere see Schmitz (2010: 292-5).

to be this last tale of metamorphosis that sets him off on a new train of thought, listing incredible mythological monsters:

> ... ἔτι δὲ Πηγάσους καὶ Χιμαίρας καὶ Γοργόνας καὶ Κύκλωπας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, πάνυ ἀλλόκοτα καὶ τεράστια μυθίδια παίδων ψυχὰς κηλεῖν δυνάμενα ἔτι τὴν Μορμὼ καὶ τὴν Λάμιαν δεδιότων.

> ... and Pegasuses too, Chimaeras, Gorgons, Cyclopes, and all that sort, things totally strange in form, monstrous little stories that have power to beguile the imaginations of children who still fear Mormo and Lamia.[53]

Yet later, when Eucrates tells his tale (22) and vouches for the appearance of a 'terrible woman half a stadion tall', it is the Gorgon to which he likens her, and she even has snaky hair as well.

Eutychus thus appears to be challenging Tychiades' original claim that Gorgons do not exist, but it turns out that this 'terrible woman' is not in fact a Gorgon — that was just a helpful comparison — but Hecate, who opens up the whole of Hades to view (24). Eutychus' description of what he saw in Hades then disproves Tychiades' view that 'the whole tragedy' in Hades is the invention of poets.[54] Ogden argues that Eutychus' vision of Hades recalls the Myth of Er, and the great[55] size of

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53. *Hermotimus* 72 has a similar list (Hippocentaurs, Chimaeras, Gorgons and the other impossible 'dreams' of poets and painters).

54. Ogden (2007: 161-70) offers an excellent analysis of Eutychides' tale, but does not cover these connections with Tychiades' opening remarks, as he focuses on the ten tales alone: see Wilshere (2011).

55. Perhaps parodically great: see Ogden (2007: 163).

the 'Gorgon' apparition recalls the massive female figures of Plato's myth — Necessity and the Fates, but also the Sirens. Again an elaboration on the Gorgon-figure includes a connection with the post-Homeric significance of the more obviously allegorical Sirens.

The connection which Lucian makes between these two myths is present too in *Imagines* and *Pro Imaginibus.* As we have seen, the latter ends with an allusion to the ear-stopping from the Sirens episode. *Imagines* begins, like *Philopseudes*, with a reference to the Gorgon's supernatural powers, when Lycinus claims that on recently seeing a beautiful woman he was so astounded that he was almost turned to stone; this conceit continues through the next few speeches. With this inversion of the Gorgon-story Lucian comes close to a reversal of the euhemerizing, rationalizing interpretation which was often proposed for the Sirens and is attested for Medusa herself.[56] If the Ur-Gorgon was 'really' a courtesan, the suggestion that Panthea is (nearly) 'really' a Gorgon shows Lucian perilously close to giving offence by suggesting a disreputable profession, rather than praising her. For an audience of rhetorical connoisseurs, part of the pleasure of this opening section lies in his skilful avoidance of potential disaster.

There is a footnote to all this in *Quomodo historia*, where Lucian begins by describing the symptoms of the Abderites who were afflicted by a fever which

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56.   See p.265 above; see also ps.-Heraclit., *De mirab.* 1: 'She was a beautiful courtesan, so that anyone who saw her was astounded, as though turned to stone' (αὕτη ἑταίρα καλὴ ἐγένετο ὡς τὸν ἰδόντα αὐτὴν ἔκπληκτον γενόμενον οἷον ἀπολιθοῦσθαι).

caused them to recite speeches from tragedy. The actor Archelaus was to blame, because his singing of Euripides' *Andromeda* in the midsummer heat brought on the fever, with the memory of Perseus carrying Medusa's head filling their memories. Again the Gorgon is used to begin a work; there is no mention here of Sirens, but again the emphasis is on aural enchantment, even in connection with a mythological story of visual enchantment.

This is such a remarkable opening to a work on historiography that when the Gorgon's-head shield appears (19), in a particularly lengthy purple patch from one of Lucian's inept historians, the reader cannot fail to recall the earlier auditory effects of the Gorgon story. But here the emphasis is on visual appearance; indeed the historian allegedly devoted nearly a whole book to a description of the Gorgon on the boss of the emperor's shield. This is the only place where Lucian is definitely recalling the Homeric Gorgon, since the historian is trying to outdo Homer's two lines on the Gorgon on Agamemnon's shield;[57] even in Lucian's summary Homer's single adjective is expanded to eighteen words. As with *Philopseudes*, the association of an introductory passage with a later one in the same work illuminates a further thematic connection. Here the Gorgon (with her petrifying gaze) appears as an

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57.   *Il.* 11.36-7. The historian is trying to combine lengthy ekphrasis of a shield (like Homer's Shield of Achilles) with the arresting subject-matter of Agamemnon's Gorgon-shield, which is the most striking part of the description of his armour (*Il.* 11.32-7).

example of 'frigid' prose style, like 'Celtic crystal', in contrast with the Euripidean Perseus and Medusa passage which brought on fever.[58]

My final passage draws together a number of the issues raised by the Sirens. At the beginning of *De saltu*, Lycinus upbraids Crato for his indictment of dancing as something 'common' (φαῦλος) and 'womanish' (γυναικεῖος). Crato responds by warning him of the danger that he might turn into a Lyde or Bacche (3), whereupon he compares Lycinus to Odysseus under the influence of the lotus. Then, in a passage which recalls Archelaus' theatrical enchantment of his audience, he warns that Lycinus is falling under the spell of 'the Sirens in the theatre' (τῶν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ Σειρήνων).[59] And, in a now familiar move, he says that it is not only sound but vision which is enchanting him:

> καίτοι ἐκεῖναι μὲν τοῖς ὠσὶν μόνοις ἐπεβούλευον καὶ
> διὰ τοῦτο κηροῦ ἐδέησεν πρὸς τὸν παράπλουν αὐτῶν·
> σὺ δὲ καὶ δι' ὀφθαλμῶν ἔοικας ὅλος δεδουλῶσθαι.
>
> Furthermore, they [= the Sirens] used to plot only against the ears, and for this reason one could use wax to sail past them. But you seem wholly to have been enslaved, through the eyes as well.

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58.   On 'frigidity' of style, see above, p.162 n.211. Lucian's phrase τὸν κρύσταλλον τὸν Κελτικόν reflects 'the common view … that rock-crystal, like ice, was formed from water' (Eichholz (1965: 16 n.2)), thus making a connection with the petrifying gaze; cf. Plin., *NH* 37.23.

59.   On connections between pantomime and the conception of declaimers as Sirens see Lada-Richards (2007: 94 & 146-7).

Yet Lycinus objects: unlike the victims of lotus and Sirens, he does not forget his home and business, and has derived much insight from his theatrical experiences. He quotes Homer back at Crato, using the line in which the Sirens tempt Odysseus by claiming that men who listen to them depart having learned their wisdom.[60] This shocks Crato all the more, so that he exclaims 'By Heracles, Lycinus, what's happened to you?' (Ἡράκλεις, ὦ Λυκῖνε, οἷα πέπονθας) since he is now talking like a Siren. But Lycinus takes on the 'persona' of Circe advising Odysseus, as he tries to persuade Crato to come and experience the performance for himself; when Crato rejects this idea he grudgingly agrees to listen to Lycinus' apologia for his art.

In his final speech before allowing Lycinus to speak at length, Crato embellishes the Siren-metaphor. He presents himself as Odysseus, listening to this man who seems so possessed by Sirens that he has just been ventriloquising them. But here the conceit falls apart, because Crato calls Lycinus merely a 'madman' (μεμηνότος ἀνθρώπου) speaking 'nonsense'.[61] There is no need for wax when listening to a madman who only thinks he is a Siren; Crato is able to '(over)hear paltry men without wax' (ἄνευ κηροῦ παρακούειν τῶν φαύλων).

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60.   *Od.* 12.188. He will later (7) connect the Dance with primordial harmony and the music of the Spheres, which, as we have seen, Plato especially associates with the Sirens.

61.   λῆρος — the same term used by Zeus to describe the Athenian chatter he tries to block from his ears at *Timon* 9.

So, Crato implies, it is performances themselves which have the power to enchant, not descriptions of them,[62] just as the Phaeacians can listen to Odysseus' report of the Sirens' song without falling prey to their enchantment. So Lycinus, in recounting the many stories which the pantomime can portray, plays the part of Odysseus telling his adventures. But Crato too is an Odysseus, listening with ears free of wax and able to sail past unharmed; in his final words before Lycinus begins there is a hint of this identification, since he urges Lycinus to proceed in saying however much he wishes 'as though nobody were listening' (ὡς μηδὲ ἀκούοντός τινος). The form of words is suggestive: Odysseus called himself 'Nobody' and listened to the Sirens, but the latter-day 'Odysseus' of Lucian's dialogue underestimates the power of visual and aural enchantment. By the end of the dialogue he can only say 'I have been persuaded by you, and have thrown open my ears and eyes' (πείθομαί τέ σοι καὶ ἀναπεπταμένα ἔχω τὰ ὦτα καὶ τὰ ὄμματα), before asking for a place to be saved for him at the theatre. Lycinus really was a Siren, as it turns out, and Crato was not enough of an Odysseus to escape his clutches.

5.3 — Dreams, visions and prophecies

> Men of considerable intelligence in the second century
> attached great value to dreams.[63]

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62.   Platonic *mimesis*-theory evidently lies behind this.

63.   Bowersock (1969: 73).

Mythical monsters are not only the kind of vision that might appear in a dream, but they seem to have been especially associated in ancient ideas about dreams with the Lucianic theme of falsehood,[64] and confusion about the truth of dreams is a prominent feature of more than one dream in Lucian. So I now consider Lucian's allusions to two Homeric passages: the dream sent by Zeus to Agamemnon (*Il.* 2.5-15), and the dream of Penelope (*Od.* 19.535-53). On the subject of Homeric dreams the scholia do not provide much discussion, and it is not always illuminating; for instance, Aristarchus evidently failed to understand the purpose of *Il.* 22.199-201 — comparison of Achilles' chase of Hector to a futility-dream — since he athetized the verses as 'worthless' (εὐτελεῖς), according to the A-scholia. But there is contemporary evidence from elsewhere, especially Artemidorus' work of dream-interpretation and the first-person reports of Aelius Aristides, pointing to ideas about dreaming which seemingly influence Lucian's use of Homeric dreams. Again, let us consider the conceptual background before turning to Lucian's own work.

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64.   The combined evidence of the monstrosities in *Artem.* 2.44 (Hippocentaurs and Scylla) and in Virgil's account of the region of false dreams at *Aen.* 6.282-6 (Centaurs and Scyllas) 'suggests a parallel association between falsity — of either hopes or dreams — and mythical monsters of impossible form in popular dream-theory' (Harris-McCoy (2012: 491)).

5.3.1 — Aristides and Artemidorus

> ἔπειτα οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ φαίνεται τήν τε
> αἰγίδα ἔχουσα καὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ
> σύμπαν δὴ σχῆμα οἷα περ ἡ Ἀθήνησιν ἡ Φειδίου.
> ... ἀνεμίμνησκέ με τῆς Ὀδυσσείας καὶ ἔφασκεν οὐ
> μύθους εἶναι ταῦτα, τεκμαίρεσθαι δὲ χρῆναι καὶ τοῖς
> παροῦσι. δεῖν οὖν καρτερεῖν, εἶναι δ' αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ
> τὸν Ὀδυσσέα καὶ τὸν Τηλέμαχον καὶ δεῖν αὐτῷ
> βοηθεῖν· καὶ ἄλλα τοιουτότροπα ἤκουσα.

> Then, not long afterwards, Athena appeared, wearing
> the aegis and, in beauty, size and indeed her whole
> form, she was just like Pheidias' [statue of Athena] in
> Athens. ... She called the *Odyssey* to my mind and said
> that these things were not fictions, but needed to be
> judged even in the present situation, so I must be
> steadfast, that I myself was assuredly both Odysseus
> and Telemachus, and that she must help me. And I
> heard other things of the same sort.[65]

When Aristides has this dream-like vision of Athena, she casts him in the role of not

just one but two Homeric characters;[66] he is Odysseus and Telemachus, receiving

help direct from the gods. Reflecting the author's levels of vanity, Athena's

manifestation is not under the disguise of a mere human, as is common in Homer,

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65.   Aristid., *Or.* 48.41-2 Keil.

66.   Strictly speaking, he says only that his visions on this occasion were 'as if it were a
dream' (40: ἔδοξα δὲ ὡς ὄναρ) and implies later that he was not delirious; the whole episode
occurs during some kind of out-of-body experience.

but in her full and statuesque glory.[67] She will help him, just as she helped Odysseus and Telemachus; indeed it is likely that Aristides models his entire *Hieroi logoi* on the *Odyssey*, but again it is characteristic that, in a vision which takes place at Smyrna, one of the candidates for Homer's birthplace, he puts himself in the position of not one but two Homeric characters.[68] Whether or not we trust Aristides to record his vision without embellishment, its association with a situation from Homer is significant, and by no means unique. In light of Homer's cultural pervasiveness it is perfectly possible that real second-century Greeks did dream about characters from Homer, and such dreams inevitably occur in literary contexts too: the dreamer in Alciphron's *Letters of Farmers* 23 thinks he is Ganymede, and the prophecy in Calasiris' dream at Heliodorus 5.22 is delivered by Odysseus.[69]

However, Aristides' association of himself with two of Homer's most prominent characters perhaps also reflects an idea that only important men can have dreams about important matters. This idea is discussed by an author who is mentioned not by Lucian himself but in the Byzantine *Philopatris* attributed to him,

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67. I am not so convinced as Beard/North/Price (1998: 233) that this is 'a vision of Athena in the guise of her cult statue'; Aristides could equally be praising the accuracy of Pheidias' work, since it looks just like this real Athena in the vision.

68. See Holmes (2008: 81-113). Aristides has just quoted *Il.* 11.813.

69. Artemidorus 5.6 has a man who dreamed that he turned into the river Xanthus/ Scamander at Troy. He was presumably recalling Achilles' combat with the river, which appears to Achilles in anthropomorphic form and addresses him at *Il.* 21.211-21. Xanthus' burning by Hephaestus in the same episode forms the subject of *Dial. mar.* 10 (=11). As Gera (1995: 238 n.8) notes, Socrates' dream at *Crito* 44b2 quotes a Homeric verse.

namely the dream-interpreter Artemidorus of Daldis.[70] Artemidorus, a rough contemporary of Lucian,[71] sets out to provide a compendious handbook on dreams and their meanings, stating that he is drawing on the work of earlier authors of lesser works on the subject, who in turn drew on books of 'the ancients' (τῶν παλαιῶν); so he claims to offer insight into a long oneiromantic tradition.[72] Two things are of particular interest from the perspective of Homeric reception: he speaks of dreams as 'allegorical', using the language of Homer scholarship,[73] and alludes to several Homeric passages. Indeed, if the addressee of the work is Maximus of Tyre, then it is significant that Artemidorus' interpretations 'resemble Maximus' allegorical exegesis of Homer, and both use a similar interpretive vocabulary',

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70.   ps.-Lucian, *Philopatris* 21-2. On Artemidorus' place in the second-century world ('He brilliantly reflects a culture that he closely observed but never joined') see Bowersock (2004). On Artemidorus' (often contradictory) interpretative methods and his project to establish dream-interpretation as a respectable scientific pursuit, see Holowchak (2002: 93-105).

71.   On his date, see White (1975: 1-2).

72.   1.proem.

73.   'But allegorical dreams are those that signify different things through different images, since in these dreams the soul naturally speaks in riddles' (ἀλληγορικοὶ δὲ οἱ δι' ἄλλων ἄλλα σημαίνοντες, αἰνισσομένης ἐν αὐτοις φυσικῶς τι [καὶ] τῆς ψυχῆς (1.2)). On this terminology, see Harris-McCoy (2012: 38-40), whose translation I quote for passages from Artemidorus. A dream 'hints' (αἰνιττομένου τοῦ ὀνείρατος) to Persinna at Heliod., *Aeth.* 10.3.1.

which also suggests that Artemidorus 'is appealing to Maximus' Homeric inclinations by quoting the *Iliad* at the outset of the text'.[74]

These connections with Homer are a manifestation of Artemidorus' desire for the work to be of superior quality to his predecessors' books, expressed in the proem to Book 1; earlier writers simply plagiarized each other, he says, and wrote things down 'in whatever way each of them was moved concerning some matter' (ὅπως ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐκινεῖτο περί τινος). He achieves this in part through quotation of and allusion to literary texts: 'he gives evidence of being especially well acquainted with Homer, Hesiod, Theognis, Pindar, Euripides, Xenophon, Menander, and Callimachus'.[75]

The Homeric polish is particularly notable in Book 4, the first of the two books which form the work's second part, addressed to Artemidorus' son. In one dream (4.2), a surgeon dreamed that he was acting in a Homeric performance in which he wounded many men. Artemidorus' interpretation is that actors of Homeric scenes, like surgeons, cause wounds and shed blood, but with no intention of killing. A similar idea lies behind Lucian's tale of an actor in real life who was so carried away by his performance of Ajax's madness that he seemed to go mad

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74.   Harris-McCoy 409. The quotation is *Il.* 10.122, the original context of which indicates that Artemidorus is making 'a clever play on the theme of sleep' (Harris-McCoy (2012: 410; cf. 410 and 413 for other allusions to Homer in the preface)).

75.   White (1975: 6).

himself and caused physical harm to another performer.[76] In the second Homer-dream (4.59), a woman dreamed that someone spoke to her the lines *Il.* 18.20-1, concerning Patroclus' death and Hector's stripping of his armour; this foreshadowed her husband's death abroad and the subsequent seizure of his property by the imperial treasury. In contrast to Aristides' vision, it is here a dream involving a *performance* of Homer which is considered significant; the performer is anonymous, their identity irrelevant.[77]

In the proem to Book 4 comes the quotation from Agamemnon at *Il.* 2.56 which Lucian uses on several occasions, and which might have been expected back in the Book 1 proem:[78]

> κλῦτε, φίλοι, θεῖός μοι ἐνύπνιον ἦλθεν ὄνειρος.
> Listen, my friends, a divine dream came to me in my
> sleep.

Artemidorus is clarifying what he considers a terminological inexactitude, giving this as an example of Homer's use of ὄνειρος as a colloquial alternative to ἐνύπνιον, because Homer's usage contradicts Artemidorus' own careful distinction between the technical terms ἐνύπνιον (a non-predictive dream) and ὄνειρος (a predictive dream). He has previously made this distinction (1.1), deriving ὄνειρος from <τὸ ὂν> εἴρειν ('to speak the truth') and offering Teiresias' words 'I tell you unerring things'

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76. *De saltu* 83-4 with Lada-Richards (2007: 36).

77. See also the use of a Homeric line (*Il.* 5.429) to interpret the dream at 5.39.

78. Instead he began by dropping in a quotation of *Il.* 10.122, explaining that it was the arduous nature of the task, not laziness, which had been delaying his work on the subject.

(τὰ δέ τοι νημερτέα εἴρω) as corroboration.[79] Further support is provided by Irus (i.e. Ἶρος) the beggar, who ran errands, like a veridical dream from the gods.[80]

But what of Agamemnon's dream? Only a commander could receive a dream on such weighty matters, says Artemidorus (1.2), since only such men put their minds to such things. Ironically, it is this very factor which made the deceitful dream believable: Artemidorus quotes *Il.* 2.80-2, in which Nestor says

> εἰ μέν τις τὸν ὄνειρον Ἀχαιῶν ἄλλος ἔνισπε,
> ψεῦδός κεν φαῖμεν καὶ νοσφιζοίμεθα μᾶλλον.
> νῦν δ' ἴδεν ὃς μέγ' ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν εὔχεται εἶναι.
>
> If some other of the Achaeans told us of this dream, we
> would think it deceitful and turn away from it, but
> now it is that man who has seen it who greatly boasts
> that he is the best of the Achaeans.

As Artemidorus observes, Nestor is not saying that anyone else who reported such a dream would be lying, but that it would be a lying dream; if the king saw it, it must be telling the truth.[81] What Artemidorus does not mention, but which no doubt tickled Lucian, is that there is also a delicious irony here since Nestor, who makes

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79. *Od.* 11.137.

80. *Od.* 18.7. See further Harris-McCoy (2012: 418).

81. This reflects the close association of kings and the divine made explicit at Hes., *Theog.* 96. Σ A *Il.* 2.82: 'A man would not lie for whom failure [sc. of the lie] brings danger' (ᾧ ἡ ἀποτυχία κίνδυνον φέρει, οὐκ ἂν ψεύσαιτο).

this pronouncement, is the very person in whose form the lying dream had appeared.[82]

5.3.2 — Lucian's dreams

The ironies and obvious comic potential of Agamemnon's dream and his humiliation in its aftermath are exploited in both works known as *The Dream.* In *Somnium (Vita Luciani)* 5, Lucian marks the transition from the 'ridiculous, childish' (γελάσιμα καὶ μειρακιώδη) part of his story to the part which 'deserves completely attentive hearers' (πάνυ φιληκόων ἀκροατῶν δεόμενα) with a rise in register in the work's first Homeric quotation, Agamemnon's words at *Il.* 2.56-7. Lucian then improves on the quotation with an additional description: 'so vivid that it was in no way inferior to reality' (ἐναργὴς οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲν ἀπολείπεσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας).

But no matter how vivid it was, the dream is tinged, through the context of the Homeric quotation, with a suspicion arising from the reader's knowledge that Agamemnon is reporting a false dream (and from Lucian's own hint that it was so deceptive as to seem like real life). Hopkinson points out the irony: 'the address to the audience and the Homeric quotation imply (with a high degree of Lucianic irony) a rise in ὕψος and seriousness for the narrative'.[83] He adds that this is further

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82. White (1975: 68 n.14) observes that Macrob., *In Somn.* 1.3.15 makes a similar point about this *Iliad* passage.

83. Hopkinson (2008: 101).

picked up by an allusion to Socrates' ironic speech in Plato's *Menexenus* 235b-c, and notes that these clues are reinforced by the deceptive nature of Agamemnon's dream.[84] The whole work describes events of dubious historicity, and Hopkinson follows Baldwin in seeing a large amount of invention in the narrative of unverifiable but convenient 'facts' from Lucian's early years.[85]

The effect of bathos introduced by this ironic 'rise' in sublimity is reinforced if one considers the Artemidoran interpretation of Agamemnon's dream. As we have seen, in Artemidorus' understanding of how dreams operate, a dream — whether true or false — about important matters of public concern can come only to important people, so Lucian's use of these lines for a dream sent to an unimportant person recalls Nestor's principle: any of the lower orders reporting dreams are to be doubted as a matter of course. But neither is the dream about a matter of great public concern (unless one is meant to assume that Lucian's persona here is one with Aristidean levels of vanity), so what is the reader to think? The implications of the Agamemnon-quotation's context are well brought out by Humble & Sidwell, who conclude that the quotation indeed implies the falseness of the dream, since it promised too much, as would have been clear to the original

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84.   Hopkinson (2008: 96).

85.   Lucian as apprentice sculptor who forsook this career path for more intellectual pursuits has suspicious similarities with Socrates, a parallel made explicit in *Somnium (Vita Luciani)* 12: see Hopkinson (2008: 94-5) and, on literary models and parallels that might raise doubts, Gera (1995).

audience who knew at least something of Lucian's career.[86] And Lucian was hardly a person of any importance at the time when he had the dream; indeed he goes out of his way to say otherwise, so this whole episode is an exercise in self-deprecatory irony.

Following Lesky, White writes that Lucian's attacks 'were not directed so much at astrology, dream interpretation, demon worship, or other fashionable aspects of Antonine irrationalism, but rather at the traditional notions of religion that were contained in poetry.'[87] But in the older Lucian's account of the younger Lucian's alleged dream — an account so convoluted by the difficulties of understanding what is true, what is literary embellishment and what is downright invented for the author's own self-aggrandisement — there is implicit criticism of dream interpretation for claiming to follow straightforward rules such as Nestor's, while actually allowing the interpreter to give whatever impression the listener is willing to receive. This use of a Homeric quotation recalls how Alexander of Abonoteichus gives the answers he thinks the questioner wants to hear, unaware of the Homeric questions which have no straightforward answer.

Such suspicions that dreams could be made up for one's own purposes suggest Aristophanic influence from *Knights* 1090-5, where Paphlagon and the Sausage-seller forge competing dreams with obvious political subtexts: Athena pouring wealth over Demos with a big ladle, or pouring ambrosia over Paphlagon's

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86.   Humble & Sidwell (2006: 221-2).

87.   White (1975: 4). cf. Lesky (1966: 841 [1963: 896]).

head and garlic sauce over Demos'. Harris is particularly sceptical of ancient accounts of dreams of significant political import,[88] especially when they are reported to troops, Agamemnon-fashion, by their commanders. But this view is unexpectedly missing from Lucian's analysis of history writing in *Quomodo historia.* Even though he discusses Thucydides and Xenophon, Lucian does not take the opportunity to make any capital out of a possible comparison between Xenophon (who records two of his own dreams, supposedly of military significance[89]) and Thucydides (whose remarks at the beginning of Book 8 suggest strong disapproval of dream-interpretation), so in *Quomodo historia* he seems not to be especially focused on condemning the practice of including commanders' dream-speeches.[90] Lucian's hecklers (17) prompt him to make an explicit comparison with Xenophon, but when one asks 'He's not taking us for dream-interpreters, is he?' (μὴ ὀνείρων τινὰς ὑποκριτὰς ἡμᾶς ὑπείληφεν;), the response he gives is not that this

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88.   Harris (2009: 54): 'The epiphany dreams dreamt by Homeric rulers presumably reflect the fact that an archaic monarch could use his dreams to justify his decisions'; but, when it comes to later ages, 'we may think that only an exceptionally prestigious commander could get away with it'.

89.   Xen., *An.* 3.1.11 & 4.3.7, cited at *Somnium (Vita Luciani)* 17.

90.   On dreams in Greek and Roman historians see Harris (2009: ch.3). He points out (184) that Caesar's commentaries — which are matter-of-fact to a level that the Lucian of *Quomodo historia* would probably approve — contain no dreams. Hall (1998: 19): '[Caesar] displays little interest in religious ritual, omens, portents or signs and wonders generally'.

straightforward allegory requires no interpretation, but that the dream has, like Xenophon's, served a useful rhetorical purpose.[91]

In *Somnium (Gallus)*, the Agamemnon dream is again used. Here the talking cockerel is like something out of a dream, or so it appears to Micyllus on first encountering him.[92] Artemidorus is quite clear on animals in dreams: they must be believed.[93] But, despite Micyllus' suggestion that this might be a dream, it soon becomes clear that the cock is real. But if the cock is not a dream-animal, does that therefore make him less certainly veridical? Furthermore, Artemidorus' precise reasoning actually points to another irony in Lucian's context of a talking animal: what makes them believable in dreams is that 'the dumb animals speak the truth in every instance due to their being unaware of the artifice of speech' (καὶ τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα πάντως ἀληθῆ λέγει διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν μεθόδῳ λόγου). But Lucian's cock is so

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91.   Lucian is (deliberately or accidentally) confusing Xenophon's two dreams: Hopkinson (2008: 107-8). On 'Antiphon the dream-interpreter' who appears at *VH* 2.33, see ní Mheallaigh (2014: 232-3).

92.   *Somnium (Gallus)* 3. Note the Euripidean parody in Ar., *Ran.* 1331-61, when an old woman dreams of her cockerel being stolen, which possibly inspired Lucian here. But cocks appear quite often in Greek dreams (perhaps because they crow at daybreak): see Alciphr., *Agr.* 2. Artemidorus (2.42) says that a cock 'in a poor man's house signifies the head of the house and, in a rich man's house, the household manager, due to his waking those within for work' (ἀλεκτρυὼν ἐν μὲν πένητος οἰκία τὸν Οἰκοδεσπότην, ἐν δὲ πλουσίου τὸν οἰκονόμον σημαίνει διὰ τὸ ἀνιστᾶν τοὺς ἔνδον ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα). Note also 'the temple of the Cock' (τὸ τοῦ Ἀλεκτρυόνος ἱερόν) located just by the gate of ivory (*VH* 2.32), and Night and the Cock as the gods whom dreams worship (*VH* 2.33).

93.   2.69.

aware of 'the artifice of speech' that he lectures a human on the subject. Furthermore, since it turns out that the cock is not really an animal anyway, but the human Pythagoras-cum-Euphorbus, even if he were a dream-vision it would be less clear whether Artemidorus' animal-rule would apply in any case.[94]

This confusion introduces a theme of dreaming which is picked up when Micyllus begins to recount a dream of his own (5-8). In the course of this discussion come allusions to two Homeric dreams, both Agamemnon's and Penelope's, or rather the explanation of Penelope's dream in terms of the gates of ivory and horn through which the dreams proceed. When Micyllus introduces his dream he does as the narrator did in *Somnium (Vita Luciani)*, quoting Agamemnon (*Il.* 2.56):

> εἶτά μοι κατὰ τὸν Ὅμηρον "ἀμβροσίην διὰ νύκτα"
> θεῖός τις ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄνειρος ἐπιστὰς.
>
> Then 'during the ambrosial night', in Homer's phrase,
> a truly divine dream stood over me.

Here there is only a brief quotation, with the accompanying paraphrase emphasizing that the dream was 'truly' divine; unlike Agamemnon, Micyllus is acutely aware of the problem of false dreams. He has learned from Homer, and makes a point of showing this by naming Homer his quotation's source.

At this point the Cock breaks in and encourages him to first describe the dinner he had attended just before the dream came to him: 'nothing prevents you from dining again by, as it were, making up a dream of that dinner' (κωλύει γὰρ

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94.   Indeed, Micyllus addresses him as 'Pythagoras', and expresses his confusion (20) about what to call him.

οὐδὲν αὖθίς σε δειπνεῖν ὥσπερ ὄνειρόν τινα τοῦ δείπνου ἐκείνου ἀναπλάττοντα).

This 'dream'-report is acknowledged by both parties as an invented one, further blurring the distinction between what constitutes a reliable and unreliable dream or dream-report.

The theme is picked up by allusion to Agamemnon's troubled sleep. At the beginning of a list of the cares of leaders comes a quotation of *Il.* 10.3-4:

> οὐδὲ γὰρ Ἀτρείδην Ἀγαμέμνονα …
> ὕπνος ἔχε γλυκερὸς πολλὰ φρεσὶν ὁρμαίνοντα.
>
> For sweet sleep did not hold Atreus' son Agamemnon,
> who was debating many things in his heart.[95]

This is the only place within the list where Lucian quotes another author,[96] so it seems a ruse to recall the earlier discussion of Agamemnon's dream. Suffering from insomnia, Agamemnon has no respite from his diurnal cares; but when he does get to sleep he is subject to deceptive dreams from the gods. This second quotation of Homer therefore gives added point to the irony of the first, while the first reinforces Agamemnon's hopeless situation in the second. This quotation comes from Book 10 of the *Iliad*, the authenticity of which was already questioned in

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95. *Somnium (Gallus)* 25. For sensible analysis of Lucian's replacement of ἀλλ' οὐκ with οὐδὲ γὰρ, and his omission of ποιμένα λαῶν in the first line, see Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 196-7).

96. The list's other members are Croesus, Artaxerxes, Dionysius the Younger and Alexander.

antiquity:[97] if the reader is aware of this, there is a further level of confusion over the passage's 'truth'.[98]

One of Artemidorus' dream-reports almost sounds as though it could have come straight from Lucian's *VH*. A shipowner dreamed he had somehow become trapped in the Islands of the Blessed; restrained by the heroes there, he was not saved until Agamemnon came to release him.[99] The interpretation of the dream makes the heroes the procurators who pressganged the shipowner, and Agamemnon the Emperor, who freed him.[100] This is a particularly clear example of how the 'allegorical' interpretation of dreams resembles not only attempts to

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97.   See the introductory note of the D-scholia on *Il.* 10: 'They say that the rhapsody was separately drawn up by Homer and is not part of the *Iliad*, but was assigned to the poem by Peisistratus' (φασὶ τὴν ῥαψῳδίαν ὑφ᾿ Ὁμήρου ἰδίᾳ τετάχθαι καὶ μὴ εἶναι μέρος τῆς ᾿Ιλιάδος, ὑπὸ δὲ Πεισιστράτου τετάχθαι εἰς τὴν ποίησιν).

98.   However, Lucian's other quotation from this book (*Piscator* 3, slightly altering *Il.* 10.447-8), in the mouth of Plato, proves such a powerful response to Parrhesiades' Iliadic cento that Parrhesiades expresses dismay that even Homer 'my greatest hope' (ἡ μεγίστη ἐλπίς) is of no avail, and has to resort to quotation of Euripides. Could it be that even verbatim but inauthentic Homeric material is more powerful than a cento of several authentic lines? But in neither of these passages is there any indication that Lucian is aware of or concerned by issues of authenticity, so I would not press the possibilities I raise here. For discussion of both passages see Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 196-9).

99.   Artemidorus 5.16.

100. Harris-McCoy (2012: 554) says the procurators 'are appropriately signified by the Heroes insofar as they are understood as being within the same spectrum as the "gods" — i.e. the emperor himself — but as possessing relatively little power'.

interpret Homer allegorically but also Lucian's announced intention of hiding 'hints' to his work's parody of other authors in *VH* itself; Lucian's extended description of the Isle of Dreams (*VH* 2.32-35) can be seen as a further reference to the spirit of allegory which lies at the heart of the work.

In both *VH* and *Somnium (Gallus)* Lucian shows a special interest in the Homeric Gates of Dreams,[101] pointing out the problems with assuming that dreams (or reports of dreams) are either true or false:

> [A] dream-report does not have to be either true or false — it may very commonly be somewhere between the two. Penelope disagreed, for according to her, and according to Vergil, dreams came *either* through the Gate of Horn *or* through the Gate of Ivory — a harmful dichotomy (implicitly recognized as such, centuries later, by Lucian) ... .[102]

In each work Lucian questions this dichotomy through an assertion that there were not *only* these two gates. At the opening of *Somnium (Gallus)*, Micyllus has been awoken from a dream in which he acquired great riches; indeed in this opening he is thrice implicitly associated with the quest for the golden fleece.[103] He later denies that his dream came through either of the two Homeric gates: after all, Homer knew

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101.   *Od.* 19.560-8.

102.   Harris (2009: 94). His emphasis.

103.   He says the cock is sleepless like the fleece's guardian; and the cock alludes to Jason's monosandalism and the speaking Argo.

nothing about them, since he was blind.[104] In fact the dream was so full of gold that it must have come through a gate of gold (6). But Micyllus is either misunderstanding the Homeric metaphor or is so overcome by thoughts of gold that the reader cannot take him seriously — the dream was itself gold, dressed in gold, bringing huge amounts of gold with it.[105] None of this gives any indication of the dream's reliability, a question which Micyllus evidently prefers not to consider; for their own purposes both characters in this dialogue are happy to dispense with the evidence of the 'unreliable' Homer.

When the Lucian-narrator of *VH* describes the gates of dreams (2.33), he says that Homer was wrong, since there are actually four gates. But, although he identifies the extra two gates (of iron and earthenware), he treats them as a pair, through which 'the terrifying, murderous, rough' (οἵ τε φοβεροὶ καὶ φονικοὶ καὶ ἀπηνεῖς) dreams leave, making it unclear whether different subdivisions of this group go through one gate or the other. Since he makes no comment about the gates of ivory and horn, other than acknowledging their existence, the reader is left asking whether the true and false dreams similarly go out through these two Homeric gates without any distinction.

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104. As I have demonstrated, such allusions to Homer's blindness are rather more significant than the 'plaisanterie facile' that Bompaire (2003b: 113 n.18) suggests.

105. The cock's request that he stop 'talking gold' (χρυσολογῶν), and his allusion to Midas, imply that even Micyllus' words are turning into gold.

5.4 — Conclusion

What makes Homer-interpretation and dream-interpretation similar is the need for experts who can understand and correctly explain the hints hidden in these 'texts'. Within the text of Homer, where the hinting in one episode, such as that of the Sirens, can be multivalent in the eyes of different interpreters with divergent agendas, the addition of dreams brings further complications, since a double interpretation is required. So, characteristically, Lucian not only plays with a situation where Homer indicates that a dream was untrue, but also questions the oneiromantic wisdom of Homer and the confidence with which true and false dreams might be distinguished.

CHAPTER 6

Charon

Antiquity parodied essentially everything *...* .
Everything has its parody, that is, its laughing aspect,
for everything is reborn and renewed through death.[1]

6.1. — Charon and Hermes

Charon is the subject of this final chapter for two reasons.[2] First, the dialogue's abundant Homeric quotations, and the report of a meeting with Homer himself, offer the opportunity to apply the kinds of interpretation presented in earlier chapters to a more extensive passage of text, and to show their combined effect throughout a work. Secondly, although *Charon* is consistently praised as one of

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1. Bakhtin (1984: 127).

2. This chapter was largely written before I had sight of Charrière (2011). We reach similar conclusions through different approaches; I note below places where we disagree significantly.

Lucian's finest pieces,[3] it has not yet been furnished with a thorough commentary in English, and stands in need of fuller examination.[4]

The dialogue begins as Hermes discovers Charon in the upper world and agrees to show him around. To save time, they pile up mountains as a platform from which Charon can see all he wants, once his eyesight has been improved. They observe various scenes, especially the meeting between Solon and Croesus, so that Charon returns to the underworld better informed but no less bemused concerning his original question — why the dead are sad to leave life behind. In this chapter I analyse the Homeric material woven through much of this conversation.[5]

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3.   Du Soul writes (Hemsterhuis & Reitz (1789-93 [1743]: Vol.3, 368)): 'You have now the most elegant work of Lucian in this genre, and the most finished in all its parts. There is nothing in it with which you could find fault' ('Habes jam elegantissimum & omnibus suis numeris absolutissimum *Luciani* hoc in genere opus; in quo quod reprehendas nihil est') — perhaps alluding to Longinus' assessment of Eratosthenes' *Erigone* as 'faultless throughout' (διὰ πάντων γὰρ ἀμώματον, *Subl.* 33.5). Similarly Gould (1932: xvi): 'Among the works of Lucian the present dialogue, in the estimation of all critics, stands very high.'

4.   Gould (1932) and Mills (1904) are elementary commentaries with mostly grammatical notes; von Shirnding (2007) provides brief notes. Halliwell (2008: 443-54) examines Charon's laughter in the dialogue.

5.   Charrière (2011: 45) observes that the central section (8-20) has relatively little Homeric material. But this is partly due to the conversation (10-12) between Solon and Croesus, who presumably knows no Homer. However, the real philosophical meat of the piece (15-19) is indeed unadorned with Homer, comprising longer, less playful speeches than earlier in the dialogue.

Charon and Hermes are something of a double-act in Lucian, appearing together in two dialogues other than *Charon*, although these shorter dialogues are less 'Homeric'.[6] The ferryman has only two speeches at the beginning of *Dial. mort.* 20 (=10), but plays a bigger role in *Dial. mort.* 14 (=4). There he asks for an extended loan period to tide him over a quiet patch, with the satire working on two levels, rather as *Charon*'s does: the first is on the immortal plane and pokes fun at mythology, making Charon and Hermes amusingly engage in very human commerce, presumably inspired by the obol paid to Charon by his passengers. But this humour does not undermine the second level, the moral message that mortals do not prosecute wars as bravely as they used to, instead devoting their energies to the kind of killing which will swell their own coffers. The incongruous language of immortals' balancing their accounts has offered a novel way into a fundamentally Homeric observation that today's mortals are inferior to those of the past.[7] But things are even worse now than in Homeric times, since at least when Homer complains of such decline he is still discussing heroic warriors, not those victims of the Lucianic obesity crisis, 'whose bellies and legs are swollen up with luxurious living, all of them pale and sordid, not at all like those people in the olden days' (ὑπὸ τρυφῆς ἐξῳδηκὼς τὴν γαστέρα καὶ τὰ σκέλη, ὠχροὶ ἅπαντες καὶ ἀγεννεῖς, οὐδὲν ὅμοιοι ἐκείνοις). *Charon*'s satire similarly comprises, on the one hand, various means of poking fun at the logic of mythology and literature, and, on the other, satirical

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6.   See too Charon's appearance in *Cataplus*, with Halliwell (2008: 454-62).

7.   See above, p.89.

moralizing on mortals' foibles by making the reader see them through immortals' eyes.

6.2 — A gods'-eye view: *Charon* and the shield of Achilles

Most of the dialogue consists of Charon and Hermes gazing out upon the world of mortals, from their physically elevated position. This feature of the text is emphasized by the manuscripts' subtitle ἐπισκοποῦντες, which can be variously translated but has the radical sense of 'looking upon',[8] so signals the importance of visual observation. The text exhibits a special interest in themes of seeing and looking; indeed it is permeated with a wealth of vision-related vocabulary. This is a dialogue all about looking and seeing, but the vocabulary is also used

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8.　It has been translated as 'spectators' (Abbott 1872), 'observers' (Costa 2005), 'inspectors' (Harmon 1915), and 'observateurs' (Bompaire 2008), and paraphrased as 'Die Betrachtung der Welt' (von Shirnding 2007); but there is also a lurking sense of tutelary deities' 'watching over' mortals (LSJ, s.v. ἐπισκοπέω). We cannot know whether the subtitle is Lucian's own, but, as Bompaire observes (2008: 24 n.27), it chimes well with the use of the same verb in *Charon* 5: 'Now please look around in a circle and inspect everything' (σὺ δέ μοι ἤδη ἐν κύκλῳ περιβλέπων ἐπισκόπει ἅπαντα).

metaphorically, which suggests an authorial decision to foreground this theme as much as possible.[9]

As the work is also permeated by allusions to Homer, let us begin by examining how this vision-theme both implicitly and explicitly recalls passages of Homer in which the idea of 'looking (from above)' is prominent: first, the panorama made up by the scenes on the Shield of Achilles in *Il.* 18,[10] then the *teikhoskopia* of *Il.* 3. But there are also other passages in which mortals and immortals are spectators of action unfolding below them; indeed, as Purves points out, giving the examples of *Il.* 8.51-2, 11.80-3, 13.10-14, and the moment at 13.3-9 when 'Zeus turns his eyes away from the battle to look toward distant lands', Homer even hints at 'the possibility that the poet is able to present the topography of his plot synoptically because he

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9.   There are 15 examples of literal or metaphorical seeing-concepts in the first two chapters alone: ἰδεῖν, τὸ φῶς, δείξεις, τῷ ζόφῳ, περιόψει, ἰδών, οὐδὲν τῶν τυφλῶν διοίσω, ἐν τῷ σκότῳ, ἀμβλυώττω πρὸς τὸ φῶς, ἰδεῖν, ἴδοις, σκεπτέον, κατίδοις, καθεώρας, περισκοπεῖν. This rivals the opening of *Imagines*, on which see Francis (2003: 581). Compare the prevalence of seeing-vocabulary in the remarkable opening scene of Heliodorus' *Aethiopica* (on which see Bühler (1976)).

10.   It is no accident that Lucian has Hermes allude to the Homeric Hephaestus (who made the shield) at the outset of this piece, which also enables him 'to position his dialogue concisely in relation to a paradigm of divine burlesque' (Halliwell (2008: 445)). In *Icaromenippus* 16, when Menippus views the world from above, he makes an explicit connection with the Shield: 'the main things looked like what Homer speaks of on the shield' (τὰ μέντοι κεφάλαια τῶν πραγμάτων τοιαῦτα ἐφαίνετο οἷά φησιν Ὅμηρος τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀσπίδος). At *Nigrinus* 4 & 17-20 Nigrinus uses a different metaphor, comparing himself to a spectator at the theatre looking down on the performance of fools on stage: for these and other instances of the theme see Anderson (1976a: 17) and Camerotto (1998: 234-42).

has some kind of special access to the way that the immortals see'.[11] Lucian's use of the dialogue form plays with such implications: there is no 'narrator' of the dialogue, so Hermes and Charon themselves are both doing the job of the poet in Homer. Both characters are in different respects the 'experts' in their fields.[12]

When Hermes and Charon have piled up their super-mountain to form a viewing platform, what they see is a panorama of the entire *oikoumenē*, a sort of god's-eye view[13] described thus by Charon (6): 'I can see a lot of land, some big marsh flowing around it, and mountains and rivers' (ὁρῶ γῆν πολλὴν καὶ λίμνην τινὰ μεγάλην περιρρέουσαν, καὶ ὄρη καὶ ποταμούς). Charon is no doubt familiar with marshes, since Hades is repeatedly characterised thus, in Lucian and elsewhere; but in applying the term to the encircling Ocean he is naively using the term in a way which happens to recall the use of the word to describe the sea in

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11. Purves (2010: 4-5). On the *Iliad*'s visual and spatial imagery more generally, see Strauss Clay (2011).

12. Whitmarsh (2013: 102) writes of the dialogue form's 'absence of hierarchical authority'.

13. Winkler (2007: 54) writes that *Il.* 4.422-32 'implies an observer stationed on an elevation, such as a mountain top, and looking down along the beach'. In her introduction and first chapter, Purves (2010) interprets the Shield as figuring the god's-eye view of the poem as a whole. She also characterises the Muses' viewpoint in the *Iliad* as 'protocartographic because of its affinities not only to early versions of *mappae mundi*, such as the Shield of Achilles, but also to the invention of cartography in the Greek world and, in particular, its uses in literature from the sixth and fifth centuries BCE' (2010: 2).

Homer and other poets.[14] This panorama, and in particular the encircling Ocean, recalls the quasi-panoramic view of the world fashioned by Hephaestus on the Shield of Achilles,[15] where Ocean has particular prominence as the last part of the decoration to be added (607-8). But Charon's interest is initially caught by slightly different things than Homer's: at 483-9 Homer has Hephaestus begin with earth, sky, and sea, going on to describe the stars in further detail. Charon is not looking upwards, so he does not register the sky: he looks only at the earth and the rivers.[16] What Charon first focuses on is the 'tiny people and their dens' (ἀνθρώπους πάνυ

14.   LSJ, s.v. λίμνη. The usual prose meaning of λίμνη is 'standing water' or 'marsh' (so that the idea of its 'flowing' is somewhat oxymoronic). For Hades as 'marsh' see Finglass (2007: 145). In Lucian: *Philopseudes* 24, *Menippus* 10.

15.   *Il.* 18.478-608. For a good example of the epic 'god's-eye view' see Verg., *Aen.* 1.223-6, and, in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, Jesus' temptation at *Matt.* 4.8. Ar., *Eq.* 168-75 also involves looking down from on high at many lands, while in *Somnium (Vita Luciani)* 15-16, Paideia shows the world from a chariot drawn by winged horses. But what happens in *Charon* is different from these passages, as it is not saying 'all this is/could be yours' (cf. *Eq.* 176) — although it is made clear that Charon will indeed 'receive' everything mortal eventually. For ancient ideas on the Shield of Achilles as quasi-'map' of the cosmos see Aujac (1987), who connects the 'conventional' and 'fanciful' nature of the Shield-'map' with Strabo's ridicule (3.4.4) of those who use such Homeric passages as the basis of scientific investigation (123).

16.   This lack of interest in what lies above the earth sharply distinguishes this pair of mountain-movers from the impious Otus and Ephialtes on whom they model themselves (p.366 below).

σμικροὺς καί τινας φωλεοὺς αὐτῶν).[17] Hephaestus will eventually move on to the

people, but Charon's principal interest throughout the text remains what it was

when he first thought of visiting the upper world (1): 'what people do' (ἃ

πράττουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι).

So far there has been only a general resemblance to this Homeric intertext.

But a reading of the entire *Charon* reveals that Lucian is producing a parodic mirror-

image of the shield-decoration, with many of the dialogue's scenes recalling those

on Achilles' shield and giving the explicitly moralizing interpretation which is

lacking in Homer. As Georgiadou & Larmour argue, *VH* is structured according to a

similar pattern of parodic reminiscence of Homer. There Lucian explicitly invites

the identification of intertexts,[18] whereas in *Charon* the reader is given the hint by

means of a large amount of Homeric content.

We have already seen that Ocean, which appears at the end of the Homeric

description, is introduced right at the beginning of Lucian's; this alteration can be

taken as another early signal of an inversion which arises because, when the world

is viewed for the first time by Charon (who belongs below the earth, rather than on

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17.   The 'tiny people' recall both the Lucianic comparison of men viewed from above to ants (*Hermotimus* 5, *Icaromenippus* 19) and the Homeric similes (*Il.* 2.441-83) by which in the Catalogue of Ships the Greek armies are compared to swarming insects, flocks of goats, etc.; this view from the gods' perspective encourages the audience to create vivid mental images (Lovatt & Vout (2013: 3-6)).

18.   *VH* 1.2; for *VH* as allegorical parody of the *Odyssey* see Georgiadou & Larmour (1988: 5-10).

Olympus like Hephaestus), it is fundamentally ludicrous, whereas the shield is more optimistic, or at least less pessimistic.[19] While the shield is an outline of various aspects of mortal life, Charon and Hermes are viewing not only a general scene of human life but also specific historical exempla which emphasize the individual mortals' mortality even as they appear to show them at their greatest. This is not, however, to say that mortality has no place in the Shield; perhaps it is better to think not in terms of 'optimism' or 'pessimism' but rather of *Charon*'s engagement with what Whitman calls the Shield's 'classic implications — passion, order, and the changeless inevitability of the world as it is'.[20] The shield description, like many of the similes, has a wistful air about it. But even though the shield is designed by an immortal it lacks anything like the sardonic, even cruel, amusement at human frailty which is exhibited by Charon and Hermes, or the general negativity of Charon, for whom this order is all a reminder of the inevitability of death.[21]

Let us now consider each passage of the dialogue which can plausibly be shown to recall some feature of the Homeric *ekphrasis*, and consider how Lucian's use of this intertextual resonance gives added point to the lessons drawn by Charon

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19.　Indeed, the Shield of Achilles is remarkably optimistic in comparison with other literary shields, most notably the Shield of Heracles in the Hesiodic *Scutum*, an *ekphrasis* of similar scale. See Taplin (1980: esp. 1-4), who writes (2): 'the joys of civilization and fertility on our shield are peculiar.'

20.　Whitman (1958: 206).

21.　Hopkinson (2008: 3) writes of Charon's 'mingled indignation and incomprehension' at human vanities.

and Hermes from what they see. It has often been suggested, at least since Lessing's *Laocoön*,[22] that the Shield of Achilles presents a microcosm of human existence. The scholia show an interest in identifying, at some length, the specific places which are supposedly represented, seeing the shield as an encoded, allegorical document.[23] The shield's all-embracing nature is recalled in Hermes' recommendation at the outset of the dialogue (2) that Charon 'observe everything' in the world (πάντα κατίδοις), which is reinforced later (5) when Charon complains that he cannot yet see far enough and requests further elevation. Charon's subsequent description of what he can see recalls such scenes as the two cities in Homer, but with the help of Hermes the people and places can be identified; Hermes thus becomes a kind of scholiast himself, acting as Charon's knowledgeable scholar of allegory. In particular, the question-and-answer format also recalls sets of 'Homeric Questions'

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22. 'Homer was able to make his shield the very essence of all that had happened in the world by means of but a few pictures', Lessing (1962 [1766]: 216). This idea's history is traced in Byre (1992).

23. So Σ A *Il.* 18.490 begins 'What are the two cities? Agallias of Cercyra, the pupil of Aristophanes, says that the two cities are Athens and Eleusis ... ' (τίνες δέ εἰσιν αἱ δύο πόλεις; Ἀγαλλίας ὁ Κερκυραῖος, ὁ Ἀρισοφάνει γνώριμος, εἶπε τὰς δύο πόλεις εἶναι Ἀθήνας καὶ Ἐλευσῖνα ...). Modern readers tend to restrict such interpretations to tentative identification of the besieged city with Troy, as the archetypal besieged city (and perhaps of the city at peace with prewar Troy): the parallels with Troy in other passages of the *Iliad* are noted in Edwards' commentary on 509-15. See too Σ AB *Il.* 18.590.

such as the work of Porphyry.[24] When Charon says (23) 'show me now the notable cities' (τὰς πόλεις δὲ τὰς ἐπισήμους δεῖξόν μοι ἤδη), he goes on to list the six cities in which he is interested.[25] This reverses the usual procedure up to this point, and indicates Charon's growing confidence; he says he has heard of these specific places and now wants to see them, whereas initially he had put himself entirely in Hermes' hands. So although he says (2), 'It is you, Hermes, who should consider what is best; I know nothing of what is above the earth, being a stranger' (αὐτός, ὦ Ἑρμῆ, ἐπινόει τὸ βέλτιστον· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν οἶδα τῶν ὑπὲρ γῆς ξένος ὤν), he reveals now at the end that he is not entirely ignorant, which has been clear to the reader since he mentioned hearing reports of life above through such channels as Homer's recitation of his poetry: he explains his familiarity with Homer (7), while his promise to sit in silence (3), 'as is proper for passengers' (ὥσπερ ἐπιβάταις νόμος) perhaps implies that he has had other annoyingly talkative passengers as well as the poet.

This procedure allows Lucian's reader to act as both a 'Charon' and a 'Hermes': they are first mystified like the inexperienced Charon (and Homer's less scholarly readers), but then get enough clues from Charon's initial description of each vignette that, using their familiarity with such authors as Herodotus, they can

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24.   See the example in the previous note. This is discussed further in the next section on *teikhoskopia*, to which the question-and-answer format is particularly relevant. For the extant parts of Porphyry's work on the *Iliad*, see MacPhail (2011).

25.   In 'seeing many cities', Charon resembles Odysseus (*Od.* 1.3).

easily recognise the correctness of Hermes' explanation when it comes, without the need for further justification on his part, and sometimes they might even be ahead of him. However, once each scene has been explained, Charon is not at a loss for moralizing interpretations, enthusiastically joining Hermes in this, as one special kind of 'Homeric' scholar himself.

Charon's repetition of 'I can see ... ' at the start of his speeches and his 'Who/ what is ... ?' questions[26] recall the structure of Homer's *ekphrasis*, which similarly turns from one vignette to the next with a repeated introductory phrase 'and on it' (ἐν δέ); it also has the effect of placing emphasis firmly on Charon's own gaze.[27] Lucian here uses a similar approach to that of Auden's 'The Shield of Achilles', which replaces Homer's 'and on it he fashioned ... ' with the thrice-repeated 'She looked over his shoulder ... '.[28] Auden does this to the same effect as Lucian: the reader takes the journey around the fashioning of the shield through Thetis' eyes in

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26.   ὁρῶ begins speeches by Charon (6, 15, 16, 18), and his requests for information (8 & 9) begin τίς τ' ἄρ' ὅδ' (in Homeric cento recalling the teichoscopia of *Il.* 3), with τί ἄρα (10), τίνας ἐκείνους (11), ἐκεῖνος δὲ τίς ἐστιν (14) and τί οὖν ἐκεῖνοι (22) bringing to mind the repetitive structures of both the *teikhoskopia* and the Shield.

27.   Even when a new vignette is introduced by Hermes rather than Charon, it is with a 'Do you see ... ?' or an instruction to look (ὁρᾷς τὴν Σκυθίδα ... ; (13); ἀπόβλεψον (9); cf. ὡς ὁρᾷς (11)). As I showed above (n.9), figurative use of seeing-verbs is also prominent in this work: e.g. Charon says (11), 'I don't *see* what good it is for him' (οὐχ ὁρῶ ὅ τι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ πρόσεστιν).

28.   Auden (1955: 35-7); brief discussion in Taplin (1980: 2-3).

Auden, just as they travel around the world through Charon's eyes in Lucian. The absence of any primary narratorial voice in Lucian strengthens this effect.

Charon expresses his disappointment in 6: he wants to see not something that looks like a painting, but rather 'people themselves, what they do and the sort of things they say' (τοὺς ἀνθρώπους αὐτοὺς καὶ ἃ πράττουσι καὶ οἷα λέγουσιν). His synaesthetic use of ὁρᾶν — *seeing* the speaking — recalls the special feature of the Shield of Achilles, which features not Gorgon's heads (as with Agamemnon's shield), but scenes with a real, even supernatural, power to evoke a fuller narrative, whether that is as complex as the details of the lawcourt case amid the city's bustle (*Il.* 18.490-508) or as straightforward as attendants serving wine to the ploughmen at the end of each furrow (541-9). This feature of the Homeric shield has particularly interested modern commentators,[29] while the shield-*ekphrases* of Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes* synaesthetically 'elaborate on the original programmatic statement by the Chorus, "I see the sound"',[30] and the younger Philostratus also has an extended description of the Shield of Achilles (or rather its representation in a painting), in an embedded *ekphrasis* which emphasizes the skill of Hephaestus 'the craftsman' (τοῦ δημιουργοῦ), rather than the painter, in the evocation of narrative.[31]

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29.   Becker (1990).

30.   Porter (2013: 20-2).

31.   Philost., *Imag.* 10.4-20.

By presenting generic scenes (as in the world of the similes), in preference to scenes situated within specific historical or mythological moments, the Shield is different from Agamemnon's shield at *Il.* 11.32-7, where the design, although considerably more straightforward than that on Achilles' shield, incorporates portraits of (36-7) the 'grim-faced Gorgon ... looking terrifying and, around her, Terror and Fear' (Γοργὼ βλοσυρῶπις ... | δεινὸν δερκομένη, περὶ δὲ Δεῖμός τε Φόβος τε). It is also different from the Hesiodic Shield of Heracles, which is of a comparable level of complexity but includes a host of named mythological characters depicted at recognisable moments of their lives.[32] Lucian's focus on actual historical moments therefore marks a divergence from both the non-specific Shield of Achilles and the specific but mythological scenes of other shields; he combines the 'everyman' or 'everyday' feel of the Shield of Achilles with the specificity of the others.

Once Charon has had his vision improved so that he is able to see and hear the details that he wants on this picture,[33] Hermes points out ten vignettes, all

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32.   See above, n.19. As well as the abstractions (Tumult, Panic, etc.) in the Hesiodic *Scutum* 154-60, such as appear on Agamemnon's shield, there is a good example in the collection of 17 names (Lapiths and Centaurs) in 178-90. Although not every character named is depicted on the shield (so Aegeus only appears as a patronym for Theseus), such mentions of characters who are not even present gives a further level of specificity.

33.   It is a *topos* of ancient art criticism that one can 'almost hear' things depicted visually, an idea which perhaps feeds into the improvement of both vision and hearing here. See especially the younger Philostratus' description of the Shield (*Imag.* 10.17): 'you can almost hear the cows mooing in the painting' (τὸ δὲ καὶ μυκωμένων ὥσπερ ἀκούειν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ), and Squire (2010) on the various games played with the possibility of the artwork mooing or speaking in the series of epigrams on Myron's cow.

associated with or implying their subjects' mortality or worldly failure. The events depicted come from across the Greek world and obviously did not all happen on the same day; such a collapsing of time reminds the reader that this is a view through the eyes of immortals for whom time is an irrelevance.[34] Here are the key points of each vignette (with what I identify as the 'morals' in italics).

8: Milo of Croton — He is seen receiving acclaim for carrying the bull through the stadium. *The spectators should rather be applauding Death/Charon, who will overpower even Milo.*[35]

9: Cyrus — He is seen as he contemplates consolidating his military successes by overthrowing Croesus. *The moral comes in 13: Cyrus will be decapitated by Tomyris and have his head put in a wineskin.*

9-13: Croesus and Solon — They are seen during their conversation in Herodotus (1.29-33) about the fortunate life. In an embedded scene Croesus sends gold ingots to Delphi (11), which is picked up in the second, non-Herodotean, part of Croesus' and Solon's conversation. *The pursuit of riches makes people do terrible things. Croesus' wealth will not prevent his defeat by Cyrus.*

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34. This is also demonstrated by Hermes' account (1) of Hephaestus being thrown from heaven by Zeus 'just lately' (πρῴην), although the evidence of Homer shows it must have taken place before the action of the *Iliad*, and therefore well before the sixth-century Herodotean events which they are viewing. Consider the similar collapsing of time in the afterlife of *VH* (p.234 above).

35. At Acharaca in Caria a bull was carried by athletic men every year to the cave of the Charoneion (Strabo 14.1.44). This may add extra point to Charon's observation here.

13: Cambyses — He will become king. *But will suffer bad luck and go insane.*

14: Polycrates of Samos — His ring has just been found in the fish, in a moment of apparent good luck. *But he will be betrayed and impaled.*

15-21: The common people — This is the most wide-ranging section, covering the many human activities of the πληθύς. *Humans seek wealth and power, but forget that they must leave them behind when they die.*

22: Tombs in general — People offer dinners, libations, garlands and perfume. *But do not know that the souls do not come up from below to get them.*

23: The tombs of Achilles and other heroes — A pendant to the previous vignette. *The tombs (even though they commemorate heroes) are not large.*

23: Ruined cities — They were once great and celebrated by Homer. *But now lie in ruins.*

24: Argives and Spartans — The armies are seen at war over the plain where they are fighting. *The plain will keep changing hands; the Spartans' trophy will be turned up by a plough some day.*

Exactly how many vignettes there are is perhaps debatable; I have not counted Tomyris separately, since she is introduced only to form the end of Cyrus' story. And is Achilles' tomb just a special example illustrating the more generic human tombs? But if there are indeed ten vignettes, the number parallels the ten stories told by the participants in the symposium of *Philopseudes*, which range, just like these, from short outlines of a few sentences to much more lengthy tales. There

are also ten vignettes on the Shield of Achilles (counting the city at peace and city at war as separate items despite the lack of an introductory formula for the second); these similarly vary in length and detail.

Lucian's first five vignettes, which focus on specific individuals, recall the identification of individuals in the *teikhoskopia*,[36] but also form a counterpoint to the following long section on the πληθύς. This latter section, and the scenes of tombs and ruined cities, are most reminiscent of the Shield of Achilles; the final vignette combines Homer (in the form of the fighting over a plain, as at Troy, and the trophy, which recalls the loss of Achilles' armour that led to the shield's manufacture) with Herodotus, who tells the story of the Argives and Spartans and is also an obvious source for the first five characters to whom Charon was introduced.[37] By contrast, the long section on the common people is similar in its

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36.   The Homeric introductions to the first two, with direct quotation of material from the *teikhoskopia*, make that scene the most obvious intertext, but it is significant that the first vignette is not of a military scene (or military hero) but of peacetime athletics — 'war minus the shooting', to quote Orwell (1970 [1945]), on the classical application of which see Spivey (2004: ch.1). It is not until the final vignette that there is a scene, of fighting over a plain, that echoes directly what happens during the *teikhoskopia*, although the ruined cities and the tomb of Achilles have introduced this theme obliquely. The funeral games of *Il.* 23 contrast with Charon's grim point: Milo is not competing in such games, but will soon have a funeral of his own. These funeral games are parodied in the Thanatousia of *VH* 2.22: Kim (2010: 168).

37.   Hdt. 1.82. These characters appear at Hdt. 3.137 (Milo, with the incident in Lucian drawn from elsewhere: cf. Ath. 10.412f-413a); 1.214 (Cyrus and Tomyris); 1.29-33 (Croesus and Solon) & 1.50-1 (Croesus' ingots and other dedications); 3.27-38 (Cambyses); 3.39-43 &

focus to the scenes of the Shield, but with certain significant differences which we can now explore further in an analysis of Shield-themes throughout the dialogue.

Lucian begins with Hermes discovering that Charon has come to 'our part of the world', and asking why he has undertaken his *anabasis*. This recalls the presentation of Thetis' movement from her more accustomed space to the palace of Hephaestus. Hermes asks:

> τί γελᾷς, ὦ Χάρων; ἢ τί τὸ πορθμεῖον ἀπολιπὼν δεῦρο
> ἀνελήλυθας εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν οὐ πάνυ εἰωθὼς
> ἐπιχωριάζειν τοῖς ἄνω πράγμασιν;

> What are you laughing at, Charon? Why have you left
> your ferry and come up here to our world — you who
> don't usually pay a visit[38] to matters up above?

This recalls the words of Hephaestus' wife Charis (and later Hephaestus himself):

> τίπτε, Θέτι τανύπεπλε, ἱκάνεις ἡμέτερον δῶ
> αἰδοίη τε φίλη τε; πάρος γε μὲν οὔ τι θαμίζεις.

> Why, flowing-robed Thetis, are you coming to our
> house, dear and reverend lady? This has not previ-
> ously been your custom at all.[39]

Both ask 'Why have you come to *our* place?' and observe that this is an unusual, unexpected visit. Charon, like Thetis, makes a request for assistance, so already in the opening speech Lucian has set up a Homeric parallel.

120-5 (Polycrates).

38. Tackaberry (1930: 73) well observes that ἐπιχωριάζειν alludes to ἐπιχωρίῳ at Pl., *Phdr.* 230c, as ξεναγεῖν alludes to ἐξενάγηται in the same passage of Plato: see below (n.62).

39. *Il.* 18.385-6 = 424-5.

When Hermes worries in his next speech that Zeus might throw him out of heaven as he has recently done with Hephaestus,[40] he recalls Hephaestus' own account of this event (which is why he owes a debt to Thetis, as she saved him) at *Il.* 18.394-409.[41] Again, the Homeric original involves a god visiting somewhere other than their accustomed place; like Thetis, Charon then makes his request for help. He asks Hermes not to leave him stranded like the blind who 'stumble and reel about' (σφάλλονται καὶ διολισθάνουσιν), obliquely recalling once more the lame Hephaestus and hinting at the blind Homer whose meeting with Charon will be prominent later. When Hermes is eventually persuaded to do as Charon wishes, he speaks of the obligation he feels to a friend — 'What is one to do, when a friend compels one?' (τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ πάθοι τις, ὁπότε φίλος τις ὢν βιάζοιτο;) — and Hephaestus makes a similar point, saying 'my *thumos* bids me fulfil [whatever you ask]' (τελέσαι δέ με θυμὸς ἄνωγεν).[42]

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40.   As well as the danger of being laughed at like Hephaestus (*Il.* 1.599-600 & *Od.* 8.325-7), Hermes has special reason to fear any resulting lameness, since his function as messenger and psychopomp requires him to travel far and swiftly.

41.   Charrière (2011: 30) notes that Lucian prefers this account (both here and at *De sacrificiis* 6) to the contradictory one at *Il.* 18.395-405, where Hera throws Hephaestus out after discovering his lameness: see Σ A *Il.* 1.591. Charrière argues that this was the more familiar version in Lucian's time, as in the second-century Apollod., *Bibl.* 1.3.5 (for date and authorship see Fowler (2013: 378-84)), but also that it is simply more promising comedic material.

42.   *Il.* 18.426.

These reminiscences have therefore established a number of parallels with the situation which led to the creation of Achilles' Shield, and Lucian makes a clear intertextual connection with the Homeric story by having Hermes rework Iliadic lines. Homer has ῥῖψε ποδὸς τεταγὼν ἀπὸ βηλοῦ θεσπεσίοιο (*Il.* 1.591) and τεταγὼν ἀπὸ βηλοῦ (15.23, when Zeus makes a similar threat to Hera); Hermes says (1) ῥίψῃ κἀμὲ τεταγὼν τοῦ ποδὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ θεσπεσίου βηλοῦ. In substituting κἀμέ for ποδός as the second word, replacing the genitive -οιο ending and altering the word order of the second half of the line, Hermes has sufficiently disrupted the metrical form that the quotation feels prosaic; indeed Harmon (1915), usually alert to Homeric allusion, fails to note the source.[43] But Homeric origins are betrayed by the vocabulary, especially the Homeric form τεταγών. Literal quotation of the entire line would in any case have been impossible, since the aorist ῥῖψε could not stand in the context of this sentence, a factor which perhaps influenced the additional prosification.

When the mountains have been successfully piled up, Charon sees first the earth's physical features (recalling the opening of the Shield *ekphrasis*), before looking closer to spot the people and their 'dens'. When Hermes identifies these as cities, it seems as though things are moving on to the next part of the Shield, the cities at peace and war. But this proves an abortive start; Charon's complaint that he cannot see all the detail he had hoped for redirects the observation onto

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43. The tradition of prosifying Homer goes back to Socrates' paraphrase of *Il.* 1.12-42 (Pl., *Resp.* 3.393d-394a).

individuals, with cities only reappearing towards the end of the dialogue, although the acropolis of Sardis is mentioned in passing as Croesus is introduced (9).

The king who appears on the Shield of Achilles is supervising the harvest while a sacrifice and meal are prepared for the workers (550-60). This comes immediately after a description of the plough-furrows which look real but are fashioned by Hephaestus from gold. When Lucian's Croesus sends his ingots to Delphi (11), Hermes considers how different gold is from agricultural produce: gold is rare and must be dug from deep in the earth in small amounts. Not only does Croesus harvest gold rather than food from the earth, but there is also a contrast between Croesus' offering (in payment for prophecies, since he is 'extraordinarily fond of oracles' (φιλόμαντις ... ἐκτόπως)) and the sacrifice made as a thank-offering at the harvest by Homer's king. Because of his obsession with gold and prophecy, Croesus will himself end up offered like a 'sacrifice' on the pyre.

After the harvest on the Shield comes the vintage and accompanying celebrations (561-72). But next in Lucian comes Tomyris, who will cut off Cyrus' head and put it in a wineskin full of blood. In this perversion of the Shield the wine represents barbaric celebration, and has acquired a sinister association, making it a striking example of this dialogue's lack of 'optimism'.

In 15-21, on the common people, and the section on tombs (22), comes the fuller range of human experience missing from the limited 'microcosm' of the Shield. As well as men fighting, litigating and farming, who do appear on the Shield, Hermes describes sailors, moneylenders and beggars, who do not. But whereas the

litigation in the Shield's city at peace represents the orderly governance of a civilized society, Lucian's mortals are like wasps (15), all stinging their neighbours.[44] Furthermore, the nasty abstractions which had their place in the Shield's city at war — Strife (Ἔρις), Uproar (Κυδοιμός) and Doom (Κήρ) (535) — are actually outnumbered by those in the Lucianic city at peace — Hopes,[45] Fears, Ignorance, Pleasures, Greed, Anger, Hatred, Jealousy, Stupidity, and Doubt (15), not to mention the Fates (16), Death (17), and Error (21). Life in supposedly peaceful cities is made terrifying not only by these but also by the many threats to life and limb (17):[46]

> ἄγγελοι δὲ καὶ ὑπηρέται αὐτοῦ [= Θανάτου] μάλα
> πολλοί, ὡς ὁρᾷς, ἠπίαλοι καὶ πυρετοὶ καὶ φθόαι καὶ
> περιπλευμονίαι καὶ ξίφη καὶ ληστήρια καὶ κώνεια καὶ
> δικασταὶ καὶ τύραννοι.

> [Death's] messengers and servants are very many, as
> you see — chills, fevers, wasting diseases, inflamma-

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44.   This simile can hardly help recalling the theriomorphized chorus of Aristophanes' *Wasps*, and Aristophanes' presentation of Athenians as hyper-litigious (*Nub.* 206-8, 494-6; *Av.* 40-1; *Eq.* 1316-7).

45.   The prominence of Hopes in this list, together with the reappearance of Hope later, seems an allusion to Hesiod's account of Pandora's 'box' (*Op.* 96-9). Tackaberry (1930: 79) suggests a parallel with the list of troubles in Pl., *Resp.* 9.576d-578a.

46.   This is a clear example of Lucian's perversion of the Shield material, and strongly recalls Auden's procedure in 'The Shield of Achille*s*', with the city at peace revealing its hidden unpleasantness: 'His hands had set no dancing-floor | But a weed-choked field. | A ragged urchin, aimless and alone, | Loitered about that vacancy; a bird | Flew up to safety from his well-aimed stone: | That girls are raped, that two boys knife a third, | Were axioms to him'.

tions of the lung, swords, pirate ships, doses of hemlock, judges, and tyrants.

In particular, the tale of the man building a house without knowing that he will never live to move into it recalls the pathos of the man killed by a tile after promising to come to dinner, to Charon's great amusement (6), and shows the poignant truth behind the Shield's joyful 'everyday' scenes.[47] The reminder of an earlier point in the dialogue is followed up with two further reminiscences, which place some of the individual characters already encountered into the wider context of this all-embracing scene, and seem to mark Lucian's conscious summing-up. The phrase 'the father of the athlete victorious at Olympia' (τὸν τοῦ ἀθλητοῦ πατέρα τοῦ Ὀλύμπια νενικηκότος) recalls Milo (8), while 'those who pile up money' (τοὺς συναγείροντας τὰ χρήματα) are a reminder of Croesus' excessive wealth (10-12).

Since Ocean has already appeared at the beginning of this 'observation' of the world, the ending of the dialogue has nothing of the finality achieved by the all-encircling river, on the outermost rim, which rounds off Homer's description of the

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47.   Note the close parallels to i) Protesilaus (*Il.* 2.698-702), who left his house half-built, and whose request to be permitted to finish it was Charon's precedent for 'shore-leave' from Hades (1); ii) the theme of building earlier in the dialogue when Hermes and Charon construct their super-mountain with the guidance of Homer the ἀρχιτέκτων; and iii) Jesus' parable (*Luc.* 12.16-20) about the rich man's plans to build bigger barns, which concludes with a Charon-like question from God: 'But God said to him, "You idiot, this night your soul is demanded back from you; whose will be those things which you have prepared?"' (εἶπεν δὲ αὐτῷ ὁ θεός, "ἄφρων, ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ τὴν ψυχήν σου ἀπαιτοῦσιν ἀπὸ σοῦ· ἃ δὲ ἡτοίμασας, τίνι ἔσται;"). In *Dial. mort.* 18 (=8), Cnemon says he died suddenly when his roof fell in; contrast Homer, where the drunk Elpenor falls from Circe's still-intact roof (*Od.* 10.552-60).

Shield. Instead the apparently closural discussion of tombs and the destruction of cities is followed by a more unsettling final look at warfare (24). But unlike the Homeric 'city at war', this conflict is not even over a city, but just the plain — the conflict between Spartans and Argives.[48] However, in a reversal of the earlier pattern, where peacetime calm covers up all kinds of terrors and dangers, Charon sets this wartime scene in the context of repeated peacetime cultivation, by one people after another: 'This plain will be farmed by different people at different times, and often with their plough they will turn up the trophy from the depths' (τὸ δὲ πεδίον τοῦτο ἄλλοτε ἄλλοι γεωργήσουσι πολλάκις ἐκ βάθρων τὸ τρόπαιον ἀνασπάσαντες τῷ ἀρότρῳ). This theme of 'land and wealth forever changing owners' has already appeared in Charon's speech (20); the combination of that theme with the present specific example of a trophy being unearthed by the plough forms a final link to the Trojan War and the arms of Achilles which include the Shield.[49] Hephaestus has to provide him with new armour because Patroclus

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48. Charon's final reference to Homer uses Homeric epithets for Troy ironically — and Charrière (2011: 43) notes the wordplay Κλεωναί ~ κλέος in the adaptation (23) of *Il.* 2.570 ἐϋκτιμένας τε Κλεωνάς: 'Woe for your praises, Homer, and your names, "Holy wide-wayed Troy" and "well-built Cleonae!"' (παπαὶ τῶν ἐπαίνων, Ὅμηρε, καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων, "Ἴλιος ἱρὴ" καὶ "εὐρυάγυια" καὶ "ἐϋκτίμεναι Κλεωναί"). So on his final outing in the dialogue Homer is addressed with the characteristic condescending pity which Charon applies to mortals in general. By changing the case and omitting τε, Charon has disrupted the metrical form, in a way that perhaps reflects the cities' own destruction.

49. Contrast the sombre mood here with the sense of marvel (*mirabitur*) in the happier thought at Verg., *Geor.* 1.493-7.

borrowed the previous set and had it stripped from him after his death; and the armour which Hephaestus makes will itself become the subject of dispute between Odysseus and Ajax after Achilles' own death.

6.3 — *Teikhoskopia* and looking from above

We have already seen parts of the dialogue which make reference to the *teikhoskopia* of *Il.* 3.121-244. This has a connection with Lucian's allusions to the Shield, since Hephaestus' depiction of women, children and old men standing on the walls around the Shield's city at war recalls this *teikhoskopia*.[50] I therefore turn next to Lucian's use of this theme in *Charon*, as Hermes and Charon figure themselves in the position of Helen and Priam; we shall also see connections with other epic passages where characters observe others from a distance.[51]

The first parallel between the Helen-Priam and Hermes-Charon pairs comes in their boundary-crossing: at the beginning of the dialogue, Charon has already transgressed the boundary between lower and upper worlds; Helen is likewise transgressive as a woman taking an advisor- or 'narrator'-role, by informing the king about matters of warfare: 'A transgressive woman acts as narrator within this

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50. *Il.* 18. 514-15. They are 'guarding' (ῥύατ') the wall, rather than watching the battle, but the former implies the latter.

51. Lucian's use of lines from the *teikhoskopia* is discussed by Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 109-19).

most masculine of genres'.[52] Furthermore, each of the acts of viewing in Homer, and of viewing and listening in *Charon*, is likewise a form of transgression, as it constitutes an act of eavesdropping.

Cultural attitudes to eavesdropping have been little researched, as Locke complains in his recent book on the subject: 'The reason why social scientists have failed' to study the subject 'is not because they looked for it and discovered that there was nothing to be seen. They never looked in the first place.'[53] Among his evidence for changing cultural *mores* is an early-18th-century literary text reminiscent of *Charon*'s viewing-from-above. In Alain-René Le Sage's *Le Diable Boiteux*, the demon Asmodeus reveals the secret thoughts of Madrid's populace to his human disciple Don Cleophas, by magically removing the roofs of their houses.[54] The parallel with Lucian is probably not coincidental, since it is evident from

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52. Lovatt (2013: 217). For an earlier comic view of mortals from above by means of transgressive *anabasis*, consider the dung-beetle ride of Ar., *Pax*, esp. 819-23, where Trygaeus says after his journey 'straight to the gods' (εὐθὺ τῶν θεῶν) that humans looked bad from up there, but are even worse when viewed at close quarters. See too Lucian's *Icaromenippus*.

53. Locke (2010: 3). Scholars of classical drama are rather ahead of the game on this though; see n.60 below for discussions of eavesdropping in comedy and tragedy.

54. Locke (2010: 13); A.-R. Le Sage (1708). Bakhtin (1981: 127): 'the Lame Devil ... exposes personal life at those moments when a "third person's" presence would not be permitted'. Note too the similar comic theme of Defoe's *Political History of the Devil*, which relates the Devil's return to earth and his discovery that he is being blamed for humans', and especially tyrants', misdeeds: this work has explicit intertextual connections of its own with *Paradise Lost*: Rothman & Bowerman (2003: 560-1).

chapter 17 of the expanded second edition (1726) that Le Sage was familiar with Lucian: 'Il a été riché; mais il s'est ruiné comme le Timon de Lucien'; indeed the connection between Le Sage's work and *Charon* was noted at least as early as 1839: 'This dramatic sketch ... is a sort of protoype of the *Diable Boiteux;* of which, however, the *Cobbler and the Cock* [i.e. *Somnium (Gallus)*] is the direct original.'[55] Asmodeus' physical removal of roofs makes the eavesdropping more blatant, but the satirical principle is identical to Lucian's: foolish, morally dubious humans are observed unawares by a pair of characters (in *Charon*, both superhuman; in Le Sage only one superhuman), with one using the eavesdropping to instruct the other about human foibles.

Yet for Hermes and Charon there is no need for removal of roofs. While some of what they observe clearly happens outside (such as Milo's athletics), elsewhere, in locations such as Croesus' palace, walls and roofs seem to cause no obstruction, although Lucian does not make it clear whether the 'magic charm' from Homer which improves Charon's vision also gives him X-ray eyes and super-sensitive hearing.[56]

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55.   From the introduction to Maginn (1839: 732).

56.   See further below, §6.5. Exceptional powers of both sight and hearing are found together in the Norse god Heimdall ('He can see, by night just as well as by day, a distance of a hundred leagues. He can also hear grass growing on the earth and wool on sheep and everything that sounds louder than that', according to Snorri Sturlson's *Edda* (*Gylfaginning* 27; tr. Faulkes (1987: 25)), but Lynceus, to whom Charon compares himself, seems only to have the former. In Posidippus 99 AB a deaf man's hearing is restored so well that he can

Charon's myopia (no doubt the result of his full-time work in the dingy underworld) recalls a passage in the tragic *teikhoskopia* of Euripides' *Phoenissae*, when, in a bathetic-cum-pathetic moment, Antigone complains that she cannot see her distant brother clearly enough (158-62). Mastronarde writes that 'the notion of the difficulty of viewing from a distance is deployed emphatically at just this point not as a matter of realism, but in order to heighten the poignancy of [Antigone's] separation from her brother'.[57] This is at least open to interpretation as implied criticism of Homer for allowing his characters to see details from the top of a city wall with an implausible degree of clarity, and might have inspired Lucian, concerned as he always is to point out the absurdities of mythology, to make this a feature of his own *teikhoskopia*.[58]

This ability to overcome limitations of visual and aural distance marks a significant difference from the Homeric *teikhoskopia*. Helen and Priam are also looking at people without their knowledge, and the objects of their gaze are

hear speech clearly through brick walls.

57.   Mastronarde (1994: 196).

58.   Whether Euripides is interested in 'criticising' other authors in this way is best exemplified by modern debate over the 'parody' in *Electra* of Aeschylus' use of recognition tokens in *Choephori*. Multiple interpretations of what Euripides is trying to achieve and the purpose of any 'humour' here are not mutually exclusive: 'Euripides is not just mocking Aeschylean practice in this scene. ... The humorous questioning of the Aeschylean devices of recognition is also a serious questioning of Aeschylus' manipulation of the Orestes myth in its widest implications as played out in the recognition scene' (Goldhill (1986: 249)). See too the discussion of Cropp (2013: 178-81).

unaware of exactly who is looking at them,[59] but the Homeric heroes are in a situation where they expect, indeed desire, to be looked at; after all, the shield of Agamemnon or Achilles is very much something to be seen, and to be visible too in the fear of those who look upon it. Moreover, Helen and Priam are unable to hear the words of any of the warriors, and Helen is unable even to distinguish the chattering of the Trojan elders who are close to her (3.150-2), whereas Charon and Hermes listen in to distant private conversation. Charon's initial frustration at not being able to hear what is going on in the scene spread out before him is perhaps in part a comment on the lack of true 'vividness' here, just as Helen's failure to hear the scene in Homer contrasts with the usual *enargeia* of Homeric *ekphrasis.*

In contrast to the *teikhoskopia*, most of the dialogue's settings are relatively domesticated and 'everyday', with Charon and Hermes almost condescending to the position of the slaves whose omnipresence in the ancient household must have ensured they saw and heard plenty more than their masters would have liked, an anxiety reflected in the frequent use of eavesdropping (and especially slaves' eavesdropping) as a plot device in comedy. By making Hermes and Charon characters who listen as well as see, and to whom walls are no obstacle, Lucian is

59.   With respect to being unaware of who is observing one, Locke (2010: 109-11) adduces Gyges' ring of invisibility in Pl., *Resp.* 2.359a-360d as a tool to facilitate eavesdropping and other misbehaviour. Lucian alludes this ring at *Bis accusatus* 21 and *Navigium* 42 (Tackaberry (1930: 82)); the appearance of Polycrates' ring in *Charon*, and its combination with the appearance of Gyges' master Candaules, suggest that he had this Plato passage at least in the back of his mind.

therefore giving the scene echoes of comedy at the same time as it has echoes of epic, a generic confusion which he often exploits.[60] In the context of *Charon*, it is significant that in one version of the story of Protesilaus (the first man mentioned in the dialogue), a slave peeps through the door to catch Laodamia *in flagrante* with a simulacrum of her dead husband Protesilaus, a version of the story that was probably the subject of Euripides' *Protesilaus*.[61] Lucian has therefore begun his

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60.   See my earlier discussion of Homeric allusion in the New Comic world of *Dial. meretr.* (§2.2.3 & §2.2.4). For comic eavesdropping see Menander (e.g. Onesimus (slave) in *Epitrepontes*, Moschion (free) in *Perikeiromene*), and Roman comedy *passim.* Marshall (2006) discusses Plaut., *Persa* 544-75, where 'the scene functions like an eavesdropping scene' and 'the focus remains on the eavesdroppers [i.e. the *leno* Dordalus and slave Toxilus] except when they call attention to the *virgo*' (162); and 'Eavesdropping creates a ... split-focus scene: the character or characters on one side of the stage are aware of the presence of those on the other side, but such awareness operates only in one direction' (167). Moore (1998: 34-40) and Slater (2000: 133-6) discuss Plautus' eavesdropping scenes. For Donatus' brief comment on the eavesdropping at Ter., *An.* 415 see Demetriou (2014: 790). In tragedy, 'ordinary servants, too, seen and not heard, are effective eavesdroppers' (Mills (2013)).

61.   For the likely plot see Hyg. *Fab.* 104 and note Eur. fr. 655 Kannicht, with Bettini (1999: 239 n.18): 'based on the way in which the citation appears in Dio Chrysostom [37.46, probably by Favorinus], it can be clearly deduced that Laodamia is referring to the statue that she has in her possession.' Laodamia's father later places the simulacrum on a pyre, another intriguing half-connection with the subject matter of this dialogue — Croesus' near-death on the pyre. Protesilaus' request is dramatized in *Dial. mort.* 28 (=23), where he alerts Pluto and Persephone to the precedents of Orpheus/Eurydice and Heracles/Alcestis, just as Charon in his appeal gave the precedent of Protesilaus himself. Bowersock (1994: 111-2) discusses Protesilaus' possible connection with contemporary 'correction' of Homer. On Protesilaus in Philost., *Her.*, see Kim (2010: ch.6).

dialogue by alluding to a myth which shares its themes of eavesdropping and time-limited *anabasis* from the underworld.

Lucian has taken the Homeric situation and given it a few more turns of the screw, making the eavesdropping more effective, and more sinister, than the observation of the *teikhoskopia*.[62] The Homeric connection is emphasized, since not once but twice Charon quotes Priam's words to Helen.[63] If Lucian is being consistent, the reader should assume that these words were among the lines that Charon learned from Homer in the ferry, since this is apparently the only occasion when he has had the chance of learning any Homeric verse (see §6.4 below); and while they could have been collected from Homer's vomit, it is easy to imagine Homer himself asking such questions of Charon on seeing his fellow-passengers or inhabitants of the underworld. The reader might therefore deduce that Charon has himself acted

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62.   Charon's use of ξεναγήσεις to Hermes (1) seems to be an allusion to Pl., *Phdr.* 230c, a possibility raised by Hemsterhuis (Hemsterhuis & Reitz (1789-93 [1743]: Vol.3, 369)), which would make Charon equivalent to Socrates (who is unaccustomed to travelling outside the city just as Charon is unfamiliar with the upper world), and Hermes like his guide Phaedrus. The *Phaedrus* also has a connection with the looking-from-above theme (247a-d) which also appears at *Phaedo* 109e; both appear in the list of Platonic myths used by Lucian in Anderson (1976a: 7 n.51).

63.   Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 116) remarks that 'Lucien a vraisemblablement en tête tout le passage de la τειχοσκοπία', going on to note that Hermes and Charon looking down 'font penser à Priam et Hélène qui, des remparts de Troie, regardent vers la plaine les guerriers Achéens.' However, she explores the idea no further. Helm (1906: 171) and Camerotto (1998: 20) also make the connection with Priam.

as a Helen-style 'guide' for the passengers on his ferry, especially Homer, who have made the downward journey which Charon is now reversing.

The lines he adapts are *Il.* 3.226-7, which form Priam's third question to Helen (as he looks at Ajax):[64]

> τίς τ' ἄρ' ὅδ' ἄλλος Ἀχαιὸς ἀνὴρ ἠΰς τε μέγας τε,
> ἔξοχος Ἀργείων κεφαλήν τε καὶ εὐρέας ὤμους;
>
> Who then is this other Achaean man, big and strong,
> standing out head and broad shoulders from the Achaeans?

In Charon's first adaptation (at the beginning of 8), three changes are made. ἄλλος is replaced by ἐστι: keeping ἄλλος would be nonsensical because this is the first identification Charon is asking for, whereas it is Priam's third. This change suggests that Lucian is establishing that this resembles the *teikhoskopia* as early as possible. The second and third changes edit out references to the Greeks, with ὅδ' ἄλλος Ἀχαιὸς ἀνὴρ becoming ὅδ' ἐστὶ πάχιστος ἀνήρ[65] and Ἀργείων becoming ἀνθρώπων. So these are essentially pragmatic changes enabling Lucian to emphasize quickly the Homeric intertext the reader should have in mind. This happens even before the lines are quoted: Camerotto (1998: 22) identifies a Homeric adaptation in the

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64. Bouquiaux-Simon's discussion (1968: 115-18) of the textual issue regarding the readings γάρ, τ' ἄρ and τἄρ in line 226 is not of importance for the points I make here — but on this question see Lowe (1973).

65. Here the competing reading κάκιστος seems an obvious *lectio facilior* miscopying, although Camerotto (1998: 22 n.24) should at least give us pause by citing κάκιστος ἀνήρ in *Il.* 16.570.

phrase with which the lines are introduced (εἰπὲ γάρ μοι), which differs only slightly from the opening of *Il.* 3.192 (εἰπ᾽ ἄγε μοι).

When, at the beginning of 9, Charon adapts line 226 (only), he becomes more adventurous. He uses the Homeric line unchanged up to ἄλλος, which is enough to recall it to the reader's mind again, but then continues with a phrase of his own, 'the majestic/august/haughty man' (ὁ σεμνὸς ἀνήρ), which is not drawn from Homer and seems to be entirely his own invention. The Greeks, edited out of the previous adaptation, are no longer a concern since the second line has disappeared, and, in a clever intertextual play set up by the previous, fuller quotation, Charon draws attention to this omission by surmising, correctly, that the man he is looking at is 'apparently not Greek' (οὐχ Ἕλλην, ὡς ἔοικεν).[66]

These two appropriations of Homer prompt the reader to think of Charon as corresponding to Priam, since he is the one asking the questions. However, whereas Priam is unable to identify the Greeks because he is a non-combatant by reason of his age, Charon is totally ignorant, having never previously ventured into 'battle' in the upper world (2): 'I know nothing of things above the earth, being a stranger' (ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν οἶδα τῶν ὑπὲρ γῆς ξένος ὤν). This is not to say that he is never in a position of knowledge, though: as well as the earlier implication that he answered Homer's questions about the world of the dead, Charon makes clear in his second

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66.   In §6.4 below I expand upon these observations, arguing that this pair of adaptations in fact forms part of a sub-plot involving Charon's attempts at (re-)composing Homeric verse.

speech of the dialogue, as well as his first speech in 3, that he is the one with expertise in sailing in the underworld and Hermes must do as he is told when he is the one visiting.[67] Lucian also varies the structure of the conversation between Hermes and Charon, with some vignettes introduced by Charon asking 'Who is that?' and others by Hermes directing Charon's attention to them.[68] This reflects the pattern in the *teikhoskopia*, where Priam asks questions by pointing out some striking figures, but Helen also looks about on her own initiative, seeking out those particularly important to her — Idomeneus (230), Castor and Pollux (234-8).[69]

Consider now the response of Helen and Priam, who express admiration for the physically impressive warriors they are observing, as well as Helen's wistful longing for her brothers. This response contrasts with the amusement of Hermes and Charon at what they see unfolding below them. In this respect they more closely resemble Zeus watching from Olympus with pleasurable laughter (ἐγέλασσε … γηθοσύνῃ) at the ridiculous spectacle of the *theomakhia*.[70] Charon's overwhelming

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67.   This question of expertise recurs in the later discussion, which is reminiscent of Plato's *Ion*. On this see too Plut., *An seni* 12, on the 'art of being a ship's captain' (κυβερνητικά).

68.   There is however, an age-reversal: Hermes, son of Zeus and Maia, is a 'younger' being than Charon, who is represented as an old man in art. On the development of the Hermes-Charon double-act and modern interpretations of Charon's old age, see Sourvinou-Inwood (1995: ch.5).

69.   What initially brought her to the wall was a longing for Menelaus: 3.139-40.

70.   *Il.* 21.389-90.

feeling of amusement has been emphasized from the dialogue's very first words, and comes in response to mortals acting just as mortals do — which means paradoxically acting just as though they were immortal. His reaction is like that of Zeus watching immortals acting like mortals; and with his good view from above he is able to indulge himself all the more, just as Zeus does. The phrase (5) 'each taking one peak' (μίαν ἑκάτερος ἄκραν ἀπολαβόμενοι) even recalls how Hera stands on one peak of Ida, and Zeus sits on another peak.[71]

For mortals such as Helen and Achilles (who looks on from the wall and trench in *Il.* 18.202-38, weeping for Patroclus), *teikhoskopia* is an activity associated with sadness and sympathy. Zeus too is capable of feeling a concern for favourite mortals[72] which is quite alien to Charon, whose reactions extend only to gloating, bemusement and a decidedly condescending version of pity.[73]

These immortals' reactions contrast with those of the Homeric narrator, who brings himself to the fore when Helen is unable to see her brothers and gives

71. *Il.* 14.153-60.

72. Primarily his dilemma (*Il.* 16.433-8) over whether to save his son Sarpedon, 'dearest of men' (φίλτατον ἀνδρῶν). Charon has no emotional attachment to any mortal, and certainly not to any living mortal, having met none of them before. Halliwell (2008: 447): 'Charon … may resemble the Olympians in his capacity to observe human life with detachment, but he entirely lacks the compensating factors of personal interest and even pity that can complicate, and sometimes soften, divine attitudes to events on earth.'

73. Gloating: τοῦτον οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν γέλωτα ἡμῖν παρέξοντα ὁπόταν πλέῃ (8), bemusement: δεινήν τινα λέγεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν ἀβελτερίαν, οἳ τοσοῦτον ἔρωτα ἐρῶσιν ὠχροῦ καὶ βαρέος κτήματος [i.e. gold] (11), condescending pity: ὦ μάταιοι, τῆς ἀνοίας (22).

her own, faulty, explanation for their absence (236-42). The narrator is calm and restrained in giving the real reason (243-4): 'so she spoke, but already the life-giving earth held them fast there in Lacedaemon, in their dear native land' (ὣς φάτο, τοὺς δ᾽ ἤδη κάτεχεν φυσίζοος αἶα | ἐν Λακεδαίμονι αὖθι, φίλῃ ἐν πατρίδι γαίῃ).[74] The lack of an omniscient narrator ought not to be felt in *Charon*, since Hermes is a god, and proves himself well informed and able to answer all of Charon's questions, going beyond the information known by the mortals themselves. But Charon's amused and callous reactions to what he sees — and, unlike Helen, he is able to see everything that he wants — make a strong contrast both with Helen's grief at her inability to see her absent relatives, and with the narrator's measured response to a situation which, in the form of her ignorance about her brothers' death, resembles the ignorance of the man whom Charon saw being killed by the falling tile after making his dinner plans for the next day (6). Whereas the Homeric narrator's omniscience often leads, as here, to sympathy for characters, Lucian's immortals react with little sense of sympathy.

The theme of human mortality reminds the reader that Charon has a personal stake in all of this: as he himself puts it, '[Milo] will very soon be giving us a laugh when he's on my ferry'. Charon is thus like Helen, over whom the duel of *Il.* 3 (and the war more generally) is being fought, in the sense that she also has a significant interest in the outcome of the events she is observing. But Charon's

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74.   Lovatt (2013: 222): 'The text draws a strong contrast between what she says and what is really true, emphasising Helen's subordination to gods and narrator.'

interest is simply the result of his appetite for money and amusement at the dead; he is forever looking forward to more opportunities to laugh at life's little ironies. When the final vignette comes, this difference is emphasized since the soldiers are fighting over the plain itself and not over Charon, who will rather be a beneficiary in terms of extra dead men and, no doubt, a bumper crop of laughter. The scene's humour is heightened by this implicit contrast with Helen, whose self-recriminatory speech on the wall, her weeping and indeed her awareness of being the prize for the duel, suggest that laughter is the last thing on her mind.[75]

Lucian goes further than Homer in exploiting one narratological possibility of *teikhoskopia* — employing *mise en abyme* in the extended vignette of Solon and Croesus, in a way that is harder to do with the Homeric viewers, who are unable to hear what they are observing. Croesus judges Solon adversely for offering his own judgement on Croesus' wealth and (in Croesus' view) being jealous of it, while Hermes and Charon offer their judgements on both of these human characters, Solon being the only mortal in the whole work about whom they cannot find a bad word to say. When Solon asks Croesus about Lydia's mineral produce (gold more than iron), and when Hermes says Solon is laughing at Croesus' 'barbarian arrogance', Lucian is recalling the procedure of the Hippocratic *Airs, Waters, Places*, which begins by explaining how to look for knowledge about peoples by considering natural features and their effects on human health and habits in different places. In

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75.   She hears the terms of the duel from Iris (3.130-8), weeps (139-45), and blames herself (172-80).

presenting this wide-ranging view of the world, the author of that work takes a conceptual tour in order to benefit people medically. Solon, who has also gained such wisdom, having physically travelled around the world, is attempting to benefit Croesus morally. But Hermes and Charon, with a genuinely 'god's-eye' view, are able to see the deeper truth that such moral benefit is simply not possible.

Finally, let us turn to a more fundamental question: why must Hermes and Charon go to the effort of piling up a viewing platform in order to look down from above? Could they not have sped around the earth instead? Lucian's answer is that there is simply not time, as Hermes is afraid that much delay will land him in Zeus's bad books (1). By using Homeric 'charms' they are easily able to construct the super-mountain,[76] but this raises the objection that they could have found other Homeric passages that could be recited or combined in a cento to enable speedy flight.[77] Such easy travel is also a trope of Old Comedy, especially Aristophanes' *Clouds* and *Birds*,

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76.   In Greek mythology mountains are 'places of danger and reversal' (Buxton (2009: 206-7)), so their association with Charon's *anabasis* also emphasizes his reversal of natural order in leaving the underworld.

77.   See, e.g., Σ bT *Il.* 14.226-7 on Homer's narrative reasons for treating Hera's movements as he does. In just six lines (225-30) she covers a huge distance, using 'a cross between flying and stepping from one peak to the next' (Janko (1994: 187)). As well as the Aloadae, there is another Homeric precedent for mountain-moving: in *Od.* 13. 159-64, Poseidon wants to turn the Phaeacian ship to stone and to place a mountain on top of their city. His plan may be frustrated, although 'the text leaves it quite unclear' (Bowie (2013: 3)) whether Poseidon actually does squash the city, and this was the subject of scholarly debate: see Bowie (2013: 124).

so would be appropriate in this comic dialogue which plays on the *katabasis* and *anabasis* themes of Aristophanic comedy.[78]

But there is another feature of Homeric gods which Lucian brings to the fore instead: unless disguised as mortals for some special purpose, they usually view the human world from above, whether from Olympus or the peaks of other mountains, or in the form of birds — such as Athene as a swallow in the rafters, or Athene and Apollo as a pair of vultures in a tree.[79] This 'natural' divine vantage-point is counterpointed by the oddness of Charon viewing from above rather than below, signalled early on by Hermes' use (1) of the phrase 'the upper Zeus' (τῷ ἄνω Διί), which is otiose from the human point of view, but points out the disruption caused to the natural order by Charon's visit, since Homer's Underworld 'Zeus' is Hades/ Pluto.[80] Because Lucian's immortals have this view from above, because he makes them explicitly analyse the mechanics of the way they go about watching humans, and because the dialogue form means there is no 'epic' narrator, the text makes the

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78. Reckford (1987: 208): 'With comic lightness, with almost magical ease, the comic hero moves back and forth between houses, between town and country, and even, like the comic playwright himself, between different levels of reality.'

79. *Od.* 22.240; *Il.* 7.58-66. On this, with further examples from Greek and Latin epics, see Lovatt (2013: 29). Such spectating is not the only time when gods become birds: after disguising herself as Mentor, Athene departs as a vulture at *Od.* 3.371-3. Buxton (2009: ch.1) discusses the interpretation of all these Homeric passages, and the 'extraordinary contortions' of readers who deny that gods actually change shape.

80. *Il.* 9.457: 'Zeus beneath the earth and dread Persephone' (Ζεύς τε καταχθόνιος καὶ ἐπαινὴ Περσεφόνεια).

reader especially aware of its own focalisation by the immortals. Although the scene on the human level keeps changing, it is always Hermes or Charon who directs the reader's attention there.

There is another cleverly humorous reversal in the comparison of Charon's improved vision to that of the Argonaut Lynceus, since Charon, who normally lives below the earth, is now being enabled to see the things *above* the earth. Lynceus' sight was so good that he could perceive even things underground,[81] and, in Iamblichus, he can see through walls and trees.[82] He is used there to illustrate the point that life would be unbearable if one could see the wicked characters of all the people around one, a theme well in tune with those of *Charon.* Anderson considers Lynceus' sight as a 'cliché' which Lucian 'uses often enough', but this obscures the unique features of each occurrence.[83] Lynceus does not appear in Homer, but this passage offers a good example of how Lucian also uses the literary heritage of non-

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81. Ap. Rhod., *Argon.* 1.151-5; see also 4.1477-80, where even Lynceus only thinks he can dimly see Heracles far away, like the new moon through mist. Menippus is compared to Lynceus at *Icaromenippus* 12, where he can 'very nearly make out the mosquitoes' nests' (μικροῦ δεῖν τὰς τῶν ἐμπίδων νεοττιάς) from the moon. Lynceus is mentioned also in *Hermotimus* 20, where Lycinus says that Hermotimus can see even into men's hearts (διὰ τοῦ στέρνου). The Argonauts reappear later in *Hermotimus* (73): see von Möllendorff (2000b: 180).

82. *Protr.* 47.

83. Anderson (1976a: 92). Compare how collected editions of Alan Coren's columns reveal that he relied on various repeated themes, phrases and linguistic structures, but always with such contextual freshness that one is loath to call them clichés at all.

Homeric mythological characters. As well as his appearances in Apollonius and Iamblichus, in the *Cypria* Lynceus views the Peloponnese from the top of Taygetus[84] — a passage which Lucian seems to be recalling in *Charon*'s super-mountain — and in the philosophical tradition he is also used in Plato's *Seventh Letter* (343e-344a), where not even he could make a person who is defective in virtue see the truth. This is again a theme which lies at the heart of Lucian's dialogue, with the over-confident mortals entirely unaware of what will happen to them.[85]

In a further connection with Apollonius, the use of the super-mountain, a (super)natural lofty feature of the landscape, recalls the viewing-from-above at *Argonautica* 3.1275-6, when Aeetes and the Colchian spectators watch Jason's efforts from the top of the Caucasian heights (Καυκασίοισιν ... σκοπέλοισιν). This suggests that it is no accident that the first mountain which Hermes suggests using is Caucasus (3), but the eventual use of several mountains indicates that Lucian is going further than Apollonius, just as the eavesdropping builds on Helen and Priam's eavesdropping. Likewise the first scene which Charon observes — Milo carrying a bull across the stadium — recalls Jason's own taming of bulls, which is keenly observed by the Colchians in the Apollonian scene. Jason yokes the fire-breathing bulls, but Lucian presents Milo overpowering the bull sufficiently that he can carry it on his shoulders. Apollonius' strategy of 'echoing Homeric precedents

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84.   fr. 16 West.

85.   See Hermes' two speeches in *Charon* 21.

yet simultaneously setting them at a distance'[86] has now been repeated by Lucian with precedents from Apollonius himself. These parallels suggest that Lucian's quotation of the Homeric *teikhoskopia*-scene also invites the reader to observe his engagement with other such scenes and themes of looking elsewhere in the epic tradition.

6.4 — Charon's Homeric 'parodies'

Lucian is scrupulous about explaining why Charon can quote Homer: it is because he has actually met him in person (7). Lucian skilfully ensures that this reminiscence seems to be motivated primarily by the recent use of a Homeric line to effect an improvement in his sight; presumably the mention of blindness in the previous sentence ('Lynceus would be blind compared to me') turns his mind to the most famous blind man he has come across,[87] but Charon is also keen to compete with Hermes, with whom he has already engaged in friendly banter about not helping out on the ferry.

To Hermes' surprise, Charon offers to show himself 'not untrained in Homer's poems' (οὐδ' αὐτὸν ἀμελέτητον ὄντα με τῶν Ὁμήρου). Hermes has earlier (4) described Charon as 'not at all poetic' (ἥκιστα ποιητικός), which appears simply

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86.   Buxton (2009: 116).

87.   The question of Homer's blindness hangs over this whole episode in which Homer is used to improve sight.

to indicate that the ferryman has had no training in the art of poetry. However, Charon is also 'not poetic' in the subtler sense that he is post-Homeric, unlike Hermes; this is a reversal of the implication which we have seen in earlier chapters, that Homeric characters 'know' their descriptions in Homer. So by Lucianic logic it follows that, as he does not appear in Homer, Charon would not be expected to know any Homer.[88]

Charon explains that his knowledge derives from a meeting with Homer in the ferry, and outlines the two means by which he acquired his store of Homeric lines. First, Homer sang lines which turned out inauspiciously because they described a storm. By the logic of this dialogue, Homer's words can have 'magical' power, so these lines caused an actual storm to arise, which only just failed to capsize the ferry. Charon (perhaps wisely) refrains from reporting Homer's exact words but offers a summary:

> ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἤρξατο ᾄδειν οὐ πάνυ αἴσιόν τινα ᾠδὴν τοῖς πλέουσιν, ὡς Ποσειδῶν συνήγαγε τὰς νεφέλας καὶ ἐτάραξεν τὸν πόντον ὥσπερ τορύνην τινὰ ἐμβαλὼν τὴν τρίαιναν καὶ πάσας τὰς θυέλλας ὠρόθυνεν καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

> Then he began to sing a song which was not entirely auspicious for those sailing:[89] how Poseidon brought

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88. For the literary and iconographic evidence for Charon see Austin (1977: 125) on Verg., *Aen.* 6.298-301; see too the survey in Sourvinou-Inwood (1995: ch.5).

89. Harmon translates 'the passengers', but the application is probably more general, implying 'for anyone who travels by ship'; my translation is an attempt to retain the ambiguity.

the clouds together, stirred up the sea, casting in his
trident like a ladle, and roused all the squalls — and
much else.

The prosified parody is based on *Od.* 5.291-2, with the addition of the ladle-simile —
just the kind of material that some Homeric scholars might have found too 'low' for
serious epic.[90] According to Charon's presentation of the situation, it was Homer
himself who included this simile, even though τορύνη is not a Homeric word, unlike
the others here, so Charon is presenting Homer as indulging in bathetic parody of
his own poems.[91] But it is possible that Charon himself has introduced the simile for
comedic effect, or else that he has done it accidentally, by misremembering Homer's
exact words. This second possibility is attractive, since the word τορύνην could be a
jumbled misremembering of the phonically similar ὀρόθυνεν in *Od.* 5.292. Homer
seems to have been unaware of the power of his verses (as has already been
demonstrated to the reader by Hermes), since he recklessly recites lines about a
storm while undertaking the ferry crossing. Perhaps there is an implication that

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90.   The simile (*Od.* 20.25-8) by which Odysseus is compared to a sausage is described by Σ
T *Il.* 10.5 as 'humble' (ταπεινός), though Homer is there saved from any accusation of
inappropriateness by the observation that this accords well with Odysseus' disguise as a
beggar at that moment in the story. In other contexts, however, the introduction of
kitchen-vocabulary in Homeric parody was evidently felt to be comical, judging from the
evidence of Matro's *Attic Dinner-Party*, of which Athenaeus preserves fragments: see Olson &
Sens (1999).

91.   On the original sense of 'parody' as specifically *Homeric* parody, see §1.4 above. The
main literary appearances of τορύνη are Aristophanic (*Eq.* 984, *Av.* 78, 79), so it carries comic
connotations.

mere mortals cannot use the lines to such effect; in some places Homer was worshipped as a hero,[92] so perhaps he is only now discovering new *post mortem* abilities. Or perhaps he is being deliberately mischievous.

The second opportunity for Charon to accumulate Homeric verses came during the ensuing storm, when Homer, suffering from seasickness, vomited up 'the greater part of his rhapsodies' (τῶν ῥαψῳδιῶν τὰς πολλάς). The examples given by Charon are Scylla and Charybdis and the Cyclops, which suggests that Homer was still serving up especially appropriate lines: Charybdis, being a whirlpool, is suitable for the ferry nearly being capsized by rough waters, while Polyphemus not only tries to sink Odysseus' ship,[93] but is also the most memorable Homeric character to vomit, and, like Homer, vomits up something unusual.[94] Accusations of metaphorical 'vomiting' seems to have been often used by sophists as a form of abuse: Philostratus records Aelius Aristides' words to Marcus Aurelius: 'Today give me the subject, and hear me tomorrow; for I am not one of those who vomit, but one of those who make their speeches perfect' (τήμερον … πρόβαλε καὶ αὔριον

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92.   Hero-cult of Homer: the Homereion of Ptolemy IV Philopator (Ael., *VH* 13.22) and the Homereion in Smyrna documented by Strabo (14.1.37), on which see Graziosi (2002: 74).

93.   *Od.* 9.480-6.

94.   The remnants of the men he had cannibalized: *Od.* 9.371-4. Second place probably goes to Hector, who vomits blood at *Il.* 14.437-9 (and when he recovers himself at 15.239–40 he indicates that he thought he had died — i.e. he nearly performed a *katabasis* himself). Charrière (35) notes that Charybdis also 'vomits' up bits of ship at *Od.* 12.437-8.

ἀκροῶ· οὐ γὰρ ἐσμὲν τῶν ἐμούντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀκριβούντων).[95] Philostratus also writes that the speeches against Proxenus are not to be attributed to Favorinus, but rather to a 'youth who was drunk, or rather vomiting' (μειρακίου ... μεθύοντος, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐμοῦντος). So Lucian's imagery could even imply criticism by Charon of Homer as a rhetorician.[96]

But there is another, more significant, intertext: Aelian describes a painting by Galaton depicting 'Homer himself vomiting, and the other poets drawing up what he had vomited' (τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον αὐτὸν ἐμοῦντα, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ποιητὰς τὰ ἐμημεσμένα ἀρυομένους).[97] What Lucian does here is to replace the metaphorical vomit with the very verse for which it is a metaphor — producing an even more bizarre image.[98] In the strange surroundings of the underworld, just as in the world of *VH*, such odd happenings mixing the real and imaginary are not especially out of

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95.   *VS* 583.

96.   *VS* 491. On these passages see Hall (1981: 182). Wright (1921: 216-7) points to the same idea in Eunap., *VS* 488; Synesius, *Dio* 56c; and Cic., *Fam.* 12.2.1.

97.   Ael., *VH* 13.22. Note Reardon's comment (1991: 160) that Aelian's work 'display[s] just that taste for the unbelievable that Lucian satirizes in *The Lover of Lies*'.

98.   I am not convinced that the Galaton picture represented Homer with 'des vers très connus ou bien des personnages épiques s'échappant de la bouche de l'aède', which was misinterpreted or caricatured as 'vomiting' (Charrière (2011: 35)); on this picture see also Prioux (2011: 164-6). The alimentary figuring of Homeric verse goes back at least to Aeschylus' description of his plays as 'scraps from Homer's banquet' (Ath. 8.347e); Korenjak (2000: 64 n.85) notes the similar description of Herodes at Philost., *VS* 574: 'Herodes, we sophists are all scraps of you' (ὦ Ἡρώδη, τεμάχιά σου ἐσμεν οἱ σοφισταὶ πάντες).

the ordinary. There is also some irony in Homer's seasickness, considering that Odysseus in the *Odyssey* must be one of the most fearless sailors of all time. Lucian is therefore making Homer himself prove the point made by Socrates in Plato's *Ion* about Homer's poems — that simply being knowledgeable enough about a subject (such as seafaring) to compose or reproduce a poetic description of it does not of itself make one an expert at doing it. The idea that lines of verse have a physical existence, which enables them to be vomited up and harvested, recalls the weighing of Aeschylean and Euripidean lines in Aristophanes' *Frogs*,[99] and this continues the association with comedy that was set up by the use of the jarringly low word τορύνη. But in the background also lies the implication of physical existence in the Homeric conception of spoken words as winged.[100]

If Charon is like the poets of Galaton's painting, he has 'fed from' Homer's work as a poet in his own right, rather than as a mere rhapsode repeating Homer's words. Although Homer appears to have been indulging in Homeric parody himself, there is another option, that Charon has been carried away by the idea that collecting the vomit has made him a fully-fledged poet, so he has started

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99.   1365-1410.

100.   On this formulaic phrase see S. West in Heubeck/West/Hainsworth (1988: 92): 'The metaphor of πτερόεντα more probably derives from archery than from ornithology ... and the image of utterance as an arrow is common in Greek', with further bibliography there. See too M.L. West (1997: 230-1) on the metaphors of words as arrows and swords. For a related idea see Plut., *De prof. virt.* 7 [= *Mor.* 79a], on Antiphanes of Berge's tale of somewhere so cold that words literally freeze.

embellishing Homer with his own rather bathetic simile. This question is not easy to decide, but Charon does go on to produce Homeric quotations and 'parodies', which offer a sub-plot for the attentive reader.[101]

Charon is keen to show off his Homeric knowledge, although he confesses its limitations when he says that he was not able to salvage all of the lines, but just 'a few' (ὀλίγα), and he does this in various ways. Some are quite subtle, for instance his description (1) of Hermes as 'fellow-guide' (συνδιάκτορος), an allusion to Hermes' Homeric epithet 'guide' (διάκτορος), and as Κυλλήνιε, from *Od.* 24.1;[102] and he even characterizes himself as Odysseus in the same speech, where he is 'wandering over the earth' (πλανώμενον ὑπὲρ γῆς) and appeals to Hermes as 'comrade' (ἑταῖρος) and 'shipmate' (σύμπλους). But others, such as his first quotation of *Il.* 3.226-7, are more obviously Homeric, although he introduces minor alterations to accommodate this passage to the situation in which he finds himself. He has thus demonstrated familiarity with both general and specific aspects of the Homeric text; he can not only remember lines but also produces a revised version which slightly alters the sense but retains the metre. As Camerotto emphasizes, this

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101. On Charon's parodies see Camerotto (1998: 20-5).

102. This forms part of a series of different forms of address by Charon to Hermes — from the formal, hieratic 'Maia's son' (ὦ Μαίας παῖ) and 'Grant me this, O Cyllenian, and I shall remember your kindness for ever' (δός, ὦ Κυλλήνιε, ἐς ἀεὶ μεμνησομένῳ τὴν χάριν) to the colloquial/comic 'Dearest little Hermie' (ὦ φίλτατον Ἑρμάδιον) — which recall the procedure of (Homeric) hymn, especially the opening of the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes.* For the comic diminutive see esp. Ar., *Nub.* 746 (ὦ Σωκρατίδιον φίλτατον), but also *Nub.* 223 & 237 (Σωκρατίδιον), *Eq.* 726 & 1199 (Δημίδιον) and *Eq.* 823 (Δημακίδιον).

proof of Homeric competence requires 'il destinario' of the parody to appreciate the skill involved;[103] and here Charon's handiwork is directed at Hermes, who has proved already that he has enough command of Homer to select the appropriate 'magic formulas' from his text. However, being only newly initiated into the techniques of (re)composition, Charon shows a development through the dialogue from tentative allusion to skilful parody.

When Charon observes the next figure, Cyrus, the quotation is of less than a whole line (*Il.* 3.226 again), in which, as we have already seen, he has again made a competent alteration (ὁ σεμνὸς ἀνήρ). But he does not continue with the next line, nor does he even complete the first, and it seems that he is overreaching himself. The conventions of modern editions' typesetting force a decision upon the reader, in a way that the ancient format would not, about where this 'line' of poetry ends. As usually printed, the line gives up halfway through (at a strong caesura in the fourth foot), whereas the earlier parody contained two full lines. However, Charon's next two words could be interpreted as an attempt to continue the line, as the three long syllables of οὐχ Ἕλλην would complete the fourth foot and also form a spondaic fifth foot. It is only with the next clause that the reader can be certain that Charon has abandoned his attempt at versification, or else has produced only a five-footed hexameter. This uncertainty and Charon's apparent lack of confidence are reflected in the apologetic sense of what he says: 'or it doesn't seem so anyway, to judge from his dress at least' (ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀπὸ γοῦν τῆς στολῆς). The possibility that

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103.   Camerotto (1998: 21).

Lucian is deliberately introducing another instance of metrical ineptitude in *Charon* is raised in a short but important article by Anderson, in connection with the variant manuscript readings γάρ and τ' ἄρ' in Charon's centos:[104] 'If Hermes [in *Juppiter tragoedus* 6] can make a metrical howler, how much more so the unschooled Charon, who has picked up his material only from the poet's own vomittings [sic]?'[105] The further possible example of metrical failure that I have identified adds support to Anderson's interpretation.

So in these first two Homeric 'parodies', Charon has added his own words but attempts to cover up when he fails at versification. This point marks a change in his approach, so that he now restricts himself to cento, using only Homer's own words. In 14 the line νήσῳ ἐν ἀμφιρύτῃ; βασιλεὺς δέ τις εὔχεται εἶναι combines the

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104.   See n.64 above.

105.   Anderson (1976c); I quote from the final paragraph. Anderson suggests that Lucian is recalling Plato's interest in 'bad verses and bad memory', with evidence from Philostratus that such botched versifying 'would appeal to a Second Sophistic audience' (255). Hermes fears (*Juppiter tragoedus* 6) that he is 'not much of a poet' (ἐγὼ δὲ ἥκιστα ποιητικός εἶμι) and that he will be laughed at for not using the correct number of feet per line. See too Branham (1989: 168-9).

phrase νήσῳ ἐν ἀμφιρύτῃ[106] with a variety of formulaic bits and pieces.[107] At this point Hermes comments favourably (εὖ γε παρῳδεῖς) on Charon's skill in 'parody' (in the ancient sense, but what we would call cento). Indeed, after his previous botching, Charon has already come a long way; he has quickly become skilled in Homeric parody and deserves Hermes' praise.[108]

Camerotto has shrewdly observed that in this line, as Charon is describing the rediscovery of Polycrates' ring and the reversal of fortune which this represents, there are two ironic connections with the original contexts of the lines used.[109] In his ignorance of the situation, Charon has chosen to describe an apparently fortunate man with a phrase (νήσῳ ἐν ἀμφιρύτῃ) which is always used

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106.   *Od.* 1.50, 1.198, 12.283.

107.   His dropping into verse mid-sentence is not necessarily an indication of ineptitude, however, since this often happens with quotations: e.g., to take an example at random, *Nigrinus* 18. Camerotto (1998: 23) sets out the sources from which this line is constructed: βασιλεύς in this *sedes* at *Il.* 10.435 etc., εὔχεται εἶναι at *Il.* 1.91 etc., ἱκέτης δέ τοι εὔχεται εἶναι at *Od.* 16.67, and τις εὔχεται at 14.484. Both Harmon (1915: 427) and Lelièvre (1954: 69) see in the second half of this line an adaptation of *Od.* 1.180 alone, but Camerotto is right to identify a more wide-ranging list of sources. Charrière (2011: 37) notes that the sense (though not the wording) of the line-end recalls Priam's words (about Agamemnon) at *Il.* 3.170: 'for he resembles a kingly man' (βασιλῆϊ γὰρ ἀνδρὶ ἔοικε).

108.   Camerotto (1998: 23) comments on the parody's 'virtuosismo … che merita l'elogio dell'interlocutore', taking further the point of Bouquiaux-Simon (1968: 359) about Lucian's skill in producing this line ('notre auteur était un grand intime de la matière homérique'). Her focus on Lucian's skill leads her to downplay that of Charon.

109.   Camerotto (1998: 24).

in Homer in a context of misfortune, and which follows the phrase 'suffers calamities' (πήματα πάσχει) in *Od.* 1.49-50; Polycrates' good fortune is indeed about to end. Similarly, Camerotto points to one of the original contexts of the phrase εὔχεται εἶναι (*Od.* 16.67), where the noun is not 'king' (βασιλεύς) but 'suppliant' (ἱκέτης). But there is another important point here: since Charon does not yet know who this figure is, or what is about to happen, the ('tragic') irony which the reader might see in his selection of these lines is accidental, and only retrospectively ironic; indeed Charon has unknowingly become a poet of no little pathos. He is thus different from the alert reader of the dialogue, who can use the clues in Charon's description of Polycrates to work out who is being described before Hermes reveals the answer, and to appreciate the significance of the cento's sources.

When Hermes next discusses Charon's literary abilities it is in response to a lengthy simile, not in verse but in prose (19). Here Charon has imbibed the spirit of Homer's similes but does not give his new composition poetic form. In praising him for 'having made a simile in no way worse than Homer' (οὐδὲν χεῖρον σὺ τοῦ Ὁμήρου εἴκασας) Hermes perhaps unintentionally highlights that it is prose, and goes on to allude to *Il.* 6.146 (οἵη περ φύλλων γενεὴ τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν), which is more concisely expressed than Charon's simile.[110] Charon has therefore produced a simile equal to Homer's in its content, but more long-winded, and not in verse. Just to become Homer's equal, Charon has had to produce more material. And yet in the course of this prosaic simile Charon has used two Homeric *hapax legomena*:

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110.   For ancient scholarship on Homeric similes see Nünlist (2009a: ch.14).

La comparaison imaginé par Lucien, tout en étant ludique, n'est pas parodique; il s'agit plutôt de rivaliser sur le plan poétique (le mot grec φυσαλλίς est un hapax au sens de *bulle* et le verbe ὑπερφυσᾶσθαι est un hapax).[111]

Charon's fifth and final Homeric moment comes (at the end of 22) in the form of a cento, this time of five lines.[112] Perhaps taking heart from the success of his earlier one-line cento, Charon reintroduces the theme of his knowledge of Homer with a display piece on the subject in which he would naturally show most interest, and which now expresses a more serious philosophical message,[113] although it presents poetically sentiments similar to those he has wished (20) that he could address to mortals in prose:

> κάτθαν' ὁμῶς ὅ τ' ἄτυμβος ἀνὴρ ὅς τ' ἔλλαχε τύμβου,
> ἐν δὲ ἰῇ τιμῇ Ἶρος κρείων τ' Ἀγαμέμνων·
> Θερσίτῃ δ' ἶσος Θέτιδος πάϊς ἠϋκόμοιο
> πάντες δ' εἰσὶν ὁμῶς νεκύων ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα,
> γυμνοί τε ξηροί τε κατ' ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα.

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111. Charrière (2011: 38).

112. Householder (1941: 70) uses Lucian's reluctance to quote long passages as evidence against certain works' authenticity (naming *Amores* and *Demosthenis laudatio*); but the present five-line cento is in a work of unquestioned authenticity. In this connection Householder apparently draws a distinction, between verbatim quotation and cento, for which he does not provide any reasoning; and his claim that 'The fact that *Amores* has four quotations of three or more verses is *surely* evidence against the authenticity of the work' (my emphasis) is overstated.

113. Charrière (2011: 41): 'Le ton est plus à la prédication sentencieuse qu'à l'ironie.'

They die alike, both the unburied man and he who has
been allotted a tomb, and equal in honour are Irus and
lord Agamemnon; and the son of lovely-haired Thetis
is Thersites' equal. And all alike are feeble heads of
corpses, bare and dry, throughout the asphodel
meadow.

Charon seems to have salvaged many lines on the subject of the underworld from
those which Homer vomited up,[114] although, as Charon's account of the crossing
showed, even before his seasickness, Homer was already reciting verses appropriate
to sailing, and one can well imagine that he was also reciting verses to describe the
underworld around him,[115] so that this cento might even have been remembered
verbatim from that occasion, rather than being compiled extempore by Charon.
Lucian lets the reader decide, but, when Hermes immediately responds with a
sailing metaphor 'By Heracles, what a lot of Homer you're baling out!' (Ἡράκλεις,
ὡς πολὺν τὸν Ὅμηρον ἐπαντλεῖς), he reminds the reader both of the ferry-crossing
and also of the confusion between the author, the work and its physical
embodiment which is characteristic of the dialogue.

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114. He plunders *Il.* 9.319-20 and *Od.* 10.521 (etc.), 11.539 and 11.573.

115. In *Catabasis* 19 Charon accedes to Cyniscus' offer to perform sea shanties (κέλευσμά τι
τῶν ναυτικῶν) as they cross.

6.5 — Homer as 'magic charm'

Such confusion is seen also in the way that the mere recitation of Homeric lines seemingly has the power to effect physical changes in the world. Hermes introduces this theme (3) with a further reminiscence of Plato's *Ion*,[116] since he calls himself ποιητικός (also using the adverb ποιητικῶς immediately after effecting the mountain-building) and puts Charon in his place (ἰδιώτης γὰρ εἶ) as he claims special knowledge of the art of using Homer for 'magical' purposes.[117] This use of Homer is attested in real-life magic, as documented in the magical papyri, so this is not merely a Lucianic invention. In particular, Otus and Ephialtes, the subjects of the two lines quoted by Hermes to move the mountains, appear in a line (*Il.* 5.385) used in the papyri.[118]

The passages used in Lucian for 'magical' purposes achieve things which might otherwise seem implausible — piling up mountains, improving Charon's sight, and raising a storm — recalling Aristotle's comment that the sweetness of Homer's poetry allows him to cover up 'implausibilities in the *Odyssey*'.[119] Hermes is

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116.   And likewise *Phdr.* 258d, cited by Bompaire (2008: 21).

117.   I have so far been putting 'magic(al)' in inverted commas; we shall see that it is not clear how much magic is involved.

118.   *PGM* IV.474. See too *PGM* IV.467-74 and 2145-2240, with Betz (1997: 47). On connections between 'magical' texts, the allegorical interpretation of Homer, and 'Homer as a window to the divine', see Stoholski (2007).

119.   *Poet.* 1460a35-b2, discussing τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ ἄλογα. At 1460a12, 'implausibility' (τὸ

likewise using the authority of Homer's lines to cover up the implausibilities of this dialogue.[120] But the question of Homeric charms' efficaciousness also has some relevance to Homer-cult:[121] if the magic does work, then Homer himself seems to have supernatural powers which the mere invocation of his verse can activate. However, if Hermes' quotations are only a means of inspiring the psychic effort of Hermes and Charon,[122] this could suggest that Homer does not have the powers of a hero, but this is contradicted by Homer's raising of the storm.[123]

ἄλογον) is considered a particularly epic feature.

120. Camerotto (1998: 21 n.21) seems to share this view: he suggests that the use of Homeric verses as efficacious magic spells is 'una esaltazione — ambigua tra l'ironia e il compiacimento d'autore — del potere della poesia'.

121. cf. n.92 and pp.182-3 above.

122. Hermes apparently 'gives away' this secret when he tells Charon that he needs to keep concentrating hard to make the magic work (7): 'and when I say the verses, remember no longer to have poor vision, but to see everything clearly' (κἀπειδὰν εἴπω τὰ ἔπη, μέμνησο μηκέτι ἀμβλυώττειν, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς πάντα ὁρᾶν). Charrière (2011: 33) rightly views this as a way of making the Iliadic material more comic, but it also awakens doubts in the reader.

123. Charrière (2011: 47) sees satire of those who credulously believe in verses' supernatural powers, comparing the *sortes Vergilianae* allegedly used by Hadrian (SHA, *Hadr.* 2.8) — although as Benario (1980: 49) observes, this may be 'nothing more than fantasy', since the practice is attested in no other ancient source. Lucian leaves it up to the reader to decide whether the lines used by Hermes do spontaneously achieve what they appear to.

When Hermes retells the Otus and Ephialtes story (3) he produces a more prosaic version than Odysseus' original,[124] reserving quotation for the 'magic charm' itself. This indicates a rhetorical strategy in which their achievements are reduced to something more quotidian: they construct a 'ladder' (κλίμαξ), they are 'children' (παῖδας) and 'a pair of lads' (μειρακίω). The Homerically dignified θέμεν ('putting' the mountains on top of each other) becomes a slightly comic image of 'rolling' (ἐπικυλινδοῦντες) mountains about. 'There were only two of them as well' (δύο καὶ αὐτοὺς ὄντας) is likewise designed to persuade Charon of the ease with which the plan can be accomplished. Again, when Hermes responds to Charon's scepticism (4) the pair become 'little babies' (βρεφυλλίοιν) to suit his rhetorical purpose. Considering that Homer makes them nine years old,[125] the first term Hermes uses would seem the most appropriate. The (rare) diminutive here further emphasizes the point in a way that perhaps recalls comic diction, as we saw with Charon's use of a diminutive of Hermes' own name.

By keeping direct Homeric quotation in reserve, Hermes gives added force to the 'two lines' which he will use. His description of Homer as 'well-bred' (ὁ γεννάδας Ὅμηρος) characterizes the poet as a true gentleman who has euergetically bequeathed his verses for just such profitable use. What makes the magical use of the verses possible is, as Hermes next indicates, the convention by which an author is said to 'do' the things described in his work (visible in the scholia, where it is

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124. *Od.* 11.305-20.

125. 11.311.

sometimes unclear whether 'he' refers to a character or to the poet, and in our own critical language to some extent).[126] The present passage suggests that within this dialogue the magical power of Homer's verses stems from a comedic application of this convention. So 'putting together the mountains so easily' (οὕτω ῥᾳδίως συνθεὶς τὰ ὄρη) refers to Homer himself effecting this change in the real world, rather than making his characters do it in the world of his narrative.

However, Hermes goes on say 'the *epos* and the master-builder Homer guided us' (ἡμῖν ὑφηγεῖται τὸ ἔπος καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων Ὅμηρος), an expression which seems to acknowledge that the poet and his poem are two separate things, at the same time as making Homer a master-builder not only because he 'makes' this

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126.   Nünlist (2009a: 19 n.68): 'Scholia often do not specify the grammatical subject of the sentence. In the case of speeches and dramatic texts this can lead to some uncertainty as to whether the ancient critic is speaking of the poet or the character.' Gildersleeve (1900: 63-4) gives examples of the 'causative active' in classical prose.

'building' in his poem, but also as an allusion to his 'building' of grand poetic structures.[127]

When the 'two lines' promised by Hermes finally come, they are in fact two half-lines (αὐτὰρ ἐπ' Ὄσσῃ | Πήλιον εἰνοσίφυλλον), the end of *Od.* 11.315 and the beginning of 316. In part this is to eliminate the 3rd-person verb in the first half of the first line (Ὄσσαν ἐπ' Οὐλύμπῳ μέμασαν θέμεν), thus making it feel more like a magic charm; but note the less easily explained omission of the rest of 316 — ἵν' οὐρανὸς ἀμβατὸς εἴη — which would be quite at home, indeed very welcome, in such a magic spell, but is not relevant here because the aim, as Hermes has already explained, is *not* to reach the heavens, where Charon would be unwelcome. Unlike the sons of Aloeus, the intention of Hermes and Charon is not sacrilegious.[128] The omission of the first part of 315 also has the effect of omitting the placing of Ossa upon Olympus. Is the situation therefore that Hermes first uproots Ossa

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127. See too Plut., *Alex.* 26.3-5 on Homer as θαυμαστὸς καὶ σοφώτατος ἀρχιτέκτων. Nagy (2010: 29-48) sets out the many places in the *Vitae* where the verb for Homer's 'making' his poetry is ποιεῖν. Camerotto (1998: 216-7): 'L'arte verbale del poeta diventa — all'interno del testo letterario — un'arte concreta: Omero è un ἀρχιτέκτων (*Cont.* 4) e attraverso la poesia esercita una *techne* οἰκοδομική (*Cont.* 5).' He observes (217 n.58) that the poet-as-ἀρχιτέκτων appears in Aristophanes (*Pax* 749-50, *Eq.* 530), but in light of this dialogue's allusions to the Shield of Achilles, note too that the term is applied to Hephaestus by Heraclitus (*Quaest. Hom.* 43.8), who writes that '[Homer] has not inappropriately made Charis live together with Hephaestus, the master-builder of the universe' (ὅθεν συνοικοῦσαν οὐκ ἀπιθάνως τῷ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχιτέκτονι πεποίηκε τὴν Χάριν).

128. Hermes is clear (2) that Charon 'is not permitted to set foot in the palace of Zeus' (οὐ θέμις εἰδώλοις ἀεὶ συνόντα ἐπιβατεύειν τῶν βασιλειῶν τοῦ Διός).

(ἀναμοχλεύωμεν τὴν Ὄσσαν πρῶτον), without the help of a Homeric charm, and simply moves it to a more convenient location, rather than placing it upon Olympus? Strictly speaking, this seems to be the implication of his words, but to the reader who knows the quotation's context the implication is that it is indeed placed on top of Olympus.

There is a problem with all of this, though, which Hermes has elided by the omission of those first words of line 315: the sons of Aloeus never actually achieved what they desired, since Zeus killed them before they had the chance. Part of the comedy of this whole scene derives from Hermes' failure to mention this important fact to Charon: by creative editing, Homer is being made to say something that he does not say, just as happens when a parody or cento uses parts of the Homeric text.[129]

Hermes goes on to use the Homeric lines as he moves Pelion, but there is a problem with simply interpreting this as magic, because of an ambiguity with the 'charm' itself, since Hermes does not explicitly say that he is employing 'magic' in the same way as he does later when improving Charon's sight. Lucian's reader will most naturally assume that when Hermes moves the mountain simultaneously with his quotation of the verses it is the Homeric quotation itself which has achieved the transportation. And yet, Hermes and Charon themselves roll Oeta and Parnassus

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129. Charrière (2011: 32) writes of the giants' project that 'Lucien, lui, le considère comme réalisé', but the point is precisely that it is not Lucian who does this but Hermes, who is seeking a deliberate rhetorical effect.

around (5), but this can only be achieved after Charon has been taught the 'lesson' from Homer that two supernatural beings are capable of performing such feats. Hermes expresses surprise that Charon might find such a proceeding 'prodigious' (τεράστια), since he knows of such immortals as Atlas performing exceptional feats of lifting. Homer, says Hermes, has made it easy for them by composing the verses, but it is not clear in what way they have helped. Charrière notes the sense of the verb ἀναμοχλεύω,[130] which implies the use of a lever; is this a further example of the implication that lines of verse have a physical existence, and in this case actually have the same very physical effect as a lever? Nor, for that matter, is it clear how the mountains will be returned to their former places, which Hermes says must be done in a speech which is at once closural and teasingly open-ended (24). The reader is prompted to wonder whether any Homeric centos could be constructed to undo the work; the answer which the reader gives to this conundrum will depend on, and perhaps retrospectively affect, their interpretation of the purpose served by the original mountain-piling centos.

Therefore perhaps a better way of looking at this is to consider it as a kind of *reductio ad absurdum* of the notions addressed in Plato's *Ion*, a work to which I have kept returning. Homer's baldly saying that one mountain was put on top of another does not actually give any tips on how to go about achieving it, but it does

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130. Charrière (2011: 32), comparing Archimedes' words about moving the whole earth with a lever. On the sources for, and various forms of, this saying (paraphrased at Plut., *Marc.* 14.7), see Dijksterhuis (1956: 14-18).

conveniently serve here to cover up the most implausible part of Lucian's narrative. Bompaire writes that 'La fantaisie et le merveilleux tiennent une place importante dans ce dialogue' and he does believe that Homer is used 'comme moteur d'action', equating the mountain-moving to the improvement of Charon's sight;[131] perhaps we can use this idea of 'moteur d'action' to sit on the fence about just how 'fantastical' this use of Homer is. But the key thing emphasized by Hermes is that Homer helps to make the procedure an easier one than it would otherwise have been.[132]

The ambiguity of agency reappears when Charon worries lest the final construction, which seemingly involves four or possibly five mountains and thus exceeds the previous record attempt, be too slender (λεπτότερον) and collapse through a lack of stability. There is ambiguity in his worry about the experiment in 'Homer's building-work' (τῆς Ὁμήρου οἰκοδομικῆς), a phrase for which Harmon's 'Homeric building' is a misleading translation, as it suggests a form of words that Lucian seems to have carefully avoided: does the proper noun imply that the 'builder' Homer himself 'built' this structure through the incantation of his verses? One could equally argue that Ὁμηρικῆς would have produced a jingle which Lucian has judiciously avoided for the sake of euphony, but in any case, the phrase is qualified by the predicative 'bitter' (πικρᾶς), raising the question whether the ἀρχιτέκτων Homer's expertise in this sort of precarious building is really as great or

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131. Bompaire (2008: 6).

132. 4: 'We've done the job, at once easily and poetically' (ῥᾳδίως ἅμα καὶ ποιητικῶς ἐξειργασάμεθα).

beneficial as Hermes suggested earlier. When Charon explains (7) how Homer himself inadvertently raised a storm by reciting his own verse,[133] this question of agency is also alluded to: 'how Poseidon brought the clouds together' (ὡς ὁ Ποσειδῶν συνήγαγεν τὰς νεφέλας). The words uttered by Homer-the-rhapsode make the storm happen, but it is in a sense Poseidon who does it, having been originally made to do it in the narrative fashioned by Homer-the-poet, which recorded an event which Poseidon had already caused in the real world.

As in the story of the 'sorcerer's apprentice' in *Philopseudes*, such playing with magically efficacious words can be dangerous, but things are safer and more straightforward in 7, when Charon complains about his defective sight and Hermes suggests using more Homer to improve it.[134] Here — for the first time — Hermes explicitly characterizes the lines of Homer as a magic 'charm' (ἐπῳδήν). Charms are a genuine 'medical' procedure, for which there is in turn Homeric authority: a 'charm' (ἐπαοιδῇ) is used for medical purposes at *Od.* 19.45. Hermes' verb 'I shall cure' (ἰάσομαι) indicates that he considers this procedure to be a medical one. He

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133. *Od.* 5.291-2.

134. However, I cannot see the thematic connection suggested by Anderson (1976a: 105 n.17) with the 'sorcerer's apprentice' spell (*Philopseudes* 35-6), where the initial magic spell begins but cannot stop the supernatural action. The first use of Homer in the *Charon* passage is complete in itself and achieves its desired aim (piling up a viewing platform), and the second likewise performs a completely different task (improving Charon's sight). At the end of the dialogue the mountains will be returned to their original positions, which is the equivalent of undoing the 'sorcerer's apprentice' spell, while nothing more is said of the future state of Charon's eyesight.

believes that the charm will only work — or will work more effectively — if Charon exercises his own willpower as well, as we have already seen. But Charon's cooperation was also required in the mountain-moving (3): 'You too must share in the work a bit and help out' (συγκαμεῖν δέ τι καὶ ὑπουργῆσαι καὶ σὲ δεῖ).

The pair of lines Hermes quotes are from Athene's speech to Diomedes, *Il.* 5.127-8:

> ἀχλὺν δ᾽ αὖ τοι ἀπ᾽ ὀφθαλμῶν ἕλον ἣ πρὶν ἐπῆεν,
> ὄφρ᾽ εὖ γιγνώσκῃς ἠμὲν θεὸν ἠδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα.
>
> And from your eyes I have taken again the mist which
> before was upon them, so that you now can distinguish
> god and man.

The second line is not necessary in the new context; unlike Diomedes, Charon has no need to distinguish mortals and humans, which he has shown no difficulty in doing. This inclusion of an unnecessary line paradoxically highlights just what Hermes had pointed out to Charon before — their shared status as superhuman immortals.[135]

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135. This 'ironic gesture of Homeric emulation' is brought out by Halliwell (2008: 447): 'What Hermes cannot do … is give Charon an authentically anthropic sensibility. The ferryman is permitted to *watch* life close-up, but his sense of its absurdity remains entirely bloodless.'

6.6 — Conclusions

In this chapter I have considered several kinds of thematic connection between passages of Homer used by the two immortals. The quotations and parodies prompt the reader to recall well-known scenes from the *Iliad* — the Shield of Achilles and the *teikhoskopia* — on which the whole dialogue is modelled, and to consider the various ways in which these scenes have been refashioned and inverted. They also reward the reader who can identify the contexts of individual Homeric lines and words. The combined effect is to demonstrate not only Hermes' easy familiarity with Homer and Homeric parody, but also Charon's increasing confidence when making first steps in the rhetorical manipulation of Homeric material.

Charon's meeting with the dead Homer contrasts with the situation in *VH*: there the narrator is already an expert in Homeric scholarship, who obtains definitive answers to tricky questions after undertaking a *katabasis*; but here Charon's *anabasis* is an attempt to answer questions raised by his job in the underworld, when the newly dead (of whom Homer is the most prominent member) make him curious about the life of mortals.

What the Homeric background, especially the Shield of Achilles, brings to the dialogue is a sense that everything is now 'going wrong', in contrast to the stability of the Homeric shield which Whitman identifies. Unlike Auden's version, though, the focus is still on canonical 'heroic' figures from the historical Greek past, such as Milo and Croesus. What is sad about the debased post-mythic world which Charon and Hermes observe is these characters' ignorance about this state of the

world, in contrast to the awareness, which is more readily available to characters and narrator in Homer, of the pathos of their own stories. Furthermore, as Halliwell has well observed, the dialogue's special emphasis on Charon and Hermes' use of Homeric material even prompts the reader to reflect that mortals' highly prized knowledge of Homer, no less than wealth and power, is ultimately useless.[136]

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136.   Halliwell (2008: 452).

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Lucian laughed at scholars who asked too many questions about literature.[1]

For ... every ancient author who thought about Homer, the poet was not a static figure with stable characteristics inherited from tradition; to properly engage with Homer meant taking a stance as to who he was, what he stood for — to construct an image of Homer out of his poetry, the biographical lore, and one's own desire.[2]

To close this study I want to draw out three themes that have run through it. First, despite the implications of what Anderson and Kim say in these two passages, Lucian himself asks plenty of questions about Homer, and each answer that he gives is by no means consistent with his answers elsewhere. While this is perhaps particularly to be expected in an author whose career was relatively long, it nonetheless illuminates how the use of earlier literature by sophistic *pepaideumenoi*, and perhaps Lucian above all, is not a matter of arguing for definitive 'solutions' to

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1.   Anderson (1976a: ix).

2.   Kim (2007: 385).

'problems' but rather of using these issues in ways appropriate to each rhetorical context, to entertain a heterogenous audience and especially to win the acclaim of its most learned members, while also highlighting more general resemblances to Homeric scenes which everyone should be able to recognise. In any case, Lucian seems to have had no very fixed views on Homeric scholarship — or rather, even if he did, the deployment of his range of aliases, and his different approaches to 'parody', positively encourage readers not to concern themselves with the issue, but to enjoy the variety of playful responses which he demonstrates.

Secondly, for Lucian it is ultimately irrelevant what the answers are to questions about Homer's life, since they can never be established, despite the abundance of *Vitae.* In particular, it is repeatedly left frustratingly vague whether the reader should take Homer as a mortal, a reincarnated mortal, a heroised mortal, a deified mortal, or simply a body of text. Such issues connect, more closely than has usually been thought, with presentations of Homeric textual scholarship, as is clear, for instance, from the repeated insinuations that Lucian's Homer might not be blind, but can present a true account of the world, despite scholars' obsession with inconsistency of detail, precisely because he is able to see it. Yet elsewhere, just as with the textual scholarship, Lucianic characters can use Homer's allegedly self-evident blindness as a powerful rhetorical move.

Thirdly, I have observed at several points that Lucian's readings of Homer are often focused through a Platonic lens, a fact which is especially clearly expressed in Tackaberry's identification of Lucian's use i) of Homeric quotations at

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Convivium 12, to mirror the equivalent moment in Plato's *Symposium*;[3] and ii) of *Od.* 9.8 in both *Parasitus* 10 and Plato's *Republic*: 'Both Lucian and Plato add that it is the "wise" Homer who says these things'.[4] As ní Mheallaigh has shown, the influence of Plato can be felt widely in Lucian, as is clear too from the passages of close reference which Tackaberry collected.[5] Indeed he writes, 'Lucian everywhere shows the influence of Plato. In many places he expresses for him the highest appreciation'[6] — making a similar point to that which Ziegeler makes about Homer.[7] It would therefore be desirable for a thorough study similar to mine to be undertaken into Lucian's use of Plato, taking Tackaberry's brief survey further and drawing on more recent ideas about intertextuality and parody, as I have built on those of Householder and Bouquiaux-Simon.

I have been unable to include material on some Homeric issues raised by the scholia on Lucian, owing both to lack of space and to their tangential relation to this project, but hope to work further on those readings of Lucian's readings of Homer. Indeed, this thesis could easily have been twice as long, such is the amount of

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3.   Tackaberry (1930: 71): Pl. *Symp.* 174a-e.

4.   Tackaberry (1930: 83); Pl., *Resp.* 3.390a-b.

5.   Tackaberry (1930: 62-85); ní Mheallaigh (2005) and (2014). See too Branham (1989: ch.2) and, on the philosophical background of *VH*, both Laird (2003) and Georgiadou & Larmour (1998).

6.   Tackaberry (1930: 62).

7.   See p.31 above.

Homeric material in Lucian's works, but in my discussion of each of the varied passages selected I have examined a representative cross-section of issues arising both from the many ways of reading Homer that were current in Lucian's time and from Lucian's practice in playing with his cultural heritage. It is often asked whether Lucian is a true 'philosopher' or an exploiter of philosophy as a peg on which to hang humour. It seems to me that these are not mutually exclusive categories: for with his use of Homer, too, we would be wrong to think (*pace* Householder and Anderson) that he is not deeply imbued with the detail of Homer's text, Homeric compositional techniques and biographical data. When Lucian laughs at Homeric scholars he is also laughing at himself. As Camerotto is keen to emphasize, *VH* in particular is at once a parody of Homer and an affectionate celebration of his vast cultural influence.[8] Indeed I have suggested that Homer in *VH* is one of Lucian's most straight-talking characters, paradoxically not unlike the locals on the Eridanus, who have no time for myth at all.

Though I cannot claim to have summoned up Lucian as Apion did with Homer, he has still been a hugely congenial companion during the past six years while I have undertaken this research; he is, I think, the only ancient author who has succeeded on occasion in reducing me to fits of giggles. So I hope above all that his shade, whether it now resides in Homer's part of Elysium or elsewhere, will not feel that I have too often emphasized the *spoudaion* at the expense of the *geloion*.

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8.   Camerotto (1998: 141-70).

Appendix 1 — The authenticity of Lucian's works

Several works in the Lucianic corpus have been deemed inauthentic; since I discuss some of these on the assumption that they are correctly attributed to Lucian, I present here my views on the issue.[1]

The Loeb edition's final volume assembles the pieces about which most doubt has been expressed concerning authorship. Its editor, MacLeod, writes that 'there are good reasons' for doubting the authorship 'of some if not all' of them: *Soloecista*, *Asinus*, *Amores*, *Halcyon*, *Demosthenis laudatio*, *Podagra*, *Ocypus*, and *Cynicus*; additionally, those 'certainly not by Lucian' are *Philopatris*, *Charidemus*, *Nero*, and the epigram which I discuss at the beginning of the introduction. Macleod reserves judgement on the other epigrams.[2] However, I assume that most of Macleod's first group, and some other works about which doubts have been raised, are authentic.

Recent years have seen a wave of scepticism concerning earlier arguments against authenticity. For general scepticism on this issue — and on the extent to which we can say much about the dating of Lucian's works, or about his life and

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1. See Bompaire (2003a: xvi-xvii) and MacLeod (1987: xv-xix). Karavas (2005: 22-8) gives an overview of the bibliography on authenticity, reaching slightly different conclusions from me.

2. MacLeod (1967: ix & 523). Baldwin (1980/81) is a detailed study on the epigrams.

career — see the analyses of Hall and Baldwin.[3] The most notable examples are *Demosthenis laudatio*, defended by Baldwin;[4] *DDS*, the authenticity of which Lightfoot discusses in her commentary;[5] *De saltu*, which Lada-Richards follows Anderson in taking as authentic;[6] and *Amores*, almost universally ascribed to 'ps.-Lucian' but recently defended as Lucian's by Jope with lucid objections to previous attempts to prove it spurious.[7]

In particular, arguments from style are built on weak foundations,[8] especially since we evidently do not have Lucian's 'complete works' (just as with Galen, Dio, and Plutarch), so that the works with the most impeccable manuscript

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3.   See Hall (1981), esp. ch.1 on general principles, with more specific comments *passim* under the works in question; and Baldwin (1973), esp. ch.1 and ch.2.

4.   Baldwin (1969).

5.   Lightfoot (2003: 184-208), with 86-7 on *DDS*'s 'formidable' problems: 'How are we to assess the tone of this particular specimen and its relation to its literary forebears — as pastiche, parody, or somewhere between the two?'; cf. Halliwell (2008: 435) on Lucian's 'perpetually shifting mixture of parody, burlesque, pastiche and satire'.

6.   Lada-Richards (2007: 213 n.20), quoting Anderson's opinion (1977a: 255) that 'there has never been a single cogent argument' against authenticity.

7.   Jope (2011). While *Cynicus* is still often considered spurious (e.g. Desmond (2006: 5)), Luck (1997: 380-1) makes the case for reconsideration.

8.   e.g. Householder dubiously identifies lengthier quotations from Homer as telltale evidence against authenticity. Householder (1941: 70): 'If he wanted to use more than two, rarely three, verses, he paraphrased part of the passage or broke up the quotation into several shorter ones.'

tradition may well have been carefully selected and therefore cannot be relied upon to provide a true cross-section, but may simply reflect the tastes of the compiler.[9] Any argument from Lucian's 'habitual style' is therefore likely to be circular. This issue is more acute in Lucian's case than in, say, Plutarch's because of his talent for stylistic ventriloquism. The Lucian who appears as a hoaxer in Galen's anecdote is a good enough imitator of Heraclitus to convince experts.[10] As Whitmarsh writes, 'This is an author with a real facility for imitation, someone whose entire literary identity is predicated on his ability to take on roles.'[11]

Indeed (to give Plutarch his due), Plutarch's own *Gryllus*, with its satirical, witty reworking of Homeric myth in 'philosophical' dialogue form seems somewhat

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9.   The opening of *Demonax* refers to a lost work, *Sostratus.* There is no reason to disbelieve that this work really existed — unlike the unfulfilled promise of further books at the end of *VH.* Hopkinson (2008: 1 n.1) suggests that the anecdote in Galen (see below, n.10) may derive from a lost work by Lucian. I believe the ass-narrative (*Onos*) probably has at least some connection with Lucian: see ní Mheallaigh (2014: 126-7) and Whitmarsh (2010).

10.   Strohmaier (1976) and MacLeod (1979). The assocation of a good ear for different styles with satirists in particular is familiar to the modern academic from Sokal's hoax, which he characterizes as both satire and parody. Sokal (1996): 'While my method was satirical, my motivation is utterly serious', and Sokal (1998: xviii): 'the parody article'. Although not always plainly 'parodic', Peter Ackroyd's novels display an astonishing ability to ventriloquise different styles, and 'he still cultivates a postmodernist delight in parody and linguistic self-consciousness' (Finney (1992: 243)). Ackroyd (1999), his most obviously satirical work, plays with these issues: in the year AD 3700, the 'comic masterpiece' *The Origin of Species* is misattributed to Charles Dickens.

11.   Whitmarsh (2013: 85).

alien to the style of the Plutarch we 'know'. Anderson has delineated the similarities between this work and Lucian's *Somnium (Gallus)*; so if *Gryllus* had been transmitted anonymously would we not be more ready to ascribe it to Lucian rather than Plutarch?[12]

   This thesis therefore reflects my own opinion that *Philopatris*, *Ocypus* and *Nero* are definitely not by Lucian, while *Halcyon* may well not be.[13] In the absence of convincing evidence one way or the other I assume that the remaining works are not spurious. A noteworthy feature of *Philopatris*, a clearly Byzantine imitation, is that it goes overboard with Homeric allusion, in a manner unparallelled even in the other *dubia*.[14] The *Philopatris* author is protesting too much and thereby offering

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12.   Anderson (1976a: 168). Compare the New Posidippus, which presents epigrams differing markedly in style and content from the same author's previously known work. While the question is somewhat vexed, both 'old' and 'new' Posidippus seem to show the influence of different compilers' preferences: see Krevans (2005).

13.   I go further than Baldwin (1973: 4-5): 'Internal evidence would lead me to support the rejection of the *Cynicus* and the *Philopatris*, whereas I would return an open verdict on, say, the *Ocypus* and the *Epigrams*. Beyond this, I do not see that we can reasonably go.' On the authorship of *Nero* see Whitmarsh (1999: 143 n.14). Mras' argument (1911: 236) that *Nero* accidentally found its way from the beginning of Philostratus to the end of Lucian in a manuscript seems a likely explanation for its attribution to Lucian. For bibliography on the authenticity of *Podagra* and *Ocypus* see Mossman (2010: 263).

14.   'The *Philopatris* is crammed with epic tags' (Baldwin (1982: 326)). Householder and Bouquiaux-Simon sensibly discount this piece from their analyses, but there are approximately 40 Homeric allusions in just 29 chapters, an exceptional figure equating to more than 8% of the combined total of Homeric quotations across all 75 works which Householder includes in his analysis.

further evidence for the point, made at the beginning of my Introduction, that Homeric content was a feature which later readers felt to be especially characteristic of Lucian's work.

Appendix 2 — A third epigram on (a) Lucian

I present here an epigram of less literary distinction than the two discussed in the opening section of the Introduction. It refers to 'Lucian', who may well not be Lucian of Samosata.[1] Nonetheless, it could offer additional evidence for an association in the mind of an educated reader between Lucian and Homeric language. The text of Boissonade and Cougny is as follows.

> *[lemma 1:]* εἰς Λουκιανόν.
>
> *[lemma 2:]* ὅτι τοῦ Λουκιανοῦ μαΐστωρ ἦν ὁ Ἀριστοφάνης.[2]
>
> ῥήτωρ, σοφιστής, ἀλλὰ καὶ λογογράφος,
> ῥήτωρ μέγιστος ὅλων τε τῶν ῥητόρων,
> ῥήτωρ ἀγαθός, πρηστήριος τὴν φύσιν,
> ῥήτωρ δεξιός, ἔμπλεως κομπασμάτων,
> ῥήτωρ ἀληθὴς τοὺς θεωνύμους ὅλους
> πιμπρῶν, ἀναιρῶν, ἐκτεφρῶν πολυτρόπως
> λόγοις μυρίοις ἐν συνετῇ καρδίᾳ.
>
> *[lemma 1:]* On Lucian.
>
> *[lemma 2:]* Note that Lucian's teacher was Aristophanes.

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1.   I can locate neither an edition more recent than 1890 nor an English translation. The text appears in Boissonade (1830: 472), where the source is cited as 'cod. Bibl. Publ. Paris. 1310, p.216.2'. Cougny (1890) reprints Boissonade's text (328 (no. 224) with n. on 378).

2.   Cougny suggests ('videtur') that the lemma εἰς Λουκιανόν was Boissonade's own, but on what grounds is unclear, since Boissonade only admits (472 n.1) to adding a lemma to the previous poem in his edition (which is from a different manuscript). Boissonade describes the ὅτι-sentence as the/a 'lemma', although this does not exclude the possibility of two lemmata.

> Rhetor, sophist, but also writer of speeches, greatest
> rhetor of all rhetors, good rhetor, inflammatory by
> nature, dextrous rhetor, full of boasts, truthful rhetor,
> burning up, confuting, and reducing to ashes with
> many wiles all divine-named men, with myriad words
> in his intelligent heart.

The anonymous author appears to be a Christian, since he uses the adverb πολυτρόπως, found in the opening verse of the Epistle to the Hebrews,[3] while the phrase ἐν συνετῇ καρδίᾳ also seems Christian language.[4] If so, this is strikingly unexpected praise, since the scholia on Lucian reveal virulent opposition to his alleged atheism.[5] There may therefore be confusion here between Lucian of Samosata and his namesake St. Lucian of Antioch (who appears to have hailed from Samosata, and was presumably named after its most famous son).[6]

But whoever produced the second lemma evidently believed the subject to be Lucian of Samosata, since this Lucian was undoubtedly influenced by Old Comedy, whereas it is hard to believe that the martyr was much influenced by

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3. In the past 'God spoke πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως'.

4. cf. συνιέντες καρδίᾳ συνετῇ in John Chrysostom [?], Εἰς τὴν παραβολὴν τοῦ ἐμπεσόντος εἰς τοὺς λῃστάς, *PG* 62, 755.

5. Baldwin (1980/81).

6. The evidence is collected in Appendix 6 of Amidon (2007). On the possible conflation of the two Lucians see Baldwin (1973: 8), who also notes (103 n.17) the existence of no fewer than 13 Christian Lucians; see too Hall (1981: 434 n.3).

Aristophanes of Athens, nor that he was a disciple of Aristophanes of Byzantium.[7] So here, one way or another, is an acknowledgement of the playwright's influence on the second-century Lucian, who was undoubtedly 'rhetor', 'sophist', and λογογράφος.[8] The lemmatist could also have been confused by the use of πολυτρόπως, which, to a reader better educated in pagan classics than Christian scriptures, more plainly alludes to the description of Odysseus as ἄνδρα … πολύτροπον in the *Odyssey*'s opening line;[9] just as Lucian knew παλαιά τε μωρά with the (ambivalent) wisdom of Homeric characters, here is a Lucian who, in the lemmatist's mind, exhibits the quick-witted cleverness, particularly of speech-'writing' and confutation, which is such a feature of the tricksy Homeric Odysseus.

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7. Ath. 1.5b writes of Ἀρτεμίδωρος ὁ Ψευδαριστοφάνειος, apparently implying that Artemidorus falsely claimed to be a disciple of Aristophanes of Byzantium (*BNP*, s.v. 'Artemidoros [4]').

8. The *Suda* reports that Lucian ἐπὶ τὸ λογογραφεῖν ἐτράπη (λ 683).

9. The following line again echoes a Homeric opening — μυρία appears in the second line of the *Iliad* — but, unlike πολύτροπος/-ως, this is a sufficiently common word that one should not over-interpret the apparent reminiscence.

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However, the reader should note in particular i) that *Prometheus* and *Prometheus es* are two different works; ii) that I refer to *Verae historiae* and *De dea Syria* as *VH* and *DDS* respectively; and iii) that I distinguish the two pieces known as *The Dream* by referring to *Somnium (Gallus)* and *Somnium (Vita Luciani).* For the dialogue collections *Dial. deor., Dial. mort.,* and *Dial. mar.* I present MacLeod's numbering, with the traditional numbering in brackets. For *Dial. meretr.* the numberings are the same. Works of all other authors are cited in the text by their most familiar title, while the notes generally follow the style in the fourth edition of the *OCD.* I quote Lucian from Bompaire's Budé edition where available, and otherwise from MacLeod's Oxford Classical Text.

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