Dubious by nature

Tallant, Jonathan (2013) Dubious by nature. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43 (1). pp. 97-116. ISSN 0045-5091

Full text not available from this repository.


There is a charge sometimes made in metaphysics that particular commitments are ‘hypothetical’, ‘dubious’ or ‘suspicious’. There have been two analyses given of what this consists in—due to Crisp (2007) and Cameron (2011). The aim of this paper is to reject both analyses and thereby show that there is no obvious way to press the objection against said commitments that they are ‘dubious’ and objectionable. Later in the paper I consider another account of what it might be to be ‘dubious’, and argue that this too fails. I use Bigelow's (1996) Lucretian properties as a vehicle for the discussions of dubiousness that follow. As a consequence, the paper ends up offering a partial defense of Lucretianism.

Item Type: Article
RIS ID: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/716536
Keywords: Presentism, Lucretianism, Hypothetical properties, Dubious properties, Suspicious properties, Point beyond
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2013.812372
Depositing User: Wahid, Ms. Haleema
Date Deposited: 17 Apr 2014 11:20
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 16:37
URI: https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/2392

Actions (Archive Staff Only)

Edit View Edit View