Commitment in symmetric contests

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Possajennikov, Alex (2009) Commitment in symmetric contests. Economics Bulletin, 29 (1). pp. 376-384. ISSN 1545-2921

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Official URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2009/Volume29/EB-09-V29-I1-P39.pdf

Abstract

The paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contests with concave success function, commitment to a

particular strategy does not increase a player's payoff, while in contests with more than two players it does. The paper also provides a contest-like game in which commitment does not increase a player's payoff for any number of players.

Item Type:	Article
RIS ID:	https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1014731
Schools/Departments:	University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User:	Possajennikov, Dr Alex
Date Deposited:	14 Jun 2013 16:00
Last Modified:	04 May 2020 20:26
URI:	https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/1999

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