INTERNATIONALISATION OF TURKISH LAW ENFORCEMENT:
A STUDY OF ANTI-DRUG TRAFFICKING

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Abstract

This thesis explains how policing has changed in Turkey between the late 1960s and 2012 and explores ways to explain the changes by looking at the enforcement anti-drug trafficking measures. Using a process tracing method, it argues that Turkey's formerly lax approach to drug control was gradually replaced by stronger enforcement, to the point that nowadays Turkey seems to see itself as a champion of international police cooperation. The thesis then demonstrates that this change can only be partially explained by theories focusing on external change drivers, such as the Americanization of global law enforcement or the Europeanization of Turkey in its bid for EU membership. It argues that change is best explained by analysing micro-processes of socialization within the Turkish National Police (TNP), which reveal the role of domestic factors unexplainable otherwise, such as the importance of protecting the reputation of Turkey and of the TNP among international partners, and the importance of personal career-oriented behaviour by officers of the TNP.
Acknowledgement

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Kursat Cevik
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFSJ:</td>
<td>Area of Freedom Security and Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BKA:</td>
<td>Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNDD:</td>
<td>Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEE:</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA:</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CND:</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs</td>
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<td>DEA:</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC:</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMCDDA:</td>
<td>European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU:</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROPOL:</td>
<td>European Police Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI:</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7/G8:</td>
<td>Group of 7/Group of 8 Leading Industrial States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCB:</td>
<td>International Narcotics Control Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERPOL:</td>
<td>International Criminal Police organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR:</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>JHA:</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<td>JICA:</td>
<td>Japanese International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>KOM:</td>
<td>Anti-Smuggling and Organised Crime Department of Turkish National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD:</td>
<td>Lysergic Acid Diethylamide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDA:</td>
<td>Euro Mediterranean Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGK:</td>
<td>Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council of the Republic of Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIT:</td>
<td>Milli İstihbarat Teşkilati (National Intelligence organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPAA:</td>
<td>National Programmes for the Adoption of the EU Acquis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC:</td>
<td>Organised Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK:</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>REITOX:</td>
<td>European Information Network on Drugs and Drug Addiction (Réseau Européen d’Information sur les Drogues et les Toxicomanies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TADOC:</td>
<td>Turkish International Academy on Drugs and Organised Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBMM:</td>
<td>Turkish National Grand Assembly (Turkish Parliament)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNP:</td>
<td>Turkish National Police</td>
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</table>
TOC: Transnational Organised Crime
TUBIM: Turkish Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addition
UN: United Nations
UNDCP: United Nations Drug Control Program
UNFDAC: United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control
UNGASS: United Nations General Assembly Session on Drugs
UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UK: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
USA/US: United States of America
Chapter 1: Introduction

Few topics attract more debate and controversy worldwide than the recreational use of drugs. Despite the global promise made by states at the United Nations (UN) in 1998, and again in 2009, to spare no effort in moving towards a “drug-free world”, there is no consensus on the actual harmfulness of controlled substances on individuals and on how best to measure harmfulness, on the efficiency and effectiveness of criminalizing or de-criminalizing drug use, on the appropriate response to drug-related crime, or even on the concept of drug addiction (McKeganey, 2011; Pryce, 2012; Bewley-Taylor, 2012). The issue of how to prevent the production of illicit drugs is also highly debated. At one end of the spectrum, some argue for crop fumigation despite its devastating environmental impact and the subsequent alienation of affected populations, while at the other end of the spectrum there are those who advocate negotiating with farmers and local figures in the hope that they will turn towards alternative crops, despite the fact that this is a painstakingly long and unpredictable process (Jelsma and Vargas, 2000; Jelsma and Kramer, 2009; McKeganey, 2011). The international drug control regime is deeply divided on these matters.

Nevertheless, there does remain common ground in the international community on a key aspect of the drug control regime (Bewley-Taylor, 2012: 2): the trafficking of illicit drugs. Carried out by organised crime groups, meaning that a small few gain huge profits while negatively affecting many, drug trafficking is nowadays accepted as a challenge to global security that can “only be met if law
enforcement authorities are able to display the same ingenuity and innovation, organizational flexibility and cooperation that characterizes criminal organizations themselves” (UN, 1994, quoted by Woodiwiss, 2003: 383). Much of the infrastructure of international crime control today would not exist if the production, trade, use and possession of opium, cocaine and cannabis for non-medical purposes had not been progressively criminalized, starting in 1912 with the International Opium Convention and culminating with the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 37-46). Much of international crime itself would not exist were it not for this criminalization: the drugs black market is the unintended but obvious consequence of prohibition (McAllister, 2000: 42; Pryce, 2012: 93-98). Much of international policing would not resemble what it is today, had it not been for launching of the War on Drugs in 1971 and the rapid expansion of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) beyond the United States of America (US) in order to train foreign enforcement agencies, collect information about drug traffickers and even circumvent local legislation that might restrict their involvement in operations, thereby irritating local governments and forcing them into establishing better police cooperation (Nadelmann, 1993; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 5). In other words, the internationalization of policing is intimately linked to the development of international drug control, and international police cooperation is an integral part of international drug control that states do not question.
1.1 Problematization

This thesis analyses how one state internationalized its policing: Turkey. It seeks to explain how Turkish law enforcement, and in particular the Turkish National Police (TNP) has been collaborating increasingly with foreign counterparts; how Turkish legislation has been undergoing progressive harmonization with other states’ legislation to allow police and prosecutors to work together more easily; and how Turkey has entered into bilateral and multilateral agreements with other states and international institutions to allow its institutions to share information and improve and increase their work with others. It focuses on drug enforcement because of its particular relevance in the global rise of international policing and because Turkey has a unique story within the international drug control regime.

Drug trafficking is an issue of particular salience for Turkish law enforcement because the country’s geographical location places it on the most direct route between Afghanistan, the largest poppy producer in the world, and Western Europe, the largest consumption market for heroin, as well as on the route between Europe and the Middle East where most synthetic drugs are produced and consumed respectively. Moreover, it is often believed that Turkish organised crime groups control the drug trade in Western Europe, whether or not they operate from Turkish soil. Turkey is also among the world’s largest producers of licit poppy used for medical purposes. There is, therefore, a clear interest on the part of Turkish authorities to protect their export market and to ensure that the poppy derivatives on its territory originate from a licit source.

Today, combating drug trafficking is a priority of Turkish law enforcement, but this was not always the case. For the majority of the hundred years of the
international drug control regime's history, Turkish authorities were either openly opposed to regulation of the drugs trade or indifferent to trafficking, in the sense that they publicly opposed it while in practice putting few resources into fighting it. Today, on the other hand, Turkey is a leading country in the fight drug trafficking. This thesis, then, is interested in how and why drug control emerged as a priority for Turkey, and in particular for the TNP. It is ultimately interested in how and why making drug control a priority has transformed Turkey into an advocate of international police cooperation.

The premise on which this work is based is that the sequence of events, mechanisms, and cause-to-effect relationships through which the change took place can be uncovered, and that the subsequent behavioural pathway can be explained (Young, 1999). The analysis is chronological, identifying three distinct periods between the late 1960s and 2012. It is also thematic to the extent that it considers whether the observed change in behaviour has been influenced by Turkey’s partners, the United States and the European Union, or whether domestic factors have played a more significant role or whether the change has been produced by a combination of these factors.

Immediately after World War II and throughout the Cold War, the United States and Turkey enjoyed close relations, in particular militarily. Uslu notes that in many respects the United States-Turkey alliance represented the perfect example of a relationship between a superpower and a small state, but notes that there is also a lot of evidence to refute the theory that Turkey fell victim to American influence (Uslu, 2003: 2). The United States has also been an “undisputed driving force of international drug control” (Bewley-Taylor, 2012: 10) as well as an undisputed driving force of international police cooperation in the modern era.
At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, Turkey was granted formal candidacy status in its application to join the EU. From this moment on, the concept of 'Europeanization' and surrounding debates have almost automatically been employed to assess the relationship between Turkey and different aspects of European integration (Alpan, 2010). The latter involves a multitude of treaties and other arrangements to facilitate law enforcement cooperation, in particular in the area of drug control (Occhipinti, 2003; Elvins, 2003). This thesis will argue that Turkey’s relationships with both the United States and the European Union (EU) have played a role in the transformation of the TNP, and in behavioural change in respect of combating illicit drug trafficking; but not a sufficient enough role to conclude that Turkey has been pressured into updating its approach to drug control by one or the other. Other explanatory factors also have to be taken into account. It is argued that reputational concerns and pragmatic, career-oriented decisions by police officers at the TNP’s Anti-Smuggling and Organised Crime Department (Kacakcilik ve Organize Sucularla Mucaedele Daire Baskanligi, KOM) are also crucial to explain the change.

1.2 Area of academic contribution

While the subject matter of this thesis is located within the discipline of International Relations, its two main research focuses, policing and drug control, are also of interest to scholars in criminology, sociology, and international law. Academic research on the internationalization of policing is growing, but the field is still relatively new and much remains to be understood about transfer processes of policy and practice between law enforcement agencies (Goldsmith and
Sheptycki, 2007: 394). Most existing research focuses either on the United States and Western Europe (Nadelmann, 1993; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006; Lemieux ed., 2010; Marenin, 1999), or on international policing in the context of peacekeeping (Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2007), and it is generally undertaken within the fields of criminology (Lemieux, 2010) rather than International Relations. To the best of the author’s knowledge there are no studies available on the political science or International Relations dimensions of Turkey’s law enforcement, and this thesis seeks to contribute to that research agenda. Studies on drug control in Turkey are also few. Robins looked at drugs in general, both supply and demand (Robins, 2008 and 2009); Spain focused on a specific event, the ban of opium production between 1972 and 1974 (Spain, 1975); and Mansfield and Kamminga focused on Turkey’s licensing system (Mansfield, 2001; Kamminga, 2011). There is, therefore, a gap in existing academic knowledge between studies of international policing worldwide, of which a number have attempted to make general conceptualisation of the phenomenon (Deflem, 2002a and 2002b; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006; Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2007) and case-specific knowledge about Turkish policing. This thesis seeks to make the link between the two.

This thesis also borrows from a body of International Relations theory, namely regime theory, in order to better interpret the transformative process observed in Turkey. This choice is guided by two observations. Firstly, regime theory has not developed within a single research tradition or paradigm but rather across neorealist, neoliberal and constructivist approaches (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996). Analytic eclecticism (in the sense defined by Sil and Katzenstein) thus appears as a possible way to proceed as it offers numerous
theoretical tools available that seem applicable to this case study (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010). This thesis chooses to consider multiple perspectives on the case study in order to achieve a finer and richer explanation of the process studied, rather than filter the empirical evidence through one paradigm, with the resultant need to justify the choice of paradigm. The second observation is that such analytic eclecticism was used by Andreas and Nadelmann in their study of the internationalization of crime control (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 4-13) and by Bewley-Taylor in his study of the international drug control regime (Bewley-Taylor, 2012: 19), thus this thesis places itself in this same line of research.

This thesis will demonstrate that Schimmelfenning’s contention that “eclecticism is the unintended result of research that seeks to explain specific events as well as possible” (quoted in Sil and Katzenstein, 2010: 191) applies to this case. Eclecticism, in this thesis, makes it possible to ask whether explanatory frameworks that are commonly used in the academic field of International Relations, namely the US influence on other states policy change and the impact of EU accession on policy change, tend to be filters that the research community frequently apply, but which frame explanations too narrowly. Specifically, this thesis will show that crafting an explanation of the internationalization of Turkey’s law enforcement around either US or EU influence is possible, but is not convincing. Rationalist theoretical frameworks that are normally best suited to evaluating external influence on a state’s policy change overlook crucial factors. The best way to understand the processes that transformed Turkey’s law enforcement is to focus on micro-socialization processes, events and changes that
took place at the level of agents of the TNP, and which ultimately impacted on the state’s policy and practice.

1.3 Method of enquiry

This thesis postulates that there exists a causal chain, a specific sequence of steps to explain how and why Turkey’s approach to drug control changed radically in the space of forty years. In order to uncover the various elements of this causal chain and explain how they are linked, process-tracing is used (George and Bennett, 2006: 206). In particular, the empirical analysis relies on “theory-oriented systematic process analysis” (Hall, 2003 and 2008), which is a refined version of process-tracing in which various sets of theories of causal explanations are used in the research design in order to go beyond a simple historical analysis.

The analysis will consist of a range of observations made, as diversely as possible, that seek to explain “the outcomes of interest by going back in time and identifying the key events, processes, or decisions that link the hypothesized cause or causes with the outcomes” (Faletti, 2006: 5). This should involve looking for elements such as: the unfolding of situations; actions and events; traces of motivations (or other lower level mechanisms); evidence of (complex) interactions between causal factors and/or information about restricting/catalyzing contexts/conditions; and detailed features of a specific outcome. (Blatter and Blume, 2008: 319). According to Hall, theory-oriented systematic process analysis:

“construes the task of explanation as one of elucidating and testing a theory that identifies the main determinants of a broad class of outcomes and attaches special importance to specifying the mechanisms whereby those determinants bear on the outcome. [...] The object is not to provide a complete explanation for why one outcome occurs at a particular time and place, but to identify the most important elements in the causal chain generating this class of outcomes. [...] This approach attaches less value to securing
precise parameter estimates for a few key variables seen as the ‘ultimate causes’ of the outcome and more value to identifying regularities in the causal chain through which the relevant outcome is generated” (Hall, 2008: 306).

Two additional parameters have been decisive in the choice of this method of enquiry: the existing state of the available literature and the existing set of theories. Firstly, in the absence of a sufficiently developed literature, a wide variety of observations of a different nature needs to be collected and analysed. Process-tracing allows for this kind of work because it is:

“analogous to detective work, legal briefs, journalism, and traditional historical accounts. The analyst seeks to make sense of a collection of observations and disparate pieces of evidence that are often non-comparable, but where each element sheds light on a single outcome or set of related outcomes (Gerring, 2007: 178-9).

Secondly, as noted above, regime theory offers a broad set of causal explanations which can be tested in this case, with a view to refining them. The aim of this thesis is not to develop a new theory, but to document the temporal unfolding of events and explain it with the help of existing theoretical tools (Blatter and Blume, 2008b: 33). This case study focuses on what various theories can help to explain best, and does not rule out the possibility that different paradigms may explain different aspects of the case. Thus, it does not seek to use the observations collected in order to assess which theory best explains the case throughout. It also shows that it is useful to challenge dominant ideas in International Relations, which have created generalizations and expectations that are not necessarily supported by closer analysis.

1.4 Sources

The empirical analysis in this thesis (Chapters Six, Seven and Eight) relies mainly on semi-structured interviews carried out in person in Ankara and Istanbul; and by phone between January 2011 and April 2012. Most interviews took place during two trips to Turkey in January-February 2011 and April-May 2011, while the rest
was arranged at the convenience of interviewees. They were carried out with
former senior Turkish officials: the former Prime Minister and President
Süleyman Demirel, the former Minister of Interior Sadettin Tatan, the former
ambassador and former Deputy Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) Sumru Noyan, and Sevil Atasoy, a former member of the
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). Interviews were also carried out
with foreign police liaison officers based in Turkey and the Turkish police liaison
officer in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK).
Finally, interviews were carried out with senior and middle-ranking officers of the
TNP and middle-ranking officers of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In
total, 39 interviews were recorded and in some cases informal follow-up
discussions also took place. Informal contacts by phone and e-mail were also
made with staff at the UNODC and at the EU Enlargement Directorate General.
While the interviewees agreed to be identified, some requests for anonymity were
made with respect to parts of their comments, therefore quotes in the analysis are
attributed unless the interviewees specifically requested otherwise. Whenever
possible, interviews were carried out in English. When interviews took place in
Turkish, they were translated by the author. Most interviews were conducted
following a common guide of questions prepared ahead of the field visits, and
which constituted an inventory of the themes explored in the case study.
Conducting semi-structured interviews allowed interviewees to elaborate on their
personal experiences on the issues they were most familiar with, and this helped
bringing out some elements which had not been foreseen prior to conducting the
interviews (Bryman, 2008: 437-439).
Official documentation was sourced from the websites of the TNP, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of EU Affairs, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the UNODC, the UN archives, and the EU. Additional published and unpublished documentation was also obtained from the TNP. Most of these documents are available in English and in Turkish while both versions were used during the research, English versions are referenced whenever possible. Access was requested to the official archives of records of Turkish views at international conferences, in particular the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND). While this was permitted in theory, none were made available in practice. The theoretical and contextual sections of the thesis (Chapters Two to Five) are informed mainly by academic literature available in English, as well as by reports of independent think tanks, and by media articles in the Turkish press in both Turkish and in English.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

Chapter Two begins with a review of the drug issue in Turkey, focussing on the production, use and trafficking of drugs. The analysis reveals that since Turkey adopted its current poppy cultivation licensing system these three dimensions have evolved on separate paths. Three periods distinguish themselves: before, between and after key two dates, 1996 and 2005. In 1996 the Turkish National Security Council (MGK) included drugs in its list of threats to national security. Meanwhile, the Turkish state apparatus entered a period of reforms triggered by a series of corruption scandals. In 2005, the TNP gained full control over the Turkish International Academy on Drugs and Organised Crime (TADOC), a UN-sanctioned international academy that had been run by the UNODC and the TNP.
since its creation five years earlier. The year 2005 is also an important date in the EU-Turkey relations: formal accession negotiations were opened that year and quickly frozen because of Turkey’s policy on Cyprus, thus marking a slowing down of Turkey’s EU integration. This chapter provides the general background of the case study tracing the context of drug control in Turkey. It highlights facts and events that are analysed in detail in later chapters using the process-tracing method.

Chapter Three explores the development of the international drug control regime.¹ The present system for international drug control was established with the core objective of preventing the production, trade, supply and use of narcotic and psychotropic substances for recreational purposes. It promotes a penal and prohibition-oriented approach to all aspects of the drug issue, and in order to operationalize their commitments states are expected to engage in police and judicial cooperation to apprehend and prosecute traffickers. This chapter clarifies

¹ This thesis uses the term “international drug control regime”. It recognizes that some authors adopt other terms, for example “global drug prohibition regime” (Bewley-Taylor: 2012). Nevertheless “international drug control regime” is preferred here, though the prohibitive nature of the regime is acknowledged throughout the thesis. This thesis does not discuss the adequacy, or lack thereof, of the regime's norms in tackling the problem of drug use in the way that authors who emphasize that aspect do (Nadelmann, 1988 and 2003; Woodiwiss and Bewley-Taylor, 2005; Bewley-Taylor, 2012, Pryce, 2012). Moreover, the thesis refers mainly to drug control, drug enforcement and drug control policy. These appellations refer only to supply reduction policies, in particular anti-trafficking. This needs to be distinguished from the term 'drug policy', which is common in academic literature. Whilst 'drug policy' should cover both supply and demand aspects of drug policy, it is used mainly to refer to policies concerning drug use, drug users, addiction and treatment.
the crucial role played by police cooperation in the operation of the international drug control regime. It also highlights the extent to which the United States was central to the development of the international drug control regime into its current prohibitionist form. Existing academic literature argues that states remain under the sway of the United States on drug-related issues. This provides the contours for the first hypothesis tested in this thesis, according to which US influence determined changes in Turkish drug control enforcement.

Chapter Four reviews the existing academic literature on international policing. It explains how drug trafficking became a greater priority following the end of the Cold War, rising to the level of 'national security threat' first in the United States and subsequently in Europe, and analyses the American and European international policing models. The chapter also takes stock of current debates on the nature of international policing and its transformation, thereby identifying the components and processes of international policing that will need to be explored in the case study. This literature review delineates the three hypotheses that will tested in the case-study of Turkey: firstly, that Turkish law enforcement changed under the influence of the United States; secondly, that it changed under the influence of Turkey’s accession to the European Union, and thirdly, that it changed as a result of domestic factors.

Chapter Five explains the theoretical framework that underpins the empirical analysis in the following chapters. The chapter explains how regime theory emerged as a field of International Relations seeking to explain increased levels of cooperation between states on a growing number of issues and clarifies how the different traditions of neo-realism, neoliberalism and constructivism developed in parallel within regime theory and theoretical frameworks were proposed in each
research tradition. The chapter thus describes how various theoretical frameworks will be explored and challenged in the empirical analysis.

Chapter Six argues that the United States been a source of transformation for Turkey’s drug control policies between the late 1960s until 1996, albeit a limited one. The role of the hegemonic USA and its relationship to Turkey is assessed. It points out that utilizing this explanatory framework leaves a wealth of evidence unexplained. The chapter then proposes to carry the analysis at the level of socialization microprocesses, and argues that during this period Turkey’s approach to drug control is best explained as a process of mimicking more influential powers within the international drug regime.

Chapter Seven examines the influence of the EU accession process in the transformation of Turkey’s drug control between 1996 and 2005. Despite the fact that the EU integration has resulted in the development of a large panel of international policing practices, it is argued that the rapid transformation of the TNP over that period cannot be fully accounted for by the EU accession process. The chapter then proposes that a microprocess of social influence is more suited to explaining how the pragmatic career-oriented decisions of a number of people working at KOM proved decisive in the transformation of Turkey’s approach to drug control.

Chapter Eight looks at how the TNP has been working to develop its offer of international capacity building in Central Asia and the Middle East, as well as South East Asia and Africa. It is argued that Turkey’s behaviour is characterized by persuasion of the validity of the norms and values of the international drug regime on the one hand, while on the other there are indications that the TNP is attempting to capitalise on its good reputation among law enforcement agencies to
promote Turkey as a leading actor on security matters beyond the issue of drug control.

The conclusion appraises the outcomes of this thesis, identifying case-specific results and elements that can be generalised beyond the study of Turkish law enforcement. The thesis sought to explain the specificities of the transformation of Turkish law enforcement, and it successfully demonstrated that the personal interests of agents and the bureaucratic interests of the TNP were the drivers of Turkey’s law enforcement internationalization, while processes of Americanization and Europeanization carried much less weight. It then argues that the academic field of International Relations must challenge dominant ideas such as Americanization and Europeanization in most policymaking processes in other states, and advocates the use of research designs that combine research traditions rather than remaining within a single one.
Chapter 2: Drugs in Turkey

2.1 Introduction

Ottoman Turkey was the only state to decline an invitation to the first international conference on drugs, convened in Shanghai in February 1909 following great effort from the United States. Despite three years of intense diplomatic work between 1906 and 1909 by the US State Department to convince Great Britain, France, Japan, Germany, Russia, Portugal, Austria-Hungary, China and Siam (Thailand) and Persia to attend – on the basis that all the major producing, manufacturing and consuming states should all be represented – it may seem rather unusual, in retrospect, that the Ottomans alone did not agree to participate in the first ever intergovernmental meeting to discuss opium trade (McAllister, 2000: 28).

One hundred years later, the picture is entirely different: the Turkish Republic is completing its second two-year National Action Plan – which incorporated both supply reduction and demand reduction – as a result of a ‘twinning’ capacity building project with the EU. Since 2006 it has seized more heroin in its territory than all EU member states combined, and it boasts the second highest seizure rate worldwide (KOM, 2008; the UNODC, 2009). Its first national drug strategy was implemented between 2006 and 2012. At the time of writing a second National Drug Strategy Document (covering 2013 until 2019) is due to for imminent publication.

During that century drugs have never been far from the [centre of the] political agenda in Turkey. Maintaining the livelihoods of Anatolian opium farmers was an
important issue in elections in the early 1970s (Robins, 2007). In 1996 a fatal road traffic accident claimed the lives of a member of parliament, a notorious drug smuggler and a senior police chief, leading to the resignation of the Prime Minister (Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, 2007; Robins, 2008). The drugs issue has also been important at the international level; in 1971 the United States threatened to reduce its funding to Turkey (which amounted to approximately US$180 million per anum in food aid and military grants) in order to coerce Turkey into banning opium production (Kamminga, 2006). At the CND in 2009, the Turkish representative said that Turkey would “do its share (...) to realize the balanced objectives set forth both in the Political Declaration and the Action Plan” that had been adopted by the UN General Assembly during its Special Session on Drugs in 1998 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009).

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the characteristics of debates on drugs in Turkey; or, more precisely, to determine the nature of drug issues, since it is a country in which drugs both licit and illicit are produced, manufactured, transported and used. The chapter examines different aspects of the production, use and trafficking of drugs, utilizing a historical approach to introduce the key elements of the current situation with a view to understanding how control over each of these aspects has developed in Turkey. It consists of a review and analysis of academic literature, official documents and reports prepared by the UN, the European Police Office (EUROPOL) and the TNP. The first section addresses opium production in Turkey throughout the twentieth century, both before and after its regulation by international agreements. The second section turns to address the issue of drug use in Turkey. The third section focusses on drug trafficking and – as this thesis is focused on efforts to fight drug trafficking – it
enters into greater details than the first two – analysing seizure rates and trafficking patterns in recent years; the involvement of Turkish organised crime in trafficking; and the emergence of drug trafficking as a policy issue for the Turkish authorities. This chapter is intended to provide a narrative framing the evolution of the drug question in Turkey, highlighting and explaining the background to key factors and events. This presentation of the narrative is important in order to apply the process-tracing method in following chapters, where these key factors and events are analysed against theoretical inputs and the extent to which various theoretical mechanisms can explain the case are assessed.

2.2 Production of opium and opium derivatives

This section analyses the evolution of opium production in Turkey. It seeks to explain how Turkish authorities have responded to the development of international norms curtailing opium production, and to show how in the early 1970s they responded to US pressure to follow the example of Iran set by 1955 and ban opium production.

2.2.1 Attempts to protect domestic opium production by defending the right to trade and export; and opposition to mounting regulation

It is believed that both opium and cannabis were cultivated in Anatolia by ancient civilisations, with poppy products used for food and medicine. Poppy cultivation was much more widespread than cannabis and became an integral part of peasant tradition. During the Ottoman Empire – which lasted from the fourteenth century until 1923 – it was an essential part of rural culture. There are records of consumption of Anatolian opium for recreational use between the sixteenth and
nineteenth centuries, and of various decrees by Sultans prohibiting the practice. Poppy and opium spread as a commodity of economic and geopolitical value under the Ottomans, but Evered mentions that “[c]enturies before the eleventh-century arrival of Turkic peoples in Anatolia, poppies figured into both the ecologies of local communities and the region’s networks of trade.” (Evered 2008: 297) During the nineteenth century, the Ottomans attempted to break into the Chinese opium market with the help of US merchants who exported Anatolian opium, although this was without great success as the majority of the opium consumed in China originated from India, which was then under British rule (UNODC, 2008: 20-1, Evered, 2008: 299).

The beginning of the twentieth century saw a number of states take disparate interests in opium production and distribution. Whilst the Chinese authorities attempted to curb opium addiction, the British authorities sought to ensure that the British East India Company kept a strong hold over the lucrative Chinese opium market. The German and Dutch authorities, meanwhile, sought to ensure a constant supply of cheap raw material for their burgeoning pharmaceutical companies. The US authorities attempted not only to address drug addiction, which was associated with vice in political circles influenced by prohibitionists, but also to open Chinese markets to American industrial production. The influence of these factors on the emergence of the first international drug treaties will be addressed in Chapter Three.

Given its dependence on the high value opium trade, the Ottoman Empire's economy was inevitably to be affected by these early negotiations on control measures for drug manufacture and trade. At the time of the Shanghai conference, the Ottoman Empire was the world's fourth largest producer of opium, producing
between 320 and 380 metric tonnes in a typical year, according to estimates presented at the conference (although this is still far behind China which produced around 35,000 metric tonnes in 1906) and it is likely that other nations wanted to ensure that the Ottomans did not retain the influence they had been enjoying. The British authorities in India, for example, justified their continuing export of Bengal-originated opium into China, which had officially banned it in the nineteenth century, by arguing that Persia or Ottoman Turkey would be able fill the gap on the Chinese market if India left (UNODC, 2008: 33). Nevertheless, the good reputation of the Anatolian opium, which was highly concentrated in morphine, was well known, and it was in mainly exported to the United States and Europe.

In the light of the above it may seem odd that the Ottoman authorities refused to participate in the Shanghai Conference and in the negotiations of the first international treaty, the 1912 Hague Opium Convention, which sought to regulate the trade of narcotics that were not designed for medical use. McAllister argues that the agenda of the first conferences, which focused on ways to curb recreational drug use because of the impacts of addiction on individual behaviour, while maintaining sufficient supplies for expanding European and American pharmaceutical industries, restricted discussion on measures to control the supply of drugs. Chapter Three will examine in further detail how the belief that reducing the availability of recreational drugs was the best way to eliminate demand became intertwined with economic considerations designed to protect pharmaceutical industries in the negotiations of international drug conventions. For now, it is important to note that, in this context, it was clear that the newly established regulation would be disproportionately detrimental to producing states
(McAllister, 2000: 32-3). It is likely that the Ottomans had no intention to agree to such plans and refused to attend. Evered, however, offers a different explanation for their refusal: he argues that throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottomans had attempted create a state-run control system for the purchase of opium from producers and its trade. Although not completely effective, the system included the imposition of taxes, which became a much needed source of revenue for the Ottoman state, and later on, the Turkish Republic. Any international regulation of production and trade would have entailed a reduction in the revenue that could be expected from these taxes, thus causing Ottomans to reject the idea of international regulation (Evered, 2008: 301).

However all parties who signed the Versailles Treaty at the end of World War One were bound to adhere to the Hague Opium Convention. Thus, the newly created Turkish Republic automatically joined the convention. Thereafter, Turkey participated in the negotiations of the 1925 International Opium Convention, which also concentrated on controlling the trade in narcotics; and in negotiations for the 1931 Convention, which sought to limit narcotics manufacture to pre-estimated medicinal and scientific purposes. In both instances, Turkey refused to sign the conventions at the time of their adoption but did so later.

According to Robins, once it had ratified the International Opium Convention in 1933, Turkey:

“would remain an active participant in the ad hoc international efforts to create a standardized international control regime. Though [it] had fought a rear-guard action against the expansion of regulatory proscription policies, it had respected the provision of international convention-building once formally adopted.” (Robins, 2008: 632).

However, the major change from the first years of the century was that by then Turkey had developed manufacturing capacities and the majority of manufactured drugs were being directed to the illicit market (McAllister, 2000: 92). Arguably,
Turkey held a strong bargaining position [internationally] because the high value of its morphine-rich opium for medicinal purposes attracted licit buyers who wanted to maintain low prices, and because its manufacturing capacities meant that it could disrupt efforts to lower illicit production. States advocating tight control of narcotics supplies needed to consider Turkey as a key actor if they wanted efforts to curb the diversion of production into the illicit market to be effective.

2.2.2 The short lived US-imposed production ban and the opium licensing system

In 1958 Turkey adopted a licensing system organised around a unique state controlled agency, which purchased all domestically produced opium before selling it on to foreign buyers. According to the 1961 Single Convention, Turkey was accepted as a ‘traditional opium producer’, which excluded it from the obligation of requesting permission from the UN Economic Social and Economic Council to export its opium production. The convention also contained a provision seeking to regulate international opium production by compelling states to limit production to licensed farmers, thus requiring stricter licensing than the system implemented in 1958. It is likely that Turkish authorities were reluctant to implement this latter measure as it was bound to displease farmers. Indeed, Turkey signed the 1961 Convention shortly after its conclusion, but it took until 1967 for the ratification to be finalised. Thus, while the signature represented a show of good-will towards the international community, the slow pace of the ratification is indicative of a lack of will to implement its requirements. Moreover, as a result of its export privileges, Turkey did not have incentives to
enforce the farmers' licensing provision strictly for its opium to be authorized for
sale to other states. By delaying the implementation of this licensing system, the
Turkish authorities took the risk that Turkish produced opium may reach the illicit
market fairly easily.

In practice, this meant that surplus production was indeed directed to the illicit
market. It was then turned into morphine, usually in Lebanon, and refined in the
south of France by criminal groups known as the “French Connection”, which
exported it to places of consumption – including the United States (Robins, 2007:
21). By the end of the 1960s, this situation caused a diplomatic crisis between
Turkey and the United States (Uslu, 2003). The US authorities were faced with a
‘heroin epidemic’ in New York at the end of the 1960s, in part as a result of
heroin abuse by American soldiers returning from Vietnam (McCoy, 2003;
Kuzmarov, 2009). They pressured Turkey into banning its opium production
completely (Musto, 1999: 248; McCoy, 2003). Robins and McAllister explain
that the United States, where the “War on Drugs” had recently been launched by
the Nixon administration, exaggerated the importance of Turkish opium in the
overall illicit supply, for example by claiming that 80% of the heroin on the
streets of New York had a Turkish connection (McAllister, 2000: 166; Robins,
2007; Robins, 2008). Chapter Six will explore further the opium ban crisis and its
impact on relations between Turkey and the United States, and explain that
domestic political concerns dominated the US decision to get Turkey to introduce
the ban (Nadelmann, 1990; Bertram et al, 1996; Woodiwiss, 2001; McCoy, 2003;
Friesendorf, 2006). The increasing problems of heroin addiction in New York
City were intensively reported in the US media and national politicians were
eager to see government action (Erhan, 1996). In this context, the government
was eager to show actions and results at the time of the approaching mid-term elections (McCoy, 2003).

At the time, an estimated 70,000 families in Turkey depended on opium cultivation and the issue was highly politicised, leading the Turkish government to postpone phasing out the cultivation until 1972. Moreover, it had become evident that no other crop would be as profitable as opium to the farmers and to the state, and that in any case it would take several years for new crops to be make returns on any investment (Spain, 1975: 298). Nevertheless, a change in power following the military coup in 1971 reversed the situation. In June 1971 the new government agreed, in return for an aid package of US$35 million and a promise that the United States would support Turkey’s loans and assistance request from intergovernmental institutions, to enact measures to prohibit all planting, cultivation and production of the opium poppy after 1972; to purchase the entire crop planted in the autumn of 1971; and to pass legislation that would prohibit all future poppy farming after June 1972.

The eradication plan was a US-led initiative which improved US-Turkey relations and proved sufficient to reassure American political authorities. Despite Turkish authorities resisting American pressure to criminalise the cultivation of poppies altogether, the ban remained highly unpopular domestically (Kamminga, 2006; Evered 2008). This facilitated the later re-introduction of poppy cultivation. Indeed, the cultivation ban lead to a global shortage of opium for medical purposes and a rapid price increase on the licit market. Knowledge of this fact tamed US protestations when in 1973 the newly elected Turkish government declared its intention to remove the ban. Not only did cultivation effectively resume in September 1974, just two years after the implementation of the ban,
but Turkey also received substantial support from the United States and the UN to develop its licit opium manufacturing capacities. Turkish-US relations also significantly improved (Robins, 2007).

Today, Turkey’s licensing system is often considered as an example of best practice with regards to how licensing can effectively reduce illicit production (Kamminga, 2011). Robins suggests that it has led Turkey to place significantly greater importance to implementing its international obligations related to drugs than it has given to international obligations related to other forms of organised crimes. He also argues that from this point onwards, much more importance has been given to the law enforcement than to other aspects of the drugs issue (Robins, 2007 and 2008).

On the other hand, the unpopularity of the ban amongst rural populations, the fact that it was implemented by a military-led government and the perception that it was an act of imperial pressure from the United States also meant that it was contentious issue at the level of domestic politics. Furthermore, Evered claims that politicians used the issue to return to power after the military coup: he argues that for “many in rural, agrarian Turkey, the return of poppies was symbolic – if not tangible proof – of the republic’s return to democracy” (Evered, 2008: 303). Arguably, the importance of maintaining opium production in order to win the votes of affected farmers is likely have been an incentive for the authorities to establish an effective licensing system.
2.2.3 Licit opium production

In the early nineteenth century the Ottomans first attempted to control opium production so that they could tax it (Poroy, 1981: 191). They designed the basis of a system through which producers could only sell their production to buyers of a state-run agency. This system was intended to allow the state to fix the price of purchase from producers and to centralise the trade; as well as to establish a tax on production. Evered explains that opium remained a central source of revenue for the state until regime change in 1923. In practice, however, the effectiveness of the system was limited by the fact that the Ottoman authorities had limited resources and could not always buy all the opium as soon as it had been harvested. This was further limited by the 1838 Balta Liman Treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the UK, through which the Ottomans agreed to dismantle monopolies in exchange for British help to restore their territorial integrity in Syria.

The first narcotics control law was passed in 1928. It attempted to regulate all aspects of production and sale, under the supervision of the Ministry of Health and Social Services. Given the extent of debts that the Turkish Republic had inherited from the Ottoman regime, it is likely that there was little available for the state to invest either in modernizing and intensifying the production, or in controlling it effectively. Therefore, even if the revenue generated by opium production was highly valued, much of it still entered the illicit market easily. In 1958, Turkey adopted its first opium growing licensing system and placed the production and the exportation of opium under government responsibility (Uslu, 2003: 220). Evered argues that up until the 1970s, Turkish authorities were, on various occasions, pressed to quickly tighten control over opium production
because drug abuse and the perceived increasing incidence of drug-related crimes in Istanbul and other urban areas was attracting media and popular attention. These were, he argues, significant internal factors that influenced political decisions. Measures were taken to reduce the number of regions in which poppy could be grown. By 1970 cultivation was allowed only in six provinces, as opposed to Ottoman times, when it was found throughout Anatolia, notably in the South East, where cultivation was more productive than in others where it was retained.

The resumption of cultivation in 1974 was accompanied by a change in the production of opium, as discussed above. Instead of collecting the opium paste from poppy capsules by incising them early in their development so the paste can drip out, licensed farmers had to harvest the entire plant without incision and then separate the seeds from the capsules (they would keep the seeds for other use). Thereafter, emptied capsules were sold to a state-run agency for trade to pharmaceutical companies either in Turkey or abroad, and they would manufacture a product called “poppy straw”. This technique is thought to ease the control and policing over the production and traffic because capsules that are incised at some point of their growth turn into a different colour than those left unopened. Today, Turkey is the largest world producer of poppy straw (see figure 1). The national poppy processing factory produces 75 tons of morphine each year, 95% of which is exported for an estimated yearly income of US$160 million (Kamminga, 2006; 4). Turkey’s licensing model is widely recognised as successful in preventing the diversion of the product into the illicit market. It is worth noting, however, that poppy production is undertaken by small-holder farmers – it is largely traditional and small scale. Plots for cultivation are
stipulated by state officials on a yearly basis, and state orders rotate plots among the farms. On average, licensed farmers cultivate 0.4 hectare of poppy per 100 hectares (Mansfield; 2001:6). As a result, the activity does not provide farmers with revenues significantly higher than other crops. Yet poppy is believed to be valued by farmers as part of their cultural heritage (Evered, 2008; 305-6).

The costs of the transition from loosely regulated raw opium to controlled poppy straw cultivation were borne by the US government and the UN (Mansfield 2001, 33). According to Mansfield, the fact that Turkey was a key supplier of the licit opium market made it easier for the country to receive assistance, and the price increase on the international licit market caused by the few months of ban is likely to have strengthened its position. In 1981, the United States put in place the so-called ‘80/20 rule’, aimed at limiting the number of countries involved in licit opium trade, while guaranteeing that US medical needs were met at a reasonable price. This stipulated that “at least 80% of licit opium imported into the United States must come from India and Turkey and not more than 20% from Australia, Hungary, Poland, France and the former Yugoslavia” (Mansfield, 2001: 8). It appears, therefore, that the need for cheap and stable opiates for medical purposes has been a real incentive from the international level for Turkish opium licensing system to operate effectively.
Figure 1: reported harvest for licit poppy straw used for the manufacture of heroin, 1964-2006. (Source: the UNODC, 2009; collected from INCB official data.)

2.2.4 Manufacture of opium derivatives, including heroin

The 1923 Lausanne Treaty signed by the newly created Republic of Turkey; the UK; France; Japan; the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; Greece; and Italy required that Turkey pay the debts of the Ottoman Empire almost in full. This created a major burden on the state’s finances and the government became eager to develop its exports in order to improve its balance of payments. Moreover, a customs agreement between the parties to the Lausanne Treaty put greater pressure on the balance of trade, because it forced the government to keep taxes on imported goods low until 1929, with the result that Turkish business groups expecting tax increases after this date were eager to import as much as possible. Eventually, the 1929 financial crisis and the general economic slowdown of the 1930s caused a reduction of exports while imports continued to rise. In these
circumstances, the government facilitated the opening of heroin producing factories in Istanbul with the help of Japanese investors (Erdinç, 2004: 54-57). The laws on opiates in Turkey at the time actually facilitated the establishment of these factories. Three opened between 1926 and 1929 and together they could produce monthly as much as ten tons of morphine and other alkaloids, including heroin. They were highly profitable and the Turkish state benefited greatly through the taxes on exports.

Turkey was not a signatory to the 1925 International Opium Convention, which attempted to regulate the trade of opium. This created a gap that weakened the effectiveness of the international control regime. As a result, opium transformation factories that had been operating in Western Europe, in particular France, moved to Turkey and heroin could then be sold and exported back to these states (Block, 1989: 328). Moreover the 1926 Turkish Penal Code also had loopholes when it came to narcotics. It prohibited the production, import, sale, possession or export of “recreational substances”, with punishments including prison sentences and fines, but it did not stipulate what “recreational substances” were. Moreover, in 1930 heroin was included as a medical drug in the first Turkish codex (the official list of medicines allowed in Turkey), even though it had been banned for several years in other countries. This actually permitted the licit production of heroin.

Erdinç argues that Turkish authorities were actively promoting the trade of heroin, both licit and illicit throughout this period for two main reasons (Erdinç, 2004: 54-57). The first is that it provided a much needed income to the state, as explained above. The second is that members of the Turkish political elite had invested in these factories so they wanted to secure their personal gain. Finally,
the opium factories in Istanbul functioned with Western investors who were directly involved in the illicit market. For example, one factory was controlled by a French manufacturing company and it was well known to police authorities of various states that much of what was coming out of the Istanbul-based factories was actually falling straight into the illicit market, reaching Europe mainly via Egypt, as well as Lebanon. (Blok, 1989: 326-328). In 1933, police forces from the UK, the United States, the Netherlands and Germany collaborated to arrest a Greek citizen, and it is believed that he revealed the existence of an elaborate international network running from Turkey to the United States, through Lebanon and Marseille in France (Erdinc, 2004; Times, 1933). This network was the early stages of the "French Connection", which was to become famous in the 1960s (Blok, 1989: 329).

Western countries were buying Turkish opium and the morphine produced in Istanbul, but it was well known that large amounts were bought by traffickers. The Turkish delegation at the League of Nations announced publicly during negotiations for stronger limitations on production that it had produced 2 tons of morphine and 4 tons of heroin in the previous six months, though the Opium Observation Committee of the League of Nations had not been notified of it as Turkey was not yet party to the 1925 International Opium Convention. Implicitly, it admitted that most of it had reached the illicit market. Block argues that during these negotiations, the Turkish delegation even attempted to trade its signature of the 1925 Geneva Convention against being guaranteed a substantial part of the quotas of production under discussion. In 1932, Turkey signed the International Opium Convention and therefore had to change its policies, which it did in principle. This followed intense pressure, from the United States mainly but also
the UK, France, Germany, the official buyers of Turkish opiates. In February 1931, factories were officially closed until the state set up a system to control the transformation of opium and trade, which occurred in 1933. However, Erdinc argues that only one of the three factories ceased production during that time (Erdinc, 2004: 100).

This section has demonstrated that for sixty years, Turkish authorities either resisted or ignored the emergence of international norms curbing the production of opium and its derivatives. As a traditional opium producer in the sense of the 1961 Single Convention, it is one of the biggest world producers of licit opium, and the largest producer through the poppy “straw method”. Despite remaining a substantial source of revenue for the state, poppy production is no longer a sensitive political issue in Turkey.

2.3 Drug use

2.3.1 The importance of drug use as an issue in policy-making

Since before the twentieth century, issues surrounding drug consumption have been much less known and understood than production, a trend that continues to the present day. A 2003 national assessment on drug abuse, conducted by the UNODC in partnership with national institutions concluded that even if research has been undertaken it has not been informing policy. It also noted “an apparent lack of a contemporary understanding of drug abuse patterns” (UNODC, 2004; 1). Nevertheless, surveys are few and far-between (as discussed below); data on and knowledge of drug abuse remains relatively low; and prevention and rehabilitation strategies have only been developed in the last few years (TUBIM,
Robins identifies a number of explanatory factors for this apparent gap, pointing to a concentration of efforts on supply reduction rather than demand (Robins, 2009). Firstly, he notes that the importance placed on preventing the leakage of opium into the illicit market before, but mostly after 1974, has led to a concentration of attention, resources and effort into the policing and prevention of trafficking. He argues that the power of law enforcement agencies, the police and the gendarmerie in national budget allocations has exacerbated that trend. He also notes that until 1996, there was effectively no national policy concerning drug abuse. Secondly, Turkish politicians have often expressed a belief that higher moral standards amongst Turkish youths when compared to Western youths mean that they use drugs less frequently. This also explains the general reluctance to understand and prevent drug abuse in a coordinated manner. Thirdly, when the decision was taken to set up a national strategy on drug abuse in 1996, the intricacies of the domestic political and administrative structures ensured that the institution in charge did not have enough political power to function efficiently or to impose its views. In this context, the will and determination of specific individuals has proved instrumental in the eventual emergence of a national policy.

Today, the Turkish Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (TUBIM) is the national institution for all drug demand-related activities. It functions within KOM, which itself is within the TNP. It is the national focal point to the for REITOX, the European Information Network on Drugs and Drug Addiction, part of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). It was established as the result of a “twinning project” set up between TUBIM and its counterpart in Portugal under the 2002 Pre-Accession Assistance Programme.
Robins identifies three elements that may lead to drug use continuing to be seen as an issue of relatively low importance: firstly, TUBIM has few resources and is understaffed compared to its European counterparts, so it may not be able to carry out its responsibilities; secondly, it is a relatively small institution within a much larger ministry which deals mainly with drug supply reduction; and thirdly, it has little contact with the health sector (Robins, 2009; 300-301, European Commission, 2012). Nevertheless, Turkey’s move towards EU accession seems to have catalyzed activity and has resulted in new policy-making in the area of drug demand – this is discussed in further detail in Chapter Seven, below.

2.3.2 The reality of hard drug use in Turkey

There are historical accounts of opium and cannabis being consumed in Anatolia throughout the centuries. There are also anecdotal accounts that Ottoman sultans imposed decrees prohibiting the consumption of opium in order to reduce opium addiction. Erdinç, meanwhile, describes how the opening of heroin manufacturing factories in Istanbul caused widespread heroin addiction in the city in the 1920s and early 1930s (Erdinç, 2004). A 2002 study carried out by the Turkish Psychologists’ Association and the previously mentioned 2003 the UNODC study were the first nation-wide data collection exercise on drug use, however (TUBIM, 2008; 18). In 2007, a survey on substance abuse amongst school children was commissioned by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and in 2011 a national comprehensive survey was conducted, the result of which will be first published in TUBIM’s 2012 report to EMCDDA2.

2 This report was not published at the time of writing but the version communicated to EMCDDA was obtained.
The absence of in-depth knowledge on the issue until the 2002 and 2003 surveys were undertaken was highlighted by the UNODC:

“Drug abuse is still viewed as a relatively small problem in Turkey, but health officials acknowledge that heroin and cocaine addiction are increasing steadily and that there is a potential of further growth. In the absence of epidemiological data and statistics, estimates by the local drug control and health experts on the real number vary between a few thousand abusers for the entire country up to half a million for the Istanbul population alone.” (UNODC, 2001: 53)

Studies indicate that hard drugs abuse is less prevalent than in European countries and in Turkey's neighbours in Central Asia, although it is increasing, especially amongst youth. Cannabis is the most frequently used drug, followed by inhalants, synthetic opiates and heroin, and ecstasy is recorded at much lower levels but its use is said to be increasing in urban centres (UNODC, 2004: 5). The TNP considers, however, that the ecstasy it seizes is imported into Turkey for the domestic market (KOM, 2008: 21). It also mentions that it seizes increasing numbers of ‘fake ecstasy’ pills that are meant for the domestic market, which contain substances that are chemically close to ecstasy but not illegal in Turkey, and are packaged in the same way as ecstasy pills. Manufacturers and traffickers, concludes the TNP, are well aware of the current domestic legislation and of the fact that there is demand for these drugs in Turkey (KOM, 2008: 22).

The available data does not indicate a disproportionately high prevalence of opiate abuse that could be attributed to the ready availability resulting from their production in and trafficking through Turkey. Similarly, amphetamines, which are trafficked through the country in high volumes, are not subject to disproportionately high use. This suggests that reasons for the low but rising levels of drug use and drug addiction are sociological, and pertain to the nature and evolution of Turkish society; and the nature and evolution of drug use across

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3 mCPP (meta-chlorophenylpiperazine). It is also called a ‘designer drug’, meaning that it is not illegal but it reacts likes other illegal substances.
societies. They are not dependent on the presence of a domestic poppy culture or of trafficking. The absence of this incentive for policy-making may also explain why there seems to have been considerably less attention paid to drug abuse in comparison to drug trafficking, which has remained high on the political agenda, as will be explained in the next section.

2.4 Trafficking

This section focuses on drug trafficking, which is a central issue for the remainder of this thesis. It begins with an outline of the kinds of drugs currently trafficked in and through Turkey. It then shifts focus to the groups responsible for trafficking, weighing various arguments about the involvement of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a Kurdish separatist group engaged in guerrilla-type warfare in the south-east of Turkey, and which is recognised as a terrorist group by Turkey, the EU and the United States; as well as considering the involvement of Turkish organised crime. Finally, it analyses the rise of drug trafficking as an issue of concern in the Turkish political agenda.

Echoing President Nixon’s claims almost 40 years ago that 80 per cent of the heroin reaching the streets of New York was of Turkish origin, it is now estimated that close to 80 per cent of the heroin transiting through Turkey originates from Afghanistan and the remainder from Iran (UNODC, 2009: 50). Cases of diversion of Turkish-produced opium from the licit programme to illicit activities have consistently been accepted as negligible: in 2000 the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) estimated that “from the date that the [licensing] system was put into practice in 1974 until now, no seizures of Turkish poppies have been reported in the country or abroad” (UNODC, 2001: 53). Afghanistan emerged as
an opium producer after Turkey’s opium stopped leaking into the illicit market (UNODC, 2008: 93), and Turkey’s strategic location on the historical Silk Road has made it particularly vulnerable to traffic from Afghanistan towards Europe and North America.

Turkey therefore finds itself in a situation where it is a key producer of licit poppy and morphine at the same time as it devotes considerable resources to fighting the trafficking of opiates that are only transiting through the country. In 1999, the INCB estimated that up to 75% of the heroin reaching Western Europe had transited through Turkey. Even if more recent reports do not mention such high proportions, the figure speaks for itself about the volume of the trafficking, since only a small portion (difficult to measure with precision) is actually intercepted.

In 2012, the European Commission wrote on its website that:

“Most heroin reaches Europe via the Balkan routes, starting in Turkey via: (i) Bulgaria, FYROM, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia into Italy or Slovenia; (ii) via FYROM into Kosovo or Albania into Greece. A route via Ukraine and Romania is also gaining importance.” (European Commission, 2012)

Opiates are not the only illicit drugs that transit in high quantities through Turkey: synthetic psychotropic substances produced in Western Europe travel towards the Middle East where they are popular. Moreover, chemicals used as precursors for the manufacture of opiates as well as synthetic drugs travel through Turkey from Europe towards Central Asia and the Middle East. The result is that nearly all borders of the country are both an entry and an exit point for one substance or another.

2.4.1 Level of trafficking and levels of seizures

Due to the obvious illegal and secret nature of this activity, it is impossible to evaluate with precision the level of drug trafficking through Turkey. Seizure
levels by law enforcement agencies can offer a rough indication, but these also depend on the commitment of law enforcement agencies to the task, on their actual success, and on the fact that it is at best possible to estimate routes taken by the drugs from the point of production to the point of consumption. There is no irrefutable scientific method to quantify the proportions of drugs that are seized. Crop cultivation surveys are used to estimate opium, cocaine and cannabis production, but it is more difficult to track the production of synthetic drugs (UNODC 2009: 9) and the lack of precision at this stage makes estimations further in the process even more uncertain. Nevertheless, the INCB estimates that 4 to 6 tons of heroin pass through the country on a monthly basis, corresponding to a seizure rate of 15 percent put forward by the TNP (KOM, 2007). Turkey also seizes the greatest quantities of opiates in Europe – since 2006 it alone has seized as much or more heroin than all EU countries (KOM 2007: 8). According to the Turkish authorities, this reflects their level of commitment and success in countering trafficking, a point that will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Seven.

Most seizures by the TNP occur in Istanbul and other major cities, especially those close to the borders where drugs enter in the country. Given that opiates are not widely consumed in Turkey but are intended for the European market, counter-trafficking efforts are targeting substances that are destined for export. This is completely different, for example, to the intentions of Iranian counter-trafficking agencies, which concentrate on opium entering Iran because consumption levels are very high, rather than directing significant effort towards reducing the quantities of drugs leaving the country towards Europe, including from the domestic illicit production (EUROPOL, 2006; 3).
2.4.1.1 Opiates

According to the UNODC 2012 World Drugs Report, in 2010 Turkey seized the fourth highest amount of opiates globally, following Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. Turkey has also been among the four countries seizing most heroin for the past ten years (UNODC, 2012, see figure 2) and these four countries have been topping opiates seizures for several years, which indicates that opiates are seized mostly close to the site of production (in this case Afghanistan) (UNODC, 2009: 42). Following several years of increased seizures, rates dropped substantially in 2010 and 2011. Several factors are thought to have caused this drop in seizures: a reduction in opium production in Afghanistan in 2009; the rising price of opium, which has pushed smaller trafficking groups to turn to other goods (in particular tobacco and fuel); and changing routes and modes of transport by traffickers, who increasingly use sea and air travel, thereby bypassing Turkey on the way to Western Europe (KOM, 2011:22). Seizures of morphine also declined substantially: in 2004 a record was set at 4730kg, most of which (4410kg) was seized in a single Istanbul operation; but since 2008, only one seizure has taken place (in 2009) (KOM, 2004: 38, KOM, 2011). The amount of raw opium seized is also very low, which is explained mainly by the fact that opium is transformed close to the source (UNODC, 20012). Moreover, although refining laboratories have operated in Turkey throughout the 1990s (mainly in the southeast and Istanbul), the last reported laboratory seizure took place in 2006 (KOM, 2006: 2). Laboratories are now reported on the Iranian side of the Iran-Turkey border (Department of State, 2008b and 2012b).
2.4.1.2 Other drugs: cannabis, cocaine, synthetic drugs

All estimates reviewed indicate that the levels of trafficking of other substances such as cannabis/hashish and cocaine are well below the level of heroin trafficking. The fact that Turkey is not situated on obvious routes between producer and consumer countries renders it less prone to high levels of transit.

Cannabis is imported into Turkey for the domestic market, in addition to some that is grown domestically. It is produced legally in Turkey for industrial purposes, although in much smaller proportions than poppy, which is partly because the content in Turkish-produced cannabis is significantly lower compared to cannabis grown elsewhere, meaning it is unattractive outside the domestic market. However, the TNP believes that the PKK is involved in its production and trafficking (Pek and Ekici, 2007; KOM, 2008: 16). Cannabis seizures have risen...
in the past five years, though the TNP attributes this rise to better investigations and planning of operations rather than to a significant rise in production or imports (KOM, 2011: 27).

Cocaine enters Turkey mainly by air, and according to the TNP it arrives most frequently from West African countries and Venezuela (KOM, 2011:20). Although amounts remain low, it is believed to be on the rise and there are growing concerns that Istanbul also might be an emerging hub for cocaine trafficking between West Africa and Europe.

Synthetic drugs are mostly manufactured in Western Europe (Belgium and the Netherlands) or Eastern Europe and transit eastwards and southwards through Turkey towards the Middle East – though they are increasingly destined for the Turkish market. It is, however, difficult to single out a specific pattern, because the routes change quickly, and legislation concerning the components needed for the manufacture evolves, new substances appear in different places of production and consumption. For example, captagon producing laboratories were found in Turkey until 2007, but more recent seizures of captagon and of amphetamines used in its production have revealed that the manufacture has moved to Syria (KOM, 2008: 23; KOM, 2011: 31).

2.4.1.3 Precursors and chemical substances

Producing morphine and heroin requires large quantities of precursor chemicals such as acetic anhydride, a substance which is essential in the refinement of morphine to heroin. Since there is no legitimate production facility and no or little reported legitimate use of the substance in Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries, in which the majority of Afghan opium is transformed into morphine
and heroin, acetic anhydride has to be imported, in particular from European
countries which are important producers of the substance. As a result, large
quantities of precursor chemicals transit eastwards through Turkey. Moreover,
chemicals used in the production of synthetic drugs also transit through the
country on their way from Europe to Central and South East Asia.

According to the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention, some of these chemical
substances are subject to specific regulations regarding their export, import and
transit. This typically involves official inter-state notification that shipments are
taking place. Turkish authorities have been calling on their European counterparts
to increase their cooperation with Turkey and exchange more information. In
2007, for example, it was reported that an illicit shipment of acetic anhydride that
had been detected in Slovenia and was transiting through Istanbul could not be
subjected to a “controlled delivery police operation” until its final destination
because the Slovenian authorities failed to share the information they possessed
(KOM, 2008: 23).

In 2003 an agreement was signed between the European Community (EC) and the
Turkish Republic regarding “precursors and chemical substances frequently used
in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances”.
According to the agreement, a greater number of chemical substances are
controlled than required by the 1988 UN Convention; and there are specific
provisions for administrative assistance and the exchange of information between
countries.

To conclude this section, it appears from this analysis of the substances trafficked
in Turkey that it is mainly a country of transit and that the domestic market is
beginning to be targeted. The analysis has also shown that trends can change
quickly and determining what causes these changes is difficult. Educated guesses
can be made about the capacity of law enforcement to disrupt trafficking routes
and other factors can be taken into consideration, such as the lower than expected
supply of Afghan opium in 2009, but nothing can be ascertained.

2.4.2 Patterns of trafficking: narco-terrorism and organised crime

This sub-section analyses the official and academic literature on the involvement
of the PKK in drug trafficking, and on the involvement of Turkish organised
crime in drug trafficking.

2.4.2.1 Narco terrorism: PKK

There is an extensive literature on the relationship between drugs and terrorism
but it remains an area where evidence is difficult to obtain and is often disputed
on ideological grounds. The involvement of the PKK in drug trafficking is a
typical example. Founded in 1978, the group adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology
and in 1984 it launched guerrilla-type warfare against Turkish authorities,
including suicide and car bombings; kidnapping foreign tourists; attacking
Turkish diplomats in Europe; and attacking symbolic representatives of the
Turkish state in the southeast, such as teachers (Roth and Sever, 2007: 905). It
was officially recognised as a terrorist organization by the European authorities
only in 2002. The US authorities designated the PKK as a “Specially Designated
Global Terrorist” group in 2001 (Department of Treasury, 2012).4

4 “The State Department designated the PKK as a Foreign Terrorist organization in 1997,
and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2001 pursuant to Executive Order 13224”
(Department of Treasury, 2012).
After it lost the backing of Syria in the 1990s, the PKK began financing its activities through drug trafficking. In particular, it drew on from two factors in order to develop its drug trafficking capacities (Robins, 2008; 635-637). Firstly, the policies adopted by the Turkish State to fight the PKK triggered the emigration of large numbers of Kurds, some of whom had radical political backgrounds. They subsequently settled in Western Europe and many were used by the PKK, be it forcibly or voluntarily, to distribute drugs (Pek and Ekici, 2007: 143). Secondly, the PKK took advantage of the fact that European countries knew little about its involvement in the drugs business and about the related involvement of immigrant networks, but had observed the military repression of the PKK in the south-eastern Turkey and so focused on the human rights abuses that accompanied it. As a result, they acted leniently towards Kurdish populations, creating a sanctuary for the PKK’s activities to flourish (Robins, 2008: 637).

The involvement of the PKK in drug trafficking is widely reported in the media (see, for example, Today’s Zaman, 2010). Expert and academic literature on the involvement of the PKK in drug trafficking shows agreement that the group makes considerable profit from and finances its activities using drug trafficking, but disagree on methods used and the proportion it takes in the overall volume of trafficking (Boekhout van Solinge, 1998; Curtis and Karacan, 2002; Pek and Ekici, 2007; Robins, 2008). However, few downplay the PKK’s involvement in the way that Boekhout van Solinge does when writing that “the heroin trade from Turkey is dominated by Turks, even though the Turkish authorities try to make it appear as if mostly Kurds – the PKK in particular – are involved” (Boekhout van Solinge, 1998: 102). Curtis and Karacan point to the fact that while publicly
available data distinguishes between PKK members, other ethnic Kurds and ethnic Turks so that “the PKK’s true share of the narcotics market in Western Europe cannot be ascertained precisely”, drug trafficking has been the organization’s most profitable criminal activity (Curtis and Karacan, 2002). The methods used by the PKK in drug trafficking are rarely touched upon, even in official reports such as those of EUROPOL, which in 2007 indicated a “rise of fundraising activities by the PKK in the EU” and the following year reported that “Belgian authorities arrested the EU leader of PKK/KONGRA-GEL on suspicion of financing terrorism via drug trafficking” without offering further analysis (EUROPOL, 2007: 30 and 2008: 4). Most studies limit the PKK's activities to the taxation of drug smugglers in Turkey and abroad. Robins, for example, writes that “DEA information indicates that the PKK is involved in the taxation of drug shipments and the protection of drug traffickers throughout the Southeastern Region of Turkey” (Robins, 2008: 634). Since 2008, the US authorities have designated the PKK as a drug trafficking organization under the “Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act”, according to which individuals and organizations designated face assets freezing and the impossibility to conduct financial and economic transactions under US jurisdiction (TUBIM, 2012; Department of Treasury, 2012).

Relying on data and statistics collected by KOM in cooperation with INTERPOL, the DEA and other European law enforcement agencies; as well as on statements by PKK members and well known traffickers and media reports, Pek and Ekici found that the PKK has been involved “in every phase of the illicit drug business starting from cultivation to the coordination of distribution in the streets of European countries” (Pek and Ekici, 2007:142). Since 1984, 90 percent of the 332
operations launched by the TNP against terrorist organizations active in Turkey have found evidence of the PKK's involvement in drug trafficking. Pek and Ekici argue that the organization began by “taxing and commissioning drug traffickers and cannabis cultivators in southeastern Turkey, northern Iraq, the Bekaa Valley and north-western Iran.” To do so, it established illegal customs points on roads used to cross the mountainous borders between these regions, and it taxed families involved in drug distribution in Europe. Later, the PKK evolved and operations conducted by law enforcement agencies in Turkey and in Europe revealed that it was involved in producing opium, transforming morphine base into heroin in laboratories situated in south-eastern Turkey and dealt directly with distribution (Pek and Ekici, 2007; Ekici, 2007). Seizures made in PKK secret houses uncovered cannabis seeds, heroin or acetic anhydride (Ekici, 2007).

Against this background, it appears the involvement of PKK in drug trafficking should not be reduced to a simple ‘tax against protection’ equation. As a result of the links it most probably maintains with organised crime groups, it will always be difficult to separate PKK-related narco-terrorism from criminal activities that it does not profit from, but it is clear that the PKK plays a major role in the drug trade in Turkey. Moreover, the PKK’s designation under the Kingpin Act is further international recognition that the PKK is implicated in trafficking directly and not only in levying taxes (KOM, 2008: 9).

2.4.2.2 Organised Crime

While the involvement of the PKK in drug trafficking tends to be a subject of interest, the role of Turkish organised crime has been much less studied. The involvement of organised crime groups from Turkey in drug trafficking is often
accepted as a given, but it is difficult to assess with precision. The European media frequently refers to the role of what it calls the 'Turkish mafia', an element of language echoed by Boekhout van Solinge, who wrote in 1998 that “it has been extensively documented how different Turkish Mafia organizations are having a relatively free hand in the international heroin trade”. However, such claims tend to be under-discussed and uncontested (Robins 2008: 631).

This shortage of information is due to the fact that so little analysis of trafficking in Turkey has been undertaken – let alone drug trafficking. Icduygu and Toktas conducted a field sociological research on human trafficking, in which they attempted to go beyond geographical factors in explaining the importance of trafficking by analysing who is involved in trafficking and how they operate. They concluded that preconceived notions of trafficking being governed by strictly controlled, hierarchical organised crime groups is misrepresentative of human trafficking in Turkey. Similarly, the involvement of Turkish organised groups in drug trafficking is something of a grey area. The main element put forward to explain their strength and their involvement in international trafficking, which is rather descriptive and deterministic, consists in arguing that because Turkey is at the crossroads of East and West; and because it has long borders on the South-East that are porous and difficult to control, it is bound to be prone to trafficking and its population are bound to take part. Ethnic ties are also offered as an explanation for the disproportionate involvement of Turkish diasporas in trafficking in European countries. The strategic position of Turkey on the route between Central Asia and Middle East, and Western Europe certainly creates a ‘comparative advantage’ that is further increased by the conservation of close family ties between diasporas and home communities, but a review of the
existing literature reveals that the perception that large-scale organised crime groups dominate over trafficking is at best based on anecdotal evidence.

2.4.2.2.1 Turkish organised crime abroad

In respect of Turkish organised crime groups operating in Europe, a review of EUROPOL reports provides most of the information available. Most details are found in the 2003 Organised Crime Report:

“Turkish [organised crime (OC)] groups are engaged in drugs and arms smuggling, money laundering and protection rackets. While these groups continue to dominate the heroin trade in the EU impacting on the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany in particular, there are indications that other groups have begun to challenge them. In some cases, Turkish groups are described as importing heroin and retaining strategic control, while ethnic Albanian groups distribute the drug. The most remarkable change is the rise in the amount of soft drug trafficking by Turkish OC groups.

Turkish groups are renowned for their hermetic nature, which resembles a network structure which is usually connected through family or blood ties. They have a strict division of roles, and have severe internal control mechanisms used to discipline members of their group. Turkish groups are associated with high levels of violence and intimidation, which is often directed at other Turkish nationals living abroad.

It is worth noting that Turkish groups are increasingly known to collaborate with groups of different ethnicities and nationalities. This can be explained by the fact that many of the Turks settled in communities in the EU are now second generation, and have more familiarity with the host country. This has facilitated the development not only of Turkish OC, but also of these links to indigenous and other OC groups” (EUROPOL, 2003: 15).

It is clear, then, that the existence of strong Turkish Diasporas is seen as a key factor in explaining the strength of trafficking from Turkey to Europe, but the reason for this claim is not clear. In their study of the involvement of ethnic minorities in drug trafficking in Western Europe, Paoli and Reuter agree that Turks dominate the heroin market but at the same time they point to misrepresentations of groups as large, centralised structures:

“In Frankfurt, as presumably in other cities and countries, Turkish heroin entrepreneurs never made up a single trafficking organization; rather they formed a galaxy of independent dealing enterprises. Some of these were composed of just a few friends or associates. Many were family businesses, sometimes quite stable, that relied upon a large but changing pool of more recently arrived Turkish collaborators for the more menial and risky tasks. Additionally there are a few large-scale criminal organizations capable of organizing shipments of several hundred kilograms. Turkish traffickers in the market had varying roles.” (Paoli and Reuter, 2008: 20-21).
It appears, therefore, that the presence of Turkish organised crime in Europe is known but there is little knowledge about the conditions of its emergence and its modes of operation, except for the fact that the migration of Turks to Western Europe has contributed to its expansion.

2.4.2.2 Domestic organised crime

There is also little literature on organised crime groups involved in trafficking in Turkey. Exceptions here are Erdinc’s history of heroin in Turkey through the twentieth century and Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz’s history of the Turkish Mafia (Erdinc, 2003; Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, 2007). Erdinc attempts to explain why trafficking developed in the 1960s and he identifies the 1955 Iranian ban on poppy production as the trigger. According to him, the demand for Turkish opium caused by the ban was an incentive for small poppy producers to find ways to divert their yield towards small scale, illicit heroin laboratories within Turkey and smuggle the substance into Iran, initially just in small quantities. This new type of trafficking differed from the practice that had developed in the 1920s and 1930s when opium factories were operating in Istanbul. Until 1955, trafficking had been made possible by businessmen and high-ranking civil servants who were connected to organised criminals diverting legally produced morphine or alkaloids from the legal market. These individuals usually originated in France, Greece or other European countries and settled in Istanbul when the authorities in their home country began to crack down on the illicit manufacture of morphine and heroin (Block, 1989: 329). By the end of the 1950s, the diversion from the legal market into the illegal market took place right after the production and the
manufacturing was undertaken illicitly. Block identifies a similar situation in Europe between the two world wars:

“At the beginning of this period, the illicit trade in refined narcotics depended to a large extent on diverting legally manufactured narcotics. Organised criminals were typically located at the tag end of the drug-manufacturing and marketing process. In combinations with manufacturers or various and numerous middle-men in transportation and retail outlets, they diverted a portion of the product to supply de-certified consumers. Before the two decades were over, however, professional criminals were almost alone at the beginning of the process, owning clandestine drug factories around the world” (Block, 1989: 315).

Erdinc identifies multiple elements to explain this new trend. Firstly, some of the former workers of the opium processing factories of the late 1920s acquired the skill to prepare heroin and were willing to use it in underground laboratories. Secondly, the traditional methods used to sell Anatolian opium helped the development of trafficking through what are best described as 'family smuggling enterprises'. Farmers usually did not go to sell at specific selling points, but traders travelled through villages and agreed with farmers to buy all that had been produced over some or all their land. This trading system was quite flexible because it favoured agreements made through personal contacts rather than considerations of market prices for the given commodity on a large scale. It also meant that opium farmers knew middlemen between farmers and bigger buyers in cities and underground heroin factories operating in the country. Thirdly, the large flows of immigration towards Western Europe guaranteed that those involved in illegal production of opium would be able to rely on relatives to reach places of distribution and consumption of the substance. Through the years, the networks grew stronger to reach their current levels.

From the 1970s to the early 1990s, organised crime groups also evolved out of ideologically-oriented groups formed in the early 1970s. Their emergence is well explained by Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, and is examined further in Chapter Six,
below (Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, 2007). Turkey’s state institutions were dominated by the army and, against a backdrop of high levels of social violence (Karabelias, 1999: 133), promoted some ultra-nationalist gangs referred to as the Bozkurtlar (ülkücü), the 'Grey Wolves', to combat other violent groups. Meanwhile, the army, who had already staged two military coups in 1960s and 1971, played a dominant role in the formation of governments and became increasingly politicised. The military came not only to assume sole responsibility for defining security threats and implementing national security policies, but were also seen as the only group capable of bringing order and stability to Turkey (Narli, 2011:2017; Karabelias, 1999: 133, 145). Dominated by the military bureaucracy, the state secretly cultivated relations with these ultra-nationalist groups because it was felt that fighting the PKK and other leftist movements engaged in terror acts could not be achieved by constitutionally acceptable means (Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, 2007: 179-180). These Grey Wolves developed criminal activities and grew close to organised crime groups, while benefiting from the protection of the state and the absence of democratic oversight over their activities (Robins, 2008; Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, 2007). Robins argues that the parallel existence of a number of security agencies created tension and competition between them, which resulted in relative freedom and impunity for members of the gangs operating in the shadow of one or another state institution:

“in such a context of opacity and violence, leading institutions had both mutated and fractured, to the detriment of policy coherence and both central and democratic control. (...) Thus, the competition inherent within different branches of the security state had acquired an additional edge because of the proliferation of new intelligence and special forces.” (Robins, 2008: 639-40)

The importance of Robins’ analysis lies in the fact that it highlights how institutional arrangements, and especially their weaknesses, explain some characteristics of drug trafficking in Turkey: they created opportunities for certain
groups that were only loosely organised around a certain political ideology. While the Turkish state apparatus was, in Baran’s words “busy defending itself against communism”, the country became the key transit point for drugs sent to Western Europe (Baran, 2000: 139).

2.4.3 The emergence of drug trafficking as a stand-alone policy issue

2.4.3.1 The impact of the Susurluk scandal: evidence of state corruption

Revelations of collusion between members of the government and organised crime groups that followed from the November 1996 car accident near Susurluk in western Turkey – in which three died near the town of Susurluk – have been key to policy changes and triggered a state clean-up. News of the accident sent shockwaves throughout Turkish political life in Turkey and its impact has been analysed by several scholars. Their focus, however, has been on changes in political leadership and the corruption of politicians, rather than on the corruption of civil servants or the implication of state security agencies in crime.

The key victim of the accident was Abdullah Catli, a former ildcü and a gunman who built a strong reputation in the 1970s for his suspected implication in murders. He was already sought after by INTERPOL after escaping a Swiss jail where he was serving on sentence for drug trafficking. The other people travelling in the car were Huseyn Kocadağ – a high ranking police officer who had participated in the creation of the police’s special security teams to combat the PKK; Catli’s girlfriend, who was travelling with him on a false identity; and the only survivor Sedat Bucak – a Kurdish traditional chief who was leading the state-sponsored, anti-PKK militia, and was at the time a junior minister in the
main conservative party in the coalition in power. Investigations revealed that the car also carried a trunk-full of weapons issued by the Ministry of Interior, and that Abdullah Catli – who had been issued various fake passports – was carrying police identity and a weapons license issued by the Minister of Interior himself, Mehmet Ağar.

According to Baran, “the crash, for the first time, exposed the public to the structure of the long suspected criminal cell at the head of the State.” (Baran, 2000: 137). Indeed, the accident soon became a national scandal, catching the attention of both public and media. It was investigated by the public prosecutor’s office and by an investigations commission of the parliament. The latter's report, however, revealed little of the actual links between organised crime and the state, leading Baran to conclude that it was a “missed opportunity”. Moreover, even after the resignations of the Minister of Interior and (later on), the Deputy Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, their successors did not take up the task of revealing the truth about the accident. Even Mesut Yılmaz, who became the Prime Minister in February 1997 with the involvement of the army, did not keep his promise to shed light on the scandal, and the investigation stopped at that stage. At a political level, therefore, the scandal did have an impact in the short term – probably because the case of collusion was so blatant. Yet its impact was not sufficient to result in major investigations into corruption and the involvement of politicians in drug trafficking (Meyer, 1998; Baran, 2000). Another sign that political authorities were unwilling to make substantial changes is the fact that the National Security Council, which was at that time the institution with most authority and was composed of a majority of military staff, discussed the matter only a year later in November 1997 and took the decision to designate organised
crime groups, in particular ultra-nationalist groups, as a "primary threat" to the security of the state in the summer of 1998 (Robins, 2008, 642).

If business in the political arena went back to usual for some time, Robins notes that the scandal led to a 'clean-up' of institutions – especially the police and the National Intelligence organization (MIT). An estimated 60 people were removed from office in these two organizations, including the head of KOM (Robins, 2008, 640). Key legislation was adopted in 1997 on 'controlled deliveries', the sharing of wire taping evidence, money laundering and casinos, and this helped police operations and investigations. High profile criminals who had built themselves a reputation for their links with the MIT or politicians were arrested in and after 1998. Robins attributes this decisive change to the NSC decision to tackle the organised crime issue and "to remove any ambiguity in the states position on the gangs issue" (Robins, 2008: 643).

A closer look into political developments between 1996 and 2000, however, seems to point to the fact that the process of ‘state clean up’ has been more gradual. It also indicates that the Susurluk accident and its repercussions alone cannot explain the effort that was put into ending corruption and the collusion between state institutions and organised crime. Shortly after the Susurluk accident, the government was forced to publicly accept the existence of the JITEM – a secretive section of the Gendarmerie which had been involved in drug trafficking and extra-judicial killings in the eastern part of Turkey, where the State had been fighting the PKK. This occurred after judicial proceedings against a criminal gang revealed the extent of the JITEM’s involvement in drug trafficking (Tezcur. 2009: 314; Duvaklı, 2010; Erdoğan, 2010).
On 28 February 1997, the army conducted what is commonly referred to as the ‘post-modern’ coup, whereby they obtained the dismissal of the Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, Tansu Ciller’s coalition partner, by means of a letter sent to the President of the Turkish Republic by the General Staff of the Army. Erbakan was replaced by Mesut Yılmaz, who pledged to fight organised crime and corruption, but his government collapsed due to a corruption scandal related to the privatisation of a national bank in the autumn of 1998. This came to light following the arrest of another criminal on INTERPOL’s wanted list, Alaattin Cakici, was arrested in France in August of that year. A few days prior to his arrest, the TNP had informed the government of Yılmaz that Cakici was attempting to interfere in a national bid for the privatisation of the Turkish Commercial Bank which had just been finalised. When arrested, Cakici was carrying four Turkish passports, including one diplomatic. In September 1998, a member of parliament released a wire tapped phone conversation between him and the minister Eyüp Asik, who warned him to flee his current hiding place. The investigation then revealed that the buyer of the bank and Cakici had worked together, and that during the bid the buyer had received the support of Yılmaz and his government (who had full knowledge of the deal). It also appeared that Cakici was complaining about the lack of government protection against his arrest so soon after having made Yılmaz an offer related to the bank’s privatisation (Baran, 2000; 140-141). These revelations lead to a public outcry against corruption and triggered the fall of the government. They also revealed the ambivalence of the government on corruption, since it had pushed the adoption of new anticorruption legislation without seriously abandoning old methods. Arguably, had it not been for this second corruption scandal – linked to Turkey’s economic affairs rather
than drug trafficking – and its repercussion on the political scene, the positive
effect of the new legislation could have easily been overpowered by the
continuing practices of collusion.

During this period, the police also reached a level of expertise that allowed it to
conduct successful operations against organised crime groups. It had, in the past,
arrested a number of these key figures of organised crime but had failed to
provide courts with sufficient evidence and they were released. Such events were
widely reported by the press and were thought to increase their reputation further.
The former head of the TNP, Saadettin Tantan, was appointed Minister of Interior
in 1999 and is believed to have played a crucial role in reforming police practices
during his tenure. Following his appointment, new senior officers were appointed
to key positions and KOM was reinforced. A number of large scale operations
concluded with convictions. These elements in detail will be discussed in Chapter
Seven.

2.4.3.2 The impact of Turkey’s changing security discourse

As in the case of drug use, there are few studies available on Turkey's anti-drug
trafficking policies, with the notable example of Philip Robins' aforementioned
work. This could be seen as something of an oddity in the Turkish context given
that drug trafficking has been attracting considerable media attention for many
years. However, several elements indicate that since approximately 1996, anti-
drug trafficking has emerged as a priority issue for Turkish authorities. Until then,
it had been in a state of limbo because it did not fit the accepted definition of risk
to Turkey’s national security at a time when attention in Turkey was given largely
to national security matters (Bilgin, 2005).
Between the end of World War Two and the brief opium ban of 1972-1974, trafficking was not an issue of priority so long as the licit production was sufficient and foreign countries did not complain too much about the ongoing diversion for Turkey to react. The licensing system implemented after the ban undoubtedly had the unintended consequence of boosting the production of opium in Afghanistan. What is important here is that this new licensing system prepared the Turkish authorities to restrain leakages of Turkish poppy into the illicit market, but it did not prepare them to deal effectively with the massive influx of opium that started to enter its borders. Between the 1970s and the early 1990s, the problem of drug trafficking was absorbed into the larger issue of counter insurgency, and the collusion of state institutions hindered efforts to address trafficking meaningfully. Moreover, the PKK was heavily involved in trafficking from its inception and Turkish authorities prioritised fighting the organization as a whole from an anti-terrorism angle, while the authorities of Western countries did not give due credit to Turkey’s accusations against the PKK, including those about its involvement in drug trafficking. In this context, the national security discourse that prevailed at the time contributed to pushing the problem of trafficking into limbo, and resulted in it being little discussed by central policy makers. In addition, the military exploited ‘the fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory’, claims which were linked to a geographically determinist, which argued that Turkey’s unique geographical location called for extraordinary security measures. This over-emphasis placed on national security, especially around the 1980 military coup and after the beginning of the fighting against the PKK, seems to have made it impossible for sufficient discussions on drug trafficking to take place. It also helped trafficking proliferate, because of the
unreceptiveness of European partners on the Turkish definition of national security. Oğuzlu and Kibaroğlu describe fundamental incompatibilities between the Turkish and the European security culture, where the former works on a state-centric basis while in the latter the main security referents are societies and individuals (Oğuzlu and Kibaroğlu 2008: 947). Two reasons can be highlighted, based on the arguments presented earlier. Firstly, the Turkish army and security agencies collaborated with groups involved in trafficking and allowed them to operate with impunity in Turkey and in Western Europe. All activities were put under the cover of national security, which could not be questioned. Secondly, European countries opposed Turkey’s response to the PKK insurgency, its discourse on the PKK and the way it defended national security interests. and Such attitudes are likely to have contributed to allowing the PKK develop its drug trafficking activities in Western Europe and in Turkey – if not by to the extent that it was responsible for the majority of trafficking, at least significantly enough for it to become highly skilled in the operation. As a result, neither party had a genuine incentive to curb trafficking through the country.

It would appear that around 1996, a combination of elements created the right environment for change. Firstly, the 1996 Susurluk scandal resulted in a new government, who introduced legislation designed to tackle drug trafficking; while the 1998-wiretapped conversation scandal ensured that they were adequately implemented. Secondly, as Robins’ argues, international pressures placed on the National Security Council to recognize organised crime as a key national security concern triggered changes (Robins, 2007). At the end of the Cold War, the breakdown of the Soviet Union upset the agenda of military agencies, since they found themselves without any defined target (this is analysed further in Chapter
Three). This new development created an opportunity for both European countries
and, as Robins notes, the United States to criticise Turkey for its poor handling of
trafficking; and to call for renewed involvement from Turkish authorities in the
international efforts against drugs.

In this context, had Turkey not demonstrated its goodwill by intensifying its anti-
organised crime and anti-drug trafficking efforts, it is likely that it would have
faced continued international criticism. As a result, the National Security Council,
the army and the political parties that supported the army as the main guardian of
the Turkish Republic adopted an attitude of policy change that is, as Bilgin’s
analyses it, typical of the Ottoman reaction against European pressures to
modernize:

“Although the norms of international society were viewed as threatening the internal
cohesion and strength of the state, they were nevertheless adopted by Ottoman statesmen.
According to Karaosmanoglu (2000: 207), ‘[Ottoman statesmen] used the policy of
reform in two different ways. At times, they exploited it in order to attract foreign
support. (. . .) Sometimes, however, in demonstrating commitment to modernization,
Turks hoped to avert European interference” (Bilgin, 2005: 181).

It is also important to note that this period coincides with the acceptance of
Turkey’s candidature for membership of the European Union in December 1999.
This candidature had already been debated intensely at the domestic level
between those in favour and ‘Euro-skeptics’, who believed that joining the EU
would reduce Turkey’s control of its national security. It also triggered intense
debate about which institutions could participate in defining national security
(centring around whether this should be solely the role of the National Security
Council), and about the lack of accountability of security agencies. Finally,
Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, was arrested in 1999, meaning there was
renewed hope regarding a solution to the Kurdish problem in certain quarters,
where it was argued that cooperation with European institutions could be utilized d
to this end. In this context, it became possible to rethink strategies designed to combat the PKK, including targeting its drug trafficking activities.

In the late 1990s, then, various elements coincided to ensure that 'national security' could no longer be used to justify the authorities' lack of accountability, and the lack of specific efforts made regarding drug trafficking. In turn, it became possible for law enforcement institutions to reinforce themselves in this area, and the call for increased international cooperation – coupled with public pressure to rid the government and the institutions of corruption – strengthened them even further. Moreover, European institutions' demands that Turkey embark on reforms, particularly legislative reforms, in order for Turkey to comply with EU requirements, began to be acted upon. This meant that the necessary legal instruments to develop a stand-alone policy on drug trafficking were progressively being put in place.

To conclude this section, then, the analysis above has traced the emergence of drug trafficking as an issue on Turkey’s political agenda around the years 1996 to 2000, between the Susurluk scandal and Turkey’s recognition as a candidate to EU membership. Many changes took place in this period, which are related to the aftermath of the Susurluk scandal and to the fact that Turkey’s national security discourse changed radically, affected as it was by domestic events like the PKK insurgency and international events like the fall of the Soviet Union.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the context for the current situation with regards to the production of poppy and manufacture of opiates, the consumption of illicit drugs and the trafficking of drugs in and out of Turkey. From the outset, it must be
noted that some areas are well documented, for example with regards to the 1972 opium ban and the Turkish-American relations in that period while others have not, so far, been subjected to sustained analytical and academic review.

Based on this broad overview, it appears that the production and trafficking have dominated the political agenda throughout the twentieth century, while the issue of drug use has only recently emerged. It also appears that as the drug prohibition regime developed, Turkey only reluctantly joined in international efforts, but today it can be regarded as one of its main proponents. While in the beginning of 1930s morphine and heroin were openly produced in Istanbul, Turkish authorities are now at the forefront of anti-trafficking efforts and are actively demanding increased international cooperation, especially when it comes to precursor chemicals, in the spirit of the norms of the international drug regime.

This chapter has shown, then, that domestic and external factors coincide with regards to the handling of trafficking by Turkish authorities. In the following chapters, these phenomena will be analysed in order to identify the causal mechanisms that can explain Turkey’s radical change in its approach to international drug control in the space of four decades.

In this chapter, several references were made to the international drug regime. The next chapter will analyse this regime. By explaining how its norms were agreed upon by States in a series of international treaties, it will show that the enforcement of anti-drug trafficking has emerged as the cornerstone of the regime.
Chapter 3: The International Drug Control Regime

3.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the development of the international drug control regime. Before embarking in the analysis of the specific case study of Turkey’s drug law enforcement, the focus of this thesis, it is important to understand the context surrounding the Turkish case. Taken together with Chapter Four, this chapter provides an understanding of international drug controls and the international policing of drugs. In particular, given this thesis' focus on anti-drug trafficking measures as representative of the internationalization of Turkey’s law enforcement, this chapter demonstrates why international police cooperation is a crucial part of drug control today. As the theoretical approach adopted in this thesis is regime theory, it is important to establish from the outset which regime is considered in this analysis and what its characteristics are.

This chapter adopts an historical and analytical approach to explain how international police cooperation gradually became the backbone of the international drug regime. It also explains how the United States successfully pursued particular objectives in order to globalise both the prohibitive approach to drugs and the activities of its law enforcement agencies; to the point that the international drug regime has been heavily influenced by the American prohibitive paradigm since its inception. Given that Chapter Six, below, assesses the extent to which American power influenced Turkey’s drug enforcement, it is necessary to establish beforehand why American influence on the international drug regime has been so strong.
Three UN conventions are at the heart of the international drug regime: the 1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended in the 1972 Protocol (from hereon the 1961 Single Convention); the 1971 United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances (from hereon 1971 Psychotropic Convention); and the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (from hereon 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention). According to these conventions, some substances are dangerous to individuals and states and measures must be taken to protect both from their harmful effects. These substances, namely opium and its derivatives; cocaine and crack; cannabis; and a range of synthetic psychoactive substances including amphetamines, Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD) and ecstasy, are referred to as “drugs” or sometimes “narcotics” – although neither term is wholly accurate. While the latter is too narrow (not all substances identified in the conventions are narcotics), the former is too broad, as it can be used to refer to all mood-affecting substances including alcohol, tobacco or coffee. It is, however, commonly used to label this group of substances because it has come to evoke what is prohibited, illicit and dangerous to use (Pryce, 2006). The conventions are not self-executing, therefore, in order to ensure protection against the harmful effects of drugs, states need to take certain measures, which can be grouped in three categories. The first two, supply reduction demand reduction, both work from a belief that it is possible to stop individuals from consuming drugs and thus eliminate the drug market. The final approach is that of harm reduction and focuses on minimising the deleterious effects of drug abuse on individuals and societies. In the conventions supply reduction measures overwhelmingly dominate, placing an obligation on states to prevent drugs from
reaching users. The path chosen to do so is the criminalisation of all acts that can lead to drug use. Therefore, law enforcement institutions find themselves at the heart of states’ actions against drugs. The conventions also recognise that the drug trade is a cross-border problem and call on states and law enforcement institutions to work together to combat it. In practice, this translates into an expectation that law enforcement institutions will cooperate. It is because cross-border cooperation is the core element of drug control that it has been chosen as a case study to examine the phenomenon of the internationalization of policing in Turkey.

Drugs have not always been perceived as an international danger by all states; this view gradually came to dominate as the regime emerged (McAllister, 2000; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2007; Herschinger, 2011). Criminalisation and punishment of illicit cultivation, production and supply have not always been conceived as the primary solution to drug use, but today virtually every state has criminal sanctions in place for such activities. The academic literature exploring how this happened is vast. Some argue that it was a result of the hegemonic role of the United States (Bewley-Taylor, 1999; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2008); whilst others emphasize the construction of discourses arguing that drugs constitute a threat to global security (Herschinger, 2011; Crick, 2012); and the influence of particular individuals in spreading these ideas, and on the diplomatic processes that led to the drug treaties (Bruun et al, 1975; McAllister, 2000).

The history of international drug control has been the subject of extensive academic interest (Nadelmann, 1990; Bewley-Taylor, 1999 and 2012; McAllister, 2000; Boister, 2001; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2007) but for the purpose of this thesis revisiting it is useful in order to understand how and why international
police cooperation has come to play the central role in states’ compliance with the obligations emanating from the international conventions that are the foundation of the international drug control regime. In the first section, this chapter draws on these academic works to highlight how the regime progressed from regulation to prohibition and criminalisation. In the second section, attention is given to the legal framework of the regime in order to explain how law enforcement cooperation has become the key feature of the regime.

3.2 The emergence of the international drug control regime

3.2.1 From 1909 to 1961, from regulation to prohibition

When the first international conferences to discuss international agreements regulating opium production and distribution were called, in Shanghai in 1909 and then in The Hague in 1911, few states were in favour of setting up a strict control regime. Many had economic interests in the existing opium trade, including the UK, which traded Indian cultivated opium in China. Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands were also reluctant because they were developing pharmaceutical industries and so had an interest in the continuation of opium production. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, western states began to view with concern the negative side effects of drug use on individuals and society. The knowledge of the phenomenon of addiction was growing, but there was also a growing awareness of the potential to developing analgesics from the derivatives of opium and coca leaves; and states were eager to protect the burgeoning pharmaceutical industry. As McAllister explains, in the majority of the western world “the question was not whether access to drugs
should be regulated but *what* level and type of regulation was appropriate” (McAllister, 2000:16; emphasis in original). The push towards the prohibition of all non-medical use of opium came from the United States, where economic and moral interests in prohibiting the trade of opium were rising. Following the US acquisition of the Philippines in the Spanish American war of 1898, Americans sought to challenge Europe's domination of trade in China, particularly the British opium trade. At the same time, the Philippines population of opium smokers was a cause for concern. The American Episcopalian bishop of the Philippines Charles Brent, who had the confidence of William Tafts, the governor of the Philippines, and of American President William McKinley, soon began to lobby for the full prohibition of opium on the island and beyond. His message resonated with the stories brought from China by missionaries who witnessed the extent of addiction there. Brent was to become one of the first 'moral entrepreneurs' who perceived non-medical drug use, such as smoking opium, as a vice and who promoted prohibition as a measure to protect individuals and societies (Musto, 1999; McAllister, 2000; Crick, 2012).

At the Shanghai conference it was agreed to limit opium use to medical purposes and to control its export and its harmful derivatives. Boister argues that the Shanghai Commission, which had been convened at the request of the United States, was the first instance of the United States taking the lead in international drug control (Boister, 2001: 27), and that they were influenced by a small number of key prohibitionists, such as Brent. These prohibitionists opposed opium consumption on moral and racial grounds, feeling that the practice was foreign to the American Protestant way of life. Furthermore, it was felt that after the United States had taken control of the Philippines, the state had risen on the international
stage and that as “a world power it had a moral obligation to rectify what it perceived as the immoral use of narcotics” (Bewley-Taylor, 1999: 11). Thus, the US administration was increasingly convinced that in order to stop drug use on its territory it needed to ensure that none entered its borders and that the best way to achieve this was to limit its production to medical purposes and endeavoured to convince other states to adopt the same approach (Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 2012: 73). In this regard, Bewley-Taylor writes:

“Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States has been consistent in its intention to confront the issue of drug use from the prohibitionist perspective and locate the source of domestic problems beyond the boundaries of American society. The intention was to deflect blame for domestic drug problems and eliminate behaviour deemed sinful by a Protestant culture. (Bewley-Taylor, 1999: 6)

Nevertheless, the mix of geopolitical, commercial and moral considerations meant that intense diplomatic work was required for agreements to be reached. Initially, these agreements constituted a system controlling the licit production of drugs in order to avoid their diversion into an illicit market, the main concern at the time (Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 2012:173).

The development of the international drug control regime is usually divided into two periods: before and after the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (Bewley-Taylor, 1999; Albrecht, 2001; Crick, 2012). In the first period, several rounds of negotiations took place and several international treaties were signed with varying degrees of success, until the Single Convention was drawn up to streamline provisions of previous texts into one. Signed in January 1912, the Hague Opium Convention restricted the trade in raw and prepared opium and provided for less extensive restrictions on manufactured drugs such as heroin and cocaine as Germany argued vehemently against further restrictions, believing they would compromise the business of its pharmaceutical industry. After 1920, the
The Hague Opium Convention granted the responsibility of supervising the execution of the agreements to the League of Nations and created an Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, whose remit was to collect and analyse information on drug traffic and to encourage compliance with the convention, sealing the involvement of international organizations in drug control. Following the replacement of the League of Nations by the UN the latter took over this supervisory duty. Today the CND supervises the execution of the conventions, whilst the INCB has a mandate similar to that of the Advisory Committee (Boister, 2001: 28). The 1931 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs introduced the idea of a classification of different substances in a schedule where the levels of control are based on ‘addictive propensity’ of the substances, and a licensing system for the manufacture of different drugs, which are still in place today (Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 2012: 74). It also encouraged states to communicate on large trafficking cases (Boister, 2001: 31), thus introducing the notion that international police cooperation is a way of executing states obligations. At this stage, the regime was decisively oriented towards the control of drug supply and was premised on the belief that it would be possible to dry up excessive capacity and reduce the illicit drug market (because prices would go up and put off potential users, thereby eliminating demand). This belief continues to drive the regime today, encapsulated in the idea of a 'drug-free world', which was the motto of the UN Special Session on the Drug Problem in 1998.

The 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs contained the first to call to penalise drug-related activities and to define related offences so that national penal systems could be harmonised to ease
international cooperation. The convention contained specific provisions relating to law enforcement action and cooperation, but never entered into force. The treaty was promoted by the League of Nations and did not have the backing of individual states. Indeed, if states did not oppose the idea of an anti-trafficking treaty per se, only a few chose to ratify it. It then became unworkable when World War II began (McAllister, 2000: 123). This shows that, at the time, states were still reluctant to be constrained by international law when defining domestic penal offences. Nevertheless, the 1936 convention had an effect because it “had the effect of making illicit drug trafficking a crime of international character, and the punishment and prevention of illicit traffic became the concern of the community of nations” (Renborg, 1957: 102, quoted by Boister, 2001: 39). Finally, the 1953 New York Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in and Use of, Opium restricted the right to export opium to seven traditional opium producing countries around the world, of which Turkey was one. (Boister, 2001: 41). This list of traditional opium producing countries is still valid today.

The 1961 Single Convention was a watershed for several reasons. Firstly, by unifying in one document provisions that had previously been contained in a number of documents, including the 1936 convention which had not come into force, it codified existing provisions into a coherent text, simplified the existing drug control machinery (Boister, 2001: 42). Secondly, it anchored the drug control regime in a supply-reduction orientation more strongly than previous agreements by focusing on the drug producing countries (Crick, 2012: 4). Thirdly, it strengthened the prohibitionist nature of the regime by proscribing completely the use of a range of psychoactive substances for non-medical purposes, including
the plants that are the raw material for the production of narcotic drugs, which meant that it prohibited practices that were deeply entrenched in the culture of producing countries, such as chewing coca leaves in the Andean region (Bewley-Taylor, 1999; Hershinger, 2011; Crick, 2012). Until 1961 the drug control regime had revolved around the control and regulation of licit drug production, but with the Single Convention it began to revolve around what states should do to suppress the illicit drug market. Fourthly, according to Crick, with the Single Convention, the message that illicit drugs constitute a danger to mankind had finally been universally accepted, with the Preamble of the convention stating that “addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind” (Crick, 2012). Fifthly and as a result of branding drugs as having 'evil' effects on individuals, the Single Convention called for “the provision of facilities for the medical treatment, care and rehabilitation of drug addicts”, something that allowed a degree of manoeuvre for states who wished to develop demand reduction measures to accompany the supply reduction measures the convention required. Nevertheless, this provision was not seen as central to the agreement (Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 2011: 75).

The 1961 Single Convention was complemented by two additional agreements a decade after its signature. The 1971 Psychotropic Convention was modelled on the 1961 Single Convention and extended the ban to cover illicit substances such as amphetamines, barbiturates and LSD, which fell outside the scope of existing controls. In 1972, the UN adopted a protocol amending the 1961 Single Convention in order to remedy the situation whereby the United States, which had been the main sponsor of the 1961 Single Convention during its drafting, refused to ratify it – arguing that the text was not strong enough. The 1972 Protocol did
not overhaul the system in place but rather “fine-tuned existing provisions relating to the estimates system, data collection and output, while strengthening law enforcement measures and extradition, and the functioning of the INCB” (Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 2012: 78-79). The 1971 Psychotropic Convention, on the other hand, ended the long period during which the potentially harmful effects of psychotropic drugs had been consistently downplayed by Western governments because they were the manufacturing states. They had sought to protect their pharmaceutical industries and so concentrated on traditional drugs like opiates and coca, which were produced outside the Western world. By the 1960s, however, evidence of the addictive nature of psychotropic substances could no longer be ignored. The 1971 convention, McAllister explains, broke little new ground in drug control and pharmaceutical firms lobbied their governments heavily to ensure that controls would be as limited as possible, but it represents an international sanction that psychotics are liable to abuse and addiction and should be treated accordingly (McAllister, 2000: 226-239)

3.2.2 The US “War on Drugs”

In 1971, US President Richard Nixon announced that drugs were ‘public enemy number one’ and launched the 'War on Drugs'. Sworn into office two years earlier on a programme in which 'law and order' featured prominently, Nixon drew on the long-standing association between drugs and crime in the public mind to garner support for his decision to multiply law enforcement agencies’ involvement on curbing drug trafficking domestically and internationally (Bertram et al., 1996: 106). At the time, the US largest cities were facing serious upsurges in drug abuse and drug-related crime was a growing concern. Moreover,
it was known that substantial numbers of American soldiers fighting the Vietnam War used drugs (mainly heroin and marijuana), and there was a fear that they would bring their addiction back to the US (McCoy, 2003; Friesendorf, 2006; Kuzmarov, 2009).

With the War on Drugs, the American administration reframed a domestic problem of addiction as a foreign policy matter, in a scaling up of the discourse of early prohibitionists for whom drug use was seen as 'foreign' to American Protestant culture. In this discourse, drug addicts and drug traffickers were sources of danger threatening to spread crime and societal decay (Crick, 2012). Drugs were thus represented as a threat to the state, not simply the individual. Furthermore, whilst drug traffickers were an expression of this menace, the real danger was seen to come from states with lax enforcement of anti-drug laws.

One of the main – and arguably one of the most visible – effects of launching the War on Drugs was the boost it gave to the drug control administration and law enforcement agencies. In 1973, the DEA was created through a merger of the previous Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence and the Customs Service Drugs Investigation Unit (Bertram et al., 1996: 107-108). Friesendorf, like Crick, asserts that launching the War on Drugs helped to increase presidential control over law enforcement and most importantly helped restructure and enlarge it considerably (Friesendorf, 2007; Crick, 2012). Nadelmann adds that the War on Drugs provided the opportunity to expand the presence of US drug enforcement agencies abroad. DEA agents stationed overseas were an expression of the US government’s “commitment to international drug enforcement and its willingness to assist foreign police agencies”, and they served as a constant reminder to both
the host government and the US ambassadors with whom they were co-located that “drug enforcement was now a high-level foreign policy objective” (Nadelmann, 1993: 141-142, emphasis in the original text). International police assistance and training became a key feature of the War on Drugs after 1974, when the US Congress terminated the existing police assistance programme, the Public Safety Program that had been created in 1962, amid concerns that its police advisers were associated with torture in countries where they operated. It allowed two exceptions: the fight against international drug trafficking and the fight against terrorism (Cottam and Marenin, 1989; Nadelmann, 1993: 111-124). Cottam and Marenin assert that this exception meant that the public safety programme stopped in name but continued in practice as part of the DEA’s activities (Cottam and Marenin, 1989: 606-607). Nadelmann, meanwhile, states that:

“Where once U.S. police assistance had focused on developing police capabilities in general and counterinsurgency capabilities in particular, it now focused almost entirely on drug enforcement agencies and tasks. A foreign police interested in obtaining U.S. training and funds had little chance of success if it could not establish some connection with drug enforcement.” (Nadelmann, 1993: 119-120).

Understanding how the War on Drugs started and how it evolved after Nixon’s departure from the US presidency is important because the policy also affected how the global drug control regime evolved a decade later. During their time in office, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter took less interest in the policies instituted by Nixon. However, they did not bring an end to it either and drug law enforcement budgets continued to escalate whilst the federal anti-drug bureaucracy built by Nixon continued to strengthen (Bertram et al., 1996: 109-110). Under Reagan’s presidency, the War on Drugs was greatly intensified, however. Bertram et al. assert that at the beginning of the 1980s, patterns of drug use were changing, with a radical rise in the use of cocaine and the arrival of
crack cocaine – which was becoming increasingly prominent in Black and Hispanic neighbourhoods in particular. At the same time, Reagan had been elected by a right-wing electorate with conservative Christian moral values, which had grown impatient with the permissive attitudes towards drug use of the previous decades. This resurgence of conservatism facilitated the resurgence of the War on Drugs, and it was declared a priority mission in June 1982 (Bertram et al., 1996: 112). The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was given a mandate to provide guidance to drug enforcement agencies, and the *Posse Comitatus* Act – which outlawed military involvement in civilian law enforcement – was amended in 1982 to allow military involvement in the War on Drugs. In 1983, the US Congress was urged by the Nixon administration to lift the prohibition of international police training adopted in 1974, leading to a surge in assistance programmes, which were run not only by the DEA but also by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State Department and the Defence Department, thus mobilizing a large section of the American law enforcement apparatus (Nadelmann, 1993: 120). In 1986, Reagan added drug trafficking to the list of threats to national security in a directive that authorized the US military to intervene abroad in order to fight drug production (Youngers and Rosin, 2005).

Throughout the 1980s, the War on Drugs developed along two axes, first by attacking traffickers directly using the full spectrum of US law enforcement apparatus including the military and secondly by trying to undermine the illicit trade and its proceeds through anti money-laundering efforts.

The intense militarization of the War on Drugs became most visible in the 1990s with the involvement of the US military in Latin America (Bewley-Taylor, 1999: 186-199; Youngers and Rosin, 2005). While Reagan had supported crop
eradication and fumigation programmes throughout Latin America, in particular in Colombia (McCoy, 2003: 444), his successor Bush launched the 'Andean Initiative', which provided training and support for the military and civilian law enforcement forces of Latin American countries by their American counterparts. Youngers and Rosin contend that with the end of the Cold War, the American military, intelligence and civilian law enforcement apparatus found itself searching for new security threats in order to justify its activities and the War on Drugs effectively filled a vacuum (Youngers and Rosin, 2005). These vested interests and their strong administrative structures made it very difficult to deescalate the approach and soften the rhetoric (Bertram et al., 1996: 117). The militarization of the War on Drugs began before the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but the two events collided when large criminal organizations emerged rapidly at the end of the Cold War and became involved in drug trafficking. At this point, the threat represented by these powerful traffickers was referred to as the threat of 'narco-terrorism' (Crick, 2012). Drug trafficking thus became the central concern because it was seen to pose risks not only to individuals, but also to the United States, and to the entire international community. Moreover, as part of its efforts to internationalize its War on Drugs, the US administration lobbied international organizations for new international anti-money laundering measures (Scherrer, 2009:14-15). The rationale behind focusing on money laundering was to fight activities that supported the drugs trade. As Scherrer explains, money laundering was portrayed as “the motor which made criminality of all kinds possible” – a transnational threat to be fought because “criminal organizations could not operate without access to financial resources and they were exploiting existing weaknesses in international financial control systems” (Scherrer, 2009: 19).
3.2.3 The 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention

The adoption of the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention represented a new phase for the international drug control system as the threat drug trafficking and drug-related organised crime posed to national security took precedence over the dangers they posed to individuals. Albrecht goes so far as to argue that this convention, the most recent, is not really a drug convention,

“but an international convention on international criminal law in the field of drug control with emphasis on particular strategies, among them forfeiture policies, money laundering control, judicial aid, extradition, control of precursors of drugs and police cooperation, in particular as regards, controlled deliveries.” (Albrecht, 2001: 53).

The 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention can also be seen as a successful attempt to implement what had failed in 1936: an international agreement seeking to suppress the illicit traffic (Boister, 2001:52). Other aspects of drug policy were not dealt with in much detail in this convention and the provisions of the 1961 and 1971 agreements remained in place.

Limiting drug control to criminal law and criminal enforcement as the convention did clearly reveals that the United States had a strong influence on the direction that the regime was taking. According to Bewley-Taylor, the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention followed the spirit of the War on Drugs so closely that the agreement was an example of the Americanization of international law (Bewley-Taylor, 1999: 178). Moreover, it can be argued that with the adoption of the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention, the War on Drugs approach to the drug problem was legitimized under international law and therefore received a form of recognition by other states as the correct way to enforce drug control. Not only did this make it difficult to criticize states that adopt such an approach to drug problems, but it also seemed to retroactively justify the US expansion of its law
enforcement and its presence overseas; and to make drugs a high priority issue in foreign relations, as it had done through the 1970s and 1980s.

When analysing drug policies at the level of other states, as this thesis seeks to do, one needs to reflect on the extent to which policymakers in those states made decisions because they agreed with the provisions of the drug control regime and worked at complying with their obligations under the drug conventions, and the extent to which they did so as a result of the direct influence of the United States through the DEA presence and activities on their territory. This question is addressed in relation to Turkey in Chapter Six.

This chronological review of the emergence of the international drug regime also shows how the notion that drug use is a danger to people may have been the motivation of early proponents of the drug control regime, but that it has since been superseded by other concerns, such as the risks for states associated with the rise of criminal organizations; the existence of sources of funding for terrorist organizations; and ultimately the risk of disrupting peace and security in general. The initial impulse came from 'moral entrepreneurs' such as Bishop Brent, who found support for their cause in the US administration, which then took on the task of inscribing drug prohibition in international law. Prohibition de facto placed law enforcement at the heart of compliance with the conventions. Though there has been no new international drug treaty or convention since 1988, this does not mean that the regime's norms and values have not been debated and challenged since. Jelsma explains that the 1998 General Assembly Special Session exposed a long-standing conflict between states who wished to preserve prohibition and those who sought a more pragmatic approach to drugs – in particular with regard to their public health dimensions (Jelsma, 2003). In the past
two decades, voices questioning prohibition have been heard with increasing regularity, leading Bewley-Taylor to declare that the international consensus around prohibition – which was at its peak in 1988 – has fractured (Bewley-Taylor, 2012). Several states have begun to make national policy choices that deviate from their obligations under conventions. This aspect, which is the subject of Bewley-Taylor’s study, is not dealt with in detail here because it does not relate to police cooperation directly and because there is no international treaty to update the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention. Yet it is important to mention that it is likely to continue to influence the future developments of the regime, and because harm reduction and demand reduction measures have been gradually integrated in the EU Drugs Strategy, as discussed below. Chapter Two, above, also highlighted that in Turkey supply reduction policies are well established, while drug demand policies are still developing, and that TUBIM, the institution in charge of drug abuse in Turkey, recognises that the current drug legislation in Turkey is “prohibitive”, but that it is evolving to include increasing demand reduction efforts (TUBIM, 2012: 30).

To conclude this section, it has become apparent that the existence of the international drug control regime depends on prohibition in theory and practice. The 1961 Single Convention unified the regime that had been established through a series of treaties, providing a single system of control for the supply of drugs; and the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention – deeply influenced by the law enforcement practices of the US – strengthened the criminalisation of illicit practices. The next section will explore the ways in which international cooperation has been placed at the core of the system of implementation of the regime provisions.
3.3 The legal framework for law enforcement cooperation in the international drug control regime

This section analyses how the regime works and sheds light on why law enforcement cooperation is key to implementing what is requested of states under the existing agreements, in particular the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention.

3.3.1 United Nations Conventions

The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is the core treaty of the international drug control regime not only because it consolidated into a single document provisions of the various treaties that had been adopted prior to that date, but also because it redefined the drug control regime from aiming for the international regulation of the drugs trade to aiming for a global prohibition of illicit drugs (Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 2012). It is in this treaty (as amended by the 1972 Protocol) and in the 1971 Psychotropic Convention that the main rules and norms of practice of participating states are set.

The 1961 Single Convention requires that states criminalise actions in relation to drugs (specifically the “cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession, offering for sale, distribution, purchase sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation and exportation of drugs”, Article 36). By doing so, it generates state-level activity well beyond the simple fact of changing the law. Indeed, because the 1961 Single Convention is not self-executing, states themselves must pass the necessary legislation, adopt policies and provide institutions capable of implementing the agreement’s provisions. In this case, the 1961 Single Convention requests states criminalize all drug-related activities. Therefore, law
enforcement institutions are required to have responsibility to investigate, make arrests and collect evidence that can be used in court when suspects are prosecuted. Ultimately, the capacity of the judiciary to prosecute and convict people relies on the prior involvement of the police.

Entitled 'Action Against Illicit Traffic', Article 35 encourages international cooperation for the repression and the prosecution of illicit trafficking, and the 1971 Psychotropic Convention uses the same language in its Article 21 (with regard to the illicit trafficking of psychotropic substances). Boister notes that paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 35 require states to “assist each other” and “cooperate closely” in the fight against illicit drug trafficking, but neither specifies the nature of this cooperation (Boister, 2001: 287-293). This leaves ample room for interpretation regarding the form and degree of cooperation, ranging from informal exchanges of information to the signature of mutual legal assistance treaties. The 1961 and 1971 conventions also promote international technical assistance designed to enable countries to meet the required standards. The Commentary of the Single Convention falls short of saying that there is an obligation on parties to provide technical assistance to others to fight drug trafficking (Boister, 2001:287). It does, however, mean that the United States' proposals to train and financial support other states' law enforcement personnel cannot be criticized from a legal point of view, because it is a response to the provisions of the convention, even though interventionist policies can be negatively judged from a political point of view). Similarly, the establishment of the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control5 (UNFDAC) following a proposal by the

5 UNFDAC was integrated in the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) in 1990. In 1997, UNDCP was combined with the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division to form the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, which took the name the UNODC in 2002.
United States to increase states’ compliance with the 1961 Single Convention; and the fact of the majority of its budget consists of US funds (Bewley-Taylor, 1999: 167; Department of State, 1971: 158) can be justified on the basis of the convention’s call for international technical assistance.

The 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention was drafted to deal with international trafficking in illicit substances. Its approach reinforced the reliance on law enforcement authorities to implement its provisions, including giving guidance on what measures should be taken (De Ruyver, 2002: 11). The general aim of the convention was to increase multilateral action and international cooperation, seen as a prerequisite for efficient drug trafficking control (Albrecht, 2001: 53). Article 9 was dedicated to police cooperation and established a “general obligation on Parties to cooperate internationally with the purpose of enhancing the effectiveness of ‘law enforcement’ action” against drug trafficking offences. Boister notes that this general obligation means states must provide investigative assistance, establish joint teams and provide specific drug enforcement training to their law enforcement and customs personnel (Boister, 2001: 281-464, see in particular 329-346). States were also encouraged to exchange personnel, appoint police liaison officers and engage in international cooperation in training and research. Moreover, Article 10 on “international cooperation and assistance for transit states” established an obligation to support transit states directly or indirectly through international and regional organizations. This article recognised that in some states illicit drugs were mainly transiting towards destination states, and that this obliged other states who had the capacity to assist them to provide technical cooperation, for example through training programmes.
The 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention also made provisions for the specific law enforcement measures that should be used in the course of investigating and prosecuting drug trafficking. These included seizures and confiscations; controlled deliveries; the monitoring and control of precursors used in the manufacture of drugs; and the control of commercial carriers, maritime transport, free trade zones and free ports. Boister argues that it is clear that these measures have their roots in consumer countries and in particular the United States, where they were first developed informally by law enforcement agents before being legitimised first by domestic legislation and then through international law. He adds that “the crystallisation of these strategies and tactics into international legal provisions has been a political process conducted by senior government officials concerned as much with overcoming state sovereignty as overcoming illicit trafficking.” (Boister, 2001: 464). In effect, the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention did not simply define a concept of international law enforcement cooperation already mentioned in the 1961 and 1971 conventions, it made it the backbone of international drug control. In practice, this meant that for law enforcement agencies, while actively engaging in countering drug trafficking a multitude of opportunities for agents to work with foreign colleagues arose. It also meant that those investigating drug trafficking cases became the international representatives of their entire institution.

3.3.2 Drug control at the European level

The Council of Europe and the EU also have agreements relating to drugs. In terms of a legal framework, the Council of Europe primarily puts into operation certain provisions of the UN conventions, such as the 1995 agreement in illicit
traffic at sea, which is designed to implement Article 17 of the UN Drug Trafficking Convention (De Ruyver et al, 2002: 13). The Council of Europe also has a structure to address drug control: the Pompidou Group (named after the French President who suggested its creation in 1971) which was formally merged into the Council of Europe in 1980. Essentially an intergovernmental policy-oriented forum focusing on consolidating international cooperation, (De Ruyver et al, 2002: 13,18) it is important insofar as it represents the first initiative taken by European states to cooperate on drug matters, thus marking the birth of European drug control cooperation (Elvins, 2003: 84). Indeed, it was from this initiative that EU member states developed further avenues for cooperation in the field of drug control. This process is described and analysed at length by Elvins, who argues that attempts to build law enforcement cooperation on drug matters between member states emerged after 1985, when it was agreed that the TREVI group, a meeting of officials from the justice and interior ministries of member states initially created to discuss anti-terrorism matters should begin to discuss drug control matters (Elvins, 2003: 84). The rationale behind this decision was not concern over the health and social aspects of drug use, but fears that the abolition of borders between the EC’s countries following the adoption of the Schengen agreement in 1985 and the Single European Act of 1986 might put member states at risk from a sudden upsurge in trafficking. Elvins believes that this decision demarcated drug control as a field of discussion in its own right at the European level. This is not to say that the work of the TREVI group was to reinvent drug control policymaking, however.

In the 1986 Schengen Convention, Title III Chapter 6 makes provisions related to illicit drug trafficking and requests that states, “in compliance with the existing
UN Conventions”, should take measures “for the prevention and punishment of the illicit traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances” (Schengen Convention, quoted by De Ruyver et al, 2002: 14). In 1993, the European Council established a European Drug Unit to facilitate cooperation between member states in their fight drug trafficking. Based in the Netherlands and staffed with liaison officers from all member states, this became EUROPOL in 1998 with the adoption of the EUROPOL Convention.

The Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon treaties of the EU have incorporated the work of the TREVI group into the EU's institutional structure. This includes drug-related provisions to increase police cooperation and judicial cooperation. Binding and non-binding legal documents frame the EU’s approach to drugs, among which the EU Drugs Strategy best encapsulates the European approach to drugs. This approach deviates to a certain extent from the international regime because it places a greater emphasis on public health concerns and harm reduction. The 2005-2012 Drugs Strategy even mentions public health concerns before security concerns:

“Considering the Treaties, other relevant European policy documents and the experience of the last decade, the Council identifies two general aims with regard to drugs. They can be summed up as follows:

• the EU aims at a contribution to the attainment of a high level of health protection, well-being and social cohesion by complementing the Member States’ action in preventing and reducing drug use, dependence and drug-related harms to health and society.

• the EU and its Member States aim to ensure a high level of security for the general public by taking action against drugs production, cross-border trafficking in drugs and diversion of precursors, and by intensifying preventive action against drug-related crime, through effective cooperation embedded in a joint approach” (EU Drugs Strategy, 2004: 5)

International police cooperation, however, remains at the heart of the supply reduction aspect of the EU Drugs Strategy. In 2004, the European Council adopted two framework decisions: one “laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug
trafficking”; the second “laying down rules for the monitoring of trade between the Community and third countries in drug precursors”. Moreover, there are also framework decisions on police cooperation on matters other than drugs – most notably establishing cross border joint investigative teams and information exchanges. Therefore, the police forces of EU states also function in a framework where international police cooperation is seen as the key to the efficient control of drug trafficking, and there is an array of measures at their disposal enabling them to work with their European counterparts.

3.4 Conclusion

Ever since the International Opium Commission gathered in Shanghai in 1909, one message has remained constant and it provides the foundation for the international drug regime: drugs are a danger and states must prohibit their use by citizens. The regime has emerged as states seek ways to minimize the problems caused by drugs, and today it is based on two interconnected tenets: firstly that the best way to reduce problems caused by the use of proscribed drugs is to minimize the scale of the illicit market; and secondly that this can be successfully achieved through prohibition-oriented supply-side measures (Bewley-Taylor, 2012:4). As the main sponsors of this prohibitionist approach, the United States gradually imposed its view. This has led to the three basic treaties underpinning the regime, which seeks to ensure that the illicit production, supply and use of narcotic drugs are suppressed by criminal law. As a result, law enforcement agencies are the main state institutions responsible for taking appropriate actions to ensure state compliance with the rules of the regime. Thus, the extent to which a state complies with the regime can today be seen by observing the penal sanctions it
imposes for drug-related crimes, and by the level of institutional cooperation by its law enforcement agencies in combatting drug trafficking. This creates a paradox, however: while there is a wealth of evidence that prohibition has failed to suppress illicit drugs, states can be seen to fully adhere and comply with the regime norms and values. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, Turkey is indicative of this paradox: there is little evidence that there its law enforcement agency's adherence to the drug control regime has resulted in a decrease in drug trafficking.

Having determined that international law enforcement cooperation is a key element of the international drug regime, the next chapter will focus this phenomenon and identify its characteristics, observe how it has changed over the years, and consider what the main drivers for change have been. This will determine how an analysis of Turkey’s policing will be carried out in the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 4: Literature review: the internationalization of policing

4.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the phenomenon of 'policing internationalization'. Like Chapter Three it explores the background to Turkey’s transformation in policing and seeks to provide the reader with a general understanding of the 'internationalization of policing'. As academic works in this area are plentiful, this chapter takes the form of a literature review in order to extract important ideas about the phenomenon of internationalization of policing put forward by other authors. These ideas are integral to the analysis of the case study in the following chapters. In particular, the analysis highlights the arguments presenting the United States as uncontested leader of the internationalization of policing – a hypothesis tested in Chapter Six. It also identifies the arguments according to which the EU integration process is a driver of the internationalization of Turkish policing – a hypothesis tested in Chapter Seven.

Academic interest in the practices, institutions, and evolutions of policing; along with its political rationale and the implications it carries for the conduct of domestic and international affairs is relatively recent. Sheptycki dates it back to the 1960s (Sheptycki, 2000: xi), but a growing interest in this field of study can be identified since the mid-1990s. Studies that draw from criminology, law, political science and International Relations offer a wealth of information about, and explanations for, the emerging trend of internationalization of policing, or 'transnational policing' (Sheptycki, 2000: Newburn, 2008: Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2010). Drug control is at the core of this emerging style of policing, as
was discussed in Chapter Three and today remains “the flagship of transnational law enforcement” (Sheptycki, 2000: 202).

This literature review is intended to help to make sense of the external influences that have shaped policing in Turkey by explaining how they became important enough to be considered as potential influences to others. It also offers an analysis of a number of issues about the nature of international policing, factors that have enabled policing to become internationalized, and the implications of internationalization on common understandings of what a nation state is. All of these elements are important insofar as they provide a basic framework for understanding international policing something necessary for the following chapters, where the analysis focuses on the elements deemed relevant for the specific case-study without going into further detail regarding their importance as markers of Turkish policing's internationalization.

The first section sheds light on what is actually meant by the term 'transnational/international policing'. The second section focuses on the way in which the security agenda of the United States changed radically at the turn of the 1990s to incorporate the so-called 'new threats' of drug trafficking and organised crime, a change that had global effects. In the third section, the North American and European models of police cooperation are presented. The fourth section adopts a more sociological approach and discusses theories regarding the role of intelligence technologies and the bureaucratisation of police forces in the emergence of transnational policing; while the fifth section examines the place of drug enforcement within transnational policing. The sixth and final section reviews a recent study, which attempts to conceptualise vectors of influence at play when a police force receives foreign assistance. The conclusion offers an
overview of these areas of study and analyses their importance for the Turkish case.

4.2 Nature of transnational/international policing

In order to initiate this literature review, this section clarifies what is meant by the terms 'transnational policing', 'international policing', 'international police cooperation' and the 'internationalization of policing'. As this thesis is based on the premise that Turkey has internationalized its policing and that it increasingly attaches importance to international police cooperation, the meaning of these concepts has great significance.

Some authors prefer using 'transnational' to 'international' policing in describing “a rising tide of international collaboration in policing transnational crime”, a phenomenon whereby states work to “extend the reach of law enforcement systems beyond borders” (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 224). The phrase 'transnational policing' seems to be broadly accepted alongside 'international police cooperation', where the latter is one element of the former. Authors invariably refer to the concept of the modern state developed by Max Weber, which defines the state as “a human association that successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate violence in a given territory” (Scheptycki 2000: 3; Deflem, 2002a and 2002b; Friedrichs, 2008: 5; Walker, 2008: 141). They also note that the evolution towards a form of policing that transcends the nation state system is altering the most common understanding of statehood. Hereafter, the use of 'international' or 'transnational' will be chosen to reflect the choice of each author, though the distinction made by Walker is useful:
“The term transnational is preferred to international for an important reason. If we are concerned with policing other than policing that is authorised and practised within the territorial and institutional confines of the state, then only some such policing can be properly labelled as international. That is to say, policing beyond the state often does take the form of ‘international’ or (more correctly) ‘ interstate’ policing – police co-operation and common action between officials and bureaucracies who owe their authority and allegiance first and foremost to the discrete states in questions – yet it may also take a different form. For some form of policing beyond the state are not reducible to co-operation between actors whose main reference point is their state of origin, but may instead involve networks which owe authority and allegiance to other non-state ‘polities’ or political communities.” (Walker, 2008: 119).

Andreas and Nadelmann argue that the internationalization of law enforcement is characterized by “the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements; the creation of bilateral and multilateral law enforcement organizations, working groups and conferences; the inclusion of liaison officers in foreign countries” (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 224). Goldsmith and Sheptycki focus on policing aspects only and argue that the forms of transnational policing are “liaison networks: personnel exchanges; foreign training programmes; technical assistance programmes; joint operations; intelligence sharing agreements; peacekeeping; and capacity-building programmes” (Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2010: 11). Looking beyond these categorizations, Den Boer notes that law enforcement agencies, cooperate across borders because doing so results in the sharing and pooling of information, policing concepts, methods and practices, leads to the “convergence of organizational models and styles of policing” (Den Boer, 1999: 70). Goldsmith and Sheptycki's analysis offers greater depth: they identify five pathways that can lead to a harmonized model: contact, communication, contagion, conversion and convergence, all of which impact on a broad range of questions: “institutional needs assessments, the establishment of priorities, agendas for reform, choices of partners, choices of technology, selections of strategies and tactics, and so on” (Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2010: 11).
This raises the question of which model is at the heart of this process of harmonization. Den Boer argues that there has been a degree of competition between police organizations across within states, and notes that scholars agree that the process of internationalization is above all a process of Americanization (Den Boer, 1999: 68). Invariably, these scholars refer to Nadelmann’s seminal work on US law enforcement, which describes the aggressiveness of the US approach in convincing foreign governments to modify their laws; and sign extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties and other forms of cooperative arrangements (Nadelmann, 1993; Bigo, 2002a: 86; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006; Walker, 2008: 139). As an example, Den Boer writes:

“Senior Dutch and Belgian officials would not deny that some centralization initiatives have been modelled on the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and even seem to suggest that pressure by American diplomats encouraged the creation of national undercover teams and support services” (Den Boer, 1999: 68).

Deflem’s work, a historical analysis of international policing beginning in the nineteenth century runs contrary to these claims, however, arguing that the internationalization of policing took place in Europe long before it became an American enterprise, and that the United States imported European policing models (Deflem, 2002a: 216). Andreas and Nadelmann acknowledge that Europe has played a role in the internationalization process (and continues to do so), but argue that it does not compare to that of US law enforcement: “although the EU plays and activist role in creating regional and international law enforcement institutions, it would not be much of an exaggeration to say that much of the internationalization of crime control has in practice meant Americanization” (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 243).
Having clarified what various authors mean when using the terms of ‘transnational’ or ‘international policing’, ‘international police cooperation’ and ‘internationalization’, the following sections explore related issues in greater detail. In particular, the reasons why internationalization is often seen as a process of Americanization is explored by reviewing how the US policing model developed in section three, whilst Deflem’s approach is explicated in greater detail in section five.

4.3 The emergence of new security threats and international responses in the 1980’s and 1990’s

This section presents the reasons identified for the emergence of organised crime on national security agendas. It was noted in Chapter Two that throughout the late 1970s and 1980s Turkey faced a rapid surge in organised crime, which was closely linked to political groups in power, and whose activities spread to Western Europe. The majority of scholars who have analysed the issue, however, argue that states' concerns regarding their national security were not primarily caused by the growth of organised crime groups. There are a number of complimentary explanations as to why international crime control has grown so rapidly since the 1980s and in particular during the 1990s. Firstly, it is observed that challenges to state security changed following the end of the Cold War and the following process of globalization. Economic liberalisation and globalisation are blamed for easing the task of transnational criminal organizations and for creating incentives for international criminals. Governments had been devoting attention to an increasingly wide array of transnational activities, including the trafficking of illicit narcotics, arms and people; money laundering; and the trade of counterfeit
products, stolen property, ivory, endangered wildlife, toxic waste, arts and antiquities (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 5; Winer, 2006: 106). This provided a rationale for the reinforcement of legal controls and their international imposition, despite the fact that the enforcement methods called for had proved unsuccessful so far:

“Blaming the influx of drugs into the United States on trade liberalisation has also helped law-enforcement agencies to deflect criticism, and has served as a convenient rationale for more resources to be devoted to border control. (…) In short, a new political and bureaucratic rationale has emerged to escalate further, rather than re-evaluate, the viability of policies that have long histories of failure” (Andreas, 2002: 49).

Secondly, Rees notes that the traditional distinction between internal and external security began to blur as states faced these new challenges. These transnational activities could not be treated as domestic sources of lawlessness, which would normally be the responsibility of the police, and states could not single-handedly maintain safe domestic spaces from a dangerous external world (Rees, 2006: 389-392). As a result, police and military matters could no longer be strictly separated and internal security agencies had to recognise the necessity of working together and pursuing cooperation with their foreign counterparts.

Thirdly, building on Nadelmann’s original study, Andreas and Nadelmann deconstruct any attempt at such a simplistic functional explanation, arguing that:

“The globalization of crime control (...) cannot be entirely or even primarily explained in terms of the functional need to respond to the globalization of crime. It is equally valid to turn this common explanation on its head. The underlying impetus of all international criminal law enforcement activities is the initial fact of criminalization by the state. New laws turn once legal cross border activities into criminal activities, resulting in a sudden and sometimes dramatic overall increase in transnational crime” (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 225).

Several authors have thus examined the emergence of the concept of organised crime in national and international security agendas, offering insights as to how countries gradually came “under pressure to respond in a uniform manner in accordance with numerous international agreements, conventions, guidelines”
A constant theme throughout their work is that responding to transnational organised criminal activities became a priority less because this type of crime had grown, than because its consequences had been overstated – if not fabricated (Nadelmann, 1993; Andreas and Price, 2001; Andreas, 2002; Beare, 2003; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006; Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 2009; Scherrer, 2010). Indeed, as was noted in Chapter Three, in the United States fears about increasing levels of drug consumption was only partly responsible for the War on Drugs, which was largely lead by Nixon and Reagan's desires to satisfy their electorates. This also contributed to the changing profile of those perceived to represent security threats, with Colombian cartels, Japanese Yakuzas and Asian Tryads gradually becoming seen as state enemies. Meanwhile, the state – along with its laws and institutions – was seen as an institution in need of strengthening, regardless of its failures thus far (Woodiwiss, 2001; Naylor, 2002).

Andreas and Nadelmann and Price argue that a gap had been created with the disappearance of purely military threats prevailing during the Cold War, which was conveniently filled by organised crime-related concerns (Andreas and Price, 2001; Andreas, 2002; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006). More specifically, Youngers and Rosin contend that the War on Drugs was revived in the 1980s to fill a vacuum in the security agenda (Rosin and Youngers; 2005). Rather than moving financial and technological resources traditionally allocated to security purposes to other matters, law enforcement matters were elevated into the security agenda (Andreas and Price, 2001; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006). Military
hardware, technology and intelligence were increasingly devoted to police operations, in particular anti-drug trafficking. Walker concurs with this analysis, describing the implications it has on the allocation of state resources and technologies:

“In the post-Cold War era we have seen a significant reconfiguration of US security strategy in response to the end of bipolarity. Security threats, and security resources, can no longer be compartmentalised into the domestic and the global (....) instead these threats are perceived as more fluid and more various, requiring new security rationales and operational methodologies, but still drawing upon old institutions and rhetorics. (....) We see significant technological change in the conversion of military hardware for police missions, and organizational change in increased linkages and overlaps between police and intelligence communities” (Walker, 2008: 139-140)

Gradually, the discourse evolved and the term 'organised crime' became prevalent, despite the fact that it referred mainly to drug trafficking (Scherrer, 2010). Winer recounts that in October 1995 President Clinton issued a directive declaring international crime to constitute an international security threat just the day before he spoke at the UN General Assembly calling on all states to join together and develop strategies to combat transnational crime (Winer, 1998). Soon after the new threat of drug trafficking and organised crime reached the American security agenda it was discussed internationally. Scherrer demonstrates that the United States used its leadership in the Group of 7/Group of 8 Leading Industrial States (G7/G8) to place drug trafficking and money laundering on the agenda for discussion at the forum’s meetings throughout the 1980’s (Scherrer, 2009). She contends that it was relatively easy to justify action against money laundering (made easy by economic globalisation), as it was at the heart of transnational crime. Nevertheless, it remained intrinsically linked to anti-drug efforts: tackling money laundering was presented as a way to address the proceeds made out of drug trafficking, though it stopped short of going against the trafficking itself. This helps clarify how drug trafficking, the sole objective of the War on Drugs,
came to be replaced by the broader notion of organised crime in the American and international discourse. Scherrer, Woodiwiss, Den Boer and Anderson thus conclude that whilst the United States initially failed to convince other countries to join the War on Drugs, they succeeded once they modified their discourse and adopted the vague term ‘organised crime’. This new terminology was officially endorsed internationally in 1994 at the Ministerial Conference on International Organised Crime held under the auspices of the UN, something understood as a great success for the US administration in ensuring that other states adopt their law enforcement policies and practices. (Woodiwiss, 2003: 26-29; Scherrer, 2009: 21-22,).

In the aftermath of the 11th September 2001 attacks, the need to improve international law enforcement was undisputed, but Winer and Rees point out that in fact “changes were already well under way when global terrorism took the centre stage as the great threat to an interconnected world”. (Winer, 2006: 106; cf. Rees, 2011). The threat of terrorism most probably accelerated the pace at which cooperation was being developed by United States and the EU, both of which had begun “internationalizing the powers of their law enforcement agencies and building networks amongst them for sharing information” quite some time before (Rees: 2011: 390).

The existing literature therefore demonstrates that international crime control penetrated the international security agenda following the end of the Cold War, through a gradual redefinition of the concept of national security itself. The historical malleability of this concept, and others such as organised crime, have allowed for matters of law enforcement to be alternatively integrated or excluded from internal and external security agendas (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 235-
The first tangible indication that Turkey underwent a similar process came in 1996 when its National Security Council (MGK) placed drug trafficking on its agenda and declared it a national security threat. Within the following two years, the MGK had also updated its National Security Policy Document, in which it included the ultra-nationalists gang ılkücü as a threat to national security and requested the government to act against organised crime (Robins, 2009: 642). This reveals the gradual emergence of the discourse on drug trafficking and organised crime in the Turkish context, an issue addressed at length in Chapters Six and Seven.

4.4 Two models of international/transnational policing: North America and Europe

Lemieux argues that “when it comes to international police cooperation, national police agencies in North America and in Europe are clearly operating differently” (Lemieux, 2010: 278). The historical foundations and legitimacy of police systems have driven the development of police cooperation strategies, which Lemieux classifies under two opposing paradigms: one economic, driven by performance and operational outcomes; and another political, operating through political leadership and aimed at building institutions. (Lemieux, 2010: 278-280). This section summarizes the key elements of both models, focusing on the United States and the EU. This choice should not be construed as implying that these are the only two regions where police cooperation is ongoing (see, for example Lemieux, 2010, Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2009). Rather, notwithstanding the fact that they are the most studied in academic literature, they are of most relevance for the case of Turkey given its historical links with the United States and the
ongoing process of accession to the EU. In the following chapters, this thesis seeks to ascertain the extent to which US law enforcement or EU law enforcement have played a determining role in Turkey’s internationalization of policing, and so it is important to determine what these two models are and how they have become internationalized.

4.4.1 The US model of international/transnational policing

That US law enforcement agencies pioneered the internationalization of policing in the latter part of the twentieth century is undisputed, as shown by Nadelmann’s study (Nadelmann, 1993). US agents were increasingly stationed in foreign countries and together with US officials they worked to persuade foreign states to harmonize their criminal justice systems in order to accommodate the requirements of the US criminal justice system. He writes:

“The United States has provided the models, and other governments have done the accommodating. It thus would be quite fair, in describing the evolution of drug enforcement and many other domains of law enforcement around the world since the 1960’s, to substitute the word “Americanization” for “harmonization”. (…) No other government has acted so aggressively in collecting evidence from foreign jurisdictions, apprehending fugitives from abroad, indicting foreign officials in its own courts, targeting foreign government corruption and persuading governments to change their criminal justice systems. Nor has any government devoted comparable diplomatic resources to pursuing its international law enforcement agenda during the past few decades. The US government has, more than any other government, proved willing and able to intrude on the prerogatives of foreign sovereigns, to challenge foreign political sensibilities, and to circumvent and override foreign legal norms” (Nadelmann, 1993: 470-473).

Several authors agree with this point, noting the extent to which the United States put pressure on other states first to adopt international standards on law enforcement cooperation, such as in the 1988 Vienna Convention (Naylor, 2002; Woodiwiss, 2001; Rees, 2006), but it is also important to understand how American law enforcement developed.
In his study of organised crime, Woodiwiss describes how it came to be seen as a major American problem because ‘moral panics’ were fabricated and exploited throughout the twentieth century, in particular during Nixon’s War on Drugs, and during Reagan’s time in office from 1980 to 1988 (Woodiwiss, 2003; Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 2009). The significance of organised crime and its consequences on the wellbeing of the American population was exaggerated in official reports and in the media as well as in journalistic essays and popular literature. In a manner quite similar to the portrayal of drug use as alien to American culture, organised crime was painted as an alien conspiracy (as discussed in Chapter Three). Woodiwiss, Naylor and Paoli describe how the Mafia mythology was created in the first part of the twentieth century and reinforced after the World War II (Woodiwiss, 2001; Paoli, 2002; Naylor, 2004).

“From the 1930s (…) a line on organised crime began to emerge that was less critical of established laws and institutions and by the 1950s the consensus opinion on organised crime saw it in terms of Mafia conspiracy - an outside threat to otherwise sound U.S. laws and institutions. The Mafia conspiracy theory was updated in the 1980s to include other conspirational entities, but official U.S. thinking about organised crime keeps to the simple formula. Forces outside mainstream American culture threaten U.S. laws and institutions and therefore these laws and institutions need to be strengthened.” (Woodiwiss; 2001: 227)

As a result, a rhetoric of organised crime policing developed, which called for concerted international policing (Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 2009: 124). The purpose was to justify the approach to drugs and crime developed by American drug enforcement agencies to the American public and foreign administrations. Andreas makes a similar argument regarding the fabrication of the threat of organised crime, showing how it transformed the American security agenda. His point of departure is that the exaggeration of organised crime served narrow political and bureaucratic interests (Andreas, 2002: 48) following the disappearance of the Soviet threat at the end of the Cold War. Drug trafficking
thus represented the first 'new' security threat placed under “the broad (and conveniently vague) label of organised crime” (Andreas, 2002: 48). It was noted in Chapter Two that during the ‘opium crisis’, which opposed Turkey to the United States – and in order to launch the 'War on Drugs' – the Nixon administration inflated the threat posed by Turkish-originated heroin. The political and bureaucratic interests of the Nixon administration in making this move are analysed in detail in Chapter Six.

Andreas and Price describe how US international law enforcement became militarized during the Reagan and Bush administrations: a change they describe as a shift “from war fighting to crime fighting” (Andreas, 1997; Andreas and Price, 2001). Admittedly, Caribbean and Latin American neighbours have been the primary focus of this switch, but the pressure the Nixon administration placed on Turkey in the early 1970s was also a sign that these efforts extended beyond the Americas.

Friman offers an interesting insight into US pressure on Japan throughout the 1980s, arguing that US diplomacy insisted on every possible occasion that Japan should be active in the War on Drugs. Whilst Japan did cooperate, this was more due to a desire to work more closely with the United States regardless of the issue than because drugs were of particular concern to them (Friman, 1991). The study undertaken by Alain, meanwhile, shows that there have been some formal police cooperation agreements, notably between the United States and Canada, but that there is heavy reliance on ad-hoc cooperation for specific operations (Alain, 2001: 115-116).

Cottam and Marenin studied the evolution of U.S. police training assistance between the Nixon and the Reagan administrations, showing that even though
training programs were highly contentious and drew criticism because of the frequent associations of US police trainers with torture and human rights violations perpetrated by foreign police forces they were training, fighting international drug trafficking provided a justification for granting assistance to other states (Cottam and Marenin, 1989). Assisting with police reform in the states of the former Eastern bloc was seen as crucial in the consolidation of democracy, and Marenin studied the effects of the end of the Cold War on US international police aid programmes (Marenin, 1998). He argued that the increasing amounts of police aid were motivated by the perceived risks associated with growing networks of transnational organised crime and international terrorism. Responding to the new threat environment, the United States offered to provide more training and assistance to states fighting terrorism and various forms of organised crime, especially drug trafficking (Marenin, 1998; Lia, 2007: 5). The International Law Enforcement Academies that opened in 1996 in Budapest and Bangkok are run respectively by the FBI and the DEA for the specific purposes of countering these threats (Bayley, 2001).

It appears, therefore, that drug trafficking has always been a main driver of the American efforts to internationalize their law enforcement, and that US authorities have acted at every level in order to have other states join in their efforts and adopt their operational methods. Most analysts, however, highlight the failure to acknowledge that these approaches to law enforcement have not had the desired results. Nadelmann argues that the United States is obsessed with controlling drug trafficking and Falco argues this amounts to an addiction to failure (Nadelmann, 1988; Falco, 1996). Cottam and Marenin contend that assistance to foreign police training was a central objective in foreign policy
under several administrations from Kennedy to Clinton, as it was thought to be an effective instrument for promoting the goals of democracy, but that the results have been to teach foreign police forces techniques of secrecy, brutality and repression (Cottam and Marenin, 1989; Marenin, 1998). For Dolan, the September 11 attacks pushed drug trafficking further up on the security agenda by exploiting the narcoterrorism nexus and merging the 'War on Drugs' with the newly declared 'War on Terror' (Dolan, 2005). He notes that the “narcoterrorism policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplomatic weight to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies” (Dolan, 2005: 468).

This section has revealed the centrality of anti-drug trafficking in the US model of international policing, which is an element that is useful for the empirical analysis in the Chapter Six of this thesis for a two main reasons. Firstly, it strengthens the case for choosing as a hypothesis the claim that Turkish policing has internationalized because it has been the target of US pressures and incentives to adapt and harmonise to the US model. Secondly, the fact that Turkey has been operating the international training academy TADOC since 2000, with praise from the US government, also indicates that Turkish policing may be following US law enforcement in its steps not only by adopting its modus operandi in dealing with drug trafficking but also in the way it behaves internationally.

4.4.2 The European policing model

This sub-section analyses how the EU gradually developed its own international policing framework – an issue that has been extensively addressed by a number of scholars. The aim is to show how this European international policing model has
developed to gain enough significance for this thesis to test the hypothesis that change in Turkish policing was due to Turkey’s membership bid to the EU.

Police cooperation among EU member states has been the object of study from its first steps in the 1970s until the present day. There is extensive academic literature on the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Pillar of the EU instituted by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (see for example Den Boer and Walker, 1993; Anderson and Den Boer, 1994; Anderson et al., 1995; Monaco, 1995); and on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), which replaced it following the Amsterdam Treaty (see for example Anderson, 2000; Monar, 2000; Anderson and Apap, 2002; Mitsilegas et al., 2003; Occhipinti, 2003; Balsacq and Carrera, 2006; Friedrichs, 2008). Literature concentrating on the changes brought by the Lisbon treaty is also developing (see for example Guild and Geyer, 2008; Monar, 2010).

Several authors have also analysed and elaborated theories on how the EU developed its internal security policy and the instruments chosen to respond to security concerns such as drug trafficking, organised crime, and terrorism. Ensuring effective police cooperation has, without doubt, been considered a leading strategy. The creation of EUROPOL and the implementation of the Schengen Information System are good indicators in this regard; as are the adoption of bilateral and multilateral treaties to facilitate regional cooperation (Bellanova, 2008; Guille, 2010) and the operation of Joint Investigative Teams (Block, 2008). It should be noted most in most of these studies, the focus is on whether new arrangements diminish oversight and accountability mechanisms that would normally exist at the national level. This question is not the central concern of this research, however, and so the following section concentrates on
the issues of how and why police cooperation increased dramatically as part of the construction of the European Union.

Den Boer and Walker established a multi-level system to explain developments in European policing which is still useful today:

“First, there is a series of public rationales which have set a favourable ideological climate for the intensification of police co-operation. Secondly, there are a number of underlying influences which provide a deeper explanatory sub-text for these developments. Thirdly, there is a set of facilitating conditions which have expedited the process of development. Finally, we should recognize that as macro-political initiatives filter down into the complex interorganizational setting of European policing, they may in due course develop their own practical momentum” (Den Boer and Walker, 1993: 8).

With regards to public rationales, in the final two decades of the twentieth century, the European understanding of internal security changed rapidly. The pattern here has striking similarities to those observed in the US, and one should not rule out the claim that US foreign policy influenced European policy makers (see for example Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 2008: 106). As in the US, the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led to a blurring of the distinction of internal and external security because the threat of a 'conventional' military attack disappeared. Meanwhile, policy analysts and policy makers developed the “idea of a security continuum which makes connections between general categories of illegal activities: terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime, transfrontier crime, illegal immigration, asylum-seekers and minority ethnic groups” (Anderson and Apap, 2002: 5).

One element which did not affect the United States, but is presented as a catalyst for the change of approach by EU member states is the perceived threat attached to the progressive abolition of borders between countries (Den Boer and Walker, 1993: 9; Anderson and Apap, 2002; Mitsilegas et al., 2003: 42-60). Fears associated with the potential existence of a new array of illegal activities once
both individuals and goods could move freely across Europe pushed policy makers to present organised crime and illegal immigration as the new threats to the well-being of European citizens. Walker emphasizes the fact that the perception of the threat is more important than the threat itself:

“Much of the public perception about the need for cross-border police cooperation has been focused on the activities of so-called ‘transnational organised crime’ (TOC). Organised crime has indeed become the major policy concern in transnational criminal justice circles across Europe. The threat of TOC represents a ‘condensation’ of insecurity problems in a few key concerns, most notably illegal immigrants and drugs. The tenor of these discussions is usually very emotive and the direction of policy development is worrying” (Walker, 2001:145).

Academics focussing on this process of 'securitization' (Balzacq, 2011) argue that the new threats became highly politicized, providing a ‘public rationale’ for the development of cooperation in the field of security. According to Anderson and Apap:

“Internal security risks, previously tackled at the national level, bounded by psychologically reassuring state borders, came to be regarded as a legitimate field for European cooperation. The third pillar of Maastricht (almost exclusively regarded as a sphere of law enforcement cooperation) and the area of freedom, justice and security of the Treaty of Amsterdam were the result. Justice and Home Affairs has been, since 1999, the most dynamic area of activity of the EU” (Anderson and Apap, 2002: 6).

It should be noted that, as in the US context, both the validity of these perceived threats and of the security continuum it engendered have been strongly criticized in academic literature. According to Bigo:

“The internal security field at the European level connects questions of terrorism with organised crime, and/or with serious cross border offences, with money laundering and drug trafficking, with mafia activities, with human trafficking, with illegal migration, with religious radicalization, with asylum seekers, with urban riots (see the Prüm Treaty, Council declarations on terrorism, and declaration of ministries of interior of some of the member states) without any clear evidences that these elements are interrelated. They repeat it again and again as a new “faith” for a new “god” (Bigo 2008: 105).

In respect of underlying influences, Den Boer and Walker argued in 1993 that the push for greater police cooperation took place at a time when there was a general ethos for integration among European governments (Den Boer and Walker, 1993: 10). Occhipinti argues that policing integration resulted from integration in other
areas (and following the enactment of the Amsterdam Treaty) around a decade later (Occhipinti, 2003: 4-6). He contends that understanding the rapid development of police and judicial cooperation through the prism of intergovernmentalism actually fails to explain much of it. For him,

“a strong case can be made that cooperation on JHA, especially since the mid-1980s, can be explained in terms of “functional spillover” which has been the central component of neofunctionalist theory. The concept of spillover (…) implies that cooperation in one area of European integration leads to cooperation in another. In the case of JHA, for example, it can be shown that the creation of the Schengen free-travel area contributed to the need for a deepening of collaboration on crime fighting in the EU.” (Occhipinti, 2003: 5-6)

Occhipinti’s argument is shared by others. Andreas, for example, argues that the EU’s economic integration provided as strong a political impetus to the development of cooperation against organised crime as did the unintended dangers of economic liberalisation (Andreas, 2002: 48). Mitsilegas et al. go further by emphasising that the provision of integrated security measures, such as police cooperation, became a structural political project in the construction of the EU. They observe that the main impetus for the rapid development of the EU security arrangements have come from:

“a combination of increasing transnational challenges, a powerful spillover effect for economic integration, national interests in a “Europeanization” of certain national problems and the emergence of AFSJ as a major political project in its own right with its own legitimising rationale” (Mitsilegas et al., 2003: 161).

There is a growing body of literature pointing to the fact that the EU prioritisation of police and justice cooperation has resulted in a highly complex, institutionalised and hierarchical system. Two observations are made in this regard. Firstly, the system is complex because it intertwines traditional institutional agencies (which are marked by a vertical form of governance) with smaller scale initiatives (formed of horizontal, network-types of governance). It also intertwines strictly formal arrangements, such as rules of cooperation between EUROPOL and national police agencies, and informal arrangements,
such as the day-to-day cooperation that is noted to take place among liaison officers stationed at EUROPOL or in other European capitals (Den Boer, 2010: 42-61, Block, 2010). Block argues that both formal and informal channels of communication are important. It can be argued that these take place at two different levels: at the high bureaucratic level where negotiations over European agreements take place, and at the operational level. Secondly, some of the most recent work on European security tends to argue that elite forms of cooperation are developing fastest (Guille 2010b: 25-40). For example, Guille argues that so far as the operational level is concerned, the proliferation of agreements, guidelines and rules for cooperation have actually produced a malfunctioning system; whereas cooperation tools subjected to less legislation produce far superior results (Guille, 2010a: 259). These two elements are important because they highlight that in order to understand how policing changes it is important to look beyond formal agreements to focus on practice and the behaviour of agents. In order to identify whether an elite exists within law enforcement agencies regrouping agents are involved in international cooperation, it is important to look at how the institution itself functions. The following chapters will demonstrate that these elements are of great importance in analysing of the Turkish case. Den Boer and Walker also argue that trust and respect would develop between police authorities as the level of knowledge about each other’s goals and practices increase (den Boer and Walker, 1993: 11). However, this issue is barely addressed in more recent studies, with the exceptions of Mitsilegas et al., who mention it in the context of the EU accession processes, and Block, who studies the role of liaison officers (Mitsilegas et al., 2003: 160; Block, 2010). Given Turkey’s status as a candidate to the EU and the difficulties associated with the process, such as
the freeze of negotiation of certain accession chapters and the openly negative opinion on Turkey’s accession by some member states’ policy makers and heads of states, the question of trust, and what might foster cooperation in practice is a very important one. This section has analysed the existing literature on the US and EU international policing models. It has been noted that the expansion of police and judicial cooperation within the EU followed a different path than in the United States, even if public rationales and securitization discourses tended to be similar. It has also clarified that the pathways through which they might have influenced Turkey’s policing would differ from one another. In the case of US influence, a “general fixation with drug trafficking” (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 5) seems to be the main driver of international policing. In the case of EU influence, the internationalization of policing has become a major policymaking area within the development of the AFSJ, and this must be considered within the broader context of Turkey's attempts to integrate ahead of accession to the EU.

4.5 Pathways for the emergence of transnational/international policing

This section presents sociological rather than political theories regarding the internationalization of policing. The focus here is on certain conditions that – it is argued – must be in place in order for internationalization to occur. Den Boer and Walker argue that police cooperation develops in an environment where certain 'facilitating conditions' are present: the use of particular technologies, and the adoption of certain organizational structures (Den Boer and Walker, 1993). These two elements have been explored in the greatest depth by Deflem, although Sheptycki also engages with them to a degree (Deflem, 2002a; 2002b; Sheptycki, 2001). The analysis of the Turkish case will determine whether these facilitating
conditions have been present (or at least whether they have been observable), and so it is important to establish what they are in detail here.

4.5.1 Technology

Sheptycki notes that information technology has been “the motor of organizational change in contemporary policing” (Sheptycki, 2001: 146). For Deflem, meanwhile, mastery of technology presents a way for police agencies to become independent from their political centres and to engage in cooperation (Deflem, 2002b: 470). It was noted earlier that a consequence of the elevation of drug trafficking and organised crime such that they are seen to present significant security threats resulted in the tightening of links between law enforcement and intelligence communities (Andreas and Price, 2001: 36, Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 2009). The unprecedented developments in surveillance and information technologies of the past decades are recognised as having opened many possibilities in this regard and to have greatly increased the power of police agents. It has changed the way in which policing is performed and organised as profoundly as it has changed the way in which crime is committed. For example, in his study of cross-border operations Sheptycki notes that “much of the work carried out by police agents is concerned with obtaining, classifying, and analysing a wide variety of data produced in the context of nearly ubiquitous control system surveillance relating to traffic in the border region” (Sheptycki, 2001: 148). New technologies have led to the development of what can be called ‘intelligence-led policing’, as they rely on surveillance and information sharing to the greatest extent and as quickly as possible. Deflem contends that technology can also become a site of cooperation: police agencies that do not possess the
latest technological tools and knowledge may be inclined to acquire them through collaboration with organizations that do.

4.5.2 Organization: the role of bureaucracies in shaping international policing

Beyond analysing the importance of technology in international policing, Deflem designed a comprehensive analytical framework for the internationalization of policing. He grounds his analysis on the theoretical model of bureaucratization rooted in Max Weber’s sociology (Deflem, 2002a: 3; 2002b: 455), and posits that as bureaucracies, modern police agencies evolve gradually towards independence from “their political centres on the basis of professional expertise and acquired knowledge” (Deflem, 2002b: 456). Deflem’s theory is composed of two elements. Firstly, he argues that the greater independence police institutions achieve from their political centres, the greater the chances are that they engage in police cooperation. Secondly, he argues that the greater the desire of police institutions to fight international crime, the greater the chances are that they will cooperate with other organizations. He goes on to propose that the element that will make cooperation possible is “police technology”, which incorporates technical know-how and administrative methods. Police agencies establish and share technical apparatus before having acquired knowledge about international crime. Once the system of knowledge is in place the information emerges, thus defining particular crimes as a risk to be dealt with. In this regard, he argues that “[i]nternational crime functioned as a professionally defined construct that was real in its consequences of expanding international police organization and facilities” (Deflem, 2002a: 222) In other words, the development of modern policing is
technology-driven and it is precisely this technological drive and the accompanying systems of knowledge that leads police agencies to engage internationally.

Deflem’s analysis differs from other approaches as it adopts a sociological approach rather than a legal or political one, although it does not necessarily contradict them. For example, in his study of the making of the EU’s anti-drug policies, Elvins develops an analysis pointing to the role of bureaucracies or sub-state agents in installing drug control at the heart of transnational policing (Elvins, 2003). His work retraces the historical development of anti-drug policies from the creation of the Pompidou group to the inclusion of drug control in the agenda of emerging European institutions (the TREVI group, then the JHA Pillar of the EU, through to the establishment of EUROPOL). He contends that national experts from interior and justice ministries and law enforcement agencies were given a critical role in defining the EU’s anti-drug policies. Given their area of expertise, the result was that they focused on law enforcement:

“At a period when the broader political backdrop created the conditions for a more ‘technocratic’ emphasis on the drug issue at the European level, as political makers were pre-occupied with the wider implications of extended integration, the result was an institutionalised response focused on enforcement.” (Elvins: 2003: 122)

Thus, in addition to Deflem’s theory centred on the technical know-how and the bureaucratic independence of police agencies, Elvins draws on theories of ‘epistemic communities’ to argue that European national agents managed to influence political processes because they had an arena within TREVI and other JHA working groups of the European Council through which they could present their expertise to decision-makers. In turn, the existence of these arenas allowed the experts to develop stronger networks, making their positions even more legitimate to decision-makers:
“Many of the initiatives put in place have given police and customs officials a significantly expanded range of opportunities through which to express their views leading to the development of an intense inter-governmental network between interior ministries and police” (Elvins, 2003: 152).

The emergence of the European security apparatus was therefore an essentially technocratic process through which European policy-makers agreed to experts’ assessment of drug trafficking and organised crime.

Walker’s analysis of “the patterns of transnational policing” differs slightly, as he argues that explanations of “the possibility of transnational policing” are not solely political but relate to the development of the professional field of law enforcement (Walker, 2008: 122-134). He argues that factors conducive to policing beyond the state are for the most part pragmatic. This pragmatism is both political and professional: on the political front, it drives cooperation in order to address “the forms of cooperation between deviant groups that cause crime to ramify across borders”. Professionally, this pragmatism operates because “typically police officers have a more immediate sense of the urgency of particular avenues of co-operation than do their political masters” and because they “can find solidarity, trust and empathy with foreign colleagues born of similar working conditions and priorities” (Walker, 2008: 122-123). Walker’s analysis is relevant here not so much because it follows paths similar to Elvins’, and to some extent Deflem’s, but because it shows that the functional argument whereby the growth of transnational crime calls for more transnational policing should not be discredited entirely. Indeed Whilst Walker agrees that it does not provide a credible explanation, it is clear that the functional argument is constantly present in the minds of policy makers and professional experts. Elvins, for example, shows that through the 1970s and 1980s European policy makers’ central concern was a belief that the removal of controls at national borders would
in itself give rise to more transnational crime towards and within the EU (Elvins, 2003).

It was mentioned earlier that in recent years a new “internal security discourse” has become a leading factor in European integration. Walker, among others, has shown how the establishment of a bureaucracy in the field of JHA has both shaped this discourse and contributed to its success in influencing policymakers. He argues that these bureaucracies have a vested interest in the consolidation and extension of their own structures and have therefore developed a rhetoric of urgent threats, aimed at giving European political elites:

“a conveniently reductionist way of viewing the complex problems associated with (...) the prospect of sharing the privileged European space with outsiders, with more specific concerns about the development of criminal organizational links across internal and external borders” (Walker, 2008: 130-131).

This security discourse does not function alone, he argues, but is matched by an explicit project on the part of policy-makers to build a European ‘polity’ – “a ‘state-like’ entity, even if not a full-blown state” (Walker, 2008: 131). Policy-makers have thus been using the new internal security discourse to secure broader political legitimacy for the polity-building projects: “a strong element within the politics of the EU dramatises what Europeans have in common, even if it is an identity which emphasizes what Europe is not – the other beyond the borders – than its positive features” (Walker, 2008: 133-134). Therefore, Walker goes further than Elvins and Deflem in arguing that even if the experts in transnational law enforcement proposed a discourse calling for greater transnational policing, it is a shift in the macro-political environment that has made possible the practical application of this discourse.

To conclude this section, it appears that the ‘facilitating conditions’ for the emergence of international policing that have been examined in the literature
relate to access to modern technological tools and high level human capacity by law enforcement agencies; to the capacity of sub-state agents to influence policymaking; and to the existence of self-interest that these agents find in engaging in international cooperation. This section has highlighted the importance of analysing international law enforcement not only from a state-centred, top-down approach; but also from an agent-centred, bottom-up approach. This offers a different angle of study for the Turkish case from the two that have been emerging so far: the hypotheses of Americanization or Europeanization are state-centred hypotheses, while the above has demonstrated the necessity to looking for other factors that take place domestically and at smaller levels than the state. The process tracing method, insofar as it is intended to uncover causal chains and mechanisms, will provide the leverage to study all of these possibilities. The following section turns to analyse another way of studying international policing by looking at the issues it addresses, and shows that drug control is seen as a core domain for international policing.

4.6 Anti-drugs policing within transnational/international policing

This thesis is based on the premise that analysing Turkey’s drug control efforts is sufficient to draw broader conclusions about Turkish policing, even though other areas in which significant international cooperation also exists such as trafficking in persons and illegal migration, terrorism, trafficking in counterfeit goods or other types of organised crime. This section seeks to clarify why anti-drug trafficking is perceived to be central to international policing, such that generalisation is possible in this case.

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6 See Chapter One, p.8 and Beach and Pedersen (2010: 3).
Anti-drug trafficking has always been at the very heart of international policing in the United States and in Europe, but many other issues have been attached to it, either through political opportunism in the case of the emergence of the term 'organised crime' or through the development of perceived connected threats. For example, authors interested in the establishment of EUROPOL note that the portfolio of the agency, which started as the European Drug Unit in 1993, was gradually enlarged as negotiations on the EUROPOL convention advanced. As its legal basis for action grew, EUROPOL’s mandate became increasingly vague, giving it increasing leeway (Walker, 2008: 129). Elvins argues that anti-drug trafficking was “partly an instrumental device in establishing what has become the lead institutions on the building of a much broader security apparatus” (Elvins, 2003: 122), and in his conclusion proposes that “drug trafficking has provided an important legitimizing principle for the building of a European security apparatus at a formative stage in its development” (Elvins, 2003: 122).

Similarly, Sheptycki argues that “by the end of the 1990s it was clear to knowledgeable observers that action against drug trafficking had become the site for the convergence of policing systems in Europe” (Sheptycki, 2000: 214).

Similarly, Elvins argues that integrating drug trafficking into security agendas, thus recognising it as a “high policing issue”, has allowed a number of new discourses to emerge regarding activities linked to drug trafficking, which would ultimately serve to integrate national security agendas:

“The conflation of different kinds of transnational security threats has seen drug trafficking steadily become positioned as part of a broader set of problems on the argument that it is a significant component in an integrated pattern of activities undertaken by organised criminals” (Elvins, 2003: 181-182).

The observation that drugs control is so deeply entrenched in decision making regarding international crime control in general also calls for an analysis of the
reasons why drug control seems to be so attractive, and why governments tend to favour this kind of extended state control. Sheptycki argues that drug prohibition has become “integral to the fabric” of the current transnational system (Sheptycki, 2000: 216). Transnational policing now goes far beyond anti-drug trafficking, and is held by an extensive range of supporting regimes, those that govern extradition and mutual legal assistance for example. This suggests that because drug control is at the very basis of the existing policing system beyond the borders of state its usefulness or validity is no longer questioned.

This question is similar to the one Andreas and Nadelmann ask about what makes the success of a global prohibition regime. They argue that key factors are the existence of a dominant power; the existence of a moral consensus on the ‘evil’ of activity in question; and that regime proponents seek to suppress undesirable activities and maintain moral boundaries around the acceptable behaviour of states in international society (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 228-229). In respect of the drug prohibition regime, they argue that the norm of anti-drug trafficking has the capacity to transcend politics, as have other prohibition regimes before, and as others may do in the future.

Bull offers a slightly different perspective on this question (Bull, 2007). Her analysis does not focus on the enforcement aspects of the regime, but seeks to explain the political rationalities that led the regime to rely almost exclusively on law enforcement for its implementation. She argues not only that have drugs been 'problematized' exclusively along the lines of supply reduction, but also that the rhetoric invoked in so doing has removed the possibility of other ways to 'problematize' it. For her, the credibility of demand reduction has been recurrently challenged: there cannot simply be a two-pronged approach of supply and
demand control because they operate on contrary assumptions about the nature of drug use and the possibilities for its regulation (Bull, 2007: 164). Her analysis is interesting here because it refocuses attention on the fact that the first stated goal of the drug prohibition regime is to regulate drug use, and that all other discourses on supply reduction and anti-trafficking, and progressively on the fight against organised crime, money laundering and all other aspects of international crime control, were supposed to achieve that goal – yet what has been achieved seems to be a self-justification of the importance of enforcement measures. In this sense, Bull shares much of the analysis made by Woodiwiss, who showed in several studies how policy-makers and members of the US executive had consistently sidelined comments that would contradict the enforcement discourse (see in particular Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 2009; Woodiwiss, 2007).

In conclusion, it can be drawn from this section that the existing literature on the role of anti-drug trafficking in international policing supports the premise of this thesis: that anti-drug trafficking efforts in Turkey are at the heart of Turkey’s policing internationalization. It was noted in Chapter Two that until today Turkey has adopted a limited policy on drug demand reduction, and this thesis adopts the approach of Bull, among others, to argue that the law enforcement bias in responding to drug use is due at least in part to the fact that the norms and rules of the international drug regime are biased in this way.

4.7 Analysing influences that shape a state’s policing

This section focuses on the work of Goldsmith, Llorente and Rivas, who analyse foreign assistance in Colombian policing. It is of particular interest because this work seeks to make sense of the nature and extent of foreign influence on
policing policy and practice in a given state (Goldsmith, Llorente and Rivas, 2010). This is the only study that was identified in the existing literature that focused on influences on policing. In order to conceptualise the phenomenon in question the authors argue that it is important to look at ideas, institutions and practices regarding policing in the way they are transmitted, which calls for a careful analysis of questions of power in transnational relationships; and in the way they are received, which necessitates looking at questions regarding resistance, the impact on local power relations and the legitimacy of existing practices. The theoretical framework they propose builds on Deflem’s by adding three elements. Firstly, they argue that the extent to which institutional independence from bureaucratic centres drives the involvement in international cooperation should also be considered vis a vis transnational power relations. Indeed, Deflem does not engage in issues regarding the un-evenness of power relations. Thus, they propose that in the support of foreign governments or other actors may mean that domestic autonomy comes “at the price of acceptance of foreign agendas” (Goldsmith, Llorente and Rivas, 2010: 78). Secondly, they argue that Deflem is wrong to suggest that the chances of international collaboration are determined by the extent of common organizational interest, as this implies that police organizations have a completely free choice in their actions. Rather, they argue that some actions are undertaken not out of choice but out of obligations in particular those resulting from international treaties and laws. As such, the extent to which international treaties call for international action also plays a role. The third element they introduce (connected to the first two) relates to the importance of analysing the domestic and regional contexts in which cooperation between two police forces take place. They argue that Deflem only
considers the context of friendly relationships between states, which they believe is a false assumption in many cases. They argue that this influences the 'reception' dimension in particular, where members of the police agency and even the general public may be at odds with official discourses.

Despite the efforts they make to develop this theoretical framework, in the second part of their study the authors focus largely on foreign assistance to Colombian policing, rather than applying their framework. Thus, it is difficult to assess its possible generalisation beyond Colombia, but it can nonetheless serve as a useful guide of elements to look for in the analysis of the case of Turkey’s policing. In particular, the question of accepting foreign support to guarantee a certain degree of operational autonomy will be highly relevant to the analysis of whether Turkish law enforcement internationalized through a process of Americanization.

4.8 Conclusion: relevance for the study of drug enforcement in Turkey

This literature review has revealed how the development of international policing is a highly complex phenomenon that is driven by a multitude of factors of a political nature, but also of a technical and organizational nature. The objective of analysing what other scholars have written about international/transnational policing and what theories they have proposed to explain its development was to be able to extract from their work the features that can be expected while studying the internationalization of policing in Turkey. The exercise also served to build hypotheses regarding the influences on the internationalization of Turkish policing. These hypotheses are drawn from the conclusions of leading scholars of international policing, therefore by validating or refuting them the analysis of the
case study in the next chapters will situate itself within existing academic literature.

Firstly, it was noted that once the US administration placed countering drug trafficking high on its national security agenda it spared no effort in seeking to influence other states to do likewise and to adopt their own vision and practices of law enforcement. It would be surprising not to find this as a relevant factor in US-Turkey relations throughout the same period. One question that will need to be examined, however, is whether it was the only factor driving this transformation, or whether it was one among many.

Secondly, it was noted that in order to achieve its accession into the European Union, Turkey needed to integrate an extensive amount of European law, including in the domain of judicial and police cooperation and border control. The main question to consider in this regard is to understand the extent to which the European accession process is driving the changes observed in Turkish policing.

Thirdly, it will be important to examine whether the internationalization of Turkish policing may have been boosted by the development of organizational interests to fight drug trafficking within the institutions in charge, in particular the TNP. For example, the fact that some officials who had the opportunity to integrate international networks gained a great deal of influence over decisional processes may well be an influence on Turkish police internationalization. Should this be the case, it would point this research towards theories highlighting changes not at macro-levels but at micro-level; theories that do not take states as the unit of analysis, but which look deeper into the roles and behaviours of state institutions. It is important to note, however, that the presence of this element does not exclude either of the first two elements from being present
simultaneously. Indeed, with the exception of some recent studies on transnational policing (Sheptycki, 2000; Newburn, 2008), it seems that scholars who have studied this field adopted two easily distinguishable approaches. They either focused predominantly on the political aspects and the general international implications or on institutional or ‘bureaucratic’ aspects, and analysed how the profession and policing practices were evolving. This thesis, on the other hand, argues that both elements are important and need careful analysis, including a consideration of how these two facets interact. On the basis of these hypotheses, the next chapter explains the theoretical framework for the case-study analysis that follows.
Chapter 5: Theoretical Framework

5.1 Introduction

This chapter develops a theoretical framework that will be used to interpret the empirical data collected in this study. It has two main functions. Firstly, it connects the three previous chapters, which presented the background to the case study examined in this thesis, to the case study itself, which will be carried out in the following three chapters. Secondly, it presents the theoretical tools available for the study of International Relations which have been selected in this study, and shows why they are relevant to this case.

In Chapter Three it was shown that since 1909 a web of international treaties to control activities related to illicit drugs, from cultivation to use and possession, have come to form an international drug control regime. The concept of an 'international regime' is constructed by political scientists in order to understand international cooperation around a specific issue. In this context, the first section of this chapter offers an overview of regime theory and explains why it has been chosen for the theoretical underpinning of this thesis. It emphasizes the breadth and diversity of the theoretical field. The second section will specify which concepts of regime theory are used in the case study, namely regime compliance, regime effectiveness and norm diffusion, and the third section will show that different research tradition have established different ways to use these concepts that do not necessarily oppose each other.

Chapter Two, which discussed the drug issue in Turkey, clarified that the object of this research project is the attitude of a specific state and not the regime as a
whole. Chapters Three and Four also highlighted how important the United States has been in the emergence of the international drug control regime and demonstrated the continued US influence on international police cooperation. It also analysed the rise of the European model of international police cooperation as the EU’s AFSJ developed. Thus, the fourth section of this chapter explains how the dimensions of the possible American and European influences will be scrutinized in the following empirical analysis.

5.2 Regime theory and its relevance to this study

Regime theory appeared in the 1970s as political scientists sought to explain how rule-based cooperation emerges and how international institutions affect state behaviour and collective outcomes. Levy, Young and Zürn, argue that "the principal claim of regime analysis is that states may generate institutions in identifiable issue areas that affect their behavior and foster cooperation, even if short-term interests would dictate deviation." (Levy, Young and Zürn, 1994: xi) In the early years of regime analysis, scholars focused on regime formation. Their main analytic concern was to understand the consequences of the apparent decline of American dominance in the realms of international economics and security, and to counter neorealist claims that institutions are a necessary ingredient of any theory of world politics (Levy, Young and Zürn, 1994: viii). Regime scholars were interested in what motivated states to instigate cooperation, and two main approaches dominated: the power-based approach of realists and the interest-based approach of neoliberals. Both realists and neoliberals applied a rationalist understanding of the state, according to which the state acts as an 'individual' capable of making rational choices: it is a unitary actor behaving among its peers
by calculating costs and interests. A third, knowledge-based approach was
developed at a later stage, largely by constructivists theorists, for whom power
and interests are not the only explanatory factors of cooperation. They argued, for
example, that the implementation of agreements by states and their compliance or
lack thereof to regime rules could not be adequately explained by a rational
choice perspective. Realists and neoliberals showed relatively little interest in
explaining states’ compliance to norms and rules established by regimes, the
question was posed more in terms of evaluating whether a minimum level of
compliance was a condition for the existence of a regime (Krasner, 1983;
Rittberger, 1993). Studies on when and why states comply with regime rules were
brought into the debate by constructivists (Checkel, 1999 and 2001; Chayes and
Chayes, 1993, Tallberg, 2002), and these triggered an interest in understanding
the role played by regimes in the states’ behavioural changes.

Most of the research on the question of implementation and compliance, and on
the question of effectiveness and consequences of international regimes has been
developed with regard to environmental regulatory regimes and, to a lesser extent,
trade regimes (Young and Zürn, 2006; Victor and Rausitala, 1998; Underdal and
Young, 2008). However, much of the theoretical interpretation and
conceptualisation arising from these studies that is likely to be of relevance to
other regimes, including the international drugs prohibition regime. Analysts of
regimes have developed generic hypotheses about the formation, the operation
and the effectiveness of regimes related to the environment, while recognising
that the concerns motivating their study and the conclusions they were drawing
were not limited to environmental cooperation (Victor, Rautišala and Skolnikoff,
Since its emergence, regime theory has developed in many directions, as Breitmeier, Young and Zürn note:

“regime theory provides an umbrella that is broad enough to encompass a wide range of epistemological preferences and theoretical perspectives. There is room for those who focus on the roles of power, interests, or knowledge to interact constructively with one another in analyses of the formation and operation of specific regimes (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997). Regime theory has no difficulty accommodating the contributions of constructivists as well as an array of analysts who regard themselves as positivists (Rittberger, 1993; Young, 1999b)” (Breitmeier, Young and Zürn: 2010: 2, see also Gale, 1998: 278).

This thesis relies on the variety of perspectives within regime theory to be able to challenge the assumptions and expectations that characterize the most commonly used explanations of how international drug control functions and how policy changes take place in Turkey. The choice of regime theory to comprehend the issue of international drug control is not original, however. Nadelmann resorted to regime theory when developing the concept of a prohibition regime (Nadelamnn, 1990), which he uses in his later works (albeit without discussing the concept itself any further) (Nadelmann, 1993; Andreas and Nadelamnn, 2008). Bewley-Taylor follows Nadelmann’s definition of drugs control as a prohibition regime and studies the role of the United States in the formation of the regime. His first study is largely influenced by neorealist thinking and seeks to demonstrate how the hegemonic power of the United States expresses itself through the drug control regime by channelling its coercive policies through the UN (Bewley-Taylor, 2001). In his recent work on the drug control regime, he also works on the basis of American hegemonic power over the international drug control regime and explains how other states have been challenging the inability of the current regime to solve the drug problem (Bewley-Taylor, 2012). A number of scholars have also used the concept of regime, or of a prohibition regime, to address international drug control although they have not addressed in detail the
theoretical underpinning of this concept (see for example Boister, 2001; Drucker, 2003; Fazey, 2003). Grounding this study in regime theory, therefore, helps to situate it within an existing body of literature. This thesis seeks to draw from and build on this existing work while at the same time seeking to challenge recurring assumptions by exploiting a range of regime theoretical explanatory tools that go beyond the neorealistic approach.

5.3 The use of regime theory in this study

Chapter Three described how the present system of worldwide drug control was gradually built up to become an international prohibition regime. The UN conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988 prescribe the rules to be obeyed by state parties domestically and in their relations with each other. States have agreed to regularize their cooperation around the issue of drug control, meaning it can be regarded as a set of “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area”. (Krasner, 1982: 185). Virtually all discussion of international regimes proceed from this definition, despite the fact that it has been widely criticised, and [that] many have attempted to modify or clarify the concept (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1996: 179-183). The definition of an international regime adopted here is that of Levy, Young and Zürn:

“Regimes are social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue-areas” (Levy, Young and Zürn, 1994: xiii).

This definition avoids lengthy debates to reach a unique and consensual definition of the concept of regime (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1996: 179-183). It encompasses both the importance of states’ recognition of "agreements as having
a continuing validity”, and of related "observed behaviour" (Keohane, 1993: 26-29), meaning that the regimes influence the behaviour of states by giving rise to social practices in international society.

Regime theorists have studied a wide range of issues relating to how regimes are formed, how they function, and how they fail or break down. In this thesis, the focus is placed on 'regime effectiveness'. It is therefore important to clarify how this concept has developed and what it encompasses. Regime effectiveness has been studied by Young in particular (Young, 2002; Young and Levy, 1999) in an attempt to understand why “some regimes can range along a continuum from ineffectual arrangements, which wind up as dead letters, to highly effective arrangements, which produce quick and decisive solutions for the problems at hand” (Young 1999:1). The inability of the prohibitive policies of the international drug control regime to reduce the scale of the illicit drug market are well known, for example, but states are usually keen to argue that existing drug conventions are “effective and appropriate”, and that they “provide a workable framework for cooperation” (Bewley Taylor, 2012: 11).

This poses a range of questions about what constitutes a measure of effectiveness. Young and Levy identify various approaches to interpret regime effectiveness: problem solving, legal, economic, normative and political approaches (Young and Levy, 1999). The first emphasizes the degree to which the regime alleviates the problem and relates to the concept of performance. The second approach emphasizes the degree to which obligations are met, the third focuses on whether a regime generates the desired outcome whilst accruing the least possible cost, and the fourth on whether a regime generates fair or just outcomes or outcomes in accordance with other normative principles. Finally, the political approach, which
has been broadly accepted by regime scholars as the most important refers to the degree to which regimes "cause changes in the behavior of actors, in the interests of actors, or in the policies and performance of institutions in a way that contribute to positive management of the targeted problem" (Young and Levy, 1999: 5). In this sense, the effectiveness of a regime is not equated to its ability to eliminate the problem at hand (which relates to the regime's performance): rather, a regime can result in helpful or unhelpful effects. In order to separate these two notions, scholars also refer to regime 'consequences': "Regimes can and often do produce consequences whose effects are felt beyond their own issue areas, whether or not they succeed in solving the problems that motivate their creators to solve them" (Young, 2006: 7). Because regimes do not operate in an institutional vacuum, impacts beyond their immediate issue area are likely to occur, which can be understood as unintended side effects of regime operations, or as "products of indirect efforts to influence either domestic or international affairs" (Young, 2006: 13).

This thesis builds on the political approach as it assumes regime effectiveness to refer to regime 'influence' on state behaviour. It is important to note, however, that it also accepts Young’s assertion that “the debate about whether international regimes matter is essentially over”, and that “while regimes matter, the ways in which they matter, the extent to which they matter and the conditions under which they matter are variables whose values range widely” (Young, 2004: 3). This thesis, therefore, does not test whether the international drug control regime is effective in curbing drugs; but rather how, in what conditions, and through what mechanisms Turkey has been influenced to change its policy and practices relating to drug control.
It is posited that Turkey’s change of behaviour is an indication of the drug control regime's 'effectiveness'. What remains unexplained, and is therefore at the centre of this thesis, is the mechanism, or mechanisms, of such effectiveness. Observable phenomena of regime effectiveness are the actions and decisions taken by the actors of the regime, mainly states’ actions (or lack thereof) in meeting their obligations. These actions, which constitute the behaviour of actors, can be interpreted from different angles and are relevant to the study of regime compliance, norm diffusion and socialization in particular.

Checkel and Heinze both note that it is not possible to clearly separate norm diffusion research from compliance research or from other studies that seek to focus specifically on other mechanisms such as socialization, social learning, policy transfer, policy convergence, and – as will be discussed later – Europeanization (see in particular Börzel and Risse, 2012). The same concepts are used by scholars who borrow concomitantly from rationalist and constructivist epistemologies to construct explanatory frameworks (Checkel, 2001: 556; Heinze, 2011: 5). This thesis follows in this spirit, as it seeks to use rationalist and constructivist approaches not in opposition to each other, but alongside each other in order to fine-tune the explanation of processes studied. Even if at first sight it seems that the theoretical frameworks are distinct and incomparable, it is assumed that they look at the same 'objects' from different angles, meaning that when combined they highlight the finer details of the object of study. Following Zürn and Checkel, it is assumed that building bridges between the various approaches in this manner is useful (Zürn and Checkel, 2005: 1045). It is all the more useful in the context of this study as it seeks to explain a specific case by using existing theory rather than by developing new theoretical tools. It aims to show that
dominant explanations of drug control and of Turkey’s policymaking tend to rely on established ideas, such as the “Americanization of international policing”, or the “Europeanization of Turkey”, and that these need to be revisited.

To conclude this section, it appears that regime theory provides an adequate theoretical framework for this thesis because the concept of regime effectiveness has been developed for the study of processes of state behaviour change on an issue that is subjected to international norms and rules. There are, however, several approaches that exist alongside each other to explain regime effectiveness. The next section maps out these different paradigms and identifies how they can be used alongside each other in this thesis.

5.4 The different approaches in regime theory

This section begins with a presentation of the rationalist approaches, both neorealist and neoliberal; and constructivist approaches to regime theory. The second part of this section details how they will be used in the empirical analysis.

5.4.1 Rationalist perspectives on international cooperation, compliance and norm diffusion

Early theorists of international regime theory, including Ruggie, Keohane or Nye, Krasner, Haas and Young, adopted a rationalist approach to explain the emergence of rule-based international cooperation (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996: 177). Whether neorealist or neoliberal, all were rational choice scholars and they agreed on a set of assumptions regarding the state and international society: the latter being formed exclusively by the former, who act as individual actors. They disagree, however, on what motivates states in their
decisions to cooperate, and on the significance of international institutions in explaining forms of cooperation. Neorealist scholars argue that power structures and power differentials are the key explanatory factors for the formation and the operation of regimes. They contend that regimes are established by actors who hold most power relevant to the issue area in question, and that they operate so long as the power structure amongst actors remains unchanged. In this perspective, the international agreements on which regimes function reflect the interests of the most powerful. The regimes in question have no independent effect because even if they appear to be effective they only constitute part of the influence of the hegemon onto other actors. The most powerful actor is in a position to dictate the rules of cooperation, to manipulate other actors into cooperating (through threats or promises, for example) and to terminate cooperation if its interests change. It was noted in Chapter Three, for example, that Bewley-Taylor contends that the United States has been the driving force of international drug control. He writes:

“Continuing US dominance was demonstrated by the key role its delegations played in construction and ultimate form of the later drug control treaties, including the amending protocol instigated by the Nixon administration to strengthen the Single Convention in 1972. More recently, that the motif for the 1998 UNGASS [United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Drugs] not only US conceptualization of the issue but also bore a remarkable resemblance to President Clinton’s then recent domestic pronouncements on the issue, was emblematic of the continuing influence of the USA within the functioning of the regime three decades after the Single Convention came into force” (Bewley-Taylor, 2012:11).

Power-based approaches do not consider that cooperation between actors is impossible, but that it is limited to cases where it is primarily in the interest of dominant actors to further common objectives. They rely on the vision of the international system as anarchic, meaning that each actor seeks to exploit the capabilities or the wealth of others in order to enhance its own power. To do so, a relative loss in some relationships will not necessarily keep powerful states from
cooperation, provided the relative losses are outweighed by absolute gains. (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996)

Neoliberal approaches to regime theory focus on power differentials as identified by realists, but they emphasize that states pursue absolute and relative interests and will join or instigate an international regime if cooperation helps them realizing interests they might have in common. Neoliberals thus view cooperation as far more likely to occur than do realists. Indeed, the general proposition of the neoliberal approach is that cooperation would be difficult to achieve in the absence of international regimes because the costs for states when creating or joining regimes are outweighed by the benefits they reap from fulfilling their interests through cooperation. Neoliberals differ from the realist perspectives insofar as, for them, states are essentially egoists and are insensitive as to how well the other actors do so long as their own interests are fulfilled. This results in a second major difference: if states are insensitive to how well others do, then both strong states and those with fewer capabilities can have interests and attempt to pursue them successfully. In this sense, the power that states have is treated as an assumption rather than a variable.

Neoliberals argue that regimes begin by altering the incentives for action. This must occur before they can affect states' interests or values, which are understood as given and independent of when regimes are formed. Keohane identifies several reasons for this, although all are connected and they should not be considered separately (Keohane, 1993: 29-31). Firstly, regimes reduce the cost of transactions: since there are clear, pre-established rules for action states need not renegotiate a path for action every time. Secondly, regimes allow for better information flows, especially with regard to scientific knowledge, which may be
useful for states in the given issue area. This further reduces the costs of action for states that may not have had the opportunity to access such information otherwise. Thirdly, when regimes function on clear rules they reduce the fear of cheating and increase the cost of non-compliance: regimes are likely to have integrated compliance monitoring and/or sanctioning mechanisms, which create greater incentives for conforming to the expected behaviour. Because actors’ behaviour is more likely to be known to others, the incentive to cheat or defect is lowered. Regimes can thus be said to reduce uncertainty and make it possible for states to work in an optimal situation, which occurs when two actors seeking the same objective cooperate rather than seeking to unilaterally become better off and/or making the other actor worse-off.

For neoliberals, the operation of regimes impacts on other areas. They can “alter the underlying capabilities of states, whether by reinforcing the dominance of the rich, powerful states or by dissipating the hegemon’s resources” (Keohane, 1993: 29). This constitutes a shift in capabilities at the international level, but Keohane argues that it also impacts upon regimes at the domestic level:

“Regimes can have other effects on states: by altering bureaucratic practices and rules (or ‘habits’); by promoting learning about cause effect-relationships; by altering ideas about the legitimacy and value of practices; by becoming embedded in higher level normative networks; by increasing the political salience of certain issues; by changing the balance of political influence within domestic politics; or by enhancing the political or administrative capacity of governmental or non-governmental organizations within countries (Keohane, 1993: 29-30).”

What is apparent in Keohane’s argument is that neoliberal scholars accept that regimes can be determinants of collective outcomes independently from states, which realists do not see as possible. Whilst realists and neoliberals begin from the assumption that states are rational and unitary actors on the international scene, they diverge on the willingness of states to enter into cooperative arrangements. Thus they differ also along the same lines on the reasons why
states comply with regime rules and on how norms are spread among regime actors.

Young identifies two causal mechanism models of regime effectiveness that apply a rationalist perspective (Young, 1999: 20). The first mechanism considers regimes as 'utility modifiers': actors that factor into a utilitarian calculus the costs and benefits of regime rules (and of resisting the rules), and which alter their behaviour “if and when social practices make it worth their while to do so” (Young, 1999: 22). The second model considers that regimes affect behaviour by mitigating collective-action problems that stand as a barrier to the realization of joint gains. States change their behaviour only when doing so offsets the costs of keeping the same behaviour, it is a strategic decision. This views states as having the capacity to weigh the costs and benefits of behaviours (which functions as a capacity to predict the consequences of compliance and non-compliance), and so rationalists apply a logic of consequentiality. Although this may appear as a straightforward application of the rationalist approach, the difficulty lies in the possibility of defining precisely what constitutes a relevant cost or benefit for a state within the issue area considered.

For neorealists, there is only one process by which the policies of a regime are spread – the convergence of secondary actors’ behaviours with the behaviour of the dominant actor (Johnston, 2008: 5; Raustiala, 1998: 24-25). The hegemon’s coercion and sanctions induce secondary actors to adopt its policies, which in turn reinforces its strength and influence. Ikenberry and Kupchan’s proposed theory of 'socialization and hegemonic power' stems from neorealism and illustrates how this approach envisaged the diffusion of norms within a regime, although with the use of the term 'socialization' the authors reveal that they have been influenced to
a certain extent by the constructivist epistemology, as discussed further below (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990). They argue that hegemonic powers influence other states to adopt the rules they have set for the international system partly through the manipulation of material incentives and partly through the manipulation of substantive beliefs of the elites in these states. The first mechanism appears to be a necessary condition for the second to be set into motion, and occurs when coercive methods are used to induce acquiescence. This is followed by the targeting of elites in order to obtain their approval for the norms and values in question. There are, then, two ways to look at this theoretical framework, which mirror each other: it is as much about the diffusion of norms (how the hegemonic power works to instil norms and values within secondary states) as it is about socialisation (how these secondary powers internalise the norms and values, where the internalisation is directed by a calculation of costs and benefits by the state elites). From this neorealist perspective, norm diffusion is no more than a process of the homogenisation of all states’ behaviour to reflect the dominant state’s behaviour (Johnston, 2008: 5). Having analysed how neorealist and neoliberal scholars developed theoretical models of regime compliance and regime effectiveness in their respective research tradition, the next sub-section introduces the constructivist approach on the same questions.
5.4.2 Constructivist perspectives on international cooperation, compliance and norm diffusion

Constructivist scholars have attempted to fill the gaps that rational thinking leaves in the understanding of cooperation. They argue that the basic premise that states act as rational actors with identities, powers and interests prior to their presence in the international society is flawed. Hopf writes:

“Meaningful behaviour or action is only possible with an intersubjective social context. Actors develop relations with, and understandings of, others through the media of norms and practices. In the absence of norms, the exercises of power, or actions, would be devoid of meaning. Constitutive norms define an identity by specifying the actions that will cause others to recognise that identity and respond appropriately.” (Hopf, 1998: 173)

Constructivists also argue that rationalist thinking encourages a static approach to the study of International Relations, which is ill-equipped to account for learning processes and fails to understand how international social norms work (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996: 206). This creates a situation where theory gradually disconnects from empirical observations. The hypothesis of constructivism is that states do not have a definite perception of themselves and of others, nor definite answers about what their goals are and how to achieve them. These conceptions are in constant formation and so they should be treated as variables, not as unchanging givens. Knowledge-based theories of regimes have enlarged the scope of variables: these do not exclude rationalist approaches entirely, but leave the door open to theoretical pluralism (Checkel, 1999: 39).

Knowledge-based approaches make two general claims that cannot be made using a rationalist perspective. Firstly, they argue that each regime constitutes a 'learning complex', within which states develop new understandings of their social and political environment over time. This affects decision making processes because policy makers can think of new strategies to achieve their goals, or
national interests can change. By doing so, they introduce an element of
dynamism which is absent from rational choice analyses. Secondly, they argue
that norms and rules have a power of their own over states, which adopt them as
their own following a logic of appropriateness rather than a logic of
consequentiality. Observing the rules gives legitimacy to states' actions and
positively affects their reputation, offering a legitimacy that states seek

With regards to the issue of compliance, constructivist scholars have brought into
the study of International Relations a new path of analysis, which can be
described as a compliance pull exercised by the rules of the regime. According to
Hurd:

“Compliance with a rule may be motivated by a belief in the normative legitimacy of the
rule (or in the legitimacy of the body that generated the rule). Legitimacy contributes to
compliance by providing an internal reason for an actor to follow a rule. When an actor
believes a rule is legitimate, compliance is no longer motivated by the simple fear of
retribution, or by a calculation of self-interest, but instead by an internal sense of moral
obligation: control is legitimate to the extent that it is approved or regarded as ‘right’
(Hurd, 1999: 387).”

Constructivists have therefore inverted rationalists’ assumptions by arguing that
states have a “general propensity to comply”. The perspective they bring, which
stresses the role of social structures, learning and socialisation, in fact
complements the arguments developed by rationalists, which focus on material
factors and instrumental motives (Checkel, 1999: 2).

Socialization is one of the central concepts of constructivist research (Checkel,
is a highly developed concept and has been applied to various fields of
International Relations, in particular the study of European integration
(Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2004; Zürn and Checkel, 2005;
The concept has been defined by many and Johnston brings these definitions together:

“Socialization is the generic term used to refer to the processes by which the newcomer—the infant, rookie, trainee for example—becomes incorporated into organised patterns of interaction” (Stryker and Statham 1985: 325). Berger and Luckman define the term as “the comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into the objective world of a society or sector of it.” It gives people identities; they are “assigned a specific place in the world.” Socialization, then, involves internalization: “the immediate apprehension or interpretation of an event as expressing meaning, that is, as a manifestation of another’s subjective processes, which thereby becomes subjectively meaningful to myself.” And internalization means the development of shared identification such that people come to believe “[w]e not only live in the same world, we participate in each other’s being” (Berger and Luckman 1966: 129–30). Thus, socialization is aimed at creating membership in a society where the intersubjective understandings of the society become “objective facticities” that are taken for granted (Berger and Luckman 1966: 44”). (Johnston, 2008: 21)

For constructivists, international regimes are in themselves institutions of socialization: they create forums for processes of learning, persuasion, or social influence. These are dynamic processes, with decision-making viewed not as strategic but as deliberative (Checkel, 1999). Constructivists argue that ‘collective’ understanding of the self and others can develop in a process of repeated cooperation. As Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger explain, states are socialised into patterns of cooperation:

“Rule governed cooperation by egoistic actors within a state of nature can gradually lead those actors to change their beliefs about who they are. They get habitualized to cooperation and, as a result, develop more collective identities. The emergence of collective identities, in turn, strengthens the readiness of these actors to cooperate even if the dominant strategy of a self-interested actor would be to defect” (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996: 215).

Young identifies four non-mutually exclusive models of behavioural pathways indicative of regime effectiveness that adopt constructivist hypotheses (Young, 1999: 23-28). The first is based on the legitimacy and authority of a regime's rules. It considers that this normative status triggers a behavioural response from states rather than calculations of anticipated benefits and costs. The second model argues that regimes “achieve their effects by initiating processes that give rise to individual and, especially, social learning” (Young, 1999: 26). The learning in
question here takes the form of new perspectives on the nature of the problem to solve, or new ideas to implement measures. This learning process can lead to the generation and sharing of relevant scientific information, for example, through 'epistemic communities'. These are defined as “network(s) of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain” (Haas, 1992: 3). The causal impact of an epistemic community rests not only on its ability to create a dominant international framing of the problem, but also on its influence within the bureaucracies of the states involved (Blatter, 2009: 92). Scholars who argue that epistemic communities play an important role in the operation of international regimes do not consider states as rational actors, nor do they view them as unitary actors in the international community. On the contrary, they accept that the influence of actors of another nature (nongovernmental organizations; or scientific or business lobby groups, for example) must be taken into account. The third model argues that regimes help shape the identities of actors, which influence the way these actors behave in the roles assigned to them. This model inverts the utilitarian model through which actors are believed to have set interests determining their role by arguing that the emergence of new rules determines the role and interests of each, upon which they construct their identity. Finally, the fourth model argues that regimes affect behaviour by creating new constituencies and shifting the balance of power among factions and subgroups competing for influence within individual states. This model focuses on the internal dynamics of states, assuming that the creation of a highly visible regime can lead to the creation of powerful pressure groups among the community of government and non-government entities.
Young’s models of behavioural pathways go beyond the approach of the majority of constructivist research. Constructivists assume that norms and values are internalized (this is the core of the logic of appropriateness), such that pro-norm behaviour becomes so deeply internalized that it is viewed as automatic and taken for granted, but they tend to leave a number of questions unanswered regarding which norms are internalized by agents; and how and to what degree this occurs (Johnston, 2008: 15-16). The idea that socialization occurs within certain behavioural pathways acknowledges that the dynamics of socialization are not yet fully understood. In an attempt to fill this gap, Johnston proposes a matrix of 'micro-processes of socialization', through which he studies how effectively socialization takes place; or how “social interaction can change actor preferences and interests in pro-social ways” and “lead to pro-normative behavior” (Johnston, 2008: 20). His theoretical contribution also hinges around a perceived weakness in constructivist discourse. Constructivists, he argues, have taken for granted the fact that actors internalize norms and values without analysing how this process actually takes place, leading them to focus on the end result of value internalization (Johnston, 2008: 16-17). Moreover, he argues that it is because constructivists have neglected looking at how smaller groups and entities, sometimes individuals or single institutions, as valid units in the analysis of socialization, that they have been unable to explain adequately its mechanisms. In order to fill this gap, he identifies three mechanisms of pro-normative behaviour, or 'micro-processes': mimicking, social influence and persuasion, which he defines as follows:

- **mimicking** explains pro-group behaviour as a function of borrowing the language, habits and ways of acting of others because it seems a safe option in a new environment. “Mimicking is a microprocess whereby a novice initially copies the behavioral norms of the group in order to
navigate through an uncertain environment.” I do X because everyone does X (Johnston, 2008: 23).

- **social influence** explains pro-group behaviour as a function of an actor’s sensitivity to status markers given by a social group. I should do X because others believe that X is the appropriate thing to do and I will be rewarded socially for doing it. (…)

– **persuasion** explains pro-group behaviour as an effect of the internationalization of new norms in an environment. I do X because it is good for me to do X” (Johnston, 2008: 23-26).

Johnston’s conceptual framework does not contradict the constructivist argument on socialization. Rather, its purpose is to focus attention on a finer level of detail, and in doing so it addresses an often noted limitation of regime theory: that states are taken as unitary actors or units of analysis. While this logical at first sight, it is often misleading because it hides the fact that domestic and international decision-making processes interact through more than one channel. This issue was already at the centre of Putnam’s concept of the 'two-level game', which argues that international and domestic levels are 'entangled'. This states that in order to make sense of how decision makers act at the international level regarding an issue-area, it is necessary to understand the domestic level by focussing on, for example, the existence of pressure groups, their respective positions on this issue-area, and the political gains or losses that might incur for the decision-maker following an international agreement (Putnam, 1988).

In another proposal to understand the dynamics of pro-group behaviour, Blatter proposes the concept of 'performance’ as a social behaviour, where actors seek attention and recognition on a much larger level than the issue area around which they set rules for cooperation. They then use the issue area to achieve international recognition (Blatter, 2009). In a manner similar to Johnston’s micro-processes of socialization, Blatter defines performance as follows:
“The concept of “performance” (...) stresses the non-policy-specific motivations for policy-making. (...) A “performance” approach stresses the political imperative for gaining attention and recognition not only for policy issues, but also for political actors and political communities. The “performance” perspective points to the mutually constitutive processes of policy-making (issue-specific regulation) and polity-building (symbolic representation of a political community)” (Blatter, 2009: 102).

By emphasizing the symbolic value of norms, Blatter follows key elements of the constructivist discourse, but he differs considerably on the issue of compliance to rules. According to his understanding, commitment to the rules should be seen as a side effect of political performance primarily motivated by a search for attention and recognition. Moreover, he does not distinguish himself completely from the standard rationalist discourse because the idea of a political imperative for attention introduces elements of strategic cost/benefit calculations alongside the symbolic aspects of performance.

This sub-section has analysed the constructivist approach on regime effectiveness and compliance. It shows that constructivists develop their understanding on these questions as a response to perceived weaknesses of the rationalist approaches (presented in the previous sub-section). The next section details how all these approaches are used in the case-study in order to find the most satisfactory answer to the question of what processes have led Turkey’s transformative process.

5.5 Using the theories to challenge “dominant ideas” about Turkey’s drug enforcement

Having explained the theoretical used in the empirical analysis and having highlighted its main concepts, it is now possible to propose how it can help identify what processes have driven Turkey’s transformation. In other words, it is now possible to analyse how and why Turkey’s drug control policy and practice changed radically over the course of two decades. Through Chapters Three and
Four, two main claims have emerged. The first is that the international drug control regime is best understood through a neorealist lens, which argues that the United States' interests are best served by the regime. The second claim is that the main policy tool used to control drugs – international police cooperation – has developed well beyond the realm of drug control. Specifically, it argues that international police cooperation has become an important area of policymaking within the European Union. These two ideas are important here because they can be easily assimilated to two frequent generalizations regarding drug control and Turkish policymaking. Firstly, that states have been coerced into pursuing American style drug prohibition; and secondly that Europeanization is the first (and best) explanatory framework for analysing changes in Turkish politics and policymaking (Alpan, 2011).

In order to challenge these ideas, this thesis' empirical analysis draws on the theory explained above. The objective here is to establish firstly the extent to which these dominant ideas help understand the process studied and then to reveal the limits of their analytical powers by highlighting elements they leave unexplained. The variety of theoretical approaches within regime theory allows for such a dialogue. It is perhaps unconventional to seek to connect theory and empirical data in this manner – doing so does not seek to establish how one theoretical perspective fits the data available (or to demonstrate a lack of fit between the two), but rather explores “if the empirical material can encourage the challenging and rethinking of established theory”, and “challenge[s] the value of a theory as well as to explore its weaknesses and problems in relation to the phenomena it is supposed to explicate” (Alvesson and Karreman, 2011: 15). However, this thesis argues that this approach is the one that most effectively
mobilizes a complex and dense set of empirical material and therefore most aptly leads to answering the research main question of this thesis, which asks how and why Turkey’s drug law enforcement changed radically between the 1960s and today. The following paragraphs demonstrate how this question will be addressed by setting out the various hypotheses that can be generated using the theoretical tools of neorealist, neoliberal and constructivist approaches to international regime theory.

5.5.1 Testing the Americanization hypothesis

In the first empirical chapter (Chapter Six), the thesis focuses on neorealism, which is primarily interested in the role played by a hegemon in the diffusion and enforcement of international norms. Neorealists argue that for secondary states, compliance with international norms is a matter of survival because the hegemon coerces them into applying these norms. They therefore focus on the US position as the uncontested leader of the international drug regime. Thus, whilst not all states necessarily consider the threat of illicit drugs worthy of serious consideration, they may oblige with the regime nonetheless for fear of receiving a scolding from the United States either directly or through international forums. In this context, a demonstrable willingness to adhere to the international drug control regime may be explained as a diplomatic choice (Xenakis, 2006: 55). It would then follow that it is as a result of American influence that Turkey has adapted its drug control policies to conform with the international norms and rules. This hypothesis is scrutinized in the following chapter by constructing an analysis around the theoretical model offered by Ikenberry and Kupchan, which argues that hegemonic actors extend their power and control in international relations by
obtaining agreement from weaker states to bring their practices into line with the demands of the regime (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990). The theory of international norm diffusion they propose is that:

“hegemon sponsored norms are spread from the hegemon to the international political arena and then filter down from state elites to their societies. The promotion and diffusion of the hegemon’s norms, through the manipulation of elite preferences in states within the hegemon’s sphere of influence, constitute a subtle but significant exertion of power by the hegemon.” (Xenakis, 2006: 57).

Looking at the period from the late 1960s until the mid-1990s, the following chapter opens by discussing the extent to which it can be argued that the Turkey’s drug control policies and practices over that time bore the marks of American influence. As a second step, it will be shown that this theoretical model prioritizes a section of the empirical material available to be effective, but that this selection is arbitrary and fails to engage with many other aspects it cannot explain. This selection bias parallels the oft-cited weaknesses of neorealism: comprehending states as unitary actors and policy-making exclusively as a top-down process. The observed gap between Turkey’s strong stance on drug control in international forums and its lack of action against ongoing trafficking cannot be explained using this approach.

In order to overcome the difficulty posed by this falsification of the original hypothesis of the American influence over Turkey’s drug control policymaking, the chapter takes the third step of examining the hypothesis that Turkish behaviour can be best described as 'mimicking' other states, in particular the United States, according to the micro-process of socialization, as described in the previous section. In this sense, Turkey’s pro-group behaviour is seen as a function of its desire to survive in the international drug control community, but lacks a “detailed ends-means calculation of the benefits of doing so” (Johnston, 2008: 145).
This characterization of Turkey’s behaviour over the period under review as 'mimicking' may be the best way to explain both the absence of response to threats and material inducements; and the lack of self-motivation to comply with the international drug control norms.

5.5.2 Testing the Europeanization hypothesis

Chapter Seven (the second empirical chapter) tests whether Turkey’s behavioural change on drug control matters has been part of its transformation to join the European Union. Here, the analysis focuses on the period between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, during which time Turkey’s efforts to join the EU were most intensive. The claim here is that Turkey’s adherence to the international drug control regime and to other international police cooperation arrangements relating to organised crime was included in the accession negotiations because it is part of the EU *acquis communautaire*. Whilst the 'American influence' hypothesis tends to be the first that comes to mind in research concerning international drug control, 'Europeanization' theory is often the first theory of interest for scholars analysing transformations in Turkey (Alpan, 2001: 3). The analysis will be built around existing theoretical frameworks seeking to explain Europeanization in candidate states, which themselves draw from neorealist, neoliberal and constructivist perspectives. The first assumption is that the relationship between the EU and candidate states is characterized by a power asymmetry along neorealist terms, whereby the EU is the dominant actor, or 'normative hegemon' (Alpan, 2011; Haukkala, 2011; Diez, 2011). The second assumption adopts a neoliberal approach by looking at rational incentives of the parties. It argues that Turkey’s compliance to the international drug control norms is voluntary rather
than the result of hegemonic coercion, and is agreed upon following a consideration of the material interests and long-term gains to be made from complying. This corresponds to a situation where compliance with regime norms becomes an element in a calculation of costs and benefits. In this context, a demonstrable willingness to adhere to the norms of the international drug control regime may be explained by the existence of incentives, sanctions and conditionalities attached to the EU accession process. Finally there is also a significant trend of research taking a constructivist approach that identifies processes of 'social learning', or 'socialization' in Europeanization processes. The proposed models have much in common with Young’s models of 'regime effectiveness', mentioned above. They rely on the same claims: that the legitimacy and authoritativeness of the rules are sufficient to make states comply with them; that epistemic communities influence policymaking processes at domestic and international levels; that actors’ identities can be shaped by the norms at stake; and that new international rules can affect the behaviour of actors at domestic level in different ways and shift existing balances of power. Following the pattern in Chapter Six, attention is then given to elements that have been observed and which cannot be explained with satisfaction using Europeanization theoretical models. To overcome this falsification of the original hypothesis that Europeanization can explain Turkey's drug control policymaking, the chapter then examines the possibility that behaviour changes were driven by reputational concerns. If embracing international drug control policies and active involvement in fighting illicit drug trafficking created opportunities for Turkey to be rewarded socially by its peers, a micro-process of social influence would be at play.
5.5.3 Testing the persuasion and performance hypothesis

In Chapter Eight (the third and final empirical chapter), the thesis seeks to explain Turkey’s strong attachment to the international drug control norms since 2005 through the theoretical prism of 'socialization micro-processes'. The theoretical approach adopted here remains within the constructivist school of thought, with a narrow focus on socialization micro-processes. Having demonstrated in the two previous chapters that dominant theories about drug control and change in Turkey yield unsatisfactory results in the case under scrutiny, the micro-process analysis stands as a more effective explanatory tool. The chapter develops a two-fold analysis of Turkey’s policies and practices of drug control, arguing that they are characterized by demonstrations of persuasion of the validity of the international drug control norms and by a willingness to be recognised as a leader in matters of international security. To do so, the theoretical framework of persuasion as a micro-process of socialization is used to show that Turkey’s pro-group behaviour within the international drug regime is a result of having internalized the regime's norms and accepting them as being consistent with Turkey’s identity. However, Turkey’s strategy of offering capacity building on anti-drug trafficking for police forces of other countries is related to its desire for attention and recognition on a larger level than the issue of drug control.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the theoretical framework that will guide the analysis of the empirical evidence in the following three chapters. References to regime theory are not uncommon in the works of scholars interested in international drug control, yet with the exception of Bentham few spend much time analysing how regime theory can help explain how the regime works, or the behaviour of its
actors (Bentham, 1998; Bewley-Taylor, 1999; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006). This stands in stark contrast with other issue-areas, such as environmental protection regimes, which have been the subject of extensive scrutiny for the purpose of generating theoretical models. This chapter also showed that regime theory, rather than proposing a single approach to explain how and why states adopt the same norms and cooperate on given issue areas, offers a variety of angles of analysis depending on the school of thought chosen: neorealism, neoliberalism or constructivism. Moreover, scholars studying states' behaviour have proposed a great variety of conceptual tools under different labels such as 'effectiveness', 'compliance', 'norm diffusion' and 'socialization' while looking at similar processes, yet little attention is paid to the mechanisms and pathways that lead to compliance or socialization.

Following a presentation of this extensive variety of approaches and models, the chapter outlined how these theoretical models are used in the empirical analysis, below. Rationalist approaches appear best suited to address the hypotheses of external influence on Turkey’s international policing, while constructivist approaches appear to more adequately address the hypothesis of a domestic-led and agent-based driver for change. Rationalist approaches also appear to be best suited for theories at the macro-level, while the various constructivist theoretical frameworks highlighted in this chapter allow for the study of change at the micro-level.

This chapter has outlined how combining research traditions and theoretical frameworks enables the organization of this thesis' case study into three steps: firstly probing the possibilities offered by a macro-level analysis, secondly ascertaining that the macro-level analysis is insufficient, and finally proposing a
micro-level analysis. The assumption that the United States dominates international drug control matters is articulated in the form of a hypothesis tested in Chapter Six, while the assumption that Turkey’s bid to join the EU is the driver of change in all Turkish policymaking is the hypothesis tested in Chapter Seven. Concluding the empirical analysis, Chapter Eight analyses socialization micro-processes. The decision to focus on this approach has been made not only because it provides a useful explanation of the phenomena observed, but also because this line of enquiry is new and needs further exploration in order to fill a gap in the existing theory of socialization.
Chapter 6: The influence of the US on drug law enforcement in Turkey

6.1 Introduction

This chapter is the first of three in which the empirical data collected for this study is examined and tested against the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter Five. Covering the period from the late 1960s to 1996, it seeks to explain Turkey’s behaviour on the issue of international drugs enforcement. It focuses on relations between Turkey and the United States on this issue and questions whether the power of the United States in determining Turkish action on drug trafficking has been as effective as is often assumed. The year 1996 is chosen as a cut-off date for this chapter for two reasons: firstly, it was when the MGK first named drug trafficking as a national security concern; and secondly, it was the year of the Susurluk car accident, which brought years of state collusion with organised crime under the spotlight.

This period, which starts around the entering into force of the 1961 Single Convention, is characterised by significant Turkish involvement in the international rule-making processes of the international drug control regime. This involvement did not, however, translate to considerable action to apply these rules domestically. At the beginning of the period, Turkey appears to have bent under pressure from the United States to adhere to strict drug control rules. Yet it is apparent that throughout the 1980s, Turkey’s drug control system was ineffective and that there was little will within the state apparatus to strengthen it. During this period, the international drug regime and international policing also underwent significant changes, as was established earlier in Chapters Three and Four, with
scholars such as Andreas, Nadelmann and Bewley-Taylor arguing that drug control and policing 'Americanized'. This chapter will therefore attempt to determine if this label can be applied to the Turkish law enforcement (Nadelmann, 1993; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006; Bewley-Taylor, 1999, 2002 and 2012).

To test the hypothesis of the Americanization of Turkish law enforcement, the analysis is guided by a neorealist theoretical framework. This seems the most appropriate conceptualisation of the fact that contacts between law enforcement agencies rarely occur on a level playing field, so the capacity to influence and the capacity to be influenced is not evenly distributed between the parties, as has undoubtedly been the case between the DEA and the TNP (Goldsmith, Llorente and Rivas, 2010: 78). The analysis, however, finds that this neorealist theoretical framework is insufficient to account for the outcome, given that during the period under review drug trafficking continued to thrive in Turkey. The hypothesis of American influence, it is argued, can be replaced by a hypothesis of 'mimicking' American practices, which needs to be analysed at the micro-, agent-level, rather than at the macro-, state-to-state level.

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first explores how Turkey interacted with other states throughout this period, with a significant emphasis on the United States. The second utilizes Ikenberry and Kupchan’s theory of socialization and hegemonic power to analyse the role of the United States in Turkey’s drug enforcement. The third highlights the weaknesses of this conceptual framework by identifying elements that cannot be explained by Ikenberry and Kupchan’s theory. The final section proposes to overcome these weaknesses by analysing these elements through the lens of socialization micro-processes. It demonstrates
that Turkey’s behaviour can convincingly be explained as an instance of mimicking other states, in particular the United States.

6.2 Turkey’s interaction with states and international treaties in respect of drug control

6.2.1 Turkey’s role in the work of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs

This section begins with an analysis of Turkey’s participation in the work of the CND as this provides good indicator of Turkish interest in the issue of drug control. As was noted in Chapter Three, in 1971 the CND adopted the Psychotropic Convention, in 1972 it produced a Protocol amending the 1961 Single Convention, and in 1988 it produced the Drug Trafficking Convention. Throughout this period, then, there were regular international discussions on the norms and rules to be adopted by the international drug regime. Analysing Turkey’s involvement in this rule- and policy-making process is the very first step to understand its positions on the matter.

In a study of the UN drug control apparatus, Bruun et al. identified Turkey as one of the key actors of the international drug control regime – albeit one whose influence in that regime is below that of others of its standing (Bruun et al., 1973: 130-31). This may be because Turkey was identified by the 1961 Single Convention as one of the producers of opium for the licit market. The exact reasons why Turkey did not have as much influence as would ordinarily be expected are impossible to ascertain precisely. It can be argued that Turkey attempted to stay abreast of new developments and to influence decisions that
could be detrimental to Turkey’s opium farmers (Robins, 2007), but did not make this a top priority at the UN because it had no inclination to fully apply international agreements.

Bruun et al. focus largely on the size of delegations presented by each state and the number of years they have been key members of the evolving drug control regime. It is also useful to look at when Turkey intervened and the positions that it defended. For example, the official texts of the 1961 Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol, as well as the text of the 1971 Psychotropic Convention, reveal that during the negotiation a Turkish ambassador to the CND was always among the Vice Presidents. This means that at each treaty negotiation the bureau of the commission charged with overseeing the conduct of the negotiation included a Turkish representative. Turkey is also known to have been active in getting the Commission to agree to discuss the 1971 Psychotropic Convention by introducing resolutions on this issue in the preceding sessions of the commission (Bruun et al., 1973).

According to a former Turkish Ambassador, the state played an active role in the work of the CND because it was felt that being recognised as an active participant in international forums was important for its reputation (Interview with Sumru Noyan, Ankara, 2011). Moreover, it was felt that remaining silent on drugs would send a wrong message to other states. The former Ambassador added that even before Turkey established an effective control system for opium production, which happened after the opium ban was lifted and cultivation resumed, it wanted to be seen as being in the group of states standing up against drugs and thus be regarded as a 'good member' of the international community and in order to do so it was important to be against drugs (Ibid., see also interview with Suleyman
Demirel, Ankara, 2010). This point is noteworthy in itself, but also because it reflects changes from the pre-World War Two years of the international drug control regime, which the Ottoman and then Turkish authorities were opposed to, as noted in Chapter Two.

6.2.2 The opium ban of 1972-1973

Robins argues that Turkey only began to take seriously its obligations under the 1961 Single Convention following the 'opium ban crisis' of the early 1970s (Robins, 2008). Chapter Two analysed how the ban was put in place in 1972 and lifted in 1974, but it is important to analyse here why it happened and the implications for Turkey in the international drug regime – in particular for its relationship with the United States, which pressured Turkey into adopting the ban. Despite Turkey’s active involvement in the work of the CND, it is widely recognised that by the late 1960s its control over the domestic opium cultivation was loose. Farmers were able to sell their produce directly to middlemen who channelled it to Marseille’s organised crime groups, often via Syria and Lebanon, for transformation and shipment – predominantly to the United States (Booth, 1996; Gerber and Jensen, 2001; McCoy, 2003; Friesendorf, 2006).

The ban on opium cultivation between June 1972 and September 1974 is commonly described in literature on the US ‘War on Drugs’ as a clear-cut example of the pressure placed by the United States on other states to combat drug trafficking through their territory (Booth, 1996: 247-249; McCoy, 2003: 464; Friesendorf, 2006). The existing literature takes a critical approach to the US approach to the ban, largely because the Nixon administration is seen as having used the events for the sole purpose of domestic politicking (Bertram et
Bertram et al. contend that Nixon first identified crime as the main issue on his domestic political agenda and later singled out drugs as a major source of crime, and making drug control a central issue for his administration as a result (Bertram et al., 1996:105).

Nadelmann and Woodiwiss argue that launching the War on Drugs was primarily a means for the Nixon administration to increase federal power over crime control (Nadelamnn, 1990; Woodiwiss, 2001). Woodiwiss writes:

“Nixon narrowly won the election of November 1968 and needed to maintain his "law and order" constituency to win re-election in 1972. Headlines had to be made, results had to be achieved, otherwise the tough talk and promises to restore law and order might backfire. (...) Therefore the Nixonites decided to increase federal jurisdiction to an unprecedented level” (Woodiwiss, 2001: 266).

Developing another aspect of the same events, Uslu insists on the role played by Congress in pressuring Turkey:

“US Congressmen took the lead in calling for measures to force Turkey to abandon its opium cultivation. They argued: The United States had given considerable military and economic aid since the Second World War. The Turks owed the Americans a favour, therefore they should be willing to abandon the 5 million dollars a year they earned from legal opium production, which constituted less than one third of one percent of Turkey’s total foreign trade. In 1970 and 1971 Congressmen continuously threatened to terminate all aid to Turkey if it did not stop opium production. They argued that this threat would force Turkey to cooperate with the United States on the matter. Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, passed by Congress, reads as follows: “The use of funds herein appropriated to assist any country shall be suspended by the President in whole or in part when the President determines that the government of such country has failed to take appropriate steps to prevent narcotic drugs…” It should be noted that congressmen were mainly trying to placate their home constituencies by indicating they were indeed doing something about the situation” (Uslu, 2003: 229-230)

Friesendorf also explains the way in which the Nixon administration, knowing little about global drug production and transit routes, clung to a belief that most of the heroin consumed in the United States originated from the Mediterranean region (Friesendorf, 2006). As a result, Turkey was chosen as the “most logical target since pressure on the country promised the quick return that Nixon needed at home”, enabling him to assure the American electorate that progress was being made on the drug front. (Friesendorf, 2006: 61). Moreover, in inducing Turkey
into declaring a ban on opium cultivation following Iran's ban on opium cultivation in 1955 (McAllister, 200: 196), the United States threatened to withdraw humanitarian aid from as early as 1965 (Friesendorf, 2006: 45).

The United States also advocated and helped finance crop substitution programmes. This was in line with a 1968 UN General Assembly resolution, which recommended that:

“the Governments concerned develop plans to seek assistance from these agencies, from the United Nations Development Programme and from bilateral sources in their efforts to develop alternative economic programmes and activities, such as the substitution of crops, as one of the most constructive means of ending the illegal or uncontrolled cultivation of narcotic raw materials” (UNGA, 1968; emphasis added).

Therefore, even if the American offensive on Turkish opium cultivation is likely to have largely served domestic interests for the Nixon administration, and most likely reflected a widely held belief among US policy-makers that eliminating supply would bring an end to drug use in American cities (Gerber and Jensen, 2001; Friesendorf, 2006: 40), it could be justified using the norms of the international drug control regime at the time. Moreover, Turkey was party to the 1961 Single Convention, so had to accept crop substitution as a viable solution to its problem. The ban on opium production was finally declared in June 1972 after the civilian government was toppled by the military in a coup in 1971, and the United States agreed to pay $35 million in compensation for farmers’ income loss.

The literature on the manner in which Nixon and his administration launched the War on Drugs discusses the ban in Turkey as one of the events that set this ‘war’ in motion. For Bertram et al., the ban was just one element within a broader succession of events:

“Operation Intercept was Nixon’s first attempt to strike at the source. The operation deployed two thousand agents on the Mexican border in September 1969 (…). Nixon
then targeted Turkey, one of a number of countries that produced heroin for the US market. Turkey, however, was “the only country where we could expect dramatic results, and that was what the president wanted” explained a Nixon official – particularly after the 1972 elections. (...) The Turks complied – and Nixon declared success. (...) As Nixon’s War on Drugs campaign succeeded legislatively, anti-drug spending ballooned” (Bertram et al, 1996: 107).

What is particularly interesting for the purpose of this study is that these events opened up a phase of close cooperation between the TNP and US law enforcement. Turkish officials and DEA representatives confirmed that it was around this period that a close relationship between American and Turkish law enforcement agencies began (interviews with Sadettin Tantan, Istanbul, 2011; Suleyman Demirel, Ankara, 2010; DEA officials, Ankara, 2011). It was in 1962 that the Bureau of Narcotics – the predecessor of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) – established an office in Turkey, although at the time as it was under the US Department of the Treasury. The BNDD then became the DEA in 1973 and cooperation with Turkish law enforcement continued. A former police officer explained that he had been trained by the BNDD/DEA in 1971 or 1972, and from there on went on to open the narcotics bureau of the TNP in Bursa, a city in Western Anatolia (Interview with Sadettin Tantan, Istanbul, 2011).

6.2.3 After the opium ban

In the years between the opening of the US Bureau of Narcotics in Turkey in 1962 and the appointment of the first police liaison officers from European countries in the 1990s, US law enforcement agencies enjoyed an unchallenged relationship with their Turkish counterparts. This fact should partly be seen in the context of the Cold War, during which Turkey was a close military ally of the United States. The DEA provided considerable support to the TNP in terms of

There are several signs of the strengthening cooperation between Turkey and the United States. By 1975, the DEA had four offices in Turkey: in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana. In 1979, the two states signed a mutual legal assistance treaty and an extradition treaty, both of which entered into force in 1981. Turkey was not the only country where the DEA had such a strong presence, however: Nadelmann’s study of the DEA reveals that the 1970s were a period of great expansion worldwide, including in Western Europe (Nadelmann, 1993). What is important to note, though, is that the DEA were the only foreign law enforcement agency in Turkey at that time, and there was little close interaction between Turkish law enforcement and their European counterparts. It is reasonable to assume that European law enforcement agencies should have had a greater need for cooperation with Turkey on the drug front given that drugs transiting through Turkey were bound for European markets. Germany’s Federal Criminal Police, the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), for example, only appointed its first representative in 1986; the Netherlands and France sent theirs in 1992; while representatives of UK agencies also first arrived in the late 1980s (interviews with European liaison officers, Ankara, 2011). This coincided with Turkish and Kurdish organised groups becoming predominant in the trafficking of heroin into Europe (Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, 2007).

The major difference with the period before the opium ban is that by the 1980’s heroin was largely manufactured from Afghan-originated opium – which had become increasingly widely available – rather than from Turkish produced opium,
around which the controls were effective (Evered, 2008; Kamminga, 2006, this is further explained in Chapter Two above). Turkish and Kurdish organised groups established processing factories to transform the opium into heroin in Turkey, which was then smuggled through to Europe. As Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz explain, most often these organised criminal groups involved in drug trafficking were linked to the state apparatus; the police or government; or the PKK. They claim in their study of Turkish organised crime groups that:

“there were underworld connections with both ultra-right wing and ultra-left wing politicians and with individual politicians and civil servants at the centre of power. Turkish drug trafficking turned out to be an integral part of the arms struggle between the Kurdish PKK movement and the Turkish government. … [The government] had become partially dependent on European drugs revenue.” (Bovenkerek and Yesilgoz, 2007: 14).

The publicity surrounding the trafficking of Turkish opium during the 1960s gave the Turkish authorities a bad reputation, and this was aggravated even further during the 1970s and particularly in the 1980s (interviews with Sumru Noyan, Ankara, 2011; European liaison officers, Ankara, 2011). Robins’s assessment is a case in point: he writes that during these years, “Turkey came to resemble a 'crime-challenged democracy', a category more familiar in Latin America” (Robins, 2002: 150). Among the police forces of other countries, in particular European countries, the opinion was that Turkish law enforcement forces were not to be trusted (interviews with European liaison officers, Ankara, 2011). Several liaison officers admitted that for a very long time, requests for information or cooperation coming from Turkish authorities were easily dismissed, and that even now it was still part of the role of the liaison officers to convince sceptical colleagues at home that it was safe to share information with and work with the TNP (Ibid.).
The situation that evolved through the 1970s and 1980s included two paradoxes. Firstly, Turkish authorities seem to have consistently expressed agreement with and support for the prohibitionist approach of various drug treaties in international forums, and they ensured that Turkish opium did not leak into the illicit market. On the other hand they allowed, if not promoted, the emergence of organised groups involved in trafficking towards Europe. The Turkish intelligence MIT admitted in 1996 that:

“A criminal organization has been set up within the police force in such a way as to give the impression that the people involved are combating the PKK and Dev-Sol [a violent leftist organization]. The group consists largely of former ülkücü and specialises in crimes such as intimidation, robbery, extortion, drug smuggling and homicide. (…) They give the impression of being active in combating terrorists but are, in reality, smuggling drugs to Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Hungary and Azerbaijan” (quoted in Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, 2007: 176, brackets added).

This means that Turkish authorities were ready to commit to the norms of the international drug regime, but did not transform their commitment into compliance. Secondly, the European countries that were most affected by the traffic going through Turkey were yet to establish a meaningful presence in Turkey. Meanwhile, the Americans cultivated a close relationship and kept a strong presence on the ground, despite the fact that by the 1980s they no longer saw the traffic ongoing in Turkey as a major threat to their national security. Uslu argues that even if the lifting of the ban caused some friction between Turkey and the United States, concerns that were expressed by US politicians more than by the administration itself – these issues were soon outweighted by the security concerns resulting from the crisis in Cyprus. The alliance between the two countries was foundational in the maintenance of security in the context of the Cold Ward confrontation between East and West. The US turned its attention to the Turkish plans to control smuggling and as early as 1974 it praised Turkey for adopting the poppy straw process (Uslu, 2003: 248-250, see also Chapter One).
These paradoxes lead to a complex picture. Beyond acknowledging that the involvement of the DEA in Turkey has been a long-standing one, the substantial impacts of this presence on Turkey’s approach to drug trafficking are not straightforward. Material incentives have been given by the United States to Turkey, but the actual impact of these incentives needs to be analysed. Chapter Four explained that authors like Nadelmann contend that US enforcement agents devoted a great deal of effort to persuading their foreign counterparts to develop their own drug enforcement capabilities and adopt American practices (Nadelmann, 1993: 247-249). US drug enforcement internationalized by providing models of ways to conduct criminal investigations and of laws to adopt in order to facilitate drug trafficking-related investigations. This assumption of law enforcement Americanization needs to be evaluated in the case of Turkey too. The next section will therefore test the hypothesis that Turkish law enforcement changed under US pressure. It does so by adopting a neorealist approach to international change, as this is the most suited to equate a process of international norm diffusion with a process of harmonization within secondary states to the model provided by the leading state.

6.3 Explaining the US influence on Turkey through the lens of Ikenberry and Kupchan

6.3.1 Ikenberry and Kupchan’s theory of socialization and hegemonic power

International drug control is commonly designated as an aspect of international relations where the United States is unchallenged as the hegemonic power, and has shaped the international regime to its preferences by getting others to comply
with its preferred norms and values (Bewley-Taylor, 1999, 2012). According to Levine, “there is no doubt that governments throughout the world have accepted drug prohibition because of enormous pressure from the US government and some powerful allies” (Levine, 2003: 147). To make sense of this phenomenon, it is useful to employ the theoretical framework developed by Ikenberry and Kupchan in their 1990 article 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power'. They argue that hegemonic powers obtain compliance to the rules they have set for the international system only partly through the manipulation of material incentives, while the rest is obtained by the manipulation of substantive beliefs of the elites in the secondary states (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990). When the hegemonic power manipulates the preferences of the elites in order to secure their acceptance of the norm, mechanisms of 'strategic acceptance' and 'cognitive acceptance' come into play. The former, also known as acceptance, or 'acquiescence', occurs “when there are incentives to do so”, after which the latter occurs “where the state elite has to a certain degree internalise the norm” (Xenakis, 2004: 346). This is a rationalist, power-centred argument and the main assumption is that states are calculating actors that perform a cost/benefit analysis (Williams, 2010: 9). For Ikenberry and Kupchan, the first mechanism appears to be a necessary condition for the second mechanism to be set into motion. Coercive methods are used first to induce acquiescence and then the work of targeting elites to obtain their approval to the norms and values in question begins.

There are two ways to look at this theoretical framework: either that it is as much about the diffusion of norms (how the hegemonic power works to instil norms and values within secondary states) as it is about socialisation; or that it focuses on how these secondary states internalise the norms and values. It should be noted
that in this context, socialization should be understood from the neorealist perspective of the acceptance of rules and norms because of external constraints imposed by the hegemon, and not in a constructivist sense. There are effectively two different perspectives on the material or beliefs manipulation relevant here, as it can be analysed from the point of view of the hegemonic power or from the point of view of the secondary state. This leads to four separate elements that require analysis. Firstly, regarding material incentives, the existence of threats of sanctions or promises for reward needs to be assessed. Secondly, there needs to be an investigation into the reasons why the secondary power accepted rewards or bent under the threats of the hegemonic power. For instance, there could also have been other factors influencing decision-making. Thirdly, it is important to analyse the manipulation of beliefs in order to understand how the hegemonic power sought to reach the leaders of the secondary state. Fourthly, the elements indicating that these leaders have internalized the norms and values impressed on them by the hegemonic power need to be established.

Several elements in the sequence of events in Turkey during the 1970s indicate that Ikenberry and Kupchan’s theoretical framework can explain how it internalised these norms. Firstly, the way in which the opium ban was obtained is extremely revealing. Friesendorf mentions, for example, that the US ambassador to Turkey investigated poppy cultivation in Turkey and recommended the ban rather than improving production controls (Friesendorf, 2006). This led to intense diplomatic pressure, marked by a combination of threats and rewards. Süleyman Demirel, who was Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic in 1969, explained that during an official visit to Washington to attend the funeral of former President Eisenhower he met with Nixon and his staff, who asked him to put this ban in
place (interview with Süleyman Demirel, Ankara, 2010). It appears that Nixon sought to add to regular diplomatic contacts between the two states by making this request personally, increasing pressure on the Turkish Prime Minister. The US also threatened to reduce humanitarian aid, though it finally agreed to pay compensation for farmers’ lost income.

On the other hand, Turkish authorities were confronted with very strong negative opinion at home. The fact that there was a military coup in 1971 played a key role in the setting up the ban (interview with Suleyman Demirel, Ankara, 2010). The Turkish military depended greatly on US assistance, so it would have feared a backlash if requests were ignored. In the previous section it was noted that US Congress expected Turkish authorities to feel obligated to comply because Turkey was receiving high levels of military aid (Uslu, 2003: 229-230) Throughout the Cold War, the Turkish state sought acceptance as a European state, an approach that determined much of its foreign policy (see for example, Aydin and Keyman, 2004: 3-7; Buhari Gulmez, 2011). Turkey portrayed itself as the 'last guardian' of the West before the Communist bloc. Therefore, a long-term diplomatic conflict with the United States was unlikely to happen (Bozdaglioglu, 2007: 163).

Whether the concurrence of timing between the pressures placed on Turkey by the United States for an opium ban and the military coup of 1971 is a coincidence or not is beyond the scope of this research. Nonetheless, this supports Ikenberry and Kupchan’s claim that,

“the timing of socialization and the extent to which it occurs are highly dependent on the efforts of the hegemon to propagate its conception of international order and also on the susceptibility of secondary states to a restructuring and redefining of the terms of domestic political legitimacy” (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990: 313).

This leads to a further observation, which is that what matters for a norm and value to become integrated into state behaviour is the socialization of the elites,
not of the masses. As mentioned above, in international drug forums representatives of the Turkish Foreign Ministry were concerned about Turkey’s reputation and wanted to show that the country was accepting international norms and values. This was at a time when Turkish elites emphasized the country’s European, Western identity and portrayed its Eastern civilisational heritage as 'backward'. It was thus felt that adopting the rules favoured by the Western bloc would be a step further to demonstrate Turkey’s Western identity.

Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter Two, the army has played a dominant role in Turkish politics since the 1960s, including staging military coups. It has positioned itself as the guardian of Turkey’s Western, secular, Kemalist values; and the defender of the Turkish state against threats as varied as communism and separatism. Until the end of the Cold War, the army dominated all aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy, but it was dependent on its close partnership with the United States to maintain its legitimacy to lead the country and its reputation as a trusted ally. Thus, the military bureaucracy and the state civilian elite were in a position to be highly receptive to the United States as the dominant state actor on drug control. This fits Ikenberry and Kupchan's proposition that the elites of secondary states are more receptive to the norms of the hegemon when there is domestic turmoil threatening their status, which means that they seek to reaffirm their legitimacy (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990: 292). Here, then, is an example of decision-makers placing the emphasis on Turkey’s Western identity by co-opting the norms preferred by the United States and Western countries, and suppressing domestic opposition that called on Turkey’s Ottoman heritage and beyond (Bozdaglioğlu, 2001: 163).
Following the opium ban, the DEA office in Turkey developed a privileged relationship with its Turkish counterpart, the TNP’s KOM department (Interviews with: Sadettin Tantan, Istanbul, 2011; senior police officers, Ankara, 2011 and 2012). This was due to the longevity and the nature of their relationship, with two elements being of particular importance. Firstly, the DEA had been present and active in Turkey far longer than law enforcement agencies of any other country, and its financial support had been more consequential than that of any other country's. Secondly, the DEA had supported its Turkish counterparts during the 1990s, when Europeans by and large lacked trust in and, as some admitted, were reluctant to work with the Turkish police. This created a gap which the DEA filled, and it was reflected in the methods adopted by the Turkish police around the year 2000, when a “culture of drug seizures” grew (interview with BKA and Italian liaison officer, Ankara, 2011). Additionally, it seems that police officers became increasingly interested in making large seizures, even if these occurred at the possible expense of making more significant arrests and bringing down entire trafficking networks. Most European liaison officers based in Turkey claim that achieving large seizures within Turkey and being able to claim a part of the success in its achievement is more important for the DEA than for European police forces. Indeed, the DEA needed to justify its presence and investment in Turkey each year because most of the drugs trafficked there were not meant for the American market, and seizures offered a straightforward indication to this end. On the other hand, for European agencies, seizing drugs in Turkey means stopping a drug consignment from reaching its destination, but does not necessarily have much impact on the network that organised it. Thus, it makes more sense to follow the drug consignment through controlled deliveries to its
destination so as to bring down all the network in all the countries involved (interviews with European, Iranian and Sudanese liaison officers, Ankara, 2011; senior police officers, Ankara, 2011 and 2012). Thus the 'culture of drug seizures' is seen as a mark of the American influence on the Turkish police.

European liaison officers also claim that in the monthly meetings organised by KOM to discuss drug trafficking cases, the DEA representatives always sat to the right of KOM representative chairing the meeting, which reflected the influence of the DEA on KOM (interviews with: European liaison officers, Ankara, 2011; senior police officers, Ankara, 2011 and 2012). Liaison officers of European countries explained, either implicitly or explicitly, that the DEA office sometimes acted as a broker between Turkey and other states when a case was developing and cooperation was necessary between them; and that there had been instances when the DEA was suspected of having prevented cooperation between Turkey and other states.

Nadelmann argues that US law enforcement agencies developed a sense of pride in seeing foreign police adopt their measures and that they had started to perceive “a commonality of identity” (Nadelmann, 1993: 468). This pride was clearly expressed in discussions with DEA representatives. They explained that Turkey had always been a good partner, but insisted that at the turn of this century there had been a change of pace and attitudes. By then, Turkish law enforcement, in particular the TNP, had become an active, reliable and successful partner. The metaphor of parents allowing their offspring to acquire their independence was used, which reveals that – from the American side at least – there is an impression that the current shape of Turkish law enforcement results in part from the long-term support of the DEA (Interviews with: DEA, Ankara, 2011; SOCA, Ankara,
This suggests that the long term investment of the DEA in Turkish law enforcement has played a role in the adoption of anti-trafficking norms and values. It points to a process of socialization constituted of direct coercive measures, material inducement and normative persuasion – the three elements of Ikenberry and Kupchan’s framework.

An issue Ikenberry and Kupchan do not discuss however, is whether the balance between the three elements has an impact on the way the secondary states are socialized: they only mention that normative persuasion alone is insufficient to drive socialization. While it was not possible to find detailed information about the level and exact nature of the support from the US authorities to Turkish law enforcement from the 1970s to the 1990s, it seems that the most important factor is that it continued over so many years. Some argue that the TNP today still defer to the DEA because they have been present for so long and, in particular, because they did not lessen their support during the 1990s when Turkish authorities were criticised internationally for their handling of the PKK (interviews with European liaison officers, Ankara, 2011). Thus, it seems that the theoretical framework proposed by Ikenberry and Kupchan can be useful, to some extent, in understanding how US-Turkey relations led to Turkey’s adoption of international drug control norms and values. There are, however, a number of issues that are left unexplained.

6.3.2 Weaknesses of this theoretical approach

Ikenberry and Kupchan’s theoretical framework helps to explain some elements that would make the DEA presence in Turkey the main factor in Turkey’s move from not involving itself in drug control to being a strong promoter. Yet it seems
to leave out a number of factors which, if explored in greater detail, may lead to another perspective on this issue. The relevance of their theoretical approach is weakened, firstly, if one asks who the term 'elite' – a concept that is central to their theory – can be applied to; and when one questions whether domestic factors might have played a part in the turn of events: a possibility Ikenberry and Kupchan do not consider.

Ikenberry and Kupchan are interested in the socialization of elites, not of the masses: thus they state that it is when an elite community adopts an international norm, state behaviour is affected. The existence of such an elite in Turkey, which had the control of the state’s political and administrative structures from the creation of the Turkish Republic, is widely accepted. These elite, which carried the Kemalist project of the modernization of Turkey, is secular and Western-oriented and has to a large extent rejected the Islamic components of the Turkish identity associated with the Ottoman empire (Bozdaglioglu, 2003: 5; Mehtap, 2013). However, what Ikenberry and Kupchan seem to assume is that in any state the diffusion of norms occurs from the elites and follows a simple top-down path within a well-connected state administration. The political project of elites is therefore assumed to be implemented by the administrative structure and the possibility emergence of gaps between commitments and compliance; and between pledge and practice is not considered. This makes it difficult to understand why the initial commitments by Turkish authorities at the CND were only belatedly and partly implemented. Indeed, when Turkey decided to return to legal opium production, it established a strict control system that was successful in preventing leakage into the illicit market, but which still enabled opium originating in Afghanistan to pass through its territory. A potential explanation for
this is that the state simply lacked enough resources to allocate to law enforcement agencies for this matter. This straightforward claim fits with the DEA’s explanation of the opening of the BNDD bureau in 1962. It was with the DEA’s support that the TNP established its anti-trafficking division in 1969, and Turkish police officers received DEA training for many years (interview with Sadettin Tantan, Istanbul, 2011).

A potentially superior explanation may be offered, however. This focuses on the fact that there was no real connection between the state representatives at international conferences and those in the law enforcement agencies. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to preserve the reputation of Turkey as a trustworthy partner on the international stage, the remainder of the state apparatus did not have the same level of international exposure and may not have attached the same level of importance to international agreements. In other words, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed Turkey’s commitment to fighting drug trafficking, the Ministry of Interior, and in particular the TNP, may not have made it a priority to investigate drug trafficking, especially at a time of collusion between the state and organised crime groups.

Therefore, while Ikenberry and Kupchan conclude that “for norms to have a consequential effect on state behaviour, they must take root within elite community” (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990: 314), it seems that in this case the elite's agreement to abide by the norms were insufficient to elicit the necessary change in state behaviour – at least for many years. This suggests that top-down norm diffusion does not function as fluidly as Ikenberry and Kupchan suggest. Rather, there is a rigid division between the representatives of the state internationally and those who act domestically. A former Turkish ambassador
claimed that Turkey had always been a strong supporter of the international drug control norms, but that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives had been trying to convince the Ministry of Interior to take international norms more seriously, implying that they were usually unsuccessful in doing so – something that would explain gaps in implementation (interview with Sumru Noyan, Ankara, 2011). Another element that reveals the gap between the two sides of the state is the fact that it was not until 1996 that the National Security Council recognised drug trafficking as a security problem for the state. This council, which determines the national security policy, has for decades been one of the most authoritative bodies of the Turkish Republic. The fact that it had not paid attention to drug trafficking would have had a direct influence on the level of priority security agencies gave to this matter. In other words, this institution is the best placed to initiate changes in state behaviour regarding security and law enforcement matters, and in the sense of Ikenberry and Kupchan, they represent a key group. Furthermore, the composition of the council, which consisted of a majority of military personnel, would fit in Ikenberry and Kupchan’s concept of elite. It was also noted in Chapter Two that a key piece of legislation on the prevention of money laundering which included elements on controlled deliveries and sharing of wire tapping evidence was adopted in November 1996 and became effective with the publication of the regulation for its implementation in 1997 (Law 4208, Regulation 23111). All of this suggests that it took over thirty years for US law enforcement agencies to successfully socialise their Turkish counterparts to the norms of international drug control, which is a very long period of time for such efforts to be considered successful. As a result, the prominence given to the socialization of elites in the diffusion of norms is
problematic in this case as it provides only one superficial narrative and overlooks details that can bring another explanation to account for the changes in practice.

Similarly, Ikenberry and Kupchan do not consider the role that domestic factors can have in changes of state behaviour. They claim that the reason for the adoption of international norms and values is located in international relations. This overshadows the fact that leaders of states do not make decisions regarding international matters by considering only the international arena. It has already been noted above that Nixon’s declaration of the War on Drugs was partly explained by his domestic agenda. In Turkey, the sequence of events and decisions during the opium crisis also indicates that domestic factors played a crucial role. The civilian government was reluctant to enact a ban as this would prove highly unpopular with the Turkish population, especially as the poppy crop was cultivated for its seeds and oil and represented an important part of the rural economy at a time when vegetable oils were still uncommon. It was only after the military coup that the ban was put in place (interview with Süleyman Demirel, Ankara, 2010). The lifting of the ban also became a political campaign promise, which Bülent Ecevit executed once he became prime minister in 1974 – despite American opposition to this move (Uslu, 2003:248-250).

Ikenberry and Kupchan’s theory also does not help to explain the attitude of Turkish institutions during the 1970s and 1980s, when Turkish organised crime groups flourished in Turkey and in Europe by trafficking heroin. These organised crime groups are now known to have had links to movements such as the ultranationalist Grey Wolves, who played a key role in the 1980 military coup and enjoyed a significant level of state protection (Gunther, 2008: 126-127). Drug trafficking became tied into much broader political matters and served as a means
to raise funds for other criminal activities. The 1996 car accident in Susurluk and the subsequent investigation brought these connections between the state and the criminal world into the spotlight (see Chapter Two above). Analysts do not agree on the extent to which this accident brought immediate change in Turkey, and the parliamentary investigation is seen largely in a negative light, with politicians refusing to accept any responsibility and burying the issue. Nevertheless, the fact that it occurred only a few months after the National Security Council recognised drug trafficking as a security problem is important in itself. Indeed, within the police force, the Susurluk accident is accepted as a turning point. The public outcry it generated also triggered change within the law enforcement system – in particular within the TNP, which sought to eliminate corruption and complacency towards certain organised crime groups (interviews with senior police officers, Ankara, 2011, 2012). This means that these groups finally lost their freedom to engage in drug trafficking (and other crimes). Combined, these two factors meant that pursuing drug trafficking related crimes became an important matter because of domestic pressures.

Relying on a theoretical framework that gives prominence to international relations at the expense of domestic aspects does not allow for any consideration of the above factors, and may even contradict them. Indeed, Ikenberry and Kupchan’s approach suggests a rather slow diffusion of international drug control norms into Turkish law enforcement, stemming from the United States by way of the DEA. Examining domestic factors, however, suggests that Turkish complacency towards drug trafficking was only part of a much broader problem of state corruption and a culture of involving organised crime groups in the political arena. It was the Susurluk scandal (followed by a series of other
corruption-related scandals, as explained in Chapter Two) that led to an end of this complacency and resulted in the combatting of drug trafficking being taken more seriously. In other words, Ikenberry and Kupchan’s approach tends to assume that once a norm is accepted it is also complied with, while this examination of domestic issues tends toward concluding that whilst the norms had been accepted, their implication was delayed as a result of domestic factors.

6.4 Turkey’s ambivalence towards drug trafficking: the micro-process of mimicking

The analysis conducted above showed that the conditions identified by Ikenberry and Kupchan as leading to socialization by a secondary state to the norms of a hegemon seemed present in Turkey. But their theory also seems to neglect a series of elements that point to another explanation. They argue that material inducement is a pre-requisite for cognitive inducement, and this is supported by the fact that during the years in question the US government, through the DEA, provided substantial material support to the development of KOM, along with training and support for specific operations. They also posited that the elites of the secondary state ought to experience critical periods during which they need to reaffirm their legitimacy. This is supported by the fact that the civilian and military leaders and decision-makers during the second half of the twentieth century were concerned with re-affirming the Western identity of Turkey through their policy-making, especially in the area of security, while rejecting the Ottoman and Islamic heritage of the country in order to justify their position in power. Turkey’s belonging to the Western world was demonstrated by its becoming a party to international treaties, although observers such as Bilgin point
to the fact that participation in international affairs was maintained at a minimal level (Bilgin, 2005). From the late 1970s through to the early 1990s these same pro-Western elites also cultivated relations with gangs and organised crime groups that financed their activities through drug trafficking, because it was felt that fighting the PKK and leftist movements would not lead to any positive outcome if it had to be done within constitutional limits (Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, 2007: 179-180). This is a critical factor that finds no explanation in Ikenberry and Kupchan’s theoretical framework.

The weakness of this approach is to be found in its reliance on the positive role of the elite community for the adoption of new norms. There were in fact deep divisions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and law enforcement agencies, which prevented agreement to the rules of the international drug control regime from being translated into effective action. Johnston argues that the key weakness in Ikenberry and Kupchan’s theory is that it does not look closely enough at the process of norm diffusion. 7 The analysis below uses Johnston’s theory of microprocesses of international norm diffusion to help to fill this gap. As explained in Chapter Five, he identifies three main mechanisms: 'mimicking', 'social influence' and 'persuasion', with the former being most useful in this context. Mimicking refers to

“copying pro-normative behaviour as satisfying means of adapting to an uncertain environment prior to any detailed ends-means calculation of the benefits of doing so. …[It] is a microprocess whereby a novice initially copies the behavioral norms of the group in order to navigate through an uncertain environment. It is an efficient means of adapting to uncertainty prior to any detailed ends-means calculation of the benefits of

7 He writes for example – and here the text in parenthesis matters most – that “Ikenberry and Kupchan list two routes of pro-norm behaviour that do not involve persuasion: exogenous shocks that lead to elite transformation in a state; and exogenous material inducements that lead, over time (and somewhat mysteriously) to the internalization of norms that were once adopted for instrumental reasons (1990:290-292)”. (Johnston, 2001:495)
doing so. To be sure, this microprocess stretches the concept of socialization somewhat, since pro-group behavior is only indirectly an effect generated by the nature of the social environment” (Johnston, 2008: 20-23).

A state mimicking the behaviour of a group is motivated by survival uncertainty: it does not know what benefits there will be from adopting group behaviour, but because it identifies with the group it is eager to be seen to behave in the same way as the group. The concept of mimicking, as developed by Johnston, can be extended further by looking not only at the behaviour of the state in question in its dealings with other states and international organizations, but also when it comes to the implementation of the norms and values agreed upon.

It is argued here that the reason why Turkish authorities always proclaimed their acceptance of the strict anti-trafficking norm of the international drug control regime, when in fact they did little to prevent the activities of organised crime groups, is because Turkey sought to behave like other members of the group in this specific arena, without having reviewed the implications of upholding these specific norms. Consequently, older practices, in particular those relating to collusion and corruption, continued. That Turkey should have played an active role in the negotiations of the various drug treaties, or that it always claimed that it recognised trafficking as a danger, is understandable. It makes sense in a context where it was important to proclaim Turkey’s attachment to the norm because so doing signalled that it should be considered Western. In the international forums it was important to reiterate that Turkey was a supporter of the regime, largely for reputational concerns. The norm’s integration was not complete, however, and this is evident in its lack of implementation. In this sense, mimicking is in fact a sign of incomplete socialization. Interestingly, however,
Johnston notes that mimicking can lead to an integration of the norm through repetition (Johnston, 2008:24).

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the United States has had a presence in Turkey for five decades; and that with the exception of a few years around the imposition of the opium cultivation ban, Turkey did not express opposition to the US’ views on anti-trafficking. However, evaluating the actual influence exerted by the United States, through the DEA, on Turkish law enforcement authorities is less than straightforward. Throughout the period under review, the TNP was the recipient of high levels of technical support from the DEA, which contributed financially to the setting up narcotic teams in across Turkey and trained its personnel. As Goldsmith, Llorente and Rivas have already pointed out, however, the support of a foreign government can sometimes be “the price of acceptance” for domestic autonomy (Goldsmith, Llorente and Rivas, 2010: 78). Thus, it should not automatically be understood as a genuine indicator of internationalization through the influence of that state.

Ikenberry and Kupchan outlined a theoretical model to identify the necessary conditions for international norms and values to be successfully transmitted by a hegemonic state to a secondary state. Even if these conditions were found in the case of US-Turkey relations, this theoretical framework fails to explain other elements, which suggest factors other than socialization by a hegemonic power. Whilst the hypothesis of American influence tends to be the first approach adopted by a researcher when studying the international drug control regime, this
chapter has shown that in the case of Turkish drug policy it is an insufficient explanation.

The chapter has argued that, until the late 1990s, Turkish organised crime flourished through the trafficking of opiates towards Europe, and that whilst Turkish authorities claimed to support anti-trafficking norms, they did not implement them. The Susurluk accident and other corruption scandals then shook Turkish authorities into reconsidering, if not abandoning altogether, their reliance on the organised crime world. Robins argues that after the 1971-1972 opium crisis, Turkey’s adoption of a strict licensing system for its licit opium production encouraged it to pay much more attention to enforcing its drug control policy (Robins, 2009: 293). The analysis conducted in this chapter differs from Robins’ as it argues that in the immediate aftermath of the opium crisis and the lifting of the opium ban an influx of American assistance prompted changes at the TNP, but that efforts to ensure there was no further leakage of Turkish opium into illicit drug production did not increase the limited levels of concern regarding drug trafficking. While it does appear that “international cooperation on the subject came to be regarded as a core indicator of Turkey’s standing as a good international citizen” (Robins, 2008: 632), this concern did not translate to the law enforcement level. This disconnection between policy and practice is indicative of an incomplete socialization process.

This chapter has contended that Turkey’s behaviour over the period studied can be best explained as a process of mimicking, which can lead to the internalisation of norms through repetition. US authorities insisted that Turkey should be active in their drug control efforts and by financially and technically supporting the TNP sought to ensure that they had the means to do so. Yet Turkish authorities might
have primarily agreed not because drugs were a great concern to them, but rather because they were eager to find an area of cooperation with the United States irrespective of the subject matter. In reaching this conclusion, it has been demonstrated that non-material desires to conform offer a viable alternative explanation where the neorealist approach fails to convince. The next chapter, which focuses on the period between 1996 and 2005, will look at the European presence and influence in Turkey, and will demonstrate that a more extensive process of socialization seems to have been at play.
Chapter 7: The influence of the EU on drug law enforcement in Turkey

7.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the evolution of the relationship between Turkey, the EU, and EU member states. It will show that between 1996 and 2005, cooperation between the two sides underwent dramatic changes. It will explore whether the fact that Turkish anti-drug trafficking efforts increased at such a fast pace during this period of time can be explained by the Europeanization of Turkey’s policing, since this period coincides with the start of Turkey’s official EU accession process. In doing so, this chapter turns to the EU as the second possible source of external pressure on Turkey, having demonstrated in Chapter Six that viewing the United States as the main influence behind Turkey’s drug control efforts has only limited explanatory power. Its tests the explanatory power of this approach in a manner similar to that used in the previous chapter, exploring what it can explain before highlighting its weaknesses. As in Chapter Five, the hypothesis tested is one of externally-induced change, but unlike Chapter Six it does not rely solely on a neorealist approach, examining also neoliberal and constructivist arguments, which have all been utilized in Europeanization literature.

Scholarly interest in the transformative power of the EU is considerable, particularly in the context of accessions, and there is a very large body of literature available proposing explanatory models of the ways in which the EU shapes, directs and sometimes determines changes in policy and practice in candidate states (Haughton, 2007 and 2011; Kirisci 2007). The main explanatory
models are assessed here, bringing to light the elements they help to understand, but also highlighting elements that they seem to overlook.

This chapter is composed of four sections. The first examines the evolution of the relationship between Turkey, EU institutions and EU member states both before and after the recognition of Turkey’s candidate status in 1999. The second examines theoretical models of change through Europeanization and highlights how they apply to this case study. The third then identifies the limits of these theoretical frameworks in explaining the case study. The fourth and final section proposes an alternative approach to explain changes, based on Johnston’s theory of international norm diffusion micro-processes, and in particular the micro-process of social influence.

7.2 The evolution of relations between Turkey and EU and EU member states

7.2.1 Relations before the start of the accession process

The previous chapter demonstrated how the DEA implanted itself in Turkey as early as 1962 and has remained involved with Turkish law enforcement ever since, with the 'high point' of its involvement took place around the 1972 opium cultivation ban. The involvement of European states’ law enforcement agencies follows a very different pattern, despite the fact that European countries have always been the destination for the great majority of all the drugs trafficked out of Turkey. It was noted in Chapters Two and Six that during the late 1960s, the Turkish opium that found its way to the United States was largely purchased by Corsican and French organised crime groups and was transformed into heroin in
Marseille before transatlantic shipment – a process that came to be known as the 'French Connection' (McCoy, 2003). Thus, this traffic also presented a problem for France and one could have expected the French authorities to be as least as interested in stopping the flow of Turkish opium as the Americans were. Several reasons can explain why the French and other European states did not respond as the Americans had, but two particularly powerful explanatory factors are that they had not developed institutions comparable to the DEA at national level; and that they accepted the rationales for regional and international cooperation on drug matters later than the United States. Indeed, it was explained in Chapter Four that the earliest attempts at European cooperation in combatting crime dates back only to the 1970s (Elvins, 2003; Occhipinti, 2003). The traditional law enforcement approach of stopping illegal trafficking at national borders, which was thought to be most effective, had not yet been challenged, even though the prevalence of drug use in Western countries was causing increased concern. The creation of the Pompidou Group in 1971 was the earliest attempt at drug control cooperation by European States, followed by the creation of the TREVI group in 1975, which marks the beginning of the progressive institutionalisation of mechanisms of international cooperation relating to law enforcement. Elvins explains:

“Despite the emergence of new kinds of drugs and growing evidence of an evolving mass market in North America and Western Europe from the 1960s national governments clearly believed that domestic-level enforcement measures – focused on interdiction at national borders – were both sufficient and appropriate trafficking control mechanisms (with perhaps the occasional recourse to Interpol)” (Elvins, 2003: 71).

Rees, meanwhile, argues that changes in the EU’s understanding of how to best preserve national security came about in the 1990s. He writes:

“Through the course of the 1990s the EU has come to accept that national security challenges cannot be combated effectively by a policy designed to preserve a safe internal environment from a dangerous outside space. Instead threats need to be tackled and eradicated in those areas in which they originate if they are to avoid being imported into the Union. The process of organizational enlargement contributed to the realisation
that the EU would have to help shape its external neighbourhood, rather than withdraw behind the walls of a twenty-first century fortress. This thinking has been built into external relations by linking trade, cooperation, and Association Agreements to each third country's willingness to work with the EU on issues such as illegal immigration and transnational crime” (Rees, 2011: 395).

In line with this, it appears that until the 1990s European states did not establish channels of communication and cooperation with Turkish law enforcement counterparts beyond the formal requests usually made through INTERPOL. Four further interconnected observations can be made regarding this relationship. Firstly, interest in international cooperation on drug matters and law enforcement matters was growing, and the growth of the European institutional framework seems to have given greater legitimacy to international cooperation. UN treaties called for international cooperation and the Pompidou Group was the first institution to offer substantive regional cooperation in the area. Then, as the Single European Market was set up in 1985, the TREVI structure was complemented by a working group looking at “ways of improving cooperation against organised crime, principally drug trafficking.” (Elvins, 2003: 86) The Palma Document, a report to the European Council commissioned by the TREVI group in 1989, recommended a series of measures relating to law enforcement and the free movement of people in connection with drug trafficking, among other matters. Among these measures, the ratification of UN drug conventions was given priority, and the exchange of liaison police officers was also proposed. This concerned only those states party to the Single European Act, but meant that practical measures of cooperation were beginning (Elvins, 2003: 86-89).

Secondly, in the 1980s and early 1990s European police agencies “discovered Turkish organised crime” (Bovenkerk and Yesilgöz, 1996: 145-172). Bovenkerk and Yesilgöz describe how in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and the UK, police forces realized that Turkish organised crime groups had taken over (or
were in the process of taking over) the trafficking of heroin. In Italy and the Netherlands, Turkish criminals collaborated with existing organised crime groups; and in other countries the presence of immigrant communities contributed to their emergence. Therefore, greater attention was paid by these states on Turkish organised crime and drug trafficking in Turkey.

Thirdly, these European states began to revise their national drug policies, which evolved from simple interdiction at the borders to more complex operations geared towards stopping trafficking as close as possible to the drugs' source. This was undoubtedly related to the progress made through the TREVI group, and more generally to institutional changes resulting from the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Germany’s BKA adopted this new approach in the early 1980s and was the first state to appoint a liaison officer to Turkey in 1986: only their second foreign officer following the appointment of one to Bangkok in 1983. This appointment was decided upon following the adoption of a new drug strategy, which shifted away from a simple protection of the federal borders to interception in the source country and the neutralization of the organised crime groups. It is believed that at the time much of the heroin smuggled into Europe from Turkey arrived in, or passed through, Germany (Interview with the BKA liaison officer, Ankara, 2011).

In the early 1990s, the UK, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands all followed Germany's lead and appointed liaison officers in Turkey. Likewise, these countries adopted new drug strategies, shifting attention from border protection towards source and trafficking countries – with Turkey among the countries to which liaison officers were sent (Interviews with liaison officers, Ankara, 2011).

Fourthly, at the same time as these new institutional links were being created between Turkey and European states, the first European drug strategies were
formed: the European Council approved the first European Plan to Combat Drugs in December 1990 (Elvins, 2003: 94). This emerging framework to combat drugs at the level of European institutions comprised the measures that were already being experimented by some states, such as the posting of liaison officers in other European countries as well as outside the EU. It also encouraged other states to do likewise.

These four elements explain why the number of police liaison officers from European countries in Turkey increased considerably during the 1990s, making exchanges easier and more frequent. But while there may have been a greater number of requests for exchange of information, it seems that communication remained very difficult for many years. Indeed, the level of trust between the parties seems to have remained very low for a long time, because each side had preconceived negative ideas about the other (interviews with European liaison officers and DEA officials, Ankara, 2011). Generally, Europeans felt that Turkish authorities were unprofessional, corrupt, disrespectful of human rights standards and, most of all, that they were only interested in investigating suspected members of the PKK based in European countries. For example, one liaison officer explained that there was a time when every information request from the Turkish authorities would be categorised as “yet again another request to arrest a guy who distributed PKK propaganda leaflets, even though it is not a crime here” (interview with European liaison officer, Ankara, 2011). Chapter Two explained that in the aftermath of the 1996 car accident in Susurluk, the public exposure of the links between the state security apparatus and the Turkish mafia reinforced the negative opinion of European police about their Turkish counterparts (interview with European liaison officers, Ankara, 2011). Turkish authorities, meanwhile,
were reluctant to agree to requests to share information regarding suspected drug cases because of the frustration caused by the lack of attention given to suspected PKK members. Moreover, the complexities of the Turkish bureaucracy were such that requests were rarely answered promptly or in detail, which gave the impression that the matter was not deemed important in Ankara (interviews with liaison officers of France, Germany and Denmark, Ankara, 2011).

By 1999, when Turkey’s candidature to the EU was officially accepted, Europeans, who had developed structures for international police cooperation and adopted EU-level multi-year drug strategies that called for cooperation with countries outside the Union, had become aware of the need for cooperation with Turkish authorities. In practice, cooperation was far from efficient – though in the proceeding years this changed drastically.

### 7.2.2 Relations following Turkey’s recognition as a candidate state to the EU

On 4th December 1999 the European Council recognised Turkey as a candidate for EU membership. This set in motion a process (which will theoretically end with Turkey joining the EU) through which Turkey should progressively reform and upgrade its institutions and legislation in order to incorporate all of the EU acquis communautaire, the legal framework shared by all EU members. By this time, the Treaty of Amsterdam had entered into force in May 1999, with the Schengen Treaty incorporated in it; and during a special meeting at Tampere in October 1999, the European Council agreed the creation of an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ in the EU (see Chapter Four). The Tampere programme recognised that organising an internal security area meant developing the EU’s external action, in particular with candidate states (Trauner, 2011: 12). Fighting
crime constituted a key objective of the AFSJ and measures to increase cross-border police cooperation (such as the establishment of joint investigative teams) gained momentum. One of the arguments put forward for their creation was their usefulness in the investigation of illicit drug trafficking, which was to be the priority of the first cross border initiatives (Elvins, 2003: 141; Trauner, 2011).

With the issue of internal security having gained such importance for the policymaking of EU states, candidate states are subject to a high number of demands in the area. The *acquis communautaire* relating to police cooperation and illicit drug trafficking (and the fight against organised crime more generally) is extensive – it obliges states to ratify international treaties; incorporate relevant framework decisions; sign and ratify cooperation agreements with EUROPOL and EMCDDA; and participate in the Schengen Information System. Thus, it is clear that from the moment Turkey was officially recognised as a candidate to the EU there would be substantive changes made at the levels of policy, legislation and operations.

The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11th September 2001 added political momentum to the issues that the EU had grouped in the AFJS, and created additional pressure for greater decision-making powers, increased international cooperation and greater intelligence sharing regarding terrorist groups and their modes of financing their activities. The United States also placed pressure on the EU to establish greater cooperation between law enforcement agencies. According to Rees, the 9/11 bombings exposed the weaknesses of border and transport security, which falls within the jurisdiction of law enforcement agencies – in particular police forces (Rees, 2006: 80). Shortly after the attacks, the EU and the United States agreed to work together to target the sources of funding that
finance terrorist operations. The fact that the trafficking of Afghanistan-originated heroin through Turkey into Europe was highly likely to have helped finance the Al-Qaeda movement made the need for Europeans to establish effective cooperation with Turkish authorities even more pressing (Chouvy, 2004). A new series of measures to prevent terrorism and its funding sources including drug trafficking was thus adopted by the EU, and these encouraged European states to take a much stricter stance on PKK activities in their territories, as they had for several years showed reluctance to do so. Acting on a proposal of the French government, the EU placed the PKK on its list of terrorist groups in June 2002. These changes brought about a new environment in which the lack of trust that had previously prevailed in relations between Turkey and EU member states could be improved. A liaison officer explained that at this time, “Europeans took one step towards Turkey, and Turkey took two steps towards the Europeans” (Interview with European liaison officer, Ankara, 2011).

At the operational level, this meant that European states took Turkish requests for cooperation and information about PKK suspects more seriously, while Turkey took greater care in responding to European requests relating to drug related cases, and in particular they agreed to investigate the PKK for its drug trafficking activities separately from its terrorist activities, which had previously been a source of contention. It seems that the EU's decision regarding the PKK was key in allowing trust to develop between and it is likely to have been related to the fact that fighting terrorism became a paramount priority for all the law enforcement agencies of Turkey and EU states at the operational level, as shown by the succession of bombings in Istanbul, Madrid and London in 2003, 2004 and 2005, was key in allowing trust to grow between. This new common
understanding was already clearly expressed at political level in multilateral forums.

A close examination of the official documents relating to Turkey’s accession is an effective way to extract clues about changes to Turkey’s approach to police cooperation and illicit drug trafficking as they show what the EU expected of Turkey. The Accession Partnership documents are the most general documents since they constitute the general framework agreement. The ‘National Programmes for the Adoption of the EU Acquis’ (NPAA) proscribed what legal and institutional changes were needed in various fields in order to fulfil various harmonisation demands in accordance with the EU *acquis communautaire*, and the yearly progress reports of the European Commission provide a succinct evaluation of what had been achieved, as well as detailing what further courses of action the EU recommended. The first Accession Partnership document and the first NPAA were adopted by the Turkish government in 2001, and both were replaced by newer versions in 2003. In 2006 a third national programme was adopted, and in 2008 both documents were updated once more. The European Commission’s progress reports have been published yearly since 1998.

The national programmes are interesting because they reveal how far-reaching the requested changes were: new laws needed to be adopted and existing ones amended, with necessary regulations for the implementation of the laws adopted as a consequence. Existing government institutions were requested to change their organizational structure, create new divisions and often to train personnel in the areas introduced through harmonisation – such as, for example, with the training of Ministry of Interior personnel in EU law (NPAA, 2003: 685). The progress reports of the European Commission perhaps offer the best picture of what
changed from year to year as well as providing the best picture of how the view that the EU held of Turkish authorities changed. In the 1999 report, the European Commission makes a rather negative evaluation of the efforts and capacities of Turkey with regard to police cooperation and fighting illicit drugs, writing the following:

“Turkey remains a major trafficking centre, particularly for drugs coming from Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia. It is also a centre for refining opium. The Turkish authorities need to devote attention to dismantling hidden laboratories and combating the chain of trafficking more effectively. Greater efficiency will require significant reinforcement of police cooperation with EU Member States, an area hitherto marked by insufficient exchanges of information. The Turkish authorities will have to acquire legal instruments which are compatible with international police cooperation practices, particularly in connection with ‘controlled delivery’” (European Commission, 1999: xx).

The following year, the European Commission also found Turkey seriously lagging behind:

“As regards police co-operation, the fight against fraud and corruption, the fight against drugs, customs co-operation and judicial co-operation in criminal and civil matters, serious efforts are required to comply with the acquis. This also implies the ratification of the respective international conventions by Turkey. Moreover, serious efforts are needed to increase the capacities to effectively implement and enforce legislation in these areas” (European Commission, 2000: xx).

It is only from 2003 onwards that the reports mention that the Turkish authorities were active and carrying out operations against illicit drug trafficking:

“As far as the fight trafficking in drugs is concerned, a number of successful operations were carried out by the law enforcement authorities, partly in international cooperation including some Member States of the EU” (European Commission, 2003: xx).

In terms of the actions the EU expects Turkey to take for harmonisation, the reports mention some of those that appear to be the most important, and those that suffer from excessive delays. For example, between 2002 and 2007, it is recommended that Turkey should establish a Mini-Dublin Group, 8 which would

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8 The Dublin group is described as a “flexible, informal consultation and coordination mechanism for global, regional and country-specific problems of illicit drugs production, trafficking and demand.” Created in 1990 at the initiative of the US, it is composed of the 27 EU members, Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, the United States, the European Commission and the UNODC. The mini-Dublin groups are set up in countries where it is deemed that drug trafficking is of significant concern to the group members. They are set up to “monitor all aspects of the drug
be a meeting of the representatives of the Dublin Group present in Turkey focusing specifically on the Turkish drugs situation. After this date, the recommendation is not mentioned again – although nothing is said of the fact that the recommendation was never put into practice, nor is it mentioned that Turkey applied to be a full-fledged member of the Dublin Group (Interview with KOM official, March 2011). This is an indication of the fact that Europeans were unwilling to accept Turkey in the central Dublin Group and that they were hoping that by repeating their initial recommendation year after year that Turkish authorities would reconsider their position on the matter.

What the reports reveal is that Turkey made several steps to adapt to the standards of the EU in terms of police cooperation, as well as the fight against illicit drug trafficking and organised crime in general. Turkey ratified international and regional conventions such as the 1961 Single Convention (as amended in 1972) in 2001; the Palermo Convention against transnational organised crime and its protocols in 2003; and it signed the Council of Europe Agreement on illicit traffic by sea, and the Convention on laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime and on the financing of terrorism. It also changed its penal and criminal codes accordingly. In 2004, it adopted an agreement with the EU on “precursors and chemical substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances”. It adopted a drug strategy and action plan in line with EU drug strategy in 2005. TUBIM acts as the EMCDDA’s focal point in Turkey since a cooperation agreement between Turkey and the EMCDDA was signed in 2007 and became fully operational in July 2012 after it

control situation in the host country, including the legal situation and the organization and facilities of the anti-drugs authorities, particularly in relation to national masterplans, where these are in place.” (General Secretariat, 2006).
was ratified by the Turkish National Grand Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM). Turkey also signed a cooperation agreement with EUROPOL, although it is not fully effective to this date because a new law on personal data protection that would allow full cooperation is yet to be adopted (European Commission, 2011).

Since 1999, standards have thus become considerably closer, and this has made cooperation between European and Turkish law enforcement authorities easier. This is in line with the Joint Declaration on Drugs adopted in February 2002 by EU member states and candidate countries, including Turkey, in which the parties reaffirm their commitment to the “intensification of international cooperation with other countries and with international organizations”, and commit themselves to “enhance regional co-operation in supply reduction, notably by strengthening law enforcement co-operation including reinforcing activities against synthetic drugs, the diversion of chemical precursors and money laundering” (European Council, 2002: 13-14). In this declaration, candidate countries also commit themselves to consolidate the process of institutional, regulatory and administrative reinforcement that will ensure that national drug strategies and coordination mechanisms are developed.

At the same time, through the pre-accession instruments several initiatives have been set up to develop the administrative capacity of Turkish law enforcement. The national programmes for the adoption of the acquis communautaire call for training, exchange programmes and study visits – these are organised mainly for members of the Turkish police, Gendarmerie and the Customs Agency. For example, several twinning projects set up between Turkey and EU member states have been directed at all three agencies, in particular the TNP (Ministry for EU
Two are of specific relevance: the first ran in 2006 and 2007 to support TUBIM. The second, which ran between 2009 and 2011, sought to strengthen the investigation capacity of the anti-smuggling and organised crime divisions of the Police and the Gendarmerie (Ibid.).

### 7.2.3 The current situation between Turkey and the EU / EU member states

The most recent evaluation of the European Commission on the state of Turkey’s harmonisation with the EU *acquis communautaire* recognises the changes that have taken place, but also highlights sticking points, such as the lack of progress on the adoption of a law on the protection of personal data, which impairs full cooperation with EUROPOL. The failure to ratify TUBIM's agreement with EMCDDA impaired the former's full participation in the agency, but this was remedied on 29 June 2012 when the necessary legislation was adopted (despite the issue having been on the agenda since 2009). There seems to have been no formal opposition to their adoption and law enforcement agencies had been expecting the changes to take effect, but because they were not a priority for the government they were not put forwards for discussion in the busy agenda of the legislative body (interview with the former Director of TUBIM, Ankara, 2011).

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9 The 2012 TUBIM report mentions that “Following its signature between Turkey and the European Union on October 30, 2007 and its transfer to the TBMM by the Office of the Prime Ministry on March 9, 2009, the “Law Regarding The Suitability of the Approval of the Agreement Between the European Community and the Republic of Turkey concerning the Participation of the Republic of Turkey in the Studies of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction” was approved in the session of the TBMM held on June 29, 2012. The agreement came into effect following its publication in the Official Gazette on July 12, 2012. Turkey had been conducting its activities since 2007 as a candidate country in the EMCDDA, and with the signature of this agreement, Turkey achieved the status of a full member in this institution. As the National Focal Point of EMCDDA in Turkey, Turkish Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (TUBIM) will continue to execute and increase its activities as a member of an EU institution. Thus, TUBIM has acquired the status of one of the first Turkish institutions to become a member of the European Union.” (TUBIM, 2012: 44).
At the operational level, all but one European liaison officer interviewed said cooperation with the TNP was excellent. They noted that their Turkish counterparts were highly qualified, dedicated and knowledgeable, in stark contrast with evaluations of the police a decade earlier. Some noted that relations with the Gendarmerie were considerably more difficult, and put it down to the fact that as a military body the Gendarmerie was not used to cooperating with civilian institutions. They also noted that cooperation between the TNP and the Gendarmerie seemed poor. More interestingly, they emphasized that informal, colleague-to-colleague relationships had emerged between them and their Turkish counterparts, and that these were essential for effective cooperation. A culture of cooperation and of reaching out had taken root in the TNP, particularly within KOM as contacts are more frequent with this department than with other departments of the TNP. There seems to be a desire to overcome difficulties that lengthy administrative procedures can generate, and officers tend to be proactive in seeking cooperation. The TNP has also been more proactive in reaching out to European countries in order to benefit from activities such as exchange visits and training courses, which can be organised within the pre-accession funds under the enhancement of administrative capacity (Interviews with liaison officers, Ankara, 2011).

It can be concluded, then, that in the area of combating drug trafficking, Turkey seems to have accomplished much of what was expected of it in order to advance the EU accession process. It adopted EU regulations and ratified international conventions, it adapted its administrative structure and enhanced the knowledge and capacity of its law enforcement personnel; and it is in the process of establishing strategic and operational links with EU agencies. At the operational
level, the TNP is significantly more trusted and respected than it had previously been and is praised for its professionalism. The opportunities created by twining projects, training courses and exchange visits – which enable Turkish authorities to meet their European counterparts – have acted as a catalyst for the development of professional networks, both formal and informal. The next section seeks to put all these elements into perspective in order to evaluate the extent to which the fact that Turkey is a candidate to the EU has been a key factor explaining the internationalization of Turkish policing.

7.3 Explaining the EU’s influence with theories of change through the accession process

There is extensive research focussing on the impact of the EU on changes in prospective EU member states, with a number of elaborate theoretical frameworks proposing explanations of “when, why and how the EU shaped, directed and occasionally determined change” (Lavenex, 2004; Schimelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2004 and 2005; Grabbe, 2006; Haughton, 2007 and 2011). The accession of twelve central and eastern European countries (CEE) in two ‘waves’ in 2004 and 2007 allowed researchers working in the area to go beyond case studies to develop theories of Europeanization. Given the high number of comparisons possible, the validity of these theories could be more easily tested than if there were only a small number of cases to concentrate on. Moreover, with the current accession bids of Turkey and the Balkans states, there is still much work needed in order to update and refine what has already been proposed in this field. Research on the transformative power of the EU on Turkey is also vibrant, as Bolukbaşi et al. have demonstrated (Bolukbaşi et al., 2010), to the point that
Europeanization is typically the first approach a researcher will use to analyse changes that have occurred within the Turkish state since 1998 (Alpan, 2001: 3). However, it is important to note that the most frequent area of study is politics and polity, rather than specific policies of the Turkish state (Aydın and Keyman, 2004; Bolukbaşi et al., 2010; Börzel and Soyaltun, 2012). Furthermore, analysis usually revolves around the political criteria set by the EU at the Copenhagen summit – democratisation, human rights, the rights of minorities (Aydın and Keyman, 2004; Muftuler Bac, 2005; Tocci, 2005) – rather than narrower policy areas like police cooperation and drug trafficking.

In the case of the transformation of Turkish foreign policy, Kirisci found that “the EU’s ‘conditionality’ and the need to meet certain criteria for starting accession talks and then gaining membership has been an important driving force” (Kirisci, 2009: 34). The aspect of conditionality that he considers is what Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier call 'the *acquis* conditionality', and is distinct from what they call 'democratic conditionality'. They argue that the *acquis* conditionality is effective (more so than the democratic conditionality) in the sense that the EU has enjoyed unprecedented influence on the restructuring of domestic institutions and public policy (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2004: 661, 675-6). This kind of argument can be applied in the area of law enforcement and drug control policies.

It was noted in the section above that Turkey has enacted many of the reforms requested by the EU in the areas of anti-drug trafficking and police cooperation. It has ratified international conventions, re-organised its administrative structures including the creation of new agencies like TUBIM, and enhanced the capacity of civil servants through means as varied as training courses, exchange study visits
and scholarships for higher education in European countries (NPAA: 2001 and 2003). Using the financial assistance obtained from pre-accession reform instruments, the TNP has also acquired equipment that puts it on par with the most technologically advanced European police forces, with some claiming it is better equipped than most European police forces (interviews with European liaison officers, Ankara, 2011).

The extent of change that has occurred in Turkish policing should not be underestimated, yet it is important not to assume that Turkey simply complied with EU demands without further analysis. Europeanization scholars have proposed several analytical tools to this end, and these utilize various approaches. Some adopt a realist approach, which sees the relationship between the EU and Turkey as asymmetrical; others utilize a neoliberal approach by focusing on the presence of rational incentives for relevant actors. There is also a significant trend of constructivist research, which seeks to identify processes of social learning and rule adoption within Europeanization. The main arguments are tested below against examples from the fields of police cooperation and anti-drug trafficking.

The argument that is usually presented first to explain Turkey’s transformation, (and transformation in EU candidate states in general), presents the EU as the cause for domestic change as a result of a power asymmetry between the two parties. This is what Alpan describes as the 'Europe-as-hegemony' analysis, which typically consists of analysing changes in Turkey through the prisms of the EU’s pressure to adapt and the extensive list of conditions required by the EU for Turkey to become a fully-fledged member of the union (Alpan, 2010). Haukkala also contends that “the EU can be envisaged as a regional hegemon that is using its economic and normative clout to build a set of highly asymmetrical
relationships that help to facilitate an active transference of its norms and values (Haukkala, 2011: 46).

In this sense, rules and norms are transferred from the EU to candidate states such as Turkey in a top-down manner. This approach is visible in Lavenex's analysis, which explains how rule transfer is part of the EU accession process where the EU, mainly through the European Commission, has developed a set of institutional practices in order gain acceptance of given rules from countries (Lavenex 2004). She contends that the *acquis* conditionality is a form of ‘external governance’: it is necessary from a functional point of view in order to increase the efficiency and problem-solving capacity of policies, but it is also necessary from a geostrategic point of view in order to ensure that states which are not yet members of the EU make political choices in line with the EU (Lavenex, 2004: 681). Rees also argues that:

“The EU has insisted that its own standards be followed by others, thereby exporting its model of internal security. (…) The main mechanism that the EU has been able the use to secure compliance from its neighbours has been the prospect of membership. The principle of conditionality has enabled the EU to impose its model of internal security upon countries seeking membership and subject them to regular monitoring” (Rees, 2011: 395, 401).

To apply this to the present case, it would be argued that the EU pushed Turkey to ratify international conventions relating to drugs (in addition to organised crime, terrorism and corruption); and demanded that it collaborate with EMCDDA, EUROPOL and the law enforcement agencies of EU member states. The objective here is not simply to ensure that the EU’s policies on controlling illicit drug trafficking are efficient, but also to ensure that Turkey strongly supports the spirit of European drug strategies and other over-arching policies, such as the Stockholm Programme or the European Pact to Combat International Drug Trafficking, which were both adopted in 2010 and represent the latest EU-wide
policy agreements in the area of internal security and drug trafficking respectively.

The analysis of the annual evaluations and recommendations in the European Commission’s progress reports presented in the section above shows that what is expected from Turkish authorities can indeed be explained at a functional level, but also at a subtler level, which engages with the fact that Turkey is expected to act in the same way as other EU member states, even if it is not yet a member. For example, the EU requested Turkey align its national drug strategy paper with the European Drug Strategy Paper in each of its progress reports from 2003 to 2007 (European Commission, 2003, 2004c, 2005, 2006 and 2007). Taking into account the fact that such strategy papers are of a declaratory nature and are not legally binding, insisting that a candidate state model its own strategy on that of the EU is a political rather than technical request to ensure that general policy frameworks are aligned. Furthermore EU policies on internal security matters including drug trafficking and organised crime are evolving: policies are re-evaluated every four years and priorities are redefined with each new policy that is agreed by the member states, thus implying that candidate states also adapt their priorities in parallel as the EU’s evolve.

These expectations suggest a power asymmetry, placing the candidate state in an inferior position during the *acquis* process of integration (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2004: 675). Regarding CEE states’ EU accession, Haughton argues that:

“the EU seems extremely powerful.” […] Moreover, there was a clear power asymmetry during the process of accession, when the accession states of CEE were expected to transpose into domestic law the 80,000 pages of the *acquis* to a standard acceptable to the Commission and European Council (a condition which was not necessarily met by the existing member states). Indeed, the term ‘accession negotiations’ is in many respects a
misnomer, as there was very little left open to negotiation beyond the odd temporary transitional arrangement (derogation).” (Haughton, 2007:235)

As a result of this asymmetry, scholars identify conditionality as possessing a transformative force, as it seems that what really matters is how quickly and accurately candidate states go through all the changes listed in their national accession partnership agreements. The extent of the expectations made by the EU regarding what Turkey should achieve in the fields of drug control and police cooperation should not be underestimated. For example, the 2001 national partnership agreement stipulates the following:

“...The capacity to fight against organised crime, the illicit use, production of and trafficking in drugs, fraud and corruption, money laundering and police and judicial cooperation will be enhanced.

Work on the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information on suspicious financial transactions will be accelerated. (...)

For full membership in Europol, harmonisation with the relevant acquis will be achieved and preparations will be completed. (...)

It is envisaged to benefit to the greatest extent possible from existing cooperation schemes within the framework of MEDA, and with the assistance of EU Member States, from specific programmes such as Falcone, Odysseus, Grotius, Daphne, Oisin and Stop, the Action Plan Against organised Crime, the Action Plan on the Fight Against Drugs, and the European Refugee Fund, in the field of justice and home affairs.” (NPPA, 2001: 15)

The formulation of these objectives indicate that the EU assumes it has significant leverage over Turkey through the process of conditionality in the accession, as it is clear that in order to fulfil all of these objectives wide-ranging reforms in policy and practice are necessary. In this sense, the EU can be seen to have applied pressure on Turkey, with the result that Turkey has become increasingly involved in international police cooperation and the international fight against illicit drug as part of its Europeanization process.

The second type of argument used to explain Turkey’s transformation adopts a neoliberal approach. It assumes that states are rational actors for which strategic
policymakers – those whose interests are at stake – make calculations of costs and benefits for each of the EU criteria for membership. EU conditionality is seen as a set of incentives and sanctions that trigger domestic change in the candidate state when the change is not costly for the strategic domestic player and when they provide additional resources for the strategic player to exploit the opportunities offered by the change (Börzel and Soyaltın, 2012: 9).

The main rational incentive for Turkey to go through this process is, obviously, to join the EU. Coupled with this are material incentives in the form of funding and training opportunities, which can be provided under instruments of pre-accession. The former Director of TUBIM provided an example of this as he explained why the TNP sought to create an agency dealing with national drug use, which became TUBIM, as there was none existing at the time in Turkey (interview with the former Director of TUBIM, Ankara, 2011). Indeed, since the 1996 National Security Council decision recognising drugs as a security matter, the Ministry of Family and Planning had been made responsible for drug use policies but in practice had done very little about it (see Robins, 2009). As a result, KOM was the only agency seeking to develop increased data and knowledge about drug use, drawing evidence from police cases. Around 1998-1999, KOM officers acting on their own initiative created questionnaires to give to people arrested for drug offences (interview with former KOM officer, March 2012). These provided what little knowledge was available about drug use, and there was considerable awareness that it was insufficient. In 2000, KOM proposed that a separate department be created, which would be the EMCDDA's focal point in Turkey. They put together applications for funding and training from the EU in order to set up this department (interview with the former Director of TUBIM, Ankara,
According to TUBIM's former director, the reason for this was that they wanted to be ready for the moment when Turkey joined the EU and to benefit from the training that could be organised through pre-accession instruments. It was also good for Turkey, as there was a real need to develop policies to deal with addiction and drug use. In other words, it was a good opportunity for Turkey to strengthen its domestic policies on drug control.

What this example reveals is that it was easy for Turkish authorities to overhaul their policies concerning drug use and addiction because it was a relatively vacant policy area at the time. A wealth of opportunities were created by the EU’s stipulations that Turkey cooperate with the EMCDDA and “work jointly with EU Member States and organizations affiliated with the EU to increase the effectiveness of the protective and preventive measures”, as laid down in the 2001 NPAA (2001: 443). Turkish authorities were presented with considerable incentives in an area where they acknowledged there was a lack of information and knowledge. Furthermore, the prospect of becoming part of the regional network as the EMCDDA focal point was viewed very positively by those in charge of this policy area. Therefore, the creation of TUBIM, which continues to exist within the organizational structure of the police, is significant because it can be seen to be a by-product of the accession process. This follows the analysis made by Grabbe:

“Through the accession process the EU can directly affect policy, institutional development, and the capacity of the state. The EU’s influence is most readily identifiable where it advocates particular policy and institutional preferences. However it can stimulate far-reaching changes simply by moving an issue up the government’s decision-agenda, that is, by attracting more political attention to it” (Grabbe, 2006: 201).

The third approach to explain the transfer of rules brought about by *acquis communautaire* moves away from the rationalist perspective and engages with
constructivist approaches. It considers *acquis* integration and the general process of Europeanization to be a process of social learning, or socialization – meaning that candidate states go ahead with the *acquis* integration because their state agents are socialized to new rules and norms during their interactions with external agents. Through this process they develop new understandings of their identities and interests, which requires the adoption of these new rules into their own system (Sedelmeier, 2011: 15; see also Checkel, 2001; Johnston, 2008: 15-16; Börzel and Soyadin, 2012: 8). As Sedelmeier explains it:

“As a result of such processes, elites in candidate countries become convinced that the EU’s rules are legitimate and have an intrinsic value. Governments thus adopt the EU’s rules regardless of the material incentives that the EU might offer for doing so” (Sedelmeier, 2011: 15).

This theoretical approach is useful because it explains all the training opportunities and twinning projects organised under pre-accession instruments not as opportunities or rewards, as the rational choice approach does, but as 'spaces' where socialization can occur. Arguably, this is one of the rationales for their use by the EU. As Tomalova and Tulmets point out:

“Originally, Twinning was designed to facilitate learning about and socialisation into the transposition and implementation procedures as part of the accession process, focussing mainly on the *acquis* in Candidate Countries” (Tomalova and Tulmets, 2007: 382; see also European Commission, no date: 2).

Furthermore, the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs has been the institution with which the highest number of twinning projects has been organised: between 2002 and 2007, 25 out of 77 projects involved this ministry, a far greater than any other (Ministry for EU Affairs, 2008b). From 2002 to 2011, a total of 17 projects have involved the police or Gendarmerie, and some specifically related to the fight against drugs, such as the projects 'Strengthening the Turkish National Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction' (2002-2004) and
Socialization scholars contend that through such opportunities, agents’ beliefs and their perception of their interests change because they learn new rules and norms; and because they develop professional networks with other agents who practice those rules (Haas, 1992; Meyer et al., 1997). These factors then convince them of the necessity of adopting these rules. Senior ranking police officers explained in their interviews that processes of this kind have occurred between them and European police forces, and that it influenced practices, if not policies. For example, one explained how KOM's yearly activity reports were influenced by European practices following the posting of liaison officers from various European police forces in Turkey. They requested statistics on arrests and seizures from the TNP. Initially, the TNP responded by providing raw statistics, until one officer proposed to make a report following the example of other European police agencies, in particular the Italian Guardia di Finanza. This report would not only be similar to those produced by European police forces to communicate their success and drug seizure rates, but it would also allow the Turkish police to analyse the raw data and share this analysis with counterparts, rather than leave it to others to make their own analysis (Interview with former KOM officer, 2012). This example shows that Turkish police officers adopted practices of their European counterparts. It suggests that there was a desire to be seen and understood by European police as a good police force, or at least one that works to the same standards. It also suggests how interacting with European police forces led the TNP to adopt some of their practices, and that the Turkish
police became conscious of the necessity to show to their counterparts that it was equally serious when in combating drug trafficking and organised crime.

This leads to one of the main arguments of the proponents of Europeanization through socialization, which is that through interaction values and perceptions tend to converge, or at least that actors in candidate states align their understandings with their European counterparts by learning the practices of EU states. Some evidence of this process was noted by several European liaison officers in order to explain increasing determination by Turkish authorities to investigate drug trafficking after 2000. As mentioned earlier, in the aftermath of the 9/11 bombings the PKK was placed on the EU’s terrorist organizations list, and it seems that this decision triggered a positive response in the sense that Turkish authorities began to attach greater attention to cooperation requests from European countries on drug trafficking cases (Interviews with European liaison officers, Ankara, 2011). In a global context in which states turned much of their attention to the financing of terrorism, it seems that the drug trafficking activities of the PKK were singled out as representing a significant threat, providing common ground around which Turkey and its European partners can converge. Simultaneously, Turkey agreed to increase cooperation regarding cross border investigations of drug trafficking.

The legal and administrative reforms undertaken to integrate into the EU *acquis communautaire* seem to have been concomitant with the changes in values and perspectives, which would indicate that socialization has taken place. Indeed, several observers noted that between the years 2000 and 2005, middle-ranking and high-ranking police officers holding key positions in KOM were increasingly reaching out to international partners and worked actively to increase the outward
orientation of their organization. This is in line with the 2002 Joint Declaration on Drugs, which stipulates that candidate countries will enhance “regional co-operation in supply reduction, notably by strengthening law enforcement co-operation including reinforcing activities against synthetic drugs, the diversion of chemical precursors and money laundering” (European Council, 2002: 13-14). It also reveals that these officers, who occupied strategic positions at the time, were eager to prove Turkey’s credentials as a committed actor against drug trafficking. Several observers contended that their work has had a lasting effect on the extent to which Turkish authorities are attached to international cooperation in this field (interviews with European and DEA liaison officers, Ankara 2011; senior police officers, Ankara 2011 and 2012).

To conclude this section, it can be argued that changes in and reforms to the Turkish state have been broad and far-reaching; and that the process of Europeanization can be observed even in areas as specific as anti-drug trafficking and international police cooperation. Europeanization scholars utilize several theoretical frameworks to explain how norms, values and rules have been transferred from the EU towards the candidate states, and these provide useful explanations for the changes that took place. The next section reviews the growing body of literature arguing that tracing all institutional change in candidate states back to the EU and Europeanization is too great a step as it leaves many factors unexplained.

7.4 Weaknesses of Europeanization theories

Alongside the large strand of academic research on Europeanization, a growing number of studies are critical of its claims. They question the almost automatic
assumption that the diffusion of European policies and institutions means that the process of Europeanization is the main catalyst for domestic change, in particular in EU candidate states (Börzel and Risse, 2012). Within this recent strand of study there is a growing body of work centring on Turkey’s accession to the EU (see for example Saatçioglu, 2010; Alpan, 2011; Buhari-Gülmez, 2011a and 2011b; Börzel and Soyaltın, 2012; Noutcheva and Aydın-Duzgit, 2012). The aspects of Turkey’s reforms most commonly studied are democratisation, human rights and the country's political structures, meaning that there is less interest in areas such as police cooperation and anti-drug trafficking – which relate more to administrative reforms and are only indirectly connected to political criteria. However, the approach these studies adopt to critique Europeanization literature is useful in this case too, as it helps make sense of some elements left unexplained or neglected.

The first critique of note goes to the very core of the incentives model of Europeanization theory, critiquing: the top-down perspective it uses. This tends to assume a one-direction process in which the EU is allowed to impose its laws and institutions – an understanding that Buhari Gülmez critically labels a 'sender-receiver' model (2011a). The claim here is that such an approach restricts understanding of more complicated processes. Specifically, it is argued that it obliges observers to conceive of the EU and Turkey as separate units that interact with each other in isolation of the rest of the international community, and that their relationships with other external actors have no impact on their interaction. This results in the exclusion of two important factors: firstly, criteria set by the EU are often defined in accordance with international standards, rather than European standards only, and secondly, current members of the EU should not
automatically be considered stronger or better performing states than candidate states.

The first of these two elements points to the fact that the conditions of EU membership can hardly be considered as uniquely European. For example, the ratification of international and regional conventions and treaties is a major component of the EU *acquis communautaire*, yet this is only part of a global context: in relation to police cooperation and drug trafficking, the EU's first requirement is the ratification of UN and Council of Europe Conventions as these encompass global norms. Furthermore, Turkey has long attached a great deal of importance to participation in global organizations and claims to be highly committed to their norms and values. Therefore, when the EU requirements correspond to the norms and values of international regimes, the likelihood of Turkey complying with the EU requirements increases, as it already has a strong connection with the global institutions from which these norms and values originate (Buhari Gülmez, 2011: 16). Thus, the reason why changes in legislation or policy are made is related to global trends as much as it is the pressure to adapt to the EU. Thus, by taking this step Turkish authorities are committing the state to norms that go beyond the EU, and assuming that it is merely Europeanization is too limiting.

The second element to consider is that the Europeanization approach assumes that, as a candidate state, Turkey is 'weak', or performs poorly in all aspects of governance, with existing EU states performing better. In the case of fighting illicit drug trafficking, however, such assumptions are debatable. Turkish authorities have for several years been keen to publicize the fact that rates of drug seizures have consistently been higher in Turkey than in all of the EU countries
combined,\textsuperscript{10} so a simple assumption that “Turkey needs to learn from EU” is wrong (Interviews with senior police officers, 2011, 2012). It is apparent that Turkish authorities have never placed themselves in the position of a ‘receiver’ or ‘learner’ \textit{vis à vis} the EU, so an alternative paradigm must be found to explain its harmonization with the EU’s norms. To use the words of Börzel and Soyadın, Turkey did not simply 'download' what it needed from the EU in order to strengthen its anti-drugs efforts simply because it had been imposed by the EU (Börzel and Soyadın, 2012).

The second criticism of Europeanization theory is that it automatically sets the prospect of EU accession as the main, if not sole, driver of domestic change, thereby ignoring domestic factors. Bolukbaşi \textit{et al.} criticise Europeanization research on Turkey for its tendency to:

> “adopt a top-down research design approach, although they do not explicitly discuss this choice leaving the reader to infer such choice. […] The nature of this process leads to the expectation that any domestic change observed is attributable to the EU” (Bolukbaşi \textit{et al.}, 2010: 477).

When the role and the weight of such domestic causes are not explored, reforms that had begun prior to the accession bid can be mistakenly attributed to Europeanization. Similarly, the possibility that some domestic actors favour, or are empowered by, Europeanization reforms and use them to their advantage against those who reject the reforms is downplayed. Alpan uses the term 'Europe-as-Hegemony' to describe this situation, where the relationship between Europe and domestic politics is one in which “the former shapes and hegemonises

\textsuperscript{10} It is widely accepted that volumes of drug seizures are an inaccurate indicator of a state’s success in curbing illicit drug trafficking (higher seizures could be indicative of higher volumes of trafficking, and it is impossible to assess what proportion of the entire volume trafficked is caught at any point of time, just as it is impossible to know for certain how much drugs are trafficked). However, the fact that Turkey seizes a greater quantity of drugs than the 27 EU countries combined is a strong indication of its relative strength in this area, and is the statistic that Turkish authorities tend to rely on.
politics”, with other processes sidelined in analyses of factors causing or influencing change (Alpan, 2011: 6). Thus, it is important to look closely at factors that may be overlooked as a result of the assumption that changes relating to drug policies and police cooperation simply result from Europeanization.

Looking at reforms that had begun prior to the accession bid, it is important to take into account that even if December 1999 was a milestone due to the EU Council’s official acceptance of Turkey’s candidacy, the watershed moment in relation to police matters occurred a few years previously in the aftermath of the car accident at Susurluk in 1996. Once appointed Minister of Internal Affairs in April 1999, former police officer Sadettin Tantan proposed a new bill designed to combat organised crime and this was adopted by parliament later that year. At the same time, staffing of the TNP’s KOM was overhauled and new, high-calibre officers were employed who had no without links to the former minister Mehmet Ağar and his followers in the police, given the revelations regarding his deep level of involvement in the Susurluk scandal (Interviews with: Sadettin Tantan, Istanbul, 2011; senior police officers, Ankara, 2011 and 2012). All of this happened in an effort to eradicate personnel and practices that were compromised from the connections between state and organised crime, but in particular it was the result of a desire to modernise the police. It should be noted, however, that these reforms occurred around the same time as the official acceptance of Turkey’s EU accession bid, making it difficult to clearly distinguish the importance of each potential factor, and their precise role. Furthermore, in Turkey the concepts of modernization and Europeanization have very often been conflated, as the Kemalist ideology has long been based on the premise that Turkey ought to look towards the West in order to modernise itself, and turn away
from its 'backwards' Islamist and Ottoman past (see for example Aydın and Keyman, 2004; also Buhari Gülmez, 2011: 27). However, it can be stated that it seems that for many the urge to modernise was more pressing than the urge to ‘Europeanize’, and that reforms which at first look as though they are part of the process of Europeanization were actually undertaken in order to modernise the Turkish state. Whilst these reforms fit the EU *acquis* harmonization process, this was not the primary objective of the domestic actors who pushed them forward. Rather, it is argued here that they were instrumentalised and that modernization of the state was the main objective.

This instrumentalisation the EU demands, can be observed at two different levels. The first level offers a strong indication that it may be more relevant to look at changes using a bottom-up approach rather than Europeanization literature's top-down approach, with a focus on changes which took place at the level of KOM. Certain key people who held key positions in this department at the turn of the millennium changed its way of working and created an environment that favoured outward-reaching behaviour, cultivating contacts with other police forces, and attending important international conferences such as the CND yearly sessions (interviews with: liaison officers, Ankara, 2011; senior police officers, Ankara, 2011 and 2012). It appears that because they put themselves in situations where they were able to promote Turkey’s efforts in fighting drug trafficking (and organised crime in general), their own initiative was viewed positively by the organization's hierarchy and so they continued this practice in order to benefit themselves and their colleagues within KOM. Progressively, a working culture developed where attending international events, for example training or conferences, or engaging in joint activities with international partners through, for
example information sharing or joint operations, was seen by many as an effective career advancement method. It seems that eventually, the possibility to propose twinning projects for capacity enhancement also became a way for staff to be seen as active and dedicated officers, and some projects grew out of individuals’ desires to take the opportunity given them by the availability of pre-accession funds (interviews with senior and middle rank KOM officials, Ankara, 2011). This suggests that what might have first appeared to be a genuine effort by the police as an institution to conform to European standards is in fact better described as instrumentalization by individual employees concerned with career progression; or as the result of rational choices at a personal rather than at institutional level.

A second level of instrumentalization is also identifiable in the relations between the different institutions involved in fighting drug trafficking in Turkey. As explained in Chapter Two, the TNP is the primary agency in this field, but the Gendarmerie, Customs and the Coastguards are also active. At present, working relationships between the TNP and other agencies are inefficient, and remain a concern for the European Commission, who have noted it as 'problematic' in a number of reports (European Commission, 2002; 2005; 2006). The TNP seeks to promote itself as a 'leader' by adopting an openly pro-European attitude – in particular to distinguish itself from the Gendarmerie, which forms part of the army's structure. This explains why the Gendarmerie has exhibited a considerably lower level of openness to European police liaison officers (interviews with European liaison officers, Ankara, 2011). This also needs to be contextualised against the fact that the Turkish armed forces continue to play a significant role in Turkish politics and are thought to be hostile to reforms towards EU membership.
Thus, it can be argued that by adopting the opposite attitude, the TNP is placing itself in the political arena as an institution that can be relied on by the current government, which has been championing EU reform since its arrival in power. These examples suggest that even if institutions like the TNP have embraced the reforms they were asked to introduce in order to align themselves with EU requirements, the reasons behind such moves are not restricted to Europeanization. Theories on the Europeanization of candidate states suffer from multiple weaknesses because they leave out processes of change which, when analysed in depth, turn out to be difficult to separate from the supposed Europeanization process. Thus, the theoretical framework typically used to demonstrate the influence of the EU on changes in candidate countries – what is often termed the EU’s 'transformative power' – may not to be the most appropriate approach to the case studied here.

By combining these findings with those of Chapter Six, above, it can be stated that external factors are insufficient in explaining how Turkish policing has changed. In the following section, Johnston's concept of social influence is utilized to explain how Turkish policing has changed. While in Chapter Six it was demonstrated that the concept of 'mimicking' successfully explains much of Turkey’s behaviour during the 1970s and 1980s, it is proposed here that the micro-process of ‘social influence’ offers further understanding.

7.5 Using 'social influence' to explain change

Bolukbaşi et al. argued that in Europeanization research “top-down research design is still the dominant approach despite calls for a bottom-up research design, which reflects a preference for the search for ‘causes of effects’
(Bolukbaşi et al., 2010: 478). Based on the review of the weaknesses of the research designs analysed in the previous section, it is contended here that rather than looking for bottom-up research design it would be preferable to adopt an approach that focuses on the process of diffusion itself. In particular, it is argued here that what is missing in Europeanization research and its critiques is an explicit engagement with the underlying causal mechanisms: what Johnston terms the 'micro-processes of norm diffusion', which can help in clarifying norm transfer and norm convergence between the EU and candidate countries (Johnston, 2008). It is particularly useful in the case in question here contributing greatly to an understanding of how and why Turkey changed its approach to the fight against drugs between 1996 and 2005, from one that saw it repeatedly criticised for a lack of engagement to one that saw it widely recognised as a strong player in this field.

In Johnston’s words, social influence is:

“[social influence] explains pro-group behaviour as a function of an actor’s sensitivity to status markers bestowed by a social group and requires some common understanding in the social value the group places on largely symbolic backpatting and opprobrium signals. I should do X because others believe that X is the appropriate thing to do and I will be rewarded socially for doing so” (Johnston, 2008: xxiv).

The key feature of this type of behaviour is the existence of rewards and punishments, which he describes in this way:

“Rewards might include psychological well-being, status, a sense of belonging, and a sense of well-being derived from conformity with role expectations, among others. Punishments might include shaming, shunning, exclusion and demeaning, and dissonance derived from actions inconsistent with role and identity. The effect of (successful) social influence is an actor’s conformity with the position advocated by a group as a result of “real or imagined pressure” (Nemeth, 1987: 237)” (Johnston, 2008: 79).

Applying this to the present case study, Turkey’s decision to become a highly cooperative state in drug enforcement matters can be seen as being motivated by a desire to “accumulate status markers” as a cooperative actor; seeking rewards and
avoiding the opprobrium that comes with failing to behave in this manner. Turkey's changing behaviour, however, did not require it to believe that this was the right way to behave, but rather that it would gain it a good reputation. As Johnston writes:

“Social influence rests on the influenced actor having some prior identification with a relevance group. Social influence involves connecting extant interests, attitudes and beliefs in one “attitude system” to those in some other attitude system, e.g., attitudes towards cooperation get connected to seemingly separate attitudes toward social standing, status, and self-esteem in ways that had not previously occurred to the actor” (Johnston, 2008: 80).

In order to understand changes in Turkey’s approach to drug enforcement and police cooperation, it is important to analyse EU-Turkey relations outside of the accession process and in the context of the international drug control regime. It was noted in Chapter Six that throughout the 1970s and 1980s Turkey had tried to shake off a bad reputation as an untrustworthy state. When the EU officially recognized of Turkey as a candidate in 1999, the TNP had begun to reform and modernise in the wake of the Susurluk scandal, which had likely been a contributing factor to Turkey's poor reputation among foreign counterparts. In this context, it can be argued that the reforms undertaken were intended to show Turkey’s determination to fight illicit drug trafficking and organised crime; and to avoid shame and condemnation that would have resulted from failing to do so. By accepting the EU’s acquis requirements, Turkey collected rewards on two levels: firstly as a state actively engaged in combatting international drug trafficking, and secondly as a state progressively integrating the EU acquis. The first is a marker of high status within the international community “as a co-operator or an active pro-social member of a group” (Johnston, 2003: 91); and the second is a social reward, as Turkey receives added recognition from the EU. At the level of the TNP, there was a strong desire to gain recognition from the effective institutions.
of foreign counterparts. It is often stated, for example, that Turkey seizes more illicit drugs on a yearly basis than all of the EU states combined (interviews with middle ranking and senior police officers, Ankara, 2011, 2012). TNP officers also expressed some exasperation at the fact that Europeans tend not to see Turkey as a victim of illicit trafficking in the same way as EU countries. For example, EMCDDA and EUROPOL reports on drugs and crime tend to mention illicit drugs entering EU countries from Turkey, giving the impression that Turkey is the place of origin and not predominantly a transit country (interviews with a senior police officer, Ankara, 2011). The TNP are keen to highlight this distinction because not to make it tarnishes its reputation in their opinion. Meanwhile, European liaison officers recognise that the TNP has worked hard to clear its name and appear as a police force committed to fighting drug trafficking (interviews with European liaison officers, Ankara, 2011).

Johnston argues that a social influence process is at work when the arguments given for adopting pro-group behaviour stress back-patting, image benefits and opprobrium costs (Johnston, 2003:95). Senior police officers explained that while there was no decision taken at political level to engage the TNP in cooperation with foreign counterparts, some key officers took that decision because they understood that it would improve the image of the TNP (interviews with senior police officers, Ankara, 2011, 2012). They also understood that such a move would also be beneficial for their careers, as they would be recognised among their peers as contributing to the good reputation of the institution (interviews with senior police officers, Ankara, 2011, 2012).

It is therefore argued that Turkey's concerns about its image and reputation have played a major role in its approach to fighting illicit drug trafficking and
international police cooperation. This seems to have driven change as much as, or more, than any political decision. In particular, Turkey's behaviour in this area should not be construed as the result of a decision to harmonise laws and practices with the EU, but rather as a result of the fact that the EU requests provided opportunities not only for Turkey to improve its reputation as a state actively fighting drugs for the benefit of the international community, but also to gain rewards for actively pursuing the *acquis* harmonisation agenda.

### 7.6 Conclusion

This chapter has showed that Turkey’s approach to drug enforcement and police cooperation changed dramatically from the end of the 1990s to 2005. The TNP – a police force once deeply involved in corruption, with links to organised crime groups, and that was mistrusted by its international counterparts transformed into an institution that these same international counterparts recognise as dedicated, efficient, professional, well trained and excellently equipped. This chapter showed that, although this transformation happened at the same time as Turkey entered the phase of pre-accession to the EU and thus engaged in a number of reforms to integrate the EU *acquis communautaire*, assuming that the transformation of Turkey’s law enforcement is a result of European influence or the of EU transformative power is misleading. While the two processes are not completely unrelated, presuming the existence of a simple cause-and-effect relation between the two is an ineffective way of explaining how and why Turkish policing transformed itself.

Thus, while Europeanization literature's focus on how Turkey's progressive implementation of the EU *acquis* does offer some conceptual tools that are useful
to make sense of how changes took place, it fails to explain why changes happened. The use of these conceptual tools – which largely take for granted an asymmetrical power relation between the EU and Turkey – leads to scholars overlooking the fact that EU requirements in the area of drugs enforcement and international cooperation correspond to the norms and values of the international drug control regime. Modernisation is also easily equated with Europeanization because the two processes tend to take the same form but they do not always have the same causes or follow the same rationales.

The concept of social influence, then, has proven to be a useful explanatory tool. It has revealed that a better understanding of the changes can be made by looking at Turkey’s behaviour within the community of actors of the international drug regime rather than within the confines of the Turkey-EU relationship. It has also shown that the most important motivation for change has been Turkey’s concern that it be recognised as a high-status state in the issue of drugs enforcement. Additionally, these concerns were of particular concern for a number of employees of KOM, who acted as agents of change in order to advance their careers.

In the next chapter, the analysis turns to the period between 2005 and 2012 and focuses on the role and motivation of these domestic actors of change. Having demonstrated in Chapter Six and in this chapter that Johnston’s theory of socialization micro-processes is effective in this case study, the chapter will apply these findings and test the extent to which they help elucidate the causal processes of this case study.
Chapter 8: Turkey’s approach to international police cooperation

8.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses Turkey’s approach to international police cooperation from 2005 until 2012, thereby completing the analysis begun in Chapter Six and Seven, which reviewed the 1960s to 1996 and 1996 to 2005 respectively. It argues that from 2005 onwards there is growing evidence that Turkish authorities have been seeking to capitalise on the good reputation they had gained with international partners by investing extensively in training of the police forces of states with less expertise and resources in drug and organised crime investigation. There seem to be two reasons for such investment. Firstly, the TNP has come to attach the utmost importance to the principle of fighting drugs and organised crime; and secondly, it sees sharing its expertise in this domain as an opportunity to increase its reputation internationally on security matters beyond drug enforcement. While Turkey’s intent to enforce the rules of the drug control regime appears genuine, doing so is also seen as a means to further international power and prestige; and to gain acceptance among the international community as a regional leader in law enforcement. This chapter explores in further detail the argument that emerged out of the previous two chapters, according to which reputational concerns are an essential explanatory element for the changes observed. Rather than pointing to a period of great change in Turkey’s approach to drug enforcement, the data seems to indicate a consolidation of the practice of and belief in the norms and values of the drug control regime. It is argued that in the period of time under review, there is evidence that the norms of the international drug regime have a strong hold among Turkish law enforcement authorities.
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first explores Turkey’s engagement internationally – both in diplomatic forums and at an operational level. It also explains the special role played by TADOC in Turkey’s international outreach. TADOC was created in 2000 as a five-year collaborative project between the TNP and the UNODC, with UN participation ending in 2005. Turkish authorities' control of the institution after that date represents a milestone, with the institution seen as a flagship of Turkey's international cooperation. This makes 2005 a suitable starting point for the analysis in this chapter. This should not, however, be understood as a clear-cut moment at which Turkish authorities changed their behaviour from that observed and described in the previous chapter.

The second section proposes an explanatory model of Turkey’s engagement along the two dimensions identified in the previous chapter: the internalization of the norms of the international drug control regime, and the desire for status maximization. This model is based on Johnston’s conceptualisation of socialization micro-processes and focuses on persuasion, following the focus on mimicking and social influence in Chapters Six and Seven respectively (Johnston, 2008: 155-196). However, the model developed goes beyond Johnson's by introducing one further micro-process: performance. It is argued that as a result of its expertise in the field Turkey has become an influential power with Turkish decision makers using this power to gain international recognition for its work on global security.
8.2 The nature of Turkey’s engagement in international drug control

In order to understand the motivations behind Turkey’s drug enforcement it is useful to start by determining its main characteristics. In order to assess the consistency between what Turkish authorities claim to do and believe in; and actual practice, three aspects are examined separately: official discourse; the international activities and operations in which Turkey is engaged; and the development of the international training activities of the TNP.

8.2.1 Turkey’s participation in diplomatic forums

Turkey’s official position on drugs is documented in the variety of public statements it has been making for international audiences. It can easily be seen in speeches at the CND, for example, and in the TNP's official reports. These public statements are structured around three arguments designed to prove Turkey’s attachment to the norms of the international drug regime. The first is that international cooperation is essential to any attempt to suppress illicit drug trafficking. For example, on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is stated that:

“Turkey’s global strategy on the fight against illicit trafficking of drugs is based on the principle that the issue can only be addressed by extensive cooperation, exchange of information and expertise within the international community” (MFA, 2012).

Meanwhile, KOM's 2010 annual report states that:

“Today, distances between countries have largely disappeared (…) organised crime that earlier was perceived as a local problem has now acquired a character that goes far beyond the nation’s borders. When considered from this point of view, it is inevitable that police forces cooperate quickly, safely and effectively for the purpose of fighting crime organizations. An investigation initiated for crime organizations that are beyond borders should not be limited to the jurisdiction of that country; international police cooperation should be exploited actively for the purpose of exposing the crime organization with all its tentacles” (KOM, 2010).
Similarly, at the 52nd session of the CND in 2009, Turkey stated:

“Turkey regards the Political Declaration as an expression of a universal commitment to create a more cooperative political climate in our battle with this global threat. On its part, Turkey will do its share on the international and domestic fronts, through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, to realize the balanced objectives set forth both in the Political Declaration and the Action Plan” (Ertay, 2009).

In TADOC's 2011 report, meanwhile, it is written that:

“strong international cooperation is vital to achieve success in fight against organised crime. Having strong belief in international cooperation, Turkey has supported every initiative aimed at combating drug trafficking at the international level” (TADOC, 2011).

These are just four examples of the public expression of Turkey’s determination to reach out to, and work with, other states’ law enforcement agencies. Similar assertions can be found in the many documents and statements published by Turkish authorities on this matter. The use of such language can also be interpreted as a way for Turkish authorities to signify that they wish their counterparts to be as willing to cooperate as they are.

The second element of recurrent discourse is that the Turkish authorities – in particular the police – have achieved a very high level of expertise and success with their investigations of drug trafficking. The easiest way to advertise this success is by highlighting that drug seizures in Turkey are among the highest in the world on a yearly basis. The Turkish representative at the CND in 2008 stated that:

“Turkey carried on her fight against illicit drug trafficking activities with an impetus and made record amount (more than 15 tons) of heroin seizures in 2008. In the World Drug Report 2008 of the UNODC it is stated that seizures in Turkey amounted to the 18% of the world’s whole heroin seizure in 2006” (Ertay, 2008, see also KOM, 2010: 5).

As statistics of seizure rates are published in the UNODC’s annual report, comparisons with other countries are easy to make (see for example KOM, 2011: XVI). However, the value of using seizure rates as an indicator of actual success in curbing trafficking is debatable because of the illicit nature of drug trafficking.
Knowing how much has *not* been seized and thus what proportion of the entire trade the seizures actually represent is virtually impossible.

More striking than the reference to seizure rates is the recurrence of the claim that Turkish police officers have very high levels of expertise and access to the most modern equipment. The reports of KOM emphasize the use of “modern investigative techniques”, and state that it has been professionalizing its work through “improved risk analysis, profiling methods and investments in modern policing techniques and methods” (KOM, 2006: foreword; 2007: 9). Reforms and modernization of the police force are also mentioned, as in the 2011 annual report:

> “having renewed and developed itself in all respects in recent years [the police] performs its tasks [with] exemplary dynamism and productivity in all aspects with its fully fledged manpower, fast adaptation of advanced technology into its daily routine and a professional concept of policing” (KOM, 2011: XIII).

The third element of discourse, which follows from the first two, is that Turkey is in a favourable position to share its expertise by training other police forces. It positions such offers as a gesture towards enhancing global efforts against illicit drug trafficking:

> “Special importance is also given to training co-operation beside operational and strategic co-operation in fighting organised crime. The Turkish international Academy against Drugs and organised Crime, established in the year 2000, has filled in a big gap regionally and internationally on personnel training” (KOM, 2010: XI).

The activities of TADOC (studied in greater detail later) are shown to indicate the strength and determination of Turkey not only in the fight against illicit drug trafficking, but also its willingness to do so in cooperation with other states. Thus, there seems to be a conscientious effort made by Turkey to publicize its own drug enforcement work as something beneficial not only for Turkey, but also for other states.
8.2.2 Turkey’s international activity at the strategic and operational levels

In line with its public position, Turkey is actively engaged in international cooperation at the strategy, policy and operational levels. It participates first and foremost in the CND: it has been a member of the 53-seat forum continuously from 1997 to 2009, and in 2011 it was elected once more for a four-year term.\textsuperscript{11} Turkey’s participation in the work of the Commission evolved slightly in 2008 when it agreed not to present a resolution calling for support for “traditional and established supplier countries”, as it had in previous years. Entitled “The need for a balance between demand for and supply of opiates used to meet medical and scientific needs”, this resolution had been co-sponsored by Turkey and India (the two traditional suppliers of opiates according to the 1961 Single Convention), which meant that Turkey had played a lead role in the negotiation and adoption of that resolution by the Commission every year. According to a Turkish delegate to the UNODC, the decision to no longer put forward this resolution was due in part to the efforts made by member states of the commission to streamline its workload, and it was felt that it may not be necessary to engage in negotiations over this issue every year as it was not highly controversial (Turkish delegate to the UNODC, telephone interview, 2012). Nevertheless, by agreeing to drop this resolution from the CND’s agenda, Turkey sent a signal that it does not wish to draw attention to its status as a traditional opiate supplier, and that in its dealing with the CND it prefers focusing on trafficking, the central theme of its declarations.

Turkey is also striving to be amongst the countries that have most influence over international drug control. Following three years of negotiations (interview with Sumru Noyan, Ankara, 2011), Turkey became a member of the Major Donor Group of the UNODC in 2005. This is an informal group of the 21 largest donors of the UNODC, which monitors how the institution is run and has an unofficial say in its policy decisions. Membership of the Major Donor Group requires states to make a larger contribution to the organization’s general budget than to specific projects. In Turkey’s case, this latter part is focussed mainly on activities in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and more recently Africa (Turkish delegate to the UNODC, telephone interview, 2012). This newfound interest in Africa can be explained by the fact that during the last few years West Africa has emerged as a hub for cocaine trafficking from South America to Europe (Cornolli, 2011). One of the trafficking methods identified is the use of 'mules', or 'air couriers', who ingest the drugs and fly from West African cities to Istanbul, from where the drugs are redirected to Western European markets (interviews with KOM director and with Danish liaison officer, Ankara, 2011). This has also led to Istanbul being identified as an emerging hub for cocaine trafficking, and seizures have increased dramatically (KOM, 2011: 20).

Turkey also participates in the work of a range of other institutions fighting against drugs (besides EMCDDA, as detailed in the previous chapter), including the Pompidou Group of the Council of Europe, the Paris Pact (which deals specifically with the traffic of Afghan originated opiates), the organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCDE), the Southeast Europe Law Enforcement Centre (SELEC, known as the Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative until
October 2011), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization (BSEC), and the Drug Control Coordination Unit of the Economic Cooperation organization (ECO) (KOM, 2011). It is also an observer of the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre, which is a drug control cooperation project established by the UNODC in Central Asia.

However, for the most part, law enforcement cooperation occurs at the level of police work itself, in the form of intelligence sharing for investigations led by another country. To facilitate such exchange of information, states tend to rely on bilateral security agreements and increasingly assign liaison officers to foreign countries. By 2000, Turkey had signed 54 bilateral agreements and assigned 6 liaison officers abroad. By 2011 a total of 86 agreements were in place and the number of Turkish liaison officers assigned abroad had increased to 22 – although this increase only took place after 2005, as there were only 5 liaison officers on duty that year (KOM, 2000: 69; KOM, 2005: 115; KOM, 2011: 76). Since 2012, the Turkish government has been working on new legislation to create a legal framework for the appointment of liaison officers in 170 countries (almost every country in the world). Furthermore, since 1997 the Turkish legal system has allowed its police force to take part in controlled deliveries, which are inter-state operations through which consignments of illicit drug are followed throughout their journey in order for the police forces of the various countries involved to investigate and bring down entire trafficking networks. For each state taking part, this investigative technique must be clearly defined by law, as it obliges the police forces of countries through which consignments are ‘only’ transiting not to make arrests. This tactic is recommended in Article 11 of the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention, the 2000 Convention on Transnational Organised Crime
and the 2003 Convention on Corruption, though not all states have adjusted their legal systems accordingly (EMCDDA, 2010). The TNP has led 96 international controlled delivery operations and 107 international investigations (KOM, 2011: 21).

Working with other police forces has thus become an accepted method of investigation for the TNP, and one that the government has been willing to facilitate by signing bilateral cooperation agreements. Whilst such agreements also provide for cooperation in areas unrelated to drugs or organised crime, in practice most of the requests concern drug trafficking and/or organised crime. This is why it can be argued that KOM acts as the international window of the TNP – a claim made by liaison officers posted in Turkey – while other departments of the police are far less prone to working with international counterparts (interviews with liaison officers of Denmark, Italy and the UK, Ankara, 2011).

KOM, then, seems to stand out as an elite department within the TNP. Liaison officers noted that it is made up of officers selected for their professionalism and dedication and uses the most modern equipment available to the TNP. Some European liaison officers also expressed a belief that KOM most probably worked with superior equipment to that available to most European police forces (Interview with liaison officers of Denmark, UK and Germany, Ankara: 2011). Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that efforts are being made to ensure that KOM has the means to work on an equal footing with international counterparts, and to ensure that it has sufficient resources to carry out its duties.

Turkey’s commitment and its efforts are also recognised by its partners, who acknowledge its competence (Bozkurt, 2009). In 2011, for example, Nigel Kirby,
the Head of Drug Intelligence at UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) highlighted the role of Turkey’s law enforcement when he explained that the reason for a shortage of heroin in Britain was due to successful law enforcement, especially on the part of the TNP. The most significant reason for the shortage was identified as:

“concerted and sustained law enforcement action. That's law enforcement action with partners overseas in Afghanistan, seizing the drugs and traffickers, that's law enforcement action in Turkey particularly, with our colleagues and liaison officers over there, at the border and in the UK. We've had concerted efforts against the traffickers, against the drugs, against their money and we believe that is one of the main reasons there is now a heroin shortage in the UK. […] We've worked hard on identifying the major traffickers in Turkey for example, gave that to the Turkish National Police, they've been very professional about it and they've tackled the traffickers in their country, they've tackled the drugs, they've given us their intelligence and in turn we've looked at the organizations in the UK that have been operating with them and putting that back, that information, back up into Afghanistan when necessary. So that there has been a concerted effort of sharing intelligence, sharing information and working together to tackle the trade, not just one person, but the main people behind it, the source of the drugs and the routing, and of course the money behind it” (Kirby, 2011).

Similarly, in 2011 the Home Affairs Committee of the British House of Commons reported positively on Turkey’s contributions to the fight drug trafficking and organised crime in Europe. It noted the high levels of appreciation the TNP had been receiving from both SOCA and EUROPOL:

“There are three bodies responsible for policing in Turkey (…). Mr Coates [SOCA] had high praise for the Turkish National Police: They are efficient, professional and competent. They have high-end capabilities and technical capability. Mr Wainwright [Europol] was also complimentary: From my relatively narrow perspective of what I see of the Turkish authorities’ dealings with the European Union, including Europol, I am impressed by the commitment and energy” (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2011: 12).

Ukrainian authorities have also given state medals to Turkish police officers for their involvement in heroin seizures on Ukrainian territory (Güneç, 2008). The apparent ease which Turkey is now cooperating with international partners and the praise it has gained from other states raises questions about whether this has resulted from changes to its methods of cooperating. This can be assessed at two levels: the legal framework and police practice. Legally speaking, several
legislative changes have been made in order to harmonize Turkey’s legal system with international practices, such as the aforementioned controlled deliveries. Other practices, such as the sale or purchase of illicit drugs by undercover officers, which are commonly carried out by DEA agents, is prohibited. The current legal framework allows Turkey to work well with countries using a common law system (which is largely uncodified legal procedure) while maintaining a civil law system (which is entirely codified), although these two systems vary greatly in the ways in which police can investigate crime and collect evidence. This has helped to maintain smooth working relationships with countries that use the former, such as the United States and the UK, as well as countries using the latter such as the Germany, France, Italy and most other European countries. (interviews with Italian, German, Danish, and UK liaison officers, Ankara, 2011).

As Turkey has a common law system, police can only carry out investigations under the authority of a prosecutor and its independent powers are limited, whereas in civil law systems the police have more extensive independent powers to carry out investigations. The use of certain methods such as relying on informants or infiltrating organised crime groups is much more restricted in common law systems than in civil law systems (when it is not prohibited altogether), meaning that evidence produced through these methods is not always admissible in all judicial systems. To ensure the prosecution of crimes that involve more than one jurisdiction and different judicial systems, then, it is important that law enforcement agencies ensure the methods they use are acceptable to all. In terms of police practice, liaison officers interviewed agreed that their Turkish counterparts were more often than not willing to do their best to
share available intelligence and guarantee that joint operations could take place even when facing obstacles, such as guaranteeing that evidence can be accepted in the courts of different jurisdictions. The impression given was that Turkey had not modelled its drug enforcement on that of another state, but that it had adapted its legislation and practice in such a way that effective cooperation with all partners is possible (irrespective of those partner's legal systems).

As noted in Chapter Seven, the EU’s decision to classify the PKK as a terrorist organization functioned as a catalyst for the intensification of cooperation between Turkish and European police forces on drug trafficking cases. This makes it possible to argue that the first and foremost motive of the Turkish state in tackling drug trafficking has been to suppress the PKK’s main source of income in order to bring the entire organization down. This assumption, however, does not seem to be supported by evidence. It is clear that Turkish authorities are keen to emphasize that the PKK is directly involved in drug trafficking, because PKK members have been arrested on drug trafficking charges, and because drugs have been seized in caches together with weapons and propaganda material (see KOM reports, in particular KOM, 2011: 21, 40). However, evidence has been found to determine that Turkey’s drug enforcement efforts are motivated solely or primarily by the state’s desire to dismantle the PKK. The Director of TADOC argued that Turkey’s drug enforcement policy was a by-product of the state’s fight against organised crime, which was stepped up following the Susurluk scandal, and is not directly related to the fight against terrorism, which has been in place for many years:

“I think that Turkey’s drug policy has developed as by-product of combating organised crime and mafia. I believe that neither the Turkish government nor the TNP had a counter drug policy until recently. However, Turkey has always had an anti-terror policy since 1990s. (...) After the Susurluk scandal and 1999 there was a strong policy to dismantle
the mafia groups. I think that was the main drive for the development of KOM
department. To be able to stop the mafia, KOM was strengthened and once they were
finished with the mafia problems they also focused on drugs, and on financial crimes and
cybercrimes. From my point of view especially for the last 5 - 6 years, after 2005, Turkey
became very successful on drugs and it is because KOM department waged a successful
fight against the mafia and won it then it focused on drugs” (Director of TADOC,
Ankara, 2011).

Likewise, although for many years European police forces usually had the
impression that requests for cooperation emanating from Turkish authorities were
made in connection to the PKK (interviews with French and Danish liaison
officers, Ankara, 2011), this trend has disappeared after 2000. The representative
of SOCA (UK) noted that he rarely worked on the same cases as the British
liaison officer for terrorism based in Ankara (interview with SOCA liaison

To conclude this section, it appears that the concerns Turkey has raised in
international forums regarding drugs and its commitment to curb trafficking has
been matched by the resources it allocates to the issue. Its status as a major donor
to the UNODC is symbolic of this, and the fact that KOM has gained high levels
respect among its counterparts shows it is seen as a trusted partner. The next
section examines Turkey’s involvement in international capacity building on anti-
drug trafficking and organised crime.

8.2.3 TADOC

Formed in 2000 through collaboration with the UNODC, the Turkish
International Academy against Drugs and Organised Crime (TADOC) is a
training centre falling under the auspices of the Turkish police. Its 2011 Activities
Report states that the centre has trained over 4,000 law enforcement personnel
from 84 countries and almost 20,000 Turkish police officers in matters relating to
drug enforcement and investigating organised crime.
TADOC is now seen as the flagship of the TNP’s international outreach, thus it is useful to review the history of its creation and how it functions. In the late 1990s, the UNDCP\textsuperscript{12} initiated discussions for the establishment of a regional training academy for drugs and crime in one of the countries on the trafficking routes from Central Asia to Europe. This academy was to function in a manner similar to the DEA’s international academies, and provide drug enforcement training for law enforcement officers in the surrounding countries in the hope that it would help curb trafficking on these routes. It was initially proposed to open the institution in a Balkan or Eastern Europe country, but in 1999 the Turkish capital city Ankara was chosen. There seem to be several factors explaining this choice. Firstly, at the time Turkey was trying to change the nature of its collaboration with the UNODC: until then it had generally been thought of as a country in need of assistance from the organization, but for some time it had been felt that the assistance received was inadequate (interview with Sumru Noyan, Ankara, 2011). For example, there were years when border control equipment was donated but was left unused because it was not needed by the Turkish authorities, who already had similar equipment (Ibid.). When the UNODC proposed the establishment of the training academy in Turkey, the Minister of Interior Sadettin Tantan allocated a building in Ankara, the refurbishment of which was entirely paid for by the “Foundation to Strengthen the Turkish Police” – a not-for-profit organization linked to the police. This move, coupled with the support of the United States and the lobbying of Sumru Noyan, a former Turkish Ambassador who at the time was working as the Deputy Director of the UNODC, convinced the UNODC to choose Turkey as the host for the academy (interviews with: Sumru Noyan, first Director of TADOC).

\textsuperscript{12} The UNDCP became the UNODC in 2002. See chapter 2, footnote 1.
Furthermore, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported the establishment of this training academy:

“They thought that strategically the creation of TADOC in Turkey would help to increase the visibility of Turkey in the international arena, that it would increase Turkey’s influence in the region and globally, and that it would increase Turkey’s capacity to take initiatives in the international arena in the future” (First Director of TADOC, 2012).

TADOC functioned as a joint project of the UNODC and the TNP between its opening in 2000 and 2005, but the financial support by the UNODC was gradually phased out. The academy has been funded entirely by the Turkish government since 2005. Initially, it was strongly supported by the DEA as well as the law enforcement forces of several European states. Through the UNODC, the DEA covered the costs of running the academy during its first two years, and the UK's SCIS (formerly SOCA) covered the expenses for the following two years (Ibid.). Course curricula were designed in collaboration with American, British, French and German experts. In the centre's early years, trainers from several European countries and the DEA were regularly invited: this practice continues today, but is much more infrequent (interviews with liaison officers, Ankara, 2011).

TADOC hosts four research centres on drugs and organised crime, but is first and foremost a training centre. Under the bilateral security agreements Turkey has signed with other countries, it delivers training to police forces of countries in the Middle East, Central Asia, Asia and Africa. In 2011 alone, participants from 30 countries received such training (KOM, 2011: 61). In addition to its activities in Ankara, it has created mobile training teams and has concluded agreements with several organizations for the training of police forces outside Turkey. For example, under the umbrella of the NATO-Russia Council, TADOC is charged
with the anti-drug training of Afghan and Pakistani police, as well as those in some Central Asian States (usually in the countries concerned or in Russia). TADOC also has a team in Afghanistan, providing training for the Afghan police under an agreement with the UK's SOCA and a team training Central Asian police in Kazakhstan under an agreement with the DEA. Along with the OSCE, TADOC has also developed training modules for Kosovan police and delivered training for Balkans states (OSCE, 2012).

Extending its reach away further than Turkey and the trafficking routes of Afghan originated opium, TADOC has also made an agreement with the 'Colombo Plan' – an organization of sixteen East and South East Asian countries (KOM, 2011). TADOC is involved in their latest project: a NATO and Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) led initiative to training Afghan police cadets at a vocational police school in Sivas. Five hundred cadets graduated in June 2011 and more were trained in 2012 (Sivas Police School, 2012). TADOC has therefore successfully established itself at international level and is capable of reaching audiences beyond Turkey’s immediate neighbours.

The success of TADOC is highly regarded both in and beyond Turkey; and its diplomatic value is widely acknowledged. As its first Director noted:

“TADOC is an important institution for Turkey to develop Turkey’s influence in the region. I know from my own experience that TADOC and its efforts were highly appreciated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They think that it increases Turkey’s influence in the region and in the world in the area of law enforcement. They are proud of TADOC and they praise it” (interview with the First Director of TADOC, 2012).

The use of TADOC’s services is advantageous for the DEA and SOCA particularly because Turkey has cultural and linguistic connections with the countries of Central Asia, which is thought to help establish trust and understanding during the delivery of training. The SOCA representative in
Ankara admitted that they had an agreement with TADOC for the training of Afghan intelligence officers. He stated that “not only is the training good but also SOCA understands that the Turks have privileged cultural connections we do not have to influence others” (interview with SOCA liaison officer, Ankara, 2011). Turkish police training is therefore becoming increasingly widespread in Central Asia, and most of all in Afghanistan. A DEA official remarked that “Turkey now has the best trainers in Afghanistan” (interview with DEA officials, Ankara, 2011). Interestingly, while the representatives of the DEA, SOCA and other foreign police forces seem to see the cultural connection as a strategic asset helping to ensure that the 'foreign intervention' of international training is well received, it seems that within Turkey this task was conceived of more as a responsibility. Some of the officials interviewed spoke of a regional and historical responsibility, connecting this to the Ottoman Empire; others spoke of an international humanitarian responsibility attached to Turkey’s role as a honourable member of the international community (interviews with senior Turkish police officers).

The TNP's latest project is the development of a new International Police Training Centre forecasted to accommodate 3,000 students. This seems to epitomise Turkey’s strategic desire to become a world leader in law enforcement. The new centre is planned to be completed in 2014 at an estimated cost of 200 million Turkish Lira (approximately USD 110 million). The Turkish state has invested heavily because it foresees positive outcomes at more than one level: its own police and foreign police forces will be better trained, and Turkey’s status as a strong actor on security issues will be reinforced. The project’s description states in unequivocal terms that:
“The target is that Turkey will become a leader in the area of security first in its region and in the world and Ankara will be a national and international capital of security. The creation of the International Police Training Centre will enable Turkey to share the extensive knowledge and experience that it has had for long time with law enforcement agencies of other states and Turkey will have an important role in determining the international security policies. (...) The vision of international trainings of the TNP will be redefined. Thus, in compliance with Turkey’s foreign policy, the TNP will rise to leading position in the area of security training in its region and in the world. The International Police Training Centre will constitute an international platform where foreign police officers who are experts in their field will deliver trainings and share their knowledge therefore Turkey will play an important and active role in the creation of an international concept of police work”. (Turkish National Police, 2011).

It is therefore clear that this project brings Turkey’s willingness to engage in international police cooperation to the fore. It also suggests that it has gained significant confidence in the excellent capacity of its law enforcement force, to the point of considering it as one of the elements defining its identity within the international community.

Since 2005, Turkey has demonstrated that it has matched its official policy with practical steps to combat drug trafficking. KOM has been equipped with human and technical resources at a high level and its success is widely acknowledged in Turkey and beyond. Moreover, by financing the UNODC’s activities, attracting police trainees from a great variety of countries to TADOC and investing in the International Police Training Centre, Turkey is actively engaging in international capacity building. This is in stark contrast with how it behaved prior to 2005 and in particular prior to the Susurluk scandal in 1996. The following section proposes an explanation of this change of behaviour.

8.3 Explaining Turkey’s attitude with a socialization micro-process analysis

This section consists of an analysis of Turkey’s drug enforcement approach using Johnston’s theory of micro-processes of socialization. Whereas in Chapters Six and Seven it was proposed to combine the analysis of external influences of the United States and the EU from rationalist perspectives, in this chapter the focus is
on the domestic, sub-level state only. It is argued that socialization micro-
processes can offer a sufficient explanation of Turkey’s behaviour.

8.3.1 Evidence of a micro-process of persuasion

A critical examination of the facts presented in the previous section indicates that
since 2005 Turkish authorities appear to have become convinced that the norms
of the international drug regime not only benefit Turkey but are consistent with
the country's identity (Johnston, 2008: 22). This seems to resonate with Johnston's
concept of 'persuasion', which he defines as having:

“to do with cognition and the active assessment of the content of a particular message. As
a microprocess of socialization, it involves changing minds, opinions, and attitudes about
causality and affect (identity) in the absence of overtly material or mental coercion”
(Johnston, 2008: 155).

There are an abundance of studies referring to persuasion processes but, as
Johnston and Checkel note, these are less clear on how persuasion occurs
(Checkel, 2005: 7). Johnston suggests three channels through which an actor can
be persuaded. Firstly:

“s/he engages in a high-intensity process of cognition, reflection and argument” about the
content of the information at stake. Secondly […] when the actor has a relationship to the
persuadee, s/he looks for clues about the nature of this relationship to judge the
legitimacy of the arguments presented, so that information from a persuadee that is
“liked” is more convincing than that from one that is disliked. Thirdly, […] the
persuasiveness of a message may be a function of characteristics of the persuadee
himself” (Johnston, 2008: 156-157).

These three channels of persuasion seem to have been at play in Turkey. While it
is virtually impossible to precisely weigh their respective importance, it is argued
here that the first channel – which Johnston calls the 'central route' – may have
carried the least weight of the three.

The first channel of persuasion, which utilizes cognition, reflection and argument
is visible in Turkey’s official discourse on illicit drugs and trafficking because it
is highly consistent with the normative arguments of the international drug regime. In fact, the official position of Turkey on illicit drugs has been in line with the norms of the regime from the moment it joined the International Opium Convention in 1933 (Robins, 2008: 632; interview with Sumru Noyan, Ankara, 2011). In practice, however, Turkey’s behaviour did not converge with this official position until the end of the 1990s (see Chapter Seven, above).

What appears to have developed in recent years is a process of reflection, leading to a state where the general norms of the drug regime – such as the fact that illicit drugs in themselves are a threat to human, national and international security; and that they can only be curtailed through international cooperation, have become engrained. Several liaison officers in Ankara argued that Turkey has strong views regarding the harm caused by drugs and this was confirmed by interviews with Turkish officials. Comparing drug trafficking to crimes against humanity is common, for example. Such strong opinions indicate that a deep-rooted belief in the harmfulness of drugs for individuals supersedes concerns about the risks for states caused by organised criminal groups that are involved in trafficking.

Furthermore, as the Director of TADOC notes, Turkey’s national drug policy is a by-product of its organised crime policy, and it seems that it only in recent years have illicit drugs been seen as a problem distinct from organised crime (interview with the Director of TADOC, Ankara, 2011). This is becoming a more pressing concern, with the fear that Turkey may become a country with high drug consumption levels increasing. To counter this fear, strong supply reduction methods are preferred, building on a belief that the prohibitionist approach's success in keeping the domestic consumption market small means it should be continued.
Thus, even if Turkey is currently strengthening the prevention and treatment aspect of its policies, demand reduction responses remain limited. Until the creation of TUBIM in 2002, there was little in the way of expertise on this issue (interview with the former Director of TUBIM, Ankara, 2011). In 2007, a National Strategy for Organised Crime was adopted separately from the national drug strategy, which has been developed according to the EU drug strategy. This reveals that there is an acceptance of two distinct problems: drugs are not simply a trade of organised crime. It also reveals a strong belief that continuing to fight trafficking will prevent Turkey's domestic drug market from growing. Therefore, perceptions about the harmfulness of drugs and the righteousness of limiting their availability are consistent with the central prohibitive norm of the global drug control system.

The second channel of persuasion focuses on the relationship between an actor and a persuadee. It can be argued the fact that Turkey has been reinforcing its presence in international institutions (notably the UN) means that it has not been able to stray from the norms of the drug regime that the UN promotes. Turkey has been a member of the group of major donors to the UNODC since 2004, and was elected as a member of the Security Council for the years 2009 and 2010. In this context, it would be extremely difficult for Turkish representatives not to endorse the position of the international drug regime, which is supported by the UN. As a member of the major donor group, Turkey has undertaken the responsibility to uphold the norms and values of the regime, and these norms and values have gradually become taken for granted. Moreover, it is worth noting that, in recent

13 The UN Security Council is composed of five permanent members and ten non-permanent members, which are elected for two years. See for further details: http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/.
years, Turkish authorities have largely been represented by KOM staff at international drug and crime forums rather than diplomats. Arguably, the reasoning for this is that police officers are best placed to discuss matters of law enforcement, but it also means that police officers are put in direct contact with the institutions of the international regime rather than through the filter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a result, they internalized the norms, values, rules and working methods of the regime.

The third channel, whereby persuasion is a function of the characteristics of the persuadee themselves, also appears to have played an instrumental role in this case, with KOM most frequently embodying the role of persuadee. In Chapter Seven, it was noted that from 2000 onwards a renewal of management and personnel in KOM was decisive in the adoption of a new working culture, characterised by a greater willingness to reach out to international partners and a greater ease in working in this manner. This was viewed positively by senior management and so officers pursued it because it would be advantageous for their own careers. Drug control is also incentivised by a system of bonuses paid to officers involved in drug seizures, contributing to the commitment of officers to that task (interviews with senior police officers, Ankara, 2011, 2012). In 2004, these bonuses were doubled and seizures of synthetic drugs also qualified for bonus payments, which had initially been restricted to heroin seizures (Güneç, 2003). Once again, it is highly likely that this incentive generated a virtuous cycle whereby the apparent effectiveness in the policy of increasing drug seizures reinforced the beliefs in its effectiveness. Thus, it seems that a process of self-persuasion and self-interest was set in motion. As a result of apparent success in practice (in the form of high seizure rates and in the form of recognition by
international partners), the process of self-persuasion turned into what Johnston calls a “most durable and self-reinforcing pro-social behavior” (Johnston, 2008: 26).

A combination of these three micro-processes of socialization appears, then, to have contributed to the internalization of the international drug regime's norms and values. These are now considered “normal, given, and normatively correct” (Johnston, 2008: xxv), and there is a sense that upholding them is an important responsibility.

8.3.2 The re-definition of Turkey’s role in the drug regime

Turkey has traditionally been perceived as a country of transit for drugs. Its geographical location accounts for the persistence of that notion, yet the country’s licit poppy production and its domestic drug use are mentioned far less frequently.

A major aim of Turkish authorities for the past decade or so has been to modify Turkey’s reputation from being seen as a country with porous borders where drug trafficking was widespread, easy and uncontrollable – to a country that has had success in disrupting this traffic, such that traffickers have been forced to divert to other routes. This reputation seems to be the key to understanding why Turkey appears increasingly committed to the norms of the international drug regime.

Joshi’s analysis of honour in international relations is useful to understand how such reputational concerns can matter greatly (Joshi, 2008). Honour, he explains, is composed of both negative and positive elements. The negative aspect is more easily identifiable, and can be defined as an aversion to humiliation, or being regarded as unreliable and inconsistent. Positive honour, however, is pursued in three ways: the maintenance of a stable image; the pursuance of eminence and
prestige; and the pursuance of a “specialized and recognised role” (Joshi, 2008: 10). Chapter Seven has already shown that the Turkish authorities worked hard to shake off Turkey’s poor reputation as a country with porous borders and untrustworthy law enforcement; whilst it was noted earlier in this chapter that this initial bad reputation has been overcome and that foreign law enforcement forces have radically changed their view about the integrity of the TNP. Nevertheless, by investing so heavily in developing training for foreign police forces, Turkey also shifts towards the pursuit of a “specialized and recognised role”. More importantly, it does so by capitalising on its newly acquired good reputation; and its success in disrupting drug trafficking and seizing drugs. This suggests that there is a discourse developing, according to which Turkey deserves to be accepted as the provider of international law enforcement training because it is successful on the home front.

When presented with the opportunity to host the UN-sponsored international academy (which ultimately became TADOC) and to be a provider of international police training, Turkey keenly accepted the offer because the decision-makers quickly understood that it would reinforce the police’s and the country’s credibility (interview with: Director of TADOC, Ankara, 2011; First Director of TADOC, 2012). Thus, the fact that this training centre has been success plays a key role in the way in which Turkish authorities have constructed the country’s role and responsibility internationally. The idea that Turkey is a country committed to drug trafficking is integral to the image it wants to promote. Thus, whilst it may suffer from an illicit trade because of its location between producing and consumption countries, it is keen to highlight that it has the capacity to disrupt illicit drug trafficking and that it takes this responsibility seriously.
It could be argued that by presenting itself as tough on drug trafficking, Turkey is merely following the rules of the international drug regime. Was this the case, Turkey’s behaviour would simply be the result of a thorough internalization of the regime's norms. However, this seems to be too simple an explanation of the position Turkish authorities are establishing for themselves within the international drug regime. Indeed, the basis for international cooperation in the fight drug trafficking is the principle of collective responsibility: one that is held in common and shared between states. This appeared in 1984, in the UN Declaration on the Control of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse, and again in the 1998 Political Declaration adopted at the UN General Assembly special session (UNODC, 2007: 206). It refers to the “moral obligation that countries with high levels of drug consumption (consumer countries) should assist countries with high levels of drug production (the traditional supplier or producer countries)” (Kamminga, 2011). Strictly speaking, this principle means that states have a responsibility to combat illicit drugs either as consumer country or as producer country – but although it is routinely mentioned in international agreements and declarations since its emergence thirty years ago, exactly what it entails remains unclear. At the 2012 session of the CND, it was mentioned that:

> “an operational definition of the principle of common and shared responsibility was lacking, as was a definition of the extent of each country’s responsibilities and commitments in the fight against illicit drugs, and more work was needed in order to clarify the concept of common and shared responsibility” (Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 2012: 38).

As Turkish authorities tend to frame Turkey’s dealing with drugs around trafficking and fail to mention the ongoing licit poppy production or domestic drug use, they are effectively interpreting the principle in a particular manner in order to establish their responsibility as a transit country. This has implications, because there is room for interpretation regarding what the moral obligations and
responsibilities of drug transit countries are. Even more importantly, it reveals how Turkish authorities are not just emphasising Turkey’s compliance with the prescriptions of the regime, but the distinct (and possibly unique) manner in which compliance is achieved. In this sense, they have cast themselves in a special role within the international drug regime: a state that is successful in disrupting drug trafficking so that it has a responsibility to help others in this task.

8.3.3 Explaining Turkey’s behaviour through a logic of gaining attention and recognition

Johnston's concept of persuasion and the fact that Turkey has internalised the norms and values of the international drug regime seem insufficient to explain why Turkey has invested so much in international law enforcement training. Blatter's theory of performance as a causal mechanism of social interaction is useful here, and seems to provide a more complete understanding of Turkey’s behaviour as it is articulated around the idea of actors as 'role-makers' rather than 'role-takers' (Blatter, 2009), which corresponds better to the process described above. Blatter’s theory of performance, which he sees as an alternative to mainstream regime theory, is conceptualised as follows:

“Social actors are seen not so much as norm conforming role-takers whose social orientation depends on the internalization of established community values. Instead, they are conceptualized as creative role-makers, who strive for an attractive image connecting her/him to current cultural and communicative trends in the social environment. Since meanings and identities are not stable structures (but instead have to be permanently reproduced and re-presented), rituals, symbolic actions and projects, staging, branding and other theatrical performances are increasingly important to make meanings and identities visible. A performance is an “event,” an activity through which presence is created. Social interaction as performance does not follow the logic of appropriateness, but the logic of gaining attention” (Blatter, 2009: 101).

What this theoretical framework helps to explain is the importance of the symbolic motivations behind policy decisions. Thus, Turkey's recent turn towards
leadership in international law enforcement training can be seen to be motivated by symbolic concerns as much as by a desire to maintain the good reputation it has established. With TADOC taking charge of training an increasing number of foreign law enforcement organizations, and with the planned development of an International Police Training Centre in Ankara, Turkey positions itself as a country with valuable expertise and experience to share. Through this, it seeks to influence 'beneficiary' countries. Thus, Turkey's real motivation is not to increase the efficiency of the international drug control regime, but is to gain influence on security matters.

Turkey, then, is seeking to gain recognition internationally as a state with significant political power. The aim is to establish a long term relationship with, and credibility within, other states – and whilst this begins in the field of law enforcement, Turkey has aspirations to extend this influence to other areas. For example, Minister of Interior Güler has argued that the work of Turkish police liaison officers abroad grew into an “efficient instrument of Turkish foreign policy” (Turkish National Police, 2013).

To conclude this section, it appears that for the period under review, utilizing the concept of micro-processes of socialization can provide an adequate analysis of Turkey's increasing role in the international drug control regime. Moving away from the rationalist tradition of enquiry has highlighted that Turkey’s behaviour is driven to a great extent by reputational concerns. Thus, the reasons for Turkey’s push to become a leading country in training and learning on policing and security are likely to extend well beyond this specific issue-area, as Bozkurt argues:

“the Turkish army and police presence in other countries as part of multilateral or bilateral commitments (…) helps shore up Turkish diplomatic clout in a number of
regions, setting the stage for a windfall profit in terms of political capital that later may be cashed in for economic benefits” (Bozkurt, 2012).

8.4 ConclusionBy focusing on the post-2005 period, this Chapter has explained how and why Turkey has become a strong supporter of the international drug regime. It suggests that Turkey has carved a role for itself within that regime and intends to nurture and develop this role. It is also argued that the motivations behind this move have been a concern for its reputation and – in recent years – a belief that it can capitalise on its acquired good reputation in this issue-area to influence other states on a broader spectrum of security matters. In other words, Turkey has found self-interested reasons to support this regime. To some extent, the analysis made in this chapter resonates with theories developed by Deflem and Walker (discussed in Chapter Four), in which it is argued that law enforcement agencies are more likely to cooperate internationally when they have access to adequate, modern police technologies; and when they had developed a vested interest in expanding and consolidating their own structure (Deflem, 2002a, 2002b and 2010; Walker, 2000 and 2008). These two elements can be observed in the Turkish case.

The findings in this chapter are likely to be relevant beyond this case study in the context of the study of international regimes in general. Indeed, the scenario uncovered corresponds to one that Young and Levy envisaged as one of the behavioural pathways indicative of regime effectiveness (Young, 1999: 1-32), – as analysed in Chapter Five. In their study of environmental regimes, they posited that regimes could “operate at the constitutive level, shaping identities (and therefore the interests) of actors and, in the process influencing the way actors behave as occupants of the roles to which they are assigned” (Young, 1999: 25). Undoubtedly, the international drug regime seems to be one in which states are
almost automatically allocated a role: each country is designated as a place of production, transit or consumption – despite the fact that no country falls neatly into just one category. To a considerable degree, these three roles condition the behaviour that is expected of each state in its approach to the drug problem.

This chapter has also demonstrated that Turkey has been able to re-define its position and role within the regime, since it seems to have largely overcome being defined by its traditional role as a supplier of licit opiates. Thus, the model proposed by Young and Levy seems validated in this case in the sense that the international drug regime has been effective: it has influenced the behaviour of Turkey by providing it with a space in which it has established a special role within the international community.

This chapter completed the case study analysis of this thesis. Whilst Chapters Six and Seven were aimed primarily at dispelling notions that modelling change in Turkey as a response to Americanization or Europeanization is sufficient, this chapter sought to present an alternative model focusing on domestic drivers for change. In doing so, it left rationalism aside and assumed a constructivist approach, combining the socialization micro-processes models of Johnston, Joshi and Blatter to build a valid explanation for this case study.

The general conclusion to the thesis that follows offers some final thoughts on the outcomes of this case and the way in which it fits within the literature on the internationalization of policing; IR scholarship regarding international norms diffusion; and the value of regime theory and the possibilities it offers to combine several research paradigms simultaneously.
Chapter 9: Conclusion

This thesis makes three main contributions to knowledge. Firstly, it tells the story of how Turkey’s law enforcement internationalized as a result of a change of approach to drug control in the years from its ratification of the UN Single Convention in the late 1960s to 2012. Secondly, it draws on this analysis to reflect on the mechanisms of international norm diffusion. In so doing it questions IR scholarship that has – at times – become overly reliant on research designs assessing the influence of the United States and the EU on phenomena and processes of interest beyond these territories. Thirdly, it explores the richness of regime theory in order to analyse states’ behavioural changes in given issue-areas. This conclusion brings together the various elements highlighted for each of these three levels.

9.1 Main contributions to knowledge

This thesis is first and foremost aimed at explaining the internationalization of Turkish law enforcement. It identified international drug control as a key case study, as this has served as the catalyst for the process of law enforcement internationalization. Chapter Three demonstrated that law enforcement has become the cornerstone of the international drug control regime. State parties to the three UN drug conventions have committed themselves to working together in order to suppress the trafficking of illicit drugs, and their law enforcement agencies have the responsibility to operationalize these commitments. In other words, states, as members of the international drug control regime, are required to engage their law enforcement agencies in international cooperation in order to
fulfil their obligations under the UN drug conventions. Chapter Four explained how international cooperation has gradually become integral to global policing. It noted that as the Cold War ended, and as technological advances made communication easier, states re-evaluated their security priorities. They found that organised crime groups and drug traffickers, whose activities disregarded national borders, represented threats to national security. To counter these borderless threats, law enforcement agencies found ways to overcome the limitations of their jurisdictional confines by integrating international cooperation into their working methods. DEA agents operating outside the United States were once the exception, but the presence of police liaison officers abroad and investigations involving law enforcement agencies from more than one country have now become the norm.

Chapters Six, Seven and Eight documented how Turkey progressed through these changes. Chapter Six showed that Turkish authorities put an end to the leakage of opium grown in the country into the illicit drug market. Two factors were highlighted as indicative of Turkey's desire to remain a privileged and trusted ally of the United States: its receptivity to the opium ban, and, once the ban was lifted, the emergence of a close working relationship between the DEA and the TNP. But as opium from Afghanistan began to flow across its borders towards European markets, and as Turkish and Kurdish organised crime groups emerged in Turkey and Western Europe, Turkish authorities did not make it their priority to fight against the ongoing traffic. In international diplomatic forums Turkey pledged that it was committed to drug control, but in practice collusion between its security agencies and Turkish organised crime group undermined these claims. From 1984 onwards, Turkey engaged in a military struggle against the PKK, and
terrorism trumped drug trafficking in the accusations brought against the organization. Turkey’s behaviour reveals a wide gap between its policy and its practice on drug control: despite wanting to appear committed to fighting trafficking, its drugs enforcement efforts were ineffective, to the point that the TNP’s relationships with its European counterparts were plagued by its poor reputation and a lack of trust. Chapter Seven showed that changes came about after 1996. This year was a watershed because the Turkish state re-evaluated both policy and practice on the issue of drugs. The National Security Council listed drug trafficking as a threat to national security, thereby joining the global trend in that direction (as identified in Chapter Three). At the practical level, the 1996 Susurluk scandal and the subsequent revelations of state collusion with organised crime rocked the Turkish political class the public opinion. It was the first in a series of major scandals that precipitated reforms, in particular within the TNP. This coincided with the beginning of reforms initiated in preparation for EU membership, which provided a number of opportunities for Turkish law enforcement authorities to work closely with European police agencies, in particular on matters related to drug trafficking. The TNP, and in particular KOM officers, started to use the issue of drugs to initiate collaborative activities, for example through twinning projects and working visits. They did so in order to acquire new skills and expertise as much as to restore the reputation of their organization with their counterparts. They also did so to raise their personal profiles within the police, hoping that acting as the initiators of successful international activities would facilitate career advancement. Progressively, their growing successes helped establish a new working culture within KOM, one of
reaching out to foreign counterparts and initiating further cooperation whenever possible.

Finally Chapter Eight argued that since 2005 the TNP has sought to capitalise on its newly-acquired good reputation in order to promote itself as a transmitter of expertise in the fight drug trafficking and organised crime. TADOC has developed into a successful international training centre, whilst the recent project to build an international police academy reveals Turkey’s ambition to be recognised as a state where law enforcement is of the highest international standards. A steady stream of training requests from countries in Central Asia, South East Asia and Africa guarantees that Turkish expertise will continue to spread for some time. Turkey seems not only to have embraced the norms and values of the international drug control regime by making the fight trafficking a law enforcement priority for itself, but also to have elevated its international capacity-building efforts on the issue to one of its defining features. This is aimed at further elevating its prestige in the hope that it will spill-over to other security issues.

At the second level, this analysis contributes to debates about methods of enquiry in IR scholarship. Establishing how change occurred over a period of 40 years has helped to make sense of Turkish law enforcement's embrace of international cooperation step by step. In order to piece together the multitude of elements that constitute the final puzzle (Alvesson and Karreman, 2011), it has proved necessary to challenge traditional explanatory frameworks whereby behavioural changes in states other than the United States or the EU are explained by elaborating on the relationship between that state and the United States or the EU. At this stage it should be noted that the necessity of undertaking this exercise revealed itself as a consequence of the interviews undertaken for this thesis, as
their preliminary findings did not match the researcher’s pre-understanding and expectations. Testing the level of influence by the United States and the EU on Turkey’s drug control policy is in line with mainstream international norm diffusion scholarship. According to Heilmann and Schulte-Kulkman, “domestic policy decisions are systematically examined for their links with prior policy choices made in other countries, international organizations, or multilateral agreements” (Heilmann and Schulte-Kulkman, 2011: 639). Indeed, the analysis in Chapter Six showed that military cooperation between the United States and Turkey during the Cold War played a crucial role in the way events unfolded both during and after the opium crisis when Turkey resumed poppy production. US financial and technical assistance since the 1970s has undoubtedly contributed to the development of the TNP. Similarly, Chapter Seven showed that EU pre-accession partnership funds have been used to finance twinning projects and joint activities between the Turkish authorities and their counterparts in the EU.

Nevertheless, this thesis has argued that the injection of funds and the introduction of policies from abroad are not sufficient to make a valid statement on causal mechanisms and outcomes (Heilmann and Schultke-Kolkman, 2011: 635-636, Johnston, 2008). Moreover, it argues that limiting the possibilities of causal mechanisms of change to US or EU influence on Turkey’s drug control policies are inadequate explanations that reflect “social pressures and convention-guided constraints” within IR scholarship. Alvesson and Karreman argue that:

“A researcher’s work can often be seen as an effect of the various social forces at play and the pressure to show coherent and convincing results. A persuasive study mobilizes and prioritizes empirical material that clearly supports one case” (Alvesson and Karreman, 2011: 10).

Western-centric and Eurocentric biases in IR research have been highlighted by many (Bilgin, 2011: 403). This thesis has attempted to deconstruct these biases
and present an alternative explanatory framework. Thus, it is hoped that this thesis will critically inform debates about the transformative impact of the EU on Turkey, which has become a well-established area of research since the 1999 decision to accept Turkey as an EU candidate (Bolukbaşi et al., 2010). While some have begun to question the analytical limits of Europeanization as a conceptual and analytical tool, this thesis develops this line of thought to question whether research into Turkey’s Europeanization might have developed because of academic fashion rather than evidence (Blavoukos and Oikonomou, 2012).

Finally, the third aspect to this thesis is theoretical. While this case study alone cannot attempt to lead to theory generation (indeed, this was not the intention of this project), it can contribute to debates about the mechanisms of regime effectiveness. Theory-oriented process tracing as a method of enquiry was used in this thesis in order to highlight what can be best explained by the different theoretical frameworks available within regime theory, and to propose alternative explanatory models to overcome weaknesses when they were brought to light. This thesis does not deploy the rivalry between theoretical frameworks in order to test which is the most robust. However, some conclusions can be drawn about the advantages presented by the socialization micro-process approach. It is argued that throughout the period analysed, Turkey’s behaviour on drug control has been characterized by micro-processes of mimicking, social influence, persuasion, and performance. Coming to this conclusion was made possible not by looking at Turkey as a unified actor, but by refining the analysis to the level of individuals who occupied positions that enabled them to make key decisions affecting policy and practice. As it has been necessary to bring the analysis to such a fine level of detail, it becomes clear that a rationalist perspective, which takes the state as unit
of analysis in international relations, could not have provided a satisfactory explanation for Turkey’s behaviour change. In this sense, it would seem this thesis' analysis has revealed weaknesses in neorealist and neoliberal theoretical frameworks, and that in general the analysis of regime effectiveness is one that needs to be conducted from a constructivist perspective if one hopes to yield a convincing theoretical explanation.

It should be noted, however, that conducting such fine analyses is not always possible. To be able to analyse the roles played by individuals in policymaking it is important to bear in mind personal tactical adaptations made with career progression in mind, including the ways that individuals seek to raise the international prestige of their institutions in order to benefit their careers. This is only possible when a researcher can conduct a large enough number of interviews with interviewees of different backgrounds and who have knowledge about the same events or sequence of events. This in turn reveals that the choice of theoretical framework can also depend on the method of enquiry and the availability of data. While there is a general trend towards increasing transparency in government policymaking processes, meaning data is increasingly made available, different issues and areas will be subject to varying levels of openness and accessibility, which may limit the comparability of results. This is also why this thesis mainly seeks to explain one specific process and recognizes the limits of its contribution to theory generation.

9.2 Areas for further study
This thesis has touched on some issues that fall beyond the scope of this research but would deserve further study. Firstly, because the object of study was the internationalization of Turkish law enforcement, this thesis focused on the law enforcement aspect of drug policy. Though the issue of drug use is evoked in Chapter Two and Chapter Seven, it is not analysed in detail. With the notable exception of Robins, there is a dearth of political science research into Turkey’s policies on drug demand and drug users. For him:

“Turkey has been more effective at using the drugs issue to create ties with international organizations, raising significant funds from a plethora of foreign agencies, and generating prestige abroad. It has been less successful in developing sound and effective systems against different aspects of illegal drugs at home. Whether greater success in this latter challenge is to be achieved will very much depend on the future administrative record of the responsible specialist agencies (Robins, 2009: 302).

On 11 July 2012, the Turkish Grand National Assembly ratified the cooperation agreement between Turkey and the EMCDDA, which had been pending for several years. It remains to be seen whether this ratification, which will allow Turkey to be fully integrated in the activities of EMCDDA will contribute to strengthening Turkey’s emerging drug demand policies. TUBIM’s 2012 report to EMCDDA includes a discussion on the future of Turkey’s policies:

“it is possible to say that a transition from a prohibitive regime to a medical intervention regime is currently [taking] place in Turkey. The judiciary system’s decisions that have paved the way for probation and treatment for addicts, in other words (...) that addicts should be in treatment centers and not in prisons, as well as the recognition of addiction as a disease and an important public health issue in the National Drug Strategy Document (2006-2012), are among the indications of this transition. Naturally, this transition process engenders the necessity to immediately reinforce Turkey’s existing treatment and rehabilitation capacity” (TUBIM, 2012: 30).

The process of change in Turkey’s drug demand policies is thus an area that could be studied further.

The second area that would be well served by further study is the claim made in Chapter Eight that Turkey is trying to become a regional, if not international, leader on law enforcement matters. Three aspects of this new development will
deserve particular attention. The first pertains to Turkey’s commitments with the Afghan National Police, in conjunction with Turkey’s role in the NATO presence in Afghanistan. While it seems that Turkey has been praised by other NATO partners, and in particular the United States, for its engagement in Afghanistan, the conditions of, and reasons for, Turkey’s willingness to be part of Afghanistan’s reconstruction are not well understood. Goldsmith and Sheptycki suggest that states which engage in training other police forces across regions are driven by “a choice between or combination of missionary idealism, humanitarian assistance and national self-interest” (Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2007: 10). Thus, further study of Turkey’s involvement in Afghanistan is needed in order to verify the extent to which this statement applies. The second aspect pertains to Turkey’s increasing interest in Africa. Aynete gives the following explanation regarding Turkey’s growing interest in Somalia:

“Moral authority that defines Ankara’s Islamic values; business opportunity that makes Turkey a raising global economic competitor and geo-strategic vision that is part of Ankara’s global roundabout ambition – a roundabout of different ideas, cultural, business, people and innovation” (Aynete, 2012, italics in the original text).

Whether Aynete’s assessment is valid in general for Turkey’s growing interest in Africa remains to be evaluated.

Thirdly, the fact that Turkey seems to be trying to raise its international profile by investing in policing should be reflected with reference to the fluctuation of understandings of 'national security' and 'international security'. In Turkey, the concept of 'national security' is undergoing redefinition (Bilgin and Cizre, 2011). This has largely been studied, however, with regard to the declining power the army holds over civilian institutions, with policing largely ignored. Yet it remains unclear whether military matters will retain priority over law enforcement matters in states’ definitions of national and international security. Goldsmith and
Sheptycki argue that after the Cold War, Western states have come to understand the police character of new national security threats (Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2007: 10), but the extent to which policing is increasingly linked to international security is unclear. It remains to be seen whether having effective police forces in places that often never had them will become a more important aspect of international security.

Finally, this study into the internationalization of Turkish policing has demonstrated that it is underpinned by a number of coincidental and sequential factors that do not lend themselves to a single theoretical explanation. The hypothesis of the Americanization of Turkey’s law enforcement helps to understand the period from the opium ban until the mid-1990s, whilst the hypothesis of its Europeanization helps to explain the period since, but the limits of their explanatory powers are easily observable. This internationalization process cannot be fully understood unless account is taken of domestic, sub-state issues, including the changing nature of organised crime and collusion with state institutions in Turkey, the behaviour of individuals within the TNP, and the discourse surrounding the shaping of Turkey’s reputation and its international identity.
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