THE ROLE OF NEUTRALISATION IN CONSUMERS' ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING

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To my grandma Zoe (1926 – 2006)

ABSTRACT

Consumers often behave in ways that are in apparent contradiction to their expressed ethical concerns (e.g. Carrigan and Attalla, 2001). In light of this, it is imperative that theories of consumer's ethical decision-making explain the ways in which people justify these acts to themselves and others. This thesis advances the concept of neutralisation (Sykes and Matza, 1957) in order to explore how individuals soften or eliminate the impact that counter-attitudinal and norm-contradictive behaviour can have upon their self-concept and social relationships.

A mixed method approach was adopted, comprising of two qualitative and two quantitative studies. The first qualitative study examined the applicability of neutralisation in consumers' support for the Fair Trade movement, a context which has been identified as of particular concern in previous research. Subsequently, the role of neutralisation in ethical decision-making was hypothesised within the theoretical framework of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB; Ajzen, 1985, 1991). A second qualitative study enabled the operationalisation of the TPB and neutralisation constructs and informed the design of the quantitative studies.

A survey study and an experiment served to test the main research hypotheses. Results indicated that neutralisation has a significant, negative effect on intention and it precedes actual behaviour. This represents the first successful attempt to integrate neutralisation with an existing account of ethical decision-making. Despite this, there was no conclusive indication that neutralisation moderates the norm-intention, attitude-intention and intention-behaviour relationships. The experimental study did not appear to confirm the causal role of neutralisation but it did suggest possible moderating effects of the personal (rather than social) acceptance of

neutralising beliefs. These findings are discussed in the light of previous studies and implications for neutralisation and ethical decision-making research are explored.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

JOURNAL ARTICLES

Chatzidakis, A., and Mitussis, D. (2007). Computer Ethics and Consumer Ethics: The Internet's Impact on the Consumer's Ethical Decision-Making Process. *Journal of Consumer Behaviour,* forthcoming

Chatzidakis, A., Hibbert, S., and Smith, A. (2007). Why People Don't Take their Concerns about Fair Trade to the Supermarket: The Role of Neutralisation. *Journal of Business Ethics*, forthcoming

Chatzidakis, A., Hibbert, S., and Smith, A. (2006). "Ethically Concerned, yet Unethically Behaved": Towards an Updated Understanding of Consumer's (Un)ethical Decision Making. *Advances in Consumer Research*, 33, pp.693-698

Chatzidakis, A., Hibbert, S., Mitussis, D., and Smith, A. (2004). Virtue in Consumption?. *Journal of Marketing Management* , 20 (5/6), pp. 526-543

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Moufahim, M. and Chatzidakis, A. (2006). Marketing the "Ethically Questionable" Product: The Case of a Xenophobic Political Party", at *European Marketing Academy, Athens University of Economics & Business, May, Athens*

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(Un)ethical Decision-Making. at *Association for Consumer Research, North American Conference, September-October, San Antonio, Texas*

Chatzidakis, A., Hibbert, S., Mitussis, D., and Smith, A. (2005). The Role of Neutralization in Explaining Inertia Towards "Ethical" Consumption Choices: The Case of Fair Trade Products. at *European Marketing Academy, University of Bocconi, May, Milan*

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AB:	Actual Behaviour
ANOVA:	Analysis of Variance
AtHL:	Appeal to Higher Loyalties
ATT:	Attitude
b:	Standardised Regression Coefficient
CES:	Consumer Ethics Scale
CFA:	Confirmatory Factor Analysis
CFI:	Comparative Fit Index
CtC:	Condemning the Condemners
DoI:	Denial of Injury
DoR:	Denial of Responsibility
DoV:	Denial of Victim
EFA:	Exploratory Factor Analysis
EOB:	Ethical Obligation

GFI:	Goodness of Fit Index
IE:	Internal Ethics
INT:	Intention
NEUT:	Neutralisation
PAF:	Principal Axis Factoring
PBC:	Perceived Behavioural Control
PCA:	Principal Components Analysis
RMSEA:	Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
SDB:	Social Desirability Bias
SEM:	Structural Equation Modeling
SI:	Self-Identity
SN:	Subjective Norm
sr^2:	Semipartial Correlation
TPB:	Theory of Planned Behaviour
TRA:	Theory of Reasoned Action
β:	Unstandardised Regression Coefficient

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Research Context and Objectives

This thesis is based on the premise that consumers often behave in ways that are in apparent contradiction to their expressed ethical concerns and attitudes. It explores how counter-attitudinal behaviour is facilitated and sustained through the use of neutralisation (or rationalisation) mechanisms. The importance of this area of study is evident in the documented costs of 'unethical' or questionable consumer behaviour to the environment, the economy and broader social welfare. For example, the cost of customer theft for the UK retail sector in 2006 alone was estimated at £1691.7 million, the equivalent of £31 pounds for every UK resident (Bamfield, 2006) [1]. Conversely, 'ethical' spending has been growing year on year. Co-op's Ethical Consumerism Report, shows that in 2005, the UK's ethical market was worth £29.3 billion, for the first time overtaking the retail market for tobacco and alcohol (estimated at £28 billion)[2]. This figure takes into account activities such as green and Fair Trade buying, consumer boycotting, eco-tourism, energy conservation and ethical investing. Recent research by Mintel (2007), however, guards against complacency for governments, businesses and organisations that promote these behaviours. For example, less than half (48%) of the 36% of

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[1] Another example is the British audio-visual industry, where the total losses through copyright theft – e.g. file sharing, home burning and borrowing other people's counterfeit DVDs – have been estimated at £818 million for 2005 (Federation Against Copyright Theft, 2007; http://www.fact-uk.org.uk/site/media_centre/statistics2.htm, last accessed, 17/08/2007.). Most existing accounts have shown little if any decline in such types of consumer misbehaviour, despite the employment of an extensive variety of education- and deterrence-based approaches to their prevention (Fullerton and Punj, 2004).

[2] http://www.co-operativebank.co.uk/servlet/Satellite?c=Page&cid=1177658000641&pagename=CB%2FPage%2FtplStandard&loc=I , last accessed, 17/08/2007.

respondents who said they are concerned about Third World exploitation tried to act on their concerns by buying Fair Trade products. Furthermore, such estimations are based on attitudes and self-reported measures of behaviour, which are well known to be upwards biased when compared to actual behaviour in support of social and environmental issues (e.g. Davies *et al.* 2002). Accordingly, Cowe and Williams (2000) have noted the 30:3 syndrome, whereby the good intentions of 30% of consumers usually translate into market shares of maybe 3%.

Undoubtedly, notions of ethics and morality in consumer behaviour are inherently contestable[3]. For example, Caruana (2007) has criticised the academic literature for having ascribed moral status to subjects such as Fair Trade, ethical and green consumerism, without scrutinising or recognising the philosophical traditions of morality in which these movements are ultimately grounded on. Similarly, self-interested and hedonistic activities are typically perceived as amoral or immoral (Caruana, 2007) and illegal activities, as immoral[4].

One way in which academic scholars have attempted to overcome such criticisms is by adopting a relativistic approach to research into ethical behaviour (e.g. Ferrell and Gresham 1985; Tsalikis *et al.* 2001)[5]. That is, rather than aiming to discover universal moral principles or prescribe normative injunctions, researchers have focused on the actual contexts and variables that influence the ethical decision-making process (Tsalikis *et al.* 2001). Notions of morality are clearly shaped by various philosophical, historical and socio-cultural influences, yet, on the empirical

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[3] In this thesis, the terms ethical and moral are used interchangeably (Bauchamp and Bowie, 1988).

[4] For example, there are theories of moral rights that are against copyright laws (e.g. Aristotle's ethics; McFarland, 1999).

[5] On a rather philosophical/epistemological level, Caruana (2007) argues for a multi-disciplinary perspective to understanding how notions of morality are shaped and cultivated in consumption.

level, a sensible starting point is what consumers perceive as ethical themselves (e.g. Cooper-Martin and Holbrook, 1993). Accordingly, this thesis adopts a descriptive rather than normative approach to the study of ethics in consumption (Beauchamp and Bowie, 1988; Fukukawa, 2003).

Related research has grown substantially since the 1990s and has provided valuable insights into the ways that people respond to the moral challenges of living in contemporary consumption environments (e.g. Marks and Mayo, 1991; Vitell *et al.* 2001; Shaw and Shiu 2002a, 2002b, 2003). However, it remains a relatively small body of literature and there is much to be done in terms of a comprehensive and unified understanding of the role of ethics in consumption. One of the key challenges identified in this field is the so-called *attitude-behaviour gap* (e.g. Roberts, 1996; Bird and Hughes, 1997; Strong, 1997; Carrigan and Attalla, 2001; Uusitalo and Oksanen, 2004; DePelsmacker *et al.* 2006; Nicholls and Lee, 2006). Whereas most theoretical models of decision-making are established on the premise that attitudes are consistent with intentions and behaviours, consumers often behave in ways that are incongruent with their expressed ethical concerns and attitudes. For example, consumers may buy environmentally hazardous products regardless of their expression of concern for greener alternatives (Roberts, 1996) and shoplift regardless of their adherence to societal and economic norms of behaviour that guide marketplace behaviour (Strutton *et al.* 1994, 1997)[6]. This thesis advances the concept of neutralisation and the associated taxonomy of the

[6] In some stages of this thesis, the terms ethical concerns, personal and social norms and values are used interchangeably with attitudes. Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p.1) define the attitude concept as "a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour". Accordingly, these authors argue that although specific conceptualisations of norms, ethical concerns and values serve certain analytic purposes, on a broader level, they can be subsumed under the concept of attitudes: "Attitudes, understood in the sense of general evaluations, may be products of affective and behavioural reactions to attitude objects, as well as cognitive responses" (p.178).

techniques as one theoretical contribution that promises to increase understanding of this gap.

Social and personal norms play an important role in guiding ethical behaviour (e.g. Davies *et al.* 2002). When norms are not internalised to the degree that they guide behaviour under all circumstances, consumers may develop coping strategies to deal with the anticipated or post-behavioural dissonance that they may otherwise experience. Neutralisation theory represents a conceptual approach that has been applied to understand how individuals soften or eliminate the impact that their norm violating behaviour might have upon their self-concept and social relationships (Grove *et al.* 1989). The concept was originally introduced by Sykes and Matza (1957) in reference to juvenile delinquency. These authors argued that delinquents do not learn moral imperatives, values or attitudes that are in a complete opposition to those of their society; rather, they learn a set of justifications or rationalisations, i.e., the techniques, which can insulate them from self-blame and the blame of others. These techniques include: denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victim, condemnation of the condemners and appeal to higher loyalties.

The main aim of this thesis is, therefore, to examine the potential of this concept in accounting for the widely evident attitude-behaviour discrepancies. Furthermore, the role of neutralisation is considered in relation to relatively minor ethical breaches rather than illegal or clearly immoral activities to which the theory was originally applied. The proposed conceptualisation is informed by advances in the attitude and ethical decision-making literatures, with a view to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the role of neutralisation in deciding to behave (un)ethically.

1.2 Methodological Approach

The research adopted a mixed-method approach. Consumers' support for the Fair Trade movement was chosen as an appropriate context for the research, originally because it has been identified as an area of particular concern in previous studies (Shaw and Clarke, 1999; Chatzidakis *et al.* 2004). A qualitative study (study one) aimed to further examine the applicability of neutralisation in this area and helped develop hypotheses and scales for the quantitative stages of investigation.

The role of neutralisation in ethical decision-making was conceptualised within the theoretical framework of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB; Ajzen, 1985, 1991). Subsequently, a second qualitative stage (study two) aimed to generate a comprehensive pool of items for the TPB and neutralisation scales and to design an experimental treatment.

The research hypotheses drew on the existing literature and primary qualitative data and were formulated as follows:

H1a: Neutralisation has a direct, negative influence on consumers' behavioural intentions to support Fair Trade.

H1b: The higher the acceptance of neutralising beliefs the weaker the relationship between attitudes and behavioural intention.

H1c: The higher the acceptance of neutralising beliefs the weaker the relationship between subjective norms and behavioural intention.

H2a: Neutralisation has a direct and indirect (via intentions) negative influence on actual behaviour in support of Fair Trade.

H2b: The higher the acceptance of neutralising beliefs the weaker the relationship between behavioural intentions and actual behaviour.

H3a: The higher the acceptance of neutralising beliefs the weaker the relationship between ethical obligation and behavioural intention.

H3b: The higher the acceptance of neutralising beliefs the weaker the relationship between self-identity and behavioural intention.

H4a: Cognitive accessibility of neutralisation techniques negatively affects behavioural intentions to support Fair Trade and actual behaviour in support of Fair Trade.

H4b: Acceptability of neutralisation techniques negatively affects behavioural intentions to support Fair Trade and actual behaviour in support of Fair Trade.

A field survey (study three) aimed to address H1-H3, whereas a survey experiment (study four) served as a preliminary test of H4. The design of these studies was based on a naturally occurring setting (i.e., Fair Trade roadshows taking place in a UK University in March 2006) which enabled observation of actual rather than self-reported behaviour or intention. In contrast with previous research, this helped address more stages in the ethical decision-making process and provided a more realistic assessment of the proposed model's explanatory and predictive ability.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

For the sake of clarity, the structure of the thesis is presented in figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1: Outline of Thesis Structure

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Part I: How and Why Consumers Choose to Behave (Un)Ethically: The Importance of Neutralisation

Part II: Conceptualising the Role of Neutralisation in Deciding to Support the Fair Trade Movement

Chapter 3: Methodology

Part I: A Qualitative Exploration of the Role of Neutralisation in Supporting Fair Trade

Part II: Identification and Elicitation of Salient Beliefs

Part III: Quantitative Assessment of the Role of Neutralisation in Supporting Fair Trade

Chapter 4: Data Analysis

Part I: Analysis of the Survey Data

Part II: Analysis of the Experimental Data

Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusions

The next chapter reviews the relevant literature and is split into two main parts. Part I covers the research into ethical consumer behaviour, neutralisation, attitudes and ethical decision-making, and advances some generic propositions on the role of neutralisation at each stage of the decision-making process. Lastly, it critically examines the underlying tenets of neutralisation theory, with a view to inform subsequent research. Part II introduces consumers' support for the Fair Trade movement as an appropriate setting for empirical research, and formulates hypotheses on the role of neutralisation, within the theoretical framework of the TPB (Ajzen, 1985, 1991).

Chapter 3 introduces the philosophical and methodological debate and positions the current research within the postpositivist metaphysic. Next, it discusses the concept of social desirability bias and the use of student samples in relation to this research. The remainder of the chapter details the methods used in each stage of research, and is split into three parts. Part I is concerned with a qualitative study (study one) that examined the applicability of neutralisation in the context of supporting Fair Trade. Part II introduces an additional qualitative study (study two) that helped generate items for the TPB and neutralisations scales, and to design an experimental manipulation. Lastly, Part III discusses the methods used in the main stages of research (study three and four), in which the research hypotheses were tested.

Chapter 4 discusses the analysis and presents the results from the quantitative studies. Part I focuses on the analysis of the survey data, including descriptive statistics, data screening for outliers, missing values and statistical assumptions, development and validation of the scales and finally, testing of the research

hypotheses (H1-H3). In a similar fashion, Part II details the analysis of the experimental data, which provided a preliminary test of H4.

Chapter 5 discusses the findings in the light of previous studies and implications for neutralisation and ethical decision-making research. Subsequently, it considers the theoretical, methodological and practical contributions of this thesis, before moving to note its limitations and suggest avenues for future research.

Chapter 2 Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is a), to introduce the key streams of literature in relation to this thesis and b), to choose an appropriate behavioural context and develop a theoretical framework for subsequent research. Accordingly, the chapter is split into two main parts.

Part I reviews the ethical consumer behaviour literature and focuses on existing attempts to develop models of consumers' ethical decision-making (2.2). These models seek to understand how and why consumers behave (un)ethically in a more holistic manner, as opposed to studies that either implicitly or explicitly focus on one or few components of the decision-making process. Subsequently, neutralisation theory is introduced as a promising way of bridging the so-called *attitude-behaviour gap*, a phenomenon which challenges most existing models as they are built on the fundamental premise that attitudes are consistent with intention, which in turn is a proxy of actual behaviour. The relationship of neutralisation with theories of attitude-behaviour consistency and wider attitudinal research is highlighted (2.3), before moving to some general propositions on its role at each step of the decision-making process (2.4). Finally, section 2.5 puts the fundamental tenets of neutralisation under scrutiny, with a view to inform subsequent empirical research.

Part II introduces consumers' support for Fair Trade as an appropriate setting for empirical research (2.8). Section 2.9 highlights the implications for subsequent measurement and validation of the decision-making constructs. Finally, section 2.10 reconsiders the role of neutralisation in supporting Fair Trade within the theoretical framework of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1985, 1991), and formulates testable hypotheses.

Part I: How and Why Consumers Choose to Behave (Un)Ethically: The Importance of Neutralisation

2.2 Ethics and Consumer Behaviour

2.2.1 Introduction

"...How much we could accomplish if we would turn even a portion of our talents toward understanding and ameliorating the dark side of consumer behaviour."

(Hirschman, 1991, p.4)

Notions of "rightness" and "wrongness", "brightness" and "darkness" in consumption are inherently contestable (Caruana, 2007), yet on the empirical level, (un)ethical consumer behaviour can be broadly defined, as the "decision making, purchases and other consumption experiences that are affected by the consumer's ethical concerns" (Cooper-Martin and Holbrook, 1993, p.113). It remains a relatively young field of consumer research, where although studies certainly existed prior to the 90s, the bulk of the extant literature appeared in the last two decades (Vitell, 2003; Caruana, 2007). Moreover, generic treatments of ethical consumer behaviour have remained few and far between (Cooper-Martin and Holbrook, 1993; Brinkmann, 2004; Chatzidakis *et al.* 2004).

Earlier research was prompted by the consumerism movement of the 1970s, and investigated specific topics in the context of "environmentally concerned or

conscious" consumption (e.g. Anderson and Cunningham, 1972; Webster, 1975; Brooker, 1976; Antil, 1984; Haldeman *et al.* 1987; Alwitt and Berger, 1993; Jackson *et al.* 1993). Similarly, studies emerged for issues such as self-restraint (Horrowitz, 1985), voluntary simplicity of consumption (e.g. Leonard- Barton, 1981; Shaw and Newholm, 2002), ethical investing (e.g. Irvine, 1987; Lewis, 1999), consumer boycotts (e.g. Smith, 1990; Burke *et al.* 1993) and shoplifting (e.g. Kallis *et al.* 1986; Moschis and Powell, 1986; Cox *et al.* 1990).

Broader treatments of ethical consumer behaviour can be grouped under two headings: "consumer ethics" and "ethical consumerism" (Brinkmann, 2004; Chatzidakis *et al.* 2004)[7]. The subject of the "consumer ethics" stream (e.g. Vitell and Muncy, 1992; Vitell *et al.* 1991; Fullerton *et al.* 1996; Albers-Miller, 1999; Singhapakdi *et al.* 1999; for a review see Vitell, 2003) is "the moral principles and standards that guide behaviour of individuals or groups as they obtain, use and dispose of goods and services" (Muncy and Vitell, 1992, p. 298). Yet, empirical research has in effect focused on "immoral", illegal or at best questionable consumer behaviour, mainly in retail settings (e.g. failure to declare undercharging, using expired coupons etc.; Brinkmann, 2004). By far the most common denominator in this tradition is the development, validation and replication of a "consumer ethics scale" (CES; Muncy and Vitell, 1992; Vitell and Muncy, 1992). This scale attempts to distinguish consumer perceptions of ethically questionable behaviour based on two underlying dimensions: "actively versus passively benefiting" and "deceptive, illegal practices versus no harm/no foul". Vitell and Muncy (2005) have recently addressed criticisms that there should be more in

[7] Brinkmann (2004) further distinguishes between "consumer behaviour as voting behaviour" and "socially responsible behaviour", yet here they are subsumed under the field of "ethical consumerism" (see e.g. Shaw *et al.* 2006a).

consumer ethics than "resisting moral temptation" (referring to Brinkmann, 2004), and have suggested a modification in their scale, to include items relating to "recycling/environmental awareness" and "doing the right/doing good". Such types of positive or "moral" behaviour, however, have long been the subject of the other stream of research, that is "ethical consumerism".

"Ethical consumerism" (e.g. Roberts, 1996; Strong, 1996, 1997; Creyer and Ross, 1997; Shaw and Clarke, 1999; Straughan and Roberts, 1999; Carrigan and Attalla, 2001; De Pelsmacker *et al.* 2005; Nicholls and Lee, 2006) incorporates concerns for the environment, business practices and social justice (e.g. Cowe and Williams, 2000; Nicholls, 2002). It is often viewed as an evolution of green or environmental consumerism, to accommodate issues such as trading relationships with the Third World (Connolly and Shaw, 2006). Much of the research in this field has paid attention to the characteristics and motivations of green and ethical niches (Shaw and Clarke, 1999). It has in the main attempted to profile the demographic and sociopsychological characteristics of the "socially conscious", "green" or "ecologically conscious" consumer (e.g. Anderson and Cunningham, 1972; Webster, 1975; Roberts, 1996; Straughan and Roberts, 1999), terms which have later evolved to "ethical" or "caring" in order to incorporate concerns about Fair Trade (e.g. Shaw and Clarke, 1999; Carrigan and Attalla, 2001; DePelsmacker *et al.* 2005).

2.2.2 Attempts to Understand Consumer's Ethical Decision-Making

A theme that transcends the above streams is the development of theoretical models of consumers' ethical decision making, both in specific contexts (e.g. Whalen *et al.* 1991; Fullerton and Punj, 1993; Jackson *et al.*1993; Nebenzahl *et al.* 2001;

Tan, 2002) and the broader domains of ethical consumerism (Shaw and Clarke 1999; Shaw *et al.* 2000; Shaw and Shiu 2002a, 2002b, 2003) and consumer ethics (Marks and Mayo 1991; Vitell *et al.* 2001; Fukukawa 2002). These models attempt to understand how and why consumers behave (un)ethically in a more holistic manner, as opposed to studies that either implicitly or explicitly focus only on one or few components of the decision-making process (e.g. formation of beliefs, importance of demographic and psychographic characteristics; see e.g. Vitell and Ho, 1997). An overview of these models follows.

In line with the above categorisation of the literature, attempts to understand consumers' ethical decision-making can be distinguished based on whether they pertain to specific or broader streams of consumer research. Examples of context-specific frameworks include a structural model of aberrant consumer behaviour (Fullerton and Punj, 1993), a model of the determinants of recycling consumer behaviour (Jackson *et al.* 1993), ethical decision-making with respect to purchase of pirated software (Tan, 2002), a model of a seller's ethical behaviour as a consumer decision criterion (Whalen *et al.* 1991) and a model for consumer's punishment and rewarding process via purchasing behaviour (Nebenzahl *et al.* 2001). Studies such as these have provided valuable insights, yet they remain restricted in their scope (Fukukawa, 2002). In contrast, models that have been adopted in broader streams of research enjoy the advantages of greater generalisability, empirical validation and replication. Prominent amongst these are Hunt and Vitell's (1986, 1992, 2006) general theory of marketing ethics and Ajzen's Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB; 1985, 1991).

In Hunt and Vitell's (1986, 1992, 2006) general theory of marketing ethics (as adapted to a consumer context by Marks and Mayo, 1991; Figure 2.2a), the ethical decision process begins with the consumer perceiving an ethical problem (exogenous variables include the consumer's cultural environment, reference groups and past personal experiences). Subsequently, s/he combines a deontological and a teleological evaluation to arrive at a judgment, i.e., an attitude about the ethical problem which, in turn, influences the consumer's behavioural intentions[8]. It is suggested that teleological evaluations affect intentions both directly and indirectly (through ethical judgments). That is, an individual may not choose the most ethical alternative due to desirable consequences of a less ethical one. Furthermore, intention may differ from actual behaviour due to situational conditions that facilitate unethical behaviour (e.g. the opportunity to adopt an alternative). Finally, the consequences of the actual behaviour become part of the consumer's learning experiences. In the case of choosing an unethical alternative, the consumer might have guilt feelings that affect future behaviour. Hunt and Vitell's model was originally applied to business contexts where it has received considerable empirical support (see Hunt and Vitell, 2006 for a review). The theory has been modified and successfully applied to consumer ethics by Marks and Mayo (1991) and subsequently by Vitell *et al.* (2001) and Shang *et al.* (2007). Albeit in a workplace setting, Thong and Yap (1998) have also supported the theory's applicability to the illegal copying of software for personal use.

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[8] Teleological ethical theories hold that the moral worth of actions or practices is determined solely by the consequences of the actions or practices. Deontological theories hold that one or more fundamental principles of ethics differ from the principle of utility; they are in turn based on principles of duty such as "never treat another merely as a means to your own goals" (Beauchamp and Bowie, 1988, p.37).

Figure 2.2a: Hunt and Vitell's (1986, 1992, 2006) General Theory of Marketing Ethics (as modified by Marks and Mayo, 1991, p. 722):



Ajzen's (1985; 1991; Figure 2.2b) Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) is the most popular attitude-behavioural model, with an impressive record of applications in a variety of domains (for reviews see e.g. Notani, 1998; Ajzen, 2001; Armitage and Conner, 2001). Briefly, the TPB suggests that behaviour in a specified situation is a direct function of behavioural intention, which in turn is a function of attitude and subjective norm. Perceived behavioural control is a construct that was added to TPB's predecessor, the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980), to address behaviours that are under incomplete volitional control. Perceived behavioural control is supposed to affect behaviour indirectly, through behavioural intention but also directly, as a proxy for actual control. Upon some modifications, the TPB has been successfully applied both in consumer ethics (Fukukawa, 2002) and ethical consumerism (Shaw and Clarke 1999; Shaw *et al.* 2000; Shaw and Shiu 2002a, 2002b, 2003). Further, it has been subjected to a variety of context-specific applications, including software piracy (Chang, 1998), buying environmentally friendly products (e.g. Kalafatis *et al.*1999; Follows and Jobber, 2000), waste recycling (Chan, 1998) and waste minimisation (Thogersen and Grunert-Beckmann, 1997), among others. The model is reproduced in figure 2.2b.

Both these models are therefore established on the fundamental premise that an individual's ethical judgment (or related attitudinal constructs) is consistent with behavioural intention, which is in turn an effective proxy for actual behaviour in most circumstances (e.g. Fukukawa, 2002). However, as noted in the introduction, the so-called phenomenon of the *attitude-behaviour gap* has been extensively witnessed in ethical consumer behaviour research (e.g. Roberts, 1996; Bird and Hughes, 1997; Carrigan and Attalla, 2001; Uusitalo and Oksanen, 2004;

DePelsmacker *et al.* 2006; Nicholls and Lee, 2006). Consumers' ethical concerns and attitudes do not always translate to congruent behaviour. For example, consumers have been found to buy environmentally hazardous products regardless of their expression of concern for greener alternatives (Roberts, 1996) and to shoplift regardless of their adherence to societal and economic norms of behaviour that guide marketplace behaviour (Strutton *et al.* 1994, 1997). The additional influences that are apparent in the context of ethical consumer behaviour point towards the internal tensions that consumers should feel when balancing their own desires with moral behaviour that favours societal well being. Coming from the sociology of deviance and social disorganisation literature, the concept of neutralisation and the associated taxonomy of neutralisation techniques, is a theoretical contribution that promises to increase understanding of this gap.

Figure 2.2b: Ajzen's (1985, 1991) Theory of Planned Behaviour

(adapted from Ajzen, 2002a, p.1)



2.2.3 Introducing Neutralisation Theory

Social and personal norms play a crucial role in guiding ethical behaviour (e.g. Davies *et al.* 2002). When norms are not internalised to the degree that they guide behaviour under all circumstances, consumers may develop coping strategies to deal with the anticipated or post-behavioural dissonance that they may otherwise experience. Neutralisation theory represents a conceptual approach that has been applied to understand how individuals soften or eliminate the impact that their norm violating behaviour might have upon their self-concept and social relationships (Grove *et al.* 1989).

In 1957, Sykes and Matza published their seminal article on juvenile delinquency criticising the predominant theoretical viewpoint that delinquency is a form of behaviour based on the values and norms of a deviant sub-culture in the same way as law-abiding behaviour is based on the norms and values of the larger society. These authors suggested that rather than learning moral imperatives, values or attitudes that stand in a complete opposition to those of his/her society, the delinquent learns a set of justifications or rationalisations, i.e., the techniques, which can insulate him/her from self-blame and the blame of others. This perspective can be attributed to the flexibility of the normative systems in contemporary societies: rather than being categorical imperatives, social norms or values are "qualified guides for action, limited in their applicability in terms of time, place, persons, and social circumstances" (Sykes and Matza 1957, p.666). For example, the moral injunction against killing does not apply in time of war, and so on. Thus, the delinquent learns patterns of thought that help him/her remain

committed to the normative system and qualify his/her actions as "acceptable" if not "right".

It is important to note that while neutralisation techniques may be viewed as following unethical behaviour (i.e., rationalisations), ultimately they can precede it, and facilitate unethical behaviour. That is, once successfully internalised, they can truly become neutralising devices.

The five techniques, as adapted by Strutton *et al.* (1994, p.254) in a consumer context, are listed below:

1) Denial of responsibility (DoR): A circumstance in which one argues that s/he is not personally accountable for the norm-violating behaviour because factors beyond one's control were operating; e.g., "It's not my fault, I had no other choice".

2) Denial of Injury (DoI): A circumstance in which one contends that personal misconduct is not really serious because no party directly suffered as a result of it; e.g., "What's the big deal, nobody will miss it?"

3) Denial of Victim (DoV): A circumstance in which one counters the blame for personal actions by arguing the violated party deserved whatever happened; e.g., "It's their fault; if they had been fair with me, I would not have done it".

4) Condemning the condemners (CtC): A circumstance in which one deflects accusations of misconduct by pointing out that those who would condemn engage in similarly disapproved activities; e.g., "It's a joke they should find fault with me after the rip-offs they have engineered".

5) Appeal to higher loyalties (AtHL): A circumstance in which one argues that the norm-violating behaviour is the result of an attempt to actualise some higher order

ideal or value; e.g., 'To some what I did may appear wrong, but I did it for my family'.

Since its original formulation by Sykes and Matza, neutralisation theory has been one of the most widely known and frequently cited theories in sociology of deviance, either incorporated into or rebutted by most subsequent theories of crime and norm-violating behaviour (for recent reviews see Maruna and Copes, 2005; Fritsche, 2005). Examples of its application include a variety of juvenile (e.g. Ball 1966; Minor 1981; Costello, 2000) and adult non-normative contexts (e.g. Levi, 1981; Eliason and Dodder, 1999; Fox, 1999) such as occupational misconduct (e.g. Friedman, 1974; Gauthier, 2000; Dabney, 1995; Sheahan and Smith, 2003), management of stigmatised professions (e.g. Hong and Duff, 1977; Thompson and Harred, 1992), murder (Levi, 1981), deer poaching (Eliason and Dodder, 1999, 2000), dogfighting (Forsyth and Evans, 1998), drug using (Priest and McGrath, 1970) and student binge drinking (Dodder and Hughes, 1987, 1993), among others. Further, neutralisation theory has been the subject of more intuitive applications, both within and beyond the boundaries of what is typically labelled as deviant behaviour. Examples include the role of neutralisation techniques in the victimisation of battered wives (Ferraro and Johnson 1983), playing bingo (King, 1990), genocide and the Holocaust (Alvarez, 1997), organisational rule enforcing (Fershing, 2003), abortion (Brennan, 1974), religious dissonance (Dunford and Kunz, 1973), mothers entering preteen daughters into beauty contests (Heltsley and Calhoun, 2003) and eating unhealthily during pregnancy (Copelton, 2007).

Neutralisation has been applied to consumption contexts, but research in this domain remains limited (Strutton *et al.* 1994, 1997; Mitchell and Chan, 2002;

Rosenbaum and Kuntze, 2003; Chatzidakis *et al.* 2004; Cohn and Vaccaro, 2006). Strutton *et al.* (1994) embedded two different vignettes in a survey instrument, and found that conventional consumers tend to rely on neutralisation techniques when engaging in shoplifting, especially in situations that involve unethical disposition (i.e., fraudulent return of goods) as opposed to unethical acquisition of retail goods (i.e., switching price tags). This was mainly attributed to a sense of emotional detachment, entailed in the act of "getting rid of" goods. Strutton *et al.* (1997) noted a generation gap between American "Primal Boomers", born from 1943 to 1960, and "Thirteeners", born from 1961 to 1981. The younger generation of "Thirteeners", arguably raised in a different moral high ground, was found to have a more flexible normative system and they were therefore more inclined to view the techniques as appropriate devices for "overriding social norms prohibiting unethical consumer behaviour" (p. 93). Cohn and Vaccaro (2006) analysed written protocols and weblogs in an attempt to explore neutralisation's applicability in the context of music file-trading on the internet. Their findings suggested that consumers readily employ a significant amount of neutralisation techniques when engaging in unauthorised trading of intellectual property.

More obliquely, the concept of neutralisation has been addressed by Mitchell and Chan (2002) and Rosenbaum and Kuntze (2003). Mitchell and Chan (2002) adapted the Muncy-Vitell scale (Muncy and Vitell, 1992; Vitell and Muncy, 1992) in a UK context, and interpreted consumers' tolerance of various questionable activities based on neutralisations that had been explored in a parallel qualitative study. Rosenbaum and Kuntze (2003) addressed the relationship between neutralisation techniques, anomie and fraudulent return of retail goods. They found that anomic

consumers are more likely to employ neutralisation techniques in order to justify unethical retail disposition.

It is worth noting that several other authors have used the concept in a *post hoc* fashion, as a perspective for interpreting results of their studies. For example, in explaining the underlying structure of the consumer ethics scale, Vitell and Muncy (1992) suggest that consumers view "passive" unethical behaviours as more acceptable than "active" ones because they employ techniques of neutralisation such as "denial of victim" and "condemnation of the condemners". Ang *et al.* (2001) found that purchasers of pirated goods believe that piracy benefits society, and linked this to the technique of "denial of injury".

However, all the above studies have addressed the applicability of neutralisation to illegal or at best questionable activities, and they therefore pertain to the consumer ethics stream of research. In contrast, Chatzidakis *et al.* (2004) explored the applicability of neutralisation to a wider variety of consumer contexts. Eight in-depth consumer interviews provided preliminary evidence for neutralisation techniques being readily employed not only in clearly deviant or "unethical" contexts, such as heavy shoplifting, but also in more normatively flexible or "ethical" ones, such as recycling and buying Fair Trade products. This study therefore emphasised that several consumer activities which are not necessarily guided by broader societal standards as much as by personal norms and values, represent possible and particularly interesting areas for the application of neutralisation. Further support for this was provided in an interpretive study by Devinney *et al.* (2006). These authors explored consumer "justifications or excuses" that disconnect attitudes from behaviour. They introduced three different scenarios, i.e., buying a sweatshop, a

non-biodegradable, and a counterfeit product, and then attempted to understand "varying consumer ethical rationales" based on different cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds. Although Devinney *et al.* (2006) did not explicitly adopt a neutralisation-based taxonomy of consumer accounts, there was clear indication that consumers were employing several neutralisation-type of arguments to defend the inconsistency between their beliefs and actual behaviour.

The need for neutralisation, however, assumes that behaviour violates *social* norms. Contemporary ethical dilemmas, such as the ones noted above, do not involve the violation of conventional or universal social norms (Reiss, 1951; Sartorius, 1972) to which neutralisation theory was originally applied. For example, there is not an absolute norm that "one ought to buy Fair Trade products". Nevertheless, as an arena of behaviour, consumer activities offer the opportunity for the expression of a wide range of norm types (Grove *et al.*1989)[9]. Failure to behave ethically may involve the violation of different group norms (March, 1954; Bettenhausen and Murnighan, 1985) or subcultural norms (Yinger, 1960) or, what Jackson *et al.* (1993) describe as "felt" norms. It is these felt norms that affect activities such as recycling and buying Fair Trade products. People may also make individual ethical judgments (e.g. Sartorius, 1972; Beauchamp and Bowie, 1988), as neither all non-normative behaviours are unethical nor all unethical behaviours normative (e.g. Beauchamp and Bowie, 1988; Strutton *et al.* 1997). Individuals may view certain consumer choices as wrong for themselves, but not necessarily wrong for others (Baron, 1999). Nonetheless, even these individual judgments may be violated in some circumstances. Therefore, it is important to recognise the nature of the norms relevant to particular consumption contexts, but neutralisation can nevertheless be

[9] Grove *et al.* (1989, p.132), refer to three different norm types, i.e. "folkways", mores and laws.

used in any circumstance in which a consumer has a desire to commit (or has committed) a questionable activity and has an ethical concern that requires neutralisation (Minor, 1981, pp. 300-301)[10].

Indeed, there is empirical evidence to suggest that the need to justify/rationalise one's own behaviour spans all sorts of activities, as long as they involve the negligence of a personal ethical concern. For example, while not strictly within a consumer context, experimental studies by Bersoff (2001) and Fritsche (2003) have both confirmed the applicability of neutralisation to relatively small – rather than clearly deviant – ethical breaches, that is failure to declare small overpayment and drinking from non-recyclable cans respectively. A survey by Hansmann *et al.* (2006) confirmed the explanatory power of two neutralisation techniques (denial of responsibility and injury) alongside other traditional determinants of self-reported battery recycling behaviour. Finally, a very similar psychological process, i.e., *defensive denial*, has been reported in the contexts of helping behaviour (Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz and Howard, 1980, 1981) and energy conservation (Tyler *et al.* 1982).

The influence of "felt norms" (Jackson *et al.* 1993) or individual ethical standards (e.g. Beauchamp and Bowie, 1988) that apply to such behaviours, may only be limited to the extent that they are not adequately internalised. In fact, for the conventional population segments, the most frequently encountered phenomena will concern the violation of relatively small, non-duress-driven ethical breaches. The same will therefore apply for the subsequent need to neutralise (Bersoff, 2001).

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[10] In fact, some authors suggest that this assumption could be relaxed further. Neutralisation techniques represent generic modes of resolving cognitive inconsistency, applicable to any situation (ethical or not) where one's actions are inconsistent with his/her beliefs (Hazani, 1991; Maruna and Copes, 2005).

It is in these behaviours that potential feelings of guilt or dissonance will exist at levels susceptible to neutralisation strategies. That is, neither too low, rendering neutralisation of problematic behaviour unnecessary, nor too high, threatening the effectiveness of neutralisation or making the occurrence of problematic behaviour less likely in the first place (cf. Thurman, 1984, p. 295). Indeed, Mitchell and Dodder (1980, 1983) have shown that as the seriousness of norm-violating behaviour increases (specifically, from "minor" to "predatory" to "aggressive"), the tendency to neutralise decreases.

In sum, neutralisation as a psychological mechanism that restores equilibrium without attitude change, should be more widely applicable in small ethical breaches, than in clearly deviant activities. Drawing on Chatzidakis *et al.*'s (2004) study, the purpose of the following discussion is to elaborate further, how neutralisation addresses questions of attitude-behaviour correspondence, and develop research propositions on its role in ethical decision-making. It departs from the consumer field of research, to reconsider neutralisation theory from a wider multidisciplinary perspective, including contributions from sociology, social psychology and ethical decision-making research.

2.3 The Underlying Foundations of Decision-Making Models: Cognitive Consistency, Attitude Research and the Role of Neutralisation

While attitude-behavioural models have been found to have some explanatory power, a large part of the ethical consumer decision-making process still remains

unexplained. In general, this has been accounted for by sampling, methodological and context-specific issues (see e.g. Luzar and Cosse 1998; Ogden 2003) or by the addition of further constructs. For example, in the context of consumer ethics, Fukukawa (2002) has proposed the addition of a fourth construct affecting intentions, namely "perceived unfairness"; while in the ethical consumerism field, Shaw and colleagues (Shaw and Clarke 1999; Shaw *et al.* 2000; Shaw and Shiu 2002a, 2002b, 2003) have proposed the addition of two constructs, namely "ethical obligation" and "self identity". These models still fail to account for the psychological realities of consumers who consistently behave in ways, which are in apparent contradiction to their expressed ethical concerns.

More generally, theories of cognitive or attitude-behaviour consistency within social and cognitive psychology – in which ethical decision-making models are mainly based on – have left the diverse modes of restoring equilibrium without attitude change unexplored (Hazani, 1991). Even within the cognitive dissonance literature, where attitudes after performing a counter-attitudinal behaviour have been found to remain in striking opposition to that behaviour, the focus has largely been on the arousal of dissonance, as opposed to the subsequent processes that lead to attitude change. This, therefore, generates little evidence regarding the nature of those processes (Kunda, 1990; Holland *et al.* 2002). Accordingly, Holland *et al.* (2002) observe that there is surprisingly little research on the different ways in which people justify their attitudinally-incongruent behaviour: "Although many different examples of self-justification have been documented in the psychological literature, this has not produced a comprehensive taxonomy of self-justification strategies" (p.1714). The concept of neutralisation and the associated taxonomy of neutralisation techniques is one theoretical contribution that addresses this gap.

A possible explanation for the relative negligence of neutralisation theory in accounting for how people cope with dissonance in ethical decision-making contexts is that its origins are sociological (for the issue of multidisciplinary compartmentalisation in attitude research, see e.g. Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). Indeed, in one of the most comprehensive reviews of neutralisation research to date, Maruna and Copes (2005) highlight that although neutralisation was developed before or around the same time as some of the most major works in cognitive and social psychology (e.g. the theory of cognitive dissonance; Festinger, 1957), there has been a surprising lack of research that integrates neutralisation with relevant advancements in these fields. Yet, Sykes and Matza's (1957) original conceptualisation is "much more psychological than sociological" (Hamlin, 1988, p. 427). In their review, Maruna and Copes (2005) attempt to redress this issue by illustrating the links between neutralisation and various other traditions in psychology, including explanatory style, narrative psychology and shame management.

In one of the first studies to highlight the potential usefulness of neutralisation in the cognitive consistency debate in particular, Hazani (1991, pp. 144-145; see also Minor, 1984) argues that the techniques are "universal modes of resolving cognitive inconsistency" since they contain three elements and their respective dissociations, i.e., "ego" (actor), "target" (victim) and "practice" (injury), that should logically appear in any situation involving (un)ethical behaviour. Similarly, three decades after Sykes and Matza's conceptualisation, one of the leading scholars in social psychology (i.e., Bandura, 1990, 1999; see also, Bandura *et al.* 1996; Anderson and Bushman, 2002) suggests the logical elements of what he calls a theory of "moral

disengagement". He identifies three key steps in the self-regulation process, from "reprehensible conduct" to "detrimental effects" to "victim", and then the mechanisms through which ethical self-sanctions may be selectively activated or disengaged at each stage of the process. These are: moral justification, euphemistic language, advantageous comparison, minimising, ignoring or misconstruing the consequences, dehumanisation and attribution of blame, displacement and diffusion of responsibility. Bandura's conceptualisation is so similar to Sykes and Matza's techniques of neutralisation, that Maruna and Copes (2005) characterise this as a prime example of "wasteful duplication of effort that follows from mutual interdisciplinary ignorance" (Howard and Levinson, 1985, p.191 in Maruna and Copes, 2005). At the same time however, it supports the contention that neutralisation is a relatively comprehensive and well-established conceptual framework, which describes and predicts cognitive strategies that may be employed as a defence against dissonance and feelings of guilt people might otherwise experience when violating their internalised norms and values. Therefore, it represents a psychological process capable of restoring equilibrium *without* attitude change.

Another example of duplication of scholarly effort is Tsang's (2002; Batson *et al.* 2002; Tsang *et al.* 2005; for yet another similar concept, called "normalisation" see Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999, 2002; Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Ashforth *et al.* 2007) recent theory of "moral rationalisation". Tsang (2002, p.26) defines moral rationalisation as "the cognitive processes that individuals use to convince themselves that their behaviour does not violate their moral standards". Her typology of "methods of rationalisation" builds on and is very similar to Bandura's work, yet she reviews research that moves beyond that typology to consider the

dynamics and motivational foundation of rationalisation-related processes. Most notably, Tsang's article presents an elaborate account of how moral rationalisation and subsequently neutralisation, relates to its sister theory in social psychology, i.e., cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957).

Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance is arguably the most suitable for explaining the motivational underpinnings, or the "why" of neutralisation processes (Maruna and Copes, 2005; see also Dunford and Kunz, 1973; Hazani, 1991; Peretti-Watel, 2003; Rauhut, 2003; Fritsche, 2005). According to Festinger, the need for cognitive consistency is one of the strongest human drives. Whenever two cognitions – understood widely to include both attitudes and behaviours – are in a dissonant/discrepant relationship, people will experience unpleasant psychological tension and engage in "cognitive work" to reduce it, by either changing cognitive elements or by adding consonant elements through self-justification or rationalisation (e.g. Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Holland *et al.* 2002). Ever since Festinger's original formulation, cognitive dissonance has been the most comprehensive theory of cognitive consistency (see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993) and one of the most influential ones in social psychology more broadly, inspiring thousands of experimental studies and several theoretical revisions (for reviews see Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999; Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones, 2007).

Whilst subsequent research has confirmed that dissonance is a motivated process versus alternative non-motivational explanations (e.g. through observing electrodermal activity), there is still considerable ambiguity as to which are the exact motives guiding dissonance effects (Harmon-Jones, 2007). For example, in

Aronson's (1968, 1999) self-consistency theory, dissonance occurs when a person performs a behaviour which is against his/her self-concept. Steele's (1988) self-affirmation theory suggests that dissonance occurs when a self-image of moral and adaptive adequacy is threatened, whereas under Cooper and Fazio's (1984) "new look" of cognitive dissonance, these processes occur only when someone feels personally responsible for an aversive consequence. All these authors have provided support for their revisions through a series of experimental studies, yet findings in the main remain open to alternative interpretations and explanations (see e.g. Beauvois and Joule, 1996; Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999). Nonetheless, taken together, these studies support the notion that rationalisation or neutralisation, as a dissonance reduction strategy of adding consonant cognitions, should be a motivational rather than non-motivational process. Maruna and Copes (2005) point out that this is a central assumption of neutralisation, yet it has hardly ever been empirically investigated (but see Bersoff, 2001). They review several often cited motives behind neutralisation processes, such as guilt or shame avoidance, self-esteem maintenance and self-awareness, and suggest that given the paucity of research, neutralisation can be better understood as generally driven by a sense of internal consistency.

An individual should experience moral dissonance whenever his/her perceptions of the moral self, or principles, are in apparent contradiction to performed behaviour (e.g. Tsang, 2002; Rauhut, 2003). Dissonance can in turn be reduced by either changing cognitions (i.e., lowering norm acceptance or changing behaviour) or adding more consonant cognitions (i.e., neutralisation techniques; Fritsche, 2005). Festinger (1957) initially viewed dissonance as a phenomenon that occurs after a decision has been made and characterised the pre-decisional process as unbiased

information processing. Accordingly, rationalisation in this tradition has been mainly perceived as a post-behavioural process whereby "a previous problematic behaviour acquires a value that justifies its exhibition and/or becomes for the individual a less problematic one" (Beauvois *et al.* 1993, p. 2; see also for example, Beauvois and Joule, 1996; Fointiat, 1998). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, most studies have aimed to specify the conditions under which dissonance is aroused as opposed to specifying the subsequent ways in which people rationalise their behaviour (Holland *et al.* 2002). However, Tsang (2002; see also Rauhut, 2003) points to Festinger's later views and relevant research that supports the possibility of *anticipated* dissonance. In line with Sykes and Matza's conceptualisation, techniques of rationalisation or neutralisation can be then employed on a pre-decision basis and ultimately make unethical behaviour possible.

Neutralisation addresses recent advances in the psychology of attitudes in at least two more ways. Firstly, on a related note to the above, it assumes that the motives individuals bring with them before the reasoning process bias subsequent judgments. Likewise, while the cognitive revolution in the 1970s and early 1980s witnessed numerous attempts to reinterpret putatively motivational phenomena, in non-motivational, cognitive terms (including dissonance processes), recent social psychological research adopts a more multifaceted and complex view on how different motives guide people's cognitive processing (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). For example, within the "motivated cognition" tradition, a series of studies (see e.g. Kunda, 1990; Baumeister, 1996; Ditto *et al.* 1998) have made a strong case for directional goals, as opposed to accuracy goals, that "may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes: strategies for accessing, constructing and evaluating beliefs" (Kunda, 1990, p. 480). Elsewhere in the

persuasion and attitude change literature, one of the dominant perspectives, i.e., the heuristic- systematic model (Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Chaiken *et al.* 1989), assumes that three different types of motivation, accuracy versus impression management versus self- defence, may affect the type (i.e., heuristic versus systematic) and final outcome of a certain information processing task. Accordingly, mainstream attitude models (e.g. Ajzen, 1985, 1991; Fazio, 1990; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993) have been recently criticised for not incorporating explicit or at least adequate, motivational content (see Perugini and Bagozzi, 2004). These advancements share similar ground with neutralisation theory (and with cognitive dissonance if understood both as a pre- and post-decisional process) in that, a range of enduring and situational motives affect the final behavioural outcome, but also the cognitive strategies deployed before and afterwards. Yet, neutralisation is specifically concerned with processes of moral reasoning and with motives such as self-esteem maintenance, guilt and shame avoidance (more broadly understood as involving a sense of consistency; Maruna and Copes, 2005).

Secondly, although neutralisation is likely to co-exist with other modes of reasoning and deliberate cognitive processing, it should also be pertinent in cases where motives such as the above prevail, as opposed to arriving at a valid ethical judgment (see e.g. Eagly and Chaiken 1993). Therefore, it is compatible with less deliberative or accurate modes of processing such as the spontaneous (Fazio, 1990), the peripheral (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) or the heuristic (Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Chaiken *et al.*1989). Indeed, the lack of cognitive effort devoted to many ethical decisions was highlighted by Irwin (1999, p.212), who claimed that most consumers are unlikely to "incorporate a complex hedonic calculation of the greatest utility for society into (their) weekly supermarket trip". Surely, involvement can

fluctuate as ethical concerns are continuously influenced by contingencies such as peer pressure and availability of information (Clarke, 2004). Nonetheless, neutralisation in this respect can also be applied to less deliberative decision making, to represent particular dissonance reduction "heuristics" or cognitive strategies that may be employed in everyday, low-involvement contexts, where consumers downplay ethical considerations.

The purpose of this section was to illustrate how neutralisation theory relates to, as well as complements, the existing developments in the broader domain of social psychology. Although stemming from the sociological realm, its relationship to key advances in attitude research has been outlined, as this is the underlying foundation of most existing consumer decision-making models. The next section develops research propositions on the specific role of neutralisation at each step of the ethical decision making process.

2.4 Ethical Decision-Making: A Space for Neutralisation?

Attempts to understand ethical decision-making in the broader field of management studies have increased substantially since the 1980s and now represent one of the most distinguishable and flourishing streams of research, crossing several disciplines and covering diverse behaviours, from student cheating (see Crown and Spiller, 1998) to the decision-making of consumers and business professionals (O'Fallon and Butterfied, 2005). For example, in the Journal of Business Ethics alone, the number of articles that explicitly focus on ethical decision-making has increased from approximately 70 between 1980-1990, to 550 between 1991-2000, to 570 between

2001-2006[11]. In a recent review of this literature, O'Fallon and Butterfield (2005) highlight the surprising lack of research identifying variables that may moderate key relationships of the existing ethical decision-making models. As noted above, the primary function of neutralisation is to restore balance when people act in an attitudinally-incongruent manner and, as such, it may be an important moderating variable that explains ethical breaches in the everyday choices that people make.

Much of the research in this broader stream of research is based on one or another of the so-called positive ethical decision-making models such as Hunt and Vitell's (1986, 1992, 2006) general theory of marketing ethics, Trevino's (1986) person-situation interactionist model, Ferrell and Gresham's (1985) contingency framework for understanding ethical decision-making and Jones' (1991) issue-contingent model (for reviews see Ford and Richardson, 1994; Loe *et al.* 2000; O'Fallon and Batterfield, 2005). Rest's (1979) four-stage model of moral judgment is often highlighted as a major influence in this stream of research (e.g. Jones, 1991; O'Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). Its four fundamental components – 1) recognising a moral issue, 2) making a moral judgment, 3) resolving to place moral concerns ahead of other concerns, and 4) acting on those moral concerns – can be viewed as the underlying structure of all the prominent ethical decision-making theories because, despite emphasising different variables/constructs, they focus in some way on one or more steps of this model (O'Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). Whilst the role of neutralisation in some stages of this process was suggested as early as 1987 in business (Vitell and Grove, 1987) and 1989 (Grove *et al.* 1989) in consumer contexts, unfortunately, subsequent empirical research has remained very limited (McDonald and Pak, 1996).

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[11] Results returned from a Google Scholar hit of the term "ethical decision-making" in the Journal of Business Ethics (10/05/2007).

However, there have been examples of psychological processes similar to neutralisation being incorporated in empirical studies of other ethical decision-making models. For example, one of the most dominant accounts of altruistic behaviour, i.e., Schwartz's (1977; Schwartz and Howard, 1980, 1981) "norm-activation" model, incorporates "defensive" or "responsibility denial", a construct which has been found to have explanatory ability in contexts such as helping behaviour (Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz and Howard, 1980, 1981) and energy conservation (Tyler *et al.* 1982). In addition, Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1997), found evidence for the applicability of an additional form of denial based on the justification of "...and besides, I probably couldn't have made a difference anyway", to the context of cooperative behaviour. Applying the TPB in consumer ethics, Fukukawa (2002) made a strong case for the inclusion of a construct named "perceived unfairness". From a neutralisation point-of-view, all the above constructs represent a rather fragmented picture of the neutralising process: Schwartz's "defensive denial" relates to the technique of "denial of responsibility", Kerr and Kaufman Gilliland's additional justification relates to "denial of injury", and Fukukawa's "perceived unfairness" to the "denial of victim". Hence, the incorporation of neutralisation into ethical decision-making models promises a more holistic account of defensive psychological mechanisms.

Further indication that neutralisation might serve a significant role in the ethical decision-making process is provided by re-examining its underlying theoretical tenets in relation to a concept that has enjoyed more attention – at least within organisational ethical decision-making research - that is moral intensity (Jones, 1991). The moral intensity concept acknowledges the convergent support for the

issue-contingent nature of moral decisions. The characteristics of the moral issue, collectively called "moral intensity", are important determinants of ethical decision-making and behaviour (for a review, see O'Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). Jones (1991) originally proposed six basic components of moral intensity: magnitude of consequences, social consensus, probability of effect, temporal immediacy, proximity and concentration of effect. These are purported to independently affect all steps in the ethical decision-making process, as neutralisation does. Indeed, neutralisation-types of reasoning should very much be based on a biased interpretation of precisely those situational characteristics. For example, the denial of injury technique may rely on downplaying the magnitude of an act's consequences or underestimating the probability of (negative) effects, whilst the denial of victim may be based on its lack of temporal immediacy.

The commonality in the fundamental structure of the ethical decision-making models suggests that the conceptualisation of neutralisation in relation to any model that represents Rest's four-stage process, or part thereof, can be relatively readily transferred. This includes Ajzen's TPB (1985, 1991) and Hunt and Vitell's (1986, 1992, 2006) theory of marketing ethics, models that have been highlighted previously as the most subjected to consumer applications. Hence, for the sake of simplicity and comparability with the broader ethical decision-making literature, the following discussion develops some generic propositions on the role of neutralisation at each step of Rest's model. Compared to Grove *et al.*'s (1989) article on the applicability of neutralisation to non-normative consumer behaviour, the following discussion considers the role of neutralisation separately for each step of the process, and builds on Chatzidakis *et al.*'s (2004) study to consider a wider array of ethical consumer behaviours.

Figure 2.4: The Influence of the Ability to Neutralise on the Ethical Decision-Making Process



Figure 2.4 depicts the basic four-stage model of ethical decision making advanced by Rest (1979, 1986), along with the "ability to neutralise" as an additional moderator in the process. As mentioned earlier, Rest's model proposes that in the ethical decision process an individual must a) recognise the moral issue, b) make a moral judgment, c) resolve to place moral concerns ahead of other concerns, and d) act on the moral concerns. Each of these stages is conceptually distinct and success at one stage does not imply success in subsequent stages. The figure further suggests that individuals can bring to bear neutralisation techniques between each and/or every stage of the ethical decision process to mitigate pre- or post-behavioural dissonance.

At the beginning of the process, an individual recognises that there is a moral issue that requires a decision to be made. In the process of becoming sensitive to the situation, the degree to which s/he considers it acceptable, if not right, to deviate

from relevant norms or values will be influenced by his or her ability to apply neutralisation techniques. For example, in the consumer ethics field, the Muncy-Vitell scale (Muncy and Vitell, 1992; Vitell and Muncy, 1992) acknowledges that consumers' perceptions of a problematic situation, depend on the extent to which they view themselves as "actively versus passively benefiting". Vitell and Muncy (1992) have linked this to the possibility of consumers employing neutralisation techniques of "condemning the condemners" and "denial of victim". Similarly, in Chatzidakis *et al.*'s (2004) study, many consumers did not perceive copying music files as ethically problematic at all, because "everyone else is doing it" and because record companies are "ripping off both consumers and the artists". Hence the following proposition is:

P1: The ability to neutralise will have a negative effect on moral judgments (attitudes) and make unethical alternatives be perceived as less problematic.

When a moral issue has been recognised as severe enough to initiate ethical decision-making, an individual must recognise which responses to the ethical dilemma are right or justifiable (Rest, 1979). S/he may not intend to pursue a morally superior course of action because other competing concerns/desired consequences sometimes take priority (e.g. Hunt and Vitell 1986). In such cases, neutralisation techniques can serve as mechanisms of reducing anticipated dissonance, by adding cognitions that are consistent with, and make ethically inferior decisions justifiable. For example, some consumers in the Chatzidakis *et al.* (2004) study had moral principles in favour of recycling. At the same time however, they might have not been willing to undergo the inconvenience of keeping separate bins, driving to the recycling station and so on. By employing neutralisation

techniques such as "no one else is doing it in the neighbourhood" or "it is the council's responsibility for not having a better infrastructure in place", they could avoid dissonance or feelings of guilt that they could otherwise experience when expressing no or low willingness to behave in line with their concerns for the environment.

P2: When a moral judgment is in favour of ethically superior choices, the ability to neutralise will increase the likelihood that a consumer will form inconsistent moral intentions.

Even if the consumer has established an intention to pursue an ethically superior course of action, situational constraints or the existence of an opportunity might affect actual behaviour (e.g. Ferrell and Gresham 1985; Hunt and Vitell 1992). Again, the techniques can guard against any feelings of guilt or dissonance that might arise in these situations. For example, a consumer may be willing to pay a higher price for fairly traded goods but when s/he goes to the supermarket the Fair Trade brand is out of stock. Similarly, an individual may have no intention to engage in any sort of consumer "transgressions", but when s/he is undercharged in a large chain retail store, s/he may "overlook" the incident (e.g. Bersoff, 2001). In both cases, techniques such as attributing responsibility to the retailer and claiming that "no one else would do it" can effectively guard against anticipated dissonance, and thus facilitate the process of not acting on previously established moral intentions.

P3: When moral intentions are in favour of ethically superior choices the ability to neutralise will increase the likelihood that a consumer will submit to situational

constrains or opportunities that inhibit him or her from acting upon those positive intentions.

Actual (unethical) behaviour might lead to the employment of neutralisation techniques on a *post hoc* basis, indicating the consumer's sensitivity to its unethical nature and becoming part of his/her experience (Grove *et al.* 1989). If successful, the techniques might be internalised and thus they will affect the recognition of an ethical issue in subsequent decisions on an *ad hoc* basis. This issue of successful internalisation was highlighted in several consumer accounts in the Chatzidakis *et al.* (2004) study. For example, one of the participants stated that at some point she stopped recycling because "no one else was doing it" and it was "too much of a hassle", yet after a while she started feeling increasingly guilty, felt that "even recycling a little bit counts" and started recycling again. However, another participant stated that although he had tried buying more organic/environmentally-friendly products in the past, he was not willing to do so anymore, because he realised they were "too expensive" and probably just a "marketing ploy". That is, if the techniques have become genuine neutralising devices, on similar occasions in the future an individual will not consider a significant moral dimension exists to the problem (Vitell and Grove 1987; Grove *et al.* 1989). Indeed, by making the unexpected expected, the untoward either justified or inconsequential, neutralisation techniques essentially make things "right" (Massey *et al.* 1997, p. 238).

P4: The use of neutralisation techniques following actual behaviour (if successfully internalised) will reduce the likelihood that a consumer will recognise a moral dimension to a similar problem in the future.

In sum, the foregoing discussion has highlighted how neutralisation, a parsimonious and precise theory of resolving cognitive inconsistency without (ethical) attitude change, may have a broader role to play in ethical decision-making processes. However, when it comes to empirical testing, neutralisation has proven to be one of the most perplexing theories in criminology and beyond (Maruna and Copes, 2005). After five decades since its original formulation, studies on neutralisation suffer from a range of methodological and conceptual difficulties that continue to be largely unresolved (Copes, 2003; Maruna and Copes, 2005; Fritsche, 2005). Accordingly, the purpose of the next section is to put key assumptions of the original theory under scrutiny, and highlight imperatives for subsequent empirical research.

2.5 Conceptual and Methodological Problems Surrounding Neutralisation theory

2.5.1 Introduction

The majority of neutralisation research tends to fall in one of two camps: qualitative studies that probe the theory's applicability in a variety of different domains, and quantitative, often survey-based attempts to test Sykes and Matza's propositions (Maruna and Copes, 2005; Fritsche, 2005). The former tend to support neutralisation theory while the latter tend to challenge it, yet they are both bounded by serious methodological difficulties (e.g. Minor, 1981; Copes, 2003; Maruna and Copes, 2005). Most qualitative studies fall short in providing anything more than illustrative evidence on the theory's applicability in new domains, whilst quantitative ones, suffer from seemingly insurmountable problems of operationalisation and

alternative interpretations. These have left the original theory intact to any major modifications or reformulations up until now (Maruna and Copes, 2005; Fritsche, 2005). The following review of this literature is organised around four key assumptions of the theory: a) that employment of the techniques suggests a general support of conventional norms, b) that there are only five, conceptually distinct techniques, which c) ultimately precede rather than follow immoral behaviour and lastly, d) implicit assumptions on the "nature" of these techniques. Although these assumptions are essentially interrelated, they are reviewed separately for analytical purposes and with a view to highlight imperatives for subsequent empirical research.

2.5.2 Where the Techniques Stand in Relation to Conventional Norms?

"It is by learning these techniques that the juvenile becomes delinquent, rather than by learning moral imperatives, values or attitudes standing in direct contradiction to those of the dominant society" (Sykes and Matza, 1957, p.667)

At the heart of neutralisation theory lies the acceptance of both a conventional norm and the situational exceptions to it (e.g. Minor, 1981; Dodder and Hughes, 1987). It was developed at a time when the dominant, subcultural approaches to deviance viewed crime-committing as the result of being exposed to a deviant subculture and adopting values that were in complete opposition to the ones of conventional society (see e.g. Matza, 1964). In response to these theories, Sykes and Matza proposed that most people do not become delinquents because they value for example, the excitement and adventure involved in norm-violating

behaviour for its own sake (Matza, 1964). Rather, they do this because in the course of social interaction, they have learned techniques of neutralisation that make norm-violating behaviours seem acceptable. Although Sykes and Matza acknowledged that "...some delinquents may be so isolated from the world of conformity that techniques of neutralisation need not be called into play" (p.669), their premise was that the proportion of delinquents who are committed to subcultural values had been previously overestimated.

However, the distinction between beliefs that serve to neutralise conventional bonds and beliefs that show unconventional commitment poses a major operational problem in neutralisation research (Austin, 1977). That is, if the techniques are an indication of one's conventional bonds to society, then delinquents that are non-committed to societal norms and values, or even non-delinquents, should not need to neutralise. Several studies have attempted to test this assumption by comparing acceptance of neutralisation techniques amongst delinquent and non-delinquent groups and/or by correlating acceptance with self-reported behaviour (see Maruna and Copes, 2005; Fritsche, 2005). Mixed results and weak-to-moderate effects for neutralisation found in most of these studies, have in turn been attributed to several "fundamental flaw(s) in virtually all research on neutralisation" (Agnew, 1994, p.560). For example, it has been suggested that existing neutralisation scales have been poorly constructed, inappropriate samples have been selected and research designs are too often cross-sectional or do not specify the conditions that would allow for fuller tests of the theory (e.g. Minor, 1981; Agnew, 1994; Copes, 2003; Fritsche, 2005; Maruna and Copes, 2005). Perhaps more importantly, all studies suffer from the possibility of alternative interpretations. For example, delinquents that are commited to unconventional values may also accept techniques of

neutralisation if one assumes that apart from acting as moral justifications they may also act as "motivational forces" (Minor, 1981), or that non-delinquents may also accept the employment of techniques by others but not for themselves.

A popular alternative interpretation is based on Matza and Sykes's (1961) and particularly Matza's (1964) "drift theory", which postulates a "softer" causal role for neutralisation. He suggests that the techniques are not "constraining" in the way that conventional or unconventional norms would commit somebody to any course of action. Rather, they provide release from moral restraint and thus the ability to "drift" in and out of delinquency (Matza, 1964). This approach however:

> "...centers its attention on how an impetus to engage in delinquent behaviour is translated into action. But it leaves unanswered a serious question: What makes delinquency attractive in the first place? Even if it is granted that techniques of neutralisation or some similar evasions of social controls pave the way for overt delinquency, there remains the problem of the values or ends underlying delinquency and the relationship of these values to those of the larger society" (Matza and Sykes, 1961, p.713).

From this perspective, neutralisation removes the explanatory problem only one step, leaving unresolved the issue of why some people employ techniques of neutralisation and others do not (Hindelang, 1974). Drawing on this assumption, several authors have interpreted previous contradictory findings by adopting a rather situational or conditional viewpoint on the effects of neutralisation on behaviour. Most notably, Minor (1981, p.300-301) suggests that neutralisation, as well as rationalisation, is a factor only for those offenders who have a strong moral bond that requires neutralisation and a strong need or desire to commit a deviant behaviour, as opposed to all other combinations. Others have noted for example, the importance of being in a situation where neutralisations are perceived as

applicable (Agnew and Peters, 1986; Agnew, 1994) and the coexistence of an opportunity (Ball and Lilly, 1971; Gauthier, 2000; Peretti-Watel, 2003).

Contrary to the above however, the techniques could be viewed as another set of beliefs, with similar to conventional and unconventional beliefs' characteristics. Then, as Austin (1977; see also Sheley, 1980) points out, it would be more useful to think of neutralisation as being in the middle of a conventionality continuum, rather than opposing neutralisation to unconventional commitment. Neutralising beliefs would have a more direct role in causing delinquency, as they would represent an attitudinal disposition in the same way as conventional and unconventional beliefs[12].

Minor (1981, 1984) has argued for a somewhat different reconciliation thesis. Drawing on Hirschi's work (1969), he also rested the assumption of a shared common value system and proposed a considerable variation in the extent to which people subscribe to the prevailing norms of society. Neutralisation can be viewed as part of a "hardening process", in which it represents a facilitating element in the developmental process of becoming committed to unconventional norms (Minor, 1984). That is, in early stages of delinquency, someone may need to neutralise or rationalise in order to bring his/her values and behaviours into agreement, and this in turn may weaken his/her commitment to those values until finally s/he no longer needs to neutralise. McCarthy and Stewart (1998) have also suggested a similar reformulation of neutralisation theory, based on Bandura's (1973) thesis of graduate desensitization. Longitudinal research designs are naturally better equipped for answering such questions. Unfortunately, findings from the very few examples of

[12] In fact, this position has been both implicitly and explicitly adopted in some studies. For example, Mitchell and Dodder, 1983, p. 310; see also Mitchell and Dodder, 1980) note: "neutralisation, as used in this study, refers to an attitudinal construct or predisposition to act.".

longitudinal studies on neutralisation (Minor, 1981, 1984; Agnew, 1994; Shields and Whitehall, 1994) have been equivocal (see Fritsche, 2005). In addition, Fritsche (2005) suggests that a reinterpretation of neutralisation processes based on the notion of cognitive dissonance contradicts the hardening hypothesis. That is, once dissonance has been reduced through neutralisation, other cognitions need not be changed.

Fritsche (2005) further points out that findings from Agnew's (1994) study – arguably the most rigorous longitudinal study on neutralisation to date – as well as experimental data on neutralisation (i.e., Fritsche, 2003), indicate that neutralisation has an effect on subsequent behaviour for people with both high and low norm-acceptance but the effect is stronger for people with high normative commitment. Drawing on Agnew (1994), Fritsche suggests that whereas people with low norm-acceptance may employ neutralisation techniques in a *post hoc* fashion in order to avoid social sanctions, people with high norm-acceptance may in addition need to employ neutralisation techniques *ad hoc*, to cope with internal pressures[13]. The existence of internal pressures should hence "promote rather than act as a necessary condition for the impact of neutralisation on behaviour" (Fritsche, 2005, p. 18).

There is however an additional explanation for Fritsche's observation, which seems particularly plausible in the context of decision-making for relatively minor ethical breaches. Matza's (1964) "softer" view on the causal role of neutralisation implies a *moderating* rather than a *direct* effect on the decision-making process, applicable to

[13] Another explanation might be that some neutralisations are mostly associated with persistent criminality and others with maintaining desistance from crime (Maruna and Copes, 2005).

people with high normative commitment. By providing release from moral restraint, neutralisation "*enables* crime but does not *require* it" (Minor, 1981, p.300). Therefore, its effect on behaviour (or intention) should be through weakening or moderating the norm acceptance - behaviour relationship (in line with e.g. Agnew, 1994; Fritsche, 2003). In contrast, Austin's (1977) and Sheley's (1980) view of a conventionality continuum implies that neutralising beliefs may be as "constraining" as conventional or unconventional beliefs. They are able enough alone – independently of high versus low norm acceptance – to *directly* affect subsequent behaviour. This assumption is perhaps complementary (i.e., applicable to different populations or both additive and non-additive effects) rather than alternative to Sykes and Matza's proposition. Minor (1981, p.313) has long noted this possibility when he found a significant effect of neutralisation on deviance for people with both high and low normative commitment: "some unanticipated findings suggest that aspects of the theory may need to be modified or clarified...neutralising excuses may not only *allow* deviance but also *encourage* it". Unfortunately, studies that have presumed a direct causal role between neutralisation and behaviour are often accused of misrepresenting as opposed to extending Sykes and Matza's conceptualization (see e.g. Agnew, 1994, Maruna and Copes, 2005). Further, as it will be shown in section 2.5.5, these issues are interrelated with questions about the "nature" of the techniques of neutralisation. Nonetheless, Austin's and Matza's propositions can be reinterpreted as distinct questions on the direct and moderating effects of neutralisation on (un)ethical intention or behaviour.

In sum, by attempting to challenge subcultural approaches to deviance, Sykes and Matza understated the range and significance of "moral imperatives, values or attitudes standing in direct contradiction to those of the dominant society" (p. 667)

in explaining norm-violating behaviour (Maruna and Copes, 2005). This is even more relevant in consumer contexts where pro-social behaviour (e.g. buying fairly traded goods) might be the exception rather than the norm. In these contexts Sykes and Matza's and Austin's propositions can be viewed as complementary, representing moderating and direct effects of neutralisation on ethical decision-making.

2.5.3 There are only Five, Conceptually Distinct Techniques

"In analysing these techniques we have found it convenient to divide them into five major types" (Sykes and Matza, 1957, p. 667)

Another operational problem of neutralisation theory is related to whether the techniques are only five, and whether they are conceptually distinct. Several authors have argued (e.g. Dodder and Hughes, 1993; Copes, 2003; Maruna and Copes, 2005) that the mixed results found in neutralisation research may be in part due to researchers' reliance on broad, unclear categories and unrefined neutralisation scales.

There have been dozens of previously unidentified techniques suggested in the literature. Examples include "the defence of necessity" (Minor, 1981), "the metaphor of the ledger" (Klockars, 1974), "the denial of humanity" (Alvarez, 1997), "the claim of benefit" (Friedman, 1974), the claim that "we are good people" (Forsyth and Evans, 1998), the "denial of the necessity of the law", the claim that "everybody else is doing it" and "the claim of entitlement" (Coleman, 1994), the techniques of "scapegoating", "self-confidence" and "comparison between risks" (Peretti-Watel,

2003), among others[14]. Neutralisation techniques should indeed come in different varieties, particularly when unique contexts are examined (e.g. Gauthier, 2000; Gailey and Prohaska, 2006). Identification of these techniques should in turn increase the theory's applicability and explanatory power in these contexts (Alvarez, 1997). However, the considerable amount of "newly identified" techniques in the literature raises questions of conceptual distinctiveness and redundancy. For example, Minor (1981) notes that the "defence of necessity" overlaps with the "denial of responsibility" and they could hence be subsumed under a more inclusive set of verbalizations, whilst Forsyth and Evans (1998) note the resemblance between the "we are good people" and "the metaphor of the ledger" techniques. Similar conceptual overlaps can be argued to exist for other techniques. "The claim of benefit" technique (Friedman, 1974) is arguably a variation or "the denial of injury", whilst the "everybody else is doing it" technique (Coleman, 1994) is similar to "condemning the condemners", and so on.

Questions concerning the conceptual distinctiveness of the original five techniques have been also raised in the literature. Minor (1981; see also Sheley, 1980) suggests that a second dimension of denial of victim, i.e., when the victim is conceptually abstract or unknown may be conceptually closer to the denial of injury, while Hazani (1991) has argued that these two dimensions should be viewed as entirely separate techniques. Copes (2003) has argued that denying the existence of a victim because of his/her carelessness is distinct from his/her deservedness; and Erez and Laster (1999) and Sheley (1980), view the techniques of condemning the condemners and appealing to higher loyalties respectively, as variations of the

[14] Peretti-Watel's (2003) proposed techniques concerned an updated variant of neutralisation theory for risky behaviours. Several other authors have also argued for the addition of new techniques, although these are of more context-specific value (e.g. Nelson and Lambert, 2001, p.102 for academic "bullying"; Hazani, 1991, p.140, for German youth coming to terms with the Holocaust).

denial of responsibility. Similar points can be made about other techniques (e.g. depending on the loyalty in question, appealing to higher loyalties can be viewed as having two dimensions, one being conceptually closer to the denial of responsibility).

Much of the above debate however, reflects issues of idiosyncratic researcher judgment and inter-coder agreement. Indeed, several authors have criticised previous studies because neutralisation statements employed "do not measure what they purport to measure" (e.g. Minor, 1981 in criticizing Austin's, 1977 study), whilst a few others, have noted issues of interpretive difficulties when identifying new or existing techniques. For example, in a qualitative study on the applicability of neutralisation to dogfighting, Forsyth and Evans (1998, p.217; see also Hazani, 1991, p.143) note: "Although these techniques are presented as being theoretically exhaustive data does not always lend itself to the sole support of one technique. Data is presented here under the technique it best fits, realising that aspects of other techniques may be present". To an extent, these are inherent difficulties when analysing and coding qualitative data into themes. What finally counts as a separate theme (or neutralisation technique in the present case) also depends on the researcher's own theoretical priorities and judgment (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

Furthermore, these issues are relatively minor, simply suggesting the need for some technical modifications of the theory (Minor, 1981, p.298). Sykes and Matza's intention was to identify some "major types" of neutralisation techniques rather than to provide the most theoretically and empirically exhaustive list of accounts. It is indeed questionable whether such an endeavour would be useful, if possible, given the complexities underlying cognition and behaviour (Orbuch, 1997; Marx,

2003; for such attempts cf. Schonbach, 1990; Fritsche, 2002). Sykes and Matza's taxonomy is nonetheless reasonably comprehensive, because as it was mentioned in section 2.3, similar attempts in other fields have identified key components or elements of moral behaviour which largely correspond to each of the original five techniques (see also Scott and Jehn, 1999)[15]. Although the possibility of additional techniques should be examined and existing ones be refined when investigating news contexts, as Maruna and Copes (2005, p. 64) point out, what is more interesting about neutralisation techniques is their function, not the flavours they come in.

2.5.4 Do the Techniques Follow or Precede Actual Behaviour?

"These justifications are commonly described as rationalisations. They are viewed as following deviant behaviour and as protecting the individual from self-blame and the blame of others after the act. But there is reason to believe that they precede deviant behaviour and make deviant behaviour possible" (p. 666)

Neutralisation theory was introduced at a time when from a psychiatric viewpoint, rationalisations were commonly understood as unconsciously motivated after a problematic act, whilst the social psychological approach often viewed them as

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[15] After a review of the literature across a broad range of disciplines, Scott and Jehn (1999) identified five overall situational components relevant to the determination of the morality of actions. They contended that variations on these components, determine both whether an act is considered to be dishonest and then, if it is dishonest, the degree to which the action is wrong (i.e. determination of whether an act is wrong and of the level of guilt or blame associated with the action respectively). These five components were: act, actor, person affected, intention and expected result. Concerning the contribution of Sykes and Matza (1957) in particular, they suggested that denial of responsibility mostly relates to the actor, denial of victim to the person affected, appeal to higher loyalties to intention, and denial of injury to expected result. Although they did not assume that condemning the condemners relates to the fifth component left, i.e. act, it is fair to do so, in the same way that the authors related factors such as "commonly done" and "social consensus" (p.305).

purposely employed before the act (Brennan, 1974). Sykes and Matza proposed another variation of the social psychological theme, in which they recognised how the rationalisations can mitigate guilt or remorse after the act, but their analysis is primarily focused on how the techniques often precede deviant behaviour (Brennan, 1974). The issue of the exact sequential ordering of the techniques is a particularly vexing one. For critics of neutralisation theory, if it cannot be proven that neutralisations precede an act, then it cannot be considered an aetiological theory of delinquency. It would be a little more than *ex post facto* explanations of deviant behaviour (Dabney, 1995, p. 316; see also Hindelang, 1970; Hamlin, 1988).

The majority of neutralisation research is however based on qualitative or cross-sectional quantitative designs. Accordingly, several authors have noted the inability to establish causal ordering as a major methodological shortcoming of their studies, and have attempted to make some provisional inferences based on provided accounts and verbatim examples (e.g. Priest and McGrath 1970; McCabe, 1992; Dabney, 1995; Alvarez, 1997; Copes, 2003) or correlational data (e.g. Dodder and Hughes, 1993; Hendersott *et al.* 1999; Cechaviciute and Kenny 2007). Fewer have attempted to establish causal ordering through appropriate research designs such as longitudinal (Minor, 1981, 1984; Agnew, 1994; Shields and Whitehall, 1994) and experimental studies (Schwarz and Bayer, 1989; Bohner *et al.* 1998; Bersoff, 2001; Fritsche, 2003). In general, these studies have found significant effects of neutralisation on subsequent behaviour, albeit of weak-to-moderate size (see Fritsche, 2005). Fritsche (2005) further suggests that the significant variation in effect sizes points to possible moderating or conditioning effects of other variables on the neutralisation - behaviour relation (see e.g. Minor, 1981; Agnew and Peters, 1986).

Some authors have further argued against a rather positivist, simplistic view of causality. As mentioned earlier, Minor (1981, 1984) and others (e.g. McCarthy and Stewart, 1998) have drawn on Hirschi's (1969) work to revise neutralisation as a "hardening" process, a notion which is against a unidirectional view of causality:

> "To my mind, the assumption that delinquent acts come before justifying beliefs is the more plausible causal ordering with respect to many of the techniques of neutralisation. It is in fact in many cases difficult to imagine how the boy could subscribe to the belief without having engaged in delinquent acts. But these considerations do not require that we reject such 'neutralising' beliefs as causes of delinquency. On the contrary, since a boy may commit delinquent acts episodically over an extended period of time, there is every reason to believe that neutralisations in some sense resulting from earlier acts are causes of later acts. In fact, if we reject, as we do here, the idea that the delinquent develops a set of beliefs that positively require delinquent behaviour, then the development of a series of neutralising beliefs is exactly what we mean by the 'hardening' process that presumably occurs at some point in a delinquent 'career'" (Hirschi, 1969, p.208).

Although evidence for such processes remain weak (see Fritsche, 2005; Maruna and Copes, 2005), it is interesting to note that findings from consumer studies suggest that in fact, attitude-behaviour consistency is higher when the preceding sequence has been behaviour-to-attitude-to-behaviour rather than simply attitude-to-behaviour (e.g. Foxall, 1977a, 1997b; Davies *et al.* 2002).

Yet, if "beliefs and behaviours are built together and their shifts are not instantaneous" (Peretti-Watel, 2003, p.24), it may never be possible to determine with absolute certainty, whether the neutralising belief or the act comes first

(Hollinger, 1991; Maruna and Copes, 2005). For some, this is not the most interesting question in the first place:

> "Deviant acts may precede and/or follow dissonance resolution. We are of the opinion however that deviant behaviours and dissonance reduction processes are just that- processes. Whether the individual neutralises dissonance before or after the fact, at one point in time or at several points in time does not change the fact that s/he does so." (Dunford and Kunz, 1973, p.5).

Accordingly, Maruna and Copes (2005) argue that even if neutralisation is to be consistently falsified as a predictive theory, it should hardly be abandoned by those seeking to understand norm-violating behaviour.

However, it would be premature to abandon the idea of neutralisation as a determinant of subsequent behaviour. As mentioned above, the few studies that have put this assumption under rigorous empirical testing have in the main provided supportive findings. Maruna and Copes (2005) are rather pessimistic when noting that "establishing a strong correlation between such thought patterns and behavior may be the best this research can hope to accomplish" (p.18). Interestingly, these authors do not review experimental data on neutralisation. Further, the question of sequential ordering is even more pertinent from an ethical decision-making perspective. A fundamental assumption of these models is that certain groups of beliefs are antecedents of intention and behaviour. Changes in these beliefs should in turn affect behaviour either directly, or indirectly, through their effect on other antecedents of behaviour (see e.g. Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). The same should therefore apply for neutralising beliefs, if to establish a role alongside traditional determinants of ethical decision-making.

2.5.5 What is the "Nature" of these Techniques?

"Social controls that serve to check or inhibit deviant motivational patterns are rendered inoperative, and the individual is freed to engage in delinquency without serious damage to self-image. In this sense, the delinquent both has his cake and eats it too, for he remains committed to the dominant normative system and yet so qualifies its imperatives that violations are 'acceptable' if not 'right'" (p.667)

"It is not the validity of this orientation that concerns us here but its function of deflecting blame attached to the violations of social norms..."(p.667)

2.5.5.1 Introduction: From a sociological viewpoint, "accounts are important for what they do, a matter to be analysed in its own right and pursued independently of the question of accuracy or truth-value" (Davis, 2000, p.50) or moral validity (Schervish, 1984, p.214)[16]. Neutralisations' main function is to deflect blame attached to the violation of social and personal norms. Nonetheless, questions of accuracy or truth-value and moral validity are not inconsequential, and are fundamentally interlinked with what the techniques "do" (see e.g. Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1967, p.102). Accordingly, this section discusses what the techniques "do", their accuracy and moral validity, and what the techniques "are".

[16] In their seminal article on accounts, Scott and Lyman (1968, p.46) define them as linguistic devices "employed whenever an act or its consequences are subjected to valuative inquiry". These are divided into justifications and excuses. Justifications are accounts in which someone accepts responsibility for the act in question but denies the negative quality associated with it while excuses are accounts in which someone accepts the negative quality associated with the act in question but denies full responsibility. (p.47). While initially introduced by Sykes and Matza (1957) as justifications, according to Scott and Lyman, the denial of responsibility technique reflects excuses and the rest four justifications. For the present purposes, and following other authors (e.g. Maruna and Copes, 2005; Maruna and Mann, 2006), the terms accounts, justifications and excuses are used interchangeably, because more broadly, they all serve to "neutralise blame".

2.5.5.2 What the Techniques "Do": Given that from a sociological viewpoint, neutralisations are important for what they do, the majority of neutralisation research has left intriguing questions about what they "are" largely unanswered. The techniques have been traditionally viewed broadly as linguistic devices or "accepted vocabularies of motive" (Mills, 1940) or "definitions favourable to the violation of law" (Sutherland and Cressey, 1955) which by deflecting self-blame and blame of others, facilitate delinquent behaviour. However, even the extent to which they are effective in serving these functions, has not been empirically addressed in a direct fashion. The most related stream of research concerns the utility of accounts in face to face to encounters (e.g. Blumstein *et al.* 1974; Ungar, 1981; Riordan *et al.* 1983; Massey *et al.* 1997). Among others, factors such as the "validity" of an account (here referring to its consensual acceptance or "normativeness"), status and power of the account giver, and believability of the account, have been examined in an attempt to understand the conditions under which accounts make "the unexpected expected, the untoward either justified or inconsequential" (Massey *et al.* 1997, p.238). This research stream therefore focuses on the accounts' function in deflecting blame of others and not personal blame. Obliquely, it leaves neutralisation theory vulnerable to strong criticism: neutralisations would just be rationalisations offered by an insincere individual in order to offset the censure (Peretti-Watel, 2003, p.25).

Maruna and Copes (2005) are the first to cite a great amount of (indirect) evidence on the function of the techniques at the intrapersonal level, based on examples from neutralisation-based cognitive therapies and other interventional settings. In addition, the contribution of accounts to self-understanding and individual creation and organisation of meaning has been examined more recently, when accounts

became the research focus of social psychologists. Yet, this stream is much less concerned with deviance and failure events (see Orbuch, 1997; Davis, 2000).

2.5.5.3 The Accuracy or Truth-value, and Moral Validity of the Techniques: The implicit assumption for most of neutralisation research is that the techniques represent some form of cognitive distortions or errors (Maruna and Mann, 2006). For example, Priest and McGrath (1970, p.192) speak of the "hypocrisy" of condemning the condemners, while Alvarez (1997, p.169) highlights the often "unconscious" nature of those techniques. Yet, these techniques are "widely available" and "conventional", because they have been learned in the course of social interaction and reflect a shared cultural system (Matza, 1964). Accordingly, several authors that have explicitly considered issues of accuracy of the techniques, have pointed to the social (e.g. sociocultural and institutional forces) rather than intrapersonal sources of erroneous thinking (e.g. Brennan, 1974; Minor, 1981; Dabney, 1995, Alvarez, 1997; Gauthier, 2000). For example, in a study of the neutralisation of "victim impact statements" (VIS) by legal professionals Erez and Laster note (1999, pp.543-544):

> "However, in the observations of all the interviewees, there is sufficient amount of ambivalence and contradiction to suggest that their views may just as likely be reflections of cognitive rationalisations as much as factual accounts of their empirical experiences with victims and VIS reform".

In line with a sociological approach however, Erez and Laster further point out that it is the interpersonal rather than intrapersonal unit of analysis (cf. for example with psychoanalytical works; Cramer, 1998) which is better suited for understanding the origins of these fictitious views or "cognitive distortions" (p.545):

> "The observations of participants may well be reality based. Nevertheless...the consistency and prevalence of denial-of-responsibility claims across all three professional

groups suggest that they are more than idiosyncratic; rather they reflect a shared professional cultural construct. Taken as a whole, these shared values allow the legal system, as an institution, to avoid dealing with the import of victim participation".

Similarly, an assumption that goes together with the above, but it is hardly ever explicitly articulated (perhaps because this would entail a philosophical or normative rather than scientific approach; see e.g. Becker, 1963) is that the techniques are morally wrong and that "good people" should not use excuses (Maruna and Copes, 2005). A notable exception is Rogers and Buffalo (1974, p. 325), with respect to the neutralisations used by the black minority:

"It is, of course, crucial to recognise that the neutralisation itself is not necessarily "right or wrong" in a moral sense; rather, in objective terms, society in point of fact, may be "wrong" or blameworthy-the neutralising individual "right" and acting responsibly to effect, for example, needed social change".

Maruna and Copes (2005) further note that it is time for neutralisation research to redress misconceptions that the employment of neutralisations is in itself, wrong or pathological; a notion which has found extensive application in interventional contexts, such as cognitive-behavioural therapy and offender treatment (e.g. zero tolerance to excuses). They contrast this to recent psychological research, where the benefits of excuse-making, such as coping with stress, maintaining self-esteem and psychological well-being have been so heavily emphasised, that their disadvantages have arguably been neglected. Accordingly, Maruna and Copes note: "Taking full responsibility for every personal failing does not make a person normal, it makes them extraordinary and possibly at risk of depression" (p. 7). They (see also Maruna and Mann, 2006) call for future neutralisation research to adopt a two-pronged approach to the consequences of neutralising, by for example,

distinguishing between "good" and "bad" neutralisations or contexts in which neutralisations may serve adaptive rather than "toxic" functions.

2.5.5.4 Rational Explanations or Rationalisations?: In line with the above, some authors have viewed neutralisation theory as a sociological response to the psychological view of denial, placing it not as much in the context of intraindividual characteristics as in the context of social processes (Tomita, 1990). They are often derived from, and reinforced by factors such as propaganda, culture, political and social climate (Alvarez, 1997, p.170). Their effectiveness in preventing guilt, depression and anxiety from developing, depends in turn, on the degree that those conditions have endowed them with considerable authenticity (Brennan, 1974, p.363). Still, the assumptions of neutralisation theory are in any other respect, essentially social psychological (see e.g. Taylor, 1979; Hamlin, 1988; Maruna and Copes, 2005). Since their original formulation, the techniques have been consistently viewed as cognitions driven by internal motives (such as self-esteem maintenance, guilt and shame avoidance or dissonance reduction), which permit but do not require delinquency (Matza, 1964). Ultimately, they represent mechanisms of dissonance reduction or "motivated reasoning" (Kunda, 1990), leading to self-deception and distortion (e.g. Wortley, 1986, p.251).

One difficult problem, however, is to "discriminate between cases of self-deceived rule bending and cases where a judgment that the rule does not apply is justified" (Boddington, 1998, p.49). From a philosophical viewpoint, there is no reason why the techniques may not represent "genuine" expressions of situational or utilitarian ethics (Bersoff, 1999, 2001) or a "noncrude" version of moral relativism (Ficarrotta, 1998). In line with Austin's (1977) proposition, they could be viewed as a set of

unbiased moral beliefs, placed somewhere in the middle of a conventionality continuum. Further, as a conceptually independent set of values or attitudinal dispositions (e.g. Mitchell and Dodder, 1980, 1983) they may also cause rather than only facilitate subsequent (un)ethical behaviour (Sheley, 1980).

To better illustrate the difference between these two views, it is useful to consider a typical concluding remark found in neutralisation research: "The evidence suggests that under certain circumstances, cheaters neutralise so effectively that they really don't think cheating is wrong, either for themselves or for others..." (Haines *et al.* 1986, p.353). In line with the original formulation of the theory, Haines *et al.* suggest that neutralisations have been so successfully internalised, that somewhat erroneously, cheaters no longer perceive their behaviour as problematic. For critics of neutralisation however, people possess much more elaborate perceptions of right and wrong (Austin, 1977; Sheley, 1980). Under a more rational or objective interpretation, the cheater has genuinely ascribed to a situational view of morality and has likewise decided that cheating is in effect "right" under particular circumstances[17]. This explanation does not need to ascribe a "distorted" motive to the cheater. As Sheley (1980, p. 53) notes:

> "Colloquial usage of the neutralisation concept has equated it with belief that extenuating circumstances justify some norm violations. That is, people who hold such qualified beliefs are said to neutralise norms. This is not the case. People who hold such beliefs are able to deviate because the beliefs provide them with the moral freedom to do so. People who neutralise create ad hoc definitions of extenuating circumstances for the express purpose of deviating. In short, the difference is that between those who possess the freedom to deviate and those who must create it."

[17] Scott and Jehn's (1999) review of the moral literature to an extent supports this point. Their paper indicates that there are some elements in the techniques that should logically be components of any situational view of morality.

To date, only one study has empirically challenged this opposing interpretation. Bersoff (2001) conducted an experiment in which participants were "accidentally" overpaid for taking part in a study. Two out of three treatments, meant to increase the participants' ability to construct neutralisations for not pointing out the overpayment, were found to have both an independent and cumulative effect on subsequent acceptance of overpayment. Following the experimental paradigm of the "motivated reasoning" tradition (see e.g. Kunda, 1990; Baumeister, 1996; Ditto *et al.* 1998), Bersoff contacted a follow-up study, which removed the participants' purported motivation to see the act of keeping the overpayment as unethical (i.e., a vignette version of the same study). Because the absence or presence of manipulations in this second study did not have a differential effect on the participants' perception of the situation's ethicality, he concluded that "decreases in taking the overpayment were unlikely to have been mediated by objective increases in the magnitude of the moral breach" (p.36). Further, as Bersoff and others (e.g. Fritsche, 2005) have pointed out, ample indirect evidence on the motivational role of neutralisations have been provided in the related research streams of motivated reasoning and cognitive dissonance.

It is in these relatively minor (un) ethical acts however, such as failure to declare overpayment (Bersoff, 2001), protecting the environment (Tyler *et al.* 1982) or buying Fair Trade products, where the possibility of a rational analysis of the ethical breach's magnitude, gains credibility. For example, it is unlikely that mechanisms such as motivated reasoning or dissonance reduction explain the behaviour of all individuals that do not opt for Fair Trade products simply because "they are too expensive" or of "inferior quality". For some, these verbalisations may represent

genuine reasons rather than biased, defence-based rationalisations. Chatzidakis *et al.* (2004) have noted both possibilities and made some preliminary inferences on the motivational role of neutralisation processes, based on verbatim examples from consumer interviews (this was later substantiated in present findings, reported in section 3.7). Surely, experimental studies such as Bersoff's (2001) are better suited for ruling out non-motivational explanations from putatively motivational neutralisation processes. Yet, from an ethical decision-making perspective, and given the paucity of neutralisation studies in this area, it is arguably more important what neutralisations "do", in terms of indirectly and/or directly affecting intention and behaviour, rather than fully ruling out – if ever possible – non-motivational over motivational explanations and vice versa.

An interesting question thereby remaining is how motivational and non-motivational explanations of neutralisation-related arguments could be integrated in a model of ethical decision-making. Authors such as Schwartz and Howard (1980, 1981) and Tyler *et al.* (1982) have opted for a solely motivational role of neutralisation-related processes and have proposed a moderating effect in the personal norm-behaviour relationship. Others have also assumed a motivational function, although they have in effect tested for direct effects of neutralisation on behaviour (e.g. Hansmann *et al.* 2006). Such direct effects leave neutralisation more susceptible to alternative, non-motivational explanations. If neutralising beliefs alone are capable enough to cause subsequent intention or behaviour, similar to other types of beliefs or attitudes, there is no reason to assume they are somehow more biased than other traditional determinants. In contrast, motivational explanations gain credibility when the effect of neutralisation on intention and behaviour is found to be limited in only

those circumstances where people have favourable attitudes or norms towards a behaviour and yet an assumed motivation for incongruent behaviour.

In conclusion, this thesis assumes both a motivational and non-motivational role for neutralisation-related processes, particularly in relatively minor ethical breaches. Given the paucity of research, it is perhaps more important what the techniques of neutralisation "do" in ethical-decision making, in terms of directly and/or indirectly affecting intention and/or behaviour, rather than what exactly they "are", in terms of fully ruling out non-motivational over motivational explanations. Yet, it is worth noting that direct effects of neutralisation on intention and behaviour leave the theory more susceptible to non-motivational interpretations.

2.6 Summary of Part I

The first part of this chapter reviewed the ethical consumer behaviour literature and then focused on attempts to understand consumers' ethical decision-making process. Neutralisation was proposed as a promising theory for understanding the widely evident attitude-behaviour discrepancies, a problem which underlies most attempts to understand how and why cosumer behave (un)ethically. The links of this theory with attitude and decision-making research were discussed and broader propositions were postulated on the role of neutralisation at each step of the decision-making process. However, as it was subsequently highlighted, neutralisation theory suffers from a number of largely unresolved methodological and operational problems. These were reviewed in order to inform subsequent empirical research.

The purpose of the second part of this chapter is to introduce a behavioural setting and conceptualise the role of neutralisation within that context in particular.

Part II: Conceptualising the Role of Neutralisation in Deciding to Support the Fair Trade Movement

2.7 Introduction

Part I considered the applicability of neutralisation in various instances of (un)ethical consumer behaviour. Yet, further understanding of neutralisation-related processes requires an in-depth investigation of specific behavioural contexts. Accordingly, the purpose of the next section is to introduce consumers' support for Fair Trade as an appropriate setting for empirical research (2.8). Section 2.9 highlights the implications for subsequent measurement and validation of decision-making constructs. Finally, section 2.10 reconsiders the role of neutralisation in this particular context, and formulates testable hypotheses for subsequent research.

2.8 Choice of Behavioural Context

Ethical consumer behaviour was earlier defined broadly, to include all activities that may be affected by the consumer's ethical concerns. The streams of consumer ethics and ethical consumerism were identified as the two most general treatments to date. Existing consumer studies on neutralisation have focused on misconduct in retail settings (Strutton *et al.* 1994, 1997; Mitchell and Chan, 2002; Rosenbaum and Kuntze, 2003) and file-trading of musical intellectual property on the internet (Cohn and Vaccaro, 2006). They therefore pertain to the consumer ethics stream and deal with behaviours that are most often illegal or undesirable. Conspicuously absent

from this corpus of literature is an array of positive consumer activities that are mostly guided by personal rather than social or universal norms and values. Indeed, Crane and Matten (2004, p.290; italics added) define the whole stream of ethical consumerism as "the conscious and deliberate decision to make certain consumption choices due to *personal* moral beliefs and values". Section 2.2.3 highlighted that applications of neutralisation in these behaviours are sound on both theoretical and empirical grounds. In fact, for the conventional consumer segments, neutralisation should be more applicable in such relatively minor, day-to-day ethical breaches rather than clearly illegal activities.

A type of behaviour that predominantly features in ethical consumerism studies is consumers' support for the Fair Trade movement (e.g. Strong 1996, 1997; Carrigan and Attalla, 2001; Shaw *et al.* 2001; Roberts, 1996; Nicholls and Lee, 2006). This has been traditionally associated with the purchase of Fair Trade products, defined as those goods that are "purchased under equitable trading agreements, involving cooperative rather than competitive trading principles, ensuring a fair price and fair working conditions for the producers and suppliers" (Strong, 1996, p. 5). Recently, there has been a trend towards supporting the Fair Trade movement more broadly, for example, by organising or participating in Fair Trade campaigns, donating to relevant organisations and petitioning (for example, see www.fairtrade.org.uk and www.maketradefair.com). This appears to be in line with a widely adopted (at least by the four main international Fair Trade networks), broader definition of the movement as "an alternative approach to conventional international trade. It is a trading partnership which aims for sustainable development of excluded and disadvantaged producers. It seeks to do this by providing better trading conditions, by awareness raising and by campaigning" (Krier, 2001, p.5). Whilst the proportion

of consumers that opt for Fair Trade products and other means of support for the Fair Trade movement has been growing year on year (Doane, 2001; Nicholls, 2002; Mintel, 2007), many others express their favourable attitudes but fail to behave accordingly (Roberts, 1996; Carrigan and Attala, 2001). These individuals may increasingly have to justify their inconsistent behaviour not only to themselves, but also to Fair Trade advocates[18].

Furthermore, Fair Trade was identified as an issue of particular concern in the Chatzidakis *et al.* (2004) study, as it was independently introduced by all informants in the course of general discussions on ethics and consumption. This has been also noted in a previous qualitative investigation on ethical consumerism (Shaw and Clarke, 1999). Chatzidakis *et al.* (2004) further provided some examples of neutralisation techniques being used in this context, but the sample size in this study was limited (n = 8; 5 female and 3 male; age range 20-50). Accordingly, the first study in this thesis aimed to examine the type and frequency of neutralisations that are used in this context in a more comprehensive manner. Findings from this study are reported in section 3.7.

It is important to note, however, that different psychological mechanisms may also have a role in explaining the behaviour of certain population segments that are concerned about Fair Trade but may not act accordingly. In fact, in everyday decisions, an existing ethical concern, may still not gain sufficient salience due to other competing, higher involvement considerations (Thogersen, 1999). Further, some consumers may block thinking about the relevant issue (Baumeister, 1996) or conversely, their final behaviour may be an outcome of utilitarian decision making,

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[18] See for example the case of Fair Trade petitioning via SMS, the first campaign of its kind. (Brand Republic, 06/09/2004)

where no neutralisation-type of reasoning need be involved (see Bersoff, 1999, 2001). For example, some consumers may consciously decide that an ethical product's "feel good" attribute or self-esteem leverage does not adequately compensate for the additional monetary cost or inconvenience. However, given the increased media interest in Fair Trade and growth of ethical consumerism (e.g. Mintel 2007; Strong, 1996, 1997), it is reasonable to suggest that the issue has crossed the barriers of perceptual defence for more than just the caring and ethical niches (Carrigan and Attala, 2001) of the population. On the other hand, it is fairly unlikely that all these consumers engage in strictly utilitarian calculations when engaging in everyday low-involvement situations such as buying Fair Trade bananas or coffee[19]. It is hence suggested that at any stage in the decision-making process, consumers may intuitively employ a set of rationalising beliefs to cope with the anticipated or post behavioural dissonance they could otherwise experience.

Furthermore, section 2.5.5 highlighted that neutralisations may represent defence-based rationalisations but also rational explanations. In this respect, neutralisation-type of arguments should be even more pervasive in consumers' accounts for (not) supporting Fair Trade.

In sum, a further investigation of neutralisation processes in the context of supporting Fair Trade would stretch the theory's applicability beyond illegal or clearly norm-violating activities, to include those that are rather driven by personal

[19] This is different from saying that ethical behaviours which occur under low-involvement circumstances cannot be explained by highly cognitive, step-by-step models of decision making. For example, Ajzen and Fishbein (1980, p.245) note about the TRA: " Although we take the position that beliefs determine attitudes and subjective norms and these in turn influence intentions, we do not mean to imply that prior to performing each and every action, people systematically scrutinize the determinants of their behaviour. Rather, we view the processes involved as largely automatic or implicit, and only in rare cases do we become fully aware of these processes".

norms and values. With the exception of the Chatzidakis *et al.* (2004) study, consumer studies have so far focused on more traditional applications. However, it is arguably within more normatively flexible domains that neutralisation is more pervasive. A substantial population segment expresses favourable attitudes towards Fair Trade but fails to behave accordingly (e.g. Mintel, 2007), and it is under these conditions that neutralisation should have greater explanatory power.

2.9 Implications for the Conceptualisation and Measurement of the Decision-Making Constructs

The exact specification of the behaviour of interest and corresponding attitudinal constructs is a major methodological and conceptual concern in attitude research. Indeed, early pessimistic views on the usefulness of attitudes in predicting behaviour have been misguided by the lack of measurement correspondence between verbal attitudes on the one hand, and observed behaviour on the other (Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005; Ajzen, 2005). For example, Kaiser *et al.* (1999a; see also Bamberg, 2003) review the environmental psychology literature and conclude that the relationship between environmental attitude and ecological behaviour has been underestimated due to the failure of past studies to define both constructs on the same level of generality. Specific behaviours such as recycling would at best weakly correlate with general environmental concern, yet could correlate strongly with specific attitudes towards recycling (Davies *et al.* 2002). General environmental concern can in turn correlate strongly with an aggregated index of pro-environmental behaviours, recycling being only one of the possible ways to support the environment.

The above point is often summarised by "the principle of compatibility", which requires that "measures of attitude and behaviour involve exactly the same action, target, context and time elements, whether defined at a very specific or a more general level" (Ajzen, 2005, p. 4). Consistent with this principle, Eagly and Chaiken (1993) distinguish between "attitudes towards targets" and "attitudes towards behaviours". General measures usually capture "attitudes towards targets" (e.g., towards the environment, minorities, politics) and do not necessarily specify the action, target and time elements. Specific measures are concerned with "attitudes towards behaviours" and define some or all the above elements to represent a single or an index of behaviours. Accordingly, the behaviour of interest in this research is carefully defined as "supporting the Fair Trade movement", reflecting a set of behaviours such as buying Fair Trade products, donating and petitioning for Fair Trade.

2.10 Conceptualising the Role of Neutralisation in Supporting Fair Trade

As mentioned in part I, attempts to understand ethical decision-making have increased substantially since the 1980s. Much of the research is based on one or another of the prominent positive ethical decision-making models such as Hunt and Vitell's (1986, 1992, 2006) general theory of marketing ethics, Trevino's (1986) person-situation interactionist model, Ferrell and Gresham's (1985) contingency framework for understanding ethical decision-making and Jones' (1991) issue-contingent model (for reviews see Ford and Richardson, 1994; Loe *et al.* 2000; O'Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). Rest's (1979) four-stage model of moral judgment is

often highlighted as a major influence in this stream of research (e.g. Jones, 1991; O'Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). Its four fundamental components – 1) recognising a moral issue, 2) making a moral judgment, 3) resolving to place moral concerns ahead of other concerns, and 4) acting on those moral concerns – can be viewed as the underlying structure of all the prominent ethical decision-making theories because, despite emphasising different variables/constructs, they focus in some way on one or more steps of this model. Whilst the role of neutralisation in some stages of this process was addressed as early as 1987 in business contexts (Vitell and Grove, 1987) and 1989 in consumer behaviour (Grove *et al.* 1989), unfortunately, subsequent empirical research has remained limited (McDonald and Pak, 1996). Accordingly, a general discussion of the role of neutralisation in every stage of this simplified model was pursued in section 2.4.

In the consumer behaviour stream of research, Hunt and Vitell's (1986, 1992, 2006) theory of marketing ethics and Ajzen's Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB; 1985; 1991) are identified as the more commonly applied theoretical frameworks (Chatzidakis *et al.* 2004). The small amount of research that has specifically investigated consumers' support for the Fair Trade movement has concentrated on developing and testing models based on the TPB (Shaw and Clarke 1999; Shaw *et al.* 2000; Shaw and Shiu 2002a, 2002b, 2003). Several other studies have provided valuable insights, yet they have not relied on a theoretical model of decision-making or addressed all steps of the process. For example, De Pelsmacker *et al.* (2005, 2006) have assessed the willingness to pay for Fair Trade products via multi-attribute modelling, and profiled the sociodemographic characteristics of the Fair Trade consumer. Wright and Heaton (2006) have focused on the consumer understanding of the Fair Trade brand and the importance of raising awareness.

Nicholls and Lee (2006) address the support of the movement by children, and Carrigan *at al.* (2004), by older consumers.

The commonality in the fundamental structure of the ethical decision-making models suggests that the conceptualisation of neutralisation in relation to any model that represents a four-stage process as Rest's does (1979), or part thereof, can be relatively readily transferred. In fact, whilst Rest's framework is the foundation of the subsequent models, it is perceived as the underlying paradigm rather than a directly testable model itself (e.g. Loe *et al.* 2000; O'Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). For this reason, the following discussion reconsiders the role of neutralisation within a TPB framework and in the context of supporting the Fair Trade movement.

The TPB is arguably the dominant account of the relationship between cognitions and behaviour in social psychology (Cooke and Sheeran, 2004). It is the most robust of all the attitude-behavioural models, with an impressive record of successful applications in numerous domains (for reviews, see e.g. Notani, 1998; Ajzen, 2001; Armitage and Conner 2001). Crucially, section 2.2.2 noted that the TPB has been applied and tested in various aspects of ethical consumer behaviour, including the purchase of Fair Trade products (Shaw and Clarke 1999; Shaw *et al.* 2000; Shaw and Shiu 2002a, 2002b, 2003) but also instances of consumer misconduct (Fukukawa, 2002) as well as more specific applications e.g. on software piracy (Chang, 1998), waste recycling (Chan, 1998) and green consumerism (e.g. Sparks and Shepherd, 1992; Kalafatis *et al.*1999). Therefore, conceptualising the direct and moderating role of neutralisation in relation to this theoretical framework promotes consistency and comparability in this nascent area of research.

Consistency and comparability with previous research is further facilitated from the fact that TPB studies, probably more than any other decision-making model applications, have enjoyed thorough and detailed guidelines on how to construct and validate respective measures (e.g. Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Ajzen, 2002a; Francis *et al.* 2004a, 2004b). Another desirable attribute of the TPB is that it remains in principle open to the inclusion of other constructs (such as neutralisation) so long as they increase TPB's explanatory power (Ajzen, 1991, p. 199). Lastly, the TPB is in line with all the ethical decision-making models mentioned previously, so long as they allow for a step-by-step (from attitudes to intentions to behaviour) view of the cognitive process (Fukukawa, 2002; Nicholls and Lee, 2006).

As mentioned in section 2.2.2, the TPB (Ajzen, 1985, 1991) is an extension of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980), suggesting that behaviour in a specified situation, is a direct function of behavioural intention, which in turn is a function of attitude and subjective norm. TPB differs from TRA by adding a new construct, i.e., perceived behavioural control, to address behaviours over which individuals have incomplete volitional control. It is suggested to impact behaviour indirectly through its effect on intention, but also directly, as a proxy for actual behavioural control. This model has been presented in figure 2.2b.

The TPB takes a cognitive, information-processing approach to attitude formation (e.g. Ajzen, 1991). It is a popular "expectancy-value" model, assuming that attitudes develop from, and can be explained based on the beliefs people hold about the behaviour in question. An overall attitudinal disposition is derived upon

summation of an individual's beliefs about the likelihood of a consequence from a behaviour (i.e., expectancy) multiplied by the desirability of each consequence (i.e., value). So-called "multiplicative composites" are likewise created for normative and control beliefs, which are assumed to influence subjective norm and perceived behavioural control, respectively. The expectancy-value assumption can be then tested by the size of the correlation between summated multiplicative composites or "indirect" measures and respective global or "direct" ones for attitude, subjective norm and perceived behaviour control.

Existing meta-analyses of TPB studies suggest that attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioural control typically account for 30 to 50% of the variance in intentions, which in turn, along with perceived behavioural control, account for 20 to 30% of the variance in actual behaviour (Fife-Schaw *et al.* 2007). Notwithstanding this success, a large part of the variance in intention and behaviour hence remains unexplained. In general, this has been accounted for by sampling, operationalisation and behaviour-specific issues (see e.g. Luzar and Cosse 1998; Ogden 2003) or by the addition of further constructs[20]. For example, Fukukawa (2002) has proposed the addition of "perceived unfairness"; while in the ethical consumerism field, Shaw and colleagues (Shaw and Clarke 1999; Shaw *et al.* 2000; Shaw and Shiu 2002a, 2002b, 2003) have suggested the addition of "ethical

[20] Of course, like other cognitive models of decision-making, the TPB has been also criticised on more generic grounds. Most notably, it does not sufficiently account for habitual or automatic processes, it assumes that intention always mediates behaviour and a unidirectional view of causality (for critiques see e.g. Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Foxall, 1997a; Davies *et al.* 2002). Yet, the explanatory and predictive ability of the TPB is still substantial and such criticisms are often confounded by alternative interpretations and equivocal findings. For example, in many studies the addition of past behaviour (or measures of habit) does not account for additional variance in intention or behaviour, intentions are found to mediate the effects of attitudes on behaviours, and longitudinal designs have shown that although actual behaviour influences attitudes, the attitude-behaviour effect is stronger than the behaviour-attitude one (see e.g. Eagly and Chaiken, 1993).

obligation" and "self identity". Inevitably, however, the model fails to account for the psychological realities of consumers who consistently behave in ways which are in apparent contradiction to their expressed ethical concerns. Accordingly, Nicholls and Lee (2006) highlight that the TPB, along with the rest of the ethical decision-making models does not appear to throw any light on the "ethical purchase gaps" (Cowe and Williams, 2000). Within the broader ethical decision-making literature, O'Fallon and Butterfield (2005) emphasise the surprising lack of research into identifying variables that may moderate key relationships of the existing ethical decision-making models. Figure 2.10 addresses the moderating and direct role of neutralisation in the TPB, alongside the additional variables proposed by Shaw and colleagues.

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Figure 2.10: The Direct and Moderating Effects of Neutralisation in the Theory of Planned Behaviour



At the heart of neutralisation theory lies the acceptance of both a norm and the situational exceptions to it. Therefore, contrary to the assumption underlying many studies based on the TPB, it does not assume that people's behaviour is always consistent with their attitudes. Indeed, the most important condition for neutralisation to play a role in consumers' ethical decision-making is that individuals should have a desire to commit an act (that represents a less ethical alternative) and at the same time have ethical bonds that require neutralisation (e.g. Minor, 1981; Dodder and Hughes, 1987). Within a TPB framework, these ethical bonds could translate in positive attitudes, but also, in positive subjective norms. Both of these constructs could be subsumed under an overall attitudinal measure, yet their distinction is of theoretical interest (see e.g. Ajzen, 1991, pp.198-199; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, p.178). It is in conceptual agreement with the original application of neutralisation theory to norm-violating instances as well as with the discrete role of social norms, as highlighted in one way or another in most existing ethical decision-making models (e.g. Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Hunt and Vitell, 1986, 1992; Trevino, 1986).

The postulation of both a direct and moderating role for neutralisation is of particular significance, as noted in section 2.5, and draws on present qualitative findings (reported in section 3.7). The direct role hypothesis places neutralisation along with traditional determinants of intention and behaviour, i.e., attitudes and subjective norms. From a TPB perspective, techniques of neutralisation may represent attitudinal beliefs that mostly relate to "reasons against" as opposed to "reasons for" performing a behaviour. These two types of cognitions can be qualitatively different and are not simply the logical opposite of each other (e.g.

Westaby and Fishbein, 1996; Westaby *et al.* 1997; Sutton, 2004). Somewhat diverting from Sykes and Matza's original conceptualisation, the techniques could be viewed as genuine expressions of "situational ethics" or valid explanations (Bersoff, 2001; see also Austin, 1977). The concept of neutralisation could then be contrasted more readily with past studies, suggesting for example that consumers need to feel Fair Trade products "make a difference" (Carrigan *et al.* 2004, p. 406; Nicholls and Lee, 2006) or that they feel alienated by the price and lack of availability of Fair Trade products (Shaw *et al.* 2006b).

However, a moderator hypothesis seems to be closer to the original conceptualisation of the theory. The techniques may still have a causal role to play, but unless they are fully internalised, it is through facilitating rather than determining (un)ethical behaviour. They allow people to behave in ways that are inconsistent with their attitudes or norms they adhere to, and hence weaken the link between attitudes and norms on the one hand, and intention and behaviour on the other. Hence the following hypotheses:

H1a: Neutralisation has a direct, negative influence on consumers' behavioural intentions to support Fair Trade.

H1b: The higher the acceptance of neutralising beliefs the weaker the relationship between attitudes and behavioural intention.

H1c: The higher the acceptance of neutralising beliefs the weaker the relationship between subjective norms and behavioural intention.

H2a: Neutralisation has a direct and indirect (via intentions) negative influence on actual behaviour in support of Fair Trade.

H2b: The higher the acceptance of neutralising beliefs the weaker the relationship between behavioural intentions and actual behaviour.

Whilst the TRA (Ajzen, and Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) was originally against the inclusion of additional constructs, in his TPB (Ajzen, 1985, 1991), an already modified version of TRA to include perceived behaviour control, Ajzen moved away from this position. The TPB is "in principle, open to the inclusion of additional predictors if it can be shown that they capture a significant proportion of the variance in intention or behaviour after the theory's current variables have been taken into account" (Ajzen, 1991, p.199). Since then, a variety of different constructs have been suggested, such as anticipated regret or guilt, affective reaction, personal norm, self-efficacy, behavioural expectations, past behaviour, direct experience, information and so on (for reviews see e.g. Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Conner and Armitage, 1998; Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005). Given the often supportive findings, most recent theorising by Ajzen and Fishbein (2005, p. 202) welcomes further additions yet with increased caution: "for the sake of parsimony, additional predictors should be proposed and added to the theory with caution, and only after careful deliberation and empirical exploration".

The sufficiency of the TPB in explaining moral behaviour has been criticised on two main grounds. Firstly, being essentially a rational-choice model, it seems to ignore the role of altruistic, non-rational motives in guiding behaviour (Kaiser *et al.* 1999b; Sparks and Shepherd, 2002). Personal feelings of rightness or wrongness, as reflected in measures of "personal norm" or "ethical obligation" were deliberately dropped from the earliest version of the TRA, yet they have been at the forefront of moral behaviour research (Manstead and Parker, 1995). For example, personal

norm is the key antecedent variable in one of the most dominant accounts of altruistic behaviour, that is Schwartz's (1970, 1977) norm-activation model. In contrast, by incorporating "subjective norms", the TPB focuses on social rather than personal norms. This construct seems to capture conventional responsibility in the form of social expectations, rather than ethical responsibility based on deliberately made moral judgments (Kaiser and Shimoda, 1999, Kaiser *et al.* 1999b). In fact, personal moral obligation was the first construct to be added in the TPB by Ajzen himself in an attempt to explain behaviours such as shoplifting, lying and cheating (Beck and Ajzen, 1991). Inclusion of a measure of ethical obligation contributed a further 3 to 6% of variance explained in intention, making Ajzen (1991, p. 199) conclude that moral issues may indeed take on added salience with respect to behaviours of this kind. Accordingly, the utility of this construct over and above traditional TPB determinants has been extensively supported in the literature (e.g. Manstead and Parker, 1995; Parker *et al.* 1995; Sparks *et al.* 1995a; Olsen, 2001; Sparks and Shepherd, 2002; Evans and Norman, 2003; Jackson *et al.* 2003; Godin *et al.* 2005; for a review see Conner and Armitage, 1998).

Secondly, the TPB views the (moral) actor primarily as a psychological entity rather than a social construct (Terry *et al.* 1999). From this point of view, the conceptualisation of subjective norm is limited because it does not capture the whole spectrum of socially defined influences (Hagger and Chatzisarantis, 2006). Identity theory suggests that "one's self concept is organised into a hierarchy of role identities that correspond to one's positions in the social structure" (Charng *et al.* 1988, p.304). When a particular behaviour (e.g. driving a hybrid SUV) becomes associated with one's role identity (e.g. pro-environment "middle-class"), it is more likely that one will behave consistently with that identity. Identity research therefore

attempts to understand and predict behaviour by conceiving "the self and the wider social structure as being inextricably linked" (Terry *et al.* 1999, p. 226). A measure of "self-identity" has been suggested as a way of reconceptualising the influence of norms, to redress the proposition that people form intentions not only on the basis of their personal beliefs (e.g. attitudes) but also on the basis of their socially defined roles (i.e., self-identity; Hagger and Chatzisarantis, 2006). This seems particularly plausible in the context of ethical consumer decision-making, where consumers may engage in a variety of pro-social activities because related issues (e.g. caring for the Third-world) have become an important part of their self-identity (Shaw, 2000). As in the case of ethical obligation, the utility of a self-identity construct has been extensively supported in previous TPB research (e.g. Charng *et al.* 1988; Sparks and Shepherd, 1992; Sparks *et al.* 1995a; Sparks and Gurthrie, 1998; Terry *et al.* 1999; Jackson *et al.* 2003; for a review see Conner and Armitage, 1998).

Research by Shaw and colleagues (Shaw and Clarke 1999; Shaw *et al.* 2000; Shaw and Shiu 2002a, 2002b, 2003) has indicated the applicability of both ethical obligation and self-identity in the Fair Trade context in particular. In line with the previous discussion (sections 2.2 and 2.8), behaviours such as supporting the Fair Trade movement should be indeed guided mostly by personal norms and self-identification with relevant issues, rather than social norms and behavioural evaluations. In addition to attitudes or subjective norms these types of ethical bonds – as reflected in the constructs of ethical obligation and self-identity - may equally be weakened by the acceptance of neutralising beliefs. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H3a: The higher the acceptance of neutralising beliefs the weaker the relationship between ethical obligation and behavioural intention.

H3b: The higher the acceptance of neutralising beliefs the weaker the relationship between self-identity and behavioural intention.

Two cognitive dimensions that relate to the effectiveness of neutralising mechanisms and which can be experimentally manipulated are "accessibility" and "acceptability". Accessibility (or availability) versus acceptability of neutralisation techniques is employed as a distinction that more effectively captures, as a whole, the causal properties of neutralisation (Fritsche, 2003). The former refers to the extent that neutralisation techniques are made available while the latter to the extent that neutralisation techniques are personally accepted (personal acceptability) or accepted by one's social environment (social acceptability). Indeed, previous experimental studies on neutralisation can be reinterpreted based on whether they have attempted to manipulate the cognitive accessibility of neutralisations only (Schwarz and Bayer, 1989; Bohner *et al.* 1998) or both (Bersoff, 2001; Fritsche, 2003). In addition, this distinction corresponds to the one proposed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980, pp.227-228) for TPB-based interventions, that is "presentation" versus "acceptability" and "yielding" of an argument. The mere presentation of an argument may at times lead to behavioural change, either because it is a novel, previously non-salient argument (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980); or in the case of neutralisation, because people may be motivated to seek for available neutralising arguments in the first place (Fritsche, 2005). Yet, it is important to distinguish this from the extent to which the acceptance of an argument has been affected (i.e., yielded) by the experimental manipulation. Hence the following hypotheses:

H4a: Cognitive accessibility of neutralisation techniques negatively affects behavioural intentions to support Fair Trade and actual behaviour in support of Fair Trade.

H4b: Acceptability of neutralisation techniques negatively affects behavioural intentions to support Fair Trade and actual behaviour in support of Fair Trade.

Within ethical decision-making research, several individual traits have been empirically established as important determinants of ethical behaviour such as gender, religion, locus of control and cognitive moral development (for reviews see Loe *et al.* 2000; O'Fallon and Butterfield, 2005; for consumer characteristics in particular, see Vitell, 2003). In line with a TPB framework however, personality traits, intelligence, demographic variables, values, and other variables of this kind are considered "background factors" that "...influence behaviour and intention indirectly by their effects on behavioural, normative or control beliefs and, through these beliefs, on attitudes, subjective norms or perceptions of control" (Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005, p.197). That is, they are not neglected but the components of the TPB are assumed to mediate the effects of background factors on intentions and actions. Since they are not expected to directly affect the relationships described in the above hypotheses, for the sake of relevance and parsimony, this research will not address the influence of these factors. Rather, it will examine the applicability of neutralisation *vis-à-vis* key established relationships in consumer's ethical decision-making. The identification of background characteristics that may influence the acceptance of neutralising beliefs in particular, as opposed to other proximal determinants of behaviour such as attitudes or subjective norms indeed poses secondary questions. For example, there is some (weak) evidence for gender effects

in neutralisation research (e.g. Ball, 1966; Ward and Beck, 1990; Bersoff, 2001). Yet, it is only after establishing a role for neutralisation in ethical decision-making, that these questions gain significance. Identification of additional background factors – particularly psychological ones - could then provide valuable information about the origin of specific neutralising beliefs and suggest ways for future interventions.

2.11 Summary of Part II

The second part of this chapter introduced consumers' support for the Fair Trade movement as an appropriate behavioural setting for this research, based on both empirical and theoretical grounds. The former related to previous qualitative findings, which highlighted the prominence of Fair Trade concerns in ethical consumption and provided preliminary evidence for the applicability of neutralisation. Theoretical considerations related to stretching the theory's applicability beyond clearly illegal or immoral behaviours to include those that are mostly driven by personal norms and values. Section 2.9 highlighted the implications of carefully defining the behaviour of interest for subsequent measurement and validation of the decision-making constructs. Finally, section 2.10 turned the research propositions developed in section 2.4, into testable hypotheses for empirical research into consumers' support for Fair Trade. These included direct effects of neutralisation on intention and behaviour, as well as moderating effects on key relationships within an extended version of the TPB. The next chapter introduces the broader philosophical and methodological debate, before describing the current research approach and exploratory findings.

Chapter 3 Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to place the thesis in context with philosophical and methodological debates that surround social sciences, and then describe the methods used at each phase of research.

The chapter begins with a discussion of the differences between interpretive and positivist traditions of research and then locates the current methodology within the postpositivist metaphysic (3.2). Accordingly, this thesis adopts a multi-method approach to research design, comprised of two exploratory qualitative studies, a field survey and an experiment. These are briefly described (3.3) before moving to consider a key methodological concern in ethics research, that is social desirability bias (3.4). Subsequently, the chapter introduces the debate surrounding the use of student samples (3.5), as students were the target population in all stages of investigation.

The remainder of the chapter discusses each phase of research separately and is split into three parts. Part I is concerned with the first study, which was a qualitative exploration of the role of neutralisation in supporting Fair Trade. Part II discusses a second qualitative stage of investigation that mainly helped generate a pool of items for scales relating to the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1985, 1991) and neutralisation. Part III describes the methods used for the main stages of the

research in which the formulated hypotheses (in section 2.10) were tested. A survey study tested H1-H3, whereas H4 was addressed by an experiment. The discussion covers the research procedures, the instruments employed and sampling issues, whilst the results from these two studies are reported in chapter 4.

3.2 The Methodological Debate

3.2.1 Introduction to Research Philosophy

Within the consumer research field and beyond, a distinction is made between positivist and interpretive approaches to research (also known as humanistic or naturalistic; e.g. Hudson and Ozanne, 1988; Szmigin and Foxall, 2000; Shankar and Patterson, 2001)[21]. The latter reflects an umbrella label for a wider range of philosophical positions and paradigms that emerged during the 1980s and challenged traditional positivist views, which have dominated the consumer research field since the 1950s (e.g. Goulding, 1999). Interpretive consumer research includes critical relativism (Anderson, 1986), structuralism (Levy, 1981), literary criticism (Stern, 1989), existential phenomenology (Thompson *et al.* 1989, 1990), humanistic inquiry (Hirschman, 1986), naturalistic inquiry (Belk *et al.* 1988), critical theory (Murray and Ozanne, 1991), post-modernism (Firat and Venkatesh, 1995) and hermeneutics (Arnold and Fischer, 1994; Thompson *et al.* 1994), among others. It is often acknowledged that there are common themes transcending interpretivist paradigms; however, there are also fundamental differences that should be

[21] This distinction somewhat corresponds to the quantitative versus qualitative one (e.g. Goulding, 1999). Yet, this is not entirely correct as there may be "positivist" qualitative approaches and vice-versa (e.g. Shankar and Patterson, 2001).

cautiously taken into account before conducting or evaluating research (e.g. Arnold and Fischer, 1994; Goulding, 1999; Szmigin and Foxall, 1999).

3.2.2 Understanding Paradigmatic Assumptions and Contradictions

A paradigm reflects a particular world-view or "a set of linked assumptions about the world which is shared by a community of scientists investigating the world" (Deshpande, 1983, p. 101 in Healy and Perry, 2000). These assumptions may not be shared by different scientific communities, hence leading to Kuhn's (1970) incommensurability thesis. That is, "two groups of scientists see different things when they look at the same point and in the same direction" (cited in Fischer, 1990, p. 20). The researcher is left with an urge to be explicit about his/her metaphysical positions (e.g. Hirschman, 1986; Hudson and Ozanne, 1988). A useful way to map these assumptions and better understand the tensions across research paradigms, is in relation to three key elements of a paradigm, that is ontology, epistemology, and methodology (e.g. Healy and Perry, 2000).

Ontology relates to assumptions about the nature of reality and existence; the very essence of the phenomena under investigation (e.g. Hollis, 1994; Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). For example, a basic ontological question is whether the "reality" to be investigated is objective, independent and external to the individual or the product of individual cognition, constructed by the researcher (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.1); or whether reality is permanent and unchanging as opposed to continuously in flux and transformation (Chia, 2002, p.2).

Whereas ontology is concerned with "what kind of things really exist in the world", *epistemology* asks "how is it possible, if it is, for us to gain knowledge of the world" (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997, p.5). It is therefore the "study of the criteria by which we can know what does, and does not, constitute warranted or scientific knowledge" (Johnson and Cassell, 2001, p.127). Epistemological assumptions may relate to what forms of knowledge can be obtained and how one can distinguish between "true" and "false" forms of knowledge; or if one can do so in the first place (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).

Different ontological and epistemological assumptions are likely to incline social scientists towards different *methodologies*, or in other words, ways in which they attempt to investigate and gain knowledge of the social world (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). In sum, ontology is the "reality" the researcher investigates, epistemology is the relationship between him/her and that reality, and methodology is the techniques s/he uses to investigate reality (Healy and Perry, 2001, p.119).

Burrell and Morgan (1979, pp. 1-8) introduce a useful schematic approach for analysing ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions, based on a key underlying dimension, subjectivity vs. objectivity (figure 3.2)[22, 23]. At the

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[22] Burrell and Morgan (1979) also introduce another key dimension, order versus conflict, and describe four alternative paradigms based on a 2x2 matrix. These are: functionalism, interpretivism, radical humanism and radical structuralism. These, however, are not reviewed here, as they pertain more to sociological and organisational analysis. Instead, the discussion moves to Guba and Lincoln's (1994) conceptualisation of four alternative paradigms, which are arguably more relevant and often cited in philosophical debates in marketing (e.g. Healy and Perry, 2000).

[23] Whilst Burrell and Morgan's (1979) and Guba and Lincoln's (1994) frameworks are discussed in this section as useful ways of providing a grasp of complex philosophical issues, it is important that the instrumental value of such divisions or typologies is remembered. That is, by reducing complex fields of variation in perspectives and practice to a small number of possibilities, there is always a danger of omission and oversimplification (see Hammersley, 1992, pp.133-135).

ontological level, one can distinguish between nominalism and realism, lying respectively at the subjective and objective extremes of the continuum. Briefly, nominalism revolves around the assumption that the reality external to individual cognition is constructed by nothing more than names, concepts and labels while realism suggests that there is a "real world" made up of hard and tangible structures. At the epistemological level, one can similarly distinguish between positivism and anti-positivism. The former reflects objectivist views that one can explain and predict what is happening in the social world by uncovering regularities and causal relationships. This is in contrast with anti-positivist, subjectivist views of a relativistic social world, which can only be understood from the point of view of the individual who is researching it. At the methodological level, the above assumptions lead to nomothetic and ideographic approaches to social science. The nomothetic approach places heavy emphasis on following systematic protocols and techniques, usually through quantitative methodologies, whereas the ideographic approach stresses the need for in-depth understanding of subjective accounts, usually through qualitative methodologies. Lastly, Burrell and Morgan also review assumptions about the "human nature" or what model of a human is reflected in any given theory. Voluntarism assumes a person who is completely autonomous and free-willed whilst determinism regards people's activities as fully determined by their situation or "environment".

To the extent that Burrell and Morgan's (1979) subjective-objective dimension summarises the key differences between two extreme philosophical positions, it is sufficient in explaining how positivist (more objective) and interpretive (more subjective) approaches to consumer research are essentially incommensurable (e.g. Hudson and Ozanne, 1988). However, this distinction alone does not explicate

"weaker" forms of incommensurability, or tensions across paradigms and philosophical positions that stand close and on the same side of the subjective-objective continuum. This point is illustrated by employing Guba and Lincoln's (1994, p.109) seminal conceptualisation of four alternative paradigms, reproduced in table 3.2[24].

Figure 3.2: Burrell and Morgan's (1979, p.3) Scheme for Analysing Assumptions about the Nature of the Social Science



[24] In a later version of this framework, Lincoln and Guba (2001) proposed the addition of a fifth "participatory" paradigm.

Table 3.2: Guba and Lincoln's (1994, p.109)

Conceptualisation of four Alternative Inquiry Paradigms

	Paradigm			
Element	**Constructivism**	**Critical Theory**	**Postpositivism**	**Positivism**
Ontology	relativism - multiple local and specific "constructed" realities	historical realism - virtual reality shaped by social, economic, ethnic, political, cultural and gender values, crystallised over time	critical realism- reality is "real" but only imperfectly and probabilistically apprehensible	naive realism - reality is real and apprehend-able
Epistemology	transactional/subjectivist: created findings	transactional /subjectivist: value mediated findings	modified dualist/objectivist : findings probably true	dualist/objectivist: findings true
Methodology	hermeneutical/ dialectical: Researcher is a "passionate participant" within the world being investigated	dialogic/dialectical : researcher is a "transformative intellectual" who changes the social world within which participants live	modified experimental/ manipulative: critical multiplism, falsification of hypotheses, may include qualitative	experimental /manipulative: verification of hypotheses, chiefly quantitative methods

Based on Guba and Lincoln's (1994) framework, both critical theory and constructivism lie on the subjective side of the objective-subjective continuum. However, this does not guarantee commensurability, particularly at the ontological level. Critical theory is based on historical realism, assuming an apprehendable reality that was once plastic, but was, over time, shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, and gender factors. This reality has now crystallised into a series of structures that are now (inappropriately) taken as "real", yet, "for all practical purposes the structures are real, a virtual or historical reality" (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p. 110). On the other hand, constructivism is based on relativism, assuming realities are apprehendable in the form of multiple, intangible mental constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific in nature. "These constructions are alterable, as are their associated realities" (p. 111). Critical theory therefore retains an element of metaphysical realism that many constructivists would reject (Hammersley, 1992). Whether commensurability between critical theory and constructivism is finally possible (cf. Lincoln and Guba, 2000) arguably comes down to which versions of the two paradigms are under consideration. For example, there is a critical theorist tradition that even works to build testable and falsifiable social theory and which is therefore fully incommensurable with relativist traditions (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). A further elaboration of this argument would move beyond the present discussion's purposes. Given that this thesis adheres to philosophical assumptions that would traditionally lie at the objective side of the continuum, Guba and Lincoln's (1994) framework is arguably more relevant in terms of highlighting similarities and tensions across the other two paradigms: positivism and postpositivism.

3.2.3 Locating the Present Research: Positivism versus Postpositivism

Whilst a considerable number of authors have cautioned about the contradictions and issues of incommensurability between different interpretive traditions (e.g. Arnold and Fischer, 1994; Szmigin and Foxall, 1999; Goulding, 1999), it is usually neglected that positivism is also a widely used and inclusive term for various schools of thought. It is employed in order to represent a summary and simplification of the picture, leaving aside the tensions within the positivist metaphysic (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997; for example, see Hunt, 1991). Nonetheless, in line with Guba and Lincoln's (1994) framework, such generalisations typically ascribe to positivism an objectivist ontology and epistemology as well as a particular methodology. As Morgan and Smircich (in Hirschman and Holbrook, 1992, p.64) say about positivists:

> "They are presuming that the social world lends itself to an objective form of measurement, and that the social scientist can reveal the nature of the world by examining lawful relations between elements that, for the sake of accurate definition and measurement, have to be extracted from the context. The large-scale empirical surveys and detailed laboratory experiments that dominate much social research stand as examples of the principal types of method operating on assumptions characteristic of the objectivist extreme of the continuum."

Furthermore, at least for the proponents of positivism (e.g. Hunt, 1976, 1991; Calder and Tybout, 1987) who give credit to Popper's redefinition of objectivity (Johnson and Duberley, 2000), those methods can purport to be scientific only when the conception of a sophisticated falsificationism is involved:

> "Scientific knowledge consists of theories that are capable of and have been subjected to rigorous empirical testing. These theories should not be regarded as proven or true;

rather they have scientific status because of and subject to attempts to refute them" (Calder and Tybout, 1987, p. 136).

Easterby-Smith *et al.* (1991, p. 23) acknowledge the danger of omission and oversimplification, yet provide a useful overview of eight "signposts" that are typically associated with the positivist metaphysic. 1) *Independence:* the observer is independent of what is being observed. 2) *Value-freedom:* the choice of what and how to study something is determined by objective criteria. 3) *Causality:* the aim of social sciences is to identify causal mechanisms and laws that explain regularities in human and social behaviour. 4) *Hypothetico-deductive:* science progresses through hypothesising fundamental laws and then attempting to refute them, as mentioned above. 5) *Operationalisation:* concepts should be operationalised in a way that enables quantitative measurement. 6) *Reductionism:* problems are better understood if they are reduced into the simplest possible elements. 7) *Generalisation:* in order to be able to generalise about laws and regularities in human and social behaviour, research samples should be of sufficient size. 8) C*ross-sectional analysis:* these laws and regularities can be most easily identified by comparing variations across samples.

On the basis of the above, the present research project could be perceived as principally grounded in a positivist approach. For example, the formulation of research hypotheses is driven by an attempt to explain and predict (un)ethical consumer behaviour. The hypotheses will in turn be subjected to attempts to refute them, by employing large-scale quantitative data and appropriate statistical analyses. However, findings from interpretive studies as well as primary qualitative data have informed stages of this research project; to an extent acknowledging the contextual influences in ethics research (e.g. Crane, 1999) and hoping to avoid the

pitfalls of prematurely relying on quantitative approaches to understand phenomena that are under-investigated and inherently complex. An underlying aim of the current research was to understand "how patterns of subjective status are correlated with features of objective reality" (Hughes and Sharrock, 1991, p.123) or in other words, how subjective views can be combined with more objective views (Letourneau and Allen, 1999). The present approach is essentially inclined towards a postpositivist rather than a positivist perspective[25].

Postpositivism can be perceived as a revised version of positivism to (partly) address some of the criticisms that have usually stemmed from interpretive paradigms such as 1) research results do not lead to an improved understanding of social problems, 2) research is disconnected from the context in which it is carried out, 3) there is a failure to accommodate human subjectivity in inquiry or the role of *meaning* in behaviour, development or social life (Shulze, 2003, p. 10; see also, Cook, 1985; Guba and Lincoln, 1994)[26]. While still resting on the objectivist (positivist) side of the objectivist-subjectivist (positivist/interpretivist) continuum, postpositivists most often hold to critical realist ontological assumptions, i.e., there is a reality existing in time and space independent of the human mind, which may be observed, but only tentatively and probabilistically as it is constrained by individual perceptions of it (Cook, 1985; Guba, 1990). Any claims about reality must therefore be subjected to the widest possible critical examination (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Critical realism's appeal as a middle-ground position between naïve realism

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[25] Sometimes postpositivism is also employed as an umbrella term for all anti-positivist, interpretive paradigms (e.g. Hirshcman and Holbrook, 1992; Morcol, 2001). This is not to be confused with the employment of the term in this thesis, which is more in line with Guba and Lincoln's conceptualisation.

[26] In marketing, postpositivism is also known as realism (Perry *et al.* 1999; Healy and Perry, 2000) and scientific/critical realism (Hunt, 1991).

and relativism (e.g. Hunt, 1990) has helped it become arguably the most dominant perspective in the field of marketing and beyond (Easton, 2002).

Postpositivism abandons the epistemological assumption of dualism, meaning that the investigator and the investigated "object" are fully independent entities (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The researcher can thus be more reflective and openly communicate about his/her assumptions, methods and results. While postpositivists remain committed to the conventional benchmarks of scientific "rigour" (i.e., external and internal validity, reliability and objectivity) and retain a preference for quantitative methods, they advocate the use of more than one method, including qualitative approaches. They prefer studying phenomena in more natural settings and may engage in multiple analyses of the same data to enhance validity (Cook, 1985; Guba and Lilcoln, 1994). A central idea in postpositivist methodology that defends all these choices is "critical multiplism". As exemplified by Cook (1985), critical multiplism takes various forms, including method triangulation and multiple analyses, but also anything else that may relate to a critical "multiplist mode" of investigation, such as synthesis of the results from multiple studies, multiple rival theoretical models and hypotheses, use of multiple analysts, multiple research targets and so on (Cook, 1985, pp.21-22). Lastly, compared to positivists, postpositivists are more welcoming of ongoing criticisms from alternative paradigms since "so long as ultimate truth is not accessible, the process of assigning validity is social and partly dependent upon a consensus achieved in debate" (Cook, 1983, p. 89).

3.2.4 Conclusion

In sum, this research retains an objectivist outlook, which is however more aligned with the postpositivist metaphysic. *Ontologically*, it ascribes to critical realism, i.e., there is an objective reality, which can only be imperfectly and probabilistically apprehended (e.g. Guba and Lilcoln, 1994); e*pistemologically,* to a modified dualist/objectivist view that is committed to the search for "warranted assertability" as opposed to "truth" (e.g. Letourneau and Allen, 1999); and *methodologically,* to "critical multiplism" (Cook, 1985); for example, it adopts a multi-method approach that recognises the usefulness of qualitative methods in knowledge development (exploratory qualitative stages), favours inquires carried out in more natural settings, multiple operationalisations of the same constructs and analyses (quantitative stages; e.g. Guba, 1990; Letourneau and Allen, 1999). The current multi-method approach is briefly described below.

3.3 Overview of the Research Design

3.3.1 Study One: Preliminary Evidence on the Applicability of Neutralisation in the Context of Supporting the Fair Trade Movement

Section 2.8 noted that Fair Trade has been identified as an issue of particular concern in previous studies on ethical consumption (Shaw and Clarke, 1999; Chatzidakis *et al.* 2004). Chatzidakis *et al.* (2004) further provided some illustrative examples of neutralisation techniques that may be used in this context. However,

the data in that study were limited (n = 8), and the sample profile (i.e., students and non-students) did not entirely correspond with the one used in the quantitative stages of the present research (Francis *et al.* 2004a). Accordingly, the first study aimed to address the applicability of the neutralisation concept within the Fair Trade context in a more comprehensive way. Sub-objectives related to whether techniques in addition to the original five were being employed (section 2.5.3), the nature of these arguments (section 2.5.5) and attitudes and motivations underlying different means of support for the movement (section 2.8).

3.3.2 Study Two: Identifying Salient Beliefs in the Context of Supporting Fair Trade

Section 2.10 mentioned that TPB constructs can be assessed either directly, by asking respondents to judge each on a set of general questions (e.g. "My attitude towards Fair Trade is favourable/unfavourable") or indirectly, on the basis of corresponding behavioural, normative and control beliefs (e.g. "I believe Fair Trade guarantees a better deal for Third World producers"). Ideally, the identification of accessible beliefs in relation to the target population and behaviour in question should be based on stages of pilot qualitative research (e.g. Ajzen, 2002a). Accordingly, one of the aims of this study was to elicit underlying beliefs in relation to supporting Fair Trade. The correlation between the direct and belief-based measures is often assessed in order to ensure the content validity of the measures and test TPB's "expectancy-value" assumption (section 2.10).

Another aim of this study was to generate an ample pool of items for the neutralisation scale, by prompting respondents to list justifications for not

supporting Fair Trade. In addition, they were asked to list possible counter-arguments to these justifications. This, in turn, helped design a treatment for the experimental study (study four).

3.3.3 Study three: A Survey Investigating the Role of Neutralisation in Ethical Decision-Making

The third study was a survey-based attempt to assess the role of neutralisation within a TPB framework, as reflected in the proposed hypotheses in section 2.10 (H1-H3). Most previous research has relied on cross-sectional designs, in effect addressing only two stages in the decision-making process (i.e., from attitudes to intentions). In contrast, this study investigated the role of neutralisation within a TPB framework more comprehensively. It relied on a naturally occurring setting (i.e., Fair Trade Roadshows at a UK university), that enabled the observation of actual behaviour (i.e., petition signing and donating) in addition to intention.

3.3.4 Study four: A survey experiment

The fourth study addressed H4 (section 2.10) and served as a preliminary test of the causal ordering between neutralisation, intention and subsequent behaviour. This was achieved by embedding two manipulations (i.e., availability and acceptability of neutralisation techniques) in a TPB-based questionnaire. This methodological approach is often described as "survey experiment" (e.g. van der Heijden, 2004).

The next section introduces the concept of social desirability bias, a key methodological concern in most research into ethics and behaviour (e.g. Crane, 1999). Detailed discussions on other methodological concerns and research design issues are presented in the following chapters and in relation to respective stages, as every study addressed different aims and subsequently faced distinct challenges. Before concluding the chapter, however, section 3.5, introduces the debate surrounding the use of student samples, as this was a common denominator in all phases of research.

3.4 Social Desirability Bias

A key methodological concern in ethics research is the presence of Social Desirability Bias (SDB), defined as "systematic error in self-report measures resulting from the desire of respondents to avoid embarrassment and project a favorable image in others" (Fisher, 1993, p. 303). SDB may be both a personality characteristic, i.e., self-deception and impression management, and an item characteristic, i.e., perceived desirability of the behaviour (e.g. Randall and Fernandes, 1991). Various techniques have been suggested towards identifying and reducing SDB, such as indirect questioning (e.g. Fisher, 1993; Fisher and Tellis, 1998), combination of direct and indirect questioning (Jo *et al.* 1997), assurance of confidentiality and anonymity, face-saving questions, among others (see e.g. Nancarrow *et al.* 2001). While SDB is most often mentioned in relation to self-report measures, it can equally affect interview methods (Crane, 1999).

The possibility of SDB had different implications for each stage of this research project. In the course of the qualitative interviews, the social influence of the

interviewer was addressed by assuring confidentiality and anonymity and by encouraging participants to talk about supporting Fair Trade both in a projective/indirect manner and with reference to themselves (Fisher, 1993). Projections were explored for other people known to the participant as well as unspecified others.

It was important, however, to appreciate the theoretical and empirical links between SDB and neutralisation (see Fisher and Katz, 2000 for a similar discussion on the relationship between SDB and values). Potential presence of SDB indicates that supporting Fair Trade is identified as an ethical behaviour or a normative expectation, which is a necessary condition for the enactment of neutralisation. In line with the original conceptualisation, neutralisation techniques may then be employed in order to serve a personal but also social function. That is, they can be used as "impression management" devices in order to project a favourable image to "others", here being the interviewer. Therefore, presence of SDB in the course of the interviews was not necessarily an undesirable condition or threat to the theory's validity. Rather, it could help probe the whole spectrum of intrapersonal and interpersonal properties of neutralisation.

In surveys, SDB is most typically addressed by the inclusion of validated yet lengthy scales such as the Marlowe-Crowne scale (33 items), the Edwards Social Desirability scale (39 items) and the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (40 items; see e.g. Fisher, 2000; King and Bruner, 2000)[27]. None of these scales was included in

[27] Another common way to address SDB is indirect questioning. However this is a risky strategy as it can cause additional validity concerns. For example respondents may indeed reveal what they think typical others might do or think or they may still engage in impression management by purposefully underestimating what they think of others (Jo, 2000).

the questionnaire, mainly due to forbidding length considerations but also due to reassuring evidence suggesting that the effects of SDB in questionnaires based on the TPB are minimal (Armitage and Conner, 1999a; see also, Beck and Ajzen, 1991; Sheeran and Orbell, 1996). For example, Armitage and Conner (1999a) included an SDB scale in a TPB questionnaire, and found that social desirability did not significantly moderate the effects of attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioural control on intention or actual behaviour. In addition, potential SDB effects are expected to be smaller for desirable behaviours, such as supporting Fair Trade, versus undesirable or norm-violating ones such as shoplifting (Chung and Monroe, 2003). Particularly in the absence of salient others (e.g. presence of the interviewer as in the qualitative interviews), supporting Fair Trade should be driven mostly by personal norms and values rather than unambiguously defined social/normative expectations (Shaw, 2000). This was substantiated by later research findings, suggesting on the one hand that social/normative influences are in most cases mediated by personal feelings of self-identity and ethical obligation and on the other, that the effects of common method bias (a concept which includes SDB) were not unduly problematic in the present research.

3.5 The Use of Student Samples

The study population in all stages of research was comprised of British undergraduate students [28] . The employment of student samples remains a controversial practice, after more than six decades of philosophical debates and

[28] International students were excluded from the analysis. Based on a preliminary investigation, they did not seem to share the same amount of experience and familiarity with Fair Trade issues. In addition, the influence of different cultural backgrounds on the decision-making process and subsequently, on the role of neutralisation was unclear (e.g. Vitell, 2003).

research in the consumer field in particular and social sciences in general (Peterson, 2001). Yet, if the science of human behaviour was already criticised as "largely the science of the behaviour of sophomores" in 1946 (McNemar, in Foot and Sanford, 2004, p. 256), it is even more so today. For example, in line with trends in other major psychology and consumer journals, the percentage of studies using students has steadily increased from 29% in the first volume of the Journal of Consumer Research to 89% in 2001 (Peterson, 2001; see also Foot and Sanford, 2004). It is hence important to introduce this debate and justify the present sampling strategy *vis-à-vis* the opponents and proponents.

The main argument against the use of student samples is a compelling one. It is essentially a question of "external validity", or whether results based on student samples can be generalised to more representational segments of the society (e.g. Lynch, 1982, 1983). For example, after a review of the psychology literature, Sears (1986) concluded that students differed in so many fundamental ways from the general population that this "narrow data base", "...may give quite a distorted portrait of human nature" (p.516). Apart from strictly demographic characteristics such as age, ethnicity and social class (e.g. Foot and Sanford, 2004), Sears cites psychographic ways in which students might be different, such as a weaker sense of "self-definition" translating into weaker attitudes and less-crystallised senses of self, stronger cognitive skills, stronger tendencies to comply with authority and more unstable peer group relationships (Sears, 1986). Nonetheless, Sears's claims are speculative and somewhat ironically, virtually every factor he lists as differing between students and non-students has been investigated within the student population itself (Petty and Cacioppo, 1996). Another often cited attribute of student samples is homogeneity, resulting into stronger hypothesis tests than in

non-student samples (e.g. Calder *et al.* 1981; Greenberg, 1987). In perhaps the most comprehensive, second-order meta-analysis of the literature to date, Peterson (2001) concludes that student samples were marginally but consistently more homogenous than non-student samples (within and across scale scorings) and nearly half (48%) of the effect sizes observed for both population groups were substantially different either in direction or magnitude, yet without exhibiting a systematic pattern. He emphatically point outs that these findings are not a *per se* indictment of research employing student samples and calls for further research into when student samples are appropriate and when not. However, for the proponents of student sampling, to dismiss the option based on claims of homogeneity or different effect sizes is to somewhat miss the point.

Calder *et al.* (1981, 1982, 1983; Calder and Tybout, 1999; cf. Lynch, 1982, 1983; Winer, 1999) make a step in resolving the controversy, by introducing a seminal distinction between "effects application research" and "theory application research". Briefly, the purpose of the former is to produce parameter estimates for some larger population whilst the latter is focusing on theory generalisation. Theory generalisation requires two stages of falsification whereby the abstract theory survives rigorous attempts at falsification first, and then theory-based interventions are tested in the real world. However, "no attempt is made to generalise any particular outcomes observed in testing the theory or the intervention" (Calder *et al.* 1981, p.199). Importantly, theory application does not require a representative sample of the population as in effects application research. Rather, the idea of the theory falsification process requires employing a maximally homogenous set of respondents that is similar on dimensions likely to influence the variables of interest. In addition, homogeneity is desirable because it results in stronger tests of the

theory and rules out background factors that would lead to less exact theoretical predictions. Uncontrolled background factors do not enter the theory-testing process *ad hoc*, as in heterogeneous sampling, but only when there are reasons to make them part of the theory itself (Calder *et al.* 1983; Calder and Tybout, 1999).

This thesis is indeed oriented towards a theoretical rather than effects application. Yet, there were two additional considerations that led to the decision to opt for a student sample. Firstly, this would allow for a fuller test of the theory, by making it possible to observe actual behaviour. It is difficult to think of an alternative research design that would enable observation of actual support for Fair Trade by a more representative sample of the population[29]. Even for the opponents of student sampling, "external validity" was not necessarily undermined, as this is enhanced not only by statistical generalisability, but also realism, that is by collecting naturally occurring "real-world" data (Lynch, 1982, 1983).

Secondly, this was a purposive or theoretical rather than convenience-based sample. The inverse relationship between age and ethical behaviour has been well documented in the broader ethical decision-making literature (e.g. Ford and Richardson, 1994; Loe *et al.* 2000; Trevino *et al.* 2006). It has also been found to be the most important demographic variable in the consumer ethics literature (Vitell, 2003), and indeed, young adults (18-24 years old) have been recently cited as the least supportive of Fair Trade, and yet with some of the highest levels of guilt, in a report on Green and Ethical Consumers (Mintel, 2007). Given that this thesis, in one sense, focuses on "unethical" rather than "ethical" decision-making, the choice of

[29] Given that this would be the population of interest in the quantitative stages, student samples were also used in the qualitative stages, in order to correspond to the principle of correspondence (e.g. Francis *et al.* 2004a).

this age group seems justified (for the selection of an "ethical group", cf. Shaw and Clarke 1999; Shaw *et al.* 2000; Shaw and Shiu 2002a, 2002b, 2003).

3.6 Summary

This thesis adopts a postpositivist approach to research and correspondingly, a multi-method research design comprising of two qualitative/exploratory, and two quantitative studies. The purpose of the first study was to gain preliminary insights into the applicability of neutralisation in the context of supporting the Fair Trade movement. Study two's aim was to generate a pool of items for subsequent measurement and validation of the TPB and neutralisation scales (used in studies three and four), as well as design an experimental treatment for study four. Drawing on findings from study one and two and some additional pilot tests, a survey study (study three) addressed the role of neutralisation in ethical decision-making, as represented by H1-H3 in section 2.10. Study four was an experiment that probed the question of causal ordering between neutralisation, intention and behaviour (H4).

Subsequently, section 3.4 discussed how the possibility of social desirability bias was dealt with at different stages of research. Lastly, section 3.5 introduced the debate surrounding student samples and justified their use in this research.

The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: the design and findings from the first and second qualitative studies are discussed in Parts I and II respectively. Part III discusses the design and questionnaire construction process for the

quantitative studies (studies three and four) and presents findings from relevant pretests. The main findings are then presented in chapter 4.

Part I: A Qualitative Exploration of the Role of Neutralisation in Supporting Fair Trade

3.7.1 Rationale

Section 2.8 noted that early indication of the applicability of neutralisation in the Fair Trade context was given in the Chatzidakis *et al.* (2004) study. These authors investigated the applicability of neutralisation in ethical consumer behaviour more broadly. All participants independently brought up the issue of Fair Trade, therefore forming significant part of the data. However the sample size in this study was limited (n = 8) and the sample profile (both students and non-students) did not entirely correspond with the one used in the quantitative stages of this research (e.g. Francis et al. 2004a). Accordingly, the main aim of the first study was a more comprehensive assessment of the depth and breadth of neutralisation techniques that are used in this context and by a younger population.

This study also had some sub-objectives, based on issues that were identified in the review of the literature. More specifically:

a) To examine whether alternative techniques are being employed, in addition to, or instead of the original five ones (section 2.5.3). Findings could then help develop an appropriate neutralisation scale.

b) To probe the underlying nature of neutralisation-types of reasoning when supporting and not supporting Fair Trade (section 2.5.5).

c) To explore attitudes and motivations underlying the purchase of Fair Trade products but also other means of support such as donating or petitioning for Fair Trade (section 2.8).

3.7.2 Sampling

A convenience sample (n = 18, eight male, ten female; 10 participated in one-to-one interviews and 8 in a focus group) was recruited during a Fair Trade Roadshow (promotional event), which took place in the participants' Hall of Residence at University of Nottingham in April 2005. This served as an initial filter that participants had a certain degree of familiarity with Fair Trade issues and as a justification for the timing of the study. The researcher approached some students during the roadshow and booked appointments for the interviews, which took place after the roadshow and in the following two days.

3.7.3 Method

One-to-one interviews were initially preferred over focus groups to avoid the social pressures of conforming to perceived norms and following the lead of dominant members of the group (e.g. Malhotra, 2004). However a focus group was also conducted with the last eight participants, mainly to address sub-objective b). This involved asking sensitive and somewhat "confrontational" questions, and the researcher felt he would elicit information more naturally in a group as opposed to in one-to-one discussions. For example, it had proven difficult to ask participants in the one-to-one interviews (either directly or indirectly) whether their arguments

represent valid reasons as opposed to guilt-reducing or impression management mechanisms. The one-to-one interviews lasted from 15 to 25 minutes and the focus group lasted 70 minutes.

In the beginning of the interviews, the researcher briefly introduced himself, explained the purpose of the interview (i.e., "to understand attitudes and motivations underlying support for Fair Trade") and assured the interviewees of full confidentiality and anonymity. The interviewer then asked the participants to introduce themselves and a general question about Fair Trade (i.e., "When did you first hear about Fair Trade?") in order to establish rapport and build dialogue (e.g. Paton, 1990). Subsequently, the discussion centred on interviewees' (and others') knowledge of and attitudes towards the movement. Participants were prompted to talk about their own (and others') behaviour as the issue arose naturally in the course of the conversation. None of the participants were challenged to rationalise incongruent attitudes and behaviour, but nearly all of them did so. Although several interviewees mentioned other means of supporting the Fair Trade movement, the biggest part of the discussion, particularly on actual behaviour, revolved around the purchase of Fair Trade products. Subsequently, the interviewer explicitly prompted participants to talk about their attitudes and experience with other means of support. The interview guide is presented in Appendix 1.

Of particular concern for the research design was the inherent problem of the perceived social desirability of opinions in relation to ethical issues and the association between neutralisation, self-presentation needs and personal importance of Fair Trade values (section 3.4). To address the social influence of the interviewer, research participants were prompted to talk about being a Fair Trade supporter both

in a projective/indirect manner and with reference to themselves (Fisher, 1993). Projections were explored for "other people" known to the participant as well as unspecified "others".

When exploring the application of existing theoretical constructs there is a deductive aspect to the research, but qualitative approaches allow participants to recount stories, examples and scenarios that illuminate the nature of those constructs within the particular context (Patton, 1990; Mason, 1996). Therefore, some sub-themes and issues relating to the broader process of neutralisation were drawn inductively from the data. This interplay of induction and deduction principles is particularly valued when eliciting neutralisation techniques (Fritsche and Mayrhofer, 2001), as it can also indicate the accessibility of arguments in people's minds, which is an important characteristic for effective neutralisation (Fritsche, 2003). Accordingly, qualitative approaches have been widely adopted for exploratory inquiries into other applications of neutralisation theory (e.g. Ferraro and Johnson, 1983; Hazani, 1991; Byers *et al.* 1999; Gauthier, 2000; Cromwell and Thurman, 2003).

Audio recordings were made of all the interviews, which were later transcribed. "Thematic analysis" was used in order to systematically code, sort and analyse the data with the aim of identifying common patterns, salient themes and sub-themes (e.g. Aronson, 1994; Boyatzis, 1998; Attride-Stirling, 2001; Tuckett, 2005; Braun and Clarke, 2006). This approach differentiates itself from other analytic methods that seek to describe patterns across qualitative data, such as discourse analysis or grounded theory, based on its flexibility and lack of attachment to a particular epistemological position or specific technological knowledge (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Furthermore, although the analysis retained an inductive element, it is more

appropriately described as "theoretical thematic analysis" because the researcher aimed to examine the applicability of a pre-existing theoretical framework to the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Fereday and Muir-Cohrane, 2006).

During the coding process it was evident that informants often used different neutralisation techniques in combination to explain their behaviour towards Fair Trade goods, which reflects what researchers have remarked in other contexts (e.g. Hazani, 1991; Forsyth and Evans, 1998). In such instances, data were allocated multiple category codes to indicate the interrelationships between themes. Coding also highlighted that when informants mentioned particular issues to explain their behaviour, they were not necessarily employing the same neutralisation technique. The framing of the statement was an important determinant of how the data were coded. For example, informants often referred to price/cost when explaining their behaviour; typical quotes were "I always go for the cheapest things" and "I would really buy more Fair Trade products if they were not excessively priced". Of these two examples, the first would be coded as an appeal to higher loyalties because it refers to the individual's own priorities, whereas the second was coded as denial of responsibility because the person is suggesting that their behaviour is contingent on the behaviour of a third party, i.e., the retailer. The findings reported below include verbatim extracts and some commentary to give a flavour of the overall nature and recurrent themes from the interviews.

3.7.4 Findings

3.7.4.1 Introduction: There was evidence to suggest that the informants were readily employing neutralisation techniques to justify their minimal purchase of Fair Trade products and non support for the movement more broadly. However, not all

original five techniques were equally represented. In accordance with Grove *et al.*'s (1989) contention that different techniques are likely to be used as the particular situation varies, in the context of supporting Fair Trade, appealing to higher loyalties (AtHL), denial of responsibility (DoR) and denial of injury (DoI, or of benefit) were the more widely used neutralisation techniques. There was some reference to denial of victim (DoV, e.g. "it is difficult to visualise the Third World producers and the negative consequences in their lives by not supporting Fair Trade") and only tenuous reference to condemning the condemners (CtC; e.g. "very few people are actively supporting Fair Trade"). Some additional techniques were also employed by some participants, and seemed to represent what has been identified in earlier research as "the metaphor of the ledger" (Klockars, 1974) and "postponement" (Thurman, 1984; Cromwell and Thurman, 2003).

3.7.4.2 Original Neutralisation Techniques: There was strong indication that several ideals or values can potentially be higher ordered from concerns about Fair Trade. AtHL can be seen as the technique which comes closer to the concept of ethical dilemmas; defined as a situation where "a) at least two actions form a conflict, that is, when one action may harm (conflict with) the actions, interests, values of others or one's self and b) the negative (unintended) consequences of one action are logically implied in positive (intended) consequences of the other action and vice versa" (Villenave-Cremer and Eckensberger, 1986, in Marks and Mayo, 1991, p. 720). The use of AtHL tended to relate to perceived financial constraints and convenience issues or to variety seeking or the expressed perception that Fair Trade products were inferior:

"Fair Trade might be a consideration, but in general...when I go for shopping in Sainsbury's I look for the cheapest and nearest thing to me." Ian.

"I've thought some times that I should be more ethical on what I buy...but part of me is quite lazy actually." Paul.

"...and then we have this coffee which is Fair Trade and whatever, but this coffee is horrible! And it's supposed to be better coffee, isn't it?! I don't like this coffee so I never buy it." Louise.

It is noteworthy in the above examples that the higher loyalties served by the behaviour relate to personal desires and self-gratification, somewhat illustrating the tension between more self-oriented goals and pro-social values:

"....I tend to see things probably more from my own perspective... ...for Fair Trade products, I think they are usually more expensive, and I haven't really thought...I haven't really bought Fair Trade products and I like the coffee I consume and I will not go as far....or bananas...I buy a particular kind and I don't want to change these things..." Graham.

Most of the informants denied responsibility on the grounds that they were uninformed and there was an implication that the responsibility for educating and encouraging consumers lies with some external party, although informants tended to be vague on the specifics of this point. This issue of external attribution relates to whether and when consumers view themselves as "acted upon" rather than "acting" (Sykes and Matza, 1957).

"I think that the issue of Fair Trade puts a lot of pressure to be good to the consumer... for example, you've got COSTA coffee, where if you look at the menu, it says in small print letters that you can request any of our coffees in Fair Trade...where maybe it should be the other way round? If a person wants to save some money they could request non-Fair Trade coffee?" Mike.

DoR was also based on the notion that Fair Trade products were not promoted enough or they were too costly. Clearly, invoking those issues relates to the point regarding AtHL made above:

"I try to buy them [Fair Trade products] because I think it's fair enough, but the only problem is that there are not many shops available...you still have to look for it, and there are not many available...and most of the time they don't have big variety....I think it's a good start, it's growing...." Malcolm.

"Yeah, that's something I really struggle with, I would ideally like not to consume anything that is unethical, but I think it's near impossible and I think everything.... and I think near enough anything we consume has been unethical to somebody, somewhere along the line..." Susan.

DoI (or of benefit) was based on notions that Fair Trade is just a marketing ploy or a small scale initiative which only marginally, if at all, contributes to the welfare of a minority of Third World producers. In any case, Fair Trade is something that does not contribute to a systemic change or improvement of the existing trading system:

"I wouldn't feel bad for not buying Fair Trade...in my view, the causes of unfair trade are systemic...[by supporting Fair Trade] I'm not doing anything that contributes to an improved trading system." Dave.

"It's kind of a little thing you can do but nothing major, nothing is going to change a great deal..."Rachel.

Of course, consumers' perceptions regarding the actual impact of Fair Trade tended to vary:

"In a way yes, you do something quite small but at the same time... it's something better than nothing." Ellie.

"I think buying a Fair Trade product is only part of the message, it also makes people being more aware of where the products are coming from, it makes people more aware of the supplying chain..." Stephanie.

It was also apparent that the techniques were used in a quite inventive and potentially logically tenuous fashion:

"I do think buying Fair Trade products is a good thing...but Fair Trade is a buzzword that may or may not correspond to actual business practices...and it's easy to make you feel you are a moral consumer and feel good for yourself but that's wrong, because it doesn't motivate you to think further what this actually means." Sam.

3.7.4.3 Additional Techniques: In the course of the interviews, some respondents took the opportunity to talk about some of their past and other current "good deeds", somewhat diverting attention from their actual support for Fair Trade at present. This seemed similar to a technique that has been identified in earlier research as "metaphor of the ledger" (Klockars, 1974). When individuals employ this technique, they justify their ethically inferior choices because of their past or other superior choices they are actualising at present, and which have led to credits they can somewhat "cash in" (Minor, 1981, Hollinger, 1991). For example, some participants mentioned their past support of Fair Trade, or how they try their best in other areas of moral interest such as caring for the environment and boycotting exploitative companies:

> "Well, I've worked in Oxfam and I'm aware of Fair Trade issues...in my previous neighborhood, the Oxfam shop was nearby and I would buy Fair Trade tea, coffee, sometimes chocolate...they were really nice... and today, it doesn't really strike me, we don't hear about it a lot anymore, do we?..." Nicky.

> "I try to be ethical when buying products...to be honest, I mostly buy green stuff rather than ethical..." Mike (admitting non support for Fair Trade, yet listing a variety of pro-environmental behaviours such as recycling and buying organic).

Few informants moved on to admit they are not supporting Fair Trade at present, but it is something they are hoping to do in the future, when they have more money, time to look into the issue and so on. This was similar to a technique previously identified as "postponement" (Thurman, 1984; Cromwell and Thurman, 2003). By employing this strategy, individuals suppress their guilt feelings by

momentarily putting them out of mind to be dealt with at a later time (Cromwell and Thurman, 2003):

> "...it's something I will definitely do more when I get a job and start earning some money." Nicky.

3.7.4.4 Techniques Being Used in Unison: It is important to note that in line with Grove *et al.*'s (1989) proposition, most of the informants' accounts were a function of more than one technique. In fact, each technique can be considered as a basic strategy of justification, which may interplay or interact with others. It is reasonable to suggest that the greater the number of the techniques contributing to neutralisation the greater the possibility it will occur effectively (Bersoff, 2001). Furthermore, some interactions among the techniques were more common than others. The following extracts are examples of how the techniques were used in conjunction:

> "I'm a student, I'm struggling for money, and I think if I could I would buy more [Fair Trade products], but I just can't afford it because they are more expensive [DoR]...and because I also don't trust the labeling, so why should I spent more money for something I'm not sure I believe, really [DoI]?" Rachel.

> "I think I would become more passionate about Fair Trade products if I had realised the difference that exists when a product is Fair Trade and when it's not [DoI]...but, I think people don't know enough, they are not given much explanation [DoR]..." Anna.

3.7.4.5 Rational Explanations versus Rationalisations: Findings further pointed to a widespread employment of self defence-based neutralisation mechanisms as

opposed to alternative interpretations. Both the expression of guilt feelings and willingness to buy more Fair Trade products "in the immediate future", implied the violation of some respondent's ethical standards and possible self-esteem threat (e.g. Burnett and Lunsford, 1994; Lascu, 1991; Dahl *et al.* 2003). In addition, there was sufficient amount of ambivalence and contradiction in most of the consumer accounts to suggest that their views may just as likely be reflections of defence-based rationalisations/neutralisations, as much as factual accounts of their empirical experiences and "conscientious" judgments (Erez and Laster, 1999):

> "I don't like buying this Fair Trade coffee there so I never buy it [AtHL]...and I don't usually cook, and when I'm doing my shopping I'm usually really really quick and buy, you know, whatever [AtHL]...but I suppose...I don't know it's a bit difficult isn't it? I suppose that if I felt more incentives to do it [DoR]...but now that I think about it, I don't know, I feel guilty!" Claire.

> "...but I've never seen Fair Trade bananas!...Fair Trade bananas would appeal to me, but then again, I don't know, if I was in a stage in life where I had lots of money I would probably pay some extra pennies [DoR]...in fact sometimes you ignore principles like that [AtHL]...and I think, the problem is too big to be dealt at the level of the consumer...the problem with this is that if we say that, obviously no one will ever change anything, I understand that...but it seems to me that the minority of people that care about Fair Trade aren't going to overcome the bigger problem...which is about all those organizations and subsidies, signing agreements [DoI]... I'm not convinced that the average producer in Costa Rica will actually get more money if I buy Fair Trade coffee [DoI] ...and the effort the consumer has to make to buy Fair Trade stuff [AtHL]...." Sonia (later however expressing her willingness to start buying more Fair Trade products).

Further insights were gained in the course of the focus group, where the participants – perhaps due to feelings of familiarity within the group and lack of the "one-to-one" element of confrontation – communicated much more openly about the extent they were employing excuses as opposed to having "valid" reasons for not doing much about Fair Trade. The interviewer then prompted further discussion on the matter. Most participants agreed that several explanations for not supporting Fair Trade may indeed reflect guilt-reducing mechanisms rather than genuine expressions of "situational ethics":

> "Fair Trade is publicised but you aren't given the information you want to hear, they are not listing the pros and cons ...It's easy when you aren't sure about Fair Trade to use excuses...for a lot of people to a degree, we feel we need to look into the information and often you just can't be bothered to look into the information about Fair Trade..." Toby.

> "Well people say Fair Trade is more expensive but I remember I got approached one day by a guy working for the Red Cross...basically it was like a guilt trip, he asked me "well you go out for a drink, how much do you spend for a drink? How many drinks do you have on a night out?...and it made me think, the amount of money I spend on alcohol that I don't have to spend...to say that "I can't afford Fair Trade stuff" is terrible because I could spend an extra couple quid to buy Fair Trade stuff because other people are benefiting from it..." Martha.

> "Well, I guess it's all excuses if you then feel guilty for not doing it..." Karen.

Not all informants agreed that their reasons were not valid, suggesting a continuum of functions (from rational explanations to rationalisations) for what might appear to be neutralisation techniques:

"...These are reasons and are quite valid for different people in different situations they are in...but some people just go "oh maybe I could help but don't really want to" and then overlook it and carry on and make some kind of excuse...some genuinely don't care, and they just don't even bother with excuses, they just walk off..." Mark.

"I will still buy a Fair Trade product only if I like it, if it's of good quality; it's as simple as that really." Dom.

3.7.4.6 Attitudes towards Buying Fair Trade Products and other Means of Support:

It is worth noting that most of these verbalisations came along with generally favourable attitudes towards Fair Trade and yet conflicting goals, which is a necessary condition for the enactment of neutralisation (Minor, 1981). Indeed, nearly all of the informants (with the exception of two) acknowledged that Fair Trade is in principle "a good idea" and felt sympathetic towards it, although specific knowledge of and further attitudes towards Fair Trade tended to vary. All respondents were at the very least aware of the Fair Trade certification mark and had a vague idea that it guarantees a "fair deal to Third World producers" and as such, it's the "good" or "right" thing to do. Further information about Fair Trade seemed to come primarily from school, university and church activities, family, and the press. In line with previous research however, it seemed that the reasons for supporting Fair Trade related more to personal feelings of moral responsibility and obligation rather than perceived normative pressures from these groups (e.g. Shaw and Shiu, 2002a). It is possible that the importance of reference group support is greater in non-normative, illegal situations rather than in pro-social activities (cf. Rabow *et al.* 1987; Grube and Morgan, 1990):

"We are fortunate for living in a society which is quite wealthy, and Fair Trade is a way to help people that are not as wealthy, it's a sense of obligation we have towards them." Adrian.

"...in a way you feel good yourself indirectly by doing good for other people." Laura.

"I think Fair Trade is all about being responsible as a person...everybody should have good working conditions and earn a decent wage, and if Fair Trade is helping, then we should support it." Amy.

Most of the informants stated willingness to support Fair Trade products in the future, however intentions and attitudes towards supporting Fair Trade through other ways, particularly through donating, tended to vary. Some respondents were concerned they would have to know more about Fair Trade or acknowledged it would depend on the particular circumstances whether they would or would not give money in such a direct way. Others stated that given the opportunity, they would donate to the Fair Trade Foundation as readily as they would buy Fair Trade products, whilst some others were against the idea altogether:

"I think the idea behind Fair Trade is really really good, it's not like giving to charity, like just giving money and then whatever, it's about supporting them (Third Word producers) by buying their products, by helping their businesses expand..." Isabelle.

Attitudes towards petitioning for Fair Trade were less ambivalent. About half of the respondents already had relevant positive experience through university, school and church campaigns and the majority of them appeared willing to support such activities in the future. This is perhaps unsurprising, given the "low cost" and

"convenience" factors underlying petition signing, and which should therefore require less motivation to perform compared to donating behaviour (Hini and Gendall, 1995; Fox-Cardamone *et al.* 2000):

> "Yes, I would, why not? I would definitely sign a petition." Andy.

> "I probably wouldn't donate money because I don't know enough about it but would sign a petition..." Phil.

3.7.5 Conclusion

In sum, this study offers preliminary evidence that the techniques of neutralisation are a viable route for understanding the behaviour of a substantial consumer segment, previously identified as "semi-ethical", i.e., ethically concerned but not necessarily ethical purchasers (Bird and Hughes, 1997) or "Fair Trade likers" rather than "Fair Trade lovers" (De Pelsmacker *et al.* 2005). From a neutralisation viewpoint, these consumers may not support Fair Trade, not because they disagree with the idea in principle, or even because of a rational decision-making process in which the perceived gains (e.g. "feel good" bonus) are found to outweigh the perceived costs (e.g. additional effort and money), but because they intuitively employ a set of neutralisations that they altogether, desensitise them from greater involvement and actual support of Fair Trade.

The above findings are mostly illustrative, because this research approach cannot demonstrate causation or provide definitive answers in questions such as whether the arguments are used as defence-based neutralising devices and what is their

exact role in ethical decision-making. For example, it is likely that self-reported guilt was in part induced by the characteristics of the interaction with the interviewer (Vangelisti *et al.* 1991) and it is unclear what is the exact relationship between neutralisation and motivations to support (or not) Fair Trade, including concepts such as attitudes towards Fair Trade, personal and social norms. Furthermore, because of the nature of a doctoral study, the coding process and identification of themes was done by one person and the analysis was then discussed with the supervisors. This process allowed for consistency in the method but failed to provide multiple perspectives from people with differing backgrounds and expertise (Fereday and Muir-Cohrane, 2006).

However, this study did provide a strong indication that young consumers have a range of accessible neutralisation techniques to justify (to themselves or others) their level of support for the Fair Trade movement. Part II is concerned with an elicitation study that drew on study one and helped generate a pool of items for the TPB and neutralisation scales.

Part II: Identification and Elicitation of Salient Beliefs

3.8.1 Rationale of the study

The purpose of the elicitation study was three-fold. Firstly, identification and elicitation of "salient beliefs" is a critical stage in the construction of a TPB questionnaire (e.g. Ajzen, 2002a; Francis *et al.* 2004a). As mentioned earlier, attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control are latent (i.e., unobservable), psychological constructs that can be assessed either directly, by asking respondents to judge each on a set of generic scales (e.g. "my attitude towards supporting Fair Trade is favourable/unfavourable"), or indirectly, by eliciting corresponding beliefs (e.g. "I believe supporting Fair Trade guarantees a better deal to Third World producers"). These beliefs, in the aggregate, lead to overall evaluations as with the direct measures. Behavioural beliefs refer to likely outcomes of the behaviour and evaluations of these outcomes, normative beliefs to normative expectations of others and motivation to comply with them, and control beliefs, to the presence of factors that may facilitate or impede a particular behaviour and their perceived power (e.g. Azjen, 2002). Because direct and indirect ways of measuring the TPB constructs make different assumptions about the cognitive structures and psychological processes underlying these variables, it is advisable to use both in a questionnaire (Francis *et al.* 2004b). Their corresponding correlations can be used in order to establish the content validity and informational foundation of the direct measures.

Before moving to discuss the additional purposes of the elicitation study, it is important to clarify the purpose of employing indirect measures compared to previous research. Studies by Shaw and colleagues (Shaw and Clarke 1999; Shaw *et al.* 2000; Shaw and Shiu 2002a, 2002b, 2003) and others (e.g. Puffer and Rashidian, 2004; Holdershaw *et al.* 2003) have used belief-based measures along with direct ones in an attempt to improve prediction of intention. As Shaw and Shiu (2000, p.1158) state:

> "Each of the above studies utilising the TRA/TPB framework employed the regression analysis technique. This technique, however, does not allow a full examination of model measures in the explanation of behavioural intention (BI) and is constrained to using the direct measures, ATT, SN, PBC, EO and SI only. In light of the complexity of decision-making demonstrated in ethical choice (Shaw & Clarke 1999), it may be deemed more appropriate to use the beliefs underlying each direct measure. Indeed beliefs may not always be reflective of their direct measures, as the TRA/TPB would assume (Shaw *et al.* 2000; Ajzen 1991). It could be suggested, therefore, that beliefs may aggregate to form latent factors that are different perspectives from the direct measures."

However, this approach is not entirely valid. Firstly, belief-based measures are employed in order to either explain overall evaluations, by tracing the corresponding sets of behaviour-related beliefs or for designing interventions (e.g. Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980, Ajzen, 2007a). Ajzen and Fishbein (1980, p.81) are clear in stating that only direct measures should be used for the prediction of intentions or behaviour:

> "...A person's attitude toward a behaviour is a function of her beliefs that performing the behaviour leads to various outcomes and her evaluations of these outcomes. However, this argument assumes that we have identified and measured all of the person's *salient*

beliefs and only her salient beliefs, and that these beliefs correspond to the attitude in target, action, context and time. Since these assumptions are not always met, the relation between a particular set of beliefs and attitude cannot be taken as a given but must be considered an empirical question. The same is true for the relation between normative beliefs and subjective norm... This discussion should make it clear that it is inappropriate to use beliefs in an attempt to directly predict intentions or behaviour"

Accordingly, recent research co-authored by Ajzen (Hrubes *et al.* 2001; Daigle *et al.* 2002; Davis *et al.* 2002) has employed indirect measures solely for the purpose of exploring the cognitive foundation of the TPB components.

On a related note, Shaw and colleagues used structural equation modelling for the explanation/prediction of intention, a technique that allows for more complex modelling of the psychological variables as opposed to regression. Based on a criterion of internal consistency, they used belief-based indicators in sets, to represent reflective measures of the underlying constructs. However, internal consistency is not a requirement for the belief-based measures as they may include both positive and negative components (Ajzen, 2002a; Francis *et al.* 2002b)[30]. Further, beliefs may be conceived as causing the underlying constructs rather than simply reflecting it, and should be hence treated as "formative" rather than "reflective" indicators (Jarvis *et al.* 2003). The procedure of treating formative indicators in latent variable modelling is fundamentally different from the one used by Shaw and colleagues (see Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001; Jarvis *et al.* 2003).

[30] For this reason, Ajzen (2002a) recommends using test-retest reliability for the indirect measures.

The second purpose of the elicitation study was to help develop an appropriate neutralisation scale[31]. Findings from study one had already given an indication of neutralising beliefs that are accessible in the Fair Trade context. In the elicitation study, an additional set of respondents listed justifications that people employ for not supporting Fair Trade. Their responses were content-analysed and then compared with the findings from study one.

Lastly, the elicitation study helped design an experimental manipulation that was later embedded in a TPB questionnaire. Respondents were asked not only to list justifications for not supporting Fair Trade, but also, possible counter-arguments to these justifications.

3.8.2 Sampling

The elicitation questionnaire was researcher-administered to 36 undergraduate students (18 male, 18 female, 18-21 years old) living in a Hall of Residence, and who were incentivised by a £5 reimbursement[32]. The researcher placed a poster in several places inviting students to participate in a study about ethical consumerism. The poster also highlighted the duration of the study (30-40mins.) and provided an internal university phone number (i.e., free-of-charge), which students could use to contact the researcher for an appointment.

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[31] Existing neutralisation scales would not be appropriate or directly transferable to the Fair Trade context. Maruna and Copes (2005) discuss the inadequacy of existing scales and the need for behaviour-specific adjustments.
[32] Recommended sample size is usually 25 (Francis *et al.* 2004a).

3.8.3 Method

Prior to asking participants to complete the questionnaire, the researcher introduced himself and assured anonymity and confidentiality, as in study one[33]. The questionnaire opened with a definition of the behaviour of interest, i.e., supporting Fair Trade, to include not only buying Fair Trade products but also supporting the movement through other ways, such as donating and petitioning. The main body of the questionnaire concerned the elicitation of salient beliefs. The last part included some filtering questions, about the respondents' past experience with supporting Fair Trade (q.17), additional ethical consumer concerns (q.18), sources of information (q. 19-20) and demographic/personal details (q.21-25). The questionnaire is presented in Appendix 2.

To elicit salient beliefs underlying the TPB determinants, questions were developed based on the guidelines by Ajzen (2002a) and Francis *et al.* (2004a). For example, to elicit behavioural beliefs respondents were asked to provide few answers that come to their mind in the following questions (q.1-3):

- What do you believe could be the main advantages of your support for Fair Trade in the near future?

- What do you believe could be the main disadvantages of your support for Fair Trade in the near future?

- Is there anything else you associate with your support for the Fair Trade movement in the near future?

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[33] At that point the researcher also asked the participants about their attitudes towards buying but also other means of supporting the Fair Trade movement, as opinions in study one tended to vary. The pattern of answers was similar to study one, with most participants being equally, if not more positive about petitioning for Fair Trade but ambivalent about donating. These discussions lasted two-five minutes.

Responses to these questions were meant to help identify salient beliefs and more particularly, "modal accessible beliefs", i.e., the most commonly held beliefs in the research population (Ajzen, 2002a, p. 9). However, to address ongoing criticism that it is the perceived importance of those beliefs that effectively determines an individual's attitude (e.g. van der Plight and Eiser, 1984; van der Plight and de Vries, 1998; van Harreveld *et al.* 2000), an additional question requested respondents to rank their accessible beliefs in terms of importance (q.4).

In a similar fashion, respondents were asked about obstacles, difficulties or problems affecting the amount of their support for Fair Trade (control beliefs, q.5-8) and groups or people that may or may not approve their support for Fair Trade (normative beliefs, q.13-16). The procedure for identifying neutralising beliefs was also similar, but for the fact that respondents were asked to write down justifications for supporting Fair Trade first, and then arguments that might be advanced to counter these justifications (q.9-12). Prior to distribution, the questionnaire was pilot-tested with four undergraduate students and amendments were made.

3.8.4 Findings

Questionnaire responses were content analysed into themes, which were later labelled based on the researcher's judgement and with a view to keep them comparable to previous research (i.e., Shaw, 2000). Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) suggest that an appropriate selection criterion for modal accessible beliefs is the 5-9 most frequently employed. Salient TPB beliefs based on frequency are detailed in table 3.8a.

Table 3.8a: Elicited Salient TPB Beliefs – Frequency

Behavioural Beliefs	Frequency	% respondents
Advantages		
Better living conditions for Fair Trade producers	22	59.4
Increases awareness about Fair Trade issues	20	54.0
Fair price for Fair Trade producers	18	48.6
Clearer conscience	14	37.8
Helps Fair Trade become more mainstream	8	21.6
Disadvantages		
Cost	18	48.6
Leads to biased competition in the market	13	35.1
Normative Beliefs		
Supportive		
Ethical organisations	26	70.2
Family members	20	54.0
Friends	17	45.9
Third World Producers	14	37.8
Non-supportive		
Multinationals	20	54.0
Control Beliefs		
Cost	22	59.4
Availability of Fair Trade products/other opportunities	21	56.7
Lack of information/awareness	16	43.2
Low quality of some Fair Trade products	14	37.8

Requires commitment/time	10	27.0
Limited range of Fair Trade products	8	21.6

As mentioned above however, the selection of salient beliefs based on frequency has been criticised. For this reason, respondents were also asked to rate their beliefs in terms of importance. Table 3.8b lists beliefs rated first, second or third in terms of importance. In line with previous research (Shaw, 2000), consideration of both tables reveals no significant differences in terms of beliefs elicited. Therefore, the selected beliefs can be seen as valid both in terms of frequency and importance.

Table 3.8b: Elicited Salient Beliefs – Importance

Behavioural Beliefs	Importance (1, 2 or 3)	
	Frequency	% respondents
Advantages		
Better living conditions for Fair Trade producers	15	68.1
Increases awareness about Fair Trade issues	12	60.0
Fair price for Fair Trade producers	13	72.2
Clearer conscience	7	50.0
Helps Fair Trade become more mainstream	6	75.0
Disadvantages		
Cost	9	50
Leads to biased competition in the market	5	38.4
Normative Beliefs		
Supportive		
Ethical organisations	10	38.4
Family members	12	60.0

Friends	10	58.8
Third World Producers	12	85.7
Non-supportive		
Multinationals	7	35.0
Control Beliefs		
Cost	14	63.6
Availability of Fair Trade products/other opportunities	11	52.3
Lack of information/awareness	10	62.5
Low quality of some Fair Trade products	9	64.2
Requires commitment/time	7	70.0
Limited range of Fair Trade products	4	50.0

Given the novelty and importance of applying neutralisation to the TPB context, the process that was followed for the selection of neutralising beliefs was different. Firstly, a more conservative criterion was employed for modal accessible neutralising beliefs, that is 75% of the total belief population (Francis *et al.* 2004a). Secondly, the selection of neutralising beliefs was not only based on frequency or importance criteria, but also on theoretical relevance. For example, a belief reflecting the CtC was mentioned only three times in the elicitation study ("Would support Fair Trade only if other people were supporting it too"), yet it was included in the selection process, as it was desirable to represent all original techniques of neutralisation. Lastly, decisions made in the elicitation study drew on findings from study one. DoR, DoI and AtHL were the more frequently employed techniques in both studies, and it was hence decided to represent these techniques by more than just one belief statement (a-g, i-o and p-r, respectively). Furthermore, the newly identified techniques, metaphor of the ledger and postponement were also represented by

statements "Prefer spending my time and effort in other pro-social activities" (which was however reframed as appealing to higher loyalties) and "It's something I could do only in the future" respectively. Table 3.8c details the elicited neutralising beliefs, and highlights the primary criteria that led to their selection.

Table 3.8c: Elicited Salient Neutralising Beliefs.

Neutralising Beliefs	Primary Criteria			
	Frequency	Importance	Theory	Study one
a) Should not be the consumer's responsibility	√	√	√	√
b) Should rather be a matter for international trading agreements	√	√	√	√
c) Should instead be promoted by businesses themselves			√	√
d) Should be less costly to support Fair Trade	√	√	√	√
e) Should be easier to support Fair Trade	√		√	√
f) Should be easier to find relevant information about Fair Trade	√	√	√	√
g) Fair Trade products should be of higher quality	√	√		√
h) Would support Fair Trade only if other people were supporting it too			√	
i) Not sure my support reaches Third World producers	√	√	√	√

k) Not sure supporting Fair Trade makes a big difference	√	√	√	√
l) Do not trust the Fair Trade labeling	√			√
m) Fair Trade is against the rationale of the free trading system	√	√		√
n) Subsidising producers leads to oversupply of goods	√			√
o) Very difficult to visualise the negative consequences by not supporting Fair Trade	√		√	√
p) Should rather care about the UK economy	√	√		√
q) Have more important priorities (e.g. time/money)	√	√	√	√
r) Prefer spending my time and effort in other pro-social activities				√
s) It's something I could do only in the future				√

The elicited beliefs informed the design of a TPB questionnaire, which – after some modifications – also served as a survey experiment (discussed in section 3.12). Part III describes the overall research design and development of instruments for the quantitative stages of research.

Part III: Quantitative Assessment of the Role of Neutralisation in Supporting Fair Trade

3.9 Introduction

This part of the chapter deals with the methods used for the main stages of the research, in which the research hypotheses were tested. As mentioned earlier, these involved a field survey and a survey experiment. Because the survey experiment differed only in terms of the instruments employed, the next section discusses the design and procedures that were common in both studies. The experimental approach is dealt with separately in sections 3.11 and 3.12, which are concerned with the development of the research instruments. Lastly, this part of the chapter also presents findings from relevant pre-tests and discusses sampling issues, prior to the analysis of the data in chapter 4.

3.10 Design Rationale and Procedures

A key methodological concern in ethics (e.g. Vitell and Ho, 1997; Crane, 1999) and TPB (e.g. Armitage and Conner, 2001) research is their disproportionate reliance on cross-sectional designs and self-report measures of behaviour[34]. Self-reports are clearly more easily obtained, yet they are not of assured validity (Ajzen, 2002a) due to self-presentational and other response biases. In a seminal study on this matter,

[34] In addition, studies that measure behaviour contemporaneously with intention and other constructs are actually measuring past behaviour (Armitage and Conner, 2001).

Hessing *et al.* (1988) contrasted self-reported tax evasion with official documentation. They found that attitudes and subjective norms significantly correlated with self-reported behaviour yet they did not correlate with officially documented behaviour. This was despite the fact that all government claims had been settled and respondents were aware that their self-reports could be checked against tax records. Based on this disconcerting finding, Hessing *et al.* (1988) moved on to challenge assertions that variables which correlate with self-reported behaviour will also predict observed behavioural outcomes. However, even prospective research designs may – to an extent – suffer from similar inadequacies, if subsequent behaviour has been assessed through subjective (reported after a certain period of time) rather than more objective (observed) measures (Armitage and Conner, 2001). Pellino (1997) explicitly compared postoperative self-reported analgesic use with observed measures and found that intentions expressed prior to the operation, significantly correlated with the postoperative subjective measures, yet they did not with the objective measures (see also, Armitage and Conner, 1999b, 1999c). Accordingly, Davies *et al.* (2002, p. 34) strongly advocate the use of observed measures of behaviour:

> "...The predictability of the (TPB) model is therefore limited to situations where intention to, and behaviour, are highly correlated. In order to test the TRA (or TPB), actual behaviour should be measured objectively, and unobtrusively, without signalling in any way its connection to the prior intention measurement phase. This implies that intention and behaviour should be measured in ways that dissociate the two completely in the respondent's mind, in order to minimise response bias. In reality, most studies rely on self-reported behaviour that can result in spurious relationship between intention–behaviour and in the attitude–intention–behaviour relationship."

Observation of actual support for Fair Trade would therefore allow for a fuller test of the present theoretical framework and increase confidence on its explanatory and predictive validity. This issue becomes even more pertinent from the perspective of the Fair Trade and ethical consumerism literature. Whilst several authors have noted the attitude-behaviour gap (e.g. Bird and Hughes, 1997; Carrigan and Attalla, 2001; Uusitalo and Oksanen, 2004; DePelsmacker *et al.* 2006; Nicholls and Lee, 2006), on an empirical level, none of these studies identify actual observed behaviour.

The present research design takes advantage of a naturally occurring setting, to observe petition signing as well as donating to Fair Trade. The proposed model is further expected to make more accurate predictions for the former. Petition signing is a type of behaviour that has been rather frequently observed, and successfully predicted in attitude research (e.g. DeFriese and Ford, 1969; Brannon *et al.* 1973; Regan and Fazio, 1977; Petty *et al.* 1981; Kallgren and Wood, 1986; Hamid and Cheng, 1995; Fox- Cardamone *et al.* 2000; White *et al.* 2002). The relative success in predicting petition signing might seem unsurprising, given that it is a relatively innocuous, low-cost behaviour (e.g. Schuman and Johnson, 1976). However, Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) give a more elaborate explanation. As they point out, it is because petition signing can be predicted from both general attitudes towards a target and attitudes towards the specific behaviour of petitioning. The principle of compatibility or measurement correspondence can be somewhat relaxed when attempting to predict petition signing (p.891):

> "The relatively frequent use of petition signing or voting as measures of behaviour deserves attention in this context. Both of these behaviors constitute single-act criteria that specify the target element as well as the action element. Under most circumstances,

however, the act of signing a petition or voting for a given candidate involves little more than expressing an evaluation of the target in question."

In other words, the act of petitioning can be viewed as a behavioural criterion where the "action" element is rather generic or unspecified (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977). Subsequently, more general attitudes, either towards a target (e.g. Fair Trade) or an aggregated index of (e.g. Fair Trade-related) behaviours, should have greater correspondence with petition signing than with specific behaviours such as donating money or buying a particular product.

Petition signing and donating to the Fair Trade Foundation were the observed dependent variable(s), measured unobtrusively in the course of some "Fair Trade Road Shows" that took place in the dining areas of several Halls of Residence at the University of Nottingham, in March 2006. The roadshows were organised by the "Environment and Social Justice Committee" (part of the University's student's union) in order to increase awareness about Fair Trade issues (through flyers and other information material), provide free samples of several Fair Trade products, collect signatures for a petition (asking for the University's clothing range to be converted to Fair Trade), and place a collection tin for donations to the Fair Trade Foundation. The researcher liaised with members of the committee in order to request their collaboration and assistance during the data collection. In return, the researcher agreed to help in organising the roadshows, give an academic presentation on ethical consumerism and monetary reimbursements for members who agreed to help in the distribution of the questionnaires. Prior to distributing the questionnaires, the researcher had to request permission from Hall wardens, and only those Halls for which permission was granted (eight in total; one was used for the exploratory phases of the investigation) formed part of the study.

The questionnaires were distributed door-to-door in each Hall, approximately two days before the respective roadshows. This rather short time lapse served to maximise the "temporal stability" of intentions, by measuring them as close as possible to the behavioural observations (e.g. Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). Respondents were asked to return their completed questionnaires to a member of the Environment and Social Justice Committee on the specified day of the roadshow. During the event, members of the committee were instructed not to prompt students to either sign the petition or donate money, as this could be an intervening situational factor. Rather, it was made sure that these behavioural choices were clearly visible at the stall which was set up in order to also promote the Fair Trade products and other information material. The members of the committee were also instructed to discretely observe students who were signing the petition and put a small tick next to the names of those petitioners that also put money in the collection tin. In nearly all cases, those that donated money also signed the petition, making their identification possible. This list was then checked against the list of questionnaire respondents and data was recorded.

Undoubtedly, the covert observation of actual behaviour is an ethically sensitive activity. It is often viewed as entailing a degree of deception and manipulative intent (e.g. Bulmer, 1982; Herrera, 1999; Bekin *et al.* 2007), and is against the principle of informed consent in social science research (see e.g. Clarke, 1999; Wiles et al. 2005). However, it is generally considered a less controversial issue when the behaviour in question is taking place in public spaces, the researcher does not actually take part or influence its occurrence, and its recording has not any negative consequences for those observed (as in the present research; see Petticrew *et al.*

2007). Accordingly, this methodological strategy has been often adopted in social psychological and consumer behaviour studies (e.g. Pellino, 1997; Davies *et al.* 2002; White *et al.* 2002).

The next section describes the measures used in the survey questionnaire, followed by the description of the survey experiment in section 3.12.

3.11 Development of TPB-Based Questionnaire(s)

3.11.1 Behaviour of Interest

Upon introducing the purpose/context of the study and a £300 prize draw that aimed to increase response rates, respondents were given an explicit definition of the behaviour of interest. This was "supporting the Fair Trade movement in the near future", further explained as:

> "*Supporting* the Fair Trade movement may involve *buying* Fair Trade products, that is, products that have been certified by the Fair Trade Labelling Organization for being purchased under equitable trading agreements, involving co-operative rather than competitive trading principles, ensuring a fair price and fair working conditions for the producers and suppliers. Support also includes backing the Fair Trade movement in other ways, for example, by *making a donation* to the Fair Trade Organization or *signing a petition* about Trade Justice."

Following Ajzen's (2002a) guidelines, this definition served to specify the target, action, context and time elements of the behaviour of interest. The target element was the "Fair Trade movement" and the action was "supporting" or an aggregated

index of behaviours, including buying Fair Trade products, but also petitioning for Fair Trade and donating. The time element was "near future" while the context element was left unspecified. In keeping with the principle of compatibility, all measures in the questionnaire were then defined based on exactly the same elements.

3.11.2 Scaling

Following common practice in TPB questionnaires, all direct measures were assessed on a 7-point unipolar (1 to 7) scale. Some questions were reverse ordered (and interspersed), so to decrease the possibility of acquiescence bias (Ajzen, 2002a; Francis *et al.* 2004a). Scaling for the indirect measures followed the mathematical solution suggested by Francis *et al.* (2004b). Behavioural beliefs, motivation to comply and control beliefs were measured on a unipolar scale (1 to 7), whilst outcome evaluations, normative beliefs and control power were measured on a bipolar (-3 to +3) scale.

3.11.3 Intention

General intention to support Fair Trade was assessed using three items (q. 10, 15 and 25; see Appendix 3) that followed the suggested format by Francis *et al.* (2004a). These were: "I expect to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future" (Strongly disagree – Strongly Agree), "I want to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future" (Strongly disagree – Strongly Agree) and "I intend to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future" (Strongly disagree – Strongly Agree). Three additional items (q. 28-30) were used in order to measure intentions

for specific behaviours: "I would support the Fair Trade movement in the near future, by buying Fair Trade products" (Strongly disagree – Strongly Agree), "I would support the Fair Trade movement in the near future, by signing a petition for Fair Trade " (Strongly disagree – Strongly Agree) and "I would support the Fair Trade movement in the near future, by donating to the Fair Trade Organization " (Strongly disagree – Strongly Agree).

3.11.4 Attitude

The direct measure of attitude was assessed by employing a semantic differential scale (q.32), as suggested by Ajzen (2002a). Respondents were presented with the statement "Supporting the Fair Trade movement is...", followed by seven pairs of adjectives: harmful/beneficial, good/bad, pleasant/unpleasant, worthless/valuable, enjoyable/unenjoyable, rewarding/not rewarding and the right thing to do/the wrong thing to do. An additional question (q.31), "In general, my attitude towards Fair Trade is..." was followed by two pairs of adjectives, unfavourable/favourable (Ajzen and Fisbein, 1980) and negative/positive (Biddle *et al.* 1987; Sparks and Shepherd, 1992) and was intended to capture overall evaluation (Sparks and Shepherd, 1992).

The indirect measures of attitude were based on salient beliefs derived from the elicitation study. These were rephrased in order to assess both belief strength and belief evaluation, following the guidelines by Ajzen (2002a). Belief strength was assessed by a block of questions (q. 1) starting with the sentence "My support for Fair Trade will...", completed by the following behavioural beliefs: "result in a fair price for Third World producers", "result in better living conditions for Third World

producers", "give me a clearer conscience", "increase other people awareness about Fair Trade issues", "help Fair Trade products become more mainstream", "entail spending extra money" and "lead to biased/unhealthy competition". The response scales were marked "Unlikely – likely" at their endpoints. Belief evaluation was assessed by the statement (q.2) "I believe...", followed by the same set of beliefs and the endpoints "unimportant – important".

3.11.5 Subjective Norm

Subjective norm was measured directly by five sentences (q. 8, 18, 20, 22, 26) following the recommendations of Ajzen (2002a). These were: "Most people who are important to me support Fair Trade" (strongly disagree – strongly agree), "Most people who are important to me think that I should support Fair Trade" (strongly disagree – strongly agree), "The people in my life whose opinions I value would not approve of my supporting for Fair Trade" (strongly disagree – strongly agree), "The people in my life whose opinions I value support Fair Trade" (strongly disagree – strongly agree) and "It is expected of me that I support Fair Trade in the near future" (strongly disagree – strongly agree).

The indirect measures of subjective norm followed a logic similar to the one involved in the assessment of behavioural beliefs (Ajzen, 2002a). Two blocks of questions were developed, in order to assess normative belief strength and motivation to comply (q. 3 and 7). Normative belief strength was measured by the sentence "Please indicate below how likely it is that the following groups think you should support Fair Trade", completed by the following salient groups: "friends", "family", "Fair Trade producers", "ethical organisations (e.g. charities, environmental

groups etc.)" and "multinational companies (that do not sell Fair Trade products)", all marked with the endpoints "unlikely – likely". Motivation to comply was measured with the sentence "Generally speaking, how much do you want to do what the following groups think you should do?", followed by the same salient groups and the endpoints "not at all – very much".

3.11.6 Perceived Behavioural Control

Perceived behavioural control was directly measured by four statements (q. 14, 17, 24 and 33; Ajzen, 2002a): "For me to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future would be difficult" (strongly disagree – strongly agree), "If I wanted to I could support the Fair Trade movement in the near future" (strongly disagree – strongly agree), "It is mostly up to me whether or not I support Fair Trade in the near future" (strongly disagree – strongly agree) and "How much control do you believe you have over supporting Fair Trade in the near future?" (no control – complete control).

As in the case of behavioural and normative beliefs, each salient control belief was used in two blocks of questions, capturing control belief strength and control belief power (q. 4 and 5; Ajzen, 2002a). The first block of questions addressed control belief strength and was phrased in the form: "Please indicate below how often you encounter the following problems when it comes to supporting Fair Trade", followed by the seven control beliefs: "lack of information/awareness", "takes more time", "costs more money", "availability of opportunities to support Fair Trade", "Availability of Fair Trade products in retail outlets", "Limited range of Fair Trade products", "Low quality of Fair Trade products". These were accompanied by

endpoints labelled "never – always". Control belief power was addressed by the statement: "Please indicate below how likely are you to support Fair Trade when encountering the following problems", followed by the seven control beliefs, and endpoints marked "unlikely – likely".

3.11.7 Ethical Obligation

Ethical Obligation was measured by three questions (q. 9, 11 and 16): "I feel that I have an ethical/moral obligation to support Fair Trade" (strongly disagree – strongly agree), "I personally feel I should support Fair Trade" (strongly disagree – strongly agree) and "Supporting the Fair Trade movement would be the right thing for me to do" (strongly disagree – strongly agree). The first question retained the format suggested by Sparks *et al.* (1995a) and Shaw (2000), whilst the second and third were of similar format to measures employed Sparks and Guthrie (1998) and Davies *et al.* (2002).

3.11.8 Self-Identity

Three questions were constructed to assess self-identification with Fair Trade issues (q. 12, 13 and 21): "To support Fair Trade is an important part of who I am" (strongly disagree – strongly agree), "I think of myself as someone who is concerned about ethical issues in consumption" (strongly disagree – strongly agree) and "I am not the type of person oriented to support Fair Trade" (strongly disagree – strongly agree). The first two questions took on the format suggested by Terry *et al.* (1999) and the third was based on the wording used by Sparks and Shepherd (1992) and Shaw (2000).

3.11.9 Neutralisation

Both direct and indirect measures were taken for neutralisation. Neutralisation was measured directly by three questions (q. 19, 23, 27): "For me, not supporting Fair Trade is justifiable" (strongly disagree – strongly agree), "I have many arguments against supporting Fair Trade" (strongly disagree – strongly agree) and "I've got reasons for not supporting Fair Trade" (strongly disagree – strongly agree). Given that neutralisation is usually assessed via indirect measures/specific neutralising beliefs (see e.g. Maruna and Copes, 2005) direct measures had to be constructed anew. The common denominator in these questions was meant to be "justifiability" of non-supportive behaviour towards Fair Trade. Content validity of the direct measures was then established through their correlation with the indirect measures (discussed in chapter 4).

Indirect measures of neutralisation were based on the beliefs identified in study two (section 3.8.4) and were presented in a block (q.6). Personal acceptance of these beliefs was measured by the question: "Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following justifications against supporting Fair Trade", completed by the following statements: "Ensuring Fair Trade should not be the consumers' responsibility", "Fair Trade should only be a matter of international trading agreements, not for individual consumers", "Fair Trade should instead be promoted by businesses themselves", "It should be less costly to support Fair Trade", "It should be easier to support Fair Trade", "It should be made easier to find relevant information about Fair Trade", "Fair Trade products should be of higher quality", "I would support Fair Trade only if many other people were supporting it", "I'm not

sure that my support actually reaches Fair Trade producers", "I'm not sure supporting Fair Trade makes much of a difference", "I do not trust the Fair Trade labelling", "Fair Trade is against the rationale/operation of the free trading/free market system", "Subsidising producers (through Fair Trade) leads to global oversupply of products", "It's very difficult to visualise/picture any negative consequences (e.g. for producers) by not supporting Fair Trade", "I should rather care more about the UK economy", "I have more important priorities (e.g. money, convenience, quality)", "I rather spend my time and effort engaging in other positive activities" and "It's something I would only do in the future (when I've got more time, money etc.)". All beliefs were marked with the endpoints "strongly disagree – strongly agree".

3.11.10 Additional Measures

The last part of the questionnaire concerned past behaviour (q. 33-40), familiarity with Fair Trade issues (q. 41-42), additional comments (open-ended question, q. 43) and personal details (q. 44-48). Past behaviour was assessed through a variety of differently worded questions, as recommended by Ajzen (2002a). Familiarity with Fair Trade issues was assessed by the questions: "How familiar would you say you are with Fair Trade issues" (1 = not at all to 7 = a lot) and "When do you first remember hearing about Fair Trade?" (<1 a year ago to 8+ years ago). Personal details related to gender, age, degree of study, nationality and full name. In order to decrease respondents' suspicion that their behaviour at the roadshow could be monitored, identification was optional, for those that wanted to be considered for the prize draw. Finally, the respondents were thanked for their participation and

were reminded of the date and place of the Fair Trade roadshow in their Hall, where they were asked to return their completed questionnaire.

3.12 A Survey Experiment

3.12.1 Introduction

Intention and actual behaviour in support of Fair Trade (i.e., donating and signing a petition) also served as the dependent variable(s) in a field experiment conducted in three Halls of Residence. This aimed to establish the causal role of neutralisation, by addressing hypotheses H4a and H4b. The experimental manipulations were embedded in a shorter version of the TPB questionnaire. A brief introduction to this rather innovative approach, often called as "survey experiment" or "experimental survey" follows.

3.12.2 Background of the Experimental Strategy

Although the methodology of "survey experiments" (also known as "experimental surveys" and "split-ballot" experiments) may be perceived as innovative, it is not uncommon. Indeed, a Google hit for the terms "survey experiment" and "experimental survey" returned 30,000 and 54,600 results respectively[35]. They have been used in survey research for at least half a century, originally to investigate how different types of measurement and other survey design issues affect responses (e.g. Saris *et al.* 2004). More recently, survey experiments have

[35] Date accessed: 10/05/2007.

witnessed a shift in scope and emphasis. The aim of survey experiments is increasingly moving away from questionnaire-related, methodological and measurement refinements, to address substantive discoveries (Sniderman and Grob, 1996; for a recent review of such experiments in political science see Gaines *et al.* 2007). An important advantage of this new approach is that it combines the internal validity of experiments with the external validity of surveys (e.g. Sniderman and Grob, 1996; Lee, 2005; Gaines *et al.* 2007). Accordingly, survey experiments have been successfully applied in diverse areas such as "consensus effects" (van der Heijden *et al.* 2004), a comparative test of psychological reactance and balance theories (Hayes and Reineke, 2007), an application of a cognitive-interactionist framework to public decisions to go to war (Hermann *et al.* 1999) and the impact of social trust on consumer participation in e-commerce (Mutz, 2005).

Examples of survey experiments in neutralisation research include Schwarz and Bayer's (1989) study on the impact of neutralising cognitions to theft and Bohner *et al.*'s (1998) on rape proclivity. Both of these studies were based on the same methodological rationale. They made respondents think about neutralisation techniques (i.e., accessible) before or after assessing the dependent variable (i.e., intention to commit a questionable activity). Whilst findings from both studies suggested a causal role for neutralisation, unfortunately, they suffered from similar methodological weaknesses: measuring probability or intention to commit an immoral activity rather than actual behaviour, and more importantly, failure to exclude alternative interpretations of the findings, such as the possible intervening effects of priming information (see Fritsche, 2003; Rauhut, 2003).

Before moving to describe the present design in more detail, it is important to note that because the experiment deals with intact groups (i.e., students in each Hall of Residence were assigned a different questionnaire version) rather than random assignment of participants, it can be viewed as quasi rather than true experimental design (e.g. Campbell and Stanley, 1963). Indeed, this is often viewed as a strict trade-off consideration. Conducting a legitimate field experiment without the participants being aware of it, is possible with intact groups but not with random assignment of participants to groups (e.g. Dimitrov and Rumrill, 2003, p.160; Sobel and Clarkson, 2003, p.572). However, the present research strategy takes advantage of a situation conducive to "natural randomisation". That is, students are assigned in different Halls of Residence (mainly) based on a lottery procedure (see Campbell and Stanley, 1963, p.22; Cook and Campbell, 1979, pp.372-373). Further, a stronger case for equivalence is made by controlling for several variables (i.e., TPB and demographic variables) that could, in theory, debase the true-experimental conditions.

3.12.3 Conditions

Hypotheses H4a and H4b, build on the proposed distinction made by Fritsche (2003), i.e., availability versus acceptability of neutralisation techniques, in order to capture more analytically and rigorously the causal properties of neutralisation. This distinction largely corresponds to the one between "presentation" versus "acceptance" and "yielding" of an argument, identified by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980, pp.227-228) for TPB-based interventions. Manipulation of these variables resulted in three different questionnaire versions or conditions. It should be noted that ideally, the manipulation of the availability and acceptability variables should have resulted

in a 2 (availability/unavailability) x 2 (high/low acceptability) experimental design and hence four different questionnaire versions. This was not feasible due to the restricted number of Halls of Residence for which permission to conduct research was granted. As mentioned earlier, they were eight in total, amongst which one was used for exploratory research and four for the field survey; leaving only three Halls of residence available for the experiment. Questionnaire 2 hence combined both the availability and acceptability conditions. It was hypothesised that intention and subsequent behaviour would be lower in questionnaire 2 (validation: high availability and acceptability), followed by 1 (no availability), followed by 3 (invalidation: low acceptability, availability of counter-arguments).

H4a refers to availability, i.e., the extent to which neutralisation techniques are made cognitively accessible to respondents. In the first questionnaire version (Appendix 4, version 1), which also served as the control condition since no manipulation was embedded (i.e., no availability), respondents were presented with a shorter version of the survey questionnaire. This questionnaire included all direct TPB measures and background questions in exactly the same format, but did not include the belief-based measures. This approach was in line with both Francis *et al.*'s (2004a) recommendations on brief forms of TPB questionnaire for designing interventions, and with Ajzen and Fishbein (1980, p.62) who postulate that antecedent variables (e.g. belief-based measures) may be excluded from a questionnaire when for appropriate practical and theoretical reasons. In the present case, reasons related to questionnaire length and possible confounding effects of including a substantial number of other (belief-based) measures.

The second questionnaire version (Appendix 4, version 2), served to make some neutralising techniques available (H4a) and to increase their acceptability (H4b). The questionnaire was identical to the first version, but for the embedment of the manipulation. All TPB measures preceded the manipulation, apart from four measures of intention (q.25, 28-30 in the survey questionnaire) that served as dependent variables. The treatment related to a block of questions that was introduced with the sentence: "The following are reasons for not supporting Fair Trade, frequently expressed by students at Nottingham University. Please indicate the extent to which you agree/disagree". This served to increase the acceptability of the following neutralisations statements by presenting them as "reasons", "frequently expressed" by their fellow students (i.e., H4b, high acceptability)[36]. Subsequently, respondents were asked to express their agreement with the following neutralisation techniques (i.e., H4a, accessibility): a) "It should be easier to find relevant information about Fair Trade", b) "Fair Trade should be a matter for international trading agreements, not for individual consumers", c) "It should be less costly to support Fair Trade", d) "I have more important priorities (e.g. money, convenience)", e) "Subsidising producers (through Fair Trade) leads to global oversupply of goods", f) "I do not trust the Fair Trade labelling" and g) "I'm not sure supporting Fair Trade makes much of a difference". Statements were marked with the endpoints "strongly disagree – strongly agree".

The selection of these neutralising beliefs followed a procedure similar to the one recommended by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) and Ajzen (2007b) for TPB-based interventions. The main premise of TPB-based interventions is that "...beliefs are

[36] More precisely, this statement served to manipulate "social" acceptability of neutralising beliefs. It was hoped that personal acceptability would then be affected indirectly. This is further discussed in the following chapter.

the basic determinants of any behaviour. It follows that, in the final analysis, behaviour change is brought by producing changes in beliefs" (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980, p.223). Compared to traditional experimental designs that may develop and pre-test an intervention on other grounds, TPB-based interventions require formative research that identifies salient beliefs and then develops a TPB survey, results from which are informing the type and rationale of the intervention (Ajzen, 2007b). In the present case however, neutralisation was the focal variable for the intervention *ad hoc*, regardless of its relationship with other TPB antecedents.

Given that salient neutralising beliefs had already been identified in the elicitation study, prior to designing the manipulation, a short (2-5 min.) questionnaire was administered in the course of a second-year undergraduate class to test the relationship of those beliefs with direct measures of neutralisation and intention (n = 83)[37]. The questionnaire contained all eighteen neutralising statements, one direct measure of neutralisation and the four measures of behavioural intention reported above. Data was then entered in SPSS v.14 to assess the bivariate correlations between neutralising beliefs, neutralisation and the aggregated measure of intention. Those neutralising beliefs that correlated significantly ($p < .05$) and most substantially with neutralisation and intention ($r > .25$ and $r < -.35$ respectively), and which could be effectively counter-argued (based on q.12 in the elicitation study), formed part of the experimental manipulation[38].

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[37] A second-year undergraduate class was selected, in order to avoid reaching students that might have been staying in Halls of Residence and which are predominantly occupied by first-years.

[38] Exceptions concerned three different conditions. Firstly, statement a) in the questionnaire, was not significantly correlated either with neutralisation or intention but was included due to its frequent occurrence in the qualitative findings. Secondly, another statement was significantly correlated but in the opposite direction. It was based on the technique of postponement but due to the phrasing of "it's something I'm hoping to do in the future", was obviously perceived as a question of intention. Thirdly, two more statements correlated

The final questionnaire version (Appendix 4, version 3) aimed to decrease the acceptability of neutralising beliefs by presenting counter-arguments of fellow students to "excuses" for not supporting Fair Trade (H4b). These counter-arguments had been identified through q.12 of the elicitation study. The manipulation was embedded in a similar fashion to the second questionnaire version but this time the block of counter-arguing statements was introduced with the sentence: "The following are possible excuses for not supporting Fair Trade (referenced in *italics*) and counter-arguments, as expressed by students at Nottingham University. Please indicate the extent to which you agree/disagree with the counter-arguments". Subsequently, the neutralising statements used in the second questionnaire version were presented in italics, followed by their respective counterarguments: a) "It's also true that most people choose not to be better informed about Fair Trade", b) "Yet, modern western consumers should be more responsible and do their own bit to support Fair Trade, cannot just rely on international agreements" c) "Most people I know can surely afford paying a few pennies extra for a good cause", d) "...Sometimes ethics should come first and then money, convenience etc.", e) "There is strong evidence that rather than leading to global oversupply of goods, a higher Fair Trade price leads to investments in quality and production improvements", f) "All products that carry the Fair Trade logo are assessed by an independent and highly credible body, that is, the Fair Trade Labeling Organization" and g) "Supporting Fair Trade even in a small way is still much better than doing nothing". These statements were also marked with the endpoints "strongly disagree – strongly agree".

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significantly and substantially but due to the similarity in terms of respective counter-arguments with already selected techniques, they were not included.

As in the case of the survey questionnaires, each experimental version was administered in a different Hall of Residence early in the morning of the day before the roadshow. In terms of the experimental design, it served to minimise "history" as a threat to internal validity (e.g. Campbell and Stanley, 1963).

3.13 Pilot Testing

Prior to the final distribution, all questionnaire versions were thoroughly pre-tested for format and layout, scaling, content and readability (Hunt *et al.* 1982). Content was analysed by asking respondents if they understood the meaning of each statement and readability, by asking them if they found any statements awkward or grammatically incorrect (e.g. Fraedrich, 1993). Eight personal interviews were conducted for both the survey and experimental versions, with respondents of a similar profile to the ones used in subsequent research (i.e., undergraduate students, e.g. Ajzen, 2002a). In addition, the main questionnaire was pre-tested in a class of 15-20 PhD students, attending a seminar on questionnaire design. Lastly, during the distribution of a pilot questionnaire that served to test the reliability of the direct measures (n = 38, discussed below), a question at the end prompted respondents to comment on the questionnaire itself. Amendments made are listed in Appendix 5.

A questionnaire including all direct TPB measures was distributed at the end of a second year undergraduate class to test for internal consistency (n = 38; Ajzen, 2002a; Francis *et al.* 2004a). Cronbach alphas for attitude (ATT), subjective norm (SN), perceived behaviour control (PBC), ethical obligation (EOB), self-identity (SI), neutralisation (NEUT) and intention (INT) were .820, .701, .654, .725, .755, .730

and .795 respectively. Given the small sample size and items for most measures, these levels were deemed adequate (i.e., > .60, e.g. DeVellis, 1990). In addition, inspection of the correlations between all variables and intention suggested that they were all significant in the proposed direction, hence giving some very first indication of their predictive validity. These results are summarised in table 3.13.

Table 3.13: Pearson's Correlation (r) for Direct Measures of ATT, SN, PBC, NEUT, EOB, SI and INT

	ATT	SN	PBC	NEUT	EOB	SI	INT
ATT	1						
SN	.425*	1					
PBC	.304*	.072	1				
NEUT	-.289*	-.604**	-.070	1			
EOB	.283*	.634**	.018	-.455**	1		
SI	.286*	.592**	.141	-.388*	.696**	1	
INT	**.308***	**.544****	**.316***	**-.388***	**.705****	**.670****	1

**** correlation is significant at the 5% level**

*** correlation is significant at the 10% level**

3.14 Sampling Issues

3.14.1 Study Population

For reasons mentioned in section 3.5, the study population was British undergraduate students (18-21 years old). International students were excluded from analysis because firstly, preliminary research showed that they did not share

the same degree of familiarity and experience with Fair Trade issues; and secondly, it was unknown how different cultural backgrounds may affect the decision-making process and subsequently, the role of neutralisation (e.g. Vitell, 2003).

3.14.2 Response Rate

The response rate was 21% for the main survey and 23% for the experimental survey, resulting in 180 and 113 usable questionnaires respectively, after exclusion of the international students, incomplete and invalid responses. This was in line with the typical response rate of 20% in general mail surveys (Lambert and Harrington, 1990; Colombo, 2000), as well as with response rates found in previous consumer ethics (see e.g. Vitell *et al.* 1991; Vitell and Muncy, 1992; Fukakawa, 2002; Vitell and Paolillo, 2003) and ethical consumerism studies (see e.g. Strong, 1996; De Pelsmacker *et al.* 2005; Mohr and Webb, 2005). Although the inclusion of a lottery incentive was hoped to improve response rates, recent research suggests that regardless of its monetary size, increase in responses might have been minimal (Porter and Whitcomb, 2003; see also James and Bolstein, 1992). Unfortunately, the opposite might have held true for the adverse effects of questionnaire length (Smith *et al.* 2003).

Furthermore, the response rate in this study cannot be directly compared to typical mail surveys. Firstly, the time span between the distribution and collection of the questionnaires was about two days. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the temporary stability of the reported intentions (Ajzen, 2005). Secondly, there was a fixed time (6-7pm), place (dining hall) and date for the collection of each questionnaire, to enable observation of actual behaviour. However, only about 55-

65% of the students have dinner in the Halls of Residence in any given day. Lastly, the research took place in the middle of the academic year. By that period however, several rooms in Halls of residence remain unoccupied, as some students decide to leave University or move to private accommodation.

Regardless of the above explanations for the current response rate, unless it is 100%, the possibility of non-response bias should be considered. That is "the difference between the true value and the estimate obtained from the respondents" (Colombo, 2000, p. 85). The researcher should try to indicate or discover whether the respondents are different from non-respondents (Baruch, 1999). There are various techniques for discovering and adjusting for nonresponse bias, such as subsampling of nonrespondents (e.g. Malhotra, 2003)[39]. This entails contacting again a subsample of nonrespondents and then projecting the values obtained from the subsample to all the nonrespondents. This however was not feasible, as it was against student welfare-related practices to ask for wardens' permission to contact students that had already decided not to participate. Alternatively, later responses can be used as substitute for non-responses and compared to earlier ones (e.g. Vitell and Paollilo, 2003). This was also impossible, as sets of questionnaires were collected at the same time. When comparable data on nonrespondents are not available, Randall and Gibson (1990) suggest that the researcher warns the readers about the limited generalisability of the findings. Whilst this links to the distinction between effects and theory application research, it does suggest a larger research limitation if variables of theoretical interest were not fully represented. Most notably, respondents had in the main, favourable attitudes towards Fair Trade and were rather low neutralisers (cf. Mintel, 2007). This might have, in fact, been the reason

[39] Other techniques such as substitution, weighting and imputation (e.g. Malhotra, 2003) were deemed inappropriate due to lack of sufficient information and theoretical justification.

they decided to complete the questionnaire in the first place. It is also worth noting that most of the respondents stated familiarity and experience with Fair Trade issues. It is possible that students who were less familiar and experienced found it more difficult to respond to all questions and were put off by the content of the questionnaire (e.g. Sparks *et al.* 1995).

3.14.3 Sample size

The original sample size was 180 and 113 cases for the main and experimental survey respectively. To maximise use of the data, 29 questionnaires relating to the control condition in the experimental survey, were also included in the analysis of the field survey. This was appropriate given that these questionnaires were based on a shorter version of the field survey questionnaire, with the only difference being the exclusion of the belief-based measures (Francis *et al.* 2004a). Similarly, in the scale validation process, some analyses were based in both sets of data. This is discussed in more detail in the next chapter, along with specific sample size requirements for each stage of statistical analysis.

3.15 Summary

The second half of this chapter focused on the distinct phases of empirical research. Part I described a qualitative study that aimed to assess the applicability of neutralisation in the context of Fair Trade. Despite its limitations, this study provided strong indication that consumers are readily employing a range of neutralisation-type of arguments when discussing their level of support for the Fair

Trade movement. Subsequently, part II was concerned with an elicitation study that drew on study one and helped generate a pool of items for the TPB and neutralisation scales. This study also helped design a treatment for the survey experiment. Part III described the methods used in the main stages of research, which tested the formulated hypotheses. The discussion centred on the rationale of the studies' design and procedures, the development of relevant instruments, pre-tests and sampling issues.

The next chapter discusses the analyses, and presents the results from the main stages of research, in which the research hypotheses were tested.

Chapter 4 Data Analysis

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 described the methodological approach to the research and presented findings from the preliminary phases of investigation. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the analysis and present the results from the main stages of research; in which the proposed model of ethical decision-making and hypotheses on the role of neutralisation were tested. For ease of reference, these hypotheses are reproduced below:

H1a: Neutralisation has a direct, negative influence on consumers' behavioural intentions to support Fair Trade.

H1b: The higher the acceptance of neutralising beliefs the weaker the relationship between attitudes and behavioural intention.

H1c: The higher the acceptance of neutralising beliefs the weaker the relationship between subjective norms and behavioural intention.

H2a: Neutralisation has a direct and indirect (via intentions) negative influence on actual behaviour in support of Fair Trade.

H2b: The higher the acceptance of neutralising beliefs the weaker the relationship between behavioural intentions and actual behaviour.

H3a: The higher the acceptance of neutralising beliefs the weaker the relationship between ethical obligation and behavioural intention.

H3b: The higher the acceptance of neutralising beliefs the weaker the relationship between self-identity and behavioural intention.

H4a: Cognitive accessibility of neutralisation techniques negatively affects behavioural intentions to support Fair Trade and actual behaviour in support of Fair Trade.

H4b: Acceptability of neutralisation techniques negatively affects behavioural intentions to support Fair Trade and actual behaviour in support of Fair Trade.

A field survey aimed to assess the role of neutralisation (i.e., H1-H3) in the proposed model of decision-making, whereas H4 was addressed by a survey experiment. Accordingly, this chapter is split into two parts. Part I focuses on the analysis of the survey data. It begins with data screening for outliers and missing values (4.2), and provides a descriptive analysis of the data (4.3). Subsequently, it tests for statistical conditions and assumptions (4.4), before moving to refine the scales by means of Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA; 4.5). Having ensured that the scales exhibit desirable psychometric properties, H1-H3 are tested through multiple linear regression, moderated linear regression, binary logistic regression and moderated logistic regression (4.6). Part II analyses the experimental data (4.7), before concluding the chapter in section 4.8.

Part I: Analysis of the Survey Data

4.2 Data Screening and Testing of Statistical Conditions and Assumptions

4.2.1 Missing Data

There were 14 questionnaires with more than 40% of missing values. Individual inspection revealed they concerned cases of respondent fatigue, with only the first two thirds of the questionnaire or less being completed. These questionnaires were dropped from the analysis. Missing values for the rest of the sample were less than 5% and were scattered randomly through the data matrix. Random distribution was established through tests of mean differences for respondents that had or did not have missing values on particular variables. Listwise deletion was therefore deemed appropriate (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001) and was preferred over pairwise deletion in most cases, because some statistical techniques, particularly CFA, do not work equally well after pairwise deletion (Kline, 2005). Pairwise deletion was not a problem in the analysis of the belief-based measures (and the experimental data), and was selected in order to maximise the sample size (Pallant, 2005).

4.2.2 Outliers

No univariate outliers were detected. Multivariate outliers were detected through the centroid-distance statistic Mahalanobis, which was assessed by running a regression procedure (Osterlind and Tabachnick, 2001). Summated scales of the direct measures of attitude (ATT), neutralisation (NEUT), subjective norm (SN), perceived behavioural control (PBC), ethical obligation (EOB) and self-identity (SI) were the independent, and intention (INT) was the dependent variable. Three outliers were detected, (cases numbered 6, 65 and 175) based on the critical value of 22.4 for $p = .001$ and six independent variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). In line with the guidelines by Osterlind and Tabachnick (2001), a stepwise regression was used to discover which combination of variables caused these cases to be multivariate outliers. It was discovered that by far the most important variable causing these cases to be outliers was ATT. Individual inspection of the questionnaires showed that this was due to fatigue or acquiescence bias, i.e., respondents did not notice the reverse ordering of some items, raising doubts about the reliability of their responses. These cases were subsequently dropped from the analysis.

4.2.3 Final Sample Size

Final sample size upon listwise deletion of missing values, exclusion of the outliers and inclusion of 29 cases from the control condition in the experimental study (see section 3.14.3) was 190 cases.

4.3 Descriptive Statistics

4.3.1 Respondent Profile

The respondent profile was slightly biased towards the female population (45% males, 55% females). They were all undergraduate British students (upon exclusion of the International ones), age ranging from 18-22 years. Most of them were familiar with Fair Trade issues (mean = 4.47, Std.Deviation = 1.396), having first heard about Fair Trade, three to four years ago. In terms of past behaviour, most respondents stated they had supported Fair Trade about half of the times they had had the opportunity (mean = 3.49, Std. Deviation = 1.62) or sometimes as opposed to never or always (mean = 3.65, Std. Deviation = 1.38). A high proportion (75%) had bought a Fair Trade product at least once, with the majority of them opting for Fair Trade products sometimes as opposed to never or always (mean = 3.46, Std. Deviation = 1.4). Regarding other means of supporting Fair Trade, amongst those who had been given the opportunity to sign a petition in the past (42%), nearly all had done so (83%), but much fewer (35%) had decided to donate to Fair Trade when given the opportunity (25% of the sample). The vast majority of students (87%) stated they hadn't had the opportunity to support Fair Trade in other than the above ways. Amongst those that did, frequently cited ways of support were sending letters to politicians, participating in protests (e.g. the Make Poverty History campaign), helping in school-run and church-run Fair Trade campaigns[40].

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[40] It is worth noting that measures of past behaviour in this research are employed for descriptive purposes only (section 2.10). That is, past behaviour is considered a background characteristic, and like age and gender, it is not hypothesized to affect INT or AB directly, but only indirectly through the TPB components (Ajzen, 2002b; cf. Rhodes and Courneya, 2003). This was also substantiated through *post hoc* analyses, indicating no residual effect

4.3.2 Actual Behaviour

In contrast, descriptive statistics for actual behaviour (AB), indicated that the majority of respondents signed a petition (62.9%, n = 186), however, very few decided to make a donation to the Fair Trade Foundation (3.7%, n = 186). To an extent, this pattern was in line with the discussion in section 3.10 and the qualitative findings (section 3.7.4.6). Furthermore, donating was the least popular way of supporting Fair Trade based on the current data, where the mean for the question "I would support the Fair Trade movement in the near future, by donating to the Fair Trade Organisation" was 3.93 compared to 5.10 and 5.34 for questions on intentions to purchase and sign a petition for Fair Trade respectively (min: 1, max: 7). Nonetheless, the remarkably low number of respondents who donated, renders inferential statistics based on this behavioural measure meaningless.

Further explanation of the low propensity to donate is based on inherent research design difficulties. Firstly, given that the respondents also had the option to sign a petition for Fair Trade, they might have rationalised not donating by signing instead the petition (e.g. through the use of "the metaphor of the ledger"). Secondly, although respondents were reminded of the donation opportunity in the questionnaire, they do not usually carry money when dining in their Hall of Residence. Donating to Fair Trade would therefore require high levels of recall and motivation. This is discussed more extensively in chapter 5.

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of past behaviour on INT when controlling for ATT,PBC,SN,NEUT and SI, as well as no effect on actual behaviour, after controlling for INT. The same applied for gender effects.

4.3.3 Psychological Constructs

Descriptive statistics for the direct measures of EOB, SI, ATT, PBC, NEUT and INT, constructed as ordinary sum scores and prior to any modifications are provided in the table 4.3a whilst zero-order correlations are presented in table 4.3b.

Descriptive statistics in table 4.3a show that respondents had overall favourable attitudes towards Fair Trade (mean = 50, Std. Deviation = 8.4) and equally strong feelings of EOB (mean = 15.6, Std. Deviation = 3.6) and SI (mean = 14.2, Std. Deviation = 3.64). These were all congruent with willingness to support Fair Trade, as measured by the high scores on INT (mean = 29.1, Std. Deviation = 6.28). Respondents also felt they had high control over supporting Fair Trade (mean = 20, Std. Deviation = 3.9), whilst perceptions of pressure by their social environment were rather moderate (mean = 20, Std. Deviation = 4.95). In the main, respondents were low neutralisers, with the majority of them believing there are not many readily available justifications for not supporting Fair Trade (mean = 8.2, Std. Deviation = 3.87).

Table 4.3b further reveals that all variables had significant correlations with INT. EOB had the strongest relationship (Pearson's $r = .784$, $p < .01$). In addition, some correlations between the antecedent variables were high enough to suggest potential problems with multicollinearity (above .70; Leech *et al.* 2005), particularly between EOB and SI (Pearson's $r = .733$, $p <. 01$). This issue is addressed upon refinement and modification of the scales in section 4.5.

A similar pattern of results was exhibited for the indirect or belief-based measures of ATT, PBC, SN and NEUT, upon summation and multiplication of the individual items, as illustrated in table 4.3c.

Table 4.3a: Descriptive Statistics for Direct Measures of EOB, SI, ATT, PBC, NEUT and INT

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Skewness	Kurtosis
ATT	17.00	63.00	49.963	8.405	-.936	1.590
SN	8.00	35.00	20.500	4.949	.258	.278
PBC	8.00	28.00	20.321	3.897	-.400	.056
NEUT	3.00	21.00	8.252	3.870	.908	.771
EOB	3.00	21.00	15.563	3.599	-.835	1.018
SI	3.00	21.00	14.236	3.643	-.325	-.066
INT	6.00	42.00	29.710	6.276	-.614	1.235

Valid N (listwise): 190, **Std.Error of Skewness:** .176, **Std.Error of Kurtosis:** .351

Table 4.3b: Pearson's Correlation (r) for Direct Measures of EOB, SI, ATT, PBC, NEUT and INT

	ATT	SN	PBC	NEUT	EOB	SI	INT
ATT	1						
SN	.655**	1					
PBC	.251**	.228**	1				
NEUT	-.611**	-.416**	-.386**	1			
EOB	.653**	.506**	.289**	-.627**	1		
SI	.655**	.603**	.324**	-.584**	.733**	1	
INT	.702**	.506**	.409**	-.665**	.784**	.765**	1

Table 4.3c: Univariate and Bivariate Results for the Belief-Based Measures

				Std.	Pearson's r				
	Min.	**Max.**	**Mean**	**Deviation**	**ATT**	**SN**	**PBC**	**NEUT**	**INT**
ATT	-78	117	49.14	29.726					
SN	-39	65	22.72	20.302	.616**				
PBC	-93	108	-8.75	37.011	.237**	.405**			
NEUT	-42	28	-6.16	15.027	-.579**	-.556**	-.414 **		
INT	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	.637**	.588**	.341**	-.631**	
Valid N (listwise) = 165, ** **p <** .01									

Correlations between direct and indirect measures were .660, .590, .276 and .594 for ATT, SN, PBC, and NEUT respectively. With the exception of the PBC, they are classified as substantial (Cohen, 1992), therefore supporting TPB's "expectancy-value" assumption or informational foundation of the direct measures (section 2.10). This finding is even more notable if to take into account that the belief-based measures reflect only a subset (most salient/commonly cited beliefs) of a more universal set of beliefs underlying each construct. Furthermore, they assume different levels of cognitive capacity when it comes to recalling or expressing them: that is, "reasoned process" as opposed to "gut reaction" that characterises the evaluation of the direct measures (Shaw *et al.* 2000).

Data were then screened to ensure that statistical assumptions were met, prior to multivariate analysis.

4.4 Tests for Statistical Assumptions

4.4.1 Normality

An investigation of the data revealed that the assumption of normality was not fully met. Given the relatively large sample size, more attention was given to the actual size of skeweness and kurtosis, and visual appearance of the distributions of the variables as opposed to significance tests of normality (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).

For the purposes of regression, it was not necessary to screen individual variables given that the expected normal probability plot and detrended normal probability plots were normal (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). Indeed, even after transformation of the variables the results were very similar and therefore, the original variables were kept due to ease of interpretation of the findings.

Individual inspection of items was more important in the case of the direct measures and for the purposes of CFA, a technique which is very sensitive to normality violations (e.g. Byrne, 2001). Given that most of these items had skewness values of less or close to ± 1 and kurtosis values of less than 4, deviation from normality was deemed as not severe enough to render the results unreliable (Kline, 2005; Leech *et al.* 2005).

4.4.2 Linearity and Homoscedasticity

Linearity was assessed through inspection of a number of bivariate scatterplots amongst individual items and of all possible pairs of the summated scales. There was no indication of curvilinear or other nonlinear relationships. Appendix 6 exhibits scatterplots for pairs of INT with each of the independent variables, IE, SN, PBC, NEUT and ATT[41]. These are also used to establish homoscedasticity, given that all bivariate scatterplots seem to have roughly the same width all over (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).

4.4.3 Common Method Bias

Because all measures (apart from AB) were gathered at the same time, a potential problem in this research, but even more so in cross-sectional studies, is the presence of common method bias. That is, "variance that is attributable to the measurement method rather than to the constructs the measures represent" (Podsakoff *et al.* 2003, p. 879)[42]. There are numerous potential sources of common method bias, including social desirability bias (section 3.4), but also a variety of common rater (e.g. consistency motive, acquiescence bias), item characteristic (e.g. common scale formats), item context (e.g. item priming effects) and measurement context effects (e.g. predictor and criterion variables are measured at the same time; see Podsakoff *et al.* 2003).

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[41] These are the scatterplots of the final scales used in the survey (direct measures), upon refinement and validation.

[42] Other authors suggest that the effects of common method bias are overstated (e.g. Crampton and Wagner, 1994; Spector, 1994; Lindell and Whitney, 2001)

To determine whether common method bias was present in this research, a Harman's (1967) one-factor test was performed following the approach outlined by Podsakoff *et al.* (2003)[43]. All measurement items for INT, ATT, SN, PBC, NEUT, EOB and SI were entered into a principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation. According to this technique, if a single factor emerges from the factor analysis or one "general" factor accounts for the majority of the covariance in the variables, common method variance is present. The results suggested a six-factor structure (based on eigenvalues of more than 1.00), with the first factor accounting for 39% of the covariance. This indicated that common method bias is not unduly problematic, yet cannot be considered as fully absent in this study.

It is worth noting that common method bias might have been stimulated by the similarity in the wording of items intended to directly measure respective TPB constructs. Unfortunately, this possibility is rarely mentioned in the TPB literature, despite the fact that most existing studies are based on cross-sectional data (but see Conner and Armitage, 1998; Armitage *et al.* 1999; Perugini and Conner, 2000, Kaiser *et al.* 2007). The most notable exception is Kaiser *et al.* (2007) who have recently argued that common method variance in TPB studies is in part triggered by their adherence to the compatibility principle (see section 2.9). Item measurement on the same level of specificity, results in a parallel semantic item content, as every measure commonly encloses the target behaviour (p. 1526). Therefore, a possible

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[43] At a later stage of the analysis, a CFA was also used to assess the potential impact of common method bias (Podsakoff *et al.* 2003). A single factor model was compared to a six-factor model, containing one factor for each measure, i.e., ATT, IE, PBC, SN, NEUT and INT. The six-factor model fit the data much better than the single-factor one (chi-square difference = 355, $p < .0001$), substantiating the proposition that common method bias is not a huge problem in this study (e.g. Bradfield and Aquino, 1999). *Post hoc* remedies such as the inclusion of a "common method" factor in the measurement model (Podsakoff *et al.* 2003) were therefore not undertaken, particularly more so, due to the additional concern of violating the sample-to-parameters ratio.

drawback of compatible measurement is that along with increasing conceptual and predictive precision, it also exploits common method variance.

In this research, given the result of the Harman's one factor test and size and pattern of the correlations, it is unlikely that true relationships between the variables of interest are not at least partly responsible for the research findings (Conner and Armitage, 1998). Nonetheless, possible effects of common method bias will be taken into account in appropriate stages of analysis. For example, in the process of scale validation, common method bias may render tests of convergent validity strong and tests of discriminant validity weak (e.g. Armitage *et al.* 1999; Perugini and Conner, 2000).

4.4.4 Other statistical assumptions and conditions

Other assumptions and conditions, such as sample size, multicollinearity in regression and homogeneity of variance for Analysis of Variance, are discussed along with the results from each stage of analysis.

4.5 Scale Development, Validity and Reliability

4.5.1 Introduction

Following established guidelines in scale development, the assessment of validity and reliability was conducted in two stages (Gerbing and Anderson, 1988). At the first stage, traditional analyses such as Cronbach's alpha and EFA were performed

for a preliminary assessment and refinement of the scales. At the second stage, CFA was employed as a more powerful and theory-driven technique to establish the unidimensionality, discriminant and convergent validity of the scales. Preliminary results from the first stage are reported below, along with a brief introduction to the basic concepts of reliability and different types of validity.

4.5.2 Exploratory Analysis

4.5.2.1 Reliability: Reliability is the degree to which the observed variable measures the "true value" and is "error free" (Hair *et al.* 1998). The most commonly used measure of internal consistency (which is the appropriate criterion for reflective indicators; see e.g. Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001) is Cronbach's alpha with values of .70 (Hair *et al.* 1998) and .60 (DeVellis, 1991), usually cited as lower acceptable thresholds.

Initial reliability levels for the direct, summated measures of EOB, SI, NEUT, ATT, SN, PBC and INT were .836, .755, .782, .916, .723, .586 and .818 respectively. These were deemed satisfactory, particularly when taking into account that reliability is adversely affected by shorter scales (i.e., less than ten items; Pallant, 2005). There were only three items for EOB, SI and NEUT, four for PBC, five for SN, six for INT and nine for ATT. However, the reliability of the PBC construct, falling just below .60, was at a questionable level. Item-to-total and inter-item correlations were also inspected for this scale, with the smallest item-total correlation being acceptable at a level of .541 but with only one inter-item correlation being acceptable at a the .3 threshold (Hair *et al.* 1998). Given that ambiguities and difficulties in operationalising the TPB construct have been noted in previous TPB

research (e.g. Notani, 1998, Trafimow *et al.* 2002), it was decided not to take any remedial action at this stage, but to address this issue in the CFA.

4.5.2.2 Validity: Reliability is a necessary, yet not sufficient condition for establishing the validity of a measure. Validity also assumes that a measure accurately represents what is supposed to measure (Hair *et al.* 1998). Establishing validity is an ongoing process and usually means investigating for several different subtypes of validity, including content, nomological, convergent and discriminant validity (e.g. Eagly and Chaiken, 1993).

Content validity concerns item sampling adequacy, or in other words, the extent to which a specific set of items reflects a content domain (DeVellis, 1991). In this research, content validity can be primarily inferred from the indirect measures, since the salient beliefs emerged from students' own responses to the open-ended questions (study two, section 3.8). The content validity of the direct measures is in turn supported by their substantial correlations with the indirect ones, as noted in section 4.3 (Francis *et al.* 2004b).

Nomological or *construct* validity refers to the degree that the summated scale predicts and explains other concepts in a theoretically-based model (Hair *et al.* 1998). It is therefore the final goal of most research projects (e.g. Gerbing and Anderson, 1988). As a preliminary test (following Czerniak *et al.* 1999), validity was inferred from the significant raw correlations (all at $p < .001$) of the direct measures of EOB, SI, PBC, NEUT, ATT and SN, with INT, with the lowest correlation being .409 for PBC-INT and the highest being .784 for EOB-INT. These were also in the proposed direction (positive for all but NEUT) as indicated in the proposed

model/extended version of the TPB. This procedure relates to *criterion-related* validity, that is, comparing scores on the scales of interest with scores on other variables, or criteria (here with INT; Spector, 1992). Establishing construct validity also involves testing for discriminant and convergent validity.

Convergent validity assesses the degree to which two measures of the same concept are correlated, whereas *discriminant* validity refers to the degree to which two conceptually similar concepts are distinct (Hair *et al.* 1998). Evidence of these types of validity is typically provided through factor analytic methods. Items from each scale should load on different factors than items from scales that are assumed to capture different constructs (DeVellis, 1991). Subsequently, the exploratory factor analytic procedure undertaken for the purposes of this research is described.

4.5.2.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis: The 32 items underlying the six antecedents of INT in the extended TPB model were subjected to *exploratory factor analysis* (EFA) using SPSS version 14. Principal axis factor analysis (PAF) is preferred over principal components analysis (PCA) when there is reason to believe that there is a smaller set of "factors" or unobserved (latent) variables that cause or underlie the variables that are actually observed or measured (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Dancey and Reidy, 2004; Leech *et al.* 2005).

Prior to performing PAF, the suitability of data for factor analysis was assessed. A critical concern was sample size, as factor analysis is a method which requires particularly large sizes, with some authors recommending at least 300 cases (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001) or a 10 cases per item ratio (i.e., 320 cases; Pallant, 2005). Whilst some authors deem five cases per item as marginally adequate under

certain circumstances (Hair *et al.* 1998), to increase confidence on the reliability of the findings, it was decided to include 80 more cases from the experimental data (relating to the treatment conditions; see section 3.12.3). These should be uncontaminated by the experimental manipulation, as they were measured prior to its embedment. This, however, was not the case for INT, and measurement items for this construct were not included at this preliminary phase of analysis. It should be noted that this augmented sample size (n = 270) is only used in the present analysis and in a comparable CFA model (i.e., model 3, section 4.5.3.4).

Suitability of the data was then assessed by inspecting the correlation matrix, which revealed the presence of many statistically significant coefficients of .3 and above. The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin value was .919, well above the recommended value of .6 (Pallant, 2005) and the Barlett's tests of Sphericity reached statistical significance (p < .0005), supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix (Pallant, 2005).

PAF revealed the presence of six components with eigenvalues exceeding 1, explaining 18.6%, 11.7%, 9.5%, 6.5%, 5.1% and 4.8% of the variance respectively, after varimax rotation[44]. Inspection of the screeplot was less clear-cut, as there was a considerable break after the second factor and smaller ones thereafter[45]. The six-factor solution was in any case theoretically meaningful, given that the items were designed to index six constructs (ATT, PBC, SN, EOB, SI and NEUT). The factor structure generally followed the expected pattern. Most of the items loaded on the proposed constructs with values exceeding .45 (Hair *et al.*

[44] Varimax is the most commonly used rotation and is an orthogonal approach. It assumes that factors are uncorrelated as opposed to oblique approaches such as oblimin rotation, that assume factors are correlated (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). Factor analysis was also run with oblimin rotation (Delta was set to equal 0), but given the results were very similar, it is preferred to report the simpler, varimax rotation (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).

[45] However, the first break might have also reflected that the first factor (ATT) was indeed measured by a much larger number of items.

1998) and no substantial cross-loadings (more than .40); therefore providing some initial evidence for both convergent and discriminant validity of the measures. Bearing in mind that in EFA the researcher has no control over the resulting factor pattern, it is particularly reassuring, and in this sense confirmatory, that most items grouped together as suspected (DeVellis, 1991). Loadings of items on factors are shown in table 4.5a. Values of loadings under .40 are suppressed.

Two main deviations were noted, however: all items that were presupposed to reflect EOB and SI clearly loaded on the same factor and there was an additional factor, arguably reflecting a partial overlap between NEUT and SN. EOB and SI were finally combined to reflect a single variable due to the following considerations. Firstly, individual questionnaire items were reassessed in terms of face and content validity and it was deemed possible that they could reflect an underlying construct of the same nature, e.g. "I feel I have an ethical obligation to support Fair Trade", as opposed to "To support Fair Trade is in important part of who I am". Secondly, this possibility has been hinted elsewhere. In a CFA analysis, Shaw and Shiu (2002a, 2003) concluded that SI and EOB may both reflect an underlying second-order construct named "internal ethics" (IE). Thirdly, all EOB and SI items were clearly loading on one single factor with no significant (below .40) cross-loadings. Finally, when multiple regression was conducted with EOB and SI being considered separate independent variables, multicollinearity was a problem, at least based on stricter criteria, that is when correlations amongst the independent variables are above .7 or VIF is less than $1\text{-}R^2$ (Leech *et al.*2005) rather than more relaxing ones of e.g. correlations above .9 and VIF < .1 (Hair *et al.*1998). The lack of discriminant validity between EOB and SI is discussed further both in the context of CFA and in chapter 5.

Table 4.5a: Rotated Factor Matrix

	Factor					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
	18.6%	11.7%	9.5%	6.5%	5.1%	4.8%
EOB, item a		.658				
EOB, item b		.713				
EOB, item c		.596				
SI, item a		.607				
SI, item b		.531				
SI, item c		.485				
ATT, item a	.648					
ATT, item b	.623					
ATT, item c	.670					
ATT, item d	.727					
ATT, item e	.541					
ATT, item f	.644					
ATT, item g	.645					
ATT, item h	.745					
ATT, item i	.775					
NEUT, item a				-.498		
NEUT, item b				-.435	-.470	
NEUT, item c				-.549		
SN, item a			.753			
SN, item b			.717			
SN, item c					.592	
SN, item d			.718			
SN, item e						
PBC, item a				.493		.463
PBC, item b						.596
PBC, item c						.538
PBC, item d						.458

The partial overlap between NEUT and SN – as suggested by an additional factor – was not addressed at this stage. Firstly, the two items that loaded on this factor were assessed again in terms of face/content validity, i.e., "The people in my life whose opinions I value would not approve of my supporting for Fair Trade" (SN) and "I have many arguments against supporting Fair Trade" (NEUT). They were still deemed as distinct, in terms of content, and more in line with the presupposed constructs (SN and NEUT respectively). Secondly, the NEUT item also loaded on the presupposed NEUT factor (.44 as opposed to .47), whilst the SN item did not load elsewhere substantially (above .40). Given that this factor was represented by these two items only, there was no sufficient evidence for the existence of a conceptually independent factor as opposed to estimation or item-specific considerations (e.g. Costello and Osborne, 2005).

4.5.2.4 Conclusion: Results from the preliminary analysis were in the main satisfactory in terms of scale development and validation objectives. The two main areas of concern were the lack of discriminant validity between the measures of EOB and SI, and the failure of some PBC items to exhibit desirable psychometric properties (that is, lack of internal consistency). These are in line with previous findings in TPB research. Moreover, despite the merits of EFA and reliability analysis, there is much criticism regarding the extent to which these techniques can offer a precise test of unidimensionality, based on both internal and external consistency criteria (Gerbing and Anderson, 1988). They are exploratory in nature and not entirely appropriate when there is a theory behind the proposed structure; specifying for example, number of factors, pattern of zero and nonzero loadings of the measured variables on the common factors, and correlations between factors or errors (e.g. Fabrigar *et al.* 1999; Costello and Osborne, 2005; Kline, 2005).

Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is a special case of Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) that can be employed to redress these issues and provide a more rigorous, theory-driven assessment of discriminant and convergent validity.

4.5.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis

4.5.3.1 Introduction: CFA is a specialised form of SEM, and as such, a "second-generation" technique as opposed to traditional, "first-generation" techniques of multivariate analysis, including EFA, reliability analysis, analysis of variance, multiple and logistic regression (Haenlein and Kapland, 2004). SEM is increasingly favoured over traditional techniques due to several advantages: most importantly, it takes a confirmatory rather than an exploratory approach to data analysis, it distinguishes between observed and unobserved (that is, latent) variables, it assesses and corrects for "measurement error", it deals with multiple relationships amongst variables simultaneously and can test the overall fit of alternative conceptual models as opposed to only individual coefficients (Hair *et al.* 1998; Byrne, 2001; Kline, 2005).

Whilst EFA is used to determine what is the most likely factor structure for the relationships between a set of variables, CFA is used to test the probability that a hypothesised factor structure is confirmed by the data (Cramer, 2003). In addition, alternative measurement (factor) models can be compared to assess which one provides the best fit to the data. Performing CFA is in essence similar to a full SEM approach, but all direct effects between latent variables are replaced by covariances/correlations. As in any other SEM application, a model must be developed and evaluated by using goodness of fit measures generated by an SEM

software (in the present case, AMOS v.6). A brief introduction to how SEM models are evaluated follows.

Whether a model should overall be accepted or rejected is (mainly) determined by its "goodness of fit" indices. There are dozens of fit indices in the SEM literature and unfortunately, little agreement as to which ones should be reported or taken more into consideration. The oldest fit statistic is the model chi-square and is actually a "badness of fit" index. That is, the higher its value the worse the model's correspondence to the data. Because chi-square is severely affected by sample size, with most of the time overestimating badness of fit, researchers have developed a large number of goodness of fit indices that take a more pragmatic approach to the evaluation process (e.g. Byrne, 2001). One of the very first of those, is the normed chi-square, which is the chi-square value divided by the degrees of freedom. Values below 3 or 2 usually suggest an acceptable model fit (e.g. Byrne, 2001).

Goodness of fit indices can be grouped into five categories: "comparative fit indices", "absolute fit indices", "indices of proportion of variance accounted", "degree of parsimony fit indices", and "residual-based fit indices". In choosing amongst those, Kline (2005) recommends reporting the "model chi-square", the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), the comparative fit index (CFI) and the standardised root mean square residual (SRMR) whilst Byrne (2001) recommends the goodness of fit index (GFI), CFI and RMSEA. Ullman (in Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001) cites CFI and RMSEA as the most frequently reported ones. Importantly, RMSEA and CFI are also less sensitive to small sample sizes ($n < 200$; Fan *et al.* 1999), and along with GFI and the normed chi-square, are some of the most frequently reported indices in TPB research (e.g. Armitage *et al.* 1999;

Kalafatis *et al.* 1999; Hagger *et al.* 2002; Shaw and Shiu, 2002a; Bennet and Rundle-Thiele, 2004). Because of these considerations, evaluation of the models will be based on the indices that are summarised in table 4.5b, along with recommended threshold values (Byrne, 2001; Kline, 2005).

Table 4.5b: Model Fit Indices and Recommended Threshold Values

Model Fit-Index	**Recommended Value**
Chi-square	Less the better, ideally $p \geq 0.05$
Chi-square/degrees of freedom	$\leq$ 2.00 or 3.00
GFI	$\geq$ .90
CFI	$\geq$ .90 or .95
RMSEA	$\leq$ .10 or .08, ideally $\leq$ .06

The analytic strategy for assessing the measurement (factor) model was based on three stages. The first and second stages aimed to establish convergent and discriminant validity respectively, whilst the final stage aimed to assess the measurement model as a whole. In other words, the first stage ensures that a construct is unidimensional by itself, the second assesses unidimensionality for all possible pairs, and the last stage tests for unidimensionality in the presence of all constructs (Medsker *et al.* 1994; Garver and Mentzer, 1999). This process systematically guides refinements and modifications and assures that constructs exhibit both internal and external consistency (Anderson *et al.* 1987; Garver and Mentzer, 1999).

4.5.3.2 Assessment of Convergent Validity (Stage One): At the first stage, individual CFA measurement models were estimated for all constructs that comprised more than three items, to assess unidimensionality and internal consistency (e.g. Joreskog, 1993; Hair *et al.* 1998; Armitage *et al.* 1999). In accordance with common practice in CFA modeling, for every factor, one item was arbitrarily set to unity to ensure the model is properly identified and error terms were (initially) assumed to be uncorrelated (Byrne, 2001). Results for each CFA model are discussed below, and detailed in Appendix 7.

Estimation of an individual CFA model for ATT with all nine items included, suggested an unacceptable model fit (Chi-square = 224.5, df = 27; GFI: .827, CFI: .875, RMSEA: .165). Inspection of residuals and modification indices revealed that items e, g and h (asking whether supporting Fair Trade is "pleasant", "enjoyable" and "rewarding", respectively), which were meant to capture the experiential aspect of supporting Fair Trade, might have been problematic. Indeed, these items were perceived as ambiguous/vague by some respondents at the pilot stage, but it was decided to initially keep the items given established guidelines on TPB scales (Ajzen, 2002a; Francis *et al.* 2004a). The possibility of a second, independent attitudinal factor to capture experiential as opposed to evaluative aspects was therefore deemed problematic and these items were removed from the analysis (cf. Hagger and Chatzisarantis, 2005). Estimation of the revised CFA model showed an improved but inadequate model fit (Chi-square = 70.91, df = 9; GFI: .871, CFI: .917, RMSEA: .191). Inspection of residuals and modification indices suggested substantial decreases in chi-square by allowing the error terms of items a and b as well as d and i to correlate. Whilst this is a controversial practice, within-construct correlated errors are considered acceptable when there is reason to believe they are

indicative of redundant content in the measurement of the constructs rather than of misspecifications in the hypothesized model (Byrne, 2001; Hagger and Armitage, 2004). Indeed, items a and b were formatted in the same block and concerned an identical question ("In general my attitude towards Fair Trade is...") but for the final adjective in the sentence ("favourable/unfavourable" versus "positive/negative"). Similarly, items d and i were under the same block/question wording ("Supporting the Fair Trade movement is...") and completed by very similar adjectives ("good" versus "right thing to do"). The revised model exhibited particularly good fit with the data (Chi-square = 8.38, df = 7; GFI: .986, CFI: .998, RMSEA: .031). All factor loadings were substantial and statistically significant at $p < .001$ (min: .72, max: .83, mean: .77).

Composite reliability was .865, well above the recommended threshold of .70 (Hair *et al.* 1998). This coefficient is similar to Cronbach's alpha, but it relaxes the assumption that each item is equally weighted in determining the composite (i.e., the actual factor loadings are taken into account). It was calculated as follows: (square of the summation of the standardized factor loadings) / {(square of the summation of the standardized factor loadings) + (summation of measurement errors for each indicator) + 2 x (summation of all non-zero error covariances)}; whereas measurement error for each indicator is 1 minus its squared standardized loading, and the last term of the denominator extends over correlated errors (Raykov, 2001; Raykov and Penev, 2005). The final model, including significant coefficients in standardised form is illustrated in figure 4.5a.

Figure 4.5a: Final CFA model for ATT, with Significant Coefficients Presented in Standardised Form



An individual CFA model for INT suggested a questionable model fit (Chi-square = 39.274, df = 9; GFI: .931, CFI: .944, RMSEA: .133). Inspection of the modification indices revealed that the largest decrease in chi-square could be achieved by allowing the error terms of items c and d to correlate. This was justifiable, given that these items were i) nearly adjacent and ii) item c was measuring intention to "support" Fair Trade as opposed to "buy" in the case of item d, yet the latter was the most common way of supporting Fair Trade (based on study one, section 3.7.4.6). This modification led to an improved model fit (Chi-square = 21.681, df = 8; GFI: .966, CFI: .975, RMSEA: .0.95). Whilst two error term correlations could improve the model fit further (by a decrease of 5 and 4.747 in chi-square), there was no apparent justification behind them and they were not performed. All factor

loadings were substantial and statistically significant at $p < .001$ (min: .50, max: .85, mean: .72). Composite reliability of INT, was .843. The final model, along with significant coefficients in standardised form is illustrated in figure 4.5b.

Figure 4.5b: Final CFA model for INT, with Significant Coefficients Presented in Standardised Form



An individual CFA model for SN suggested a questionable model fit (Chi-square = 27.1, df = 5; GFI: .960, CFI: .936, RMSEA: .128). Examination of the parameter estimates showed that two measures of SN failed to load sufficiently on their corresponding factor (standardised loadings of .31 and .14), and were therefore dropped from the analysis. This led to a just-identified model, with a composite reliability of .828. The model is illustrated in figure 4.5c, with significant coefficients in standardised form.

Figure 4.5c: Final CFA model for SN, with Significant Coefficients Presented in Standardised Form



A CFA model for PBC also suggested an unacceptable model fit (Chi-square = 17.86, df = 2; GFI: .959, CFI: .85, RMSEA: .205). Examination of the parameter estimates revealed that two items failed to load substantially on their corresponding factor (standardised loadings of .31 and .47). Removal of these items resulted in an under-identified model with a marginally acceptable Cronbach alpha value of .66 (e.g. DeVellis, 1990). Indeed, the measurement of PBC has been proven to be one of the most problematic issues in TPB research (see e.g. Ajzen, 2002b). In a meta-analysis of 90 studies that have employed PBC measures, Cheung and Chan (2000, cited in Ajzen, 2002b) report an average reliability value (.65) that is similar to the one found in this study.

EOB, SI and NEUT were comprised of three items, leading to just-identified models. Composite reliability was .854, .748 and .753 respectively. These models are illustrated in figures 4.5d, 4.5e and 4.5f.

Figure 4.5d: CFA model for EOB, with Significant Coefficients Presented in Standardised Form



Figure 4.5e: CFA model for SI, with Significant Coefficients Presented in Standardised Form



Figure 4.5f: CFA model for NEUT, with Significant Coefficients Presented in Standardised Form



4.5.3.3 Assessment of Discriminant Validity (Stage Two): Discriminant validity was assessed in the second stage of analysis, based on a three key criteria:

a) Absolute size criterion: inspection of correlations between latent constructs, with any value above .90 indicating a serious violation of discriminant validity (Hair *et al.* 1998).

b) Significance testing criterion: all correlations between latent constructs should be significantly different from unity at the 95% confidence interval; that is, every correlation value ± 1.96 x (standard error of the correlation) should not include 1 or -1 (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988; Bagozzi *et al.* 1991)[46]. Based on this criterion, all correlations were significantly different from unity, except the correlations between EOB, SI and INT.

c) CFA procedure: a series of two-factor CFAs were conducted for every possible combination of latent variables. Specifically, each pair of factors was collapsed into one (which is comparable to fixing their correlation to equal 1.0; Kline, 2005) and

[46] Standard errors of the correlations are not readily provided in the AMOS output, but can be obtained by requiring bootstrap estimations in the analysis properties interface.

then the resulting change in chi-square was assessed. In most cases, the observed decrease in model fit was significant at $p < .0005$. Problems were noted again in terms of discriminating between EOB, SI and INT.

The correlation between EOB and SI was very high (.94) with the chi-square test indicating marginal statistical difference between the congeneric and discriminant model (Chi-square difference = 4.2, p = .04)[47]. It was therefore decided to aggregate both constructs into a single factor, as already mentioned in EFA, and which was named "internal ethics" (IE) in accordance with previous research (Shaw and Shiu, 2002, 2003). It is important to note that this is conceptually sensible and preferred over a higher-order factor solution (cf. Shaw and Shiu, 2002a, 2003), given that self-identification as a consumer who is interested in fair trade issues most probably involves a particular ethical consumer orientation in the first place (Sparks and Shepherd, 1992). This is further discussed in chapter 5.

The correlation between the new IE construct and INT was also very high (.96) with the chi-square test indicating marginal statistical difference between the congeneric and discriminant model (Chi-square difference = 5.1, p = .024). There are, however, two alternative interpretations of this finding. On the one hand, it could suggest that measures of IE and INT capture the same meaning, and therefore should be merged into a single construct. A conceptual argument for this could be that internalised ethics are so important in the present context, that subsequent measures of INT are in effect capturing "ethical intention" as opposed to rational or utility-driven intention. The latter could be the case in contexts where ethical

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[47] When conducting a number of chi-squares to assess discriminant validity, it is recommended that a stringer alpha value is adopted due to increased possibility of Type 1 error (e.g. Garver and Mentzer, 1999). For example. based on a "bonferroni adjustment", alpha should be 0.003.

considerations are not as important or salient, e.g. selecting amongst different electronic appliances. On the other hand, however, this finding could also mean that IE is a very good predictor of INT, sharing a greater deal of common variance than with any other variable (as indicated by the square root of their correlation, i.e. 92%). This is substantiated by the following considerations. Firstly, discriminant validity can also be established through face validity, and unlike the case of EOB versus SI, items purported to measure IE are clearly different from items that measure INT. Secondly, as mentioned earlier (section 4.4.3), measures of IE and INT share a common method (self-report), rendering it more difficult to establish discriminant validity due to inflated correlations. This is more so in the context of structural equation modelling because correlation values are corrected for measurement error, and are higher than the raw correlations between measures (e.g. Armitage *et al.* 1999; Perugini and Conner, 2000). Indeed, based on the assumption of common method bias, all correlations between INT and antecedent variables are – to a certain extent – inflated and therefore, to assume that IE is same as INT, would entail the danger of excluding INT's best predictor.

Based on the above, it was decided to take *post hoc* remedial action for common method bias, based on a technique suggested by Podsakoff and Organ (1986), i.e., "scale item trimming". An assumption of the trimming approach is that the "researcher can identify those items that the respondents perceive as conceptually similar on the scales of interest" (p. 538). Such a selection was based on an EFA with varimax rotation, which was forced into a two-factor solution (initially, eigenvalue for the second component was .992) and included all items measuring IE and INT. Those items with substantial crossloadings (above .50) in the rotated factor solution were subsequently removed from the analysis, leaving three

measures for IE and five for INT. This was not viewed as modifying the conceptual meaning of the IE and INT variables. Rather, all excluded items were adjacent to each other, suggesting that given a certain extent of conceptual similarity, respondents found it more difficult to discriminate among them than with the rest of the items. Analysis of a new two-factor CFA model indicated that in addition to the conceptual arguments, there was now some empirical basis for discriminating amongst IE and INT. Correlation between the revised IE and INT was .87 and the chi-square difference was significant (Chi-square difference = 14.3, p = .0002) . Composite reliability for the revised IE and INT measures was .788 and .766. Results from the tests of discriminant validity based on the revised measures are summarised in table 4.5c.[48]

Whilst convergent and discriminant validity was established for most measures, as described above, it is important to note that some correlations between – otherwise discriminant – constructs were still high. Most notably, the correlation between ATT and NEUT was as high as -.84 and between IE and SN, .72. However, the pattern of all correlations was conceptually sound. For example, it was anticipated that ATT and NEUT would correlate strongly, because they are both based on behavioural beliefs which, in one sense, differ only in terms of performing as opposed to justifying not-performing a particular behaviour. Likewise, SN may be reflected in measures of IE, because the latter also captures social norms and values that have been successfully internalised by an individual and are closely related to one's self-concept (Schwartz and Howard, 1980). Similar close conceptual and empirical relationships between traditional and additional predictors have often been reported

[48] Given the negative correlations between NEUT and all other variables, the scores of all NEUT items had firstly to be reversed before testing for discriminant validity via the chi-square difference, otherwise results would have been misleading. Alternatively the correlations between NEUT and the rest of the variables could have been fixed to -1.

in TPB research (see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Conner and Armitage, 1998). Finally, it is important to note again that these correlations are higher than the raw correlations (Pearson's r), since the latter are based on the observed measures and do not take into account measurement error. This also indicates that multicollinearity would have been a more serious problem in SEM as opposed to path analysis or regression (which is later used to test the present research hypotheses; Grapentine, 2000).

Table 4.5c: CFA Results on Discriminant Validity

	Correlation	Chi-Square Congeneric Model	Chi-Square Discriminant Model	Chi-Square Difference
ATT-IE	.69	106.8	40.8	66 **
ATT-NEUT	-.84	72.8	48.9	23.9 **
ATT-SN	.47	233.4	43.2	190.2 **
ATT-PBC	.44	61.4	21.2	40.2 **
ATT-INT	.85	107.1	75.1	32 **
INT-IE	.87	51.2	36.9	14.3 **
INT-NEUT	-.82	61.8	39.9	21.9 **
INT-SN	.54	171.0	36.7	134.3 **
INT-PBC	.74	84.2	67.1	17.1 **
IE-NEUT	-.67	62.2	15.3	46.9 **
IE-PBC	.59	36.1	7.5	28.6 **
IE-SN	.72	78.4	21.5	56.9 **
NEUT-PBC	-.67	30.2	8.7	21.5 **
NEUT-SN	-.46	111.7	10.8	100.9 **
PBC-SN	.43	44.1	3.5	40.6 **

***** p< 0.0005***

4.5.3.4 Establishment of Unidimensionality in the Presence of Other Variables (Stage Three): The last stage aimed to assess the adequacy of the measurement model as a whole. However, in order to avoid violating minimum sample size to parameter ratios, the scales were analysed in sets (Hooley *et al.* 2005). Specifically, in set 1, ATT, INT and IE were analysed in a single CFA and similarly in set 2, SN, NEUT and PBC were analysed in a single CFA. In both cases, results demonstrated good fit with the data (set 1: Chi-square = 127.04, df = 71; GFI: .910, CFI: .965, RMSEA: .065; set 2: Chi-square = 24.43, df = 17; GFI: .969, CFI: .986, RMSEA: .048). Inspection of standardised residuals in both sets revealed all values to be well below the 2.58 threshold (Hair *et al.* 1998). Amongst the modification index values, there was only one in set 1 suggesting a considerable (>10) drop in chi-square by allowing one item measuring INT and one measuring ATT to correlate. It was decided not to make any respecifications to either model, due to the lack of any substantive considerations behind suggested modifications and the adequacy of fit statistics and unstandardised/standardised solutions.

In a third set, (set 3), all antecedent variables (excluding INT) were analysed in a single CFA, by augmenting the sample size in the same way as in the EFA (section 4.5.2.3). The additional 80 cases should be uncontaminated, given that they were measured prior to the experimental manipulation (in contrast to INT). Overall sample size was augmented to 270 cases. The five-factor model, in which all predictor variables (ATT, IE, NEUT, SN and PBC) were made to correlate with each other, was subjected to CFA with a maximum likelihood method. Results demonstrated good fit with the data (Chi-square = 182.17, df = 107; GFI: .925, CFI: .968, RMSEA: .052). Inspection of standardised residuals indicated all values were below the 2.58 threshold (Hair *et al.* 1998) whilst modification indices

indicated that the largest decrease in chi-square (12.56) could be achieved by allowing error terms of one ATT and one SN item to correlate. Given however that a) the rest of modification index values were considerably smaller, b) the adequacy of fit statistics and unstandardised/standardised solutions, and c) the lack of any substantive considerations behind suggested modifications, the model was deemed to adequately represent the underlying structure of the item scores, without any respecifications.

Lastly, a similar model with all predictor variables plus INT was also examined (set 4), yet with the caution of having violated minimum item to parameter ratios (that is, 3:1 as opposed to the recommended minimum of 5:1, as n = 190 for 62 parameters to be estimated; Hair *et al.* 1998). The CFA model demonstrated a rather acceptable model fit (Chi-square = 361.99, df = 191; GFI: .847, CFI: .930, RMSEA: .069), with the exception of GFI. Given that a) with smaller sample sizes (n < 250) lower cut-off values are recommended because all fit indices display a downward bias (Fan *et al.* 1999; Chatzisarantis *et al.* 2002), b) most standardised residuals were well below the 2.58 threshold (Hair *et al.* 1998), and c) the lack of substantive considerations behind the modification indices, no respecifications were made to the model. The results of the above analyses are summarised in table 4.5d.

Table 4.5d: CFA Results on Unidimensionality in the Presence of other Variables

	Chi-Square	df	GFI	CFI	RMSEA
Model 1	127.04	71	.910	.965	.065
Model 2	24.43	17	.969	.986	.048
Model 3	182.17	107	.925	.968	.052
Model 4	361.99	191	.847	.930	.069

4.5.4 Conclusion

In sum, upon performing a few modifications and refining the scales to exclude items that did not exhibit desirable psychometric properties, the above results support the unidimensionality, discriminant and convergent validity of the measures. This provides the "green light" to proceed with the confirmatory assessment of nomological or construct validity (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). The following section evaluates the "structural model" and tests H1-H3.

4.6 Regression Models

4.6.1 Introduction

Table 4.6a summarises descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for the revised, summated scales that were used in order to test the directional paths in the model[49] [50].

Table 4.6a: Univariate and Bivariate Results for the Revised Measures

				Std.	Zero-Order r				
	Min.	Max.	Mean	Deviation	IE	SN	PBC	NEUT	ATT
IE	3.00	21.00	13.32	3.88121					
SN	3.00	21.00	11.24	3.95232	.588**				
PBC	2.00	14.00	9.54	2.52308	.425**	.330**			
NEUT	3.00	21.00	8.25	3.87085	.621**	-.377**	-.471**		
ATT	12.00	42.00	35.38	6.01099	.568**	.398**	.335**	-.676**	
INT	5.00	35.00	24.71	5.19416	.712**	.455**	.482**	-.656**	.703**

N = 190, **p <** .01

The proposed paths were tested by means of multiple and logistic regression as opposed to SEM. Whilst the main disadvantage of this approach is the inability to incorporate/model measurement error to the extent that SEM does (e.g. Kline, 2005), it was viewed as a more sensible choice due to the following considerations:

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[49] Composite measures are usually formed by either adding individual items to represent their respective constructs, that is summated scales, or by computing factor scores and then weighting the contribution of all items to reflect their loadings on each factor/construct. Factor scores have the advantage of representing a composite of all item loadings on a factor, however this can make interpretation difficult and it is "sample-specific". For this reason, the construction of summation scales is preferred when they are reasonably unidimensional and reliable (Hair *et al.* 1998).

[50] Due to reasons mentioned earlier, these are lower than the correlations found in CFA.

a) First and foremost, sample size was inadequate for a full SEM approach as it would violate even the most lenient recommendations on item-to-parameter ratios (i.e., 5:1 for a model of 62 parameters). This could be overcome by averaging/summing scale items to create composite variables (e.g. Hooley *et al.* 2005). However, because of the simplicity of the proposed model, this would lead to a just-identified solution; reflecting a regression model with perfect fit and meaningless fit statistics. Similar concerns over sample size have led several TPB researchers to opt for regression (e.g. Davies *et al.* 2002; Kraft *et al.* 2005).

b) Whilst guidelines for testing moderating effects in multiple regression are well established, this gets substantially complicated/problematic in SEM (e.g. Conner and McMillan, 1999). Several different approaches have been recommended (e.g. Schumacker and Marcoulides, 1998; Cortina, 2001) and little consensus exists regarding which is best (Frazier *et al.* 2004). Importantly, with sample sizes below 200, these approaches are hardly applicable because the properties of the estimators and tests are asymptotic (e.g. Schumacker and Marcoulides, 1998; Cortina, 2001; Reinecke, 2002).

c) Given SEM's difficulty in handling dichotomous dependent variables (see e.g. Kupek, 2006), logistic regression was deemed as more appropriate for predicting Actual Behaviour (e.g. Bansal and Taylor, 2002; Davies *et al.* 2004). Performing multiple regression for explaining the antecedents of INT, would at the same time, enhance comparability/equivalence with the results of logistic regression.

Regression analysis remains the most popular approach in TPB research (Rashidian *et al.* 2006). In fact, several merits of SEM, such as the ability to incorporate multiple causal relationships amongst variables, are not directly applicable to the fundamental TPB structure. Therefore, perhaps the greatest limitation of regression – in relation to this research – is that it can deal with observable variables only, assumed to be measured without error (e.g. Haenlein and Kapland, 2004). Nonetheless, the employment of reliable, unidimensional composite scales – as illustrated by the findings from the EFA and CFA – significantly reduces measurement error (Hair *et al.* 1998). This is because several sources of measurement error are "averaged out" when multiple items of the same underlying construct are contained in a summated scale (Spector, 1992; Grapentine, 1995).

Subsequently, the analysis begins with testing the direct effects of ATT, SN, PBC, NEUT and IE on INT by means of multiple regression. Moderated regression is then employed to examine moderator effects of NEUT on the SN-INT, IE-INT and ATT-INT relationships. The ability of the proposed model to explain and predict AB (i.e., signing a petition for Fair Trade) is assessed through the use of binary logistic regression. The analysis continues with testing the moderator effect of NEUT on the INT-AB relationship.

4.6.2 Multiple Linear Regression

A sequential/hierarchical linear regression was employed to assess a) if addition of the NEUT construct (step 2) improved prediction of INT over and above the original TPB constructs (Ajzen, 1991; step 1), and then b) if this effect persisted after controlling for an additional determinant, relevant to the extended version of the

TPB, i.e., IE (step 3). Sequential regression is preferred over alternative ways of entering the variables into the equation, i.e., stepwise and standard/simultaneous regression, when there are theoretical propositions to be stated, as highlighted above (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Cohen *et al.* 2003). Analysis was performed using SPSS version 14.

Most of the assumptions for multiple regression (e.g. linearity of the relationships, lack of outliers, homoscedasticity and normality of the residual distribution) were already addressed in data screening, so at this stage, consideration was given to sample size and absence of multicollinearity. Sample size was adequate (n = 190), according to commonly cited recommendations of n > 50 + 8m (where m = number of independent variables; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001) or between 15 to 20 observations for each independent variable (Hair *et al.* 1998). Multicollinearity was not problematic, given that correlations between variables were all below .70 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Leech *et al.* 2005). This was also supported through collinearity diagnostics, with all tolerance values being well above .10 (min = .464) and VIF values well below 10 (max = 2.154; Hair *et al.* 1998; Pallant, 2005).

Table 4.6b displays the correlations between the variables, the unstandardised regression coefficients (β) and intercept, the standardised regression coefficients (b) the semipartial correlations (sr^2), and R, R square, and adjusted R square after entry of all five independent variables. R was significantly different from zero at the end of each step. After step 3, with all variables in the equation, adjusted R square was .667, $F(5, 163) = 97.5$, $p < .0005$. This indicates that 66.7% of the variance in INT to support Fair Trade was explained by the extended TPB, a substantial effect

according to general statistical recommendations (Cohen *et al.* 2003) and also in comparison to average sizes found in TPB research (Armitage and Conner, 2001).

Table 4.6b: Sequential Regression of TPB determinants, NEUT and IE on INT

	Zero-Order r								
Variable	**INT**	**SN**	**PBC**	**ATT**	**NEUT**	**IE**	**β**	**b**	**sr^2**
INT									
SN	.455*						-.014	-.011	.009
PBC	.482*	.330*					.269*	.131	.112
ATT	.703*	.398*	.335*				.283*	.327	.226
NEUT	-.656*	-.377*	-.471*	-.676*			-.232*	-.173	-.118
IE	.712*	.588*	.425*	.568*	.621*		.516*	.386	.269
						Intercept = 7.335			
Mean	24.71	11.24	9.54	36.38	8.25	13.31	**R** =.822*		
SD	5.194	3.952	2.523	6.010	3.870	3.881	**R^2** =.676*		
							Adjusted R^2 =.667*		

p<.01

After step 1, with all the traditional TPB determinants in the equation, adjusted R square was .573, F (3, 186) = 85.71, p < .0005. ATT contributed most to predicting INT (standardized beta = .571) with PBC and SN also significantly contributing to this prediction at p < .01 (standardized betas of .244 and .151 respectively). After step 2, with NEUT added to the prediction, adjusted R square was .596, F (4, 185) = 70.42, p < .0005. Addition of NEUT to the equation resulted in a significant R squared change (p < .01) of .023. NEUT was the second most important predictor in the equation (negatively affecting INT with a standardized beta of -.222) after

ATT (standardized beta = .436), whilst SN and PBC were still significant (standardized betas of .187 and .136 respectively, $p < .01$). The results of this step therefore suggested that NEUT can be a useful and important additional determinant in the traditional TPB model. Step 3 reconsidered NEUT's position in an extended version of the TPB, after taking into account an additional determinant reflecting both EOB and SI, that is IE, as applied in ethics-related contexts. Adjusted R square was .667, $F(5,184) = 76.77$, $p < .0005$, with the addition of IE resulting in a significant .072 R squared change. IE was now the most important predictor of INT with standardized beta of .386, followed by ATT, NEUT and PBC (standardized betas of .327, -.173 and .131 respectively). Upon addition of the IE, SN did not significantly contribute to the equation at $p < .05$.

Although the correlation between SN and INT was .455 it did not significantly contribute to the final regression. A conceptually sensible explanation of this finding is that normative influences, as reflected in the measure of SN, are fully mediated by constructs which also capture norm-related considerations, i.e., IE. Indeed, IE reflects feelings of SI and EOB, both of which should incorporate social influences (see discussion in section 2.10). For example, according to Schwartz (1977; Schwartz and Howard, 1980) feelings of *personal norm* (or EOB) reflect those *social norms* and values that have been successfully internalised by an individual and are closely related to one's *self-concept*. *Post hoc* evaluation of this assumption revealed that indeed, the correlation of SN with INT was significantly different from zero, [$F(1, 188) = 48.99$, $p < .0005$, $\beta = .598$, $R = .455$], but its effects were mediated by IE. This was established by running two additional regressions, in accordance with Baron and Kenny's recommendations (1986). IE was regressed on SN, [$F(1,188) = 99.36$, $p < .0005$, $\beta = .577$, $R = .588$] and then INT was regressed

on both IE and SN [F (2, 187) = 97.11, p < .0005, R = .714]. A case of complete mediation was demonstrated because the effect of SN on INT after controlling for IE (in the last regression), was insignificant and approached zero (β = .072, p = .389). The indirect effect of SN to INT was .526 (p < .001)[51]. This was computed by subtracting SN's coefficient when INT is regressed on SN only, from the partial SN coefficient obtained when INT is regressed on both IE and SN (Kenny, 2006).

In terms of NEUT's role on ethical decision-making, H1a was supported. NEUT contributed a 2.3% of explained variance in INT over and above the TPB determinants (ATT, PBC and SN), hence meeting Ajzen's (1991) criterion for the inclusion of additional variables. The independent effect of NEUT on INT (b = -.22) was only smaller in size than from the effect of ATT (b = .436). This effect remained significant even when a modified version of the TPB was taken into account (by the inclusion of IE), turning NEUT into the third most important predictor of INT (b = -.17).

4.6.3 Moderated Linear Regression

Moderator effects, as suggested in the extended model, were tested in an additional hierarchical regression (step 4), where all variables were entered first (i.e., direct effects), followed by those variables that were multiplied to form interaction/product terms (i.e., NEUT x SN, NEUT x IE and NEUT x ATT). This is the recommended procedure (as opposed to others, such as a two-way ANOVA) when both the moderator (NEUT) and the independent variables (ATT, IE, SN) are continuous

[51] Statistical significance of the indirect effect was calculated based on the on-line sobel calculator, found at http://www.psych.ku.edu/preacher/sobel/sobel.htm (for an overview of the different methods for assessing the significance of indirect effects see MacKinnon *et al.* 2002).

(Aiken and West, 1991; Cohen *et al.* 2003) and is in line with the way moderator effects have been tested in TPB research (e.g. Conner *et al.* 2000; Umeh and Patel, 2004)[52]. It is also important that all moderator effects being considered are entered in the same step to help control for type I error (Cohen *et al.* 2003; Frazier *et al.* 2004). Finally, because interactive terms may result in high multicollinearity and thus low tolerance and statistical instability (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001), before performing this step of the analysis, all variables had to be centred. This involves subtracting the mean from the values of each variable, which results in deviation scores with means of zero. Centering is also recommended because of the advantages it offers in interpreting the regression coefficients (Cohen *et al.* 2003).

Inclusion of the product terms at step 4, resulted in a non-significant R square change of .001 [F (3, 181) = .241, p = .864]. This finding should be interpreted with caution, given that detection of moderator effects is particularly difficult and non detection is the rule rather than the exception in field studies (McClelland and Judd, 1993; Frazier *et al.* 2004). Indeed, when significant interactions have been reported, they typically account for as little as 1%-3% of the variance (McClelland and Judd, 1993; Cohen *et al.* 2003). However, the effect size of the interactions (.001) in the present study is arguably so small that can be classified as trivial (e.g. according to Cohen's, 1992 conventions). Therefore, failure to support the hypotheses H1b, H1c, H3a and H3c is not fully attributable to sample size and power of the analysis (Faul *et al.* 2007).

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[52] Although strictly speaking Likert scales are not continuous, there are various justifications for why they are treated as such in most multivariate analyses (see e.g. Nunnally, 1978; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Streiner & Norman, 1989).

4.6.4 Binary Logistic Regression

Subsequently, a sequential/hierarchical logistic regression was performed to assess INT's impact on AB (step 1), and whether any of the other variables (particularly PBC and NEUT) add to prediction of AB after controlling for INT (step 2). Logistic regression was preferred over discriminant analysis – which is another applicable statistical technique when the dependent variable is categorical and all the predictors are continuous – due to logistic regression's similarities and comparability with linear regression (Hair *et al.* 1998) and ability to incorporate interactive terms (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). In addition, the assumption of homogeneity of covariance matrices across groups – required in discriminant analysis but not in logistic regression – was not met according to Box's test of Equality of Covariance Matrices ($p < .001$).

Prior to performing the logistic regression, consideration was given to missing values and sample size. There were four additional missing values, compared to the linear regression, attributable to the research design. These respondents did not provide their full details in the questionnaire and it was therefore impossible to observe whether they did or did not sign the petition. The final sample size was 186 and it was deemed adequate, based on the 20 cases per predictor criterion (Leech *et al.* 2005).

The logistic regression was performed using SPSS version 14. Overall, the majority of respondents decided to sign a petition (117 as opposed to 69 that did not sign) resulting in a baseline prediction of 62.9%. In step 1, only INT was entered as predictor. A test of the full model versus a model with intercept only was statistically

significant [Chi-square (1, n =186) = 25.59, p < .0005]. The Hosmer and Lemeshow Test also suggested good model fit (i.e., it was non-significant, p = .703). Cox & Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R Square values indicated that between 12.9% and 17.5% of the variability in AB was explained by INT, a rather low to moderate amount. The respective B value for INT was .166, indicating a positive relationship with AB, being statistically significant according to the Wald test [(1, n = 186) = 20.237, p < .0005]. The odds ratio/Exp(B) of 1.180 (CI = 1.098-1.269), suggested that the odds of estimating AB correctly increases by 18% when knowing one's score on INT (table 4.6c).

Addition of ATT, NEUT, PBC, IE, and SN at step 2, showed unreliable improvement [Chi-square (5, n = 186) = 3.840, p = .583]. This provides support for TPB's premise that these variables have no effect on AB, after controlling for INT.

The overall classification rate was 68.3%; with correction classification rates for not signing a petition being 42%, and for signing a petition, 83.8% (table 4.6d). It is obvious that the model was a better predictor for those who signed the petition than those who did not, indicating a problem of overclassification into the "signing the petition" group. This is in line with previous research findings that intentions alone are capable of accurately classifying individuals who act on their intentions but incapable of classifying those who do not (e.g. Boldero, 1995; Davies *et al.* 2002).

In relation to NEUT's effect on AB, H2a was not supported. It is worth noting, however, that NEUT had a significant relationship with AB prior to controlling for INT [Chi-square (1, n = 186) = 12.46, p < .0005; Cox & Snell R^2 = 6.5%,

Nagelkerke R^2 = 8.8%]. This partly addresses the sequential ordering question and suggests that NEUT reflects more than just *post hoc* rationalisations (section 2.5.4).

Table 4.6c: Results from Binary Logistic Regression of INT on AB

Predictor	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig	Exp(B)	95% C.I.	
							Lower	Upper
INT	1.66	0.37	20.237	1	.000	1.180	1.098	1.269
Constant	-3.499	.902	15.059	1	.000	.030		
χ^2(1, N = 186) = 25.59, $p < .0005$, **Hosmer–Lemeshow *p* value =** .703								
Cox & Snell R^2 = 12.9%, **Nagelkerke R^2 =** 17.5%								

Table 4.6d: Classification Table

Actual Behaviour Observed	Predicted Did not Sign a Petition	Signed a Petition	Percentage Correct
Did not Sign a Petition	29	40	42%
Signed a Petition	19	98	83.8%
	Overall Percentage		68.3%

4.6.5 Moderated Logistic Regression

Finally, the moderator effect of NEUT on the INT-AB relationship was examined in a similar way as in multiple regression, following Jaccard's (1991) recommendations. Inclusion of the product term in an additional step showed unreliable improvement [Chi-square (1, n = 186) = .019, p = .860]. H2b was not supported.

Part II: Analysis of the Experimental Data

4.7.1 Data Screening for Missing Values, Outliers, Statistical Conditions and Assumptions

4.7.1.1 Missing Values: As in the case of the survey data, there were six questionnaires with 40% of missing values or more, and these were dropped from the analysis. Missing values for the rest of the sample was less than 5% and were scattered randomly through the data matrix.

Pairwise deletion was preferred over listwise deletion in the case of the experimental data, as listwise deletion would unnecessarily limit the sample size (n = 113; Pallant, 2005).

4.7.1.2 Outliers: Following the procedure outlined in section 4.2.2, neither univariate nor multivariate outliers were detected.

4.7.1.3 Normality, Linearity and Homoscedasticity: Deviation from normality was not a major problem in the analyses of the experimental data, given that the techniques used tend to be robust in large sample sizes (n > 30; Pallant, 2005).

Similarly, as in section 4.4.2, a number of bivariate scatterplots were inspected and there was no indication of curvilinear and other nonlinear relationships.

4.7.2 Descriptive Statistics

4.7.2.1 Respondent Profile: The respondent profile in this study was comparable to the one presented in the survey study (section 4.3.1). It was slightly biased towards a female population (47% males, 53% females) and the age range was from 18-21 years old. Most of them were familiar with Fair Trade issues (mean = 4.56, Std.Deviation = 1.32), having first heard about Fair Trade, three to four years ago. In terms of past behaviour, most respondents stated that they had supported Fair Trade about half of the time they had had the opportunity (mean = 3.72, Std. Deviation = 1.58), or sometimes as opposed to never or always (mean = 4.10, Std. Deviation = 1.55). A high proportion (89%) had bought a Fair Trade product at least once, with the majority of them having opted for Fair Trade products sometimes as opposed to never or always (mean = 3.83, Std. Deviation = 1.49). Regarding other means of supporting Fair Trade, amongst those who had been given the opportunity to sign a petition in the past (53%), nearly all had done so (85%), although fewer (39%) had decided to donate to Fair Trade when given the opportunity (35% of the sample). During the roadshows, 71.6% signed the petition but only 4.5% (n = 5), actually donated to the Fair Trade Foundation.

4.7.2.2 *Group Equivalence:* In the case of the experimental study, it was important to establish that groups were equivalent in terms of the psychological variables of interest. This was tested through a series of one-way between-groups analyses of variance for all ATT, NEUT, SN, EOB, SI and PBC measures. There were no statistically significant differences in the scores of any these measures at the alpha level of .05, which would have to be further lowered to .0015 after Bonferroni adjustment.

4.7.3 Analysis

A one-way between-group analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA) was then conducted to explore the impact of the experimental manipulation on INT, as measured by the four intention statements that followed the introduction of the manipulation in the survey instrument, and which were summed to form a single INT scale (Cronbach alpha = .779) . Subjects were split into three groups (Group 1: validation of neutralising statements, n = 41; Group 2: invalidation of neutralising statements, n = 42; Group 3: Control, n = 29). There was not a statistically significant difference in the mean INT scores for the three groups, [F (2, 109) = 0.92, p = .91]. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, was .002 indicating that the effect of the experimental manipulation was very small (Cohen, 1992) and could not raise concerns over sample size and power of the analysis (Faul *et al.* 2007). Descriptive statistics are presented in the table below:

Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics for INT Scores across Conditions

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Min.	Max.
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Group 1	41	20.02	4.514	.705	18.60	21.45	7	26
Group 2	42	20.19	4.769	.736	18.70	21.68	5	28
Group 3	29	20.48	3.690	.685	19.08	21.89	12	28
Total	112	20.21	4.383	.414	19.38	21.03	5	28

Subsequently, a Chi-square test was carried out, to explore the relationship between the experimental manipulation and AB (signing a petition), resulting in a 3 (Group 1: validation of neutralising statements, n = 41; Group 2: Invalidation of neutralising statements, n = 42; Group 3: Control, n = 29) x 2 (Group 1: signed a petition; Group 2: did not sign a petition) table. Whilst the proportion of people that signed a petition was higher in the invalidation condition (Group 2 = 76.2%) than both the validation (Group 1 = 69.2%) and control condition (Group 3 = 67.9%), the result was non-significant [Chi-square (2, n = 109) = .735, p = .692].

A plausible interpretation of the above findings is that the experimental manipulation mainly affected respondents' perceptions of the social validity of the neutralising beliefs, whereas ultimately, it is their personal acceptance that should influence INT and AB. Indeed, this interpretation is in line with the results from the multiple regression and specifically, on the significance of IE, and its mediator effect on the SN-INT relationship. A *post hoc* analysis of the data aimed to examine this possibility.

Responses to the neutralising statements (min. = 1, max. = 7, strongly disagree/strongly agree), were collapsed into two categories based on a median-split, so to reflect high versus low (personal) acceptance for both the (social) validation and invalidation treatments. Scores in the invalidation treatment had to be reversed so to reflect high/low acceptance in the same direction as in the validation treatment. Subsequently a 2 x 2 factorial design was used in order to examine the impact of (social) validation/invalidation and of (personal) high/low acceptance of neutralising statements on INT. In other words, high versus low

personal acceptance of neutralising statements (and by implication, personal as opposed to social validity) was now employed as a quasi-experimental factor.

Results from the two-way ANOVA indicated a significant, very strong, effect for high versus low acceptance of the neutralising statements [F (1, 79) = 51.4, p = .0005, Partial Eta Squared = .394]. Furthermore, there was an effect of marginal significance (i.e., p = .096, Partial Eta Squared = .035) for the interaction between social validation and personal acceptance. Figure 4.7 shows that the relationship between acceptance of neutralising beliefs and INT increases as a function of social validation. That is, when personal acceptance is low, INT is lower in the social validation (mean = 22.05, Std. Deviation = 2.8) than in the invalidation condition (mean = 23.55, Std. Deviation = 2.13), but when acceptance is high, INT is higher in the validation (mean = 17.68, Std. Deviation = 5.03) than in the invalidation condition (mean = 16.50, Std. Deviation = 4.08)[53].

Conclusions from this *post hoc* analysis are tentative. For example, wording effects alone (in the neutralising statements used in the validation and invalidation condition) may overthrow the rationale of splitting both sets of responses on their respective median rather than alternative cut-off values. Nonetheless, this analysis, along with the survey findings, points to directions for future research. Firstly, social validation may not affect INT directly, but do so through its moderating role on the relationship between personal validation and INT. Future research designs should attempt to directly manipulate either this moderator function or the personal rather than social acceptability of neutralising beliefs. Secondly, different groups of

[53] When the file was split, two separate chi-square tests were also carried out, suggesting there were no significant differences on AB between the validation and invalidation groups, based on the "acceptance versus non-acceptance" distinction.

individuals may respond differently to attempts that counter their employment of neutralisation techniques. This analysis indicates a "polarisation effect" (Lord *et al.* 1979), whereby low neutralisers scored higher on INT when neutralisation statements were further invalidated, but this pattern was inversed for high neutralisers.

Figure 4.7: Estimated Marginal Means of INT



The interaction between social and personal acceptability, however, was only marginally significant at the $p < .01$ level, and there are alternative interpretations for the failure to detect a significant effect of the experimental manipulation on INT and AB (i.e., H4a and H4b were not supported). These are discussed more extensively in the following chapter.

4.8 Summary

In sum, only H1a was fully supported whilst H1b, H1c, H2, H3 and H4 were not. In terms of advancing neutralisation theory as a new determinant in ethical decision-making, NEUT's direct effect on INT was established. NEUT did not affect AB directly, but did so prior to controlling for INT. There was no evidence to suggest that NEUT moderates the SN-INT, IE-INT, ATT-INT and INT-AB relationships. Furthermore, a preliminary test of the causal role of NEUT on INT and AB did not provide positive findings, but pointed to directions for future research. The next chapter reconsiders these findings in the light of previous studies, and discusses the implications for neutralisation and ethical decision-making research.

Chapter 5 Discussion and Conclusions

5.1 Introduction

The first section of this chapter discusses the survey findings, in the light of previous studies and implications for neutralisation and ethical decision-making research (5.2). It considers the role of the traditional antecedents of intention, the distinct role of neutralisation, and it critically assesses the sufficiency of these variables in accounting for actual behaviour. The next section discusses the findings and implications from the survey experiment, which provided a preliminary test of neutralisation's causal properties (5.3).

Subsequently, the chapter reconsiders the theoretical (5.4), methodological (5.5) and practical contributions of this thesis (5.6). It reviews the limitations of the studies (5.7) and advances suggestions for further research (5.8).

5.2 Discussion of Survey Findings

5.2.1 The Antecedents of Intention

5.2.1.1 The Original Determinants: Results from the survey study indicated that the original TPB antecedents, i.e., attitude (ATT), subjective norm (SN) and perceived behavioural control (PBC), were able to explain a substantial amount (57.3%) of the variance in intention (INT) to support Fair Trade. This was slightly above the typical 30-50% range of explained variance in TPB research (Fife-Schaw *et al.* 2007), yet

well over the 24% of variance explained in a previous application of the TPB in Fair Trade (Shaw, 2000). There are at least two explanations for the latter finding. Firstly, this research employed multi-item, reliable measures of the TPB constructs, as opposed to single-item ones (cf. Shaw, 2000). This must have increased substantially the explanatory and predictive ability of the measures (e.g. Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Sparks *et al.* 1995b; Armitage and Conner, 2001). Secondly, the sample population was students as opposed to committed ethical consumers. Perhaps due to greater variability in the scorings of respective TPB measures (Ajzen, 2007a), previous research has indicated that the theory better explains the behaviour of population groups that are occasional rather than regular Fair Trade supporters (Ozcaglar-Toulouse *et al.* 2006).

5.2.1.2 The Inclusion of Additional Predictors: In line with existing criticisms on the sufficiency of TPB in explaining moral behaviour (section 2.10), addition of neutralisation (NEUT) and previously proposed measures of self-identity (SI) and ethical obligation (EOB) contributed to an additional 9.3% of variance explained. This also resulted in a final model structure that had considerably departed from the original TPB conceptualisation. Most notably, SN was no longer a significant predictor of INT, whereas an additional measure called "internal ethics" (IE), reflecting both SI and EOB, was now the most important predictor of INT, well over and above traditional determinants such as ATT and PBC. Figure 5.2 presents the final model of consumer's support for Fair Trade based on the significant paths found in the current study.

Figure 5.2: A Model of Consumer's Support for Fair Trade



5.2.1.3 The Role of SN: Upon inclusion of the additional variables, SN was the only variable that was no longer statistically significant. Indeed, several authors have argued that SN is the weakest component of the TPB (see e.g. Shepperd *et al.* 1988; Goding and Kok, 1996; Puffer and Rashidian, 2004), whereas others (e.g. Sparks *et al.* 1995b) have moved to deliberately exclude it from analyses. Furthermore, previous research has found that the importance of social influences should be weaker in positive or pro-social contexts, such as supporting Fair Trade, as opposed to clearly norm-violating ones, such as shoplifting (Chung and Monroe, 2003). Consumers may be reluctant to acknowledge pressure from others in what they may otherwise perceive as driven by their altruistic values (Taylor and Todd, 1997). On the other hand, it is unlikely that social influences are fully absent in human behaviour. Instead of distinguishing between behaviours that are or are not under normative control, Finlay *et al* (1999; see also Finlay *et al.* 1997; Tramifow and Finlay, 1996) have therefore suggested a distinction between people that are in

the main normatively controlled and those that are attitudinally controlled. Armitage and Conner (2001) have noted, however, that the most likely explanation of the poor performance of SN lies in its measurement. In their meta-analysis, they found that when multiple-item, reliable measures of SN were taken – as opposed to single-item ones that are typically found in TPB studies – SN had a consistent, significant relationship with INT. Likewise, in this research, the effect of SN on INT was significant when only traditional TPB constructs were entered in the regression. The fact that SN was forced out the equation when additional constructs were entered, suggests that alternative conceptualisations may increase clarity on the role of normative influences in contexts such as supporting Fair Trade.

Mediation analysis based on the Baron and Kenny (1986) procedure indicated that the effect of SN on INT was fully mediated by feelings of EOB and SI (reflected jointly in a measure of IE). This idea is not novel in pro-social behaviour research. For example, Schwartz's (1970, 1977) norm-activation model has long assumed such an indirect effect for social norms, through their influence on personal norms (synonymous with EOB). Apart from a person's own moral reflections, personal norms capture his/her *internalised* social norms or other-expectations or what is conceptualised in the TPB as SN (Harland *et al.* 1999; Thogersen, 1999). Residual effects of SN on INT or behaviour (after controlling for personal norms) may in turn indicate non-internalised social norms or external social sanctions (Harland *et al.* 1999). Recent norm-activation research continues to confirm this mediation hypothesis (see e.g. de Ruyters and Wetzel, 2000). Accordingly, SN has been forced out of the regression equation once a measure of personal norm has been added in a number of previous TPB studies (e.g. Kurland, 1995; Sparks *et al.* 1995a; Harland *et al.* 1999), including Fair Trade applications (Shaw, 2000).

5.2.1.4 The Role of IE: However, the measure of personal norm used in this study (i.e., EOB) was combined with a measure of SI, as findings indicated lack of discriminant validity between the two constructs. This possibility has been noted in the TPB literature. For example, Sparks and Guthrie (1998, p. 1397; see also Sparks and Shepherd, 1992) note: "Not only may some identities (e.g. Socialist, Christian, vegetarian) be associated with values that may be moral values of one sort or other, certain identity ascriptions (e.g. benevolent, loyal, compassionate) may refer to aspects of character that are seen as being of intrinsic moral value". However, these authors found an independent effect for self-identity (after controlling for EOB) on intention[54]. Accordingly, in their review of relevant TPB literature, Conner and Armitage (1998) suggest that although the link between EOB and SI is clear, these concepts can be theoretically distinct. They note for example that an individual may not feel a moral obligation to consume healthy food but may regard himself or herself as a "healthy eater". Yet, given the often mixed findings on the effects of EOB and SI on INT or actual behaviour (AB), Conner and Armitage conclude that their influence may vary depending on the behaviour in question. Such might also be the case for their interrelationship. In the context of supporting Fair Trade, feelings of moral obligation may be driven by an "ethical consumer" or broader "caring" identity in the first place. Indeed, from a norm-activation perspective, feelings of ethical obligation are essentially related to one's self-concept. Conformity to personal norms elicits feelings of self-esteem or self-satisfaction whereas inaction results in feelings of self-deprecation (Schwartz, 1977; Scwhartz and Howard, 1980). Further, it is unlikely that the high correlation between EOB and SI found in this study is attributable to measurement and

[54] Yet, Sparks and Guthrie (1998) did not explicitly test for discriminant validity of EOB and SI.

operationalisation issues only, as previous Fair Trade research has also reported similar findings (i.e. r = .64 ; Shaw, 2000). Perhaps because Shaw and colleagues (Shaw and Clarke 1999; Shaw *et al.* 2000; Shaw and Shiu 2002a, 2002b, 2003) did not test for discriminant validity, they moved to conceptualise these two constructs as reflective of a higher-order rather than same-order structure (i.e., IE).

IE was in turn the most important determinant of INT in the final model (b = .386), followed by ATT (b = .327), NEUT (b = -.173) and PBC (b = .131). This was in line with previous research, highlighting the weakness of traditional TPB constructs in fully capturing the range of normative influences underlying behaviour (e.g. Sparks *et al.* 1995a; Sparks and Guthrie, 1998; Jackson *et al.* 2003; see Conner and Armitage, 1998 for a review). Being essentially a rational choice model of self-interest, the original TPB structure understates the importance of altruistic motives and concerns for other people's welfare in guiding behaviour (Kaiser *et al.* 1999b; Sparks and Shepherd, 2002). Although from a TPB viewpoint, measures of EOB and SI could be subsumed under a more general attitudinal disposition, the present findings suggest that these constructs may carry both a cognitive and emotional component which is not "especially salient when respondents rate behaviours on the evaluative scales used to assess attitude toward the act" (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, p. 178)[55]. Schwartz and Howard (1984, p. 245) suggest that whereas "other attitudinal concepts refer to evaluations based on material, social and/or psychological payoffs, personal norms focus exclusively on the evaluation of acts in terms of their moral worth to the self". Accordingly, several scholars have bridged the gap between TPB and norm-activation perspectives (Schwartz, 1970, 1977) by

[55] For example, the rationale for subsuming personal norms under the concept of attitude is that guilt, self-reinforcement and other outcomes of meeting or violating one's own standards are merely additional consequences of a behaviour (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, p.178).

adding a measure of personal norm, or what has been conceptualised in this research as IE (e.g. Kaiser *et al.* 1999b; Davies *et al.* 2002; Harland *et al.* 1999; but also Shaw and Clarke 1999; Shaw *et al.* 2000; Shaw and Shiu 2002a, 2002b, 2003)[56].

5.2.1.5 The Cognitive Foundation of the TPB Constructs: Notwithstanding the inability of the original TPB constructs to fully capture altruistic or irrational motivation, the present findings provide support for their proposed informational or cognitive foundation. The strong correlations between the direct measures of ATT and SN and their respective belief-based aggregates (r =. 660 and .594) support Ajzen's (1985, 1991) "expectancy-value" assumption that attitude towards a behaviour is derived from beliefs about the likelihood and importance of a behaviour's consequences and that SN is derived from beliefs about the expectations of others and willingness to comply. Indeed, the correlations found in this research can be classified as representing "large" effect sizes (Cohen, 1992) and are above the average value (i.e., r = .50) reported in previous meta-analyses (Armitage and Conner, 2001).

5.2.1.6 The Measurement of PBC: However, the correlation of PBC with respective control beliefs was low to moderate (r =.276). The conceptualisation and measurement of this construct has been one of the most controversial issues in TPB research, and several authors have suggested that it should be operationalised as a multidimensional variable (e.g. PBC versus "self-efficacy" and "perceived control" versus "perceived difficulty"; see e.g. Ajzen, 2002b). Conner and Armitage (1998)

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[56] Although the final model in this research draws on norm-activation perspectives, it is important to note that as a standalone model of decision-making, Schwartz's (1970, 1977) conceptualisation has not enjoyed the amount of extensive replication and validation that the TPB has (see e.g. Kaiser *et al.* 1999b).

further note that unlike the case of ATT and SN, there has been no consensus about how to best elicit control beliefs. They report an average correlation value with direct measures of PBC (r =.26) which is in line with what has been found in the present research. In a later meta-analysis however, these authors report a higher correlation value (r =.52; Armitage and Conner, 2001). Conclusions made in this research regarding the predictive and explanatory ability of the PBC construct should be hence treated with caution.

5.2.2 The Effect of Neutralisation on Intention

Findings from this research provide evidence for the inclusion of NEUT within applications of the TPB in ethical contexts. NEUT contributed to a further 2.3% of explained variance in INT over and above the TPB determinants (ATT, PBC and SN), thereby meeting Ajzen's (1991) criterion for the inclusion of additional variables. The independent effect of NEUT on INT (b = -.22) was second only to the effect of ATT (b =.436). This effect remained significant even when a modified version of the TPB was taken into account (by the inclusion of IE); turning NEUT into the third most important predictor of INT (b =.-17).

This study represents the first known attempt to integrate NEUT with a holistic account of consumer's ethical decision-making (cf. Hansmann *et al.* 2006), and as such makes a significant contribution to both neutralisation applications and the generality of ethical decision-making research [57]. In addition, findings suggested that the operationalisation of a global neutralisation disposition (i.e., NEUT) based

[57] Hansmann *et al.* (2006) provided support for the role of NEUT – alongside demographic, normative and attitudinal determinants – in explaining self-reported recycling behaviour. However their approach was context-specific and exploratory as they did not rely on an established model of decision-making.

on underlying neutralising beliefs was accurate. The correlation between NEUT and the sum of respective beliefs was .594, classified as substantial (Cohen, 1992). Near-equivalent NEUT-INT and neutralising beliefs-INT correlations (-.655 and -.631) provide further support that the two measures closely map onto one another (e.g. Armitage and Conner, 2001)[58]. From a construct measurement and validation perspective, this is particularly important because it turns neutralisation directly compatible with the way other attitudinal constructs have been operationalised. Virtually all previous neutralisation research has measured acceptance of specific neutralising beliefs rather than a global neutralisation disposition. Findings regarding the effects of neutralisation on intention or behaviour might have been underestimated not only because these beliefs did not correspond with the context under investigation (e.g. Maruna and Copes, 2005; Hansmann *et al.* 2006) but also because in this respect, the employment of a global measure of neutralisation is more efficient. As it was mentioned in section 3.8.1, the correspondence principle can be readily met with measures of global disposition but not necessarily with specific underlying beliefs.

This research confirmed the presence of a direct effect of NEUT on INT but not an indirect, moderating effect. From a TPB perspective, this may suggest that the operationalisation of NEUT has, in the main, captured attitudes towards *not* performing rather than performing a particular behaviour. Results from the elicitation study and discriminant analysis have shown that the former are not just the logical opposite of the latter. For example, a consumer may believe that buying Fair Trade products guarantees (or does not guarantee) a better deal for Fair Trade

[58] In line with the principle of compatibility, the correlation of neutralising beliefs with INT was slightly smaller, and this pattern was similar for the rest of the measures (i.e. ATT, PBC, SN).

producers and from this information alone, it could be assumed that s/he is (not) willing to support Fair Trade. However, s/he may also believe that such assurances will or should instead be provided by international trading agreements. Accordingly, Sutton (2004) highlights that the "complementarity assumption" may apply in the case of measuring INT or AB (i.e., asking someone whether s/he intends to perform a behaviour is the same as asking if s/he is not) but is not useful in the case of underlying cognitions. He notes that, ideally, "relevant cognitions should be measured with respect to *both* alternatives (performing and not performing the behaviour)" (pp. 96-97). Westaby and Fisbein, 1996 (see also Westaby *et al.* 1997; Westaby, 2002, 2005) have recently suggested a new "reasons theory approach" to the exploration of cognitions underlying behaviour. This approach explicitly discriminates between "reasons for" and "reasons against" and postulates that both should be taken into account, particularly when people sometimes perform and sometimes do not perform the behaviour in question. Westaby (2002, 2005) further notes that reasons for and against could capture justification and defence mechanisms (such as motivated reasoning and dissonance reduction) that are not theoretically accounted in TPB research. From a "reasons theory" perspective, the operationalisation of NEUT in this study represents one method of eliciting and assessing the effects of "reasons against" in a TPB framework[59].

The detection of an independent effect of NEUT on INT is also relevant to the neutralisation literature (see section 2.5.5). If NEUT, like the rest of INT's antecedents (ATT, SN, BC, IE), has a direct (presumably causal) effect only, then in line with Austin (1977) and Sheley (1980), neutralising beliefs share similar to other

[59] The way reasons against have been elicited in past "reasons theory" research is different to the one in this study (i.e., NEUT), yet Westaby (2005) suggests that what is the best method for developing and testing reasons scales remains open for future research.

belief characteristics (i.e. ATT, SN, PBC) and are more susceptible to non-motivational explanations. The lack of a moderating effect on the ATT-INT and IE-INT relationships, challenges Sykes and Matza's (1957) assumption that these cognitions need necessarily be contrasted with unconventional/conventional commitment or what is conceptualised in the present context as favourable/unfavourable attitudes and high/low norm acceptance. Neutralising beliefs may reflect genuine expressions of "situational" and "utilitarian ethics" (Bersoff, 1999, 2001) or rational explanations for not supporting Fair Trade, as opposed to excuses made in an attempt to retain consistency with otherwise favourable norms and attitudes towards the movement; as the latter should have been manifest in the present data primarily as a moderating effect.

Indeed, previous research has highlighted "valid" obstacles or difficulties in supporting Fair Trade that share commonalities with what has been subsumed in this research under the concept of neutralisation. For example, Carrigan *et al.* (2004) and Nicholls and Lee (2006) have found that consumers often need to feel Fair Trade products make a difference whilst Shaw *et al.* (2006b) have noted that some consumers feel alienated by the price and lack of availability of Fair Trade goods.

The absence of confirmation of moderating effects should be interpreted with caution, given that detection is particularly difficult and non-detection is the rule rather than the exception in field studies (McClelland and Judd, 1993; Frazier *et al.* 2004). Furthermore, this study tested for a particular type of linear moderation as opposed to other possibilities, including the existence of moderating effects within particular respondent groups or non-linear and curvilinear effects (e.g. Baron and

Kenny, 1986). More specifically, a conceptually sensible alternative is that NEUT affects the ATT-INT and IE-INT relationships in a quadratic (curvilinear) fashion. That is, a moderating effect could be present for groups with moderate scores in measures of attitude and norm acceptance but not for groups with either low (i.e. neutralisation is not needed to resolve an inconsistency) or high scorings in these constructs (i.e. congruent INT and AB is more likely in the first place, cf. Maruna and Copes, 2005). However, *post hoc* analysis of this hypothesis, based on Aiken and West's (1991) recommendations (i.e., inclusion of the squared product terms of NEUT with IE and with ATT in an additional regression step), showed unreliable improvement in the model[60].

An interesting parallel can be drawn between the present findings and previous attempts to establish moderating effects for the PBC construct. Ajzen (1985) originally suggested that both theoretically and intuitively, PBC should moderate the INT-AB relationship. However, following the lack of evidence for such effects in his 1991 meta-analysis, Ajzen postulated a direct effect of PBC on AB. He suggested that failure to detect moderating effects may be due to the fact that linear models provide good accounts of psychological data even when conceptually, interaction effects should be present (Ajzen, 1991, p.188; but see Armitage and Conner, 2001; Yang-Wallentin *et al.* 2004). Ajzen and Fishbein (2005) further noted that in order to obtain a statistically significant interaction, PBC and INT would have to cover the full range of the measurement scale. In most behavioural contexts however, INT and PBC tend to naturally fall on one or the other side of these continua (and so did NEUT in the present study). Indeed, as a way of increasing the power of moderation tests, researchers have long suggested oversampling of extreme cases

[60] For a justification of *post hoc* testing for curvilinear interactions see Ping (2006).

but this approach remains controversial (see McClelland and Judd, 1993; Frazier *et al.* 2004).

5.2.3 The Observation of Actual Behaviour

In addition to measuring INT, this study moved to observe actual support for Fair Trade, through petitioning and donating behaviour. However, the low amount of respondents that decided to make a donation (n = 7) makes descriptive and inferential statistics based on this behavioural measure highly questionable. Apart from inherent research design difficulties (see section 4.3.2), there are at least three more explanations for the respondents' apathy towards the donating opportunity.

Firstly, it has been generally found that the higher the cost of prosocial behaviour, the less likely that positive attitudes will translate into action (e.g. Tyler *et al.* 1982; Stern, 1992; Schultz and Oskamp, 1996; Diekmann and Preisendörfer, 1998, 2003). Indeed, donating is a type of behaviour that consumers should experience less frequently and requires more motivation to perform compared to petition signing (Hini and Gendall, 1995; Fox-Cardamone *et al.* 2000). Similar to the present study, Fox-Cardamone *et al* (2000) observed both petition signing and monetary donation in an application of the TPB to antinuclear activism. The link between antinuclear attitudes and petition signing was significant, however there was no significant relationship between intentions to donate money and actual behaviour. More broadly, Diekmann and Preisendörfer (1998, p. 92) have argued that people often resort to low-cost pro-environmental behaviours, because on a cognitive level, they serve as "alibi-areas" of ecological correctness.

Secondly, unlike traditional donation appeals from charitable organisations, donating to Fair Trade is positioned as a secondary way of supporting the movement. Indeed, despite the availability of donation opportunities (e.g. www.fairtrade.org.uk), Fair Trade organisations are actively playing down the charity side of Fair Trade (Nicholls and Lee, 2006). On their behalf, consumers may see the donating option as an alternative rather than complementary way of trading their monetary sources. They may therefore decide to opt for Fair Trade products, given that there is nothing tangible or of "objective value" in return to donating money (e.g. Desmet and Feinberg, 2003).

Lastly, in the qualitative phase of data collection, it was evident that several consumers felt that the idea of donating to Fair Trade was somewhat against the movement's principle, and this was in turn manifest in the quantitative findings. The mean intention score for the item "I would support the Fair Trade movement in the near future, by donating to the Fair Trade Organisation" was 3.93 (Std. Deviation = 1.608) compared to 5.10 (Std. Deviation = 1.283) and 5.34 (Std. Deviation = 1.493) for items relating to buying and signing a petition for Fair Trade respectively (min: 1, max: 7).

Signing a petition for Fair Trade was a more popular option, with 117 of the participants opting and 69 not opting for the petition. Results from the logistic regression indicated that 12.9 to 17.5% of the variability in this behaviour could be explained by INT, a rather low amount compared to a typical 20 to 30% of variance explained in previous TPB meta-analyses (Fife-Schaw *et al.* 2007). This finding was surprising not only because there was a short time interval (2 days) between completion of the questionnaires and observation of behaviour, but also because,

for reasons mentioned in section 3.10, petition signing is a type of behaviour that should be easier to predict based on aggregated TPB measures. On the other hand, even in the case of petition signing, intentions with respect to a behavioural category cannot be expected to be perfect predictors of a single instance of one behavioural alternative (Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005). Previous research has at times reported relatively low amounts of variance explained in petitioning behaviour (10% in Fox-Cardamone *et al.* 2000; 26% in Hini and Gendall, 1995; 20% in Albrecht and Carpenter, 1976). In addition, high INT-AB correlations cannot be expected when there is low variability in either of the measures (e.g. Ajzen, 2005). Nearly two thirds of the respondents signed the petition, resulting in an already high baseline prediction of 62.9%. Lastly, the behavioural measure in this study was observed rather than self-reported (see section 3.10 e.g. Pellino, 1997; Armitage and Conner, 1999b, 1999c). In their meta-analysis, Armitage and Conner (2001) report a statistically significant difference between the variance that is typically accounted by the TPB in prospective measures of self-reported (31%) and observed (20%) behaviour.

Notwithstanding the strength of the INT-AB relationship, in line with the TPB, a link stronger than chance was found. Additionally, although NEUT, ATT and IE had a significant effect on AB when they were considered individually, these effects were turned insignificant after controlling for INT; hence confirming that INT is the closest cognitive antecedent of actual behavioural performance (e.g. Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005). However, PBC did not also affect INT directly, as the TPB postulates. The rationale of this assumption is that in addition to serving a motivational role like ATT and SN, PBC serves as a surrogate for "actual control" over behaviour. In a meta-analysis of the PBC construct, Notani (1998) cautions

that "if these perceptions are false, PBC will not be a useful predictor of behaviour over and above intention" (p. 263). This seems likely in the case of petition signing, which is a relatively simple and effortless behaviour to perform once a situational opportunity arises. Previous TPB research has provided inconsistent findings on the direct effect of PBC on AB (for reviews, see Armitage and Conner, 2001; Notani, 1998; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993).

Contrary to H2a and H2b, there was no evidence for additional direct or moderating effects of NEUT on AB. Considerations mentioned above for NEUT's role in explaining and predicting INT therefore also apply in the case of AB. Furthermore, it is likely that NEUT did not affect AB directly or through moderating the INT-AB relationship, because most respondents acted in accordance with their intentions and there were arguably no salient motives to engage in counter-attitudinal behaviour (cf. Minor, 1981). Nonetheless, the link between NEUT and AB prior to controlling for INT [Chi-square (1, N=186) = 12.46, $p<0.0005$; Cox & Snell R^2 = 6.5%, Nagelkerke R^2 = 8.8%] is of particular relevance to the neutralisation literature (see section 2.5.4). By employing a prospective measure of behaviour, this study addresses the sequential ordering issue and confirms that albeit weakly, prior acceptance of NEUT is related to subsequent behaviour.

Closer inspection of the logistic regression results reveals that correction classification rates were 83.8% for signing a petition but only 42% for not signing a petition (table 4.6d in section 4.6.4). This indicates a problem of overclassification into the "signing the petition" group. Previous research has indeed highlighted that "intentions alone are capable of accurately classifying individuals who carry out their intentions but incapable of classifying those who do not, with the same degree of

accuracy" (Davies *et al.* 2002, p. 71; see also e.g. Sheeran, 2002; Boldero, 1995). Ajzen and Fishbein (2005) note that this asymmetric pattern is understandable, given that people who state unwillingness to engage in a behaviour should find it easier to act in accordance with their negative intentions, but people who state willingness to perform the behaviour may or may not do so. When a logistic regression was run based on the item measuring specific intention to sign a petition, the asymmetric pattern was even more salient, with correction classification rates of 94% and 17.4% for signing and not signing the petition respectively[61].

Regardless of the above considerations, about 80% of variance in petitioning behaviour remained unexplained. In general, research into attitude-intention-behaviour consistency has identified numerous situational, behavioural and psychological factors that may account for low correspondence between verbal responses on the one hand and overt behaviour on the other (for reviews, see Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005; Fazio and Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; for a meta-analysis, see Sheeran, 2002). One of the earliest accounts of low attitude-behaviour consistency is based on the possibility of response biases (see sections 4.4.3 and 3.4). In this research, results from Harman's one-factor test (section 4.4.3) indicated that the presence of common method bias (a concept that encompasses most types of response bias, including social desirability) was not particularly problematic. However, it might have – to an extent – inflated the relationship between INT and its antecedents, whereas the relationship of INT with observed AB should be in turn uncontaminated by such biases. This of course, does

[61] Given that this was a single-item measure, it was not surprising that although significant, its relationship with AB was lower compared to the aggregated INT measure [Chi-square (1, N=186) = 9.45, $p<0.01$; Cox & Snell R^2 = 5%, Nagelkerke R^2 = 6.8%].

not address variables or conditions that could have increased INT-AB correspondence.

Ajzen (2005) notes that when the relationship between INT-AB is weak even after ensuring considerable compatibility between the two measures and both are taken within a short time interval, there is a case of "literal inconsistency" (i.e., people say they will do one thing and do another). One of the most compelling explanations of literal inconsistency is the presence of "hypothetical bias". Hypothetical bias may arise simply because in the real behavioural context, considerations or beliefs are activated that are different and not readily available in the hypothetical context (Ajzen, 2005). A way to reduce hypothetical bias is by asking people to form "implementation intentions", that is when, where and how they are planning to carry out their intentions (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999; for a review of existing findings, see Sheeran, 2002). Implementation intentions should decrease the possibility of hypothetical bias because compared to broader goal intentions (i.e., the type of intentions measured in this study), the mental representation of a future situation becomes "highly activated and thus more easily accessible". In addition, this heightened accessibility "should make it easier to detect the critical situation in the surrounding environment, to readily attend to it even when one is busy with other things, and to recall it more effectively when the question arises" (Gollwitzer, 1999, p. 495).

A related explanation of literal inconsistency is based on the notion of "attitude strength", meaning the degree of influence that attitudes can have on behaviour

(rather than how extreme they are; Fazio and Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005)[62]. A considerable amount of research has found that when attitudes are formed from direct experience as opposed to information, they are more accessible from memory (i.e., "attitude accessibility") and are thus more predictive of later behaviour (see Fazio and Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005). In this respect, a potential moderator of the intention-behaviour relationship is age, as younger individuals should be relatively inexperienced with most target behaviours. This effect has been indeed confirmed in previous meta-analyses of the TPB in physical activity (Hagger *et al.* 2002) and health-related applications (Sheeran and Orbell, 1998). Equally, although participants in this study had various degrees of experience with Fair Trade issues, they should be generally less experienced compared to the average population[63].

Notwithstanding the conditions that could in theory increase INT-AB correspondence, it is likely that the present multivariate model simply cannot provide a sufficient account of Fair Trade supporting behaviour. A future line of research could consider the role of additional moderating variables, such as individual difference (e.g. self-monitoring, need for cognition), situational (e.g. time pressure) and attitudinal (e.g. implicit and explicit attitudes) variables (see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005; Fazio and Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005); but also alternative conceptualisations of the role of ethics in contemporary consumer dilemmas, based on competing theoretical models (e.g. Schwartz's norm-activation model, 1970, 1977; Hunt and Vitell's general theory of marketing ethics, 1986, 1992, 2006).

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[62] There are various concepts relating to attitude strength, including attitude importance, accessibility and ambivalence (see Miller and Peterson, 2004).

[63] "Attitude accessibility" refers to the ease with which an attitudinal evaluation is retrieved form memory (e.g. Fazio *et al.* 1982). Hence, on the other hand, attitude accessibility should have been increased in the present study due to situational cues (i.e. return of the completed questionnaires at the roadshows) that were present during the behavioural opportunity.

Lastly, other researchers have questioned the scope of the intention construct and in fact the role of cognitions in driving behaviour altogether (see Sheeran, 2002). For example, in their seminal article, Wegner and Wheatley (1999) have proposed that the idea of intentionality can be analysed from an attributional perspective. People interpret their thoughts as the cause of a particular action where in reality, the causal mechanisms are never present in consciousness. In a related stream of research, Bargh and colleagues (Bargh *et al.* 1996; Bargh, 1997; Bargh and Chartrand, 1999) have provided an accumulating amount of evidence suggesting that much behaviour is guided by automatic processes, such as "priming effects", rather than by intentions. Within the consumer behaviour literature, Foxall (1997, 2001, 2003) has argued for an alternative behavioural approach to consumer choice, which builds heavily on the role of environmental rather than sociocognitive determinants. However, as Sheeran (2002) has argued, much more research is needed if to warrant the conclusion that automatic and other non-cognitive processes provide a better prediction of behaviour than do behavioural intentions[64].

5.3 Experimental Findings

Results from the survey experiment indicated that the manipulation had no statistically significant effect neither on INT nor AB. In order to explain this unexpected finding – given the qualitative findings and results from both the pilot and survey studies – a *post hoc* analysis was carried out, where the personal

[64] Sheeran (2002) also cites a line of research that challenges the role of intentions based on often cited findings that past behaviour – and by implication "habit" – predicts better future behaviour than a measure of intention. However, there are certain operational and analytical problems with this approach (see Sheeran, 2002; Ajzen, 2005). Besides, in this research, past behaviour did not contribute to the explanation of future behaviour after controlling for intentions.

(measured by the acceptance of neutralisation statements) rather than social acceptability (i.e., the likely effect of the experimental treatment) of neutralisation techniques was employed as a quasi-experimental factor[65]. Consistent with the results from the survey study, this indicated that social validation of neutralising beliefs did not affect INT or AB directly, but might have done so indirectly through its moderating effect on personal acceptance of these beliefs. Closer inspection of this interaction indicated that whereas low neutralisers scored higher on INT when neutralisation statements were further invalidated, this pattern was inversed for high neutralisers. This "polarisation" effect (Lord *et al.* 1979; see also e.g. Chaiken and Yates, 1985; Miller *et al.* 1993; Kuhn and Lao, 1996) might have been due to the fact that social invalidation invoked further neutralisation-related reasoning or other defence-mechanisms that had an adverse effect on INT. However, this finding was of marginal significance (at $p < .10$) and it is tentative, because framing effects in the presentation of the statements challenge the rationale of measuring personal acceptance in both conditions based on respective median-splits.

An alternative interpretation of the present (null) finding is that neutralisation processes are not sufficient alone to influence subsequent INT and AB. They may represent ongoing thought patterns that facilitate norm-contradictive behaviour but not causal beliefs in the social-psychological sense of the term (e.g. Maruna and Copes, 2005). Indeed, the effect size of the experimental treatment, as calculated by eta squared, was only .002 and can be classified as very small (Cohen, 1992). However, previous experimental findings on neutralisation (Bersoff, 2001; Fritsche, 2003) disconfirm this assumption. In addition, indirect evidence for the causal role

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[65] Following Fritsche (2003), an additional post-hoc analysis was based on only those participants that scored high on IE and ATT, yet the treatment had no effect on INT or AB even when only these groups were considered.

of neutralising beliefs stems from the survey findings and the relationship of these beliefs with other decision-making constructs. A considerable amount of research has shown that interventions that target specific behavioural, normative or control beliefs, influence TPB determinants which in turn lead to changes in INT and AB (see Ajzen and Fisbein, 2005). From a TPB perspective, this effect should logically hold true for interventions that target any type of underlying cognitions, including neutralising beliefs. Clearly, this is an area worthy of further future investigation.

The presence of a null effect in this study may also be explained based on characteristics of the experimental procedure[66]. For example, because respondents were presented with a set of neutralisation statements rather than asked to produce their own (cf. Fritsche, 2003), they might have engaged in further elaboration of the arguments, which mediated or cancelled out the effect of the experimental treatment on INT and AB. Secondly, in an attempt to establish group equivalence, several TPB-related measures were introduced prior to the experimental manipulation. However, there is evidence to suggest that merely answering a question increases attitude accessibility (e.g. Fazio *et al.* 1982, 1989) which can in turn have "carryover" effects in subsequent questionnaire measures (e.g. Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1988; Tourangeau *et al.* 1989a, 1989b; Feldman and Lynch, 1988; Teas and Laczniak, 2004)[67]. This should have confounded the influence of the experimental treatment, although other studies have shown that such measurement effects remain minimal in relation to TPB constructs (Armitage and Conner, 1999c; Darker *et al.* 2007). Thirdly, Schwarz and Hippler (1995) found that in self-administered mail surveys, some respondents often look ahead while

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[66] On the other hand, it may suggest that TPB measures are particularly robust to questionnaire format variations (cf. Armitage and Conner, 1999c; Darker *et al.* 2007).

[67] A related stream of research has found that simply asking one's INT can influence his/her AB (Chapman, 2001; Morwitz *et al.* 1993; Morwitz and Fitzsimons, 2004). Based on these studies, attitude-behaviour correspondence in the survey study should have been higher.

answering the questions. Undoubtedly, a researcher-administered or computer-administered survey that controls for question ordering, would have been more efficient in ensuring that respondents stated or reflected on their future intentions after rather than prior to being exposed in the experimental treatment.

A further interpretation relates to the absence of additional conditions that should in theory, induce a higher effect of neutralisation on subsequent INT or AB. Most notably, neutralisation processes should be pertinent when there is an associated cost or strong motivation to engage in counter-attitudinal behaviour (e.g. Minor, 1981). Indeed, in a previous experiment on neutralisation, when participants were offered both non-recyclable cans and returnable bottles, previous validation of neutralisation techniques did not affect subsequent behaviour, but did so when the pro-environmental option was made more difficult (i.e., respondents had to actively look for the bottles; Fritsche, 2003; see also, Bersoff, 2001). Similarly, an additional treatment could have been introduced in the present study, in which for example, respondents knew prior to completing the questionnaire that they will be asked to donate to a Fair Trade organisation whereas such a motivational cue would be absent in a control condition. This manipulation could initiate motivated search for valid neutralising arguments that should in turn strengthen *one-sidedly* the inclination to avoid supporting the Fair Trade movement (Fritsche, 2003).

5.4 Theoretical Implications

5.4.1 The Role of Neutralisation in the Decision-Making of Relatively Small Ethical Breaches

If most consumers hold several ethical concerns and pro-social attitudes, yet fail to behave accordingly (e.g. Bird and Hughes, 1997; Cowe and Williams, 2000; Carrigan and Attalla, 2001; Uusitalo and Oksanen, 2004; DePelsmacker *et al.* 2006; Nicholls and Lee, 2006), it is imperative that existing theories of ethical consumer decision-making evolve to explain the ways in which people restore equilibrium beyond attitude change. Chapter 2 introduced neutralisation theory as a promising way to address this criticism. Drawing on Chatzidakis *et al.*'s (2004) study, it considered neutralisation's role in key stages of the decision-making process and discussed its applicability to consumption contexts that involve relatively minor ethical breaches, such as caring for the environment and buying Fair Trade products. Indeed, although neutralisation was originally applied to illegal or social norm-violating activities, recent studies have considered the role of justifications and excuses in behaviours that are rather driven by personal norms and values, such as boycotting multinationals (Devinney *et al.* 2006) and recycling batteries (Hansmann *et al.* 2006).

In addition, most existing applications have either provided illustrative evidence (e.g. Cohn and Vaccaro, 2006) or correlational data on the relationship of neutralisation with specific variables (e.g. disposition versus acquisition, Strutton *et al.* 1994, 1997; anomie, Rosenbaum and Kuntze, 2003; past behaviour, Hansmann et al. 2006). Virtually none of the existing consumer studies has attempted to

investigate the role of neutralisation within more comprehensive accounts of decision-making, such as Ajzen's TPB (1985, 1991) or Hunt and Vitell's general theory of marketing ethics (1986, 1992, 2006). This also holds true for applications of neutralisation outside the consumer behaviour domain, although the tenets of neutralisation theory are understood to be much more social psychological than sociological (see e.g. recent reviews by Maruna and Copes, 2005; Fritsche, 2005). Whereas attitudes and cognitive models of decision-making have played a pivotal role in social psychology (see e.g. Eagly and Chaiken, 1993), surprisingly, advancements in these fields have hardly ever been integrated into neutralisation research.

In addressing the above, the empirical part of this thesis focused on consumer support for the Fair Trade movement (a behavioural category that is predominant in studies of ethical consumerism and which formed significant part of the data in the Chatzidakis *et al.* 2004 study) and investigated the role of neutralisation within the conceptual framework of the TPB (Ajzen, 1985, 1991). Qualitative findings showed that consumers were readily employing neutralisation techniques to justify their minimal support for the Fair Trade movement and that this context was appropriate for subsequent quantitative research (Chapter 3). In addition, this phase of research highlighted a conceptual problem underlying neutralisation research that arguably becomes more pertinent when investigating relatively minor ethical breaches. That is, for some consumers neutralisation-type arguments seemed to represent genuine reasons for not supporting Fair Trade as opposed to defence-based rationalisations in the original formulation of the theory. One's rationalisations may indeed be another's rational explanations (e.g. Maruna and Copes, 2005). From a decision-

making perspective, this issue was partly resolved by conceptualising both direct and moderating effects of neutralisation on intention and behaviour.

5.4.2 The Operationalisation of Neutralisation

Further qualitative research helped operationalise both traditional TPB determinants and neutralisation (Chapter 3). In line with established guidelines and assumptions in the attitude literature (e.g. Ajzen, 2002a; Francis *et al.* 2004a, 2004b), neutralisation was measured both as a general disposition or overall evaluation and with respect to underlying neutralising beliefs. In addressing criticisms that most of neutralisation research has relied on broad and unrefined neutralisation scales (e.g. Copes, 2003; Maruna and Copes, 2005), the beliefs used in this study were based on primary data and were context-specific. Yet, previous studies have, in effect, measured the belief-component of the neutralisation construct only. There are certain disadvantages in this approach, such as the difficulty in ensuring compatibility between measures (discussed in chapter 4), that may account for the low-to-moderate effect sizes that have been reported in previous research (Fritsche, 2005). The operationalisation of neutralisation as an overall "tendency to neutralise" or "justifiability of inaction", in addition to belief-specific measures, promises to increase the explanatory and predictive power of the theory. As noted earlier, subsequent analysis of the empirical data supported this operationalisation.

5.4.3 The Relationship of Neutralisation with Key Determinants of the Decision-Making Process

Results from the survey study represent a first successful attempt to integrate neutralisation with a holistic account of ethical decision-making. Neutralisation had a significant negative effect on intention over and above traditional determinants. Moreover, by employing a prospective design this study established a link between prior employment of neutralisation techniques and subsequent observed behaviour. Neutralisations hence represent more than just *post hoc* rationalisations (section 2.5.4).

However, neutralisation's effect on behaviour was mediated by intention and there was no evidence to suggest that neutralisation moderated the relationship of intention neither with positive norms and attitudes nor with observed behaviour. In this respect, rather than being susceptible to strong criticisms regarding its etiological quality, neutralisation suffers from another stream of criticism: contrary to Sykes and Matza's (1957) conceptualisation, neutralisation's effect on intention (and behaviour) was independent of positive norms or attitudes (section 2.5.2).

An interlinked assumption is that neutralising beliefs represent dissonance-reduction mechanisms or biased rather than accurate cognitions (section 2.5.5). If this holds true, then one would expect acceptance of neutralising beliefs to be related to lower intentions only under conditions of high-normative acceptance or favourable attitudes[68]. Similarly, it should negatively affect observed behaviour only under

[68] Unless one assumes a reverse moderating effect. In the context of criminal behaviour, people who hold extremely unconventional/subcultural norms may also need to neutralise their conventional intentions or behaviour (Topalli, 2005).

conditions of high positive intentions. In other words, neutralisations should be brought in the decision-making process as a means of resolving inconsistency and this should be manifest as a moderating effect in the data. However, it was previously mentioned that failure to detect this effect in this study should be treated with caution. The moderating hypothesis makes both intuitive and theoretical sense, and it has also been indirectly supported on empirical grounds (e.g. Schwartz, 1977; Tyler *et al.* 1982; cf. Fritsche, 2005)[69]. Nonetheless, it is imperative that future research confirms this effect; otherwise neutralisation would lose much of its richness as a theory of (un)ethical decision-making.

5.5 Methodological Implications

5.5.1 The Measurement of Actual Behaviour

In contrast to the majority of previous studies on ethical consumer decision-making, dependent measures in this research related to both behavioural intention and observed behaviour. Results indicated that although intention is indeed the most immediate antecedent, it only accounted for a small-to-moderate amount of variability in behaviour. Accordingly, studies that have relied on intention as an effective proxy of behaviour, might have overestimated the sufficiency of attitudinal constructs in guiding the actual everyday choices that consumers make (e.g. Shaw and Clarke 1999; Shaw *et al.* 2000; Shaw and Shiu 2002a, 2002b, 2003). It is

[69] Fritsche (2005) argues that (the few) neutralisation studies that have tested moderator hypotheses have provided equivocal findings. However, only Agnew's (1994) study has used a rigorous test of moderation (i.e. inclusion of product terms; Aiken and West, 1991). According to this study, the moderator effect of neutralisation on the norm acceptance-behaviour relationship was in the proposed direction based on longitudinal data but in the opposite one based on cross-sectional data. The latter was attributed to that delienquents with unconventional values may also employ techniques in a post-hoc basis, as a means of impression management (see also section 2.5.2).

imperative that future studies on ethical decision-making rely increasingly more on prospective rather than cross-sectional designs, in order to provide fuller tests of their theoretical frameworks and address conditions that may increase intention-behaviour correspondence (as highlighted above).

5.5.2 A Survey Experiment

In an attempt to empirically confirm neutralisation's causal role on behaviour, this research used an innovative methodology known as "survey experiment". Given that a follow-up experiment which would address limitations highlighted in section 5.3 was not feasible (given the time-constraints), the present results have a preliminary status. However, the methodology of survey experiments should hardly be abandoned. Experimental questionnaires have been rarely used in consumer behaviour and marketing research, yet their employment in other fields suggests that when successfully applied, they can lead not only to questionnaire refinements (as originally assumed) but also, to substantive discoveries (for a review in the field of political science see Gaines *et al.* 2007). This is an even more appealing attribute in the context of ethics research, where for both practical and moral reasons, many variables of interest cannot be manipulated (Bohner *et al.* 1998; examples of consumer behaviours include consumer fraud, drug abuse and shoplifting).

5.6 Practical Implications

5.6.1 For Public Policy and Practitioners

The concept of neutralisation and the associated taxonomy of the techniques offer a promising alternative to the marketing of Fair Trade causes (see e.g. McDonagh, 2002; Wright and Heaton, 2006) and pro-social behaviour more broadly. The evidence in this research, that consumers readily employ neutralisations to justify minimal support for Fair Trade, suggests that marketing communications could attempt to manipulate, negate and pre-empt the deployment of those beliefs in particular (Hansmann *et al.* 2006). For example, Fair Trade campaigns that give consumers a feel of "making a difference" by emphasizing individual producer "stories" (Nicholls, 2002), could be reinterpreted as attempts to pre-empt the employment of the "denial of injury" technique. More generally, a neutralisation-based perspective to social marketing communications would require stages of formative research that identify those justifications that consumers employ when pursuing their more selfish goals.

Indeed, such "neutralisation-based" campaigns can be already found on the practitioner's arena. For example, one of the slogans used in the 2006 "Keep Britain Tidy" campaign was "However you disguise it, it's still litter" (www.encams.org). This was inspired by an extensive, mixed-method phase of investigation by an environmental charity (i.e. ENCAMS, 2001), revealing that "justifiers" were the second largest segment of the population (25%), only after people who do not litter

(i.e. "beautifully behaved", 43%)[70]. Justifiers used arguments such as "everyone else is doing it", that cigarette butts are small and biodegradable or that they litter only when they are drunk. A follow-up study in 2006 revealed that some of these justifications were no longer used because they had become socially unacceptable[71]. The "Keep Britain Tidy" campaign was hailed as a huge success based on a variety of indicators, including 35% reduction on littering damage[72]. It is expected to run again in 2007 and an additional slogan is "However you tart it up, it's still litter"[73].

Clearly however, more research is needed in order to understand when and in which contexts neutralisation may be the most effective approach to communication compared to alternative informational and emotional appeals. For example, current findings indicate that feelings of ethical obligation and self-identity relate more strongly to Fair Trade supporting behaviour. It is possible that a relevant guilt-enhancing campaign (e.g. "Fair-Trade Coffee. Sleep better at night" by Co-op, 2005) may be a more effective approach to communication, although the use of guilt-invoking material is a potentially problematic area (Bennett, 1996). Further, this research shows that the effectiveness of guilt-arousal might be mitigated by the public's capacity to neutralise the non-support for Fair Trade. Indeed, previous studies have shown that the effectiveness of guilt appeals is fully mediated by the extent to which people accept responsibility for the prosocial behaviour in question (Basil *et al.* 2006; Miceli and Castelfranchi, 1998). From a neutralisation perspective,

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[70] Another group called "blamers" (of the council, manufacturers etc.) comprised 9% of the population.
http://www.encams.org/uploads/publications/people_who_litter.pdf , last accessed, 27 July 2007.

[71] http://www.encams.org/uploads/publications/people_who_litter.pdf , last accessed, 27 July 2007.

[72] http://www.encams.org/campaigns/main.asp?section=2&sub=25&pageid=199 , last accessed , 27 July 2007.

[73] http://www.encams.org/campaigns/sub.asp?sub=25, last accessed, 27 July 2007.

denial of responsibility is only one of the cognitive mechanisms that may limit the effectiveness of guilt appeals on behaviour.

In the context of recycling, Lord (1994) has demonstrated that although positively framed messages are effective in forming supportive attitudes, negatively framed messages more successfully encourage behaviour. Accordingly, Max Havelaar's (Fair Trade) coffee campaign has been praised as a balanced application of "sick-and well-baby" appeals where the importance of the issue is raised but in a positive, reassuring way, focusing on the solution (Langeland, 1998). Findings from the experimental study partly support this assumption, as there was some indication that crude attacks on the employment of neutralising techniques may have opposite, "polarisation" effects on intention and behaviour. For example, positive messages of what Fair Trade achieves for producers could also be successful because individuals' denial of injury typically refers to the purchase not delivering substantial benefit rather than resulting in some disadvantage/injury. Hence a two-pronged approach, which subtly works at pre-empting possible counterarguments, might be needed, to simultaneously form positive attitudes and increase behaviour.

Lastly, neutralisation-based campaigns need not be limited to the promotion of pro-social behaviour. For example, binge drinking or eating is often neutralised in communication material that downplay or normalise the severity of overindulgence (e.g. "it's ok to indulge yourself", "you deserve it"). Moufahim and Chatzidakis (2006) have shown how campaigns of extreme right-wing parties often employ neutralisation techniques, in order to redress and redefine political stances that might otherwise be perceived as xenophobic or controversial.

5.6.2 For Consumer Education

Furthermore, the present research is of potential relevance to consumer development and education. A more critical stance on the ethical rationalisations that consumers intuitively employ in numerous everyday contexts could be powerful enough to uplift change. Indeed, Bersoff (1999, p. 425) has argued that such educational programmes could help individuals "differentiate sophistry from sound moral reasoning". By inducing them to "judge and criticise arguments similar to those they might be tempted to use themselves when faced with a situation in which their selfish interest is in conflict with their moral values, they should have a more difficult time using pseudo-justifications as a pretext for acting unethically" (p. 425). For example, is it sensible and valid to argue that "I do not support Fair Trade because I do not know enough about it" or is it the case that we have an increasing responsibility to make informed and pro-active consumer choices, even if doing so is not as convenient as we would like? It has been suggested that relatively small, non-duress driven social breaches are likely to be the most strongly influenced by self-presentation and self-esteem, and yet, these are the types of questionable behaviours that are the most common (Bersoff, 2001). Recognising and readdressing some of these minor violations may have positive consequences for consumers in terms of their freedom from guilt and peace of mind as well as broader societal benefits.

5.7 Limitations

Despite the above contributions, this research has its limitations. Primary amongst those was the moderate sample size used in the survey study. Although this was

due to certain research design requirements (e.g. observation of actual behaviour in a pre-specified number of Halls of Residence, short time-span between distribution and collection of questionnaires in order to ensure temporal stability), a larger sample size would have aided analysis in a number of ways such as more efficient tests of moderation (McClelland and Judd, 1993) and the ability to use a full structural equation modelling approach (e.g. Hair *et al.* 1998).

A second limitation of the research concerns the difficulties that were noted during the scale construction and validation process. Most notably, the perceived behaviour control construct failed to exhibit desirable psychometric properties and therefore current conclusions regarding the explanatory and predictive ability of this construct should be treated with caution. In addition, there were relatively high correlations amongst all constructs, a feature that was attributed to substantive considerations and in part, to the presence of common method bias. A larger sample size would have also been helpful in this respect, given that structural equation modelling approaches allow the inclusion of a common method bias factor as part of the model, and hence they are superior in controlling for such effects (see Podsakoff *et al.* 2003). On a related note, a social desirability scale was not included in the questionnaire, although there was evidence to suggest that this was not a major problem in this study.

In addition, this research addressed more stages of the ethical decision-making process than typically done in previous studies (i.e. from intentions to actual behaviour), but not all the propositions on the role of neutralisation in decision-making as highlighted in chapter 2. More specifically, a longitudinal design would allow assessing the extent to which employment of neutralisation techniques upon

actual behaviour affects the recognition of a moral issue in a future situation, and this represents an interesting avenue for future research.

Lastly, although a student sample was deemed appropriate based on the prioritised objectives of this research, the generalisability of the findings cannot be guaranteed before further research employs more representative samples of the population.

5.8 Recommendations for Future Research

Given the limitations and ideas advanced throughout this chapter, there is scope for a variety of future research suggestions, some of which have been already noted.

In his review of the neutralisation literature, Fritsche (2005) comments on the considerable variance in effect sizes and points to moderator variables that might exert influence on the neutralisation effect. In relation to the present experimental study, it was suggested that a key moderator variable may be the existence of high costs or strong motivation to engage in counter-attitudinal behaviour. In fact more generally, if neutralising beliefs, apart from valid arguments also represent motivated cognitions, a future line of research should attempt to investigate such effects under conditions in which presumed motives for counter-attitudinal behaviour are activated. This however also applies to survey-based attempts. Conflicting motives may not be salient enough when people are simply asked to rate their acceptance of various neutralising statements and this might explain why moderating effects were not manifest in the present data. Therefore, both experimental and survey studies should attempt to increase the accessibility of conflicting motivations. For example, participants could be introduced to a high cost

pro-social behaviour prior to completing a questionnaire, by being told that they will be asked to donate some money, or part of their reimbursement to a relevant cause (e.g. Basil *et al.* 2006).

Alternatively, respondents could be presented with scenarios that describe realistic ethical dilemmas and at the same time work at increasing the salience of conflicting motives (e.g. by manipulating the actual monetary cost in each scenario). Scenario-based approaches face particular challenges, such as wording and framing effects (see e.g. Bateman *et al.* 2001), however they could also help address another potential moderator of the neutralisation effect. That is, increased situational applicability and accessibility of the neutralising arguments (cf. Agnew and Peters, 1986).

A supplementary line of experimental research, which would be useful on a practical level, would be to investigate when and in which contexts, neutralisation-based interventions may promote pro-social behaviour, over and above traditional approaches to social marketing. It was noted for example, that guilt-appeals – a predominant approach to the promotion of pro-social behaviour – may be of limited value, when consumers effectively mitigate guilty feelings through the use of neutralisation techniques. The mediating role of neutralisation in this context could be disrupted by introducing "anti-neutralisation" techniques along with emotional appeals to consumers' conscience.

In considering the limitations of the experimental study, it was also noted that a computer-administered questionnaire could have ensured that the dependent measure (i.e., intention) was measured immediately after the experimental

treatment as opposed to other possibilities. Computer-administered questionnaires have another desirable attribute. Aguinis *et al.* (1996) have shown that such procedures provide more efficient tests of moderation, as they can overcome problems relating to transcriptional errors and scale coarseness[74].

On a more general level, future research should attempt to replicate the existing findings and investigate neutralisation's role in additional behavioural contexts. Chapter 2 highlighted several consumer settings in which neutralisation promises to increase current explanatory and predictive ability. Further, by focusing on a generic framework, i.e., Rest's four-stage process, the initial conceptualisation can be readily transferred to most existing accounts of how and why consumers behave (un)ethically. Future research could therefore focus on other contexts but also provide comparative tests of alternative models of consumers' ethical decision-making.

5.9 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the results from the survey and experimental studies, in the light of previous findings and implications for the role of neutralisation in ethical decision-making research. Neutralisation had a significant, strong effect on intention and there was evidence it precedes actual behaviour, yet there was no clear and conclusive indication of moderating effects on the relationship of intention with internal ethics and attitudes, and with behaviour. Further, the experimental survey did not establish a causal role for neutralisation. These results leave neutralisation

[74] Scale coarseness refers to the operationalisation of a criterion variable that does not include sufficient scale points (Aguinis, 1995). In tests of moderation, a dependent variable should ideally have as many scale points as the product terms that are entered in the regression, something which is usually non-feasible in paper-and-pencil questionnaires.

susceptible to criticisms: neutralising beliefs do not need to be contrasted to positive attitudes or norm-acceptance, and they may represent simply another set of beliefs based on information, rather than biased judgments. Clearly, these seemingly dichotomous findings suggest that the processes investigated are inherently complex and fluid. The positive results suggest that neutralisation has a contribution to make but clear prediction of its role remains elusive and in some respects its effects are somewhat ambiguous.

Subsequently, the chapter considered the broader theoretical, methodological and practical implications of this thesis, the limitations of the research and directions for future studies. Theoretical implications related to the role of neutralisation in the consumer's ethical decision-making for relatively minor ethical breaches, the conceptualisation and operationalisation of neutralisation in this research, and what can be confidently concluded about neutralisation based on the current findings. Methodological implications concerned the broader use of survey experiments and observation of actual behaviour, whereas practical implications related to the scope for neutralisation-based interventions in encouraging pro-social behaviour. The current research however had some limitations, such as the use of a moderate sample size and problems with the construction and validation of some scales. Accordingly, there is scope for a variety of future research, such as the design of both surveys and experiments that increase the salience of conflicting motivations, the need to replicate the present findings and apply neutralisation in additional consumer contexts.

The fact that this research does not provide a neat complete set of positive results can be seen as both reassuring and frustrating in the same measure. A complete

and clear capture of these complex processes at the first attempt would have been surprising given the heritage of neutralisation research thus far. Conversely, it also suggests that the route towards a more comprehensive understanding of consumers' ethical decision-making is Byzantine.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: Interview Guide of Study One

Hello! I am a PhD student at Nottingham University Business School, doing research in people's attitudes and motivations underlying support for Fair Trade. Your help will be very much appreciated. The interview will be tape-recoded but all the answers you give are absolutely confidential, which means that nothing you say will ever be identified with your name. If you have any question during the interview, please feel free to ask. Is there anything you want to ask before beginning?

1. Right...Hello again! What's your name?
2. Can you recall the first time you heard of Fair Trade?
3. What do you think of Fair Trade more generally?

Checklist of issues to probe before the end of the interview:

4. Attitudes towards Fair Trade. Probe for range of beliefs and motivations.
5. Background knowledge.
6. Other ethical concerns in consumption.
7. Other people's attitudes and knowledge of Fair Trade issues. Probe for range of beliefs/motivations and interaction between own and other people's.
8. Respondent's actual behaviour, if not mentioned already. Probe further information (e.g. type of products and frequency).
9. Other people's actual behaviour, if not mentioned already. Probe for interaction between own and other people's.
10. Reasons for not supporting Fair Trade. Prompt further conversation (if applicable).
11. Other people's reasons for not supporting Fair Trade. Interaction between own and other people's (if applicable).

12. How do you feel about alternative ways of supporting the Fair Trade movement, say campaigning, petitioning, donating and so on?
13. Have you ever supported Fair Trade in such ways?

...Thank you so much for your time, that was very helpful!

APPENDIX 2: Elicitation Questionnaire

QUESTIONNAIRE

Fair Trade

The followings series of questions refer to your beliefs about supporting the Fair Trade movement in the near future.

Supporting the Fair Trade movement may involve buying Fair Trade products (products purchased under equitable trading agreements, involving co-operative rather than competitive trading principles, ensuring a fair price and fair working conditions for the producers and suppliers) but also backing the Fair Trade movement in other ways, for example, by making a donation to the Fair Trade Organization or signing a petition about Trade Justice.

1. What do you believe could be the main advantages of your support for Fair Trade in the near future

Q4. Do not answer until completed Q1-Q3
Importance

- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
-

2. What do you believe could be the main disadvantages of your support for Fair Trade in the near future

- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____

3. Is there anything else you associate with your support for Fair Trade in the near future

- _____ _____
- _____ _____

- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____

4. Treating Q.1-3 as one continuous question, please rank all the attributes you have listed in order of importance. Allocate a score of 1 for the most important, 2 for the next, and so on. So, for example, if the attributes listed for Q1-3 total 20, your importance ranking would start at 1 and end at 20, with 1 being the most important and 20 the least important. Please place ranking in the "Importance" column, next to the corresponding attributes, on the right hand side of this page

5. What obstacles, difficulties or problems can negatively affect your level of support for the Fair Trade movement

Q8. Do not answer until completed Q5-7
Importance

- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____

6. What factors or circumstances can positively affect your level of support for the Fair Trade movement

- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____

7. Are there any other issues or factors that come to mind when you think about the difficulties of supporting Fair Trade in the near future?

- _____ _____

- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____

8. Treating Q.5-7 as one continuous question, please rank all the attributes you have listed in order of importance. Allocate a score of 1 for the most important, 2 for the next, and so on. So, for example, if the attributes listed Q5-7 total 20, your importance ranking would start at 1 and end at 20, with 1 being the most important and 20 the least important. Please place ranking in the "Importance" column, next to the corresponding attributes, on the right hand side of this page

9. Please write down reasons, justifications or excuses for not supporting Fair Trade

Q12. Do not answer until completed Q.9-11
Importance

- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____

10. Please write down arguments that might be advanced to counter these reasons, justifications or excuses for not supporting Fair Trade

- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____

11. Please list anything else that comes to your mind when thinking about reasons, justifications or excuses for not supporting Fair Trade

- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____

12. Treating Q9-11 as one continuous question, please rank all the attributes you have listed in Q9-11 in order of importance. Allocate a score of 1 for the most important, 2 for the next, and so on. So, for example, if the attributes listed for Q9-11 total 20, your importance ranking would start at 1 and end at 8, with 1 being the most important and 20 the least important. Please place ranking in the "Importance" column, next to the corresponding attributes, on the right hand side of this page

13. Please list any groups or people who may approve of your supporting Fair Trade

Q16. Do not answer until completed Q.13-15
Importance

- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____

14. Please list any groups or people who may disapprove of your Supporting Fair Trade

- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____

15. Please list any other groups or people who come to mind when you think about supporting Fair Trade

- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____

16. Treating Q13-15 as one continuous question, please rank all the attributes you have listed in order of importance. Allocate a score of 1 for the most important, 2 for the next, and so on. So, for example, if the attributes listed for Q13-15 total 20, your importance ranking would start at 1 and end at 20, with 1 being the most important and 20 the least important. Please place rankings in the "Importance" column, next to the corresponding attributes, on the right hand side of this page

17. Please circle the appropriate response

a) Do you purchase fairly traded products?

Always Often Sometimes Never

b) If applicable, please list products purchased below

_____

_____

c) If applicable, where do you purchase those products?

_____

_____

d) Do you support the Fair Trade movement in any other ways?

Yes No

e) If applicable, please list how and where

_____

_____

18. If applicable, please list any other ethical consumer issues which you are concerned about

_____

_____

_____

19. If applicable, how did you first become aware of these ethical issues

_____

_____

20. With regards to ethical issues generally, please list any other sources which are important in affirming your ethical concerns

_____

_____

Facts about you

21. Gender: Male Female
22. Age: ____
23. Degree _____
24: Nationality_____
25. Please enter your name, room and mobile number (Please note that these details will only be used to claim your £5 reimbursement and in case I need to contact you in the future; your personal opinions and findings from the interviews will be treated with absolute confidence and reported anonymously)

Name _____
Student ID number_____
Room number _____
Mobile number _____

THANK YOU VERY MUCH!

APPENDIX 3: Main Survey Questionnaire

ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE COMMITTEE
FAIR TRADE FORTNIGHT

The University of Nottingham

SURVEY OF CONSUMER SUPPORT FOR THE FAIR TRADE MOVEMENT

Your opinion is essential to a better understanding of this important issue, "Supporting the Fair Trade movement". This is the subject of my PhD research at Nottingham University Business School. Your contribution will be very important and I'm very hopeful that you will participate by completing the following questionnaire. To acknowledge in some way my appreciation for your co-operation, upon completing this questionnaire you will be entered into a **£300** prize draw.

The questionnaire should require no more than **15- 20 minutes** to complete, and I can assure you of total confidentiality. I hope you will take the time to complete this questionnaire and return to a member of the Environment and Social Justice Committee, at the **Fair Trade** roadshow which is going to take place **in Ancaster Hall, tomorrow (Tuesday the 14th), during dinnertime.** The prize draw will take place on the 21st of March 2006 and winners will be notified by email. Your willingness to assist in this research is very much appreciated.

The followings series of questions refer to your beliefs about supporting the Fair Trade movement in the near future. Please read the definition provided below:

IMPORTANT NOTE: *Supporting* the Fair Trade movement may involve *buying* Fair Trade products, that is, products that have been certified by the Fair Trade Labeling Organization for being purchased under equitable trading agreements, involving co-operative rather than competitive trading principles, ensuring a fair price and fair working conditions for the producers and suppliers. Support also includes backing the Fair Trade movement in other ways, for example, by *making a donation* to the Fair Trade Organization or *signing a petition* about Trade Justice.

INSTRUCTIONS: Many questions in this survey make use of rating scales with 7 places; you are to circle one number that best describes your opinion. For example, if you were asked to rate "The Weather in Nottingham" on such a scale, e.g.

The Weather in Nottingham is:
Very bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very good

The 7 places should be interpreted as follows: 1 = very bad, 2 = moderately bad, 3 = slightly bad, 4 neither/not sure, 5 = slightly good, 6 moderately good, 7 very good

Please remember to: a) answer all questions; b) circle ONLY ONE number for each question.
Answer each of the following questions by circling the number that best describes your opinion. Some of the questions may appear to be similar, but they do address somewhat different issues. Please read each question carefully.

1. My support for Fair Trade will

	Unlikely						Likely
a) result in a fair price for fair trade producers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
b) result in better living conditions for fair trade producers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
c) give me a clearer conscience	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
d) increase other people's awareness about Fair Trade issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
e) help Fair Trade products become more mainstream	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
f) entail spending extra money	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
g) lead to biased/unhealthy competition in the market	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2. I believe

	Unimportant						Important
a) providing a fair price for fair trade producers is	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
b) providing better living conditions for fair trade producers is	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
c) having a clearer conscience is	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
d) increasing other people's awareness about Fair Trade issues is	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
e) helping Fair Trade products to become more mainstream is	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
f) spending extra money to support Fair Trade is	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
g) leading to biased/unhealthy competition in the market is	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3

3. Please indicate below how likely it is that the following groups think you should support Fair Trade

	Unlikely						Likely
a) Friends	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
b) Family	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
c) Fair Trade producers	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
d) Ethical organizations (e.g. charities, environmental groups etc)	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
e) Multinational companies (that do not sell Fair Trade products)	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3

4. Please indicate below how often you encounter the following problems when it comes to supporting Fair Trade

	Never						Always
a) Lack of information/awareness	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
b) Takes more time	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
c) Costs more money	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
d) Availability of opportunities to support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
e) Availability of Fair Trade products in retail outlets	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
f) Limited Range of Fair Trade products	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
g) Low quality of Fair Trade products	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

5. Please indicate below how likely are you to support Fair Trade when encountering the following problems

	Unlikely						Likely
a) Lack of information/awareness	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
b) Takes more time	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
c) Costs more money	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
d) Availability of opportunities to support Fair Trade	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
e) Availability of Fair Trade products in retail outlets	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
f) Limited Range of Fair Trade products	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
g) Low quality of Fair Trade products	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3

6. Please indicate the extent to which *you* agree with the following justifications *against* supporting Fair Trade

	Strongly disagree						**Strongly agree**
a) Ensuring Fair Trade should not be the consumers' responsibility	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
b) Fair Trade should only be a matter for international trading agreements not for individual consumers	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
c) Fair Trade should instead be promoted only by businesses themselves	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
d) It should be less costly to support Fair Trade	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
e) It should be easier to support Fair Trade	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
f) It should be made easier to find relevant information about Fair Trade	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
g) Fair Trade products should be of higher quality	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
h) I would support Fair Trade only if many other people were supporting it	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
i) I'm not sure that my support actually reaches Fair Trade producers	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
k) I'm not sure supporting Fair Trade makes much of a difference	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
l) I do not trust the Fair Trade labeling	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
m) Fair Trade is against the rationale/operation of the free trading/free market system	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
n) Subsidizing producers (through Fair Trade) leads to global oversupply of products	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
o) It's very difficult to visualize/picture any negative consequences (e.g. for producers) by not supporting Fair Trade	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
p) I should rather care more about the UK economy	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
q) I have more important priorities (e.g. money, convenience, quality)	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
r) I rather spend my time and effort engaging in other positive activities	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
s) It's something I would only do in the future (when I've got more time, money etc.)	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3

7. Generally speaking, how much do you want to do what the following groups think you should do?

	Not at all						**Very much**
a) Friends	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
b) Family	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
c) Fair Trade producers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
d) Ethical organizations (e.g. charities, environmental groups etc)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
e) Multinational companies (that do not sell Fair Trade products)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

	Strongly disagree						Strongly agree
8. Most people who are important to me support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. I feel that I have an ethical/moral obligation to support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. I expect to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. I personally feel I should support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. To support Fair Trade is an important part of who I am	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. I think of myself as someone who is concerned about ethical/moral issues in consumption	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. For me, to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future would be difficult	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. I want to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. Supporting the Fair Trade movement would be the right thing for me to do	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. If I wanted to, I could support the Fair Trade movement in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
18. Most people who are important to me think that I should support the Fair Trade movement	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19. For me, not supporting Fair Trade is justifiable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20. The people in my life whose opinions I value would not approve of my supporting for Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
21. I am not the type of person oriented to support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
22. The people in my life whose opinions I value support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
23. I have many arguments against supporting Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
24. It is mostly up to me whether or not I support Fair Trade in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
25. I intend to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
26. It is expected of me that I support Fair Trade in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
27. I've got reasons for not supporting Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
28. I intend to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future by buying Fair Trade products	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
29. I would support the Fair Trade movement in the near future, by signing a petition for Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
30. I would support the Fair Trade movement in the near future, by donating to the Fair Trade Organization	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

31. In general, my attitude towards Fair Trade is								
Unfavourable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Favourable
Negative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Positive

32. Supporting the Fair Trade movement is								
harmful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	beneficial
good	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	bad
pleasant (for me)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	unpleasant (for me)
worthless	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	valuable
enjoyable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	unenjoyable
rewarding	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	not rewarding
the right thing to do	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	the wrong thing to do

33. How much control do you believe you have over supporting Fair Trade in the near future?
No control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Complete control

34. In the course of the past three months, how many times have you decided to support the Fair Trade movement (please tick)
Every time that I had the opportunity __
Almost every time that I had the opportunity__
Most of the time that I had the opportunity __
About half of the times that I had the opportunity __
Sometimes, but less than half of the times I had the opportunity __
Few times that I had the opportunity __
Not at all when I had the opportunity __
I have not had the opportunity __

35. How often do you support the Fair Trade Movement?
Never 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Always

36. How often do you purchase Fair Trade products?
Never 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Always

37. Have you ever bought Fair Trade products (please tick)
Yes __
No, but I have had the opportunity __
No, I have not had the opportunity __

38. Have you ever signed a petition for Fair Trade (please tick)
Yes __
No, but I have had the opportunity __
No, I have not had the opportunity __

39. Have you ever donated to the Fair Trade Organization (please tick)
Yes __
No, but I have had the opportunity __
No, I have not had the opportunity __

40. Have you ever supported Fair Trade through other ways (please tick)
Yes __
No __
If yes please specify : _____

41. How familiar would you say you are with Fair Trade issues?
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A lot

42: When do you remember first hearing about Fair Trade?
Year Ago <1 1 2 /3 4 /5 6/7 8+ Years ago

43. Is there anything else you would like to add about supporting Fair Trade?

_____

_____

Facts about you

44. Gender: Male Female
45. Age: _____
46. Degree _____
47: Nationality _____
48: Please enter your full name and email address if you would like to be considered for the prize draw
Name_____ Email_____

THANK YOU VERY MUCH!!

Please return the questionnaire to a member of the Environment and Social Justice committee at the Fair Trade roadshow which will be taking place on the 14th of March, in the dining area, 6-7pm. You may be interested to know that at the roadshow, you will also have the opportunity to taste Fair Trade tea and hot chocolate and if you would like, donate to the Fair Trade Organisation.
In case you've got any questions about this questionnaire please email me at lixac2@nottingham.ac.uk

APPENDIX 4: Experimental Questionnaires (Version 1)

ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE COMMITTEE
FAIR TRADE FORTNIGHT

The University of Nottingham

SURVEY OF CONSUMER SUPPORT FOR THE FAIR TRADE MOVEMENT

Your opinion is essential to a better understanding of this important issue, "Supporting the Fair Trade movement". This is the subject of my PhD research at Nottingham University Business School. Your contribution will be very important and I'm very hopeful that you will participate by completing the following questionnaire. To acknowledge in some way my appreciation for your co-operation, upon completing this questionnaire you will be entered into a **£300** prize draw.

The questionnaire should require no more **than 5-10 minutes** to complete, and I can assure you of total confidentiality. I hope you will take the time to complete this questionnaire and return to a member of the Environment and Social Justice Committee, at the **Fair Trade roadshow** which is going to take place **in Nightingale Hall, tomorrow (Friday the 17th), during dinnertime.** The prize draw will take place on the 21st of March 2006 and winners will be notified by email. Your willingness to assist in this research is very much appreciated.

The followings series of questions refer to your beliefs about supporting the Fair Trade movement in the near future. Please read the definition provided below:

IMPORTANT NOTE: *Supporting* the Fair Trade movement may involve *buying* Fair Trade products, that is, products that have been certified by the Fair Trade Labeling Organization for being purchased under equitable trading agreements, involving co-operative rather than competitive trading principles, ensuring a fair price and fair working conditions for the producers and suppliers. Support also includes backing the Fair Trade movement in other ways, for example, by *making a donation* to the Fair Trade Organization or *signing a petition* about Trade Justice.

INSTRUCTIONS: Many questions in this survey make use of rating scales with 7 places; you are to circle one number that best describes your opinion. For example, if you were asked to rate "The Weather in Nottingham" on such a scale, e.g.

The Weather in Nottingham is:								
Very bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very good

The 7 places should be interpreted as follows: 1 = very bad, 2 = moderately bad, 3 = slightly bad, 4 neither/not sure, 5 = slightly good, 6 moderately good, 7 very good

Please remember to: a) answer all questions; b) circle ONLY ONE number for each question.
Answer each of the following questions by circling the number that best describes your opinion. Some of the questions may appear to be similar, but they do address somewhat different issues. Please read each question carefully.

1. In general, my attitude towards Fair Trade is								
Unfavourable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Favourable
Negative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Positive

2. Supporting the Fair Trade movement is								
harmful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	beneficial
good	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	bad
pleasant (for me)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	unpleasant (for me)
worthless	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	valuable
enjoyable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	unenjoyable
rewarding	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	not rewarding
the right thing to do	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	the wrong thing to do33. How

3. How much control do you believe you have over supporting Fair Trade in the near future?
No control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Complete control

4. In the course of the past three months, how many times have you decided to support the Fair Trade movement (please tick)
Every time that I had the opportunity __
Almost every time that I had the opportunity__
Most of the time that I had the opportunity __
About half of the times that I had the opportunity __
Sometimes, but less than half of the times I had the opportunity __
Few times that I had the opportunity __
Not at all when I had the opportunity __
I have not had the opportunity __

5. How often do you support the Fair Trade Movement?
Never 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Always

6. How often do you purchase Fair Trade products?
Never 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Always

7. Have you ever bought Fair Trade products (please tick)
Yes __
No, but I have had the opportunity __
No, I have not had the opportunity __

8. Have you ever signed a petition for Fair Trade (please tick)
Yes __
No, but I have had the opportunity __
No, I have not had the opportunity __

9. Have you ever donated to the Fair Trade Organization (please tick)
Yes __
No, but I have had the opportunity __
No, I have not had the opportunity __

10. Have you ever supported Fair Trade through other ways (please tick)
Yes __
No __
If yes please specify : _____

11. How familiar would you say you are with Fair Trade issues?
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A lot

12: When do you remember first hearing about Fair Trade?
Year Ago <1 1 2 /3 4 /5 6/7 8+ Years ago

13-31: For all the following statements, please indicate the extent to which you agree/disagree

	Strongly disagree						**Strongly agree**
13. Most people who are important to me support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. I feel that I have an ethical/moral obligation to support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. I expect to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. I personally feel I should support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. To support Fair Trade is an important part of who I am	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

18. I think of myself as someone who is concerned about ethical/moral issues in consumption	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19. For me, to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future would be difficult	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20. I want to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
21. Supporting the Fair Trade movement would be the right thing for me to do	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
22. If I wanted to, I could support the Fair Trade movement in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
23. Most people who are important to me think that I should support the Fair Trade movement	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
24. For me, not supporting Fair Trade is justifiable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
25. The people in my life whose opinions I value would not approve of my supporting for Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
26. I am not the type of person oriented to support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
27. The people in my life whose opinions I value support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
28. I have many arguments against supporting Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
29. It is mostly up to me whether or not I support Fair Trade in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
30. It is expected of me that I support Fair Trade in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
31. I've got reasons for not supporting Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

32-35: About your future intentions

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree
32. I intend to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
33. I intend to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future by buying Fair Trade products	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
34. I would support the Fair Trade movement in the near future, by signing a petition for Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
35. I would support the Fair Trade movement in the near future, by donating to the Fair Trade Organization	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

36. Is there anything else you would like to add about supporting Fair Trade?

_____

_____

_____

Facts about you

37. Gender: Male Female
38. Age: _____
39. Degree _____
40: Nationality _____
41: Please enter your full name and email address if you would like to be considered for the prize draw
Name_____Email_____

...THANK YOU VERY MUCH!!

Please return the questionnaire to a member of the Environment and Social Justice committee at the Fair Trade roadshow which will be taking place on the 17th of March, in the dining area, 6-7pm. You may be interested to know that at the roadshow, you will also have the opportunity to taste Fair Trade tea and hot chocolate and if you would like, donate to the Fair Trade Organisation.

In case you've got any questions about this questionnaire please email me at lixac2@nottingham.ac.uk

APPENDIX 4: Experimental Questionnaires (Version 2)

ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE COMMITTEE
FAIR TRADE FORTNIGHT

The University of Nottingham

SURVEY OF CONSUMER SUPPORT FOR THE FAIR TRADE MOVEMENT

Your opinion is essential to a better understanding of this important issue, "Supporting the Fair Trade movement". This is the subject of my PhD research at Nottingham University Business School. Your contribution will be very important and I'm very hopeful that you will participate by completing the following questionnaire. To acknowledge in some way my appreciation for your co-operation, upon completing this questionnaire you will be entered into a **£300** prize draw.

The questionnaire should require no more than 5-10 minutes to complete, and I can assure you of total confidentiality. I hope you will take the time to complete this questionnaire and return to a member of the Environment and Social Justice Committee, at the **Fair Trade** roadshow which is going to take place in **Lincoln Hall, tomorrow (Wednesday the 15th), during dinnertime**. The prize draw will take place on the 21st of March 2006 and winners will be notified by email. Your willingness to assist in this research is very much appreciated.

The followings series of questions refer to your beliefs about supporting the Fair Trade movement in the near future. Please read the definition provided below:

IMPORTANT NOTE: *Supporting* the Fair Trade movement may involve *buying* Fair Trade products, that is, products that have been certified by the Fair Trade Labeling Organization for being purchased under equitable trading agreements, involving co-operative rather than competitive trading principles, ensuring a fair price and fair working conditions for the producers and suppliers. Support also includes backing the Fair Trade movement in other ways, for example, by *making a donation* to the Fair Trade Organization or *signing a petition* about Trade Justice.

INSTRUCTIONS: Many questions in this survey make use of rating scales with 7 places; you are to circle one number that best describes your opinion. For example, if you were asked to rate "The Weather in Nottingham" on such a scale, e.g.

The Weather in Nottingham is:							
Very bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very good

The 7 places should be interpreted as follows: 1 = very bad, 2 = moderately bad, 3 = slightly bad, 4 neither/not sure, 5 = slightly good, 6 moderately good, 7 very good

Please remember to: a) answer all questions; b) circle ONLY ONE number for each question.
Answer each of the following questions by circling the number that best describes your opinion. Some of the questions may appear to be similar, but they do address somewhat different issues. Please read each question carefully.

1. In general, my attitude towards Fair Trade is								
Unfavourable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Favourable
Negative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Positive

2. Supporting the Fair Trade movement is								
harmful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	beneficial
good	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	bad
pleasant (for me)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	unpleasant (for me)
worthless	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	valuable
enjoyable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	unenjoyable
rewarding	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	not rewarding
the right thing to do	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	the wrong thing to do

3. How much control do you believe you have over supporting Fair Trade in the near future?
No control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Complete control

4. In the course of the past three months, how many times have you decided to support the Fair Trade movement (please tick)
Every time that I had the opportunity __
Almost every time that I had the opportunity__
Most of the time that I had the opportunity __
About half of the times that I had the opportunity __
Sometimes, but less than half of the times I had the opportunity __
Few times that I had the opportunity __
Not at all when I had the opportunity __
I have not had the opportunity __

5. How often do you support the Fair Trade Movement?
Never 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Always

6. How often do you purchase Fair Trade products?
Never 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Always

7. Have you ever bought Fair Trade products (please tick)
Yes __
No, but I have had the opportunity __
No, I have not had the opportunity __

8. Have you ever signed a petition for Fair Trade (please tick)
Yes __
No, but I have had the opportunity __
No, I have not had the opportunity __

9. Have you ever donated to the Fair Trade Organization (please tick)
Yes __
No, but I have had the opportunity __
No, I have not had the opportunity __

10. Have you ever supported Fair Trade in other ways (please tick)
Yes __
No __
If yes please specify : _____

11. How familiar would you say you are with Fair Trade issues?
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A lot

12: When do you remember first hearing about Fair Trade?
Year Ago -1 1 2/3 4/5 6/7 8+ Years ago

13-31: For all the following statements, please indicate the extent to which you agree/disagree.

	Strongly disagree						Strongly agree
13. Most people who are important to me support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. I feel that I have an ethical/moral obligation to support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. I expect to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. I personally feel I should support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. To support Fair Trade is an important part of who I am	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

18. I think of myself as someone who is concerned about ethical/moral issues in consumption	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19. For me, to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future would be difficult	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20. I want to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
21. Supporting the Fair Trade movement would be the right thing for me to do	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
22. If I wanted to, I could support the Fair Trade movement in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
23. Most people who are important to me think that I should support the Fair Trade movement	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
24. For me, not supporting Fair Trade is justifiable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
25. The people in my life whose opinions I value would not approve of my supporting for Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
26. I am not the type of person oriented to support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
27. The people in my life whose opinions I value support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
28. I have many arguments against supporting Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
29. It is mostly up to me whether or not I support Fair Trade in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
30. It is expected of me that I support Fair Trade in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
31. I've got reasons for not supporting Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

32. The following are reasons for not supporting Fair Trade, frequently expressed by students at Nottingham University. Please indicate the extent to which you agree/disagree.

	Strongly Disagree						**Strongly Agree**
a) It should be easier to find relevant information about Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
b) Fair Trade should be a matter for international trading agreements, not for individual consumers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
c) It should be less costly to support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
d) I have more important priorities (e.g. money, convenience)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
e) Subsidising producers (through Fair Trade) leads to global oversupply of goods	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
f) I do not trust the Fair Trade labeling	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
g) I'm not sure supporting Fair Trade makes much of a difference	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

(continued...)

33-36: About your future intentions.

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree
33. I intend to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
34. I intend to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future by buying Fair Trade products	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
35. I would support the Fair Trade movement in the near future, by signing a petition for Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
36. I would support the Fair Trade movement in the near future, by donating to the Fair Trade Organization	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

37. Is there anything else you would like to add about supporting Fair Trade?

_____

_____

_____

Facts about you

38. Gender: Male Female
39. Age: _____
40. Degree _____
41: Nationality _____
42: Please enter your full name and email address if you would like to be considered for the prize draw
Name_____Email_____

...THANK YOU VERY MUCH!!

Please return the questionnaire to a member of the Environment and Social Justice committee at the Fair Trade roadshow which will be taking place on the 15th of March, in the dining area, 6-7pm. You may be interested to know that at the roadshow, you will also have the opportunity to taste Fair Trade tea and hot chocolate and if you would like, donate to the Fair Trade Organisation.

In case you've got any questions about this questionnaire please email me at lixac2@nottingham.ac.uk

APPENDIX 4: Experimental Questionnaires (Version 3)

ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE COMMITTEE
FAIR TRADE FORTNIGHT

The University of Nottingham

SURVEY OF CONSUMER SUPPORT FOR THE FAIR TRADE MOVEMENT

Your opinion is essential to a better understanding of this important issue, "Supporting the Fair Trade movement". This is the subject of my PhD research at Nottingham University Business School. Your contribution will be very important and I'm very hopeful that you will participate by completing the following questionnaire. To acknowledge in some way my appreciation for your co-operation, upon completing this questionnaire you will be entered into a **£300** prize draw.

The questionnaire should require **no more than 5-10 minutes** to complete, and I can assure you of total confidentiality. I hope you will take the time to complete this questionnaire and return to a member of the Environment and Social Justice Committee, at the **Fair Trade roadshow** which is going to take place in **Florence Boot Hall, tomorrow (Thursday the 16th), during dinnertime**. The prize draw will take place on the 21st of March 2006 and winners will be notified by email. Your willingness to assist in this research is very much appreciated.

The followings series of questions refer to your beliefs about supporting the Fair Trade movement in the near future. Please read the definition provided below:

IMPORTANT NOTE: *Supporting* the Fair Trade movement may involve *buying* Fair Trade products, that is, products that have been certified by the Fair Trade Labeling Organization for being purchased under equitable trading agreements, involving co-operative rather than competitive trading principles, ensuring a fair price and fair working conditions for the producers and suppliers. Support also includes backing the Fair Trade movement in other ways, for example, by *making a donation* to the Fair Trade Organization or *signing a petition* about Trade Justice.

INSTRUCTIONS: Many questions in this survey make use of rating scales with 7 places; you are to circle one number that best describes your opinion. For example, if you were asked to rate "The Weather in Nottingham" on such a scale, e.g.

The Weather in Nottingham is:							
Very bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very good

The 7 places should be interpreted as follows: 1 = very bad, 2 = moderately bad, 3 = slightly bad, 4 neither/not sure, 5 = slightly good, 6 moderately good, 7 very good

Please remember to: a) answer all questions; b) circle ONLY ONE number for each question.
Answer each of the following questions by circling the number that best describes your opinion. Some of the questions may appear to be similar, but they do address somewhat different issues. Please read each question carefully.

1. In general, my attitude towards Fair Trade is							
Unfavourable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Favourable
Negative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Positive

2. Supporting the Fair Trade movement is							
harmful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	beneficial
good	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	bad
pleasant (for me)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	unpleasant (for me)
worthless	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	valuable
enjoyable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	unenjoyable
rewarding	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	not rewarding
the right thing to do	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	the wrong thing to do

3. How much control do you believe you have over supporting Fair Trade in the near future?
No control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Complete control

4. In the course of the past three months, how many times have you decided to support the Fair Trade movement (please tick)
Every time that I had the opportunity __
Almost every time that I had the opportunity__
Most of the time that I had the opportunity __
About half of the times that I had the opportunity __
Sometimes, but less than half of the times I had the opportunity __
Few times that I had the opportunity __
Not at all when I had the opportunity __
I have not had the opportunity __

5. How often do you support the Fair Trade Movement?
Never 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Always

6. How often do you purchase Fair Trade products?
Never 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Always

7. Have you ever bought Fair Trade products (please tick)
Yes __
No, but I have had the opportunity __
No, I have not had the opportunity __

8. Have you ever signed a petition for Fair Trade (please tick)
Yes __
No, but I have had the opportunity __
No, I have not had the opportunity __

9. Have you ever donated to the Fair Trade Organization (please tick)
Yes __
No, but I have had the opportunity __
No, I have not had the opportunity __

10. Have you ever supported Fair Trade in other ways (please tick)
Yes __
No __
If yes please specify : _____

11. How familiar would you say you are with Fair Trade issues?
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A lot

12: When do you remember first hearing about Fair Trade?
Year Ago -1 1 2 /3 4 /5 6/7 8+ Years ago

13-31: For all the following statements, please indicate the extent to which you agree/disagree

	Strongly disagree						**Strongly agree**
13. Most people who are important to me support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. I feel that I have an ethical/moral obligation to support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. I expect to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. I personally feel I should support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. To support Fair Trade is an important part of who I am	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

18. I think of myself as someone who is concerned about ethical/moral issues in consumption	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19. For me, to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future would be difficult	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20. I want to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
21. Supporting the Fair Trade movement would be the right thing for me to do	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
22. If I wanted to, I could support the Fair Trade movement in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
23. Most people who are important to me think that I should support the Fair Trade movement	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
24. For me, not supporting Fair Trade is justifiable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
25. The people in my life whose opinions I value would not approve of my supporting for Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
26. I am not the type of person oriented to support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
27. The people in my life whose opinions I value support Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
28. I have many arguments against supporting Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
29. It is mostly up to me whether or not I support Fair Trade in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
30. It is expected of me that I support Fair Trade in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
31. I've got reasons for not supporting Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

32. The following are possible excuses for not supporting Fair Trade (referenced in *italics*) and counter-arguments, as expressed by students at Nottingham University. Please indicate the extent to which you agree/disagree with the counter-arguments.

	Strongly disagree						**Strongly agree**
a. (it should be easier to find relevant information about Fair Trade):							
It's also true that most people choose not to be better informed about Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
b. *(Fair Trade should be a matter for international trading agreements, not for individual consumers):*							
Yet, modern western consumers should be more responsible and do their own bit to support Fair Trade, cannot just rely on international agreements	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
c. *(supporting Fair Trade is costly):*							
Most people I know can surely afford paying a few pennies extra for a good cause	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
d. (*having more important priorities, e.g. money, convenience):*							
...Sometimes ethics should come first and then money, convenience etc.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

e. *(subsidising producers, through Fair Trade, leads to global oversupply of goods):*

There is strong evidence that rather than leading to global oversupply of goods, a higher Fair Trade price leads to investments in quality and production improvements	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

f. *(not trusting the Fair Trade labeling):*

All products that carry the Fair Trade logo are assessed by an independent and highly credible body, that is, the Fair Trade Labeling Organization	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

g. *(not being sure that supporting Fair Trade makes much of a difference)*

Supporting Fair Trade even in a small way is still much better than doing nothing.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

33-36: About your future intentions

	Strongly disagree						Strongly agree
33. I intend to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
34. I intend to support the Fair Trade movement in the near future by buying Fair Trade products	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
35. I would support the Fair Trade movement in the near future, by signing a petition for Fair Trade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
36. I would support the Fair Trade movement in the near future, by donating to the Fair Trade Organization	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

37. Is there anything else you would like to add about supporting Fair Trade?

_____

_____

_____

Facts about you

38. Gender: Male Female
39. Age: _____
40. Degree _____
41: Nationality _____
42: Please enter your full name and email address if you would like to be considered for the prize draw
Name_____Email_____

...THANK YOU VERY MUCH!!

Please return the questionnaire to a member of the Environment and Social Justice committee at the Fair Trade roadshow which will be taking place on the 16th of March, in the dining area, 6-7pm. You may be interested to know that at the roadshow, you will also have the opportunity to taste Fair Trade tea and hot chocolate and if you would like, donate to the Fair Trade Organisation.

In case you've got any questions about this questionnaire please email me at lixac2@nottingham.ac.uk

APPENDIX 5: Summary of Results from the Questionnaire Pre-Tests

1. The introduction was expanded, to give clear instructions on how to complete the questionnaire.

2. Several sentences were reworded and rephrased.

3. The abbreviation for Fair Trade (i.e. FT) was omitted.

4. The initial layout, i.e. all similar questions in squared blocks (following Shaw, 2000) was changed to individual items for each direct measure, and blocks for the indirect ones, but with transparent bordering and shading.

5. The practice of reverse ordering was restricted to fewer questions (q.14, 20, 21, q32b, q32c, q32e, q32f, q32g) and only for the direct measures.

6. Some respondents found the experiential adjectives used in the direct measure of attitude rather vague/ambiguous (i.e. pleasant/unpleasant, rewording/not rewarding, enjoyable/unenjoyable), they were however kept at this stage, in order to keep with Ajzen's (2002) guidelines.

7. Scoring for most of the direct measures (q.8-31 in the survey questionnaire) was kept consistent. Few questions had to be slightly rephrased, in order to keep with recommended formats but prompt at the end for the respondents' agreement/disagreement.

8. The indirect, belief-based measures were introduced first, as respondents found them more engaging.

9. Layout and format were further changed in order to make the questionnaire look short and professional (e.g. key statements in bold, arial as opposed to times new roman, University of Nottingham's logo).

10. Participants in the PhD seminar pointed to the issues of familiarity with FT and relevant understanding based on different cultural backgrounds. These were used as filters in subsequent research.

APPENDIX 6: Bivariate Scatterplots between INT and IE, SN, PBC, NEUT and ATT




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30.00
25.00
20.00
15.00
10.00
5.00
INT
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
SN


35.00
30.00
25.00
20.00
15.00
10.00
5.00
INT
2.50
5.00
7.50
10.00
12.50
PBC


35.00
30.00
25.00
20.00
15.00
10.00
5.00
INT
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
NEUT


35.00
30.00
25.00
20.00
15.00
10.00
5.00
INT
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
45.00
ATT

APPENDIX 7: Confirmatory Factor Analysis – Full Results

4.1 CFA Results for ATT

Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default modsel)

Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

		Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
q32d	<--- ATT	1.078	.102	10.522	***	
q32bre	<--- ATT	.975	.087	11.205	***	
q32a	<--- ATT	.881	.074	11.830	***	
q31b	<--- ATT	1.010	.053	18.950	***	
q31a	<--- ATT	1.000				
q32gre	<--- ATT	.978	.095	10.270	***	

Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

		Estimate
q32d	<--- ATT	.725
q32bre	<--- ATT	.770
q32a	<--- ATT	.799
q31b	<--- ATT	.802
q31a	<--- ATT	.829
q32gre	<--- ATT	.720

Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
err2 <--> err1	.260	.059	4.414	***	
err4 <--> err9	.222	.068	3.238	.001	

Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)

		Estimate
err2	<--> err1	.572
err4	<--> err9	.324

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
ATT	.894	.136	6.598	***	
err5	.940	.115	8.207	***	
err4	.586	.078	7.556	***	

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
err3	.393	.054	7.251	***	
err2	.506	.073	6.918	***	
err1	.408	.063	6.491	***	
err9	.796	.099	8.041	***	

Squared Multiple Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate
q32gre	.518
q31a	.687
q31b	.643
q32a	.638
q32bre	.592
q32d	.525

Model Fit Summary

CMIN

Model	NPAR	CMIN	DF	P	CMIN/DF
Default model	14	8.308	7	.306	1.187
Saturated model	21	.000	0		
Independence model	6	757.682	15	.000	50.512

RMR, GFI

Model	RMR	GFI	AGFI	PGFI
Default model	.032	.986	.958	.329
Saturated model	.000	1.000		
Independence model	.769	.338	.074	.242

Baseline Comparisons

Model	NFI Delta1	RFI rho1	IFI Delta2	TLI rho2	CFI
Default model	.989	.977	.998	.996	.998
Saturated model	1.000		1.000		1.000
Independence model	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Parsimony-Adjusted Measures

Model	PRATIO	PNFI	PCFI
Default model	.467	.462	.466
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	1.000	.000	.000

NCP

Model	NCP	LO 90	HI 90
Default model	1.308	.000	12.820
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	742.682	656.238	836.524

FMIN

Model	FMIN	F0	LO 90	HI 90
Default model	.044	.007	.000	.068
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	4.009	3.930	3.472	4.426

RMSEA

Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSE
Default model	.031	.000	.098	.596
Independence model	.512	.481	.543	.000

AIC

Model	AIC	BCC	BIC	CAIC
Default model	36.308	37.385	81.766	95.766
Saturated model	42.000	43.615	110.188	131.188
Independence model	769.682	770.143	789.164	795.164

ECVI

Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI
Default model	.192	.185	.253	.198
Saturated model	.222	.222	.222	.231
Independence model	4.072	3.615	4.569	4.075

HOELTER

Model	HOELTER .05	HOELTER .01
Default model	321	421
Independence model	7	8

4.2 CFA Results for INT

Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
q10inta <--- INT	1.000				
q15intb <--- INT	.870	.068	12.766	***	
q25intc <--- INT	.886	.078	11.357	***	
q28intd <--- INT	.835	.077	10.788	***	
q29 <--- INT	.821	.093	8.834	***	
q30 <--- INT	.721	.104	6.955	***	

Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate
q10inta <--- INT	.846
q15intb <--- INT	.829
q25intc <--- INT	.759
q28intd <--- INT	.731
q29 <--- INT	.618
q30 <--- INT	.504

Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
err12 <--> err13	.272	.075	3.647	***	

Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate
err12 <--> err13	.366

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
INT	1.257	.184	6.837	***	
err10	.501	.080	6.263	***	
err11	.434	.065	6.688	***	
err12	.725	.094	7.744	***	
err13	.762	.095	8.006	***	
err14	1.372	.154	8.907	***	
err15	1.920	.207	9.275	***	

Squared Multiple Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate
Q30	.254
Q29	.381
Q28intd	.535
Q25intc	.576
Q15intb	.687
Q10inta	.715

Model Fit Summary

CMIN

Model	NPAR	CMIN	DF	P	CMIN/DF
Default model	13	21.681	8	.006	2.710
Saturated model	21	.000	0		
Independence model	6	554.001	15	.000	36.933

RMR, GFI

Model	RMR	GFI	AGFI	PGFI
Default model	.070	.966	.911	.368
Saturated model	.000	1.000		
Independence model	.798	.414	.179	.296

Baseline Comparisons

Model	NFI Delta1	RFI rho1	IFI Delta2	TLI rho2	CFI
Default model	.961	.927	.975	.952	.975
Saturated model	1.000		1.000		1.000
Independence model	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Parsimony-Adjusted Measures

Model	PRATIO	PNFI	PCFI
Default model	.533	.512	.520
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	1.000	.000	.000

NCP

Model	NCP	LO 90	HI 90
Default model	13.681	3.489	31.504
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	539.001	465.762	619.652

FMIN

Model	FMIN	F0	LO 90	HI 90
Default model	.115	.072	.018	.167
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	2.931	2.852	2.464	3.279

RMSEA

Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSE
Default model	.095	.048	.144	.056
Independence model	.436	.405	.468	.000

AIC

Model	AIC	BCC	BIC	CAIC
Default model	47.681	48.681	89.892	102.892
Saturated model	42.000	43.615	110.188	131.188
Independence model	566.001	566.462	585.483	591.483

ECVI

Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI
Default model	.252	.198	.347	.258
Saturated model	.222	.222	.222	.231
Independence model	2.995	2.607	3.421	2.997

HOELTER

Model	HOELTER .05	HOELTER .01
Default model	136	176
Independence model	9	11

4.3 CFA Results for SN

Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
q22snd <--- SN	1.050	.097	10.867	***	
q18snb <--- SN	1.039	.096	10.814	***	
q8sna <--- SN	1.000				

Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate
q22snd <--- SN	.838
q18snb <--- SN	.825
q8sna <--- SN	.775

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
SN	1.389	.236	5.887	***	
err4	.650	.120	5.427	***	
err2	.705	.121	5.815	***	
err1	.924	.131	7.056	***	

Squared Multiple Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate
q8sna	.601
q18snb	.680
q22snd	.702

4.4 CFA Results for EOB

Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
q16eobc <--- EOB	.908	.097	9.321	***	
q11eobb <--- EOB	1.063	.113	9.365	***	
q9eoba <--- EOB	1.000				

Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate
q16eobc <--- EOB	.730
q11eobb <--- EOB	.921
q9eoba <--- EOB	.712

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
EOB	1.203	.232	5.173	***	
err4	.868	.119	7.309	***	
err2	.242	.110	2.198	.028	
err1	1.168	.153	7.625	***	

Squared Multiple Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate
q9eoba	.507
q11eobb	.849
q16eobc	.533

4.5 CFA Results for SI

Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
q21sidre <--- SI	.772	.115	6.712	***	
q13sidb <--- SI	1.074	.163	6.594	***	
q12sida <--- SI	1.000				

Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate
q21sidre <--- SI	.618
q13sidb <--- SI	.811
q12sida <--- SI	.684

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
SI	1.222	.279	4.385	***	
err4	1.179	.155	7.626	***	
err2	.735	.201	3.665	***	
err1	1.390	.215	6.456	***	

Squared Multiple Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate
q12sida	.468
q13sidb	.657
q21sidre	.382

4.6 CFA Results for NEUT

Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
q27neutc <--- NEUT	1.516	.231	6.552	***	
q23neutb <--- NEUT	1.220	.181	6.725	***	
q19neuta <--- NEUT	1.000				

Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate
q27neutc <--- NEUT	.803
q23neutb <--- NEUT	.745
q19neuta <--- NEUT	.588

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
NEUT	.814	.210	3.877	***	
err4	1.031	.259	3.986	***	
err2	.971	.182	5.324	***	
err1	1.541	.189	8.161	***	

Squared Multiple Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate
q19neuta	.346
q23neutb	.555
q27neutc	.645

4.7 CFA Results for Model 1

Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
q32bre	<---	ATT	.889	.078	11.356	***	
q32d	<---	ATT	1.026	.092	11.131	***	
q32a	<---	ATT	.834	.066	12.687	***	
q31b	<---	ATT	1.025	.051	20.186	***	
q31a	<---	ATT	1.000				
q32gre	<---	ATT	.905	.086	10.552	***	
q9eoba	<---	IR	1.000				
q12sida	<---	IR	1.134	.116	9.751	***	
q13sidb	<---	IR	.917	.104	8.847	***	
q15intb	<---	INT	1.000				
q25intc	<---	INT	.970	.086	11.252	***	
q28intd	<---	INT	.928	.085	10.917	***	
q29	<---	INT	.910	.103	8.792	***	
q30	<---	INT	.859	.114	7.510	***	

Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate
q32bre	<---	ATT	.730
q32d	<---	ATT	.718
q32a	<---	ATT	.787
q31b	<---	ATT	.846
q31a	<---	ATT	.862
q32gre	<---	ATT	.693
q9eoba	<---	IR	.733
q12sida	<---	IR	.791
q13sidb	<---	IR	.706
q15intb	<---	INT	.843
q25intc	<---	INT	.736
q28intd	<---	INT	.720
q29	<---	INT	.606
q30	<---	INT	.532

Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
ATT <--> IR	.761	.125	6.095	***	
IR <--> INT	.971	.142	6.824	***	
ATT <--> INT	.840	.112	7.517	***	
err2 <--> err1	.173	.048	3.631	***	
err5 <--> err9	.296	.069	4.290	***	
err25 <--> err26	.314	.074	4.236	***	

Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate
ATT <--> IR	.687
IR <--> INT	.868
ATT <--> INT	.860
err2 <--> err1	.469
err5 <--> err9	.390
err25 <--> err26	.399

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
ATT	.967	.135	7.143	***	
IR	1.272	.234	5.435	***	
INT	.985	.143	6.887	***	
err5	.672	.079	8.473	***	
err4	.960	.112	8.607	***	
err3	.414	.052	7.989	***	
err2	.404	.060	6.687	***	
err1	.335	.053	6.385	***	
err9	.859	.099	8.691	***	
err10	1.098	.144	7.609	***	
err13	.976	.147	6.623	***	
err14	1.076	.136	7.919	***	
err24	.401	.059	6.740	***	
err25	.785	.095	8.301	***	
err26	.789	.094	8.415	***	
err27	1.403	.155	9.077	***	
err28	1.846	.199	9.287	***	

Squared Multiple Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate
q30	.283
q29	.368
q28intd	.518

	Estimate
q25intc	.541
q15intb	.711
q13sidb	.499
q12sida	.626
q9eoba	.537
Q32gre	.480
Q31a	.743
Q31b	.716
Q32a	.619
Q32d	.515
Q32bre	.532

Model Fit Summary

CMIN

Model	NPAR	CMIN	DF	P	CMIN/DF
Default model	34	127.041	71	.000	1.789
Saturated model	105	.000	0		
Independence model	14	1682.205	91	.000	18.486

RMR, GFI

Model	RMR	GFI	AGFI	PGFI
Default model	.088	.910	.866	.615
Saturated model	.000	1.000		
Independence model	.791	.244	.128	.212

Baseline Comparisons

Model	NFI Delta1	RFI rho1	IFI Delta2	TLI rho2	CFI
Default model	.924	.903	.965	.955	.965
Saturated model	1.000		1.000		1.000
Independence model	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Parsimony-Adjusted Measures

Model	PRATIO	PNFI	PCFI
Default model	.780	.721	.753
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	1.000	.000	.000

NCP

Model	NCP	LO 90	HI 90
Default model	56.041	28.421	91.505
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	1591.205	1461.764	1728.031

FMIN

Model	FMIN	F0	LO 90	HI 90
Default model	.672	.297	.150	.484
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	8.901	8.419	7.734	9.143

RMSEA

Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSE
Default model	.065	.046	.083	.093
Independence model	.304	.292	.317	.000

AIC

Model	AIC	BCC	BIC	CAIC
Default model	195.041	200.903	305.439	339.439
Saturated model	210.000	228.103	550.938	655.938
Independence model	1710.205	1712.618	1755.663	1769.663

ECVI

Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI
Default model	1.032	.886	1.220	1.063
Saturated model	1.111	1.111	1.111	1.207
Independence model	9.049	8.364	9.773	9.061

HOELTER

Model	HOELTER .05	HOELTER .01
Default model	137	152
Independence model	13	15

4.8 CFA Results for Model 2

Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

		Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
q8sna	<--- SN	1.000				
q18snb	<--- SN	1.021	.092	11.051	***	

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
q22snd	<---	SN	1.031	.093	11.140	***	
q19neutare	<---	NEUT	1.000				
q23neutbre	<---	NEUT	1.139	.165	6.881	***	
q27neutcre	<---	NEUT	1.651	.229	7.222	***	
q14pbcre	<---	PBC	1.000				
q17pbcb	<---	PBC	.928	.152	6.103	***	

Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate
q8sna	<---	SN	.785
q18snb	<---	SN	.821
q22snd	<---	SN	.833
q19neutare	<---	NEUT	.579
q23neutbre	<---	NEUT	.685
q27neutcre	<---	NEUT	.862
q14pbcre	<---	PBC	.701
q17pbcb	<---	PBC	.705

Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
SN	<-->	NEUT	.481	.117	4.115	***	
NEUT	<-->	PBC	.637	.138	4.610	***	
SN	<-->	PBC	.550	.140	3.922	***	

Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate
SN	<-->	NEUT	.453
NEUT	<-->	PBC	.675
SN	<-->	PBC	.435

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
SN	1.425	.237	6.019	***	
NEUT	.791	.200	3.945	***	
PBC	1.125	.262	4.300	***	
err16	.888	.127	6.992	***	
err17	.720	.117	6.148	***	
err18	.668	.115	5.809	***	
err19	1.564	.182	8.574	***	
err20	1.157	.154	7.497	***	
err21	.748	.208	3.600	***	
err22	1.166	.204	5.712	***	
err23	.983	.175	5.631	***	

Squared Multiple Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate
q17pbcb	.496
q14pbcre	.491
q27neutcre	.742
q23neutbre	.470
q19neutare	.336
q22snd	.694
q18snb	.674
q8sna	.616

Model Fit Summary

CMIN

Model	NPAR	CMIN	DF	P	CMIN/DF
Default model	19	24.429	17	.108	1.437
Saturated model	36	.000	0		
Independence model	8	554.656	28	.000	19.809

RMR, GFI

Model	RMR	GFI	AGFI	PGFI
Default model	.088	.969	.933	.457
Saturated model	.000	1.000		
Independence model	.780	.495	.351	.385

Baseline Comparisons

Model	NFI Delta1	RFI rho1	IFI Delta2	TLI rho2	CFI
Default model	.956	.927	.986	.977	.986
Saturated model	1.000		1.000		1.000
Independence model	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Parsimony-Adjusted Measures

Model	PRATIO	PNFI	PCFI
Default model	.607	.580	.599
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	1.000	.000	.000

NCP

Model	NCP	LO 90	HI 90
Default model	7.429	.000	24.694
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	526.656	453.835	606.902

FMIN

Model	FMIN	F0	LO 90	HI 90
Default model	.129	.039	.000	.131
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	2.935	2.787	2.401	3.211

RMSEA

Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSE
Default model	.048	.000	.088	.489
Independence model	.315	.293	.339	.000

AIC

Model	AIC	BCC	BIC	CAIC
Default model	62.429	64.329	124.122	143.122
Saturated model	72.000	75.600	188.893	224.893
Independence model	570.656	571.456	596.632	604.632

ECVI

Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI
Default model	.330	.291	.422	.340
Saturated model	.381	.381	.381	.400
Independence model	3.019	2.634	3.444	3.024

HOELTER

Model	HOELTER .05	HOELTER .01
Default model	214	259
Independence model	15	17

4.9 CFA Results for Model 3

Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
q32bre	<---	ATT	.901	.069	13.080	***	
q32d	<---	ATT	1.092	.078	13.973	***	
q32a	<---	ATT	.912	.059	15.581	***	
q31b	<---	ATT	1.018	.042	24.489	***	
q31a	<---	ATT	1.000				
q32gre	<---	ATT	.904	.072	12.598	***	
q9eoba	<---	IR	1.000				
q12sida	<---	IR	1.072	.084	12.745	***	
q13sidb	<---	IR	.889	.076	11.686	***	
q8sna	<---	SN	1.000				
q18snb	<---	SN	1.045	.087	12.010	***	
q22snd	<---	SN	.974	.082	11.820	***	
q19neuta	<---	NEUT	1.000				
q23neutb	<---	NEUT	1.172	.133	8.778	***	
q27neutc	<---	NEUT	1.474	.160	9.192	***	
q14pbcre	<---	PBC	1.000				
q17pbcb	<---	PBC	.922	.147	6.275	***	

Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate
q32bre	<---	ATT	.707
q32d	<---	ATT	.738
q32a	<---	ATT	.794
q31b	<---	ATT	.843
q31a	<---	ATT	.876
q32gre	<---	ATT	.689
q9eoba	<---	IR	.789
q12sida	<---	IR	.792
q13sidb	<---	IR	.728
q8sna	<---	SN	.765
q18snb	<---	SN	.799
q22snd	<---	SN	.781
q19neuta	<---	NEUT	.590
q23neutb	<---	NEUT	.733
q27neutc	<---	NEUT	.801
q14pbcre	<---	PBC	.679
q17pbcb	<---	PBC	.669

Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
ATT	<-->	IR	.803	.104	7.713	***	
IR	<-->	SN	.961	.135	7.112	***	
ATT	<-->	SN	.514	.089	5.765	***	
SN	<-->	NEUT	-.461	.097	-4.731	***	
IR	<-->	NEUT	-.690	.116	-5.950	***	
ATT	<-->	NEUT	-.696	.100	-6.965	***	
NEUT	<-->	PBC	-.577	.111	-5.183	***	
SN	<-->	PBC	.477	.112	4.251	***	

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
IR	<-->	PBC	.557	.120	4.659	***	
ATT	<-->	PBC	.362	.087	4.183	***	
err2	<-->	err1	.152	.036	4.274	***	
err5	<-->	err9	.286	.057	4.980	***	

Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate
ATT	<-->	IR	.713
IR	<-->	SN	.702
ATT	<-->	SN	.475
SN	<-->	NEUT	-.438
IR	<-->	NEUT	-.631
ATT	<-->	NEUT	-.805
NEUT	<-->	PBC	-.627
SN	<-->	PBC	.414
IR	<-->	PBC	.465
ATT	<-->	PBC	.383
err2	<-->	err1	.476
err5	<-->	err9	.374

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
ATT	.890	.102	8.685	***	
IR	1.424	.198	7.185	***	
SN	1.316	.194	6.784	***	
NEUT	.840	.172	4.869	***	
PBC	1.008	.219	4.609	***	
err5	.724	.071	10.238	***	
err4	.885	.088	10.044	***	
err3	.434	.046	9.402	***	
err2	.376	.047	8.002	***	
err1	.271	.037	7.229	***	
err9	.805	.078	10.351	***	
err10	.862	.105	8.240	***	
err13	.969	.119	8.167	***	
err14	1.001	.107	9.308	***	
err16	.933	.112	8.353	***	
err17	.813	.108	7.546	***	
err18	.799	.100	7.997	***	
err19	1.574	.152	10.347	***	
err20	.991	.111	8.911	***	
err21	1.020	.138	7.409	***	
err22	1.180	.181	6.531	***	
err23	1.057	.156	6.760	***	

Squared Multiple Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate

	Estimate
q17pbcb	.448
q14pbcre	.461
q27neutc	.641
q23neutb	.538
q19neuta	.348
q22snd	.610
q18snb	.638
q8sna	.585
q13sidb	.529
q12sida	.628
q9eoba	.623
q32gre	.474
q31a	.767
q31b	.710
q32a	.630
q32d	.545
q32bre	.500

Model Fit Summary

CMIN

Model	NPAR	CMIN	DF	P	CMIN/DF
Default model	46	182.173	107	.000	1.703
Saturated model	153	.000	0		
Independence model	17	2510.031	136	.000	18.456

RMR, GFI

Model	RMR	GFI	AGFI	PGFI
Default model	.091	.925	.893	.647
Saturated model	.000	1.000		
Independence model	.732	.273	.183	.243

Baseline Comparisons

Model	NFI Delta1	RFI rho1	IFI Delta2	TLI rho2	CFI
Default model	.927	.908	.969	.960	.968
Saturated model	1.000		1.000		1.000
Independence model	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Parsimony-Adjusted Measures

Model	PRATIO	PNFI	PCFI
Default model	.787	.730	.762
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	1.000	.000	.000

NCP

Model	NCP	LO 90	HI 90
Default model	75.173	41.740	116.484
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	2374.031	2215.082	2540.330

FMIN

Model	FMIN	F0	LO 90	HI 90
Default model	.690	.285	.158	.441
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	9.508	8.993	8.390	9.622

RMSEA

Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSE
Default model	.052	.038	.064	.405
Independence model	.257	.248	.266	.000

AIC

Model	AIC	BCC	BIC	CAIC
Default model	274.173	280.905	438.840	484.840
Saturated model	306.000	328.390	853.699	1006.699
Independence model	2544.031	2546.518	2604.886	2621.886

ECVI

Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI
Default model	1.039	.912	1.195	1.064
Saturated model	1.159	1.159	1.159	1.244
Independence model	9.636	9.034	10.266	9.646

HOELTER

Model	HOELTER .05	HOELTER .01
Default model	192	209
Independence model	18	19

4.10 CFA Results for Model 4

Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model)

Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
q32bre	<---	ATT	.855	.076	11.306	***	
q32d	<---	ATT	1.014	.088	11.510	***	
q32a	<---	ATT	.805	.063	12.759	***	
q31b	<---	ATT	1.025	.050	20.644	***	
q31a	<---	ATT	1.000				
q32gre	<---	ATT	.876	.083	10.590	***	
q9eoba	<---	IR	1.000				
q12sida	<---	IR	1.164	.116	10.064	***	
q13sidb	<---	IR	.941	.104	9.058	***	
q8sna	<---	SN	1.000				
q18snb	<---	SN	1.043	.092	11.300	***	
q22snd	<---	SN	1.040	.092	11.321	***	
q19neuta	<---	NEUT	1.000				
q23neutb	<---	NEUT	1.173	.150	7.799	***	
q27neutc	<---	NEUT	1.454	.179	8.147	***	
q14pbcre	<---	PBC	1.000				
q17pbcb	<---	PBC	.976	.147	6.631	***	
q15intb	<---	INT	1.000				
q25intc	<---	INT	1.063	.090	11.762	***	
q28intd	<---	INT	1.021	.089	11.477	***	
q29	<---	INT	.881	.110	7.985	***	
q30	<---	INT	.908	.120	7.587	***	

Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate
q32bre	<---	ATT	.713
q32d	<---	ATT	.721
q32a	<---	ATT	.772
q31b	<---	ATT	.860
q31a	<---	ATT	.876
q32gre	<---	ATT	.682
q9eoba	<---	IR	.719
q12sida	<---	IR	.798
q13sidb	<---	IR	.712
q8sna	<---	SN	.777
q18snb	<---	SN	.830

			Estimate
q22snd	<---	SN	.832
q19neuta	<---	NEUT	.607
q23neutb	<---	NEUT	.739
q27neutc	<---	NEUT	.795
q14pbcre	<---	PBC	.683
q17pbcb	<---	PBC	.723
q15intb	<---	INT	.810
q25intc	<---	INT	.775
q28intd	<---	INT	.761
q29	<---	INT	.564
q30	<---	INT	.540

Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
ATT	<-->	IR	.765	.124	6.147	***	
IR	<-->	SN	.939	.158	5.963	***	
ATT	<-->	SN	.557	.113	4.944	***	
SN	<-->	NEUT	-.499	.119	-4.211	***	
IR	<-->	NEUT	-.672	.133	-5.059	***	
ATT	<-->	NEUT	-.776	.127	-6.125	***	
NEUT	<-->	PBC	-.636	.135	-4.713	***	
SN	<-->	PBC	.534	.136	3.941	***	
IR	<-->	PBC	.678	.144	4.697	***	
ATT	<-->	PBC	.463	.112	4.151	***	
PBC	<-->	INT	.669	.125	5.338	***	
NEUT	<-->	INT	-.739	.124	-5.947	***	
SN	<-->	INT	.634	.117	5.421	***	
IR	<-->	INT	.928	.138	6.746	***	
ATT	<-->	INT	.815	.110	7.423	***	
err2	<-->	err1	.139	.044	3.188	.001	
err5	<-->	err9	.326	.070	4.641	***	
err25	<-->	err26	.215	.066	3.261	.001	

Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate
ATT	<-->	IR	.691
IR	<-->	SN	.718
ATT	<-->	SN	.472

			Estimate
SN	<-->	NEUT	-.454
IR	<-->	NEUT	-.651
ATT	<-->	NEUT	-.833
NEUT	<-->	PBC	-.661
SN	<-->	PBC	.437
IR	<-->	PBC	.592
ATT	<-->	PBC	.448
PBC	<-->	INT	.678
NEUT	<-->	INT	-.832
SN	<-->	INT	.563
IR	<-->	INT	.879
ATT	<-->	INT	.855
err2	<-->	err1	.416
err5	<-->	err9	.412
err25	<-->	err26	.312

Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
ATT	1.000	.136	7.377	***	
IR	1.227	.227	5.400	***	
SN	1.395	.233	5.991	***	
NEUT	.867	.201	4.304	***	
PBC	1.070	.244	4.380	***	
INT	.909	.139	6.541	***	
err5	.706	.081	8.720	***	
err4	.950	.109	8.707	***	
err3	.439	.053	8.321	***	
err2	.369	.056	6.573	***	
err1	.303	.049	6.238	***	
err9	.884	.100	8.872	***	
err10	1.143	.141	8.119	***	
err13	.949	.136	6.982	***	
err14	1.059	.129	8.193	***	
err16	.918	.124	7.389	***	
err17	.687	.110	6.273	***	
err18	.673	.108	6.221	***	
err19	1.488	.170	8.775	***	
err20	.990	.129	7.685	***	
err21	1.068	.159	6.705	***	
err22	1.222	.189	6.464	***	
err23	.933	.165	5.650	***	
err24	.476	.062	7.722	***	
err25	.685	.085	8.048	***	
err26	.690	.084	8.180	***	
err27	1.512	.163	9.281	***	

	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P	Label
err28	1.824	.195	9.335	***	

Squared Multiple Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)

	Estimate
q30	.291
q29	.318
q28intd	.579
q25intc	.600
q15intb	.656
q17pbcb	.522
q14pbcre	.467
q27neutc	.632
q23neutb	.546
q19neuta	.368
q22snd	.692
q18snb	.688
q8sna	.603
q13sidb	.506
q12sida	.636
q9eoba	.518
q32gre	.465
q31a	.768
q31b	.740
q32a	.596
q32d	.520
q32bre	.509

Model Fit Summary

CMIN

Model	NPAR	CMIN	DF	P	CMIN/DF
Default model	62	361.987	191	.000	1.895
Saturated model	253	.000	0		
Independence model	22	2657.705	231	.000	11.505

RMR, GFI

Model	RMR	GFI	AGFI	PGFI
Default model	.113	.847	.797	.639
Saturated model	.000	1.000		
Independence model	.774	.211	.136	.193

Baseline Comparisons

Model	NFI Delta1	RFI rho1	IFI Delta2	TLI rho2	CFI
Default model	.864	.835	.931	.915	.930
Saturated model	1.000		1.000		1.000

Model	NFI Delta1	RFI rho1	IFI Delta2	TLI rho2	CFI
Independence model	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Parsimony-Adjusted Measures

Model	PRATIO	PNFI	PCFI
Default model	.827	.714	.769
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	1.000	.000	.000

NCP

Model	NCP	LO 90	HI 90
Default model	170.987	121.149	228.638
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	2426.705	2264.470	2596.314

FMIN

Model	FMIN	F0	LO 90	HI 90
Default model	1.915	.905	.641	1.210
Saturated model	.000	.000	.000	.000
Independence model	14.062	12.840	11.981	13.737

RMSEA

Model	RMSEA	LO 90	HI 90	PCLOSE
Default model	.069	.058	.080	.003
Independence model	.236	.228	.244	.000

AIC

Model	AIC	BCC	BIC	CAIC
Default model	485.987	503.168	687.303	749.303
Saturated model	506.000	576.108	1327.497	1580.497
Independence model	2701.705	2707.801	2773.140	2795.140

ECVI

Model	ECVI	LO 90	HI 90	MECVI
Default model	2.571	2.308	2.876	2.662
Saturated model	2.677	2.677	2.677	3.048
Independence model	14.295	13.436	15.192	14.327

HOELTER

Model	HOELTER .05	HOELTER .01
Default model	118	125
Independence model	20	21