POST GENOCIDE RWANDA:

IMPLICATIONS FOR CROSS-CULTURAL POLICE TRAINING

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CONTENTS

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

APROSOMA	*Association pour la promotion sociale des masses* (predominately Hutu political party)
AR	Action Research
AWOL	Absent Without Leave
Banyarwanda	Rwandan people
CDR	The Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (set up by the MRND)
Cellules	Villages
CG(P)	Commissioner General (of Police)
CIPD	Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development
CLO	Community Liaison Officer
CPTS	Communal Police Training School
DCG(P)	Deputy Commissioner General (of Police)
Danida	Danish Government Aid Body
DfID	Department for International Development
FAR	Rwandan Armed Forces
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
Genociders (génocidaires)	Those who took an active role in the 1994 genocide
GIADNIR	Genocide, Impunity and Accountability: Dialogue for a National and International Response
GoR	Rwandan Government of National Unity
HRMFR	Human Rights Mission for Rwanda
ICT	Intercultural Training
ILMgt	Institute of Leadership and Management
Impuzamugambi	The youth wings of the MRND and CDR
Interahamwe	Rwanda militia who took an active part in the 1994 genocide
Inyambo	Best royal cattle
Inyenzi	Means 'cockroaches' and referred to groups of Tutsi refugees and the RPF
Ishega	Heifer or Cow
Jacquérie	'Peasant revolt'
MININTER	Ministry of Interior and Communal Development
MRND	National Republican Movement for Democracy (predominately Hutu political party)
MSF	Medicine Without Frontiers
Mwami	Rwandan King
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NPT	National Police Training (now Centrex)
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Overseas Development Administration
Parmehutu	*Parti du mouvement de Imancipation des Bahutu* (predominately Hutu political party)
PPC	Préfecture Police Commander
PRA	Participatory Rival Appraisal

GLOSSARY OF TERMS continued

RADER	*Rassemblement democratique rwandais* (predominately Tutsi political party)
RC(U)P	Rwandan Communal (and Urban) Police
Returnees	Rwandans returning from exile
RNP	Rwanda National Police
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army (formerly RPF)
RPC	Regional Préfecture Commander
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RTLM	Name of a Rwandan radio station that promoted the genocide
TNA	Training Needs Analysis
TORs	Terms of Reference
Ubuhake	A form of pastoral service
Ubukande	Donation of agricultural produce
Ugushega	A friendship exchange of cattle
Umeheto	Land client ship
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda
UNAR	*Union nationals rwandaise* (predominately Tutsi political party)
UNDP(R)	United Nations Development Programmes (in Rwanda)

Abstract

Within a period of three months in 1994, up to one million people were killed as a result of war and genocide in Rwanda. Large numbers were physically and psychologically afflicted for life through maiming, rape and other trauma; over two million fled to neighbouring countries and half as many became internally displaced within Rwanda's borders. Post-genocide Rwanda is dramatically different from pre-genocide Rwanda; the genocide transformed the social, political and cultural landscape of Rwanda and undermined the trust that normally binds its people together.

It was against this backdrop that I went to Rwanda in 1995 to engage in a process of action research with local stakeholders, in order to formulate, implement and evaluate a sustainable and effective police training programme. I was also able to reflect upon and research the issues of cultural transferability in a training context. This thesis therefore engages with both of those issues through a framework of the integrated theories of Weaver's 'Colliding Icebergs' (1993) and Schein's Process Consultation (1987 and 1998). Weaver believes that entering another culture is similar to two colliding icebergs. The real clash occurs beneath the water where values and thought patterns conflict — the area that Schein describes as 'Process' or, when deep-rooted and recurrent, 'Structure', that is **how** things are done. The part of the iceberg that is above the surface would be described by Schein as the 'Content' part of culture, that is **what** is done or the task that is to be achieved.

This research describes how our team and other international community transfer agents initially concentrated on the Content aspects of their research and assistance programmes and ignored the Process and Structure elements. In some cases this limited focus had catastrophic effects as many aid workers failed to incorporate the implications of genocide into the design and implementation of their assistance programmes. This apparent lack of understanding of the psychological impact of genocide (Process and Structure) contributed to the distrust, and even

outright hostility, of the Rwandan government and its people towards many of the international field operations in Rwanda.

Whilst working with and developing this theoretical framework for over four and a half years, in a particularly complex and sensitive cross-cultural situation, I identified many strengths that supported this action research. The integrated theories enabled both researchers and practitioners to analyse the cross-cultural situation in which they found themselves in order to fully understand the context of their research and interventions. Additionally, transfer teams and their stakeholder colleagues were able to artificially accelerate the maturity of their cross-cultural team, by making their own development part of their formal agenda (Content), rather than leaving it to chance.

This research therefore confirms the importance of personal and organisational intercultural training prior to and during any cross-cultural training event and emphasises the need to analyse, and intervene appropriately, in Content, Process and Structure issues. This includes the importance of understanding the external environment that the culture under research finds itself in and the need to acknowledge the shifting and kaleidoscopic nature of ethnic differentiations and identities. It also stresses the importance of communication and, mutual reflection and learning by the 'insider' and 'outsider' of the culture in which the action research and training is to be carried out.

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In memory of those Rwandan friends and colleagues who have died during the period of this research.

Chapter 1:

Introduction and Background to the Research

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Introduction

This introductory chapter presents the context in which this research was conceived and conducted. It begins with an insight into my own professional and personal background, as far as it is relevant to this piece of action research. It details the aims of my research and explains the issues that took me to Rwanda. This was primarily to produce a sustainable and effective police training programme in a post-war and genocide environment, along with Rwandan stakeholders. In the process of doing this, I began to reflect upon the issues of cultural transferability in a training context. This thesis therefore engages with both of these issues. The chapter then examines the role of the Communal Police before and during the 1994 genocide. It concludes with a section on rebuilding the police service.

Personal and professional background of the author

As an action researcher I had to be aware of my own background and subsequent personal value base, in order to maintain objectivity throughout my research and address issues of bias. I will state from the beginning that I was not always successful, for example, when my students became ill with malaria I was quick to intervene with the provision of medicine and mosquito nets. This obviously altered the situation and environment for my research subjects, but they were also people that I cared deeply about; consequently I was unable to remain an impartial 'pure' researcher. However, I was careful to record all of my interventions throughout the action research including the impact they had on any given situation. I therefore believe this introductory section is important for the readers, in order for them to have an understanding of my personal motivation for carrying out this work and gain an understanding of the ways in which it impacted on this research.

I served as a police cadet and officer of the Sussex Police for twenty-two years. Throughout the last seven years of my service I took an active interest in police training and equal opportunities; consequently my Masters degree in Education and Evaluation was entitled 'Sex Bias and Discrimination; Implications for Police Training'. The last four years of my police career were spent as a Director of Studies (National Trainer of British Police Trainers).

In April 1996 I left the police service to pursue a second career in training and development in my husband's company, although I have never lost contact with the police service as much of my current work still involves police training. This led to the Overseas Development Administration *(now The Department for International Development)* contacting our organisation regarding work in Rwanda. This culminated in a large contract to assist the newly formed Rwandan Communal and Urban Police *(RCUP, now the Rwanda National Police)* in the formulation and implementation of a sustainable and effective police training programme. At that time Rwanda was still decimated following the war and genocide that the people of Rwanda had endured.

It is not an exaggeration or superlative to say that the country, the tenacity of my Rwandan colleagues and the spirit of the Rwandan people stole a place in my heart, which will belong to them forever. I make this passionate statement deliberately, for it is an emotive fact that I had to wrestle with and discuss with my supervisors in order to remain objective when collecting and analysing data. For example if a Rwandan colleague, whom I admired for her/his strength of character and courage, made a statement during an interview I had to accord the statement its appropriate weight in my research, rather than weigh it emotionally.

My professional role in Rwanda involved carrying out three major Training Needs Analyses (TNAs), initially for the RCUP Trainers, in order to design and implement a competence-based Training of Trainers Programme. Later, TNAs involved countrywide consultations to develop Code of Conduct and human rights training for the Rwanda National Police (RNP). During my

stays in the country I became aware of many issues, both positive and negative, around the cross-cultural transference of professional methodologies from one country to another. Many of the negative issues concerned me for two reasons, the first being my own ignorance of such matters. Prior to the Rwandan project, I had only travelled abroad for short holidays in Europe and had no idea of the enormity of the task that presented itself. I was so confident in my own abilities as a Director of Studies, that I had not considered the implications of the cross-cultural transference of the British National Police Training estate's training methodologies to Rwanda.

One example that highlights this occurred when I gave an input to the RCUP Trainers on Practical Exercises (a type of role-play). This was followed by a simple four minute demonstration, by myself and a colleague, involving an 'RCUP officer' dealing with the theft of a goat. I then asked the RCUP Trainers to design a **simple** Practical Exercise, carry it out and video it, the primary training objective being that they could use the videos and/or the actual Practical Exercises when training new RCUP recruits. After a considerable period the Trainers played their Practical Exercise videos to my colleague and me for debriefing purposes. To our total surprise, they involved mass-murders, thefts from severely disabled people (played by RCUP Trainers), burglaries, very dramatic police chases, and the searching of vehicles containing criminals who were suspected of having firearms. The final video was a very dramatic production involving a married woman (played by a heavily disguised male RCUP Trainer) who met an old male friend. They went to bed together and began to hug and kiss, they were caught by the 'husband' who called the police. Amidst much screaming and wailing the 'wife' was arrested for adultery, which is a criminal offence in Rwanda, and taken to the police station where 'she' was charged. The video took over thirty minutes to run. All of these were a far cry from the simple Practical Exercises carried out by British Police Trainers and their recruits, examples of which would include the theft of a pedal cycle, shoplifting, minor public order problems and dealing with drunks.

In order to understand the cross-cultural issues that had created this situation I carried out semi-structured interviews with the RCUP Trainers. I found that drama has a very important place in

Rwandan culture; consequently most individuals are comfortable with it. To the RCUP Trainers the task I had set them was simply a form of drama, which they enjoyed with great gusto. This is different to the majority of British Police Trainers and students who are uncomfortable with drama and, consequently, with most forms of role-play/practical exercises.

The RCUP Trainers also described how the word 'simple' had meant something very different to them, when compared to my own interpretation. In a country that had recently experienced a horrific genocide, where an estimated eight hundred thousand to a million people were killed in just three months, the scenarios they had created were, to them, simple. Whereas my colleague and I had expected a variety of simple (by our values and standards) scenarios, involving minor crimes.

The second reason for my concern around the cross-cultural issues was the negative impact some of the events had on the Rwandan people. Following an unpleasant incident with a trainer from my team, who no longer works with us, one of the RCUP Trainers said, "I felt worse than a snake on the ground, he believes I am stupid because I am African. He thinks he knows what is best for me and for my country and his ideas are wrong, they will not help – I know my country but he will not listen".

Another incident occurred when a Western donor decided to provide some army-style lace-up boots to RCUP officers who were undergoing their initial training, because the donor's representative felt they looked 'scruffy' in their own shoes. However, the officers had already received a large quantity of similar boots from Britain, but had decided not to wear them until their pass out parade. The Chief of the RCUP requested that, if possible, could they be supplied with wellington boots instead. Before he could explain why, the donor representative replied that, "wellington boots are not suitable for the Rwandan climate, it's therefore army boots or nothing". He was also very rude, publicly, about the Rwandans, saying things such as: "... ignorant Rwandans who want foot rot" and "... who does he think he is? Beggars and bush fighters can't be choosers". At no time did he enter into conversation to ascertain the reason for the request. The impact of this, and many other such

episodes that I witnessed, caused me great worry. Combined with my aforementioned concern regarding my own ignorance and assumptions of cross-cultural situations, I was motivated to incorporate this issue in my research.

Aims of the research

As discussed earlier, the main aim of my presence in Rwanda was to engage in a process of action research with local stakeholders, in order to formulate, implement and evaluate a sustainable and effective police training programme in a post-war and genocide environment. The second aim of my research was to reflect upon and research the issues of cultural transferability in a training context. The two aims resulted in the following three key objectives:

1 To identify and discuss the problems facing foreign trainers/researchers and indigenous students/practitioners in the civil Rwandan police service, following war and genocide.

2 To identify the environmental, personal and economic factors that are likely to impact on the cultural transferability of British training and education to Rwanda, as a form of development.

3 To examine the effects of cross-cultural communication on the learning environment, including the implications of the exclusion or inclusion of indigenous cultural traditions from or into the training environment.

These objectives will later form the organisational framework for the presentation and analysis of results chapters. The following sections are intended to provide a backdrop to my research and therefore put it into context for the reader. They briefly explain: how the pre-war and genocide Communal Police were formed and the functions they performed; the role of the Communal Police in the genocide and the subsequent need to rebuild an efficient and effective police service.

The Communal Police in pre-war and genocide Rwanda

Rwanda is divided and subdivided into administrative units known as préfectures, sous-préfectures, communes, sectors and cellules; the cellule being the smallest of these. The préfet is the highest local government official, with sous-préfets, bourgmestres, councillors, responsables and Nyambukumi respectively in charge of smaller units. These names and designations are currently under review (2002). According to the 1991 census, 90.4% (or some 6.5 million) of the resident population in Rwanda was Hutu, 8.2% (0.6 million) Tutsi, and 0.4% (approximately 30,000) Twa. In general authors and interviewers (African Rights (1995a), Keane, (1996) and Vassell-Adams (1994) among them) are in agreement that these figures reflect reality, but there are some exceptions, particularly among Rwandan community interviewees.

In 1963 a presidential decree in Rwanda formally established the *police-communale* (Communal Police) as one of three bodies, along with the Gendarmerie (Military Police) and the army, who were charged with assuring the security of the Rwandan people. Until 1996 Communal Police agents were appointed by the commune leaders (bourgmestres) and in many cases were former gendarmes or army reservists. My research indicates that many of these appointments were based on family ties or other forms of nepotism, resulting in a corrupt and unreliable police service. As one interviewee of this research said:

> "On the face of it, which was not accurate, they were there to maintain internal peace, security and good order. They did not do this; in the killings of 1959 and 1994 the majority of Communal Police officers assisted with the murders and genocide."

My findings are supported in research carried out by African Rights (1995a) and the United Nations Development Programmes in Rwanda (UNDPR) (1997). They both state that most of the Communal Police played a very active role in the massacres and describe how the few police officers that tried to resist the genocide were murdered.

The role of the Rwandan Communal Police in the 1994 genocide

Of the many who have looked at and studied the war and genocide in Rwanda (Waller (1993), Vassall-Adams (1994) and Keane (1996) amongst them) only African Rights (1995a and 1995b) and the UNDPR (1997) have examined the involvement of the Communal Police. African Rights' research did not concentrate on the Communal Police in isolation; it focused on their role as agents of powerful women or local government officials. The research carried out by the UNDPR was on a very small scale. It is therefore important for this research, which focuses on the police service, to examine the role of the Communal Police in more depth. In order to do so it is necessary to begin with the following exploration of the events that led up to the war and genocide.

In the 1970s and 1980s, Rwanda was an authoritarian state ruled by President Juvenal Habyarimana with a single Hutu-led party, the National Republican Movement for Democracy (MRND). At that time the principle power struggle was between the northern-based MRND and a Hutu-led political opposition based in the centre and southern parts of Rwanda. Tutsis were largely absent in Rwandese politics.

In October 1990 there was an invasion by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), a group largely formed of Tutsi refugees in neighbouring countries. President Habyarimana and the MRND faced the prospect of electoral loss at the hands of the civilian parties and military defeat in the potential war with the RPF. The political and military opposition, neighbouring countries, aid donors and the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) began a democratisation and peace process. It was perceived that these initiatives would remove the MRND from power; subsequently political tension was high and killings and political assassinations began to take place, including a series of attacks against Tutsi communities in the Northwest in December 1992 and January 1993. An International Commission visited Rwanda in January 1993 and published a report two months later, which provided details about killings and massacres. It identified the individuals responsible for inciting and organising communal violence and named members of death squads. The principle

instruments in the killings included the Presidential Guard, the army, gendarmes, the Communal Police, the civil administration and the extremist MRND militia known as the *interahamwe*. The report also explained that these forces were developed in late 1990 and how they were expanded, trained and armed.

On the 8th February 1993 the RPF began an assault on Kigali; after a month of fighting a cease-fire was agreed and negotiations were set in place. The Government of Tanzania set the agenda, supported by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU); international observers included the United Nations and the governments of Belgium and Germany. There was a ten day meeting in Arusha, Tanzania, culminating in the signing of the 'Arusha Accords' on the 4th August 1993, which consisted of five protocols. In brief, they were:

1 Protocol on the rule of law. This committed the parties to upholding basic human rights.

2 Protocol on power sharing. All the existing institutions of government were to be reformed. The Presidency, cabinet and national assembly were to be transitional, pending democratic elections.

3 Protocol on the repatriation of refugees and resettlement of displaced people.

4 Protocol on the integration of the armed forces, i.e. integrating the RPF and the Rwandese Armed Forces into a new, smaller, unified army.

5 Protocol on miscellaneous issues and final provisions.

The Arusha agreements provided for a six hundred strong battalion of the RPF to be stationed at Kigali to provide security for the RPF members of the transitional cabinet and parliament. It also provided for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to oversee the implementation of the Accords. As a result, extremists within the MRND set up the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR) with an explicit agenda of Hutu ethnic supremacy. One political crisis followed another as President Habyarimana reneged repeatedly on his commitment to installing the transitional institutions of the Accords, despite pressure from international mediators.

On the 6th April 1994, the Government of Tanzania hosted a regional summit meeting on

Rwanda and Burundi. The Presidents of Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, the Vice-President of Kenya and the Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) all attended the meeting in Dar es Salaam. There was a great deal of international pressure on President Habyarimana, which compelled him to capitulate and agree to the Accords. At 20.30 hours President Habyarimana's private aeroplane was shot down as it approached Kigali airport, on its return from the summit. A few hours after the President's death the first killings began in the genocide of the Rwandese Tutsi and the murder of many moderate Hutus. Opposition politicians, independent journalists, human rights activists and senior civil servants were killed.

The first large-scale massacres were committed within days of the death of the President. Killing began in the southern préfecture of Gikongoro with a large number of isolated attacks on Tutsis; massacres in that area included Kibeho, where people were killed in the parish school and hospital. Other major massacres occurred in the Parishes of Kaduha and Muganza. In the adjacent Préfecture of Butare, there were no large-scale killings for twelve days as it was a stronghold for the opposition and because of the efforts of the préfet Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana, the only Tutsi préfet.

On the 19th April 1994 préfet Habyarimana was removed and replaced, resulting in mass killings. Many internally displaced people from Gikongoro and Greater Kigali had sought refuge in Butare. Because of the large concentration of people, the numbers killed were among the highest in all of Rwanda. In Gyahinda, it is estimated that twenty thousand people died. In Karama, between thirty-five and forty-three thousand are estimated to have been killed. The central Préfecture of Gitarama was initially calm, but several massacres are documented. In the southeast Préfecture of Kibungo, the killings began almost instantaneously. In Gahini, Rukara, Zaza and elsewhere there were mass killings. In Kigali City there were a number of large massacres, several of which are also documented by African Rights (1995a and 1995b). Kibuye, in the west, had the largest Tutsi population and was the region most devastated by the genocide. In a few weeks, nearly a quarter of a million

people were killed. Two thousand people were bulldozed to death at the Parish of Nyange in Kivumu. Thousands were murdered at the commune office of Rwamatamu, the Parish of Mubuga in Gishyita and at several Adventist churches in Ngoma, Muhomboli and Murangara. With the exception of Kibuye, Cyangugu in the southwest suffered the most from the genocide. Massacres were carried out in parishes throughout the préfecture at Nyamasheke, Hanika, Nkanka, Mibilizi and Shangi. People were murdered in schools and health centres attached to these parishes. African Rights (1995a p.119), state that:

> '... Civil administrators had a particular responsibility for the actions of communal policemen, who proved to be among the most cruel and systematic killers after 6th April ...'

In their publication *'Rwanda, Death, Despair and Defiance'* (1995a p.442) African Rights name many communal police officers that are alleged to have been involved in the genocide. They also include detailed transcripts from victims of the war who make allegations against Communal Police officers. An example of these transcripts follows:

> '... soldiers, communal policemen and militia came to attack the church of Mubuga. They shot so much into the refugees and used so many grenades that most of the refugees died. It is very difficult to estimate the number of victims. The church was packed with people, about eight thousand people and most of them died ...'
>
> *Zayasi Kanamugere (34 years of age)*

The African Rights' interviewees also state that some local policemen did their best to protect people from the killings. My own interviewees supported this finding and highlighted that the resistance of ordinary people, including Hutus, was crucial to the survival of many of the Tutsis. Two examples, which detail both resistance and killings, from an African Rights' publication (1995a) follow:

> "... We went to see the head of the gendarmerie in Gitarama. He was very cooperative and asked three young gendarmes to accompany us. They came with us to search for the perpetrators of the violence. On their way they saw about twenty-five persons coming from Kibuye, armed with spears and machetes... The policemen (*gendarmes*) tried to stop them ... took them to the

police station in town. They were released the next day ... The three policemen from Gitarma kept taking them back ... they were called away, apparently to go to the front."

African Rights (1995a pp 1048-1049)

Having survived the massacre itself, Yvette had to undergo further horrors that no human should ever experience, let alone a young schoolgirl ... "... they (*two gendarmes and the driver*) drove me to a house near the college where there were more than a dozen policemen. The interrogation began. It was followed by gang rape ... They began to beat me ... I realised that I was going to die ... I don't know how many policemen raped me, nor the number of times they raped me ..."

African Rights (1995a pp 310-311)

In another study, *'Not so Innocent'*, which looks specifically at the role of women killers, African Rights (1995b) detail killings that were carried out by named male Communal Police officers who were assisted or led by women. Examples of such murders occurred at the health centre of Sova and the Huye, Butare. At the health centre nuns assisted Communal Police officers, retired soldiers and other killers to burn alive and massacre in excess of six thousand refugees. At the convent refugees were forcibly ejected by nuns to ensure their deaths, in which Communal Police officers have been implicated. In the sector of Mutima, Commune Nyarugenge in Kigali, Euphrasie Kamatamu, the female councillor, is described as having actively participated in the genocide with the support of a Communal Police officer called 'Ninja', who lived with Euphrasie Kamatamu and her husband. In 1993, Kamatamu organised recruitment meetings for future *interahamwe* and 'Ninja' trained them. There are many eyewitness accounts of murders and atrocities committed by them during 1994 in African Rights' study of female killers (1995b). Another woman killer was Rose Karushara, a councillor in the sector of Kimisagara, commune Nyarugenge in Kigali; her bodyguard was a Communal Police officer called Ndahiro. One description of their activities states:

"Karushara and her allies killed a lot of people. At least five thousand were killed, all thrown into the Nyabarongo River under orders from Karushara. The Tutsis were thrown into the Nyabarongo river as paper is thrown into the dustbin ... I am ready to show all these mass graves."

African Rights (1995b pp117-118)

An undated (post November 1996/pre May 1998) African Rights' report on the massacres of almost fifty thousand Tutsis in Bisesero, Kibuye during the 1994 genocide, contains the testimonies of seventy-one survivors. They tell how the Tutsis, armed with clubs and spears, fought a battle against soldiers, Communal Police officers, Militia and civilian *génocidaires* equipped with guns and grenades. Chronological accounts from this report, which describe the activities of the Communal Police officers, are detailed below. Chadrac Muvunandinda (African Rights, undated pp 7-8) described an incident in early April 1994:

> "Shortly afterwards, a group of people, headed by the bourgmestre of the commune of Gishyita, some gendarmes and the policeman of the Commune, Ruhindura, arrived and declared a cease fire. Our arms were taken away from us and given to our enemies. These were our traditional arms, machetes, old spears and clubs."

Another witness, Michel Serumondo (African Rights, undated p.8) from sector Musenyi in Gishyita described how a great friendship with his neighbour, Sylvestre Rwigimba, ended when President Habyarimana died. He stated that Rwigimba was a Communal Police officer and the head of the cellule, when the bourgmestre ordered the Tutsis to give up their weapons. Rwigimba gathered them up so Michel went to see him. One of his two wives had taken their children to her parents' home in Gishyita. He was worried about his second wife, Agnes and their remaining children.

> "The evening of the 10th April, I went in Rwigimba's house to ask him why they wanted to kill us. I also wanted to ask him to hide my six children because he was a friend of mine. My wife Rachel Nyirampeta preferred to go to her parent's home in Ngama Gishyita and she left with her seven children. They all died with her during the genocide. When I got there he told me that it was thieves who were trying to sabotage the Tutsis. I asked Rwigimba to hide my children. He replied, laughing, that he could not hide any child, but that he could hide my cows and valuable objects. I realised that our first friends had become our first enemies.
>
> I felt angry when he told me that he could hide objects instead of my children. He could see very well that I was hungry, but he gave me nothing to eat or drink. Before the genocide, when I went to his house, he would welcome me with open arms and even if he had no beer he would go out and buy some

> straight away. I was disappointed that evening, I left the house and went to hide in the bush near where I lived; I could see Rwigimba's children stealing things like chairs and clothes from my house. When I saw this I was frightened, I was afraid to stay alone in the bush, so I went to the hill with the others. All the Tutsis had come to that same hill."

The 'transformation' of local government officials, policemen and soldiers into executioners is described by many of the survivors as 'shocking' and 'difficult to believe'. Anathalie Usabyimbabazi stated that: '...I could not believe that our local policeman, armed with his gun would shoot on people armed only with stones ...'. Catherine Kamayenge, aged 76, described the first attack, in which her husband was killed:

> "It began to rain at the time and we were shivering a lot. The cows mooed and the children began to cry. From that day on, we spent our lives in the bush. The next day, the *interahamwe* started to attack us. They were led by our councillor, Muhirwa and a policeman, Rwigimba. My husband was the first to die because he was the one who was guarding the cows when the militiamen came to steal them. My husband was hit on the head with a stone, he died immediately. We did not have too many problems burying him because it was still at the beginning of the genocide and things had not become too serious.
>
> Even though the *génocidaires* were attacking us we still tried to organise ourselves. The men carried spears and machetes to try and defend us. The women and girls had the responsibility of collecting stones so that they could push back the attackers. We therefore had to spend the whole of each day collecting these stones. My old age did not exempt me from the agony of collecting stones."
>
> *African Rights, undated p.20*

All the testimonies state that the battles usually began at around 9.00am and lasted until evening. The bourgmestres of Gishyita and Gisovu were among the leaders. Most of the assailants knew one or many of their intended victims — they included former friends and neighbours. The 'refugees' killed many of their opponents, including communal policemen and soldiers, taking their guns. Augustin Ndahimana Buranga (African Rights, undated p.22) said:

> "... we were also well organised; we went to fetch stones, spears and swords so that we could defend ourselves. We put up a strong fight during the month of April and at the beginning of May. We managed to kill a lot of militiamen, soldiers and police. We knew the men who attacked us at the beginning. They

used to be our neighbours. They would often call out our names and tell us not to run so that they could kill us more easily."

To quell the resistance shown to the genocide in Bisesero, armed reinforcements were drawn in for the *génocidaires*, from all over Rwanda on the 13th May 1994. The testimonies describe how 'virtually all the women and children died that day'. Claver Mbugufe (African Rights, undated p.33) described how: '...we spent the entire day running up and down. We tried to concentrate our defence in one area ... sometimes we even managed to wrest guns from soldiers and policemen'. It is estimated by African Rights (1995a, 1995b and undated) and the Rwanda Government for National Unity that as many as twenty-five thousand people were killed on the 13th May 1994 on the hills of Bisesero. When French soldiers arrived at the end of June 1994 there were approximately two thousand survivors remaining who came out of hiding to seek protection. The soldiers left for four days and on their return another thousand had been massacred. Five of the testimonies describe how Communal Police officers were killed by those who resisted the genocide. Others, like Rwigimba left Rwanda following the genocide; he returned with the influx of refugees in November 1996 and was subsequently arrested.

Whilst the RPF was a party to the conflict with the government, there is no evidence to suggest that they were a party to the genocide. All accounts and independent research indicate that the final RPF offensive, launched in the afternoon of the 7th April 1994 and the subsequent victory is what brought the genocide to an end. On the 19th July 1994 the new Government of National Unity was sworn in at Kigali.

Rebuilding the police service

The atrocities committed by the police during the genocide were discussed openly by the post-war and genocide Rwandan Communal and Urban Police officials during interviews that I carried out during 1998 and in the UNDPR publication, *'The Rwandan Communal Police'* (1997). This small book describes how the Communal Police Force was decimated due to the active role it played in

the massacres, as most of its members fled the country. It went on to say that rebuilding the police service was one of the priorities of the new Government of National Unity. At that time the Ministry of Interior and Communal Development (MININTER) was made responsible for re-establishing the Rwanda Communal and Urban Police (RCUP). They prepared plans in collaboration with the UNDPR and several donor countries to establish a well trained and impartial force. The premises for the Police Training School in Gishali was inaugurated on the 19th November 1995 when the first group of seven hundred and fifty RCUP officers (known as 'cadets' whilst in training) began a four month training programme. This training resulted in the deployment of four police officers per commune and one hundred and twenty-seven RCUP officers formed the core of the Urban Police in Kigali City. A second group of seven hundred and fifty cadets began a six month training programme at the school in August 1996, which is the intake that I met on my initial visit to Rwanda, that is detailed in Chapter four on methodology. Thus my involvement with the rebuilding of the police service began.

Having presented a brief introduction to the context for this research, the following chapter will review literature that examines culture and associated phenomena in order to create a theoretical framework for the research.

Chapter 2:

Literature Review

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

> *Our culture is not inherently bad, despite the genocide. Western culture is not inherently bad; despite the assistance you gave to the genocide, despite your lack of intervention to stop it. I believe the majority of our culture is good as is the majority of yours. We must look for the good in each other, even if it is different and not easily recognisable to the other. Only then will we succeed.*
>
> Rwandan Police Constable, 1998

> *Intercultural sensitivity is not natural. It is not part of our primate past, nor has it characterised most of human history. Cross-cultural contact usually has been accompanied by bloodshed, oppression, or genocide ... Education and training in intercultural communication is an approach to changing our natural behaviour. With the concepts and skills developed in this field, we ask learners to transcend traditional ethnocentrism and to explore new relationships across cultural boundaries. This attempt at change must be approached with the greatest possible care.*
>
> M. Bennett, 1993, p.21

In order to research and analyse the process of producing a sustainable and effective police training programme in a post-war and genocide environment and the corresponding issue of cultural transferability in a training context, a theoretical framework is required. The first section of this literature review examines general definitions of culture at a national level. It also explores the associated phenomena of cultural differences, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, cross-cultural communication, disorientation, stress, cultural relativism and culture shock in both a general and a training context.

The final section pulls all the strands of the previous sections together, to create the methodological and theoretical framework for this research, which is based around the Co-Generative Action Research Model of Greenwood and Levin (1998) and supported by the work of Edgar Schein (1987 and 1998), Gary Weaver (1993) and, Bhawuk and Triandis (1996).

These researchers and authors seek to demonstrate the importance of personal and organisational intercultural training prior to and during any cross-cultural training event and emphasise the need to analyse, and intervene appropriately, in Content, Process and Structure issues. They also stress the importance of communication, mutual reflection and learning by the 'insider' and 'outsider' of the culture in which the training is to be carried out.

Culture at a national level

The first clear and comprehensive definition of national culture was that of the British anthropologist Sir Edward Burnett Tylor. Writing in 1871, Tylor defined culture as, "That complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society". Since Tylor's time, definitions of culture have proliferated, so that by the early 1950s, North American anthropologists A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn were able to collect over a hundred definitions of culture from the available literature (Haviland 1996). Recent definitions tend to distinguish more clearly between actual behaviour and the abstract values, beliefs, and perceptions of the world that lie behind that behaviour.

Haviland (1996) believes that culture is not observable behaviour, but rather the shared ideals, values, and beliefs that people use to interpret experience and generate behaviour, and which are reflected in their behaviour. His modern definition of culture runs as follows: Culture is a set of rules or standards that, when acted upon by the members of a society, produce behaviour that falls within a range of variance the members consider proper and acceptable. It is axiomatic that different cultures will consider different behaviours acceptable and that different individuals within those cultures will have different ranges of variance. If individuals believe that it is *only* their own cultural values and behaviours that are acceptable, it can cause them to be ethnocentric or xenophobic as outlined in the following section.

Ethnocentrism and xenophobia

Schipper (1999 p.5) described ethnocentrism as ... 'this deep-rooted human feature ... can be defined as a group attitude in which a self-evident central position is given to ones own cultural group amid other groups and in which one's own group characteristics are valued positively and those of others negatively'. Haviland (1996 p.49) described the phenomenon as, 'any culture that is functioning adequately regards itself as the best'. He gives an example from the educator Dorothy Seymour regarding a dialect spoken by many inner city African Americans, which is often regarded by Americans from a different sub-cultural background as substandard and defective. Rather, he said, 'it is a highly structured mode of speech, capable of expressing anything its speakers wish to express - a fact that was recognised by Martin Luther King, Jr. who was particularly skilled at switching between the two dialects'.

Staub, E. (1992) and Allport, G (1958) both emphasise that a source of ethnocentrism is the fact that the human mind works by categorisation. Humans see and remember objects and people as green or red, tall or short. Staub argues that people would be overwhelmed by uncertainty and anxiety if they approached each event or person without using past learning as a guide. He also asserts that categorisation is a basis of stereotypes including exaggerated beliefs about groups that are often negative.

Many individuals also believe in the intrinsic superiority of the nation, group or culture to which they belong, which is often accompanied by feelings of dislike for other groups – this is known as xenophobia. It is stronger than ethnocentrism, in that it involves a hatred or fear of foreigners or strangers to their own politics or culture (Haviland 1996).

Daniel (1975 p.55) highlighted the problems that can occur as a result of ethnocentrism and/or xenophobia in a cross-cultural training environment, particularly in developing countries. He argued that the whole field of 'academic traffic is open to the sentiments of colonialism,

including paternalism, kindness and taking the victim by the hand and leading him into the light'. He discussed the commonly held view that Westerners are 'ahead' of the local population and argued that this terminology assumes that the cultural difference is one of being behind on the same road. He believes that other societies may simply follow different roads and there is no need for them to catch up, simply to intersect. He summarised by saying that the term 'ahead' simply feeds Western egos, whereas in reality there is too much wrong with our own affairs, and too little reason to assume that others must go along our road.

Saris, samosas and steel bands

Donald and Rattansi (1995 p.2) believe that many of the definitions of culture are far too simplistic and that they focus too much on the superficial manifestations of culture. They argue that this tends to reproduce the 'saris, samosas and steel bands' syndrome. Rattansi (1995, p.39) believes that the shape and character of ethnic cultural formation is too complex to be reduced to formulas around festivals, religions and lifestyles. They fail to grapple with the shifting and kaleidoscopic nature of ethnic differentiations and identities, and their relations to divisions of class and gender. An earlier piece of research, by Hofstede (1991 p.10) also examined the 'kaleidoscopic nature' of culture within every national culture, including regional or ethnic cultures; religious or linguistic affiliations; generation levels; gender; social class levels and organisational or corporate culture. He also explored how they may conflict with one another, for example, religious values may conflict with generation values; and gender values with organisational practices. If it is acknowledged that there are conflicting values within the same national culture, it is axiomatic that there is a likelihood of conflicting values between individuals from different national cultures.

Weaver's 'Iceberg Analogy' of culture

Weaver (1993, p.159-170) discussed the issue of conflicting values in depth; he believes that entering another culture is similar to two colliding icebergs. The real clash occurs beneath the water where values and thought patterns conflict — the area that Edgar Schein (1987 and 1998) described as 'process', that is **how** things are done, for values and thought patterns drive the way in which things are done. Schein described the deep-rooted recurrent process as 'structure'. Weaver believes this area is implicitly learned, unconscious, difficult to change and subjective. The part of the 'iceberg' that is above the surface would be described by Schein (1987 and 1998) as the 'content' part of culture, that is what is done or the task that is to be achieved. Weaver describes that area as explicitly learned, conscious, easily changed and objective. Figure 1 graphically demonstrates his analogy and I have integrated it with Schein's Process Consultation theory, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

Figure 1 An Integration of Weaver's (1993) and Schein's (1987 and 1998) Theories



Deihl, in Pillai and Shannon (1995) also discussed this issue of 'conflicting value systems' as a source of potential problems, when individuals from different national cultures meet, which will decrease the potential for successful transference. One example from his research is the 'ascriptive' (who they are) rather than 'achievement' (what they accomplish) social prestige value systems. Burchert's findings (1994), when she researched education in the development of Tanzania, supported Deihl's view regarding 'ascriptive' prestige; she described how economic and social activities determined when educational testing could be held and status differentials influenced who would sit and when. Generally, women and 'junior people' could not sit for the tests until their husbands or seniors had passed. Others, both women and men, refused to sit for fear of 'losing face' if they did not pass.

Daniel (1975 p.45-46) believes that Ree found a partial solution to the potential problems of conflicting value systems when he was discussing education in Pakistan and said:

> "I found myself sometimes refusing to give them advice which they asked for, or doing so only on the condition they would not take it, because it came from someone who did not know their problems or their culture. The most I felt I could do was to get them to look at the dangers and difficulties which we had found or foreseen . . . and to examine the solutions which we had tried, in order to see if they were relevant."

In addition to the potential problems caused by the conflicting value systems of individuals from different cultures, Daniel (1975) discusses the personal problems that may be faced by sojourners. He groups these together as causes and symptoms of culture shock, which is discussed in the following section.

Culture shock, disorientation and stress

Daniel (1975) discusses cultural shock, the initial condition of disorientation in which most people find themselves when they first live in a strange culture and the stress that is associated with that shock. It can be extended to include the period of cultural adaptation,

which normally follows, or the alternative of settling into a stable condition of hostility. An exhaustive review of the literature detailing the symptoms of stress is neither practicable nor desirable. Therefore, as this research aims to concentrate on the symptoms specific to cultural shock in a cross-cultural training context, this section of the review will focus on those aspects of stress that are relevant to the research.

Many authors have cited stress as one of the most significant concepts ever developed in the social and biomedical sciences. The term has become so widely and indeed loosely used, both in everyday speech and in a variety of different disciplines, that there is now a multiplicity of definitions, approaches, theories and models. There is no general agreement on a single, universally accepted, scientific definition of stress. However, Dale (1998) in her research on stress in British Police training environments argued that it could be proffered that stress is a perceptual phenomenon that arises from a comparison between external demands on the individual and the inherent ability to cope with those demands. The term stress refers to a process; that of experiencing problems and the resultant attempts to cope with them. The critical feature of the stress process is the individual's own perception of the problem. The structure of the problem can best be depicted in terms of the way that individuals evaluate or appraise their relationship with their environment and surrounding circumstances. This definition correlates with research on the stress that is caused to individuals during a culture shock, including the work of Daniel (1975).

When discussing the degree of stress experienced by a 'foreigner living in a strange society', Daniel (1975 p.60-61) believes that '...if the individual has a well balanced personality, they need no deep change of *persona*. Anyone who is accustomed to adapt himself to the different people whom he meets or has dealings with in the ordinary way should have little difficulty'. He goes on to describe how:

> "... a less outgoing personality may find more difficulty in cultural adaptation, although, if people are ill-adapted to their own cultures, they may be no worse

> adapted to a strange one. The characteristic of cultural difficulty is to be unable to behave as usual in a new cultural environment. Emotional instability must make it harder to manage without the support of a familiar background of life. Perfect emotional stability, if it exists, will make it possible wholly to ignore changes of background. If it be combined with intellectual curiosity, a fair degree of emotional stability must make for positive enjoyment of cultural change."

Dale (1998) believes that stress does not happen in a vacuum; it is accompanied over time by coping, which entails the individual's efforts to manage or overcome the source of stress and return the individual to a stable level of normal functioning. Havard, Rechnitzer and Cunningham (1975) argued that stress is the price individuals pay to survive – "As animals, humans now pay the price to accomplish what they consider great heights". They believe that there should be a balance between what people want to do and what they can achieve; between the significance of challenges to rise to and meet, and the price they will have to pay as a consequence. Their goals and priorities should then be established accordingly. This correlates with the findings of Deihl, in Pillai and Shannon (1995), who highlights 'unrealistic expectations' in the setting of goals and priorities as a factor that causes poor performance in attempts to transfer methodologies to developing areas. He describes the most common as 'excessive time optimism' when setting a goal, which places a burden on the transfer team ('outsiders' who are involved in cross-cultural work) and their counterparts, thereby reducing the potential for lasting change. One example from this research involved a task that most Westerners view as simple – photocopying. A British support member of the Research Team estimated that it would take her two hours to photocopy test papers for a group of students. In reality it took her two days and in her words, "Stressed me unbelievably, I couldn't believe it – broken photocopiers, no transport, when there was transport there was no fuel, no ink, electricity failure, no paper! – You name it and it happened".

Deihl, in Pillai and Shannon (1995 p.393-394) describe another 'unrealistic expectations in the setting of goals and priorities' as transfer teams who are unfamiliar with the degree of formality found in developing nations; consequently many fail to go through the correct, and often lengthy, consultation process. They simply revise the procedures of the host

country/organisation and prepare detailed programmes for their implementation, fully — but unrealistically — expecting that they will be utilised. When they are subsequently reviewed by senior personnel from the host country/organisation and turned down, members of the team experience varying degrees of stress. This can create a difficult or unsatisfactory relationship between the individuals concerned and their new environment.

Dale (1998) described how humans, like all living systems, are entirely dependent upon maintaining a satisfactory relationship with their total environment. Failure to do so can resort in the impaired effectiveness of their behaviour and in poor physical and psychological well-being. The many demands placed on a person, how they experience those demands and their affects are all involved in what she termed stress. Those involved in cross-cultural transference of training have to make adjustments in order to feel comfortable in the new environment. Some tutors and trainees achieve this more easily than others, with the resultant positive or negative effects on that individual. Daniel (1975) described the difficulties foreign teachers find in their new environments, which may cause dissatisfaction and subsequently impaired effectiveness. He included unaccustomed food and ways of washing; little resistance to infection in food and water; their own temperament; establishing social relations with those hosts who are already familiar with Western cultural preoccupations; taking 'expatriate myths' too seriously; isolation due to distance and poor communication, and a lack of resources. In the Rwandan situation it is important to note that these issues also impacted on the majority of the trainees, particularly during the first year of the research as the 'returnees' (the term used to describe refugee Rwandans who had returned to Rwanda) became used to their new home. Those who had been refugees, or had been living in exile, were as unaccustomed to the food, lack of resources and water infections as our team were. As one student trainer on the first Training of Trainers course said:

> " In Uganda there was a good water supply — dysentery was never a problem to me as it is now – I could get medicine, which I cannot now. I was in their police service, it had problems, but nothing like this – we are not starting from zero — it is far worse than that. But this is my country, I belong here whatever the problems, whatever the burden."

This links to the research by Dale (1998), who asserted that life change, such as working in another national culture, had been shown to be an important predictor of changes in mental and physical well-being. At least one very important aspect may be a change in the content of daily thinking; a person may need to undergo a period in which they free themselves from the old or previous environment or lifestyle and adapt to the new. During this period a person may be preoccupied or 'worried' and the content of the worry will relate to the demands made by the life change. This is supported by the 'Transactional Model' of Mackay and Cox (1976), which treats stress as the result of a particular dynamic interaction between the individual and the situation, including life changes. I found this model very helpful when introducing personnel to a new culture, one example being that I ensure that new personnel do not have any tasks to complete during the first two weeks of a long stay overseas. They simply observe, socialise and get to know the new culture that they are entering, using the strategy of 'cultural relativism', which is discussed in more depth later in this chapter. This period of 'cultural adaptation' reduces or eradicates the majority of the fears that the individual has – particularly those based on ethnocentric or xenophobic rumour and hearsay. This is supported by Haggard (1949) who asserted that a person is able to act realistically and effectively in a stressful situation only if they know the nature and seriousness of the threat, know what to do and are able to do it. An example of this occurred in 2002, following a severe volcanic eruption in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, just across the border of Rwanda. One of my new team members said: "I was watching Richard and Judy on TV, when Richard said … the poor Congolese, they have the choice of a volcano or going across the border to the genocidal Rwandans – personally I'd take my chance with the volcano; I find his comment really worrying".

This alleged comment created fear in the new team member who was due to work in Rwanda, as it greatly exaggerated the nature and seriousness of any threat he may face from the Rwandese. The period of cultural adaptation and communication with the Rwandese enabled him and other team members to understand the genuine safety issues that exist within Rwanda, which are far less than the chat show host appears to have intimated, thereby reducing their stress levels.

Cross-cultural communication

Daniel (1975) argued that people, due to their disorientation, stress and possibly their ethnocentrism or xenophobia, usually hate to overcome cultural barriers, which is why national clubs are so very popular overseas. He added that if English people cannot relax with English people, they are more likely to relax with American people or French people if the alternative is to relax with people who they perceive as even more different. This was very true in Rwanda, where the 'American Club' in Kigali was almost exclusively frequented by English-speaking whites of many different nationalities. Daniel (1975) continued by stating that every divergence of background inhibits communication to some extent, because people are deeply attached to their habits and customs, to particular ways of doing things, and greatly exaggerate their importance. This can lead to a lack of trust and misunderstandings. Daniel (1975) gives examples that include a culture that requires handshaking, head bowing and formality and another culture that acts differently, viewing the behaviour of the first as ridiculous. The other considers the second brusque, ill-bred and barbaric. Cultures that differ about methods of cleanliness in the lavatory are particularly apt to think of the other as dirty. All these differences can limit communication because of the hostility they engender. Daniel believed that most people have a fundamental weakness – the failure to accept that it is quite normal that other people should be different. Deihl, in Pillai and Shannon (1995 p.388-397) highlighted the following cross-cultural communication difficulties, associated with the transferability of management technology and the associated training to developing countries. Inadequate communication of innovations and inappropriate transfer agents; inappropriate use of transfer mechanisms, for example, inadequate executive support; inappropriate selection, overemphasis on formal training and inadequate provision for follow-through; unrealistic expectations. Assistance teams tend to believe what they are told by their host institution representatives, which in many cases does not reflect reality; the assistance team spend time revising current procedures (which are never followed) and preparing detailed programmes that ... (*are*) ... never implemented. Modern or 'superior' technologies may have superfluous characteristics

that exceed the needs of 'lesser developed countries', adopting management technologies because of their 'modernness' rather than their effective contributions.

Deihl (1995 p.396) concluded that whilst management technology is readily available it is not as readily accessible or transferable. Nevertheless he states that, "with proper adaptation, this technology is capable of assisting Third World managers to effectively utilise scarce development resources. In this manner the transfer of management technology is capable of accelerating the process of economic development".

Deihl's example highlights the additional dimensions that must be considered in any cross-cultural encounter in development co-operations. By definition, the donor country is rich and the receiving country poor. Hofstede (1991 p.218) argues that for decades, developing a country has been considered to primarily be an economic and technical problem; consequently, with some notable exceptions, development assistance has been dismal. He asserts that it is now evident that the quality of development co-operation depends on the effectiveness of the intercultural encounter of members of two very different societies. He believes that nobody can develop a country except its inhabitants; foreign 'experts' are only effective to the extent that they can transfer their know-how in the local context, and to the extent that the proposed aid fits in with the needs and priorities in the receiving countries. Hofstede believes this demands intercultural communication, understanding and training skills.

Hofstede's findings are supported by other researchers including Landis and Bhagat, 1996, and, Schell and Solomon, 1997, who believe in the importance of individuals receiving Intercultural Training (ICT) prior to working in a culture other than their own. In a survey of expatriates carried out by Schell and Solomon (1997), ninety per cent of respondents regarded cross-cultural preparation programmes as having great or high value. Only ten per cent indicated that it had medium or little value, although the perceived quality of the training they experienced may have influenced their responses. My research team were initially selected for the work in Rwanda because of our 'content' experience and expertise in Britain, even though we had never worked in

another culture. Consequently, we were totally unprepared regarding 'process' and 'structure' issues and learnt, predominately through our mistakes, as we went along. Bhawuk and Triandis (1996, p.18) would have described us as 'Lay Persons' in their Model of Intercultural Development (see Figure 2), which is discussed in more depth throughout this thesis.

Figure 2

A Model of Intercultural Expertise Development



Using his 'colliding iceberg' analogy, Weaver (1993) discusses the ICT programmes which begin with culture specific information alone (for example, Koreans have historically regarded foreigners as 'un persons'). He suggests that the focus is on 'those people,' and participants naturally expect to be given a 'cookbook', which starts them off on the wrong foot. He argues that ICT programmes which move from the culture general (the use of critical incidents from many different cultures, which allow trainees to learn principles that cut across specific cultures) to the culture specific should abate this desire for 'cookbooks'. In turn, sojourners are more likely to develop coping strategies and gain understanding rather than simply amassing questionable information. Culture specific knowledge is important and should be available with as much depth and breadth as possible. However, Weaver believes the mind set that aids cross-cultural adaptation best, is one oriented toward cross-cultural communication and process and focused on us rather than simply 'them'.

Weaver (1993) also asserts that training which begins with the study of 'those people' implies that we need not examine or understand our own culture. How can sojourners understand the impact of culture on the behaviour, perceptions, values and thought patterns of 'those people' if they do not understand the impact of their own culture on their personality? Weaver argues that an admonition that might be taken to heart by all trainers is 'know thy own culture first'. He also believes that for many Westerners, this is a special problem because most people are culturally unaware. They may have studied literature and history, but few have systematically studied their own culture and consequently, many take their own culture for granted.

Gudykunst, Guzley and Hammer (1996, p.65) summarise the goals and objectives of ICT as involving change in three areas: cognition, affect and behaviour. Cognitively, ICT helps trainees to understand how their own culture, stereotypes, values, thought patterns and attitudes influence their interactions with members of other cultures. Affectively, ICT aims at helping trainees to manage their emotional reactions when interacting with members of other cultures. Behaviourally, ICT is designed to help trainees to develop the skills they need to interact effectively with members of other cultures. Such training would, therefore, cover both content and process areas; however, Bhawuk and Trandis (1996 p.18) would still regard those who have gone through such training as 'Novices'. In order to become 'Experts' they would need to go through a more advanced theory based ICT, which would enable them to organise cognitions about cultural differences more meaningfully around a theory. In order to progress from 'Expert' to 'Advanced Experts' Bhawuk and Trandis assert that 'Experts' need to have the amount of practice that enables them to perform automatically.

Following our initial experiences as 'Lay Persons' working within Rwandan culture, our organisation ensured that the Research Team were provided with sufficient ICT to bring them to the level of 'Novice'. This was then complemented with a plethora of experiences and practice

within the Rwandan culture. I was the only team member to go through advanced theory based training in order to become an 'Expert' in the context of the Model of Intercultural Development, although I now (2002) run sessions with our cross-cultural transfer personnel to provide them with theory based training. However, I have difficulty with the terms 'Expert' and 'Advanced Expert'. To quote Rattansi (1995 p.39) I believe that they oversimplify the 'shifting and kaleidoscopic nature of ethnic differentiations and identities, and their relations to divisions of class and gender'. Further, I do not believe they take into account the environment that the culture finds itself within; for example, the post-war and genocide environment had a very negative affect on Rwandan culture. Shortly after the genocide, many Rwandan interviewees described their traditional culture as a 'gift culture', where any Rwandan would try to help a fellow Rwandan, even a stranger, in need with shelter and food. However, the war and genocide had caused people to lose trust in their friends and family, therefore they were now reluctant to provide accommodation for anyone. To become an 'Expert', I believe there is a need to move beyond the 'organisation of cognitions about cultural difference more meaningfully around a theory', in order to take account of contradiction and ambivalence in the operation of ethnocentrism and racism, and engage with 'new ethnicities' and other differentiations. New ethnicities are those individuals who have begun to explore, construct and express new identities, for example young Rwandans who grew up in exile among other cultures and have now returned to their mother country. They are 'borrowing' cultural elements, such as music and language from their country of exile and creating new syncretic versions. In order to become such an 'Expert' or 'Advanced Expert' I believe there is a need to 'organise the cognitions about cultural difference around a theory, particularly one which recognises the Content, Process and Structure elements of a culture. Preferably this should occur whilst working and living in the other culture and consciously learning about that culture and the environment it exists within. Cultural relativism is an important part of this process as it enables the researcher to suspend their judgement in order to understand the people and their practices in their own cultural terms.

Cultural relativism

Haviland (1996 pp.49-50) described the phenomenon of cultural relativism as 'the fight against ethnocentrism', stating that anthropologists have been actively engaged in such a fight ever since they started to live among so-called 'savage' peoples, then discovered that they were just as human as anyone else. He believes that, because of the discovery, anthropologists began to examine each culture on its own terms, asking whether the culture satisfied the needs and expectations of the people themselves: a theory that this research has shown to be of equal use to transfer teams, as it is to those involved in research. Haviland described cultural relativism as the idea that one must suspend judgement on other peoples' practices in order to understand them in their own cultural terms. He asserts that only through such an approach can one gain an undistorted view of another peoples' ways, as well as insights into the practices of one's own society. Essential though cultural relativism is as a practitioner or researcher's tool, it does not require suspension of judgement forever, or that researchers must defend the right of any people to engage in any practice, no matter how reprehensible. Haviland (1996 pp 49-50) stated that: "... all that is necessary is that they avoid premature judgements until they have a proper understanding of the culture in which they are interested". Then, and only then may the practitioner or researcher, usually but not exclusively an anthropologist, adapt a critical stance. Bodley (1990 p.138) quotes a useful formula devised almost fifty years ago by the anthropologist Walter Goldschmidt, who believed that the important question to ask, is:

> "How well does a given culture satisfy the physical and psychological need of those whose behaviour it guides?"

Goldschmidt stated that specific indicators are to be found in the nutritional status and general physical and mental health of its population, the incidence of crime and delinquency, the demographic structure, stability and tranquillity of domestic life, and the group's relationship to its resource base. The culture of a people who experience high rates of malnutrition, crime, delinquency, suicide, emotional disorders and despair, and environmental degradation may be

said to be operating less well that that of another people who exhibit few such problems.

Fox (1968 p.290) agrees with Goldschmidt when he states that:

> "In a well working culture, people 'can be proud, jealous, and pugnacious, and live a very satisfactory life without feeling '*angst*', 'alienation', 'anomie', 'depression', or any of the other pervasive ills of our own inhuman and uncivilised way of living."

Haviland (1996 p.51) summaries the views of Bodley, Goldschmidt and Fox by saying, "It is when people feel helpless to effect their own lives in their own societies, when traditional ways of coping no longer seem to work, that the symptoms of cultural breakdown become prominent". Haviland goes on to further describe culture, saying it is essentially a system to ensure the continued well-being of a group of people; therefore, it may be termed successful so long as it secures the survival of a society in a way that its members find reasonably fulfilling. He explains that matters are complicated because any society is made up of groups with different interests, raising the possibility that some peoples' needs may be served better than others'. Therefore, a culture that is quite fulfilling for one group within a society may be less so for another. For example, a group who instigate genocide may feel extremely fulfilled, whereas those who are forced to take part, or those who are victims, will obviously feel very differently. For this reason, Haviland believes that researchers must always ask: "Whose needs, and whose survival, is best served by the culture in question?" Only by looking at the overall situation can a reasonably objective judgement be made as to how well a culture is working. If the new Rwanda National Police is accepted as an integral part of Rwandan culture then rephrasing Goldschmidt's question, 'How well does the newly trained Rwandan National Police satisfy the physical and psychological needs of those whose behaviour it guides?', seems an appropriate research question. However, because of the actual and perceived divisions in Rwandan society, it is important to take this further and ask the questions posed by Haviland's summary: "Who are the groups with different needs?" and, "Whose needs, and whose survival, are best served by the Rwandan Police Service?"

African Rights' reports (1998 pp 369-379) of the insurgence by the Liberation Army of Rwanda

(ALIR) give some answers to Haviland's questions, for example twenty year old Ananias Sibomana's account of the murder of six students and a guard and the injury of 20 others at Nyange secondary school on the 18th March 1997. He tells how the 'infiltrators' (ALIR) asked the students to divide into 'ethnic lines'. Ananias explained how they shot at the students, then he said:

> "My determination not to separate from the others was a conscious one ... I could have gone to stand over in the place they told Hutus to go. But I know very well where ethnic problems have 'gotten' us, and I was determined to die with the others. I now think any Rwandese who attaches importance to ethnicity is an idiot ..."

My fundamental premise is that police training and the Rwandan Police Service should serve the needs of those who, like Ananias, are searching for peace, unity and the survival of the Rwandan people whatever their 'ethnicity'.

The methodological and theoretical framework

The Research Team and I selected Action Research (AR) as the basis of our methodological framework because we believe that AR contributes actively and directly to the processes of democratic social change that are required in Rwanda. AR will be discussed in more depth in the methodology chapter. As time progressed we worked particularly in accordance with the Co-generative Action Research Model of Greenwood and Levin (1998) – (see Figure 3) who advocate AR on two distinct but related bases: democratic inclusion and social research quality. They believe AR democratises research processes through the inclusion of the local stakeholders/actors as co-researchers and argue that AR produces better research results than those arising from the professional expert social research models. They also view AR as central to the enactment of a commitment to democratic social transformation through social research. Like Greenwood and Levin (1998) I do not believe that outsiders have the right or wisdom to lead others or correct social arrangements. It would be arrogant for 'outsiders' to tell the police service of Rwanda how they should police their country. However, they can offer their experience, skills

and knowledge to the Rwandan National Police, as the service moves through a rapid change process, against a background of war and genocide. I particularly advocate the AR approach when considering it against the more conventional and positivistic academic research practices that have occurred throughout Rwandan and general African history.

Figure 3

Greenwood and Levin's Co-Generative Action Research Model



Schipper (1999 p.2) in her research regarding 'insiders' and 'outsiders' in Africa, described how:

> "Throughout the centuries, human beings have created binaries, devising images of themselves as opposites of Others. They have embedded such images in stories, songs and other forms of artistic expression. Scholarship too has been influenced by people's imagination and existing narratives."

Schipper (1999 p.153) goes on to cite that an example of how this applied to Western (Self) research in Africa (Others) occurred as late as 1963 in a BBC radio lecture by the English historian Hugh Trevor-Roper. He claimed that Africa had no history and that there was nothing to be found on that continent other than 'unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes in

picturesque but irrelevant corners of the globe.'

Schipper (1999 p.3) believes that the African 'Other', as an object of research, became more and more problematic to scholars as they grew aware of the obscuring barriers of power between their own subjective gaze and the Other in a Western (white, colonial) history and culture. She stated that:

> "...because so many mistakes had been made in the past and because Western researchers were said to be descended from slave traders as well as colonialist and sexist ancestors, a new generation of scholars (emphasising at the same time their political correctness) began to assume a distance from this cultural and academic heritage, showing how wrong and disgusting their predecessors had been."

She goes on to describe how anthropology was the first of all human sciences to reconsider the relationship between Self and Other and the scientific consequences of the relationship. Because of the nature and the history of their disciplines they began to reflect on the problem of unequal power relations between researchers and their, then non-writing object of research. She describes how many anthropologists have tried to struggle free of the colonial behaviour pattern of their predecessors. My research demonstrates how AR can assist this process particularly when it is supported by activities that are based around the work of Gary Weaver (1993), Bhawuk and Triandis (1996) and Edgar Schein (1987 and 1998)

Schein's Process Consultation

Edgar Schein's (1987 and 1998) work focussed primarily on ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of managers and consultants in, what he termed as, 'process consultation' in organisational culture. Whilst it was not his intention, Schein's research and guidance proved equally efficient and effective in the delivery of cross-cultural training in Rwanda in the areas of national and organisational culture. In its broadest sense 'Process' refers to **how** things are done, rather than **what** is done that is the Content. Schein argued that an understanding of human

Interpersonal and Group Processes is critical for managers and consultants, because they spend far more time intervening in how things are done, rather than on what is done. To be effective they must be able to create situations that will ensure that good decisions are made. Schein also thought it was important to recognise that the concept of 'Organisational Structure' is only an extension of the concept of Process, in that it refers to those Processes that are stable, recurring, and defined by members in the group as their 'Structure'; it also includes any recurrent interpersonal relationships that are created to maintain that Structure. My research supports this assertion in relation to the cross-cultural transference of training methodologies, particularly in a post-crisis situation where sensitivities are higher, such as the war and genocide experienced by the Rwandan population. Those consultants and trainers who did not consider the *how* were more likely to fail than those who did. For example, many assumed that the Rwandan National Police had little or no 'Process Structure', due to its recent formation. In reality, much of the structure (recurrent processes, 'standard operating procedures' and recurrent interpersonal relationships) was formed in the Rwandan Patriotic Front, an understanding of which was very important to the success of any cross-cultural project, not just training initiatives.

Paige and Martin (1996, p.57) also supported these findings when they stated that, 'the complexities and demands of cross-cultural training require exceptional competencies of the intercultural trainer'. They included a variety of 'process consultation' skills including a high degree of self-awareness and a recognition of one's skill limitations; sensitivity to the needs of the learners; the ability to respond to problems that learners from other cultures encounter; and an awareness of the ethical issues involved in cross-cultural training, and conceptual understanding. Paige and Martin also included 'Content Skills' such as programme design and implementation skills; research and evaluation skills and theoretical understanding, which are obviously important but prone to be of little use if process is not understood and considered. They go on to say that due to the extensive competencies that are required, many researchers now argue that cross-cultural training should be a discipline in its own right and some campaign for a new commitment to professionalisation in the form of a licensure programme for inter cultural/cross-cultural trainers.

Hofstede (1991, p.221) described a study by the Canadian International Development Agency, which reinforces my argument. It sought the views of two hundred and fifty Canadian expatriates in six host countries and ninety host country counterparts who identified overseas effectiveness as consisting of three components: intercultural interaction and training, related to involvement with the local culture and people, including the transfer of skills; professional effectiveness in the performance of tasks, and personal adjustment related to the capacity for living abroad. The expatriates were found to be generally competent in the second and third area, but lacking in the first. However, their local counterparts stressed the transfer of job skills through intercultural training, interaction and interventions as the most crucial dimension for success (Hofstede quotes Hawes and Kealey, 1979).

Schein presented a simplifying model of the ways in which to intervene to improve a situation, which is reproduced at Figure 4. He described how 'one has to first differentiate a situation's content from its Process and its Structure. Secondly, one has to differentiate for each of the three aspects of a situation, whether we are focusing on the task issues or the interpersonal issues'. Other authors, including Hofstede (1991 p.219) describe task issues as 'institutional', but maintain the term 'interpersonal'. The Research Team and I initially found Schein's descriptions of the six areas of foci very difficult to understand; therefore I have attempted to simplify them in the following paragraphs in order for them to be more easily understood and utilised.

Figure 4

The Six Areas of Foci in Process Consultation (1987)

	Task		**Interpersonal**	
Content	1	Formal agenda, goals.	4	Who is doing what to whom?
Process	2	How the task is done.	5	How members relate to each other, communicate, *et cetera*.
Structure	3	Recurrent processes — 'standard operating procedures'.	6	Recurrent interpersonal relationships, roles.

Schein went on to develop each of the six areas of foci in a monocultural setting. In order to establish a theoretical framework for cross-cultural research, I linked Schein's theory to that of Weaver's (1993) on understanding and coping with cross-cultural adjustment stress through his iceberg analogy. I will utilise this framework in my methodology and analysis of the findings.

Task Content (Cell 1)

Schein (1987 and 1998) argues that the most obvious thing to focus on in any group situation is why it is there in the first place. What is the group's task? What are the aims and objectives? Why does the group exist at all? Every group, every organisation has an ultimate function, a reason for existence, a mission, and its goals and tasks derive from that ultimate function. A group may not be aware of its ultimate mission or may not agree on its goals. Schein believes that one of the main functions of the facilitator/trainer may be to help the group to understand its task and function. He stresses that it is something that any consultant should focus on explicitly, because if there is misunderstanding or disagreement at this level, the group will have a hard time functioning effectively. Therefore, the consultant must keep close track of the Task Content to make sure that it stays 'on track', to ensure that the group achieves its goals.

Schein describes how the most observable aspect of Task Content is the actual subject matter that the group talks about or works on, what would typically be labelled its 'formal agenda'. Having made time costly mistakes during our initial work in Rwanda our team quickly learnt the importance of an agreed formal agenda (Task Content). One example of a time costly problem occurred at a very early stage of the human rights programme. Many Rwandans had a totally different view of 'human rights as a policing function' to their British counterparts and vice versa. For instance, when I talked of 'universal human rights principles' it was argued by many Rwandans, that my so-called universal principles were in reality Western principles. Because of these concerns I created a 'Human Rights Research Discussion Document' (see Appendix 1).

This document discusses issues around policing and human rights, such as universal principles; policing and the exercise of power and authority; the dual function of policing, i.e. enforcing the law and the humanitarian social service role; styles of policing and police rights and duties. The document was translated and then read and altered by the sponsors, stakeholders and representatives of other interested parties. This ensured that we all had the same written vision and goals for the Rwanda National Police in relation to human rights. To ensure all team members had a common understanding of the aims and objectives of our programmes we utilised AR techniques. As discussed earlier, this was particularly in accordance with the Co-generative Action Research Model (see Figure 3) of Greenwood and Levin (1998). We also adopted the AR approach as good practice in the formulation of 'formal agendas' (Cell 1) in situations that did not require formal research conclusions. Our team offered their skills and knowledge to the police service and other local actors did the same; each bringing their own capacities and experiences to bear on the formulation of an agenda that was realistic, relevant and approved by the donors. This combination of personnel proved a powerful way to generate aims and objectives for our programmes, and all the actors were able to learn from each other.

AR also aims to alter the initial situation of the group, organisation or community in the direction of a more self-managing liberated state. Practitioners define 'liberated state' in a variety of ways from self-realisation to revolutionary praxis, however I agree with the view of Greenwood and Levin (1998) that most AR practitioners are democratic reformers rather than revolutionaries.

Task Process (Cell 2)

Schein (1987 and 1998) believes that even if you pay close attention to and actively manage Task Content, the group may develop communication problems. People may not listen to one another or may misunderstand one another, people may interrupt one another, arguments and conflicts may develop, and the group may not be able to agree. Too much time may be spent on

what might be regarded as trivial issues; disruptive side conversations may develop, and other behaviour may be displayed that gets in the way of effective task solution.

Groups may have the same task and same content yet engage in drastically different processes of working on the task. **Task Process**, then, is the way in which the group works, how it solves problems, gathers information, makes decisions, and so on. Schein's research highlights that Task Processes are elusive; it is easy to experience and to observe them, but hard to define and clearly segregate them from the content that is being worked on. He describes how group members learn that they can partially control the content outcomes by controlling the Process, as debaters do when they destroy an opponent's argument or composure by ridicule, changing the subject, or in other ways diverting the process from what has been said. He believes that one of the toughest tasks for the intervener is not to get seduced by the Content, not to get so caught up in the actual problem the group is working on as to cease to pay attention to **how** it is working.

An example of Task Process from the countrywide consultation was the focus groups. We had thoroughly prepared our Task Content, as a team, and had a detailed timetable and formal agenda. However, the British team members believed that timetable would be adhered to, except in emergencies, and the Rwanda team members had no such expectation because they placed a higher value on relationships. The concepts of low time emphasis and high time emphasis cultures, and high relationship emphasis, low relationship emphasis cultures are discussed in depth by Schell and Solomon (1997 pp 31 – 48), who believe that anyone functioning in the international arena, will immediately recognise the emphasis that each culture places on time and relationships and the way they communicate with each other.

Task Structure (Cell 3)

Schein (1987 and 1998) then described how, if you observe a group for some period of time, certain patterns recur, some kinds of events happen regularly and some kinds of events never

happen. For example, one group always uses parliamentary procedure, while another one refuses to vote on any issue, even if they cannot resolve the issue by any other means. One group always has an agenda and follows it slavishly, while another waits until the meeting begins before generating a list of topics. If the group contains more than one level of management, the likely pattern is that higher ranking people interrupt lower ranking ones, but never the reverse. These relatively **stable, recurring processes** that help the group or organisation to get its tasks accomplished are the **Task Structure** of the group.

In large organisations structure is the formal hierarchy, the defined chain of command, the systems of information and control, and other stable recurring processes that are taught to newcomers as 'the way we work around here'. As stated previously, it is important to recognise that the concept of Structure is only an extension of the concept of Process in that it refers to those Processes that are stable, recurring, and defined by members in the group as their 'Structure'. Schein (1987 and 1998) believes that all groups require such regularities and stability to make their environment and working patterns predictable and, thereby, manageable. The assumptions that develop over time as the underlying premises of those patterns can then be thought of as part of the culture of the group. They become shared and taken for granted, and the structures that we can observe can be viewed as artefacts or manifestations of the culture of the group (Schein, 1987 and 1998).

The culture itself is not immediately visible because it is best thought of as the taken for granted underlying and unconscious assumptions that have evolved over time to deal with the various external and internal issues that the group has had to face (Schein, 1987 and 1998). The culture will be reflected in the overt behaviour that is visible and can be searched out through a joint process of inquiry between the outsider and members of the group. For purposes of this model it is useful to focus on the manifest artefacts, the visible behaviour, always bearing in mind that they reflect important underlying assumptions that will eventually have to be taken into account. These assertions by Schein are supported by Weaver's (1993) 'colliding icebergs' analogy, when he describes 'values and thought patterns'.

Schein (1987 and 1998) explains how the Task Structure that evolves in a group is composed of regularities that pertain specifically to the group's survival in its external environment. He argued that all groups face at least five basic survival problems:

1 *Defining the fundamental mission that justifies its existence – its primary task.* The structural elements dealing with this issue are usually company charters, statements of philosophy or mission, formal agenda statements, and other efforts to document members' implicit understanding about the role of the group.

2 *Setting specific goals derived from the mission.* The structural elements are written goal statements, formal planning procedures and their outcomes, publicly defined targets and deadlines.

3 *Deciding what means to use to accomplish the goals.* The structures for accomplishing goals are the defined formal organisation, assigned task roles, and recurring procedures for solving problems and making decisions.

4 *Measuring and monitoring whether or not goals are being accomplished.* Formal information and control systems are set up, and managerial planning, budgeting, and review processes are formalised.

5 *Getting back on course by fixing problems once they are identified (when the group discovers it is off target or not accomplishing its goals).* A group needs processes for remedying situations, fixing problems, getting itself back on course. Often solutions are invented *ad hoc*, but any group or organisation has to be able to regularise remedial and corrective processes and thus make them part of the structure of the group.

Schein (1987 and 1998) describes how Task Structure processes will not be very stable in a young group; therefore a young group is not very structured. However, as the group evolves, it develops assumptions about itself. If those assumptions lead to success, they eventually become the culture of the group. They then become visible and may be formally described in organisation charts, manuals of procedure, rules of order, and other artefacts of the culture. This is an important area to consider prior to and throughout any cross-cultural project. Schein's discourse regarding young groups primarily referred to organisations in a monocultural setting and, therefore, should be developed to include cross-cultural issues. Following the war and genocide, many new groups and organisations were set up in Rwanda and it was easy for donor representatives to conclude that the personnel were inexperienced and the group had little or no structure. In some

organisations this, when researched, was true due to the rebuilding that was required by the country. However, the National Police was created from the Rwandan Patriotic Army (formally the Rwanda Patriotic Front), the Gendarmerie, the Communal Police and the Judicial Police. Therefore the newly formed police service had a combination of task structure elements, which either complemented or conflicted with each other and needed to be considered by our team. For example, different individuals from within the National Police had a variety of views on '... what means to use to accomplish the goals ...' dependant largely on the Task Structure of their original organisation. Other elements of Task Structure did not exist in the early stages, such as the fundamental mission and specific goals of the National Police. Many of these were formulated by the Research Team during the countrywide consultation, using the Draft Bill Seeking for the Establishment and Organisation of the Rwanda National Police and the relevant sections on Civil Liberties (12-33) from the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda as a guide.

Interpersonal Content (Cell 4)

All the cells that deal with the group's task and its problems of survival in its environment, have now been defined. Schein (1987 and 1998) then describes how a consultant or manager observing a group, will note immediately that many of the salient events that occur in the group have to do with what the individual members are doing to one another, much of which may have relatively little to do with the task at a manifest level. For example, Antoine seems to always get into arguments with Joan, and Immaculate consistently supports Jim, no matter what he says, and Rudy dominates the conversation and tries to control all the other members, while Paul speaks up rarely, and only when asked a direct question. Some individuals interrupt others, and others increase the tension in the group by being divisive, or reduce tension by telling a joke at just the right moment when things are getting tense. Some individuals are good initiators and energisers of the group, while others are good summarisers and are able to test consensus in the group.

Schein (1987 and 1998) states that just as we can track the content agenda of the group, we can also track 'who does what to whom', 'who plays what roles in the group', and construct a picture of the group in terms of the actual members and their relationship to one another and to the task. Whereas the focus in Cell 1 is on the task content, the focus in Cell 4 would be on the relationships among the members of the group, regardless of what the group is actually working on.

Interpersonal Process (Cell 5)

Schein (1987 and 1998) believes it is possible to observe a group at work and abstract the methods it uses to accomplish that work, so it is possible to abstract the Interpersonal Processes evident in a group independent of the actual people involved in these processes. For example, one group may exhibit frequent confrontation and arguing among members, while another group's members may always be very polite and agree with one another. In one group people may listen to each other intently and try to build on each other's ideas, while in another they may constantly vie for one another's attention - paying more attention to how they present their own view than to what others may have said. Schein's (1987 and 1998) explanation of interpersonal process, i.e. Group Process rather than Individual Process becomes more complex when there are cross-cultural considerations in the group. Whilst our team worked well together and enjoyed each other's company, there were still clearly distinct cultural forms of Interpersonal Process, independent of the actual individuals concerned. For example, it was possible to abstract the following forms of Interpersonal Process in relation to support personnel such as drivers, cleaners and cooks, irrespective of who the individuals were.

How Rwandan senior officers related to Rwandan support personnel.

How British senior managers related to Rwandan support personnel.

How Rwandan junior officers related to Rwandan support personnel.

How British support personnel related to Rwandan support personnel.

How Rwandan support personnel related to all the aforementioned groups.

Examples of these different forms of Interpersonal Process included the reverence that Rwandan support personnel showed to Rwandan senior officers and all whites. It was difficult to know if the manifestations of profound respect were genuine, but they were clearly demonstrated. Rwandan senior and junior officers were obviously used to having servants, they were polite to support personnel, but expected them to be in their place, such as the kitchen, whereas the British members of the team were not used to being waited on or driven, and most felt quite uncomfortable. This Interpersonal Process was demonstrated by British team members clearing the table, ironing their own clothes and making tea for support personnel. This, in turn, made the support personnel very uncomfortable.

It is important to observe Interpersonal Process because group outcomes result from a complex interaction of what goes on at the task (Cell 2) and interpersonal (Cell 5) level. For example, facilitators may notice that different members have different definitions of the task, and this leads to various kinds of communication breakdowns interfering with task performance. They may also notice that some members systematically seem not to listen to other members, resulting in imperfect accumulation of information relevant to the task. Other examples include groups where some members work on generating alternative solutions whilst others are busy advocating or attacking these solutions. Such interpersonal conflicts obviously get in the way of effective decision making.

All of these behaviours also involve Task Processes as previously defined in that they affect directly the efforts of the group to work on its task. Nevertheless, at the same time, each of these processes also involve aspects of members' relationships with and feelings about one another, their roles, and mutual influence patterns that do not directly affect the task. These then would be examples of **Interpersonal Process** that seem more motivated by the feelings people have toward each other than by task concerns. Schein (1987 and 1998) believes that one of the toughest choices for the intervener is deciding when to intervene around such processes

and when merely to note them and leave them alone.

Interpersonal Structure (Cell 6)

Schein (1987 and 1998) argued that in order to develop Structure — that is, stable, recurring processes — the group needs to develop a culture that will solve its problems of survival in the external environment. Similarly, any group or organisation needs to develop stable, recurring processes to manage its internal affairs, to enable members to work together and to feel secure as a group. Recurring and stable processes are necessary to make the internal group environment safe and predictable, so that members can relax enough to put their emotional energy into working on the survival tasks. Schein's research is probably even more relevant to the National Police, in a post-war and genocide environment where survival can mean something as basic as staying alive. Part of the culture of the group, then, can be thought of as the stable perceptions, thought processes, feelings, and communication rules that permit the group to function as a group. Schein goes on to describe how, for any group to function, it must develop a stable solution for each of the following problems:

1 *How to communicate with each other — developing a common language.* The observable structure will be the actual language the group evolves as it works together: special terminology, special meanings attached to certain words and concepts, and special symbols that only insiders will understand.

2 *How to define its own boundaries — developing rules of inclusion and exclusion.* The observable structure will be the policies and practices of recruitment, who is given symbols of membership such as uniforms or badges, policies about rehiring people who may have left, policies toward temporary members or contract workers, rules about whom one tells things and from whom one must keep secrets, and so on.

3 *How to allocate power and authority — developing criteria for who can influence whom and on what issues.* In this area what is formally structured and how things work out in practice have often been noted to be different. It is possible to publish organisation charts and to have rules about the chain of command, but observers often note that even on a regular basis some of these rules are ignored, and alternative structures will develop that often get labelled the 'Informal' Structure.

4 *How to define appropriate peer relationships — developing criteria for openness and intimacy, appropriate levels of co-operation and*

competition. This area is often the least structured and, therefore, the source of most anxiety until new members have learned the implicit rules of the game. In observing indoctrination programmes or mentoring discussions, Van Maanen (1979) states that Structure can be expressed by such remarks as, "Around here teamwork is the name of the game." "Never get caught playing politics." "We always address the boss by his title here." "We are very informal and on a first name basis here." "You always better tell exactly what you think, even if you feel it might get you into trouble." "You always have to be careful not to contradict the boss in public." Such rules do not get embedded as readily as more explicit rules in the visible formal Structure, but they always exist in the culture.

5 *How to allocate status and rewards.* The formal reward system, the performance appraisal system, the ratings of potential, and the actual recurring procedures for promoting and otherwise rewarding and punishing people are usually observable. As in item 4, however, the Structures embodied in written policies and procedures do not always match the recurring regularities that may be observed — the informal reward system.

6 *How to deal with unexplainable, unmanageable, and threatening events.* This area is the least likely to be formally structured, though every group will evolve rituals and procedures for dealing with those unpredictable and stressful events that cannot be easily controlled. It may become stable in that they are passed on and taught to new generations of members.

In the Rwanda National Police many of these solutions are not formally in place, those that exist are based around the Interpersonal Structure of the original organs (the Communal Police, the Gendarmerie and the Judicial Police) and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (previously Rwandan Patriotic Front). The research and work that our team were involved in is part of the extensive programme that is in place to assist the National Police in developing its structure and an appropriate culture. As the Rwanda National Police develops, it will evolve stable perceptions and relationships to deal with each of the six areas; these will gradually become assumptions that it has about itself and come to constitute a major part of the culture of the National Police.

The underlying assumptions will not be visible in the overt workings of the group, but the Process observer will see the effects in the political alliances, in the communication patterns, in the recurring patterns of expressed feelings of members toward each other, and in the deference and demeanour they display toward each other. Schein (1987 and 1998) believes that the

immediate intervention focus should be on the dynamic processes that are visible because then members can see the same things that the observer sees. Eventually, as the group itself becomes more sophisticated in analysing its own processes, less visible structural and cultural elements can increasingly become the focus of intervention. Consultants and managers should note events in all six cells, then analyse which of the events are most relevant to increasing the effectiveness of the group and/or achieving the aims and objectives of the training.

Conclusion

As my understanding of the three areas of Content, Process and Structure developed I was able to integrate them effectively within the methodological approach of the Co-generative AR Model (Greenwood and Levin, 1998). However, many of the AR team found Schein's (1987 and 1998) model too complex and preferred to adopt the model I formulated, which integrates Weaver's (1993) research with Schein's work (see Figure 1). The new model is now used prior to, and during, any cross-cultural research or training event that I am involved in.

During this AR process I was able to plot my progress and that of the British Research Team members along the continuum of Bhawuk and Triandis' (1996) Model of Intercultural Expertise Development. In order to progress along the model from 'Novice' to 'Expert', it was important for me to undergo theory based training that involved research into Rwanda's significant historical factors that pertained to the situation at the time of my research. The following chapter examines the historical factors that I highlighted during that phase of my research.

Chapter 3:

Significant Historical Factors

Pertaining to the Current Situation

Chapter 3: Significant Historical Factors Pertaining to the Current Situation

Introduction

This chapter on the historical literature begins with a review of the most recent data on Rwanda's demographic and social features, in order to put the historical information into a modern day perspective. The historical section is divided into four periods, the first being pre-colonial Rwanda, the second examines the colonial rule of Rwanda, the third period follows Rwanda's transition to independence and the forth examines Rwanda following independence. The latter includes an examination of the war and genocide. For ease of reference, Appendix 2 gives a chronological list of Rwanda's history. Because of the many complex issues surrounding the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa groups, this chapter also reviews the available literature regarding the history of 'ethnicity' during those four periods, particularly in relation to 'genocidal' politics in Rwanda. This will provide a clear background to the two foci of this research, that is to utilise action research with local stakeholders, in order to formulate, implement and evaluate a sustainable and effective police training programme in a post-war and genocide environment. Secondly, to reflect upon and research the issues of cultural transferability in a training context.

Rwandans, Belgians and other nationalities write the majority of the literature on Rwanda in the French language. This is a language that I am not fluent in. To overcome this barrier and minimise bias, I commissioned two French students who were studying at the University of Nottingham. They read the French language books and wrote transcripts or summaries for me, depending on the relevance of the information contained within the books.

Current demographic and social features

The available literature on this area is dated no later than 1996; therefore it should be read in the context of the following observational and anecdotal research. Throughout the time of my research in Rwanda I have seen regular and apparently sustainable development, particularly in the capital, Kigali. These developments include post offices, restaurants, petrol stations, fast food stands, roads, schools, mobile telephones, lighting, basic housing, recreational and sports premises, motels and hotels. However as this was not the focus of my research I only have anecdotal evidence that suggests the positive and important nature of these developments. The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, (Millwood, D. Ed. 1996) states that, according to the 1991 census (*République Rwandaise*, 1993:11), in August of that year Rwanda had a total population of 7.15 million, with an annual increase of 3.1%. This translates into a very high population density. In fact, with 271 people per square kilometre, it was the highest in mainland Africa; if lakes, national parks and forest reserves are excluded, it was far higher. Thus, the actual area of arable agricultural land (some 17,600 square kilometres out of the total 26,300) had to support an average of 406 people per square kilometre over the whole country. The most densely populated area was said to be Ruhondo in the Ruhengeri *préfecture*, with some 820 people per square kilometre of usable land. At the other end of the scale was Rusomo (Kibungo), with 62 people to the same unit.

Rwanda is a country of peasant farmers, or large-scale gardeners and many observers link the tragedy that unfolded in 1994 to high population pressure and increasing competition for means of survival. Thus, in the words of Prunier (1995 pp 246-248): "...the decision to kill was of course made by politicians, for political reasons. But at least part of the reason why it was carried out so thoroughly by the ordinary rank-and-file peasants ... was the feeling that there were too many people on too little land, and that with a few less there would be more for the survivors ... ". In 1991, there were some 1.5 million households with an average of 4.7 members in Rwanda. The dominance of agriculture - and traditional life - is underlined by the fact that not less

than 94.6% of the population lived in the countryside, while almost two thirds of the urban population were concentrated in Kigali. Rwanda is thus a rural country, where most of the people live and farm on hills (*musozi* in Kinyarwanda or *collines* in French), which form the basis of the society. This has determined a very precise and peculiar form of human settlement. The Rwandese peasant - Hutu or Tutsi - is part of a *rugo*, which broadly translates into enclosure, compound or household. (In a polygamous household, each wife occupies her own *rugo*). Every hill consists of several *ingo* (plural for *rugo*), where Hutu and Tutsi traditionally live side by side on the same slopes, "for better or for worse; for intermarriage or for massacre" (Prunier, 1995 p.3).

The 1991 census showed that 48% of the population was below the age of 15 and that the average life expectancy was 53.1 years. At the same time - i.e. before the massacres and the demographic upheavals of 1994/95 - more than 20% of the sexually active adults in the urban areas were infected with the HIV virus (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995). Women get infected at younger ages and in greater numbers than men. It had been estimated that between 100,000 and 200,000 Rwandese in their prime age would die from AIDS by the year 2000. This fact impacted personally on our research team, having lost three members of our support personnel to AIDS related illnesses. A large section of the rural population suffers from endemic diseases such as bilharzia, diarrhoea, dysentery and respiratory infections. Water related diseases are the main causes of death among children. According to World Bank estimates, the infant mortality rate fell from 142 per 1,000 in 1970 to 117 in 1992, but in 1992, 1.5 million Rwandese were without access to health services; 2.6 million were without potable water, and 3.2 million without sanitation (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995).

The official language of administration was French prior to the war and genocide; it is now English, as many of the 'returnees' (those returning from exile) from Uganda and Tanzania speak English; French is still widely used and remains an official language. People also communicate in the common national vernacular Kinyarwanda and, as a *lingua franca* for traders, Swahili. According to the 1991 census, 44% of the population could not read or write,

with a higher illiteracy rate among women (50%) than among men (37%). The World Bank estimates that 71% of primary age Rwandans attended school in 1991, compared with 68% in 1970. However, only 8% benefited from secondary and less than 1% from tertiary education (The Economist Intelligence Unit 1995).

The Catholic Church has played a major role in Rwanda's history. The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (Millwood, D. Ed. 1996) believes that, in a sense, it would be more appropriate to characterize the colonization of Rwanda as a venture by the French Catholic 'White Fathers' than by the German Empire. They arrived in 1899, and had within a few years set up a number of missions around the country. During the colonial period, the Catholic Church worked hand in hand with the German and Belgian authorities, and after Independence there has been a remarkably high degree of political intertwining between the Church and the state.

The founding fathers of modern Hutu nationalism - among them the former President, Grégoire Kayibanda - all formed part of the small elite of so-called *évolués* educated at Catholic schools and seminars. In the mid-1970s, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kigali, Vincent Nsengiyumwa, became a member of the Central Committee of the ruling MRND party, official confessor to President Habyarimana's wife and close to the *akazu* inner circle of Hutu nationalists. The wide spread of Christianity in Rwanda should be seen against this background. According to the 1991 census, not less than 90% of the population was Christian, out of which 63% Catholic, 19% Protestant and some 8% Adventist. The Muslim faith has a certain following in Kigali and in other urban centres, but is of marginal importance on a national scale, representing just over 1% of the population. Many researchers discuss the active role of the Catholic Church in the genocide, including African Rights (1995), but no evidence has been found that Muslims were involved in the genocide.

Employment data is sketchy, since only about 4% of Rwanda's population live wholly within the cash economy. World Bank statistics for 1985 suggest that 93% of the labour force worked

in the agricultural sector (well above the average for sub-Saharan Africa), 3% in industry and 4% in the service sector. In the beginning of the 1990s, the biggest employer in the formal sector was the government, with about 7,000 employees in the central and some 43,000 in the local administration, not including personnel in the armed forces. In addition, almost everyone was active in the 'parallel' economy, if only from time to time. This included cross-border trade and barter, or smuggling, with neighbouring countries (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995).

The position of women

As a female researcher I thought it was important to have an understanding of the position of women in Rwandan society. As in other African countries, I found that the legal position of women is ambiguous. The 1991 constitution, which is due to be revised in the early 2000s, stipulates that all citizens are equal, while at the same time accepting the validity of traditional law in areas where there is no written code. In effect, a Rwandan woman can own nothing legally, neither house, tools, livestock, nor crops. This lack of legal status causes particular problems in rural households headed by single women (22% of the total in 1984, and undoubtedly more since the war and genocide due to the large number of widows). In the modern sector of the economy, a woman's legal incapacity means that she cannot open a bank account without the permission of the husband, or - if unmarried - a male relative. Combined with her inability to own assets, this makes it almost impossible for a woman to obtain any loans. Rwandan women have become increasingly conscious of the injustice of their position in society. Thus, associations of women working together in the rural areas grew in strength throughout the 1980s. Within these associations women have acquired a *de facto* legal status through which they can gain access to land and credit. However, in general, during times of political turmoil and upheavals - such as in 1994 - under the traditional, male dominated and conservative political culture, women have not exercised a moderating influence.

The new Government of National Unity, which includes a Ministry of Gender and Family

Affairs, is also seeking to redress this balance. Women are still a small minority in the Rwandan Police Service and there were none on the RCUP Training of Trainers' Programme or the Human Rights Training of Trainers Programme. However I had the opportunity to interview some of the female officers who were very positive about their roles. One woman had succeeded in being the top recruit in her group of seven hundred and fifty students and a female senior officer stated that her role included motivating women to join the service.

Pre-colonial Rwanda

In Rwanda, as elsewhere, history is interpreted differently by the different parties to various conflicts. In particular the meanings of the ethnic labels 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' are vigorously disputed. The current position adopted by 'Hutu' supremacists and extremists such as Ferdinand Nahimanai (1993) is that the two are not only different ethnic groups but also different *races*. They also believe that the two races are mutually antagonistic. The contrasting position, articulated very strongly by the former and current Presidents of Rwanda, and the Government of National Unity, is that there is no significant difference between the two groups. They are both Banyarwanda, speaking the same language and sharing the same culture and territory. At the swearing-in ceremony of the former President Bizimungo Pasteur in Kigali on the 19th July 1994, he appealed to his 'fellow Rwandans' to 'break the infernal cycle of hate in which those who organised the apocalypse wanted to lock us'. He declared that was the only way that Rwanda could be 'the motherland for all its offsprings'. (See Appendix 3 for a transcript of the speech).

There are also many views and hypotheses that fall between the two extremes described above. This review of the relevant literature, based on documentation of historians and reports by interviewees, examines and discusses those views. Elements of the research indicate an 'ethnic' diversity based partly on occupational status, partly on a patron/client relationship and on Hutu/Tutsi ancestry. Others argue that people identified themselves by clan rather than by

ethnic groups and that it was European travellers who first laid down descriptions of so-called ethnic groups. Destexhe (1995) is of the opinion that nobody knows the exact origin of the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa people. Keane (1995) agreed with Destexhe and stated that the concept of a 'pure' ethnic divide in Rwanda was a myth'.

As in many other areas of Africa, the absence of written source material and archaeological remains, means that data from before the mid-nineteenth century is scarce. However, there is an oral tradition in Rwanda which hands historical information from parent to child. I have therefore included interviews within this literature review to enhance the amount of available data.

History of 'political ethnicity' in Rwanda

Many European studies researching pre-colonial Rwanda, (Pagès (1933), Maquet (1954), Vassall-Adams (1994) and Prunier (1995) among them) focus primarily on the complex pyramid of political, cultural and economic relationships of which the king (*mwami*) was the apex. Many historians, including Vansina (1962) and de-Heusch (1966), agree that the first inhabitants of Rwanda were hunter-gatherers and forest dwellers. Their modern day descendants are the Twa, today's small minority who have inhabited the country from as early as 2000 BC.

There is little authenticated research concerning pre-colonial Batwa; Waller suggests that the many anecdotal theories concerning 'pygmoid people' migrating into the area between the Rift Valley and lakes of Central Africa, between the years 2000 BC and 1000 AD, are rather too neat and uncontroversial. Waller (1994) described the modern day Batwa as 'hunters and gatherers in a disappearing world'. African Rights (1995) described the fact that the Twa were relegated to the status of pygmies as an offensive categorisation, that has reverberated up to this day. Most researchers agree that there are two groups of Batwa, the first being potters; the second being the aforementioned hunter-gatherers. The latter group - also known as *Impunyu* - numbers less than five thousand people and is concentrated in the Ruhengeri and Gisenyi *préfectures*. Some

interviewees of this research argued that the *Impunyu* and Twa were actually two totally unrelated groups.

Around 1000 AD a migration of farmers began to displace the Batwa. This migration was part of the 'Bantu expansion', which in Rwandan history can be followed from the savannahs of the present Cameroon to the Great Lakes area. They cleared the forest and cultivated the volcanic soil. The immigrant Bantu-speaking agriculturists grew sorghum, kept livestock and bees, hunted, developed village industries and organised themselves into lineages and clans under the leadership of heads or chiefs. Hutu coexisted with Twa, and bartered skins and meat in exchange for salt and iron goods.

By the fifteenth century, many Hutu were organised into 'statelets'. Each of them was controlled by a dominant clan and composed of several different lineages under a ruling lineage (which over time became dynastic) headed by a *mwami* (chief or king), who is described by Vansina (1962) as a land chief and ritual leader in charge of rainmaking. There is evidence that some lineages had already acquired cattle at that time and that several states had emerged before the arrival of the Tutsi (principally the *Nyiginya* clan). According to Kagame (1972) seven major clans had pre-*Nyiginya* status. Mullen's research (1995) supports these theories, quoting both Macquet (1961) and Luc de Heusch (1966), regarding the Twa and Hutu. He then argues that the pastoral Tutsis immigrated into Rwanda as part of a wider southward movement of pastoral peoples. They are believed to have come from the Horn of Africa to the inter-lacustrine area, west of the rift valley around the sixteenth century.

The majority of researchers agree that Tutsis were part of larger pastoral migration southwards into the Great Lakes region, but whether the immigration into Rwanda was gradual or sudden has been contested. However many historians do agree that, over time, the Tutsi settlement was achieved through both conquest and peaceful assimilation (Lemarchand, 1970 a and b; Kagame, 1972; Vansina, 1962; Ogot, 1984; and Reyntjens, 1985). Vassall-Adams (1994) summaries

their views of pre-colonial Rwanda by suggesting that four hundred years ago, a group of people called Tutsi established feudal kingdoms in the lands now called Rwanda and Burundi. They formed a landowning and cattle-owning aristocracy, ruling over the Hutu, a larger group, who were farmers. In return for their labour, Hutu were granted the use of land and cattle, and the protection of their overlords. Vassall-Adams also believes the hunter-gatherer Twas lived a marginal existence alongside the Tutsi and Hutu.

Vassall-Adams (1994), supported by Mullen (1995), goes on to describe the Tutsis as controlling the three main sources of power; the cattle economy, the monarchy, and religious life. Their rule was reinforced by an oral mythology, which taught that Tutsi were inherently superior and that God ordained their dominance. This was later reinforced by Pierre Ryckmans, one of the most important Belgian administrators of the 1920s, who is quoted in Chrétien (1985 p.26) as saying:

> "The Batutsi were meant to reign. Their fine presence is in itself enough to give them a great prestige vis-à-vis the inferior races which surround ... It is not surprising that those good Bahutu, less intelligent more simple, more spontaneous, more trusting, have let themselves be enslaved..."

The Tutsi *mwami* stood at the apex of this complex social order, which encompassed three different sets of 'chieftaincies' over land, cattle, and the military. Vassall-Adams (1994) and Prunier (1995) espouse that despite the hierarchical nature of this society, it was unusually unified. Tutsi and Hutu lived together, shared the same language (Kinyarwanda) and, in most important respects, the same culture. However, Mullen (1995) considered that to revolt against the king would have been an affront to *Imana* (God) and therefore Tutsi superiority, which made for a powerful disincentive to threaten the inequality inherent in the *status quo*, stating that the king had numerous armies at his disposal to validate his claims.

Mullen (1995) also described how, particularly in central Rwanda, patron-client ties bound most individuals together in a closely-knit hierarchy. The institution under this system, a patron gave a

cow to his client - thereafter the client performed for protection. The peasant Hutu masses and the Twa became clients based upon a form of pastoral service contract called the *ubuhake*. A Hutu client gained the protection of a Tutsi overlord by supplying him/her with services in labour and goods, and the overlord in turn gave the client cattle on a leasehold basis. African Rights (1995) also state that an earlier generation of scholars including Maquet (1961), identified the clients as Hutus and the patrons at Tutsis. Like Vassall-Adams (1994) and Prunier (1995) they also argued that *ubuhake*, plus the Tutsi control of administration, made for a stable, well ordered society.

Newbury (1988) has challenged this view. Research in other parts of Rwanda indicated that many Rwandese, particularly those on the margins of the central state, were not involved in any form of patron-cliental. She also believes that the simplistic and intense focus by earlier researchers on *ubuhake* excluded and neglected the analysis of other forms of ties such as *umeheto*, land clientship and *ubukande*, which involved the donation of agricultural produce; all of which held great significance for human relations in Rwanda. The patrons involved in *ubukande* were often Hutu, and exclusively so in the north.

An elderly interviewee of this research, believed to be in his late nineties, served as a young page in King Musinga's court (reigned 1896-1931), his anecdotal reports of his childhood experiences agree with the version of events described by Vassall-Adams. The following synopsis of his description of court life is also supported in part by Prunier (1995) and Newbury (1988). He described the king as a parental figure with a godlike authority, whose court was characterised by elaborate rituals and entertainment. Many people camped on the outskirts of the court, sometimes numbering into thousands. The king treated them well by providing work and gifts, making no distinction between Tutsi, Hutu or Twa. When further questioned regarding the positions, power and representation of the Twa, Hutu and Tutsi, he stated that the 'Hutu/Tutsi problem' had not been an issue in pre-colonial times. It had been a class system, nothing more, prior to the arrival of the Belgians. A Tutsi was simply someone who had wealth, in terms of cattle. If Tutsis 'fell on hard times' and lost their cattle, they became Hutus. It also worked in

reverse; if Hutus became wealthy and gained cattle, they became Tutsis. He attributed the possible differences in physical appearance to wealth, stating that Tutsis would grow strong, tall and healthy because they were well nourished.

Some authors agree with the elderly interviewee's views that the Tutsi and Hutu belong to the same basic racial group. For example, Desmarais (1978) stated that the Tutsi, as good herdsmen, knew about race selection and systematic breeding. They therefore applied these bovine techniques to themselves in order to grow tall. Harroy (1984 p.29), the last Vice Governor General of Rwanda-Urundi also discussed these issues stating that, '... these giants (*Tutsis*) were created through techniques, which have been discarded during the 1920s'. His line of argument focused on his hypothesis that Tutsis consumed exclusively milk products. Prunier (1995 p.17) states that, 'crazy as it was, the idea was picked up by the RPF during the war'. He quotes interviews with former pupils of the RPF Cadre School (Christine Ornutoni, Cabinet Director of the Ministry of Social Rehabilitation Kigali, 13th January 1995 and with journalist Faustino Kagame, Kigali 17th January 1995). It appeared that in their keenness to play down the Tutsi/Hutu dichotomy, some teachers said that the Hutu and Tutsi shared a common racial stock, but that Tutsi babies 'were stretched during infancy' and given a special high protein diet, 'like the *inyambo* cows'. Critics, including some of the school organisers, pointed out that this 'anti-racist' interpretation was actually racist, for *inyambo* cows were the best royal cattle, the cream of the herd. This meant that the Tutsi had to be the very best human material among the Banyarwanda, an interpretation that was not desired in the quest for national unity among the Banyarwanda.

Like the elderly interviewee, many authors and interviewees of this research asseverate that conflict did not exist between Hutu and Tutsi prior to the colonial era. Gakunzi's (1996 pp.1-5) article in the Rwandan monthly magazine '*Propeace*', describes the pre-colonial history of Rwanda as:

> 'Five centuries ago, the kingdom of Rwanda takes shape. So far, the country was composed of self-government "chefferies". The central power became stronger then and a social hierarchy crystallises in three groups (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa),

> which compose the population. Their differences? The Tutsi are rather cattle owners and the Hutus are cultivators. The Twa go hunting, live on crops and pottery. But these groups of population are not definitely fixed...
>
> ... if a Tutsi loses his cows, he is immediately assimilated to a Hutu and if a Hutu is the owner of a flock, he is immediately taken for a Tutsi. This social mobility was probably one of the reasons why pre-colonial Rwanda had never known a general conflict.'

Gakunzi asserts that pre-colonial Rwanda was not a model of harmony, but rather that the power relied on consensus. For example, the king could be of Tutsi origin but his power would be balanced by the 'Wise Hutus'. He also affirms that the pre-colonial state, an emanation from the social body, had set daily mechanisms to handle the various conflicts. When there was a problem, it was brought to the wise of the hills, or to the royal court. The conflicting parties would not leave before the problem was settled. Gakunzi argues that with colonisation, at the end of last century, Rwandese society became little by little a divided society.

Rwanda's Prime Minister in 1994, Faustin Twagiramungo, a Hutu, is quoted in David Beresford's article in the Guardian newspaper as saying: '... before the arrival of colonialism, this population did not suffer any conflict similar to the one we have been experiencing'. Such reasoning still leaves the absence of an explanation in which ethnicity as a 'colonial creation' plays a role. Obi Igwara (1995) believes that in order to assess the role of ethnicity in shaping the genocidal mentality displayed in Rwanda, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the terms employed in such an assessment: ethnic group, ethnicity and genocide. He goes on to describe an ethnic group as 'an historical entity comprising of individuals who identify with each other on the basis of shared symbolic sociocultural attributes that have the power of influencing the outcome of social interaction with other groups'. From this perspective Hutu and Tutsi are different ethnic groups, despite claims to the contrary such as that of the former President Bizimungo Pasteur and Prime Minister Twagiramungu. As Alex de Waal (1994) observes:

> 'Specialists on Rwanda protest in vain that Hutu and Tutsi are not separate ethnic groups. But sixty years of colonial and Tutsi rule, and thirty-five years of Hutu supremacy following the 1959 revolution, which consigned half the Tutsi population

> to exile, have fundamentally changed the nature of the relationships between them. Political conflict, punctuated by inter-communal violence, has created distinct and mutually opposed Hutu and Tutsi identities, which, for all the hesitations of social scientists, are identifiably ethnic'.

The genocide

Chapter one, 'Introduction and Background to the Research', details the events which led up to the genocide and the circumstances pertaining to it that are relevant to this research. Therefore, at this point of the historical review, I will simply detail my own observations and interviews of the 15th February 1997, that I carried out at one of the designated genocide sites. These sites have been left relatively untouched since the massacres, as a permanent reminder and witness to the enormity of the problems that faced and still face the Rwandese people. The site was at Ntarama church, which is a branch of the Parish of Nyamata in Bugesera, Greater Kigali (see Appendix 4 for a map of Rwanda).

The site is typical of many in which thousands died. Following the death of the President, Tutsi and some moderate Hutu gathered in the church compound. They were attacked by the militia *interahamwe* who were armed with machetes and a few firearmed Communal Police Officers. The people managed to deter their attackers for some days until the attackers were reinforced by several busloads of well-armed soldiers and police officers. The parish was then assaulted until resistance was broken. The *interahamwe* subsequently carried out the mass killings of men, women and children with machetes, spears and sharpened sticks. Some were also burned alive and yet others given the opportunity to drown themselves rather than face the machete, many took this chance and drowned their own children and babies to prevent them suffering a more painful death. Among those who were reported as trying to resist the *interahamwe* and soldiers were a Tutsi Communal Police Officer and his Hutu nephew who was a soldier. Both were killed.

All the components of well organised mass killing were evident at the site; congregation of

people in one place, co-ordinated military assault, looting and the hunt and murder of any survivors. Many survivor interviewees stated that it was only the desire to loot, prior to murdering survivors that enabled them to escape. During my observations I noted the following: several sections of the church bricks had been removed which confirms the survivors' accounts that grenades were launched through holes in the masonry. Bodies still lay on the floor of the church, their badly damaged skulls evidence of the probable cause of death. A makeshift shelter of blue plastic sheeting was erected outside the church. On long tables inside it were the skulls, bones and clothing of those who had lost their lives in the massacre. The majority of the skulls were also badly damaged and again were corroborative evidence to the witnesses' accounts. Children who were at the church on the 15th February 1997 also bore large scars, but interviews were not carried out due to their age. A mass grave a few miles away, bore hundreds of wooden crosses. One adult interviewee said:

> 'They are all buried together, there are thousands, too many to bury one by one. The genocide site must serve as a reminder. This cannot happen again. I entered Kigali just after the RPF offensive, there were murdered people everywhere; these children have seen such sights. They would tell you if you ask, they are not afraid to tell, it may stop it from happening again, we encourage them to tell, we do not want - we are more afraid of - it happening again. The world must know, the world must understand that this was an organised government slaughter not tribal warfare, that is a nonsense, the world must know …'

The role of the French from 1990 – 1994

In Rwanda, there is a strong belief that France is implicated in the war and genocide of 1990-1994, which is important to this research. It explains, in part, why the British system of police training is favoured over that of the French system, which was employed in Rwanda prior to the genocide. These views are reflected and possibly reinforced by the Rwandan media. *The New Times*, a Rwandan newspaper, published a series of four front page articles in February 1998, entitled 'French role in Rwanda genocide an enigma'. The articles pose many questions including: 'Why should François Mitterand associate himself so closely with the side of the Hutu power which later became responsible for a genocide?' and 'Why did the co-belligerance of

France against the exiled Tutsis in 1992 continue in veiled complicity in 1994 when, despite the massacres, Paris continued to supply arms to the Hutu killers?'. The paper also quotes François Mitterand as saying, "In those countries a genocide is not that important". It attributes him with the view that the atrocities of 1994 were 'an insignificant genocide'. In the same issue of *The New Times* there is a detailed report of a press conference held by the Rwandan Vice-President and Minister of Defence, Major General Paul Kagame (*now the President*) in Brussels, Belgium. When asked about Rwanda's relationship with France he is quoted as replying:

> "Maybe the time has not yet come for the contacts, but if they are there, there is certainly a willingness on the part of our government, my colleagues, to work well with any country, particularly France ... outstanding issues should be discussed in order to establish a good relationship ..."

An interviewee of this research described the 'atmosphere of suspicion towards anything French' among the Rwandese people. He said:

> "The vast majority of people are confused and angry that France assisted in the training, arming and escape from justice of the genociders. Only those who are genociders or sympathisers of the genociders will be happy with France."

It is necessary to briefly examine both Rwandan and independent reports of the French role in Rwanda from 1990 – 1994 as it is this period that appears to have created the greatest problems in the Rwandan-French relationship.

Summary of Rwandan and independent reports on the French role in the genocide

Gakunzi (1996) expresses his belief that "France knew what was happening" regarding the genocide in *Propeace*, a Rwandan magazine. He describes how the French army trained the Rwandan Presidential Guard and how 'its pupils committed the genocide'. He outlines the financial help that the French gave to Habyarimana's government, thereby increasing the Rwandese army from ten thousand to forty thousand. He alleges that in March 1992 the Crédit

Lyonnais, a French bank owned by the state, guaranteed large purchases of arms for the Rwandese militia, including a quantity from Egypt valued at six million USD.

Destexhe (1995 p.29) supports Gakunzi's view and gives some background to the situation. He describes how from 1990 the *interhamwe* and the *impuzamugambi* (the youth wings of the MRND and CDR) were carrying out: '... intimidation raids and punitive expeditions against the terrorised Tutsi population and Hutus who supported democracy and negotiation with the RPF'. Destexhe maintains that massacres should have been regarded as alarm bells, however the *interhamwe* and *impuzamugambi* were given arms and military training by the Rwandan Armed Forces (the FAR) which, 'thanks to French generosity, grew from five thousand to forty thousand men, thus enabling them to take on both the RPF and internal opposition'. He continues by stating that the French '... remained silent in the face of the fragrantly racist policies and practises of the Habyarimana government for far longer that any other country'.

An interviewee of this research describes the intervention of the French during 1990 as 'wholly inappropriate'. He described how the French troops were used in roadblocks to check identity cards. I have seen videotapes of this actually happening. It is the interviewee's firm belief that some of these checks were 'tantamount to signing Tutsi death warrants'. Human Rights Watch (1995) describe France as a former colonial ruler in Africa that continues to wield enormous economic, political and military power in the continent. France was the main ally of the Habyarimana government until July 1994. It sent in three hundred troops to support the government after the invasion by the RPF in October 1990 — a force later reduced to one hundred and seventy soldiers — and provided military training to the FAR. In early 1993, after a new offensive by the RPF, France increased its military presence in Rwanda to six hundred and eighty troops, ostensibly to "protect French citizens and other foreigners". Destexhe (1997) outlines how one month after the RPF offensive in October 1990, Belgium intervened to protect and subsequently evacuate its nationals, then

withdrew all its military troops. He then gives a detailed transcript of how France decided to remain and its troops took an increasingly active role in field combat.

According to several interviewees and other independent sources (African Rights [1995] and Prunier [1995] among them), the French intervention was the determining role in stopping the RPF advances in 1992 and in February 1993. With each new RPF offensive, France increased the number of its troops until they totalled seven hundred soldiers of the elite Rapid Action Force. France also increased arms deliveries out of proportion to the actual military situation and the defence needs of the country. The French government had no official defence agreement with Rwanda beyond a basic undertaking, signed in 1975, to provide military assistance.

African Rights (1995) view it as remarkable that one of the aims of France in Rwanda is simply to keep the country francophone. The RPF leaders were mostly educated in Uganda and speak English. After the French intervention in Rwanda ('Operation Turquoise'), General Jacques Lanxade, the French Chief of Staff, spoke of "the Anglo-Saxon conspiracy" (The Times, 23rd August 1994). African Rights (1995) believe a second strand to French policy was personal friendship. After the RPF overran the presidential palace, journalists were able to wander around it and saw a personal Christmas card from Francois and Danielle Mitterand to the Habyarimanas on the mantelpiece. The relationship between the presidential families was close. In particular, the French President's son Jean-Christophe, who was special advisor at the Elysée Palace, was close to the Habyarimana family. President Habyarimana's private aeroplane, *Mystére Falcon*, was a personal gift from Jean-Christophe. Unlike former British colonies, the relationship between France and the governments and ruling elites of its former territories in Africa is extremely close. France has also extended this intimacy to former Belgian Colonies. There is a high degree of collective policy making for the francophone leaders. African Rights (1995) and Chafer (1992) believe it is probable that French loyalty to its genocidal friends in Rwanda was in part dictated by the concerns of other francophone African governments, whether or not they made them explicit to Paris.

Interviews that I carried out in the Hotel Mille Collines, Kigali, confirms African Rights' (1995) view that the French had an influence over the interim government. This was demonstrated when Bruno Delhaye, head of African affairs at the presidency, personally intervened to request the Chief of Staff of the Rwandese army to stop militiamen killing people who had taken refuge at the hotel. The intervention was effective – raising the prospect that more vigorous French action may have stopped the genocide. This point was also made forcefully by Dr Jean Hervé Bradol (1994), the programme co-ordinator of MSF (*Medicine Without Frontiers*) – France for Rwanda, when he said, "... so far, we have not heard a single French official clearly condemn the perpetrators of these massacres and yet these people are well known to the French state, because they are equipped by them ...".

It is also important to note that a large shipment of arms arranged by the French arrived in Goma on the 25th May *en route* to Rwanda. Human Rights Watch Arms Project (1995) stated that the arms flow to the FAR was not suspended immediately by France after the imposition of the arms embargo on the May 17th, 1994. Rather, they were diverted to Goma airport in Zaire (*now Democratic Republic of the Congo*) as an alternative to Rwanda's capital, Kigali, where fighting between the FAR and the rebel RPF, as well as an international presence, made continued shipments extremely difficult. These weapons were taken across the border into Rwanda by members of the Zairian military and delivered to the FAR in Gisenyi. Mcgreal (1994) reported in the Guardian newspaper that the French consul in Goma at the time, Jean-Claude Urbano, justified the five shipments as a fulfilment of contracts negotiated with the government of Rwanda prior to the arms embargo. In the view of Human Rights Watch, these shipments constituted a clear violation of the U.N. imposed embargo and are all the more to be condemned because the recipients were carrying out a campaign of genocide at the time.

Operation Turquoise (14th June —21st August 1994)

In mid-June 1994, as the Rwandan government in Kigali was on the edge of collapse, the French government announced plans to dispatch two thousand, five hundred troops to Rwanda for humanitarian purposes. Foreign Minister Alain Juppé announced on Radio France Internationale, "France is ready... to put an end to the massacres and protect the populations threatened with extermination ... France will live up to its responsibilities". Prunier (1995 pp.281-311) describes these as, 'brave words, even if their motivation was somewhat less than glorious' and goes on to describe how, on June 22nd, the U.N. Security Council authorised the French intervention in Rwanda, called "Operation Turquoise". Soon after, the French government, without prior United Nations approval, declared its intention to carve out a "safe zone" in south-western Rwanda. It was to this zone that the rump government and the majority of the Rwandan armed forces and militias retreated following the fighting in Kigali and the RPF's military advance. Human Rights Watch (1995) describe how 'under French protection, the FAR and militias were able to exert their control over the vast population that was quartered in the safe zone'. The rump government moved its radio station (RTLM) into the zone where it continued without interference to incite Hutu to kill Tutsi in its broadcasts. For the duration of Operation Turquoise, the FAR continued to receive weapons inside the French controlled zone via Goma airport. Yet the French authorities neither made an attempt to interdict these shipments nor reported them to the committee set up by the Security Council.

French forces began withdrawing from Rwanda in mid-August. Local Rwandan gendarmes and administrators in the Cyangugu area of the French controlled zone have told Human Rights Watch that they had arrested two prime suspects in the Rwandan genocide from that area, known locally as "Prima" and "Sebastial", in addition to many others and handed them over into French custody during Operation Turquoise. These authorities added that these detainees were then escorted into Zaire in French vehicles as the French troops withdrew from Rwanda and were subsequently released.

According to U.N. officials, the French military flew key commanders, including Col. Theoneste Bagasora and *Interahamwe* militia leader Jean-Baptiste Gatete and elite troops of the ex-FAR and militias, out of Goma to unidentified destinations on a series of flights between July and September 1994. Human Rights Watch has received allegations that Hutu military and militia personnel continued to receive military training at a French military facility in the Central African Republic after the FAR's defeat.

The Office of the President of the Republic of Rwanda organised in Kigali, from the 1st to the 5th November 1995, an International Conference on 'Genocide, Impunity and Accountability: Dialogue for a National and International Response' (GIADNIR). The subsequent report makes the following observations and recommendations relating to the French government:

> "... it requests France and all other countries, including African countries which contributed to the arming and protection of genocide perpetrators, to stop all possible support to the latter and contribute instead to adequate compensation to the Rwandese State, the victims of genocide and crimes against humanity committed in Rwanda." (GIADNIR p.12)
>
> "The Conference notes that those state Governments with specific direct and indirect complicity in the genocide, in particular the Government of France, must be held legally accountable, under international law." (GIADNIR p.32)
>
> "The Conference notes the extensive destruction of Rwandan public and private property during the Turquoise Operation, by the Government of France and urges that appropriate compensation be provided". (GIADNIR p.32)

Having looked at the significant historical factors pertaining to this research, the following chapter presents the methodological framework that I adopted.

Chapter 4:

Methodology

Chapter 4: Methodology

Introduction

This chapter explains how the aims and objectives, listed on page 14 of this research, were investigated and why I predominantly employed qualitative methods and techniques, in particular action research. To put this methodology into context for the reader, the chapter begins with a flowchart (Figure 5) of the most distinct phases of my work in Rwanda. These phases relate to the main purpose of my presence in Rwanda (the formulation, implementation and evaluation of a sustainable and effective police training programme with local stakeholders, in a post-war and genocide environment). Appendices 5 to 15 detail many of the methodological instruments that were used during these phases, including questionnaires, work-plan flowcharts, lists of students and research respondents, the proposed police Code of Conduct and details of training events. The flowchart also highlights that I took advantage of my privileged position in Rwanda to reflect upon and action research the issues of cultural transferability in a training context, which is the main focus of this piece of research.

The sections on research design, that follow the flowchart, detail the available options and the reasons that I selected particular methods, including the issue of insiders and outsiders in Africa and the concept of Otherness. The chapter goes on to explain the size and make-up of sample groups and the techniques used in particular phases of the research; it also highlights any deficiencies in the selected methods and some of the challenges that I and our team were faced with, including emotional ones. Finally, this chapter discusses the means that were used to minimise or overcome those deficiencies and challenges.

Figure 5


RESEARCH PHASES
Phase 1:
Initial Research Visit
To ascertain the extent of the research problem(s) regarding police training and the aims of the research (three weeks).
Phase 2:
Training of Rwandan Communal Police (RCP) Trainers
Classroom based training and teaching practice, accredited by a British awarding body (five months).
Phase 3:
Evaluation of Training of Trainers Phase
Consultation with RCP managers, trainers and cadets/students (three weeks).
Phase 4:
UK Study Tours for RCP Personnel
RCP officers visited UK police services, prisons, fire services and attended training courses at UK establishments (several trips which ranged in time from two weeks to six months).
Phase 5:
Reorientation Visit
To ascertain the current extent of the research problem(s) and the aims of the research in light of the amount of time I had spent away from Rwanda and the formation of the Rwanda National Police (two weeks).
Phase 6:
Human Rights Training Needs Analysis (TNA)
Countrywide consultation and TNA involving seven thousand respondents including police personnel, local administrators and the community (including detainees) (four months).
Phase 7:
Consultation on the Formulation of a Police Code of Conduct
Countrywide consultation, involving seven thousand respondents including police personnel, local administrators and the community (including detainees) (four months).
Phase 8:
Formulation of a Draft Code of Conduct
A draft Code of Conduct was formulated for the National Police and the Government of Rwanda to ratify.
Phase 9:
Rwanda National Police Human Rights Trainers Programme
The delivery of a training programme that was designed as a direct result of the Human Rights TNA, then accredited by a British awarding body (six months).
Reflection and research on the issues of cultural transferability in a training context, in a post-war and genocide environment.

Research design

Broadly, there are two approaches to research: quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative research concentrates on the collection of 'hard facts' that are then analysed 'scientifically', against a standardised set of measures. The results are usually quantifiable and generalised. Qualitative research deals with the experiences, opinions, perceptions, feelings and behaviours of people. Qualitative research methods address more 'open-ended' questions, adopting a range of instruments such as questionnaires; face-to-face interviews; case studies: audio and video discourse analysis; diaries and diary interviews and observation studies. These interviews may be formal or informal, with individuals or groups.

Robson (1999) argued that qualitative research methods, rather than quantitative methods are more suited to 'naturalistic enquiry' because of their sensitivity, flexibility and adaptability. He described 'naturalistic research' as a phenomenon, which is particularly compelling for studies involving human beings, where particular problems and opportunities arise from the fact that both the enquirer and the subjects of the enquiry are from the same species. Examples of this occurred during both of the teaching phases of this research (Phases 2 and 9), when the majority of the students on each programme became sick with malaria, including the most life-threatening strains of cerebral malaria. As a member of 'the same species' I was unable to stand by and watch them deteriorate and possibly die, especially when I had the funds and resources to prevent that happening. Our team therefore replaced windows, purchased mosquito nets, insecticide spray, medicine and medical treatment to minimise the effects of the disease. Our actions obviously altered the research situation, which I recorded and utilised as part of my AR, for example one of my recommendations to donors and practitioners is to include a health risk assessment for trainers, students and support personnel in initial project planning visits and be proactive in preventing such problems from arising in the first place. This is an action that I will also take in future situations, thereby 'solving concrete problems in a real situation' (see Rapoport's [1970] explanation of Action Research in the following paragraph). However, my intrusions and subsequent recommendations may not have been appropriate in traditional positivistic science methodology.

Susman and Evered (1978) stressed the following difficulties of positivistic science (in short, that which only recognises positive facts and observable phenomena) when working with humans. Values necessarily intrude and treating people as objects ignores their ability to reflect on problems and situations, and act upon their reflections; their solution is Action Research (AR). Rapoport (1970) said that, as the name indicates, AR is concerned both with action (solving concrete problems in real situations) and research (trying to further the goals of science). Greenwood and Levin (1998) also emphasised the third element of 'participation' and argue that if one of the three elements is missing it is not AR.

Genocide, war and murder and the enormous problems they create when rebuilding a country and its police service through training and other mediums, are obviously 'concrete problems in real situations' that are concerned with the values, attitudes and beliefs of individuals. Any study of such issues and the affects on those who survive and attempt to rebuild their country, will be suited to an AR approach and be primarily qualitative in nature. Bright (1991) supports this view, describing the advantages as: '... a new appreciation for qualitative research has emerged amongst educators ... There has come a profound realisation that people everywhere have a way of life, a culture of their own, and if we want to understand humankind we must take these cultures seriously. Qualitative research ... has come of age '.

The need for AR methodologies and techniques was of particular importance in this research because I was an outsider. Consequently, there were a plethora of cross-cultural issues to consider which required active participation from both the insiders and outsiders to understand and manage (the concept of 'insider' and 'outsider' are covered more fully in a later section of this chapter). As Scheurich (1997 p.1) identified, "... even though we researchers think or assume we are doing good works, or creating useful knowledge, or helping people, or critiquing the status quo, or opposing injustice, we are unknowingly enacting or being enacted by 'deep' civilisation or cultural biases, biases that are damaging to other cultures and to people who are

unable to make us hear them because they do not 'speak' in our cultural languages". These potential problems caused me great concern during my initial trips to Rwanda, particularly when I witnessed unpleasant incidents between local stakeholders and outsiders, and became aware of my own ignorance and assumptions of cross-cultural situations, as described in the first section of Chapter one. I therefore took this phenomenon into account when selecting my methodology and techniques.

Because this study involved research into individual and organisational, unique and often horrific experiences, the idiographic approach (in terms of the particulars of the case) of qualitative analysis were more appropriate than the nomothetic quantitative approach (in terms of law like generalizations) to collecting 'hard data'. Lincoln and Guba (1985) included 'idiographic interpretation' in their list of 'naturalistic enquiry' characteristics. The underlying theme of their work is to urge social researchers to engage with people directly to make sense of any evaluation process and its results. Other researchers who suggest this approach are Patton (1986), Brunner and Guzman (1989), Weiss and Greene (1992) and Lather (1991). I selected this approach to AR because I was confident that it would reduce or prevent me and my research team from, in Scheurich's words, 'unknowingly enacting ... 'deep' civilisation or cultural biases'. In turn, this would reduce biases that are potentially '... damaging to other cultures and to people who are unable to make us hear them because they do not 'speak' in our cultural 'languages'... (1997)'.

Due to my privileged position of living and working with my Rwandan colleagues and students, the issue of ethics was of primary importance. I adhered to the nine rules and protocols outlined by Connexions (2001) throughout this AR and issued copies of their booklet to my Rwandan colleagues. This ensured that they were aware of my research values and the ethics that I adhered to. They were:

> **Informed consent:** Ensure that the relevant persons and authorities have been consulted and that the necessary permission and approval have been obtained.

Obtain explicit authorisation: Ensure you have permission before you observe, examine files, or use quotations, correspondence or other documentation.

Negotiate with those affected: Your work should take into consideration the responsibilities and wishes of others; not everyone will want to be directly involved in research activities.

Involve participants: Encourage the study's participants to express their views at different stages of the research, not just in the data collection phases. Failure to involve individuals appropriately can effect the reliability and validity of the research.

Negotiate descriptions of people's work: Allow those being described and/or discussed to challenge your accounts on the grounds of fairness, relevance and accuracy.

Report the progress: Keep the work visible and remain open to suggestions so that foreseen and unforeseen consequences can be taken into account.

Consider the audience(s): It may be necessary to produce reports for a variety of audiences, each operating at a different level and requiring a different focus. If a number of different reports are required, this should be negotiated at the outset.

Confidentiality and anonymity: You must accept responsibility for assuring and maintaining confidentiality and anonymity. Individuals or organisations that wish to remain anonymous in your research activities should not be named, and steps should be taken to ensure that they are not traceable.

In summary, I selected the qualitative method of AR for both the aims of my research. I found the application of Greenwood and Levin's (1998) Cogenerative Action Research Model (see Figure 6) particularly suitable for the main focus of this research - the reflection on and research into the issues of cultural transferability in a training context. Phases 1-9 of my research, which related to the formulation, implementation and evaluation of a sustainable and effective police training programme with local stakeholders, involved several AR techniques (including the Cogenerative Action Research Model of Greenwood and Levin, 1998), dependent on the phase in question. For example, much of the research regarding the actual training of the police managers and trainers followed the Teacher-Researcher/Practitioner-Researcher tradition of AR, associated with the work of Stenhouse (1975) (1980) and (1985); Kemmis and McTaggart (1982) and Robson (1999). Whereas the evaluation phases followed the Utilization Focused Evaluation/Participatory Evaluation tradition associated with Patton (1986) and Greenwood and Levin (1998) and was informed by Participatory Rural Evaluation, which is strongly associated with Chambers (papers: 1994a, 1994b, 1994c and book: 1997). The following sections detail these specific techniques in greater depth.

Greenwood and Levin's Action Research

Greenwood and Levin (1998 p.4) describe Action Research as:

> 'social research carried out by a team encompassing a professional Action Researcher and members of an organisation or community seeking to improve their situation. It promotes broad participation in the research process and supports action leading to a more just or satisfying situation for the stakeholders.'

This practical application of this definition was particularly suited to my work and research in Rwanda. The nine phases were implemented by our Research and Training Team, which included all the necessary representatives highlighted by Greenwood and Levin. Our primary role was to improve the current situation (a new police service with no experience and limited resources, in a post-war and genocide environment) for members of an organisation (the police in Rwanda) and the community they wished to serve. There was broad participation and support from all members of the team throughout the nine phases, each of which included actions that led to a more just and satisfying situation for the stakeholders. For example, as the knowledge of human rights increased, the fundamental human rights of police officers improved. An example of these improvements came to light in an interview with a recruit at the end of Phase Two, the Training of Rwandan Communal Police Trainers. The recruit said:

> "I was not a good recruit, I got many things wrong. In the beginning I was beaten by my trainers and made to do horrible things. As your training progressed they began to treat us differently, we were helped to understand if we were struggling and if we did not behave well the punishments were fair and left us with dignity. Some of the staff you have not trained still wanted to beat us, but the staff you have trained would not let them. I have learnt more and tried harder because of this ..."

With regard to my research into the issues of cultural transferability in a training context, I found Greenwood and Levin's (1998) Cogenerative Action Research Model (see Figure 3) very useful, although the active participation of the local stakeholders was reduced when compared to their involvement in the nine phases of my research. However, they were able to give me

numerous examples of their experiences of previous bad practice in the area of cultural transferability, which greatly assisted with the 'problem definition' aspect of AR. I was then able to implement actions in their presence and with their assistance, which minimised some of the difficulties associated with cultural transferability. The entire team were then in a position to reflect on the actions and, where necessary, redefine the problems and implement new actions.

The process that our team went through correlates with Greenwood and Levin's (1998) description of their Cogenerative Action Research Model as a process consisting of at least two analytically distinct phases. The first involves the clarification of an initial research question, whereas the second involves the initiation and continuation of a social change and meaningful construction process. They emphasise that this does not mean that the problem definition process is ever final; in fact, a good sign of the learning taking place in an AR project is when the initial questions are reshaped to include newly discovered dimensions. An example of 'newly discovered dimensions' in this research are the nine distinct phases, each of which came about when the initial questions were reshaped.

The model identifies two main groups of actors. The insiders are the focal point of every AR project. They are the 'owners' of the problem, but they are not homogeneous, egalitarian, or in any way an ideal group. They simply 'own' the problem. Outsiders are the professional researchers, in this case from a different national culture, who seek to facilitate a co-learning process aimed at solving local problems. Insiders and outsiders are both equal and different. They are different because most insiders have to live directly with the results of any change activity in a project, whereas most outsiders can leave. Another difference is that the insiders should have the central influence on what the focus of the research activity should be. The following quote from a Rwandan member of our team summaries these issues in a very real world way:

> "I have worked with so many whites, religious people, industry people, trainers, so many and they never seem to listen or care. They want to give us what they

> think we need; your worries about 'cultural transferability' are not present. The concept appears to be missing from their vocabulary. One training team provided us with a training package that had been used in Haiti. They expected it to work for us, how could it? They then think we are ungrateful and refuse to work with us; we then have to accept their offer to use Haiti material, or refuse it and suffer the consequences of either action. They then move on and leave us to our problems, probably going to 'inflict' their help on some other poor Africans!"
>
> *(At this point he laughed loudly for two or three minutes at his own joke).*

Greenwood and Levin (1998) go on to explain that the professional Action Researcher may or may not be engaged in the actions deriving from the AR process, dependant on the situation and the needs of the stakeholders. During this research I was required to do both; at times I was fully engaged in the actions, particularly in relation to my role as a Teacher-Researcher. An example of this would be an alteration to the RCP Trainers' curriculum due to the findings of a piece of AR, such as student interviews, which I would obviously implement in my role as a trainer on that programme. However, I was less likely to be involved in the implementation of the wider political and organisational actions, although my research results often guided those actions, thereby 'leading to a more just or satisfying situation for the stakeholders'. An example of the latter being my recommendation based on AR, that police trainers and senior managers would benefit from courses and study tours in the UK; the resultant actions were actually taken by the appropriate members of the Government of Rwanda and their counterparts in the UK. Greenwood and Levin (1998 p.4) also explain how the professional researcher and the stakeholders define the problems to be examined, co-generate relevant knowledge about them, learn and execute social research techniques, take actions, and interpret the results of actions based on what they have learned. They believe that Action Research rests on:

> '... the belief and experience that all people — professional Action Researchers included — accumulate, organise, and use complex knowledge constantly in everyday life. This belief is visible in any Action Research project because the first step professional Action Researchers and members of a community or organisation take, is to define a problem that they seek to resolve. They begin by pooling their knowledge. Action Research democratises the relationship between the professional researcher and the local interested parties.'

Consequently, Greenwood and Levin (1998) view AR as a practice with a social change agenda;

it involves a critique of conventional academic practices and organisations that study social problems without trying to resolve them. They describe how AR regards academic and professional knowledge systems that do not engage practice direction, as 'wrongheaded'. However, they emphasise that Action Researchers neither reject formal research methods nor ignore the epistemological issues that necessarily undergird the development of valid social knowledge. I fully advocate the approach of Greenwood and Levin (1998) and believe that it was most appropriate for my research, particularly when considering the more conventional and positivistic academic research practices that have occurred throughout Rwandan and general African history. This area is discussed more fully in the following section.

Insiders and outsiders in Africa: the concept of Otherness

Schipper (1999) in her research regarding 'insiders' and 'outsiders' in Africa, described how, throughout the centuries, human beings have created binaries, devising images of themselves as opposites of 'Others'. She believes they have embedded such images in stories, songs and other forms of artistic expression and argues that scholarship has been influenced by people's imagination and existing narratives. She cites an example of how this applied to Western research in Africa (Others) as late as 1963 when, as quoted earlier, the English historian Hugh Trevor-Roper claimed that Africa had no history, in a BBC radio lecture.

Morris (1997 Chapter two p.6) states that, 'During the period of history in which Britain established herself as the most powerful and wealthiest nation of earth, albeit through the subjugation of Others, the concept of 'whiteness' as being a dominant cultural marker was born ... it served to create a boundary against which 'Otherness' could be defined. Thus the concept of 'whiteness' emerged as symbolically dominant over its polar opposite of 'blackness'... thus defining 'blacks, among other social groups, as being Others'.

Schipper (1999) gives Johannes Fabian (1990) as a representative of this anthropology,

describing him as a researcher who continually questions the assumptions implicit in the contemporary work of anthropologists, including his own. In *Power and Performance (*1990), Fabian no longer talked in terms of 'us' and 'them', constructing instead a dialogue with his Congolese partners and thereby establishing a relationship between anthropologists and the Others in a joint performance. In this way he sought to avoid the allegation of an unequal and manipulative relationship between subject and object, between researchers and informants, for which a previous generation had been blamed; an uncomfortable reproach for which solutions were eagerly sought. Fabian's (1990) thesis is that: although our academic culture leads us on a separate way our efforts to signify are, in fact, no different from and certainly of no higher an order than those of the people we study from the perspective of that academic culture.

Fabian (1990) advocates an encounter on the basis of equality, a true dialogue, a dialogue in which the information relationship is no longer asymmetrical and in which nothing of what really happened is hidden. Nevertheless, during the process the researcher remains a researcher, states Fabian, and therefore we need a further step. On the basis of what he calls his 'discovery', he tries to create a research situation in which there is no longer a question of different roles and everybody involved participates on an equal footing. Thus he explains how the construction of knowledge about a culture can be achieved through a joint effort with the people of that culture.

There have been criticisms of Fabian's research, such as Bal (1993) who argues that, because of its form, the text can only be subordinate to what she calls an 'extremely self-centred first person'. Schipper (1999) also argues that Fabian's ardent efforts to create a position of equality cannot succeed. In support of her argument she cites Fabian's own book for which Fabian claims all responsibility, for only his name appears on the cover. Schipper further asserts that Fabian's Congolese performance partners are not in the academic circuit of which he is a part and for which the results of his research are finally intended. Fabian's scientific research narratives lead to a kind of discourse that differs from his Congolese interlocutors' oral

performance traditions. The problems described by Schipper (1999) and Bal (1993) were not so apparent in my research, as the gap between my scholarly and research skills and those of my Rwandan colleagues is smaller or non-existent. In some cases the gap was caused by the extensive research and other experiences and skills of my interlocutors, which minimised the potential for me to become self-centred. Often, my Rwandan colleagues caused me to be humbled, rather than feeling arrogant or self-centred, including the following example that informed my methodology for Phases 7 and 8 at a very early stage of their implementation.

Two of my Rwandan colleagues were participating in the first focus group in a prison, *Gereza ya Kigali*; the respondents were all awaiting trial for their alleged roles in the genocide. Each of the respondents were believed to have actively orchestrated the genocide and ordered mass murders throughout Rwanda. This caused me concern because many relatives of my Rwandan colleagues had been killed in those incidents and I felt a need to protect them. However, my colleagues were polite, professional and objective in their questioning and when receiving genocidal ideology responses, which I believe were far removed from their value systems. I considered this to be the best example of cultural relativism that I had ever witnessed. My colleagues were able to suspend judgement on the alleged, in some cases self-confessed, genociders' practices in order to understand them in their own terms. As Haviland (1996) asserts it is only through such an approach that one can gain an undistorted view of another peoples' ways and beliefs, as well as insights into the practices of one's own society. He also recognises that whilst cultural relativism is essential as a research tool, it does not require suspension of judgement forever, or that researchers must defend the right of any people to engage in any practice, no matter how reprehensible. All that is necessary is that they avoid premature judgements until they have a proper understanding of the culture in which they are interested. Through that focus group I learnt several things that informed my methodology. My Rwandan colleagues did not need my emotive protection, therefore I replaced it with professional debriefs, during which they expressed their true feelings of sadness and anger about the behaviour they viewed as reprehensible. I also adopted the cultural relativism approach to my AR and included myself in the debriefing process,

during which I too received constructive and professional support from my colleagues. I also believe that the data we collected through this AR technique was of a much higher quality than that which we would have collected without implementing cultural relativism, although I do not have a control group to assess this belief against. This process is supported by Fabian's (1990) previously cited view, in which he advocates an encounter on the basis of equality, a true dialogue, a dialogue in which the information relationship is no longer asymmetrical and in which nothing of what really happened is hidden.

I also believe that, as the professional Action Researcher, Fabian *is* the author of his research and his name is appropriately on the cover of his published works, although members of any AR team should receive appropriate acknowledgements. However, the issues highlighted by Schipper (1999) and Bal (1993) in their critique of Fabian's work were still potential research problems that I had to consider at all times, particular when working with individual Rwandans who relied heavily on the oral traditions of speech, storytelling and song, which is very different to the academic discourse of this research.

My assertion is that Fabian's vision is a positive one that I implemented as a research technique in Rwanda, with the exception of his final step of 'discovery' which I considered to be impracticable. It would have been impossible to create a research situation in Rwanda without different roles for members of the Research and Training Team, because of our different experiences, skills and occupational roles/ranks. We were also made up of Self and Others, a phenomena which we tried to minimise; however, we were definitely insiders and outsiders. As I highlighted earlier in this section, Greenwood and Levin (1998) believe insiders and outsiders are different because most insiders have to live directly with the results of any change activity, whereas most outsiders can leave. Insiders also have the central influence on what the focus of the AR activity should be. However, some of Fabian's proposed methodology was central to this research, in that all team members had the right to participate in the AR on an equal footing; consequently all members are cited in the acknowledgements of this research.

The Practitioner-Researcher

As stated previously, much of my research regarding the actual training of the police managers and trainers followed the Teacher-Researcher/Practitioner-Researcher tradition of AR. Robson (1999) describes the Practitioner-Researcher as someone who holds down a job in some particular area and at the same time carries out systematic enquiry, which is of relevance to the job. He describes how, in education, this might be the teacher carrying out a study of a way of helping an *individual child* with a learning difficulty; or a project on delivering some aspect of curriculum to a *school class*; or (possibly working with colleagues from the same or other schools) a systematic enquiry into a proposed local authority initiative to improve communication *between first and secondary schools*. Corresponding foci of enquiry, for *individual* through *group* to *organisation*, are not difficult to envisage for practitioners in other professions. In relation to this piece of research the three foci of enquiry apply to the nine phases, examples include the following incidents.

One student had suffered severe trauma due to the war and genocide, which created problems for him in class. In his own words:

> ' ... Sometimes you believe I am not trying or at least I am not concentrating. This is true, but not because I do not care. I am somewhere else, in my mind, with my parents before they died — with my family and friends before they died. Now there is only me, sometimes it is too hard to stay in the present, so I dream of the past...'

My research with this *individual* was carried out to find actions that would support him through his grief and enable him to learn.

My work with *groups* of RCP Trainers examined issues such as the relevance and utility of the British Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development's Core Trainers' Award

(CIPD's CTA) curriculum to their situation. For example, the British term 'equality of opportunity' is used throughout the CTA standards and students must demonstrate their competence in that area. This term has an entirely different but equal, or more important, meaning in Rwanda, where many lives could be saved by an 'equality of opportunity' ethos. The resultant action was to use the CTA standards but, through negotiation with the IPD, enable the RCP candidates to provide a variety of evidence that would not be available or appropriate to British candidates. In relation to the police *organisation* my research provided the Government of Rwanda and senior police officials with a variety of recommended actions, many of which they took up.

Robson (1999) believes that postgraduate study is moving away from the notion that the Practitioner-Researcher determines the focus of his/her studies and in particular that of any project or thesis work, solely on the basis of his/her own individual interests. The move is towards study relevant to the professional setting, in part determined by the agenda and concerns of that setting. Reduction in individual freedom is balanced by an increasing likelihood of implementation, and of additional resources and time for the Practitioner-Researcher. Zeisel (1984) described this as a move towards research being seen as problem and situation specific, to achieve someone's purposes rather than an end in itself. Robson (1999 p.447) outlines how Practitioner-Researchers are often at a considerable disadvantage *vis-à-vis* outside professional researchers, but also believes that they have complementing advantages. Robson's views are reproduced in quotes below and then correlated to my own research.

Disadvantages of the Practitioner-Researcher role

1 *Time*. 'Probably the main disadvantage. Trying to do a systematic enquiry on top of normal commitments is very difficult.'

Whilst I agree that time constraints can be problematic, I also believe there is an increasing

acceptance that investigation, enquiry, evaluation and innovation are all part of the professional trainer's role. My training background is grounded in the 'reflective practitioner' ethos of Donald Schon (1983) that was introduced into police training following the Scarman Report (1982). Therefore Schon's concept was implicit during my first nine months in Rwanda, before I began this research process. When I formalised my Action Research, the concept became more explicit in my thoughts and research documentation. My belief is reinforced by the work of Allen-Meares and Lane (1990) who argue, in the context of social work practice, that there is a synergy between research and practice and their integration is of benefit to both.

2 *Lack of expertise.* 'This obviously depends on the individual. There is a need for some background in designing, carrying out and analysing studies. A major problem can be not knowing what it is that you don't know.'

Despite my professional experience and qualifications, I soon recognised my lack of expertise and background in research methodology. These findings were important to the police of Rwanda if the project was to achieve its full potential; I needed to enlist support to counteract my weaker areas. I did this by formalising my investigation and enquiry through this research, thereby adding the expertise of my supervisors to the equation and consequently increasing my knowledge.

3 *Lack of confidence.* 'Lack of experience in carrying out studies leads to lack of confidence.'

Similar to my comments in 2 above, I believe that supervisory support and formal training in research methods was important to increase my professional confidence and secure the success of the nine phases. My views echo those of Robson (1999 p.450) who states, 'A possibility . . . is to register for a research degree or other post-graduate award and carry out the enquiry as part of it, receiving supervisory support to do this'.

4 *'Insider' problems.* 'The insider may have preconceptions about issues and solutions. There can also be hierarchy difficulties (both ways, i.e. with high status and low status Practitioner-Researchers); and possibly

> the 'prophet in own country' phenomenon (i.e. outside advice may be more highly valued).'

I encountered hierarchy difficulties in Rwanda where I was viewed as both a high status and low status Practitioner-Researcher, dependent on the situation. For example, there was often a mistrust of 'Westerners' by the Rwandese. They believed that I was there to gather information to use against them. Others viewed me as an expert from outside who would be able to offer valuable advice.

Advantages of the Practitioner-Researcher role

1. *'Insider' opportunities.* 'You will have a pre-existing knowledge and experience base about the situation and the people involved.'

I had a pre-existing knowledge and experience base which greatly assisted me in relation to training and consultancy. However, I had little or no knowledge about the various aspects of the Rwandan situation or the people of Rwanda. I therefore needed to carry out a thorough historical literature review, although I also had to be acutely aware of the fact that most of the publications were written by non-Africans. To counteract the possibility of this adding to my own ethnocentrism, I carried out many semi-structured interviews with Rwandans from a variety of backgrounds.

2 *'Practitioner' opportunities.* 'There is likely to be a substantial reduction of implementation problems.'

In relation to 'individual' and 'group' issues our Research and Training team were able to implement our actions with no problems, other than those of our own making. For example, we were able to introduce a more active and facilitative style of training, and reduce or eliminate physical punishment by RCP Trainers. However, at times, we created problems by introducing British methodologies that were not suitable or by ignoring potential Rwandan methodologies such as the use of song and dance as an 'icebreaker'. This methodology was not used in Phases 1-5, but when, through AR we realised our error, it was introduced in Phases 6-9, with very

positive results from the police and the community.

3 *'Practitioner-Researcher' synergy.* 'Practitioner insights and role help in the design, carrying out and analysis of useful and appropriate studies.'

As previously stated in this section my AR findings have led me to a belief in the concept of 'Practitioner-Researcher' synergy and that their integration is of benefit to both.

The Teacher-Researcher

Phases 2 and 9 of my research in Rwanda (the Training of Rwandan Communal Police [RCP] Trainers and Managers, and the Rwanda National Police Human Rights Trainers Programme) followed the Teacher-Researcher aspect of Practitioner-Researcher, particularly in relation to working with individuals and groups of students. These studies start with problems identified by teachers, rather than researchers, and attempt to improve educational practice by means of their own practical actions and by their own reflections upon the effects of those actions.

There are many definitions of the 'Teacher as Researcher' model. Brown and McIntyre (1981) emphasise the ongoing nature of the method and describe how the researcher/actor, at an early stage, formulates speculative, tentative, general principles in relation to the problems that they have identified. They then explain how hypotheses may be generated from those principles, about what action is likely to lead to desired improvements in practice. Such action will then be tried out and data on the effects collected; these data are used to revise the earlier hypotheses and identify more appropriate action that reflects a modification of the general principles. Collection of data on the effects of this new action may then generate further hypotheses and modified principles as the researcher/actor moves towards a greater understanding and improvement of practice. Brown and McIntyre go on to assert that this method implies a continuous process of research and the worth of the work is judged by the understanding of, and desirable change in, the

practice that is achieved.

Cohen and Manion (1981) predominantly support Brown and McIntyre (1981) when they describe the 'Teacher-Researcher' model as an on the spot procedure, which is designed to deal with a concrete problem located in an immediate situation. This means that the step by step process is constantly monitored by a variety of mechanisms, such as questionnaires, diaries, interviews and case studies. This ensures that the ensuing feedback may be translated into modifications, adjustments, directional changes, redefinition, as necessary, so as to bring about lasting benefit to the ongoing process itself.

As both pairs of researchers point out, an important feature of this type of AR is that the task is not finished when the project ends. Phases 2 and 9 (the Training of the RCP Trainers and Managers, and the Rwanda National Police Human Rights Trainers Programme) included the following monitoring mechanisms: diaries, field notes, photographs, video recordings and audio recordings. The method can be conceived as a continuing cycle until a satisfactory solution is reached, as demonstrated in Figure 6 from my field notes of Phase 2, which I shared with my students.

Figure 6 Extract from Field Notes of Phase 2



The strengths of the Teacher-Researcher approach to Phases 2 and 9 of this research were that:

a) It was alert to the gap between rhetoric and practice.

b) It bridged the gap between theory and practice by moving away from the normal procedure of providing a report at the end of the project, which would not provide assistance to practitioners or educationists.

c) It will provide educationists and practitioners (including the newly trained Rwandan practitioners) in similar fields, with in-depth information and explanation about what is actually happening with Rwandan police training.

d) It drew on the 'natural' processes of evaluation and research that I engaged in on a daily basis as I was working in entirely new areas throughout both these phases.

e) It built on the knowledge and experience that fellow practitioners and I had already accumulated.

f) It will continue to facilitate professional development and curriculum change.

The specific weaknesses that I identified in order to minimise them were:

a) The conflicting demands of data collection and providing training and support for the students.

b) The need to recognise the effects that the Teacher-Researcher's role and potential assumptions had on data collection and analysis.

c) At times it was viewed as a threatening activity for the police trainers, students, senior officers and other team members.

Because of the participatory nature of AR the conflicting demands were minimised greatly, for everyone was involved and interested in the research, and viewed it as an integral part of their own development; as a Rwandan member of our team said, when he looked up from the work he was carrying out on his qualification:

> "Sometimes I am a bit confused, am I a student? Am I a trainer? An evaluator? Or am I an Action Researcher? Then I think it does not matter, you all help me to keep a track of what I am doing – what an opportunity for me and what a benefit I will be to my country when I can train, evaluate and Action Research. It is not that long ago that I was hiding in the bush not knowing if I would live or die."
>
> *(At this point he laughed loudly and returned to his work)*

My approach to AR, which has already been discussed in depth, such as cultural relativism, participation, co-generation of relevant knowledge and objectivity ensured that I recognised, with

support from my colleagues, more of my assumptions about the training process and the students than I would have done without that discipline to guide me. In turn, this reduced the negative effects that my Teacher-Researcher role and subsequent assumptions had on data collection and analysis. There were many occasions during the first months in Rwanda when my research was viewed as a threatening activity by the police trainers, students and their senior officers; this was exasperated by the post-war and genocide environment. Spouse had murdered spouse, parents had murdered children, teachers had murdered pupils, priests had murdered their congregations and security organisations representatives had murdered the people they were there to protect. Many of these activities had been funded by the white Western community as described in Chapter two of this research, therefore trust had to be earned by our team, for it was not readily given. As time passed we became more trusted and respected, which resulted in this problem being minimised, but never eradicated. Part of the solution to this problem was about being very clear about permission and access to both personal and organisational data with all stakeholders. For example, as I lived with my Research and Training Team colleagues, I was always hearing things in informal settings, which could be useful to my research. I was very clear about requesting permission to use such data, which resulted in my colleagues becoming bored with my constant requests; they therefore asked to read my work so that they could ask for things to be omitted at that stage rather than constantly being asked. Interestingly, I was asked to add information to put some data into context, but I was never asked to remove anything.

Participatory Evaluation and Participatory Rural Appraisal

Phases 3, 6 and 7 (Evaluation of Training of Trainers Phase, the Human Right Training Needs Analysis and the Consultation on the Formulation of a Police Code of Conduct) all involved Participatory Evaluation and were informed by Participatory Rural Appraisal approaches. Greenwood and Levin (1998 p.235) describe evaluation and auditing processes as '...a common site of some of the most authoritarian, coercive behaviour in organisational life. Being visited by an evaluator, accountant, assessor, accreditation reviewer, or any of the many other figures

playing a professional evaluation role, is usually experienced as being placed in a subordinate position to a person whose professional role is to review and evaluate you, your programme, or your organisation objectively'. They go on to say that nearly all of us have had experiences with such evaluations, and so it should be easy to conjure up the image of the objective, impartial outsider who asks hard questions in what is frequently, but not always, experienced as a hostile way.

Distance is supposed to be crucial in conventional evaluation, and attempts to co-opt an evaluator are to be guarded against (and often engaged in). Although some evaluators are more skilled than others in managing their relationships with their subjects, conventional evaluation is assumed to centre on a potential conflict of interest between the evaluator and the subjects. Greenwood and Levin (1998) also assert that this approach to evaluation parallels the concepts of conventional social science. The notions of objectivity, distance, and the need to avoid bias and co-optation, match closely the standard rules for conventional social research with the complex mechanisms of sampling, statistical testing, and other associated techniques. In addition, most conventional evaluations take place at the end of a project or at major intervals after some significant project activity has occurred. The purpose of the evaluation is generally to grade the performance of the project and its leaders, though some interim evaluations aim to produce useful information for subsequent phases of the project. Greenwood and Levin (1998) believe that one clear assumption of this approach is that the subjects should not be trusted to provide either an honest or a good quality evaluation of himself or herself, and that making use of the evaluation results for immediate and ongoing changes in the project is not a principal goal. AR approaches have made significant contributions to this field by opening up the notion of evaluation to collaborative and participatory approaches, an idea that is just beginning to take hold but that revolutionises evaluation processes. This section discusses two different and separate groups of approaches that centre on issues of evaluation - Participatory Evaluation and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA). Although these emerged from very different institutional sources and focus on different kinds of processes, both involve the problem owners in the process of generating the basic data

on which project design, redesign, and evaluation are constructed. Greenwood and Levin (1998) believe these two approaches have generated an immense amount of work in AR.

Participatory Evaluation

Evaluation, as a field of professional work, has been dominated historically by conventional social scientists and accountability thinking. To a high degree, evaluation has focused on measuring and reporting the merits and defects of specific activities, and the outcome of evaluations has taken the form of reports to the authorities who fund the activity, or who are responsible for programme oversight so that they can document the outcomes of particular activities. Conventional evaluation places little or no emphasis on making a positive effect on a project while it is under way. Generally, it records outcomes for a particular audience of decision makers.

Greenwood and Levin (1998) describe how programmes to fight poverty, to teach the uneducated to read, or to support rural community efforts to survive, have all received the scrutiny of evaluators. Such evaluations generally result in reports that are inaccessible to the stakeholders in the programmes, either because they are kept confidential or they are written in such a way as to be difficult for most non-professionals to understand. On my arrival in Rwanda I found it difficult to understand the evaluations that had been written prior to my arrival and they were in English, my first language. My Rwandan counterparts found them of little or no use. This had a negative effect on them and, as Greenwood and Levin (1998) identify, on their autonomy as intelligent individuals. These forms of evaluations give the insiders little say in regard to what is evaluated, how it is done, and how to make sense of the results. They are simply treated as informants for the evaluators — placing them in a passive relationship to the outside and 'expert' evaluators. Scriven, (1995) argues that this is because one of the most basic tenets of conventional evaluation is that the essence of evaluation is the professional evaluator's own judgement of the outcome. The cornerstone of the profession, in

this view, is to make neutral and objective judgements of the activities under evaluation.

Greenwood and Levin (1998) argue that this is a problematic position for evaluators. The exclusively professional focus and the hierarchical approach make evaluation an activity without practical utility for the programme being evaluated. At best, such evaluations legitimate spending on or terminating projects but do little to help programme participants in their daily lives. In response to this dilemma, some evaluators began to develop participative approaches in which the evaluator and the evaluands have created a closer relationship and opened up the possibilities of mutual learning. Patton (1986 p.53) was one of the first to point to this different path for evaluation. In his title, '*Utilization-Focused Evaluation*', Patton points to the use of the evaluation results to improve projects as an imperative in evaluation work:

> What fundamentally distinguishes utilization-focused evaluation from other approaches is that the evaluator does not alone carry this burden for making choices about the nature, purpose, content, and methods of evaluation. These decisions are shared by an identifiable and organized group of intended users.

Basically, Patton (1986 p.43) aims to include every stakeholder, as defined by him. They "are people, who have a stake — a vested interest — in evaluation findings". For any evaluation there are multiple stakeholders with a direct or even indirect interest in programme effectiveness. In Phases 3, 6 and 7 of this research they included: the programme funders; the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); senior police personnel; police trainers and their manager; local administrators and, indirectly, student and members of the community, including detainees. Patton's (1986) argument is important in pinpointing how utilisation depends on stakeholders' involvement in the evaluation process. Greenwood and Levin (1998) believe that the insight that involvement is necessary for getting the results of evaluations to be used, leads to an interest in ways programme recipients can deal with evaluation results. These recipients are in a different position from all other stakeholders because they are the actors who potentially should benefit most from the evaluation. Their interest in the programme is not the

same as the interest of the programme staff. They are, in a certain sense, the primary actors in any programme, simply because the focus of the activity is to do something about their life situation. No other stakeholder group is in such a position, so it is a powerful move to focus attention on ways these primary beneficiaries can use the evaluation. One of the ways in which we solved the potential problem of different audiences for the evaluation reports was for me, as the professional researcher to write the reports that were required for the funders, the UNDP and senior police personnel. My Rwandan colleagues then delineated the research findings for the police trainers and their managers, the local administrators, the students and members of the community in a variety of innovative ways that took into account cultural differences and diversity. Examples included: the use of plays presented by the police students and pictorial posters and calendars (see Figure 7) for those members of the community who were unable to read; television and radio broadcasts; leaflets in Kinyarwanda, French and English for the police students. In that way we had a constant stream of new data from those individuals who do not often have a voice, for example after each play the community voiced their enthusiasm and/or concern with the proposals of those particular recommendations.

Greenwood and Levin (1998) state that Participatory Evaluation aims to create a learning process for the programme recipients that will help them in their effort to reach desired goals. Participatory approaches to evaluation purposely muddy the distinction between the programme activity and evaluation results, because the evaluation aims to make a difference by helping programme recipients achieve their goals better. Such an approach often goes even farther and helps to question the definition and ranking of the goals of the programme being evaluated. This was the case in my AR, for example the views of the audiences of the plays were used to rank and define the goals of the programme being executed. The original aim of the donor and the UNDP was for the British team members to train the human rights programme, then leave. The majority of community respondents wanted the British trainers to train Rwandan trainers, so that they could fulfil that role. Once that was completed, the Rwandan trainers could train

Rwanda National Police Service

Community Policing and Human Rights Department

January					
Mon	1	8	15	22	29
Tue	2	9	16	23	30
Wed	3	10	17	24	31
Thu	4	11	18	25	
Fri	5	12	19	26	
Sat	6	13	20	27	
Sun	7	14	21	28	
Week No.	1	2	3	4	5

February					
Mon		5	12	19	26
Tue		6	13	20	27
Wed		7	14	21	28
Thu	1	8	15	22	
Fri	2	9	16	23	
Sat	3	10	17	24	
Sun	4	11	18	25	
Week No.	5	6	7	8	9

March					
Mon		5	12	19	26
Tue		6	13	20	27
Wed		7	14	21	28
Thu	1	8	15	22	29
Fri	2	9	16	23	30
Sat	3	10	17	24	31
Sun	4	11	18	25	
Week No.	9	10	11	12	13

April					
Mon		2	9	**16**	23	30
Tue		3	10	17	24	
Wed		4	11	18	25	
Thu		5	12	19	26	
Fri		6	**13**	20	27	
Sat		7	14	21	28	
Sun	1	8	15	22	29	
Week No.	13	14	15	16	17	18

May					
Mon		7	14	21	**28**
Fri	4	11	18	25	
Sat	5	12	19	26	
Sun	6	13	20	27	
Week No.	18	19	20	21	22

June					
Mon		4	11	18	25
Fri	1	8	15	22	29
Sat	2	9	16	23	30
Sun	3	10	17	24	
Week No.	22	23	24	25	26

July					
Mon		2	9	16	23	30
Fri		6	13	20	27	
Sat		7	14	21	28	
Sun	1	8	15	22	29	
Week No.	26	27	28	29	30	31

August					
Mon		6	13	20	**27**
Fri	3	10	17	24	31
Sat	4	11	18	25	
Sun	5	12	19	26	
Week No.	31	32	33	34	35

September					
Mon		3	10	17	24
Tue		4	11	18	25
Wed		5	12	19	26
Thu		6	13	20	27
Fri		7	14	21	28
Sat	1	8	15	22	29
Sun	2	9	16	23	30
Week No.	35	36	37	38	39

October					
Mon	1	8	15	22	29
Tue	2	9	16	23	30
Wed	3	10	17	24	31
Thu	4	11	18	25	
Fri	5	12	19	26	
Sat	6	13	20	27	
Sun	7	14	21	28	
Week No.	40	41	42	43	44

November					
Mon		5	12	19	26
Tue		6	13	20	27
Wed		7	14	21	28
Thu	1	8	15	22	29
Fri	2	9	16	23	30
Sat	3	10	17	24	
Sun	4	11	18	25	
Week No.	44	45	46	47	48

December						
Mon		3	10	17	24	31
Tue		4	11	18	**25**	
Wed		5	12	19	**26**	
Thu		6	13	20	27	
Fri		7	14	21	28	
Sat	1	8	15	22	29	
Sun	2	9	16	23	30	
Week No.	48	49	50	51	52	1

Figure 7 Calendar that was displayed in the community, depicting elements of the AR.

Chief Inspector Damas Gatare
Head of Department

Community Policing and Human Rights Department, National Police, Floor 3, Ministry of Interior, Kigali, Rwanda

the community about their rights, ensuring sustainability. It was the latter suggestion that was implemented, the trainers then requested accreditation of their programme, to improve their credibility particularly if they were to train people of higher authority and this was also actioned.

This methodology is supported by Guba and Lincoln's (1989) *Fourth Generation Evaluation* which introduced a constructivist approach to evaluation, arguing that evaluation is a process of construction and reconstruction of realities. Guba and Lincoln (p.142) say, 'the major task for the constructivist investigator is to tease out the constructions that various actors in the setting hold and, so far as possible, to bring them into conjunction — joining — with one another and with whatever other information can be brought to bear on the issues involved'. Brunner and Guzman's (1989 p.10) identify evaluation as a 'methodological component of the educational development project that aims at empowering the dominated groups in a society so that they will be able to join the struggle for a just and egalitarian society'. The overall aim of the nine phases of this research is to work towards that vision through the formulation, implementation and evaluation of a sustainable and effective police training programme. Greenwood and Levin (1998) cite Weiss and Greene (1992) and Patti Lather (1991) as other proponents of this approach. Michelle Fine (1996) summarises this work in the form of five commitments to Participatory Evaluation research: building local capacity; evaluation and reform; an ethic of inquiry; evaluation and democratic participation and rethinking the 'products' of evaluation research.

Greenwood and Levin (1998) state that a standard practice in Participatory Evaluation is to involve the recipients of a programme in an evaluation activity or in the process of interpreting evaluation results. The most conventional way to do this is to discuss the collected data with the local people as a way of making sense of the findings. A more advanced form is to involve participants in the process of designing what to evaluate from the beginning of the project, to engage them in the data collection process, and to include them in making sense of the findings. This was the methodology that I adopted throughout Phases 3, 6 and 7. The insider members of

the Research and Training Team were involved in the entire evaluation process. They included senior police managers, police constables, police support staff and community members. They participated fully in deciding the variables to be evaluated and the data collection process. All insider members assisted in interpreting the evaluation results, devising the recommendations and implementing the resulting actions. Whilst this research has finished and the outsiders have left Rwanda, I am aware that the insiders are continuing to run Human Rights Programmes as a direct result of the evaluation process (emails from Rwanda, May 2002). This process was merged with the AR that was apparent throughout Phases 1 to 9.

Greenwood and Levin (1988) clearly see the parallels between Participatory Evaluation and AR, but describe some important differences in emphasis. Participatory Evaluation emphasises the participatory dimension as the cornerstone of every move in the process. Most forms of AR have a more developed view of the action orientation and group processes involved in a change project and emphasise a variety of techniques for promoting group actions above and beyond the evaluation part of the process. This is most evident in Participatory Evaluations that focus on giving a voice to groups that usually are silent, but lack a clear focus and strategy about how to channel voices into actions for improving conditions. They also believe that a good deal of AR has been careless in data gathering and analysis strategies of the sort Participatory Evaluation excels in. I am in agreement with Greenwood and Levin's (1998 p.241) conclusion that 'the field continues to develop, a rapprochement between Participatory Evaluators and other Action Researchers will be invaluable for both groups', for I witnessed the success of this rapprochement in Rwanda.

Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)

Greenwood and Levin (1998) state that PRA is a very different institutional position. PRA is an element in overall socio-economic development programmes, mainly in poor countries, such as Rwanda. These strategies aim to develop more reliable baseline data about problems through involvement of local people in the definition and documentation of those problems. Though all

major social research is a collaborative endeavour, drawing on the experiences, theories, and expertise of generations of researchers, PRA is strongly associated with the representations of it made by a single practitioner: Robert Chambers. He has developed statements about PRA in a series of papers (Chambers, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c) and in a book that summarises PRA, *Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last* (1997).

Greenwood and Levin (1988) believe that the point of entry for PRA is provided by one of the most bizarre and frustrating dynamics of development programmes over the years: the complete lack of baseline data for the development of programme strategies and the evaluation of outcomes. They argue that a whole generation of interventions was based on presumptions about what was wrong, guesses about how to fix it, and post hoc justifications for the failed strategies. Yet the development establishment resisted baseline research as too expensive, or unnecessary, or impossible. Greenwood (1980) developed an early, and ignored, position paper on this subject, arguing that rapid, efficient, and meaningful baseline data could and should be collected.

Over time, the notion that quick baseline studies were necessary was agreed, resulting in a set of strategies called Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA), Belshaw, (1981); Chambers, (1981). By the mid-1980s, a union was forged between RRA and PRA in which RRA was modified to emphasise local knowledge and participation more fully and completely. Although RRA was more expert centred and academically based, PRA gained more momentum through the activities of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) worldwide. It stressed local knowledge and training, empowerment, and the development of sustainable initiatives for local self-management. In those statements of its aims, PRA is very much like the AR used in this research. However, unlike many other forms of AR, PRA has a relatively specific set of techniques and methods associated with it. It was the specific techniques and methods that led me to reject PRA as a methodology for this research, despite its apparent relevance. I did not consider myself sufficiently knowledgeable on the multiplicity of methods, such as timelines,

seasonal calendars and trend analyses, and I had insufficient time to prepare myself for implementing such techniques with a view to passing them on to other team members. However, I did feel that much of what Chamber's suggested was very appropriate to this research and therefore used some of his work to inform the Participatory Evaluation aspects of this AR.

Descriptions of the techniques and methods that I used to inform this research follow. PRA involves a number of interviewing and sampling methods and some specific group and team dynamics approaches. Among the approaches used are participatory mapping and modelling of local communities and problem areas, the picking of key informants as local experts, attempts to identify the different significant local groups and to make contact with some members of each, having participants help analyse things written about them and the development of teams and team contracts. Flexibility, attentiveness to the way local people think and react, and a powerful belief in the knowledge system of local people, are the keys to PRA; these areas were also key to my research into cultural transferability.

Greenwood and Levin (1998) state that each PRA project is a slightly different mobilisation of the techniques, depending on the expertise of the outsiders coming in, the capacities available locally, and the problems being examined. Having become massively popular, PRA is now applied in a multitude of situations, including the development of participatory evaluations of projects, particular topical studies, and as the source of training programmes for both community members and outsiders. Greenwood and Levin go on to describe PRA as familiar to AR, in that local knowledge is given pride of place. The behaviour of outside experts is carefully controlled to provide space for insiders to make their own choices. The methods are not applied scattershot, and there is a kind of reasonable sequencing in the activity that moves from one kind of knowledge and team dynamics to more complex ones over time. PRA also deals with issues of validity and reliability of data, and it claims to give local people a greater right to define their own situation and act on it. Chambers (1997) believes that the issues of

power and knowledge are joined directly; the subtitle of his book, *Putting the First Last*, gives the flavour. The assumption is that the ideas and practices of the rich and powerful will dominate in all situations unless they are intentionally subverted by 'handing over the stick' to the local people, by insisting on hearing their views, and by respecting their knowledge. Development professionals are the ones who must change, learn to listen, and then take what they learn to become advocates for local people. Critiques of PRA abound because of the many problems surrounding its practice. Greenwood and Levin (1998 p.248) argue that:

> 'development establishment welcomed it as a panacea, without much caring about its participatory dimensions other than the euphonic sound the word *participation* has in moral debates. PRAs are often mandated, but the larger conditions in the agencies that mandate them prejudge the outcome of the work and carry on projects that were already defined without the use of PRA. PRA, though an array of techniques, in the hands of incompetent or insincere practitioners can become an empty formalism, a set of ritual steps to go through rather than a set of tools to be deployed differently as the complexities of local situations become better understood. Of course, this co-opted formalism is not unique to PRA; it is a problem in all forms of AR.'

PRA, often sponsored by powerful external agencies, is caught in a contradiction between espousing participatory methods while working within an institutional environment. Greenwood and Levin (1998) describe how feminists have pointed out that many PRAs fail because they do not get to the voiceless members of the community and thus create a false impression of the dynamics of local situations, especially when the outside agents are male and dealing with male local leaders. As Dadié (1959) stated, 'A people is always misunderstood if only its rulers are quoted.' Our team took these criticisms of PRA very seriously and whilst we were not formally adhering to PRA, we worked hard to overcome them. We took extensive steps to get our presence known to women in the community and to meet them in groups in their own homes, particularly in Phases 6 and 7 due to our extended experience and knowledge. The Rwanda police members of our team voluntarily avoided these focus groups, for fear of intimidating the women. Unlike many researchers in Rwanda we included detainees in our focus groups, whilst they are not hard to reach they are often 'voiceless members of the community'.

David Mosse (1993) points not to the failure of PRA but to its weaknesses in practice and why it should not be viewed as a panacea. He shows how PRA can unintentionally structure local knowledge to reflect existing social relationships by failing to develop the long-term and subtle sensitivity to local power relationships that an AR project would necessarily develop. He argues that when a PRA team arrives in a community and begins a rapid process of data collection and analysis, it usually does not have the time or inclination to become aware in a detailed, subtle, ethnographic way about the nuances of local power. As a result, the coercion and collusion that dictate the public face of many communities are quite likely to be expressed in the outcomes.

Greenwood and Levin (1998) believe that, at its worst, PRA is an extractive approach to information in which data are gathered for the purposes of the development agency rather than for meeting the espoused intention of having the agency's programmes built to suit the needs of the community. Thus, a PRA team may come in, organise a major data gathering effort, organize the data, and leave, designing the intervention in the local community on this basis and calling the process participatory. These were not issues for this research as PRA informed, rather than replaced, our AR process. Mosse (1993) points out that the participatory language of PRA can also be experienced as oppressive in some situations. When local people ask PRA teams about what should be done and the answer is that 'the community should decide,' local people can easily experience this as an unwillingness of powerful outsiders to reveal to the local people what their true agenda is. This creates additional insecurity and distrust, whereas in the minds of the PRA team members, they are being open and participatory. This occurred on several occasions with community representatives during Phases 7 and 8 of this research. Many found it very difficult to believe that their views would be of any importance. The fact that our Research and Training Team was so diverse usually helped to minimise this problem, although it was never eradicated. For example, if a white Westerner was not trusted a Rwanda senior police officer might be, if he was not trusted a constable might be, if he was not trusted a woman might be and so on. There was usually a member of the team that a troubled respondent

could relate to in order to allay their fears. Traditional Rwanda culture would also dictate that time should be allowed for this process to take place.

Whatever the problems involved in its deployment, there is a clear relationship between PRA, Participatory Evaluation generally, and AR. Local knowledge is valued and is taken as the basis for development programme design and implementation. PRA does result in some warrants for action. These approaches also treat the insider-outsider relationship as a key dimension in the dynamics of the processes. My view is that PRA is directly relevant to AR and complements its process. This approach minimises the problems associated with PRA as a short-term intervention. Greenwood and Levin (1998 p.251) agree in part with my view in their conclusion:

> 'Participatory Evaluation and PRA are rapidly growing and highly significant developments directly relevant to AR. More dialogue among practitioners is needed to share effectively the diverse kinds of knowledge and experiences they have had and to build more robust approaches for all. The future of AR is intimately tied to what happens in Participatory Evaluation and PRA, and a strong dialogue among practitioners is essential to the future of all of us.'

Having presented the methodology and methods adopted in this research, the following chapters present and analyse the research findings.

Chapter 5:

Presentation and Analysis of Results;

Colliding Icebergs and Process Consultation

Chapter 5: Presentation and Analysis of Results; Colliding Icebergs and Process Consultation

Introduction

This chapter begins to present and analyse the results of my research aims, *that is* to engage in a process of AR with local Rwandan stakeholders in order to formulate, implement and evaluate a sustainable and effective police training programme in a post-war and genocide environment and, secondly, to reflect upon and research the issues of cultural transferability in a training context. The two aims have three associated objectives that will form the organisational framework for this and the following chapter. The results of the first two objectives are presented and analysed in this chapter and form two distinct section headings, which are 1 and 2.

The theoretical and analytic framework within which the data in this chapter is predominantly analysed was devised by integrating the research of Edgar Schein (1987 and 1998, see Figure 4) and Gary Weaver (1993, see Figure 1), supported by the work of Bhawuk and Triandis (1996, see Figure 2). These researchers and authors sought to demonstrate the importance of personal and organisational intercultural training (ICT) prior to and during any cross-cultural training event and emphasise the need to analyse, and intervene appropriately, in Content, Process and Structure issues. This includes the importance of understanding the external environment that the culture under research finds itself in, at the time of that research. They also stress the importance of communication, mutual reflection and learning by the 'insider' and 'outsider' of the culture in which the research and training is to be carried out. For the purpose of this analysis, the data was collected between October 1996 and March 2001, predominantly using the methodological approach of the Co-generative Action Research Model of Greenwood and Levin (1996, see Figure 3).

1 To identify and discuss the problems facing foreign researchers/ trainers and indigenous students/practitioners in the civil Rwandan police service, following war and genocide

In the period following the war and genocide the problems faced by all foreign personnel and all Rwandans were catastrophic ones; this was reflected in the problems that our Research and Training Team found when we began our AR in Rwanda. The indigenous RCUP students and practitioners were also confronted by catastrophic difficulties. This AR identified that those enormous problems were associated with Cells 3 and 6 of Schein's (1987 and 1998, see Figure 4) model on the six areas of foci in process consultation, that is Task Structure and Interpersonal Structure. Schein described Task Structure as 'the way we do things around here' — the stable and recurring processes and patterns that all groups require to make their lives predictable and, thereby, manageable. Schein (1987 and 1998) also asserted that the assumptions, which develop over time as the underlying premises of those patterns, could be thought of as part of the culture of a group. In the immediate aftermath of the genocide there were no stable, recurring processes, life was not predicable and for many not manageable. The culture of the Rwandan people had altered forever. The many other researchers who agree with my findings include, Prunier (1995), GIADNIR (1995), Gukunzi (1996) and African Rights (1995a and b).

Schein (1987 and 1998) went on to describe Interpersonal Structure as the part of a group culture that solves its problems of survival in the external environment. Neither party to the genocide had solved their problems of survival, the survivors of the genocide were traumatised and, during the entire period of this AR, I did not meet a genocide survivor or an RPF member who had not lost members of their family or friends in the genocide. The *génocidaires* had not solved their problems of survival either, for they were dead, in prison or in exile and for many of them, particularly the instigators, the genocide was perceived to be a failure (reference: interviews with prisoners during this AR). Therefore, this section predominantly analyses the issues that are associated with identifying the problems of Cells 3 and 6 and assisting the insiders to rebuild both their Task Structure and Interpersonal Structure. Cells 1, 2, 4 and 5 will

be explored in the following section, which examines the impact of environmental, personal and economic factors on the cultural transferability of British police training programmes to Rwanda.

I first arrived in Rwanda in October 1996 accompanied by a colleague, Sally Dale, to carry out Phase 1 of this AR (see Figure 5 for details of the Phases). Using Bhawuk and Triandis' (1996) Model of Intercultural Development (see Figure 2) we were Lay Persons, as we had not received any intercultural training nor had we experienced an extended time in a cross-cultural environment. We had been selected purely on the basis of our experience as British Directors of Studies in the National Police Training (NPT) estate. The purpose of our three week visit was to ascertain the extent of the problem facing the new GoR in relation to the establishment of the RCUP, which urgently needed to earn the respect and trust of the Rwandese people. Our Terms of Reference (TORs) stated that we were required to make recommendations to our sponsors, the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), regarding the following areas: setting up and training the RCUP, in particular a Training of Trainers Programme; deciding the initial objectives of the RCUP Training School; ascertaining the immediate training requirements of the RCUP; training members of the public to understand the role of the RCUP and identifying the required time frames. Due to our inexperience as cross-cultural transfer agents, Sally Dale and I both concentrated on the Content aspect of our visit that is the TORs and ignored the Process and Structure elements (Weaver 1993 and Schein 1987 and 1998; see Figure 1 for a model that integrates their theories) unless incidents occurred which brought them to our attention. For example, Sally Dale felt hurt and surprised when Rwandan interviewees demonstrated a lack of trust towards us. However, when we considered the fact that Sally Dale and I represented the white, Western and post-colonial world to many of our interviewees, it was not surprising that we were mistrusted. As described in Chapter three, Westerners had done little or nothing to prevent or stop the genocide, even though it was in their power to do both, and France had been described as having 'direct complicity' (Prunier [1995], GIADNIR [1995] and Gakunzi [1996]). If we had considered the Process issues associated with that Western inactivity or involvement prior to our visit, the potential for Rwandans to mistrust us would

have been easily foreseeable, particularly when considered alongside some of the Rwandan and African Interpersonal Structure negative stereotypes of whites. With that foresight, strategies could have been developed to reduce the tension created by that distrust and other Process or Structure incidents.

Analysis of the data from Phase 1 indicated that the greatest problem for many Rwandans, including members of the RCUP, was the experience of the 1994 genocide and preceding war, which had been shattering and demoralising. I carried out interviews which were indicative of the fact that community confidence in moral order had been profoundly shaken, and in some cases destroyed. Had Sally Dale and I been more prepared as cross-cultural transfer agents, we would have appreciated that any post-war and/or genocide community would require skilful interventions that took account of Process and Structure problems and issues, rather than simply concentrating on Content (the TORs). Whilst we utilised our professionalism and interpersonal skills, neither of us were prepared for the Cell 3 (Task Structure) and Cell 6 (Interpersonal Structure) problems that confronted us (Schein 1987 and 1998, see Figure 4). Whilst Schein's research focus was predominately on organisational culture, his work was transferable to national cultural issues, although the impact was greater. For example, the relatively stable, recurring processes that help a group to accomplish tasks, which Schein refers to as Task Structure (Cell 3), were destroyed for the vast majority of Rwandans, including members of the RCUP. Other Task Structures such as those of the RPF had temporarily taken their place, which created other problems, as some community respondents were very cautious about trusting the RPF. This was in part due to the fact that the RPF had been demonised by propaganda, and in part due to the war crimes that were committed by some of their personnel, GIADNIR (1995).

Interpersonal Structure (Cell 6) had also been decimated for the vast majority of the Rwandan population. Schein (1987 and 1998) highlighted that every group needs to develop a culture that will solve its problems of survival in the external environment as a key part of its Interpersonal Structure. The war had begun the destruction of most of those stable, recurring interpersonal

processes and the genocide had completed that destruction. In relation to the six Interpersonal Structure areas that Schein (1987 and 1998 see page 56) highlighted as requiring a stable solution; they were also decimated for the vast majority of people. They no longer knew how to communicate with each other; they did not know the rules of inclusion and exclusion; the allocation of power and authority was confused; peer relations were damaged; status and rewards were predominately connected to war heroes and most of the community no longer knew how to deal with unexplainable, unmanageable and threatening events.

Sally Dale and I were not the only international transfer agents to ignore these vital Process and Structure problems and issues. The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (Millwood, Ed. 1996) argued that most of the international community members, who responded to the post-war and genocide crises in Rwanda, did not consider the emotional effects of genocide, but treated the situation as a post-war scenario. Whilst the evaluation did not explicitly refer to Content, Process and Structure problems, my analysis of their report and my own AR concludes that most international agents concentrated purely on Content, particularly Task Content (Cell 1). Schein (1987 and 1998) described Cell 1 as the 'formal agenda and goals', which in the Rwandan situation were the TORs that the international agents were given by the donor countries. Consequently, the agents ignored much of the other five foci of attention. Most of those agents would be regarded as an 'Expert' on the Model of Intercultural Expertise Development (Bhawuk and Triandis, 1996, see Figure 2) which, in light of their limited foci of enquiry, emphasises the difficulties I have with the terms 'Expert' and 'Advanced Expert', as discussed in Chapter two. The evaluation (Millwood, Ed. 1996) went on to describe how this lack of awareness and attention caused bad feelings and, at times, outright hostility from the GoR towards the international agents and donors. Despite this, many Rwandans were hopeful that an effective Criminal Justice system (which included a fair and impartial police service) would restore a sense of moral order for their country. They were therefore prepared to support Sally Dale and me in Phase 1 of our AR. As one senior police officer stated:

> '... I lost my father, and my brothers and sisters in the war and genocide. I now raise their children. Those who have murdered must be brought to justice, using the

> legal system. There must be no divide amongst the people; there must be unity, for we are all Rwandese. The streets must be patrolled by a civil police service, like that of Britain. That is why we have reformed the Rwandan Communal Police, to be like the British Police, which will be good. It is not good to be policed by the army or by individual Communal Police Officers who only do as their bourgmestres tell them. Those things will not help our country . . . '

A prison detainee made the following comment:

> "The police service is like a mirror – if you look at a police service and it is a good one it reflects a good society; a corrupt police service reflects a corrupt society. Therefore our officers must be exemplary – only then can our Country have peace and security."

These quotes indicated that whilst, as discussed, the majority of Rwandan Task Structure (Cell 3) and Rwandan Interpersonal Structure (Cell 6) had been destroyed, the desire for them to be rebuilt still remained, such as the desire for the standard operating procedure of a legal system, and the perceived positive role a police service could play in dealing with future threatening events. Whilst there was also a desire for summary revenge among some of the genocide and war victims, my observations suggested that those who believed that the imperative was to dispense justice, to tell the truth and to end the culture of impunity for criminals, vastly outnumbered them; African Rights' (1998) and Fergal Keane's (1996) views supported my early observations. Both pieces of research also indicated that, whatever their faults, the RPF and the moderate Hutu politicians remained the best chance for Rwanda. They also asserted that the Hutu politicians who survived the genocide were as adamant as the RPF that, given time, a Rwanda free of hatred could be created. Despite being 'Lay Persons' (Bhawuk and Triandis, 1996) Sally Dale and I ascertained the enormity and complexity of the Content, Process and Structure problems facing the newly formed RCUP and were able to create action plans for the implementation of police training programmes and procedures, thereby achieving our TORs. However, in subsequent cross-cultural projects, including the subsequent phases of this AR, I utilised the integrated model of Weaver's (1993) and Schein's (1987 and 1998) theories (see Figure 1 and Figure 4) to anticipate the Process and Structure problems that accompanied any Content that I was there to achieve, rather than finding out by 'trial and error' as we had during Phase 1. This included briefings and debriefings

for all team members on the three areas of Content, Process and Structure, using the iceberg analogy model (Figure 1) which integrates Schein's (1987 and 1998) theories with those of Weaver (1993), rather than Schein's in-depth model (Figure 4), which many individuals find very difficult to work with. The British team members also trained their Rwandan counterparts in training delivery, design, assessment and evaluation to increase the local expertise in the workplace thereby increasing the Structure (Cells 3 and 6, Schein 1987 and 1998) of the police service.

Our team also utilised the iceberg analogy to anticipate problems and issues when planning training programmes, as the following examples illustrate. During the training design process the primary problem the Research and Training Team had to take into account was the minimal training experience within the RCUP and later, the RNP, both in the delivery of training and in the design and evaluation of training sessions or courses. The normal course of events for British police trainers after Training of Trainers Programmes, is a posting to a training environment staffed by experienced colleagues with an established Structure (Cells 3 and 6, Schein [1987 and 1998]). Therefore the newly trained personnel would be ensured of an ongoing development plan and the transference of their skills into the workplace. This was not the case with the Rwandan police personnel, who had no experienced colleagues in the workplace. Therefore, my colleagues and I considered supported teaching practice phases of at least six weeks to be essential on each of the trainers courses, as it would aid the transference of skills from the classroom to the workplace - thereby maximising the benefit of the British assistance and ensuring, as far as possible, sustainability of the programmes. These teaching practice sessions included developmental feedback, both from the British and Rwandan trainers and Rwandan course participants, ensuring that maximum benefit would be derived from them. Another event that demonstrates the impact of the destruction of Cells 3 and 6 occurred in Phase 2. The existing RCUP trainers and identified potential RCUP trainers displayed skills in all the areas that were under assessment, with the exceptions, in most cases, of 'Leadership' and 'Personal Responsibility'. As newly recruited constables in a newly formed police service most looked to their senior army personnel managers for guidance and leadership. Schein (1987 and 1998) described how the Task Structure (Cell 3)

processes are not very stable in a young group; therefore a young group is not very structured, which was true for the newly recruited constables and the police service they had joined. This lack of police Structure would explain why they looked to their senior army personnel managers for guidance. The RPF had been formed for many years, consequently their Task Structure (Cell 3) and Task Process (Cell 6) were well established, ensuring that there were 'standard operating procedures' and 'recurrent interpersonal roles'. This gave Structure to the constables and built their confidence in the RCUP. However, many of these 'standard operating procedures' and 'recurrent interpersonal roles' were based around the required form and level of procedures and discipline to fight a war. As Action Researchers our team had to fully understand this complex situation, in order to utilise the skills of cultural relativism and make appropriate judgements. For example, during the Training of Trainers Phase, if our students committed a minor discipline offence they were put under house arrest and we were not informed. Through cultural relativism we were able to suspend judgement, acknowledge the appropriateness of the action and subsequent secretiveness in wartime, then negotiate for a different action during the peacetime training process. This resulted in the house arrest being suspended until the weekend when there were no classes and, during the time they were under arrest, the officers were allowed to study, thereby making best use of the international aid resource without losing discipline procedures.

To assist the rebuilding of Cells 3 and 6, the training and development interactions progressed through a continuum like that of John Adair's Planning Continuum (1988) in accordance with best practice from the training and development of British police managers, as illustrated in Figure 8.

Figure 8



On each phase of the AR the Rwandans who were not used to working with us, were naturally reluctant to take part in any training or research activities, other than listening and answering questions put to them by the British team members, as they were used to that methodology. It was a part of the 'standard operating procedures' of the Task Structure (Cell 3) for most African educational systems in the Rwandan region. A skilled Task Structure intervention was therefore required (Schein, 1987 and 1998), so we selected a gradual change methodology that would not create resistance. As time progressed our chosen methodology facilitated the movement of the Rwandan students and team members along the continuum, until we played a very small support role. This was made easier by sharing the John Adair's Planning Continuum with them at an early stage of the programme. The underpinning motivation, which was also shared with the students, being the need for sustainability - if we held on to all the responsibility until we left, the Rwandan students and team members would not be able to manage their new responsibilities due to a lack of experience and Structure. The Rwandans recognised that this was a sound argument that suited their culture and therefore responded with vigour and enthusiasm. For example, at the end of Phase 2 of the AR the Rwandan students were planning and designing training sessions; sorting all the administration; preparing facilities and resources, evaluating their own and their peer's lessons and maintaining the training equipment. We were simply there to observe and make comment if absolutely necessary, or give advice when requested. When I returned on a field trip to the CPTS

in 2000, I was able to observe the way in which the former student trainers had taken complete responsibility for a recruits' pass out parade. Many of the skills they had developed with us were still apparent, yet far more honed and natural. A visitor to the CPTS made the following comment:

> "This is marvellous, so different to a normal parade. It is lively, interesting and stops us all falling asleep. The play was exceptional — I have learnt so much about the police. I wonder how they learnt to do all this?"

All the student trainers from Phase 2 (bar two who had left the police service) had been promoted and were in key training or managerial roles within the service, demonstrating the organisational value placed on their skills. A second example of increased Structure within the RNP is the Human Rights training programmes that are currently (2002) being delivered and assessed at the Ruhengeri Police Staff College in Rwanda, without an international presence. The International Red Cross/Crescent and Danida, the donors, recently evaluated the programmes and rated the courses and the assessment process very highly (reference: interviews with representatives from both organisations).

2 To identify the environmental, personal and economic factors that are likely to impact on the cultural transferability of British police training to Rwanda as a form of development

This section follows the previous section's examination of Schein's (1987 and 1998) Cells 3 and 6 (Task Structure and Interpersonal Structure). It predominantly explores environmental, personal and economic factors and categorises them according to Schein's Cells 1, 2, 4 and 5 of his six areas of foci in Process Consultation (Task Content, Task Process, Interpersonal Content and Interpersonal Process respectively). This research recognises that there are many other areas that could be explored, analysed and categorised in a similar way, such as political factors. I chose those areas that had the most impact in the field in relation to this AR; future researchers may choose different factors to analyse.

Due to the existence of TORs in most aid missions, the majority of international agents in Rwanda fully understood their formal agenda (Cell 1, Task Content). However, as both Chambers (1997) and, Greenwood and Levin (1998) have argued, the TORs are often defined by the donor development associations, without any form of participatory assessment or appraisal. This presents a dilemma for international agents, who are usually sponsored by powerful external agencies that espouse participatory methods whilst working in an institutional environment. An example of this contradiction occurred when I presented the results of the Human Rights TNA (Phase 6 of the AR) to the representative of the aid agency who had sponsored the research. One of the TORs stated that our team must 'obtain information from a truly representative sample of the internal and external customer base that the RNP serves'. The key result of that research, which involved over 7,000 respondents is summarised in the following quotes from focus group members:

> "The human rights training must skill up Rwandan police officers. They should work alongside British experts and gradually be trained to do it themselves."

> "You should start small, with a well trained team of 15-30 police officers from Rwanda. Once they are trained they can train others. There must be sustainability, we do not want whites flying in, lecturing, then flying away again."

However, when this information was presented to the donor representative, she argued that if we trained and utilised local human rights trainers instead of doing the training ourselves, we would not reach the previously unannounced target of training 1,000 RNP officers in six months. We were fortunate that the aid agency representative was prepared to listen to our arguments about value for money and sustainability and take them to the agency. Our recommendations were finally accepted after a lengthy bureaucratic process. This example illustrates many issues regarding environmental, personal and economic factors, including the difficulties associated with working in a large multi-national institutional aid environment, which is not equipped to understand the complexities of local situations. It also highlights the importance of individuals and their personalities within the development process; in this case my willingness to argue against the formal agenda of training 1,000 officers, and the willingness of the aid agency

representative to listen and take my case further. This example also illustrates the potential for different economic perceptions; one being based purely around quantitative statistics that is 'we have trained 1,000 personnel in six months for this amount of dollars', which is simply the completion of an ethnocentric formal agenda (Cell 1, Task Content). This is a similar economic perception to that described by Greenwood and Levin (1998 p.248) when they assert that community participation is often mandated by donor development associations, who welcome it as a panacea. However, the larger conditions in the agencies that mandate them prejudge the outcome of the work and carry on projects that were already defined before, thereby making the participation nothing more that a set of ritual steps.

The other economic agenda that this example raises is one that genuinely utilises participation and cultural relativism. It therefore considers best value through all the six areas of Process Consultation foci (Schein, 1987 and 1998), in a non-ethnocentric way. In this example, the formal agenda (Task Content, Cell 1) was devised in a participatory way through the countrywide TNA, as was Task Process, (Cell 2) which defined the ways in which the task can be achieved. Additionally, by utilising local personnel and stakeholders in the training and development processes, the interpersonal areas (Cells 4, 5 and 6) were more easily achieved due to, among other things, local knowledge and a lack of ethnocentrism. Local partners are able to understand how members of the student group relate to each other (Interpersonal Process, Cell 5) and can quickly identify individual relationships and problems as they occur within a student group (Interpersonal Content, Cell 4). They also have a deeper understanding of the educational Structure that may exist in a classroom (Cells 3 and 6). As long as there continues to be a participatory approach, their knowledge, understanding and associated skills can be combined with those of the 'outsiders' in order to promote democratic social reform.

My assertions that genuine participation is an absolute necessity are supported by the fact that through the second economic approach, over 2,500 Rwandan police officers were trained in human rights, over a period of two years and the training is planned to carry on until all the

RNP personnel have been trained. Following that process the RNP senior personnel intend to implement human rights refresher courses.

There are many difficulties in participatory approaches, such as the need to develop sensitivity to the nuances of local power relationships (Cell 5, Interpersonal Process) and the importance of involving hard to reach and 'voiceless' members of the community (Cell 5, Interpersonal Process and Cell 6, Interpersonal Structure – dependent on the depth of the Process), which were discussed in Chapter four. Additionally, participatory findings may include community/stakeholder recommendations that are completely contrary to the Structure of the researchers and/or donor development associations. Examples include: a rural farming community who believe that schooling is totally unnecessary and should be discontinued, unless it solely concentrates on agricultural skills; individuals who believe they are not worthy of development because it is not their birthright and stakeholders who believe that sectors of their community are not worthy. A Rwandan proverb (usually based around Cell 6, Interpersonal Structure) that reflects those sentiments is translated as, 'Never put the shoulders where the head should be'. However, like Greenwood and Levin (1998), I firmly assert that outsiders do not have the right or wisdom to lead insiders or correct their social arrangements, therefore participation is essential. Outsiders simply bring their knowledge to the process, in order to inform the aforementioned democratic social reform.

This section now briefly examines other examples from this AR that involved environmental, personal or economic factors and correlates them with Cells 1, 2, 4 and 5 of Schein's (1987 and 1998) six areas of foci in Process Consultation.

Shortly before Phase 2, the training of the RCUP trainers began and Nick Dale, Richard Mellors and I moved into a small refurbished house in the CPTS grounds. The house was comfortable and had running cold water and electricity. However, its most useful feature was its close proximity to the classroom and to the thirteen student trainers. The classroom was only two minutes walk

away and the trainers' accommodation was only a twenty minute walk. This proved invaluable in building trust and, as time progressed, friendship. This promoted a greater understanding of Content, Process and Structure issues and, using Weaver's colliding 'icebergs' analogy (1993, see Figure 1) there was less likely to be a clash 'beneath the water' where values and thought patterns usually conflict, because we promoted mutual respect for each other's values and discussed them with each other in order to understand them. Additionally, our cross-cultural experience improved our categorisation on Bhawuk and Triandis' Model of Intercultural Expertise Development (see Figure 2) from 'Lay Person' to that of 'Novice'. It also assisted us to work with the six areas of foci in Process Consultation, Schein (1987 and 1998, see Figure 4). Although it is important to recognise that during Phase 2 our team was still not adept at using the model, partly due to its complexities and partly due to its original organisational focus. For example, many of the team members found it difficult to distinguish between Task and Interpersonal issues, such as the difference between Task Process (Cell 2) and Interpersonal Process (Cell 5). Others experienced the same difficulty with Interpersonal Content (Cell 4) and Interpersonal Process (Cell 5). These difficulties were exasperated by Schein's descriptions of the various cells, due to their monocultural and organisational focus and, at times, his complex style of writing. His descriptions necessitated an in-depth study of the theory in order to understand and apply it in a practical manner, which required a lot of time that many team members did not have. To overcome these difficulties I adopted Weaver's (1993) colliding iceberg analogy (see Figure 1), which has an explicit cross-cultural focus and overlaid part of Schein's (1987 and 1998) model onto it, that is Content, Process and Structure. The Training and Research Team fully understood the new model and were able to work with it throughout the rest of this AR, and in other unrelated cross-cultural projects, such as those in India and Turkey.

Whilst we were not fully adept at using the model during Phase 2, as described above, it did focus our attention onto understanding personal and group processes, as the following example illustrates. We were delivering a Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development accredited programme, so there was a great deal of extra-curricula, activity for the trainers. This was generally carried out in

the classroom due to the electricity supply for lighting and the computer equipment. The close proximity to our house ensured that we were always aware of this activity and therefore able to offer help and support, which built the British team members into the Rwandan group processes. Schein (1987 and 1998) described these group processes as Interpersonal Process (Cell 5), which involves members' relationships and feelings about one another, including their roles and influence patterns that do not directly affect the task. It is not about individual personal relationships. An example would be, 'the Rwandan students do not trust the white trainers' rather than 'Elisha does not trust Debra'. Such personal and individual relationships are covered by Cell 4 (Interpersonal Content) because they are more obvious. Using Weaver's (1993) iceberg analogy they would be above the surface, more explicit and easier to change, whereas the group process of distrusting all whites is deeper and more subjective. As the positive group processes developed the trust built within the trainers, so that they felt comfortable to call us and ask for help. The close proximity to the trainers' accommodation also meant that we quickly became involved in social activities, such as nights in the CPTS canteen, football, running and watching films on our video and television. Due to the resulting discussions, these relatively simple activities greatly assisted and accelerated our understanding of each other's cultures, including their similarities and differences. The following quotes, which promoted great discussion, are taken from my field notes and vividly illustrate this point.

> "Why are all Western women in the films so skinny — do they have Aids — are they sick?"
>
> *A student trainer*

> "I cannot and will not accept that England was ever cruel to Scotland. English are good, honest, noble, loyal people. Why does the film paint you so badly?"
>
> *Student trainer during a showing of the film 'Braveheart'.*

> "Well, Wallis is a man and Grommet is his dog, and Sean is their sheep ... Grommet rides a motorcycle and he lives with Wallis ... No, I haven't borrowed my child's socks ... in Britain adults have cartoons on their clothes ... well, perhaps cartoons were originally for children, but they have a large adult following now ... probably because we're all children at heart."
>
> *Extracts from a 40 minute conversation during which a British trainer tried (and failed) to explain his 'Wallis and Grommet' socks and handkerchief!*

"Debra, you have lovely fat, soft skin, not like most Western women who have

> hard, firm muscles like men. You must be very proud of how your skin wobbles and shakes."
>
> *Rwandan housekeeper paying me a compliment!*

The cultural aspect that quickly warmed me to my new surroundings was the genuine interest my Rwandan colleagues showed in the family and friends that I had 'left behind'. Such interest is an important part of traditional Rwandan Interpersonal Structure (Cell 6, Schein 1987 and 1998) and was slowly returning to their culture, following the war and genocide, which had initially decimated it. They were keen to see photographs and hear all about experiences I had gone through with my family and friends. Sometimes I felt ashamed because they asked questions about issues I could not answer, such as my nieces' grades in school. Similar questions to them always promoted a detailed and enthusiastic result, if the child was doing well, or sadness if he or she was struggling. Another interesting phenomenon was how the role of 'student' and 'trainer' changed, dependant on the time of day. In the classroom we were respected and revered due to our Western experience (Schein's [1987 and 1998] Interpersonal Process, Cell 5). On leaving the classroom we were regarded as vulnerable individuals due to the civil strife in the country at that time and the stereotypes that existed about whites. For example, one evening Nick Dale and I returned home after nightfall to be greeted and severely 'told off' by the students for our thoughtless and irresponsible behaviour. However, their genuine concern and anxiety shone through the 'telling off' — rather like a British parent might act if a teenage child had stayed out too late. In the view of our students, we had therefore moved from trainers, whose roles were revered (Cell 5, Interpersonal Process) to individuals, 'Nick and Debra', who they were worried about (Cell 4, Interpersonal Content). Additionally, some of that concern also came from Interpersonal Structure (Cell 6) stereotypes that Rwandans have of whites. One of the stereotypes was the view that whites are very fragile; Elisha Ngoga, our interpreter, stated: "You are like fragile eggs – easy to break, and we all know that whites cannot carry their own luggage or bananas, or they will snap like a twig. If you catch malaria it is certain you will die, that is why you take tablets to prevent it, moreover, I have had the disease numerous times, which proves I am strong enough to overcome it. You need us to look after you". His Rwandan friends and colleagues enthusiastically agreed with him.

Conclusion

In conclusion, every researcher in any research situation has to be aware of Cells 3 and 6 (Task Structure and Interpersonal Structure) in order to understand the context of their research. The cells will usually be observable as the stable and recurring processes that members of the researched group will define as their Structure and, interpersonally, will use to manage their affairs. In any post-crises situations, such as those caused by natural disasters, war or genocide, researchers also need to be acutely aware of the level of destruction that Task Structure and Interpersonal Structure has experienced, to ensure that their research does not aggravate the crises, as well as to contextualise their findings. Action Researchers have an additional responsibility in post-crises situations, as their role is often associated with rebuilding Task Structure and Interpersonal Structure alongside local stakeholders. If they and the funding organisation fail to acknowledge the depth of that responsibility and simply concentrate on Cell 1 (Task Content), they can amplify the catastrophe rather than actively contributing to the processes of democratic social change, which should be the aim of any AR (Greenwood and Levin, 1998). Additionally, the majority of cross-cultural transfer training and research teams leave the development of their own Task Structure and Interpersonal Structure to chance, particularly those teams that are formed from insiders and outsiders; consequently they learn by trial and error. The probability of supporting and achieving successful and sustainable development will be greatly enhanced if the maturity of the transfer team and their stakeholder colleagues is artificially accelerated. This can be achieved by making the development of the team's Structure into part of the team's formal agenda (Task Content, Cell 1). Once the Structure is in place the team will have efficient procedures and processes to assist in all the other areas of process consultation foci.

As previously stated, the complexity of Schein's model (1987 and 1998) and its original monocultural and organisational focus made it a difficult theoretical model for many of the

practitioners and stakeholders within my team. It is probable that other practitioners would experience the same difficulty. However, I assert that the extended cross-cultural framework that I have utilised in relation to Schein's (1987 and 1998) process consultation in this AR would be a useful theoretical approach for those members of teams who are Action Researchers. The model that simplifies and integrates the theories of Schein (1987 and 1998) and Weaver (1993, see Figure 1) is particularly useful for those members of the team who are not Action Researchers.

Having presented and analysed the cross-cultural issues from the first two objectives of this AR, using the theoretical framework of process consultation (Schein, 1987 and 1998) and Weaver (1993), the next chapter examines the third research objective, particularly the effects of cross-cultural communication on the learning environment according to the categorisations of Daniel's theoretical approach (1975) and presents a framework of good practice for managing cross-cultural projects.

Chapter 6:

Presentation and Analysis of Results;

The Effects of Cross-cultural Communication on the Learning Environment

Chapter 6: Presentation and Analysis of Results; The Effects of Cross-Cultural Communication on the Learning Environment

Introduction

As intended by the third objective of this AR, it identified many cross-cultural communication issues surrounding the application of a British training and development programme in Rwanda, which may be applicable to other developing countries. The first section of this chapter presents and analyses the plethora of data and material I gathered during my fieldwork, according to the theoretical categorisations of Daniel (1975) in his book '*The Cultural Barrier*'. These categories include: interpersonal skills; language, including non-verbal communication; ethnocentrism; xenophobia; personality; superiority/exaggerate faults of other group; social life/hobbies/interests; coping mechanisms; personal experiences; disorientation; fear; health hazards and medical facilities; stress; historical issues; suspicion of the 'West' and the fear of 'Westernising'; suspicion of Africans; impact of the colonial era and expatriate communities; icons and security. In the Literature Review I stated that Daniel's work was stimulating and that he had implicitly identified the need for further research regarding the variables a teacher/trainer may experience when working in another culture. It is my aim that this AR contributes to that new knowledge by developing Daniel's categories alongside the model of Schein's (1987 and 1998) and Weaver's (1993) integrated theories (see Figure 1) that was presented in Chapters two and five. The chapter begins with an overview of the results and then examines each of Daniel's categories in more depth.

To examine the effects of cross-cultural communication on the learning environment, including the implications of the exclusion or inclusion of indigenous cultural traditions into the training environment

> "Our help will be greatest if we recall that our problems and theirs, despite many similarities, are not identical; that our assumptions at any given time, about which we can be so very confident, may not have a universal validity; and we can work with and for a people not our own — only through intimate understanding and partnership."
>
> (Sir Christopher Cox 1956, *speaking before the independence of most formerly British-controlled African territories*)

Overview of results

My key results in relation to cross-cultural communication and indigenous traditions identified the positive impact of social interactions; the importance of having some knowledge of the culture you are working in, and the need to understand the ways in which members of that culture reward the successful completion of a training event. These findings are supported by Daniel's research (1975); he believes that most foreigners are too tired or too lazy to put imaginative effort into understanding the other cultures, and others are not interested. He states that 'a little gentle grumbling will see most people through' and argues that only those with a genuine love of their job and their students will cross the barrier. My research indicates that the social interactions between the British team members and their Rwandan counterparts demonstrated a 'love of the job and an interest in each other's culture', which led to a 'crossing of the barriers'. My organisation has tested this assumption in other situations in Rwanda, and in India, where the findings were the same. As one Indian student said:

> "We are used to the British living in big hotels, arriving late and leaving early. You have been our constant guides, our companions; you have eaten with us and slept in poor quarters. I would not have stayed in such quarters if you had not. I would have left in the first week. The success of the programme rests very much on this fact. You understood our ways and knew what we wanted, in particular, Mr Ric is fully aware of our cultural ways, even if he doesn't always understand the depths they go to..."

Buchert (1994 p.45) made the following observations, about a training project that took place in Tanganyika (*now Tanzania*) during 1933-39, which also support my key findings:

> "The understanding of the wishes of the local population . . . by the British administration was restrictive . . . peasant reactions to enforced agricultural change was explained by perceptions of laziness and distaste for manual labour... there seemed to have been little or no understanding of the fact that new methods could disrupt certain cultural patterns, including division of labour and social institutions related to issues of autonomy and settlement."

Buchert's research reinforces Weaver's (1993) assertion, through his iceberg analogy, that the real clashes occur beneath the water, where values and thought patterns conflict — the area that Schein (1985) described as Process and, when deep-rooted, Structure. In Buchert's example the British administration were keen to complete the Content parts of their training project and were quick to use their own values (Process) to judge the peasant reactions. Additionally, Buchert highlighted that there was little understanding of potential disruption to cultural patterns (Structure). Buchert (1994) goes on to explain how the clash was irreparable and resulted in the failure of the project.

Buchert's work also details how a lack of knowledge of other cultures can seriously damage the progress of cross-cultural training projects, which supports my view that careful exposure through social interactions is a critical success factor. Bhawuk and Trandis (1996) believe that extended cross-cultural experience is a key element for international agents, to enable them to progress from being a 'Lay Person' to a 'Novice'. My research demonstrated that many sojourners in Rwanda simply experience a professional cross-cultural experience and prefer to socialise with others of their kind, usually white Westerners. I assert that this form of interaction is not a true cross-cultural experience and will simply result in a deeper understanding of each other's Content (that which is explicitly learned, conscious, easily changed and objective, Weaver, 1993), whereas there will be little or no understanding of each other's Process and Structure (that which is implicitly learned, unconscious, difficult to change and subjective, Weaver, 1993). This argument is developed further in the section of social life, hobbies and interests. It is important to emphasise that such interactions should be without favour for particular individuals, which is discussed in more depth in the following section on

language. The second critical success factor was the use of an accredited programme with objectives and performance criteria, that is the CIPD's Core Trainers' Award and the ILMgt's Human Rights Diploma. In Rwanda, opportunities for qualifications are still limited and at the time of the initial Training of Trainers' Course they were non-existent. The motivation and self-esteem this created in the student trainers was overwhelming, as these three quotes indicate:

> "... The trainers are all very good, even though they have different ideas. We are never bullied. They still maintain good discipline but they are fair. They are some of the most qualified trainers in Africa and they are Rwandan."
>
> *RCUP recruit*

> "I am so proud to have this qualification — I thought only whites were clever enough. You have helped me to realise it is experience, not intelligence — I am clever enough too. I just didn't have the experience — now I have."
>
> *student trainer*

> "I am overwhelmed by the value that is placed on the qualification — perhaps we have it too easy in the UK. Everything is 'on a plate' for us. When I tell UK students that there is a qualification attached to the programme most of them moan and groan because it means they have to do some study and written work. They don't even want to fill in registration forms. Here they asked to keep copies of their college enrolment forms to show their families — they were really proud. It makes me ashamed."
>
> *British trainer*

Using the data gained from this research my British colleagues, working on a similar project in India, asked the Indian police students the method of reward that would be most suited to their culture. The following quote from a senior officer summarises the majority of the responses:

> "We do not want a British qualification, some of us may desire them as individuals, but our government believes they are too closely linked to the colonial days. We would like a brightly coloured certificate, preferably with a seal, signed by a very well qualified person. It must include details, in a long list, of *everything* we have done and achieved over the year. Perhaps there could be an opportunity for individuals to convert them to British qualifications at their own cost, but the government will not support it".
>
> *Senior Indian police officer*

This supports my finding that it is important to understand how cultures reward the successful completion of any cross-cultural training event. The trainer/teacher must not make assumptions

based on previous experiences, but should have an acute awareness that this is a variable that needs to be explored. Schein (1987 and 1998) states that for any group to function they must have a stable solution for deciding how to allocate status and rewards. He rates this as so important that it is placed within Cell 6 (Interpersonal Structure) as a deep-rooted process. These key results are now explored in more depth, through Daniel's categories (1975).

Language, including Non-verbal Communication (NVCs)

You have to understand your neighbours' language before you judge them.

Douala proverb, Cameroon

Language had many impacts in relation to cross-cultural communication and training, however the only one that our team considered before the Rwandan project began was the most obvious Task Process (Cell 2, Schein, 1987 and 1998) issue, that is the inability to understand each other and the subsequent need for an interpreter. However, the experience of this AR enabled me to observe the numerous other impacts that language can have. Haviland (1996 p.104) summarises this well in a section of his book entitled, 'Language in its Cultural Setting' as quoted below:

> "Rewarding though it is to *analyze* language as a system in which linguistic variables dependent upon other linguistic phenomena operate, it is important to remember that languages are spoken by people, who are members of societies, each of which has its own distinctive culture. Individuals tend to vary in the ways they use language, and ... social variables such as class and status of the speaker will also influence their use of language. Moreover, people choose words and sentences to communicate meaning, and what is meaningful in one culture may not be so in another. The fact is that our use of language affects, and is affected by, the rest of our culture.
>
> The whole question of the relationships between language and other aspects of culture is the province of **ethnolinguistics,** an outgrowth of both ethnology and descriptive linguistics, which has become almost a separate field of inquiry. Ethnolinguistics is concerned with every aspect of the structure and use of language that has anything to do with society, culture, and human *behavior*."

As an example, Haviland describes how the Nuer people of southern Sudan have more than four hundred names to describe their cattle because of the high value they place on them. This is similar

to Kinyarwanda as many Rwandan proverbs are built around cattle culture, for example, "If one man brings a cow to the top of your hill, you must take one down to him", which relates to the concept of 'give and take'. There are also numerous words that describe the ways in which a person can give or transfer cattle to someone else. It took one interviewee over three hours to explain all the different terms to me. One example of this is *ugushega*, which is a friendship exchange of cattle, during which A gives B a heifer or cow called *ishega*. In return B gives A a gift such as several goats or a bull calf and they become A's property. However, after every third calf born of the *ishega* cow, B must send A a heifer called *inyiturano*. It is of note that most interviewees and many researchers (Prunier (1995); Vassall-Adams (1994) and Waller (1993) among them) link cattle culture to the Batutsi, rather than to the Bahutu and Batwa people, although Newbury (1998) disagrees and cites *ugushega* as an exchange between two Hutus who are normally linked by a blood pact, *kunywana*. If the first argument is accepted it further evidences Haviland's view, as all three groups speak Kinyarwanda, but there are different usages of the language due to the sub-cultures within Rwandan culture. Haviland (1996) also details the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, proposed by the linguist B. L. Whorf, which states that language, by providing habitual grooves of expression, predisposes people to see the world in a certain way and so guides their thinking and behaviour. In the case of Nuer and Rwandan children, for example, they would automatically believe cattle to be important because of their numerous descriptive words. However, Haviland also argues that the theory creates a problem like the old question of the 'chicken and the egg' and describes the opposite view that language reflects reality. Despite the fact that Haviland refutes much of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, he still places some value on it, because it focuses attention on the relationship between language and the rest of culture. These findings caused me to study traditional/pure Kinyarwanda with our interpreter; whilst I was not a particularly good student the experience aided my understanding of the Rwandan culture far more than I anticipated. For example, the traditional method of telling the time included phrases like 'when the cows arise' instead of 'morning' and directions included phrases such as 'over yonder hill' and 'close to my mother's house'. These phrases link to the cultural facts that many Rwandans view time keeping to be of little importance, directions revolve around walking rather than vehicles, and distance is associated with the importance of the destination rather than the

number of miles. Learning the language helped me to be less ethnocentric and put some of these Rwandan characteristics into context. It also raised my standing with many Rwandans because I was able to do short speeches in their mother tongue. Additionally, many Rwandans had been forbidden to speak Kinyarwanda in their countries of exile and were learning their language alongside me, which created a feeling of *camaraderie* with both French and English speaking Rwandans.

Another incident that relates to language from my research occurred during Phase 2. The entire British team made the assumption that the first language of the Rwandan student trainers would be Kinyarwanda, and if they had a second language it would be French or English. In actual fact, as stated above, many of the student trainers had only recently returned or moved to Rwanda - having lived or been born in exile in neighbouring countries and consequently learnt the language of their host country. Furthermore, the majority spoke in excess of six languages. One incident that illustrates this is described in the following extract from my field notes.

> Elisha, our interpreter, was off sick; I therefore selected a student trainer to interpret in his absence, because he spoke excellent English. As he interpreted, the French speaking students appeared bored and uninterested, whereas the English speaking students appeared alert and interested. I noticed this and asked the group what was happening; the interpreter repeated the question, but there was no reply. Eventually I ascertained from the English speaking students that the 'interpreter' did not speak Kinyarwanda. It transpired that he was translating into one of the many Ugandan languages, which the French speakers did not understand. They had not wanted to mention it for fear of being rude and out of respect for me — they viewed me as superior in the classroom due to my age and position.

A second example occurred when a Rwandan member of the Research and Training Team that I knew very well, visited the UK on a study tour. He had delivered an assessed lesson on prejudice to a class of British students and was receiving his feedback from a British training manager, who said:

> "A very good affective lesson, which clearly highlighted the relevant points. You did use a lot of gender specific language, but I also appreciate that English is your second language so the concept may be more difficult for you."

The Rwandan trainer replied factually that English was his twenty-sixth language and he fully understood the concept of discriminatory language. He apologised and thanked the manager for his feedback. Despite this the manager appeared upset or annoyed and made no further comment. I brought the incident up in the subsequent debrief and it transpired that the manager thought the student was being rude and mocking him — he had no concept that anyone could speak over twenty languages. I dealt with this Process issue by bringing the two people together to discuss the issue with me. Once the clash had been discussed the manager later learnt to write his name in Arabic and how to say 'hello' in many languages. What could have been negative Process became positive Process and both parties enjoyed the interaction and learnt a lot from each other.

Another way in which language affects some individuals during cross-cultural experiences, is that they become very reluctant to undertake quite ordinary chores because of the language difficulty. An example of this occurred when a normally assertive British trainer declined to buy a pineapple at the roadside in a very rural location. He believed the seller would not be able to speak English due to the isolated area; therefore he would be unable to ascertain the price and would look foolish. Other individuals were quite happy to tackle this, and similar issues, with the use of signs, actions and pictures. This therefore has a link to personality, which is covered later in this section. Daniel (1975 pp.66-67) emphasises this point in his examination of 'Cultural Shock and Adaptation' when he states:

> "Satisfaction with the terms of living in a foreign situation is composed to some degree of trivia. It will often happen that all or some of a group of foreign teachers will expect administrative services that no British university will offer. At home they will expect to fetch the plumber themselves. Overseas it often happens that because of language difficulties, or because of unfamiliarity with the local way of doing things, foreigners are reluctant to undertake quite ordinary chores. Here their sense of not belonging is operative."

Some Rwandan trainees also stated that they had initially been reluctant to ask questions because they did not want to waste time with interpretation. It was only when they were

assured that time had been built into the programme for interpretation that they relaxed and asked questions. Throughout this research many of the French speakers we met and worked with had additional Process problems with language. They initially thought that the British trainers would view them as 'second class' because they were Francophones and therefore associated with the French who had complicity in the genocide. Others felt inferior because, in their words, "English is the language of the whole world". A view that they predominately based around the fact that American-English is the main language of the World Wide Web. Once trust had been built their fears were usually allayed, but they still worked hard to improve their English and requested extra-curricula, English lessons, which were supplied. I am only explicitly aware of one individual who was unable to trust us and frequently bad-mouthed our team because we were Anglophones or, in relation to the Rwandan team members, associated with Anglophones. Interestingly he spoke fluent English, but had been raised in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and therefore identified himself as a Francophone, which is a common phenomenon with Francophone Rwandans. This also applies to Anglophones who speak fluent French but still regard themselves as Anglophones, due to the country and culture they were raised in. Additionally many Rwandan rural people, who do not speak English or French, still identify themselves as Anglophone or Francophone. Our team had originally thought the terms were directly linked to language; whilst that plays a part there are also more deep-rooted Process and Structure issues associated with the self-labelling process.

The issue of language has a direct link to my previous assertion about social interactions, for it is often easier to meet socially with those who are most similar to you — language being an obvious similarity. To overcome cultural barriers it is important to interact equally, without favour, with your indigenous colleagues/students, or problems will arise. For example, the only television and video available in the various areas we trained in were in the houses of the Training and Research Team members, so we invited our students to watch a film each evening on a rotational basis. Initially, in each location, it was only the English speakers who

attended. We had to make it clear that everyone was welcome and that we screened French and English films, before the French speakers would attend. This finding is supported by Daniel (1975) when he describes the difficulties foreign teachers find in their new environments, which may cause dissatisfaction and subsequently impaired effectiveness. He includes '... establishing social relations with those hosts who are already familiar with Western cultural pre occupations ...' as one of those difficulties.

There were also problems linked to words that could not be directly translated. The word 'gender' is an example of this, when translated into Kinyarwanda it has sexual connotations. When interviewing a government official from the Ministry of Gender, Family and Social Affairs, she stated that this issue had caused several difficulties. Many women, who only spoke Kinyarwanda, refused to attend Ministry workshops in their community. They believed that they would be asked questions about their sex life, which, unsurprisingly, they viewed as very private. I therefore discussed this issue in depth with our interpreter so that he could guide me, in relation to untranslatable words and prevent problems before they arose.

Non-verbal communication also created confusion and, once trust had been built up, a lot of humour. For example, the Rwandan 'non-verbal' for 'please come here' is very similar to the British wave 'goodbye'. Therefore when the Rwandan students wanted a British trainer's attention they used the sign, but the British trainers usually waved in response and walked away. It was only when they became more familiar with the local way of doing things that they responded appropriately. The situation caused a lot of humour because of the relationship between the two groups. However, it highlights how non-verbal communication can be misinterpreted and that there is potential for confusion, mistrust, annoyance or conflict. An example of this negative misinterpretation is linked to the manner in which Rwandans request a lift; they will stand at the roadside with their arm extended and the palm of their hand turned upward. I heard many Westerners disparagingly say words to the effect of, "Look at them, always begging at the roadside – why don't they do some useful work?".

Ethnocentrism

The concept of ethnocentrism is discussed in Chapter two. I became aware of my own ethnocentrism on Wednesday the 7th May 1997 when I arranged an afternoon tea for the student trainers. This was unusual as we normally had cold drinks but the supply was exhausted; the student trainers crowded round the tray in great excitement to make their own drinks, they feverishly tore open the tea bags, emptied them into the cups, put several teaspoons of coffee and hot chocolate onto the tea, added five or six spoonfuls of dried milk and at least seven spoonfuls of sugar. They then poured a small amount of hot water into this mixture and stirred it into a paste, which they ate with relish. My immediate reaction was one of distaste and I considered the student trainers to be inferior during that brief moment. This feeling was short-lived but one that I felt required debriefing with the other team members. I subsequently found out that they had experienced similar incidents but had not wanted to divulge them for fear of appearing prejudiced. One of the incidents they identified was the inability of many of the student trainers to put paperwork into a lever-arch file, a task that they believed to be very simple. During the debrief we identified that these incidents were caused by a lack of experience of the activity in question or cultural differences and they should definitely not be regarded as a 'test' of intelligence. Our experiences in the classroom had identified a good or high level of intelligence amongst all our students. In the example of the afternoon tea all the students were male and therefore had little experience of making drinks, due to the gender roles in Rwanda. Many of them had never seen a tea bag or hot chocolate powder before; additionally cows and milk play an important part in Rwandan culture, therefore milk is taken in great amounts whenever possible.

As a team, we made the decision to formally discuss any similar experiences so that we could deal efficiently and effectively with the management of our own ethnocentrism, using skills such as cultural relativism and reflective practice (Schön, 1983). From that day, we regularly used the term 'ethnocentrism management' and integrated the process into our regular briefing

and debriefing sessions. As our knowledge and experience increased we utilised the integrated model I developed of Weaver's (1993) and Schein's (1987 and 1998) theories to ensure that we covered Content, Process and Structure issues, as ethnocentrism can impact on them all. Using Schein's (1987 and 1998) theory as an analytical tool, it can be seen that ethnocentrism may cause individuals to decide on the formal agenda (Cell 1); how that agenda should be achieved (Cell 2); what standard operating procedures are suitable (Cell 3) and how the associated interpersonal relationships (Cells 4 – 6) should be formed and maintained. When this is overlaid onto Weaver's (1993) colliding icebergs analogy the potential for a clash is very apparent, therefore the briefings and debriefings were critical to the success of the AR. Taking Cell 2 (Task Process) as an example, an ethnocentric approach to deciding 'how the task is done' would exclude indigenous cultural traditions, which is exactly what I did during the early AR phases. As my experience increased I found out what the traditions were; for example when I observed and assessed potential trainers giving short presentations it created the assumption for me that, culturally, Rwandan men have very little or no problem with public speaking. All appeared comfortable, confident and exceeded their allocated presentation time. This was very different to our experience with British police officers during similar assessments, who were generally uncomfortable, nervous, and finished early. Later research confirmed this assumption, linking the phenomenon to a variety of cultural norms, which correlate with Schein's Cell 6, Interpersonal Structure (1985) and the submerged areas of Weaver's 'icebergs' (1993). These include a love of verbal banter, dance and drama, which is encouraged from an early age and incorporated into many celebrations and festivals, such as marriage.

I therefore included indigenous cultural traditions at appropriate times during the research and training, for example, each of the Phase 6 and 7 focus groups began and concluded with a Rwandan song and dance for unity, which enhanced their effectiveness. Plays and pictures also had an important role in the human rights training, particularly for the members of the community who did not read or write and were used to learning through the radio and pictures (see Figure 9 as an example of pictures that we used at focus groups).

Figure 9



Misuse of Resources —

Damage to Police Property

Freedom from ...

Inappropriate Security Measures



When our team increased to include Rwandan members they also took part in our ethnocentrism management sessions, which highlighted some of the stereotypical views they had of Westerners and British people. For example, one team member viewed the English as very bigheaded because many goods that were imported into Rwanda had the words 'made in England' on them rather than 'made in Britain'. Another believed that Westerners left home as young adults and *never* saw their parents or siblings again, because he had been taught in school that Westerners did not live in nuclear families. He was amazed that I carried photographs of my extended family members, including an aunt, an uncle and my nieces and nephews. He believed that they were too far removed from my family to be of any importance to me.

During these ethnocentrism management sessions, both British and Rwandan team members found the integrated model of Schein and Weaver's theories (1985 and 1993, see Figure 1) more pragmatic and useful than Schein's original theory. They found particular difficulty in separating the interpersonal Cells (4 – 6) although all of them appreciated the critical importance of interpersonal issues.

Xenophobia

Xenophobia is stronger than ethnocentrism, in that it involves a hatred or fear of foreigners or strangers to their own politics or culture, as discussed by Daniel (1975). I did not witness this phenomenon during my time in Rwanda, although I did observe the consequences of it, as much of the genocide was rooted in xenophobia. Illustrations of this were the genocide sites where the remains of the victims could still be seen; the large number of orphans; the dismembered people and the high proportion of widows.

Personality

In Chapter two, I noted that many authors refer to 'personality' in relation to dealing with culture

shock and the degree of success international projects have. Baron and Byrne (1991) define personality as, 'the combination of those relatively enduring traits which influence behaviour in a predictable way in a variety of situations. Thus, a person who is adaptable within his or her own culture or subculture is more likely to be adaptable in another culture'. Gross (1996) explicitly agrees with this definition and emphasises that ' ... personality is not something a person 'has' (it is not a 'thing') but more to do with how we relate to other people and generally deal with the world'. When Haviland (1996) describes the skills and personality traits of an anthropologist, he states that they must be as free of cultural bias as possible and be able to immerse themselves in the field. Daniel (1975 p.60) talks about well balanced personalities having more success and reduced culture shock. He argues, " ... that if the foreigner living in a strange society has a well balanced personality, they need no deep change of *persona*. Anyone who is accustomed to adapt himself to the different people whom he meets or has dealings with in the ordinary way should have little difficulty. A less outgoing personality may find more difficulty in cultural adaptation, although, if he is ill adapted to his own culture, he may be no worse adapted to a strange one". Daniel (1975) believes that the main characteristic of cultural difficulty is the inability to behave as usual in a new cultural environment and emotional instability must make it harder to manage without the support of a familiar background of life. Perfect emotional stability, if it exists, will make it wholly possible to ignore changes of background. If it is combined with intellectual curiosity, a fair degree of emotional stability must make for positive enjoyment of cultural change.

I find this area quite difficult to comment on due to the diversity of theories, psychology and judgements involved, for, as Gross (1996) went on to identify; it is virtually impossible to find a definition of personality that all psychologists would accept. However, I did witness the positive and negative impacts that different individuals had on the cross-cultural transfer of training. Over time, it became very clear that Rwandans like to indulge in general conversation before getting down to any business. For example, in the early stages of this research I visited the Chief of the Communal Police, Dennis Karera, to report on some of my professional activities. Due to my inexperience of the culture I immediately began to give an account of the

activities in question. He gently held up his hand to stop me and said, "Tell me Debra, how are your parents?". Once I had told him he continued to ask me many very caring questions about how I was coping and about all my family members. When he visited England in 2001 and stayed at my house he also said:

> "It amazes Eva *(his wife)* and I how your milk is delivered — it could be poisoned — you don't even know the man's name who delivers it. In Rwanda he would have to stay a while, ask how your family are, have a drink, chat about what, what, what! It is very strange."

My observations identified that the British trainers who naturally liked to talk and enjoyed conversations, were accepted more readily and the culture shock was reduced for them. I also saw some personnel from another Western country who wanted to get straight into task at every meeting. They were regarded as rude and pushy by their Rwandan counterparts, whereas those donors viewed the Rwandans as lazy and ungrateful. Another example occurred in 2001 when a Rwandan officer that I knew very well, visited Europe on a study tour, during which he visited my organisation's head office for a two week period. He was obviously very uncomfortable, despite what I ethnocentrically considered to be a very warm welcome from my colleagues. When I asked him if I could help he replied:

> "I just feel so rude, I come in every morning and people just say hello and ask if I am OK; they are friendly but they do not give me the opportunity to check out how all their family members are. Even the tea break is only fifteen minutes so I cannot do it then. I spend much of my day concerned about their families and I cannot concentrate on my studies."

Our visitor's personality was a quiet, caring and gentle one; therefore the cultural shock he was experiencing in his new workplace was magnified by his personality. We discussed the cultural differences of English and Rwandan workplaces and the fact that there are also regional differences in both countries, which alleviated some of his concerns. We also ascertained that due to the additional conversations in Rwanda, the Rwandan working day is often much longer than an English working day but the same amount of work is achieved. My colleagues also

spent a little more time each day assuring our visitor that their families were fine without him having to ask, which appeared to be a practical compromise that met the needs of all who were involved.

Superiority/Exaggerate faults of other group

Numerous authors have written about the issue of ethnocentrism (which has already been discussed in an earlier section) and of whites believing they are superior to blacks. Some have looked historically at the slave trade and colonialism, others have concentrated on the legacy of that history, the psychological reasons for it and the present situation, including: Dollard (1939); Allport (1954); Mafeje (1991); Pillai and Shannon (1995); Haviland (1996); Maier (1998) and Gross (1999). This is something that I witnessed on a regular basis in Rwanda; those from the 'West' (the majority of whom were white) had a variety of approaches, but most viewed themselves as 'a helping hand to the less fortunate' and a few were overtly racist. Many also believed that they knew what was best for the 'underprivileged' and would decide, without consultation, what was needed to 'improve their lot'. Examples include:

> The supply of unsuitable equipment to support training programmes, without consulting Rwandan training officers regarding their resource needs.
>
> A Rwandan official refused aid on several occasions because it was not suitable. The donor representative became angry and appeared to regard the incident as a personal one. He went on to say that the Rwandan official concerned was "... arrogant and 'looked a gift horse in the mouth'..." - he also linked this to all Rwandan people:
>
> > "... but then they're all awkward and don't know a good thing when they see it ... don't trust any of them".
>
> A similar incident occurred at a meeting between a Rwandan police official, a donor representative and a supplier that the donor had recommended. The Rwandan police official refused aid from the supplier because it was not cost-effective. He stated that he could obtain double the equipment of a superior quality for the same price from another supplier, saving thousands of pounds. The original supplier became very angry, shouted at the Rwandan police official and was quite abusive. The donor representative tried to calm the situation by suggesting the official, '... went with this deal now and the other supplier on the next occasion ... it wasn't the official's money anyway, it belonged to the donor'.
>
> One Western military security officer said, "I hate working here (*Rwanda*)

because the place is full of f****** blacks – lazy idle bastards".

It is possible that the latter comment is linked to the speaker's xenophobia, but I only met that security officer on one occasion so I am unable to corroborate my assumption. In relation to feeling superior, during a three week holiday that Nick Dale, Richard Mellors and I took, a relief British trainer displayed this behaviour on numerous occasions, to the point that he was dismissed. He frequently shouted at the Rwandan student trainers and gave them inappropriate tasks, such as fetching his water. The morale of the students was very low after three weeks of this treatment; one said,

> "He made me feel like a dog; I had to 'crawl on my belly' to avoid his displeasure … I went off sick with 'malaria' when I was actually well …"

The same trainer also ordered the Rwandan housekeeper to sell water that had been filtered and purified at the local market. She resigned due to this and only resumed work when he had returned to Britain and the main team were back in Rwanda. The increase in the morale of the student trainers was very evident when we resumed the training function. The class number rose from 5 or 7, to 13 or 15 student trainers and many actually admitted they had feigned illness.

I only witnessed this behaviour in reverse, that is from a Rwandan, during the AR that occurred in 1996 when a senior police officer described all whites as untrustworthy and only out to get all they could for themselves. He actively tried to prevent the British trainers from completing their task. He was not successful, due to the positive actions of the student trainers and other Rwandan officials. The same official worked with our team in 2000 and 2001 and his whole persona and attitude was completely different - he assisted the AR in any way that he could. I discussed the change with him and he replied:

> "When you came you made many promises — promises I have heard from whites

for so many years. Very few have come to fruition. You have achieved all of yours — you promised us the most well qualified trainers in Africa and we have them. You promised to bring us gifts for our social club and we have them — snooker and other games. You keep your promises."

Social life/Hobbies/Interests

Social life, hobbies and interests play a key role in reducing or exaggerating cultural shock. An illustration of this point is the part hobbies can play in highlighting differences or similarities. One of the British trainers was a keen footballer, as was one of the senior Rwandan police officers. They went to football matches together and became very friendly which reduced the culture shock for my colleague; in his words:

"I was the only white face in the stadium, which was a little unnerving. But we were all there for a common reason - a love of football. We were cheering and groaning together, so I very quickly forgot the colour thing - I was just among fellow sports lovers. It was a great experience. I feel so much more at home now, especially among the blokes, we're all kids at heart really, we love to play!" *(He smiles and laughs).*

It is vital to emphasise Daniel's (1975) warning again, in relation to social life, hobbies and interests, when he describes the difficulties foreign teachers find in their new environments, which may cause dissatisfaction and subsequently impaired effectiveness. As stated before, he includes '... establishing social relations with those hosts who are already familiar with Western cultural preoccupations ...' as one of those potential difficulties. As I asserted before, to overcome cultural barriers it is important to interact equally, without favour, with your indigenous colleagues and students, or problems will arise. Whilst working in Rwanda I have made many good friends and I had a worry that they were all Tutsis, because they often discussed cow culture with me. If my assumption was correct others could construe the situation as me favouring one group and researching in an unethical way. However, it is now insensitive to ask people their 'ethnicity' because of the plethora of connotations that I have described previously, particularly in Chapter three. I therefore shared my concern with a trusted

Rwandan colleague and he was able to alleviate my fears without identifying specific individuals as coming from particular 'ethnic groups'.

Another example arose from the fact that I am a keen amateur ornithologist and enjoy the variety of bird life in Rwanda. Many Rwandan children capture the more exotic and brightly coloured birds, tie a string to their feet and fly them as the British would a kite. I found their hobby repulsive and was unable to accept it. I used the integrated model of Weaver (1993) and Schein's (1987 and 1998) theories to analyse this situation and realised that my love of birds was a deep-rooted personal value that would be difficult to change. Additionally, animal rights are a Task Structure (Cell 3) element of British culture. In the organisational context, Schein (1987 and 1998) described part of Cell 3 as the fundamental mission that justifies its existence, including its philosophy and mission. When extended to include national culture this would encompass a nation's philosophy and mission with regard to both human and animal rights.

Equally, the enjoyment of the game with the birds was a deep-rooted personal value for the children but it did not form part of Task Structure for Rwandan culture, it was simply of little importance. As one Rwandan colleague said, "We have little time for animal rights, except cows, let us get human rights in order first. We love nature and we will come to that later. It is not resistance, it is about priorities". Consequently, I had to use a variety of interpersonal skills to facilitate the birds' releases, without being viewed as petty or upsetting any of the children. If I had failed there would have been 'a clash of the icebergs' which could have created numerous problems, due to the immense value that Rwandans place on family life, particularly children.

Coping mechanisms

Bailey, (1985) describes coping mechanisms as, "...Successful coping should then enable the

professional to continue competently and in such a way which does not place more excessive demands on them. This will also help to avoid spiralling into repeated stressful experiences and progressively more serious problems of human functioning such as burnout". In 'Concept of Direct Action and Palliatives', Lazarus (1975) argues that individual varying coping mechanisms can be averaged and overlaid onto a continuum. At each pole of this continuum, individuals are located whose reactions in stressful situations differ from each other according to their grouping to a pole. Some individuals react rigidly in stressful situations, i.e. not according to the specific demands of the situation but preferably with the same mechanism. Secondly, they react comparatively often, with the respective anxiety defence mechanism and thirdly they already respond accordingly to weaker cues. Thus, this coping system has the following properties: rigidity, frequent manifestations and easy release. Unlike individuals in the middle of the continuum (so called non-defensive persons) who use coping mechanisms more adequately and variably as the prevailing situational demands. Furthermore they do not readily react to weaker ones, thus respond less frequently. Additionally, as detailed in Chapter two, Weaver (1993) argues that sojourners are more likely to develop coping strategies and gain understanding if they have previous training that is oriented toward cross-cultural communication and process; is focused on us rather than simply 'them' and aids cross-cultural adaptation. The following sections highlight the cross-cultural 'coping mechanisms' that were adopted by different individuals during this AR.

Personal experiences

Many of our Rwandan colleagues and student trainers had endured some tragic or unpleasant experiences such as genocide, famine, war, living in exile, poverty, high infant mortality rates and the loss of loved ones or property. It became apparent from my observations that many of them had internal or external coping mechanisms that British people of my generation had generally not required. It was therefore an essential element of our role to understand these issues in more depth to prevent us making incorrect judgements. These mechanisms varied from driving ambition and

working extremely hard for long hours to ensure, in their words, "That my family and comrades have not died in vain" and "So that my children have the prospect of a more positive future," to drinking alcohol. In the following two extracts from my field notes a student gives an explanation of the latter from his perspective (the first is from 1997, three years after the interviewee had lost his family in the genocide and the second is from 2001, a day after his baby son had died):

> "All my family has gone from the roots to the very tips of the branches. I have no father, mother, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews or cousins; I am the only single one left standing (*he uses his hand and one finger to demonstrate*). Sometimes when you ask me in class what is wrong and I say 'nothing' I am sorry to have said that because the truth is I am remembering and I try not to remember. That is why I drink so much or I cannot sleep, I remember." (*He laughs, but there is no humour in his voice or his laugh*).

> "It is not so bad now, I am married and I care for my wife very much. When my son was born I drank less and less – I became a man, not a scared boy who hid in alcohol and I was promoted. Now he has died so young and so innocent, I am trying hard not to begin drinking. It will help that you have all returned; you give me courage because you did not give up on me even when I was rude and fell asleep in class – Nick would talk with me late into the night on many, many occasions and it helped me to deal with the pain. I do not want to let you all down; you and my wife are my family now, I will be sober for you. *On seeing my tears he said:* Do not be sad, what you must remember is that the death of our children is part of our life here – in your world you assume that parents go first and are devastated if the natural course of your lives are altered – here this is the natural course of our lives."

His experiences taught the British team members many lessons regarding cultural assumptions and coping mechanisms. The differences between the Interpersonal Structure (Cell 6, Schein, 1987 and 1998) of the Rwandan team members and the British team members with regard to infant death were immense. These differences impacted on the ways in which the speaker's British colleagues and Rwandan colleagues interacted with him after the death of his child, in both an individual and group way (Interpersonal Content, Cell 4 and Interpersonal Process, Cell 5 respectively). For example, British team members wanted him to take an extended time off work, whereas his Rwandan colleagues thought that time should be reserved purely for the funeral.

The practical application of ethnocentrism management and cultural relativism, as outlined in

Chapter two, continually came to the fore when working in a variety of cross-cultural incidents. As Haviland (1996) stated, 'cultural relativism is the fight against ethnocentrism'. He described cultural relativism as the idea that one must suspend judgement on other peoples' practices in order to understand them in their own cultural terms. Haviland asserts, and my research supports him, that only through such an approach can one gain an undistorted view of another peoples' ways, as well as insights into the practices of one's own society. If we had judged this student as lazy or disinterested and treated him in accordance with that judgement, it would have had a profoundly devastating impact on his life, not simply his learning.

Disorientation

Most people find themselves in a condition of disorientation when they first live in a strange culture. It is often described as 'culture shock' and can be extended to include the period of cultural adaptation. In Rwanda, there was an unusual combination of culture shock, for it affected both the British trainers and our Rwandan colleagues and student trainers. Many of them had lived their entire lives in exile, in neighbouring countries such as Zaire, (*now Democratic People's Republic of the Congo*) Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, which are very different from Rwanda. The disorientation that people experienced varied from individual to individual and there appeared to be a correlation to the amount of preparation they had made before coming to Rwanda. As previously discussed, personality and character traits also played a large part in how individuals coped with culture shock. One Rwandan student trainer expressed the disorientation he had experienced in the following words:

"Rwanda is still very disorganised, I lived in Uganda for a long time and was an officer in their police service. It was well trained and well established and I was respected . . . In order to return from exile to my own country I lost my rank, I now live in poor accommodation with few utilities and I am having to learn my native tongue because it was forbidden in the refugee camps. All my colleagues have had very different experiences of this culture shock you talk about, some have come from countries where they were beaten or arrested for the smallest excuse and so they find it difficult to trust even when there is no reason to doubt. It is very difficult for everyone, but it is also worthwhile for this is our country and things will improve. Sometimes I think I will return to Uganda — then I stand firm — this is **my** mother country and I will help it to grow and

stand on its feet ... "

From an interview of the 27th April 1997 - the interviewee has now been promoted several times and currently (July 2002) holds a senior training post.

The British trainers experienced disorientation to varying degrees and for a variety of different reasons. They all found ways of dealing with the culture shock, which varied from person to person. Although there were female members of the research teams, I was the only female member of the training team and experienced disorientation regarding my standing as a woman in Rwandan culture. I was given immediate formal respect, because I was British, an ex-police officer and academically qualified. When I attended a lecture by the Chief of the Communal Police, I was publicly held up as a role model in relation to lifelong learning, to the large audience of Rwandan police officers. However, many of the Rwandan officers also believed that I was not looking after my husband properly (he was a member of the British Training Team) and that I should cook for the British team whenever our housekeeper was unavailable. When I explained that I had very little experience of cooking because I used pre-prepared food in England, they were either very concerned or unable to control their laughter. Whenever I achieved anything of note, the thanks were often directed at my husband for allowing me the time to achieve the task in question. Others regarded me as a 'mother', as one student trainer said:

"I have lost my family. If you say 'symbol' in English, you are that symbol of my mother. You are our teacher and we are your pupils, you are our mother."

Whilst I found these experiences difficult at times because they clashed with my own belief in gender equality, it was similar to my exposure to the British Police Service in the 1970s and the subject of my M.Ed. I therefore had an understanding of their view and was able to discuss the issues with my Rwandan colleagues at length, which increased our awareness of each other's cultures. Initially, the most negative experience was that my British colleagues were completely unaware of the gender issues or only viewed them as humorous. We had to discuss the problems this created in order to ensure that there was no conflict in our team.

I believe it is a fair assumption that similar gender issues in other groups, with less training or preparation, could create dysfunctional conflict.

One member of the British team experienced disorientation regarding Rwandan children that created serious problems for him. Rwanda has many orphans due to the war, genocide and disease; large numbers of them are disabled and live on the streets. Many survive by theft and begging, which often involves them displaying their machete wounds and dismemberments. 'Whites' are viewed as wealthy and as providers of aid by many of these children. Therefore, at times a white person could be surrounded by ten to twenty of these children all requesting food or money. This created intense anxiety for our team member, who felt powerless to help the children and finally resented them. In an interview he said:

> " ... I feel so guilty because I want to push them away and shout at them . . . yet they have lost their parents and have been burnt, hacked at or battered. Yet I no longer see them as individuals, they are just a mass surrounding me and I feel so hemmed in. But when I'm not there I feel guilty and want to help ... it's got to the point where I want to stay in our house and never set foot outside the police compound ... "

A second member of the team wanted to help the children but was concerned that he would look foolish or 'soft'. This also had an adverse affect on him, although not as serious as the first. In order to overcome these problems we held a formal team meeting to remove the emotion from the problem and discuss the issues cognitively and devise a strategy or 'coping mechanism'. We assessed the amount of help we could actually afford to give the children in relation to financial and time constraints. We examined the positive and negative impacts of such help, for example the children could begin to rely on us and then we would return to Britain. We then devised a strategy in liaison with Rwandan colleagues of who we would help, when we would help and how we could distribute our assistance without the recipients losing their dignity. For example, we decided to help an orphanage close to the training school and the police officers would distribute the gifts to promote their positive role within the community. This strategy provided very clear boundaries for the team members,

which were reflected in a second interview:

> " ... I now know I haven't closed my eyes to the suffering around me; I am helping. I know that I simply cannot help everyone, by having boundaries I know where to stop — before I was frozen, I stopped before I started! I feel much more at ease and I can get on with my job knowing I'm not an evil person — I'm a human being doing what I can ... "

Whilst this approach was very successful, it was one that we could have foreseen and planned for on our initial two week research visit, rather than simply reacting to a team member's discomfort.

Fear

Fear is also discussed in the section on stress in relation to the training team; therefore this section will concentrate on the fear of the student trainers. The following extract from my field notes illustrates many of the issues that lead to fear.

Extract from Field Notes made in May 1997:

It appeared to the three primary British trainers, that the students very quickly trusted them and were prepared to carry out any task set them, not mindlessly, but with critical thinking and a need to understand how it would assist in achieving the task, but never doubting that it would. They produced portfolios of evidence, including essays, videotapes, photographs and assessments even though they were 'under the microscope'; the desire to achieve their qualification was always paramount. However, the introduction of an 'outsider' in the form of Human Rights Mission for Rwanda (HRMFR) representatives, raised old fears and suspicions. On the 23rd May 1997, a pre-course questionnaire on Human Rights was given to the students in order to estimate their knowledge level, prior to the arrival of HRMFR — thus ensuring that their two day course to be held on the 28th and 29th June 1997 would be needs based. The questionnaire produced a wide variety of responses.

Two students completed it immediately with no hesitation; one finished his with 'a very warm welcome to you for your forthcoming visit'. The two students concerned did not communicate with the rest of the group throughout this process. One student was very hostile to completing the form, stating he had not met the HRMFR trainers; why hadn't they come to get the questionnaire answered themselves. The logistical problems of this option were explained, that is armed guards would be required and it would take time *etcetera*. The purpose of the questionnaire was also explained, but the fear and resistance was still as strong from that individual, "Why should I tell a stranger who I am and what I do, if they haven't been introduced to me?". Another individual explained from his point of view, that the questionnaire was just to aid the quality of their lesson on Human Rights. The rest of the group seemed unsure — some completed part of the questionnaire, and then stopped. Others listened and made a few comments — much of this took place in Kinyarwanda and wasn't translated due to the speed of conversation. However, it was apparent that feelings ran high, even to a non-Kinyarwanda speaker. My initial thought was that 'it's only a pre-course questionnaire so what is their problem?'. I decided to utilise 'critical thinking' and 'ethnocentrism management' skills. Whilst these are my own terms they are comparable with the theory of 'cultural relativism', which is the thesis that one must suspend judgment on other peoples' practices in order to understand them in their own cultural terms. Initially I kept quiet in order to analyse the situation prior to any intervention, to ensure that it was objective and appropriate, which an immediate intervention would not have been. After 10 minutes my intervention was as follows:

a) Explanation of this model:



b) Trainer input on the model:

For example when someone offers to teach you to swim, you may think, 'Oh no, I may drown' or 'Great, I'll have fun and swim'; most of those forces are based on past experiences. So looking at the experiences of the British trainers; a pre-course questionnaire is an opportunity to give our views, to ensure that we are taught what we require, i.e. not above or below our level of knowledge, we see little or no threat because past experiences tell us that they are positive. For some of you that may be the same - others of you may have equal forces — it's an opportunity and a threat, so I'll do nothing until either the 'threat' is proved to be stronger and I refuse to complete the questionnaire, or the 'opportunity' is proved to be stronger and I complete it. For others of you the threat is **much** stronger and you therefore resist. That too is based on past experiences — I know that many of you have experienced horrors I cannot imagine — and I would not pry — that may include giving information that the receiver has used to harm you, or that someone else has punished you for giving to the receiver. It may be that it is cultural and you do not wish to answer questions to a 'stranger' as it is against your culture — again I do not wish to pry. You know your trainers well enough to know that we would never force you to do anything, but that we will guide you and give you other viewpoints. The problem with past experiences is that they **usually** cause you to respond with your feelings 'from your gut' and not with your mind, that is 'It was great/horrific last time so I will/will not do it again'. Alternatively, it may simply be, 'I've always done it this way so that is it'. I am not here to tell you that you must/must not do this **but** what I ask you to do is make the choice from your minds, 'think about it', be a wise person, don't just respond to your gut feelings, be they good or bad.

c) Group discussion:

Please discuss this matter and use your **minds** — in Kinyarwanda so that you are free to talk about your thoughts — make your decision and let us know. You are adults — free to make choices — well reasoned and rational ones — because you are police officers and police trainers (*½ hour discussion ensued and situational leadership was demonstrated*).

d) Group response:

They decided that individual questions would be answered individually and that group questions would be answered as a group. *(To date not sure which are regarded as group/individual questions or criteria for same!).* One student trainer suggested that the reasons for the fear and resistance was due to their experiences of living under a dictatorship where people feared that careless talk or disclosure could cost them their lives or result in imprisonment. He added that people needed more exposure to the 'outside' in order to open their minds to opportunities to prevent them being missed. When I compared this against my initial reaction of 'it's only a pre-course questionnaire so what's the problem?', I felt ashamed.

NB *The student who feared and resisted the questionnaire most strongly — also took it to the Head of the Police Training School who gave his approval for its completion via a short note.*

End of extract from Field Notes

Health hazards and medical facilities

Evans, Hall and Warford (in Pillai, V. K and Shannon, L. W. [1995]) discuss the fact that developing countries face the challenge of coping with a heavy burden of illness that differs markedly in subgroups of the population at different stages of development. Their findings are supported by the fact that during the period of this AR, our research team has lost three of its Rwandan members due to fatal illnesses and all of the Rwandan team members have been seriously ill (requiring hospitalisation) at some stage of the research. Many other Rwandan colleagues have lost family members and friends in accidents or due to illness. During the same period the British members of the team have remained relatively healthy (only one has received hospital treatment for an illness) and none have lost a family member for health related reasons, despite there being an equal number of team members. In Rwanda, the lack of utilities and

infrastructure can create health hazards, for example, without good roads and/or transport, medical facilities are difficult to reach. Damp, dirty and damaged buildings may harbour disease and provide little or no protection against mosquitoes and other insects or animals. As one student trainer put it:

> "At the end of a long day in class, I walk home and have a drink of water straight from the supply. I know I should really collect firewood, make a fire, boil the water and wait for it to cool — but I can't be bothered. It is a risk I know and it probably accounts for my frequent stomach problems, but I'm still too tired."

During our initial planning and preparation for the first phase of this AR, we considered this issue in relation to our own health, but had not given it a thought in relation to the Rwandans. It was only when class numbers dwindled from 15 to 3 due to a serious malaria epidemic that we took action. We provided medicine; mosquito creams, sprays and nets, and assisted in boarding up the vast quantity of war-damaged windows. Whilst we were not there to provide medical assistance, it would have been impossible for our team to complete their training mission (Task Content, Cell 1, Schein 1987 and 1998) without providing this type of practical support. On subsequent research and training missions to developing countries, my organisation has extended our medical planning and preparation to all individuals/personnel who will be required to ensure the successful completion of our task and research. In conclusion, my observations highlighted the importance of individually considering all the potential health hazards and corresponding material and budgetary requirements, prior to any stay in a foreign country for the visitors and their indigenous colleagues. This involves lateral thinking and consultation with others in order to ensure adequate protection such as water filtering facilities, medical packs containing syringes and sutures and malaria protection and prevention.

Stress

Some elements of stress were unavoidable due to culture shock and disorientation. However, my research has shown that stress can be reduced with careful preparation and strategies. Stress was created prior to our initial visit by the exaggerated claims of national British newspapers that 'Rwanda was descending back into genocide'. On subsequent visits, checks have been

made with more reliable sources, including the British Embassy in Kigali and indigenous colleagues, to ensure a constructive pre-brief and reduction in stress. Potential problems are also highlighted and discussed at pre-briefs in the UK using the experience of others, including:

> "You will often be the only white person in a crowd; what impact do you think that will have?" "How will you deal with it?"
>
> "You will see a lot of dismembered people including children. What assistance, if any, will you need to deal with that?"

These pre-briefing sessions are carried out sensitively, by skilled and experienced personnel and have enjoyed a degree of success. A British trainer spoke about the sessions, after his first trip to Rwanda in 1998:

> "I was glad we talked, at the time it seemed silly. I'm not racist so why should I worry about being the only white face? Nevertheless, when I was there I was frightened; I felt different, small, isolated and a long way from home. I felt like my colleague's 'scaredy cat bag carrier'. I wanted to lock myself in my room. However because of the pre-brief I was reflecting in action, remembering what we had talked about. The stress was alleviated quite quickly and I began to enjoy myself. Mind you, I also think my culture shock was exaggerated because my colleague was an 'old hand'. I was therefore thrown in at the deep end, straight into the middle of a new culture!" (*he laughs*).

When individuals experienced stress, it was important that we recognised and supported each other and our individual coping mechanisms. The following personal comments from my field notes of the 1st May 1997 graphically illustrate this point:

> 'I have never experienced such emotions, they twist and turn inside me — creating physical feelings — sickness, stomach aches and dizziness — some from rage, some joy, some sadness and some I cannot comprehend — they are from outside my previous experience. I miss sharing with my family — I miss lots of things I didn't think I would. I know that I will cope — we all will in our different ways. One will get into task and be busy, another will read a novel, watch a video, switch off — I will immerse myself in my research. If I don't record how I feel, record what is happening inside me — it will be lost as my coping mechanisms click in.'

The point is further illustrated when it is compared to the following extract from the 24th January 2001:

> 'As always I feel as though I have come home – my second home, Rwanda is now in my blood so I have to ensure I remain objective and rational, despite the joy I am experiencing to be back on familiar turf, with good friends and colleagues. This will be my last official AR visit so my happiness is tinged with a degree of melancholy – but I am confident I will return for new tasks.'

This relates to Daniel's aforementioned assertion (1975) that the main characteristic of cultural difficulty is the inability to behave as usual in a new cultural environment and emotional instability makes it harder to manage, particularly without the support of a familiar background of life. He also believes that if emotional stability is combined with intellectual curiosity it must make for positive enjoyment of cultural change. At the time of the first quote I was unable to behave as usual and I did not have a familiar background of life and my emotions were unstable for a brief period of time due to culture shock. However, I am usually emotionally stable and my AR is driven by intellectual curiosity. By the time of the second quote I had become very familiar with Rwanda and its culture and it is apparent that I was positively enjoying the cultural change.

Historical

Like many countries, historical issues have a great impact on Rwandan culture - if a teacher, trainer or researcher from another culture is unaware of the history, they can make serious mistakes. Alternatively, if they are aware of the history there is the potential of bias for or against particular linguistic or 'ethnic' groups, which the professional has to recognise and manage. The British media frequently misrepresented both the war and genocide in Rwanda stating things such as ... 'the Hutu tribe were slaughtering the Tutsi tribe' and 'the new Tutsi-led government is...' In reality: the groups are not tribes; Hutu extremists slaughtered moderate Hutus as well as Tutsis; the new government consists of both Hutus and Tutsis and wishes the population to be known as Rwandese.

Initially our team were not aware of the reality and therefore made many assumptions based on the media's representation of the situation. However, we had recognised the potential for prejudice and potential problems if we purely relied on the media for information. Prior to beginning my AR, I was well equipped to ensure that any data we collected was corroborated by a variety of independent sources before it was weighted, as I had been a police officer for over twenty years. Once I formally began my AR I utilised the data I was collecting to brief the British team members of the various interpretations of Rwandan history. Following the team briefings the British trainers were able to be more objective and open when building relationships with their Rwandan colleagues. We also expressed our concerns about any unintentional, inappropriate behaviour to them and asked for feedback. Initially they did not respond, but as the relationship grew we did receive feedback and information, which helped us to put historical issues into context. For example, we were taken to meet people whom were regarded as 'elders', so that they could tell us about their colonial experiences.

Suspicion of the 'West' and the fear of 'Westernising'

Daniel (1975) discusses the dilemma facing those from outside Europe and America – the suspicion of the West. How to modernise without Westernising; how to equal or surpass the West in its own technological field, without accepting its culture as their own. Often this suspicion is linked to the theory of 'neo-colonialism'. Daniel quotes Kwame Nkrumah as saying, '… the State which is subject to it (*neo-colonialism*) is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside …' Nkrumah and Daniel describe neo-colonialism as much worse than direct colonialism, stating that it means 'power without responsibility' for the neo-colonisers and 'exploitation without redress' for the neo-colonised. Daniel suggests that Europeans or Americans may say 'these people are just not prepared to give up their muddled traditional ways… for the sake of efficiency'. I observed this phenomenon on many occasions;

the majority of my Rwandan colleagues wish to modernise without Westernising. Others wish to equal or surpass the West in its technology and experience, without accepting its culture. As one interviewee said:

> "The Europeans and Americans have many excellent ideas and products, it is important that we learn from them. But we do not want to become them, nobody knows our country like we do, we know which parts to take on and which parts to discard. It is also important for the morale of our people that they can be proud of their own culture, they do not need to take on yet another culture. Rwanda has a troubled history and throughout that history it has been forced or chosen to discard its own culture in favour of another. For example Rwandan women are beginning to take their husbands' names – like Westerners. It has never been a Rwandan custom – why should a woman lose years of her identity just because she marries."

Our Rwandan colleagues generally admired British achievements and qualifications, but they wanted them to enhance their own ways of life; they did not desire a totally different way of living or working.

Suspicion of Africans

Maier (1998 p.vii) believes that many of the suspicions of Africans are a direct result of media coverage as the following quote demonstrates:

> 'I have been asked often by Westerners why in the world I have chosen to live for all those years in Africa, with its wars and famines, its horrible diseases such as malaria, yellow fever, the *Ebola* virus, river blindness, and many others, all the chaos and violence that appear on Western television screens like unending snippets from one long nightmarish film of the coming apocalypse. Of course, had there been CNN during World War I filming the mustard gas attacks, had the television cameras been poking through the fences of the concentration camps and into the gas chambers of World War II, or had there been footage of Africa's own holocaust, the Atlantic and Arab slave trade, perhaps the West would exercise a bit more humility in its judgment of Africa's current crisis. Certainly future historians, if they are truthful, will rate the violence of twentieth century Africa as relatively mild indeed, compared to the slaughter that Europe had experienced and imposed on others. My answer to the question, however, is twofold. I freely admit to having succumbed to an overwhelming sense of admiration for the courage and sheer determination with which so many Africans seek to overcome their difficulties. In general, Africans are among the most hospitable and direct people I have met anywhere. It is true that I have had my

> brushes with trouble; I have been shot at, detained, threatened, and I came within hours of dying from malaria. But it is also true that never have I been more welcomed into people's homes or treated with more respect.'

My observations correlate with those of Maier; I too have been repeatedly asked similar questions which the enquirer has based primarily on media coverage. However, my research in Rwanda, led me to believe that the suspicion of Africans was usually born of racism, prejudice or ethnocentrism which are discussed earlier in this chapter; some other conversations that I witnessed included the following quotes:

> "All Africans like brightly coloured things so I bought all my boys (*talking about her staff who were aged 18 to 60 years of age*) some lovely yellow wellingtons, they were so thrilled that they carried on walking in their bare feet so that they didn't get their new wellingtons dirty."

> "They don't know what they want, they've asked for 500 manual typewriters, computers would be much more appropriate, they're so backward. I think we'll get them computers, although because of the cost we'll only be able to get 20." (*The typewriters were required for the police stations, the majority of which had no electricity supply*).

> "Whatever you get them they'll try to get more, the best thing to do is offer them less than your budget, they'll negotiate for more and you can then look magnanimous with the money you've kept back." (*This was advice that we received from another donor*).

Again the solution to this potential problem was found to be ethnocentrism management and cultural relativism.

Impact of the colonial era and expatriate communities

Maier (1998) argues that: '... the European carve-up of Africa at the Berlin Conference – a massive exercise in international piracy whose goal was to create moneymaking colonies – bequeathed to the founding fathers of modern Africa a deformed heritage'. It is a fact that Rwanda's colonial period has obviously influenced its cultural and political development. During colonialism the borders had little relationship to language, tribal or ethnic boundaries.

When countries emerged as independent nations, new borders were drawn with continued disregard for the socio-demographic compositions of the borderlands. As a result, linguistically and ethnically homogeneous regions continued to be split and heterogeneous social groups were combined to form nations. Due to this and other complex colonial and cultural issues, Rwanda has continued to be hampered by 'ethnic' unrest. Since the genocide in 1994, there has been a steady but slow improvement in the legacy of this period. This had several impacts on the British team including the need to be aware of historical issues in Rwanda. Due to the civil unrest that was still present in the country the team had to be security aware, for example in the early stages of the AR we needed an armed guard to travel into certain areas and could not give lifts to strangers, even if they appeared to be seriously injured in a road accident, as this was a common ploy of the militia. In 2000 we were told that the rule about lifts no longer included elderly people or children, as the militia no longer used them in ambushes. In itself, this created a minor cultural misunderstanding, as I do not regard myself to be elderly, whereas many Rwandans do because of their low life expectancy. Therefore we had to have clearer boundaries about who we could give a lift to.

Icons

Icons play a very important part in Rwandan culture; an illustration of this is Fred Rwigema, a former leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) who died in the early days of the war. He is now regarded as the national hero and there is a remembrance day in his honour. Initially our team were unaware of the importance of icons, which could have caused offence. However, even when we became aware of these issues, it was important that we respected them without overemphasising their importance to us, due to the political connotations.

Security

Security in a different culture, particularly in a country emerging from war and genocide, is of

paramount importance. It is something that our team were quite naïve about in the initial months of our stay in Rwanda. An early experience that most highlights this, is the occasion when a colleague and I drove a visitor home, after dark at approximately 19.00 hours. Our three mile journey took us about 30 minutes due to the condition of the roads. On our return we were met by six of the student trainers, all armed, who began to berate us for going out unaccompanied, at night, without notifying anyone. We were informed that the 'gate-guards' had been concerned and therefore alerted our students. The security provided by the Police Training School was of a high level, but discreet; we were therefore surprised by the reaction. I was personally shocked to see the different 'side' of our students, but pleased to see genuine concern they had for our safety and well-being. This incident was discussed at length the following day to ensure that we had not offended anyone, to ascertain any other unwritten ground rules and to explain the reasons for our naivety. The student trainers also explained the numerous reasons for the security including some we were totally unaware of.

For example, there is an extreme, by British standards, form of 'neighbourhood watch' in place. In every five dwellings there is a security representative who meets with his or her counterparts every evening. These groups then check every house to ensure that those who should be present are at home and that no terrorists or wanted criminals are hiding in the residences. By involving the community in this process the officers believe it reduces the risk of human rights abuses, without compromising security.

Summary of my categorisations according to the work of Daniel (1975)

As stated in my introduction to this chapter, Daniel's work has assisted me to categorise the plethora of data and material I gathered during my AR. In summary, my research demonstrated that ignorance of another culture could have serious or problematic consequences. Haviland (1996) supports my finding when he discusses the failed United Nations intervention in Somalia; he argues that blinded by their own cultures' assumption of the universality of centralized political structure,

the powers intervening in Somalia misunderstood the nature of that country's *uncentralized, segmentary* system.

In summary, all the data from this AR highlighted that social interactions are a key success factor in the cross-cultural transfer of training and development from Britain to Rwanda. It creates its own problems and does not suit all personalities, but these issues are outweighed by the positives, such as the acceleration of the process of understanding each other's cultures, working with the six areas of foci of Process Consultation, Schein (1987 and 1998) (see Figure 4) and preventing a clash of values, Weaver's (1993) colliding 'iceberg' analogy (see Figure 1).

Concluding remarks

For all the reasons mentioned in previous chapters, I propose the integrated framework of Schein's (1987 and 1998) Process Consultation and Weaver's (1993) Colliding Iceberg theories (see model at Figure 1) to the field of cross-cultural research. The new framework develops Weaver's practical guidance and both simplifies and extends Schein's work.

Whilst working with and developing this framework for over four and a half years, in a particularly complex and sensitive cross-cultural situation, I identified many strengths that supported my Research and Training Team's action research. The integrated model enables both researchers and practitioners to analyse the cross-cultural situation in which they find themselves, against the six areas of foci in Process Consultation (Cells 1 to 6), in order to fully understand the context of their research. Additionally, transfer teams and their stakeholder colleagues are able to artificially accelerate the maturity of their cross-cultural team, by making their own development part of the formal agenda (Task Content, Cell 1) rather than leaving it to chance. Any weaknesses that I identified were linked to the discrete models, such as Schein's organisational and monocultural focus and the limitations of Weaver's practical guidance. By integrating the two models the weaknesses were eliminated or greatly reduced. This thesis therefore makes a contribution to knowledge by exploring in detail the use of the Schein and

Weaver integrated model, in relation to the cross-cultural transferability of British police training methodologies to Rwanda in a post-war and genocide environment.

This thesis can also provide the basis for further cross-cultural studies that utilise the integrated Schein and Weaver model, particularly between developed and developing countries. Such studies may corroborate the findings in this research, thereby enabling future researchers and practitioners to understand the importance of Content, Process and Structure when contributing to the processes of democratic social change through action research.

HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH DISCUSSION DOCUMENT

Free people expect much of their police. In such societies the police stand at the point of balance, on the one hand securing human rights and, on the other, exercising their lawful powers given to them by governments in the name of the people, to protect the people and their institutions. Societies which are not free, or which are despotic, acquire omnipotent police who serve only those in power. Laws are promulgated which give police wide powers to deny human rights, in some cases even the most basic civil liberties. Police in such corrupt systems are themselves corrupted and through degeneration are permitted to indulge in arbitrary conduct including torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. However, the police of the world are not divided neatly into two distinctive forms, for there are degrees of both.

Police authority can be abused even in democracies. It can become more the master and less the servant. It can snuff out more freedom than it protects. The main problem lies in control. This is particularly so in the growth and practice of secret police. It is important to remember that abuses can flourish not only because of official negligence or acquiescence, but because rightly or wrongly broad sections of the people identify with such practices and consider that, in spite of their excesses, the police are carrying out a necessary and unpleasant task if both state and society are to be preserved and protected. Such conditions, great or small, place considerable moral burdens on decent police officials whose actions to check drifts of this kind are of paramount importance to the preservation of human rights.

In an ideal world there would be no need for the police. Society would achieve order through agreement, mutual tolerance and through the leadership of true authority. There would be no call for physical coercion and its threat. But human experience indicates that noble sentiments alone are too weak to control those whose ambitions, greed, aggression and anger give way to threatening and damaging activity on either a small or on a grand scale. From genocide to simple theft there are requirements for laws and for some form of enforcement of those laws. The instrument of enforcement in most states is the police and the judicial processes.

In creating such instruments free societies have to take great care on two counts. Firstly, they have to ensure that the system created to protect them does not become the instrument of their bondage. That the manner of its control and the nature of its work ensure, that in containing crime and disorder, it does not take away those basic freedoms enshrined in the best of domestic laws, the United Nations Declaration, other instruments and in the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda. The police have to be seen to be carrying out their function within the law to which they themselves are subject. Secondly, nations have to ensure that those who are chosen to exercise the power and authority of police officials are carefully selected for their human qualities, properly trained to perform their difficult duties in an ethnically correct manner, and, very importantly, to be led and directed by persons with high qualities of human excellence. Nothing less than this will help to secure the balancing of human rights with adequate control of excessive human misbehaviour. Even in the best of regulated democratic police systems, aberrations will emerge from time to time in which groups and individuals will fail to maintain the high criteria, which are sought. In such cases measures have to be available to maintain correct standards by the imposition of disciplinary regulations, having regard to the human rights of the malefactors, to be followed by such internal reforms necessary to reduce repetition.

Police and the Exercise of Power and Authority

Power and the authority, which flows from it, as phenomena, have to be understood by police officials since, in one sense at least, they are the creatures of power. Power as an abstract concept is neither good nor bad; it is endowed as an evil or as a virtue according to its nature and use. Power of the strong over the weak is always present in human affairs, but if such power is used by the strong not to subjugate or mistreat the weak but to protect and uplift them

it will take on ethnical characteristics of good. It is in the control of power by one person or group over another person or group that laws play such a vital role. To leave human affairs to the caprice of arbitrary power is of course untenable, but to use laws to diminish the reasonable exercise of freedom and to give excessive power to individuals or groups, such as police, over others, is equally so.

It is both possible and desirable for power to be mixed with discretion particularly in police activity. For example, where police have power to arrest, to bring people before the courts of law, it may not always be necessary to use it since arrest and detention before proof of guilt is an administrative convenience and not a punishment. Other means of securing attendance before courts, a summons, for example, may be sufficient in some cases. In cases where such action is possible the police will be seen to have a high regard for individual freedom. Authority is usually the offspring of power of one kind or another. Authority when given by laws democratically enacted and having the respect of people generally can be said to be true and legitimate. Authority based on power or arbitrariness, such as naked power or pure strength, lacks the virtues of the former and is authoritarianism. Such authority requiring blind obedience is generally offensive to the concept of human rights.

Authority may be said to be at its purest where it is freely given by free people who recognise the authority figure as a person of excellence to be trusted. It has been said, "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely". Police officials have to be on guard to avoid the potential and insidious corrupting influence of power if it is to be neutralised in them as individuals and in the groups to which they belong. Power for the police is not to be seen as an end in itself, but as a means towards a free social order. It is therefore in the proper use of their considerable powers that one test of police at the service of human rights will be made.

Police - A Dual Function

In many democratic countries the police are looked upon by the public as having two characteristic roles. One is to enforce laws and to prevent crime and public disorder; the other is to offer a humanitarian social service in emergencies both small and large. There may be others, such as military responsibilities, customs and excise, and immigration duties, but even in such cases there arise countless opportunities for police to perform actions of service.

It is often a question for argument as to how far the police should develop their social service function and on the other hand how intrusive into people's privacy the police should go in their law enforcement duties. It is neither possible nor perhaps desirable to be didactic about these matters prior to any survey or TNA, but since the issues do in one degree or another affect the subject of human rights some comment is appropriate.

One police ideal would be circumstances where all the many parties would so respect and trust the police that they would offer maximum assistance to them in their functions of law enforcement, investigation of crimes, maintenance of public tranquillity and the prosecution of offenders. Where the police are seen to be at the service of human rights in particular, and humanitarian acts in general, it might be expected that such public support will be forthcoming to a greater or lesser degree. It is important therefore that police officials under training should be enabled to address their minds to this phenomenon. Since it is an important principle of the police function that crimes should not only be investigated and detected but those crimes should also be prevented by other means, it follows that social actions and influence of police could be brought to bear in this connection. Thus, for example, where individuals or groups are exposed to great inequality of treatment or rendered victims to denial of human rights and civil liberties, generally they may resort to anti-social or criminal behaviour. If the police therefore have a highly developed social awareness they will often be presented with opportunities for the prevention of crimes and the maintenance of social order through bringing their influence to bear. In this way, police will enhance their own stature and function and in so doing will improve their position as law enforcement officials. It is important therefore that, through an

understanding of the subject of human rights, police officials see their relationships with the many differing sections of the public as positive.

Styles of Police

An examination of the nature of policing at different times and in different countries will reveal a number of variations. Styles will vary according to political, economic, social and cultural conditions. Even where the police system itself has one dominant or seemingly universal character, closer examination of police in practice will reveal differences of emphasis.

Of course in all societies most social control, including control of criminal behaviour, stems from *informal controls*. Superstitions, taboos, religions, customs, shared values and moral standards have preceded or given rise to laws upon which the more advanced formal policing arrangements are developed. If informal controls are weak, greater reliance is placed upon laws and their enforcement. In their role as preventors of crime the police have an interest in encouraging the retention or development of informal controls. The role of the family, the school, institutions of innumerable kinds, as well as public opinion itself, can all help or hinder the police function. It accords with the best principles of human rights that the dignity and freedom of the individual is reconciled with the dignity and social purpose of legitimate informal controls.

At the other extreme is to be found considerable reliance on *punitive policing*. Punitive policing if carried to extremes may be described as control through suspended terror. It works on the assumption that, provided the penalties for crimes, or police severity, are sufficiently horrible, people will be deterred. Although this philosophy of social control has existed from time to time and place to place, it runs counter to the provisions of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 5),* which forbids not only torture, but inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as well.

It accords with both the *United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (Article 8)* and the *Declaration on the Police (Article 1)* that a *preventive police* is developed. Preventive police activity, when carried out properly and effectively is superior activity since it not only prevents victimisation of citizens and their own lawful human rights but it also reduces the stigma associated with the criminal offender. It marks the concern of society to reduce the suffering of crime and the problems of criminality. Preventive policing may operate at *primary*, *secondary*, and *tertiary* levels in the control of crime and at each level the principles of human rights should be observed.

The *primary* level consists of any form of legal activity, which is likely to diminish the prospects of crime. In addition to such obvious activities as education, social welfare, housing and environmental protection, it includes the supervision of ex-offenders and concern for their rehabilitation. Where social tensions exist between ethnic groups it includes methods and means of reducing such tensions to avoid violence. The provisions on human rights play an important part in primary prevention.

The *secondary* level of prevention might be said to consist of police patrolling, guarding and a general presence. This function is passive but is also reactive where necessary and when it becomes reactive it moves from secondary to tertiary prevention. The *tertiary* level of prevention consists of deterrence of repeated criminality through detention and arrest of offenders, their arraignment before a proper judicial authority and their punishment, supervision and rehabilitation.

In all three elements of preventive police activity important principles of human rights apply. A form of police activity, which is designed to counteract such problems as terrorism, subversion of institutions of the state, as well as serious organised crime, is that of *secret police or security services*. Operating, as they have to, under cover and in plain clothes, secret police are subject to less direct supervision. They are also often empowered to carry out surveillance, to gather

intelligence, and in so doing to lawfully interfere with rights of privacy and similar liberties. It is important however to stress that, essential as this police role may be, it should be contained within domestic laws and amenable to the control of human rights provisions and recommendations, if proper standards of behaviour are to be maintained.

It is a hallmark of despotic and totalitarian regimes to employ large numbers of secret police and agents often operating outside constitutional provisions and comprising 'the state within the state'. In such cases the ideals upon which the whole edifice of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is based would be negated.

There are considerable responsibilities upon police officials operating in secret police or security services and those who supervise their activities to ensure that operations are subject to the rule of law and democratic accountability. All police are officers of the law and it is therefore a contradiction for them to operate outside it.

The above examples of styles of policing are not intended to be exclusive since many others, including repression, passivity, etcetera, might be cited, but what has been said has been intended to direct the reader's attention to the variety of functions affected by human rights principles.

Police Demeanour

As a society becomes more civilised, free, educated and informed at all levels, its expectations of the police along with other public servants are raised. Amongst other things, it requires not only that the police carry out their primary functions but also that they do so with greater sensitivity and understanding.

As people become more aware of the dignity of the individual and of human rights they are likely to criticise and complain about police behaviour, which in another age would not have been regarded as wrong. This phenomenon may lead to the false impression that police have deteriorated in behavioural matters but closer consideration may often reveal that it is the higher demands being made upon them. This can partly be explained when it is pointed out that not only do domestic legal and procedural matters become more exacting, but that both the United Nations and the Government of Rwanda have made resolutions concerning control of police behaviour in the performance of their duty. This should not be seen as an attack upon police officials and organisations, but as recognition of their civic importance and of the high standards of conduct which are manifest in the best of police practice.

The general demeanour required of the police is not necessarily constant. In the plural, multicultural society, particular care has to be taken in this regard. A society, which is homogeneous, monocultured, and classless, would require less adaptability from police officials than one in which there are ethnic, religious, cultural and other differences. In the latter case, greater understanding of the differences, which exist, is essential, if human rights are to be upheld.

Police at the service of human rights will develop a demeanour, which embodies an instinct or a perception for human dignity. Being witness to human beings, as they sometimes are, in degrading and degraded situations, police are exposed to the influence of cynicism. They have to avoid becoming indifferent, however difficult that may be, if they are to develop and retrain proper judgment of and appreciation for the rights and dignities of all.

The foundations of good police practice will therefore be based on an understanding and acceptance of ethical principles of duty to the enforcement of laws not as an end in themselves but as a means of securing fairness and justice to all manner of persons irrespective of their race, religion or social standing. The provisions of human rights law seek no lower standard of police behaviour and practice.

Police Rights and Duties

It will be apparent from examination of human rights that the police themselves are protected as individual citizens in the exercise of their fundamental rights and freedoms. It follows therefore that the police are themselves protected by the rule of law.

The police as individuals are endowed with powers and duties in excess of those given to other citizens in order that they may carry out their functions effectively. They are, for example, given rights to interfere lawfully with the liberties of persons suspected of crime or to use force in their duties to protect other people and to maintain order. Necessary limitations are however placed upon the use of such powers. It is vital to apply particularly high ethical standards to police forces in a democratic society that is concerned to protect and safeguard fundamental human rights.

There are at least two particular problems in this connection, however, which require special emphasis at this stage. One is concerned with the problem of unlawful orders of senior officials, and the other is concerned with limitations on the use of force.

Under the provisions of *Article 8 of the United Nations Code* the question of obedience to orders, which in themselves are denials of human rights and violations of the Code, is raised. Officials who have reason to believe that such violations are taking place have a duty to report them to superior authorities. The commentary further provides that officials who report such matters shall not suffer penalties for doing so.

The provisions and the attempts of the human rights declarations to protect police officials give rise to important ethical considerations, which merit careful explanation at all stages of their training as does the subject of the use of force.

The use of force by police officials is generally governed by the principles of proportionality or expressed in some national laws as the principles of the minimum use of force. The *United Nations Code (Article 3)* seeks to strengthen national laws in this regard.

Ideally, police should aim to achieve their objectives without the use of force at all. By striking the correct attitude it is often possible to achieve these by persuasion. Where force has to be used it should only be in proportion to the problem being encountered. In particular both the code and the declaration stress the need to control the use of firearms and other deadly measures by requiring explicit instructions on their limitations and use. This subject will require the most careful attention throughout the training of police officials of all grades, since ignorance and fear, often rising from inexperience, may result in the excessive application of force.

Universal Principles

It is recognised that police systems and the laws of a country are often the product of historical diversity. Differing cultural, social and legal traditions not only produce different police concepts but also differing public attitudes towards police. Police officials are likely to have differing views of their place in society, and of what is regarded as their proper function. It is perhaps neither possible nor even desirable to envisage one police system acceptable to all nations. Even allowing for the diversity of police systems, however, when it comes to the subject of human rights there are principles and laws of universal applicability, which it is intended, should transcend those systems. To understand this will go a long way towards grasping the intentions of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.

Conclusions

It has been stressed that it is desirable for police officials to acquire a general consciousness of concepts of democracy, justice, fundamental freedoms and human rights. However, this in itself

would be insufficient if police practice were not pervaded and directed in accordance with this consciousness and knowledge. In their day-to-day functions, police operate on those margins of society where liberties are at risk and where freedoms and rights often have to be curtailed and infringed if police are to be effective. Yet the police are not a law unto themselves. They are the servants and agents of both their domestic laws and of the great body of international human rights law.

It is this rule, which protects both police and public. It protects the public from arbitrary and improper interference with their liberties and it protects the police in the proper discharge of their duties. The police official therefore carries the legal responsibility for ensuring at all times that his or her actions are within the limits of this convention and within the limits of their country's domestic law and constitutions. The relevant aspects of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda follow.

Civil Liberties

The Human Person is Sacred

The liberty of the human person is guaranteed; nobody may be accused, arrested, detained or convicted except under conditions established by law in force prior to the commission of the act and in the forms set by it.

No offence may be subject to punishment that was not set by law prior to its commission. Nevertheless, the law may derogate from this provision in cases where an exceptional public danger threatens the existence of the nation.

Everyone is presumed innocent of offences charged until definitive conviction.

Acts or admissions which were not punishable at the time they were committed, may be charged and judged if they were considered criminal according to general principles of law recognised by the community of nations.

Nobody may be subject to security measures except as provided by law for reasons of public order or State security.

Criminal liability is personal.

Civil liability shall be defined by law.

Defence is an absolute right at all states and degrees of legal proceedings.

The right to asylum is recognised under conditions determined by law.

Extradition is only authorised under limits set by law.

All citizens are equal before the law, without distinction based on race, colour, origin, ethnic origin, clan, gender, opinion, religion, social position or other reasons.

All forms of slavery and bondage are prohibited.

Freedom of worship and of public celebration of religion, freedom of conscience as well as the right to manifest one's opinions on any subject is guaranteed, subject to prosecution of crimes committed during their exercise.

Freedom of association is guaranteed under conditions set by law; prior authorisation may not be prescribed.

Freedom of peaceful assembly without arms is guaranteed under terms set by law.

Prior authorisation must be prescribed by law, and solely for open-air meetings, on public roads or places, and as required by reasons of security, peace and cleanliness.

All citizens have the right to circulate freely and to settle within the national territory as well as to leave and to return; the exercise of this right may only be limited by the law for reasons of public order and State security.

Interference with privacy is prohibited.

Confidentiality of correspondence and postal, telegraphic, telephone or other communication is guaranteed; it may only be restricted by law.

The home is inviolable. Entry into the home may only take place in cases provided by law and under the forms that it prescribes.

Private property, individual or collective, is inviolable. It may only be interfered with for reasons of public utility, in cases and in the manner established by law, and subject to just and prior compensation.

The family, which is the natural basis of Rwandan society, is protected by the State.

Parents have the right and the duty to raise their children.

Only monogamous marriage is recognised, under conditions and forms set by law.

Conditions and forms of divorce are determined by law.

Freedom of education is guaranteed, subject to punishment of offences committed during its exercise. Organisation of official and subsidised free education as well as the recognition of diplomas and certificates issued by private education is determined by law.

Subject to article 24(2), primary schooling is mandatory and free, according to terms established by law.

National service, either civil or military, is organised by law.

Non-penal forced labour is prohibited.

Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment and to just and favourable conditions of work.

Every worker may defend his or her rights through trade union action, subject to punishment of offences committed during exercise of this right.

The right to strike is exercised in accordance with the laws that regulate it; it cannot hinder exercise of the right to work.

The judiciary is the guardian of civil liberties and rights, and ensures their respect under conditions set by law.

Multiple sources in Rwanda including: international, regional and national human right instruments and domestic legislation; Yves de Wolf translations and United Nations discussion papers.

Rwanda: A Chronology	
15th C.	Rwandan Kingdom established under Tutsi monarchy.
1532-1559	Ruganzu Bwimba
1559-1586	Cyilima Rugwe.
1586-1588	Kigeri Mukobanya.
1588-1593	Mibarmbwe Mutabazi.
1593-1603	Yuhi Gahima.
1603-?	Ndahiro Cyamatarc.
1603-1630	Ruganzu Ndori.
1630-1657	Mutara Semugeshi.
1657-1684	Kigeri Nyamuheshera.
1684-1711	Mibambwe Gisanura.
1711-1738	Yuhi Mazimpaka.
1738-1756	Karemera Rwaka.
1756-1765	Cyilima Rujugira.
1765-1792	Kigeri Ndabarasa.
1792-1797	Mibambwe Sentabyo.
1797-1830	Yuhi Gahindiro.
19th C.	Rwandan Kingdom at its height under Mwamis Gahindiro and Rwabugiri Tutsi rule is enhanced by colonial administrations: German (1989-1916) and Belgian (1916-962).
1830-1860	Mutara Rwagera.
1860-1895	Kigeri Rwabugiri.
1885	The Berlin Conference decides that the region should become the responsibility of the German Empire.
1895-1896	Mibambwe Rutarindwa.
1889	Germans establish themselves. Civil administration follows in 1907.
1908	A German military command is installed in Kigali but power continues to be exercised though the Mwami, the head of a Tutsi dynasty.
1916	Belgian troops arrive.
1896-1931	Yuhi Musinga.
1918	Under the Treaty of Versailles the former German colony of Ruanda-Urundi is made a UN protectorate to be governed by Belgium, adding to the vast Belgian possessions in the Congo. The two territories (later to become Rwanda and Burundi) are administered separately under two different Tutsi monarchs.
1919	Ruanda-Urundi (as it was then called) mandate territory entrusted to Belgium by Treaty of Versailles.
1924	*After the First World War*. Belgium accepts the mandate of the League of Nations to administer Rwanda and Burundi.
1926	Belgians introduce a system of ethnic identity cards differentiating Hutus from Tutsis.
1930	Administrative reforms including the introduction of identity cards indicating ethnic group membership.
1931	King Musinga dethroned by colonial administration and replaced by his son, Rudahigwa Mutara III.

1931-1959	Mutara Rudahigwa.
1933	A census of the Rwandan population is carried out by the colonial authorities. Mandatory identity cards stating the ethnic identity of the bearer are extended.
1940-1945	Famine. Many scholars attribute this to colonial policies, which promoted the exploitation of labour.
	After the Second World War. The UN confers the mandate for Rwanda and Burundi onto Belgium with commitment to 'emancipation'.
1946	United Nations Trusteeship replaces League of Nations mandate.
1952	Power of African Authorities increased with the institution of policy to elect chiefs.
1957	Parmehutu (Party for the Emancipation of the Hutus) is formed while Rwanda is still under Belgian rule.
1957	Publication of the Hutu Manifesto calling for Hutu independence from the Belgians and the Tutsi monarchy.
1959	Mwami Mutara III dies. Seizure of power by a Tutsi group who try to eliminate Hutu leaders. Farm workers, organised by the Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARMEHUTU), revolt against Tutsi rule. About 100,000 Tutsi are killed and 200,000 flee to Burundi. By the end of the year Kigeri V, the new Mwami, also flees.
1959	A bloody Hutu revolt leads to Rwanda being placed under military government. The massacre of 20,000 Tutsi results in a first exodus, mainly to Uganda.
1960	Elections held amid widespread violence. PARMEHUTU victorious. Victory not recognised by UN but supported by Belgium.
1961	UN supervised referendum votes for republican independence constitution. Parliamentary elections give Hutu victory, ending the monarchy. Belgium recognises the Republic proclaimed by PARMEHUTU. Rwanda and Burundi separated.
1961	The PARMEHUTU (party of the Hutu) seizes power, abolishes the monarchy and proclaims a republic. This is confirmed by a majority of 80 per cent in a referendum a few months later.
1962	Rwanda gains independence from Belgium. Wide-scale killing of Tutsi and further massive outflow of refugees, many to Uganda. Hutu nationalist government of Grégoire Kayibanda's PARMEHUTU comes to power.
1962	Independence is declared. Election of a Hutu president, Grégoire Kayibanda, who nominates only Hutus to his government.
1963	Further massacres of Tutsis, this time in response to military attack by exiled Tutsis in Burundi. Again more refugees leave the country. It is estimated that by the mid-1960s half of the Tutsi population is living outside Rwanda.
1963	Unsuccessful attempts by Tutsis of the diaspora to return by force on two occasions result in anti-Tutsi pogroms.
1964	**January**: Several thousands Tutsi are killed by Hutu. Many more flee into exile, mainly to Uganda and Burundi. The UN High commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that about 150,000 Rwandans, mainly Tutsi, were refugees in neighbouring countries. The number of refugees could be twice as much, as many of them were not registered with UNHCR.
1965	Elections. PARMEHUTU obtain 97% of the vote. Rwanda declared a one party state. Some Tutsi chiefs, inside Rwanda, attempt a coup with the help of exiles.
1967	Renewed massacres of Tutsis.
1967	Unsuccessful attempts by Tutsis of the diaspora to return by force on two occasions result in anti-Tutsi pogroms.
1972	Ethnic violence in Burundi. Tutsi slaughter Hutu. Thousands of Hutu flee into exile in Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire.
1973	**July 5**: Colonel Juvenal Habyarimana overthrows President Kayibanda who is jailed and dies shortly after. Hutu gain more power by system of 'ethnic quotas' allowing Tutsi a maximum of 14% of jobs and educational places.

1973	Purge of Tutsis from universities. Fresh outbreak of killings, again directed at Tutsi community.
1975	PARMEHUTU is replaced by Habyarimana's party, the *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement* (MRND) as single ruling party.
1975	Habyarimana's political party, the MRND is formed. Hutus from the President's home area of northern Rwanda are given overwhelming preference in public service and military jobs. This pattern and the exclusion of the Tutsis continues throughout the seventies and eighties.
1976	**April**: total blockade of Rwanda imposed by the Amin government of Uganda. The route from Mombasa through Uganda is the lifeline of Rwandan trade with the outside world.
1978	Habyarimana returned to office in an election in which he was the only candidate. A new constitution promulgated. National Assembly is replaced by a National Development Council.
1979	Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) founded in Nairobi, Kenya.
1982	Uganda expels Rwandan exiles. Ugandan troops destroy towns leaving at least 10,000 people homeless. During the year about 50 refugees kill themselves, in protest, at Rwandan immigration offices.
1985-1986	Import route through Uganda is blocked due to civil war.
1986	National Resistance Movement/Army (NRA) gains power in Uganda with Rwandan refugees as a large part of the army. Presence of Rwandan refugees in NRAQ becomes top foreign policy concern of Rwanda. Rwandan exiles are among the victorious troops of Yoweri Museveni's NRA who take power, overthrowing the dictator Milton Obote. The exiles then join the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) a Tutsi –dominated organisation.
1988	Rwandans from all over the world meet in Washington and endorse the unconditional repatriation of Rwandan refugees as sole solution to refugee problem. **December 16**: Habyarimana is re-elected. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) grows in Uganda, grouping together exiled Tutsis and dissident Hutus.
1989	The coffee price collapses, causing severe economic hardship in Rwanda. Setting up of a special commission dealing with the problems of Rwandan emigrants.
1990	**July**: Under pressure from western aid donors Habyarimana concedes the principle of multi-party democracy. **July 5**: President Habyarimana announces the creation of a national commission to draw up a political charter. **September 30**: Fred Rwigema, a Tutsi and former Major General in the Ugandan NRA, leads invasion of RPF from Uganda. Invasion is put down with the help of French, Belgian and Zairean troops. Cease-fire in October. **October 1**: The RPF launches an attack on the northeast of the country from Uganda. This leads to the arrest of thousands of Tutsis, accused of being RPF 'accomplices'. **October 4**: Belgium and France send in troops to protect and evacuate their nationals. **October 8**: The Rwandan army massacres between 500 and 1,000 Hima du Mutura (a Tutsi sub-group). **October 11-13**: Massacres of around 400 Tutsi in the commune of Kibilira. **Late October**: The RPF is pushed back into Uganda. Start of a guerrilla war. Belgium withdraws troops but a French contingent remains stationed in Rwanda.
1990	**November 13**: President Habyarimana announces that other political parties will be allowed to form, and the suppression of any mention of ethnic group on identity cards. The latter measure is never carried out.

1990-1991	The Rwandan army begins to train and arm civilian militias known as Interahamwe ('Those who stand together'). For the next three years Habyarimana stalls on the establishment of a genuine multi-party system with power sharing. Throughout this period thousands of Tutsis are killed in separate massacres around the country. Opposition politicians and newspapers are persecuted.
1991	**January**: 600 RPF troops enter the country from Uganda. Sporadic clashes along the border, but are forced to retreat. **March 29:** Cease-fire signed between Rwandan government and RPF. **June 8:** Habyarimana amends constitution and provides for multi-party system and reform. **End January-mid-March-end March**: Massacre of 500 to 1,000 Bagowe (a Tutsi sub-group) in the northwest of the country. Publication of the draft of the national charter and proposals for a constitution and a law in regard to political parties. **June 10**: Promulgation of a new constitution recognising Rwanda as a multi-party state. **July**: Assent is given to the creation of the first opposition parties: social-democrats, liberals and Christian-democrats.
1992	**March**: At least 300 Tutsi are killed and 15,000 displaced in the Gugesera region. Talks between government and the RPF continue at various venues in Tanzania and Zaire. Cease-fire agreement signed on July 13. **April**: Transitional government formed to govern until 1995 multiparty elections agreed by government negotiators. Dismas Nsengiyaremye as Prime Minister of the new government. Agreement later rejected by MRND party leadership and CDR. The transitional government never took off due to the continued prevarication and manoeuvring by Habyarimana and his hard-line supporters. **June**: Amnesty International issues a report alleging widespread persecution of the Tutsi in Rwanda. The report states that over 1,000 Tutsi had been killed since 1990, while dozens had disappeared. **November**: Rioting in Kigali as 10,000 opposition supporters march through Kigali in protest against the slow pace of peace talks with RPF and what they called the thuggery by the youth wing of Habyarimana's MRND. **November**: Prominent Hutu activist Dr Leon Mugusera appeals to Hutus to send the Tutsi 'back to the Ethiopia' via the rivers. **Beginning March**: Massacres in the Bugesera region with at least 300 deaths. **May**: RPF offensive takes over some communes in the extreme north of Rwanda and leads to the displacement of around 350,000 people. **July 12**: Ceasefire is signed between the RPF and the Rwandan government.
1993	**January 7-21**: Visit by an international team investigating human rights violations in Rwanda since October 1, 1990. **February 8**: RPF offensive in the north of the country, which provokes the exodus of a million Hutus. The RPF carries out summary executions and France responds by sending an additional attachment of 300 men complete with heavy armour. **February**: RPF attacks and captures the northern town of Ruhengeri, breaking the cease-fire agreement. The RPF justifies its action by citing reports of ethnic massacres by the government in those areas. **February**: The RPF launches a fresh offensive. The guerrillas reach the outskirts of Kigali and French forces are again called in to help the government side. Fighting continues for several months. **March**: The French minister for Economic co-operation, Mr \Marcel Debarge arrives in Uganda for talks with President Museveni on the conflict in Rwanda amid reports in the French media that the NRA was actively backing RPF. France appeals to the UN to intervene in the civil war in Rwanda due to its international character. RPF is implicated in reprisal killings of more than one hundred people especially in the Hutu areas of Ruhengeri. RPF denies the reports.

1993	**March 7**: Ceasefire signed in Dar-es-Salaam. **March 8**: The international investigation team publishes report condemning human rights violations in Rwanda. Belgium recalls her ambassador and other European countries threaten sanctions. **April 7**: The Rwandan government acknowledges the report but denies both the existence of 'death squads' and that some of these incidents were planned in advance. **June 9**: A protocol is signed in Arusha, Tanzania, in regard to the repatriation of refugees and the reinstallation of displaced people. **June**: Melchior Ndadaye wins presidential elections in Burundi and becomes the first Hutu president of Burundi. **August**: At Arusha in Tanzania, following months of negotiations, Habyarimana agrees to power sharing with the Hutu opposition and the RPF. He also agrees to integrate the RPF into a new Rwandan army, giving the guerrillas almost half the positions among officers and men. The presidential guard was to be merged with elite RPF troops into a smaller republican guard. 2,500 UN troops are subsequently deployed in Kigali to oversee the implementation of the accord. **October**: President Ndadaye of Burundi assassinated in a Military coup by Tutsi officers and it sets off a spiral of ethnic violence. **October 5**: UN Security Council Resolution 872 authorises the creation of UNAMIR with 2,500 soldiers and military observers to be provided from among 23 countries. **November 1**: UNAMIR starts to deploy. **December 28**: The RPF arrives in Kigali.
1993-1994	**September 1993 to March 1994**: President Habyarimana stalls on setting up of power-sharing government. Training of militias intensifies. Extremist radio station, Radio Mille Collines, begins broadcasting exhortations to attack the Tutsis. Human rights groups warn the international community of impending calamity.
1994	**February**: Felicien Gatabazi, Public Works and Energy Minister and general secretary of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), is killed by gunmen. Tension builds. **February**: Revenge killing of Gatabazi's opponent, Martien Bucyana — lynched by a mob in Butare. At least 37 people die in violence in Kigali. **March**: Many Rwandan human rights activists evacuate their families from Kigali, believing massacres are imminent. **March 11**: Tanzanian Foreign Minister arrives in Kigali in an attempt to install a transitional government. **March 15**: Leader of the opposition Liberal Party and four others killed in a blast that destroys their car. **March 16**: The UN say Rwanda requires 115,000 tons of cereal in 1994 with immediate need of 67,000 tons for drought victims, displaced persons, and 261,000 Burundi refugees, mainly Hutu. **April 5**: The UN Security Council renews UNAMIRs mandate for four months — now has 20,539 military personnel from 24 countries. **April 5**: Security Council Resolution 909 extends the UNAMIR mandate until July 29. **April 6**: President Habyarimana and President Ntaryamira (Burindi) killed in a plane accident as they return to Kigali from a peace conference in Tanzania. Also killed are two Burundi ministers, five senior Rwandan officials and the plane's French crew. A Belgian military investigative team concluded the jet was hit by rockets similar to those used by the Rwandan army — later is said possibly by Habyarimana's 600 strong Palace Guard. **April 6**: (*As above — slight variation*) President Habyarimana and the president of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, are killed when Habyarimana's plane is shot down as it comes in to land at Kigali Airport. Extremists, suspecting that the president is finally about to implement the Arusha Peace Accords, are believed to be behind the attack. That night the killing begins.

1994	**April 7**: The presidential Guards kill the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwiliniyimana and several leading opposition figures. Troops and militia men go on the rampage in Kigali and are joined by gangs of youths attacking Tutsi and moderate Hutu, with machetes, clubs and firearms. **April 7**: The Rwandan armed forces and the Interahamwe set up roadblocks and go from house to house killing Tutsis and moderate Hutu politicians. Thousands die on the first day. UN forces stand by while the slaughter goes on. They are forbidden to intervene, as this would breach their 'monitoring' mandate. **April 8**: The RPF launches a major offensive to end the genocide and rescue 600 of its troops surround in Kigali. The troops had been based in the city as part of the Arusha Accords. **April 9**: Belgian and French paratroopers arrive in Kigali to evacuate expatriates. **April 12**: Beginning of the battle for Kigali between the government forces and the RPF. Tutsis are victims of massacres throughout the country. **April 21**: The UN cuts the level of its forces from 2,500 to 250 following the murder of ten Belgian soldiers assigned to guard the moderate Hutu prime minister, Agathe Uwiligyingimana. The Belgians were disarmed, tortured and shot and hacked to death. They had been told not to resist violently by the UN force commander, as this would have breached their mandate. **April 30**: The UN Security Council spends eight hours discussing the Rwandan crisis. The resolution condemning the killing omits the word 'genocide'. Had the term been used, the UN would have been legally obliged to act to 'prevent and punish' the perpetrators. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of refugees flee into Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire. In one day 250,000 Rwandans, mainly Hutus fleeing the advance of the RPF, crossed the border into Tanzania. **May 17**: As the slaughter of the Tutsis continues the UN finally agrees to send 6,800 troops and police officers to Rwanda with powers to defend civilians. A fresh Security Council resolution says 'acts of genocide may have been committed'. The United States government forbids its spokespersons to use the work 'genocide'. Deployment of the mainly African UN forces is delayed because of arguments over who will pay the bill and provide the equipment. The United States argues with the UN over the cost of providing heavy armoured vehicles for the peacekeeping forces. **May 17**: Security Council Resolution 918 calls for an end to hostilities, a ceasefire, and the end of the massacres. The UNAMIR mandate is extended in order to protect people and areas under threat and increases the force to a maximum of 5,500 (UNAMIR II). **May 21**: The Human Rights Commission unanimously adopts a softly worded resolution, which states that acts of genocide may have been committed, and authorises a Special *Rapporteur* to carry out an inquiry.

ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY BIZIMUNGU PASTEUR, PRESIDENT OF RWANDA, AT THE SWEARING-IN CEREMONY, KIGALI, 19TH JULY 1994

Your Excellency the Vice-President of Rwanda,
The Right Honourable Prime Minister of Rwanda,
The Right Honourable Prime Minister of Uganda,
Honourable Chairman of the Rwanda Patriotic Front,
Honourable Ministers,
Your Excellency, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General,
Excellencies,
Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen.

From April 6th 1994, our country, Rwanda, was plunged in bloodbath. The cause was a pre-planned, well thought out plot, which was carried out in cold blood with professionalism. Pre-meditated large-scale massacres have been committed by the MRND Party, its militia, part of the army, the CDR party and other extremist factions.

The victims are Tutsis in the genocide that took place; others are opposition members and their families. These are crimes against humanity. At least 500,000 people have been killed. There have been obviously some survivors, thanks to the heroic action of the RPA. I take this solemn occasion to congratulate in public the forces of the Rwanda Patriotic Army. In remembrance of the victims, and of the brave sons and daughters of our motherland who gave their lives to stop the tragedy, I request this gathering here and the entire nation to stand up and observe some moments of silence ... Thank you!

The authors of this tragedy proudly claim responsibility for their daring crimes, as natural acts in accordance with their philosophy. You have heard them, you have seen them, you will see them. They have no regrets. The MRND system and its leaders had been at it before. As far back as 1972-1973, President Habyarimana had organised ethnic massacres, which he subsequently used as a pretext to make a military coup. The bloodshed of innocents not involved in politics served thus as a platform to seize power. He claimed also on the day of the coup that he had acted in self-defence, against the then rulers who wanted to kill him and his colleagues and to plunge the country into chaos. To this day, more that 20 years after that episode, no one has been able to establish a single proof on the subject.

Assassinations and lies have been powerful levers of the MRND regime throughout it reign. The leadership of the First Republic having lost power, with its men reduced to nothingness; the horror series could have stopped there. But President Habyarimana found it necessary to eliminate physically, one by one, all former leaders of the First Republic coming from the South. He could not relent before exterminating the Southern elite, especially the military whom he considered as potential opponents. The MRND power was born in the bloodshed of one group — the Tutsis — and had to reaffirm itself with the blood of the other group — the Hutus. All ethnic groups were affected. Everyone knew more or less from the start that the MRND regime was guilty of abominable crimes. For the sake of their comfort, all preferred to keep silent in complicity.

The regime's grip on power, the cowardice of many of our compatriots and the silence of the international community combined to give a seal of approval to that situation which, on the contrary, called for clear condemnation.

In 1972 – 1973, the world which is used to taking lightly the misfortunes that befall us, intoned the same old chorus with a litany of stale clichés: Tutsi lords are paying with their blood the price of their greatness at the hands of angry Hutus. These absurd prejudices could in no way help.

No genocide and related crimes would have taken place if the atrocities of 1972 – 1973 and assassinations in subsequent years had been condemned. The killers of that period, practically the same ones in current time, came to believe that the world would always close its eyes on new atrocities or that the Rwandans would always give in to intimidation. They were not wrong altogether. The RPF struggle against the MRND regime, coupled with the challenge from FDC (Democratic Forces for Change), would have long ago defeated that regime. But the international community imposed arrangements for power sharing in which MRND could not find any guarantees. Then that regime opted to carry to the end its criminal logic by panning the apocalypse. Those people showed many times, particularly through inconsiderate demands for a general amnesty, that their criminal past could not in their view deserve forgiveness, which made necessary their self-imposition by force.

Between 1980 and 1990, the regime continued to carry out small-scale killings as dictated by circumstances in a bid to achieve nearly total subjugation of the people. The victims included again mostly Southerners, such as Dr. Muganza (former Minister), Father Sindambiwe (Priest Journalist), Madame Nyiramutarambirwa (former Parliamentarian), etc. But they also included some prominent figures from the North; men like Lt. Col. Baliyanga, Col. Mayuya, without forgetting the long list of those thrown into prison, after fabricated cases, to suffer inhuman conditions for life, unless they managed to escape like Col. Kanyarengwe. The Rwandan people preferred again to compromise with those crimes, each adopting a low profile so as to remain inconspicuous. And since the regime's targets were categorised with ethnic or regional tags, many people hoped that by playing more or less cleverly their cards in that regard, they would manage to stay safe.

In those waves of killings that befell the country between 1980 and 1990, the victims include very few Tutsis. These had generally accepted the pariah status imposed on them by the Government. They had resigned themselves to their fate, as other Rwandans endured theirs. It was during that period, in 1982 to be exact, that the Government used its army to shoot at and refuse entry to fellow Rwandans — most of them refugees — who were expelled from Uganda by President Obote.

The provisions of Article 15 of the universal Declaration of Human Rights state:

> "Everyone has a right to a nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality ..."

This was no longer valid for a certain category of Rwandans, who as everyone knows, were deprived forever of that right. The denial to those Rwandans of the right to a peaceful return to their country — which denial featured in some provisions of the Constitution — was legally, morally and socially unacceptable. The exclusion reflected a policy that was being implemented deftly inside the country.

All this shows that the current genocide and other mass killings are the logical sequence of past practices. They are not a new phenomenon apart, different from what has been happening before. They justify in retrospect the taking up of arms by the RPF to achieve the following:

* To prevent the kind of tragedy that has just befallen our country, while safeguarding forever against its recurrence;
* To guarantee for all Rwandans without distinction the respect of fundamental rights, while ensuring that oppression stops forever.



Map of Rwanda highlighting its geographical position in Africa

Appendix 5

Please answer in French or English

1) Name .....

Are you married? .....

2) Where do you come from? .....

What hobbies do you have? .....

3) Please tell us about the training you have received to become an instructor

4) What part of that training has helped you the most?

5) What part of being an instructor is the hardest?

6) What lessons do you teach?

7) What help would you like from the U.K. instructors?

8) How do you think it will be for <u>you</u> when the Ugandan Trainers leave?

Your answers and photographs will be given to the U.K. instructors who will work with you next year. Please write any other information you would like them to have.

Thank you, Merci, Murakoze.

COLLATION OF RESPONSES FROM QUESTIONNAIRE

Are You Married?	3 Married	7 Single	1 Declined
Age?	1 age 24		10 Declined
Where Do You Come From?	4 Kigali 1 Butare	4 Gisenyi 1 Kibungo	1 Ruhengeri
What Are Your Hobbies?	4 Sport, e.g. Football, Karate and Basketball. 1 Declined Lectures and Films Music Traditional Rwandan dancing Listening to the radio Writing letters and exchanging photographs		

Please Tell Us What Training You Have Received To Become An Instructor?

In Gishali we had the basic training under which we trained in physical exercises, scientific police, traffic police, some Rwandan law, professional ethics, service at the police station. In EGENA (*Gendarmerie Police Training Centre*) we underwent a special course for eight weeks and studied, scientific police traffic police, maintenance of order and Human Rights.

The instruction that we had; scientific police techniques, traffic police, the maintenance of order and professional codes of ethics.

Traffic control, maintenance of order, scientific police techniques, police administration, judicial police, prisoners' rights (both general and special), prison procedures and service of the community. After the first course here at Gishali I went on a second course for two months at EGENA where I specialised traffic police, maintenance of order, scientific police techniques.

Basic police training at Gishali consisting of scientific police techniques, maintenance of order, police administration, morale, prisoners' rights (both general and special), physical exercise. After then we went on a special course at EGENA in Ruhengeri for instructors. I specialised in police scientific techniques, traffic control, maintenance of order and Human Rights.

I went on studies for five months at Gishali, after that I went to EGENA (Ruhengeri), for specialist training in instruction. I covered maintenance of order, traffic control, police scientific techniques, Human Rights, police administration, professional codes of ethics, service of the community, judicial police, the rights of prisoners (both general and special) and prison procedure.

I underwent the basic training to be a communal police officer here in the prefecture (*similar to a County*) Kibungo in the commune of Muhazi, in the sector of Gishali, here I carried out physical exercise, the maintenance of order, police administration, police judicial, traffic control, police scientific techniques, history of our Country, professional codes of ethics and Human Rights. After this we went to Ruhengeri to the EGENA for a special course by the Germans.

The training I have had to be an instructor the maintenance of order, traffic control, police scientific techniques, service of the community, Human Rights, professional codes of ethics and judicial police.

I had five months basic training at Gishali plus two months of specialisation in instruction at Ruhengeri EGENA. I covered traffic control, police scientific techniques, maintenance of order, professional codes of ethics, police administration, Human Rights, the judicial police, the rights of prisoners, general and special and prison procedures.

My studies included four months in basic studies and then two months on a special course, we studied the police scientific techniques, police administration, traffic control, judicial police, the rights of prisoners special and general, the maintenance of order, the history of the police, Human Rights and sport.

We had basic training to be a police officer and classes on how to be a police instructor. We had the basic studies here at Gishali at the National School of Police for five months our studies included, the maintenance of order, traffic control, judicial police, the rights of prisoners special and general and police scientific techniques. After that we left Gishali and went to EGENA the school for the National Gendarmerie for experiences with the Germans.

What Part Of That Training Has Helped You The Most?

Rwanda law and international laws as stated in the international conventions. These help the police force in general as they continue the work of protection of life and property.

The basic course, all of the course, was very important for me.

The important parts for me were the scientific police and the maintenance of order.

For me the interesting parts were police scientific police techniques.

Professional codes of ethics.

The lesson that helped the most was the professional codes of ethics

The part of the course which helped me the most was Human Rights.

It was professional codes of ethics.

The bit I liked was the maintenance of order.

The course which for me was indispensable was the scientific police, police administration and the professional codes of ethics.

What Part Of Being An Instructor Is The Hardest?

The beginning of the course is hardest. Getting used to a new kind of life that is being initiated into police force from a civilian life.

The lesson which I find most difficult is the police scientific techniques, although I like it very much.

Scientific techniques.

Scientific police.

The lesson which I find hardest is physical education.

The lesson which I find hardest is police scientific techniques.

It is not known what part was the most difficult to me.

The lesson which I find most difficult is Human Rights.

It is the police scientific techniques.

No answer given.

The police scientific techniques.

What Lessons Do You Teach?

I teach scientific police and spend much time in translating work - the Uganda team of police instructors use English and I help in translating work.

The lesson which I will teach is the maintenance of order.

The history of the Communal Police in Rwanda.

The maintenance of order.

The police scientific techniques.

I deliver traffic control.

Traffic control and associated regulations.

I give the police scientific techniques.

The material I deliver l'O.P.J. (*the Office of the Judicial Police*) and scientific police.

I deliver the maintenance of order.

No answer given.

Traffic control.

What Help Would You Like From The UK Instructors?

Teaching materials, i.e. overhead projectors, video tapes on police activities from the UK and any other Countries. Text books and other written work on police, international law, materials in maintenance of order. Sports wear.

Materials such as riot shields, riot helmets, and books.

The materials that are very necessary: document case of l'O.P.J., overhead projector, photographic equipment and materials for use by the traffic police.

The materials that we need are accoutrements of instructors, photographic equipment, document case l'O.P.J. and overhead projector.

We need the materials for the use of the scientific police and the document case l'O.P.J.

Document case of the l'O.P.J. and the equipment for the scientific police.

Training in the maintenance of order and provision of basic materials, for example riot shields, helmets and batons.

I require help in court procedure and traffic control.

What I would love is a specialist course on the maintenance of order.

I would like basic instructional materials.

How Do You Think It Will Be For You When The Ugandan Trainers Leave?

They will have left a good work, the police force will live to remember, here in the history of Rwanda.

When the Ugandan instructors leave it will be 'hot and cold' because a great, significant and generous amount of knowledge has been left at the school of police in Gishali.

After the departure of the Ugandan instructors there will be a problem of materials of education and persons capable of using those materials without making mistakes.

After the Ugandan instructors go we will not have a problem showing capability of delivering the lessons .

I am capable of giving the lessons to the standard of the Ugandans.

When the Ugandan instructors leave it will not be too difficult to simulate their instruction.

When the Ugandans leave . . . studies . . . capable . . . . . exempt. (*not readable*)

Your answers will be given to the UK instructors who will work with you next year. Please write any other information you would like them to have.

I would like to correspond with Sally because she has a lot of experience in her career.

I have been a secondary school teacher for five years before I joined the police force.
I would like them to tell me of their experience of training and to provide sports equipment.

Before I became a police officer I was a student.

No answer given.

Before I joined the police service I was in education.

I was a fisherman.

I was in education.

Before I came here I was in charge of the population in my sector.

I was in education.

I was a photographer with the police.

Appendix 6

Workplan Flowchart



Appendix 7

PLAN FOR FOCUS GROUPS

1. Introductions. Debra Willoughby, Chief Inspector Damas, Superintendent Vianney or Ismael, Elisha then Paul.

2. General input by the Research Team on the new National Police Service, its primary objectives and role within the community, i.e. community policing (see Official Gazette Year 39 special n° of 29/6/00) using pictorial flip charts to illustrate the key points. ***Chief Inspector Damas to lead***

3. The Research Team will share their vision, using flip charts, in relation to the Code of Conduct and explain that they need the assistance of the group to achieve the vision, so that it is appropriate to the needs of Rwanda. ***Superintendent Vianney or Constable Ismael to lead***

4. Questions to ascertain where the respondents believe the Police Service are now in relation to their conduct. ***Paul and Elisha to lead***

5. Questions to ascertain where the respondents believe the National Police **should be** in relation to their conduct and ways they believe that can be achieved. ***Paul and Elisha to lead***

6. The Research Team will share their vision in relation to Human Rights using pictorial flip charts to illustrate the key areas that may be covered – i.e. international instruments; the African Charter; Human Rights elements of the Rwandan Constitution; prisoners, women and children's rights) - and explain that they need the assistance of the group to achieve it. ***Debra and Elisha to lead***

7. Questions by the Research Team to ascertain where the respondents believe the Police Service are **now** in relation to Human Rights. ***Debra and Elisha to lead***

8. Questions to ascertain where the respondents believe the National Police **should be** in relation to Human Rights and ways they believe that can be achieved. ***Debra and Elisha to lead***

9. Question time.

N.B. Pictorial Flipcharts were used, as a large percentage of the Rwandan population are unable to read draft copies of the Code of Conduct and Human Rights Training Programmes.

PROPOSED SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS IN ENGLISH AND KINYARWANDA

1) Interviews with Rwanda Police Officers

* What do they understand by 'policing'?
* What steps can be taken to overcome the negative consequences of the widespread participation of Rwanda police officers in genocide? Has there been a systematic effort, to see that former communal police officers, who played a prominent role in the genocide are not currently in service? Apart from isolating individuals, what has been done, and what still needs to be done from a Human Rights perspective, to give the force the institutional ethos that would reverse the legacy of the genocide?
* How do they see their professional role and their role as members of society?
* What kind of day-to-day problems to they confront?
* What type of training do they think they need, in order to have better relations with the public and to ensure that respect for Human Rights is institutionalised and becomes integral to the culture of the Rwanda police force?
* How can an integrated Human Right training programme be designed to improve police community relations at all levels of the force - new recruits, those in need of refresher courses and training of trainers?
* What measures need to be taken so that police officers see the training programme as beneficial, a useful tool that will facilitate their work, and not as an academic exercise, an imposition or a strategy to hamper the exercise of their professional duties and curb their powers?

2) Interviews with Members of the Public

* Do members of the public think that the National Police Force is, on the whole, respectful of their Human Rights?
* If not, what kind of Human Rights violations are most common and how widespread is the problem?
* Do police officers behave more in accordance with the principles of Human Rights than prior to the genocide?
* If so, what are the reasons for the change?
* Do most victims of Human Rights abuses by former police forces complain against these police officers?
* If so, do they feel their complaints were treated in a sympathetic and appropriate manner and the necessary measure taken within a reasonable period?
* If they were dissatisfied with the way their complaints were treated, what are their criticisms?
* If they did not complain at all, why did they fail to do so?
* What can be done to raise public awareness about the responsibilities of the police vis-à-vis the public?
* What can the media do to enhance mutual confidence between the public and the police?

* What can civic organisations - such as women's groups and local Human Rights organisations do to make the force more accountable and responsive to the needs of the public?

* Can displaying posters in public buildings make a difference? If so, what should be the content of those posters?

* What kind of written material, would give greater understanding of the responsibilities of the police towards detainees and towards the public at large?

* How can permanent structures to institutionalise respect for Human Rights in the force be created? What measures need to be taken to ensure that such structures encourage transparency and accountability and give members of the public the confidence to lodge complaints without fear of reprisals?

* What kind of effective internal disciplinary procedures need to be adopted, so that the public believes that abusive and or corrupt police officers will be punished in an effective manner?

3) Interviews with Detainees

* How do detainees perceive the police?

* Do they respect the existing safeguards for the lawful arrest of suspect?

* If not, how widespread is the problem? In particular, is torture common?

* Do detainees feel that there is a structure in place for lodging complaints, against the police who resort to violence or who abuse the established procedures for arrest of suspects?

4) Interviews with Other Branches of the Government

* What is your role within the Government?

* What are the Human Rights implications for your role?

* What experiences do you have of Human Rights issues in the police service?

* How well do the police forces interact with other agencies?

* What do préfets, bourgmestres, councillors and judicial police inspectors think should be done to enhance the Human Rights training of the police with whom they work?

Translation of questions into Kinyarwanda follows on next 3 pages.

INTERIVIYU IGENEWE ABAPOLISI BO MU GIPOLISI CY'URWANDA

1. Bumva bate '**Policing**' aribyo bisobanura: Imirimo y'ibanze umupolisi ashinzwe gukora yose.

2. Ni izihe ngamba zishobora gufatwa kugira ngo ishusho mbi Igipolisi cy'u Rwanda cyahawe n'uruhare cyagize mw'itsembatsemba n'itsembabwoko rikosorwe n'ingaruka mbi z'urwo ruhare zihanagurike?

   Hari ingamba zafashwe kugirango Abapolisi bamwe bo mu Gipolisi cya cyera bagize uruhare mw'itsembatsemba n'itsembabwoko babe batahurwa, bakurwe mu gipolisi cy'ubu, niba barimo kandi niba batarimo babuzwe kukinjiramo?

   Uretse kuba umuntu (Umupolisi) wagize uruhare mu itsembatsemba n'itsembabwoko yahabwa akato, ntavange n'abapolisi bazima, niki kindi cyakozwe cyangwa niki kindi gikwiriye gukorwa hakurikijwe uburenganzira bw'ikiremwamuntu kugirango Igipolisi kigire amatwara n'imikorere byagishoboza kurwanya ibishamikiye ku bintu byose bifite aho bihuriye n'imitekerereze y'itsembatsemba n'itsembabwoko n'ingaruka zabyo?

3. Abapolisi babona bate uruhare bafite muri Sosiyete Nyarwanda

   a) birebye ku ruhande rw'akazi bakora kandi bigiye?

   b) birebye nka rubanda, nk'Abanyarwanda bari mu bandi Banyarwanda?

4. Ingorane Abapolisi bakunze guhura nazo mu kazi kabo ka buri munsi ni izihe?

5. Kugirango abapolisi bagire umubano mwiza n'abaturage kurusha n'uwo baba bafitanye ubu?

   Bahabwa inyigisho ki cyangwa amahugurwa ki kugirango uburenganzira bw'ikiremwamuntu bwubahirizwe, kandi imikorere y'igipolisi cy'u Rwanda ibigendereho nk'ihame n'umuco bigomba kugenderwaho buri munsi?

6. Hashobora gukorwa iki kugirango Porogaramu yihariye irebana n'uburenganzira bw'ikiremwamuntu ikorwe, itunganywe kandi ishyirwe muri gahunda z'amahugurwa, n'inyigisho zihabwa abapolisi kugirango bagire imibanire n'imikoranire myiza n'abaturage kurusha n'uko bimeze ubu, n'ahabaye ikosa hakosorwe kandi ku buryo uwo mugambi wafata ku nzego z'abapolisi zose-abakinjizwa mu Gipolisi, abifuza guhabwa amahugurwa yatuma barushaho gukora akazi kabo neza cyangwa mu gihe habayeho kwigisha, guhugura abazigisha, abazahugura abandi (kwigisha abarimu)?

7. Hafatwa ngamba ki kugirango Abapolisi babone amahugurwa yabahwa nk'ikintu kibafitiye akamaro, nk'igikoresho k'ingirakamaro kizajya kibafasha mu kazi kabo ka buri munsi, batayafashe nk'inyigisho zo mu bitabo zityaza ubwenge gusa, kandi ku buryo batafata aya mahugurwa, inyigisho nk'ikintu cyazanywe kugirango gikoreshwe mu kubagabanyiriza imbaraga n'ubushobozi basanganywe mu kazi kabo ka buri munsi?

INTERIVIYU IGENEWE GUHABWA ABATURAGE
(Abantu batari mu Gipolisi)

1. Abaturage cyangwa abo twakwita rubanda rwa giseseka babona igipolisi bate?

   Babona Igipolisi cy'Igihugu cyubahiriza uburenganzira bw'ikiremwamuntu?
   Niba ariko babibona se, byashyirwa ku ruhe rugero?

2. Niba atariko babibona se, ni ibiki bikunze gukorwa (ni uburenganzira ki bukunze gukandamizwa)? Niba izo ngorane ziriho se, umuntu yavuga ko zikorwa cyane, henshi kandi kenshi?

3. Abapolisi b'iki gihe batandukanye bate n'abari bariho mu gihe cya mbere y'itsembatsemba n'itsembabwoko mu mikorere yabo? Mu mikorere yabo haba harangwamo amatwara yubahiriza uburenganzira bw'ikiremwamuntu kurusha uko abambere y'itsembatsemba n'itsembabwoko babikoze?

4. Niba hagaragara ubwubahirize bw'uburenganzira bw'ikiremwamuntu kurusha mbere y'itsembatsemba n'itsembabwoko, ni izihe mpamvu zaba zarabiteye?

5. Abaturage baba bararenganyijwe, bakavutswa uburenganzira bwabo n'Abapolisi bamwe bo mu gihe cya mbere y'itsembatsemba n'itsembabwoko? Babyitwaramo bate muri iki gihe, bajya bitotombera cyangwa bakarega ababarenganyije icyo gihe cyangwa ntacyo bavuga?

6. Niba hari abajya barega cyangwa barigeze kurega, babase babona ko, cyangwa barabonye ko ibirego byabo byitaweho bigafatirwa ingamba zikwiriye kandi mu gihe kitarambiranye?

7. Niba hari abumva ko hari ukuntu uko ariko kose ibirego byabo bititaweho neza ngo bikemurwe neza, niki bajya bavuga kitakozwe neza, cyangwa mu yandi magambo bagaya iki mu migenzereze y'abagombaga kubakemurira ibibazo?

8. Niba hari ababa baravukijwe uburenganzira bwabo, ariko ntibatange ibirego mu nzego zibishinzwe ngo zibarenganure, icyaba cyarabateye kutabikora niki?

9. Hakorwa iki kugirango abaturage barusheho gusobanukirwa ibyo bateze ku bapolisi mu rwego rw'imirimo Umupolisi ashinzwe kubakorera?

10. Itangazamakuru ryakora iki kugirango ubwunvikane hagati y'abaturage n'igipolisi burusheho gushimangirwa?

11. Imiryango idaharanira inyungu kandi yashinzwe n'abaturage yakora iki kugirango Igipolisi kirusheho gukorana umurava, no gukora bazi ko nibakora nabi bazabibazwa kandi bakihatira no gutega abaturage amatwi, bakanabakemurira ibibazo ?

    Urugero rw'iyo miryango ni nk'amashyirahamwe y'abagore n'imiryango yashinzwe n'Abanyarwanda ubwabo kugirango iharanire uburenganzira bw'ikiremwamuntu.

12. Inyandiko n'ibishushanyo bifite ubutumwa ku birebana n'uburenganzira bw'ikiremwamuntu bigiye bimanikwa mu mazu ahurirwamo n'abantu benshi hari icyo byafashaho? Hari icyahindukaho? Niba hari icyahinduka, ibyaba bikubiye muri ubwo butumwa ni ibiki? (ni ngingo ki?).

13. Kugirango abagororwa cyangwa abaturage barusheho gusobanukirwa ibyo abapolisi bashinzwe kubakorera, hakoreshwa inyandiko ziteye gute? Zikubiyemo ibihe bitekerezo?

14. Hashobora gukorwa iki kugirango uburenganzira bw'ikiremwamuntu bucengezwe mu Gipolisi nk'ihame bagomba kugenderaho mu mikorere yabo, nk'inkingi bagomba guhora biyegamiza mu mikorere yabo? Hafatwa ngamba ki kugirango hashyirweho uburyo buhamye kandi buzaramba bwatuma ubwo bwubahirize bw'ikiremwamuntu bucengezwa mu Gipolisi? Ni izihe ngamba zikwiriye gufatwa kugirango ubwo buryo bwaba bwashyizweho butere abapolisi gukorana umurava, gukorera mu mucyo no gukora batagamije kugira ibyo banyereza, ahubwo bagakora bazi ko nihagira amakosa azabonekaho bazasabwa kwisobanura ku babishinzwe? Hakorwa iki kugirango ubwo buryo bwashyizweho burusheho gutera abaturage umwete wo kumva ko ari uburenganzira bwabo bwo kubaza impamvu barenganyijwe aha n'aha nta gutinya ngo niba babikoze birabazanira ingaruka mbi?

15. Hakorwa iki mu Gipolisi mu rwego rwo kubungabunga Discipline (kubahiriza ibigomba kwubahirizwa) kugirango abaturage bemere ko abapolisi babi babatuka n'abakora ibyo bakagombye kudakora bose bafatirwa ingamba bagahanwa mu buryo bukwiriye, butajenjetse?

IBIBAZO BYAHABWA ABAGORORWA

1. Abagororwa babona bate Igipolisi ? Bagitekerezaho iki ?

2. Abapolisi iyo bajya gufata umuntu ukekwaho icyaha, babikora mu buryo bwubahirije amategeko ?

3. Niba batabikora nk'uko bikwiriye, uko guca ku mategeko agenga imifatire y'umuntu ucyekwaho icyaha gukorwa kenshi na kenshi ? Gukorerwa henshi mu Gihugu ? Abagororwa n'abafatwa kubera gukekwaho icyaha bafatwa bate ? Bakunze gukubitwa no kubabazwa ?

4. Abagororwa bajya babona ko hari inzego bashobora kwiyambaza mu gihe abapolisi babarenganyije bakabafata bunyamaswa, bakoresha imbaraga zirenze izikwiriye, cyangwa bakirengagiza uburyo buzwi busanzwe bukoreshwa mu gihe bagiye gufata ucyekwaho icyaha ?

IBIBAZO BIGENEWE IZINDI NZEGO Z'UBUTEGETSI.

1. Polisi ikorana ite, isabana ite mu mikorere yayo mu gihe bibaye ngombwa ko yiyambaza n'ibindi bigo cyangwa nabyo bikaza biyigana ?

2. Ba Perefe, ba Burugumesitiri, ba Konseye n'abagenzuzi b'ubucamanza (IPJ) batekereza ko hakorwa iki kugirango ubwubahirize bw'ikiremwamuntu mu Gipolisi binyujijwe mu nyigisho n'amahugurwa ahabwa abo bapolisi bababakorana.

PROPOSED RWANDA NATIONAL POLICE (RNP) CODE OF CONDUCT

Introduction

The legislation governing the police is now generally contained within the National Police Act 2000, which makes provision for the establishment, general organisation and jurisdiction of the RNP. Article 11 of which states that:

> 'Every police officer shall perform his/her duties in a manner that is reasonable, and when he/she acts unreasonably or with negligence he/she shall be liable to punishment.'

This Code of Conduct has been produced as a direct result of Article 11, in order to:

identify unreasonable or negligent acts;

identify suitable punishments for those acts;

ensure that punishments do not violate an officer's human rights and

set out specific procedures for investigating complaints about an officer's conduct.

To ensure that the Code of Conduct also fulfils the needs of the community, a countrywide consultation process was carried out throughout every Préfecture in Rwanda. It sought the opinions, feelings and ideas of over 7,000 respondents in both the community and the RNP.

Whilst the Code of Conduct is written under the authority of the National Police Act, it is not a law in itself. It is an internal instrument for use by the RNP, in order to encourage and maintain appropriate conduct by their personnel. Officers who commit offences under the Code of Conduct do not necessarily break the law. However, they can be investigated and punished by their police supervisors for such breaches.

If an officer commits a criminal offence, it is probable that senior RNP personnel will direct that officer to be dealt with by the law, i.e. the Rwandan Penal Code. However, if that officer is found guilty by the Courts, they will have also breached Article 16 of the Code of Conduct, which states that: 'Criminal conduct is committed when a member of the National Police Service has been found guilty by a court of law of a criminal offence'. Therefore that officer is liable to punishment under both the Penal Code and the Code of Conduct. The latter punishment is usually dismissal.

It is recognised that the majority of RNP personnel work effectively and efficiently in order to provide a high quality of equitable service delivery to the Rwandan community. This Code of Conduct has been created to support and guide that ethos, not to ignore or undermine it. The dedication and hard work of those officers is valued and appreciated by the Government, RNP management and all good thinking Rwandan people.

The International Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials

In support of the provisions of the National Police Act 2000 and the wishes of the community, The International Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials has also been incorporated into the offences contained within the Rwandan Code of Conduct.

Senior officers of the RNP should be familiar with the International Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, which in brief summary, covers such issues as the duties of all officers to:

Uphold human rights and protect human dignity.

Use the minimum force necessary to carry out their lawful duties, within the principles of proportionality.

Only use firearms as an extreme measure and report such use.

Maintain confidentiality in all cases, unless the performance of lawful duty or the needs of justice strictly require otherwise.

Refrain from inflicting, instigating or tolerating torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Never cite superior orders or exceptional circumstances as a justification for torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Secure medical attention for the victims of violations of law.

Protect the health of detainees.

Never commit acts of corruption and rigorously oppose and combat such acts.

Code of Conduct Offences

The Police Code of Conduct 2000 provides that a member of the RNP commits an offence against discipline if he/she commits any of the offences set out below.

* Discreditable conduct.
* Misconduct towards a member of the RNP.
* Disobedience to orders.
* Neglect of duty.
* Falsehood or prevarication.
* Improper disclosure of information.
* Corrupt or improper practice.
* Abuse of authority, including the use of a firearm other than allowed for under the National Police Act 2000.
* Ethnically, or any other, discriminatory behaviour.
* Neglect of health.
* Improper dress or untidiness.
* Damage to police property and misuse of police resources.
* Drunkenness.

* Drinking on duty or soliciting drink.

* Entering premises where intoxicating liquor is consumed or betting and gaming takes place.

* Criminal conduct.

* Being an accessory to a disciplinary offence.

1) Discreditable conduct is committed:

a) when a member of the RNP acts in a disorderly manner, or any manner prejudicial to discipline or reasonably likely to bring discredit on the reputation of the Service.

2) Misconduct towards a member of the RNP is committed, when:

a) the conduct of a member of the RNP toward another such member is oppressive or abusive, or

b) a member of the RNP assaults another such member.

3) Disobedience to orders is committed, when a member of the RNP, without good and sufficient cause:

a) disobeys or neglects to carry out any **lawful** order, written or otherwise;

b) fails to comply with any requirement of a code of conduct/practice for the time being in force under any law, regulation or Presidential Order;

c) contravenes any provision in police regulations/instruments containing restrictions on the private lives of members of the RNP, or requiring him/her to notify the Chief Officer of police that he/she, or a relation included in his/her family, has a business interest within the meaning of those regulations/instruments.

4) Neglect of duty is committed, when a member of the RNP, without good and sufficient cause:

a) neglects, or omits to attend to, or carry out with due promptitude and diligence, anything which it is his/her duty as a member of the RNP to attend to or carry out, or

b) fails to work his/her area in accordance with orders, or leaves the place of duty to which he/she has been ordered, or having left his/her place of duty for an authorised purpose fails to return thereto without undue delay, or

c) is absent without leave for, or is late for, any duty, or

d) fails properly to account for, or to make a prompt and true return of, any money or property received by him/her in the course of his/her duty, or

e) fails to maintain records as required by the National Police Act 2000.

5) Falsehood or prevarication is committed, when a member of the RNP:

a) knowingly, or through neglect, makes any false, misleading or inaccurate oral or written statement or entry in any record or document made, kept or required for police purposes, or

b) either wilfully and without proper authority, or through lack of due care, destroys or mutilates any record or document made, kept or required for police purposes, or

c) without good and sufficient cause alters or erases or adds, to any entry in such a record or document, or

d) has knowingly, or through neglect, made any false, misleading or inaccurate statement in connection with his/her appointment to the RNP.

6) Improper disclosure of information is committed, when a member of the RNP:

a) without proper authority communicates to any person, any information which he/she has in his/her possession as a member of the RNP.

7) Corrupt or improper practice is committed, when a member of the RNP:

a) in his/her capacity as a member of the RNP and without the appropriate consent of his/her senior officer, directly or indirectly, solicits or accepts any gratuity, present or subscription, or

b) places him/herself under a pecuniary obligation to any person in such a manner as might affect him/her to carry out his/her duties as a member of the RNP, or

c) improperly uses, or attempts so to use, his/her position as a member of the RNP for his/her private advantage, or

d) in his/her capacity as a member of the RNP and without the consent of his/her senior officer writes, signs or gives a testimonial of character or other recommendation with the object of obtaining employment for any person or of supporting an application for the grant of a licence of any kind.

8) Abuse of authority is committed, when a member of the RNP treats any person with whom he/she may be brought into contact in the execution of his/her duty in an oppressive manner and without prejudice to the foregoing, in particular where he/she:

a) uses a firearm other than allowed for under Articles 39-41 of the National Police Act 2000, or

b) commits any Human Rights violations as laid down in international and national declarations, conventions and the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, or

c) without good and sufficient cause conducts a search or requires a person to submit to any test or procedures, or makes an arrest, or

d) uses any unnecessary violence towards any prisoner or any other person with whom he/she may be brought into contact in the execution of his/her duty, or improperly threatens any such person with violence, or

e) is abusive or uncivil to any member of the public.

9) Ethnically or any other discriminatory behaviour is committed, (without prejudice to the commission of any other offence) where a member of the RNP:

a) while on duty, on the grounds of another person's race; nationality; birthplace; ethnic, regional or national origins, acts towards that other person in any such way as is mentioned in paragraph 8 (abuse of authority), or

b) in any other way, on any of those grounds, treats improperly a person with whom he/she may be brought into contact while on duty.

10) Neglect of health is committed when a member of the RNP:

a) wilfully, or through lack of due care, commits any act or adopts any conduct that is harmful to his/her health **and** renders him/herself unfit through that act or conduct for duties that he/she is, or will be, required to perform, or which he/she may reasonably foresee having to perform.

b) without good and sufficient cause, neglects to carry out any instructions of a medical officer appointed by the RNP or, while absent from duty on account of sickness, commits any act or adopts any conduct calculated to retard his/her return to duty.

11) Improper dress or untidiness is committed:

a) when without good and sufficient cause a member of the RNP while on duty, or while off duty but wearing uniform in a public place, is improperly dressed, including if their uniform does not indicate the officer's name, rank and registration number or is untidy in his/her appearance.

12) Damage to police property or misuse of police resources is committed, when a member of the RNP:

a) wilfully or through lack of due care causes any waste, loss or damage to any such police property, or

b) fails to report as soon as is reasonably practicable any loss of or damage to any such property issued to, or used by him/her, or entrusted to his/her care.

13) Drunkenness is committed:

a) when a member of the RNP renders him/herself unfit through drink for duties that he/she is, or will be, required to perform, or which he/she may reasonably foresee having to perform.

14) Drinking on duty or soliciting drink is committed, where a member of the RNP, while on duty:

a) without proper authority or good cause, drinks, or receives from any other person, any intoxicating liquor, or

b) demands, or endeavours to persuade any other person to give him/her or to purchase or obtain for him/herself any intoxicating liquor.

15) Entering premises where intoxicating liquor is consumed or betting and gaming takes place is committed where a member of the RNP:

a) while on duty, or

b) while off duty but wearing uniform,

without **good and sufficient cause**, enters any premises in respect of which a licence or permit has been granted in pursuance of the law relating to liquor licensing or betting and gaming or regulating places of entertainment.

16) Criminal conduct is committed:

a) when a member of the RNP has been found guilty by a court of law of a criminal offence.

17) Being an accessory to a disciplinary offence is committed:

a) when a member of the RNP incites, connives at or is knowingly an accessory to any offence against this Code of Conduct.

1.4 Punishments

The National Police Act 2000 and the community consultation process indicate that any breaches of the Code of Conduct will be punishable by a:

* caution;
* reprimand;
* fine;
* period of community labour;
* reduction in pay;
* transfer;
* reduction in rank;
* requirement to resign;
* dismissal.

When suitable, minor offences can be dealt with by informal resolution (see 1.5.6), as an alternative to formal resolution.

N.B. A reduction in pay or fine should not cause inappropriate or severe hardship. It is imperative that the punishments do not amount to a breach of human rights.

Someone, other than the Chief Officer (or officer acting under delegated authority, such as the Regional or Préfecture Commander), may hear some disciplinary offences - but not those where the punishment is anything other than a reduction in pay, community labour, a fine, a reprimand or caution.

Where officers face the more severe punishments they are entitled to legal representation at their disciplinary hearing.

The Code of Conduct ensures that elements of 'natural justice' are observed in any proceedings, which potentially hold grave professional and personal consequences for officers against whom an allegation is proven. Those elements include giving officers the opportunity to hear the nature and substance of an allegation against them and, similarly, being given an opportunity to present their response. The burden of proof in such cases is 'beyond all reasonable doubt'.

The Code of Conduct procedure is also intended to ensure that complaints are investigated thoroughly and impartially — and are seen to be so. However, it is recognised that complaints against officers are easily made; consequently there may be a need for redress against those who abuse the complaints procedure as a vehicle for their own personal grievances.

Complaints and Discipline

A police officer may appear before their Chief Officer (or officer acting under delegated authority, such as the Regional or Préfecture Commander) if reported for a Code of Conduct disciplinary offence as a result of either an **internal report** or of **a complaint from a member of the public**.

A Chief Officer will be vicariously liable for the civil wrongs of his/her officers committed in the performance (or purported performance) of their duties. This means that the Chief Officer will be responsible for the payment of any damages arising out of a civil action in respect of such a civil wrong.

Complaints

This section includes an examination of the procedures that relate to complaints made against officers from Constable up to and including the rank of . . . *(state highest senior officer's rank that RNP wish to be covered by the Code of Conduct)*

Receiving and Recording Complaints

A 'complaint' is defined below.

A complaint about the conduct of a member of the RNP, which is submitted:

(a) *by a member of the public, or*
(b) *on behalf of a member of the public and with his/her written consent.*

Complaints are therefore generally 'public', that is, made by or on behalf of someone outside the police service. It is not necessary for the complainant to register the complaint personally as it may be referred to the police service by a third party.

None of the procedures set out in the Code of Conduct or the Police Act 2000 apply to any conduct that forms the whole or part of a complaint, where that conduct **has already been** the subject of criminal or Code of Conduct disciplinary proceedings.

1.5.3 Action on Receiving a Complaint

On receiving a complaint the Chief Officer (or officer acting under delegated authority, such as the Regional or Préfecture Commander) has a duty to:

i) Take whatever preliminary steps are necessary to obtain or preserve evidence, e.g. arranging for medical examinations, preservation of fingerprints etc.

ii) Determine whether he/she has the 'appropriate authority' in the case of the officer whose behaviour is the subject of the complaint, i.e. is he/she the correct investigating officer. If he/she is not the relevant officer, he/she must send the complaint to the appropriate officer.

iii) If a Chief Officer determines that he/she is the appropriate authority in relation to an officer whose conduct is the subject of a complaint, he/she must record the complaint.

iv) The Chief Officer must then consider whether the complaint is capable of informal resolution (see paragraph 1.5.6) and may appoint a member of his/her Region/Préfecture to assist.

A complaint is not suitable for informal resolution unless the complainant consents and the investigating officer is satisfied that the conduct, if proved, would not justify criminal or disciplinary proceedings.

v) If it is considered suitable for informal resolution, the Chief Officer must seek to so resolve the complaint and may appoint an officer to assist *(now referred to in this document as the 'appointed officer').*

If, after attempts have been made to resolve a complaint informally, it appears that:

* such resolution is impossible, or

* the complaint is for any other reason not suitable for informal resolution,

the investigating officer must appoint a member of his/her Region/Préfecture to investigate it formally as outlined in vii below.
any officer previously appointed for the informal resolution of a complaint may not be appointed to investigate the same offence formally.

vi) If the complaint is not suitable for informal resolution, the Chief Officer must appoint a member of his/her own Region/Préfecture, or another area to investigate it *(now referred to in this document as the 'investigating officer').* Where the original investigating officer makes such a request to another officer, the latter must comply with the request. The investigation will involve such actions as interviewing the officer who is subject to the complaint or disciplinary action and any witnesses, and the examination of physical evidence.

vii) The investigating officer's report will be sent to the original appointing investigating officer, unless the Police Council is supervising the investigation, in which case the report will go to them.

The Police Council

Article 8 of the National Police Act 2000 provides for the establishment of a Police Council. The terms of reference, constitution and administration of the Police Council are set out in that Article, including:

* to exercise general disciplinary control over members of the Force;

* to deal with complaints by members of the public against the Force or its members.

The investigating officer concerned **shall** refer to the Police Council:

a) any complaint alleging that the conduct complained of resulted in the death of, or serious injury to, some other person, and

b) any complaint of a description specified for the purposes of this section in regulations made by the Minister of National Police.

The investigating officer **may** refer to the Police Council:

a) any matter which appears to the appropriate authority to indicate that an officer may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner which would justify disciplinary proceedings, and

b) any matter which is not the subject of a complaint, if it appears to the appropriate authority that it ought to be referred by reason of:

i) its gravity, or

ii) exceptional circumstances.

c) any complaint which is not required to be referred to them if he/she deems it necessary.

The Police Council **shall** supervise the investigation:

a) of any complaint alleging that the conduct of a police officer resulted in the death of or serious injury to some other person, and

b) of any other complaint specified in regulations made by the Minister of National Police.

The Police Council **shall** supervise the investigation:

a) of any complaint if they consider that it is desirable in the public interest that they should supervise that investigation.

Informal Resolution of Complaints

Complaints that must be referred to, or supervised by the Police Council are not suitable for informal resolution.

Appointed Officers

If it is decided that informal resolution is appropriate, the officer initially deputed to handle the complaint may act as the 'appointed officer' and seek an informal resolution. Alternatively, the case might be referred to another officer to undertake the role of appointed officer.

Early Resolution

Supervisory officers of whatever rank should deal speedily with a complaint if it appears to them that it can be resolved in an informal manner at the time it is made.

When a supervisory officer receives a complaint, if the officer complained about is both present and willing to explain his/her understanding of the incident giving rise to the complaint, the supervisory officer may deal with it at the time.

In order to do this, the complainant must accept the explanation given or, if appropriate, any apology as a satisfactory outcome. In such a case the supervisory officer should report the matter to the officer having delegated responsibility for the informal resolution of complaints. If satisfied with the handling of the complaint, that officer may make a record in the complaints register and write to or visit the complainant explaining the way in which the complaint was handled and indicating the intention of recording it as having been informally resolved.

Where it appears to the appointed officer that the resolution of a complaint is likely to be assisted by a meeting between the complainant and the officer concerned — or any other person considered appropriate — then suitable arrangements may be made.

There will be no obligation on the officer who is the subject of the complaint to attend such a meeting.

A meeting may provide an opportunity for the complainant and the officer to exchange views and for any misunderstandings to be cleared up. Where there is an admission to the conduct complained of, it will allow the officer to offer an explanation, or an apology, to the complainant.

Where there has been an attempted or a successful informal resolution of a complaint, no record must be made of it in the personal record of the officer concerned.

If in the course of the informal resolution procedure, evidence comes to light of a more serious complaint, which might require a formal investigation, the informal procedures should be terminated and the matter reported to the investigating officer immediately.

Statements made in the course of an informal resolution are not generally admissible in any subsequent criminal, civil or disciplinary hearing.

Formal Investigation

If a complaint is unsuitable for informal resolution or cannot be so resolved, it must be investigated formally. Once an investigating officer has been appointed, a formal investigation will be carried out. At the conclusion of that investigation the investigating officer will report to the relevant Chief Officer (unless the complaint has been supervised by the Police Council, in which case the report will go to them).

On receiving the report the Chief Officer must take appropriate action as set out in this Code of Conduct. This action involves sending a copy of the report to the Public Prosecutor's Office, unless the report satisfies the Chief Officer that the officer concerned has committed no criminal office. In some circumstances the Chief Officer will also send a copy of the report to the Police Council even if the report is not being sent to the Public Prosecutor's Office, together with a memorandum explaining if he/she is to bring Code of Conduct disciplinary proceedings against the officer, together with reasons for that decision. The Police Council can then advise and direct the Chief Officer in relation to the bringing of those proceedings.

When an officer has been acquitted of a criminal office he/she may not be charged with any offence against Code of Conduct **that is the same** as the offence of which he/she has been acquitted.

Restrictions on Private Lives

The following restrictions are also imposed on the private lives of officers. They are designed **purely** to secure the proper exercise of the functions of an officer.

A member of the RNP:

* Shall at all times abstain from any activity which is likely to interfere with the impartial discharge of his/her duties or which is likely to give rise to the impression amongst members of the public that it may so interfere (this does not include serving as a school governor), and in particular a member of the RNP shall not take any active part in politics.

* Shall not reside at premises that are not for the time being approved by their senior officer.

* Shall not, without the previous consent of their senior officer, receive a lodger in a house or quarters, which the police provide him/her with, or sub-let any part of the house or quarters.

* Shall not wilfully refuse or neglect to discharge any lawful debt.

Business Interests

If a member of the RNP, or a relative included in his/her family, proposes to have, or has, a 'business interest', the member shall forthwith give written notice of that interest to the Senior Officer unless that business interest was disclosed at the time of the officer's appointment as a member of the Service.

On receipt of such a notice, the Senior Officer shall determine whether or not the interest in question is compatible with the member concerned remaining a member of the Service and shall notify the member in writing of his/her decision, within 28 days.

Within 14 days of being notified of the Senior Officer's decision, the member concerned may appeal to the Police Council against that decision by sending written notice to the Police Council.

If a business interest is felt to be incompatible, the Senior Officer may dispense with the member's services after giving them an opportunity to make representations.

For the purposes of such regulations, a member of the RNP or relative has a business interest if:

* the member holds any office or employment for hire or carries on any business;

* a shop is kept or a like business carried on by the member's spouse (not being separated) at any premises, or by any relative living with him/her, or

* the member, his/her spouse (not being separated) or any †relative living with them has a pecuniary interest in any licence or permit granted in relation to liquor licensing, refreshment houses or betting and gaming or regulating places of entertainment.

†*'Relative' includes a reference to a spouse, parent, son, daughter, brother or sister.*

HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINERS' COURSE: STUDENT LIST IN STUDY GROUP FORMAT

Group: INYENYERI

	RANK	NAMES	PREFECTURE	LANGUAGE	EDUCATION
1	Sergeant	BIZIMANA Celestin	Public Order/Sec	French	S.4
2	Corporal	UWIMANIFASHIJE JMV	Kibungo	French	S.5
3	Police Constable	NYAMUHIRWA Tharcisse	Butare	French	S.2
4	Police Constable	RUTISHEREKA MAKUZA	Gishari PTS	French/English	D.6
5	Police Constable	KABERA Emmanuel	Gisenyi	English	S.6

Group: URUMURI

	RANK	NAMES	PREFECTURE	LANGUAGE	EDUCATION
1	Inspector of Police	MURANGIRA Tom	D/Intelligence	English	S.6
2	Chief Sergeant	NDUWAYEZU Vincent	Ruhengeri	French	D.6
3	Corporal	RUDURA Bonaventure	Byumba	French	S.6
4	Police Constable	NTAGANIRA Augustine	Traffic Police	French	S.5
5	Police Constable	KARANGO Anastase	Byumba	French	S.4

Group: INUMA

	RANK	NAMES	PREFECTURE	LANGUAGE	EDUCATION
1	Chief Sergeant	HABIYAMBERE Gerald	Ruhengeri	French	S.6
2	Sergeant	NTABURANA Alexis	D/Admin & Pers	French	S.6
3	Police Constable	NKURANGA Fred	PVK	English	S.6
4	Police Constable	MUNYAMPUNDU Antoine	Butare	French/English	S.6

Group: ABAHUJE

	RANK	NAMES	PREFECTURE	LANGUAGE	EDUCATION
1	A/Insp. of Police	FATA Alex	Butare	English	S.6
2	Chief Sergeant	KALISA Eugene	Gikongoro	French	S.6
3	Sergeant	MUGAMBAGE Viateur	PTS	French	S.6
4	Corporal	KAYINAMURA Muvunyi	D/Intelligence	French	S.6
5	Police Constable	SEBURIKOKO Methode	Gitarama	French	S.6

Group: FIRST-BORN

	RANK	NAMES	PREFECTURE	LANGUAGE	EDUCATION
1	Sergeant	MUNYAMARIBA Gaspard	Kigali Rural	French	S.6
2	Police Constable	NGARUYE Paul	Kibuye	English	S.6
3	Police Constable	NGARUKIYINTWALI Sixbert	PVK	English/French	S.6
4	Police Constable	USENGUMUREMYI Silas	Judicial Police	French	S.6

INSTITUTE OF SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT
HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMA

MODULE 1 PRE-COURSE READING

Candidates will have a copy of the 'International Human Rights Handbook' and, due to language issues, copies of tri-lingual textbooks, i.e.

René De Wolf and Yves De Wolf – Human Rights in Rwandan Law – Handbook of National Law.

René De Wolf and Yves De Wolf – Human Rights in Rwandan Law Handbook of International Conventions.

MODULE 2 TAUGHT/CLASSROOM ELEMENT

Week 1(06/11/00 – 10/11/00) Introduction to the Programme

Thorough introduction to the programme including:

Background and Countrywide consultation (Damas)

Materials – still being developed as a result of the consultation (i.e. this is an important pilot programme) – their views as the programme progresses are **vital** (Debra and Elisha).

Methodology and content (Debra and Elisha) ensuring the group are aware that the first week is primarily on trainer skills, during the second week they will be training Human Rights – **so they need to study and read their Human Rights material in the evenings** – include board-work as below:



Introductions to Each Other

Divide delegates into Study Groups of three persons (ensuring the one is an English Speaker to assist the communication process).

Each Study Group prepares two flipcharts to present to their colleagues containing:

The name of their Study Group.

Their individual names and what they *would like* to be called on the Programme.

What **K**nowledge, **U**nderstanding, **A**ttitudes and **B**ehaviour (**KUSAB**) they can bring to the Programme.

N.B. ***All Trainers*** **as one group (Damas, Paul, Elisha, Ismael and Debra) role model this exercise first and highlight the skills of flip-chart preparation, the use of colour, clear voice, address the whole group etc.**

De-brief

De-brief of each group's basic trainer skills as they present their flip-charts (Debra and Elisha).

Good/Bad Trainer Exercise

Demonstration of poor training skills for five minutes, e.g. walking into flip-chart; not being prepared; continually reading from notes; not looking at group or only looking at one or two of them; shouting; talking too quickly (Paul).

Demonstration of good training skills for five minutes, i.e. the opposite of above (Debra).

De-brief by Damas

What did they notice about the two trainers?

What was good/bad?

Whilst we exaggerated the issues to make our point, what can they learn from it that will assist their roles as Human Rights Trainers?

Good/Bad Trainer Flip-chart Exercise

Debra and Elisha to run this section.

Study Groups join a second group (making six persons) for next exercise only.

The larger groups then discuss the introduction exercise, previous demonstration and their own training experience (as a student and/or instructor).

They then prepare two flip-charts for presentation to their colleagues entitled:

What Makes a Bad Trainer and the ***KUSAB of a Good Trainer?***

The flip charts are then displayed on the wall for the rest of the taught element – for the trainers to aim towards (KUSAB of a good trainer) or avoid doing (What makes a bad trainer).

N.B. As they are presenting Elisha (Advisor/Interpreter) writes the answers in note form for the Training Team's reference.

TRAINING TEAM'S INPUT ON KEY TRAINING MODELS

'Simple to Complex' and 'Small, Simple Steps'

Trainer input on the two short theories (Debra and Elisha)

Domains of Learning: Affective (heart), Cognitive (head) and Psychomotor (hands)

Demonstrations by the Training Team of each domain – at this stage the group will not know the purpose of the demonstrations but they will jot down brief notes about what they have seen and the impact it had on them after each demonstration (introduced by Debra and Elisha).

Cognitive – Elisha has five minutes to explain all the clans to the group, with no visual aids, just their brains. At the end of five minutes, members of the group have to recite as many clans as they can remember.

Psychomotor – Paul has five minutes to teach the group to make a paper model (complicated), with no visual aids, just their hands. At the end of five minutes members of the group have to make the model themselves.

Affective – Debra, Ismael and Elisha act out the Nairobi Airport incident, whilst Damas does a commentary – ensuring that the group know it is a **true** story – the intention is to arouse feelings in the group, such as amusement or anger.

Debrief

Debra and Elisha to run this section.

What happened for you during each demonstration?
Which will be the easiest to remember/learn about?
Which was the hardest to remember/learn about?

Use board work as below:

Final Debrief

What impact do the Domains of Learning have on your role as a Human Rights Trainer?

Key Points – Trainers should use all domains to aid memory, create interest and prevent boredom.

(Debra and Elisha – supported by team)

Further Input on the Cognitive Domain by a Trainer

Board Work as below:



Debrief

What impact does the Cognitive Domain have on your role as a Human Rights Trainer? (Debra)

Transactional Analysis

Trainers' input on the theory of TA. (Debra)

Demonstration by Trainers on floor circles using a play/scenario.

(*Cognitive Domain – Knowledge*)



Divide into Study Groups – each Study Group devises a play/scenario to demonstrate they have understood the model. (*Cognitive Domain – comprehension*)

Debrief

What impact does TA have on your role as a Human Rights Trainer? (*Application*)

Key Points – Trainers should remain in Adult for most functions, but utilise the other ego states at appropriate points – **no ego state is bad** unless overused.

Demonstration of Visual Aids/Methodologies

Ask the Group to call out all the methodologies they have seen during the programme so far (it does not matter if they do not know the correct training term – just in their words). Trainer prepares list on flip chart(s), which will be displayed on the wall for reference. (Damas)

Debrief of Methodologies by Debra and Ismael

Demonstrations/Discussions of the following equipment.

The equipment is set up in various locations and the Study Groups visit each location to obtain instruction and/or practice.

Overhead Projector (OHP). (Damas)

Board/Flipchart. (Ismael)

Video Camera, Television and Player; for their practice sessions debriefs. (Paul)

Plays, including: 'What', So What' and 'Now What', i.e. experiential Learning. (Debra)

Saturday and Week 2 and 3

Overall input on Human rights – explaining how the units of the qualification link to the actual progress of Human rights from International, to Regional, to Domestic Law and instruments. (Input by Debra re progress and qualification, input by Ismael re Domestic Law etc.).

Trainer Input on Lesson Planning (Debra)

Each Study Group takes three of the Articles from the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and prepares a 90-minute presentation on those Articles. The following rules apply:

Trainers (Damas, Ismael and Elisha) will run the first input as an example and in order to obtain their qualification.

All the Study Group **must** take part in the presentation.

It cannot be a simple lecture about the Articles, although this will play a part – try to use a variety of methodologies such as flip charts, OHPs, plays etc. and involve the group.

Consider the Domains of Learning; Knowledge to Application of the Cognitive Domain; Small, Simple Steps; Simple to Complex; Transactional Analysis and everything that was covered in the first week.

The programme will then proceed as follows, some topics may be covered quicker than others, and therefore Study Groups should be ready to present a day earlier or later if required. *If group numbers drop some adjustment may be required.*

N.B. During the first weekend group must complete Exercise 1 from DLP 1 as homework and focus their reading on the International Declaration of Human Rights.

DAY	MORNING	AFTERNOON
Saturday 11/11/00	Articles 1 – 3 and Training Skills Debrief. *All human beings are born free and equal …* *Everyone is entitled to rights and freedoms …* *Everyone has the right to life, liberty …* **Damas, Ismael and Elisha**	Contents of Articles 1 – 3 discussed and relevance to Rwandan Law. Exercises 2 – 5 started (to finish in evening).
Sunday 12/11/00	Free Time	
Monday 13/11/00	Preparation Time	
Tuesday 14/11/00	Articles 4 – 6 and Training Skills Debrief. *No slavery, servitude …* *No torture or cruel, inhuman treatment …* *Right to recognition before the law …*	Contents of Articles 4 – 6 discussed and relevance to Rwandan Law. Exercises 6 – 9 started (to finish in evening).
Wednesday 15/11/00	Articles 7 – 9 and Training Skills Debrief. *Equal before the law …* *The right to effective remedy …* *No arbitrary arrest …*	Contents of Articles 7 – 9 discussed and relevance to Rwandan Law. Exercises 10 – 12 started (to finish in evening).
Thursday 16/11/00	Articles 10 – 12 and Training Skills Debrief. *Entitled to fair and public hearings …* *Presumption of innocence …* *No interference with privacy …*	Contents of Articles 10 – 12 discussed and relevance to Rwandan Law. Exercises 13 – 15 started (to finish in evening).
Friday 17/11/00	Articles 13 – 15 and Training Skills Debrief. *Freedom of movement …* *Right to asylum …* *Right to nationality …*	Contents of Articles 13 – 15 discussed and relevance to Rwandan Law. Exercises 16 – 19 started (to finish in evening).
Saturday 18/11/00	Articles 16 – 18 and Training Skills Debrief. *Right to marry …* *Right to property …* *Right to freedom of thought …*	Contents of Articles 16 - 18 discussed and relevance to Rwandan Law. Exercises 20 – 22 started (to finish in evening).

DAY	MORNING	AFTERNOON
Sunday 19/11/00	Free Time	
Monday 20/11/00	Articles 19 – 21 and Training Skills Debrief. *Freedom of opinion and expression …* *Freedom of peaceful association …* *Right to take part in Government …*	Contents of Articles 19 - 21 discussed and relevance to Rwandan Law. Exercises 23 – 25 started (to finish in evening).
Tuesday 21/11/00	Articles 22 – 24 and Training Skills Debrief. *The right to social security …* *The right to work …* *The right to rest and leisure …*	Contents of Articles 22 – 24 discussed and relevance to Rwandan Law. Exercises 26 - 29 started (to finish in evening).
Wednesday 22/11/00	Articles 25 – 27 and Training Skills Debrief. *The right to a standard of living for health …* *The right to education …* *The right to community cultural life …* Contents of Articles 25 – 27 discussed and relevance to Rwandan Law. Exercises 30 - 32 started (to finish in evening).	Articles 28 – 30 and Training Skills Debrief. *Entitlement to a social and international order …* *Duties to the community …* *Intention of Declaration …* Contents of Articles 28 – 31 discussed and relevance to Rwandan Law. Exercises 33 - 36 started (to finish in evening).

The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda in Relation to Human Rights

Thursday 23/11/00	DLP 1 (Exercise 1 – 22 to be completed) 1 x computer lesson.	Explanation of Exercise 8 and relevant Case Study. 1 x computer lesson. Briefing re session, using play – song – dance – mime etc.
Friday 24/11/00	Preparation time for session.	Muhabura run their session on Articles 19 and 20 including debrief using experiential learning cycle (ELC). Exercises 23 and 24. 1 x computer lesson.
Saturday 25/11/00	Inyenyeli run their session on Articles 21 and 22 including debrief using ELC. Exercises 25 and 26.	First Born run their session on Articles 23 and 24 including debrief using ELC. Exercises 27, 28 and 29. 1 x computer lesson.
Sunday 26/11/00	Free Time	
Monday 27/11/00	Urumuri run their session on Articles 25 and 26 including debrief using ELC. Exercises 30 and 31.	Abahuje run their session on Articles 27 and 28 including debrief using ELC. Exercises 32 and 33. Inuma run their session on Articles 29 and 30 including debrief using ELC. Exercises 34, 35 and 36. 1 x computer lesson.

DAY	MORNING	AFTERNOON
Tuesday 28/11/00	Inputs on any areas of Unit 1 that are still causing confusion. Unit 1 should now be completed – afternoon to ensure any individuals who are behind can catch up. Reading time re African (Banjul) Charter … 1 x computer lesson.	
Wednesday 29/11/00	Input on the way in which human rights instruments can be divided into sections such as '*Freedom from Oppression*'. Each group is given a comparison exercise between the UDHR and the ACHPR to complete and present to their colleagues regarding a specific section **(no more than one hour!)**	Abuhuje presents '*Freedom from Oppression*' which compares Articles 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the UNDHR with Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 20 of the ACHPR. They highlight any similarities and/or differences. Colleagues then complete Exercise 37. 1 x computer lesson.
Thursday 30/11/00	Inuma presents '*Protection by the Law*' which compares Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the UNDHR with Articles 3, 7, 18 and 19 of the ACHPR. They highlight any similarities and/or differences. Colleagues then complete Exercise 38.	Urumuri presents '*Freedom to Move-Rest-Travel*' which compares Articles 13, 14 and 15 of the UNDHR with Article 12 of the ACHPR. They highlight any similarities and/or differences. Colleagues then complete Exercise 39. 1 x computer lesson
Friday 01/12/00	First Born presents '*Freedom to Choose*' which compares Articles 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the UNDHR with Articles 8, 9, 10, 11, 21, 13, 14 and 15 of the ACHPR. They highlight any similarities and/or differences. Colleagues then complete Exercise 40.	Inyenyeli presents '*Freedom to socialise -/Duties*' which compares Articles 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the UNDHR with Articles 22, 24, 16, 17, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 OF THE achpr. They highlight any similarities and/or differences. Colleagues then complete Exercise 41. 1 x computer lesson.
Saturday 02/12/00	Individual work on Distance Learning Packs	
Sunday 03/12/00	Free Time	
Monday 04/12/00	Each group is given one hour to discuss one of the sections of the human rights instruments covered so far, e.g. 'Freedom from Oppression' and 'Protection by the Law'. They then feed back their results, using a flip chart to their colleagues for no more than 30 minutes. The flip charts are retained on the wall to assist with Exercises 42 – 47. 1 x computer lesson.	
Tuesday 05/12/00	Exercises 42 – 47 completed. 1 x computer lesson.	

DAY	MORNING	AFTERNOON
Wednesday 06/12/00	Discussion re Exercises 48 – 53 and completion of same. 1 x computer lesson.	
Thursday 07/12/00	Slippage time to allow any incomplete Exercises to be completed and any other issues to be cleared up. 1 x computer lesson.	
Friday 08/12/00	**Preparation for and meeting with community members to obtain their views on Human Rights, security, safety, access to justice and relevant policing issues. Followed by official closing ceremony.** **Media coverage.**	
Saturday 09/12/00	**Briefing for DLP 2 (Units 3 and 4) and workplace assignments.** **Course Closure.** To include: Debrief of taught element. Briefing for following Modules. Briefing on DLPs 3 and 3. Available telephone support, e.g. Elisha's contact re translation, Ismael re Legal issues and Damas re entire project.	

HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMA PROGRAMME: PHASE 2

PROPOSED TIMETABLE FOR TWO-WEEK REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TEACHING PRACTICE

DAY	MORNING	AFTERNOON
MONDAY **KUWA MBERE**	Introduction to the course and its content, including overview of the *Countrywide consultation.* Introduction by the trainers and the students.	General introduction to international, regional and domestic human rights instruments and how they link to *Rwandan law.* Including UNDHR, *ABCHPR, CRR* and the rights of detainees, women & children.
TUESDAY **KUWA KABIRI**	Introduction to, and background of, the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda. Including the number of Articles that relate to human rights (12 – 32), which will be covered in detail over the following two weeks. **Article 12** *All human beings have a right to life…* Trainer input, followed by an interactive session, during which the students examine, explore and discuss examples – through group exercises or question and answer or any other **activity.**	**Article 13** *No person shall be subjected to security measures except…* Trainer input, followed by an interactive session, during which the students examine, explore and discuss **the security measures that they are responsible for as police officers** – through group exercises or question and answer or any other **activity.**
WEDNESDAY **KUWA GATATU**	**Article 14** *Criminal Liability is personal…defined by law…right to defence…* Trainer input, followed by an interactive session, during which the students examine, explore and discuss **their role as police officers in relation to this Article** – through group exercises or question and answer or any other **activity.**	**Article 15** *The right to asylum…* Brief Trainer input. **Article 16** *All citizens are equal…* Trainer input, followed by an interactive session, during which the students examine, explore and discuss **their role as police officers in relation to this Article** – through group exercises or question and answer or any other **activity.**

THURSDAY KUWA KANE	**Article 17** *All forms of slavery and servitude are prohibited…* Trainer input, followed by **a short** interactive session, during which the students examine, explore and discuss examples – through group exercises or question and answer or any other **activity.** **Article 18** *The right to freedom of religion…* Trainer input, followed by **a short** interactive session, during which the students examine, explore and discuss examples – through group exercises or question and answer or any other **activity.**	Article 19 *Right to freedom of association…* Article 20 *Right to assemble freely…* Trainer input, followed by an interactive session, during which the students examine, explore and discuss examples in relation to **their role as police officers in relation to these two Articles** – through group exercises or question and answer or any other **activity.**
FRIDAY KUWA GATANU	**Article 21** *All citizens have the right to move freely…* Trainer input, followed by an interactive session, during which the students examine, explore and discuss **their role as police officers in relation to this Article** – through group exercises or question and answer or any other **activity.**	**Article 22** *No person shall interfere with the privacy of another… place of abode is sacred…* Trainer input, followed by an interactive session, during which the students examine, explore and discuss **their role as police officers in relation to this Article including the issue of official visits to private abodes** – through group exercises or question and answer or any other **activity.**
SATURDAY KUWA GATATANDATU	**Article 23** *Private property…is inviolable…* Trainer input, followed by an interactive session, during which the students examine, explore **their role as police officers in relation to this Article including the issue of justifiable interference by authorities, within the constraints of law**– through group exercises or question and answer or any other **activity.**	Private study.

MONDAY **KUWA MBERE**	**Article 24** *The family is protected by the State…duty to raise children…* **Article 25** *Only monogamous marriages …* Trainer input, followed by an interactive session, during which the students examine, explore and discuss examples – through group exercises or question and answer or any other **activity.**	**Article 26** *The right to education is hereby guaranteed…* **Article 27** *…primary education is free and compulsory…* Trainer input, followed by an interactive session, during which the students examine, explore and discuss examples relating to the two Articles – through group exercises or question and answer or any other **activity.**
TUESDAY **KUWA KABIRI**	**Article 28** *National service…is organised by the law* Brief Trainer input **Article 29** *Forced labour is abolished.* Trainer input, followed by a brief interactive session, during which the students discuss this article and its implications.	**Article 30** *Every person has the right to work…* **Article 31** *Every worker may defend his rights…* **Article 32** *The right to strike…* Trainer input, followed by an interactive session, during which the students examine, explore and discuss examples relating to the issue of employment – through group exercises or question and answer or any other **activity.**
WEDNESDAY **KUWA GATATU**	De-brief of all the Articles, during which the trainer tests the knowledge of the students through a competition/quiz.	Students are asked to explain how they will use their increased knowledge to develop their skills and abilities as Rwanda National Police personnel - through group exercises or question and answer or any other **activity.**
THURSDAY **KUWA KANE**	Trainer input and group discussion on the rights of prisoners.	Trainer input and group discussion on the rights of women.
FRIDAY **KUWA GATANU**	Trainer input and group discussion on the rights of children.	Final de-brief of course, again highlighting the development the students believe they have achieved that will enhance their skills and abilities.

HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMA PROGRAMME: PHASE 2 ESSAYS

Unit 3: Understanding the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda

LEARNING OUTCOME 1 COMPARISON

Write an essay on each of the following sections of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, which relate to human rights:

* Freedom from Oppression (Articles 12, 13, 17, 29, 33).

* Protection by the Law (Articles 14, 16, 22, 23, 24, 25).

* Freedom to move/rest/travel (Articles 15, 21).

* Freedom to choose (Articles 18, 19, 20, 24, 30, 31, 32).

* Freedom to socialise/duties (Articles 26, 27, 28).

N.B. Each essay must be at least one page (A4) long. **It must** explain how the sections are different and/or similar to the same categories in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

LEARNING OUTCOME 2 APPLYING THE CHARTER

Write 5 essays, which analyse your own organisation/country and explain in what ways individuals can be afforded:

* Freedom from Oppression (Articles 12, 13, 17, 29, 33).

* Protection by the Law (Articles 14, 16, 22, 23, 24, 25).

* Freedom to move/rest/travel (Articles 15, 21).

* Freedom to choose (Articles 18, 19, 20, 24, 30, 31, 32).

* Freedom to socialise/duties (Articles 26, 27, 28).

Write an essay that provides an example of where your organisation/country could progress/develop in relation to achieving the above areas from the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda.

N.B. Each essay must be at least one page (A4) long.

LEARNING OUTCOME 3 THE CHARTER'S FIRST TITLE

Write a one-page essay on each of the following titles:

* Democracy.
* The importance of voting and its relationship to democracy.
* The importance of having a Rwanda Seal and its relationship to human rights.
* Why law fixes some elements of the Constitution.
* The sanctions that are available to ensure compliance with the rights described by the Constitution.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. Prepare lesson plans with your colleagues to meet the requirements of the two-week timetable (attached) for the Regional Human Rights Programme.

2. Run the two-week programme with students (police officers from your region), using all the techniques of training that you have acquired or developed over the Phase 1.

3. Liaise with community members to inform them about your progress in line with the organogram (attached).

4. In preparation for **Unit 4** arrange a visit to a prison and speak with senior personnel and detainees about the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Annex 10 of your Handbook). Write a two-page essay about your visit. To minimise disruption to prison personnel and detainees, try to arrange your visits in small groups.

PROGRAMME Y'AMAHUGURWA AGANISHA KU KUZAHABWA DIPOROME: IKICIRO CYA 2

Unit 3: Gusobanukirwa itegeko nshinga rya Repuburika y'Urwanda

Learning Outcome 1 KUGERERANYA

Andika mu buryo burambuye kuri buri gice (section) kiri mw'itegeko nshinga rya Repuburika y'Urwanda kyerecyeye ku burenganzira bw'ikiremwa muntu:

* Uburenganzira bwo kudakandamizwa (Ingingo ya 12, 13, 17, 29, 33).
* Kuridwa no kurengerwa n'itegeko (Ingingo ya 14, 16, 22, 23, 24, 25).
* Uburenganzira bwo kuva ahantu ukajya ahandi; bwo kuruhuka; bwo kugenda (kujya mu ngendo) (Ingingo ya 15, 21).
* Uburenganzira bwo kwihitiramo (Ingingo ya 18, 19, 20, 24, 30, 31, 32).
* Uburenganzira bwo gusabana n'abandi (urugero mu biganiro no mu myidagaduro) (Ingingo ya 26, 27, 28).

N.B. Buri nyandiko muzo hejura igomba nabura kuba yuzuye ku rupapuro rufite ubunini bwa (A4). Igomba gusobannura aho izo ngingo (sections) zitandukanira cyangwa aho zihurira na zene wabo zisa nazo zo mu UNDHR.

Learning Outcome 2 GUSHYIRA AYA MASEZERANO MU BIKORWA

Andika inyandiko eshanu zirambuye ugerageza gusesengura no gusobanura bihagije organisation yawe cyangwa igihugu cyawe kandi usobanure uko abantu bashobora guhabwa:

* Uburenganzira bwo kudakandamizwa (Ingingo ya 12, 13, 17, 29, 33).
* Kuridwa no kurengerwa n'itegeko (Ingingo ya 14, 16, 22, 23, 24, 25).
* Uburenganzira bwo kuva ahantu ukajya ahandi; bwo kuruhuka; bwo kugenda (kujya mu ngendo) (Ingingo ya 15, 21).
* Uburenganzira bwo kwihitiramo (Ingingo ya 18, 19, 20, 24, 30, 31, 32).
* Uburenganzira bwo gusabana n'abandi (urugero mu biganiro no mu myidagaduro) (Ingingo ya 26, 27, 28).

Andika mu buryo burambuye utanga urugero ku gihe/ku hantu organisation cyangwa igihugu cyawe cyatera intambwe/imbere mu ngingo zira haruguru – zigaragara mu itegeko nshinga rya Repuburika y'Urwanda.

N.B. Buri nyandiko igomba kuba yuzuye urupapuro rufiti ubunini bwa (A4).

Learning Outcome 3 TITRE (umutwe) WA MBERE WAYA MASEZERANO

Andika inyandiko yuzuye urupapuro (paji) imwe kuri buri kimwe:

* Demokarasi.

* Impanvu gutora ari ngombwa n'isano bifitanye na demokarasi.

* Erekana agaciro n'uburemere bw' ikiranga ntego cy'Urwanda ukurikije isano gifitaniye isano n'uburenganzira bw'ikiremwa muntu.

* Impanvu ingingo zimwe zo mw'itegeko nshinga rya Repuburika y'Urwanda zishyirwaho ziteganywa ni itegeko.

* Ibihano cyangwa izindi ngamba zose ziriho zituma uburenganzira buvugwa mu itegeko nshinga bwubahirizwa.

IBYO KUZAKORA

1. Tegura integuro z'amasomo (ufatanyije na bagenzi bawe mufatanyije mu ntara ya gipolisi) zishobora kurangi za muzikoresha mu mahugura muzatanga ku burenganzira bw'ikiremwa muntu muri iyo ntara mukoreramo.

2. Sa nuwigisha abanyeshuri (abapolisi bo muri region - intara ya gipolisi) ukoresha uburyo bwose bwakoreshwa mu kwigisha nkuko wabunyuzemo mu kiciro cya mberi cyaya mahugurwa.

3. Uzahure n'abaturage kugirango ubabwire kandi unabamenyeshe ibyereke ranye n'uburenganzira bw'ikiremwa muntu, uzifashishe 'organigramme' uzaba ufite kandi ijanye niki kibazo cyangwa iyi ngingo.

4. Mbere yuko utangira gukora unit ya 4, uzarebe ukuntu wasura gereza imwe maze ugirane ikiganiro n'abayobozi ba gereza bakura, n'abanyururu, muganira ku mategeko cyangwa amabwiriza agenga imicungire ya za gereza n'abanyururu (nabura bike bemerewe kubona no gukorerwa nubwo baba bikiri abanyururu). Nyuma yaho, wandike inyandiko irambuye ku mpapuro ebyiri usobanura icyo wungukiye muri uko gusura gereza nuko uko icyo gikorwa cyakugende keye. Kugirango mutazarogoye imirimo ya gereza ya buri munsi; muzarebe uko mwajyayo mu matsindi mato mato.

Appendix 14

ORGANOGRAM

UNDP RWANDA POLICE HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT AND ON-GOING VISION

"Striving to make the people of Rwanda feel safe, involved and reassured"

COMMUNITY ⟷ **POLICE** ⟷ **OPPORTUNITIES**

FOCUS GROUPS TOTALLING 7000 RESPONDENTS
GROUPS INVOLVED:
Vulnerable Groups / Local Administrators / Community Representatives Detainees / 2 Community members involved in Research Team: UK / Rwandese

↔

COUNTRY-WIDE CONSULTATION
MIXED RESEARCH TEAM:
Rwandan / European / Police / Community / Male / Female /. Community Police Department / Legal Department

Every Prefecture Visited

↔

MEDIA COVERAGE

To raise community awareness of the new National Police Service (NPS)

To encourage trust in the NPS

Promote further community involvement

↓

EVALUATION OF DATA
To develop a Human Rights Programme run by the research team

↓

COMMUNITY SESSIONS WITH TRAINERS

Community members attend the classroom phase to give their views on the following issues:
Policing
Community Policing
Safety
Human Rights
Security
Access to Justice
Community involvement

↔

TRAINING OF HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINERS (DIPLOMA) CLASSROOM PHASE
UNIT 1: Understanding the UNDHRs
UNIT 2: Understanding the A(B)CHPRs
Assessed Teaching Practice
Assessor Training
Students-Centred (Problem focussed)

↔

MEDIA COVERAGE
To acknowledge the previous valuable input by the community and to let them know that their ideas are being implemented (8th Dec 2000)

DONOR SEMINAR
To let them understand the success of the current projects and motivate contributions to the vision

UN PRESENTATION
To UNDP staff as soon as possible

↓

COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT / INTERVIEWS
Assignments involving community:
Unit 3 – Public
Unit 4 - Prisoners

↔

WORK-BASED ASSIGNMENTS
UNIT 3: Understanding Constitution
UNIT 4: Treatment of Prisoners

Student–Centred (Problem focussed)

↔

MEDIA COVERAGE
To show Police and Community working together (Dec - Jan 2001)

EXPANDING CP / HR DEPT.
With Qualified Personnel

↓

COMMUNITY INVOLVED IN TRAINING SESSIONS

Community members from panel to give their views to students

↔

ASSESSED TEACHING PRACTICE
UNIT 5: Understanding … human rights of women
UNIT 6: Understanding … rights of the child

Every Prefecture (Jan – Mar 2001)

↔

MEDIA COVERAGE
Jan – Mar 2001

ASSESSOR TRAINING
Rwandan personnel assess and use assessments as evidence for NVQ

↓

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES INVOLVED AS LAY PERSONNEL
Community support training centre

↔

CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE

Ruhengeri Police Staff College

Gishali Police Training School

Providing accredited courses

↔

INCOME GENERATION

Rwanda is in an ideal situation to offer accredited Human Rights Qualifications (Basic to Level 5) to neighbouring countries

Abbreviations : UK = United Kingdom — UNDHRs = Universal Declaration of Human Rights — A(B)CHPRs = African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights — CONSTITUTION = Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda NPS = National Police Service — NVQ = National Vocational Qualification

Appendix 15

Semi-structured Interview and Focus Group Respondents

Police and Army Personnel respondents included:

Commissioner General of Police Mugambage.

Deputy Commissioner General Karera.

Focus Group of Directorate Heads and Heads of Departments.

Central Regional Police Commander.

Préfecture Police Commander of Kigali Ville.

Préfecture Police Commander of Kigali Rural.

Police Commander of Muhima.

Focus Group at Muhima, Kigali Ville .

Focus Group at Masaka, Kigali Rural .

Eastern Regional Police Commander.

Préfecture Police Commander of Kibungo.

Préfecture Police Commander of Umutara.

Préfecture Police Commander of Byumba.

Police Recruits (300 former Judicial Police Inspectors).

Focus Group at Kibungo.

Focus Group at Umutara.

Focus Group at Byumba.

Northern Regional Police Commander.

Préfecture Police Commander Gisenyi.

Préfecture Police Commander Ruhengeri.

Focus Group at Gisenyi, including 1 Inspector and 1 Assistant Inspector.

Focus Group at Ruhengeri, including 2 Chief Inspectors.

Western Regional Police Commander.

Préfecture Police Commander of Kibuye.

Deputy Préfecture Police Commander of Kibuye.

Préfecture Police Commander of Gitarama.

Focus Group of Police and Army personnel at Kibuye.

Focus Group of Police and Army personnel at Gitarama.

Southern Regional Police Commander.

Préfecture Police Commander of Gikongoro.

Préfecture Police Commander of Butare.

Préfecture Police Commander of Cyangugu.

37 Police Commanders at Butare, including 2 Inspectors and 1Assistant Inspector.

Community Respondents included:

40 Kora *(Male Artisan)* Community members at Nyarugenge Commune in Kigali – and passers-by, including six women and four children

5 Women from Remera district of Kigali Ville and 2 men.

Yves De Wolf - Author of 'Human Rights in Rwandan Law'.

Kanzira Hildebrand, Secretary General, Unity and Reconciliation Commission
Anne GAHONGAYIRE, Coordinator of Forum for African Women Educationalists.

Focus Group at Gitarama of businessmen and women, NGOS and individual community members.

Focus Group of male Religious leaders and business people at Gisenyi.

Focus Group of 30 males, 39 females and 46 children returnees at Gisenyi.

Hoteliers from Gisenyi (informal responses).

276 Teachers from 12 different Communes at a Solidarity Camp meeting, Cyangugu.

Focus Group at Byumba of businessmen and women, NGOS and individual community members.

Focus Group at Kibuye.

Local Administration Respondents included:

Bourgmestre for Commune Nyarugenge.

301 Local Leaders and Community Heads at a Solidarity Camp in Cyangugu.

The Préfet of Kibungo.

13 Bourgmestres and Local Administrators from Kibungo.

17 Bourgmestres and Heads of Departments from Umutara.

19 Bourgmestres and Heads of Departments from Byumba.

2 Sous-Préfets from Gisenyi.

10 Gisenyi Bourgmestres Focus Group.

8 Gisenyi Local Administrators Focus Group.

9 Departmental Heads Focus Group at Gisenyi.

Focus Group at Kibuye with the Préfet, Bourgmestres, heads of departments and members of the community.

Focus Group at Gitarama with the Préfet, Sous-Préfets, Bourgmestres, Councillors, other Local Administrators and members of the community (58 men and 8 women).

Prison Respondents included:

Prison Director from Gereza ya Kigali (Prison of Kigali).

Prison Director from Gereza ya Rilima.

Prison personnel from Gereza ya Rilima.

Detainees from Gereza ya Kigali - 1930 including:

the leader of the female prisoners;
the leader of the male prisoners;
the head of internal security;
the secretary;

Project leaders.

Over 1,500 detainees from Gereza ya Rilima.

Prison Director from Gisenyi Prison.

Detainees from Gisenyi Prison.

Prison Directors from: Nsinda Prison.

Four female and 17 male detainees from Nsinda Prison.

Prison Officer from Kibungo.

Prison Director from Gereza ya Gitarama.

2 Assistant Prison Directors from Gereza ya Kibuye.

3,000 + Detainees from Gereza ya Gitarama.

Prison Personnel from Gereza ya Gitarama.

2 Assistant Prison Directors from Butare.

24 Detainees from Gereza ya Butare (Hostel Captains).

3 Prison Guards and the Secretary (Prison Administration) of Gereza ya Butare.

Detainees from Gereza ya Byumba.

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