

Biting the Hand That Feeds You

Rebel Organisation and One-Sided Violence
in sub-Saharan Africa

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Abstract

This thesis examines the relationship between rebel organisation and violence against civilians in sub-Saharan Africa. I argue that rebels use such one-sided violence to enforce popular support when they are unable to secure support otherwise. An important determinant of this strategic use of violence is the rebels' organisational configuration. Organisational factors such as the ideology of a rebel group, the occurrence of leadership divisions, the level of fractionalisation within a rebel group's population base, the existence of external support and the number of competing rebel factions determine whether non-violent strategies to secure support are available or whether rebels can only rely on violent means to enforce support. I test this theoretical model using both quantitative and qualitative methods. First, I conduct a statistical cross-sectional study analysing the relationship between rebel organisation and rebel one-sided violence in sub-Saharan Africa between 1989 and 2007. The analysis reveals that the occurrence of leadership divisions increases the probability of an onset of rebel violence against civilians. I also find that ethno-nationalist rebel groups kill fewer civilians while rebel groups who draw support from highly fractionalised population bases kill more civilians. Second, I use qualitative within-case analyses of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) to test whether these correlations are actually driven by the causal pathways outlined in my theoretical model. While both case studies provide supporting evidence for this, they also uncover that the causal pathways linking leadership divisions to rebel violence can substantially differ from each other. Moreover, the qualitative analysis reveals that the theoretical model only partly captures the causal pathways between rebel ideology and the rebel groups' population base and the level of one-sided violence.

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Abbreviations

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AFDL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Kinshasa
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AU	African Union
CDF	Civil Defence Forces
CMA	SPLM/A Civil-Military Administrator
CNDD	National Council for the Defence of Democracy
CNDD-FDD	National Council for the Defence of Democracy - Forces for the Defence of Democracy
COW	Correlates of War Project
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DLF	Darfur Liberation Front
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
EIJM-AS	Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement - Abu Suhail Faction
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ETA	Basque Nation and Liberty
FDLR	Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda
FPR	Rwandan Patriotic Front

ABBREVIATIONS

FROLINA	National Liberation Front
FRUD	Front for the Restoration of Democracy
G-19	SLM/A Group of 19
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IRA	Irish Republican Army
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
LRM	Logistic Regression Model
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MDD	Movement for Development and Democracy
MFDC	Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of Congo
NBRM	Negative Binomial Regression Model
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRF	National Redemption Front
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
Palipehutu-FNL	Palipehutu Forces for the National Liberation
PITF	Political Instability Task Force
PMHC	Political-Military High Command of the SPLM/A
PRM	Poisson Regression Model
RCD	Congolese Rally for Democracy

ABBREVIATIONS

RCD-ML	Congolese Democratic Rally - Liberation Movement
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
RFDG	Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SAF	Sudan Alliance Forces
SFDA	Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance
SINGO	Sudanese Indigenous Non-Governmental Organisations
SLM/A	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A	Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army
SRRA	Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association
SSDF	Southern Sudan Defence Force
SSIM/A	South Sudan Independence Movement/Army
START	National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
WNBF	West Nile Bank Front
ZINB	Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Model
ZIP	Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression Model

Introduction

Deadly violence against civilians is a common feature of contemporary civil wars. The most haunting example of recent history is, without doubt, the Rwandan genocide of 1994, in which government forces and affiliated militias killed at least half a million people in a matter of weeks. While there has been no atrocity of a similar scale since then, there have been numerous instances of violence against civilians during wartime. In 2011 alone, civilians have been killed in conflicts in Afghanistan, Ivory Coast, Libya, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen.

Despite the high frequency of violence against civilians in civil wars, however, the causes and dynamics of this violence remain poorly understood. It is unclear why governments and rebels caught in struggles over political power target civilians. The violent behaviour of rebel groups towards civilians seems particularly incomprehensible, as these groups are often dependent on support from the civilian population to sustain their movements. This thesis seeks to address this issue by exploring the determinants of rebel perpetrated violence against civilians in sub-Saharan Africa. It considers how the organisation of rebel groups affects the onset and level of violence against civilians in civil wars.

This chapter introduces the main arguments and the findings of the thesis. In the first section I formulate my central research question; the second section provides an outline of the theoretical model linking rebel organisation to one-sided violence; the third section presents the research design. In the final section I introduce the structure of the thesis and summarise the key findings of each chapter.

1.1 Research Question

Anecdotal evidence of government forces and rebels engaging in deadly violence against civilians abounds in narratives of civil wars. Only recently, however, has a comprehensive and systematic data collection on such violence been presented. Collected by the *Uppsala Conflict Data Program* (UCDP) (Eck and Hultman 2007), this data set uses the term ‘one-sided violence’ to refer to violence against civilians and defines it as the direct and deliberate killing of civilians by either government or rebels in civil wars.

A closer look at this data collection reveals an interesting aspect of violence against civilians in civil wars. While government forces have been responsible for the most severe acts of one-sided violence since 1989, they typically use only low levels of violence. Rebel groups, on the other hand, engage in one-sided violence more frequently and tend to employ higher levels of violence. Considering this, it is surprising that most research on one-sided violence has focused on violence carried out by governments and has largely disregarded rebel groups (e.g., Davenport 1995; Harff 2003; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999; Rummel 1995; Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004). This omission is particularly surprising as rebel violence against civilians is not obviously explicable: these armed and organised opposition groups tend to be characterised by underdeveloped political and military capabilities and are therefore strongly dependent upon political and material support from the civilian population (Galula 1964; Laqueur 1977; Leites and Wolf 1970; Tilly 1978).

Lately, however, the question of why rebels perpetrate one-sided violence has begun to attract attention among scholars of armed conflict. The starting point of this research is the conceptualisation of violence against civilians as a strategic action used by rebel groups to achieve central objectives (Kalyvas 2006; Mason 2004). More specifically, it is argued that one-sided violence occurs when rebel groups receive insufficient support from the civilian population. In such cases, violence is employed to force civilians into supporting the rebellion.

So far, this research agenda has provided vital insights into the causes and dynamics of rebel one-sided violence in civil wars (e.g., Azam and Hoeffler 2002; Balcells 2010; Hultman 2008; Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2010). In particular, it has identified the strategic interaction between rebel groups and state governments and the dynamics of a conflict as central determinants of rebels’ violent behaviour. At the same time, however, research on the strategic use of violence has largely disregarded another potentially influential determinant: the organisation of rebel groups.

Rebel organisation - as defined in this study - includes not only the internal structures of a rebel group, but also how they interact with the civilian population and their relationships with other actors, both domestic and foreign (Clapham 1998a; Herbst 2000; Pearlman 2010; Shellman, Hatfield and Mills 2010; Zahar 2000). These factors show considerable variation across time and space, and these variations are likely to shape whether a rebel group is able to secure popular support non-violently or has to resort to violence to enforce it. Although some scholars acknowledge this impact of rebel organisation on violence against civilians (e.g., Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007; Wood 2010), it has not yet been comprehensively analysed as a determinant of the strategic use of one-sided violence.

This thesis addresses this shortcoming in prior research. Its primary research question is whether and how rebel organisation shapes the use of one-sided violence in order to enforce popular support in civil wars.

1.2 Theoretical Model

The theoretical framework of this thesis is based on the core assumptions of economic theories of conflict (e.g., Hegre and Sandler 2002; Leites and Wolf 1970; Lichbach 1989; Muller and Weede 1990; Sandler 2000). I assume that the key actors in conflicts are rational utility-maximisers who are guided solely by their self-interest and make their decisions based on cost-benefit calculations. Following from these core assumptions, I develop a theoretical model capturing the relationship between rebel organisation and rebel one-sided violence.

The starting point of this model is the notion of civil war as a ‘collective action problem’ (DeNardo 1985; Lichbach 1995; Moore 1995; Olson 1971; Popkin 1979; Silver 1974; Tullock 1971). In order to engage in an armed struggle against the government of a state, rebels require support from the civilian population. This support may take the form of recruits, food, shelter or information. Civilians, however, are often reluctant to provide such support to the rebels. One reason for this is that the prospects of a rebel victory are normally low and, as a result, the benefits civilians can expect for providing rebels with support are uncertain. Moreover, the provision of support to a rebel group is likely to be costly for civilians as they are likely to have only scarce resources at their disposal and face the risk of government reprisals. More often than not, therefore, civilians decide not to support a rebel group.

Faced with this collective action problem, rebel groups have to find ways to increase the level of popular support for their rebellion. Rebels’ preferred option is to secure popular support through

the use of non-violent strategies (Lichbach 1995; Moore 1995). They can, for example, increase the benefits of supporting a rebellion by providing private benefits to supportive civilians. Alternatively, they can seek support among pre-existing political or social communities. If rebels are successful in these aims the costs of lending support to a rebellion decrease for individual civilians as a larger group shoulders the costs. Whether any of these non-violent strategies is actually available to a rebel group, however, depends on its organisational configuration.

When a rebel group's organisation does not permit the provision of private benefits or prevents successful appeals to base communities, rebels find themselves unable to use non-violent means to secure popular support. In such instances, they often resort to violent methods (Kalyvas 2006; Lichbach 1995; Mason 1996, 2004). When rebels target a civilian population, they aim to increase the costs of not lending support to the rebel group. Rebel organisation therefore determines whether rebel groups engage in one-sided violence in order to enforce popular support.

Rebel organisation also shapes the level of one-sided violence. Even when they have already resorted to violence against civilians, their organisation might still allow them to muster some support with non-violent means. Then, they only have to employ low levels of one-sided violence. But when rebel organisation precludes the use of non-violent strategies altogether, the only remaining option is large-scale violence against civilians.

Based on this theoretical model, I present a number of hypotheses linking selected aspects of rebel organisation to rebel one-sided violence. In particular, I explore how the ideology of a rebel group, the occurrence of leadership divisions, the level of fractionalisation within a rebel group's population base, the existence of external support and the number of competing rebel factions is connected to the onset and level of rebel one-sided violence on the other.

The development of these hypotheses focuses on sub-Saharan Africa.¹ First and foremost, this regional focus is due to sub-Saharan Africa being the global 'hot spot' for rebel perpetrated one-sided violence during civil wars (Eck and Hultman 2007; Human Security Report Project 2011). Looking exclusively at the violent behaviour of rebel groups in this world region allows a focused analysis of the majority of instances of rebel violence against civilians. More importantly, however, the focus on rebel groups in sub-Saharan Africa allows me to construct hypotheses which specify the causal pathway between rebel organisation and rebel one-sided violence in greater

¹In this thesis, the following countries constitute the world region sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial-Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Sao Tome and Principe and Seychelles.

detail (Achen 2002; Clarke 2005). As the organisation of many of these groups shares a number of features, it is possible to clearly identify how variation in a particular organisational aspect affects the onset and level of rebel one-sided violence.

1.3 Methodological Approach

The empirical analysis of the theoretical model and its hypotheses is conducted using both quantitative and qualitative methods.

I begin the empirical analysis of this thesis with a statistical cross-sectional study of the relationship between rebel organisation and one-sided violence in sub-Saharan African civil wars. The objective of this analysis is to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3 across a large number of cases in order to identify the organisational factors shaping the onset and level of rebel one-sided violence in sub-Saharan Africa. This analysis will allow me to determine the average effect of each organisational factor on rebel violence against civilians.

The unit of analysis in the quantitative analysis is the violent behaviour of a rebel group in a given year. The data for the dependent variables (the onset and level of rebel one-sided violence) is taken from the *UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset* (Eck and Hultman 2007) and covers the years from 1989 to 2007. The explanatory variables are the rebel group's ideology, the occurrence of leadership divisions within the rebel group, linguistic fractionalisation within the group's population base, the existence of external support, and the number of competing rebel factions. I also include a number of control variables to account for the impact of alternative explanations of rebel one-sided violence.

Following the statistical analysis, I conduct two qualitative studies of rebel groups using one-sided violence in civil wars. The aim of these studies is to provide evidence corroborating the relationship between the statistically significant explanatory variables and the outcome variables (Lieberman 2005). That is, I conduct a model-testing qualitative analysis in order to uncover the causal pathways linking rebel organisation to one-sided violence. By doing this, I gain additional evidence clarifying the extent to which the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3 is correct.

In the qualitative analysis, I employ within-case analysis and disaggregate the group-year as unit of analysis. This enables me to explore the temporal sequence of events linking rebel organisation to one-sided violence in greater detail. This approach also allows to me to collect additional data on the characteristics of the relevant explanatory variables. The cases under analysis are the Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) during the Second Sudanese Civil War

and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) during the War in Darfur.

1.4 Plan of the Thesis

This thesis contains eight chapters. In Chapter 2, I conceptualise one-sided violence as the core concept of this study and discuss rebel groups as the perpetrators of such violence and civilians as their victims. The chapter also presents two influential analytical approaches explaining violence against civilians in civil wars. The first focuses on rebel organisation and assumes that organisational factors shape the violent behaviour of individual rank-and-file rebel fighters. The second approach, in contrast, focuses on the strategic use of violence and argues that rebel groups use violence against civilians in order to enforce support.

In Chapter 3, I develop the theoretical model linking rebel organisation to rebel's use of one-sided violence as a strategy to enforce popular support. Initially, I present the main assumptions of this model and discuss its central actors: rebel leaders and civilians. Based on the logic of collective action, I then theorise the link between the organisation of rebel groups and the onset and level of one-sided violence. As civilians are often reluctant to provide support to rebel groups, I argue that the latter have to find ways to change the former's cost-benefit calculus in favour of lending support. Rebel organisation determines whether a group uses non-violent strategies to accomplish this or resorts to one-sided violence. I conclude this chapter with a number of hypotheses linking selected characteristics of rebel groups in sub-Saharan Africa to the onset and level of rebel one-sided violence.

Chapter 4, begins the empirical testing of my theoretical model and the hypotheses derived from it. The chapter opens with a presentation of the dependent, explanatory and control variables used in the quantitative analysis. I then analyse the relationship between rebel organisation and the onset of rebel one-sided violence using a logistic regression model. I find that the occurrence of leadership divisions within a rebel group is the only organisational factor that increases the likelihood of a rebel group commencing a campaign of one-sided violence. Thereafter, I analyse the relationship between rebel organisation and the level of one-sided violence using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model. Here, the results show that ethno-nationalist rebel groups kill fewer civilians during a campaign of one-sided violence than rebel groups with revolutionary or religious ideologies, while rebel groups with a highly fractionalised population base are likely to kill more civilians.

Chapter 5 presents an initial discussion of the statistical findings and asserts the need to find

further evidence corroborating the theoretical model of this thesis. I therefore develop a research design for the qualitative analysis of two sub-Saharan African rebel groups who have used one-sided violence. For these studies, I use within-case analysis to uncover the temporal sequence linking the statistically significant explanatory variables to the outcome variables. I also collect additional data on these variables to arrive at a more comprehensive picture of rebel violence against civilians. Based on an examination of the statistical findings of the previous chapter, I identify two Sudanese rebel groups - the SPLM/A and the SLM/A - as suitable cases for my qualitative analysis.

In Chapters 6 and 7, I conduct these qualitative studies into the relationship between rebel organisation and the onset and level of rebel one-sided violence. The analysis of both the south Sudanese SPLM/A and the Darfurian SLM/A present evidence corroborating the relationship between the occurrence of leadership divisions and the start of a campaign of rebel one-sided violence. Regarding the level of one-sided violence, however, both studies provide only limited evidence supporting the claim that rebel groups with ethno-nationalist ideologies kill fewer civilians than rebel groups with alternative ideologies. The hypothesised relationship between a rebel group's population base and the level of one-sided violence is supported by the analysis of these two rebel groups, however.

Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. I summarise and discuss the main findings of the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the relationship between rebel organisation and rebel one-sided violence and explore the extent to which the empirical findings of this thesis can help policy-makers in their efforts to reduce the impact of civil war on the civilian population. Finally, I signal potential future directions for research into violence against civilians and the study of armed conflict in general.

One-Sided Violence in Civil Wars

This chapter conceptualises rebel one-sided violence and reviews past research on its occurrence in civil wars in general and sub-Saharan Africa in particular. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section presents a definition of one-sided violence and discusses both the rebel perpetrators and victims of such violence. Based on this definition, the following two sections discuss two influential analytical approaches which seek to explain rebel violence against civilians. The first of these approaches sees one-sided violence as a result of rebel organisation. The second analytical perspective, to be elaborated in section three of this chapter, considers one-sided violence as a tool used by rebel groups to enforce popular support. The final section of this chapter summarises the main findings and outlines the implications for this thesis.

2.1 Conceptualisation

Any conceptualisation of one-sided violence needs to be based on an understanding of civil war as the environment in which such violence takes place. Following past research, I define civil war as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” (Kalyvas 2006, 17).² The warring parties in the conflict are the government of a state on one side and at least one rebel group on the other (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Sambanis 2004).³ Against the background of this definition of civil war, I will now conceptualise one-sided violence as a particular type of civil war violence.

²This basic definition of civil war serves as an umbrella term for a plethora of more refined and detailed definitions. The most prominent examples are those which have been developed to construct large databases of civil war across time and space as, for example, the *Correlates of War Project* (COW) (Sarkees, Wayman and Singer 2003), the *Political Instability Task Force* (PITF) (Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2007) and the *Uppsala Conflict Data Program* (UCDP) (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

³This excludes non-state or communal conflicts between organised actors without the participation of the government of a state (Harbom and Sundberg 2009; Sarkees, Wayman and Singer 2003).

Following past research, I will also define rebel groups fighting the government of a state as the perpetrators and civilians as the victims of one-sided violence (Downes 2008; Eck and Hultman 2007; Kalyvas 2006).

2.1.1 One-Sided Violence

In civil war, violence usually comes in two forms: battle violence and one-sided violence. Battle violence is considered to be the defining feature of armed conflict (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Sarkees, Wayman and Singer 2003). The term refers to instances of violence which result in battle-related deaths due to combat between at least two armed groups (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Lacină 2006; Lacină and Gleditsch 2005). One-sided violence, on the other hand, does not explicitly relate to the military contest between the conflict parties: it is violence directed towards the non-combatant civilian population (Downes 2008; Eck and Hultman 2007; Kalyvas 2006).⁴ It is this type of violence which is the primary object of study in this thesis.

One-sided violence can encompass a wide range of phenomena. In the Angolan civil war, for example, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) under Jonas Savimbi was accused of frequently torturing dissenters among the civilian population (Whitney and Jolliffe 1989). Another type of violence against civilians is sexual and gender-based violence. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone has been notorious for raping women and girls during the civil war in the 1990s (Human Rights Watch 2003). One-sided violence often escalates to large-scale killings of civilians.⁵ For example, the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) regularly attacked villages and refugee camps, resulting in large numbers of civilian fatalities (United States Department of State 1999).

Finally, some scholars define one-sided violence as also comprising indirect instances of violence against a civilian population as, for example, in the forced displacement of civilians or the deliberate triggering of famines (e.g., Ghojarah, Huth and Russett 2003; Human Security Centre 2005; Macrae and Zwi 1992). Since the mid-1990s, for example, rebel groups in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo have frequently expelled civilians from conquered territories (Amnesty International 2003). Likewise, in 1998 the SPLM/A intentionally caused a

⁴Scholars have used different terms for this form of civil war violence. Eck and Hultman (2007) introduced the term ‘one-sided violence’, Downes (2006; 2008) uses the term ‘civilian victimisation’ and others like Azam and Hoeffler (2002) simply call it ‘violence against civilians’. In the remainder of this thesis, I will primarily use the term ‘one-sided violence’ as it has become the established label for this type of civil war violence. To avoid repetition, however, I also use the other terms interchangeably.

⁵The killing of civilians in internal wars bears the risk of an escalation to full-scale genocide. Up to now, however, the available data collections on genocides only provides evidence of government forces as perpetrators of genocidal campaigns (e.g., Harff 2003; Rummel 1995).

famine, resulting in a death toll of tens of thousands of civilians (Human Rights Watch 1999). In the following, I do not regard acts of one-sided violence committed by rebel forces as by-products of armed combat between government and rebels in a civil war. Rather, I follow previous research and understand civilian victimisation as a purposeful action based on rebels' cost-benefit calculations: the violence is designed to help them achieve central objectives (Azam and Hoeffler 2002; Downes 2008; Hultman 2008; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Mason 1989, 1996; Weinstein 2005, 2007).⁶

2.1.2 Perpetrators of One-Sided Violence

In this thesis, I focus on one-sided violence perpetrated by rebel groups.⁷ Scholars of armed conflict generally define rebel groups as armed organisations violently challenging the authority of state governments (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Sambanis 2004; Sarkees, Wayman and Singer 2003). This definition of rebel groups as organisations implies that they are made up of different elements which are structured in particular ways. This is a crucial point as variations in this rebel organisation may have the potential to shape the use of one-sided violence as a strategically chosen action (DeNardo 1985; Lichbach 1995; Moore 1995).

Against this background, it is important to have a closer look at the organisation of rebel groups. Following past research (Clapham 1998a; Herbst 2000; Pearlman 2010; Shellman, Hatfield and Mills 2010; Zahar 2000), I employ a broad definition of 'organisation' including not only the hierarchical structure of the organisation but also how this organisation approaches the civilian population and whether it engages in relations with other domestic and external actors.⁸ As rebels are strongly dependent upon the environment they operate in, such a broad definition allows capturing the full range of variation in rebel groups. Ultimately, I focus on the ideology of a rebel group; the rebel leadership; the group's population base; and its relationships with other actors.

The ideology of a rebel group encompasses the political objectives guiding its armed struggle against the government of a state (Angstrom 2001; Clapham 1998a; Sambanis 2004). Most commonly, rebels either follow ethno-nationalist, revolutionary or religious objectives, although these are not mutually exclusive (Clapham 1998b; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Kaufmann 1996;

⁶This understanding does not imply that violence against the population cannot also be motivated by other factors as, for example, emotions (e.g., revenge) or private interests (e.g., local feuds) (Kalyvas 2003a).

⁷In the remainder of this thesis I will use the terms 'rebel group', 'rebel movement', 'rebel forces' and 'rebels' interchangeably.

⁸This broad definition of 'organisation' shares some similarities with the concept of a 'political opportunity structure' as introduced by the literature on social movements (e.g., Eisinger 1973; Kriesi 1995; Tarrow 1998).

Post, Ruby and Shaw 2002*a,b*).⁹ Examples are the ethno-nationalist Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia, the socialist UNITA in Angola or the Christian fundamentalist of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda.

Rebel groups also have some degree of hierarchical structure, meaning that a leadership commands a set of subordinates in order to achieve particular political objectives (Coleman 1990; Eckstein 1973; Lake 2009). The leadership of a rebel group is made up of an individual or a set of individuals who oversee its operations throughout the armed struggle. Examples include the high command around John Garang de Mabior of the SPLM/A, the clique of Liberian exiles under Charles Taylor running the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) or Frédéric Bitsangou's command of Ntsiloulous in the Republic of Congo.

Any rebel group is also based upon one or more political groups among the civilian population which form its main constituency (Findley and Edwards 2007; Tilly 1978; Vinci 2007; Zahar 2000). The rebels fight - or claim to fight - for the interests of these civilians and, in return, the civilians provide the rebels with recruits and political and material support. Somali rebel groups, for example, primarily recruit their members from the country's different clans (Compagnon 1998). The rebel movements in Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, on the other hand, draw their recruits and support from the local ethnic groups of the Hutu and Tutsi (Prunier 1998; Reed 1998).

Finally, rebel groups often maintain both friendly and hostile contact with actors within and outside their country. To begin with, it must be noted that in civil wars there is frequently more than one rebel movement fighting the government of a state. The larger the number of opposition groups, however, the smaller the amount of resources available to each group (Gallagher Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012; Metelits 2009*a,b*). Moreover, rebels may also establish relations with outside actors. Indeed, external actors often fund rebels' war efforts (Byman et al. 2001; Zahar 2000). Taken together, these relationships play an important role in determining the resource base of a rebel group. The civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo serves as an illustrative example for both aspects: there were a number of rebel groups active simultaneously throughout the years each of who, received substantial support from the government of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda.¹⁰

⁹I elaborate on these three different rebel ideologies in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

¹⁰The most important of these rebel groups were the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), Congolese Democratic Rally - Liberation Movement (RCD-ML) and Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC).

2.1.3 Victims of One-Sided Violence

The victims of rebel violence against the population are civilians. I understand civilians as non-combatants, as defined by the 1949 *Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*. That is, civilians are those individuals who do not actively participate in the armed conflict between government and rebels.¹¹

Civilians as victims of rebel violence can be further distinguished on the basis of battle violence and one-sided violence. Battle violence is commonly defined as those instances of violence which result in fatalities due to combat between at least two armed groups (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005).¹² In the case of one-sided violence, in contrast, the perpetrator of violence does not risk any direct and immediate retaliatory measures as the target is unable to defend itself (Eck and Hultman 2007; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). An actor using civilian victimisation therefore targets individuals who are not directly involved in the battles between government and rebels. Furthermore, the conceptualisation of one-sided violence as the rational actions of rebel groups implies that civilians are deliberately targeted. This means that civilians caught in the crossfire between government and rebels are excluded from the definition of civilian victimisation (Eck and Hultman 2007). Although such incidents might constitute war crimes, civilian fatalities as by-product of armed clashes between government and rebel forces do not constitute deliberate acts of one-sided violence.

Two examples illustrate this distinction. When rebel forces enter a civilian settlement in order to loot the property of its inhabitants, rape the women, abduct the children and kill the men, then these are acts of civilian victimisation. The rebels entered the village for the purpose of attacking civilians and did not face an immediate threat of retaliatory measures from the villagers. When a civilian settlement is destroyed and its inhabitants killed because the village served as a battlefield for government and rebel forces, it is not an act of civilian victimisation however: although the result might be the same, none of the actors had the explicit objective of attacking civilians.

To sum up, the victims of one-sided violence are civilian non-combatants who are deliberately targeted by rebel groups. This definition implies that rebel violence against civilians is not a

¹¹The exact definition of the *Geneva Convention* of a non-combatant is as follows: “Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed *hors de combat* by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, (...)”

¹²The concept of battle-related deaths focuses equally on soldiers and civilians killed in combat, which is defined as “political violence against any target, military or civilian, in which the perpetrator faces the immediate threat of lethal force being used by the opposing forces against him/her and/or allied fighters” (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005, 150).

by-product of armed combat between the conflict parties but serves a particular purpose for the rebel group perpetrating such violence.

2.2 One-Sided Violence and Rebel Organisation

Based on these conceptualisations of one-sided violence and its perpetrators and victims, two strands of research exploring the determinants of violence against civilians have emerged. The first strand focuses almost exclusively on the organisation of rebel groups as the main determinant of civilian victimisation.

The theoretical starting point of this strand of research is the ‘opportunity model of rebellion’. This framework assumes that grievances cannot explain the emergence of civil wars as grievances are almost ubiquitous whilst civil war is a relatively rare event. Scholars therefore identify the factors giving individuals the opportunity to rebel as main determinant of civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Lichbach 1995; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Olson 1971; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). The argument there is that individuals join a rebel group in order to address grievances only when the participation costs of the rebellion are sufficiently low and smaller than the expected benefits from taking up arms against the government of the state (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Grossman 1991; Hirshleifer 2000).

In a number of recent studies, scholars identify the nascent rebel organisation as the central factor in determining the nature of these incentives (Azam 2002; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Weinstein 2005, 2007; Zahar 2000). Firstly, the incentives to join a rebel movement can be of a political nature. When a rebel group possesses strong links to pre-existing social groups, it can mobilise recruits and followers within these groups by credibly promising future rewards to them. This results in rebels who are tightly embedded in the population and are therefore often thought to exhibit less violence towards civilians. Secondly, the incentives to join a rebellion can be of an economic nature. In this case, rebel leaders promise immediate material rewards in the form of resource exploitation, drug cultivation or looting. When rebel leaders motivate their forces with such economic incentives, fighters are more likely to regard the civilian population as a resource for enrichment and consequently the likelihood of civilian victimisation increases.

In the following section, I discuss rebels’ links to ethnic identity, their modes of resource procurement and their internal structures as organisational determinants of the type of incentive used for mobilisation. The section concludes with a brief discussion of the desiderata of this strand of research.

2.2.1 Ethnic Identity

Ethnic identity is assumed to be crucial in group formation (Bates 1974; Cederman and Girardin 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Gurr 2000; Horowitz 1985). Ethnic identities offer specific markers of community based on characteristics like physical appearance, religion, language, region of residence and any other indicator of a common descent. These shared characteristics create patterns of solidarity and a common belief system among individuals, increasing mutual trust and the sense of a common goal (Lichbach 1995). The resultant community makes it easier for its members to join forces and act as a group. Against this background, scholars regard ethnic identity as a crucial factor in the emergence and maintenance of rebel movements (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Ellingsen 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Reynal-Querol 2002).

Zahar (2000), for example, conceptualises ethnic identities as a central determinant in the occurrence of one-sided violence. When a rebel group identifies with a particular ethnic group, it is likely that rebel fighters will not prey on the members of that ethnic group - to do so would be to prey on their own kin. At the same time, however, violence against non-members of the ethnic group becomes sometimes more likely as they can be perceived as enemies of the ethnic group the rebels are representing (Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Byman 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2000). Ethnic identity is therefore assumed to define the constituencies of rebel groups and their enemies.

To illustrate both aspects, Zahar (2000) refers to the Lebanese Hezbollah, a group which considers Lebanon's Shi'a community as its primary constituency and provides various social services to Shiites. Over time, Lebanese Shiites have accepted Hezbollah as the representative of their grievances and are staunch supporters of the group. However, this strong affiliation has also made it easier for Hezbollah to regard civilians of other groups - for example, Sunnis or Maronite Christians - as legitimate targets of violence.

More recent research accepts the basic premise of rebel groups using ethnic identities to gain access to civilian populations. In contrast to Zahar (2000), however, they combine this argument with an 'opportunity model of rebellion'. Weinstein (2005; 2007) identifies rebel groups with close links to a particular ethnic groups as generally less predatory towards the population than rebel groups without such affiliations. Ethnic recruitment attracts fighters who are more interested in the overall long-term benefits of 'their' group and are less interested in personal short-term benefits. Consequently, ethnically motivated rebel fighters do not prey on the population. According to this logic, violence against the population is primarily committed by rebel groups

which rely on material incentives rather than ethnic or ideological incentives. Such groups are assumed to attract rebel fighters who are almost exclusively interested in their personal benefit. As a result, looting and predation are much more common.

Weinstein (2005; 2007) supports this theoretical logic with evidence from in-depth case studies of civil wars in Mozambique, Peru and Uganda. The detailed accounts of the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and the Shining Path in Peru show that violence by rebel fighters was more likely when the particular rebel group relied on material resource incentives. A similar conclusion is presented in Lyall's (2010) analysis of Russian 'sweep' operations in the Chechen civil war, which finds that civilian victimisation is less likely when the soldiers in these operations are co-ethnics of the targets.

The hypothesised relationship between ethnic identities and violence against civilians is far from conclusively confirmed, however. In a micro-level analysis of the civil war in Sierra Leone, for example, Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) do not find any statistically significant evidence for the claim that civilian victimisation is less likely when rebels are fighting in their own ethnic communities, or when a substantial proportion of civilians in the conflict zone are co-ethnics of the rebel fighters.¹³ They do find, however, that the ethnic structure of the rebel group itself affects civilian victimisation. As the level of ethnic homogeneity among rebels' rank-and-file membership increases, the level of violence against civilians regardless of their respective ethnic identities decreases. It seems, therefore, that ethnic homogeneity strengthens social networks within the rebel group which ultimately helps in policing and sanctioning abusive behaviour.

2.2.2 Material Resources

It is of great importance to a rebel movement for its leaders to have access to substantial amounts of material resources in order to recruit and equip fighters and finance their operations (Laqueur 1977; Leites and Wolf 1970; Tilly 1978; Wickham-Crowley 1990; Zahar 2000). Material resources come in various forms and from varied sources (Le Billon 2001, 2005; Weinstein 2007; Wemmann 2007). They may be donated voluntarily by the civilian population, they can be extorted from the population, they may originate from the exploitation of natural resources, or they may be provided by an external sponsor (Byman et al. 2001; Hovil and Werker 2005; Humphreys 2005; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). Recent studies argue that the type and origin of the necessary resources of a rebel group affect its behaviour towards the civilian population.

¹³This study is based on interviews of former fighters of the RUF, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).

Once again, the underlying logic is provided by Zahar (2000). She discusses a continuum of possible economic relations between armed groups and civilian populations. At the one end of this continuum are armed groups who are heavily dependent on material contributions from the civilian population. Such groups have developed an elaborate system of resource extraction. Examples include Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) in Ethiopia or the Bosnian Serbs in the Republika Srpska (Zahar 2000). At the other end of the continuum are groups who are almost completely independent of contributions from the population. Such groups receive their funds from the exploitation of natural resources or from external sponsors. Examples of this kind of armed group are UNITA in Angola, NPFL in Liberia and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland (Zahar 2000). The higher the dependence of the armed group on the civilian population, the less likely it is that its rebel fighters will victimise the civilian population as to do so would jeopardise their material support (Zahar 2000).

Building on this logic, Weinstein (2005; 2007) presents a detailed theoretical account of the relationship between resources and violence against the population. He argues that rebels utilising the promise of material resource gains to recruit fighters primarily attract those interested in their own short-term benefit. Such privately motivated rebel fighters are far more likely to victimise civilians in order to enrich themselves. Weinstein supports this theory with his case studies of civil wars in Mozambique, Peru and Uganda whilst further evidence can be found in Humphreys and Weinstein's analysis of the violent behaviour of armed factions in the Sierra Leonean civil war (2006).

However, large-N studies of rebel violence against civilians which control for the impact of natural resources and/or external support on violence present inconclusive results (Hultman 2007b; Wood 2010). The existence of external support increases the likelihood of one-sided violence and therefore lends support to the arguments outlined above. However, there is no statistically significant evidence showing that the exploitation of natural resources affects violence against civilians at all. A possible explanation for this is that rebel groups still need local support in forms of workers to extract natural resources (Wood 2010). Following this, resource exploitation would be a consequence of popular support and not a cause of civilian victimisation.

Given this, some scholars offer an alternative explanatory approach (Gallagher Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012; Lawrence 2010; Metelits 2009a,b). They argue that it is not the exploitation of natural resources itself which leads to one-sided violence, but the competition between several conflict parties over these resources. When multiple conflict actors compete over

the same pool of resources, the primary objective of each group is to secure a significant amount of these resources as soon as possible and at all costs. Violence against civilians is then considered a viable option to secure access to natural resources. With this explanation, however, scholars depart from the argument that violence against civilians is committed by privately motivated fighters.

2.2.3 Internal Structure

Finally, some scholars turn to the internal structures of rebel groups to explain civilian victimisation. When a rebel organisation features a clear and effective chain of command, the leadership is able to monitor the behaviour of its fighters (Clapham 1998*a*; Zahar 2000). As a consequence, rebel leaders are able to exert strict control over their rank-and-file members and sanction any acts of violence against civilians by undisciplined fighters. It should therefore be expected that highly organised and disciplined rebel groups are less likely to engage in violence against the civilian populations.

Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) test this hypothesis empirically in their study of the civil war in Sierra Leone. In their interviews with ex-combatants, the authors ask a series of questions about the likelihood of disciplinary action by superiors for violent misbehaviour. Using the data obtained from these interviews, they find support for their hypothesis linking indiscipline to civilian victimisation.

Heger, Jung and Wong (2008) present another test of this hypothesis. In their study, they distinguish between vertically organised and centralised groups with a strong hierarchy; and horizontally organised and decentralised groups featuring a flat hierarchy. Examples of the former are the Hamas in Israel, the NRA in Uganda or the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR), whereas the various Somali groups in the 1990s are examples of the latter. Heger, Jung and Wong (2008) hypothesise that the ability of rebel leaders to control the use of violence and to sanction violent misbehaviour is higher in vertically organised groups than in horizontally organised groups. Their statistical analysis using data on terrorist groups - as well as a case study of the separatist group Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA) - lends support to this hypothesis.

Kalyvas (2003*a*; 2006) rejects indiscipline as the cause of one-sided violence, however. Rather, he argues that violence against civilians during civil wars is often the result of local feuds on the ground which appear as war-related violence. He explores this claim in more detail by distinguishing between two different levels of agency. Firstly, the elites of conflict parties commit

violence in order to achieve their central objectives in the civil war. Secondly, there are a multitude of local actors allied to either one of the conflict parties: they are liable to follow their own private agendas and use the central political cleavages of the war as cover to murder local rivals and enrich themselves using violence.

The common denominator of all these studies is the assumption that one-sided violence is the result of privately motivated individuals (Azam 2002; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Weinstein 2005, 2007; Zahar 2000). The notion that one-sided violence might be a rational decision of rebel leaderships is played down or even not considered at all. It is possible, however, that rebel leaders purposefully establish an undisciplined combat organisation, or allow local actors to settle scores so that they can deny accountability for violence against civilians (Schneider, Banholzer and Haer 2010). Using principal-agent theory, Mitchell (2004) explores this possibility with regard to government forces. He finds that government officials frequently follow such logic to deny accountability for atrocities they have ordered. If this also applies to rebel groups, the focus on the private interests of rebels' rank-and-file members and local actors when analysing civilian victimisation is misleading.

2.2.4 Assessment

In this section, I have reviewed research linking one-sided violence to rebel organisation. Based on the opportunity model of rebellion, scholars focus on the dominant recruitment strategy of rebels in order to explain violence against the population. Rebel leaders have to choose between two recruitment strategies: using economic incentives, which attracts self-interested fighters who are more likely to prey on the population; or utilising political or social incentives to attract those interested in the well-being of the aggrieved population, which results in lower levels of civilian victimisation.

Following these theories, much research has focused on rebel organisation in order to identify the dominant recruitment strategy and, subsequently, the likelihood of civilian victimisation. Here, organisational aspects like the rebels' relationships to ethnic groups, their modes of resource procurement and their internal structures have been identified as important explanatory factors. While this research improves our understanding of the organisation of rebel groups, there is insufficient empirical evidence to conclusively link these organisational factors to one-sided violence.

In particular, the research overemphasises the importance of private interests in explaining one-

sided violence. Civilian victimisation is assumed to be exclusively caused by self-interested groups and undisciplined rank-and-file members. However, this excludes the possibility that the violent misbehaviour of undisciplined fighters is an intention of the rebel leadership. This means that scholars ignore the influential role of rebel leaders and the possibility that these leaders allow and possibly encourage one-sided violence to happen due to strategic reasons dictated by civil war itself.

2.3 One-Sided Violence and Popular Support

The second strand of research pays less attention to rebel organisation and focuses instead on the relationship between conflict actors and the civilian population. The starting point here is that conflict parties in a civil war fight over the distribution of political power (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Kalyvas 2007b; Leites and Wolf 1970). In this power struggle, it is essential for the government and rebels alike to acquire and maintain substantial popular support. Popular support justifies claims to power and constitutes an important source of recruits, political supporters and material assistance (Kalyvas 2006; Laqueur 1977; Leites and Wolf 1970; Lichbach 1995; Tilly 1978; Wickham-Crowley 1990).

However, the distribution of popular support for either government or rebels is not easily determined as both conflict actors compete with each other for the same limited pool of potential supporters (Lichbach 1995; Mason 1989, 1996). Furthermore, the civilian population only lends support to one actor when they deem it rational: they weigh the costs and benefits of supporting either the government or the rebels against each other. Scholars compare this setting to the logic of firms competing for consumers, with governments and rebels taking a role analogous to firms who depend on the supportive behaviour of consumers (the civilians) (DeNardo 1985; Leites and Wolf 1970; Lichbach 1987; Mason 1996). To gain the necessary support, each competitor develops a set of strategies which imposes different costs and benefits on the population.

At this point, the use of violence against the population becomes important. As well as offering additional benefits to the population to facilitate support, a conflict actor can also use violence to increase the costs for those who choose not to lend any support (Goodwin 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Lichbach 1995; Mason 1996; Moore 1995). However, the use of one-sided violence to secure popular support is also considerably risky. Large-scale violence against a civilian population might induce individuals to defect to the opponent in the hope of more protection, leaving the leaders of armed groups with an even more severe lack of support (Kalyvas 2006).

Against this background, the question emerges as to what conditions are required for one-sided violence to become a rational strategy for rebel groups to use in order to secure popular support. To answer this, past research has focused on the balance of power between the conflict actors, the reciprocity of violence and the use of one-sided violence in order to destroy the opponent's support base.

2.3.1 Balance of Power

So far, the most detailed research exploring the relationship between the balance of power between conflict actors and the use of civilian victimisation has been conducted by Kalyvas (1999; 2003b; 2006). Based on the theoretical logic outlined above, Kalyvas (2006) assumes that civilians' costs or benefits for supporting either one of the conflict actors are determined by the conflict actors' relative power. Kalyvas (2006) operationalises the actors' relative power to the degree of territorial control exerted by each conflict party. When a conflict actor exerts effective control over a territory relative to the opponent, it can be assumed that the civilians within this territory consider defection to the opponent as too costly and direct their support to the de facto ruler. A low degree of territorial control relative to the opponent, meanwhile, reduces the costs of defection and civilians will increasingly divert their support to the opponent.

Given limited military resources to achieve full territorial control, Kalyvas (2006) argues that conflict actors resort to civilian victimisation as a strategy of warfare in order to improve their levels of support. Micro-level analyses of the civil wars in Greece (1946-1949) and Vietnam (1965-75) lend empirical support to this argument (Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2009). In both of these conflicts, violence by rebel forces (the Democratic Army of Greece and the Vietcong respectively) was less likely when the rebel group exerted effective control over villages in the region in question. When this was the case, civilians within the region considered defection to the government as too costly and directed their support to the insurgents. When the rebels were unable to effectively control a territory, they resorted to one-sided violence as an alternative strategy to increase the costs of defecting for civilians.¹⁴

As Kalyvas' (2006) theory on violence against civilians rests on very stylized assumptions, recent research tries to flesh out his basic logic. Wood (2010) directs attention to rebels' relative military

¹⁴However, there are also studies which - at least in part - contradict these findings. Analysing the Spanish civil war (1936-1939), Herreros and Criado (2009) present evidence that civilian victimisation was only used by the Francoist rebels as a strategy to secure popular support. In Republican-held territories, violence against civilians was mostly caused by processes of state collapse. Looking at the civil war in Sierra Leone meanwhile, Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) do not find any robust empirical evidence at all to support a relationship between territorial control and violence against civilians.

capabilities, which he defines as the rebel troop's strength relative to government forces.¹⁵ He argues that if rebels have weakly developed military capabilities this will result in a decrease in the amount of popular support they obtain as civilians consider it too costly to back a group which lacks the means to stand their ground against government forces. As a consequence, rebel groups resort to one-sided violence as a means of enforcing popular support. Here, the struggle of the NRA in Uganda (1981-1986) serves as an illustrative example (Kasfir 2005): for as long as they controlled significant military resources they enjoyed widespread popular support and even engaged in democratic village management, but as their military capabilities waned they received less support and began to victimise the population.

Another approach focuses on the impact of structural factors on the balance of power between the conflict actors. Balcells (2010), for example, argues that pre-war ideological allegiances affect the strategic use of civilian victimisation. In an analysis of the Spanish Civil War, she finds that violence against civilians was more likely in localities that exhibited almost equal support for the Republican and Francoist faction prior to the war. Civilian victimisation in such localities had a greater chance of changing the status quo when compared to localities where support was predominantly for one of the ideological factions.

Along the same lines, Lilja and Hultman (2011) argue that violence against civilians is more likely in ethnically heterogeneous regions. Here, the battle over territorial control is structured along ethnic lines and violence against civilians of one ethnic group from an opposing ethnic group is perpetrated with the aim of changing the ethnic make-up of the region. Support for this argument comes from Lilja and Hultman's analysis of violence against civilians by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) between 1985 and 1988. However, the aforementioned study of the Sierra Leonean civil war finds no empirical support for the claim that violence against civilians is less likely in ethnically homogeneous regions (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). Furthermore, Kalyvas (2008) and Wood (2008) strongly argue against this reasoning. Referring to constructivist theory, both authors argue that identities can be easily changed and transformed in times of war. The argument that civilian victimisation is therefore more likely in ethnic conflicts due to fixed ethnic identities cannot be upheld.

Finally, some scholars analyse how military intervention affects violence against the population (Bussmann, Schneider and Haer 2009; Hultman 2010). As intervention often radically changes

¹⁵Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay (2004) complement this approach and analyse how the relative military capabilities of governments and rebels shapes the use of civilian victimisation by government forces. Their findings suggest that government violence against a population is more likely when rebels are relatively strong and enjoy widespread popular support.

the balance of power between the parties in a conflict, it is argued that rebels are more likely to resort to civilian victimisation as a last-minute strategy in order to establish territorial control when third parties intervene on behalf of the government. Bussmann, Schneider and Haer (2009) see this mechanism at work in the Bosnian civil war (1992-1995) whilst Hultman (2010) provides empirical evidence for this argument with an analysis of the impact of military interventions on violence against civilians in all civil wars between 1989 and 2006.

2.3.2 Reciprocity of Violence

The use of one-sided violence as a strategy to acquire and maintain popular support can bear considerable risks for a conflict actor. The civilians under attack may decide to defect and seek protection from the opposing conflict actor. As a consequence, scholars have begun to look at the reciprocal effects of civilian victimisation in greater detail (Balcells 2010; Kalyvas 2006; Lyall 2009; Wood 2010).

To explore the reciprocity of violence, Kalyvas (2006) distinguishes between selective and indiscriminate violence. Selective violence takes place on a low level and targets only those civilians who are known not to lend support to the conflict actor. It increases the costs of not supporting the actor in question, meaning that unsupportive civilians are more likely to lend their support in the future. In contrast, indiscriminate violence takes the form of large-scale attacks against the population regardless of the allegiances of individuals. Here, cooperation with the conflict actor does not improve the situation for civilians as the violence does not distinguish between supporters and non-supporters. As a consequence, civilians do not see any benefits in lending support to the conflict actor perpetrating the violence and defect instead to the opponent in search of protection. This opponent does not have to rely on civilian victimisation in order to enforce popular support.

This logic of violence finds support in micro-level studies of the Greek civil war and the conflict in Vietnam (Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2009). In both cases, acts of indiscriminate violence committed by government forces helped rebel groups. Yet this logic is unable to explain why we still frequently observe indiscriminate violence. Lyall (2009) addresses this puzzle with a case study of the Chechen civil war (2000-2005). His analysis of the relationship between Russian artillery attacks on villages and the subsequent response of Chechen insurgents suggests that Kalyvas (2006) underestimates the effectiveness of indiscriminate violence, which is actually able to deter civilians from lending support to rebel forces.

Against this background, scholars have also focussed on alternative aspects to explore the reciprocity of violence. Wood (2010), for example, links it to the level of rebels' military capabilities relative to the government. He argues that escalating government violence only reduces rebel one-sided violence when the rebels have relatively highly developed military capabilities, for it is only when a rebel group has a realistic chance of winning the conflict that civilians begin to support the insurgent organisation and rebels do not have to use civilian victimisation. When a rebel group is militarily weak, however, civilians see no benefit in supporting them, even when they suffer from large-scale government violence. As a consequence, rebels turn to violence against the population as well. To illustrate this argument, Wood (2010) refers to the situation in Gaza in 2009, when Israel's violent campaign in the Gaza strip did not result in increased support for Hamas as Gaza civilians did not consider them capable of ending their hardships. As a consequence, Hamas fighters used violence against civilians in order to generate popular support.

Finally, Bussmann, Schneider and Haer (2009) explore the reciprocal effects of one-sided violence in their study of the civil war in Bosnia. They conceptualise this form of violence as a way of exterminating the opponent's civilian support base and argue that it is likely to lead to a situation of tit-for-tat violence in which violence against the population by one conflict actor will provoke retaliation from their opponent, which will also be directed against the population. In the Bosnian civil war, for example, attacks by Serbian forces on Bosnian civilians were answered with attacks by Bosnian forces on Serbian civilians. Similarly, Balcells (2010) finds empirical evidence suggesting that occurrences of civilian victimisation by either Republican or Francoist forces in the Spanish Civil War were often followed by incidents of civilian victimisation by the opposing side, and that these were motivated by the desire for revenge and retaliation.

2.3.3 Exterminatory Violence

Finally, some scholars consider violence against the population not as a strategy to facilitate support for one's own group, but as a strategy to destroy the support base of the opponent (Azam and Hoeffler 2002; Bussmann, Schneider and Haer 2009; Hultman 2007*a,b*, 2008).

Hultman (2007*a*) argues that the asymmetric nature of civil war results in extreme sensitivity to military defeats within rebel organisations, whilst governments remain relatively unaffected due to their highly developed military capabilities. High rebel losses on the battlefield minimise the ability of rebel groups to pressure governments into conceding and, ultimately, reduce the prospects of winning the civil war. As a consequence, rebels suffering from military losses look

for alternative means to impose costs on the government and identify violent attacks against the civilian population as a suitable strategy. The 2004 Gatumba massacre in Burundi serves as an illustrative example here (Hultman 2007a). Prior to the massacre, its main perpetrator - the Palipehutu Forces for the National Liberation (Palipehutu-FNL) - suffered several military setbacks on the battlefield and used the large-scale killing of civilians in order to show their unwavering resolve.

In contrast to this finding, Bussmann, Schneider and Haer (2009) find that a conflict actor which is succeeding on the battlefield is more likely to attack civilians. Their argument is that the stronger actor resorts to violence against the civilian population in order to further diminish popular support for the defeated opponent: civilian victimisation serves to eradicate the opponent's support base. They refer to the Bosnian civil war to support their argument, finding that large-scale campaigns of ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Serbs were more likely after the Bosnian Serbs had successfully conquered territory.

Recently, scholars have argued that the use of one-sided violence as a strategy to destroy an opponent's support base is also moderated by the country's regime type.¹⁶ So far, such research has primarily focused on the impact of democracy on government violence against civilian populations (Downes 2006, 2007, 2008; Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004). Only Hultman (2007b) constitutes an exception as she explicitly analyses how rebels use this strategy in different regimes. As noted above, Hultman (2007a; 2008) considers violent attacks not as a rebel strategy to enforce popular support but as a strategy aimed at imposing costs on the government. This strategy seems to be particularly effective in democracies as the government derives its legitimacy - to some extent - from successfully protecting the population. When a government is unable to protect its civilians and the population becomes the target of terrorist attacks it risks losing its legitimacy and may be more willing to concede to rebel demands. Hultman's (2007b) quantitative analysis of civil wars taking place between 1989 and 2004 lends empirical support to this reasoning.

2.3.4 Assessment

In this section, I have reviewed theories of one-sided violence which focus on the relationships between conflict actors and the civilian population. Civil wars are struggles over the political power to rule a country's population. Given this, conflict actors depend on popular support in

¹⁶This argument draws heavily from past research on terrorism (e.g., Eubank and Weinberg 1994, 2001; Li 2005; Pape 2005).

order to justify their claims to power and, more importantly, to receive the necessary means to engage in combat. Civilian victimisation is a suitable strategy to enforce such support when non-violent strategies fail.

Empirical research has presented sound support for this conceptualisation of one-sided violence. The balance of power between rebel groups and government forces is identified as a central determinant of violence against civilian populations. However, research on alternative factors of the strategic interactions between governments and rebels has not yielded equally solid results: the reciprocity of one-sided violence and the use of exterminatory one-sided violence are not fully understood yet, for example.

While war-related factors seem to be significant predictors for one-sided violence, more recent studies indicate that they are not the only ones. Increasingly, rebel organisation is identified as an additional determinant influencing the strategic use of one-sided violence. So far, however, research into these organisational factors is still at an initial stage and has not yet resulted in conclusive findings.

2.4 Summary

In this chapter, I have reviewed research on one-sided violence in civil wars. I opened with a conceptualisation of this type of civil war violence where, based on previous work, I understand one-sided violence as the rational use of violence by rebel groups against a civilian population. I noted that scholars explain the occurrence of such violence with two broad explanatory approaches. Firstly, civilian victimisation occurs when a rebel group recruits primarily from self-interested individuals. The organisation of a rebel group is assumed to determine whether such recruitment is used by rebel leaders. Secondly, civilian victimisation is explained with regard to the relationship between conflict actors and the civilian population. Rebels depend on popular support and may use violence to enforce it when other options are not available or more 'expensive'.

The first strand of research adds an important dimension to our understanding of conflict actors in civil wars. By disaggregating rebel groups, we gain invaluable insights into the political, social and economic workings of these insurgents. However, scholars linking rebel organisation to one-sided violence do not properly embed their research within the wider context of civil wars: they have a tendency not to consider violence against civilians as resulting from the rational actions of rebel leaders, but as a by-product of rebellion. Their argument is that civilian victimisation

is caused by self-interested and undisciplined rank-and-file members of rebel organisations. This excludes the possibility that the violent actions of undisciplined fighters are intended by the rebel leadership. This strand of research, then, disregards the strategic dimension of civilian victimisation in civil wars.

It is this strategic dimension of rebel violence against civilians that the second strand of research focuses on. Here, one-sided violence is conceptualised as the result of strategic interactions between governments, rebels and civilians in internal wars. However, the theories developed remain overly stylized and exclude important aspects of civil wars. For example, scholars disregard the potential impact of rebel organisation on the strategic use of civilian victimisation. Instead, it is implicitly assumed that violence as a rational action is not constrained by organisational factors. But as this literature review has shown, differences in the organisation of conflict actors matter a great deal.

In the remainder of this thesis, I address the omissions of these two theoretical approaches. I follow the concept of one-sided violence as a rational action of rebel leaders. Rather than focus on how the strategic interaction shapes the calculus of the conflict actors in deciding whether to use violence against a civilian population, I focus on the organisational constraints shaping the occurrence of such violence. I argue that rebel organisation has an important impact on the use of strategic violence against a civilian population.

A Theory of Rebel Organisation and One-Sided Violence

In this chapter, I develop a theoretical model for analysing rebel one-sided violence in civil wars. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first presents the main assumptions of the analytical framework: I discuss the central actors, their objectives and preferences. Based on these assumptions, the second section introduces a basic model of rebel organisation and popular support in civil wars. This model conceptualises the organisational characteristics of rebel groups as determinants of their ability to secure popular support. It suggests that when the organisational characteristics of a rebel group prevent achieving such support non-violently, the group resorts to violent means. In the third section, I discuss selected organisational characteristics of rebel groups in greater detail and formulate hypotheses linking these characteristics to the onset and level of rebel one-sided violence. The final section summarises the theoretical model.

3.1 Actors and Their Objectives

In Chapter 2, I conceptualised violence against civilians as a rational action of rebel groups. Following past research, I resort to economic theories of civil war to analyse rebel one-sided violence (e.g., [Azam and Hoeffler 2002](#); [Downes 2008](#); [Hultman 2008](#); [Humphreys and Weinstein 2006](#); [Kalyvas 2006](#); [Mason 1989, 1996](#); [Weinstein 2005, 2007](#)). Economic theory is based on the assumption that any social phenomenon is the result of utility-maximising actors guided solely by their self-interest (e.g., [Hegre and Sandler 2002](#); [Leites and Wolf 1970](#); [Lichbach 1989](#); [Muller and Weede 1990](#); [Sandler 2000](#)). The decision on which course of action is pursued is based on

the expected costs and benefits of each of the available actions.¹⁷ I now provide a more detailed overview over the key actors and their central objectives.

3.1.1 Rebel Leaders and Civilians

At the core of economic theory lies the assumption of the individual as the central unit of analysis. This is commonly known as methodological individualism (Arrow 1994; Schumpeter 1909; Udehn 2002). Informed by this concept, the economic analysis of conflict often treats rebel groups as unitary actors and consequently disregards the internal dimension of the rebels' decision-making process (e.g., Hegre et al. 2001; Lichbach 1987; Sambanis 2002).¹⁸ However, as I have outlined in Chapter 2 above, it is empirically misleading to conceptualise rebels as unitary actors. A rebel group is actually a collective actor constituted by different organisational elements (Clapham 1998b; Pearlman 2010; Shellman, Hatfield and Mills 2010). It is therefore necessary to clarify which element of this collective actor is actually responsible for acts of one-sided violence.

Until now, research on the relationship between rebel organisation and one-sided violence has focused almost exclusively on rank-and-file rebel fighters as the main perpetrators (e.g., Azam 2002; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Weinstein 2005, 2007). Implicitly, this perspective assumes that violence against civilians is the consequence of privately motivated rebel fighters living off civilians' possessions. Thus, and also implicitly, this approach assumes that one-sided violence does not serve any strategic objectives of the rebel leadership. Furthermore, it is also implied that rebel leaders are unable to exert control over their fighters and have to accept any predatory behaviour of their subordinates.

As I argued in Chapter 2 above, this conceptualisation tends to overemphasise the influence of rank-and-file rebel fighters (Schneider, Banholzer and Haer 2010; Tarrow 2007). It seems unrealistic to assume that rebel leaders are unable to exercise significant control over their subordinates (Gates 2002; Lichbach 1995). Furthermore, it is frequently the case that violence which appears to be the predatory actions of undisciplined fighters is actually tolerated - or even intended - by rebel leaderships (Herbst 2000; Kalyvas 2007a). Given this, I focus on rebel leaders as the main perpetrators of one-sided violence and understand them as the central authority when

¹⁷Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007), Grossman (1995) and Hirshleifer (1995) present comprehensive reviews of this theoretical approach.

¹⁸Although the government of a state is naturally a central actor of civil war as well, my theoretical approach excludes governments from analysis. This is due to the focus of the thesis on the impact of rebels' organisational characteristics on instances of one-sided violence. The organisation of a rebel group differs substantially from the organisation of a state (Herbst 2000, 2004; Zahar 2000). Consequently, government violence and rebel violence against civilians is shaped by different organisational logics. However, I include a number of control variables to account for the strategic interaction between government and rebels during a civil war in the subsequent quantitative analysis (Chapter 4).

it comes to the decision whether a rebel group should resort to one-sided violence or not. With this conceptualisation, I follow past research which considers one-sided violence as a rational action of rebel leaders utilised in order to achieve certain strategic objectives during civil wars (Goodwin 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Mason 1996).

To illustrate the power of rebel leaders, I refer to the Liberian NPFL under Charles Taylor (Ellis 1999; Herbst 2000). They are often understood as archetypal undisciplined fighters, who constantly and violently preyed on the civilian population for private gain. Ellis (1999), however, points out that Charles Taylor was always able to control his fighters: he refers to the third battle for Monrovia in 1996, where the NPFL was able to accomplish specific military objectives despite the looting of the city. It can be assumed that this predation was sanctioned by Charles Taylor himself, as the NPFL advance was dubbed ‘Operation Pay Yourself’ by its military commanders.

The other actors of interest in this thesis are civilians. In Chapter 2, I defined civilians as non-combatants, i.e. individuals who do not actively participate in the armed conflict between government and rebels. Some scholars conceptualise civilians as a unitary actor when they identify the civilian population as a whole as the target of rebel violence (e.g., Hultman 2007a; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Weinstein 2005, 2007). This conceptualisation implies that civilians are passive victims of rebel violence.

Such a conceptualisation cannot be upheld, however. Research into the relationship between rebel groups and civilian populations shows that the latter are actually able to influence the violent behaviour of the former (Kalyvas 2006; Leites and Wolf 1970; Mason 1989, 1996; Wickham-Crowley 1990). Scholars argue that support from the civilian population is essential for rebel leaders to conduct military operations and to ensure the continued functioning of their group. Furthermore, civilians can also withhold support from the rebel group. Consequently, it seems reasonable to conceive of individual civilians as rational actors who either support or do not support rebel movements (Kalyvas 1999, 2003b, 2006; Mason 1989, 1996).

The conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A provides an illustrative example of this relationship between rebels and civilians (Johnson 2003). In the early years of the civil war, the SPLM/A received considerable support from civilians in southern Sudan. However, some of this support waned after civilians of certain ethnic groups decided to back splinter factions of the SPLM/A in the early 1990s. As a consequence, civilian victimisation by the Sudanese rebels increased. Finally, the SPLM/A was able to restore much of its popular support in the late 1990s when civilians decided to back the rebels again and this coincided with a decrease in violence against civilians. This example shows that civilians were indeed actors (rather than

being only passively present) who - at some point during the conflict - retracted their support from the SPLM/A. It also shows that the population was not a unitary actor as different ethnic groups behaved differently towards various rebel groups.

In sum, the central actors of this theoretical model are the leaders of a rebel group and the individual civilians who form a country's non-combatant population. The former determine the actions of a rebel groups whilst the latter react to these actions during the course of a conflict.

3.1.2 Political Power and Survival

The next step is to specify the interests that we think rebel leaders and civilians attempt to pursue as rational actors. As I have noted, the economic analysis of civil war is based on the assumption that any decision taken is based on the interests and objectives of the respective actors (Hegre and Sandler 2002; McCarty and Meirowitz 2007; Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953; Sandler 2000). Given these objectives, an actor evaluates which actions should be pursued in order to further his or her interests, i.e. the actor makes a rational choice. By doing this, it is assumed that the actor has sufficient knowledge to assess the expected costs and benefits of each action.

At first sight, civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa seem to be motivated by a very diverse set of objectives. For example, the Rwandan FPR under Paul Kagame sought only to oust the sitting Hutu government. The Angolan UNITA, on the other hand, had the objective of a fundamental regime change. Other rebel groups focus their efforts on a sub-national level. The rebel groups in the Sudanese region of Darfur, for example, have always claimed that their main objective is to achieve increased levels of autonomy for their home region. However, such demands may conceivably evolve into other demands, such as secession from the central state, as was the case with the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) in Senegal, the rebels in the Angolan Cabinda exclave and EPLF in Ethiopia.

Some scholars have claimed that these political objectives have increasingly been replaced by economic agendas: exploiting a country's natural resources, for example, or protecting networks of patronage and corruption (e.g., Duffield 2001; Kaldor 2001; Kaplan 2000; Münkler 2005).¹⁹ The rebellion of the RUF in Sierra Leone, NPFL in Liberia and the various rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo serve as examples for this argument. In these civil wars, it seems that personal enrichment is the main objective of the rebel leaders.

¹⁹This argument has been widely criticised for its theoretical and empirical shortcomings (e.g., Henderson and Singer 2002; Kalyvas 2001; Melander, Öberg and Hall 2009; Newman 2004).

However, this strand of research disregards that economic agendas also serve political objectives. Scholars consider the economic interests of elites in the aforementioned countries as an alternative way of accumulating political power (Bates 2008; Keen 1998; Reno 1998, 2007). When an actor commands meaningful economic resources, the actor can use these to buy political influence. I therefore assume that the guiding interest of the political entrepreneurs who constitute rebel leaderships is to form and maintain an organisation which is able to win political power in a contest with the government of the state (Weinstein 2005).

Civilians are guided by a different set of interests. Early studies of civil war assumed that civilians engage in a rebellion when they suffer from severe grievances (e.g., Davies 1962; Gurr 1968, 1970; Lichbach 1989; Midlarsky 1988; Muller 1985; Muller and Seligson 1987). These grievance-based explanations argue that people rebel when their political, social or economic situation has become unbearable and their only way to redress their situation is through the use of violence. However, such approaches are unable to account for the fact that whilst grievances are ubiquitous in many societies, civil war is a relatively rare event (Tilly 1978).

Consequently, scholars have begun to move beyond the exclusive focus on grievances to explain civilians' behaviour during civil wars. Kalyvas (2006) argues that grievances and ideological preferences are of only secondary importance when civilians are facing imminent violence and possibly death. Civil war violence also has a potentially negative impact on the political, economic and social well-being of civilians as a result of famines, diseases and displacement (Ghobarah, Huth and Russett 2003; Human Security Centre 2005; Iqbal 2006). Following past research, I therefore assume that civilians are primarily interested in securing their survival and well-being (Azam 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Mason 1996).

3.2 Rebel Groups and Popular Support

In this section, I present a model specifying the theorised relationship between rebel organisation and one-sided violence. The purpose of this model is to develop testable hypotheses for the empirical analysis conducted in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. The model is based on the conceptualisation of rebel groups and civilians as the central actors of interest in civil wars and makes use of the central tenets of collective action theory (Hardin 1982; Lichbach 1995; Moore 1995; Olson 1971).

At the outset, it is important to recall the definition of civil war presented in Chapter 2: a civil war is a violent conflict between the government of a state and at least one armed opposition

group over the distribution of political power within the affected state (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Kalyvas 2006; Sambanis 2004). First and foremost, such a conflict is carried out on the battlefield. That is, the government of the state and the rebel group engage in military combat in order to militarily overpower their opponent (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). However, past research has shown that the military contest between government forces and rebel fighters captures only one aspect of civil wars. The conflict parties are also caught in a political competition over support from the civilian population (DeNardo 1985; Leites and Wolf 1970; Lichbach 1995; Popkin 1979; Tullock 1971): such support is crucial as it determines the level of political backing, number of recruits and amount of material support for the parties. Popular support is of particular importance for rebel groups as they have to build their military and political organisation from scratch (Clapham 1998a; Herbst 2000; Zahar 2000).

Rebel groups, however, face considerable obstacles in their efforts to secure popular support. As I have argued above, civilians are assumed to be rational actors who examine the costs and benefits of their political actions and try to minimise the former while maximising the latter (McCarty and Meirowitz 2007; Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953; Olson 1971). Lending support to an armed rebellion carries considerable risk and may be extremely costly for civilians (Lichbach 1995; Mason 1996; Popkin 1979; Silver 1974; Tullock 1971). They have to share their scarce resources with rebels and are likely to face government reprisals. Furthermore, the costs of lending support to a rebel group are not necessarily outweighed by the benefits. Even if rebels are able to win against often better trained and equipped government soldiers, it is uncertain whether they will be able to live up to their promises and improve their supporters' lives. More often than not, therefore, civilians come to the decision not to lend support to rebel forces (DeNardo 1985; Lichbach 1995; Popkin 1979; Tullock 1971).²⁰

Given this, rebel groups face a collective action problem (Lichbach 1995; Moore 1995; Olson 1971; Popkin 1979; Tullock 1971). They depend on the support from the civilian population but civilians are often reluctant to give this support due to the costs attached to supporting a rebellion. According to the logic of collective action, however, there are a number of strategies available to rebels to solve this problem by influencing civilians' cost-benefit calculus. These strategies can be broadly grouped into two categories. Firstly, rebels may use non-violent strategies to secure popular support: Certain organisational characteristics of a rebel group allow rebels to increase civilians' expected benefits and decrease their expected costs of lending support to a rebel group (Lichbach 1995; Moore 1995; Tilly 1978).²¹ Secondly, rebels may rely on violent strategies in

²⁰For a competing view, see Kalyvas and Kocher (2007).

²¹As I have outlined in Chapter 2, however, a considerable amount of research on rebel groups fails to ac-

order to increase civilians' costs of not lending support. By attacking the civilian population, rebels not only punish (suspected) defectors; they also signal to civilians that non-compliance entails severe consequences. Ultimately, this changes civilians' cost benefit calculations to the extent that supporting the rebel group becomes a rational action (Goodwin 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Mason 1996).

In the remainder of this section I present the main non-violent strategies rebels use in order to secure support from the civilian population, discuss one-sided violence as an alternative strategy to enforce support and - finally - develop three propositions which explain how rebels choose which strategy to pursue.

3.2.1 Non-Violent Strategies to Secure Popular Support

There are a wide range of non-violent strategies available to rebel leaders to help them sustain their group during the course of a civil war.²² The first set of these solutions focuses on the benefit side of civilian support for a rebellion. Civilians support a rebel group when the expected benefits of this support exceed its expected costs.

One way rebels may seek to increase the benefits to civilians of siding with their forces is to make use of incomplete information (Coleman 1990; Downs 1957; Lichbach 1995; Siegenthaler 1989). Rebel leaders often resort to ideologies to justify their armed struggle and these ideologies, by necessity, overplay what can be achieved with a successful rebellion. As a result, civilians might be insufficiently informed about the real benefits of collective action and assume higher expected benefits resulting in these civilians' decision to support the rebel group.²³ UNITA, for example, followed a Maoist ideology and promised their followers that a socialist and democratic Angola was a realistic goal. Likewise, the secessionist movements in Senegal or the Angolan enclave Cabinda motivated their supporters with the prospect of achieving an independent state.

Alternatively, the expected benefits of a rebellion increase when civilians are convinced that the rebel group has a high probability of winning the civil war (Lichbach 1995; Moore 1995). In such cases, civilians believe that a rebellion can make a difference and that the expected benefits of a successful rebellion could outweigh the costs of government repression. A good example of

knowledge this relationship between rebel organisation and the level of popular support given to a rebel group.

²²Since Olson's (1971) seminal study on the 'collective action problem', an extensive body of research has explored potential solutions. This section can only present part of this research and is therefore inevitably incomplete. I mostly focus on Lichbach's (1995) application of the collective action problem to the situation of rebels in civil war to discuss the available solutions.

²³Ideology can also cloud the costs of supporting a rebel group (Lichbach 1995). When civilians are not aware of the actual costs, they are more likely to contribute to collective action.

this mechanism is provided by the EPLF, who fought for Eritrean independence from Ethiopia (Pool 1998). They were one of the most well-organised rebel groups in sub-Saharan Africa, boasting a coherent command hierarchy, a thorough, well-established training programme for recruits; and maintaining high levels of discipline throughout the civil war. By focusing their existing resources in these ways, the EPLF's leaders were able to sustain their struggle and finally achieved independence from Ethiopia.

Finally, rebel leaders can use selective incentives to solve the collective action problem (Lichbach 1994, 1995; Popkin 1979; Tullock 1971). Selective incentives are defined as "private benefits that can be withheld from those who do not participate in the collective action" (Mason 2004, 87). When rebel leaders provide selective incentives to civilians, the expected benefits of supporting the rebellion increase as civilians are offered additional perks. Examples here would include the protection of villages from government reprisals or the provision of agricultural land, cattle or grain in return for support.

Whether rebel leaders can apply this solution depends on the availability of resources, however. In this regard, Metelits (2009a; 2009b) identifies the number of rebel factions as the main determining factor. Resources are normally scarce and the greater the number of rebel groups active in a conflict, the lower the likelihood that there will be enough resources for the provision of selective incentives. The SPLM/A in Sudan, for example, had to compete with numerous splinter factions during the 1990s (Johnson 1998), hampering their ability to secure the resources necessary for the distribution of selective incentives.

The second set of solutions turns to the costs of civilian support to collective action. A decrease in the expected costs makes it more likely that civilians lend support to the rebel group.

One way of doing this is to refer to pre-existing communities. Olson's (1971) initial model of collective action ignores the fact that individuals do not act in a vacuum but may be members of families, villages, clans and ethnic or religious groups (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 1996, 2009). These communities create common values and patterns of solidarity among civilians which can be utilised to facilitate popular support (Lichbach 1995; Marwell, Oliver and Prahl 1988; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978). When civilians can rely on their relatives, neighbours or co-ethnics to act as well, the costs of support (government repression, for example) are shouldered by a larger group which effectively decreases the costs for each individual.

Such communal links can be found in numerous sub-Saharan African rebel movements. The rebel groups in Burundi and Rwanda, for example, sought to appeal to the ethnic groups of

either the Hutu or Tutsi for their political and material support. Likewise, rebel groups with a religious ideology may be able to rely on that religious community: examples here include the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in Somalia, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM-AS) and Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa in Nigeria.

Finally, the costs of rebellious collective action can be minimised when rebel groups receive support from external actors (Lichbach 1995). Assistance from state or non-state actors located beyond the borders of the war-affected country can come in very different forms: political support, the supply of weaponry, military training, intelligence, economic funding or even extra-territorial bases. In all these instances, the external assistance defrays the costs of rebellion by providing central resources to the rebel group. As a result of this subsidisation, civilians face lower costs when supporting a rebel group which makes collective action more likely.²⁴

The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo serves as an illustrative example for the effects of external support. The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Kinshasa (AFDL), the MLC and the RCD (and its various splinter factions) all received external support from neighbouring states (Prunier 2004) which enabled them to recruit and arm fighters and conduct their military operations

Taken together, rebels can - theoretically - fall back on a large variety of non-violent strategies to secure popular support during a civil war. The question is, however, whether all of these strategies are actually available to a rebel group. Ultimately, this depends on a group's organisational configuration: whether its ideology, leadership, population base, external supporters and domestic rebel competitors permit the application of one or more of these non-violent strategies (Lichbach 1995; Moore 1995; Tilly 1978).

3.2.2 Violent Strategies to Enforce Popular Support

Rebel leaders can also resort to violence to enforce popular support. Again, my analysis of violent strategies focuses on the cost-benefit calculations made by civilians.

It is assumed that rebels are able to identify those civilians who choose not to contribute to the collective action effort as they consider supporting a rebel group to be too costly. If rebel leaders detect these non-contributors, they can use violence to punish them, increasing the expected costs of not contributing to the collective action effort (Kalyvas 2006; Leites and Wolf

²⁴However, external support can also lead to the co-optation of the rebel group by the outside actor (Hovil and Werker 2005; Lichbach 1995): this constitutes a serious challenge for the group as civilians might refrain from supporting them if they consider it to be the puppet of the external sponsor.

1970; Lichbach 1995; Mason 1996). Alternatively, rebel leaders may kill defectors, signalling to other civilians that the costs of non-contribution are high. Civilians then have to consider that they could face violent sanctions should they abstain from collective action. As a consequence, non-contribution might be considered as more costly than contributing.

Past research has followed this logic in order to explain acts of one-sided violence in civil wars (e.g., Balcells 2010; Kalyvas 1999, 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2009; Lyall 2010). Hultman (2009), for example, looks at Mozambique's RENAMO rebels, who killed civilians and burned villages with the explicit aim of spreading fear among the population. In so doing, they projected the message that civilians would pay with their lives if they did not support their efforts, a strategy that helped them continue their armed struggle for sixteen years.

However, the use of violence against civilians in order to enforce popular support is a considerably risky strategy for rebel leaders with high costs for themselves (Kalyvas 2006; Lichbach 1995; Mason 1996). One-sided violence by rebels has the potential to alienate civilian populations when it is excessive and when it targets innocent civilians. If civilians feel alienated from the rebel group they might decide to seek support from the government, abandoning the rebels altogether. In this case, the rebel leader's attempts to sustain their group would be severely hampered.

The conflict ravaging northern Uganda clearly illustrates the risks that perpetrating one-sided violence may pose to rebels (e.g., Bevan 2007; Vinci 2005). From the beginning of their armed struggle against the Museveni regime in Kampala, LRA fighters victimised the local population in northern Uganda, raping and killing villagers and abducting children. Over time, civilian victimisation by the LRA became so extreme that civilians saw that their only chance for survival lay in seeking protection from the government and so they ceased to provide support for the rebels.

This conceptualisation of one-sided violence as a strategy used by rebel groups to enforce popular support allows me to further refine the phenomenon under analysis. The definition of one-sided violence presented in Chapter 2 encompassed a wide range of phenomena including torture, sexual violence, mass killings and forced displacement. However, this broad definition might constitute a problem for a sound empirical analysis of the outlined theoretical model if not all these forms of civilian victimisation are employed by rebel groups for the same purpose, that is to enforce support. As several scholars point out, low-scale and non-lethal violence is not necessarily committed under the orders of rebel leaders, but is often the consequence of predatory rank-and-file fighters (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Weinstein 2007). The inclusion of such instances

of one-sided violence in an analysis of the use of violence to enforce support will obfuscate the empirical results.

In order to avoid this problem I refine the definition of one-sided violence used in this thesis. Following Eck and Hultman (2007), I exclusively focus on the direct and intentional use of violence against civilians and exclude indirect instances of violence as, for example, in forced displacements or famines. Furthermore, I concentrate solely on instances of civilian victimisation resulting in fatalities, i.e. the direct and deliberate killing of civilians by rebel forces. Non-lethal types of violence against the population are excluded. Given that I assume that rebel leaders are normally able to exercise full control over their rank-and-file fighters, this direct, intentional and lethal use of violence against civilians is consequently implicitly sanctioned, tolerated or encouraged or even explicitly ordered by rebel leaders.

3.2.3 Model Propositions

In the following, I make use of rational-choice theory to hypothesise under which circumstances a rebel group relies on non-violent strategies to secure popular support, and when it resorts to violent strategies instead and what level of one-sided violence it then uses.

Rational-choice theory postulates that an actor chooses a particular course of action when the net benefit of this action is larger than the net benefits of the other available options (McCarty and Meirowitz 2007; Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953). Against this background, I assume that rebel leaders generally prefer non-violent strategies to secure popular support over violent strategies to enforce such support. Non-violent strategies offer a wide range of options to secure popular support at a relatively low cost (Lichbach 1995; Mason 2004; Moore 1995). In contrast, violent strategies are considerably more costly as they carry the risk that civilians may be permanently alienated from the rebel group (Kalyvas 2006; Lichbach 1995; Mason 1996).

This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 1: Rebel leaders prefer non-violent strategies over violent strategies to secure popular support during a civil war.

However, one has to bear in mind that this proposition refers to an ideal situation in which a rebel group's organisational characteristics allow its leaders to rely on the non-violent strategies discussed above in order to secure support. Only in such cases will rebels choose non-violent over violent strategies.

In reality, however, rebel groups rarely have all of the non-violent strategies at their disposal (Clapham 1998a; Herbst 2000; Zahar 2000). As rebel organisation can vary substantially over time and space, some groups will lack some or all of the organisational characteristics allowing for the use of non-violent strategies in the attempt to secure popular support. In these situations, rebels will be unable to make use of incomplete information, increase their probability of winning, provide selective incentives, exploit communal ties, or benefit from external support; and leaders may instigate a campaign of violence against civilians in an attempt to enforce popular support (Lichbach 1995; Mason 2004; Moore 1995).²⁵ Whilst rebels still face the risk of alienating civilians when using one-sided violence, the alternative of being left with no support at all is far more costly. In terms of rational-choice theory, the benefits of using one-sided violence in order to enforce support now outweigh the costs associated with alienating civilians.

I summarise this reasoning with the second proposition of this study:

Proposition 2: Rebel leaders resort to violent strategies when the organisation of the rebel group constrains the use of non-violent strategies to secure popular support during a civil war.

Figure 3.1 illustrates this proposition. The graph depicts the violent behaviour of a rebel group towards civilians during a civil war. The x -axis depicts time and the y -axis captures whether the group relies on non-violence (0) or violence (1) to secure popular support. Up to t_2 , the group relies on non-violent strategies and does not resort to violence against civilians: to do so would be too costly when compared with the available non-violent strategies. At t_2 , the organisation of the rebel group changes and the non-violent strategy is no longer an available option. At this point, the use of one-sided violence to enforce support becomes the rational choice as there are no non-violent alternatives possible anymore. Consequently, the rebel group switches to violence. At t_5 , rebel organisation again changes and non-violent strategies become available. As a result, the rebel group abstains from violence against civilians. Later in the conflict, this whole process may repeat itself.

The argument that rebel one-sided violence is a strategy to enforce popular support does not end at this point, however. Interestingly, there is substantial variation in the level of rebel one-sided violence over time in a number of cases. For example, UNITA in Angola started a campaign of one-sided violence in 1998 which continued over the next four years but varied considerably in intensity (Eck and Hultman 2007). They killed 64 civilians in 1998, 377 in 1999 and 267 in 2000,

²⁵Chapter 2 shows that the onset of one-sided violence is also shaped by war-related factors. I control for these factors when I test this theoretical model in the empirical analyses reported in Chapter 4.




Figure 3.1: Onset of Rebel One-Sided Violence

a considerable increase that continued into 2001 when 1,132 civilians were killed by UNITA. In 2002, however, the level of one-sided violence decreased sharply and UNITA were responsible for only 57 fatalities. 2003 did not see any rebel one-sided violence at all. Given this frequent variation in the number of civilians killed over time, a comprehensive analysis not only has to explore the factors which trigger campaigns of one-sided violence, but also the factors which shape the level of one-sided violence over the course of such a campaign.

In this study, I assume that the level of one-sided violence is also a result of rebel leaders' cost-benefit calculations. During a campaign of one-sided violence, rebel leaders still face the risk that the excessive use of violence results in civilian alienation and, ultimately, civilian defection (Kalyvas 2006). High levels of one-sided violence are extremely costly, so rebel leaders try to control the number of civilians killed by their forces. They employ a level of one-sided violence of which the benefits still outweigh the costs (Goodwin 2006; Kalyvas 1999, 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2009).

As for the onset of one-sided violence, these cost-benefit calculations are shaped by the organisational characteristics of rebel groups.²⁶ Rebels' use of violent strategies to enforce support

²⁶The level of one-sided violence is also shaped by war-related factors (see Chapter 2). I control for these complementary explanations in my empirical analysis (see Chapter 4).




Figure 3.2: Level of Rebel One-Sided Violence

does not imply that the organisational characteristics of a rebel group preclude all non-violent strategies altogether; it merely means that the rebel group is characterised by an organisation which also requires the use of one-sided violence in order to achieve the necessary levels of popular support. So long as the organisational characteristics of a rebel group allow the use of some non-violent strategies to secure support, high levels of one-sided violence will remain too costly given the potential risk of alienated civilians defecting. Only when the organisational characteristics of the rebels preclude all available non-violent strategies will they resort to large-scale civilian victimisation. In such cases, the costs of high levels of one-sided violence are outweighed by the costs of the alternative options available to the rebels.

This results in the final proposition of this study:

Proposition 3: When rebel leaders do not have any non-violent strategies to secure popular support at their disposal, a low level of one-sided violence is insufficient to enforce popular support and rebel leaders have to employ a high level of one-sided violence instead.

This proposition is illustrated in figure 3.2. As in the previous graph, I depict the violent behaviour of a rebel group towards civilians during a civil war. Here, however, the y -axis

captures the level of violence against civilians. At t_2 , the rebel group resorts to high levels of one-sided violence to enforce popular support. The costs of such violent behaviour do not exceed its benefits as the organisational characteristics of the rebel group preclude almost all non-violent strategies to secure support. At t_3 , however, changes in its organisational configuration allow the group to limit the use of one-sided violence as some non-violent strategies to secure support are now available. This change is only temporary and at t_4 the rebels return to a high level of one-sided violence as a result of another change in their organisational characteristics. Later in the conflict, the whole process repeats itself.

3.3 Hypotheses

The final section of this chapter formulates testable hypotheses linking the organisational characteristics of rebel groups to the onset and level of one-sided violence in sub-Saharan African civil wars. Based on the definition of rebel groups presented in Chapter 2, these hypotheses focus on group ideology, leadership divisions, the characteristics of the population base, the number of external supporters and the number of rebel competitors. Specifically, I explore how the particular nature of these organisational characteristics affects rebels' choice between non-violent and violent strategies in order to secure the support of civilians.

3.3.1 Group Ideology

The first organisational characteristic under scrutiny is the ideology of a rebel group. Following past research, I define ideology as a secular and/or religious belief system identifying the grievances plaguing a society, outlining available remedies and offering a vision of the ideal society (Coleman 1990; Downs 1957; Gurr 1970).

Given this definition, group ideology can have a substantial impact on the likelihood of rebels' popular support as it is able to transform civilians' expectations of rebellious collective action (Coleman 1990; Downs 1957; Lichbach 1995; Siegenthaler 1989). For example, individuals might expect higher benefits from a rebellion when an ideology causes them to believe that the rebels directly address their grievances. In such instances, the increased benefits of supporting the rebels may outweigh the costs of doing so. Likewise, an ideology may be able to decrease the costs if its narrative convinces individuals that their grievances are unbearable and they have no choice but to rebel. Finally, an ideology might propose a set of strategies to address grievances which are perceived by individuals to offer a less costly course of action than not supporting the

rebels.

In sub-Saharan Africa, rebel groups generally follow at least one of three ideologies. The first is ethno-nationalist ideology, which seeks to redress the grievances of a particular ethnic group (Clapham 1998a; Olzak 2004; Sambanis 2001). Ethno-nationalist rebel groups include the MFDC in Senegal and the Hutu rebel groups in Burundi and Rwanda.²⁷ Secondly, there are rebel groups with a revolutionary ideology who seek to overthrow the state's current political order (Clapham 1998a; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Kaufmann 1996). For example, UNITA in Angola pursue a revolutionary socialist agenda while groups like the Chadian Movement for Development and Democracy (MDD) and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) claimed to fight for multi-party democracy. Finally, rebels may have a religious ideology and seek to defend their faith from persecution or force their faith on the entire population (Kniss and Burns 2004; Post, Ruby and Shaw 2002a,b). Here, groups like the Ntsiloulous in the Republic of Congo, the LRA in Uganda and the UIC in Somalia serve as illustrative examples.

In theory, each of these three different ideologies can be used to influence civilians' cost-benefit calculus. However, a closer look at sub-Saharan African civil wars of the past reveals that ethno-nationalist ideologies have been more successful in securing popular support than revolutionary and religious ideologies (Bøås and Dunn 2007a; Clapham 1998a; Heywood 1998; Love 2006).

Ethnicity plays an important role in almost every country in sub-Saharan Africa (Bates 1974; Easterly and Levine 1997; Horowitz 1985; Posner 2004), providing people with markers of common identity based on a common language, origin or region of residence. In the absence of alternative markers in sub-Saharan Africa, ethnicity has become the dominant path of group formation. Unsurprisingly, political competition, economic activities and social life are all structured along ethnic lines. Rebel groups who refer to ethnic identity by means of an ideology which promotes the political or territorial claims of a particular ethnic group can therefore easily tap into already existing narratives. These narratives often shroud the true costs and benefits of rebellion resulting in civilians' cost-benefit calculations being biased in favour of supporting the rebellion.

Revolutionary rebel groups, on the other hand, seek to win over civilian populations in the hope of changing the political order of the state (Clapham 1998a; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Post, Ruby and Shaw 2002b). While revolutionary ideologies often address existing grievances of civilians, they suffer from two shortcomings: Marxism, Maoism and similar ideologies are not as

²⁷Such ethno-nationalist rebels do not necessarily have to pursue increased autonomy or separatism, they may also intend to replace the national government.

deeply embedded in sub-Saharan African societies as in other regions such as, for example, South East Asia or Latin America (e.g., Clapham 1998a; Heywood 1998) and - even more importantly - many rebel groups merely refer to such ideologies in order to cloak the absence of a well-developed political programme. Between 2000 and 2005, for example, four rebel groups emerged in Chad who all claimed to fight for 'democracy', 'democratic change', 'justice' or 'development', yet all of these claims were mere embellishment to their basic desire to oust the sitting government. Given this, it is relatively difficult for rebels to successfully shape civilians' cost-benefit calculus with revolutionary ideologies.

Finally, there are rebel groups who pursue a religious ideology (Basedau and De Juan 2008; Kniss and Burns 2004; Love 2006; Post, Ruby and Shaw 2002b). They share similarities with ethno-nationalist groups in that they may exhibit close ties to pre-existing religious communities. However, many religiously motivated rebel groups in sub-Saharan Africa follow extremely radical and cult-like beliefs and - as a consequence - religious ideologies often only have a following among a small number of fundamentalists and zealots. Beyond such groups of hard-core believers, religious ideologies do not have a substantial impact on larger parts of the civilian population and religious rebels therefore resort to violence to enforce popular support. Examples include the LRA in northern Uganda and the Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa in Nigeria. The former group follows an ideology which proclaims to fight for a state solely ruled by the Ten Commandments and worships its leader, Joseph Kony, as God's prophet; whilst the latter group was built around a core of middle-class Muslims who perceived Nigerian society to be riddled with sin and corruption, and who propagated the formation of a Taliban-like Islamic state.

Given this, I conclude that ethno-nationalist rebel groups are capable of securing popular support through non-violent means while revolutionary or religious groups are not. This means that for ethno-nationalist rebel groups, campaigns of one-sided violence to enforce popular support are often too costly. For revolutionary and religious rebel groups, however, one-sided violence is often a viable means of enforcing support.

H1_a: Ethno-nationalist rebel groups do not resort - ceteris paribus - to one-sided violence in order to enforce popular support while revolutionary or religious rebel groups do.

If a campaign of one-sided violence is already underway, ethno-nationalism allows a rebel group to employ lower levels of violence against civilians than revolutionary or religious rebel groups.

H1_b: Ethno-nationalist rebel groups kill - ceteris paribus - fewer civilians in order to

enforce popular support than revolutionary or religious rebel groups.

3.3.2 Leadership Divisions

After having discussed the expected impact of rebel ideology on one-sided violence, I now turn to the cohesiveness of the political and military leadership of rebel groups (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003; Clapham 1998a; Jordan 2009; Morris and Staggenborg 2004).

As noted above, civilians abstain from lending support to rebel groups as the net benefit of this action often outweighs the net benefit of supporting a rebel group. A cohesive rebel leadership is thus important, as it can increase the benefits associated with supporting a rebel group (Bianco and Bates 1990; Calvert 1992; Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009; Heger, Jung and Wong 2008; Lichbach 1995). Cohesive leadership makes it considerably more likely that the tactics and strategies devised by a rebel group's leaders will be executed accordingly by mid-level commanders and rank-and-file soldiers, increasing the probability that they will win their military conflict against the government. As the likelihood of this victory increases, civilians are more likely to lend support to the rebel group as the expected benefit side of lending support to the rebellion increases.

Rebel group leaderships are not immune to internal divisions and challenges to their authority, however (Clapham 1998b; Gallagher Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012; Kenny 2010; Lawrence 2010). Disagreements over political and military tactics are common - between both the leader and members of their inner circle; and between the leadership and officers at the mid-level in the group's hierarchy. Very often such divisions are fuelled by ideological or ethnic cleavages and personal animosities within the leadership, and over time such divisions can lead to the defection of rebel leaders, coup attempts and the formation of splinter groups.

Angola's UNITA serves as an illustrative example here (UCPD 2011). It was established in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi and he remained its leader throughout the conflict, personally retaining command over all political and military issues. In the 1990s, however, the leadership around Savimbi experienced several divisions. In 1992, two high-ranking cadres defected, accusing Savimbi of torturing and murdering dissenters. After the parliamentary elections in 1993, some of the elected UNITA members under the third-in-command Abel Chivukuvuku decided to take their seats in parliament which further divided the group's leadership. Further divisions became visible in 1995 when a group of high ranking UNITA officials defected to the government and in 1998, leadership divisions led to a split and the emergence of UNITA-Renovada. These divi-

sions were all accompanied by severe military setbacks for UNITA forces and dwindling support among the Angolan population. After the death of Savimbi in 2002, UNITA's armed struggle collapsed altogether.

Another example is the SLM/A, led jointly by Abdel Wahid Mohammad Ahmad Nur and Minni Arkou Minnawi (Tanner and Tubiana 2007). Under their leadership, members of the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit ethnic groups came together to form an armed opposition group with the aims of addressing their long-standing grievances. While the group's leadership remained relatively cohesive until 2004, there were serious disagreements over the course of action in subsequent years. These divisions culminated in the signing of a peace agreement with the government by one of the factions of the SLM/A under the leadership of Minni Minnawi and a subsequent split between Abdel Wahid and Minnawi. As a consequence, large-scale military operations by the rebels against Sudanese government forces became less frequent. The SLM/A was effectively neutralised and its remnants experienced further splits in 2006 and 2007. At the end of 2007, observers counted up to a dozen different breakaway factions due to divisions within the rebel movement.

As these examples show, internal divisions can inflict severe damage on the cohesiveness of a rebel group's leadership with a severe impact on the effectiveness of the group as a whole (Clapham 1998a; Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009; Lichbach 1995). The emergence of dissenting factions disrupts the command structure, with parts of the rebel group transferring their loyalties to the dissenters. Very often, the line of command linking the rebel's leadership, their mid-level commanders and their rank-and-file is destroyed. As a consequence, tactics are insufficiently implemented and the military effectiveness of the group diminishes. This reduces the probability of the group winning their military struggle and civilians are likely to retract their support.²⁸ If this occurs, rebel leaders are often left with one-sided violence as their only available means of enforcing popular support.

Taken together, the occurrence of leadership divisions prevents that rebel leaders engage in central tasks necessary for the maintenance of the movement. Thus, the availability of non-violent strategies to secure popular support decreases and the onset of a campaign of one-sided violence becomes a less costly alternative.

H2_a: Rebel groups with leadership divisions resort - ceteris paribus - to one-sided violence in order to enforce popular support while rebel groups without leadership

²⁸Research on the assassination of the heads of states (e.g., Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Iqbal and Zorn 2006, 2008; Jones and Olken 2009) and the decapitation of terrorist or insurgent movements (e.g., Cronin 2006; Johnston 2010; Jordan 2009; Langdon, Sarapu and Wells 2004) lends support to this line of argument.

divisions do not.

Likewise, the occurrence of leadership divisions reduces the availability of non-violent strategies to secure popular support once a campaign of one-sided violence is underway. Consequently, rebel leaders resort to high levels of violence against civilians to enforce popular support.

H2_b: Rebel groups with leadership divisions kill - *ceteris paribus* - more civilians in order to enforce popular support than rebel groups without leadership divisions.

3.3.3 Population Base

I now turn to a rebel group's population base which forms the main constituency of a rebel movement and provides it with recruits and support (Findley and Edwards 2007; Tilly 1978; Vinci 2007; Zahar 2000).

In terms of collective action theory, it is clear that the existence of such a population base provides the necessary conditions for the creation and survival of rebel groups (Lichbach 1995; Marwell, Oliver and Prahl 1988; Moore 1995; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978). As I argued earlier in this chapter, rebel leaders can secure popular support by drawing on pre-existing social networks and community institutions in local populations, creating ties and shared values between civilians. Utilising these can decrease the civilians' costs for supporting the rebellion and also reduce the likelihood of defection. Strong networks mean that civilians are more likely to lend support to the rebel group.

In sub-Saharan Africa, rebels' constituencies are determined almost exclusively by ethnic identity (Bates 1974; Clapham 1998a; Herbst 2000; Posner 2004; Young 2002), due largely to the high number of ethnic groups in the region.²⁹ These groups offer easy access to the aforementioned social networks, community ties and material resources and so - since colonial times at least - political mobilisation in sub-Saharan Africa has run along ethnic lines.

Rebel groups vary widely in the ethnic composition of their population bases. First of all, some rebel groups rely primarily on one ethnic group: the Front for the Restoration of Democracy (FRUD) in Djibouti recruited almost exclusively from the Afari, whilst the Kamajors in Sierra Leone recruited primarily from the Mende people. Other rebel groups, however, rely on a population base comprising several ethnic groups. For example, the AFDL in the Democratic

²⁹According to Fearon (2003), 43% of the world's ethnic groups are found in sub-Saharan Africa with an average of more than eight groups per country. The average number of ethnic groups per country in other world regions, on the other hand, lies between 3.2 and 4.7 (Fearon 2003).

Republic of Congo was led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila - a member of the Luba tribe - and united the Banyamulenge-Tutsis with a plethora of other ethnic groups (Reed 1998). Likewise, the SPLM/A consisted of an association of Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk and several other southern Sudanese ethnic groups (Johnson and Prunier 1993).

Such variation in ethnic diversity can affect the ability of rebels to tap into the social networks of their population base (Alesina, Baqi and Easterly 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Easterly and Levine 1997; Fearon and Laitin 1996). When rebels utilise these, they can decrease civilians' costs of supporting the rebel movement and can also police non-supporting or defecting civilians. However, this only applies to ethnically homogenous rebel groups - when a rebel movement is based on a coalition of two or more ethnic groups, the density of community ties is reduced as the social networks do not extend across group boundaries. As a result, it becomes increasingly difficult for rebel leaders to utilise the social networks and achieve collective action non-violently (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). Furthermore, it can be assumed that ethnic groups in fractionalised rebel movements are more distrustful of each other as they might fear to be dominated by the other ethnic groups (Gates 2002).

It can be said, then, that rebel groups featuring little ethnic fractionalisation are more successful in utilising pre-existing social networks and community ties to secure popular support. For highly fractionalised rebel groups, resorting to such networks is more difficult and the use of one-sided violence to enforce support is therefore less costly.

H3_a: Highly fractionalised rebel groups resort - ceteris paribus - to one-sided violence in order to enforce popular support while rebel groups with a low level of fractionalisation do not.

A high degree of group fractionalisation also shapes the level of rebel one-sided violence in a similar way. During an ongoing campaign of one-sided violence, highly fractionalised groups have fewer complementary non-violent strategies at their disposal for securing support. For such groups, large-scale violence against civilians is consequently the most rational course of action.

H3_b: Highly fractionalised rebel groups kill - ceteris paribus - more civilians in order to enforce popular support than rebel groups with a low level of fractionalisation.

3.3.4 External Supporters

Next, I consider is the availability of external support for a rebel group. External support can be given by state and non-state actors based in foreign countries (Byman et al. 2001; Clapham 1996, 1998a; Gleditsch 2007; Saideman 2002; Salehyan 2007; Zahar 2000). It can range from diplomatic or political support to the deployment of military advisors; the delivery of weapons and equipment; economic funding; or the provision of trans-border sanctuaries.

External support is important for rebels as they seek to improve their relatively weak political and military position vis-à-vis state governments (Byman et al. 2001; Clapham 1996; Salehyan 2007). Consequently, the vast majority of civil wars since 1989 have featured some form of external involvement on at least one occasion during the conflict, and this has been especially prevalent in sub-Saharan African civil wars where state weakness, porous national borders and regional rivalries offer opportunities for rebel groups to secure support from external actors (Bøås and Dunn 2007b; Clapham 1998a; Jackson 2002).

External support is predominantly provided by state actors as, for example, the government of a foreign state or its military or intelligence services (Bøås and Dunn 2007b; Byman et al. 2001; Clapham 1996, 1998a). Since the end of the cold war, external support from global powers to sub-Saharan African rebel groups has mostly disappeared.³⁰ Yet, neighbouring states or regional powers are the most important external supporters for rebel groups in sub-Saharan Africa. The AFDL, RCD and MLC in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, received massive support from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. At the same time, the government in Kinshasa and its allies supported the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD), the CNDD-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and Palipehutu-FNL in Burundi, the FDLR in Rwanda and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and LRA in Uganda (e.g., Hovil and Werker 2005; Prunier 2004; Reed 1998; Young 2006).

External support may also be given by non-state actors such as rebel groups or refugee populations in neighbouring states (Byman et al. 2001; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). For example, the Liberian NPFL were largely responsible for kick-starting the armed struggle of the RUF in Sierra Leone by providing weapons, training and access to Liberian territory (Richards 1996).

The FDLR in Rwanda, meanwhile, received support from the government of the Democratic

³⁰Since the end of the Cold War, mainly France and the United Kingdom have continued to lend support to various governments and rebel groups to secure their respective spheres of influence in Africa (Jackson 2002). In recent years, however, the United States and China have shown a renewed interest in Africa. The former because of the so-called 'Global War on Terror' (Lyman and Morrison 2004) and the latter owing to its interest in oil and natural resources (Taylor 2006).

Republic of Congo and benefited from the large Hutu refugee population in that country which provided recruits and resources ([International Crisis Group 2003](#)). Due to the limited resources of non-state actors, however, such support is normally less frequent and less extensive compared to the support of state actors.

Externally funded rebel groups often become more or less independent from popular support ([Kalyvas 1999](#); [Lichbach 1995](#)). Such rebels have therefore less reason to resort to violent strategies to enforce support. Even when an externally funded rebel group does continue to depend on popular support, the existence of an outside sponsor helps them to secure this non-violently as rebel leaders receiving material and/or financial assistance can pass on some of these benefits to supportive civilians ([Gurr and Lichbach 1986](#); [Lichbach 1995](#); [Popkin 1979](#)). Additionally, external support may offer rebel leaders the opportunity to spend resources previously earmarked for supplying troops on winning new supporters. Such incentives can push civilians' cost-benefit calculations in favour of supporting rebels, from whom they can expect private benefits.

The previous argument leads to the following hypothesis:

H_{4a}: Rebel groups receiving external support do not resort - ceteris paribus - to one-sided violence in order to enforce popular support while rebel groups which are not receiving external support do.

Along the same lines, the existence of external support also renders large-scale violence against civilians an overly costly course of action. Rebels therefore employ only limited violence during a campaign of one-sided violence when they benefit from external support:

H_{4b}: Rebel groups receiving external support kill - ceteris paribus - fewer civilians in order to enforce popular support than rebel groups which are not receiving external support.

However, there is a caveat. External support provided by a state actor is usually different from external support provided by a non-state actor. While state actors generally have large resources at their disposal, non-state actors like other rebel groups or refugee populations in neighbouring countries can normally command only limited resources ([Byman et al. 2001](#)). It is therefore possible that the effects stipulated in the hypothesis above are weaker for non-state external than for state external support. To account for this possibility, I will examine external support from state and non-state actors separately in the ensuing quantitative analysis.

3.3.5 Competing Rebel Factions

The final aspect of rebel organisation I consider is rebel factions.³¹ During civil wars, there is often more than one opposition group fighting against government forces meaning that the rebels consist of different ‘factions’ (Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen 2008). I define rebel faction here as any additional rebel group which - independently from other rebel groups - challenges the authority of a government.

Rebel factions have two distinct origins. Firstly, they may emerge when a substantial section of an existing rebel group establishes itself as an independent organisation (Gallagher Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012; Siqueira 2005). Such splintering of rebel groups is often due to divisions in the rebel leadership caused by personal animosity; political and/or military disagreements; or ideological or ethnic fault lines (Clapham 1998a). The MFDC in the Casamance region of Senegal offers an example of such a disintegration: in the early 1990s it split into a northern and a southern wing; then in 1995 the southern wing split into two factions - one which continued the armed struggle and one which sought a political solution. The armed southern wing of the MFDC split again in 1999 into two further armed factions who fought the Senegalese government, whilst the northern wing splintered in 2003. In some years there were up to four rebel factions opposing the government in total.

Secondly, rebel factions can emerge independently from other rebel groups whose grievances they share (Cunningham 2006; Gallagher Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012; Lawrence 2010). Their independent emergence is usually due to differences in regional base, ethnic allegiance or ideological orientation (Cunningham 2006). The case of Uganda from 1996 onwards illustrates such separate development. In the late 1980s the LRA emerged in the north of the country: they consisted of Christian fundamentalists and forcibly recruited fighters from the local Acholi population. In 1996 two further rebel groups formed: the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), whose base was in Koboko county in the utmost north-western region of Uganda and who fought for multi-party democracy; and the ADF, who were based in the Rwenzori mountains of western Uganda and were largely regarded to be based on an Islamic ideology.

Irrespective of their origins, additional rebel factions change the dynamics of civil war. When there is more than one rebel group in a conflict, these groups may easily find themselves competing over popular support and material resources, both of which are often scarce. (Gallagher Cun-

³¹While the previous discussion of leadership divisions exclusively focused on the immediate impact of these divisions on rebel one-sided violence, this hypothesis focuses on the aftermath of leadership divisions. That is, I explore the relationship between factions emerging from leadership divisions on the rebels’ violent behaviour.

ningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012; Lawrence 2010; Metelits 2009*a*; Siqueira 2005). The higher the number of rebel factions active in a country, the greater the difficulty for any of them to accumulate the amount of support and materials required to secure its survival and, consequently, their ability to distribute resources to the civilian population as an incentive for support is seriously hampered. This decreases the potential benefits for civilians who offer their support to the faction and so the use of violence against civilians in order to enforce popular support becomes increasingly likely.

Support and resources are scarce and the larger the number of rebel groups in a country, the more difficult it is for any of them to accumulate the necessary amount of both to secure its survival. Thus, the ability of a rebel group to distribute the resources under its control to the civilian population as an incentive for support is seriously hampered. When there are no selective benefits available, however, civilians' cost-benefit calculus is not altered in favour of supporting the rebellion. Given this, rebel factions are more likely to use violence against civilians in order to enforce popular support.³²

Ultimately, an increasing number of rebel factions decrease the availability of non-violent strategies to secure support. Meanwhile, the cost of utilising one-sided violence as a strategy to enforce support also decreases. Consequently, rebels start a campaign of one-sided violence.

H5_a: Rebel groups competing with other rebel factions resort - *ceteris paribus* - to one-sided violence in order to enforce popular support while rebel groups which are not competing with other rebel factions do not.

The same logic applies during campaigns of one-sided violence. With an increasing number of competing rebel factions, rebels are increasingly unable to utilise non-violent strategies and the costs of large-scale violence against civilians decreases.

H5_b: Rebel groups competing with other rebel factions kill - *ceteris paribus* - more civilians in order to enforce popular support than rebel groups which are not competing with other rebel factions.

³²In contrast to this finding, Cunningham and Stanton (2009) present empirical evidence that competition actually results in rebel factions exercising restraint towards the civilian population. According to their reasoning, a rebel group's restraint towards civilians serves the purpose to present itself as legitimate representative of the population. However, they only conducted a first preliminary test of their theory and their findings need to be treated with caution.

3.4 Summary

In this chapter, I have presented the theoretical model for an empirical analysis of rebel one-sided violence in civil wars. Based on economic theories of conflict, I began by discussing the core assumptions regarding the central actors and their objectives. I identified the leadership of rebel groups as responsible for the strategic use of violence against civilians. The guiding objective of these rebel leaders is to form and maintain a rebel group which can credibly challenge the government of a state in order to acquire political power. I then considered civilians who, like rebels, are also assumed to be rational actors. They are defined as those members of the population who are not actively participating in the civil war and their principle objective is not to redress political, social or economic grievances but simply to survive the armed conflict between government and rebels.

Following this, I developed a theoretical model designed to capture the link between the organisation of rebel groups and the onset and level of one-sided violence. Based on the logic of collective action, I noted that one of the central tasks of rebels in a civil war is to gain and maintain support from the civilian population, without which they will lack the resources for a successful struggle. In order to achieve the necessary support, rebel leaders can resort to two broad strategies. Firstly, they can use non-violent strategies to influence civilians' cost-benefit calculus towards supporting the rebel group, but the availability of such non-violent strategies is largely dependent on the organisational configuration of the group in question. Alternatively, rebel leaders can resort to violence against civilians, increasing the costs to those who do not contribute to the collective action effort. While rebels normally will prefer non-violent strategies, they turn to violent strategies when their organisational characteristics preclude this course of action.

The final section of this chapter developed a series of testable hypotheses which will be used to empirically explore this theoretical model. Based on the definition of rebel groups introduced in Chapter 2, I examine the ways in which the purpose of rebel groups; divisions with rebel leaderships; the nature of rebels' population bases; the amount and nature of external support; and the number of competing rebel factions affect the onset and level of rebel one-sided violence. Table 3.1 summarises these hypotheses. In the next chapter, I conduct a quantitative analysis to test these hypotheses. In those analyses, I also control for the complementary explanatory factors discussed in Chapter 2

Table 3.1: Organisational Determinants of the Onset and Level of Rebel One-Sided Violence

Rebel Organisation	Onset of One-Sided Violence	Level of One-Sided Violence
Group ideology	$H1_a$ Ethno-nationalist rebel groups do not resort - ceteris paribus - to one-sided violence in order to enforce popular support while revolutionary or religious rebel groups do.	$H1_b$ Ethno-nationalist rebel groups kill - ceteris paribus - fewer civilians in order to enforce popular support than revolutionary or religious rebel groups.
Leadership divisions	$H2_a$ Rebel groups with leadership divisions resort - ceteris paribus - to one-sided violence in order to enforce popular support while rebel groups without leadership divisions do not.	$H2_b$ Rebel groups with leadership divisions kill - ceteris paribus - more civilians in order to enforce popular support than rebel groups without leadership divisions.
Population Base	$H3_a$ Highly fractionalised rebel groups resort - ceteris paribus - to one-sided violence in order to enforce popular support while rebel groups with a low level of fractionalisation do not.	$H3_b$ Highly fractionalised rebel groups kill - ceteris paribus - more civilians in order to enforce popular support than rebel groups with a low level of fractionalisation.
Existence of external support	$H4_a$ Rebel groups receiving external support do not resort - ceteris paribus - to one-sided violence in order to enforce popular support while rebel groups which are not receiving external support do.	$H4_b$ Rebel groups receiving external support kill - ceteris paribus - fewer civilians in order to enforce popular support than rebel groups which are not receiving external support.
Number of competing factions	$H5_a$ Rebel groups competing with other rebel factions resort - ceteris paribus - to one-sided violence in order to enforce popular support while rebel groups which are not competing with other rebel factions do not.	$H5_b$ Rebel groups competing with other rebel factions kill - ceteris paribus - more civilians in order to enforce popular support than rebel groups which are not competing with other rebel factions.

Quantitative Analysis of Rebel Organisation and One-Sided Violence

In this chapter, I present the results of a quantitative analysis of the onset and of the level of rebel violence against civilians in sub-Saharan African civil wars from 1989 to 2007.³³ The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section presents the dependent, explanatory and control variables used in the quantitative analysis. The second section presents the analysis of the onset of rebel one-sided violence. I explore whether selected organisational characteristics of rebel groups influence rebels' use of violence against civilians in order to enforce popular support. This analysis uses logistic regression models. The third section reports an analysis of the level of rebel one-sided violence. This analysis focuses on the question whether rebels' organisational characteristics affect the number of civilians killed by rebel forces during a campaign of one-sided violence. This analysis uses count models. In the final section, I summarise the main findings of the statistical analyses.

4.1 Data and Operationalisation

The theoretical model of this thesis focuses on the organisational characteristics of rebel groups as determinants of rebel one-sided violence in sub-Saharan African civil wars. The unit of analysis is therefore the rebel group in a given year. Given this, I use the *Dyadic Dataset* of the (UCDP)

³³The quantitative analysis is conducted using STATA 9.2 software ([StataCorp 2007](#)).

(Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen 2008) to define the universe of cases for the subsequent statistical analysis.³⁴ This data set contains yearly data on rebel groups which are violently challenging the government of a state.³⁵

As I focus on civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa taking place between 1989 and 2007, the *UCDP Dyadic Dataset* is modified as follows. Firstly, I only include observations of civil war. That is, I focus on observations of any conflict between the government of a state and internal opposition groups “that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” in a given year (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 618f). Observations of interstate and extra-systemic armed conflict are therefore excluded.³⁶ The definition of civil war also excludes any instances of non-state conflict, i.e. armed conflicts between two or more non-state actors. In contrast to the *UCDP Dyadic Dataset*, I also exclude coup d’états or mutinous military factions from this definition of civil war and drop the corresponding observations as these events are conceptually distinct from the civil wars analysed in this study (McGowan and Johnson 1984).³⁷ Finally, I drop all observations of rebel groups caught in civil war taking place outside the time period of interest ranging from 1989 to 2007 and located in world regions other than sub-Saharan Africa.³⁸

The data used for the quantitative analysis covers 91 rebel groups fighting the government of a state in an internal armed conflict for at least one year between 1989 and 2007. These 91 rebel groups have been active in 23 of the 47 countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Overall, there are 312 group-year observations in the data set. Table A.1 in the Appendix lists all of these rebel groups, their primary location of operation and the years in which their conflict with the government of this state crossed the threshold of 25 or more battle deaths.

In the following, I present the dependent variables measuring the onset and level of rebel one-sided violence, the explanatory variables capturing rebel organisation and a number of control variables. Table 4.4 at the end of this section summarises the descriptive statistics of these variables. Table A.2 in the Appendix displays the correlation matrix of the variables used for

³⁴The statistical analysis of this thesis is based on version 1-2009 of the *UCDP Dyadic Dataset*.

³⁵The *UCDP Dyadic Dataset* is just one example of the recent trend of actor-based disaggregation in the quantitative study of armed conflict. Other examples include the *Expanded Nonstate Actor Conflict Data* (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009), the *Ethnic Power Relations Dataset* (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010) or the *Minorities At Risk Organizational Behavior Dataset* (Minorities At Risk 2008). However, these alternative data sources cannot be used for the purposes of this study owing to their limited timeframe or a different regional or conceptual focus than what is used here.

³⁶An interstate armed conflict is defined as armed combat between two or more states whereas an extrastate armed conflict takes place between a state and a non-state actor outside the state’s territory (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

³⁷I identified incidences of coup d’états with the help of the qualitative case descriptions of the *UCDP Database* (UCPD 2011).

³⁸See Footnote 1 in Chapter 1 for a list of the countries which make up the world region sub-Saharan Africa.

the analysis of the onset of rebel one-sided violence, and Table A.3 shows the correlation matrix of the variables used in the analysis of the level of rebel one-sided violence.

4.1.1 Dependent Variables

The dependent variables of this thesis are the onset and the level of rebel one-sided violence in sub-Saharan African civil wars.

In Chapter 2, I refined the conceptualisation of civilian victimisation used in this thesis. Instead of covering all violent acts of rebel forces against the civilian population, I restrict the focus on the direct and intentional use of violence resulting in civilian fatalities. This definition basically follows the concept of one-sided violence developed by Eck, Sollenberg and Wallensteen (2004):

“One-sided violence is the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths per year.” (Eck, Sollenberg and Wallensteen 2004, 136)³⁹

Based on this definition, Eck and Hultman (2007) constructed a data set in an actor-year format containing the number of civilians killed by governments and by respectively formally organised non-state groups from 1989 to 2007. Up to now, this data set is the most comprehensive publicly available data collection on one-sided violence.

I use this data set to construct the dependent variables for the statistical analysis.⁴⁰ Firstly, I drop all government actors as well as those non-state actors which are not listed as rebel groups in the *UCDP Dyadic Dataset*.⁴¹ Secondly, I allocate the data on civilian fatalities to the respective rebel groups.⁴² When a rebel group is not listed in the *UCDP One-sided Violence*

³⁹It is important to point out that this operationalisation of one-sided violence is agnostic on the question for which purpose the violence is actually employed. Although I have argued in Chapter 3 that such deliberate, direct and deadly violence against civilians is very likely to be either ordered or tolerated by rebel leaders in order to enforce popular support, the data itself does not contain any information about this. That is, I am ultimately unable to directly test the hypotheses presented which link rebel organisation to the level of popular support and, subsequently, to one-sided violence. I can only test whether rebel organisation affects one-sided violence. To address this problem, I later complement the quantitative analysis with qualitative case studies. A more detailed discussion of this issue is presented in Chapter 5.

⁴⁰I use version 1.3 of the *UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset* last updated on September 7, 2009. It includes best, low and high estimates of the number of civilians killed by rebel groups. However, I only use the best estimate for the construction of the dependent variables. In contrast to the low and high estimate, the best estimate is exclusively based on data sources which have been identified as reliable and unbiased (Eck and Hultman 2007).

⁴¹The *UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset* includes a number of non-state groups which acted as pro-government militias as, for example, the *Interahamwe* in Rwanda or the *janjaweed* in Sudan.

⁴²The allocation of violence against civilians to particular rebel groups is generally unproblematic as a rebel group can only be active in one civil war dyad at the same time. However, one case in the *UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset* proves to be slightly problematic. The data set includes a non-state actor called ‘Hutu rebels’ which used one-sided violence in the years 1995 to 2000. The *UCDP Database* explains that ‘Hutu rebels’ is an umbrella term encompassing the following rebel groups: CNDD, the National Liberation Front (FROLINA) and Palipehutu-FNL. Although Eck and Hultman (2007) can identify Hutu rebel groups in general as perpetrators

Dataset, it is coded as not having used one-sided violence.

Having done this, I am able to give first details on the incidence of one-sided violence by rebel groups in sub-Saharan African civil wars between 1989 and 2007. There are 100 (32%) group-years in which a rebel group used one-sided violence while there has not been any one-sided violence in 212 (68%) of the observations. Furthermore, these 100 incidences of one-sided violence have been committed by only 30 of the 91 rebel groups covered: only a minority of rebel groups resorts to violence towards the population while the large majority does not victimise civilians.

The onset of rebel one-sided violence is defined as the point in time during the course of a civil war at which a rebel group begins to use violence against the population. This means that the analytical focus of this dependent variable is exclusively directed towards the starting point of a campaign of civilian victimisation. I therefore construct a binary variable which takes the value of 1 when a rebel group starts to use one-sided violence and 0 otherwise. Possible successive group-years of one-sided violence by a rebel group are excluded from the statistical analysis. Only state changes are coded, i.e. the change from non-violence to violence (the respective group-year is coded 1) and the cessation of violence towards civilians (the group-year is coded 0).⁴³ The result is a data set with 162 group-year observations. 46 (28%) of these indicate the beginning of a campaign of rebel one-sided violence. The remaining 116 (72%) observations mark the beginning of time periods without any rebel violence against the population.⁴⁴

The second variable to be analysed as dependent variable, level of one-sided violence by rebel groups, is defined as the actual number of civilians killed by a rebel group in a given year. For this dependent variable, I use the count of civilian fatalities given in the *UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset*. Years in which a rebel group does not resort to one-sided violence take the value of 0. In total, I have 312 group-year observations. Table 4.1 displays the frequency distribution of the number of civilians killed by rebels. One-sided violence crossed the threshold of 300 or more civilian fatalities per year in less than 9% of the observations in the data set. The mean value of this fatality count is 94 with a standard deviation of 397.59 civilians killed.

of one-sided violence, they are unable to specify which rebel outfit committed which acts of violence in these years. When excluding these instances of one-sided violence from the statistical analysis, however, the civil war dyads including CNDD from 1995 to 1998, FROLINA in 1997 and Palipehutu-FNL from 1997 to 2000 would be incorrectly depicted as being non-violent towards the civilian population. I therefore use the total number of civilians killed by ‘Hutu rebels’ for each of the three actors.

⁴³When a period of continuous use or non-use of one-sided violence is interrupted by an intermittent lull in the fighting between government and rebels, I code the first year after the intermittent lull as onset as well. An intermittent lull in fighting encompasses those civil war years in which the fighting between government forces and rebels caused less than 25 battle deaths per year. I employ this restriction as I only examine rebel one-sided violence in the context of civil wars in this study.

⁴⁴At first sight, one should expect that the number of 0 and 1 should be roughly equal in the data set. However, there are a number of groups which never resort to one-sided violence and whose fight against government forces is characterised by intermittent lulls. Ultimately, this increases the number of 0s in the data set.

Table 4.1: Number of Civilians Killed by Rebels per Year in sub-Saharan Africa, 1989-2007

	Frequency	Percent
0	212	67.95
25-99	48	15.36
100-199	12	3.84
200-299	13	4.16
300-399	5	1.60
400-499	8	2.56
500-599	3	0.96
600-699	3	0.96
700-799	1	0.32
800-899	1	0.32
900-999	2	0.64
> 1,000	4	1.28
	312	100

To summarise, two thirds of the rebel groups fighting in sub-Saharan Africa never resort to one-sided violence during their existence. Only 30 of the 91 rebel groups in the data resort to the killing of citizens as a strategy of warfare. Whenever one-sided violence by rebel groups occurs, the majority of these incidences are at a relatively low level.

4.1.2 Explanatory Variables

I now continue to present and discuss the explanatory variables of the statistical analysis. These variables are used to test the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3. Table 4.2 at the end of this section gives an overview of the name and operationalisation of each explanatory variable.

Group Ideology

I test the impact of a rebel group's ideology on rebel violence against civilians with three dummy variables. Firstly, I include a variable indicating whether a rebel group has an ethno-nationalist ideology. Ethno-nationalist rebels fight in the name of a specific ethnic group or a coalition of ethnic groups. Such rebels address political, social or economic grievances of a particular group. Secondly, I measure whether a rebel group follows a revolutionary ideology. This category encompasses all rebel outfits repeatedly and explicitly claiming to fight for a non-ethnic, non-religious leftist, liberal or rightist agenda. This also includes groups which justify their struggle with broad and generic terms as, for example, democracy, development or justice. Finally, I assess whether a rebel group has a religious ideology. Religious rebels intend to transform a country's society or political system according to their religious convictions.

Each of these three variables is a binary variable taking the value of 1 when a rebel group

follows the specific ideology and 0 otherwise. As rebel groups often combine ideologies (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Jost, Federico and Napier 2009), each variable is coded for every movement which allows a rebel group to be coded as exhibiting multiple ideologies. For example, the SPLM/A combines a leftist agenda with an ethno-nationalist agenda aiming to improve the situation of the southern Sudanese population. Likewise, the LRA in northern Uganda is ethno-nationalist as it claims to fight for the Acholi and - at the same time - has a crude religious ideology based on Christianity. All variables are coded on a yearly basis. However, all the ideology variables are ultimately time invariant.

The data used for the statistical analysis comprise 40 ethno-nationalist rebel groups with 141 (45%) group-year observations. There are 40 revolutionary rebel groups resulting in 195 (63%) group-year observations. Finally, 11 rebel groups have a religious orientation and these make up 43 (14%) group-year observations.

To code the ideology of a rebel group, I rely on information from the *UCDP Database*, the *Terrorism Knowledge Database of National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism* (START) (2011) and the *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series*. I determine the group ideology with reports on official statements or documents by rebel leaders stating the underlying incompatibilities of the conflict. When the sources contradict each other, I consult additional secondary literature on the respective rebel group

Leadership Divisions

Leadership divisions occur in all instances of violent or non-violent infighting among a rebel group's leadership due to disagreements over the political or military direction of the group or personal animosities between rebel leaders. Such divisions are a sign that the rebel leadership is unable to uphold its control over the group which seriously hampers its ability to enforce popular support in a non-violent way. Over time, these divisions might result in the defection of rebel leaders to the government, coup attempts against the present rebel leadership or even the emergence of splinter groups.

The occurrence of leadership divisions is captured with a binary variable which takes the value of 1 when a rebel group experiences at least one event of infighting in a given year and 0 otherwise.⁴⁵

Turning to the present data set of 312 group-year observations, there are 51 (16%) observations

⁴⁵This variable only measures the occurrence of divisions in the rebel group and disregards the existence of rebel factions alongside the rebel group in subsequent years. This is because the continuing existence of such rebel factions does not provide any information on the current status of the rebel leadership. For a definition of 'rebel faction', I refer to the discussion of the explanatory variable measuring the number of competing factions presented below.

of internally divided rebel groups. It is noteworthy that some rebel groups experience more than one event of leadership divisions throughout their existence. This is illustrated by the fact that only 29 of the 91 rebel groups suffer from internal divisions. Of these 29 groups, six (UNITA in Angola, Palipehutu-FNL in Burundi, NPFL in Liberia, MFDC in Senegal, RUF in Sierra Leone and LRA in Uganda) experience three or more events of severe divisions. Taken together, I conclude that the large majority of rebel groups are not internally divided.

The information for the occurrence of internal divisions is taken from the *UCDP Database*, the *Terrorism Knowledge Database* of START and the *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series*. If these sources provide contradicting information, I consult additional secondary literature on the respective rebel group.

Population Base

To measure fractionalisation of a rebel group's population base, I firstly collect information on the ethnic affiliation of the leadership, rank-and-file and civilian supporters of a rebel group.⁴⁶

When a rebel group is made up of more than one ethnic group, I code all of these ethnic groups as being part of the rebel group.⁴⁷ This data collection relies on the *UCDP Database*, the *Terrorism Knowledge Database* of START and the *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series*.⁴⁸

Following this, I use the collected data and the 16th edition of *Ethnologue: Languages of the World* (Lewis 2009) to determine which languages are spoken in a particular rebel group. The decision to exclusively focus on languages as a determinant of a rebel group's population base is based on language being the most common way to define group membership in sub-Saharan Africa (Alesina et al. 2003; Laitin 1992).⁴⁹ Furthermore, I identify how many speakers of this language exist in the country against which government the rebel group is fighting. This information is

⁴⁶Ethnic affiliation encompasses the membership in or allegiance to a particular ethnic group. If this information was not available, I used indirect pieces of evidence as, for example, information about a rebel groups' geographic heartland.

⁴⁷Even when there is no reference to a particular ethnic group for subsequent years in the data sources, I assume that this particular ethnic group continues to be involved in the rebel group. Only when the sources explicitly mention that a particular group is not longer linked to a rebel group, I exclude this ethnic group.

⁴⁸Only when these sources did not contain any relevant information, I turned to previous research on the particular rebel movements and other secondary sources.

⁴⁹In the data under analysis, 53 of the 91 rebel groups have an affiliation to only one language group. These 53 rebel groups sum up to 165 group-year observations which constitutes 53% of a total population of 309 observations. 17 rebel groups have affiliations to two language groups and form 56 (18%) group-year observations. 19 rebel groups unite between 3 and 9 languages resulting in 60 (19%) group-year observations. Finally, there are 4 rebel groups with affiliations to 10 or more language group adding up to 28 (9%) group-year observations. The numbers of rebel groups just given do not add up to the 91 rebel groups in the data as the linguistic composition of some groups changes throughout the course of the conflict. Furthermore, I had to exclude three group-year observations involving two rebel groups due to missing data. These groups are the Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa in Nigeria and the Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea (RFDG) in Guinea.

then used to construct a variable measuring the linguistic heterogeneity of the rebel organisation. Linguistic heterogeneity is measured with a fractionalisation index based on the Herfindahl concentration formula (e.g., [Alesina et al. 2003](#); [Fearon 2003](#)):

$$LINGUFRAC_j = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^N s_{ij}^2 \quad (4.1)$$

where s_{ij} is the share of group i ($i=1\dots N$) in rebel group j . This formula measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a rebel group speak different languages. The fractionalisation index ranges from 0 (complete homogeneity) to 1 (complete heterogeneity). The mean of this variable is 0.24 with a standard deviation of 0.30. 53% of the group-year observations in the data set have a value of 0 on the fractionalisation index.

Existence of External Support

The variable external support is defined as any support given by actors based outside the borders of the conflict-affected country short of military intervention.⁵⁰ Following the *UCDP Database*, external support for a rebel group encompasses the delivery of weapons and equipment, economic funding, training and the provision of extraterritorial bases by state or non-state actors. These actors can be neighbouring states, regional organisations, diasporas or rebel groups in other states.

Based on these definitions, I construct two binary variables. The first measures whether a rebel group receives support from state actors in a given year. This has been the case in 139 (45%) cases. The second measures whether a rebel group receives support from non-state actors in a given year. Non-state support only happened in 44 (14%) cases. The information for these variables comes from the *UCDP Database*.

Number of Competing Factions

Measuring the independent variable competition over resources between different rebel factions requires the definition of a rebel faction. A faction is defined as an armed opposition group violently challenging the authority of a government over the same conflict issue as the rebel

⁵⁰Between 1989 and 2007, there have only been 14 group-year observations of military interventions on behalf of rebel groups. These interventions occurred in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Congo-Brazzaville. Against this background, I do not use military interventions as a separate explanatory variable as there are too few cases for a meaningful analysis. Moreover, military intervention almost exclusively occurred in conjunction with non-military external support. The case of RCD-ML in 2001 is the only exception. External support and military intervention are therefore difficult to analytically separate from each other.

Table 4.2: Name and Operationalisation of Explanatory Variables

Variable Name	Operationalisation
Ethno-nationalist ideology	Coded 1 if a rebel group follows a leftist, liberal or rightist ideology and 0 otherwise.
Revolutionary ideology	Coded 1 if a rebel group follows an ethno-nationalist ideology and 0 otherwise.
Religious ideology	Coded 1 if a rebel group follows a religious ideology and 0 otherwise.
Leadership divisions	Coded 1 if a rebel group internally fragments in a given year.
Population base	The probability that two randomly selected individuals in a rebel group speak different languages.
External state support	Coded 1 if a rebel group receives external support from a state actor and 0 otherwise.
External non-state support	Coded 1 if a rebel group receives external support from a non-state actor and 0 otherwise.
No. of competing factions	Number of rebel factions competing with rebel group under analysis in a given year.

^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

group under analysis. Such a rebel faction has to be a group acting independently from the rebel group under analysis. Rebel factions can emerge when sufficiently large parts of a rebel group establish themselves as independent groups due to divisions among the rebel leadership. However, rebel factions can also emerge independently from the rebel group under analysis.

I use a count variable to reflect the number of rebel factions competing with a rebel group over resources in any given year. This count is made up of two elements. First, I take the number of splinter groups due to leadership divisions within the rebel group. These splinter groups are counted as competing factions for every year in which I find empirical evidence confirming their existence. The necessary information is obtained from the *UCDP Database*, the *Terrorism Knowledge Database* of START and the *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series*. Second, I count the number of additional rebel groups which are militarily active in the same conflict in a given year and emerged independently from the rebel group under analysis. That is, the additional rebel groups have to cause more than 25 battle deaths in a given year and they have to fight the government over the same conflict incompatibility (Gleditsch et al. 2002). This information is provided by the *UCDP Dyadic Dataset*.

There has been at least one additional rebel faction in 186 (60%) of the 312 group-year ob-

servations. In these instances the number was one for 76 (24%) cases and two for 80 (26%) observations. Three or more rebel factions can be found in 30 (10%) observations. The maximum value observed is 9.

4.1.3 Control Variables

I include in the analyses a number of control variables to account for explanations of rebel violence against the population complementary to the variables of central interest, which were discussed above (for a further discussion of the controls, see Chapter 2). Table 4.3 at the end of this section gives an overview of the name and operationalisation of each control variable.

Conflict Duration

The first control variable is conflict duration. As discussed in Chapter 3, civilian survival is becoming more and more threatened by death due to crossfire or one-sided violence and the social and economic hardships of military conflict, the longer the conflict continues. I therefore assume that civilians' willingness to lend support to a rebel group declines over time. As a consequence, rebels are more likely to resort to violence against civilians over time in order to enforce popular support.

As rebel groups tend to form clandestinely, we cannot know with absolute certainty when an internal armed conflict starts and at which point in time rebels start to vie with the government for popular support. Against this background, I assume that the incidence of battle deaths is the best available estimate of a civil war onset. I count the number of years since the first battle deaths in a civil war dyad occurred. This variable has a mode of 1 year, a mean value of 6.91 and a standard deviation of 7.25. The variable is skewed to the right and has heavier-than-normal tails. Given this, I log-transform it before using it as a control in the regressions. The data is taken from the *UCDP Dyadic Dataset*.

Conflict Intensity

This control variable measures the intensity of battle violence between government forces and the rebel group. Battle violence encompasses any incidence of military combat between armed groups. It is formally defined as

“political violence against any target, military or civilian, in which the perpetrator

faces the immediate threat of lethal force being used by the opposing forces against him/her and/or allied fighters” (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005, 150).

As battle deaths only result from battles between government forces and the rebel group, the number of these fatalities reflects the severity or intensity of the military contest between the conflict actors (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Sambanis 2004; Sarkees, Wayman and Singer 2003). Battle violence is therefore conceptually different from one-sided violence. The reasons for including this variable as a control have been discussed in Section 2.3.3 of Chapter 2.

I use data from the *UCDP Dyadic Dataset*. This data set identifies two levels of conflict intensity. A civil war dyad is considered to be a minor conflict when the fighting between government and rebels cause between 25 and 999 battle deaths in a given year. A conflict is considered to be a war when the fighting between government and rebels cause 1,000 or more battle deaths in a given year. Given this distinction, I construct a binary variable which takes the value of 1 when a civil war dyad is considered a war in a given year. Only 58 (19%) observations of the 312 observations in the data cross this threshold of 1,000 battle deaths in a given year.

Government Violence

The third control variable tests the impact of government violence against civilians on civilian victimisation by rebel forces. I include this variable as a control due to the discussion of the reciprocity of violence in Section 2.3.2 in Chapter 2. I use the best estimate of the number of civilian fatalities due to one-sided violence by government forces taken from the *UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset*. Government forces did not use violence against civilians in 180 (58%) cases while they did so in 132 (42%) observations. The mean number of civilians killed is 1,768 with a standard deviation of 28,301. However, these descriptive statistics include the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 which is an extreme outlier with 500,000 civilian fatalities, which would be highly influential on the results of any analysis. I therefore omit this case from the data. After this, the mean number of civilian fatalities due to government one-sided violence is 165 with a standard deviation of 456.

Regime Type

The control variable regime type is included due to reasons discussed in Section 2.3.3 of Chapter 2. It is measured by the *polity2* score of the *Polity IV* data (2009). The *polity2* score is a 21-point indicator ranking regimes from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic).

Table 4.3: Name and Operationalisation of Control Variables

Variable Name	Operationalisation
Conflict duration ^a	Number of years since the first battle death occurred in the civil war dyad.
Conflict intensity	Coded 1 if a civil war dyad crosses the threshold of 1,000 or more battle deaths in a given year and 0 otherwise.
Gov't violence ^b	Number of civilians killed by government forces in a given year.
Polity2	Scale measuring a country's regime type ranging from -10 to +10.
Polity2 squared	Scale ranging from 0 to 100.
Population density ^a	Number of population divided by land area in square kilometer.

^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

^bThis excludes the number of 500,000 civilians killed by government forces in Rwanda in the year 1994.

In the data to be analysed, the *polity2* score has a mode of 0, a mean value of -2.38 and a standard deviation of 3.73. I also include a squared term of the *polity2* score to control for a possible non-linear relationship between regime type and one-sided violence.

Population Density

The fifth control variable focuses on the population density of the country against which government the rebel group is fighting. The more civilians a rebel group encounters, the higher the probability that it comes to one-sided violence. I therefore assume that rebel one-sided violence takes places more often and causes more civilian fatalities when a country is densely populated. The information for this variable derives from the *World Bank Development Indicators* (World Bank 2009). The variable is computed by dividing a country's midyear population by its land area in square kilometres. The variable has a mean of 62.32 with a standard deviation of 80.02. The distribution is positively skewed and has heavier-than-normal tails. I therefore log-transformed the variable for the statistical analysis.

Table 4.4: Summary Statistics of Dependent, Explanatory and Control Variables

	Min	Max	Mean	Mode	Std Dev
<i>Dependent Variables</i>					
Onset of one-sided violence	0	1	0.28	0	0.47
Number of civilians killed	0	6,316	94.22	0	397.59
<i>Explanatory Variables</i>					
Ethno-nationalist ideology	0	1	0.45	0	0.50
Revolutionary ideology	0	1	0.63	1	0.49
Religious ideology	0	1	0.14	0	0.35
Leadership divisions	0	1	0.16	0	0.37
Population base	0	0.87	0.24	0	0.30
External state support	0	1	0.45	0	0.50
External non-state support	0	1	0.14	0	0.35
No. of competing factions	0	9	1.11	0	1.22
<i>Control Variables</i>					
Conflict duration ^a	0	3.53	1.41	0	1.04
Conflict intensity	0	1	0.19	0	0.39
Gov't violence ^b	0	3426	165.44	0	456.02
Polity2	-8	8	-2.38	0	3.73
Polity2 squared	0	64	19.53	0	20.98
Population density ^a	1.55	5.85	3.42	2.36	1.19

^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

^bThis excludes the number of 500,000 civilians killed by government forces in Rwanda in the year 1994.

4.2 Onset of Rebel One-Sided Violence

In this section, I analyse which organisational characteristics of a rebel group shape the likelihood that it starts to use violence against civilians. I begin with the presentation of the research design guiding the statistical analysis. I then turn to regression results, regression diagnostics, interpretation and alternative model specifications.

4.2.1 Research Design

As explained earlier in this chapter, I define the onset of rebel one-sided violence as the point in time during the course of a civil war at which a rebel group begins to use violence against the population. To capture the onset of one-sided violence, I constructed a binary variable taking the value of 1 when a rebel group starts using one-sided violence and 0 otherwise. This variable follows a Bernoulli distribution which is a discrete probability distribution taking the value 1 with probability p and the value 0 with probability $1-p$ (Evans, Hastings and Peacock 2000). As the dependent variable therefore deviates from the normal standard distribution, I use a logistic regression model (LRM) (Eliaison 1993; Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000; King 1998; Long 1997).

Potentially, the LRM has to be modified to account for another property of the dependent

variable. It is possible that an observation of a rebel group using one-sided violence is not independent from other observations of the same rebel group at other points in time. A rebel group might intermittently resort to one-sided violence due to a particular characteristic of its organisation or of the conflict setting in general (Hultman 2007a; Wood 2010). Alternatively, the rebel group might simply return to one-sided violence in later years because it has been an effective strategy in the past (Bussmann, Schneider and Haer 2009; Eck and Hultman 2007; Hultman 2007a). If this is the case, the data might be affected by intraclass correlation (Harris 1913; Shrout and Fleiss 1979).

When the statistical analysis does not account for such intraclass correlation, the standard errors will be calculated with the erroneous assumption that each observation is independent from all other observations. Ultimately, this will result in underestimated standard errors making significance tests invalid. However, a test of intraclass correlation in the present data set does not indicate any dependence between observations within the same rebel group (intraclass correlation coefficient $r = 0.000$).⁵¹ Consequently, the LRM does not have to be modified.

Turning to the model design, I begin the statistical analysis of the onset of rebel violence against civilians with a model including all previously presented explanatory variables. That is, the LRM tests the effect of the following factors on the onset of one-sided violence: rebels' ideology, leadership divisions, fractionalisation of the population base, existence of external support and the number of competing rebel factions. First and foremost, the selection of these explanatory variables is guided by the theoretical model in Chapter 3 (Achen 2002; Kennedy 2008; King 1998).

I also include a number of control variables into the regression equation. These are conflict duration, conflict intensity, government violence, government's regime type and the country's population density. Past research has identified these factors as relevant predictors of rebel violence against the civilian population. The inclusion of these variables serves the purpose to evaluate the impact of rebel organisation on one-sided violence while controlling for complementary explanatory factors of such violence (Ray 2003, 2005). By doing this, I can specifically determine whether the hypothesised relationship between rebel organisation and rebel violence against civilians persists once the model accounts for the strategic interaction between government and rebels.

In a second step, I estimate a trimmed version of the initial statistical model. This is obtained by iteratively deleting the not statistically significant explanatory variables in order of their p -values

⁵¹I used the STATA program *lway* to conduct this test of intraclass correlation (Gleason 1997).

until all remaining explanatory variables are significant at the 0.10 level or better (Greenland 1989; Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). This procedure generally leads to the most parsimonious model without much loss of explanatory power (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000; King 1998). Moreover, a trimmed model avoids problems of ‘overfitting’ (Greenland 1989; Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000; King 1998). As the population under analysis only contains 162 observations, the inclusion of too many independent variables can result in large estimated coefficients and/or standard errors caused by fitting ‘noise’ in the analysed data. Reducing the number of independent variables mitigates this problem and makes the model more easily generalisable.

Regardless of their statistical significance, however, all of the control variables are kept in the statistical analysis at all stages of the stepwise deletion procedure. As I am interested in the impact of rebel organisation on one-sided violence given complementary explanations, it is vital to consistently control for these complementary explanatory factors.

4.2.2 Regression Results

Table 4.5 reports the results of the logistic regressions with the onset of rebel one-sided violence as dependent variable. The complete model includes all explanatory and control variables. The trimmed model constitutes the result of the stepwise deletion of statistically not significant explanatory variables.⁵² This trimmed model constitutes the basis for determining whether the hypotheses are supported or rejected by the statistical analysis.

I hypothesised in Chapter 3 that ethno-nationalist groups do not resort to one-sided violence compared to revolutionary and religious groups ($H1_a$). Turning to the complete model, I find that ethno-nationalism has a negative impact on the onset of rebel one-sided violence. Revolutionary and religious ideologies, on the other hand, have a positive effect on the onset of violent campaigns against the population. These findings tentatively indicate that different ideologies shape rebels’ abilities to secure popular support in different ways. However, all three coefficients are statistically not significant in the complete model and they are excluded from subsequent models.

Hypothesis $H2_a$ states rebel groups experiencing leadership divisions resort to one-sided violence while groups without such divisions do not. This hypothesis is supported by the statistical results of the complete model. The coefficient is statistically significant and points in the predicted direction. The coefficient remains statistically significant throughout the stepwise deletion pro-

⁵²Table A.4 in the Appendix reports the statistical results for each intermediate model in this stepwise deletion procedure.

Table 4.5: Onset of Rebel One-Sided Violence

	Complete Model		Trimmed Model	
<i>Explanatory Variables</i>				
Ethno-nationalist ideology	-0.277	(0.54)		
Revolutionary ideology	0.669	(0.75)		
Religious ideology	0.961	(0.82)		
Leadership divisions	1.201**	(0.59)	1.198**	(0.50)
Population base	-0.136	(0.75)		
External state support	0.105	(0.46)		
External non-state support	1.130*	(0.59)		
No. of competing factions	-0.084	(0.19)		
<i>Control Variables</i>				
Conflict duration ^a	0.416*	(0.22)	0.295*	(0.17)
Conflict intensity	1.293*	(0.67)	1.463**	(0.57)
Government violence	0.001	(0.00)	0.001*	(0.00)
Polity2	0.016	(0.08)	-0.033	(0.09)
Polity2 squared	-0.004	(0.01)	-0.008	(0.01)
Population density ^a	0.376*	(0.21)	0.442**	(0.20)
Constant	-3.799***	(1.06)	-3.467***	(0.80)
Observations	160		162	
Wald Chi ²	30.89***		22.24***	
Pseudo R ²	0.213		0.180	
Log likelihood	-75.580		-79.220	

Logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p <0.1

^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

cess. In the case of leadership divisions, rebels are more likely to start a campaign of one-sided violence.

Next, I turn to the degree of fractionalisation within a group's population base. In Chapter 3, I formulated the hypothesis that rebels are unable to secure popular support with non-violent means and therefore resort to one-sided violence when their population base is fragmented ($H3_a$). The complete model lends no empirical support to this hypothesis. The coefficient points in the opposite direction. The higher the degree of fractionalisation, the less likely the use of one-sided violence by this group. More importantly, however, the logistic regression finds this coefficient statistically not significant. I therefore exclude this variable from subsequent models.

Hypothesis $H4_a$ involved the effects on the onset of rebel one-sided violence of external support. I test this hypothesis separately for external support given by state actors and external support provided by non-state actors. In the complete model, both coefficients feature a positive direction. That is, the provision of outside support actually increases the likelihood of rebel one-sided violence. However, only the coefficient of non-state external support is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. During the process of stepwise deletion towards a reduced model, however, the coefficient loses its significance and is therefore not included in the final trimmed model.

Finally, Hypothesis $H5_a$ stipulated a positive impact of the number of competing rebel factions on the likelihood of one-sided violence by a rebel group. The complete model does not lend any support to this hypothesis. The coefficient points in the opposite direction. That is, the more rebel factions compete with a rebel group, the less likely it is that the rebel group uses one-sided violence. Furthermore, the coefficient is statistically not significant. Therefore, I drop this explanatory variable from subsequent trimmed models.

Taken together, the LRM finds only support for the hypothesis that leadership divisions in a rebel group increase the probability that this group begins a campaign of violence against civilians. Rebels' ideology, the fractionalisation of their population base, the existence of external support and the number of competing rebel factions do not exert a statistically significant influence on the onset of rebel one-sided violence. As only one out of the eight tested organisational variables has a substantial impact on the start of a violent campaign against civilians, I have to conclude that the role of rebel organisation on the onset of violence against civilians is smaller than hypothesised. The subsequent interpretation of these statistical results will further elaborate on the relationship between rebel organisation and the onset of one-sided violence.

I now turn to the control variables included in the statistical models. These variables represent complementary impact factors on rebel violence against civilians identified by past research. As I am interested in the impact of rebel organisation on one-sided violence while controlling for complementary explanations, the stepwise deletion does not apply to these control variables.

Conflict duration is statistically significant at the 0.10 level in the complete model as well as in the trimmed model. The longer a civil war lasts, the more likely that a rebel group resorts to one-sided violence. Apparently, the hardships that long-lasting conflicts put on civilians result in a reduced willingness of civilians to lend support to a rebel group (Azam 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Mason 1996). As a consequence, rebels are more likely to use violence to enforce popular support. Alternatively, it is also possible that long-lasting conflicts result in an increased need for civilian support by the rebel group which, if not met, will be extorted by force.

The trimmed model also shows that the onset of one-sided violence is more likely in wars than in minor conflicts. The coefficient has a positive direction and is statistically significant. This supports the logic outlined by Bussmann, Schneider and Haer (2009), Downes (2006) and Hultman (2007a). That is, rebels are more likely to use violence as a strategy to enforce popular support when high levels of battle violence put additional pressure on a rebel group.

The statistical analysis provides mixed results regarding the impact of government violence on

rebel one-sided violence. In the complete model, the coefficient is statistically not significant. During the stepwise deletion process, however, it becomes statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The trimmed model presents evidence that rebels are more likely to begin a campaign of one-sided violence when the government is attacking the population as well. This contradicts research which identifies government violence as an opportunity for rebels to secure popular support non-violently (Kalyvas 2006; Mason 1996). Instead, it lends support to research advocating an escalatory logic (Bussmann, Schneider and Haer 2009; Wood 2010).⁵³

I find no empirical evidence that an sub-Saharan African country's regime type affects the likelihood that rebels resort to one-sided violence. Past research argued that rebel violence against civilian should be more likely in democratic countries (Hultman 2007b). In democratic regimes, government legitimacy partly depends upon the secure protection of civilians from violence by government forces. Rebels might therefore use violence against civilians to undermine the government. However, the *polity2* variable and its squared term are both statistically not significant.

Finally, the variable measuring a country's population density is statistically significant in the complete and trimmed model, and in the expected direction. This indicates that rebel one-sided violence is more likely in densely populated countries.

In sum, the control variables lend support to previous research which identifies war-related factors as important determinants of the onset of one-sided violence (e.g., Balcells 2010; Hultman 2007a; Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2010). With increasing conflict duration, conflict intensity and government violence, the likelihood increases that rebels begin a campaign of violence against civilians. Against the background of these findings, however, the identification of leadership divisions as a statistically significant predictor of one-sided violence also gains further importance. In contrast to past studies, the analyses demonstrate that at least one organisational factor has been missing in previous explanations of civilian victimisation.

⁵³The main analysis rests on the assumption that the dependent variable is not affected by the history of the civil war dyad. To test this assumption, I ran an additional model in which conflict duration, conflict intensity and government violence are lagged one time unit (i.e., a year). If the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables in this lagged model differ substantially from the trimmed model, I have found evidence that the onset of rebel one-sided violence is also affected by the history of the civil war dyad. Table A.5 in the appendix reports the statistical findings of this alternative specification. Overall, I did not find any substantial empirical evidence that the history of a civil war dyad affects the use of rebel violence against civilians.

Table 4.6: Collinearity Diagnostics for the Trimmed Model of the Onset of Rebel One-Sided Violence

	VIF	Tolerance
Onset of one-sided violence	1.27	0.79
Leadership divisions	1.14	0.88
Conflict duration ^a	1.12	0.89
Conflict intensity	1.22	0.82
Government violence	1.13	0.89
Polity2	1.41	0.71
Polity2 squared	1.41	0.71
Population density ^a	1.10	0.91
Mean VIF	1.22	

^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

4.2.3 Regression Diagnostics

I base the analysis of the onset of rebel violence against civilians in sub-Saharan Africa on the trimmed LRM presented in the previous subsection. Before I turn to a more detailed interpretation of its statistical results, however, I have to assess the adequacy of this trimmed model (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000; Long 1997; Pregibon 1981). For this, I assess a series of regression diagnostics. While each of these tests alone would not suffice to evaluate the adequacy of a statistical model, in combination they allow me to make a well-founded statement about the quality of the specified model.

Firstly, I test for multicollinearity. Multicollinearity describes the situation when two or more independent variables feature an approximate linear relationship between each other and are therefore highly correlated with each other (Kennedy 2008; O'Brien 2007). In such a case, the standard errors for the logistic regression coefficients tend to be inflated and the coefficients itself can be highly unreliable. To test for multicollinearity in the trimmed model, I computed the variance inflation factor and tolerance for each variable in the regression equation.⁵⁴ The variance inflation factor indicates the degree of inflation of the standard error caused by multicollinearity. Tolerance indicates the level of collinearity which the regression model can reasonably cope with. Table 4.6 reports the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance for the variables included in the trimmed model. A common rule of thumb is that variance inflation factors larger than 10 and tolerance values close to 0 indicate severe multicollinearity (O'Brien 2007). However, this does not apply to the variables in the trimmed model. I therefore conclude that I do not encounter any multicollinearity problems.

Secondly, I assess whether the trimmed model is affected by the existence of dependence between

⁵⁴I used the command *collin* in STATA to compute these collinearity diagnostics.

the observations of the dependent variable. As I explained in the research design at the beginning of this section, it might be possible that an observation of a rebel group resorting to one-sided violence affects observations of the same rebel group using violence against civilians in later years (Bussmann, Schneider and Haer 2009; Eck and Hultman 2007; Hultman 2007a; Wood 2010). If this is the case, the analysis suffers from intraclass correlation resulting in underestimated standard errors and, ultimately, invalid significance tests (Harris 1913; Shrout and Fleiss 1979). A test for intraclass correlation prior to the logistic regressions was negative. To err on the side of caution, I also conduct this test after estimating the trimmed model. Specifically, I test whether the standardised residuals exhibit any intraclass correlation. However, the intraclass correlation coefficient is statistically not significant. This indicates that the analysis does not suffer from dependent observations on the dependent variable.

Thirdly, I conduct a goodness-of-fit test of the trimmed model using the Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistic (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1980; Lemeshow and Hosmer 1982). This statistic compares the predicted probabilities of the fitted model with the observed data. The closer the match between the predicted probabilities and the observed data, the better the fit of the model. If this is the case, the test statistic is approximately χ^2 distributed.

The trimmed model of the onset of rebel violence against civilians has a Hosmer-Lemeshow χ^2 of 6.26 with a p -value of 0.62. That is, the test statistic indicates a relatively close match between the predicted probabilities and the observed data. I therefore conclude that the trimmed model fits the data reasonably well. However, this test statistic - as any other goodness-of-fit measure - only provides a very rough indication if the chosen model is adequate. A maximised value of the goodness-of-fit measure does not necessarily imply that the chosen model explains 'more' than models with a relatively lower goodness-of-fit (Long 1997).

Finally, I use a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve as additional measure of model predictive performance. While the Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistic provides a first indication of the overall fit of the chosen model, it does not contain any information on how well the chosen model predicts the actual outcomes in the data under analysis (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). A ROC curve, however, measures the ability of a model to discriminate between those cases which experience an outcome of 0 and those cases which have an outcome of 1.

Figure 4.1 displays the ROC curve of the trimmed model of the onset of rebel violence against civilians. The y -axis of this plot measures the true positive rate (sensitivity) of the fitted model, i.e. the proportion of observations with an onset of one-sided violence which are correctly




Figure 4.1: ROC Curve for the Trimmed Model of the Onset of Rebel One-Sided Violence

predicted as positive by the model. The x -axis measures the false positive rate (1-specificity) of the fitted model, i.e. the proportion of observations with no onset of one-sided violence which are incorrectly predicted positive by the model. The ROC curve is a plot of the true positive rate as a function of the false positive rate at different probability cut-off points. A model which perfectly maximises the true positives while minimising the false positives would have a ROC curve that passes through the upper left corner. That is, the larger the area under the ROC curve, the higher the overall accuracy of the fitted model. As Figure 4.1 reports, the model fitted in the previous subsection has an area under the ROC curve of 0.80. Although a model with no predictive power at all would still have an area under the ROC curve of 0.50, the value of 0.80 of the trimmed model is still reasonably good.

Taken together, the conducted regression diagnostics allow me to conclude that the trimmed model of the onset of rebel one-sided violence is adequately fitted. The properties of the data under analysis do not lead to biased or misspecified statistical results. Furthermore, the fitted model also effectively describes the analysed data.

Table 4.7: Discrete Change in the Probability of the Onset of One-Sided Violence for the Trimmed Model

	Coefficient	0→1	SD	Min→Max
Leadership divisions	1.198**	0.24	-	-
Conflict duration ^a	0.295*	-	0.04	0.15
Conflict intensity	1.463**	0.30	-	-
Government violence	0.001*	-	0.06	0.59
Polity2	-0.033	-	-0.02	-0.07
Polity2 squared	-0.008	-	-0.02	-0.07
Population density ^a	0.442**	-	0.08	0.30

^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p <0.1

4.2.4 Interpretation

As the relation between the independent variables and the outcome variable in logistic regression is non-linear, the coefficients reported previously cannot be interpreted in a straightforward manner. I therefore use predicted probabilities to facilitate proper interpretation of the regression results of the trimmed model of the onset of rebel one-sided violence (Long 1997; Long and Freese 2006).⁵⁵

First of all, I compute the discrete change in the predicted probabilities of the onset of rebel one-sided violence for a given change in an independent variable, holding all other independent variables constant (Long 1997; Long and Freese 2006). Continuous independent variables are held constant at their mean while binary independent variables are held constant at their mode. Table 4.7 displays the discrete change for each independent variable given varying amounts of change. In the case of the binary variables indicating the occurrence of internal divisions among a rebel group and the overall fighting intensity of the civil war, I computed the discrete change when the variable changes from 0 to 1. For the continuous variables, I computed the standard deviation change of the respective variable centred on its mean. Finally, I also computed the discrete change when the independent variable moves from its minimum value to its maximum value.

The occurrence of leadership divisions increases the probability that one-sided violence will be initiated by 0.24, holding other variables at their mean or mode. That is, the presence or absence of leadership divisions has a very large impact on the start of a rebel campaign of violence against civilians. This finding establishes this organisational factor as an important determinant which needs to be included in future research on rebel civilian victimisation.

Turning to the control variables, I find that conflict duration has only a modest impact on the

⁵⁵I used the *SPost* package (Long and Freese 2006) to conduct all of the following computations.

probability that a rebel group resorts to one-sided violence. A standard deviation change in the logged measure of conflict duration increases the probability of rebel violence by 0.04, holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode. The difference in conflict duration between the minimum value of 1 year in the current data set to the maximum observed value of 34 years represents an increase of only 0.15 in the probability of the onset of rebel one-sided violence. Intensity of fighting, on the other hand, exerts a larger influence. In wars, the probability of rebels resorting to violence against civilians is 0.30 larger than in minor conflicts, holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode. The impact of the number of civilians killed by government forces has less impact: one standard deviation change in government violence centred on the mean increases the probability of rebel violence against civilians by 0.06, holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode. This is a rather minimal increase given that a standard deviation change in government violence translates into 500 civilian fatalities and that in 57% of the observations under analysis the government did not resort to violence against civilians at all.

The control variables measuring the potential impact of regime type on rebel one-sided violence have turned out statistically not significant in the logistic regression. Therefore, I do not examine their impact in more detail. Finally, a standard deviation change in the natural log of population density centred on its mean increases the probability of rebel one-sided violence by 0.08, holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode. I conclude from this that population density exerts a rather small influence on the likelihood of rebel violence against civilians.

Overall, this analysis of the discrete change in the probability of the onset of rebel one-sided violence identifies leadership divisions and conflict intensity as the two most potent determinants. Rebel organisation in conjunction with war-related factors shape the outbreak of rebel civilian victimisation. Interestingly, however, conflict duration and government violence against civilians have a relatively small impact on the probability of one-sided violence. This does not diminish the relevance of past studies which attach great importance on war-related factors, but it does put those findings into perspective (e.g., [Kalyvas 2006](#); [Mason 1996](#); [Wood 2010](#)).

Next, I graph the predicted probabilities of the trimmed model of the onset of rebel one-sided violence ([Long and Freese 2006](#)). In contrast to the summary measure of discrete change, graphical means allow me to explore potentially existing nonlinear relationships between variables and the outcome. The graphs also report the confidence intervals for the predicted probabilities at the 95% level. An examination of these confidence intervals allows me to assess the precision of the predicted probabilities.




Figure 4.2: Predicted Probabilities with Confidence Intervals for the Onset of Rebel One-Sided Violence by Leadership Divisions, Conflict Duration and Conflict Intensity

Figure 4.2 displays the predicted probabilities for the onset of rebel one-sided violence by conflict duration for four different subsets of civil wars. The two upper graphs show the predicted probabilities for rebel groups without and with leadership divisions in minor conflicts. The two lower graphs show the predicted probabilities for rebel groups without and with leadership divisions in wars. First of all, the graphs show that conflict duration has a rather minimal impact on the predicted probability of an onset of rebel one-sided violence. The increase in the predicted probability when conflict duration moves from its minimum to its maximum value ranges between 0.15 and 0.24 in these four graphs, holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode. In sum, these graphs further corroborate the claim that conflict duration is of minor importance in explaining the onset of one-sided violence.

The graphs also show the substantial impact of leadership divisions and conflict intensity on the onset of rebel violence against civilians. For example, rebel groups without leadership divisions in the first year of a minor conflict have a predicted probability of 0.13 that rebels resort to one-sided violence. In contrast, rebel groups with leadership divisions in the first year of a war have a predicted probability of 0.68 that rebels begin a campaign of civilian victimisation. With the exception of the upper left graph, all graphs feature considerable wide confidence intervals.




Figure 4.3: Predicted Probabilities with Confidence Intervals for the Onset of Rebel One-Sided Violence by Leadership Divisions, Conflict Intensity and Government Violence

That is, the possible range in which the predicted probabilities can fall is relatively large. This implies a rather poor precision of the estimates which is possibly caused by the small size of the data set under analysis.

Figure 4.3 displays the predicted probabilities for the onset of rebel one-sided violence by government violence against civilians for four different subsets of civil war. The two upper graphs show the predicted probabilities for rebel groups without and with leadership divisions in minor conflicts. The two lower graphs show the predicted probabilities for rebel groups without and with leadership divisions in wars. In the absence of government violence against civilians, the probability of one-sided violence does not deviate substantially from the already presented findings. The probability of the start of rebel one-sided violence is considerably higher when leadership divisions occur and when the conflict is a war.

Interestingly, however, the graphs also show that the differences between rebel groups with and without leadership divisions in minor conflict or wars becomes much smaller with higher levels of government violence against civilians. When government violence is at its maximum value, the probability of the onset of rebel one-sided violence is 0.73 for rebels without divisions in minor conflicts, 0.90 for groups with divisions in minor conflicts, 0.92 for undivided groups in

wars and 0.98 for divided groups in wars. Apparently, leadership divisions and conflict intensity become less relevant when the government engages in large-scale violence against civilians. It is important to note, however, that such high levels of government violence are very unusual as the mean value of government violence is only 165 civilian fatalities.

Similar to the previous set of graphs, I find relatively wide confidence intervals for the predicted probabilities in each graph. As above, this indicates a rather poor precision of the predicted probabilities due to an inadequate population size.

4.2.5 Interaction Models

The statistical analyses reported above rest on the assumption that the impact of the explanatory variables on the outcome variable is not moderated by any other factor under analysis. In the case of the onset of one-sided violence, this assumption implies that the effect of leadership divisions is independent of any other variable. In past research, however, scholars have primarily identified the characteristics of a civil war as determinant of rebel violence against civilians (e.g., [Hultman 2007a](#); [Kalyvas 2006](#); [Wood 2010](#)). Against this background, it might well be possible that leadership divisions only trigger a campaign of one-sided violence when a particular conflict setting is given.

Against this background, I estimate three additional models in which the initial trimmed model is amended with an interaction term. Specifically, I interact leadership divisions firstly with conflict duration, then with conflict intensity and finally with government violence. The interpretation of these interaction models, however, is not straightforward. The magnitude, direction and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms and their constitutive variables can be misleading ([Berry, DeMeritt and Esarey 2010](#); [Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006](#); [Braumoeller 2004](#)). One reason for these potentially misleading regression results is that - sometimes - the interaction between independent variables is only present at particular values of the constitutive variables.

I therefore calculate the discrete change of leadership divisions at different levels of the respective moderating variable ([Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006](#); [Long and Freese 2006](#)).⁵⁶ To assess the statistical significance of the discrete change, I compute the confidence intervals at the 95% level. When either the lower bound or the upper bound of these confidence intervals transgresses the

⁵⁶Table A.6 in the Appendix shows the regression results of the conflict duration interaction model (Model 1), the conflict intensity interaction model (Model 2) and the government violence interaction model (Model 3). Table A.7 also shows the collinearity diagnostics of these models. Overall, I do not find any indication of multicollinearity of a noteworthy magnitude.




Figure 4.4: Discrete Change of Leadership Divisions on the Onset of One-Sided Violence Moderated by Conflict Duration and Government Violence

zero line, a clear-cut direction of the discrete change is not given and the hypothesised interaction effect is rejected.

The left graph in Figure 4.4 displays the discrete change of leadership divisions moderated by conflict duration. The confidence intervals for this discrete change are above and below the zero line. I therefore conclude that conflict duration does not act as a moderating variable.

Turning to the relationship between leadership divisions and conflict intensity, I find limited evidence supporting an interaction between these two variables. In minor conflicts, leadership divisions increase the probability of an onset of rebel one-sided violence by 0.23, holding all other variables constant. The lower bound of the confidence intervals of this discrete change is -0.002 and the upper bound is 0.46. In wars, this probability increases to 0.26, holding all other variables constant. Here, the lower bound of the confidence interval is -0.07 and the upper bound is 0.59. While the lower bound of the confidence interval transgresses the zero line in both cases (-0.002 and -0.07), this transgression is rather minimal compared to the overall range of the confidence intervals. This means that there might indeed be an interaction effect between the two variables. However, the overall increase in the point estimate of the probability of rebel one-sided violence is 0.03, which is small, particularly in view of the main effect in the original trimmed model. In other words, any potentially existing interaction effect is negligible from a substantive perspective.

The right graph in Figure 4.4 shows the discrete change for rebel groups experiencing internal divisions for different levels of government violence. The lower bound of this discrete change only transgresses the zero line when government forces kill more than 1,400 civilians in a year. For values below this threshold, I find a statistically significant interaction effect between leadership divisions and the number of civilians killed by government forces. The probability that a rebel group experiencing leadership divisions resorts to one-sided violence is lower in situations when

government forces use large-scale civilian victimisation. Interestingly, leadership divisions have a less substantial impact on the probability of rebel violence against civilians when the population already suffers from government attacks. Apparently, the negative consequences of leadership struggles are outweighed by large-scale government one-sided violence. This interaction effect helps to shed some light on the not fully understood reciprocal relationship between one-sided violence committed by rebels and those committed by government forces (Azam 2002; Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2010).

Although I only find statistically significant evidence for an interaction effect between leadership divisions and government violence against civilians, I conclude from this analysis that rebel organisation and war-related factors should be analysed in conjunction with each other in order to better understand the determinants of rebel one-sided violence.

4.3 Level of Rebel One-Sided Violence

After having analysed factors impinging on the onset of one-sided rebel violence, I now turn to the level of such violence. I analyse which organisational characteristics of a rebel group affect the number of civilians killed by rebel groups during a civil war. Similarly to the previous section, I begin with a discussion of the research design and then present regression results, regression diagnostics, interpretation and alternative model specifications.

4.3.1 Research Design

The level of rebel violence against civilians is defined as the number of civilians killed by a rebel group in a given year of a civil war. The dependent variable therefore is a count variable providing information on the number of civilian fatalities due to rebel violence against the population. This count variable is discrete and truncated at 0 as there can be no negative number of civilian fatalities due to one-sided violence. Such a count variable is often represented with the Poisson distribution which is a discrete probability distribution capturing the probability of a number of events (Evans, Hastings and Peacock 2000). Following this, social scientists commonly refer to the Poisson regression model (PRM) (Cameron and Trivedi 1998; King 1998; Long 1997).

In the following statistical analysis, however, I also have to account for several - potentially problematic - properties of the dependent variable. As with the onset of one-sided violence in the previous section, the number of civilians killed by a rebel group in one year might be dependent

on previous observations of one-sided violence by this rebel group (Bussmann, Schneider and Haer 2009; Eck and Hultman 2007; Hultman 2007a; Wood 2010). Following from this, the observations might be organised in several clusters with the observations in each cluster being correlated with each other (Harris 1913; Shrout and Fleiss 1979). Such intraclass correlation might be even aggravated by the fact that the data under analysis includes more observations of each rebel group as it collects data on the number of civilians killed in every year in which the rebel group is violently fighting the government.⁵⁷ Unsurprisingly, a test of intraclass correlation results in a coefficient of 0.422 which indicates a strong correlation between observations of one-sided violence perpetrated by the same rebel group.⁵⁸

The statistical analysis has to account for this dependence among observations in order to draw correct conclusions about the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients. Two options are available to address this problem. The first possibility is to estimate the statistical model using robust standard errors clustered on rebel groups (Williams 2000). Using these standard errors is a straightforward method to account for the intraclass correlation within the data.

The second option that is sometimes proposed uses an alternative statistical estimator for count data: the negative binomial regression model (NBRM) (Cameron and Trivedi 1998; King 1998; Long 1997). The PRM assumes independence among the counted events and - following from this - equality of the mean and variance (equidispersion) (King 1998). As I have argued above, however, there is no equidispersion in the dependent variable under analysis. Instead, I observe overdispersion as the variance exceeds the mean by a factor of 1,678. While the PRM cannot account for this overdispersion and produces underestimated standard errors, the NBRM is able to deal with this overdispersion.

Another data property requires a further adjustment of the statistical estimator. In 212 out of 312 observations rebel groups do not cause any civilian fatalities. This large number of zero observation is due to the overall number of rebel groups which used one-sided violence at least once during their violent struggle against the government of a state. Only 30 of 91 rebel groups in sub-Saharan African groups fall in this category. Given this, the total population of rebel groups in the data can be divided into two sub-groups: One group consisting of rebel organisations which never use one-sided violence and another group including those rebel organisations which are likely to use one-sided violence at least once during their existence.

If I do not distinguish these subpopulations in the statistical analysis, I inflate the theoretical

⁵⁷In contrast to the data on the onset of rebel one-sided violence which drops the years of one-sided violence following the onset from the data set

⁵⁸I used the STATA program *l1way* to conduct this test of intraclass correlation (Gleason 1997).

probability of zeroes. I therefore use the zero-inflated negative binomial regression model (ZINB) for the following analysis (Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Long 1997). A zero-inflated count model assumes that observations can be sorted into two latent groups (Long 1997). The first group includes the units of observations which have a zero probability of rebel one-sided violence in a given year. In the second group are the units of observations which have a nonzero probability of rebel one-sided violence in a given year. A zero-inflated count model accounts for these two latent groups by conducting a negative binomial regression which is adjusted for excess zeroes (Long 1997; Long and Freese 2006). This adjustment is achieved by a logit inflation performed prior to the NBRM to identify the zero observations.⁵⁹

The statistical analysis of the level of rebel violence against civilians follows the model design developed for the analysis of the onset of rebel one-sided violence. That is, I begin with a ZINB regression model including all explanatory variables: group ideology, leadership divisions, population base, existence of external support and the number of competing rebel factions. The theoretical model motivating the selection of these variables has been presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis (Achen 2002; Kennedy 2008; King 1998).

This model also includes a number of control variables to evaluate the impact of rebel organisation while controlling for complementary explanatory factors (Ray 2003, 2005). More specifically, I control for conflict duration, conflict intensity, government violence, government's regime type and the country's population density.

Along the lines of the research design presented in the previous section, I then construct a trimmed model. I drop the not significant explanatory variables one by one (in the order of decreasing p -values) until all remaining explanatory variables are significant at the 0.10 level or better (Greenland 1989; Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). For the stepwise deletion, I exclusively focus on the coefficients of the NBRM part of the ZINB regression and do not consider the logit inflation coefficients. As explained earlier, the stepwise deletion of statistically not significant variables serves the purpose to arrive at the most parsimonious model and to prevent 'overfitting' (Greenland 1989; Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000; King 1998). With 312 observations included in the data under analysis, the inclusion of too many independent variables might result in numerically unstable estimates.

As with the trimmed model in the onset analysis, the stepwise deletion does not apply to the control variables. By keeping the control variables in the statistical model, I consistently control

⁵⁹In the tables reporting the statistical results of the estimated ZINB models, the column entitled 'LI' gives the results of the logit inflation.

for the potential impact of these complementary explanatory factors.

4.3.2 Regression Results

In the following, I present the results of the ZINB regression models with the number of civilians killed by rebel groups as the dependent variable.⁶⁰ For the stepwise deletion process in these ZINB models, I focus exclusively on the statistical significance of the NBRM coefficients of the explanatory variables. The LI coefficients can be disregarded as they simply serve the purpose to identify the zero observations in order to adjust the NBRM coefficients. Likewise, I focus on the NBRM coefficients of the trimmed models to evaluate the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3. Table 4.8 displays the results of the complete and trimmed model including all explanatory and control variables.⁶¹

In Chapter 3, I hypothesise that ethno-nationalist groups are less violent than revolutionary or religious groups ($H1_b$). I first look at the results of the complete model. Here, the coefficient of the effect of ethno-nationalism on rebel violence is negative while the coefficients for revolutionary and religious groups are positive. This lends general support to the reasoning outlined in Chapter 3. However, the three coefficients are statistically not significant in the complete model. During the stepwise deletion, only the estimate for ethno-nationalist groups becomes statistically significant. The remaining two coefficients are subsequently excluded from the statistical models.

Next, I turn to the occurrence of leadership divisions within a rebel group as a determinant of the number of civilians killed by rebels. I hypothesised that a divided leadership increases the level of one-sided violence used by the rebel group to enforce popular support ($H2_b$). The variable testing the impact of leadership divisions on the level of rebel violence against civilians is statistically significant throughout the stepwise deletion process. However, the coefficient is negative which means that leadership divisions within a rebel group actually decrease the number of civilians killed by a rebel group. Hypothesis $H2_b$ is therefore rejected. A more detailed discussion of this finding and its theoretical implications will be provided in the subsequent interpretation of the regression results.

The next hypothesis postulates that rebel groups with a highly fractionalised population base kill more civilians than groups with a less fractionalised population base ($H3_b$). The regression

⁶⁰As already mentioned in the data section of this chapter, I drop the case of the Rwandan FPR in 1994 as it features an extreme outlier with 500,000 civilians killed by government forces.

⁶¹Table A.8 in the appendix reports the statistical results for each model in the stepwise deletion process.

Table 4.8: Level of Rebel One-Sided Violence

	Complete Model		Trimmed Model	
	<i>NBRM</i>	<i>LI</i>	<i>NBRM</i>	<i>LI</i>
<i>Explanatory Variables</i>				
Ethno-nationalist ideology	-0.426 (0.29)	0.239 (0.55)	-0.561** (0.28)	0.841 (0.55)
Revolutionary ideology	0.614 (0.40)	-1.141 (0.84)		
Religious ideology	0.697 (0.48)	-2.018** (0.98)		
Leadership divisions	-0.709*** (0.17)	-0.841 (0.53)	-0.653*** (0.21)	-0.873** (0.42)
Population base	1.783** (0.76)	0.056 (0.67)	1.715** (0.67)	-0.059 (0.71)
External state support	-0.039 (0.17)	-0.308 (0.44)		
External non-state support	0.494* (0.30)	-1.614*** (0.37)		
No. of competing factions	-0.142** (0.06)	-0.265** (0.12)	-0.157*** (0.06)	-0.270** (0.13)
<i>Control Variables</i>				
Conflict duration ^a	-0.046 (0.16)	-0.613** (0.25)	-0.101 (0.18)	-0.483* (0.25)
Conflict intensity	0.751** (0.31)	-1.140*** (0.42)	0.847*** (0.30)	-1.415*** (0.43)
Government violence	0.000 (0.00)	-0.001* (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)
Polity2	-0.014 (0.02)	0.007 (0.11)	-0.038 (0.03)	0.098 (0.09)
Polity2 squared	0.027*** (0.01)	0.005 (0.02)	-0.023*** (0.01)	0.011 (0.02)
Population density ^a	0.452** (0.18)	-0.732*** (0.20)	0.470*** (0.17)	-0.946*** (0.21)
Constant	3.327*** (1.08)	6.353*** (1.30)	3.915*** (0.91)	5.489*** (0.94)
Inalpha		-0.161 (0.19)		-0.124 (0.16)
alpha		0.851 (0.16)		0.884 (0.14)
Observations		308		308
Nonzero		99		99
Zero		209		209
Log pseudo-likelihood		-770.225		-783.721

ZINB Regression with robust standard errors clustered on rebel groups

(***) $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

results provide empirical support for this hypothesis. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant throughout the stepwise deletion procedure. That is, a highly fractionalised population base increases the number of civilians killed by rebels.

Hypothesis H_{4b} focuses on the impact of external support on the level of rebel one-sided violence and holds that the provision of external support to a rebel group results in the rebel group killing more civilians when using civilian victimisation as a strategy to enforce popular support. In the complete model, the coefficient estimating the existence of external support from state actors points in the hypothesised direction but it is statistically not significant. I therefore drop it from subsequent models. The estimate for the existence of non-state external support, on the other

hand, is positive and statistically significant. However, this coefficient becomes statistically not significant during the stepwise deletion procedure. As a consequence, I conclude that external support does impact on the level of civilian victimisation, and I reject Hypothesis $H4_b$.

The final explanatory variable concerns the effect of the number of competing rebel factions on the level of rebel one-sided violence ($H5_b$). While the coefficient is statistically significant in all models, its sign is not as hypothesised. The number of civilians killed by a rebel group decreases when the number of rebel factions competing with this group increases. Hypothesis $H5_b$ is therefore rejected. As in the case of leadership divisions, I will discuss this finding as well as its theoretical implications in the subsequent interpretation of the regression results.

Overall, the statistical analyses lend support to the central argument of this study. Organisational characteristics of a rebel group do indeed shape the level of rebel one-sided violence. I find that an ethno-nationalist ideology, leadership divisions, population base and number of competing rebel factions are statistically significant determinants of the number of civilians killed by rebel forces. Only the variables measuring revolutionary and religious ideologies as well as the variables capturing external support provided by state and non-state actors are statistically not significant. But while these findings support the hypotheses theorising the impact of a rebel group's ideology and population base ($H1_b$ and $H3_b$), they actually contradict the hypotheses outlining the influence of leadership divisions and competing rebel factions ($H2_b$ and $H5_b$). The subsequent interpretation of the statistical results will elaborate on these findings.

I now turn to the control variables included in the ZINB models. These variables account for complementary impact factors on the number of civilians killed by rebel groups. As mentioned previously, the stepwise deletion does not apply to these control variables. The coefficient estimating the effect of conflict duration on the level of rebel one-sided violence is statistically not significant. I find conflict intensity to be statistically significant and positive. Rebel groups embroiled in war are likely to kill more civilians when using civilian victimisation than rebel groups in minor conflicts. This further strengthens the claim that the intensity of fighting between government and rebels puts pressure on the latter resulting in a higher level of civilian victimisation (Bussmann, Schneider and Haer 2009; Downes 2006; Hultman 2007a).

The statistical results also show that government violence is statistically not significant throughout all stages of the stepwise deletion process. The number of civilians killed by rebel forces is not affected by government violence against civilians. This contradicts previous research which states that rebels' violent behaviour is shaped by government one-sided violence (Bussmann,

Schneider and Haer 2009; Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2010).⁶²

The trimmed model does not provide empirical support for the argument that large-scale civilian victimisation is more likely in democratic countries (Hultman 2007b). However, the squared *polity2* variable is statistically significant. This term accounts for a possible non-linear relationship between regime type and rebel violence. The negative direction of the squared *polity2* variable indicates that the number of civilians killed by rebel groups decreases in autocracies and democracies. Apparently, rebels tend to use large-scale civilian victimisation primarily in regimes which mix democratic and autocratic characteristics.

Finally, I find that there are more civilian fatalities due to rebel one-sided violence in densely populated countries. This lends support to the notion that rebels kill more civilians when there are more civilians per square kilometre in the country.

Taken together, the only statistically significant war-related factor is conflict intensity. In line with past research (Downes 2006; Hultman 2007a; Wood 2010), I find that rebels are likely to kill more civilians in wars than in minor conflicts. Conflict duration and government violence against civilians, however, are found to be statistically not significant. As this contradicts previous findings (Kalyvas 2006; Mason 1996; Wood 2010), I have to analyse the relationship between rebel organisation and war-related factors in more detail in a following subsection. I also do not find any statistically significant evidence showing that the level of democracy affects rebels' use of one-sided violence. Instead, it appears that rebels primarily resort to large-scale civilian victimisation in unstable political regimes.

4.3.3 Regression Diagnostics

Before I move on to a more detailed interpretation of the regression results, I have to assess the adequacy of these results. Along the lines of the previous section, I therefore conduct a series of regression diagnostics to assess the adequacy of the trimmed model of the level of rebel one-sided violence.

I begin with a test for multicollinearity. As explained in the previous section, multicollinear-

⁶²I also test the underlying assumption of this analysis that the dependent variable is not affected by past levels of civil war violence. For this, I run a model in which conflict duration, conflict intensity and government violence are lagged one time unit (i.e., a year). If the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables in this lagged model differ substantially from the trimmed model, I would find evidence that the level of rebel one-sided violence is also affected by the history of the civil war dyad. Table A.9 in the Appendix reports the results of this model. With one exception, there are no major differences regarding the explanatory variables between the model including the lagged conflict variables and the trimmed model. The exception is that the estimated coefficient capturing the impact of the number of competing factions on the outcome variable is now statistically not significant.

Table 4.9: Collinearity Diagnostics for the Trimmed Model of the Level of Rebel One-Sided Violence

	VIF	Tolerance
Number of Civilians Killed	1.08	0.93
Ethno-nationalist ideology	1.31	0.77
Leadership divisions	1.09	0.92
Population base	1.21	0.83
No. of competing factions	1.16	0.86
Conflict duration ^a	1.22	0.82
Conflict intensity	1.22	0.82
Government violence	1.18	0.85
Polity2	1.67	0.60
Polity2 squared	1.60	0.63
Population density ^a	1.29	0.77
Mean VIF	1.27	

^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

ity arises when two or more independent variables feature an approximate linear relationship between each other (Kennedy 2008; O'Brien 2007). When multicollinearity is present, the standard errors of the regression coefficients tend to be inflated and the coefficients can be highly unreliable. To detect potential instances of multicollinearity, I compute the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance for each variable in the initial trimmed model. Table 4.9 reports these collinearity diagnostics. Overall, I do not find any indication for multicollinearity of a magnitude that endangers the validity of the statistical results.

Secondly, I explore the overall goodness-of-fit of the statistical model using Nagelkerke/Cragg & Uhler's R^2 . This statistic ranges from 0 to 1 and measures the improvement from the null model to the fully fitted model.⁶³ The trimmed level model has a Nagelkerke/Cragg & Uhler's R^2 of 0.361 indicating an acceptable improvement in predicting the dependent variable. Like any other pseudo- R^2 measure, however, Nagelkerke/Cragg & Uhler's R^2 only provides us with a very rough index of model fit (Long 1997). That is, the adequacy of any statistical model cannot be assessed solely by the value of this statistic.

Thirdly, I focus on the chosen statistical estimator. The dependent variable - the number of civilians killed by rebel groups - is characterised by two aspects. Firstly, the variable is overdispersed due to dependence among the counted events. Secondly, I assume the existence of two subpopulations in the dependent variable. One population encompasses observations of rebel groups which never uses one-sided violence and another group covers the observations of rebel groups which are likely to use violence against civilians at least once during their existence. I have identified the ZINB regression model as a statistical estimator capable of dealing with

⁶³Only under very specific circumstances, however, it is possible for the statistic to reach 1.




Figure 4.5: Residual Plot of the PRM, NBRM, ZIP and ZINB Estimations of the Trimmed Model of the Level of Rebel One-Sided Violence

these properties of the dependent variable.

To assess this choice, I compare the fit of the estimated ZINB model with estimates of the initial trimmed model using different statistical estimators for count data: the PRM, the NBRM and the zero-inflated Poisson regression model (ZIP). When the residuals and fit statistics of one of these alternative models indicate a better fit, the ZINB as statistical estimator has to be replaced with it.

Firstly, I examine the residuals of each model. Figure 4.5 plots the residuals of the PRM, NBRM, ZIP and ZINB models against each other. Small residuals indicate a good fit of the respective model and, therefore, the model with the line closest to zero on the y -axis should be picked for the analysis. Figure 4.5 shows that the PRM performs rather poor in predicting 0s. As already mentioned in the research design of this analysis, I therefore conclude that the PRM is unable to account for the overdispersion and subpopulations in the data under analysis. While the NBRM performs much better in the prediction of zero counts, it still under-predicts the actual amount of zeroes. Unsurprisingly, the ZIP and ZINB are able to accomplish this task.

However, I am unable to conclude from Figure 4.5 which statistical estimator provides the better fit. I therefore directly compare the fit statistics of each count model with each other. For

Table 4.10: Fit Statistics for PRM, NBRM, ZIP and ZINB Estimation of the Trimmed Model of the Level of Rebel One-Sided Violence

	BIC	Difference
PRM	83575.68	
... vs NBRM	38.34	83537.35
... vs ZIP	31627.19	51948.50
... vs ZINB	-65.64	83641.32
NBRM	38.34	
... vs ZIP	31627.19	-31588.85
... vs ZINB	-65.64	103.97
ZIP	31627.19	
... vs ZINB	-65.64	31692.82

such comparisons, the Bayesian information criteria (BIC) constitutes a reasonable choice (Long 1997). Table 4.10 displays this information measures for each count model and also reports the difference in the information measure between each pair of count models. When the difference from subtracting the BIC from the second model from the first model is larger than 0, the second model is preferred (Long and Freese 2006). When the difference is smaller than 0, the first model is preferred. The results presented in Table 4.10 firstly support the previous finding that the PRM is inferior to each other count model. However, I also find that the ZIP model is inferior to the NBRM and ZINB models. A comparison of the NBRM and ZINB models finally indicates that the latter is the preferred statistical estimator.

To further corroborate these findings, I conduct two additional test statistics. Firstly, I carry out a likelihood ratio test of overdispersion comparing the PRM with the NBRM and the ZIP with the ZINB model (Long and Freese 2006). When the overdispersion parameter α equals zero the NBRM reduces to the PRM and the ZINB reduces to the ZIP. The likelihood ratio test of overdispersion comparing the NBRM to the PRM results in a value of 83543.08 which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This indicates that the NBRM is preferred over the PRM. Regarding the second pair of count models, the likelihood ratio test of overdispersion has a value of 31698.55 which is also statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Consequently, the ZINB is preferred over the ZIP.

Secondly, I conduct a Vuong test to compare the zero-inflated models (ZIP and ZINB) to the ordinary PRM and NBRM models (Long and Freese 2006; Vuong 1989). The Vuong test statistic for the comparison of the ZIP and PRM models has a value of 7.54 and is statistically significant at the 0.01 level which implies that the ZIP model is preferred over the PRM. The result for the comparison of the ZINB and NBRM models is 6.45 and is statistically significant at the 0.01 level implying that the ZINB model is preferred over the NBRM. Taking together all fit statistics

and test results, I conclude that the ZINB model is to be preferred over all other count models. The above presented trimmed model of the level of rebel one-sided violence therefore does not have to be adapted.

Finally, I test whether the ZINB regression model (in conjunction with the robust standard errors clustered on rebel groups) is able to account for the existing intraclass correlation in the dependent variable. If intraclass correlation is still present, it will produce underestimated standard errors and invalid significance tests (Harris 1913; Shrout and Fleiss 1979). I therefore test the Pearson residuals of the trimmed level model for intraclass correlation.⁶⁴ The intraclass correlation coefficient of the trimmed model indicates that the residuals within the same cluster (i.e., a rebel group) are not correlated with each other and that no further action is necessary.

This finding questions a common practice in past studies using the *UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset* (e.g., Eck and Hultman 2007; Hultman 2007a,b; Wood 2010). Here, scholars often use the dependent variable lagged one time unit in order to account for the observed dependence. In the light of the test for intraclass correlation of the residuals, however, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable seems to be unnecessary. Furthermore, the absence of intraclass correlation also casts doubts on the statistical results of studies based on lagged dependent variable specifications. As Achen (2000) points out, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in a statistical model often inflates the effect of the lagged dependent variable at the expense of the other independent variables.

Taken together, I conclude that the trimmed model of the level of rebel one-sided violence is adequately fitted. The properties of the dependent or independent variable do not lead to biased or misspecified statistical results. Furthermore, the ZINB regression model is the adequate statistical technique to analyse the data at hand.

4.3.4 Interpretation

The interpretation of the implications of the regression results obtained from the trimmed model of the level of rebel one-sided violence runs along similar lines as for the analysis of onset.⁶⁵

I begin reporting the discrete change in the expected number of civilians killed for a change in each independent variable (Long 1997; Long and Freese 2006). The discrete change of an

⁶⁴I used the STATA program *lway* to conduct this test of intraclass correlation (Gleason 1997).

⁶⁵I use the *SPost* package (Long and Freese 2006) to conduct the necessary computations for this interpretation. Please note that this interpretation is based on the estimates of the NBRM part of the ZINB model and therefore excludes those cases which have a zero probability of rebel one-sided violence in a given year.

Table 4.11: Discrete Change in the Number of Civilians Killed by Rebel Groups for the Trimmed Model

	Coefficient	0→1	SD	Min→Max
Ethno-nationalist ideology	-0.561**	-35.45	-	-
Leadership divisions	-0.653***	-3.80	-	-
Population base	1.715**	-	26.64	117.31
No. of competing factions	-0.157***	-	-2.70	-4.59
Conflict duration ^a	-0.101	-	13.44	44.05
Conflict intensity	0.847***	218.18	-	-
Government violence	0.000	-	19.46	289.07
Polity2	-0.038	-	-20.62	-75.25
Polity2 squared	-0.023***	-	-33.27	-79.24
Population density ^a	0.470***	-	72.99	475.81

^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p <0.1

independent variable is computed with all remaining variables held constant at their mean in the case of continuous variables or at their mode in the case of binary variables. Table 4.11 displays the discrete change for the initial trimmed model of the level of rebel one-sided violence. The first column reports the coefficients and significance level for each independent variable, the second column provides the discrete change when a binary variable changes from 0 to 1, the third column gives the standard deviation change of continuous variables centred on their mean. The final column reports the discrete change when a continuous variable moves from its minimum value to its maximum value.

Rebels pursuing an ethno-nationalist agenda kill approximately 36 civilians fewer during a campaign of one-sided violence, holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode. Given a mean of 94 civilians killed by a rebel group per year in the data under analysis, ethno-nationalism cuts the expected fatality count due to one-sided violence by more than a third. The fractionalisation of a group's population base has a similarly substantial impact on the level of rebel violence against civilians. Rebel groups depending on a population base which fractionalisation score is with 0.54 a standard deviation above the mean of 0.24 kill 27 more civilians, holding all other variables constant. The impact of this variable on the number of civilians killed by rebels is even larger when we look at the respective endpoints of the underlying continuum of fractionalisation. Rebel groups with the most fractionalised population bases in the data (0.87) kill 117 more civilians than similar rebel groups with a completely homogeneous population base. In contrast, the influence of leadership divisions on the level of one-sided violence is considerably lower. Compared to rebels with a cohesive leadership, rebel groups experiencing leadership divisions kill 4 civilians fewer, holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode. The impact of the number of competing rebel factions is even lower. Rebel groups which face the

maximum value in the data of 9 additional rebel factions in a given year kill just 5 civilians more than those rebel groups which do not face any factional competitors at all. While the cohesion of a rebel group's leadership and the number of competing factions is statistically significant, its actual impact on the number of civilian fatalities due to one-sided violence is extremely low.

Regarding the control variables, I find that the level of fighting between government and rebel forces has a major impact on the number of civilian fatalities due to rebel one-sided violence. Rebel groups fighting a war kill 218 more civilians than rebel groups fighting in a minor conflict. The coefficients measuring the impact of conflict duration and government violence are statistically not significant and therefore excluded from this interpretation.

The *polity2*-score is also statistically not significant and its discrete change therefore not reported. Its squared term, however, is statistically significant. Rebel groups operating in countries whose squared *polity2*-term is a standard deviation above the mean value of 20 kill 21 more civilians, holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode. This means that rebels kill more civilians in politically unstable countries mixing democratic and autocratic characteristics.

Finally, the logged value of population density has a positive impact on rebel violence against civilians. Rebel groups located in densely populated countries are likely to kill considerably more civilians. Rebels in countries whose population density is a standard deviation of 1.19 above the mean of 3.42 kill 73 more civilians, holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode.

Next, I examine the confidence intervals at the 95% level for the predicted count of civilian fatalities of the statistically significant explanatory variables.⁶⁶ By doing this, I am able to assess the precision of the estimates. The two upper graphs in Figure 4.6 display the confidence intervals for rebel groups without and with an ethno-nationalist ideology by the level of fractionalisation within the population base, holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode. The two lower figures show the confidence intervals for rebel groups without and with leadership divisions by the number of competing rebel factions, holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode.

First of all, the confidence intervals for each curve are wide. This casts doubt on the precision of the predicted fatality counts. Despite these wide confidence intervals, however, the two upper graphs do not fundamentally challenge the general direction of the variables measuring the impact of ethno-nationalism and the population base. One can still see that rebels not pursuing an ethno-nationalist agenda kill considerably more civilians the higher the level of fractionalisation

⁶⁶I use the *pvalue* command of the *SPost* package to compute the confidence intervals (Long and Freese 2006).




Figure 4.6: Predicted Numbers with Confidence Intervals for the Level of Rebel One-Sided Violence by Ethno-Nationalist Ideology, Leadership Divisions, Population Base and Number of Competing Rebel Factions in Minor Conflicts (Note: The two lower graphs use a different scale on the *y*-axis)

within the population base than rebels with an ethno-nationalist agenda.

In the case of leadership divisions and the number of competing rebel factions, however, the confidence intervals indicate that these variables can actually also have an opposite impact. While the regression results and discrete change indicated a negative influence of these coefficients on the number of civilians killed, an examination of the confidence intervals reveals that a positive impact would also be possible. Given this finding, I exclude both variables from the subsequent discussion. I cannot unambiguously discern the actual impact of leadership divisions and the number of competing rebel factions on the level of rebel one-sided violence.

Finally, I turn to a more detailed graphical representation of the impact of ethno-nationalism and population base on the number of civilians killed by rebel forces. Figure 4.7 displays the predicted count of civilian fatalities by the level of fractionalisation within the population base for rebel groups with and without an ethno-nationalist agenda in minor conflicts and wars.

One can see from this graph that rebels not pursuing an ethno-nationalist agenda (*a* and *c*) generally kill more civilians than their respective ethno-nationalist counterparts (*b* and *d*). Similarly, groups with highly fractionalised population bases kill more civilians than rebels with




Figure 4.7: Predicted Numbers of Civilians Killed by Ethno-Nationalist Ideology, Population Base and Conflict Intensity

less fractionalised population bases. Interestingly, however, the impact of these two variables depends on conflict intensity. In minor conflicts, there are only very small differences in the number of civilians killed by ethno-nationalist rebels (9 civilian fatalities) and all other rebels (32 civilian fatalities) when groups' population bases are completely homogeneous. Even at the maximum value of fractionalisation within a population base, the difference between ethno-nationalist rebels (*d*) and other rebels (*c*) is only 105.

In wars, however, other rebels (*a*) already kill 104 more civilians than ethno-nationalist rebels (*b*) when a population base is completely homogeneous. With increasing fractionalisation within the population base, the predicted number of civilians killed by ethno-nationalist rebels increases relatively modestly. It moves from 63 civilian fatalities for completely homogeneous population bases to 96 fatalities when the fractionalisation is set at its mean of 0.24 to 288 fatalities when the fractionalisation is at its maximum value of 0.87. At the exact same values of fractionalisation within the population base, however, other rebels move from 63 civilian fatalities to 253 fatalities to 755.

In sum, it is especially the absence of an ethno-nationalist purpose in combination with a highly fractionalised population base and high levels of conflict intensity which result in large-scale civilian victimisation. It appears that such groups only have very few non-violent strategies to

secure popular support at their disposal. As a consequence, these groups resort to violence to enforce support.

4.3.5 Interaction Models

In this section I relax the assumption that the explanatory variables under analysis are not moderated by the control variables capturing conflict duration, conflict intensity and government violence. As in the case of the onset of rebel one-sided violence, it is possible that the characteristics of a civil war moderate the impact of rebel organisation on the number of civilians killed by rebel forces. After all, such conflict variables have been identified as important determinants of rebel one-sided violence (e.g., [Hultman 2007a](#); [Kalyvas 2006](#); [Wood 2010](#)). Against this background, I run a series of additional trimmed models in which I successively interact ethno-nationalism and the level of fractionalisation within a population base with conflict duration, conflict intensity and government violence. By analysing one interaction at a time, I am able to focus exclusively on the potentially moderating effect of these three variables on each explanatory variable.

As already mentioned previously, the interpretation of these models is not straightforward as the magnitude, direction and statistical significance of the coefficients of the interaction terms and its constitutive variables can be misleading ([Berry, DeMeritt and Esarey 2010](#); [Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006](#); [Braumoeller 2004](#)). I therefore focus on the marginal effects⁶⁷ of each explanatory variable on the dependent variable at different levels of the respective moderating variable ([Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006](#); [Long and Freese 2006](#)).⁶⁸ To assess the statistical significance of the marginal effects, I also compute the confidence intervals at the 95% level. When either the lower bound or the upper bound of these confidence intervals transgresses the zero line, a clear-cut direction of the marginal effect is not given and the hypothesised interaction effect is rejected.

I begin with the interpretation of the interaction models focusing on ethno-nationalism. [Figure 4.8](#) displays the marginal effect of ethno-nationalism on the number of civilians killed by rebels moderated by conflict duration. The confidence intervals of this marginal effect are both above and below the zero line. I therefore conclude that ethno-nationalism is not moderated by conflict duration. A similar conclusion is drawn with regard to the hypothesised interaction between

⁶⁷In case of dichotomous variables, I compute the discrete change.

⁶⁸Table [A.10](#) in the Appendix report the full regression results. There is also no indication of multicollinearity of a noteworthy magnitude (Table [A.11](#) in the Appendix).




Figure 4.8: Marginal Effects of Ethno-Nationalist Purpose on the Level of Rebel One-Sided Violence Moderated by Conflict Duration and Government Violence

ethno-nationalism and conflict intensity. The marginal effect of ethno-nationalism on the level of one-sided violence for rebel groups caught in a war is -47.95 with a lower confidence interval bound of -151.47 and an upper confidence interval bound of 55.58 . This marginal effect also crosses the zero line.

A different picture emerges when looking at the marginal effect of ethno-nationalism on the number of civilians killed by rebel forces moderated by government violence (Figure 4.8). Although the upper bound crosses the zero line, this transgression is rather minimal compared to the overall range of the confidence interval. Turning to the direction of this marginal effect, I find that ethno-nationalist rebels kill fewer civilians when government forces are stepping up their attacks on the population. In conflicts without government violence against civilians, the number of civilian fatalities due to rebel violence is reduced by 30 when rebels follow an ethno-nationalist agenda. When government forces kill more than 1,000 civilians per year, this reduction is more than doubled. However, it is also important to note that the average number of civilians killed by government forces is only 165 and that there are no events of government violence in 58% of the observations. Nevertheless, this interaction effect can be interpreted against the background of the theoretical model as a sign that the link between rebels and civilians created by ethno-nationalism is even strengthened when civilians are victimized by government forces.

Next, I turn to the impact of fractionalisation within a rebel group's population base set at its mean moderated by conflict duration. Figure 4.9 shows that the interaction effect becomes statistically significant when the natural log of conflict duration is higher than 0.5 which equates to civil wars lasting longer than one year. As almost 80% of the civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa last longer than one year, it is important to know that the impact of a fractionalised population base on one-sided violence increases over time. Figure 1 also shows that this increase is considerable. While the marginal effect of fractionalisation set at its mean on one-sided violence is




Figure 4.9: Marginal Effects of Fractionalisation within a Rebel Group’s Population Base on the Level of Rebel One-Sided Violence Moderated by Conflict Duration, Conflict Intensity and Government Violence

zero for rebel groups in their first year of armed struggle, the marginal effect increases to roughly 250 civilians killed by rebels in the seventh year of an armed struggle. Rebel groups caught in conflicts exceeding this mean value are likely to kill even more civilians. With increasing conflict duration, it apparently becomes increasingly difficult for groups with a fractionalised population base to muster popular support non-violently. As a consequence, rebels resort to violence against civilians to enforce support.

Figure 4.9 also provides tentative evidence for a limited interaction effect between a group’s fractionalised population base and conflict intensity. The lower bound of the confidence interval is just below the zero line for rebel groups with a value of 0.4 or below on the fractionalisation index. However, the widened confidence interval for more fractionalised groups might be caused by a lack of data. There are only 24 of 309 observations in which rebel groups have a fractionalisation score of 0.4 or higher and are caught in a full-blown civil war. Turning to the impact of a fractionalised population base when moderated by conflict intensity, Figure 4.9 shows that the marginal effect increases from 500 civilians killed for groups with a completely homogeneous population base to almost 1,000 civilians killed for rebel groups with the highest level of fractionalisation in the data (0.87). This interaction model therefore lends support to the notion that a highly fractionalised

population base makes it more difficult for a rebel group to secure popular support non-violently in high-intensity conflicts.

Finally, Figure 4.9 displays the interaction effects between government violence and the population base. In both cases, one bound of the confidence intervals crosses the zero line. But this transgression is rather minimal when compared to the overall range of the confidence interval. When the fractionalisation score is set at its mean, an increasing level of government violence also increases rebel violence against the civilian population. As already mentioned above, however, it needs to be noted that government violence does not happen that frequently and takes place on a rather low scale. Nevertheless, government violence appears to increase the gap between rebels and civilians when the population base is highly fractionalised. Violent reprisals by government forces seem to further alienate civilians from these rebel groups.

To summarise, the interaction models show that the number of civilians killed by rebel groups is often influenced by a combination of organisational factors and conflict characteristics. This implies that explanations which exclude either rebel organisation or conflict characteristics from their framework offer an incomplete understanding of rebel violence against civilians.

4.4 Summary

In this chapter, I examined how the organisation of a rebel group affects the onset and level of one-sided violence. I used already existing data sets and newly collected data to operationalise the dependent and independent variables. I relied on logistic regression to examine the onset of rebel one-sided violence and ZINB regression to analyse the level of rebel violence against civilians. A set of regression diagnostic for each analysis confirmed that the obtained statistical results are sufficiently robust.

Regarding the onset of rebel one-sided violence, I identify the occurrence of leadership divisions in a rebel group as statistically significant. When a rebel group experiences divisions within its central leadership, the rebels are more likely to begin a campaign of one-sided violence. The other organisational factors tested in the analysis turn out to be statistically not significant. Instead, I find that rebels' use of one-sided violence is strongly influenced by war-related factors. Rebels are more likely to resort to violence against civilians in long-lasting and high-intensity conflicts in which government forces target the civilian population. This lends support to previous studies identifying conflict dynamics as important predictor of popular support and, subsequently, civilian victimisation. Testing for possible interaction effects between these war-related factors and

leadership divisions, I find that rebels are less likely to begin a campaign of one-sided violence when government forces already target the civilian population.

The analysis of the level of rebel one-sided violence identifies a group's ethno-nationalist ideology and the level of fractionalisation within its population base as statistically significant. Ethno-nationalist rebels kill fewer civilians during a campaign of one-sided violence than any other rebel group. An increase in rebels' degree of fractionalisation, however, results in more civilians killed due to one-sided violence. Turning to the control variables, I find that conflict intensity is the only war-related factor shaping the level of rebel one-sided violence. When a rebel group uses one-sided violence in a war, it kills more civilians than in a minor conflict. Finally, the interaction models show that government violence amplifies the effect of ethno-nationalism on the level of rebel one-sided violence. The fractionalisation within a rebel group's population base, however, is positively moderated by conflict duration, conflict intensity and government violence against civilians.

Taken together, I conclude that certain aspects of rebel organisation are indeed relevant additional factors influencing the onset and level of one-sided violence. It is important to note, however, that the onset of violence is shaped by a different set of organisational and war-related factors than the level of violence. Apparently, the processes leading a rebel group to start a campaign of one-sided violence are different from those mechanisms underlying the actual level of one-sided violence once such a campaign has begun. This distinction has not been identified by past studies on the subject. Furthermore, my analysis shows that it is often the combination of rebel organisation and war-related factors shaping the occurrence of violence against civilians. Research which excludes either factor from its theoretical model offers an incomplete understanding of this phenomenon.

The statistical results lend support to the theoretical model of this thesis. It appears that the organisation of rebel groups is an additional factor shaping rebels' ability to muster popular support. That is, selected organisational factors influence civilians' cost-benefit calculus in a way that these civilians consider supporting the rebels as beneficial. If these organisational factors are deficient or absent, however, rebel leaders face a neutral or even hostile populace unwilling to offer anything to the rebel movement. In such a case, rebel leaders frequently resort to violence against civilians to enforce support. But as a quantitative analysis is unable to confirm these assumed causal mechanisms definitively, I explore the relationship between rebel organisation and one-sided violence further with case studies and qualitative methods.

Qualitative Analysis of Rebel Organisation and One-Sided Violence

In this chapter, I present a framework for the qualitative analysis of the relationship between rebel organisation and one-sided violence. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the limitations of the previously conducted quantitative analysis. I argue that these limitations are primarily related to potential threats to internal and construct validity of the quantitative analysis. The second section develops a qualitative case study design using within-case analysis to address these limitations. The third section addresses the issue of the selection of cases for further qualitative inquiry. Based on an examination of the quantitative data set and the statistical findings, I identify two rebel groups in Sudan as suitable for further qualitative analysis. The fourth section discusses the data sources used for the qualitative analysis. The final section summarises the key aspects of the case study design.

5.1 Limitations of the Quantitative Analysis

In Chapter 4, I tested a number of hypotheses linking a rebel group's ideology, leadership, population base, external supporters and domestic rebel competitors to one-sided violence.

The analysis of the onset of rebel one-sided violence identified the occurrence of divisions among the rebels' leadership as a statistically significant determinant. If such divisions occur, a rebel

group is more likely to start a campaign of one-sided violence. Regarding the level of one-sided violence, I found ethno-nationalist ideology and the fractionalisation within a rebel group's population to be statistically significant predictors. While ethno-nationalist rebels kill comparatively few civilians during a campaign of one-sided violence, rebel groups with a highly fractionalised population base kill comparatively many civilians. The remaining organisational factors of rebel groups did not have much of an impact on the outcome variables and are therefore considered to be of no importance in explaining one-sided violence. The hypotheses involving these remaining organisational factors were consequently rejected. Turning to the control variables included in the models, conflict duration, conflict intensity and government violence were found to have an impact on rebel violence against civilians. An analysis of potential interaction effects showed that these control variables also moderated the impact of some of the explanatory variables. Finally, a set of regression diagnostics conducted after each analysis confirmed the robustness of these statistical findings.

With these statistical findings, I achieved a number of objectives central to a better understanding of the link between rebel organisation and one-sided violence in sub-Saharan African civil wars. Firstly, I identified which of several organisational factors are particularly relevant in shaping the onset and level of such violence across all cases in the data under analysis. Secondly, I estimated the average effect of the statistically significant aspects of rebel organisation on the onset and level of violence against civilians. Finally, I was able to establish that the statistical findings are reasonably robust.

At the same time, however, the quantitative analysis was unable to achieve other important objectives of this thesis. Most importantly, the statistical inferences made in Chapter 4 are unable to confirm the causal interpretation in which rebel organisation is linked to popular support and to one-sided violence which was presented in the theoretical model of this thesis (see Chapter 3). For example, I argue that leadership divisions within a rebel group obstruct the rebels' ability to conduct effective military operations. As a consequence, the probability of a rebel military victory decreases, which makes civilians more hesitant in lending support to the rebel group. Faced with this, rebels will be more inclined to resort to one-sided violence to enforce popular support. While the quantitative analysis lends support to this relationship, it cannot test the assumed causal pathway because none of the intervening variables (e.g., civilian hesitation to lend support) have been observed. Similar problems apply to the hypotheses modelling the relationship between a rebel group's ideology and population base on the one hand and the level of rebel one-sided violence on the other.

This inability to test the underlying causal mechanisms is mainly due to two aspects. Firstly, the conclusions of the quantitative analysis are subject to internal validity threats. The concept of internal validity is understood as the validity

“(...) of inferences about whether observed covariation between A and B reflects a causal relationship from A to B in the form in which the variables were manipulated or measured.” (Shadish, Cook and Campbell 2002, 53)

The data set employed in the analysis of Chapter 4 only allows a cross-sectional analysis with the group-year as unit of analysis. This coarseness of the temporal location of the data disallows an explicit test of the hypothesised causal sequence between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable properly. It is unclear whether the score of the explanatory variable in a given year actually precedes the outbreak of one-sided violence in the same year. The previously given example of the occurrence of leadership divisions and the onset of one-sided violence illustrates this point. The data set used in the quantitative analysis does not contain any information about whether the event of rebel infighting is actually antecedent to the start of a campaign of rebel one-sided violence. The actual order of events could be the other way around. That is, a rebel group resorts to violence against civilians and this causes frictions in the rebel leadership. Moreover, the cross-sectional design employed in the quantitative analysis cannot establish temporal ordering in another way. When group-years are the units of analysis, the normal ordering of years get lost and thus the ordering of events at $t-1$, t and $t+1$. Consequently, the quantitative research design employed in Chapter 4 cannot explore whether the leadership divisions in one year are actually causing an onset of one-sided violence in the following year.⁶⁹ Overall, these limitations of the data impede the analysis of the causal pathways outlined in the theoretical model of this thesis.

The second aspect hampering the disclosure of the underlying causal pathways can be traced back to threats to construct validity (Shadish, Cook and Campbell 2002). Construct validity is defined as:

“The degree to which inferences are warranted from the observed persons, settings, and cause-and-effect operations sampled within a study to constructs that these samples represent.” (Shadish, Cook and Campbell 2002, 53)

Due to the difficulties in obtaining precise and accurate information from war zones, quantitative

⁶⁹While this can be addressed by another design of data representation (namely an explicit time series for each conflict), such an approach would produce problems in the present context given the relatively small number of observations in the data under analysis.

research on civil wars has frequently resorted to rather imprecise proxy measures of variables of interest. In the present study, this problem especially applies to the variables measuring the impact of a rebel group's ideology and its population base. The ideology variables only provide a very crude distinction between the possible ideological beliefs of a rebel group. In the case of the population base variable, on the other hand, the fractionalisation score only offers a rough approximation of the challenges rebels face in securing popular support. Specifically, it is unclear in which way rebels utilise the social networks within their population base and how this process is affected by ethnic diversity. Moreover, the scarcity of reliable information from war zones also results in an inability to observe and collect data on variables intervening between the independent and explanatory variables for all the observations in the population under analysis. For example, I do not have reliable data on how different rebel ideologies or the structure of rebels' population bases directly affect the actual level of popular support for rebel groups.

If I want to corroborate my interpretation of the findings of the quantitative analysis and lend stronger support to the theoretical model of this thesis, I have to provide further supporting empirical evidence. I will do so with qualitative analyses.

5.2 Case Study Research Design

I use qualitative case studies to collect the required additional empirical evidence. These case studies follow a model-testing approach (Lieberman 2005). That is, I focus exclusively on the statistically significant explanatory variables of the quantitative analysis and attempt to gain more in-depth information about how these variables are linked to the outcome variables.

In these case studies, I use a within-case approach and disaggregate the group-year as unit of analysis (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007). This means that I determine the actual level of the particular organisational variable at t , the impact of this organisational variable on the availability of non-violent strategies to secure popular support at $t+1$, the actual level of popular support at $t+2$ and, finally, if and how a rebel group uses violence at $t+3$ to enforce popular support. Following this, I concatenate these observations in order to arrive at a detailed temporal sequence of events which will clarify whether leadership divisions are causally linked to the onset of one-sided violence and whether a group's ideology and population base is causally linked to the level of violence against civilians. Ultimately, this procedure addresses the problems raised by the threats to the internal validity of the quantitative analysis (Shadish, Cook and Campbell 2002).

To conduct this within-case analysis, I follow a set of standardised questions directed at each case under analysis (George and Bennett 2005). While I will continue to use the definitions and operationalisations of the explanatory and dependent variables, these standardised questions aim at collecting additional in-depth and contextual information about a group's leadership divisions, its ideology and population base as well as about the exact time, location and victims of one-sided violence. This additional information is essential to address the threats to construct validity referred to above (Shadish, Cook and Campbell 2002).

In the remainder of this section, I present the standardised questions for the analysis of the relationship between leadership divisions and the onset of rebel one-sided violence and for the analysis of a group's ideology and population base and the level of rebel one-sided violence.

5.2.1 Onset of Rebel One-sided Violence

The onset of rebel one-sided violence is defined as the point in time during a civil war when a rebel group starts to use violence against civilians. As explained in Chapter 3, the onset of one-sided violence therefore signifies the moment when a rebel group changes from non-violent means to secure popular support to violent means to enforce such support.

The qualitative analysis of such an onset is restricted to those instances in which the occurrence of leadership divisions coincides with the start of rebel one-sided violence. This restriction is due to the model-testing objective of the qualitative analysis (Lieberman 2005). As I am exclusively interested in finding evidence further corroborating the hypothesised relationship between leadership divisions and the onset of one-sided violence, it is necessary that both events occur.⁷⁰

I begin the qualitative analysis with a description of the rebel leadership at the outset of the civil war. I define rebel leaders as the strategic decision-makers taking up the top ranking position in a rebel group's hierarchy (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003; Clapham 1998a; Jordan 2009; Morris and Staggengborg 2004). Starting from this definition, it is necessary to identify the leaders in person and to outline the leadership structure within the rebel group. Moreover, it is important to provide additional background information by outlining the emergence of this leadership.

Following this, I investigate when and why this leadership experiences internal divisions. Such divisions encompass any event of violent or non-violent infighting among a rebel group's lead-

⁷⁰At this point, cases in which the occurrence of leadership divisions is not followed by an onset of rebel one-sided violence are of no further importance as I do not claim that the occurrence of leadership divisions is a sufficient *and* necessary condition for the onset of rebel violence against civilians.

ership due to disagreements over the political or military direction of the group or personal animosities between rebel leaders (Clapham 1998b; Gallagher Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012; Kenny 2010; Lawrence 2010). In the qualitative analysis, this definition needs to be fleshed out with additional information about the rebel group under analysis. That is, it needs to be answered who is revolting against the leadership, what the dividing fault lines are within the leadership and how severe the leadership divisions are.

In the next step, I analyse how the leadership divisions affect the rebel group. Specifically, I examine how the divisions affect the group's ability to secure popular support with non-violent means. As discussed in Chapter 3, this discussion focuses on the rebel group's military command structure (Clapham 1998a; Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009; Lichbach 1995). If this structure is disrupted, the rebels are less likely to successfully engage in military operations, and this decreases their probability of winning the conflict. Against this background, I then examine the level of popular support for a rebel group in the aftermath of leadership divisions.

The final task focuses on a detailed analysis of the onset of rebel one-sided violence. It needs to be answered whether the onset of rebel one-sided violence is actually a consequence of the leadership divisions designed to address lacking popular support. For this, the time, place and victims of the campaign of one-sided violence are analysed in more detail.

5.2.2 Level of Rebel One-sided Violence

The level of rebel one-sided violence is defined as the actual number of civilians killed by a rebel group once it began to use violence against civilians. As I explained in Chapter 3, the level of one-sided violence therefore captures how a rebel group uses violent means to enforce popular support.

The analysis of the level of rebel one-sided violence focuses exclusively on those campaigns of one-sided violence in which there is sufficient variation within the series of concatenated observations of the actual configuration of rebel ideology and the rebel group's population base, the impact of these two factors on the availability of non-violent strategies to secure popular support and how a rebel group uses violence at to enforce lacking support. As in the case of the onset analysis, this restriction is due to model-testing objective of the qualitative analysis (Lieberman 2005). To gain additional information of the relationships between a rebel group's ideology and population base on the one side and the number of civilians killed on the other side, it is vital to identify if and how any changes in the explanatory variables affect the dependent variable.

I begin the qualitative analysis of the level of rebel one-sided violence with a first presentation of a rebel group's ideology and population as the key variables of interest. A rebel group's ideology is defined as a secular and/or religious belief system identifying the grievances plaguing a society and outlining the available remedies as well as the shape of the ideal society (Coleman 1990; Downs 1957; Gurr 1970). With regard to the case under analysis, the first task is to specify which kind of ideology is formulated by the rebel group. Following this, I direct the focus on the reception of this ideology among the civilian population.

The second organisational factor of interest is the population base of the rebel group. This concerns the ethnic composition of the rebel group's civilian constituency which may provide recruits and support (Findley and Edwards 2007; Tilly 1978; Vinci 2007; Zahar 2000). Here, I begin with a description of the ethnic groups composing the population as well as their relationships to each other. Then, I explore in which way the rebel group governs this population and how this affects their access to popular support.

In the next step, I turn to an examination of these two organisational factors during the campaign of rebel one-sided violence under analysis. Regarding group ideology, the key aspect is to determine to what extent ideology enables the rebel group to muster popular support. That is, whether ideology actually presents an alternative credible enough for the civilians to risk their lives and support the rebel movement (Coleman 1990; Downs 1957; Lichbach 1995; Siegenthaler 1989). Turning to the population base, the question is whether the rebel group is able to tap into the social networks and community ties of its constituency (Lichbach 1995; Marwell, Oliver and Prahl 1988; Moore 1995; Tilly 1978). This discussion of the two explanatory variables also has to take into account whether they undergo major changes during the campaign of one-sided violence under analysis and how these changes have an impact on the level of popular support.

Finally, I look in more detail at the level of rebel one-sided violence. The main objective is to examine whether the aforementioned mechanisms linking a rebel group's ideology and population to popular support have an impact on how the rebel group uses violence against civilians. Then, I turn to an examination of the time, place and location of the events of rebel violence against civilians in order to explore whether there is a link between rebel organisation and violence.

5.3 Case Selection

It is reasonable to select rebel groups as cases for further analysis which are located in the same country. By doing this, I can minimise the impact of any - potentially interfering - additional




Figure 5.1: Index Plot of the Standardised Pearson Residuals of the Trimmed Model of the Onset of Rebel One-Sided Violence and the Raw Residuals of the Trimmed Model of the Level of Rebel One-Sided Violence

factors (Gerring 2007; King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Lieberman 2005). In the data under analysis, there is more than one active rebel group in 17 of the 23 included countries. That is, there is a reasonably large subset of observations suitable for the qualitative analysis. Within this subset, I then look for rebel groups which are representative of the population under analysis and which feature between them maximum variance on the explanatory variables.

5.3.1 Representativeness

As already explained above, the central purpose of the model-testing qualitative analysis in this thesis is to further assess the causal mechanisms linking rebel organisation to rebel one-sided violence (Gerring 2007; Lieberman 2005). However, if the analysed cases are unrepresentative of the population used in the quantitative analysis of Chapter 4, the relevance of any corroborating - or refuting - evidence is limited because it derives from cases that are not typical instances of the tested relationships. I therefore have to select cases for the qualitative analysis which are representative of the population of sub-Saharan African rebel groups.

To determine which group-year observations are representative of the population, I analyse the residuals of the trimmed models of the onset and level of rebel one-sided violence. Representative group-year observations should preferably feature residuals which do not deviate too strongly from the regression line.

Figure 5.1 displays an index plot of the standardised Pearson residuals of the trimmed model of the onset of rebel one-sided violence plotted against the observation numbers. The horizontal line originating at 0 on the y -axis is the regression line. The horizontal lines originating at 2.5 and -2.5 on the y -axis are used as threshold values. I consider residuals above 2.5 or below -2.5 as too large and the corresponding observation as not sufficiently representative. In total, I find

Table 5.1: List of Outlying Observations in the Trimmed Model of the Onset of Rebel One-Sided Violence

Observation	Rebel Group	Country	Year	Residual
30	Palipehutu-FNL	Burundi	2001	-3.147
54	FARF	Chad	1997	2.967
70	Ntsiloulous	Congo-Brazzaville	2002	2.735
71	AFDL	DR Congo	1996	2.517
148	FIAA	Mali	1994	3.880
215	ADF	Uganda	1997	2.618
255	UNRF II	Uganda	1997	2.618
307	CNDP	DR Congo	2007	3.006

Table 5.2: List of Outlying Observations in the Trimmed Model of the Level of Rebel One-Sided Violence

Observation	Rebel Group	Country	Year	Residual
11	UNITA	Angola	2001	933
71	AFDL	DR Congo	1996	6,249
72	AFDL	DR Congo	1997	-1,670
91	EPRDF	Ethiopia	1991	-442
134	NPFL	Liberia	1993	730
146	LURD	Liberia	2003	-593
151	RENAMO	Mozambique	1991	457
165	FDLR	Rwanda	1998	738
168	FDLR	Rwanda	2001	-583
186	RUF	Sierra Leone	1998	-1,168
187	RUF	Sierra Leone	1999	-483
203	LRA	Uganda	1996	438
208	LRA	Uganda	2002	522
209	LRA	Uganda	2003	426
210	LRA	Uganda	2004	556
221	ADF	Uganda	2007	-556
287	SPLM/A	Sudan	1993	445

eight group-year observations which are not representative of the fitted model of the onset of rebel one-sided violence. Table 5.1 lists these observations.

In the case of the level of rebel one-sided violence, I determine the representativeness of the observations with the raw residual. That is, the difference between the observed and predicted number of civilians killed by rebels. As the dependent variable is a count variable, such a direct comparison is more illustrative than an examination of the standardised Pearson residuals. Figure 5.1 shows the corresponding index plot.⁷¹ The used threshold value is the standard deviation of 398 civilian fatalities in the data under analysis. Table 5.2 list the 17 outlying observations.

Taken together, the residual analysis of the models exploring the onset and level of rebel one-sided violence provides us with a number of observations which are likely to be unrepresentative of the data under analysis. If possible, these cases should not be selected for further qualitative

⁷¹To increase the readability of this plot, I excluded those observations with excessively large raw residuals (observations 71, 72 and 186).

Table 5.3: Scores of the Explanatory Variables of Leadership Divisions, Group Ideology and Population Base by Those Countries With More Than One Rebel Group

Country	No of Rebel Groups	Leadership Divisions	Group Ideology	Population Base
Angola	3	4 events	ethno-nationalist/ revolutionary	0.00 and 0.32
Burundi	5	6 events	ethno-nationalist/ revolutionary	0.00
Chad	13	1 events	revolutionary/ religious	0.00 and 0.79
Congo-Brazzaville	4	2 events	ethno-nationalist/ revolutionary/ religious	0.00 and 0.37
Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire)	6	3 events	ethno-nationalist/ revolutionary/ religious	0.00 to 0.68
Djibouti	2	1 events	ethno-nationalist/ revolutionary	0.00
Ethiopia	7	0 events	ethno-nationalist/ revolutionary/ religious	0.00 to 0.70
Ivory Coast	4	2 events	ethno-nationalist/ revolutionary	0.00
Liberia	4	6 events	ethno-nationalist	0.18 to 0.86
Mali	3	1 events	ethno-nationalist/ religious	0.49 and 0.63
Niger	6	0 events	ethno-nationalist/ revolutionary	0.28 to 0.56
Nigeria	2	0 events	ethno-nationalist/ religious	0.12
Rwanda	2	1 events	ethno-nationalist/ revolutionary	0.00
Sierra Leone	4	5 events	revolutionary	0.00 - 0.80
Somalia	5	4 events	revolutionary/ religious	0.00 and 0.30
Sudan	8	7 events	ethno-nationalist/ revolutionary/ religious	0.00 to 0.87
Uganda	5	3 events	revolutionary/ religious	0.00 to 0.50

analysis.

5.3.2 Maximum Variance

The representativeness of observations, however, is only one criterion for case selection. A model-testing case study also requires observations which show the widest possible degree of variation on the explanatory variables (Gerring 2007; King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Lieberman 2005). Such maximum variance makes it possible to establish whether different scores on the explanatory variables are actually linked to the dependent variable.

Table 5.3 summarises the values of the key explanatory variables - leadership divisions, ideology

Table 5.4: Scores of the Explanatory Variables of Leadership Divisions, Group Ideology and Population Base of the Rebel Groups in Sudan

Country	No of Observations	Leadership Divisions	Group Ideology	Population Base
SLM/A	4	2 events	ethno-nationalist/ revolutionary	0.36
JEM	3	2 events	ethno-nationalist/ revolutionary/ religious	0.36
NRF	1	0 events	ethno-nationalist/ revolutionary	0.36
SLM/A-MM	1	0 events	ethno-nationalist/ revolutionary	0.00
SAF	1	0 events	revolutionary	0.00
SPLM/A	16	2 events	ethno-nationalist/ revolutionary	0.86 and 0.87
NDA	7	1 events	revolutionary	0.00
SLM/A-Unity	1	0 events	ethno-nationalist/ revolutionary	0.00

and population base - by those countries which feature more than one rebel group. From this list, I firstly exclude those rebel groups based within a country which show no variation at all. These are the rebel groups in Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Secondly, I exclude those rebel groups which only show a minimum variation on one or more explanatory variables. These are the rebel groups in Angola, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Mali, Somalia and Uganda.

After the elimination of these cases, the rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan are left as those observations which feature maximum variance on the key explanatory variables. The previous section, however, has shown that a number of group-year observations in the Democratic Republic of Congo are not representative of the overall population.

I therefore focus on rebel groups based in Sudan as the final subset from which I draw the cases for the qualitative analysis. These are the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), SLM/A-Minni Minnawi faction, SLM/A-Unity faction, Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), National Redemption Front (NRF), Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF), Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA).

5.3.3 Rebel Groups in Sudan

The final step of the case selection process focuses on finding those Sudanese rebel groups which vary strongly between each other on the key explanatory variables.

Table 5.4 lists the number of observations and the scores of the key explanatory variables for

each of the eight Sudanese rebel groups. I firstly exclude the NRF, SLM/A-Minni Minnawi, SAF and SLM/A-Unity from the list of potential case studies. These rebel groups did not experience any events of leadership divisions during their existence. Moreover, there is only one observation for each of these groups in the data which further precludes them from a meaningful qualitative analysis. From the remaining four rebel groups, I then exclude the NDA. During its existence, this group was closely allied with the SPLM/A. More importantly, the SPLM/A was the almost undisputed political and military leader of this alliance and this makes it difficult to distinguish the NDA's violent behaviour from that of the SPLM/A.

This leaves me with the SPLM/A, SLA and JEM as suitable candidates for further qualitative analysis. With regard to their scores on the explanatory variables, these groups differ strongly. Each group experiences years with and without leadership divisions and they feature different ideologies. Moreover, the SPLM/A has a highly fractionalised population base whereas SLM/A and JEM have a less fractionalised constituency among the civilian population. At the same time, however, the SLM/A and JEM exhibit - more or less - similar scores on the explanatory variables. The inclusion of both rebel groups in the qualitative analysis therefore results in a very limited added value. Against this background, I exclude the JEM as it only features a small number of events of one-sided violence which actually precede their military conflict with the Sudanese government ([UCPD 2011](#)).

At the end of this process of case selection, I arrive at the SPLM/A and the SLM/A as cases for the qualitative analysis. The observations of these rebel groups are largely representative of the population under analysis and show major differences on the key explanatory variables. The only exception is the SPLM/A in 1993 (observation 287, see [Figure 5.1](#) and [Table 5.2](#)). This observation has a rather large raw residual and therefore constitutes an outlying observation. However, this drawback can be tolerated given their overall suitability to be used in a model-testing qualitative analysis.

5.4 Data Sources

The qualitative analysis is based on secondary data in the form of scholarly research, reports from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and aid agencies and, finally, event-based data collections and press reports. In the following, I briefly discuss these data sources.

To begin with, I use previously conducted academic research on Sudan and its civil wars for the qualitative analysis. For a general overview over Sudanese history, I mainly refer to the

detailed historical studies by Collins (2006; 2007; 2008). Relevant studies of the organisation of the SPLM/A and the civil war in southern Sudan have been produced by - amongst others - Johnson (1989; 1993; 1994; 1998; 2003), Hutchinson (1996; 1999; 2001), Daly and Sikainga (1993) and Harir and Tvedt (1994). In the case of the civil war in Darfur, important studies on the conflict and rebel groups have been presented by de Waal (1993a; 1993b; 2004; 2005; 2007b), Flint (2007; 2008), Burr and Collins (2006), Prunier (2007) and Hassan and Ray (2009).

Secondly, I refer to policy reports from aid agencies, governments, human rights watchdogs and non-governmental organisations. For example, I use reports by *Amnesty International* and *Human Rights Watch* to arrive at a more detailed picture of one-sided violence by the Sudanese rebel groups under analysis. The *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* compiled by the U.S State Department are also used for this purpose. As the conflict in Darfur has raised considerable attention over the past few years, there are also several relevant policy reports by non-governmental organisations. These especially include the reports by the *International Crisis Group* and the *Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment*.

Finally, I make use of press reports and event-based data collections. The monthly issued *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series*, for example, presents information-rich summaries on the actions of the analysed rebel groups over the years. These summaries are compiled from reports from local and global media outlets and news agencies. Finally, I utilise the aforementioned *UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset* and the *Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities Dataset* (2009) to collect additional information on the time, location, victims and context of rebel one-sided violence in Sudan.

All these data sources are considered reasonably impartial and offer the best information available on the rebel groups and conflicts under analysis. I engage in cross-validation of these sources in order to sort out any contradicting information about important aspects. When such cross-validation does not enable me to arrive at a definite conclusion regarding such aspects, I report the encountered problems.

5.5 Summary

In this chapter, I presented a case study design to further explore the relationship between rebel organisation and one-sided violence in civil wars. The central objective of the qualitative analysis is to complement the statistical findings with further evidence on the underlying causal pathways.

The qualitative analysis follows a model-testing approach and conducts a within-case analysis to address the lack of internal validity and construct validity. The within-case analysis disaggregates the group-year observation as unit of analysis allowing the examination of the temporal sequence of events. Moreover, it enables me to collect additional contextual information on the statistically significant explanatory variables and the dependent variables. The cases selected for this qualitative analysis are the Sudanese rebel groups SPLM/A and SLM/A. Both are representative of the population under analysis while featuring maximum variance on the relevant explanatory variables.

In the next two chapters, I conduct the qualitative analysis of the SPLM/A and the SLM/A. In Chapter 8, I compare the findings of each case study with each other and also discuss the results against the background of the statistical findings.

The SPLM/A in Southern Sudan

In this chapter, I report a qualitative analysis assessing whether the organisation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) is causally linked to the onset and level of one-sided violence against civilians it perpetrated during the Second Sudanese Civil War. The case study serves the purpose to find further evidence for the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first presents background information on the Second Sudanese Civil War, which took place between the SPLM/A and the government of Sudan. In the second section I discuss the organisational configuration of the SPLM/A at the outset of the war. The third section explores whether the occurrence of leadership divisions within the SPLM/A resulted in the onset of campaigns of violence against civilians, and if so what influence they had. The fourth section investigates whether the ideology and population base of the SPLM/A affected the level of one-sided violence whilst the fifth section offers a summary of findings and places them within the context of this thesis.

6.1 Background to the Conflict

From 1899 to 1956, Sudan was governed jointly by Egypt (a British protectorate) and the United Kingdom, with the former controlling the northern parts of Sudan and the latter the southern territories (Collins 2008; Holt and Daly 2000). In 1956, both areas formed the newly independent Republic of Sudan. From its founding the country was plagued by internal conflicts, the most severe of which was the conflict between the national government in Khartoum and southern Sudanese rebels.⁷² The First Sudanese Civil War, fought between Khartoum and the Anya-Nya

⁷²In addition to the north-south conflict, Sudan also suffered from conflicts in the Darfur region and eastern Sudan and experienced a number of coup d'états in Khartoum (Collins 2008).




Figure 6.1: Map of Southern Sudan

rebels, lasted from the early 1960s until the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in February 1972. This conflict broke out again as the Second Sudanese Civil War in 1983, with the Sudanese government fighting against the SPLM/A. It took more than two decades until the Second Civil War was resolved with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. It is the Second Civil War which will be analysed in detail in this chapter.

In the following section I elaborate on the background to the war, setting the stage for my analysis of SPLM/A violence against civilians. I begin with a discussion of the two central structural factors of this conflict, which shaped the nature of the war and the organisation of the rebels. The first of these is the political, social and economic marginalisation of southern Sudan, which was the root cause of the conflict; the second is the ethnic heterogeneity of southern Sudan, which had consequences for the armed resistance against Khartoum. Having discussed these, I give a brief overview of the course of events during the Second Civil War, focussing in particular on violence against the civilian population. Undertaking this analysis enables me to situate the subsequent qualitative analysis in the proper historical context.

Before beginning this section, however, I must briefly consider the terminology I use throughout the chapter (and in the following chapter). Firstly, it must be noted that whenever I use the term Sudan, I am referring to the state of Sudan as its borders existed from 1956 to 2011. That is, I do



Figure 6.2: Map of Sudan

not take into account the recent secession of the southern states and the subsequent formation of the Republic of South Sudan. Secondly, I define southern Sudan as a geographical area comprising the states of Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, Western Bahr al-Ghazal, Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes, Unity, Upper Nile and Warrap. Map 6.1 (United Nations Sudan Information Gateway 2011b) displays these southern Sudanese states, along with their counties, as of December 2009. Throughout this chapter I refer to the administrative units

shown on this map when giving the geographical location of relevant events during the civil war. Occasionally, I also refer to events in locations or states in the rest of Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains in Southern Kordofan; the southern parts of Blue Nile state; and Southern Darfur. Map 6.2 (United Nations Cartographic Section 2011) of the Republic of Sudan with the 1956 to 2011 borders shows their location, as well as showing Sudan's neighbouring states, some of which are also mentioned in this chapter.

6.1.1 Marginalisation of Southern Sudan

The separate colonial administration of northern Sudan by Egypt and southern Sudan by the United Kingdom had a severe impact on these regions, effectively decoupling their political and economic development (Collins 2008; Daly 1993; Harir 1994b; Holt and Daly 2000; Johnson 2003). Events in the north were guided by well-formulated policies of political and economic development: large investments in agriculture and transportation were made and over time a relatively wealthy elite with good access to education emerged. Khartoum became the administrative centre of the north, further advancing the development of the political and economic northern elites. In the south, however, the British administrators relied heavily on the native administrative structures of local tribes to exercise power. In addition, they did not formulate specific goals for political or economic development, focussing economic activities in the south on the exploitation of small rubber, cotton and coffee plantations. These discrepancies lead to large socio-economic differences between northern and southern Sudan.

In the run-up to Sudanese independence in the early 1950s, these socio-economic differences began to influence the distribution of power in the soon-to-be new state. The northern elites dominated the political process and sidelined southern Sudanese politicians. Sudan's newly drafted constitution centralised power in Khartoum and did not include arrangements for autonomy for southern Sudan. Against this background, discontent grew in the south and fears of northern dominance became rampant. A mutiny among southern Sudanese soldiers against their northern officers broke out in the Eastern Equatorial town of Torit in 1955. It was violently crushed and this - along with the subsequent retaliation of the Sudanese army against the southern Sudanese civilian population in Torit - led to a further deterioration of north-south relations. After Sudanese independence in 1956, the government in Khartoum began to exploit the resource-rich south while neglecting the region's persisting socio-economic problems (Collins 2008; Jendia 2002; Johnson 2003; Poggio 2009; Yongo-Bure 1993).⁷³ Additionally, Khartoum

⁷³While the northern parts of Sudan are predominantly arid and dominated by deserts and mountains, southern

began to marginalise southern Sudan politically, even adopting a policy of Arabisation and Islamisation there.

These developments fuelled southern resistance against Khartoum and led to the emergence of small bands of rebels fighting the Sudanese army. However, this armed resistance was only sporadic and did not reach the level of a full-scale war. In the 1960s, however, this picture changed. First of all, the southern Sudanese rebels slowly moved towards a greater degree of political and military cohesion. Under the command of the Equatorian Joseph Lagu, the large majority of the southern rebels formed a common rebel force which became known as the Anya-Nya Armed Forces.⁷⁴ More importantly, the rebels managed to improve their military capabilities by drawing on a variety of sources.⁷⁵ Despite this, the Anya-Nya never succeeded in offering a serious political or military challenge to the government in Khartoum.

One important reason for the Anya-Nya's political and military shortcomings was their secessionist agenda (Collins 2008; Jendia 2002; Johnson 2003; Poggo 2009). They aspired to independence in order to free themselves from northern rule and advance the political, social and economic development of their home region. The newly independent African states, however, had pledged to maintain the old colonial borders, meaning no state was willing to support an openly secessionist rebel movement in the Sudan. In addition, the Anya-Nya's secessionism prevented them from linking up with northern Sudanese opposition groups, alliances which would have been necessary to present a real challenge to the government. While southern marginalisation therefore fuelled the armed conflict between the north and the south of the country, the southern rebel's claim that secession was the only way to remedy the south's marginalisation ultimately prevented them from achieving any substantial improvement in their situation.

Despite this, the civil war slowly became too costly for the Khartoum government which therefore began negotiations with the Anya-Nya. These resulted in the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 which ended the First Civil War (Jendia 2002; Johnson 2003; Kok 1996a; Poggo 2009; Sharkey 2008; Wakoson 1993). The agreement established regional autonomy for southern Sudan, but ultimately proved unable to remedy the political, social and economic marginalisation of its people. Indeed, the political exclusion and economic marginalisation of the southern Sudanese people continued unabated, and the government in Khartoum continued its policy of Arabisation and Islamisation in southern Sudan. Unsurprisingly, tensions remained, and in the early 1980s

Sudan has a tropical climate with savannahs and forests, and is suitable for farming and cattle-breeding (Central Intelligence Agency 2011). Moreover, the south has substantial deposits of oil and minerals.

⁷⁴The name Anya-Nya referred to a snake venom or type of poison (Johnson and Prunier 1993).

⁷⁵Amongst others, limited political and military support was given by the Congo, Uganda and Israel (Poggo 2009).

southern discontent reached a new high which saw small bands of rebels resort to armed struggle. In 1983, the SPLM/A emerged and the government in Khartoum renounced the Addis Ababa agreement, resulting in the outbreak of the Second Civil War. Like the Anya-Nya, the SPLM/A fought to address the political, social and economic marginalisation of the southern Sudanese population. However, the new rebel movement learned from the mistakes of the Anya-Nya and aimed for national liberation rather than secession. The subsequent section exploring the organisational configuration of the SPLM/A explains these differences in greater detail.

6.1.2 Ethnic Fragmentation in Southern Sudan

Sudan is one of the most diverse countries in the world (Alesina et al. 2003; Fearon 2003; Laitin 1992; Lewis 2009). It is home to more than 133 living languages and these languages constitute the central indicator of the ethnic group membership of its civilians. As illustrated by Map 6.3 (The Gulf/2000 Project 2011), however, these ethno-linguistic groups are unevenly distributed across Sudanese territory. Northern Sudan is relatively linguistically homogeneous, with Arabic - albeit in a variety of dialects - being the dominant language; and it is in southern Sudan where the large majority of the ethno-linguistic groups are to be found.

The population sizes and home regions of the largest language groups in southern Sudan can be seen in Table 6.1 (Deng 1995; Lewis 2009). With more than 1,350,000 speakers, Dinka is the most common language in southern Sudan. It is spoken in the Bahr al-Ghazal states, Jonglei, Lakes, Southern Kordofan, Upper Nile and Warrap; though it must be noted that it is a so-called ‘macrolanguage’, and actually comprises five variations, or ‘member languages’. This means that the Dinka do not represent a homogeneous group themselves. Similarly, southern Sudan’s second most widely spoken language - Nuer - comprises several dialects that reflect the geographical divisions of the Nuer speakers. Together with the Anuak and Shilluk, these languages form the bloc of the so-called Nilotic population which are predominantly semi-nomadic pastoralists or cattle herders. The Acholi, Azande, Bari, Moru, Lotuko, Mundu, Murle and Toposa, on the other hand, are often called the Equatorians due to their home regions being the three Equatorians states in the very south of Sudan. In these states, there is also a large number of much smaller linguistic groups. In contrast to the Nilotics, the Equatorians are primarily agriculturists.

Despite sharing a history of political repression and economic marginalisation at the hands of northern Sudanese elites, the southern ethno-linguistic groups never formed a fully unified common identity (Badal 1994; Deng 1995; Harir 1994b; Young 2003). Instead, they were char-




Figure 6.3: Linguistic Groups in Sudan

acterised by numerous rifts and cleavages, largely as a result of the geographical concentration of each language group - a factor which allowed them to uphold ethnic boundaries, which were marked by considerable variation of political and economic organisation.

The most important cleavage is the one between the Dinka and southern Sudan's other ethno-linguistic groups (Badal 1994; Deng 1995; Johnson 2003; Lesch 1998). With the Dinka being the largest and most geographically widespread group, the Nuer, Shilluk and many of the Equatorians were fearful of a 'Dinka hegemony' emerging in southern Sudan (this disregards the fact that the Dinka do not form a unified group, but consist of several smaller ethnic groupings marked

Table 6.1: Selected Linguistic Groups of Southern Sudan

Linguistic Group	Population Size	Home Region
Acholi	45,000	Eastern Equatoria
Anuak	52,000	Jonglei, Upper Nile
Azande	350,000	Central and Western Equatoria
Bari	420,000	Central Equatoria
Dinka	1,350,000	Northern and Western Bahr al-Ghazal, Jonglei, Lakes, South Kordofan, Upper Nile, Warrap
Moru	70,000	Central and Western Equatoria
Lotuko	135,000	Eastern Equatoria
Mundu	23,000	Central and Western Equatoria
Murle	60,000	Jonglei, Upper Nile
Nuer	740,000	Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity
Shilluk	175,000	Upper Nile
Turkana/Toposa	100,000	Eastern Equatoria

Source: Ethnologue (Lewis 2009)

by a variety of forms of political organisation).

The scepticism towards the Dinka shown by many southern Sudanese groups is also part of a much broader cleavage affecting southern Sudanese unity: the divide between the Nilotics and the Equatorians (Badal 1994; Deng 1995; Johnson 2003; Lesch 1998). Primarily, this divide is caused by economic differences between the pastoral Nilotics and the agricultural Equatorians; although there is also an important political divide, with the Equatorians favouring independence for the south.

Ultimately, these cleavages had severe consequences for the southern Sudanese uprisings against Khartoum. The Anya-Nya, for example, primarily recruited from the Equatorian ethno-linguistic groups and less so from the Nilotic Dinka, Nuer or Shilluk (Johnson and Prunier 1993; Johnson 1998, 2003), and as a result of the animosities between Equatorians and Nilotics their rebellion never gained a foothold in the whole of southern Sudan. Even more importantly, however, was the fact that the Anya-Nya rebels were unable to bridge the ethno-linguistic differences within the movement itself. Rather than form a unified fighting force, their combat units were for the most part ethnically homogenous, meaning they operated autonomously from each other and - on occasion - against each other, severely damaging their military effectiveness in operations against government forces.

The cleavages within southern Sudan also offered the government in Khartoum opportunities to divide the southern ethno-linguistic groups (Collins 2008; Johnson 2003; Salih 1989; Salih and Harir 1994). Especially in the Second Civil War between the government and the SPLM/A, Khartoum proved to be remarkably adept at instrumentalising fears of Dinka domination and encouraged a number of southern Sudanese ethnic groups to form anti-SPLM/A militias. Ex-

amples included - amongst others - the militias of the Fertit, Mundari, Murle, Nuer and Toposa. Since 1983, these ethnic militias have regularly attacked SPLM/A units and often obstructed the political and military advances of the SPLM/A.

6.1.3 Course of the Second Civil War

I conclude this section with a historical overview of the Second Sudanese Civil War, fought between the government in Khartoum and the SPLM/A. In particular I focus on the central instances of one-sided violence against civilians by both sides during the war ([Collins 2008](#); [Eck and Hultman 2007](#); [Johnson 2003](#)).

In the first few years of the war, the primary objective of the SPLM/A was to strengthen their underdeveloped political and military capabilities. This task was achieved with surprising speed as the government forces in southern Sudan were unable to effectively engage the rebels, and by 1984 the SPLM/A operated in the whole of southern Sudan. By 1985, it controlled the entire southern Sudanese rural countryside; by 1991 it had captured a number of significant southern Sudanese towns and was moving in on the remaining southern government garrisons in Juba, Rumbek, Tonj, Wau and Yei. By this point, it had also successfully established military operations in the Nuba Mountains of Southern Kordofan, the Ingessana Hills of Blue Nile and Southern Darfur.

There are very few reports of rebel one-sided violence between 1983 and 1991. In 1985 and 1986, the SPLM/A attacked the civilian population in the Bahr al-Ghazal states, the Equatorial states and Jonglei ([Collins 2008](#); [Johnson 2003](#); [Nyaba 1997](#)). It seems the SPLM/A conducted these attacks as civilians in these states were perceived as being hostile to their cause. However, the SPLM/A changed its strategy in 1987 and began to exercise more restraint towards civilians. The next major incident occurred in September 1989, when rebel forces raided the village of Pugnido in Ethiopia ([UCPD 2011](#)). There were a large number of civilian fatalities in this raid but it was an isolated event which had not been preceded or followed by any comparable event of one-sided violence.

[Collins \(2008\)](#) reports several incidences of one-sided violence by government forces in Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, Southern Darfur and Southern Kordofan during the years 1986 to 1989. In 1986, the Sudanese government under Sadiq al-Mahdi formed and armed the *murahiliin* militia, which was drawn from the Baggara tribes native to these states. In the following years, the *murahiliin* conducted numerous raids against the local Dinka population in order to break the

backbone of the SPLM/A's Dinka support.⁷⁶ After the coup of 1989 and the takeover of power by Brigadier Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, this strategy was used even more frequently and one-sided violence became increasingly common, with the majority of events of government violence against civilians between 1989 and 1991 taking place in Southern Kordofan's Nuba Mountains in and White Nile.

The situation in southern Sudan did not change until May 1991 with the fall of the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime in Ethiopia, which had been the most important external sponsor of the SPLM/A. Its overthrow led to a cessation of political and military support, dealing a serious blow to the Sudanese rebels. Against this background, internal divisions in the SPLM/A flared up, culminating in a coup attempt against the SPLM/A's leader John Garang by a number of SPLM/A commanders. While this failed, it caused a split in the rebel movement between forces loyal to Garang and the rebel dissidents, known initially as the SPLM/A-Nasir faction.⁷⁷

After the split in the SPLM/A, the two factions engaged each other militarily in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei and Upper Nile. In these battles, both factions resorted to large-scale violence against civilians (Collins 2008; Human Rights Watch 1994; Hutchinson 2001; Johnson 2003; UCPD 2011). In November 1991, shortly after its failed coup attempt, the SPLM/A-Nasir faction conducted a series of attacks against Dinka villages in the Bor area of Jonglei, which became known as the 'Bor Massacre'. Shortly after this, SPLM/A units loyal to Garang moved into Jonglei and Upper Nile where they clashed with the SPLM/A-Nasir and engaged in large-scale violence against civilians from the Nuer ethnic group. In late 1992, the SPLM/A extended this campaign of one-sided violence to Eastern Equatoria. There were numerous instances of one-sided violence by both the SPLM/A and the SPLM/A-Nasir faction in the years leading up to 1993, resulting in a large number of civilian fatalities in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes, Unity and Upper Nile. Garang's rebel forces continued to use one-sided violence between 1993 and 1996 - albeit on a much lower scale.

In 1992, the Khartoum government began to exploit this infighting and made heavy inroads into SPLM/A-held territory, recapturing substantial parts of Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria. In the course of these events, government forces extended their campaigns of one-sided violence into the newly captured southern Sudanese territories (UCPD 2011). Khartoum also continued its

⁷⁶The Sudanese government revisited this strategy in the Darfur conflict when it formed and armed the *janjawiid* militia (Collins 2008).

⁷⁷This group changed its name repeatedly over the years. First, it was known under the name SPLM/A-Nasir, then it changed its name to SPLM/A-United in March 1993 and to South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A) in September 1994. Finally, it used the name Southern Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) from 1997 onwards. For the sake of clarity, I use the name SPLM/A-Nasir faction throughout this chapter or will - more generally - speak of SPLM/A splinter factions.

strategy of arming tribal militias in the south in order to further weaken the SPLM/A. It also worked to strengthen political and military support for the SPLM/A splinter groups.

From 1993 onwards, the SPLM/A began to slowly recover from its political and military setbacks. It raised its international profile by participating in mediation efforts and succeeded in regaining external sponsors. Most importantly, the SPLM/A began to reform itself politically and held a National Convention in April 1994 in Chukudum in Eastern Equatoria. In 1995, they regained the military initiative with their first offensive in four years. By 1996, they had re-captured substantial parts of Eastern Equatoria and began a siege of Juba. At the same time, Khartoum's war efforts were crippled by an increasingly tarnished international reputation,⁷⁸ economic problems and growing domestic opposition in the north. However, the southern rebels were still too weak to win a military victory over Khartoum and so the two conflict parties found themselves at a stalemate.

From 1997 onwards, the SPLM/A resorted to one-sided violence only infrequently - and when it did (in 1997, 1998, 2002 and 2004) - it was at a particularly low level ([Political Instability Task Force 2009](#); [UCPD 2011](#)). The geographical focus of this rebel one-sided violence shifted from the east of southern Sudan to the Bahr al-Ghazal states, Southern Kordofan and Southern Darfur. The Sudanese army and their proxy forces, however, continued to use one-sided violence on a larger scale, using it in attempts to displace the civilian population from the oilfields located in the Bahr al-Ghazal states, Blue Nile, Jonglei, Southern Kordofan, Unity and Upper Nile.

In 1997, attempts were made to resume the peace process, with Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda convening talks under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).⁷⁹ By 2001, negotiations had not resulted in substantial steps towards peace, and fighting between government forces and the SPLM/A continued unabated. That changed with the signing of the Machakos Protocol on 20 July 2002, when Khartoum and the SPLM/A agreed a framework outlining the fundamentals of a future peace agreement; and on the steps necessary to achieve a peaceful solution. This process culminated in the signing of the CPA in January 2005, ending the Second Sudanese Civil War.

⁷⁸The Sudanese government actively supported rebel groups in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda; was allegedly involved in an assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak; and maintained relationships with Iraq, Iran, the Palestinian Hamas and Usama bin Ladin ([Collins 2008](#); [Holt and Daly 2000](#); [Johnson 2003](#)).

⁷⁹IGAD is a regional development organisation in East Africa. Its member states are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.

6.2 Organisation of the SPLM/A

Having sketched the background of the Second Sudanese Civil War, I now turn to examine the organisational configuration of the SPLM/A prior to 1989.⁸⁰ Given the empirical findings of the quantitative analysis (see Chapter 4), I focus on three factors: the SPLM/A's leadership, its ideology, and its population base. This sets the stage for the subsequent analysis of the causal relationship between rebel organisation, popular support and one-sided violence in southern Sudan after 1989.

6.2.1 Leadership

In spring 1983, three groups of southern Sudanese dissidents gathered in a newly established guerrilla base in Ethiopia (Collins 2008; Johnson and Prunier 1993; Johnson 2003). The first of these groups comprised Anya-Nya veterans and Sudanese army officers - including John Garang, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol and William Bany Nyuon - who had recently defected together with more than 2,500 southern Sudanese soldiers. Secondly, there were Anya-Nya-II units under Akwot Atem who had been fighting the Sudanese government since the early 1980s, and finally there were a number of Anya-Nya veterans including Samuel Gai Tut, William Abdallah Cuol; and southern Sudanese politicians like Joseph Oduho and Martin Majier.

These groups discussed the formation of a new southern Sudanese rebel movement. At first, it was proposed that Akwot Atem would become chairman of the political wing of the new rebel movement and Samuel Gai Tut the supreme commander of the military wing, with John Garang as his chief of staff. This seemed a realistic proposal given the seniority and increased levels of experience of these Anya-Nya veterans in comparison to the younger army defectors like Garang, Kerubino and Nyuon, and was also favoured by many southern Sudanese politicians and Anya-Nya veterans, who preferred a strict separation between the political and the military wings of the organisation.

However, the central sponsor of the new rebel outfit - the Ethiopian government - objected to this proposal and proposed John Garang should be the sole political and military leader (Collins 2008; Johnson and Prunier 1993; Johnson 2003; Ronen 2002). Although Garang possessed very little field experience and was less experienced in matters of military command, his youth and high level of education (in comparison to the older Anya-Nya veterans) meant he was a better choice

⁸⁰Due to data limitations, the quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter 4 did not cover the years prior to 1989. To streamline the qualitative analysis, I therefore exclude the years 1983 to 1988 from my analysis and summarise the SPLM/A's organisational development until 1989 in this section.

in the eyes of the Ethiopians.⁸¹ Furthermore, the Ethiopians (and some southern Sudanese) preferred a unified political and military command in order to avoid the factionalism that had hampered the Anya-Nya rebellion of the 1970s. Most importantly, Akwot Atem and Samuel Gai Tut sought southern independence as the ultimate goal of the rebellion, and this was at odds with the interests of the Ethiopian government, who - facing several secessionist insurgencies within their own country - did not want to support an openly secessionist rebel group in a neighbouring country.

This meant that Garang was able to establish himself as the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the new rebel group, a decision which resulted in the first split, as Akwot Atem, Samuel Gai Tut and William Abdallah Cuol did not accept his leadership role and returned with the Anya-Nya-II units to southern Sudan.⁸²

At its inception, the SPLM/A featured a relatively well-developed leadership structure (Johnson 1998, 2003; Nyaba 1997; Rolandsen 2005; Scott 1985). The SPLA was organised on the basis of the division of southern Sudan into separate war zones, each of which was headed by a zonal commander, with the Commander-in-Chief Garang and its military staff at the top of the military hierarchy. The SPLM was led by a number of committees made up of the movement's Chairman John Garang, military commanders and politicians. The central committees were the National Committee, Central Committee, Political Committee and the Executive Committee. Additional working committees dealt with specific portfolios and included the Political and Foreign Affairs Committee and the People's Justice and Administration Committee. Finally, the activities of the political and military wing of the new rebel group were coordinated by the Political-Military High Command (PMHC), which was headed by Garang.⁸³

Over the years, however, Garang circumvented this command structure and centralised the political and military power around himself and his closest group of advisors (Johnson 2003;

⁸¹Garang, a Twic Dinka, was born in 1945 in a village close to Bor in the Upper Nile Province (Collins 2008; Johnson 2003). After receiving education in Tanzania and a BA in economics from Iowa State University in the United States, he joined the Anya-Nya as a captain in 1971. At the end of the civil war he was absorbed as an officer into the Sudanese army. In the following years, he rose to the rank of colonel and obtained a Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics from Iowa State University. In 1982, Garang was appointed head of the Staff College of the Sudanese Army in Omdurman.

⁸²Shortly afterwards, the Anya-Nya-II began to attack the newly formed SPLM/A (Collins 2008; Johnson and Prunier 1993; Johnson 1998, 2003; Nyaba 1997; de Waal 1993a). Until 1984, however, the SPLM/A managed to contain the threat posed by this competing rebel outfit. After the deaths of Samuel Gai Tut and Akwot Atem in 1984, William Abdallah Cuol took control of the remnants of Anya-Nya-II. He rebuilt the group recruiting exclusively from the Nuer. Cuol also received substantial government support which effectively transformed Anya-Nya-II into a government militia. Following his death in August 1985, Paulino Matip took over and continued the fight against the SPLM/A, but in late 1987 significant numbers of Anya-Nya-II fighters defected to the SPLM/A, leaving only a small group under the command of Paulino Matip.

⁸³The PMHC was composed of permanent and alternate members as well as zonal commanders (Johnson 2003; Rolandsen 2005). According to Nyaba (1997), John Garang, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, William Nyuon, Salva Kiir Mayardit and Arok Thon Arok were among the members of the PMHC.

Nyaba 1997; Rolandsen 2005; Young 2003). Underlying this development was Garang's desire to prevent the emergence of additional centres of power which might lead to factional infighting. He established himself as the sole decision-maker of the SPLA's military strategy and did not pay any attention to the strategic considerations of commanders outside his inner circle. He marginalised the SPLM, meaning that the civilians and politicians who sat on its committees were effectively redundant: the PMHC, for example, did not meet once until 1991. This development resulted in a severe imbalance between the two wings of the rebel groups, to the disadvantage of the SPLM. In the late 1980s, sidelined rebel commanders Kerubino Kuanyin Bol and Arok Thon Arok, began to criticise Garang's increasingly autocratic rule over the rebel movement as did southern Sudanese politicians such as Joseph Oduho (Collins 2008; Johnson 1998, 2003; Nyaba 1997). Garang reacted quickly with internal purges and the arrest of high-ranking dissenters. In 1987, Kerubino was put in detention for his plans to overthrow Garang and in 1988 Arok Thon Arok and Joseph Oduho were also arrested. By early 1991, John Garang - Chairman and Commander-in-Chief - had effectively crushed opposition to his rule within the movement.

6.2.2 Ideology

The ideology of the SPLM/A was made public with the *SPLM Manifesto*, released on 31 July 1983, and in subsequent speeches and radio broadcasts by John Garang (Johnson 2003; Khalid 1987; Salih and Harir 1994; Scott 1985). In these announcements, the northern elites were held responsible for the severe political, social and economic inequalities in the country. Garang summarised this allegation in a speech broadcasted on Radio SPLA on 3 March 1984:

“The neo-colonial system that has developed in our country since 1956 and was represented by Nimeirism since 1969 is a regime in which a few people have amassed great wealth at the expense of the majority. This injustice has resulted in profound crises and distortions in our economy, politics, ethnics and even religion which Nimeiri has perverted into an article of trade.” (Khalid 1987, 19)

To corroborate these claims, the manifesto and Garang's speeches primarily referred to the marginalisation of southern Sudan. Specific examples of grievances included the dissolution of the southern regional assemblies by President Ja'afar Numayri in 1983, the constant interference by the Khartoum government in southern political affairs since the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, and the continued economic exploitation of the south's economy and resources (Khalid

1987).⁸⁴

A second important theme in the SPLM/A's ideology was the critique of the prevalent discrimination of Sudan's people on the base of ethnic or religious differences. In the previously quoted speech, Garang states:

“The oppressor has time and again employed various policies and methods of destroying or weakening the just struggle of our people, including the most notorious policy of ‘divide and rule’. To this end the oppressor has divided the Sudanese people into Northerners and Southerners; Westerners and Easterners, Halfawin and the so-called Awlad el Balad who have hitherto wielded political power in Khartoum; while in the South, people have been politicized along tribal lines resulting in such ridiculous slogans as ‘Dinka Unity’, ‘Great Equatoria’, ‘Bari Speakers’, ‘Luo Unity’ and so forth. The oppressor has also divided us into Muslims and Christians, and into Arabs and Africans.” (Khalid 1987, 19)

With this, the southern rebels pointed to governmental policies which systematically disenfranchised the non-Arab and non-Muslim parts of the Sudanese population. They also railed against the Islamic fundamentalism of the ruling clique and Khartoum's policies of transforming Sudan into an Islamist state.

However, while the SPLM/A ideology referred primarily to the specific grievances of southern Sudan, the rebels took great pains to situate these grievances within a wider national context of exploitive centre-periphery relations throughout Sudan (Johnson 2003; Khalid 1987; Lesch 1998; Salih and Harir 1994; Scott 1985). Likewise, they explicitly stated that their armed struggle should incorporate all Sudanese opposition groups and should culminate in the emergence of a unified ‘New Sudan’: a secular and united socialist state which would rectify the grievances of its citizens and respect their political, economic and social human rights.⁸⁵

The repeated emphasis that the SPLM/A was a national movement could be traced back to the problems of the Anya-Nya rebellion of the 1960s and 1970s (Jendia 2002; Johnson 2003; Poggio 2009). The primary objective of the Anya-Nya was the secession of southern Sudan - a

⁸⁴According to Johnson (2003), this analysis of patterns of underdevelopment in Sudan benefited greatly from Garang's research as a Ph.D. student in Agricultural Economics at Iowa State University in the late 1970s.

⁸⁵The SPLM/A's ideology frequently employed Marxist concepts to analyse the situation in Sudan and present their vision of a ‘New Sudan’ (Johnson 2003; Khalid 1987; Nyaba 1997; Salih and Harir 1994; Scott 1985). In the context of the Cold War, these reference to Marxism were used by Khartoum, the USA and many other international actors to denounce the SPLM/A as a proxy of the Communist military junta in Ethiopia. It was very likely, however, that the Marxist language was merely employed by the SPLM/A to please their Ethiopian supporters: in his broadcasts over Radio SPLA, for example, Garang refrained from using Marxist jargon and explained in plain language the reasons for the SPLM/A's struggle to the southern Sudanese population.

policy that caused them severe problems, effectively isolating them from opposition groups in northern Sudan and costing them international support. Against this background, the founding members of the SPLM/A decided that their group should fight for national liberation (Johnson 2003; Lesch 1998; Salih and Harir 1994; Scott 1985). First of all, this decision allowed them to establish tactical alliances with northern opposition groups and - more importantly - opened up the possibility of external support. Ethiopia, for example, would have been unlikely to sponsor the SPLM/A had it followed a secessionist agenda.

The rebels' ideology had mixed success in terms of mobilising the Sudanese population (Africa Research Bulletin 1989*b*; Johnson 2003; Kok 1996*b*; Nyaba 1997; Salih and Harir 1994; Scott 1985). The grievances identified by the manifesto resonated strongly with the southern Sudanese population and parts of the population in Southern Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile state. However, the concept of a united 'New Sudan' had considerably less traction among the southern Sudanese population. First of all, southern independence remained the hidden preference of many southerners and was never completely off the table.⁸⁶ There was even less support for a 'New Sudan' in the Equatoria states, where the population remained strongly in favour of secession. Finally, the SPLM/A made the mistake of not developing the concept of a 'New Sudan' politically and socially: they did not engage in political education in their territories, meaning that they failed to convince their southern constituencies that a united Sudan was preferable to southern independence.

6.2.3 Population Base

At the time of its formation in 1983, the population base of the SPLM/A was primarily composed of the two largest ethno-linguistic groups in southern Sudan: the Dinka and the Nuer (Collins 2008; Johnson and Prunier 1993; Johnson 1998, 2003; Scott 1985). Up to 1991, however, the SPLM/A was able to substantially enlarge this population base and attracted recruits and support from many other southern Sudanese ethnic groups.

A detailed account of this enlargement process of the rebels' population base is given by Jackson and Prunier (1993). For the first two years of its existence, the majority of SPLM/A recruits in the Ethiopian camps were Dinka from Jonglei and Lakes and Nuer from the Nasir and Bentiu districts in the Upper Nile. These were also the areas in which the rebels enjoyed the highest levels of popular support. In 1984, the SPLM/A extended its recruitment drive to Northern

⁸⁶Collins (2008), however, claims that John Garang was undoubtedly devoted to the idea of a 'New Sudan'. He argues that Garang's stays in the United States convinced him that a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic society was also possible in Sudan.

Bahr al-Ghazal and tapped into the largest regional concentration of Dinka in southern Sudan around Aweil and Gogrial. By this point, the rebels also received support from the Shilluk based in the Malakal area of Upper Nile.

In 1985, the SPLM/A gained a foothold in the Equatoria states of southern Sudan, but recruitment and support levels in these areas remained at a relatively low level and by 1986, only small numbers of recruits from the Acholi, Lokoya, Lotuko, Moru and Pari groups had joined the movement. Over the next two years, Equatorians became slightly more sympathetic to the rebels and by 1988 the rebel group was able to extend its population base to encompass sections of the Boya, Didinga and Mundari communities. In 1985, the SPLM/A also began to expand beyond southern Sudan. It set up operations in the Nuba Mountains in Southern Kordofan and soon established a successful local branch of the rebel movement. It was also able to move to the southern Blue Nile area where it received recruits and support from Uduk county and the Ingessana hills.

By the end of 1990, the SPLM/A's population encompassed a large number of southern Sudan's ethno-linguistic groups. As a consequence, however, the rebels' population base was also highly diverse and incorporated pre-existing divisions and tensions between the southern Sudanese groups. To avoid the fate of the Anya-Nya, the SPLM/A adopted military and civil administrative structures designed to minimise the risk of ethnic factionalism and to facilitate access to popular support.

To achieve this, the SPLM/A adopted a military structure with multi-ethnic units under a centralised command (Johnson and Prunier 1993; Johnson 1998; Nyaba 1997). Newly enlisted recruits were sent to the rebel training camps in Ethiopia where the recruits were put into units largely irrespective of their ethnic origin. After their one-year basic training, these units were then deployed anywhere in southern Sudan and were often transferred from front to front. The rebels also established a system of operational zones which subsumed several ethno-linguistics groups under a unified command. Ultimately, these structures prevented the emergence of ethnically homogeneous combat units acting on their own account.

In matters of civil administration, the SPLM/A's zonal commanders relied on local chieftains and pre-existing local administrative structures (Johnson 1994, 1998; Karim et al. 1996; Rolandsen 2005; de Waal 1997; Young 2003). Generally, SPLA Zonal Commanders appointed Civil-Military Administrators (CMA) from the ranks of the SPLA, who were placed in charge of a particular area and exercised authority over the local chiefs and courts. In this system, the primary task of the CMAs was the collection of taxes and supplies for the war effort. The provision of public

services was left completely to the local chiefs. This system of indirect rule allowed the SPLM/A to exert sufficient control over the civilian population and to extract the necessary resources from local communities.

Until 1991, these structures helped the SPLM/A to avoid ethnic factionalism and secure the necessary levels of popular support among the southern Sudanese population ([Africa Research Bulletin 1989a](#)). However, the military successes of the rebels in the 1980s concealed the ethno-linguistic divisions within their population base. The establishment of multi-ethnic units and their deployment across southern fronts caused resentment and frustration among the rank-and-file fighters ([Johnson and Prunier 1993](#); [Johnson 1998, 2003](#); [Kuol 1997](#); [Nyaba 1997](#)), many of whom had joined the SPLM/A due to local grievances or in order to defend their home communities from the raids of Khartoum's militias. After their basic training, however, they were not sent back to their home regions and were often put into battle in distant regions. There, the fighters often misbehaved in their dealings with the local population, slowly alienating civilians. Additionally, the limited build-up of rebel administration and the co-option of local structures prevented the SPLM/A from ingraining itself into southern Sudanese society ([African Rights 1995](#); [Nyaba 1997](#); [Rolandsen 2005](#); [Young 2003](#)). As a consequence, the rebel forces were often perceived as occupation forces.

6.3 Onset of SPLM/A One-Sided Violence

I now turn to an analysis of the onset of a SPLM/A campaign of one-sided violence during the Second Sudanese Civil War. As previously explained in [Chapter 3](#), the onset of rebel one-sided violence is defined as the point in time during a civil war when a rebel group starts to use violence against civilians. Given the assumption that such violence is used to enforce popular support in the absence of alternative means, the onset of one-sided violence therefore marks the moment in time when a rebel group becomes unable to use non-violent means to secure support.

In this thesis, I argue that the availability of these non-violent means to secure popular support (and the potential subsequent use of one-sided violence) is shaped by the organisational characteristics of the rebel group. The quantitative analysis of this assertion has shown that the occurrence of leadership divisions within a rebel group is a particularly important organisational factor which precludes the use of non-violent strategies and leads rebels to resort to violence against civilians (see [Chapter 4](#)). The underlying causal reasoning claims that leadership divisions severely damage the rebels' military effectiveness, reducing the rebels' probability

of winning the conflict. With a reduced probability of military victory, the cost-benefit calculations of the rebels' civilian supporters also change and the benefits of supporting the rebel group notecase to outweigh the costs. As a consequence, civilians retract their support and the rebel group has to resort to one-sided violence in order to enforce it.

The following qualitative analysis of the Second Sudanese Civil War presents corroborating evidence for this causal reasoning. In this analysis, I focus in particular on the failed coup attempt directed at Garang's leadership of the SPLM/A, and the subsequent campaign of one-sided violence by the rebels between 1992 and 1996. I begin this section with a description of the SPLM/A's political and military situation in 1991 then turn to discuss the Nasir coup of 1991, its consequences for the SPLM/A leadership structure and its impact on the group's popular support. The final subsection analyses whether there is any link between the leadership divisions of 1991 and the one-sided violence began by the SPLM/A in 1992.

6.3.1 The SPLM/A in 1991

From the foundation of the SPLM/A, Garang established himself as the group's central decision-maker (Collins 2008; Johnson and Prunier 1993; Johnson 1998, 2003; Nyaba 1997; Rolandsen 2005). He concentrated political and military power under himself and sidelined the formal institutions of the SPLM and SPLA. This leadership structure transformed the SPLM/A into a highly centralised and cohesive military organisation and the military organisation played an important role in the military successes of the rebel group. By 1991, Garang's SPLM/A was in firm control of almost the whole rural area of southern Sudan. It occupied several important garrison towns and Garang prepared for a major offensive to capture the southern capital Juba. The rebels had also managed to set up military operations in Southern Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Garang's tight grip over the rebel movement and its military successes extended the support base of the SPLM/A. By 1991, they enjoyed the popular support of the Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk in the Bahr al-Ghazal states; and the Jonglei, Lakes, Unity and Upper Nile. Garang also gained the reluctant support of the Equatorial ethnic groups, who slowly overcame their hostility towards the SPLM/A. Theoretically, this growing popular support can be explained by a growing awareness among the southern Sudanese civilian population that the SPLM/A's fight could be successful. This rising probability of winning the conflict ultimately increased civilians' expected benefits of supporting the rebellion.

The Role of Ethiopian Support to the SPLM/A

The strong position of the SPLM/A in 1991 was - to a considerable degree - made possible by the support given by the Ethiopian government under Mengistu Haile Mariam (Collins 2008; Johnson 2003; Ronen 2002; Scott 1985).⁸⁷ The SPLM/A was allowed to locate its political headquarters and its radio station in Addis Ababa: while the former provided the SPLM/A leadership with a safe haven protected from reprisals from the Khartoum government, the latter proved to be an important propaganda tool for the rebels. Radio SPLA broadcasts featured news of the latest rebel activities and commentaries on the political, social and economic situation in Sudan. Frequently presented by John Garang himself, these broadcasts helped in establishing Garang's SPLM/A as the main rebel movement in southern Sudan.

Another aspect of Ethiopian support was even more important, however. (Johnson 1998, 2003; Nyaba 1997). From 1983, Garang developed a close personal relationship with Mengistu and the latter lent almost unconditional support to the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLM/A. Amongst other things, for example, Mengistu allowed Garang to use Ethiopian security forces to keep the SPLM/A under his control meaning that despite increasing internal discontentment with Garang's autocratic rule, dissent could be crushed and challenges to his rule suppressed.⁸⁸

In addition to this political support, Ethiopia supplied crucial military support to the SPLM/A (Johnson 1998; Ronen 2002; Scott 1985). They provided a territorial base protected from Sudanese government attacks which the SPLM/A used to establish training camps for recruits; and provided refugee camps at Itang, Fungyido and Dimma, which served as safe havens for the southern Sudanese population. The SPLM/A also received large shipments of arms and logistical support from Ethiopia. This sustained support played an important part in the military operations of the SPLM/A in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

However, the comfortable situation of John Garang and the SPLM/A changed fundamentally with the fall of Mengistu Haile Mariam government in Ethiopia in May 1991 (Collins 2008; Johnson 2003). After fifteen years of armed struggle, rebels from the Khartoum-supported Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) toppled the regime and the new

⁸⁷The importance of Ethiopian support increased after 1985 (Johnson 1998; Ronen 2002) when, following the military coup d'état which saw the overthrow of Sudanese President Ja'afar Numayri, Libya retracted its support to the SPLM/A and began supporting the Sudanese government. This left Ethiopia as the only remaining source of external support for the southern rebels.

⁸⁸The arrest of Kerubino Kuanyin Bol in 1987, for example, was accomplished with Mengistu's help (Johnson 1998). Kerubino approached Mengistu with his plans to overthrow Garang but the Ethiopian head of state arrested Kerubino and handed him over to the SPLM/A.

Ethiopian government immediately stopped the provision of support to the SPLM/A. It closed the SPLM/A headquarters, radio station and training camps and ceased the shipment of military and non-military goods. It also gave Khartoum sensitive Ethiopian government information about the operations of the SPLM/A.

The SPLM/A Nasir Command in Upper Nile

The cessation of Ethiopian support had severe consequences for the SPLM/A. First of all, Garang could not rely any longer on Mengistu's security forces to stifle internal dissent. This meant that the rebels' high degree of centralisation and cohesion - so crucial in their military successes - was threatened. Moreover, without Ethiopian sanctuaries and supplies, the SPLM/A's military gains and advances of the last couple of years were suddenly in extreme jeopardy.

The consequences of the loss of Ethiopian support were vividly demonstrated by the actions of two SPLM/A senior commanders in the Upper Nile area: Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon and Lam Akol Ajawin (Collins 2008; Johnson 1998, 2003; Lesch 1998). In the late 1980s, both rose to political and military prominence in the movement - Lam Akol in his role as Director of the External Relations Department and Riek Machar as zonal commander of northern Upper Nile. Both were members of the PMHC of the SPLM/A.

By late 1990 they felt increasingly marginalised within the SPLM/A (Johnson 1998, 2003; Jok and Hutchinson 1999; Lesch 1998; Young 2003, 2006). Although Garang frequently sent them on important diplomatic missions to countries in Europe and Africa, both were excluded from the political and military decisions of the rebel group (as previously noted, the PMHC did not meet at all from its inception in 1983 until 1991). Machar and Akol also questioned Garang's 'New Sudan' policy: responding to widespread sentiments among the southern population, they argued that the SPLM/A should fight for independence rather than seek to take over power in Khartoum.

After the fall of Mengistu in May 1991, Riek Machar's and Lam Akol's discontent was fuelled by fears over their territories in the Jonglei and Upper Nile states (Johnson 2003). Both states faced the imminent threat of invasion by the Sudanese army, which could now use Ethiopian soil as a staging ground. Moreover, Jonglei and Upper Nile took a large proportion of more than 100,000 refugees who returned to Sudan from the disbanded camps in Ethiopia.⁸⁹ Given the scarcity of resources available to the SPLM/A in general, both developments threatened the

⁸⁹There is no reliable data about the number of refugees returning to southern Sudan in 1991. Scholars' estimates vary between 100,000 and 350,000 (Hutchinson 2001; Johnson 2003; Rolandsen 2005).

very existence of the SPLM/A rule in the Upper Nile region.

Most importantly, however, Machar and Akol were discontent with the changes to the military focus of the SPLM/A (Johnson 1998, 2003). From the beginning of the 1990s, Garang was intent on capturing the southern capital Juba and prepared for an assault by relocating troops and supplies from the northern parts of the SPLM/A zones to the Equatorial states. Garang sped up this relocation after the fall of the Mengistu regime. Control over the Equatorial states was also crucial to protect the supply lines to Uganda, the last remaining external sponsor. As a consequence the northern SPLM/A territories and especially the Upper Nile area were dangerously exposed to an invasion by government forces.

6.3.2 The Nasir Coup

Against this background, Riek Machar and Lam Akol decided to stage a coup against Garang's leadership of the SPLM/A.⁹⁰ Together with the former Anya-Nya-II commander Gordon Kong Cuol, they announced the overthrow of Garang in a radio broadcast on 28 August 1991:

“For the last eight years, John Garang has been running the movement in a most dictatorial and autocratic manner. He oppressed, humiliated and degraded the people and turned a popular struggle into war-lordism and a reign of terror. A big number of members of the movement are now under detention for many years for no reason other than differing with John Garang. The so-called high command never held a meeting and some of its members do not know each other. The direct result of Garang's one man show is a simmering discontent among the rank-and-file of the movement. (...) In order to save the movement from the imminent collapse, it has been decided to relieve John Garang from the leadership of SPLM/A.” (Akol 2003, 291)

In this broadcast, they also outlined their agenda as new leaders of the rebel movement. They announced a separation of the military and civil administrations of the rebel group, called for a democratisation of the movement and pledged to adhere to the principle of human rights. In a subsequent statement called ‘Why Garang Must Go Now’, they elaborated on these demands and also implicitly called for southern independence as goal of the SPLM/A:

“On the peace process, the Movement will continue to explore all avenues that may

⁹⁰The books by Lam Akol (2003) and Peter Adwok Nyaba (1997) present personal (and highly subjective) accounts of the events leading to the uprising, the coup attempt itself and its aftermath.

lead to a peaceful resolution of the present conflict. Whereas the Movement is committed to realizing a united secular Sudan, the SPLA will neither impose unity nor will it fight to the last man to achieve it. It takes two to tango. Politics being the art of the possible the Movement rules out no option provided it can lead to a permanent peace.” (Akol 2003, 312)

The SPLM/A-Nasir Faction

The grievances outlined in the radio broadcast and subsequent statements were primarily motivated by Machar and Akol’s feelings of marginalisation, which had developed in the early 1990s. Decisions about the political and military actions of the SPLM/A were made almost exclusively by Garang and his circle of advisers and Field Commanders like Machar and Akol were not included in the decision-making process. However, while Garang had undoubtedly established an autocratic style of leadership, it was crucial in creating a centralised and cohesive military organisation. As this military organisation contributed greatly to the rebels’ military successes of the past, the Nasir coup not only threatened Garang’s rule but also the overall military effectiveness of the rebel movement.

Machar and Akol’s call for southern independence, on the other hand, was motivated by their conviction that the SPLM/A’s objective of a democratic, secular and unified ‘New Sudan’ was deeply unrealistic (Johnson 2003; Lesch 1998): in their opinion, southern secession was a much more obtainable objective. They were supported in this perspective by secret talks with government officials, who apparently offered them independence for the south.⁹¹

The call for southern independence also served their immediate objective of displacing Garang from his position as leader of the SPLM/A (Johnson 2003). The ‘New Sudan’ ideology was never fully accepted in southern Sudan and many SPLM/A commanders and fighters - as well as the civilian population - secretly hoped for southern independence. Against this background, Riek Machar hoped that by making secession an explicit goal of his faction he would be able to gain the support of a large majority of SPLM/A units and the southern Sudanese population.

From July 1991, the coup plotters maintained relations with Sudanese government officials (Johnson 1998, 2003; Young 2006). Initially, these contacts came about as part of the relief efforts for the Sudanese refugees returning from the camps in Ethiopia. Soon, however, Machar and Akol also discussed their coup plans with government officials and secured support from Khartoum

⁹¹Although the precise terms of this offer are unknown, it is highly likely that it was unfavourable for the south: Johnson (2003) refers to a later statement by a Sudanese government official, who explained that an independent south would exclude all of the southern oil fields.

for their plans.

At first sight, this alliance between the Sudanese government and secessionist rebel seems a little unusual. Both sides, however, considered the alliance as beneficial for their plans. For the Nasir faction, the government support was of a purely tactical nature: they planned to sever their contact with Khartoum as soon as they gained control over the SPLM/A. For the government, the support for a splinter faction served their plan to weaken the southern Sudanese rebels - a policy in line with its previous arming of tribal militias hostile to the SPLM/A (Salih 1989; Salih and Harir 1994; de Waal 1993a).

The actual execution of the coup, however, appeared to be precipitated by factors beyond the plotters' control (Johnson 1998; Jok and Hutchinson 1999; Rolandsen 2005). In August 1991, Garang announced a meeting of the PMHC which Riek Machar, Lam Akol and Gordon Kong - as members - were supposed to attend. The three refused to appear as they feared that Garang would use their attendance to arrest and maybe execute them for their growing opposition to his rule.⁹² Furthermore, Machar and his co-conspirators suspected that the results of this PMHC meeting might placate some of SPLM/A commanders meaning they held off their support for the coup. They therefore announced the 'overthrow' of Garang before the PMHC meeting took place.

Distribution of Popular Support

On 28 August 1991, Riek Machar and his allies started their uprising against Garang's rule in the hope that they would be quickly joined by other marginalised SPLM/A commanders as well as by large parts of the civilian population.

First and foremost, these hopes were based on the power of ethnic affiliations (Johnson 1998, 2003; Rolandsen 2005). As Riek Machar and Gordon Kong were Nuer and Lam Akol a Shilluk, they expected to immediately receive the support from the southern Sudanese Nuer and Shilluk populations. Beyond their respective home regions, Riek Machar and his allies expected that the SPLM/A commanders of Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, Lakes and the Nuba Mountains would throw their support behind the coup (Africa Research Bulletin 1991a; Johnson 1998). To varying degrees, the SPLM/A leaders in these regions all felt marginalised and neglected by John Garang's policies. With the support of these SPLM/A commanders, the conspirators then expected that the support of the population would soon follow.

⁹²As Rolandsen (2005) emphasises, these fears were well-founded as Garang had previously not hesitated in taking action against real or perceived threats to his rule.

Unfortunately for the conspirators, their hopes for large-scale defection failed to materialise ([Africa Research Bulletin 1991a](#); [Johnson 1998, 2003](#)). Following the announcement of the coup attempt, only certain subsections of the Nuer rallied behind the SPLM/A-Nasir faction and a large number of Shilluk SPLM/A fighters chose to remain loyal to Garang. SPLM/A commanders in Bahr al-Ghazal and Lakes felt that any attempt to change the group's leadership should wait until the SPLM/A had dealt with the loss of Ethiopian support and refused to rally behind the Nasir faction, preferring to see which faction prevailed. Finally, the SPLM/A branch in the Nuba Mountains decided explicitly to remain loyal to Garang.

Given the reluctant response of SPLM/A forces to the Nasir coup, Machar and his allies failed to attract substantial popular support ([Johnson 1998, 2003](#)). Their only substantial support came from the civilian populations in the areas of Blue Nile, Jonglei and Upper Nile (which were already under their immediate control). In areas beyond their control, the population followed the local SPLM/A commanders and remained reluctant to commit their support to either side. The SPLM/A-Nasir also failed to summon significant levels of popular support in the Equatorial states, despite their call for southern independence resonating with local civilians.

Without support from field commanders and the civilian population, the conspirators failed to achieve their immediate objective ([Human Rights Watch 1994](#); [Johnson 1998, 2003](#); [Rolandsen 2005](#)): Garang remained Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLM/A, and continued to control the movement. Nonetheless, the coup attempt - in conjunction with the subsequent foundation of the splinter faction SPLM/A-Nasir - constituted a major blow to the leadership structure of the SPLM/A.

6.3.3 Enforcing Popular Support

So far, I have detailed the events leading to the occurrence of leadership divisions in the SPLM/A in August 1991, and the immediate impact of these divisions on the movement. I now turn to consider whether these leadership divisions are causally linked to the onset of one-sided violence in by the SPLM/A 1992. Specifically, I look for evidence which further corroborates the causal reasoning linking leadership divisions to a reduced probability of rebel victory, resulting in lower levels of popular support and the increasing likelihood of rebels resorting to violence in order to enforce support.

Initially, it is important to note that the Nasir coup severely damaged the military effectiveness of the SPLM/A ([Africa Research Bulletin 1991b,a, 1992b](#); [Human Rights Watch 1993, 1994](#);

Johnson 1998, 2003; Rolandsen 2005; Young 2007). Following the coup attempt and the defection of several field commanders to the SPLM/A-Nasir, the line of command within Garang's group was disrupted. Furthermore, a large number of rebel officers, fighters and many resources were now beyond Garang's control. The SPLM/A's situation worsened after fighting broke out between the two rebel factions in late 1991, depleting their military capabilities further.⁹³

It soon became apparent to civilians in southern Sudan that the SPLM/A's ability to continue its successful military campaign against government forces had been damaged, and that the probability of a rebel victory had been significantly reduced (Johnson 1998, 2003; Rolandsen 2005). With an SPLM/A victory over government forces in southern Sudan decreasing in likelihood, the willingness of the civilian population to lend support to the rebel movement also waned. In theoretical terms, one can say that the immediate consequences of the leadership division in the SPLM/A had reduced the benefits to civilians in supporting the SPLM/A to such an extent that they began to be outweighed by the costs of supporting the group.

It is against this background that an analysis of the onset of SPLM/A violence against civilians in southern Sudan in 1992 must be undertaken. I will do this now by looking at the events in two southern Sudanese regions in greater detail. Firstly, I examine the onset of rebel one-sided violence in the Duk Ridge in early 1992, and then I look at the onset of rebel one-sided violence in Eastern Equatoria in September 1992.

One-Sided Violence in Jonglei

The Duk Ridge and its surrounding areas are located in the Ayod, Duk, Twic East and Uror counties of Jonglei state (Johnson 1989). It is one of the places in southern Sudan where the settlements of the Dinka meet the settlements of the Nuer. The areas to the north of the Duk Ridge are primarily settled by Nuer, whilst to the south are areas populated by the Dinka. Following the Nasir coup of 1991, the frontline between Garang's SPLM/A and the newly formed SPLM/A-Nasir faction went right through the Duk Ridge. The Bor area to the south of the Duk Ridge, for example, was the heartland of Garang's popular support, not least because the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLM/A was a Twic Dinka from this region. The Nuer-dominated SPLM/A-Nasir faction, on the other hand, could rely on the support of the local Nuer population.

⁹³In September and October of the year 1991, Garang's forces clashed several times with Nasir troops under Elijah Hon Top in the Duk Ridge area of Jonglei state. In November, the SPLM/A-Nasir even invaded the Bor area, Garang's home region and the heartland of his support. In response, the SPLM/A forces again advanced into the Duk Ridge area in early 1992.

In the Duk Ridge, however, the loyalties of the civilian population to either the SPLM/A or the SPLM/A-Nasir faction did not necessarily run along the Dinka-Nuer divide ([Human Rights Watch 1994](#); [Johnson 1989](#)). Over the centuries, the local Dinka and Nuer communities developed a close network of trade and kinship relations as a result of the region's harsh climate and its unfavourable soil, meaning each group's local economy was dependent on the other, and that the ethnic divide between the groups did not manifest itself in everyday interactions. Following the Nasir coup, it was therefore unclear to the conflict parties which side civilians in the Duk Ridge would support.

The ambiguity regarding the loyalties of civilians in the Duk Ridge became especially apparent after the outbreak of factional fighting in Jonglei ([Africa Research Bulletin 1992b](#); [Human Rights Watch 1993, 1994](#); [Johnson 2003](#); [UCPD 2011](#); [Young 2007](#)). In November 1991, the SPLM/A-Nasir moved swiftly through the Duk Ridge and invaded the Bor area to the south. There, they engaged in one-sided violence on a large scale.⁹⁴ To the leaders of the SPLM/A, this campaign suggested that the civilian population in the Duk Ridge were siding with the Nasir faction and had supported it in its raid on the SPLM/A's heartland around Bor. After all, the fighters of the Nasir faction moved through the Duk Ridge without any attack on the civilian population and only began their raids on civilian settlements after they entered the Bor area.

It was against this background that SPLM/A forces advanced into the Duk Ridge area in January 1992 and almost immediately began to conduct raids against villages ([Africa Research Bulletin 1992b](#); [Human Rights Watch 1993, 1994](#); [UCPD 2011](#)). In January 1992, the SPLM/A attacked the village of Wunderud, close to Ayod. They killed its inhabitants and looted cattle. In February 1992, the SPLM/A raided the Pagau villages to the east of Ayod where, according to witnesses, they killed 130 civilians. In March, SPLM/A forces attacked the villages of Fadiak, Pathai and Kuac Deng where they killed civilians; looted livestock and grain; and burned down the villages.

All of these villages were Nuer settlements and so these acts of violence initially appeared to follow the retaliatory logic as outlined in Chapter 2 ([Balcells 2010](#); [Bussmann, Schneider and Haer 2009](#)), with the Dinka-dominated SPLM/A attacking the Nuer support base of the Nasir faction in response to the latter's raid against the Dinkas in Bor. Interestingly, however, the commander of the SPLM/A forces in Jonglei, William Nyuon Bany, was a Nuer, whilst the SPLM/A soldiers were not exclusively Dinka but were drawn from almost all of the ethnic

⁹⁴It is worth mentioning that the SPLM/A-Nasir faction was at that time already nothing more than a government proxy ([Johnson 1998, 2003](#); [Lesch 1998](#); [Rolandsen 2005](#); [Young 2006](#)). As Riek Machar and his allies failed to convince field commanders to join their side, their splinter group became heavily dependent on government support. The government exploited this dependency and began to dictate political and military decisions to the Nasir faction.

groups found in southern Sudan - including the Nuer ([Human Rights Watch 1994](#); [Johnson 1998, 2003](#)).⁹⁵ Furthermore, the SPLM/A did not exclusively target civilians from the Nuer population. In a small number of attacks in the spring of 1993, for example, they also attacked Dinka civilians. Given this, it is unlikely that this violence was solely an act of revenge by Dinka against the Nuer.

It seems, then, that the SPLM/A one-sided violence in the Duk Ridge followed the theoretical logic outlined in this thesis (see Chapter 3). Facing a decrease in popular support due to the leadership divisions of late 1991, the rebels resorted to violence against civilians as the only available means to enforce support. The underlying rationale was that attacks against civilians who were suspected of supporting the Nasir faction would deter other civilians in the region from doing the same. That is, the one-sided violence seemed to be intended to make it more costly for the local population to withhold support from the SPLM/A than providing it with support. As a matter of fact, reports on the events in the Duke Ridge in 1992 and 1993 show that the SPLM/A forces committed one-sided violence with the clear objective of punishing civilians who were believed to be supporting the SPLM/A-Nasir ([Africa Research Bulletin 1992b](#); [Human Rights Watch 1993, 1994](#); [UCPD 2011](#)). Regarding an attack on Ayod on 2 April 1993, for example, *Human Rights Watch* reports:

“A (...) Dinka woman, displaced from Duk Fadiat in 1991, said Garang’s forces burned her house, with four sick female relatives inside who were unable to run away and burned to death. The soldiers knew that the women victims were Dinka; they shouted at them that they had ‘sided with the Nuer’. Four children, two boys and two girls, were taken captive. She saw women being raped and afterwards killed.” ([Human Rights Watch 1994](#), 74)

Another survivor reported:

“A thirty-year-old Dinka man, displaced from Duk Fadiat in early 1992, said the Garang soldiers trapped his uncle and the husband of his sister inside their Ayod hut and burned them to death. They also burned his house, clothes, cooking utensils, and other personal possessions. As this witness was running away, he saw Garang’s soldiers push approximately twenty Dinka inside one tukl and set fire to it while shouting at the people inside that they were ‘Nuer now’, and they would have to

⁹⁵Johnson (1998), for example, mentions that during his fieldwork in Sudan in October 1991 he frequently visited Nuer villages where he was told that the men of these villages were part of the SPLM/A forces under Garang.

die.” (Human Rights Watch 1994, 74)

Although the SPLM/A soldiers in these attacks equated (actual or alleged) support from Dinka civilians for the Nasir faction with ‘being Nuer now’, this label is likely to refer to supporters of the almost exclusively Nuer-dominated SPLM/A-Nasir faction. Jok and Hutchinson (1999) and Hutchinson (2001) stress that Dinka and Nuer civilians interviewed in the 1990s explicitly stated that the rebel infighting was not a Dinka-Nuer confrontation - they saw the violence between the SPLM/A and the SPLM/A-Nasir as a political conflict between the leaders of each group over regional hegemony.

It seems clear, then, that the leadership divisions in the SPLM/A resulted in a lack of popular support for the rebels which they sought to counter through the use of violence against civilians.

One-Sided Violence in Eastern Equatoria

From the beginning of the civil war, the civilian population in Eastern Equatoria harboured a deep-seated distrust against the SPLM/A due to their fears of Dinka hegemony in southern Sudan (Badal 1994; Johnson and Prunier 1993; Johnson 2003; Scott 1985). Consequently, they were reluctant to support the armed struggle of a group who drew its support primarily from the Dinka. It took the SPLM/A until 1991 to muster popular support in the Equatorial states.

At first, the Nasir coup did not really change this situation, but it altered with the defection of William Nyuon Bany to the SPLM/A-Nasir in September 1992 (Collins 2008; Human Rights Watch 1994; Johnson 2003). Nyuon was a senior rebel commander in command of the troops fighting the Nasir faction in Jonglei and Upper Nile. To raise the profile of the SPLM/A as a multi-ethnic force, Garang had dispatched the Nuer Nyuon to the peace talks in Abuja in May and June 1992. During these meetings in Nigeria, government officials and members of the SPLM/A-Nasir delegation offered Nyuon money in exchange for his defection from Garang’s forces and he accepted this offer. Following his return to the SPLM/A headquarters in Eastern Equatoria, Nyuon released imprisoned SPLM/A dissidents including Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, Joseph Oduho and Arok Thon Arok, and then left the headquarters together with his units to join the SPLM/A-Nasir troops in Eastern Equatoria.

With the high-profile defection of Nyuon, the SPLM/A faced the risk of losing more territory to the SPLM/A-Nasir faction (Johnson 1998, 2003). The emergence of the Nasir faction suddenly presented an alternative to Equatorians who gave only reluctant support to the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A-Nasir was primarily drawn from the Nuer, alleviating fears of Dinka domination and -

more importantly - the Equatorians always preferred southern secession over national liberation, a goal shared by the SPLM/A. Against this background, Garang's forces immediately started to hunt down Equatorian defectors to the SPLM/A-Nasir ([Human Rights Watch 1994](#); [Johnson 2003](#)). During their pursuit, they frequently raided villages which had harboured Nyuon's troops. The large majority of these attacks took place in the Budi, Ikotos, Lapon, Magwi and Torit counties of Eastern Equatoria.

Given the temporal sequence of Nyuon's defection and the onset of SPLM/A violence against civilians, accounts of this period which focus either on undisciplined rebel rank-and-file fighters ([Azam 2002](#); [Humphreys and Weinstein 2006](#); [Weinstein 2007](#)) or ethnically motivated violence ([Balcells 2010](#); [Lilja and Hultman 2011](#)) can easily be discarded. These interpretations cannot convincingly explain why the SPLM/A restrained from violence against the Equatorian population until September 1991, before suddenly engaging in a campaign of one-sided violence.

Rather, it appears that the SPLM/A campaign of violence against civilians was started in order to enforce (or uphold) popular support after Nyuon and his units defected. As in the case of the violence in the Duk Ridge, rebel one-sided violence served the purpose of deterring civilian defections from the SPLM/A to the Nasir faction. That is, one-sided violence was employed to increase the civilians' costs of withholding any support to the SPLM/A, or lending support to the SPLM/A-Nasir faction.

This interpretation is supported by a *Human Rights Watch* report, which states that the large majority of these attacks followed the clear objective of punishing civilians for allegedly siding with defectors:

“SPLM/A-Torit forces targeted villages or centers which Commander Nyuon's forces either passed through or took refuge in, in late 1992, (...) , and burned some villages, killed civilians, and abused some women to punish those civilians believed to have sided with Commander William Nyuon, in violation of the rules of war. As a long-time resident of south Sudan commented, ‘When people are perceived to support the other side in the conflict, Garang feels they must be punished. This is why villages are burned.’” ([Human Rights Watch 1994](#), 74)

Further reports on instances of one-sided violence in Eastern Equatoria support this interpretation. In late 1992, for example, the defecting forces under Nyuon moved through the Acholi settlement of Magwe close to the Ugandan border ([Human Rights Watch 1994](#)). Three days afterwards, SPLM/A forces loyal to Garang arrived there and - according to witnesses - killed

seven civilians, raped women and took cattle and grain. Following this, their pursuit took them to the area surrounding Magwe where the SPLM/A fighters continued to victimise the civilian population.

Similar events occurred in Lapon country. In October 1992, Nyuon's forces arrived in Lafon, a Pari settlement ([Human Rights Watch 1994](#)). Over several months, the defectors then used Lafon as a base for their operations against the SPLM/A, and were joined by several hundred fighters of the SPLM/A-Nasir faction. After they retreated in late December, SPLM/A troops attacked Lafon's neighbouring village, Lopit, killing seven civilians. Following this, they began to shell Lafon on 4 January 1993 and then raided the village, killing 31 inhabitants.

It seems clear, then, that the leadership divisions of August 1991 and the subsequent defection of Nyuon to the Nasir faction meant the SPLM/A was in danger of losing popular support in Eastern Equatoria altogether and - to avoid this - they extended their campaign of one-sided violence against civilians to this region.

6.4 Level of SPLM/A One-Sided Violence

I now turn to an analysis of the level of SPLM/A one-sided violence during the Second Sudanese Civil War. In Chapter 3, I defined the level of rebel one-sided violence as the number of civilians killed by a rebel group once it began to use violence against civilians. Based on the understanding of one-sided violence as a way to enforce popular support, the level of one-sided violence can be regarded as capturing the manner in which a rebel group uses violent means to enforce popular support.

As I have outlined in the theoretical model of this thesis, I argue that the organisation of a rebel group also determines the level of violence against civilians. Even when it is already using one-sided violence, a rebel group might retain the organisational capacities to secure some support non-violently. In such instances, the rebel group will not have to use large-scale violence to enforce popular support. However, if the organisation of the rebel group precludes the use of any non-violent alternatives, it is likely to kill a higher number of civilians. The quantitative analysis of this assumption has shown that the nature of a rebel group's ideology and the make-up of its population base are particularly important factors affecting the number of civilians killed (see Chapter 4). Ethno-nationalist rebels are less likely to resort to large-scale violence, while rebel groups with a high degree of linguistic fractionalisation are likely to kill more civilians.

In the case of group ideology, the underlying causal reasoning states that a rebel group's ethno-

nationalism often presents a narrative to the civilian population that successfully overstates the benefits of rebellion to the respective ethnic groups whilst downplaying the real costs of supporting the rebellion. Following this, civilians lend support to the rebel group and this reduces the need for rebels to resort to large-scale violence when they do engage in one-sided violence. In the case of linguistic fractionalisation among a rebel group's support base, the theoretical model states that a fractionalised population base is characterised by a number of internal ethnic boundaries that make it difficult for rebels to easily tap into the social networks of their supporters. As a consequence, rebels are unable to decrease civilians' costs of supporting their struggle. This results in higher levels of violence against civilians during campaigns of one-sided violence.

The following qualitative analysis seeks to present further evidence for these two causal pathways by focussing on the Second Sudanese Civil War in the years from 1992 to 1996. During this time period, the SPLM/A's ideology and population base underwent significant changes: the emergence of the Nasir faction in 1991 resulted in a shake-up of its organisational configuration and in 1994 it held its first National Convention in Chukudum in Eastern Equatoria. At this convention, the SPLM/A revised their ideological position, reformed their organisational structure and changed the way they interacted with the civilian population. In the years 1995 and 1996, the reforms of the National Convention were - to an extent - put into action. In my analysis I look at these different stages in more detail to analyse whether the rebel's ideology and the nature of its population base had an impact on the level of one-sided violence it carried out.

6.4.1 The SPLM/A After the Nasir Coup

Throughout 1992, SPLM/A forces and troops of the SPLM/A-Nasir faction repeatedly clashed in the Duk Ridge of Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria. In March 1992, the Sudanese government seized the opportunity presented by continued rebel infighting to launch a major assault on SPLM/A positions in Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei. Moving without hindrance through Ethiopia and the territories of their SPLM/A-Nasir proxy, government forces retook a number of towns. The factional fighting between the SPLM/A and the Nasir faction continued in 1993. The government, on the other hand, refrained from launching another large military offensive at the beginning of the 1993 dry season and as a result, most fighting between the SPLM/A and government troops took place at a low level.

Ideology

Having outlined the main events on the southern Sudanese battlefields, I now turn to a discussion of the organisational configuration of the SPLM/A after the Nasir coup.

The founding document of the SPLM/A - the *SPLM Manifesto* - identified the national liberation of Sudan as the primary objective of its struggle and called upon all aggrieved groups of Sudan to join the uprising against the national government. With this 'New Sudan' ideology, the SPLM/A - a primarily southern Sudanese movement - gave itself a clearly anti-secessionist orientation (Deng 1995; Johnson 2003; Lesch 1998; Salih and Harir 1994; Scott 1985). Amongst other things, this was adopted to appease Ethiopia, their main external sponsor who - facing several secessionist insurgencies of its own - was unwilling to lend support to a rebel movement which could set a precedent by successful struggling for independence.

But while this ideology succeeded in securing Ethiopian support, the decidedly anti-secessionist ideology of the SPLM/A had important consequences for the extent of its popular support in southern Sudan (Africa Research Bulletin 1993; Badal 1994; Johnson 2003; Kok 1996*b*; Salih and Harir 1994). As the large majority of southern Sudanese clearly preferred southern independence, the SPLM/A sometimes faced a rather sceptical population. Especially in the Equatorian states, civilians wished for their own state and were therefore reluctant to lend their support to the southern rebels.⁹⁶ The military successes of the SPLM/A in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, shrouded these ideological differences.

The SPLM/A ideology became an issue again in 1991 (Johnson 2003; Kok 1996*b*; Rolandsen 2005; Young 2003, 2006). The fall of the Mengistu regime in Addis Ababa and the subsequent cessation of Ethiopian support for the SPLM/A freed the southern rebels from the need to avoid calls for southern independence. Moreover, the coup attempt of 1991 and the subsequent emergence of the Nasir faction forced a re-evaluation of the national liberation approach of the SPLM/A. The new rebel faction followed a decidedly secessionist ideology, placing themselves in both military and ideological competition with Garang's group. Given the clear preference of most southern Sudanese for secession, the SPLM/A faced the risk of losing supporters due to its continued insistence on the national liberation of the whole of Sudan.

A radical shift in ideology towards southern independence was not expedient for the SPLM/A, however (Johnson and Prunier 1993; Johnson 2003; Rolandsen 2005). From 1983, the rebel

⁹⁶However, the national liberation ideology of the SPLM/A was not the only reason for this reluctant attitude of the Equatorians. As already mentioned earlier in this chapter, Equatorians' scepticism was also due to fears of being oppressed by a Dinka-dominated SPLM/A (Badal 1994; Johnson 2003; Lesch 1998; Salih and Harir 1994).

group had also secured popular support in the border regions of Southern Darfur, the Nuba Mountains of Southern Kordofan and the Ingessana Hills of Blue Nile - regions that were not considered part of southern Sudan. If the SPLM/A suddenly fought for southern secession, it would risk alienating these supporters and that would be significant blow to an already weakened movement.

Taken together, the SPLM/A found itself in a predicament. Its 'New Sudan' ideology did never resonate well with the southern Sudanese population and was seriously challenged after the emergence of the Nasir faction. However, abandoning this ideology altogether was also no option as this could result in losing the support of ethnic groups located beyond the borders of southern Sudan.

Population Base

As I have already shown in the section discussing the organisation of the SPLM/A, by 1991 the rebel movement encompassed many of southern Sudan's ethno-linguistic groups ([Johnson and Prunier 1993](#); [Johnson 2003](#)), with recruits from the Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk formed the backbone of the rebel movement (along with other forms of support from these ethnic groups). From the mid 1980s, the SPLM/A could also rely on the support of several Equatorial groups including the Acholi, Boya, Didinga, Lokoya, Lotuko, Moru, Mundari and Pari. Finally, the southern rebels also received recruits and support from the people of the Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hills beyond the southern Sudanese borders.

The coup of 1991 and the subsequent emergence of the rebel splinter group did not fundamentally change the ethnic composition of the SPLM/A's population base ([Johnson 1998](#)). Although the SPLM/A-Nasir faction drew its support primarily from the Nuer population, there remained substantial number of Nuer soldiers under Garang's command and the SPLM/A's population base still included a number of Nuer-populated areas.

What the emergence of the SPLM/A-Nasir faction did change, however, was the way in which the SPLM/A dealt with its extremely heterogeneous population base. To recall, the rebel group established a military organisation aimed at creating multi-ethnic units which would then be deployed anywhere in southern Sudan ([Johnson and Prunier 1993](#); [Johnson 1998](#); [Nyaba 1997](#)). The rebel civil administration, on the other hand, simply consisted of regional CMAs who co-opted local chiefs ([Johnson 1998](#); [Karim et al. 1996](#); [Rolandsen 2005](#)). These structures neither transcended ethno-linguistic boundaries within the rebel's population base nor ingrained the

SPLM/A in southern Sudanese society. After the Nasir coup of 1991, the structural shortcomings of the relations between the SPLM/A and its population base suddenly became apparent.

Due to factional fighting and subsequent government offensives, many SPLM/A-controlled areas found themselves isolated from the SPLM/A command (Rolandsen 2005). Other territories were heavily contested and under changing military control. As a result, the system of SPLA Zonal Commanders overseeing CMAs who in turn controlled local chiefs was disrupted and it was frequently the case that only local CMAs remained. Without the backing of rebel forces, however, their influence decreased and the chiefs and local administrative structures increased in importance. As the SPLM/A civil administration had failed to incorporate itself into these structures, the newly-strengthened chiefs were reluctant to channel support to the rebel movement.

The unwillingness of civilians on the ground to continue lending support to the SPLM/A was exacerbated by the military organisation of the rebel movement (Johnson 1998; Karim et al. 1996; Nyaba 1997). Where there were SPLM/A forces present in a particular area, its officers and soldiers were often not from the local ethno-linguistic groups. For example, there were Dinka from all over southern Sudan and Nuer from Jonglei and Upper Nile in the Equatorial states, while Equatorians from the south and Dinka from the Bahr al-Ghazal states in the west were stationed in Jonglei and Upper Nile. Local civilians consequently perceived these rebel forces as 'foreign' and were often reluctant to lend them any support.

One-Sided Violence, 1992-1993

Having analysed the SPLM/A's ideology and the make-up of its population base in the years 1992 and 1993, I now examine how these two factors shaped the level of one-sided violence employed by Garang's forces. This analysis is based on the theoretical assumption that a rebel group's ideology and population base influences the extent to which they can rely on non-violent strategies to secure the support of civilians. Where they are able to do so, they do not resort to high levels of one-sided violence; but where these two factors leave no non-violent strategies available to the rebel group, they resort to large-scale violence against civilians to enforce support.

Given the nature of the SPLM/A's ideology and population base in 1992 and 1993, I expect to see a high level of rebel one-sided violence. Following the emergence of the secessionist Nasir faction, the rebels' 'New Sudan' concept was seriously challenged and there was the real risk that the southern Sudanese population - who generally preferred southern independence - would switch allegiance to the SPLM/A-Nasir. The SPLM/A could not rely on its ideology to change

the civilians' cost-benefit calculations in their favour; nor did it command over the organisational structures required to transcend the ethnic boundaries within their population base. Especially after the Nasir coup and the ensuing rebel infighting, these structures were severely disrupted preventing the SPLM/A from tapping into their constituents' social networks to secure popular support.

The level of SPLM/A one-sided violence from 1992 to 1993 lends support to this reasoning. The first two years of the rebels' campaign of one-sided violence resulted in a relatively high number of civilian fatalities (Eck and Hultman 2007; Human Rights Watch 1993, 1994; Johnson 2003; UCPD 2011): according to the *UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset*, the SPLM/A killed at least 161 civilians in the first year of this campaign. Until the summer of 1992, the large majority of these events of one-sided violence took place in the Duk Ridge and its surrounding areas within Jonglei. Then, in September 1992, SPLM/A forces also resorted to one-sided violence in the Budi, Ikotos, Lapon, Magwi and Torit counties of Eastern Equatoria. This SPLM/A campaign of one-sided violence continued into the next year - the *UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset* reports a body count of 460 civilian fatalities in 1993. Again, the attacks took mostly place in Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei.

The geographical concentration of the SPLM/A's campaign of one-sided violence on the Duk Ridge area in Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria provides further evidence supporting the hypothesis linking rebel ideology to the level of violence against civilians (Badal 1994; Human Rights Watch 1994; Hutchinson 2001; Johnson and Prunier 1993; Johnson 2003; Jok and Hutchinson 1999).

In the Duk Ridge, SPLM/A areas were directly bordered by territories controlled by the Nasir faction. This geographical proximity made it increasingly difficult for the SPLM/A to use their 'New Sudan' ideology as a tool to secure popular support non-violently. In these regions they were in direct competition with the Nasir faction, whose secessionist stance was a great deal more popular among the southern Sudanese population. A similar observation can be made with regard to Eastern Equatoria, where the local population had always been strongly in favour of secession. The defection of William Nyuon Bany in September 1991 strengthened the forces of the Nasir faction in this region and offered the local population the opportunity to switch their allegiance to the SPLM/A-Nasir, whose political position was more closely aligned to theirs.

A closer look at the available data on the SPLM/A's use of violence in the Duk Ridge and Eastern Equatoria does not reveal clear evidence supporting the hypothesised relationship between rebel ideology and the level of one-sided violence. There are no reports that events of violence against civilians resulted in increased numbers of fatalities due to differing ideological stand-

points between the rebels and the civilian population. The relationship between rebel ideology and the level of rebel one-sided violence cannot clearly be established.

However, the geographical concentration of violence against civilians in the Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria regions does provide evidence supporting my hypothesis that rebels' population base has an effect on the level of one-sided violence (Human Rights Watch 1994; Hutchinson 2001; Johnson 2003; Jok and Hutchinson 1999). The heavy fighting between the SPLM/A and the Nasir faction in the Duk Ridge since August 1991, for example, resulted in frequent shifts in the territory controlled by each faction. This led to the collapse of the SPLM/A's local administrative structures in the Duk Ridge, as CMAs found themselves either isolated or expelled; and left the rebels lacking the structures required to tap into local social networks to secure popular support. While Eastern Equatoria was less affected by the heavy fighting, the SPLM/A's administrative structures in the region were even less developed: in the most part the rebels secured the popular support of local ethnic militias by providing them with food and weapons. The defection of William Nyuon Bany threatened a number of these alliances, leaving the SPLM/A with a diminished local influence. Against this background, violence against civilians seemed to be the only available way for the SPLM/A to secure popular support.

There is also more straightforward empirical evidence for the hypothesised relationship between the SPLM/A's population base and the level of one-sided violence it engaged in. As explained above, the rebels deliberately deployed their fighters far from their home regions (Johnson and Prunier 1993; Johnson 1998; Karim et al. 1996; Nyaba 1997). While this approach had previously minimised the risk of ethnic fragmentation, it now backfired as many rebel fighters were considered as foreigners - or even invaders - by the civilian populations in the Duk Ridge and Eastern Equatoria. In the absence of well-developed local administrative structures in these regions, the SPLM/A - relying on these troops to secure necessary popular support - found the population was increasingly reluctant to support their cause.

Human Rights Watch (1994), for example, reports that the civilians in the Duk Ridge did not hold the SPLM/A troops in high regards and spoke of the 'Dinka from Bahr al-Ghazal' when referring to Garang's forces. A similar observation can be made in Eastern Equatoria. There, the majority of the garrisoned SPLM/A forces were drawn from the Dinka and Nuer. Due to the historical animosities between these Nilotic groups and the Equatorian groups, the SPLM/A forces found it difficult to approach the civilian population. Without such links to the local population, however, the rebels were unable to draw resources from the structures and networks on the ground. The campaign of one-sided violence - already begun by this point - could therefore

not be complemented with non-violent strategies, and a high level of violence against the civilian population followed.

Analysing the relationship between the SPLM/A's ideology and its population base on one side; and the levels of one-sided violence it engaged in on the other provides supportive evidence for the theoretical model of this thesis.

6.4.2 Reforming the Movement

Following the Nasir coup of 1991, the SPLM/A was in a precarious situation. The split between Garang's SPLM/A and the SPLM/A-Nasir faction resulted in a severe loss of territory, fighters and resources. Furthermore, the SPLM/A's political hegemony in southern Sudan was also challenged by the SPLM/A-Nasir faction. This challenge was especially serious as the true extent of government support to the forces under Riek Machar was unknown to the southern Sudanese population. Against this background, the SPLM/A complemented its military struggle against defectors with attempts to raise their legitimacy as the sole representative of the aggrieved population.

The SPLM National Convention

In February 1993, the SPLM/A unveiled plans to hold a National Convention in the near future (Johnson 1998, 2003; Rolandsen 2005; Young 2003). This convention was supposed to bring together the people of southern Sudan, host elections for the SPLM/A leadership and discuss organisational reforms. Although international and national observers felt that it would be a mere propaganda event, the workings of the National Convention - held in April 1994 in the Eastern Equatorial town of Chukudum - indicate that it was a genuine forum for discussing politically reforming the movement.

The agenda of the National Convention, for example, illustrates that this event went beyond mere propaganda (Rolandsen 2005). It contains a number of items focused on corruption and the misconduct of SPLM/A cadres and fighters. With this, the rebel leadership implicitly admitted mistakes and opened up a space for delegates to voice further grievances. Secondly, the rebel movement invited discussion about their objectives and future political and military actions. Given the failure of the SPLM/A's 'New Sudan' ideology to gain a significant following among the southern Sudanese population, such a discussion was an attempt to move the group ideology closer to the beliefs of the civilian population. Finally, the SPLM/A acknowledged the need for

reform of the group's organisational structure. They conceded that greater democratic structures were required and admitted that the balance between their military, political and civil institutions had to be realigned.

The delegates present at the National Convention give a further indication of the SPLM/A's desire to initiate real reforms (Rolandsen 2005). The leadership did not select delegates exclusively from the ranks of the rebel group, but reached out to the civilian population, inviting - among others - civilians from areas 'liberated' by the SPLM/A, displaced people, refugees, members of churches and members of Sudanese non-governmental organisations.

However, the SPLM/A leadership did not cede all control over the National Convention. A large number of the delegates were directly nominated by Garang, whilst a large proportion owed their status as delegates to their official position within the group (to which they had been appointed by Garang).⁹⁷ Finally, most of the delegates representing the civilian population were appointed by the Zonal Commanders or the CMAs within the 'liberated' areas and only a small numbers of the civilian delegates were actually selected by the local population which they represented.

Despite this, one should bear in mind that the SPLM/A - from its foundation in 1983 - had never made any attempt to incorporate the civilian population into its organisation and so the convention's agenda and the composition of its delegate groups constituted a significant move forwards in incorporating a plurality of voices into the structure of the group. And as the two subsections which now follow show, the National Convention resulted in genuine reforms within the SPLM/A.

Ideology

As explained earlier, the secessionist stance of the Nasir faction seriously challenged the 'New Sudan' ideology of the SPLM/A (Johnson 2003; Kok 1996*b*; Rolandsen 2005; Young 2003, 2006), whose emphasis on national liberation did not resonate well with a civilian population that had always preferred independence for the south. Abandoning this approach, however, could result in the loss of their support base in the non-southern regions of Blue Nile, Southern Darfur and Southern Kordofan. Against this background, the SPLM/A avoided giving a clear response to the secessionist ideology of the SPLM/A-Nasir and instead simply ceased referring to their 'New Sudan' ideology between 1991 and 1994.

⁹⁷Although this resulted in a large number of convention delegates who were directly or indirectly selected by Garang himself, this did not necessarily mean that these delegates stood firmly behind his positions. Rolandsen (2005) mentions the example of Mario Muor, the Secretary General of the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) of the SPLM/A who repeatedly voiced strong opinions deviating from Garang's position during the convention.

The concept of 'New Sudan' was broached at the National Convention, however, with Garang reaffirming SPLM/A's commitment to fight for a 'New Sudan' in his opening speech (Kok 1996b; Rolandsen 2005). The meaning of the term had changed significantly, however: rather than refer to the building of a secular and united state, Garang now used it more generally to refer to victory over the government in Khartoum.

If this victory were to be achieved, the people of the 'New Sudan' would face two options. Firstly, they could choose to radically reform the Sudanese state in order to remedy the political, social and economic marginalisation of the peripheral regions, following the 'New Sudan' policy outlined in the *SPLM Manifesto* of 1983. Alternatively, the southern Sudanese - together with, for example, Blue Nile state or the Nuba Mountains - could opt for independence once the 'New Sudan' had been achieved. This was a logical extension of the first option as, with the hegemony and oppression of the northern elites overcome, the free and empowered people of Sudan would naturally have the right to secede peacefully.

During the National Convention, the concept of a 'New Sudan' was also specified geographically (Rolandsen 2005). In one of the resolutions, it is stated that the 'New Sudan' encompasses the already 'liberated' territories of Sudan. In 1994 these were Northern and Western Bahr al-Ghazal, Western, Central and Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes, Unity, Upper Nile and Warrap; as well as parts of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. As these were basically the territories of southern Sudan, the concept of a 'New Sudan' implicitly reinforced the notion of southern independence.

The reinterpretation of the concept of a 'New Sudan' at the National Convention continued the SPLM/A's gradual move away from its anti-secessionist stance towards the right of self-determination (Africa Research Bulletin 1992a, 1995; Collins 2008; Johnson 2003). This development had begun in earnest in 1992 with the first round of the Abuja talks between Khartoum, the SPLM/A and the Nasir faction. It then continued with the *Washington Declaration* of 1993, which was signed by John Garang and Riek Machar. In these meetings, the SPLM/A increasingly resorted to the language of self-determination to counter the secessionist ideology of the Nasir faction.

This ideological renewal of the SPLM/A had also been made possible by the continuing decline of the Nasir faction (Collins 2008; Johnson 2003). From 1993, it slowly succumbed to infighting and began to disintegrate. More importantly, its calls for southern independence were increasingly discredited as a result of its role as a government ally.

Population Base

The ethnic composition of the SPLM/A and its civilian support base remained unchanged after the National Convention (Johnson 2003; Rolandsen 2005). The rebel group continued to recruit and receive support from a large majority of southern Sudanese ethno-linguistics groups and from certain groups in Blue Nile, Southern Darfur and Southern Kordofan.

The National Convention, however, initiated some reforms of the military and civil organisation of the rebel movement (Johnson 1998, 2003; Karim et al. 1996; Kok 1996b; Rolandsen 2005). A new civilian administrative structure was developed that clearly separated civilian administration from the group's military organisation and built up a formal judiciary system. A core element of this was the formalisation of the 'liberated' territories, which were divided into regions, counties, sub-districts and villages - each of which had its own administrative structure. These changes resulted in a much needed liberalisation of the rebel group and increased levels of civilian participation. The southern Sudanese consequently regarded the National Convention as a potent symbol of the movement's change and they were more supportive of the SPLM/A.

The most important change of the military organisation of the SPLM/A was the introduction of a mobile combat force which was used in major offensives against government units and its proxy militias (Johnson 2003; Rolandsen 2005). As with the SPLA units of the past, this mobile force was multi-ethnic and could be deployed everywhere in southern Sudan and its border regions, but to complement it the SPLM/A also established locally recruited defence forces. While the mobile force served to maintain the SPLA's military capabilities, the locally recruited defence units were supposed to minimise the risk of civilian abuse by SPLA soldiers who were 'foreign' to their location of deployment.

Aside from this change, the most important reforms took place on the local level of administration (Johnson 1998, 2003; Rolandsen 2005). Generally, these reforms devolved power from SPLM/A bodies to the native administrative structures on the local level. The SPLM/A also began to recognise the local laws of ethnic groups, strengthening the political power of local chiefs. In sum, this voluntary devolution of power under the umbrella of the SPLM/A affirmed the legitimacy of the rebel movement in southern Sudan.

Finally, the SPLM/A allowed the formation of indigenous non-governmental organisations: the 'Sudanese Indigenous Non-Governmental Organisations' (SINGO) (African Rights 1995; Karim et al. 1996; Riehl 2001; Rolandsen 2005). They quickly became the local partners of international aid organisations and strengthened political and social institutions on the ground, resulting in

the emergence of an embryonic southern Sudanese civil society.

Although the SPLM/A failed to implement all major reforms discussed at the National Convention, the changes that were made to its political and military organisation eased the tensions between the rebel group and the civilian population. Moreover, the emerging local administrative structures and organisations also opened up a much needed space for political participation outside the realms of the SPLM/A.

One-Sided Violence, 1994-1996

I conclude this analysis with a discussion of the relationship between the SPLM/A's ideology, its population base and the level of its one-sided violence in the years from 1994 to 1996. As explained previously in this section, the objective here is to determine whether the rebels could rely on non-violent strategies to secure popular support during their campaign of one-sided violence. If this is the case, one would expect a low level of rebel one-sided violence in southern Sudan.

Through the National Convention, the SPLM/A successfully addressed several of the challenges posed by the Nasir coup of 1991 and the subsequent rebel infighting (Johnson 1998, 2003; Rolandson 2005). They used it to revise the concept of a 'New Sudan' and explicitly included the possibility of southern independence in their programme. With this, they realigned their ideology with the preferences of the southern Sudanese population and gained legitimacy as a representative for southern Sudanese interests. The convention also helped the SPLM/A ease tensions with the civilian population - this was achieved primarily by devolving power to local levels and through the use of forces recruited locally to each southern Sudanese state.

It would be expected that these developments would help the SPLM/A return to more non-violent strategies to secure popular support, and an analysis of levels of rebel one-sided violence in southern Sudan from the years from 1994 to 1996 provides tentative support for this, with violence against civilians reducing in level from the previous two years (Amnesty International 1996; Africa Research Bulletin 1996; Eck and Hultman 2007; Human Rights Watch 1996; Political Instability Task Force 2009; United States Department of State 1996).

The *UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset* reports no incidents of SPLM/A violence against civilians in 1994. Without providing any detailed information, however, the *United States Department of State* (1995), reports that the southern rebels attacked civilians throughout the year. I therefore conclude that the SPLM/A campaign of one-sided violence continued but at only a

very low level. In 1995, sources report only one instance of SPLM/A violence against civilians when, at the end of July, rebel forces attacked villages in the Ganyliel area of Unity state, killing between 147 and 210 civilians - most of whom were children from the Nuer ethnic group. The rebels destroyed a total of 35 villages and looted up to 4,000 cattle. There is also only a single incident of one-sided violence recorded for 1996. This occurred in March, when the SPLM/A attacked Yabus - a town in Blue Nile on the border to Upper Nile, for which the *UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset* reports 27 civilian fatalities. I have found no evidence of one-sided violence by the SPLM/A after this event.

Looking in greater detail at the available data, I find no evidence of the changes in either the rebels' ideology or its population base affecting the level of one-sided violence perpetrated by the SPLM/A ([Amnesty International 1996](#); [Africa Research Bulletin 1996](#); [Eck and Hultman 2007](#); [Human Rights Watch 1996](#); [Political Instability Task Force 2009](#); [United States Department of State 1996](#)). While this does not lend support to my theoretical model, it is striking that the available reports on the incidences of one-sided violence do not mention issues related to the ideological orientation of the rebel factions, or their use of 'foreign' fighters.

However, it is necessary to take a closer look at the SPLM/A raid on the Ganyliel area in July 1995 as this single event was responsible for the high body count in this year ([Eck and Hultman 2007](#); [Political Instability Task Force 2009](#)). I argue that this event does not contradict the general logic outlined in this chapter. To begin with, it was an isolated event which was neither preceded nor followed by similar acts of one-sided violence. Furthermore, the attack on the Nuer villages in the Ganyliel area appeared to follow a retaliatory logic: observers reported that it was most likely to be a response to an attack on the Akot area by an SPLM/A splinter group in October 1994. Moreover, the SPLM/A insisted in a couple of press statements that this attack was carried out primarily by local people seeking revenge for the previous attack ([Amnesty International 1996](#); [Human Rights Watch 1996](#); [Johnson 2003](#); [Jok and Hutchinson 1999](#); [United States Department of State 1996](#)).

Finally, it is worth pointing out that the low level of one-sided violence in the years 1994 to 1996 was also affected by other factors ([Johnson 2003](#); [Rolandsen 2005](#)). As noted above, the disintegration of the SPLM/A-Nasir faction continued unabated in the years after 1993, allowing the SPLM/A to easily regain its political hegemony in southern Sudan and win over the civilian population. Moreover, they were able to stop the military advances of the government forces in 1994. Following this, the threat of military defeat was averted, providing the SPLM/A with the necessary space to reform its organisation.

6.5 Summary

In this chapter, I have conducted a qualitative analysis of the relationship between the organisation of the SPLM/A and the onset and level of rebel one-sided violence in southern Sudan. Given the objective of this case study to find evidence corroborating the interpretations of my quantitative analysis, I focused on leadership divisions within the SPLM/A and on its ideology and the nature of its population base.

The analysis of the onset of SPLM/A one-sided violence focused on the Nasir coup of 1991, which led to the emergence of a splinter faction and a subsequent period of rebel infighting. The results of this case study indicate that the onset of SPLM/A one-sided violence in early 1992 was indeed caused by the leadership divisions of August 1991. Specifically, it is possible to trace how the coup reduced the SPLM/A's military capabilities and, subsequently, resulted in decreased levels of popular support for the group. This was especially apparent in Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria, where Garang's forces stood in direct competition with the Nasir faction. As a consequence, the southern rebels resorted to one-sided violence in order to enforce popular support.

In analysing the level of SPLM/A one-sided violence in southern Sudan, I focused on the years from 1992 to 1996. During this period, they repeatedly used one-sided violence of varying levels. In the first two years of this campaign, the ideology and population of the SPLM/A was in disarray - making it difficult for them to complement the use of one-sided violence with non-violent strategies to secure support. The analysis showed that the rebels were unable to utilise their 'New Sudan' ideology to change civilians' cost-benefit calculations and that their poorly designed military and administrative structures prevented them from tapping into the social networks of their population base. Consequently, the SPLM/A resorted to large-scale violence against civilians. In the following years, however, the rebel group engaged in political reforms and regained its ability to create support with non-violent means and the level of one-sided violence decreased.

Taken together, these findings successfully address the limitations of the quantitative analysis outlined in Chapter 5. First, I am able to improve the internal validity of the inferences regarding the relationships between rebel organisation and one-sided violence. The analysis of the onset of SPLM/A one-sided violence clearly showed that the occurrence of leadership divisions in 1991 was temporally antecedent to the start of the campaign of one-sided violence. Moreover, I am also able to corroborate the assumed causal pathway linking these two variables. A similar

conclusion can be drawn with regard to the relationship between rebel ideology and the nature of a rebel group's population base on the one side and the level of one-sided violence on the other. The analysis of the SPLM/A established a temporal and causal sequence linking variations in the two organisational factors to the varying level of violence against civilians.

However, the analysis of the level of SPLM/A one-sided violence also confirmed that the quantitative analysis suffered from lacking construct validity. To begin with, the qualitative analysis showed that it is not so much the type of rebel ideology which affects the level of popular support but the ideological differences between rebel groups and the civilian population. Consequently, I conclude that the concept of rebel ideology tested in the quantitative analysis has only partly been able to capture the impact of this factor on the level of one-sided violence. Moreover, the analysis of the SPLM/A's population base demonstrated that while the fractionalisation of a rebel group's population base is indeed a relevant explanatory factor of the level of one-sided violence, it is also important how the rebel group administers its population base. The measure of linguistic fractionalisation employed in the quantitative analysis does therefore only analyse one aspect of the relationship between rebels and their population base.

The SLM/A in Darfur

In this chapter, I use qualitative methods to analyse whether the organisation of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) is causally linked to its use of one-sided violence in the War in Darfur. I consider both the onset and the level of one-sided violence it perpetrated in the conflict. The objective of this case study is to find further evidence supporting the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3 and backed-up by my analysis of the Second Sudanese Civil War in the previous chapter. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first explores the background of the War in Darfur: a civil war between the SLM/A and Sudan's government. The second section explores the organisational configuration of the SLM/A at the beginning of the civil war. The third section analyses whether the occurrence of leadership divisions within the SLM/A resulted in the onset of campaigns of violence against civilians, and if so to what extent. The fourth section investigates whether the ideology and population base of the SLM/A affected the level of one-sided violence. The final section offers a summary of findings.

7.1 Background to the Conflict

From c. 1600 to 1916, a significant proportion of the area today known as Darfur formed an independent sultanate, which was ruled by the Fur ethno-linguistic group (Burr and Collins 2006; Flint and de Waal 2008; Prunier 2007; de Waal 2005).⁹⁸ The Sultanate of Darfur was one of the earliest states in this part of Africa, and was a powerful kingdom with considerable political and economic influence. The end of the sultanate came in 1916 when the Fur armies were defeated by a British expeditionary force and Darfur was integrated into the British Empire as a part of Sudan.

⁹⁸Darfur translates to 'homeland of the Fur'




Figure 7.1: Map of Darfur

In 1956, Darfur became a part of the newly independent Republic of Sudan. Throughout the following decades, the region suffered from political and economic marginalisation at the hands of the central government in Khartoum. Against this background, relations between the African and Arab population groups of Darfur became increasingly hostile over the years, eventually leading to conflict: the Arab-Fur war from 1987 to 1989 and the Arab-Masalit war from 1995 to 1999. With the emergence of the SLM/A and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in 2003, conflict rose up again, and it is this conflict that I analyse in this chapter. Until 2006,

the SLM/A were the main rebel actor in the civil war: though the JEM was politically active, its military capabilities were overshadowed by those of the SLM/A. After 2006, the SLM/A succumbed to fragmentation and the JEM's military importance increased. The conflict has not been resolved and fighting continues to this day in Darfur.

In this section, I present a brief history of the War in Darfur in order to provide a background for my analysis of SLM/A violence against civilians. I start with a discussion of the two central structural factors shaping the civil war and the organisation of the SLM/A. Firstly, I consider Darfur's role in Sudan and its political and economic marginalisation since Sudanese independence. I then turn to explore the nature and structure of the inter-ethnic relations in Darfur, and analyse how they contributed to the overall conflict setting. Following this, I give a brief overview of the course of events during the civil war, with a special focus on the incidences of violence against civilians throughout the conflict.

The SLM/A was active in three Sudanese states: Northern Darfur, Western Darfur and Southern Darfur. Map 7.1 ([United Nations Sudan Information Gateway 2011a](#)) displays these states and the counties within these states, as of June 2008 - I refer to the administrative units shown in this map when giving the geographic location of relevant events during the civil war. The map of 6.2 (with its 1956-2011 borders) in Chapter 6, above, shows the location of these states within the country. It must be noted that my analysis focuses on the years from 2003 to 2007 and thus excludes the most recent events in the Darfur conflict. This temporal restriction is primarily due to the quantitative analysis I use, which does not include any data from years after 2007.

7.1.1 Darfur's Role in Sudan

Darfur was of little political or economic importance to the British Empire ([Burr and Collins 2006](#); [Collins 2008](#); [Flint and de Waal 2008](#); [Prunier 2007](#); [de Waal 2005](#)). Its subjugation under colonial rule was primarily due to the dynamics of the First World War - Britain feared the Sultan of Darfur siding with the Ottoman Empire (who joined the war on Germany's side) and to avoid the threat of a hostile force on the borders of their colony in Sudan, sent an expeditionary corps to Darfur, defeated the Fur armies and killed the Sultan.⁹⁹

After the First World War, the British resorted to a low-key approach to government in Darfur, with the sole aim being the maintenance of a minimum level of political order in the region

⁹⁹According to [Flint and van Waal \(2008\)](#), the British colonial administration fabricated the intelligence of an Ottoman-Darfurian Alliance. They argue that the Governor General of Sudan, Sir Francis Reginald Wingate, felt cut off from the political and military events of the First World War and used the conquest of the Darfur Sultanate to obtain some military glory.

(Abdul-Jalil, Mohammed and Yousuf 2007; Burr and Collins 2006). To this end, they introduced a system of ‘Native Administration’ and created a hierarchy of tribal administrators. So long as these tribal authorities remained in line, the British rulers did not interfere in Darfur. This resulted in an absence of economic development and modernisation in Darfur: there were only a small number of schools and hospitals, no investments were made in infrastructure and export levels were low.

Following Sudanese independence in 1956, the political and economic neglect of Darfur continued (Flint and de Waal 2008; Harir 1994a; Prunier 2007; Tanner 2005; de Waal 2007a; Yongo-Bure 2009). Khartoum had established itself as the political and economic centre of the Republic of Sudan and was the base from which the ruling elites exploited the periphery of the country (including Darfur) to increase their wealth and influence. Successive national governments failed to implement sustainable development processes in Darfur and its inhabitants were offered only menial work as seasonal labourers or construction workers; or were used to fill the lower ranks of the Sudanese army. In 2000, a manuscript called *The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan* appeared in Khartoum. It succinctly summarised this centre-periphery conflict and included a large wealth of demographic and economic statistics illustrating the marginalisation of the country’s peripheral people and regions.¹⁰⁰

As a result of the constant exploitation, marginalisation and oppression at the hands of the Khartoum government, Darfurians have become increasingly insubordinate over the years (Collins 2008; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tanner 2005). Resistance against government bureaucrats and businessmen from Khartoum began in the 1980s and grew steadily. This was soon complemented by more elaborate political voices demanding the rule of Darfur by Darfurians and stronger representation of the region in the central government and the national legislature of Sudan.

Despite the marginalisation of Darfurians and the growing tensions between the region and Khartoum, Darfurians continue to regard Darfur as a part of the Republic of Sudan and these themselves as Sudanese citizens (as does the Sudanese government) (Burr and Collins 2006; Collins 2008; Flint and de Waal 2008; Prunier 2007; Tanner 2005). It is also worth highlighting the important place Darfur occupies in the Sudanese national and historical imaginary: the Fur sultanate was one of the earliest states in what is now Sudan, and provided the political and military backbone to the Mahdist Sudanese state which existed from 1885 until its defeat by the British in 1898 and, to this day, is often seen as the first embodiment of Sudanese nationalism

¹⁰⁰A translation of this manuscript from Arabic to English can be found in the appendix of the edited book by Hassan and Ray (2009).

and anti-colonial struggle.

7.1.2 Ethnic Relations in Darfur

The Darfurian people number around six million and are almost exclusively Muslim. Although they have shared a strong feeling of a common Darfurian identity throughout their history, the population is now increasingly divided into several ethnic groups and tribes.¹⁰¹

The main dividing line is between Arab Darfurians and African Darfurians (El-Tom 2009; Flint and de Waal 2008; Prunier 2007; Sharkey 2008; de Waal 2005). The group of Arab Darfurians encompasses the Arabic-speaking Bedouins of the region. Since Sudanese independence, large portions of this population group have adopted an Arab supremacist ideology, a development strongly promoted by radical Islamists in Khartoum's ruling elite. The African population of Darfur, on the other hand, encompasses the sedentary farmers who very often still speak their own languages. Facing an increasingly hostile Arab population, many non-Arab Darfurians resorted to 'Africanism' as a strategy to build political alliances against the Arab Darfurians. Their identity is therefore a more recent creation of the political discourse and owes much to the ideological influence of the southern Sudanese SPLM/A.

In addition to this Arab-African distinction, the Darfurian population is also differentiated into several smaller groups or tribes (Burr and Collins 2006; Harir 1994a; Prunier 2007; de Waal 2005). The Arab groups of Darfur, for example, are either Abbala (camel herders) or Baggara (cattle herders). The Abbala are primarily found in north and west Darfur and encompass the tribes of the Beni Halba, Beni Hussein, Misiriya, Rizeigat and Zayadiya though, unfortunately, there are no reliable estimates of their numbers. The Baggara are located in Southern Darfur and comprise the southern sections of the Beni Halba, Misiriya and Rizeigat as well as the Habbaniya, Ma'aliya and Ta'aisha. Altogether, they number around one million. The main African groups in Darfur are the Berti, Birgid, Daju, Fellata, Fur, Masalit, Midob, Tama, Tunjur and Zaghawa. By far the largest of these groups are the Fur, who have more than 500,000 members; followed by the Masalit and Tunjur who both number around 175,000. Other African groups range in number between 50,000 and 100,000 members. Table 7.1 lists both African and Arab groups with their population size (where available) and home region.

Over the course of the twentieth century, the identity of these ethnic groups and tribes has

¹⁰¹In the case of Darfur, the term 'ethnic group' normally refers to ethno-linguistic groups. The term 'tribe', on the other hand, describes groups which often share linguistic or cultural characteristics but are politically distinct (de Waal 2005).

Table 7.1: Selected Linguistic Groups and Tribes of Darfur

Group	Population Size	Home Region
<i>Major African Groups</i>	<i>>3 million</i>	<i>Northern, Western and Southern Darfur</i>
Berti	n/a	Tagabo Hills, Northern Darfur
Birgid	n/a	Northern Darfur
Daju	80,000	Western and Southern Darfur
Fellata	90,000	n/a
Fur	500,000	Northern, Western and Southern Darfur
Masalit	60,900	Western and Southern Darfur
Midob	50,000	Northern Darfur
Tama	5,000	Northern Darfur
Tunjur	170,000	Northern, Western and Southern Darfur
Zaghawa	75,000	Northern Darfur
<i>Major Arab Groups/Abbala</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<i>Northern and Western Darfur</i>
Beni Halba	-	-
Beni Hussein	-	-
Ereigat	-	-
Misiriya	-	-
Rizeigat-Mahamid	-	-
Rizeigat-Mahriya	-	-
Zayadiya	-	-
<i>Major Arab Groups/Baggara</i>	<i>1 million</i>	<i>Southern Darfur</i>
Beni Halba-Awlad Jabir	-	-
Beni Halba-Awlad Jubara	-	-
Habbaniya	-	-
Ma'aliya	-	-
Misiriya-Terjam	-	-
Rizeigat-Mahamid	-	-
Rizeigat-Mahriya	-	-
Rizeigat-Nawaiba	-	-
Ta'aisha	-	-

Source: de Waal (2005) and Ethnologue (Lewis 2009)

grown stronger. The main reason for this can be found in the nature of the 'Native Administration' imposed by the British colonial authorities (Abdul-Jalil, Mohammed and Yousuf 2007; Burr and Collins 2006; International Crisis Group 2004b; de Waal 2005). This system formally acknowledged the status of tribal authorities and equipped them with executive and judicial powers whilst introducing a system of land tenure which gave each group their own *dar* or homeland. This strengthened the political identity of individual groups and tribes at the expense of Darfurian identity, and though the abolishment of 'Native Administration' by President Ja'afar Numayri in 1971 stripped them of administrative power, it did not change the fact that the group or tribe was now the central factor in political mobilisations.

From the 1980s onwards, this mosaic of Arab and African Darfurian groups has become in-

creasingly conflict-prone due to increased inter-group competition over access to land and water (Flint 2010; Flint and de Waal 2008; Harir 1994a; International Crisis Group 2004b; Prunier 2007; Tanner 2005). Centred on agriculture and pastoral farming, the Darfurian economy is strongly dependent on fertile land, so the droughts of the 1970s and early 1980s - coupled with the pressures of a rapidly expanding population and ecological destruction - have put great pressure on the existing land tenure system. Large numbers of Northern Darfurians fled their home regions and moved south to the fertile areas of Jebel Marra and Southern Darfur. Here, they were joined by the Arab Abbala tribes, which had not been granted land under 'Native Administration'. With these movements bringing the Arab-African division to the forefront there was a sharp increase in communal clashes, and groups began to establish armed militias and local self-defence committees. This culminated in the Fur-Arab war of 1987 to 1989 and the Arab-Masalit war of 1996 to 1998, but even outside of these conflicts, the underlying problems of the polarised tribal identities and land disputes were not satisfactorily resolved.

7.1.3 Course of the Darfur Conflict

In their comprehensive historical account of the Darfur conflict, Flint and de Waal (2008) date the beginning of the rebellion on 21 July 2001, when a meeting took place between Fur and Zaghawa representatives in the Northern Darfurian town of Abu Gamra. At this meeting, both groups agreed to fight against government oppression and the marginalisation of their communities. In November 2001, this Fur-Zaghawa alliance was widened to include the Masalit from Western Darfur. Representatives from these three groups then formed the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF). In early 2003, the DLF changed its name to Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and was joined in its struggle by a second rebel group, the JEM (Burr and Collins 2006; Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). In the following months, these two rebel groups inflicted substantial losses on government forces. One of the most severe attacks was a joint operation by SLM/A and JEM forces on the Al-Fasher air base in Northern Darfur, which destroyed several government planes and helicopters; resulted in the deaths of around 100 government soldiers; saw the kidnapping of the head of the Sudanese Air Force; and the capture of military equipment and vehicles. The rebels conducted further attacks directed at government garrisons in the towns of Tine, Kutum and Mellit in Northern Darfur over the next few months. Responding to these attacks, the government stepped up its counterinsurgency efforts in the summer of 2003 (Flint 2009; Human Rights Watch 2004a,b,c; International Crisis Group 2004b; Johnson 2003). Khartoum armed some of the Arabic-speaking tribes of Darfur to form the so-

called *janjawiid* militias.¹⁰² Together with these proxy militias, government forces then began to attack civilian Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa civilian settlements across Darfur, with the intention of destroying the rebel's civilian support base. During these attacks, they killed male villagers, raped and abducted women and children and looted homes and livestock before destroying the villages. By the end of the year, this counterinsurgency campaign resulted in more than 100 destroyed villages, 700,000 internally displaced persons, and 110,000 refugees in neighbouring Chad. A ceasefire agreement between government forces and the Darfurian rebels mediated by the Chadian President Idriss Déby in September 2003 was ignored almost immediately.

In 2004, the government and its proxy militias started a major military offensive against the Darfurian rebels. This proved particularly successful against the larger and more militarily adept SLM/A (Africa Confidential 2004a,b; Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). In January their military leader Abdallah Abbakar Bashar was killed and in the following months the group was almost completely driven out of Northern Darfur. Most of the rebel fighters fled to the Jebel Marra massif in Western Darfur, which subsequently became one of the war's main battlefields. While the SLM/A was able to re-strengthen during the following year, tensions between its political leader Abdel Wahid Mohammad Ahmad Nur and its new military leader Minni Arkou Minnawi prevented them from achieving a full political and military recovery. I analyse this split in greater detail in relation to the onset and level of one-sided violence below. The smaller JEM also saw first splits within its ranks.

Throughout 2004, the government and the *janjawiid* continued their violent campaign against Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa civilians (Human Rights Watch 2004a,b,c; International Crisis Group 2004c, 2005a). By the middle of the year, the SLM/A also began to attack civilians - albeit on a much smaller scale. Consequently, the numbers of civilian fatalities, internally displaced persons and refugees increased further. The international community, however, did not respond decisively to this emerging humanitarian crisis. Fearful of derailing the peace process between Khartoum and the SPLM/A in southern Sudan, many states abstained from exerting serious pressure on the Sudanese government and the only noteworthy international action was the deployment of military observers by the African Union (AU) in Darfur, though they were unable to contain the violence. Meanwhile, AU-mediated peace talks between Khartoum and rebels in the Nigerian town of Abuja failed.

¹⁰²In Darfur, the Arab word *janjawiid* is commonly used to describe criminals and bandits who prey on villagers and nomads. However, the actual origin of this word is unclear. According to Flint (2009, 52), there are a number of possible explanations: "The origin of the word is pure speculation. Some say it is a combination of *jawad* (horseman), *Jiim* (the G3 rifle), and *jinn* (devil). Others say it passed into common currency as a result of the exploits of a notorious robber from the Shattiya tribe, nicknamed Hamid 'Janjaweed', in West Darfur in the 1970s."

In 2005, the rebels ceased to constitute a serious challenge to Khartoum as they were preoccupied with internal fighting (Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; International Crisis Group 2005b; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). In April, the JEM experienced a further split as some disgruntled field commanders formed a small breakaway group. In May, the JEM and SLM/A reportedly clashed several times with each other. Then, in November 2005, the SLM/A's military leader Minni Minnawi convened a conference in the small town of Haskanita in eastern Darfur at which he was elected as the new chairman and overall leader of the rebel movement. This led to clashes between his faction and those who remained loyal to Abdel Wahid.

Against this background of rebel group infighting, government forces reduced the frequency of attacks against Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa civilians (UCPD 2011). Following two years of large-scale and constant civilian victimisation, there were fewer targets available for the Sudanese army and the *janjawiid* militias: a large number of villages had either been deserted or destroyed and a large proportion of Darfurians were concentrated in refugee camps in Darfur and Chad. But while civilian victimisation by government forces decreased, rebel violence against the population continued. Throughout the year, rebel infighting was accompanied by low scale rebel violence against civilians.

Tense relations between and within Darfurian rebel groups continued into 2006 (Africa Confidential 2006; Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). Early on in the year, the two SLM/A factions of Abdel Wahid and Minni Minnawi were joined by a third splinter group: the SLM/A Group of 19 (G-19), which brought together Northern Darfurian rebel commanders disappointed by the power struggle paralysing the movement. The rebel splintering was further accelerated in May with the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) negotiated under AU-mediation in Abuja. This agreement was only signed by Khartoum and Minnawi's faction, which was then denounced as a sell-out by the other rebel factions. As a consequence, many of Minnawi's fighters defected and he lost the support of the civilian population. Abdel Wahid, however, could not seize this opportunity as he had to fend off further internal challenges to his leadership. Finally, the rebel umbrella group National Redemption Front (NRF), was formed in June and united JEM, G-19 and a number of smaller SLM/A factions, had disintegrated by the end of 2006. These developments coincided with an upsurge in clashes between government forces and rebel factions, and increased *janjawiid* attacks on the civilian population.

The following year brought no improvement in the situation on the ground (Flint and de Waal 2008; International Crisis Group 2006, 2007; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). Darfurian rebels continued to be plagued by infighting and splintering. By now, however, the most important rebel

actors were the JEM and SLM/A G-19. The political and military influence of Minnawi and Abdel Wahid had almost completely disappeared, and they were left with only a handful of fighters each. Their factions were joined by more than a dozen small rebel factions who maintained a complicated web of overlapping loyalties, with some even acting as proxy militias for Khartoum. It was not only rebels who experienced infighting and fragmentation, however (Flint 2009, 2010; International Crisis Group 2007). Excluded from the peace talks in Abuja, the Arabic-speaking tribes of the *janjawiid* militias had become increasingly suspicious of Khartoum. They were particularly afraid of the possibility of retribution at the hands of their former victims should the Sudanese government live up to its promises to the international community and disarm them. Furthermore, Khartoum's campaign in Darfur had failed to bring any lasting improvement of their socio-economic status - the Arabic tribes suffered from the years of conflict as all Darfurians did. Against this background, several of the *janjawiid* militias turned against the government allies and formed alliances with rebel factions, meaning that the conflict in Darfur had evolved from a civil war between Khartoum and two rebel groups into a low scale conflict with numerous small armed groups each fighting for their own limited interests in 2007. The conflict continues to the present day.

7.2 Organisation of the SLM/A

I will now consider the organisational configuration of the SLM/A at the beginning of the civil war. I focus on the three organisational factors identified as statistically significant explanatory factors in Chapter 4: its leadership, its ideology and its population base. The purpose of this section is to present the configuration of these factors and additional contextual information on them. In so doing I provide the groundwork for the analysis of the causal relationship between rebel organisation, popular support and one-sided violence in Darfur after 2003.

7.2.1 Leadership

The leadership structure of the SLM/A is shaped by the relations between the three main ethnic groups of this rebel movement: the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa (Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tanner and Tubiana 2007; de Waal 2005). While the Fur and Masalit have always had a relatively close relationships with each other, the relationships between the Fur and Masalit on the one side and the Zaghawa on the other side was rather conflict-prone. This was primarily due to the recent past in which many Zaghawa had migrated into the settlement areas of other

Darfurian groups. There, Zaghawa traders and merchants quickly amassed considerable wealth and acquired disproportionately high amounts of political and economic power. Consequentially, many Darfurians feared domination by Zaghawas.

In the run-up to the foundation of the SLM/A these ethnic animosities were put aside due to common grievances and opposition to the Sudanese government (Burr and Collins 2006; Collins 2008; Flint and de Waal 2008). The divisions soon re-emerged, however, with the Fur and Masalit decrying the aggressive and arrogant behaviour of Zaghawa fighters stationed on their territories, and the Zaghawa accusing the Fur and Masalit of failing to provide them with enough support.

To ease the tensions between the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa, their leading figures met in March 2002 in Boodkay, a village in the Jebel Marra massif in Western Darfur (Burr and Collins 2006; Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; International Crisis Group 2005*b*; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). The main objective of this meeting was to find a sustainable power-sharing agreement between them which would dispel fears of ethnic domination and build mutual trust. To achieve this, the participants of the Boodkay meeting agreed on joint leadership of the SLM/A. It was decided that a Fur would become the chairman of the movement and act as the political leader, while a Zaghawa would assume the role of the chief of staff and act as the military leader of the rebel forces. The deputy chairman would be Masalit.¹⁰³

The Fur chose Abdel Wahid as chairman (Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008).¹⁰⁴ Born in 1968 in the Western Darfurian town of Zalingei, he had organised the political and military networks for the Fur uprising in the 1990s, proving himself to be a charismatic leader and establishing himself as a widely known figure among the Fur population. The Zaghawa faction of the SLM/A, meanwhile, chose Abdallah Abbakar as chief of staff (Flint 2007). He was a member of the Ohora - a small Zaghawa clan - but was well respected among the whole Zaghawa population. He had participated in the rebellion of Idriss Déby in the early 1990s and then served as an artillery officer in the Chadian army.¹⁰⁵ The Masalit did not fill the post of deputy chairman until 2005.

¹⁰³As the contributions of other African and Arab Darfurian groups to the SLM/A were minimal in comparison with those of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa, they were not considered in this power-sharing agreement (Flint and de Waal 2008), though they were given influence on the middle levels of the SLM/A's political and military leadership. Several field commanders of the rebel group, for example, were from smaller African and Arab groups.

¹⁰⁴Flint (2007) states that the preferred candidate of many Fur was Ahmad Abdel Shafi. Born in 1973, he was a graduate of the Juba University College of Education and had been one of the most successful agitators and fund raisers for the Darfurian cause in the 1990s. At the time of the Boodkay meeting, however, he was considered to be too young, which tipped the scales in favour for the slightly older and widely respected Abdel Wahid. During the civil war, Abdel Shafi remained a loyal supporter of Abdel Wahid and proved himself a gifted military commander. However, he grew increasingly frustrated and tried to oust Abdel Wahid in July 2005.

¹⁰⁵Both, Abdel Wahid and Abdallah Abbakar, were united in their belief that a successful rebellion was crucially dependent upon the participation of the Darfurian Arabs (Flint 2007).

Soon after the Boodkay meeting, it became apparent that the leadership structure chosen did not solve the problems between the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa (Africa Confidential 2003; Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). Instead of creating a coherent organisational structure for the SLM/A, the creation of a Fur-led political wing and a Zaghawa-led military wing actually cemented the tribal divisions within the rebel movement.

Moreover, the chosen leaders of the SLM/A - Abdel Wahid and Abdallah Abbakar - further aggravated these divisions. Although Abdel Wahid was not a tribalist and sought to integrate representatives from other Darfurian groups,¹⁰⁶ his leadership style ultimately excluded others from the central decision-making processes of the SLM/A. He did not consult other leading figures in the rebel movement and made a number of erratic and unpredictable decisions. Abdallah Abbakar, meanwhile, quickly established a separate military leadership structure which was almost completely Zaghawa-dominated. This meant that by the time the War in Darfur began, the leadership of the SLM/A lacked cohesion.

7.2.2 Ideology

Initially, the SLM/A was founded as the Darfur Liberation Front. This name reflected their emphasis on the regional issues and problems of the Darfurian states (Collins 2008; Burr and Collins 2006; Flint and de Waal 2008). The rebels decried the fact that Darfur had constantly suffered from political and economic marginalisation and neglect at the hands of the central government since Sudanese independence in 1956 and complained about Khartoum's siding with Arab militias in Darfur, which resulted in widespread violence against Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa and other non-Arab groups in the 1980s and 1990s.

In their search for political and material support, however, the rebels' agenda underwent an evolution from exclusive demands for greater regional autonomy to a broader ideology of national liberation. One of the main reasons for this ideological evolution was the support given by John Garang and his SPLM/A (Flint 2007; International Crisis Group 2004*b*, 2005*b*; Tanner and Tubiana 2007; de Waal 2005). In addition to military equipment and the training of fighters, the southern rebels offered political advice to the nascent rebel movement. Garang argued in favour of more far-reaching political ambitions and, specifically, for the adoption of the SPLM/A's 'New Sudan' ideology.¹⁰⁷ The Darfurians followed these proposals, changed their name to Sudan

¹⁰⁶Amongst other things, Abdel Wahid brought Arabs into the SLM/A, gave key positions within the movement to representatives from a broad range of the Darfurian groups and never openly favoured his own group, the Fur (Flint 2007).

¹⁰⁷Of course, the SPLM/A's partisanship for the Darfurian rebels was due to ulterior motives (International

Liberation Movement/Army and drafted their ideological manifesto with the help of the senior SPLM/A officials in the southern Sudanese town of Rumbek in January 2003.¹⁰⁸

This manifesto, the *SLM/A Political Declaration* was made public on 14 March 2003. In it, the new rebel group called for an end to the marginalisation of the Darfurian people, but this demand was anchored in a broader national agenda - they saw the causes of the Darfurian grievances at a governmental level and sought a change in the government in Khartoum. They stated that:

“Although the SLM/A has originated from Darfur as a matter of necessity in response to the brutal genocidal policies of the (...) government in that region, we want to affirm and underline that the SLM/A is a national movement that aims along with other like-minded political groups to address and solve the fundamental problems of all of Sudan. The objective of SLM/A is to create a united democratic Sudan on a new basis of equality, complete restructuring and devolution of power, even development, cultural, and political pluralism and moral and material prosperity for all Sudanese.” (Hassan and Ray 2009, 375)

Following from this central tenet, the Darfurian rebels specified their political demands in the remainder of the *Political Declaration*. They argued in favour of a federal system of governance in which each of Sudan’s regions would be allowed to govern themselves autonomously, while enjoying adequate representation in central government. They also demanded a redistribution of national resources and increased investment in the neglected peripheral regions of the country. Finally, they called for a strict separation of religion and the state.

The *Political Declaration* also stated explicitly that the SLM/A is a movement intent on transcending the divide between African and Arabic groups in Darfur:

“The Arab tribes and groups are an integral and indivisible component of Darfur social fabric who have been equally marginalized and deprived of their rights to development and genuine political participation. (...) We call upon all fellow citizens of Darfur from Arab background to join the struggle against Khartoum and its divisive policies, the restoration of our traditional and time-honored peaceful coexistence and the eradication of marginalization.” (Hassan and Ray 2009, 376)

Crisis Group 2004b; Johnson 2003; Tanner and Tubiana 2007): a well-equipped and politically ambitious rebel movement in the Darfur region would exert additional pressure on the Sudanese government and would help the southern rebels in their negotiations with Khartoum.

¹⁰⁸It is worth mentioning, however, that the chairman of the SLM/A, Abdel Wahid, as well as the deputy chief of staff, Minni Minnawi, admired Garang and were already sympathetic towards him and his ideas of a ‘New Sudan’ (Tanner and Tubiana 2007). Given this, it was not overly difficult for Garang and the SPLM/A to influence the nascent Darfurian rebel movement.

With this call to unity, the SLM/A wanted to counteract Khartoum's divisive policies in Darfur. The chairman of the SLM/A, Abdel Wahid, and the chief of staff, Abdallah Abbakar realised that the new rebel movement could only be successful if it was supported by all Darfurian groups (Flint 2007).¹⁰⁹

The SLM/A's ideology played only a minor role in securing popular support, however (Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; International Crisis Group 2005*b*; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). Whilst many civilians agreed with the rebel's Darfurian grievances, the idea of armed resistance to address them was not well received. Given their past experience of Khartoum's dealings in Darfur, civilians were afraid of government retaliation against them. More importantly, the national agenda and the call for unity between African and Arab groups did not resonate among the population: there was only a very basic notion of a shared Darfurian identity and the loyalties of most Darfurians were almost exclusively directed to their ethnic group or tribe.

7.2.3 Population Base

The SLM/A's population base, which provided them with recruits and political and material support, encompassed several of the ethno-linguistic groups and tribes of Darfur (Burr and Collins 2006; Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). However, the main source of its popular support came almost exclusively from the three largest ethnic groups of the region Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups, all of whom were African and had settlements in Northern, Southern and Western Darfur.

Beyond the central support from these groups, the SLM/A also included field commanders and fighters of other non-Arab groups, including the Berti from north-eastern Darfur, Midob from Northern Darfur and Tunjur from central Darfur. Finally, the rebels relied on recruits and support from some Arab groups, including the Mima based around Al-Fasher in Northern Darfur and the Rizeigat from Southern Darfur, though these smaller Darfurian groups played only a secondary role in the movement.

The population base of the SLM/A was not excessively fractionalised along ethnical lines. Even more importantly, the rebel's mobilisation efforts relied heavily on local structures, which enabled them to tap easily into the social networks and resources of their constituent groups (Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; International Crisis Group 2005*b*; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). Fur

¹⁰⁹To justify this conviction, both referred - amongst other things - to the failed SPLM/A invasion of Darfur in 1991 (Flint 2007; Johnson 2003). In this invasion, the SPLM/A forces led by Fur and Masalit were repelled by the Sudanese army, who relied heavily on the political and military support of the Arab militias of Southern Darfur.

rebels, for example, relied exclusively on the *aga'id* (village commanders), who led Fur self-defence groups. The Masalit used the youth self-defence groups which they had established in the late 1980s for mobilisation purposes and the Zaghawa recruited their fighters and drew support from the armed camps they had established to defend themselves from Arab herders.

Unfortunately, however, the make-up and configuration of the SLM/A's population base was also characterised by two structural characteristics which bore the potential for substantial tensions between the SLM/A and the Darfurian population in the future. Firstly, rebel commanders drew recruits and support almost exclusively from their own groups and - in many cases - from a particular sub-branch of that group (Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; International Crisis Group 2005b; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). Over time, these single-ethnicity mobilisation drives resulted in combat forces composed entirely of either Fur, Masalit or Zaghawa fighters. Moreover, the rebels failed to establish sustainable links between their ethnic communities. While Fur could rely on Fur support and Zaghawa on Zaghawa support, for example, Fur were unable to draw support from Zaghawa communities and vice-versa. Ultimately, the SLM/A was therefore nothing more than a loose coalition of ethnic groups and tribes.

Secondly, the demographic composition of the SLM/A's population base meant future tensions were likely (Africa Confidential 2003; Flint and de Waal 2008; International Crisis Group 2004b; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). The large majority of the rebels were younger than 40, with many fighters still in their twenties. Senior rebel leaders including Abdel Wahid, Abdel Shafi and Minni Minnawi were only in their mid thirties. These young rebels stood in opposition to the elder tribal leaders who had cooperated with the Khartoum government in the past and were not in favour of armed rebellion. Moreover, many of the rebels had studied in Khartoum and other urban centres of Sudan and were therefore closer to the political ideas of the national parties than to the political convictions of the tribal authorities in Darfur.

7.3 Onset of SLM/A One-Sided Violence

In this section, I analyse the onset of a campaign of one-sided violence perpetrated by the SLM/A during the civil war in Darfur. In Chapter 3, I argued that the availability of non-violent means to secure popular support and the use of one-sided violence is shaped by the organisational characteristics of the rebel group. The quantitative analysis (Chapter 4) showed that the occurrence of leadership divisions within a rebel group makes non-violent strategies less available, and facilitates the use of violence against civilians. The underlying causal reasoning

states that the occurrence of leadership divisions has a negatively effect on the rebel group's military effectiveness which, in turn, decreases its probability of winning the conflict. This decreased probability of a military victory then changes civilians' cost-benefit calculus as the benefits of lending support to the rebels will not any longer outweigh its costs. As a result, civilians withdraw their support and the rebels resort to one-sided violence to enforce popular support.

The following qualitative analysis of the SLM/A intends to present further evidence for this causal reasoning. I focus in particular on the split between Abdel Wahid, chairman of the SLM/A, and Minni Minnawi, who became its military leader after Abdallah Abbakar was killed in January 2004. While many regard the Minnawi's signing of the DPA as the event which caused the SLM/A to splinter, I argue that the leadership of the SLM/A had already fragmented during 2004.

I begin this section with a description of the SLM/A's situation in 2003. Following this, I discuss the split in greater detail the split between Abdel Wahid and Minni Minnawi in 2004 and its consequences for the provision of popular support. The final subsection analyses whether there is any link between the leadership divisions of 2004 and the use of one-sided violence by the SLM/A in 2004 and 2005.

7.3.1 The Bifurcation of the Leadership Structure

2003 began in Darfur with a series of successful SLM/A attacks against government outposts (Africa Confidential 2003, 2004a; Collins 2008; Flint and de Waal 2008; Johnson 2003; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). In February, they attacked and seized the town of Golo in Western Darfur and the following month they captured the garrison town Tine, on the border with Chad. With the help of the JEM, the SLM/A then inflicted a humiliating defeat on government forces in late April, when they attacked the military air base of Al Fasher, the capital of Northern Darfur. They destroyed five Antonov planes, two helicopter gunships, killed around 100 government soldiers and kidnapped the head of the Sudanese Air Force, General Ibrahim Bushra. Following this operation, the SLM/A also attacked the towns of Mellit and Kutum in Northern Darfur and won a number of battles against government forces in Southern Darfur. The rebel group also militarily controlled large parts of Northern Darfur and the Jebel Marra massif.

These initial successes showed that the SLM/A was a capable military force (Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; International Crisis Group 2004a; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). While many

of the rebel's six or seven thousand fighters were untrained, they had a considerable number of former soldiers from the Sudanese and Chadian armed forces, as well as a small number of SPLM/A veterans in their ranks. Due to their raids on government arms caches, the rebels also possessed the military equipment required for their insurgency. More importantly, however, their military successes were a result of their use of highly mobile combat units and desert warfare tactics. Drawing on the experiences of Zaghawa veterans of the Chadian civil wars, the rebel's strike forces were built around so-called 'technical': pick-up trucks mounting a machine gun. With these, the rebels could quickly advance across Darfur's semi-desert and Savannah terrain and stage sneak attacks on government forces and outposts.

The early successes of the SLM/A rebellion showed the Darfurian population that military resistance to Khartoum was not in vain and the string of SLM/A victories in early 2003 established the SLM/A as an effective military organisation (Flint and de Waal 2008; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). As a consequence, it experienced an increase in popular support, which was manifested in the form of food, shelter, information and new recruits. In terms of the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3, it appeared that many Darfurian civilians saw an increased probability of victory in the conflict, and this increased the benefits they expected to receive from the rebellion, tilting their cost-benefit calculus towards providing support for the SLM/A.

The Government Counteroffensive

The Sudanese army was caught by surprise by the SLM/A attacks as their conventional forces were unfamiliar with the tactics of desert warfare employed by the rebels (Collins 2008; Flint and de Waal 2008). The ineptitude of the national army was aggravated by its underfunding, disorganisation and the fact that many of its rank-and-file members were Darfurians and were hesitant to retaliate. Against this background, Khartoum devised a two-pronged strategy to contain the insurgency in Darfur.

First, the government unleashed local militias as a support force in their counterinsurgency campaign (Flint 2009, 2010; Flint and de Waal 2008; Haggar 2007; International Crisis Group 2004b,a).¹¹⁰ Specifically, Khartoum made use of the tensions between the Arab and African communities of Darfur, providing arms and equipment to the Rizeigat Abbala, Arabic nomads from Northern and Western Darfur. Still suffering from the consequences of the droughts of

¹¹⁰A similar strategy had already been employed in the civil war with the SPLM/A in the 1980s and 1990s (Collins 2008; Johnson 2003), when the Khartoum government formed the *murahiliin* militias from the Southern Darfurian Baggara Arabs. Together with army units, the *murahiliin* engaged the Dinka in the Bahr al-Ghazal states and Southern Kordofan.

the 1980s, these landless tribes were more than willing to prey on the landholding Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa populations. Funded by the government, a number of armed groups consequently sprang up in Northern, Western and Southern Darfur. Over the course of the conflict, these groups were also joined by Chadian Baggara migrants. Although these groups differed substantially from each other and also operated autonomously, collectively they became known as the *janjawiid*.

Together with regular units of the Sudanese army, these *janjawiid* militias began a ruthless counter-insurgency campaign in the second half of 2003 (Flint 2009; Flint and de Waal 2008; International Crisis Group 2004b,a; Prunier 2007; Tanner 2005; UCPD 2011). For the most part they did not directly attack SLM/A or JEM forces but rather targeted the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa populations, who were perceived to be supporting the rebels. The attacks followed a similar pattern: villages were bombed by government planes or helicopter gunships, then the *janjawiid* entered the villages where they killed the men, raped the women, looted, and burnt all buildings to the ground.

The government's counter-insurgency campaign followed a 'scorched earth' strategy, that collectively punished the African Darfurians for (real or alleged) support for the rebel groups (Human Rights Watch 2004a,b,c; International Crisis Group 2004b,a; Tanner 2005; Tanner and Tubiana 2007; UCPD 2011). By the end of 2003, this counter-insurgency campaign had resulted in several thousand civilian fatalities, more than 100 destroyed villages, 700,000 internally displaced persons and 100,000 refugees in neighbouring Chad, with the Fur the population group most affected. Yet despite resorting to such enormous levels of civilian victimisation, Khartoum did not manage to substantially decrease the SLM/A's levels of popular support.

The second element of Khartoum's strategy to defeat the rebels was a military counteroffensive, which started in December 2003 (Collins 2008; Flint and de Waal 2008; Prunier 2007). This counteroffensive focused on Northern Darfur, where the SLM/A forces were strongest, and where the rebels held a large proportion of the territory. Government forces opened a front from Kulbus to Tine in order to cut the rebels' supply lines to the Chadian Zaghawas. In addition, they engaged the rebels on a fronts ranging from Kutum to Umm Baru and Karnoi to Kebkabiya, operations designed to end the civil war in Darfur for good.

By early 2004, the counteroffensive had produced major results (Flint and de Waal 2008; Human Rights Watch 2005b). The rebels suffered heavy losses in terms of fighters and equipment and had been forced to retreat from each front. Much of the territorial control of Northern Darfur by the SLM/A was gone. More importantly, however, the Sudanese army managed to kill a number

of the rebel groups' military leaders. In January 2004, the SLM/A's chief of staff - the Zaghawa Abdallah Abbakar - was killed in a gunship attack. Shortly afterwards, government forces also killed the Masalit rebel commander Adam Bazooka.

To survive this enormous government onslaught, SLM/A units decided to flee from Northern Darfur (Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). They fled to Libya, the Midob Hills (in the north-east corner of Northern Darfur), the Jebel Marra massif (in the Fur settlement area) and the areas around Nyala (the capital of Southern Darfur).

The Rise of Minni Minnawi

While the government counteroffensive dealt a serious blow to the SLM/A, it did not end the insurgency (Africa Confidential 2004a; Flint and de Waal 2008; Prunier 2007; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). Following their dispersion in early 2004, the rebels quickly established new bases in the Jebel Marra massif and Southern Darfur and could still rely on a steady flow of new recruits for their depleted forces. However, the killing of Abdallah Abbakar in January 2004 had serious consequences for the SLM/A's leadership structure as his successor, the Zaghawa Minni Arkou Minnawi, almost instantly tried to assume full power over the whole movement.

Minnawi was born in the Northern Darfurian village of Furawiya in 1972 as a member of the Ila Digen clan of the Zaghawa (Flint 2007; Tanner and Tubiana 2007).¹¹¹ He only had modest education and no military experience. After a few years spent working in Chad and Nigeria, he returned to Darfur in April 2001 and joined the nascent rebel movement. According to observers, his rise to up the SLM/A's hierarchy was initially due to coincidence: he was one of the few rebel fighters who could read and write and so became the personal secretary of Abdallah Abbakar. In this role he became increasingly assertive and designated himself the 'secretary-general' of the SLM/A. While fellow rebel commanders had little respect for him, he managed to create a support base among the rank-and-file fighters, something which helped him to establish himself as Abbakar's deputy and, ultimately, to succeed him as chief of staff.

This swift rise of Minni Minnawi and his low standing among fellow rebel commanders is succinctly summarised by the following statement of SLM/A leader made in September 2006:

“If Abdallah Abbakar were still alive, Minni would never have gotten to where he is. Minni was only the secretary of Abdallah Abbakar. In the first meetings, he was the only one who knew how to read and write. We had him take notes. We called

¹¹¹Once a powerful Zaghawa clan (Flint 2007), the Ila Digen are now poor, live in dry areas of Northern Darfur and are generally looked upon by other Zaghawa.

him ‘secretary’. (...) Minni became Abdallah Abbakar’s assistant. The fighters always saw them together: they thought he was the number two. They mistrusted the elders, the people with experience. They thought the intellectuals would betray them. Minni convinced Abdallah Abbakar and the fighters that the intellectuals would take their place. When Abdallah Abbakar was killed, the fighters trusted no one other than Minni. He grabbed all the power” (Tanner and Tubiana 2007, 24f)

Once in power, Minnawi consolidated his position in the SLM/A (Flint 2007). He began to fill important political and military posts of the rebel movement with members of the Ila Digen clan and either sidelined or killed challengers to his rule. As a result, he quickly assumed full control over the Zaghawa units of the SLM/A. His actions also served to accelerate the development of separate command structures within the rebel group: although Abbakar had already begun to rely on command structures beyond the influence of the SLM/A chairman Abdel Wahid, it was Minnawi’s exclusive patronage of his Zaghawa Ila Digen clan that further promoted the bifurcation of the rebel movement.

An event in February 2004 clearly illustrates this division of the rebel command structure (Flint and de Waal 2008; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). In the course of a government offensive in the south-western parts of the Jebel Marra massif, thousands of government troops and *janjawid* militiamen had surrounded the SLM/A chairman Abdel Wahid and a small number of fighters, who he commanded. Facing certain defeat, Wahid asked Minni Minnawi to send reinforcements to his position. The rebel chief of staff, however, did not even respond to the calls from his chairman. Abdel Wahid himself then directly ordered nearby Zaghawa units to help him, but they declined as the local rebel commanders did not acknowledge the authority of Abdel Wahid - they recommended he ask Minnawi for help. Ultimately, Abdel Wahid turned to the SPLM/A, which was able to airlift him out of the combat zone.

The Peace Talks in N’djamena

Following the establishment of a separate military command structure, Minni Minnawi attempted to minimise Abdel Wahid’s political influence. The peace talks in the Chadian capital N’djamena between the SLM/A, JEM and Khartoum offered the Zaghawa rebel leader an opportunity to achieve this objective (International Crisis Group 2004c, 2005b; Johnston 2007; Toga 2007; de Waal 2006). The talks began in March 2004 and were mediated by the Chadian government under President Idriss Déby. A number of international observers from the AU,

European Union, United Nations and the United States were also present.

During the N'djamena talks, Minni Minnawi and his allies actively sought to sideline the SLM/A chairman Abdel Wahid ([International Crisis Group 2004c, 2005b](#); [Johnston 2007](#)). It seems that their thinking was that if they could exclude Abdel Wahid from the negotiations on the resolution of the Darfur conflict, his political standing in Darfur and among the exiled Darfurians would be diminished, meaning that both the SLM/A and the Darfurian population would rally behind Minni Minnawi as the remaining strongman of the rebel movement.

In implementing this plan, the Zaghawa conspirators benefited from the actions of Sharif Harir - the coordinator of the SLM/A delegation in N'djamena ([International Crisis Group 2004c](#); [Tanner and Tubiana 2007](#)). He was a Zaghawa academic and was deputy leader of the Darfurian diaspora organisation Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) (he was also distantly related to Minnawi).¹¹² Over the course of the talks, Harir effectively excluded Abdel Wahid from the negotiation process and managed to shape the SLM/A negotiating agenda in favour of the Zaghawa. Minnawi's scheme further benefited from the fact that the Chadian authorities had denied visas for many exiled Fur and Masalit leaders. As a result, a large proportion of the SLM/A's delegation were made up of Zaghawa rebels and politicians.

While events within the SLM/A's delegation undoubtedly weakened the position of Abdel Wahid in N'djamena, the Zaghawa faction of the SLM/A was unable to push him aside and replace him with Minni Minnawi as the new, undisputed leader of the rebel movement ([International Crisis Group 2004c, 2005b](#); [Tanner and Tubiana 2007](#)). This was mainly due to the meagre outcomes of the peace process, which was insufficient for Minnawi to claim he had brokered a successful peace agreement. The rebel delegation allowed Chadian mediators to trick them into signing an unfavourable ceasefire agreement by using differently worded Arabic and English documents and - more importantly - the ceasefire (which was signed on 8 April 2004) soon proved ineffective. Though fighting between Khartoum and the rebels decreased, it did not cease entirely, and *janjawiid* attacks on Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa communities continued unabated.

Additionally, Abdel Wahid (along with the exiled leaders of the JEM, who also participated in the negotiations) quickly rejected the results of the subsequent political talks between the warring factions ([International Crisis Group 2004c](#)). These talks included an agreement (signed on 25 April 2004) setting up an agenda for a conference aimed at establishing a final peace in Darfur. Wahid and the JEM claimed that the mandate given to delegates in N'djamena did not

¹¹²In the 1990s, Sharif Harir, a social anthropologist, published on the history and conflicts of Sudan (see: [Harir 1994b,a](#); [Harir and Tvedt 1994](#)). I have referred to some of these publications in this chapter and the previous chapter.

give them power to make such decisions. Observers blamed the negotiation of Sharif Harir and the Chadian mediators - who favoured Khartoum - for this transgression of the mandate.

7.3.2 Enforcing Popular Support

So far I have described how the developments in the civil war in Darfur created severe tensions between the chairman of the SLM/A, Abdel Wahid, and its new chief of staff, Minni Minnawi. Here, I explore how these leadership divisions are causally linked to the onset of SLM/A one-sided violence in Darfur in 2004. I look particularly at evidence that is relevant to assess the causal reasoning linking these divisions to a decreased probability of SLM/A victory, the subsequent loss of popular support and, ultimately, the SLM/A's use of one-sided violence in order to enforce support.

By the summer of 2004, it was obvious that the split between Abdel Wahid and staff Minni Minnawi was beyond repair (Collins 2008; Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Prunier 2007; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). Following the death of the former chief of staff, Minnawi had systematically worked towards establishing his own military command structures. To this end, he had put members of his Zaghawa clan, the Ila Digen, in central leadership positions, resulting in a Zaghawa-dominated rebel wing who did not accept the authority of the Fur chairman Abdel Wahid, and a Fur-led rebel wing who opposed this Zaghawa domination. Moreover, the course of events since Minnawi took over as chief of staff had also shown that there was little common political ground between the two rebel leaders: Abdel Wahid continued to stick to the original SLM/A ideology of a democratic and federal Sudan and called for an united Darfurian rebel movement comprising African and Arab groups, whilst Minni Minnawi appeared to have no political programme beyond furthering the influence of the Zaghawa, and in particular his Ila Digen clan.

This split of the SLM/A had severe consequences for its military effectiveness (Flint 2007; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). First of all, the bifurcation of the rebel military structures further weakened the (already rudimentary) lines of command within the group. As a result, local commanders became more autonomous and conducted uncoordinated attacks on government forces and the *janjawiid* militias. The virtual separation of the Zaghawa combat forces from the remaining SLM/A troops also diminished the overall military capabilities of the rebels and meant the rebels found themselves increasingly unable to protect their civilian support base from *janjawiid* raids.

Contrary to the theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter 3, however, the SLM/A's reduced military effectiveness and the resulting decreased probability of a rebel victory did not negatively affect their levels of popular support (Flint and de Waal 2008; Tanner and Tubiana 2007): support from the Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa and other Darfurian groups remained basically unchanged. However, the leadership divisions resulted in a division of popular support along ethnic lines: the Fur and Masalit lent their support to the faction under Abdel Wahid, whilst the Zaghawa supported Minni Minnawi.

Following the government counteroffensive in early 2004, Minnawi's forces were expelled from their Zaghawa homeland and found refuge in the areas of other Darfurian groups in Southern and Western Darfur (Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). There, Minnawi's Zaghawa fighters joined their civilian brethren who had migrated to these areas in the 1980s. In these refuges, however, the Zaghawa population only formed a small minority group and so was unable to sustain the Minnawi faction. Moreover, the other Darfurian groups only grudgingly received the Zaghawa fighters. Minnawi's struggle with the Fur Abdel Wahid and his favouritism towards his fellow Zaghawa stoked fears of Zaghawa domination of Darfur.

It is possible, however, to propose an alternative theoretical link between the occurrence of leadership divisions and the onset of rebel one-sided violence. Given the tensions between Abdel Wahid and Minnawi and the widespread antipathy towards the Zaghawa, the Minnawi faction seemed to find it increasingly difficult to use the social networks of the non-Zaghawa groups to secure popular support. As a consequence, Minnawi could not change the cost-benefit calculations of these civilians to his favour, resulting in the absence of popular support for his rebel faction. He then resorted to one-sided violence to enforce support.

Minnawi decided to end the power struggle with Wahid in the summer of 2004 (Flint and de Waal 2008; International Crisis Group 2005b; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). He ordered one of his closest allies, Yahya Hassan al Nil, to invade Jebel Marra - the heartland of Wahid and his Fur. Though Wahid resided permanently in Eritrea at this point, the plan was to kill Wahid's chief of staff, Abdel Gadir Abdel Rahman Gadura, and loyal commanders and then announce Minnawi as the new chairman of the rebel movement. Following this, Minnawi could consolidate his position as the central Darfurian rebel leader.

In late June, several hundred Zaghawa fighters moved towards eastern Jebel Marra (Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Human Rights Watch 2004c; International Crisis Group 2005b; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). Upon arrival, they joined forces with those Zaghawa fighters who had been given safe haven by the Fur following the government counteroffensive in Northern Darfur. The

joint forces then attacked the Fur rebel fighters and their camps in Jebel Marra. According to observers, the fighting lasted for several weeks. In the end, the Zaghawa were beaten by the Fur faction of the SLM/A and were driven out of Jebel Marra.¹¹³ During this operation, however, the Zaghawa fighters attacked Fur civilians on several occasions.

One-sided violence by SLM/A forces continued to occur throughout the remainder of 2004 and continued into 2005 (Human Rights Watch 2004c; International Crisis Group 2005a; United States Department of State 2006; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). There were attacks on the villages of Malam and Tawila to the east of the Jebel Marra massif in October and November 2004, for example. In this case, however, it is unknown whether the perpetrators belonged to the Minnawi faction, or whether they were followers of Wahid. Another example is the use of violence against civilians in the Gereida area of Southern Darfur. Reports indicate that in this instance it was forces loyal to Minnawi who conducted the one-sided violence. Finally, there are reports that SLM/A fighters frequently attacked Arab nomads in Southern Darfur, but once again the exact identity of the perpetrators is unknown.

Given the sparse information on these acts of one-sided violence, it is difficult to ascertain the underlying purpose of this violence with absolute certainty. The evidence available, however, suggests that many instances of one-sided violence were committed by fighters loyal to Minnawi, and were designed to enforce popular support for his faction (Flint and de Waal 2008; Human Rights Watch 2004c; International Crisis Group 2005a; United States Department of State 2006; Tanner and Tubiana 2007).

Regarding the events in Jebel Marra, for example, it appears that Zaghawa fighters attacked the civilian population in order to assert the overall authority of Minnawi. They imposed taxes on Fur civilians and responded with violence when they met any resistance. A similar observation can be made with regard to the attacks on the villages of Malam and Tawila to the east of the Jebel Marra massif in October and November 2004. Here, available reports indicate that the attacks were to extract resources from the civilian population. Likewise, the Minnawi faction used violence in Gereida to forcefully recruit local Masalit youth. Finally, the attacks on Arab nomads in Darfur appeared to have been designed to enforce support for the SLM/A. After the rebels had gained control over the regional grazing routes for cattle, they only provided access to groups who agreed to join the rebels.

This suggests that there is a causal pathway linking the leadership divisions within the SLM/A

¹¹³An *International Crisis Group* report (2005b) also states that Eritrea, one of the sponsors of the rebel SLM/A, put considerable pressure on Minnawi to stop his invasion of the Jebel Marra massif.

to the onset of rebel one-sided violence in the summer of 2004. In contrast to the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3, however, this causal pathway links leadership divisions to the ethnic identity of civilians. After the split between Abdel Wahid and Minni Minnawi, the latter was unable to tap into the networks of non-Zaghawa groups, which meant he suffered from a lack of popular support and resorted to violence in an attempt to enforce it.

7.4 Level of SLM/A One-Sided Violence

In this section, I analyse the level of SLM/A one-sided violence during the Darfur conflict. Given the assumption that one-sided violence functions as a way to enforce popular support, the level of one-sided violence can be understood as capturing the way in which rebels use violent means to enforce popular support.

Previously, I have argued that the level of one-sided violence is also determined by the organisation of a rebel group. Even when a group is already using one-sided violence, they may retain the organisational capacity to secure some support non-violently. In such instances, they do not have to use large-scale violence to enforce popular support. However, if the organisation of the rebel group precludes the use of non-violent alternatives, the rebels kill higher numbers of civilians. My quantitative analysis has found that it is a rebel group's ideology and the nature of its population base which affect the number of civilians killed (see Chapter 4). Ethno-nationalist rebels are less likely to resort to large-scale violence, while rebel groups with a high degree of linguistic fractionalisation are likely to kill more civilians.

The theoretical model presented in Chapter 3 states that ethno-nationalism often offers a credible narrative to the targeted civilian population which strongly emphasises the benefits of rebellion whilst downplaying the costs of supporting the rebellion. Following this, civilians lend support to the rebel group and this reduces the necessity for the rebel group to resort to large-scale violence should they engage in one-sided violence. The theory also hypothesises that a fractionalised population base is characterised by a number of internal ethnic boundaries which make it difficult for the rebels to easily tap into the social networks of their supporters. As a consequence, the rebel group in question is unable to decrease civilians' costs in supporting the rebellion. During a campaign of one-sided violence, this results in higher levels of violence against civilians.

The following qualitative analysis aims to present further relevant evidence for assessing these hypothesised causal pathways. The analysis focuses exclusively on the years 2003-2005. I begin by describing the SLM/A's ideology against the background of these three years of civil war in

Darfur. I then turn to the population base and present additional information on its characteristics during the opening stages of the conflict. Finally, I examine in greater detail the impact of these two factors on the level of SLM/A violence against civilians.

7.4.1 An Emerging African Identity

In March 2003, the SLM/A published its founding manifesto, the *Political Declaration* (Hassan and Ray 2009). In it, they stated the political, economic and social grievances of the Darfurian population and presented themselves as a political movement designed to address these grievances. Given the widespread feelings of marginalisation and neglect among the Darfurians, these ideological claims bore the potential for substantial popular support.

After the fighting in Darfur began, however, the rebel movement failed to develop its ideological foundations further (Flint 2007; International Crisis Group 2004a, 2005a). Although the ongoing negotiations with Khartoum saw the rebels make some of their specific political positions clear, they did not engage in a coherent promotion of their ideological beliefs. Moreover, there was no further debate within the rebel group over the long-term objectives of their struggle. Most importantly, the rebels did not engage in the ideological education of their civilian support base. Taken together, these factors meant that the SLM/A failed to effectively use ideology as a technique for securing popular support.

However, it quickly became apparent that this omission had no major impact on popular support (Tanner 2005; Tanner and Tubiana 2007; de Waal 2005). Even without further elaboration on their ideological claim to act on behalf of the Darfurian people, the rebels were seen as true representatives of the African Darfurians, and they gained the support of these African groups for the SLM/A. The reasons for this development can be found in the large-scale one-sided violence employed by government forces and their proxies against the Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa and a number of other African groups in Darfur.

Until 2005, thousands of civilians had been killed or raped and several hundred thousand more were displaced (Human Rights Watch 2004a,b,c, 2005a,b; Political Instability Task Force 2009; UCPD 2011). The main perpetrators of this one-sided violence were the *janjawiid* militias, drawn from the Abbala Arabs of Northern and Western Darfur. In their raids, they resorted to massacres, torture and sexual violence to clear whole areas of their native Fur, Masalit or Zaghawa inhabitants. These attacks were often followed by the settlement of the areas by the *janjawiid* themselves (this was particularly the case in Southern and Western Darfur). The

nature of these Janjawiid attacks convinced African Darfurians that they were not aimed only at supporters of the rebel groups (whether real or alleged), but at the African Darfurians as a whole.

This perception was reinforced by the fact that Khartoum not only tolerated these *janjawiid* attacks, but actively supported and participated in them (Flint 2009; Haggar 2007; International Crisis Group 2004a, 2005b; Tanner 2005). The government delivered weapons, uniforms and equipment to the militias and erected joint military camps of regular army units and *janjawiid* units. Moreover, attacks were often preceded by government air strikes and were closely coordinated with other military operations in the respective region.

More importantly, however, it appeared that the *janjawiid* acted as enforcers of Khartoum's ideology of Arab supremacy (Flint and de Waal 2008; Sharkey 2008; de Waal 2005). The displacement of African Darfurians and the subsequent resettlement of Abbala tribes in the attacked areas seemed to be a deliberate attempt to 'Arabise' Darfur. Many African villagers reported that the *janjawiid* fighters referred to their targets during the raids as *zurug* - a Sudanese Arabic derogatory term for 'blacks', i.e. Africans.¹¹⁴

In response to this violence, the Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa and other African groups of Darfur formed a common identity as victims of the Arabs of Sudan (Sharkey 2008; Tanner 2005; Tanner and Tubiana 2007; de Waal 2005). They began to see armed resistance to the Khartoum government as the only available solution to their present situation. After 2003, the one-sided violence employed by government forces and *janjawiid* militias was at such high levels that it appeared to be an attempt to eradicate Darfur's Africans altogether. This meant that civilians lending support to the Darfurian rebels felt they could not be punished with more extreme government violence, and the SLM/A began to receive growing support for their insurgency.

This process of identity formation and the consequential increase in popular support for the SLM/A was reinforced by the discourse within the international community (Hamilton and Hazlett 2007; Murphy 2007; Sharkey 2008; de Waal 2005). In the United States and other Western countries, for example, the civil war in Darfur was soon almost exclusively discussed in terms of a genocide instigated by Arab supremacists against defenceless African communities. In the Arab world, meanwhile, a narrative emerged that saw the increasing activism of Western states and societies as yet a further instance of their anti-Arab sentiments.

¹¹⁴In this context, it is worth noting that there are no major differences in the skin colour of the African and Arab populations of Darfur (de Waal 2005).

7.4.2 The Population Base During Wartime

At the beginning of the civil war in Darfur, the SLM/A was able to easily tap into the pre-existing social networks of its constituent groups in order to secure popular support (Burr and Collins 2006; Flint and de Waal 2008; Prunier 2007). Its main sources of support were the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa populations in Darfur, though it also received recruits and support from other groups and tribes based in the region.

However, the population base of the SLM/A was characterised by two features which were potentially damaging to future levels of popular support (Flint 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). Firstly, the tribal divisions between a number of Darfurian groups was potentially dangerous to the overall cohesion of the rebel group. These divisions were especially problematic as the rebels failed to develop sustainable relations between their core groups. Second, there was a divide between the traditional tribal authorities of each group and their younger generations. While the former were committed to cooperating with the Khartoum government, the latter were in favour of armed rebellion.

In the first few years of the civil war in Darfur these structural features of the SLM/A's population base did not have a noteworthy negative impact on the level of popular support. To explain this, it is necessary to discuss both aspects against the overall background of the conflict.

When considering the tribal divisions in rebel constituencies, it is important to remember that the government counteroffensive of early 2004 had scattered the SLM/A troops across the Darfurian states (International Crisis Group 2004c, 2005b; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). Following this counteroffensive, most SLM/A units fought in their respective home regions. This led to increased contact between the rebels and the civilian population. In addition to this, SLM/A rebels stepped up their propaganda efforts and spread the message that they were fighting in the interests of Darfurians. Finally, the military pressures on the rebel forces prevented large-scale military operations, which would have required a higher degree of cooperation between rebels and civilians of a different ethnic background. Whilst these factors were not beneficial to the overall struggle of the SLM/A, they prevented the tribal divisions between the ethno-linguistic groups and tribes of Darfur from destroying levels of popular support for the rebels.

The generational divide within many of the ethno-linguistic groups and tribes of Darfur was also defused during the course of the war (Flint and de Waal 2008; Kahn 2008; Tanner and Tubiana 2007). While relations between young rebel leaders and their rank-and-file on one side and the older traditional authorities on the other deteriorated throughout the conflict, this did

not negatively affect the SLM/A's levels of popular support for the SLM/A. The main reason for this can be found in the dwindling influence of the traditional tribal authorities. Due to the large-scale one-sided violence by government forces and *janjawiid* militias, substantial parts of the Darfurian population were forced to live in internally displaced person camps throughout the region. In these camps, the authority of traditional leaders waned and so-called 'camp sheikhs' gained power. These new civilian authorities often allowed the Darfurian rebels to extract resources from the camp inhabitants.

7.4.3 One-Sided Violence, 2004-2005

Having detailed the SLM/A's ideology and the nature of its population base during the first few years of the Darfur conflict, I now analyse the relationship between these organisational factors and the level of one-sided violence employed by the SLM/A. This analysis is based on the theoretical assumption that a rebel group's ideology and population base determines whether the rebels can rely on - at least to an extent - non-violent strategies to secure support or if they have only violent strategies at their disposal.

The previous discussion of the SLM/A's ideology and its population base leads me to expect a low level of one-sided violence in Darfur ([International Crisis Group 2004c, 2005b](#); [Sharkey 2008](#); [Tanner 2005](#); [Tanner and Tubiana 2007](#); [de Waal 2005](#)). Although the rebels did not further develop their ideological agenda, the large-scale use of one-sided violence by government forces and *janjawiid* militias made the SLM/A appear to be one of the only political forces willing to fight for Darfurians and - regardless of the rebels' internal divisions - the civilian population perceived them as credible advocates addressing their grievances and continued to support them. The SLM/A also benefited from the fact that by 2004 their units were almost exclusively active in their home regions. This resulted in higher levels of contact between the rebels and their support bases - this increased their ability to tap into the social networks of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa communities.

An analysis of the overall level of SLM/A one-sided violence in Darfur in 2004 and 2005 lends support to these conclusions ([Flint and de Waal 2008](#); [Human Rights Watch 2004b,c](#); [International Crisis Group 2005a](#); [Political Instability Task Force 2009](#); [United States Department of State 2005, 2006](#); [UCPD 2011](#)). They resorted to violent attacks against the civilian population only infrequently, and when they did these attacks resulted in small numbers of fatalities. In 2004, for example, the main incidences of one-sided violence were the Zaghawa attacks on the Fur population in Jebel Marra in June and a number of attacks on villages to the east of this

massif in October and November. The Jebel Marra attacks resulted in 22 civilian fatalities and the attacks later that year resulted in 17 civilian fatalities. In the following year, the *UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset* reports 63 civilian fatalities from SLM/A attacks. These attacks took place primarily in Southern Darfur and targeted Arab nomads.

Looking in greater detail at reports of SLM/A one-sided violence in 2004 and 2005, however, I cannot find any definite evidence supporting a clear-cut relationship between ideology and the level of violence against civilians. The only indication supporting this relationship is that the rebels primarily targeted Arab nomads in 2005 ([International Crisis Group 2005a](#); [Political Instability Task Force 2009](#); [UCPD 2011](#)). As the government counter-insurgency campaign primarily targeted the African communities of Darfur, the SLM/A especially received support from the Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa and other African Darfurian groups. Although the SLM/A also included fighters and commanders from Arab tribes, they received less popular support from them. Apparently, the rebels therefore almost exclusively targeted Arab communities in Southern Darfur to enforce popular support.

When considering the relationship between the nature of the SLM/A's population base and levels of one-sided violence, it is important to keep in mind that most SLM/A units were active only in their respective home regions, and that the rebels only resorted to violence against civilians when they were operating outside their home regions ([Flint 2007](#); [Flint and de Waal 2008](#); [Human Rights Watch 2004c](#); [International Crisis Group 2004c, 2005b](#); [Tanner and Tubiana 2007](#)). The overall level of one-sided violence was consequently rather low. The invasion of Jebel Marra by fighters loyal to Minni Minnawi is an instructive example which supports this reasoning. The Jebel Marra massif is the home region of the Fur and popular support for Abdel Wahid was strong in this area. The Minnawi faction, however, primarily consisted of Zaghawa fighters who did not have roots in the region and so had no links to the local population. When the Minnawi faction invaded eastern Jebel Marra, they therefore resorted to one-sided violence in order to enforce support.

Taken together, the dearth of useful data on rebel one-sided violence in Darfur makes it difficult to find clear-cut evidence supporting the hypothesised relationship between rebels' ideology and population base on the one side and the level of rebel violence against civilians on the other. However, the information available provides tentative evidence suggesting that the relatively low level of rebel one-sided violence in 2004 and 2005 was affected by the popular perception of the SLM/A rebels as advocates of African Darfurians, and the strong links of rebel commanders to their respective home regions.

7.5 Summary

In this chapter, I qualitatively analysed the relationship between the organisation of the SLM/A and the onset and level of rebel one-sided violence in Darfur. I focused this analysis on the occurrence of leadership divisions within the SLM/A and the rebels' ideology and population base in order to find evidence lending further support to the interpretations of the quantitative analysis.

I found that there is a causal relationship linking increased tensions between the chairman of the rebel movement, Abdel Wahid, and his chief of staff, Minni Minnawi, to the onset of one-sided violence by the SLM/A. In contrast to the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3, however, the rebel's recourse to violence against civilians was not caused by a loss of popular support resulting from decreased military effectiveness. Rather, the tensions between Abdel Wahid and Minnawi created an ethnic split within the movement that meant the latter did not receive support from ethnic groups supporting the former. This led to a campaign of one-sided violence by Minni Minnawi's faction as it sought to enforce popular support.

The analysis of the level of SLM/A one-sided violence focused on the years 2004 and 2005. Due to the large-scale violence against civilians by government forces and *janjawiid* militias, the rebels could still rely on their ideology to secure popular support non-violently. Moreover, the rebels primarily operated in small units based in their home regions. While this minimised their military effectiveness, the SLM/A could largely rely on the continuing support of their constituency. As a consequence, the overall level of one-sided violence was low.

Similarly to the previous chapter, these findings address the limitations of the quantitative analysis in terms of lacking internal and construct validity (see Chapter 5). The analysis of the onset of SLM/A violence against civilians in 2003-2004 provides evidence of a temporal and causal sequence linking leadership divisions to one-sided violence. To a lesser extent, I also find evidence causally linking rebel ideology and the level of fractionalisation within a rebel group's population base to the level of one-sided violence.

The analysis of the SLM/A presented in this chapter also illustrates the problem of lacking construct validity. Although the qualitative study of the SLM/A is able to provide additional evidence on the relationship between rebel organisation and one-sided violence, it is also apparent that the dearth of reliable data on this conflict prevents definite conclusions. Despite this, however, some conclusions are possible. As in the case of the SPLM/A, it appears that rebel ideology has to be analysed in relation to the ideological standpoints of the civilian population

and other political actors. Regarding the SLM/A's population base, I also find that the nature of the relations between rebel commanders and their local constituencies is an important determinant of the level of rebel one-sided violence.

Conclusion

This thesis has analysed how the organisation of rebel groups shapes the onset and level of rebel violence against civilians. It has done so with a particular focus on the violent behaviour of rebel groups in sub-Saharan African civil wars. In this final chapter, I review and discuss its findings and place them within a wider context. The chapter is divided into two sections: the first summarises and assesses this thesis' quantitative and qualitative analyses of the relationship between rebel organisation and one-sided violence; the second turns to the implications of this study for policy-makers and the international community, and discusses its implications for future research into violence against civilians and the study of armed conflict in general.

8.1 Empirical Findings of the Study

The empirical analysis of the relationship between rebel organisation and rebel one-sided violence in sub-Saharan African civil war is guided by collective action theory (see Chapter 3). I argue that rebel groups depend on support from the civilian population in order to begin - and maintain - an armed struggle against the government of a state (DeNardo 1985; Lichbach 1995; Moore 1995; Olson 1971; Popkin 1979; Silver 1974; Tullock 1971). Civilians, however, often fail to provide such support as they perceive there to be considerable costs attached to doing so. In response, rebel groups resort to a set of strategies designed to change civilians' cost-benefit calculations in favour of supporting the rebellion.

Rebels' preferred way to achieve this is through non-violent strategies, which are designed to increase the benefits or decrease the costs to civilians who support their rebellion (Kalyvas 2006; Lichbach 1995; Mason 1996, 2004; Moore 1995). Whether such non-violent strategies

are available, however, depends on the organisational configuration of the rebel group. If this prevents them from using non-violent strategies, they may resort to violence against civilians as an attempt to increase the costs of not supporting their campaign.

When rebel groups do resort to one-sided violence to enforce popular support, their organisation also shapes the level of this violence. Organisational factors might allow them to complement the use of one-sided violence with non-violent strategies and, in such instances, they use only relatively low levels of violence. When organisational factors rule out the use of non-violent strategies, however, the level of violence against civilians is considerably higher.

Based on this theoretical model, I developed a set of hypotheses linking the organisational characteristics of sub-Saharan African rebel groups to rebel one-sided violence in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3. In particular, I explored how the ideology of rebel groups, the occurrence of divisions within rebel groups' leaderships, the level of fractionalisation amongst rebel groups' population bases, the existence of external support for rebel groups and the number of competing rebel factions are connected to the onset and level of one-sided violence.

8.1.1 Quantitative Analysis

The quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter 4 tested these hypotheses across a large number of cases in order to identify the organisational factors which shape the use of rebel violence against civilians in sub-Saharan Africa. The key finding is that these factors are indeed important in the explanation of one-sided violence, although not all my hypotheses were supported by evidence.

The occurrence of leadership divisions within a rebel group is the only organisational factor found to affect the probability of a rebel group resorting to violence against civilians; other organisational characteristics proved statistically not significant in determining the onset of one-sided violence (see Section 4.2 in Chapter 4). However, the impact of leadership division is large, and of roughly equal importance to war-related factors such as the duration of the civil war, its intensity and whether the government uses violence against civilians. The implication of this finding for future research is that the almost exclusive focus in the extant research until now on conflict dynamics as determinants of one-sided violence is too narrow, and in need of being broadened.

The occurrence of leadership divisions, however, does not affect the level of rebel one-sided violence. In this regard, I found two statistically significant variables (see Section 4.3 in Chapter 4). First, rebel groups who adopt ethno-nationalist ideology kill fewer civilian during campaigns

of one-sided violence than rebel groups embracing revolutionary or religious ideologies. Second, rebel groups who draw support from a highly fractionalised population base kill more civilians during campaigns of one-sided violence than those whose population bases are relatively homogeneous. The magnitude of the effects of these two variables on the number of civilians killed is quite large. Yet, the intensity of fighting within the civil war and the overall population density of the country have an even larger impact on the number of civilians killed.

To further clarify the relationship between rebel organisation and conflict dynamics, I conducted a set of additional model specifications in which I interacted the statistically significant organisational variables with control variables capturing the impact of war-related factors (see Section 4.2.5 and Section 4.3.5 in Chapter 4). I found that the impact of rebel organisation on both the onset and level of rebel violence against civilians is sometimes dependent upon the nature of the conflict. Regarding the onset of rebel one-sided violence, for example, I found that rebels are less likely to begin a campaign of violence when government forces are already targeting the civilian population. In terms of the level of one-sided violence, the interaction models show that government perpetrated violence amplifies the negative (i.e., beneficial) effect of ethno-nationalism on the number of civilians killed during rebel perpetrated one-sided violence. The fractionalisation within a rebel group's population base, meanwhile, is positively moderated by conflict duration, conflict intensity and government violence against civilians.

8.1.2 Qualitative Analysis

My qualitative analyses of SPLM/A during the Second Sudanese Civil War and SLM/A in Chapters 6 and 7 sought to find evidence corroborating the relationship between the statistically significant organisational variables and the onset and level of rebel one-sided violence. In particular, these case studies were intended to provide evidence relevant for assessing the causal interpretations of the relations between rebel organisation and the level of popular support and, subsequently, to the use of one-sided violence as a means of enforcing support.

Both case studies do provide support for my hypothesis that the occurrence of leadership divisions results in the use of one-sided violence as a strategy to enforce support. However, the causal pathways differ for the two cases that were studied in detail. There is clear evidence that leadership divisions in the SPLM/A reduced the group's military effectiveness, that this in turn resulted in lower levels of popular support and the onset of one-sided violence (see Section 6.3 in Chapter 6). Following the split between John Garang and disgruntled rebel commanders in 1991, the SPLM/A lost large numbers of officers, and fighters; and substantial amounts of

equipment and territory. As a consequence, it had to scale down its military operations and lost the support of many southern Sudanese civilians. The SPLM/A then resorted to one-sided violence in early 1992 to enforce support.

In the case of the Darfurian SLM/A, the increasing tensions between the group's chairman Abdel Wahid and his chief of staff Minni Minnawi also decreased their military effectiveness. The onset of one-sided violence, however, was a result of Minnawi's inability to tap into the ethnic networks utilised by Abdel Wahid. Unable to gain the support of civilians who had followed Wahid with non-violent means, Minnawi's faction resorted to one-sided violence in an attempt to enforce support (see Section 7.3 in Chapter 7).

Irrespective of these differences, the two cases support the theoretical arguments presented in Chapter 3 regarding leadership divisions. However, the causal pathways linking rebel ideology to violence against civilians are not as easily assessed by the case studies (see Section 6.4 in Chapter 6 and Section 7.4 in Chapter 7). It can be stated, for example, that following popular revisions to the SPLM/A's 'New Sudan' ideology in 1994 - which had previously failed to resonate with the civilian population - lower numbers of civilians were killed by the rebels than in 1992 and 1993, but no definitive evidence was found to link these developments to each other. A similar observation can be made with regard to the SLM/A: while it is likely that their ideology helped them secure support among the African groups in Darfur, there is no clear evidence that it was responsible for the low level of violence during campaigns of one-sided violence in 2004 and 2005.

Both case studies lend reasonably strong support to the hypothesis linking the level of fractionalisation within a population base to levels of popular support and, subsequently, the level of one-sided violence (see Section 6.4 in Chapter 6 and Section 7.4 in Chapter 7). Following the Nasir coup in 1991, the SPLM/A lacked the capability to effectively tap into the networks and communities ties of its diverse population base: local civilians frequently regarded rebel fighters as 'foreign' and refused to provide them with their support. To attempt to enforce support, these fighters frequently resorted to violence. This pattern only changed after the SPLM/A reformed its structures in 1994 and regained the ability to secure support non-violently. In contrast, SLM/A fighters operated almost exclusively in their home regions and so were able to tap into local networks and community ties. Rebel violence against civilians therefore only took place at low levels. Indeed, what SLM/A one-sided violence did take place primarily occurred when Zaghawa fighters were operating in Fur, Masalit or Arab areas.

8.1.3 Discussion

The empirical findings from the quantitative and the qualitative analyses support the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3, particularly when seen in conjunction. Certain aspects of rebel organisation shape the ability of rebel groups to change civilians' cost-benefit calculations in favour of providing support to a rebellion. When these organisational factors are deficient or absent, however, rebels are unable to secure popular support non-violently and so resort to varying levels of one-sided violence in order to enforce it. This finding adds a new dimension to research on the strategic use of one-sided violence in civil wars.

To begin with, this thesis casts doubt on some of the insights deriving from earlier studies on rebel violence against civilians. My findings question the notion that some rebel groups are more likely to resort to one-sided violence than other groups due to their organisational configuration (e.g., [Weinstein 2005, 2007](#)). In the context of sub-Saharan Africa, at least, the only factor of rebel organisation which makes the start of a campaign of one-sided violence more likely is the occurrence of leadership divisions. Such leadership divisions, however, can occur in almost every rebel group.

The most prominent role played by the organisation of rebel groups in affecting rebel perpetrated violence against civilians occurs once a rebel group has resorted to such violence. Here, my thesis adds an important dimension to the relationship between conflict dynamics and civilian victimisation, something previously considered by a number of researchers (e.g., [Azam and Hoeffler 2002](#); [Bussmann, Schneider and Haer 2009](#); [Hultman 2008](#); [Kalyvas 2006](#)). [Kalyvas \(2006\)](#), for example, identifies the strategic interaction between conflict actors as the main factor guiding the levels of popular support and, consequently, the manner in which rebels use violence to enforce support. I have shown, however, that the degree of popular support is also determined by the ideology of a rebel group and the levels of fractionalisation within a group's population base. Rebel organisation can therefore be understood as a factor mediating the strategic interaction between rebels, government forces and civilians.

My analysis of rebel organisation also lends support to past research which considers ethnic identity to be a central determinant of rebel violence against civilians (e.g., [Humphreys and Weinstein 2008](#); [Lilja and Hultman 2011](#); [Zahar 2000](#)). The finding that ethno-nationalist agendas and low levels of fractionalisation within a rebel group's population tend to lead to low levels of rebel perpetrated one-sided violence strengthens those studies which claim that ethnically homogeneous rebel groups are less violent towards civilians. The case studies of the SPLM/A and

SLM/A, however, highlight that it is not necessarily the ethnic structure of a rebel group that reduces violence, but rather how a rebel group deals with existing ethnic divisions within their population base. That is, ethnic relations between rebels and civilians - in addition to ethnic relations between civilians themselves - shape the level of popular support for a rebel group and, subsequently, the level of violence it uses.

It is necessary to explore whether the findings of this study are applicable in the analysis of rebel perpetrated one-sided violence beyond sub-Saharan Africa. Here, it seems plausible that my findings regarding the importance of leadership divisions within rebel groups can be generalised. The logic underlying the hypotheses - namely that popular support is dependent on expected cost-benefit 'calculations' by civilians - is not restricted in its applicability to any particular region. Moreover, rebel groups across the globe experience leadership divisions, and they frequently resort to violence against the population (e.g., [Gallagher Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012](#); [Gallagher Cunningham 2011](#); [Lawrence 2010](#)). A similar conclusion can be drawn with regard to the organisational factors shaping the level of rebel violence against civilians. In many regions affected by civil war, rebels mobilise their support along ethnic lines (e.g., [Ellingsen 2000](#); [Horowitz 1985](#)). Consequently, the adoption of an ethno-nationalist ideology and low levels of fractionalisation within a rebels' population base are also likely reduce levels of violence in other regions than sub-Saharan Africa. In regions such as Latin America or the Middle East, however, economic classes and religious identities may complement or even replace ethnicity as key mobilisation factors. In such cases, the findings of this thesis are unlikely to be directly applicable.

8.2 Implications of the Study

The empirical findings of this thesis have important implications for attempts by the international community to prevent civilian victimisation in internal armed conflicts, and have consequences for future research into one-sided violence and the study of armed conflict in general.

8.2.1 Policy Recommendations

Rebel one-sided violence is a common feature of civil wars and frequently results in large numbers of civilian fatalities ([Eck and Hultman 2007](#); [Human Security Report Project 2011](#)). Given this, the international community (consisting of concerned states, international organisations and NGOs) seeks to minimise the occurrence and level of rebel one-sided violence in civil wars. The

findings of this thesis can contribute to such efforts by identifying ways of preventing one-sided violence from occurring or, when it is already underway, to minimise its impact on the civilian population.

For example, the finding that leadership divisions increase the probability of campaigns of one-sided violence presents a straightforward way of reducing such risks. Policy-makers should pay close attention to cleavages and divisions within rebel groups and work towards defusing them. To achieve this, international actors should, first of all, refrain from siding with factions within rebel leaderships. Rather, they should encourage conflicting rebel leaders to resolve their differences peacefully. If leadership divisions cannot be prevented, international actors should take steps to reconcile the factions.¹¹⁵

The international community could also take pre-emptive steps to prevent large-scale violence against civilians in instances where one-sided violence cannot be averted. Given my finding that high levels of violence are less likely when there are no ethnic tensions between rebels and their population base - and within the population base itself - international actors should encourage rebel leaders to build up well-developed administrative capabilities and refrain from playing ethnic groups off against each other.¹¹⁶

There is, however, an important caveat to these policy recommendations. Any attempt to prevent rebels from using one-sided violence as a strategy to enforce popular support inevitably results in strengthening popular support for the rebel group. This might mean that the fighting between rebel groups and the government of a state is perpetuated, as higher levels of popular support enable rebels to engage government forces militarily. Eck (2009), for example, shows that rebel groups who successfully mobilise along ethnic lines are more likely to engage in full-scale combat with the government. In order to avoid perpetuating conflicts, the international community has to embed any attempt to minimise the risk of rebel one-sided violence as well as the level of such violence within broader efforts to resolve the overarching conflict between

¹¹⁵The case studies analysed in this thesis serve as examples of how *not* to deal with leadership divisions. International actors including the United States and numerous NGOs encouraged Riek Machar to revolt against Garang (Johnson 2003). In 1991 Riek Machar and other rebel commanders in Upper Nile believed that the southern Sudanese rebellion would regain some of its international support if Garang would no longer head the movement. Although this was not the primary cause of the Nasir coup, it certainly facilitated it. In the case of the SLM/A, meanwhile, the divisions between Abdel Wahid and Minni Minnawi were deepened during the peace talks in N'djamena in the spring of 2004 (International Crisis Group 2004c) - while the Chadian negotiators were biased towards Khartoum, international observers from the United States, France and other European countries had their own differences which prevented them from actively engaging in the talks. This contributed not only to the deeply flawed ceasefire agreement between the Sudanese government and the SLM/A, but also facilitated the delegation's takeover by Minni Minnawi loyalists, further aggravating the power struggle within the rebel movement.

¹¹⁶In this regard, the SPLM National Convention of 1994 serves as a positive example of international intervention (African Rights 1995; Karim et al. 1996; Riehl 2001; Rolandsen 2005): to a degree, the reforms adopted there by the SPLM/A followed concerns by international NGOs that the southern Sudanese rebels were not putting enough effort into governing the civilian population in 'liberated' areas.

rebels and state governments.

8.2.2 Future Research

The empirical findings of this thesis show that aspects of rebel organisation need to be taken into account when analysing the strategic use of one-sided violence in civil wars. Future research on this topic should therefore explore in greater detail how the internal politics of rebel groups and the institutions shaping their relations with the civilian population affect the level of popular support for an insurgency and, subsequently, the use of violence against civilians.

The first step to fulfilling this research agenda is the collection of more detailed data on rebel organisation. The objective here should be to identify relevant actors within a rebel group and their relationships with each other. Likewise, it is necessary to collect data on the political institutions which shape the relations between these rebel actors and the civilian population. As it often proves difficult to collect such data on a global level, it might be beneficial to focus on a smaller group of prominent cases such as, for example, the conflicts in Sudan and newly independent South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq and Afghanistan. With such data, research can progress to analyses of single causal pathways linking rebel organisation to popular support and one-sided violence. This will also permit examinations into the relationships between rebel organisation, conflict dynamics and violence against civilians in greater detail.

Such research would also advance the study of armed conflict in general. While recent studies have already turned to rebel organisation as a factor influencing the duration and outcome of civil wars (e.g., [Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009](#); [Gallagher Cunningham 2011](#); [Nilsson 2010](#)), future research would benefit from refined conceptions of rebel organisation and an improved comprehension of how rebels relate to civilian populations. Moreover, an increased focus on rebel organisation more generally would advance attempts to explain how opposition groups radicalise and resort to arms.

Understanding rebel organisation does therefore not only have immediate relevance for analysing rebel one-sided violence, it also opens up new ways of analysing the emergence and escalation of internal armed conflicts.

Appendices

APPENDIX A

Quantitative Analysis: Additional Tables

Table A.1: Rebel Groups in sub-Saharan Africa, 1989-2007

<i>Country</i>	<i>Rebel Group</i>	<i>Years Active</i>
Angola	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	1989-1995, 1998-2002
	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda - Armed Forces of Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)	1994, 1996- 1998, 2002, 2004, 2007
	Front for the liberation of the enclave of Cabinda - Renewed (FLEC-R)	1991, 1994, 1997, 2002
Burundi	Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu)	1991-1992
	National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD)	1994-1998
	National Liberation Front (FROLINA)	1997
	CNDD - Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD)	1999-2003
	Palipehutu - Forces for the National Liberation (Palipehutu-FNL)	1997-2006
Central African Republic	Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR)	2006
Chad	Revolutionary Forces of 1st April	1989
	Movement for the National Salvation of Chad (MOSANAT)	1989
	Islamic Legion	1989-1990
	Committee of National Revival for Peace and Democracy (CSNPD)	1992-1994
	National Council for Recovery (CNR)	1992-1994
	Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS)	1990
	Chad National Front (FNT)	1992-1994
	Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD)	1991-1993, 1997
	Armed Forces of the Federal Republic (FARF)	1997-1998
	Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT)	1999-2002
Comoros	United Front for Democratic Change (FUCD)	2005-2006
	Rally of Democratic Forces (RAFD)	2006
	Union for Democracy and Development (UFDD)	2006-2007
	Anjouan People's Movement (MPA)	1997

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Table A.1 – Continued from previous page

<i>Country</i>	<i>Rebel Group</i>	<i>Years Active</i>
Congo-Brazzaville	Ninjas	1993-1994, 1998-1999
	Cocoyes	1997-1999
	Cobras	1993, 1997
	Ntsiloulous	1998-1999, 2002
Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire)	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Kinshasa (AFDL)	1996-1997
	Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)	1998-2001
	Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)	1998-2001
	Congolese Democratic Rally - Liberation Movement (RCD-ML)	1999-2001
	National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP)	2006-2007
	Bundu dia Kongo (BDK)	2007
Djibouti	Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD)	1991-1994
	Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy - Ahmed Dini faction (FRUD-AD)	1999
Eritrea	Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement - Abu Suhail Faction (EIJM-AS)	1997, 1999, 2003
Ethiopia	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)	1989-1991
	Afar Liberation Front (ALF)	1989-1991
	Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF)	1996
	Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)	1989-1991
	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	1994, 1996, 1999-2002, 2004-2007
	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	1989-1992, 1994-1995, 1998-2007
	Islamic Union (AIU)	1995-1996, 1999

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Table A.1 – *Continued from previous page*

<i>Country</i>	<i>Rebel Group</i>	<i>Years Active</i>
Guinea	Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea (RFDG)	2000-2001
Ivory Coast	Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast (MPCI)	2002
	Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO)	2002-2003
	Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP)	2002-2003
	New Forces (FN)	2004
Liberia	National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)	1989-1995
	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL)	1990-1995
	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Development (LURD)	2000-2003
	Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)	2003
Mali	Azawad People's Movement (MPA)	1990
	Islamic Arab Front of Azawad (FIAA)	1994
	Tuareg Alliance for Change of Northern Mali (ATNMC)	2007
Mozambique	Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO)	1989-1992
Niger	Air and Azawad Liberation Front (FLAA)	1991-1992
	Coordination of the Armed Resistance (CRA)	1994
	Union of Forces of the Armed Resistance (UFRA)	1997
	Democratic Front for Renewal (FDR)	1996
	Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Sahara (FARS)	1997
	Niger Justice Movement (MNJ)	2007
Nigeria	Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa	2004
	Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF)	2004
Rwanda	Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR)	1990-1994
	Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR)	1997-2002

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Table A.1 – Continued from previous page

<i>Country</i>	<i>Rebel Group</i>	<i>Years Active</i>
Senegal	Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC)	1990, 1992-1993, 1995, 1997-1998, 2000-2001, 2003
Sierra Leone	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	1991-2000
	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)	1997-1999
	Kamajors	1997-1998
	West Side Boys (WSB)	2000
Somalia	Somali National Movement (SNM)	1989-1991
	Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)	1989-1991
	Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)	1991
	United Somali Congress (USC)	1990-1991
	United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA)	1991-1996
	Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC)	2001-2002
	Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia/Union of Islamic Courts (ARS/UIC)	2006-2007
Sudan	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)	2003-2006
	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)	2003-2004, 2007
	National Redemption Front (NRF)	2006
	SLM/A - Minni Minnawi (SLM/A-MM)	2006
	Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF)	1996
	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)	1989-2004
	National Democratic Alliance (NDA)	1996-2002
	SLM/A - Unity (SLM/A-Unity)	2007
Uganda	Uganda People's Army (UPA)	1989-1992
	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	1989-1991, 1994-1998, 2000-2006

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Table A.1 – *Continued from previous page*

<i>Country</i>	<i>Rebel Group</i>	<i>Years Active</i>
	West Nile Bank Front (WNBFB)	1996
	Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)	1998-2002, 2007
	Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II)	1997

Table A.2: Correlation Matrix of all Variables included in the Analysis of the Onset of One-Sided Violence ($N=160$)

	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15
01: Onset of one-sided violence	1.00														
02: Ethno-nationalist ideology	0.02	1.00													
03: Revolutionary ideology	0.09	-0.38	1.00												
04: Religious ideology	0.06	-0.15	-0.40	1.00											
05: Leadership divisions	0.24	0.01	0.08	-0.04	1.00										
06: Population base	0.09	0.02	0.19	-0.04	0.12	1.00									
07: Ext'l state support	0.15	-0.01	0.22	0.04	0.13	0.17	1.00								
08: Ext'l non-state support	0.24	0.12	-0.10	-0.04	0.05	-0.10	0.04	1.00							
09: No. of competing factions	0.02	-0.11	0.23	-0.06	0.20	0.03	0.00	-0.11	1.00						
10: Conflict duration ^a	0.20	0.20	-0.23	0.05	0.13	0.22	-0.04	0.01	0.07	1.00					
11: Conflict intensity	0.27	0.03	0.30	-0.14	0.03	0.21	0.31	0.09	0.05	0.22	1.00				
12: Gov't violence ^b	0.21	0.21	0.25	0.01	0.04	0.18	0.06	0.10	0.14	-0.00	0.12	1.00			
13: Polity2	-0.08	0.16	-0.27	-0.07	0.04	-0.18	-0.19	-0.01	-0.06	-0.06	-0.26	-0.25	1.00		
14: Polity2 squared	0.01	0.09	0.10	0.03	-0.21	0.25	-0.04	-0.03	-0.08	0.10	0.21	0.20	-0.48	1.00	
15: Population density ^a	0.19	0.18	-0.25	0.07	0.08	-0.12	0.08	0.31	-0.21	0.14	-0.10	-0.01	0.14	-0.10	1.00

^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

Table A.3: Correlation Matrix of all Variables included in the Analysis of the Level of Rebel One-Sided Violence ($N=308$)

	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15
01: Number of civilians killed	1.00														
02: Ethno-nationalist ideology	-0.07	1.00													
03: Revolutionary ideology	0.05	-0.39	1.00												
04: Religious ideology	0.04	-0.21	-0.45	1.00											
05: Leadership divisions	0.01	-0.04	0.11	-0.05	1.00										
06: Population base	0.09	0.10	0.17	-0.13	0.12	1.00									
07: Ext'l state support	0.10	0.03	0.19	0.02	0.11	0.15	1.00								
08: Ext'l non-state support	0.11	0.15	-0.04	-0.10	0.03	-0.05	0.06	1.00							
09: No. of competing factions	-0.05	-0.11	0.25	-0.06	0.19	0.08	0.00	-0.09	1.00						
10: Conflict duration ^a	0.00	0.19	-0.26	0.03	0.06	0.26	-0.03	0.02	0.02	1.00					
11: Conflict intensity	0.11	0.01	0.29	-0.10	0.08	0.27	0.33	0.03	0.11	0.20	1.00				
12: Gov't violence ^b	0.13	0.19	0.18	-0.03	-0.00	0.13	0.10	0.15	0.08	-0.10	0.14	1.00			
13: Polity2	-0.00	0.15	-0.28	-0.10	0.08	-0.06	-0.16	-0.04	-0.12	-0.01	-0.25	-0.19	1.00		
14: Polity2 squared	-0.06	0.09	0.13	0.01	-0.12	0.13	-0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.20	0.15	-0.57	1.00	
15: Population density ^a	0.09	0.29	-0.37	0.16	0.03	-0.09	0.07	0.33	-0.28	0.18	-0.14	-0.01	0.14	-0.11	1.00

^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.^bThis excludes the number of 500,000 civilians killed by government forces in Rwanda in the year 1994.

Table A.4: Onset of Rebel One-Sided Violence: Complete Model and Stepwise Deletion

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
<i>Explanatory Variables</i>								
Ethno-nationalist ideology	-0.277 (0.54)	-0.243 (0.55)	-0.220 (0.53)	-0.225 (0.53)				
Revolutionary ideology	0.669 (0.75)	0.605 (0.73)	0.646 (0.74)	0.627 (0.73)	0.754 (0.63)			
Religious ideology	0.961 (0.82)	0.888 (0.82)	0.932 (0.79)	0.937 (0.80)	1.053 (0.68)	0.660 (0.59)		
Leadership divisions	1.201** (0.59)	1.208** (0.58)	1.221** (0.57)	1.188** (0.59)	1.162** (0.59)	1.275** (0.54)	1.217** (0.51)	1.198** (0.50)
Population base								
External state support	0.105 (0.75)	0.147 (0.46)						
External non-state support	1.130* (0.59)	1.068* (0.56)	1.058* (0.57)	1.076* (0.56)	1.087* (0.56)	0.978* (0.57)	0.910 (0.57)	
No. of competing factions	-0.084 (0.28)	-0.066 (0.20)	-0.072 (0.20)					
<i>Control Variables</i>								
Conflict duration ^a	0.416* (0.22)	0.422** (0.20)	0.417** (0.20)	0.410** (0.19)	0.407** (0.19)	0.312* (0.17)	0.314* (0.17)	0.295* (0.17)
Conflict intensity	1.293* (0.67)	1.270* (0.67)	1.327** (0.63)	1.330** (0.62)	1.293** (0.62)	1.503*** (0.57)	1.370** (0.57)	1.463** (0.57)
Government violence	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001* (0.00)	0.001* (0.00)	0.001* (0.00)
Polity2	0.016 (0.08)	0.009 (0.09)	0.005 (0.08)	0.005 (0.08)	0.001 (0.08)	-0.021 (0.08)	-0.031 (0.09)	-0.033 (0.09)
Polity2 squared	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)
Population density ^a	0.376* (0.21)	0.373* (0.21)	0.380* (0.21)	0.393* (0.20)	0.384* (0.20)	0.341* (0.20)	0.353* (0.20)	0.442** (0.20)
Constant	-3.799*** (1.06)	-3.857*** (1.07)	-3.848*** (1.06)	-3.951*** (0.99)	-4.084*** (0.92)	-3.399*** (0.79)	-3.292*** (0.79)	-3.467*** (0.80)
Observations	160	162	162	162	162	162	162	162
Wald Chi ²	30.89***	30.48***	30.34***	29.14***	26.57***	21.56***	21.81***	22.24***
Pseudo R ²	0.213	0.211	0.210	0.209	0.209	0.200	0.193	0.180
Log likelihood	-75.580	-76.283	-76.334	-76.396	-76.492	-77.297	-78.033	-79.220

Logistic Regression with robust standard errors clustered on rebel groups in parentheses (***) p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1).
^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

Table A.5: Onset of Rebel One-Sided Violence: Complete Model and Stepwise Deletion for Lagged Conflict Variables

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
<i>Explanatory Variables</i>								
Ethno-nationalist ideology	0.085 (0.54)	0.123 (0.55)						
Revolutionary ideology	1.190** (0.68)	1.132** (0.66)	1.074** (0.60)	1.060** (0.59)	1.124* (0.60)	0.773 (0.53)		
Religious ideology	0.847 (0.88)	0.790 (0.88)	0.730 (0.74)	0.737 (0.74)	0.801 (0.73)			
Leadership divisions	1.041* (0.55)	1.056* (0.54)	1.060* (0.54)	1.040* (0.55)	1.060* (0.55)	1.073** (0.51)	1.183** (0.49)	1.151** (0.47)
Population base	-0.084 (0.80)							
External state support	0.264 (0.45)	0.307 (0.45)	0.314 (0.45)	0.321 (0.45)				
External non-state support	1.169** (0.59)	1.087* (0.57)	1.090* (0.57)	1.103* (0.57)	1.084* (0.58)	0.964* (0.58)	0.882 (0.59)	
No. of competing factions	-0.062 (0.20)	-0.049 (0.20)	-0.046 (0.20)					
<i>Control Variables</i>								
Conflict duration, t-1 ^a	0.462** (0.24)	0.468** (0.22)	0.470** (0.22)	0.462** (0.21)	0.455** (0.20)	0.423** (0.20)	0.316* (0.19)	0.281 (0.19)
Conflict intensity, t-1	0.570 (0.73)	0.528 (0.73)	0.556 (0.70)	0.547 (0.70)	0.614 (0.68)	0.596 (0.67)	0.792 (0.70)	0.876 (0.67)
Government violence, t-1	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Polity2	-0.008 (0.08)	-0.012 (0.08)	-0.010 (0.08)	-0.010 (0.08)	-0.019 (0.08)	-0.041 (0.08)	-0.064 (0.07)	-0.068 (0.07)
Polity2 squared	0.001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
Population density ^a	0.365* (0.19)	0.367* (0.20)	0.371* (0.19)	0.379** (0.19)	0.393** (0.19)	0.383** (0.19)	0.336* (0.18)	0.431** (0.18)
Constant	-4.212*** (1.02)	-4.282*** (1.02)	-4.218*** (1.00)	-4.278*** (0.96)	-4.222*** (0.91)	-3.826*** (0.93)	-3.161*** (0.75)	-3.341*** (0.75)
Observations	145	147	147	147	147	147	147	147
Wald Chi ²	27.12**	26.28**	26.35***	24.79***	25.65***	20.50**	18.84**	18.93***
Pseudo R ²	0.177	0.176	0.176	0.176	0.173	0.164	0.150	0.137
Log likelihood	-71.837	-72.443	-72.473	-72.497	-72.763	-73.507	-74.765	-75.879

^aLogistic Regression with robust standard errors clustered on rebel groups in parentheses (***) p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1).
a variable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

Table A.6: Onset of Rebel One-Sided Violence: Interaction Models

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Explanatory Variables</i>			
Leadership divisions	0.862 (0.78)	1.168** (0.52)	1.743*** (0.52)
... × conflict duration	0.255 (0.53)		
... × conflict intensity		0.214 (1.56)	
... × government violence			-0.002*** (0.00)
<i>Control Variables</i>			
Conflict duration ^a	0.254 (0.19)	0.293* (0.17)	0.317* (0.18)
Conflict intensity	1.450** (0.57)	1.426** (0.58)	1.342** (0.57)
Government violence	0.001* (0.00)	0.001* (0.00)	0.001*** (0.00)
Polity2	-0.031 (0.08)	-0.0334 (0.09)	-0.030 (0.09)
Polity2 squared	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)
Population density ^a	0.443** (0.20)	0.444** (0.20)	0.426** (0.20)
Constant	-3.430*** (0.79)	-3.470*** (0.81)	-3.591*** (0.82)
Observations	162	162	162
Wald Chi ²	21.86***	22.45***	26.88***
Pseudo R ²	0.182	0.181	0.210
Log likelihood	-79.100	-79.107	-76.401

Logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses (***) p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1).
^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

Table A.7: Onset of Rebel One-Sided Violence: Collinearity Diagnostics for the Interaction Models

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	<i>VIF</i>	<i>Tol.</i>	<i>VIF</i>	<i>Tol.</i>	<i>VIF</i>	<i>Tol.</i>
Onset of one-sided violence	1.27	0.79	1.27	0.79	1.32	0.76
Leadership divisions	2.94	0.34	1.34	0.75	1.41	0.71
... × conflict duration	3.26	0.31				
... × conflict intensity			1.56	0.64		
... × government violence					1.59	0.63
Conflict duration ^a	1.29	0.78	1.12	0.89	1.13	0.89
Conflict intensity	1.22	0.82	1.51	0.66	1.22	0.82
Government violence	1.13	0.89	1.13	0.89	1.48	0.68
Polity2	1.41	0.71	1.43	0.70	1.41	0.71
Polity2 squared	1.43	0.70	1.44	0.70	1.41	0.71
Population density ^a	1.10	0.91	1.11	0.91	1.10	0.91
Mean VIF	1.67		1.32		1.34	

^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

Table A.8: Level of Rebel One-Sided Violence: Complete Model and Stepwise Deletion

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	NBRM	LI	NBRM	LI	NBRM	LI	NBRM	LI	NBRM	LI
<i>Explanatory Variables</i>										
Ethno-nationalist ideology	-0.426 (0.29)	0.239 (0.55)	-0.425 (0.28)	0.186 (0.53)	-0.630** (0.28)	0.918 (0.56)	-0.617** (0.29)	0.900 (0.57)	-0.561** (0.28)	0.841 (0.55)
Revolutionary ideology	0.614 (0.40)	-1.141 (0.84)	0.606 (0.41)	-1.223 (0.85)	0.168 (0.34)	0.096 (0.59)				
Religious ideology	0.697 (0.48)	-2.018** (0.98)	0.696 (0.48)	-2.110** (0.96)						
Leadership divisions	-0.709*** (0.17)	-0.841 (0.53)	-0.707*** (0.17)	-0.865* (0.51)	-0.699*** (0.17)	-0.885* (0.46)	-0.688*** (0.17)	-0.873* (0.45)	-0.653*** (0.21)	-0.873** (0.42)
Population base	1.783** (0.76)	0.056 (0.67)	1.771** (0.75)	0.007 (0.66)	1.607** (0.71)	-0.111 (0.67)	1.716** (0.68)	-0.087 (0.67)	1.715** (0.67)	-0.059 (0.71)
External state support	-0.039 (0.17)	-0.308 (0.44)								
External non-state support	0.494* (0.30)	-1.614*** (0.37)	0.498* (0.30)	-1.613*** (0.36)	0.294 (0.28)	-1.277*** (0.37)	0.337 (0.27)	-1.266*** (0.38)		
No. of competing factions	-0.142** (0.06)	-0.265** (0.12)	-0.142** (0.06)	-0.253** (0.12)	-0.143** (0.06)	-0.281** (0.12)	-0.143** (0.06)	-0.278** (0.12)	-0.157*** (0.06)	-0.270** (0.13)
<i>Control Variables</i>										
Conflict duration ^a	-0.046 (0.16)	-0.613** (0.25)	-0.045 (0.16)	-0.601** (0.24)	-0.078 (0.16)	-0.487* (0.25)	-0.091 (0.17)	-0.500** (0.25)	-0.101 (0.18)	-0.483* (0.25)
Conflict intensity	0.751** (0.31)	-1.140*** (0.42)	0.747** (0.31)	-1.263*** (0.39)	0.761** (0.31)	-1.404*** (0.42)	0.785*** (0.30)	-1.377*** (0.43)	0.847*** (0.30)	-1.415*** (0.43)
Government violence	0.000 (0.00)	-0.001* (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.001* (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)
Polity2	-0.014 (0.02)	0.007 (0.11)	-0.013 (0.02)	0.015 (0.11)	-0.027 (0.03)	0.090 (0.10)	-0.034 (0.03)	0.089 (0.10)	-0.038 (0.03)	0.098 (0.09)
Polity2 squared	-0.029*** (0.01)	0.005 (0.02)	-0.027*** (0.01)	0.007 (0.02)	-0.023*** (0.01)	0.010 (0.02)	-0.024*** (0.01)	0.010 (0.02)	-0.023*** (0.01)	0.011 (0.02)
Population density ^a	0.452** (0.18)	-0.732*** (0.20)	0.453** (0.18)	-0.749*** (0.19)	0.438** (0.17)	-0.816*** (0.22)	0.424** (0.17)	-0.825*** (0.23)	0.470*** (0.17)	-0.946*** (0.21)
Constant	3.327*** (1.08)	6.353*** (1.30)	3.306*** (1.08)	6.352*** (1.27)	3.933*** (0.85)	5.140*** (1.08)	4.050*** (0.89)	5.235*** (0.97)	3.915*** (0.91)	5.489*** (0.94)
Inalpha	-0.161 (0.308)	(0.19)	-0.161 (0.308)	(0.18)	-0.143 (0.308)	(0.17)	-0.139 (0.308)	(0.17)	-0.124 (0.308)	(0.16)
alpha	0.851 (0.99)	(0.16)	0.852 (0.99)	(0.16)	0.867 (0.99)	(0.14)	0.870 (0.99)	(0.15)	0.884 (0.99)	(0.14)
Observations	308	308	308	308	308	308	308	308	308	308
Nonzero	209	209	209	209	209	209	209	209	209	209
Log pseudo-likelihood	-770.225	-770.641	-770.225	-770.641	-777.808	-777.808	-778.020	-778.020	-783.721	-783.721

ZINB Regression with robust standard errors clustered on rebel groups in parentheses (***) p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

Table A.9: Level of Rebel One-Sided Violence: Complete Model and Stepwise Deletion for Lagged Conflict Variables

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	NBRM	LI	NBRM	LI	NBRM	LI	NBRM	LI	NBRM	LI	NBRM	LI
<i>Explanatory Variables</i>												
Ethno-nationalist ideology	-0.854** (0.35)	0.250 (0.55)	-0.830** (0.35)	0.191 (0.52)	-1.041*** (0.35)	0.859 (0.56)	-1.041*** (0.36)	0.828 (0.56)	-0.990*** (0.37)	0.719 (0.53)	-1.154*** (0.33)	0.691 (0.53)
Revolutionary ideology	0.599* (0.35)	-1.014 (0.79)	0.594* (0.35)	-1.104 (0.80)	0.189 (0.27)	0.147 (0.52)	0.189 (0.27)	0.147 (0.52)	0.189 (0.27)	0.147 (0.52)	0.189 (0.27)	0.147 (0.52)
Religious ideology	0.650 (0.45)	-1.854** (0.88)	0.653 (0.45)	-1.957** (0.87)								
Leadership divisions	-0.515*** (0.20)	0.814 (0.50)	-0.513** (0.20)	-0.843* (0.48)	-0.497** (0.20)	-0.892** (0.43)	-0.482** (0.20)	-0.875** (0.41)	-0.450* (0.24)	-0.858** (0.38)	-0.475** (0.23)	-0.891** (0.39)
Population base	1.486* (0.79)	0.048 (0.68)	1.478* (0.78)	-0.021 (0.68)	1.321* (0.77)	-0.119 (0.67)	1.420* (0.74)	-0.083 (0.67)	1.385* (0.72)	-0.106 (0.72)	1.199* (0.71)	-0.148 (0.20)
Ext'l state support	-0.092 (0.24)	-0.401 (0.41)										
Ext'l non-state support	0.451* (0.25)	-1.624*** (0.39)	0.456* (0.25)	-1.627*** (0.39)	0.290 (0.24)	-1.340*** (0.41)	0.330 (0.24)	-1.326*** (0.40)	-0.112 (0.07)	-0.256** (0.13)		
No. of competing factions	-0.102* (0.06)	-0.261** (0.12)	-0.102* (0.06)	-0.248** (0.12)	-0.102 (0.07)	-0.272** (0.13)	-0.104 (0.07)	-0.268** (0.13)				
<i>Control Variables</i>												
Conflict duration, t-1 ^a	0.013 (0.18)	-0.449* (0.26)	0.014 (0.18)	-0.433* (0.26)	-0.025 (0.17)	-0.313 (0.25)	-0.056 (0.18)	-0.337 (0.26)	-0.085 (0.19)	-0.309 (0.25)	-0.145 (0.17)	-0.296 (0.25)
Conflict intensity, t-1	0.004 (0.26)	-1.419** (0.58)	-0.003 (0.28)	-1.508*** (0.56)	-0.039 (0.28)	-1.731*** (0.54)	0.028 (0.28)	-1.677*** (0.54)	0.094 (0.30)	-1.632*** (0.57)	0.063 (0.27)	-1.705*** (0.58)
Government violence, t-1	0.001*** (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.001*** (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.001*** (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.000*** (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.001*** (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	0.001*** (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Polity2	-0.009 (0.03)	0.002 (0.12)	-0.009 (0.03)	0.014 (0.11)	-0.025 (0.04)	0.086 (0.10)	-0.032 (0.03)	0.084 (0.10)	-0.034 (0.03)	0.097 (0.09)	-0.018 (0.03)	0.097 (0.09)
Polity2 squared	-0.021*** (0.01)	0.002 (0.02)	-0.021*** (0.01)	0.005 (0.02)	-0.018** (0.01)	0.006 (0.02)	-0.018** (0.01)	0.006 (0.02)	-0.018** (0.01)	0.007 (0.02)	-0.016* (0.01)	0.006 (0.02)
Population density ^a	0.314** (0.15)	-0.770*** (0.21)	0.314** (0.15)	-0.782*** (0.21)	0.290** (0.15)	-0.841*** (0.23)	0.280* (0.15)	-0.854*** (0.23)	0.323** (0.16)	-0.968*** (0.22)	0.334** (0.16)	-0.883*** (0.20)
Constant	4.043*** (1.00)	6.223*** (1.36)	4.024*** (1.01)	6.161*** (1.30)	4.675*** (0.74)	5.019*** (1.09)	4.812*** (0.78)	5.169*** (1.02)	4.737*** (0.79)	5.388*** (1.02)	4.807*** (0.85)	4.836*** (0.89)
Inalpha	-0.148 (0.16)		-0.147 (0.16)		-0.131 (0.15)		-0.127 (0.15)		-0.112 (0.14)		-0.092 (0.14)	
Observations	863 294	863 294	863 294	863 294	877 294	863 294	877 294	863 294	863 294	863 294	863 294	863 294
Nonzero	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96
Zero	198	198	198	198	198	198	198	198	198	198	198	198
Log likelihood	-748.033	-748.763	-748.033	-748.763	-754.736	-755.007	-754.736	-755.007	-760.890	-760.890	-763.808	-763.808

ZINB Regression with robust standard errors clustered on rebel groups in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.
^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

Table A.10: Level of Rebel One-Sided Violence: Interaction Models

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	NBRM	LI	NBRM	LI	NBRM	LI	NBRM	LI	NBRM	LI	NBRM	LI
<i>Explanatory Variables</i>												
Ethno-nationalist ideology	-0.148 (0.60)	-1.194* (0.72)	-0.380 (0.29)	0.459 (0.61)	-0.599* (0.32)	0.767 (0.56)	-0.184 (0.27)	0.686 (0.52)	-0.503* (0.27)	0.892 (0.58)	-0.563* (0.29)	0.855 (0.55)
... × conflict duration	-0.255 (0.39)	1.258*** (0.40)										
... × conflict intensity			-0.728 (0.63)	1.562* (0.93)								
... × gov't violence					0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)						
Leadership Divisions	-0.683*** (0.20)	-0.595 (0.44)	-0.730*** (0.19)	-0.782* (0.44)	-0.663*** (0.22)	-0.883** (0.42)	-0.622*** (0.19)	-0.794* (0.42)	-0.633*** (0.21)	-0.874** (0.42)	-0.682*** (0.20)	-0.878** (0.42)
Population base	1.951** (0.84)	-0.719 (0.64)	1.827*** (0.66)	-0.403 (0.80)	1.765** (0.76)	-0.071 (0.72)	4.322*** (0.86)	-1.569 (1.14)	2.401*** (0.79)	0.161 (0.87)	1.989** (0.80)	-0.211 (0.72)
... × conflict duration							1.798*** (0.45)	0.900 (0.62)				
... × conflict intensity									-2.025*** (0.78)	-0.790 (1.23)		
... × gov't violence											-0.001** (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
No. of competing factions	-0.140** (0.07)	-0.535*** (0.13)	-0.131** (0.07)	-0.310** (0.12)	-0.157*** (0.21)	-0.275** (0.13)	-0.049 (0.04)	-0.299** (0.13)	-0.081 (0.07)	-0.256** (0.12)	-0.161*** (0.05)	-0.278** (0.13)
<i>Control Variables</i>												
Conflict duration ^a	-0.017 (0.22)	-1.133*** (0.29)	-0.188 (0.21)	-0.399 (0.25)	-0.112 (0.18)	-0.496** (0.25)	0.455*** (0.12)	-0.769*** (0.27)	-0.043 (0.16)	-0.481* (0.25)	-0.079 (0.16)	-0.503** (0.25)
Conflict intensity	0.767** (0.33)	-1.010*** (0.39)	1.173*** (0.23)	-2.096*** (0.42)	0.865*** (0.31)	-1.419*** (0.44)	0.938*** (0.28)	-1.441*** (0.44)	1.526*** (0.28)	-1.134* (0.60)	0.869*** (0.28)	-1.406*** (0.42)
Government violence	0.000 (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000** (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)	0.000*** (0.00)	-0.001* (0.00)
Polity2	-0.032 (0.03)	0.054 (0.08)	-0.043 (0.03)	0.117 (0.09)	-0.035 (0.03)	0.104 (0.09)	-0.065** (0.03)	0.109 (0.03)	-0.034 (0.03)	0.096 (0.09)	-0.035 (0.03)	0.097 (0.09)
Polity2 squared	-0.023*** (0.21)	0.006 (0.01)	-0.023*** (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)	-0.024*** (0.01)	0.011 (0.02)	-0.015** (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)	-0.024*** (0.01)	0.011 (0.02)	-0.024*** (0.01)	0.010 (0.02)
Population density ^a	0.496*** (0.19)	-0.919*** (0.18)	0.493*** (0.16)	-0.985*** (0.21)	0.476*** (0.17)	-0.957* (0.21)	0.366*** (0.13)	-0.919*** (0.20)	0.524*** (0.16)	-0.947*** (0.21)	0.477*** (0.17)	-0.941*** (0.21)
Constant	3.634*** (1.13)	6.428*** (0.93)	3.827*** (0.84)	5.863*** (0.21)	3.834*** (0.89)	5.618*** (0.97)	2.882*** (0.56)	5.901*** (1.00)	3.314*** (0.81)	5.392*** (0.91)	3.814*** (0.88)	5.569*** (0.97)
alpha	-0.130 (0.17)											
Observations	308	308	308	308	308	308	308	308	308	308	308	308
Nonzero/Zero	99/209	99/209	99/209	99/209	99/209	99/209	99/209	99/209	99/209	99/209	99/209	99/209
Log likelihood	-776.134	-776.134	-780.624	-780.624	-783.269	-783.269	-775.025	-775.025	-780.213	-780.213	-782.366	-782.366

ZINB Regression with robust standard errors clustered on rebel groups in parentheses (***) p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1).
^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

Table A.11: Level of Rebel One-Sided Violence: Collinearity Diagnostics for the Interaction Models

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	VIF	Tol.	VIF	Tol.	VIF	Tol.	VIF	Tol.	VIF	Tol.	VIF	Tol.
Number of civilians killed	1.08	0.93	1.08	0.92	1.09	0.92	1.11	0.90	1.08	0.93	1.08	0.93
Ethno-nationalist ideology	3.45	0.29	1.62	0.62	1.42	0.70	1.35	0.74	1.33	0.75	1.31	0.77
... × conflict duration	5.33	0.19										
... × conflict intensity			2.57	0.39								
... × government violence					4.47	0.22						
Leadership Divisions	1.13	0.89	1.11	0.90	1.09	0.92	1.11	0.90	1.09	0.92	1.09	0.92
Population base	1.26	0.79	1.28	0.78	1.21	0.83	4.06	0.25	1.56	0.64	1.33	0.75
... × conflict duration							6.26	0.16				
... × conflict intensity									3.13	0.32		
... × government violence											2.99	0.34
No. of competing factions	1.18	0.85	1.19	0.84	1.16	0.86	1.18	0.85	1.18	0.85	1.16	0.86
Conflict duration ^a	2.55	0.39	1.29	0.78	1.22	0.82	2.37	0.42	1.22	0.82	1.24	0.80
Conflict intensity	1.28	0.78	2.14	0.47	1.22	0.82	1.23	0.82	2.44	0.41	1.22	0.82
Government violence	1.18	0.85	1.18	0.85	4.19	0.24	1.18	0.85	1.18	0.85	2.87	0.35
Polity2	1.68	0.60	1.73	0.58	1.70	0.59	1.69	0.59	1.68	0.60	1.68	0.60
Polity2 squared	1.60	0.63	1.60	0.62	1.60	0.63	1.61	0.62	1.60	0.63	1.60	0.63
Population density ^a	1.29	0.77	1.31	0.76	1.30	0.77	1.31	0.76	1.29	0.77	1.31	0.76
Mean VIF	1.92		1.51		1.81		2.04		1.57		1.57	

^aVariable log-transformed due to skewed distribution.

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