The explanationist argument for moral realismTools Sinclair, Neil (2011) The explanationist argument for moral realism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 41 (1). pp. 1-24. ISSN 1911-0820 Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://www.canadianjournalofphilosophy.com
AbstractIn this paper I argue that the explanationist argument in favour of moral realism fails. According to this argument, the ability of putative moral properties to feature in good explanations provides strong evidence for, or entails, the metaphysical claims of moral realism. Some have rejected this argument by denying that moral explanations are ever good explanations. My criticism is different. I argue that even if we accept that moral explanations are (sometimes) good explanations the metaphysical claims of realism do not follow.
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