An Evaluation of America's Security Transfers during the Cold War

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Abbreviations

ARVN   Army of the Republic of Vietnam

KMAG   Korean Military Advisory Group

KPA   Korean People's Army

MACV   Military Assistance Command Vietnam

NVA   North Vietnamese Army

ROKA   Republic of Korea Army

Visual Aids

Abstract

As the United States participates in a military conflict inside a developing country, it is common for instability to surface in many locations. At first, U.S. officials attempted to cope with this issue by keeping combat troops in a nation for decades. Over the course of time, though, they began to have local forces assume the responsibilities of American soldiers. To ascertain whether this transferal policy is an effective tool for decreasing instability, it is imperative to evaluate prior missions in nations such as South Korea and South Vietnam.

While looking at the literatures about the Korean and Vietnam Wars, it becomes evident that most of the assessments of the transfers in South Korea and South Vietnam lack degrees of success and failure. These works also do not contain convincing explanations for the outcomes in South Korea and South Vietnam. To properly explain the result of a security transfer, it is necessary to devote a substantial amount of attention to many determinants and the interplay between them. In their explanations, researchers overlook key factors that contributed to the outcomes inside South Korea and South Vietnam.

 The main objective of the thesis is to contribute to the literatures regarding the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. Through the utilization of levels of success and failure from policy studies publications, it will be possible to conduct sophisticated appraisals of the transfers within South Korea and South Vietnam. There will then be an opportunity to offer persuasive explanations for the outcomes that emerged in these developing countries. The thesis uses principal-agent concepts as a framework to guide the empirical data and help a reader see the influence of the determinants that were not taken into account in prior works.

This study will also be of interest to parties outside of academia. Given its prior

behavior, it is safe to say that the U.S. will conduct more transfers in the developing world in the years ahead. Consequently, policymakers should be more familiar with the circumstances that are conducive to successful operations. The content from the explanations for the outcomes in South Korea and South Vietnam will be used to construct a set of conditions which is likely to lead to productive initiatives in conventional conflicts.

1. Introduction

Main Goals

To accomplish its objectives in the developing world, the United States sometimes needs to participate in wars. During a conflict, instability surfaces within the target country. When this issue emerges, the courses of action for dealing with it are limited. Since officials in Washington want to end their involvement in the arduous war, they will be reluctant to let American troops remain in charge of a stabilization effort. Instead, a more appealing option will be to give the responsibility of leading the effort to local forces after years of training and combat experience.

American policymakers devoted a lot of attention to Asia in the Cold War. During the Second World War, a communist network became quite active in the Filipino countryside. A year after the war ended, this organization mounted a major insurgency against the American-backed government in Manila (Ambrose and Brinkley 1997, 117). From 1946 to 1954, local units led the effort to combat the resistance campaign. While American combat troops did not lead the security effort in this Asian nation, they did head the initiatives within Japan, South Korea and South Vietnam for extended periods. Over the course of time, though, Japanese, South Korean and South Vietnamese personnel inherited the task of maintaining security within their respective countries.

After the Cold War ended, the U.S. launched a campaign to decrease terrorist attacks by Islamic extremist organizations. During the initiative, American officials sent troops to Afghanistan to head a stabilization effort for many years. They also deployed soldiers to Iraq to lead a security campaign for an extended stretch. When U.S. servicemen left these Muslim

nations, Iraqi and Afghan personnel assumed control of the stabilization operations.

The first inclination of some may be to presume that it is appropriate to evaluate the transferal policy by looking at the more recent initiatives from the War on Terror. However, it is actually advantageous to refrain from focusing on them in an assessment. To provide the most accurate readings of the performances of fledgling forces during transfers, it is necessary to utilize data from advisory reports and other documents composed by eyewitnesses (Blanken and Lepore 2015, xii). At the moment, only the key documents for the operations during the Cold War are available.[1] As a result, one can present more veracious accounts of the performances of the nascent armies associated with these missions.

Although reports from advisors and other actors can be an asset in an assessment of the Cold War transfers, they possess a noteworthy limitation. The members of local security forces performed duties before and after engagements that were supposed to increase the likelihood of success, including conducting patrols and gathering intelligence about the locations and capabilities of enemy units. Within declassified reports, American personnel, like a lot of observers who compose accounts during transfers, do not devote much attention to the conducting of these non-combat responsibilities. Instead, they primarily concentrate on how soldiers carried out certain tasks in skirmishes. Because the reports are written in this fashion, it will only be possible to get veracious readings of the combat performances of local security forces.

The most common way to measure policy success is by comparing results to the goals of

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[1] According to the United States National Archives, there is presently no timetable for the release of the pertinent reports for the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

government leaders (McConnell 2015, 232). While transfers occurred during the Cold War,

officials from the United States and developing countries often possessed different priorities.

The former wanted soldiers to develop the capacity to assume control of campaigns to stabilize

different regions (Record 1998, 123). The latter, on the other hand, hoped that troops would

go on to thwart coups by rogue elements (Talmadge 2015, 9). When faced with divergent aims,

it is necessary to decide whether to compare results to the intentions of those in the United

States or developing nations. Given how one of the target audiences of the study is U.S.

policymakers, it will be appropriate to compare the outcomes of Cold War transfers to the

primary American goal and answer the following questions:

Main Research Questions: Did the major Cold War transfers produce armies with the

capacity to effectively manage stabilization efforts? Why did different outcomes

surface during the major Cold War transfers?

Sub-questions: Did a fledgling force contribute to the emergence or continuation of

stability following the commencement of a transfer?

If a transfer succeeded, what factors enabled this desirable result to emerge?

If a transfer failed, what factors generated the disappointing outcome?

In addressing the questions, the thesis advances the following arguments and answers:

Argument #1: The Republic of Korea Army qualifies as a force with the capacity to

effectively lead a stabilization campaign since it contributed to the continuation of stability

below the thirty-eighth parallel during the second Korean transfer.

Argument #2: The Army of the Republic of Vietnam does not qualify as a force with the ability to effectively lead a stabilization effort because it failed to contribute to the maintenance of stability underneath the seventeenth parallel during the Vietnam War transfer.

Argument #3: Factors such as responsible troop withdrawals and a long-term residual force led to the success in Korea.

Argument #4: Determinants like precipitous troop drawdowns and a short-term residual force led to the failure in Vietnam.

The first and second arguments make it appropriate to present this answer:

Answer to the First Major Research Question: Only one major transfer produced an army with the capacity to effectively manage stabilization efforts.

The third and fourth arguments make it appropriate to present this answer:

Answer to the Second Major Research Question: Factors such as cautious withdrawals and a long-term residual force precipitated the successful outcome in the first major Cold War transfer, while determinants like hurried drawdowns and a short-term residual force caused the unsuccessful outcome in the second major Cold War transfer.

What Transfers Will Be Examined in the Thesis?

This section will be used to identify the transfers that will be examined in the study. It became apparent above that the thesis will concentrate on the combat performances of nascent armies. The members of some fledgling forces did not receive a lot of chances to participate in battles after assuming the responsibilities of American personnel. These transfers

will be discussed in the first subsection. The focus will then shift to the major transfers that warrant attention in the last subsection.

Transfers That Will Not Be Examined

Once a communist government came to power in China following the Second World War, U.S. leaders feared that Japan would also become partners with Moscow. To prevent this turn of events from happening, these figures kept troops inside Japan (Haruki 2014, 98). After they took this step, communist nations did not launch a military operation to take control of Japan. As a result, when the members of Japan's armed forces and security services assumed control of regions in their homeland, they, like the West German personnel who inherited areas from Americans, did not participate in many battles. Considering how there are not any chances to ascertain whether the Japanese possessed the capacity to adequately secure inherited regions, it would be prudent to refrain from examining this case in the thesis.

The first transfer in Korea took place during the latter portion of the 1940s. After the conclusion of the Second World War, American and Soviet negotiators agreed to divide Korea at the thirty-eighth parallel. Following the completion of the deal, Washington sent a contingent of troops to South Korea to protect a new government from attacks by North Korea (Sandler 1999, 35). In the middle of 1949, U.S. officials elected to give the recently formed ROKA the responsibility of heading the security campaign in South Korea. Once Pyongyang launched an invasion a year later, American troops quickly took over the defensive effort and fought most of the battles against North Korean forces. Consequently, it would not be possible to properly assess the capabilities of ROKA personnel at the time of the initial Korean transfer.

Major Transfers That Will Be Examined

American troops remained in control of the effort to halt communist aggression for one year. Then, in 1951, U.S. policymakers took steps so the ROKA could head the military campaign. As South Korean soldiers led the war effort from 1951 to 1953, they fought in many engagements against communist forces. Through the examination of significant clashes, it will be possible to see how the figures in the ROKA protected inherited regions in a satisfactory fashion during the second transfer on the Korean Peninsula.

The transfer inside South Vietnam commenced in the latter portion of the 1960s. During it, the North Vietnamese often attempted to seize territory below the seventeenth parallel. Because they frequently resorted to aggression, the experience of South Vietnamese soldiers was comparable to what ROK personnel encountered between 1951 and 1953. In other words, the troops in the ARVN participated in grueling clashes on a number of occasions (Hammond 1998, 293-294). By looking at pivotal battlefield performances in the upcoming chapters, it will be possible to notice how the South Vietnamese did not secure assumed areas in an adequate manner.

Types of Transfers That Can Be Performed with Local Forces

The United States can perform a complete or partial transfer inside a developing nation. This section will give the reader an opportunity to become familiar with these operations. In the following paragraphs, it will also be important to properly identify the missions which will be

taken into consideration later in the thesis.

Complete Transfers

A complete transfer involves a local force inheriting all the security responsibilities in a developing state. It should only happen when U.S. officials believe personnel possess the ability to act in an autonomous fashion. There are occasions, though, when the members of a military, who have yet to meet this standard, assume every responsibility from American servicemen. This unwanted development sometimes takes place because policymakers in Washington receive misleading information from the theater of operations. In 1949, advisors and other figures on the Korean Peninsula claimed that the ROKA could halt a North Korean attack without American assistance. As a result, civilian officials concluded that a complete withdrawal should transpire below the thirty-eighth parallel. After South Korean troops failed to thwart the North Korean offensive in 1950, these leaders recognized that they made a major error at the end of the 1940s.

Besides inaccurate information, political conditions on the home front can precipitate an imprudent complete transfer overseas. When a transfer commences, it is common for an anti-war movement to be prevalent inside the United States. If protests and other forms of collective political action increase as the transfer continues, policymakers may be forced to hand over all the security responsibilities within the target state to underperforming servicemen. The material in the upcoming pages will demonstrate the manner in which this undesirable turn of events occurred in South Vietnam during the 1970s.

Partial Transfers

Since a force seldom develops the capacity to perform all the responsibilities in a developing nation, it is prudent to carry out a partial transfer. Table 1.1 shows that there are two ways the U.S. can perform a partial transfer. One option is to keep a considerable number of American personnel in a war zone. If thousands of troops remain in a location, they can defend the areas which the members of a local force are not yet capable of securing. When defending assigned areas, a residual force sometimes manages to deter major attacks by enemy troops. The examination of the second transfer in Korea will provide an opportunity to see a large residual force serving as a deterrent since thousands of American troops prevented a substantial communist offensive while they secured one of the sectors on the defensive line by the thirty-eighth parallel.

U.S. policymakers, as the empirical chapters in the thesis will demonstrate, depend heavily on reports from personnel in a theater of operations while they consider a partial transfer. In addition to identifying the shortcomings of the fledgling force in their reports, personnel will indicate what type of operation they think should take place. If these figures do not recommend a partial transfer with a large amount of soldiers, they will encourage their civilian masters to perform one with a limited number of servicemen. A small residual force does not contain an adequate number of men to secure different areas. As a result, when policymakers elect to conduct a compact operation, they instruct the members of the residual force to support the local personnel who are trying to stabilize every region. It is common for assistance to come in the form of aviators dropping bombs on enemy strongholds. In fact, if a

formidable anti-war movement was not prevalent in the United States during the 1970s,

policymakers probably would have mounted an initiative that consisted of a group of pilots

providing air cover for the soldiers in the ARVN (Kissinger 1979, 986).

Table 1.1

Different Types of Transfers
-Complete Transfer: American Servicemen Relinquish All the Security Responsibilities in the Developing Country   -Possible Partial Transfer with a Substantial Number of American Personnel: Thousands of U.S. Troops Maintain Control of Certain Regions   -Conceivable Partial Transfer with a Small Number of American Personnel: Small Contingent of U.S. Pilots Provides Aerial Support for a Local Force Attempting to Secure Every Region

Justification for Completing the Study

There are multiple reasons why the examinations of the partial transfer in Korea and

complete transfer in Vietnam should be conducted. One is that the analyses can make

contributions to the pools of literature on the Korean conflict, the Vietnam War and war

termination. Another is the investigations can provide more insight into the principal-agent

partnerships which impact security transfers. The last reason why the inquiries should be

performed is policymakers need more knowledge about the conditions which produce effective

transfers.

Empirical Contributions

A pool of literature about a particular topic evolves over the course of time. Since the emergence of the body of literature about the Korean War, most scholars have refrained from concentrating closely on the second transfer below the thirty-eighth parallel. However, in the future, this subject could gain more attention from researchers. If more individuals start to focus on the transfer, they should be able to develop a firm understanding of the operation. By filling certain gaps within the literature, it will be possible to provide interested parties with a solid understanding of the initiative. Within prior evaluations, scholars just labeled the transfer as a success (Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 137; Gibby 2012, 131). Consequently, they made it seem as if ROK personnel developed the capacity to conduct all the security responsibilities in their homeland. The soldiers did not make this much progress over the course of the mission, though. Through the employment of levels of success from a policy studies publication, there will be an opportunity to present an accurate reading of the transfer outcome. Besides providing a veracious account of the result, the thesis will set forth a persuasive explanation for why long-term stability emerged on the Korean Peninsula. In the past, analysts attempted to explain the favorable result by focusing heavily on American aid, the surfacing of more qualified leaders at the top of the ROKA, and the improvement in the training system for South Korean soldiers. Because they dedicated so many pages to these determinants, there was not enough room to take other contributing factors into consideration. To provide a persuasive explanation for the outcome in the upcoming pages, it will be necessary

to take the overlooked determinants into account.

The second major transfer from the Cold War has received more attention within the literature about the Vietnam War in recent years. Unless multiple gaps are filled in the literature, though, readers will not be able to develop a firm understanding of this operation. Most of the earlier studies about the transfer called the mission a failure (Clarke 1988, 517; Collins 2014, 129-130). This label insinuates that the South Vietnamese Army never impressed American leaders during the initiative in Southeast Asia. However, there were occasions when ARVN personnel performed well on the battlefield. With the employment of degrees of failure from policy studies publications, there will be a chance to produce an assessment which contains a veracious account of the result below the seventeenth parallel. In addition to an accurate reading of the transfer outcome, the literature pertaining to the Vietnamese conflict needs a persuasive explanation for why the security situation in South Vietnam deteriorated during the 1970s. While explaining the result in Vietnam, researchers utilized the same approach as the individuals who tried to explain the outcome of the Korean operation. Since these analysts concentrated heavily on a limited amount of factors, they neglected key determinants within their explanations. To provide a convincing explanation for the outcome later in the thesis, it will be imperative to take the previously disregarded factors into consideration.

Since a transfer usually takes place during the latter portion of a conflict, the thesis should be connected to the wider body of literature that deals with this phase of a war. That is, it should be linked to the war termination literature. During the Cold War and War on Terrorism, a lot of interventions in developing countries involved soldiers attempting to quell insurgencies. When major powers encountered adversity in the operations, many elected to complete

unilateral withdrawals. Because unilateral withdrawals often transpired in unconventional conflicts, most war termination scholars examined them within their respective publications (Kolenda 2019, 992; Paul, Clarke, Grill and Dunigin 2013, 149). As a result, readers cannot currently gain an adequate amount of knowledge about how nations unilaterally end major operations in conventional conflicts. The thesis can shed some light on this topic since the selected cases entail the United States unilaterally halting its direct involvement in two conventional wars. There are two major lessons that the reader will be able to learn in subsequent pages. One is that a nation can secure an auspicious peace once an ally begins to withdraw from a war zone. The other is that factors such as the maintenance of material assistance from the withdrawing partner increase the likelihood of this desirable outcome.

Theoretical Insights

Principal-agent theory concentrates on situations where weak actors perform tasks on behalf of strong ones. In the selected cases, the United States tried to get agents to perform the security responsibilities within developing countries in a productive manner. Therefore, it will be appropriate to utilize principal-agent theory in the pages ahead to help explain key events. Through the employment of this perspective, it will be possible to provide new insights into the relationships that impact transfers. One, which will be emphasized quite frequently, is that the principal should directly monitor the agent's personnel and enemy forces and collect information with clandestine methods when overt observers can no longer perform their duties within a theater of operations effectively. Another is that the principal sometimes thinks about using drastic measures such as covert action to alter the conduct of a recalcitrant agent.   A third

insight is that the principal should respond to the prevalence of an underperforming agent by launching an assistance campaign. The last insight is that pressure from internal groups sometimes makes the agent hesitant to cooperate with its partner and the principal can overcome this problem by gaining more leverage than the domestic factions.

After being established, a theory does not remain in its original form. Instead, as the history of realism displays, scholars refine it over the course of time. One of the main benefits that comes from taking this step is the perspective develops the capacity to explain more phenomena (Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016, 2). By highlighting the above insights in this study, it will be possible to refine principal-agent theory so that future works can shed light on more developments associated with security transfers.

American Leaders Need More Knowledge about What Conditions Generate Productive Transfers

Following the Cold War, Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the early 1990s, and other policymakers asserted that America should avert prolonged military interventions in the future.[2] For a period of time, it appeared as if the United States would refrain from conducting lengthy missions abroad since initiatives like Operation Desert Storm took days and weeks as opposed to years. Under George W. Bush, though, extended initiatives resurfaced. During the first year of his presidency, Bush mounted the protracted military intervention in Afghanistan. Two years later, he decided to launch the long operation in Iraq.

Because the initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan did not generate desirable outcomes,

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[2] For Powell's argument against prolonged interventions, see U.S. Forces: The Challenges Ahead.

most American leaders are presently reluctant to launch other extended missions overseas.

However, the decline of isolationist sentiment in the early 1940s demonstrates that a

perspective can rapidly lose strength in Washington after a major event takes place on the

world stage. If the U.S. suffers a harmful attack against a military base or a significant ally's

forces are overrun by an adversary, officials may conclude that a protracted campaign in a

developing country is necessary and then initiate another transfer at the appropriate time.

Consequently, leaders should learn more about the conditions under which transfers should

succeed. One can see the manner in which some officials do not possess a sufficient amount of

knowledge regarding what conditions should be prevalent at the end of a conflict by taking the

comments of Ben Rhodes, a Deputy National Security Advisor from 2009 to 2017, into account.

For decades, Rhodes has written about how U.S. military operations should transpire in books

and articles. Within these publications, he has consistently focused on what developments

should allow the U.S. to initiate effective missions (Rhodes 2018, 174). The content in the

following pages can provide Rhodes and other figures with much needed insight into the

circumstances that should increase the likelihood of success during the latter stages of

campaigns.

Chapter Structure

There will be seven more chapters in the thesis. The material in Chapter Two will

demonstrate the empirical contributions of the thesis to the bodies of literature on the Korean

conflict, the Vietnamese conflict and war termination. Chapter Three will outline and justify the

research design and methodological choices. Chapter Four will further discuss principal-agent

theory and explain how it will be used to guide the subsequent empirical work. The

examinations will be conducted in Chapters Five through Seven. Chapter Five will assess the

transfers to show that success surfaced in Korea and failure emerged in Vietnam. Following the

evaluations, the focus will shift to explaining the results of the initiatives. Chapter Six will

examine the determinants that produced the success in Korea. Chapter Seven, by contrast, will

examine the factors which precipitated the failure in Vietnam. The final chapter of the thesis

will identify important conclusions and topics for investigation in future studies.

2. Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter places the thesis in the context of three pools of literature to demonstrate its empirical contributions. To display the gaps in these literatures and the contributions of this thesis, it will be necessary to proceed through multiple steps. The next section will present the features of a rigorous assessment. The third and fourth sections will then put the information from the second section into dialogue with works on the case studies from the literatures about the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts to demonstrate how these literatures lack thorough appraisals. Upon revealing the gaps in the literatures pertaining to the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts, the focus will shift to the wider pool of literature in which the thesis is situated. The fifth section will display that the literature on war termination studies needs insight into key topics, including what factors can enable stability to surface when one country unilaterally ends its active role in a conventional conflict within the developing world.

What Does It Take to Complete a Thorough Evaluation?

This section will consist of three parts. In the first subsection, content from policy studies publications will show that an evaluation should contain several levels of success and failure. Within the second subsection, material from foreign policy analysis and strategic studies works will demonstrate that an assessment should try to identify all the conditions which generated policy success or failure. Inside the third subsection, information from strategic studies publications will display the way that an appraisal should have metrics to ascertain whether an initiative succeeded or failed.

The Need for Several Levels of Policy Success and Failure

   Since policies seldom succeed or fail all of the time, an analyst should employ levels of

success and failure during the evaluation process (McConnell 2010, 346). The limited number

of historians who conduct appraisals possess different perspectives about whether degrees of

success and failure should appear in an assessment (Van Evera 1997, 93). It is appropriate to

conclude that Michael Sherry is one of the individuals who believes a policy should not be

referred to as simply a success or failure. After all, in the latter portion of the 1980s, he used a

sophisticated term to describe the result of the major American bombing campaigns during the

Second World War. When American officials initiated the bombing campaigns in Germany

and Japan, they wanted to eliminate a number of plants that manufactured weapons and

military bases. As a result, Sherry attempted to determine the effectiveness of the efforts by

comparing these goals with the conditions that surfaced on German and Japanese territory.

Through the examination of different primary documents, the historian learned that American

aviators just managed to seriously damage significant industrial and military targets from time

to time, so he concluded the initiative deserved to be called a limited success (Sherry 1987,

360). On this occasion, the sophisticated term enabled the evaluator to present an accurate

reading of a particular outcome. However, a policy may generate a more favorable result once

a nation implements it in a certain setting. If this is the case, it will only be possible for the

appraiser to provide the reader with a veracious description of the outcome by utilizing more

than one positive label.

   Paul Schroeder is one of the historians who thinks levels of success and failure are

unnecessary. During the 1930s, Japan invaded Manchuria and other territories in the Far East.

In the early portion of the next decade, it continued to perform offensive operations in the

region. For most of 1941, the United States tried to prevent Japanese aggression with

economic measures such as an oil embargo. Within one of his publications, Schroeder took the time to evaluate the American policy of economic pressure. To ascertain whether it succeeded, he compared results to the goals of American officials. When figures in Washington implemented the policy, they wanted to see Japan start to relinquish control of certain portions of Asia, especially land inside China. Since this turn of events did not transpire, Schroeder labeled the policy as a failure (1961, 203).[1]

While reading strategic studies publications, one often comes across evaluations that are comparable to the one in Schroeder's work (Van Evera 1997, 91). Daniel Drezner is one of the strategic studies scholars who thinks it is not imperative to utilize degrees of success and failure. For centuries, the leaders of nations have tried to alter the conduct of their adversaries with sanctions. To discern whether they are effective, Drezner compared the goals of some nations at the time that sanctions were imposed with the subsequent behavior of target countries. In most cases, he found that the target states did not behave differently after the introduction of punitive measures. Consequently, he refrained from labeling sanctions as an effective method for advancing the interests of a state.[2]

Paul Huth is another strategic studies researcher who does not believe in using degrees of success and failure. Within one of his works, Huth examines the utilization of the deterrence strategy between 1885 and 1984. During this period of time, he found fifty-eight cases where nations employed the strategy (Huth 1988, 23-26). On many occasions, government officials had opportunities to see adversaries refrain from utilizing coercion. Because Huth encountered a lot of instances where results matched the aims of policymakers, he concluded

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[1] For other historical evaluations like the one in Schroeder's work, see Paul Kennedy's *Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945* and Gerhard Ritter's *The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth.*

[2] Although a lot of strategic studies works just label policies as successes or failures, it should be noted that some studies contain a limited number of degrees of success and failure. One of these publications will be taken into consideration in the fourth section of the chapter.

that deterrence is an effective strategy under certain conditions.

Most policy studies researchers recognize an assessment should contain degrees of success and failure. However, there are differences between them that warrant some attention. According to the members of one school of thought, a policy that does not generate auspicious results all of the time should be called a partial success (Howlett 2012, 549). It is imprudent for an analyst to depend on one positive label during the evaluation process. After all, as mentioned in the above discussion about Sherry's work, the term cannot provide an accurate reading of every result that falls short of complete success.

Some policy studies researchers recommend utilizing more than one positive label. One of the most well-known advocates of this fruitful approach is Allan McConnell. Within one of his publications, he mentions that an assessor may encounter a policy that generates auspicious results most of the time or one which produces favorable outcomes half of the time. If the evaluator comes across the former, he or she should refer to it as a resilient success (McConnell 2010, 352). On the other hand, if the appraiser encounters the latter, he or she should call it a conflicted success (McConnell 2010, 352).

Although prominent policy studies scholars agree that an appraiser should employ a sophisticated approach when dealing with an unsuccessful policy, they possess different perspectives about how many degrees of failure exist.[3] Some researchers believe that one term should be used to describe any policy which falls short of complete failure. Roger Cobb and David Primo prefer to call a policy that does not generate undesirable results all of the time a major failure (2003, 1-12). If an evaluator encounters unfavorable results the majority of the time like Drezner did in his work about sanctions, it will be appropriate to use the term major

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[3] One can also find a major difference between policy studies scholars while concentrating on the topic of ontology. Some participants in the debate over ontology fall into the positivist camp. Others, in contrast, belong to the post-positivist school of thought. For more on the positivist and post-positivist perspectives, please see the second section of Chapter Three.

failure. However, if he or she only comes into contact with them half of the time, it will be inappropriate to utilize the label because it does not provide an accurate reading of the policy outcome.

Another contingent within the field of policy studies looks at policies, which fall short of complete failure, in a more effective manner. Rather than promoting the employment of one label like the members of the above group, the figures affiliated with this school of thought insist that an appraiser should select from multiple options. McConnell suggests that the features of the case should serve as a guide for the assessor during the selection process. For instance, if the policy that the evaluator is taking into consideration just failed on a limited number of occasions, he or she should call it a tolerable failure (McConnell 2015, 233).

Conditions Responsible for Policy Success or Failure

Officials working within the corridors of power in Washington or any other capital want to know the circumstances that will probably generate policy success and failure (George and Bennet 2005, 273). Consequently, at some point in an evaluation, an analyst should take the time to identify all the conditions that led to a successful or unsuccessful outcome in a particular setting. To unearth each condition that impacted a policy outcome, it is necessary to concentrate on both the international and domestic levels. According to a lot of strategic studies researchers, conditions on the international level have the most impact on a result. One way to notice this emphasis on the international realm is by focusing on the period that precedes the outbreak of a major conflict. During the stretch before the commencement of a war, a national leader may try to avert violence by negotiating with an adversary. Although domestic factors can influence the outcome of diplomatic negotiations, strategic studies scholars tend to

disregard them. Instead, as Russell Leng's *Interstate Crisis Behavior* shows, they primarily attempt to identify the international conditions which can increase the likelihood of successful talks between rivals.

Foreign policy analysis researchers think that circumstances within nations have the strongest impact on policy outcomes. Since the United States frequently conducts interventions, they have used many publications to establish what internal events will make it easier for this power to conduct successful military operations. Figures like Ronald Steel acknowledge that the developments within target countries are important. However, they are far more concerned with favorable circumstances inside the United States. According to them, the most important condition, which must be present on the American home front at the time of an intervention, is popular support (Steel 1995, 137; Hilsman 1967, 11).

From the information in the preceding paragraph, one can gather that foreign policy analysis researchers dedicate a lot of attention to the impact which citizens in the U.S. and other countries can have on policy outcomes. It is important to note, though, that figures in this field also concentrate on the manner in which the decision-making environment within the corridors of power in Paris or another capital can influence results. Within their study about the conditions that can surface during policy-making sessions, Alex Mintz and Carly Wayne focus heavily on groupthink. They, like the authors of some other foreign policy analysis publications, mention how it often leads to the implementation of flawed policies since skeptics do not have an opportunity to share valid concerns with their peers (Mintz and Wayne 2016, 91).

The Importance of Metrics

Unless metrics appear in an appraisal, it will not be possible to verify if success emerged in a location. While reading strategic studies publications, one becomes cognizant of the manner in which figures in this field possess different perspectives regarding what measures should be utilized in a study. The members of one school of thought believe that it is advantageous for an analyst to depend on quantitative measures (Reiter and Stam 1998, 259-277).[4] In 1999, the U.S. and some European states conducted a bombing campaign over Serbia. At the time, the leaders of these nations claimed that they wanted to prevent Serbian security forces from killing innocent civilians in Kosovo. To ascertain whether success appeared during an operation such as this one, it is imperative to look closely at estimates of how many people survived in the target state.

In the example from above, the researcher needed to see if a positive trend surfaced after the initiation of a military campaign. There are occasions, though, when the analyst wants to determine whether a particular group contributed to the establishment or maintenance of certain conditions. If the scholar possesses such a goal, he or she cannot depend on statistics. Rather, as the proponents of qualitative metrics have noted, the individual needs to find out if the figures in a group performed different tasks in a satisfactory manner (Blanken and Lepore 2015, 6). Michael Richardson used this approach to determine whether the members of the U.S. Army contributed to the establishment of new conditions on the Southern Plains towards the conclusion of the nineteenth century. At the time, American officials wanted to make it impossible for the Kiowi, Comanche, and other Indian tribes to continue living in their settlements.

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[4] Reiter and Stam are not the only ones who possess an affinity for statistics. For another work that promotes the employment of statistics, please see Scott Sigmund Gartner's *Strategic Assessment in War*.

Consequently, they instructed cavalry members to destroy homes, seize food supplies, and so forth. Because the cavalry members managed to perform most of these assignments while the campaign was in progress, Richardson labeled it as a success (2015, 105-106).

Richardson is not the only researcher who has benefited from focusing on the completion of tasks. Within another study, Michael Shafer wanted to ascertain whether the American attempt to help allies fight insurgencies during the Cold War succeeded. To accomplish this objective, he devoted a lot of attention to South Vietnam's counterinsurgency campaign during the early portion of the 1960s (Shafer 1988, 15). When Shafer examined different battles, he noticed that South Vietnamese personnel failed to complete certain tasks in an adequate manner. These performances, along with some other factors, prompted Shafer to label the American effort as a failure.

The preceding content demonstrated that an evaluation should consist of several levels of success and failure, a discussion about all the conditions which contributed to policy success or failure and metrics. Within the next two sections, it will be possible to see whether publications from the main bodies of literature contain these features. Although the reviews in subsequent sections will vary in length, they will be structured in the same fashion. A review will commence with a discussion that shows the evolution of a pool of literature about a particular conflict. There will then be analyses of the works about a transfer. The review will conclude with a discussion which highlights where the thesis sits in certain debates and how it will fill gaps that authors have left.

<u>The American Transfer in Korea</u>

Overview of the Literature about the Korean War

It did not take long for historians and strategic studies scholars to start writing about different aspects of the Korean conflict. When military personnel participated in the First and Second World Wars, their civilian masters did not impose many constraints on how they could employ force in different theaters of operations. The outbreak of the Korean War brought an end to this period of total war since political leaders set forth a lot of restrictions. Towards the end of the 1950s, scholars began to discuss these limitations in various publications.[5] In the 1960s, figures continued to concentrate on them, but their interest waned during subsequent decades.

The limited nature of the Korean conflict is not the only topic that received less attention over the course of time. In the middle of 1951, cease-fire talks commenced between capitalist and communist representatives. These individuals did not experience a breakthrough at the negotiating table until the Spring of 1953. Shortly after the war concluded, analysts started to study the cease-fire talks to see what kept negotiators from reaching a settlement at an earlier date. As a result, a number of publications regarding the negotiations appeared in the 1950s and 1960s.[6] Following this period, though, it became difficult for readers to find books and articles pertaining to the meetings at Kaesong and Panmunjom.

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[5] For analyses of the restrictions placed on the utilization of coercion, see Robert Osgood's *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*, David Rees' *Korea: The Limited War*, Seymour Deitchman's *Limited War and American Defense Policy* and Morton Halperin's *Limited War in the Nuclear Age*.

[6] For discussions about the cease-fire negotiations, see William Vatcher's *Panmunjom: The Story of the Korean Military Armistice*, Walter Hermes' *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, Robert Leckie's *Conflict: The History of the Korean War, 1950-1953,* and Robert Oliver's *Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth*.

While some topics became less appealing following the 1950s and 1960s, others continued to attract attention in the scholarly community. Of these themes, the one, which maintained the most interest, was the American failure to experience a decisive victory on the Korean Peninsula. Like their predecessors, most analysts in the latter portion of the twentieth century attributed the absence of a convincing American victory to two major factors. Some historians and strategic studies scholars ascribed the outcome to the poor relationship between Harry Truman and Douglas MacArthur.[7] Others, in contrast, claimed that the result emerged because Chinese soldiers began to participate in the war.[8]

Certain topics have become more popular in the scholarly community during the early portion of the twenty-first century. When researchers initially examined the impact of the war on the capitalist bloc, they dedicated a considerable amount of attention to the United States and South Korea since these states provided the majority of the troops for the effort to halt communist aggression. In recent years, though, analysts have started to widen their focus. Within some publications, scholars have used pages to examine the manner in which the conflict influenced Japan. Pilots from the United States and other capitalist nations, who flew sorties inside the theater of operations, were situated in Japan during the war. This country also served as the staging area for soldiers participating in the major amphibious landings above and below the thirty-eighth parallel. Developments such as servicemen making purchases at stores in Tokyo and other locations during leaves helped the Japanese economy grow while the war was in

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[7] Late twentieth century publications about this relationship include David McCullough's *Truman,* Michael Schaller's *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General*, Harold Gosnell's *Truman's Crises*, Robert Donovan's *Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry Truman, 1949-1953* and William Manchester's *American Caesar*.
[8] Late twentieth century works regarding this turn of events include Russell Gugeler's *Combat Actions in Korea*, Roy Appleman's *East of Chosin*, Bruce Cumings' *Korea's Place in the Sun*, Paul Edwards' *The Korean War* and James Schnabel's *The Korean War: Policy and Direction The First Year.*

progress (Haruki 2014, 285).

Although the neglect of some topics has ended during the early portion of the twenty-first century, other issues have continued to receive an inadequate amount of attention from scholars, including the main strategy that U.S. officials utilized to deal with their difficulties in the war zone (Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 90).[9] Over the past two decades, only three major analyses of the transfer have appeared in the literature. These examinations, along with an in-depth investigation from the twentieth century, will be taken into account within the upcoming subsections. As the analyses are discussed, it will become clear that they have left gaps in the literature which the thesis needs to fill.

The Employment of Metrics in Studies about the Transfer

The preceding section showed how an evaluation of a security policy needs metrics. The content in subsequent paragraphs will demonstrate that the studies about the Korean transfer possess measures. It will also display that a major problem is prevalent within the battle analyses of these works.

The evaluators of a transfer, as mentioned in the last chapter, must decide whether to compare outcomes to the expectations of American officials or those of the host government. The appraisers of the Korean initiative prefer to concentrate on the expectations of U.S. policymakers. When American leaders launched the transfer on the Korean Peninsula, they wanted the members of the ROKA to develop the capacity to

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[9] While scholars have neglected the transfer, they have continued to focus heavily on the American failure to achieve a decisive victory on the Korean Peninsula. Most of the recent explanations for this outcome are similar to the ones from the twentieth century. To notice the validity of this point, see H.W. Brands' *The General versus the President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War*, Michael Pearlman's *Truman and MacArthur: Policy, Politics and the Hunger for Honor and Renown*, Donald Farinacci's *Truman and MacArthur: Adversaries for a Common Cause* and Xiaobing Li's *Attack at Chosin.*

prevent Chinese and North Korean forces from conquering South Korea. It is possible, of course, to ascertain whether an army contributed to the preservation or establishment of certain conditions by concentrating on the completion of tasks. Within an article, Stephen Biddle, Julia MacDonald, and Ryan Baker focus on how the South Koreans performed certain responsibilities, especially the holding of territory (2017, 138). It is appropriate to conclude that Bryan Gibby also sees the value of qualitative measures. After all, he devotes attention to the carrying out of various duties in the theater of operations throughout his publication (Gibby 2012, 13).

Battle analyses provide chances to learn if a nascent army possessed the capacity to perform certain tasks with proficiency. During an engagement, several factors can impact events on the battlefield. Following the initiation of a security transfer, policymakers gradually withdraw U.S. soldiers from the war zone. Consequently, when an appraiser examines a battle, he or she should attempt to see whether an intervention by the remaining U.S. servicemen or the actions of the local force was the main cause of auspicious developments like the holding of territory. While examining two battles during the transfer in Korea, Biddle, MacDonald and Baker focus heavily on the conduct of South Korean soldiers. Therefore, it is difficult to see if American personnel had a major impact on these clashes. Inside his book, Gibby takes more skirmishes from the transfer years into account. Like Biddle, MacDonald and Baker, though, he concentrates closely on the behavior of figures from the ROKA. As a result, the reader cannot easily determine whether Americans played an important role in the engagements.

The Absence of Levels of Success

The content in the last subsection showed that researchers have utilized metrics

while studying the transfer in Korea. During the next two subsections, there will be a chance to see the way that these individuals have not integrated the other features of a thorough policy evaluation into their books and articles. Their disregard for levels of success will be taken into account within the remaining paragraphs of this subsection.

Because a security policy usually falls short of complete success during the implementation process, a publication should contain degrees of success so a reader can recognize that it did not produce favorable outcomes on certain occasions. To notice how the Korean War literature needs studies which evaluate the transfer with levels of success, it is necessary to revisit the works from the last subsection. In the first engagement that Biddle, MacDonald and Baker take into consideration within Small Footprint, Small Payoff, South Korean personnel managed to stop multiple Chinese offensives, but they did not keep their opponent from making territorial gains as the second battle transpired. The information from the last section showed how there is a label which can provide a veracious account of a situation that consists of an equal number of policy successes and failures (McConnell 2010, 352). Rather than calling the transfer on the Korean Peninsula a conflicted success, Biddle, MacDonald, and Baker just label it as a "success" (2017, 137).

Besides looking at the engagements from above, Gibby devotes attention to other battles that South Korean troops participated in following the commencement of the transfer. Although Gibby takes more engagements into consideration, he still deserves to be included with Biddle, MacDonald, and Baker in the category of analysts who fail to utilize degrees of success. The members of the South Korean military performed well in most of the engagements examined in *The Will to Win*. Consequently, Gibby could not have referred to the Korean transfer as a conflicted success (McConnell 2010, 352). However, he could have called the initiative underneath the thirty-eighth parallel a

resilient success (McConnell 2010, 352). Instead of utilizing this sophisticated term, he simply says "success is not too strong a word" to describe the campaign (Gibby 2012, 13).

The Overlooking of Significant Factors that Contributed to Success in Korea

At some point in an evaluation of a productive security transfer, a researcher should identify the conditions that allowed the members of a local force to carry out the tasks of departing soldiers in a satisfactory manner. The analysts of the effort on the Korean Peninsula provide explanations for the emergence of success within their respective publications. While reading them, it becomes apparent that they hold conflicting opinions about what determinants had the most impact on the outcome below the thirty-eighth parallel. In addition to discussing these different perspectives in the following paragraphs, it will be imperative to note that the scholars overlook crucial factors.

Biddle, MacDonald and Baker believe that the introduction of an effective soldier training program, the surfacing of many competent commanders at the top of the ROKA, and conditional incentives led to success during the transfer years. Of these determinants, they claim that incentives were the most influential. When policymakers in Washington indicated that military assistance and other benefits would only continue if recommended changes were made in the ROKA, the president usually introduced reforms to mollify them (Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 121-126). Therefore, it is fair to say that these incentives contributed to the favorable result. However, there are other factors that Biddle, MacDonald and Baker fail to take into consideration. For instance, they do not discuss the manner in which cautious troop withdrawals by the United States played a role in the outcome as well.

Gibby's study also demonstrates that the literature needs a work which explains the result of the transfer in a comprehensive fashion. In addition to providing a lot of details about the bolstering of the training program in South Korea, this author concentrates heavily on the evolution at the top of the ROKA. Before the operation, the president consistently filled leadership vacancies in the ROKA with underperforming loyalists. However, while the campaign was in progress, he started to appoint qualified figures. As a result, South Korean soldiers encountered more favorable conditions on the battlefield (Gibby 2012, 6). If Gibby devoted less attention to South Korea's commanders, he could have touched upon other contributing factors, including the presence of a long-term American residual force on the Korean Peninsula.

Robert Sawyer claims that the effective training program was the main factor which allowed success to appear after the commencement of the transfer. During the early stages of the conflict, the ROKA did not suffer from personnel shortages. If numbers declined in an artillery or infantry unit, a sufficient number of replacements could be recruited from villages and towns (Sawyer 1988, 143-144). Before these recruits served in combat, they received a limited amount of training. Consequently, by the time they arrived at the front, they were not prepared to deal with the fierce fighting that was taking place. After hearing about this problem, American military officials reformed the training program so recruits could learn about utilizing basic weapons and elementary tactics for a longer period (Sawyer 1988, 150).

Because he dedicates so much attention to the training initiative on the Korean Peninsula, Sawyer's publication overlooks key determinants that played a part in the productive transfer. It is appropriate to assert that the last major work about the operation also contains this shortcoming since Robert Ramsey just deals with the training of soldiers in

Advising Indigenous Forces.[10] There is an important difference between Ramsey's analysis of the training program and the one conducted by Sawyer. While Sawyer claims the rise in instructional opportunities for soldiers was the main factor which led to the surfacing of the effective training system, Ramsey insists the improvement in instruction was the primary cause of this development. A year before North Korean forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, Washington had a limited number of advisors working with South Korean soldiers. By the time the conflict concluded, though, it had drastically increased the amount of advisors inside South Korea (Ramsey 2006, 10).

The increases in the amount of time that recruits spent at instructional facilities and number of American advisors on the Korean Peninsula certainly contributed to the emergence of the productive training program. However, there were other factors that precipitated this auspicious turn of events. If Sawyer and Ramsey placed less emphasis on the amount of time spent at instructional facilities and rise in advisors, they could have dedicated enough attention to the other key factors. One determinant, which warranted more attention from the authors, is the leadership situation inside the American camp. During a transfer, there is usually an organization that oversees the activities of American advisors in the target country. For a period of time, the entity monitoring the U.S. advisors in South Korea did not have an effective leadership team. American officials, though, eventually arranged for a capable contingent to go to the Far East to guide the advisory effort (Gibby 2012, 179). Once this group of administrators arrived, they made different changes that enhanced the training system for South Korean soldiers, including establishing a field retraining program below the thirty-eighth parallel.

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[10] Biddle, MacDonald and Baker, Gibby, Sawyer and Ramsey are the only individuals who have produced works which contain in-depth analyses of the effort to turn the ROKA into an effective force. There are also some books that contain short sections regarding the development of the South Korean Army. For brief analyses of the strengthening of the ROKA, see William Stueck's *Rethinking the Korean War* and Edgar O'Ballance's *Korea 1950-1953.*

Position of the Thesis in Debates and How It Will Fill Identified Gaps

Within the second subsection, it became evident that scholars realize the battlefield performances of ROK personnel should be used to assess the transfer. However, there is a noticeable problem with the manner in which these individuals examine the conducting of tasks in selected battles. Since U.S. personnel remained in the theater of operations following the start of the transfer, it is important to search for a sizable American intervention while conducting a battle analysis. Rather than utilizing this approach in their publications, evaluators tend to concentrate heavily on the actions of figures from the ROKA. During the upcoming battle analyses, the broad approach will be used so the reader can easily see whether the primary cause of a favorable development was the behavior of South Korean troops or an American intervention.

Following the discussion about metrics, attention turned to the manner in which scholars label the outcome of the Korean transfer. These individuals believe it is sufficient to refer to the result below the thirty-eighth parallel as a success. When a work contains such a label, it is likely that a reader will fail to deduce that there were actually times when the members of a fledgling force did not perform well on the battlefield. In the fifth chapter, a sophisticated evaluation of the Korean initiative will be conducted. Through the utilization of one of McConnell′s labels, it will be possible to provide the reader with a veracious account of the outcome on the Korean Peninsula.

The last subsection showed that researchers attempt to explain the auspicious result in Korea by just concentrating on conditional incentives, the emergence of several competent commanders at the top of the ROKA and the establishment of a productive soldier training

program. As a result, they do not present convincing explanations for the outcome. It will be possible to provide a persuasive explanation for the successful transfer in Chapter Six by proceeding through two steps. At first, attention will be paid to the factors discussed in prior works. The focus will then shift in the second part of the chapter to the determinants which scholars overlooked in these publications.

The Vietnamese Transfer

Overview of the Literature on the Vietnam War

   The pool of literature about the Vietnam War emerged in the midst of the struggle in Southeast Asia. During the 1960s, a formidable anti-war movement surfaced in the United States. A lot of the publications, which initially appeared in the literature, focused on the growth of this movement. Political scientists and historians used different approaches to show the strengthening of the anti-war campaign on the American home front. The former usually attempted to display the bolstering of the movement by concentrating on polling data. The latter, on the other hand, often tried to demonstrate this trend by discussing the increase in anti-war organizations on college campuses across the United States.[11]

   In the aftermath of the war, analysts wanted to develop convincing explanations for another undesirable outcome in the Far East. Some attributed the disappointing result to a series of events that transpired in 1968. At the beginning of the year, communist forces attacked Hue and other cities during a cease-fire. Although the communists failed to seize control of most target areas, the wave of anti-war protests following the Tet

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[11] For works about the rise of the anti-war movement during the 1960s, see Sidney Verba's Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam, Seymour Lipset's Polls and Protests, E.M. Schreiber's Opposition to the Vietnam War among American University Students and Faculty, David Armor's Professors' Attitudes toward the Vietnam War and Arthur Schlesinger's *The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941-1966.*

Offensive forced Lyndon Johnson to initiate peace talks in Paris and take other steps that had the potential to end the war.[12]

The information in the last paragraph shows how the anti-war movement remained of interest to some scholars after the fighting in Vietnam came to an end. There were other researchers, though, who did not attempt to explain the failure in Southeast Asia by concentrating on this campaign. Instead, they tried to shed light on the unfavorable result by focusing on the inner workings of Lyndon Johnson's administration. Upon coming to power in the middle of the 1960s, Johnson decided to send combat troops to South Vietnam and bomb different parts of North Vietnam. At the time that Johnson made these moves, he asserted that the conditions in the Far East would improve considerably. However, unwanted developments continued to transpire, including the infiltration of communist supplies and fighters into South Vietnam. This damaging escalation, according to the second contingent of scholars, would have been averted if Johnson allowed advisors to introduce alternative strategies during meetings at the White House.[13]

In recent years, the American failure to achieve a decisive victory in Vietnam has continued to attract a lot of attention. While looking at works from the early portion of the twenty-first century, it becomes evident that researchers have offered a new explanation for the unfavorable outcome. Although some authors still concentrate on the way the Tet Offensive strengthened the anti-war movement and the decision-making

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[12] Publications regarding the impact of domestic politics include Eliot Cohen's Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars, Leslie Gelb's *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked,* George Herring's *America's Longest War*, Stanley Karnow's *Vietnam: A History,* Michael Maclear's *Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War* and Gabriel Kolko's *Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States and the Modern Historical Experience*.

[13] Studies about the decision-making process during the Johnson presidency include Stephen Rosen's Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War, H.R. McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty*, Larry Berman's *Planning a Tragedy*, Irving Janis' *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes,* Brian VanDeMark's *Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War* and Lloyd Gardner's *Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam*.

environment in the Johnson White House like scholars did during the latter portion of the twentieth century, others focus on Johnson's background within their respective publications.[14] Prior to becoming commander-in-chief, Johnson accumulated knowledge about foreign policy while serving as vice president and a member of Congress. According to the figures from the newly developed school of thought, this knowledge had a strong impact on Johnson's decision-making during the Vietnam conflict (Saunders 2009, 119-161).

In addition to presenting a new explanation for the absence of a convincing American victory, scholars have started to devote more attention to another phase of the war in recent years. Towards the end of the 1990s, one analyst noted that publications gave "relatively little consideration" to the "later years" of the Vietnamese conflict (Sorley 1999, Prologue). During the early portion of the twenty-first century, more works about the 1970s have surfaced in the literature. A considerable number of the studies have dealt with "the inner workings of the Nixon White House." (Daddis 2017, 8). Before he assumed control of the executive branch, Nixon often mentioned that he would concentrate on brokering an honorable peace settlement with the North Vietnamese. Through the analysis of declassified documents, some scholars have found that Nixon did not rely heavily on input from the Secretary of State and the heads of other bureaucratic agencies in the negotiations with North Vietnam. Instead, the president consistently turned to his National Security Advisor for guidance during this

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[14] For the main work on Johnson's background, see Elizabeth Saunders' Transformative Choices. As for recent works about domestic politics and the inner workings of the Johnson administration, see Jonathan Caverley's The Myth of Military Myopia, Alexander Downes' How Smart and Tough Are Democracies?, Edwin Moise's *The Myths of Tet*, James Willbanks' *The Tet Offensive: A Concise History*, David Schmitz's *The Tet Offensive: Politics, War and Public Opinion*, Kelly McHugh's Understanding Congress's Role in Terminating Unpopular Wars, Robert McMahon's The Politics and Geopolitics of American Troop Withdrawals from Vietnam, 1968-1972, Jeffrey Record's The Use and Abuse of History: Munich, Vietnam and Iraq, Jonathan Colman's Lost Crusader? Chester L. Cooper and the Vietnam War, 1963-68, and Fredrik Logevall's Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam.

process (Berman 2001, 21-24).

Besides concentrating on the negotiations with the North Vietnamese, Nixon focused on developing a plan for altering the course of the war. Certain researchers have tried to determine how this commander-in-chief came to the conclusion that a security transfer could improve the conditions below the seventeenth parallel. During 2016, David Prentice composed an article about the initiation of the transfer. Nixon, according to this author, did not decide to launch the mission after speaking to his National Security Advisor. Rather, he elected to take this step upon attending a number of meetings with the Secretary of Defense (Prentice 2016, 445).[15]

New evaluations of the transfer have appeared in the literature during the early 2000s. Although these works possess some strengths, they have left multiple gaps that the thesis needs to fill. Within subsequent subsections, these lacunas will be identified for the reader.

The Employment of Metrics in the Studies about the Vietnamese Transfer

This subsection will show that the researchers who concentrate on the operation in Vietnam include metrics within their publications. It will also demonstrate that they belong to two schools of thought. Some believe it is appropriate to evaluate the transfer below the seventeenth parallel with qualitative metrics. Meanwhile, others think that it should be assessed with quantitative measures.

One proponent of utilizing qualitative metrics during the evaluation process is Caitlin Talmadge. Towards the beginning of *The Dictator's Army*, Talmadge indicates

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[15] For additional works about how Nixon came to conduct the transfer in Vietnam, see Dale Van Atta's *With Honor: Melvin Laird in War, Peace and Politics*, Dale Andrade's Nixon's Vietnam War: The First Eighteen Months, Robert Jervis' The Politics of Troop Withdrawal: Salted Peanuts, the Commitment Trap, and Buying Time, Richard Reeves' *President Nixon: Alone in the White House* and Evan Thomas' *Being Nixon: A Man Divided*.

that she will discern whether the transfer succeeded by focusing on how South Vietnamese troops performed certain tasks in combat (2015, 6). It is advantageous, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, to examine battles in a broad fashion since this approach helps the reader notice when intervening factors enabled a nascent army to hold territory or conduct other tasks in a theater of operations. Rather than examining engagements in a broad fashion, Talmadge concentrates heavily on the actions of South Vietnamese soldiers. Consequently, there are occasions when it is difficult for one to see the manner in which American military operations impacted the outcomes of certain clashes.

It is important to note that some members of the qualitative school refrain from analyzing skirmishes from the transfer years in a narrow manner. Prior to the release of Talmadge's study, Jeffrey Clarke appraised the transfer inside South Vietnam. When he examines engagements within his publication, he devotes attention to both the conduct of South Vietnamese soldiers and U.S. personnel. As a result, it is easy for the reader to notice how American intervention kept North Vietnamese forces from seizing target areas at certain points. For instance, he or she can see that the behavior of American servicemen prevented the NVA from taking control of An Loc in 1972 (Clarke 1988, 482).

Scott Sigmund Gartner is the most prominent figure that objects to concentrating on the completion of tasks while evaluating the operation in Vietnam. Instead of using the term transfer to describe the mission, Gartner prefers to utilize the one that the members of the Nixon administration employed. In other words, he likes to refer to this project as Vietnamization. During the early stages of Differing Evaluations of Vietnamization, there are various indications that Gartner is in favor of assessing the initiative with a quantitative approach. For instance, at one point, he states that he will

utilize "a variety of statistical analyses" to ascertain whether success emerged below the seventeenth parallel (Gartner 1998, 244).

When the transfer commenced, the number of U.S. soldiers being killed and injured in combat was rather high. Consequently, as Gartner mentions, the Nixon foreign policy team wanted the operation to reduce American casualties (1998, 258). This contingent also wanted to see South Vietnamese personnel develop the ability to maintain security within their borders. Because they placed emphasis on this other objective, Gartner should have focused on it at some point. If he did, it would not have been possible for him to learn whether the ARVN contributed to the preservation of stability with statistics. Like Clark and Talmadge, he would have needed to look at how troops performed tasks on the battlefield.

The Consistent Overlooking of Degrees of Success and Failure

For many years, evaluations of the transfer ended with a scholar claiming that it failed. However, just before the start of the twenty-first century, some researchers started to suggest that the initiative succeeded. Although the members of these schools of thought possess conflicting perspectives regarding the outcome of the campaign, there is something that they have in common. Most of them, as will be seen in the following paragraphs, fail to appraise the mission in a sophisticated fashion. As a result, the literature needs works that assess the effort with several levels of success and failure.

In most of the engagements that Clarke examines, the South Vietnamese did not accomplish key objectives on the battlefield. However, they did manage to perform well against the North Vietnamese on a limited number of occasions. Given how Clarke did not encounter complete failure during the evaluation process, it would have been

appropriate for him to include degrees of failure in his study. Rather than taking this step, he merely implies that the transfer failed towards the end of his publication (Clarke 1988, 517).

Although most of the researchers, who claim the transfer failed, utilize the same approach as Clarke, it is worth noting that one figure looks at the operation in a sophisticated manner. Within the first chapter of her publication, Talmadge asserts that soldiers can possess excellent battlefield effectiveness, adequate battlefield effectiveness, or poor battlefield effectiveness. The large number of inadequate performances by the South Vietnamese prompted Talmadge to conclude that they possessed poor battlefield effectiveness. The term poor battlefield effectiveness will likely make a reader conclude that the members of the ARVN never performed well during the transfer years. However, as mentioned in the last paragraph, there were times when they managed to achieve important goals in combat. If Talmadge utilized more than one level of failure, the literature would not currently need a veracious reading of the result in South Vietnam.

Some researchers arrived at a different conclusion after examining the battlefield performances of South Vietnamese troops. Lewis Sorley is one of the figures who contends that a lot of improvement surfaced below the seventeenth parallel during the transfer years. He has a tendency to only concentrate on the actions of the South Vietnamese and their adversaries while discussing battles that transpired in the war zone. As a result, it is difficult to recognize the impact that South Vietnam's ally had on particular engagements. If he examined engagements in a broad manner like Clarke, the reader would not have trouble noticing how some of the communist defeats from the 1970s occurred because of substantial American interventions instead of an improvement in South Vietnamese capabilities. Given these mixed results, it is clear that Sorley should

have utilized degrees of success rather than just present the transfer inside South Vietnam as a success (1999, 255).

The Failure to Take Key Determinants into Consideration

Researchers concur that multiple factors contributed to the outcome in Vietnam. They disagree, though, on whether the presence of underperforming figures at the top of the ARVN, the ineffective training program for South Vietnamese soldiers, the anti-war movement in the United States, or the international political landscape of the 1970s was the most impactful determinant. These competing perspectives in the scholarly community will be looked at in greater detail within subsequent paragraphs. The following material will also display the way that analysts tend to overlook significant factors in their explanations for the result underneath the seventeenth parallel.

There is a group, which believes the main factor that precipitated the disappointing outcome in Vietnam, was the figures at the top of the ARVN. At one point in *The Dictator's Army*, Talmadge alludes to how the South Vietnamese president was worried about coup attempts (2015, 9). To decrease the likelihood of them, the president consistently filled leadership vacancies with political loyalists. This approach enabled the president to weaken the internal threats to his power. However, it left him vulnerable to an external one because many loyalists were not capable of developing effective strategies for defeating the North Vietnamese on the battlefield.

Although Talmadge establishes that promoted loyalists were unqualified, she does not display that the officers without close ties to the president were competent. There are some researchers who take the time to show that political outsiders possessed the ability to conduct the duties associated with key leadership positions. Within another work from the early 2000s, Andrew Wiest tracks the performances of certain political

outsiders during the war. In the late 1960s, a number of young officers outside the president's inner circle guided small ARVN units to victories in skirmishes (Wiest 2008, 80-81). These results made Wiest conclude that the young officers should have controlled divisions and other large units during the transfer years rather than the president's political allies.

In addition to establishing that the political outsiders who did not receive posts were qualified, a discussion about the leadership situation in the ARVN should identify the moves that likely would have enabled Washington to alter the filling of vacancies. Within his study, Clarke includes a section which contains some counterfactual analysis. Over the course of the transfer, U.S. officials frequently attempted to impact the decision-making of the South Vietnamese president with unconditional aid. According to Clarke, if American policymakers relied on conditional assistance, the president probably would have inserted capable commanders in the posts at the top of the ARVN (1988, 500-501). Although competent commanders and conditional incentives would have increased the likelihood of a successful transfer, Clarke does not devote attention to the other determinants which were missing in Southeast Asia, including cautious troop withdrawals by the United States.

Some scholars contend that the primary cause of the unsuccessful transfer was the training of South Vietnamese soldiers. During the war, many of the South Vietnamese units, which received a substantial amount of training, did not improve over the course of time. There are multiple explanations for why the training program below the seventeenth parallel generated this result. James Collins asserts that the main reason the program failed to produce a desirable outcome is U.S. advisors refrained from interacting with their advisees in a forceful manner (2014, 129-130). Ramsey, on the

other hand, insists that the major reason why failure emerged is advisors did not have

enough time to develop a solid rapport with the soldiers from various units (2006, 73).

A researcher should refrain from concentrating heavily on the interaction

between ARVN personnel and American advisors in an explanation for the failure to

build an effective training program in South Vietnam. After all, this approach will

prevent him or her from devoting an adequate amount of attention to other key factors.

Within another publication from the early 2000s, James Willbanks presents a shorter

discussion about the interaction between advisors and advisees. As a result, he, unlike

Collins and Ramsey, has time to properly examine other determinants, including the

leadership problem in the American camp. It is common, as mentioned in the previous

section, for the United States to establish an entity to oversee the activities of advisors in

a theater of operations. The organization responsible for monitoring the advisory effort in

Vietnam, according to Willbanks, was suffering from a shortage of competent

administrators during the early portion of the transfer (2004, 37). Upon learning about

this issue, U.S. officials did not arrange for capable figures to travel to Southeast Asia to

run the oversight bureau.

Researchers can just concentrate on the theater of operations as they attempt to

determine whether a transfer succeeded. If they want to explain a favorable or

unfavorable outcome, though, they will also need to devote attention to political

developments in the United States since they often impact the implementation

process. The above groups do not place too much emphasis on the political events in

the United States, but there is a contingent of researchers that focuses heavily on

them. Andrew Mack was one of the first individuals to concentrate on the U.S.

political landscape. Within one of his articles, he asserts that the anti-war movement

on the American home front was the main factor that precipitated the failure in

Southeast Asia (Mack 1975, 177-178). Since it was so formidable, officials in Washington often made choices which were designed to improve the political situation in the United States rather than the security situation in South Vietnam. While Mack recognizes the importance of the anti-war campaign, he does not closely examine the different ways that policy decisions adversely impacted the security environment below the seventeenth parallel. For instance, he does not show the manner in which the failure to leave a long-term residual force inside South Vietnam enabled Hanoi to acquire more territory in the middle of the 1970s.

As later works are perused, it becomes evident that they contain the same shortcoming as Mack's article. During the early portion of the 1990s, Charles DeBenedetti composed a book regarding the effort to end the war. This publication received a lot of praise from scholars since DeBenedetti discussed key aspects of the anti-war movement which had been overlooked in prior studies. In a major political campaign, it is common for activists to form splinter groups. At one point in the Vietnam War, some members of the Students for a Democratic Society decided to establish the Weather Underground. Within his book, DeBenedetti provides information about how the Weather Underground attempted to halt the conflict in the 1970s. Although the activities of the Weather Underground and other anti-war groups caused officials in Washington to take certain steps below the seventeenth parallel, DeBenedetti does not offer thorough analyses of the damaging consequences of these policy decisions inside his study.

In 2013, Penny Lewis completed a major study about the campaign to end the conflict in Vietnam. Many individuals think of the movement as an effort which just consisted of students from American universities (Lewis 2013, 5). Lewis presents

evidence within her book that unions and other working-class organizations also played an integral part in the campaign on the American home front. She notes how there were moments when workers and students managed to "change foreign policy" (Lewis 2013, 11). She does not go into detail, though, about how American policy changes negatively influenced the security conditions inside South Vietnam.

The developments inside a war zone and the United States influence the outcome of a transfer. To gain a complete understanding of a result, though, it is imperative to take conditions in the enemy camp into consideration as well. For many years, the developments in the communist camp did not receive much attention from researchers (Logevall 1997, 709-710). Like some of the topics mentioned in the first subsection, though, this issue has attracted more interest in the early portion of the twenty-first century. During the 1950s and 60s, American policymakers believed they had to work closely with allies in the developing world since the Soviet Union was frequently attempting to spread communism. According to Gregory Daddis, in the 1970s, officials concluded that they did not need to continue to behave in this fashion because Moscow signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and took other steps to reduce the tension between communist and capitalist states (2017, 9).

A decline in tension transpired, but there was still a major divide between the U.S. and Soviet Union since Moscow elected to give more military aid to Hanoi. Some other publications in the literature concentrate on the rise in Soviet assistance during the 1970s. While these works devote attention to the topic, they do not offer detailed analyses of the American response to the increase. It is possible to notice the validity of this point while taking a book by Ilya Gaiduk into consideration. Within his study, Gaiduk says the Soviets feared giving more aid to North Vietnam would prompt the

United States to attack them. In the aftermath of the increase, American leaders actually decided to decrease military aid to South Vietnam. Although this decision had a major impact on the performance of the ARVN, Gaiduk does not look closely at it inside *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War*. The thesis, besides examining the impact of the short-term residual force and precipitous troop withdrawals, will offer a more comprehensive account of the crucial rise in Soviet aid to North Vietnam.

Position of the Thesis in Debates and How It Will Fill Identified Gaps

The material in the second subsection demonstrated how studies regarding the transfer utilize metrics. It also showed that they possess conflicting perspectives regarding which measures should be used during the evaluation process. On the one hand, some works claim that the transfer during the Vietnam War should be evaluated with statistics. On the other, certain publications insist that it is more appropriate to look at the ARVN′s performances in various engagements. Since this thesis will be analyzing key clashes to ascertain whether the South Vietnamese developed the ability to perform inherited responsibilities effectively, it should be aligned with the second group.

The third subsection dealt with the labels that studies use to describe the outcome of the Vietnamese transfer. Most works refer to the operation in Southeast Asia as a failure, but there are a few that prefer to call the mission a success. This thesis, like the works from the first contingent, will claim that the transfer did not meet the expectations of policymakers in Washington. Although the thesis will set forth this argument, it will be structured much differently than most of its predecessors. Following the start of the initiative below the seventeenth parallel, there were some occasions when South Vietnamese soldiers performed well on the battlefield. As a result, it is appropriate to employ levels of failure while taking

this case into account. The thesis, unlike a lot of its precursors, will contain this important feature so the reader can receive an accurate reading of the transfer result.

The prior works about the transfer include explanations for the outcome in South Vietnam. Within the last subsection, it became clear that these explanations are unpersuasive since they fail to take crucial determinants into consideration. The penultimate chapter of the thesis will provide a convincing explanation for the result underneath the seventeenth parallel. Besides looking at the previously examined determinants, it will present descriptive discussions about the ones which did not receive attention inside earlier studies.

War Termination Literature

This section of the chapter will consist of two major parts. In the first subsection, the main debate in the war termination literature will be brought to the attention of the reader. Within the second subsection, there will be a discussion about where the thesis sits in the debate and how it will fill certain gaps in this wider body of literature.

Main Debate in the War Termination Literature

Most strategic studies researchers concentrate on the commencement of military conflicts. There are a few scholars, though, who prefer to focus on the end of wars (Rose 2010, 2). While the leading works regarding this subject are taken into account, it will become apparent that analysts possess conflicting viewpoints about which war termination method is the most important.

The oldest school of thought in the literature insists that decisive defeats deserve the most attention from the scholarly community. While the members of this contingent concentrate solely on routs in their publications, they disagree on whether the losing side can secure concessions at the negotiating table after a humiliating defeat. According to researchers like

Lewis Coser, the defeated party does not possess any bargaining power at the conclusion of a conflict. Instead, its only option is to "accept the terms of the victor." (Coser 1961, 350). The outcome of the Persian Gulf War suggests that there are occasions when the defeated side behaves in this manner. During the conflict, an American-led coalition destroyed a considerable amount of Iraqi military equipment. Because its forces were so weak, Baghdad had to accept a peace settlement that contained harsh measures such as using Iraqi oil revenues to pay for the devastation within Kuwait.

Other scholars associated with the oldest school of thought believe that concessions emerge at the end of a rout. During the Second World War, there were several times when sides chose to surrender to more formidable opponents. Inside *The Origins of Peace*, Robert Randle takes some of these cases into consideration.[16] According to him, losing parties often managed to convince their adversaries to make some accommodations in negotiating sessions. For instance, upon surrendering in September 1943, Italian representatives extracted various concessions from their British and American counterparts (Randle 1973, 6).

Other schools of thought have become prominent in the early portion of the twenty-first century. One of them claims that a stalemate is the form of war termination which warrants the most attention. According to Branislav Slantchev, the brokering of a peace deal can only be expected in a standoff when the leaders of two belligerent countries develop similar perspectives regarding the employment of force. Towards the conclusion of a war, leaders in one nation may believe their security objectives can still be attained with force and leaders in another may think coercion cannot generate desirable results. Under these conditions, it will not be possible for negotiators to finalize a pact. However, if the former eventually acquires

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[16] Richard Hobbs, Francis Beer and Thomas Mayer and Paul Kecskemeti are the other major participants in the debate regarding concessions. For their thoughts on this topic, see *The Myth of Victory*, *Why Wars End*, and *Strategic Surrender.*

the same viewpoint as the latter, there will be an opportunity for their subordinates to reach a settlement (Slantchev 2003, 622).

Although an alignment of perspectives is conceivable, it is more likely that the political situation in a belligerent nation will enable progress to emerge at the negotiating table. It is common for a robust anti-war movement to surface in a belligerent state when a conflict does not unfold as anticipated. Once numerous demonstrations take place, the leader of the nation usually elects to broker a cease-fire or peace agreement with an adversary. This response placates individuals on the home front, but it, as Hein Goemans has noted, prevents the official from accomplishing important objectives in the theater of operations (2000, 17). One can notice the validity of this point while looking at the 2006 war in Lebanon. Just days after the conflict commenced in July, Israeli citizens held anti-war demonstrations in Tel Aviv and other major cities. This domestic pressure, along with other factors, prompted Ehud Olmert, the Israeli Prime Minister, to approve a cease-fire deal with Hezbollah. Since the fighting ended so quickly, the members of the Israeli Defense Forces did not achieve some key goals, including eliminating Hezbollah's capacity to conduct damaging attacks from Southern Lebanon (Lambeth 2012, 83)

In the case from above, a national leader opted to appease citizens who believed a military campaign should come to an end. When a chief executive fails to take this step, though, a diplomatic breakthrough, as Elizabeth Stanley and John Sawyer have mentioned, will only be able to occur with a leadership change.[17] At the beginning of the First World War, German leaders were confident that their military would be able to fight on both the western and eastern fronts in Europe. However, as the conflict continued, these figures recognized that a

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[17] Slantchev, Goemans and Stanley and Sawyer were not the first researchers to devote attention to negotiations between adversaries involved in a standoff. The individuals, who dealt with this topic before them, include Allan Stam, the author of *Win, Lose or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War* and Donald Wittman, the writer of How A War Ends: A Rational Model Approach.

two-front war was too much of a burden for their soldiers to bear, so they concentrated on bringing the fighting against Russia on the eastern front to an end. Under Nicholas II, a peace deal was not a possibility since this tsar did not want to halt the military campaign against Germany in Eastern Europe, but Berlin managed to broker an agreement with Moscow after the Russian Revolution because V.I. Lenin was eager to stop his nation's involvement in what he saw as an illegitimate war.

Another school of thought, which has become popular in recent years, asserts that more attention should be devoted to unilateral withdrawals. Most members of this contingent have concentrated on the withdrawals that transpire during conflicts in the developing world. When a formidable nation halts its major operations, it wants an ally to assume its responsibilities in the developing country (Kolenda 2019, 992). In addition to seeing a security transfer, the developed nation wants the partner to secure a favorable peace at some point in the future. There are certain war termination publications that lead readers to believe an auspicious peace cannot emerge following the commencement of a unilateral withdrawal. Within one article, Christopher Kolenda looks at the American exit from Afghanistan. At the time that the withdrawal commenced, U.S. officials wanted Afghan security personnel to quell an insurgency led by an Islamist network. As the number of American soldiers in Afghanistan declined, cities and towns across the country fell into enemy hands. Consequently, the author had to label the American departure from Afghanistan as a failure (Kolenda 2019, 992).

It is important to note that other scholars encountered different results when they studied unilateral withdrawals. Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, Beth Grill and Molly Dunigin, unlike Kolenda, took multiple security forces into consideration within their study. Although some of the examined forces performed poorly like the one in Afghanistan, others managed to weaken insurgencies within their respective states. These favorable outcomes prompted the

authors to conclude that nascent armies can maintain stability when certain conditions are present in the target country, especially popular support for the government (Paul, Clarke, Grill, and Dunigin 2013, 149).

The material in the last two paragraphs shows that analysts have predominantly concentrated on the unilateral withdrawals that occur in unconventional conflicts. There is clearly a need in the literature for works that shed light on the unilateral withdrawals which take place during conventional wars. When the U.S. removed troops during the transfers that will be examined in the pages ahead, conventional battles were occurring in South Korea and South Vietnam (Daddis 2017, 21). Consequently, the thesis will be able to provide some insight into this overlooked issue.

Position of the Thesis in Preceding Debate and How It Will Fill Identified Gaps

The last subsection devoted attention to the major debate in the war termination literature. The members of the first two schools of thought that were taken into consideration insist it is crucial to concentrate on routs and stalemates. It is not possible to connect the thesis with either of these schools since the selected cases do not concentrate on decisive victories or standoffs. Towards the end of the preceding subsection, the focus shifted to a third school of thought that stresses unilateral withdrawals. The study can be aligned with this school of thought since the upcoming case analyses will contain discussions about unilateral withdrawals by the United States.

Rather than focusing on withdrawals during unconventional conflicts like a lot of previous works, the thesis will concentrate on the ones which transpire in conventional wars. The exiting nation, of course, wants its ally to go on to secure an auspicious peace in the theater of operations. The content in subsequent pages will display that this objective is attainable. The material later in the thesis will also indicate that deterrence is the main determinant which

generates an auspicious peace. As we will see, after the United States began to reduce its personnel in one location, communist forces did not continue to perform major offensive operations since they believed the expected costs and risks outweighed the anticipated benefits (Mearsheimer 2018, 3).

Conclusion

This chapter showed how the thesis will make contributions to multiple pools of literature. In the middle of the third section, it became apparent that the literature regarding the Korean War lacks an accurate reading of the result of the first major transfer from the Cold War. Through the employment of the levels of success developed by McConnell, it will be possible to present a veracious account of the outcome in subsequent pages. Towards the end of the third section, it was learned that the literature on the Korean conflict also does not have a persuasive explanation for the favorable result below the thirty-eighth parallel. To fill this gap later in the study, it will be necessary to take factors, which researchers overlooked in prior analyses, into consideration.

Within the fourth section, the time was taken to review the literature pertaining to the Vietnam War. The review demonstrated that this body of literature does not contain a veracious reading of the outcome of the transfer which the United States performed underneath the seventeenth parallel in the 1970s. By relying on degrees of failure from various policy studies scholars, there will be an opportunity to provide an accurate account of the result in the upcoming pages. The content in the fourth section revealed that the Vietnam War literature lacks a convincing explanation for the inauspicious outcome in Southeast Asia, too. To present a persuasive explanation in the penultimate

chapter, it will be imperative to concentrate on determinants that were not examined inside earlier works.

The thesis will contribute to a wider pool of literature as well. In the fifth section, it became evident that prior war termination studies focused heavily on unilateral withdrawals during unconventional conflicts. As the ROKA and ARVN inherited more responsibilities in the conventional wars in the 1950s and 1970s, American policymakers carried out unilateral withdrawals. The discussions about these maneuvers will reveal that an auspicious peace can surface following the start of a withdrawal in a conventional war and what conditions are likely to precipitate this outcome.

3. Methodology

Introduction

This chapter will consist of three major sections. To complete a program evaluation properly, it is necessary to utilize an ontological approach. In the second section, the approaches that can be used to conduct an assessment will be introduced. There will also be a discussion about which one will be employed in the appraisals of the transfers from the Cold War. Within the third section, a justification for utilizing a small n research design and the methods for determining whether success emerged in theaters of operations and explaining transfer outcomes will be presented. The fourth section will provide an opportunity to introduce the main data sources for the analyses of the Korean and Vietnamese transfers. In addition to explaining how the sources will be utilized, it will be possible to identify the technique for examining the information from them and the steps which were taken to ensure that this content is veracious.

Positivism versus Post-Positivism

The main schools of thought regarding ontology are positivism and post-positivism. The key differences between these perspectives will be taken into account within this section. There will also be a chance to see why the positivist approach should be utilized in the appraisals of the transfers in Korea and Vietnam.

One can find a difference between positivists and post-positivists while focusing on ways to measure policy success. Positivists believe that an evaluator should closely examine data

which was collected from the location where a policy was implemented. If the data suggests that the result in a setting matches the goals of government officials, he or she should label the policy as a success (McConnell 2010, 346). Post-positivists think that an appraiser should focus on the political discourse. If the figure finds that the majority of the public supported a policy, he or she should consider it as a success (Fischer 1995, Preface).

The positivist approach can help establish whether the ROKA and ARVN developed the ability to effectively manage stabilization efforts. To get the most accurate readings of the capabilities of fledgling forces, one must look closely at information provided by the individuals who witnessed their combat performances (Blanken and Lepore 2015, xii). When the transfers occurred in Korea and Vietnam, American personnel had many opportunities to observe South Korean and South Vietnamese soldiers in action. In the aftermath of battles, they submitted reports to their superiors. By examining the data from these documents, it will be possible to see if the South Koreans and South Vietnamese improved enough during the transfers.

While completing an assessment, it is important for an individual to remain neutral. Positivists think that a figure can remain objective as he or she conducts an appraisal. Post-positivists, on the other hand, believe that a person is incapable of remaining impartial during the evaluation process. Some even use their respective publications to identify factors which prevent impartial evaluations from taking place. Within *Failing to Win*, Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney pay close attention to the impact that political pressure and misinformation can have on appraisals. As these analysts discuss the former, they allude to the way that certain politicians from the United States evaluated the outcome of the Chinese Civil War. Shortly after Mao Tse-tung's takeover in China, multiple Republican legislators claimed that the actions of the

Truman administration allowed the communist victory to transpire. These figures did not arrive

at this conclusion following the reading of reports about the Chinese conflict by experienced

analysts at the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Instead, they reached it after facing pressure

from other Republicans who wanted to undermine the presidency of their Democratic rival

(Johnson and Tierney 2006, 10). Nineteen years after the fall of China, the majority of the

American public concluded that the war in Vietnam was unwinnable. In this case, the observers

did not form an opinion about the conditions in an Asian country because others pressured

them. Rather, they developed this perspective since the media presented engagements in

unfavorable and sometimes distorted terms.

To ascertain whether political pressure, misinformation and other negative factors keep

independent and trained researchers from objectively evaluating developments months and

years later, it is imperative to focus on the way that prior assessments were completed. When

a rebellion surfaced in the Philippines at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in the

late 1800s, U.S. officials launched a counterinsurgency campaign to quell it. These

policymakers in Washington wanted soldiers to form protected zones for civilians and gather

important intelligence about guerrilla leaders during the initiative. Consequently, while Brian

McAllister Linn conducted an assessment of the effort earlier this century, he concentrated on

the completion of these tasks. Through the examination of veracious pieces of data, Linn

recognized that the troops consistently performed their duties in an adequate fashion and

concluded that the American operation succeeded (2015, 124). Given the manner in which

accurate data guided this author's thinking, it is fair to assert that his study qualifies as an

objective evaluation. If there were no other works like Linn's available, it would be possible to

understand the skepticism of post-positivists. However, as the information in the first

footnote displays, other objective appraisals have been conducted by strategic studies

scholars.[1] The presence of these works should give the reader confidence that the upcoming

evaluations of the South Korean and South Vietnamese transfers will also be performed in an

impartial fashion.

Justification for Small N Design, Metrics and Methods

This section will be divided into three parts. In the first subsection, there will be a

discussion about why the small n approach should be utilized in the upcoming chapters. During

the second subsection, the methods and metrics, which will show how the Korean transfer

succeeded and the Vietnamese transfer failed, will be introduced. Within the final subsection,

the factors that allowed policy success and failure to emerge in the target countries and the

approaches for examining them will be taken into account.

Justification for Using a Small N Design

There are multiple benefits that will come from using a small n design. The primary goal

of the thesis is to ascertain whether local security forces contributed to the maintenance of

order in multiple countries. To determine if entities contributed to outcomes, it is necessary to

examine cases in a detailed manner. In a large-n study, it would not be possible to complete in-

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[1]Other impartial assessments include Jerome Slater's Dominos in Central America, Robert Jervis' *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*, Robert Art's A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War, John Mearsheimer's A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe, and Richard Ned Lebow's The Soviet Offensive in Europe: The Schlieffen Plan Revisited?

depth analyses because many cases would be taken into consideration. However, within this

work, there will be a chance to conduct detailed examinations since only a limited amount of

cases will receive attention (Gerring 2001, 24).

In addition to providing an opportunity to complete detailed analyses, the South

Korean and South Vietnamese cases will make it possible to utilize the comparative method.

To employ this method, there must be a small amount of cases with many common features

(Collier 1993, 105; Lijphart 1975, 158-177). The appropriate number of cases for engaging in

comparative analysis is present in this thesis since only two transfers will be taken into

account. One can also notice a number of shared characteristics while inspecting the

campaigns. A noteworthy link is how the operations took place around the same time. Besides

being close in time proximity, the initiatives occurred in the same part of the world. Within

the preceding pages, it became apparent that soldiers in the ROKA and ARVN fought against

national armies once they inherited responsibilities from American troops (Daddis 2017, 21).

 The presence of conventional opponents in both of the transfers provides another reason to

make comparisons between them.

While the cases will provide the above benefits, there is a noteworthy limitation

associated with them. It is preferable to reach broad conclusions in the last chapter of a study. It

is only appropriate to take this assertive step if a considerable number of cases are taken into

account in prior chapters (Gerring 2001, 105). Because a sufficient amount of cases will not be

examined in the empirical chapters of the thesis, there will not be a chance to reach broad

conclusions about transfers in Chapter Eight. However, it will be possible to make a more

cautious move at this juncture. Within *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social*

Sciences, Alexander George and Andrew Bennett note how conclusions about a particular subclass of a general phenomenon can be reached at the end of a work if the limited number of cases were connected to it (2005, 266). Since the Korean and Vietnamese operations transpired during conventional wars, there will be an opportunity to reach conclusions about the transfers which the United States performs in these conflicts.

Methods and Metrics for Evaluating the Performances of Local Security Forces

There are multiple methods that researchers can use to discern the effectiveness of a policy. One, which has produced desirable results in the past, is the before and after comparison approach. [2] To get an accurate reading of a policy's impact, it is imperative to establish the circumstances in a setting prior to the implementation process (Gerring 2001, 222-223). Consequently, it will be important to closely examine the actions of American servicemen in the time that preceded a transfer. Since U.S. officials wanted a local force to maintain control of areas seized from enemy units, an analysis will need to focus on the territorial gains that American combat troops made before the commencement of a transfer. By taking pivotal campaigns into consideration, it will be possible to show how much land was in the hands of American soldiers as a local force started to assume their responsibilities. Although a lot of attention will be paid to U.S. operations at the beginning of an assessment, there will also be a discussion that

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[2] One appraisal that benefits from the presence of a before and after design is *Making Democracy Work*. Within this publication, Robert Putnam concentrates on the impact that a 1970 reform program had on governance in Italy. Prior to the introduction of the initiative, this European state had weak institutions at the regional level. However, once it went into effect, regional governments began to play a key role in the decision-making process.

identifies the state of the fledgling force at the time of a transfer. In other words, some

time will be taken to show the amount of men, firepower, skill level and morale within the

ROKA or ARVN as well.

After the American effort to stabilize areas and state of an army are taken into account,

the focus will shift to the developments in a target country during the transfer. The initial

objective will be to see whether auspicious conditions continued in the nation. If communist

forces failed to make territorial gains once personnel began to assume the responsibilities of

U.S. troops, it will be appropriate to conclude that the security situation did not decline in the

country. On the other hand, if they acquired a substantial amount of land over the course of

time, it will be necessary to claim that the situation deteriorated.

A discussion about the distribution of land in a nation will provide a reader with a

chance to see whether stability continued after the start of a transfer. However, it will not be

able to help him or her learn what precipitated a certain trend. *To ascertain whether South

Korean or South Vietnamese soldiers contributed to the preservation of order following the

initiation of a transfer*, it will be necessary to look closely at the conducting of a particular task

on the battlefield (Record 1998, 123; Blanken and Lepore 2015, 6). It would be inappropriate to

concentrate on the clearing of territory while assessing the soldiers in the South Korean or

South Vietnamese Army since U.S. troops removed communist forces from most locations prior

to the commencement of a transfer. Rather, the purpose of an appraisal should be to decipher

how the South Koreans or South Vietnamese performed as they attempted to keep their

adversaries from seizing territory. The inexperienced troops in a local force cannot be expected

to hold territory at the same level of proficiency as seasoned soldiers from the United States

(Bensahel, Oliker and Kelly 2011, 9). So, during the inspection of the South Koreans or South Vietnamese, there will be an attempt to find out if they held land at a minimum level or in half of the examined engagements.

The battles for each case analysis should be identified at this juncture. Since there will be a discussion at the beginning of an assessment that establishes the state of a fledgling force at the time of a transfer, it would not be prudent to examine battles which transpired days after the commencement of an operation. Instead, it would be wise to examine engagements that occurred approximately six months later because this time frame has provided American officials with accurate readings of conditions in war zones on prior occasions (Stout 2007). While the skirmishes are taken into consideration, it will be possible to compare the later performance level to the one from around the time the transfer started to ascertain whether improvement happened in the target state. The initiative during the Korean War began with Harry Truman sending a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense and other relevant parties in the Spring of 1951, so it will be necessary to utilize clashes six months after this turn of events (Schnabel 1992, 394-395). In March 1969, Richard Nixon decided to initiate the operation in Southeast Asia (Daddis 2017, 61). As a result, it will be imperative to use battles that transpired six months after this development.

The conduct of South Korean or South Vietnamese soldiers in battles from a month or year should not be the focal point in the upcoming pages. After all, it would only demonstrate if they held territory at a certain point. To learn whether South Korean or South Vietnamese troops played an integral part in the maintenance of stability over the course of time, it will be necessary to examine their conduct at different stages. In other words, engagements from

multiple years will need to be taken into consideration. The first portion of Chapter Five will reveal whether ROK soldiers contributed to the holding of territory in the Battle of White Horse Mountain in October 1952, the Battle of the Noris in December 1952 and January 1953, the Spring Offensive in 1953, and the Summer Offensive in 1953. The second part of this chapter will then display if the members of the ARVN played a part in holds in the Battle of Quang Tri City in April 1972, the Battle of Hue in May 1972, the Campaign in the Central Highlands in March 1975, and the Battle of Xuan Loc in April 1975.

Three measures will make it possible to ascertain whether the ROKA or ARVN contributed to the holding of territory in an engagement. One of them is the level of U.S. involvement in a battle. A desirable development is American officials refraining from employing available personnel in a clash because this will be an indication that they believed South Korean or South Vietnamese servicemen possessed the capacity to inherit all the responsibilities associated with a security campaign. Another occurrence, which will be seen as a sign of success, is a limited intervention such as American pilots periodically dropping bombs on enemy positions. This turn of events will be viewed in such a way since it will suggest that U.S. leaders thought the South Koreans or South Vietnamese could assume most of the duties linked to a stabilization effort (Record 1998, 123).

Unless the members of a fledgling army possess skills and determination, it will not be possible for them to succeed in combat (Biddle 2007, 218; Morell 2015, 317). During an examination of an engagement, there will be chances to see whether soldiers in the ROKA or ARVN possessed these attributes. To learn whether troops were motivated, it will be necessary to take some time to search for shirking (Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 95). On the battlefield, one of the most common forms of shirking is desertion. It is inappropriate to assert that a force

suffered from low morale when a small number of soldiers abandoned their defensive positions in a battle because a side can remain effective once this development transpires. Although a force can still be productive following a limited amount of desertions, it cannot keep an enemy from seizing target areas after thousands of soldiers leave their assigned locations (Hermes 1966, 63; Willbanks 2004, 155). If a force did not encounter a low morale problem or thousands of desertions in an engagement, it will be viewed as a sign of success.

While concentrating on the skill level of the ROKA or ARVN in a particular battle, it will be imperative to look for multiple developments. In a conflict, a side uses battles to accomplish a political objective (Clausewitz 1985, 117). The tactical maneuvers devised by its officers strongly impact whether it goes on to achieve a particular goal (Strachan 2013, 11). When officer decision-making helps achieve the aim of preventing a communist occupation in the pages ahead, it will be appropriate to view the turn of events as a sign of success. Prior to the commencement of a clash, officers will often need to take steps to bolster defensive positions around a target area. If the information in an examination reveals that the strengthening of flanks or another tactical move by an officer prior to a skirmish kept the enemy from acquiring a coveted location, it will be possible to conclude that he contributed to the goal of thwarting a communist occupation. An officer can take some time to create tactical plans before an engagement. However, during it, he must make "rapid-fire decisions" to keep the opponent from succeeding on the battlefield (Mearsheimer 1989, 169). The battle analyses will provide opportunities to see officers operate under these difficult conditions as well. As they do, it will be important to continue looking for signs of success. For instance, it will be imperative to search for them inserting reinforcements at auspicious times.

A unit of an army, of course, needs soldiers who can properly execute the proposed maneuvers of officers. Another way that it will be possible to decipher whether the South Korean or South Vietnamese participants in a battle were skillful is by concentrating on the conducting of tactical plans. A lot of the plans in a conventional battle require units to cooperate with each other for a long time (Talmadge 2015, 6). If there is evidence that soldiers from South Korean or South Vietnamese units worked together to correctly execute the plans of a commander, it will be regarded as an indicator of success.

There is a chance that only two or three of the indicators of success will be found in some battle analyses. As a result, levels of success should be utilized in the pages ahead. If the information in the first column of Table 3.1 is taken into account, it will become apparent that a battle will only be labeled as a resilient or conflicted success if one of the indicators that emerges in an analysis is a hold. This indicator should be stressed since it is the main development that must transpire to attain the U.S. objective of preventing a communist occupation.

Table 3.1

Levels of Success in a Battle	Levels of Failure in a Battle
-Complete Success: Holding of Territory, An Absence or Limited Amount of American Intervention, Few Reports of Desertions, and Officers Devising Effective Tactical Plans or Multiple Units Properly Executing Maneuvers -Resilient Success: Holding of Territory and Two Other Indicators of Success -Conflicted Success: Holding of Territory and Another Indicator of Success	-Outright Failure: Loss of Territory, Substantial American Intervention, Many Reports of Desertions, and Officers Failing to Develop Effective Tactical Plans or Soldiers Improperly Executing Maneuvers -Major Failure: Loss of Territory and Two of the Indicators from Above -Tolerable Failure: Loss of Territory and One or None of the Indicators from Above

Levels of failure will be utilized during the battle analyses as well. As the information in the second column of Table 3.1 shows, there will be three options to select from if a battle does not qualify as a complete, resilient or conflicted success (McConnell 2010, 352). If territory is lost and three other signs of failure surface during an examination, the engagement will need to be referred to as an outright failure (McConnell 2015, 233). If there is a loss of territory and two other signs of failure, the battle will be labeled as a major failure (Cobb and Primo 2003, 1-12). If there is a loss of territory and one other sign of failure or just a loss of land, the clash will be called a tolerable failure (McConnell 2015, 233).

There will be an opportunity to properly label a transfer at the end of an assessment. During this process, it will be helpful to depend on levels of success again. If the fledgling force

somehow manages to contribute to the holding of territory in every engagement, the transfer will

be referred to as a complete success. If it plays a role in three holds, the transfer will be looked at

as a resilient success (McConnell 2010, 352). The last positive result that may be seen during an

assessment is a security force helping to hold territory in half of the battles. If it reaches this

minimum level, the transfer will be labeled as a conflicted success (McConnell 2010, 352).

Table 3.2

Levels of Policy Success	Levels of Policy Failure
-Complete Success: Security Force Contributes to Holds in all Battles -Resilient Success: Security Force Contributes to Holds in Most Engagements -Conflicted Success: Security Force Contributes to Holds in Half of the Engagements	-Outright Failure: Security Force Does Not Contribute to Holds in Any Battles -Major Failure: Security Force Does Not Contribute to Holds in the Majority of the Battles

The levels of failure in the second column of Table 3.2 will be utilized as the overall

performance of a security force is being evaluated, too. If the members of a nascent army do not

contribute to the holding of territory in any of the engagements, the security transfer will be

called an outright failure (McConnell 2015, 233). Should they fail to perform the desired task in

the majority of the battles they participate in, the transfer will be labeled as a major failure (Cobb

and Primo 2003, 1-12). There is no reason to develop a label for two unsuccessful attempts since

this outcome would qualify as a conflicted success. It is also unnecessary to develop a label for

one engagement without a security force contributing to the holding of territory because this

result would count as a resilient success.

There is a chance that the sole cause of holds will be substantial interventions by the United States. In other words, it is possible that prolonged and intense U.S. bombing campaigns or American combat troops leading resistance efforts with aerial support will prevent communist forces from seizing target areas in engagements. If substantial U.S. interventions precipitate every hold, the transfer will be looked at as an outright failure. If substantial U.S. interventions lead to three holds, the transfer will be referred to as a major failure. If substantial U.S. interventions produce two holds, the transfer will be viewed as a conflicted success. If a substantial U.S. intervention generates one hold, the transfer will be described as a resilient success.

Methods for Explaining Successful and Unsuccessful Transfers

Government officials occasionally make the mistake of utilizing a policy in an improper setting (Neustadt and May 2011, 161). If the focus of this thesis were limited to ascertaining whether the transferal policy produced favorable results during the Cold War, it would not be possible to provide American leaders with much insight about when it is advantageous to make a transfer in a conventional conflict. However, the study will identify the conditions under which transfers should be made since each case analysis will end with either an explanation for what allowed a fledgling security force to contribute to the maintenance of order or an explanation for what kept it from playing a part in such a development. This subsection will provide important details about the explanations.

From the information in the first column of Table 3.3, one can gather that there are six

factors that will be taken into consideration during the explanation for the outcome of the Korean transfer. Conditional aid from the United States, the surfacing of many proficient commanders at the top of the ROKA and the effective soldier training program were already examined in works from the secondary literature. In certain declassified documents, it is possible to notice that American officials do not devote all of their attention to these factors. Instead, the figures also focus on the other determinants mentioned in the table. They, as will be seen in Chapter Six, influenced the crucial events in the middle and latter stages of the successful operation more than the previously examined factors.

The explanation for the result in Vietnam will also take six factors into account. The American decision to refrain from frequently utilizing conditional aid, the shortage of qualified leaders in the ARVN, and the poor training system underneath the seventeenth parallel, as seen in the last chapter, were examined in prior secondary works. The factors deserved this attention, but various declassified documents indicate that authors should have taken the time to thoroughly examine the last three determinants in the second column of Table 3.3 as well. The content in Chapter Seven will reveal that these overlooked determinants had a stronger impact on the pivotal developments during the middle and latter portions of the unsuccessful initiative.

Table 3.3

Factors from the Successful Transfer in Korea That Will Be Examined	Factors from the Unsuccessful Transfer in Vietnam That Will Be Examined
1. Conditional Aid to the ROK 2. Emergence of Many Capable Leaders in the ROKA 3. Productive Training of ROK Troops 4. Unhurried Troop Withdrawals 5. Long-Term American Residual Force 6. Soviet Military Aid	1. Unconditional Aid to Saigon 2. Shortage of Qualified Leaders in the ARVN 3. Poor Training of South Vietnamese Troops 4. Hurried Troop Withdrawals 5. Short-Term American Residual Force 6. Soviet Assistance to North Vietnam

The preceding paragraphs showed how the factors for the explanations in Chapters Six and Seven emerged. However, they did not demonstrate the way that these determinants will be examined in a detailed fashion. To do this, it will be necessary to introduce some of the analytical methods that will be used in the explanations for the outcomes in Korea and Vietnam. When the focus shifts to the leaders of the ROKA in Chapter Six, it will be possible to display how these figures improved by looking at their behavior over the course of time. In the Fall of 1950 and first half of 1951, ROK officers participated in two major campaigns on the Korean Peninsula. The discussions about the attempt to seize North Korea towards the end of 1950 and the effort to remove Chinese personnel from South Korean territory in the Spring of 1951 will display that a lot of individuals at the top of the ROKA did not make effective decisions in the period which preceded the transfer (Gibby 2012, 170-172). American

officials, after the disappointing performances in 1950 and 1951, initiated a campaign to reform the officer corps. The second portion of the examination will give the reader a chance to look at officer decision-making following the American modifications. If the reader only sees effective decision-making in one engagement during this part of the analysis, he or she may conclude that it was an aberration. As a result, there will be a need to take multiple battles into consideration. At first, attention will be paid to the planning of a South Korean general in a skirmish from the early part of 1952. The focus will then shift to the steps that another ROK officer took in a battle from the fall.

There will be, as mentioned earlier, opportunities to utilize the comparative method in the pages ahead. One of them will be when the soldier training system in South Vietnam is taken into account within Chapter Seven. During the initial part of the analysis, the goal will be to identify the main problems that were prevalent inside the program in the first year of the transfer (Willbanks 2004, 37). Following the completion of this portion of the examination, time will be taken to reveal how the U.S. attempt to alter the training program underneath the seventeenth parallel did not contain all the features from the campaign to improve the training system in South Korea. The analysis will conclude with a discussion about the manner in which the reform effort in South Vietnam failed to produce rapid progress like its Korean precursor.

Data Collection and Analysis

A considerable amount of data will make it possible to evaluate the performances of South Korean and South Vietnamese soldiers and explain why success and failure emerged in

their nations. The following paragraphs will introduce the major data sources that will be used in the upcoming chapters. They will also show what steps were taken to ensure that the information from the sources is accurate and how it will be examined.

Major Data Sources for Assessing Security Personnel and Explaining Transfer Outcomes

When the battle analyses take place in Chapter Five, the reports of American advisors will serve as key data sources. If information from a report indicates that officers developed effective tactical plans, soldiers performed maneuvers properly, desertions did not become a serious problem or American involvement in an engagement was limited, it will be used to show that a security force contributed to the holding of territory. On the other hand, if content from a report suggests that officers failed to devise effective tactical plans, soldiers conducted maneuvers incorrectly, desertions became a severe issue, or American intervention in a clash was considerable, it will be utilized to demonstrate that an army did not play an important part in a hold.

Information from the reports of U.S. military commanders, American memorandums, and the memoirs of U.S. officials will be an asset in Chapters Six and Seven. This content will make it possible to strengthen a number of arguments that appear in the explanations for the outcomes in Korea and Vietnam. There will be some opportunities to use information from non-American sources in the explanations. Following the operations in Asia, South Korean and South Vietnamese generals released publications about their experiences on the battlefield. The material from these memoirs will also be used to make different points in Chapters Six and Seven more convincing. Although a lot of the officials in communist nations

attempted to restrict Western access to information pertaining to their military campaigns in

Korea and Vietnam, some took steps that made it easier for Westerners to learn about the

communist operations during the conflicts. In fact, one North Vietnamese official went so far

as to release a memoir in the West. Like the material from the American, South Korean and

South Vietnamese publications, the information from this release will help to strengthen

certain contentions.

Critical Reflection on Data Sources

Two problems surfaced during the collection of data at locations such as the U.S. Army

Heritage and Education Center in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. While looking through a primary

document, one may come across information which he or she suspects is misleading. The

triangulation method can enable the researcher to ascertain whether the content is reliable.

This technique requires the scholar to compare the questionable material in one source to the

content in documents by other authors. If the comparisons result in matches, he or she will

know that it is appropriate to insert the material from the original source within his or her

study (Yin 2003, 97-98).

Questionable material surfaced on certain occasions as documents pertaining to the

explanations in Chapters Six and Seven were taken into consideration. While gathering

information for the discussion about the long-term residual force in Korea, it appeared as if

one author inadvertently inserted misleading information about the capabilities of the ROKA in

a memorandum. During another search for data about the troop withdrawals from Vietnam, it

seemed as if authors unintentionally included inaccurate information in a report regarding the

skill level of the ARVN.   The triangulation method eventually showed that the details in the memorandum and report could be placed in the last two research chapters of the thesis.

The other issue, which appeared during the data collection process, was unavailability. At one point, it was learned that reports from advisors were not available for certain engagements which will be taken into account during the assessments. As a result, it became necessary to search for alternative documents to utilize in the battle analyses. When several documents from commanders and other American actors were uncovered for each clash, the triangulation method was used to check their content for accuracy. The sources with veracious material will be used to complete the examinations of the Battle of White Horse Mountain and other skirmishes in Chapter Five.

Method for Examining the Data from the Sources

To determine whether transfers produced armies with the capacity to lead stabilization campaigns and explain successful and unsuccessful outcomes, it is necessary to utilize an approach that allows data to be examined in an in-depth manner. For years, process tracing has enabled researchers to look at information in a detailed fashion (George and Bennett 2005, 210). While using this approach, it is imperative to insert extended narratives into a work.

Towards the end of an assessment, it will be advantageous to utilize process tracing. When an extended narrative appears in an analysis of an engagement, there will be important pieces of evidence that will enable a reader to recognize what indicators of success or failure emerged during the action on the battlefield. In one examination, a witness will claim that

many South Vietnamese soldiers left their assigned positions without authorization. The

quotation will help the reader see that the members of the ARVN did not possess a sufficient

amount of determination. From additional details in the narrative, he or she will then learn that

other signs of failure appeared during the skirmish. With all this information, it will be possible

to conclude what level of failure was reached in the clash (McConnell 2015, 233).

Many extended narratives will appear in the explanations for the transfer outcomes. It

will become apparent within Chapter Six that several reforms allowed U.S. officials to improve

the South Korean soldier training program. During the early portion of the transfer, they

elected to establish a field retraining program below the thirty-eighth parallel. Through the

insertion of pertinent details in the narrative about this program, there will be a chance for the

reader to realize that it played an integral part in transforming the overall training initiative on

the Korean Peninsula. For instance, at one point in the narrative, attention will turn to the

manner in which one South Korean general claimed that the retraining effort improved the

performance of his subordinates substantially.

Conclusion

This chapter showed how the transfers will be examined in subsequent pages. When

the missions commenced, U.S. officials wanted members of the ROKA and ARVN to go on to

maintain stability within their respective nations. To see if the goals of leaders were met, it will

be necessary to utilize the ontological approach that positivists have promoted for years. In

other words, it will be imperative to concentrate closely on data that was collected from the

settings where the initiatives took place. Post-positivists believe that figures cannot remain

neutral during the evaluation process, but the second section of the chapter identified appraisals where researchers examined details from certain settings in an impartial manner.

Besides identifying the ontological approach that will be utilized, the chapter discussed how each case analysis will be structured. The assessment at the beginning of an analysis will consist of three parts. The discussion in the first part about the operations of American combat troops will establish how much land a fledgling force assumed control of when a transfer commenced. The second portion of the assessment will then show whether stability lasted in the nation by examining the distribution of land during the transfer years. The analyses of pivotal engagements in the last part of the evaluation will reveal how the nascent army impacted a particular trend. Following the completion of the assessment, the focus will shift to explaining the outcome in a nation. If stability continued within the country, there will be an opportunity to identify the determinants that contributed to the desirable outcome. On the other hand, if security did not last, it will be important to establish what factors enabled the unfavorable result to emerge.

4. Theoretical Framework

Introduction

Principal-agent theory consists of "a set of interrelated concepts." (Isaak 2001, 80). The following section will provide an overview of these concepts and a discussion about their development in the field of economics. The third section will present a justification for employing principal-agent theory in the pages ahead. It will commence with a discussion about the way that leading international relations theories are incapable of shedding light on important parts of security transfers. The focus will then shift to the manner in which international relations scholars utilized PAT in prior works regarding transfers. Inside the fourth section, it will become evident how the selected perspective will be applied to the empirical data later in the thesis.

History and Components of Principal-Agent Theory

Multiple topics will be covered in this section of the chapter. Following the discussion about the emergence of principal-agent theory in the middle of the twentieth century, attention will turn to how principal-agent theorists concentrate on the convergence and divergence of interests, incentives, monitoring, dilemmas of control and double principals. There will be a chance to reiterate these points in the final subsection.

The Origin of Principal-Agent Theory

Principal-agent theory, as mentioned in the initial chapter, is a perspective that provides insight into situations where weak actors perform tasks on behalf of strong ones. Corporations and other powerful entities in the business world often ask weaker actors to perform duties. Consequently, in the 1960s, economists began to use principal-agent theory to shed light on these relationships. While economists concurred that the partnerships warranted attention, they developed conflicting perspectives regarding certain aspects of them. It is possible to notice the validity of this point while looking at a formidable actor's reason for urging a weaker party to conduct a task. From earlier writings, one can deduce that there were two major schools of thought about this subject. On the one hand, one contingent of economists believed that the principal encourages an agent to perform an assignment because it wants to cut costs. On the other, another group thought that a principal behaves in this fashion since it has additional tasks to complete (Martimort and Laffont 2001, 28).

The Convergence and Divergence of Interests

The interests of the agent will have a major impact on how quickly a partnership comes into existence. An ideal situation for a principal is to encounter an agent that possesses similar interests. If a convergence of interests is present, the principal will not need to do much to

persuade the agent to complete a particular task. It is possible to find an example of a convergence of interests in the economic realm while looking at the relationship between a broadcasting network and a sponsor. To make a profit, a network needs to air commercials during breaks between programs. The network will not have a difficult time convincing the leaders of another business to fill an advertising spot when one emerges since these figures will recognize that the commercial will allow them to attract more customers.

A principal is more likely to face a situation where a divergence of interests exists (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 25). When his or her interests are not aligned with those of the prospective agent, a partnership will only materialize if the principal is willing to take steps such as offering incentives (Shapiro 2005, 264). It is common for a homeowner to turn to a landscaping company for assistance when he or she does not have time to cut his or her lawn. Rather than being concerned with the appearance of the property like the homeowner, the head of the company wants to receive a certain amount of money to cover employee salaries and other expenses. Until the homeowner offers some form of payment, this figure will refuse to complete the desired task.

Incentives

There are different ways that incentives can become part of a relationship. One possibility is that the principal will choose to depend on unconditional incentives. In other words, this actor may provide a partner with certain carrots before he or she even starts working in a location. This approach often produces a desirable outcome for the principal during the

hiring process. When a company wants to keep a prospective employee from working for a competitor, it can offer him or her a signing bonus, extra vacation days and so forth. Even if these incentives convince the individual to accept an offer, unwanted developments may surface once he or she assumes a position. For instance, the employer could learn that the new employee is guilty of shirking or disregarding his or her assigned duties (Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 95).

The issues associated with unconditional incentives have prompted certain analysts to insist that a principal should not provide rewards in advance (Byman 2006, 113; Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 121-126). After an employee works at a company for an extended period, he or she wants to see his or her hourly wage increase. According to the proponents of conditional incentives, an employer should not provide a worker with a raise in the immediate aftermath of a request. Rather, this actor should inform the worker that more money will only be given if he or she completes a construction project by a particular date or makes it through a span of time without any customer complaints. The supporters of conditional incentives presume that this move by the employer will lead to the worker improving his or her performance so that he or she can earn the desired raise. However, unwanted events can also emerge following such a maneuver, including the agent exhibiting the inability to reach the performance goal.

Monitoring

The principal must receive information about the conduct of the agent once the

relationship commences. There are different ways that this actor can learn about the performance of the partner. One is to monitor the behavior of the agent directly through the utilization of his or her subordinates or technological capabilities. When the leaders of a company have products to ship to a store for customers to purchase, they may hire a third party to complete the task for them. The officials can ensure that the products arrive on time by following the movement of the delivery truck with GPS or another tracking device.

In the example from the last paragraph, the principal did not need to rely on the agent or a third party for assistance during a monitoring campaign. However, there are occasions when it must depend on another actor. Within large republics, it is not possible for citizens to represent themselves in legislative chambers. Instead, they have to select officials to speak on their behalf when major issues are being taken into consideration. The knowledge that elections will transpire at some point in the future is enough to keep some lawmakers from participating in unsavory activities such as taking bribes (Downs and Rocke 1994, 206). There are others, though, who are incapable of averting corruption while legislative sessions are in progress. When these politicians engage in misconduct, their constituents learn about it indirectly from members of the press (Hilsman 1967, 9).

Dilemmas of Control

As a principal receives information during the monitoring process, he or she wants to learn that the agent is performing the assigned task in a satisfactory manner. However, he or she could hear that one of the undesirable developments from above has transpired. In other words, the principal could find out that the agent has disregarded his or her duty or

demonstrated that he or she is incapable of performing it independently. When there are reports of shirking or an inability to operate in an autonomous fashion, the principal will have to take steps to ensure that the task is completed properly in the future. The principal can sometimes solve the problem simply by finding another agent to carry out the task. For example, if a supervisor discovers that a subordinate is arriving at work late or falling asleep during his or her shift, this actor can just replace the unreliable worker with a more dependable one.

Every principal, of course, needs a plan for dealing with the worst-case scenario. That is, he or she must have a way to respond when another agent is not available to replace the underperforming one. In such an event, there are two options available to the principal. One is to help the current agent perform the assigned task. The United States occasionally utilizes this approach while responding to a major crime in a developing nation. At first, Washington will give law enforcement personnel from the developing country time to see who kidnapped or killed an American citizen. If they fail to identify the guilty party, American leaders will then send individuals from the FBI abroad to assist with the investigation. Besides helping an agent, a principal can conduct the task alone (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney 2006, 7). Some nations still give private security firms the task of protecting citizens at airports, train stations and other transportation hubs. However, if one of them experiences a terrorist attack at a transportation center, it will probably have government personnel assume the responsibility like the U.S. did following the 9/11 operation.

Double Principals

After the start of a partnership, an agent may encounter problems as well. A rather impactful one is the prevalence of double principals. As an external principal urges an agent to behave in a certain fashion, there may be another actor within its domain encouraging it to resist this pressure (Downes 2021, 6). During critical periods, it is common for department heads in the American government, figures who have been the focus of prior PAT studies, to face internal principals (Hedge, Scicchitano and Metz 1991, 1055; Moe 1985, 1094-1116). Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, John Kennedy revealed that he intended to have the military oversee America's clandestine missions in the future. Having played an integral part in covert initiatives for decades, many rank-and-file personnel at the CIA objected to Kennedy's plan. Consequently, they encouraged John McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence, to refrain from performing his assigned task. In other words, they urged him to abstain from assisting with the effort to alter the way the U.S. conducted its surreptitious operations overseas. Although McCone faced pressure from this internal principal, he still elected to cooperate with Kennedy or his external principal.

In the case from above, an agent behaved in a way that advanced the interests of an external principal. It is important to note, though, that the conduct of this actor occasionally benefits an internal principal. Towards the end of the 1990s, al Qaeda operatives bombed the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Just as Kennedy did not want to see another humiliating covert operation after the Bay of Pigs, Bill Clinton did not want to witness another damaging terrorist attack following the one in East Africa. One way that he attempted to accomplish this objective was by urging George Tenet, the head of the CIA, to share more

intelligence with other agencies. While Clinton pushed for more intelligence sharing, certain

individuals at the CIA claimed it would be imprudent to increase interagency cooperation.

Subsequent developments suggest that Tenet did not go on to make intelligence sharing more of

a priority within his department. In the early portion of 2000, CIA employees learned that two al

Qaeda operatives traveled from Southeast Asia to the United States. If Tenet took the step that

his external principal wanted, these figures would have notified the FBI and other relevant

departments about the arrival of the al Qaeda members (Kean and Hamilton 2004, 262).

Summary

This section showed how researchers developed principal-agent theory to shed light on

the partnerships between strong and weak actors. To get a weak actor with different interests

to become a partner, a strong actor needs to present him or her with incentives. After the

relationship commences, the principal monitors the partner, who may also be facing internal

pressure, to ascertain whether he or she possesses the capacity to perform a task in an

acceptable manner. If the principal uncovers evidence of an inadequate performance, he or

she must choose from finding another agent, assisting the present agent, or carrying out the

task independently.

Why Should Principal-Agent Theory Be Utilized in the Thesis?

The aim of this section is to explain why principal-agent theory should be used in the

thesis. It will be possible to achieve this goal by proceeding through multiple steps. Inside the

first subsection, attention will be paid to how the international relations theories that researchers often utilize in studies about security matters do not concentrate enough on key aspects of transfers. Within the second subsection, the focus will shift to how principal-agent theory helped authors examine these features in the past.

Problems with Prominent International Relations Theories

Defensive realists believe the leaders of nations are quite cautious. According to them, officials from a country will respond to aggression on the world stage by increasing their weaponry or launching a limited reprisal against the guilty nation (Waltz 2010, 126). Although defensive realists devote a lot of attention to the relationships between adversaries, they acknowledge that the ones between allies are important. Some defensive realists use the space within their respective publications to focus on how alliances between strong and weak nations come into existence. It is common for problems to emerge in the international system that threaten the security of both large and small states. When the leaders of a large state and small state recognize that a mutual threat is prevalent, they will likely form a security partnership (Walt 2013, 5; Posen 1984a, 63-64). In addition to concentrating on the development of alliances, defensive realists focus on the management of them. After the formation of a partnership, there are multiple forms of interaction which occur between member states. While perusing the pages of various works, it becomes apparent that leading defensive realists look closely at maintaining an adequate amount of material support for the weaker member of an alliance (G. Snyder 1984, 472). During a transfer, it is important to provide a weaker ally with enough weapons and equipment. For a favorable outcome to

emerge in a theater of operations, though, the more formidable member of a partnership must take additional steps, including tracking the battlefield performances of the ally's security personnel. Since defensive realism does not concentrate heavily on these other maneuvers, it would be imprudent to utilize this perspective in the pages ahead.

While defensive realists contend that states are cautious, offensive realists claim that these actors are rather aggressive. One can comprehend this difference by looking closely at the goals which defensive realists and offensive realists believe policymakers possess. Defensive realists think that the major objective of national leaders is to just "maintain their positions in the system." (Waltz 2010, 126). Offensive realists, on the other hand, believe that the "overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power" (Mearsheimer 2014, 2). To acquire more power, a state must take a number of steps on the world stage. According to offensive realists, a nation sometimes needs to form an alliance with another country. Like defensive realists, offensive realists think that states will agree to establish a partnership when they face a mutual threat. Besides concentrating on how an alliance emerges, offensive realists discuss the way that the stronger member of an alliance will resort to buck-passing shortly after it starts to work with a partner. That is, they mention the manner in which the stronger actor will attempt to get the weaker one to assume the responsibility of weakening the mutual threat (Mearsheimer 2014, 159-162). If offensive realism went into detail about the moves that the more formidable nation makes to increase the likelihood of a willing partner weakening the mutual threat, it would be a helpful tool in the research chapters of the thesis. Because the perspective does not contain this strength, though, it would be inappropriate to utilize it in subsequent pages.

Constructivism pays close attention to the steps that officials from a particular government can take to improve their security as well. For the members of this school of thought, interaction on the world stage is strongly impacted by the identities of states. Consequently, rather than insisting that a nation should increase its tanks, planes and other military capabilities like realists, they contend that a nation should attempt to decrease the risk of aggression by making moves which will show others that it should start to be viewed as a friend rather than a foe (Wendt 1995, 160). As the twentieth century came to an end, Western nations saw Libya as a security threat since it sponsored acts of terrorism and developed weapons of mass destruction. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, though, these countries began to view Libya in a different fashion because it provided financial assistance to parties impacted by prior acts of terrorism and relinquished its WMDs. Some of them then turned to Tripoli for assistance in their campaigns to prevent terrorist attacks by Islamic extremist organizations (Burns and Cowell 2011). In addition to showing how a partnership can emerge, constructivism can display the impact which identity had on the interplay between partners. Within the following pages, a lot of attention will not be paid to the role that identity played in the interaction between the United States and its partners during the transfers. Instead, emphasis will be placed on the manner in which the distribution of power in the alliances heavily impacted the results of the operations. Given how constructivism does not stress power distribution, it would be improper to rely on it later in the thesis.

Like realists and constructivists, neoliberals concentrate on relationships between both adversaries and allies. While discussing the latter, these theorists tend to focus on the way that partnerships surface in the international community. Besides talking about how the presence of a mutual threat can prompt countries to form an alliance, they note how a partnership is likely to

appear when nations anticipate that the relationship will lead to economic benefits such as increases in exports and jobs (Keohane and Nye 2001, 8-9). Although neoliberalism shows how partnerships can surface, it does not closely examine the interaction which transpires following the establishment of them. Therefore, this perspective does not have the capacity to help explain how the interplay between the U.S. and its allies influenced the transfer results in South Korea and South Vietnam.

A study about transfers should utilize a theory that focuses on key forms of allied interaction and the distribution of power in a relationship. The discussions about defensive realism, offensive realism and neoliberalism showed that these perspectives do not dedicate enough attention to important types of interaction which occur between allies after the commencement of a partnership.   The discussion about constructivism, in contrast, revealed that the members of this school of thought do not emphasize the distribution of power in a relationship.

Reviews of Earlier PAT Works about Transfers

Principal-agent theory devotes an adequate amount of attention to the features that were mentioned in the last paragraph. To bolster this point, it will be necessary to take some earlier PAT works about transfers into consideration.[1] Within Friends Like These, Daniel Byman examines the American transfer in Iraq. When this operation from the War on Terror commenced, there was a divergence of interests between Washington and Baghdad.

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[1] Other important issues examined with principal-agent theory include state-sponsored terrorism and paramilitary operations. For an insightful analysis of the former, see Daniel Byman and Sarah Kreps' Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism. As for a useful work about the latter, refer to Armin Krishnan's *Why Paramilitary Operations Fail.*

American policymakers wanted the security services in Iraq to concentrate on weakening

Islamist groups such as al Qaeda. Iraq's Shiite leaders, though, often used security personnel

to target Sunni opposition figures. During the portion of the transfer that Byman focuses on,

U.S. officials consistently attempted to alter the conduct of their weaker partner with

unconditional aid. Like most American leaders who utilize unconditional aid, these figures did

not get a chance to see the agent align its behavior with U.S. interests (Byman 2006, 113).

The leaders of nations face pressure on both the domestic and international levels as

they make certain foreign policy decisions. The debate over the utilization of Iraq's security

services, like certain events from the upcoming case analyses, shows how two-level games

often surface at the time of security transfers (Putnam 1988, 427-460). While the U.S. urged

the members of the Iraqi regime to use security personnel differently, a formidable

contingent of Shiite clerics urged them to resist this external pressure. Byman's narrow focus

in Friends Like These prevents a reader from noticing the manner in which the actions of the

internal principal prompted Iraqi officials to refrain from aligning their conduct with the

interests of the external principal.

The interaction in a security transfer, of course, is not limited to an external principal

trying to impact the handling of an agent's personnel. While the soldiers in a nascent army

inherit the security responsibilities in the target country, the principal wants to see whether

they perform their new duties in a satisfactory fashion. Consequently, it must monitor soldiers

as they participate in engagements, patrol volatile areas and so forth. Inside Byman's article, it

is possible to find a discussion about the American monitoring campaign in Iraq. The content

in the discussion displays that the United States occasionally received information from

Baghdad. Since Washington did not have a solid rapport with the members of the Iraqi government, it, like most principals, questioned the veracity of shared data.

Given how depending on a weaker partner for information is unlikely to generate a favorable outcome, the principal must find another way to learn about key developments in a war zone. Within his article, Byman examines an additional approach which can be relied on during a transfer. While an initiative is in progress, newspapers and other entities have individuals on the ground to collect information. At one point, Byman suggests that the principal should depend on these organizations for information about the agent's security personnel. If several third parties present similar accounts of the performance of local units, the principal will know that they are probably credible (Byman 2006, 82).

With the information that it receives during the monitoring process, the principal will decide whether the members of a fledgling force possess the capacity to assume all of the security duties in their country. During the operation in Iraq, American officials concluded that local units could not act in an autonomous fashion. Because the Iraqi transfer involves an underperforming agent, a researcher should concentrate on dilemmas of control while examining this case. There is no mention of dilemmas of control, though, inside Byman's publication. If he focused on dilemmas of control, Byman could have insisted that the United States used an assistance campaign to deal with the presence of the underperforming agent in Iraq since American troops stayed behind to help the Iraqis for a stretch (Obama 2020, 314-315).

Biddle, MacDonald and Baker examine the American transfer in Korea with principal-agent theory. They, as mentioned in Chapter Two, show how conditional aid caused the regime

in Seoul to make various reforms inside the ROKA. While these researchers display the manner

in which the U.S. altered the conduct of its weaker partner, their discussion about aid contains

the same shortcoming as the one within Byman's publication. In other words, it just focuses on

the pressure from the external principal. Since they utilize this narrow approach, it is not

possible to recognize the way that the South Korean regime faced a considerable amount of

pressure from domestic factions. This internal pressure periodically made government officials

reluctant to cooperate with policymakers in Washington.

In addition to concentrating on how the United States changed South Korea's behavior

with conditional aid, Biddle, MacDonald and Baker discuss the American monitoring campaign

below the thirty-eighth parallel. With so many members of the ROKA assuming new tasks, U.S.

leaders needed information about their performances on the battlefield. While engagements

occurred, American military personnel, who were still situated on the Korean Peninsula,

observed the actions of South Korean soldiers. Over the course of the transfer, policymakers in

Washington became quite reliant on reports from these servicemen (Biddle, MacDonald and

Baker 2017, 121-126).

Biddle, MacDonald and Baker also assess the different approaches for conducting a

monitoring campaign. While they appraise the options which are available, they note how a

major obstacle surfaces in a transfer that cannot be seen in a lot of other situations involving

principal-agent relationships. It is common for the principal to maintain the same number of

subordinates in a location to track the performance of the agent over the course of a

partnership. During a transfer, though, the amount of personnel working for the principal in a

war zone decreases considerably as the agent assumes more responsibilities. From various

statements, one can gather that Biddle, MacDonald and Baker believe the principal is unlikely

to conduct a productive direct monitoring campaign under these circumstances. For instance,

at one juncture, they say "the lighter the" principal's "footprint, the harder effective

monitoring becomes." (Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 98). As it reduces its presence in

the target country, the principal's other option is to turn to third parties for assistance. When

the authors discuss this alternative, they assert that the principal should refrain from utilizing it

since actors like the press often do not have enough access to battlefields and other key

locations (Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 98). The criticism of the indirect approach is

warranted, but these scholars fail to look at important matters in their examination of the

direct technique. The principal, as mentioned in the preceding section, has technological

capabilities that it can use to track the performance of its partner. If a principal in a transfer

concludes that it does not have enough field advisors and other overt monitors left in the

theater of operations to observe the actions of inexperienced soldiers, it can gather data with

spy satellites, drones and so forth. Besides neglecting technological capabilities, Biddle,

MacDonald and Baker do not devote attention to the manner in which the principal has covert

personnel within the developing state. Like the technological assets, these operatives can help

collect information in the event that an insufficient amount of overt observers surfaces during

a mission.

The monitoring campaign in South Korea revealed that the agent's personnel could not

operate in an autonomous fashion. Consequently, it is appropriate to devote attention to

dilemmas of control while examining the transfer below the thirty-eighth parallel. However,

Biddle, MacDonald and Baker do not focus on this principal-agent concept within their

publication. If they concentrated on dilemmas of control, it would have been necessary for them to claim that the United States addressed the prevalence of the underperforming agent in South Korea by initiating an assistance campaign since this principal left troops behind to help maintain stability.

The primary objective in Chapters Six and Seven will be to explain the results of the selected transfers. To achieve this goal, it will be necessary to employ a theory that concentrates on the key forms of interaction which transpire between allies after the start of a transfer and the distribution of power in a partnership. Principal-agent concepts, as seen in the above paragraphs, helped other researchers examine the allied interaction and power distribution that impacted transfers from the Cold War and War on Terrorism. Therefore, it is appropriate to conclude that they can also be fruitful tools later in this study.

Ways Principal-Agent Theory Will Be Used and Approach for Dealing With Its Main Limitation

The outcomes of the transfers can only be explained by taking the factors that were introduced in the last chapter into consideration. Principal-agent concepts can make it easier to recognize the impact that some of the determinants had on the results in South Korea and South Vietnam. One of them can also be an asset in the assessments of the transfers. The first three subsections will show how the concepts will be integrated into the evaluations and the examinations of certain factors and identify the theoretical insights that will come from utilizing them. The last subsection will establish what step will be taken to compensate for the major shortcoming of principal-agent theory.

Monitoring during the Korean and Vietnamese Transfers

The last chapter showed that an evaluation will conclude with analyses of battles that transpired during a transfer. In an examination of an engagement, the primary goal will be to ascertain whether the members of the ROKA or ARVN contributed to the holding of territory. The results of a monitoring effort will make it possible to see if the soldiers from a nascent army played a part in a successful hold. Policymakers in Washington, as discussed in the last section and Chapter Three, depended on reports from military personnel who had yet to return to the United States during the operations in the Far East. Consequently, the conclusions reached about a performance in a clash will be strongly influenced by the observations of these direct monitors.

There will be multiple opportunities to take monitoring into consideration in the explanations for the outcomes of the transfers. One will be during the discussions about the pace of the American troop withdrawals from South Korea and South Vietnam. When withdrawals transpire, one cannot assume that improvement surfaced within the agent's army since there is a chance the principal made the moves to placate anti-war activists on the home front. To determine whether an adequate amount of progress emerged before U.S. drawdowns in a theater of operations, it will be imperative to look closely at the performance of the ROKA or ARVN in a major skirmish prior to a certain withdrawal with information that American monitors inserted in a report to a superior.

During a transfer, the actions of enemy states can have a major bearing on the behavior of the agent's security forces. Consequently, while an operation is in progress, the principal cannot just track the performance of the agent's personnel. Instead, it must also look for alarming developments in the enemy camp. Once the transfers began in South Korea and South Vietnam,

officials in Washington instructed American personnel to closely watch communist nations. At various points in Chapters Six and Seven, it will become apparent that reports from direct monitors enabled U.S. leaders to see what steps these states were taking to keep South Korean and South Vietnamese troops from maintaining security within their borders.

There is one more point that should be made in this subsection. Biddle, MacDonald and Baker, as mentioned above, have suggested that a principal cannot conduct an effective direct monitoring campaign. Since policymakers in Washington often received reliable information from their subordinates during the South Korean and South Vietnamese operations, it will not be appropriate to conclude that these cases bolster their perspective. Instead, it will be proper to infer that they indicate direct monitoring can generate desirable results.

Interests, Incentives and Double Principals during the Korean and Vietnamese Transfers

Troop withdrawals are not the only factors from Chapters Six and Seven that can be examined with principal-agent theory. As Table 4.1 shows, there are six other determinants which can be examined with the selected perspective. This subsection will provide an opportunity to see how it will be a benefit in the examinations of factors one and two.

Table 4.1

Other Determinants That Can Be Examined with Principal-Agent Theory
− American Aid to South Korea
− U.S. Aid to South Vietnam
− Increase in Soviet Military Aid during the Korean Conflict
− Rise in Soviet Military Assistance to North Vietnam
− Long-Term American Residual Force in Korea
− Short-Term American Residual Force in Vietnam

When a transfer begins, the principal wants the agent to use a nascent army in a way that advances its interests. However, as the discussion about the Iraqi transfer displayed, a divergence of interests is more likely to emerge during an operation. This thesis will later take the divergence of interests between the United States and South Korea into consideration. Washington wanted South Korean soldiers to concentrate on preventing a communist occupation below the thirty-eighth parallel. Seoul, on the other hand, wanted these troops to conduct offensive operations until all of the Korean Peninsula was under capitalist control (Hermes 1966, 14). American policymakers, of course, attempted to bridge this gap by utilizing conditional aid at various points in the transfer (Byman and Kreps 2010, 12). Within Chapter Six, a lot of attention will be paid to the assistance that they offered in the Spring of 1953. Since authors focused exclusively on the behavior of the U.S. in prior analyses of conditional aid, they failed to show how pressure from internal principals almost kept some agents from accepting weapons and equipment to improve the battlefield performances of local units. By adopting a wider focus in the upcoming

examination of the situation in 1953, it will be possible to notice the way that pressure from a domestic faction made the South Korean regime resist American demands for a stretch.

The explanation for the outcome in Vietnam within Chapter Seven will contain an examination of American aid, too. Following the start of the transfer, U.S officials wanted the President of South Vietnam to make halting North Vietnamese aggression his main priority. However, he continued to devote most of his attention to thwarting coup attempts by dissident generals in the ARVN (Talmadge 2015, 9). It will be possible to show how unconditional aid did not enable American policymakers to overcome this divergence of interests by taking the assistance that Saigon received at one point in the early 1970s into account. In addition to focusing on the conduct of the U.S. in the analysis, time will be taken to address the pressure that the South Vietnamese president faced on the domestic level. With this broad focus, there will be a chance to see the manner in which the internal principal in South Vietnam kept the president from making reforms that figures from the United States believed would enhance the security conditions below the seventeenth parallel.

The examinations of American aid to South Korea and South Vietnam in the upcoming pages will bolster the popular perspective that conditional incentives are more effective than unconditional ones (Byman 2006, 113). They will also reveal how leverage is the main factor which determines how an agent responds to pressure on two fronts. If the external principal gains more leverage over the agent, the agent will likely align its behavior with the interests of this actor. On the other hand, if the internal principal secures more leverage over the agent, an alignment will probably not occur.

Dilemmas of Control during the Korean and Vietnamese Transfers

There is another way that the thesis will differ from a lot of the earlier PAT works about

transfers. Besides focusing on double principals, it will concentrate on dilemmas of control at

multiple points. When a dilemma of control surfaces in a security transfer, there is seldom an

actor available to replace the underperforming agent. Consequently, the principal must choose

between the second and third options from the second section of the chapter. That is, it needs

to decide whether to assist the underperforming agent or resort to direct action.

Within Chapters Six and Seven, there will be a chance to discuss the American

assistance campaigns inside South Korea and South Vietnam. The underperforming agent does

not usually possess the ability to manufacture weaponry independently. Consequently, as

researchers have noted, an assistance campaign involves the principal providing its partner

with an adequate number of weapons and equipment (Berman, Lake, Miquel and Yared 2019,

3). While scholars have concentrated on this portion of an assistance campaign, they have not

devoted a lot of attention to how it is also imperative for the principal to leave a residual force

behind for the appropriate amount of time. Towards the end of the Korean War, South Korea's

adversaries received more aid from their benefactor. The material in Chapter Six will show that

an increase in weapons and equipment from Washington and help from a long-term American

residual force enabled the ROKA to deal with this development in a productive manner. Soviet

assistance to North Vietnam, as mentioned in Table 4.1, rose considerably in the 1970s (Thi

1986, 141). The content in Chapter Seven will demonstrate that the American failure to

maintain a residual force in Southeast Asia for an extended period and increase weapons and

equipment to Saigon kept troops in the ARVN from dealing with this turn of events effectively.

There is a final point that should be made about the examinations of residual forces and aid to communist countries. These analyses will undermine a contention about dealing with dilemmas of control in security transfers. It is believed that a principal should conduct a task independently when an underperforming agent surfaces in a nation (Berman, Lake, Miquel and Yared 2019, 2). However, in the latter stages of Chapters Six and Seven, it will become apparent that an assistance campaign is more effective than direct action.

Approach for Dealing With Principal-Agent Theory's Main Limitation

The objective in the last two research chapters will not just be to show that the factors contributed to the favorable outcome in South Korea and the unfavorable outcome in South Vietnam. Rather, time will also be taken to identify the conditions which enabled them to be impactful. On certain occasions, it will be necessary to concentrate on how the behavior of anti-war activists in the United States allowed determinants to impact the outcomes of the transfers. When the conduct of activists is being taken into consideration in a subsection, it will not be possible to turn to principal-agent theory for insight. After all, earlier in the chapter, it became apparent that this perspective only devotes attention to the internal pressure encountered by the agent.

When proponents of a theory do not focus on a particular domain, it is imperative to use the works of other scholars to gain insight into key developments within the area (Posen 1984a, 35). The studies composed by the supporters of the international relations theories that were

taken into account in the last section primarily concentrate on events which occur on the foreign

level. Consequently, they would not be able to shed much light on the significant developments

that transpired inside the United States at the time of South Korean and South Vietnamese

initiatives. While the writings of defensive realists, offensive realists, constructivists and

neoliberals do not dedicate much attention to the domestic level, foreign policy analysis

publications, as mentioned in Chapter Two, focus heavily on this domain. As a result, it will be

advantageous to rely on them as events on the American home front are examined in Chapters

Six and Seven.

Conclusion

This chapter further discussed why and how principal-agent theory will be used in the

thesis. The selected perspective emerged in the field of economics in the middle of the

twentieth century. However, it can still be an asset in a work that pertains to security

transfers. After all, as mentioned in the third section, researchers already used principal-agent

theory in publications about the topic.

The fourth section identified the different ways that principal-agent concepts will be

utilized in the upcoming chapters. Within Chapter Five, monitoring will serve as a helpful tool

in the evaluations of the transfers from the Cold War. It will then be used in Chapters Six and

Seven as the troop drawdowns in South Korea and South Vietnam are taken into

consideration. The other factors that contributed to the transfer outcomes in South Korea and

South Vietnam will also be addressed in these chapters. As determinants such as aid to Seoul

and Saigon are examined, it will be appropriate to focus on converging and diverging interests,

incentives and double principals. During the analyses of the American residual forces and

military assistance to communist adversaries, there will be a need to concentrate on dilemmas

of control.

5. Evaluations of the Transfers in Korea and Vietnam

Introduction

In prior studies, most scholars simply labeled the transfer in Korea a success and the transfer in Vietnam a failure. As a result, the literatures about the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts do not have veracious readings of the outcomes of the missions. Through the utilization of the levels of success and failure from earlier in the study, it will be possible to fill these holes in this chapter. The degrees of success will be used during the evaluation of the Korean operation. At the time of the initiative in Korea, American officials wanted soldiers in the ROKA to develop the capacity to keep communist forces from conquering their homeland. There will initially be a discussion that considers the extensive amount of territory that the South Koreans inherited from U.S. troops. Once the conditions at the start of the Korean transfer are established, the focus will shift to how vital areas remained out of communist hands during the mission. This portion of the assessment will display the way that stability continued, but it will not prove how members of the South Korean Army contributed to the trend. Consequently, it will also be imperative to examine their performances in battles from different years. When engagements transpired, figures from multiple entities watched the actions of ROK personnel. Given the theoretical framework of the thesis, there will be a need to devote a lot of attention to the monitoring campaign conducted by South Korea's principal. While the developments that American monitors observed in clashes are discussed, it will be possible to see that the transfer in Korea qualifies as a conflicted success (McConnell 2010, 352).

The levels of failure will be used in the second appraisal. The U.S. policymakers overseeing the transfer in Vietnam wanted to prevent a communist occupation as well. The first

portion of the evaluation will show that North Vietnamese forces did not control any key areas below the seventeenth parallel at the beginning of the transfer. The second segment will reveal how the North Vietnamese acquired a substantial amount of land during the operation. The observations of American monitors from pivotal battles in the final part will display the way that ARVN personnel often took steps which helped the NVA make territorial gains. This information will make it appropriate to label the initiative in Vietnam as a major failure (Cobb and Primo 2003, 1-12).

Evaluation of the Transfer in Korea

This section will commence with a discussion about the security environment that the South Koreans assumed control of when the transfer began in the Spring of 1951. Upon looking at the conditions that they inherited, attention will turn to how communist forces failed to seize major locations in the years that followed the beginning of the transfer. For the reader to recognize the manner in which the members of the ROKA played a part in this result, it will be necessary to look at their efforts to hold territory in engagements from 1952 and 1953. At first, their attempts to perform this task in the Battle of White Horse Mountain and the Battle of the Noris will be taken into consideration. The focus will then shift to their efforts in the Spring and Summer Offensives from 1953.

Security Situation and State of the ROKA in 1951

For a period, American troops encountered a lot of problems on the battlefield. However, by the commencement of the transfer, they had established stability on the Korean

Peninsula. While the main objective in the upcoming paragraphs will be to show the

environment that the Americans left for the ROKA, time will also be taken to identify the size

of this fledgling force, the weapons it possessed and whether its members were motivated

and competent.

Mao Tse-tung's strategy for armed struggle spread throughout Asia in the middle of the

twentieth century. According to Mao, there is a point in a conflict when it is necessary to make

the transition from unconventional warfare tactics to conventional ones (1961, 113). At the

beginning of the 1950s, the members of the North Korean government made this move. In the

late 1940s, Pyongyang started to provide communist organizations below the thirty-eighth

parallel with clandestine assistance. North Korean officials wanted this aid to lead to the

downfall of the capitalist regime in Seoul, but South Korean soldiers quelled each communist

uprising. Consequently, towards the end of June in 1950, the North Koreans decided to launch

a full- scale invasion of South Korea. When the members of the Truman administration originally

heard about this invasion, they attempted to limit American intervention to providing weaponry

and air support to the soldiers in the ROKA. Since alarming reports from the Korean Peninsula

continued to arrive after these steps were taken, though, they recognized that American soldiers

would need to take control of the military campaign from the South Koreans (MacArthur 1964,

337).

Throughout the months of July and August, American troops suffered defeats in

engagements against North Korean forces (Gugeler 1970, 3). However, in September, they

managed to remove the North Koreans from South Korean territory. Instead of settling for the

restoration of the status quo ante, the Truman administration sent troops above the thirty-

eighth parallel to unite the Korean Peninsula under the rule of Seoul. Because U.S. troops

moved into North Korea, Chinese officials instructed multiple divisions to cross the Yalu River to

fight alongside the North Korean Army. During the latter portion of 1950, communist forces

pushed all of the American units back into South Korea.

With the introduction of new leadership, the United States regained the momentum

from the communists (Acheson 1969, 515). In April 1951, Truman decided to replace Douglas

MacArthur with Matthew Ridgway. Cognizant of the disappointing results that MacArthur's

aggressive approach produced during the campaign in North Korea, Ridgway instructed his

subordinates to eliminate gaps in the defensive line and carry out limited offensives against

the enemy. Throughout the Spring of 1951, U.S. forces removed Chinese troops from territory

that they seized after moving below the thirty-eighth parallel in early January. By the time the

transfer commenced in June, there were no longer any Chinese soldiers inside South Korea

(Schnabel 1992, 389).

Since the security conditions on the Korean Peninsula are now known, attention can

turn to the state of the army that American officials expected to halt communist aggression in

the future (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 1951). By June 1951, the amount of soldiers in the ROKA

had increased to over 230,000. In addition to having numerous soldiers, the South Korean

Army contained several units with howitzers, tanks and other heavy weaponry from the United

States. The ROKA possessed a sufficient amount of firepower and manpower, but there were

two notable problems inside this entity. A nascent army, as mentioned in Chapter Three, will

not be able to succeed in combat if its members do not possess skills and determination

(Biddle 2007, 218; Morell 2015, 317). During the communist offensive in the Spring of 1951,

American observers noticed that a lot of the figures in the ROKA did not yet have these qualities. As the communists attacked South Korean strongholds, U.S. monitors did not see many ROK officers devise effective tactical plans to keep them from seizing coveted areas (Ridgway 1951). To see how a considerable number of South Koreans lacked determination, it is necessary to concentrate on desertions. The discussion in Chapter Three alluded to how a force cannot accomplish key objectives when thousands of soldiers leave locations without authorization. At one point in the Spring Offensive, the majority of the soldiers in one South Korean division abandoned their positions on the capitalist defensive line (Van Fleet May 1951). Officials in Washington, upon learning about the thousands of desertions, urged John Muccio, the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, to confront the president about the low morale problem inside the ROKA.

The material in the preceding paragraphs displayed the conditions on the Korean Peninsula and the state of the ROKA when the transfer began. At various points in 1950, American soldiers faced difficulties in engagements against North Korean and Chinese troops. In the first half of 1951, though, they managed to remove communist forces from South Korean territory through the utilization of a new strategy. The ROKA inherited an auspicious situation in the Spring of 1951, but most of its personnel still had to acquire the skills and determination to succeed in combat.

The Maintenance of Stability on the Korean Peninsula

To discern whether the American objective of keeping communist forces above the thirty-eighth parallel was met, it will be necessary to look at the distribution of South Korean

territory during the transfer. There will initially be an attempt to see if communist personnel controlled valuable areas within South Korea in 1952. The focus will then shift to data from the Summer of 1953 to determine whether troops from China and North Korea gained or relinquished key locations in the last year of the conflict.

There was not a considerable amount of fighting on the Korean Peninsula during the first half of 1952. However, in the second part of this year, the number of engagements between communist and capitalist forces increased. Some of these battles transpired after soldiers from China and North Korea launched offensives against sections of the capitalist defensive line. On multiple occasions in 1951, communist personnel managed to seize important locations below the thirty-eighth parallel once they mounted attacks. The offensives in 1952, though, did not enable them to acquire Seoul, Inchon, and so forth (Hermes 1966, 340).

From January to July 1953, communist attacks continued in the theater of operations. During the month of June, the North Koreans initiated a Spring Offensive by the thirty-eighth parallel. A month later, the Chinese carried out another major attack against the capitalist defensive line. By the time the fighting ended in late July, the situation in South Korea remained unchanged. In other words, there were still not any significant locations under the control of the communist participants in the Korean conflict (Hermes 1966, 498).

Communist forces, as the information from above showed, did not make major territorial gains within South Korea in 1952 and 1953. Consequently, it is appropriate to conclude that stability persisted following the start of the transfer in 1951. However, one cannot go so far as to say that South Korean soldiers played a part in this positive trend since

evidence of a contribution has yet to surface. There will be an opportunity to see whether the

South Koreans contributed to the maintenance of order as their performances in engagements

from 1952 and 1953 are examined with the measures from Chapter Three (holding of territory,

officer decision-making or performing of tactical maneuvers, number of desertions and level of

American intervention).

Analysis of the Battle of White Horse Mountain

During a military conflict, it is advantageous to control elevations since they can help an

army ascertain enemy positions. From 1951 to 1953, South Korean troops attempted to

maintain control of several ridges and mountains along the thirty-eighth parallel. In the Fall of

1952, American military officials wanted the ROK Ninth Division to prevent Chinese soldiers

from acquiring White Horse Mountain, a location that provided an excellent view of the

Ch'orwon Valley (pictured in Figure 5.1). At the beginning of October, there were indications

that the Chinese intended to launch an attack against the South Korean soldiers on the

mountain, including increases in the number of armored vehicles on their line. Because he

believed an attack was imminent, General Kim Jong-oh, the leader of the ROK Ninth Division,

took steps to strengthen his defensive positions. Cognizant of how Chinese officers usually

utilized a substantial amount of soldiers in their offensives, Jong-oh requested more battalions

in the days leading up to the start of the engagement. In addition to this move, the South

Korean officer positioned tanks and anti-aircraft batteries on the flanks of White Horse to

protect against Chinese envelopment (U.S. IX Corps October 1952).

Figure 5.1 (Originally Appeared in *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*)

When the battle began on October 6th, the Chinese targeted the sector of the South Korean line that contained the recently added battalions. Each time Chinese troops launched an attack, these reinforcements worked with their fellow soldiers to keep portions of the mountain from falling into enemy hands. Although the South Koreans maintained their positions, they experienced heavy casualties during the first day of the engagement (Hermes 1966, 305). Consequently, Kim made another request for reinforcements to be sent to White Horse.

After the 6th, the Chinese carried out other assaults against the South Korean positions on White Horse. During these attacks, South Korean soldiers managed to "inflict extremely large casualties" on the Chinese (Hermes 1966, 306). With casualties rapidly rising inside their ranks, Chinese commanders elected to halt the offensive campaign on October 15th. Because they failed to achieve their objective of seizing the mountain, it is appropriate to assert that the first sign of success appeared in the clash.

The focus will now shift to the level of American involvement at White Horse. Inside Chapter Three, it became evident that United States soldiers enduring most of the fighting on the ground with aerial support from American pilots or a prolonged and intense U.S. bombing campaign would qualify as a substantial intervention in an engagement. Given the manner in which the South Koreans assumed the lead role in the ground operations against the Chinese, it is not possible to say that the first development transpired in the Fall of 1952. There is enough evidence to bolster the contention that the second development occurred, though. From October 6th to October 15th, American aviators flew 745 sorties over the battlefield (U.S. Eighth Army October 1952). During these missions, they "dropped over 2,700 general-purpose bombs and 358 napalm bombs and launched over 750 5-inch rockets at enemy positions." (Hermes 1966, 306-307).

American participation was not limited at White Horse, but the monitors, who watched the action, claim the members of the South Korean Army remained motivated. Over the course of the battle, the Chinese Army mounted twenty-eight assaults and fired 55,000 artillery rounds at ROK positions (U.S. Eighth Army October 1952). However, this unceasing pressure did not cause numerous desertions on the South Korean line. Instead, most soldiers continued to fight until the enemy withdrew from the area in the middle of October (U.S. IX Corps October 1952).

The last sign of success that must be searched for is officers making effective decisions or multiple units properly executing tactical maneuvers on the battlefield. A lot of American observers focused on officer decision-making in their respective accounts of the skirmish. The decisions of officers, as mentioned in Chapter Three, should only be labeled as effective if they

helped accomplish the objective of preventing a communist occupation in the developing

country. The choices of Kim Jong-oh made it more difficult for the Chinese to take control of

the land below the thirty-eighth parallel in the Fall of 1952. During the struggle for White

Horse, soldier fatigue became a problem in the South Korean camp. To address this issue, the

South Korean general sent replacements to the front when he believed troops needed a

respite. For instance, upon receiving reports of exhaustion in the 30th Regiment, he had the

28th Regiment relieve it on October 12th (Gibby 2012, 221). The officer's handling of this

difficult situation prompted one U.S. official to assert that the head of the Ninth Division knew

when to inject "fresh troops on both offense and defense." (Van Fleet October 1952).

This subsection concentrated on the engagement that transpired at White Horse

Mountain. At the start of the appraisal, it became apparent that the skill level and morale in

the ROKA were low when the transfer commenced in the Spring of 1951. The material in the

examination showed that the South Koreans improved substantially in these areas over the

course of the initiative. Many desertions did not occur on the South Korean line in the Fall of

1952. This auspicious development coincided with ROK officers displaying the ability to make

effective decisions under pressure. Considering how the Chinese also failed to take over White

Horse, it is appropriate to label the battle as a resilient success.

Analysis of the Battle of the Noris

Following the preceding engagement, the ROKA participated in the Battle of the Noris.

Like White Horse Mountain, Little and Big Nori provided the South Koreans with an opportunity

to closely monitor the activities of the Chinese. In early December, the leaders of the ROK First Division noticed multiple Chinese units gathering in the areas to the north and west of the Noris. Consequently, they instructed their subordinates to fortify their positions on the two hills.

On December 11th, Chinese soldiers attacked Little Nori and Big Nori in the early morning hours. The Chinese managed to take control of the latter for weeks. Their time on top of the former, in contrast, only lasted for a few days. When the members of the First Division's 15th Regiment departed from Little Nori, they went to Hill 69. After regrouping on this elevation to the east of Little Nori, they mounted two unsuccessful counterattacks. The head of the First Division had the 11th Regiment relieve the 15th Regiment following the last counterattack (Hermes 1966, 381). The soldiers in this unit seized firm control of Little Nori with an offensive on December 13th (U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group December 1952).

The effort to retake Big Nori commenced after the start of the new year. In January, South Korean soldiers launched multiple attacks against the Chinese troops on the hill. Towards the end of the month, the Chinese decided to withdraw from this location. Since this withdrawal transpired, it is appropriate to assert that the first sign of success appeared in the engagement. In other words, it is correct to claim that territory was held.

The role that the U.S. played in the battle is the next issue that will be taken into consideration. Just after the skirmish commenced, U.S. military officials learned that the Chinese repelled the 15th Regiment's attempts to retake Little Nori. Instead of instructing their own forces to replace this South Korean unit, they allowed Seoul to send in another regiment. Because U.S. leaders did not utilize combat troops at this critical juncture or another point in the

engagement, it is appropriate to infer that the first type of substantial intervention did not occur in the struggle for the Noris. In addition to looking for American troops assuming control of the resistance effort on the ground, it is necessary to search for U.S. aviators conducting an extended and intense bombing campaign. While perusing the reports of American observers, it becomes clear that this other type of heavy intervention happened in the clash. Throughout December, American pilots dropped numerous 260-pound fragmentary bombs on Chinese positions (U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group December 1952). During this period, they also bombarded the enemy with rockets and napalm (U.S. Eighth Army December 1952).

The accounts of American monitors can provide insight into the conduct of ROK personnel during the battle as well. In the preceding examination, it became apparent that the South Korean troops at White Horse Mountain possessed determination. There is no mention of many South Korean soldiers fleeing from their assigned positions in the reports that are presently available about the clash for the Noris (U.S. I Corps January 1953; U.S. Eighth Army January 1953). Because numerous desertions did not transpire, it is clear the men who fought in this engagement possessed tenacity, too.

It is now appropriate to ascertain whether the majority of the ROK participants in the struggle for the Noris were skillful. Rather than concentrating heavily on officer decision-making in their reports like the individuals who watched the Battle of White Horse Mountain, the figures who witnessed the action at the Noris devote a substantial amount of attention to the execution of tactical maneuvers. By January, there were not many Chinese soldiers left on Big Nori. Consequently, the South Korean attempt to retake this location just consisted of raids by small units. The members of the ROKA struggled as they performed these maneuvers

towards the end of the engagement. Without American air support, they would have failed to

remove Chinese personnel from their defensive positions (U.S. I Corps January 1953; U.S.

Eighth Army January 1953). The performance during the raids, along with other disappointing

maneuvers mentioned in the reports of monitors, make it necessary to infer that most of the

South Koreans at the Noris were not proficient.

Like the Battle of White Horse Mountain, the Battle of the Noris ended with Chinese

personnel failing to assume control of territory that they coveted. This was not the only

positive sign that appeared during the engagement. The content in this subsection also

demonstrated that desertion did not turn into a problem on the ROK line. Since two of the

indicators of success emerged in the examination, the Battle of the Noris qualifies as a

conflicted success.

Analysis of the Spring Offensive in 1953

In the Spring of 1953, the members of the ROKA controlled the central and eastern

sectors of the capitalist defensive line near the thirty-eighth parallel. Throughout much of

June, the communists mounted attacks against the divisions in these areas. At the beginning of

the month, North Korean soldiers seized Hill 812 and Anchor Hill in fierce engagements against

the South Koreans. Following this turn of events, ROK units performed several counterattacks

to regain control of the hills, but they failed to do so (U.S. X Corps June 1953).

Chinese units led the remainder of the attacks in the month of June. On June 10th,

Chinese soldiers seized Hill 973 and Hill 882 during grueling battles with ROK personnel. In the

aftermath of this development, the South Koreans attempted to regain control of the hills on multiple occasions. Like the efforts to retake Hill 812 and Anchor Hill, though, these counterattacks did not generate desirable results. The final Chinese assault against South Korean positions transpired on June 18th. While the Chinese did not utilize as much firepower and manpower in this operation, they still managed to get South Korean units to withdraw from certain locations (U.S. Eighth Army June 1953). By the end of the Spring Offensive, communist forces had pushed South Korean troops back an average of 3,000 meters along the 13,000-meter front (U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group June 1953). Given the amount of territory that changed hands, it is not possible to assert that the first indicator of success emerged on the Korean Peninsula in June 1953.

The loss of territory was not the only inauspicious development in the Spring Offensive. During it, the United States conducted another large intervention. When South Korean soldiers encountered setbacks against Chinese and North Korean personnel, American officials did not send their own soldiers to the front. However, they often instructed American aviators to perform airstrikes against enemy positions. Throughout the eight-day offensive, U.S. pilots flew 810 sorties over the battlefield (U.S. X Corps June 1953).

Some signs of success appeared in the Spring Offensive. During the examinations of the engagements at White Horse Mountain and the Noris, it became evident that a lot of ROK personnel refrained from deserting their positions when the enemy mounted fierce assaults. When the Chinese and North Korean attacks transpired at Anchor Hill, Hill 882, and so forth in June 1953, most South Korean soldiers did not leave assigned locations until instructions arrived from their superiors (U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group June 1953). Consequently, one can claim that the ROK participants in the Spring Offensive possessed determination as well.

There is also evidence that the South Korean participants in the Spring Offensive were skillful. Like the Battle of White Horse Mountain, the offensive contained multiple episodes of effective officer decision-making. With the communists applying pressure at several points, it became necessary for many ROK commanders to order retreats. In certain cases, officers eventually instructed their subordinates to work with the members of other units to form a new line of resistance. By taking this step, they managed to prevent enemy personnel from seizing even more territory in the month of June (U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group June 1953).

In the Spring Offensive, numerous South Korean desertions did not transpire and some ROK commanders made productive decisions under difficult circumstances. However, this campaign should be referred to as a tolerable failure for two reasons. One is how the United States performed a substantial intervention in the struggle. The other is the way that communist forces managed to seize a considerable amount of land when they conducted their assaults.

Analysis of the Summer Offensive in 1953

In the middle of July, the Chinese launched their final offensive of the war. At the start of the summer campaign, Chinese military leaders wanted to remove South Korean personnel from their defensive positions near the town of Kumsong. On the night of July 13th, Chinese soldiers applied a lot of pressure on the left and right flanks of the South Korean line in their initial attack. By midnight, they had already penetrated certain portions of the line up to 1,000 meters (U.S. IX Corps July 1953).

The Chinese kept seizing territory from the South Koreans without much difficulty on the second day of fighting. This continuation led to major changes in the line of resistance. When the South Koreans experienced setbacks in prior campaigns, new regiments and battalions arrived at the front to replace underperforming ones. During the Summer Offensive, though, American and South Korean military officials went so far as to remove entire divisions from Kumsong (U.S. IX Corps July 1953). In the aftermath of these modifications, the Chinese continued to make progress. At one point, they even managed to push their opponent across the Kumsong River.

Capitalist forces eventually attempted to regain their positions on the other side of the river, but Chinese troops repelled every counterattack that they mounted. By the end of the final counterattack, the Chinese had suffered approximately 28,000 casualties (U.S. Eighth Army July 1953). Although the Chinese experienced these casualties, they still seized a substantial

amount of territory from their opponent. Because they took over so much land, it is appropriate to conclude that the first indicator of success did not surface in July 1953.

One cannot make the claim that the American intervention in the Summer Offensive was limited. Once the campaign commenced in July, American pilots dropped many bombs on enemy strongholds. U.S. military officials also instructed combat troops from multiple divisions to participate in the fighting near Kumsong. By settling into blocking positions, the members of the American Third Division managed to halt the Chinese advance in their assigned sector. U.S. leaders then expected the soldiers from the Third Division to go on to regain pieces of land that were seized earlier in the clash, but they failed to accomplish this other objective (U.S. IX Corps July 1953).

It is important to determine whether many soldiers in the ROKA deserted their assigned positions on the battlefield. Within their accounts of the clash, American monitors do not allude to several episodes of troops leaving outposts, trenches and so forth without authorization from their commanding officers (U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group July 1953; U.S. IX Corps July 1953). As a result, it is appropriate to infer that the South Korean participants in the engagement had the same mindset as the individuals who fought in the already examined skirmishes. In other words, one should reach the conclusion that they possessed resolve.

There was a major issue during the Summer Offensive that receives a lot of attention in the reports of American observers. After the retreat across the Kumsong River, ROK division commanders instructed their subordinates to work with the members of other units to straighten out the line of resistance. The leaders expected that this adjustment would reduce the size of the front which needed to be defended. However, these individuals never had an opportunity to witness the emergence of the anticipated configuration. According to U.S. monitors, the arrangement did not surface because several South Korean soldiers moved past their assigned locations (U.S. Eighth Army July 1953). From the preceding information, it can be gathered that the ROK units involved in the Summer Offensive failed to demonstrate the ability to perform tactical maneuvers in an acceptable fashion.

Within this subsection, the Summer Offensive in 1953 was taken into account. Desertion did not become a problem on the South Korean line during the campaign, but one needs to label it as a major failure since territory was not held, American involvement was not limited and ROK units did not display the capacity to properly execute maneuvers in combat. If there was a third hold during the analysis of the offensive, the transfer on the Korean Peninsula would qualify as a resilient success (McConnell 2010, 352). Since just two successful efforts to hold territory (the minimum level mentioned in Chapter Three) emerged in this section, though, the initiative must be called a conflicted success (McConnell 2010, 352).

Besides showing that the transfer led to a favorable outcome, the battles provided a close look at how the overall defensive campaign unfolded below the thirty-eighth parallel. American officials knew that they would not accomplish the objective of preventing a communist occupation unless their agent remained in control of target areas in a considerable

number of engagements. While two of the holds from the productive defensive campaign were taken into consideration in the preceding pages, it became evident that one is far more impressive than the other. During the first examination, it was learned that the Chinese performed numerous assaults against the ROK personnel at White Horse Mountain. Rather than fleeing from their positions like thousands of soldiers did in the 1951 Spring Offensive, these troops kept fighting until the enemy withdrew from the area surrounding White Horse. The Chinese did not display as much interest in seizing Big Nori and Little Nori in late 1952 and early 1953. Chinese commanders removed a lot of soldiers over the course of the engagement, but the South Koreans experienced severe problems while attempting to clear and maintain control of different parts of the Noris. U.S. intervention, as seen in the second examination, ultimately enabled them to succeed during their offensive and defensive maneuvers.

The resistance efforts in the other skirmishes from the last portion of the assessment did not contribute to the defense of South Korea. While the Spring and Summer Offensives from 1953 both entailed unsuccessful attempts to hold territory, there was a major difference in the ROKA's performance levels in the clashes. During the third examination, it became apparent that the ROK participants in the Spring Offensive were proficient and determined. The South Koreans involved in the Summer Offensive possessed resolve. However, as the discussion about the execution of tactical maneuvers in the fourth examination revealed, they were not capable. In addition to different performance levels from the ROKA, the Spring and Summer Offensives contained different types of interventions by the United States. The content in the third examination showed that the U.S. intervention in the Spring Offensive consisted of a prolonged bombing campaign. Even with this aerial assistance, it was not

possible to prevent the enemy from seizing a considerable amount of land. In July, U.S. pilots flew many sorties and American combat troops took over different sectors of the capitalist defensive line. Although the United States provided assistance in both the air and on the ground, the Chinese still went on to triumph in the Summer Offensive.

Assessment of the Transfer in Vietnam

This section will be used to evaluate the transfer in Vietnam. Like the preceding one, it will consist of three major parts. In the first subsection, the main objective will be to display how stability was prevalent in South Vietnam when the transfer commenced. Within the second subsection, there will be a discussion about the distribution of land in 1972 and 1975. It will show that the North Vietnamese took control of the territory below the seventeenth parallel as South Vietnamese soldiers inherited the responsibilities of American troops. To demonstrate that South Vietnamese personnel played a part in this undesirable development, it will be imperative to take their attempts to hold territory in the Battle of Quang Tri City in April 1972, the Battle of Hue in May 1972, the Campaign in the Central Highlands in March 1975, and the Battle of Xuan Loc in April 1975 into account in the remaining subsections.

Security Situation and State of the South Vietnamese Army in 1969

U.S. combat troops encountered a lot of instability inside South Vietnam after arriving in 1965. By the time the transfer commenced in March 1969, though, they had established a more secure environment. This improvement will be looked at in more detail in the following

paragraphs. There will then be a discussion that reveals the size of the ARVN, the weapons that it possessed, and if its members were determined and capable at the start of the transfer.

The North Vietnamese were also advocates of Mao's strategy for armed struggle. While looking at their employment of this approach, though, it becomes apparent that there was a major difference between them and the North Koreans. The last section showed how the North Koreans only supported communist insurgents for a couple of years. The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, waited much longer to make the transition to conventional warfare because the National Liberation Front, the main resistance network below the seventeenth parallel, experienced a lot of success after it came into existence.

It is important to underscore this slower transition to conventional warfare because it strongly impacted the experience of American combat troops. Upon arriving in Korea to relieve the members of the ROKA, U.S. soldiers became involved in a conflict that was reminiscent of the conventional war which transpired during the preceding decade. The troops that policymakers in Washington sent to Vietnam had never participated in a counterinsurgency campaign. As a result, it was far more difficult for these individuals to adapt to their new environment (Taylor 1972, 238-244). During the effort below the seventeenth parallel, the majority of the inexperienced U.S. soldiers concentrated on eliminating insurgents in population centers such as villages since their superiors pressed them to kill as many members of the National Liberation Front as possible (Greene 1965). Although these troops were only supposed to eliminate the National Liberation Front's operatives, they frequently killed civilians after mistaking them for insurgents. When individuals witnessed friends and relatives lose their lives, they usually went on to join the National Liberation Front

(Barnet 1968, 216).

Once many Viet Cong operatives died in the Tet Offensive, North Vietnamese troops started to fight in more engagements. There was another development that helped U.S. troops recognize Hanoi was in the process of making the transition to the style of warfare with which they were more familiar. For three years, American personnel seldom faced the heavy weaponry that the Chinese and North Koreans utilized in the 1950s. In the aftermath of Tet, though, the North Vietnamese often used weapons such as tanks on the battlefield (Maclear 1981, 195). An engagement from the Spring of 1968 can show how the employment of a different strategy enabled American troops to keep this conventional opponent from seizing key locations below the seventeenth parallel. At the beginning of May, North Vietnamese troops launched an attack against areas around Saigon. Rather than targeting enemy sanctuaries in jungles and other remote areas as they had in the past, American military leaders elected to respond to this offensive by bolstering their defensive positions near population centers (Sorley 1999, 20). This approach generated a favorable outcome as North Vietnam failed to make territorial gains and lost many soldiers (Tin 1995, 63).

As the members of the ARVN started to inherit the responsibilities below the seventeenth parallel in the late 1960s and early 1970s, U.S. officials believed that they would eventually halt North Vietnam's offensives (Sorley 1999, 19). With hundreds of thousands of troops and several American tanks and howitzers, this force certainly had the manpower and firepower to meet this expectation, but a lot of figures did not possess skills and determination (Biddle 2007, 218; Morell 2015, 317). Within multiple reports from 1969, departments inside the United States government heavily scrutinized the skill level of the members of the ARVN

(Willbanks 2004, 12). Around this time, there was also concern about the resolve of the South

Vietnamese Army. At the end of 1969, the monthly desertion rate in the South Vietnamese

camp was 8,000. By the Spring of 1970, the amount of monthly desertions had increased to

11,000 (Sterba 1970).

Upon arriving in Southeast Asia, U.S. troops did not encounter much success against the

Viet Cong. However, when North Vietnamese soldiers became their primary opponent, they

began to make some progress. In fact, by March 1969, the North Vietnamese did not control

any of South Vietnam's important towns or cities. Although the ARVN inherited favorable

conditions in the early portion of 1969, it faced the same problem that the ROKA encountered

in the Spring of 1951. That is, it did not have a sufficient number of members with the skills and

determination to operate effectively on the battlefield.

The Decline in Stability within South Vietnam

The aim of this subsection is to discern whether stability continued in South Vietnam

following the commencement of the transfer. To accomplish this objective, it will be necessary

to look at the amount of South Vietnamese territory that North Vietnam possessed in 1972

and 1975. It is appropriate to concentrate on these years since the most robust North

Vietnamese offensives occurred during them.

In early 1972, there were developments in North Vietnam that alarmed American and

South Vietnamese leaders, including an increase in activity by North Vietnamese troops just

above the seventeenth parallel. Sensing that a major offensive was imminent, the South

Vietnamese took steps to strengthen the defensive positions along the borders with North

Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Although they made these enhancements, more North

Vietnamese divisions managed to cross into South Vietnam in the spring. These divisions then

worked with units, which had been in the country for an extended period, to take control of

multiple cities and towns. Upon experiencing this success during the initial portion of the

operation, the North Vietnamese launched attacks against other locations throughout the

summer. These assaults, unlike the ones in the spring, did not lead to territorial gains. During

the fall, North Vietnamese officials finally elected to end the "Easter Offensive." When the

operation began, these policymakers intended to seize every portion of South Vietnam. At the

time that it concluded, though, they only controlled ten percent of the nation (Palmer 1984,

94).

During the early part of 1975, Hanoi mounted another operation within South Vietnam.

The offensive also commenced with a number of triumphs for the North Vietnamese. What sets

this initiative apart from the one in 1972 is the manner in which North Vietnamese troops

continued to seize South Vietnamese territory during its middle and latter stages. By the end of

April, they actually controlled every province inside South Vietnam (Sorley 1999, 380).

Following the start of the transfer in the Korean conflict, communist forces did not seize

a considerable amount of territory inside South Korea. The material in this subsection showed

that the opposite happened during the transfer in South Vietnam. While the information proved

that stability did not last under the seventeenth parallel, it did not demonstrate that the

members of the South Vietnamese Army played a major role in this undesirable turn of events.

To see the South Vietnamese contribution, it will be imperative to examine their combat

performances in the following subsections with the indicators of success (holding of land,

effective officer decision-making, low number of desertions and limited American intervention) that were utilized in the prior assessment.

Analysis of the Battle of Quang Tri City

There were four tactical zones in South Vietnam during the war. When the Easter Offensive commenced, Hanoi targeted Zones One, Two and Three. In prior offensives such as Tet, North Vietnamese personnel invaded Zone One from a sanctuary in Laos. However, as seen in Figure 5.2, many troops entered the sector on this occasion by moving directly across the seventeenth parallel. Once these soldiers crossed the border, they targeted multiple population centers, including Quang Tri City.

Like most urban areas in South Vietnam, Quang Tri City was surrounded by defensive outposts. In the early and middle portions of April, the North Vietnamese seized control of the majority of these outposts (Andrade 2001, 90). The discussions in the last section displayed how South Korean units usually mounted counterattacks after losing locations to communist forces. The South Vietnamese did not attempt to regain their outposts following the defeats in the Spring of 1972. As a result, the North Vietnamese had an opportunity to save a considerable amount of ammunition, food and so forth for the assault on Quang Tri City.

Towards the end of April, the North Vietnamese campaign to take Quang Tri City began. By this point in time, most ARVN regiments contained an inadequate number of soldiers. For example, the 57th Regiment, a unit from the recently activated Third Division, only had 1400

Figure 5.2 (Originally Appeared in *Abandoning Vietnam*)

men to utilize in the struggle against the North Vietnamese (U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam 1973). Like the heads of a lot of other understrength units below the seventeenth parallel, the leaders of the South Vietnamese regiments inside Quang Tri City saw their requests for reinforcements denied by their superiors. The shorthanded ARVN units managed to remain in the city for a period of time, but the North Vietnamese eventually seized it at the beginning of May. Since the North Vietnamese captured their main target, it is necessary to conclude that the first sign of success did not surface in the struggle for Quang Tri City.

It is now appropriate to start the search for signs of a major contribution by a fledgling security force. One indication that local personnel played a key role in an engagement is a limited American intervention. During the clash, American pilots performed a bombing campaign around Quang Tri City. For an aerial effort to qualify as a limited intervention, there must be evidence that the pilots only dropped bombs on targets periodically. American aviators did not carry out occasional airstrikes against the North Vietnamese Army. Instead, they flew many sorties that failed to prevent the North Vietnamese from continuing most of their assaults on the ground (U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam 1973). Given the frequency of the airstrikes, it is necessary to reach the conclusion that a considerable American intervention transpired at Quang Tri City.[1]

The South Vietnamese transfer, like the South Korean operation, consisted of a direct monitoring campaign by the United States. There were several occasions during the fight for Quang Tri City, according to American observers, when members of the 57th Regiment left the

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[1] American airstrikes in the spring did not generate a desirable outcome. However, in the fall, U.S. pilots initiated another bombing campaign that removed North Vietnamese personnel from the Quang Tri City area. For more on this productive effort, see Dale Andrade's *America's Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi's 1972 Easter Offensive.*

battlefield without authorization from their superiors (U.S. Military Assistance Command

Vietnam 1973). At first, these individuals saw hundreds of troops abandoning their comrades.

Then, after more time elapsed, they noticed that thousands of soldiers were leaving the

ARVN's defensive line (Willbanks 2004, 155).

The 57th Regiment was not the only unit that dealt with a high desertion rate in the

struggle for Quang Tri City. Just before the engagement commenced, the Saigon regime

developed a new unit called the 20th Tank Squadron. Like the figures in other tank units, the

members of the 20th had many M-48 tanks from the United States (Sorley 1999, 309). As the

North Vietnamese assault became more intense, soldiers from the 20th began to abandon their

M-48's on the battlefield. This turn of events prompted one South Vietnamese general to

request more tanks from an American officer. Upon receiving this request, the U.S. general,

cognizant of the hundreds of desertions in the 20th, said: "I don't think you've lost a tank to

enemy fire. You lost all the tanks in the 20th because the men abandoned them, led by the

officers." (Abrams 1999).

In addition to lacking determination, the ARVN personnel at Quang Tri City were not skillful. Just as it was recognized before the Battle of White Horse Mountain that tanks and anti-aircraft batteries should be placed on the ROKA's flanks, it became apparent in the time leading up to the struggle for Quang Tri City that several of the ARVN's outposts needed more men (Hawkins 1972). After he learned that tanks and anti-aircraft batteries were needed at White Horse, Kim Jong-oh placed them in the necessary locations (Gibby 2012, 220).   Upon hearing about the weakness on his line in the Spring of 1972, Hoang Xuan Lam did not increase the number of troops at the outposts. Since the head of Military Region One failed to make this move, North Vietnamese units did not lose many men and weapons in the assaults to take the outposts and still possessed a substantial amount of strength at the commencement of the subsequent attack on Quang Tri City.

After the engagement started, South Vietnamese commanders continued to make decisions which made it harder to prevent the capture of Quang Tri City by the enemy. During the battle, American advisors realized that the ARVN officers could halt the advance of the North Vietnamese if they positioned more troops near the bridges leading into Quang Tri City. As a result, they strongly urged generals to send reinforcements to multiple locations.

Although the Americans provided their input, the majority of the South Vietnamese exhibited a reluctance to make any changes (Willbanks 2004, 132). For instance, the figures who Gerald Turley approached about reinforcing the Dong Ha Bridge South resisted taking the proposed step (2010, 177).

During this subsection, the Battle of Quang Tri City was taken into consideration. When the transfer commenced in 1969, the skill level and morale in the ARVN were low. The information in the analysis suggested that a sufficient amount of progress was not made in these areas over the course of the mission. Numerous desertions occurred on the South Vietnamese line in the Spring of 1972. This unfavorable turn of events coincided with ARVN officers engaging in ineffective decision-making on the battlefield. These developments, along with the loss of territory and substantial American intervention, make it necessary to refer to the struggle for Quang Tri City as an outright failure.

Analysis of the Battle of Hue

The North Vietnamese attempted to seize other Zone One cities in the Easter Offensive. One, which they devoted a lot of firepower and manpower to, was Hue. During the Tet Offensive, communist forces took over this city in a rapid fashion and held it for an extended period of time. As a result, several officials in Hanoi were confident that the campaign in 1972 would produce a similar outcome.

There were a number of South Vietnamese outposts around Hue. Those that received the most attention from the North Vietnamese were Firebases Bastogne and Checkmate. In

the early portion of the engagement, soldiers from North Vietnam's 324B Division took control

of Bastogne and Checkmate (Andrade 2001, 155-156). However, they later relinquished them

when members of the ARVN mounted robust counteroffensives (Andrade 2001, 167).

Upon losing Bastogne and Checkmate, the members of the NVA performed other

offensives. During these subsequent operations, the North Vietnamese did not remove South

Vietnamese forces from outposts. They also failed to force ARVN personnel out of the more

important location of Hue. Given the North Vietnamese inability to seize coveted areas, it is

appropriate to assert that the first indicator of success emerged during the clash for control of

Hue.

Other indications of success appeared as the fighting near Hue took place. The ARVN

commanders at Hue, unlike the ones at Quang Tri City, possessed the ability to engage in

effective decision-making. Following the commencement of the Easter Offensive, Ngo Quang

Truong eventually received the responsibility of leading South Vietnam's forces in Military

Region One. Upon arriving from Military Region Four, Truong saw that the northern portion of

Hue was not adequately defended. To eliminate the vulnerability, he placed additional units

from Military Region One and reinforcements from Military Regions Two and Three in this part

of the city (Andrade 2001, 162). Truong also recognized that North Vietnamese personnel

could seize the western section of Hue without much difficulty. Through the positioning of

more units in this area, the South Vietnamese officer managed to decrease the likelihood of

North Vietnamese penetration (Willbanks 2004, 149).

A side, as multiple military analysts have noted, needs to keep the enemy off balance

in a skirmish (Liddell-Hart 1967, 340; Foch 1970, 293). It cannot keep the opponent off balance

strictly through the conducting of defensive operations. Instead, it must also take the time to complete some offensives on the battlefield. One can make the argument that Truong recognized the importance of depending on both offensive and defensive maneuvers. After all, shortly after the general bolstered the defenses in the northern and western sections of Hue, he instructed his subordinates to launch limited attacks against the North Vietnamese (Willbanks 2004, 149). At one point in their history of the war, the North Vietnamese acknowledge that these assaults made it difficult for them to proceed with their "preparations to attack Hue." (Military History Institute of Vietnam 2002). Truong received praise from a lot of American monitors underneath the seventeenth parallel as well. For instance, in an interview with a journalist, one said that the general "spoils lots of the enemy's plans before they are even set in action." (Baltimore Sun 1972).

There is another notable difference between the ARVN's performance during the struggle for Hue and the one in the fight for Quang Tri City. Since they witnessed a substantial amount of desertions in the engagement at Quang Tri City, American monitors continued to question the commitment of ARVN personnel. For example, in a message to a superior, one observer said: "All Vietnamese must understand clearly that the problem is not equipment. It is men who will stand and fight." (Kroesen 1972). As the North Vietnamese carried out fierce assaults around Hue, thousands of South Vietnamese soldiers did not abandon their assigned locations. To understand why desertion did not become a serious problem on the South Vietnamese line in this battle, it is necessary to concentrate on the hierarchy of the ARVN. The character of officers, as one analyst has mentioned, strongly impacted the way that South Vietnamese soldiers responded to strenuous conditions (Cantwell 1989, 254). When a

commander possessed resolve, his men usually continued to fight once the situation deteriorated. Truong, unlike certain South Vietnamese officers who oversaw the campaign in Quang Tri City, did not flee when difficulties emerged during the effort to protect Hue. Consequently, the majority of his subordinates remained in their positions until the conclusion of the skirmish.

It is now appropriate to identify the level of American involvement in the clash. During the engagement, personnel from the American Air Force flew missions over Hue. The heaviest airstrikes against North Vietnamese positions occurred in the middle of May. On May 13th, U.S. B-52s dropped bombs each hour "to inflict as much damage as possible on the major enemy troop units and their supporting artillery." (Abrams 1972). In the aftermath of the war, the North Vietnamese noted how these aerial attacks precipitated many problems within their camp (Military History Institute of Vietnam 2002). Towards the end of the month, the United States conducted more impactful airstrikes. At this point in time, North Vietnamese troops were moving rapidly towards Hue from the west. However, once American pilots started to drop bombs on the battlefield, they had to cease this offensive (Andrade 2001, 168). Considering the amount of aerial support that the South Vietnamese received at Hue, it is necessary to conclude that the American intervention in the clash was not limited.

During the Battle of Hue, territory did not change hands, desertion was not an issue on the ARVN line, and South Vietnamese officers showed the ability to make effective choices. The analysis in this subsection also demonstrated that a considerable American intervention took place in the engagement. Since the U.S. intervention was not limited, it is appropriate to call the clash a resilient success.

Analysis of the Campaign in the Central Highlands

During North Vietnam's final offensive in 1975, there were battles in Zones One, Two and Three. The offensive commenced in the month of March with an assault in Zone Two (LeGro 1985, 155). Prior to the attack, the North Vietnamese used diversionary fire and radio messages to make their opponent think that they intended to seize Pleiku and Kontum. This deception campaign produced the response that the North Vietnamese wanted. That is, it led to Pham Van Phu, the head of ARVN forces in Zone Two, keeping numerous soldiers in Pleiku and Kontum. Since a lot of South Vietnamese troops were in these locations, the North Vietnamese managed to take Ban Me Thuot, the actual target during the initial attack, on March 11th (Dung 1977, 320).

Following the fall of Ban Me Thuot, South Vietnamese officials held a meeting to discuss potential reactions to this damaging turn of events. The attendees of the conference concurred that the remaining troops in Pleiku and Kontum should move to Zone Three to assist with the defense of Saigon. It did not take long for North Vietnamese personnel to move into

Pleiku and Kontum after the departure of South Vietnamese soldiers. Because the North Vietnamese took control of these major urban areas in March 1975, it is clear that the first sign of success did not emerge in the Campaign in the Central Highlands.

By 1975, American aviators and combat troops were no longer participating in the conflict below the seventeenth parallel. Consequently, one cannot search for a limited or substantial intervention by the U.S. during the Campaign in the Central Highlands. However, it is still possible to look for determination and ability within the ranks of the South Vietnamese Army. During the preceding analyses, the observations of overt American monitors revealed whether desertions became a serious problem in the South Vietnamese camp at Quang Tri City and Hue. After the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement in the early part of 1973, these monitors left the theater of operations. Policymakers in Washington responded to this turn of events by continuing their direct monitoring campaign in a clandestine fashion. In other words, they became quite reliant on information from surveillance planes and covert operatives on the ground. Just after the North Vietnamese attack on Ban Me Thuot began, covert monitors saw thousands of South Vietnamese soldiers flee from their defensive positions around the city (U.S. Defense Attaché Office 1975).

Saigon wanted the desertion issue to subside following the loss of Ban Me Thout. In the aftermath of this development, though, soldiers continued to leave the ARVN at an alarming rate. One can notice the manner in which this undesirable trend persisted by focusing on the aforementioned movement of personnel to Zone Three. According to American monitors, thousands of desertions transpired during the withdrawal from the Central Highlands (U.S. Defense Attaché Office 1975). Some of the soldiers fled because they feared that they would

perish if they remained with their assigned units. Meanwhile, others decided to leave their

comrades since they wanted to stay in Zone Two to protect family members from the North

Vietnamese (U.S. Defense Attaché Office 1975).

The above material showed the lack of determination in the South Vietnamese camp.

However, it did not demonstrate whether the ARVN participants in the Campaign in the Central

Highlands were skillful. To accomplish this objective, attention must turn to the decision-

making of officers. The majority of the Americans, who were still below the seventeenth

parallel in the Spring of 1975, believed that Phu could not make useful defensive adjustments

on the battlefield (Snepp 1977, 171-172). His conduct in the early portion of the North

Vietnamese assault displays how this perspective is valid. Once Truong assumed control of the

troops in Hue in 1972, he took steps to eliminate the vulnerable spots on his defensive line.

While the North Vietnamese moved toward Ban Me Thuot three years later, there were

weaknesses in the ARVN's defensive perimeter around the city. Phu's failure to make

modifications helped NVA personnel penetrate the perimeter in a rapid fashion.

There is another development which suggests the ARVN officers involved with the

Campaign in the Central Highlands lacked the ability to engage in effective decision-making.

These men, as mentioned in the earlier paragraphs, elected to conduct a withdrawal once the

North Vietnamese seized control of Ban Me Thuot. Unless certain conditions are prevalent, it is

unlikely that a withdrawal will succeed. With numerous soldiers and pieces of equipment, a

retreating army needs a major route to make it to a particular destination (Clausewitz 1985,

304-307). At the start of the withdrawal from the Central Highlands, South Vietnamese

commanders instructed their subordinates to proceed down "a little-used secondary route"

(Sorley 1999, 376). Besides the proper escape route, soldiers in an army need a viable plan to complete a retreat (Willbanks 2004, 236-237). Following the decision to withdraw from Zone Two, South Vietnamese leaders dedicated little time to creating a feasible plan for moving personnel and equipment to the southern portion of the country (Sorley 1999, 376). Therefore, while the initiative took place, troops moved down Route 7B in a chaotic manner. If South Vietnamese officials selected a different escape route and devoted more attention to planning, the retreat probably would not have been one of the worst "withdrawal operations in the annals of military history" (Hosmer, Kellen and Jenkins 1978, 96).

This subsection served as an opportunity to examine the Campaign in the Central Highlands. Over the course of the campaign, the North Vietnamese managed to seize the territory that they wanted, desertion became a problem on the South Vietnamese line and ARVN officers displayed that they did not possess the capacity to make effective choices in combat. Because these unwanted developments transpired, it is appropriate to label the engagement as a major failure.

Analysis of the Battle of Xuan Loc

By early April, the only towns and cities below the seventeenth parallel, which remained in the hands of the ARVN, were in Zone Three. On April 9th, the North Vietnamese began to attack the South Vietnamese soldiers that controlled Xuan Loc (pictured in Figure 5.3). The North Vietnamese expected that the response to this assault would be similar to the one at Ban Me Thuot. In other words, they believed South Vietnamese troops would fail to mount a fierce resistance once shots were fired (Snepp 1977, 342-343). However, the members of the ARVN

worked diligently to maintain their positions after the assault commenced. Although the South Vietnamese organized this resistance effort, the North Vietnamese still seized key locations such as the police station during their initial attack.

Following the NVA's opening assault, the South Vietnamese tried to regain the areas that they lost. The ARVN's 18th Division initiated this campaign with an attack against North Vietnamese soldiers in the center of Xuan Loc. It eventually managed to remove the North Vietnamese from the heart of the town (Willbanks 2004, 266). In addition to retaking territory, the 18th Division destroyed a lot of the NVA's weaponry and equipment in the middle of April (LeGro 1985, 174).

Through the introduction of additional troops, the North Vietnamese regained the momentum in the struggle for Xuan Loc. On April 15th, North Vietnam's 320B and 325th Divisions arrived in Xuan Loc (LeGro 1985, 174-175). Shortly after their arrival, they participated in offensives that forced South Vietnamese commanders to order a withdrawal. Considering the withdrawal by ARVN personnel, it is evident that the first indicator of success did not appear in this engagement.

Figure 5.3 (Originally Appeared in *Abandoning Vietnam*)

Since U.S. personnel did not participate in engagements during the final offensive of the war, it is unnecessary to search for a limited or substantial American intervention in the Battle of Xuan Loc, but time must be taken to discuss how the ARVN participants in the skirmish were skillful. The officers involved in the clash at Xuan Loc often demonstrated the ability to develop effective tactical plans. Of these leaders, Le Minh Dao, the head of the 18th Division, received the most attention from individuals outside the South Vietnamese Army. When enemy units approach a target area, it is imperative to take the step which Truong took during the Battle of Hue. In other words, it is essential to strengthen the defensive positions surrounding the city or town. While North Vietnamese forces moved toward Xuan Loc, Dao attempted to bolster the defensive perimeter around the town. This effort ultimately failed, though, since Dao was in a more difficult position than Truong. In the Spring of 1972, Truong had a lot of troops to place in vulnerable locations. Three years later, Dao did not have a sufficient amount of men to put in vulnerable spots since his 18th Division was understrength and reinforcements from other ARVN units were unavailable (Willbanks 2004, 267).

It is crucial, as mentioned earlier in the assessment, to keep the enemy off balance during an engagement (Liddell-Hart 1967, 340; Foch 1970, 293). One can make the claim that Dao concentrated on keeping the North Vietnamese off balance in the struggle for control of Xuan Loc. After all, while the skirmish was in progress, he did not just instruct his subordinates to bolster the defensive positions around Xuan Loc. Rather, he also had them perform assaults on a number of occasions. These offensive maneuvers, according to the leader of the NVA, frustrated the members of the North Vietnamese artillery units. During the clash, some of the units actually exhausted their ammunition supplies (Dung 1977, 167).

It is also necessary to mention the manner in which the South Vietnamese participants in the skirmish possessed resolve. Since thousands of South Vietnamese desertions occurred during the Campaign in the Central Highlands, some figures in the U.S. government feared that many soldiers would abandon their defensive positions at Xuan Loc. Days after the engagement commenced, though, U.S. monitors did not encounter a high desertion rate when they arrived at the front. Instead, they frequently came across soldiers who still wanted to halt North Vietnamese aggression "even though the odds" were "heavily weighted against them." (Smith 1975). One can attribute the determination of South Vietnamese soldiers to two factors. Many servicemen, as seen in the last subsection, deserted their units in the Campaign in the Central Highlands since they were afraid that North Vietnamese troops would harm their family members. Before the Battle of Xuan Loc commenced, the relatives of most soldiers were taken to more secure locations (Willbanks 2004, 264). In addition to not having to worry about the safety of family members, the ARVN personnel at Xuan Loc had different leaders than those who participated in the Campaign in the Central Highlands. Because the South Vietnamese soldiers at Xuan Loc had motivated officers above them, they continued to fight as the conditions deteriorated in April 1975. It is possible to notice the manner in which the ARVN commanders were motivated by taking the conduct of Le Minh Dao into consideration. When the general was not devising effective tactical plans, he was attempting to inspire his subordinates. In one interview, he said: "I vow to hold Xuan Loc. I don't care how many divisions the other side sends against me. I will knock them down." (Dao 2004). Upon speaking to the reporters, he proceeded to fight alongside his men.

This subsection was used to examine the Battle of Xuan Loc. Although two of the

indicators of success surfaced in the analysis, it is still necessary to call the engagement a tolerable failure because the North Vietnamese seized Xuan Loc. If a hold transpired in the battle, it would be possible to assert that the transfer in Vietnam was a conflicted success like the operation in Korea. Since the minimum level for the holding of territory was not reached, though, the initiative must be labeled as a major failure (Cobb and Primo 2003, 1-12).

Besides displaying that the transfer produced an inauspicious outcome, the engagements provided a close look at how the overall resistance campaign unfolded during the 1970s. At the time, American policymakers wanted the ARVN to keep North Vietnamese units from conquering South Vietnam. To prevent an occupation, the defending army, of course, needs to remain in control of target areas during a lot of skirmishes. In clashes underneath the seventeenth parallel, the South Vietnamese Army often surrendered territory to the NVA. Within the prior pages, major differences were detected in the ARVN's performance levels during these defeats. The first and third examinations showed that thousands of desertions and ineffective officer decision-making surfaced inside the South Vietnamese camp in the Battle of Quang Tri City and the Campaign in the Central Highlands. However, it became apparent in the final examination that these problems did not emerge during the clash at Xuan Loc. If the ARVN personnel at Xuan Loc received a lot of aerial support from the United States like the soldiers at Hue, they probably would have maintained control of the town.

Conclusion

In preceding works, Gibby (2012), Clarke (1988) and other researchers just called the

transfer in Korea a success and the transfer in Vietnam a failure after examining various pieces of data. During the assessments in this chapter, important information pertaining to the operations from the Cold War was again taken into consideration. However, at the end of the appraisals, the levels of success and failure from Chapter Three were used to label the outcomes of the missions. Through the employment of this sophisticated approach, it was possible to provide the reader with accurate readings of the results in Asia.

When the first transfer commenced in June 1951, there was stability below the thirty-eighth parallel. Between the Spring of 1951 and the Summer of 1953, Chinese and North Korean forces did not seize any significant locations inside South Korea. The communist failure to take major areas demonstrated that stability continued once South Korean soldiers began to assume the responsibilities of American troops. However, it did not show that they played a role in this trend. To ascertain whether the South Koreans made a contribution, it was necessary to examine their performances in battles from 1952 and 1953. In these analyses, ROK personnel only helped prevent communist territorial gains on two occasions, so the transfer on the Korean Peninsula was referred to as a conflicted success (McConnell 2010, 352).

The first assessment was not just used to discern whether the members of the ROKA contributed to the continuation of stability. Instead, time was also taken to search for improvement over the course of the transfer. During the first part, it became evident that the skill level and morale in the ROKA were low at the start of the operation. Then, in the first battle analysis from the third section, it was learned that ROK officers made effective decisions and many desertions did not take place on South Korea's defensive line during an engagement

from the Fall of 1952. Because these developments happened a year after the transfer began, it was appropriate to conclude that the skill level and morale in the ROKA improved considerably. This substantial progress provides another reason to call the Korean initiative a conflicted success.

The transfer in Vietnam, like the one in Korea, commenced with stable conditions. This stability did not last, though, because North Vietnamese troops eventually took over every province in the target state. To discern if South Vietnamese personnel played a part in the emergence of this instability, battles from multiple years were taken into account. Because the North Vietnamese managed to seize land in three out of the four engagements and South Vietnamese actions contributed to the majority of the territorial losses, the operation in Vietnam was called a major failure (Cobb and Primo 2003, 1-12).

The second appraisal served as an opportunity to look for improvement within the ARVN as well. When the transfer started below the seventeenth parallel, the skill level and morale in the South Vietnamese Army were low. During the first battle that was taken into account in the third portion of the evaluation, ARVN generals made costly decisions and numerous desertions occurred on the South Vietnamese defensive line. Since these developments transpired three years after the commencement of the transfer, it was necessary to reach the conclusion that enough progress did not surface in the South Vietnamese Army. The inadequate amount of improvement in this entity provides an additional reason to label the operation in Southeast Asia as a major failure.

Besides presenting veracious readings of the results in South Korea and South Vietnam, this chapter provided insight into the monitoring campaigns that principals conduct during

security transfers. Over the course of a transfer, the principal reduces its personnel in the target nation. This decline, as seen earlier in the thesis, has made some scholars claim that a direct monitoring campaign cannot generate an auspicious outcome for the principal (Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 98). The appraisals of the operations in Korean and Vietnam, though, indicate that it is an effective technique.   The content in the first assessment showed the way that American military personnel often compiled reliable reports regarding the capabilities of South Korean soldiers for their superiors. The material in the second evaluation then revealed that the accounts of U.S. observers enabled officials in Washington to follow the combat performances of South Vietnamese troops.

The main reason why a direct monitoring campaign can still provide a principal with credible information as personnel leave a war zone is this actor usually has other collection methods to use as substitutes. For four years, American policymakers depended on information from advisors and other overt observers in South Vietnam. After the finalizing of the Paris Peace Agreement in 1973, though, they became reliant on data from clandestine operatives on the ground and aviators on reconnaissance missions. These covert monitors did not have as much access to battlefields and other key locations as their overt predecessors, so they could not produce as much information for figures in Washington. However, it is evident that they generated enough since most officials on the home front were cognizant of how the ARVN did not perform well during the Campaign in the Central Highlands and other pivotal clashes in the middle of the 1970s.

Monitoring will remain a focal point in the next chapter of the thesis. The other components of principal-agent theory (interests, incentives, dilemmas of control, and double principals) will be taken into consideration in the sixth chapter of the study as well. These

concepts will make it easier to see why an auspicious outcome emerged on the Korean Peninsula

years ago.

6. Explanation for the Outcome in Korea

Introduction

What still remains uncertain at this juncture is why different results emerged for the United States in South Korea and South Vietnam. The main purpose of this chapter is to present an explanation for the outcome in South Korea. The material in Chapter Two revealed that the literature about the Korean War does not contain a convincing explanation for this result since scholars such as Ramsey (2006) and Gibby (2012) focused heavily on American aid, the South Korean soldier training system and the surfacing of more competent commanders at the top of the ROKA in their respective publications. Although these factors were influential, significant primary documents indicate that other determinants contributed to the auspicious result below the thirty-eighth parallel. Principal-agent theory will help demonstrate that the overlooked determinants were more impactful than the previously examined ones.

Besides bolstering the above contention, two other goals will be accomplished inside the chapter. Since some interplay transpired between the factors that contributed to the productive transfer, there will be a need to highlight it in the pages ahead. While the forms of interaction are identified, it will become apparent that the one, which allowed American troop withdrawals to be so influential, was the most significant. This chapter will also provide a chance to consider certain principal-agent propositions from the penultimate section of Chapter Four. The developments pertaining to the transfer will demonstrate that only the claims regarding conditional incentives and double principals are credible.

Factors That Contributed to the Conflicted Success in Korea

Within most of the following subsections, determinants will be examined individually. However, during one of them, both conditional aid and the increase in competent commanders will be taken into consideration. It will be appropriate to look at these factors collectively since a strong connection exists between them.

The Effort to Build an Effective Soldier Training System during the Transfer

The last chapter showed that South Korean troops improved after the start of the transfer. The main reason why this turn of events took place is an effective soldier training system emerged inside South Korea. For a reader to see the transformation of the training program during the transfer years, it will be necessary to take conditions before and after the arrival of a new leadership team from the United States, the centralization of the basic training system, the establishment of the field retraining initiative and modifications within the Korean Military Advisory Group into consideration.

In the time leading up to the transfer, the training program in Korea did not develop enough capable soldiers for the ROKA. Rather than attributing this lack of productivity entirely to issues connected to the ROKA, civilian officials in Washington acknowledged that there were some problems in the American camp which they needed to address. From the steps that they took after the commencement of the transfer, it can be gathered that one of the issues which concerned them was how the American officers in Korea did not have much experience with

building a new army in an allied nation. To solve this problem, policymakers sent James Van Fleet

to Korea to serve as the head of the American Eighth Army (Truman 1956, 450). Prior to receiving

his assignment, Van Fleet led an American intervention in Greece towards the end of the 1940s.

During the mission, U.S. personnel developed an army to quell an insurgency by communist

guerrillas.

Upon his arrival, Van Fleet needed to adapt to the command structure in the theater of

operations. Since Matthew Ridgway was the leader of the American campaign, Van Fleet could

not implement any plans without his approval (Hermes 1966, 98). Between the Spring of 1951

and Spring of 1952, there were seldom occasions when Ridgway rejected Van Fleet's proposals for

strengthening the ROKA. When Ridgway left Asia to become the Supreme Allied Commander in

Europe, the effort to develop South Korea's army continued since Mark Clark, his replacement,

exhibited an affinity for Van Fleet's suggestions as well (Gibby 2012, 206).

Besides adjusting to the command structure in the Far East, Van Fleet had to find a new

figure to run the entity responsible for training South Korea's forces. An evaluation of the Korean

Military Advisory Group prompted the leader of the Eighth Army to conclude that Francis Farrell

needed a rest (Van Fleet June 1951). When he proposed replacing Farrell with Cornelius Ryan,

Ridgway agreed to make the leadership change. Like Van Fleet, Ryan had a history of developing

competent soldiers. One of his most widely recognized accomplishments on the training front

was improving the instructional program for soldiers in the United States Second Army. For this

achievement, he received praise from the U.S. Senate Preparedness Subcommittee on Military

Changes to Indoctrination Centers (Gibby 2012, 179).

It did not take Van Fleet and Ryan very long to address the issues associated with the

training initiative for South Korean soldiers. When a lot of recruits enter the army, they do not

possess much knowledge about what it takes to excel in combat. Instructors attempt to prepare these individuals for the conditions they will encounter on the battlefield with basic training at instructional facilities. If a recruit went to a training facility at the commencement of the Korean conflict, he did not have a chance to receive training for an adequate amount of time. Instead, his basic training only lasted for a couple of days (Hermes 1966, 62). Under Van Fleet and Ryan, major changes were made to the basic training program. For an extended period, training centers in South Korea were largely separate entities. In the Van Fleet and Ryan era, the transition to a more centralized organization happened since this structure produced auspicious results for the American leaders on previous occasions. As individuals attended sessions at one of the eleven facilities in the centralized system, they had the benefit of receiving instruction about basic weapons and elementary tactics for a number of weeks as opposed to just two days (Gibby 2012, 191-192). By the middle of 1953, there were approximately 7200 recruits arriving at the centers each week for this extended training (Hermes 1966, 439).

Although the proper amount of basic training can enable a recruit to acquire important information, there are still gaps in his knowledge as he fights on the battlefield for the first time. Consequently, the principal needs to monitor the performances of the agent's personnel to identify the remaining deficiencies which should be tackled. In the Spring of 1951, U.S. officials learned from monitors that several units needed more knowledge about issues such as basic weapons fire (Taylor 1951; Gibby 2012, 196). When the commencement of cease-fire talks between capitalist and communist negotiators precipitated a decline in fighting during the summer months, they established four field retraining centers where the subordinates of ROK commanders could receive extra instruction (Hermes 1966, 209-210). Once the members of a division arrived at a retraining center for a nine-week period, U.S. advisers reviewed basic

weapons fire and then moved on to more advanced topics (Gibby 2012, 198).

It is important to note how an alteration in the American style of warfare impacted the way that advisers interacted with ROK personnel at the retraining centers. For decades, the leaders of the American Army urged soldiers to destroy the enemy's forces as they fought for control of territory. Limited wars, conflicts where restrictions are placed on the utilization of force, do not create conditions that enable a side to focus on eliminating enemy units (Strachan 2013, 116). Since they became more prevalent across the globe in the middle of the twentieth century, the figures at the top of the U.S. Army began to encourage troops to just concentrate on securing pieces of land (Weigley 1973, 466-467). The advisors at the retraining centers, after coming into contact with this new approach in instructional facilities on the home front and training manuals, did not push South Korean troops to eliminate China and North Korea's forces in tutorials. Instead, they devoted a lot of attention to maneuvers that could keep the land below the thirty-eighth parallel in the hands of the South Koreans. Besides being known as an entity that focused on eliminating the opposition's forces, the U.S. Army had a reputation for preferring offensive maneuvers. During this era of limited wars, the U.S. continued to exhibit an affinity for offensives (Cohen 1984, 151-181). While trainers from some developed countries encouraged inexperienced troops to be patient and cautious during offensives, U.S. instructors told South Korean soldiers that rapid attacks would make it easier to accomplish objectives on the battlefield (Osgood 1957, 132; Weigley 1973, 423). Cognizant of the ongoing threat of communist offensives, the Americans also provided recommendations about defensive maneuvers in retraining sessions, including that a force should not be static or passive as it tried to repel attacks (Weigley 1973, 424).

There are multiple pieces of evidence that suggest the retraining sessions improved the

performances of ROK units. In subsequent engagements, retrained units "typically reduced casualty and equipment losses by 50 percent over their counterparts." (Sun-yup 1999, 162). Besides seeing their casualty and equipment losses decline, these units went on to contribute to some of the holds that were mentioned in the last chapter. For instance, in the Fall of 1952, the ROK's Ninth Division thwarted numerous Chinese offensives at White Horse Mountain.   The preceding information makes it easy to understand why one South Korean officer believed the field retraining program helped the ROKA far more than any other American initiative (Sun-yup 1999, 162).

When examining the improvement in soldier training during the Korean War, it is important to devote attention to reforms that transpired in KMAG under Ryan. A year before North Korean forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, there were just 500 figures from KMAG working with South Korean troops. However, by the time the conflict concluded in July 1953, the number of advisors within South Korea had increased to 2,866 (Ramsey 2006, 10). The presence of many advisors in a theater of operations is not enough to ensure a useful training experience for the members of a nascent army. The figure overseeing an initiative must also make sure that trainers have certain attributes, especially combat experience (Ramsey 2006, 44; Willbanks 2004, 39-40). Just as aspiring executives will probably listen to a business instructor with years of experience in the corporate world, an agent's security personnel will likely pay attention to an advisor who has spent a considerable amount of time fighting in engagements. It is appropriate to conclude that Ryan recognized the importance of placing experienced instructors in the war zone. After all, while serving as the head of KMAG, he filled key advisory posts with individuals who participated in major campaigns during previous conflicts. For instance, at one point, he asked Richard Stillwell, an individual who served in the Normandy invasion, to become the advisor

for the ROK I Corps (Gibby 2012, 182-183).

To build a productive training program in a developing country, it is imperative to have cooperative leaders who want to improve the performances of their subordinates. When U.S officials mounted their reform campaign in the early portion of the 1950s, they did not encounter much resistance from ROK officers. Instead, most of the figures at the top of the ROKA exhibited a willingness to provide assistance. It is possible to notice the validity of this point by taking the conduct of General Paik Sun-yup into account. During the Summer of 1951, he helped the U.S. establish the retraining program below the thirty-eighth parallel. With moves like this one, Sun-yup managed to develop a solid rapport with Van Fleet and other key people in the American Army (Gibby 2012, 181).

This subsection focused on the training of soldiers in the ROKA. For a period of time, there was not a system with the capacity to effectively train South Korean soldiers. However, a productive program eventually emerged when another contingent of leaders arrived from the United States, the basic training program was centralized, helpful instruction was provided to soldiers already in the field, and constructive modifications were made inside the Korean Military Advisory Group. As the preceding material revealed, the Americans would have failed to implement some of these reforms without assistance from their South Korean partners.

Washington's Utilization of Aid during the Transfer

The initial portion of the subsection will concentrate on the increase in qualified leaders at the top of the ROKA. To show this change, it will be necessary to examine officer decision-making from before and after the start of the transfer. The longitudinal analysis will be accompanied by a discussion that displays how American conditional aid contributed to the

surfacing of more qualified commanders below the thirty-eighth parallel. If the subsection just

focuses on South Korean generals, there will not be a chance to see the way that the United

States benefited from the employment of conditional aid at other points in the transfer.

Consequently, after the ROKA's leaders are taken into consideration, attention will turn to the

influence that conditional aid had on the behavior of the South Korean regime when the cease-

fire negotiations took place in 1953.

During the early portion of the Korean War, Syngman Rhee, the President of the ROK,

feared that members of the military would attempt to remove him from power. It is common to

use the filling of leadership vacancies to keep plots from emerging against a regime. When

openings surface at the top of divisions and other units, a dictator needs to appoint individuals

who are viewed as political allies rather than figures who are dedicated to the state (Quinlivan

1999, 131). The majority of the loyalists that Rhee appointed did not possess the capacity to

develop effective tactical plans (Van Fleet October 1951). This deficiency allowed communist

forces to experience triumphs in a number of the engagements that preceded the transfer. At

the end of 1950, Chinese soldiers managed to surround many United States and South Korean

units when commanders failed to properly defend their flanks during attacks. Since American

officers had their subordinates secure their flanks in the communist offensive in the Spring of

1951, Chinese troops could not successfully complete envelopment maneuvers in the U.S.

sections of the capitalist defensive line. While the Chinese could not surround American units,

they did envelop several South Korean divisions because officers again failed to make the

appropriate moves to protect their flanks (Gibby 2012, 170-172).

Shortly after the poor performances in the Spring Offensive, James Van Fleet and his

subordinates altered the training for prospective officers. At first, they had individuals attend

officer candidate school for twelve weeks. Upon finishing this program, candidates took another

preparatory course that was linked to their respective branches of the army. For instance, if a

figure was assigned to artillery, he attended a twelve-to-sixteen-week course about how to lead

men who operated heavy weaponry. Training for most officer candidates ended after they

completed the branch specific course, but a small number went on to attend programs at the

ROK Army Command and General Staff College and training facilities in the United States (Gibby

2012, 188). Of the facilities within America, the ones that received the most South Koreans were

the U.S. Army Infantry and Artillery Schools. In most cases, South Korean students remained at

the Infantry and Artillery Schools for a period of six months. While they worked with American

instructors, they acquired knowledge about key topics, including air-ground operations and

troop movements (Hausrath 1956, 326-327).

The effort to improve the performance of ROK commanders was not limited to modifying

the officer training program. Once a transfer commences, there are pressure tactics which the

principal can utilize to alter the conduct of its partner. On certain occasions, it may instruct

diplomatic and military personnel in the target country to confront the agent about an issue.

Officials in Washington, as seen in the preceding chapter, told the American ambassador in Seoul

to meet with the South Korean president to discuss the ROKA's low morale problem after the

1951 Spring Offensive. During the campaign to increase the amount of qualified generals at the

top of the ROKA, these figures again pushed for meetings with Rhee. Rather than having the

ambassador speak to the president about the leadership situation in the ROKA, they opted to let

military officials like Van Fleet attend the conferences.

It became apparent in Chapter Four that conditional aid can help the principal modify the

behavior of a partner as well (Byman 2006, 113). During the effort to improve the performance

of South Korean commanders, the United States used this tactic. At one point in 1951, American

officials informed Rhee that aid would be withheld if he did not start to fill leadership vacancies

with young and qualified officers recommended by the members of the Korean Military Advisory

Group (Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 121-126). When the South Korean president received

this information, he had to consider a potential development on the domestic front. Since he

had placed political loyalists in the posts at the top of the ROKA for an extended period of time,

the president could not rule out the possibility that they would withdraw their support for his

presidency if he altered the selection process. An agent, as noted earlier, usually takes a step

that benefits the actor with the most leverage when it faces the double principal dilemma. In

1951, the United States was the only actor providing South Korea with a lot of weapons and

equipment. It also had operational control of the ROK personnel participating in the struggle

against Chinese and North Korean soldiers (Schnabel 1992, 102). For these reasons, Rhee

eventually told the United States or his external principal that he would refrain from filling

leadership posts with political allies.

There is evidence that the above steps led to a considerable amount of improvement

inside South Korea. One sign of this progress is General Paik Sun-yup's conduct during 1952. In

one engagement from this year, communist units attempted to depart from their positions near

the thirty-eighth parallel. However, according to American monitors, this strategic retreat failed

since Sun-yup positioned many South Korean soldiers along their escape routes (U.S. Korean

Military Advisory Group January 1952). Sun-yup was not the only young South Korean officer

who impressed U.S. observers in 1952. General Kim Jong-oh, as seen in the preceding chapter,

received praise from them after his decision-making prevented Chinese personnel from

completing envelopment maneuvers at White Horse Mountain.

Besides contributing to the increase in qualified leaders at the top of the ROKA, conditional aid played a pivotal role in the cease-fire negotiations. During the first year of the conflict, there was a convergence of interests between the United States and South Korea since both of these nations wanted to reunify the Korean Peninsula under a capitalist regime. By the time the transfer commenced in the Spring of 1951, though, a divergence of interests had emerged because American policymakers just wanted to keep communist forces above the thirty-eighth parallel and Rhee still possessed the desire to extend his power into North Korea. This gap later caused the principal and agent to respond differently to the breakthrough at the negotiating table in 1953. For American officials, the proposed agreement was palatable since it enabled them to accomplish their objective of preserving the sovereignty of South Korea (Eisenhower 1963, 174). However, in the eyes of Rhee, the deal was unacceptable because it did not set the stage for the reunification of Korea under capitalist rule (Hermes 1966, 450).

Although Rhee had fought for reunification for years, it is important to note that political considerations also precipitated his disapproval of the cease-fire agreement. During the campaign to improve the performance of ROK commanders in 1951, Rhee only had to consider how aligning his conduct with the interests of the United States could upset certain officers (Byman and Kreps 2010, 12). Two years later, there was a possibility that appeasing the United States could infuriate, not only South Korean military officials, but also legislators and citizens. One can see the manner in which the South Korean president initially placated this larger domestic faction or internal principal rather than officials in Washington by taking multiple developments from the Spring of 1953 into consideration (Downes 2021, 6). At one point in an

address on April 5th, he encouraged soldiers from the ROK II Corps to drive north to the Yalu.

Upon delivering this speech, Rhee took another step that had more of a chance to make the

communists back out of the cease-fire agreement. On June 18th, the president went so far as to

release 25,000 North Korean POWs from camps in Pusan, Masan, Nonsan, and Sang Mu Dai

(Hermes 1966, 451).

The Eisenhower administration approached Rhee's provocative actions with a sense of

urgency. When their initial talks with the South Korean president did not generate a desirable

result, Eisenhower's advisors began to set forth alternative strategies for dealing with him. Of

the proposals, the one, which received the most support inside the corridors of power in

Washington, was removing Rhee from power in a coup d'etat. In meetings, the Eisenhower

foreign policy team did not talk about encouraging civilian officials to conspire against Rhee.

Instead, they concentrated on having South Korean soldiers apprehend the president "and hold

him in protective custody." (Collins 1953).

Although Eisenhower and his associates engineered multiple military coups in the 1950s,

they never urged ROK personnel to oust Rhee since a breakthrough finally occurred on the

diplomatic front (Gwertzman 1975).[1] Since Rhee did not want to travel to Washington for a

summit, Eisenhower sent Walter Robertson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern

Affairs, to Seoul for a series of meetings. During these sessions, Robertson presented

incentives such as additional military aid (Clark 1954, 146). While Robertson spoke to Rhee, he

indicated that the assistance would only be given if the president supported the agreement.

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[1] The plan to oust Rhee was called Operation Ever-Ready. For more information about it, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol.15 or Wada Haruki's *The Korean War: An International History*.

An agent, of course, will ultimately cooperate with the party that possesses the most clout when he encounters pressure from external and internal principals. In the middle of 1953, the United States was still the only actor providing South Korea with a lot of weapons and equipment and controlling ROK personnel in the field. Consequently, Rhee eventually stopped placating the domestic faction and informed American officials that he would respect the terms of the deal (Foreign Relations of the United States 1953, 1358).

Once Rhee altered his behavior, there was less of a chance for an undesirable development to take place on the Korean Peninsula. The South Korean leader, as seen earlier in this subsection, insinuated that he wanted to conduct another offensive above the thirty-eighth parallel. If the United States did not present him with the offer of more aid, he may have retaken control of the ROKA and instructed it to invade North Korea. By the middle of 1953, the ROKA was on the verge of expanding to twenty divisions (Hermes 1966, 439). Even with this level of manpower, though, the ROKA probably would have failed to seize control of a substantial amount of North Korean territory since it would have been forced to perform the attack without any assistance from the U.S. (Hermes 1966, 453). Had such a disappointing outcome been a part of the ROKA's combat history, analysts would be inclined to label the transfer as a failure rather than a success.

The United States wanted conditional incentives to align the conduct of South Korea with its objectives (Byman and Kreps 2010, 12). This desirable outcome consistently surfaced during the transfer years. There was a scarcity of qualified commanders in the ROKA prior to the transfer. As the material in the first half of the subsection displayed, though, this problem vanished during the initiative since the president realized that American assistance would be

withheld if he continued to put underperforming loyalists in key leadership posts. Within the second half of the subsection, the focus shifted to the cease-fire negotiations in the Spring of 1953. For a while, the president exhibited a desire to prevent the implementation of the cease-fire deal. However, once this figure recognized that additional U.S. aid would only be provided if he respected the terms of the agreement, he eventually became more cooperative.

The Removal of U.S. Troops during the Transfer

After the start of the transfer, the ROKA did not develop the capacity to assume all the security responsibilities below the thirty-eighth parallel. If an underperforming agent surfaces in a country, there are different moves that can be made to salvage a transfer. This subsection will concentrate on the importance of cautious troop withdrawals by the principal. Policymakers should only remove troops when there is evidence that the soldiers in a nascent army are capable of inheriting new tasks. In other words, they should only take this step after the personnel in the fledgling force improve over a period of time. To show how the figures in the ROKA improved before U.S. withdrawals, it will be necessary to examine their conduct on the battlefield before a particular drawdown. Following this analysis, time will be taken to identify the factors which enabled American leaders to proceed with caution in the early portion of the 1950s.

A key drawdown during the Korean transfer happened in the latter stages of 1952. The fighting from the earlier months of 1952 can show the way that South Korean soldiers improved in the time leading up to the withdrawal of multiple American divisions (MacDonald

2019, 43). Personnel from the ROKA, as the content in the last chapter revealed, impressed American monitors during the battle that occurred at White Horse Mountain in the month of October. It would be imprudent to just concentrate on their reaction to this engagement, though, since another major battle took place before the drawdown. By taking their thoughts about this skirmish into account as well, there will be an opportunity to learn how the performance at White Horse Mountain was part of a positive trend. At the time of the battle, American and South Korean leaders wanted to remove communist forces from a certain location. Once it becomes apparent that enemy personnel left the target area, discussions about the tactical maneuvers of the ROKA, the South Korean desertion rate, and the American reaction to developments on the ground will demonstrate the manner in which South Korean forces were solely responsible for this outcome.

The other major battle prior to the drawdown transpired at the beginning of 1952. For an extended period of time, communist forces had been in control of the Chiri Mountains. In January, the members of various units assaulted communist strongholds on the mountain range. At first, it did not look as if the communists would abandon their defensive positions. After a while, though, they began to flee from these locations (Hermes 1966, 183).

During a campaign to clear territory, personnel should not halt an attack once enemy soldiers relinquish control of a particular area. Instead, they should attempt to prevent a successful retreat by seizing the roads around the captured spot with blocking maneuvers (Clausewitz 1985, 304-307). Within a declassified document, there is evidence that this development transpired at the start of 1952. Once the communists recognized that they could not hold their positions, they began to move down the roads on the mountain range. However,

American monitors claim that they never made it to safety since many South Korean troops effectively implemented the blocking maneuvers which their commanding officer ordered (United States Korean Military Advisory Group January 1952). As the South Koreans established formidable defensive positions along the escape routes, the fleeing communists suffered heavy casualties (United States Korean Military Advisory Group January 1952).

Besides being skillful, the South Korean soldiers at the Chiri Mountains possessed resolve. The content in prior chapters established that personnel should be described as motivated when thousands of desertions do not transpire in a skirmish. According to American observers, numerous South Koreans did not abandon their assigned positions in the early stages of 1952 (United States Korean Military Advisory Group January 1952). Consequently, it would be inappropriate to infer that the ROK forces suffered thousands of desertions like the ARVN units did in the Battle of Quang Tri City in 1972 and the Campaign in the Central Highlands in 1975. Rather, one should conclude that they experienced a tolerable number of desertions.

There is one more issue that needs to be taken into consideration in this analysis. In the engagement at White Horse Mountain, U.S. pilots provided a considerable amount of aerial support for ROK personnel on the ground. When South Korean soldiers needed assistance during the struggle for the Chiri Mountains, American aviators did not fly sorties over the battlefield. Instead, South Korean pilots in F-51 Mustangs carried out the airstrikes during the skirmish (Gibby 2012, 214). This lack of American involvement provides a fourth reason to label the clash at the Chiri Mountains as another example of South Korean improvement in the time leading up to the withdrawal towards the conclusion of 1952.

Although the information in the preceding paragraphs established that the drawdowns occurred after periods of improvement, it did not explain what enabled American leaders to handle the withdrawal process in a careful fashion. To understand this opportunity to proceed with caution, one must concentrate on determinants from both South Korea and the United States. There were, as seen in the last subsection, occasions when key contributing factors influenced each other. During the transfer years, soldiers moved through the effective training system underneath the thirty-eighth parallel. While the rank-and-file members of the ROKA attended impactful tutorials, more competent officers started to appear in leadership positions above them. Since these developments coincided with each other, the South Koreans had opportunities to perform well in battles before drawdowns like the one in 1952.

The prevalence of a productive soldier training program and surfacing of competent commanders can improve the performance of an agent's security forces in the time that precedes a withdrawal. Unless the principal receives accurate information from the theater of operations, though, it will not be possible for this actor to know that its partner can assume new responsibilities. Consequently, it is imperative to conduct an effective monitoring campaign during the withdrawal process. Chapter Four showed that some theorists believe it is unwise to collect information in a direct fashion because the number of overt observers working for the principal in the war zone decreases as local units inherit more tasks (Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 98). However, if the principal switches to clandestine collection methods once an inadequate amount of overt monitors is in a particular location, it can still gather enough information. The United States did not have to make this move in Korea since it always had a sufficient number of overt observers on the ground during the transfer. Prior to a

drawdown, policymakers in Washington looked closely at reports that these monitors sent from

the Far East. From the information in the accounts, the officials learned that recently

appointed officers and graduates of soldier instructional programs such as the field retraining

initiative managed to accomplish key objectives in combat (United States Korean Military

Advisory Group January 1952). As a result, they became confident that the members of the

ROKA possessed the capacity to assume more duties from American soldiers.

One can identify the main factor that contributed to the cautious drawdowns by

concentrating on the political landscape in the United States. When members of the public

participate in the political process, they want government officials to make decisions that

advance their interests (Putnam 1988, 434). To accomplish this objective, it is necessary, as one

foreign policy analysis researcher has noted, for citizens to place a considerable amount of

pressure on those in power (Mueller 1985, 65). If citizens just limit their activism to

participating in public opinion polls and other types of individual political action, there will not

be an opportunity for them to place much pressure on policymakers. However, if they also hold

demonstrations and engage in other forms of collective political action, it will be possible to

apply enough pressure on national leaders (Mueller 1985, 65).

At the start of the Korean War, most U.S. citizens supported the effort to halt

communist aggression. However, once American casualties increased, many individuals started

to think the initiative in the Far East should come to an end. When an anti-war movement

surfaces, it is common for young citizens to play an active role in the effort since government

officials will expect them to endure most of the fighting if the unpopular conflict continues

overseas. The youth in the United States, though, did not attempt to halt the war on the

Korean Peninsula. Instead, older conservatives led the campaign to end the conflict because

they believed it was not advancing America's interests (Mueller 1985, 39). These individuals

consistently tried to influence the conduct of policymakers with forms of individual political

action. For instance, in one poll, sixty-four percent of the respondents claimed that they

disapproved of Harry Truman's performance as commander-in-chief (Gallup 1952).

The tactics of anti-war activists had a strong impact on the withdrawal of American

troops. Since a wave of anti-war demonstrations did not surface in the country, Truman did not

have to contend with a lot of political pressure during his time in the Oval Office. With just a

limited amount of political pressure being applied in the United States, American military

officials below the thirty-eighth parallel had an opportunity to see the development which they

desired. In other words, they got a chance to see their commander-in-chief order cautious

drawdowns like the one at the end of 1952.

The members of a fledgling security force can fail to carry out duties properly when

U.S. troops depart from a target country in a precipitous manner. Policymakers in

Washington cautiously removed their soldiers from the Korean Peninsula in the early part of

the 1950s. Consequently, South Korean troops did not assume new responsibilities when

they were unprepared. Besides showing that U.S. officials carefully performed drawdowns in

South Korea, the preceding content identified the factors which allowed them to take this

step. Of these determinants, the most important was how opponents of the war in the

United States relied on forms of individual political action rather than types of collective

political action.

The Length of the U.S. Residual Force's Mission in the Theater of Operations

Since ROKA personnel did not possess the ability to defend their homeland independently, policymakers in Washington needed to decide whether American servicemen should retake control of the security campaign or provide assistance. They responded to this dilemma of control by launching an assistance campaign below the thirty-eighth parallel. During an assistance campaign, civilian officials can instruct a large residual force to perform the responsibilities that the nascent army cannot conduct in an effective manner or tell a small one to provide aerial cover for allies on the ground.   In this subsection, it will become apparent that a considerable amount of U.S. troops carried out the duties which ROK personnel could not perform. As the events following the cease-fire in 1953 are compared to the developments that transpired in the aftermath of the first Korean transfer in 1949, it will be possible to see that the unit helped maintain stability. While the primary objective will be to display the impactful role that the American residual force played in the partial transfer, it will also be imperative to explain what enabled civilian officials to establish such a sizable unit and keep it on the Korean Peninsula for decades.

In the Spring of 1949, the members of the Truman administration were in the process of removing troops from South Korea. At this point in time, Pyongyang had a military that consisted of 87,500 men, sixty-four tanks, fifty-nine armored cars, and seventy-five aircraft. The reports of monitors made officials in the Defense Department think that ROK personnel possessed the capacity to stop any attacks by this fighting force. These individuals eventually attempted to convince others that the South Koreans could deal with the North Korean threat

in an autonomous fashion. For instance, in one memorandum to the State Department, they claimed South Korean troops were "sufficiently organized, trained, and equipped to meet external aggression precipitated by North Korean armed forces as now constituted." (United States Department of Defense 1949). One can conclude that the Defense Department's campaign succeeded since Truman refrained from keeping a residual force on the Korean Peninsula.

Following Truman's decision, North Korea engaged in a number of alarming activities. For several months, platoons and other small units from the North Korean Army performed raids inside South Korean territory. Then, in the early portion of 1950, intelligence reports indicated that Pyongyang intended to carry out a full-scale invasion with multiple divisions. During February and March, some soldiers from the Korean People's Army started to build more bridges and roads along the border with South Korea (United States Korean Liaison Office March 1950). As they completed these construction projects, other members of the KPA removed civilians from the towns and villages by the thirty-eighth parallel (United States Korean Liaison Office April 1950). Towards the end of June, North Korean divisions finally moved into South Korean territory. Just days into the invasion, these units began to seize key locations across South Korea, including the capital city on June 28th (Schnabel 1992, 71).

A different sequence of events surfaced on the Korean Peninsula when the United States used a residual force in the second transfer. Before these developments are examined, though, the primary factors that contributed to the establishment of a force in this other situation should be identified. The material in the last subsection displayed that the monitoring campaign in Korea helped the United States withdraw soldiers in a careful fashion.

This effort also made it possible for a residual force to play a part in the successful transfer. In the middle of 1953, the Eisenhower administration received multiple reports about the ROKA. These accounts, unlike the ones which arrived from South Korea in 1949, did not claim that ROKA personnel were capable of independent action. Just a month before the fighting stopped, Mark Clark sent a message to his superiors in Washington. Inside it, the leader of the military campaign in Korea suggested that thousands of U.S. soldiers should remain in the western sector of the defensive line along the thirty-eighth parallel (Clark 1953). With reports like Clark's arriving in the White House, Eisenhower and his advisors recognized that giving all the security responsibilities to the ROKA would probably lead to another unsuccessful Korean transfer.

Information from monitors can enable policymakers to see that a residual force will increase the likelihood of a favorable result in a target nation. However, they will not be able to keep a unit in a location unless certain conditions are prevalent on the international level and the home front. During 1953, there was not a major conflict occurring in another part of the globe. Consequently, Eisenhower and his advisors did not have to contend with the possibility that leaving a considerable number of soldiers in Korea would prevent success from emerging elsewhere. Although these figures did not have to deal with an additional military campaign abroad, they did have to worry about an anti-war movement inside the United States. At the time, activists were still refraining from organizing large demonstrations throughout the country (Mueller 1985, 65). Since the members of the Eisenhower foreign policy team did not encounter a substantial amount of pressure, they had an opportunity to keep multiple American divisions in Korea like Clark recommended.

It is now appropriate to take the impact of this residual force into consideration. Towards the end of the 1950s, Mao removed his soldiers from the Korean Peninsula. Following this troop withdrawal, personnel from North Korea carried out several cross-border raids (Becker 2005, 154). In 1968, Pyongyang instructed a thirty-one-man commando team to assassinate the President of South Korea. Upon crossing the thirty-eighth parallel, the members of this contingent moved to within a thousand yards of the Blue House. However, when they attempted to get inside the president's residence, South Korean forces managed to repel the attack (Oberdorfer 1997, 11).

At the beginning of the 1970s, meetings between high-ranking officials from the North Korean and South Korean governments transpired. The talks led to the signing of a joint statement in which Pyongyang and Seoul promised not to conduct attacks against each other (Oberdorfer 1997, 57). North Korea later carried out attacks, but these assaults, like the offensive operations from the 1960s, were small. For instance, towards the end of 1974, North Korean troops initiated a brief exchange of fire with South Korean soldiers along the border (Oberdorfer 1997, 56). Because North Korean officials never went so far as to launch another invasion of South Korea, it is necessary to conclude that the American residual force made them behave in the same fashion as the Eastern European leaders who faced the U.S. residual force in Western Europe. In other words, it is imperative to reach the inference that the unit prompted them to exercise a considerable amount of restraint (Posen 1984b, 50-51).

When a principal performs a partial transfer, it wants the agent's personnel to eventually assume the responsibilities of the members of the residual force. Some may presume that the appropriate time to make this transition is when the situation in the target

country is comparable to the one within South Korea during the latter stages of the second

transfer. However, it is unwise for a principal to initiate a complete transfer simply because the

enemy has performed limited attacks against the agent. After all, there is a chance that this

actor may become more aggressive following the departure of the residual force. To ascertain

whether an increase in aggression is a likely development in a particular location, the principal

must closely monitor the activities of the enemy. Through the monitoring process, the United

States uncovered useful information about North Korea. Following the cease-fire, U.S.

personnel discovered tunnels along the thirty-eighth parallel. They initially believed that the

North Koreans were just using the tunnels for intelligence collection purposes. In the middle of

the 1970s, though, the monitors encountered passages leading into South Korean territory that

contained electrical lines and lighting and places for sleeping and weapons storage (Oberdorfer

1997, 56). When American civilian and military officials learned about these more

sophisticated tunnels which Pyongyang could use to infiltrate thousands of troops and supplies

into South Korea during a major offensive operation, they elected to expand the monitoring

campaign by placing hundreds of seismic listening devices near the border with North Korea

(Oberdorfer 1997, 58).

There was another development that concerned officials in the United States. Once the

cease-fire went into effect, U.S. personnel began to track the production of weapons and

equipment within North Korea. In the 1970s, they told their superiors in Washington that

Pyongyang was working covertly to produce "large quantities of its own field artillery pieces,

rocket launchers, armored personnel carriers, main battle tanks, and surface-to-air missiles."

(Oberdorfer 1997, 61). The bolstering of North Korea's military capabilities, coupled with the

construction of the sophisticated tunnels, made American policymakers fear that the removal of the residual force would lead to the launching of a major offensive against an agent which had yet to gain their complete confidence.

An agent will probably not develop the capacity to inherit all the responsibilities in a target country. Instead, a more likely outcome is that this actor will only gain the ability to perform most of the tasks in a state. The principal can address the prevalence of an underperforming agent by conducting a partial transfer in a nation. When a partial transfer with a large amount of servicemen takes place, the residual force will perform the duties which the agent's personnel cannot conduct in a productive fashion. The sizable American residual force in Korea had to defend the western sector of the defensive line by the thirty-eighth parallel since South Korean troops could only secure the central and eastern sectors. A considerable residual force, as mentioned in Chapter One, sometimes manages to deter major attacks after assuming its responsibilities. It is appropriate to assert that the unit on the Korean Peninsula served as a deterrent since North Korea only performed cross-border raids and other small attacks following the cease-fire. If Pyongyang refrained from constructing sophisticated tunnels and improving its military capabilities behind the scenes, Washington probably would have just kept personnel in South Korea for a brief period.

Did Soviet Weapons and Equipment Keep America's Agent from Succeeding in Combat?

There is another step that a principal must take while dealing with a dilemma of control. Since the members of the residual force play a secondary role, an underperforming agent's personnel need to lead the response to any security challenge that surfaces. Unless they

receive an adequate amount of weapons and equipment from the principal, it will not be possible for them to carry out this duty in an acceptable fashion. If the enemy of an agent receives additional supplies and increases its offensives, the principal will have to provide its ally with more weapons and equipment. China, the communist nation that applied the most pressure on South Korea between 1951 and 1953, relied heavily on weapons and equipment from the Soviet Union. Towards the end of the war, Moscow's commitment to the communist military campaign started to dissipate. Through a comparison of the shipments from 1951 and 1953, there will be a chance to ascertain whether the Soviet Union continued to send enough supplies to the front after its dedication began to wane. In the event that an increase is detected between these years, it will be important to establish whether American leaders put their agent in a position to deal with it effectively by sending more supplies to the Korean Peninsula.

When Mao Tse-tung decided to enter the conflict in October 1950, numerous Chinese divisions were situated just north of the North Korean border in Manchuria. As a result, the Chinese leader knew that he possessed a sufficient number of men to keep the United States from seizing land inside his country. What he did not have an adequate supply of at the time was weapons. After he requested many arms from the Soviet Union, Moscow quickly sent assistance to the Chinese troops in the war zone (Haruki 2014, 130). Because the amount of Chinese soldiers participating in the conflict rose during the following year, Soviet officials increased their supply shipments to the Korean Peninsula. By the middle of 1951, there were enough howitzers, machine guns and so forth to arm 248,100 Chinese soldiers (Hermes 1966, 76). The United States dominated the airspace in the theater of operations throughout the

conflict. Consequently, American pilots on reconnaissance missions noticed the rise in supplies to Chinese personnel. Upon learning about the increase from their monitors, officials in Washington adjusted their supply shipments accordingly so the communist forces would not gain an edge in firepower over the troops on the capitalist defensive line (Hermes 1966, 96).

Although the United States matched the supply increase in the enemy camp, the Chinese still managed to experience some success on the battlefield. In the middle of 1951, they initiated one of their most significant operations of the war. At the time of this Spring Offensive, the Chinese wanted to seize multiple locations below the thirty-eighth parallel. The personnel on the capitalist defensive line worked diligently to maintain control of target areas in the initial Chinese assault. However, Chinese troops went on to take certain positions during the attack.

As the war continued, there were developments outside the theater of operations which had the potential to halt the flow of helpful supplies to Chinese forces. For decades, leadership changes did not occur in the Soviet Union because Joseph Stalin repeatedly executed and imprisoned his political opponents. When Stalin died in March 1953, though, a new premier finally came to power. Georgy Malenkov, like his predecessor, wanted to triumph in the ideological struggle against the United States. However, he did not think a victory would surface if the war in Korea continued (Haruki 2014, 258).

Around the time that Malenkov came to power in Moscow, another significant leadership change took place in the United States. During a transfer, the principal does not just attempt to alter the conduct of the agent. Rather, this actor also tries to modify the conduct of enemy nations. Just as the offering of conditional aid can prompt an agent to behave

differently, the threat of force can compel an adversary to act in a desirable fashion (Schelling 1988, 3-5). Although he possessed many nuclear weapons, Truman refrained from using the threat of a nuclear attack to change the Soviet Union's hardline approach to the conflict in Korea. Upon coming to power, Eisenhower did not follow in his predecessor's footsteps. At one point, he instructed diplomatic personnel to lead representatives from other nations to believe that he was willing to use nuclear weapons to break the stalemate on the Korean Peninsula (Eisenhower 1963, 181). Subsequent developments suggest that this alarming information impacted the Malenkov government's handling of the war. For two years, Moscow encouraged Chinese and North Korean negotiators to not make concessions in the cease-fire talks at Panmunjom. However, in the Spring of 1953, Vyacheslav Molotov, Malenkov's foreign minister, urged the Chinese and North Koreans to meet some American demands (Haruki 2014, 258).

While Eisenhower's strategy helped American diplomats, it did not benefit the South Korean soldiers involved in the transfer. Under the new premier, a noticeable rise in aid to the soldiers who were fighting against the South Koreans took place. It is possible to see the validity of this statement by focusing on the artillery rounds fired from the communist line in 1953. During the month of April, 51,690 rounds were fired at South Korean forces. Then, in July, the amount increased to 375,565, the highest monthly total of the war (Hermes 1966, 477). With an abundance of supplies to utilize, the Chinese accomplished multiple objectives on the battlefield. By the Summer of 1953, Chinese military officials were determined to seize the land around the Kumsong River. As the content in the preceding chapter showed, their subordinates took control of this territory during a two-week operation in July (United States

Eighth Army July 1953).

Presumably, if a reduction in supplies accompanied the Soviet alteration on the diplomatic front, enemy units would have behaved cautiously and it would have been easier for the members of the ROKA to defend the positions they inherited from departing soldiers. Because the increase happened, though, they never had an opportunity to experience this development that an agent's personnel desire. Faced with a more formidable adversary, South Korea needed additional military assistance from its principal. With U.S. surveillance planes frequently monitoring communist controlled areas, it did not take long for policymakers in Washington to learn about the rise in aid. These figures, as seen in the second subsection, gave South Korea more aid during the final months of the war. In the years that followed the start of the cease-fire, U.S. military assistance to South Korea remained at a high level. Although the South Koreans never had to use the American aid to respond to Chinese attacks, they did need to utilize it to thwart the small attacks by North Korea.

The Soviet Union's commitment to the war began to dissipate in 1953. This change benefited capitalist negotiators in their discussions with communist representatives at Panmunjom. However, one cannot assert that it helped the South Korean soldiers situated on the defensive line by the thirty-eighth parallel since Soviet supply shipments rose substantially as the war came to an end. American policymakers, who learned about the increase from direct monitors, eventually delivered more arms and equipment to Asia. Through the utilization of the additional aid, the South Koreans managed to meet the main security challenge which emerged after the cease-fire went into effect. Although some principal-agent theorists suggest that a principal should resort to direct action when a dilemma of control surfaces during a transfer,

the positive impact of this rise in supplies to the ROKA and the contribution of the American residual force indicate that an assistance campaign is more effective (Berman, Lake, Miquel and Yared 2019, 2).

Conclusion

In a military conflict, multiple factors typically precipitate key developments. The content in this chapter demonstrated that five factors led to the conflicted success in Korea. During the first part of the last section, previously examined determinants were taken into consideration. The President of South Korea sometimes indicated that he would not behave in a way that advanced American interests, but Washington usually managed to get him to alter his conduct through the utilization of conditional assistance. From 1950 to 1953, there were major changes in the army that the president oversaw. At first, many of the figures at the top of the ROKA did not possess the skills that are needed to successfully head units in engagements. However, qualified individuals later appeared in most of the leadership posts. The subordinates of these commanders also underwent a noticeable transformation during the transfer. When it commenced, a lot of South Korean troops could not complete crucial tasks in combat. Once their training program improved, though, they began to hold territory and perform other duties.

Although the previously examined factors contributed to the favorable outcome, they were not as impactful as certain determinants that did not receive attention within earlier works about the transfer. Once a transfer commences, a local force usually does not gain the

ability to defend every portion of its homeland. Consequently, the United States must make various moves to salvage the initiative. Among them is refraining from conducting troop withdrawals until signs of improvement appear within the ranks of the nascent army. At the time of the Korean mission, American anti-war activists did not apply a lot of pressure on officials in Washington. As a result, there was a chance for policymakers to perform drawdowns after periods of progress and ROK personnel assumed control of certain areas when they were ready. The limited amount of political pressure inside the United States also enabled civilian leaders to leave multiple divisions below the thirty-eighth parallel. If they did not establish this large residual force, North Korea probably would have carried out major attacks after the start of the cease-fire. Following the discussion about the American residual force, the decrease in the Soviet Union's commitment to the communist military campaign on the Korean Peninsula was taken into account. When the devotion of Soviet officials started to decline, they sent more weapons and equipment to the theater of operations. Therefore, it was necessary to infer that a reduction in Soviet supplies did not play a role in the productive transfer.

Another objective of the chapter was to underscore the forms of interaction between the determinants. While conditional aid influenced the filling of vacancies at the top of the ROKA, one cannot claim this was the most significant type of interaction within the last section. After all, the other form of interplay enabled the American troop withdrawals to have more of an impact on the favorable result below the thirty-eighth parallel. After capable leaders such as Paik Sun-yup and Kim Jong-oh became more prevalent, the ROKA managed to triumph in pivotal engagements at the Chiri Mountains and White Horse Mountain. It is not possible to

assert that the victories, which preceded the drawdown at the end of 1952, were just influenced by the effective decision-making of South Korean commanders, though, because the reformed training system on the Korean Peninsula provided troops with helpful skills to utilize against communist forces.

Multiple claims regarding principal-agent concepts were taken into account in the previous pages. The last goal of the chapter was to display the manner in which only some of them possess merit. It is imperative for a principal to monitor the conduct of multiple actors following the commencement of a transfer.   In the last section, there was evidence that American monitors often collected useful information about the South Koreans for their superiors in Washington. At one point, observers noticed that ROK personnel needed additional knowledge regarding basic weapons fire and other topics. Upon learning about the presence of this problem, civilian officials at the Defense Department agreed that it would be advantageous to provide these soldiers with more instruction at field retraining centers. With this extra training, the South Koreans managed to improve their combat performances considerably.

During a transfer, enemy states, as established in Chapter Four, take steps that can adversely influence the performance of the agent's security forces. Consequently, the principal must also track their conduct over the course of time. The preceding section showed how American personnel on the Korean Peninsula closely followed the moves of communist nations. The work of these servicemen enabled officials in Washington to learn about the construction of tunnels by North Korean soldiers along the thirty-eighth parallel. Because details from direct monitors were helpful in this situation and the one which received attention in the above

paragraph, it is appropriate to conclude that they further weaken the assertion that direct monitoring is incapable of preventing information asymmetry from surfacing in a principal-agent relationship (Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 98).

When a principal and agent work together, it is unlikely that their interests will be entirely aligned. It is possible to rectify the issue of competing interests by offering incentives to the agent. Since the South Korean regime consistently altered its behavior after U.S. officials presented conditional incentives, it is necessary to draw the inference that scholars like Byman are correct about them being more impactful than unconditional ones. Although researchers concentrated on incentives in prior studies, they did not devote attention to how a principal also considers extreme measures while dealing with a recalcitrant agent. The discussion from the second subsection revealed that covert action is one of the drastic steps that this actor thinks about taking to change the conduct of an uncooperative partner. Washington never executed the proposed coup d'etat in Seoul, but it is fair to say that a principal may go so far as to remove a leader from power. After all, in some partnerships pertaining to matters other than security transfers, principals have made this move. For instance, when the United States encountered issues with the South Vietnamese regime prior to the start of the transfer in 1969, it helped members of the military oust Ngo Dinh Diem.

A principal usually learns that an agent does not possess the ability to complete an assigned task independently. In some relationships, a principal can overcome this problem just by finding another agent. However, when an underperforming agent surfaces during a security transfer, the principal seldom has the option of locating a new partner. As a result, it must choose between helping the current agent carry out a task or performing a duty alone. Berman,

Lake, Miquel and Yared, as mentioned earlier, suggest that a principal should rely on direct action. Because North Korea did not conduct any damaging attacks below the thirty-eighth parallel following the establishment of an American residual force and an increase in weapons and equipment to South Korea, though, it is appropriate to conclude that providing assistance to an underperforming agent for a prolonged period is a more effective way of dealing with a dilemma of control in a security transfer.

The agent occasionally contends with the prevalence of double principals following the start of a relationship. Once negotiators finalized the cease-fire agreement, the President of the ROK encountered a substantial amount of external and internal pressure. On the foreign level, officials from the United States urged him to respect the terms of the deal. Within South Korea, though, a faction insisted that he should attempt to undermine the implementation of the settlement. Since the president eventually went on to observe the terms of the pact, one can infer that an agent usually deals with the double principal dilemma by making a maneuver that benefits the actor with the most leverage. In all likelihood, if the United States was not a major supplier of weapons and equipment and controlling ROK personnel in the field, the president would have behaved differently in this situation.

7. Explanation for the Outcome in Vietnam

<u>Introduction</u>

The main aim of this chapter is to explain why the transfer in Vietnam failed. The content in Chapter Two displayed that the literature regarding the Vietnam conflict does not have a convincing explanation for this outcome because Collins (2014) and other researchers concentrated heavily on factors like the ineffective training system for South Vietnamese soldiers and the shortage of capable commanders at the top of the ARVN within their respective publications. While these factors were influential, important primary sources indicate that a short-term residual force and other determinants, which were closely associated with the American political landscape, also contributed to the result. It will be possible to show that they had more of an impact on the unsuccessful outcome below the seventeenth parallel by relying on principal-agent theory.

Although the primary objective will be to bolster the above contention, two other goals will be achieved in the chapter. While the transfer was in progress, the chosen determinants impacted each other at various points. It will later become apparent that the most significant forms of interaction were the ones which enabled troop withdrawals and Soviet assistance to have a major influence on the inauspicious result. In addition to underscoring the interplay

among the factors, the principal-agent claims from the last chapter will be revisited.

During the following section, there will be more evidence that shows how just the

propositions regarding conditional incentives and double principals are valid.

Determinants Which Contributed to the Major Failure in Vietnam

Determinants that scholars stressed in prior works will initially be discussed in this

section. The focus will then shift to the neglected factors which contributed to the unsuccessful

mission in South Vietnam. While the majority of the subsections will be dedicated to a sole

factor, one will concentrate on both American aid and the paucity of competent figures at the

top of the South Vietnamese Army since these determinants share a strong connection.

The Effort to Build an Effective Soldier Training System during the Transfer

An effective soldier training program did not exist in South Vietnam at the start of the

transfer. American officials eventually introduced reforms that were designed to improve the

system considerably, but these alterations did not generate the desired outcome. To see how

the program did not improve substantially like the one in South Korea, it will be imperative to

proceed through two steps. In the first part of the subsection, attention will be paid to the state

of the program prior to the modifications. Within the second portion, the focus will shift to the

conditions which were prevalent following the implementation process.

During the first year of the transfer, the ARVN experienced a substantial increase in

recruits (Sheehan 1988, 732). As an army grows, its leaders must expand the soldier training system. Before an expansion can commence, it is necessary to identify the major areas where growth is required. With numerous soldiers coming into its ranks, one may presume that the ARVN needed to construct more training facilities. However, there was actually an adequate number of facilities within South Vietnam in 1969 (Willbanks 2004, 37).

ARVN officials, like the figures at the top of the ROKA, utilized American advisors in the training effort inside their borders. Because the amount of South Vietnamese soldiers was rising in 1969, they needed more advisors at the centers to lead tutorials on key topics, but U.S. leaders did not dispatch additional trainers to Southeast Asia. Even if more U.S. advisors were prevalent, it is unlikely that most South Vietnamese personnel would have learned valuable lessons since evidence suggests the American Army was predominantly sending unqualified figures abroad at this critical juncture. To excel as an advisor, a person must be able to build a solid rapport with his advisees (Ramsey 2006, 44; Willbanks 2004, 39-40). Formidable relationships between training advisors and advisees were difficult to uncover during the first year of the transfer for multiple reasons. Before their deployments, advisors completed a course at Fort Bragg that provided them with information about the Vietnamese language (Wiest 2008, 86). Since the course just lasted for six weeks, the advisors were not fluent speakers when they arrived below the seventeenth parallel. Over the course of time, the majority of the advisors did not attempt to develop a better understanding of the Vietnamese language. Consequently, a lot of figures in the South Vietnamese Army started to view the Americans as arrogant individuals (Ramsey 2006, 44). Conflicting perspectives on the proper time frame for building an effective army also contributed to the surfacing of the divide between the advisors and advisees. The

Americans often asserted that the effort to develop the ARVN should proceed at a rapid pace.

This suggestion did not sit well with the South Vietnamese who believed the campaign required

a lot of time and patience (Wiest 2008, 87).

Once ARVN personnel left the training facilities, they worked with other American

advisors in the field. During the first year of the transfer, it was also difficult to find strong

relationships between American field advisors and South Vietnamese troops. One can claim that

the behavior of the Americans contributed to the emergence of this problem since a lot of

advisors in the field made the same moves as the instructors at the training sites during their

tours of duty. When an advisor in the field fails to develop enough respect for his advisees'

language and timetable for improvement, he can still build a solid rapport with them by

arranging for wounded soldiers to receive the proper medical attention, calling in airstrikes at

appropriate times and taking other steps during engagements (Wiest 2008, 84). It is possible for

a figure to learn the importance of making these maneuvers while completing multiple tours as

an advisor (Wiest 2008, 84). Most of the American field advisors in 1969, though, did not have

any prior instructional experience. An advisor, as mentioned in the last chapter, should possess a

substantial amount of combat experience as well since it can make him look more credible in the

eyes of the agent's security personnel (Collins 2014, 105). It is appropriate to conclude that

many American field advisors did not meet this other criterion for being a helpful instructor

because they had little or no combat experience prior to arriving below the seventeenth parallel

(Clarke 1988, 317).

The shortage of qualified American advisors was not the only problem associated with

the instructional program. During the first year of the transfer, American and South Vietnamese

officials decided to start performing joint operations in every military region. The missions in Military Region One enabled personnel from the ARVN to learn more techniques to improve their performances on the battlefield, but the initiatives in other sectors failed to produce useful outcomes. If the operations in Military Region Two are taken into account, it will be possible to strengthen this contention. When joint operations transpire, it is advantageous for the headquarters of the participating armies to be in close proximity. The headquarters of the Americans and South Vietnamese in Military Region Two were not near each other, so it was difficult for the U.S. and ARVN commanders to coordinate efforts on the battlefield (Willbanks 2004, 53). The coordination problem, as well as other issues, prompted the Americans to terminate the joint operations before South Vietnamese troops in Military Region Two had an opportunity to acquire a substantial amount of knowledge like their comrades in Military Region One.

With concerning reports about the training program arriving from the theater of operations throughout 1969, policymakers in Washington elected to send General Donnelly Bolton and others to Southeast Asia to assess the situation. During the 1970 trip, the members of the Bolton team had a chance to tour training facilities and interview relevant parties. Through their activities, these monitors managed to unearth more pieces of helpful information. For example, they learned that the MACV Training Directorate, the unit responsible for supplying the ARVN's training centers with advisors, was just functioning at seventy percent of assigned strength (Willbanks 2004, 37). Shortly after the Bolton team returned to Washington, civilian officials at the Pentagon urged the commanders in the war zone to offer ways to improve the training initiative.

There is a difference between the American commanders in Vietnam and the ones who played a pivotal role in the planning sessions for the reform effort within Korea that warrants some attention. While the Korean initiative was in progress, most of the recommendations for altering the training of ROK personnel came from James Van Fleet. Van Fleet, as seen in the last chapter, was the ideal figure to participate in this process since he led a prior effort to build an army inside an allied nation. When looking at the situation in South Vietnam, it becomes evident that the U.S. commanders did not possess much experience with developing security forces. Instead, most of them just controlled corps and other large units on the battlefield prior to arriving in the war zone (Kissinger 1979, 272-273).

Creighton Abrams was the American commander with the most authority. At one point, the head of MACV informed his civilian masters in Washington that additional advisors should be sent to South Vietnam (Willbanks 2004, 37-38). By the end of 1971, there were over 3500 American instructors working at the training facilities in the theater of operations (Vien 1980, 175). These figures, like the extra advisors who arrived below the thirty-eighth parallel after the start of the reform campaign in Korea, urged soldiers to protect their homeland with maneuvers such as rapid offensives (Cohen 1984, 151-181). Once the peace agreement was signed at the start of 1973, though, they had to stop working with the South Vietnamese.

One can find another key connection between the reform effort in Vietnam and the initiative in Korea while focusing on the backgrounds of advisors. During the analysis in the last chapter, it became apparent that U.S. reformers tried to give members of the ROKA more opportunities to interact with skillful advisors. It is possible to assert that the same step was taken in the second major transfer from the Cold War since only figures with certain

qualifications were sent to South Vietnam to work with ARVN personnel. American leaders were especially interested in seeing more individuals with combat history helping the South Vietnamese. By June 1971, "over 90 percent of the training advisers were combat experienced." (Collins 2014, 105).

The reformers in Vietnam did not always follow in the footsteps of their predecessors in Korea. Over the course of time, Abrams faced less pressure from Washington to make modifications to the training program. Once pressure from civilian officials declines, the leader in a theater of operations will concentrate on the aspects of the war effort which he believes are the most important (Wiest 2008, 71). Of all the problems that were prevalent in Vietnam, Abrams did not see the state of the training program as the most severe. Instead, he thought that other matters such as the pacification campaign needed to receive more attention (Wiest 2008, 153). Consequently, after the pressure from Washington started to decrease, he primarily focused on them. With the training system receiving less emphasis, certain problems inside it managed to persist. The MACV Training Directorate, as mentioned earlier, was experiencing a shortage of administrators in the early 1970s. Since this issue was never addressed, it was difficult for some trainers to receive suitable placements below the seventeenth parallel. If Abrams led earlier efforts to build new armies, he probably would have, not only continued to think of improving the training program in South Vietnam as a major priority, but also placed a capable team of administrators at the top of the MACV Training Directorate like Van Fleet put a qualified team at the top of KMAG in the 1950s (Kissinger 1979, 272-273).

It is possible to notice how the limited reform campaign was ineffective by revisiting the combat performances of the ARVN between 1972 and 1975. Because complete success is an

unlikely development, it would be inappropriate to expect a modified training system to produce

soldiers with the capacity to accomplish the objectives of their superiors in every engagement.

Rather, a more realistic expectation is that an altered program will generate troops with the

ability to achieve goals half or the majority of the time (McConnell 2010, 352). While skirmishes

from 1972 to 1975 were taken into consideration in Chapter Five, the members of the ARVN did

not reach either one of these standards. Consequently, it is necessary to assert that the changes

failed to produce a sufficient amount of improvement within the training program. One may

argue that it is unfair to apply these benchmarks to the effort in South Vietnam since American

advisors departed from the theater of operations before the end of the conflict. The situation in

South Korea, though, indicates that progress is not contingent on the length of an advisory

team's mission. The initiative to transform the South Korean training system commenced in the

Spring of 1951. A little over a year after more qualified advisors began to assist South Korean

soldiers, signs of a robust program could already be seen, including the ROKA's impressive

victory against communist forces at White Horse Mountain (U.S. Eighth Army October 1952).

It is not appropriate to just blame the United States for the failure to construct an

effective soldier training system. After all, when a principal embarks on a reform campaign in a

target country, it cannot implement changes without some cooperation from the leaders of the

agent's security forces. The material in the preceding chapter showed how officers in the ROKA

supported new American initiatives such as the field retraining program because they recognized

these efforts would improve the combat performances of their subordinates. The main goal of

many commanders in the ARVN, as the next subsection will display, was not to see their units

become more effective on the battlefield (Snepp 1977, 193). As a result, following the arrival of

more U.S. advisors in the theater of operations during the early 1970s, there were often occasions when officers refrained from working closely with them to address the shortcomings of various units.

This subsection dealt with the initiative to alter the training system for South Vietnamese troops. This campaign shared a number of connections with the effort which was designed to change the program for South Korean soldiers. However, it failed to generate as much improvement as its predecessor from the 1950s. During a reform campaign, the principal's personnel need to receive a sufficient amount of cooperation from the officers in the agent's security forces. After additional U.S. advisors came to South Vietnam, many encountered resistance from the leaders of underperforming ARVN units. This South Vietnamese conduct, along with the presence of an American commander who did not have experience building forces in allied countries and the absence of effective leaders in the organization responsible for overseeing the activities of American advisors, contributed substantially to the disappointing outcome below the seventeenth parallel.

Washington's Utilization of Aid during the Transfer

After the start of the initiative in Vietnam, a lot of proficient generals did not appear in the ARVN's leadership posts. As the performances of key officers are tracked over the course of time, a reader will be able to notice the lack of progress underneath the seventeenth parallel. Following these longitudinal analyses, there will be an opportunity to show how the American decision to refrain from utilizing conditional assistance kept many skillful commanders from emerging during the transfer. To do this, it will be necessary to focus on the aid that Saigon

received in 1972.

During the evaluation of the Vietnamese transfer in Chapter Five, the ARVN General Hoang Xuan Lam was mentioned. In the early portion of the 1970s, civilian officials in Saigon asked Lam to lead a military operation in Laos. For an extended period, the North Vietnamese government had used Laotian territory to send military aid into South Vietnam. When South Vietnamese soldiers moved into Laos, Lam wanted them to eliminate Hanoi's main supply route. At first, these troops managed to seize coveted areas inside Laos, but North Vietnamese personnel eventually gained the momentum in the struggle for Laotian territory. Shortly after this shift occurred, South Vietnamese forces began to withdraw from Laos. Although President Nguyen Van Thieu tried to present the initiative as a success, there were several indications that such a label was unwarranted, especially the continued movement of personnel and supplies down the northern portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. To unearth the main reason why this operation failed to generate a productive outcome, one must concentrate on the South Vietnamese Officer Corps. Once South Vietnamese soldiers faced hardship in Laos, Lam did not attempt to regain the momentum on the battlefield by making certain adjustments. This lack of flexibility caught the attention of various American monitors. For instance, Sidney Berry, a Brigadier General from the 101st Airborne, believed that Lam's planning was "of unacceptably low quality." (1984).

It is not surprising that Lam performed poorly in the Laotian operation. After all, in the preceding chapter, it became evident that South Korean officers took costly steps when they initially led large units in engagements. While one focuses on Lam's conduct in subsequent campaigns, it is possible to notice a key difference between him and the South Koreans. The

majority of the members of the South Korean Officer Corps eventually displayed the capacity to engage in effective decision-making on the battlefield. Lam's performance, as the examination of the Battle of Quang Tri City in Chapter Five demonstrated, did not improve over the course of time. Instead, he continued to make choices that kept his subordinates from defeating the enemy (Hawkins 1972).

Lam's disappointing performance coincided with another one by General Nguyen Van Toan. During the conflict, Toan held important posts within the hierarchy of the South Vietnamese Army. At the time of the Easter Offensive, he was the Commander of Military Region Two (pictured in Figure 7.1). Although NVA personnel carried out many assaults, they never managed to seize Kontum. One of the factors that kept them from taking over this major city in Military Region Two was the tactical maneuvers of the South Vietnamese Army. Like most officers in the ARVN, Toan had American advisors alongside him for the majority of the war. While the fighting transpired at Kontum, John Paul Vann was working with Toan. By this point in time, officials in Washington wanted South Vietnamese officers to start assuming more responsibilities, but Toan did not work diligently to devise the plan for the campaign against the North Vietnamese. Instead, Vann, an assertive figure known for securing the responsibility of making decisions in pivotal situations, served as the lead tactician on the Kontum front in the Spring of 1972 (Andrade 2001, 313).

Figure 7.1 (Originally Appeared in *Abandoning Vietnam*)

Following the successful defense of Kontum, Toan became the head of South

Vietnamese forces in Military Region Three. As fighting occurred inside this sector in the Spring

of 1975, Toan followed the action from his headquarters in Bien Hoa. During the month of April,

North Vietnamese territorial gains rose substantially within Toan's assigned region. This

unfavorable turn of events did not prompt the South Vietnamese general to develop a new

tactical plan to halt the advance of the North Vietnamese. Rather, he devoted most of his

attention to arranging for passage from Bien Hoa to a more secure location (Willbanks 2004,

275).

The focus can now shift to what prevented competent commanders from filling the

majority of the posts at the top of the ARVN. The content in the last chapter displayed how it is

crucial to establish an effective training program for officers in the target country. There were

two institutions underneath the seventeenth parallel that provided officer candidates with

quality instruction. Thu Duc Reserve Officers School, an entity modeled after the U.S. Army's

Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, produced "several thousands of officers per year."

(Wiest 2008, 33). Some figures went on to experience success on the battlefield upon leaving

this instructional facility. Pham Van Dinh led many small units in the South Vietnamese Army

after he graduated from Thu Duc. Just before the Tet Offensive, Dinh received the

responsibility of leading the Second Battalion, Third Regiment of the First Division. During the

early portion of the offensive, communist forces seized the Citadel in Hue. With the guidance

of their commanding officer, the soldiers in the Second Battalion later regained control of this

important location. For his role in the liberation of the Citadel, Dinh received the U.S. Bronze

Star for Valor (Wiest 2008, 121).

The Vietnamese National Military Academy was the other institution that trained officers for the ARVN. Although this facility did not produce as many officers each year as Thu Duc, it was still "one of the premier national service institutions in the whole of Asia." (Wiest 2008, 33). One can notice how this school also developed qualified figures by taking Tran Ngoc Hue into consideration. Following his graduation from the Vietnamese National Military Academy, Hue had the opportunity to lead many small units. At the time of the Tet Offensive, he was in control of the Hac Bao, another part of the ARVN's First Division. When communist forces took over the Imperial Palace in the city of Hue, the Hac Bao initiated a campaign to regain control of this key area. Because his unit eventually liberated the Imperial Palace, Tran Ngoc Hue received multiple awards, including the United States Silver Star (Wiest 2008, 121).

By the time of the transfer, Dinh, Hue and other young officers were in the same position as Kim Jong-oh and other young ROK officers in the early portion of the 1950s. In other words, they were ready to lead large units on the battlefield (Wiest 2008, 121). To understand why they did not get the opportunity to head divisions and corps like their Korean predecessors, it is imperative to concentrate on the allocation of American assistance. While U.S. policymakers wanted to see young and qualified officers take control of key posts, Thieu preferred to give them to underperforming commanders with close ties to his administration. When a divergence of interests is present, it, of course, is prudent for the principal to try to alter the conduct of the agent with conditional aid (Byman 2006, 113). During the Vietnamese transfer, American officials did not threaten to withhold assistance until more capable leaders surfaced within the nascent army like their predecessors did in Korea. The amount of leverage

in a partnership influences whether a principal's officials decide to use this pressure tactic.

Because the U.S. provided South Korea with a considerable amount of assistance and

possessed operational control of ROK personnel, American policymakers knew that a threat to

withhold aid would probably make Rhee change his approach for filling openings. Although the

U.S. gave a lot of aid to South Vietnam, it did not have operational control of ARVN personnel

in the field (Palmer 1984, 50). Since the U.S. did not possess as much leverage in this

relationship, there was more of a chance that the withholding of aid would lead to the

alienation of the partner rather than the appointment of more proficient figures.

The U.S. also had to work with a more vulnerable agent in South Vietnam. At the time

of the transfer, Thieu feared that rogue elements within the military would try to remove him

from power. When the president placed loyalists in important posts within the hierarchy of the

ARVN, he presumed that the likelihood of a coup attempt would decrease. Once officers

assumed these positions, many of them had to deal with the same personal problem. Although

the officers in the ARVN were responsible for protecting all South Vietnamese citizens, their

main priority was providing family members with security (Brigham 2006, 110). Besides

worrying about family members being killed by communist forces, commanders feared that

they would not continue to receive necessities such as food and shelter since the salaries of

ARVN officers covered only one third to one half of their expenses (Wiest 2008, 40). Faced with

inadequate earnings, a lot of generals elected to use their prominent positions in the ARVN for

personal gain (Talmadge 2015, 9). It is possible to notice this corruption by looking at the

manner in which Toan selected his subordinates. Within a military region, there were several

provinces that the leader needed to protect from communist attacks. Just below him in the

chain of command, he had provincial chiefs to assist with these defensive efforts. According to

a former CIA analyst, while Toan ran Military Region Three, he filled his provincial posts "on the

basis of various personal gratuities." (Snepp 1977, 193).

Thieu had to contend with the presence of a formidable resistance movement as well. The

National Liberation Front, as mentioned within Chapter Five, lost numerous fighters in the Tet

Offensive towards the end of the 1960s. Although the Viet Cong could not consistently conduct

attacks against ARVN personnel during the transfer years, it continued to attract support from

citizens since unfair elections and other problems were prevalent below the seventeenth parallel.

Through the introduction of multiple reforms, Thieu could have reduced the appeal of the

National Liberation Front in South Vietnamese society, but the president failed to take this step in

the 1970s (Wiest 2008, 302). The United States maintained an organization in South Vietnam to

assist with the political struggle against the National Liberation Front. The members of Civil

Operations and Revolutionary Development Support frequently assassinated and captured Viet

Cong operatives in the Mekong Delta and other locations.[1] They also allocated food and other

vital supplies to citizens living in poor conditions. If Washington withheld this humanitarian

assistance until more proficient officers appeared in the ARVN, there was a chance that the

beneficiaries of it would halt their support for the Thieu regime. The content in certain

documents suggests that the fear of further weakening Thieu's government played more of a role

in the decision to refrain from using conditional aid to alter the leadership selection process in the

ARVN than the limited amount of leverage. For instance, within one publication, a general notes

how his superiors "believed that the South Vietnamese government fabric was fragile" and too

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[1] The American program to neutralize the political operatives from the National Liberation Front was called Operation Phoenix. For more information about it, see William Colby's *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA*.

much pressure "would be unduly risky." (Palmer 1984, 88)

The United States settled for trying to impact the filling of key leadership posts with unconditional aid (Willbanks 2004, 173-175). When aid arrived, Thieu had to consider a potential development on the domestic front. If he altered his selection method, it would become quite difficult for corrupt commanders to keep receiving the personal benefits associated with their respective positions. Consequently, Thieu could not rule out the possibility that aligning his behavior with the interests of the U.S. would prompt them to abandon him as other officers had deserted previous South Vietnamese leaders (Sheehan 1988, 377). An agent, as seen in the last chapter, will usually try to appease the principal with the most influence. To see how the internal principal possessed more leverage than the external one in this situation, it is necessary to focus on the aid that South Vietnam received in 1972 (Downes 2021, 6). Although South Vietnam received over a billion dollars in unconditional assistance from the U.S. during this year, Thieu's behavior frequently benefited the contingent of unscrupulous generals (Clarke 1988, 502; Daddis 2017, 197). Prior to the outbreak of the Easter Offensive, he could have instructed a capable individual to lead South Vietnamese forces in Military Region One. However, as mentioned earlier, he decided to place Lam in this position. To the south, the North Vietnamese conducted attacks in Military Region Two as well. Therefore, it also would have been advantageous for Thieu to order a competent leader to oversee the defensive efforts in this sector rather than Toan.

While discussing the failure of unconditional aid to influence the appointment process in South Vietnam, one starts to wonder whether American leaders would have encountered a more favorable result if they relied upon another approach. In the last chapter, it became

apparent that figures on the Eisenhower foreign policy team thought about dealing with an uncooperative partner by performing a coup d'etat. When a disagreement with the South Vietnamese president transpired, policymakers in Washington did not seriously consider the possibility of carrying out a regime change operation. It is possible to explain the conduct of these individuals by concentrating on the atmosphere within the United States. At the time of the transfer in Korea, officials in the executive branch could seriously consider the option of removing an uncooperative dictator from office since members of Congress were not imposing constraints on America's surreptitious missions abroad (Schlesinger 1986, 397). By the 1970s, though, this was no longer a realistic alternative because lawmakers such as Frank Church were introducing restrictive measures (Snepp 1977, 291).

Conditional aid probably would have made the South Vietnamese regime give capable figures more opportunities to lead major ARVN units in combat since it generated an auspicious outcome the only time that Washington utilized it during the war (Byman 2006, 113). Following Nixon's rise to power, Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor, started to hold peace talks with North Vietnamese diplomats in Paris. For most of Nixon's first term, Kissinger could not convince the North Vietnamese to accept the terms of various proposals. However, when the United States conducted a damaging bombing campaign above the seventeenth parallel towards the end of it, they decided to sign an agreement (Isaacson 2005, 480). Although the North Vietnamese embraced the deal, Thieu and his associates objected to many of its components, especially the one that enabled NVA personnel to remain in South Vietnam following the commencement of the cease-fire. To get them to alter their perspective, the Nixon administration indicated that American assistance would only continue

if they began to support the pact (Kissinger 1979, 1469). Shortly after receiving this information in the early part of 1973, the South Vietnamese reluctantly agreed to back the agreement.

Once the initiative in Vietnam commenced, some competent figures surfaced in the ARVN's key leadership posts. However, most South Vietnamese commanders did not possess the ability to properly execute the tasks associated with their respective positions. The main factor that prevented more qualified leaders from emerging was the unconditional aid that Saigon received from the United States. In all likelihood, if policymakers in Washington attempted to influence the filling of vacancies with conditional assistance, skillful individuals would have led most of South Vietnam's important units.

The Removal of U.S. Troops during the Transfer

Certain moves by the United States and enemy nations ultimately determine whether most transfers succeed or fail. One of these maneuvers is the way that the U.S. removes combat troops from a target country. To keep the members of a fledgling force from being overwhelmed with new responsibilities, American policymakers must refrain from withdrawing personnel until there are signs of improvement. During his time in office, Nixon instructed his closest advisors to inform military officials in South Vietnam that a drawdown would only occur if figures inside the ARVN developed the capacity to perform the duties of American soldiers in an acceptable manner (Wheeler 1969). Within this subsection, the main goal will be to show how South Vietnamese improvement did not precede the drawdowns. It will be possible to see

the way that precipitous withdrawals transpired by examining the main engagement which came before a drawdown in 1969. Following this examination, there will be a chance to identify the major determinants that kept responsible withdrawals from occurring during Nixon's presidency.

American leaders wanted to remove enemy personnel from a particular location in the engagement that will be taken into account. The first portion of the upcoming analysis will establish that North Vietnamese soldiers fled from the area during the skirmish. The second part will then display the manner in which the members of the ARVN did not play an integral part in the clearing operation. To demonstrate their failure to make a major contribution, it will be imperative to utilize the measures that were employed in the last chapter to show the impact the ROKA had on the favorable outcome at the Chiri Mountains. In other words, it will be necessary to concentrate on the performing of tactical maneuvers, desertions, and the amount of American involvement in the engagement.

The first withdrawal in 1969 transpired during the summer when 25,000 troops left the theater of operations (Hinh 1980, 27). In the spring, an offensive was launched to remove North Vietnamese troops from Ap Bia Mountain. After the initial assaults failed to remove the North Vietnamese from the top of Ap Bia, reinforcements arrived to participate in more attacks (Wiest 2008, 168). During the subsequent assaults, the attacking forces encountered a fierce resistance effort from the North Vietnamese. They eventually managed to make it to the summit of Ap Bia on May 20th, though, when the North Vietnamese retreated into Laos (Karnow 1983, 601).

A discussion about tactical maneuvers can display how the South Vietnamese

participants in the clash were not skillful. Ap Bia, like the Chiri Mountains, contained routes

that the enemy could utilize during a retreat. Consequently, there was a need to perform the

blocking maneuvers which the ROKA executed at the beginning of 1952. However, while

perusing the main account of the battle, one cannot find any mention of effective blocking

maneuvers by the South Vietnamese. Instead, the American monitors frequently allude to the

costly mistakes which kept the ARVN's First Division from experiencing success in the early

portion of the skirmish (U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam 1970).

One can learn how the South Vietnamese at Ap Bia possessed resolve by looking at

desertions. Within the major account of the skirmish, there is no mention of numerous South

Vietnamese soldiers fleeing from their posts (U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam

1970). Therefore, it would be wrong to conclude that the ARVN's desertion rate during the

Spring of 1969 rose to the damaging level which was mentioned in earlier chapters. In other

words, it would be improper to surmise that it climbed into the thousands. Rather, a more

appropriate inference to reach is that this force experienced a manageable desertion rate like

the ROKA did in the Battle for the Chiri Mountains.

It is now appropriate to discuss the amount of American involvement in the Battle of

Ap Bia. Once the ARVN's First Division struggled in the initial part of the engagement, U.S.

officials went so far as to send the American 101st Airborne to Ap Bia. The members of this

unit led the assault that prompted the North Vietnamese to abandon their defensive positions

on May 20th. While this attack was impactful, it would be inappropriate to give the personnel

in the 101st Airborne all the credit for the North Vietnamese retreat. After all, as they fought

on the ground, U.S. pilots dropped a substantial number of bombs on NVA strongholds (U.S.

Military Assistance Command Vietnam 1970). If the accounts of observers outside the U.S.

government are read, it becomes clear just how much damage this bombing campaign

caused. Jay Sharbutt, a reporter for the Associated Press, said heavy jungles could be seen

around Ap Bia at the beginning of the American aerial effort. By the time it came to an end,

though, the mountain was almost bare (Sharbutt 1969).

The robust assaults of U.S. combat troops and impactful airstrikes of American pilots

removing North Vietnamese personnel from Ap Bia suggests that an adequate amount of

progress did not surface within the ranks of the South Vietnamese Army before drawdowns

such as the one in the Summer of 1969. The remainder of this subsection will be used to

identify the factors which kept the South Vietnamese from inheriting new tasks when they

were prepared. The discussion about the drawdowns in South Korea showed that monitoring

plays a key role in the withdrawal process. While the principal only wants to receive accurate

information about the performance of the agent's personnel, it cannot rule out the possibility

that monitors will provide misleading reports. If the principal comes into contact with

unreliable information about the capabilities of the agent's security forces, it may conclude

that unprepared personnel possess the capacity to assume additional tasks and remove

combat troops at inappropriate times. In the periods leading up to the drawdowns in

Vietnam, Nixon and other American leaders did not usually receive reports which insinuated

the South Vietnamese were showing a lot of improvement on the battlefield. Instead, as seen

earlier in this subsection, documents suggested that these figures were struggling in

engagements against the enemy (U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam 1970).

Consequently, it is not possible to attribute the irresponsible drawdowns in Vietnam to

monitors passing along inaccurate information to their superiors.

The interaction between two previously examined factors prevented withdrawals from occurring in a desirable fashion. Within the first subsection, it became apparent that a productive training program for soldiers was not established below the seventeenth parallel. Then, in the last one, the reader learned that underperforming officers gained control of the majority of the key leadership posts in the ARVN during the transfer years. Since most South Vietnamese units contained troops who moved through the ineffective training program and commanders such as Lam and Toan, they were not capable of inheriting new responsibilities within the theater of operations.

To develop a complete understanding of the hasty withdrawals, it is imperative to take the political landscape inside the United States into consideration. During the conflict, another anti-war movement emerged on the American home front. There are two differences between this political movement and the effort to end the Korean War which warrant some attention. Within the last chapter, it became apparent that conservatives led the campaign to halt the American intervention on the Korean Peninsula. At the time of the conflict in Vietnam, the individuals on the right-wing of the political spectrum did not urge policymakers to cease the military operation below the seventeenth parallel. Instead, liberals encouraged officials in Washington to conclude the initiative against communist forces (Mueller 1985, 39). Young citizens, as mentioned earlier in the thesis, stand to benefit from the cessation of hostilities because government officials will expect them to endure most of the fighting if the unpopular conflict continues in the target country. Since many American college students did not want to be sent abroad to serve in Vietnam, they decided to

participate in the anti-war movement. While students played an integral part in this political

movement, it is important to note that a lot of other American liberals worked diligently to

bring an end to the conflict. For example, veterans, who saw many American casualties and

how the South Vietnamese would probably not overcome their problems on the battlefield,

joined the campaign after completing their tours of duty in Southeast Asia.

One can find the other important difference between the efforts to end the Korean

and Vietnamese conflicts while concentrating on tactics. Critics of the war in Vietnam, like

those who objected to the conflict in Korea, expressed their opinions with types of individual

political action. For instance, in the Fall of 1970, fifty-five percent of the participants in one

poll claimed that all U.S. troops should be removed from South Vietnam by the end of 1971

(Gallup). The members of a political movement cannot place an adequate amount of pressure

on policymakers solely through the employment of types of individual political action.

Instead, as noted in the last chapter, they must also rely on forms of collective political action

(Mueller 1985, 65). The opponents of the Vietnam War, unlike their predecessors from the

1950s, displayed an affinity for collective action. When students became disillusioned with

the war, they often joined Students for a Democratic Society. Once the students became

members of this prominent anti-war group, they participated in marches, sit-ins and so forth.

While Students for a Democratic Society attracted a lot of students, Vietnam Veterans Against

the War enticed many former soldiers. After veterans joined this organization, they also

engaged in non-violent activities across the United States.

The anti-war groups were quite active during Nixon's first term in office. Towards the

end of 1969, they organized demonstrations in Washington and other major cities throughout

the country (Nixon 1978, 400). The invasion of Cambodia by American and South Vietnamese personnel in the Spring of 1970 then prompted student organizations to lead protests at Kent State University in Ohio, Jackson State College in Mississippi and several other institutions of higher learning (Ellsberg 2002, 337). As student groups organized protests on college campuses, Vietnam Veterans Against the War held marches in other locations. For example, in the early portion of September, the members of this organization led a major demonstration in eastern Pennsylvania. With so much pressure building across the country, Nixon and his advisors had to placate the critics of the war by removing U.S. soldiers before ARVN personnel were ready to assume their responsibilities. The remarks of the former Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff can demonstrate the extent to which these protests influenced the policy-making process. At one point, Thomas Moorer said: "The reaction of the noisy radical groups was considered all the time. And it served to inhibit and restrict the decision makers." (2017).

This subsection contained material that weakens the argument against direct monitoring (Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 98). During the Spring of 1969, U.S. officers provided civilian officials in the Defense Department with an accurate report about the behavior of ARVN personnel in the engagement at Ap Bia Mountain. Although these figures at the Pentagon later told the White House that South Vietnamese soldiers performed poorly against the North Vietnamese, Nixon still withdrew American troops from the theater of operations in the summer. If the members of the anti-war movement refrained from organizing numerous demonstrations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, he would not have ordered precipitous drawdowns like this one.

The Length of the U.S. Residual Force's Mission in the Theater of Operations

When an agent cannot act in an autonomous fashion, the principal will leave personnel behind to provide assistance or retake control of the security effort. Nixon dealt with a dilemma of control in South Vietnam by helping his ally conduct the assigned task. This subsection will focus on the role that a small residual force played in the assistance campaign. It will be possible to show how the rapid departure of this unit adversely influenced the situation on the ground by examining developments before and after the point at which American personnel left. While the main goal in this subsection will be to display the strong impact of the residual force, time will also be taken to explain what made Nixon conclude it was appropriate to utilize a small unit in this setting and why he elected to remove the servicemen from Southeast Asia so quickly.

During the withdrawal process, American observers informed Nixon that South Vietnam did not have the ability to fight North Vietnam independently. They also claimed it would be advantageous to have a residual force work with the agent's personnel. Rather than recommending a large residual force like the monitors in Korea, these individuals asserted that a small contingent of servicemen should remain in the war zone. A small unit, as discussed in Chapter One, does not have a sufficient amount of manpower to defend certain areas. Consequently, it must support the nascent army as it attempts to secure every portion of its homeland. In meetings at the White House and written reports, monitors told Nixon that support for the ARVN should come in the form of airstrikes by U.S. pilots (Sheehan 1988,

735).

It became apparent in the last chapter that conditions on the home front and international level ultimately determine whether a principal leaves a residual force behind to assist an underperforming agent. By August 1972, anti-war protests had prompted members of Congress to impose many restrictions on how the war could be fought in Southeast Asia. However, they had yet to prohibit American airstrikes in the region. The situation on the foreign level also caused Nixon to take the step recommended by American observers. While considering a potential move on the world stage, a U.S. commander-in-chief may devote a lot of attention to how allies will react to it (Gaddis 2005, 235-271). In the early 1970s, some other partners were still facing communist threats within their borders. By leaving a contingent of American pilots behind after the completion of the troop withdrawals, the president could, not only compensate for the weaknesses of the ARVN, but also reassure these allies that the U.S. remained committed to assisting them with their respective struggles (Palmer 1984, 155; Nixon 1978, 348).

For years, data from American soldiers enabled pilots to realize where communist forces were situated below the seventeenth parallel. However, because they were no longer present in South Vietnam, aviators had to depend on reports from ARVN personnel on the frontlines (Khuyen 1984, 387). When looking at certain developments from the early portion of 1973, it becomes evident that the collaboration between South Vietnamese soldiers and U.S. pilots generated some auspicious results. Just days before the cease-fire started in January, the North Vietnamese attacked over four hundred villages and hamlets across South Vietnam. They never managed to seize control of these locations, though, since pilots from the U.S. Air Force

and Navy carried out a considerable amount of airstrikes (Schulzinger 1997, 305). While many hoped that the cease-fire would last for an extended period of time, fighting resumed shortly after it commenced. During the month of March, an offensive allowed North Vietnamese personnel to take over Hong Ngu, a port on the Mekong River. Upon learning about this aggression, the United States performed airstrikes near Hong Ngu. If this aerial support was not provided, the members of South Vietnam's Ninth Division probably would have failed to retake Hong Ngu (Willbanks 2004, 191-192).

Once the aerial support for the ARVN ended in August of 1973, the North Vietnamese continued to target areas throughout South Vietnam. Between January and June, another sixty-five thousand North Vietnamese soldiers arrived below the seventeenth parallel (Dawson 1977, 99). These reinforcements helped the North Vietnamese assume control of many of the places that they attacked during the second part of the year, including Le Minh, a ranger border camp twenty-five miles west of Pleiku. The territorial gains by the North Vietnamese discouraged the members of the ARVN, but they went on to mount counterattacks as 1974 commenced. The operations allowed South Vietnam to regain a lot of the locations which it lost in the latter stages of the previous year. As a result, the United States Defense Attaché Office, one of the entities which completed multiple assessments each year for concerned officials in Washington, claimed that the South Vietnamese could halt communist aggression independently (February 1974).

The setbacks at the start of 1974 did not keep the North Vietnamese from launching other assaults later in the year. When these attacks occurred, the majority of NVA units seized outposts, villages, and other locations from South Vietnamese personnel (Dung 1977, 16).

Upon reading about the territorial losses and absence of robust counteroffensives in reports

from the Defense Attaché Office and other parties, most American officials concluded that the

South Vietnamese could not defeat the North Vietnamese without a residual force. However,

some policymakers in Washington continued to believe their agent in Asia could act

independently. For example, in front of the members of a Congressional committee, Robert

Ingersoll, the Assistant Secretary of State, said that "South Vietnam is stronger militarily and

politically than ever before." (1983). It is fair to assert that the skeptics in the United States

government possessed a better understanding of the capabilities of the South Vietnamese.

After all, as seen in Chapter Five, ARVN personnel continued to lose territory in battles against

the North Vietnamese in the first part of 1975.

To comprehend why the residual force ceased its operations in Southeast Asia, even

though the South Vietnamese could not act alone, it is necessary to concentrate solely on the

conduct of Americans. The reports of monitors, as the preceding information showed, help a

president recognize that a residual force should remain in the theater of operations. Following

the commencement of the residual force's mission, this official continues to receive

information about the situation overseas. If he comes into contact with misleading reports that

insinuate the agent's personnel are capable of independent action, he may elect to halt the

operations of the residual force. One cannot assert that Nixon received unreliable information

about the abilities of the ARVN. After all, in the time leading up to the residual force's

departure, monitoring agencies did not suggest that the South Vietnamese were ready to act

independently (United States Defense Attache Office 1973).

Since Nixon depended on input from the members of his administration, it would be

prudent to take this factor into consideration in the present discussion. As various documents are examined, one does not encounter any evidence that the president's advisors encouraged him to terminate the airstrikes in Southeast Asia. Instead, the content in memorandums, memoirs and so forth indicates that they hoped the bombing campaign would continue for a prolonged period of time. For instance, at one point in his memoirs, Henry Kissinger states that he wanted the result of the conflict to "depend on whether the South Vietnamese, aided only by American airpower" could resist North Vietnamese attacks (1979, 986).

Once reports from monitors and the input of advisors are eliminated as the causes of the decision to conclude the aerial campaign, it becomes necessary to concentrate on actors outside the executive branch. When the mission of the residual force began in the second part of 1972, members of Congress, as mentioned earlier in this subsection, had yet to take steps to restrict the air war in Southeast Asia. During 1973, they started to devote more attention to this portion of the military campaign. In the month of June, representatives and senators attempted to placate anti-war activists by prohibiting American aerial operations across Indochina (Isaacson 2005, 487). With the introduction of this measure, Nixon did not have the option of letting a residual force contribute to the campaign against North Vietnam for an extended period.

Some theorists, as seen in the preceding chapters, suggest a principal should resort to direct action after learning about the prevalence of an underperforming agent (Berman, Lake, Miquel and Yared 2019, 2). However, within this subsection, it became apparent that the United States dealt with a dilemma of control in Southeast Asia by assisting a partner. The members of the unit that stayed in the region helped ARVN personnel thwart several attacks by

the North Vietnamese. Consequently, the president wanted them to continue their mission for a prolonged stretch. With the anti-war movement remaining influential on the home front, though, these figures could not follow in the footsteps of the personnel in Korea. Instead, they had to cease their activities after a short span of time. When the South Vietnamese began to fight in battles without the residual force, they struggled to prevent NVA forces from seizing control of important areas underneath the seventeenth parallel.

Did Soviet Weapons and Equipment Keep America's Agent from Succeeding in Combat?

To notice how the conduct of enemy states can heavily impact the outcome of a transfer, it is imperative to focus on the topic of supplies. Besides leaving behind a residual force, a principal must make sure that an underperforming agent leading an effort to halt enemy aggression continues to receive an adequate number of weapons and equipment. During the 1970s, military assistance from the Soviet Union to North Vietnam rose substantially, so policymakers in Washington needed to provide more weapons and equipment to the South Vietnamese Army, which was directing the initiative to thwart North Vietnamese attacks. By revisiting the major offensive operations from 1972 and 1975, it will be possible to notice how the U.S. did not respond appropriately to the Soviet increase and the NVA proceeded to acquire a lot of South Vietnamese territory. The subsequent paragraphs will also contain an explanation for the American reaction.

Unless a principal closely monitors activities in the enemy camp, it will not be able to uncover whether its partner needs more supplies. Because the United States did not have a lot of operatives within North Vietnam to collect information about the enemy's material

capabilities in the 1970s, it needed to depend on the same approach which it utilized to gather

information during the Korean War (Shultz 1999, 8). That is, it needed to mount an extensive

aerial reconnaissance campaign over enemy territory. Around the time of the Easter Offensive

in 1972, U.S. surveillance planes detected a rise in shipments from the Soviet Union to North

Vietnam. Twelve NVA divisions desperately needed tanks to break through the defensive lines

around multiple cities and towns across South Vietnam (Summers 1982, 112). As a result, the

Soviet shipments in the first half of 1972 contained a lot of T-54 tanks. Upon receiving some

training from Soviet advisors about how to operate the T-54's, North Vietnamese personnel

began to use them against the ARVN. These tanks later helped the North Vietnamese take

control of Quang Tri City and other key locations during the Easter Offensive (Snepp 1977, 290).

Following the Easter Offensive, Soviet assistance to North Vietnam continued to

increase. During 1974, it went over the billion-dollar mark for the first time in the conflict (Thi

1986, 141). Without this record level of assistance, Hanoi would not have been in a position to

launch the 1975 offensive that brought every portion of South Vietnam under its control. In

the final campaign of the war, American monitors learned that the Soviets were sending their

partner SA-2 missiles. When the North Vietnamese started to utilize "these highly

sophisticated weapons," South Vietnamese pilots needed to fly their planes at higher altitudes

(Snepp 1977, 358). Once the pilots reached these heights, it became quite difficult for them to

hit NVA strongholds (Snepp 1977, 358).

The Soviet supply increase certainly helped the North Vietnamese accumulate

numerous triumphs on the battlefield in 1975. It is important to note, though, that the

conduct of the United States enabled this success to surface as well. The principal, as

mentioned earlier, must increase aid to the agent after monitors inform it that the enemy received more weapons and equipment. For a while, civilian officials in Washington exhibited a desire to match the supply increase within the communist camp. Around the time that the Paris Peace Agreement was finalized, these figures believed that the North Vietnamese would eventually violate the cease-fire. Consequently, they sent more aid to the South Vietnamese towards the end of 1972. This shipment, which the Americans labeled as Operation Enhance Plus, included "thirty-six amphibious vehicles and over 100,000 tons of other equipment and supplies." (Sorley 1999, 325). The material assistance, along with the American airstrikes that were mentioned in the last subsection, enabled the members of the South Vietnamese Army to keep the North Vietnamese from seizing the major areas which they targeted after breaking the cease-fire during the early portion of 1973.

The American effort to provide the South Vietnamese with enough weapons and equipment continued until 1974. During this year, assistance to Saigon fell to 813 million dollars (Shriek 1974). In the aftermath of the decrease, multiple military officials insisted that there would be a noticeable decline in the performance of ARVN personnel. For instance, the head of the American Defense Attaché Office in Saigon said without a sufficient amount of aid "the South Vietnamese would lose, perhaps not right away but soon." (July 1974). With fewer essentials arriving from the United States, South Vietnamese civilian officials again encountered the double principal dilemma. On the one hand, these figures could seek to placate the members of the ARVN by urging Washington to reverse its policy regarding supplies. On the other, they could try to appeal to the United States by accepting the new policy and limiting the amount of weapons and equipment sent to the front. Although they

protested the reduction in aid for a while, South Vietnamese leaders eventually took steps

which pleased their external principal, including decreasing a soldier's monthly bullet supply to

eighty-five during the last part of 1974 (LeGro 1985, 86-87).

One can see the serious impact of the decline in supplies by taking multiple

developments from 1975 into account. In the first half of the year, ARVN officials, as seen in

Chapter Five, instructed personnel in Military Region Two to move to Military Region Three.

While performing a retreat, it is imperative to have an adequate amount of vehicles to move

personnel and supplies to their new location. At the time of the retreat from the Central

Highlands, South Vietnamese units had enough vehicles. However, fuel shortages kept them

from getting as much use out of the vehicles as they wanted (Wiest 2008, 279).

As some ARVN units were moving south in the Spring of 1975, others were attempting

to prevent the North Vietnamese from seizing target areas. With less ammunition arriving at

the front, the leaders of units had to impose restrictions on how many shots their

subordinates could fire each day. For instance, the members of many artillery batteries only

had the opportunity to fire a few rounds at North Vietnamese personnel (Wiest 2008, 279).

The restrictions, along with the previously mentioned underperforming officers and poor

training system, kept a lot of South Vietnamese troops from fighting effectively in the final

months of the war (Dung 1977, 17).

It is now appropriate to explain why South Vietnamese personnel did not keep receiving

a sufficient amount of assistance like the members of the ROKA did following the rise in Soviet

aid to China towards the end of the Korean War. During the middle of the 1970s, Gerald Ford

became the U.S. Commander-in-Chief. From his actions, one can gather that he wanted to

continue providing the South Vietnamese with enough assistance to prevent the North

Vietnamese from seizing all the territory underneath the seventeenth parallel. In March 1975,

Frederick Weyand, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, traveled to Southeast Asia to complete a

thorough assessment of the situation in the theater of operations. Upon his return to

Washington, he informed Ford that the South Vietnamese could survive with $722 million in

emergency aid from the United States (Weyand 1975). At one point in a Congressional

address, Ford urged legislators to pass a bill that would enable Saigon to receive the emergency

assistance (Snepp 1977, 337).

Unfortunately for the South Vietnamese, there were not any figures in the legislative

branch who shared Ford's desire to maintain an adequate level of aid. After he proposed the

emergency assistance in his speech, the president did not receive one clap of support from a

Democratic or Republican legislator (Willbanks 2004, 261). To understand this Congressional

unwillingness to provide Saigon with enough supplies, it is necessary to concentrate on the

same factor which led to the precipitous troop withdrawals and a residual force remaining

active in the war zone for a brief period. During the Spring of 1975, senators and

representatives still remembered the demonstrations, sit-ins and so forth that occurred

throughout the country earlier in the decade. Because these individuals did not want political

unrest to resurface, they refrained from cooperating with Nixon's successor. While looking at

certain comments, it becomes apparent how much public opinion influenced the conduct of

lawmakers. For example, Don Bonker, a Congressman from Washington state, said: "People

are drained. They want to bury the memory of Indochina. They regard it as a tragic chapter in

American life, but they want no further part of it." (2004).

When faced with a dilemma of control in a transfer, a principal cannot limit an assistance campaign to leaving behind a residual force. Rather, it must also provide an underperforming agent with a sufficient amount of supplies to direct a security campaign. Since U.S. officials did not allocate additional weapons and equipment to the South Vietnamese after their adversary received more assistance, it became quite difficult for them to lead the stabilization effort below the seventeenth parallel. If American policymakers did not have to contend with the possibility of reviving the anti-war movement within their borders, they probably would have sent the supplies to Southeast Asia.

Conclusion

This chapter revealed that several factors contributed to the unsuccessful security transfer inside South Vietnam. During the first part of the preceding section, the reader became familiar with the determinants which received emphasis in prior works. When key positions became available at the top of the ARVN in the 1970s, the President of South Vietnam usually refrained from filling them with qualified candidates because American policymakers attempted to influence his decision-making with unconditional aid. Washington also tried to upgrade the training system for ARVN personnel. However, a robust instructional program for troops did not emerge while the transfer was in progress.

While the above factors contributed to the major failure in Southeast Asia, they were not as influential as the previously neglected determinants that were closely tied to the U.S. political climate. During a transfer, American policymakers should prevent the members of a nascent army from being overwhelmed with the duties of U.S. soldiers. They can accomplish

this goal by keeping troops in the target country until signs of improvement begin to emerge. Following the commencement of the mission in Vietnam, officials from the executive branch said that drawdowns would only take place after ARVN personnel performed well in engagements against the enemy, but it became apparent in the preceding pages that they made hasty withdrawals to appease activists associated with the anti-war movement. If inexperienced servicemen assume responsibilities too quickly, the U.S. can still salvage a transfer by taking certain steps, including leaving a residual force in the war zone. Towards the end of the conflict in Vietnam, the White House left a residual force in Southeast Asia to help the South Vietnamese. However, because lawmakers were imposing restrictions on military operations overseas, the unit could not remain in the region for a sufficient amount of time. It is also crucial to react accordingly to supply changes in the enemy camp. Since Soviet shipments to Hanoi rose considerably during the 1970s, South Vietnam needed more weapons and equipment from the U.S. When the president attempted to gain support for an increase, though, legislators refused to cooperate with him.

Another objective in the preceding pages was to identify the interaction between the determinants. U.S. troop withdrawals and Soviet aid had a major impact on the result, so it is necessary to infer that the interplay, which allowed this influence to surface, was the most important. After Washington failed to provide more weapons and equipment following the aid increase in the communist camp, the ARVN could not stop the NVA from seizing a substantial amount of land during the last offensive of the conflict. One cannot assert that the insufficient number of supplies was entirely responsible for the disappointing performances by South Vietnamese personnel, though, since the underperforming commanders and poor soldier training system prevented them from properly carrying out their tasks in 1975, too. These

other factors kept the South Vietnamese from performing at an acceptable level in the time leading up to the drawdowns as well.

Propositions regarding four principal-agent concepts were revisited in the prior section. The last aim of the chapter was to provide additional evidence that just two of these contentions are credible. It is important for the principal to receive information about the agent's security personnel after the start of a transfer. During the operation in South Vietnam, there were several occasions when policymakers in Washington requested reports from U.S. miliary personnel regarding the performance of the ARVN. In the third subsection, it became apparent that the withdrawal process was one of the times when these direct monitors shared veracious information about the behavior of South Vietnamese troops with their civilian masters.

The U.S. monitors in Vietnam, like their predecessors in Korea, also had to follow the actions of communist states. When officials in Moscow sent more military aid to North Vietnam in the 1970s, they did not want policymakers in the United States to learn about the increase. American leaders eventually became aware of the additional weapons and equipment, though, because U.S. Air Force and Navy surveillance planes frequently flew over North Vietnamese territory. Since officials did not receive misleading information in this situation or the one which received attention in the above paragraph, it is appropriate to assert that they further undermine the claim that a direct monitoring campaign cannot enable a principal to avoid the problem of information asymmetry (Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 98).

Information asymmetry is not the only issue that a principal must worry about following the establishment of a partnership. There is also a chance it may have to work with an agent whose behavior does not advance its interests. In such a situation, a principal can attempt to

align an agent's conduct with its interests by offering conditional or unconditional incentives. Washington, as seen, often tried to change the actions of the South Vietnamese government with the latter. Because an alteration in behavior did not occur, one can conclude that this is another illustration which supports Byman's contention that conditional incentives are more likely to help a principal produce a useful outcome.

There is one more problem that a principal frequently encounters inside the target nation. If it learns that independent action is not possible, it may decide to help the agent conduct the assigned task. While members of the U.S. residual force briefly worked with ARVN personnel, North Vietnamese troops did not experience much success in combat. Given this result, it is safe to say that Hanoi probably would not have conquered South Vietnam if the small residual force remained active in the theater of operations for more than a year and Washington continued to send an adequate number of weapons and equipment to its agent. The experience in South Vietnam is another case which indicates that once a principal comes across a dilemma of control in a security transfer it should assist an underperforming agent rather than resort to direct action as Berman, Lake, Miquel and Yared suggest.

An agent may face issues following the start of a partnership, too. Inside the last section, there was an opportunity to look at how one dealt with the problem of double principals. When the President of South Vietnam encountered pressure on the foreign and domestic fronts in 1972, he made a decision that advanced the interests of an internal principal. Later in the decade, though, his behavior benefited an external principal. The reactions of this leader further strengthen the claim that leverage is the main factor which impacts the agent's conduct. During 1972, a coup attempt was more likely than the

withholding of American aid, so the president recognized he needed to appease the officers in

the ARVN instead of policymakers in Washington. With conditions rapidly deteriorating below

the seventeenth parallel and no other allies to ask for weapons and equipment in the middle

of the 1970s, it was imperative for him to cooperate with the latter as opposed to the former.

8. Conclusion

Introduction

This concluding chapter consists of four major parts. In the next section, it will become apparent that the analyses from the earlier chapters answered the research questions at the beginning of the study and filled gaps in different bodies of literature. Within the third section, the findings from Chapters Six and Seven will be used to develop a set of conditions that is likely to lead to the United States performing successful transfers in wars against conventional enemies. During the penultimate section, the theoretical insights from the thesis and ways to strengthen future PAT works will be presented. Inside the fifth section, there will be an opportunity to identify some potential topics for future studies.

Key Findings

As the findings of the thesis are summarized in this section, it will become clear that certain holes in the literatures about the Korean conflict, the Vietnam War and war termination were filled in the empirical chapters. The material in the first subsection will show the way that sophisticated appraisals of the Korean and Vietnamese transfers appeared in Chapter Five. The content in the second subsection will display the manner in which convincing explanations for the outcomes of these operations were provided in Chapters Six and Seven. The information in the final subsection will demonstrate how Chapters Six and Seven also revealed that stability can emerge when unilateral withdrawals occur during conventional conflicts and what conditions increase the likelihood of this favorable outcome.

Did the Major Cold War Transfers Produce Armies with the Capacity to Effectively Manage Stabilization Efforts?

During the review of the literature about the Korean War, it became evident that past works simply labeled the second Korean transfer as a success after looking at the performances of the ROKA in clashes against communist adversaries (Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 137; Gibby 2012, 13). Through the utilization of degrees of success, there was an opportunity to present a veracious reading of the outcome of the initiative in the fifth chapter of this study. Once it was learned that stability continued in South Korea during the transfer, the focus shifted to ascertaining whether the ROKA played a part in this favorable trend. To accomplish this objective, pivotal battles were examined with multiple measures. U.S. and South Korean officials wanted to keep communist units from seizing pieces of land in the clashes, so an examination started with a discussion about whether a hold transpired. When a hold took place, the remaining measures (decision-making of ROK generals or performing of tactical maneuvers by ROK soldiers, number of ROK desertions, and level of American intervention) helped to determine whether the South Koreans contributed to the desirable outcome. Although both of the holds involved substantial American interventions, it was still possible to label them as successes since one contained ROK generals making effective choices and a limited amount of ROK desertions and another included a small number of desertions in the South Korean camp. With two out of the four battles containing auspicious results, it was appropriate to attach the label that McConnell (2010) used to describe an initiative which succeeds half of the time to the Korean operation. That is, the campaign deserved to be called a conflicted success.

While most of the attention in the last portion of the Korean assessment was devoted to discerning whether the ROKA contributed to the maintenance of stability, it is important to remember how time was also taken to accomplish another objective. In the first part of the appraisal, it was mentioned that the morale and skill level in the South Korean Army were low when the transfer began. The last section enabled the reader to see if the ROKA improved in these areas over the course of the initiative. The first engagement that was taken into consideration occurred approximately a year after the commencement of the mission. It was during this skirmish that ROK generals engaged in effective decision-making and a limited number of desertions surfaced on the South Korean line. Since the clash contained these favorable developments, it was possible to conclude that the skill level and morale of the South Koreans improved considerably during the transfer. The substantial amount of improvement within the ranks of the ROKA provides an additional reason to label the first major operation from the Cold War as a conflicted success.

The review of the literature regarding the Vietnam War revealed that most of the earlier evaluations of the transfer underneath the seventeenth parallel did not include degrees of failure (Clarke 1988, 517). The assessment in Chapter Five contained this important feature so the reader could receive an accurate reading of the result of the operation. During the 1970s, North Vietnamese troops assumed control of every province within South Vietnam. Certain battles were closely analyzed to ascertain the main party responsible for this turn of events. Upon learning that North Vietnamese units seized target areas in the majority of the examined engagements, multiple indicators were used to determine whether the conduct of American or South Vietnamese personnel precipitated the

losses. On most occasions, ARVN generals made costly decisions, numerous desertions occurred in the South Vietnamese camp, and American involvement was non-existent, so it became apparent that the ARVN's actions allowed the NVA's territorial gains to take place. Since this fledgling force often contributed to the emergence of instability, it was necessary to allude to the second major Cold War transfer with the label which Cobb and Primo (2003) employed to describe a campaign that produces unfavorable results most of the time. In other words, it was imperative to call the effort a major failure.

A secondary objective in the last portion of the evaluation was to look for improvement within the South Vietnamese Army. Inside the initial part of the appraisal, it was mentioned that the ARVN's skill level and morale were low at the start of the transfer. During the first battle that was taken into account later in the assessment, ARVN commanders did not engage in effective decision-making and thousands of troops left their assigned positions without authorization. Because these undesirable events took place in a skirmish three years after the commencement of the transfer, it was necessary to infer that the skill level and morale of the South Vietnamese did not improve enough during the operation. The inadequate amount of progress in the ARVN provides another reason to call the Vietnamese mission a major failure. When a nascent army does not make enough progress and fails to contribute to the maintenance of stability within its borders, there is not a chance to claim that it possessed the capacity to effectively manage stabilization efforts. Although it is not possible to argue that the ARVN had the ability to lead stabilization campaigns, one can assert that the ROKA possessed this capability because it showed a lot of improvement and contributed to the continuation of stability below the thirty-eighth parallel.

Why Did Different Outcomes Surface during the Major Cold War Transfers?

The sixth chapter of the study provided an opportunity to determine why the first major transfer from the Cold War succeeded. As shown in the review of the literature about the Korean War, prior works attempted to explain this outcome by focusing on the conditional aid that Seoul received from the U.S., the emergence of many skillful commanders at the top of the ROKA, and the establishment of an effective soldier training program below the thirty-eighth parallel (Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 121-126; Gibby 2012, 214). These determinants enabled success to emerge in this setting, but cautious troop drawdowns and the maintenance of an American residual force were also influential. During the last two years of the conflict, U.S. officials only removed combat troops after receiving reports of South Korean improvement from the theater of operations. As a result, ROK personnel were ready to inherit the duties of departing soldiers. Following the commencement of the cease-fire, Washington left multiple divisions in the war zone. Because they remained on the Korean Peninsula for an extended stretch, communist units did not perform any major acts of aggression.

It is also important to indicate which determinants had the most impact on an outcome. Given how Biddle, MacDonald and Baker, Gibby and other scholars spent a considerable amount of time focusing on the improvement in the officer corps and the formation of the productive soldier training system, they would probably disagree with the claim that the overlooked factors had the most influence on the result below the thirty-eighth parallel. If the operation entailed the ROKA developing the capacity to perform all the duties in

the theater of operations, it would be possible to understand these authors emphasizing the previously examined factors. However, this entity, like most fledgling forces involved in transfers, only gained the ability to inherit some of the security responsibilities. By taking steps such as establishing a long-term residual force, the United States managed to salvage the initiative on the Korean Peninsula.

Attention turned in the penultimate chapter to the disappointing result in the second major transfer from the Cold War. The review of the literature about the Vietnam War displayed how earlier studies tried to shed light on this outcome by concentrating on factors such as the shortage of qualified figures in the ARVN's key leadership posts and the prevalence of an ineffective soldier training system under the seventeenth parallel (Talmadge 2015, 9; Collins 2014, 105). Within the first part of Chapter Seven, various pieces of evidence demonstrated that these determinants contributed to the unfavorable result. Inside the second part of the chapter, precipitous troop withdrawals, the departure of the American residual force and Soviet aid to North Vietnam were taken into consideration. It became apparent that they kept success from emerging during the 1970s as well.

Chapter Seven was not just used to identify the factors that contributed to the inauspicious result. Rather, time was also taken to show which ones were the most influential. Considering how they devoted so much attention to determinants like the scarcity of qualified commanders and the inadequate soldier training system, Talmadge, Collins and other figures who completed earlier studies about the transfer would likely disagree with the contention that the previously overlooked factors were the most impactful. However, these determinants ultimately prevented the U.S. from salvaging the operation in Southeast Asia. At various points,

American officials had to decide whether to remove combat troops from South Vietnam. Since they failed to perform cautious withdrawals like their predecessors did in Korea, ARVN personnel were not capable of conducting new tasks. This is not the only difference that was found between the decision-making for the transfers in Vietnam and Korea. Once the American residual force emerged in Southeast Asia, it began to perform helpful attacks against the North Vietnamese. Instead of allowing this unit to make a contribution for several years, policymakers chose to cease its operations after a short period of time. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union began to provide the North Vietnamese with more weapons and equipment to utilize in their assaults. Leaders in Washington, unlike those who oversaw the Korean operation, refrained from matching a major aid increase in the enemy camp, so their ally did not have an adequate amount of weapons and equipment to use in engagements versus the opposition.

Numerous anti-war protests prompted policymakers to make the above moves in South Vietnam. The officials, who oversaw the effort in Korea, faced a much different political climate on the home front in the early portion of the 1950s. Although critics of the Korean conflict were present throughout the United States, they were not as vocal as the individuals who objected to the conflict in Vietnam (Mueller 1985, 65). Rather than organizing many demonstrations, most citizens limited their activism to participating in public opinion polls and writing letters to legislators. Since officials faced less pressure in this situation, they managed to avert the costly mistakes of their successors. Individual political action, as the preceding material showed, will likely produce a successful transfer abroad. Collective political action, on the other hand, will probably generate an unsuccessful operation overseas.

Stability Can Emerge When Unilateral Withdrawals Occur in Conventional Conflicts

A lot of earlier war termination studies concentrated on the unilateral withdrawals that take place during unconventional conflicts (Kolenda 2019, 992; Paul, Clarke, Grill and Dunigin 2013, 149). The thesis, in contrast, focused on the withdrawals which transpire in conventional wars. A nation will refrain from conducting large offensives when it expects aggression to result in more costs than benefits (Mearsheimer 2018, 3). Once the American withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula began, officials in Pyongyang only performed small attacks such as cross-border raids since they recognized that a full-scale invasion would probably produce many losses. In addition to revealing that deterrence is the main factor which enables stability to emerge, the Korean case indicated a developed nation should assume a supporting role in a war zone following the cessation of its major operations. While American leaders would have preferred to completely end their involvement in the Korean dispute, they realized that the ROKA did not possess the capacity to deal with the communist threat in an independent fashion. Consequently, they did not go so far as to remove all their personnel from the Korean Peninsula. Instead, as mentioned in the last subsection, they elected to keep some soldiers in place to assist the members of the ROKA. This residual force, coupled with the frequent American arms and equipment shipments to South Korea, made figures in Pyongyang exercise a substantial amount of restraint.

One may argue that the other case from the study suggests stability cannot surface after the start of a unilateral withdrawal. However, the necessary conditions were not present in South Vietnam. Once the American withdrawal commenced, policymakers in Washington, as

discussed in the prior subsection, did not leave behind a long-term residual force or continue to allocate a lot of weapons and equipment to figures in the ARVN. With their enemy in such a vulnerable position, the North Vietnamese did not need to be as cautious as the North Koreans.

What Will Probably Enable a U.S. Transfer to Succeed in the Future?

Since only two cases were taken into consideration in the empirical chapters, it is not proper to reach broad conclusions about transfers at this point in the thesis. Instead, it is more appropriate, as mentioned in Chapter Three, to just reach conclusions about the operations which the United States performs in conventional conflicts. The first portion of this section will establish what kind of transfer Washington should perform if another conventional operation transpires in the developing world. The second and third parts will identify the conditions that will increase the likelihood of a productive mission in a conventional conflict. The final segment will show why an initiative during the early portion of the twenty-first century is plausible.

The Need for Partial Transfers

Every president wants local units to become "competent and large enough to maintain security within the country's borders without help from U.S. forces." (Obama 2020, 321). The material regarding Korea, however, suggests that only a partial transfer is feasible. Truman elected to give all the security responsibilities on the Korean Peninsula to the members of the ROKA in the Spring of 1949. Upon gaining control of each sector on the defensive line by the thirty-eighth parallel, South Korean soldiers relinquished a substantial amount of territory to

North Korean forces, so it is necessary to look at this complete transfer as a failure. The U.S.

then adapted its position during the second transfer to ensure that the ROKA would only have

to defend the central and eastern sectors of the line (Hermes 1966, 465). It, of course, is now

possible to call this partial transfer a conflicted success since communist forces did not go on

to seize any major South Korean cities or towns.

The second initiative in Korea qualifies as a partial transfer with a large amount of

U.S. personnel since over 20,000 troops remained in place to work with a partner. A partial

transfer with a small amount of American personnel can also take place in a developing

country. The content regarding Vietnam indicates that this type of partial transfer can

generate a desirable result. For a while, a small contingent of U.S. pilots provided aerial

support for South Vietnamese personnel in engagements against North Vietnamese soldiers

(Kissinger 1979, 986). During this stretch, the North Vietnamese failed to accumulate many

triumphs. Once it ended, though, they amassed numerous victories below the seventeenth

parallel.

Favorable Conditions during the Early Portion of a Transfer

Because a nascent army inherits a lot of security responsibilities in a partial transfer, its

members need to improve considerably during the early portion of an operation. Unless an

effective soldier training program emerges in the initial part of a transfer, it will not be possible

for this turn of events to take place. The experience in Korea suggests that a productive system

is more likely to surface when a capable administrator overseas the advisory effort and an

adequate number of qualified advisors serves in the target nation. Following the

commencement of the Korean operation, Cornelius Ryan received the responsibility of heading

the advisory unit below the thirty-eighth parallel. Having led impactful training programs on

the home front, Ryan knew figures who possessed the ability to fill important advisory roles in

the theater of operations. In addition to knowing individuals who could serve as effective

subordinates, Ryan had superiors who did not limit the number of advisors who could work in

the war zone, so he managed to bring thousands of trainers to Korea (Ramsey 2006, 10). If

many advisors with combat and instructional experience were not on the Korean Peninsula, a

satisfactory number of ROK personnel would not have become familiar with the American style

of warfare and gone on to contribute to pivotal victories against enemy forces.

The transfer in Vietnam also indicates that a soldier training program should contain

the preceding features. During the first year of the operation, there were not many qualified

American advisors in South Vietnam. Although thousands of trainers with combat and

instructional experience started to arrive underneath the seventeenth parallel in the second

year, a lot of South Vietnamese soldiers failed to learn key lessons from American instructors.

This lack of progress, as mentioned in the last chapter, can partially be attributed to how the

advisors did not have skillful administrators in the oversight bureau above them.

The state of the relationship between American officials and the leaders of a

developing country will strongly impact the way that a transfer takes place in the future.

Besides contributing to the establishment of the effective soldier training program below the

thirty-eighth parallel, Washington managed to play an integral part in the selection of the

commanders in the ROKA since it maintained a substantial amount of leverage over Seoul

throughout the transfer. Through his interaction with American policymakers, the South

Korean president learned that military aid would be withheld if he did not start to refrain from

giving significant positions at the top of the ROKA to underperforming loyalists. Cognizant of

how his soldiers could not fight effectively without a steady flow of arms and equipment from

the U.S., the president began to insert proficient officers in these leadership posts (Biddle,

MacDonald and Baker 2017, 121-126).

Table 8.1

Conditions That Should Be Present during the Early Portion of a Partial Transfer	Conditions Which Should Be Prevalent during the Middle and Latter Stages of a Partial Transfer
-An Effective Soldier Training Program - -Surfacing of Many Competent Leaders at the Top of the Nascent Army -Experienced American Commander in the Target Nation	-Cautious Troop Withdrawals -A Residual Force -An Adequate Amount of Aid to an Ally -Low Level of Collective Political Action in the United States

One can also see the importance of leverage while looking at the filling of the key

posts at the top of the ARVN. At the beginning of the transfer, many corrupt and

underperforming commanders were receiving these positions. Although U.S. leaders had the

option of threatening to withhold aid, they refrained from making this move during the

1970s (Palmer 1984, 88). Since American policymakers failed to establish enough influence

over Saigon, a lot of South Vietnamese soldiers did not go on to serve under leaders with the

ability to develop effective tactical plans.

The findings from Chapters Six and Seven demonstrate that a transfer is more likely to succeed when an experienced American commander serves in the target country. During a transfer, an officer, as one Secretary of Defense learned while overseeing the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, needs "different skills." (Gates 2020). With fewer U.S. soldiers participating in engagements on the battlefield, it is not advantageous to have a leader who can conduct envelopment maneuvers or disrupt the enemy's supply lines. Rather, it is beneficial to have a commander with the capacity to establish an effective soldier training program, make sure that an advisory group runs smoothly and so forth. At the start of the Korean operation in 1951, a figure with these skills was below the thirty-eighth parallel. James Van Fleet, after overseeing the development of a proficient army in another allied nation at the end of the 1940s, recognized what moves could turn the ROKA into a more productive entity, including forming the field retraining centers (Gibby 2012, 198). While placing an experienced commander in the theater of operations is a prudent move, it is important to remember that success will probably not emerge unless cooperative leaders also surface in the nascent army. When the field retraining initiative commenced, General Paik Sun-yup and other South Korean commanders worked closely with Van Fleet to ensure that their subordinates completed the program. If Van Fleet encountered resistance from these men, there would not have been as much improvement within the ranks of the ROKA.

The leader of the American campaign below the seventeenth parallel did not possess a track record of constructing forces overseas. During the Second World War, Creighton Abrams served as a tank commander in several clashes against German units (Kissinger 1979, 272-273).

Consequently, while he led the effort to strengthen the South Vietnamese Army, there were occasions when he did not take steps that could have enabled success to emerge in Southeast Asia. The organization responsible for overseeing the activities of U.S. advisors in South Vietnam, as mentioned earlier in this subsection, desperately needed competent administrators at the start of the 1970s. However, Abrams did not take the time to eliminate the leadership problem in the MACV Training Directorate like Van Fleet removed the one within the Korean Military Advisory Group in 1951. Of course, even if proficient individuals assumed control of the MACV Training Directorate, it still would have been difficult for progress to surface during the initial portion of the transfer since the officers at the top of most ARVN units were not eager to implement training reforms like South Korea's General Paik Sun-yup.

Auspicious Conditions during the Middle and Latter Stages of a Transfer

The developments from the last subsection will probably not impact a future transfer as much as the ones that occur during the middle and latter stages of a mission. As seen in the second column of Table 8.1, one of these developments is cautious troop withdrawals. Drawdowns usually commence at the beginning of a transfer, but early withdrawals are not as influential as the ones which happen towards the middle of an operation. One way to notice the validity of this point is by revisiting the drawdowns that took place in Vietnam. Even though South Vietnamese troops were not prepared to inherit the duties of American soldiers in the early portion of the transfer, Washington elected to remove personnel from the theater of operations. Fortunately for the members of the ARVN, enough American combat troops were still around to intervene when they were overwhelmed on the battlefield. By the middle part of

the transfer, there were not many U.S. soldiers left in the war zone. Consequently, when underperforming South Vietnamese troops encountered difficulties after precipitous withdrawals, it was no longer possible to send a sufficient amount of American personnel to locations to serve as replacements.

The Korean transfer demonstrates how it is crucial to avert hasty drawdowns as well. In the middle portion of this operation, policymakers in Washington frequently received reports about the combat performances of South Korean soldiers. When ROK personnel showed improvement over a period, these officials removed U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula. This approach, as mentioned in the preceding section, enabled South Korean troops to assume new responsibilities at appropriate times.

During the withdrawal process, policymakers cannot remove every serviceman from the theater of operations. After all, in a partial transfer, a residual force must remain in place to participate in the continued effort to maintain stability. From the findings of the thesis, one can learn important lessons about the employment of a residual force. The members of a residual force do not always need to receive the same responsibilities. The American personnel within Korea, as mentioned earlier in this section, received the task of patrolling the western portion of the defensive line since South Korean soldiers could only secure the central and eastern sectors. Of course, two decades later, the U.S. servicemen in Southeast Asia did not spend time patrolling part of a defensive line. Instead, their superiors gave them the responsibility of providing aerial support for local units on the ground.

It is crucial, as noted in the prior section, for a residual force to remain in the war zone for both the middle and latter stages of a transfer. Following the emergence of the residual

force in Korea, certain presidents decided to complete drawdowns. However, they never went

so far as to terminate the mission to assist the ROKA. If the residual force did not remain in

place through the latter portion of the transfer, North Korean personnel probably would have

completed a major attack. Just one year into the bombing campaign in Southeast Asia, U.S.

officials ordered pilots to halt their sorties. As a result, the members of the North Vietnamese

Army went on to experience several triumphs during the latter portion of the transfer.

Although the cases shed light on the utilization of a residual force, there is a noteworthy

lesson that one cannot learn while taking them into consideration. Once a mission commences,

the members of a unit may encounter hostility from citizens in the developing country.

Consequently, the policymakers, who oversee a transfer in the future, should be cognizant of

the factors which increase the likelihood of a backlash. In addition to showing that nationalist

sentiment can trigger a backlash, transfers from after the Cold War demonstrate that a close

association with an oppressive or corrupt government can precipitate this problematic turn of

events. For part of the transfer in Iraq, the United States residual force encountered a

considerable amount of hostility. While some citizens objected to the presence of foreign

soldiers on their soil, certain Sunni Muslims refused to cooperate with the Americans because

they believed Washington was complicit in the discriminatory practices of the Shiite

government. During the War on Terrorism, U.S. officials also decided to leave a residual force in

Afghanistan. The members of this unit took various steps to assist the Afghan people, but they

still faced a backlash during their mission. Certain citizens resisted the American presence

because they wanted to keep foreign elements out of their country. Meanwhile, others

behaved in this fashion since the U.S. was linked to a regime in Kabul which accepted bribes and

engaged in other corrupt activities (Obama 2020, 316).

Since local personnel assume a lot of responsibilities in a war zone, it is critical to maintain an adequate amount of aid to them during the middle and latter stages of a transfer. In the middle of the Korean transfer, communist forces received more weapons and equipment from the Soviet Union (Hermes 1966, 477). Fortunately for the members of the ROKA, the United States delivered additional supplies shortly after this increase in the communist camp. American aid remained at a sufficient level during the last portion of the initiative, so South Korean soldiers kept limiting communist territorial gains to inconsequential pieces of land by the thirty-eighth parallel.

In 1972, the United States provided the South Vietnamese with over a billion dollars in assistance. If the amount of aid remained at this level in the latter stages of the transfer, there would have been a chance for the members of the ARVN to fight the remaining engagements of the war in an effective fashion. As noted in the last section, though, officials in Washington reduced supply shipments to their partner during the middle of the 1970s. Consequently, when battles took place, South Vietnamese troops struggled to keep NVA personnel from seizing target areas (Summers 1982, 17).

The officials in the executive branch during the middle and latter stages of another transfer will not be able to concentrate solely on events in the war zone. Like the individuals who handled the Cold War operations, they will also have to pay attention to the political climate on the home front. The ideal environment for policymakers will be one in which anti-war activists do not hold a lot of demonstrations in Washington and other population centers. With a low level of collective political action inside the United States, a president and his

advisors will likely encounter legislators much different than the ones who served in Congress at the time of the Vietnamese transfer. In other words, they will probably face lawmakers who refrain from imposing restrictions which make it difficult to keep a residual force abroad and introducing acts that reduce military supplies to a partner.

Why Is Another Conventional Transfer Conceivable?

China will have a major bearing on whether a transfer takes place in the future. In the early part of the twenty-first century, this country has taken some alarming steps in the security realm. Besides performing cyberattacks on multiple occasions, it has gone so far as to build military bases on disputed islands in the South China Sea. Considering this recent misconduct, it is fair to say that the Chinese will perform other threatening acts.

China could launch a sustained conventional campaign to take territory at some point. Of all the conventional attacks that may happen, the one, which receives the most attention, is a Chinese assault against the security personnel in Taiwan (Lin and Culver 2022). On several occasions, American officials have only promised to give the Taiwanese more weapons and equipment in the event of a Chinese attack (Jacobs 2022). As a result, many do not believe that policymakers would provide troops if the Chinese overwhelmed their ally. After Dean Acheson claimed South Korea did not fall within America's defense perimeter in Asia at the beginning of 1950, some presumed Washington would not send troops to the Korean Peninsula if the ROKA failed to thwart any major acts of aggression (Osgood 1957, 164). However, as we know, the U.S. inserted soldiers below the thirty-eighth parallel when the South Koreans encountered adversity later in the year. Since the U.S. inherited control of the defensive campaign in this

situation, analysts should not go so far as to rule out the possibility that it would relieve

Taiwanese units struggling against Chinese forces. If American personnel assumed control of a

defensive effort, Washington would also provide Taiwanese forces with additional training so

they could become more effective on the battlefield. Once the Taiwanese displayed a

sufficient amount of improvement, it would then be appropriate for a transfer to take place.

It is important to note that factors, which did not contribute to the Cold War

operations, could have a bearing on the outcome of a transfer in Taiwan. The content in the

last chapter displayed how an American president who oversees a transfer may devote a lot of

attention to the needs of other partners as he works with the leaders of a nascent army.

During the 1970s, Nixon did not have to think about how the establishment of a residual force

would require the removal of troops from another vulnerable country since he just wanted to

perform a partial transfer with a small number of U.S. servicemen. However, when a chief

executive desires to conduct a partial transfer with a large amount of American personnel, it is

often necessary to take this factor into account. If a commander-in-chief considering a sizable

mission in Taiwan learned that the initiative would require the removal of soldiers from

another location, he would probably refrain from carrying it out because American leaders

usually seek to honor troop commitments (Gaddis 2005, 235-271).

Besides troop commitments, there is a chance that a concerning development on the

world stage could influence the result of a transfer in Taiwan. One, which could be quite

impactful, is an attack on a key location such as an American base. This turn of events, as

mentioned in the first chapter of the study, would probably lead to a prolonged U.S. military

operation in another country. Since a considerable amount of manpower is needed during an

extended initiative, it is unlikely that Washington would be able to have multiple divisions

work with underperforming Taiwanese units. Although a partial transfer with a large number

of American personnel could not occur in the aftermath of a direct attack against the United

States, it would be possible for policymakers to have a small contingent of American pilots

provide air cover for local forces on the ground.

Theoretical Insights and Ways to Bolster Future PAT Works

The findings provide insight into the principal-agent partnerships that influence security

transfers. The primary purpose of this section is to identify the conclusions about principal-

agent relationships which can be drawn from the examinations of the operations in South

Korea and South Vietnam. Once it becomes apparent what the case analyses reveal about

monitoring, techniques for altering the conduct of an agent, dilemmas of control, and double

principals, there will be a chance to discuss how they also offer ways to widen the scope of PAT

studies pertaining to transfers.

Monitoring Key Actors

After a transfer starts, it is necessary for a principal to monitor the conduct of certain

actors. Some theorists suggest that a principal cannot perform an effective direct monitoring

campaign since the amount of personnel working for this actor in a war zone decreases over

the course of an operation (Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 98). However, the findings of

the South Korean analysis indicate that this perspective is not credible. During the Korean

initiative, policymakers in Washington consistently turned to reports from the different

service branches of the U.S. military to ascertain whether ROK personnel were making a sufficient amount of progress. This direct approach enabled them to come into contact with veracious information on a number of occasions. For example, a document from the second year of the transfer helped these individuals see that the South Koreans could not defend every portion of the defensive line by the thirty-eighth parallel (Clark 1953). Because developments in the enemy camp can adversely impact the performance of the agent's personnel, U.S. monitors also had to track the actions of communist states. Towards the end of the transfer, the Americans devoted a considerable amount of attention to the conduct of North Korea. At one point in the 1970s, information indicated that Pyongyang was in the process of drastically increasing the amount of weapons and equipment for the members of the Korean People's Army (Oberdorfer 1997, 61). Once officials in Washington learned about this increase, they concluded it would be advantageous for the residual force to remain on the Korean Peninsula.

The results of the South Vietnamese examination also suggest that direct monitoring is an effective technique. At various points in the transfer below the seventeenth parallel, U.S. civilian officials read detailed reports from military personnel regarding the ARVN. A lot of the documents enabled them to recognize that South Vietnamese troops did not possess the ability to fight against the NVA in an independent fashion. Policymakers in Washington had to examine reports from their subordinates regarding developments in the communist camp as well. From the information in certain documents, they learned about key events such as the Soviet Union sending a substantial number of T-54 tanks to the members of the North Vietnamese Army in the Spring of 1972.

Unless a principal takes certain steps during a transfer, it is unlikely that a direct monitoring campaign will generate a favorable outcome. While the amount of American servicemen in Korea declined in the 1950s, this decrease was not as impactful as the one which took place in Vietnam. By the middle of the 1970s, there were no longer any U.S. personnel operating overtly beneath the seventeenth parallel. Policymakers in Washington remained aware of key events in the war zone, though, since they had covert monitors gather information on the ground and pilots conduct reconnaissance missions in the air (U.S. Defense Attaché Office 1975). The American experience in South Vietnam displays that clandestine collection methods can enable a principal to stay up to date on developments in a theater of operations. However, once this actor makes the switch to a covert approach, it must be prepared for a decline in the quantity of information. After all, covert observers do not have as much access to battlefields and other important locations as overt ones.

Approaches for Dealing with a Recalcitrant Agent

During a transfer, an agent is sometimes unwilling to implement the plans of a principal. Like prior PAT works, this thesis found that conditional incentives can help a principal alter the conduct of an uncooperative agent. What sets this study apart from earlier ones is the way that it also touched upon the more extreme courses of action which a principal may consider as it works with a recalcitrant partner. At one point, U.S. officials discussed the possibility of having South Korean soldiers overthrow the unyielding president in Seoul. However, since the president later modified his behavior in exchange for additional assistance, he never had to contend with a plot against his regime (Foreign Relations of the United States 1953, 1358).

The South Vietnamese case demonstrates that conditional aid can change the conduct of an uncooperative agent, too. In the 1970s, there was one occasion when U.S. policymakers used this tool to alter the behavior of the Saigon regime. The President of South Vietnam initially refused to back the peace deal that was finalized in Paris. Once American leaders informed him that a lack of support would lead to the withholding of assistance, though, he decided to accept the agreement (Kissinger 1979, 1469).

Dilemmas of Control

Following the start of a transfer, it usually becomes apparent that an agent is incapable of independent action. The principal has two options for handling the surfacing of a dilemma of control. On the one hand, it can choose to initiate an assistance campaign in the theater of operations. On the other, it can retake control of the security effort or resort to direct action. Some researchers suggest that it is advantageous for a principal to select the second option, but the information in this thesis suggests that helping the underperforming agent is more effective (Berman, Lake, Miquel and Yared 2019, 2). Once a principal launches an assistance campaign, it will need to keep a residual force in place for an extended period to carry out a limited number of duties. This actor will also have to make sure that the agent continues to receive an adequate amount of weapons and equipment to direct the stabilization effort in the war zone. One can assert that the United States took both of these steps in South Korea since the establishment of the long-term residual force coincided with the increase in material assistance to the ROKA.

The developments in South Vietnam also indicate that it is sagacious for a principal to

respond to a dilemma of control with assistance rather than direct action. The American

residual force in Southeast Asia, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, helped thwart multiple

acts of aggression by the North Vietnamese before its abrupt departure in the Summer of 1973.

While the decision to cease the activities of the residual force had an adverse impact on the

campaign to assist the South Vietnamese, it was not the only factor which kept this mission

from generating a favorable outcome. Since the United States did not send enough weapons

and equipment to the theater of operations during the latter portion of the transfer, it became

difficult for South Vietnamese soldiers to perform their responsibilities in a satisfactory fashion

(Summers 1982, 17). If ARVN personnel received a sufficient amount of supplies and the U.S.

residual force remained active beyond the middle part of the transfer, the assistance effort

inside South Vietnam probably would have turned out to be productive like the one within

South Korea.

Double Principals

The thesis concentrated on how an agent can encounter the double principal dilemma

during a transfer. In the middle of 1953, officials from the United States urged the President of

South Korea to accept the terms of a cease-fire deal. A powerful faction inside South Korea,

on the other hand, encouraged him to obstruct the implementation of the agreement. For a

while, this leader placated the faction applying pressure on the domestic front. However, upon

being offered additional American military assistance, he eventually stopped taking steps to

undermine the deal (Foreign Relations of the United States 1953, 1358). The outcome in South

Korea suggests that an agent will proceed with a course of action which benefits the principal

with the most leverage.

Certain events pertaining to the transfer in Vietnam also indicate that leverage is the main factor which determines how an agent reacts to the double principal dilemma. Among them is the way that the President of South Vietnam behaved after he received a considerable amount of assistance from the United States in 1972. American policymakers hoped that this unconditional aid would prompt the president to refrain from filling key positions at the top of the ARVN with underperforming loyalists. The president's allies within the officer corps, in contrast, did not want him to take this step because it would prevent them from continuing their practice of using leadership posts to secure personal benefits (Snepp 1977, 193). The president, cognizant of how disgruntled officers removed some of his predecessors from office, decided to keep giving positions to loyalists. If U.S. leaders handled this situation like their predecessors dealt with the one in Korea, it would have been possible for them to acquire more leverage than the internal principal. In other words, they could have gained an edge over their competitor by informing the agent that assistance would only be provided if he aligned his conduct with their interests.

Main Ways to Broaden the Scope of Future PAT Studies about Security Transfers

The case analyses provide two major ways to make future PAT works more insightful. The material in Chapter Four revealed that the discussions about conditional aid in earlier PAT studies just concentrated on the interaction between the agent and the external principal (Biddle, MacDonald and Baker 2017, 121-126). The interaction between the agent and the internal principal also has a strong impact on a response to an offer of conditional assistance.

Since the interaction between the South Korean regime and its internal principal was taken into consideration in Chapter Six, there was an opportunity to shed more light on Seoul's reaction to Washington's offer of conditional aid in 1953. If a researcher employs this broad approach in a future study, he or she will be able to provide readers with a better understanding of an agent's response to a particular offer of conditional aid from an external principal.

In addition to showing that PAT has the capacity to provide insight into key developments within the agent's borders during a transfer, the case analyses in the thesis offer a way to help explain the principal's reaction to the emergence of an underperforming partner. After researchers such as Byman mentioned that monitoring enabled principals to learn about the prevalence of underperforming agents in target countries, most of them did not go on to explain how these actors attempted to address this problem. The examinations in the preceding pages did not just note how monitors uncovered that underperforming agents were present in South Korea and South Vietnam. Instead, they also identified how U.S. officials elected to deal with their partners' inadequate performances. By focusing on dilemmas of control in the discussions about the American responses, it was possible to shed more light on them. Given these results, it would be advantageous for a scholar to concentrate on dilemmas of control if he or she chooses to examine a principal's plan for coping with an underperforming agent in a future work about a transfer.

Although the examinations offer ways to improve PAT studies regarding transfers, it is important to note that they also reveal the manner in which this perspective contains a major limitation. Like its partner, the principal encounters a considerable amount of pressure on the domestic front following the commencement of a transfer. One cannot rely on PAT as he or she

examines this development since it only devotes attention to the internal pressure encountered

by the agent (Downes 2021, 6). This shortcoming prompted me to utilize the ideas, which the

proponents of other theoretical perspectives discuss within their respective publications, while

analyzing the political pressure that American leaders faced during the Cold War transfers.

Because this approach generated a desirable outcome, it would be prudent for a future

researcher to utilize it if he or she must shed light on some political pressure that a principal

encountered after initiating a transfer within a developing state.

Potential Topics for Future Studies

Although this thesis contains a number of strengths, it has three notable limitations.

One is that it does not look closely at the U.S. transfers from the War on Terrorism. Another is

the manner in which it does not discuss operations performed by America's allies and rivals.

The last limitation is the way it does not examine initiatives where actors other than local forces

dealt with security challenges. The purpose of this section is to explain why these topics should

be thoroughly analyzed in future studies.

American Security Transfers during the War on Terror

Prior releases regarding Iraq and Afghanistan, as seen earlier in this chapter, contain

some useful lessons about transfers. Once the reports of the American monitors in these

countries become accessible, it will be possible for researchers to learn far more. When U.S.

personnel initially intervened within Iraq in 2003, there were conventional battles near Basra

and other urban areas. However, by the time the members of the new Iraqi Army began to

inherit the responsibilities of American soldiers, engagements were predominantly being

fought against insurgents who were attempting to overthrow the government (Ricks 2009, 67).

With information from declassified documents, there will be a chance to unearth all the

determinants which contributed to the outcome in Iraq. Just as the thesis showed the training

of South Korean and South Vietnamese personnel impacted the Cold War operations, a

researcher would probably uncover that the training program in Iraq was influential. During a

counterinsurgency campaign, soldiers cannot limit their activities to fighting battles against the

enemy. Instead, they must also allocate supplies, build schools, and complete other tasks with

the potential to maintain popular support for the government. If an analyst uncovered that

American advisors did not place enough emphasis on the civic action component of

counterinsurgency in tutorials and Iraqi soldiers often failed to take steps to improve the living

standards of citizens, he or she could conclude, not only that the training contributed to the

inauspicious result, but also that a multifaceted training program (one that prepares soldiers for

both combat and civic action) is a condition which will increase the likelihood of a successful

American transfer in an unconventional conflict.

Soon after American troops entered Afghanistan in late 2001, they participated in

conventional engagements within Mazar-e-Sharif and other cities. By the time the soldiers in

the Afghan Army started to assume their duties, though, insurgents were attempting to topple

the government (Gates 2014, 352). Consequently, this case provides another chance to learn

what conditions are conducive to a productive American transfer in an unconventional

conflict. The examinations of the South Korean and South Vietnamese campaigns

demonstrated that aid shipments from the U.S. play a key role in determining the outcome of a transfer in a conventional conflict. Because soldiers also take steps to improve the living standards of citizens during an unconventional war, it is imperative to send both weaponry and humanitarian supplies to the target country. While looking at certain declassified documents, a researcher could find that a shortage of the latter kept Afghan personnel from finishing civic action projects in many villages which insurgents seized. This information would make it necessary for him or her to reach the inference that an inadequate amount of humanitarian aid enabled the unsuccessful transfer to occur in this Central Asian country. If the scholar then proceeded to identify the conditions which are likely to result in a fruitful transfer in an irregular war, he or she could use the material from the Afghan case to bolster the claim that success will probably emerge when the U.S. maintains a sufficient flow of humanitarian supplies to the target state.

Transfers Performed by Other Powers

American allies carried out security transfers during the Cold War and War on Terror as well. Considering how these Western countries have democratic leaders like the United States, a researcher would likely find that some of the factors, which impacted America's Cold War missions, also influenced their operations. For instance, in unsuccessful campaigns, politicians probably ordered hasty troop withdrawals since war-weary citizens organized many demonstrations. Besides these similarities, there are likely important distinctions between the initiatives that others should be aware of, including how the allied countries' styles of warfare impacted local forces differently than the American one. Through an investigation of a transfer,

it would be possible to see whether another nation's style of warfare positively impacted an outcome in a particular setting. In 2012, French officials discovered that the members of Islamist insurgent groups were settling in the northern section of Mali. To keep the radical networks from toppling the Mali government, they sent military units to Africa. After the strength of the insurgent organizations started to decline, Paris announced that local forces would gradually replace the French troops in Mali. With the help of French trainers, Malian personnel were supposed to develop the capacity to perform the duties of the departing soldiers. French advisors, like American ones, accumulate a lot of knowledge at their nation's instructional facilities (J. Snyder 1984, 210). If a scholar uncovered Malian soldiers went on to consistently defeat insurgents with methods which their advisors learned at Saint-Cyr and other training centers in France, he or she would be able to assert that this exposure to the French military culture contributed to the desirable result.

The rivals of the United States rely on the transferal policy, too. When these countries perform operations overseas, their authoritarian rulers usually do not face many marches, sit-ins and other forms of dissent on the home front. Although the leaders do not encounter much pressure on the streets like officials from the United States, they must contend with it inside the corridors of power since certain government ministries seek to influence the way transfers unfold (Snyder 1989, 304). Consequently, a study about the operations of America's opponents would shed light on how much bureaucratic agencies impact the outcomes of campaigns by authoritarian states. One case, which could be used in such a work, is the Soviet initiative in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Prior to the transfer, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Premier, had taken steps to reduce the military's role in the decision-making process. By closely examining

the mission, a researcher could ascertain whether this entity remained ineffective or if it managed to have a bearing on the policy deliberations inside the Kremlin.

Transfers Without Local Forces

This thesis concentrated solely on situations where government forces assumed the security responsibilities of soldiers from a developed country. On some occasions, it is not possible to take this step since a functioning government does not exist in the target state. When operating in a failed state, a developed nation usually elects to give its duties to an international organization. If failed states like Yemen become more prevalent in the years ahead, transfers involving international organizations will need to take place more frequently in the developing world. Through the examination of different cases, a researcher could provide insight into these initiatives.

Since its founding in 1945, the United Nations has participated in multiple transfers. During the middle portion of the 1990s, it became involved in a major operation within East Africa. The United States sent troops to Somalia to create a more stable environment in 1992. When eighteen soldiers died in Mogadishu towards the end of 1993, U.S. officials gave the responsibility of leading the security effort to the United Nations. In the aftermath of this transfer, the situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate. If a scholar closely examined this case, he or she could uncover the factors that precipitated the disappointing outcome in Somalia. With his or her findings, he or she could then set forth inauspicious conditions which will probably keep the United Nations from performing a successful transfer within the developing world in the future.

The methods from this thesis could be helpful tools while examining the above transfers. The American residual force within Afghanistan, like the one in Southeast Asia, was impactful. Inside Chapter Seven, the before-and-after comparison approach revealed how instability increased below the seventeenth parallel following the departure of the latter. As a result, this technique could enable a researcher to display the way that the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated after the exit of the former.

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