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Nottingham

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A Corpus-based Study on China's International Counterterrorism Discourse (2001-2021)

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Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

October 2023

Abstract

This thesis seeks to investigate the characteristics of China's international counterterrorism discourse. It argues that China discursively represents terrorism and counterterrorism through its lens of strategic culture. Drawing upon Johnston's strategic culture paradigm, this thesis analyses China's international counterterrorism discourse in three areas: discourse on terrorism, discourse on counterterrorism war, and discourse on international counterterrorism cooperation. Within each area, discursive themes, strategies, and prosodies are analysed to reveal the characteristics of China's international counterterrorism discourse, and strategic cultural explanations are carried out to interpret the findings through the lens of Chinese strategic culture. To do so, it adopts a corpus-based approach to carry out discourse analysis. Specialised corpora, which include the Terrorism Corpus, the Counterterrorism War Corpus, and the Counterterrorism Cooperation Corpus, are constructed based on texts collected from People's Daily. The analysis reveals that: terrorism is represented as an absolute, common, and severe threat to the international community but also a threat that is possible to manage at its roots; the use of force is represented as a path of low efficacy in dealing with the terrorism threat; international counterterrorism cooperation is represented as the preferred approach in international counterterrorism. The findings suggest that the representation of terrorism and counterterrorism corresponds with China's strategic cultural perceptions and preferences in dealing with national threats. First, anything that poses challenges to China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity is regarded as a core threat. But at the same time, China is also predisposed to the perception that conflict is not zero-sum in nature and is possible to be resolved with appropriate measures. Second, as a less efficacious approach to dealing with threats, the use of force is self-defence in nature and should conform to international norms and moral standards. Third, the existing international system and multilateralism should be upheld in dealing with international security issues.

Acknowledgements

Stay curious, work hard, and be grateful. This is what I always keep in mind during my doctoral studies. Undertaking this research project is one of the most fortunate experiences of my life. I'm thankful to have many people backing me up in pursuing academics and living a meaningful life.

I'm deeply indebted to Professor Wyn Rees, Professor Edward Burke, Professor Carl Gibson, and Professor Yingtao Li for their inspiring and insightful instructions that helped to make this project possible. It's very fortunate to have Wyn, Edward, and Carl as my English supervisors. They provided invaluable guidance and constant support during my stay at the University of Nottingham. My gratitude also goes to my Chinese supervisor, Yingtao Li, at Beijing Foreign Studies University. Her inspiring suggestions and warm encouragement helped me finish this project. It's very fortunate to have all of them as my supervisors. They are my mentors in academics. I benefit a great deal from them and learn the importance of maintaining critical thinking and generating new knowledge. It's my privilege to work with these distinguished scholars.

An immense thank you to Professor Michael Lister, Professor Jason Klocek, Professor Yizhou Wang, Professor Jisheng Sun, Professor Shaojun Li, Professor Mingjin Wang, Professor Yi Yang, Professor Dongyan Li, Professor Bo Qu, and Professor Shuo Wang for their constructive criticism and suggestions. Their instructive advice helped me make the thesis more solid. I also thank Dr. Chen, Dr. Wang, Dr. Chris, and many others. There isn't enough room to name everyone I'd like to thank. So many friends have been supportive during my studies in China and the United Kingdom. I wish I could mention them all. Their friendship keeps me moving forward with a feeling of luck and happiness.

Finally, but most importantly, I want to give my most profound appreciation to my family. They are a precious gift, more incredible than anything I can imagine. I dedicate this thesis to my family for their unconditional love and support at every step of my life.

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Abbreviations

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CL	Critical Linguistics
CT	Counterterrorism
CTL	Counterterrorism Law
CTS	Critical Terrorism Studies
CPC	Communist Party of China
DA	Discourse Analysis
ETIM	East Turkestan Islamic Movement
EU	European Union
ISIS/ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/Levant
IR	International Relations
KWIC	Keyword in Context
LCMC	Lancaster Corpus of Mandarin Chinese
LL	Log-Likelihood
MND	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPC	National People's Congress
PD	People's Daily
PRC	People's Republic of China
PLA	People's Liberation Army
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
US	United States of America
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WOT	War on Terror
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Research Background

Terrorism is one of the major non-traditional security concerns for the international community in the 21st century. Terrorist activities can be found in most regions across the globe. It is a persistent threat to national and international security. Terrorism kills innocent people, induces psychological panic, and causes social trauma. Most important of all, the transnational tendency of modern terrorism defines contemporary international politics (English 2021). The 9/11 terrorist attack is a typical example of the global impact of terrorism. It demonstrated the growing ability of terrorist organisations to carry out transnational attacks and ushered in a new era of international counterterrorism. In the context of globalisation, transnational mobility and regional turmoil have accelerated the development of international terrorism. Furthermore, international terrorist organisations have the capability to exert influence over global audiences and establish transnational links with the help of modern communication technology (Crenshaw 2020). In the post-9/11 era, the danger of terrorism to the world is real and pervasive. The world has witnessed deadly terrorist attacks in many places around the world, such as London, Paris, Berlin, Brussels, Moscow, Abuja, Baghdad, Kabul, Mumbai, and Kunming. The rise of the Islamic State has demonstrated spectacular brutality and the zealous sectarianism of modern terrorism. Furthermore, the Islamic State has proven able to operate as a proto-state by building institutions, controlling territories, providing state-like service, developing strategies, making propaganda, and conducting conventional military operations (Byman 2016). The dynamic development of terrorism produces imminent challenges for countries around the world. As a result, how to address the challenge of international terrorism has become an important topic in international political discourse.

1.1.1 The Rise of International Counterterrorism Discourse

Counterterrorism requires 'the construction of a whole new language' (Jackson 2005:1). To cope with the growing threats from international terrorism, counterterrorism discourse has

been incorporated into the national security discourse systems of numerous countries that suffer from terrorism. Counterterrorism has gradually become a commonly discussed topic in the discourse of political, media, and social communities. The issues of terrorism and counterterrorism frequently appear in official policy documents, political speeches, and media reports.

Major international actors have established counterterrorism discourse to provide narrative frameworks for political actions against terrorists and securitise terrorism as a threat to national and international security. Take the United States as an example. After the 9/11 terrorist attack, terrorism became an important non-traditional security threat in US political discourse (Lindahl 2018). In the aftermath of the attack, the United States adopted a war-based discourse. In a speech to Congress on September 20, 2001, former US President George W. Bush announced a global campaign against terrorism, formally declaring war on al-Qaeda. Within the ‘war on terror’ narrative framework, the 9/11 terrorist attacks were framed as an act of war, and military action against terrorism is narrated as the battle between good and evil, freedom and fear, a war between the civilised West and barbaric terrorism. The counterterrorism discourse provides moral support for the US to resort to the use of force and send troops to fight terrorists in foreign lands (Jarvis 2009). In the post-9/11 era, the United Kingdom raised counterterrorism as one of its top priority issues. It put forward the counterterrorism strategy of CONTEST as a vital part of how the UK communicates its approach to counterterrorism. In its counterterrorism strategy, terrorism is securitised as a threat that erodes British values, destroys democracy and social cohesion, and challenges national security (UK Home Office 2023). Four pillars of counterterrorism were discursively constructed, including Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare, implying the strategic significance of proactive measures against terrorism (Gearson & Rosemont 2015). For Europe, terrorism is regarded as a persistent and one of the most serious threats to international peace, security, and the well-being of citizens of European countries (Council of Europe Committee 2023). In the post-9/11 era, the European Union has published a series of policies, documents, and strategies to securitise terrorism as a grievous challenge to European civilisation, democratic regimes, freedom, ways of life, and human rights. On many occasions, the European leaders argued that terrorism is both ‘an internal and external

threat' to all Europeans. Through discourse construction, the European Union keeps strategic engagement against terrorism (D'Amato & Terlizzi 2022).

1.1.2 Understanding China's International Counterterrorism Discourse

China also keeps a close eye on the threat of terrorism and the international counterterrorism situation, as terrorism is gradually becoming a global security threat and an important international security issue. For China, understanding how to collaborate with the international community to combat terrorism and achieve common security is a realistic demand for participation in global governance on terrorism. At the same time, terrorist activities in China's Xinjiang region have become increasingly active due to the influence of international terrorism. International terrorist forces are shaping the terrorism situation in China through propaganda, infiltration, and support. It poses a serious challenge to China's national security and social stability.

This study focuses on China's international counterterrorism discourse. I'm especially interested in finding out how China's discourse represents and constructs international terrorism and its preference to deal with it. The following are reasons why I seek to investigate China's international counterterrorism discourse.

(1) Oversimplification of China's counterterrorism

There is a tendency to investigate China's counterterrorism with the oversimplification that China's counterterrorism is mainly about fighting domestic terrorism in its Xinjiang region. Most of the existing scholarship looks at China's counterterrorism at the domestic level. The common topics include: a) counter-insurgency versus insurgency; b) party rule versus religion; and c) the majority Chinese Han people versus the minority Uygur people (Cai 2014; Clarke 2008; Greitens, Lee, & Yazici 2019; Roberts 2018, 2020; Topal 2023; Wayne 2008). The securitisation and binary frameworks of observing China's counterterrorism mainly at the domestic level risk losing lots of interesting things because China looks at the terrorism issue from a broad, comprehensive, and strategic lens.

The current study of China's counterterrorism is partial for two reasons. The subjective reason could be the ideological divergence. It's true that mainstream Western counterterrorism scholarship has made tremendous contributions to this discipline. But it is also real that the academic, social, and political backgrounds of Western academics make it hard to objectively analyse a non-Western country, especially a rising China that is politically and socially different from the Western world. Sometimes, views about China are generated through 'imagined constructs, which are a reflection of Western-centrism' (Said 2003). As Bilgin notes, Western-centrism 'has been constitutive of security studies' and 'further insights from the non-Western world are needed' (Bilgin 2010: 620). The objective reason is the language barrier. Many Western researchers do not master the linguistic abilities to read and comprehend the Chinese language. As Buzan notes, without the capability to speak or read Chinese, the contribution of a China study scholar comes mainly from a broad view of China through a certain theoretical lens (Buzan 2010). Hence, the language inability hinders in-depth research on China's counterterrorism.

The reality is that China gives lots of attention to international counterterrorism. Most important of all, China looks at terrorism issues from an international perspective. Therefore, the oversimplification of China's counterterrorism leaves us with a gap. The investigation of China's international counterterrorism can be helpful to comprehensively understand China's perceptions of terrorism and how to deal with this non-traditional security issue. At a broader level, a better understanding of China's international counterterrorism is beneficial for academics and policymakers to objectively view this rising power. This is also meaningful, as a valid understanding can reduce misinterpretation and lead to significant cooperation in dealing with international threats and creating a peaceful and better world for the international community.

(2) China's internationalisation of international counterterrorism norms

International counterterrorism is the major field in which China gradually forms its perceptions and understandings of terrorism issues. China understands, accepts, and internalises terrorism-related concepts and norms from an international perspective. A fact that might be overlooked by many is that China has kept internalising the norms of international counterterrorism ever since it started to integrate into the international system. In the 1980s, China started to integrate into the international system due to its national strategy of reform and opening-up. China needed to accept the norms and principles of the international system to cope with regional and global issues. Furthermore, China realised that the current international system played an irreplaceable role in maintaining international peace as it looked forward to a peaceful environment for economic development. Internalisation of international security norms is one of the key areas that China has paid attention to. In terms of counterterrorism, China joined most of the United Nations' treaties against international terrorism from the 1980s to the 1990s (see Table 1.1).

Table 1.1 China's participation in UN treaties against international terrorism

Join Date	UN Treaties Against International Terrorism
1978	Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft
1980	Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
1980	Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
1987	Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents
1992	Convention Against the Taking of Hostages
1988	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
1991	Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
1988	Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf
1988	Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Aviation
2001	International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
2001	International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism

Source: <https://treaties.un.org/>

The 9/11 terrorist attack in the United States further shaped China's impression of terrorism. China was shocked by the fact that terrorism has evolved into a transnational threat that can challenge the world's most powerful country. China realised that terrorism is a dangerous, imminent, and international threat that it should pay high attention to. Shortly after the attacks, the then-Chinese President Jiang Zemin made a phone call to US President George W. Bush, sending condolences to the victims and expressing willingness to cooperate with the US and any other countries to carry out international counterterrorism cooperation. China saw the devastating impact of international terrorism and realised that terrorism is essentially an international threat that could possibly have an impact on anyone in any place. To cope with international terrorism, China started to engage with the international community to carry out counterterrorism practices. At the bilateral level, China launched counterterrorism mechanisms with many countries. At the regional level, China initially established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan for the purpose of fighting regional terrorism. At the international level, China proactively supports and participates in the United Nations' measures against international terrorism.

(3) The connotation of the term terrorism in China's counterterrorism discourse

In the Chinese context, the term terrorism has the connotation that it is more of an international threat. In official Chinese discourse, there is no clear distinction between international terrorism and domestic terrorism. In most cases, terrorism in its official discourse denotes international terrorism. For example, China consistently stresses that counterterrorism should be based on the notions and measures of the United Nations' Global Counterterrorism Strategy. If we look at the official document of the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy, we can find that terrorism is defined as 'the most serious threats to international peace and security' (United Nations 2006b). Hence, we can see the implied message that terrorism in official Chinese discourse has the connotation of an international threat.

In fact, terrorism used to be an exotic term referring to international terrorism in official Chinese discourse. We can find sufficient evidence in the records of China's official discourse.

First, in the early official Chinese discourse, violent activities that resembled the current-recognised characteristics of domestic terrorism were not described as terrorism but as 'counterrevolutionary crime' and 'crime against national security'. For example, according to Article 41 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China in 1950, attacks on government institutions, the army, government staff, patriotic democratic personages, and heroes and activists of democratic causes and their families are defined as 'counterrevolution crime' (Gao & Zhao 2015). In 1979, the law was further revised and defined activities similar to what we now know as terrorism as crimes to overthrow proletariat rule and the socialist system and jeopardise the national security of the People's Republic of China.

Second, the official usage of the term terrorism is often positioned in an international context. We can find evidence in the reports to the National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Before 2002, there was no mention of terrorism in reports. Since the 16th CPC National Congress in 2002, terrorism has been formally described in the report and defined as a non-traditional security threat in the international community. Furthermore, all of the mentions of terrorism in the 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th CPC National Congress reports were positioned in the sections that talk about the international situation and China's foreign policy (see Table 1.2).

Table 1.2 Description of terrorism in the reports to the 16th-19th CPC National Congress

Report	Section	Narrative of Terrorism
16th CPC National Congress Report	IX. The International Situation and Our External Work	The old international political and economic order, which is unfair and irrational, has yet to be changed fundamentally. Uncertainties affecting peace and development are on the rise. The elements of traditional and non-traditional threats to security are intertwined, and the scourge of terrorism is more acutely felt.
17th CPC National Congress Report	XI. Unswervingly Following the Path of Peaceful Development	China works for peaceful settlement of international disputes and hotspot issues, promotes international and regional security cooperation, and opposes terrorism in any form.
18th CPC National Congress Report	XI. Continuing to Promote the Noble Cause of Peace and Development of Mankind	China is committed to peaceful settlement of international disputes and hotspot issues, opposes the wanton use of force or threat to use it, opposes any foreign attempt to subvert the legitimate government of any other countries, and opposes terrorism in all its manifestations.
19th CPC National Congress Report	XII. Following a Path of Peaceful Development and Working to Build a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind	And yet, as a world we face growing uncertainties and destabilizing factors. Global economic growth lacks energy; the gap between rich and poor continues to widen; hotspot issues arise often in some regions; and unconventional security threats like terrorism , cyber-insecurity, major infectious diseases, and climate change continue to spread. As human beings we have many common challenges to face.

Source: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Nov/49107.htm>; <http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm>; http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27137540_11.htm; <http://www.china.org.cn/20171105-002.pdf>.

Third, China narrates the terrorism in its Xinjiang region within the context of international terrorism. As previously mentioned, there is no official distinction between domestic and international terrorism. Terrorist activities in Xinjiang are discursively positioned under the category of international terrorism. For example, at the 13th Ministerial Plenary Meeting of

the Global Counterterrorism Forum, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that ‘faced with the deep-seated scourge of terrorism, countries have a shared task to effectively address the root causes of the problem and overcome the international counterterrorism dilemma. China is also a victim of terrorism and is confronted with real threats from the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), an international terrorist group listed by the UN Security Council. As it combats terrorism, China is also reflecting deeply on and exploring a solution to this pressing issue’ (Wang 2023). Hence, we can see that domestic terrorism is described by China as part of international terrorism.

From the abovementioned analysis, we can see that China’s international counterterrorism discourse is an overlooked area. We have a limited understanding of how China perceives, construes, and constructs international terrorism. Such a gap is worthy of in-depth investigation. It is of academic value to discover characteristics of China’s international counterterrorism discourse, the method by which China construes terrorism, and the discursive strategies employed in its narratives of terrorism and counterterrorism issues.

Furthermore, the study on China’s international counterterrorism discourse also has practical implications for policymakers. China’s one of the major countries that participates in international counterterrorism and is having a growing influence on international issues. China’s international counterterrorism discourse may have both horizontal and vertical implications. At the horizontal level, it is an essential part of the overall counterterrorism discourse within the international community. China is one of the permanent members of the United Nations’ Security Council. What China says and does will have an impact on international security issues. As terrorism is now an international security issue with complexity and intractability, it is unimaginable to deal with terrorism issues without China’s engagement. Hence, it is necessary to have a better understanding of how China articulates and views international terrorism. At the vertical level, China’s international counterterrorism discourse is closely interconnected with its domestic counterterrorism policies, measures, and activities. As previously mentioned, China has always linked the terrorism in its Xinjing Uygur Autonomous Region with international terrorism and placed domestic terrorism under the scope of international terrorism. A better understanding of

China's international counterterrorism will also help observers comprehend the logic of China's counterterrorism policies, measures, and practices at home.

The remainder of this introductory chapter will examine the existing studies relevant to the study of counterterrorism discourse, put forward research questions, and elaborate on the organisational plan of this thesis.

1.2 Literature Review

Existing research on counterterrorism discourse focuses on three areas: the narrative patterns and characteristics of counterterrorism discourse, the constructive role of counterterrorism discourse, and terrorism discourse. Among the studies in these three areas, scholars mainly focused on studying the system, patterns, strategies, and constructive role of counterterrorism discourse in the Western world.

1.2.1 Narrative Patterns of International Counterterrorism Discourse

In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attack, terrorism became one of the highest national security issues in the United States. To address the security threat of terrorism, the US launched the global war on terror. The 'war' with terrorist forces became a central topic of US counterterrorism discourse. War originally refers to armed conflict between state actors with independent sovereignty, territory, and population (Dinstein 2017). In counterterrorism discourse, war turned out to be a conflict between state actors and the non-state actors of terrorist organisations. The war on terror became an issue where traditional and non-traditional security threats converged. War is a common conflictual phenomenon in human history. Before resorting to military forces, states normally use certain discursive strategies to justify military actions and gain public support. In this regard, the war on terror is not exceptional.

Counterterrorism discourse can reflect a country's strategic thinking in international politics. In a study of US counterterrorism discourse, Esch finds two strategic myths implied in

America's narrative of international counterterrorism. One is American exceptionalism, and the other is the struggle between civilisation and barbarism (Esch 2010). According to Esch, American exceptionalism defines the ideal self-image of the United States and its position in international politics. The struggle between civilisation and barbarism, on the other hand, defines America's national identity and its opposition to the 'evil' other. Throughout American history, these two frameworks of political discourse have often been used to provide a moral excuse for its engagement in wars and sending military force to foreign lands. In the era of counterterrorism, the US counterterrorism discourse follows these traditional frameworks to represent its global war on terror.

The narrative framework of war plays a fundamental role in the representation of counterterrorism operations. War narratives are the basis for normalising overall strategy and operational tactics. In other words, war narratives should be built on legitimacy in order to persuade the public to support the war. According to Vlahos, a war narrative should create truths that appear to be self-evident and undeniable and tell stories about existence (Vlahos 2006). Through such a discursive strategy, a rhetorical framework can be set up with little criticism, and the use of force becomes an action beyond dispute. Furthermore, to legitimise the use of force against terrorism, the war narrative normally works as a system that includes the discourse of war framing, the discourse of war guidance, and the discourse of agenda setting (Wang 2017).

The construction of binary identities is a common strategy in war narratives. Chang and Mehan examine the characteristics of President Bush's war discourse. They find that President Bush framed the invasion in Afghanistan as the 'war on terror' by employing a discursive strategy that created a binary opposition between good and evil. Subsequently, the Bush administration used the same strategy to justify the use of force in the invasion of Iraq as part of the global war on terror (Chang & Mehan 2008). By comparing the mobilising speeches between Franklin D. Roosevelt and George W. Bush, Oddo finds that President Bush's discourse on the war on terror followed the same logic as President Roosevelt's war discourse during World War II, as both used the 'us versus them' frame to justify the use of force and garner public support before engaging in wars (Oddo 2011).

Convincing the public is significant in gaining support for military operations against terrorism. Winkler carries out a comparison of the mass communication strategies employed by President Regan and President Bush before the US bombing of Syria and the invasion of Iraq. He analyses how the US government used language to justify military action against terrorism and how the media set the war narrative agenda (Winkler 2007). Winkler finds that in order to justify America's use of force and make a pre-emptive strike, President Regan and President Bush exaggerated facts and cited non-verified information to support their assertions.

Elaborately organised rhetoric is also important in maintaining the legitimacy of the use of force in counterterrorism. Hasian conducts a textual analysis of the counterinsurgency manuals of the US Army and Marine Corps. The protracted war on terror, as well as the presence of still-active terrorist forces, prompted the United States to reconsider and revise its counterterrorism policy. Political and military leaders of the United States started to use the term 'counterinsurgency' as a rhetoric in counterterrorism practice. He discovers that the narrative of 'shock and awe' gradually shifted into a description of 'winning hearts and minds.' In this way, as Hassan argues, unconventional and proactive warfare is framed as a humanitarian military intervention to fight terrorism.

Once certain values, norms, and common sense are normalised in counterterrorism discourse, it is extremely difficult for policymakers to change the institutionalised discourse. McCrisken investigates the rhetorical change in the war on terror narrative in official US discourse. Despite the fact that the Obama administration claimed to reconstruct the narrative of the war on terror, the core pillars of the US counterterrorism discourse shifted less. President Obama didn't draw back significantly from President Bush's war on terror narrative (McCracken 2011). In Obama's discourse, the real enemies are terrorists in Afghanistan or Pakistan. In fact, as McCrisken argues, Obama inherited Bush's war rhetoric framework by declaring the United States was at war with terrorists on many occasions. Therefore, the rhetorical change is only a reflection of strategic adjustment, and the core assumptions of the war on terror narrative have not changed too much in the Obama administration.

The war narrative, binary identity construction, and normalisation of counterterrorism are not exclusive characteristics of the US counterterrorism discourse. Similar discursive patterns can also be found in other Western countries. Qian analyses the representation of counterterrorism by the mass media. Through thematic analysis of the British newspaper *The Sun*, she finds the newspaper adopted a war narrative akin to the World War II discourse and employed a narrative framework that elaborately conveyed binary messages such as good versus evil, civilised versus barbaric, and the West versus Islam (Qian 2010a). Holland compares the war on terror discourse between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. He finds these three Western countries have discursive convergence in the representation of international counterterrorism, such as framing 9/11 as an attack on all of the Western coalition countries, constructing 9/11 as an act of war, and linking terrorism to certain states (Holland 2013).

Apart from some Anglo-Saxon studies on the discursive representation of the war on terror, some scholars studied the counterterrorism discourse of other Western countries. Fragon investigates the counterterrorism discourse of the French government. He finds that 'war' started to become a key term after the Paris terrorist attack in 2015. In the subsequent years, using war analogies and representing terrorist attacks as acts of war became a common discursive strategy for French politicians. Fragon argues that the use of war narratives in counterterrorism discourse can help enhance the sense of national unity, manufacture a political consensus, get public support, and justify a rupture to break with routine political order (Fragon 2019).

The representation of terrorism and counterterrorism can also be found in Scandinavian countries. Parker, Pearce, Lindekild, and Rogers investigate the problem of mass media discourse in framing terrorism in the UK and Denmark. They find that all Muslims are framed with negative language when describing terrorist attacks by individuals of Muslim background. On the contrary, the far-right non-Muslim attackers were usually labelled as mentally ill with individualistic framings (Parker, Pearce, Lindekilde, & Rogers 2019). Such representation of terrorism could create a binary opposition between Muslim and non-Muslim groups, which inadvertently helps terrorist groups attract and recruit potential

Muslim extremists in Western societies. Wahlström selects Sweden as the case to study how Sweden constructs violence-affirming extremism. He finds that violence-affirming extremism was discursively constructed as a novel social problem due to the drama and urgency caused by domestic and international terrorist attacks. He also discovers that Islamist extremism is the focus in the representation of all types of extremism (Wahlström 2022).

The interpretation of freedom, liberation, and democracy in Euro-American counterterrorism discourse can be recognised in the Western world, but it does not always resonate with non-Western countries, whose counterterrorism discourse reflects a different understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism in different cultures and political systems. According to Ross, the Muslims in the Middle East hold different views of the phenomena and roots of terrorism. The divergence in perceiving terrorism and counterterrorism is due to a few factors, including a culture of victimhood, a culture of humiliation, and a feeling of betrayal by the Western world. Hence, Ross suggests that the Western world should have a new 'strategy for transforming how the Western world and the radical Islamists are perceived' (Ross 2007). Shukry analyses the public speeches, interviews, and comments made by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in relation to the US war on terror. He argues that Mahathir's discursive assessment of the war on terror demonstrated a critique of the abuse of power by the United States on the issue of counterterrorism and a reflection on the injustice this has caused in the international community. He also claims that Mahathir has two reasons for opposing the Western war on terror. On the one hand, the Malaysian government had the experience and capacity to deal with domestic terrorism during his tenure. Malaysians, on the other hand, believe in a peaceful and decent Islam (Shukry 2013).

Religion defines the current wave of terrorism (Rapoport 2022). Islamic extremism is one of the salient features of current international terrorism. Hence, some scholars carry out studies to explore how non-western countries, which believe in Islam, frame terrorism and counterterrorism.

In the Muslim world, there are alternative discursive strategies to the ‘war on terror’ approach. Christopher investigates the soft counterterrorism measures of Saudi Arabia, which aim to deal with terrorism from a religious and ideological angle. He finds that Saudi Arabia uses a discursive strategy, which includes construing the binary relationship between religion and terrorism and constructing an ingroup identity of all Muslims, in its public information and communication campaign to prevent public support and tolerance for extremist beliefs (Christopher 2008).

Identity construction can also be found in counterterrorism discourse in Africa. Chukwuma argues that Nigeria discursively framed its counterterrorism strategy by constructing a unique Nigerian identity. Drawing upon the concept of space in postcolonial scholarship, he contends that a specific Nigerian identity is constructed by articulating that Nigeria is threatened by terrorist organisations and ungoverned spaces such as the northeast region and the Lake Chad Basin regions of Nigeria (Chukwuma 2022). Identity construction is a helpful discursive strategy in counterterrorism discourse. But on some occasions, it can also become a dilemma for a Muslim country when framing terrorism. Chan discusses how Malaysia has to resecuritize the term ‘Islamic state’ in a situation where a terrorist group of the Islamic State has become an international threat. Chan argues that Malaysia faces an ‘Islamic state versus Islamic State’ dilemma. On the one hand, Malaysia has ‘sanctified, normalised, and legitimised the identity as an Islamic state’; on the other hand, Malaysia has to cope with the religious-ideological discourse of the terrorist group of the Islamic State. Hence, he argues that Malaysia ‘has no choice but to defend itself as a sovereign state as well as an Islamic one’ (Chan 2018).

1.2.2 Constructive Practice of Counterterrorism Discourse

Counterterrorism discourse plays a fundamental role in defining who is the terrorist and what kind of threat terrorism poses. In other words, counterterrorism discourse constructs the threat of terrorism. Furthermore, counterterrorism discourse is often utilised by state actors to securitize a certain individual, group, or political actor as a ‘terrorist’. In this way,

counterterrorism operations against the designated terrorists can receive public support and operational legitimacy.

Counterterrorism discourse is often considered a subjectively constructed discourse (Holland 2013; Jackson 2005). Jackson argues that US counterterrorism discourse constructed the nature of the terrorism threat, reinforced the national identity, expanded the power of political elites, marginalised public dissent, and, most importantly, institutionalised counterterrorism as a security culture (Jackson 2005). At the domestic level, the US counterterrorism discourse has worked well in practice, with counterterrorism issues successfully embedded in law enforcement agencies, national security contexts, legal systems, and legislative processes. At the international level, the counterterrorism discourse served to provide support and legitimacy for its military campaign against international terrorism.

Constructing the threat of terrorism is a common practice in counterterrorism discourse. Winkler examines how the Bush administration construed terrorism, invaded Afghanistan, and denounced the legitimacy of the Afghan government through counterterrorism discourse. Winkler argues that Bush used three definitions of the relationship between terrorism and the state to legitimise the invasion of a sovereign state (Winkler 2008). The three definitions are state-sponsored terrorists, terrorist states, and terrorist-sponsored states. The definitions served to frame the war on terror as an act of justice and exempt the US from the international norm of respecting the sovereignty of other countries.

Counterterrorism discourse involves not only defining the threat of terrorism but also a process of securitisation. Securitisation refers to 'the process by which an issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure' (Buzan, Wæver, & De Wilde 1998: 23-24). In multicultural societies, there exist competing perceptions and understandings in everyday discussion of issues such as causes of terrorism and counterterrorism strategies against terrorism (Jarvis & Lister 2016). Therefore, for the state actors, they have to securitise the everyday lives of citizens and inscribe the public as a stakeholder in national security through

discourses of danger, responsibility, and empowerment (Rodrigo Jusue 2022). They need to construct terrorism as an existential threat so that common sense can be created and exceptional counterterrorism measures can be justified. In other words, securitisation is the ability to speak security, which enhances political actors' control of the securitised issues and enables them to deploy extraordinary measures to cope with the issues. As Vultee finds in his investigation of the US frame of the war on terror, terrorism is securitised as an existential threat, and the war narrative was internalised as an established framework that received wide acceptance (Vultee 2010).

Securitisation can also help legitimise and institutionalise certain counterterrorism policies. In the post-9/11 era, international terrorist terrorism was securitised by European countries as a far broader threat to Europe, or 'the civilised world', as a whole. In the representation of counterterrorism practice against international terrorism, the European Union didn't phrase it as the 'war on terror'. Instead, it used the narrative of 'global threat' to denote international terrorism. As Kauner and Léonard argue, due to the collective securitisation by the EU, terrorism has become a collective threat to member states, and broad counterterrorism measures can be subsequently passed and institutionalised (Baker-Beall 2016).

Constructing social groups with certain identities, beliefs, or ethnic backgrounds as the Other with heterogeneity can also be found in practices of counterterrorism discourse. For example, in the post-9/11 era, Muslims and immigrants are often securitised as the Other or potential threat to mainstream societies and the national security of European countries (Ajala 2014; Baker-Beall 2009; Léonard & Kaunert 2022; Messina 2014; van Meeteren & van Oostendorp 2019). Hence, the counterterrorism discourse that constructs the Others as suspected communities legitimises the implementation of counterterrorism legislation and security measures against certain social groups.

Political metaphors are often applied by state actors to construct the nature of the terrorism threat. Spencer investigates the role of metaphors in the linguistic construction of terrorism and in shaping public perceptions of counterterrorism. By analysing media coverage of

terrorism, he discovers four metaphors, including ‘terrorism is war,’ ‘terrorism is criminality,’ ‘terrorism is an uncivilised evil,’ and ‘terrorism is a disease.’ He argues that terrorism is a subjective construction and that the construction of terrorism affects people’s perceptions of terrorism, which in turn affects their responses to terrorism. Under the war metaphor, military counterterrorism becomes a necessary instrument, whereas under the crime metaphor, justice becomes a necessary counterterrorism route (Spencer 2012). The metaphors of evil and disease differentiate terrorism as an issue that cannot be resolved through rational communication. Fang and Guo investigate the significance of war metaphors in counterterrorism discourse. They argue that metaphors, as a means of persuasion, shape the cognition of audiences through simple and concrete descriptions that are readily accepted (Fang & Guo 2021). The use of war metaphors can make it easier for audiences to perceive terrorism and make them realise the gravity and urgency of the terrorist threat. Additionally, the underlying message of the war metaphors is that state actors are defenders and terrorists are enemies. Hence, the use of force against terrorists is legitimised. Zeng and Chen investigate the role of metaphor in US counterterrorism discourse. They contend that there exists a discursive tradition of using metaphor in American culture. As to counterterrorism, metaphors of portraying terrorism as ‘war’, ‘barbaric things’, ‘diseases’, and ‘unwanted plants’ reflect the US mainstream perceptions of terrorism. They also argue that the metaphors involved in counterterrorism discourse will keep existing and will not disappear in a short time (Zeng & Chen 2021).

1.2.3 Terrorism Discourse as Counternarrative

In the study of counterterrorism discourse, reflection on how terrorism discourse forms and works is also a topic under discussion. Some scholars argue that rethinking terrorism as a communicative process is significant for counterterrorism, as it can help understand how terrorists convey messages, attract audiences, and justify violence (Archetti 2013; Conway & Conway 2011; Tuman 2009). The preceding analysis has demonstrated that counterterrorism discourse works to provide legitimacy to the use of violence and other extraordinary counterterrorism measures and military operations, and counterterrorism discourse is typically underpinned by a logic of dichotomy between the good self and the

evil other. The discursive myths underlying such political narratives also exist within the discursive narratives of terrorist organisations.

Terrorist discourse is frequently employed as a counternarrative to international counterterrorism efforts. Military strikes can limit terrorist organisations' operational ability on the battlefield, but terrorist organisations' mobilisation and development on the ideological battlefield provide them with tough resilience. The discourse system employed by terrorist organisations is a crucial component of their ideological struggle. Thus, some scholars have shifted their focus to studying the characteristics and mechanisms of the discourse system of terrorist organisations.

Some scholars argue that terrorist discourse is an elaborately designed strategic tool rather than a loose and unstructured system of rhetoric. Ingram's analysis of the Islamic State's discourse demonstrates that the terrorist organisation's information dissemination is guided by a rigorous strategic propaganda logic (Ingram 2015). He finds that ISIS mobilisation is based on two logical chains: the logic of consequence and the logic of appropriateness. The logic of consequence uses the rational choice of cost-benefit as a logical framework to persuade audiences that ISIS's political and military actions can provide security and stability for Muslims. The logic of appropriateness constructs a dichotomy between ingroup and outgroup, allowing audiences to acquire an identity and generate hostility towards the Other.

The grand ideological narrative underpins the strategic logic of the terrorist discourse. Islamic fundamentalism is at the centre of the terrorists' narrative system. Within the ideological narrative framework, the world is divided into two opposing groups: the holy Islamic world and the Crusades, and the Zionist alliance of infidels. In his study of the discursive character of al-Qaeda, Payne discovers that the al-Qaeda narrative framework is composed of five parts: the awakening of Muslims to shared identity and quest for the ummah; the invasion of the Islamic world by the Western world; jihad as a legitimate and just countermeasure against the Western world's oppression of the Islamic world; violence as a legitimate tactical means; and the glory of martyrdom (Payne 2009).

In addition to the ideological narrative framework, the dissemination of information is also a crucial part of counterterrorism discourse analysis. Drawing on a social movement theory perspective, Pelletier and his colleagues contend that the Islamic State is effective in spreading extremist ideas because its message relies heavily on interpretations of Sharia law (Pelletier, Lundmark, Gardner, Ligon, & Kilinc 2016). When its message is consistent with mainstream Sharia, the Islamic State focuses on the fact that its claims are compatible with traditional Islamic teachings. When the views it propagates are inconsistent with mainstream Sharia, it adopts a vague narrative and reinterprets traditional Sharia to mobilise the public to accept the new interpretation.

Terrorist organisations usually have effective discursive strategies for persuading and convincing targeted audiences. El-Nashar and Nayef investigate the Islamic State's discursive strategies and find that in order to systematically achieve social, political, psychological, and linguistic control, the terrorist organisation frequently uses a narrative framework of the dichotomy between ingroup and outgroup. Psychological manipulation of the targeted audience is a central component of the discursive strategies. The discourse of terrorist organisations usually presents positive representations of the Self and negative representations of the Other. Such representations attribute positive identity to the audience, create a sense of belonging, and demonise the outgroup members. These discursive strategies help terrorists gain support and reduce the level of guilt associated with violent acts against the discursively constructed outgroup members.

Some scholars focus on terrorist organisations' propaganda ability in handling media. Galloway's analysis of the Islamic State's media content production shows that the Islamic State's communication practices are based on rational and strategic communication thinking in order to persuade not only the Muslim communities under their control but also the potential audience of the global Muslim community (Galloway 2016). The elaborately designed propaganda aims to garner support from Muslim communities worldwide and enrol potential sympathisers in jihad. Ingram investigates the Islamic State's Dabiq magazine and analyses the terrorist organisation's propaganda strategy aimed at Muslims in English-speaking nations. He finds that the production and content of Dabiq reflect the Islamic State's

discursive strategy of producing crisis narratives and constructing ingroup identities (Ingram 2016). The narratives are served to convince the targeted audiences that supporting and joining the Islamic State can help them resolve their identity and life crises.

1.3 Research Question

The abovementioned analysis indicates that the existing scholarship on counterterrorism discourse is mainly focused on the Western world. The current research on counterterrorism discourse covers three areas: the narrative patterns and characteristics of counterterrorism discourse, the constructive role of counterterrorism discourse, and terrorism discourse. There is still room for new research on counterterrorism discourse.

First, there is a scarcity of systematic research on China's international counterterrorism discourse. As scholars of critical terrorism studies (CTS) argue, it is necessary to 'address the Western-centrism prevalent in terrorism research' and include non-Western views and perceptions of those countries that are also victims of terrorism (Jackson, Smyth, & Gunning 2009:230). The majority of country-specific studies on counterterrorism discourse focus on Western actors such as the United States and European countries, with relatively few studies on non-Western countries' counterterrorism discourse. A systematic study of China's international counterterrorism discourse has so far remained scarce.

Second, theoretical lenses are relatively homogeneous. From a theoretical perspective, the existing research paradigm on counterterrorism discourse is dominated by constructivism, which focuses on discourse's constructive role in securitising terrorism issues and uses more constructivist-related theories in its research. A constructivist perspective is useful to explain the functional constructs of discourse in counterterrorism. Moreover, it provides a reasonable answer to how and what impact discourse has on counterterrorism practice. Most studies of counterterrorism discourse emphasise the constructive role of counterterrorism discourse, focusing on the constructive role of discourse in the formation of threats, the construction of identities, and the legitimisation of ways of responding to threats.

Third, there are relatively few corpus-based studies of counterterrorism. The majority of studies on counterterrorism discourses are qualitative research. Many observe, analyse, and draw conclusions based on selected texts regarding counterterrorism discourse. The textual data used by these studies is too small to be representative of the subject of their analysis and could be criticised for cherry-picking. To reveal language patterns and implied meanings, large volumes of textual data should be used (Baker et al. 2008). As counterterrorism is an important topic in political discourse, it is not difficult to find a large volume of textual data for a comprehensive analysis of the counterterrorism discourse of a specific country. So far, very few studies on China's counterterrorism have used a corpus-based approach, such as Qian's analysis of China's discursive construction of terrorism before and after 9/11 (Qian 2010b). Thus, corpus-based research has the potential to contribute to the study of China's counterterrorism.

Fourth, there is a lack of cultural perspective in counterterrorism discourse explanations. Counterterrorism is seen to be both cultural and discursive (Holland 2016: 428). Discourse and culture are 'interrelated systems,' and the recurrent formulations and embodied shared meanings of a particular discourse are inextricably linked to the social values and cultural perspectives of a particular discourse community (Stubbs 2001; Yarbrough 1999). Counterterrorism discourse can manifest a country's security perceptions and threat-response preferences rooted in its established strategic culture in the context of counterterrorism. However, few existing studies of counterterrorism discourse have explored counterterrorism discourse through the lens of strategic culture.

China is one of the world's major states and has significant international influence. China also suffers from terrorism and considers it a serious security threat. Moreover, as mentioned in previous sections, China's international counterterrorism discourse is an overlooked area. But so far, very limited research has been done on China's international counterterrorism discourse.

Following the above analysis of the current gap in counterterrorism discourse, this paper seeks to examine China's international counterterrorism discourse through an

interdisciplinary approach that combines the studies of discourse and strategic culture. It is important to note that culture is a relatively broad and vague concept that is difficult to be operationalised in analysis. Strategic culture, on the other hand, is a subculture relevant to security issues. It is more pertinent and practical to use strategic culture as the analytical angle to study counterterrorism discourse. The concepts and theories of discourse and strategic culture will be explained in detail in the next chapter. Therefore, this thesis will use strategic culture as the analytical lens to study China's international counterterrorism discourse.

Based on the above rationale, this study aims to investigate China's international counterterrorism discourse. **It argues that China discursively represents terrorism and counterterrorism through its lens of strategic culture.** In other words, **China's international counterterrorism discourse reflects how it perceives the threat of terrorism and the options to deal with it.** It is important to note that this study does not posit strategic culture as the causal factor. It regards strategic culture as the lens through which China describes and constructs terrorism and counterterrorism. That is, China's discourse on terrorism and counterterrorism correlates with its strategic culture.

The core question is: What are the characteristics of China's international counterterrorism discourse? How does China discursively represent terrorism and counterterrorism? The core question is further divided into three key questions. Each question will be analysed in three dimensions.

Q1: How does China's international counterterrorism discourse represent terrorism?

- 1a) What is the discursive focus of the representation of terrorism?
- 1b) How is terrorism constructed as a security threat?
- 1c) What are China's attitudes towards terrorism?

Q2: How does China's international counterterrorism discourse represent counterterrorism war?

- 2a) What is the discursive focus of the representation of the use of force?

2b) How is the counterterrorism war constructed?

2c) What are China's attitudes towards the counterterrorism war?

Q3: How does China's international counterterrorism discourse represent counterterrorism cooperation?

3a) What is the discursive focus of the representation of counterterrorism cooperation?

3b) How is counterterrorism cooperation constructed?

3c) What are China's attitudes towards counterterrorism cooperation?

1.4 Organisation of this Thesis

Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter that presents an overview of this research and its focus. It introduces the research background, reviews current literature on counterterrorism discourse, and presents the research question of this study.

Chapter 2 presents the analytical framework for this study. This research draws insights from Iain Johnston's strategic culture theory. An analytical framework is constructed based on the core paradigm of Johnston's strategic culture, which includes the nature of threat, the efficacy of the use of force, and strategic preference. The discourse analysis will be conducted in accordance with the theoretical paradigm of strategic culture in three areas: terrorism (threat), counterterrorism war (use of force), and counterterrorism cooperation (strategic preference). For each area, the discourse analysis will be carried out in three dimensions: discursive theme, discursive practice, and strategic cultural explanation.

Chapter 3 illustrates the method of corpus-based discourse analysis. First, it introduces how a corpus-based approach will be applied in this study. Then, it presents the collection and processing of the textual data in detail. Three corpora will be built in accordance with the research question and analytical framework, namely, the Terrorism Corpus, the Counterterrorism War Corpus, and the Counterterrorism Cooperation Corpus. Next is a description of the specific tools and corpus analysis techniques used to conduct discourse analysis.

Chapter 4 aims to answer the Q1: How does China's international counterterrorism discourse represent terrorism? This chapter will start by studying the discursive themes in the corpus. Then, discursive strategies regarding how China constructs terrorism as a security threat will be analysed. The discourse prosody of terrorism will be studied before the explanation through the lens of Chinese strategic culture.

Chapter 5 seeks to answer Q2: How does China's international counterterrorism discourse represent counterterrorism war? First, it analyses the discursive focus in China's international counterterrorism discourse before interpreting discursive strategies that construct counterterrorism wars. Subsequently, discourse prosody around the war practice will be analysed to reveal attitudes towards the use of force in combating terrorism. An explanation will then be presented to expound on the findings through the lens of Chinese strategic culture.

Chapter 6 attempts to answer Q3: How does China's international counterterrorism discourse represent counterterrorism cooperation? The analysis will first study the discursive themes of international counterterrorism cooperation in Chinese international counterterrorism discourse. Then, the discursive construction strategies related to international counterterrorism cooperation will be analysed. Next, the attitudes towards international counterterrorism cooperation are examined by reviewing the prosodies reflected in the discourse. Finally, the findings of the discourse analysis are explained through the lens of Chinese strategic culture.

Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by summarising this study's major research findings, contributions, and limitations and offering suggestions of potential avenues for future work in the interdisciplinary research of counterterrorism and discourse studies.

Chapter 2 Analytical Framework

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will present key definitions, introduce the analytical lens of strategic culture, and establish the analytical framework for subsequent discourse analysis. To begin this chapter, I first discuss the terminology that is relevant to the investigation of counterterrorism discourse analysis.

2.2 Key Definitions

This study aims to explore China's international counterterrorism discourse through the lens of China's strategic culture. It is necessary to define the working definitions of a few terms, including discourse, terrorism, international counterterrorism discourse, and strategic culture.

2.2.1 Discourse

There is no standard definition of discourse. It is often attributed different meanings by scholars from a diverse range of disciplines, such as philosophy, linguistics, literature, sociology, political science, and literature (Boholm 2016). Discourse is a much broader concept beyond language. It is too limiting to regard discourse as the same concept as language because discourse is not only about the performance of language. In other words, discourse is not only a system of symbols with specific rules but also a social practice that 'represents the world' in a particular way (Fairclough 2014).

Discourse can reflect the perspectives, attitudes, and positions of the speaker. Furthermore, as a social practice, discourse has a constructive function. Discourse is 'a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, statements, and so on that in some way together produce a particular version of events' (Burr 1995:48). According to Foucault, 'discourse is a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation' (Foucault 2002:131). He defines discourse as 'practices that systematically form the object of which

we speak' (Foucault 2002). I follow Foucault's definition of discourse and employ this term to refer to China's discursive practices which systematically represent and construct the threats of terrorism and the way to deal with terrorism.

2.2.2 Terrorism

Terrorism is still 'essentially a contested' concept. Currently, there is no universal definition of terrorism. In line with Jackson's definition, I consider terrorism to be 'violence or its threat intended as a symbolic communicative act in which the direct victim of the action is instrumentalized as a means to creating a psychological effect of intimidation and fear in a target audience for a political objective' (Jackson 2011: 123).

This definition is adopted for two reasons. On the one hand, this minimal definition contains the core features of terrorism, such as violence and political objectives. Taking a 'minimal foundationalist' ontological position makes it possible to study 'terrorist forms of political violence in the real world' (Jackson 2011: 127). As Schmid puts it, 'a narrow and precise definition of terrorism is more likely to find broad support' (Schmid 2004: 204). On the other hand, this definition includes the communicative characteristics of terrorism. In this way, terrorist violence aims to convey intimidating messages and generate fears in targeted audiences. In addition to innocent civilians, state actors are also part of the targeted audiences. This study aims to explore China's perception of terrorism. Hence, it is pertinent to adopt Jackson's definition of terrorism.

2.2.3 International Counterterrorism Discourse

In this study, the term international counterterrorism discourse refers to the language and discursive practice in which international terrorism and counterterrorism are discursively represented and constructed. An issue related to the working definition of international counterterrorism discourse is the position of international counterterrorism vis-à-vis domestic counterterrorism. In this study, I will focus on how China describes and narrates issues related to international counterterrorism, such as the activities of international

organisations, terrorist attacks that occurred around the world, norms of international counterterrorism, and practices of international counterterrorism. China's domestic terrorism issues, such as domestic terrorist attacks and domestic counterterrorism measures, are not a key concern in this study. For this study, international terrorism and domestic terrorism are considered external threats and internal threats, respectively. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 1, terrorism in the Chinese context always has the connotation of an international threat. In the realm of strategic cultural study, the threats a country perceives and decides to deal with are normally regarded as external threats (Booth 1990; Klein 1991; Lantis 2002). Hence, it is more relevant to use the term international counterterrorism if I seek to explore China's discourse on terrorism through the lens of strategic culture. Finally, as this study aims to explore China's international counterterrorism discourse through the lens of Chinese strategic culture, international counterterrorism will include discourse on terrorism and counterterrorism, which are related to perceptions of threats and ways to deal with threats.

2.2.4 Strategic Culture

In this study, strategic culture refers to the lens through which a country perceives and evaluates the threat, the efficacy of the use of force, and appropriate responses. It consists of shared norms, beliefs, attitudes, and preferences regarding the interpretation of the threat and the ways to deal with it. My conceptualisation of strategic culture is based on three reasons.

First, it follows the common grounds shared by scholars of strategic study. In security studies, there are many definitions of strategic culture. Most of them argue that strategic culture concerns a country's specific traditions, angles, attitudes, habits of mind, and behaviours with respect to the threat or use of force (Booth 1990; Glenn 2009; Gray 2013; Johnston 1995b; Legro 2013; Poore 2003; Snyder 1977; Uz Zaman 2009). Hence, the basic similarity shared by the mainstream definitions is that strategic culture relates to how a country habitually perceives threats and the use of force to deal with them.

Second, it can be applied to build an analytical framework. My conceptualization of strategic culture draws insight from Johnston's core paradigm of strategic culture, which includes the

nature of the adversary, the efficacy of the use of force, and strategic preference in dealing with the threat (Johnston 1995a). The paradigm serves to answer a series of questions, such as whether the conflict is zero-sum, whether war is a normal or abnormal phenomenon, and whether the use of force is efficacious. For counterterrorism discourse, the representation of terrorism and counterterrorism concerns the nature of the terrorism threat, whether the use of force is an effective method, and what are the preferred options to deal with the threat at the operational level. Hence, my conceptualisation of strategic culture can be operationalised into an analytical framework to investigate how China describes, construes, and constructs the threat of terrorism and the ways to deal with it.

Third, it is consistent with counterterrorism studies and discourse studies. As highlighted by the critical terrorism study, culture, language, and discourse are interrelated. ‘Counterterrorism is seen to be cultural and discursive’ (Holland 2016: 428). More specifically, counterterrorism concerns the dominant discourse that defines, interprets, and evaluates terrorism and measures against it. Therefore, this concept can work well in a counterterrorism context to help analyse how terrorism and counterterrorism are described, constructed, and evaluated.

2.3 Bringing in the Lens of Strategic Culture

Despite the development in recent years, the study of counterterrorism still ‘suffers from major theoretical weakness’, lacking theories that can explain counterterrorism preferences and strategies (Perliger 2012). Understanding the factors shaping counterterrorism preferences is not only essential to discovering the characteristics of responses to terrorism but also allows us to better understand a country’s perception of dealing with the threat. Current literature mainly looks at counterterrorism from non-cultural lenses.

2.3.1 Traditional Lenses in Counterterrorism Studies

(1) The lens of geopolitics

Ikenberry analyses counterterrorism from the perspective of geopolitics. He argues that the 9/11 terrorist attack would not challenge the international order led by the United States. The United States' counterterrorism illuminates the hegemonic logic of American order (Ikenberry 2001:30), which has two bargains: one is the realist bargain that the United States provides public goods such as security protection and worldwide open market economies to its partners in Europe and Asia; the other is the liberal bargain that the European and Asian partners accept the United States as the leader and abide by the institutional rules set by America. Therefore, the unilateralism in the United States' counterterrorism reflects a practical reality where the United States has the superpower 'to say no to agreements and not pay a huge price' (Ikenberry 2001:28). Nevertheless, the transnational and evasive nature of terrorism distinguishes it from conventional security threats. The war on terror can challenge the balance among Western liberal nations and influence the relationship between the United States and great powers outside of the Western world. For example, by supporting the United States' counterterrorism, Russia got reciprocal support in matters concerning Russian interests, such as economic aid, the Chechnya issue, NATO expansion, and missile defence. In other words, counterterrorism offers an opportunity for an exchange of political interests between the two powers. Beinart investigates counterterrorism strategies from the standpoint of new liberalism. Despite being the world's most powerful country, the United States is not morally or politically free in its counterterrorism efforts. As Beinart argues, the United States must constrain its counterterrorism power. The success of the United States' counterterrorism strategy should depend on a new liberalism that emphasises the importance of military restraint, multilateralism, economic development, and democracy promotion (Beinart 2007).

(2) The lens of deterrence

Some scholars apply the theory of deterrence to counterterrorism studies. The underlying logic of deterrence is the fear of unacceptable consequences based on a cost-benefit calculation (Achen & Snidal 1989; Jervis 1989). The deterrence strategy aims to reduce the possibility of ‘undesirable action via threatening and inflicting pain on those contemplating the action’ (Dershowitz, 2002: 19). The punishment-denial approach of deterrence is applicable to coerce, compel, and influence the behaviour of terrorists (Wilner 2011b). Antony explains that deterrence is an effective counterterrorism approach as terrorists are prudent in engaging in activities with high risks, and even the most committed suicide terrorists are not willing to sacrifice their lives in operations that have a slim chance of success (Anthony 2003). Trager and Zagorchevaz also agree that deterrence is an effective approach to counterterrorism. They point out that the relationship between terrorists and states is adversarial but not zero-sum. Despite the difficulty, powerful states are still able to influence the political objectives of terrorists, as some core elements of terrorists’ supporting systems are vulnerable to deterrence (Trager & Zagorcheva 2006). Furthermore, as they point out, even the most zealous terrorists can be deterred via measures that can break their political objectives, not their lives or liberty.

(3) The lens of game theory

Some scholars analyse the effectiveness of counterterrorism through game theory. As for Arce and Sandler, due to strategic interactions where the choices of governments and terrorists are interdependent, game theory can be applied in counterterrorism studies. Similar to the logic of deterrence theory, game theory holds that all players are rational and can second-guess their opponents. Under the framework of game theory, they argue that ‘proactive policies tend to provide purely public benefits to all potential targets and are usually undersupplied, whereas defensive policies tend to yield a strong share of provider-specific benefits and are often oversupplied’ (Arce M. & Sandler 2005). They also contend that the best strategy for counterterrorism not only takes terrorist actions into account but also considers actions from other governments targeted by terrorism.

(4) Limitations of traditional lenses

Power position, the effectiveness of deterrence, and rational choice can play important roles in determining preference in counterterrorism strategy. Nevertheless, it is surprising to find that few studies apply a cultural lens to studying counterterrorism. Most important of all, sometimes traditional lenses cannot provide a satisfactory explanation when it comes to China.

Take the geopolitical lens, for instance. It can partially explain China's international counterterrorism. For example, it can well explain China's immediate cooperation with the United States in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. China offered international support to the United States in the hope that the Americans could reciprocally recognise ETIM as an international terrorism organisation and express support for China's international counterterrorism efforts in the region. But it cannot explain why China still sends support and condolences to the United States when Sino-US relations are in tension. For example, China condemned the vehicular attack in New York City in 2017, which is considered the deadliest terrorist attack in the city since the 9/11 attack. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said that China expresses condolences to the victims and the bereaved families and that China is against all forms of terrorism and advocates international counterterrorism cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). In 2021, thirteen US marines and 140 Afghan civilians were killed at Kabul Airport during the US military retreat from Afghanistan. China also strongly condemned the terrorist attack, even though the attack was against the US military. There are lots of such cases in which China always disentangles terrorism from geopolitics. It does not praise the terrorists as 'freedom fighters' or 'justice fighters' against US hegemony. To put it simply, China does not use terrorism as a rhetorical weapon to gain a political advantage in its relations with the United States.

As to the lenses of deterrence and game theory, the explanations are dependent on the premise that terrorists are rational actors. But the truth is that some terrorists are considered irrational actors who do not have a cost-benefit calculus. As Pape points out, many terrorists are extremely hardened and committed and are 'willing to die, and so not deterred by fear of

punishment or of anything else' (Pape 2006:5). Davis and Jenkins criticise the strategy of deterrence as the wrong theoretical concept in counterterrorism 'as it is too limiting and too native', and there is no evidence that al-Qaeda terrorists were deterred in the war on terror after 9/11 (Davis & Jenkins 2002). For China, using the military to kill terrorists is not considered a good option, even though the annihilation of bodies is the ultimate deterrent for terrorists. China always emphasises that poverty and social inequality are the basic roots of terrorism and advocates soft measures, such as improving economic and educational conditions, as rational ways to deal with terrorism (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021).

2.3.2 Strategic Culture as an Alternative Lens of Explanation

After reviewing the traditional lenses in counterterrorism studies, it then comes to the question of why strategic culture can be used as an alternative lens. Strategic culture was used to explain a country's strategic preference and behaviour in the context of traditional threats. In this study, I argue that strategic culture can also be applied in counterterrorism studies.

First, strategic culture reflects a country's perception of threat. In traditional security studies, strategic culture was used to examine a country's preference for dealing with threats from other state actors. As Johnston puts it, strategic culture is a shaping context for how a state perceives ways to deal with threats and captures a country's predisposed beliefs about using military force (Johnston, 1995a). The dynamism of international terrorism shows that terrorism can pose a serious threat to national and regional security. Subsequently, terrorism is regarded by most countries as a significant threat to national security. States have adopted diverse responses to cope with this non-traditional security threat (Crelinsten & Schmid 1992). For example, the use of force to deal with the terrorist threat is a common approach in counterterrorism. Counterterrorism operations involve both state and non-state actors, but their innate nature is similar to the logic of traditional warfare (Gray 2006). Therefore, it is relevant to apply the strategic culture lens to counterterrorism studies.

Second, strategic culture reflects a country's perception of the use of force in counterterrorism practices. Among the three traditional approaches to counterterrorism, the use of force is a common approach to dealing with the terrorism threat in the post-9/11 era. For example, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack, the United States declared war on terror and was committed to getting rid of terrorism that was a potential threat to its national security. The declaration of the war on terror led to a militarization of counterterrorism, and the United States was joined by its allies to wage war on terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Iraq (Paust 2001). The aggressive military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States and its allies serve as a good example of dealing with terrorism through the use of force (Silke 2018). However, different countries have different views on the use of force against terrorism. Therefore, strategic culture can be used to examine different state responses to combat terrorism. The United States and Europe are typical examples of this. As Rees and Aldrich find in their research on transatlantic divergence and convergence in counterterrorism (Rees & Aldrich 2005). The United States' strategic culture is influenced by the belief in American exceptionalism, which views itself as the leader of the world and is politically and morally superior to other countries. The strategic culture of the United States is influenced by the belief in American exceptionalism, which holds that the United States is the world's leader and morally and politically superior to other nations. Due to its status as a superpower, the United States has a tendency to prefer the use of force to combat terrorism abroad. For this reason, the United States prioritises preemptive action in Afghanistan and Iraq to combat terrorism.

Due to their strategic cultures, some Western nations have different perspectives on international counterterrorism, believing that military force is ineffective against the elusive and disparate targets posed by transnational terrorism (Rees & Aldrich 2005: 914). The difference in views on the use of force can also be seen in some other countries' counterterrorism practices. Fredrik and Eidenfalk argue in their research that due to different strategic cultures between Australia and Poland, the two countries act differently in participating in military coalitions against the Islamic State (Doeser & Eidenfalk 2019). The Australian strategic culture focuses on terrorism as a threat to its liberal values, preference of expeditionary defence, experiences of joining the coalition, a flexible approach to

international law, and keeping strategic partnership with America’, while ‘the Polish strategic culture includes ‘fear of military intervention by Russia, preference of territorial defence, less coalition experience, a somewhat flexible approach to international law, and America as its key strategic partner’ (Doeser & Eidenfalk 2019:5-6). Due to the influence of their different strategic cultures, Australia actively joined the United States to combat the Islamic States with military forces, while Poland declined to make a military contribution to the cause.

Third, strategic culture reflects a country’s preference for dealing with the threat of terrorism. In counterterrorism practice, the military, law enforcement, and appeasement are the three principal traditional ways to respond to terrorism (Abrahms 2008; Rees & Aldrich 2005). The military approach is based on the use of military force to strike, deter, and punish terrorists preemptively. The legal and regulatory approach deals with terrorism through the lawful punishment of criminal activities related to terrorism. The appeasing approach decreases the prospective political benefits of terrorism through appeasement. Although appeasement is rare in counterterrorism practices, there is also a widespread view in the international community that it is possible to defuse terrorists via political accommodation (Laqueur 1977:5). When it comes to the strategic choice to deal with terrorism, strategic culture can serve as a lens to define the threat and frame options to deal with it. According to Rapoport, the current wave of terrorism is defined by religion (Rapoport 2022). Considering the current dynamism of international terrorism, it is pertinent to apply a strategic culture lens to counterterrorism studies. As Klocek puts it, policymakers usually draw on shared beliefs, assumptions, and, especially, the correspondence bias embedded in strategic culture to evaluate how to respond to religion-related terrorism or insurgency (Klocek 2018).

Culture is the foundation of politics, society, and history and is an important element that shapes strategy. Furthermore, cultural differences are manifest and identifiable (Zhang 1992). Strategic culture can provide an angle to look at how a country with a specific historical and cultural background deals with the threat. The next sections will review strategic culture studies and Johnston’s strategic culture theory.

2.3.3 Revisiting Strategic Culture

Strategic culture concerns ‘a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements, and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force’ (Booth 1990: 121). It was brought forward in security studies in the era of the Cold War in order to explain differences in strategic thoughts between decision-makers in the United States and the Soviet Union. Jack Snyder is one of the first scholars to use the strategic culture approach. He applies the cultural approach to illustrate the discrepancy in the superpowers’ nuclear behaviour in the 1970s. According to Snyder, strategic culture is ‘the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy’ (Snyder 1977:8).

Snyder investigates what game theorists may find difficult to illustrate in understanding the various strategic choices made by the nuclear powers during the nuclear crisis. Traditional game theory assumes that actors are rational and will make rational decisions based on national interests. Thus, the Soviet Union at that time should have adopted a nuclear strategy based on the idea of mutually assured destruction. The game theory indeed offered some insights into analysing nuclear strategy, but it ignored the fact that different actors could have different strategic cultural backgrounds. Political leaders who have the authority to make strategic decisions are not culture-free and are under the influence of the strategic culture, which is formed by a country’s specific historical and cultural experiences. Snyder argues that the differences are due to the two countries’ different strategic cultures and that if nuclear deterrence were to fail, the Soviet Union would prefer unilateral approaches to the damage limitation of unrestrained strikes on military targets. At the same time, the United States would be inclined to take a cooperative approach. Despite his emphasis on strategic culture, Snyder admits that ‘strategic culture is not the only variable that might have an impact on an actor’s strategic behaviour in a nuclear crisis,’ and situational temptations and constraints could also be influential.

In the 1980s, the focus of strategic culture shifted from the grand strategy of great powers to domestic strategic decision-making. Bradley Klein applies the approach to analyse strategic decision-making among political elites within a country. The study of strategic culture during this period focuses on the ambiguous instrumentality of strategic culture and assumes that divergence exists between the discourse of political elites and their real purpose. The discrepancy lies in the fact that political elites applied declaratory strategy instrumentally to make their decisions acceptable and justified (Klein 1989). Historical experiences contribute to strategic culture. As a result, different countries with varying historical experiences can have distinct strategic cultures. Due to its emphasis on the instrumentality of strategic culture, it is not clear whether strategic discourse can have an impact on strategic behaviour. Besides, the literature in the 1980s was unable to clarify whether countries act differently in terms of operational strategy (Johnston 1995b).

Different from previous studies that stressed strategic culture's decisive role or instrumental function, the literature in the 1990s departed from previous strategic studies' determinism view and regarded strategic culture as an intervening variable (Johnston 1995b). Previous strategic research aimed to solve the conundrum that game theorists could not explain by looking at the cultural roots of countries with different historical experiences. Studies in the 1990s had a different emphasis than the previous ones and attempted to figure out why interest-determinism failed to explain strategic choices. Legro uses organisational culture, which he defines as beliefs and customs dominating a country's military service, to explain when collaboration among enemies succeeds or fails. Preferences and actions can be directly or indirectly formed by the organisational cultures of different countries (Legro 2013). Kier also points out that the shift in French and British military doctrines between the first and second world wars was caused by the dynamics of the two countries' organisational cultures rather than structural reasons or a balance of power (Kier 1997).

Johnston raises his criticism based on a previous strategic culture study. He argues that strategic culture is 'an ideational milieu that limits state behaviour choices.' (Johnston 1995b:46). According to Johnston, the previous strategic culture study lacked methodological rigour because the concepts used by previous generations of strategic

researchers were too broad. Too many factors, including 'technology, geography, organisation culture and traditions, historical strategic practices, political culture, national character, political psychology, ideology, and even international system structure, were involved in the strategic culture, making verification of the strategic cultural explanation an arduous task to do (Johnston 1995b:37).

He contends that strategic culture should be distinguished from other factors and used as an observable and verifiable tool. It should enable researchers to predict decision-makers' strategic choices and trace their transmission. He proposes that strategic culture is a system of symbols at two levels. On the one hand, it is a series of premises about whether war is an inevitable or particular phenomenon, whether relations between opponents are zero-sum or variable-sum, and whether the use of force is effective in coping with threats. On the other hand, strategic culture should have a ranked preference that is consistent across the objects of analysis 'on the content of some of the most recent texts and some from the distant past' (Johnston 1995b:39). One of Johnston's cautions is that, while strategic cultures may exist, different countries may have strategic cultures that are similar due to similar identity formation processes.

Gray recognises the unique value of the strategic cultural lens in the analysis but argues that such an approach has theoretical defects. According to Gray, the cultural dimension of the strategy includes 'the persisting socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods that are more or less specific to a particular security community that has had a unique historical experience' (Gray 1999b:51). He contends that culture is merely a conditioning factor that influences strategic behaviour and that using culture as the variable would lead to misleading results. Thus, he highlights that while strategic culture is useful for contextual understanding, it lacks the explanatory power to predict strategic behaviour (Gray 1999a). Material factors such as the physical or perceptual geographical setting also play essential roles in strategy development. He also points out that strategic culture should be inspected through an organic, biological, or perhaps ecological framework, as 'objective geographical location and geography of the imagination are important,

influential factors in strategic culture. Thus, according to Gray, if one looks into American culture, he or she needs to consider the unique geography of North America (Gray 2013:30).

Gray develops three categories for strategic cultural analysis by employing a reductionist methodology. The roots of culture and strategy, including geography and historical experience, are located at the highest level, which is also the most essential and crucial level. The second level is characterised by the study of conceptual, behavioural, and material indicators of a strategic culture. The final level is manifestations of a culture, which includes cultural imprints in social, political, economic, technological, and military sectors (Gray 2013). Despite his criticism of strategic culture as a reliable and practical predictor of strategic behaviour, Gray concedes the significance of strategic culture in analysis, taking into account the enduring and existential nature of culture and its unique explanation.

From the development of the study of strategic culture, we can see how strategic culture was introduced into the discipline of security study, how it was used as an analytical toolkit, and what the main arguments and contentions were. Since the emergence of strategic cultural study in the 1970s, the cultural lens has only been used to analyse the strategic behaviours of powers in conventional wars and conflicts. To be more precise, this analytic approach focuses solely on states, particularly the superpowers. The strategic environment changed as a result of the dissolution of the bipolar hegemonic structure following the fall of the Soviet Union. The study of strategic culture depends on the strategic environment in international relations. With the development of international relations, strategic culture still has room to develop due to the new phenomena and challenges in world politics. In contemporary world affairs, non-traditional issues such as terrorism pose more severe threats to states but receive less attention from a strategic perspective. Such dynamics provide a new region to explore by inviting a strategic cultural lens into the study of counterterrorism.

2.3.4 Johnston's Strategic Culture Framework

Security is the key focus of strategic culture theory, which 'is based on the understanding that states are predisposed by their historical experiences, political systems, and cultures to deal with security issues in particular ways' (Rees & Aldrich 2005). In strategic studies, Johnston's strategic culture paradigm is one of the most recognised theories in explaining that strategic culture is a major factor that impacts a country's perception, preference, and practice to deal with the threat (Johnston 1995a).

Johnston argues that the state actor's strategic culture is an important factor in shaping its strategic behaviour. According to Johnston, countries with different strategic cultures will have diverse perceptions of war, peace, conflict, and cooperation, which will determine their preferences in choosing specific strategic actions on security issues. Johnston's theory challenged the structural realists' theoretical presumption that states are rational actors in ahistorical contexts and act in similar ways within the international power structure and the international anarchy conditions. In theories of neorealism or structural realism, culture is not considered a variable that has explanatory power in international politics. For neorealists, the structure, which is defined by anarchy and power distributions, is the determinant that affects countries' behaviour and outcomes (Gilpin 1981; Waltz 2010). To put it another way, the anarchy of the international system is a constant condition, and countries within such a structure make their choices according to individual interests and power capabilities. In this way, state actors are considered 'like units'; each state 'is like other states, being an autonomous political unit', and international interaction becomes a power struggle in a zero-sum game in which each state's purpose is to gain relative advantages against others (Waltz 1990). Johnston challenged the neorealists' ahistorical and cultural stance, arguing that, despite its theoretical rigour in international relations theories, neorealism cannot explain some scenarios in which countries with similar power status and structural conditions make different choices. In Johnston's perspective, strategic culture is 'the unit-level attribute' independent of structural factors and a country's strategic preference, which determines behaviours and actions that should be rooted in history and culture (Johnston 1995a).

In addition, he also argues that the existing studies of strategic culture have flaws in the design of strategic culture theory. First, strategic culture is overcomplicated with too many elements such as technology, geography, organisational culture and tradition, historical strategic behaviour, political culture, national character, political psychology, ideology, and even the structure of the international system. These elements can be used separately as individual variables to explain strategic choices. Therefore, the combination of these independent elements leads to a few problems. It is difficult to evaluate the effects of these elements. On the other hand, it makes strategic culture an unfalsifiable concept, as which element plays a central role in deciding a state's strategic behaviour becomes a problem. In other words, the overdetermined way that includes too many elements creates the dilemma that if all these elements are a strategic culture, 'there is nothing that is not strategic' (Johnston 1995b:12). Furthermore, some strategic culture researchers failed to distinguish between strategic culture and strategic behaviour. For example, Gray considers strategic culture 'as a shaping context for behaviour and itself as a constituent of that behaviour' (Gray 1999b). Second, the problem of considering strategic culture as a symbolic and functional tool to legitimise mainstream traditions of a country's strategic behaviour. Hence, the explanatory power of strategic culture theory is reduced as it creates an ambiguous relationship between strategic culture and strategic behaviour. It is difficult to tell whether strategic culture indeed impacts strategic culture or whether strategic culture is used for the justification of behaviour caused by non-strategic culture factors. Moreover, if strategic culture is only a tool for strategic decision-makers to construct legitimacy and respond to political challenges, then similar symbolic cultures may emerge in different countries, which leaves strategic culture as a vague concept with little theoretical relevance. Third, few strategic scholars make clear what sources could be considered 'repositories or representations of strategic culture' to analyse a country's grand strategic preferences (Johnston 1995b). The sources could include political or military leaders' speeches, writings, and debates; media reports of war and peace; or even military ceremonies. Therefore, one should study the sources across historical time for the persistence of strategic culture.

Based on the abovementioned criticism of neorealism and previous strategic culture studies, Johnston puts forward his definition. He defines strategic culture as a 'milieu that limits

behavioural choices’ and ‘an integrated system of symbols that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs’ (Johnston 1995a: 36). To make the concept practical for empirical research on strategic culture, Johnston operationalises strategic culture through two dimensions. The first dimension includes the core paradigm of strategic culture, which assumes the ‘orderliness of the strategic environment’:

- (i) The role of war in human affairs – whether it is aberrant or inevitable.
- (ii) The nature of the adversary and the threat it poses – zero-sum or positive-sum.
- (iii) Efficacy of the use of force – about the ability to control outcomes and eliminate threats and about the conditions under which the use of force is useful (Johnston 1995a: 37).




Figure 2.2 Core paradigm of Johnston’s strategic culture framework (Johnston 1995b:47).

Based on the core paradigm, Johnston puts forward the second dimension of strategic culture, the ranked set of strategic preferences. In his words, this dimension ‘flows logically from the core paradigm’ and includes ‘assumptions at a more operational level that impact directly on behavioural choices’ (Johnston 1995a: 37). If war is viewed as commonplace in human affairs, the nature of the adversary is regarded as zero-sum, and the use of force is considered

a high-efficacy method to resolve conflict, the state is deemed to have a *realpolitik* strategic culture. In a *realpolitik* strategic culture, the state behaves belligerently and prefers coercive strategies to deal with threats. On the other hand, if war is perceived as not inevitable, the conflict with an adversary is not always zero-sum, and the use of force is not the primary choice to deal with the threat, the state is believed to have a defensive strategic culture. In a defensive strategic culture, the state prefers much more defensive strategies in the face of security challenges. In between the *realpolitik* and defensive strategic cultures, Johnston also puts forward an intermediate condition where a state prefers ‘accommodating strategies as temporary fixes for disadvantageous conditions’ (Johnston 1995b). Such a condition usually exists when the state, which has a hard *realpolitik* strategic culture, is at a relative disadvantage compared with its adversary and will choose more defensive strategies before it can consolidate and mobilise more resources and power to deal with the threat.

Johnston’s strategic culture framework offers insights for this research. First, it turns strategic culture into a falsifiable concept. Second, it shows that preference for strategic culture can be demonstrated through the investigation of the formative texts of a specific state’s strategic traditions. Finally, the core paradigm and the ranked strategic preferences illustrate that the effect of strategic culture on a state’s practices can be tested. This research will draw upon his notions of core paradigm and strategic preference as the foundation of the analytical framework to study China’s international counterterrorism discourse.

According to Johnston, it is impossible to ‘understand China’s behaviour without reference to historical and cultural precedent (Johnston 1995a: xii). Therefore, the next section will provide a general analysis of China’s strategic culture before building the analytical framework for the study of China’s international counterterrorism discourse.

2.4 General Analysis of Chinese Strategic Culture

2.4.1 Roots of Chinese Strategic Culture

The etymology of the term ‘strategy’ may be traced back to its ancient Greek counterpart, ‘strategos’, which is a combination of the words ‘stratos’ and ‘ago’. In Greek, ‘stratos’ refers to an army, while ‘ago’ signifies guidance or leadership. The Chinese word 战略/*strategy* is composed of two individual words, ‘战’ and ‘略’. The word ‘战’ means war and conflict. The word ‘略’ originally refers to the territory of a kingdom and is then used to describe stratagem and tactics. The combination of ‘战’ and ‘略’ finally refers to strategy for war and conflict in the Chinese language. Thus, the fundamental meaning of the word ‘strategy’ exhibits similarities across Western and Eastern cultures.

Despite the similar literary meaning of strategy, different cultures cultivate different strategic thoughts because of the diverse development environment. Before substantial global interaction among countries, the development of civilisations was relatively independent. Different geographical terrain, historical experience, social and economic development status, and national psychological cognition create different development contexts for strategic culture. Strategic culture finds its roots in the development of the nation and is formed by practices, preferences, and traditions associated with national interest, target, friend, enemy, and external affairs. It has an impact on a country’s strategic preferences and is relatively stable (Li 2009a). As differences remain between strategic cultures in the East and West, it is imperative to take the cultural context into account in strategic culture studies. Strategic studies researchers should investigate the material realm from the perspective of culture, and strategic culture is a ‘context all the way down’ approach. As Stuart Poore puts it, ‘everything cultural does matter and cannot be disconnected from anything else’ (Poore 2003:282).

Traditional culture is the foundation of strategic culture, as the root of strategic thinking is embedded in the development of history and culture. The integration of ideology, culture, and strategy forges a strategic culture. Thus, strategic culture is often regarded as strategic

thinking and theories that are formed in certain historical, national, and cultural traditions and guide strategic actions and social and ideological trends (Li 2002). China has a long history and a wealth of experience when it comes to war and violence. Security and violence have been central issues in Chinese history, and Chinese strategic culture has been heavily influenced by the country's military history (Zhang 1999).

In Chinese history, warfare, along with sacrifices to gods and ancestors, was regarded as the most important national affair more than two thousand years ago (Zuo 2016). China has been a unified ethnic community for most of its history, and its traditional strategic culture is relatively stable and complex (Shi 2011:5). The stability of traditional Chinese culture is based on Confucianism, which serves as the core value of the Chinese as a nation, and the complexity stems from a synthesis of strategic ideas from various schools of thought throughout Chinese history.

As the core of traditional Chinese culture, Confucianism is defined by concepts such as 仁 / *benevolence*, 义 / *righteousness*, 礼 / *propriety*, 德 / *virtue*, and 和 / *harmony*. 仁 / *benevolence* is the most crucial thought in Confucianism, which calls for kindness, inclusiveness, peace, and harmony. In the Confucian classic, *The Analects of Confucius*, there are plenty of thoughts on war and peace. According to Confucian epistemology, war is an ominous thing, and the leader should be cautious about 'fasting, war, and diseases' (Confucius 2016).

In Confucianism, 仁 / *benevolence* is also the highest level of human pursuit. Only with 仁 / *benevolence* can the world achieve harmony. To realise ideal governance, the state must exercise virtue and propriety. At the state level, a country should limit its behaviour in both domestic and foreign affairs and pursue benevolent governance. Furthermore, Confucius (551BC-479BC) advocates self-control and non-aggression, or, in his words, do not impose on others what you do not desire yourself (Confucius 2016). Such thoughts are ingrained in traditional Chinese strategic culture, which demonstrates an introverted, non-aggressive, and non-expansionist disposition. Confucianism is not without power and national interest considerations. It emphasises the significance of projecting power with virtue, which can

entice others to follow voluntarily. Confucius, for example, stated that ‘if the remote people are not submissive, all the influences of civil culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract them to be so; and when they have been so attracted, they must be made content and tranquil’ (Confucius 2016). In this scenario, Confucianism advocates conquering others with virtue instead of force, a way of power projection similar to the concept of ‘soft power’ which means the ability to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion (Nye 2004).

Taoism is another school of thought that contributes to the formation of traditional Chinese culture. It also contemplates the role, function, and influence of war and violence. According to Laozi or Lao-Tse (601 BC–531 BC), the founder of Taoism, the military and weapons are ominous objects and should be the last tools a master or gentleman resorts to (Laozi 2007). Laozi also recommends that state elites assisting the ruler with 道/*Tao* should not conquer with physical force. Wars will not only kill and destroy but also lead to ominous consequences in the following years (Laozi 2007). Taoism views war as a last resort, and it is only used to solve problems when all other options have been exhausted. Furthermore, political leaders who are de facto national strategists should exercise caution when it comes to waging wars for the sake of expansion. It implies that war is not completely out of the policy toolbox of national strategic decision-makers but rather serves as the last resort. Thus, traditional Chinese strategic culture can be traced back to Taoism’s cautious and negative attitudes towards war and violence.

Even Chinese legalists, ancient Chinese philosophers who regard humanity as evil and believed in laws, realpolitik, and statecraft, asserted that safety is reciprocal and that military force should be used with caution. A saint who has no desire to harm others, according to the traditional Chinese legalist philosopher Han Feizi (280 BC-233 BC), should be safe as well. He also contends that the principle of winning wars is that a ruler should not use force arbitrarily and should seek popular support before waging wars (Han 2015).

Confucianism, Taoism, and legalism all have strategic viewpoints on war and peace, but Sunzi or Sun Tzu (544 BC–496 BC) presented the first truly systematic military strategic theory and philosophy in his illustrious classic *The Art of War*. Sunzi uses succinct and

philosophical words to share his strategic philosophy in *The Art of War*. According to Sunzi, the military and war are critical to the existence of a nation, and national leaders should pay very close attention to them (Sunzi 2018).

Sunzi considers national security to be the most important national interest, and he believes that all military strategies and actions should be geared towards safeguarding national security. In addition to discussing specific military strategies for winning battles, he concludes the strategic reasoning on a philosophical level. By emphasising the significance of strategy in warfare, he establishes several criteria for evaluating strategy. The best strategy, according to his evaluation system, is based on strategy; a good strategy employs diplomacy; an average strategy relies on forces; and the worst strategy is to attack a castle (Sunzi 2018). Even though Sunzi acknowledges that defeating adversary states is crucial to acquiring power and prestige among states, the highest standard of a successful strategy in his strategic philosophy is to defeat opponents through non-violent means (Sunzi 2018). In contrast to Clausewitz's view of total war as a zero-sum game to annihilate all enemy forces, Sunzi prefers less violent practices in war and subduing the enemy without fighting the war (Clausewitz 2007).

2.4.2 Myths of Chinese Strategic Culture

Strategic culture plays an important role in understanding China's approach to using force. There are widespread claims that China is profoundly influenced by its pacific Confucian culture. Such perspectives draw on traditional Chinese strategic thoughts and contend that Chinese strategic culture is non-aggressive. General Jijun Li, former vice president of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, is the first Chinese scholar to introduce strategic culture study in China (Li 2002). He argues that Chinese strategic culture is rooted in traditional Chinese culture and is influenced by Chinese philosophy, which holds that man is an integral part of nature and that the relations between man and nature are harmonious. From this philosophical starting point, traditional Chinese strategic culture is peaceful and defensive. Li highlighted the key characteristics of Chinese strategic culture: First and foremost, war should be righteous and justified. Second, national unity is regarded as the

most fundamental and pressing concern. Third, there is the non-offensive mindset, which is defined by the use of force with caution and a reluctance to use force to solve problems. Fourth, preparations should be made for national security threats even during times of peace. Fifth, China should never start wars to conquer, but always be on the lookout for foreign invasions. Sixth, excessive violence should be avoided during wars. Seventh, nonviolent approaches should be advocated to achieve strategic goals at a low cost. Eighth, the use of exceptional military talents should be emphasised (Li 2002). Li's viewpoint is typical of the traditional view of Chinese strategic culture, but there is a lack of theoretical explanation as to whether and how China's non-offensive strategic culture influences the use of force.

Alastair Iain Johnston is among the few scholars who build theoretical frameworks for China's strategic culture through cultural approaches. His inspiring work, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategies in Chinese History*, offers a theoretical angle to analyse China's strategic culture (Johnston 1995b). The main question he aims to investigate is whether there exists a Chinese strategic culture and, if so, what impact it has on China's use of force in fighting with foreign threats in history'. He argues that strategic culture has two essential parts. One part is about the view on the 'nature of conflict in human affairs, the nature of the enemy, and the efficacy of violence'. The other part is strategic preferences stemming from such a paradigm (Johnston 1995b).

Based on his definition and theoretical framework of strategic culture, Johnston examines the *Seven Military Classics*, which he thinks were representatives of traditional Chinese strategic culture, and picks up the Chinese grand strategies in the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) against the northern Mongols as an empirical case study. He argues that Chinese strategic culture has two facets: a) idealised and symbolic Confucian-Mencian strategic culture, which is defined as defensive and peaceful (Confucius and Mencius were founding philosophers of traditional Chinese Confucianism); and b) parabellum strategic culture, which is offensive and proactive. After analysing the Ming's military responses to external threats, he concludes that China believes that war is inevitable, that relations between adversaries are zero-sum, and that the use of force is an effective means of addressing external threats. Thus, the Confucian-Mencian strategic culture is merely ideational and non-operative, whereas the

real Chinese strategic culture should be defined as *realpolitik* and favour offensive strategies when dealing with potential threats.

Johnston's work contributes to the cultural approach study on China's strategic culture, but several problems might exist. First, the reliability of the case he picks up might diminish, considering the long history of China. Given the recent development of international relations, it is misleading to draw on experiences from more than 400 years ago to predict current Chinese strategic preferences. Second, the military classic texts he uses cannot represent the whole picture of Chinese strategic thoughts, and he spends little effort on texts of mainstream classics such as the *Analects of Confucius*, which are also the roots of Chinese strategic culture. Third, he analyses the strategic preferences of top generals and officials of the Ming court and overlooks the role of the emperor in ancient imperial China. It is the emperors who turn out to be the real top decision-makers of grand strategies, and the degree of their internalisation of Confucianism is directly related to their strategic cultural preferences. Therefore, it is hasty to conclude that Confucianism is only non-operative and symbolic in strategic culture in Ming's China without a comprehensive study of the emperors.

Scobell contends that previous views on Chinese strategic culture are flawed and that Chinese strategic culture cannot be classified as either peaceful or bellicose. Unlike Johnston, Scobell argues that both Confucianism and *realpolitik* are functional and integrated in a dialectic manner, and he defines Chinese strategic culture as a 'cult of defence.' (Scobell 2002:5). According to the logic of his argument about the cult of defence, Chinese decision-makers would regard their use of force as defensive and justify offensive strategic decisions, leading to a scenario where elites would have a preference for solving problems with force. Scobell's conception of the cult of defence is basically similar to what Johnston puts in his work as organic integration, which argues that there is no clear boundary between offensive and defensive strategic mindsets and that China, while ostensibly holding peaceful Confucian views, makes offensive-oriented decisions in practice.

Johnston and Scobell's illustration of Chinese strategic culture is partial for two reasons. On the one hand, Chinese strategic culture is composed of diverse factors. It is not feasible to

conclude that the features of Chinese strategic culture displayed in a certain historical period can represent the whole picture of current Chinese strategic culture. On the other hand, strategic culture is the combination of a country's tradition and custom in terms of national interests, cognition of friends and foes, and foreign relations (Li 2009a:26).

Some scholars adopt non-cultural perspectives to investigate Chinese strategic culture. Structural realism, for instance, is an 'acultural' theory that does not consider culture as an essential factor in influencing the behaviour of state actors in the international system. It treats all states as the same type of actors and behaves in line with the same logic (Mearsheimer 2013). Wang examines the grand strategies of China during the Song (960–1279) and Ming (1368–1644) dynasties through the lens of structural realism to determine if culture can influence strategic decision-making. He argues that the Song and Ming dynasties are the 'least likely cases' for structural realism due to their distinct Confucian characteristics. Therefore, if they are verified from the perspective of structural realism, this theory would be strengthened. He concludes that China's strategic decisions are not constrained by its pacifist Confucian culture but rather by its position of power. The pacific Confucian culture was unable to restrain China's willingness to use force, and China has historically believed in power politics and pursued grand offensive strategies (Wang 2010).

Zhang disagrees with the cultural realism theory and contends that traditional Chinese culture is a kind of cultural moralism. He defines cultural moralism as China's long-term custom or practice of maintaining domestic order and implementing national security strategies. The traditional practices tend to underline the role of Confucian thoughts of benevolence, virtue, and righteousness. He distinguishes traditional Chinese strategic culture from contemporary Chinese strategic culture, arguing that some features of the former one still exist in the current one, but with the development of an external strategic environment, China's strategic culture has changed into a defensive realism that stresses material power (Zhang 2002). He expounds that the memory of the humiliation of foreign invasions in recent Chinese history and current Chinese political leaders' pursuit of national interests drive the nation to adopt strategies to increase comprehensive national strength while remaining prudent in the use of force.

Men adopts a midway standpoint on looking at Chinese strategic culture. He argues that realism is the essential feature of any mature strategic culture, and China is no exception to realism. Thoughts that focus on national interests also exist in Chinese strategic culture (Men 2012). However, he also emphasises that other non-realism factors are also vital to Chinese strategic culture. In his view, contemporary Chinese strategic culture is composed of realism, moralism, and cooperationism.

2.4.3 Pillars of Chinese Strategic Culture

Every culture has both an inner core and external manifestations. However, while the external manifestations can vary depending on the context, the inner core, which includes cultural values, is relatively stable (Du 2005). Based on the abovementioned review, this study regards the core of contemporary Chinese strategic culture as moralism, prudence in using force, and peace-cooperativism.

The emphasis on moral standards is a key feature of contemporary Chinese strategic culture. It is influenced by traditional Chinese culture, which ‘stresses harmony and discourages abstract speculation of friction’ (Nisbett 2004). The ‘proclivity of destiny by moral choice’ persists in contemporary Chinese strategic culture (Dellios 1994). Moralism is a distinctive feature of Chinese strategic culture that emphasises peace and opposes aggression, sees harmony as the essence of the world, and promotes harmonious relationships among nations (Li 2009b:290). The adherence to moralism also indicates that China is an ‘inward-looking and risk-averse’ country (Hu 2006). Because of moralism in Chinese strategic culture, war is only used as a last resort to solve problems, and only wars for moral reasons can be considered justice wars. In other words, winning hearts and minds is preferable to attacking towns and cities (Cao 2001).

The prudent use of force is another feature of contemporary Chinese strategic culture. This is not to say that modern Chinese strategic culture is totally unwilling or hesitant to use force. Force is viewed as a defensive strategy for preserving sovereignty and national unity. The use of force beyond its defensive purpose of keeping peace is considered immoral and costly

(Bell 2009). If we examine the wars China has fought in since 1949, we can see that, in the majority of instances, China has fought for anti-aggression with defensive purposes and refrained from escalating conflicts. Take the Sino-Indian territorial dispute, for instance. China dispatched the army to its southwestern border to protect intruded territory and then defeated the Indian army. China was able to enter northern India after a decisive victory over India, but refrained from doing so. China retreated its forces to its borders and unilaterally declared a ceasefire. The Sino-Vietnam War of the 1970s is another example of the distinctive nature of the Chinese use of force. China retaliated against Vietnam only after the Vietnamese invaded Chinese territory. Even though China had captured more than 20 strategic locations by the end of the war, it quickly withdrew all of its forces back to China because the mission of protecting Chinese territory had been accomplished. The prudent use of force and defensive character of Chinese strategic culture are still manifested in China's new national defence strategy in 2019, which stresses the traditional Chinese values of peace and harmony and adheres to the defensive principle that China only uses force after being attacked (Ministry of National Defense 2019).

Peace-cooperativism is also one of the defining characteristics of modern Chinese strategic culture. Xiaofeng Yu proposes the English term 'peace-cooperativism' following his discussion with Alastair Ian Johnston and Joseph Fewsmith (Yu & Zhang 2019). Peace-cooperativism originated in the philosophies of the Chinese classics. *The Book of Change* brought up the thought that the 'best harmony is achieved by extreme unity; the whole world shares the common security; and all nations are coordinated for greater harmony and security' (Yu & Gao 2016). It manifests a Chinese view of international relations that prefers a defensive strategy and the principle of inclusiveness (Zhao 2005). Peace-cooperativism is a Chinese paradigm that advocates for the respect of differences between civilisations, cultures, and nations and seeks to resolve global issues through peace, reconciliation, and integration. The core value of peace-cooperativism is 'superior co-existence,' which emphasises peace, development, and shared security, transcends the dichotomy of 'self versus other,' minimises conflicts, and maximises mutual interests by recognising differences (Yu & Zhang, 2019).

2.5 Building the Analytical Framework

The analysis in previous sections shows that strategic culture theory offers a pertinent framework for the investigation of China's international counterterrorism discourse. As this research is an interdisciplinary study that covers counterterrorism and discourse analysis, Johnston's theoretical framework cannot be applied instantly without proper adjustment. This section will illustrate how the analytical framework is built to investigate China's international counterterrorism discourse.

2.5.2 Operationalising the Strategic Culture

This study draws insights from Johnston's strategic culture theory and positions its key paradigm in the context of counterterrorism. The core paradigm of Johnston's strategic culture theory will serve as the foundation of the analytical framework for studying China's international counterterrorism discourse. To build the analytical framework, some adjustments have to be made in order to make it applicable in the counterterrorism context. First, let's return to Johnston's core paradigm of strategic culture. According to Johnston, the core paradigm of strategic culture is as follows: the role of war in human affairs—whether it is aberrant or inevitable; the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses—zero sum or positive sum; the efficacy of the use of force.

The logic of counterterrorism starts with the perception of threat, as a state should confirm that terrorism is a threat that needs to be dealt with before making the judgement of countermeasures. Following the perception of threat come perceptions of how to deal with terrorism threats and what the most efficient counterterrorism approach is. Based on such logic, the core paradigm in the context of counterterrorism is operationalised in the following:

(i) The nature of terrorism (perception of threat)

(ii) Efficacy of the use of force in counterterrorism (perception of the use of force)

(iii) Strategic preference in counterterrorism (strategic preference)

For the nature of terrorism, I will analyse China's discourse on terrorism, as it will reveal how China perceives the nature of terrorism. For the efficacy of the use of force, I will analyse China's discourse on counterterrorism war, which can indicate China's views on the efficacy of the use of force in dealing with terrorism threats. For strategic preference, I will analyse China's discourse on international counterterrorism cooperation. This adjusted paradigm is the foundation of the analytic framework for this research. But to make it operable in analysing China's international counterterrorism discourse, I need to design the specific dimensions to carry out discourse analysis.

2.5.1 Analytical Dimensions

The aim of this study is to reveal the characteristics of China's international counterterrorism discourse and find out how China discursively represents terrorism and counterterrorism. Based on the purpose of the research, the discourse analysis will be focused on three dimensions.

(1) The dimension of discursive themes

The aim of the analysis in this dimension is to find out the discursive themes that indicate what China cares about and how China perceives and construes the threat of terrorism and the ways to deal with it. The analysis will mainly focus on discovering and expounding the language features and patterns at lexical levels, as they are more instructive than the grammatical patterns in revealing hidden messages, connotations, and attitudes in the discourse. This is a basic analytical dimension in discourse analysis. According to Fairclough, the linguistic exploration of language features and patterns is a necessary step to take in analysing a certain type of text. For example, researchers can investigate the thematic structure of the text, the information focus, lexicalization, the use of nominalization, the use of active and passive voice, patterns of transitivity, choices of modality or polarity, and cohesion devices (Fairclough 2014). It should be noted that grammatical elements of the language will not be studied as they do not help reveal linguistic features or patterns relevant to discursive themes. Furthermore, the analysis in this dimension will incorporate corpus

techniques such as keyword analysis and collocation analysis to explore specific discourse content in the text. The use of corpora and relevant techniques can help generate substantial and reliable linguistic features. The corpus methods will later be explained in the subsequent methodology chapter.

(2) The dimension of discursive practice

The purpose of analysis in this dimension is to reveal the discursive strategies in the representation of terrorism and counterterrorism. The analysis will focus on discursive tactics such as attributing traits to certain entities, identity construction, and the usage of metaphors (Wodak & Meyer 2009). The discursive practices not only display the basic characteristics of China's international counterterrorism discourse but also indicate the underlying messages and connotations in describing and constructing the nature of the terrorism threat and the practices against terrorism. By revealing the discursive strategies for representing and constructing terrorism and counterterrorism, we can find out China's attitude and preference hidden in the discourse. Furthermore, the qualitative analysis in this dimension will be supported by corpus techniques such as collocation analysis to reveal the underlying information regarding attitude and preference.

(3) The dimension of the strategic cultural explanation

The analysis in this dimension serves as an explanation of the linguistic features, discursive strategies, and underlying message and connotations of the discourse through the lens of China's strategic culture. The analysis in this dimension follows the procedure of traditional qualitative discourse analysis, which holds that the manifestation and production of a discourse are interrelated with sociocultural factors such as power structure, ideology, and culture (Fairclough & Wodak 1997). For this study, it is too ambitious to include too many sociocultural elements for explanation because it risks losing research focus. Moreover, this study contends that China's international discourse correlates with its strategic culture. That is, in the context of counterterrorism, China's discourse reflects its perceptions of the terrorism threat and appropriate measures against it. Therefore, the findings of the analysis

in dimensions of discursive themes and strategies will be explained through the lens of China's strategic culture.

2.5.2 The Analytical Framework

Based on the abovementioned plan, the analysis of China's international counterterrorism discourse will be carried out in the following way. In the first stage, China's international counterterrorism discourse is separated into three categories: **discourse on terrorism, discourse on counterterrorism war, and discourse on counterterrorism cooperation.** These categories are consistent, respectively, with the core paradigm of strategic culture, which contains the nature of the threat, the use of force, and strategic preference in dealing with the threat. The second stage concerns three analytical dimensions. At this stage, analysis of discursive themes and discursive practice, as well as the strategic cultural explanation, will be carried out, revealing characteristics of China's discursive representation of the terrorism threat, the use of force in counterterrorism, and international counterterrorism cooperation, and explaining and verifying the consistency of China's international counterterrorism discourse with its strategic culture (see Figure 2.3).




Figure 2.3 Analytical framework of China's international counterterrorism discourse

It's important to note that discourse analysis of the three dimensions is not a linear procedure. For example, when studying China's discourse on terrorism, the analysis of language

patterns will appear not only in finding the thematic focus of terrorism issues but also the discursive strategies in constructing terrorism. In other words, the three dimensions of discursive themes, discursive practice, and strategic cultural analysis are interconnected and intertwined.

2.6 Summary

This chapter introduces and analyses key definitions and an analytical framework for this study. The review of strategic culture studies shows that there is a paucity of strategic culture lenses in counterterrorism studies, and a few studies of counterterrorism via strategic culture demonstrate that this lens can be applied in counterterrorism and generate an insightful explanation of states' diverse counterterrorism practices. Among all strategic culture studies, Johnston's strategic culture paradigm is a robust theoretical approach that transforms strategic culture into an operable analytical framework. By drawing on Johnston's strategic culture paradigm, a new analytical framework is built. The analytical framework designates three key areas of China's international counterterrorism discourse: discourse on terrorism (threat), discourse on counterterrorism war (the use of force), and discourse on international counterterrorism cooperation (strategic preference). The analysis of each area will be carried out in three dimensions: discursive themes, discursive practice, and strategic cultural explanation. The framework provides an analytical outline for the investigation of China's international counterterrorism discourse. In order to carry out discourse analysis, I have to use specific corpus methods. The next chapter will introduce the corpus-based approach and designated techniques that will be applied to explore how China discursively represents terrorism and counterterrorism.

Chapter 3 Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to illustrate the specific methods used in this research. This study adopts a corpus-based approach to discourse analysis. It involves analysing huge masses of text data, typically collected as corpora, in order to identify features and patterns in language use. This approach is particularly useful for discovering language patterns, revealing underlying connotations, and uncovering the shared cultural values of a certain discourse.

3.2 The Corpus-based Approach

In this section, I will briefly discuss the methodological weakness of traditional discourse analysis. I will use critical discourse analysis as an example to discuss why a pure qualitative approach is methodologically inadequate for managing and analysing large amounts of textual data. I will also provide a definition of corpus and illustrate why the corpus method is beneficial and proper for this study.

3.2.1 Criticism of the Traditional Discourse Analysis Approach

In traditional studies of discourse, critical discourse analysis is the most commonly used approach by scholars of different disciplines. As a qualitative approach that can be applied to interdisciplinary research, critical discourse analysis significantly expands the scope of language study and makes language a medium to explore society, politics, and culture. However, in terms of specific research methods, many scholars criticise the methodological weakness of critical discourse analysis (Rogers, Malancharuvil-Berkes, & Mosley 2005; Stubbs 1997; Widdowson 1995; Widdowson 1998, 2004). The CDA has been criticised for its ‘paucity, unrepresentativeness, and supposedly agenda-driven selection of data,’ which hamper the credibility of its empirical analysis and conclusions made on the basis of the limited size of textual data (Mautner 2005:815).

(1) Limited data

Critical discourse analysis has been criticised as ‘theory rich but data poor’ due to its lack of concern with information such as frequency and distribution, which are possible when resorting to properly accumulated textual data (Mautner 2005). The problem lies in the fact that critical discourse analysis usually engages with single or several texts with limited data. The root cause of the weakness is that traditional CDA is a qualitative approach that focuses on a ‘more detailed and holistic method’ for in-depth analysis of a certain discourse (Mautner 1995). The theoretical proclivity of holistic analysis leads to the methodological constraint that critical discourse analysis ‘is especially relevant to detailed analysis of a small number of discourse samples’ (Fairclough 1992:230).

Due to the small body of texts, it is difficult to produce ‘generalisable results’ and ‘accurately describe the discourse characteristics of selected texts’ (Biber, Conrad, & Reppen 1998:106-107). Traditional CDA practitioners use relatively too small quantities of textual data to produce reliable results (Baker et al. 2008). Many language features and patterns cannot be observed simply by observing a few texts with an analyst’s eyes and intuition. They can only be realised across thousands or even millions of words with proper corpus tools to provide more interesting results pertinent to research targets and enable comprehensive analysis of the discourse in concern (Stubbs 1994).

(1) Empirical shortcoming

As to the empirical scope, CDA is criticised for its lack of empirical rigour in providing evidence for analysing language phenomena. CDA analysts often judge and ascertain some typical language features based on their intuition rather than quantitative evidence, such as frequency (Baker 2006b; Mautner 1995). The problem is that ‘when we are asked to reflect on language use, our recall and intuitions about language often are not accurate’ (Reppen 2010:31). Furthermore, many language patterns and features could be missed or ignored unintentionally. They are impossible to find through human eyes and can only be revealed through comprehensive and exhaustive searches via some corpus techniques on the computer.

These hard-detected language phenomena might contain pertinent and interesting contents that imply what the CDA practitioners pursue to find, be it power relationships, ideology, or socio-cultural norms.

3.2.2 Bringing in the Corpus Method

To boost methodological vigour, some pioneer linguists advocate the integration of corpus linguistics and qualitative discourse analysis (Baker 2006b; Mautner 1995; Stubbs 1997). The introduction of modern corpus linguistics into qualitative discourse analysis can be traced back to the 1990s. To build discourse analysis into a more robust approach to analysing language and its social context, Stubbs proposes that it is necessary to apply a large quantity of corpus data that can generate reliable generalisations concerning the features, practices, and effects of a particular type of language in use (Stubbs 1997). The corpus-based approach saw a blooming momentum in the 2000s as many researchers improved and applied corpus techniques to the analysis of texts (Adolphs 2006; Baker 2006b; Baker et al. 2008; Charteris-Black 2004; O'Keeffe 2006). Moreover, the quantitative techniques of corpus methods offer a means to survey the whole corpus of data ordinarily lost in intensive, qualitative research and 'gain a sense of the flavour of the data as a whole' (Silverman 2014:160).

(1) Defining the corpus

Corpus or corpora are common concepts referred to by linguists as a representative and significant amount of text samples, which usually consist of thousands or even millions of words 'of a particular type of naturally occurring language' (Baker 2006b:2). The corpus data are collections of texts 'selected according to a specific set of criteria and held in electronic format' (Olohan 2004:1). As Biber notes, a corpus is a large and principled collection of natural texts (Biber et al. 1998:12). In corpus studies, linguists collect texts of 'real life language in use', convert the collected texts into computer-readable form, and utilise quantitative methods to study particular language phenomena (McEnery & Wilson 1996). Hence, corpus linguistics is defined as an approach that focuses on using corpus data

(McEnery & Hardie 2011). Another related term is text. It has two senses of meaning. On the one hand, the text is ‘continuous segments of naturally occurring discourse’. On the other hand, a text is a format or file that stores computer-readable data in written or spoken language (Biber & Finegan 1991:212; McEnery & Hardie 2011:2). The texts used in most of the corpus studies are textual in form and contain contents such as newspaper reports, historical written records, transcriptions of semi-structured interviews, or spoken languages. In a much wider sense, text can also denote non-textual forms of data, such as video. In this thesis, corpus and text mainly refer to textual and computer-readable forms that store written language.

The turn to the application of corpora in studying language is influenced by Hallidayan systemic functional linguistics, which sees language as social semiotic and firmly rooted in its socio-linguistic context (Orpin 2005). Under the functionalism framework, language is regarded as not an isolated and abstract system of symbols but a functional system that is shaped ‘by how it is used to communicate meanings, by the context of the language in use, and by the structure of human cognition’ (McEnery & Hardie 2011:168). The corpus-based discourse analysis accepts the ‘Hallidayan assumption that all linguistic usage encodes representations of the world’ (Stubbs 1994). Hence, linguistic features in the use of language reflect implicit and explicit social and cultural views. As such, analysing language by resorting to corpus methods can help analysts discover and explain what and how language shapes the world from particular social and cultural norms, angles, and perspectives.

(2) Corpus as the method

In general, corpus-based research focuses on using corpus techniques and textual data analysis to testify a hypothesis or refine an existing theory in the literature. Some analysts accept the neo-Firthian approach and bring forward the notion of corpus-driven study, which regards corpus linguistics as not a method but the corpus itself as the source of theory and hypothesis (Tognini-Bonelli 2001:84-85). But such a binary perspective between corpus-based and corpus-driven study is rejected by some analysts who refute that ‘corpus itself has

no theoretical status' and is only an analysis method and argue that 'all corpus linguistics can just be described as corpus-based' (McEnery & Hardie 2011:6).

This thesis agrees with the corpus-as-method position and considers that using corpus data as a method is complementary to qualitative discourse analysis and works with other methods and non-corpus theories (Römer 2005:8). Corpus data and techniques can be 'utilised with a theoretical framework of qualitative discourse analysis in the interpretation of the findings' (Baker et al. 2008:285). In corpus-based discourse analysis, qualitative and quantitative analysis are complementary and are used synergistically, not played off against each other (Mautner 2001). In other words, using corpus techniques is not to replace qualitative analysis but to offer complementarity to a qualitative discourse analysis, as it can support the qualitative explanation with empirical, credible, and convincing evidence.

3.2.3 Synergy of the Corpus Method and Qualitative Discourse Analysis

The use of corpora in social science proves to be a boon to exploring questions previously not practicable to investigate. As Biber and Finegan proclaim, corpus data and methods 'inspire what might be called Mount Everest questions-questions arising because the corpora are available but otherwise practically impossible to image' (Biber & Finegan 1991:204-205). Corpus linguistics is frequently criticised because the corpora data used in the analysis are invariably de-contextualized and corpus linguists fall short of taking the sociocultural context of discourse into account (Baker 2006b:25). Sociocultural context is a vital dimension for consideration and analysis in the qualitative discourse analysis approach. The purpose of discourse analysis is to reveal the cultural or ideological meaning of a certain type of discourse. A corpus study aims to discover quantitative linguistic patterns in language. Hence, the synergy of qualitative discourse analysis and corpus study can overcome the shortcomings of corpus linguistic methods and make the combination methodologically stronger (Fairclough 2003:6).

In general, corpus-based discourse analysis has several characteristics. First, it is based on selected collections of natural texts of a certain genre. Second, with the application of a large

quantity of corpus data, the analysis process is empirical in discovering and analysing the actual language patterns as well as their sociocultural context. Third, computers and specialised software are used with automatic and interactive techniques in processing data and analysing results. Fourth, it involves both quantitative and qualitative analytical techniques (Biber et al. 1998:4).

Based on a large quantity of corpus data and the application of corpus linguistic tools and techniques, qualitative discourse analysis is enhanced with empirical evidence regarding how language contributes to the production and dominance of certain power relations or sociocultural ideologies (O'Halloran 2010). The use of abundant textual data fights back against criticism of the arbitrariness of analysis. For example, with the application of a specialised corpus and a reference corpus, a keyword list can be generated from the corpus. It offers the direction of investigation, as the keywords denote the discursive focus of the discourse under investigation. It avoids the subjective selection of research areas within limited texts. Furthermore, salient linguistic features can be found with concordance analysis. Hence, the application of corpora results in more complete 'characterisations of registers than approaches that focus on individual linguistic features' (Biber et al. 1998:169). That is, compared with traditional qualitative methods used by discourse analysts who manually and subjectively search and interpret language patterns, the corpus-based approach can offer much more comprehensive, objective, and representative language characteristics.

Given the huge volume of textual data, it is almost impossible to discover comprehensive and interesting characteristics through traditional qualitative methods. The corpus study also enables researchers to carry out either synchronical or diachronical analysis to explore regular linguistic patterns that reflect ideological meaning within the large quantity of textual data. In other words, analysts can study the discourse at a particular point in time with the support of collected texts from a specific period of time, be it a day, a few months, or a few years. Analysts can also do chronical research to study the consistency or divergence of linguistic patterns across a longer period of time, such as a few decades or even longer, on the basis of the large accumulative number of texts. Such an advantage can be illuminating when combined with particular theories of discourse analysis, such as the discourse-

historical approach (Wodak 2001). By analysing the linguistic patterns spanning different historical stages, researchers might find interesting discoveries of language phenomena that can be used to interpret the evolution of a certain genre of discourse and the dynamics of related factors such as political power configuration, cultural norms, social contexts, etc.

In the process of corpus-based discourse analysis, analysts usually employ specific computer software to deal with extremely large corpus data. Researchers can analyse abundant frequently occurring language phenomena with the help of corpus processing software, which helps retrieve and display the textual data of the corpus rather than intentionally single out examples from limited texts and generalise findings in an undisciplined fashion (Mautner 1995). It displays another advantage in using corpora, as it is not practicable to search, observe, and analyse mass textual data simply through manual efforts. Even with team efforts, it is very time-consuming to explore large datasets by hand and eye in a reasonable timeframe. To put it simply, the corpus methods make discourse analysis feasible if analysts want to conduct research based on a large quantity of data.

The corpus method has theoretical and methodological benefits. It allows question- or issue-oriented discourse analysis to discover, ascertain, and explain the underlying social and political ideologies of discourse by using massive amounts of textual data (Nartey & Mwinlaaru 2019). It enables discourse analysis to qualitatively answer socially inspired questions on the basis of a quantitative analysis of linguistic usage and patterns. With the help of corpora data and techniques, intensive analysis can be made of the language in use and its particular social context, generating rich and interpretive results that go beyond grammar and lexicography (Bednarek & Caple 2014).

With the expansion of research fields and topics and the improvement of corpus analytic tools, corpus-based discourse analysis becomes a more diversified and versatile approach that can be applied in different interdisciplinary studies concerning political, media, education, or even scientific discourse.

3.3 Designing the Use of Corpora

In this section, I will explain how corpus analysis is designed for this study, introduce the collection and building of corpora, and illustrate the specific tools and techniques applied in the investigation of China's international counterterrorism discourse.

3.3.1 Blueprint of Research Methods

The general principle of using corpus data is that the collected corpus data must be well-matched with the research questions. That is, 'the corpus is best used to answer the research questions that are suitably composed to address' (McEnery & Hardie 2011:2). As such, the essential plan of compilation and analysis will be based on the following steps.

First, research methods are applied based on the research questions and theoretical analysis frameworks. The main question is: What are the characteristics of China's international counterterrorism discourse? How does China discursively represent terrorism and counterterrorism? Therefore, corpus-based discourse analysis will be developed following this research aim.

Second, the collection of textual data is based on the core paradigm of strategic culture theory. The text is collected and classified into three corpora according to three categories: the nature of the threat, the efficacy of the use of force, and strategic preference.

Third, corpus-based discourse analysis is carried out in line with the analytical framework established in Chapter 2. First, salient linguistic patterns will be identified and examined. Second, discursive strategies will be analysed. Third, the interpretation and explanation of the discourse features and practices are made through the lens of strategic culture.

Fourth, techniques of corpus-based discourse analysis will be applied. Based on the above analysis method design, corpus analysis tools and techniques, such as keyword analysis, concordance analysis, and collocation analysis, will be used to investigate the corpora.

3.3.2 Data Collection and Corpora Building

Corpus is fundamental in investigating questions and issues related to language use (Reppen 2010). The corpus compilation is the basic stage regarding corpus design, textual data collection, markup, and storage (Adolphs 2008:21; Kennedy 1998:70). If there are no existing corpora available to explore an analyst's research question, one needs to build corpora for the purpose of their study (Reppen 2010:31). As for this study, there are no existing corpora available to study China's counterterrorism discourse. Therefore, I have to build the specialised corpora accordingly. The advantage of using specialised corpora is that a more detailed and qualitative analysis of the discourse can be made than using general corpora. The specialised corpora in this study are topic-based corpora, which are compiled to research China's discourse on terrorism and counterterrorism.

There is no universal principle regarding how many words should be included to build a proper corpus, as corpus size is not a matter of 'more is better' or 'one size fits all' (McCarthy & Carter 2001). For the size of specialised corpora, it does 'not need to be as large as more general corpora to yield reliable results' as the 'specialised corpora are carefully targeted and more likely to represent a particular register or genre than general corpora reliably' (Koester 2010:68). But two things need to be considered when building corpora: representativeness and time constraints (Reppen 2010; Sinclair 2006).

As for the representativeness, the text data of the corpus is taken from the People's Daily, an official newspaper recognised as one of the most representative news outlets of China's political discourse. Newspapers are an essential sector in discourse generation (Baker 2006b:72). As China's most influential official newspaper, People's Daily serves as a critical platform to display and disseminate knowledge, ideas, arguments, opinions, and policies of the Chinese government. Newspapers are also essential tools for the role of power and ideology, which reflect the systematic tendencies of power hidden behind media discourse (Fairclough 2014:54). Therefore, People's Daily is a pertinent and important source to examine China's views regarding key domestic and international political issues. Terrorism is a common security topic reported and discussed in People's Daily. Texts related to

terrorism and counterterrorism issues are abundant and convenient to collect. Thus, the People's Daily's reports and comments on terrorism and counterterrorism are suitable data sources for this research.

The text data is collected through the People's Daily e-paper database using search words such as terrorism, terror, terrorists, counterterrorism war, and counterterrorism cooperation. The time scope is from September 1, 2001, to October 1, 2021. The reason for choosing the year 2001 as the starting point is that the 9/11 terrorist attacks defined the new era of international terrorism and counterterrorism. Since then, international counterterrorism has become an important issue on the international political agenda, and discussions on international terrorism in China have gradually accumulated during this period. The year 2021 is selected as the ending time. On the one hand, it is the closest time to the study, so more new research data can be obtained. On the other hand, the period from 2001 to 2021 is nearly twenty years, during which the international counterterrorism situation saw dramatic developments, for example, the rise and fall of the Islamic State and the end of the counterterrorism war in Afghanistan.

After the search and collection, the retrieved data are manually reviewed to remove irrelevant and duplicated texts. In addition, the raw materials cannot be immediately analysed as there are many extraneous words and symbols, such as the names of editors and unrecognisable characters, in the electronic text copy. For example, the original text contains pictures, but when copied to the text document, they will be automatically transcoded into unreadable codes.

Another issue is having permission or consent to collect certain texts before data collection. The People's Daily is a public newspaper, and all of its texts are readily available for free within my institution. The use of such data will not violate copyrights, confidentiality, or other academic ethics or legal issues.

When building the corpora, it is impossible to include all the texts to achieve complete representativeness of the discourse. Therefore, this study tries to build corpora that are

determined to capture enough of China's counterterrorism discourse for accurate representation. This study is carried out on a corpus of 794,381 tokens, compiled specifically for this study, which comprised texts related to terrorism, using force to combat terrorism, and counterterrorism cooperation. Three specific corpora, including the Terrorism Corpus, the Counterterrorism War Corpus, and the Counterterrorism Cooperation Corpus, are constructed.

Table 3.1 Corpora of China's international counterterrorism discourse (2001-2021)

Corpus	Files	Tokens
Terrorism	157	87207
Counterterrorism War	432	302063
Counterterrorism Cooperation	509	405111

3.3.3 Tools for Corpus Analysis

Corpora are just collections of natural linguistic data and do not speak for themselves. We need to resort to particular tools for corpora analysis. According to Hunston, corpora do not contain new information about language, but corpus software can provide us with new perspectives on the familiar (Hunston 2002:3). Using the computer is an advantage of corpus-based discourse analysis. Many outstanding programmes such as Wordsmiths, AntConc, and MonoConc are quite often used by analysts to identify and analyse a larger database of natural language than could be dealt with by hand (Biber et al. 1998:4; Davies 2015:33).

This study resorts to AntConc to study the corpora, as it is capable of dealing with large corpora of the Chinese language and has a package of tools to retrieve keywords, clusters, concordances, collocates, etc. AntConc is a corpus retrieval tool developed by Professor Laurence Anthony of Waseda University in Japan. This software is widely used in linguistics, media, politics, and interdisciplinary research. AntConc is multi-functional corpus processing software. Researchers can use its keyword, cluster, KWIC, concordance, and collocate functions to conduct keyword analysis, concordance analysis, and collocation

analysis. The use of the corpus programme of AntConc makes it possible to organise great masses of data and find linguistic patterns that pure human perception, introspection, or any other manual effort are difficult to discover (Stubbs 2007:131).

3.4 Corpus Analytical Techniques

The use of corpus techniques helps analysts find valuable information within large language datasets, but there is no ‘automatic discovery procedure’ when using the corpus techniques. As Fowler notes, ‘there is no constant relationship between linguistic structure and its semiotic significance’ (Fowler 1991:90). Therefore, the corpus-based study involves researchers’ choices in deciding which techniques to use for the purpose of their specific studies (Baker 2006: 175). For this study, analytical techniques applied in the corpus analysis mainly include keyword analysis, concordance analysis, and collocation analysis. The corpus analysis techniques applied in this study by no means represent an exhaustive set, but they are effective techniques commonly used by corpus-based discourse analysts. Most important of all, they are quite compatible with the research purpose, hypothesis, and practice of this study.

3.4.1 Keyword Analysis

Keyword analysis is often the first and essential step to take in a bid to discover concepts, ideas, and notions that recurrently occur in a particular discursive context and to reveal how the speaker views the social world (Ädel 2010; Mautner 1995; McEney 2006).

Keywords in the corpus study ‘overlap with words that are intuitively regarded as culturally important’ (Mahlberg 2007:197). They are considered as ‘vocabulary of culture and society’ and ‘focal points where entire cultural domains are organised’(Wierzbicka 1997:156). As such, in a broader sense, keywords are referred to as ‘indicative words in certain forms of thought’ and a shared body of words and meanings in our most general discussions of the practices and institutions that we group as culture and society (Williams 2015:xxvii). In a narrower sense, keywords ‘contribute to the search for units of meaning’ (Sinclair 2004).

In corpus studies, keywords are normally retrieved by comparing the target corpus with a larger reference corpus. Hence, keywords are defined as the words that are outstanding in their frequencies and saliencies in a targeted corpus in comparison with a reference corpus (Baker 2006b; Mahlberg 2007: 196; Scott 1997: 236). They are items that might be interesting to further look at and have a frequency that differs significantly from the reference corpora. In this study, keywords are generated by comparing the specialised corpora of China's international counterterrorism discourses with a general corpus of the Lancaster Corpus of Mandarin Chinese. The Lancaster Corpus of Mandarin Chinese is selected as the reference corpus as it is an acknowledged, publicly available, and balanced corpus of contemporary Mandarin Chinese. Frequency and keyness are two indicators related to keywords. Frequency shows how many times a word occurs in the corpus. Keyness is another important indicator, which is based on the measurement of log-likelihood or chi-square, is complementary to the indicator of frequency, and casts the 'aboutness of a text, or what items are worthy of further investigation' (Rayson 2015:41).

In this study, keyword analysis aims to find frequent discourse themes from a large amount of textual data to show the foci in China's international counterterrorism discourse. 'In the work on keywords, semantic and social analysis are inseparable' (Stubbs 2008). Keywords can be derived from the corpus and categorised into semantic domains to identify dominant themes and topics in the discourse (Baker 2013; Taylor & Marchi 2018). Keyword analysis can indicate the implicit and explicit information in a particular corpus. As one of the corpus-based techniques applied in this research, keyword analysis is used to discover the words in the corpus that indicate the 'aboutness of the corpus'-the topic of discourse reflects the speaker's focus and implicit views and arguments (Baker 2006b; Scott & Tribble 2006).

There are three types of keywords: proper nouns, words that researchers can recognise as key and indicators of the 'aboutness' of the text, and some grammatical words that frequently show up in the text and can indicate text style (Baker 2004; Scott 1997). The first two are often used as research objects in most interdisciplinary discourse studies, and the third is the main object of linguistic analysis. This research will focus on the first two types of keywords. The earliest researchers using keyword analysis intuitively concentrated on words that they

thought embodied important concepts that reflected social or cultural issues (Baker 2004; Firth 1957; Williams 2015). Now, with the help of the corpus tool, researchers can efficiently find keywords that intuition cannot find in large amounts of text data and discover more complex linguistic phenomena in text. The application of the keyword analysis technique can help researchers go beyond subjective intuition and find interesting and valuable information hidden in a large amount of text data. However, after the data is retrieved, researchers still need to manage, analyse, and interpret the data according to their research aim, theories, and experiences, which is one of the essential steps in corpus-based discourse analysis.

Therefore, after retrieving keywords with the help of corpus tools, it is important to analyse the language patterns to answer research questions. The first step is to manually eliminate grammatical and irrelevant words, as they are not the focus of this study. Then, I will keep the relevant lexical words prepared for more detailed qualitative analysis. These keywords will be grouped into categories based on their semantic meaning and context. Then, studies of the keywords and their clusters will be carried out to reveal salient linguistic features and underlying connotations in the context (Baker 2004).

3.4.2 Concordance Analysis

As a key technique of the corpus-based approach, concordance analysis can help to find language patterns, explore contexts, and testify hypotheses (Evison 2010; Sinclair 1991). It enables analysts to explore the original contexts of the items, be they words or phrases, by bringing a large volume of examples together in one list. Concordance analysis serves as a bridging toolkit that makes qualitative methods fit with corpus methods when dealing with a corpus with a large number of texts (Koller & Mautner 2014; Mautner 1995). The idea of concordance analysis is put forward by Firth, who argues that it is necessary to systematically study the contexts and contextual distribution of the focal words, which have significant social and cultural implications. The Firthian method of analysing the contexts or concordance of the pivotal words that have significant social or cultural implications is then received by linguists. Now, concordance analysis is considered not only a

complementary method to analyse lexical units but also a key approach to studying lexical semantics (Rigotti & Rocci 2005; Stubbs 1996a, 2002).

In corpus studies, concordance is defined as a collection of the occurrences of a word form, each in its own textual environment' (Sinclair 1991:32). The concordance programmes or software that have concordance functions can present concordance in list form with the 'search-word or phrase appearing centred both horizontally and vertically in the output' (Scott 2010). The concordance lines that are used for analysis normally 'consist of a node word or phrase with a small amount of context (measured in characters) to the left and right' (Susan 2010:156). Researchers can use concordance analysis to analyse language elements, be they individual words or word clusters, by putting them back in context and checking the explicit and implicit language patterns. Finding linguistic patterns of high frequency and saliency is critical because they can reveal the social and cultural context of the discourse under consideration (Bhatia, Flowerdew, & Jones 2008). In corpus studies, pattern refers to the repetition of words or structures that repeatedly occur in the context of the use of language. The repetition of patterns is a natural linguistic phenomenon, as they occur in a language without anyone having planned it (Susan 2010:152-153). By looking at the linguistic patterns that repetitively occur in the corpus, we can find the 'shared area of meaning creation in a certain discourse community (Bonelli 2010:22). Therefore, the exploration of linguistic patterns can help find out the embedded social and cultural meanings of the particular discourse in question.

Concordance analysis plays a fundamental role in corpus-based discourse analysis as it enables analysts to discover and describe 'syntactic and semantic properties of key lexical items exhaustively rather than selectively', displaying 'all examples of a particular linguistic feature retrieved from the corpus and displayed in context' (Mautner 1995; Rayson 2015:40). The qualitative analysis of concordance lines serves as the juncture at which corpus linguistic analysis synergizes with qualitative discourse analysis (Mautner 2009:42). On the one hand, the concordance tool can retrieve quantitative results that serve as empirical evidence of linguistic features and patterns. On the other hand, the concordance lines need analysts' qualitative interpretation, which is also a central aim of corpus study (Stubbs 2007:131).

Hence, concordance analysis is regarded by corpus analysts as a ‘heuristic tool’ that helps to investigate the retrieved results of the textual data from a critical perspective, as the concordance list provides analysts with a large number of occurrences as well as the context of the language patterns (Mautner 1995).

In this study, concordance analysis is applied for two purposes. First, it will be applied to find discursive practice modes or patterns in China’s international counterterrorism discourse. Second, it can help uncover the connotation, ideas, and intention hidden behind the discourse through quantitative and qualitative investigation of concordance lines so as to provide clues for interpretation from the perspective of strategic culture. As Stubbs notes, repeated language patterns are important as the frequent occurrence of lexical patterns provides illuminating evidence of ‘what is typical and routine in language use’ (Stubbs 2002:221). In a computer-assisted corpus study, concordances can be displayed in a table with all cases of words, phrases, or pairs of collocates in their immediate co-text (Baker 2013:40). Therefore, in this study, the concordance analysis is carried out by reviewing the concordance lines in AntConc, and particular focus will be given to similar or repetitive patterns that need to be explored in the concordance lines. Then, analysis of common patterns, co-occurrence, and context will be carried out, which are sources for analysis of discursive practices and hidden connotations. Due to the limits of space and the setting of measures, the concordance lines in AntConc cannot show all the left and right context of the word or phrases in concern. Hence, sometimes it needs to expand the concordance lines to look at the fuller context, which might yield interesting findings.

3.4.3 Collocation Analysis

Collocates are words that frequently appear in the neighbourhood of the target word, and the frequency or probability of such collocations is higher than we would expect (Baker 2006a:36-38). Collocation is relevant to the tendency to cooccur, which indicates that there is a statistically significant likelihood that another word or words will appear along with a given word. As Hunston notes, collocation is the statistical tendency of words to co-occur (Hunston 2022:12). The collocation of words is essential for studying discourse, as it is not

only a linguistic form of companionship between words but also a vehicle of meaning (Firth 1957:195-196).

The semantic extension of collocation can be considered discourse prosody, which is evaluative and often reveals the speaker's or writer's stance (Baker et al. 2008; Stubbs 2001). The exploration of discourse prosody through collocation analysis is 'of mutual interest for corpus linguistics and discourse analysis' (Koller & Mautner 2014). According to Louw, collocates imbue a consistent aura of meaning in the context (Louw 1993:157). In other words, discourse prosody is a pointer to attitudes or attitudinal preference (Hunston 2007). It reflects attitudes, intentions, opinions, perceptions, and ideologies in the discourse. As discourse prosody is a reflection of attitudes and intentions, it is also an indicator of the speaker's preferences. Stubbs argues that there are three types of discourse prosody: positive, neutral, and negative (Stubbs 1996a:176). For example, in their study of the discursive construction of refugees in the British media, Gabrielatos & Baker analyse the frequent collocation between refugees and floods in British media coverage, arguing that this collocation creates a negative discursive rhyme that dehumanises refugees as a fearful and repulsive natural disaster (Gabrielatos & Baker 2008). Therefore, the examination of discourse prosody is usually carried out by analysing the collocations.

In this study, the collocation analysis will be applied by focusing on analysing the collocates with high frequency and saliency in order to discover China's perceptions of the threat of terrorism, attitudes towards counterterrorism by using force, and preferences in counterterrorism cooperation. Collocates that frequently co-occur with the node word are a pointer to social attitudes. As Stubbs points out, the study of repeated wordings is essential to the study of language and ideology, and it may provide verifiable proof of how culture is mirrored in lexical patterns (Stubbs 1996a:169). Concordance analysis will also be used during the collocation analysis to help review the context of the collocates and reveal the attitudinal preference and cultural connotation of the discourse (Brezina 2016:106).

A specific statistical measure should be utilised when it comes to measuring the strength of association between lexical items. In collocation analysis, mutual information score (MI), T-

score, Z-score, etc., are often applied to ‘account for the likelihood of words occurring together by chance in order to judge the strength of associations between words’ (Biber et al. 1998:265). In this study, the collocation analysis will use the T-score as the statistical measure because it can evaluate the likelihood of words that appear as collocates of a certain word rather than another word (Biber et al. 1998:267). In addition, the range of a collocation needs to be taken into account before retrieving collocates for further analysis. The range means the distance of the collocates appearing in the vicinity of the target word. In corpus studies, such a range is called the window span. In this research, collocates can be identified by using the collocate search function of AntConc. The window span is one of the features of AntConc regarding the search for particular words. It enables researchers to decide the range of words separated by spaces to the left or right of the target word. There is no required standard or optimal choice for setting the window span. It is up to the researcher to make the choice according to the needs of the study (Jones & Sinclair 1974). In this study, after several tests, the initial settings of AntConc for the window span were used, setting the search range from 5 left to 5 right, which means the statistically significant collocates will be identified within the ten-word range with the target word at the centre. A list of the top collocates of the query item will be obtained automatically using the AntConc collocates retrieving function, drawing data from the specialised corpora. The programme takes the collocates from a span of five words on either side of the node word, and the collocational significance is calculated via the T-score statistical measure.

3.5 A Few Clarifications

Despite the fact that corpus-based discourse analysis is efficient and promising in dealing with a large amount of textual data and can provide the research with a reasonably high degree of objectivity, there are some statements that need to be made clear beforehand.

Corpus-based discourse analysis is a synergy of quantitative and qualitative research methods, and qualitative analysis plays a critical role in the whole analysis process. That is, an analyst’s knowledge and sensitivity about the genre and topic of the discourse for investigation are indispensable in deciding where to start the analysis (Mautner 1995). One

aspect of corpus-based discourse analysis involves counting and sorting language patterns and applying statistical algorithms to textual data. But the major part of the research depends on the analyst's qualitative analysis of the results generated by the corpus tool. Analysts can decide what sort of data is generated by the corpus tool for further analysis according to research questions and their judgement of the significance of particular language elements (Stubbs 2002:167). For example, the keyword list might include hundreds of words. The analysts can choose some of them rather than others for further analysis because the chosen ones have greater potential to create feasible analysis to answer the research questions. Furthermore, it is impossible to analyse all of the linguistic data generated by the corpus tool. Therefore, this study also follows such a practice, selecting and analysing the data that is considered significant, interesting, and inductive to answering the research questions.

In the process of analysis, I will concentrate on the language patterns and features that have significant frequencies and saliencies, as the frequently reoccurring language phenomena are more informative and useful to carry out discourse analysis (Mautner 1995). It is impossible to analyse all the language features discovered from the large quantity of corpus data, and it is efficient and pertinent to focus on the most salient ones. They can help us understand both the depth and breadth of the corpus data, which are manifestations of the discursive and social practices that we try to decipher and explain (Fairclough 1992:73).

Another issue is the cut-off point. The corpus size is large enough to generate a considerable amount of data. It is necessary to set a cut-off point in order to limit the amount of data that needs to be analysed. Cut-off points are the data thresholds selected when processing corpus data, which can determine levels of salience. There is no standard cutoff point for corpus-based discourse analysis. But the corpus tool, such as the AnConc, normally has several cut-off point choices for selection. Therefore, the analyst can make several tests of each value and choose the most suitable one for the research (Baker 2004). In this study, $p < 0.01$ (LL=6.63) is chosen as the cut-off point. On the one hand, after several trials, it can be found that the parameter setting of $p < 0.01$ (LL=6.63) is able to provide enough valuable and manageable data for analysis. On the other hand, it is also a commonly used cut-off point value in corpus-based discourse analysis (Gabrielatos & Marchi 2011).

3.6 Summary

This chapter introduces the definition, method, tool, and techniques of corpus-based discourse analysis. It shows that the use of corpora is fundamental and helpful when researchers aim to study questions and issues concerned with language use. From a methodological perspective, the corpus-based approach can help reveal important patterns in language use and point to areas within the texts that could be interesting for more intensive and qualitative analysis. The corpus-based discourse analysis goes beyond simple counts of linguistic features. It is synergized with the qualitative analysis to interpret the quantitative patterns discovered in the corpus.

Analysing language use is the focus of the corpus-based approach, which is often applied by corpus linguists to ‘describe the characteristics of different varieties of language used in different situations’ (Biber et al. 1998:1-2). The research goals of the corpus-based approach include two areas: one is to uncover typical patterns and assess their extent; the other is to analyse ‘the contextual factors that influence variability’. To put it simply, the corpus-based approach is a method to discover the characteristics of a certain type of language in use. Hence, it is a pertinent approach to this study, which aims to find the characteristics of the language China uses in the counterterrorism domain.

The corpus methods brought up in this chapter will be applied accordingly in the following empirical chapters. On the basis of the theoretical framework established in the previous chapter, keyword analysis, concordance analysis, and collocation analysis will be applied to reveal the thematic focus, discursive strategy, and discourse prosody, which reflect the discursive characteristics and strategies of China’s international counterterrorism discourse. Then, the discursive phenomena and practices will be elucidated through the lens of Chinese strategic culture.

Chapter 4 Terrorism in China's International Counterterrorism Discourse

4.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to answer **Q1: How does China's international counterterrorism discourse represent terrorism?** This question is further divided into three sub-questions.

In China's international counterterrorism discourse:

1a) What is the discursive focus of the representation of terrorism?

1b) How is terrorism constructed as a security threat?

1c) What are China's attitudes towards terrorism?

Based on the questions, this chapter will commence by examining the discursive themes in the corpus. I will analyse the discursive strategies employed by China in constructing terrorism as a security threat. Then, the analysis of discourse prosody in the representation of terrorism will be conducted, followed by an explanation through the lens of Chinese strategic culture. This chapter will culminate with a summary of the findings regarding how China's international counterterrorism discourse represents terrorism.

The analysis is based on the Terrorism Corpus, and the analytical procedure will proceed as follows:

First, I will analyse the key discursive themes displayed in the corpus. Keyword analysis will be carried out to study the thematic discussion of terrorism in China's international counterterrorism discourse.

Second, I will conduct a concordance analysis of the keyword terrorism to analyse how terrorism is constructed and the discursive strategies.

Third, I will conduct a collocation analysis to study the prosody that implies China's views and attitudes towards terrorism.

Fourth, I will explain the discursive features and strategies through the lens of Chinese strategic culture.

Based on the above questions and analytical agenda, the following section will start by analysing the keywords in the Terrorism Corpus.

4.2 Discursive Themes in the Representation of Terrorism

This section aims to study the discursive themes in the description of terrorism through keyword analysis. As noted in the methodology chapter, keyword analysis is essential to helping the researcher know what the corpus is about and the key themes in the discourse. The basic meaning of discursive theme is ‘lines of arguments’ which can characterise the ‘places’ where a speaker or writer may ‘locate’ arguments that are appropriate to a given subject (Rubinelli 2009; Žagar 2010). In discourse studies, it is referred to as ‘parts of argumentation’ that store ideas, views, and arguments (Wodak & Boukala 2015:94). In this study, the discursive themes refer to the discursive topics and focus on the subject described, discussed, and argued in China’s international counterterrorism.

The discursive themes can be found through keyword analysis. Keyword analysis can help to ‘gain descriptive accounts and spot traces of discourse within language’ beyond the researcher’s intuition (Baker 2004). Keywords are also a ‘pointer to social attitudes’ (Scott 1997:235). In other words, keywords in a discourse embody significant views, ideas, arguments, and ideologies that reflect cultural concerns (Baker 2004; Firth 1957; Moran 2021). In addition, keyword analysis is routinely the first step in corpus-based discourse analysis to carry out a preliminary study of the features and themes of the corpus before diving further into the linguistic interpretation and cultural explanation of the discourse.

In this section, keyword analysis is carried out by studying key discursive themes in China’s discourse on terrorism. The research is based on the Terrorism Corpus. In terms of the cut-off point, the p value is set as less than 0.01 (6.63). After the data processing in AntConc, the top 100 keywords ranked by keyness are selected for further analysis. Based on the derived

keywords, four thematic groups can be generalised: nature of terrorism threat, victim and scope of terrorism, the severity of terrorism, and responding to terrorism. These groups cover the main themes regarding what kind of threat terrorism is, where terrorism poses a threat, who is threatened by terrorism, and whether terrorism is a severe threat that needs to be dealt with.

4.2.1 Nature of the Terrorism Threat

In China's international counterterrorism discourse, the representation of the nature of terrorism reflects China's perception of the characteristics and attributes of the terrorist threat. Examining the keyword list, it can be found that 17 keywords with high frequency and keyness values are related to threat and security (see Table 4.1). It implies that threat and security are key topics in the discourse on terrorism.

Table 4.1 Nature of terrorism threat

Word	Frequency	Keyness	Word	Frequency	Keyness
恐怖主义/terrorism	1044	5601.698	伊斯兰国/Islamic State	249	1333.912
恐怖/terror	739	3935.390	恐怖分子/terrorist	212	1135.616
袭击/attack	662	3491.126	问题/problem	306	709.669
安全/security	478	2275.937	爆炸/explosion	133	676.744
事件/incident	349	1723.069	基地/al-Qaeda	143	635.598
组织/organisation	494	1674.323	暴力/violence	112	481.784
威胁/threat	299	1455.268	死亡/death	79	404.595
极端/extreme	279	1453.266	新/new	217	413.999
发生/occur	315	1352.593	挑战/challenge	89	369.226

The discursive focus on terrorism is mainly about the violent nature of terrorism and the security threat posed by the violence of terrorist acts. 恐怖主义/terrorism and 恐怖/terror are the keywords with high frequency and keyness in the Terrorism Corpus. 恐怖主义/terrorism has 1,044 occurrences in the corpus with a keyness value of 5,601.698. 恐怖/terror is second to 恐怖主义/terrorism and appears 739 times in the corpus, and the keyness value is 3,935.390. The high-frequency cluster of 恐怖主义/terrorism includes 恐怖主义威胁/terrorism threat, 恐怖主义活动/terrorism activity, and 恐怖主义袭击/terrorism attack. It suggests that terrorism is closely associated with threat and security, and terrorism activities are a key focus in the discourse on terrorism.

Examining the cluster of 恐怖/*terror*, more evidence is revealed that security is of key concern in the discourse on terrorism. The most frequent clusters that occur in the corpus are 恐怖袭击/*terrorist attack*, 恐怖组织/*terrorist organisation*, 恐怖威胁/*terrorist threat*, 恐怖事件/*terrorist incident*, and 恐怖爆炸/*terrorist bombing*. Take the 恐怖袭击/*terrorist attack*, for example. This cluster has the highest occurrences, as it appears 387 times in the corpus, often occurring in contexts that describe the terrorist as an international threat. It can be found that the manifestation of the terrorism threat to the international community is often conveyed by narrating notorious terrorist attacks around the world, for example, the 9/11 terrorist attack, the 7/7 London bombing, the Manchester Arena bombing, terrorist attacks in Brussels, the Charlie Hebdo shooting, the Moscow subway bombing, and the Mumbai terrorist attacks. The descriptions of terrorist attacks that occur at many locations around the world indicate that terrorism is a real and widespread global security threat. In addition, the representation of terrorist attacks also reflects the trend of the rapid spread of terrorism worldwide. The examples below show that the development of international terrorism and the international threat posed by terrorist activities are key foci in China's discourse on terrorism.

(1) 9.11 之后的过去 5 年来, 各类恐怖袭击事件此起彼伏、从未间断

In the past five years since 9/11, all kinds of *terrorist attacks* and incidents have kept occurring and *never ended*.

(2) 2012 年至 2015 年 4 年中, 全球恐怖袭击的年均发案数量上升为 13034 起, 造成的年均死亡人数为 29268 人

The average annual number of terrorist attacks worldwide *rose* to 13,034 in the four years from 2012 to 2015, resulting in an *average annual death toll* of 29,268.

The fundamental features of terrorism are violence and extremism, which is why terrorism is often regarded as a threat (Crenshaw 1995; Johnston & Bose 2020). In the keyword list, many keywords are related to the violent nature of terrorism, such as 极端/*extreme*, 暴力/*violence*, and 死亡/*death*. The most frequent cluster of 极端/*extreme* is 极端主义/*extremism*, which occurs 114 times in the corpus. Extremism often refers to recognising

violence where violence against civilians is considered legitimate (Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino, & Caluya 2011). Therefore, extreme ideology and cognition lead to the radical nature of the terrorist threat. In China's discourse on terrorism, extremism is regarded as the catalyst of terrorism violence. For example, 国际恐怖主义之所以仍很猖獗, 核心问题是极端主义的广泛传播/*the core reason international terrorism is still rampant is widespread extremism*.

Violence is represented as a distinctive feature of terrorism. The most frequent clusters of 暴力/*violence* include 暴力极端/*violence and extremism*, 暴力袭击/*violence attack*, 暴力事件/*violence incident*, and 暴力恐怖/*violence and terror*, indicating the intrinsic connection between violence and terrorism. By looking at the description of 暴力/*violence* in context, it can be found that 暴力/*violence* is often used to define the violent nature of terrorism. The keyword 死亡/*death* is related to the representation of the consequences of violence generated by terrorism. In context, it often appears to describe the fatal consequences of terrorist attacks. The frequent clusters of 死亡/*death* include 人死亡/*people dead*, 年均死亡/*annual death*, and 平民死亡/*civilian death*, which denotes the fatal consequence caused by terrorist attacks. Therefore, it is obvious that the violent nature of terrorism and the threat it poses to human life and safety are key foci in the representation of the nature of terrorism.

4.2.2 Victims and Scope of Terrorism

The victims and scope of terrorism are key topics in China's international counterterrorism discourse. It is one of the important manifestations of China's perception of international terrorism.

Table 4.2 Victims and scope of terrorism

Word	Frequency	Keyness	Word	Frequency	Keyness
国际/international	732	3035.296	阿富汗/Afghanistan	172	729.803
国家/country	496	1324.205	巴基斯坦/Pakistan	115	615.899
全球/global	248	1199.404	中国/China	274	610.477
地区/region	343	1126.18	非洲/Africa	125	599.597
法国/France	316	1082.028	中东/Middle East	128	533.066
美国/US	347	1075.028	人/people	285	529.572
欧洲/Europe	259	1062.827	网络/cyber	106	500.979
各国/each country	206	901.387	民众/public	72	375.148
叙利亚/Syria	156	766.972	人类/mankind	79	320.321
英国/UK	172	759.512	平民/civilian	64	157.058
伊拉克/Iraq	188	746.544	遇难者/victim	59	155.287

The focus on the victims and scope of terrorism are related to international society, nations, and individuals. In other words, in the context of China's international counterterrorism discourse, the terrorism threat extends to three levels: international, national, and individual (Kydd & Walter 2006; Wolfendale 2006). 国际/*international* is a keyword with high frequency in the corpus, with 732 occurrences and a keyness value of 3035.296. The typical cluster of this keyword is 国际社会/*international society*. Terrorism is a destructive force for the international community. The spread of terrorism can lead to more terrorist attacks and heavy casualties but also cause damage to the mainstream political, cultural, and economic norms in the existing international order (Makinda 2003; Schmid 1992). In China's discourse, terrorism is often described as a threat to international society. As shown in the following examples, terrorism is represented as an international threat to global order, peace, and security.

(3) 国际恐怖势力不惜草菅人命，滥杀无辜，不仅危及普通公民的人身安全，也严重破坏了国际社会的安全秩序

International terrorist forces are not only endangering the personal safety of ordinary citizens but also seriously undermining the security order of the international community by killing people indiscriminately.

(4) 恐怖主义危害深重，对世界和平、安全与发展造成巨大威胁，已经成为国际社会的公害

Terrorism poses a great threat to world peace, security, and development and has become a public hazard to the international community.

The most frequent cluster of 国家/*nation* is 国家安全/*national security*, indicating that terrorism is also a security issue closely connected with national security. The discursive focus on terrorism's threat is threefold. First, terrorism poses a threat to national security. As examples 5 and 6 show, members of international terrorist groups are depicted as a serious security threat to many countries. Second, the political power of the state has been challenged by terrorism. Example 7 shows that terrorism is a challenge to existing political norms in which the use of violence is a normative practice and right enjoyed by the sovereign nation. Third, a nation's social stability and economic interests can be damaged by terrorism. As example 8 shows, terrorist organisations are depicted as critical security threats to national stability and development.

(5) 该集团是由一群有经验的“基地”组织成员组成的，对美国和西方国家安全构成迫切的威胁

The group is made up of veteran al-Qaeda members and poses an imminent threat to US and Western countries' national security.

(6) 来自非洲的恐怖分子从中东国家返回非洲是当前该地区国家安全面临的最大威胁

The return of terrorists from Africa to Middle Eastern countries is currently the greatest threat to the security of countries in the region.

(7) 恐怖主义的主要特点之一，就是滥用暴力伤害无辜。它在暴力使用上僭越了国家对暴力的合法垄断，在暴力的使用程序和使用对象上违背了现代文明社会广泛认可的准则

One of the main characteristics of terrorism is the indiscriminate use of violence to harm the innocent. It challenges the state's legal authority in the use of violence and violates the widely accepted norms of modern civilised society regarding the use of violence.

(8) 一些打着分裂旗号的恐怖主义组织危害上升，成为一些国家安全、稳定与发展所面临的主要威胁

The rise of terrorist groups under the banner of secession has become a major threat to the security, stability, and development of some countries

The keywords associated with individual people are 人/*people*, 民众/*public*, 平民/*civilians*, and 遇难者/*victims*. Take 人/*people*, for example, the most frequent cluster of this keyword is 人死亡/*people died* and 人受伤/*people injured*. This means that when talking about the threat of terrorism, it often refers to the casualties induced by terrorism. 人/*people* is used as a unit of measurement to show that individual security is threatened by terrorist activities. Therefore, it implies that terrorism can pose a severe threat to the lives and safety of individuals. The frequent cluster of 民众/*public* is 民众恐慌/*public panic*. The cooccurrence indicates that in China's discourse on terrorism, terrorism can not only bring physical harm to innocent citizens but also generate psychological stress and panic among people.

Furthermore, some keywords are related to geographical locations, suggesting the extent of the terrorism threat. At the regional level, the keywords include 全球/*global*, 地区/*region*, 欧洲/*Europe*, 非洲/*Africa*, and 中东/*Middle East*. At the national level, we can find 法国/*France*, 美国/*United States*, 叙利亚/*Syria*, 英国/*United Kingdom*, 伊拉克/*Iraq*, 阿富汗/*Afghanistan*, 巴基斯坦/*Pakistan*, and 中国/*China*. These keywords cover geographical regions that often witness terrorist attacks, which indicates that China cares about international terrorism dynamism. Moreover, it also implies that in China's international counterterrorism, terrorism is a ubiquitous threat to the international community.

4.2.3 Severity of Terrorism

Many keywords are related to the situation and grave consequences of terrorism (see Table 4.3)

Table 4.3 Severity of terrorism

Word	Frequency	Keyness	Word	Frequency	Keyness
名	185	541.437	多/more than	171	231.205
形势/situation	137	468.93	造成/cause	139	341.022
成为/become	137	428.42	起	161	279.564
面临/face with	126	455.914	严重/severe	152	238.852
目前/current	127	389.021	个	158	219.542

Keywords related to threat situation include 形势/*situation*, 成为/*become*, 面临/*face with*, 目前/*current*, 多/*more than*, 造成/*cause*, 严重/*severe*. The contexts of these keywords create an atmosphere that the situation of terrorism has reached a warning level. Take the keyword 形势/*situation*, for example. The most frequent cluster is 形势不容乐观/*situation not optimistic* and 形势严峻/*bad situation*. The cluster 形势不容乐观/*situation not optimistic* is often used in describing the world or regional situation of terrorism, as shown in the following examples.

(9) 全球反恐形势不容乐观, 反恐斗争依然任重道远

The *global counterterrorism situation is not optimistic*, and the fight against terrorism remains *a long and arduous task*.

(10) 欧洲反恐形势不容乐观, 可能会遭遇新一轮恐怖袭击

The *counterterrorism situation in Europe is not optimistic* and may see a new round of terrorist attacks.

(11) 随着极端组织“伊斯兰国”在伊拉克、叙利亚相继溃败, 该组织 6000 多名非洲成员可能回流非洲大陆, 非洲面临的反恐形势不容乐观

As the Islamic State loses ground in Iraq and Syria, more than 6,000 of its African members are expected to return to the continent. The *counterterrorism situation in Africa is not optimistic*.

Some keywords are quantifiers that indicate the severity of terrorism through numbers. The common quantifier keywords are: 名, 起, and 个. In Chinese, quantifiers are measure words usually used before nouns to indicate the object's numbers, volumes, or scale (Huang 1998; Yang & Wu 2020). There is no such counterpart in English. The quantifier word that has high keyness is 名. In context, it is often used to illustrate the large number of terrorists and extremists and the serious terrorism situation in certain countries. Another quantifier word 起 frequently often clusters with terms such as 恐袭/*terrorist attacks*, 爆炸/*bombings*, and 袭击/*attacks*. In context, it is used to describe the number of terrorist incidents, showing the scale of the terrorism situation. These quantifier keywords play a role in implying that terrorism is rampant and causes critical consequences worldwide. Take the keyword 个 as an example. In the context of China's international counterterrorism discourse, 个 is always clustered with the word 国家/*country* to show how many countries are affected by terrorism

and imply that the terrorism situation is not optimistic. As shown in the example below, the serious situation of terrorism development around the world is depicted by bringing forward the fact that more than 60 countries are threatened by terrorism.

(12) 形形色色的恐怖组织还在全球60多个国家开展恐怖活动

All types of terrorist organisations are still carrying out terrorist activities in more than 60 countries around the world.

4.2.4 Responding to Terrorism

Examining the keyword list, it can be found that 17 of them relate to responding to terrorism, indicating that stances and measures against terrorism are one of the key focus areas in China's discourse on terrorism.

Table 4.4 Responding to terrorism

Word	Frequency	Keyness	Word	Frequency	Keyness
反恐/counterterrorism	1324	7108.066	斗争/fight	114	434.781
打击/fight	313	1539.709	谴责/condemn	82	407.348
加强/strengthen	328	997.587	采取/adopt	128	394.813
行动/action	227	968.163	支持/support	115	335.921
情报/intelligence	116	557.841	进行/proceed	162	335.305
战略/strategy	156	554.997	反对/oppose	94	318.756
应对/respond	107	553.373	强调/emphasise	91	315.000
警方/police	105	551.156	防范/prevent	128	312.070
措施/measure	168	505.561			

反恐/counterterrorism is the top keyword with 1324 occurrences and a keyness value of 7108.066 in the Terrorism Corps. The saliency of 反恐/counterterrorism indicates that responding to terrorism is a key discursive theme in China's discourse on terrorism, implying that terrorism is a threat that must be managed. Examining the clusters of the keyword 反恐/counterterrorism, it can be found that China perceives counterterrorism as an international approach to responding to terrorism. The most frequent clusters are 国际反恐/international counterterrorism and 全球反恐/global counterterrorism. On the one hand, it indicates that China perceives the terrorism issue from an international perspective and regards it as a global threat. On the other hand, it implies that international society should take a united

position to jointly deal with the threat. As shown in the example below, China stresses that no individual country can cope with terrorism alone and advocates for international society to build a united front for the global governance of terrorism.

(13) 世界各国无论大小强弱, 都应承担反恐全球治理的责任。全球反恐要取得根本成效, 仅仅靠个别国家努力难以实现, 各国都应在全球反恐统一战线中贡献自己的力量

All countries in the world, regardless of their size and strength, should assume responsibility for the global governance of counterterrorism. To achieve fundamental results in global counterterrorism, it is difficult to rely solely on the efforts of individual countries, and all countries should contribute their efforts to a *united global counterterrorism front*.

In discourse on terrorism, verbs play a particularly interesting role as they can often be instructional, providing suggestions on actions and measures that should be taken to respond to terrorism threats (Baker 2006b:58). Many of the keywords relevant to responding to terrorism are verbs, including 打击/*fight*, 加强/*strengthen*, 应对/*respond*, 斗争/*fight*, 谴责/*condemn*, 采取/*adopt*, 支持/*support*, 进行/*proceed*, 反对/*oppose*, 强调/*emphasise*, and 防范/*prevent*. Among all the verbs that denote actions against terrorism, 打击/*fight* is the most frequently occurring in the Terrorism Corpus.

The high-frequency clusters are 打击恐怖主义/*fight terrorism*, 打击伊斯兰国/*fight Islamist States*, and 打击恐怖分子/*fight terrorists*. The cluster 打击恐怖主义/*fight terrorism* often occurs in the context that calls for international efforts to deal with the terrorism. In such contexts, 打击/*fight* mainly embodies a stance and position against terrorism, not particular measures against terrorism. As shown in the following example, terrorism is defined as the common threat to mankind, and fighting terrorism is defined as the obligation of all countries. In addition, 打击/*fight* conveys the connotation that fighting terrorism is a peaceful approach aiming to solve problems and should not generate more conflicts.

(14) 恐怖主义是人类的共同威胁, 打击恐怖主义是每个国家都应该承担的责任

Terrorism is a common threat to humanity, and the *fight* against it is the *responsibility of every nation*.

(15) 打击恐怖主义是和平与暴力的较量，不是民族、宗教或文明的冲突

The fight against terrorism is a contest between peace and violence, not a clash of nations, religions, or civilisations.

It is interesting to see that 打击/*fight* cluster with a specific terrorist group, the Islamic State. There are dozens of international organisations operating in different regions worldwide (El Masri & Phillips 2021). The high cooccurrences between 打击/*fight* and 伊斯兰国/*Islamic State* indicate that China pays much more attention to the terrorist organisation. Since the rise of the Islamic States, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Syria, and Iraq have been engaging the Islamic State with airstrikes or ground troop campaigns (McInnis 2016). Therefore, the cluster 打击伊斯兰国/*fight Islamic State* implies the use of military force to combat terrorism. But examining the contexts of 打击/*fight* in the corpus, it can be found that most of them are used in the context that terrorism is a threat that the international society must collectively deal with, and the focus should be paid to eradicating the root causes of terrorism.

From the above analysis of the keywords in the terrorism corpus, we have a basic understanding of what terrorism is about in China's international counterterrorism discourse. The study of keywords can help provide a preliminary understanding of the 'aboutness' of the corpus (Baker 2004). However, keyword analysis is not enough to explain the whole picture of the discourse. We need further study on discursive strategies to interpret how terrorism is constructed as a threat. Therefore, in the next section, a concordance analysis of the keyword 恐怖主义/*terrorism* will be made to observe and analyse how terrorism is constructed in China's counterterrorism discourse.

4.3 Discursive Construction of Terrorism

In the last section, the keyword analysis revealed the discursive themes of China's discourse on terrorism. This section will analyse China's discursive strategies for constructing terrorism as a threat. As terrorism is the central topic of the discourse and the question this chapter tries to answer is 'how China views terrorism', it makes sense to focus on how 恐

怖主义/*terrorism* is characterised in the corpus (Baker, Gabrielatos, & McEnery 2013:35). Hence, to uncover how terrorism is represented in China's international counterterrorism discourse, the concordances of keyword 恐怖主义/*terrorism* are searched in the corpus. After observing and categorising the concordance lines resulting from the AntConc, the concordance results will be analysed, with possible expansions of the concordance lines to examine broader contexts in the discourse. The analysis will help to reveal the discursive practices in constructing terrorism.

4.3.1 Terrorism Against Human Security

In constructing terrorism as a threat, one of the most salient discursive strategies is to frame terrorism as the opponent of mankind as a whole. In China's international counterterrorism discourse, terrorism is placed in the grand narrative of human destiny and described as the common enemy of all mankind. Terrorism, as a potentially significant security threat, is linked to the security of mankind and the security of the international community.

One of the most salient language patterns displayed in the discourse is that in most cases, terrorism is described as 人类公敌/*enemy of humankind*, 国际社会的公敌/*enemy of international society*, and 全世界公敌/*enemy of the whole world*. The interesting thing is that there is no such expression as 中国的敌人/*enemy of China*. The absence of something that could have been commonly mentioned in a particular discourse is significant as it can show implicit purposes, attitudes, and ideologies (Hunston 2002). In the context of Chinese international counterterrorism discourse, the absence of depicting terrorism as China's enemy and the abundance of expressions of terrorism as the enemy of the world indicate that China deploys a discursive strategy to construct terrorism as a common threat to international society or all humankind. In this way, the severity and implications of the terrorism threat are highlighted.

(1) Terrorism as the common enemy of the world

From the concordance lines, it can be seen that terrorism is often described as the common enemy (see Figure 4.1). The most frequent description of terrorism is 公敌/*common enemy*, construing terrorism as the enemy of mankind that threatens the world's peace and security. Under such logic, terrorism becomes a threat that must be managed. As shown in line 4, anyone who commits terrorist acts with whatever excuses and at any location should be opposed and faced with countermeasures. Therefore, as terrorism is a common enemy of mankind, it also indicates that counterterrorism becomes the shared responsibility of all countries. For example, in lines 1 and 6, it is described that each country should take the responsibility to fight terrorism in order to maintain global peace and stability.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	极端主义相结合，难以遏制极端意识形态的泛滥。	恐怖主义	是人类公敌，反恐是各国共同责任。未来，
2	与会代表呼吁强化多边合作打击恐怖主义。	恐怖主义	是人类公敌，反恐是各国共同责任。当前
3	迎来信息革命新时代，安全领域面临新的挑战。	恐怖主义	是人类公敌，特别是网络恐怖主义给世界
4	远远不够，第四，要坚持统一标准，摒弃双重标准。	恐怖主义	是人类公敌，无论何人，在何时何地，以何种
5	道路，而不是把难民视为主要威胁。”专家指出，	恐怖主义	是人类的共同敌人，面对日益严重的
6	俄罗斯支持巴沙尔·阿萨德政权、对叙利亚平民狂轰滥炸有关”。	恐怖主义	是人类的共同威胁，打击恐怖主义是每个
7	过去将近4周年了，国际社会已达成共识，就是	恐怖主义	是人类的公害，国际社会需要通力的
8	义山大使在决议草案通过后发言。他指出，	恐怖主义	是人类的公敌。一切形式的恐怖主义，不论
9	包括恐怖主义、暴力极端主义等复杂挑战的前景。	恐怖主义	是人类公敌。自“9·11”事件以来，国际社会为

Figure 4.1 Terrorism as the common enemy of mankind

(2) Terrorism is anti-humanity and anti-civilisation

In general, the essential trait of terrorism is violence (Cronin 2002; Primoratz 1990; Schmid 2011). No matter what kind of terrorism it is or what the definition of terrorism is, violence is always regarded as the fundamental element of the terrorism phenomenon. In the current dynamics of terrorism, indiscriminate violence against innocent civilians is considered a typical modus operandi (Jackson 2008). In China's international counterterrorism discourse, the trait of unlawful and indiscriminate violence against civilians is defined as anti-humanity and anti-civilisation. As shown in Figure 4.2, one of the common patterns to represent terrorism is 恐怖主义+反人类+反文明/ *terrorism + anti-humanity + anti-civilisation*. In

such a discursive strategy, terrorism is constructed as a threat against the existence of human society and a common threat to the collective security of all humans. Therefore, it implies that all countries and peoples will suffer if the international community ignores the potential threat of terrorism. For example, in the expanded lines 3 and 5, it warns that without the common sense that the nature of terrorism is anti-humanity and anti-civilisation, it would be difficult for all nations to solve the terrorism problem, and the consequence would be the endangerment of the common security of mankind.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	在人类命运共同体的高度。因此，在深刻认识	恐怖主义	反人类、反文明本质的基础上，国际社会
2	与各国携手建构全球反恐战略体系。以对	恐怖主义	反人类、反文明本质的共识为携手
3	给某些国家奉行双重标准留下空间。不充分认识	恐怖主义	反人类、反文明的本质，各国就难以
4	在打击国际恐怖主义中进行有效合作。因此，对	恐怖主义	反人类、反文明的本质特性形成共识，
5	在全球治理中难以发挥自主自决作用。当前，	恐怖主义	反人类、反文明的本质，危害人类共同

Figure 4.2 Anti-humanity and anti-civilisation of terrorism

4.3.2 Victim Identity

In constructing terrorism as a threat to human security, China's international counterterrorism discourse also forges an in-group identity that all countries that suffer from terrorism belong to (see Figure 4.3)

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	王毅说，中国反对一切形式的恐怖主义。中国也是	恐怖主义	的受害者。在中国境内从事恐怖活动的“东
2	能力建设，进一步深化反恐合作。胡锦涛强调，中国也是	恐怖主义	的受害者。我们坚决反对一切形式的恐怖主义，
3	一恐怖主义的野蛮行径。李肇星指出，中美两国都是	恐怖主义	的受害者。正如江泽民主席在与布什总统
4	不懈努力。中国与世界上许多国家一样，是	恐怖主义	的受害者。长期以来，以“东突”“藏独”为
5	筹建反洗钱金融交易支付监测中心。中国是	恐怖主义	的受害者之一。“东突”恐怖势力长期与“
6	国际反恐斗争中的主导作用。熊光楷说，作为	恐怖主义	的受害者之一，中国积极支持和参与国际
7	多狼，都是从本国利益来考量。中国也是	恐怖主义	的受害者，在国际上中国遭受恐怖袭击殃及
8	的主导作用，组成反恐统一战线。王毅表示，中国也是	恐怖主义	的受害者，打击以“东伊运”为代表
10	创造一个和平安全的环境。江泽民强调，中国深受	恐怖主义	之害，坚决谴责和反对一切形式的
11	融资，保障通讯安全。唐家璇最后强调，中国也深受	恐怖主义	之害，坚决谴责和反对一切形式的
12	局局长姆拜。孟建柱指出，中国和印尼都是	恐怖主义	受害者，两国在反恐领域的交流合作是
13	都相继发生了恐怖袭击事件。中国也是国际	恐怖主义	受害者。”秦刚指出，中国在反恐问题上的

Figure 4.3 Collective victimhood and ingroup identity

(1) China as a member of the victimhood group

The above analysis shows a binary relationship between terrorism and mankind's security in China's international counterterrorism discourse. Under such a framework, terrorism threatens all humans and is anti-human in nature. Therefore, constructing China as a member of the victimhood group not only displays China's view against terrorism but also includes China in an ingroup identity of victimhood.

From Figure 4.3, we can see a common expression of 中国也是恐怖主义的受害者/ *China is also a victim of terrorism*. It implies that China, similar to other nations, is faced with the challenge of terrorism. In most cases, the perception of victimhood identity is quoted from China's top leaders and officials. In Lines 2 and 10, President Hu Jintao and President Jiang Zemin emphasised that China is also a victim of terrorism at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings. In Lines 1, 3, and 11, Chinese foreign ministers' victimhood remarks are quoted. The aforementioned viewpoints demonstrate China's official perspective on the impact of terrorism on global security as well as its implications for China's own national security, as indicated in the extended line 13.

Expanded line 13

我们也应该看到这几年来恐怖主义并没有消亡，还在肆意作孽。在土耳其、英国、肯尼亚以及其他地方都相继发生了恐怖袭击事件。中国也是国际恐怖主义受害者。

We should also see that terrorism has not died out in the past four years and is still rampant. There have been terrorist attacks in Turkey, the United Kingdom, Kenya, and elsewhere. China is also a victim of international terrorism.

(2) Domestic terrorism as a part of international terrorism

China also represents domestic terrorism as a significant part of international terrorism to strengthen the victimhood group identity (see Figure 4.3). As shown in the expanded line 4, China, like other terrorism-inflicted countries, is also a victim of domestic terrorism by separatist forces of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement and the Tibetan independence

force. It further emphasises that these terrorist forces not only damage China's national security and social stability but also create grave consequences for international society. The narrative implies that China's domestic terrorist forces can also be harmful to the international community. In recent years, there has been plenty of evidence that the ETIM members have forged alliances with al-Qaeda or the Islamic State and engaged in terrorist activities outside of China (Potter 2013; Reed & Raschke 2010; Soliev 2019).

As illustrated in the expanded line 1, it defines China's victimhood group identity and emphasises that domestic terrorism in China is inextricably linked with international terrorism and is part of international terrorism. Thus, mentioning the victimhood identity and China's domestic terrorist forces within such a context can justify China's securitisation of separatist organisations as terrorist groups. The narrative attempts to demonstrate that domestic terrorism in China is part of international terrorism.

Expanded line 1

中国反对一切形式的恐怖主义。中国也是恐怖主义的受害者。在中国境内从事恐怖活动的“东突”分子长期受到国际恐怖组织尤其是“基地”组织的训练、武装和资助，打击“东突”恐怖势力也是国际反恐斗争的组成部分。

China opposes all forms of terrorism. China is also a victim of terrorism. East Turkestan terrorists in China have long been trained, armed, and financed by international terrorist organisations, especially al-Qaeda. Fighting against East Turkestan terrorist forces is also integral to international counterterrorism.

4.3.3 Terrorism as an Absolute Threat

There is another salient language pattern that is worthy of analysis, which describes China's stance against terrorism: 反对+一切形式+恐怖主义/*opposition + all forms + terrorism* (see Figure 4.4). Under such framing, terrorism is constructed as an absolute threat that must be denounced and dealt with. First, it makes a clear official stance and position against terrorism. Opposition to all forms of terrorism is an official statement frequently articulated by top Chinese leaders. Chinese leaders often describe China as being against all forms of

terrorism before talking about China's counterterrorism policy. In this way, it emphasises China's firm stance against any form of terrorism. As shown in lines 4, 11, and 12, Chinese presidents stressed that the opposition to all forms of terrorism is the fundamental and consistent principle of China's international counterterrorism policy.

Second, terrorism is often represented as the absolute threat that needs to be eliminated. As shown in lines 7 and 9, terrorism is described as the most serious threat to international peace. It alerts the international community that the threat is looming large, considering the recent development of all forms of terrorism. Moreover, China often links the terrorism threat to the safety of all humans, expanding the boundaries of the concept of security and elevating it from a concept associated with national security to the level of human security. For example, in the expanded line 6, the Chinese representative at the United Nations explains that the common feature of all forms of terrorism is using violence to hurt innocent people, indicating terrorism is an absolute threat to people's safety.

Expanded line 15

恐怖主义无论采取任何形式和手法，其共同点都是危害无辜百姓的生命和安全，构成对人权的严重侵犯

No matter what form or method it takes, terrorism has the common feature that it endangers the *lives and safety of innocent people* and constitutes a *severe violation of human rights*.

Third, it presents the international consensus that all forms of terrorism are threats. In China's international counterterrorism discourse, international regulations on terrorism are often cited to prove that most countries agree that terrorism is a definite threat. In this way, it enhances and rationalises China's perception that all forms of terrorism pose dangerous challenges to international security. For example, in the expanded line 1, it describes the passing of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy as a manifestation that the international community agrees to oppose all forms of terrorism. In a similar vein, it quotes the communiqué passed at the ASEAN counterterrorism meeting, reiterating ASEAN members' resolution against all forms of terrorism, as shown in the expanded line 10.

Expanded line 1

Line 1: 《联合国全球反恐战略》充分体现了 各会员国一致反对 任何人、在任何地方、以任何理由、任何方式实施任何形式 恐怖主义 的坚定立场，以及采取行动防止和打击一切形式恐怖主义的坚定信念

The United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy fully embodies the *unanimous determination of Member States to oppose* any form of *terrorism* by anyone, anywhere, for any reason and by any means, and their firm belief in taking action to *prevent and combat all forms of terrorism*.

Expanded line 10

公报说，东盟各国一致谴责各种形式的恐怖主义，强调必须采取协调一致的行动，有效地对付恐怖主义

The communiqué said *ASEAN countries unanimously condemned all forms of terrorism* and stressed the need to make joint efforts to deal with it effectively.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	坚定立场，以及采取行动防止和打击一切形式	恐怖主义	的坚定信念。在该战略具体内容中，
2	通过的公报重申了东盟各国反对一切形式	恐怖主义	的决心。公报说，东盟各国一致谴责各种
3	要“坚决和明确地强烈谴责各种形式的	恐怖主义	不论其在何处发生、何人所为和何种
4	关于国际反恐斗争，江泽民说，反对一切形式	恐怖主义	是中国政府的一贯立场。我在去年
5	在会议上发言表示，中方反对一切形式的	恐怖主义	将继续为彻底清除恐怖主义威胁作出自己
6	夫人的工作报告时作以上表示的。他说，	恐怖主义	无论采取任何形式和手法，其共同点都是
7	又一个新的行动。决议强调所有形式的	恐怖主义	都是国际和平与安全的最严重威胁，
8	加强反恐合作。宣言说，一切形式和表现的	恐怖主义	都是对国际和平与安全的一个最
9	不能单纯以武力反恐当前，各种形式的	恐怖主义	在全球范围内呈扩大之势，尤其
10	决心。公报说，东盟各国一致谴责各种形式的	恐怖主义	强调必须采取协调一致的行动，有效地
11	的基本政策，即：谴责并反对一切形式的	恐怖主义	打击恐怖主义要标本兼治，反恐斗争要注重综合治理，
12	以同样标准来对待与处理国内外的一切	恐怖主义	活动，反对任何形式的恐怖主义。他认为，人类

Figure 4.4 Against all forms of terrorism

4.3.4 Terrorism in Political Metaphor

Political metaphors have been extensively employed in China’s international counterterrorism discourse to frame terrorism as a significant threat. Political metaphors typically serve several key functions, including image construction, persuading, and conveying implied values or ideologies (Mio 2018; Musolff 2012; Wodak 2011). Three distinct types of metaphors can be identified: natural disaster metaphor, disease metaphor,

and ecology metaphor. These metaphors construct the characteristics of the harmfulness, complexity, and evolution of terrorism. Through the discursive strategy of political metaphors, terrorism is represented as an imminent, constantly changing, dangerous, and difficult threat.

(1) Natural disaster metaphor

In China's international counterterrorism discourse, the natural disaster metaphor is often used to represent terrorism as an extreme threat to mankind's security. The typical metaphor uses 重灾区/ *disaster areas* (see Figure 4.5) to represent the expansion of international terrorism. According to the dictionary definition, a disaster area is normally defined as an area heavily infected by natural disasters that is qualified to receive emergency aid (Merriam-Webster). Therefore, by comparing regions with serious problems to disaster areas, it creates the connotation that international terrorism is an emergent threat that needs the help of the international community. South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa are often described as disaster areas for terrorist activities. By expanding the concordance line 7, we can see more interesting findings about the usage of disaster area metaphors in constructing the terrorism threat. It vividly describes the result of counterterrorism in these regions as terrorism being hit and splashed over into Southeast Asia, Middle Asia, Europe, and America. The dictionary defines splash as 'to spread or scatter in the manner of splashed liquid' (Merriam-Webster). Hence, the splashing of terrorism has two aspects of meaning. First, the disaster area mentioned at the beginning of line 7 means the natural disaster of a flood. Second, it indicates the dynamics of international terrorism, which can 'splash over' into other regions. Therefore, it shows that terrorism is not only dangerous but also highly flexible under the pressure of the outside environment.

Expanded line 7

长期以来，南亚、中东、北非等地区是国际暴恐活动的重灾区和策源地，也是国际反恐行动的重点区域。经过十多年的联合打击，南亚、中东、北非等地区的暴恐活动在一定程度上得到了遏制，但是另一方面，恐怖主义被打得四处“溅”开，东南亚、中亚、欧美等地区的诸多国家成为恐怖活动的新活跃区。

For a long time, South Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and other regions have been the most affected *disaster areas* and sources of international violent and terrorist activities, as well as the focus of international counterterrorism operations. After more than a decade of joint strikes, violent terrorist activities in South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa have

been curbed to a certain extent. On the other hand, terrorism has been hit and *splashed over everywhere*. Many countries in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Europe, and the United States have become new areas for terrorist activities.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	年，西方成为恐怖袭击的重灾区。分析普遍认为，	恐怖主义	威胁不仅不会在短时间内消失，而且
2	报告认为，除西亚、北非、中亚和北高加索地区等	恐怖主义	重灾区外，欧洲将成为“圣战者”发动攻击的
3	阿富汗、菲律宾、尼日利亚、也门、叙利亚、索马里为全球	恐怖主义	袭击的十大重灾区，这些国家分布在
4	带来的严峻挑战。阿拉斯泰尔·里德：过去3年，西方成为	恐怖主义	袭击的重灾区。分析普遍认为，恐怖主义威胁不仅
5	国家都有可能遭到恐怖袭击。“过去3年，西方成为	恐怖主义	袭击的重灾区。”荷兰海牙国际反恐研究中心
6	事件采取双重标准，最近几年随着欧洲日益成为	恐怖主义	重灾区，欧洲国家逐渐改变了先前看法，选择
7	长期以来，南亚、中东、北非等地区是国际	恐怖主义	的重灾区和策源地，也是国际反恐行动的重点区域

Figure 4.5 Metaphor of disaster area

Another natural disaster metaphor is using *泛滥/flooding* to describe terrorism. (see Figure 4.6) According to the dictionary explanation, flooding means ‘a rising and overflowing of a body of water, especially onto normally dry land’ (Merriam-Wester). The flood metaphor is quite often applied as a discursive strategy in political discourse to delegitimise and attribute a dangerous identity to a particular subject (Wodak & Reisigl 2015). In the context of China’s counterterrorism discourse, the metaphor of flooding is used to display two aspects of its implications. On the one hand, terrorism has root causes, just as flooding disasters always have water sources. For example, in lines 2 and 5, we can see that the turmoil and disorder of a country, stalled economic development, poverty, and ethnic and religious conflicts are represented as the sources that can breed terrorism. On the other hand, flooding has been a perennial natural disaster since the advent of human historical records. Therefore, by comparing terrorism to flooding, it implies that terrorism is a severe threat to human security and is also a chronic threat that can exist in the long term.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	苗头。最后，武器管制不严、枪支泛滥使得‘独狼’	恐怖主义	从技术上成为可能。必须加强武器管制，
2	倒退，失序造成发展停滞，发展停滞催生恐怖主义，	恐怖主义	泛滥使得民众更加难以安生，这是一个可怕
3	极端主义相结合，难以遏制极端意识形态的泛滥。	恐怖主义	是人类公敌，反恐是各国共同责任。未来，
4	举起来，“目”才能真正“张”起来，以有效遏制	恐怖主义	的泛滥。
5	国际社会贫富分化悬殊，民族宗教矛盾深化时，	恐怖主义	便有可能借机滋生与泛滥。

Figure 4.6 Metaphor of flooding

(2) Disease metaphor

The metaphor of terrorism as a severe disease, especially using cancer, tumours, and cancer cells to refer to terrorism, is also a common discursive strategy to construct terrorism as a fatal security threat (see Figure 4.7). Cancer is one of the most severe common human diseases. If cancer is found and not treated, a person's health and life will be threatened. In addition, cancer is deadly because the uncontrolled growth of cancer cells destroys the environment of normal cells, and the growth rate of cancer cells is rapid (Potts & Semino 2019). Therefore, using cancer-related terms to refer to terrorism implies that terrorism violates and disrupts human life and development, conveying an implicit message that terrorism, if left without treatment, will lead to fateful consequences.

First, it refers to terrorist organisations as tumours. In the discourse, the most notorious terrorist organisations of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda are referred to as 肿瘤/*tumours*. As a medical term, tumour refers to the accumulation of cells produced by the proliferation of cancer cells. In clinical practice, surgery often removes tumours to save a patient's life. Therefore, referring to the Islamic State and al-Qaeda as tumours has two implicit messages. On the one hand, terrorist organisations pose malignant threats to international and national security. On the other hand, actions should be taken to remove the danger of terrorism. Therefore, as shown in the expanded line 8, we can see that in China's international counterterrorism discourse, international effort is promoted as the necessary way to remove the 'tumours' of terrorism.

Expanded line 8

要使恐怖主义这个毒瘤最终被控制和消灭，只有通过国际社会的共同努力

This tumour of terrorism can only be controlled and eliminated through the joint efforts of the international community.

Second, it refers to the development of terrorism as cancer cell metastasis. The comparison of the development of terrorism in various parts of the world to the spread of cancer highlights the serious situation of current international terrorism and the urgency of dealing

with such a threat. Expanding line 2, we can find that it refers to the 9/11 terrorist attack as the timing when terrorism-cancer initially formed and describes the worrying situation that the ‘terrorism cancer cells’ have spread to ‘many parts of the body’. In this way, it sends an alert message that terrorism is spreading around the globe at an alarming speed and will cause deadly consequences.

Expanded line 2

如果说恐怖主义是癌症的话，9·11 事件后，恐怖主义的癌细胞已经从初期的原发部位向全身多个部位扩散。

If *terrorism* is *cancer*, the *cancer cells of terrorism* have spread from the primary site to many parts of the body since the September 11 attack.

Third, it refers to terrorism development as virus transmission. The virus metaphor is applied in a bid to indicate that terrorism is as contagious as the virus and can infect across regions. For example, in line 6, it warns that terrorism has a similar feature to a virus and can indiscriminately affect any country. In a globalised and social media era, terrorism can take advantage of new technologies and platforms to diffuse extremist ideologies and recruit members (Asongu, Orim, & Nting 2019). We can also find that, in context, social media is referred to as a boost to the dissemination of terrorism ideologies, as shown in line 3, indicating that the terrorism situation may exacerbate with the improvement of new media technologies.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	包括非洲和欧洲在内的更广泛地区。如果说	恐怖主义	是个癌症，那么，它已从原发
2	出分散性、年轻化、“独狼”式新特点梅建明：如果说	恐怖主义	是癌症的话，9·11”事件后，恐怖主义的癌细胞已经
3	相对有限，但借助社交媒体的强大传播功能，	恐怖主义	思想就像病毒一样快速蔓延。很多恐怖分子
4	当前，“伊斯兰国”组织与“基地”组织成为世界两大	恐怖主义	毒瘤，亟须国际社会携手应对。一是促进
5	新特点梅建明：如果说恐怖主义是癌症的话，“9·11”事件后，	恐怖主义	的癌细胞已经从初期的原发部位
6	利用多边主义找到切实可行的解决方案”古特雷斯表示，	恐怖主义	跟病毒一样不分国界，对所有国家
7	合作，消除导致恐怖主义产生的根源。因此，在铲除	恐怖主义	这一国际性“毒瘤”的过程中，必须走
8	的国际合作，与恐怖主义进行斗争”。的确，要使	恐怖主义	这个毒瘤最终被控制和消灭，只有通过

Figure 4.7 Metaphor of cancer, tumour, and virus

(3) Ecology metaphor

The ecology metaphor is manifested in two aspects. On the one hand, comparing terrorism to 公害/*public hazard* shows that terrorism can cause significant harm to the common interests of mankind. On the other hand, by comparing the causes of terrorism to 土壤/*soil* and 温床/*hotbed*, and comparing the constantly evolving terrorism with 变色龙/*chameleon*, the complexity of the causes of terrorism and the changing characteristics of terrorism are presented.

First, it compares terrorism to 公害/*public hazards*. In Chinese, 公害/*public hazard* is usually referred to as an environmental issue that might threaten the health and living environment of the public. According to China's environmental protection law, 公害/*public hazard* refers to the environmental dangers that seriously threaten the ecological environment on which human survival and development depend and the life and health of the public, such as the pollution of air, soil, and water resources (Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People's Republic of China 2012). In Figure 4.8, we can see that terrorism is referred to as 人类公害/*public hazard of mankind* and 国际公害/*international public hazard*, indicating that terrorism can pose a threat to the safety of mankind and damage the security environment of the international community.

N	Left Context	Hit	Right Context
1	过去将近 4 周年了，国际社会已达成共识，就是	恐怖主义	是人类的公害，国际社会需要通力的
2	部门和研究机构的官员和专家一致认为，	恐怖主义	是国际公害，国际社会应加强合作，打击
3	非传统威胁上升为“国际公害”。防范和打击	恐怖主义	已成为世界主要国家安全战略面临的
4	文明之间的协商对话，寻求从源头上根除	恐怖主义	这一人类公害，为人类社会的昌明
5	孤立恐怖主义威胁并使其丧失能力，才能战胜	恐怖主义	这个全人类的公害。

Figure 4.8 Metaphor of public hazard

Second, it compares factors causing terrorism to 土壤/*soil* (see Figure 4.9). The soil metaphor manifests that certain factors and the environment create terrorism. In other words, terrorism is a threat that has complex causes. In China's international counterterrorism discourse, poverty, ethnic and religious conflicts, ideology, and political turmoil are often used to refer to the soil that produces terrorism, as shown in lines 2, 4, and 7. As the breeding ground of terrorism is composed of many complicated factors, tackling terrorism becomes a necessary but formidable task. For example, in line 1, it describes that terrorism is still rampaging worldwide because the soil that breeds terrorism still exists, which means the root causes of terrorism have not been solved. Moreover, the soil metaphor also conveys an implicit connotation that many factors should be taken into consideration in order to effectively manage the terrorism problem.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	了，全球的反恐之路依然漫长，因为滋生	恐怖主义	的土壤并没有铲除。今天的世界依然
2	的民族和宗教问题，消除宗教极端主义，铲除	恐怖主义	的土壤。
3	的国际反恐斗争取得了一定成效，但滋生	恐怖主义	的社会土壤和国际因素远未根除，一旦
4	动荡是恐怖主义滋生的温床，贫穷和落后是	恐怖主义	产生的土壤。我们应在缓和地区及
5	意识形态问题纠缠在一起，为恐怖分子所利用，成为	恐怖主义	产生的温床和土壤。因此，打击恐怖主义必须
6	真空中发生，恐怖分子也不会存在于社会之外，	恐怖主义	思想都有其社会土壤。因此，普通民众
7	宗教、文化和意识形态等方面的原因，要消除	恐怖主义	滋长的土壤，是极其复杂的事。问题
8	有助于从根本上解决贫困与贫富差距问题，铲除	恐怖主义	生存土壤。

Figure 4.9 Metaphor of soil

In a similar vein, the metaphor of 温床/*hotbed* represents terrorism as a threat with complex root causes. The causes include poverty, underdevelopment, political conflict, and civil war, as shown in Figure 4.10.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	人们对正义得到伸张不抱希望，是滋长	恐怖主义	的温床”。他们提出要“劝阻那些心怀不满的
2	报记者采访时表示，贫困是极端主义和	恐怖主义	滋生的温床，解放摩苏尔是对“伊斯兰国”的
3	斗争的最终胜利，必须标本兼治。冲突和动荡是	恐怖主义	滋生的温床，贫穷和落后是恐怖主义产生
4	坐大、多国内战旷日持久和外溢效应蔓延等等，都是	恐怖主义	滋生的温床。2014年6月，“伊斯兰国”组织攻占伊拉克
5	动荡是恐怖主义滋生的温床，贫穷和落后是	恐怖主义	产生的土壤。我们应在缓和地区及
6	利用，成为恐怖主义产生的温床和土壤。因此，打击	恐怖主义	必须标本兼治，国际社会必须以更大的
7	国家本来就发展迟缓、贫富悬殊、民生艰难，为滋生	恐怖主义	提供了温床。沙特《生活报》网站刊文

Figure 4.10 Metaphor of hotbed

Third, it compares terrorism to the chameleon (see Figure 4.11). The chameleon metaphor is the only analogy that refers to terrorism as a type of animal. The chameleon is a lizard with the ability to change colour in response to its surroundings. Using the chameleon to describe terrorism, the discourse constructs terrorism as a tricky threat that can adapt to changing environments. The logic of referring to terrorism as a chameleon indicates that terrorism is a tough problem to deal with as it can take advantage of the macroenvironment such as the globalisation and development of new information technologies and evolve new features, as shown in the expanded line 1.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	斗争战略转型。国际恐怖主义的新特点当代国际	恐怖主义	如同超级“变色龙”，随着经济全球化和社会信息化
2	在未来制造更多、更大规模的恐怖袭击。此外，	恐怖主义	是超级变色龙，会随着环境的改变而

Figure 4.11 Metaphor of chameleon

Expanded line 1

当代国际恐怖主义如同超级“变色龙”，随着经济全球化和社会信息化的不断深化以及外界环境的变化而发生相应变化，但它们也具有一些共同的新特点

Contemporary international terrorism, like a super ‘chameleon’, has undergone corresponding changes with the deepening of economic globalisation, social informatisation, and changes in the external environment. But they also share some new features.

From the abovementioned analysis, we can see that China’s international counterterrorism discourse employs many discursive strategies to construct terrorism as a security threat. The strategies encompass creating a binary relationship between terrorism and mankind’s security, building a victimhood group identity, and using political metaphors. The subsequent section will conduct a collocation analysis in order to examine the discourse prosody of terrorism. The objective of collocation analysis is to reveal the underlying attitudes towards terrorism that are implied in this discourse.

4.4 Discourse Prosody in the Representation of Terrorism

This section aims to analyse the prosody in the representation of terrorism in China’s international counterterrorism discourse. Discourse prosody is the embodiment of attitude,

preference, and idea in discourse (Baker, Francis, Tognini-Bonelli, & Sinclair 1993; Stubbs 1996b, 2002). Discourse prosody can be revealed through collocation analysis, as collocates can imbue an object with a consistent ‘aura of meaning and attitudes’ (Baker 2006a; Louw 1993: 157) Therefore, the collocation analysis of the Terrorism Corpus will reveal the overall prosody around terrorism in China’s international counterterrorism discourse. In other words, by investigating the collocates of terrorism, we can find the attitudes and views towards terrorism in China’s international counterterrorism discourse.

To investigate the discourse prosody, 恐怖主义/*terrorism* is set as the node word from which the collocates in the Terrorism Corpus are derived. The threshold measure is set as $P < 0.01$ (6.63) and $T > 2$. The search window span is set as 5L-5R. Based on the setting, 79 salient collocates are found. The collocation analysis will be made on these collocates by investigating and interpreting their semantic meaning, connotation, and hidden ideas and attitudes. Collocates can be classified in terms of semantic meanings, themes, or grammar according to the purpose of the study (Baker 2006b:104-112). This study only focuses on lexical words. Thus, the derived collocates of 恐怖主义/*terrorism* are categorised into three groups according to their semantic meanings and themes: evaluation of terrorism, threats by terrorism, and responses to terrorism.

4.4.1 Evaluation of Terrorism

According to semantic meanings and context, the collocates denoting the evaluation of terrorism can be divided into three collocation groups (see Table 4.5). In context, the collocation between these terms and 恐怖主义/*terrorism* creates particular prosodies around terrorism issues regarding the perception of terrorism, analysis of terrorism causes, and review of terrorism trends.

Table 4.5 Evaluation of terrorism

Semantic Group	Collocates
Perception of terrorism	威胁/threat 形式/form 一切/all 活动/activity 主义/doctrine 危害/hazard 势力/force 特定/particular 任何/any
Analysis of terrorism causes	产生/generate 根源/root 滋生/breed 土壤/soil 温床/hotbed 条件/condition 成为/become
Review of terrorism trends	蔓延/spread 面临/face with 趋势/trend 特点/feature 极端/extreme 传播/propagate 发展/development 当前/current 新/new 猖獗/rampant

(1) Perception of terrorism

The analysis of the perception of terrorism reflected in collocation aims to investigate the attitudinal opinions of China's international counterterrorism on the nature and manifestation of terrorism. The most common collocation in terms of the perception of terrorism is 恐怖主义威胁/*terrorism threat*. In this pattern, the proximity of *terrorism* and *threat* creates a connotation that terrorism is a threat in nature. In addition, many negative evaluative expressions adjacent to this collocation can be found in the context, such as 警钟/*alarm bells*, 不安/*unsafe*, 严重/*serious*, 严峻/*severe*, 紧迫/*urgent*, and 肆虐/*rampage*. In context, the collocation and context imply that the threat of terrorism is pervasive and can pose challenges at international, regional, and national levels (see Figure 4.12). First, terrorism is represented as a global security threat that poses severe challenges to the international community's peace, stability, and development, as shown in lines 7, 8, 12, and 24. Second, terrorism is perceived as a regional threat that continues to grow. For example, in lines 1 and 6, Africa and Europe are depicted as regions that are facing international terrorism threats. Third, terrorism is perceived as a severe threat to national security. Lots of countries are described as suffering from terrorist attacks, as lines 11, 14, 17, 21, 22, and 28 illustrate the gloomy terrorism situation in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Indonesia, Germany, and Australia.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	加强反恐合作，应对这股逆流。非洲遭受恐怖主义	威胁	的地区主要有四个，分别是索马里
2	发生数起暴力袭击事件，再次敲响了恐怖主义	威胁	的警钟。为打击恐怖主义，欧盟近年来采取了
3	这个时代最大的挑战。”面对日益严峻的恐怖主义	威胁	欧洲民众神经紧绷，在深深的不安中
4	了深入探讨，取得广泛共识。双方重申，恐怖主义严重	威胁	着世界和平与发展。国际社会应加强
5	斗争的立场。发言如下：恐怖主义是全人类的公敌，	威胁	着国际和平与安全。新年伊始，我们聚集
6	男子，凸显出美国本土极端主义和恐怖主义的	威胁	依然严峻。为应对严峻的反恐形势，欧美
7	对叙利亚平民狂轰滥炸有关”。恐怖主义是人类共同	威胁	打击恐怖主义是每个国家都应该承担的
8	月起就已经将本国面临的国际恐怖主义	威胁	等级从“较严重”提高到第二高的“
9	认为，相比境外受训后回流的恐怖分子，本土恐怖主义	威胁	越来越大，去极端化任务艰巨。新冠肺炎
10	特征不能否认，整个法国也依然在恐怖主义的	威胁	之下。奥朗德表示，面对恐怖主义，法国将展现出
11	周系列活动敦促各会员国，对恐怖主义的全球	威胁	保持警惕，并提出了保持反恐力度、加强
12	极端组织，该组织宣称效忠极端组织“伊斯兰国”。为应对恐怖主义	威胁	印尼政府今年1月颁布了《2020年至2024年
13	决心，但德国仍面临历史上最严重的恐怖主义	威胁	反恐形势依然严峻。据《南德意志报》等
14	各国所面临的最严峻和紧迫的安全	威胁	合力打击恐怖主义既是国际社会的当务之急，也是
15	以什么形式出现，都是对人类社会的共同	威胁	听任恐怖主义活动肆虐，各国人民的和平与
16	日开始，澳政府就把本国面临的恐怖主义	威胁	级别从“中级”提升至“高级”。这是澳大利亚自2003
17	都是对国际和平与安全的一个最严重	威胁	要击溃国际恐怖主义，必须按照《联合国宪章》和

Figure 4.12 Threat and terrorism

A frequent discursive pattern can be found when 特定/*particular* collocates with terrorism in the context: 特定+宗教+民族/*particular + religion + ethnicity*. Examining the context, we can find that in the vicinity of such a pattern, negative expressions, such as 反对/*oppose*, 不能/*must not*, and 不应/*should not*, create a prosody of objectiveness that there should be a standard to define terrorism in terms of its violent nature. We can also find a prosody of caution that linking particular religion or ethnicity to terrorism would make the situation worse. For example, in line 9, it describes the fact that within Western society, there exists a tendency to associate terrorism with particular religions and ethnicities. Such associations can intensify animosity between diverse religious and ethnic groups, thereby potentially fostering an environment conducive to terrorism. Therefore, through the examination of this collocation, we can find that China regards terrorism as an absolute threat, but it also holds objective and cautious attitudes that religion and ethnicity must be disentangled from perceiving the terrorism issue.

N	Left Context	Right Context
1	国际法的基本原则，中方反对将恐怖主义问题与	特定 的宗教和民族相联系。“要想彻底
2	宪章》和国际法基本准则；反对将恐怖主义问题和	特定 的宗教或民族相联系；要标本兼治。在
3	优劣、高低和贵贱之分。反对恐怖主义不应与	特定 的民族或宗教挂钩。第五十五届联合国
4	恐怖主义属于极少数极端邪恶势力，不能把恐怖主义与	特定 的民族或宗教相联系。打击恐怖主义是
5	不能任意扩大打击范围，更不能把恐怖主义与	特定 的民族、宗教和国家相联系。沙祖康
6	对反恐问题的关切。中国反对将恐怖主义与	特定 的民族、宗教和地区挂钩；反对以打
7	世界和平与稳定的重要力量。恐怖主义不应与	特定 国家、民族和宗教挂钩，推动不同文明对话
8	一国国内法凌驾于国际法之上，也不应将恐怖主义与	特定 国家、民族和宗教挂钩。
9	亦有关系。西方社会某些人将恐怖主义与	特定 宗教挂钩，从根本上加深了宗教、民族间
10	于以国家为主体的战争，也不同于针对	特定 目标的传统犯罪。恐怖主义的主要特点之一，

Figure 4.13 Disentangling religion, ethnicity, and nationality from terrorism

(2) Analysis of terrorism causes

The semantic meanings of the collocates of 产生/*generate*, 根源/*root*, 滋生/*breed*, 土壤/*soil*, 温床/*hotbed*, and 条件/*condition* are relevant to the causes of terrorism. Examining the context in which these collocates cooccur with terrorism, we can find a discourse prosody of objectiveness. China displays a neutral attitude towards the causes of terrorism, perceives terrorism as a complex security issue, and holds that it should be understood from a wide angle that multiple reasons cause terrorism. Take the collocate 产生/*generate* for example. The common expression in the vicinity of the collocation is 复杂/*complex*. For example, in lines 1, 3, and 4, we can find that the generation of terrorism is depicted as a highly complex process that involves political, economic, religious, cultural, and social issues. Among those factors, economic-related issues such as poverty, social economic disparity, political instability, and regional conflict are frequently regarded as reasons that generate terrorism. Therefore, it shows that China is aware of the complexity of the terrorism issue. In addition, international factors such as unfair international political and economic order and foreign interference in sovereign countries are also represented as catalysts for generating regional and international terrorism. Therefore, the collocation and context also convey the implicit connotation that economic and political measures should be the major concern in addressing the root causes of terrorism.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	是极其复杂的事。问题还在于，美国对	产生	恐怖主义的内外原因，还没有进行深入的
2	需要建立预防的“软”手段，有步骤地消除	产生	恐怖主义和极端主义的因素，使预防性工作
3	的情报方面加强国际合作。第四，恐怖主义的	产生	有其复杂的政治、经济、宗教、文化和
4	主渠道作用；第三，要坚持标本兼治，综合应对。恐怖主义的	产生	有着复杂的政治、经济、社会原因，仅靠
5	是恐怖主义滋生的温床，贫穷和落后是恐怖主义	产生	的土壤。我们应在缓和地区及国际
6	经济全球化发展的不公平、不平衡是恐怖主义	产生	的深层原因。第三，民族、宗教、文化的矛盾
7	问题纠缠在一起，为恐怖分子所利用，成为恐怖主义	产生	的温床和土壤。因此，打击恐怖主义必须标本兼治
8	点：第一，政治上的不合理、不公正正是恐怖主义	产生	的直接原因。第二，经济全球化发展的不
9	不合理的国际政治和经济秩序为恐怖主义的	产生	与生长提供了基础，恐怖组织和恐怖活动
10	只是“隔靴搔痒”，有时效果可能会适得其反，因为恐怖主义的	产生	与蔓延，既是一个政治问题，也是一个经济
11	的社会和政治不满情绪，将为恐怖主义提供	滋生	土壤，我们对此需保持警惕。” 欧盟外交

Figure 4.14 Root causes of terrorism

(3) Review of terrorism trends

Examining the concordance lines where 趋势/*trend* collocate with 恐怖主义/*terrorism*, we can find the context that implies the connotation of new features and the intractable development of terrorism. 新的/*new* is the common expression that appears frequently adjacent to the collocation. We can see a prosody of vigilance and a sense of crisis in the context. First, international terrorism is spreading all over the world with rampant momentum. World security is under serious challenge as terrorist attacks frequently occur worldwide, as shown in the expanded line 20, implying that terrorism is becoming an imminent international threat. It also depicts the rise of the Islamic State and foreign fighters as catalysts for transnational terrorist acts. In the expanded line 4, we can find that a difficult scenario is created by depicting thousands of foreign jihadists of the Islamic States returning from the battleground in Iraq and Syria to their home countries.

Expanded line 20

在如此短时间内，接连发生恐袭事件，为近年来罕见，凸显当前国际恐怖主义新的发展趋势。国际恐怖主义呈全球蔓延之势，波及范围更广。

The spate of terrorist attacks within such a short period of time has been rare in recent years and highlights the new trend of international terrorism. International terrorism is spreading globally and affecting wider areas.

Second, the terrorism situation in some regions is exacerbating. Lines 2, 6, and 11 show the description of the worsening condition of terrorism in regions such as Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. It suggests that these areas will be faced with a severe challenge from international terrorism. Third, terrorism has evolved new features. Expanding line 23, we can see that the representation of the development trend of international terrorism highlights that the Islamic State terrorist organisation has acquired the quasi-state military capability to govern territory and wage wars against the sovereign nations of Syria and Iraq. The most stunning evolution is that terrorist organisations, commonly referred to as non-state actors, exhibit characteristics and behaviours akin to those of state actors (Aydinli 2016; Hoffman 2017; Josselin & Wallace 2001). Hence, this suggests that China cares much about the new phenomenon of international terrorism.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	地区安全局势更加严峻。恐怖主义在西非的发展	趋势	呈现多方面特征。首先，极端组织武装避免
2	外国“圣战”分子跨国流窜，是恐怖主义呈现全球蔓延	趋势	的重要原因，国际社会亟须就此建立联防
3	恐怖主义新的发展趋势。国际恐怖主义呈现全球蔓延	趋势	波及范围更广。长期以来，南亚、中东、欧洲
4	不平衡。非洲和欧洲的恐怖主义形势有恶化	趋势	南亚和中东，出现好转迹象。其次，国际恐怖主义
5	接连发生暴恐大案，凸显国际恐怖主义发展新	趋势	国际社会亟须加强反恐合作，联手应对新
6	当前，国际恐怖主义新的发展	趋势	已经日渐明朗，恐怖势力正在渗透那些经济
7	应密切监测不断变化的恐怖主义威胁和发展	趋势	并在应对措施方面保持创新。第三，反恐
8	更大。这一袭击更显示欧洲恐怖主义“本土化”	趋势	明显。美国情报机构评估显示，数千名
9	疫情发生以来，欧盟境内恐怖主义传播转向互联网的新	趋势	更加突出。针对10月16日的中学教师遇害
10	社会既要保持反恐力度，也要密切关注恐怖主义发展新	趋势	要进一步弘扬多边主义，支持联合国在反恐
11	和中东，出现好转迹象。其次，国际恐怖主义出现分散化	趋势	这主要是因为“伊斯兰国”等极端组织遭受打击
12	各种极端思想，从左到右，都呈上升	趋势	这是我们理解恐怖主义问题的主要时代背景。
13	为近年来罕见，凸显当前国际恐怖主义新的发展	趋势	国际恐怖主义呈全球蔓延之势，波及范围
14	的规模，全力确保民众安全。恐怖主义活动呈现新	趋势	从巴黎到布鲁塞尔，从伊斯坦布尔到拉合尔，

Figure 4.15 Trends of international terrorism

4.4.2 Scope of the Terrorism Threat

Many collocates of 恐怖主义/terrorism represent particular semantic and contextual connotations of the range of the terrorism threat and who is threatened by terrorism (see Table 4.6). The collocations show a dim prosody that terrorism is an extensive and widespread threat.

Table 4.6 Scope of the terrorism threat

Semantic Group	Collocates
Range of terrorism threat	国际/international 全球性/global 全球/worldwide 世界/world
Subjects threatened by terrorism	人类/mankind 公敌/common enemy 社会/society 受害者/victim 中国/China

(1) Range of terrorism threat

The collocates 国际/*international*, 全球性/*global*, 全球/*worldwide*, and 世界/*world* denote the semantic meaning of geopolitical ranger and scope. The context where 全球性/*global*, 全球/*global* collocate with 恐怖主义/*terrorism* creates a connotation that terrorism is a threat with global impact. The most salient pattern in context is 全球性威胁/*global threat*, 全球性问题/*global problem*, and 全球蔓延/*spread worldwide*. In addition, we can also find many expressions, such as 难题/*conundrum*, 主要的/*major*, 演变/*evolution*, 肆虐/*rampant*, 迫切/*urgent*, 猖獗/*rampant*, and 严峻/*severe*, presenting a global emergency in the face of international terrorism (see Figure 4.16). By representing terrorism as a critical global threat, the discourse hints that there is an urgent need to deal with it for the benefit of the international community, as shown in the expanded line 2.

Expanded line 2

恐怖主义是 21 世纪主要的全球性威胁之一。铲除和根绝恐怖主义, 是实现世界和平与发展进程中所面临的一个严峻挑战。

Terrorism is one of the *major global threats* of the 21st century. *The eradication of terrorism* is a huge challenge to maintaining *world peace and development*.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	恐怖主义问题进行全球性的综合治理。当下恐怖主义已成为	全球性	、普遍性、系统性难题, 超越个别国家的局部利益,
2	和铲除恐怖主义, 仍然任重而道远。恐怖主义是 21 世纪主要的	全球性	威胁之一。铲除和根绝恐怖主义, 是实现
3	会长理查德·哈斯表示。“恐怖主义仍是不断演变的	全球性	威胁”当前全球反恐形势严峻复杂, 消除恐怖主义
4	参与恐袭而遭逮捕。“恐怖主义仍是不断演变的	全球性	威胁, 危及国际和平与安全, 摧毁社会, 破坏
5	关键因素。因此, 在应对恐怖主义肆虐蔓延这一	全球性	问题时, 各个国家和地区都非常有必要
6	区域问题转变为关系人类社会共同发展的	全球性	问题。恐怖主义不应被看作个别热点地区的“
7	解决, 携手应对自然灾害、气候变化、传染病疫情、恐怖主义等	全球性	问题。”从道义基础、价值取向、现实要求和
8	价值取向, 寻求从根本上解决恐怖主义问题。恐怖主义的	全球	蔓延迫切要求对恐怖主义进行全球治理。伴随
9	单纯以武力反恐当前, 各种形式的恐怖主义在	全球	范围内呈扩大之势, 尤其以民族分裂主义
10	间断。全球各地仍然“闻恐色变”。这说明	全球	范围内恐怖主义活动依然猖獗, 恐怖主义蔓延的
11	接连发生的恐怖袭击震惊世界。恐怖主义已经成为	全球	当前面临的最严峻和急迫的安全

Figure 4.16 Global problem of terrorism

(2) Subjects threatened by terrorism

The collocates of 人类/*mankind*, 社会/*society*, 受害者/*victims*, and 中国/*China* are terms that indicate who is under the security challenge of terrorism. Examination of the concordance lines of the collocation that include these terms and terrorism reveals that two kinds of actors are under the threat of terrorism.

The first is that mankind is threatened by terrorism. Examination of concordance lines that include collocate 人类/*mankind* and 恐怖主义/*terrorism* reveals some patterns that mankind is threatened by terrorism, including 人类公敌/*common enemy of mankind*, 人类共同威胁/*common threat for mankind*, and 人类的公害/*public hazard to mankind* and 反人类/*anti-human* and 反文明/*anti-civilisation*. The most interesting finding is that China brings forward the suggestion that terrorism should be considered under the comprehensive security view of the 人类命运共同体/*community with a shared future for mankind*, indicating that the security of all humans is interconnected in the face of terrorism threats. Investigating the context that includes both 社会/*society* and 恐怖主义/*terrorism*, it can be found that the most salient pattern is 恐怖主义是对国际社会的威胁/*terrorism is a threat to the international community*.

N	Left Context	Right Context
1	相结合，难以遏制极端意识形态的泛滥。恐怖主义是	人类 公敌，反恐是各国共同责任。未来，国际社会
2	有评论称，恐袭频发惨案不断，恐怖主义已成为	人类 公敌，各国固然应当加强安保提高防范，国际
3	新时代，安全领域面临新的挑战。恐怖主义是	人类 公敌，特别是网络恐怖主义给世界安全带来
4	治理中难以发挥自主自决作用。当前，恐怖主义反	人类 、反文明的本质，危害人类共同安全的
5	命运共同体的高度。因此，在深刻认识恐怖主义反	人类 、反文明本质的基础上，国际社会应彻底
6	携手建构全球反恐战略体系。以对恐怖主义反	人类 、反文明本质的共识为携手建构全球
7	巴沙尔·阿萨德政权、对叙利亚平民狂轰滥炸有关”。恐怖主义是	人类 的共同威胁，打击恐怖主义是每个国家都
8	周年了，国际社会已达成共识，就是恐怖主义是	人类 的公害，国际社会需要通力的协作，来
9	上跳出冷战思维的束缚，将打击恐怖主义置于	人类 命运共同体中、置于人类社会发展与安全
10	进行全球治理就具有坚实的道义基础。建构	人类 命运共同体是对恐怖主义进行全球治理的
11	协商对话，寻求从源头上根除恐怖主义这一	人类 公害，为人类社会的昌明进步、繁荣稳定
12	恐怖主义正从国内和国际安全问题转变为	人类 安全问题。过去，恐怖主义常常被人们看作是
13	依然时时萦绕于心。然而，这一恐怖主义造成的	人类 悲剧远未结束：从印尼巴厘岛的恶性爆炸，
14	领域不容忽略的重点。极端恐怖主义的危害，是	人类 面对的共同危害。阻止以“伊斯兰国”为代表

Figure 4.17 Mankind threatened by terrorism

Another noteworthy finding is that 中国/*China* is the only term representing a country or state actor in the collocates derived from the corpus. Examining the concordance lines where 中国/*China* collocates with 恐怖主义/*terrorism*, we can find two patterns that denote the threat of terrorism (see Figure 4.18). The first is 中国也是恐怖主义的受害者/*China is also a victim of terrorism*, as shown in 1-5 and line 9. The second is shown in lines 6-8 and 10: 中国也深受恐怖主义之害/*China is also threatened by terrorism*. When we combine the aforementioned findings, the hidden meaning becomes clear. It suggests that, given the threat posed by terrorism, security is interconnected and that actions should be coordinated by the international community to combat this global menace.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	打、打多狠，都是从本国利益来考量。	中国	也是恐怖主义的受害者，在国际上中国遭受恐怖
2	发挥联合国的主导作用，组成反恐统一战线。王毅表示，	中国	也是恐怖主义的受害者，打击以“东伊运”
3	各成员能力建设，进一步深化反恐合作。胡锦涛强调，	中国	也是恐怖主义的受害者。我们坚决反对一切形式
4	的贡献。王毅说，中国反对一切形式的恐怖主义。	中国	也是恐怖主义的受害者。在中国境内从事恐怖活动
5	以及其他地方都相继发生了恐怖袭击事件。	中国	也是国际恐怖主义受害者。”秦刚指出，中国在反恐
6	可持续发展等全球性问题有助于铲除国际恐怖主义。唐家璇说，	中国	也一直面临着恐怖主义的威胁。“东突”
7	稽查，切断恐怖主义融资，保障通讯安全。唐家璇最后强调，	中国	也深受恐怖主义之害，坚决谴责和反对
8	地区和国际和平与稳定的一大威胁。	中国	也面临恐怖主义的危害。“东突”恐怖组织
9	系统积极筹建反洗钱金融交易支付监测中心。	中国	是恐怖主义的受害者之一。“东突”恐怖势力
10	与繁荣创造一个和平安全的环境。江泽民强调，	中国	深受恐怖主义之害，坚决谴责和反对一切

Figure 4.18 China threatened by terrorism

4.4.3 Reactions to Terrorism

Nearly half of the derived collocates are related to the category of reactions to terrorism. Some typical high-frequency collocates are chosen for collocation analysis. They were further categorised into two groups according to their semantic meanings (see Table 4.7). The examination of their concordance lines in which they collocate with 恐怖主义/*terrorism* reveals a discourse prosody of firmness in fighting the terrorism threat.

Table 4.7 Responses to terrorism

Semantic Group	Collocates
Stance against terrorism	反对/oppose 坚决/resolute 指出/point out 强调/emphasise 重申/reiterate 支持/support
Action to solve terrorism	打击/fight 消除/eliminate 铲除/eradicate 根除/root out 共同/joint 统一/united 必须/must 不应/should not 不能/must not

(1) Stance against terrorism

The examination of the context of the collocates of 反对/*oppose*, 坚决/*resolute*, 支持/*support*, 必须/*must*, 不应/*should not*, and 不能/*must not* indicates that China's firm stance against terrorism is implied in the discourse. The collocate 反对/*oppose* is chosen for detailed analysis, as it is the most frequent and salient collocate with terrorism. Two patterns of collocation can be found in the context. The first is 反对一切形式的恐怖主义/*oppose all forms of terrorism*. This pattern of expression is used to describe China's consistent stance on perceiving terrorism. In addition, expressions such as 历来/*always* and 一贯/*consistently* often cooccur with the collocation, conveying a message that opposition to all forms of terrorism is held by China as the long-standing and consistent attitude towards terrorism issues. Examining the context, we can find that such a pattern often occurs in contexts where spokespersons of the Chinese Foreign Ministry announce China's basic position in counterterrorism. For example, in lines 4, the Chinese spokesman stresses China's perception of terrorism as a common threat to the international community and China's willingness to cooperate with the international community to oppose all forms of terrorism.

The second typical pattern is 反对恐怖主义/*oppose terrorism*. It is often used to present the opinions of the international community on terrorism to reinforce China's firmness against terrorism. Examining the concordance liens, it can be found that three types of actors are presented in the context, including international organisations, nation states, and individual citizens. For example, lines 8-9 and 13-15 describe the opposition to terrorism by international organisations such as the United Nations, European Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Lines 10, 11, 16, 18, and 19 describe opposition to terrorism by the countries of Canada, the US, Germany, France, Spain, Tunisia, Syria, and Indonesia. Lines 12 and 17 illustrate the counterterrorism protests in Paris and Tunis in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. Therefore, it creates a prosody of universal opposition to terrorism from the international community at different levels.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	一法案表示严重关切。耿爽说，中方坚决	反对	一切形式的恐怖主义，支持国际社会开展反恐
2	姜瑜说，“恐怖主义是国际社会的公敌，中国历来	反对	一切形式的恐怖主义，并积极参与国际反恐
3	事件以后的认识是一致的。中国一贯强调，	反对	一切形式的恐怖主义，主张加强国际反恐合作，
4	威胁时刻存在，没有一国能独善其身。王光亚强调，坚决	反对	一切形式的恐怖主义是各国共同承担的
5	在反恐问题上的立场是一贯的，中方	反对	一切形式的恐怖主义，但反恐不能有双重标准。
6	中国在反恐问题上立场鲜明，基本立场是：	反对	一切形式的恐怖主义；反恐不能持双重标准；应
7	中国确立了反恐的基本政策，即：谴责并	反对	一切形式的恐怖主义，打击恐怖主义要标本兼治，反恐
8	的 31 条建议。“9·11”以来，安理会通过的十几个有关	反对	恐怖主义的决议，意在切断恐怖组织和
9	和 1373 号决议，第五十六届联大通过了关于	反对	恐怖主义的第一号决议，还举行了关于
10	他表示，加拿大政府继续支持巴基斯坦政府和人民	反对	恐怖主义的行动。德国总理默克尔 21 日发表声明，
11	宣布反恐对策法国总统希拉克 19 日在此间强调，	反对	恐怖主义必须遵循国际法准则。希拉克是当天在
12	大规模反恐游行 1 月 11 日，法国巴黎举行大游行，	反对	恐怖主义暴行。众多游行民众聚集在巴黎共和国
13	2002.05.22 东盟反恐会议闭幕东盟部长级	反对	恐怖主义特别会议 21 日在这里闭幕。会议通过
14	所为，在何时发生，为何目的，都是犯罪。与会者一致	反对	将恐怖主义意识形态和恐怖分子与某宗教或
15	首脑会议 23 日在这里通过了《亚欧会议哥本哈根	反对	国际恐怖主义合作宣言》和《亚欧会议哥本哈根反对
16	由印度尼西亚和澳大利亚联合倡议主办的亚太区域	反对	恐怖主义部长级会议 4 日在印尼旅游胜地巴厘岛
17	首都突尼斯城举行反恐大游行，表达突尼斯国民	反对	恐怖主义、反对暴力行为，团结、坚强的心声。突尼斯
18	恐怖主义的重大步骤。巴沙尔强调，叙利亚支持国际合作	反对	恐怖主义，但是反恐怖不是战争，不能滥杀无辜，
19	西班牙政府呼吁民众，“每个人都应该团结一致，坚决	反对	恐怖主义。”欧盟安全委员朱利安·金近日撰文指出，

Figure 4.19 Opposition to terrorism

(2) Action to solve terrorism

The collocation of terrorism encompasses a range of verb collocates that are interesting to analyse, including 打击/*fight*, 消除/*eliminate*, 铲除/*eradicate*, 根除/*root out*, 必须/*must*, 不应/*should not*, and 不能/*must not*. Verbs are often used in China's international counterterrorism discourse and serve as instruction or advice on actions that should and should not engage in dealing with terrorism issues (Baker 2006b:58). Examining these collocates in context helps reveal China's attitudes towards dealing with the terrorism threat.

打击/*fight* is the most salient collocate. Examining the context in which 打击/*fight* cooccurs with 恐怖主义/*terrorism*, it can be found that in most cases, 打击/*fight* refers to comprehensive measures that include the use of force but highlight the priority of political and economic approaches. The first evidence can be found in the context of the frequent discursive pattern of 打击 + 恐怖主义 + 标本兼治 / *fight + terrorism + address both*

symptoms and root causes. In China's counterterrorism discourse, addressing both symptoms and root causes is regarded as the core paradigm for dealing with terrorism threats. It emphasises non-military approaches to solving the root causes of terrorism, such as poverty, disparity, and a conflictual environment. As the expanded line 6 shows, the use of force is represented as a limited method, and comprehensive approaches and international cooperation are depicted as the appropriate solutions to solve the terrorism problem.

Expanded line 6

Line 6: 打击恐怖主义要标本兼治，反恐斗争不能单纯依靠军事手段，要注意综合治理，应充分发挥联合国在国际反恐斗争中的主导作用

The *fight against terrorism* should *address both the symptoms and root causes* of terrorism and *not rely solely on military methods*. The international community should pay attention to the *comprehensive governance of terrorism*, and the *United Nations* should play a *leading role* in the fight against terrorism.

The second piece of evidence can be found in the depiction of China's Counterterrorism Law (CTL). In the expanded line 9, it describes that China has enacted its first counterterrorism law and is committed to intensifying its efforts to combat terrorism and promoting international counterterrorism cooperation. A review of the law shows that Article 4 of Chapter 1 emphasises the strategic and comprehensive nature of counterterrorism and that the fight against terrorism should be conducted by political, economic, legal, cultural, educational, diplomatic, and military means (National People's Congress 2018). Two points can be made from the law. First, most of the measures defined by China's counterterrorism law are non-violent. Second, the use of force is an option but is considered the last resort among the available methods. Therefore, it is evident that the collocation of 打击/*strike* and 恐怖主义/*terrorism* shows a prosody of preference for political and economic measures to solve terrorism problems.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	的民族、宗教和国家相联系。沙祖康指出，	打击	恐怖主义需要标本兼治，不仅应考虑解决当前的
1	外交部副部长王毅 2 日在会议发言中指出，	打击	恐怖主义需要标本兼治，既考虑解决当前的问题，
2	社会经济发展，消除恐怖主义滋生的条件。防范和	打击	恐怖主义需要在国家、地区、全球等各个层面
3	交换了意见，并达成广泛共识。双方一致认为，	打击	恐怖主义是一项系统和长期的工作。
4	叙利亚平民狂轰滥炸有关”。恐怖主义是人类共同威胁，	打击	恐怖主义是每个国家都应该承担的责任。
5	所利用，成为恐怖主义产生的温床和土壤。因此，	打击	恐怖主义必须标本兼治，国际社会必须以更大
6	的指导原则。在反恐问题上不能采取双重标准，	打击	恐怖主义要标本兼治，反恐斗争不能单纯依靠军事
7	和平与不同文明间的对话。他还指出，	打击	恐怖主义不应局限于采取军事行动，应当从
8	因素不可能在短时期内消除，惩治和	打击	恐怖主义也将是一项长期而艰巨
9	成员。不久前，中国颁布了《反恐怖主义法》 致力于加大	打击	恐怖主义力度，推进国际反恐合作。《反恐怖主义法》
10	反恐战略构建上跳出冷战思维的束缚，将	打击	恐怖主义置于人类命运共同体中、置于人类社会
11	发展。国际社会应加强合作，采取综合性手段，共同	打击	一切形式的恐怖主义，并充分发挥联合国和
12	中国国内各部门也加大了对恐怖主义的	打击	在立法、航空、金融、海关等领域采取了

Figure 4.20 Acting to strike terrorism

In addition, the collocates of 消除/*eliminate*, 铲除/*eradicate*, and 根除/*root out* cooccur with terrorism in the context where a prosody of elimination is displayed. Take the collocate 消除/*eliminate* for instance. Examining the concordance lines, it can be found that the most common patterns are 消除+恐怖主义+根源/条件 /*eliminate + terrorism + root/condition*. In China's international counterterrorism, the root and condition often refer to social factors that contribute to the development of terrorism. Therefore, the repetitive mention of eliminating the terrorism root or condition has two implications. On the one hand, terrorism is a threat that must be eliminated. On the other hand, social and economic development is critical to solving the terrorism problem, as shown in expanded line 5.

Expanded line 5

努力消除恐怖主义产生的根源，通过促进就业、教育、卫生等途径实现社会经济发展，消除恐怖主义滋生的条件

Efforts should be made to *eliminate* the *root causes* of terrorism. *Conditions* breeding terrorism can be *eliminated* through *social and economic development*, such as promoting employment, education, and healthcare.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	支持联合国在反恐中发挥领导作用。要努力	消除	恐怖主义产生的根源，通过促进就业、教育等
2	指出，要解决恐怖主义，除了要打击恐怖分子，还要努力	消除	恐怖主义产生的根源，通过促进就业、教育、卫生
3	情报以及思想领域综合施策，标本兼治，尤其是致力于	消除	恐怖主义产生的根源和滋生土壤，采取军事
4	和民族相联系。“要想彻底铲除恐怖主义，就要	消除	恐怖主义产生的根源，必须标本兼治。”秦刚说。
5	打击恐怖主义应注重综合治理，标本兼治，把重点放在	消除	恐怖主义产生的根源上。在就打击恐怖主义
6	根源，通过促进就业、教育等实现经济社会发展，	消除	恐怖主义滋生的条件。中国国内反恐、去极端化
7	促进就业、教育、卫生等途径实现社会经济发展，	消除	恐怖主义滋生的条件。防范和打击恐怖主义需要
8	公民和组织的合法权益。反恐的关键要	消除	有利于恐怖主义蔓延的长期条件。以美国为首

Figure 4.21 Eliminate root causes and conditions of terrorism

The examination of the collocation of the modal verb collocates, which include *不应/should not*, *不能/must not*, exposes the discourse prosody of objection. Examining the concordance lines, we can find three patterns of objection. First, we can find disagreements about linking terrorism to a particular religion, ethnic group, or country. The most frequent pattern is *不应/不能 + 特定的 + 宗教/民族/国家/should not/must not + particular + religion/ethnicity/nation*. In context, the pattern conveys the meaning that China is against any form of practice that links specific religions, ethnic groups, or countries to terrorism. In other words, the purpose of counterterrorism is to solve the threat of terrorism without politically stigmatising other religions, ethnic groups, or countries. As shown in the expanded line 2, it reveals China's perceptions of respecting the diversity of cultures and ethnicities in the face of terrorism threats.

Expanded line 2

人类社会由各种不同的文明组成，文明本身无优劣、高低和贵贱之分。反对恐怖主义不应与特定的民族或宗教挂钩

Human society is made up of *different civilisations*. *No civilisation is superior or inferior to any other culture*. The fight against terrorism *should not be linked to any particular ethnic group or religion*.

Second, we can find the opposition to double standards (*不应/不能+双重标准*). In China's perception, the primary objective of international counterterrorism is to maintain peace and security in international society. For China, it is imperative that terrorism-related issues not be exploited as a pretext to advance the political agendas of specific countries, as indicated in lines 12-14.

Third, we can find the objection to using the military method as the exclusive counterterrorism method (不应/不能+军事手段). As lines 5 and 11 show, China advocates that it is imperative to broaden the scope of counterterrorism beyond a purely military approach. Adopting a comprehensive strategy that encompasses political and economic interventions is essential to addressing the underlying factors that give rise to terrorism. For China, the military approach should not be considered the standard framework for international counterterrorism efforts.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	支维护世界和平与稳定的重要力量。恐怖主义	不应	与特定国家、民族和宗教挂钩，推动不同
2	本身无优劣、高低和贵贱之分。反对恐怖主义	不应	与特定的民族或宗教挂钩。第五十五
3	基本原则。不应将一国国内法凌驾于国际法之上，也	不应	将恐怖主义与特定国家、民族和宗教挂钩。
4	地区和平与安全，影响世界经济发展。双方强调，	不应	将恐怖主义等同于某一宗教、民族或
5	不同文明间的对话。他还指出，打击恐怖主义	不应	当局限于采取军事行动，应当从政治和
6	任何时间、任何地点发生的恐怖主义行为，并强调	不应	把恐怖主义同任何宗教、种族和文化联系
7	人道法和人权，不能任意扩大打击范围，更	不能	把恐怖主义与特定的民族、宗教和国家
8	范围。王毅还指出，恐怖主义属于极少数极端邪恶势力，	不能	把恐怖主义与特定的民族或宗教相
9	严重侵犯。他强调，在打击恐怖主义的过程中	不能	搞双重或多重标准，必须遵守国际
10	指出，中国政府反对一切形式的恐怖主义，但反恐	不能	搞扩大化，要标本兼治，应充分发挥联合国和
11	上不能采取双重标准，打击恐怖主义要标本兼治，反恐斗争	不能	单纯依靠军事手段，要注意综合治理，应充分
12	鲜明，基本立场是：反对一切形式的恐怖主义；反恐	不能	持双重标准；应有利于维护人类的和平与
13	一贯的，中方反对一切形式的恐怖主义，但反恐	不能	有双重标准。应有利于维护人类的和平与
14	国际反恐合作的指导原则。在反恐问题上	不能	采取双重标准，打击恐怖主义要标本兼治，反恐斗争不能

Figure 4.22 Precaution in dealing with terrorism

From the above analysis, we can see that China's international counterterrorism discourse exhibits both negative and neutral prosodies in viewing the terrorism threat. On the one hand, it displays discourse prosodies of danger, crisis, urgency, firmness, and objection in representing terrorism as an imminent, hazardous, and full-scale security challenge to individual countries and mankind as a whole, while also expressing its resolute stance against all forms of terrorism. On the other hand, it demonstrates the discourse prosodies of objectiveness and caution by highlighting that terrorism is a result of complex factors, advocating for solutions that focus on addressing the underlying causes of terrorism, and rejecting the association of terrorism with certain ethnic groups, religions, or countries.

4.5 Strategic Cultural Explanation of Discourse on Terrorism

The preceding corpus analysis shows that the nature, extent, and impact of terrorism are key discursive themes in China's international counterterrorism discourse. Terrorism is represented and constructed as a significant security threat to the international community. In addition, the analysis of discourse prosody reveals that the Chinese international counterterrorism discourse exhibits a resolute oppositional attitude towards terrorism. Terrorism is regarded by China as a critical security threat that must be seriously dealt with. In the following, the above language phenomena and discursive strategies, which displayed China's perceptions of terrorism, will be explained through the lens of Chinese strategic culture.

4.5.1 Core Security Under Threat

The fundamental reason for representing terrorism as a serious and must-be-dealt-with security threat is that international terrorism has the characteristics and capabilities to challenge core national security interests. According to the defensive nature of Chinese strategic culture, national sovereignty and territorial integrity are the core elements of national security when China perceives and evaluates possible security threats. Anything that can pose a severe challenge to China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity would be considered a critical threat that needs to be seriously dealt with. In other words, when China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity are challenged, China will perceive these challenges as the foremost security danger.

First, international terrorist organisations have acquired the capacity to challenge the sovereignty of states and infringe on their territorial security. After waves of development, international terrorist organisations have evolved dramatically in terms of their organisational structure, combat capabilities, propaganda, and mobilisation abilities (Rapoport 2022). Some international terrorist organisations can even carry out terrorism campaigns as quasi-states with paramilitary forces. The most typical example is the Islamic State, which has emerged in an unprecedented way to cause a strong impact not only on

peace and stability in the Middle East but also on the modern nation-state system (Caló, Malet, Howie, & Lentini 2020).

The Islamic State originally began as a less-influential extremist group called the ‘Group of Monotheism and Jihad’ (Arabic: Jama’at al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad), which was established by Abu Musab az-Zarkawi in Jordan in 1999. It then took the oath of allegiance to the al-Qaeda leader Usama bin Ladin and transformed into the ‘Organisation of Jihad’s Base in Mesopotamia’ (Arabic: Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn) and operated as a branch of al-Qaeda in Iraq. In 2007, it was under the command of Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and transformed into the organisation of ‘Islamic State in Iraq’. In 2013, the group secured major military victories in Syria and Iraq. In 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the establishment of the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/Levant’ (ISIS/ISIL) and aimed to change the geopolitical landscape in the region, claiming to be the leading force in the global Jihadist movement (Stern 2015).

The Islamic State’s objective is to create a religious state based on extreme religious ideology. In the pursuit of such a goal, it carried out a series of military campaigns in Syria and Iraq and achieved tremendous military successes. At its height in 2015, the Islamic State conquered and controlled 1/3 of the territories of Syria and Iraq. The Islamic State even controlled some major cities in both countries, including Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, and Raqqa in northern Syria. Since the end of WWII, no armed organisation has occupied such vast territory in the region as the Islamic State did (Adamczyk 2019).

In addition to the encroachment of territories in Syria and Iraq, the most significant threat from the Islamic State is at the systemic level. It challenges the most fundamental principles of the world order. By asserting caliphal authority, the Islamic State follows the example set by al-Qaeda in undermining the tenets of the current world order, according to which political authority is institutionalised in a system of sovereign nation-states rather than rooted in a common framework of religious authority (Phillips 2014).

The Islamic State explicitly seeks to establish a global Islamic empire, denying the legitimacy of existing national borders, particularly in the Middle East. The Islamic State's vision is to establish a caliphate with self-claimed extreme religious ideologies, which is, in fact, a theocratic state distinct from the modern secular democratic sovereignty state and a return to the religious state of the mediaeval age. From the perspective of contemporary international relations, the Islamic State is a quasi-sovereign state that threatens the security of neighbouring regions and countries, and the concept and practice of statehood that it propagates and demonstrates is a unique quasi-sovereignty (Alexander & Alexander 2015). It differs significantly from both the modern view of state sovereignty and the mainstream Islamic view of the sovereignty of God. Moreover, the Islamic State has surpassed al-Qaeda in terms of ideology, modus operandi, and international influence and represents the culmination of a new global jihad movement. By gaining territory, controlling populations, forming alliances, and raising money for their extremist cause, the Islamic State displayed some of the foundational features of a state to a certain extent.

Guided by the extremist ideology of Salafi jihad, the Islamic State's pursuit and attempt to create a worldwide caliphate, which rejects the foundational norms of international order and the principles of national sovereignty, is a challenge to any sovereign state. At the height of its power, the Islamic State also issued threats to China. In 2014, the Islamic State posted a video online in which it threatened 'rivers of blood' in China (Gramer 2017; Luch 2017). It also claimed territory in China's Xinjiang region and designated it as the Khorasan province of its future Caliphate territory (Israeli Intelligence & Heritage Commemoration Center 2014). In 2015, a Chinese citizen was kidnapped and killed by the Islamic State, and three other citizens were killed in another terrorist attack in Mali (Reuters 2015; Wu 2015). Therefore, the Islamic State makes a profound impression on China that international terrorism is capable of threatening the core security concerns of a sovereign nation.

Second, domestic terrorist forces seek to split China's territory, posing a threat to China's national and territorial security. The risk of domestic terrorism in China stems primarily from the East Turkestan separatist forces in the Xinjiang region. The East Turkestan forces' purpose is to separate Xinjiang from China and establish an East Turkestan state. In order to

achieve this goal, the separatist forces, particularly the East Turkestan Islamic Movement and the Turkestan Islamic Party, employed violent approaches to attack civilians in Xinjiang and other parts of China (Purbrick 2017). The cost of transnational terrorist campaigns has considerably decreased as a result of enormous developments in transportation, communications, and information technology. In addition, terrorists often take refuge in foreign host countries and employ transnational tactics, engaging in attacks on their home countries in order to avoid a crackdown by the governments of their home countries. Research shows that most terrorist campaigns are operated from neighbouring host states other than the target home countries (Bapat 2007). The East Turkestan Islamic Movement also adopts transnational tactics, planning terrorist activities such as inciting riots, suicide bombings, knife attacks, and assassinations in Xinjiang, Beijing, Yunnan, and Guangdong provinces. More importantly, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement is strengthening its connections with international terrorist organisations and forming international terrorist networks. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement has long been funded and trained by al-Qaeda and the al-Qaeda-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as part of the global jihadist movement to wage a 'jihad war' on China and its neighbouring countries in Central Asia (Wayne 2009). The Turkestan Islamic Party, another Uyghur Islamist group designated by the United Nations as a terrorist group, has long been engaged in international terrorism in Badakhshan province, an Afghan region that is close to China's borderland. For example, in 2021, ordered by the Turkestan Islamic Party, an extremist of Chinese nationality carried out a suicide bombing at a Shia mosque in Kunduz province of Afghanistan, leaving dozens of people dead and injured (Kelemen 2022). In addition, it is estimated that thousands of Chinese Uyghurs took part in terrorist activities and fought under the command of the Islamic State in the Syrian-Iraqi borderland regions (Soliev 2017). The internationalisation of terrorist organisations has enabled the East Turkestan separatist groups to improve their transnational operational capacity and train a large number of Uyghur extremists with actual combat experience. In the wake of the Islamic State's defeat, these veteran foreign fighters, who have been involved in international terrorism, could potentially return to China and pose a serious threat to its national security.

From the above analysis, it is obvious to see that international terrorism, exemplified by the Islamic State, demonstrates the development and trajectory of international terrorism. International terrorist organisations have the potential to evolve into a certain type of proto-state entity. It can pose a serious challenge to existing international order and norms and jeopardise the security of national sovereignty and territorial security. Such dynamics have prompted China to be more alert to the potential threat of international terrorism and strengthen prevention measures to shield its national security from being damaged by international terrorism.

On the other hand, the persistent attempts made by East Turkestan terrorist groups in China's Xinjiang and bordering areas also pose a serious threat to China's national sovereignty and territorial security. The magnitude of this threat will escalate as the separatist forces garner increasing support and acquire combat experience through engagement and participation in the transnational network of international terrorist organisations. This is also the factor that explains why China holds a firm attitude and position against terrorism, as the stronger separatist terrorism groups can pose a more severe challenge to its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Unification and defending national unity lie at the core of the Chinese strategic culture (Li 2002:20-22). Reviewing China's history, we can see that China consistently adheres to a steadfast commitment to the values and principles of national unity, resolute opposition to separatism, and unswerving promotion of national integration. Sovereignty and territorial integrity are always the red lines, and a unified China is always the paramount objective according to China's defensive strategic culture. China's strategic culture is predominantly oriented towards defence, with a primary focus on safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

China rarely initiates the use of force beyond its borders but will consider resorting to a military approach as a possible option when its territory and sovereignty are threatened. In other words, China prioritises the security of its territory and sovereignty and assesses the seriousness of threats based on this criterion. Thus, according to the logic of Chinese

strategic culture, terrorism is considered a security threat that must be addressed, which is why in China's international counterterrorism discourse, terrorism is characterised as an absolute security that demands high alertness and effective measures.

4.5.2 Common Security Under Threat

China holds a systemic and universal view of security in which terrorism is seen as a comprehensive threat to the international community, sovereign nations, and individuals. The previous analysis of the corpus demonstrates that the systemic perspective on security is evident in the representation of terrorism, which frames terrorism issues within the broader notion of human security as a whole. Terrorism is represented as a common security threat confronting all humanity in China's international counterterrorism discourse. The representation is relevant to China's perception of the common security shared by all members of the international community.

(1) Security perception of the community with a shared future for mankind

As the corpus analysis shows, China discursively construes terrorism as a common threat to all humans. Under such a framework, terrorism becomes a security threat to human security and seriously affects the common interests of human society. This discursive strategy to narrate terrorism within a broad, inclusive, and comprehensive framework of human security echoes China's security perception of the community with a shared future for mankind.

The perspective of the community with a shared future for mankind embodies China's intention to seek safety within the framework of the security community (Bauman 2001). The concept of 人类命运共同体/ *a community with a shared future for mankind* was introduced by President Xi Jinping in a speech at the Moscow Institute of International Relations in March 2013. According to Xi, the world is becoming a community of shared destiny where each country's safety and future are linked together (Xi 2018). Although the concept of community with a shared future for mankind has only been introduced in the last few years, the security perception embodied in this concept has consistently been

emphasised by the Chinese government, particularly on terrorism issues. For example, during his visit to Germany in April 2002, former President Jiang Zemin said that terrorism is a serious threat to world peace and stability and a great danger to the international community; regardless of when, where, against whom, and in what way terrorism occurs, the international community should work together to firmly condemn and fight terrorism (Jiang 2006). In a similar vein, former President Hu Jintao has repeatedly stressed on different occasions that various terrorist and extremist forces have continuously brought harm to the international community, and global problems such as the environment, drugs, and refugees have become increasingly prominent. These are global problems common to mankind, requiring the participation of people all over the world and the solidarity and cooperation of all countries in the world (Hu 2016).

The perspective of a community with a shared future for mankind embodies the idea of a security community, but it goes beyond the traditional theoretical perception of common security. In international political studies, the concept of the 'security community' was first introduced by Richard Wagenen. The security discussed by scholars is in the narrow sense of national security, and the security community refers to a group of countries associated with each other to maintain security status through military cooperation (Van Wagenen 1952). According to Karl Deutsch, a security community is an integrated group in which members are convinced that they do not use force against each other and settle their disputes through other means; in addition, the members should have homogeneous values and cultures in order to build a security community (Deutsch 1957:5-6). Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett note that a security community is a transnational region of sovereign states whose people can maintain a credible expectation of peaceful change (Adler & Barnett 1988:30-31). A common feature of both Deutsch's and Adler's definitions is that one of the main characteristics of a security community is that its members must have similar identities and values (Devetak 2008). Therefore, the classic definition of the security community is based on cultural homogeneity. The logical premise of the perspective of the security community is that the members within the community should have a similar cultural background.

China's perception of a community with a shared future for mankind transcends the traditional sense of security community and stresses the importance of common security, regardless of the community members' cultural background, ideology, and values. It pursues a common security that is defined as common, inclusive, and sustainable and puts the security issue within the framework of the humankind community. Within such a community, the relationship between each member is equal, and the security of each member is interconnected and related to the security environment of the community.

(2) Maintenance of common security and governance of terrorism issues

The perception of common security is also reflected in the metaphors for terrorism. The corpus analysis reveals that metaphor is a common discursive strategy in the representation and construction of the threat of terrorism. The prominent patterns include natural disaster metaphors, disease metaphors, and ecological metaphors. Natural disasters, infectious diseases, and ecological issues are all serious security issues that are relevant to the common well-being and collective survival of human societies. These problems are a hazard to each individual. More importantly, when these disasters occur, they have universal and serious consequences. The use of metaphor is not just about replacing one abstract word with another figurative one on a linguistic level but, more importantly, about creating a strong perceptual link between two things. (Bates 2004). Thus, the use of metaphors reflects the perceptions and preferences of the users, and the kind of metaphors used projects their values (Spencer 2012).

China is a country that has taken natural disasters seriously since ancient times. Chinese mythology is full of stories about the management of natural disasters (McNeal 2012). The analogy of terrorism to natural disasters indicates that China considers the danger of terrorism to be as important as a natural disaster that can threaten human existence. Furthermore, the use of natural disasters, infectious diseases, and ecological problems as metaphors conceals two aspects of meaning. On the one hand, terrorism is a serious issue that needs to be dealt with, as humans always have to deal with natural disasters, infectious diseases, and ecological issues. On the other hand, terrorism is an issue that needs collective

efforts, just as when humans are faced with natural disasters, no individual can cope with the consequences alone and must cooperate to manage the threat.

Under such logic, China is essentially highlighting the similarities between terrorism and natural disasters, infectious diseases, and ecological issues and advocating that terrorism should be viewed as a common threat to all nations, as it has extremely serious consequences. When terrorism occurs, it can pose a systemic threat not only to each individual country but also to the security environment of the international community. The underlying message of the metaphors is that, just as humans commonly do when dealing with issues such as natural disasters, the international community should also coordinate common efforts in preventing and managing the terrorism threat.

4.5.3 Peace-cooperativism

In the collocation analysis of terrorism, we can find cautious prosody when describing the international discussion and management of terrorism issues. The common language pattern is 不能将恐怖主义同特定宗教和民族联系在一起/*terrorism should not be linked with a particular religion or ethnicity*. Such a language pattern conveys a prudent perception that disentangles terrorism from any type of religion or ethnicity. It indicates that China's perception of terrorism is not focused on attributes of religion or ethnicity but on the violent nature of terrorism.

It is relevant to the peace-cooperativism/和合主义 embedded in China's strategic culture. One of the main features of peace-cooperativism is the deconstructive perception of heterogeneous conflicts. Heterogeneous conflict refers to the conflict and confrontation between civilisations, cultures, religions, ethnicities, and societies that arise from differences in history, geography, interests, resources, and political institutions (Yu & Zhang 2019). According to the notions of peace-cooperativism, different cultures, religions, ethnicities, nationalities, and political systems can co-exist in harmony. In other words, as classic Chinese proverbs say, harmony but not uniformity/和而不同. The pursuit of harmonious coexistence and the tolerance of diversity and divergence are long-standing traditions in

China's perception of the world. China's ancient norms of all-under-heaven/天下主义 and harmony with all nations/协和万邦, as well as the contemporary perspective of a community of a shared future for mankind/人类命运共同体, embody its perception of a pluralistic world and the philosophy of resolving conflicts and contradictions among diverse entities, transcending differences, and seeking common ground to achieve harmonious co-existence (Zhu 2020).

In many circumstances, terrorism is a manifestation of heterogeneous conflict. Terrorism usually arises in an environment where people have different religious, ethnic, ideological, or cultural backgrounds. The never-ending history of terrorism in the Middle East is a typical example. The situation can be further exacerbated when people adopt a dichotomous perception, or us-versus-them identification, to resolve conflictual issues (Crenshaw 2011; Schwartz, Dunkel, & Waterman 2009). For instance, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack, United States President George W. Bush referred to the fight against terrorists as a 'crusade' in a public speech. The crusade metaphor reflects the dichotomous thinking that compares the military campaign against terrorists as a kind of civilisation clash between Christianity and Islam, thus implying that the war on terror is akin to the holy march of the Christian army against the Islam infidels (Graham, Keenan, & Dowd 2004; Maddox 2003). In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israelis refer to Palestinians as terrorists, while Palestinians call Israel state terrorists, creating a complicated situation where one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter (Ganor 2002). Hence, terrorism has become a pervasive phenomenon that shows no signs of abating in the foreseeable future. When terrorist attacks occur in the United States or Europe, some views associate terrorism with the Islamic religion and Muslims, arguing that the religious teachings of Islam and the identity of Muslims are the cause of terrorism. The prevalence of Islamophobia exacerbates the existing rifts and animosity among diverse religious and ethnic groups, potentially resulting in heightened tensions and more instances of violence. This, in turn, can deteriorate the security situation, lead to more conflicts, and make terrorism a self-fulfilling prophecy (Gilks 2020; Mondon & Winter 2017).

Within the perceptual framework of peace-cooperativism, China's perception of the root causes of terrorism transcends the dichotomy and considers religion and ethnicity as not the reasons for terrorism. It is true that terrorists may take advantage of religious extremist ideology to recruit sympathisers and rationalise their violent acts, but the root of the problem may be the result of political and economic factors such as the legacy of Western colonialism, an unfair international economic order, social development injustice, and the sense of deprivation caused by poverty and social inequality. This is also why we often find that in China's international counterterrorism discourse, terrorism is represented as a security issue that is caused by complex factors.

4.6 Summary

The task of this chapter is to analyse how terrorism is represented in China's international counterterrorism discourse. Through keyword analysis, concordance, and collocation analysis of the Terrorism Corpus, the discursive focus and strategies have been found in China's representation of terrorism. In addition, China's attitudes towards terrorism have also been revealed.

China's discourse on terrorism focuses on four topics, including the nature of terrorism, the victim and scope of terrorism, the severity of terrorism, and responding to terrorism. The discursive themes indicate that China cares about the extent and grave consequences of terrorism and terrorism's ability to challenge international, national, and individual security. In addition, the discursive focuses also show China's attention to global governance on terrorism.

Several discursive strategies have been employed to construct terrorism as a real and absolute threat. A binary opposition relationship between terrorism and human security is created where terrorism is labelled as an anti-humanity and anti-civilisation threat to humans. In addition, political metaphors are employed to construct terrorism as a threat formed by complicated factors and as an evolving threat that is hard to cope with.

The collocation analysis uncovers the prosody of China's international counterterrorism discourse on terrorism, revealing China's attitudes and stances against terrorism. Negative discourse prosody has been found in narrating terrorism's omnipresent threats to international society and individual nations. Neutral discourse prosody has been discovered in explaining the roots of terrorism and the appropriate ways of managing terrorism threats.

The discursive focus, features, strategies, and attitudes in the representation of terrorism are explained through the lens of China's strategic culture. First, international terrorism is evolving into a type of threat that can challenge a nation's core security concerns, such as national sovereignty and territorial security. In Chinese strategic culture, anything that threatens such core security interests will be regarded as a serious threat. Second, China's holds a systemic and universal view of security and perceives that the real security is the common security of all international community members. International terrorism is a comprehensive threat to international society at all levels. Third, peace-cooperativism is the factor behind the cautious perception of the causes of terrorism, which transcends the dichotomy mindset that relates religion and ethnicity to terrorism and holds that terrorism is caused by complex factors and managed with comprehensive measures.

Based on these analyses and findings, a conclusion can be drawn to answer the Q1: In China's perception, terrorism is a severe and absolute threat that endangers the international community and is an ominous threat that must be appropriately dealt with. But at the same time, China also perceives terrorism as a threat that is possible to manage at its roots with appropriate measures. Therefore, another question naturally comes with this conclusion. As terrorism is a threat that must be managed, what method should be used to cope with the danger? Using force is one of the common options to deal with terrorism in international counterterrorism (Boyle 2018; Hughes 2011; Sheehan, Marquardt, & Collins 2022). In the next chapter, I will examine how the use of force to deal with terrorism is represented and what views and attitudes are reflected in China's international counterterrorism discourse.

Chapter 5 Counterterrorism War in China's International Counterterrorism Discourse

5.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to find out how China perceives the use of force in counterterrorism. The use of force is a common option in dealing with terrorism issues (Ersen & Özen 2010; Harmon 2010). Using military forces is always considered an indispensable element in counterterrorism (Boyle 2018: 384). The last two decades have witnessed many military campaigns and operations to fight international terrorism (Hajjar 2019). A typical example of international counterterrorism is the global 'war on terror' led by the United States in a bid to fight international terrorism. Despite the fact that the 'war on terror' terminology was gradually discarded discursively by the US government, it was always fought militarily (Hoffman 2021). As McIntosh notes, counterterrorism as war is 'different in type but not in kind'. (McIntosh 2015).

As the use of force is a commonplace option in international counterterrorism, how does China view such a practice? Hence, it comes to the second question of this study. **Q2: How does China's international counterterrorism discourse represent counterterrorism war?** This question is further divided into three sub-questions.

In China's international counterterrorism discourse:

- 2a) What is the discursive focus of the representation of the use of force?**
- 2b) How is the counterterrorism war constructed?**
- 2c) What are China's attitudes towards the counterterrorism war?**

To answer the questions, the analysis will start by analysing the discursive focus displayed by China's international counterterrorism discourse before interpreting discursive strategies that construct counterterrorism wars. Subsequently, discourse prosody around the war practice will be analysed to reveal China's attitudes towards the use of force in counterterrorism. Based on the above analysis, an explanation will be presented to expound

on the findings through the lens of Chinese strategic culture. Finally, this chapter will draw a brief conclusion by summarising the results and answering the questions. The analysis is based on the Counterterrorism War Corpus and will proceed as follows.

First, I will carry out keyword analysis to explore the discursive themes in the corpus, discovering the focus of China's international counterterrorism discourse regarding the use of force in dealing with terrorism.

Second, based on the findings of the keyword analysis, I will use Afghan War and Iraq War as the query words to do concordance analysis to investigate the discursive construction of counterterrorism war.

Third, I will use war as the node word for collocation analysis, revealing the discourse prosody that indicates China's attitudes towards the use of force in counterterrorism.

Fourth, I will explain the findings of the discourse analysis through the lens of Chinese strategic culture. According to the above questions and analysis procedure, the next section will begin with the keyword analysis of the Counterterrorism War Corpus.

5.2 Discursive Themes in the Representation of Counterterrorism War

This section will explore the discursive foci in the representation of the use of force in China's international counterterrorism discourse. Keyword analysis will be carried out as the keywords can denote the discursive themes or topoi of the designated corpus (Baker 2004; Stubbs 2001). Keywords are derived from AntConc, through which the Counterterrorism War Corpus is processed. Before processing the data, loglikelihood is the default measurement, and the threshold is set as $p < 0.01$. After data processing, the top 100 keywords with high keyness scores are chosen for further analysis. Then, based on their semantic meaning and contexts, the keywords are sorted into four thematic groups: nation and region, practices of using force, counterterrorism target, and reflection on the use of force in counterterrorism.

5.2.1 Nations and Regions

Nation-states are the main actors in counterterrorism, especially when it comes to the use of force, as the military is the essential element of a sovereign nation (Lewis 2017). Among the top 100 keywords, 26 are related to countries and regions, demonstrating the geographic places that are key foci in China’s international counterterrorism discourse (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 Nations and regions

Word	Frequency	Keyness	Word	Frequency	Keyness
美国/ United States	5695	16220.383	奥巴马/Obama	425	1353.118
伊拉克/ Iraq	2243	6636.824	布什/Bush	425	1171.386
阿富汗/ Afghanistan	2051	6538.807	北约/NATO	411	995.257
国家/nation	1383	2410.515	英国/United Kingdom	393	1053.128
政府/government	1219	2813.329	俄罗斯/Russia	279	875.363
地区/region	1114	2473.146	伊朗/Iran	263	814.608
美/American	876	2219.609	西方/West	242	595.179
叙利亚/Syrian	852	2617.651	叙/Syrian	238	745.135
巴/Pakistani	767	2375.143	也门/Yemen	213	647.779
巴基斯坦/Pakistan	678	2159.073	非洲/Africa	207	582.402
中东/Middle East	592	1652.702	土耳其/Turkey	195	608.628
阿/Afghan	559	1725.007	摩苏尔/Mosul	179	569.785
总统/president	522	1244.866	美国人/American	167	531.582

美国/*the United States* is the keyword with the highest frequency and keyness, which appears 5695 times in the corpus and has a keyness value as high as 16,220.383. It shows that the United States is a very frequent topic in the context of counterterrorism. The high-frequency cluster of 美国/*the United States* includes 美国政府/*the US government*, 美国总统/*US president*, 美国主导/*US-led*, 美国反恐/*US counterterrorism*, 美国发动/*the United States launched*, and 美国为首/*headed by the United States*. These clusters are all related to the war on terrorism initiated by the United States. In context, these clusters are associated with the narrative of strategies, tactics, and the development of the war on terror led by the United States.

Another keyword, 美/US, the Chinese abbreviation for 美国/*the United States*, displays a different language pattern. The frequent expressions that include this abbreviated word are 美英联军/*the US and UK joint forces* and 美英发动的伊拉克战争/*the Iraq war launched by the United States and the United Kingdom*. This linguistic phenomenon shows the Iraq War, and the use of force by the coalition army of the US and UK is one of the common topics in the discourse. Other keywords referring to the United States include US presidents 奥巴马/*Obama* and 布什/*Bush*. It is interesting to see that the frequency and keyness of these two keywords are quite close. Both have 425 occurrences, while 奥巴马/*Obama* has a relatively higher keyness value of 1,533.118 and 布什/*Bush* has a value of 1,171.386. On the one hand, it shows again that the United States is a country of concern in the discourse. On the other hand, the higher keyness values indicate that China pays attention to the United States troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq, as Obama often mentioned when describing the US withdrawal plan from the counterterrorism wars.

Next to the keyword 美国/US in terms of frequency and keyness value are 伊拉克/*Iraq* and 阿富汗/*Afghanistan*, indicating that these two countries are often cited in the context of counterterrorism. Reviewing the clusters of 伊拉克/*Iraq* and 阿富汗/*Afghanistan*, we can find that the most frequent phrases are 伊拉克战争/*Iraq War* and 阿富汗战争/*Afghan War*. It indicates that the Iraq War and the Afghan War are key themes in China's international counterterrorism discourse. Another source of evidence can be seen from the clusters of the keyword 政府/*government*. It shows that other keywords, such as 美国/US, 奥巴马/*Obama*, 布什/*Bush*, 阿富汗/*Afghan*, 巴基斯坦/*Pakistan*, 伊拉克/*Iraq*, and 叙利亚/*Syria*, co-occur quite often with 政府/*government*, denoting the key actors of counterterrorism in the regions of Central Asia and the Middle East.

5.2.2 Practices of Using Force in Counterterrorism

Based on the semantic and contextual meanings, several keywords can be categorised into a group representing the practices of using force in fighting terrorism (see Table 5.2).

Table 5.2 Practices of using force in counterterrorism

Word	Frequency	Keyness	Word	Frequency	Keyness
战争/war	1875	5535.716	全球/global	385	1086.821
反恐/counterterrorism	1692	5392.668	报告/report	354	829.074
安全/security	1092	3138.432	目标/target	332	556.731
军事/military	1053	2856.914	武装/armed	327	918.974
美军/US army	1045	3082.062	无人机/drone	284	904.095
行动/operation	947	2653.496	力量/strength	279	533.658
战略/strategy	780	2009.918	武器/weapon	274	720.87
打击/strike	745	2210.285	宣布/announce	252	538.589
进行/proceed	539	810.419	军队/army	236	541.043
发动/launch	496	1464.153	情报/intelligence	233	668.893
空袭/air strike	402	1266.325	政府军/government forces	207	613.852
部队/troop	389	1026.596	作战/fight	199	552.169

战争/*war* and 反恐/*counterterrorism* are keywords of high frequency, as expected. Among them, 战争/*war* appears 1,875 times with a keyness of 5,392.668. 反恐/*counterterrorism* has 1,692 occurrences, and the keyness value reaches 5,535.716. Since 反恐战争/*counterterrorism war* is one of the search terms when collecting texts in databases, it is no surprise that 战争/*war* shows up in the keyword list. Therefore, by excluding the term 反恐战争/*counterterrorism war*, we can find that the most frequent clusters of 战争/*war* are 阿富汗战争/*Afghan War* and 伊拉克战争/*Iraq War*, with 225 and 250 occurrences, respectively. This again indicates that the Afghan War and the Iraq War are key themes in the representation of the practices of using force in counterterrorism. Another related keyword that denotes war as a practice in counterterrorism is 全球/*global*. In context, the most frequent expression that includes 全球/*global* is 全球反恐战争/*global war on terror*. It is relevant to the expression brought forward by US ex-president George W. Bush when he declared the United States' global strategy to exterminate international terrorism worldwide (Clarke 2004).

At the operational level, some keywords are associated with the practical application of force in terms of army deployment, offensive operation, use of weaponry, and war tactics. 美军/*US forces*, 政府军/*government forces*, 部队/*troops*, and 军队/*military* are related to army deployment and offensive operations. It is noteworthy that the keywords 美军/*US forces*

and 政府军/*government forces* refer to two different types of military forces. The former represents the military forces of countries outside the region where terrorism is prevalent, and the latter relates to the forces of local sovereign states. In context, 政府军/*government forces* always co-occur with 阿富汗/*Afghan* and 伊拉克/*Iraqi*. Similarly, the cluster of the keyword 安全/*security* shows a fixed-expression-阿富汗安全部队/*Afghan security forces* and 伊拉克安全部队/*Iraqi security forces*, which is another way to describe the government forces of Afghanistan and Iraq. Examples 1 and 2 show the description of counterterrorism operations by the Afghan and Iraqi government military. This indicates that in China's international counterterrorism discourse, the counterterrorism war in Afghanistan and Iraq is the key focus of the discourse and leaves a hint that there might be distinctions in describing the use of military forces in fighting terrorism. Further investigation will be made in the following sections by carrying out concordance and collocation analysis.

(1) 阿安全部队日前在东部拉格曼省对极端组织“伊斯兰国”目标实施清剿行动, 打死至少 20 名武装分子。

Afghan security forces have killed at least 20 Islamic State militants in a military operation that aims to eliminate Islamic State forces in eastern Laghman province.

(2) 伊拉克政府军展开摩苏尔攻城行动 11 月 1 日, 伊拉克反恐部队士兵进入位于摩苏尔市东部郊区的古克贾利区。

Iraqi government forces launched an offensive operation in Mosul on November 1st. The soldiers of the Iraqi counterterrorism forces have entered Kokjali, an eastern suburb of the city of Mosul.

Returning to the keyword 美军/*US forces*, common expressions include 美军的介入/*US forces' intervention*, 美军的打击/*US forces' strikes*, and 美军的行动/*US forces' operations*, displaying the practices of using force by the US army in counterterrorism, as shown in the following examples.

(3) 从这个意义上讲，与其说美军的介入加速了地区反恐的进展，不如说给中东地区的人民带来了更多灾难。

In this sense, rather than accelerating the progress of regional counterterrorism, the intervention of US forces has brought more disasters to the people of the Middle East.

(4) 美军于 15 日在叙利亚东部对极端组织“伊斯兰国”发动突袭行动，击毙该组织高级头目阿布·萨亚夫，并抓获了他的妻子。据称，美军的行动共打死该组织 32 名成员，包括 4 名高级头目。

US forces killed Abu Sayyaf, a senior leader of the Islamic State, and captured his wife in a raid in eastern Syria on Sunday. The US forces' operation killed 32 IS members, including four senior leaders.

The keywords 空袭/*air strike*, 武装/*armed*, 无人机/*drone*, and 武器/*weapon* are related to the use of weaponry. Much attention has been paid to US air power in combating terrorism, especially the depiction of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) airstrikes. The most frequent expression is 武装无人机/*armed drone*. In context, it shows two concerns about the use of the armed drone. As a new type of military equipment, drones change the course of the counterterrorism war. Second, the controversial ethical issues created by the drone air strikes, as shown in examples 5 and 6.

(5) 在 10 多年来的反恐战争中，武装无人机的应用达到顶峰，其踪迹遍布阿富汗、巴基斯坦、也门和索马里等热点地区，执行过数百次打击恐怖分子的任务。面对飘忽不定的小规模武装力量，无人机的快速反应、精确定位和高效打击能力，比派遣特战队等传统做法更具优势。

During the decade-long counterterrorism war, armed drones were widely used in hundreds of missions to strike terrorists in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. It has been proven that drones are responsive to precisely lock and efficiently kill targets, which is more advantageous than traditional ground operations by special forces.

(6) 在阿富汗战争中，美军飞机和无人机在打击恐怖分子时，时常将炸弹投向邻近的巴基斯坦村寨伤及无辜，甚至迎新的婚车和巴基斯坦边防军士兵都未能幸免。

In the Afghan War, US warplanes and drones often dropped bombs on nearby Pakistani villages, killing and injuring innocent civilians. Even wedding cars and Pakistani border guards were not spared.

Intelligence is a crucial tactic to gain advantages in military conflicts. It plays a vital role in both conventional wars and military counterterrorism operations (Arena & Wolford 2012; Byman 2014). The keyword 情报/*intelligence* indicates the discourse also gives much attention to the role of intelligence in counterterrorism operations. The common clusters of intelligence, such as 情报部门/*intelligence department* and 情报机构/*intelligence institution*, show the descriptions of the coordinated roles of intelligence agencies with the ground and air forces in carrying out precision strikes on terrorists and lowering operational costs. See the following example.

(7) 奥巴马政府强调避免动用大规模军队，更多地依靠特种部队与情报机构合作，依靠无人机等进行高精度、低成本的反恐。

The Obama administration stressed the need to avoid large manoeuvres by ground troops and rely more on the cooperation between special forces, *intelligence institutions*, and drones to conduct high-precision, low-cost counterterrorism operations.

5.2.3 Counterterrorism Target

The focus on counterterrorism targets can be analysed through a group of keywords related to the representation of international terrorism, international extremism, and international terrorist organisations (see Table 5.3).

Table 5.3 Counterterrorism target

Word	Frequency	Keyness	Word	Frequency	Keyness
伊斯兰国/Islamic State	1026	3268.214	极端组织/extreme organisation	404	1286.235
组织/organisation	1040	2075.762	发生/occur	402	936.083
袭击/attack	777	2416.319	恐怖分子/terrorist	344	1095.156
恐怖/terror	739	2326.7	拉登/Laden	278	884.99
恐怖主义/terrorism	687	2187.75	势力/forces	274	735.234
基地/al-Qaeda	600	1724.121	极端/extreme	253	765.969
事件/incident	587	1708.813	武装分子/militant	247	786.284
塔利班/Taliban	512	1630.226	境内/domestic	233	695.462
国际/international	477	822.7	冲突/conflict	220	600.69
威胁/threat	448	1270.227	暴力/violence	181	564.205

First, international terrorism is the main focus of China's international counterterrorism discourse. This can be proved by the common expression of 国际恐怖主义/*international terrorism*, which is the cluster of two keywords 国际/*international* and 恐怖主义/*terrorism*. 9/11 is an iconic event that brought international terrorism into the spotlight and started an era of international counterterrorism (Siniver & Kerr 2010). The keyword 事件/*incident* often co-occurs with 9/11. Figure 5.1 shows examples of the frequent mention of 9/11 事件/*9/11 incidents*. We can see that during the two decades after the incident, 9/11 always existed in China's international counterterrorism discourse and is used as a mark to be compared with when depicting the development of counterterrorism wars. This indicates that international terrorism is a discursive theme in the representation of the use of force in counterterrorism.

Examples of mentioning 9/11
自从去年“9·11”事件发生以后，反恐、防恐就成了美国对内、对外政策中的重中之重
“9·11”事件后，美国打了两场战争，一是阿富汗战争，二是伊拉克战争
“9·11”事件发生后，美国发动的“反恐战争”已届5年，伊拉克目前是其“核心战场”
“9·11”事件后，全球恐怖活动以及反恐战争的进行给人类带来了巨大的挑战
自“9·11”事件发生近9年来，美国的反恐一直有着陷于悖论的趋向
“9·11”事件后，美国先后发动了阿富汗战争与伊拉克战争
从2001年“9·11”事件发生到当年年底，是美国及其盟友军事打击塔利班和“基地”组织阶段
“9·11”事件发生以来，从小布什政府的“全面反恐战争”，到奥巴马政府的“打击恐怖主义”
2001年“9·11”事件发生后，反恐成为美国国家安全和对外政策的重心

Figure 5.1 Examples of mentioning 9/11

Another piece of evidence is the frequent mention and description of terrorist attacks worldwide. The keywords 恐怖/*terror* and 袭击/*attack* often co-occur 310 times as a cluster, creating the context that international terrorism is pervasive around the world. For example, 美国、欧洲、中东等地恐怖袭击/*terrorist attacks in the US, Europe, and the Middle East*, 中东和非洲北部地区的恐怖袭击/*terrorist attacks in the Middle East and North Africa*, 阿富汗、叙利亚、土耳其等过发生的恐怖袭击/*terrorist attacks occurred in Afghanistan, Syria, Turkey, etc.*, 针对英国的恐怖袭击/*terrorist attacks that target the UK*, 法国《沙尔利周刊》恐怖袭击/*the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack in France*, 布鲁塞尔恐怖袭击/*terrorist attack in Brussels*, 阿尔及利亚恐怖袭击/*Terrorist Attack in Algeria*.

Second, the spillover of international extremism is another discursive focus. 极端/*extreme* is one of the keywords related to the terrorism threat. Its most frequent cluster is 极端主义/*extremism*. In context, it is often used to describe the spread of terrorist groups' extreme ideology and the transnational flow of extremists, especially the returning Islamist fighters from the Middle East into Europe, as shown in example 8.

(8) 当前不仅有恐怖分子从叙利亚战场渗透到欧美, 极端主义思想也在蔓延。

The current difficulty is that *terrorists* are infiltrating Europe and the United States from the Syrian battlefield. At the same time, *extremist ideologies* are also spreading across the regions.

Third, al-Qaeda and the Islamist State are key topics in the representation of international counterterrorism targets. Nearly all these incidents mentioned in the discourse are related to these two international terrorist groups. In the keyword list, we can find two types of international counterterrorism targets. One is the general expression of the terrorist group, as shown by the keyword cluster of 恐怖组织/*terrorist organisation*. The other one is the reference to specific international terrorist organisations, such as the 伊斯兰国/*Islamic State* and 基地组织/*al-Qaeda*. Both of them have high frequencies and keyness. The 伊斯兰国/*Islamic State* has 1026 occurrences in the corpus with a keyness of 3628.214, while 基地组织/*al-Qaeda* has 422 occurrences with a keyness of 1724.121. One thing to be noted is that apart from the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, we can find no other international organisations appearing in the keyword list. This indicates that the Islamic State and al-Qaeda are the key topics when referring to the use of force to combat international terrorism in the discourse.

5.2.4 Reflection on the Use of Force in Counterterrorism

Ethical issues are often a key topic when describing wars and military conflicts, such as under what circumstances the use of force can be legally applied and what adverse effects it may have (Clifford 2017; Johnson 2014). We can find reflections on this topic in China's international counterterrorism discourse by analysing some keywords (see Table 5.4).

Table 5.4 Reflection on the use of force

Word	Frequency	Keyness	Word	Frequency	Keyness
问题/problem	853	1291.329	局势/situation	315	803.865
人/people	853	1080.581	严重/severe	312	601.617
名	780	1708.414	民众/public	311	977.042
新/new	607	751.926	死亡/death	311	966.781
世界/world	596	1219.962	美元/US dollar	279	548.83
造成/cause	460	1100.988	当地/local	273	691.244
联合国/UN	446	1230.545	导致/lead to	266	736.513
人权/human rights	424	1245.499	反/anti	264	664.433
政治/politics	421	641.898	国际社会/international society	244	776.732
平民/civilian	399	1227.27	媒体/media	243	773.548
支持/support	386	785.795	外交/diplomacy	238	583.386
合作/cooperation	375	727.118	显示/show	230	597.324
政策/policy	371	549.328	主义/doctrine	212	653.085

First, the use of force in counterterrorism and human rights protection is a key focus. The keywords 人权/*human rights* and 问题/*issue* frequently occur in the corpus. The cluster of 人权问题/*human rights issues* is often used to represent the ethical violation of human rights by the abuse or mistake of using force to fight terrorism. In addition, keywords 平民/*civilian*, 人/*people*, 民众/*citizen*, 死亡/*death*, 当地/*local*, 伤亡/*casualty*, and 万人/*thousands of people* are related to the negative impacts of counterterrorism by force. Take 平民/*civilian*, for instance. The most frequent clusters are 平民死亡/*civilian death*, 平民伤亡/*civilian casualty*, 平民死伤/*civilian dead and injured*, and 平民丧生/*civilians being killed*. All of them are used to represent the infringement of the right to life, a key element of human rights.

Second, the backfire of the use of force is another focus. In context, the keyword 局势/*situation* always appears in expressions of 局势动荡/*turmoil situation*, 局势恶化/*deteriorated condition*, and 局势紧张/*tense situation*, which is used to describe that the excessive use of force not only fails to realise the goals of solving terrorism problems but also makes the security situation worse, as shown in example 9.

(9) 美国先后发动阿富汗战争和伊拉克战争，导致地区局势动荡，安全威胁外溢。

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq launched by the United States have led to *turmoil* in the region and a spillover of security threats.

Third, the breaking of international norms is also the focus. The keyword 联合国/*the United Nations* signifies the focus of international norms for international counterterrorism. The most common expression in the corpus is 联合国宪章/*the UN Charter*, which is frequently used to depict the fact that US military counterterrorism operations violate the norms stipulated by the UN Charter. It stresses the importance of upholding the UN Charter principles when countries carry out international counterterrorism practices, as shown in examples 10 and 11s.

(10) 未经联合国安理会授权发动伊拉克战争，违背了《联合国宪章》的宗旨和原则，“是非法的”。
The Iraq War launched without the authorisation of the UN Security Council is illegal as it violates the purposes and principles of the *UN Charter*.

(11) 在国际反恐斗争中，最关键的是要尊重《联合国宪章》宗旨、原则和国际关系基本准则，尊重有关国家的主权、独立和领土完整，综合施策，标本兼治。

In the international fight against terrorism, it is crucial to respect the purposes and principles of the *UN Charter*, the basic norms of international relations, and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of relevant countries, and to take comprehensive approaches to solve the terrorism issue.

Through keyword analysis, it can be found that the discourse representation of the use of force in counterterrorism mainly focuses on describing the war practices in Afghanistan and Iraq led by the United States. Therefore, the next section will analyse how these two wars are constructed in China's international counterterrorism discourse.

5.3 Discursive Construction of Counterterrorism War

The keyword analysis in the last section shows that the Afghan War and the Iraq War initiated by the United States are the main focus of the representation of the use of force in international counterterrorism. Such key areas in discourse are pertinent to the research question and worthy of further exploration (Baker 2004), as they are the embodiment of the use of force in China's international counterterrorism discourse. Therefore, in this section, 伊拉克战争/*Iraq War* and 阿富汗战争/*Afghan War* will be selected as the query words in

concordance analysis to find out the discursive strategies in constructing the counterterrorism war.

5.3.1 The Afghan War: An Unpopular War

China's international counterterrorism discourse attributes negative images to the discursive construction of the Afghan War, framing it as an unpopular war that started from an action based on self-defence to a prolonged war that gradually lost support from the international community. From the preliminary observation of the concordance lines of 阿富汗战争 /*Afghan War*, most cases are about the description, analysis, and comments on the process and results of the Afghan War. However, a few cases are related to the legitimacy of war. This is an interesting point to start the analysis.

(1) Reference to legitimacy

Reviewing all the concordance lines, only 5 cases mentioned the legitimacy of resorting to the use of force to combat international terrorism in Afghanistan (see Figure 5.2). Despite the scarcity of describing the legitimate basis of the Afghan War, it still indicates that in China's discourse, at least at the initial stage of the war, it is recognised as a legal action to deal with international terrorism in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	对于美国的反恐，我们应该一分为二地看，在	阿富汗战争	期间，美国的反恐具有正义性，是
2	两场战争的认同却又大不相同：	阿富汗战争	得到了欧洲各国的广泛理解与
3	阿富汗慷慨解囊，而对援助伊拉克却囊中羞涩了呢？	阿富汗战争	是美国开打的第一场反恐战争，
4	焦点也在于此。讨论北约的未来，不能不提	阿富汗战争	“9·11”事件发生后，北约第五条款首次
5	发展代价。巴基斯坦人渴望和平与安宁。当前在	阿富汗战争	已进入第十个年头之际，应该

Figure 5.2 Mentioning legitimacy of the Afghan War

From the concordance lines 1-3, we can see the reference to the legal basis of the launch of the Afghan War and the recognition of the broad support of the international community at the start of the war. Take line 3 as an example. In the expanded concordance line 3, we can see that it uses the expression 师出有名/*war waged with compelling reasons* to describe the

origin of the Afghan War. It is called a war waged with compelling reasons because this war was launched with the authorisation of the United Nations. The Afghan War was triggered by al-Qaeda's terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, which were the most severe attacks on US territory (Hoffman 2002). After the 9/11 attack, the United States decided to respond with military action in Afghanistan to crack down on al-Qaeda and the claimed supporter Taliban. The situation was also discussed at the United Nations Security Council, which then published resolutions 1368 and 1373 (United Nations Security Council 2001a, 2001b). The resolutions condemned the 9/11 attacks and mentioned that self-defence is an inherent right and that all means and necessary steps can be taken to combat terrorist acts. They are accepted as the legitimate basis for the United States to resort to the use of force. It indicates unanimous agreement that the use of force is among the options for this case.

Expanded Line 3

阿富汗战争是美国开打的第一场反恐战争，师出有名，得到了国际社会较为普遍的支持，因为全世界有这样一个共同愿望：铲除恐怖主义的滋生地。

The *Afghan War* was the first war of the United States War on Terror. It is *a war waged for compelling reasons*. It has received *widespread support from the international community* because the whole world shares the same aspiration: to eliminate the breeding grounds of terrorism.

Another case regarding the description of using force based on the legal procedure is shown in the expanded line 4. It explains that the Afghan War is launched based on legal procedure, as the military action is the invocation of NATO Article 5. According to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, an attack on any NATO member state is considered an attack on all member states (NATO 1949). The mention of the NATO article with a neutral tone shows an understanding of the reason for the US-led NATO coalition military operation at the early stage of the Afghan War.

Expanded Line 4

“9·11”事件发生后，北约第五条款首次启动。该条款规定，对任何一个北约成员国的袭击都被视为对北约所有成员国的攻击。于是，北约发动了针对阿富汗的反恐战争。

NATO Article 5 was invoked for the first time after the September 11 attacks. The article stipulates that an attack on one ally is considered an attack on all allies. Therefore, NATO launched the counterterrorism war in Afghanistan.

(2) Changing nature of the war

Examining the concordance lines, we can find that when describing the war process, more negative traits are attributed to the war (see Figure 5.3). It is constructed as the epitome of America’s hegemonic power expansion and a political tool in international relations.

Figure 5.3 Changing nature of the Afghan War

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	和应对未来全球变局。事实上，美国自 2001 年发动	阿富汗战争	后，就一直借机谋求在该地区
2	美军仓促撤离造成的混乱，成为美国发动的	阿富汗战争	留给世人的最深刻记忆之一。美国
3	大国势力东进西出、南下北上的必经之地。而	阿富汗战争	是北约跨出传统的欧洲防区、走向
4	跨度从 2004 年 1 月至 2009 年 12 月。这些文件对	阿富汗战争	细节多有披露，其中关于塔利班力量
5	战略性失败充分说明霸权主义和强权政治不得人心。20 年	阿富汗战争	显示，美国“新干涉主义”注定不可能
6	赶赴中亚，确立日本与中亚的利益契合点。	阿富汗战争	之后，美国的霸权已经进入中亚，重构
7	平民死伤，并遗留下大量未爆弹药。在	阿富汗战争	中，美军飞机和无人机在打击
8	出虚假的成功感觉。在情况如此复杂的	阿富汗战争	中，新的衡量标准除应审视
9	基说，检察官的初步调查证据可信，美军在	阿富汗战争	中确实涉嫌战争罪和反人类
10	群”。2020 年，特朗普政府宣布对参与调查美方在	阿富汗战争	中行为的国际刑事法院官员实施
11	期间虐待战俘，严重侵犯了人权。美军把在	阿富汗战争	中抓获的“基地”组织和塔利班成员
12	在处理该组织的恐怖分子时，却把在	阿富汗战争	中抓获的一批中国籍“东
13	反思中，这种声音尤为响亮。当长达 20 年的	阿富汗战争	走到尽头之际，人们更加清楚地看到

First, the Afghan War is depicted as the manifestation of hegemonic power politics. In the expanded lines 2, 5, and 6, we can find the phrases 霸权/*hegemony* and 霸权政治/*hegemonic politics*. In the context of expanded line 6, it describes the impact of the Afghan War and ascribes the regional political conflicts to the American hegemony’s intervention in Central Asia. In the context of expanded line 2, it comments on the result of the two-decade-long Afghan War as turmoil and disorder, emphasising that hegemonism and power politics are unpopular. Hence, the repeated reference to hegemony indicates the attempt to create a hegemonic image of America’s war in Afghanistan so that the nature of the Afghan War changed from just war to solve the international terrorism problem to a war of hegemonic power politics.

Expanded Line 6

阿富汗战争之后，美国的霸权已经进入中亚，重构了该地区的地缘政治版图，引发新的地缘战略利益的碰撞。

Following the war in Afghanistan, US *hegemony* has entered Central Asia, reconfiguring the region's geopolitical map and triggering a new collision of geostrategic interests.

Expanded Line 2

美军仓促撤离造成的混乱，成为美国发动的阿富汗战争留给世人的最深刻记忆之一。美国对阿政策的战略性失败充分说明：霸权主义和强权政治不得人心。

One of the most profound memories of the Afghan War is the chaos caused by the hasty withdrawal of the US troops. The strategic failure of US policy towards Afghanistan has made it abundantly clear that *hegemony and power politics* are unpopular.

Second, the Afghan War is portrayed as a political tool for achieving American national interests. In the context of expanded Line 10, we can see that it refers to the fact that the United States released a group of Chinese ETIM fighters caught up during the Afghan War. The logic here is that the Afghan War is a war with double standards. The American standard is its national interests. Its war effort in fighting international terrorism focuses only on its national interests rather than providing public goods for the international community. Furthermore, if the terrorists happen to pose a threat to America's strategic rivals in international politics, America deliberately ignores the fact and uses the terrorists as political tools to gain political advantage and weaken its rivals.

(3) Negative impact of the war

From the concordance lines, we can see many cases that present details of numbers to indicate the negative consequences of the Afghan War (see Figure 5.4). It uses specific numbers to show the war's harm to Afghan people. Casualty is a topic often used in discursive strategy to create a negative image of war, which is commonly characterised as dangerous and destructive (Boettcher & Cobb 2006; Borrelli & Lockerbie 2008). In lines 1-3 and 4, it frames the Afghan war as a humanitarian crisis where large numbers of people

died or were injured due to the counterterrorism war. For example, line 2 presents the total number of deaths caused by the Afghan war but stresses the number of civilian deaths of 43,000 people. In this way, it serves as valid evidence that the war is dangerous to the local people's lives. War can also negatively impact local society as a whole. In lines 3 and 9, it uses specific numbers to show the serious refugee crisis and economic instability caused by the war. In addition, the war is depicted as a problem itself, as war can create more threats. In the context of line 7, we can see that it mentions that after the Afghan war started, the plantation of opium poppies increased dramatically, accounting for nearly 3/4 of the world's heroin production resources. Therefore, it underlines the possible connection between the growth of international drug production and the Afghan War, implying that the war generates more non-traditional threats to the international community.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	带来了什么? 美国布朗大学“战争代价”项目估算,	阿富汗战争	已造成 15.7 万人死亡, 仅阿富汗平民就
2	以来, 美军共造成 48 万人死亡, 其中 24.4 万人是平民。	阿富汗战争	已造成 15.7 万人死亡, 受害者中仅阿富汗
3	是平民。联合国难民署称, 持续近 20 年的	阿富汗战争	造成 260 万阿富汗人逃往国外, 350 万人
4	自 2001 年 10 月打着“反恐”旗号发动	阿富汗战争	以来, 美国在阿富汗的军事行动造成
5	式袭击扩散, 对地区安全造成威胁。美国发动	阿富汗战争	以来, 以恐袭为主要形式的对抗
6	美国发动的伊拉克战争造成 65.5 万伊拉克人死亡,	阿富汗战争	以来, 超过 3.1 万阿富汗民众死亡。大量
7	反弹。联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室 2003 年度报告称,	阿富汗战争	开打后, 当地的毒品活动不降
8	建立在可行或可持续的基础之上。” 20 年	阿富汗战争	显示, 美国的作用是破坏而不是
9	并通过美国爱国者法案。美国以反恐为名, 发动	阿富汗战争	致使阿富汗地区的战乱已持续了 18

Figure 5.4 Negative impact of the Afghan War

(4) A war gradually losing support

Many concordance cases demonstrate scepticism and opposition to the war in Afghanistan. By examining the context of these concordance lines, we can find that these descriptions aim to highlight the decreasing support for the counterterrorism war, framing it as a war that is gradually losing support (see Figure 5.5).

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	用以增强其国防军的战斗能力。对澳军参与	阿富汗战争	一事，澳大利亚政界和民间有着截然不同的
2	报记者所接触到的民众大多认为，参加	阿富汗战争	是拿澳大利亚人的生命和纳税人
3	要撤回阿富汗驻军；日本政府正因支持美军	阿富汗战争	的法案在国会难以通过而忍受“
4	国家。美国在“9·11”事件后以反恐为借口发动	阿富汗战争	不曾想恐怖袭击却愈反愈
5	之重。多次民调显示，大多数美国人反对和厌倦	阿富汗战争	除数千名美军官兵在阿富汗丧生
6	战争，不曾想恐怖袭击却愈反愈烈，	阿富汗战争	在美国国内越来越不得人心。这场战争
7	有着千丝万缕的联系。持续了13年之久的	阿富汗战争	已经成为美国社会难以承受之重。
8	阿富汗局势持续恶化的情况下，美国民众对	阿富汗战争	的支持率不断下降，奥巴马总统将
9	提供重建服务。近来美国民意调查显示，民众对	阿富汗战争	的支持率大幅下跌。美国国会中
10	在刚派往阿富汗两个月后，因为对	阿富汗战争	的正义性产生极大疑虑，最终“
11	国务院派驻阿富汗的外交官马修·洪赫宣布辞职，成为	阿富汗战争	爆发8年来首位辞职的美国驻

Figure 5.5 Losing support of the Afghan War

First, international support for the war in Afghanistan has declined. The highlight of the American allies' discontent, scepticism, and opposition can be more persuasive in constructing it as an unpopular war. For example, in line 2 and the expanded line 3, it can be found that more countries are sceptical about the war in Afghanistan, including Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Japan. All these countries had participated in the war on terror led by the United States to some extent.

Second, the participants in the Afghan War opposed the war. A more convincing way to represent the war as losing support is to highlight the low morale and opposition by American soldiers and officials, indicating the righteousness and rationality of continuing the prolonged war is under suspicion. In the expanded line 10, it describes that an American soldier became a deserter and was eventually captured by the Taliban because they thought the war in Afghanistan was unjust. Line 11 represents the resignation of a US diplomat in Afghanistan who questioned its military policy in Afghanistan. All these accounts are intended to show that officials and soldiers involved in the war are demoralised and querying the integrity of the war.

Expanded Line 10

美军士兵鲍·伯格达尔在刚派往阿富汗两个月后，因为对阿富汗战争的正义性产生极大疑虑，最终“幻想破灭”，于2009年6月30日出走，被塔利班俘获。

Two months after his initial deployment to Afghanistan, *US soldier* Beau Bergdahl *deserted* his post on 30 June, 2009 as he *doubted the justice of the war*. The soldier was later kept captive by the Taliban.

Third, the American public's distaste for the war in Afghanistan. The presentation of declining American public support for the war contrasts sharply with previous public opinion. When the Afghan War started right after the 9/11 attack, it enjoyed a high level of support among the American public (De Graaf, Dimitriu, & Ringsmose 2015). As we can see in lines 5, 6, 8, and 9, the expressions of 民众/*the public*, 人心/*public opinion*, and 支持率/*support rate* indicate the public opinion of the war. Looking into the context, we can find that all of them describe a situation in which American society's support for the war is waning. In expanded line 7, the lowering approval rate of the public opinion poll of the Afghan War is highlighted, creating a situation in which the mainstream of American society is fed up with war. In this way, it is constructed as a war that lost the American people's hearts and minds.

(5) A war with unsatisfactory results

The representation of the low efficacy of the war is a common discursive strategy in constructing the war in Afghanistan, mainly reflected in three aspects: cost and benefit, the accomplishment of missions, and the backfire of the use of force (see Figure 5.6)

First, the description of the high price of human resources and military expenditure is often used in the discourse as a background to introduce the deteriorated terrorism situation in Afghanistan. Through this contrast, America's war on terror in Afghanistan is constructed as a very unsatisfactory war. Concordance cases show that there are many descriptions of casualties among American troops. The expressions 之最/*highest* and 最多/*most* are often used to highlight that the American troops are continuing to suffer from losses in the war in Afghanistan. For example, lines 1 and 2 highlight that the number of US soldiers killed in a single month reached a record high since the outbreak of the war in 2001. The construction of the Afghan War as a high-cost one is also manifested in the frequent display of military expenditure. In the expanded lines 7 and 8, we can find that the phrases of 万亿/*trillion* and 千亿/*hundred billion* describe the very high economic cost of waging war and welfare for the veterans and injured after the war. Furthermore, as the expanded line 23 shows, even with such tremendous costs and efforts into the war, the security situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating rather than getting better.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	异常频繁，共有 102 名美军和北约士兵丧生，创下	阿富汗战争	9 年来的单月之最。6 月 29 日，
2	名驻阿美军士兵阵亡，使得今年 10 月成为	阿富汗战争	爆发以来美军死亡人数最多的一个
3	着反恐旗号出兵阿富汗 20 周年。持续近 20 年的	阿富汗战争	超过越战成为美国历史上最漫长的
4	动武，对阿富汗塔利班政权实施严厉的军事打击。	阿富汗战争	从 2001 年 9 月下旬谋划，到 12 月底组成
5	全国总人口的 8.2%，是全球最大的非法毒品市场。	阿富汗战争	打了将近 5 年，那里塔利班之类的“
6	尽管美国自 2001 年以来花费了 3000 亿美元用于	阿富汗战争	但塔利班却比以往任何时候都
7	家庭的补偿每年超过 220 亿美元，为参加过	阿富汗战争	的退伍军人支付的医疗和伤残护理
8	着沉重的财政负担。美国官方从未详尽透露	阿富汗战争	的真正财政支出情况。据英国《金融
9	背离了“传统”的价值观，是“不合法”政府。在	阿富汗战争	后的初期，“基地”组织遭到美国的
10	出钱和出兵方面常常难以满足美方的要求。	阿富汗战争	开打以来，无论是美国还是其北约
11	应该继续向阿富汗增兵。尽管麦克基南拒绝接受“	阿富汗战争	失败论”，但他那番近似“鸽
12	美国以反恐为名带领盟友入侵阿富汗。20 年来，	阿富汗战争	是美国历史上持续时间最长的
13	反抗。“9·11”事件后，美国发动了两场反恐战争。	阿富汗战争	虽然推翻了塔利班政权，打散了“基地”
14	反恐一直有着陷于悖论的趋向。当年美国发动	阿富汗战争	一个很明晰的目标是活捉本·
15	安全和经济仍未得到根本性的改观。同时，	阿富汗战争	已使中亚地缘战略格局发生了
16	及其盟友的空袭。据美国防部统计数据 displays，	阿富汗战争	已致约 2300 名美军死亡，超过 2 万人
17	大幅削弱。阿富汗塔利班与“基地”组织有所不同。2001 年的	阿富汗战争	因为阿富汗塔利班坚持庇护“基地”组织而
18	可以在世界范围内为所欲为。但长达 20 年的	阿富汗战争	再次打碎了美国虚妄的幻想——美军
19	阿富汗，美军所到之处，留下的都是动荡分裂、家破人亡。20 年	阿富汗战争	再次证明，试图将特定的价值观强加
20	分别高达 103284 人和 153303 人。2001 年至 2005 年，从伊拉克和	阿富汗战争	中返回的 103788 名退伍军人中，约有 13
21	平民伤亡。由于缺乏权威的统计数据，各方对于	阿富汗战争	中平民的伤亡数据没有定论。一般
22	一泥潭中自拔。约 3500 名北约军人在	阿富汗战争	中丧生阿富汗战争是美国历史上
23	深陷阿富汗和伊拉克战争的泥潭。美军已在	阿富汗战争	中死亡 560 多人，在伊拉克战争中

Figure 5.6 Unsatisfactory results of the Afghan War

Second, the objective of the military fight against terrorism has not been achieved. The original purpose of the war in Afghanistan was to destroy al-Qaeda and topple the Taliban. Some concordance lines describe the unsatisfactory progress of counterterrorism. In the expanded line 9, instead of losing its combat capability, al-Qaeda gained practical experience and spiritual inspiration and developed strengths in confrontation with the US army. In the expanded line 10, it uses an expression of 越打越多/*the war on terror generates more terrorists*. Therefore, it portrays a gloomy prospect that, against the background of increased military deployment and military actions in Afghanistan, the terrorist groups in Afghanistan are more powerful than ever.

Expanded Line 10

阿富汗战争开打以来，无论是美国还是其北约盟友都曾数度向阿增兵。可结果是，对手非但没有被击垮，甚至呈“越打越多”之势

Since the start of the war in Afghanistan, both the United States and its NATO allies have deployed several reinforcements in the country. But the terrorists are not crushed by increased forces. Instead, the war on terror 'generates more terrorists'.

Third, the abuse of force creates a backfire impact. It uses the phrase of 帝国坟场/*graveyard of empires* to define the prolonged Afghan War waged by the United States, as shown in the expanded line 3. This metaphor echoes the history of invasions by outside powers, which ended up with the failure of occupation and power declination. The latest cases were the invasions in Afghanistan by the British Empire in 1839-1842 and 1878-1881 and by the Soviet Union in 1979-1989. Neither the British nor the Russians failed to conquer and control Afghanistan (Milton 2001). The use of such a metaphor implies two meanings. First, the ongoing Afghan War shares the exact nature of imperial expansion with the historical wars. Second, America's obsession with military hegemony and its reliance on strong military power to fight the war on terror in Afghanistan are doomed to fail.

Expanded Line 3

持续近 20 年的阿富汗战争，超过越战成为美国历史上最漫长的战争，不仅令美国及其盟友深“帝国坟场”，更给阿富汗人民带来深重灾难，导致数万平民丧生，上千万人流离失所或成为难民。

The nearly 20-year war in Afghanistan, which surpassed the Vietnam War as the longest war in US history, has not only plunged the US and its allies into the “graveyard of empires”, but has also wreaked havoc on the Afghan people. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed. Tens of millions were displaced or became refugees as a result of the war.

5.3.2 The Iraq War: An Unjust War

Unlike the depiction of the outbreak of the Afghan War, the Iraq War is constructed as a war without legitimacy, justification, righteousness, or support from the international community.

(1) An illegal war

Large volumes of expressions related to the concerns of legitimacy are found in the concordance lines, such as 合法性/*legitimacy*, 非法/*illegitimacy*, 非法/*illegitimate*, and 违反国际法/*violation of international law*. Reviewing the contexts of the concordance lines, most cases display a negative picture of the Iraq War and depict it as a war without legality (see Figure 5.7). The main argument of the discourse is centred on the United Nations. Lines 5 and 8 stressed that the Iraq War was launched without the UN's authorisation and against the principles and regulations of the UN Charter. In the expanded line 14, we can find that the Iraq War is defined as an illegal unilateral war that is not only without the authorisation of the United Nations but also objected to by other permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The United States launched the Iraq War based on the excuse that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction and supports international terrorism. Many cases in the concordance lines show criticism of the excuse. In lines 1, 18, and 20, we can see the expressions 莫须有/*groundless*, 肆意/*recklessly*, and 借口/*excuse*, which indicate the excuse for the war is baseless and fabricated. In the expanded line 3, we can see the war is defined as 师出无名的战争/*a war without just cause*.

Expanded Line 3

再观伊拉克战争，这是一场被美国再次冠以“反恐”两字、但没有得到国际社会普遍认同的战争，所谓出师之名，即伊拉克拥有大规模杀伤性武器纯属借口而已，是美国执意要进行的一场“先发制人”的战争，实际上也就是一场师出无名的战争。

The Iraq war, branded by America as a counterterrorism war, is not universally supported by the international community. America insisted on carrying out war with pre-emptive strikes based on the excuse of Iraq's possession of WMD. The Iraq War is actually a war without just cause.

In addition to illegitimacy, labels of invasion and aggression are attributed to the Iraq War. The phrases 侵略/*invade* and 入侵/*intrude* are commonly used in describing the Iraq War. For example, in expanded line 17, it defines the Iraq War waged by the United States and its ally, the United Kingdom, as an invasion without legitimate reasons. By defining the war as an invasion, it creates an underlying message that the war lacks justice and morality and might result in resistance and induce more violence. As shown in the expanded line 10, America's invasion of Iraq exacerbated the security situation in the Middle East region and created a breeding environment for terrorism.

Expanded Line 17

2003年3月，美国不顾国际社会普遍反对，联合英国等以莫须有罪名侵入伊拉克。

In March 2003, despite widespread international opposition, the US joined forces with the UK and others to invade Iraq on trumped-up charges.

Expanded Line 10

美国用飞机和坦克入侵了一个伊斯兰国家，这个举动本身就激化了伊斯兰世界对美国的仇视。与此同时，伊拉克战争还在很多中东国家内部造成了亲美政府与反美民众之间的分裂和对抗，为恐怖主义提供了兴风作浪的空隙。

The US invaded an Islamic country with planes and tanks, which inflamed hatred of the US in the Islamic world. At the same time, the Iraq War has created divisions and confrontations within many Middle Eastern countries between pro-American governments and anti-American populations, providing an opening for terrorism to flourish.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	伤害。第一，违反国际法肆意发动战争。阿富汗战争和	伊拉克战争	是美国在中东及其周边发动的
2	不惜一切手段保持美国的霸权。通过阿富汗战争、	伊拉克战争	等，美国企图把“武力和正义”合二为一。
3	一个共同愿望：铲除恐怖主义的滋生地。再观	伊拉克战争	这是一场被美国再次冠以“反恐”两
4	宗旨和原则，“是非法的”。安南说，他在	伊拉克战争	爆发前就明确表示，绕过安理会采取
5	指出，美英在去年3月未经联合国安理会授权发动	伊拉克战争	违背了《联合国宪章》的宗旨和原则，
6	事件发生，相信有关方面将无话可说，无颜以对。	伊拉克战争	的“合法性”一直是个问题。从国际法
7	军事法庭”不合法，这将对美英发动的	伊拉克战争	和“反恐战争”的合法性构成另一种
8	大国协调重现龃龉，美军也在伊拉克进退维谷。其次，	伊拉克战争	在缺乏联合国授权、未找到大规模杀伤性
9	其说。在英国国内，几乎从阿富汗战争和	伊拉克战争	开打之日起，不少民众就质疑
10	就激化了伊斯兰世界对美国的仇视。与此同时，	伊拉克战争	还在很多中东国家内部造成了
11	伊战中有得有失对美而言，	伊拉克战争	总体上是得有有失。首先，伊战
12	美、英入侵伊拉克13年来，该地区硝烟弥漫，血流成河。	伊拉克战争	导致的惨剧本不该发生。美国
13	推卸的责任。国际舆论认为，美、英发动的	伊拉克战争	非法，对于战争的反思来得太迟，
14	单方面推翻一个主权国家政权的非法战争。在	伊拉克战争	爆发前，联合国是和平解决伊拉克危机
15	批评。2004年9月，时任联合国秘书长安南明确表示，	伊拉克战争	与《联合国宪章》不符，从宪章的角度
16	未经联合国安理会授权的情况下，美英发动了	伊拉克战争	理由是美英认为萨达姆与恐怖
17	塔利班完全控制区域已翻倍，超过阿富汗政府。	伊拉克战争	2003年3月，美国不顾国际社会普遍反对，
18	不顾国际社会普遍反对，以莫须有的罪名发动	伊拉克战争	根据美国沃森国际与公共事务
19	武力的国际法基本原则，以凭空捏造的理由发动	伊拉克战争	构成对伊拉克的侵略。根据全球统计
20	我们这个时代最大的难民危机”。面对阿富汗和	伊拉克战争	泥潭，肆意发动战争的美国政府却

Figure 5.7 Illegitimacy of the Iraq War

(2) A war based on lies and political interests

Another feature the discourse attributes to the Iraq War is deception (see Figure 5.8). It is constructed as a war based on political lies. The excuses for launching the Iraq War are defined as lies that have been proven by history, as indicated in line 15. Other related cases show similar definitions of the war. For example, in lines 17 and 19, it uses expressions of 惊人谎言/*great lies* and 有瑕疵的情报/*intelligence with flaws* to frame the excuses and evidence to justify the military actions in Iraq as lies.

Political interests are described as the real reason behind the scene. In lines 2, 6, 7, 9, and 13, the phrases 亲美/*pro-American*, 帝国/*empire*, 私利/*selfish gain*, and 变味/*changed nature* are used to form an argument that the real reason for the Iraq War is America's political interest to replace a pro-America Iraqi government and expand its hegemony in the Middle East. In this way, the narrative distinguishes the Iraq War from a real counterterrorism war and constructs it as a political tool to expand America's geopolitical influence in the region. In addition, 军工集团/*military-industrial complex*, 军火商/*arms dealer*, 巨额利润/*huge profits*, and 获利/*earn profit* are found in lines 4, 8, 11, and 14. Examining the context of these lines, we can find a narrative that frames the war as a deception by revealing that one of the key causes of the war is America's military-industrial complex, which seeks to profit from the war.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	事后揭发的情报，使人有充分理由质疑	伊拉克战争	发动者实际的动机，质疑美国鹰派
2	后果。”当年，美国不顾国际社会的反对，孤注一掷发动	伊拉克战争	是要在中东树立一个亲美
3	美国随后以“反恐”为名发动的阿富汗战争和	伊拉克战争	验证了那些军火商的“眼力”。2002年，
4	军火商就为了一己私利而竭力怂恿政府参加	伊拉克战争	因此，持续数年之久的“反恐
5	空前增加军费支出，而且在2003年3月发动了	伊拉克战争	自今年7月开始部署国家导弹防御
6	分子所劫持，借机发动了蓄谋已久的	伊拉克战争	以谋求建立一个美国现代“帝国”。而
7	毫无道理的。美英以莫须有的罪名发动	伊拉克战争	只是为了铲除萨达姆政权并满足其
8	能赚到巨额利润。而布什政府一意孤行地发动	伊拉克战争	的背后，军工集团恐怕是原动力之一。
9	认同这场战争。可现在越来越清楚的是，	伊拉克战争	是美国为一己之私，盗用“反恐”
10	围堵所谓“邪恶轴心”、“流氓国家”，再到发动以	伊拉克战争	为中心的所谓反恐战争，美国“战争
11	波音公司、诺斯罗普·格鲁曼公司以及在	伊拉克战争	中获利最大的“新秀”联合科技系统
12	有着潜移默化影响；第五，从经济利益看，	伊拉克战争	在耗费大量资源的同时，也为
13	都可能在“反恐”的大旗下进行，但经过	伊拉克战争	后，反恐一词早已变味。某些大国
14	鹰派集团和背后财阀势力的真实目标，拒绝“	伊拉克战争	是国际反恐战争重要部分”的说法。
15	何在，便成为美国国内争论的话题。而发动	伊拉克战争	的反恐借口早已被历史证明是一个谎言
16	的中东战略环境造成的结构性的冲击。当初，	伊拉克战争	的设计师们为战争设定了三
17	一系列鲜为人知的“惊人谎言”和“失败教训”。机密文件显示，	伊拉克战争	爆发前，时任首相的布莱尔误导了
18	得出的结论与美国总统布什反复宣扬的	伊拉克战争	对取得反恐战争胜利至关重要的说法
19	这份长达260万字的调查报告认为，英国作出	伊拉克战争	的决策是基于“有瑕疵”的情报
20	瑕疵”的情报，盲目追随美国发动伊拉克战争。在	伊拉克战争	开始13年后，调查报告给这场假借

Figure 5.8 Deception of the Iraq War

(3) War of disaster

Attributing the disastrous trait to the Iraq War is common in China's international counterterrorism discourse. The war is framed as catastrophic by emphasising its humanitarian disaster and negative impact on international order and regional politics (see Figure 5.9). The disaster narrative is displayed in two ways.

N	Left Context	Right Context
1	辱尸，亵渎当地人民的宗教感情。美军在	伊拉克战争中
2	国际人权领域的纪录劣迹斑斑。美国发动的	伊拉克战争
3	但实际上加强了对中东的控制；第四，	伊拉克战争
4	来说令人难以理解。从国际关系的视角看，	伊拉克战争
5	全球范围看，因为“9·11”后的美反恐战争以及	伊拉克战争
6	恶劣影响。“9·11”事件后，美国先后发动阿富汗战争和	伊拉克战争，
7	军事打击。美国以反恐名义发动阿富汗战争和	伊拉克战争
8	难以根除该地区恐怖主义威胁。进入21世纪以来，从	伊拉克战争
9	美国先后发动了阿富汗战争和伊拉克战争，其中	伊拉克战争
10	以及地区恐怖势力的上升，因此可以得出结论，	伊拉克战争
11	周在中东走访得出的结论——美国发动的	伊拉克战争
12	本土防御和反恐能力，导致反恐形势愈加恶化。	伊拉克战争
13	对外发动战争最频繁的国家。美国发动的	伊拉克战争
14	中东文明的历史悠久和灿烂辉煌。美军发动	伊拉克战争
15	使用了释放金属污染物的白磷弹等，	伊拉克战争
16	和71%的农村人口能享受公共医疗服务。2003年	伊拉克战争
17	并构成该地区地缘政治上的平衡。但	伊拉克战争
18	萨达姆的伊拉克视为最大威胁)。因此，美国发动的	伊拉克战争
19	阿富汗战争平民死亡超过3万人，受伤7万人，难民1100万人；	伊拉克战争
20	并结合逃离伊拉克的难民数据，计算出在	伊拉克战争
21	城市可用病床仅有区区1000张。此外，美国发动	伊拉克战争
22	空袭中，有超过200名平民遇难，这是自2003年	伊拉克战争
23	上的调查显示，由美英为首发起的	伊拉克战争
24	的人道主义灾难。据报道，截至2011年，美国发动的	伊拉克战争
25	不会被历史遗忘2003年3月美军发动的	伊拉克战争
26	日公布的数据显示，2003年3月至2009年底，在	伊拉克战争
27	政治圈进行外交政策辩论时的“筹码”。不过，	伊拉克战争
		中使用白磷弹和贫铀 和阿富汗战争，造成大量平民伤亡。维 不仅改变了伊拉克，事实上对“阿拉伯之 成为冷战后国际形势发展的一个 打乱了全球化的进程。从得的 导致地区局势动荡，安全威胁外溢。 导致数以万计的平民无辜丧命，数以百万计的 到西亚北非动荡，中东地区多国出现 对中东的冲击是直接的和 给美国整体影响力带来了负面作用。 给中东地区带来了一场真正的 还使美国的国际形象和“软 和阿富汗战争造成大量平民伤亡。制止 后，其军事行动直接造成政权更迭、 后，伊拉克婴儿的出生缺陷率大幅 后，约2万名当地医生逃离，大量医疗 后，这种局面有了实质性的变化， 可以说是打在了中区的“痛 平民死亡20万至25万人，难民325万人；叙利亚 期间的非正常死亡人数为46.1万人，其中直接 时，曾大量使用贫铀弹，给 以来，美国空中军事行动造成的最大 在2003年至2011年间已造成46.1万人死亡， 造成65.5万伊拉克人死亡，阿富汗战争以来， 造成约20万至25万平民死亡，其中 中，有28.5万人伤亡，至少10.9万人丧生，其中 最大的代价还是背负在伊拉克人民

Figure 5.9 Catastrophic impact of the Iraq War

On the one hand, innocent Iraqi people are victims of the war. Many concordance cases show the description of civilian casualties. The expressions 伤亡/*casualty*, 死亡/*death*, 非正常死亡/*abnormal death*, and 丧生/*dead* can be found in lines 2, 13, 19-20, 24-26,

demonstrating that the war threatens the lives of Iraqi people. Lines 15, 16, and 20 demonstrate the humanitarian tragedy of war by depicting the use of white phosphorus munitions and depleted uranium shells that caused health damage to local children and the destruction of public medical services in Iraq due to the war.

On the other hand, war is portrayed as a catastrophe for the international order and the regional geopolitical environment. For example, in the expanded line 4, the Iraq War is described as wreaking havoc on the international system, with the United Nations at its core. In line 11, the war is framed as a ‘real disaster’ in the Middle East.

(4) International opposition to the war

Public anti-war campaigns are presented in narratives to construct the war as an unsupported war. Many concordance lines show expressions such as 抗议/protest, 反对/oppose, and 反战/anti-war (see Figure 5.10).

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	本月 12 日联名发表的公开信。信中称：美国以	伊拉克战争	为中心的对外政策是美国自
2	的情绪，而共和党候选人也迫切希望尽早摆脱	伊拉克战争	的包袱。2007 年初，布什政府出人意料地推出
3	份战略也有呼应民意之处。阿富汗和	伊拉克战争	的现实使美国逐渐认识到，依靠
4	国民众 20 日举行示威游行，反对美英发动	伊拉克战争	和继续占领伊拉克。日本全国共有 13 万人
5	横幅。绿党议员施特勒贝尔在集会上说，发动	伊拉克战争	就是侵犯人民的权利。他呼吁德国
6	今天顶风冒雨走上伦敦街头，抗议美国领导的	伊拉克战争	抗议联军继续占领伊拉克。早晨 6 点多，
7	罹难者总人数，美国民众开始全方位反思甚至反对	伊拉克战争	伊战成为美国中期选举前夕的
8	美国的外交变得更加困难；63% 的人认为	伊拉克战争	是不值得的；56% 的人认为伊
9	民众 18 日走上街头举行示威游行，在美国发动	伊拉克战争	三周年之际再次表达反战呼声，并
10	纽约、旧金山、洛杉矶等一些城市 18 日举行大规模反对	伊拉克战争	的示威游行，要求政府立即无条件地
11	取得成功。因此，新的外交理念的提出源于	伊拉克战争	的经验教训，是对前任“迷信军事万能”
12	人提出一项建议，要求布什政府制订结束	伊拉克战争	的策略。面对来自各方不断加大的
13	是个“太漫长的等待”，但对于一直反对	伊拉克战争	的民众来说也许是值得的，请
14	也表达了类似的看法。欧洲人为什么不愿将	伊拉克战争	看成是反恐战争呢？恐怕有以下

Figure 5.10 International opposition to the Iraq War

To make it more convincing, most of the anti-war campaigns described in the narrative of widespread opposition and resistance to the war are in developed countries, which are allies or friendly countries with the United States in international relations. For example, the

context of the expanded line 4 shows that the international anti-war campaigns occurred at many locations worldwide, including the UK, Germany, Denmark, Japan, etc. On the other hand, many cases are about domestic protests in America. As shown in line 10, major cities such as New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles witnessed large-scale anti-war demonstrations.

(5) A failed war

Failure is a key feature discursively attributed to the Iraq War (see Figure 5.11). Containing terrorist threats posed by international terrorist organisations is a key measure to judge the result of the counterterrorism war (Lehrke & Schomaker 2016; Wilner 2011a). In China's international counterterrorism discourse, the Iraq War is framed as a failed war in the following ways.

First, the war boosts the strength of terrorists. As shown in line 5, it describes that al-Qaeda has not been 'exterminated' but grew more powerful after the Iraq War and Afghan War. In line 6, terrorist attacks in Iraq became more frequent after the war. It also explains why the terrorist groups are reinforced by the war. On the one hand, the war brought economic development into stagnation, and increased poverty offered an opportunity for terrorist groups to recruit members, as shown in line 20. On the other hand, line 20 expounds that war leads to an atmosphere of revenge on invaders, which can be taken advantage of by terrorist groups.

Second, the war generates new terrorism. The Iraq War is depicted as the cause of new international terrorist groups. The typical example it uses to manifest the war's failure is the rise of the Islamic State, as shown in lines 4 and 18. One interesting case is the expanded line 7. The Iraq War is described as 潘多拉魔盒/*Pandora's box* to indicate that the war brings disasters to Iraqi people and fosters more terrorists. The myth of Pandora's Box in Greek mythology recounts the tale of a box that was cursed and should not have been opened. However, it was opened by Pandora, the woman created by God, resulting in the release of

both physical and emotional curses onto humanity. Thus, the reference to Pandora's box indicates that the Iraq War served as the catalyst for the rise of the Islamic State.

Third, war is proven to be an ineffective method of counterterrorism. In line 1, it employs another metaphor to indicate the failure of the war. It describes the deteriorated security situation in Iraq as evidence that the war is not a 灵丹妙药/*panacea* to solve terrorism problems.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	看清一个事实：战争不是解决恐怖主义问题的灵丹妙药。	伊拉克战争	改变了世界上很多人对美国
2	战线太长、兵力不足及士气低落等弱点。	伊拉克战争	既显示了美强大军事优势，也
3	不断为国际恐怖主义发展蔓延提供肥沃的土壤。	伊拉克战争	的一个明显后果是，西方国家不仅
4	壮大起来的 ISIS 极端组织，其始作俑者也是一意孤行发动	伊拉克战争	的美国，是美国中东政策负效应累加
5	“基地”组织的影子。“基地”组织在阿富汗战争和	伊拉克战争	后不仅没有被扑灭，反而越来越活跃。
6	体现在行动上，甚至没有体现在意识中。	伊拉克战争	以来，爆炸在伊拉克几乎天天发生。
7	之中，还助长了极端主义、恐怖主义的复仇情绪。	伊拉克战争	不仅给伊拉克人民带来了灾难，其
8	的注意力被转移了，因为要去占领伊拉克”；“	伊拉克战争	不仅对反恐没有帮助，还分散了
9	使人们感到普遍安全，而今天的现实并非如此。	伊拉克战争	之后，遍及世界的恐怖袭击活动非但
10	中东区域，恐怖活动和恐怖组织如雨后春笋般出现。“	伊拉克战争	引发灾难性后果，牵连中东地区和世界
11	份反恐专家为安理会撰写的报告，同样认为	伊拉克战争	为“基地”组织提供了训练场和兵源，
12	直接打击，失去阵地，其活动陷入低潮。但在	伊拉克战争	之后，“基地”组织重新找到了活动的
13	实力大增。具有讽刺意味的是，美国发动	伊拉克战争	前，“基地”组织在伊拉克并没有发展
14	了塔利班政权，打散了“基地”组织，但后来的	伊拉克战争	又为“圣战”分子提供了新的
15	的，英国发布的报告再次证明了这一点。	伊拉克战争	没有带来所谓的“民主”与“和平”，反而
16	源。必须指出的是，正是由于美国发动的	伊拉克战争	才使伊变成了恐怖活动的渊藪。
17	分子涌入，最终导致“基地”组织出现。近来，无论是	伊拉克战争	阿富汗战争，还是叙利亚内战，都能看到
18	战略难以奏效后的纠结心态。美国发动的	伊拉克战争	所造成的中东乱局诱发极端组织“
19	反美势力乘虚而入。与上述后果相关的是，	伊拉克战争	成就了基地组织意想不到的战略性胜利。
20	取得反恐战争胜利至关重要的说法截然相反。报告指出，	伊拉克战争	已被极端组织用来作为招兵买马的借口，
21	贫穷是滋生恐怖主义的最好土壤，在漫长的	伊拉克战争	进程中，一批批伊拉克少年成长
22	的重要因素，美国等西方国家难逃其责。	伊拉克战争	后形成的安全真空为极端组织伊斯兰国
23	中东地区安全局势不确定因素。2003 年美国发动	伊拉克战争	后，“基地”组织与伊拉克反政府武装
24	边境线明显承压。从中东的反恐形势看，	伊拉克战争	非但没有完成其初衷，反而孵化出

Figure 5.11 Failure of the Iraq War

5.4 Discourse Prosody in the Representation of Counterterrorism War

This section aims to analyse the collocations of 战争/*war* to find the discourse prosody around the representation of counterterrorism war. Discourse prosody reflects the speakers'

attitudinal preferences (Hunston 2007). In this way, China's attitudes towards the use of force in international counterterrorism will be revealed. The discourse prosody will be identified by examining the collocations' semantic meanings, language patterns, and contexts. Then, China's attitudes and preferences towards the use of force in counterterrorism can be revealed through the analysis. To do so, 战争/*war* is used as the query word in AntConc to conduct searches in the corpus. The T score is selected as the measure, and the threshold is set at $p < 0.01$. The window span is 5L to 5R. Excluding grammatical words, 102 collocates are derived from the corpus. Based on the semantic meaning and context, the collocates are categorised into three groups: war as the approach, development of the war, and evaluation of war.

5.4.1 War as the Approach

War is the 'institutionalisation of violence' and the 'contending by force' (Vasquez 2009; Wright 1965). It is the manifestation of the use of force in pursuing political or security objectives. Some collocates of 战争/*war* are relevant to the representation of the war as the approach to dealing with terrorism. According to their semantic meaning and context, these collocates can be further classified into two groups (see Table 5.5).

Table 5.5 War as the approach

Semantic Group	Collocates
War Analogy	反恐/counterterrorism 伊拉克/Iraq 阿富汗/Afghanistan 越南/Vietnam 全球/global 科索沃/Kosovo 朝鲜/Korea 对外/foreign 多场 many 海湾 Gulf
Military Operation	发动/launch 爆发/outbreak 打/fight 卷入/engage 开打/fight 参与/participate 犯/commit 打响/start 进行/proceed 先发制人/pre-emptive 开展/conduct 推翻/overthrow 决定/decide 侵/invasion 虐/abuse

(1) War analogy

One of the noteworthy findings is the frequent co-occurred collocates of 伊拉克/*Iraq*, 阿富汗/*Afghanistan*, 越南/*Vietnam*, 科索沃/*Kosovo*, 朝鲜/*Korea*, and 海湾/*Gulf*. By examining the contexts in which these collocates co-occurred, it can be seen that all of these collocates denote wars in history, which puts the counterterrorism wars in Iraq and

Afghanistan in the same context as the Korean War, Vietnam War, Gulf War, and Kosovo War.

越南/Vietnam is the most salient collocate that denotes traditional wars, occurring 46 times in the corpus. It is interesting to see why the Vietnam War, a traditional war fought in the last century, appeared more frequently than other wars in the counterterrorism context. We can find three features by examining the concordance lines of the 越南/Vietnam (see Figure 5.12).

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	超过梵蒂冈的美国大使馆便知。伊拉克战争与	越南	战争的不同之处在于，尽管都是“泥潭”，
2	恢复和平，但显然我们在阿富汗失败了”	越南	战争的幽灵从一开始就徘徊在阿富汗
3	计算，美国反恐战争的军费开支将超过当年	越南	战争的开支。这家媒体披露了包括
4	的“五角大楼文件”极大地改变了美国公众对	越南	战争的看法。但朱利安·阿森否认该
5	等一切……我就是杀人……我射杀他们……”曾参加	越南	战争的美国老兵瓦尔纳多·辛普森
6	家庭的补偿每年达28亿美元，给参加过	越南	战争的老兵及其家庭的补偿每年超过220
7	美国历史学家艾伦·布林克利在《美国史》中记载，	越南	战争期间，美军使用“饱和轰炸”袭击越南村庄，
8	文件显示，在阿富汗战争中，美国军方采取了	越南	战争中的策略，即操纵公众舆论，“无论
9	根据美国退伍军人事务部的统计，美军在朝鲜战争和	越南	战争中的身体受伤人员分别高达103284人和153303
10	所谓的‘人道主义罪行’，自己却拒绝照镜子”“从	越南	战争到最近的‘反恐战争’，美国犯下
11	不会简单地重复，但又有其相似性。从	越南	战争到阿富汗战争，美国似乎在重复自己
12	用于伊战的开支已达742.3亿美元，超过	越南	战争和朝鲜战争的费用。在本土安全方面，
13	布什政府无可奈何地目睹了反美主义自	越南	战争结束以来发展到最高潮。”世界多极化
14	对付。美国攻打伊拉克的开销已经直逼当年的	越南	战争，如此高昂的费用，非但没有带来和平，
15	开始时曾警告说，“阿富汗将成为另一场	越南	战争”。美国政府的这份内部文件印证

Figure 5.12 War analogy

First, it links the counterterrorism war in Afghanistan to the Vietnam War. The ghost metaphor is used to imply that the Afghan War is haunted by the destiny of the Vietnam War, as shown in Line 2. The narrative implies that the counterterrorism war in Afghanistan will end in failure like the Vietnam War. In Line 11, it depicts the Afghan War as a historical repeat of the Vietnam War, implying that the war is doomed to fail. In Line 15, it directly defines the Afghan War as 另一场越南战争/*another Vietnam War*, indicating that the Afghan War is similar to the Vietnam War in terms of nature and result.

Second, it depicts the war on terror as unpopular and prolonged as the Vietnam War. In line 13, it describes that the two counterterrorism wars face a common consequence of the

prevalence of anti-Americanism around the world, illustrating wide international opposition and resistance to the war on terror. It also analogises the two counterterrorism wars by the United States as 泥潭/*quagmire*, as shown in line 1. Therefore, a mire of difficulties is created by the narrative.

Third, it draws parallels between the terrible outcomes of the war on terror and the Vietnam War. In lines 3, 4, 6, 9, and 14, it compares the war on terror with the Vietnam War in terms of military expenditure, war crimes, and civilian and military casualties. In such a comparison, the war on terror is constructed as a humanitarian disaster and a costly war like the Vietnam War.

War analogy is a common discursive strategy to justify the act of war (Jackson 2005; Noon 2004). But here, the war analogy is used in the opposite way. The repeated analogy to the Vietnam War brings bitter memories and historical experiences into the context. Although the Vietnam War is a contentious topic in history, there are some widely recognised features regarding the evaluation of the war (Anderson & Ernst 2014). The Vietnam War is the product of hegemonic power politics in the Cold War era as the US tried to gain geopolitical advantages against the Soviet Union. The United States spent twenty years and hundreds of billions of dollars and suffered huge casualties in Vietnam. The war in Vietnam caused tremendous civilian casualties and dramatically changed the geopolitical configuration that shadowed future regional conflicts. Finally, the Vietnam War is one of the most painful memories in human history.

Therefore, the metanarratives embedded in the Vietnam War analogy construct the prosody of failure, painfulness, and alarm, implying that the war on terror is not welcomed, unwanted, and dangerous.

When the collocates of 阿富汗/*Afghanistan*, 伊拉克/*Iraq*, 越南/*Vietnam*, 朝鲜战争/*Korean War*, and 海湾战争/*Gulf War* co-occurred in the context, it creates a prosody of danger. In the following example, we can see these collocates appear in the same context, which implies a dangerous situation. The expressions of 公然违反/*blatant violation*, 制造

分裂冲突/*create division and conflict*, 带来动荡/*bring turmoil*, 极为严重的平民伤亡/*extremely serious civilian casualty*, 巨大的人道主义灾难/*severe humanitarian disaster*, 国际社会普遍反对/*universal opposition*, 严重危害当地生态环境/*seriously endanger local ecology* indicate that the use of force in counterterrorism is dangerous to international norms and the safety of human lives and living environment. It specifically mentions that the *Iraq War is the most typical example*/最典型的莫过于伊拉克战争 to illustrate how war brings more disasters than security.

(2) Military operation

Regarding the collocates related to military action, 发动/*launch* is the most salient one (see Figure 5.13). Two patterns frequently occur in the context associated with the excuses to carry out military campaigns against international terrorism. One is 以反恐为名/借口/由+发动+战争. Another one is 以...罪名/理由+发动+战争/. Both express the same meaning. The war is waged in the name of particular excuses. Hence, an implication is presented that counterterrorism is not the real aim of the war on terror, and its legitimacy is under question. For example, in lines 5 and 13, the quotes from the US media report and the UK official investigation are used to illustrate that the Iraq War was launched based on fake and inaccurate intelligence.

Other collocations of 发动/*launch* + 战争/*war* indicate they are related to the negative narrative that waging war to fight terrorism is inefficient. In line 1, it describes that the war launched by the United States *ended in failure*/以失败收场. In line 7, it comments that the counterterrorism war in Afghanistan resulted in more unexpected and fierce terrorist attacks.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	阿富汗爆发新的内战，这就意味着美国	发动	的阿富汗战争以失败收场。吉
2	持续时间最长的战争。美国以“反恐”为名	发动	阿富汗战争带来了什么？美国布朗大学“战争
3	单方面对伊拉克实施军事打击。美国以反恐名义	发动	阿富汗战争和伊拉克战争，导致数以万计的平民
4	斗争，实力大增。具有讽刺意味的是，美国	发动	伊拉克战争前，“基地”组织在伊拉克并没有
5	反响。美国《华尔街日报》报道说，美、英对伊拉克	发动	战争本身就是错误的，原因是莫须有的，
6	健康造成了长期恶劣影响。“9·11”事件后，美国先后	发动	阿富汗战争和伊拉克战争，导致地区局势动荡，
7	民主国家。美国在“9·11”事件后以反恐为借口	发动	阿富汗战争，不曾想恐怖袭击却愈反愈烈
8	年，美国不顾国际社会普遍反对，以莫须有的罪名	发动	伊拉克战争。根据美国沃森国际与公共
9	使用武力的国际法基本原则，以凭空捏造的理由	发动	伊拉克战争，构成对伊拉克的侵略。根据全球
10	行动，并通过美国爱国者法案。美国以反恐为名，	发动	阿富汗战争，致使阿富汗地区的战乱已持续
11	以反恐为名	发动	的阿富汗战争给当地百姓带来深重苦难
12	意愿美国全球战略受挫美国不顾内外压力，执意	发动	伊拉克战争后，接连受挫，其结果让许多
13	英国公布伊拉克战争调查报告西方借虚假情报	发动	战争滥用武力削弱联合国权威经过长达7年
14	有效的。“9·11”事件之后，美国以反恐为由先后	发动	阿富汗战争和伊拉克战争，其中伊战尤为
15	预见的后果。”当年，美国不顾国际社会的反对，孤注一掷	发动	伊拉克战争，是要在中东树立一个亲
16	战争，彻底改变了他的想法。“我终于明白，	发动	战争不是解决问题唯一的选项，而是最
17	整个中东地区安全局势不确定因素。2003年美国	发动	伊拉克战争后，“基地”组织与伊拉克反政府

Figure 5.13 Launch of the counterterrorism wars

Similarly, the emphasis on the inefficiency of the war on terror and the question of its legitimacy can be observed in the context of the collocation of 打/fight and 战争/war. Two patterns can be found. One is 反恐战争+越打越恐/越打越不安全/*counterterrorism war + more fight more terrorism/more fight more insecurity*. As shown in lines 1-3 in Figure 5.14, the prosody of doubt is generated by implying that relying on military intervention may exacerbate the threat of terrorism rather than mitigating it. In other words, the use of force in coping with international terrorism is counterproductive. The expressions 打不赢/*cannot fight to win* and 打得甚为艰难/*fight in extreme difficulty*, as shown in lines 10 and 12, also indicate that using force to fight international terrorism is faced with great challenges.

The other pattern is 打着反恐战争的旗号/幌子/*under the flag of counterterrorism war*. In ancient Chinese, the original meaning of 旗号 is the army flag with the general's name on it, while 幌子 originally denotes a flag-like sign hung outside a shop or restaurant. In modern Chinese, both 旗号 and 幌子 are often used as negative phrases referring to deceitful activities. Therefore, such a pattern generates a negative connotation to describe the counterterrorism war. As shown in lines 6-9 in Figure 5.14, the war on terror by the

United States is depicted as a war under the flag of counterterrorism, implying that the war on terror is an action for the benefit of America’s political interests, not for the sake of solving the threat posed by international terrorism.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	淡忘，相反，英国人切身感受到的是反恐战争越	打	越不安全，而让他们更加困惑的
2	得更加安全。“全球反恐战争”使世界出现“越	打	越恐，越恐越打”的怪圈，也
3	并重 2010 年美国的反恐战争会不会仍然越	打	越恐？2010 年 1 月 18 日，塔利班武装针对阿富汗
4	评论认为，美国当初派兵阿富汗，对外宣称是要	打	一场声势浩大的反恐战争，在即将撤出阿富汗
5	他计划向伊拉克增派兵力，以便美国军队能够	打	一场长期的反恐战争。布什说，他已
6	中亚地区曾是俄罗斯的后院，“9·11”事件后美国	打	着反恐战争的旗号深入这一地区，
7	那摩监狱系统性虐囚和酷刑臭名昭著。美国中情局	打	着所谓“反恐战争”的幌子在多国设立“
8	国民生产停滞不前。美国在国外发起的战争，往往	打	着“人权高于主权”“人道主义干预”等旗号，为何
9	讯报》指出，事实上“奴隶制在美国从未终结”。美国	打	着“反恐战争”的幌子，在至少 54 个国家
10	对伊拉克穆斯林这样的战争，“美国人是永远也	打	不赢的”。看来，美新保守派大大低估
11	而第二场战争（2003 年的伊拉克战争），一场可	打	可不打的战争，使其陡然终结。”“9·11”事件后

Figure 5.14 Fighting the counterterrorism wars

5.4.2 Development of War

Some collocates relate to the development of the war on terror. They can further be classified into two semantic groups (see Table 5.6). One group of collocates plays as an indicator of the duration of the war on terror. The other group of collocates is associated with the war on terror timeline.

Table 5.6 Development of war

Semantic Group	Collocates
Duration of War	年/year 旷日持久/prolonged 期间/period 时间/time 延续/continue 长/long 久/long 经历/experience 历史上/historical 一直/always 长达/as long as
Timeline of War	周年 anniversary 后/after 之际/at the time of 自从/since

(1) Duration of war

The most salient and typical collocate is 年/year. In context, the collocate 年/year is used to indicate the long-term progress of the war on terror. The most frequent pattern in the context is 长达 X 年/as long as X years, as shown in lines 1-3, 8-10 in Figure 5.15. The

context implies that the war on terror is longer than expected. In addition, the expressions of 3 年/3 years, 5 年/5 years, 10 年/10 years, 13 年/13 years, and 20 年/20 years display that the discourse presents a macro view of the progress of the war. Furthermore, words and phrases that have negative meanings frequently occur around the collocation of 年/year + 战争/war, such as 打碎/break, 适得其反/counterproductive, 化解不了/unresolvable, 动荡不断/constant turmoil, 不得人心/unpopular, 警示/alert, 创伤难平/enduring trauma, 越反越恐/more fight generate more terrorists, 效果不彰/ineffective. Therefore, the prosody of pessimism is generated in the context of these collocations.

N	Left Context	Right Context
1	政策的反思中, 这种声音尤为响亮。当长达 20	年 的阿富汗战争走到尽头之际, 人们更加清楚
2	的实力可以在世界范围内为所欲为。但长达 20	年 的阿富汗战争再次打碎了美国虚妄的
3	不得人心 20 年阿富汗战争给美国的警示美国长达 20	年 的阿富汗战争, 留下的是千疮百孔的烂摊子,
4	的、恐怖的行径。”不少人感到, 打了几	年 的反恐战争后, 其成效似乎适得其反, “基地”
5	美国领导的北约军队在阿富汗打了近 13	年 的反恐战争后, 也面临着如何体面
6	此间分析人士指出, 美国在阿富汗进行了近 8	年 的反恐战争, 却没有取得任何值得炫耀
7	对抗, 他们在当地具有广泛的民意基础, 过去 10	年 的战争已表明, 军事对抗化解不了与
8	节点”, 不久之后就有可能获知是否能结束长达 10	年 之久的阿富汗战争打开突破口。谈判在
9	日期的临近, 由美国发动、北约介入的长达 13	年 之久的阿富汗战争即将落下帷幕。阿富汗
10	变乱, 局势错综复杂, 各派长期纷争不已。这次长达 13	年 之久的反恐战争虽然使塔利班受到
11	撤军留下来的“安全真空”, 发动大规模袭击。持续了 13	年 之久的阿富汗战争已成为美国社会
12	自“9·11”至今, 美国的反恐战争已经打了近 3	年 之久。3 年来, 美国的反恐成效究竟
13	视线重新拉回伊拉克战场。伊拉克战争爆发已有 13	年 之久, 这个地区仍然动荡不断。报告指出,
14	霸权主义和强权政治不得人心。20	年 阿富汗战争给美国的警示美国长达 20 年
15	穷兵黩武只会使问题越来越多 20	年 阿富汗战争给美国的警示从上世纪
16	还是阿富汗, 美军所到之处, 留下的都是动荡分裂、家破人亡。20	年 阿富汗战争再次证明, 试图将特定的价值观
17	事件发生后, 美国发动的“反恐战争”已届 5	年 伊拉克目前是其“核心战场”。布什总统最近
18	以消灭“基地”组织为名, 发动了阿富汗战争。五	年 来, 阿富汗江山易主, 但最为基本的两
19	的灾难, 而美国也因此处于进退两难的境地。“9·11”5	年 来, 美国的反恐战争“越反越恐”, 这已是
20	诟病的伊拉克战争作辩解。美国多数选民对 5	年 来美国反恐战争的评价是: 效果不彰,

Figure 5.15 Duration of the counterterrorism wars

In a similar vein, the collocate 旷日持久/prolonged is frequently surrounded by words with negative tones, including 损耗/attrition, 滥杀无辜/indiscriminate killing, 侵犯/infringe, 阴谋/conspiracy, 消耗/deplete, 深重/heavy, 摧毁/destroy, 灾难/disaster, 暴行/atrocity. In context, they displayed gloomy pictures in four aspects (see Figure 5.16).

First, a prolonged war on terror is an infringement of national sovereignty. For example, in line 3, the enduring war in Afghanistan is described as a violation of Afghan sovereignty. Second, non-traditional threats might transform into traditional threats. The expanded line 9 shows an alert that, due to the impact of the war on terror, the political situation is in turmoil and civil war is possible. Third, the war on terror caused humanitarian disasters. Line 6 shows that the war destroyed infrastructure in Iraqi cities, creating devastating living conditions for the locals. The expanded line 10 describes the maltreatment of war prisoners as an infringement of international law and human rights. Fourth, a long-lasting war is costly and could drain national power, as shown in lines 1-2.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	给美国的全球战略布局带来了收益，但	旷日持久	的反恐战争毕竟损耗了美国的国力，
2	加速从阿富汗撤军有其深刻的原因。一方面，	旷日持久	的反恐战争给美国造成了巨大的
3	军队在阿期间滥杀无辜，频频侵犯阿富汗主权。	旷日持久	的反恐战争导致阿富汗生灵涂炭，却收效不佳。
4	了，但这“只不过是美国的阴谋，为自己	旷日持久	的反恐战争找一个台阶下”。当地人瓦
5	持续时间最长的战争，不仅给美国带来	旷日持久	的巨大消耗，更是给阿富汗人民带来深重
6	这些为恐怖分子在伊拉克的活动提供了土壤。	旷日持久	的战争几乎摧毁了伊拉克主要城市的
7	的美国驻军。特朗普曾多次批评美国在外陷入	旷日持久	的战争，对于从叙利亚和阿富汗撤军意愿
8	越南平民、造成巨大人道主义灾难的暴行。1968年初春，	旷日持久	的越南战争进入了最血腥的阶段。
9	角力不断。这使得发生在阿富汗的这场	旷日持久	的“国际反恐战争”有可能转而成为新的“内战”
10	之名，在阿富汗和伊拉克发动了两场	旷日持久	的“反恐战争”。战争期间，美国士兵和中情局

Figure 5.16 Prolonged counterterrorism wars

(2) Timeline of war

周年/*anniversary* is a typical collocate that denotes the timeline of the war on terror. In most cases, it co-occurs with 伊拉克战争/*Iraq War* (see Figure 5.17). The collocation of 周年/*anniversary* and 伊拉克战争/*Iraq War* often occurs in the context that anti-war protests happened at anniversaries of the Iraq War, creating prosody of opposition and unpopularity. For example, in lines 2-3, 6-9, and 11-13, it describes large-scale anti-war protests worldwide on various anniversaries of the Iraq War, indicating the opposition to the war is extensive and consistent throughout the process of the war. The collocation works as an indicator of time in the description of the consequences of the war. For example, in the expanded line 4, against the backdrop of the 15th anniversary of the Iraq War, it reviews the destructive impact of the war, such as the violation of national sovereignty, humanitarian disaster, and deterioration of the regional situation.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	的角度看，这是一场非法战争。伊战爆发 15	周年	之际，美国各界也在反思战争。包道格
2	美欧多国爆发反战游行在布什政府发动伊拉克战争 3	周年	之际，美国首都华盛顿以及纽约、旧金山、洛杉矶等
3	自卫队，实现世界和平。在伊拉克战争爆发一	周年	之际，上万名伊拉克民众 19 日走上首都巴格达
4	在废弃的公园里荡秋千。在伊拉克战争爆发 15	周年	之际，以历史的后见之明回视
5	美国可以毫无顾忌地在全球推进自身战略利益。“9·11” 5	周年	之际，审视伊拉克战争引发的一系列混乱，人们
6	从阿富汗撤军。在美国、英国对伊拉克发动战争 3	周年	之际，意大利数千名民众 18 日在首都
7	分社报道：在美英联军发动伊拉克战争一	周年	之际，芬兰、澳大利亚、日本、韩国等国民众 20 日
8	政策，战争必须结束。”在美国、英国发动伊拉克战争 3	周年	之际，英国数万民众今天走上街头，与
9	在那里举行了和平集会。在伊拉克战争爆发 3	周年	之际，西班牙巴塞罗那市约 5000 人 18 日举行反战
10	街头举行示威游行，在美国发动伊拉克战争三	周年	之际再次表达反战呼声，并要求加政府
11	伊拉克战争爆发一	周年	之际世界各地举行反占领示威游行布什
12	伊拉克战争三	周年	之际美欧多国爆发反战游行在布什政府发动
13	要求结束阿富汗战争 7 日是阿富汗战争爆发十	周年	纪念日。数百名美国民众 6 日聚集在
14	发动战争是最坏的选择伊拉克战争 15	周年	美国仍未吸取教训由于战争带来的
15	美国官方和智库有意无意地回避着伊拉克战争 10	周年	话题，但这场战争的得失利弊仍是

Figure 5.17 Anniversary of the counterterrorism wars

5.4.3 Evaluation of War

A group of collocates plays an evaluative role in context (see Table 5.7). These collocates are the direct manifestation of attitudes towards the use of force in counterterrorism. They can further be classified into two categories.

Table 5.7 Evaluation of war

Semantic Group	Collocates
Outcome of War	胜利/victory 打赢/win 赢得/win 取得/obtain 失败/failure 泥潭/quagmire 泥淖/quagmire 越来越/more and more 输掉/lose
Reflection on War	一场/a war 带来/bring 代价/cost 造成/cause 后果/consequence 错误/mistake 罪行/crime 教训/lesson 警示/alert

(1) Outcome of war

Among the collocates denoting the outcome of the war, 胜利/victory and 打赢/wining are particularly interesting to analyse. As found in previous sections, most collocates are related to negative semantic meanings. But 胜利/victory and 打赢/wining, at least from their literal meaning, convey positive connotations.

Examining concordances that contain 战争/*war* along with the collocate 胜利/*victory* (see Figure 5.18), it is surprising to find that two opposite prosodies are embedded in the context.

On the one hand, the positive prosody can be seen when the collocation of 胜利/*victory* and 战争/*war* occurs in the context that sovereign nations resort to the use of force against terrorism threats. In lines 1-5, 8-9, and 12-14, many positive expressions occurred in the context to describe the result of counterterrorism wars by governments of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, including 决定性/*decisive*, 大面积/*comprehensive*, 曙光/*hopeful*, 重大/*major*, and 祝贺/*congratulation*. They imply that a military campaign by a sovereign nation on its territory is recognised as feasible and meaningful in the face of the severe terrorism threat to national security. A particular example is shown in the expanded line 12 that, in a meeting with the Iraqi prime minister, Chinese President Xi Jinping stressed China's support of Iraq's efforts in maintaining the security of national sovereignty and territorial integrity and congratulated the victory of Iraq's counterterrorism war. This is a point where it is necessary to step outside the corpus to consider the background information of the meeting. The meeting was convened in 2019 when the Iraqi government recovered nearly all of the territories occupied by the Islamic State. The victory of the counterterrorism war mentioned by President Xi refers to this result. Therefore, it indicates that China holds a positive attitude towards Iraq's military crackdown on the Islamic State.

On the other hand, negative prosody can be found when the collocation of 胜利/*victory* and 战争/*war* occurs in the context that describes the American government's global war on terror. Examining the concordances that include the 美国/*United States*, 战争/*war*, and 胜利/*victory*, two patterns of expressions can be seen. One is the negative estimation and judgement of the result of the war on terror, such as 难以取得战争的胜利/*difficult to achieve victory* and 并未带来战争的胜利/*has not brought victory to*, as shown in lines 7 and 10. The other one is 阶段性胜利/*partial victory*, a cautious recognition of the outcome achieved by US military operations. Such patterns only exist in the description of the killing of Ben Laden by the US special military operation. For example, the expanded lines 6 and

11 describe the killing of Ben Laden as a partial victory. In other words, the death of Ben Laden is not a real sign of the triumph of the war on terror.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	下半年，随着叙利亚政府军在反恐战争中取得决定性	胜利	叙利亚国内局势逐步趋稳。首都大马士革尽管时常
2	年下半年，随着政府军在反恐战争中的大面积	胜利	叙利亚国内局势整体趋稳，但局部形势仍
3	这里上演。不过分析认为，虽然叙利亚反恐战争出现	胜利	曙光，但整个叙利亚危机远未结束，政府军、反
4	极端组织“伊斯兰国”节节败退，反恐战争出现	胜利	曙光，在此背景下叙利亚政府着手恢复
5	举行阅兵式，庆祝打击极端组织“伊斯兰国”的战争取得历史性	胜利	美国和英国政府则警告说，恐怖组织
6	随着本·拉登被击毙和反恐战争的阶段性	胜利	美国有可能加速在巴阿地区的战略
7	更难以在这一地区取得反恐战争的	胜利	
8	影响力将被大幅削弱“伊拉克反恐战争取得重大	胜利	伊斯兰国’的影响力将被大幅削弱。”伊拉克军事
9	解围代尔祖尔标志着叙利亚反恐战争即将迎来阶段性	胜利	但这并不意味着极端组织已被彻底清除。
10	与行径并未给美国带来反恐战争的	胜利	反倒使美国的国际形象遭受重创，跌落到
11	国内的复仇情结缓解，反恐战争取得了阶段性	胜利	在国内厌战情绪上涨的情况下，撤
12	干涉伊拉克内政。中方祝贺伊拉克取得反恐战争重大	胜利	愿继续积极支持和帮助伊方开展
13	期盼近日，伊拉克反恐战争取得重大	胜利	战略重镇摩苏尔全城解放，不少当地民众开始
14	发展，阿富汗安全部队能够在反恐战争中取得	胜利	阿富汗总统国家安全顾问阿特马尔 19 日表示，未来

Figure 5.18 Victory of counterterrorism wars

Similar attitudes can be discovered when examining the concordance lines containing the collocation of 打赢/*wining* and 战争/*war* (see Figure 5.19).

One is a sceptical and pessimistic attitude towards the US war on terror, arguing that the path of war alone will not succeed in fully addressing the threat of terrorism. In lines 1, 3, and 8-10, the expressions 无力/*powerless*, 放弃/*giving up*, 无法/*unable*, 质问/*questioning* and 输掉/*losing* are employed to describe the ineffectiveness and incompetence of the US in the war on terror, creating the idea that the war on terror is the achievement of the ultimate goal of victory. In the expanded line 4, a strong contrast is presented between, on the one hand, the overconfidence of the US in its commitment to winning both wars on terror and, on the other hand, the actual performance of the war on terror, showing signs of the failure of the use of force as a counterterrorism strategy.

The second is framing the conditions for winning the war on terror. In lines 5-8, we can find some indicators that imply preconditions, such as 前提/*preconditions*, 只有…才能/*only...can*, 仅靠…无法/*only by...cannot*. In line 5, there is a particular emphasis on peace and stability as the primary precondition for *winning the war on terror*/打赢这场反恐战争. In line 8, the US is referred to as a counter case, claiming that the reason why the US has been unable to win the war on terror is that its strategic focus *paid more attention to security than development*/重安全 轻发展, implying that social development is the key prerequisite for solving the problem of terrorism. In lines 6 and 7, it is stressed that international cooperation against terrorism is an essential condition for victory in the war on terror.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	未来在地区冲突中面对的威胁, 同时	打赢	两场战争的理念已不再适用。
2	无力同时	打赢	两场战争巨额军费成沉重负担
3	重要性。” 美军战略利益评估报告建议放弃同时	打赢	两场战争的战略原则, 改而
4	全球战略相呼应, 五角大楼提出了所谓同时	打赢	两场战争的军事战略。但很快
5	唯有以恢复国家和平与稳定为前提,	打赢	反恐战争, 才能更好解决政治问题,
6	伊斯兰国” 仍存在疑问。只有加强国际反恐合作, 才能	打赢	反恐战争, 维护国际和平稳定。目标与
7	危险, 而仅靠美国自己的力量无法	打赢	反恐战争。因为对美国来讲, 最大的
8	这种“重安全、轻发展”的战略是无法	打赢	这场反恐战争的, 反而会陷入
9	的许多人已经开始质疑美国到底能不能	打赢	这场战争。此前, 包括美国总统奥巴马
10	美国在阿富汗的政策不对头, 称美国是“	打赢	战斗却输掉了战争”; 而后, 北约驻

Figure 5.19 Wining the counterterrorism wars

(2) Reflection on war

The collocate 一场/a (*war*) is frequently used to denote the Afghan War or Iraq War in a reflective description of the war on terror (see Figure 5.20). The frequent expressions are 一场不负责任的战争/*an irresponsible war*, 一场出师无名的战争/*a war without righteous excuses*, 一场耗不起的战争/*a war cannot afford to continue*, 一场非法的战争/*an illegal war*, etc. In addition, negative words are often in conjunction with the collocation, such as 噩梦/*nightmare*, 伤亡/*casualty*, 巨额/*huge*, 错误/*mistake*, 悲剧/*tragedy*, 无力/*powerlessness*, and 艰苦/*hardship*. For example, in the expanded line 4, negative expressions of 潘多拉魔盒/*Pandora's Box*, 肆虐/*rampant* 恶魔/*demonic*, and 难以预期/*unpredictable* are used to describe the unexpected catastrophic consequence and security dilemma that the America's war in Iraq waged will lead to more disasters if it fails. In the expanded line 9, we can find a quote from Chinese philosopher Mencius: *The majority will*

support the righteous and benevolent side. In contrast, the morally wrong side will fail/得道多助，失道寡助 (Ivanhoe 2009). The quote generates the implication that a preemptive war against Iraq in the name of counterterrorism is neither morally right nor supported by the international community and will ultimately fail. Therefore, the prosody of critical and negative evaluations of the war can be seen.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	两场所谓的反恐战争，一场在阿富汗，	一场	在伊拉克。就广泛的国际舆论来看，很多
2	一个“象征性的结束”。美国在阿富汗经历了	一场	战争噩梦，迄今仍难以从这一
3	伤亡和巨额军费之后，反倒又陷入了	一场	新的“反恐战争”，着实让许多美国人
4	让人感觉有些沉重，它承载的，是	一场	输不起的战争，面对的，却是难以预期
5	以错误的方式跟错误的敌人进行	一场	错误的战争。战争的迷雾厚厚
6	理解，但决不应该利用这场悲剧开始	一场	“不负责任的”战争。伊朗外长哈拉
7	收敛。事实上，美国目前已无力再发动另	一场	先发制人的战争，可能会不情愿地
8	专家普遍认为阿富汗战争是北约遭遇的	一场	失败。英国《经济学家》杂志的文章指出，不少
9	要进行的一场“先发制人”的战争，实际上也就是	一场	师出无名的战争。中国有句
10	如何“可控退出”和确保既得利益。阿富汗战争也是	一场	耗不起的战争，每年军费高达
11	行动可能会更长也更困难。这是	一场	艰苦的战争，比一些人估计的
12	联合国宪章》不符，从宪章的角度看，这是	一场	非法战争。伊战爆发 15 周年之际，美国

Figure 5.20 Reflective definition of counterterrorism war

The reflection on the impacts of the war on terror manifests in the collocation of 战争/*war* and 带来/*bring*. The typical pattern is 战争/*war* + 带来/*bring* + 灾难/*disaster*, frequently applied in depicting the impacts of war that it does not get security but instead creates a more insecure situation (see Figure 5.21). For example, in lines 1, 4, 8, and 9, the war on terror has brought suffering, disaster, and psychological trauma to the Iraqi people. In line 3, the war on terror has brought enormous challenges to humankind. As seen in expanded lines 4 and 10, the war on terror causes social unrest, triggers refugee crises, creates ecological crises, and increases the prevalence of terrorism. Positive words 民主/*democracy* and 和平/*peace* appear in line 12. However, the expansion of line 12 reveals the use of a negative statement in the context, such as *the war in Iraq has not brought democracy and peace/战争没有给伊拉克带来民主与和平*, while describing the real consequences of the war as creating more terrorism threats.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	的民族灾难。这场战争给阿富汗人民	带来	了深重的苦难，造成 10 多万阿富汗
2	结论——美国发动的伊拉克战争给中东地区	带来	了一场真正的灾难，而美国也
3	全球恐怖活动以及反恐战争的进行给人类	带来	了巨大的挑战，非国家武装团体
4	的复仇情绪。伊拉克战争不仅给伊拉克人民	带来	了灾难，其产生的连带影响让
5	并且一直承受着反恐战争给安全环境	带来	的冲击。塔利班等武装分子跨越巴阿
6	战争 15 周年，美国仍未吸取教训由于战争	带来	的巨大破坏，伊拉克部分地区卫生条件
7	提及以武力进行“政权更迭”。显然，伊拉克战争	带来	的巨额军费开支和道义困境，以及
8	着伊拉克人民的日常生活。与此同时，战争给人们	带来	的心理创伤也久久难以弥合。萨达姆
9	反恐为名发动的阿富汗战争给当地百姓	带来	深重苦难北约在阿富汗“象征性”结束战斗
10	远超美国军方正式报告的数字。战争	带来	一系列复杂的社会问题，包括难民潮、
11	预算赤字不断上涨以及伊拉克战争给全球	带来	不稳定因素等。除了战争本身的
12	报告再次证明了这一点。伊拉克战争没有	带来	所谓的“民主”与“和平”，反而把伊拉克
13	持续时间最长的战争，不仅给美国	带来	旷日持久的巨大消耗，更是给阿富汗人民

Figure 5.21 Reflection on the impacts of counterterrorism wars

Examining the concordances that contain the collocate 造成/*cause* we can find the prosody of grief reflection on the catastrophic consequences of war. Negative terms such as 伤痕/*scar*, 伤亡/*casualties*, 创伤/*trauma*, 恶果/*evil consequence*, and 死亡/*Death* in conjunction with the collocation create a hostile atmosphere that indicates war as an ominous thing. In context, two common patterns can be found. The most frequent is 战争/*war* + 造成/*cause* + 万人死亡/*thousands of deaths*, implying the serious consequence of waging wars in counterterrorism can lead to the large scale of casualties of innocent people. In lines 12-13 and 16-23, details are presented to show that hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties are caused by the counterterrorism wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Another common pattern is to emphasise the harmful consequences that war can have on multiple levels of actors. For example, in lines 2-5, and 25, the war is described as causing wounds, trauma, and crises to the world, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and civilians, which implies that the war on terror has serious effects on all three levels: the international community, the state, and the individual.

In addition, there are also frequent expressions of 战争/*war* + 造成/*caused* + 美国/*the United States* to use America as an example to show that the use of force in counterterrorism is costly and counterproductive (see Figure 5.22). As shown in the expanded lines 9 and 24,

it stresses that America has suffered huge losses at economic and military levels, presenting a reflection that war as a solution to terrorism threats may harm others as well as oneself, with the underlying implication that war is not a reliable method.

N	Left Context	Right Context
1	后的纠结心态。美国发动的伊拉克战争所	造成 的中东乱局诱发极端组织“伊斯兰国”坐大，不愿
2	的反思不足以弥合战争给伊拉克和世界	造成 的伤痕。当前，比反思伊战更为重要
3	还是背负在伊拉克人民身上。时至今日，战争在伊拉克	造成 的具体伤亡数字仍无定论，多方统计
4	责任地一走了之，阿富汗人民却要长期面对战争	造成 的创伤。2011年3月19日，以美国为首的
5	可以被摧毁，但这场反恐战争给平民	造成 的巨大创伤，却是持久的、很难弥合
6	了严重的恐怖袭击，这完全是伊拉克战争	造成 的恶果。报告发布后，阿拉伯国家媒体的
7	供应紧张问题而走上街头进行抗议。同时，战争	造成 的环境污染也十分严重，土地大面积荒芜、水源
8	战争暴力的人数在 89.7 万到 92.9 万之间，战争	造成 的难民和流离失所人口超过 3800 万。美国沃
9	深刻的原因。一方面，旷日持久的反恐战争给美国	造成 了巨大的军费开支和重大的人员
10	场目标模糊、复杂程度远超想象的战争，不仅	造成 了巨大的人道主义灾难，而且让北约愈发
11	阿富汗两场战争使用的设备。两场战争	造成 了美国政府债务的过量增长，制约了
12	灾难。据报道，截至 2011 年，美国发动的伊拉克战争	造成 65.6 万伊拉克人死亡，阿富汗战争以来，超过 3.1 万
13	战后延续时间最长、最残酷的一场战争，	造成 200 万平民死亡，300 多万难民流离失所。美军在
14	枪炮之下伤亡，1000 多万人流离失所。阿富汗战争平均每天	造成 6000 万美元损失，严重拖累阿经济社会发展。
15	联合国难民署称，持续近 20 年的阿富汗战争	造成 260 万阿富汗人逃往国外，350 万人流离失所。2003 年，美
16	美国布朗大学“战争代价”项目估算，阿富汗战争已	造成 15.7 万人死亡，仅阿富汗平民就有 4.3 万人之多。2018
17	人员统计，自 2001 年“反恐战争”开始以来，美军共	造成 48 万人死亡，其中 24.4 万人是平民。阿富汗战争已
18	造成 48 万人死亡，其中 24.4 万人是平民。阿富汗战争已	造成 15.7 万人死亡，受害者中仅阿富汗平民就有 4.3
19	劣迹斑斑。美国发动的伊拉克战争和阿富汗战争，	造成 大量平民伤亡。维基解密网站 2010 年 10
20	的国家。美国发动的伊拉克战争和阿富汗战争	造成 大量平民伤亡。制止战争联盟网站 2012 年 6 月 14
21	人员指出，自 2001 年“反恐战争”开始以来，美军共	造成 了 48 万人死亡，而其中 24.4 万人是“和平居民”。
22	有损美国的软实力，同时这场战争还	造成 了“伊斯兰国”的出现以及地区恐怖势力的
23	最新数据显示，“9·11”事件后，美国开展的“反恐战争”	造成 军民死亡总数高达 92.9 万，其中包括 38.7 万平民，
24	被历史遗忘 2003 年 3 月美军发动的伊拉克战争，	造成 约 20 万至 25 万平民死亡，其中美军直接
25	约 33.5 万人，间接死亡人数可能高出数倍。战争	造成 阿富汗、伊拉克、叙利亚等国约 2100 万人流离失所，或

Figure 5.22 Reflection on the casualties caused by counterterrorism wars

5.5 Strategic Cultural Explanation of Counterterrorism War Discourse

From the above analysis, it can be seen that the counterterrorism war is discursively constructed with a negative image. It shows that, in China's perception, using force to cope with international terrorism is not a good option. The findings show that China's views of the use of force in counterterrorism are consistent with the paradigm regarding the use of force in China's strategic culture.

5.5.1 Perception Framework of Strategic Culture

In China's international counterterrorism discourse, counterterrorism, a non-traditional security issue, falls into the realm of the traditional perceptual framework when it comes to the use of force. As found in previous sections, counterterrorism war is discursively represented in accordance with the Chinese strategic culture's paradigm, which usually applies to traditional warfare. A noteworthy finding in the preceding discourse analysis is war analogies that place the counterterrorism wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the same context as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the Kosovo War.

Counterterrorism wars are different from conventional wars in some ways. For example, the counterterrorism war is a type of asymmetric conflict between a state actor and a non-state actor (Arreguín-Toft 2012). However, instead of distinguishing the differences, the Chinese international counterterrorism discourse highlights similarities between the war on terror and traditional warfare regarding cost, casualties, and impact. For example, in descriptions of the war on terror, reference is often made to the number of military and civilian casualties, the impact on the international order, and the regional political configuration.

Thus, the association of counterterrorism wars with traditional wars suggests that although the former are conflicts between nation-states and terrorist forces, as long as they involve the use of force, they are still perceived through the traditional lens of war. Thus, China's perceptions and views on the use of force in counterterrorism are expressed and conveyed within the logic of its strategic culture.

5.5.2 Defensive Nature of the Use of Force

In China's strategic culture, the use of force to deal with threats is only justified and legitimate in the context of self-defence, and the central role of the state's military is to defend homeland security. As shown in the Chinese Defence White Paper, it is clearly stated that the country's armed forces are defensive in nature and that China's defence policy is a continuation of the traditional Chinese culture, which advocates 和为贵/ *peace and harmony*

are precious (Ministry of National Defense 2019). For China, the primary role of the armed forces is to protect national sovereignty and maintain territorial integrity. Under such a strategic logic, when a country is subjected to armed aggression by foreign invaders or when its territory is violated, the army can be used to respond to the threat by using its force defensively or offensively according to the situation. The Chinese war history proves that China resorted to war mostly when its territory had been invaded. There are limited cases in which China adopted offensive strategies and waged aggressive wars against others when its territory was not threatened (Johnson 2009; Zhang 2002). Therefore, in the perception framework of Chinese strategic culture, the use of force is essentially defensive.

The perception of the defensive nature of the use of force can explain some findings. As to the counterterrorism war, the Iraq War waged by the US is described in an entirely negative discourse prosody. In contrast, the counterterrorism war launched by Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria on their territory is narrated in positive prosody. This is because the former contradicts the perception of the defensive nature of the use of force in Chinese strategic culture that the use of force should be defensive, while the latter is consistent with it.

There is also a gap in the representation of US military campaign results. Apart from the description of the killing of Osama bin Laden by US forces, there are few displays of how many terrorists US forces have killed in combat. In contrast, numerous accounts of the number of terrorists killed in action by Afghan, Iraqi, and Syrian government or security forces show their military achievements in fighting the terrorist forces. In fact, the US military has killed a large number of terrorists in various battles in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (White House 2006). The reason for the gap and contradiction is due to the following reasons: The Iraq War was an offensive war by the United States to wage pre-emptive strikes on the territory of other sovereign countries, whereas the counterterrorism wars by the Afghan, Iraqi, and Syrian governments were a legitimate use of force by sovereign states to combat terrorism within their territories and to retake territories occupied by terrorist groups. The former contradicts the Chinese strategic culture's perception of the defensive nature of force, while the latter is in line with it.

5.5.3 Justice in the Use of Force

In contemporary Chinese strategic culture, the use of force should conform to international norms and moral standards. In other words, the use of force can only be considered legitimate and justified when it complies with the international community's shared laws, principles, and norms. Regarding international norms, China stresses the importance of the UN Charter and regards it as the principle when a country must resort to using force in international issues. As to the moral standards, 师出有名/*sending troops with justified reasons* is an important value in Chinese strategic culture, which means that under any circumstance, the resort to the use of force to address security threats should be based on solid and moral justification with proper methods and objectives (Godehardt 2008; Lo & Twiss 2015). Such perceptions of the use of force determine the views of just war, which influence China's judgements of counterterrorism war. Hence, the discursive features in constructing the Afghan War and the Iraq War can be explained.

Let's first return to the proceeding findings in constructing the Afghan War. The neutral description of the origin of the Afghan War is based on the fact that the United Nations authorised the war in Afghanistan, and the international community unanimously condemned the September 11 attacks. Therefore, the launch of the Afghan War by the United States is in line with international norms and moral standards. This falls under the just war criteria perceived by the Chinese strategic culture. However, the process and development of the war indicated the changing nature of the Afghan War due to the signs of neglect of Afghan sovereignty rights, the killing of innocent civilians, and the outbreak of another pre-emptive war in Iraq. This runs counter to the moral principles of China's strategic culture regarding the use of force. Therefore, the Chinese international counterterrorism discourse constructs it as an unpopular war, gradually losing support and having unsatisfactory results and harmful impacts.

As to the other war on terror, the Iraq War is constructed with a more negative image as an entirely unjust war because it contradicts China's perception of a just war. On the one hand, the Iraq War was launched without a UN mandate. China regarded it as a challenge to the

international norms that the United Nations should play a central role in resolving security threats and conflicts. On the other hand, the war in Iraq was widely opposed by the international community and was perceived as an invasion of a sovereign state. Moreover, the Iraq war has subverted the regimes of sovereign states, created social unrest, caused heavy casualties and humanitarian crises, altered the geopolitical balance, and posed a great danger to regional peace and stability. All of the above is contrary to the Chinese strategic cultural perception of the use of force. In other words, it was neither legally nor morally justified. As a result, the Iraq War is portrayed in entirely negative discourse prosody and constructed as an illegal, disastrous, unsupported, and failed war.

5.5.4 Perception of the Efficacy of the Use of Force

In China's strategic culture, the use of force is always considered the last resort to solve security threats. While force is regarded as an important tool for maintaining national security, non-violent means are much more recognised. In terms of efficacy in solving security threats, the use of force is considered inferior to non-violent means of solving problems. 不战而屈人之兵/*Conquering the enemy without fighting* has always been perceived as the highest level of strategic method. As Sun Tzu stated, 'what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy; the next best is to disrupt his alliances; the next best is to attack his army; the worst policy is to attack cities' (McNeilly 2015).

In the context of counterterrorism, China perceives terrorism as a non-traditional security threat formed by complex issues and conditions. For example, terrorism is often described in Chinese international counterterrorism discourse as a violent phenomenon generated by social underdevelopment, economic poverty, social injustice, and religious, ethnic, and interstate conflicts. Under such logic, the use of force should only serve as a protective measure, while non-violent measures should be used to solve the root causes of terrorism. This is why the expressions of 标本兼治/*treating both the symptoms and the root causes* often occur in China's international counterterrorism discourse. In other words, the focus should be on non-violent measures to 'conquer' terrorism. Therefore, using military forces is regarded as a low-efficient means of counterterrorism when the focus is only on the use

of force to eliminate tangible terrorists or terrorist groups instead of solving intangible problems. Furthermore, the overuse of force might lead to more severe consequences, as shown in the frequently occurring expression of 越反越恐/*more terrorism is generated due to more use of force*. Hence, it can explain why, even though China recognises the legitimacy of the origin of the Afghan War, it still constructs the war with negative prosodies and why the Iraq War is constructed as a war that dooms to end in failure. For China, the war on terror concentrates mainly on eradicating tangible terrorists with the use of force and ignores the non-violent measures that could solve the intangible issues that cause the terrorism problems.

China always treats the use of force with particular prudence. The overuse of force is often regarded as a disastrous and destructive strategic choice that could bring harm to national interests. A quick and short wartime period is preferred, even when it is necessary to resort to war. As Sun Tzu said, ‘Thus the army values being victorious; it does not value prolonged warfare. Therefore, a general who understands warfare is a Master of Fate for the people, ruler of the state’s security or endangerment’ (Sawyear 1993). Therefore, it further explains why there are many descriptions of the duration of the war on terror and its impact. As the analysis above of the corpus shows, the prolonged wartime and large scale of casualties are the key topics in the representation of the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. China’s discourse attributes negative features to both wars. Furthermore, the war analogy implies that the Afghan War is prolonged and catastrophic, as doomed as the Vietnam War. The discursive themes, strategies, and prosodies that negatively represent the war on terror are manifestations of China’s attitudes towards the use of force in international counterterrorism.

5.6 Summary

This chapter aims to find out how China represents the use of force in counterterrorism. The analysis focused on the discursive representation, construction, and prosody of counterterrorism wars in China’s international counterterrorism discourse. Through keyword analysis, concordance analysis, and collocation analysis, as well as the cultural explanation from the lens of Chinese strategic culture, this chapter reveals the discursive themes and strategies of China’s international counterterrorism discourse regarding the use of force in

counterterrorism, China's attitudes towards the use of force, and the strategic cultural logic behind the discourse phenomenon.

The discursive representation of counterterrorism war focuses on four themes, including nations and regions, practices of the use of force, counterterrorism targets, and reflection on the use of force in counterterrorism. Through the examination of clusters and contexts of keywords, the United States, Afghanistan, and Iraq are key topics denoting nations and regions. Regarding the practices of using force, the Afghan War and Iraq War are key topics, and there are specific descriptions of the deployment and use of troops and weapons in the counterterrorism war discourse. As to the counterterrorism target, international terrorism is a critical discursive theme, as al-Qaeda and ISIS are the terrorist organisations most frequently described in the corpus. Finally, the reflection on the use of force in counterterrorism is also a key theme that highlights the description of war impacts, counterproductive effects of using force, and norms in international counterterrorism.

The overall discursive strategy for constructing the war on terror is to attribute negative features and images to the Afghan War and the Iraq War. But the concordance analysis reveals some divergence in the representation of the two counterterrorism wars. In China's discourse on the Afghan War, it can be found that the legitimacy of the origin of the war is recognised with a neutral understanding. But in the representation of its process and development, the Afghan War is attributed with many negative features by depicting it as a war that gradually transformed from a counterterrorism military practice into a geopolitical war, losing support from the international community and causing significant negative impacts on the local society and region. On the other hand, the construction of the Iraq War is much more direct. China's international counterterrorism discourse attributes the negative traits, including illegitimacy, deceit, immorality, broad opposition, and destined failure, to the war.

The collocation analysis further revealed the war analogies and negative discourse prosodies of pessimism, doubt, danger, opposition, failure, and criticism in the representation of counterterrorism wars. However, the analysis also revealed an exception: positive prosody

of victory can be found in the description of the use of force in the Afghan, Iraqi, and Syrian governments' counterterrorism wars against the international terrorist organisations of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

The findings of the corpus analysis are explained through the lens of Chinese strategic culture. It is found that counterterrorism wars are still perceived through the traditional perception framework of Chinese strategic culture. In other words, China still holds a cautious position in viewing the use of force in resolving the non-traditional security threat of terrorism, as long as military forces are applied in practice. This also indicates that the paradigm of Chinese strategic culture is feasible to explain discursive practices in the realm of non-traditional security threats. Evidence has been shown in the representation and construction of counterterrorism wars. China's perception of the legitimacy and morality of resorting to war and the low efficacy of using force to resolve threats is why the US war on terror is attributed to negative images. At the same time, China's views of the defensive nature of using force and the legitimacy of using force to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity can explain why the representation of the Afghan, Iraqi, and Syrian governments' counterterrorism wars displays positive prosody.

With the findings and analysis, this chapter can conclude with answers to Q2 that the use of force is not an efficacious way to deal with terrorism problems from China's view. In other words, the use of force is not perceived as a preferred method of counterterrorism. So, what is China's preference for international counterterrorism? This will be the focus of the next chapter. Chapter 6 will focus on the counterterrorism cooperation discourse to find out China's preference for coping with the international terrorism threat.

Chapter 6 International Counterterrorism Cooperation in China's International Counterterrorism Discourse

6.1 Introduction

The analysis in the last chapter revealed that the use of force to combat terrorism on the ground is constructed as a path of low efficacy in China's international counterterrorism discourse. Both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 reveal lots of evidence that indicates that using force is not China's preference in dealing with terrorism threats.

As illustrated in Chapter 4, apart from delineating the violent nature of terrorism, the complexity of the root causes of terrorism is also highlighted in the representation of terrorism. The underlying connotations are twofold. On the one hand, addressing the threat of terrorism requires a Chinese perception of 标本兼治, which means prominent terrorist organisations, terrorists, and terrorist acts should be managed while the environment and factors that contribute to the creation of terrorism should also be given much more attention to taking out the root causes of terrorism. On the other hand, terrorism is a pervasive and violent threat to all humans. Therefore, it needs the joint efforts of the international community to address such non-traditional security threats, as no individual country can deal with the problem alone, considering the complexity and global trends of terrorism.

Such perceptions are also reflected in Chapter 5. In the representation of counterterrorism wars, using military forces to crack down on terrorism can only contain the development of terrorism to a certain extent. Still, it cannot comprehensively address the root causes of terrorism. Moreover, the overuse of military forces and long-term war campaigns can generate more conflicts and hatred, making the counterterrorism situation worse and falling into the dilemma of fighting terrorism while creating more terrorists.

Given that the threat of terrorism is a severe threat that needs the joint efforts of the international community and that the use of force is a low-efficacy way of dealing with the problem, how does China perceive the peaceful approach of international counterterrorism

cooperation? This chapter will focus on answering Q3: **How does China's international counterterrorism discourse represent counterterrorism cooperation?** Q3 is further divided into three sub-questions.

In China's international counterterrorism discourse:

3a) What is the discursive focus of the representation of counterterrorism cooperation?

3b) How is counterterrorism cooperation constructed?

3c) What are China's attitudes towards counterterrorism cooperation?

Based on the above research questions, the analysis will start by investigating the discursive themes in the representation of international counterterrorism cooperation. Then, the discursive construction strategies related to international counterterrorism cooperation will be analysed. Subsequently, the attitudes towards international counterterrorism cooperation are examined by reviewing the prosodies reflected in the discourse. Finally, the findings of the discourse analysis are interpreted through the lens of Chinese strategic culture. The discourse analysis in this chapter is based on the Counterterrorism Cooperation Corpus. The detailed analysis procedure is displayed below.

First, I will examine the discursive themes in the discourse through keyword analysis of the corpus. At this step, the basic features of the discursive focus of counterterrorism cooperation will be revealed.

Second, based on the keyword analysis results, a concordance analysis of the keyword China will be conducted to discover the discursive strategies in the representation of counterterrorism cooperation.

Third, I will conduct collocation analysis to investigate the prosodies in the representation of the United Nations and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. This will reveal China's attitudes towards international counterterrorism cooperation.

Fourth, the results of the corpus-based discourse analysis will be further reviewed via the lens of Chinese strategic culture to explain the factors behind the discourse characteristics, patterns, and strategies.

According to the abovementioned questions and study procedures, the next section will start by analysing the Counterterrorism Cooperation Corpus to discover the discursive themes in the context of counterterrorism cooperation.

6.2 Discursive Themes in the Representation of Counterterrorism Cooperation

The main objective of this section is to analyse the discursive themes of international counterterrorism cooperation in China's international counterterrorism discourse, identifying the key focus in the representation of counterterrorism cooperation. The keyword analysis is performed to fulfil this task. By categorising the keywords in the corpus and analysing them in their context, it is possible to outline broadly the discourse themes related to international counterterrorism cooperation (Baker 2012). Based on the Counterterrorism Cooperation Corpus, keywords are derived from the AntConc and processed for further analysis. For the acquisition of keyword data, loglikelihood is used as the default measurement, with $P < 0.01$ as the data threshold. According to the semantic meaning and context, the keywords are classified into four groups for further analysis: security and development, nation and region, international organisation and norm, and diplomacy and multilateralism.

6.2.1 Security and Development

The aim of counterterrorism is usually to contain and eliminate terrorism in order to achieve a safe environment free from unexpected and harmful terrorist attacks (Crelinsten 2009; Nacos 2019). Reviewing the top 100 keywords, it can be found that 30 of them are related to security and development (see Table 6.1). It indicates that security and development are key discursive themes regarding international counterterrorism cooperation.

Table 6.1 Security and development

Word	Frequency	Keyness	Word	Frequency	Keyness
合作/ cooperation	5552	14200.315	稳定/stable	1045	1931.745
安全/ security	2560	6595.504	促进/promote	886	1712.515
反恐/ counterterrorism	2363	6461.208	主义/extremism	618	1662.062
发展/development	3319	5820.859	极端/extreme	617	1639.113
恐怖主义/terrorism	2092	5719.16	威胁/threat	655	1620.538
共同/common	1847	4384.366	新/new	1142	1575.333
加强/strengthen	2088	4253.332	行动/action	614	1360.825
领域/area	1477	3723.967	事件/incident	555	1360.017
和平/peace	1520	3492.136	袭击/attack	491	1287.884
恐怖/terror	1146	3102.733	挑战/challenge	482	1148.422
国际/international	1506	3064.284	实现/realise	652	1085.147
世界/world	1215	2466.347	解决/solve	636	1042.953
维护/maintain	1001	2334.788	保障/safeguard	439	988.606
经济/economy	1575	2149.423	提供/provide	523	986.354
交流/communicate	856	2034.839	方面/aspect	657	976.306

安全/security is the most frequent keyword in this group and the second-highest-ranking keyword in the top 100 high-frequency keywords. *安全/security* appears 2,560 times in the corpus, with a keyness value as high as 6,595. Many keywords are related to security, indicating two categories of discursive focus. The first category is about the threat to security, for example, *恐怖主义/terrorism*, *恐怖/terror*, *极端/extreme*, *威胁/threat*, *新/new*, *事件/incident*, *袭击/attack*. The second category is related to the actions and practices to achieve security, including *加强/strengthen*, *打击/strike*, *维护/maintain*, *交流/communicate*, *保障/safeguard*, and *提供/provide*. The frequent occurrence of these keywords in the context suggests that security is a key focus in the context of counterterrorism cooperation.

China has always been concerned about terrorism as it has emerged as a severe non-traditional threat to its national security since the 1990s and seeks cooperation with countries in order to reduce the danger (Banlaoi 2021). Therefore, it is not surprising that *安全/security* shows up as a keyword in the corpus. The main objective of the analysis here is to examine what kind of security is the focus of China's international counterterrorism

discourse in the context of counterterrorism cooperation. In this regard, clusters of the keyword 安全/*security* give much interesting information.

The most frequent clusters are 安全合作/*security cooperation*, 安全稳定/*security and stability*, 地区安全/*regional security*, and 国家安全/*national security*. Security cooperation is often an important route to international counterterrorism. It also underlines that security cooperation among members of the international community will be the future trend of international counterterrorism. In the narrative, the field of security cooperation covers both macro-security cooperation mechanisms and specific security cooperation practices, such as intelligence security cooperation, law enforcement security cooperation, and cyber security cooperation, as shown in the following example.

(1) 要切实落实成员国打击“三股势力”合作纲要, 扩大情报信息交流, 加大打击毒品种植及加工、贩卖力度, 切断恐怖组织资金来源。要深化网络安全合作, 继续有力打击网络极端主义思想的传播。

We must effectively implement the cooperation programmes of member states in combating the ‘three forces’, expand the exchange of intelligence and information, step up efforts to combat drug cultivation, processing, and trafficking, and cut off the sources of funding for terrorist organisations. We should deepen cooperation on cyber security and continue to combat the spread of extremist ideas on the Internet vigorously.

The cluster 安全稳定/*security and stability* often occurs in a context that emphasises the critical role of security cooperation in maintaining international, regional, and national security and stability. It can be seen that security and stability in the discourse on counterterrorism cooperation refer not only to China’s security alone but also to the safety of China’s neighbouring region and the international community, implying a focus on common security among nations in the face of the terrorism threat.

It is surprising to find that 地区安全/*regional security* appears more often in the corpus than 国家安全/*national security*, with the former occurring 63 times and the latter 48 times. This suggests that in China’s international counterterrorism discourse, security cooperation on

counterterrorism issues is focused more on regional security. This is not to say that China attaches greater importance to regional security than its national security. However, it implies that China's definition and consideration of security are not based on absolute self-security but are more focused on achieving collective security and self-security at the same time (Propper 2008; Yu & Li 2008). Regional security can create a conducive environment for the safeguarding of national security. Therefore, the discursive focus on regional security reflects China's views on counterterrorism that China's neighbouring security situation, especially in Central Asia, is an external condition closely connected with China's domestic security in the context of counterterrorism.

In the context of counterterrorism cooperation, *发展/development* is another keyword with high frequency and saliency that indicates the discursive focus in counterterrorism cooperation. *发展/development* appears 3,319 times in the corpus, with a keyness of 5,820. The context in which the keyword *发展/development* occurs is often related to economic development. Therefore, it indicates economic development is an important discourse theme regarding international counterterrorism cooperation. Furthermore, it signifies that the aim of counterterrorism cooperation is to maintain security so that a stable development environment can be created. The following example shows that China advocates strengthening counterterrorism cooperation to provide favourable regional development conditions.

(2) 要加强反恐合作, 为本地区的发展和繁荣创造和平与安全的环境。

Efforts should be made to strengthen counterterrorism cooperation to create a peaceful and secure environment for the development and prosperity of the region.

Examining the clusters of *发展/development*, we can find more evidence that economics has been attached with much importance to counterterrorism cooperation. Two types of high-frequency clusters in the corpus denote the significance of economic development. The first type is *发展经济/develop economy*, which is mainly used to describe the development of the economy as one of the important paths to address the threat of terrorism, as shown in the example below. The second type of cluster is *经济发展/economic development*, which often

occurs in the context of counterterrorism cooperation that can curb terrorism and create a peaceful and stable environment for the economic development of all countries. In other words, international counterterrorism cooperation is conducive to the economic development of members of the international community.

(3) 反恐应坚持综合施策、标本兼治，推动热点问题政治解决，倡导不同文明和宗教相互尊重、和谐共处，帮助有关地区和国家发展经济、改善民生，从源头消除恐怖主义滋生土壤。

Comprehensive approaches should be adopted to tackle both the root causes and symptoms of terrorism, promote political solutions to hot issues, advocate mutual respect and harmonious coexistence among different civilisations and religions, and help relevant regions and countries *develop their economies* and improve people's livelihoods so as to *eliminate the breeding ground for terrorism at source*.

The cluster of the keyword 共同/*joint* also shows a similar emphasis on development. In the corpus, the keyword 共同/*joint* often occurs in a context that describes the need for joint efforts in counterterrorism cooperation. One of the high-frequency clusters is 公共发展/*joint development*. In the context of counterterrorism cooperation, it implies that joint development is the real solution to the terrorism problem at its roots. In addition, other keywords such as 稳定/*stability*, 和平/*peace* and 保障/*safeguard* are also relevant to economic development in the context of counterterrorism cooperation, creating a connotation that counterterrorism cooperation can help reduce terrorism and create a stable, peaceful, and secured environment for development.

6.2.2 Nations and Regions

Among the top 100 keywords derived from the Counterterrorism Cooperation Corpus, only 13 words are related to nations and regions (see Table 6.2). The key findings are: first, China is the most frequent country occurring in the corpus; second, the region around China is a key topic in the discourse on counterterrorism cooperation; third, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States frequently occur in the corpus.

Table 6.2 Nations and regions

Word	Frequency	Keyness	Word	Frequency	Keyness
中国/China	3336	6803.469	巴/Pakistan	629	1653.527
地区/region	2352	5083.828	俄/Russia	555	1501.649
国家/country	2353	4021.738	俄罗斯/Russia	486	1313.415
中/China	2438	3598.51	巴基斯坦/Pakistan	466	1272.566
中方/China	873	2281.052	美国/United States	786	1137.942
全球/global	882	2243.391	阿/Afghanistan	381	989.933
阿富汗/Afghanistan	621	1696.021			

In the Counterterrorism Cooperation Corpus, China ranks as the second most frequent keyword among the top 100, with 3,337 occurrences and 6,803 keyness. If we take into account the keywords, which are abbreviations of China, such as 中/*China* (2,438 occurrences and 3598 keyness) and 中方/*Chinese* (873 occurrences and 2,281 keyness), 中国/*China* turns out to be the most frequent keyword in the corpus. Therefore, we can find that 中国/*China* is a key subject in the discursive representation of international counterterrorism cooperation and is worthwhile for further analysis.

In addition, we can see some major differences from the keyword analysis in the previous two chapters. The keyword results in the Terrorism Corpus and Counterterrorism War Corpus show that China is not a keyword with particularly high frequency and saliency. But in the Counterterrorism Cooperation Corpus, China becomes the most frequent and salient keyword. The discrepancy indicates that China is a key discursive topic strongly associated with counterterrorism cooperation in the Chinese international counterterrorism discourse.

Further analysis of the clusters for the keyword China reveals that the most frequently occurring cluster is 中国政府/*Chinese government*. In the corpus, we can find two typical usages of the cluster in the representation of counterterrorism cooperation. One is to express *opposition to all forms of terrorism/反对一切形式的恐怖主义*. In this respect, we can find a triangulation with previous findings in the Terrorism Corpus and Counterterrorism War Corpus, in which the expression of China's firm opposition to all forms of terrorism is also prevalent in context. Moreover, it shows that China's opposing attitudes against terrorism

are consistent. In China's perception, terrorism is an absolute security threat that needs to be addressed.

Another common use of the cluster is to express the Chinese government's willingness to engage in international counterterrorism cooperation. For example, *the Chinese government has always attached great importance to international counterterrorism cooperation/中国政府历来高度重视国际反恐合作; the Chinese government is willing to cooperate with the international community in counterterrorism/中国政府愿与国际社会开展反恐怖合作; the Chinese government is willing to work hand in hand with all parties/中国政府愿与各方携手合作; the Chinese government is willing to work with the international community to strengthen cooperation/中国政府愿与国际社会一道加强合作.*

One cluster that is noteworthy to look at is 中国军队/*Chinese army* which is related to the use of force in counterterrorism. In the previous chapter, the discourse on the counterterrorism war indicates that China is cautious about using force to fight terrorism. Therefore, the representation of the Chinese army can reflect how China views its own use of force in counterterrorism. Examining the context in which the Chinese military occurs, we can find that the description of the Chinese army is mainly represented in the two themes.

First, the Chinese military is represented as the defensive force to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests, and counterterrorism is described as one of the responsibilities of the Chinese army. Second, the Chinese military frequently occurs in the context where China holds joint counterterrorism military exercises with neighbouring countries to prevent regional terrorism.

(4) 中方一贯反对一切形式的恐怖主义，致力于加强国际反恐合作。中国军队肩负着反恐任务，将根据国家统一部署做好相关工作。中国军队有决心有能力维护国家的主权、安全与发展利益。China has always opposed all forms of terrorism and is committed to strengthening international counterterrorism cooperation. *The Chinese army is tasked with counterterrorism* and will do its work in accordance with the nation's command. The Chinese army has the determination and ability to safeguard the country's sovereignty, security, and development interests.

(5) 上海合作组织成员国军队将于 6 月 8 日至 14 日在塔吉克斯坦举行“和平使命—2012”联合反恐军事演习。参演总兵力 2000 余人，其中中国军队官兵为 369 人。此次演习以应对恐怖主义引发的地区危机为背景，重点演练山地条件下联合反恐行动的准备与实施等内容。

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states will hold the ‘Peace Mission-2012’ joint counterterrorism military exercise in Tajikistan from June 8 to 14. The total number of participants is more than 2,000, including 369 Chinese army officers and soldiers. The exercise will focus on the preparation and implementation of joint counterterrorism operations in mountainous conditions against the backdrop of a regional crisis caused by terrorism.

Therefore, we can see that in China’s international counterterrorism discourse, the Chinese army is represented as a defensive force. On the one hand, it explicitly defines the Chinese army’s duty to defend national territorial sovereignty and security. Military exercises manifest an act of deterrence, not a use of force to actually wage war or strike extraterritorial targets (Jin & Dehang 2019; Kroenig & Pavel 2012). Thus, on the other hand, the conduct of counterterrorism military exercises by the Chinese army is also defined in the discourse as defensive in nature. From this, we can see the triangulation with the previous findings in Chapter 5 that, from China’s perspective, the use of force is primarily applied to defend national sovereignty and territory and is defensive in nature.

地区/*region* is the second most frequently occurring keyword next to 中国/*China* in this category. Examining the context in which 地区/*region* is commonly described, we can find that China attaches particular importance to terrorism and counterterrorism issues in its neighbouring regions. The salient cluster shows that 上合组织地区/*Shanghai Cooperation Organisation region* is the most frequently discussed region in the corpus. The founding members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In 2017, India and Pakistan were accepted as new members. All these countries are China’s neighbouring countries. (Ahmed, Ahmed, & Bhatnagar 2019). The distribution of other keywords that are related to nations and regions gives further evidence to China’s focus on the SCO and neighbouring region, as 俄罗斯/*Russia*, 阿富汗/*Afghanistan*, and 巴基斯坦/*Pakistan* are of high frequency in the corpus. All these countries are SCO member states and have border connections with China.

Therefore, we can find that terrorism and counterterrorism in China's neighbouring regions are key foci in the discourse.

Of all the keywords used to denote countries and regions, 美国/*United States* is an exception, as it is not a neighbour of China. From the previous analysis in Chapter 5, the United States is represented as a typical example of using force to deal with terrorism, and China's discourse on the US counterterrorism wars displays negative prosodies. However, in the context of counterterrorism cooperation, China still sees the US as an important partner and has a positive willingness to cooperate with the US on counterterrorism issues. The evidence can be found in the high-frequency cluster of 与美国/*with the US*. The cluster, 与美国/*with the US*, often occurs in a context that indicates a connotation that China regards the United States as a key partner in international counterterrorism. In example 6, China expresses its willingness to cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism, leaving behind geopolitical divergence. Despite geopolitical competition and occasional political disputes, China and the United States have engaged with each other since 9/11 in counterterrorism practices such as intelligence exchange, border control, and online counterterrorism (Garrett 2006; Kan 2010). In China's counterterrorism discourse, international counterterrorism cooperation is always regarded as a good way to create favourable living conditions. As shown in example 7, it portrays a positive development of Sino-US counterterrorism cooperation to ensure the people of the two countries live in a secure environment.

(6) 由于美国在反恐中消耗了大量财力、物力和人力, 像中国这样的新兴大国, 本可以借机扩展自己的势力, 中国在反恐问题上积极与美国合作。

As the United States has spent a lot of financial, material, and human resources on counterterrorism, an emerging power like China could have taken the opportunity to expand its power. However, China actively cooperates with the United States on counterterrorism issues.

(7) 中国愿与美国、联合国、国际社会一道继续相互支持, 加强合作, 打击一切形式的恐怖主义, 确保我们的老人、妇女、孩子、全体人民都永远生活在和平与安全之中。

China is willing to work with the United States, the United Nations, and the international community to continue to support each other and strengthen cooperation to combat all forms of terrorism and to ensure that our *elderly, women, children, and all other people live in peace and security forever*.

6.2.3 International Organisations and Norms

In the keyword list, some are related to international organisations and norms in the context of counterterrorism cooperation (see Table 6.3). It can be found that the United Nations and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are key themes in the representation of international counterterrorism cooperation, as they are both keywords of very high frequency and keyness and the only keywords regarding international organisations.

Table 6.3 International organisations and norms

Word	Frequency	Keyness	Word	Frequency	Keyness
成员国/member state	1832	4733.376	建立/establish	745	1341.309
联合国/UN	1618	4169.973	作用/role	725	1327.875
支持/support	1316	2941.255	认为/consider	686	1272.49
问题/problem	1693	2763.85	强调/emphasise	572	1252.618
组织/organisation	1488	2685.814	参与/participate	499	1092.123
上海合作组织/SCO	970	2649.802	主席/president	505	1068.307
推动/promote	1046	2474.995	协调/coordinate	527	1060.122
上合组织/SCO	870	2376.467	原则/principle	569	1026.408
重要/important	1174	2221.414	机构/institution	616	997.212
积极/active	988	1924.614	联合/unite	497	989.234
战略/strategy	825	1781.329	有效/effective	427	977.179
对话/dialogue	634	1626.638	全面/comprehensive	500	974.897
努力/effort	720	1385.432	利益/interest	512	959.651
通过/through	778	1344.784	应对/cope with	587	1577.57

The United Nations appears 1,618 times in the corpus, with a keyness of 3,393. The distribution of the keyword United Nations in the corpus and the related contexts show that the United Nations is seen as the most important international organisation that gives guidance to international counterterrorism cooperation. The frequent expressions that denote norms and practices in international counterterrorism include 联合国宪/UN Charter, 联合国全球反恐战略/UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, 联合国反恐委员会/UN

Counterterrorism Committee, and 联合国反恐办公室/*UN Office of Counterterrorism*. The repetitive mention of UN normative principles and institutions demonstrates that China attaches importance to the international norms within the UN framework.

For example, in the contexts in which the UN Charter appears, the most common expression is that *counterterrorism should follow the purposes and principles of the UN Charter*/反恐要遵循《联合国宪章》的宗旨和原则. As the UN Charter has explicit provisions for equality and respect for sovereignty, peoples, and religions, the repetitive emphasis of the UN Charter in the context of counterterrorism cooperation implies two connotations (Simma 2012). First, any counterterrorism measures must respect national sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. Second, terrorism cannot be associated with particular religions and ethnic groups.

(8) 反恐要遵循《联合国宪章》的宗旨和原则以及其他公认的国际关系准则，充分发挥联合国和安理会的主导作用，并有利于维护世界和地区的和平、稳定。不能将恐怖主义与特定的民族或宗教混为一谈。

Counterterrorism should follow the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and other recognised norms of international relations, support the leading role of the United Nations and the Security Council, and contribute to the maintenance of world and regional peace and stability. *Terrorism should not be linked with a particular nationality or religion.*

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is another keyword that denotes international organisations and norms in counterterrorism cooperation in the corpus. The keywords 上海合作组织/*Shanghai Cooperation Organisation* and 上合组织/*SCO* occur 1,740 times in total. In addition, many expressions represent international norms, such as 上海合作组织框架/*Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Framework* and 上海合作组织章程/*Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Charter*.

An interesting finding is that expressions related to the use of force also appear in these contexts. For example, the frequent expression that occurs in the context is 上海合作组织联合反恐军事演习/*joint counterterrorism military exercise of Shanghai Cooperation*

Organisation. SCO military exercises are joint military drills routinely held by SCO member states to improve counterterrorism capabilities and deter terrorist forces in the region. Under the SCO framework, member states voluntarily participate in joint counterterrorism military exercises with mutual respect and agreement. In addition, there are no actual military campaigns in the name of counterterrorism by SCO member states. Therefore, the repetitive mention of the SCO joint counterterrorism military exercises implies that China attaches importance to the role and principles of the SCO counterterrorism framework and the defensive orientation in the use of force against terrorism.

Some verbal keywords, such as 通过/*pass*, 支持/*support*, 推动/*promote*, and 建立/*establish*, frequently occur in the context, demonstrating the discursive focus on the normative construction of international counterterrorism cooperation. For example, the keyword 通过/*pass* often appears in descriptions of the adoption of UN conventions, policies, and resolutions on international counterterrorism to indicate the international community's recognition and need for norms and principles that can be relied on in international counterterrorism cooperation.

6.2.4 Diplomacy and Multilateralism

According to the semantic meanings and contextual background, some keywords are related to diplomacy and multilateralism (see Table 6.4). For example, the keywords of high frequency and saliency, such as 两国/*two countries*, 双方/*both sides*, and 双边/*bilateral*, indicate that counterterrorism cooperation is one of the important parts of China's diplomacy. In the context, common expressions include 加强两国反恐合作/*strengthening cooperation between the two countries on counterterrorism*, 双方将加强反恐合作/*both sides will strengthen counterterrorism cooperation*, and 双边反恐合作/*bilateral counterterrorism cooperation*. The countries that appear in the counterterrorism cooperation discourse include China's neighbouring countries, such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines, as well as some major countries, including the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France.

Table 6.4 Diplomacy and multilateralism

Word	Frequency	Keyness	Word	Frequency	Keyness
两国/both countries	1375	3757.189	愿/willing	550	1328.501
双方/both sides	1559	3614.946	领导人/leader	557	1281.016
打击/strike	1211	3131.497	推进/advance	531	1302.295
各国/each country	959	2325.233	政府/government	776	1242.238
会议/meeting	1134	2081.993	多边/multilateral	427	1166.033
关系/relation	1099	2072.411	框架/framework	432	1145.618
表示/note	899	1957.712	外长/foreign minister	466	1141.558
机制/mechanism	773	1861.091	元首/head of state	421	1106.712
举行/hold	820	1818.169	三国/three countries	397	1050.521
继续/continue	919	1711.818	双边/bilateral	395	1036.201
开展/carry out	918	1709.398	各方/all sides	392	996.714
国际社会/international society	618	1687.824	我们/we	1075	995.1
方/party	636	1493.484	总统/president	498	959.434
相互/mutual	595	1370.09			

Multilateralism is a key topic in China's counterterrorism cooperation discourse in a diplomatic context. Take the keyword 国际社会/*international community* as an example. One of the most frequent clusters of this keyword is 国际社会一道/*together with the international community*. The cluster often occurs in diplomatic speeches or statements by Chinese leaders during meetings and talks with foreign leaders from the international community. In example 9, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang expressed his condemnation of the terrorist attacks in France and his willingness to work with France and the international community to strengthen international cooperation in the fight against terrorism during a telephone conversation with French Prime Minister Manuel Valls.

(9) 李克强表示，中国政府和人民对法方的遭遇感同身受，同法国人民坚定地站在一起，愿同法国和国际社会一道，加强反恐国际合作，捍卫正义和世界和平安宁。

Premier Li Keqiang noted that the Chinese government and people share the feelings of the French side and stand firmly with the French people, *willing to work with France* and *the international community* to strengthen *international counterterrorism cooperation* and safeguard international justice, peace, and stability.

The cluster of the keyword 多边/*multilateral* also indicates the emphasis on multilateralism in dealing with international terrorism. In context, the common expressions are 多边主义/*multilateralism*, 多边合作/*multilateral cooperation*, and 多边反恐/*multilateral counterterrorism*, which are often used to describe China's promotion of multilateralism, which means that achieving global governance of terrorism requires the participation of multiple parties. As shown in example 10, the Chinese representative at the United Nations calls for support of the United Nations' leading role in international counterterrorism and multilateral cooperation and stresses that international cooperation is the only way to deal with the terrorism.

(10) 必须加强对国际机制的坚定支持，继续支持联合国在反恐中发挥领导作用。坚持多边主义，加强国际合作，是应对挑战的唯一选择。

It is important to strengthen firm support for international mechanisms and continue to support the *United Nations* in its *leading role* in counterterrorism. Adhering to *multilateralism* and strengthening *international cooperation* is the *only option* to address the challenges.

China always regards the United Nations as the embodiment of multilateralism (Wu & Lansdowne 2008). This can also be seen from the cluster of the keyword 战略/*strategy*. One of the frequent clusters of this keyword is 联合国全球反恐战略/*United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy*. The UN global counterterrorism strategy often occurs in a context that conveys the meaning that China always perceives international terrorism within the UN multilateral framework and delivers the connotation that China supports multilateralism in dealing with the terrorism threat. As shown in example 11, a statement regarding China's views on international counterterrorism cooperation expresses China's firm support for the UN's primary role in counterterrorism, the decisions made by the UN security council, and the implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy.

(11) 中国支持联合国在国际反恐斗争中发挥主导作用，支持安理会通过的一系列反恐决议，大力推动《联合国全球反恐战略》全面实施。

China *supports* the *leading role* of the *United Nations* in international counterterrorism cooperation, supports a series of counterterrorism resolutions adopted by the Security Council, and *vigorously promotes* the comprehensive *implementation* of the *United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy*.

6.3 Discursive Construction of Counterterrorism Cooperation

In the keyword analysis in the previous section, China is one of the most salient keywords. China is not a high-frequency keyword in the Terrorism Corpus and Counterterrorism War Corpus. However, China has become the second most frequent and salient keyword in the Counterterrorism Cooperation Corpus. It indicates that the representation of China in the context of counterterrorism cooperation is the central discursive theme. Therefore, China's perceptions of international counterterrorism cooperation can be found by exploring how China construes its image of itself in international counterterrorism. In this section, China is selected as the query word for concordance analysis to analyse China's discursive strategies in the context of international counterterrorism cooperation.

6.3.1 Collective Identity in International Counterterrorism

In the context of counterterrorism cooperation, China's discourse adopts a strategy of building a collective identity to promote joint efforts to deal with the terrorism threat. In political discourse, the construction of collective identity can generate in-group identification, enhance persuasiveness, and give legitimacy to political action (Chilton 2004; Wodak 2011). In constructing the collective identity, China empathises with countries that suffered from terrorist attacks. The empathy further creates the resonance that all countries could be victims of terrorism. Based on this shared identity, China promotes the willingness and necessity that the international community work together to deal with terrorism and stresses the importance of international counterterrorism cooperation.

(1) Shared identity

The most common discursive pattern to build the shared identity is 谴责+慰问+构建共有身份+提倡反恐合作/*condemnation + condolences + construction of a shared identity + advocacy for cooperation against terrorism*. The pattern often occurs in the context in which a country has just been attacked by terrorists or terrorist groups. In the aftermath of terrorist attacks, Chinese leaders often express condolences to the victim country in the name of the

Chinese government. In such discursive practice, China is attributed with a positive image that stands firmly with the victim country. Furthermore, both China and the countries that suffered from terrorist attacks are represented as victims of terrorism, reinforcing a shared identity of victimhood. With the shared identity, it becomes reasonable to send a convincing message that China and all countries have the same need and goal to address the threat of terrorism.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	“9·11”事件发生后，中国国家主席江泽民代表	中国	政府和人民向布什总统、美国政府和
2	事件一周年纪念仪式。李肇星在致辞中表示：	中国	政府和人民同美国政府和人民一道，
3	发展。中国人民和美国人民都是恐怖主义的受害者，	中国	政府和人民坚决反对一切形式的恐怖主义。
4	造成重大人员伤亡致电俄罗斯总统普京，代表	中国	政府和人民向遇难者表示深切哀悼，向普京
5	恐怖袭击胡锦涛主席向穆巴拉克总统致电慰问表示	中国	政府和人民强烈谴责这一恐怖暴力
6	要求有关部门全力做好救治善后工作并代表	中国	政府和人民向约旦国王致慰问电正在
7	致以诚挚慰问，对遇难者表示深切哀悼。胡锦涛表示，	中国	政府和人民强烈谴责这一恐怖主义行径。
8	家属表示深切慰问。洪磊说，樊京辉被绑架后，	中国	政府和人民十分牵挂他的安危。中国
9	沉痛哀悼，对遇难者家属表示诚挚慰问。李克强表示，	中国	政府和人民对法方的遭遇感同身受，
10	中国工程人员遭到恐怖袭击深感震惊和痛心。	中国	政府和中国人民强烈谴责这一惨无人道
11	这一令人发指的恐怖袭击行径。我谨代表	中国	政府和中国人民，并以我个人的
12	恐怖袭击事件，造成大量人员伤亡。我谨代表	中国	政府和中国人民，并以我个人的
13	一针对无辜平民的恐怖暴力行径。胡锦涛代表	中国	政府和人民，并以个人名义，对在
14	强烈谴责这一恐怖袭击行径。我谨代表	中国	政府和人民，并以我个人的名义，
15	发生恐怖爆炸事件胡锦涛向普京总统致慰问电重申	中国	政府坚决反对一切形式的恐怖主义，愿同
16	遇难者表示哀悼，向遇难者家属表示慰问。他说，	中国	政府坚决反对一切形式的恐怖主义，支持俄罗斯
17	慰问。胡锦涛强烈谴责这一恐怖暴力行径，重申	中国	政府坚决反对一切形式的恐怖主义，愿同
18	诚挚慰问，对不幸遇难者表示深切哀悼表示	中国	政府坚决反对一切形式的恐怖主义，强烈谴责
19	诚挚慰问，对不幸遇难者表示深切哀悼。胡锦涛表示，	中国	政府坚决反对一切形式的恐怖主义，强烈谴责

Figure 6.1 Shared identity in face of international terrorism

For example, in line 17, former Chinese President Hu Jintao expressed his condemnation of terrorism and willingness to strengthen cooperation with Jordan in the fight against terrorism in a phone call to King Abdullah II of Jordan following a major terrorist attack in the Jordanian capital, Amman, where a series of bombings in 2005 killed 56 people and injured more than 300 others.

The countries that receive China’s condolence remarks are numerous and cover quite broad geographical regions in America, Europe, Africa, and Asia. They include countries such as

the United States, Russia, Spain, Egypt, Jordan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, etc. Considering the discursive pattern and its comprehensive coverage of countries, it can be seen that in representing the shared identity of terrorism victims, China conveys the same sympathetic message, not differentiated by the degree of friendly relations between the victim countries and China. It all expresses the same perception that China opposes all forms of terrorism, deplores terrorist attacks, and is willing to work together with all countries to strengthen international counterterrorism cooperation in order to eliminate the threat of terrorism.

For example, in line 1, former Chinese President Jiang Zemin expressed his condolences to the victims and his sympathy to the US government and people following the September 11 terrorist attacks, stressing China's opposition to all forms of terrorism and its willingness to actively participate in international counterterrorism cooperation to address the threat of terrorism jointly. In the expanded line 12, Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed his condolences and sympathy to the victims of the terrorist attack in Barcelona and China's opposition to all forms of terrorism and voiced China's willingness to strengthen cooperation with the international community to deal with terrorism and maintain the security and stability of the international community.

Expanded line 12

我谨代表中国政府和中国人民，并以我个人的名义，向遇难者表示深切的哀悼，向遇难者家属和伤者表示诚挚慰问，祝愿伤者早日康复。中方坚决反对一切形式的恐怖主义，愿同包括西班牙在内的国际社会一道，加强反恐合作，共同维护地区和世界和平稳定。

On behalf of the Chinese government and the Chinese people, and on my own behalf, I would like to express my deep condolences to the victims, sincere sympathy to their families and the injured, and wish the injured a speedy recovery. China is firmly opposed to all forms of terrorism and is ready to work with the international community, including Spain, to strengthen counterterrorism cooperation and jointly maintain regional and world peace and stability.

(2) Needs for international support

Based on the shared identity with the international community, China's international counterterrorism discourse applies a strategy to link China's counterterrorism to international counterterrorism in the face of the terrorism threat. On the one hand, the East Turkestan forces are defined as part of international terrorism. The East Turkestan forces are represented as terrorist organisations that can threaten China's national security and the peace, stability, and security of the international community. For example, in lines 8 and 11, it describes that many terrorist attacks in China and Central Asia are carried out by East Turkestan forces and emphasises the links between East Turkistan forces and al-Qaeda. China's need for international support and cooperation with the international community is emphasised. The concordance lines in Figure 6.2 show that the common language pattern is 与+国际社会(各方)+合作/*with + international society (all parties) + cooperation*. Such a pattern often appears in the context where China expresses its need for counterterrorism cooperation with the international community in order to jointly deal with various terrorist organisations, including the East Turkestan forces, and to realise the common security of the international community.

N	Left Context	Right Context
1	买合苏木被击毙是国际反恐合作的成果。	中国 政府将继续与国际社会一道，共同打击恐怖主义
2	组织名单，表明“东突”组织已为世人所唾弃。	中国 政府愿与有关各方携手合作，有效地
3	东突”恐怖势力大肆发布恐怖音视频，煽动对	中国 政府发动所谓“圣战”，成为近年来中国境内特别
4	中国政府愿与国际社会开展反恐合作，	中国 政府同样希望国际社会对中方打击恐怖活动给予
5	视频，宣称对袭击案件负责，并继续煽动对	中国 政府实施恐怖袭击。“东伊运”等“东突”
6	恐怖犯罪？必须进一步加大国际合作力度。发生在	中国 的暴恐活动不是孤立现象，要重视
7	意愿。“东突”恐怖组织的恐怖活动不仅严重影响	中国 的国家安全和社会稳定，对国际和平
8	国际恐怖主义集团的训练、资助和支持，多次在	中国 新疆地区及其他国家制造各种恐怖活动，残害
9	委员会工作时发言指出，“东突”恐怖势力一直在	中国 新疆地区活动，作恶多端，并与“基地”组织和
10	哈萨克斯坦领空；同时，另一股国际恐怖分子秘密潜入	中国 新疆伊犁地区，建立武装营地，伺机制造
11	东突”恐怖势力长期与“基地”组织相互勾结，在	中国 新疆和中亚地区等制造了多起
12	东突”势力为实现破坏国家统一的目的，在	中国 新疆等地和有关国家策划、组织、实施
13	不是“世外桃源”，本身也是东突等恐怖活动的受害国。	中国 反恐是全球反恐合作的一个重要组成部分，
14	东突伊斯兰运动”是国际恐怖势力的一部分，在	中国 境内外制造了大量暴力恐怖事件，对地区
15	指导反恐斗争。同世界上许多国家一样，长期以来，	中国 面临着境内外恐怖主义的严重威胁，以“东突”
16	世界遭受恐怖袭击次数最多的6个国家中，	中国 周边就有5个，分别为第二至第
17	呼吁国际社会共同打击“三股势力”在被问及	中国 是否就一些恐怖分子在境外受训与有关

Figure 6.2 Needs for international support in face of international terrorism

6.3.2 China as a Supporter of International Counterterrorism Norms

In the representation of international counterterrorism cooperation, China's international counterterrorism discourse attributes a positive image to China, construing it as a supporter of international counterterrorism norms.

(1) Security vision

In the representation of the core vision of international counterterrorism, the idea of human peace and security is described as the most fundamental principle of international counterterrorism, as shown in the extended line 1 of Figure 6.3. A similar discursive pattern is 命运共同体/*community with a shared future*. In Line 4, we can find the expression of 人类命运共同体/*human community with a shared future*. Expanding line 4, it can be seen that the discourse first stresses that China holds a security vision that all humans share a common future in the face of non-traditional security issues such as terrorism, and China, as one victim of the terrorism threat in the international community, actively promotes global governance on terrorism.

N	Left Context	Right Context
1	来看待和推动国际反恐斗争，是十分必要的。	中国 政府认为：一、维护人类和平与安全是
2	合作等蓝图变为现实，为打造更加紧密的	中国 东盟命运共同体做出更大贡献。黄永宏等
3	暴力的较量，不是民族、宗教或文明的冲突。	中国 主张承认世界文明多样性的现实，尊重各国
4	治理体系变革、构建人类命运共同体而不懈努力。	中国 与世界上许多国家一样，是恐怖主义的
5	全球反恐形势及其前景展望》的发言，阐述了	中国 以新安全观为基础所确立的
6	和实践和平共处五项原则的过程，实际上就是	中国 以这些原则为基础构建新型中外关系
7	全球反恐战略，多措并举打击恐怖主义。习近平强调，	中国 倡导构建以合作共赢为核心的新型
8	各国合作发展、互利共赢的发展方针，凸显了	中国 和平发展的主旨。博思沃斯：无论
9	取向、现实要求和转型动力等方面来考察，	中国 提出的共商共建共享的全球治理理念
10	宗教相联系，受到国际社会的好评。对于热点问题，	中国 主张：以和为贵，通过平等谈判和平
11	周边国家和平友好关系以及新型反恐合作关系	中国 提出、倡导和实践和平共处五项原则的
12	极端化交流合作，通过自身努力为国际反恐进程提供“	中国 方案”，为建设持久和平、普遍安全的世界
13	应对威胁挑战、实现发展振兴，再次贡献中国智慧、	中国 方案。习近平主席和各成员国领导人签署并
14	力成员国应对威胁挑战、实现发展振兴，再次贡献	中国 智慧、中国方案。习近平主席和各成员国领导人
15	哪个国家、采取何种手段，都要坚决予以打击。	中国 的“反恐观”，真正聚焦问题本身，同时追求
16	成员代表讨论了亚太经合组织推动落实去年10月在	中国 上海达成的“上海共识”和加强反对恐怖主义
17	合作打击恐怖主义、分裂主义和极端主义的重要依托。	中国 将继续秉承“上海精神”，与各方主管机关
18	贡献，打击“东突”恐怖势力是其中的重要组成部分。	中国 政府一贯主张应以《联合国宪章》、国际法和

Figure 6.3 Security vision in face of international terrorism

We can also find many descriptions of norms regarding international security and cooperation, including the UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and the Shanghai Spirit, all of which are internationally recognised international norms in international relations. The common features of these norms are their emphasis on peace, common security, mutual benefit and win-win situations, and mutual respect. Take the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, for example. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were introduced by China in the 1950s and have since been widely accepted by the international community as principles in dealing with international affairs (Richardson 2010). The core norms of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence (Su 2014). The purpose of the description of these norms in the context of counterterrorism cooperation is to emphasise the need to follow these principles in international counterterrorism to avoid infringement of the sovereignty of other states and interference in their internal affairs in the process of counterterrorism cooperation. Furthermore, counterterrorism cooperation is supposed to be mutually beneficial, and all parties can realise their security interests by participating in international counterterrorism cooperation.

(2) International convention

International counterterrorism conventions are a frequent topic brought up in China's international counterterrorism discourse. By frequently mentioning China's strong willingness to join international conventions on counterterrorism, the counterterrorism discourse attributes China with a positive image as a supporter of international counterterrorism norms. As can be seen in Figure 6.4, the concordance lines contain a large number of descriptions of the international counterterrorism conventions, such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, the Terrorist Financing Convention, and the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism. Moreover, in the context, the descriptions of these conventions use positive expressions, such as support, willingness, agreement, etc.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	打击恐怖主义、分裂主义和极端主义上海公约》本周内，	中国	政府将向联合国秘书长递交中国参加《制止
2	的国际公约》批准书。他在随后接受采访时说，	中国	支持国际反恐合作，愿意通过这个公约搭建与
3	说，中国现在批准该公约，就是为了再次表明	中国	支持国际反恐合作，愿意通过这个公约搭建与
4	恐怖主义提供资助的国际公约》批准书后发表谈话强调	中国	支持国际反恐合作中国常驻联合国代表王光亚19日
5	秘书长提出的五个支柱为基础加以发展。	中国	支持进一步完善现有反恐条约体系和法律
6	和参与国际反恐合作。在12项国际反恐怖主义公约中，	中国	已加入了10项，签署了1项。中国还
7	作用，加强应对新威胁与新挑战的能力。	中国	已加入了10项国际反恐公约，并积极参与
8	反恐决议，大力推动《联合国全球反恐战略》全面实施。	中国	已加入《制止恐怖主义爆炸的国际公约》《制止向
9	在这里向联合国秘书长安南交存了	中国	参加《制止向恐怖主义提供资助的国际公约》批准书。
10	采取了行政、司法、经济、安全等一系列措施。不久前，	中国	又完成了加入《制止恐怖主义爆炸的国际公约》
11	就《关于国际恐怖主义的全面公约》草案达成一致。	中国	希望在恐怖主义定义问题上形成共识。有关
12	的合法外衣来寻求和获得资助。他说，	中国	现在批准该公约，就是为了再次表明中国

Figure 6.4 International convention

The common language pattern in the representation of international counterterrorism norms is 已加入+国际反恐公约/*already acceded + international counterterrorism conventions*. Such discursive practice mainly occurs in the context where China emphasises its recognition of and respect for international counterterrorism norms and advocates international support, acceptance, and implementation of international counterterrorism conventions. China has been actively involved in joining international counterterrorism conventions. At the UN level, China has joined most of the UN international counterterrorism conventions since 1978. At the regional level, China has joined many multilateral counterterrorism contentions within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or its neighbouring countries.

6.3.3 China as a Contributor to World Security

In the context of counterterrorism cooperation, the Chinese military is represented as a defensive instrument dedicated to maintaining national security and international peace. China is constructed as a contributor to world security. Within the context, there are numerous descriptions of the Chinese military. These descriptions focus on how China uses force in international counterterrorism.

(1) Chinese army as the defender

In China's international counterterrorism discourse, the Chinese army is represented as the leading institution that is responsible for conducting counterterrorism in China, and the primary purpose of China's use of the military is described as maintaining national security and unity (see Figure 6.5). This can be seen from the common discursive pattern of 军队+国家主权/安全/统一/*Military + national sovereignty/security/unity*. For example, in lines 4 and 6, the Chinese army is described as being tasked with counterterrorism in order to safeguard the country's sovereignty and security.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	仅靠军事手段更不行，要综合治理。他强调，	中国	一贯支持并积极参与国际反恐合作。有人说
2	是严重的罪行，不可容忍。中方予以强烈谴责。	中国	军队对上述恐怖袭击深感震惊并予以
3	反恐合作，共同维护地区和平稳定。范长龙表示，	中国	军队愿与巴方同行一道，积极落实
4	反恐任务，将根据国家统一部署做好相关工作。	中国	军队有决心有能力维护国家的主权、
5	各方面帮助表示诚挚的感谢，愿进一步加强与	中国	军队的战略沟通、务实交流、反恐合作，共同
6	一贯反对一切形式的恐怖主义，致力于加强国际反恐合作。	中国	军队肩负着反恐任务，将根据国家统一
7	伙伴协调的情况下进行。亚洲被“重新发现”	中国	坚持和平发展道路贝哲民：恐怖袭击、
8	海盗肆虐的亚丁湾派出 45 艘次军舰执行护航任务。	中国	坚决反对一切形式的恐怖主义，一贯支持国际反恐
9	贫困和地区冲突问题，消除滋生恐怖主义的根源。	中国	奉行透明的防御性国防政策，它的
10	犯罪部长级会议，就反恐合作加强交流。阿富汗、	中国	巴基斯坦、塔吉克斯坦建立了“阿中巴塔”四国军队
11	两军联系有助于增进互信。印方欢迎	中国	中央军委副主席年内访印，中方邀请印国防部长
12	它的立足点是维护国家的安全和统一。	中国	全力推进国际军控、裁军与防扩散事业，
13	中国警方是如何开展反恐国际合作的？答：近年来，	中国	公安机关以打击境外“东突”恐怖势力为重点，
14	演练，愿加强中国—东盟防务部门反恐合作，推动	中国	南部战区与东南亚国家军队的交流合作。
15	安理会通过有关决议，支持各国加强国际合作与协调。	中国	坚持，针对恐怖主义的军事行动应目标明确，
16	最多的国家，迄今累计派出军队 2 万多人次。	中国	海军先后向海盗肆虐的亚丁湾派出 45 艘次
17	反恐、救灾等为主题的联合演习和训练。	中国	防务部门和军队积极参与地区多边安全

Figure 6.5 Defensive nature of Chinese army

From the concordance lines, we can also see the common expressions that denote a peaceful and defensive connotation, such as 防御性国策/*defensive national policy*, 国际和平事业/*the cause of international peace*, 坚持和平发展道路/*adherence to the path of peaceful development*, and 积极参与地区多边安全/*active participation in regional multilateral security*. It further attributes the peaceful and defensive image of China in the context of counterterrorism cooperation.

In addition, the discourse also represents China's peaceful use of force in counterterrorism as a great benefit to regional and international security. For example, in the expanded line 17, it describes that in response to maritime terrorism, China uses its navy to escort Chinese and international cargo ships and protect the international trade routes in the Gulf of Aden area of Somalia. According to the Chinese Navy, nearly half or more of its escorts are provided for international ships and United Nations World Food Programme vessels (Liu & He 2017). Therefore, the representation of the Chinese Navy's maritime counterterrorism escort missions reflects two connotations. On the one hand, China's main approach to the use of force in international counterterrorism is defensive and protective, rather than taking the initiative to fight terrorism at the international level, with the aim of protecting the country and its people from terrorist attacks. On the other hand, China is dedicated to participating in international counterterrorism cooperation and providing public goods for international security.

(2) Deterrence to terrorism

In terms of counterterrorism, China's international counterterrorism discourse constructs the use of force as a defensive way to deter terrorism. The use of force has always been one of the instruments in counterterrorism, and the proper use of force can effectively deter terrorism and reduce security challenges caused by terrorism (Trager & Zagorcheva 2005). In China's perception, military exercises manifest the hard power against terrorism and intimidate terrorists and transnational terrorist organisations. From the concordance lines in Figure 6.6, we can see many descriptions of joint military exercises. They are represented as China's cooperative approach to improving the counterterrorism strike and emergency response capabilities of the Chinese army and to enhancing China's joint counterterrorism mechanism with its neighbouring countries.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	密切配合，使演习取得了圆满的成功。今后，	中国	军队将进一步加强与上海合作组织成员国之间的
2	合作走深走实，加强反恐能力建设。近年来，	中国	军队与相关国家军队努力推进互信
3	和平使命 2012 联合反恐军事演习。参演总兵力 2000 余人	中国	军队官兵为 369 人。此次演习以应对恐怖主义
4	上海合作组织成员国武装力量在哈萨克斯坦和	中国	境内举行代号为“联合—2003”的联合反恐军事演习。
5	演习将分两个阶段，先后在哈萨克斯坦和	中国	境内举行。中国、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、俄罗斯、塔吉克斯
6	这次联合反恐军演的介绍。这是首次由	中国	俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦
7	将观摩实兵演习。背景资料在上合组织框架内	中国	已参加过 4 次联合军事演习：一一 2002 年 10 月 10 日
8	在去年与吉尔吉斯斯坦举行了联合反恐军事演习。	中国	国内各部门也加大了对恐怖主义的
9	两个阶段，于 8 月 9 日至 1 7 日分别在	中国	乌鲁木齐和俄罗斯车里雅宾斯克举行。
10	反恐战役准备和实施两个阶段，先后在	中国	乌鲁木齐和俄罗斯车里雅宾斯克进行。 ⁹
11	联合反恐演习在哈举行。来自吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦、	中国	俄罗斯和乌兹别克斯坦等上合组织成员国以及印度、伊朗、
12	方面有着重要意义。兰州军区司令员李乾元中将军率	中国	军事代表团及中方军事专家组出席了演习
13	上合团结 2016 边防联合行动。来自哈萨克斯坦、	中国	吉尔吉斯斯坦、俄罗斯、塔吉克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦 6 个成员国
14	两个阶段，先后在哈萨克斯坦和中国境内举行。	中国	哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、俄罗斯、塔吉克斯坦 5 国武装力量
15	会议 2 9 日在北京举行。参加这次会议的有	中国	哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、俄罗斯、塔吉克斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦
16	上海合作组织成员国武装力量联合反恐军事演习	中国	阶段开始上海合作组织成员国武装力量联合反恐军事演习的
17	加强与上海合作组织成员国之间的反恐军事合作据	中国	阶段演习导演部有关负责人介绍，在这次
18	之路……从 8 月 6 日到 12 日，在哈萨克斯坦与	中国	交界的边境地区，一幕幕惊心动魄、对抗激烈
19	训练暨人道主义救援结束“期待训练场上再次见到	中国	兄弟” 3 月的柬埔寨，骄阳似火，正午地表温度超过 40

Figure 6.6 Military exercises to deter international terrorism

The deterring targets of counterterrorism military exercises are often described as *三股势力/three forces*, which are defined by China as terrorism, separatism, and extremism (Gu 2010). For example, in the expanded line 1, we can find that the purpose of the joint counterterrorism military exercises under the SCO framework is to deter terrorism, separatism, and extremism. In terms of the participants in the joint military exercises, the discursive focus is on the description of the Chinese military's cooperation with SCO member states, implying that the use of force in deterring terrorism only operates within the legal framework and certain regions in a defensive way. From Figure 6.6, it can be seen that most countries that occur in the military exercise context are China's neighbouring countries, which are also SCO member states, such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. But some cases describe joint counterterrorism military exercises with other countries, such as Singapore and Brunei, as shown in the expanded line 8. From the time span of the discursive representation of the military exercises, we can see that the description

nearly covers two decades, indicating that China has kept using military forces to deter terrorism, which has always been a key part of international counterterrorism cooperation.

(3) Public goods to international security

China is portrayed as a contributor who is willing to provide public goods for the security of the international community. This can be seen from the representation of Chinese peacekeeping troops in regions where terrorism is rampant. In China's international counterterrorism discourse, Chinese peacekeeping troops are attributed with a positive image of maintaining peace and security, a sense of responsibility, and a spirit of sacrifice. As a UN member state, China is an active participant in UN peacekeeping operations, with an 8,000-strong peacekeeping standby force and a 300-strong standing peacekeeping police force registered with the United Nations. It has the largest number of UN peacekeeping standby units and the most diverse range of units for peacekeeping services. In the context of counterterrorism, 18 of the UN peacekeeping operations in which China has participated between 2003 and 2017 have been in countries where the terrorism threat is at an alarmingly high level (Cho 2019). China's peacekeeping activities are represented as a legal and humanitarian effort under the UN framework. As shown in expanded line 1, China's participation in international counterterrorism peacekeeping is defined as the cause to support and maintain international security and peace within the framework of the United Nations.

Expanded Line 1

在全球恐怖主义威胁升级的背景下，我们参与联合国维和行动的步伐不会停下，我们反恐维和的坚定信念不会动摇。华春莹表示，中国政府坚定支持国际和平事业，坚定支持维护非洲的和平与稳定。中方将继续积极参与联合国维和行动，继续为践行《联合国宪章》精神，为维护非洲的和平与安全作出贡献。

Against the backdrop of the escalating threat of global terrorism, our participation in UN peacekeeping operations will not stop, and our firm belief in counterterrorism and peacekeeping will not waver. Hua Chunying said that the Chinese government firmly supports the cause of international peace and firmly supports the maintenance of peace and stability in Africa. China will continue to actively participate in UN peacekeeping operations and continue to contribute to the practice of the spirit of the UN Charter and to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	我们反恐维和的坚定信念不会动摇。华春莹表示，	中国	政府坚定支持国际和平事业，坚定支持维护
2	袭击事件，向牺牲的中国维和人员家人及	中国	政府致以深切慰问。“维和人员是全球团结
3	更多实质成果。（二）积极支持并参与联合国维和行动	中国	一贯积极支持联合国维和行动，参与维和行动 25 年来，
4	马里稳定团进行反恐行动并维护马里稳定。	中国	外交部发言人华春莹 6 月 1 日表示，这是一起针对
5	发生。使馆还要求马里稳定团立即展开调查。	中国	外交部和中国驻马里大使馆同时发布公告，
6	顾问马马杜·库利巴利向本报记者表示：“得悉	中国	维和人员在恐怖袭击中伤亡，我向
7	稳定团营地遭恐怖袭击事件，向牺牲的	中国	维和人员家人及中国政府致以深切慰问。”
8	多名维和军人献出了生命。目前，2400 多名	中国	维和人员正在马里、刚果（金）、利比里亚等 7 个
9	防御工事损毁，岗哨亭起火，一名正在执勤的	中国	维和人员牺牲，4 人受伤。目前，伤员情况稳定。
10	甚至献出了自己宝贵的生命。2003 年，26 岁的	中国	军人付清礼在刚果（金）执行维和任务
11	联合国维和部队为目标。在马里北部执行任务的	中国	维和部队一直坚定支持和维护马里和平进程，
12	遇难者表示深切哀悼。这已是第四批	中国	驻马里维和部队，他们为马里社会的安全

Figure 6.7 Public goods to international security

From the concordance lines, we can also see many positive evaluations of Chinese peacekeeping efforts, such as *团结/solidarity*, *积极支持/active support*, *宝贵/valuable*, *坚定支持和维护/firm support and safeguard*, constructing a positive image of the Chinese peacekeeping troops. In addition, there are many descriptions of the sacrifice spirit of the Chinese peacekeepers and the respect from the international community. For example, in the expanded lines 7, 8, and 10, it describes that many Chinese peacekeepers sacrificed their lives to maintain peace in the local region, and their behaviours are accepted as heroism by the United Nations, which awarded Dag Hammarskjöld Medals to the dead Chinese peacekeepers. Dag Hammarskjöld Medals are a posthumous award given to peacekeepers who lost their lives during service with a peacekeeping operation under the operational control and authority of the United Nations (United Nations 2006a). Therefore, the depiction of UN recognition and awards for the Chinese peacekeeper’s sacrifice creates a positive image that China is dedicated to providing public goods for the security of the international community.

6.4 Discourse Prosody in the Representation of Counterterrorism Cooperation

This section aims to analyse the prosodies in the representation of the United Nations and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. This will further reveal China's attitudes towards norms and practices of international counterterrorism cooperation. The previous keywords and concordance analysis show that the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are key subjects that reflect international counterterrorism cooperation. Therefore, 联合国 /*United Nations* and 上海合作组织 /*Shanghai Cooperation Organisation* are selected as the query words for collocation analysis. Through the collocation analysis, it is expected to reveal China's attitudes and preferences towards international counterterrorism cooperation (Xiao & McEnery 2006). As for the parameter setting, the T score is applied as the measurement, with $P < 0.01$ as the threshold and 5L-5R as the window span. After processing by AntConc and excluding grammatical words, 60 valid collocates are derived from the Counterterrorism Cooperation Corpus. According to the semantic meaning and context, the collocates are then classified into four groups: international norms, the United Nations' role, the evaluation of SCO, and counterterrorism practice.

6.4.1 International Norms

Among the collocates of the United Nations, many are relevant to international norms under the UN framework (see Table 6.5). Examining these collocations and contexts can help analyse discursive prosodies in the representation of UN norms in international counterterrorism cooperation.

Table 6.5 International norms

Semantic Group	Collocates
International Norms	宪章/charter 宗旨/purpose 原则/principle 大会/assembly 决议/resolution
	安理会/Security Council 框架/framework 公约/convention 国际法/international law
	多边/multilateral 国际组织/international organisation 准则/code
	国际社会/international society 议程/agenda 战略/strategy

宪章/*Charter* is the most frequently co-occurred collocate with the United Nations, with 189 occurrences in the corpus. Examining the contexts where these collocates co-occurred, we can find supportive prosody as the collocation of 联合国宪章/*UN Charter* is normally surrounded by expressions that denote favour, support, and obligation, such as 坚定/*firm*, 应/*shall*, 严格/*strictly*, 恪守/*adhere to*, 呼吁/*call for*. The most frequent pattern that can be found is 遵循/遵守/符合+联合国宪章+宗旨和准则/*follow/observe/conform to + UN Charter + purposes and norms*. Such a pattern generally appears in public statements following diplomatic events in which China is involved, such as the United Nations General Assembly, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit, and meetings between Chinese and foreign leaders.

For example, as shown in line 2 of Figure 6.8, the Chinese foreign minister stressed the significance of the UN Charter when he presented China’s views on international counterterrorism at the 57th session of the UN General Assembly. On the one hand, China supports international efforts to strike at terrorism; on the other hand, China reminds the international community that counterterrorism needs to be carried out in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Reviewing the historical context of the statement, we can find that it was made on the first anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attack, and the United States had already begun its international war on terror in Afghanistan. It was the time when the United States received much international support to fight al-Qaeda in the early stages of the war on terror. Therefore, China’s proposal of adherence to the UN Charter aims to remind the international community, especially the United States, to uphold the international norms embedded in the UN Charter.

N	Left Context	Right Context
1	稳定，符合国际安全不可分割的原则，并应以联合国	宪章 的宗旨和原则及其他国际法准则为
2	谴责伤害无辜的恐怖主义罪行，呼吁国际社会根据联合国	宪章 的宗旨和原则共同打击恐怖主义，铲除滋生
3	为核心的全球治理体系，坚定维护以联合国	宪章 宗旨和原则为基石的国际关系基本准则
4	反恐战略和联合国安理会反恐决议，应严格遵守联合国	宪章 和有关反恐公约。双方希望制止核恐怖
5	需综合施策、标本兼治，有关反恐行动应遵守联合国	宪章 的宗旨和原则及国际法准则，尊重各国
6	都要坚决打击。打击恐怖主义活动，要遵守联合国	宪章 和其他国际法，充分发挥联合国和安理会的
7	中发挥主导作用。一切反恐行动应符合联合国	宪章 的宗旨和原则及其他公认的国际法
8	联合国的作用，任何反恐行动都应符合联合国	宪章 和公认的国际法准则；反恐应目标明确

Figure 6.8 International counterterrorism and norms of the UN Charter

According to the UN Charter, the purposes of the United Nations are to maintain international peace and security, suppress acts of aggression, develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and achieve international cooperation. The Charter also stresses that the United Nations and its member states shall be guided by the principles of sovereign equality of states, settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, non-use of force or threat of force in international relations, and non-interference in the internal affairs of countries (Stiles & Thayne 2006). As the UN Charter is discursively construed as the fundamental rules of international counterterrorism with a supportive prosody, we can find that the discourse implies that terrorism needs to be dealt with in a collective manner by the international community. Most of all, as it implies, international counterterrorism should avoid intruding on the sovereignty and interfering with the internal affairs of other countries.

安理会/Security Council is another high-saliency collocate with the United Nations. The collocation is often found in two patterns. One is 联合国+安理会+作用/ *UN + Security Council + role*. The other is 联合国+安理会+决议/*UN + Council + resolution*. These two patterns are often surrounded by words with connotations of initiative, such as 强调/*emphasis* and 主张/*assertion*. In addition, many expressions indicate universal consensus, such as 双方一致认为/*both sides agree*, 我们呼吁/*we call for*, and 成员国一致认为/*member states unanimously agree* (see Figure 6.9). Therefore, a prosody of collective support is created so that the United Nations and the Security Council are fully recognised by the international community as the leading entities in international counterterrorism. For example, in lines 8, 10, and 12, it describes the joint statements by China and the US, China and Pakistan, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that emphasise the leading role of the UN and the Security Council and the importance of the UN counterterrorism resolutions and strategies. The United Nations and the Security Council are at the heart of the global counterterrorism system, and many of their resolutions have a significant impact on international counterterrorism, such as resolutions 1368 and 1373 after 9/11 and the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy in 2006, which sent a clear signal to the international community that it needed to work together to fight terrorism (Messmer & Yordán 2011). Thus, with the prosody of universal support, the UN and the Security Council are constructed

as the central institutions for combating international terrorism and maintaining the security of the international community.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	不能搞扩大化，要标本兼治，应充分发挥联合国和	安理会	的重要作用。中国作为国际社会负责的
2	代表李保东在发言中重申，中国支持联合国及其	安理会	在国际反恐合作发挥主导作用，呼吁国际社
3	支持中方打击“东突”恐怖势力。双方强调联合国和	安理会	在国际反恐斗争中应发挥主导作用，重申
4	恐怖主义，主张加强国际反恐合作充分发挥联合国和	安理会	在反恐问题上的重要作用。双方高度
5	打击一切形式的恐怖主义，并充分发挥联合国和	安理会	在此问题上的重要作用。双方一致
6	国际合作以应对恐怖主义威胁的挑战，希望联合国及其	安理会	在这方面发挥重要作用。
7	的立场。双方强调，为执行好联合国大会和	安理会	有关国际恐怖主义的决议，各国都不应将
8	恐怖活动人员提起诉讼。成员国认为落实联合国大会和	安理会	有关打击恐怖主义和极端主义的决议联合国
9	准则。我们呼吁所有国家全面执行联合国大会及	安理会	相关决议和《联合国全球反恐战略》。为在
10	作用下依据《联合国宪章》以及国际法原则，全面落实	安理会	相关决议和《联合国全球反恐战略》，摒弃政
11	支持联合国各项反恐公约增加成员国，主张切实执行	安理会	相关决议。推动联合国全球反恐战略的全面
12	向恐怖主义提供资助的国际公约》。中国主张，联合国和	安理会	应在国际反恐问题上发挥主导作用。中国
13	的重要组成部分。3、本组织成员国一致认为，联合国和	安理会	应在国际反恐斗争中发挥主导作用。一切

Figure 6.9 International counterterrorism and the UN Security Council

6.4.2 Evaluation of the United Nations' Role

Many collocates are related to the role of the United Nations. The collocations create a prosody of authority that the United Nations has an authoritative role in international counterterrorism.

Table 6.6 Evaluation of the United Nations' role

Semantic Group	Collocates
Evaluation of UN	作用/role 发挥/play 支持/support 应/should 主导/leading 维护/uphold 遵循/follow
	权威/authority 核心/core 充分/fully 坚定/firmly 加强/strengthen 落实/implement
	公认/universally acknowledged 广大/broad 遵守/abide 呼吁/advocate 效率/efficiency

作用/role is a collocate that has high saliency in the corpus. 作用/role normally cooccurs with the United Nations in the following pattern: 联合国+主导+作用/*United Nations + leading + role*. It creates a prosody of priority in the representation of the United Nations. For instance, in line 1 of Figure 6.10, the United Nations is described as the ideal platform for international counterterrorism cooperation. In line 14, the United Nations and UN Charter are portrayed as internationally recognised mechanisms and norms for international counterterrorism. Expressions such as 重要性/*significance*, 积极/*active*, 认真/*faithfully*, 支持/*support*, and 尊重/*respect* frequently appear in the context, creating a prosody of priority that the UN should be seen as the main platform of international counterterrorism.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	等支持。期待联合国在全球性问题上发挥引导	作用	联合国是国际反恐合作最理想的平台，会员国
2	国际反恐合作，重申联合国应在此方面发挥主导	作用	领导人特别强调联合国有关决议的重要性。5.领导人
3	解决人类所共同面临的问题方面发挥主导	作用	主张加强联合国及其安理会的作用与权威，
4	积极参与国际反恐合作，推动联合国和安理会发挥主导	作用	同时明确提出，针对恐怖主义的军事行动应
5	积极参与国际反恐合作，推动联合国和安理会发挥主导	作用	中国主张反恐应目标明确，证据确凿，标本兼治，
6	支持并积极参与国际反恐斗争，推动联合国发挥主导	作用	我们认真执行安理会有关决议，加入了绝大部分
7	辩论反恐怖问题时强调联合国应发挥主导	作用	我国常驻联合国代表王英凡大使今天在联大
8	加强国际反恐合作应对恐怖主义威胁，主张联合国发挥主导	作用	我们反对在反恐问题上持双重标准，反对
9	联合国和安理会应在国际反恐问题上发挥主导	作用	中国支持联合国和安理会通过有关决议，支持
10	乱下“药方”。国际反恐合作，要重视联合国的主导	作用	而不是由一两个国家来发号施令；
11	合作。中方认为，国际反恐合作应发挥联合国的主导	作用	符合《联合国宪章》的宗旨和原则，遵循国际法
12	加强反恐合作，充分发挥联合国及安理会的主导	作用	尊重《联合国宪章》宗旨和原则，综合施策，消除
13	反对恐怖主义应加强国际合作，应充分发挥联合国的	作用	对恐怖主义采取军事行动应符合“联合国宪章”
14	不能采取双重标准；打击恐怖主义应充分发挥联合国的	作用	任何反恐行动都应符合《联合国宪章》和

Figure 6.10 Leading role of the United Nations

In the context of international counterterrorism cooperation, 支持/*support* is another frequent collocate that frequently occurs with the United Nations. The semantic meanings of 支持/*support* have already presented a clear signal of a supportive attitude. Examining the collocate in context, we can find further evidence of such a positive attitude towards the United Nations. Two patterns can be found in the context. One is 中国+支持+联合国/*China + support + United Nations*. The other is 坚定+支持+联合国/*firmly + support + United Nations*. The first pattern often occurs in the context where China is explicitly depicted as a direct supporter to demonstrate its support for the UN on counterterrorism issues. China's support is related to two areas. On the one hand, it explicitly emphasises that

China supports the UN resolutions on counterterrorism issues. On the other hand, it reiterates China's stance in backing up the United Nations' leadership in international counterterrorism. The second pattern often occurs in a context that presents the collective support of the UN members for the United Nations' role in international counterterrorism. The collocation of both patterns generates a prosody of consensual support for the United Nations, implying that the United Nations enjoys not only China's support but also wide support from the international community, further promoting and enhancing the United Nations' leading role in international counterterrorism cooperation.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	改革的最早倡导者和有力支持者之一。中国	支持	对联合国进行全方位、多领域的改革，加强
2	安理会应在国际反恐问题上发挥主导作用。中国	支持	联合国和安理会通过有关决议，支持各国加强
3	发挥联合国在防扩散领域的核心作用。中国	支持	联合国在发展领域发挥更大作用，推动
4	大量学校停课，对全球教育事业造成严重冲击。中国	支持	联合国推动数字化教育，促进国际社会探讨疫情形势
5	时牺牲，获得“哈马舍尔德”勋章。中国	支持	联合国在国际反恐、防扩散领域发挥领导与
6	积极参与应对非传统安全威胁全球合作。中国	支持	联合国在国际反恐斗争中发挥主导作用，支持
7	提供资助的国际公约》批准书后发表谈话强调中国	支持	国际反恐合作中国常驻联合国代表王光亚19日在
8	和反对一切恐怖主义的暴力活动。王英凡说，中国	支持	联合国加强在制止和打击恐怖主义方面的
9	中国常驻联合国代表李保东在发言中重申，中国	支持	联合国及其安理会在国际反恐合作中发挥主导
10	避免实行双重标准。必须加强对国际机制的坚定	支持	继续支持联合国在反恐中发挥领导作用。
11	上的关切，实现共同治理。中国将继续坚定	支持	联合国工作。潘基文表示，联合国感谢中国坚定致力于
12	向苏丹达尔富尔部署直升机分队。我们将继续坚定	支持	并加大参与联合国维和行动力度，坚持维和行动的
13	举行第二次中亚国家元首磋商会议。成员国重申，坚定	支持	联合国作为综合性多边组织在维护国际和平
14	合作，鼓励治国理政经验交流。成员国重申，坚定	支持	联合国作为综合性多边组织，在维护国际和平
15	援助，坚决有力打击跨国组织犯罪。我们坚定	支持	联合国司法机构工作，积极参加国际司法活动，

Figure 6.11 Support for the United Nations

In a similar vein, the semantic meaning of 权威/*authority* has already attributed the United Nations an authoritative connotation. From Figure 6.12, it can be seen that a lot of positive expressions appear in the vicinity of the collocation, such as 有利于/*conducive*, 积极/*active*, 高效/*efficient*, 团结/*solidarity*, 支持/*support*, 致力于/*committed*, 坚定/*firm*, and 有效/*effective*. The most common pattern of collocation is 维护+联合国+权威/*uphold + UN + authority*. Such a language phenomenon often occurs in a context where China issues joint diplomatic statements with other countries following foreign affairs activities. For example, in line 5, consensual support for the UN is presented by describing Chinese and Russian leaders' consensus during their meetings that both countries agree that

the international community should uphold the United Nations' authority and will work together in counterterrorism.

N	Left Context	Right Context
1	原则：改革应有利于推动多边主义，提高联合国的	权威 和效率，以及应对新威胁和挑战的
2	反恐斗争，重视维护联合国在反恐斗争中的	权威 和主导作用，发挥联合国等国际和地区
3	应共同努力，积极维护联合国在国际事务中的	权威 和主导地位。一个高效、团结和强有力的
4	新秩序。双方强调国际社会应切实维护联合国的	权威 支持联合国在重大国际事务中发挥主导作用。
5	危机。为此，两国总理支持强化联合国及其安理会的	权威 两国总理重申，双方将在打击恐怖主义、极端
6	原则为基石的国际关系基本准则，坚定维护联合国	权威 和地位，坚定维护联合国在国际事务中的
7	主义道路，捍卫联合国宪章宗旨和原则，维护联合国	权威 和作用，共同致力于维护世界和平、促进共同
8	打击恐怖主义势力方面相互支持，而且在维护联合国	权威 反对“双重标准”、推动地区和国际反恐合作方面密切
9	的重要讲话中指出：“我们应该坚决维护联合国	权威 和地位，共同践行真正的多边主义。”
10	多边主义的最佳场所，联合国作用只能加强，联合国	权威 必须维护。通过改革加强联合国作用已成为
11	加强多边合作，特别是加强联合国作用、维护安理会	权威 才能有效应对日益增多的全球性威胁和

Figure 6.12 Authority of the United Nations

6.4.3 Evaluation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

上海合作组织/Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the only keyword referring to international organisation at the regional level. In the international community, the SCO is the only intergovernmental organisation established for the purpose of countering terrorism (Pan & Wang 2010). Therefore, observing the discursive prosodies in the representations of the SCO can reveal China's attitude towards international counterterrorism cooperation practices at the regional level. Among the collocates of the SCO, many emerge in the context manifesting the evaluation of the SCO counterterrorism mechanism.

Table 6.7 Evaluation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Semantic Group	Collocates
Evaluation of SCO	成员国/member state 地区/region 成立/establish 元首/leader 机构/institution
	发展/develop 理事会/council 峰会/summit 框架/framework 公约/convention
	睦邻/good neighborliness 批准/approve 宣言/declaration 宪章/charter

成员国/*member state* is the most frequent collocate that cooccurs with 上海合作组织/*Shanghai Cooperation Organisation*. In the context of counterterrorism cooperation, such collocation often appears in two patterns. One is 上合组织+成员国+坚信/*Shanghai Cooperation Organisation + member states + firmly believe*. The other is 上合组织+成员国+高度重视/*Shanghai Cooperation Organisation + member states + high priority*. In

addition, expressions with positive connotations, such as 重大进展/*significant progress*, 致力于/*commitment*, 信任/*trust*, 理解/*understanding*, and 福祉/*well-being*, are often found in the vicinity of the collocation, creating a prosody of support for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

The connotation of the collocation in the context implies that SCO members recognise the SCO's norm of cooperative security in dealing with the terrorism threat. For example, in the expanded line 4, the member states believe that the SCO can bring sufficiently lasting peace to the region. It implies that SCO member states endorse the collective approach to address the terrorism threat and achieve universal security for the international community.

In addition, the SCO member states attach great importance to the treaties and cooperation projects under the SCO framework, which they believe can bring more security benefits. For example, in the expanded line 12, it describes that the SCO members highly value the implementation of the Programme of Cooperation among SCO Member States in Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism 2022-2024. The aim of this programme is to contain terrorism, separatism, and extremism by addressing poverty in a cooperative manner and limiting the financing and operational capabilities of terrorist organisations (State Council 2021a). Therefore, the collocation in context creates a prosody that reflects China's positive attitude towards achieving common security via cooperative and comprehensive approaches.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	感兴趣领域的合作，实现开放、包容、创新、绿色、可持续发展。	成员国	将继续致力于为上海合作组织地区经贸和投资
2	暴力民族主义、种族歧视、排外主义、法西斯主义和沙文主义思想。	成员国	将一如既往落实《上海合作组织成员国元首致青年共同
3	渠道，提高合作效率，推动检察机关开展直接合作。	成员国	将致力于就上海合作组织成员国现行司法检察实践、
4	上合组织的重要原则。（一）观察员国和对话伙伴	成员国	高度重视上海合作组织观察员国和对话伙伴参与
5	进一步挖掘主管机关在上述领域合作的潜力。	成员国	高度重视落实上海合作组织成员国打击恐怖主义
6	和文化之都这一做法。（十五）上合组织论坛	成员国	高度重视进一步发展上合组织论坛这一多边
7	例行记者会上表示，中方愿继续同上海合作组织各	成员国	观察员国以及对话伙伴国一道，扎实推进
8	和中哈关系水平，深化了中国同上海合作组织	成员国	观察员国多领域互利合作，务实高效、成果丰硕，
9	新阶段，中方制定的规划基本成形。欢迎上海合作组织	成员国	观察员国、对话伙伴积极参与，共商大计、共建
10	方主席国工作，认为其成果巩固了上合组织	成员国	人民相互信任和理解、积极有效合作和
11	轮值主席国工作，认为其成果巩固了上合组织	成员国	人民相互信任和理解、积极有效合作和
12	求团结、促合作、谋发展，使上海合作组织给各	成员国	人民带来更多福祉，在维护世界和平、促进

Figure 6.13 Recognition of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Examining the context of the collocate 地区/*region*, it can be found that collocation occurs quite often in the pattern of 上合组织+地区+安全稳定/ *SCO + region + security and stability* and delivers a prosody of excellent performance. Lots of positive evaluative expressions adjacent to this collocation can be found in the context, such as 越来越大的作用/*increasingly important role*, 强大的/*powerful*, 积极/*active*, 优先 *priority*, 举世瞩目/*attract worldwide attention*, 重要力量/*important force*, 重要促进者和合作者/*important promoter and contributor*.

The positive prosody in the representation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has two implications. First, China has confidence in the ability of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to maintain regional security and stability. For example, in line 1, the SCO is described as an organisation with great potential to maintain regional security and stability. In line 3, confidence in the SCO's ability to safeguard regional security and stability is attributed to the fact that the SCO has a strong defensive force. Therefore, it also reveals China's preference for achieving regional security through common efforts.

Second, China positively appreciates the constructive role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. For example, in the expanded line 10, more positive adjectives can be found in the neighbourhood of the collocation, such as 致力于/*committed*, 举世瞩目/*world-renowned* and 远见卓识/*visionary*, portraying the SCO as a contributor with a significant and promising role in promoting international and regional security and stability. In line 11, a figurative expression is used as the SCO is depicted as 上合力量/*SCO power*, implying that the SCO is a capable force in dealing with international terrorism and contributing to a peaceful environment in the region. With such prosody, the SCO is attributed with a positive image of a security guardian.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	地改善人民大众的生活。正因为上合组织在维护	地区	安全与稳定方面发挥着越来越大的
2	认为，尽快协调阿富汗局势是维护和巩固上合组织	地区	安全与稳定的重要因素之一。成员国支持
3	成果显著。上合组织有决心也有能力维护本	地区	安全与稳定。上合组织成员国拥有强大的军事
4	对抗的基础上构建多极化世界秩序，巩固全球和	地区	安全与稳定。考虑到上合组织成员国的意见，各方
5	夫表示，中亚地区仍面临严峻安全威胁。维护	地区	安全稳定为上海合作组织的重要关注方向。应该
6	相当长的时期内，上合组织仍将以维护	地区	安全稳定为重要任务目标，同时积极促进
7	信对话，深化各领域有效合作，为加强上海合作组织	地区	安全稳定和可持续发展贡献力量。哈萨克斯坦共和国总
8	股势力’斗争仍然任重道远，我们要一如既往将维护	地区	安全稳定作为上海合作组织工作的优先方向。”习近平
9	发展。”上海合作组织成立 16 年来，坚持安全为先，维护	地区	安全稳定是上海合作组织合作的优先方向。当前
10	合作，取得了举世瞩目的成就。上海合作组织正成为维护	地区	安全稳定的重要力量。它发展了“上海
11	丰富安全合作实践的具体举措。“上合力量”，是	地区	安全的有力推动者，也为世界和平作出
12	光明前景。作为上合组织创始成员国，中国一直是上合组织	地区	安全合作的重要促进者和贡献者。2014

Figure 6.14 Regional security and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

The collocate 成立/*establish* often cooccurs with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in the context of the SCO's anniversary. As can be seen from Figure 6.15, many expressions of positive evaluation of the SCO appear in the neighbourhood of the collocation, including 高度评价/*highly praise*, 巨大潜力/*great potential*, 大有可为/*promising*, 充分肯定/*fully recognised*, 祝贺/*congratulate*, 日臻成熟/*increasing mature*. The collocation with frequent adjacent positive expressions indicates a prosody of recognition of the establishment and function of the SCO.

The positive representation of the founding of the SCO indicates China's perceptions of the organisation. First, establishing the SCO is a strategic decision of historical importance for combating terrorism and maintaining regional security. For example, in lines 5 and 6, the decision of the six countries, including China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, to jointly establish the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is represented as a historic decision and a strategic choice, attributing strategic value to the SCO.

Second, as an international intergovernmental organisation, the SCO is generally recognised and supported by the international community. For example, in lines 1, 9, and 11, an intertextual strategy is used to quote positive comments made by officials of various countries and the UN Secretary-General on the SCO's role in maintaining regional security

and stability, implying that the SCO enjoys a positive reputation and image in the international community.

Third, the SCO has a mature counterterrorism cooperation mechanism. On the one hand, the SCO counterterrorism cooperation mechanisms have been improving with the dynamics of regional terrorism and already have a strong collective defensive force to prevent terrorism, as shown in line 12. On the other hand, the SCO also contributes positively to economic and trade cooperation and socio-economic development among its member states, and economic development to reduce poverty is one of the key elements in addressing the root causes of the problem of terrorism (Yan 2021).

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	维护国家核心利益。会上，各国国防部长高度评价上合组织	成立	20年来，在维护地区和平稳定、促进防务
2	做精心准备和周到安排表示衷心感谢。上合组织	成立	17年来，安全、经济、人文等领域合作取得
3	创新发展，推动世界经济深度变革。成员国指出，上海合作组织	成立	15年来，经贸往来和投资合作形成巨大
4	举行的上合组织成员国外长理事会会议重要议题。上合组织	成立	10年来的发展轨迹与地区和国际形势
5	元首理事会会议成果，声明如下：2001年6月15日关于	成立	上海合作组织的历史决定，是成员国为积极促进
6	元首审时度势，于2001年6月15日在上海共同作出	成立	上海合作组织的战略选择，掀开了六国关系和
7	更加密切的联系。经济合作大有可为张宁自	成立	之日起，上合组织始终将经济合作视为
8	活动猖獗，毒品贩运和跨国犯罪极为严重。上海合作组织	成立	伊始，就明确将安全合作作为优先方向，
9	了中方的看法和立场。唐家璇充分肯定上海合作组织	成立	半年来所展示的积极成效。他同时
10	势力”斗争的法律体系。2001年6月15日，上海合作组织刚刚	成立	各国元首就签署了《打击恐怖主义、分裂主义和
11	会议召开之际发来贺电，祝贺会议召开及上海合作组织	成立	5周年。安南在贺电中表示，上海合作组织以实际
12	年6月，上合组织地区反恐机构在乌兹别克斯坦首都塔什干	成立	近年来，上合成员国联合反恐演习机制日臻成熟，参与

Figure 6.15 Establishment anniversary of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

In China’s perception, the factors that shape terrorism are complex, and poverty due to economic backwardness is considered one of the major causes of terrorism, so China pays special attention to the role of socio-economic development in counterterrorism (Zhang 2005). In the corpus, we can find 发展/*development* often occurs with SCO in the context of counterterrorism cooperation (see Figure 6.16).

Two common patterns can be found in the context of creating prosody that reflects China’s positive attitudes towards the SCO’s role in promoting development and the regional consensus on common security. 上合组织+发展+促进/创造/*SCO + development +*

promotion/creation often appears in the context where the positive role of SCO in the economic development of the region. For example, in line 4, security is represented as a fundamental prerequisite for national development. Following this logic, as shown in 9-11, SCO is described as playing a positive role in the common prosperity and economic cooperation in the region, indicating that the economic development due to SCO members' cooperation can, in turn, strengthen security in the face of the terrorism threat.

The other common pattern is 上合组织+发展+注入动力/*SCO + development + inject energy*. The purpose of such a description is to signify SCO members' joint support for the organisation and their consensus on common security to boost the development of SCO. For example, in line 5, the consensus of member states on the idea of a community with a shared future for mankind, which is a common security philosophy promoted by China, is described as an enhancement to the development of the SCO. It reflects China's confidence that, with a common security mindset, SCO can play a greater role in human security affairs.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	能力，呼应了本地区人民对和平稳定、共同	发展	的热切向往。上海合作组织是国际上首个明确
2	共谋和平发展》的重要讲话。他指出，建立和	发展	上海合作组织的根本目的是确保成员国的持久
3	文明，谋求共同发展的“上海精神”，和谐相处、共谋	发展	上海合作组织奉行开放、不结盟的原则，对外倡导新
4	道。“安全是发展的基石。没有安全，就谈不上	发展	上海合作组织成立16年来，坚持安全为先，维护
5	构建人类命运共同体达成重要共识，为上合组织未来	发展	注入了强劲动力。国际社会期待着上合组织在
6	吉约索夫。赵克志表示，上合组织青岛峰会为上合组织	发展	注入了强劲动力。中方愿积极支持执委会
7	之一。在当前复杂的国际形势下，为上合合作组织的	发展	注入新活力，使其更积极地参与
8	将一如既往地积极参与并全力推动上海合作组织向前	发展	上海合作组织承载着六国人民对和平与繁荣
9	提供资源十分重要。成员国认为，继续发挥上合组织在	发展	过程中积累的巨大经济合作潜力具有
10	应对新形势新挑战，促进上海合作组织持续健康稳定	发展	促进地区普遍安全与共同繁荣，推动构建
11	一个10年务实合作基调，对推动上合组织健康平稳	发展	促进地区繁荣稳定具有重要意义。本报
12	继续加强沟通、凝聚共识、拓展合作，为上合组织持续	发展	创造有利条件。各方强调应积极支持阿富汗
13	的干涉主义，防范区域外动荡冲击，为成员国	发展	创造良好外部环境。上海合作组织倡导的新合作

Figure 6.16 Development and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

6.4.4 Counterterrorism Practice of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Some collocates with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are related to the practices of counterterrorism cooperation (see Table 6.8). These collocates are a direct manifestation of China's attitudes towards the practices of counterterrorism cooperation under the SCO framework.

Table 6.8 Counterterrorism practice of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Semantic Group	Collocates
Counterterrorism Practices	合作/cooperation 安全/security 举行/hold 签署/sign 恐怖/terror
	反恐/counterterrorism 演习/exercise 分裂主义/separatism 落实/implement
	打击/strike 联合/joint 武装力量/armed force 军事演习/military exercise

Among the collocates denoting counterterrorism practices, 合作/*cooperation* has the highest cooccurrences with Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The common pattern that occurs in the context is 上海合作组织+反恐+合作/*SCO + counterterrorism + cooperation*. Examining the contexts, it can be found that positive expressions often occur in the vicinity of the collocation, including 富有成效/*highly productive*, 巨大进展/*major progress*, 重要成果/*important achievement*, 新动能/*new driving force*, and 良好形象/*good image*.

Further examining the concordances, we can find that in most cases, SCO counterterrorism cooperation is represented as counterterrorism practices that follow international laws and norms. The positive prosody in the context of the collocation of SCO cooperation implies that China holds positive views towards the SCO because the SCO counterterrorism practices strictly follow the norms of the SOC Charter, such as non-interference, equality, and mutual benefit. For example, in the expanded line 3, China praises that the SCO counterterrorism cooperation practices are based on the SCO Charter and UN Charter to pursue security through approaches of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diverse civilisations, and the pursuit of common development.

One interesting point in the concordances is displayed in line 1, where a comparison is made between the SCO and Western countries' approaches. Examining the context, we can find that it emphasises that what makes SCO counterterrorism cooperation effective is compliance with international law under the UN framework, such as respect for the territory and sovereignty of other states; it then uses a vague expression of 一些西方国家/*some Western countries* and explains the reasons for fighting terrorism while generating more terrorists/*越反越恐* is the trampling on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries under the banner of counterterrorism, which is a serious breach of international norms enshrined in the UN Charter.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	和原则，恪守国际法准则。这是上海合作组织开展反恐	合作	的重要原则。西方国家之所以会陷入越反越恐
2	和良好的精神风貌，揭开了上海合作组织军事领域	合作	的崭新篇章，在中、俄、哈、吉、塔
3	为基础，在各领域开展密切而富有成效	合作	的意愿。成员国遵循《上合组织成立宣言》《上合组织宪章》
4	代表团团长时的话，寄托着对上合组织加强安全	合作	的厚望。没有安全，就没有发展。上合组织创立
5	主要宗旨之一。一年来，上海合作组织成员国在反恐	合作	方面取得巨大进展，实际上已批准《打击恐怖主义、
6	说，一年来，我们在推进上海合作组织建设与	合作	方面取得诸多重要成果。圣彼得堡峰会为上海合作组织
7	执行委员会正式启动仪式，标志着上海合作组织在反恐	合作	方面迈出了重要一步。随后，六国元首
8	标本兼治的反恐国际合作上海合作组织在反恐领域的	合作	经验，必将为反恐国际合作注入新动能，助
9	恐怖主义威胁日趋常态化，上海合作组织在反恐领域的	合作	经验，必将为反恐国际合作注入新动能，助
10	争取到最大的主动权。上海合作组织在安全领域的	合作	经验，为国际社会合力反恐提供了有益借鉴。
11	经济等领域的合作，在国际上树立了和平、	合作	开放的良好形象。上海合作组织成为加强成员国睦邻
12	经济合作，将使成员国普遍受益。上海合作组织以和平、	合作	开放的形象走上国际舞台。它在创建之初

Figure 6.17 International counterterrorism cooperation and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

The practice of counterterrorism is aimed at achieving security. Therefore, counterterrorism and security are closely linked concepts (Wolfendale 2007). As expected, 安全/*security* is also one of the important collocates, frequently occurring with SCO in the corpus. But different from previous findings, it is worth noting that in the context of the collocation of SCO and security, there are also many expressions with negative connotations, such as 猖獗/*rampant*, 挑战/*challenge*, 责任更重/*heavier responsibility*, 没有发展/*no development*, 严重/*serious*, 危害/*hazardous*, and 严峻/*grave* (see Figure 6.18).

Examining the concordances where the collocation occurs, it can be found that the context conveys two connotations. On the one hand, it warns of possible terrorist threats in the region. For example, in lines 3 and 4, the volatile regional situation in West Asia and the evidence of rising activities by international terrorist organisations are described as posing more challenges to the security of the SCO region. On the other hand, it stresses the importance of security and the role played by the SCO in combating terrorism. For example, in lines 8 and 9, security is represented as the prerequisite of development, and there can be no development without security. In line 10, the high level of effectiveness of the SCO in combating the three forces is emphasised. Thus, it indicates that the collocation in the context displays a prosody of vigilance: an objective judgement of the terrorism situation in the region is still needed, and the SCO should play a more important role in preventing terrorism threats.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	合作、可持续的新安全观，将使上合组织	安全	合作之路越走越宽。发展是解决
2	猖獗是重要原因。在新形势下，上合组织的	安全	合作也面临新的挑战。一是西亚
3	峰会奠定了政治、安全基础。“扩员之后，上海合作组织	安全	合作潜力更大，肩负的责任更重，
4	目的。我们注意到，随着恐怖组织日趋活跃，全球	安全	威胁上升，上合组织地区面临更加严峻形势。我们
5	以增强信任措施，维护地区和平与稳定，应对	安全	威胁与挑战，为上合组织的可持续发展创造有利
6	塔什干上合组织地区反恐机构升级为上合组织应对	安全	威胁和挑战综合中心（俄罗斯联邦）；在上合组织
7	形式的援助。”他认为，中国对达成上合组织维护	安全	的初衷矢志不移，与中方同事共事非常顺畅
8	寄托着对上合组织加强安全合作的厚望。没有	安全	就没有发展。上合组织创立之初，中亚地区传统
9	的根本之道。“安全是发展的基石。没有	安全	就谈不上发展。”上海合作组织成立16年来，坚持安全
10	在安理会发言指出“东突”恐怖势力严重危害地区	安全	上海合作组织打击“三股势力”成效显著中国常驻
11	格别克还说，当前上合组织所在地区的	安全	形势依然严峻，地区安全稳定仍存在来自

Figure 6.18 Security and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

In the context where the collocate 反恐/*counterterrorism* cooccurs with SCO, the most common pattern is 上合组织/*SCO* + 反恐/*Counterterrorism* + 军事演习/*Military Exercises*. It is very obvious that the collocation is often surrounded with positive expressions, such as 掌声/*applause*, 圆满/*success*, 祝贺/*congratulation*, 非同寻常/*extraordinary*, and 重要作用/*important role* (see Figure 6.19). Examining the concordance lines, we can find that the collocation appears in the context where practices and results of the SCO counterterrorism exercises. It explicitly shows that China highly praises the role of the SCO counterterrorism military exercise and considers it a successful practice in preventing terrorism challenges.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	恐怖主义的良方在哪里？上海合作组织走出的一条合力	反恐	之路启迪着世人的思维。打击“三
2	上海合作组织在安全领域的合作经验，为国际社会合力	反恐	提供了有益借鉴。上海合作组织
3	热烈的掌声，成员国元首们热烈祝贺上海合作组织联合	反恐	军事演习取得圆满成功。这次演习的成功举行，
4	感谢中国邀请他们来华参加上海合作组织成员国武装力量联合	反恐	军事演习第二阶段的演习活动。此次5国联合
5	时，3颗绿色信号弹划破天空，上海合作组织成员国武装力量联合	反恐	军事演习落下帷幕。此时，观摩台上响起了热烈
6	非同寻常的日子。和平使命2007上海合作组织成员国武装力量联合	反恐	军事演习进入最后一天。胡锦涛主席在出席了
7	全面实现上述目标。双方将推动上海合作组织与安理会	反恐	委员会继续就反恐问题开展建设性的合作。
8	维护了地区稳定和国家安全利益。上海合作组织在	反恐	斗争中所取得的良好效果，当然是
9	的制订工作给予高度重视。上海合作组织成员国始终认为，	反恐	斗争应以国际法准则和原则为基础，
10	表示积极支持国际反恐合作，对上海合作组织、东盟组织在	反恐	方面作出的共同努力予以赞赏。中方对
11	总统普京的话说：“上海合作组织在调动、强化地区	反恐	方面的作用不断提高。”打击国际恐怖主义必须
12	发挥了重要作用。近年来，上海合作组织已举行3次联合	反恐	演习，各成员国在开展情报交流、司法协助

Figure 6.19 Military exercise of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

打击/*strike* is another collocate associated with counterterrorism practice. The literal meaning of the 打击/*strike* seems to imply the actual use of force in real combat with terrorism. But reviewing the context where the collocation occurs, it can be found that 打击/*strike* is used figuratively to stress two things.

One is the necessary prevention and governance of terrorism. The common pattern of the collocation in context is 上合组织+打击+三股势力/*SCO + strike + three forces*. The three forces refer to terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Therefore, the repetitive occurrences of the pattern indicate that the three forces are the major targets that must be dealt with through SCO counterterrorism practices. The other is about the international norms that SOC counterterrorism practices should follow. For example, in the expanded line 8, it can be found that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Convention on Countering Extremism is described as a landmark event.

Adopted at the 17th meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State in Astana in 2017, the Convention's most significant feature is that it provides a legal basis for cooperation between SCO member states in countering extremism, covering a unified definition of extremism, recognition of jurisdiction over extremist crimes, extradition of criminals, and intelligence cooperation (Wang, He, & Vasilevich 2021). It can be seen that the implicit connotation of 打击/*strike* is mainly not about the actual use of force but normative measures in defining terrorism and judicial and intelligence cooperation.

Moreover, lots of positive expressions frequently appear in the vicinity of 上合组织/*SCO* and 打击/*strike*, such as 成果显著/*remarkable result*, 积极作用/*positive role*, 启迪/*inspiration*, and 重要作用/*important role*, creating a positive prosody of high efficiency (see Figure 6.20). Such positive prosody reveals China's preference for cooperative and law-based approaches under the SCO framework in dealing with terrorism issues. In other words, it demonstrates the positive assessment of SCO counterterrorism practices and the importance China attaches to international norms in the practice of counterterrorism cooperation.

N	Left Context		Right Context
1	安全合作迈上新的台阶。事实证明，上合组织在	打击	恐怖主义、维护世界和平方面走在了各
2	国联合反恐军事演习，充分展示了上海合作组织成员国共同	打击	恐怖主义、分裂主义、极端主义“三股势力”的坚定
3	阿富汗重建提供帮助。卡里莫夫表示，上海合作组织已成为	打击	恐怖主义、分裂主义、极端主义和反毒禁毒的
4	国际问题都积极参与。他指出，上海合作组织一直致力于	打击	恐怖主义、宗教极端主义和民族分裂主义，并在为
5	发言指出“东突”恐怖势力严重危害地区安全上海合作组织	打击	三股势力成效显著中国常驻联合国代表
6	和平与稳定，促进和加强上海合作组织成员国在合作	打击	三股势力方面将发挥积极作用。与会
7	报记者的书面采访，详细介绍了上合组织在	打击	三股势力等方面发挥的作用。张新枫
8	反极端主义公约》，这对上合组织各成员国在	打击	三股势力领域开展合作具有里程碑意义。
9	形成了一个完整的体系，为上海合作组织成员国共同	打击	三股势力提供了坚实的法律基础。
10	各国的安全稳定也构成了威胁。为有效	打击	三股势力，上合组织地区反恐机构形成
11	作为可圈可点。上海合作组织的安全合作，从	打击	三股势力，逐步扩展到战略安全、防务
12	一条合力反恐之路启迪着世人的思维。	打击	三股势力，这是上海合作组织不曾动摇的初
13	协定》，并加紧筹建地区反恐机构。上海合作组织在	打击	三股势力、保障地区安全领域发挥重要
14	能力又有新的提高，显示了上海合作组织成员国	打击	三股势力、维护地区和世界和平的

Figure 6.20 Strike terrorism, separatism and extremism

6.5 Strategic Cultural Explanation of Discourse on Counterterrorism Cooperation

The results of the previous corpus analysis show that security and development, the international system and norms represented by the United Nations, the construction of China's image of counterterrorism cooperation, and multilateralism are the key discursive themes in China's international counterterrorism discourse. In its representation of counterterrorism cooperation, China is constructed as a proactive supporter of counterterrorism cooperation. In the collocation analysis, it was found that China's supportive attitude towards international counterterrorism cooperation is reflected in two specific aspects. At the international level, the United Nations is represented as the core entity and platform for international counterterrorism cooperation; at the regional level, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is represented as the model for international counterterrorism cooperation. In this chapter, the results of the previous discourse analysis will be analysed through the lens of Chinese strategic culture to explain why Chinese international counterterrorism discourse exhibits a strategic preference for international counterterrorism cooperation.

6.5.1 Preference for Maintaining International System

In the context of counterterrorism cooperation, China is attributed with a positive image as an unswerving supporter of the existing international system. As can be seen from the previous corpus analysis, this positive image is mainly constructed through China's favourable depiction of the United Nations. On the one hand, the United Nations is a keyword with high frequency and saliency in the corpus, indicating that it is the focus of the counterterrorism cooperation discourse. In this context, the United Nations is characterised as the dominant player in international counterterrorism cooperation, and the international norms represented by the UN Charter are described as the fundamental norms of international counterterrorism cooperation. On the other hand, the representation of the United Nations is imbued with very positive prosody, implying that it is the most desirable platform for international counterterrorism cooperation. The abovementioned language phenomenon and implied implicit connotations reflect China's perception of international cooperation within the existing international system.

First, China has developed a cooperative strategic culture in the past few decades' interactions with the existing international system. Under the influence of the cooperative strategic culture, China identifies with the existing international system and accepts international norms (Huang & Patman 2013; Qin 2003). Moreover, China inclines to maintain the existing international order and act as a responsible member of the existing international system, willing to contribute to the international system and provide international public goods (Cai 2012). In the framework of a cooperative strategic culture, China's national identity is positioned as a defender and builder of the international system (Liu 2020; Zhao 2013).

China believes that maintaining the stability of the international system is fundamental to safeguarding international security. A peaceful and stable international environment is essential for China, as security and stability create favourable conditions for its development. Since its reform and opening up, economic development has been China's primary strategic goal. China sees economic development as fundamental to maintaining national security and

stability (Lin & Liu). Therefore, China needs to support and maintain the existing international system in order to take advantage of economic globalisation and integrate the Chinese economy into the world economic system. In the process, China has not only achieved high rates of economic development but has also developed an identification with the international system and international norms. China has gradually become a country committed to maintaining a stable order in the international system (Jalil 2019; Johnston 2003; Kastner & Saunders 2012).

Since the end of the Cold War, China has enjoyed three decades of favourable international conditions and has made tremendous progress in its economic development. During the process, China learned how to interact and evolve together with the international system and understood the significance of maintaining peaceful development strategies (Buzan 2010; Wei 2020).

In terms of its perception of the international system, China actively defends the international system established after WWII, with the United Nations at its core. Chinese President Xi Jinping's keynote speech at the 76th United Nations General Assembly Session reflects China's understanding of the international system. According to Xi, there is only one system in the world, and that is the international system with the United Nations at its core. There is only one order, and that is the international order based on international law. There is only one set of rules, and that is the basic norms of international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter (State Council 2021b).

As to international security issues, China endorses and supports the international norms of the United Nations. This is why, as can be seen in the previous analysis of pairings, the United Nations and its Charter are given an authoritative image. As for international counterterrorism cooperation, China has always taken the United Nations as the primary platform for international counterterrorism cooperation and has endorsed the counterterrorism norms set by the United Nations. For example, since 1978, China has acceded to twelve UN international counterterrorism conventions, such as the Convention

for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (Chandra 2019).

China is also keen to provide public goods to the international community within the framework of the United Nations. Peacekeeping operations are a comprehensive and inclusive endeavour carried out by the United Nations. They have played an important role in preventing local conflicts, providing humanitarian support, and maintaining regional peace and stability (Li 2015; Ruggeri, Dorussen, & Gizelis 2017). China has always firmly supported and actively participated in UN peacekeeping operations. It is the second-largest contributor of peacekeeping contributions and the largest contributor of UN peacekeeping troops among the permanent members of the Security Council (Fung 2019).

Second, UN norms set boundaries for counterterrorism cooperation. Terrorism has become a global threat, and no single country can achieve the governance of terrorism alone. Counterterrorism, therefore, requires cooperation among countries. While cooperation is difficult in practice, contemporary terrorism requires a globalised response (Li, Yang, Chen, Gao, & Shi 2004; Romaniuk 2010). There are many types of counterterrorism cooperation. In terms of the subjects of cooperation, international counterterrorism cooperation can occur between states, international organisations, or both. As to types of cooperation, there is military counterterrorism cooperation as well as judicial and police cooperation. As a result, it is unavoidable that international cooperation against terrorism will involve sensitive questions concerning national sovereignty. As one of the most important international norms in the world, the UN Charter contains core principles such as the principle of sovereign equality, the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, the prohibition of the use of force, the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and the principle of international cooperation (Mani 1993; Sarnoff 1997). Thus, attributing an image of authority to the United Nations and the UN charters in international counterterrorism cooperation demonstrates the importance China attaches to the principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and non-force, which are closely linked to the core elements of China's strategic culture.

6.5.2 Multilateralism to Address Security Issues

From the preceding corpus analysis, we can see that multilateralism and diplomacy are the key discursive themes in the context of counterterrorism cooperation. In the representation of international counterterrorism cooperation, it is obvious to see that the multilateral approach to counterterrorism is the preferred approach in China's international counterterrorism discourse. The evidence is the positive representation of the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. In the keyword analysis, two salient keywords are related to international organisations. One is the United Nations. The other is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. In the field of security issues, China tends to solve problems through the diplomatic means of multilateralism and calls on the international community to recognise the importance of multilateralism and participate in the cause to solve security issues through joint efforts. In the description of international counterterrorism cooperation practices under the framework of multilateralism, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is the focus of China's international counterterrorism discourse.

In the context of counterterrorism cooperation, China has constructed the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as an efficient and practical counterterrorism mechanism. The collocation analysis indicates positive prosodies in the representation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The underlying reason for the positive representation and image construction of the SCO is that the SCO meets China's expectations and preferences for multilateralism in addressing security issues.

First, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation's principles of security cooperation are in line with China's strategic culture. In security matters relating to national security, China practices the principles of non-interference, equality, mutual benefit, and non-alignment. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation's charter shows similar principles. The principles of 'mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and consultation, respect for the diversity of civilisations, and the pursuit of common development' are enshrined among the SCO member states. This principle is dubbed by SCO member states as the 'Shanghai Spirit', a reference to the organisation's philosophy of peaceful and mutually beneficial

multilateralism. This is in line with China's emphasis on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which call for mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. In addition, the SCO also emphasises adherence to the UN Charter and the practice of international multilateralism, which is in line with China's preference for the UN to be seen as the primary platform for discussing and resolving international security issues.

On the other hand, although the SCO is a permanent intergovernmental organisation, the charter stipulates that the SCO adheres to the principles of non-alignment and non-targeting of any particular country or region and is open to any new members. This means that although SCO functions as a multilateral platform to maintain security, it does not work either explicitly or implicitly as a military alliance (Bailes, Dunay, Guang, & Troitskiy 2007; Vladimir 2021; Zhang 2015). The SCO has not developed into the traditional military security alliance such as NATO and has maintained the principles of non-alignment, non-confrontation, and non-targeting of third parties. Hence, the SCO's principles of action, the so-called Shanghai spirit, are consistent with China's approach to solving security problems.

Second, the SCO's counterterrorism norms are conducive to China's maintenance of national security. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has a clear definition of terrorism. It offers a work definition for China and other SCO member states to work together in regional counterterrorism cooperation. At present, there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism in the international community. Even in the United Nations, there is no international law or convention that provides a definition accepted by all nations. The reason for this dilemma lies in the fact that there is a wide divergence of views among countries on the nature of terrorism, the philosophy of counterterrorism practice, and the objectives of counterterrorism operations.

The absence of a clear definition of terrorism creates obstacles to international counterterrorism cooperation. A typical example is the double standard in counterterrorism. For example, some define violent anti-Western practices that take place in the United States

or in European regions as terrorist activities, but refer to those who engage in violent activities against civilians to overthrow local governments in the Middle East or other regions as freedom fighters. Likewise, Western political and media discourse often portrays violent terrorist activities in China as justified actions by ethnic minorities to resist ethnic and religious oppression by the Chinese government (Clarke 2018; Greitens, Lee, & Yazici 2020).

There has been a clear consensus among the SCO member states on the definition of terrorism from the very beginning. The SCO is the first intergovernmental organisation in the international community whose main purpose is to combat terrorism. The SCO is a permanent international intergovernmental organisation declared by the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People's Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan in Shanghai, China, on 15 June, 2001. It was formerly known as the 'Shanghai Five' mechanism, and counterterrorism is one of its main functions. Terrorism, separatism, and extremism were clearly defined in the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism, which was established at the birth of the SCO in 2001. This was followed by the Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization against Terrorism, signed in 2009, further refining the concepts of terrorism, terrorist activities, and terrorist organisations. According to the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism, terrorism refers to 'an ideology of violence and the practice of affecting the decision-making of the authorities or international organisations through the commission of or the threat of committing violent and/or other criminal acts intimidating the population and aimed at causing damage to individuals, society, and the state' (Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2009). The consensus on definitions among the SCO member states has made cooperation on counterterrorism possible. For China, the East Turkistan groups are included in the category of terrorist organisations, which are unanimously agreed upon by the SCO member states according to the definition.

The consensus on the definitions of terrorism, terrorist acts, and terrorist organisations has enabled the SCO member states to share the same knowledge and position to jointly deal

with terrorism. There is no difference in the definition of terrorists, paving the way for international counterterrorism cooperation such as joint law enforcement and extradition of terrorist criminals among member states. This reduces the space for Chinese Uyghur separatists to engage in transnational terrorist activities in Central Asia and further safeguards China's national security. In other words, under the SCO framework, commonly accepted and respected counterterrorism norms facilitate counterterrorism cooperation, which in turn enhances national security.

6.5.3 Deterrent Effect of Force

In the previous concordance and collocation analyses, two language phenomena were revealed. One is the representation of the Chinese military as a force of peace. The other is the positive prosody in the description of the joint military exercises between China and SCO member states. The purpose of the representation of the Chinese military and joint military exercises is to show the defensive nature of China's perception of the use of force. It implies that, from China's perspective, the military force could be used to deter terrorism through the display of military strength rather than the actual use of force. Therefore, the SCO's method of joint military exercises is in line with the Chinese strategic culture's preference for the use of force, which holds that the primary function of force is to defend and deter enemies.

First, the joint military exercise demonstrates the will and abilities to curb terrorism rather than the actual use of force in any country or region. In addition, the use of force in countering terrorism is directed against terrorism, not against any country or organisation. In other words, the use of force against terrorism within the SCO framework is a form of military cooperation with the primary objective of addressing non-traditional security rather than military confrontation with any country or military bloc (Aris 2009).

In practice, the objectives of the joint military exercises between China and SCO member states are to improve military capabilities in combating terrorism, extremism, and separatism. The first joint military exercise under the SCO framework was held between China and

Kyrgyzstan in October 2002 in the border areas of the two countries. Since then, the number of joint military exercises in the SCO has gradually increased, and the mechanism has been expanded to include both bilateral and multilateral joint military exercises. In June 2007, in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, the SCO member states signed an agreement on the holding of joint military exercises by the SCO member states, setting out a mechanism for joint military exercises. Since then, the SCO counterterrorism military exercise has established an official agenda and procedure. The most influential joint military exercises under the SCO framework are the Peace Missions series. The Peace Missions joint military exercises are participated in by most of the SCO member states and are held on a rotating basis in each country. The constant counterterrorism military exercise proved to be effective as transnational terrorist activities in the region decreased in the past two decades (Su & Li 2021a). The ongoing joint military exercises not only enhance the SOC member states' counterterrorism capabilities but also act as a deterrent to terrorism and maintain regional security.

Second, security is not a zero-sum game, and common security is the true state of safety. In China's strategic culture, security is not exclusive. China does not hold a dichotomous mindset in perceiving who should be the partner of international counterterrorism cooperation. In other words, any country can join the efforts to combat terrorism to realise common security. Take the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as an example. China has territorial disputes with India. But China agrees to accept India as the new SCO member and welcomes India's participation in the SCO counterterrorism cooperation. Security problems such as terrorism are usually more transnational than interstate (Allison 2004). Therefore, China also needs to work with its neighbouring countries on the terrorism issue, despite some quarrels or disputes. On the other hand, the SCO's joint military exercises, which are participated in by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, and Pakistan, are not aimed at the security of any particular country but rather at guaranteeing the common security of the regions against terrorism threats. Therefore, it is consistent with China's perception of common security, which is defined by mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation (Men & Zhen 2013; Yu & Li 2008).

Third, non-military measures are also important for counterterrorism. The abovementioned analysis has shown that, as one of the tasks of SCO counterterrorism cooperation, the joint military exercises are a display of determination and capabilities to deal with terrorism threats, deterring the terrorists, extremists, and separatists in the region. However, in addition to military exercises and counterterrorism law enforcement cooperation, China also has extensive cooperation in economic, political, diplomatic, and humanistic exchanges with SCO member states. This reflects China's vision of security, which stresses that the use of force is defensive and not the only measure to maintain security. Integrated approaches, including economic and political means, are also conducive to realising common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security (Ling & Yang 2019; Xu 2021). Therefore, China believes that economic development and modernisation in Central Asia could effectively reduce the risk of international terrorism, root out the breeding ground of terrorism in the region, and curb the transnational abilities of terrorists, extremists, and separatists. Based on such visions, China actively promotes economic and trade cooperation, one of the key parts of SCO cooperation. The ultimate goal is to realise comprehensive security through common development and prosperity. Within the legal framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 122 documents related to economic integration have been introduced, covering cooperation in trade, finance, investment, customs, production, agriculture, and tourism (Alimov 2018). With the accession of India and Pakistan, the potential for economic cooperation in the SCO is even greater due to the overall size of the population, land, and economies of all the member states.

6.5.4 Emphasis on Regional Security

The preceding corpus analysis shows that *安全/security* is one of the significant keywords. The realisation of security status is a key discursive theme in the discursive representation of international counterterrorism cooperation. In the keyword analysis, there is a very interesting language pattern that is worthy of discussion. In an examination of the word clusters of the keyword *security/安全*, we can see that *region/地区* co-occurs with *security/安全* more often than *nation/国家*, with the former occurring 63 times compared to 48 times for the latter. It indicates that in China's international counterterrorism cooperation discourse,

regional security is given more attention than national security, or at least both regional security and national security have been given equal emphasis in the representation of counterterrorism cooperation. Such a discursive pattern is beyond our expectations. According to our normal intuition, the purpose of counterterrorism is to maintain national security, so 国家/*nation* is expected to appear more frequently in the vicinity of the keyword 安全/*security*. But the corpus results show that it is 地区/*region* rather than 国家/*nation* co-occurs more frequently with 安全/*security* in the context. The divergence can be explained by China's perceptions of security.

In the context of contemporary Chinese strategic culture, security is a systematic and relational concept (Yu & Zhang 2022). Therefore, the fact that 地区安全/*regional security* appears more often than 国家安全/*national security* does not mean that China attaches more importance to regional security than national security. In fact, it implies that China links national security with regional security and approaches security with a systemic mindset. Such perception of security is displayed in China's security view of *a holistic approach to national security*/总体国家安全观. The concept of a holistic approach to national security was brought up by President Xi Jinping when he chaired the first meeting of the Central National Security Commission in April 2014. According to the logic of a holistic approach to national security, China's perceptions of security are based on systemic thinking that considers national security, regional security, and global security, as well as traditional and non-traditional security, within a comprehensive framework, which means security in those areas is interconnected (Liu 2014; M. Wang 2017).

China's systemic thinking of a holistic approach to national security embodies the element of Chinese strategic culture, peace cooperativism, which pursues shared and common security (Qin, Zhou, Wen, Shi, & Zhang 2006; Yu & Zhang 2019). Under such strategic thinking, China considers its national security to be interconnected with the security of its neighbouring countries in the region. In other words, China's security is not independent of regional security, and universal regional security is the essential condition for achieving true national security.

For China, regional security has two implications. On the one hand, in the context of terrorism, the most serious terrorism threats to China are from the terrorist forces in Central Asia, including the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (China), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan), Hizb ut-Tahrir (Pakistan), and the Jund Al-Khilafah (Kazakhstan), etc. These terrorist groups operate along China's borders with Central Asian countries and carry out transnational terrorist activities. Therefore, the inherent logic of maintaining regional security is to ensure that the terrorist situation in Central Asia does not deteriorate and to prevent the threat of terrorism from Central Asian countries from spilling over into China's territory. China has already managed to contain the terrorist situation in Central Asia to a certain extent through bilateral counterterrorism cooperation with Central Asian countries, such as judicial and law enforcement cooperation and counterterrorism intelligence sharing, as well as multilateral cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Su & Li 2021b).

On the other hand, security and stability in Central Asia will contribute to tackling the root causes of terrorism. In China's perception, instability and poverty are sources of terrorism. If a country is in a non-stable and insecure regional environment, it is difficult to have good conditions for development. Afghanistan and Iraq are prime examples. These two countries have lost a secure and stable environment for development due to the domestic turmoil in their countries as a result of the war on terror waged by the United States. Due to regional conflict, counterterrorism wars, and domestic political turmoil, the two countries have experienced very high youth unemployment and increasing poverty rates, which further exacerbated social and religious conflicts, leading to the rise of terrorism activities (Ministry of Commerce 2021; Rogers 2013). Therefore, in dealing with the threat of terrorism, China advocates the maintenance of regional security environment and addresses the terrorist roots from the perspective of regional security.

In terms of security issues, China positions itself as a regional power, focusing on geopolitical security. China has kept maintaining this strategic determination since the reform and opening-up in the 1980s. In the era of Deng Xiaoping, the former Chinese leader set the strategic outlook for China's development. On the one hand, China maintains an

independent role in terms of sovereignty and national system and does not ally with any country; on the other hand, China will never claim hegemony and will never be the leader (Vogel 2011). In Xi's new era, China keeps following this strategic thinking, despite its increasing involvement in international affairs. Chinese President Xi Jinping claimed on many occasions that no matter how strong China develops, it will never claim hegemony, expand and seek spheres of influence, or engage in an arms race; China will continue to be a builder of world peace, a contributor to global development, and a defender of the international order (Guo 2019; Wu & Li 2021). China has always considered regional security issues from the perspective of a significant and responsible state in the region (Luo 2014; Womack 2009; Zhao 2021). This also explains why, in the preceding discourse analysis, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a key discursive theme in the context of counterterrorism cooperation, as the SCO was established to combat terrorism, extremism, and separatism through regional multilateral security cooperation with the ultimate goal of achieving both regional security and national security. To sum up, with the systemic perception of regional security and national security, China regards international counterterrorism cooperation, particularly at the regional level, as the practical, peaceful, efficient, and comprehensive path to solving the problems of international terrorism and achieving common security among nations.

6.6 Summary

This chapter aims to discover how China perceives counterterrorism cooperation in coping with the terrorism threat. The discourse analysis focuses on how international counterterrorism cooperation is characterised and constructed, as well as the implied Chinese attitudes towards international counterterrorism. The discourse analysis is based on the Counterterrorism Cooperation Corpus via keyword analysis, concordance analysis, and collocation analysis. After the corpus-based discourse analysis, this chapter explains the strategic cultural factors behind the discursive characteristics and preferences reflected in the discourse.

The discursive focus presented by China's international counterterrorism discourse is manifested in four main areas: security and development, nations and regions, international organisations and normative consensus, and diplomacy and multilateralism. Regarding the scope of security, China is particularly concerned with regional security and stability. Regarding the purpose of security, development is the primary concern, as counterterrorism cooperation can provide a secure and stable environment for development and, in turn, can help address the root causes of the terrorism threat. Finally, regarding the path to achieving security, counterterrorism cooperation is represented as the core approach to addressing the threat of terrorism and achieving common security.

In the context of counterterrorism cooperation, China is the most frequent and salient keyword in the corpus. This finding differs significantly from those in the two previous corpora, as China is not a substantially salient keyword in either the Terrorism Corpus or Counterterrorism War Corpus. It indicates that China is the focal theme in the representation of counterterrorism cooperation. In other words, the discursive construction of counterterrorism cooperation is mainly associated with the representation of China. The United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are the only two keywords in the corpus that denote international organisations. In the representation of international counterterrorism cooperation, these two international organisations are used as key discursive themes, reflecting the importance China attaches to international counterterrorism norms and regional counterterrorism cooperation practices.

Three discursive strategies are identified in analysing the representation and construction of international counterterrorism cooperation. First, the construction of a shared identity of victims of international terrorism, based on which China advocates the importance and its need for support to cooperate with the international community in dealing with terrorism threats in joint efforts. Second, it represents China as a firm supporter of international counterterrorism norms. The most frequently discussed international norms in the discourse include the UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and the Shanghai Spirit. In the context of counterterrorism cooperation, these norms are highlighted to emphasise the need for counterterrorism cooperation to be carried out within the framework of international

norms while avoiding infringement on the sovereignty of other states and interference in their internal affairs. Third, it constructs China's military as a peaceful force for maintaining world peace. The focus is on portraying the acts of the Chinese army in providing common goods of security to the international community, for example, the non-combat UN peacekeeping missions and joint military exercises under the framework of the SCO. The purpose of such a discursive strategy is to highlight that China's use of force in counterterrorism is defensive and non-combatant and strictly follows international counterterrorism norms.

The United Nations and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are represented as the embodiments of international counterterrorism cooperation in China's international counterterrorism discourse. The collocation analysis of the UN and SCO reveals China's attitudes and preferences towards counterterrorism cooperation at the international and regional levels. At the international level, the discourse displays prosodies of universal support, recognised authority, and priority, thus constructing a positive image of the UN as the leader and guide in international counterterrorism cooperation. At the regional level, it signifies prosodies of recognition, trust, and high efficacy, portraying the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as a model of international counterterrorism cooperation.

The revealed discursive representations, constructive strategies, and attitudinal preferences in international counterterrorism cooperation are explained via the lens of Chinese strategic culture. First, under the cooperative strategic culture, China perceives the international system and norms as fundamental to safeguarding international security and setting boundaries for international counterterrorism cooperation. Second, in China's strategic cultural perception, security is a systemic and relational issue. China links its security to that of the international community. Therefore, China pays much attention to regional security, places the threat of terrorism within the framework of regional security, and stresses the maintenance of regional security through international cooperation to compress the space of terrorist threats. Third, under the influence of a cooperative strategy, multilateralism is China's preference to achieve security. Therefore, the UN and SCO are positively represented as recognised multilateral platforms in international counterterrorism. Their

principles and practices match China's perception of cooperation, equality, mutual benefit, non-interference, and non-alignment. Fourth, in China's strategic culture, the use of force is defensive in nature. Therefore, in the context of counterterrorism cooperation, the use of force is characterised by the emphasis on the use of force for non-combat tasks to maintain the international security environment and to deter terrorist forces through joint military exercises seen in the region.

Thus, with the abovementioned findings and analysis, this chapter can conclude with answers to Q3 that China considers counterterrorism cooperation as a necessary and efficient approach to dealing with the threat of terrorism. China prefers to cooperate with the international community to deal with terrorism issues in accordance with multilateralism and international norms. Lastly, for China, the use of force is considered a defensive tool to deter terrorism.

Chapter 7 Conclusion

The rise of international terrorism is one of the most significant non-traditional security issues confronting the international community. As a result, international counterterrorism has become a constantly discussed topic in international political discourse. China also pays close attention to the threat of international terrorism and consistently voices its perceptions of international counterterrorism. However, very few studies have been conducted to reveal features and explain the characteristics, strategies, and preferences reflected in China's international counterterrorism discourse. Considering the significance of terrorism issues and China's growing international influence, it is of empirical and theoretical significance to investigate how China discursively represents terrorism and counterterrorism. Moreover, China's international counterterrorism discourse is not only a microscope to observe details of its security discourse paradigm but also a window to look into how China views non-traditional security issues and its preference to deal with them. This concluding chapter will summarise the major research findings, discuss the implications, illustrate the contributions and limitations of this research, and suggest potential research avenues for future study.

7.1 Main Findings

In this thesis, a corpus-based discourse analysis is conducted to study China's international counterterrorism discourse. The analysis is based on three specifically built corpora: the Terrorism Corpus, the Counterterrorism War Corpus, and the Counterterrorism Cooperation Corpus. The purpose of investigating each corpus is to find out the characteristics of China's international counterterrorism discourse in the representation of terrorism (threat), counterterrorism war (efficacy of the use of force), and international counterterrorism cooperation (strategic preference) and explain the discursive features and practices through the lens of Chinese strategic culture. The analysis of each corpus reveals China's perceptions of terrorism and counterterrorism issues in three dimensions: the nature of terrorism threats, the efficacy of using force to deal with terrorism threats, and the strategic preference for managing terrorism through international cooperation, revealing that China perceives counterterrorism issues through its lens of strategic culture.

7.1.1 Terrorism as the Common Threat

In China's international counterterrorism discourse, terrorism is constructed as a common threat to mankind but also represented as a threat that is manageable. The keyword analysis finds that in the representation of terrorism threats, China's discourse on terrorism focuses on the following themes: the nature of terrorism threats, the victim and scope of terrorism, the severity of terrorism, and responding to terrorism. Further analysis illustrates that China's discourse on terrorism focuses on the extent and grave consequences of terrorism at three levels: threat to the international community, threat to national security, and threat to individuals. The finding indicates that China pays great attention to the universal and comprehensive threat of international terrorism and the approach to managing this problem from a broad perspective of mankind's security.

The dichotomous discursive strategy is used to construct terrorism as a violent ideology and behaviour that challenges the security of the international community, states, and individuals. It attributes characteristics of anti-humanity and anti-civilisation to terrorism, portraying it as the common enemy of humanity and the international community. The construction of dichotomies is a discursive strategy commonly applied in political discourse to form a common ingroup identity and legitimise actions against the 'dangerous' outgroup (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, Rodger, & Liebhart 2009). As such, the dichotomous discursive strategy of China's international counterterrorism discourse constructs terrorism as a threatening outgroup subject and human beings as the in-group. Thus, the governance of terrorism by all states becomes a necessary move.

However, it is particularly noteworthy that we cannot find the cognitive bias in China's international counterterrorism discourse, which never relates terrorist organisations or terrorists to specific regions, countries, religions, and ethnicities (Klocek 2018). The broad and general representation of terrorism as a common threat to all humans has twofold implications. First, any violent ideas and acts falling under the category of terrorism should be denounced and responded to. This is why the narrative of 'opposition to all forms of terrorism' is a salient feature in the discourse. Second, terrorism is an absolute threat, but

terrorist organisations and terrorists can be managed through proper methods. This is why China always emphasises poverty and social injustice as the root causes of terrorism. The underlying message is that no one is a born terrorist, and counterterrorism should focus on tackling the social-economic factors that lead to terrorism. According to this logic, once these problems are solved, terrorist organisations and terrorists will naturally decrease.

It reflects that China perceives the terrorism threat as not a zero-sum conflict in nature. Through this lens of strategic thinking, terrorism is regarded as an abstract threat that has no relation to certain religious or ethnic communities. Hence, it avoids creating antagonism between different religious, ethnic, or social groups. The dilemma that counterterrorism might ‘generate more terrorists’ can be avoided. Furthermore, terrorism, as an absolute threat due to its violent nature, can be deconstructed and diluted.

Metaphors are used to highlight the characteristics and dangers of terrorism, including the natural disaster metaphor, disease metaphor, and ecology metaphor. By comparing terrorism to flooding, cancer, virus, public hazard, soil, hotbed, and chameleon, the discourse constructs terrorism as a comprehensive threat that has a fatal impact on the well-being of all humans and a threat that is tricky, evolving, and intractable, implying that it should take international efforts to manage terrorism for the benefit of all human beings.

The collocation analysis further reveals China’s attitudes and stances in the representation of terrorism. On the one hand, the discourse on terrorism displays the prosodies of danger, crisis, urgency, firmness, and objection in representing terrorism as an imminent, hazardous, and full-scale security challenge to individual countries and mankind as a whole and expressing its resolute stance against all forms of terrorism. On the other hand, it demonstrates the discourse prosodies of objectiveness and caution by emphasising that terrorism is caused by complex factors, that solutions should concentrate on the root causes of terrorism, and that terrorism should not be linked to ethnic groups, religions, or countries.

The discursive themes, strategies, and attitudes discovered in China's discourse on terrorism correspond with China's perception of the nature of the threat.

First, the defensive proclivity of Chinese strategic culture determines that national sovereignty and territorial integrity are the fundamental factors when China perceives and evaluates potential security threats. In other words, any entity or actor that poses severe challenges to China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity would be perceived as a threat that must be dealt with. The dynamics of international terrorism show that terrorist groups such as the Islamic State have acquired the quasi-state ability to challenge the sovereign nations of Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, the connection between the Islamic State and the East Turkestan separatist forces increases China's awareness that international terrorism is dangerous to its national security. Hence, international terrorism is discursively constructed as a threat that must be dealt with.

Second, China holds a systematic and universal view of security in the face of threats. It puts national security under the umbrella of the community with a shared future for mankind, which regards individual nations' security as interconnected with the common security of international society. Therefore, international terrorism is considered a threat to mankind, and joint efforts are advocated to deal with the threat.

Third, China perceives the heterogeneous conflicts through the lens of peace-cooperativism in Chinese strategic culture, which means harmony can be achieved by acknowledging diversity and co-existence among different religious, ethnic, or social groups. This is the factor behind the discursive patterns that often appear in the context that 'terrorism should not be linked to a particular religion or ethnicity'. Within the perceptual framework of peace-cooperativism, China's perception of the root causes of terrorism transcends the clash-of-civilisation dichotomous lens and considers poverty, social injustice, and historical disputes as the reasons for terrorism.

7.1.2 Low Efficacy of the Use of Force in Counterterrorism

In China's international counterterrorism discourse, the use of force is represented as an approach of low efficacy in dealing with the terrorism threat. This is consistent with the prudent perception of resorting to the use of force in Chinese strategic culture. In China's international counterterrorism discourse, there is a large volume of texts related to the counterterrorism war. The keyword analysis of the Counterterrorism War Corpus finds that the discursive representation of counterterrorism war focuses on four themes, including nations and regions, practices of the use of force, counterterrorism targets, and reflection on the use of force in counterterrorism. The United States, Iraq, and Afghanistan are the most frequent keywords in the corpus. Further analysis of the discourse themes reveals that the Afghan War and the Iraq War waged by the US are the central topics in the discourse on counterterrorism war. In the representation of these two wars, it can be seen that China is particularly concerned with the manner, effects, and principles of the use of force in counterterrorism.

Regarding the discursive strategies in the representation of the Afghan War and the Iraq War, the research finds that negative images are attributed to the two wars. Despite acknowledging that the Afghan War at the initial stage has a certain degree of legitimacy and international support, the overall discursive strategy is to construct the counterterrorism war in Afghanistan as a war that is gradually changed from a counterterrorism practice to a political-driven war that takes on the features of hegemonic power politics. A slight divergence can be found in the representation of the Iraq War. Different from the mixed attitudes towards the Afghan War, it can be found that the counterterrorism war in Iraq is directly and entirely constructed as an illegal and unjust war that is based on lies and geopolitical interests. The common features that are attributed to the two wars are twofold. On the one hand, the wars are framed as disastrous and catastrophic by emphasising their humanitarian disaster and negative impact on international order and regional politics. The negative impact on local society and civilian casualties due to the wars are quite frequently described in the representation of counterterrorism wars. On the other hand, both wars are constructed as unsupported wars by illustrating worldwide protests against counterterrorism wars and the

reflection of US soldiers. Furthermore, the Afghan War is represented as a war with high costs and casualties. The metaphor of the ‘graveyard of empires’ implies that the Afghan War is a hegemonic war in nature and is doomed to fail. In a similar vein, the Iraq War is represented as a failed war that has counterproductive consequences and generates more terrorism.

The war analogies are one of the most interesting findings in the collocation analysis. Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Kosovo, Korea, and the Gulf are collocates of high saliency that cooccur in the context of counterterrorism war. The Vietnam War is the most frequently-described reference to the counterterrorism war in Afghanistan. The metanarratives hidden in the Vietnam War analogy create the prosody of failure, painfulness, and alarm, implying that the war on terror is not welcomed, unjust, and devastating. The analysis of most of the collocates further reveals negative discourse prosodies of pessimism, doubt, danger, opposition, failure, and criticism in the representation of the prolonged duration, adverse outcome, and terrible implications of the counterterrorism wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Another noteworthy finding is that positive prosody can be seen when the collocation of war and victory occurs in the context that describes sovereign nations’ use of force against terrorism threats. Despite the counterterrorism war narrative being mainly about the US war on terror, there are some descriptions of the counterterrorism wars by the Afghan, Iraqi, and Syrian governments. The collocation analysis shows that when these countries appear in the context of military operations against terrorist organisations, positive expressions of decisive victory, comprehensive victory, major victory, and congratulations of victory often cooccur in the vicinity. The divergence of the prosodies regarding the counterterrorism wars is related to China’s perception of the defensive nature of the use of force. For China, the US is a foreign country that carries out preemptive military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, while Afghanistan and Iraq are sovereign nations that conduct defensive military operations against international terrorist organisations on their own territories.

The characteristics of China’s discourse on counterterrorism war indicate that the use of force in counterterrorism is represented as an approach of low efficacy. It corresponds well to China’s perceptions of the use of force.

First, the use of force to deal with threats is justified and legitimate in the context of self-defence, and the central role of the nation's military is to defend homeland security. The negative representation of the United States' counterterrorism wars in Afghanistan and Iraq reflects the defensive view of the use of force, as America's use of force in combating international terrorism is an offensive approach that crosses the lines and overly interferes with other nations' sovereignty in the name of counterterrorism.

Second, the use of force should conform to international norms and moral standards. In the tradition of Chinese strategic culture, moralism in the use of force is often referred to as 师出有名/*sending troops with justified reasons* (Scobell 2003; Xiong 2022). It means that the use of force in counterterrorism should have justified and moral reasons with proper methods and objectives. It explains the slight divergence in depicting the Afghan War and the Iraq War, as the former has UN authorisation while the latter is a preemptive counterterrorism war launched by the United States without the recognition of the United Nations Security Council and widely opposed by international society. But due to the humanitarian crisis caused by the prolonged military campaigns and occupation, the general representation of the US counterterrorism wars is imbued with negative prosodies.

Third, the use of force is always considered the last resort, and non-violent approaches are considered better ways to solve security threats. This is the long tradition in China's strategic culture, which prefers 'conquering the enemy without a fight' as the best strategic method. In the context of counterterrorism, the use of force is not the ideal approach to dealing with terrorism threats and is considered a method of low efficacy. This is also why, in China's international counterterrorism discourse, the counterterrorism wars are generally attributed with negative images, and the representation of the wars often displays negative prosodies. Furthermore, China always perceives the excessive use of force as a disastrous and destructive strategic choice. The negative depiction of the prolonged counterterrorism war in Afghanistan and the deteriorating terrorism situation demonstrates that China's cautious attitude towards the use of force in counterterrorism is in line with its strategic culture.

7.1.3 Strategic Preference in International Counterterrorism Cooperation

International counterterrorism cooperation is represented as the preferred approach to dealing with the terrorism threat. The discursive themes in the representation of international counterterrorism cooperation include security and development, state and region, international organisations and normative consensus, and diplomacy and multilateralism. The keyword analysis reveals the focus of China's discourse on counterterrorism cooperation. It attaches great importance to regional security and regards development as the basic method to tackle the root causes of terrorism. The United Nations and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation turn out to be the only keywords that are related to international organisations, which indicates China's focus on international counterterrorism cooperation is at both international and regional levels. Another noteworthy finding is that China is the most frequent and salient keyword in the corpus, indicating that China is the key topic in the representation of international counterterrorism cooperation.

Three discursive strategies are found in the representation of international counterterrorism cooperation. First, it adopts a strategy of constructing the collective identity and showing empathy to countries suffering from terrorism to promote joint efforts to deal with the terrorism threat. In this way, it creates an ingroup identity that includes all countries that suffer from international terrorism and displays China's willingness to cooperate with international society in counterterrorism. Second, a positive image is attributed to China, as it is represented as a firm and active supporter of widely recognised norms of international counterterrorism. International norms, such as the UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and UN counterterrorism conventions, are often described in constructing China's image as an active supporter. Third, the Chinese army is portrayed as a contributor to world security. In the first place, the Chinese army is represented as a defensive force. It is depicted as the leading entity responsible for conducting counterterrorism in China, and the primary purpose of China's use of the military is described as maintaining national unity and security. Then, it represents China's use of force mainly in a defensive way, as the Chinese army often appears in the narrative of joint counterterrorism military exercises with neighbouring countries in a bid to deter terrorism.

In addition, by attributing a positive image to Chinese peacekeeping troops under the command of the United Nations, it portrays China as a dedicated contributor that provides public goods to international security.

The collocation analysis reveals China's positive attitudes towards the norms and practices of the United Nations and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, indicating China's preferences for counterterrorism cooperation at global and regional levels. At the global level, the prosody of support can be found in constructing the UN Charter as the fundamental international norms that should be followed in international counterterrorism, displaying a connotation that terrorism needs to be dealt with in a collective manner by the international community and, most of all, international counterterrorism should not infringe national sovereignty and interfere with the internal affairs of certain countries. Similar attitudes can be found in the representation of the United Nations' role in international counterterrorism, as prosodies of favour, consensus, and priority are created in depicting the UN as the universally recognised leading entity in international counterterrorism. At the regional level, positive prosodies can be found in constructing the SCO practices as the role model in international counterterrorism cooperation. The prosody of support can be found in the description of member states' trust and commitment to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation's role in managing transnational terrorism. In addition, prosodies of excellence and efficiency are displayed in the discourse that international counterterrorism cooperation under the SOC framework is conducive to maintaining regional security and stability in the context of counterterrorism. The positive prosodies reflect China's favourable attitudes towards achieving common security via cooperative and comprehensive approaches.

The findings revealed in the discursive focuses, strategies, and prosodies show that China's preference for international cooperation to deal with terrorism threats is consistent with the characteristics of China's cooperative strategic culture.

First, China regards itself as a member of the existing international system and a defender of international norms that maintain the security and stability of the international community. In the past few decades, China has developed a cooperative strategic culture through

interactions with the existing international system and enjoyed a stable international environment and globalisation that boosted China's development at an unprecedented speed. It is China's strategic preference to maintain the current international system and promote international security through cooperation with the international community. Therefore, in China's discourse on international counterterrorism cooperation, the United Nations, which is the symbol of the international system and norms, is represented as the leader in international counterterrorism, and its norms are represented as the principal rules that should be followed.

Second, China perceives security from a systematic and relational perspective. China views its security as interconnected with the security of the international community. The most imminent and direct terrorism threats are from the international organisations in its neighbouring countries and domestic East Turkestan separatist forces, which have close connections with international terrorist groups. Hence, China attaches great importance to cooperation with SCO member states. It is also why we can find that SCO is the key discursive topic and a positive image is attributed to it, as the SCO is a pragmatic platform to realise regional security in the face of international terrorism.

Third, multilateralism is China's preference in dealing with international security issues. The United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are both examples of multilateralism. The norms of these international organisations are in line with China's perceptions of non-interference, equality, mutual benefit, and non-alliance in managing international issues. Hence, the positive image construction and discourse prosodies in the representation correspond with China's preference for multilateralism.

Fourth, according to China's strategic culture, the use of force is defensive in nature. This is the factor that leads to the positive representation of China's dedicated non-combat UN peacekeeping efforts in the context of international counterterrorism and the SCO joint military exercises to deter terrorist forces in the region.

The abovementioned findings show the characteristics of China's international counterterrorism discourse and illustrate the representation of the terrorism threat, the use of force to deal with the terrorism threat, and China's strategic preference for international counterterrorism cooperation. The findings demonstrate that China discursively represents terrorism and counterterrorism through its lens of strategic culture.

7.2 Contribution and Limitation

An in-depth study of the characteristics and practices of China's international counterterrorism could be conducive to understanding Chinese ways of narrating and perceiving terrorism and counterterrorism issues. The limited scholarly insight and oversimplification of China's counterterrorism risk missing some key issues regarding how China perceives, construes, and constructs terrorism and counterterrorism. Furthermore, it could probably lead to misinterpretation and misunderstanding of China's voices on terrorism issues. It is not to say that China's discourse on international discourse has no political purpose or that China's perceptions of counterterrorism are better than those of other countries. However, a systematic and comprehensive study of China's international counterterrorism discourse can provide some insights into this problem and fill in the gap in the existing literature on China's international counterterrorism discourse.

7.2.1 A Systematic Analysis of China's International Counterterrorism Discourse

This thesis, to some extent, enriches counterterrorism studies and advances our knowledge of China's discursive practices in international counterterrorism. Many scholars call for expanding the scope of counterterrorism studies, giving more attention to non-Western countries, and inviting more research on non-Western countries into counterterrorism research (Jackson et al. 2009). With different historical, political, and cultural backgrounds, non-Western countries perceive and respond to international terrorism in diverse ways from their Western counterparts, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and many other European countries (Boyle 2019). Therefore, a survey of China's discursive practice in

response to international terrorism is part of the efforts to expand non-Western counterterrorism studies.

There is still a gap in the research on China's counterterrorism discourse. Even among Chinese academics, there is a paucity of studies in this area. The current existing Chinese literature only has a few papers that analyse the importance of improving China's discursive influence in international counterterrorism. Still, none of them conducts a specific analysis of the texts of China's discourse on international terrorism (Guo 2018; Ling & Wang 2013; Nie 2022; S. Wang 2017). China is growing into a politically and economically influential country in the world. With further integration into international society and more involvement in global governance, China aims to improve its international discourse power and have its voices heard and understood (Sun 2022). 'Telling the Chinese story and spreading Chinese voices' are considered by the Chinese government as a strategic initiative to promote effective communication with the international community and further integration into globalisation (Xu 2014). Its strategic aim is to create more interaction and mutual understanding between China and the international community, shaping a positive national image and raising China's influence in international affairs. International counterterrorism discourse is part of the Chinese discourse system and one of the key areas of security issues. The scarcity of academic attention to China's international counterterrorism discourse is not commensurate with either China's strategic goal to improve its international discourse power or its concern about the challenge of international terrorism. Therefore, the study of China's discourse on international counterterrorism provides a lens to observe and analyse Chinese discursive practices and decipher China's perceptions and strategic preferences in global governance.

7.2.2 Strategic Cultural Perspective in Counterterrorism Studies

By bringing in the lens of strategic culture and using the corpus-based approach, this study constructs a bridge that connects counterterrorism study and discourse study. It further expands the explanatory scope of strategic culture theory by explaining discursive practices in non-traditional security contexts. Strategic culture is usually considered an important

factor in traditional security studies that aim to investigate why different countries behave in different ways when facing a traditional security threat. With the global proliferation of terrorism and the different responses to such non-traditional threats, some scholars have used strategic culture as an analytical lens to explore the divergence in counterterrorism practices. For example, Rees and Aldrich analyse the impact of the strategic cultures of European countries and the United States on counterterrorism practice. They argue that the historical experience of homegrown terrorism influences the strategic perceptions of terrorism and counterterrorism in European countries and that they prefer to deal with terrorism as a criminal act. The US, on the other hand, is more inclined to respond to terrorism with force and acts against terrorism by using preemptive military methods (Rees & Aldrich 2005). Silva D'Amato analyses French and Italian counterterrorism practices in the post-9/11 era from a strategic cultural perspective, arguing that norms, values, and a sense of identity are cultural factors in shaping the counterterrorism practices of the two countries (D'Amato 2019). These emerging studies still focus on the strategic cultures and counterterrorism practices of Western countries. Few scholars analyse the strategic cultures and counterterrorism practices of non-Western countries. So far, no literature has been found that either analyses China's counterterrorism practices or China's discursive practices in counterterrorism through the theoretical lens of strategic culture. Therefore, the potential contribution of this study is to provide an insight into China's strategic culture and its correlation with its counterterrorism discursive practices. Through corpus-based discourse analysis, it is hoped that this study can shed light on interdisciplinary research on China's security visions and discourse behaviours in the realm of counterterrorism.

7.2.3 Corpus Study as a Practical Approach

Corpus methods are rarely used in the study of Chinese counterterrorism discourse (Qian 2010b). This thesis proves that corpus-based discourse analysis is a valid approach in the study of counterterrorism discourse. By constructing three specific corpora, this study identifies the discursive patterns and features of Chinese international counterterrorism discourse on the basis of a large volume of texts. It explains the discursive features, strategies, and connotations through the lens of Chinese strategic culture. Corpus-based discourse

analysis can help the researcher form research questions and find patterns of language that cannot be observed without corpus tools and enough text data. With a large amount of textual data, researchers can form an interdisciplinary theoretical framework and synergise the quantitative and qualitative procedures of analysis, which reduces human bias to a significant extent and helps make rigorous arguments (Baker 2006b:175).

Scholars in international politics have gradually recognised that language is an important vehicle for expressing views, presenting attitudes and positions, and achieving international interaction. At the same time, political discourse is considered to have a constructive function and is an important component of a country's soft power, which can have a direct impact on international politics (Sun 2008). However, discourse analysis in international politics needs not only qualitative analysis with a small number of texts but also empirical analysis based on a large volume of texts. As Biber notes, 'text corpora provide large databases of naturally occurring discourse, enabling empirical analyses of the actual patterns of use in a language; and when coupled with (semi-) automatic computational tools, the corpus-based approach enables analyses of a scope not otherwise feasible'. (Biber & Reppen 1998:3). Therefore, the use of corpus techniques allows researchers to do an interdisciplinary study on political discourse and help identify both explicit and implicit discursive phenomena and patterns within quantities of textual data. I hope that this study can offer some inspiration to researchers who want to conduct interdisciplinary studies on international counterterrorism and discourse analysis.

7.2.4 Limitations

This thesis conducts a corpus-based analysis of Chinese international counterterrorism discourse. It reveals the characteristics of China's discourse on terrorism, the use of force in dealing with terrorism threats, and the preference for international counterterrorism. Moreover, it demonstrates that the perception of threats and strategic preference in dealing with the threat are consistent with the paradigm of Chinese strategic culture. Still, there are some limitations in theory application and data analysis.

In this study, strategic culture is considered a stable variable. In other words, this study presumes that Chinese strategic culture has remained the same in the past two decades. In strategic culture studies, most scholars think that strategic culture is stable and rarely changes, but some argue that strategic culture is dynamic (Bloomfield 2012; Booth 1990; Johnston 1995b; Klein 1991; Lantis 2002). Hence, the dispute about the stability of strategy culture might lead to criticism of the use of strategic culture in this thesis. Furthermore, I acknowledge that there are other lenses that can explain counterterrorism issues. For example, in the aftermath of 9/11, China's international counterterrorism cooperation with the United States can also be explained through the lens of political interests. For instance, China voted in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1368, which paved the way for the United States' use of force in combating al-Qaeda. China also froze bank accounts related to al-Qaeda in Hong Kong (US Department of State 2002). Reciprocally, the United States added the East Turkestan Islamic Movement to its Terrorist Exclusion List and helped China designate ETIM under UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1390 to freeze the assets of this group (Kan 2010). Via the lens of political interests, China made the ETIM an international-designated terrorist group, and, in exchange, the United States received China's support to fight al-Qaeda.

Another limitation is the lack of a diachronic analysis of the discourse. This thesis mainly studies China's international counterterrorism discourse in the past two decades. So, the textual data used in this study spans a period of twenty years (2001-2021). Twenty years is short in the context of strategic culture, as a country's strategic culture normally transforms over a long period of time or due to dramatic historical events such as revolutions and world wars. Therefore, due to the time limit, this thesis does not conduct a diachronic analysis of China's international counterterrorism discourse in the pre-9/11 period or even the Cold War era. Due to the limited space of the thesis, this thesis only focuses on the post-9/11 era. It would be interesting to investigate the characteristics of China's international counterterrorism discourse at different historical stages.

7.3 Avenues for Future Study

This study focuses on China's international counterterrorism discourse. It reveals the characteristics of China's discursive practices in the representation of terrorism threats, the use of force in dealing with terrorism, and its strategic preference for international cooperation in counterterrorism. This research suggests that, with the help of the corpus method, strategic culture is a viable lens to explain the discursive features and practices of counterterrorism discourse. Hopefully, this research can offer some inspiration for future work in interdisciplinary studies of counterterrorism and discourse analysis.

7.3.1 Non-Western Counterterrorism Discourse

As previously mentioned, current research on counterterrorism discourse focuses mainly on Western countries. Future research could analyse the discursive practices of non-Western countries through case studies or comparative studies. Moreover, future analysis can also draw lessons from the strategic culture study. It is worth noting that many countries in the international community have distinctive strategic cultures. Russia, for example, has a long history of strategic culture, and counterterrorism is a key security concern in Russia. Considering Russia's rich experience in military campaigns against domestic terrorism in Chechnya and strategic engagement with the Islamic State in Syria, it is interesting to look at Russia's counterterrorism discourse from the lens of its strategic culture (Notte 2016). In addition, there are abundant accumulated texts regarding Russia's international counterterrorism discourse. Therefore, a corpus-based discourse analysis of Russian counterterrorism discourse through the lens of Russian strategic culture may yield many intriguing findings.

Another possible area for study is the counterterrorism discourse in South Asia and the Middle East. For example, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria have been harassed by international terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and various regional terrorist organisations for a long time. Although issues of terrorism and counterterrorism in these countries often appear in the spotlight of international attention, their voices are rarely

heard and seriously comprehended. Therefore, the research on the counterterrorism discourse of these countries would generate meaningful results to understand their perceptions of the terrorism threat and the ways to deal with the challenge, which is supposed to have been an indispensable part of counterterrorism studies.

Researchers can also conduct comparative studies of the counterterrorism discourse among different countries. As mentioned earlier, some comparative analyses of counterterrorism discourse practices in Western countries have been conducted. Therefore, the focus can be on comparing the counterterrorism discourse practices of Western and non-Western countries, such as analysing the differences between China and the United States in their discursive representation of terrorism and counterterrorism. Moreover, the two countries have distinct strategic cultures and specific differences in their threat perceptions and strategic behavioural preferences in response to threats. Therefore, a comparative analysis of their counterterrorism discourse practices from a strategic cultural perspective may also yield illuminating findings.

7.3.2 Diachronic Research in Counterterrorism Discourse

It is possible to do diachronic research in counterterrorism discourse, as researchers can deal with a considerable amount of textual data with the help of corpus tools and techniques. Text corpora can offer enough databases to study counterterrorism discourse in different historical stages. Through a historical examination of counterterrorism discourse, it is possible to observe how changes in strategic culture impact counterterrorism discourse practices. It is important to note that such research design is much more feasible in the examination of discourse over a long historical period in which the strategic culture of a particular country has undergone changes to some extent. The United Kingdom could be a suitable case for such a study. The UK has a long history of dealing with terrorism. From the 1920s to the 1990s, it was the victim of several decades of IRA terrorist threats (Dingley 2009; Gantt 2010; Gray 2007; Silke 2016). In the post-9/11 era, it witnessed sporadic terrorist attacks that are connected with international terrorism dynamism. In about a hundred years, the United Kingdom has experienced WWI, WWII, and the Cold War. Its strategic culture has

undergone some transformation due to the change in its great power status and international system (Cornish 2013; Macmillan 1995). Furthermore, the accumulated texts regarding the UK's counterterrorism are abundant to carry out the corpus-based study. Therefore, analysing the changing discursive practices of counterterrorism in the UK over time through the lens of strategic culture may also yield some interesting results.

The proposed research fields have both theoretical and practical implications. On the one hand, it is possible to discover how the discursive practices of terrorism and counterterrorism differ between countries of different cultural backgrounds. On the other hand, revealing the divergence can help better understand why there are still difficulties in international counterterrorism, such as achieving an international-agreed definition of terrorism and disputes over what should be suitable counterterrorism practices, and provide possible advice for international convergence on counterterrorism.

Terrorism has become a global threat, and international terrorism keeps evolving in a globalised world. The extensity and destructiveness of international terrorism indicate that it is impossible to achieve the governance of terrorism by a single country or a few countries. In 2021, the United States hastily ended its two-decade war on terror in Afghanistan. However, the conclusion of the counterterrorism war in Afghanistan does not put an end to international terrorism (Eichensehr 2021). The Taliban once again took control of the nation. Although the Taliban claims that it will not continue to support international terrorism, after twenty years of devastation from the war on terror, the deplorable socio-economic conditions and the complex political and religious ecology imply that there is still much room for international terrorism to survive and thrive.

Thus, international counterterrorism needs to consider not only differences in the perceptions of terrorism and counterterrorism among states but also that the governance of the international terrorist threat requires the joint participation of the international community. Only by identifying and acknowledging such differences can a consensus be found to enable the international community to participate in the global governance of terrorism. It is then possible to realise the containment of the worldwide spread of terrorism and reduce the risk

posed by terrorism to the security of the international community, states, and individuals. In this regard, the study of counterterrorism discourse in different countries has great potential to reveal the divergence and build a bridge to seek common ground in international counterterrorism.

7.4 Final Remark

Chinese discourse reflects China's perceptions, values, beliefs, and preferences in its interaction with the world. The international counterterrorism discourse is a type of China's security discourse and one sector of China's discourse system. There are still many areas worthy of exploration in China's discourse. Due to differences in ideology and political interests, views on security issues related to China are sometimes prejudiced. These biases will lead to more misunderstandings or even conflicts. It is not to say that China's views and practices are superior or should be accepted by the world. But a clear and comprehensive understanding of China is the premise for interacting with this rising country.

From the analysis of China's international counterterrorism discourse, we can see that China's security discourse is not simply a kind of political propaganda. Of course, it should be admitted that political discourse is usually imbedded with ideological factors and functions as a vehicle for disseminating the dominant ideologies of the entities in power (Fairclough 2003). This is also true of China's discourse. However, the more important thing in discourse study is to deconstruct the discourse and discover its inner logic and the factors behind its production and representation.

The analysis of China's international counterterrorism discourse reveals that China's great attention to its national sovereignty and territorial security, prudence in the use of force, and preference for international cooperation to deal with common threats are the inner logic behind its discursive practices in the representation of terrorism and counterterrorism. Hence, we can find that China's security discourse has a coherent system consistent with its strategic culture.

Security has always been a major concern in international society. In recent years, non-traditional security issues have drawn increasing attention worldwide. International terrorism is part of the overall problems facing international society. Other non-traditional security issues, such as the recent global COVID-19 pandemic, can also have a critical impact on security at the international, regional, and individual levels. It is predictable that China's voices on these non-security issues also have unique characteristics and reflect its attitudes, preferences, and positions on non-traditional security issues. These areas are also worthy of academic attention.

Finally, as China continues to grow with increasing political and economic leverage, what kind of major state it will be and how it will interact with the current international system will be significant questions. The exploration of China's discourse will be a pertinent sector to decipher the 'myth of the rising China'.

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