

The Un-Taming of the Discourse

Radical right-wing populist parties and the effect of different institutional roles



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Abstract

This thesis examines how different institutional roles, being in the opposition, in government or supporting a minority government, influence European radical right-wing populist (RRWP) parties' discourse.

Despite the proliferation of studies exploring the RRWP parties, there is a lack of research focusing on both East and West Europe. Similarly, RRWP parties in opposition and government have received scholarly attention, whereas the support role has less so. How RRWP parties approach their topics on nativism and authoritarianism and how their presence impacts mainstream parties have also attracted research. Yet, there is a gap in the literature comparing RRWP parties in different institutional roles whilst focusing on discourse.

All three lacunas outlined above are addressed in this thesis with a guiding hypothesis that the party discourse is such a robust and identifying characteristic of RRWP parties that the different institutional roles will not influence it. The thesis adopts a mixed-methods approach, where the Large-N quantitative chapter's analysis and results guide the case study chapters, which employ process tracing. The three case studies are then compared in the final analytical chapter.

The quantitative chapter compares European RRWP parties, as defined in *The PopuList* by Rooduijn *et al.* (2019), employing data from

Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR). Whereas the case studies focus on three parties representing different institutional roles: Finland's Finns Party (opposition), Hungary's Fidesz (government), and Danish People's Party (supporting a minority government). These chapters provide an in-depth analysis of the parties' discourse, examining party leaders' and members' writings and speeches from various party materials.

The thesis predominantly finds support for the central hypothesis. The supportive one of the three roles shows the highest impact on the discourse, being more radical than parties in the two other roles, with evidence from both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Although opposition and governmental parties emphasise the RRWP themes similarly in the quantitative analysis, the qualitative approach reveals toughening stances and tone with time in Fidesz's speeches. Yet, the role is not the sole factor influencing the change, but as with the opposition party's data, other components are also in play when the shifts occur.

The first primary contribution of the thesis is on radical right-wing populism and RRWP parties, the second is on institutional roles and their impact on political parties, and the third is on the field of discourse. The thesis combines these three spheres in qualitative, quantitative and comparative approaches with a solid empirical contribution.

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This is for both of us.

List of acronyms

AfD	Alternative for Germany
Ataka	Attack Party
BZÖ	Alliance for the Future of Austria
CD	Centre Democrats
Dawn	National Coalition Dawn
DF	Danish People's Party
EKo	Estonian Citizens
EKRE	Conservative People's Party of Estonia
FdI	Brothers of Italy
FIDESZ-MPSZ	FIDESZ- Hungarian Civic Alliance
FN	National Front
FNb	National Front
FPd	Progress Party
FPÖ	Freedom Party
FrP	Progress Party
FvD	Forum for Democracy
HDSSB	Croatian Democratic Alliance
IMRO	National Bulgarian Movement
IMRO-NFSB-Ataka	United Patriots
Jobbik	Movement for a Better Hungary
LAOS	Popular Orthodox Rally
LN	Northern League
LPF	List Pim Fortuyn
LPR	League of Polish Families
MIÉP	Hungarian Justice and Life Party
NyD	New Democracy
PiS	Law and Justice
POLAN	Political Spring
PRM	Greater Romania Party

PS	Finns Party
PUNR	Romanian National Unity
PVV	Party for Freedom
RN	National Rally
RZS	Order, Law and Justice
SD	Sweden Democrats
SDS	Slovenian Democratic Party
SNS	Slovenian National Party
SNS	Slovak National Party
SPD	Freedom and Direct Democracy
SPR-RSC	Coalition for Republic - Republican Party of Czechoslovakia
SR	We are family
SVP	Swiss People's Party
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
VB	Flemish Interest
VB	Flemish Block
Volya	Will
X	Party X

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Introduction

"The EU is becoming more and more a tool of radical forces that would like to carry out a cultural, religious transformation and ultimately a nationless construction of Europe, aiming to create ... a European Superstate."

"European nations should be based on tradition, respect for the culture and history of European states, respect for Europe's Judeo-Christian heritage and the common values that unite our nations."

"We reaffirm our belief that family is the basic unit of our nations. In a time when Europe is facing a serious demographic crisis with low birth rates and ageing population, pro-family policy-making should be an answer instead of mass immigration."

(Joint statement on 2 July 2021 on the future of the EU from 16[†] radical right-wing populist parties from 14 countries.)

[†] National Rally (FRA), Lega, Brothers of Italy (ITA), Law and Justice (POL), Fidez (HUN), Vox (SPA), Freedom Party (AUS), Vlaams Belang (BEL), Danish People's Party (DEN), EKRE (EST), Finns Party (FIN), Polish Electoral Action of Lithuania (LIT), Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party (ROM) and Greek Solution (GRE).

In most countries, radical right-wing populist (RRWP) actors are not new in the political arena, nor have they lacked attention in recent years. Whether that is presidents, parties, journalists or campaigners, to name but a few, they have succeeded in transforming themselves and evolving with the events and developments witnessed after the Cold War, which is where this study's timeline begins, in 1990, at the start of the decade that catalysed the RRWP party family.

These parties have effectively identified grievances that divide societies and employed approachable language and rhetoric to make the divisions deeper and harness people's dissatisfaction. The quotations above neatly summarise many of the themes, dividing lines and discontent that radical right-wing populism is constructed around, such as culture, religion, nation-state and common values.

When the surge in RRWP parties in Europe that had begun in the 1990s heightened further in the 2000s, Spain, alongside its neighbour Portugal (Quintas da Silva 2018), was one of the rarities where their support was not reaching the levels seen in most European countries. Academics were finding explanations for their lack of success and trying to predict if and when radical right-wing populism would become part of the political arena in Spain as well. It did, and the rise has been swift. The proliferation of the phenomenon in Europe can be demonstrated by the

rise of Vox in Spain.¹ Although not featuring in the empirical analysis, due to its late arrival on the Spanish politics, Vox serves as a reminder that no country is beyond the influence of RRWP parties and how quickly they can indeed become a meaningful political actor.

In Vox's first national elections in 2015 and 2016, they received 0.23% and 0.20%, respectively, of the vote. Only three years later, in April 2019, they polled 10.26%, and the same year, in November, they became the third-largest party in Spain with a vote share of 15.08%. To add to their increasing influence, in April 2022, they entered into regional government with the conservative Partido Popular (PP) in the northern region of Castilla y León.

Vox's rocketing rise to success in Spain is a reminder of what can happen when the supply meets the demand and a party can successfully materialise a political storm; in Vox's case, the Catalan crisis of 2017² (Turnbull-Dugarte *et al.* 2020: 6). The party's emergence also demonstrates that RRWP parties are able political actors, just like other parties, and seem to be here to stay, so other political actors will have to cooperate and work with them. If the belief is that these parties are a danger to liberal democracy and democratic processes, then their

¹ Portugal also witnessed an RRWP party's rise with Chega, founded in 2019 and in the elections that year received 1.3% vote share, which increased to 7.2% in 2022.

² On 1 October 2017 the Catalan ruling separatists held a ballot on independence, declared illegal by Spain's Constitutional Court but which led to the Catalan parliament declaring independence. Consequently, the Spanish government dismissed the Catalan leaders, dissolved parliament, and called a snap regional election on 21 December 2017, which nationalist parties won.

influence should be diminished, and to do this, understanding how different institutional roles impact RRWP parties as legislative actors is imperative, and is one of the main aims of this thesis, for the interest of both academics and non-academics.

There is a particular simplistic genius that RRWP parties apply to politics and the electorate, which has aided in their increasing success. They divide people into “us” and “them”. At times this is a division between natives and non-natives, while at other times it is between locals and metropolitans or between people against enhancing minority rights and those in favour. Mainly, it is the juxtaposition of people who are either for or against something. All this seems to come relatively easily to the RRWP parties and can be applied to most political debates and questions. But how do these simple constructions adapt to decision-making and power?

Europe provides a fitting region for the study, not only because it comprises countries with varying ages, histories and legacies that have been able to become somewhat uniform since the Cold War, but because there is the added benefit of the European Union (EU), which allows further measurement of the attitudes towards a supranational institution and a platform where the parties need to participate, whether indirectly or directly. As is evident from the opening quotation, it has also aided RRWP parties in establishing collaboration against the common adversaries of “the people”: “the elite” and “the other”.

Since the European political arena has seen RRWP parties as part of national parliaments for decades, there is a need better to understand and predict their behaviour, so it was time to add another perspective and ask if their discourse is directed by the institutional role they hold. Do RRWP parties in the opposition address and emphasise issues differently from the RRWP parties in government? Does the role of officially supporting a minority government influence RRWP parties' discourse? What are the impacts of these institutional roles that indicate power relationships? Or does issue ownership over their preferred topics prevail, keeping the emphasis and discourse similar between the parties, whatever the role?

This thesis will aim to answer these questions by examining one set of RRWP actors, which is the European political parties that have held seats in their national parliaments. It uses mixed methods, starting with a Large-N quantitative chapter, followed by three qualitative case studies on the Finns Party (PS), Fidesz and the Danish People's Party (DF) and finishing with a comparative chapter on the three.

This introduction proceeds by first setting the scene to introduce the research questions and why they matter. After this, the actors involved, the RRWP parties, and the different institutional roles will be presented, finishing with the general outline of the thesis.

Does it matter if the RRWP parties in opposition are more or less radical than those in government or supporting one? Why does it matter?

Is anyone interested? Who may be interested? Let us expand on those questions next.

What we can learned by answering the research questions

The overarching research question, whether the institutional role an RRWP party holds influences their discourse, has different approaches with specific detailing questions dependent on the method of analysis. Thus the central research question of the connection between the institutional role and the RRWP discourse is the same throughout the thesis, but the nuances differ.

The Large-N chapter findings guide the following qualitative studies without determining case selection or variables but providing an overview of the RRWP parties in Europe since 1990 and the discourse they have employed in their election manifestos. What this chapter does, is to indicate where to look in the case study chapters. It will establish whether the roles impact the discourse and the emphasis employed on topics in election campaigns, which can be further investigated in the later chapters with data from different sources and a more in-depth focus.

The quantitative analysis compares RRWP parties in different institutional roles, examining whether their discourse in election manifestos remains the same between positions or whether parties in a specific role emphasise the phenomenon's core issues more than others. It seeks to answer questions such as, are opposition parties more radical

than parties in government or those supporting one? Or is it the executive parties that, with their electoral success, can emphasise the RRWP themes most vigorously? Or do the parties providing parliamentary support for a minority government express more radical discourse than those in opposition or government? Or do they all address the party family's ideological issues with a similar weight, and thus the rhetoric does not differ between the roles?

The results from the quantitative chapter will be reinvestigated with the qualitative approach, which delves deeper and examines how the roles influence the rhetoric, and, if it is not the role, what can explain a change, if indeed there is any change, in the discourse or its tone. The case study chapters use different data to reveal more about the possible alterations in the party discourse and examine whether there are other motivators than the institutional role that might be causing the change in the rhetoric. Employing process tracing permits nuanced case-specific analysis and alternative explanations, aiming to enhance and deepen the prior knowledge on the three parties.

If there were changes in the emphasis, were there domestic or European-wide events that could explain the alteration, or perhaps internal party matters? Furthermore, how did the discourse change and in which direction? Was it merely a change in emphasis, or did the tone of the discourse shift as well? How were matters such as immigration and the EU discussed, and with what type of vocabulary?

After the case studies, the thesis summarised the analysis from the three in-depth chapters to add validity and generalisability, which are the weaknesses of process tracing and will also be strengthened by the initial quantitative results. Thus the triangulation occurs at three levels, which all donate to the conclusions and understanding of RRWP parties' discourse in different institutional roles. While the results widen the knowledge of RRWP parties' behaviour in parliament, they also enlighten the field on the characteristics of institutional roles, since the thesis views these parties as not dissimilar to what is considered mainstream parties. Before reviewing the likeness between RRWP and mainstream parties, the chapter will discuss RRWP parties in parliamentary settings.

All party families have their features and histories, and so too does the RRWP family, which has become part of the political environment. Thus they have had to evolve and expand their agendas and learn to interact with other parties in different settings, whether at the local, national or EU level. Involvement in daily politics requires reactions to topics beyond the usual comfort zone, to surprising matters, some with severe consequences. Cooperation is vital for successful politics and decision-making, and it would be disingenuous to claim that parties that have been a part of the political process for over three decades would not have learned the needed, if at times only minimum, skills for it.

The majority of the existing literature refers to RRWP opposition parties, mainly those operating in Western Europe (Akkerman *et al.* 2016;

Akkerman and de Lange 2012; Akkerman and Rooduijn 2015; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015; Heinisch 2003; Van Spanje 2011), yet more comprehensive European-wide research into RRWP parties' parliamentary behaviour has been deficient. Comparing the members of the party family and their approach to the core RRWP agenda will expand the available knowledge, and learning how they construct their arguments is essential for future strategies on how to approach the RRWP party family. Hence the thesis' findings will assist academics, politicians, civil servants, campaigners and anyone who works with or around RRWP actors and will be relevant when designing policy or practice.

There may be arguments that RRWP parties speak for people whom the previous politicians had forgotten and have encouraged non-voters to participate in elections, thus increasing the validity of the democratic system (Canovan 1999: 2; Müller 2015: 80; Pirro 2018: 445; Rovira Kaltwasser 2012: 197). However, even if one concurs with this, the collateral attached to the phenomenon outweighs any possible gains. Although there are features of RRWP that are worrying and threaten people's opportunities, such as attitudes toward minorities, the most dangerous development is the hostile stance towards and willingness to limit independent, democratic institutions, for instance, the media and the judiciary (Batory 2016: 284; Betz 1994: 3; Kriesi 2018: 6; Müller 2016: 103). Alas, that too could have dangerous consequences for equality and the rights of minorities. Moreover, the reversal of any democratic

backsliding will be challenging and take a long time; hence being able to prevent it is what matters.

Although this research is conducted on European RRWP parties, the findings could be transferable in other countries with prominent RRWP parties that share the characteristics identified with RRWP parties in this thesis, even more so when considering the variety of democracies in Europe, their age differences and varying political systems. Furthermore, the triangulation that occurs with the mixed-method approach enhances the study's reliability and validity, increasing the flexibility of the findings.

Politics is constantly evolving and changing and so too are the parties responding to local and international events. In the time it has taken to conduct this research, plenty will have happened that will have affected the political arena, people and countries. The benefit of a study like this is that the next researcher can pick up where this research left off, omitting time-consuming preparation that is already available for them. As Muis *et al.* (2021: 7) plea for chastity, arguing that the focus should be 'more on the robustness, repeatability and generalizability of existing insights, instead of continually generating new hypotheses inspired by overrated notions of "innovativeness" and "novelty"'. Thus, if there are significant European or worldwide events that may challenge this study's results or introduce new viewpoints or variables, the framework or comparison bases are there for future research to apply.

More will be said later about the sources employed in the quantitative and qualitative chapters, but they also provide different insights into the parties and the research questions. In the former, they will reveal how the roles influence RRWP parties' election manifestos, and in the latter, they will explore how the parties' newspapers, newsletters and leaders' speeches and writings address the topics and how their positions within the national parliaments may impact those. If the election data shows that parties in all roles address RRWP topics similarly, is that still the case when elections are over, and they focus on their followers and party members in particular rather than the broader general electorate?

Since this thesis argues that RRWP parties are no anomaly (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 173; De Lange 2008: 19) but act the same as what are called the mainstream parties, it should be able to make inferences on the impact of institutional roles in conjunction with the party family's policy preferences. For instance, if the findings indicate that RRWP parties do not alter their discourse when in government, it can be assumed that would also be the case with centre-right or green parties. Or if providing parliamentary support for a minority government is found to strengthen or radicalise RRWP parties' discourse, the conclusion should follow that it would also do so for parties from other families.

The support party's role is intriguing, and also where the lacuna in understanding is. These can be relatively minor or less established parties with less parliamentary experience but still have significant power over the government, and their role as veto players produces changes in policies beyond their normal influence. Thus, learning about this institutional role and how it impacts a party stretches across the political field and party families. Therefore, in addition to the lessons that can be learned on RRWP parties, the thesis offers another vital angle for academics and practitioners: an enhanced knowledge of how different institutional roles may impact and alter parties' discourse and behaviour.

To summarise, the thesis contributes to three areas of study, firstly on radical right-wing populism and RRWP parties, secondly on institutional roles and their impact on political parties, and thirdly on the field of discourse.

The key concepts and data sources

As will be covered in more depth and with broader discussion, RRWP parties' ideology comprises three core themes: nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde 2007; Mudde and Rovira Katwasser 2013: 155). They also prefer straightforward communication, often emotionally charged, and a strong-willed character as a leader.

Since the RRWP party family shares features with other niche and right-wing parties, the definition of the phenomenon has been somewhat

disputed (Mudde 2004; March 2012; Minkenberg 2013; Müller 2016; Rydgren 2005), and identifying RRWP parties was a challenge. Although, of course, different opinions on the matter still exist, the most common definitions are arguably established, and researchers now can choose the one that best describes their ideal of radical right-wing populism and employ that in their studies, which has widened the scope of the research and allowed it to concentrate on more specific issues.

What aided scholars even further was the categorising and listing of European RRWP parties, conducted by Rooduijn et al. in 2019 in *The PopuList*. Employing the definitions by Mudde (2004), Mudde (2007), March (2012) and Taggart and Sczcerbiak (2004), it defined parties as populist, far right, far left and Eurosceptic, respectively. The list has been peer-reviewed by more than 80 academics. The presence of the first two labels connotes radical right-wing populism, shortening and easing the researchers' work and making studies more comparable, which is also why it was the convenient and fitting data source for RRWP parties for this thesis.

Parties from *The PopuList* are further categorised into groups depending on the institutional role they held in the year under scrutiny, whether they were opposition parties, in government or officially providing parliamentary support to a minority government in, often meaningful, votes in exchange for policy influence or financial benefits.

There is also a fourth group, which is only included in the quantitative chapter, parties with no seats.

Analysing data from different sources is not only justified due to the methods being used but also to increase the validity via triangulation. In the quantitative chapter, the data is from Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR), whereas in the qualitative case study chapters, it is a wide range of party newspapers, newsletters and leaders' speeches and writings. After all, the thesis is still examining the same core question but approaching it from various angles, whether with the chosen method or via differing data sources addressing different audiences. The triangulation will make the pieces of the puzzle click together and reveal a more encompassing and expressive finished picture.

As is evident from the sources presented, the focus will be solely on RRWP parties, and thus comparisons are made only within this party family. Due to the "radical" in radical right-wing populism, their discourse is often described as either radical or moderate, which are the two descriptive words that will be employed in this thesis as well. However, since there are no comparisons, for instance, with the centre-right parties, these adjectives are used more comparatively, measuring the radicalness or moderation compared to the other RRWP parties in the study, not in an all-encompassing, absolute manner.

In other words, if the findings conclude that parties in institutional role A are more radical than parties in institutional role B, that tells the reader that A is more radical than B when one compares them to one another. It does not reveal how radical they are compared to other party families or whether they are more or less radical than the average political party, only that they are more radical than their counterparts holding a different institutional role.

The radicalness in this thesis expresses the RRWP parties' devotion to their core agenda and the issues they are seen to be owning. It is presented in the emphasis and frequency with which those topics are discussed and addressed by the parties, in the MARPOR data and in the documents coded and analysed.

The word used in this thesis and elsewhere to describe the non-radical behaviour and discourse of RRWP parties is "moderate". The word choice is due to the inclusion-moderation theory that states that participation in government will make the parties more moderate and more mainstream (Akkerman et al. 2016: 3). As with the word radical, in this thesis, moderate is understood in relative terms and measures whether a particular institutional role produces a more moderate discourse than another.

Even though the argument is that RRWP parties are not dissimilar to other political party families, comparisons, for instance, with centre-right parties ideologically or the green parties functionally could have enhanced

the knowledge gained. However, examining the RRWP party family and comparing its members with each other will be more beneficial for the aim of this thesis and what it seeks to accomplish, which is a thorough comparative study on the impact of institutional roles on RRWP parties.

What will be discovered is that parties supporting a government are showcasing more radical discourse, a finding which has support from both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Although the two remaining roles show a similar emphasis of the RRWP themes in the election manifestos, the leaders' speeches for Fidesz reveal toughening stances and tone with time. However, the governmental role is not the only explanatory factor for the increasing radicalness of the discourse; rather, as with the opposition party's data, there are other components in play influencing the changes when they occur.

How these findings will be recovered, and what will be included in each chapter, will be outlined next.

Outline

After this introduction, the thesis examines the existing literature on radical right-wing populism and will begin by providing a more detailed account than that above of the research questions this thesis aims to solve, why they matter, and to whom they matter. Defined below are the main characteristics of RRWP discourse, explained in the same order as they will be discussed throughout the chapters, beginning with the

concept of nativism (Inglehart and Norris 2016: 7; Mudde 2007: 64), followed by authoritarianism (Akkerman *et al.* 2016: 8; Mudde 2007: 145; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 18) and concluding with populism. The notion of charismatic leaders (Betz 2004: 1; Canovan 1999: 6; de Lange 2008: 83; Eatwell 2000: 412; Heinisch 2003: 95; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 62; Taggart 2004: 276) and how RRWP parties utilise cultural heritage and emotions (Canovan 1999: 15) will also be introduced.

Chapter One will also address the RRWP parties' attitudes toward democracy and democratic systems, followed by a summary of the right-turn in the European mainstream and the consequences that has had on the RRWP parties and the phenomenon, including the theories of RRWP moderation. The last section of the first chapter is on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), asking if differences exist between the European regions.

Thus, Chapter One clarifies the definition of radical right-wing populism used in this thesis, the features that are considered RRWP, how those might be visible in their discourse, and what is known about RRWP moderation prior to this research. Chapter Two narrows that outlook and, via existing literature, constructs the hypotheses. It begins by explaining how discourse is understood in this thesis, not in linguistic terms but as a political feature employed to frame parties' ideologies and policies. After this, the aforementioned inclusion-moderation thesis and the concept of mainstreaming will be introduced.

The chapter then proceeds to the drivers and moderators, to further examine which issues, and how, influence discourse and policy movements. The section on drivers will examine the three institutional roles, starting with the opposition parties, followed by governmental ones and concluding with the support parties. Each of the three discussions will finish with a hypothesis and are followed by the moderators: issue-ownership (Meguid 2005, 2007; Tavits 2007) and leadership effect (Schumacher *et al.* 2013; Strøm 1990) and their differences.

After these two chapters, it should be evident what the thesis aims to accomplish, and it is then that it turns to the methodology, how those aspirations are approached, and the most favourable methods to achieve them.

The third chapter begins with an introduction to the nested analysis, followed by a discussion on the methods used in the quantitative and qualitative chapters, ANOVA and process tracing, respectively. The focus will then turn to the case studies and begin with a presentation on *The PopuList* before turning to the justifications that steered the selection of the three cases. After this, the variables are introduced, starting with the six MARPOR ones, followed by a discussion on the codes and variables in the case studies, the process of coding and the programme used in that process, NVivo. Before the conclusion, the chapter will outline the data and timelines used in the qualitative chapters.

Before the quantitative analysis is conducted, the institutional roles

and the data on them will be discussed, focusing on the common trends within the groups as well as the outliers that will also provide an insight into each group that will not be noted with ANOVA. The ANOVA results will be presented and grouped according to the variables, not institutional roles, and to further “poke” and test the data, it is divided into four further subsets. The first two split the timeline into 1990 – 2004 and 2005 – 2018. The second two are geographically divided into Nordic and Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. This chapter serves as a practical basis for any new research to expand on the issues raised and the conclusions made in the thesis or repeat the analysis to find what may have changed and how.

The findings in Chapter Four will guide the analysis in the rest of the thesis, starting with the first case study, which is the PS. It asks in the title, *Makeover or takeover? How the rise of the nationalists changed the Finns Party*. Since the leadership change in the PS was from a more populist leader, closely rooted in the predecessor, to a more nativist one, the section on party history will be longer than in the other case studies.

The variable on nativism is divided into two discussions. The first one addresses what is here called the foreign side, meaning the discourse surrounding immigration and refugees, and the second one is on the Heartland of nativism, thus the values and morality of the homeland. Following the established order of the topics, the next is the authoritarianism of the PS, and the last of the RRWP themes is populism,

which was a prominent characteristic of PS's predecessor party.

The last variable in the case study chapters measures socio-cultural issues, which are not directly part of the RRWP ideology and agenda but add a relevant function when examining the influence of the institutional roles. With PS, these are expected to include issues concerning welfare, uncharacteristically for an RRWP party but not so for a Nordic one.

Chapter Five also contains a section that explores how the codes are linked and thus how different issue areas are justified and addressed by the party. This section is attached to the PS chapter, whereas with Fidesz and DF, it can be found in the Appendixes. Fidesz is the focus of Chapter Six, as an example of a party in government.

In the sixth chapter, the analysis begins with a summary of the party's history and roots prior to progressing to the issues concerning nativism, which are divided into the regional context, that is, Hungary's standing as a CEE country, part of the Visegrad Group and Carpathian Basin, and Fidesz's discourse when addressing immigration.

After analysing how the party holding the institutional role of government considers topics connected to authoritarianism, the chapter discusses the many-faceted variable of populism. This variable analyses Fidesz's attitudes towards the EU, which are both negative and positive, in addition to the other features commonly related to populism. The benefits of process tracing and not having pre-planned codes, and making issues and topics fit into those, are demonstrated throughout the case

studies but are especially revealed in sections like this. It grants the thesis the flexibility and independence to explore and explain further the discourse of the three parties. The same applies to the socio-cultural variable that, even more than the three others, varies in content between the three parties, and with Fidesz, this includes divisive identitarian issues.

Chapter Seven is the last case study chapter and it examines the support party via the example of the DF, again starting with a look back into the party's history before analysing the nativist variable. Similarly to the consideration of PS and to some extent Fidesz, the chapter discusses nativism from two perspectives, being a Dane and immigration, followed by the variable on authoritarianism.

With DF, the variable on populism is mainly about the party's attitudes to the EU, whereas the socio-cultural issues, as with the PS, are concentrated around the different aspects of welfare. What is unique to this party, or more so to this institutional role, is that issues relating to the support role were frequently addressed and mentioned from different angles, thus warranting a separate variable and section in the chapter.

Similarly to the quantitative chapter, these three also offer a convenient starting point for new researchers with a large amount of coded data and in-depth analysis. These chapters yield case specific inferences and are three separate "episodes" of RRWP parties in different

institutional roles, contributing to the prior knowledge of the three parties, as well as general knowledge.

The final chapter, Chapter Eight, compares the three case studies, focusing on the similarities and differences. It will discuss and analyse considerations picked up along the way that drew attention. It will explore further how these three parties differ and how they are alike, and whether geography, history or the political environment has much influence in addition to the institutional role, if indeed those have any. Comparing the three case studies provide the opportunity to make possible generalisations since it enables one to claim that a set of cases are causally similar to the others (Beach 2017: 2).

The structure will follow the already familiar model, beginning with a brief outlook on the history, then addressing the three core features of radical right-wing populism, namely nativism, authoritarianism and populism, and lastly discusses the socio-cultural themes.

After Chapter Eight has presented its findings, it is time to conclude the thesis. The Conclusion will summarise the empirical findings and draw together ideas and questions for future research, and researchers.

The combination of methods in this thesis should produce findings that enhance the understanding of how RRWP parties use their rhetoric when in different institutional roles. This has its own value, like most research, merely by expanding the existing knowledge, but it also provides an insight into what can be may be expected of these parties

when they take on a particular institutional role. Hence, the analysis could aid in predicting how RRWP parties behave in these scenarios and understanding what to expect from them, which is vital when dealing with RRWP actors that represent and campaign on divisive, if not destructive, policies.

RRWP parties are viewed here similarly to the mainstream parties, which would indicate that, like their peers, they too are vulnerable to ups and downs in the electoral scene. Thus, even though the parties have carved a place for themselves in the European political arena, their stable political presence is not inevitable, and their polling figures are not rigid, suggesting that limiting their influence is also possible. To contribute to this goal is what this thesis aims to do with an impact to three areas: RRWP parties, institutional roles and discourse.

1 Literature Review - What is in the radical right-wing populist discourse?

Introduction

In 2002 Mény and Surel stated that 'populist parties are by nature neither durable nor sustainable parties of government. Their fate is to be integrated into the mainstream, to disappear, or to remain permanently in opposition' (Mény and Surel 2002: 18). The first option, which is also called the inclusion-moderation thesis, was a prominent approach when predicting the behaviour of radical right-wing populist (RRWP) parties as a part of the executive, whilst the other two claims also received support.

But much has changed in the two decades since Mény and Surel wrote that, and the recent research on the topic shows a more complicated and, at times, contradictory story. One where RRWP parties are not only capable of governmental cooperation but are also experienced and evolved parliamentary actors, who seem to have concluded that their most effective and preferable strategy is keeping up the radicalness in their discourse and the emphasis on the RRWP agenda.

This thesis explores European RRWP parties in parliamentary

settings, aiming to test whether the institutional role,³ being in the opposition, in government or supporting a minority government, influences their discourse, and consequently, whether the parties moderate or radicalise their rhetoric according to their proximity to power.

To set the scene for the analysis that follows in the empirical chapters, this chapter will begin with more detailed insight into the research goals, what the thesis aspires to explore and how it is structured.

After introducing the core of the thesis, it will move on to the “so what” questions. Why is this research necessary? Why does it matter to know more about the behaviour of RRWP parties in institutional settings? When these questions have been discussed, the attention turns to the phenomenon under scrutiny. What is radical right-wing populism, and what are its main characteristics?

While defining the party family, this discussion also outlines the attributes and variables focused on in the analytical chapters. In addition to the three core features of radical right-wing populism, nativism, authoritarianism and populism, the accompanying elements, such as the language used, emotions employed, and the leaders' role, will also be discussed.

³ The term institutional role has been previously employed, for instance, by Cavalieri and Froio (2021).

The chapter will then summarise the turn to the right in the European political scene and what is already known about RRWP parties' moderation and radicalisation. Before the conclusion, a section will be dedicated to the possible differences between RRWP parties in Northern and Western Europe (NWE) and those in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Highlighting the possible distinctions in their characteristics, will aid in analysing and noticing alternative explanations for the potential discourse change.

1.1 The aspirations, space and timeline of the thesis

The overriding methodology in this thesis is one of mixed methods. The Large-N quantitative chapter will provide a preliminary answer to whether different institutional roles impact RRWP parties' discourse in their election manifestos and guide the in-depth analysis in the qualitative chapters. The three case studies aim to add a complex analysis and solve the questions the previous chapter may have left unanswered. Representing opposition, government, and support parties are the Finns Party (PS), Fidesz and Danish People's Party, respectively, which will be compared in the final, eighth chapter. The main part of the thesis is the in-dept case study chapters with a wide range of party material coded and analysed, which will be supported by the quantitative chapter before and the chapter after that summarises the case studies findings to construct conclusions beyond those that the process tracing would produce solely.

The material in the qualitative chapters is from leaders' and party members' writings and speeches, and they will test if the quantitative findings from election manifestos are replicated and how the possible differences are reflected in the party material. Furthermore, if there is a change in the discourse that the party's institutional role cannot explain, the case study chapters will examine the possible explanations behind this, revealing the tone of the discourse and how RRWP topics were addressed and justified.

Notwithstanding the proliferation of research exploring the RRWP parties, researchers have preferred focusing either on Western Europe (Akkerman *et al.* 2016; Akkerman and de Lange 2012; Akkerman and Rooduijn 2015; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015; Heinisch 2003; Van Spanje 2011) or on CEE (Buščíková 2009; Buščíková and Kitschelt 2009; Minkenberg 2002; Stanley 2016) when studying their incumbency behaviour. Although this thesis does not seek to analyse Europe in terms of separate geographical areas, it will be mindful of the different regional histories and how they may impact the RRWP parties, for instance, when summarising the findings from the three case studies in the final chapter.

Since it has been two decades since the critical juncture of the fall of Communism, we have arrived at a convenient time to scrutinise, 'with the benefit of hindsight' (Casal Bértoa 2013: 398), Europe as a whole. Even though RRWP parties were part of Western Europe's political scene

before the fall of the Iron Curtain,⁴ including parties from the new democracies will increase the validity of this study and open prospects for future research.

The starting point here is 1990, at the end of the Cold War, which is not to ignore the noticeable differences the 40 years of Communist politics would have created between the regions (Buščíková and Kitschelt 2009: 462; Casal Bértoa 2013: 426; Enyedi and Casal Bértoa 2018: 447; Mair and Mudde 1998: 214; Minkenberg 2002: 336; Pytlas 2018: 2), but to examine if any are revealed within the framework set by this research and if so, to add to the existing knowledge to be employed by future research.

The phenomenon of radical right-wing populism is not fading away, and neither are the parties representing it. Thus the academic research will proceed, building itself on top of existing studies, such as this one, which is one of the reasons why this topic matters, as shown next.

1.2 The “so what” questions

Although the roots of populism go back to the end of the nineteenth century, among peasants in Russia and farmers in the United States, radical right-wing populism has become the fascinating new kid on the

⁴ These six were the RRWP parties founded prior to 1989: Austrian Freedom Party 1985, Vlaams Blok (predecessor of Vlaams Belang) 1978, National Rally 1972, Progress Party, Norway 1973, Sweden Democrats 1988, Swiss People’s Party 1971.

political block. Its presence dominates beyond the traditional political arena, and it has become a topic of conversation in the broader public sphere. Until recently, the media coverage given to the RRWP party family seemed disproportionate to their vote share.⁵

The media's erroneous and hasty use of the term radical right-wing populism has contributed to misunderstanding the phenomenon and wrongly labelling some political figures as part of the party family, whether with the desired or unwanted consequences. Indeed, it has become a lazy way for some to express dissatisfaction towards behaviour or opinions one disagrees with, often without distinguishing populism from nativism or xenophobia, never mind acknowledging that populism is not restricted to the political right only.

For some (Canovan 1999: 2; Müller 2015: 80; Pirro 2018: 4; Rovira Kaltwasser 2012: 197), populism has features that potentially can correct the mode of politics in democracies, for instance, by representing groups that feel neglected or encouraging non-voters to vote. Yet, populism, and especially radical right-wing populism, is perceived as a threat, endangering European (liberal) democracies (Batory 2016: 284; Betz 1994: 3; Kriesi 2018: 6; Müller 2016: 103), and the reasons for that will

⁵ Vote share for RRWP parties in Europe in 2017 was 12.26% (Halikiopoulou 2018: 12), which rose to 17.93% when taking into consideration elections in 2018 and 2019, the last two included in this study (ParlGov 2021).

become evident when the chapter progresses to the characterisation of the phenomenon.

If RRWP parties are a peril, then what follows is that their presence in national parliaments is undoubtedly undesirable, even more so in governments. Hence, the more their behaviour and actions are known, the more successful the attempts to minimise it will become. The questions this thesis aims to solve will reveal something new about the RRWP parties' behaviour in these institutional settings, which can be employed in the strategies to limit their influence by understanding the motivations for the parties to emphasise their agenda and radicalise their discourse.

Due to the 'chameleonic' (Taggart 2000: 4) nature of radical right-wing populism and how it changes with its environment, adopting national agendas and owning discussions, as will be discussed later, these parties are heterogeneous, which enhances the uniqueness of each party and increases the number of unanswered research questions. Whether these parties are a passing phenomenon or here to stay, they are a part of the legislative and executive processes, and in order to choose how to deal with these parties, their behaviour in the institutions ought to be understood better and studied further.

Hence, the findings of this thesis are not merely for those who study RRWP parties wishing to build upon this research but also for those who report on the parties, work with them or vote for them. But before

the thesis can progress any further, what radical right-wing populism is, what the parties represent and the issues they drive need to be understood, which is why the chapter will now define the phenomenon and the terminology accompanying it, which will guide the analysis in the thesis.

1.3 Definitions and characteristics of RRWP discourse

What Mudde calls a quagmire is the mix of terms applied to this party family: populist radical right, radical right, anti-immigration, protest parties and so forth. According to him, this is due to the party family not self-identifying and thus settling the confusion (2016a: 26). Before continuing with the definition of radical right-wing populism, a few defining words should be said about party family and how that term is understood in this thesis.

Mair and Mudde (1998: 214-215) discuss four approaches that have been applied to party families, the problems with them, and their differentiation: historical origin, transnational linkages, shared party ideologies and shared party names. The authors put forward two of these approaches, which ought to 'be developed in parallel rather than as alternatives': shared origins and ideology (Mair and Mudde 1998: 223-224).

The first approach emphasises how parties were formed and their long-term development. Defining party families in this way also highlights

the newly emerging parties, such as the ones under study here. The second approach demands a comprehensive and in-depth analysis, hence being more time-consuming. This classification allows for the manoeuvre of the parties from one category to another, permitting researchers to highlight the differences between countries, since parties grouped together may have developed out of very different circumstances, as again is the case in this thesis (Mair and Mudde 1998: 224-225). This dual approach captures the RRWP party family fittingly, providing a particular room to manoeuvre, which is why this research welcomes it.

Since RRWP parties 'have different ideological backgrounds, a different voting base and are often elected on very different platforms' they might 'differ in kind rather than just degree' (Halikiopoulou 2018: 3). Thus, the party group which is here called RRWP is diverse and shares 'a similar ideological discourse', so they should be seen not as 'ideological equivalents but rather as *functional* equivalents' (Mudde 2016b: 814).

Furthermore, the conceptual challenges also arise from the fact that the politics of radical right-wing populism are not merely limited to the RRWP parties (Pytlas 2018: 2). Hence parties can adopt the RRWP discourse, or part of it, and manoeuvre themselves inside and outside of the party group's boundaries, which adds to the difficulties of labelling and listing the parties.

One of the reasons this study has opted for Mudde's definition of radical right-wing populism is due to being able to make comparisons.

Adopting a widely employed and agreed-upon description of the phenomenon makes it easier to make comparisons with other research, as well as for future researchers to reflect on this study. A further example of the benefit of endorsing and employing Mudde's definition is *The PopuList*, which uses the same conceptualisation and hence is employed in this thesis; it will be introduced in Chapter 3.

Radical right-wing populism combines nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde 2007; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 155), nativism being the defining feature of the phenomenon, and where the next section will begin. It will then move on to authoritarianism, which is followed by populism, the so-called thin-centred ideology. Due to populism being thin-centred, it requires other ideologies to attach itself to, and once it devotes itself to nativism and authoritarianism, it becomes radical right-wing populism (Mudde 2010: 3; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 155), which has become the prevailing type of populism in Europe (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 155; van Kessel 2015: 24).

To conclude the definition of radical right-wing populism, the chapter will introduce other factors that are associated with the phenomenon, one of these is the role of the leader, which is focused on here due to the documents later analysed in the case studies being produced mainly by the party leaders and their role being one of the criteria for the case selection. Hence, the following sections introduce and

define the features that will be coded, analysed and discussed in the subsequent empirical chapters, which ensures that when a passage is coded, for instance, nativist, the reader has the same understanding of the term as the coder had.

1.3.1 Natives versus the others

Nativism is rooted in the idea of the nation-state and each nation having its own state (Mudde 2010: 1173). It implies a viewpoint where “the people” are natives (Inglehart and Norris 2016: 7; Mudde 2007: 64), not mere nationals or even those born in the country but those who share the traditional culture, values and morals, and maintains that their claim to resources should be prioritised over that of non-natives (Betz 2004: 1). The populist division between “us” and “them”, which will be discussed in more detail later, becomes a division between natives and non-natives, which in turn fuels anti-immigration sentiment and promotes negativity towards multiculturalism (Akkerman *et al.* 2016: 5; Betz 2004: 1; Eatwell 2000: 413; Halikiopoulou 2018: 2).

Immigration is one of the RRWP parties’ core issues (Fennema 2005; Ivarsflåte and Guldbrandsen 2012; van Spanje 2010) and some (Fennema 1997; Van der Brug *et al.* 2005) refer to them simply as anti-immigrant parties. According to Ivarsflåte’s (2008) cross-sectional comparison, no RRWP party performed well in the early 2000s elections without employing the grievances over the issue, explaining the

hardening line taken by centre-right parties (Akkerman 2015; Bale 2003; van Spanje 2010). In comparison, Malone's (2014) study concludes that RRWP parties have affected nearly all immigration reforms over the past twenty years in some way. It is one of the defining characteristics the parties are known for; it is the issue and the debate they comfortably own.

Nativism can also manifest in hostility towards Islam, which has become the new central and uniting feature of RRWP parties in Europe (van Kessel 2015: 24). This, combined with the abandoning of Keynesian policies in favour of austerity, also affected voters, making them more accepting of nativist rhetoric (Betz 2018: 12) and welfare chauvinism, a belief that the benefits of the welfare state should be distributed only to those belonging to the country, not to the so-called "others" (Eatwell 2000: 413; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013: 160). In addition to using economic arguments to justify anti-immigration sentiments, some fear that the arrival of new cultures threatens their conventional societies.

Traditional values are seen to be in danger from foreign cultures (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 5; Mudde 2007: 19), pitching identity at the core of 'the new politics of exclusion' (Betz 2018: 13). And hence, for the RRWPs, the concept of integration is much preferable to pursuing a pluralistic society (Akkerman and Rooduijn 2015: 1145; Akkerman and de Lange 2012: 584; Betz 1993: 413; Dunn 2015: 9; Inglehart and Norris 2016: 7).

There have been concerns over how this rhetoric is constructed, and at times it has been called xenophobic or outright racist. Pappas argues that the former is complementary to if not synonymous with nativism, with its main arguments being about immigration and EU multiculturalism. According to Pappas (2016: 27):

[n]ativists see both as grave threats to well-ordered, ethnoculturally coherent societies, to their established liberal-democratic values, and, perhaps most crucially, to the sustainability of the welfare states that these societies have inherited from the days before mass immigration.

Hence, the nativist parties are seen as championing and defending something traditional, linked to the societies they represent, which is close to the Heartland concept, an ideal that the chapter will explain later.

Some authors claim that the nativist rhetoric is contributing to outbursts of racist violence and hate crimes (Eatwell 2003: 278-279; Heinmueller and Hiscox 2007: 1; Välimäki 2012: 286) and that the 'electoral and political successes of populist radical right parties increase the tolerance for intolerance' (Eatwell 2003: 286). The reply from the RRWP actors to these questions of concern or accusations is that even though they demand limits on immigration, the main enemy is still the state and its immigration policies, not the immigrants themselves (Fennema 2005: 12), which brings them full-circle back to the anti-establishment stance and to "them" being the elite, the core concept of populism.

It is primarily this emphasis on nativism which moulds the parties' agendas and makes each a little different (Rydgren 2005: 415; Mudde 1996: 226). It also, to a degree, challenges cooperation amongst RRWP parties across state lines. After all, as Minkenberg and Perrineau (2007: 50) claimed, they are parties with heavily nationalistic agendas, which makes finding a unifying common ground nearly impossible.

This, however, is changing, and although RRWP parties have not succeeded in creating one united group in the European Parliament (EP), amid discussions, they have taken visible stances to justify and defend each other, especially on issues where they share common ground. Law and order is one of them and will be discussed next.

1.3.2 The iron grip of authoritarianism

RRWP parties see law and order as imperative to their and their country's cause (Akkerman *et al.* 2016: 8; Mudde 2007: 145). They campaign for harsher punishments, regarding the increase in crime as the fault of immigrants (Dunn 2015: 10) and are willing to bypass human rights to punish the alleged offender (Akkerman 2012: 516), regularly witnessed with crimes linked to terrorism, for instance, while social problems, such as drugs and prostitution, are viewed as security issues, not issues of health or economy (Mudde 2016a: 26). Traditionally, RRWPs have been primarily hostile towards more state intervention (Betz 1993: 418), which is visible in their anti-establishment rhetoric, yet on the matter of law and

order they campaign for the opposite (Heinisch 2003: 93), as they do with issues linked to nativism.

Since the parties view themselves as the defenders of the general will, the issues they promote can effortlessly be organised to portray those opposing them as undemocratic. Hence, implying that the general will is transparent and absolute can lead to legitimising 'authoritarianism and illiberal attacks on anyone who (allegedly) threatens the homogeneity of the people' (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 18). It is not only external threats (immigrants and asylum seekers) and criminal elements that the "law-and-order" doctrine is directed against, but also the parties' critics and political opponents (Heinisch 2003: 95).

Intriguingly, RRWP parties can be hostile to the very institutions that maintain the law and order they fight for. The hostility towards courts and legislatures is justified by employing the same argument as with international institutions: they stand in the way of the will of the people (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 6; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 95). In Poland and Hungary, for example, the constitutional changes were executed 'in the name of "democracy"' and for the 'renewal of "the Nation"' (Pytlas 2018: 9). This, once again, demonstrates how RRWP parties can employ similar rhetoric on multiple occasions and towards a variety of actors.

Increasingly, authoritarianism has become a synonym for illiberalism, and the actions taken or campaigns run by RRWP parties in

the name of law and order seek to curb European liberal values. The ideas of nativism and seeing the native culture as superior to others are pushed forward by demanding changes in the law. There is an attempt by the RRWP parties to enshrine their beliefs in law. What begins as a public conversation or shared opinions on matters that are already widely accepted, such as the rights of sexual minorities, ends up, in the most controversial cases, back in the parliament, intending to take back the rights that have already been given to people.

Pappas (2016: 27, 28) views law and order issues as part of nativism, whilst populism he understands as democratic illiberalism. Notwithstanding that his terminology is differently defined, it still intertwines the three terms that this thesis emphasises as radical right-wing populism, and it is to the latter term that the chapter will next turn.

1.3.3 Populism – How to divide and conquer

Due to populism taking different forms in different political environments, the definitions of it have varied. To offer some clarity on the much-debated subject, the Oxford Handbook of Populism (Rovira Kaltwasser et al.: 2017) identifies three approaches: political strategy, socio-cultural and ideational.

In 2001, Kurt Weyland (2001: 14), who studies Latin American populism, wrote that populism is 'a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct,

unmediated, institutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers'. This political strategic approach was revisited by Weyland in 2017 when he stated that the general "will of the people" is embodied in the leader who has a quasi-direct, unmediated relationship with the mass followers (Weyland 2017: 59).

In this top-down approach, 'populism does not conceive of representation as a process, but as ensured via identity, namely the identification of the leader with the people, and vice versa' (Weyland 2017: 59). Barr (2009: 44) also emphasises the lack of ideology and the role of the leader, defining populism as 'a mass movement led by an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages'.

Although this thesis uses documents produced by the leaders in the qualitative chapters, the focus given in this approach to leadership is disproportionate. Yes, the leaders are central to the parties and often direct the discussion, but they are not all the parties are about. Furthermore, the leaders are not viewed as above critique, and even if they can change the policy or discourse dynamics, the unsatisfied voices within the party will make themselves heard.

Another problem with this approach is the distancing from ideology. Populism on its own, especially, lacks the features that ideologies traditionally have, but this does not mean that populist parties would not have a set of ideas and beliefs they pursue. They are not just ships

without sails and engines on the sea drifting without destination. No, they know what they want, even if that is only a few limited goals, and they can change their discourse and the discourse around them to go after their goals, which should become apparent in the case study chapters and will be closely monitored.

Ostiguy (2017: 73), on the other hand, sees populism as 'a particular form of political relationship between political leaders and a social basis, one established and articulated through "low"⁶ appeals which resonate and receive positive reception within particular sectors of society for social-cultural historic reasons'. Although the socio-cultural approach also focuses on leadership, it does not understand populism as a top-down phenomenon but as a *two-way*, relational one (Ostiguy 2017: 73), 'as the antagonistic, mobilizational flaunting in politics of the culturally popular and native, and of personalism as a mode of decision-making' (Ostiguy 2017: 84).

A part of this approach resonates with how populism is viewed here, mainly focusing on socio-cultural, which is one of the variables in Chapters Five to Seven. However, populist parties do listen to their followers, but they do not make decisions about their future direction based on them. It is more the case that the parties will go where they are going, and the followers will follow them. Furthermore, the socio-cultural

⁶ 'The high-low axis are ways of *being* and *acting* in politics' (Ostiguy 2018: 77). Low in social-cultural: coarse, uninhibited, culturally *popular* (see Ostiguy 2018: 77-81).

approach views populism as a style, a performative act and presentation style, whereas this thesis understands it in ideological terms as a part of the RRWP ideology.

Both approaches above treat populism as if it was distinct from other ideologies and parties, and maintaining that argument is increasingly challenging. It is not separated from the rest of the political sphere but functions within it, attracting the same voters, whose votes are counted like those of others, next to other political parties within the same political institutions.

Although the ideational approach also sees the ideology in populism as thin, it still acknowledges that there is some ideology. Furthermore, it focuses more on the actual parties than just leaders and followers and is best suited as a definition of populism when it is a part of radical right-wing populism, as shown next.

The ideational approach

The ideational approach considers 'populism to be, first and foremost, about ideas in general, and ideas about "the people" and "the elite" in particular' (Mudde 2017: 29). Among the growing number of scholars employing the ideational approach and agreeing with its core principles, there are minor differences in the views of its genus (Mudde 2017: 30-31; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018: 3). However, as Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2018: 3) note, these are 'irrelevant to many research

questions', implying that research 'based on the ideational approach is overall complementary and cumulative'.

This approach defines populism as a thin-centred ideology, which, unlike thick-centred ideology, cannot function as a stand-alone 'practical political ideology' (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 5; Mudde 2004: 544; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 150; Stanley 2008: 95; van Kessel 2015: 11). Consequently, a party may be an RRWP party, but it cannot ideologically be simply 'populist' (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 5).

Even though it is the case that parties need more than just populism to function, this does seem to be slowly changing. Arguably, if a single-issue party is campaigning on a populist platform and becomes more driven by populism than by the original topic, it could reach a point where populism overtakes the other issue and the party, raising questions about whether the party then could be classed simply as populist.

Populist campaigning is often polarised, and the Manichean division between good and evil is present in most debates. Populism simplifies matters into black-and-white contradictions and draws the battle lines between the pure people and the corrupt elite (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 4; Akkerman *et al.* 2016: 2; Betz 2018: 2; Canovan 1999: 3; Mudde 2007: 65; Müller 2016: 2-3; Pauwels 2011: 63; Rooduijn *et al.* 2014: 563), as has already been mentioned above. It mobilises the opinions and interests of those who believe themselves to be 'authentic' but are ignored by the decision-makers, when it is precisely their

concerns that are the concerns of the mainstream (Canovan 1999: 4; Mudde 2017: 30). One of populism's core concepts is "the people" (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 4; Canovan 2005: 80; Mudde 2004: 544; Rooduijn *et al.* 2014: 564).

This vague 'moral' term (Mudde 2017: 30) can be adjusted to refer to whomever but rarely does it mean all the people in its linguistic sense (Canovan 2005: 80; Heinisch 2003: 92; Mudde 2004: 545-546; Rooduijn *et al.* 2014: 564). Importantly, those who are included in the 'culturally determined' (Mudde 2017: 32) "people" know who they are, are assumed to be speaking with one voice (Kriesi 2018: 7), and, more specifically, know who the excluded out-group is (van Kessel 2015: 12), which in the case of RRWP is most often the non-natives.

Paul Taggart (2004: 274) introduces the concept of the Heartland, which, unlike the utopian conceptions, 'is constructed retrospectively from the past – it is in essence a past-derived vision projected onto the present as that which has been lost'. It is an imaginary and nostalgic place with frontiers where not all are welcome, but those who are, are the collective and homogenous "pure people" (Taggart 2000: 96). Populists can construct a Heartland to represent their romantic portrayal of what is worth defending (van Kessel 2015: 12).

The emotionally loaded concept of the Heartland is another feature of the ideological approach that makes it attractive when working on radical right-wing populism. As discussed later in the chapter the parties

and followers embrace nostalgia and wish their country to be as it once was in history. Whether the person making the claims was even alive during the period to which they want to return is irrelevant.

Similarly to “the people”, “the elite” is a fluctuating term that can be attached to politicians, academics, experts, certain media outlets or whatever suits the discussion on hand (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 6; Mudde 2007: 65; Rooduijn *et al.* 2014: 564). Mostly, it is the old mainstream politicians or career politicians who are seen as selfish and incompetent, as well as the ones steering globalisation and driving the global institutions, such as the European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and thus limiting the power of the people (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 81; Müller 2016: 48; Nordensvard and Ketola 2014: 370). Accordingly, the elite is portrayed as promoting special interests, whereas the populists ‘are the genuine voice of the people’ (Mudde 2017: 33-34; Van der Brug and Mughan 2007: 29-30).⁷

The anti-establishment attitudes are easier to express as long as the RRWP parties can credibly maintain their distance from the decision-making and thus the establishment. However, anti-establishment stances include criticism towards the EU and other international institutions

⁷ With Five Star Movement (M5S), the Italian mainstream political parties they oppose include two other populist parties: Forza Italia (FI) and Lega Nord (LN) (Verbeek and Zaslove 2016: 307).

(Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn 2016: 5; Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007: 34), which is aided by '[t]he closed politics of the European Union' and its democratic deficit (Hayward 1996: 10). Hence, the same rhetoric of the elite limiting the power of the people can be directed to bodies above the national level once an RRWP party becomes a ruling party (Krause and Wagner 2021: 164), which is why the discourse on other domestic parties and the EU are attached to the populism variable in the empirical chapters.

Interestingly, even though most RRWP parties are critical of the EU, they view the European political arena as a 'platform for their domestic aims' (Fieschi 2000: 518), therefore taking advantage of the institution they might dislike. In some countries, the EP elections, with their proportional representation (PR) system have presented the RRWP parties with an opportunity for electoral success, more significant than they experienced under other voting systems (Fieschi 2000: 521).

While other parties often avoid putting their top candidates on the electoral list in what are deemed second-order elections, smaller parties view these as a chance to gain credibility and thus opt for the more prominent names (Spoon 2011: 118). Moreover, the heterogeneous nature of the party group is evident when examining the EP, where the

parties are sitting in various groups, whilst some have in the past remained non-inscrits.⁸

As is again visible from the discussion above on the elite, it portrays radical right-wing populism, not just populism, which makes the ideational approach apt for this thesis. Moreover, employing the definition most commonly used when studying RRWP parties makes this study more comparable.

Now that three core concepts of radical right-wing populism have been introduced, and it is known what the characteristics to pay attention to and analysed in the empirical chapters are, this chapter will turn to the more supporting features. The focus here is on the role of the leaders, due to their being imperative to the analysis in the second part of the thesis, which is where the section will begin.

1.3.4 Charismatic leaders, cultural heritage and emotions

RRWP parties are strictly vertical in their hierarchy, consequently, authoritarian themselves (de Lange and Art 2011: 1232; Heinisch 2003: 94). It is characteristic for them to support a strong leader (Eatwell 2000: 412; Inglehart and Norris 2016: 6; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 62; Pauwels 2011: 65; Taggart 2000: 13), with many of their leaders

⁸ At the time of writing, Oct 2018, in five parliamentary groups.

almost synonymous with the party, and lengthy periods in the role.⁹ Some even go as far as to call radical right-wing populism 'the cult of the leader' (Pappas 2016: 25), which in many cases is fitting and arguably reflects what followers think of the leaders and how the leaders view themselves.

The phenomenon benefits from a highly personalised style of politics, and, in addition to the figureheads being strong leaders, they are habitually seen as charismatic and thought-provoking characters who understand the rules of showbusiness (Betz 2004: 1; Canovan 1999: 6; de Lange 2008: 83; Eatwell 2000: 412; Heinisch 2003: 95; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 62; Taggart 2004: 276). Charisma is a helpful tool when attempting to 'instil confidence in the leader's capacity to perform' (Barr 2009: 41), especially when the emotional charge within these parties is commonly focused on one person (Lewandowsky 2016: 6).

What creates ambiguity is how charisma is measured and its meaning. Van der Brug and Mughan (2007) doubt the effect or uniqueness of these leaders and the scientific evidence behind the phenomenon. 'The problem is that as long as the notion of charisma is not

⁹ Some are the founders or co-founders, such as Timo Soini of the Finns Party, whereas others can be credited with lifting the party to success, as did Jörg Haider for FPÖ, leading the party for 14 years, or Christoph Blocher of SVP, who was in charge for 39 years.

explicitly defined, this explanation of support for populist parties is not open to empirical falsification, which in turn means that it is not useful for scientific explanation' (Van der Brug and Mughan 2007: 44).

It is also questionable whether there are differences in the magnitude of the leaders' effect between RRWP parties and mainstream parties (Van der Brug and Mughan 2007: 45). Nevertheless, Pappas (2016: 386) argues that '[T]he stronger the charisma of their leadership, the higher the likelihood of populist parties to prosper politically and electorally'. Thus, even if the linkage of populism and charismatic leadership is weak, the 'charismatically led populist parties constitute the greatest success stories of populism in Europe' (Pappas 2016: 386).

The salience of leaders and their roles within the RRWP parties was one of the criteria for the selection of the case studies and explains the decision to analyse mostly leaders' writings and speeches in them. The leaders' decisions often outweigh those made elsewhere in the party, which can be beneficial since it provides a near-instant change of tone and reactions to new topics arising in the public debate, but it can also ruffle feathers internally, something that is considered typical of the party family (Akkerman and de Lange 2012: 581; Heinisch 2003: 94).

Another typical feature of radical right-wing populism is its distaste for so-called political correctness and the way it employs a straightforward discourse in which even complex topics are reduced to exaggerated and simplistic metaphors, where the speakers avoid political

jargon (Canovan 1999: 5; Heinisch 2003: 95; Korhonen 2012: 213). RRWP parties offer what they view as common-sense solutions (Betz 1993: 413; Heinisch 2003: 95; Mudde 2017: 33), often citing conspiracy theories (Hayward 1996: 20; Müller 2016: 32; Taggart 2000: 105).

Even though the ideational approach recognises the specific style of language used and the role the leaders have, it does not consider them as central to the phenomenon, as the strategic and socio-cultural approaches do, but more as 'accompanying properties' (van Kessel 2015: 14). Nevertheless, these features matter for this thesis due to the in-depth case studies and how and what is analysed in them.

Radical right-wing populism also relies on 'emotional appeals' (Canovan 1999: 15); thus, the feelings that are easily found in their discourse are 'nostalgia, angst, helplessness, hatred, vindictiveness, ecstasy, melancholy, anger, fear, indignation, envy, spite and resentment' (Demertzis 2006: 120). There is 'reasonably consistent evidence that populism thrives on people's feeling of a lack of political power, a belief that the world is unfair and that they do not get what they deserve' (Lewandowsky 2016). The fear that people might have towards the unfamiliar has proven successful in mobilising support for the RRWP parties. Their patriotism is often worded in a highly sentimental style, tapping into this fear and drawing support with slogans demanding the country back and nostalgic references to previous wars, which are anticipated to be present in the case study chapters.

Although they have this nostalgia for previous wars, RRWP parties are neither violent nor anti-democracy, as explained next.

1.3.5 Within the democratic system

Unlike extremist or fascist groups, RRWP parties are not against democracy or the democratic system but work within it (Akkerman *et al.* 2016: 8; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 6; Rydgren 2005: 416), and as acknowledged by Kriesi (2018: 14), populism is only possible in democratic regimes. RRWP parties are mainly critical of representative democracy, especially when they regard the representatives as part of the elite and thus not fit to represent the people, and themselves as the defenders of the will of the people, and some find it easier to champion direct democracy, which, for them, cuts through the web of the elite control (Bowler *et al.* 2017: 70; Canovan 1999: 2, 4; Heinisch 2003: 93). Thus, referenda will be a topic observed and, if evident, analysed in the qualitative chapters.

For the RRWPs, the will of the people triumphs over the liberties and equalities, whilst nativism and authoritarianism reject diversity and inclusion, all valued principles of European liberal democracies, and as such, radical right-wing populism can pose a threat to liberal democracy (Betz 2004: 184; Mudde 2007: 1; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 79; Müller 2016: 3; Pappas 2014: 2). At the core of radical right-wing populism is the belief in the superiority of some people over others, and

treating the will of a particular group as the will of all excludes numerous individuals within the society, leaving no room for pluralism, hence becoming an illiberal phenomenon itself (Kriesi 2018: 8).

The resentment radical right-wing populism has towards political institutions that are safeguarding liberal principles is based on the assumption that they stand in the way of popular sovereignty (Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart 2016: 202), as discussed in the section on populism. The struggle against the constraints imposed by the political institutions has caused radical right-wing populism to be labelled as 'an antithesis of constitutionalism' (Batory 2016: 284). Thus, although functioning within the democratic system, the parties' distaste for democracy is visible.

Pappas (2014: 2) goes even further, providing the 'most minimal definition of populism as *democratic illiberalism*', which emphasises how the parties pursue their illiberal agendas within the democratic system.¹⁰ He is also more sceptical about the parties'¹¹ attitudes towards democracy, calling them antidemocrats who comply with some of the rules of parliamentarianism but disdain its principles and spirit (Pappas 2016: 24). This disdain and distaste are particularly noticeable when the

¹⁰ Viktor Orbán (Fidesz) proudly calls the transformed Hungary an 'illiberal democracy' (The New York Times 2014).

¹¹ Important to note the distinction from Pappas' definition that, although most of the parties he mentions are here classified as RRWP, some are not, for example, Golden Dawn.

democratic processes are going against RRWP parties, which is when they may attack their opponents and the system itself.

The attacks on democratic processes and challengers will be under investigation in the case studies, but so too will be the response from the RRWP parties to attacks on them from other actors and how they conduct themselves in the face of criticism.

Most of the criticism resonates from the mainstream, from the often more moderate adversaries, focusing on the RRWP agenda. Are moderation and mainstreaming RRWP parties' ambitions or does the shifting towards the mainstream follow once in office, are questions this chapter turns to next.

1.4 What would RRWP moderation look like?

EU member states sanctioned Austria when in 2000, the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) formed a coalition with the RRWP Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in protest of the move and to send a signal to other member states. The shock when FPÖ, headed by Jörg Haider, entered into the Austrian coalition compared to the little notice the party received under Heinz-Christian Strache when repeating the same 17 years later, portrays a valuable and expressive image of the normalisation of RRWP parties success (Muis *et al.* 2022: 1). Or perhaps it is less to do with RRWP parties and more about the European party systems, including mainstream and RRWP parties, that have, over the last 30 years been

taking a turn to the right and thus mainstreaming the RRWP agenda (Mudde 2013: 13; Wagner and Meyer 2017: 86).

Before discussing what has been written about the moderation and radicalisation of different aspects of RRWP parties, this section will outline the impact the parties have had on the mainstream and vice versa to acknowledge better where the “mainstream” is and, therefore, what is meant by mainstreaming.

1.4.1 “Verrechtsing” of the Mainstream

Mainstreaming is not a one-way street, capturing merely RRWP parties’ manoeuvres towards the centre, but it also depends on the ideological location of the mainstream parties. And it is not only centre-right parties but increasingly also centre-left, which is due to the support from previously more left-leaning working-class voters that are now choosing RRWPs instead (Bale 2003: 71). Hence it is imperative to begin this discussion on the shifts that have been occurring within the mainstream to understand better what does move towards the mainstream, and therefore, moderation entails.

Many RRWP parties included here have been functioning as part of their national parliaments for decades, challenging the use of the terms “mainstream” and “established” party as the opposite of an RRWP party. Adding to the challenge is the claim made by Vittori and Morlino (2021: 19) that ‘populism has never been as “mainstream” in society and politics

as it is in the post-economic crisis scenario', which would justify the distinction along the populist and non-populist line as suggested by Albertazzi *et al.* (2021: 5). However, as Moffitt (2022: 386) notes being a populist, niche or single-issue party, does not exclude ideological mainstream or governing-potential, recommending a division between mainstream and pariah parties.

In this thesis, being mainstream is not solely considered as having taken part in office but also as pursuing a more established, traditional mainstream agenda. Hence, here mainstream combines the ideological mainstream and governing potential and thus separates it from radical right-wing populism. What further aids in the separation of radical right-wing populism and mainstream is the clear and extensive definition of the phenomenon, which has been provided previously in this chapter.

As was mentioned above, there has been a turn to the right in the European party system, labelled "verrechtsing" by Mudde (2013). Some argue this is to accommodate the RRWP parties' policy base and thus maximising the mainstream parties' vote share (Bale 2003; Moffitt 2022; Wagner and Meyer 2017; Van Spanje 2010). Whereas others (Williams 2006; Mudde 2013) denote how the turn has not been motivated by RRWP parties and has also taken place in those countries with no notable RRWP parties present.

Whether RRWP parties have an impact on mainstream parties' policy positions is not in the scope of this thesis. Still, the overall shift to

the right in the European political system is meaningful since that also includes RRWP parties. It also suggests that RRWP parties have kept their issue ownership whilst mainstream parties have attempted to “adopt” their positions in a cat-and-mouse-like scenario. Consequently, and hand in hand, both RRWP and mainstream parties have increased their emphasis on nationalist and authoritarian issues (Wagner and Meyer 2017: 87, 93), which is poignantly noted by Bale (2003: 69), who writes how ‘Cinderella and her ugly sister may have become each other’s fairy godmother’.

If the evidence above indicates that mainstream parties with the RRWP parties have been swirling to the right, can we expect any moderation from the latter group, is the question this thesis discusses next.

1.4.2 To Modera or not to moderate?

The discussion on the mainstream parties’ right-turn indicates that what had previously been the RRWP parties’ agenda is now the “new normal” for the mainstream parties, which from one point of view, could be interpreted as RRWP “mainstreaming”. In other words, the RRWP parties did not go to the mainstream parties, but the mainstream parties went to the RRWP ones. If, however, as discussed above, radical right-wing populism has not moderated but has moved further to the right, then it is no more mainstream than it was before and holds its place further right

from the mainstream parties (Wagner and Meyer 2017: 99). Furthermore, the emphasis on this thesis is to compare RRWP parties to one another thus more a priori knowledge on moderation is needed for the analysis than the mere proximity to mainstream parties.

In their 2016 book, Akkerman *et al.* examine whether Western European RRWP parties have mainstreamed by focusing on changes in party agendas and goals. In addition to two comparative chapters, they have nine chapters for nine parties and according to them, mainstreaming may occur due to two reasons: appeal to more votes or inclusion into office (Akkerman *et al.* 2016: 3). The inclusion-moderation thesis, which assumes that participation into democratic institutions and procedures act as an amendment on RRWP agenda, will be further discussed and examined in the next chapter. But the conclusion Akkerman *et al.* (2016) reached was that although some parties did express some mainstreaming predominantly, the opposite was observed. Although the findings in the book will guide this thesis, what differentiates the two is the focus this thesis has on discourse and institutional roles.

An article that includes both, discourse and institutional roles, is *Different Types of right-wing populist Discourse in Government and Opposition: The Case of Italy* by Bobba and McDonnell (2016). The article compares the populist elements of Italy's LN and Forza Italia/Popolo della

Libertà (FI/PDL)¹² in their speeches, online messages, press releases, election manifestos and media interviews. Analysing the usage of “the people”, “elites”, “the others”, and “democracy”, they conclude that the emphases remain broadly the same whether the parties are in opposition or government, except with the term “elites”, which rises in usage when out of government and diminishes when in (Bobba and McDonnell 2016: 282, 294).

As was discussed earlier in this chapter, for RRWP parties, populism follows the salience of nativism and authoritarianism and so is not considered the parties’ primary feature. Consequently, populism is not expected to be high on guarded or “owned” issues. Furthermore, the discussion on elites and anti-establishment creates further challenges for parties operating in a political system, especially when they are part of the legislature or executive. Hence it is understandable that RRWP parties would diminish the discussion on elites when in government, which portrays a more complicated picture of moderation and how an institutional role may impact it.

The inclusion-moderation thesis outlined above, and further discussed later, is anticipated to turn government participation into moderation. However, when RRWP parties take on a governmental, especially senior governmental position, they have acquired power, which

¹² FI/PDL is not defined as RRWP in *the PopuList* but just populist.

they can use to promote and implement their favoured policies (Capaul and Ewert 2021: 782), further highlighting the division between primary and secondary issues.

Secondary issues, such as socio-economic issues, are mostly those that RRWP parties did not need to repeatedly debate and discuss before taking office. Whereas primary issues, such as immigration, are the ones the parties are more devoted to, and in the case of RRWP, parties are seen as their defining issues. Consequently, those issues the parties consider secondary are more likely to be moderated than the ones they view as primary (Akkermann *et al.* 2016: 15; Capaul and Ewert 2021: 783). Furthermore, if the moderation has taken place whilst in office due to the RRWP party's coalition partners and not part of an internal strategic change, something Akkermann *et al.* (2016: 15) call 'ephemeral and cosmetic', the parties may radicalise again once back in opposition, from where, for instance, their criticism towards the establishment is more straightforward.

The aforementioned decline in mentions of the "elites" in Bobba and McDonnell's (2016) article illustrates the challenges the populist anti-elitism and anti-establishment stances pose to RRWP parties, especially to those with more extended presence in parliaments (Akkerman *et al.* 2016: 45; Krause and Wagner 2021: 163). In addition to the time element, the proximity to the executive also matters. RRWP parties that are junior coalition members or supporting a minority government might

be more likely to hold on to their anti-establishment agenda than RRWP parties that are part of a majority government (Akkerman *et al.* 2016: 15; Capaul and Ewert 2021: 794). Hence, being part of and becoming the criticised establishment, RRWP parties struggle to maintain the populist and especially anti-establishment discourse.

Bobba and McDonnell (2016: 294) also note how it is not merely the frequency of the populist themes that matter, but also the vehemency and the tone of the populist discourse. They argue that understanding how the populist discourse 'does and does not change will be the key to helping us explain the evolution and success of these parties in the twenty-first century' (Bobba and McDonnell 2016: 296). Thus further validating the scope of this thesis.

The discussion so far is leaning more towards RRWP parties not moderating, but there are instances where it has taken place in varying degrees and aspects and for different reasons. Although RRWP parties are argued to have been the primary electoral beneficiaries of the Great Recession (Hernández and Kriesi 2015), Pappas and Kriesi (2015: 305) note how little the recession affected the Nordic countries and their RRWP parties. Pappas and Kriesi (2015: 307) portray the populist parties in Nordic countries as having 'toned down their populist discourse and behaved responsibly, thus trying to appear as forces in the mainstream'.

One of those parties, the Norwegian FrP, showed mainstreaming when in government, and its politicians behaved similarly to politicians

from other parties when in office (Askim *et al.* 2022: 729; Jupskås 2016: 187). Hence for FrP, the participation in the executive and its democratic processes seem to have acted as a moderator, and thus the party represents a sample of the inclusion-moderation thesis. Whilst another Nordic party, the DF is argued to some extent mainstreamed in its pursuit for office (Christiansen 2016: 108), and the PS moderating its positions on European integration for the same reason (Jungar 2016: 134). PS did indeed succeed in its pursuit for office, whereas for DF, the mainstreaming resulted in the party staying out of the coalition but still supporting the government in parliament. Whether these conclusions hold once the focus is on party discourse shall be seen later in the case study chapters.

FPÖ is another example of an RRWP party that mainstreamed when pursuing a place in a coalition (Heinisch and Hauser 2016: 88) and whilst in office (Akkerman 2016: 276; Pappas and Kriesi 2015: 321), which culminated in a party split in 2005. However, for the FPÖ, the mainstreaming was temporary. The party adopted a more xenophobic and anti-European tone in the two following elections, thus radicalising when back in the opposition (Heinisch and Hauser 2016: 89).

The mainstreaming of FN or “de-demonisation” has been a strategy under Marine Le Pen to distance the party from its extreme past (Godin 2013; Moffitt 2022). The party rejected its association with neo-fascist and neo-Nazi groups and altered its discourse to fit within the populist

framework instead of the extremist one (Godin 2013: 55). Although there was a slight moderation in the party due to vote-seeking, FN's anti-immigration and anti-Muslim ideology has not toned down (Godin 2013: 56; Akkerman 2016: 276).

As the discussion above highlights, measuring and detecting moderation and radicalisation is problematic because it depends on the focus and what is being measured. There are different aspects of party behaviour that may or may not impact moderation and radicalisation, whether it is policy outcomes, goals, strategies, RRWP agenda, election manifestos or discourse. One example of the complexity is how Pappas and Kriesi (2015: 321) note that SVP has moderated its populism, whereas Akkerman (2016: 276) and Akkerman and De Lange (2012: 595) argue the party has retained its radical profile and not mainstreamed. Thus what one is examining and with which parameters will influence the results.

In Wagner and Meyer's (2017) study, four RRWP parties moderated their issues positions, whereas 11 moved to the right. Since they focus on the overall picture instead of particular parties, they urge caution when interpreting the findings. They note how the 'future work should consider in detail how countries and parties vary in the extent to which the changes and developments [they] identify have taken place' (Wagner and Meyer 2017: 99). Similar arguments are echoed by Capaul and Ewert (2021: 783) when they write how an RRWP party 'hardly undergoes any

moderation across the board. Instead, moderation is often nuanced and subtle'. Both remarks justify the in-depth analysis undertaken in the case study chapters in this thesis and how much they may reveal about the parties' moderation or radicalisation with the detailed examination of the large amount of data for each party.

Reviewing the arguments above, even if the parties do not show overall moderation, there could be partial mainstreaming on specific issues. And what has not been examined in the field thus far is whether the institutional role the RRWP party hold impacts the issues they consider their own. Furthermore, even if, in some instances, there is radicalisation or moderation, it is noteworthy to remember that RRWP parties are limited in their manoeuvres by bureaucracies and non-governmental actors. And that 'coalition governments are the outcomes of processes of policy convergence between mainstream and populist radical right parties that predate the governmental cooperation' (Mudde 2013: 14). Thus, their power is and can be restricted.

Indeed, RRWP parties are embedded in the rules and procedures of electoral democracy (Albertazzi and Mueller 2013: 364). As Albertazzi and Mueller (2013: 364) write, although RRWP parties reject criticism directed at them, labelling it as being against the will of the people and challenging the complicated procedures of liberal democracy, they still have to take part in elections and push their preferred policies through the democratic processes that prevail in Europe.

The scope of this research is Europe, aiming that conclusions and findings could be adapted to other RRWP parties in countries outside the continent. As previously expressed, the decision to include all parts of Europe is based on the view that Europe is now more united than divided. But whether that is so will be answered further along in the thesis. If it is not, what could we expect to be different in the Eastern European countries, their RRWP parties and backgrounds? The chapter will next present what scholars thus far have written about the phenomenon in CEE to help identify issues related to it if they arise later in the thesis.

1.5 Central and Eastern Europe – More of the same or different radicals?

Europe in 1990, the starting point for this thesis, had two different settings, one in NWE with established liberal democracies, and another in CEE, where the political landscape had experienced a reset after the Cold War and begun a new journey towards liberal democracy. The Communist legacy and the transformation towards liberal democracy have left their marks on people and politics. This section examines how recent history has shaped the RRWP parties in the region, concentrating on its differences from Western Europe, which will be studied not only in the Large-N quantitative chapter but also in the qualitative ones comparing the responses and emphasis between the three parties, one from Hungary.

The “return of history” and “return to Europe” are two distinct interpretations of the radical right-wing populism phenomenon in CEE. The former perceives similarities with the pre-Communist interwar Fascism, with ultranationalism, whereas the latter draws parallels with Western Europe and sees the RRWP parties in post-Communist countries following the path of their Western counterparts (Minkenberg 2009: 447; Pirro 2014: 603). The third understanding is that the distinctive historical forces and the transformation process have created a phenomenon *sui generis* (Buštiková and Kitchelt 2009: 462; Minkenberg 2009: 447; Pirro 2014: 600; Pytlas 2018: 6), which in comparison to Western Europe is more extreme and anti-democratic (Allen 2017: 282; Minkenberg 2002: 336; Minkenberg 2009: 447).

The modernisation process has not been equal for all, and in CEE, it has not been driven by globalisation as much as it has by the post-Communist transition (Buštiková 2009: 224; Stanley 2016: 264). Although the phenomena carry similar results, the complexity of the economic, cultural and political transformation supersedes that of globalisation in the West (Ishiyama 2009: 492; Minkenberg 2002: 355; Pytlas 2018: 4). The transition process created ‘new cleavages centred on citizenship, ethnicity, divisions between Church and state, resource distribution, and so forth’, launching the region ‘into a crisis of values and authority’ (Pirro 2014: 602-603), both favoured topics for the RRWPs.

The democratic system brought in new restrictions and rights. For instance, most states were reluctant to introduce legal limits to the freedom of speech (Mudde 2005: 172). This, as explained by Mudde, 'is not surprising, given that the first governments were often made up of former dissidents who had been fighting for the freedom of expression and other democratic rights for decades under the communist regimes' (2005: 171).

Also, the protection of minority rights was not welcomed by all. Buřtiková differentiates between ethnically homogeneous countries, where the minorities include sexual minorities, Roma, Jews, Poles, Germans, and Greeks, with limited ability and capacity to politically organise, and ethnically pluralistic societies with 'larger ethnic groups with a high degree of politicization' (2017: 566).

Especially in the first group, where democracy had empowered and given protection to these minorities, the defiance against diversity expressed itself instantly (Buřtiková 2017: 565). Furthermore, a minority group that lacks the means to inflict severe political damage is a fitting scapegoat onto which to direct ethno-cultural hostilities (Buřtiková and Kitchelt 2009: 468). The refugee crises brought the RRWP parties in CEE closer to their Western counterparts by unifying their antagonism towards Muslim migrants and those with non-European backgrounds and their discontent towards the EU (Buřtiková 2017: 567, 572; Pirro 2014: 619).

Thus, the linking of nativism to populism should become apparent in the in-depth study on Fidesz.

In most discussions, Euroscepticism and anti-elitism are justified by the policies the EU, and other international and domestic organisations, impose that promote and accommodate minority rights, elevating their status (Buřtiková 2017: 570). Thus, as Buřtiková argues, the hostility is rooted more in policies than in groups (2017: 571), and RRWP parties 'respond to the political successes of minorities and seek to reverse their political gains' (2014: 1739).

Another take on anti-elitism is formed around the idea that those who took control after the collapse of the Communist rule betrayed the nation and allowed former Communists to profit from the transition without prosecuting them (Buřtiková 2017: 572; Pirro 2014: 609), whilst representing themselves as the cure for this disease (Buřtiková and Guasti 2017: 171). This will have heightened salience in Chapter Six since the roots of Fidesz are in anti-Communism, as will be briefed in that chapter.

The issue of corruption is addressed in similar terms: 'as an endemic problem related to the communist past and former communist elites that only a radical change could solve' (Pirro 2014: 618). The RRWP parties' positions within the CEE countries are further strengthened by their competitors' ineffective siphoning off of the potential support, as well as the economic recovery not being sufficiently fast enough 'to lower the

temperature of popular dissatisfaction and disgust with politicians' (Buřtiková and Kitchelt 2009: 466). The revolutions of 1989 left the public expectations high, but many of the promises that have been made since have been deserted or left unfulfilled, which has enabled the RRWP parties to tap into the feeling of betrayal (Pirro 2014: 603).

Due to the nativism of RRWP parties, they all represent a variation from one another. However, studying and analysing them in the transformation countries in CEE, which lack democratic practice, experience unstable political alliances and host distinct historical legacies, increases researchers' challenges. Minkenberg has likened this to 'shooting at a moving target but also shooting with clouded vision' (2002: 361), which was a claim made in 2002 and thus is ready to be reassessed two decades later.

Conclusion

This chapter has set the scene for the rest of the thesis by outlining the objectives and explaining the concepts. The discussion on radical right-wing populism began by defining the term and justifying why those exact definitions were the ones chosen to be employed here, highlighting the value of future comparisons, thus contributing to the future of the field.

Before progressing to the empirical chapters, it is imperative to understand how nativism, authoritarianism, populism and other characterisations are viewed here since the analysis uses codes and

variables labelled under these terms. The discussion on the role of the leaders and their centrality within RRWP parties is a vital part of this thesis' analysis since it is mainly leaders' writings and speeches that comprise the material examined in the case studies, which is why it was covered in the chapter as well.

The operationalisation of these themes into variables will be explained in Chapter Three in more detail, but to briefly summarise the key points, nativism will include topics of values and patriotism and issues around immigration, as discussed. Similarly, the variable on authoritarianism will mainly cover themes around law and order as well as illiberalism, whereas the populist variable addresses anti-establishment views in the form of debate around the EU and other domestic parties. What also comes under populism is the style of the discourse, the straightforward rhetoric often employing the "us" versus "them" framework.

What are known as the accompanying features of radical right-wing populism were also discussed with an emphasis on the role of the leaders, which is paramount in this thesis due to the party material coded being mainly produced by the leaders. In addition, the discussion addressed how RRWP parties utilise emotions and nostalgia, again expected to be part of the party discourse, and their attitudes towards the democratic system.

The chapter also provided an outlook on the current research and what is known about RRWP parties' moderation or radicalisation, which began with how the whole European political scene has taken a turn to the right. Centre-right parties have moved to the right, somewhat occupying the "old" RRWP parties' space whilst they have ventured even further to the right, consequently radicalising both spheres but keeping the distance between them at similar levels. Since this thesis views the radicalisation of RRWP parties as comparable to other RRWP parties, the manoeuvre of the European scene to the right does not affect the findings; it merely adds to the understanding of where the mainstream now lies.

The difficulty in measuring moderation or radicalisation became evident in the discussion that presented the same parties being labelled as gone through both processes by different authors. When studying the two procedures, the findings depend on the object and what is being analysed. Is it policies, for instance? If so, which ones, since ones connected to nativism, are probably addressed differently than those linked to populism? The timeline also matters, as was shown with FPÖ, who moderated to become more attractive coalition partners but radicalised once back in the opposition.

There was one research mentioned that examined the discourse of populist parties in different institutional roles, but the parties were populist, not RRWP; only two parties were included, both from Italy and

the analysis of the discourse was limited to populist themes. Thus there is a gap in the field for this thesis.

The last section highlighted the differences between the Western and Eastern European RRWP parties. Acknowledging and being aware of these differences will aid in the analysis in the later chapters, both quantitative and qualitative.

To summarise, this chapter has reviewed the existing literature and thus provided a knowledge base for this research. It has refined what kind of parties RRWP parties are and the characteristics they are said to possess. All these discussions will form an understanding against which the material in the analytical chapters will be examined and codes created and assigned to variables.

Yet more must be clarified and learned before the empirical study can begin. The next chapter will outline how discourse is understood here, how these parties behave in different institutional roles, and what are the expected findings.

2 How do drivers and moderators influence RRWP parties' behaviour in parliament?

Introduction

The purpose of the first chapter was to explain this study's motivation and aim and to introduce the terminology employed in this thesis. It laid the foundations by discussing what is known of the RRWP party family's traits and agendas and what is known of their moderation and radicalisation thus far. The thesis is now ready to continue with the building blocks that will ensure that the analytical chapters following will have a solid basis to stand on, understanding how and why the variables are chosen and the qualities they represent and measure.

Before Chapter Three outlines the methods and operationalisations employed in the research, this chapter will hypothesise what is expected to be found and concluded. The main research question is whether RRWP parties with different institutional roles have varying discourses and how that might be expressed.

The literature thus far has mainly concentrated on what happens to RRWP parties when they progress from legislative roles to executive ones, as well as on how the parties influence specific policy outcomes, mainly immigration, when part of a coalition government. However, this study

compares RRWP parties amongst themselves, seeking to establish whether their discourse is influenced by their institutional role and thus distance to power, aiming to fill some of the gaps in the literature on the RRWP parties' institutional behaviour and reinvestigate the existing knowledge.

One of the lacuna that this thesis aspires to fill is the impact of the support role, parties that provide parliamentary support for minority governments from outside the executive. The literature focusing on this institutional role is limited, and thus the discussion later in this chapter is not exclusively focused on RRWP parties but includes examples from the green parties and other niche parties, which are brought into the discussion in other parts of the chapter as well.

To set the scene for the motivations behind parties' discourse, the term discourse and how it is understood here is covered first. Following Mudde's (2010: 1179) description of RRWP parties as pathological normalcy, the same concepts and theories that apply in mainstream political science should also be considered when studying this party family. RRWP parties are no anomaly (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 173; De Lange 2008: 19), so the literature in this chapter is neither limited to RRWP parties only.

Before the more detailed conversation on institutional roles, the inclusion-moderation thesis and mainstreaming will be reviewed. Both concepts have been mentioned earlier, and the introduction also clarified

why the chosen antonym to radical in this thesis is moderate. After this, the chapter is divided into drivers and moderators, starting with the drivers and aforementioned institutional roles. The section on the drivers, will consider what is already known about the effects of each institutional position on RRWP parties and form the hypotheses. The drivers will be discussed in the same order as they are analysed in the qualitative case study chapters of the thesis: opposition, government and support party.

With radical right-wing populism, there can be expected to be other issues, here labelled as moderators, that may also influence the parties' discourse. The two with possible effects are leadership and issue ownership; their impact on RRWP parties has already been noted and briefly discussed. This section will show how, especially with parties with narrower agendas, issue ownership often limits the space in which parties are willing to manoeuvre, to alter positions and thus discourse. The second moderator is the leadership effect and the difference between activist- or leadership-dominated parties. While RRWP parties maintain an excellent relationship with their grassroots, the leadership-dominated approach describes the party family more fittingly, as explained in the previous chapter and can either moderate or radicalise the discourse.

2.1 Discourse framing the RRWP party agenda

Discourse in this thesis is interpreted not in linguistic terms but in the manner in which RRWP parties frame their ideology and policies. The

focus is on the features of radical right-wing populism which were outlined in the previous chapter, mainly nativism, authoritarianism and populism, in addition to the other socio-cultural issues that the party family and the three case study parties promote.

The analysis concentrates not so much on singular or specific words but on the themes surrounding the RRWP agenda and how they are constructed, expressed and marketed to the party members and supporters. Where the precise words do matter is in the tone of the discourse, for instance, how immigrants and asylum seekers are described and portrayed.

Noteworthy also is that even though the attention is on discourse, populism is not viewed as a performative act, as the socio-cultural approach would define it, but as a thin ideology. Hence the emphasis is not on how things are written or said but on what is included in the message.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is commonly used when analysing RRWP discourse, largely due to the pioneering work of Ruth Wodak. Although this study examines mainly party leaders' writings and speeches, the attention is not on the relations between language and power, as per CDA. It does though apply one of the other features of CDA, which focuses on the larger discursive text unit (Wodak 2001: 1-2). Furthermore, if CDA aims to reveal what is left unsaid in the discourse, here, the object is the opposite, what is actually written and said by the

leaders, the orientation of the discourses. Although, having said that, what is left unsaid will also be discovered in the final chapter, which compares the three case studies and where it will become apparent what were the topics that some of the parties addressed whilst others did not.

According to Wodak (2013: xxii), multi-methodical approaches capture the phenomenon that is radical right-wing populism accurately. As in this thesis, most of the chapters in *Right-Wing Populism: Politics and Discourse* (eds. Wodak, KhosraviNik and Mral 2013) are not restricted to one method but use different ones whilst examining the discourse employed by RRWP parties. Similarly, in this thesis, the analysis is based on the ideology of radical right-wing populism.

To summarise, this research is not about the underlying power structures of the discourse, nor specific policies, but the rhetoric around them and how they are sold to the voter. More specifically, it is about the features of radical right-wing populism outlined in the previous chapter.

Before introducing the drivers followed by the moderators, the aforementioned inclusion-moderation thesis and mainstreaming will be discussed. The two approaches are at the core of this thesis.

2.2 Do RRWP parties hunt for the median?

The view that RRWP parties also seek to move into the mainstream is called the inclusion-moderation thesis, with the idea that 'participation in democratic institutions and procedures will amend the radical nature and

ideology of political parties' (Akkerman *et al.* 2016: 3), and the reasons are claimed to be twofold. Firstly, similarly to other parties and accordance with Downs's (1957) spatial theory, the RRWP parties also follow the median voter in the pursuit of maximising their vote share. Secondly, to become a serious coalition contender, parties must adjust their policies to be more in line with the mainstream parties (Akkermann *et al.* 2016: 3-4).

Downs's spatial theory portrays parties as rational actors who follow the median voter to maximise their vote share, mainly in two-party systems. For parties to veer to the centre – the medium of the political spectrum – is logical, not only to find the most voters but also in order not to be excluded from the coalition negotiations.¹³ Thus, spatial theory can be seen as an explainer behind RRWPs' mainstreaming.

Parties are rational and calculating actors, and the decision by an RRWP party to align itself with the mainstream parties is a strategic choice. This process, called "mainstreaming", is 'a strategy that is designed to promote the pursuit of office, policy or votes, or a combination of these goals' (Akkermann *et al.* 2016: 14). Yet, when considering the vote-seeking factor, the Downs theory on the median voter is, based on reflections on two-party systems, which excludes all

¹³ If parties anticipate either being beaten or winning by a large margin, they will embrace the issues they feel close to and move away from the centre, keeping their internal support satisfied (Budge 1994: 448-449, 451; Budge 2015: 763).

but France and the UK in Europe, and the efficiency of the strategy has been brought into question also due to the changing electoral participation, which questions the centrality and importance of the median voter. The declining electoral participation, volatility of the electorate (Mair 2013: 22, 29) and the new ways to participate, for instance, online petitions and boycotting for political reasons, mean that election results do not capture everything and every vote. Furthermore, it is argued that RRWP parties are rarely pressured by electoral competition (Akkerman 2016: 279), meaning they are pleased with the policy agenda and electorate they possess.

Thus, Akkerman *et al.* (2016) set out to examine these assumptions and whether RRWP parties have become part of mainstream politics.¹⁴ Their findings indicate that although there has been some mainstreaming,¹⁵ RRWP parties have hardly moved into the mainstream but, on the contrary, have become more radical, as was noted in the previous chapter. If the adopted mainstreaming is indeed an effect of participation in government, RRWP parties may radicalise again when back in opposition (Akkerman *et al.* 2016: 15, 47), an observation that shall be examined by this thesis, especially in Chapter Five. Furthermore,

¹⁴ This cross-time and cross-country analysis measures radicalness, immigration and integration positions, 'niche-ness' and anti-establishment positions, employing the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), Nativist Immigration and Integration Policy (NIIP), Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and automated content analysis method, respectively.

¹⁵ Mainly regarding European integration.

the inclusion-moderation theory neglects the effects of environmental changes, especially relevant after the 2008 financial crash and the 2015 refugee crisis (Akkerman 2016: 279). The influence of both will be part of the analysis in the empirical chapters.

Even if the external factors may be hidden in the Large-N analysis, they should be revealed in the case studies, and since the object here is to measure the effects of institutional role, the thesis is not concerned with the challenges that focusing on vote-seeking may bring forward. It is also important to remind ourselves of what was explained in the Introduction, that whilst these two approaches view moderation as compared to the mainstream parties, RRWP parties are compared to each other in this thesis. Consequently, if a particular institutional group is deemed, for instance, more radical, that is compared to another RRWP institutional group, not against a mainstream one, which means that “moderate” and “radical” are comparative terms concerning this party family, not absolute.

As will be shown next, RRWP parties are not just opposition parties, nor do they shy away from coalition cooperation. Instead, they hold on to their radicalness and have found the electorate to stand by them and support that. Issue ownership matters for RRWP parties, as will be later shown, and their time spent in a governmental environment does not encourage them to move more into the centre where the median voter is,

rather they have learned that keeping their radicalness pays off and at times forces other parties to take part in debates owned by RRWP parties.

To proceed to drivers of discourse change and what is already known about the RRWP parties in different institutional settings, the chapter will begin by examining their behaviour in the opposition, followed by the effects of governmental role and finishing on the 'grey' role (Bale and Bergman 2006) in between opposition and government, which is that of support parties.

2.3 Drivers

This section discusses the three institutional roles with empirical case study chapters dedicated to them: opposition, government and supportive. The fourth institutional role, extra-parliamentary so parties with no parliamentary seats, is only briefly discussed in the quantitative chapter and thus not addressed here.

2.3.1 Being the radical voice in the opposition

In representative democracies, opposition is constitutional (Sartori 1966: 150) and as important and crucial as is government (Andeweg 2013: 100). Within the constitutional framework, opposition aims to criticise and scrutinise the government and thus influence its activities, including its existence in office (Andeweg 2013: 101; Norton 2008: 237). In this

thesis, opposition comprises all the parties in the legislature that do not form the government or assist it with official support. For King (1976: 18), the relationship between government and opposition can be described as conflict with the opposition's aim to conquest, not accommodate.

To have their opposing views heard and responded to by the government, opposition utilises publicity via exchanges in the parliaments (Norton 2008: 245). As Norton (2008: 245) puts it, '[f]or opposition parties unable to mobilise a parliament majority, the most important weapon they have is the oxygen of publicity'. Thus we can arguably expect opposition parties to be more radical than government parties. However, even though in this thesis, the European RRWP parties holding opposition seats are analysed as one group of parties, it is imperative to quote King's (1976: 11) remarks on how the legislatures and their composition differ between countries.

One of Mény and Surel's (2002: 18) claims was that governing RRWP parties would integrate into the mainstream, as discussed above, and another that they would remain in the opposition permanently. The latter view is shared by Heinisch (2003), who argued that it is the centrality of anti-elitism that causes difficulties for RRWP parties and makes them more suited for the legislature than for the executive, suggesting that opposition parties' discourse is not more moderate than that of RRWP parties in other institutional roles.

According to Heinisch, structural weaknesses such as a charismatic leader, putting people before institutions, simplistic solutions, and retaining the character of a movement stand in the way of their success once they enter the government. And even as part of the legislature, RRWP parties will have to participate in the debates and votes that come to the table and consequently either give support to the government or vote against it, often leaving little room to focus solely on the issues they comfortably own (Afonso 2015: 273).

Even if the organisational weaknesses limit the ability to deliver on their core agendas when part of a coalition government, RRWP parties manage to shape the agenda-setting and policy effects through their mere parliamentary presence, and, like an opposition party from any party family, they are freer than governing parties to pick the debate they wish to concentrate on (Green-Pederson and Mortensen 2010: 258). Unlike governmental parties, opposition parties are not tied to policy solutions but can focus on issues advantageous to themselves (Green-Pederson and Mortensen 2010: 261).

If all opposition parties concentrate mainly on their owned topics, RRWP parties do so even more, wishing to separate themselves from other opposition parties (Borghetto 2018: 20), which is not the only factor where RRWP parties differ from other parties on the opposition benches. In addition to focusing on the issues they consider their own, they also overemphasise them (Cavalieri and Froio 2021: 10). They are willing 'to

work hard to propose detailed policy compromises that other parties may agree to' (Louwerse and Otjes 2018: 492), which indicates that they will not be more moderate than RRWP parties in government or those supporting one.

The aforementioned diversity between the functions of national parliaments also results in differences in the effectiveness of opposition parties and the level of the pariah status they may be subject to by other parliamentary parties (Minkenberg 2016: 593 – 594). In the most extreme cases, being only a party of the opposition is not a decision the parties have made themselves but one taken by others. *Cordon sanitaire* sanctions a party to remain in the opposition and ostracises it, denying cooperation with other parties (Akkerman 2012: 523; Louwerse and Otjes 2018: 13; Minkenberg 2001: 18), which is expected to force moderation upon them since that could guarantee coalition partnership.

Examining RRWP parties in Western Europe, van Spanje and van der Brug (2007: 1036) concluded, however, that *cordon sanitaire* prevents moderation of a party whilst inclusion encourages it, thus confirming the earlier argument of the inclusion-moderation thesis. This, however, is disputed by Akkerman and Rooduijn (2015), who built on the previous study by van Spanje and van der Brug (2007) by studying the effects of inclusion and exclusion on the RRWP parties' ideologies, and whether either of the approaches results in moderation or radicalisation of their two core policy agendas: immigration and integration.

The findings by Akkerman and Rooduijn (2015) suggest that in the 1990s, the most radical parties were hit by isolation, yet after 2000 those non-ostracised began to catch up with them, making 2000 a turning point. They establish that RRWP parties without a *cordon sanitaire* have become more radical since the start of the new millennium, which diminishes the differences between inclusion and exclusion. Overall, and in contrast to van Spanje and van der Brug, Akkerman and Rooduijn conclude that *cordon sanitaire* has no effect on the party's core policy agendas, and that non-ostracised parties have not moderated their stances over time (Akkerman and Rooduijn 2015: 1151, 1153), further reinforcing the suggestion on opposition parties' discourse's strong emphasis on RRWP themes.

Even though exclusion may not aid in an RRWP party's moderation, one of the consequences can be to present the party as irrelevant in the eyes of the voters due to their lacking access to power (Pauwels 2011: 76). After all, the electorate seeks to have their views represented and policies introduced accordingly, which becomes unachievable if parties are denied cooperation or a chance at a place in a coalition government. Arguably, demonstrating willingness and ability for office responsibility was why VB occasionally moderated its anti-establishment style between 2000 and 2007 (Lucardie *et al.* 2016: 219), thus confirming the expected impact of *cordon sanitaire* even if discursively.

However, the discussion above demonstrates the strength of the RRWP parties' discourse, which is enforced by the issue ownership they have, discussed later, and how they seem confident upholding the radicalness when in opposition, whether sanctioned by *cordon sanitaire* or not. Chapter Four does not identify ostracised parties but will measure the opposition parties' group as a whole, and even if the debates and votes brought forward in parliaments may limit their discourse somewhat, it can be expected that in their election manifestos they are not more moderate than RRWP parties in other institutional roles.

According to the literature reviewed above, Chapter Five on the Finns Party (PS) should present a party that strongly emphasises issues they own and campaign on. If there are variations in their discourse, the explanations should be found elsewhere; for instance, in the aforementioned leadership effect or domestic or global external events.

Hence the evidence suggest that RRWP parties would not moderate their discourse when part of the legislature, resulting in the first hypothesis.

H1. Radical right-wing populist parties do not moderate their discourse when in opposition.

2.3.2 Sticking to their issue-ownership when in government

With the rise in electoral support, RRWP parties are not only parties of the opposition but have also moved into government and have been both

junior and senior partners in the executive (Appendix A). Some (Buelens and Hino 2008: 159; Van Spanje 2011) argue that of the parties with no previous experience in executive roles, RRWP parties are more vulnerable to electoral losses than other parties that take on the role for the first time, whereas others (Akkerman and de Lange 2012: 276-277; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 167) conclude that the consequences of participating in government are the same for RRWP parties as they are for other party families. This thesis has already emphasised Mudde's argument that RRWP parties are no anomaly, and when to this is added the parties' ability to learn, it would suggest that the latter statement is the more viable one and that RRWP parties face the same benefits and disadvantages as parties from other families.

Akkerman and de Lange (2012: 594) note, on the one hand, that the RRWP parties' post-incumbency electoral results do not generally differ from other parties', but, on the other hand, they show there is variance within the RRWP party family. They aim to explain this disparity by looking at the policy achievements on immigration and integration, the issues owned by RRWP parties, as well as the party cohesion and performance of ministers. The last two did indeed have a negative effect on voters, whereas, intriguingly, policy achievements on the main RRWP topics, immigration and integration, had minimal influence on the electorate (Akkerman and de Lange 2012: 595).

One example of diminished polling figures and party cohesion is that of FPÖ, who suffered electoral losses following their time in a coalition government, which was preceded by moderating their anti-establishment positions to meet the conditions set out by the Christian-Democrats. Minkenberg (2016: 598) also argues that the ÖVP – FPÖ coalition programme, although radical in the context of Austrian politics, witnessed a somewhat tamed FPÖ, which some observers described as the Austrian version of Tony Blair’s New Labour. Yet, the most salient issue was not pacified, and indeed it was the ÖVP that changed their views more towards FPÖ’s on the coalition government’s immigration policy (Minkenberg 2016: 599).

So not only did the party moderate for the pursuit of office, and to a degree in office, but it also suffered for this in the next elections, followed by internal divisions, which resulted in the party splitting (Heinisch and Hauser 2016: 88-89). Instances such as this showcase the negative consequences to other RRWP parties on how moderating the discourse as a governmental party can impact them, but they also arguably act as a deterrent for anyone considering following the mainstreaming path.

There is a difference in the logic of policymaking compared to that of electoral politics, and entering a government will force the parties to take stances on new policy areas and consider more practical matters. And RRWP parties are claimed to have no significant differences from other parties when in government, but are distributing their attention

across a broader set of issues and thus demonstrating their competence as policymakers (Cavaliere and Froio 2021: 10-11).

Unlike opposition parties, government parties are required to respond to a variety of issues that demand problem-solving, decision-making and implementation, which limits them in their attempts to prioritise the issues they own, those in their electoral mandate (Froio *et al.* 2017: 6,9; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010: 261). Akkerman (2012) focuses on one of those owned issues and examines the impact six RRWP parties had on the coalition governments they were part of, challenging the view that these parties affected policy change during their time in cabinet. SVP, Akkerman (2012: 523) argues, was the only one of the six that did manage to make a difference, but even that was moderate. Otherwise, the hardening of immigration and integration was down to the centre-right parties in the cabinets (Akkerman 2012: 523). Whereas Bichay's (2022: 9) results show how coalitions with RRWP parties significantly lower the level of civil liberties, although their impact on the institutional rule of law depends on them serving also as a prime minister.

Although this does not enlighten what happens to RRWP parties in government, it does reflect on the problems the parties face when incumbent and the limited power of being in a coalition. It is also common for opposition parties to bring forward issues that they feel more comfortable with and thus challenge the government parties who are still

forced to reply to those topics, furthermore restricting the opportunity for the government parties to control the debate (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010: 260). This would be especially problematic for RRWP parties who feel more comfortable when they can stick to topics under their issue-ownership. It will, therefore, be intriguing to witness how the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) data in Chapter Four differs between opposition and governmental parties.

When examining the reasons why mainstream parties form coalitions with radical parties, Bichay (2023: 2) argues that their aim is to co-opt their rivals, inviting them into coalition when their popularity and electoral threat are rising, and it becomes less risky than allowing them to continue as an opponent. These parties spend their opposition time protesting and attacking the government and other mainstream parties, which often stops when they become part of the government and have to focus on more moderate policy (Bichay 2023: 2, 5).

Summarising the paragraphs above, holding onto the issues parties own becomes more problematic when they are in government, and one of the issues that poses the most challenges when in government is anti-elitism. If they adapt too well, the parties risk losing their *raison de être*, which poses heightened difficulties for RRWP parties (Heinisch 2003: 91, 124).

Whilst there is evidence that the anti-establishment rhetoric moderates once RRWP parties enter the government (Bobba and

McDonnell 2016; Jupskås 2016: 187; Roodujin *et al.* 2014), it also holds that RRWP parties remain anti-elitist but change the target to one that does not include them, for instance, the EU, international institutions, or the media (Aslanidis and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016: 6; Batory 2016: 7; Krause and Wagner 2021: 164). Employing the familiar framework but moulding it to fit a new purpose is what RRWP parties excel at, as is expected to become evident once the thesis begins the in-depth analysis of the party material. Hence, when in government, RRWP parties do not need to either moderate their rhetoric or fall apart; instead, they have shown solid electoral and political resilience (Batory 2016: 293; Pappas 2019: 82), thus providing further evidence against the inclusion-moderation thesis and the mainstreaming approach.

To further 'dispel the myth that populists are somehow incompatible with government', Albertazzi and McDonnell (2015: 3, 167) focus on populist parties with governmental experience,¹⁶ noting that populist parties defend the policies valuable to them and deliver on some of their manifesto promises, which again reinforces the importance of issue ownership. Other observations were how realistically the time in government was viewed and rationalised by the representatives and the party members, and similarly, that the grassroots' experiences of the incumbency were very positive, indicating a good relationship with the leadership. By focusing on the parties and their membership, Albertazzi

¹⁶ FI/People of Freedom (PDL), LN and SVP.

and McDonnell demonstrate a more positive image of populist parties in power; furthermore, they conclude by considering how the parties can learn and adapt (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 170, 172, 174-175).

Although not unheard of, it is rare for a new party to reach government from their first elections, which indicates that a governmental party has a history in politics. This can be taken as a sign that they would have had to practice cooperation and negotiation, since little happens in a vacuum in politics. Hence, the probability is that governmental parties are not amateurs but experienced actors who understand the game and have learned to promote issues important to them, just like a party from any family, which is why incumbent RRWP parties are not hypothesised to be more moderate than the parties in other roles, maintaining the emphasis on RRWP topics. The assumption will be contested in the Large-N qualitative chapter, whilst the case study on Fidesz will analyse the discourse further to pinpoint possible changes and their motivations.

Although this thesis does not separate junior and senior partners in the analysis, it is beneficial to acknowledge some of the differences linked with the RRWP features, especially since Fidesz is a senior partner with a supermajority. One of these is the belief that RRWP parties represent the true voice of the people, which would result in increasing the executive power and diminishing limitations to it so that they can lead their country to success. This behaviour however, would be irrational for junior coalition members. If indeed they would come to possess such power as a junior

member, which is highly unlikely, it would not be in their interest to erode the executive power whilst not holding majority control of that power. It would only further distance them from their desired policy platform. As Bichay (2022: 4) notes, [r]emoving the constraints of the legislative or judicial branch provides little help – the primary veto point for a junior member is simply its senior partner’.

Bichay (2022: 4) continues to explain how the differing attitudes towards constraining power does not have an effect on the RRWP’s policy platform and junior and senior partners will pursue them similarly. It is further argued by Bochsler and Juon (2020: 182-183) that the extreme events in Hungary and Poland do not represent the region, where backsliding was limited until 2016 and counterbalanced by improvements to the quality of democracy in other cases.

To conclude, the research discussed above confirms the pathological normalcy view, where RRWP parties are not an anomaly but should be studied and observed using the same concepts and approaches as with the mainstream parties, as previously mentioned. It also weakens the notion that RRWP parties are a unique phenomenon, casting considerable doubt on the earlier argument by Mény and Surel (2002) as well as on the inclusion-moderation thesis. Even if they may need to change the targets of their anti-elitist discourse, RRWP parties are strong defenders of the issues they own, which will not be altered by coalition pressure, and they

are capable of working in the coalition environment, thus implying the second hypothesis.

H2. Radical right-wing populist parties do not moderate their discourse when in government.

2.3.3 The pivotal role of the supportive party and its central policy

The last driver to be discussed here is the role of the support party that, although in the opposition, is officially supporting a government. They have a balance of power and, to a degree, a command, resulting in them being able to embrace their discourse and issues convincingly whilst acquiring credit for the government's positive policy outcomes. As Thesen (2015: 983) appropriately notes, 'the support party role offers unique credit-claiming and blame-avoiding opportunities'.

Parliamentary parties who are officially supporting a government as a parliamentary coalition, to prop up the numbers on meaningful votes to ensure the government's majority, hold the balance of power whilst lacking accountability. Compared to the government coalition partners, these parties have less internal tension and fewer organisational problems, hence enjoying a more comfortable position of being able to follow a radical opposition role while claiming policy results (Akkerman and de Lange 2012: 591).

Issue ownership matters to parties supporting a minority government; hence the role suits niche parties, as well as RRWP parties.

A fitting example of this is the Swedish Greens, who supported a minority Social Democrat cabinet from 1998 until 2002 and felt that the consultations between the support party and the government were meaningless and resulted in the former being forced to go along with policies, except for the Ministry of the Environment where like-minded people were happy to cooperate (Bale and Bergman 2006a: 196-197). However, the Swedish Greens MPs viewed their time as a support party positively, which would indicate that they were happy with the policy outcomes they managed to influence (Bale and Bergman 2006a: 198).

The details of how parties go into the negotiations to become a support party are individual, and how detailed the contracts are, varies. It can be assumed that being able to drive issues important to the party will affect how the role is perceived by the party MPs, members and supporters. However, if an RRWP party can claim that it was their involvement with the government that imposed, for instance, a specific stricter immigration law, then their time in the role would be seen as a success.

Intriguingly, there was thinking amongst the Swedish Greens that the Social Democrats were willing to give way on the environmental front to keep them away from all other issues (Bale and Bergman 2006a: 202). Arguably, though, if the support party makes gains on their narrow agenda, for whatever reason, it will be interpreted as winning among the electorate. Although in the case of the Swedish Greens, this did not

happen, and the party did not gain new voters from the broader electorate (Bale and Bergman 2006a: 204).

Still, as was discussed earlier, RRWP parties have learned from their experiences in governments, and likewise, Bale and Bergman (2006a: 205) note how the Swedish Greens and their New Zealand counterparts both negotiated better terms when they next took the role of the supportive party, similarly to the three Portuguese radical left parties that supported minority government with agreements on policy pledges drafted in 2015. Most of the policy goals included in the agreements have been fulfilled, as were the promises of the support parties to vote consensually on most of the government's legislation (De Giorgi and Cancela 2021: 296). Since the Danish People's Party (DF) have been in this position multiple times, it can be assumed that they have indeed learned how to benefit from specific terms and agreements.

The support party's power rests on the assumption that if they pull back their support it could cause serious harm to the government, even causing it to collapse. Nevertheless, the executive is not restricted to the help of the support party but can find enough votes from elsewhere in the parliament, thus weakening the power of the party (Bale and Bergman 2006a: 198) and casting a challenge on the discussion thus far.

How much bargaining power the support party wishes to apply to the government may depend on why they are outside the executive and not part of it, which may not be explicitly down to the more minor party

but a decision that the government might have taken. However, for an RRWP party, the choice arguably would be linked to anti-establishment views and thus be ideological, which is one of the three factors noted by Bale and Dann (2002: 350-351), two others being the evaluation of probabilities, interests and risks and the institutional environment of the political system.

If it is acknowledged that RRWP parties learn from their own and others' experiences in the support role, it should also be viable to argue that they learn about coalition cooperation as well, enabling them to demonstrate to other parties that they are reliable and responsible partners and to the electorate that they provide political stability (Bale and Bergman 2006b: 31). Of course, to demonstrate this requires the support party to be reliable and responsible and to provide stability, which does not always go hand in hand with a discourse that emphasises the RRWP agenda. The electorate may also interpret the party's behaviour as shying away from governmental responsibilities and see a vote for them as a wasted vote, as discussed above in relation to the negative consequences of *cordon sanitaire*.

Crowley and Moore (2020) examine the legacies of taking on the role and ask whether it is a *stepping stone, halfway house or road to nowhere* when they compare the Green parties' time supporting minority governments in Sweden, New Zealand and Australia. They conclude how in the Swedish case, it was a *stepping stone* that witnessed the party

become a coalition member. In contrast, in New Zealand, it resulted in electoral setbacks as well as, after 17 years, their first ministries, Crowley and Moore (2020: 677), calling this a *halfway house*. The support role of the third party, the Australian Greens, was a *road to nowhere* (Crowley and Moore 2020: 677). Unlike the two others, they operated in a majoritarian system, and ended their time as a support party before the elections, after Labour distanced itself from their support party early on. The first election after the fallout had the Green Party losing voters in the polls, from which they recovered in the succeeding years. However, the relationship between the two parties did not recover and remains antagonistic (Crowley and Moore 2020: 677).

The Swedish Greens also achieved policy outcomes whilst supporting the government between 1998 and 2002. Such as the substitution of eco-taxes for taxes on income, property and companies, and increased subsidies and grants to the national Nature Protection Authority, regional environmental agencies, alternative energy projects, railway construction, electrification and improvements, to environmentally friendly building, organic agriculture and research, as well as, towards the public purchase of forest areas under threat from logging (Bale and Begman 2006: 201). This is not an insignificant list for a relatively small party and indicates the pivotal role of the support party and how the role can further their favoured and salient topics and policies.

This institutional role fits RRWP parties who can focus on their own, and owned, policies and pursue them, showing their members and the electorate that they have succeeded in their policy goals. However, the research into this exciting and disproportionately powerful parliamentary group is limited, as shown above, and more evidence will begin to clarify the matter, which in this thesis is provided via a Large-N qualitative chapter, a case study chapter and a chapter comparing the three case studies, by summarising their analyses.

The cases in the former sample are small, but possible findings should be intriguing and pave the way for further study, including the one conducted on DF in Chapter Seven. It can be assumed by what is known about the RRWP party family in other parliamentary roles, that in this role they can focus on their narrower agenda and, due to the crucial balance of power they are in possession of, that RRWP parties which officially support a government have no reason to possess a more tamed discourse compared to the RRWP parties in opposition or government.

H3. Radical right-wing populist parties do not moderate their discourse when officially supporting a government.

2.4 Moderators

The discussion on moderators is divided into two parts and will begin with issue ownership, which has already been mentioned, followed by the role

of the leaders, to both build on and widen the knowledge brought together in Chapter One.

2.4.1 The importance of issue ownership

Niche parties are parties whose policy preferences are within a limited range, mainly outside the economic sphere. They characteristically own one issue dimension related to the environment, immigration, ethnoterritories, peace, feminism and so forth (Meguid 2005: 347-348; Meguid 2007: 3, 26; Meyer and Wagner 2013: 1247; Wagner 2012: 2). When founded, many RRWP parties had narrower agendas, often focusing on one of the core RRWP topics, especially immigration, and only with parliamentary participation have they somewhat widened their policy focus. Thus, they would have fitted the classification of niche parties at the beginning of their political life, gained their success with a narrower policy agenda through having a ownership over a particular issue(s), limiting their willingness to alter their approach to those specific topics.

To examine that statement further, it is argued that issues can be differentiated between principled and pragmatic ones (Tavits 2007). On the one hand, principled issues are bound to the party ideology and values and are often deeply ingrained in voters, so shifts in those would not only lead to vote losses but could also make supporters feel betrayed and alienated, portraying the party as unreliable in the eyes of any potential new voters. On the other hand, pragmatic issues concern voters'

welfare, and flexibility on those could result in vote gains (Tavits 2007: 152, 154), showing that parties are capable political actors.

Parties have ownership over specific issues following their ideological tendencies, which would be labelled as principled issues according to the above. The parties have identified many principled issues as their new and winning topics that often do not belong to opponents' generic ownership. These policy "portfolios" are often developed when the party is formed (Bélanger and Meguid 2008: 478) and during election campaigns, parties either aim to focus on their core agenda whilst avoiding bringing their opponent's strengths into the centre of the campaign debate (Budge 2015: 767; Green 2011: 760; Green-Pedersen 2007: 609; Mair *et al.* 2004: 6), or force their opponents to pay attention to those specific issues (Green-Pedersen 2010: 349).

Issue ownership is essential for all niche and RRWP parties. Adams *et al.* (2006: 526) argue that niche parties lack 'the bitter internal debates between "pragmatists" and "ideologues" that often beset mainstream parties' and that 'for niche parties, policy radicalism is an electorally pragmatic strategy'. The success of that strategy is determined by the competition between the mainstream parties and how they react to the niche parties' agenda. The former can adopt an accommodative,

adversarial or dismissive strategy to deal with the new issues.¹⁷ For the survival of the new or niche party, it becomes imperative that they can still claim the ownership of their salient issue over their mainstream rival (Meguid 2005: 357; Meguid 2007: 22, 26).

RRWP parties have direct and clear ownership over their core agenda, which has commonly evolved around the phenomenon's three main concepts: nativism, authoritarianism and populism. The parties have triumphed, for example, in bringing the immigration as well as the corruption debates into the public domain whilst leading the conversations surrounding them, which has not only led to the media attention focusing on RRWP parties on these matters but also has its implications for their opponents. In the case of the immigration debate, this happened, for example, in the Dutch elections of 2017, when the Prime Minister, Mark Rutte (VVD), shifted to the right on immigration to attract more votes from the PVV.

If the mainstream parties can join in the debate owned by RRWP parties, the RRWP parties are also capable of reframing the salient issues owned by their opponents, which helps them succeed in elections (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010: 5). This is often done by using the "us" versus "them" framework. For instance, RRWP parties can divert debates

¹⁷ An adversarial strategy strengthens the niche party by reinforcing the link between the issue and the party, as does delayed response, whereas a dismissive or an accommodative strategy undermines the distinctiveness of the niche party position (Meguid 2007: 28-29, 37).

on sexual minorities, women's rights and terrorism to arguments against Islam. They can be masterful in restructuring and moulding issues so that topics fit their agenda and discourse, as will be shown in the case study chapters.

Dis-entangling issue ownership from the aforementioned drivers could be challenging. However, if issue ownership is considered as a feature that RRWP parties adopt when they become electorally relevant, then that should not alter the emphasis the parties place on their favoured topics thereafter. They have developed their favoured policy "portfolio" and keep their positions on salient issues. Thus issue ownership is expected to keep the parties' attention on their core agenda at similar levels, whereas radicalisation, or moderation, that would be caused by the change in the institutional role should be able to be linked to the period when a change in the roles occurs. However, if a particular topic is dropped from the agenda, the emphasis decreases, which could be considered moderation. Whereas if a matter is deemed more critical than previously, it can be viewed as a radicalisation. In other words, issue ownership is somewhat entangled with the RRWP parties and thus works in conjunction with their roles, and to a degree with the leadership who may be the ones deciding the agenda.

The emphasis and salience of agendas and how they are reframed is mainly left to the leaders, in RRWP parties, or at least are announced by them, confirming the leaders' pivotal role in the parties, which is

discussed next.

2.4.2 Leaders as the rule-makers?

Although RRWP parties have close and good relations with their grassroots, they are known and recognised by their leaders. Hence the second moderator that is considered relevant here is the leadership effect that can influence the emphasis of the party discourse either way. According to one approach, the change in parties' policy positions is determined by whether they are activist-dominated or leadership-dominated parties (Schumacher *et al.* 2013), both of which could be applied to RRWP parties. This section will begin with a few words on the former before progressing to the latter approach.

As indicated by the term, the activist-dominated parties are responsive to partisan preferences at the cost of the median voter. The more prominent a role the activists have in the policy decisions, and the more decentralised parties become, the more it increases the policy orientation of the party at the expense of office and vote-seeking (Schumacher *et al.* 2013: 464; Strøm 1990: 577). Commonly used examples of this type of party are the green parties, which have 'a specific ideological profile – often quite a radical one – a specific reference to "grassroots democracy" ... and a quite specific electoral public' (Rihoux and Rüdiger 2006: S17). However, the description above is also fitting for RRWP parties.

Similarly to RRWP parties, it can be argued that the green parties started their political existence as niche parties, but the time spent in national parliaments has forced them to widen their agenda and focus on matters outside the scope of the environment. They have since the beginning been challenging the established political parties, have been more effective in more affluent countries that are producers of nuclear power than in countries with high unemployment figures (Grant and Tilley 2018: 505; Müller-Rommel 2002: 1), and have successfully entered governments, in both Eastern¹⁸ and Western¹⁹ Europe. Many of the green parties have roots in social movements or have been closely supported by them, and as activist-dominated organisations, they have wanted to keep the decision-making as close to the grassroots as possible, avoiding becoming professionals (Burchell 2001: 118; Lucardie and Rihoux 2008: 7; Rihoux and Rüdig 2006: S17). This again is a detail regularly advertised by RRWP parties with their anti-establishment views.

Similarly to RRWP parties who are forced to deal with new issues

¹⁸ In Eastern Europe, they played a crucial role during the transition period towards liberal democracy, mostly as a part of a pre-election alliance rather than on their own (Rihoux and Rüdig 2006: S4, S133; Rüdig 2006: S25, S146). During the Soviet Union, environmentalism was viewed as a symbol of the resistance to Communism, and hence lost its salience after the collapse, since then it has played markedly little role (Grant and Tilley 2018: 505; Rüdig 2006: S138). This has resulted in diminished influence, if not obliteration, of the green parties (Rüdig 2006: S128; Rihoux and Rüdig 2006: S23), except in Lithuania and Latvia. In the latter, the Green Party, in addition to keeping its role in the government for several terms, occupied the prime minister's office in 2004 (Casal Bértoa 2021).

¹⁹ The economic downturn in the early 1990s influenced the salience of environmental issues in Western Europe, 'but as well-established parties they managed to survive this period fairly well' (Rüdig 2006: S146).

when entering parliaments, the green parties have had to reassess their goals as political parties and progress from the initial concern of raising environmental awareness to gain a representation in national parliaments for direct political impact.²⁰ Some within the green parties do not view the government as the place where the real power lies. For them, participating in one is not an efficient way to implement the changes they view as necessary to achieve their goal, which they believe to be the survival of humankind²¹ (Burchell 2001: 130; Dumont and Bäck 2006: S35; Poguntke 2002: 133).

With leadership-dominated parties, the power is concentrated at the top with very few internal veto players, and the role of the leader is an imperative internal stimulus, which is why a leadership change often brings about wider change. Unlike the activist-dominated parties, leadership-dominated parties are influenced by the change in the mean voter position and office exclusion and will shift their position when excluded from office in the hope of winning it back.

From an entrepreneurial perspective, the pursuit of office is guided by the party leaders' motivation to enter the office with expectations of it benefiting them personally, including benefits they can then exchange for

²⁰ The first entry into parliament means increased resources and is likely to have a bigger impact than the possible following step into the government, as at this point the party would already be fairly established and stable (Rihoux 2006: S82).

²¹ Especially since seldom they are forming the government, and therefore only participate when invited (Rihoux and Rüdiger 2006: S10).

private gains. However, the centrality of the leader also means that the changes they initiate on the policy issues could leave them facing post-election challenges, for both losing votes and betraying the party ideals (Budge 2015: 770; Harmel and Janda 1994: 266; Schumacher *et al.* 2013: 464, 474; Strøm 1990: 571). Hence the leader is responsible for both losses and gains.

Newer parties may come under pressure to reshape their party organisation and become more professional and more institutionalised, and often instigate the decision to do so, even if it results in intra-party conflicts. The party members view the change as being made at the price of their “new politics”, whereas the leader's deliberate intention for the reform is to consolidate their standing inside the party, as well as to achieve their preferred governmental position²² (Burchell 2001: 114; Rihoux 2006: S73), which suggests moderated agenda.

In many ways, RRWP parties fit the activist-dominated approach. They have close links to their grassroots and activist base and have had difficulties adapting their organisations and agendas to better serve the national parliaments' demands, resulting in intra-party conflicts. Yet, as was established in the previous chapter, although the leader's charismatic role in RRWP parties might not be a defining characteristic of radical right-

²² This push often is attainable only when the green party is in the opposition for a longer period, due to the daily ministerial duties demanding most of the leader's time (Rihoux 2006: S73).

wing populism, it is an accompanying feature of the phenomenon, and the role and importance of the leader are pivotal for most RRWP parties.

In this thesis, the leaders' role is a vital part of the analysis, not only since the writings and speeches studied for the case studies are mainly produced by the leaders, but also due to the leader being one of the selection criteria. Essentially, RRWP parties are run from the top down, and even if the relations to the grassroots are, have been, and continue to be close, which is a salient help in their success, the importance of the leader is what triumphs. As noted in the previous chapter, RRWP parties are hierarchical, arguably even authoritarian; thus, one of their core features also describes the RRWP parties' composition, an issue examined throughout the case study chapters.

The central role of the leader is marked by Werkmann and Gherghina (2018: 10), who argue that RRWP parties who do not change their leadership too often are more stable 'because leadership continuity ensures homogeneity of the party organisation'. The same applies to mainstream parties, yet the impact of leadership change is more significant for RRWP parties due to their leaders being the "face of the party" (Werkmann and Gherghina 2018: 10). These changes also have consequences for electoral success since RRWP parties who have consistent ideological discourse perform better electorally than those who alter their discourse (Werkmann and Gherghina 2018: 18).

Determining whether the leadership-effect moderates or radicalises

the discourse is dependent on the RRWP party, and indeed, the leader. As mentioned, the leader may have personal motives to moderate the discourse in an attempt to become a more influential actor. Yet they may also decide to radicalise the rhetoric if they deem it the best solution to gain more supporters. Either way, it may impact the party discourse, which again can influence election results. However, decoupling the impact of the leadership from that of institutional roles should be relatively straightforward since the changes in the leadership are recorded and thus can be monitored separately from the changes in the institutional roles. If both changes happen simultaneously, comparing the old and new leaders' policy preferences and discourse should enlighten the argument further.

Conclusion

In addition to focusing on what is already known about RRWP parties' discourse in different institutional roles, this chapter has included literature from mainstream, niche and green parties to construct a better understanding. This is especially valuable since the thesis does not view RRWP parties as different from other parties and acknowledges that they are becoming more accustomed to the political arena and to the qualities required to succeed even if they are not mainstreaming ideologically.

The chapter began with a summary of how discourse is viewed here, analysed not in linguistic but in ideological terms, examining

broader themes surrounding policies in the writings and speeches. After this, the focus shifted to the two main themes of the thesis inclusion-moderation thesis and the concept of mainstreaming and how those are expected to influence RRWP parties. The discussion showed evidence both ways, yet the more recent research questioned the relevance of the two concepts, challenging the idea that RRWP parties are willing to adopt more neutral stances on their agenda and discourse.

The discussion then turned to drivers and moderators. The drivers, which are the different institutional roles, concluded that being in the opposition, government, or a support party for a minority government does not tame the parties' discourse and is not expected to do so in this thesis either. Thus, it is expected that there will be no variation between the three roles in the Large-N qualitative chapter, but that they all similarly emphasise the RRWP agenda in their election manifestos.

The moderators included issue ownership and leadership effect. Both are salient features of RRWP parties and provide alternative explanations for the possible discourse changes. They will come under scrutiny in the case study chapters aiming to develop the answers on what motivates the shifts in the discourse if it is not institutional roles. Although the moderators do not offer their own hypothesis for the thesis, issue ownership is relevant when constructing the three hypotheses and linked to the RRWP party discourse.

The results from Chapter Four will be further examined in the qualitative chapters, where the data comes from the party material, which possibly could provide a different outcome from the manifesto material. If that is not the case and the three hypotheses hold, meaning the institutional role does not impact the RRWP parties' discourse, the case studies should enlighten the explanations of what does.

To summarise this chapter and the literature discussed above, the dependent variable of party discourse is expected to be such a strong, identifying feature of the RRWP parties that the changes in the independent variable, proximity to a government, will not influence it. It is noteworthy how much more is known about other parties' behaviour than the RRWPs'. Even with the current academic attention and research into the phenomenon, what is known about this party family's behaviour in parliamentary settings and what influences their strategy changes is an area that needs a more comprehensive understanding.

If there is little research on RRWP parties' discourse change in different parliamentary roles, there is even less known about those parties that, without being part of a coalition government, support it in meaningful votes and thus arguably hold the balance of power. To provide insight into this group will benefit not only scholars working on RRWP parties but academics working on all political parties.

Before beginning the Large-N analysis and beginning to tackle the questions raised, the thesis will introduce the methodology employed in both quantitative and qualitative chapters.

3 Methodology

Introduction

This thesis employs a mixed-methods approach to examine whether RRWP parties' institutional role impacts their discourse and to test the hypotheses set out in the previous chapter. The empirical part of the thesis will begin with a Large-N quantitative study of European RRWP parties that have participated in their national parliaments, in Chapter Four, followed by three qualitative case studies in Chapters Five to Seven. The findings from the quantitative chapter will guide the in-depth analysis in the qualitative ones, aiding in locating enlightening details. The three case studies represent three illustrative "episodes" of RRWP parties in different institutional roles that will provide an in-depth analysis into the parties' discourse. Although the empirical contribution of the case studies that analyse a broad range of party material is strong, the causality remains limited. Furthermore, since the case study chapters employ the method of process tracing, which has low degree of external validity, the finishing Chapter Eight, which summarises the three, aims to provide further inferences.

Chapter Four asks whether a particular institutional role influences RRWP discourse, whilst the case study chapters dive deeper into the

debate of how a specific institutional role impacts the party discourse. Furthermore, if it is not the role, then which moderators, discussed in the previous chapter, may affect the party rhetoric? These in-depth analyses provide an enhanced understanding into the three parties and their behaviour with a large amount of party material coded. Whereas Chapter Eight will compare the cases and draw findings with some external validity where possible.

This chapter presents and justifies the methods and operationalisation used in this thesis and will begin by introducing the overall approach employed, called nested analysis, followed by a more detailed look into the quantitative chapter of the study. After this, the chapter presents process tracing, which is the chosen method of analysis in the three case studies on the Finns Party (PS), Fidesz and Danish People's Party (DF), representing a party of opposition, a party of government and a support party, respectively.

The focus will then turn to the cases included here, introducing the *PopuList*, which classifies RRWP parties in Europe and has been peer-reviewed by over 80 academics.²³ Their list includes all parties that have acquired more than 2% in their parliamentary elections, but only those who have held parliamentary seats are included in the list used here

²³ Although there is still debate over who is and who is not RRWP, prior to the *PopuList*, studies like this would have needed to commence their work by producing a list of their own.

(Appendix A). The chapter will then justify the choice of the three case studies and present those parties, before progressing to the variables.

The introduction of the variables will begin with a discussion on the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR), its data, and the variables selected for Chapter Four. The MARPOR dataset is widely used, and it covers decades of election manifestos from five continents, offering a unique bank of data for researchers to access effortlessly. The six variables used in this study to represent radical right-wing populism will be presented and justified, referring to the characteristics covered in the first chapter.

Once the quantitative chapter's variables have been explained, the attention moves to the qualitative chapters and the sources coded and analysed, and the timelines for each party, which will progress into a summary of the NVivo programme used in the coding. Before the conclusion, the case studies' variables and their themes will be introduced to highlight the bridge between the literature reviewed in Chapter One and the codes employed in the three case studies.

3.1 Nested analysis

To begin the research at a European level with all the relevant RRWP parties included, the choice to perform statistical analysis was fitting for the Large-N due to the time and space limits. After which, the qualitative method was the appropriate one to provide a more detailed and case-

specific analysis. Hence, although the two methods are used distinctively, the thesis follows a mixed-method approach; more precisely, a nested analysis, which divides the analysis between Large-N and Small-N (Lieberman 2005). The Large-N is the preliminary, information-providing analysis, which should complement the findings of the Small-N and guide its execution (Lieberman 2005: 438).

Linking Large-N with Small-N reduces the potential problems of endogeneity and insufficient data that pure quantitative analysis may encounter by further testing the robustness of the in-depth Small-N component (Lieberman 2005: 442), hence overcoming limits on available data or cases. For instance, any deficiencies addressed in the quantitative chapter are counteracted with more detailed case studies, adding to the research's validity. Although the case studies in this thesis were pre-selected and not guided by the Large-N, starting the analysis with a more comprehensive European coverage aided in understanding how the qualitative chapters may develop, and as Lieberman (2005: 448) states, 'strict guidelines cannot be established for the nested analysis approach'.

Thus the flexibility of the approach increases its appeal further, which explains why it has been widespread, not least among researchers on radical right-wing populism and populism (de Lange 2008; van Kessel 2015; Röth *et al.* 2018).

Furthermore, a study that uses different methods can tackle the research questions with rich data, which by employing rigorous

approaches provides more detailed results than a single approach could do alone (Green *et al.* 2015: 19; Heale and Forbes 2013: 98). It allows the researcher to focus on periods or topics where the quantitative method has revealed something intriguing by employing the qualitative approach to examine further what is occurring with the data and what more can be learned with different tools.

The nested analysis provides valid and valuable answers to research questions, since the data is not only investigated once but triangulated to solve the research questions more accurately. The underlying benefit outlined by Lieberman is echoed by Burnham *et al.* (2004: 278), stating 'when quantitative precedes qualitative, it provides aid to understand the complex relationships', and it is to the methodology of that quantitative strategy that this chapter will turn next.

3.1.1 The choice for quantitative analysis: ANOVA and Tukey

Due to the RRWP parties being divided into groups, depending on the institutional role they held in the election year of the MARPOR data, the method chosen was ANOVA, which compares specific groups to each other, identifying statistically significant differences. Since ANOVA does not identify between which groups the differences exist, Tukey's post-hoc test will be employed where required to reveal them (Tukey 1949). As with the nested analysis, researchers have used ANOVA when focusing on similar topics to the one examined here in Chapter Four (Marcos-Marne *et*

al. 2019; Filc and Lebel 2005; Akkerman 2012; Blassnig *et al.* 2019a; Blassnig *et al.* 2019b).

Although the analysis benefits from the use of qualitative methods, thus not relying solely on the ANOVA, the thesis, in addition to introducing complementary data in the form of additional tests to strengthen the findings, which can be found in the Appendix B, applies triangulation to reduce limited results and possible biases (Burnham *et al.* 2004: 31; Greene *et al.* 1989: 256). Thus, after the initial ANOVA, Chapter Four proceeds by dividing the sample into four further subsamples, in order to enhance the validity by approaching the data from different perspectives to see if anything new appears in the results. This process of dividing data is more complementary than substitutable (Balzacq 2014: 378).

With the first subsets, the data is split between the timeline to create one subset from 1990 to 2004 and another from 2005 to 2018. The latter subgroup begins after the 2004 EU enlargement, which had ten new member states joining the Union, and before the 2007 – 2008 financial crisis that arguably shaped the discourse of the RRWP party family, continuing into the refugee crisis. Hence, the choice of 2005 represents a point where the new states had joined the EU and thus shared policies with the rest, as well as a time that was arguably calmer before the two crises that impacted Europe.

The other divide is geographical, with subsets on North and West Europe (NWE) and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In addition to the

geographical divide, this division also fits one applied by Van Biezen and Kopecký (2007), who made the distinction between old and new democracies, the former meaning countries that began to democratise during or after 1974, which covers all the seven countries in the CEE subset.

These additional subsets should test the MARPOR data and the case studies and reveal insights that may have been left uncovered if ANOVA was run only on the complete set. If limitations skew the results and escape the five ANOVA analyses and the ones in the Appendix B, they are further examined in the case studies, which follow the process tracing method introduced next.

3.1.2 Qualitative analysis with process tracing

The strategy of a case-orientated analysis focuses upon a relatively small number of cases, which are examined with attention to each case as a complex unity, seeking to unravel it rather than establish relationships between variables (Della Porta 2008: 204). It is common for Small-N studies to follow statistical research to identify relevant variables, reveal deviant cases, and further refine concepts (George and Bennett 2005: 20). Although the Large-N chapter did not direct the case study choices in this thesis, it did influence the analysis and what was to be focused on in the qualitative chapters. Hence, Collier's (2011: 825) note on how 'the fine-grained description in process tracing sometimes relies on

quantitative data' is recognised here.

The method applied to the case study chapters is that of process tracing, which aims to locate the associations between the possible causes of the observed outcomes to test the hypothesised causal processes, describing political phenomena as well as evaluating causal claims (Collier 2011: 823; George and Bennett 2005: 6). Process tracing is a kind of systematic study that seeks to link an effect to an explanation based on a thorough assessment and weighting of evidence for and against the causal inference, emphasising the role of theory and the empirical testing of hypotheses (Ricks and Liu 2018: 2). Instead of assessing *how much* variable matters to the outcome, process tracing focuses on *whether* and *how* it matters (Crasnow 2017: 7; George and Bennett 2005: 25), which are the questions on which the qualitative chapters focus.

One of the trade-offs associated with process tracing is its low degree of external validity (Beach 2017: 36), hence the method of counterfactuals was considered first as the qualitative method, which would also increase causality. This is where pairs of cases for each institutional role, with a variation in the dependent variable would have been compared. This however, would have had both operational and empirical disadvantages.

Beginning with the former, comparing pairs for each institutional role would have increased the cases from three to six, and even though the coded material could have been decreased slightly to fit the time

limits, the more consequential obstacle was the language. Since selecting on the dependent variable, language that the materials would have been produced, would have not been taken into consideration, which would have, unfortunately, resulted in translation costs unbearable for a PhD thesis. If that barrier could have been solved, the method would have increased the causal influence but also raised other challenges.

The quantitative study could have been employed as the *a priori* study that finds the pairs that differ on the dependent variable and it probably would have been more beneficial to find a variable on MARPOR that best reflects the moderation and radicalisation scale instead running the ANOVA on the six separate variables as is done now. Since the MARPOR variables reflect election manifesto discourse it is expected that those might not yield similar results to the discourse employed in the party material and their analysis.

Thus beginning with the dependent variable based on MARPOR data may not guarantee that the pair would have counterfactual dependent variables once the party material was coded and analysed, posing new problems. As Levy (2009: 633) notes, '[f]or a counterfactual to be scientifically useful, the consequent must be clearly specified by the analyst, not left to the imagination of the reader'. Since there are various variables that are analysed in the case studies, that are not all expected to have the same variations with time, it would have been difficult to estimate their overall direction based on a MARPOR variable.

Furthermore, if the expectation is that RRWP parties do not moderate their discourse when taking on the different institutional roles, finding those that would have done so could skew the comparisons. This thesis does not employ predetermined codes but allows the data to direct which topics should be coded and analysed due to their salience for the parties. To use this approach with two pair comparisons would have been more difficult and so predetermined codes would have been better suited, which although increase the comparability, decreases the case specific knowledge that process tracing contributes to. As is noted by Bennett and Checkel (2015: 34) who argue that one of the great advantages of process tracing is encountering surprising explanations that the researcher may have not previously thought would apply to the case.

Another significant justification, regarding this research question, for the process tracing is how the comparative method may have deemed the inclusion of the support party group impossible since the group only has two parties in it and this is the institutional role that should benefit from the new study and literature into it.

There is a large amount of party material coded and analysed in the three case study chapters and since each represent a different institutional role and thus different "episode" of political party life, and because of the disadvantages of comparing pairs, the process tracing method was better suited. The method's low degree of external validity can be increased by combining it with comparative methods, which in this

thesis is executed with a quantitative and qualitative methods, in Chapters Four and Eight, respectively. 'Here the logic is that we need to demonstrate that the studied case is casually similar to a set of other cases, making us more confident that the casual processes found in the studied case will also be present in the other cases' (Beach 2017: 21).

The theory chapter has established the testable hypotheses based on the existing theories, which is the first step in process tracing. However, it is not only the primary explanation that matters but also the rival ones (Ricks and Liu 2018: 3), which is why several motivations were raised in the chapters constructing the hypotheses and introducing the RRWP characteristics, showing relationships to current affairs and external events and 'identifying a suspect pool' (Ricks and Liu 2018: 10).

From the suspect pool of explanations, multiple hypotheses are competing against one another, which may result in instances where they all seem to have explanatory leverage, and according to Ricks and Liu (2018: 10), when such conditions manifest, it is essential to rely on a 'deep understanding of the cases to weigh the evidence and judge which hypothesis best explains the outcome'. The evidence in those three chapters will come in the forms of codes and quotes, which will either contribute to a particular explanation, weaken it or eliminate it (Ricks and Liu 2018: 10 – 11). Beach (2017: 28) would label the latter two as alternative explanations, which can come from competing theories yet more typically are more ad hoc, case specific explanations, further

validating the prior empirical knowledge. The alternative explanations in the case study chapters will include both moderators, issue-ownership and leadership. The theoretical and empirical knowledge acquired before the analysis will further aid in the ad hoc explanations, which also benefit for not having predetermined codes.

To illustrate the research process, it must first distinguish the critical steps, which can be done by 'taking good snapshots at a series of specific moments' (Collier 2011: 824), in this case by analysing the party writings and speeches. Collier (2011: 824) argues that these snapshots are the beginning of the descriptive component of process tracing, not the mere observation of change. In the following chapters, the process starts with the coding that signifies the themes and topics salient to the parties, followed by the analysis that aims to observe the possible change.

Due to the data coded and analysed in these chapters under different themes and periods, the evidence is expected to come as "straw-in-the-wind", which affirms rather than confirms the hypothesis or weakens it rather than eliminating it (Collier 2011: 826). Thus each piece analysed adds to the explanation being sufficient for affirming causal inference instead of necessary for verifying it.

In Beach and Pederson's (2012: 9) words, due to the complexity of the social world, it would be extraordinary if an outcome only had one factor influencing it, and even if, via theory-testing process tracing, it could be argued that a specific mechanism was present and that it

functioned as expected, there would have been multiple ones acting simultaneously. A method to strengthen the analysis and exclude alternative explanations would be to combine the theory-testing process tracing with a case-centric approach, the explaining-outcome process tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2012: 10). Hence, yet again, the thorough knowledge of each case becomes essential.

Employing qualitative case studies is an advantage to this research and will further validate or challenge the theories presented in the previous chapter. In-depth case studies, although may lack in causality, make a contribution to our general knowledge, merely by “making a case” and its purpose can be manifold: a particular case can confirm, disprove, alter or generate a theory’ (Ebbinghaus 2005: 142). In this thesis, the case studies also enable triangulation between macro and micro levels. The findings from the former will be processed in the latter with the added strengthening element of comparing within-case results to cross-case ones. The funnelling of evidence from the Large-N to the case studies will create a well-functioning understanding of the three RRWP parties and, more broadly, the whole phenomenon.

Additionally, since they are analysing factors that have not received much academic attention thus far, the three case studies will likely generate new variables and hypotheses, which George and Bennett (2005: 20) call a heuristic function, and which is enhanced by the in-depth method of process tracing. The advantage of this enriches the thesis,

opening new avenues on how to inspect further the topics covered here, which will be discussed in the concluding chapter. The new puzzles raised will have to be left for future research to examine and answer, but the base to build on will be laid ready for the researchers.

3.2 Cases

3.2.1 *The PopuList* and the European RRWP parties

The debate surrounding the term populism, which also influences the definition of radical right-wing populism, was covered in Chapter One. In addition, it was mentioned how Cas Mudde's description of both has increasingly become the one scholars agree upon and use in their research, which has made it easier to compare different studies and their results. However, even when the definitions are agreed on, it has still been problematic to distinguish which parties are RRWP. What has increased the complexity of labelling these parties is how political parties may adopt certain features in one electoral cycle and fade them away in the next.

The publishing of *The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe* (Rooduijn et al. 2019) has lessened the ambiguity surrounding labelling the RRWP party family. It

classifies European parties from 31²⁴ countries into the four, possibly overlapping, categories of populist, far-right, far-left and/or Eurosceptic and consists of parties that have held a seat in a national parliament or obtained at least 2% of the vote share, only the former being relevant for this study. The citation includes nine²⁵ authors, but the list has been peer-reviewed by more than 80 academics and is supported by the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research, The Guardian, and the ECPR Standing Group on Extremism and Democracy. Studies that have employed the list or its definitions include De Giorgi and Cancela (2021), Zulianello (2019), Halikiopoulou (2019), Ruth-Lovell *et al.* (2019) and Wüest and Pontusson (2019).²⁶

Before discussing the included parties, it is worth noting that six European countries do not have RRWP parties operating within them at the time of writing; these are Cyprus, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg and Malta. The latter has no parties on the list, whereas the five others only lack the combination of the populist and far-right, thus RRWP as explained below. Scholars have varying explanations of why the phenomenon has not gained similar momentum in these countries as in

²⁴ Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.

²⁵ Rooduijn, M., Van Kessel, S., Froio, C., Pirro, A., De Lange, S., Halikiopoulou, D., Lewis, P., Mudde, C. and Taggart, P.

²⁶ The version that is being used in this study is 2.0, published in March 2020, following the Version 1.0 which became available in January 2019. Where the first version began in 1998, the second one starts at 1989.

other European nations, which concentrate on both the demand and supply sides and take into consideration the individual country-specific stimulus.

All RRWP parties are known to focus significantly on the specific conditions within their own country and on settings that influence their citizens. Hence, as mentioned earlier, the reasons for the rise of RRWP parties and their electoral success are intertwined with each specific country and dependent on that country's circumstances.

The definitions applicable for this study are those of populist parties²⁷ and far-right parties,²⁸ since the combination of these two comprises radical right-wing populism. Furthermore, the definitions used for the classifications on *The PopuList* are the same employed in this study and detailed in the first chapter, making it the pertinent data to aid in this thesis.

The list comprises 59 RRWP parties. Four of these, Sovereignty – Jany Bobosikove Bloc (S-JB), Our Homeland Movement (MH), United Romania (PRU) and Real Slovak National Party (PSNS), have not achieved enough electoral success to translate into parliamentary seats.

²⁷ Parties that endorse the set of ideas that society is ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argue that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people (Mudde 2004, cited in Rooduijn *et al.* 2019).

²⁸ Parties that are nativist (which is an ideology that holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group and that non-native elements are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state) and authoritarian (which is the belief in a strictly ordered society in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely) (Mudde 2007, cited in Rooduijn *et al.* 2019).

Furthermore, ten parties have no data on MARPOR, which renders them unavailable to be used here: Belgium’s National Front (FNb) and People’s Party (Pp), The New Right (NB), Republic Arise | France Arise (DLR|DLF), Greek Solution (EL), Southern Action League (LAM), Young Lithuania (JL), Kukiz’15,²⁹ Enough! (CH) and Voice (Vox). Of these, NB, EL, CH, and Vox only gained their parliamentary seats for the first time in 2019. With these deductions, the number of RRWP parties presented in Table 3.1 and included in the Large-N chapter is 45. A table with additional information on the parties, such as the years the elections were held and the institutional role the party had, is included in the Appendix A.

Table 3.1 The included RRWP parties and elections.

Country	Party	Abbreviation	Elections
Austria	Freedom Party	FPÖ	1990 - 2019
	Alliance for the Future of Austria	BZÖ	2006 - 2013
Belgium	Flemish Interest / Flemish Block	VB	1991 - 2019
	National Front	FNb	1991 - 2010
Bulgaria	Attack Party	Ataka	2005 - 2017
	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria	NFSB	2013 - 2017
	National Bulgarian Movement	IMRO	
	Order, Law and Justice	RZS	2009 - 2013
	Will	Volya	2009 - 2017
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Alliance	HDSSB	2007 - 2016
Czech R.	Dawn-National Coalition Dawn		2013
	Freedom and Direct Democracy	SPD	2017
	Coalition for Republic - Republican	SPR-RSC	1990 - 2017

²⁹ Poland’s 2015 parliamentary elections have not been coded in the 2019b dataset.

	Party of Czechoslovakia		
Denmark	Danish People's Party	DF	1998 - 2019
	Progress Party	FrP	1990 - 2001
Estonia	Conservative People's Party of Estonia	EKRE	2015 - 2019
	Estonian Citizens	EKo	1992 - 1995
Finland	Finns Party	PS	1995 - 2019
France	National Front	FN	1993
	National Rally	RN	1997 - 2017
Germany	Alternative for Germany	AfD	2013 - 2017
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally	LAOS	2004 - 2015
	Political Spring	POLAN	1993 - 1996
Hungary	FIDESZ- Hungarian Civic Alliance	FIDESZ-MPSZ	1990 - 2018
	Movement for a Better Hungary	Jobbik	2006 - 2018
	Hungarian Justice and Life Party	MIÉP	1994 - 2006
Italy	Northern League	LN	1992 - 2018
	Brothers of Italy	FdI	2013 - 2018
Netherlands	List Pim Fortuyn	LPF	2002 - 2006
	Party for Freedom	PVV	2006 - 2017
	Forum for Democracy	FvD	2017
	Centre Democrats	CD	1994 - 1998
Norway	Progress Party	FrP	1993 - 2017
Poland	Law and Justice	PiS	2001 - 2019
	League of Polish Families	LPR	2001 - 2007
	Kukiz'15		2015 - 2019
	Party X	X	1991 - 1993
Romania	Greater Romania Party	PRM	1992 - 2016
	Romanian National Unity	PUNR	1990 - 2000
Slovakia	Slovak National Party	SNS	1990 - 2016
	We are family	SR	2016
Slovenia	Slovenian Democratic Party	SDS	1990 - 2018
	Slovenian National Party	SNS	1992 - 2018
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	SD	2002 - 2018
	New Democracy	NyD	1991 - 1994
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party	SVP	1991 - 2019
UK	United Kingdom Independence Party	UKIP	2001 - 2019

Four parties have MARPOR data from eight elections: FPÖ, LN, SNS and SDS. There are seven parties which have only one contested election coded on MARPOR: NFSB (2014), RZS (2009), Úsvit (2013), SPD (2017), EKRE (2015), MIEP (1998) and SR (2016). All the other parties are situated somewhere between one and eight elections.

Denmark 2015, Finland 2015, and Norway 2017 are the newest additions to the 2019b dataset, providing fascinating figures from all three countries. In Denmark, the DF's performance resulted in officially supporting the government after the 2015 elections, and in Finland, PS was promoted into the coalition government and became the second-biggest party in the country's parliament. FrP achieved a governmental role after the 2013 elections, meaning their 2017 campaign was fought whilst part of the coalition government and resulted in a 1% decrease in the vote share.

Unfortunately, Poland is missing two elections: 2015 and 2019. It is understandable that the latter is missing but it is highly regrettable that the 2015 election is not coded. The PiS in Poland witnessed an increase in votes from 29.9% in 2011 to 37.6%. They became the biggest party in Poland, and with their coalition partners, Poland Together (PR) and United Poland (SP), they had an outright majority in the Sejm. Neither of these two parties is classified as populist or far-right.

In Chapter Four, these RRWP parties are divided into four groups. In addition to the three institutional roles, there is one labelled "no seats",

which includes parties on their way to the parliament or those who have previously been in parliament but no longer are. Hence, these parties have held parliamentary seats but are contesting the specific election from outside the parliament. Since this group does not include those parties that have not achieved seats in the legislature, it is not a reference to extra-parliamentary RRWP parties but merely a base-level measurement for those in this study.

The no-seat group will provide an insight into whether lowering one tier will reveal significant differences in the discourse, which would indicate an extra-parliamentary impact on parties that do achieve a place in the legislature. However, their analysis in Chapter Four will be brief, since the previous chapter did not discuss them, nor do they have a particular hypothesis, unlike the three other roles, each a topic of a qualitative chapter, which case selections will be introduced next.

3.2.2 Case selection for the qualitative chapters

Once the first part of this thesis has aimed to answer whether a particular institutional role influences RRWP discourse, the second part dives deeper into how a specific institutional role influences the party discourse, and if it is not the role, then what may impact the party rhetoric. The first part relied on quantitative analysis, whereas the second part comprises three qualitative case studies, all of which use marginally different coding mechanisms due to the differing party materials and contents. The three

will be compared in the final analytical chapter. This combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons provides 'the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies' (George and Bennett 2005: 18).

For the case studies to analyse possible changes in the parties' rhetoric, they needed to have a history in the national parliaments and specific institutional roles, exceeding two to three terms. Since only two RRWP parties, both with strong leaders, have held the supportive role, the requirement above was the one that led to the conclusion that DF was better suited than PVV. After all, the latter only supported a minority government for two years, from 2010 until 2012, whilst DF has held the role from 2001 until 2011 and again from 2015 until 2019.

There were two parties to choose from for studying the effects of being in power and its possible influence on RRWP discourse: Fidesz and PiS. Both had enjoyed an outright parliamentary majority whilst dominating the government, which was considered here as a necessary condition over a party that had been a part of a coalition government. Essentially, examining an RRWP party responsible for policies and the state would reveal more about the role's influence than choosing one constrained by a coalition.

As with the DF above, it was time that was the main criterion that determined Fidesz was the more suitable choice, since they had a more extended experience of being a governmental party than PiS did. In

addition, the democratic backsliding arguably began in Hungary whilst Poland was following suit. Hence, it was more plausible to study the party that had shown a challenge to the European liberal democracy for a more extended period.

As will be explained in Chapter Six, although Fidesz had an electoral alliance with KDNP, they ruled without being formally in a coalition with the party. Hence, when choosing the party to represent the opposition role with time as an incumbent, experience in coalition government became one of the criteria. The two parties with a history of varying the roles of opposition and coalition were FPÖ and LN. However, there is a good selection of academic research dedicated to these two parties, much of it quoted and discussed in Chapters One and Two. In choosing PS, this thesis gains a sample that not only has been part of the opposition and a coalition but also witnessed internal fighting that resulted in a party split.

In addition to time, leadership was the other main criterion. All the three parties have had longstanding, charismatic leaders in charge, Fidesz only having had one leader, and DF and PS two, and as mentioned, it is primarily the leaders' writings and speeches that are examined. Hence, if it is true with most parties that leaders are more representative and authoritative than other party members, that should be the case with these three RRWP parties.

Now that the chapter has outlined the methods used to find answers to the research questions and who the actors under investigation are, it

will continue to present the data that is analysed, again starting with the quantitative chapter before turning to the qualitative ones.

3.3 Organising the material - Data and its variables

3.3.1 MARPOR – The tool for political party cartographers

Election manifestos provide the most valid and accurate image of a party since they represent how parties want to be seen by the voters, making them the flattering self-portrait of political parties. By selling and marketing what they believe are their best policies and ideas, manifestos become the ideal of a party, an exhibit of how they want to be viewed. Most of them spend time and money composing the manifesto that suits them and their preferred voters the best. Unlike policy achievements, which are dependent on other factors, such as coalition partners and compromises, election manifestos are documents that are put together with time and thought and hence are well-suited to represent the parties and their discourse.

MARPOR provides the predominant and widely used source for parties' ideological positions and policy dimensions, coded from election manifestos.³⁰ It guides political researchers in their quest to map the

³⁰ Studies focused on RRWP that employ the MARPOR codes include: Krause and Giebler (2019), Heinisch *et al.* (2019), Abou-Chadi and Krause (2018), Wagner and Meyer (2017), Abou-Chadi (2016) and Eger and Valdez (2019).

political arena, examining where parties have been and where they may be heading by separating issues into 56 categories, measuring parties' relative issue emphasis on each, benefitting from 'availability and extensive temporal and spatial coverage' (Gemenis 2013: 3, 4). Yet, there are issues deemed problematic with the MARPOR data, such as the significance of the length of the manifesto, the role of a human coder, the coding scheme, and the country and time specificity, as will be considered next.

The process begins with the manifestos being divided into quasi sentences, which a human coder then classifies into different issue topics. One sentence can have more than one argument and thus can be classified into more than one issue category. Even though, on the one hand, this offers a nuanced evaluation, on the other, it produces a situation where the length of the manifesto matters, since, to establish the salience of the argument, the coded quasi sentences are measured as a percentage of the overall number of quasi sentences in the document. For instance, if a party copied their manifesto from the one they produced in the previous election but added a sentence, which might not even include an argument, that would effectively alter the number of quasi sentences in the document and thus would also modify the salience percentages (Prosser 2014: 91).

In addition, due to the manifestos being coded by a single human coder, the data may be prone to errors, and together with the questions

related to the coding scheme this translates into issues of validity, reliability and bias (Gemenis 2013: 9; Mikhaylov *et al.* 2012: 79). Yet, the benefits of precoded material outweigh the possible disadvantages, which seem minor when set against the decades worth of comparable data, especially since, in this thesis, the quantitative analysis will be triangulated against a qualitative one, enhancing the reliability of the results.

Another aspect to consider is how the manifestos are distinctively written for a specific election, which presents problems for comparability (König *et al.* 2013: 469). Namely, if the same policy category is mentioned ten times by two parties in different countries or decades apart, it is debatable whether they occupy the same position on a standard scale (König *et al.* 2013: 469). After all, political topics and public debates evolve with time and place, posing the question of whether we can be sure that the salience of an issue mentioned by two different parties in two separate countries fifteen years apart is comparable.

The criticisms discussed above of MARPOR and its coding methods fall short of this vast databank's benefits for researchers. Even if there are individual instances where country experts disagree with the coding, the accessibility, annexation of the number of parties and years, and the standardised form of the data make it an invaluable instrument for scholars and researchers of comparative party politics. Moreover, since the results from the Large-N do not determine the choice of the case

studies but merely direct the analysis, possible minor errors should not be detrimental.

Knowing and acknowledging the limitations of the available data, cartographers can still present a working map that guides users to the destination. A vital part of that knowledge is choosing the variables that describe the phenomenon under study, which the chapter will turn to next.

3.3.2 MARPOR variables as RRWP variables in Chapter Four

The version of MARPOR applied in this study is 2019b, and the six MARPOR variables used in this research reflect the three core concepts of radical right-wing populism. “Negative mentions of multiculturalism”, “national way of life”, and “traditional morality” portray nativism, whilst “law and order” measures authoritarianism. Although no variable measures negative attitudes towards the establishment and thus populism, the variables on “freedom” and “democracy” include mentions that fit the populist dictionary.

A summary of each will follow with three variables representing nativism, law and order measuring authoritarianism, and two variables demonstrating populism.

3.3.2.1 Nativism

The variables measuring nativism are uncomplicated, as is clear from the first variable introduced, “Multiculturalism: Negative” (per608, from now on: multiculturalism), which assesses the negative mentions of multiculturalism and the enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration. Hostility to immigration is one of the core concepts of nativism, and thus radical right-wing populism, so employing this variable was not only a clear but a self-evident choice. RRWP parties also prefer cultural assimilation rather than shielding and encouraging traditions that immigrants bring with them, and of the six variables, this portrays the party family’s attitudes the best; hence the results are highly anticipated.

The second variable from the MARPOR dataset is “National Way of Life: Positive” (per601, from now on: national way of life), which relates to the support for established national ideas as well as appeals to the pride of citizenship, patriotism and nationalism, which are all core agendas of radical right-wing populism. The variable also includes favourable mentions of the possible suspension of some freedoms to protect the state against subversion, which are common pleas from RRWP parties, for instance, in cases related to terrorism. Consequently, it is closely connected to nativism and the idea of the Heartland, and, with the variable on multiculturalism, it does candidly embody the phenomenon of radical right-wing populism.

The “Traditional Morality: Positive” (per603, from now on: traditional morality) variable captures the favourable mentions of conventional, as well as religious, moral values. These moral values may include the prohibition and censorship of immorality, the maintenance and stability of the traditional family, and the support and protection of religious institutions. Traditional morality is another variable that describes the conventional and shared values of the Heartland. For instance, most RRWP parties are reluctant to accept homosexuality as a natural part of society, some in the CEE even provoking hostility towards sexual minorities, and the uneasiness with, if not hostility towards, accepting different sexual orientations is often justified by arguments of religion and church or the traditional family, or with claims of immorality.

The role of religion is also employed in the discussion against Islam. Islam and its traditions are seen as a threat to the old traditional values and the hegemonic role Christianity has enjoyed in Europe. For many, the two religions are incompatible on the same continent, never mind in one country. The hypocrisy embedded within the arguments against LGBTQ rights becomes transparent when the treatment of sexual minorities in Islamic countries or communities develops into the central argument against the religion, and RRWP parties forget their previously stated beliefs on the matter.

National way of life and traditional morality are country-specific, as is nativism, which means that the variables and how they are expressed

and addressed in manifestos may look different in different countries. For instance, religious tendencies and attitudes towards sexual minorities will influence how RRWP parties frame these issues. However, this does not pose a problem for the variables' comparability since the ideal of both remains the same even if the details vary. It is about the discourse of the "national way of life" and "traditional morality" in that specific country, not what is said but what is the theme and purpose behind the rhetoric.

3.3.2.2 Authoritarianism

Variable "Law and Order: Positive" (per605, from now on: law and order) is directly linked to the concept of authoritarianism and quotes positive mentions of the two. These arguments include stricter law enforcement, harsher actions against crime and attitudes in courts, increasing support and resources for the police and the importance of internal security.

Subjects that come under law and order have conventionally been one of the vital election topics for conservative parties. What distinguishes the conservative parties' campaigns from those of the RRWP parties is the matter of how, for the latter, law and order supersedes human rights and is often intertwined with nativism and thus anti-immigration. The linkages are especially prominent when the debate is about terrorism and the legal proceedings and punishments for suspects accused of it. For RRWPs, terrorism is mainly considered radical Islamic terrorism, which is when

the variable on traditional morality, discussed above, also becomes a part of the argument.

Due to the centrality of nativism and thus anti-immigration, this variable is linked to the previous three. In an overly simplistic summary, for the RRWP parties, the perpetrator is the foreigner, and the threat is coming from foreign cultures. Thus the variable focusing on the foreign influences will have a relationship with the other topics, especially when attempting to appeal to voters.

The four variables described so far have also been previously used to measure radical right-wing populism (Abou-Chadi 2016; Abou-Chadi and Krause 2018; Bergman and Flatt 2019; Eger and Valdez 2019 and Heinisch *et al.* 2019), as well as, in the case of law and order, more specifically authoritarianism (Prosser 2014 and Wagner and Meyer 2017).

3.3.2.3 Populism

Although less frequently used to measure radical right-wing populism, the following two variables are said to indicate libertarian views (Wagner and Meyer 2017), which many RRWP parties claim to represent, hence the suitability here.

The variable on “Freedom and Human Rights” (per201, from now on: freedom) measures favourable mentions of personal freedom, such as freedom of speech, press, assembly and the freedom from bureaucratic control and state coercion, as well as positive remarks on the idea of

individualism. Although human rights are not necessarily championed by the RRWP parties, except in arguments against Islam as mentioned above, they do advocate individual freedom, especially the freedom of speech. The term freedom of speech is often cited as a justification to speak one's mind in a manner that could incite ethnic or racial hatred.³¹ Unsurprisingly, as Moffit (2017: 115) notes, 'despite their claims of being defenders of free speech, their passion for free speech depends on who is doing the speaking'.

Since the RRWP parties view the establishment as run by the evil others, they are averse to more state control, and in many aspects, the parties would prefer limiting the powers of the state, exclusive of serious crime and terrorism. Criticism of the EU can be formed in a way that falls under this freedom variable. The parties claim that jurisdiction coming from the EU is too bureaucratic and limits either the freedom of individuals or the freedom of independent states, which further clarifies the justification behind this variable.

The last variable, "Democracy" (per202), measures favourable mentions of democracy. Most related to populism are the mentions of democracy as a method or goal, the need for the involvement of all citizens and the support for direct democracy. The parties under scrutiny in this research see themselves as the voice of the people and the

³¹ For instance in the case of PS's Jussi Halla-aho in 2008 and 2009, FN's Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2003 and PVV's Geert Wilders in 2014.

defenders of democracy, many of them being eager for more referenda, which they claim provide more chances for direct involvement of citizens.

Moreover, their objections to various independent institutions, international or domestic, are justified by painting them as undemocratic and elitist. In the minds of the RRWP parties, they are the ones who better the quality of democracy by limiting the jurisdiction of these institutions, if not calling for them to be abolished altogether. The timeline under investigation in Chapter Four, from 1990 to 2018, has witnessed enlargement of both the EU and NATO, which have traditionally evoked opinionated if not heated public debates that would have been catalysed during election campaigns. Hence, the relevant discussion in the election manifestos would include the mention of democracy and so be included under the variable on populism.

It is often the case that the agenda directed towards limiting Western European liberal attitudes, values and rights is hidden behind the claim of democracy. The rationale is that some of those liberties are not agreed upon by the people of the Heartland, making their lives uncomfortable, with sexual and other minorities, new traditions and cultures, receiving everyday exposure and becoming part of common sense. Consequently, illiberalism becomes justified by democracy, adding another validation for this variable.

Now that we know the actors and variables in Chapter Four, we shall move on to Chapters Five to Seven, beginning with an overview of the data analysed and the timelines for each party.

3.3.3 Data and timelines for the qualitative chapters

The sources of the leaders' and party members' writings and speeches are different for PS, Fidesz, and DF (Table 3.2). The material coded and analysed in the PS chapter comes from the party newspaper, published twelve to fifteen times a year. The intention was only to include the leaders' columns in the study, but it quickly became apparent that this did not produce enough material, even more so after the change in the leadership, with Halla-aho's shorter writing style and his not contributing to every issue. Hence, the decision was made to include other columns and articles from the party newspaper, making the size of the coded material similar to that for the two other parties and providing a better understanding of the party discourse and their emphasised topics.

For Fidesz, the material was Victor Orbán's speeches and, at times, interviews published on the Prime Minister's official website, which included no documents from any other party member. Whereas with DF, other party members occasionally contributed to the weekly newsletters published on their website, and approximately once or twice a year, they were not written newsletters but speeches the leaders had delivered on a special occasion.

Table 3.2 Party timelines and the material coded.

Party	PS	Fidesz	DF
Timeline	2004 - 2019	2008 - 2020	2009 - 2019
Data	Party Newspaper	Leader's Speeches	Weekly Newsletter
By	Leaders and other party members	Leader	Predominantly leaders
Year	Number of documents analysed		
2004	12		
2005	12		
2006	12		
2007	12		
2008	15	31	
2009	15	46	51
2010	16	49	47
2011	16	54	47
2012	15	77	51
2013	16	93	48
2014	16	128	50
2015	12	93	51
2016	12	91	49
2017	12	99	48
2018	12	96	49
2019	12	68	44
2020		59	

Party newspapers and weekly newsletters are directed to party

members, thus people who most likely are already voters of the party, which arguably means that what is being written is an honest expression of views, unlike the manifesto material employed in Chapter Four, which portrays the ideal of the party. The party website users consider the information to be direct and thus unfiltered and unedited (Følstad *et al.* 2014: 54), meaning it can avoid the mainstream media and is seen as a 'relationship building tool' (Jackson and Lilleker 2007: 243).

With Fidesz, it could be argued when analysing public speeches that their influence would be closer to the election manifesto situation where possibly more than one's own followers were being addressed. However, since this is the sample of a governing party and what is being questioned is the influence of the role of power on RRWP discourse, analysing public speeches does provide a suitable example. It should shed light on any changes in how the audience was viewed and how the character of the addresses changed, if, for instance, they become bolder or brassier.

Due to the various sources being analysed, the parties' differing agenda salience and their platforms, the codes employed are not uniform but case-specific and were in all cases assigned to the more prominent themes, not to mere words, as will be discussed later in this chapter. This means that no single words were coded, but the topic needed to be addressed further, which also meant that in addition to the codes expected to be found under the RRWP themes, others were assigned their own codes due to their frequency in the material.

The analysis examines changes in the parties' discourse emphasis by comparing the frequency of codes and themes in different parliamentary terms and years. Merely comparing the numbers and frequencies only provides a limited understanding of the parties' discourse, which is viewed more as a guide to the parallel detailed, fine-tuning analysis. Yet, if focusing on the rankings between the parties, showing how much attention each party gave to a subject and where the variables were placed, the comparisons should yield more valid results, as will be done in this thesis' final empirical chapter.

Thus, again, the research filters information, triangulating the different observations and findings, with a further enhanced examination of the tone of the material and how issues are constructed and justified, demanding more in-depth analysis, which will be illustrated with direct and indirect quotes and summaries from the documents. Showcasing salient evidence in its original form is seen as qualitative research at its best (Bennett *et al.* 2019: 4), which is why this thesis will employ it in all three qualitative chapters.

Ricks and Liu (2018: 4-5) note the importance of an established timeline in process tracing research, and whilst all three time periods under scrutiny finish either in 2019 or 2020,³² their start years differ depending on external and internal factors. For PS, which has the most

³² PS and DF finish at 2019, whilst Fidesz's timeline extends to 2020.

extended timeline, the starting year is 2004, after the 2003 elections, when the party increased the number of their MPs from one to three. One of those new MPs was a celebrity wrestler, Tony Halme, who campaigned on an immigration-hostile and, at times, xenophobic platform, beginning the radicalisation of PS. Their ten-year timeline also captured a change in the leadership, which provided the thesis with a polar opposite sample of the consequences and reactions to it.

The starting year for the Fidesz analysis is 2008, which captures its last two years in the opposition before achieving a supermajority. Those two years in the opposition provide the research with a comparison to the executive years, although the focus and primary interest were on how being a dominant governing party influences the RRWP party's discourse. Hence the ten years when Fidesz arguably held unrivalled power were considered to yield the most.

DF's analysis begins in 2009, providing the study with the needed changes between the party being in the opposition and in the supportive role.³³ Regarding the parliamentary terms and the changes in DF's roles, 2009 is situated in the middle of their third consecutive term as a support party for the government, followed by three alterations between being a support party and a party of opposition. This exchange provided an ideal ten years to observe how the different positions influenced the party

³³ For literature analysing the previous parliamentary terms when DF provided support, see Christiansen 2016; Becher and Christiansen 2015; Rydgren 2010; Rydgren 2004.

discourse.

The software used for the coding was NVivo, which will be discussed next, focusing on the more prominent RRWP themes employed as variables in the case studies, which will be outlined prior to the conclusion.

3.3.4 Coding with NVivo and the qualitative chapters' variables

In the case studies, the material will be organised into two layers, with numerous codes, some differing between the parties, which are assigned to the four variables: nativism, authoritarianism, populism and socio-cultural issues. The amount of material (Table 3.2) analysed and studied made the decision between a manual or computer-assisted method heavily weighted towards the latter, and NVivo provided the appropriate software for this thesis. Organising, analysing and exploring qualitative data is effortless and straightforward with NVivo, beginning with importing the data into the software under the file assigned to the party.

For this study, the documents were coded chronologically to understand better the evolution the party was undergoing. Thus, each record was coded by highlighting the text and assigning a node to it, called codes in this thesis, which could be layered into subsections. Since the attention was not on individual words but on more prominent themes addressed, the code encompassed often more than a sentence, which, if wished, could be seen as coloured strips at the margin of the page, easily

indicating the codes assigned to the document. Organising and exploring the assigned codes was simple, and the “Matrix coding” function, showing how the codes interacted, was used in all three chapters and is exhibited in Chapter Five and added to the Appendixes on Chapters Six and Seven.

The material was expected to produce codes that fit into the RRWP discourse under the three core variables, nativism, authoritarianism and populism, as it did. The codes under each variable follow the literature and discussion in Chapter One, and most of them were relatively straightforward to identify and similar across the three parties, as shown in Table 3.3, but there were also more complicated codes.

Under which variable the code was assigned was influenced by the justification or argument surrounding it, which sometimes meant that the same codes were assigned to different variables. For instance, “borders” with Fidesz came under nativism, whereas with DF it was placed under authoritarianism, since these were the themes directing the discussion with each party. When Orbán addressed the topic of borders, it was predominantly justified by the refugees entering Hungary to reach the EU, and in his speeches he associated these two topics together.

Whereas for DF, borders were seen as a law and order issue, and the calls for tougher control were explained via the arrival of criminals into Denmark. This does not mean that Fidesz’s rhetoric on borders did not project authoritarianism and vice versa for DF and nativism, but is how the majority of the discourse was organised, as will be explained in

more detail in the chapter comparing the case studies. And although assigning similar codes to different variables only occurred a few times and thus could have been avoided by predetermining certain words into certain codes and variables, forcing the code to fit under a variable would have ignored the case knowledge acquired via the research process.

More detailed explanations and justifications will be provided in each chapter. For instance, although references to the EU, with the feature of anti-elitism and rhetoric denouncing international organisations, was placed under populism where it was discussed in Chapter One, with Fidesz, it produced enough codes to be analysed alongside populism, even though still a populist theme. Likewise, the code “people” is absent in DF’s populism because it is not part of their discourse as it is with that of the two others.

Table 3.3 Codes under nativism, authoritarianism and populism.

Variable	PS	Fidesz	DF
Nativism	Immigration	Immigration	Immigration
	Refugees	Refugees	Asylum seekers
	Islam	Islam	Islam
	National way of life	Patriotism	Danishness
	Traditional morality	Values	Values
	Hard work	Christianity	Eastern Europe
		Carpathian Basin	Integration

		Central Europe	Israel
		Visegrad	
		Welfare immigrants	
		Borders	
		Minorities	
		Roma	
		Soros	
Authoritarianism	Law and order	Law and order	Law and order
	Military	EU army	Terrorism
	Freedom of speech	Terrorism	Ghetto/gangs
		Illiberalism	Deportation
		Judiciary	Borders
Populism	Other parties	Other parties	Other parties
	People	People	EU
	Metaphor	Stories	Brexit
	Scandals	Criticism	Referendums
	Victimhood	EU positive and negative	Sweden
	EU	Democracy	
	Media	Common sense	
		Brussels elite	
		Federalisation	
		New agreements	
		EU Community	
		EPP	

In addition to codes expected to be addressed by RRWP parties, there were topics unique to each party and others that were arguably

more mainstream but were frequently mentioned by the three (Table 3.4). Again, ignoring an issue that the party often discussed and even referenced with the RRWP rhetoric would have left a part of the party excluded from the research and portrayed an incomplete view of the party's discourse and identity. Additionally, since many of these codes come under the socio-cultural theme and thus perhaps are more mainstream, they provided a valid fourth variable. After all, the thesis questions the impact of institutional roles on the parties' discourse and examines the possible dimension of modernisation, so incorporating non-RRWP topics, especially those that concern both the legislature and the executive, added a vital level to the case analyses.

Table 3.4 Codes for the socio-cultural variable.

PS	Fidesz	DF
Unemployment	Work	Jobs
Welfare	Education	Welfare
Pensioners	Family	Healthcare
Environment	Sports/culture	Elderly
Farming	Communist past	Schools
	LGBTQ	Tax
		Hospitals
		Women

In addition to these four variables, the codes on DF produced a fifth one, measuring attitudes toward their role and government, which further highlights their unique position. The full lists of codes are in the Appendixes and show that the ones analysed were commonly the more frequent ones. However, since the importance of understanding

democratic backsliding in Hungary the decision was made to include some denoting the process even if they recurred less often in the speeches.

Conclusion

The base for the study has been constructed in the first three chapters, where the first chapter presents the existing literature and the characteristics of radical right-wing populism, including the research questions the thesis aims to solve. The second chapter formulated the theory and hypotheses, indicating how variables are assumed to interact and the expected results. Whilst this chapter, the last building block, introduced the methodology and operationalisation, which started with explaining why the nested analysis was chosen as the overall method for the thesis before justifying using ANOVA as the statistical method employed in the Large-N chapter and process tracing in the qualitative ones.

The justification for process tracing included a discussion on pair comparisons that would have compared a pair of parties on each institutional role that would have differed on the dependent variable. The benefits of process tracing and its suitability to this research and research question were manifold and emphasised the focus on in-depth case method, suiting this thesis that process tracing offers. It also explained how the process tracing's weak degree of external validity will be strengthened by the quantitative analysis employed prior the case studies

and the comparative chapter after.

The attention then turned to the actors examined, with an introduction to the *PopuList* and the case selection for the three parties analysed in Chapters Five to Seven. After which, the chapter outlined the data used in the thesis, starting with MARPOR and variables used in the quantitative chapter, and it finished by presenting the material, the software used to organise and code it, and the variables used in the second part, highlighting the uniqueness of each party.

The analysis presented in the case study chapters reinforces that a flexible rather than uniform approach to materials, timelines, and coding was fruitful and permitted the study of the three parties with the methods that best suited each. As was already discussed in the chapter introducing the existing literature, the RRWP party family is not a group of ideologically identical political parties. With a core element of nativism, these parties adjust their agenda and discourse according to the country-specific circumstances, attitudes and history. Hence, studying and analysing them within a standardised framework would have undoubtedly kept insights and observations hidden that were brought to the forefront in three chapters.

However, before those three in-depth case studies, the thesis will portray the scene in Europe more broadly and examine what the quantitative methods reveal of the relationships between RRWP discourse and the parties' institutional roles.

4 Discourse that does not become tame

Introduction

This Large-N quantitative chapter seeks to portray an overview of the RRWP parties in Europe and their discourse in different institutional roles. More specifically, it examines whether their proximity to power impacts the parties' emphasis on the RRWP topics in their election manifestos. As explained in the previous chapter, discourse is understood as more prominent themes surrounding policies and party agendas, so election manifestos are a fitting place to start the analysis, which will guide us into the qualitative chapters on the Finns Party (PS), Fidesz and Danish People's Party (DF).

The analysis in this chapter is executed by studying 45 European parties defined as RRWP on *The PopuList* by Matthijs Rooduijn *et al.* (2019) that have held parliamentary seats and employing the data from the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR). The MARPOR observations from the electoral manifestos are divided into four categories depending on the party's institutional role during the election campaign the manifesto is from. To repeat what was explained in the methodology chapter, in addition to the three roles of opposition, government, and supporting a minority government, this chapter includes a fourth group for parties with no parliamentary seats. These are parties

that are going to be or have previously been part of the parliament; thus, no party would solely be in this group. As was concluded in the discussion outlining the theory, the expectation is that RRWP parties' institutional roles do not encourage them to moderate their discourse. Thus, the MARPOR data should not show statistically significant differences between the roles.

The presence and rationale of the no-seat group is to function as a base-level measurement for the RRWP parties in this thesis as it includes parties either on their way to parliament or parties that have previously participated in one. Even though the *PopuList* includes all parties with over 2% electoral success, this thesis analyses only those parties that have been part of the legislature, which is why this group cannot be a reference one for all RRWP parties but just those included in this study, which means that the parties in this group are also in at least one of the other groups.³⁴ However, the parties representing this role will provide insight into whether lowering one tier will show significant differences in the discourse, indicating an extra-parliamentary impact on parties.

The chapter will begin by detailing the four categories into which the RRWP parties and their observations are divided and focusing on each group individually to give a starting point for each role and what could be expected to dominate their discourse. Because the central argument in

³⁴ Appendix A lists the institutional roles the parties in this study have held in the different parliamentary terms from which the MARPOR data is taken.

this thesis is that institutional roles do not impact the discourse of RRWP parties, and thus there is expected to be no variance in the findings, it is the outliers that are of interest and will be reviewed. After all, these parties set themselves apart from the rest, thus contradicting the central hypothesis.

After this, the focus shifts to the different variables and whether there are variations in how parties in different institutional roles approach them. The benefit of progressing the analysis in this way is that it, once again, allows one to triangulate the data and examine it from different perspectives, which is an approach throughout the thesis, diminishing limitations.

The analysis method used in this chapter is the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to expose the possible statistical differences between the discourses of each institutional role. Since ANOVA only denotes whether there are statistically significant differences between groups, Tukey's *post hoc* test will be employed where required to reveal where the differences exist (Tukey 1949).

To further validate and examine the findings, via triangulation, the thesis will divide the MARPOR dataset into four subsets and analyse those again to see how the results from the subsets comply with or differ from those from the complete set. Two of them are categorised by year, 1990 – 2004 and 2005 -2018, and two by geography, Northern and Western Europe (NWE) and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

Further tests, found in Appendix B, will be performed using datasets from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) and the Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey (POPPA). Since they are expert surveys, neither can be used as a robustness test, but to a degree, they will assess the initial results' reliability and consistency.

Due to process tracing being the chosen method in the case study chapters, this Large-N quantitative chapter and Chapter Eight, with its summary on the case studies, add a vital layer of understanding, strengthening the thesis's findings. Without the chapters preceding and succeeding the case studies, they, on their own, lack generalisability.

As the first empirical chapter, let us begin by concentrating on the institutional roles under investigation in this thesis and see whether there is variance in the topics parties from different roles deem salient and emphasise in the manifestos.

4.1 The four categories of institutional roles

The observations from RRWP parties are in this chapter grouped into four categories when examining if their institutional role affects their discourse. The category to which the observation is assigned is dictated by the party's institutional role when they contested the election from which the MARPOR data is taken. This means that observations from a party can be included in more than one category in the 28-year timeline.

Before focusing on the ANOVA and Tukey, and what they reveal, the

attention is given to all the four groups individually, with limited focus on parties with no seats. Examining the groups separately highlights the discrepancy in the data and the number of outliers³⁵ within it. The attention later will be on the differences between these groups; hence this first section will focus on those instances where individual parties differ from the rest of the group. Progressing in this manner will provide an insight into the more common trends within the groups, which falls under scrutiny in the following section. Thus far, the thesis has merely stated the definition of each institutional role, but in the subsequent analysis conducted in this chapter and the later ones, the discussion is organised around the variables. Hence, starting the empirical part of the thesis with a focus on each role aids in creating an understanding of them that will be constructive throughout.

Although acknowledging the weaknesses related to the mean, the following discussion refers to it as the most reliable figure to indicate where the emphasis rests with each variable. Mean benefits from every observation having an effect, but unfortunately, the impact of outliers can distort it. Since the distributions are different in every group on all variables, changing mean to median or mode would not aid the comparisons. Following this section, it will also be the means used in the ANOVAs, but in both instances, the qualitative analysis has the potential to fill in possible errors left behind in the quantitative one.

³⁵ Outlier is here understood as three standard deviations from the mean.

The following will be presented in the same order as Chapters Five to Seven. Thus it will begin with opposition parties, moving on to parties in government before focusing on parties providing support for minority governments and finishing with the group not present in the qualitative chapters, parties with no parliamentary seats.

4.1.1 Opposition parties – The parties of law and order

The first group consists of observations from opposition parties' manifestos, which is the largest group in this study, with 32 parties and 82 manifestos. Here FPÖ³⁶ and VB have seven elections included, the highest figure of elections contested. In contrast, UKIP gained their first-ever parliamentary seat in October 2014 when Douglas Carswell resigned from the Conservative Party to join UKIP and won the subsequent by-election. He held the seat in the 2015 general election, where the party gained their biggest vote share at 12.7%, but resigned from UKIP in March 2017, which resulted in a 0.1% ballot for the party in the following general election in 2019.

It is worth repeating how the MARPOR data is constructed before discussing the numbers. The election manifestos are divided into quasi-sentences assigned to different topics, and the coded quasi-sentences are then measured as a percentage of the overall quasi-sentences to indicate

³⁶ All acronyms are listed in the *List of acronyms* at the beginning of the thesis.

the salience of the variable. Therefore, the numbers related to the variable and presented on the Y-axis in the following figures are a 'share of quasi-sentences in the respective category calculated as a fraction of the overall number of allocated codes per document' (MARPOR 2019b).

The six variables are listed in Table 4.1, with the number of observations from opposition manifestos, the mean, standard deviation and minimum and maximum figures. And in the case of opposition parties, if the salience of an issue is measured by the mean of the variable, law and order is the most prominent topic when campaigning, with the national way of life only narrowly behind, holding the maximum figure of 28 (Table 4.1), which would indicate that the discourses on authoritarianism and nativism are critical to opposition parties. After that, the four remaining variables do not differ considerably.

Table 4.1 Summary of opposition parties' MARPOR data.

Variable	Number of Manifestos	Variable Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Freedom & Human Rights	82	2.11	2.69	0	13.78
Democracy	82	2.41	3.52	0	20.86
National Way of Life	82	5.82	6.10	0	28.00
Traditional Morality	82	2.23	2.62	0	11.36
Law and Order	82	6.00	4.18	0	18.75
Multiculturalism negative	82	2.68	3.77	0	15.00

The number of outliers within this group becomes apparent when expanding the focus. "Traditional morality" has one, "democracy", "law and order", and "multiculturalism" have two, while "freedom" and "national way of life" have three.

The two variables with the highest means, law and order (Figure 4.1) and national way of life (Figure 4.2), have DF as an outlier, whilst the former has the maximum figure from PVV. Both parties have provided official parliamentary support for a government, and the high figures are recorded after those periods, which suggests that this role may show intriguing results later in this chapter. As was hypothesised in Chapter Two, these parties, which hold the balance of power due to their position, risk very little by keeping the radicalness up in their discourse, and arguably these figures already support that argument.

Figure 4.1 Law and Order variable in opposition parties' manifestos.





Figure 4.2 National way of life variable in opposition parties' manifestos.




Following the claim made in the previous chapter that the millennium was observed to be a turning point for the impact of *cordon sanitaire*, a few notes on VB's figures are necessary. The party has been denied cooperation during its time in the parliament, and the variable on law and order seem to reinforce the argument above, with figures at one from 1995 to 2003, 6.5 in 2007, 18.6 in 2010 and 14.7 in 2014.³⁷ As shown in the case study chapters, changes in the discourse can be influenced by factors other than the institutional role. However, with this variable and party, an increase in the emphasis begins after the millennium.

³⁷ A similar rationale appears to be repeated for the VB's mentions of multiculturalism, which went from zero in 1995, 1999 and 2003, to 7.3 and 7.8 in 2007 and 2010, respectively, to fall a little in 2014 to 5.6. The national way of life variable also jumped from 0.7 in 2003 to 5.8 in 2007. It then took a dip in 2010 when it lowered to 0.3 before rising again to 7.5 in 2014.

Moving on to the variables on “freedom” and “democracy”, it can be seen that they display significant outliers, especially the latter. The mean on the variable measuring favourable mentions of democracy (Figure 4.3) is pulled up by two consecutive PS observations from 1999 and 2003, both at 20.9. Even with these two, the mean is considerably low at 2.4, showcasing the otherwise compactness of the variable’s observations. After 2003, PS’s “democracy” mentions decreased to 4.8 in 2007, witnessing a slight increase to 6.7 in 2011 before lowering significantly in 2015 to 0.8. The 1999 observation is the first available for PS on MARPOR. Hence, it is unfeasible to determine whether the higher figures could be linked to the 1994 EU referendum associated with the variable. However, finding that PS can emphasise matters atypically makes it an appealing case study in the following chapter.


Figure 4.3 Democracy variable in opposition parties’ manifestos.



In Figure 4.4, displaying the observations for favourable mentions of freedom, there are three outliers, from FPÖ in 1994 and 1999 and FrP in 1993. Noteworthy also is how the figure shows the observations lowering in their values as they approach 2018. In addition to the outliers' values, observations drop from above 5 to below after PS's 2003 manifesto and cluster more visibly under two from 2010 onward, with only a few exceptions. The association with time is not present with the other opposition party group's variables and it is somewhat peculiar that it is here.

In the previous chapter, when these MARPOR variables were introduced, and their selection justified, it was noted how "freedom" presents personal freedom, freedom from state coercion and freedom of speech, among other things. These are considered libertarian views that one might assume would have increased in salience, for instance, due to the refugee crisis and the enlarged social media platforms, which have witnessed people using the claim of free speech to mask their, at times, illicit behaviour. The opposite trend with the observation might therefore have been expected, but hopefully, the case studies will shed light on this argument.

Figure 4.4 Freedom variable in opposition parties' manifestos.




The last two variables from opposition parties to be discussed are multiculturalism (Figure 4.5) and traditional morality (Figure 4.6). There are two outliers in the former's observations: CD in 1994 and DF in 2001. However, there are no additional observations from CD to which to compare this figure, which makes it challenging to determine whether the mention of being an outlier only applies to other opposition parties, and it is, in fact, in line with CD's other observations. Nevertheless, with the DF, there have been other high valuing observations already discussed, and in this variable, it is followed by another relatively high figure even if not a statistical outlier. What is more, we also witness the proximity of PVV to DF, both being parties that have provided official parliamentary support to governments.

Given the centrality of anti-immigration sentiment within RRWP parties' ethos, it is surprising that the mean on the variable measuring


negative mentions of multiculturalism is as low as 2.7. Furthermore, 30 observations record zero in this variable, with 20 originating from the CEE countries. Whether this is more to do with the terminology or how ethnic or religious minorities are addressed will be one of the questions the thesis aims to answer later in this chapter via the subsets and Chapter Six on Fidesz.

Figure 4.5 Multicultural variable in opposition parties' manifestos.



On traditional morality, the only outlier was from FN in 1993 (Figure 4.6). Otherwise, the observations are scattered and thin out when figures are getting higher, which is correlated to the second-lowest mean in this group, the lowest standard deviation, and the lowest maximum figure in this group's variables.

Figure 4.6 Traditional morality variable in opposition parties' manifestos.



The insight into opposition parties' data suggested more interesting results on the group of parties supporting a minority government than on the opposition parties. There were instances where DF's presence attracted attention, which adds to the justification for including the Danish party in the case studies. An intriguing remark specifically on opposition parties was how the VB's figures have changed over time, adding to the argument that *cordon sanitaire* does not work and that parties denied cooperation have become more radical since 2000.

This section also hinted at how the CEE parties seem to avoid the term multiculturalism, which would raise the question of whether terminology and concepts do travel altogether, and perhaps even more so, whether this could be taken as an indication that Europe is more divided than was the initial impression. These questions should be

illuminated later in this chapter and justify the division of the subsets geographically.

4.1.2 Governmental parties – Similar to opposition parties on the topic-salience but differing on emphasis

The second institutional role covered is governmental parties, encompassing 23 observations from eleven³⁸ parties. SVP has the most observations, seven, which arguably is related to the Swiss Federal Council's composition differentiating their system from other European governments. Fidesz's victories in 2010 and 2014, with its partner KDNP, resulted in a two-thirds majority, which meant that they had the required number of seats to modify major laws, including the country's constitution, making it the preferred selection for the case study of a governmental party.

When focusing on the mean, the figures reveal that "law and order" is the most emphasised manifesto argument amongst governmental parties and, similarly to the opposition parties, the "national way of life" has the second-highest mean, with the rest following (Table 4.2). Although the governmental parties' means on the highest variables are essentially the same as opposition parties, the rest of the five differ, all falling behind the opposition parties'. Thus, interestingly, these findings

³⁸ FPÖ, BZÖ, Fidesz, LN, FrP, PiS, PRM, PUNR, SNS, SDS and SVP.

would support the inclusion-moderation thesis in contrast to this study's central hypothesis, although indicating a similar salience on the topics.


Table 4.2 Summary of government parties' MARPOR data.

Variable	Number of Manifestos	Variable Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Freedom & Human Rights	23	1.53	1.76	0	6.78
Democracy	23	2.82	5.62	0	27.50
National Way of Life	23	3.72	3.67	0	16.21
Traditional Morality	23	1.99	2.18	0	8.05
Law and Order	23	5.84	4.43	0	16.49
Multiculturalism negative	23	1.34	1.70	0	5

In addition to the highest mean, the law and order variable also holds the highest maximum figure of 16.5 (Figure 4.7). As has been mentioned, this variable is a proxy for authoritarianism, and as well as being one of the core features of radical right-wing populism, it is also traditionally one of the conservative parties' main campaign themes. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that, by focusing on law and order, RRWP parties that have already shared an executive office with conservative parties are often portraying themselves as complementary future coalition partners, which will be tested with PS, who did share a coalition with a centre-right party. Unfortunately, it is outside the scope of this study to examine what influence coalition partners have on RRWP

discourse, but with whom governmental parties have shared the cabinet is included in the party list in Appendix A.


Figure 4.7 Law and Order variable in government parties' manifestos.



The least salient of the variables is the negative mentions of multiculturalism (Figure 4.8), which also has the lowest standard deviation. This is surprising, since this variable is the one most closely related to radical right-wing populism and was expected to portray the party family's attitudes to immigration and nativism the best, hence was not expected to be the least salient variable for any group. It will be intriguing to see the results of ANOVA and the variation between the four groups in their usage of the negative mentions of multiculturalism when taking part in election campaigns, to examine whether this is a topic that governmental parties shy away from, unlike the rest of the groups, and


even more so to see how multiculturalism is covered in the case studies and whether it is the term that is the main issue here.

Figure 4.8 Multiculturalism variable in government parties' manifestos.




The variables on democracy and national way of life both have one outlier, which on the former comes from the SVP's 2011 campaign and is 27.5 (Figure 4.9). This is an unusual jump for the party, which, without the 2011 observation, averages 2.3 on the democracy variable. As is visible from Figure 4.9, the other observations on this variable are neatly contained and clustered under the FPÖ's 2002 figure of 6.1, showing the slight but constant emphasis on democracy.

Figure 4.9 Democracy variable in government parties' manifestos.



On the national way of life, it is SNS from 1998 that is the outlier (Figure 4.10). The debate during the 1998 parliamentary elections in Slovakia focused on the country joining the EU and NATO, which could explain the high figure for a variable that can be taken as a proxy for nationalism. However, this is not exceptional for a party with a mean of 11.7 on the national way of life variable, the highest mean of the six variables. Thus it could be seen as their overall most salient campaign topic, and as such, it is not the single observation that is the outlier; instead, it is the party that is the outlier in the group of governmental parties.

Figure 4.10 National way of life variable in government parties' manifestos.



The two remaining variables, freedom and traditional morality, are similarly expressed and emphasised by the governmental parties, as observed in figures 4.11 and 4.12. They both have a low mean and low standard deviation, and neither of the variables conveys a relationship with time, rather they have the observations evenly and narrowly spread. Whilst “freedom” is one of the variables measuring populism, “traditional morality” does so for nativism. Hence again, in this group, a variable that presents the core aspect of radical right-wing populism, nativism, does not receive much emphasis from the parties.

Figure 4.11 Freedom variable in government parties' manifestos.





Figure 4.12 Traditional morality variable in government parties' manifestos.



The first insight into the discourses of governmental parties during elections did not comply with what was expected. The observations were of reasonably low figures, thus not fulfilling the hypotheses that even when part of a government, RRWP parties will not moderate their discourse but will hold it at the levels they have had in the opposition or

when having no parliamentary seats. Whether this is the case and the party family's election manifestos are not as radical as projected will be seen later when running the ANOVA and further when examining Fidesz and, to a degree, PS.

4.1.3 Parties supporting a government – Initial signs of the iniquess

The smallest of the groups is for parties that have provided official parliamentary support for a minority government, which means that whilst they are not part of the government, they have agreed to vote with them in meaningful votes. There are only two parties in this group, DF and PVV. Three times DF has fought an election whilst holding the supportive role, whereas PVV has done so only once. Hence, four observations complicate the validity of inferences drawn from this group that has already produced attractive results. Consequently, the case study chapter on DF will be critical to better understanding this role and testing any results revealed here, highlighting the advantages of nested analysis.

If the observations were low and perhaps even tamed within the last group, observations of more radical discourse, thus emphasising the RRWP agenda, should follow according to what little is known about the institutional role these parties hold and its influences. They are assumed to maintain the balance of power and hence would have no incentive to

moderate their discourse whilst supporting a government dependent on their votes. On the one hand, they can claim association with any governmental successes, whilst, on the other hand, maintaining their distance from the executive, especially if the government encounters unmanageable obstacles.

Excluding the variables on traditional morality and democracy, the means are indeed considerably high, law and order topping the figures with 12.5 while multiculturalism is only slightly lower with 11.1 (Table 4.3). The national way of life, the third variable on nativism in addition to traditional morality and multiculturalism, is also performing well.

Table 4.3 Summary of support parties' MARPOR data.

Variable	Number of Manifestos	Variable Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Freedom & Human Rights	4	3.58	4.63	0	10.38
Democracy	4	1.09	1.09	0	2.05
National Way of Life	4	9.08	6.21	4.32	18
Traditional Morality	4	0.65	0.91	0	2
Law and Order	4	12.49	1.76	10.68	14.89
Multiculturalism negative	4	11.06	6.39	2	16.14


Figure 4.13 shows some discrepancies with a few variables, but there is only one observation out of the range from the others. Otherwise, they are close together, especially with the highest and lowest performing variables (Figure 4.13).

Although there are no outliers, there is a considerable rise in the emphasis on multiculturalism, which is more in accordance with the hypothesis and even more so with this specific variable, which is a proxy for nativism, the core concept of radical right-wing populism. Similarly to the group of governmental parties, here as well, the variable on law and order has the highest scoring mean, whilst traditional morality and democracy achieve only a little mention.

Another feature of this group worth noting is how the only observations from PVV are close to the mean, only slightly grown into the distance on the variable measuring the national way of life, but even with that, it is not the furthestmost from the mean. It is somewhat intriguing that a party that has heavily politicised anti-Islam rhetoric, making it one of their main topics, has low observations for the national way of life and traditional morality variables, which would be expected to incorporate anti-Islam attitudes.

Making the arguments to challenge Islam, its traditions and Muslims themselves, employing discourse that would use topics that fall under these two variables, could have fitted the PVV's agenda. Muslims and Islam could have been described as a threat to the Dutch way of life and traditional values, and for that not being the case whilst the variable on multiculturalism was high, it does raise the question of whether the supporting role they had did influence the rhetoric.

Figure 4.13 The occurrence of the variables in support parties' manifestos.



As was mentioned earlier, due to the small sample, any figures from this group should be treated carefully until further results from the four subsets are obtained. Nevertheless, it is still interesting to note that this group seem to follow the assumption set out in the previous chapter, which enhances the salience of this group once the thesis moves on to the qualitative part. The case study will teach us more about the discourse of DF and examine whether they set themselves apart from the rest once compared to the other case studies in Chapter Eight.

4.1.4 Parties with no seats

The last category measures the discourse from parties that did not hold parliamentary seats during the election campaign but were either on their

way into a parliament or had previously participated in one. Due to this research focusing only on parties with parliamentary experience, all the parties in this group are included in at least one of the other three categories. Thus no party would only be in this group and no other (Appendix A). Hence being the extra-parliamentary role is exclusive to this chapter.

Observations from parties without parliamentary seats are treated as a base level to examine if the extra-parliamentary role influences their discourse. Since the research is focused on incumbency effects and how holding a different institutional role may influence the RRWP parties' discourse, this group is not discussed in the theory chapter, nor is there a hypothesis related to it. Hence its results will be only briefly analysed here and will not be included in the qualitative part of the thesis.

This group has 41 manifestos from 34 parties. Most of these are from the parties' first elections after being founded, with some exceptions (Appendix A). For instance, FN is a party that has contested three out of the six elections included here from a position of no seats. Even more interesting is the fluctuation of SNS in the eight elections covered here; it fought three whilst not in parliament, two whilst in opposition and three in government. All three instances validate the role's inclusion here and provide information on how the parties' discourse may differ from the other positions.

Table 4.4 summarises the six variables in this group, showing the salience of the national way of life, whilst the lowest mean figure is on multiculturalism. The standard deviation on the national way of life is considerable at 8.7, and the variable also receives the highest maximum observation in this group. The law and order variable is the only one without an outlier, whereas multiculturalism has two,³⁹ and the four others have one.⁴⁰

Table 4.4 Summary of no-seat parties' MARPOR data.

Variable	Number of Manifestos	Variable Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Freedom & Human Rights	41	2.67	3.48	0	18.06
Democracy	41	3.92	3.91	0	17.81
National Way of Life	41	8.42	8.66	0	39.22
Traditional Morality	41	2.76	3.15	0	14.67
Law and Order	41	6.51	5.46	0	21.05
Multiculturalism negative	41	2.04	3.61	0	15.33


Arguably, merely examining the means has its weaknesses, especially between four groups with considerable variance in the group sizes. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy where the variable means are positioned amongst these four groups, presented in Figure 4.14. The

³⁹ DF 1998 and PVV 2006.

⁴⁰ Freedom: UKIP 2001; democracy: AfD 2013; National Way of Life: SNS 1990 and Traditional Morality: FN 1997.

figures would, in simplistic terms, insinuate that being in the government does tame RRWP parties' discourse, whilst the most radical group is parties officially supporting a government, presenting the parties who offer parliamentary support to governments in an increasingly intriguing manner. It might suggest that the balance of power these parties hold does render them resolved to radicalise their discourse, reflecting the discussion from the previous chapter.

Figure 4.14 Variable means for each institutional role.



The discussion above has provided an initial insight into the four categories and thus set the scene for the subsequent quantitative analysis as well as the qualitative one. Next, the chapter will run the ANOVA analyses, introduce the results, and discuss how they fit into the

hypotheses, before splitting the data into subsets to rerun the tests to increase the validity.

4.2 A Story of Two Halves – Starring: support parties and parties with no seats

To compare the institutional roles further, the chapter will now employ ANOVA, which is a method that detects statistical significance in group differences for categorical independent variables. However, since ANOVA only indicates a disparity between the groups, to further locate between which groups the variance is situated, a *post hoc* test is needed, and the one employed in this thesis will be that of Tukey.

A return visit to Chapter Two and the formulation of the hypotheses reminds us that the thesis expects there to be no moderation of the RRWP parties' discourse in different institutional roles, meaning that the parties in all groups should address campaign topics with similar salience levels within their election manifestos. What follows is that, when using the one-way ANOVA, the thesis anticipates no variation between the observations from different groups, thus failing to reject the null hypothesis.

There are three variables where this is the case, which are traditional morality [$F(3, 146) = 1.00, p = 0.39$], freedom [$F(3, 146) = 1.12, p = 0.34$] and democracy [$F(3, 146) = 1.57, p = 0.20$]. Hence these three support the hypotheses, showing no statistical significance in

the discourses in different parliamentary roles, the emphasis being maintained at a similar level throughout the manifestos.

But the remaining three variables indicate statistically significant differences between the groups, which means that not all four groups treated the themes similarly during their campaigns. These are on multiculturalism [$F(3, 146) = 8.80, p = 0.00$], national way of life [$F(3, 146) = 2.94, p = 0.04$] and law and order [$F(3, 146) = 2.68, p = 0.05$].

How these six variables are divided between those that possess no significant differences and those that do, is meaningful. Two of the three with no statistically significant difference, freedom and democracy, measure populism in this thesis, whilst traditional morality is themed under nativism. As was discussed when introducing the literature on radical right-wing populism, populism is the third salient feature of the phenomenon, whereas "traditional morality" was not reaching the means that the two other nativist variables were in the previous sections.

Yet, it is the three variables with statistically significant differences that arguably are more meaningful. On the one hand, national way of life and multiculturalism are undoubtedly proxies for nativism, and, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, they are often used as such by other researchers and studies. On the other hand, the law and order variable forthrightly represents and measures authoritarianism. Therefore, the three variables, representing two of the most salient RRWP features, whose selection for the thesis was the most undemanding to justify since

they symbolise the phenomenon, show evidence that parties from different institutional roles differ in their discourse, contradicting the hypotheses.

To further inspect which groups employ different discourse from the rest when discussing these variables, the chapter will continue with Tukey, which will show where the differences between the roles exist, which is not executed by ANOVA, revealing which hypotheses are challenged by the data. To begin with multiculturalism, Table 4.5 presents the pairwise comparisons that have statistically significant differences in the variable, showing that support parties are more radical in their election manifestos than parties in other institutional roles.

Table 4.5 Pairwise comparisons on multiculturalism for the pairs showing statistically significant difference.

Roles	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey		Tukey	
			t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Supportive vs Government	9.73	1.93	5.03	0.00	4.703	14.747
Supportive vs No seats	9.02	1.87	4.83	0.00	4.169	13.880
Supportive vs Opposition	8.38	1.83	4.59	0.00	3.632	13.125

As discussed in the previous chapters, anti-immigration is the topic that unites the parties the most and negative mentions of multiculturalism measures this, which arguably makes it a very straightforward representation of radical right-wing populism as a phenomenon. Not only did this notion envision that the results of this variable would be keenly anticipated, which was further highlighted when looking into the individual roles earlier in this chapter, but the Tukey test has also linked the variable with the already intriguing group of parties providing parliamentary support to a government, which has provided a notable start to the Large-N analysis.

The other variable under nativism, showing statistically significant differences, is the national way of life. Table 4.6 separates the p-values and confidence intervals for the pairs exhibiting statistically significant differences between parties with no seats and parties in government. It shows that the governmental parties' discourse is more moderate than that of parties outside the parliament. As was detailed earlier in this chapter, most RRWP parties in the no-seat group are testing their first elections or the elections that promoted them into a parliament for the first time.

Table 4.6 Pairwise comparisons on the national way of life for the pair showing statistically significant difference.

Roles	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey		Tukey	
			t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
No seats vs Government	4.71	1.73	2.72	0.04	0.215	9.198

The differences in the means suggest that the issues of nationalism, patriotism, pride in citizenship, and endorsement of traditional national ideas are addressed and emphasised more in election manifestos of parties aiming to enter the parliament than those contesting the elections from the government benches. Hence this is a form of an inclusion-moderation thesis, where those with no strings attached can bring about a more radical discourse than those already part of the executive. Incumbency thus influences the parties' discourse regarding the variable representing one of the core concepts of radical right-wing populism: nativism.

With the law and order variable, two pairwise comparisons have statistically significant differences between the two means (Table 4.7), both including the group that provides official parliamentary support to a government, one against governmental parties and the other against opposition parties. In both cases, the parties supporting the government have more emphasis in their election manifestos on law and order issues, which here represents authoritarianism.

Table 4.7 Pairwise comparisons on law and order for the pairs showing statistically significant differences.

Roles	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey		Tukey	
			t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Supportive vs Government	6.65	2.47	2.69	0.04	0.223	13.085
Supportive vs Opposition	6.49	2.34	2.78	0.03	0.414	12.571

The inclusion-moderation thesis could explain the differing results between the observations from the parties supporting a government and those that are part of a government. However, “law and order” is a traditionally conservative agenda, and the older mainstream right-wing parties commonly campaign in this field; it is ultimately one of their core policy areas. Since it is more common for RRWP parties to share the cabinets with those on the right,⁴¹ there would be no need to tame the discourse on law and order to satisfy your coalition fellows or make you seem more attractive to future colleagues. Consequently, there would be no need for mainstreaming the rhetoric on this topic.

The parties who provide official parliamentary support to a government might have agreed to benefits and trade-offs dependent on

⁴¹ This has been the case in 16 out of the 25 coalition cabinets, see Appendix A.

their support, whether in policy or monetary terms, which could restrict their discourse, whilst opposition parties are without constraints. Yet, this variable's second statistically significant pair suggests that parties who support a government are more radical than those in the opposition. What then could be the explanation?

Perhaps it is not a case of supportive parties being more radical but that the opposition parties are more moderate. After all, the analysis compares RRWP parties against one another, not against mainstream parties. Hence the results could be interpreted as opposition parties wanting to market themselves as the ideal cooperation partners, not ones who are too risky to have as future coalition colleagues. This could be a deliberate attempt to reduce the radicalness in their discourse in order to seek executive partnership during the coalition formation. However, it is questionable why opposition parties would do this with a topic that is one of the more established favourites of traditional right-wing parties.

Feasibly, the explanation behind the results rests with the group of parties supporting a government and the balance of power that they possess. Maybe their role and influence are so momentous that they explain the radical discourse, an argument that the thesis aims to resolve.

The hypotheses state that the institutional role is not anticipated to influence the RRWP parties' discourse and that the parties are not expected to moderate their discourse when they take on different

institutional roles. Consequently, the four groups in question should be producing similar observations. Yet, the variable on multiculturalism is the most expressive of the six, where there are three pairs that differ significantly, the most of all the variables. All three pairs include the group officially supporting a government.

Table 4.8 Summary of all variables on the full dataset.

Variable	RRWP theme	Support for the hypothesis?	Varying pairs (the more radical displayed first)
Multiculturalism	Nativism	Weak	Support vs opposition Support vs government Support vs no seats
National way of life	Nativism	Partial	No seats vs government
Traditional morality	Nativism	Strong	
Law and Order	Authoritarianism	Weak	Supportive vs opposition Supportive vs government
Freedom	Populism	Strong	
Democracy	Populism	Strong	

The observations for the supportive role are more radical than those from any other group, meaning they emphasise the RRWP agenda more than parties in different positions. If one pair comparison where supportive parties were more radical than governmental parties could have been explained by the inclusion-moderation thesis, the justification

becomes muddled when there are five pairs, including all the institutional roles in this chapter.

The other explanation offered above when discussing the law and order variable was that opposition parties were deliberately being moderate in order to appear to be good and reliable coalition partners. This should also be re-evaluated in accordance with the latest results and parties supportive of a government being more radical in their discourse on multiculturalism than any other parliamentary group.

It seems that the valid explanation is based on the supportive role and the radicalness of parties in that role, not on trying to find answers from parties in the rest of the roles and why they might choose to be more moderate. In addition, the contrast numbers between the three pairs are within a narrow range; with the governmental group, it is 9.73, no seats 9.02 and opposition 8.38, as displayed in Table 4.5, which appears to suggest that the three other groups were alike in their discourse, and the only one atypical was the supportive group. Hence the justification for the results should be drawn from their experiences and behaviour, supporting the argument that the balance of power they hold renders them more radical and daring, which will be further tested in the DF's case study chapter.

One of the other puzzles with the multiculturalism variable, which was revealed in the insights into the individual groups, was how it seems that, as a term, it does not travel well between Western and Eastern

Europe, which could also influence the results. This will be tested with the subsets later in this chapter and will be one of the questions the following qualitative chapters aim to answer by examining the parties' discourse in more depth.

It was also noted that the multiculturalism variable had the lowest mean in the group on observations from parties with no parliamentary seats. Yet, with the national way of life, this institutional role had a statistically significant difference in their discourse compared to observations from parties in a government.

The "national way of life" measures attributes on nationalism, which is not far removed from the discourse on anti-immigration, measured by the multiculturalism variable. Perhaps for parties aiming to succeed in getting into a parliament, framing the conversation more along nationalist lines is preferable to discussing multiculturalism negatively. However, this does not sound plausible due to the centrality that anti-immigration has within the RRWP parties. Another explanation could be that these are younger parties than those in the traditional mainstream, and they are still finding their way to present themselves and compile an election manifesto.

The thesis has admitted that there are problems with the data. It is not random or normally distributed, it has many outliers, and the group sizes differ. To further rummage among the data, delve deeper into it, and test the validity and reliability of the results just achieved, the

chapter will next divide the data into subsections and run ANOVA on those, followed by Tukey where necessary.

4.2.1 Probing the data – Introducing the subsets

This thesis presents methodological advantages such as mixing the quantitative and qualitative methods and funnelling down from a Large-N to a more in-depth, Small-N case analysis. It compares and examines all areas of Europe from the beginning of 1990, and as much as it aims to provide generalisations from this chapter, it seeks to explain and understand the context in more detail in the qualitative ones. Unfortunately, it also has shortcomings, including the existing MARPOR data for the RRWP parties. There is no option available which would transform that data, nothing that could be added or dismissed, nor can the institutional groups be differently divided.

What can be done to inject robustness and validity is first to test whether dividing the data into smaller subsets will produce similar results compared to the ANOVA run on the complete dataset, and secondly, to run tests with two different datasets, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) and the Populism and Political Expert Survey (POPPA). The chapter will now continue with the former, whilst the latter can be found in Appendix B, primarily reinforcing the results found in this chapter.

Withdrawing subsets from the initial sample will increase the robustness of the findings, which Schmitter (2008: 291) calls probing

your data, and here it is executed by dividing the dataset into four subsets. The first two split the timeline into 1990 – 2004 and 2005 -2018, delivering on two aspects. Firstly, this tests the complete data set, and secondly, it will aid in understanding whether RRWP parties have amended their messages over time and if the turn of the millennium witnessed an effect on the parties' discourse, as has been argued. 2005 is also meaningful, since it is one year after the EU enlargement and three years before the financial crash, as explained in the methodology.

The second division is along geographical lines, where the third set comprises RRWP parties of NWE, while the fourth is CEE. These two subsets should highlight the possible differences still present within Europe and provide further insight into those puzzles that have already revealed themselves, for instance, concerning the term multiculturalism. There was evidence in the first scatterplots that the term does not travel across the continent, which will receive further attention in the CEE subset, followed by the qualitative chapter on Fidesz. If other variables have similar traits, those should become evident via the ANOVA.

In Table 4.9, setting out the number of observations in each subset and the groups within them, there are some noteworthy points. Firstly, all four subsets have between 10 and 12 parties that have taken part in a government, which is reasonably invariable considering the differences between the four subsets. Secondly, the increase from 68 observations in the first half of the timeline to 82 in the second is about 20% in fourteen

years. Yet, the increase did not affect the governmental group, where the number of parties instead decreased by one.

The argument made previously in this thesis noted that RRWP parties have learned from their past and one another and thus have become solid partners in governmental cooperation, but these figures cast doubt on that claim. On the one hand, it can be argued that those elevated into a government have also acquired the knowledge of how to stay there. On the other hand, though, if there was strength in the statement that RRWP parties learn from their own histories and from others', then undoubtedly the number of executive parties should have increased. It could also be argued that the traditional assumption that RRWP parties perform better in the opposition environment is valid after all, and that is the lesson they have indeed learned from one another, that they find the opposition benches more comfortable.

Thirdly, comparing the NWE and CEE subsets, the focal differences are between the opposition group and the no-seats group, with CEE countries having more observations from parties that have no seats and fewer from those in opposition. Since all the observations are from parties that have held parliamentary seats, one explanation for these specific differences in CEE countries could be that there have been more instances of parties fluctuating in and out of parliament.

Table 4.9 Number of manifestos in each subset by institutional role

	1990 - 2004	2005 – 2018	NWE	CEE
Governmental	12	11	10	12
Supportive	-	4	4	-
Opposition	37	45	44	29
No seats	19	22	12	25
Total observations	68	82	70	66

The difference in the number of observations from parties with no seats between NWE and CEE is meaningful and aids in explaining why that group had such a varying response to the two variables that are considered the most straightforward: the national way of life and multiculturalism. On the former, the no-seat role showed a statistically significant difference compared to the governmental one, whilst the latter was their least salient topic. Since it has been demonstrated that the parties from CEE countries are less likely to address issues in terms of multiculturalism, their being in the majority in the no-seat group will affect the results.

These observations further emphasise the importance of examining how anti-immigration issues are covered and addressed by parties from CEE if this is done without employing the terminology of multiculturalism. But for now, the chapter will establish if ANOVA and Tukey will reveal any other empirical puzzles.

To begin with the subset of the observations from 1990 to 2004, the variable on the national way of life is the only one showing a statistically significant difference on ANOVA [$F(2, 65) = 3.53, p = 0.04$], with Tukey, the same *post hoc* test as previously, revealing that the difference of -4.81 with $p = 0.05$ is between opposition parties and parties with no seats, the latter expressing the more radical discourse.

In the second subset, which is for the latter half, on manifestos between 2005 and 2018, there are two variables that display statistically significant difference on ANOVA; democracy [$F(3, 78) = 4.36, p = 0.07$] and multiculturalism [$F(3, 78) = 7.03, p = 0.00$]. Tukey only reveals one significant pairwise difference on the former variable: opposition versus no seats with the contrast of -3.56 and $p = 0.01$, again with no seats being the more radical role. Whilst on the latter variable, there are three pairs with $p < 0.05$ (Table 4.10), in which the role of supporting a minority government is more radical than all other roles.

Table 4.10 Pairwise comparisons on multiculturalism that show statistically significant difference from 2005 to 2018.

Roles	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey		Tukey	
			t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Supportive vs Government	9.22	2.16	4.26	0.00	3.543	14.889
Supportive vs No seats	8.80	2.01	4.37	0.00	3.513	14.076

Supportive vs Opposition	7.59	1.93	3.93	0.00	2.519	12.657
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Moving on to the subsets divided geographically, beginning with NWE, it can be seen that this repeats the results on the 2005 – 2018 subset. It is the same variable of multiculturalism [$F(3, 66) = 3.89, p = 0.013$] with the same pairs as above that display evidence of a statistically significant difference (Table 4.11).

Table 4.11 Pairwise comparisons on multiculturalism that show statistically significant difference on NWE.

Roles	Contrast	Std. Err.	Tukey		Tukey	
			t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Supportive vs Government	8.75	2.62	3.34	0.01	1.840	15.652
Supportive vs No seats	7.50	2.56	2.93	0.02	0.764	14.243
Supportive vs Opposition	6.78	2.31	2.93	0.02	0.684	12.876

Then the final subset, which is on CEE countries, and has two variables that are subject to the Tukey test; freedom [$F(2, 63) = 3.92, p = 0.025$] and democracy [$F(2, 63) = 4.71, p = 0.012$]. The pair showing a statistically significant difference is opposition versus no seats on both

variables. On the former, it is with contrast -1.27 and $p = 0.03$, and on the latter, the contrast is -1.92 and $p = 0.02$. Like the timeline subsets, parties with no seats express more radical discourse in their manifestos on both.

What these results mean, and how they compare to the entire dataset, will be discussed next.

4.2.2 The two roles to watch: supportive and no-seats

To begin with the good news, the only two subsets with observations from parties officially supporting a government, 2005 – 2018 and NWE, replicate the findings for the full dataset on the variable on multiculturalism. Similarly to the entire dataset, this variable, which measures nativism, includes three statistically significant pairwise comparisons on both subsets, all showing evidence that the discourse in the election manifestos from the support parties is more radical than that from parties in the other roles, which will be further investigated not only in the chapter on DF but also in the final, comparative one.

With the parties in the NWE subset, the variable on multiculturalism is the only one that exhibits significant differences between the observations from the four groups. Whereas for the 2005 – 2018 subset, there were also differences in the variable on democracy, as shown above and discussed later.

Another variable measuring nativism is the national way of life, which is also a proxy for nationalism. On the entire dataset, the pair with statistically different results for this variable was no seats versus government, with no seats expressing the more radical discourse. On the 1990 – 2001 subset, the variable had a significantly different pairwise comparison, again with the observations from the group with no seats, but this time the group with more moderated discourse was the opposition.

Thus the subsets test has strengthened the confidence in the first results on the two variables of multiculturalism and national way of life. On the national way of life, the group less radical than no-seats have changed, but it still reflects how those RRWP parties aiming to get into a parliament emphasise more radical discourse around nationalism.

Hence again, echoing the analysis earlier in the chapter, the two nativist variables with the same institutional roles stand out from the rest. Consequently, the confidence has increased to acknowledge the results received for the variables with the entire dataset.

Then the slightly more challenging news. Law and order is a variable which on the full dataset had two pairs, with a statistical difference, both with the supportive role. None of the subsets corresponds to this. Furthermore, there are no statistical differences in any subsets on this variable. Hence there is a slight cautiousness surrounding the results on this variable measuring authoritarianism. Authoritarianism is a variable

tested in all qualitative chapters, so they are expected to enhance the knowledge of the topic.

In addition to testing the findings from the entire dataset, the subsets revealed additional noteworthy points. One was the difference in the results between the two timeline subsets: 1990 – 2001 and 2005 – 2018. The expectation was that halving the research period would reveal some differences, as it did, although perhaps not as much as might have been anticipated. The no-seat group features in both subsets as the more radical group against opposition parties, albeit in the earlier timeline with the national way of life variable and in the latter on democracy. Whereas, as has already been mentioned, the 2005 – 2018 subset echoes the full dataset findings on multiculturalism.

Another noteworthy finding is the two variables, freedom and democracy, that did not show statistically significant differences on the complete set but did with the subsets. On the CEE subset, both variables have differences between observations from the no-seats group and the opposition one, with those outside the parliament evidencing more emphasis on these topics. The variable on democracy also showed significance between the same pair in the subset limited to 2005 and 2018, as just mentioned.

This increases the focus on the group with no parliamentary seats and does provide evidence that parties that are not part of the legislature are more radical in their discourse, and on the three occasions this group

is showing a significant difference in the subsets, it is against the opposition parties. Let us be reminded how the argument for the inclusion-moderation thesis states that cooperation and taking part in the decision making fortifies the understanding of trade-offs and negotiation, concluding thus that being closer to the executive moderates RRWP parties and their discourse.

ANOVA has not revealed on any of the variables, on any datasets, that governmental parties would be more moderate than opposition parties. That includes the dataset 1990 – 2001, the period when the claims were made and from which the inclusion-moderation thesis takes its primary evidence. Only on the “national way of life” were governmental parties shown to be more moderate on the entire dataset, but this was compared to parties without seats only.

RRWP parties are leadership led and hierarchical. They sustain a solid relationship with grassroots and activist bases, similar to smaller, more niche-like movements. Some of the parties started from movements and protests, which may explain the change in the parties’ discourse when they become parliamentary parties and wish to keep their presence in the legislature and thus moderate their discourse to better suit the scrutiny that the often newly attained prominence brings. Hence the moderation reaches the parties one tier lower than previously thought.

If the results on parties with no seats are somewhat surprising, the findings on the CEE subset are not so. To have genuinely united Europe in

the image of Western Europe was highly hoped and wished for after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. However, the differences that still exist have been visible from the start and become even more so with the current democratic backsliding, which has witnessed many questionable developments, or more precisely un-developments, taking place in CEE countries, where once already established liberal rights and values are taken back and reverted. How, if at all, these are reflected in the parties' discourse will be studied in the chapter on Fidesz.

The two variables with statistically significant differences in their results on the CEE subset, freedom and democracy, do not on their own provide evidence of the differences between NWE and CEE. However, when examining the whole picture that has emerged with the subsets and their differences, the argument can be made more confidently. Although the variable on democracy also shows up in the 2005 – 2018 subset, the variable on freedom is only present in the CEE subset. Furthermore, neither of the variables had statistically significant pairs in the whole dataset, meaning something separates this subset from the rest.

Table 4.12 Subset pairs with statistically significant differences.

Subset	Variable	Institutional Roles (more radical first)
1990 - 2001	National way of life	No seats vs opposition
2005 – 2018	Democracy	No seats vs opposition
	Multiculturalism	Supportive vs government
		Supportive vs no seats

NWE	Multiculturalism	Supportive vs opposition
		Support vs government
		Support vs no seats
CEE	Freedom	Support vs opposition
		No seats vs opposition
	Democracy	No seats vs opposition

To conclude this section before the conclusion of the whole chapter: overall, the results for the two variables on nativism, multiculturalism and national way of life, are intriguing, as is the presence of the two roles that signalled their difference earlier in the chapter: parties supportive of a government and those with no seats.

Conclusion

The three hypotheses assumed that being in the opposition, a part of a government, or officially providing parliamentary support for one, would not moderate the discourse of RRWP parties. In this chapter that was examined by analysing if parties holding different institutional roles differed in the emphases they placed on RRWP themes in their election manifestos. Observations from the three institutional roles were expected to be similar, and the salience given to different campaign topics to be at an equivalent level and thus unconnected to the proximity to the government. Observations from governmental and opposition parties

support this argument, whilst the third group, demonstrate conflicting results.

Parties who are not part of the government but sustaining its majority in meaningful votes are more radical in their discourse than parties in other institutional roles — the balance of power that they are said to possess gains evidence and indicates that the results of the qualitative chapter should enrich the knowledge the literature has on the role. Not only did they overcome governmental and opposition roles in the variable on law and order, but in addition to those two groups, they were also more radical than the parties without seats in the variable on multiculturalism.

One could attempt to find explanations for these results from the opposing roles had the supporting parties only been the more radical ones in one or two instances. With five statistically significant pairs, three of them repeated in the two subsets, there is evidence to suggest that parties providing official parliamentary support for a government are more radical in their discourse than those in other institutional roles are.

What contributes to these five pairs is the notion that only one statistically significant pair in the full dataset did not include the supportive group, which was on the national way of life variable. The critical difference in that variable was between parties with no seats and those in a government. In the 1990 – 2001 subset, the opposing group changed to opposition parties with the no-seat group also being more

radical on two different variables, democracy and freedom, and two other subsets, 2005 – 2018 and CEE.

The latter subset, CEE, stood out in the last part of the chapter and arguably showed that the issue emphases of RRWP parties in this group do differ from those of the rest. This further highlights and confirms the decision to have a party from this group included in the second qualitative part of the thesis and also confirms that dividing the subsets as they were was appropriate.

Interestingly, the variables that did have statistically significant differences in the whole dataset have been the most popular choices from the MARPOR data for scholars studying radical right-wing populism. One may question whether the selection of the variables was misguided since there were significant differences in the results on the ones that most straightforwardly portray the elements of the phenomenon. However, the answer will again reflect on the role of the supportive party group and how five out of the six significant pairs included this group.

Having been able to assemble an overview of Europe's RRWP parties and their election discourse has provided the thesis with a comfortable and solid base on which to build the rest of the thesis. It also contributes a basis for future researchers to repeat the analysis in the future when more data becomes available to test whether anything has changed over time. Future research could also add different MARPOR variables to examine if the results are similar with other manifesto topics

or expand the scope from European RRWP parties to include similar parties elsewhere, comparing similarities and differences.

Moving from the quantitative methods to qualitative ones will shift to more detailed analysis and look into the nuances within the RRWP parties' discourses. The same three hypotheses remain to be answered, and this will be completed through the case studies into three RRWP parties, PS, Fidesz and DF.

With PS and Fidesz, the aim is to see whether there were any manoeuvres with their discourse that were not detected here and, if there were, whether this can still be explained by their institutional roles, or if there is something else behind the changes. In the case of DF, the in-depth analysis should reveal more about this grey area between the legislature and executive and if their institutional role radicalises their discourse or whether there could be other explanations.

The next phase will begin with the case study on the Finns Party, which has spent most of its political life in the opposition, went through a bitter leadership change, and whose move to the coalition government was short-lived and ended in the party splitting. Did any of those factors impact their discourse? We shall see next.

5 Makeover or takeover? How the rise of the nationalists changed the Finns Party

Introduction

Ever since Finland gained its independence from Russia in 1917, populist parties have been a part of the country's politics. Similarly to its former ruler, these initially came in the form of agrarian populism, which is where the roots of the Finns Party (*Perussuomalaiset*, PS) lie (Jungar 2016: 115). The story of the PS analysed here has two main characters, Timo Soini, who was one of the founders and continued as a leader until 2017, and Jussi Halla-aho, who took over from him and then passed on his leadership in 2021.

The hypotheses on opposition parties predicted that the role would not moderate the RRWP parties' discourse. The findings from the previous chapter supported the hypotheses. They showed opposition parties displaying broadly similar emphasis on RRWP issues to parties in government and those supporting one, with a few exceptions on "multiculturalism" and "law and order" variables that showed support parties being more radical than the opposition ones. However, the data employed was from election manifestos, and as previously mentioned,

those are the ideal of the party and how it wishes to sell itself to the electorate. Thus they might not capture the actual behaviour of a party or party leaders' and members' discourse.

This chapter will examine whether the emphasis of the party discourse changed for the PS when they moved from opposition to government and back to the opposition. This will be done by coding and analysing the writings of the party leaders and some members in the party publication *Perussuomalainen* (A Common Finn). During the 15 years under scrutiny, did they keep pushing the RRWP agenda, or did they tame their discourse? And if there were alterations, what may have motivated them, and did the institutional role play a part in it or were there other explanations in effect?

The benefit of using material from the party's newspaper that is mainly read by party members is that the articles and columns are candid since they are directed to their base, the voters who have already been converted, as explained in more detail in the methodology chapter. Like many RRWP parties, the PS has a close relationship with the base and its activists. Increasing the support from a small party over the years has meant that many of the relationships are based on face-to-face interactions, and people know each other more than just by name, which became clear from the pieces analysed.

This chapter begins with an insight into the history of PS and its story from its foundation until 2019. It will be shown that two factions

competed for leadership and power, one more populist and the other more nativist, which coincided with the short period in government. Due to this, the summary of the party history is somewhat more thorough than in the following chapters since the party's evolution and the issues related to the two leaders discussed in the section are expected to influence the party discourse.

After it has been explained how the party has come to be what it is today, the chapter will examine whether the change in the emphasis of the party's rhetoric is better justified by the shift in the institutional role, the rise of the new faction, or perhaps external matters. The analysis will first review how the PS addressed nativism and if there were periods that witnessed a change in writings emphasising nativist themes. This section is divided between the foreign side of nativism, including immigration, refugees and Islam, and the Heartland of nativism, measuring the national way of life, traditional morality, and hard work, a perceived Finnish attribute laden with patriotic associations.

The second variable to be investigated is authoritarianism, followed by populism, which is also divided into two subsections. One examines the discourse around people, other political parties and the EU, whilst the other subsection studies the populist style of the writings. After the three core characteristics of radical right-wing populism have been addressed, the final group analysed and discussed is one measuring socio-cultural

topics, followed by a discussion on the linkages that the codes have, revealing more on the justification used by the PS on different issues.

This chapter is a snapshot of a specific RRWP party that illustrates how the opposition and coalition role seem to have impacted the PS's discourse and examines how the competing fractions and change in the leadership altered it. Further summery of the three case studies' analysis in Chapter Eight should enlighten the institutional roles' effects, whereas here, the focus is solely on this one party and its discourse.

5.1 From agrarian populist to RRWP

The origins of the PS date back to 1959 and the Finnish Smallholder Party (*Suomen Pientalonpoikien Puolue, SPP*), which in 1966 changed its name to the Finnish Rural Party (*Suomen Maaseudun Puolue, SMP*), endorsing the rural population and its smallholders and entrepreneurs against urbanisation and defending Christian values against modernisation (Jungar 2016: 115).

Veikko Vennamo was the leader of the SMP from its foundation until 1979 and became an ideological father to Soini. He was an anti-Communist and a charismatic leader with a colourful personality, known for inventing phrases and sayings he would adopt into his lexicon.⁴²

⁴² The populist political style he created is known as 'vennamolaisuus' ('-suus' at the end translates into '-ism').

Unlike their successor, Vennamo and the SMP were stern supporters of Finland joining the EU, an opinion supported by 56.9% of Finns in the 1994 EU Referendum. Like their successor, the SMP participated in government from 1983 to 1990, which resulted in diminishing support and increasing internal conflict, culminating in bankruptcy in May 1995, which facilitated the founding of the PS.

The most fitting translation for Perussuomalaiset is Common or Ordinary Finns. Hence the original English name for the party, True Finns, was more appropriate than the current Finns Party. Having a name with such a direct reference to the common man as well as to the "people", it is no surprise that PS is self-defined as a populist party, a label that other cohorts steer away from or even argue against.

Unlike most of Europe, where the origins of populism are rooted in far-right ideology or Fascism, in Finland and with the PS the roots are in agrarian populism. Hence, although the national way of life and the idea of the Heartland with its people had always been at the party's core, it was only in 2003 that PS began to radicalise, focusing on anti-immigration and anti-establishment sentiments. This was triggered by the newly elected MP, Tony Halme, a former professional show-wrestler, boxer, and actor with the fifth-highest polling figure in the country. He was a welfare chauvinist, and his comments were homophobic and

xenophobic, if not racist.⁴³ Being a public figure, this behaviour often caught the media's attention when the immigration debate became a topic in Finland, attracting more people with far-right and anti-immigration views.

In 2010, the party attracted a group of nationalist, anti-Islam, and anti-immigration online activists and bloggers with a significant number of followers who joined the PS, translating into more radical voters and views in the party. The group's leader was Halla-aho, a fierce anti-Islam critic in the European online scene,⁴⁴ and after they joined, the group's immigration-critical manifesto became the immigration chapter in the PS 2011 election manifesto.

Following in the populist footsteps of his ideological father, Soini named the 2011 elections the "Big Bang" (*jytky*) due to PS quintupling their previous result with their 19.05% poll share (Table 5.1), making them the third-largest party in Finland. There were essentially two reasons for this that coincided; the electoral funding scandal that shocked the country, dominating the media from 2008 until 2011, and the planned EU bailouts for Greece, which were not well received by the Finns, who had also struggled to jump-start their economy after the 2008 crisis. PS

⁴³ In a radio interview shortly after Halme was elected he referred to the then President Tarja Halonen as a lesbian.

⁴⁴ The Norwegian mass murderer Andreas Breivik mentions Halla-aho's writings in the manifesto he published after his atrocity.

campaigned on both themes and assimilated the Finnish electorate to the anti-elitist messaging, resulting in many voters abandoning party loyalties and looking for a venue for a protest vote.

Table 5.1 National election results for PS.

National elections	Percentage of votes	Seats (N=200)	Institutional Role
1999	0.99	1	Opposition
2003	1.57	3	Opposition
2007	4.05	5	Opposition
2011	19.05	39	Opposition
2015	17.65	28	Government*
2019	17.5	39	Opposition

Note: *PS did not serve the entire four-year term in the coalition government with the two centre-right parties: the Centre Party (KESK) and the National Coalition Party (KOK). The party split in 2017 forced PS out of the government.

Source: ParlGov 2021.

The results entitled PS to participate in the coalition negotiations but taking part in a government was abandoned due to it becoming clear that the other coalition parties would support the infamous EU bailouts, which PS was not willing to do.⁴⁵ Simultaneously, the division between the traditional PS populists and the new, more nationalist members began to grow, the latter group organising behind Halla-aho, who first became an

⁴⁵ As the chairman of the SMP youth, Soini's Master Thesis to the SMP, 'Populism - Politics and Stigma: SMP Changing Roles' (Populismi – Poliittikka ja Poltinmerkki: SMP:n Roolimuutos), discusses the decision for the SMP to join the government, the trade-offs and pressure it created, which would have influenced the decision for the PS to decline the coalition after the 2011 elections.

MP in 2011 and was in 2014 elected as a Member of the European Parliament (MEP).

The sudden increase of new and primarily inexperienced MPs in 2011 resulted in instances of unparliamentary and inappropriate conduct, with some cases involving unlawful behaviour and thus ending in court. During this time, Soini received criticism for not condemning the controversial behaviour but letting many questionable actions go unpunished. Whilst some (Jungar 2016: 128) point out how Soini tolerated the controversial rhetoric, others (Kuisma and Nygård 2017: 6) label it as a political strategy that started with Halme, where the party leadership kept him at a distance that was close enough to bring the votes in but far enough for the party to dissociate itself from him if needed.

Declining a place in the government resulted only in a minor vote decrease, and the 2015 elections successfully took the party into the coalition, with Soini becoming the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Joining the coalition and the trade-offs and compromises that came with it were not welcomed by all party members, or voters, for that matter, both being discussed by the MPs in their writings, which often addressed polling figures. There was loud criticism coming from the nationalist faction whilst their polling figures were crashing, thus confirming the view mentioned previously that RRWP parties are better suited to opposition due to their inflexibility as coalition members.

The 2015 government was with centre-right parties, although PS's socio-economic positioning on the centre-left also makes them a suitable coalition candidate for the centre-left parties. Or at least that would have been the case if Soini had not decided to step down from the leadership in 2017 and the party conference elected Halla-aho for the role, with all three deputies going to the nationalist faction as well.

After the first meeting with the new leader, the other coalition party leaders, including PM Sipilä, refused to work with the PS in the government, which resulted in all the PS ministers led by Soini resigning from the party and forming a new one, which was initially called New Alternative and later changed its name to Blue Reform (SIN). Thus, the losing side of the PS, which held the ministerial portfolios, forced the party out of the government and back to the opposition, ending the brief coalition experiment for the party. For the coalition party leaders, Halla-aho was too radical to lead the PS in the executive, but it is also comprehensible that Halla-aho wished to be out of the government due to the falling polling figures and the criticism it brought with it to the party.

Halla-aho, a fierce critic of Islam, shifted the party's focus almost solely to anti-immigration, some claiming the PS could have been labelled even more specifically as an anti-Islam party (Arter 2020: 268). In the 2019 elections, PS gained the second-highest vote with the second-highest number of parliamentary seats, but as was made clear during the

campaign, no other party would work with them, meaning they were out of the government formation, having to remain in the opposition again.

The whole saga that began in 2010 when the nationalists joined PS witnessed scandals involving MPs, dropping support numbers, difficulties in explaining coalition compromises to party members and supporters, culminating in the party's split, which ended the role as a part of the executive. Scandals, internal fighting, and party split are not a rarity for RRWP parties, and the events also highlight the pivotal role leaders have in these parties and the degree to which their persona dominates the party discourse. How much of this is visible when analysing topics under nativism, especially with the nationalist faction, will be discussed next.

5.2 The two-headed nature of PS's nativism

The above discussion claims that the anti-immigration attitudes were brought into PS by the new members who joined in 2010 and that, prior to 2010, the party expressed their nativist views more in terms of patriotism. How much of that is evident when analysing the party newspaper, and whether there is an indication of the institutional role impacting the nativist discourse, are the questions the chapter focuses on in this section.

The six topics coded under nativism are immigration, refugees, Islam, national way of life, traditional morality and hard work, as

presented in Table 5.2. The discussion is divided between the foreign side of nativism, immigration, refugees and Islam, and the Heartland of nativism, including the codes measuring the national way of life, traditional morality and hard work. The first five are justified in the previous chapters, but to explain “hard work” as a concept of nativism, unique to the PS, demands a few sentences before the analysis.

Table 5.2 The frequency of codes measuring nativism.

	Immigration	Refugees	Islam	National way life	Traditional morality	Hard work
2004	0	2	0	9	15	30
2005	4	2	1	14	19	16
2006	1	2	2	4	0	10
2007	2	0	3	5	4	6
2008	15	1	2	3	1	6
2009	17	4	4	7	11	16
2010*	23	8	3	6	3	7
2011	4	1	0	5	3	14
2012	4	0	0	9	0	10
2013	17	6	6	2	0	3
2014	22	4	3	6	1	8
2015**	24	27	2	2	0	6
2016	28	32	4	1	0	2
2017***	45	23	16	3	6	1
2018	42	28	8	14	4	1
2019	45	18	6	4	3	0

Note: *Nationalist faction joined. **PS joined the coalition. ***Party split.

Finnish people pride themselves on being hard workers, and the concept is rooted in patriotism, seen as a part of the Finnish identity. Referring to the previous chapter and how MARPOR defined the national way of life and traditional morality, one arrives at a crossroad where the concept of hard work could effortlessly be added under either of the codes. It is as much about the established national ideal of Finnish citizens as it is about the shared traditional Finnish values, and undoubtedly all the people in the Heartland of Finland would be hard workers. However, hard work has connotations of its own and is often linked to farming and the two wars Finland fought against Russia. Thus it was plausible to treat it as a separate code and not attach it to either of the two, utilising the decision not to use premeditated codes but to assign them as they appeared in the data.

If hard work, national way of life and traditional morality represent the emotional side of nationalism and patriotism, then immigration, refugees, and Islam are more concrete examples of how those emotions are dealt with and understood in real terms. Another way, more in line with the RRWP discourse, to separate the two sets of codes would be to call immigration, refugees, and Islam the foreign side of nativism, whilst the other three codes would represent the Heartland side. Thus the foreign side symbolises threats coming to the Heartland, whereas the

Heartland side illustrates shared values and traits of the people of the Heartland.

The analysis and discussion will begin with the foreign side of nativism, how the PS views the three codes, and whether the parliamentary role could explain alterations in the mentions or tone or whether other explanations would be more suited.

5.2.1 The foreign side of nativism: Immigration, refugees and Islam

The articles and columns discussing immigration began their increase in 2008 at the start of the financial crisis and two years before the more nationalist-minded bloggers joined the PS (Table 5.2). There is a considerable drop from 23 in 2010 to 4 in 2011, which is surprising since that was the year of the Big Bang election victory and the manifesto section on immigration was drafted by the new faction and steered by Halla-aho.

After the elections, the focus was on the fivefold increase in PS's support, but since the elections in Finland are not held until May, it suggests that immigration was kept away from the party's newspaper, something that was not repeated in the election years 2015 and 2019, figures for those years being 24 and 45, respectively.

The decision to stay in the opposition after the 2011 elections and not join the coalition government did not raise the visibility of immigration. However, the number of references stayed low at 6, which overturns the possible argument that PS was deliberately toning down their more radical topics to appear more attractive as coalition partners. From 2013 onwards, the rise is steady, with two leaps in 2013 and 2017, the latter being the year when the party split and the nationalist faction became the only faction in the party.

Moving on to the following code, the figure on refugee references in *Perussuomalainen* was not above four until 2010, when it increased to 8. Even in 2008, when the number of immigration codes went up by 13, there was only one article focusing on refugees. This rose to four the following year, and after 2010 it again stayed low until a jump in the election year of 2015. Although it could be argued that the elections motivated the rise in the mentions, other factors are also to be considered.

In 2015, 32,476 refugees arrived in Finland, compared to the previous years' 3,000 to 4,000 refugees. Hence, even if the rhetoric was aimed at the electorate, the crisis would not have gone unnoticed in Finland and thus would serve as a better explanation for the increased mentions than the elections. So much so that 2015 and 2016 are the only two years when refugees were a more discussed topic than immigration.

The topic of Islam in a homogenous country such as Finland is arguably also linked to 2015 and more refugees arriving. However, the increase in articles discussing Islam did not occur until 2017, when there was a fourfold jump in the figures. Although this coincides with Halla-aho becoming the leader and being known in the European blogging scene as a fierce antagonist to Islam and Muslims, the explanation for the increase is a terrorist attack that took place in Turku in 2017, where two people were killed and eight injured by a rejected Moroccan asylum seeker. The incident affected the PS's discourse, and although something like Sharia law had been mentioned previously (16/2010), it was now discussed as a severe threat to Finland (6-7/2018), and mosques were labelled as jihadi offices (6-7/2017).

Another chain of events that shocked Finland happened in the northern city of Oulu, where in late 2018 and early 2019 the police were investigating sexual harassment accusations where some of those accused were immigrants. What happened in Oulu will be discussed later in the chapter on law and order, but it is worth noting how the news would have again influenced PS's rhetoric around immigration, refugees, and Islam.

With Halla-aho, it was not merely about the number of articles dedicated to these three issues but the demeaning tone of his writings. For example, he states that uncontrolled immigration is based on living standards (14/2013) and describes refugees as young men with flashy

shoes and the newest iPhones, arguing that the only way to keep the internal borders open is to be able to turn back the jihadis and refugee tourists already at the EU's external borders (01/2018).

Even though Halla-aho emphasised these topics more, and wrote with a questionable tone, when Soini did write about immigration and refugees, his views did not differ from Halla-aho's. Only the manner and frequency did. This may have been due to Soini wanting to appear more "ministerial" to other parties, someone who, as the party leader, could be cooperative in a coalition government and not too radical, or perhaps it was clear to Soini that his not writing about immigration and refugees did not mean that other PS activists would not. Hence it may have been outside the leader's realm of topics but not the party's, and as was argued earlier, Soini seemed to have an approach where he distanced himself from issues that may have agitated some.

With the other three codes in this group, national way of life, traditional morality and hard work, the first code, with a few exceptions, is evenly spread, with slightly more emphasis in the Soini years. For the latter two, the trend is the opposite way round from what was shown in codes on immigration, refugees and Islam, which is that they were more prominent during Soini's years.

5.2.2 The Heartland of nativism: National way of life, traditional morality and hard work

Heartland is a nostalgic, emotionally driven concept that is derived from the past and projected onto the present (Taggart 2004). It is where people share common values and traditions, which is why the three codes discussed here measure it fittingly.

The national way of life was, to some extent, more discussed in the first half of the period. In the last half, there were only two occasions, 2012 and 2018, when the topic gathered heightened attention, but otherwise, the mentions of the code reveal little, thus indicating no change in the emphasis. The jump in 2018 may have been due to PS leaving the government and thus represent the inclusion-moderation thesis, but for this to be the case, the figures should have remained at that level in 2019, which they did not. Furthermore, as shown in Table 5.2, neither the inclusion of the nationalist faction in 2010 nor the change in the leadership in 2017 significantly affected the code “national way of life”.

The last two codes in this section belong to Soini’s agenda and discourse, as becomes evident in Table 5.2. The code on traditional morality was mainly linked to values, homes, PS and religion, and in the three last years, when it reappeared in other members’ writings, it primarily addressed sexual minorities and how Christianity should remain part of early education. The party newspaper reported the shooting in one

of Orlando's gay bars, claiming that PS had long been warning what would happen when sexual minorities and immigrants from patriarchal cultures collide (06 – 07/2016), thus linking more than one topic together.

The last nativist code is hard work, the patriotic symbol of Finnishness, which is present only in Soini's writings, except for the one time in 2018 when Halla-aho mentioned it whilst discussing the party's internal affairs and how cooperation with hard work would reap benefits for the PS. Soini also sometimes used hard work to motivate party members before elections, but primarily it was employed as a part of Finnish characterisation, as something to be proud of and a quality that Finns do not shy away from, appealing to the Finnish emotions.

Thus two of the codes that describe the Heartland of nativism, the patriotism of the homeland, were emphasised more during the Soini years and especially by him, whilst the analysis of the national way of life did not reveal anything conclusive. What was shown in the three earlier codes of immigration, refugees, and Islam was that the changes in the mentions were not due to the institutional role nor the inclusion-moderation thesis but were indeed a combination of the leadership change and domestic factors to which Finland had not previously been accustomed.

PS's emphasis on nativism after the nationalist faction took over is illustrated by Soini's comment in the 19/2015 issue, which candidly describes the main topics for both leaders: 'They have fiercely criticised me on the EU and Jussi Halla-aho on immigration. They are yet to show

us being wrong.’ And it is the preferred topic of Soini’s, the EU, which the chapter will discuss under the headline populism, after examining and analysing the codes under authoritarianism.

5.2.3 The not-so authoritarian PS

The link between law and order issues and the centre-right parties has been discussed in this thesis previously, arguing that it is not a topic that RRWP parties solely own. In the case of PS, this is even more so since the codes measuring authoritarianism exclude illiberalism, which somewhat separates RRWP parties from centre-right ones. Furthermore, this was one of the themes in Chapter Four where parties supporting a government showed more radical discourse than those in opposition, and it could be expected that the mentions in this section would not reach high figures.

There are three codes measuring authoritarianism: “law and order”, “freedom of speech” and “military”, all of which receive little attention from the PS. To begin with the code on law and order, there were four years where no articles addressed the topic, and most of the years averaged fewer than four mentions (Table 5.3). There is a leap in 2012 and again in 2018, after which in 2019, the code has its highest figure at 11, explainable by the aforementioned events in Northern Finland.

Table 5.3 The frequency of codes measuring authoritarianism.

	Law and Order	Freedom of speech	Military
2004	0	0	0
2005	0	0	1
2006	0	0	0
2007	1	0	0
2008	1	1	0
2009	4	1	3
2010*	3	1	0
2011	1	1	0
2012	7	0	6
2013	1	0	4
2014	1	1	1
2015**	0	0	0
2016	4	1	3
2017***	3	5	1
2018	8	7	2
2019	11	9	0

Note: *Nationalist faction joined. **PS joined the coalition. ***Party split.

In December 2018 and early 2019, the police in the northern city of Oulu were investigating a series of child exploitation crimes, including rape and grooming of minors. Although most of the crimes were unrelated, two-thirds of the suspects were migrants. Consequently, with immigration attached to the topic, 8 out of the 11 references in 2019 are related to the crimes in Oulu.

The correlation with leadership change is visible with the code measuring freedom of speech, which, as was discussed in Chapter One, has been employed by RRWP parties as a justification to express highly controversial topics, at times challenged in courts as hate speech.

The code lay near to silent until 2017, which was also the year when the Finnish Department for Education and Culture launched a campaign called 'I pledge to defy hate speech'. The PS's critique of the campaign included describing freedom of speech as the very core of democracy (10/2017), a super value (11/2017) and a central human right (1/2018).

Immigration, multiculturalism and Islam were also linked to this code, but the remarks were quite subtle and indirect. Many addressed how the elite or establishment aims to silence values they do not like, whilst the 10/2019 issue included an article on a PS MP's fine for incitement to ethnic or racial hatred and another on an MP who, after the police investigation, avoided the same charge. The same issue also questioned why labelling someone as a racist or a Nazi is not considered hate speech.

Although "freedom of speech" is considered to measure authoritarianism due to the connotations of law, with its linkages to immigration, it could have also been placed in the nativist group. The emphasis on nativist issues even on this topic further reinforces how the

new leader swayed the party further to the right and will be visited when the chapter has a closer look into the linkages the codes have.

The frequency of mentions of the military does not indicate a change in the discourse (Table 5.3), and their content was typical for a patriotic RRWP party, running with nationalistic themes, such as the national service and bringing back landmines. Finland has a compulsory national service⁴⁶ that PS vigorously defends. They would also want Finland to leave the Ottawa Treaty, aimed at eliminating anti-personnel landmines, which was joined by Finland in 2011. PS's argument for landmines rests on the long, approximately 1300-kilometre, land border with Russia, which was why Finland was relatively late to stop using them.

To repeat how the section began, the emphasis on authoritarianism is low with the PS for an RRWP party, yet it could be argued not necessarily so as an RRWP opposition party, which as a group were found to be more moderate than those supporting a government in the Large-N chapter. Also, unlike the first two codes discussed, the military is not showing a relationship to the time in government or leadership change. Furthermore, if the topics under law and order and freedom of speech

⁴⁶ It is compulsory for men and since 1995 it has been open to women on a voluntary basis.

were linked to immigration, the connotations with military were with the patriotic side of nativism.

From a topic with little interest to the PS, the chapter will now turn to a variable that includes seven of the 15 most frequent codes (Appendix C), including the two most addressed issues, populism.

5.3 The common Finns and their defenders

What has been thus far learned about the PS should explain why the codes under populism were frequently emphasised. After all, the party's roots are in agrarian populism, Soini's ideological father was a populist, and most significantly, the party itself labels it as populist.

Consequently, there are seven codes representing populism, more than in the other groups. One of those, like the previously discussed "hard work", is linked to Soini's style of speech and writing, which is the "metaphor", the most frequently occurring of all PS's codes. But the discussion in this section will start with the theme at the core of populism: people. And from "us" the people, it will then move on to "them" the others, beginning with the PS's focus on other domestic political parties before discussing the EU, Soini's favourite topic. These three codes will be addressed first under the sub-topic us versus them.

After that, the aforementioned code for metaphor will be focused on, followed by another populist discourse style, "victimhood". Together

with the codes on “scandals” and “media”, these will be presented and analysed in the second sub-section discussing the populist style of discourse.

5.3.1 The “us” versus “them” debate as viewed by the PS

When discussing the features of populism, there is no better place to start than with the people and the “us” and “them” juxtaposition. The “them” is captured via two codes, firstly other Finnish political parties that represent the opponents of PS in Finland, and secondly the EU, the elite abroad. Other parties were often, especially by Soini, called the elite or the old parties, thus viewing PS as part of the people and the fresh new blood of Finnish politics.

At a first glance at Table 5.4, the resemblance between the figures for “people” and “other parties” becomes evident. Both codes are in high numbers at the beginning, which, after a series of decreases, bounce in 2009 before beginning to diminish again, “people” dipping more in 2010. For the second half of the period, both stay low, except for the 10-figure jump for other parties in 2019.

Table 5.4 The frequency of codes measuring populism.

	Metaphor	Victimhood	EU	Other parties	People	Media	Scandal
2004	74	22	23	41	48	7	0
2005	66	5	27	29	31	9	0
2006	9	0	10	8	8	4	4
2007	27	4	9	15	14	6	5
2008	18	3	17	10	5	3	4
2009	38	2	33	25	26	3	9
2010*	12	3	23	13	10	6	2
2011	11	3	25	16	6	8	6
2012	14	7	23	13	10	7	13
2013	13	6	15	7	5	10	18
2014	12	5	13	6	3	10	19
2015**	11	5	4	4	4	2	13
2016	4	4	6	3	1	10	15
2017***	1	1	12	5	3	8	10
2018	0	1	13	4	3	13	0
2019	0	3	4	14	0	18	3

Note: *Nationalist faction joined. **PS joined the coalition. ***Party split.

The concept of the people is at the core of populism, and as has been mentioned before, Soini was more prone to populism, whereas


Halla-aho emphasised nativism. Thus the trend that can be seen with the people reinforces Soini's populism and how it slowly began to decrease with the new nationalist element of the PS, which indicates the impact of the changing atmosphere in the party and impending leadership change, not the institutional role.

What is somewhat more interesting is the low mentions of other parties, especially since PS did not join the coalition in 2011 and spent four years in the opposition after achieving a remarkable election result. Furthermore, if given the benefit of the doubt that PS decided to tame their criticism, keeping an eye out for the coalition place after the next election and thus wanting to present themselves as cooperative partners, how come that did not bounce back once out of the coalition in 2017 or 2018? It is also arguable how electable an opposition party would be if they had let the government parties off the hook due to their aspirations.

Consequently, the explanation remaining for these figures is that the party's attention was someplace else, for instance, with the above-discussed topics of nativism. However, let us inspect this further with the code on the EU.

As per the earlier quotation from Soini, he spoke about the EU and Halla-aho about immigration, evidence of which can be seen in the year-to-year comparison of the two codes in Figure 5.1. Comparing these two codes reveals how the EU was a more prominent topic between 2004 and 2012.

Figure 5.1 Year to year figures on immigration and the EU



Note: *Nationalist faction joined. **PS joined the coalition. ***Party split.

The articles and columns addressing the EU start high, dip in 2006 and 2007, before surging again around the 2011 elections, after which they begin a steady decline. 2008, which created the upsurge for the code, was the beginning of two crises in Europe: refugee and finance. The PS's resistance to the Greek bailout was one of their primary agendas in the 2011 elections. It also shows the party seemingly deciding to focus on the EU in the year of the Big Bang election in 2011 as well as the following year.

From 2013 onward, immigration began to draw more attention in the party newspaper, with a considerable lull for the EU references in 2015, 2016 and 2019. There have only been 2008 and 2013 when the two topics have received parallel attention; otherwise, they alternate,

leading to the conclusion that the PS chooses whether the bigger enemy is the EU or immigration but not both simultaneously.

Both leaders have served as MEPs to understand how the EU works and what it takes to work in Brussels. In a 2014 special issue presenting PS's MEP candidates, Soini was asked what one can influence in the EU as an MEP, to which he replied, 'everything that is being covered since the European Parliament's status is strong'.

A similar attitude is echoed by Halla-aho, who, in the 16/2014 issue, stated how the atmosphere for interaction is more constructive than in the Finnish Parliament since it lacks the juxtaposition between the opposition and the government, continuing how it actually seemed to matter when you said something in a committee meeting.

Even though they agree that an MEP can impact the EU and its practices, they are critical of it. Soini is a Eurosceptic against further integration or deepening whilst Halla-aho, although he defends Europe's identity, sees "Fixit" as the ideal outcome. Soini was dissatisfied that Finns were not given a referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon like Ireland was. He felt that Finland ratifying what he called the EU constitution was a quiet backroom deal, and he celebrated the Irish people after their first referendum result.

Whereas, Halla-aho condemned the Schengen Agreement, which he saw was built on trust, a trust that suffered during the 2015 refugee

crises when Greece and Italy were unable to stop the refugees from continuing their journeys towards, in his opinion, the more desirable countries in Northern Europe (01/2018). Halla-aho argues that the only way to keep the internal borders open is to be able to turn back the jihadis and refugee tourists already at the EU's external borders, thus returning the debate to his favoured topic.

Another example of Halla-aho linking the EU and its borders to nativism is when he discusses the border controls at one of Northern Finland's rivers with a tone that is undermining and almost mocking, reinforcing the view from the far-right that asylum seekers are young, well-off men who possess fancy smartphones but who are also dangerous, if not murderous.

The objection to bringing back border control to Tornion river has been justified by its cost, which is a weak excuse for the inactivity since, in practice, it would only mean the surveillance of a few bridges. The comers, wearing their fancy shoes and holding their iPhones, won't be swimming across the river in the wilderness. In addition, one should remember that accommodating, feeding, educating, medicating, and entertaining young men for months and even years comes with an astronomical cost. All Finns pay that with their wallets; unfortunately, many have had to pay that with their health, some even with their lives (01/2018).

If Halla-aho's EU profile is based on anti-immigration, what came to dominate Soini's rhetoric on the EU were the Economic and Monetary Union's (EMU) financially weaker member states and the bailout packages

that followed the crisis. He was especially critical of Greece, claiming Greece had fabricated their entry into the monetary union (09/2005) and demanding Greece should be suspended from the EMU until they had sorted things out. Soini believed that two families take turns to govern the country, stating that 'the Prime Minister's cousin was the head of the national statistics when Greece fiddled with its statistics to be let into the EU' (06/2010).

That is not to say that Halla-aho stayed silent on Greece. In September 2011, his Facebook post stated that 'right now Greece needs a military junta who wouldn't need to care for its popularity and who could crack down on the strikers and rioters'. It was deleted swiftly but resulted in a two-week suspension from the PS parliamentary group, which Soini viewed as a severe punishment (13/2011).

Even though Soini's and Halla-aho's differing emphasis on topics is not only visible in the figures in Table 5.4 but explicitly voiced by the first leader, the low numbers for the EU in the two years PS was incumbent should not go unnoticed.

The frequency for the EU code began to fall in 2012, dipping to its lowest in 2015, increasing only by two mentions in 2016, and once PS returned to the opposition, the code bounced back to the 2013 and 2014 levels. Intriguingly, the reason why PS did not join the coalition after the 2011 election began to lose strength whilst that government was still sitting. If a party had been so dedicated to objecting to the Greek bailout,

one would assume they would keep up the pressure from the opposition benches. Furthermore, since the bailouts were approved, that would have presented a relevant campaign topic for the 2015 elections, culminating in more mentions.

It could be argued that since PS had sat only on the opposition benches since their founding, they were longing to make a more significant impact on the decision-making and thus toned down their criticism of the EU and consequently of the then government. However, if that argument is accepted, then one would expect the emphasis to return to pre-2012 levels after the incumbency, which did not happen. It is, therefore, more plausible to conclude that both leadership change and incumbency influenced the code of the EU.

The quotes above candidly reflect more than the two leaders' favoured topics. They also show how Halla-aho views matters through his nativist lenses, and Soini discusses them using populist discourse, including metaphors. For instance, when he compared the EU to the Soviet Union and continued claiming remarkable similarities between the Communist Moscow and the National Coalition Party's⁴⁷ Brussels, continuing that one of them has the crises in the past whilst for the other

⁴⁷ At the time of Soini's column, the National Coalition Party was the senior member in the Finnish cabinet.

they are still waiting ahead (07/2014). It is the code on metaphor that the chapter will turn to next.

5.3.2 The PS's style in populist discourse

Examples of Soini's language-style have already been provided with his describing the historic elections as the Big Bang and comparing the EU to the Soviet Union, which is why it can be assumed that the codes in this section will continue to be more prominent under his leadership. The code on metaphor is considered an umbrella label for using sayings, phrases and figures of speeches, which was very common for Soini. It was rare for him to write a column or an article or be interviewed without using metaphors, and Soini often employed old Finnish sayings and made-up phrases that became his trademarks. The style was somewhat used also by other party members from his leadership period, especially figures of speech, which remained a trademark in *Perussuomalainen* after Soini's departure. However, using metaphors progressively became a more belittling way to exemplify things when the nationalist faction rose within the party.

The code began to reduce in mentions in 2010 when the nationalists joined PS and remained at similar levels for six years before a further dip in 2016, followed by one in 2017 and nil for the last two years. This is not surprising since the feature was part of Soini's character, portraying the

populist in him. Whilst metaphor was the most frequent code in this chapter, another code measuring a populist style of discourse is in the 13th place, victimhood, where the party views themselves as the underdog, with all odds against them. Victimhood also describes how the party dealt with criticism and obstacles, seeing the world as unfair and against them, as noted in relation to the emotional appeals in Chapter One.

The numbers on this code are not as clearly linked to the leadership as above. Victimhood was mentioned three times per annum on average, the exceptions being the highest figure of 22 in 2004 and a slight increase in 2012 and 2013. Therefore, perhaps the figures on victimhood tell more about the underdog feeling the party has had from the beginning and thus were not influenced by the leadership nor the changing institutional roles but by the evolution of the party as it became more mainstream.

The sense of victimhood was directed to the media, other parties and the supporters of other parties when facing criticism or questions, and even to PS members and activists after disappointing election results. For instance, in the lead-up to the 2014 EP elections, Soini wrote:

The old parties and their European siblings have begun their familiar information war, never mind the uncritical media with their sheep mentality, led by our country's leading newspaper, floundering in financial difficulties. Its own housekeeping reminds one of the Euro's success story (03/2014).

The above is another example of how issues were linked and shows many of PS's opponents addressed in a short paragraph: other parties from home and abroad, media and the EU. It is written to present PS as an underdog, a victim, fighting against the odds when the elections are played against them.

Both leaders mainly addressed the media in the same way, and the numbers do not tell much of a story, suggesting no change in the party discourse, supporting the central hypotheses. However, the most salient point is how in the last two years, under Halla-aho, there was an increase in the average, mainly calling for the Finnish Broadcasting Company's (*Yle*) funding to be cut and portraying the media as biased. These do fit into the RRWP playbook and echo the developments seen elsewhere in Europe. Thus, on this issue, PS under Halla-aho had a more populist take, making this another code linked to the leadership.

It was also many of the members Halla-aho brought with him to the party that were involved in offences, at times in court cases, which are labelled as scandals. Although both leaders have had to manage scandals, it is Halla-aho himself who was convicted of ethnic agitation, a charge known elsewhere as inciting racial or ethnic hatred, and defaming religion. Both judgements arose from the same 2008 blog post, and due to the appeals, the case went all the way through to the highest court in Finland, the Supreme Court.

The scandals portray a story that links to the nationalists joining the party, since they increased in 2012, two years after the new members joined, and stayed high until 2017, which is the year when PS split, raising the question of whether scandals were still going on but merely being ignored in the party newspaper by the new leadership.

With all that has been said, it is not surprising that Soini's time was linked with the EU, the people and metaphors, and what was reinforced further at the beginning of this section was the relationship the two leaders had with their favourite topics. Thus, the codes representing populism have shown that most of them had connections to the leadership, with only the EU showing some signs of incumbency effect.

What was intriguing was the decreasing emphasis on other parties, the PS's opponents, and how, as an opposition party, they allowed the critique to diminish from 2013 to 2019. Was the emphasis also lost in socio-cultural matters, and how much of it was driven by the leaders? These are the questions this chapter will be answering next.

5.4 The uncharacteristic emphasis on welfare

The final variable examined and analysed is socio-cultural, which is not as such an RRWP topic, but since the thesis studies the impact of institutional roles, these will enhance the understanding of RRWP parties as a part of decision-making. After all, being part of the legislature entails

the necessity to take part in most if not all debates, not only those that fit one's agenda, as argued in Chapter Two.

The socio-cultural variable has five codes representing it. Two of those might have been included under the welfare one, but keeping pensioners and unemployed separate will provide a clearer picture of PS's agenda since, as will be shown, for an RRWP party, the PS defends the welfare system and state spending on it. The pensioners' code also includes mentions of the elderly, since those terms were employed near synonymously. The other two codes are environment and farming. The latter is especially interesting for a party whose foundations are in agrarian populism.

The importance of welfare for the PS is clearly illustrated in Table 5.5, and it also was the fifth most frequent code overall. The figures start high with drops in 2006 and 2008 before declining from 2011 onward before increasing again in the last four years, although still settling lower than the first years under inspection. Hence there is some connection to the nationalist faction altering the agenda. However, that does not explain the rise in the latter years, so perhaps the figures on pensioners and the unemployed reveal more.

Table 5.5 The frequency of codes measuring socio-economic issues.

	Welfare	Pensioners	Unemployment	Environment	Farming
2004	11	1	1	0	2
2005	14	1	3	0	5
2006	3	0	1	0	2
2007	8	1	0	2	3
2008	5	0	3	4	2
2009	16	10	19	6	12
2010*	6	10	3	0	2
2011	3	2	0	3	2
2012	4	2	2	3	0
2013	1	0	2	1	0
2014	5	1	5	4	0
2015**	0	1	3	1	1
2016	6	0	1	3	2
2017***	8	0	3	3	0
2018	5	0	1	14	2
2019	7	0	3	23	4

Note: *Nationalist faction joined. **PS joined the coalition. ***Party split.

The former was PS's focus in 2009 and 2010, but in other years the mentions were low before dropping altogether from 2016 onward. As for the latter, again year 2009 is significantly higher than any other year, but overall, there seems to be no visible trend that could have been

influenced by the party's internal matters or their parliamentary role. Therefore, focusing on the rhetoric instead of the mere figures could expand the three codes further.

Soini frequently defended the welfare policies and benefits and those less well-off in his columns. He particularly spoke for the unemployed, the elderly and pensioners, and the disabled and their carers. He saw himself not only as the man of the people but also of the less well-off people, often highlighting the growing gap between the rich and the poor in Finland, for instance, noting how people in Finland are queuing more than ever nowadays and how those who are better-off queue for holidays abroad and those less well-off for bread (01/2008).

Maybe, as a religious man,⁴⁸ Soini could better empathise with the disadvantaged, whether that manifests as being a speaker for the welfare society or in rarely joining in the anti-immigration dialogue. In contrast, Halla-aho employed the official church line on immigration as a reason for his not joining the church. In the 05/2013 issue, he wrote how he sometimes goes to the church with the children, and they say their evening prayers, but he will not be joining the church as long as the

⁴⁸ It is noteworthy that Soini resigned from The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, of which nearly 70% of Finns are members, due to their opening the priesthood to women in 1988. Since then, Soini has been a member of the Catholic Church.

church officially focuses on marketing “tolerance” (in quotation marks in the original text) and multiculturalism.

The party under Halla-aho did not cease driving welfare and poverty issues, as will be discussed later, but he wrote less about the welfare system, and when he did, it was tied into the argument against immigration and refugees. For example, in 03/2019, he argued that the number of immigrants arriving renders impossible the upkeep of good social welfare and employment rights, rising wages, good schools, equality, peace in the society – a good Finland. He continued how there was enough money for the asylum seekers but not for the elderly.

The significance and value of work in Finnish society has already been discussed when analysing the code for hard work, which is reinforced by Soini’s writing in 2009, when Finland was experiencing the impacts of the financial crisis, which claimed that the only thing worse than unemployment is war (04/2009). Furthermore, in 08/2004, the editor of *Perussuomalainen* argued that around 30,000 long-term unemployed should be made pensioners.

PS has consistently been against increasing the retirement age and cutting pensions, but the last references to pensioners are in the 11/2015 issue, published a few months after the PS entered the coalition government. If the reason for dropping pensioners from the party agenda was due to incumbency, it would be expected to be back on the platform after the party split, and PS was back in the opposition, which it was not.

For a party based on agrarian populist party foundations, the references that farming and farmers receive in the coded text of *Perussuomalainen* are unexpected. As shown in Table 5.5, the mentions are relatively low even in the earlier years under investigation. Before the 12-figure peak in 2009, the references on the topic averaged 3.4, and after 2009 they suffered even more, with an average of 1.3, which included three subsequent years of no mentions of farming.

The environment is another topic that peaked considerably in 2018 and 2019. Some pieces on the environment were balanced, and even though some members may have been sceptical about the gravity of climate change, the need to protect the environment was widely recognised. Nevertheless, the resistance towards the EU's climate and energy packages, as well as the defiance towards the Copenhagen and Paris agreements, were prominent from the start, and in 2015 *Perussuomalainen* began to publish stories of the adverse health effects caused by wind turbines.

In two of the 2019 editorials, Matias Turkkila was vociferous about Greta Thunberg and wrote how the climate change hysteria had become a pseudo-religious replacement for religion (03/2019). In his editorial titled 'Follow the child leader!' he was critical of the media, calling them political actors.

Feminism and climate change. Climate change and feminism. All the time, continuously, night and day. Discrimination is bad, apart from

discrimination against Finnish men. Internet is bad, freedom of speech bad, Donald Trump bad, Finns Party bad, common men bad, populism bad, patriotism bad. Girls good, #metoo good, feminism good, vegetarianism good, climate strikes good, climate girl Greta Thunberg extra-super-good (09/2019).

Although not that visible until 2018 and 2019, the topic of environment covers various aspects and is not straightforwardly expressed. Despite the sneering and undermining tone that most of the references had, reflecting the party after the split, in 2019 there were calls from a PS MP, for instance, for Finland to use its role as the President of the Council of the European Union to demand a ban on Brazilian meat until the Amazon fires were under control, reinforcing the complexity of the topic.

Examining only the figures on each code on the socio-cultural variable would portray a different picture than what is achieved with a closer inspection of what was actually written. Welfare and environment were the only codes where the numbers indicated a connection to the leadership, which became clearer when looking in more depth. The latter focuses mainly on what is viewed as the adverse effects of slowing down climate change, whilst the former becomes a tool to express welfare chauvinism, which was also the case with the pensioners and unemployed.

As has become evident during this chapter, the tone of the writings matter, which makes it essential to know how arguments are constructed

and how they are justified. This is why the last part of this chapter will concentrate on the linkages between the topics and which issues are connected.

5.5 Connecting the codes and topics

As has been discussed throughout this chapter, the translated quotes generally include more than one code in them and thus have already shown how the RRWPs' and PS's issues are connected. This last section examines those linkages and how the PS intertwines its topics further.

Due to the Manichean worldview that RRWP parties hold, issue agendas become simplistic, and when any new debate breaks the surface, it is defined by the "us" versus "them" framework. Consequently, this means that things are black and white. They are either good or bad, where the bad is the elite, and the good is the people and their shared views and values. PS is no exception, and their arguments are either justified or condemned with their favoured topics, as shown in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6 Matrix coding.

	Environment	EU	Farming	Immigration	Law and Order	Media	Metaphor	Nat way life	Other parties	People	Refugees	Trad moral	Welfare policies
Environment		4	2	6	0	2	5	1	7	0	0	2	2
EU	4		12	16	1	8	48	17	26	10	13	2	1
Farming	2	12		0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Immigration	6	16	0		14	8	1	7	12	3	4	8	23
Law and Order	0	1	0	14		1	0	0	3	1	4	0	4
Media	2	8	0	8	1		15	0	25	4	4	3	1
Metaphor	5	48	1	10	0	15		11	62	52	3	22	10
Nat way life	1	17	0	7	0	1	11		6	18	1	16	5
Other parties	7	26	0	12	3	26	62	6		21	3	6	6

People	0	10	0	3	1	4	52	18	21		0	27	7
Refugees	0	13	0	4	4	4	3	1	3	0		2	3
Trad moral	2	2	0	8	0	3	22	16	6	27	2		3
Welfare policies	2	1	0	23	4	1	10	5	6	7	3	3	

The table includes codes from all the variables discussed in this chapter. The prominence of the favourite topic of each leader becomes evident when examining the linkages that EU and immigration have. Also, the only code not linked with metaphor is law and order, which means that all other codes have been discussed in the *Perussuomalainen* with metaphors, a figure of speech or sayings attached to them.

Until 09/2012, the newspaper had a feature showcasing randomly selected consumer products with their then-current prices converted into the old Finnish Marks, attempting to evoke a sentiment that the price increases that had occurred since Finland adopted the currency in 2002 were solely due to the Euro. This section was called 'It's expensive'. Overall and beyond this section, Soini tended to express costs in old Finnish Marks or, as he put it, the old assassinated Mark, which would account for a number of those linkages.

It is hardly surprising that the EU is also linked to immigration and refugees, but perhaps more so is its connection to farming, or blame for farmers' problems, which mainly was regarding subsidies and regulations. The figures for a link between the EU and the national way of life show how the EU was constructed as a force against Finnish traditions. A similar story is being told by the numbers connecting welfare and immigration, confirming PS's welfare chauvinism.

Furthermore, law and order is not that prominently discussed a topic, but here it is linked to seven other codes, strengthening its position

as a topic, and the highest shared connection of law and order is with immigration. An example of the linkage between law and order and immigration is found in Halla-aho's column in the 01/2019 issue, where he argues that in the same way as men are overrepresented among domestic violence perpetrators, smokers among lung cancer patients and drunken drivers in car crashes, so are immigrants as sexual abusers, continuing that this is why any measures should be directed towards those groups.

Earlier in the chapter, it was noted how the code on other parties was surprisingly low during the opposition years after the 2011 elections. However, since it is known that the code represents criticism towards PS's opponents, the connections shown are noteworthy. There is not much difference between the code's connections with the EU, media and the people, reinforcing how the PS constructed their populist "us" versus "them" argument.

Although this section contributes little to the central question of what motivates possible discourse changes, it does show the prominence of the two leaders again. Furthermore, it offers evidence of what was discussed throughout this chapter of how PS constructed their arguments, demonstrating how intertwined the topics are and how easily RRWP themes can be connected.

Conclusion

The differences between the two leaders were not limited to the topics both feel close to but were visible in how they addressed the membership and their writing styles. Soini saw himself as the defender of the less well-off and the party's father figure, although not as strict as many would have hoped. When PS members were involved in scandals, Soini remained quiet and failed to discipline, arguably condoning questionable behaviour and rhetoric. His use of language was saturated with a populist style of discourse, employing metaphors and having a unique choice of words, preferring the more commonly used over those considered more sophisticated, focusing on the EU and welfare.

Although Halla-aho was the leader of the nationalist faction before becoming the PS's leader, his writings did not reflect leadership. He was very much to the point, avoiding descriptive style and mostly adhering to anti-immigration topics, at times using demeaning language. When he did address issues such as the EU and welfare, it was executed with nativist linkages. These differences between the two leaders show how the change in leadership and the change in discourse are impacted by what they see as salient topics and wish to emphasise. Thus the possible change that leadership brings about is often more nuanced than merely predicting moderation or radicalisation, as discussed in Chapter Three.

The changes in the nativist codes labelled as foreign can be partly explained by external occurrences, but the leadership's influence on those

was overwhelming. What was more so was the evidence of how the two years the party spent as a part of the executive did not influence the discourse. The changes in the emphasis of two of three Heartland codes pointed to Soini, as the increase in “law and order” pointed to Halla-aho, with a push from external, domestic factors. The mentions of the EU did show some evidence for the inclusion-moderation thesis, yet, the change from being critical of the EU to being critical about immigration that followed the leadership change challenges that conclusion.

What is not visible from the numbers and frequencies is how the style and tone of the discourse changed. The bluntness of Halla-aho’s writing, especially when discussing immigration and refugees, is considerable. The extracts included throughout the chapter provide examples of this, highlighting the benefits of process tracing, which allows the researcher to focus on particularities they come across during the study.

Although this thesis concentrates on the supply side, it is noteworthy that the Finnish electorate seems to have radicalised with the PS, since their polling figures have been sustained ever since 2011. The radicalisation that concluded in the leadership change, which again ended the incumbency, are almost inseparable events and acted as the final culmination of the party abandoning the agrarian populist legacy that Soini had tried in the last years to keep alive in honour of his ideological father, Vennamo. However, a closer look into the party’s behaviour

exposed how the nationalist faction held the reins behind the change, primarily endorsed by the membership and the supporters.

It has to be considered that during the 16 years under investigation, Europe, with Finland in it, did not halt change but was influenced by external factors, including the two crises. However, the increases in the radical themes were more significant than the crises would have warranted. Or, to put it another way, the financial and refugee crises do not cause or force parties to react by becoming more radical or adopting more RRWP discourse.

This chapter has explained how three significant events happened simultaneously, leadership change, the party split and the move from the government back to the opposition, but it is the effects of the change in the leadership and split in the party that influenced the PS's discourse more than the change in its institutional role. This conclusion supports the hypotheses tested in the previous chapter that concluded that the institutional role a party holds does not alter the party's discourse. Although, once again, it must be stressed that this does not allow generalisation and merely illustrates the behaviour of one RRWP party.

Thus, to return to the initial question, did the Finns Party go through a takeover or a makeover? The conclusion is that what began as a makeover ended with a takeover.

Whether the hypothesis is supported by a case study on a governmental party will be examined next in the chapter on the Hungarian Fidesz.

6 Fidesz – The governing party that is forgetting the people

Introduction

When examining how incumbency influences RRWP parties' discourse and, more specifically, what effects governmental participation has on the parties, studying a party that has governed a country with a supermajority, like Fidesz, should enlighten the researcher. As was discussed in Chapter Three, including a party with a supermajority offers another case study perspective since the chapter on PS elucidates the discourse of a governmental party in a coalition.

Since 2010 when Fidesz gained a supermajority in the Hungarian Parliament, it has arguably had nearly limitless power to legislate and implement the RRWP agenda, due to the changes it has brought to the Hungarian political system. Their agenda's consequences for the quality of democracy are readily accessible, for instance, via Freedom House, where the country's democracy score in 2009, a year before Fidesz re-entered the government with their first supermajority, was 5.71, but by 2020 had dropped to 3.97. Hungary's regime classification, which was "consolidated democracy" in 2009, was changed to "transitional/hybrid regime" in 2020 (Nations in Transit). The Bertelsmann Foundation's indexes tell a similar

story. Hungary scored 9.18 in 2008 but plummeted to 6.99 in 2020 (Bertelsmann Foundation). Hence it may be soon when labelling Fidesz as an RRWP party becomes questionable. However, at the time of the writing, it was still defined as RRWP on the *PopuList* and therefore considered as such in this thesis.

Chapter Four offered two conclusions on governmental parties. Firstly, this party group was less radical than parties with no parliamentary seats when it came to issues related to national way of life, and secondly, they were also less radical than those officially supporting a minority government with issues regarding law and order. This notably suggests that the influence of the governmental role does not affect the parties' discourse. In the case of Fidesz, however, the previously published academic research shows how the party has not only evolved, as will be discussed below, but also radicalised, becoming more illiberal, challenging democratic principles and institutions.

By analysing the speeches of Fidesz's leader, Victor Orbán, presented on the Prime Minister's website, this chapter will examine whether the years in government reflected those changes and altered the discourse and how the possible shift in rhetoric was conveyed. To provide further details of the Fidesz's discourse, the chapter is intrigued to see if the core RRWP topics were emphasised similarly or whether specific subjects drew more or less attention than others, to understand better how the governmental role influenced the Hungarian party.

Altogether 984 speeches from 2008 to 2020 were coded and analysed. As is detailed further in the Methodology chapter, one address can include more than one code, and the codes are signals of the themes in the speeches. Hence they were not assigned to single words but had to be discussed further.

In the case of the Finns Party (PS), the party newspaper, which was coded and analysed, was published 12 to 15 times a year, and the DF's leader's newsletters were published weekly, which meant that focusing on the mere numbers was informative enough on where the emphases were. However, the number of Orbán's speeches on the PM's website varies from 31 a year to 128 a year, as detailed in the methodology chapter, which is why in this chapter the focus is on percentages, showing what proportion of the yearly speeches addressed the codes.

This chapter will begin by summarising the history of Fidesz and how the party has evolved from an anti-Communist youth force into an RRWP party with deteriorating reflections on democracy. After this, the focus will turn to the variables already familiar from the previous chapters: nativism, authoritarianism, populism, which includes European Union (EU), and socio-cultural issues. These will be presented with an analysis and discussion on the various codes related to each group, emphasising how the topics and the discourse on them may have changed during the years under scrutiny.

But first, the chapter will review Fidesz's political journey.

6.1 Growing with the newly independent Hungary

In 1988, whilst still under Communist rule, a group of young reformists, Orbán included, founded the *Federation of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége/Fidesz)* with an upper age limit of 35 years, which in 1993 was removed. The liberal, anti-Communist movement called for free elections, a market economy, European integration and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. In 1989 one of the founding members, Victor Orbán, gave a speech at the reburial of Imre Nagy, the leader of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, which made him a nationally recognised politician. As will be shown in the course of this chapter, both Imre Nagy and the 1956 Revolution were heavily present in Orbán's discourse.

Orbán became a member of the National Assembly in the first free elections in 1990 and leader of the party three years later, a role he took a short vacation from in 2000 before returning to the leadership in 2003 and remaining in that role at the time of the writing. In the 1994 elections, Fidesz suffered a loss in their vote share (Table 6.1), and during the two terms in the opposition, the party began their movement towards conservatism. The name *Federation of Young Democrats* was changed in 1995 to *Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Party* and again in 2003 to *Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union*.

Table 6.1 National election results for Fidesz.

National elections	Percentage of votes	Seats (N=386*, N=199**)	Institutional Role
1990	8.95	22*	Opposition
1994	7.02	20*	Opposition
1998	28.18	148*	Government
2002	41.07	164*	Opposition
2006	42.03	141*	Opposition
2010	52.73	227*	Government
2014	44.87	117**	Government
2018	49.27	117**	Government

Source: ParlGov 2021.

Fidesz's first term in the government with Orbán as the prime minister began in 1998 when it became the largest party in the National Assembly and formed a coalition with the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP), focusing on small and medium-sized domestic enterprises, reducing taxes, and limiting public debt. The government also emphasised the education, health benefits and employment rights of Hungarian minorities who, due to the 1920 Trianon Treaty,⁵¹ were living in the neighbouring countries, a project, as will be shown, that remained high on Fidesz's agenda.

⁵¹ The Trianon Treaty, signed in 1920, reshaped how Hungary was perceived during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, shearing off two-thirds of its territory and population.

Fidesz returned to opposition for two terms when *Hungarian Socialist Party* (MSzP) won both elections, 2002 and 2006,⁵² forming a coalition with the *Alliance of Free Democrats* (SzDSz). If the construction of a compelling argument against the former Communist elite was not effortless enough for Fidesz, it became even more so after the release of a leaked recording from an MSzP party meeting where Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány confesses how, during the 2006 election campaign, he had concealed the truth about the poor state of the economy, in a bid to secure a second term. Although the opposition, backed by demonstrators, failed to dismiss the PM, the government, and the elections, it did provide Fidesz with solid campaign material for the following four years, which they did not leave idle.

It is also noted by Enyedi (2016: 14) how Fidesz's anti-elite rhetoric between 2006 and 2010 was directed to the international, 'foreign minded' bodies instead of the Hungarian establishment, which provided the party with a beneficial outset once they returned to the executive. Once back in the government, they could continue the same anti-elite rhetoric even though they had become 'the de facto political elite'. To go against the government that was then proven to be liars, Fidesz had enough valuable campaign material and hence could leave the anti-establishment attacks to be better utilised elsewhere.

⁵² This was the first election in coalition with the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP).

If the leaked record of 2006 verified Fidesz's claims that socialists were unfit to govern, the IMF-imposed austerity following the 2008 financial crisis confirmed the party's assertions on anti-elitist hostility towards international institutions. The turbulent years from 2006 to 2010 further damaged their faith in democracy, and their increasing distrust was to be exploited by Fidesz. This, together with the electoral system left from the transition period and the charismatic leader, was, according to Krekó and Enyedi (2018: 41-43), one of the three prominent factors in the building of Hungary's illiberal regime.

In 2010, with the help of the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP), Fidesz won a supermajority in the Parliament, a feature left in the constitution in 1989 in the belief that no party would ever achieve it, since it permitted significant institutional changes. With this supermajority, Fidesz altered the already majoritarian electoral system to give preferentiality to more considerable support for the party, including voting rights for Hungarians living outside the country. A new constitution was passed that transferred more power into Fidesz's hands and reduced checks and balances, including those on the judiciary, elections and media.

Although Orbán's Fidesz has orchestrated the democratic backsliding and Hungary's turn to illiberalism, it is fundamental to note that, as ever, the developments described above have not taken place without the demand. The Hungarian party system is culturally rather than

economically divided into two antagonistic camps: the nationalist, anti-Communist, clerical right, to which Fidesz belongs, and the cosmopolitan, post-Communist and anti-clerical left (Casal Bértoa 2014: 24). Hence, it has been less effort for Fidesz to recognise and satisfy their side of the argument; consequently, the demand and supply both have facilitated the democratic backsliding in Hungary.

Even though the last two elections have been free but not fair (OSCE 2014 and 2018), the party has its supporters, and Orbán, who came from a modest background and made his way to the top via law school, enjoys very favourable ratings. 'For a large segment of society, his story is the nation's story, and the barbs launched against him by foreign critics simply mark yet another chapter in the old tale of Hungary's long, lonely walk through history' (Krekó and Enyedi 2018: 43).

How the nation's story views and discusses issues that come under the RRWP term nativism will be addressed next.

6.2 Nativism – The regional “us” versus the altering “them”

Of the ten most frequent codes (Appendix D), six belong to the group of nativism, which follows the RRWP typology that states that nativism is the most prominent feature of radical right-wing populism. In addition, most of the codes received more attention from 2015 onwards, fitting not only

the radicalisation of Fidesz but also the refugee crisis of 2015, which was especially felt in Hungary due to its border being the southern border of the EU and hence used as a passage to the rest of Europe.

Orbán showed considerable attention and companionship to his region, presenting himself as someone wishing to lead more than his own country, and the bad feelings that remained from the Trianon Treaty were rarely expressed. This section is divided into two and discussed first will be the regional codes of Carpathian Basin,⁵³ Visegrad⁵⁴ and Central Europe, with codes on Christianity, patriotism and values. This will be followed by the analysis of seven codes related to immigration.

6.2.1 National or regional way of life?

The code measuring patriotism is the second-highest ranking in this chapter. It shows a regular appearance, between 10 and 22 per cent throughout the years, with the highest mentions in 2008 (Table 6.2). Orbán's patriotism was not as much about the collective pride of the Hungarian people as it was about the 1956 Revolution or specific individuals, for instance, Ernő Rubik, the inventor of the Rubik's Cube, among other Hungarian Nobel Prize winners. The emphasis on national cultural heroes came out strongly in Orbán's speeches, and one

⁵³ The Carpathian Basin is a large basin that centres on Hungary, extending to Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Austria.

⁵⁴ The Visegrad Group, also known as V4, is a cultural and political alliance, including Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia.

explanation could be the wish to distance the party from the old Soviet ideal of a cultural melting pot. The doctrine of one Soviet people was an ideology promoted by the USSR, which would have diminished the celebration of these achievements as a source of Hungarian culture and identity.

Table 6.2 The proportion of codes measuring the national way of life.

	Patriotism	Christianity	Carpathian Basin	CE	Values	Visegrad
2008	39%	13%	29%	0%	13%	10%
2009	15%	4%	20%	9%	0%	0%
2010	14%	2%	6%	16%	6%	2%
2011	22%	9%	4%	22%	7%	4%
2012	18%	8%	6%	12%	4%	0%
2013	13%	10%	5%	5%	1%	3%
2014	10%	7%	5%	10%	2%	2%
2015	13%	16%	8%	8%	6%	4%
2016	12%	11%	9%	10%	5%	7%
2017	16%	14%	11%	6%	8%	8%
2018	15%	15%	7%	8%	4%	3%
2019	12%	16%	7%	6%	4%	3%
2020	15%	14%	10%	10%	2%	7%

In addition to being proud of the national heroes, Orbán was often very proud of the Hungarian economy, noting how its growth was above

the EU's average and how Hungary was not Greece in monetary terms. The various codes measuring Fidesz's attitudes towards the EU will be discussed later. However, it is noteworthy that when Central Europe was mentioned, it was regularly done with a positive view of the EU as Orbán campaigned for its enlargement to those Central European countries not yet part of the Union: Albania, the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.⁵⁵ As Table 6.2 shows, the code was frequently mentioned during the first term of the supermajority, from 2010 until 2012, and was emphasised again in the election year 2014. Otherwise, it gathered steady attention throughout the years, the exception being 2008, when it was not addressed.

In addition to discussing the membership applications of Central European countries, there were often calls for deeper cooperation among these nations with a sense of belonging together. As mentioned earlier, this was unexpected in the case of some countries due to the hurt feelings after the Trianon Treaty and the importance of the ethnic Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries. The tone of the speeches on this matter seemed to be more of a carrot than a stick, and the underlying theme appeared to be a policy of 'keep them sweet'.

⁵⁵ It is notable that these four countries are also classed as Transitional or Hybrid Regimes by Freedom House (Nations in Transit), prompting the observation that perhaps Fidesz is wishing to bring countries into the Union that might be less willing to challenge Hungary's distaste for liberalism.

This is also where the addresses on the Carpathian Basin come into play, since the discussion of Carpathian people or Carpathian Basin in Orbán's speeches reflected one Hungarian people. Whether it was done unintentionally or deliberately, there were rarely indications of whom the term Carpathian people was describing. Was it just those living within Hungarian borders, or did it also include Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries? When it was specified, it was the latter, which would lead to the conclusion that it was also so in the instances where it was not specified. If Central Europe received no attention in 2008 and very little in 2009 (Table 6.2), Carpathian Basin was emphasised more in those two years than in the years following, indicating a change in the discourse between the two regional codes with the attention shifting more towards the EU.

The regional codes were mostly mentioned positively, as were codes on Visegrad or V4 - as it has been often shortened. The codes around Central Europe were linked to supporting language towards the EU, but the connotation with Visegrad was often in the opposite direction, with a critique towards the EU. The importance of regionality and building regional cooperation was manifested strongly in these speeches, which arguably could indicate a like-minded challenge to the EU.

There are codes on the socio-cultural variable that could be interpreted as values, such as work and family, but when values are defined in nativist terms, it lacks notable appearance in Orbán's rhetoric,

gaining little attention. However, this is not the case with the code of Christianity. This code, which could also be interpreted as related to values, is well represented and the fourth most frequent code overall, even though it suffered quieter years from 2009 to 2014.

From 2015, the speeches coded under Christianity were delivered at churches' opening ceremonies or as an argument for traditional family and against the normalisation of LGBTQ issues and the legalisation of gay marriages. Other than that, the speeches lack meaningful religious aspects and detail, not to mention biblical references. Even when employed against sexual minorities, Orbán merely stated the confrontation but did not elaborate further, meaning deeper religious discussion was absent. The same applied to religious holidays such as Christmas, which did not receive the discourse expected from a religious person. The employment of "Christianity" as a whole was facile, more like a means to a favourable end.

6.2.2 Nativism and the language around immigration

In the quantitative chapter, the variable that measured negative mentions of multiculturalism, a proxy for nativism, suggested that the topic was not addressed in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as it was in Northern and Western Europe (NWE). However, two codes from the sub-group that measures the language around immigration rank within the highest ten on

the overall list, immigration, in third place, and Hungarian borders, which is ninth.

When inspecting Table 6.3, it becomes evident how the emphasis on this group of codes rests on the last five years of this study, from 2015 to 2020. Even more apparent is their absence in the years before 2015. If this was also the case with other CEE countries, the findings showcasing the difference between CEE and NWE countries in Chapter Four could be explained by the matter becoming an issue in the CEE countries later than in the NWE countries. If the analysis is repeated in the future, the variance would perhaps be less significant.

Table 6.3 The proportion of codes measuring immigration.

	Immigration	Refugees	Welfare immigrants	Borders	Minorities	Islam	Roma	Soros
2008	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%	0%
2009	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2010	4%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	2%	0%
2011	6%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	9%	0%
2012	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%
2013	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	4%	0%
2014	5%	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%	5%	0%
2015	23%	12%	9%	17%	1%	9%	3%	0%
2016	32%	1%	1%	14%	2%	3%	1%	0%
2017	24%	2%	0%	13%	4%	4%	0%	10%
2018	23%	1%	0%	13%	6%	3%	1%	10%
2019	22%	0%	1%	9%	6%	7%	3%	7%
2020	17%	2%	0%	10%	0%	2%	0%	7%

Orbán did not favour differentiating between migrants, illegal migrants, immigrants, asylum seekers or refugees but instead preferred using the term migrant for all of them. The codes here separate between immigration, refugees and welfare immigration and the fact that, in 2015, the proportion of mentions of refugees is not far from that of welfare immigrants demonstrates Orbán's attitude towards refugees accurately. After all, due to the geographical location of Hungary, all were used to describe people crossing the Hungarian border.

A speech Orbán delivered on 5 September 2015, published on the PM's website on 17 September, provides an example of the manner and tone in which the people fleeing war and humanitarian catastrophe were at times spoken about. He addresses the case of Alan Kurdi, a three-year-old Syrian boy whose body was found washed ashore on a Turkish beach a few days prior, on 2 September 2015, and who became the personification of the crisis, saying the only people responsible for Alan's death were his parents, since no one forced them to leave the refugee camp in Turkey.

Another argument that removed the accountability but still portrayed Hungary as a compassionate country was the claim that Hungary has always accepted genuine refugees and will continue to do so as a Christian country. However, immigrants are not refugees since they come looking for a better life, and although it is understandable, it is not acceptable, as noted by Orbán, for instance, on 19 May 2015 in a speech

made in the European Parliament (EP). In the same speech, he talked about the role of human traffickers, which was often cited as a reason to end the EU refugee quotas and close the borders.

As Table 6.3 shows, borders were discussed in 17% of the speeches Orbán delivered in 2015, a figure exceeded only by the immigration code. The argument around borders was surrounded by the immigration debate and involved calls for sovereignty and warnings of the ethnic Hungarians becoming the minority in their own country. Hence the code measuring minorities is mainly about the homogenous population of Hungarians, not about actual ethnic or sexual minorities, and mostly the speeches addressing this were framed around Islam and Muslims.

The discussion on Islam was mainly linked to various problems and most significantly to the fear of a foreign culture coming to dominate the Hungarian one, which had only been reclaimed in 1989. Islamisation and the invasion of Muslim migration were how the topic was expressed in Orbán's speeches. Although not as regularly as with PS and Danish People's Party (DF), women were intertwined in the justification for questioning the religion of Islam, but unlike with the two Nordic parties, the issues related to LGBTQ were not, Fidesz's opposition to sexual minorities already being mentioned and further discussed later in this chapter.

Islam was also brought into the discussion when addressing the concept of a family and the declining birth rate. These debates were

managed via a claim that the birth rate among Muslims was higher than it was among ethnic Hungarians, which consequently contributed to the Islamisation that was taking place. This was one of the reasons that Fidesz encouraged young couples to have children, something that will also be returned to in the section focusing on socio-cultural issues.

The one minority that received Fidesz's attention before the Muslims was Roma, and the change in the emphasis between the two is indicated in the proportions in Table 6.3, especially how those altered in 2015. The highest frequency of the code on Roma is seen in 2015, when the discussion was principally linked to the EU's Roma Strategy and the EU presidency, which that year was held by Hungary. Although there are tough arguments voiced on Roma, for instance, criticising their work ethic, the rhetoric did not reach the levels of negativity seen with Islam. This could be linked to the overall radicalisation of Fidesz and the start of the analyses here being in 2008. How the speeches have been selected on the PM's website could be another explanation, especially since in 2008 there were only 31 published speeches, whereas in 2015 the same number stood at 93.

The last code in the nativism variable is that of George Soros, the Hungarian-born Jewish philanthropist whose scholarship funded Orbán's education at Oxford but who became the subject of legislation known as "Stop Soros", which criminalises a group or an individual who provide help for an illegal immigrant to claim asylum. Krekó and Enyedi (2018: 47 –

48) note how the state campaign against Soros could be interpreted as anti-Semitism but continue that this would be the wrong assumption, due to Hungary's close relations with Israel and the stress Fidesz has placed on fighting anti-Semitism. Thus, even though the arguments at the core of the "Stop Soros" campaign are nativist, the reason why Soros was in the middle of this was that he conveniently embodied Fidesz's opponents, the NGOs, media, opposition parties and the EU, all in one (Krekó and Enyedi 2018: 47-48), not merely because he is Jewish.

In many of these complex and multi-layered issues discussed here under the term nativism, even more so on codes measuring immigration, the explanations and justifications from Fidesz for specific approaches were reduced to a simplicity that removed humanity and empathy from the topics, which were described in near materialistic terms. The variety and coverage of terms discussed above are wider than in the previous chapter, and even more codes were identified, which can be found in Appendix D, but this was not the case with the next group of codes that measure authoritarianism.

6.3 The tightening grip of Orbán's authoritarianism

In the Large-N quantitative chapter, authoritarianism was a theme that showed support parties being more radical than parties in government. Since only 17% of the overall 984 speeches discussed codes measuring authoritarianism, for Fidesz, it also seems like the attention is somewhere

else. This, for a country with an authoritarian leader and sour attitudes towards liberal democracy manifesting in restrictions on civic life (Buščíková 2018: 571, Krekó and Enyedi 2018: 43), presented an unexpected result. What is more is how, in addition to the discourse around immigration, these were the topics that most often gathered attention in other European countries, specifically the term illiberal democracy that Orbán attributed to the Hungarian system he has created.

The 984 speeches that were analysed were delivered at various events, including statements after state visits, visits to different factories, church openings, to name but a few. This reflects Orbán's eagerness to take the podium and deliver a speech to an audience, which is a common feature among RRWP leaders. Orbán's speeches rarely discussed actual policies, even during election campaigns, or if they did, the discussion was superficial and not detailed.

2010 was the year Fidesz achieved supermajority for the first time and the year which is considered to mark the beginning of their radicalisation. Fittingly, it was also the year when the percentages for speeches addressing issues of law and order climbed to their highest at 29% (Table 6.4). The speeches focused on the proposed new constitution and on order and security more generally, but what consequences all these measures had or what was meant by them were left out of the speeches.

Table 6.4 The proportion of codes measuring authoritarianism.

	Law and Order	Terrorism	EU army	Illiberalism	Judiciary
2008	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2009	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2010	29%	4%	0%	0%	0%
2011	9%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2012	8%	0%	0%	0%	3%
2013	3%	0%	0%	0%	1%
2014	6%	0%	0%	1%	1%
2015	9%	8%	0%	1%	0%
2016	9%	15%	1%	0%	1%
2017	8%	10%	2%	1%	0%
2018	8%	7%	5%	1%	1%
2019	7%	4%	0%	3%	0%
2020	3%	2%	2%	2%	0%

The new constitution was a crucial point in the 2010 campaign but was barely covered in the speeches; merely the plan for it was mentioned. It received more attention in the months after the election than before, which could be justified by stating that Fidesz planned to draw up the constitution in 2011. However, it would be questionable to assume that what the constitution was expected to feature would not have been considered before the election.

The decision to hold back on the details of election promises was not only an aspect of issues relating to law and order but could also be

witnessed in other areas. This was especially prominent during the 2014 campaign, which was the year with the highest number of speeches, 128, and amongst the speeches made prior to the election date of 6 April little was mentioned, firstly on the election manifesto, secondly on what it might include. People were reminded of the successes of the previous four years and promised that even better would follow, but the details of how this would happen were left until after the April polling date.

After 2015 the focus was on immigration and how to keep order and security when more migrants were crossing the borders, or more specifically, how to control the borders in such a way that the migrants would be unable to cross it, which is why the figures on terrorism and EU army began to rise then.

Terrorism was heavily linked to immigration and borders but also to a wider Europe. However, for a party that evoked fear when discussing Islam, it is somewhat surprising for Fidesz to state how Hungary is one of the safest countries in Europe, and there are no migrants and no acts of terrorism, as Orbán did in a speech on 12 March 2019. This viewpoint was a rarity and reflected the decision to promote the situation for which Fidesz could claim responsibility after nine years in power over the continued emphasis on fear, which is built up again in the calls for a common EU army.

Although the percentages representing the discussion on the EU army are low, they are significant, since Fidesz is generally, and often

vociferously, against further EU integration. However, when it comes to a joint military, they are not only behind the suggestion but frankly calling for it. Justifications for the EU army are constructed around nativist arguments and how the Muslim migrants crossing the southern border will threaten the Christian population in Europe and the parties representing them, as well as the security within Europe, which would be due to the increased risk of terrorists arriving among the migrants. Hence, this indicates that Fidesz's authoritarianism and nativism supersede their Euroscepticism and that EU integration is tolerable if not desired when it is about authoritarian or illiberal measures.

The two remaining codes in this group are perhaps the ones that received most troubling attention outside Hungary, but their coverage in Orbán's speeches is meagre, which is why their analysis is essential: illiberalism and judiciary. Orbán has declared that Hungary is an illiberal democracy and does set forth an explanation for it, for instance, in his speech on 28 July 2014, in which he claims that Hungary does not deny the fundamental values of liberalism, such as freedom, but maintains a different, specifically national approach. Whereas on 20 May 2015, when questioned by MEPs about illiberal democracy, Orbán stated that there was no time to explain it, yet again, opting for superficial bypassing comments that do not explain nor disentangle much for the listeners.

Brief also were the few mentions of the renewal of the judiciary, which was highly controversial outside Hungary. Perhaps how these two

codes are represented candidly embodies the whole group under the term authoritarianism. The decisions made under this group and the policies adopted have severe consequences for people's lives but are left unexplained, whilst the critical voices outside Hungary are labelled liberal and cosmopolitan. These changes are justified by a nativist outlook and with a view that the Hungarian people wish to keep their country's population as ethnically homogenous as possible, which is not understood by those criticising from outside Hungary. A similar argument is primarily employed in the next section when the analysis turns to codes measuring attitudes towards the EU, which will also see regionality making its way back to the discourse.

6.4 Populism and the mixed feelings towards the EU

The varying attitudes towards the EU become apparent merely by the number of codes listed in Table 6.5. In the previous chapter, the EU was within the populist group, however, with Fidesz, the variety of codes and differing attitudes towards the EU warranted that these seven codes should be presented as a group of their own, although still representing the populist variable. This section will begin by discussing those codes that were negatively associated with the EU, thus representing the first subsection headlined "Euroscepticism as We Know It", with codes negative, Brussels elite, federalisation and new agreements, the latter occupying somewhat middle ground between the negative and positive attitudes. These codes will be followed by a discussion on ones with a

more optimistic impression of the Union, with the subsection headline “Positive Eurosceptics”, which are labelled “positive”, “EU community” and the “European People’s Party” (EPP).

6.4.1 Euroscepticism as we know it

Negative mentions of the EU were the seventh most frequent code in this chapter, and the percentages in Table 6.5 show its considerably stable presence within the speeches, excluding two years (2009 and 2011) with only 2% frequency and two (2014 and 2019) at 3%. It is also noteworthy how the three election years accumulated fewer than average mentions. At the beginning of the timeline examined here, the negativity concentrated around the financial crisis of 2008 but ranged across a wide variety of issues, such as the EU losing its global competitiveness and how it was diminishing the role of the nation-state, to, of course, its handling of the refugee crisis.

Table 6.5 The proportion of codes measuring the EU.

	Negative	Brussels Elite	Federalisation	New agreements	Positive	EU Community
2008	10%	16%	3%	3%	13%	3%
2009	2%	7%	0%	2%	4%	2%
2010	4%	4%	0%	2%	2%	0%
2011	2%	2%	0%	4%	0%	7%
2012	10%	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%
2013	11%	4%	0%	0%	1%	0%
2014	3%	1%	3%	2%	4%	1%
2015	14%	6%	3%	0%	3%	2%
2016	10%	4%	5%	5%	7%	3%
2017	5%	6%	4%	3%	7%	3%
2018	4%	4%	3%	0%	4%	2%
2019	3%	7%	1%	1%	7%	1%
2020	14%	3%	0%	0%	12%	0%

Special attention was given to the different EU institutions: the Commission, Parliament, Court of Justice, and the European Central Bank. For example, when Orbán, on 13 October 2017, after a Visegrad Four meeting, announced that the institutions of the EU had failed, without further specification of which institutions. The term often employed was the Brussels elite, which continues a similar line of attack.

As was seen earlier in this chapter, Fidesz prefers to apply the term elite to the EU and other supranational institutions, and in Orbán's speeches, this anti-elitism is demonstrated by phrases such as 'the bureaucrats in Brussels' and 'EU elite', to name a few. It was commonplace for Orbán not to clarify which one of the EU's institutions he was addressing with the phrases above. However, it was the Commission that mostly received Orbán's critique.

The rhetoric under Brussels' elite followed the usual RRWP anti-elite discourse, and often linked to the EU institutions were liberal world media and international capital. The standard way RRWP parties discuss further EU integration and its perceived goals was also present in Fidesz's discourse and labelled "federalisation", which began to receive regular attention from 2014 onwards.

In addition to talking about federalist aspirations, Orbán interpreted any further integration plans as a route to the United States of Europe, with one of the instances being on 23 October 2018, an anniversary of the 1956 Revolution. These speeches were always long and saturated

with patriotism, which would be expected of any party, because after all, they were marking a historically significant nostalgic national day. On this occasion, though, he argued that there were forces within the Union wanting to replace the EU of nation-states with a multicultural, mixed-population, unified empire. Orbán was claiming that what was aspired to was a Europe without nation-states, an elite torn from its national roots, an alliance with multinational forces, a coalition with financial speculators, and how this would be the paradise of George Soros.

There are instances of Euroscepticism, anti-elitism and nativism within the few lines, together with the distaste for Soros, which was often accompanied by conspiratorial themes, therefore covering nearly all the characteristics of radical right-wing populism. And as above, the term multiculturalism, when it appeared, was mostly attached to the EU and seen as something negative the EU forced upon Hungary.

However, there were also positive aspects of the EU, which will be discussed next.

6..2 Positive Eurosceptics

The chapter will now move on to the more positive mentions of the EU, which often still incorporated Fidesz's Eurosceptic attributes, but more calmly. For instance, what is here coded as "new agreements" are the calls to undertake reforms on the economy and security, including the aforementioned common army, as well as EU institutions and common

policies, especially those on immigration and refugees. Fidesz does not call for an end to the Free Movement of People, but only that the EU's external borders should be reinforced, which is understandable due not only to their geographical location but also to the willingness of their citizens to go and work elsewhere in the EU.

The argument that it is better to be inside the Union than outside was at the core of the appeals to reform the EU, and when it came to EP elections, this was the stance taken against Jobbik, who were calling for ending Hungary's membership. As already mentioned, many of the instances coded as "positive" here were from speeches encouraging EU enlargement, even noting the future membership for Ukraine. These speeches emphasised regionality, which was also a theme in instances coded under the "EU community".

The speeches that were coded under the EU community addressed the unified people of Europe with shared values. At times they were more regionally focused and, on some occasions, meant people who were more nationally minded and wary of immigration, the community of people who love their country, as stated by Orbán on 14 June 2018. He selected his words so that he seemed like the leader of these people, for instance, calling people to join as though there was already an established community with a chosen leader.

The code "EU community", together with the appeals to reform and enlarge the EU, and the codes of Central Europe and Visegrad, present

Orbán as the leader, ready and willing to serve more than just one country, and his arrogance and pride grew towards 2020 but especially after the 2018 election victory. Pride also came across in the Fidesz leader's mentions of the EPP and EPP's influence within the EP and Fidesz's role in the party. Orbán described the EPP as a critical force in European politics, which upholds European values, and he made his commitment to the party known, which was at odds with the regional strong man image described above.

Some of the pieces published on the PM's website were not speeches but interviews or press conferences where the reporters' questions and Orbán's replies were transcribed, and when the press conferences were held in EU settings with international reporters, the contrast of what had been said previously by Orbán in a domestic environment with the topics covered there were stark. Without them, there would have been no indication that, for instance, Fidesz's domestic judiciary reforms were gathering criticism outside Hungary.

Another instance was the increasingly difficult position that Fidesz found itself in with the EPP in early 2019. Prior to the statement given by Orbán at the international press conference following an EPP assembly on 20 March 2019, after the decision to suspend Fidesz, there had been no indication of the troubles in the speeches published on the MP's website. The lack of codes under the variable on authoritarianism was mentioned earlier in this chapter and how that did not reflect the changes happening

in Hungary and how those were viewed outside the country. Comparisons can be drawn here, and the assumption that negativity and critique towards Fidesz were not repeated or addressed in Orbán's speeches, an area that will be returned to in the second section on populism.

Fidesz's relationship with the EU has been turbulent but not by any means solely negative. The developing radicalisation that began in 2010 is not straightforwardly visible when inspecting the frequency of the EU codes. However, the tone and language used by Orbán does harden towards 2020 and is especially harsh during the last two years under study, when the criticism from the EU side was toughening as well. One of the codes under the second section on populism measures the instances when Fidesz addressed the criticism of it from the EU or other parties.

6.5 'Once upon a time': Orbán – The populist storyteller

The way Fidesz expresses its populism differs from that of the PS analysed in the previous chapter. Although the similarities were there with the code on stories, for instance, the crucial populist term the "people" was, first, not employed regularly (Table 6.6), and secondly, the understanding of it diverged from the description provided earlier in this thesis. The code people will be discussed first, followed by the codes on other political parties and criticism received from them. After addressing the code on democracy, the attention will be more on the style of the discourse and how Orbán uses stories and the term common sense.

Table 6.6 The proportion of codes measuring populism.

	Other parties	Stories	Democracy	Criticism	Common sense	People
2008	19%	0%	10%	0%	6%	10%
2009	28%	0%	0%	0%	7%	7%
2010	8%	10%	8%	0%	8%	4%
2011	6%	7%	4%	0%	4%	7%
2012	1%	6%	3%	1%	6%	3%
2013	2%	4%	2%	3%	3%	0%
2014	1%	4%	2%	2%	3%	0%
2015	1%	4%	4%	5%	1%	4%
2016	1%	5%	7%	4%	1%	0%
2017	4%	4%	3%	4%	3%	5%
2018	6%	2%	3%	3%	0%	2%
2019	1%	1%	3%	7%	0%	1%
2020	0%	0%	2%	8%	2%	0%

It has been noted earlier how Fidesz’s understanding of the elite is not constructed in the same way as that of other RRWP parties in Europe, and the same can be said about the “people”, the other side of the populist coin. As was explained at the beginning of the thesis, “people” does not mean all the people in the society but only the like-minded people of the Heartland. For Fidesz, the term is more inclusive and does not suggest a division within the people. However, this is so only when analysing the use of the term people in the populist sense, since what will

be shown in the last section of this chapter is the deep divisions created by the rhetoric on socio-cultural issues.

Perhaps this is not unexpected in such a homogenous country as Hungary, where Fidesz has been polling over 40% since 2002. Yet the arguments against the centre-left parties were expressed, although rarely utilised, as the division between those supporting the old regime and those believing in the homeland.¹ What is more, Fidesz did not hesitate to label their opposition parties as a part of the old regime, but avoided that characterisation when it came to the voters.

Especially during the second half of the timeline under investigation here, the “us” versus “them” separation was portrayed as liberals versus illiberals, or, more specifically, “us” the “illiberals” versus “them” the “liberals”. Yet again, though, Fidesz seemed more comfortable calling parties, institutions and the media liberal than they did the electorate. The party's evolution is reflected in whom they view as their adversary. Starting as the anti-Communist youth movement, the main enemy was the Communist regime, which then changed to socialists, to the party that Fidesz is now with the enemy as liberals, with an increasing distaste towards Jobbik and its subgroups which Fidesz labels extremists.

As shown in Table 6.6, other parties received Fidesz’s attention during the first two years it spent in the opposition, which is to be

¹ After the 2002 defeat, Orbán famously stated that ‘the homeland cannot be in opposition’, thus questioning the new government’s legitimacy.

expected from an opposition party, especially after the admission from the government of how it had lied and achieved very little in power. The percentages of the yearly speeches that mentioned other parties in 2008 and 2009 were 19% and 28%, respectively, and still mainly focused on the previous government and their decisions. This reduced to 8% once Fidesz took office in 2010 and to a further 6% the following year. From 2012 to 2016, the code coverage was minimal, prior to a slight increase in 2017 and 2018, with 4% and 6%, primarily due to Jobbik.

It is intriguing how the low figures on other parties (Table 6.6) did not increase even during the 2014 election year, with one explanation being that Fidesz just was not worried about the competition that year and trusted that their record over the past four years added to the memory of the previous government would deliver another term for them. If that is considered a plausible justification for the numbers, what becomes even more interesting is the attention that Jobbik receives and how their challenge in the 2018 elections ought to have been interpreted by Fidesz.

There was a clear distinction Fidesz wanted to draw between itself and Jobbik, portraying the latter as more radical and, at times, even extreme, with an attack against Jobbik's EU policy. Orbán spoke positively of the other RRWP parties in Europe, especially those geographically closer to Hungary, encouraging cooperation. This urges the conclusion that he or the party did not want to share the government with another

RRWP party at home, even if it would have reached a considerable majority with that. Furthermore, it is arguable that Fidesz must view the ideological distance between them and Jobbik as too wide and thus much prefers to continue its cooperation with KDNP.

With the code "other parties", the references made were clearly identified and the parties named, whereas, with the code that measures the proportion in which Fidesz addressed the criticism it received, the addressee was left vague and often included more than one body, using descriptions such as 'Europe says'. Although Orbán usually favoured calling Hungary or himself the black sheep when talking about the criticism they had received, the surrounding discourse reflected more pride in that term than victimhood, even though the criticism was interpreted as attacks on Hungary.

Examining Table 6.6 shows how the criticism Fidesz received evolved from not being mentioned for the first four years, followed by slightly higher figures, with the stress on 2019 and 2020. During these two years, the criticism received by Fidesz was directed to the worsening levels of democracy, which would suggest that the speeches coded with criticism would also be coded under democracy. This, however, was only the case on marginal occasions. Furthermore, the democracy code is more frequently addressed at the beginning of the timeline, whereas the emphasis on the code on criticism is in the latter years.

One of the occasions where the two were linked is in a speech on 22 March 2012, when Orbán claimed that Hungarians appreciate democracy better because they have lived under a dictatorship and those who have not should not be giving out advice on democracy. This corresponds to Orbán's encompassing view on democracy and his critique on how Europeans only accept one concept of democracy, one that is tied to liberalism, and how Brexit and the election of President Trump should be celebrated as a victory for democracy, views that Orbán expressed, for instance, on 1 December 2016.

During 2008 and 2009, the discussion on democracy was directed at the then government and its actions. After 2009 the mentions slowly decreased and took on various forms of argumentation, such as those mentioned above. Another Fidesz vision of democracy is that it is intertwined with Christianity and the belief that without religion, democracy is not really a democracy, bringing the EPP and the Christian parties within it into the discussion. Although it has been discussed as a code on its own earlier, Christianity features in the next one.

In addition to just stories, the code "stories" features metaphors and myths, religious as well as non-religious, with the code being the twentieth in the overall list of frequencies. The instances vary from biblical references to traditional folk stories to Hungarian sayings and simple metaphors and jokes, and the latter two were often used to describe and talk about the EU.

One of these occasions was in a speech delivered on 5 April 2019, where Orbán criticised the EU's migration policies and remarked that any reforms will result in accommodating and encouraging immigration. He claimed it reminded him of a joke from the old regime about the parts in the Soviet bicycle factory: no matter how you put them together, they will always end up being a machine gun. This passage includes four codes: EU negative, immigration, stories and Communist past, the latter discussed in the following section. However, the joke has two purposes; it devalues the issue of immigration and refugees and likens the EU to the Soviet Union.

The populism of this code is in its simplicity and the way it transcribes topics into language that lacks the complexity of political jargon and political correctness and relies more on common sense, a term often employed by Orbán. As with the codes on people, other parties and democracy, "common sense" received more mentions during the earlier part of the timeline. Only the code "criticism" is emphasised more in the latter years within this group of codes, reflecting the diminishing role of populism within Fidesz's discourse.

Common sense was employed as one of the justifications to stay in the EU, oppose Jobbik, reduce immigration, and not follow an ideology but govern with common sense instead. Arguably, declaring that common sense supersedes ideology hinders the claims made by Orbán that Fidesz is a right-wing Christian party, but if both parts of this term, especially

Christianity, are viewed as the common sense choices, then these ideologies can mutually exist with common sense. This is yet another example of the ambiguous discourse Orbán seemed to favour, which leaves concepts and meanings unexplained. And if common sense implies Christianity, what follows is that arguments against sexual minorities, same-sex marriages and parenting, can also be justified using either of the terms: Christianity or common sense. As can the family benefits that exclude LGBTQ people and the controversial policies regarding work and unemployment benefits, all of which will be discussed in the following section that addresses socio-cultural issues.

As shown above, the discourse on populism, which was not a prominent feature of Fidesz even at the beginning of the timeline, further decreases when approaching 2020. Furthermore, in Fidesz's discourse, the populist term the "people" rarely divides the people but gives an impression that it means all the people. However, what will become apparent in the next section is the sharp splits in the way the party views its population and how, in real terms, the Hungarian people are divided by their governing party, highlighting the illiberalism in Fidesz's decisions.

6.6 Dividing the people with the socio-cultural issues

This final section introduces six codes under socio-cultural variable, which were within the twenty codes most frequently addressed by Fidesz, except the code on LGBTQ, which is included in the discussion due to its

proximity to the code on the family. There seemed to be no straightforward pattern to the emphasis the codes received with this variable, as is shown in Table 6.7. However, what is meaningful is how low on the list of codes in Appendix D are codes such as health and youth which arguably is at odds with Fidesz being a governing party.

Table 6.7 The proportion of codes measuring socio-cultural issues.

	Work	Family	Sports / culture	Communist past	Education	LGBTQ
2008	26%	0%	0%	42%	19%	0%
2009	11%	0%	4%	20%	2%	0%
2010	20%	10%	0%	4%	4%	0%
2011	20%	7%	6%	7%	2%	0%
2012	21%	1%	5%	3%	4%	0%
2013	18%	8%	11%	5%	3%	2%
2014	21%	7%	2%	5%	6%	1%
2015	22%	8%	11%	4%	8%	0%
2016	13%	2%	13%	4%	4%	1%
2017	14%	13%	5%	4%	6%	2%
2018	7%	9%	14%	4%	2%	1%
2019	7%	15%	1%	1%	0%	6%
2020	10%	5%	5%	7%	7%	8%

This section will start with references to the Communist past, addressed in 42% of the speeches delivered in 2008. After this, the codes for work and education will be attended to before moving on to family, which in Fidesz's rhetoric is linked to LGBTQ issues, before analysing the remaining code on sports and culture.

What happened in Hungary, and many other places, in 1989 was extraordinary, and the years under Soviet rule rightly influenced many of the decisions made. The patriotism expressed by RRWP parties often relies on historical legacies and nostalgia for overcoming enemies. Pytlas (2013: 167) explains how,

[t]he mechanism of mythic overlaying thus works as a mnemonic device and allows a transmission of old, culturally legitimized legacies to current political reality. Subsequently, collective action frames work as vehicles that transfer them to contemporary debates and issues. The originally neutral events of the past become 'armed' with rhetoric and the agency of political actors and can be applied to enhance the legitimacy of particular policies.

This not only resonates with the aforementioned Trianon Treaty and how Orbán has utilised the feelings of hurt and humiliation to make political gains by addressing something that no one else has done since World War II, but also with the references made to the life under the USSR, and even more so with mentions of the 1956 Revolution. These are all what construct the Hungarian national identity, and when those memories are within recent history, the more people have lived through

them, remember them or heard stories of them, the stronger the emotions they carry become.

It is to be anticipated that the party that began as a force against Communism should employ discourse emphasising the Communist past for their benefit or against their opponents. What is more striking is how Fidesz labelled the 2010 election win and the governing period that began from there as a 'new regime', almost dismissing the years from 1989 to that point, in which Socialist-led governments largely governed, therefore evoking the sense of a saviour that even just the phrase 'regime change' would bring about in many Hungarians.

The old regime and push against more socialist-leaning policies were expressed via the attitudes towards unemployment benefits, expanding into how work and jobs were addressed. The idiom that was repeated was that Fidesz had created a work-based society out of an aid-based society and that more jobs generate a better economy, not the other way around; thus, if needed, the state will create jobs so that a better economy follows, with the aim of full employment. The code for work, which includes mentions of unemployment, was the most common in this chapter, correlated in the percentages in Table 6.7 that range from the highest 26% in 2008 to the lowest 7% in 2018 and 2019.

The high value put on jobs and work was clear from Orbán's speeches but not as straightforward as the devaluing of unemployed people. The impression was given, and at times straightforwardly

expressed, that they did not want to work and that being without a job was their choice. According to Fidesz, as long as there is much unfinished work in Hungary, early retirement cannot be paid to fit and active people, nor can unemployment benefits be given to non-disabled people. No one would be left behind because jobs would be found for everyone, but loopholes, abuses, and profiteering must end, as stated, for instance, on 31 May 2011.

If the argument was made with the variable measuring authoritarianism that Fidesz wished to suppress some of their more controversial policies and did not discuss them openly, the same cannot be repeated here. The language used on work does not disguise the attitudes towards the unemployed nor where the state will create those jobs, since examples were given of the different roles with an accompanying comment on how all work must be appreciated (27 June 2017). The desire to work was attached to the Hungarian and Christian identity, which would have added to the feeling that being unemployed lowered one's status as a Hungarian.

There was an emphasis on manual factory work, and Orbán did not miss an opportunity to promote Hungarian workers in his visits to primarily foreign-owned facilities in Hungary. This emphasis also came through in the weight placed on vocational training and encouraging young people to go into work instead of further education. Hence many of the speeches that included the code "education" were made at the

factories or on visits to different towns where the local schools were mentioned. In addition to the push for vocational training, funding of schools in neighbouring countries with ethnic Hungarians was frequently mentioned. For example, in 2008, when Fidesz was already preparing for the 2010 election, the code was addressed in 19% of the speeches, as shown in Table 6.7.

As with work, the discussion on education was wrapped around Hungarian identity and patriotism. Not least on 21 September 2020, when Orbán called for patriotic education in schools without, once again, further detailing what that would entail. The same approach was applied, albeit more robustly, to discussion and policies on families, the code that was the seventh most addressed and closely linked to immigration and LGBTQ issues, candidly dividing people as shown next.

Fidesz portrayed the family as the protector of Christianity and the provider of survival and prosperity in 21st century Hungary. The argument on the importance of families was built around falling birth rates, which, according to Orbán, Europe wanted to solve by increasing the number of immigrants. It became patriotic to have children, and in doing so, one was also keeping the immigrants outside the Hungarian borders, cleverly linking the family policies to nativism and Hungarian identity.

Young people were frequently encouraged to have children, whilst Orbán pointed out how the fertility rates were higher in Asia and Africa and among the Muslim population residing in European countries. This

thinking fed back to the concept discussed earlier with Islam and minorities of how, with the slowing birth rate in Hungary, the Hungarians were on their way to becoming minorities in their own countries if the young did not settle down, marry and have children, the emphasis often being on young people specifically. To further encourage this with financial aid, Fidesz set up a family policy.

The policy was to prioritise and protect families, but the concept of family was limited to heterosexual couples as it stands in the constitution that marriage is a union between a man and a woman. Fidesz's justifications for their opposition to sexual minorities and their rights were not directed at the LGBTQ community but at the EU, who were critical of Fidesz's approach. When addressing the issue of same-sex relationships, the term Orbán preferred was a vague 'other forms of cohabitation', which on 8 May 2014 he equated to polygamy. As with the rhetoric on immigrants, the people at the core of the discussion were almost dehumanised, showing how the years in government had radicalised Fidesz's discourse.

When the criticism of Fidesz's attitudes and policies towards sexual minorities were addressed in speeches, they were brushed away with a claim that when Fidesz talks about families they are described as homophobes, and how, in Christian Europe, marriage is between a man and a woman. In the discussions on LGBTQ issues, Hungary and Poland,

often with the rest of Central Europe, were portrayed as a unified front against the EU, yet again emphasising regionality.

Prior to mentioning socio-cultural topics that gathered very little attention, a few words on the code on sports and culture. Overall, there was nothing excessively intriguing or characteristically RRWP attached to the code. The explanation for the high number of speeches mentioning sports and culture is that most of the addresses linked to this code were delivered in sporting or cultural settings, which indicates Orbán's eagerness to speak rather than the importance of those topics to Fidesz.

Often, due to the settings and the occasions, such as welcoming a student sports team back to Hungary after an international competition, Hungarian identity and patriotism were linked to the speeches, which most likely would have been the tone set by leaders from the majority of political parties in similar situations. What is, however, intriguing is the differences in the frequencies compared to codes on health, youth, elderly and poverty, to name a few.

Although not right, it may be understandable why a government would not want to address problems such as poverty, which primarily is a consequence of government failure. Furthermore, not showing much interest in women or the environment is also common among RRWP parties. However, discussing elderly and health issues combined less than, for instance, rural life (Appendix D), is somewhat intriguing. Leaving aside the mentions of Covid in 2020, which covered a range of issues, not

just health, it strikes one as an oddity how rarely health, including hospitals, was mentioned by a governing party.

When the socio-cultural issues that were important for Fidesz were mentioned in the speeches, they regularly featured patriotism, Hungarian identity and Christianity. With this group, it also became evident that Fidesz does not view all Hungarians the same but divides them according to the party's norms, which aligns with the earlier notes about Hungary's cultural bipolarity. This was especially visible when discussing the unemployed and sexual minorities, both regarded as second-class citizens. The tone with the codes on work and family and particularly on LGBTQ toughened towards 2020, strengthening the argument that Fidesz has further radicalised whilst in power and continues to do so.

Conclusion

With Fidesz, the number of meaningful codes that have been discussed above was more extensive than in the previous chapter, evident, for instance, in the various ways that the EU was addressed. The percentages of the codes do not tell the whole story, but the radicalisation became evident via the tone used by Orbán, which began its hardening after 2010. Immigrants, Muslims, and sexual minorities were portrayed as if they were not human beings but inconvenient material.

Furthermore, the salience of immigration issues was further highlighted by the calls for deeper EU integration to accommodate a

common EU army and strengthen the cooperation on the southern borders, which were at odds with Fidesz's normal Eurosceptic stance, as were the calls for further EU enlargement to include countries favoured by Orbán.

Fear was the emotion commonly linked to the immigration issues and other topics under nativism, whereas, in the case of "patriotism", the emotions utilised were about Hungarian identity and history. Fear was often linked to terrorists who were expected to cross the borders among migrants and threaten not only Hungary but the rest of Europe, whilst patriotism expanded beyond Hungarian borders and included ethnic Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries. The speeches also expressed strong regional attitudes, with Orbán portraying himself not only as the leader of the region but also as the leader of the nationalist-minded across Europe.

The lack of detail and specific policies was a common feature in Orbán's speeches, even during election campaigns. When that occurred in relation to authoritarian matters or with discussion of criticism Fidesz had received from outside the country's borders, it appeared as an attempt to keep the voters in the dark, which was not the case with socio-cultural topics, which were divided along the clerical-right cleavage.

Populist themes were not high on Fidesz's discourse, with the term elite being targeted towards actors outside Hungary, whilst the term people was not as divisive as expected from an RRWP party. However, the

divisions became visible and apparent when analysing issues such as work and family, and as with the discourse directed at immigrants, the rhetoric was dehumanising. In the latter years, the enemy became known as liberal, whether it was connected to immigration or LGBTQ topics.

The concluding chapter will compare the three case studies and shed more light on the puzzles arising between Eastern and Western Europe. However, it is worth mentioning that the radicalisation is not entirely captured by the figures presented but can be better understood via tone change. With Fidesz, the transformation began when the party took office for the second time in 2010, and, with a hastening speed, it continued to harshen its rhetoric and weakened Hungary's democracy. Orbán became bold and audacious with his speeches as the years progressed. His party's time as an executive provided him with tools to mould Hungary and its discourse, taking it further away from liberal democracy.

The last two years under study, from 2018 to 2020, portrayed Orbán as arrogant and unsympathetic, not only in matters concerning nativism but on socio-cultural topics with an impact on most Hungarians. The conclusion should inevitably comprise a warning of the possible risks RRWP parties pose when governing with a supermajority, which is why the inclusion of such a party as a case study was deemed necessary and has enhanced the understanding of how RRWP parties may govern with increased powers, further justifying the selection of Fidesz.

Governments that do not have a supermajority or even majority are often forced to govern with support from an opposition party. One example of this is the Danish People's Party, which is the subject of the next chapter.

7 Best of Both Worlds: Danish People's Party

Introduction

By 2019, the Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*, DF) had spent four of its seven parliamentary terms supporting a minority government. It had carved a place for itself in the Danish system, and although it had never been part of a coalition government, it could comfortably take credit for specific policy changes whilst not needing to tame its emphasis on the RRWP agenda.

A party that provides support in meaningful votes for a minority government in exchange for policy influence is in a strong position without direct accountability. Their role differs from incumbent parties, parties in the opposition and extra-parliamentary parties, as evident in Chapter Four. The Large-N chapter showed that the radicalness of the support parties exceeded both opposition and governmental parties when it came to law and order and multiculturalism, in the latter, they also surpassed parties with no parliamentary seats.

The hindrances of the conclusions in Chapter Four were the small number of available observations for the parties that have officially supported a government, which resulted in more questions being raised than answered. Do the parties change the discourse when they move

from opposition to the role of a supportive party? Even more intriguingly, what happens when they do not take that position and become mere opposition parties again? This chapter will try to solve some of the questions associated with this unique group of parties by examining the DF's leaders' weekly newsletters on the party's official website, which occasionally feature other party members. This in-depth study illustrates one specific support party's discourse, which will be compared with the two other case studies in the next chapter in the aim to add external validity to the findings.

Similarly to the material analysed in the chapter on the Finns Party (PS), the targeted audience is mainly party members. Unlike in the case of the PS, where Chapter Four did not indicate that the institutional role would influence the party's discourse and other explanations were to be found, here it was shown that being in the supportive role strengthened the party's rhetoric and their emphasis on RRWP topics increased during the support years.

The weekly newsletters from leaders Kjærsgaard and Thulesen Dahl addressed a wide range of issues, not only concentrating on topics favoured by the RRWPs but also including those concerning mainstream right-wing parties. They rarely focused merely on one topic but discussed several, keeping them separate without making direct links between them. Hence the Matrix table in Appendix G tells a less critical story than it did with the PS, since the figures do not mean that topics were routinely

connected, so it does not warrant a separate discussion in this chapter. For instance, immigration was not always offered as an explanation or justification in the socio-cultural sphere, even if the issues were discussed in the same letter. Those connections and justifications that were routinely made by DF will be mentioned in the discussions.

To examine whether the results from Chapter Four are repeated when looking in more depth into DF's discourse, the chapter will begin by briefly introducing the party and its origins. It will then analyse the codes that measure the core concepts of radical right-wing populism, nativism, authoritarianism and populism, including the EU, before focusing on the socio-cultural issues. The uniqueness of this institutional role becomes evident with the particular group of codes that revealed themselves during the analysis, which is one addressing the past and current governments and their own role. The frequencies of the codes' occurrence will be inspected by comparing the periods DF was supporting a government versus when they were a mere opposition party, dividing election years accordingly.

7.1 From an anti-tax party to an RRWP party

DF's predecessor was the *Progress Party* (FrP), an anti-tax and anti-bureaucratic party founded in 1972 by a charismatic tax lawyer, Mogens Glistrup, who in 1983 was imprisoned for tax fraud and released in 1986 after serving a three-and-a-half-year sentence. From there on, FrP began

focusing more on immigration, predominantly Muslim immigration. FrP was also a Eurosceptic party, campaigning for “yes” in the 1986 referendum on the Single European Act and “no” in both referendums on the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992 and 1993.

In 1990, Glistrup was expelled from the party he had founded, leaving two factions competing for power, which resulted in the 1995 split and the founding of DF by Pia Kjærsgaard, Kristian Thulesen Dahl and two other MPs from the FrP after a scandalous party conference that took place the same year.

The first elections DF fought were in 1998 and led by Kjærsgaard, in which they obtained a good result for a newcomer, 7.4% (Table 7.1). This result was slightly higher than the 6.4% that FrP had achieved in the two previous elections of 1990 and 1994. Their support increased to 12% in the 2001 elections, after which, for the first time, DF negotiated the role of a parliamentary support party to the centre-right minority government.

Table 7.1 National election results for the DF.

National elections	Percentage of votes	Seats (N = 179)	Role	Parties in government ²
1998	7.4	13	Opposition	Sd, RV
2001	12.0	22	Supportive	V, KF
2005	13.3	24	Supportive	V, KF

² Social Democrats (S), Danish Social Liberal Party (RV), Liberal Party (V), Conservatives (K), Socialist People’s Party (SF), Liberal Alliance (LA).

2007	13.9	25	Supportive	V, KF
2011	12.3	22	Opposition	Sd, RV, SF
2015	21.1	37	Supportive	V, LA, KF
2019	8.7	16	Opposition	Sd

Source: ParlGov 2021.

The position that Rydgren (2004: 486) calls 'a de facto role as an unofficial coalition partner' was upheld by DF after two subsequent elections in 2005 and 2007, where their polling remained between 13% and 14%. Halfway through this latter parliamentary term, 2009 sees the starting point for this chapter's investigation.

As explained in the chapter dedicated to methodology, a timeline from 2009 to 2019 provides a viewpoint where the roles of supportive party and opposition party change three times, thus offering a strengthened position to explore the differences between the two institutional roles held.

This research's timeline will also capture the increase to 21.1% of the vote share in 2015, resulting in DF becoming the second biggest party in Denmark, which occurred under new leadership. Contrary to the controversy and drama that PS witnessed with the transition from Soini to Halla-aho, as shown in Chapter Five, the change at the top of the DF went smoothly. Thulesen Dahl, who became the leader after Kjærsgaard voluntarily resigned in 2012, had co-founded DF, served as the parliamentary party group chairman and been chosen for the role by Kjærsgaard. Although the leaders' characteristics were somewhat

different, Kjærsgaard being viewed as the charismatic mother of the party (Meret 2015: 88, 94) whilst Thulesen Dahl was seen as a calmer figure (Christiansen 2016: 95), they both expressed the same style and topics in their weekly letters.

Against the electorate's expectations, DF declined the coalition partnership during the 2015 negotiations and instead chose to support the centre-right minority government for the fourth time, which arguably played a role in the reduced votes the party received in the next elections. After all, even if achievements can be acclaimed from the supportive party's role, the electorate will begin questioning whether their votes could be put to better use than being given to a party that does not want the executive responsibilities.

The question of whether there is a limited life for a party to keep choosing the supportive role instead of an executive one is out of reach of this research. Thus, it will move on to something within its scope and explore how the topics of nativism were addressed when changing between the two institutional roles.

7.2 Nativism

The variable on negative mentions of multiculturalism, which in the Large-N chapter was a proxy for nativism, showed that parties supporting a minority government expressed more radical discourse than parties in other institutional roles. Eight codes measure nativism: immigration,

asylum seekers, Islam, Eastern Europeans, integration, Israel, Danishness, and values, divided into two groups, with the first four discussed first, followed by the latter four. Immigration is the second most discussed code overall, whilst asylum seekers, which includes the references to refugees, is the fourth, showing the topic's salience to the DF (Appendix F). Thus, the first glance at these figures indicates that emphasis on the nativist agenda was not limited to the election manifestos examined in Chapter Four.

However, since the overall numbers tell very little of the institutional role of the support party and how that influences party discourse, the chapter will dive behind those figures to seek the answers.

If the focus in Table 7.2 is on the average mentions the codes receive, it becomes apparent that six out of the eight codes were mentioned more often when DF was supporting a government. Although qualitative research relies on more than just numbers in its analysis, this as a starting point is a significant one, further reinforcing the previous quantitative findings.

Table 7.2 The frequency of codes measuring nativism

Role	Year	Immigrati on	Asylum seekers	Islam	EE	Integratio n	Israel	Danishnes s	Values
Support	2009	9	4	10	0	0	2	4	1
Support	2010	6	0	10	0	5	2	2	0
Support	2011 pre- election	6	0	1	0	3	1	2	1
Opposition	2011 post- election	4	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
Opposition	2012	6	1	2	4	1	1	4	0
Opposition	2013	7	6	2	9	2	1	2	3
Opposition	2014	5	9	1	8	4	1	1	3
Opposition	2015 pre- election	4	3	1	2	2	2	0	1
Support	2015 post- election	9	8	0	2	1	1	2	1
Support	2016	20	15	3	4	4	0	3	4
Support	2017	8	9	4	3	1	1	4	1
Support	2018	13	12	6	0	5	1	2	1
Support	2019 pre- election	3	2	3	0	0	2	0	2
Opposition	2019 post- election	7	3	2	0	1	0	2	2
Average		7.6	5.1	3.3	2.3	2.1	1.1	2	1.4

The 2012 change in leadership does not result in a difference in the writing tone. Thulesen Dahl's first letter was published on 17 September 2012, and even though both leaders are highly critical of immigration, asylum seekers, Islam, Eastern Europeans and integration, their writing mostly lacks the downward-looking, sneering element that is often present in the RRWP rhetoric. It is also noteworthy that from the mentions of these five, only the last, integration, was mentioned positively, and that only occurred once.

7.2.1 The non-native others: immigration, asylum seekers, Islam and Eastern Europeans

Before the criticism of Eastern European migrants, which began in the 2012 newsletters, as well as the more heightened emphasis on asylum seekers brought on by the refugee crises of 2015, the discussion focused just on immigration and immigrants, with the only group or ethnicity mentioned specifically being Muslims and Islam, here coded "Islam". In the first two years under scrutiny, it had more emphasis than the code on immigration.

Islam is in the tenth overall position, illustrating the importance of the topic for the DF, and even though varying issues were discussed in the same letters without always making a connection between them, it is intriguing nevertheless that on thirteen out of the nineteen occasions when women were addressed Islam also received a mention (Appendix

G). With the LGBTQ code, which received seven mentions, Islam appeared with the code five times, highlighting and reinforcing the argument that these freedoms and matters are more convenient for the RRWP parties as a tool to evoke criticism against Islam.

The critique of Islam is nothing new for the DF, and as was mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the anti-immigration rhetoric of the party's predecessor, FrP, was concentrated on Islam and Muslims. In 2005 *Jyllands-Posten* published a cartoon of Prophet Muhammed, which sparked an anti-Danish, anti-Christian and anti-Western backlash within the Danish Muslim community and worldwide, receiving attention in the newsletters, especially by Kjærsgaard in 2009 and 2010. Interestingly, and as will be discussed later on with terrorism, the 2015 attack on *Charlie Hebdo* newspaper in Paris did not re-establish the anti-Islam sentiment constructed around the events at *Jyllands-Post* as might well have been expected.

RRWP parties are skilful at interlocking topics, explanations and reasonings together, as shown particularly with the PS. The attraction to painting the world in a black-and-white manner and seeing it as bifurcated provides the parties with an advantage to link their opponents and topics together. Yet this feature was not employed to its total capacity by the DF. Although topics were discussed in the same newsletters, the associations that could have been made were not, and

often issues were kept separate, an argument that will be revisited throughout this chapter.

One of the exceptions is the already mentioned link between Islam and women. In the 12 February 2018 newsletter, Islam was intertwined with women's rights, equality and feminism when Søren Espersen, the DF's Deputy Chairman, noted how the socialists and the so-called red/greens had changed their direction from their previous struggles supporting gender equality and speaking against the oppression of women to now not defending their Muslim sisters. She continued how the latter are oppressed daily in the most degrading way, forced to wear niqabs and burqas. This address happened only a few months before the Danish Parliament passed a law banning face coverings in May 2018 and included the following lines:

They all want the Caliphate, and they all want Sharia law. Each and every one of them despises Danish tradition and way of life. Each and every one of them despises and spits on Western civilization. Each and every one of them despises our democracy.

During the 2015 to 2019 period of DF supporting a government, the figures on immigration were high and resulted in the highest average in the nativist group. The emphasis that during the support period of 2009 to 2011 had been placed on Islam had now changed to the code measuring the discussion on asylum seekers, where the figures are not far behind those on immigration.

The arguments on asylum seekers often concentrated around the logic that it would be preferable to locate refugees closer to their home countries, which would make their return home easier, a viewpoint that the PS also endorsed. What was not claimed by the PS but was employed here was a justification that those who can afford to undertake the long journey to Denmark are financially better off than those who need to stay closer, which puts the refugees in an unequal position. Framing the argument in this way creates an image of a caring political party wanting to look after those most in need and again, the opponent is not the refugees but the unfair system.

For instance, on 30 June 2014, Thulesen Dahl noted how focusing on helping refugees in immediate proximity to their home countries would not only enable many more refugees to be helped but would also mean that the genuine refugees and the weakest amongst them would be able to receive help. Thus, the argument that the country should not accommodate asylum seekers is portrayed as an argument to look after those most in need, and the comment on the genuine refugees echoes the standpoint of the PS that most of those who arrive in the Nordic countries are young, able and male, and those they have left behind are the ones who actually require the aid.

Until 2012, Muslims were the only ethnicity specified when criticising immigration, which is when Eastern Europeans began to be identified as a problem, and there were differences in the way the two

were discussed. Muslims were portrayed as secluded from the Danish culture, unwilling to integrate and share the values attached to Denmark. In addition to the topics mentioned above that evolved around Islam, LGBTQ and women, mosques and Sweden were often linked to the code. The latter had enough attention to warrant its own code, which will be discussed with the group on populism. In comparison, the rhetoric surrounding Eastern Europeans was constructed around law and order and welfare issues.

Although ghettos and gangs were mentioned with both ethnicities, Muslims were described as family units, whereas the Eastern Europeans were represented as adult males who had come into the country without their families because the EU or the previous Danish governments were averse to border controls. They were portrayed as criminals, from burglars to human traffickers, taking advantage of the Danish welfare system by sending the child benefits to their home countries where their families still were.

The code "Eastern Europeans" and the code measuring values were the two that were mentioned more during DF's time in opposition than in their time supporting a government. The discussion on the presence of Eastern Europeans in Denmark largely follows the common reasoning amongst Northern European RRWP parties, that they simultaneously undermine the Danish unemployed by being favoured by employers who see hiring them as a means to cut wages, but are also a strain on the

welfare system by claiming benefits and sending the money to their families at home.

More than the other codes in the nativist group, the code for Eastern Europeans is linked to the EU by the party leaders, and the two are regularly discussed together, with the blame resting on the EU, whether that is in relation to the open borders or to the different EU bodies' influence on the child and unemployment benefits. This pattern fits well with the main argument in this chapter that the DF takes its role as parliamentary support for a minority government seriously, since the accusations towards the EU are more comfortably voiced from the ranks of the opposition when the party does not have to be concerned over the possible dampening of the relations between the Danish government and the EU.

7.2.2 Becoming Danish - integration, Israel, Danishness, and values

In the next set of nativist codes, the blame for failed integration was somewhat targeted at previous governments but mainly at those who were seen as unwilling to integrate. Considering the average for the code is 2.1, the figures for the supportive years of 2010, 2011, 2016 and 2018, which range between three and five, reveal the topic's greater salience during those years than the opposition ones.

The reason why the code for Israel and Jewish people is in this group is that, firstly, they were often juxtaposed to Islam, and secondly, because Jewish people and the way they had assimilated into Denmark and Danish culture was portrayed as the ideal outcome of integration, how those coming into the country now ought to be and behave.

The DF's attitude toward Israel is not exceptional among RRWP parties, which are more anti-Islam than pro-Israel. As is frequent in RRWPs' anti-Islam rhetoric, Israel and Jewish people are often defended and supported, and the DF is no exception here. There were instances where Israel's behaviour towards Palestine and Palestinians was justified, and newsletters portrayed Muslims as Jew-haters. The most intriguing link made between the codes was on 9 July 2018 by Espersen, where the Jews were used as an example of successful integration in a letter he had come across when researching for his book.

In this letter, a doctor writes of the changes Jews brought about for themselves.

The often flea-infested children lay in piles of rags instead of in beds. It was horrible to experience how poor people could be. A few years later, I was also positively surprised to observe how quickly most of these Jews worked their way up. Many of them were in a better position than the skilled Danish workers in just a few years (9 July 2018).

He continues to mention how quickly Jewish people acquired fluent Danish and how they wanted to become accustomed to the Danish culture, and

although the connection to the modern-day Danish immigrants and integration is made at the end of the newsletter, it is kept subtle and without singling out any ethnic or religious group.

Prior to progressing to the next variable, of authoritarianism, the last two codes of values and Danishness will be reviewed. The former captures the MARPOR variable of traditional morality and the latter, national way of life. Thus, they reflect shared values and patriotism, respectively.

For a patriotic political party, RRWP one especially, "Danishness" is mentioned surprisingly few times. This code described the Danish identity and was assigned to discussions on the homeland and the national identity, occasionally featuring the Danish children's writer H.C Anderson. Danishness and values mainly were kept separate, similarly to the code "monarchy", due to the party being vocal supporters of the royal family and both leaders addressing the topic in its own right, often removed from other issues.

The code for values was one of the two exceptions in this group, where the mentions were more frequent when DF was in the opposition. However, with an average of 1.4, the presence of values remains low even during the opposition periods, whilst the highest figure of four was reached in 2016, which was a year when DF was in the supportive role.

The code for Danishness has a slightly higher average with 2, and although one of its most frequently mentioned years was an opposition

year in 2012, otherwise, the code receives more mentions during the periods when DF is providing parliamentary support. Nevertheless, for an RWPP party with the idea of Heartland at the core of the “people”, both codes remain at surprisingly low figures, especially when compared to the party's emphasis on immigration, asylum seekers and Islam. Returning to the argument made above, DF could better utilise the criticism of these three by also evoking the people's feelings on shared values and Danishness.

This group of codes representing nativism has shown that the DF is more vocal on the issues they emphasise, and thus the issues of RRWP parties, whilst they are holding the role of supporting a minority government. Whether this continues with the variable on authoritarianism, which was less visible in the last two chapters with PS and Fidesz, will be examined next.

7.3 Authoritarianism - Strong on crime

The authoritarianism variable includes the self-explanatory code on law and order and four other codes linked to the term: borders, deportation, terrorism, and ghettos and gangs. Overall, how the DF justified and discussed the codes did not reveal anything surprising for an RRWP party. The calls for stricter punishments and more police were intertwined with immigration, asylum seekers, ghettos and gangs, and the demands for more border control.

Four out of the five topics followed the trend set with the nativist section, where they were being addressed more frequently when DF was providing parliamentary support for a minority government (Table 7.3). In the cases of law and order and borders, the differences between the two periods are more significant than with the rest of the codes. The analysis will begin with the former prior to progressing to the latter.

Table 7.3 The frequency of codes measuring authoritarianism.

Role	Year	Ghettos/ gangs	Law and Order	Deportatio n	Terrorism	Borders
Support	2009	8	11	0	2	2
Support	2010	4	6	0	1	0
Support	2011 pre- election	3	8	0	3	6
Opposition	2011 post- election	0	1	0	0	1
Opposition	2012	1	7	0	1	3
Opposition	2013	4	4	4	3	3
Opposition	2014	4	6	3	2	3
Opposition	2015 pre- election	1	4	3	4	5
Support	2015 post- election	0	9	1	5	7
Support	2016	0	6	2	5	19
Support	2017	5	6	6	4	9
Support	2018	3	4	11	1	4
Support	2019 pre- election	0	1	0	2	0
Opposition	2019 post- election	2	2	6	5	2
Average		2.5	5.4	2.6	2.7	4.6

Issues of law and order were the third most frequent code overall, indicating the salience of stricter policing, harsher sentencing and general

order on the streets. If, in the last section on nativism, the argument was made that DF does not take full advantage of the possibilities of linking topics and issues together, on this variable, the five codes are more often connected, and the calls for more finance for the police are justified by the troubles in the so-called ghettos and the gang members within them.

With ghettos and gangs,⁵⁸ the discussion often implied immigrants from Muslim and Eastern European backgrounds. The Danish government has since 2010 compiled a list of neighbourhoods where the unemployment and crime rates are higher than the average, educational levels lower than average, and more than half of the residents are migrants of the first or second generation.

The highest figure on this code is in 2009, arguably due to the decision to compile the list of neighbourhoods viewed as ghettos in 2010. There were also “ghetto strategy papers” with key policies published in 2010, 2013 and 2018, which likely explains the higher figures in those years and why the matter was discussed. However, even bearing this in mind, the mentions remain high in the years when DF was providing the support.

The unrest in the so-called ghettos also justified the calls to control borders. Furthermore, the calls to have border checks in place with more

⁵⁸ Placing this code under nativism could have been also justified but again, it is the rhetoric attached to it and the references made in conjunction that make it better suited to authoritarianism, which is reinforced by the inclusion of gangs in the same code.

personnel curtailing the people who cross the borders and enter Denmark were based on the argument that open borders enabled foreign fighters to enter the country.

It was not unexpected that, as a Eurosceptic RRWP party that campaigns on law and order issues, the DF would call for border controls even prior to the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2015. What the party was demanding and what has been one of DF's highest priorities is stricter control at the borders, which is justified by arguing that open EU borders allow too many immigrants and refugees into Denmark, whilst among them will also arrive criminals. What is more, the concern was not merely over foreign criminals seeking refuge in Denmark but also that those Danes who had left their country to fight might be returning more radicalised than when they left.

"Borders" is the seventh most frequently discussed topic in the weekly newsletters, and it also follows the pattern of being addressed more whilst DF is in the supportive role. It is also one of the codes that are mostly mentioned regarding the EU, and thus challenges the assumption made in the previous section that it was the proximity to the EU that resulted in the code for Eastern Europeans being one of the anomalies. Perhaps the salience of the controlled borders for DF is a more plausible explanation. After all, that has always been one of their top priorities and campaign policies and thus ranks considerably higher than the matter of Eastern Europeans.

The external circumstance of the 2015 refugee crisis will have to be taken into consideration with the figures on borders, and it is no coincidence that in 2016 mentions of this code quadruple. However, the two figures in 2011, pre and post-election, are telling, showing a considerable difference and favouring the period when DF supported the government.

The only code in this group that gathered more attention whilst DF was in the opposition was deportation, which again was linked to the other codes here, mainly, immigration, asylum seekers and law and order, as well as for borders, and it was another topic efficiently campaigned on by the DF.

In the 4 October 2018 newsletter, Thulesen Dahl states how Denmark must get an effective repatriation policy so that refugees and migrants who have received help in Denmark temporarily also return home to help rebuild their homeland instead of staying in Denmark indefinitely.

And a few weeks later, on 24 October 2018, Thulesen Dahl demands that

foreigners who have been convicted of a crime and who are to be deported must ALWAYS be deprived of their liberty until the deportation can be carried out in practice. And who knows – it may be that the prospect of a stay in a cell can help the desire a little on the way in relation to going home?

The above is a typical example of how the issue was handled and addressed.

As a topic, deportation was not relevant until 2013, thus having no mentions for the first four years under inspection but increasing the relevance with its higher figures in the later years compared to the code average. As is evident from the quotation provided above, in relation to deportation, the campaign policy was directed at those who had failed the asylum process and should be deported swiftly, and at those who had broken the law in Denmark, which often included mentions of terrorism offences.

It is noteworthy that not all discussion on terrorism⁵⁹ was limited to Islamic extremist groups; left-wing terrorism was mentioned once, and due to the terrorist attack in Norway by Anders Breivik, right-wing terrorism also received some attention.

Breivik published a manifesto on the day of the attack, describing his militant extreme right ideology mainly targeting Muslims in Europe. DF came under scrutiny after the attack due to what was seen as shared views with Breivik and the party came under criticism, which resulted in a tone change. First, there was sympathy for the victims and for Norway, then that changed into defence of the party and its members. The

⁵⁹ Although terrorism could have been added under nativism, it fits better here due to the unlawful nature of the crime, which supersedes the nativist elements. In addition, the discourse around it was constructed employing authoritarian rather than nativist arguments.

newsletter on 1 August 2011 that addressed the terrorist incident was the only signal of the feeling of victimhood.

So, although the newsletters mentioned right- and left-wing terrorism, the main focus was on Islamist terrorism and often referenced occurrences in Sweden, including the two attacks in Stockholm in December 2010 and April 2017. Yet the attack in Manchester, England in May 2017 was only mentioned in passing by Thulesen Dahl in his Constitution Day speech on 5 June 2017.⁶⁰

Other terrorist attacks in Europe, although mentioned in more detail, were also intriguingly left without further inspection or linkages to topics important to the DF. Whether this reinforces their focus on issues related to Denmark only, which would explain the very few mentions of other European RRWP parties, excluding the Swedish Democrats (SD) and PS, or whether it is a case of the party not wanting to exploit human tragedy witnessed in other countries, is uncertain.

Yet, once again, Sweden does form an exception, when on 10 April 2017 Thulesen Dahl frames his newsletter around the Stockholm attack to call for tighter policies on border controls, non-Western immigration and deportation of failed asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. He also notes that the financial burden of immigration would be better used in Danish welfare, hospitals, and police.

⁶⁰ 'And we've just seen it again in London. A few weeks ago we saw it in Manchester. Before that, Stockholm, Berlin, Copenhagen, Paris, Brussels.'

Authoritarianism is one of the core principles in RRWP, and this section has shown how the DF emphasises the codes within this group whilst they are providing parliamentary support for a minority government, reinforcing the main argument. What can also be concluded is that, whilst opportunities to link topics for an effective and more profound reasoning are not regularly employed by the DF, the codes were nevertheless more intertwined than in the nativist variable above. How the codes are connected with those under the variable on populism will be analysed next.

7.4 Populism - What's with the EU?

Populism, as we have learned, is a term that envisages societies as divided into good and evil, us and them, with a distaste for the others, and, along with them, the supranational institutions. Hence the codes in this group are: other parties, the EU, Brexit, referendums and Sweden. Since the presence of the last code is not as straightforward as the others', its justification will begin this section.

Denmark's neighbour Sweden is addressed both positively and negatively by the DF's leaders. SD is the most discussed RRWP party in the newsletters, with DF wishing them well for elections, urging Swedes to vote for them and criticising how the SD has been placed under *cordon sanitaire*. The country is also used as an example of what happens when one allows too much immigration and how the situation with ghettos

could rapidly worsen. It is also being discussed in relation to border controls due to the two countries sharing a bridge between them. However, even with the more positive mentions, Sweden is seen and described as “them” or the “other”, and this is how the arguments around it are constructed; hence it fits better under populism than under another variable.

Moving on from a country being the “other” to opponents being the “other”, the code “other parties” includes mentions of other domestic political parties, which are DF's opponents, reflecting the populist Manichean worldview. As was explained at the beginning of this section, excluded from this code is the criticism towards the government, which also means criticism towards incumbent parties when the criticism is clearly about the executive and the parties’ part in it. These are logged into the “criticism of government” code, as will become clearer later with the last variable. Although the criticism of the government is addressed more than other parties, the code is still in a respectable fifth place.

The last three codes are the EU, with the other two closely related, Brexit and referendums. DF aspired to follow Britain's footsteps in leaving the EU and to establish close trade, environmental, climate and technical relations with the European countries after their possible exit. Hence most newsletters discussing Britain's decision were written with aspiration and defended the UK against the EU. However, there were a few exceptions where the Danish interest in exports and fishing was prioritised over the

paradigm of leaving the EU, and in these cases, it was demanded that the EU protect Denmark's rights.

Out of these five codes, four are more predominant during periods when DF is supporting a minority government, the EU being the only code that is mentioned more frequently in the newsletters whilst the party is in the opposition (Table 7.4). This observation agrees with the argument presented earlier when discussing the code on Eastern Europeans and how that code was also less emphasised when DF was supporting a government. The explanation offered earlier was that this was done in order to not exceedingly pressurise the government's relations with the EU.

Table 7.4 The frequency of codes measuring populism.

Role	Year	Other parties	EU	Brexit	Referendums	Sweden
support	2009	11	4	0	0	0
support	2010	16	1	0	0	4
support	2011 pre-election	20	4	0	0	0
Opposition	2011 post-election	2	0	0	0	0
Opposition	2012	0	7	0	2	1
Opposition	2013	4	8	3	3	0
Opposition	2014	1	18	6	1	1
Opposition	2015 pre-election	2	5	1	0	0
Support	2015 post-election	1	6	3	5	1
Support	2016	2	5	8	3	3
Support	2017	3	1	4	1	1
Support	2018	6	3	6	0	6
Support	2019 pre-	3	2	1	0	2

	election					
Opposition	2019 post-election	1	0	0	0	1
Average		5.1	4.6	2.3	1.1	1.4

Thus far, the chapter has shown how the salient topics for the RRWPs, such as the DF, have received more frequent attention in the leaders' weekly newsletters when the party has been providing parliamentary support for a government compared to when they are purely in the opposition. Hence, the inverse being the case with a topic as vital for the party as the EU, and exiting it, compels the analysis to explore alternative answers instead of leaving it merely as one of the anomalies, especially when the other codes in this group show robust compliance with the main argument and the findings in Chapter Four.

The codes on Brexit and referendums are clearly part of the EU argument and do receive more mentions during the supportive years, but even when the three figures are added together, the outcome is only slightly equalised. Furthermore, the arguments on the EU and the criticism towards it did not alter, nor did the tone in the newsletters, and what is more, the decline in the mentions from 2017 onwards is considerable, with the 2019 post-election period not featuring any of the three codes.

Could it be that the EU lost its importance and the DF decided to concentrate more on matters that they do have an influence on, as has been shown above, or could it be that observing the situation in Britain

and how the negotiations are developing have lessened the eagerness to leave the EU? It was earlier noted how the newsletters that addressed Brexit did it in an applauding manner whilst advocating for a so-called soft Brexit. There was certainly an expectation that Britain leaving the EU would reveal the benefits of a future outside the Union to the Danes. It would thus be difficult for the party to publicly admit that it may perhaps be that the financial gains are challenging to achieve and that to be a part of the single market is a tremendous advantage.

Thulesen Dahl's newsletter on 5 March 2018 covering the visit by the EU's Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier, to the fishing village of Thyborøn indicates the difficulties Brexit posed for the DF. On the one hand, they wanted to support Britain, hoped they would get the solution they wanted and encouraged Britain in their negotiations with the EU. On the other hand, they knew that a so-called hard Brexit, especially a no-deal scenario, would result in shortfalls in the Danish economy and thus simultaneously desired that the EU would defend the Danish fishers. Thulesen Dahl concluded that the EU had caused the problems relating to fishing, and the solution was that the EU granted Britain access to the Single Market without the free movement of workers, thus concluding that the problem is caused by the EU and not by Brexit.

Not all the mentions on the referenda code are those calling for a vote on Denmark's EU membership, some also address treaties such as Lisbon. However, it is noteworthy that since the Brexit referendum in

2016, the newsletters discussing referenda declined from three to one in 2017 and they received no mentions in the last two years, whilst Britain's negotiations were ongoing.

Another apparent change in the party's emphasis can be seen in the code that measures the discourse on other parties, which falls from relatively high figures during the first support period to below average for six years until recovering a little in 2018 when DF again provides support for the government.

Due to the nature of this chapter, or, more so, the nature of this institutional role, there are difficulties with this code that were not present in the two previous chapters. At the beginning of the coding, it became apparent that the criticism directed towards government and parties within government was different from criticism towards other parties, mainly opposition ones.

So perhaps the emphasis on the first support years could be explained by DF's commitment to the government they were supporting and their willingness to critique those in opposition. However, if that line of argument is accepted, what raises questions is then, why was that not repeated in the following support terms? Was there a lack of enthusiasm or change in subject matter? Perhaps it came down to the refugee crisis of 2015? More can hopefully be revealed in the last section when analysing the code on criticism of the government.

Populism is yet again a variable where DF adopts a more focused approach when they are providing support for a government, which suggests that during the years when the party was in the opposition, the topics were more dispersed, addressing a more comprehensive range of issues. The anomaly in this group is, perhaps surprisingly, the EU, yet it must be acknowledged that Brexit cannot be discussed without the presence of the EU, even if only in passing. However, what the declining figures for the EU reflect is that it was not as heavily criticised during the latter years under scrutiny.

Other alternative explanations could be that the attitudes towards the EU are positive in Denmark; in a study conducted in 2018 (Sørensen), 62 per cent of Danes preferred remaining in the EU over leaving. Hence the DF may be reflecting these sentiments and understand that emphasising anti-EU views would not be replicated by the electorate.

Another area where it appears that DF follows its voters more than the familiar RRWP agenda is that of welfare, which will be covered next under the socio-cultural variable.

7.5 The Nordic model of radical right-wing populism

The economy is one of the policy areas where RRWP parties differ from one another, and there seems to be no common ground on this issue, but the importance of socio-cultural topics for DF becomes visible in Table 7.5. The code "elderly", which includes pensioners, and the code "welfare

system”, were the eighth and ninth most frequent codes, respectively, suggesting strong support for state-funded welfare policies.

Table 7.5 The frequency of codes measuring socio-cultural topics.

	Year	Elderly	Schools	Tax	Welfare system	Healthcare	Hospitals	Jobs	Women
Support	2009	4	4	1	3	1	0	0	4
Support	2010	1	2	0	5	0	0	0	5
Support	2011 pre-election	1	0	0	4	0	1	0	0
Opposition	2011 post-election	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Opposition	2012	2	2	3	4	0	0	7	0
Opposition	2013	5	3	6	10	1	0	6	1
Opposition	2014	4	1	0	5	0	4	1	0
Opposition	2015 pre-election	3	2	0	2	3	2	2	0
	2015 post-election	5	1	0	2	1	2	2	0
Support	2016	4	2	5	7	3	1	4	0
Support	2017	4	1	2	4	4	7	2	2
Support	2018	10	0	1	3	2	5	2	3
Support	2019 pre-election	3	0	1	1	3	0	0	2
Opposition	2019 post-election	8	1	1	1	0	1	0	2
Average		3.9	1.4	1.5	3.7	1.3	1.6	1.9	1.4

Overall, there are eight codes in this group, with the code on the welfare system indicating instances where it was mentioned as a concept on its own and not any of its specific areas. Most of the discussion on hospitals was concentrated on the critique of the so-called super-hospitals that were being built. Hence the code is different from healthcare. When unemployment was discussed in the newsletters, it was coded under “jobs” since the rhetoric was more focused on creating jobs and making jobs available for everyone than it was on unemployment, thus giving a more positive spin to the topic.

Most of these codes were discussed with one another and with criticism of the then present or previous government. Although immigration and asylum seekers were mentioned within the same weekly letters, it was less common for the linkages to be made that either money should be spent on welfare issues instead of immigration or that immigration levels were bringing the levels of welfare down. When these arguments were employed, it was mostly in relation to the elderly.

As is shown in Table 7.5, the variable on socio-cultural issues is another one where six out of the eight codes are more frequently mentioned during the periods when DF is in the supportive role than when it is in the opposition, and even on the two codes remaining, schools and jobs, the periods show equal mentions. This echoes the pattern seen in the groups above and the findings made in the Large-N chapter.

However, whereas the variables on nativism, authoritarianism and populism are all the core concepts of RRWP, the topics under this variable receive more diverse responses from the rest of the party family, except the RRWP parties in Nordic countries who pursue more left-leaning financial policies.

The importance of the elderly and the welfare system for the DF becomes evident from the averages in Table 7.5. The latter had a solid presence during the opposition years, whereas the former and the code for healthcare were considerably more present in the newsletters during the supportive years of the party, whilst the code for women was near to oblivion during the opposition period from 2011 to 2015.

In addition to "women", the codes "tax" and "hospitals", as well as "healthcare", are scarce in the newsletters during the period of opposition, whilst the aforementioned welfare system with the codes on schools and jobs are part of the opposition years' conversation but not receiving the attention that they do when DF is supporting a government.

The main argument in this chapter highlights the unique role that parties like DF occupy as the veto players in their parliaments, who, in many votes, have the power to overturn the government. Using this to promote the RRWP agenda, for instance, on immigration policies, as the DF has done, is arguably a skilful way of employing the role. However, it is also the very purpose of the opposition to hold the government

accountable for its decisions and actions, which with the behaviour seen here in the case of socio-cultural issues raises questions.

To keep the more radical topics on the agenda when supporting a government and, as in the case of DF, influencing the specific policy formations and implications, is understandable, but to apply that same approach on issues such as the welfare system, healthcare and the elderly when in opposition seems like a strange strategy. This can only be resolved with the observation that, for the DF, there is no difference between these topics, and socio-cultural issues are to be approached in the same manner as the traditionally more radical policy areas. The party have learned to enjoy their role as support for the government, and that is when they feel most comfortable having their words heard, whatever the topic is. It is the topics related to the role of a support party that will be discussed and further developed in the following section.

7.6 The uniqueness of a support party

The code primarily discussed in the newsletters is "criticism of the government", which includes criticism of the sitting government and the previous government or governments. Since this is also directed to other parties, it could have been added to the code on other parties and under populism, as discussed. Yet there is a significant difference between the two codes, what they represent and what they aim to explain, and the four codes under government variable specifically establish the unique

role of parties providing parliamentary support for a minority government. Discovering these codes that neatly measure a variable specific to this role only benefits from not having predetermined codes but instead having the flexibility to assign themes as they were expressed in the data analysed.

Criticising the government is hardly a surprising characteristic for a political party, but perhaps it is more so when discussed more than other policy areas, even in the case of an RRWP party and their Manichean worldview. What is exceptional is the nineteenth position where the code “support for government” can be found, including support for both sitting and previous governments. Although the least mentioned in this group, it has still been a topic of the newsletter thirty times, signalling their reliability as a support party and the gravity with which DF has undertaken its role.

What is meant by the code “DF's achievements” are the instances where the leaders discuss the policies that they have initiated or influenced as a support party. These are the concrete policy achievements they can take credit for whilst not being part of the government and the strains and drawbacks that come with that. Hence it is reasonable to find the code in the eleventh position, a little above the code for negotiations, which includes discussions on government formation negotiations as well as budget negotiations.

It is hardly surprising that the criticism of the government is more prevalent at times when DF is in the opposition, and the criticism when supporting a government was mainly directed towards the previous government or governments. However, the executive they propped up in the meaningful votes did not always escape condemnation (Table 7.6). The 2019 election was held on 5 June, which would suggest that DF was on similar figures of criticism as in 2012 and 2014.

Table 7.6 The frequency of codes measuring attitudes toward government

Role	Year	Criticism of government	Negotiations	Support for government	DF's achievements
Support	2009	0	0	7	0
Support	2010	3	1	1	6
Support	2011 pre-election	1	3	1	4
Opposition	2011 post-election	6	3	0	1
Opposition	2012	25	0	1	6
Opposition	2013	29	0	0	7
Opposition	2014	20	0	2	1
Opposition	2015 pre-election	12	1	1	0
Support	2015 post-election	4	5	0	0
Support	2016	4	5	4	6
Support	2017	1	6	3	5
Support	2018	2	9	4	5
Support	2019 pre-election	3	0	4	1
Opposition	2019 post-election	11	3	2	1
Average		8.6	2.6	2.1	3.1

During periods when DF was supporting a government, that support, measured by weekly letters addressing it, did not balance the criticism expressed whilst in the opposition but near enough corresponded with criticism voiced whilst supporting a government. Furthermore, another intriguing feature was the few occasions when support for the government was presented whilst DF was in the opposition. One of these times was in the 30 June 2014 issue, when Thulesen Dahl announced that the party had agreed with the government led by Social Democrats to a foreign policy limiting non-EU citizens' ability to seek employment in Denmark.

In the 14 October 2019 issue, after the elections that witnessed the decline in DF support and returned them to the opposition, Thulesen Dahl yet again embraces the Social-Democrat-led government. This time the legislation was over stripping the Danish dual-citizenship from people who have gone abroad to fight for terrorist groups. Although in both newsletters Thulesen Dahl also voices his disapproval that the government's other foreign policy measures do not go far enough, it is noteworthy how the DF's nativist approach and issues they campaigned for reach even the left-leaning government whilst DF sits in the opposition.

The leaders also discussed the party's own achievements more when they were supporting a government, which seems sensible since they could comment in real time when policies had been agreed to that

they had been a part of forming. Except during the opposition years of 2012 and 2013, when the weekly letters discuss what DF had accomplished to a greater degree than the average for the code. Perhaps DF thought that discussing and mentioning their own achievements might have a better impact once paralleled with the criticism they were simultaneously distributing. Consequently, making themselves look better whilst making others look worse.

Even though, in the Danish system, the minority government is able to negotiate with whichever parliament party it wishes to regarding different policies, it is mostly the case that negotiations do not need to reach beyond those parties who have initially pledged their loyalty to the government, which is reflected in the figures on the code measuring negotiations. Also, there were instances when the ongoing negotiation was addressed from a third-party point of view, for example, on 21 August 2019, during DF's time in opposition, when the government had begun negotiating its welfare policies.

To return to the arguments about other parties that were left unanswered from the populism section, if the emphasis on criticism of the government would explain the absence of the critique of other parties during the opposition years from 2012 to 2015, that would still leave the last support period unexplained. Examining the figures on both codes gives the impression that very little criticism altogether was directed to other parties between post-election 2015 and pre-election 2019.

However, there was an increased level of support for the government during the same period. DF expressed their endorsement of the government they supported, thus choosing a positive discourse instead of criticising other parties and arguably creating an image of a reliable ally.

Although the codes and their observations within this group do not expose RRWP attitudes as such, they signify the unique role that a support party has in a minority government setting, unfolding questions related to support parties across the party families. The analysis above shows that although the criticism was more common during the years the party was in opposition, it still did not cease to question the executive when supporting it and being part of the policy formation. Similarly, it revealed how DF was willing to extend their support for the government from the other side of the traditional left-right spectrum on issues vital to them, highlighting the salience of their agenda. To conclude, the evidence above indicates a balanced view on policy matters and on the relationship with the executive.

Conclusion

The codes presented and discussed in this chapter portray an orderly and accurate picture of the Danish People's Party with its heavy focus on the three characteristics of RRWP: nativism, authoritarianism and populism. They also highlight a tendency that DF shares with its Nordic

counterparts, which is the emphasis on the welfare system and more left-leaning financial policies. Whilst the fifth variable, a unique to this chapter, measures DF's attitudes as a parliamentary support party for a minority government.

The argument that RRWP parties that provide parliamentary support for a minority government adopt more radical discourse whilst in that role, constructed in the second chapter and supported via the quantitative methods in the fourth, has been reinforced by studying the Danish People's Party's leaders' rhetoric. What has been shown is that the issues considered RRWP core agenda received more focus when DF was supporting a government than when they were in the opposition, and this was replicated on issue areas extending beyond the core on topics around socio-cultural issues and government.

On nativism, the only topics that did not follow the trend of being emphasised more during the support years were Eastern Europeans and values. The former was linked to the EU, which was the only code under populism that behaved similarly. The explanation provided was connected to the supportive role and how DF may have calculated that it was more beneficial for them to tone down their Euroscepticism and be seen as a reliable partner. Furthermore, it could be argued that DF, like coalition partners, usually decided to compromise on one topic to achieve their preferred outcomes for others'.

In addition to the refugee crisis that has been an external occurrence influencing the topics in all the three case studies, the emphasis on ghettos was heightened during the years when new vital policies on the matter were published. Otherwise, there was a significant presence of authoritarian issues, of which only deportation did not fit the main argument.

If the issues representing nativism, authoritarianism and populism were salient for the DF, so too were socio-cultural topics, especially welfare. Thus it is reasonable to argue that they would keep up the pressure on those matters whilst supporting a government and being able to demand resources.

Although linkages were made between the topics, they were not employed to the extent that they could have been, especially with the codes on values and Danishness. From an RRWP perspective, tricks were missed by not further justifying the policy agenda via nativist arguments.

The logical question of what then was discussed during the opposition years if most topics were more emphasised whilst supporting a government has two possible answers. Firstly, they addressed a more comprehensive range of issues whilst in opposition, but they were not included in this analysis due to the scarcity of mentions.¹ For an RRWP party, DF has a relatively long history in the Danish Parliament, and like

¹ A full list of the codes can be found in Appendix E.

most political parties, they address topics that arrive in the public domain through external occurrences.

Secondly, there may be a difference in the composition of the newsletters between the two periods. For instance, if the leaders aim to address more topics in one letter whilst supporting a government but focus on fewer issues when in opposition, which could be the difference between a single newsletter contributing to one code or several codes.

What can be concluded after the analysis here is that DF, a party that provides parliamentary support for a minority government, is a veto player that is very aware of its powerful positioning and enjoys that role. This became apparent with the analysis of the last group of codes, measuring DF's attitudes towards government, which showed a considerably balanced relationship with the executive that did not stop with the right-leaning ones. They have learned to provide support whilst holding on to the issues that matter to them. DF feels highly comfortable furthering their own agenda whilst in that role and thus expresses more radical discourse than when in opposition.

The analysis in this chapter also contributes to future research, especially comparative studies. Comparing DF's discourse to other RRWP parties holding the same role or parties coming from a different party family would further enlighten the field of the characteristics of this role. Whether the specific variable that can be linked to DF's support role is

present with other support parties would be intriguing to test, or whether it is case specific and only an attribute to them.

To finish on another future research question, do the currently decreasing polling figures for DF suggest that choosing the supportive role over a coalition one has a limited lifespan with the electorate who will, after a while, turn to a party willing to take part in the executive?

How the findings from the three case studies compare to one another is the question the next chapter will answer by looking at the similarities and differences in the analyses, and discussing the possible overviews that may be drawn from the three, adding to the thesis' external validity. The final empirical chapter ties this thesis together and aims to set out generalisable findings.

8 Comparing the three case studies

Introduction

This thesis has progressed from outlining the RRWP features it examines in the parties' discourse to presenting what is already known about their behaviour in different institutional roles before conducting the Large-N quantitative study on European RRWP parties in Chapter Four. The results revealed that the opposition parties and those in government emphasised the RRWP agenda similarly, with no impact from their institutional roles. However, the third institutional role under examination showed that parties providing parliamentary support for minority governments expressed more radical discourse in their election manifestos than RRWP parties in the two other roles.

The variables where the differences occurred were law and order and negative mentions of multiculturalism. On the former, support parties were more radical than parties in opposition and government, and on the latter, the two were joined by the group holding no seats.²

The thesis then continued to the three case studies to find what happened to the discourse of the Finns Party (PS), the party in the

² As explained in Chapter Three, this group only consisted of RRWP parties who had also been part of the national parliament.

opposition, Fidesz, the example of a governmental party, and the Danish People's Party (DF), a party supporting a government. It covered the three core characteristics of radical right-wing populism: nativism, authoritarianism and populism, with other frequently addressed themes under the headline socio-cultural issues. An additional variable was assigned to DF, which measured the attitudes related to their role.

The discussion on methodology outlined the low degree of external validity that is associated with process tracing and how combining it with comparative methods enhances the generalisability beyond the single case (Beach 2017: 21; Bennett and Checkel 2015: 33). This chapter will summarise the analysis of the three cases, discussing the similarities and differences in their discourse, aiming to extend the scope of the findings in each chapter and find general trends.

The variables will be discussed in a same order as they have been so far, which is nativism, authoritarianism, populism, and socio-cultural issues. Due to the limits of this research and the avoidance of repetition from the previous chapters, the examples and issues raised are those that showed similarities where they were not expected, hence confirming the theory, and differences where the anticipation was for the opposite, challenging it. Since the thesis did not employ predetermined codes but assigned them to the themes during the coding process, those similarities and, to a greater degree, differences were easier to locate. The explanations behind both will utilise the knowledge developed during the thesis and thus further strengthen the theory tested.

The 15 most frequently discussed codes from the three parties in Table 8.1 reflect their agendas and roots, and it also offers a quick insight into the shared features and those that are unique to each party. Soini's relationship to his predecessor is shown on the code "metaphor" at the top of the list, as is the predominance of populism, with six other codes for measuring the variable. The separating features on Fidesz's list are Hungary's geographical location and Communist past, and on DF's list, it is the party's institutional role.

Table 8.1 The 15 most frequent codes for each party.

	PS	Fidesz	DF
1.	Metaphor	Work	Criticism of government
2.	EU	Patriotism	Immigration
3.	Immigration	Immigration	Law and Order
4.	Other parties	Christian traditions	Asylum seekers
5.	Welfare policies	Central EU	Other parties
6.	People	Carpathian Basin	EU
7.	Refugees	Family	Borders
8.	Traditional morality	EU Negative	Elderly
9.	National way life	Borders	Welfare system
10.	Hard work	Sports/culture	Islam
11.	Media	Communist past	Their role
12.	Scandals	Law and Order	Terrorism
13.	Victimhood	Education	Deportation
14.	Islam	EU Positive	Negotiations
15.	Unemployment	Values	Ghettos/gangs

The following discussion will show that the governmental and support role radicalised Fidesz's and DF's discourse. With the former,

leadership cannot be wholly decoupled from the process, yet it is not as solid and evident as it is with the PS. Analysing the PS's discourse, the inclusion of the nativist fraction, which culminated in a leadership change, resulting in a party split, presents near to two different parties under two different leaders: the first emphasising populism and the second nativism and authoritarianism.

8.1 Nativism – Sharing the concepts but differing in detail

There are commonalities between the three parties and how they addressed topics that come under the nativism variable, and many of these issues raised by the leaders have an echoing effect, confirming the hypotheses. This is intriguing since, as argued previously, it is due to nativism that RRWP parties differ among themselves and why they find it challenging to cooperate and agree on a common ground on various topics.

Table 8.2 shows the parties' nativist codes analysed in the previous chapters, highlighting which codes were the same, similar, and dissimilar. What is meant by similar is that they somewhat covered the same issues or were justified or addressed similarly. As an example, in Table 8.2, the PS's code on the national way of life is not far removed from Fidesz's patriotism and DF's Danishness, yet these labels provide a more coherent description of them and how each party discussed them.

Table 8.2 Codes analysed in the case studies on the nativism variable.

PS	Fidesz	DF
Same		
Immigration	Immigration	Immigration
Refugees	Refugees	Asylum seekers
Islam	Islam	Islam
Similar		
National way life	Patriotism	Danishness
Traditional morality	Values	Values
	Christianity	
Dissimilar		
Hard work	Carpathian Basin	Eastern Europe
	Central Europe	Integration
	Visegrad	Israel
	Welfare immigrants	
	Borders	
	Minorities	
	Roma	
	Soros	

Although most of the codes categorised as dissimilar are unique to the party, some, for instance, “borders”, were under a different variable due to the justification and discussion surrounding them, as explained previously. All the sections discussing the variables in this chapter will have corresponding figures to examine the parties’ similarities and differences where the codes that are the same or similar show evidence of generalisability in their salience to the RRWP parties, and the dissimilar ones suggest that they are case specific.

While the parties shared the main concepts of nativism, they varied in the details and how they justified their agendas. Since there is not enough scope to discuss them all, those that stood out the most will be addressed and as was noted earlier, stumbling upon surprises is one of the great advantages of process tracing (Bennett and Checkel 2015: 34)

and summarising them here should tell us more about the RRWPs direction. For instance, values were frequently employed by PS and DF in the arguments against foreign cultures and to demonstrate the importance of the Heartland, whereas they gained less attention in Fidesz's speeches and were rarely used as a justification for stricter policies on immigration.

Furthermore, the Nordic parties regularly noted how asylum seekers should stay in the first safe country they cross into, whilst Fidesz aimed to keep them on the move further north or, preferably, enhance the control on Hungary's southern border with aid from the EU. Thus the rhetoric was influenced by the geographical locations of the three parties, as well as external factors for the PS and Fidesz. The code also showed an impact from the institutional role in the cases of Fidesz and DF, both radicalising their discourse when in government and supporting a minority one, respectively. Whereas for the PS, leadership, the moderator discussed in the theory chapter, was a cause for the change in the discourse, which did not occur when DF experienced the same. Indeed, there was no evidence that the leadership change would have affected DF's discourse with the topics analysed.

Another, even worthier example of the different notions that RRWP parties attached to topics is the code for "borders", which comes under nativism with Fidesz but under authoritarianism with DF. For the DF, borders were about control. Although EU migrants and asylum seekers were mentioned, the arguments were more around criminals, and

perhaps even more evidently, the demands for stricter border controls began before the refugee crisis of 2015. Whereas the discourse of Fidesz was overwhelmingly justified by refugees and the fears that ethnic Hungarians would become the minority in their own country, and hence their rhetoric fitted the nativist variable better.

DF and Fidesz also linked their writings and speeches on borders to the EU, short of warranting analysing the code under populism, which further illustrates how intertwined the justifications and issues were. This interlocking and topic-crossing feature was not only applicable to the borders code but was also present with others, as will become apparent later.

Furthermore, the code "borders" was the seventh most frequent code for the DF and ninth for Fidesz, whereas it was only mentioned a few times by the PS, linking the issue to the Schengen Agreement and jihadis. Both Nordic parties demanded more rigid control of their borders without specifying which borders, whereas, for Fidesz, the EU's outer borders were the primary concern. The topic of the EU will be discussed in detail later on, but it is worth mentioning here how borders were linked to the Free Movement of People and the differences of opinion that the parties had regarding the issue, which again are more determined by factors outside the traditional RRWP agenda.

Unlike PS and DF, Fidesz did not call for an end to the Free Movement of People, only that the EU's external borders should be reinforced, which, when taking into consideration the directions of internal

migration movements within Europe as well as the economies of Finland and Denmark compared to that of Hungary should not come as a surprise. Finland and Denmark are financially higher-achieving countries with better welfare systems. So, for PS and DF, Hungary included, anyone from a country with lower living standards is considered a burden. Thus, the explanation for the different approaches rests, to a certain degree, on geography but primarily on economics, and here as well, with Fidesz and DF, the 2015 refugee crises prompted both to mention the borders more frequently.

Economics was also intertwined with the calls to curb immigration in Finland. Furthermore, it was common for PS to offer immigration as the explanation or justification for various matters in the socio-cultural sphere, which was rarer with DF and near to absent with Fidesz. Both PS and DF argued that welfare and immigration were a one-or-the-other decision, which meant there was no money for both, resulting in welfare chauvinism. This line was more common under Halla-aho but not excluded from Soini's writings, and in both countries, the rhetoric mainly juxtaposed the elderly and pensioners against immigrants and asylum seekers.

Welfare was also employed in the immigration debate in Hungary. Yet, instead of the contrasting argument in the two Nordic countries, Orbán preferred labelling those crossing the border into Hungary as welfare immigrants, thus ignoring why people were leaving their homes, belittling the conversation. Moreover, he rarely used the term asylum

seeker or distinguished between refugees, immigrants, or migrants, a characteristic not shared by PS and DF. The argument how Fidesz's time in the government emboldened the use of more radical discourse was justified in Chapter Six and is also relevant to immigration, similarly to the DF that discussed immigration more when they were supporting a government than when in opposition.

When Halla-aho wrote about asylum seekers, he portrayed them as young men with shiny shoes and new iPhones, close to Orbán's image of the welfare immigrants. Whereas DF aimed to paint almost the opposite picture with their writings by linking asylum seekers to deportation and ghettos and gangs, which is not to say that PS and Fidesz did not mention deportation, but DF was the only party of the three that had it as a frequently appearing code. Yet, if DF actively pursued stricter deportation as a policy, Fidesz went one step further and made it illegal to aid refugees to seek asylum, with legislation known as "Stop Soros".

Although all the three parties had their pet enemies whom they did not shy away from mentioning by name, no one received as much negative attention as the Hungarian-American philanthropist George Soros, which increased with time, adding to Fidesz's radicalisation argument. PS and DF targeted their political opponents, mainly those on the left, the green parties often receiving the harshest critique. Soros, however, is a different opponent. Not only had he funded Orbán's studies, but he was not, *per se*, a political competitor, and although much can be

debated about Soros' political objectives, he was not running for office or standing against Fidesz candidates.

As noted in Chapter Six, anti-Semitism was not the cause of the anti-Soros rhetoric and policies, and neither was it a topic of concern for the three parties, with DF, for instance, justifying Israel's attacks on Palestinians and noting the exemplary manner in which Jews had integrated into Denmark. As is apparent with the reference to the Palestinians, unlike anti-Semitism, anti-Islam was an essential topic for all three parties.

Although still discussed in Fidesz's speeches, Islam was a more prominent feature of the two Nordic parties, all three employing slightly different arguments surrounding it. Its relevance in the discourse is linked to party split and domestic affairs with PS and to the institutional role of Fidesz and DF. Perhaps the most intriguing rhetoric came from DF, when the weekly newsletters gave the impression that Muslims were family-orientated and that was the reason why they had not succeeded in integrating into the Danish society. Although the tone was not positive, neither was it the most damning take, which is hardly surprising considering Halla-aho's Europe-wide reputation before becoming the PS leader as a contributor to various online anti-Islam forums, such as *Gates of Vienna*.

One of the recurring claims on anti-Islam sites, which was also Fidesz's main argument against Islam, was the so-called Islamisation of Europe, where the ethnic Europeans are portrayed as becoming the

minority. Another frequently employed line of reasoning was Islam's purported attitudes towards women, echoed in the discourse of both PS and DF. There was, however, a significant disparity in how the RRWP parties defended women's rights when they deemed them under attack from Islam compared to how they portrayed feminism, women defending women's rights. The language attached to feminism was dismissive, if not sneering, and although neither PS nor DF were outright sexist in their discourse, the ideology of feminism seemed to infuriate them.

In addition to women's rights, DF also used LGBTQ issues as their catalyst against Islam, portraying themselves as the defenders of the sexual minorities, which was an approach less seen in PS's writings, since they had members who were not at ease with same-sex relationships and often emphasised religion more than the DF, and if this was the approach taken by the PS, the one adopted by Fidesz was even more profound.

Instead of using LGBTQ arguments against Islam, Fidesz was highly critical of sexual minorities and again employed confusing rhetoric, similarly to their approach to immigration. For instance, Orbán addressed same-sex couples as 'other forms of cohabitation', and, similarly to immigration, the target of the discourse was not necessarily LGBTQ communities but the EU, which was said to impose its attitudes on the Hungarians, a defence the two other parties also occasionally employed, which again portrayed the anti-establishment attitudes attached to the EU.

The central hypothesis that an institutional role does not moderate RRWP parties' discourse has gathered evidence when analysing the approaches to the nativist variable. Indeed, in the case of three of the codes discussed, for two parties, their roles had the opposite effect; Fidesz and DF radicalising their discourse. In the case of the latter, decoupling the changes from issue-ownership is more straightforward since the changes in the discourse reflect DF's changes between the two roles, and as was said above, their leadership change did not exhibit an alteration in the analysed party material.

For Fidesz, the analysis in their case study chapter did portray a timeline which showed a change in the tone and language used, not merely the emphases given to topics. Furthermore, one might argue that Orbán's leadership has had a significant effect on the party, yet there has not been a change in the leadership that would have consequently changed the party discourse, and the impact of the role has arguably strengthened his position in the party, emboldening his discourse.

8.2 Authoritarianism and the varied contexts surrounding terrorism

Authoritarianism is one of the main elements of radical right-wing populism, yet with PS and Fidesz, its presence did not reflect that. For both parties, the mentions were low, albeit for different reasons, but in

the DF's discourse, the theme gathered attention and was, again, linked to the party's support role.

Three PS's authoritarian codes were analysed in Chapter Five, of which "military" remained low throughout, "freedom of speech" was related to the leadership change, and "law and order" showed a resemblance to a criminal investigation taking place in northern Finland with significant links to nativism (Table 8.3). And with Fidesz, two out of the five codes were added to the discussion not because they were frequently mentioned but because they were not. Illiberalism and judiciary gathered attention outside Hungary and, especially, the latter with constitutional changes, impacted Hungarians yet were rarely mentioned by Orbán.

Table 8.3 Codes analysed in the case studies on the authoritarianism variable

	PS	Fidesz	DF
Same			
	Law and Order	Law and Order	Law and Order
Similar			
	Military	EU Army	n/a
	n/a	Terrorism	Terrorism
Dissimilar			
	Freedom of speech	Illiberalism	Ghetto/gangs
		Judiciary	Deportation
			Borders

The mentions of the EU army increased along the nativist rhetoric and thus can be linked to Fidesz's radicalisation that the governmental role brought on. Similarly, four out of five DF's codes were more

emphasised during their time as a support party hence evidencing the impact of the institutional role.

If the authoritarian variable had surprising results for the two RRWP parties, the code on terrorism varied reasonably and intriguingly between the three, hence meriting a closer insight. With PS, the code received little attention until the 2017 attack in Turku, whilst Fidesz's attention to terrorism was somewhere between the two. Of the three countries, Denmark has encountered terrorism and terrorist plots the most, explaining why the DF emphasised the topic the most also.

Before 2017, PS's mentions of terrorism included Hezbollah and an attack in an Orlando gay club in 2016, and, unlike with Fidesz and DF, the threat from Schengen open borders did not feature in their discourse. Immediately after the attack in Turku, PS's writings had a sense of shock in them that a terrorist incident could have taken place in Finland. After this, the discussion on borders began to resemble the two others'.

Another unique feature in the PS's discourse on terrorism was the focus on Finnish women, instead of the men, who had travelled to Syria to become wives to ISIS fighters and subsequently had children who were now Finnish citizens. The men were addressed more in DF's writings, similarly aimed at those Danish males who had travelled abroad to participate in terrorist groups, and both DF and PS campaigned to eliminate Danish or Finnish dual-citizenship for those who had left.

PS's typical style and approach on many topics were to make linkages and connections between issues, whether correctly or incorrectly,

but this was not the case with terrorism. Besides mentioning Hezbollah and Orlando, PS did not address terrorist attacks in other countries, nor did the party try to employ other attacks to justify its agenda when discussing terrorism. However, the two other parties did make references and linkages in their terrorism rhetoric, albeit both in a different and slightly peculiar manner.

Unlike the PS, DF did address the terrorist attack in Norway, even if the approach showed frustration with the associations made between Breivik's and DF's political attitudes, mainly towards immigration. The *Jyllands-Posten* incident in 2005 did raise tensions in Denmark, as noted in Chapter Seven, and arguably it can be considered fortunate that there were no serious attacks following it. There was no understanding from DF of why a cartoon of Muhammed insulted Muslims. Instead, it was Muslims who were portrayed as thin-skinned. DF's approach was peculiar because it was not given much attention when a similar attack occurred at the Charlie Hebdo newspaper in Paris in 2015. After all, it was cartoons of Muhammed that again were behind the attack.

Likewise, the two attacks on Stockholm in 2010 and 2017 were covered by the DF, yet the 2017 attack in Manchester was only briefly mentioned. It can, of course, be argued that incidents in Denmark are imperative to the Danes, and consequently, events in neighbouring Sweden supersede events in the United Kingdom. If so, one explanation of the decisions on what is included and excluded from the discussions could be that they are based on nativism, reinforcing the variable's role

and the idea that it is nativism that differentiates RRWP parties from one another. What is also on display is the pick-and-mix attitude to how the codes and variables are approached, something that will be returned to later.

For parties that are often quick to draw conclusions and make connections, it would have been anticipated that they would exploit the attacks to benefit their agenda. PS and DF could have effortlessly made linkages between topics, for instance, open borders, failed integration, the need for quicker deportation, and spillover of what is already happening elsewhere in Europe, to justify their viewpoints. They, however, ceased to do this with terrorism, an open goal that they missed, but if the two Nordics acted uncharacteristically, so did Fidesz, and with the topic of terrorism, it did what PS and DF usually did better, making connections to the rest of the EU.

Not only that, but, like all three, Fidesz introduces fear into the rhetoric on Islam, but when discussing terrorism, it makes the case for how safe Hungary is and how there is no reason to be afraid when you live in Hungary. This implication is done by mentioning the volatile situation in the rest of the EU and how immigration has made other countries unsafe.

In Orbán's speeches, safety was heavily associated with law and order, another authoritarianism variable where PS's emphasis was low and DF's at the fore. Even though the importance of law and order may differ to each party, or at least the frequency with which it is mentioned,

how most of those discourses were framed was not. In addition, with law and order, the changes in the discourse are linked to the institutional roles of Fidesz and DF and leadership change with PS.

Perhaps, at this point of the thesis, it will come as no surprise that in most writings and speeches, for these three RRWP parties, law and order issues were directly linked to immigration and borders and then again to security. Security via the funding of the police was then again a concern only for the PS and DF.

What was heavily present in the discourses of both PS and DF was the emphasis on the police, their work and funding, but, excluding only a few mentions, these were absent in Orbán's speeches. One of the events Orbán regularly addressed was the inauguration of police officers, so the attention was there, but even during those, the focus of the speech was elsewhere.

Arguably, calling for an increase in police officers translates into more public spending, which brings forth two possible explanations for the different linkages between Fidesz and the Nordic parties. Firstly, as shown in Chapters Five and Seven, both parties support the welfare state and are not as shy about spending as most RRWP parties with right-leaning financial policies, such as Fidesz.

Secondly, calling for more funding for the police, has very different consequences depending on the party's institutional role. The most comfortable position to argue for more public spending is from the opposition benches when there is nearly nothing you can do about the

expenditure. It could become a little harder for a support party if they first make such an argument and then do not support the government in the budget voting. However, excuses would still be possible to create, using details of the proposed budget.

As for a party that is part of a coalition government, those arguments would have to be followed in the coalition, but even so, a party that knows its coalition partners and where they stand on such matters could take a gamble, knowing their calls for more funding for the policy are not going to receive enough support. But this is all a very different matter to a governing party with a supermajority.

If Fidesz claimed that the police needed more funding, they would have to provide it and would have nowhere to hide, no other party to blame for standing against their wishes. Thus it can be concluded that although, on the one hand, Fidesz is a party of law, order and security, on the other hand, they were not so to the degree that they would have increased the funding for the police. Consequently, the countries' political environment mattered with law and order, as did the institutional roles.

The last code discussed under authoritarianism is liberalism/illiberalism, linked to the final variable addressed in this chapter, socio-cultural. As much as illiberalism is about democratic backsliding in the sense of political and state institutions, it is also about the attitudes and reactions towards minority groups. These novel issues have become widely debated, one of the most depressing effects of radical right-wing populism.

It was a rarity that Orbán would justify or explain any details about the new constitution, which limited the checks and balances on the judiciary, media and elections, thus bringing more power to the party. These reforms were weighted with hostility towards democracy and its processes that only came to light from the speeches and interviews not directed to Hungarians but delivered elsewhere in Europe.

The discourse around these amendments matters, especially the earlier ones, for scholars to predict other parties' directions of travel and what they would be prepared to do to reach their goals. So assuming PS and DF held Fidesz's institutional role, what would be the extent of their expected actions and reforms?

Soini was not as radical as Halla-aho but had a disdain towards media, which at times expressed itself with hostility. Halla-aho did not tame this tone, and towards the end of the research period the discourse was attacking, suggesting that if they had the opportunity, PS could limit the media.

How DF would treat the media were they given similar powers to Fidesz is too challenging to answer, since the attention they gave to the media was very limited. Nevertheless, DF's focus on immigration, asylum seekers, borders, Islam, terrorism and deportation, all in the 15 most frequent codes, raises the question of what measures they would be willing to take to implement their desired policies.

All political parties should be passionate about their agendas, but the rhetoric employed on topics matters, and when the language used is

not far removed from that of parties that, with similar agendas, have dismantled their democratic processes, the situation should be closely monitored. The political structures play a vital role, and the possession of power that Fidesz and Law and Justice (PiS) have managed to achieve would be close to impossible in countries such as Finland and Denmark. After all, in the latter case, the government seeks opposition parties' support in meaningful votes.

In Chapter One, the argument was put forward that RRWP is a threat to democracy rather than a corrective force and therefore any movements or rhetoric towards changing political structures should not be ignored. If liberalism is viewed and measured in terms of acceptance and tolerance, as was noted above, then illiberalism, which would be the opposite, is already visible, even with PS and DF.

If the previous discussion on nativism showed similarities and differences, which could be clarified via geographical and economic explanations, with the variable on authoritarianism, the two Nordic parties showed more alignment when justifying their discourse. The above also revealed the institutional role impacting the discourse on law and order and the significance of recent history and experienced events, as with terrorism. What will be seen next is the differences in the populist themes and how they were addressed, especially so with the EU.

8.3 Populism - A different view of the people and the pick-and-mix approach to the EU

Soini and Orbán both employed populist language by using jokes, metaphors and nostalgia, addressing the common man with a common language, but on the meaning of the term people, the two leaders differed. Soini wrote about the people in a populist manner, as defined in the first chapter of this thesis, whereas Orbán's usage of the term did not quite fit the exact definition, as is discussed in Chapter Six, and faded out of his speeches towards the end. As with many topics, Soini's and Halla-aho's discourses were distant from one another, comparable to two different parties, and populism was not a feature of Halla-aho's writings, nor was it frequently present in the DF's newsletters.

However, Fidesz was more eager to use the populist term "common sense" than the two other parties, but even still, PS under Soini was the one with the most populist discourse of the three, which the roots of PS can explain and even more so the relationship Soini had with Vennamo, who had a very populist style and ideology.

A frequently present populist code in all three parties' discourse was "other parties", measuring how the three RRWP parties addressed their opponents (Table 8.4). The code captures the populist theme of "us" versus "them" and, whilst it gathered attention throughout the PS's and DF's writings, the code was part of Fidesz's speeches mainly until 2011. The differences within this code can be attributed to the institutional roles

of the parties, arguing that Fidesz, with a supermajority, is not worried about what other parties do and perhaps views discussing them as providing them with the attention and publicity they otherwise would lack. Hence the code's mentions fade from 2011 onwards, unlike other codes discussed in this chapter thus far. Whereas for PS and DF, holding roles in the opposition comes with scrutiny of other parties, especially governmental ones. So even though the institutional role seems to have an impact here, the circumstances of each case are too varied to make any further generalisations.

Table 8.4 Codes analysed in the case studies on the populism variable

PS	Fidesz	DF
Same		
Other parties	Other parties	Other parties
Similar		
People	People	n/a
Metaphor	Stories	n/a
Scandals	Criticism	n/a
Victimhood	EU Negative	EU
EU	EU Positive	
Dissimilar		
Media	Democracy	Brexit
	Common sense	Referendums
	Brussels elite	Sweden
	Federalisation	
	New agreements	
	EU Community	
	EPP	

Furthermore, Fidesz preferred grouping all their opponents together and often addressing them as the "liberal elite". Yet again, the difficulties of classifying the terminology surrounding RRWP parties become evident, with the elite being a more appropriate term to be included in the current discussion on populism, specifically in the debate on anti-elitism, while the term liberal, especially when attached to the other side of the coin, illiberal, fits better under the variable on authoritarianism, as explained earlier.

What will be discussed here is the parties' approach to media, which is commonly hostile, as explained in Chapter One. On DF's part, however, there was a lack of attention to the press, as mentioned in the previous section, whereas Fidesz addressed it infrequently, and when it did, the media was understood to be part of the liberal elite. Yet once again, the PS's attitude towards media followed the traditional populist path, with attacks on its impartiality and how it favoured PS's opponents.

With the PS's discourse on media came a sense of victimhood. What is meant by this is how they framed what they deemed as attacks on them, which was not an uncommon feature since the code was their thirteenth most frequent code overall. DF expressed a similar sense in their attitudes after the Norwegian far-right terror attack in 2011, thus diverting the not-so-pleasant attention directed at them, due to their closely related ideology, into a sense of victimhood, whilst questioning the blame they were receiving. On the other hand, PS said very little about

the attack, perhaps because Breivik had quoted Halla-aho in his manifesto.

Fidesz took a different approach to the received criticism, and whilst certain expressions could have been labelled as victimhood, they were instead interpreted favourably. For instance, the label "black sheep" was used in the media by other actors to describe the party, but instead of taking this as an insult or applying the sense of victimhood, Fidesz took pride in the description.

This type of rhetoric was commonly attached to the EU's criticism of Fidesz, with Fidesz having the most complicated relationship of the three with the EU. With all three, the EU is a code that measures the variable on populism, yet with Fidesz, the numerous ways of approaching the subject resulted in more codes than with the two other parties. Again, to ignore Fidesz's different approaches to the EU would have brought into question the validity of the research and overlooked the benefits of process tracing that highlights the more ad hoc, case-specific explanations (Beach 2017: 26). After all, the codes under EU were frequently mentioned but differently discussed, warranting the approach taken.

Even though Fidesz's relationship with the EU has been turbulent, and, especially within the last few years, outright stormy, within the scope of this research and its research questions on the impact of the institutional role, the PS has been the most affected by the EU directly or indirectly. Much can be said about the actual influence the EU has had on

the illiberal turn that Hungary has twisted itself onto, as has been discussed. However, PS walked away from coalition negotiations after their big win in 2011 due to the planned EU bailout package for Greece, which the future coalition was going to agree to. Thus the EU impacted the institutional role of the PS.

The EU was the main topic for PS until immigration began to catch up from 2010 onwards, which coincided with the nationalists joining the party, starting the change between the two themes that was due to the leadership change, concluding in the party split. Neither of the PS leaders outright called for leaving the EU, although it appeared to be the ideal result for Halla-aho. Thus, perhaps surprisingly little was said about Brexit, unlike in the DF's writings, where the issue was addressed frequently from two different perspectives. DF celebrated Brexit as a victory for democracy, as did Fidesz, but the Danish party also commented on the negotiation process between the EU and the UK, wishing that the former would be fairer towards the latter.

Intriguingly, however, once the fishing rights issues began to affect Denmark, DF was demanding that the EU protect their fishers. To request EU aid was not limited to this one instance nor the one party, which appears peculiar for Eurosceptic parties. This is not to claim that the three countries would not be eligible for EU assistance. Of course, they are, like any other member state, if the request is within the EU's mandate.

Nevertheless, for RRWP, Eurosceptic parties to request aid from the EU instead of dealing with the challenges on the country level, portrays

an image confirming the usefulness of the EU and why it was founded. Furthermore, all three parties did emphasise the EP elections and by no means undermined them, which, as was described earlier, is one of those elections where RRWP parties traditionally succeed well.

This pick-and-mix attitude that was touched upon earlier when discussing women and LGBTQ rights with Islam was a prominent feature of the parties' attitudes towards the EU, as shown with the examples above. Arguably the most interesting pick-and-mix approach came from Hungary in the form of a Eurosceptic RRWP party calling for the formation of a joint EU army and, thus, further integration.

Not only that, but Fidesz was also in favour of the enlargement of the EU, notably to the like-minded friends of Albania, the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. It was not just this one issue where Fidesz emphasised regionality; Visegrad and Carpathian Basin were commonly featured in Orbán's speeches, and although both PS and DF occasionally mentioned Sweden, it lacked the togetherness that was present in Fidesz's rhetoric. For instance, Orbán was calling for cooperation in the region whilst the other two were using Sweden as an example of failed immigration policies, which had brought violence to the streets.

PS emphasises populism more than the two others, which can be explained by the party's populist roots and relationship to its predecessor. What also became evident with the summary chapter, was how the institutional role impacted the three, when examining their discourse on

other parties and the selective attitudes to the EU. The role influenced the discourse on the former, but since it differed with the three parties, any generalisable conclusions are difficult to justify.

With the latter, there was a willingness to accept the EU's aid when needed whilst condemning it simultaneously on other issues. The changes in the PS's discourse on the EU were firmly connected to the leadership change, with some evidence of the inclusion-moderation thesis. The institutional roles influenced Fidesz's and DF's EU discourse, but with the latter, the emphasis was reversed to most codes; the issue was addressed more when DF was in the opposition. The explanation in Chapter Seven was linked to incumbency and how DF may have attempted better relations with the EU when supporting a minority government. However, the Danes' more positive attitude towards the Union was also discussed.

The inclusion-moderation thesis' explaining the PS's diminished emphasis on the EU during the coalition years was lessened since the figures did not return to the pre-coalition years when the party was back in the opposition. Hence, even though with both Nordic parties, there are alternative explanations provided, it does seem justified to note that when addressing the EU, incumbency moderated DF's attitudes and perhaps somewhat influenced PS's also.

The last section in Chapter One discussed the RRWP parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), contemplating whether there would be differences between the parties from the CEE and Northern and Western

Europe (NWE) or whether the continent had unified since the Cold War, and the subsets in Chapter Four indicated that not all variables were emphasised in the same way by parties from the two regions. Thus far in the chapter, there has been very little evidence of a division between the two Nordic parties and the Hungarian one, but this will somewhat change with the last variable on socio-cultural issues.

8.4 Socio-cultural struggle: Work unites the three, benefits divide

This section on socio-cultural variable will begin with the most apparent fault line and the striking division between the two Nordic parties and Fidesz: the welfare system. It was the fifth most frequent code for PS and ninth for DF, yet the discourses had some dissimilarities. There was no questioning of the necessity of the welfare system with PS, Soini taking a stand against cutting benefits, especially for pensioners, who, in addition to the elderly and healthcare, were crucial topics for both PS and DF. For both parties, the immigration debate also entered this discussion via welfare chauvinism, which was present in both parties' discourse on welfare and benefits (Table 8.5).

Table 8.5 Codes analysed in the case studies under the socio-cultural variable

	PS	Fidesz	DF
Similar			
	Unemployment	Work	Jobs

Welfare	n/a	Welfare
Pensioners	n/a	Elderly
n/a	Education	Schools
		Healthcare

Dissimilar

Environment	Family	Tax
Farming	Sports/Culture	Hospitals
	Communist past	Women
	LGBTQ	

Orbán did also discuss benefits from two angles. Firstly, he introduced the family benefit that encouraged young people to have children but excluded LGBTQ families and single parents. Secondly, Orbán commented on the issue that the United Kingdom had brought forward in the EU, of Hungarian workers receiving benefits in the UK that are of higher value than those obtained in Hungary. He expressed his contentment with the decision that the UK could not refuse to pay benefits for Hungarians living in the UK under EU law.

The issue of foreign workers sending benefits back to their home countries had been on the receiving end of criticism from RRWP parties, mainly in Northern Europe, and thus, it was also for the PS and DF. Consequently, all three addressed the topic, just from opposite angles. Welfare-related codes were not the only ones under the socio-cultural variable that the parties framed differently.

PS mentioned good schools a few times relating them to welfare chauvinism, but for DF, it was a more prominent topic, especially in their opposition years. For Fidesz, the discussion was outlined slightly

differently, and instead of good schools, Orbán spoke about education. He was a keen advocate of vocational training, particularly over academic education, and although PS and DF did not pay much attention to academia, when they did, it was on similar lines to Fidesz.

It was not just academia that Fidesz disdained. Manual labour was viewed as principled labour, and there was a special pride in the Hungarian factories where Orbán enjoyed giving speeches. While not outright implied by the two other parties, the tone on work reflected similar attitudes, and work and jobs were high in all three parties' discourse, although neither DF nor Fidesz attached as much symbolism to hard work as PS did, which is the validation for it belonging under the nativist variable.

The emphasis with Fidesz was on work, which was the most frequent code overall for the party, claiming to have created a work-based society where there was work for all, and those who were unemployed just did not want to work. Work was also crucial to PS, specifically, hard work, as discussed in Chapter Five, but they also addressed unemployment in a significantly different style to Fidesz. Since hard work was seen as a part of the Finnish national identity, unemployed people received sympathy from Soini; however, this compassion was not repeated to the degree Soini had shown it by Halla-aho.

Unlike these two parties, DF emphasised jobs over work, and they too took a very different view of unemployment than Fidesz. The writings on unemployment concentrated on creating jobs, thus taking a similar

stance to PS and not criticising or condemning those out of work. As much as this might be cultural, it is perhaps more linked to the attitudes on benefits and the welfare system.

With this variable, the influence the parties' roots have on their discourse becomes apparent with DF and one of their codes being "tax". The tax was mentioned occasionally by PS but was not done in a manner that would have warranted a code dedicated to it, meaning the discussion on taxes was an afterthought to other issues PS deemed more salient. It is noteworthy that DF did not separate from FrP on good terms but still carried on their predecessor's main agenda.

Since the women and LGBTQ issues in Table 8.5 were discussed earlier in this chapter, the last topic is the parties' attitudes to Russia, which is also connected to their roots and geographical and historical proximity to Russia.

As has been noted, most RRWP parties are more sympathetic towards Russia than the United States, but the three in question here view the country differently. While DF supports EU sanctions on Russia, PS and Fidesz have more complex approaches. For example, although Fidesz condemns the sanctions on Russia, it also condemns Russia annexing Crimea, which is what PS does also, yet it is slightly tricky to distinguish from their discourse whether they support or oppose the sanctions. Russia is a significant trading partner for both Finland and Hungary, but simultaneously they have an unpleasant history with the country and are both geographically stuck in a place of discomfort.

Furthermore, both have anti-Communist legacies, with Fidesz being directly founded as an anti-Communist movement, which is strangely at odds with their more recent views.

Orbán's attitudes on Russia softened towards the end of the research period as his stances towards the EU harshened, whereas PS was always critical when addressing Russia but acknowledged its importance as a trading partner and embraced Finland's role as a mediator between Russia and the rest of the world. To finish on a more positive note, considering Finland and Hungary's geographical positions, histories, and trading relations, both parties have a calm approach to Russia, even if, in the case of Fidesz, that sometimes may be influenced by dissatisfaction with the EU.

The connections and justification were expected to vary more with this variable, since it is not explicitly one of the RRWP parties' core themes. However, the discussion highlights the complexity of the issues and how the parties' identities influence the way they approach them, highlighting the importance of history and geography. Although somewhat aligned on welfare, the two Nordic parties differ on financial attitudes towards Russia, which is where PS finds itself closer to Fidesz, and if welfare is connected to the political environment of the Nordic countries, the approach to Russia is linked to economics, roots of the parties and geography. In addition, history played a more prominent role here with most codes than it did with the other three variables, and it was perhaps due to the past of Finland and Hungary that the East/West divide did not

become as prominent as it may have been expected to when addressing the socio-cultural issues.

In all the case studies, the socio-cultural variable was not as much about RRWP attitudes as it was about decision-making, and the two Nordic parties were expected to stand apart from Fidesz; thus, generalisable conclusions are few. The difference in the rhetoric, tone and how matters are framed between the two PS leaders when writing about social-cultural topics are significant, and once again, this variable strengthens the argument that it impacted the discourse more than any other factor.

Most of the codes under this variable did not show meaningful change in the pattern of how Fidesz addressed them. Still, three strengthened the argument that ruling with a supermajority has radicalised the party. How the unemployed were spoken about, how a family was defined, and the rhetoric around the LGBTQ community were linked to Hungarian identity, patriotism and Christianity, creating second-class citizens in a society divided by radicalised discourse.

The institutional role also explained DF's approach to this variable. Even if these are not codes measuring radical right-wing populism, and unlike with Fidesz, the party's discourse on them was not radical in tone, the argument made in Chapter Seven holds. It outlined how the DF has learned to enjoy its role as support for the government, and that is when they feel most comfortable having their opinions heard on most topics.

Conclusion

The strength of process tracing is that it is case specific and allows in-depth attention to alternative, and most often ad hoc, case-specific explanations, thus further increasing the subject knowledge. This chapter has drawn together the findings from the previous three, examining the codes and variables where the changes in the discourse could be explained similarly and where they differed, adding to external validity, which, on the other hand, is the weakness of process tracing. Summarising the findings from the case study chapters has enhanced the knowledge gathered in them.

Bringing the three analyses together, the centrality of the institutional role becomes more apparent. It was a factor in radicalising Fidesz's and DF's discourse on the variables measuring nativism and authoritarianism, although the latter was not a specific focal topic for Orbán. Thus confirming the hypothesis that institutional role does not moderate party discourse.

With both parties, other factors contributed to the harshened rhetoric, as well, such as the refugee crisis linked to borders, whether the EU's Southern border, which was the concern for Fidesz or its internal borders with Freedom of Movement, which were a problem for the DF.

In Fidesz's case, it is challenging to completely decouple the leadership effect from the institutional role due to the pivotal presence of Orbán within the party, who is unquestionably in charge of the agenda

and direction. However, as discussed in the chapter, even though the two factors are somewhat intertwined, it could be argued that without the supermajority, Orbán might not have been emboldened to his levels. Hence the timid conclusion that the institutional role impacted Fidesz's discourse more than the leadership.

For the Danish party, the change in the leadership was not followed by a change in the discourse, and although there were exogenous factors influencing their discourse, it had the strongest link to the institutional role. Whereas for the PS, the leadership change was the main factor behind the shift in the discourse, which radicalised on variables measuring nativism and authoritarianism but moderated on populism, highlighting the arguments made in Chapter Two that leadership can take the discourse either way.

All three parties showcase the traditional RRWP party leader with an extended period holding the reins, and although for DF the leaders were in a crucial role, it is arguably Orbán who encapsulates the core of Fidesz. The two PS leaders had different tones and views on what is essential and how to tackle the issues salient to the party.

Nativism is regarded as the most divisive topic due to its nationalistic character, and again, on details, it was that, but it also was the variable where the three parties were the most alike. As expected of RRWP parties, immigration was interlinked with most topics, justifications and explanations.

"Borders" was one of the codes tightly linked to other topics with Fidesz and DF, yet in different ways. Perhaps the most intriguing relationship was formed by Fidesz, who called for tighter border controls on Hungary's southern border and requested the EU's aid on the matter and the formation of an EU army. These calls were at odds with the Eurosceptic party's standard view on EU integration, and this was not the only matter where pick-and-mix attitudes from all three were on show.

For instance, when the three parties decided which terrorist incidents were mentioned in their speeches and writings and how to build their argument against Islam to show the religion's incompatibility with the Western societies. The main object is shared again by all three, but the discourse around the topic is not, with the two Nordic parties, especially DF, employing Islam's attitudes towards sexual minorities in the argument, whereas Fidesz preferred to concentrate only on women's rights as a justification for its hostility to Islam. With Islam, the explanations behind the changes in the party discourse followed the ones made above. PS was influenced by the leadership change and Fidesz and DF by their institutional roles.

Populism divided the parties. DF rarely discussed the people and the elite, whilst Fidesz did address the elite but preferred to label it as the liberal elite and to include the EU, media and other institutions under the label. Orbán also used metaphors, symbolism and nostalgia in his speeches, as did Soini in his writings. Nevertheless, the way PS, especially under Soini, employed the very traditional concept of the

people arguably made the PS the party with the most populist discourse and further showed the salience of the leadership change, which continued to the topic of the EU. Furthermore, since Soini employed highly populist language, his influence on the populist variable can be decoupled from other factors.

With the EU, the discourse change showed evidence of moderation when DF moved from opposition to the support role, which was one of the rare codes where the change occurred this way. With most, the emphasis on codes analysed was enhanced when DF supported a minority government compared to when they were a party of opposition. For Fidesz, it was also about the institutional role, yet the discourse became more hostile towards the EU and more positive towards Russia during the latter years.

Although the number of documents coded and analysed for each party varied, this did not impact the comparisons made here since the focus was on how the parties emphasised the issues and their salience to each party. So even if the number of references linked to the codes differed, how they ranked within the parties' discourse was the subject of the comparisons, which is not affected by the absolute numbers.

This final chapter has put forward and justified the argument that, although the three RRWP parties had varied responses to the topics they raised, those broader issues did not vary significantly. With the detailed assessment of PS, DF and Fidesz, the differences were recognisable when examining populism and, more so with the socio-cultural variable,

primarily driven by the attitudes towards the welfare state. But overall, the three parties analysed presented a reasonably unified sample of the RRWP party family.

Conclusion

Although there have been studies explaining RRWP parties' behaviour in parliament, both in opposition and governmental roles, they have focused either on the parties' impact on policies considered as "theirs", such as immigration and law and order (Akkerman and De Lange 2012; Heinisch 2003; Minkenberg 2001; Mudde 2013). Or how their presence impacts mainstream parties (Abou-Chadi and Krause 2018; Bale 2008; Rooduijn *et al.* 2014), intra-party relationships (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015) and what have been the electoral consequences of incumbency.

Yet, not much has been written about the discourse framing the RRWP agenda and whether the parties' institutional roles have varying impacts on it (Bobba and McDonnell 2016). Furthermore, since these parties began to participate in national parliaments more commonly in the 2000s, there still is not a vast amount of data nor analysis on how that participation may affect their messaging. This is the void that this thesis aimed to elaborate on and thus enlighten the field's current state.

Although, Chapter Two identified occasions where moderation of RRWP parties had took place, the evidence for the un-taming of the RRWP discourse has been accumulating throughout this thesis. Even in the instances where the RRWP agenda lost the parties' emphasis, the

explanation could, in most cases, be found elsewhere than in the institutional role. The effects of being in opposition, in government, or supporting a minority government on the discourse were almost exclusively shown in the case of the two last groups, and the effects were radicalisation instead of modernisation.

There are insights to infer from this thesis that will benefit academics and practitioners, and it will help inform future responses to RRWP parties and attempts to limit their influence in Europe and elsewhere, aiding in designing policy and practice. This Conclusion chapter will gather, present and discuss the findings and limitations of each chapter. During the research process for this thesis, more puzzles have unravelled, and their presentation is where this study finishes, further outlining its contribution and beneficiaries, such as academics, researchers and students, as well as politicians and practitioners.

Findings along the way

For this thesis to study RRWP discourse, it had to begin by defining how radical right-wing populism is understood here and its characteristics, the features in the discourse that would be scrutinised throughout. Luckily, we are at the point where those definitions are easily accessible, and by using that of Mudde, which is also used in *The PopuList*, any findings reached here will be comparable to many existing and future studies.

Once it was known what was being researched, the thesis moved on to establish what was already known about the institutional roles and what was expected to be found during the process of the thesis. These two chapters combine the literature review and theories tested in this thesis, neatly comprising the current discussions and relevant research on radical right-wing populism, offering an easily accessible overview for students of politics and international relations. Chapter Three introduced the methodology and operationalisation used in the empirical research, after which the thesis was good to progress to the next stage.

Chapter Four, the first empirical one, had a Large-N, covering RRWP parties in Europe, employed quantitative methods to explore whether the institutional role had an impact on the parties' discourse, which was shown only to be the case with the support party group and the group with no seats, a role which was only included in Chapter Four.

Employing the data and variables from MARPOR, Chapter Four compared the four groups' emphasis on the RRWP agenda during their election campaigns. The ANOVA findings indicated that opposition and government parties did not differ on the six variables; hence, parties in both roles approached issues with similar emphasis. However, there were differences between the four groups' discourse on two variables.

First was the variable on law and order, which was the only one measuring authoritarianism, and it showed that the support parties' frequency of addressing the issue was more significant than found with

those in opposition or government. Thus, according to the dialogue that has been used in this thesis, support parties are more radical when it comes to authoritarianism than parties in the two other groups.

The same was found with the second variable, which measured negative mentions of multiculturalism. However, with this variable, support parties' discourse was also more radical than parties with no seats, meaning they emphasised the issue more than the parties holding any other institutional roles. Thus the hypothesis that institutional role does not moderate RRWP parties' discourse was confirmed at a statistically significant level, and with four out of the six variables, the parties in all four groups addressed the topics with a similar emphasis.

There were limitations in this chapter that were addressed earlier, the main one being the small number of parties in the support group. However, since the findings of the Large-N analysis were intended to direct the case study chapters, guiding the way to the more detailed analysis that follows, it can be taken as a sign that there is something unique with this institutional role, as was confirmed later. Still, the chapter will suit students and provide a basis for future research examining European RRWP parties and their discourse, manifesto emphases, or simply exploring the hypotheses presented here. As noted earlier, it is sometimes imperative to focus on repeatability instead of new hypotheses. Consequently, this would enhance our understating of the changing in the RRWP parties' discourse.

The following case study chapters employed process tracing, which benefits from a more in-depth, case-specific approach, increasing the knowledge of these three parties and their discourse in their institutional roles. Consequently, the three chapters provided a profound understanding of the three RRWP “episodes” that are an addition to the field, even if the method’s weakness is limited causality and generalisability. In this thesis, the limitation of process tracing is improved by the quantitative chapter that preceded the case studies and the comparative chapter that succeeded it. The limitations of causality in the case study chapters are outweighed by the broad range of party material analysed, strengthening the empirical contribution and detailed, in-depth understanding of the three parties.

The question focused on in Chapter Four was whether the different institutional roles impact RRWP parties’ discourse, which for the opposition parties resulted in no statistical significance for the argument. Subsequently, the Finns Party (PS) case study succeeded in finding out more and examining if their discourse altered and what may have been causing it if it did.

The party’s history revealed that PS had had two leaders from different ideological backgrounds; Soini was a populist whilst Halla-aho was a nativist. Furthermore, the second leader did not join the PS alone but with a group of more nationalist-minded members who had been a visible part of the European anti-Islam online presence. Therefore, before

beginning the analysis and coding, one could assume that there possibly might have been a shift in the party discourse due to the leadership change, the impact of which was discussed already in Chapter Two and indeed became evident from the party material.

Their differences were not limited to the agenda but were also seen in the writing style and tone and how they addressed their membership. Since Soini was more populist, so too was his style, often using metaphors and sayings, while Halla-aho kept to an upfront style that did not hold back on language directed at immigrants.

There was an exchange from issues related to the EU to topics concerning nativism and authoritarianism. This showed how the leadership change could either moderate or radicalise the discourse. Furthermore, as Chapter Five explains, there were other internal and external events happening beyond just the leadership change that would have influenced the differences in the discourse. The internal friction affected the party, and PS went from being in opposition to being in the government, which further dissatisfied some on the nationalistic side who were not pleased with the compromises necessarily attached to the coalition partnership.

The event that influenced all RRWP parties was the so-called refugee crisis of 2015, which also affected and increased the refugee numbers in Finland. In addition, the country suffered its first terrorist attack and sexual harassment accusations involving foreign-born

individuals, making it challenging to assume that Soini would not have emphasised nativist or authoritarian issues as well. An easier presumption is that, had Soini stayed as the leader, the tone of the debate on immigration might not have become dehumanising, and the stress on EU related issues would have hardly decreased.

The leader's centrality in an RRWP party is fittingly exposed and reinforced in the case of the PS. Although this is not a new finding, it strengthens the leadership's salience and how a change in it can bring about a difference in the agenda and policies. Thus, the conclusion is that leadership matters to practitioners and politicians when evaluating and cooperating with RRWP parties, also indicating the importance of leadership contests.

The brief time as an incumbent seemed to have more indirect than direct consequences due to the internal fighting, whereas for Fidesz, the time spent in government was shown to embolden them, swirling Hungary into democratic backsliding, which was analysed and discussed in Chapter Six.

The dehumanising tone present in Halla-aho's description of immigrants and refugees was also there in Orbán's speeches, encompassing other minorities, such as sexual and religious ones. Linked to the nativist discourse was the utilisation of fear, which was also applied to calls to strengthen the southern border, an EU border, and the calls to form a joint EU army.

The EU was a topic that received both positive and negative attention from Fidesz, but, towards the end of the timeline, the party did increasingly address the EU negatively, blaming it for forcing Hungary to be liberal and thus accepting of all minorities, and broadly linking the EU with the socio-cultural variable. The criticism that Fidesz was receiving from the EU was interpreted to the Hungarians almost as something to be proud of. Hence, with the EU and matters concerning illiberalism, the time in power brought about significant changes. The most damaging of these were the changes made to the constitution, which were barely mentioned and even less explained in detail by the Prime Minister in his speeches.

Aside from Orbán frequently referring to the EU as the Brussels elite and using metaphors and stories in his speeches, Fidesz was not portraying much populism. Orbán did expose an aspiration to be the leader of the whole region, which materialised in numerous mentions of the Carpathian Basin, without defining what was meant by it, Visegrad and Central Europe. He desired to have more countries with questionable political systems in the region join the EU, thus challenging the *status quo*. He spoke similarly about the European People's Party (EPP) and other RRWP parties in the EU, with the emphasis increasing towards the end of the timeline.

There are undoubtedly many questions for the EU to answer regarding its responses to the changes in Hungary and how it has shown Europe that when a country falls below the expected standard of

behaviour, it can mould the laws to accommodate the wanted transition. Moreover, once those changes have occurred, it becomes challenging to unravel them, which is why the lessons from Fidesz are vital indeed for academics, practitioners and politicians, justifying its selection as a case study.

Some could argue that choosing Fidesz to represent an RRWP party is questionable due to the recent developments and democratic backsliding, specifically. However, *PopuList* still defines the party as RRWP, and as was explained in Chapter Three, comparing a governmental party that has changed as Fidesz has whilst holding a supermajority is an essential part of the analysis. It aids in understanding how RRWP parties are willing to use their power and whether there are already similarities with other parties, in this case, PS and DF.

Orbán's attitudes towards Russia were another issue that altered during the research period and has become even more important to understand due to the invasion of Ukraine. Fidesz transformed from an anti-Communist movement to a party that rarely criticised their old rulers. The change in attitude corresponded to the earlier mentioned increase in EU scepticism that included the praise for Brexit, which was initially also cheered by the Danish People's Party (DF).

Although the small number of cases in the support role group in Chapter Four limits the reliability of the conclusions, it did appear that this group's discourse was different from that of the rest of the RRWP parties.

Hence there was anticipation for the findings of the case study into this institutional role, which was delayed until the penultimate chapter, Chapter Seven. As predicted, DF showed more dependency on the role than what had been evident in the previous cases.

Not only were the three variables measuring nativism, authoritarianism, and populism emphasised more when DF was supporting a government, but their role created a unique variable that portrayed their relationship to the executive. Their discourse in this variable described them as reliable partners for the government who took pride in their policy achievements on the issues they owned.

The coding did not set predetermined codes that were analysed under a specific variable but had a more flexible approach to the data, coding the themes as they were discussed and addressed in the documents, assigning them to the appropriate variable depending on the discourse surrounding them. This could be a limitation for some, but the benefits became clear during all the case studies. It allowed each to be analysed as an individual party and permitted the inclusion of surprising elements that were unique to each party. Perhaps the most appropriate example is the particular variable discovered when analysing DF's discourse addressing the party's relationship with the governments and their achievements as a support party.

Of the eight DF codes assigned to nativism, only two did not follow the trend of being mentioned more when DF was providing parliamentary

support for the government, which were Eastern Europeans and values. With the former, the discussion was linked to the EU, and intriguingly, the EU was also one of those anomaly codes that achieved more emphasis when DF was a mere opposition party.

The argument was made in Chapter Seven that this perhaps provided further evidence of the seriousness with which DF handled their terms as a support party, that they declined to criticise the EU unduly, in order to portray themselves as a reliable partner for the government. Or perhaps their behaviour was closer to what is expected from a coalition partner, and whilst in the supportive role, DF chose to prioritise their topics, toning down their Euroscepticism to focus on other policy issues they preferred influencing. The third explanation put forward in the chapter was the positive attitude that the Danish electorate had towards the EU, thus rendering it an unpopular topic to pursue further.

The takeaways from Chapter Seven are not limited to RRWP parties but enhance the understanding of all parties in the supportive role and their behaviour in parliament, which benefits a broader set of actors in the political arena and academics studying the subject.

One could argue that what is considered a strength in this thesis, the different sources for the material coded, is a limitation. However, the chapter that compares the three case studies does not focus on the number of mentions of each variable but instead compares the parties' different emphases. Yes, there were more Orbán speeches annually than

there were PS newspapers, yet what matters more is how those annual figures compare with the party's results, when in the timeline there was a focus on particular topics, and when it diminished.

Similarly, to the quantitative chapter, the three case studies that analyse party leaders' and members' writings and speeches from a broad range of party material are comprehensible discussions of RRWP themes and how the parties' frame and address their agenda and the specific terminology they employ in their messaging. The empirical contribution of these chapters is valuable for scholars of radical right-wing populism, and those interested in the impacts of institutional roles as well as the rhetoric parties apply for their agenda. They not only offer conclusions that can increase students' and scholars' knowledge of the topics, but with the coded data, they would also provide researchers with a foundation to test the arguments made in them or continue with their own.

Chapter Eight notes and analyses the similarities and differences in how the three justified and discussed the RRWP agenda, highlighting how the topics of nativism that may have been formed by patriotism and thus framed differently were similarly debated issues by all. All three parties radicalised their discourse on nativism, strengthening the right turn in the European political scene, discussed in Chapter One. Yet the reasons behind the nativist emphases varied between the parties, the PS's leadership impacting it, whilst, with Fidesz and DF, it was mainly the institutional role that radicalised the discourse.

Differences were present with the other variables, and as expected, the issues concerning welfare and benefits were high on the Nordic parties' agenda, unlike Fidesz's. PS was the party that utilised linkages between topics the most, which, as was argued throughout the case studies, seemed like a missed opportunity for the two others. PS and Fidesz employed a populist style in their discourse more than the DF did, albeit with them both, it decreased with time. Thus all three parties were moderating their populism towards the end of the study period. Although Fidesz's use of the term "people" did not divide the society as clearly as PS's did, the division was nevertheless highly present and pursued when Orbán discussed topics under the socio-cultural variable.

All the nuances of how these parties interact and behave in their institutional roles are vital when planning any objection to them. It is essential to understand how they justify their arguments, what may cause them to tame some rhetoric and what is expected to radicalise their discourse.

Since the thesis has shown that the similarities outweigh the differences the RRWP parties have, holding onto and strengthening democratic institutions and laws is essential for the future of liberal democracies, for instance, the Nordic parties presented their arguments on many issues similar to the already illiberal Fidesz, raising concerns that other RRWP parties would follow the path laid ahead.

The findings benefit practitioners and politicians, reflecting how RRWP parties' discourse changes or does not change when part of the legislature, executive or supporting a minority government. Hence, when RRWP parties take on these different roles, the results can aid in predicting how the parties behave in these scenarios and understanding what to expect from them, which is vital when dealing with RRWP actors. However, it should be noted that the main analysis is here based on in-depth case studies, and although they are strengthened by the chapter before, and after them, there should be caution if reflecting the findings further. After all, the mere definitions of radicalisation and modernisation depend on what aspects of party behaviour are measured, and while a large amount of material was analysed in each case study, it is possible that something that was unnoticed impacted alterations. As always in qualitative social science, it is nearly impossible to make solid causal conclusions.

Still, with the aid from Chapters Four and Eight, the conclusions should aid in understanding the decisions RRWP parties make, if not fully predicting future ones. Furthermore, this thesis has presented itself as a convenient stepping stone for further research in this area, and since there is plenty more to discover and learn, it will now turn to suggestions for future research.

Suggestions for future research

After the literature review was finished and the scope of the thesis set out, it seemed likely that the issues that would increase their prominence in the international arena and with RRWP parties would be around climate change, identitarian politics, the possible second term by President Trump and China's growing influence.

Since the start of the empirical stage of the research, there have been events that have not only shaken global politics but also stunned ordinary people worldwide. The unprecedented Covid-19 global pandemic stopped everyday lives as we knew them and forced upon us a new normal, followed by a Russian invasion of Ukraine that brought war to Europe, which at the time of writing is still a relatively new and ever-changing conflict.

Although the issues mentioned above have not disappeared, and some have been affected by the two momentous events, they have both challenged political parties' decision making, RRWP ones included, and are fitting examples of how parties in the legislature and executive can be faced with surprising issues outside their usual comfort zone of policies.

This section will begin with Covid-19, followed by the issues raised by the Russian invasion. After which, the issues of climate and identity politics will be covered with additional research questions related to institutional roles arising from this research.

RRWP parties' responses to the Covid-19 pandemic

At the beginning of the pandemic, there were predictions that the importance of and reliance on experts and increased public spending might have weakened the RRWP parties. Arguably, this did not happen, and the assumption would be that their discourse has remained untamed. There are many aspects of the RRWP discourse that can be effortlessly turned to target the undertakings and goals during the pandemic, and as this thesis has shown, RRWP parties are skilful in refiguring their toolbox of arguments, for instance, anti-elitism, to fit a variety of subjects. The main challenge for the parties was the absence of arguments that would utilise nativism, their most favoured topic, unless the case was made for Covid-19 coming from abroad with foreigners.

If one wished to conduct a Large-N analysis using MARPOR data, the only variables that come close to representing attitudes towards the pandemic or its handling are per504 Welfare State Expansion and per505 Welfare State Limitation, since healthcare would have been at the core of the pandemic discourse. Yet, a better portrayal of discourse could be achieved via in-depth case studies, including material from social media, due to the shorter timeline.

One approach could be to compare parties with different institutional roles in relation to their attitudes to national healthcare and health spending before, during and after the pandemic, or alternatively towards experts or elites. Since countries closed borders it would be

intriguing to learn if there were any differences in that approach between institutional roles. Also, did RRWP parties in governmental roles with access to more information hold differing views from others?

Did opposition parties sustain their anti-establishment views? How were the possible arguments against lockdowns justified? Was it by employing the “free will of the people” or human rights arguments? Were the arguments for freedom of speech utilised when there were attempts to combat misinformation? Was there a connection between the institutional role and to what extent conspiracy theories were spread, especially when President Trump still held office? One could also add the institutional role of the president to the variables and thus expand the research beyond Europe. Conspiracy theories were not addressed in this thesis but would be a beneficial addition when examining the responses to Covid-19, similarly to perceptions of climate change.

How was the Russian invasion interpreted and discussed by RRWP parties?

Except for the period of Trump presidency, European RRWP parties preferred to associate themselves with Russia rather than the United States, which posed some challenges when Russia began their invasion of Ukraine. Which RRWP parties have changed their attitudes the most, and were there differences in their institutional roles compared to those that have changed less? Not only may the war affect the discourse on Russia

but also that on NATO and the EU, who have made relatively quick and arguably strong responses to the war, which have unified both institutions, justifying more in-depth study into both.

Furthermore, the war has resulted in refugees, and thus far, it seems as if they are being welcomed by European countries, raising the comparative question of how the discourse around nativist themes has been changed by the RRWP parties in relation to Ukrainians.

There are three suitable variables on MARPOR to measure this, which are, per1011 Russia/USSR/CIS: Positive; per1022 Western States: Negative and per1031 Russian Army: Negative. Unfortunately, these are mainly coded in the manifestos of CEE countries, but even as such, they could produce intriguing findings, and perhaps focusing on RRWP parties in CEE countries would be the correct method. Yet, it would mean that comparing the Baltic countries to the CEE and Western and Northern European countries would be absent; comparisons would have to be made via case studies.

It is not only on attitudes to Russia that research on Baltic RRWP parties is lacking. This thesis found few differences that could be explained by geography, and in the case studies, there were topics where one of the Nordic parties was closer to Fidesz than their counterpart. Thus, it would be interesting to learn how RRWP parties from the Baltic fit into this. Furthermore, due to their being new democracies, it would be

intriguing to establish if there are differences when they take on roles in the legislature or executive.

RRWP parties' attitudes on climate change and identity politics and further research questions on the institutional roles

Climate change and sexual minorities were mentioned in this thesis, and their prominence in the political arena will keep increasing, and the former has already begun to affect the RRWPs' pet theme of nativism. It will be one to watch whether the parties will have to change their tone on climate change once its impact on refugee numbers becomes evident and experienced, and it is a subject that future researchers will undoubtedly cover.

There is also a space for research that would compare the discourse of RRWP parties in opposition and government when green parties are part of the coalition or have a significant presence in opposition. Does the existence of green parties or policies increase the RRWPs' objections to these issues?

Green parties would also provide an interesting comparison concerning the behaviour of support parties. Is the behaviour shown in this thesis limited to RRWP parties, or do parties from other families emphasise their agenda in the same way? There is a lot more to be learned about this institutional role. For instance, if, similarly to DF, they refuse to participate in coalitions, does that render them obsolete in the

eyes of the voters? Are there only so many terms that political parties can decline governmental positions in favour of the support role?

DF was officially named and labelled as a support party for the government. There are parliamentary parties that provide support without a specific contract, and the possible difference between the two and how it may impact the parties' behaviour and discourse would be a question worth answering. Are they as dedicated as DF seemed to be? Do governments offer benefits on a case-by-case basis as a show of their appreciation?

Another role that left many un-answered questions was that of no seats, which was only somewhat covered in Chapter Four. The thesis showed that parties with no seats were more radical in their discourse than those in parliament. However, the study was limited to those parties that had also managed to take seats in parliament. Thus the question would be, do they retain the strong emphasis on specific issues if they fail to take seats and is there a difference depending on whether the parties are on their way into parliament or on their way out? Again, is that alike among party families or limited to the RRWP one?

In relation to social media, even rerunning the case studies in this thesis with the same research question but with material from MPs' social media accounts would be a fascinating comparison to what is written in official party publications or said in speeches, questioning if the party's institutional role influences RRWP MPs' social media content.

These are merely a few additional puzzles that have arisen during the making of this thesis. There are indeed many more that future researchers can explore and hopefully they can build on the evidence presented here.

Final remarks

Employing a mixed-methods approach, triangulation and a variety of data sources with a peer-reviewed list of RRWP parties and agreed upon comparable definitions, this thesis has enhanced the understanding and the academic field of knowledge on RRWP parties and how their institutional roles impact their discourse. It has concluded that these actors hold on to their agenda and, like other political parties, are influenced by domestic and foreign affairs and place their leaders at the core of the party.

The thesis has discovered that the RRWP discourses can be intertwined, and topics are linked and justified by their juxtapositions and by straightforward language, which can be characterised by metaphors, sayings and reminiscences of the nation's past glorious moments. It has also revealed how minorities can be dehumanised whilst the blame for immigration and accepting minority rights is placed on other actors and institutions. Worryingly, the thesis has also shown the effects of the RRWP party governing with a supermajority, how the discourse became

more daring, and how significant constitutional changes were not explained or justified to the nation.

RRWP parties do not tame or moderate their discourse unless it strategically benefits them or the topics gradually fade away from the public domain. Opportunities to employ radical rhetoric are not wasted, and where nativist, authoritarian or populist views can be utilised, they will be. But like any political party, RRWP ones are vulnerable to losing their electoral support and risk being punished at the polls if their responses to events are not satisfactory to voters. As long as independent democratic processes and institutions endure, so too will representative democracy.

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Appendix A - Radical right-wing populist parties' elections, institutional roles and coalition partners

Table A.1 RRWP parties' elections, institutional roles and coalition partners.

Country	Party	Acronym	Founded	Election years	In government	In opposition	In support role	No seats	Coalition partners
Austria	Freedom Party	FPÖ	1956	1990		1990-1994			
				1994		1994-1995			
				1995		1995-1999			
				1999	2000-2002				
				2002	2003-2005				
				2006		2005-2006			
				2008		2007-2008			
				2013		2008-2013			
				2017	2017-2019				
				2019		2013-2017			
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria	BZÖ	2005	2006	2005-2006				ÖVP, INDEP. x 2
				2008					
				2013					
				2017	2017-2019			ÖVP, INDEP. x 1	
				2019		2019-		ÖVP, INDEP. x 1	
Belgium	Flemish Interest Flemish Block	VB VB	1978	1991		1991-1995			
				1995		1995-1999			
				1999		1999-2003			
				2003		2003-2007			
								2013-2017	

	National Front	FNb	1985	2007 2010 2014 2019 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2010		2007-2010 2010-2014 2014-2019 2019- 1991-1995 1995-1999 1999-2003 2003-2007 2007-2010			
Bulgaria	Attack Party	Ataka	2005	2005		2005-2009		2010-2014	
				2009 2013 2014		2009-2013 2013-2014 2014-2017			GERB, NFSB, VMRO, INDEP. X 4
	United Patriots National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria	IMRO- NFSB- Ataka	2016	2017	2017-				GERB, Ataka, INDEP. X 4
		NFSB	2011	2013 2014		2014-2017		2013-2014	
	National Bulgarian Movement Order, Law and Justice	IMRO RZS	1991 2005	2009 2013	2017- 2017-	2009-2013		2013-2014	GERB, Ataka, VMRO, INDEP. X 4
	Will	Volya	2007	2009				2009-2013	

				2013 2014 2017				2013-2014 2014-2017
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Alliance	HDSSB	2006	2007		2017- 2007-2011		
Czech R.	Dawn-National Coalition Dawn		2013	2013		2011-2015 2015-2016 2016- 2013-2017		
	Freedom and Direct Democracy Coalition for Republic - Republican Party of Czechoslovakia	SPD SPR-RSC	2015 1989	2017 1990 1992 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010 2017		2017- 1992-1996 1996-1998		1990-1992 1998-2002 2002-2006 2006-2010 2010-2013 2017-
Denmark	Danish People's Party	DF	1995	1998		1998-2001		
	Progress Party	FrP	1972	1990		2001-2005 2005-2007 2007-2011 2011-2015 2015 2019 2019- 1990-1994	2001-2005 2005-2007 2007-2011 2015-2019	

Estonia	Conservative People's Party of Estonia	EKRE	2012	1994 1998 2001 2015		1994-1998 1998-2001 2015-2019		2001-2005	
Finland	Estonian Citizens Finns Party	EKo PS	1992 1995	1992 1995 1995	2019- 2019-	1992-1995 1995-1999		1995-	EK, IRL
France	National Front	FN	1972	1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019 1993	2015-2017	1999-2003 2003-2007 2007-2011 2011-2015 2017-2019 2019-		1993-1997	KESK, KOK
Germany	National Rally Alternative for Germany	RN AfD	2013	1997 2002 2007 2012 2017 2013		1997-2002 2012-2017 2017-		2002-2007 2007-2012 2013-2017	
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally	LAOS	2000	2017 2004		2017-		2004-2007	
				2007 2009	2011-2012	2007-2009 2009-2011			PASOK, ND, INDEP. x 4

				2012				2012-2012	
				2012				2012-2015	
				2015				2015-2015	
	Political Spring	POLAN	1993	1993		1993-1996			
				1996				1996-2000	
Hungary	FIDESZ- Hungarian Civic Alliance	FIDESZ- MPSZ	1988	1990		1990-1994			
				1994		1994-1998			MDF, FKGP, MKDSZ, INDEP. x 7
				1998	1998-2002*				
				2002		2002-2006			
				2006		2006-2010			
				2010	2010-2014*				MDF, FKGP, MKDSZ, INDEP. x 3
				2014	2014-2018*				KDNP, INDEP. x 2
				2018	2018-*				KDNP, INDEP. x 6
	Movement for a Better Hungary	Jobbik	2003	2006				2006-2010	
				2010		2010-2014			
				2014		2014-2018			
				2018		2018-			
	Hungarian Justice and Life Party	MIÉP	1993	1994				1994-1998	
				1998		1998-2002			
				2002				2002-2006	
				2006				2006-2010	
Italy	Northern League	LN	1991	1992		1992-1994			
				1994	1994-1994				FI, AN, UDC, CCD, INDEP. x 2

				1996		1994-1996 1996-2001			FI, AN, UDC, NPSI, INDEP. x 3
				2001	2001-2006				
				2006		2006-2008			
				2008	2008-2011				FI, AN, DCA
				2013		2011-2013 2013-2018			M5S, PD, ART.1, IV, INDEP. x 3- 6
	Brothers of Italy	FdI	2012	2018 2013 2018	2018-	2013-2018 2018-			
Netherlands	List Pim Fortuyn	LPF	2002	2002	2002-2003				CDA, VVD
				2003		2003-2006			
				2006				2006-2008	
	Party for Freedom	PVV	2006	2006 2010 2012 2017		2006-2010	2010-2012		
	Forum for Democracy	FvD	2016	2017		2012-2017 2017-			
	Centre Democrats	CD	1984	1994 1998		2017- 1994-1998		1998-2002	
Norway	Progress Party	FrP	1973	1993		1993-1997			
				1997		1997-2001			
				2001		2001-2005			
				2005		2005-2009			
				2009		2009-2013			
				2013	2013-2017				H

Poland	Law and Justice	PiS	2001	2017 2001	2017-	2001-2005			H, V, KRF
				2005 2007 2011	2005-2007*	2007-2011 2011-2015			SRP, LPR, INDEP. x 7
	League of Polish Families	LPR	2001	2015 2019 2001	2015-2019* 2019-*	2001-2005			PRZP, SP, INDEP. x 5 P, SP, INDEP. x 5
	Kukiz'15		2015	2005 2007 2015	2005-2007		2007-2011		PiS, SRP, INDEP. x 7
	Party X	X	1991	2015 2019 1991 1993		2015-2019 2019- 1991-1993		1993-1997	
Romania	Greater Romania Party	PRM	1991	1992		1992-1995			
				1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016		1996-2000 2000-2004 2004-2008		2008-2012 2012-2016 2016-	
	Romanian National Unity	PUNR	1990	1990 1992 1996 2000	1992-1996	1990-1992 1996-2000		2000-2004	FDSN, PDSR
Slovakia	Slovak National Party	SNS	1989	1990		1990-1992			

				1992 1994 1998 2002	1992-1994 1994-1998	1998-2002		2002-2006	HZDS, INDEP. x 3 HZDS, ZRS
	We are family	SR	2015	2006 2010 2012	2006-2010	2010-2012		2012-2016	SMER-SD, L'S-HZDS, INDEP. x 5
	Slovenian Democratic Party	SDS	1989	2016 2016	2016-	2016-			SMER, MH, S
Slovenia				1990	1990-1992				SKD, SKZ, ZS, SDZ, SOS
				1992 1996 2000	1992-1996	1996-2000 2000-2004			SDP, LDS, ZS, DS
				2004 2008	2004-2008*	2008-2011			NSI, DESUS, SLS
				2011	2012-2013*				DESUS, DLGV, NSI, SLS
	Slovenian National Party	SNS	1991	2014 2018		2013-2014 2014-2018 2018-			
				1992 1996 2000 2004 2008		1992-1996 1996-2000 2000-2004 2004-2008 2008-2011			

				2011 2014 2018 2002		2018-		2011-2014 2014-2018 2002-2006	
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	SD	1988						
				2006 2010 2014 2018 1991 1994		2010-2014 2014-2018 2018-		2006-2010	
Switzerland	New Democracy Swiss People's Party	NyD SVP	1991 1971	1991	1992-1995				SPS, CVP, FDP
				1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019	1996-1999 2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015 2016-2019 2020-				CVP, SPS, FDP CVP, SPS, FDP SPS, CVP, FDP SPS, CVP, FDP, BDP FDP.DL, SPS, BDP, CVP FDP.DL, SPS, CVP FDP.DL, SPS, CVP
UK	United Kingdom Independence Party	UKIP	1993	2001				2001-2005	
				2005 2010 2015 2017		2014-2015 2015-2017		2005-2010 2010-2014 2017-2019	

| | | | 2019 | | | | 2019- |

* Holding the office of a prime minister

Appendix B – CHES and POPPA datasets

To further check and examine the MARPOR data, the datasets from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) and Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey (POPPA) will be analysed. Instead of focusing on a more extended period, as with the MARPOR, the two surveys provide a narrower insight into 2014 and 2018, respectively. Due to both datasets being expert surveys and hence considerably different from the MARPOR data, the tests ran and analysed here are not labelled as robustness tests. Instead, they are to increase the confidence in the results and conclusions presented in Chapter Four.

Chapel Hill Expert Survey

Along with MARPOR, CHES is one of the most used datasets among political scholars (Ernst *et al.* 2019; Kneuer 2019; Lisi *et al.* 2019). The first survey took place in 1999 and included 14 countries. The latest survey 2014,⁶³ one employed here, has 31 current or prospective EU member countries, including all EU members in addition to Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The country experts are

⁶³ 2017 FLASH Survey by CHES was on reduced number of countries hence not as beneficial to the purposes.

requested to estimate parties' positioning towards European integration, political ideology, and other policy issues.

Six variables from the CHES dataset best match the MARPOR variables in Chapter Four. Two have the exact wording as the MARPOR variables: law and order and multiculturalism, whereas MARPOR's national way of life is covered in the CHES dataset by the nationalism variable. In addition, there are two variables, positions on immigration policy and towards ethnic minorities, that further expand on the tolerance of foreigners, foreign cultures, and ethnic diversity present in the society. The last variable from CHES is a social lifestyle, which asks experts to evaluate parties' support, or opposition, to liberal policies, which is associated with MARPOR's traditional morality variable.

The 2014 version was administered between December 2014 and February 2015 to 337 political scientists specialising in political parties and European integration. From the 268 parties included, 26 appear on *The PopuList* and are separated into the four groups presenting the institutional roles. Since the political scientists reflect on 2014, the divisions have a cut-off point at the end of June to determine which group the parties belong to. On the sample used here, there were three occasions when citizens cast their votes in 2014.

Firstly, the Conservative MP Douglas Carswell shifted his membership to UKIP, triggering a by-election that saw UKIP gain their first MP, but since this happened in October, UKIP has still been

considered a party with no parliamentary seat in this dataset. Secondly, Bulgaria went to the polls in 2014 but again, this was in October, which means that the three Bulgarian parties in the dataset, VMRO, Ataka and NFSB, are in the groups they occupied prior to the October elections. As a result, Ataka’s group stayed in opposition, whereas both VMRO and NFSB had the same destiny as UKIP. They gained their first seats in the October elections but are kept in the no seat group here. Thirdly, the Slovenian polls held in July did not change the SDS’s positioning since they stayed in the opposition.

Table A3.1 exhibits the group division in the CHES dataset. Unfortunately, the group on parties providing official parliamentary support for a government has no observations with this dataset, especially since that was the group that is the most present in the results on the MARPOR dataset.

Table B.1 CHES dataset’s group divisions.

Role	Number of parties
Government	3
Opposition	16
No seats	7
Total	26

As shown in Table A2.2, the ANOVA results show no statistically significant differences between the RRWP parties in different institutional roles.

Table B.2 ANOVA results for CHES variables.

Variable	SS	df	F	Prob > F
Law and Order	0.0828	2	0.1	0.9052
Lifestyle	1.2872	2	0.34	0.7173
Immigration	1.4495	2	0.94	0.4064
Multiculturalism	0.7637	2	0.31	0.7362
Ethnic minorities	2.9013	2	2.04	0.1525
Nationalism	1.7345	2	2.52	0.1024

Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey

The POPPA dataset, based on country expert surveys, is designed to measure political parties' positions and attitudes on key aspects of populism. It includes 28 European countries and was fielded between April and July 2018. This relatively new dataset⁶⁴ consists of 250 parties, of which 31 are parties also in *The PopuList*.

Italy and Slovenia went to the polls in 2018, but in the latter case, that did not change the position of SDS, the only Slovenian RRWP party in this dataset, but they stayed in the opposition. Italian elections were held in March, and whilst FdI remained in the opposition, LN became a governmental party. Due to the timing of the polls and the survey, LN is considered a governmental party in this dataset.

The groups measuring parties supporting a government and those without seats only had an observation from a party on each. Thus these

⁶⁴ At the time of the writing there were no peer reviewed articles that would have used this dataset.

were deleted from the analysis, leaving ten parties in the government group and 19 in the opposition.

Table B.3 POPPA dataset's group divisions.

Role	Frequency
Government	10
Opposition	19
Total	28

Since the dataset is designed to measure populism, the variables are practical and convenient for this research. However, since it is used to test the MARPOR data in this thesis, only those variables that best reflect the earlier ones are chosen. Thus, the following four are included: immigration, nativism, law and order, and lifestyle. Similarly to the CHES results, the ANOVA on the POPPA dataset (Table A2.4) shows statistically significant differences.

Table B.4 ANOVA results for POPPA variables.

Variable	SS	Df	F	Prob > F
Immigration	2.0018	1	3.98	0.0561
Nativism	0.0261	1	0.04	0.8391
Law and Order	0.2173	1	0.37	0.5476
Lifestyle	4.8294	1	2.92	0.0987

Conclusion

None of the ten variables tested shows evidence of statistically significant differences between the institutional roles. Hence, the analysis supports the central hypothesis that RRWP parties' institutional positions do not influence their discourse. Unfortunately, the group with five differing results on the MARPOR data, those officially supporting a government, was absent in both CHES and POPPA datasets and thus, the viability of those results cannot be verified with the tests run above.

These test findings, overall, are satisfactory. There are no unanticipated primary results, but they largely confirm the hypothesis, witnessing no alteration between observations from different institutional roles.

Appendix C - PS codes in the order of frequency

Table C.1 PS codes in the order of frequency.

1.	Metaphor	36.	Feminism
2.	EU	37.	Experts
3.	Immigration	38.	Veikko Vennamo
4.	Other parties	39.	Globalisation
5.	Welfare policies	40.	Brexit
6.	People	41.	The Old Mark
7.	Refugee	42.	Fixit
8.	Traditional morality	43.	Urho Kekkonen
9.	National way life	44.	Speed loan
10.	Hard work	45.	Protest party
11.	Media	46.	The US
12.	Scandals	47.	Hungary
13.	Victimhood	48.	Romanians
14.	Environment	49.	Ostentatious
15.	Islam	50.	China
16.	Unemployment	51.	Political correctness
17.	Law and Order		
18.	Farming		
19.	Pensioners		
20.	Freedom of speech		
21.	Military		
22.	Women		
23.	Terrorism		
24.	LGBTQ		
25.	Youth		
26.	Russia		
27.	Diminishing language		
28.	Elite		
29.	New supporters		
30.	New referendum		
31.	War		
32.	Welfare chauvinism		
33.	NATO		
34.	Blue reform		
35.	President		

Appendix D – Fidesz codes in the order of frequency

Table D.1 Fidesz codes in the order of frequency.

1.	Work	36.	Asylum seekers
2.	Patriotism	37.	New agreements
3.	Immigration	38.	European People’s Party
4.	Christian traditions	39.	Russia
5.	Central Europe	40.	LGBTQ
6.	Carpathian basin	41.	NATO
7.	Family	42.	Antisemitism
8.	EU negative	43.	Sovereignty
9.	Borders	44.	The US
10.	Sports/culture	45.	Corruption
11.	Communist past	46.	Multiculturalism
12.	Law and Order	47.	Youth
13.	Education	48.	Women
14.	EU positive	49.	Germany
15.	Values	50.	Welfare immigrants
16.	Terrorism	51.	EU army
17.	Brussels elite	52.	Elderly
18.	Other parties	53.	International organisations
19.	Visegard	54.	Poverty
20.	Stories	55.	Environment
21.	Democracy	56.	Human rights
22.	Criticism	57.	political correctness
23.	Rural life	58.	Globalisation to the east
24.	Common sense	59.	Jobbik
25.	Soros	60.	Extremism
26.	People	61.	Euro
27.	Roma	62.	Illiberalism
28.	Liberalism	63.	National renaissance
29.	Islam	64.	China
30.	Covid-19	65.	Judiciary
31.	Federalisation	66.	Migration from Hungary
32.	Minorities	67.	Trust
33.	Community	68.	Freedom of speech

- 34.** Health
- 35.** Entrepreneurs

Appendix E – Fidesz Matrix coding

Table E.1 Fidesz Matrix coding.

	Christia nity	EU negativ e	EU positiv e	Family	Immigr ation	Border s	Islam	Law and Order	Terrori sm	Patrioti sm	People	Soros	Work
Christia nity		1	2	4	14	1	4	1	0	9	1	2	3
EU negativ e	1		10	0	9	4	0	1	1	3	0	1	1
EU positiv e	2	10		0	3	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0
Family	4	0	0		3	1	0	4	1	6	0	0	12
Immigr ation	14	9	3	3		20	2	8	17	5	0	1	3
Border s	1	4	1	1	20		0	3	3	1	0	0	1
Islam	4	0	0	0	2	0		0	0	0	0	0	0
Law and Order	1	1	0	4	8	3	0		9	4	0	1	5

Terrorism	0	1	1	1	17	3	0	9		1	0	1	1
Patriotism	9	3	2	6	5	1	0	4	1		2	1	11
People	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2		0	1
Soros	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0		0
Work	3	1	0	12	3	1	0	5	1	11	1	0	

Appendix F – DF codes in the order of frequency

Table F.1 DF codes in the order of frequency

1.	Criticism of government	34.	Radicalisation
2.	Immigration	35.	Freedom of speech
3.	Law and Order	36.	Monarchy
4.	Asylum seekers	37.	Radical right-wing populism
5.	Other parties	38.	European Court of Justice
6.	EU	39.	China
7.	Borders	40.	Citizenship
8.	Elderly	41.	Germany
9.	Welfare system	42.	Unions
10.	Islam	43.	Identity politics
11.	DF's achievements	44.	LGBTQ
12.	Terrorism	45.	HC Anderson
13.	Deportation	46.	Religion
14.	Negotiation	47.	Afghanistan
15.	Ghetto/gangs	48.	Hungary
16.	Eastern Europa	49.	Losing support
17.	Brexit	50.	Greenland & Farao Islands
18.	Integration	51.	The US
19.	Support	52.	Financial crisis
20.	Danishness	53.	Media
21.	Jobs	54.	Foreign aid
22.	Hospitals	55.	Turkey
23.	Tax	56.	Jihadi wives
24.	Values	57.	Animal welfare
25.	Sweden	58.	NATO
26.	Schools		
27.	Women		
28.	Health care		
29.	Referendums		
30.	Israel		
31.	Euro		
32.	Climate		
33.	Welfare tourism		

Appendix G – DF Matrix coding

Table G.1 DF Matrix coding.

	Danish ness	Elderly	Border s	Criticis m of gov.	Immigr ation	Asylum seeker s	Deport ation	EE	Ghetto / gangs	Law and Order	Islam	Welfare system	Women
Danish ness		4	9	7	12	5	6	2	3	6	5	7	0
Elderly	4		10	16	15	12	9	0	3	11	3	9	0
Border s	9	10		11	27	20	13	9	6	18	6	9	2
Criticis m of gov.	7	16	11		22	18	12	15	6	12	3	14	1
Immigr ation	12	15	27	22		24	12	9	15	26	11	26	4
Asylum seeker s	5	12	20	18	24		17	3	7	19	2	12	1
Deport ation	6	9	13	12	12	17		2	7	16	3	5	0
EE	2	0	9	15	9	3	2		2	8	1	8	0
Ghetto / gangs	3	3	6	6	15	7	7	2		18	5	5	2

Law and Order	6	11	18	12	26	19	16	8	18		6	7	1
Islam	5	3	6	3	11	2	3	1	5	6		6	13
Welfare system	7	9	9	14	26	12	5	8	5	7	6		3
Women	0	0	2	1	4	1	0	0	2	1	13	3	