A Foucauldian Governmentality Analysis of Security Sector Reform in Tunisia

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 Abstract

This thesis adopts Foucauldian genealogical governmentality as a conceptual framework for the examination of the concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR), and for empirical investigation into the effects of SSR practice on security and democratic reform in post-revolutionary Tunisia. This thesis broadly defines governmentality as the conduct of oneself and others' conduct through productive – rather than repressive – power. It applies a four-level analytical framework to operationalise governmentality, enabling a critical examination of SSR's rationalities, technologies, subjectivities, and finalities.

This thesis' application of governmentality challenges the predominant, liberal cosmopolitan-inspired, SSR literature through building on the Foucauldian "discontent with the epistemological and ontological claims inherited from the Enlightenment" which continue to underpin social and political theories (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2010, 2–3). This thesis demonstrates that SSR literature's liberal cosmopolitan bias poses political and conceptual problems, which ultimately promote blinkered explanatory narratives about SSR's concept and impact.

With a view to overcoming these problems, this thesis demonstrates how genealogical governmentality is the most suitable alternative, critical, perspective which interrogates and historicises the power/knowledge configurations justifying and upholding SSR, without jettisoning an awareness of the agency of the "weak" or the governed. This thesis contributes to and advances the nascent wave of literature applying governmentality research to SSR through the design of a holistic four-level governmentality framework and a tailored interpretivist methodology. Interpretivism is adopted in this thesis as an underlying philosophy as well as a practical approach which dictates the use of specific qualitative methods.

This thesis designs and applies a hybrid Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) model which combines Foucauldian thought regarding the criteria of a Discourse's

formation (Foucault 1991b, 56) with Fairclough's three dimensional CDA model (Fairclough 1992, 79). This tailored CDA model allows this thesis to undertake an in-depth genealogical analysis of SSR rationalities and epistemological conditions of possibility. Further, CDA is complemented and reinforced in this thesis by qualitative, in-depth, semi structured interviews, as a necessary method for this thesis' inquiry into SSR's subjugated knowledges and the subjectivities of various actors within the SSR field.

This thesis' genealogical governmentality analysis denaturalises the SSR concept by revealing the elusiveness of its Discourse. By doing so, this thesis advances a critique of SSR's impact in Tunisia which transcends the simplistic explanatory narratives which are limited to operational challenges within the recipient countries. Instead, this thesis reveals SSR's regime of practices as overall exacerbating Tunisia's security and democratic reform problems. This advances a conceptual and empirical contribution. Conceptually, this thesis challenges problem-solving SSR literature which upholds the positionality of donors and SSR actors as neutral providers of technical assistance, and of SSR as a normative and useful concept going wrong in practice. Empirically, this thesis advances an alternative perspective accounting for the multiplicity of conflicting and competing powers, interests, and perspectives within the security and SSR field in Tunisia. This overcomes the current polarised and contentious discourses inflicting Tunisia's democratisation path which pit ideological, political, and social groups against each other. Instead, this thesis advances an inclusive and representative diagnosis and vision for security reform, which, as revealed in this research, is essential for successful security reform and, ultimately, democratisation in Tunisia.

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List of abbreviations

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSS	Critical Security Studies
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DCAF	Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance
DFID	Department for International Development
EU	European Union
GDI	Government Defense Integrity Index
HoG	Head of Government
ISF	Internal Security Forces
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Sham
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoI	Ministry of Interior
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC	OECD- Development Assistance Committee
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TI-DS	Transparency International-Defense and Security
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USIP	United States Institute of Peace

Introduction

Background

Tunisia's revolution, triggered by the December 2010-January 2011 popular protests which removed long-time dictator Zine-al-Abdine Ben Ali, prompted a democratisation process aimed at transitioning the country away from authoritarian rule.

The democratic reform of state security structures is a central need in the country's continued democratisation process. The pre-revolution security apparatus was a central tool for the regime's authoritarian resilience (Grewal 2016, 2018; Hibou 2011; Kartas 2014; Keskes and Martin 2018; Lutterbeck 2015). The Ministry of Interior (MoI) was the central institution coordinating Ben Ali's authoritarian regime through rigorously monitoring and oppressing dissent. Ben Ali built on his predecessor Habib Bourguiba's efforts and turned the country into a police state (Hibou 2011). Tunisia was subsequently described as one of the "most heavily policed states in the world, and the police was clearly the most feared and reviled institution in the country" (Lutterbeck 2015, 813). In 2010, Freedom House classified Tunisia as "not free", having received a 7 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties, on a scale of 1 to 7, whereby 7 is the lowest (Freedom House 2010). Torture, abuse, intimidation, and unlawful incarcerations of political dissidents were common practices. Consequently, "bread, freedom, and national dignity" became the revolution's slogan, as the Tunisian people revolted against the erosion of their human rights and freedom at the hands of the security apparatus. The January 2011 popular uprising targeted the Ben Ali clan and the internal security forces, as most police stations were attacked and burned down (Kartas 2014, 377). Therefore, reforming the security sector to transition from preserving the regime to protecting all citizens is a priority in the country's democratic transition.

Notably, mainstream analyses of Tunisia's democratisation and attendant departure from police state practices are largely organised along a success-failure dichotomy. Scholars and pundits have often advanced two mutually exclusive narratives in discussing post-revolution Tunisia; the "success" camp has hailed the country as the "Arab Spring's" only democratic success and "an exception in the region" (Editorial, the Guardian 2014). On the other hand, the "failure" camp interprets standalone events, such as the passing of a controversial law, as an unequivocal return to dictatorship, with some driving the dichotomy further by wondering whether the country is "still on track as the Arab Spring's only success story, or is it drifting back toward authoritarianism?" (Walles 2018). This is consistent with "a problematic zero-sum binary in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) scholarship between either a linear democratization process or authoritarian resilience" (Keskes and Martin 2018, 662). This thesis rejects this success-failure dichotomy as it advances the false notion of a linear democratisation process while failing to account for the complex ways in which authoritarian institutional structures undergo reform within a democratising context.

Due to the centrality of the police state in Tunisia's authoritarian regime, the reform of the security institution represents a litmus test for the country's overall democratisation process. As such, this thesis undertakes the task of advancing a nuanced assessment of Tunisia's security reform progress in a way which transcends the reductionist zero-sum binaries prevalent in MENA and democratisation scholarship. This is important due to the political implications of such analyses, which underpin development programming and foreign aid priorities for Tunisia, as well as shaping bilateral cooperation and relations.

Indeed, a variety of international actors have launched programmes for the reform of Tunisia's security sector since the 2011 revolution. Such programmes are grouped under the field of Security Sector Reform (SSR), a development-led set of

processes with the stated aim of enhancing the effectiveness and democratic governance of security forces for the benefit of the populations under their control. The SSR concept, which was first advanced in 1999 by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), is the product of a post-Cold War new wave of policy and academic thinking which shifted security's referent object from the state to individuals. The ensuing "human security" agenda enshrouding SSR promoted a Kantian-inspired liberal cosmopolitanism which draws on Enlightenment morality and proclaims "a critical and an emancipatory agenda in social and political theory and in the realm of practice" (Jabri 2012, 3).This thesis examines SSR's effects on Tunisia's security and democratisation efforts. It asks the following research question: how does the concept and practice of Security Sector Reform contribute to state-level security and democratic transition in Tunisia?

Research puzzle

SSR's central principles revolve around promoting the democratic governance of security sectors while ensuring their effectiveness (OECD- DAC 2005; Short 1999). However, current SSR efforts in Tunisia have been initiated solely as a response to security and terrorist threats. For instance, the European Union (EU's) €23-million SSR assistance programme came as part of an anti-terrorism package in response to the June 2015 Sousse attack (De Kerchove n.d., 58), in which a Tunisian supporter of the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham[1] (ISIS) opened fire on beachgoers, killing 40, including 39 tourists (BBC news 2015). The EU's SSR programme also included counter-terrorism-related equipment and border security assistance. In addition, SSR programmes, such as those led by the EU, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), are largely framed as elements of larger counter-terrorism assistance efforts. This points to a general trend amongst development actors to

[1] Sham is the Arabic word for the Eastern Mediterranean Levant region, covering present day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and the occupied territories.

prioritise SSR's security objectives at the expense of democratic governance aims in shaping their SSR programming in Tunisia.

Despite SSR's current counter-terrorism focus, Tunisia is witnessing high levels of radicalisation amongst its youth. Official and unofficial accounts site Tunisia as one of the largest exporters of ISIS foreign fighters. Exact figures vary between Tunisian government accounts of 3000 Tunisians fighting in Iraq, Syria, and Libya since 2011, and UN and international accounts placing the figure closer to 7000 (Malka and Balboni 2016). Furthermore, current SSR and counter-terrorism efforts have been largely ineffective in preventing acts of terrorism. Recent examples of terrorist attacks in Tunisia challenge the current implicit assumption of SSR programmes that equipping and training security forces leads to an increase in security. In fact, police militarisation and heavy security presence did not prevent repeated attacks targeting security forces, pointing instead to a link between kinetic and militaristic security measures on the one hand and increased insecurity on the other. In recent years, repeated terrorist and suicide attacks targeted security forces; in November 2015, a suicide bomber killed 12 Presidential Guards in a then unprecedented attack on the downtown area of Tunis (Amara 2015). This attack was the first of several targeting security forces in strategic locations in the capital. The most recent examples include two suicide bombings in 2018 and 2019 in Tunis' Avenue Habib Bourguiba, home of the MoI and the heaviest police presence in the capital and the country (Belaid 2018; Guguen 2019), a 2020 suicide bombing targeting police patrols outside the US embassy (France 24 2020), and a 2021 attempted stabbing of police officers outside the MoI (Amara 2021).

Therefore, the extent of current SSR efforts' effectiveness at addressing the country's democratisation and security needs requires scrutiny. This is especially important as literature on violent radicalisation in Tunisia points to police brutality and bitterness towards the state and its security structures as key contributing factors to violent radicalisation amongst marginalised Tunisian youth (Ben

Mustapha Ben Arab 2018; Consigli 2018; Institut Tunisien des Etudes Stratégiques 2018). Against this backdrop, SSR's current focus on counter-terrorism and on providing training and equipment risks contributing to security forces' renewed impunity and the implementation of repressive and undemocratic counter-terrorism policies and measures. Indeed, successive post-revolution governments have capitalised on terrorist attacks to push for the passing of legislation encroaching on individual rights and providing blanket powers to security forces to stifle critiques or calls for reform (Human Rights Watch 2017). Furthermore, discourses around terrorist threats and counter-terrorism have justified authoritarian backsliding through the continuation of enforcing a repressive state of emergency which grants security forces sweeping and unconstitutional powers (Amnesty International 2019).

The limitations of SSR literature

This thesis argues that mainstream SSR literature suffers from a liberal cosmopolitanism bias, which favours a problem-solving approach. The result is that even literature critical of SSR is limited to highlighting SSR's failure in practice while taking its theory and underlying assumptions for granted. Therefore, this thesis' Foucauldian governmentality framework seeks to further knowledge around and critique of the SSR concept and its application. Indeed, literature attempting to explain the concept's lack of operational success has been limited to blaming recipients due to a perceived incompatibility with liberal governance values (Alley 2015; Andersen 2011; Boshoff et al. 2010; Hills 2010; Koddenbrock 2012; Kohl 2015), or to critiquing SSR's post 9/11 militarisation in practice (Abrahamsen 2016; Albrecht and Stepputat 2015; Sedra 2015). Both perspectives fail to transcend SSR's hegemonic Discourse[2] by unsettling its normative underpinnings, and their conclusions therefore remain limited within the bounds

[2] As argued in chapter 3 (Methodological Framework), this thesis employs the term "discourse" in two distinct ways. "Small D" discourse refers to written, spoken, or other semiotic markers, while a "big D" Discourse encompasses texts, their context, and systems of practices.

of the same Discourse they are critiquing. Indeed, previous research I have undertaken as part of my master's dissertation applied this narrow SSR literature lens by limiting the analysis to exploring the operational obstacles facing SSR's practice in Tunisia. This led to conclusions blaming contextual factors, such as constitutional ambiguity and the rise in terrorism, for the failure of SSR actors to achieve any progress in Tunisia. However, as the SSR process is meant to be tailored to the context in which it is applied, such conclusions are devoid of any logical merit. Therefore, a research framework inspired by mainstream problem-solving SSR literature yields circular arguments with limited political significance for Tunisia or for SSR actors. This shortcoming is consistent with predominant approaches in political science which continue to "cling to the dualisms of ideas and institutions, theory and action" (Walters 2012: 63). The ensuing problem-solving perspective in SSR literature promotes blinkered explanatory narratives about SSR's concept and impact, ultimately shielding SSR from political and intellectual scrutiny. This thesis challenges and contributes to SSR literature by adopting Foucauldian governmentality as an analytical framework. Broadly defined as the conduct of oneself and others' conduct through productive – rather than repressive – power, governmentality is employed in this thesis as a conceptual framework for the examination of the concept of SSR, and for empirical investigation into the effects of SSR practice on security and democratic reform in the Tunisian case.

Conceptual framework

Governmentality studies challenge predominant approaches to political studies and "insist that thought itself requires an entire technical apparatus making it as much part of the material world as anything else" (Walters 2012: 63). A key governmentality feature is its rejection of ontological universals. Governmentality thus allows this thesis to overcome the predominant problem-solving characteristic of SSR literature, by shifting from the conventional study of SSR as a universal ontological object to examining the contingent practices that have

produced SSR as an object. This enables a move beyond the main question posed by critical SSR scholars of why SSR is not successful in practice to asking how the current SSR concept "had been assembled, and hence how it might be transformed" (Miller and Rose 2008, 8). Therefore, the application of a governmentality framework enables this thesis to critically engage with SSR by deconstructing both its practice and conceptualisation.

Foucault coined the term and raised the question of governmentality in an 8 February 1978 lecture, posthumously published as part of the "Security, Territory, Population" lecture series at the College de France delivered in 1977 and 1978 (Foucault 2007). By examining governmentality, Foucault encompassed questions such as "how to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people will accept being governed, how to become the best possible governor" (Foucault 1991a, 87).

This thesis' application of a Foucauldian governmentality framework offers three key contributions to theory. First, this thesis's analytical framework represents an improvement on Mitchell Dean's (1999) seminal work establishing an analytical framework for the operationalisation of governmentality. This thesis' key critique of Dean's analysis is its prioritisation of an understanding of "how thought operates within our organized ways of doing things, our *regimes of practices*, and with its ambitions and effects" (Dean 1999, 27, emphasis in original). Dean's focus on "thought as it is embedded within programmes for the direction and reform of conduct" (Dean 1999, 27) aligns with governmentality's focus on technologies of government. However, it falls short of effectively capturing another key governmentality aspect which examines the ways in which thought and its subsequent programmes have been rationalised into existence. This thesis' examination of SSR as a governmentality practice begins with an analysis of the ways in which SSR found its epistemological conditions of existence. Therefore, this thesis improves on Dean's analytical framework by including rationalities as

the initial, and prerequisite, analytical step of locating the origins and conditions of existence of thought leading to its embeddedness in practical regimes.

Second, this thesis challenges critical SSR literature through building on the Foucauldian "discontent with the epistemological and ontological claims inherited from the Enlightenment" which continue to underpin social and political theories (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2010, 2–3). Through the use of governmentality, this thesis moves beyond and challenges these perspectives by calling into question not only SSR practice but also its conceptual and ontological underpinnings. This in turn contributes to SSR scholarship by freeing up the readers' political imaginations to envision more successful governmentality practices.

Third, this thesis' application of governmentality to a post-colonial setting challenges Marxist and post-colonial critiques which assert that governmentality fails to account for unequal power structures on a global level (Chandler 2009; Joseph 2010; Selby 2007). This thesis' empirical case study demonstrates how governmentality can be leveraged to enrich empirical analysis of post- and neo-colonial sites. Further, this thesis demonstrates how governmentality is better equipped than the historical deterministic and structuralist perspectives of Marxism and post-colonialism to offer an understanding of how post- and neo-colonial relations are conducted through non-repressive means. This effectively provides a theoretical and empirical contribution to traditional post-colonial readings through eventalising post-colonial power configurations rather than viewing them as a static structural object. In other words, governmentality is better equipped to capture the ways in which post-colonial power relations are resisted, subverted, and transformed within a specific empirical site, thus better accounting for the agency and the heterogeneity of the "weak" or the governed.

As elaborated in chapter 3 (methodological framework), this thesis operationalises its Foucauldian governmentality framework through the design of a tailored

methodology employing a hybrid Critical Discourse Analysis model and in-depth semi-structured interviews.

Thesis structure

The first chapter (literature review) of this thesis critically examines predominant perspectives in SSR literature and reveals the limitations imposed by their problem-solving and liberal cosmopolitan orientation. This chapter identifies three key issues in liberal cosmopolitan-inspired SSR literature, namely the depoliticisation of security, Western-centrism, and the obfuscation of global unequal power relations. It sets out to overcome these limitations through assessing the merits of alternative critical perspectives. Through comparative analysis with Marxism and post-colonialism, this chapter concludes that genealogical governmentality is best equipped to simultaneously historicise and contextualise unequal power relations in order to account for contingency, resistance and agency within the SSR recipient state.

The second chapter (conceptualising governmentality) advances this thesis' four-level analytical framework for the operationalisation of governmentality. In turn, chapter 3 (methodological framework) outlines this thesis' interpretivist research design which aligns with governmentality's ontological and epistemological assumptions. Each of the four analytical levels outlined in chapter 2 is respectively applied to the empirical case of Tunisia in chapters 4 to 7. First, rationalities of government are examined as the epistemological conditions of possibility for an object under study. This is used in chapter 4 (SSR rationalities) to trace the emergence of the SSR Discourse. Through operationalising this thesis' hybrid CDA model and interview data analysis, this chapter investigates SSR Discourse's emergence, hegemony, and transformation, both discursively and in practice in the Tunisian context.

Second, technologies of government are examined, namely through distinct, albeit interwoven sovereign, disciplinary, and biopolitics mechanisms underlying power

and making it possible. This is applied in chapter 5 (SSR technologies) through the examination of the mechanisms and techniques through which SSR is exercised and maintained in practice. Examining the various technologies employed by external SSR actors in Tunisia is an important step to evaluating their effectiveness and suitability to respond to the country's reform needs.

The first two analytical levels of rationalities and technologies trace the emergence and hegemony of the SSR concept and regime of practices and in turn address this thesis' first sub-question: how did SSR at the international level become possible and taken for granted? Further, this thesis examines the competing powers shaping SSR practice and impact in Tunisia, therefore providing an empirical contribution to the Foucauldian conception of governmental power as mutually constitutive with its resistance. This is advanced through the analytical levels of subjectivities and finalities.

Third, subjectivities are explored as the categorisation of the self and other within a given epistemological and technological field. Chapter 6 (SSR subjectivities) undertakes an analysis of the (self)categorisations of various Tunisian actors and SSR donors within the SSR dynamic. This subjectivities analysis reveals the ways in which SSR is transformed upon its encounter with diverse, state and non-state powers at the empirical site of its application. Furthermore, this chapter's investigation of the capillary powers in play at the empirical site enables this thesis to highlight the ways in which agents are both shaped by, while wielding transformative power over the structure. This in turn highlights subversions of governmental and post-colonial powers within and across the SSR recipient state in ways that are not possible from a Marxist historical determinism or post-colonial standpoint.

Finally, finalities of government are examined as the plurality of specific aims and consequences of governmentality. Chapter 7 (SSR finalities) evaluates SSR's impact in Tunisia against its stated security and democratic reform objectives. This chapter's finalities analysis overcomes the limitations of conventional

development evaluation frameworks which examine development outcomes in linear terms. Instead, this chapter examines SSR's impact as the culmination of the complex relationship between SSR practice and subjectivities within a heterogenous recipient state. In addition, in order to advance a critical evaluation of SSR's practice as well as its Discourse, this chapter compares SSR's actual impact to its desired impact in Tunisia, as articulated through subjugated knowledges. Therefore, the two analytical levels of subjectivities and finalities are geared towards addressing this thesis' second sub-question: what effects does SSR have on Tunisia's security and democratic transition?

Chapter ONE: Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter outlines the two predominant perspectives in SSR literature and illustrates their underpinning in liberal cosmopolitanism. This chapter demonstrates that SSR literature's liberal cosmopolitan bias poses political and conceptual problems, which ultimately promote blinkered explanatory narratives about SSR's concept and impact. This chapter identifies three key issues in liberal cosmopolitan-inspired SSR literature, namely the depoliticisation of security, Western-centrism, and the obfuscation of global unequal power relations. These three limitations compound to shield SSR from political and academic scrutiny and in turn limit the subversive potential of critical literature.

This chapter assesses the critical perspectives of Marxism, post-colonialism, and post-structuralism, which break with the liberal cosmopolitan intellectual tradition. This enables this thesis to overcome the liberal cosmopolitan limitations and instead scrutinise the normative justifications underpinning the SSR concept and their implications on a state and international level. Therefore, this thesis adopts Foucauldian genealogical governmentality as an alternative, critical, perspective which interrogates and historicises the power/knowledge configurations justifying and upholding SSR, without jettisoning an awareness of the agency of the "weak" or the governed. This chapter argues that genealogical governmentality is better equipped than the macro deterministic theories of Marxism and post-colonialism to simultaneously historicise and contextualise unequal power relations in order to account for contingency, resistance and agency.

While this thesis joins the emergent wave of literature applying governmentality to SSR, it advances key conceptual and methodological contributions to this literature, through the design of a holistic four-level governmentality framework and a tailored interpretivist methodology.

1. SSR Literature

The term and concept of SSR rose to prominence after its public use in 1999 by Clare Short, the UK's first Minister for International Development in the then newly-established, and now defunct, Department for International Development (DFID), and her department's subsequent SSR policy statements (Brzoska 2003, 3; Wulf 2004, 338). The concept has its roots in a development donor debate among "groups of practitioners and theoreticians on how best to target and implement development assistance" (Brzoska 2003, 2). As such, the SSR concept is largely practice-driven, with international development organisations leading the charge in conceptualising SSR and shaping debates around it. For instance, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an important institutional actor in promoting a development-centric understanding of SSR and in generating joint policy guidelines for its member states, namely members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). The importance of this institution lies in its inclusion of 34, mostly Western, development donor states that refer to the OECD as a platform to "seek answers to common problems, identify good practice, and work to co-ordinate domestic and international policies" (OECD 2007, 2). In 2007, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General established an inter-agency SSR Task Force representing 14 UN agencies engaged in SSR (United Nations n.d.).

The OECD-DAC describes SSR as the "process of transforming the security system of a state in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributing to a well-functioning security framework" (OECD 2007). Similarly, the UN describes SSR as a set of processes aiming to enhance "effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law" (United Nations 2008, 6).

Despite development donors' efforts to define and conceptualise the term, SSR literature draws its theoretical grounding from practice. Most academics and

practitioners agree on the democratic governance focus of SSR. However, this very focus on democratising institutional security structures renders the SSR process highly dependent on the institutional context in the country of its application. Therefore, a general agreement on the lack of a common SSR model exists amongst practitioners and theoreticians, as "each country adopting SSR constitutes a special case and hence a different reform context" (Hanggi 2004, 3). Most scholars agree on common principles and objectives which SSR processes must strive to instil, namely improving "the professional capacity and competence of the security sector to perform its duties in compliance with democratic governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights" (Sayigh 2015, 3). By the same token, most influential development donors and practitioners emphasise similar principles in defining the term.

Despite SSR's popularity, its operational success has been limited (Mustafa 2015, 216). This chapter maps outs, and highlights the shortcomings of, two predominant perspectives in SSR literature attempting to explain the concept's failure in practice.

1.1. Liberal Cosmopolitan SSR literature

One predominant perspective links donors' failure to achieve SSR's democratic objectives in practice to a lack of liberal and democratic norms in recipient countries (Alley 2015; Andersen 2011; Boshoff et al. 2010; Hills 2010; Koddenbrock 2012; Kohl 2015). This exemplifies how the focus on explaining the failure of Western-led SSR practices often leads analysts and practitioners to "largely place the blame for 'failed' defence reform on national authorities, attributing to them a lack of political will and commitment" (Baaz and Stern 2017, 207). This perspective leads to Orientalist or Culturalist analyses linking the failure of SSR to an essentialist or cultural incompatibility of recipient states with liberal democratic values.

This problematic assumption was inadvertently advanced by some scholars positing that the failure of SSR is due to liberal norms not being universally

achievable or "desirable in conflict-affected transition countries" (Andersen 2011, 14). This assumption was taken to more problematic lengths in an article by Hills which takes for granted and advocates for SSR's reliance on "train and equip" military assistance while linking its failure to achieve democratic reform to SSR lacking "political and cultural resonance in the regions in which it is to be implemented"(Hills 2010, 179). This perspective's normative acceptance of SSR's underlying assumptions risks hindering any attempt at interrogating the potential role that SSR, and the international structures that maintain it, play in the resilience of "corruption and patron-client relationships characterizing African societies" (Hills 2010, 178).

Another predominant perspective attributes the failure of SSR in practice to its "militarisation" as a result of a post-9/11 trend of implementing counter-terrorism driven SSR programmes (Abrahamsen 2016; Albrecht and Stepputat 2015; Sedra 2015). This perspective argues that "the democratic, transparency aspects of SSR have also suffered after the attacks of 9/11, when donors increasingly prioritised the harder, security side of SSR" (Abrahamsen 2016, 286). Inadvertently, this perspective advances the assumption that, prior to its militarisation in the wake of 9/11, SSR was geared towards achieving its democratic reform objectives. In turn, this advances an uncritical acceptance of SSR's conceptual alignment with its stated liberal democratic norms and fails to account for SSR's lack of success in achieving these norms prior to 9/11.

This second perspective is emblematic of a problem with SSR literature, which "has largely focused on the discrepancy between concept and implementation and improving the operational capability of SSR programmes" (Mustafa 2015, 213). While the second perspective advances a more critical examination of SSR's practical implications and a less problematic view of recipient countries, both perspectives are guilty of focusing on SSR's practice while failing to interrogate its underlying assumptions. Indeed, the assumption that SSR, if not in practice then at least in theory, is needed for and effective in the democratic reform of security

structures for the benefit of the populations under their control goes largely unchallenged. This is rooted in, and reinforces, a liberal cosmopolitan bias in SSR literature, which leads to the uncritical acceptance of SSR as underpinned by a normative human security impetus.

1.2. The limitations of Liberal Cosmopolitanism

The above mainstream accounts in SSR literature are informed by Kantian-inspired liberal cosmopolitanism which draws on Enlightenment morality and proclaims "a critical and an emancipatory agenda in social and political theory and in the realm of practice" (Jabri 2012, 3). Liberal cosmopolitanism largely draws on Kantian notions of perpetual peace and cosmopolitan rights, which "concern the rights of human beings as citizens of the universal state of mankind" (Wonicki 2009, 273). It posits that "if people are equal and free not only as citizens of the state but also as citizens of the world, as rational human beings we will avoid wars either for moral reasons (we accept the universal law) or egoistic reasons (it is profitable to cooperate)" (Wonicki 2009, 275).

Kant asserted the role of a federation of free republican states in ensuring perpetual peace (Kant 1991, 102). However, contemporary liberal cosmopolitan democracy theories (Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann 1997; Held 1995) diminish the weight of sovereign states and instead advocate for international institutions and global civil society. Within this perspective, notions such as international development, "human security, global governance, and international law are conjured to advocate for global transformation" (Jabri 2012, 3).

At face value, cosmopolitan rights are guaranteed to promote peace, justice and equality between states and amongst their citizens. The convergence of moral obligation and politics in liberal cosmopolitanism translates to an ontological approach agreed upon in both policy and academic circles. This is based on the conviction that liberalism solves a range of problems affecting populations, including underdevelopment, famine, disease, violent conflict, and environmental degradation (Paris and Sisk 2008). As a consequence, "new liberal policy

constructions, such as human security and the responsibility to protect, emerged as concrete manifestations and policy facilitators of the liberal peace project" (Mustafa 2019, 21).

Importantly, these liberal policy constructions were nested in and legitimised by an academic new wave of critical and emancipatory thinking. It is within this framework that Critical Security Studies (CSS) emerged in the early 1990s. Ken Booth's 1990 Plenary Address, titled "Security and Emancipation," presented at the annual British International Studies Association conference, formed the basis for the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies (Hynek and Chandler 2013, 47). This first generation of CSS shifted security's focus from states to the individual, with a Kantian emancipatory mandate to "treat people as ends and not means" (Booth 1991, 319). The emancipatory power of CSS lies in its critique and reversal of neo-realist Cold War politics, dominated by a narrow state-centric security approach whereby "threats to the state, understood also as threats to its borders, people and values, are assumed to be originating from outside the state" (Voelkner 2010, 133).

This shift had policy and conceptual implications, as it provided the intellectual basis for policy projects aimed at freeing people from physical and human constraints including war, poverty, poor education, and political oppression (Booth 1991, 319). As such, CSS laid the groundwork for theory and practice to converge "in advocacies around international law and its transnational reformulations, human rights, interventions in the name of rescue, global governance, and measures aimed at what is referred to as 'human security'" (Jabri 2012, 3).

Human security intensified the push towards a definition of security from an exclusively biopolitical standpoint, "arguing that people be security's referent" (Voelkner 2010, 133), though some commentators argue that this shift was underway well before the end of the Cold War (Doucet & de Larrinaga, 2010: 15). Biopolitics addresses the multiplicity of people "to the extent that they form, on

the contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on" (Foucault 2004, 242–43).

Within this framework, SSR's principles of democratic governance, accountability, and human rights place it within the human security Discourse. Indeed, the focus on individuals and normative liberal principles represents "the cornerstone that the entire human security discursive framework is built upon, and which informs SSR's conceptual apparatus" (Mustafa 2015, 216). This explains SSR literature's acceptance of the concept's normative framework, due to SSR's instrumentalisation of the language of liberal peace and human security, leading it to appear as "both ethical and imperative" (Mustafa 2015, 216).

This thesis argues that the liberal cosmopolitan bias of mainstream SSR literature poses political and conceptual problems and ultimately promotes blinkered explanatory narratives about SSR's concept and impact. This section outlines three key issues identified in liberal cosmopolitan-inspired SSR literature, namely the depoliticisation of security, Western-centrism, and precluding an understanding of global unequal power relations. These three limitations compound to shield SSR from political and academic scrutiny. While these themes are outlined in separate subsections for analytical purposes, they are deeply interconnected and mutually reinforcing in practice. The rest of the chapter investigates the criteria required to overcome the liberal cosmopolitan bias and instead scrutinise the normative justifications underpinning the SSR concept and their implications on a state and international level.

1.2.1 Depoliticising security: A problem-solving approach

Commentators have argued that, within a liberal cosmopolitan perspective, champions of human security promote policy and practical prescriptions, such as SSR, as politically neutral responses to human security problems (Abrahamsen 2016; Mustafa 2019). This is due to a lingering problem-solving approach within the Welsh School. Indeed, despite CSS deriving its critical credentials from

challenging the neo-realist orthodoxy, its convergence with policy circles blunted its critical edge (Hynek and Chandler 2013, 47; Newman 2010, 77). Unlike critical approaches which advance the problematic of "creating an alternative world," CSS's problem-solving approach meant that it was content with solving the problems "posed within the terms of the particular perspective which was the point of departure" (Cox 1981, 128). It is therefore no surprise that critical security scholars outside the Welsh School dismiss human security "as 'uncritical' and unsophisticated" (Newman 2010, 77).

This problem-solving approach depoliticises human security-oriented policy prescriptions and conceals the hierarchical power configurations driving these liberal governance projects. Indeed, an array of critical scholars point to the role of human security in reviving and reconfiguring state security and global hierarchy in depoliticised terms (Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Chandler 2006, 2010; De Larrinaga and Doucet 2008; Duffield 2002; Hynek and Chandler 2013; Mustafa 2015; Rojas 2004; Voelkner 2010). The consequence is a human security discourse which "often works in conjunction with – rather than against – the global exercise of sovereign power" (De Larrinaga and Doucet 2008, 517). As illustrated through the mainstream perspectives in SSR literature, a depoliticised technological approach is limited to blaming recipients if things go wrong, while denying responsibility to liberal donors (Chandler 2006, 22). For instance, in an attempt to respond to voices highlighting SSR's consistent operational failure and lack of alignment with national and local realities in "places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo," Jackson opines that "the messy and convoluted nature of such environments has been at odds with the pristine idealized liberal peace exemplified in the orthodox SSR model" (2016, 187). In turn, this depoliticised narrative stunts any attempt at highlighting the mutually constitutive relationship between universal liberal discourses and practices on the one hand and the issues they problematise on the other. This thesis seeks to advance an alternative perspective to SSR, which accounts for the ways in which donors and recipients

are co-produced through supposedly emancipatory human security discourses and practices (De Larrinaga and Doucet 2008, 518; Hynek and Chandler 2013, 49; Mustafa 2015, 218).

1.2.2 Western-centrism: historical blind spot

Against the backdrop of the unipolar moment following the end of the Cold War, human security provided Western powers with the intellectual grounds to establish a "hegemonic, universalising discourse of international liberalism" (Hynek and Chandler 2013, 49). As such, it becomes apparent that "what gave CSS its impetus was not a rise in emancipatory possibilities but their closure" (Hynek and Chandler 2013, 49). The resulting Western-centrism inherent in this universalising discourse requires scrutiny.

Literature highlighting the Western-centrism dominating the discipline of International Relations (IR) and its Security Studies subfield is abundant (see for instance Anderl and Witt 2020; Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Bilgin 2010, 2020, 2021; Jabri 2012; Krishna 2001; Sabaratnam 2020). This Western bias has an impact on shaping our understanding of the world. As Barkawi and Laffey argued, collective understanding and representations of events such as WWII and the Holocaust have been shaped in IR and security studies to dissociate the West from its genocidal and imperialist history and instead construct and orientalise an ethically inferior "other" (Barkawi and Laffey 2006, 341). For instance, despite the fact that "'Soviet Communism and Nazism were each animated by ambitions that derive from the Enlightenment'", both Nazi Germany and the USSR are dissociated from the West (Barkawi and Laffey 2006, 342). Consequently, European historians by the mid-twentieth century "were echoing the refrain that Germany was -in its "soul" -a non-Western country" (Lewis and Wigen 1997, 59).

Western-centrism manifests differently across predominant perspectives in IR and Security Studies. While realist approaches locate power, agency, and history with the West, the liberal brand of Western-centrism includes the added feature of

defining the West "in ethical and progressive terms" (Barkawi and Laffey 2006, 340). Despite its emancipatory discourse, liberal cosmopolitanism, and in turn human security and SSR literature, continue to cling to these Western-centric assumptions.

SSR is predicated upon the need to democratise security structures for the benefit of the population under their control. While SSR practice includes recipients such as Tunisia with no demonstrated need for state-building, the concept has been originally constructed as a state-building tool to counter the threat that "fragile states" pose on global security and their own populations (Abrahamsen 2016; Albrecht and Stepputat 2015; Brzoska 2003; Hanggi 2004; Mustafa 2015, 2019; Sedra 2015). This is part of the overall liberal peace project which aims to "transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative, and, especially, stable entities" (Mustafa 2019, 22).

The Western-centric implications of this narrative are twofold. First, it is built upon, and perpetuates, the "othering" of the "non-Western" world. Critical scholars have pointed to the mutual construction of the Western liberal self and the derivative, passive, and ethically bankrupt "other" (Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Bilgin 2010; Jabri 2012; Keskes and Martin 2018; Said 1979; Shihade 2012; Ventura 2017). It follows that the West and the supposedly cohesive and monolithic other are "reinscribed in terms of the dichotomy of modernity and tradition, civilisation and barbarism, freedom and unfreedom; dichotomies that are reproduced through a powerful racialised, culturalist, as well as gendered discourse" (Jabri 2012, 3).

Within this framework, liberal cosmopolitan problematisations of issues outside the West trace these issues to "non-Western" factors, "such as the absence of modern political, economic and social arrangements" (Barkawi and Laffey 2006, 342). SSR's problematisation of undemocratic security structures deploys the same essentialising and othering narratives, with some scholars advancing homogenising and reductionist assessments, such as "African policing is a brutal

business for both officers and the population, regardless of the country concerned" (Hills 2010, 187). The immediate intellectual difficulty that this poses is its concealment of the West's historical role in the establishment and maintenance of these structures. For instance, while various SSR programmes were launched in Tunisia after the 2011 revolution, the well-documented human rights abuses and breaches of democratic values by the pre-revolution regime's police state did not warrant SSR intervention. Rather, the complacency of Western powers played a role in the resilience of Tunisia's authoritarian police state. Indeed, despite its pro-democracy discourse, the EU preferred to maintain the status quo over political reform in Tunisia, "with the view to prioritising economic reform and ensuring cooperation on geostrategic issues and domestic European interests (e.g. terrorism and illegal migration)" (Paciello 2011, 4).

Second, and relatedly, Western-centrism positions the West as the ethical and normative pinnacle of liberal peace and therefore the provider of assistance. Within this framework, "agency, rationality, power and morality, as well as the fundamental dynamics of world order, are assumed to reside in the global North" (Barkawi and Laffey 2006, 346). This denies the rest of the world any agency in identifying and tackling their own political, social, and economic challenges. SSR rests on the same division of moral and technical authority, whereby Western donors and their subordinate, non-Western, recipients are mutually constituted. This has led some commentators to state that the "avatars of Eurocentrism" (Sabaratnam 2013) are "strikingly persistent in much SSR scholarship" (Baaz and Stern 2017, 208). Such myopic thinking which denies agency to the non-West renders mainstream politics and IR theories ill equipped to predict or explain homegrown revolts and revolutions demanding democratic reform, such as the uprisings that swept parts of the Middle East and North Africa at the end of 2010 (Keskes and Martin 2018).

In addition to its intellectual limitations, Western-centric security thinking carries implications for how power is shaped, understood, and reproduced on a global

scale. This makes it both a social science problem and a political problem (Barkawi and Laffey 2006, 344). Therefore, the power relations concealed by liberal cosmopolitan discourses require investigation.

1.2.3 Precluding an understanding of power relations

As argued above, while liberal cosmopolitanism pays lip service to emancipation, its liberal governance project cements the superiority of Western states, as "the agencies of emancipation were Western states, international institutions and 'global civic culture', informed by the Western academic advocates of emancipation" (Hynek and Chandler 2013, 48). The ensuing liberal peace mission is reminiscent of the "*mission civilisatrice*," which provided the political and intellectual rationale for brutal Western colonial expansion (Brauman 2005). The lack of genocide and military exploitation in liberal peace operations has led some to describe it as more benign than colonialism (Paris 2002). However, others have pointed to the processes through which liberal cosmopolitanism and human security discourses simply mask and reconfigure relations of domination (Brauman 2005; De Larrinaga and Doucet 2008; Jabri 2012; Mustafa 2019).

The obfuscation of unequal power relations is possible through two processes. First, liberal cosmopolitanism benefits from a historical blind spot in mainstream IR which enables the discipline to detach its theories from the colonial history of global power relations. As Krishna argues, IR's "fetishization" of theorisation and abstraction is "premised on a desire to escape history, to efface the violence, genocide, and theft that marked the encounter between the rest and the West in the post-Columbian era" (Krishna 2001, 401).

A blind spot to this history in turn obscures the ways in which the West and the rest are mutually constituted. Indeed, while liberal cosmopolitanism takes for granted the West's current ethical and technical superiority, it elides questions about how "the well-being and the progress of Europe have been built up with the sweat and the dead bodies of Negroes, Arabs, Indians and the yellow races" (Fanon

1967, 77). This is a relevant problem for SSR literature, in which undemocratic security structures and practices are "often explained in terms of a lack of those institutions and attributes associated with European modernity, such as sovereignty, rather than as a consequence of long histories of colonial and postcolonial interaction with the West" (Barkawi and Laffey 2006, 347). For instance, SSR's colossal failure in Afghanistan is often blamed on Taliban and conflicting warlords, viewed as "local actors who oppose peace and represent the antithesis of liberal norms and values" (Donais 2016, 236). Importantly, such narratives obscure the crucial historical role played by the US in the emergence of the Taliban, through arming and financing the Mujahideen as part of US Cold War containment policies (Parenti 2001).

Second, and consequently, this masking of historical relations of domination impedes examination of the ways in which these unequal power relations shape hegemonic policy and academic discourses in the post-colonial present. As Robert Cox underscored, theory is "always for someone and for some purpose" (Cox 1981, 129). From this perspective, knowledge, and its resulting practices, is not devoid of power interests (Bilgin 2020, 13). However, instead of colonial power relations marked by repression and domination, the liberal cosmopolitan project deploys notions of human security and emancipatory thinking as an intellectual basis for Western interventionism (De Larrinaga and Doucet 2008; Jabri 2012; Mustafa 2019). In other words, hierarchical colonial relations "continue to resonate in what was supposed to be its negation" (Gikandi 1997, 15). Viewed this way, liberal cosmopolitanism "ceases to be a benign aspiration, but acquires a material and a discursive presence that is imbricated with relations of power globally rendered" (Jabri 2012, 3).

This section revealed the ways in which the explanatory power of mainstream SSR literature is limited by its liberal cosmopolitan bias. To offset the conceptual and political limitations resulting from the liberal cosmopolitan tradition, this thesis requires an alternative, critical, perspective which interrogates and historicises the

power/knowledge configurations justifying and upholding SSR, without jettisoning an awareness of the agency of the "weak" or the governed. The next section presents Foucauldian genealogical governmentality and demonstrates its fulfilment of these required features.

2. Genealogical governmentality: overcoming the liberal cosmopolitan limitations

Table 1 provides a summary of the liberal cosmopolitan limitations addressed in the previous section and their implications. Furthermore, this table highlights and reverses the roots of these limitations in order to identify the requisites of this thesis' alternative perspective.

Table 1 Reversing liberal cosmopolitan's limitations

Limitations	Implications	Roots	Alternative
Depoliticisation	Viewing SSR as politically neutral	Problem-solving approach	Critical approach
	Critique limited to blaming recipients		
	Hinders attempts at highlighting mutually constitutive relationship between liberal practices and their problematisations		
Western-centrism	"Othering" of the "non-West"	Western bias	Historical approach; Accounting for the agency of the "weak" and the governed
	Denying agency to the "weak" and governed		
	Asserting Western superiority		
Precluding an understanding of power relations	Detaching theories from colonial past	Historical blind spot	Historical approach (highlighting the power/knowledge configurations underpinning theory and practice)
	Obscuring the mutually constitutive relationship between the West (SSR donors) and the rest (SSR recipients)		

	Concealing relations of domination in the liberal peace project and SSR		

Based on this analysis, this thesis requires an alternative perspective combining three key criteria, namely a critical inclination, historicism, and an appreciation of the agency of the weak and the governed. As such, this thesis adopts Foucauldian governmentality due to its combination of the three key criteria.

The concept of governmentality was developed by Foucault in his posthumously published “Security, Territory, Population” lecture series at the College de France in 1977 and 1978 (Foucault 2007). Through historical reconstruction, Foucault examines developments between the middle of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth centuries which transformed power and “government” from a question essentially linked to the Machiavellian Prince’s rule over his territory to “arts of government” capturing a set of widespread, decentred, and interwoven problems which are not limited to the state. These include the problem of “how to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people will accept being governed, how to become the best possible governor” (Foucault 1991a, 87).

Governmentality studies were first conceived by a number of Foucault collaborators and a group of mainly British scholars (Kiersey and Stokes 2011, xv). Governmentality studies offered an alternative to attempts at understanding social and political transformations associated with Thatcherism and the end of the Welfare State “in terms of ‘ideology’ or ‘hegemony’ by Marxist and Gramscian approaches” (Kiersey and Stokes 2011, xv). However, interest in governmentality increased dramatically in the 1990s, years after Foucault’s death, with literature “spanning many areas of the social and organizational sciences and the

humanities, and tackling a very diverse array of empirical domains and problem sites" (Walters 2012, 1).

The next three subsections illustrate how governmentality meets each of the three criteria required to offset SSR literature's liberal cosmopolitanism bias. Further, comparative analysis throughout this section reveals that governmentality is better equipped than Marxism and post-colonialism at simultaneously historicising and contextualising unequal power relations in order to account for contingency, resistance and agency.

2.1. A critical approach: Reversing problem-solving

As this chapter argued, emancipatory and human security discourses are entrenched in liberal cosmopolitanism's problem-solving perspective. This thesis rejects the problem-solving approach in favour of a critical perspective. This enables this thesis to unsettle the taken for granted underpinnings of SSR and instead denaturalise the concept by scrutinising its normative justifications.

Critical scholars seeking to challenge problem-solving approaches predominant in IR and security studies have drawn on Foucauldian thought to advance "what might be understood as a 'poststructural' or 'postmodern' critique" (Kiersey and Stokes 2011, xiii). This meta-engagement with mainstream theories reveals post-structuralism's critical power, as it "is more reflective upon the process of theorizing itself" (Cox 1981, 128). This is essential to my critical examination of the concept and application of SSR. The use of a governmentality framework allows this thesis to contribute to and challenge SSR literature which focuses on critically examining SSR practice while falling short of unsettling its theoretical and normative underpinnings. This shortcoming is consistent with predominant positivist and problem-solving approaches in political sciences which continue to "cling to the dualisms of ideas and institutions, theory and action" (Walters 2012, 63). By contrast, governmentality studies "insist that thought itself requires an entire technical apparatus making it as much part of the material world as anything else" (Walters 2012, 63). In this sense, governmentality studies' refusal "to speak

of the existence of ‘universals’” counters the ontological approach to SSR which marks mainstream academic and policy debates (Rosenow 2011, 137–38).

A Second Generation of CSS, the Copenhagen School of Critical Security Studies, challenged the Welsh School’s emancipatory narrative, instead viewing emancipatory security discourses as the result of a securitisation act (Buzan 2004; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1997). Indeed, as highlighted by Buzan (2004), “if the referent object of human security is the individual, or humankind as a whole, then little if anything differentiates its agenda from that of human rights” (369). It follows that the emancipatory discourse underpinning human security only serves to securitize human rights, whereby “security is taken to be the desired end” (Buzan 2004, 370).

However, the Copenhagen School further weakened CSS’ critical credentials, due to its rejection of post-positivist and critical security theorising on the basis that “the socially constituted is often sedimented as structure and becomes so relatively stable as practice (…) in our purposes we are closer to traditional security studies” (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1997, 34). However, a post-structuralist wave of critical security scholars, labelled the Paris School or the Third Generation of CSS, highlighted the Welsh School’s depletion of its emancipatory potential while providing a critical alternative to the Copenhagen School. This led the emancipatory narrative of CSS to be “out-manoeuvred by post-structuralist theorists who could use these radical claims couched in universal and liberal understandings of rights and freedoms in order to argue against the emancipatory project per se” (Hynek and Chandler 2013, 48).

Duffield’s influential Foucauldian-inspired critique of emancipatory security studies paved the way for Foucauldian and governmentality scholars to advance critical alternatives to security and development studies (Duffield 2001, 2002, 2007, 2010, 2014; Escobar 2012; Rojas 2004). Duffield’s critique of the appropriation of emancipatory discourses to reconfigure state security practices laid the groundwork for critical scholarship highlighting the problems with the

securitisation of development and the merging of security and development fields into what they called the security-development nexus (Abrahamsen 2016; Albrecht and Stepputat 2015; Duffield 2001; Hanggi 2004; Keukeleire and Raube 2013; Waddell 2006). This critical perspective enables scholars to demonstrate how the delivery of development aid "becomes an extension of mapping world order in terms of a global logic of security/insecurity" (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2010, 17).

Foucault's governmentality project, like most of his work, was limited to national societies. However, governmentality offers a decentred understanding of power and government which includes state and non-state actors. This makes it an appropriate framework to encompass the non-state actors involved in global governance, while advancing an alternative to liberal cosmopolitanism's view of such actors as agents of liberal transformation (Rojas 2004, 99). Instead, governmentality scholars view international NGOs and transnational donors as contributing to a mechanism of global governance which "created an efficient apparatus for producing knowledge, and exercising power over the Third World" (Escobar 1995, 9). Therefore, this thesis joins critical scholarship which employs Foucauldian governmentality to illustrate the role of liberal global governance processes in the construction of the "Third World" and its subjugation to Western security agendas (DuBois 1991; Escobar 1984, 1995, 2012; Rojas 2004).

Specifically, this thesis joins the nascent wave of literature (Baaz and Stern 2017; Larzillière 2019; Mustafa 2015, 2019) applying governmentality to SSR with the aim of "explicitly acknowledging its political dimensions and implications" on global order and the mutual construction of donors and recipients (Mustafa 2019, 29). This thesis' governmentality framework accounts for the ever evolving and mutually constitutive nature of SSR's rationalities and its subjectivities, as well as the mutual constitution of SSR donors and recipients. This contrasts with the Copenhagen School, which aligns more closely with constructivism than post-structuralism through its analytical separation of "the process of identity

constitution from the point where identities become fortified to such an extent that they function as fixed in security discourse" (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 215).

Baas and Stern (2017) employ one aspect of Foucauldian governmentality, namely "subjectivities," to problematise "the simplified notions of lack of political will and commitment, obstruction and 'spoilers' that are so prevalent in the SSR literature" (Baaz and Stern 2017, 207). Instead, a focus on governmental subjectification advances and illustrates the post-colonial agency of those intervened upon (Baaz and Stern 2017; Jabri 2012). In this sense, governmentality is used to highlight the ways in which donors and recipients are mutually constitutive within the SSR Discourse, while simultaneously accounting for how SSR processes "are heavily shaped by memories of colonialism and exploitation"(Baaz and Stern 2017, 207). Similarly, Mustafa (2015, 2019) employs governmentality to demonstrate the political implications of SSR and its role in maintaining authoritarianism and colonialism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, as "SSR has been utilized as a technology of bio-political power with an underlying objective of population control and surveillance of 'at risk' or 'risky' populations"(Mustafa 2015, 213).

Although embryonic, this wave of governmentality-inspired SSR scholarship has opened an avenue for unsettling SSR literature's predominant assumptions. However, as chapter 2 (conceptualising governmentality) demonstrates, this thesis advances a contribution to this governmentality literature through applying a holistic, four-level, governmentality framework to SSR in Tunisia. Baaz and Stern's focus on the processes of subjectification of SSR donors and recipients has significant ramifications on scholarly debates which have so far pitted the notion of depoliticised agency against unequal post-colonial power structures. Similarly, Mustafa's focus on SSR as a technology of government provides an essential framework for understanding the non-repressive power mechanisms rendering SSR a tool for "biopolitical imperialism"(Mustafa 2015, 213). However, their focus on subjectivities and technologies of government respectively renders their governmentality analysis deficient. By contrast, this thesis advances a

comprehensive governmentality framework which encompasses subjectivities and technologies and includes two key governmentality aspects missed by Mustafa, Baaz and Stern, namely rationalities and finalities. Rationalities enable this thesis to interrogate the processes through which SSR's Discourse is epistemologically rationalised into existence. Finalities allow this thesis to investigate the plurality of SSR's aims and consequences on Tunisia's security and democratisation.

2.2. Historicism

As argued in this chapter, SSR literature benefits from the historical blind spot characterising mainstream IR and security studies. The consequence is a Western-centric perspective which elides questions about the mutual constitution of the West and the ethically inferior "other," and the mutual constitution of liberal cosmopolitan discourses and practices on the one hand and their problematisations on the other. As such, this thesis rejects this historically blind perspective and instead adopts an approach which historicises and highlights the global power hierarchies and structures of domination concealed by the liberal cosmopolitan narratives.

Critical theories, such as Marxism, post-structuralism, and post-colonialism, have adopted historicism to "reveal the power relations, ideological underpinnings, and deep colonial history of patterns of global governance and therefore clearly share many affinities with global governmentality inspired approaches" (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2010, 10). However, this chapter argues that genealogical governmentality is better equipped than macro deterministic theories such as Marxism and post-colonialism to simultaneously historicise unequal power relations while accounting for contingency, resistance and agency.

Marxist theories are predicated upon a criticism of capitalist cosmopolitanism, which "reduced the number of wars – to earn all the bigger profits in peace, to intensify to the utmost the enmity between individuals, the ignominious war of competition" (Marx and Engels 1975, 423). This view forms the basis for Marxist IR theories which "reveal the power relations, ideological underpinnings, and deep

colonial history of patterns of global governance" (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2010, 10). Marxist perspectives on the development of capitalism are based on historical materialism, which argues that "society is a totality or system which is regulated or conditioned by structural relations" (Gill 1993, 28). In other words, humans and their relations are determined by their material conditions. This historical materialism poses two problems, which this thesis overcomes through the use of genealogical governmentality.

First, at the heart of Foucault's genealogical project is his "dissatisfaction with Marxism and with the method of historical materialism" which operated as a universal science and split discourse from practice "and then subordinated the former to the latter, and thereby introduced a division in critical theory between what human beings say and what they do" (Monokha 2011, 71). As argued above, this thesis rejects the false dichotomy between theory and practice and instead asserts the dialectical relation between Discourses and practices leading to the construction and maintenance of SSR.

Second, Marxism's materialist view of history has been criticised as teleological, as it holds the "belief that the European path of development would be followed by the rest of the world" (Achcar 2013, 67). Such a teleological view implicitly supports the notion that "despite its brutality, capitalist cosmopolitanism fulfils a progressive historical role, laying the groundwork for a higher level of universalism" (Achcar 2013, 90). This teleological conception of history can, and has, justified brutal colonial rule in early Marxist thought. For instance, Marx's scornful view of agrarian societies such as precolonial India led him to indulge in colonial apologism when asserting that "whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution" in India (Marx and Engels 1979, 132).

While Marxist IR has shed this problematic view of colonialism through its current focus on unequal global relations and imperialism, it continues to uphold a developmental perspective on history by evoking "more or less fixed principles to

give unity to many of these historical entities and their progress. States, for example, were defined either by traditions consisting of national characteristics or by a fixed pathway to civilization" (Bevir 2010, 427). This leads to materialist explanations of global power relations driven by economic interests concentrated at a global centre (Walters 2012, 95). By contrast, Foucault rejected this ontological view of power "to the extent that the role of power is essentially both to perpetuate the relations of production and to reproduce a class domination that is made possible by the development of the productive forces and the ways they are appropriated. In this case, political power finds its historical raison d'être in the economy" (Foucault 2004, 14).

Marxists' fixation on economic interests driving global power relations led them erroneously to critique the application of governmentality to IR due to a perceived failure of governmentality to take into account economic considerations of the role played by the capitalist global order in shaping global security and global governance (Chandler 2009; Joseph 2010; Selby 2007). This critique neglects aspects of Foucault's thought that indeed demonstrate his awareness of capitalism (Vrasti 2013). For instance, much of Foucault's works were set within and shaped by "the context of the emergence and consolidation of European capitalist social relations and the forms of domination such relations produced and maintained" (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2010, 11). As such, Foucault's rejection of Marxist historical determinism did not negate his acute awareness "of the role of capitalism and of political economy in the historical inquiries he did" (Aradau and Blanke 2010, 46). What genealogists reject as reification is "those concepts of power that refer to social relations based on the allegedly given interests of classes or other social groups. They reject these concepts of power on the grounds that people necessarily construct their understanding of their interests through particular and contingent discourses" (Bevir 2010, 433).

Therefore, this thesis argues that genealogy's radical historicism enables governmentality to overcome Marxism's teleological tendencies. Instead of

viewing current global power relations in linear or causal terms, genealogy highlights the contingent nature of the present. As Bevir explains, “radical historicism is ‘radical’ in the literal sense of ‘applying to its own roots,’ not in the sense of being ungrounded and problematising everything, nor in a somewhat empty political sense” (Bevir 2015, 259). Radical historicism rejects the Marxist teleological narratives and is better adept at portraying the discontinuities and contingencies of historical “events.” By so doing, “universals are revealed as singularities once we refuse to let them define the horizon of interpretation” (Walters 2012, 146). As such, genealogy’s “eventalisation” of history resists macro theories’ proclivity for causal explanations and linear historical narratives. Instead, genealogical governmentality presents history as “a series of contingent even accidental appropriations, modifications, and transformations from the old to the new” (Bevir 2010, 427).

In this sense, a governmentality perspective does not neglect power combinations and practices on the international level, as the Marxist critique contends (Selby 2007), as evidenced by the fact that “the concept of governmentality and the general economy of power which underpins it has been used productively from the vantage point of the international/global” (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2010, 9). Rather, a governmentality perspective rejects Marxism’s ontological assumptions about global power relations and instead views these power configurations as “contingent effects of ongoing techniques and strategies of government” (Walters 2012, 97).

As Bevir asserted, governmentality’s radical historicism is derived from Foucault’s genealogical project (Bevir 2010). Early governmentality work drew on Foucault’s archaeological method. Archaeology explored epistemes, or the “set of structural relationships between concepts” which governed discursive practises such as health, psychology, or social sciences (Bevir 2010, 424). Foucault’s focus on epistemes meant that his “archaeologies consist of synchronic snapshots, with little attention being given to the diachronic processes by which one episteme

gives way to another" (Bevir 2010, 424). This explains the neglect in early, non-genealogical, governmentality works of the role played by historical relations of colonial domination in shaping present governmentalities. By contrast, Foucault's genealogical project "replaced his quasi-structuralist epistemes with more fluid discourses and power/knowledge" (Bevir 2010, 426). Therefore, genealogical governmentality meant that "the challenges of thinking the colonial *has* been taken up within subsequent studies of governmentality" (Walters 2012, 70). As Heath and Legg argue and further demonstrate through their own work, "existing research has positioned Foucault within postcolonial studies in various ways, while not denying his general neglect of colonial and postcolonial concerns" (Legg and Heath 2018, 2).

One approach to overcoming governmentality's neglect for colonialism has been "to apply and adapt Foucault's mostly "'European' work to 'non-European' contexts and, in doing so, show how 'European' governmentalities were always a product of colonial and imperial entanglements" (Legg and Heath 2018, 2). This demonstrates that a rejection of Western-centrism and the highlighting of Western theories' limits can be executed through the use of European, or even Eurocentric, thinkers (Legg and Heath 2018, 10). Legg argues that "Foucault's exploration of the relationship between empires, the formation of subjectivities and the politics of truth offers useful tools with which to re-analyse the governmentalities of colonial and post-colonial India" (Legg and Heath 2018, 4).

Another approach, upon which this thesis relies, is to harness the conceptual and methodological benefits of applying genealogical governmentality to a post-colonial empirical case study. Scholars of South Asia studies were the first to adapt Foucault's work to the histories and geographies of colonial and postcolonial worlds (Legg and Heath 2018, 4). As Kiersey argues, "a Foucauldian perspective may be helpful insofar as it suggests the possibility not only of a non-repressive model of imperial domination but also of a broad field of social struggles and resistances" (2010, 369).

No attempt at a genealogical approach has been made to the study of SSR, with the exception of a recent article by Larzillère (2019). However, while Larzillère's work argues for the usefulness of a genealogically-minded examination of SSR, it is limited to a review and interpretation of secondary literature. This does not amount to a granular and multi-dimensional analysis of SSR's discursive formation, which, as argued in chapter 3 (methodological framework), is necessary for a sound genealogical undertaking. By contrast, this thesis engages in the design and implementation of a tailored Critical Discourse Analysis method with the specific aim of undertaking an in-depth genealogical analysis of SSR rationalities and epistemological conditions of possibility.

This thesis' empirical case study illustrates how genealogical governmentality can be leveraged to enrich empirical analysis of post and neo-colonial sites. A genealogical reading of Foucauldian governmentality necessarily eventalises post-colonial power configurations rather than viewing them as a structural or ontological object. It follows that a genealogical governmentality framework is better equipped to capture the subtle power configurations related to post-colonial vestiges at an empirical site in ways not possible through structuralist theories. As a result, through its empirical inclination and decentring of power, a genealogical governmentality perspective allows for a richer and more nuanced understanding of the ways in which post-colonial relations are challenged, subverted, and transformed at a particular site. As the next subsection demonstrates, a governmentality framework is therefore better equipped than post-colonialism to highlight unequal post-colonial power relations, while shedding light on the powers exercised by the governed.

2.3. Power and Agency

As this chapter has argued, the Western-centrism inherent in liberal cosmopolitan narratives conceals the unequal power relations characterising the liberal peace project. In turn, human security and SSR discourses construct Western donors as the ethical pinnacle and the agents of transformation and the non-Western objects

of reform as devoid of agency. When agency of the governed is evoked, it is often in the context of blaming recipients for the failure of Western donors' liberal governance efforts (Baaz and Stern 2017; Chandler 2006; Mustafa 2015, 2019). This thesis rejects this perspective in favour of balancing an awareness of the unequal power relations underpinning SSR with an appreciation of the resistance and struggles of the governed.

Post-colonialism offers a powerful lens illustrating how the relationship of inequality between donors and recipients is predicated upon, and resulting from, the continuation of physical and epistemic violence and inequalities between former colonial powers and former colonies (see for instance Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Bilgin 2021; Brauman 2005; Fanon 1967; Gikandi 1997; Jabri 2012; Said 1979). As Jabri asserts, thinking post-colonially entails the understanding that "the postcolonial subject bears the imprints of the colonial legacy, not just in relation to a colonised past, but in the constitutive role of the past in shaping the present" (Jabri 2012, 6). This is important to advance an accurate and impactful examination of SSR and its failure, as "how the problem at hand is understood shapes thinking about the solutions" (Bilgin 2021).

This thesis' governmentality framework aligns with post-colonialism in highlighting the ways in which colonial relations, characterised by domination, are repackaged in the post-colonial world. Governmentality and post-colonial perspectives share the understanding that, while direct subjugation of colonial states by colonial powers has largely ceased, the same unequal relations are maintained through more "positive" or "productive" technologies of power. As Jabri notes, "the difference now in late modernity is that the technologies of power used in the control of populations are not manifest in direct rule, but rather through complex forms of government the agents of which might be states, international institutions, or non-governmental organisations, all engaged in practices that have the global as the purview of their operations" (Jabri 2012, 8).

Post-colonial scholarship highlights post-colonial agency as a way to challenge notions of depoliticised agency or a passive and ethically bankrupt "other" (Bilgin 2010; Hansson, Hellberg, and Stern 2015; Jabri 2012). However, this chapter argues that a strictly post-colonial examination of agency is deficient, and that a genealogical governmentality framework offers the tools to upgrade post-colonial agency.

Post-colonialism's focus on the imbrications of current patterns of global governance with unequal colonial power relations may lead to structuralist analysis depriving post-colonial subjects of any resistance potential. This is manifest through post-colonial works that inadvertently deny independent epistemological articulation to the post-colonial agent, thus perpetuating the same narratives they are seeking to dismantle by giving a totalising character to Western knowledge production. For instance, Bilgin attempts to address IR's Western-centrism problem by looking through the drawers of the same Western-centric discipline (2010, 617). Such efforts are misguided and inflicted by the same Western-centrism they seek to address. Further, they result in the perpetuation of narratives denying the existence of competing, albeit subjugated, knowledges outside of Western totalising disciplines. This assumption led Bilgin erroneously to conclude that "in the 19th and early 20th centuries knowledge was produced in and by individuals and institutions in Western Europe, which was in a colonial relationship with much of the rest of the world" (Bilgin 2021).

Other post-colonial scholars overcome this problematic assumption and instead examine questions "relating to postcolonial agency, not in a generalising, simplifying, idealising mode, but in revealing its complex intersection with matrices of power and domination and their contingencies" (Jabri 2012, 9). However, a centralising and statist understanding of post-colonial power relations and agency leads to a restricted understanding of domination as power located at a global centre and exercised over, though resisted by, peripheral states. While this accounts for the ways in which post-colonial states wield and project power, as

resistance, onto the international system, it does not engage with post-colonial states' exercise of domination over their citizenry (Rafanelli 2020, 362), nor the resulting resistance of state power.

The consequence is an ostensibly empowering narrative that plays into the political rhetoric of post-colonial states leveraging their anti-colonial resistance to justify and maintain dictatorial rule. When neo-colonialism and post-colonialism engage with the ways in which local elites contribute to the perpetuation of neo-colonial interests and relations, their explanations are limited to local elite interests. While this may go some way to addressing the "why" question of post-colonial power, it does not address the question of the "how," or the processes through which local elites become entangled in and contribute to this global power system. In addition, such perspectives only account for the ways in which a supposedly monolithic elite network contributes to the perpetuation of neo-colonial powers. By doing so, they neglect questions around the various overlapping, conflicting, and contentious powers manifest at the empirical level, which not only contribute to but also challenge and potentially transform post-colonial power.

In other words, this type of theorising is based on a centralising conceptualisation of power that is prone to missing power relations within the governed post-colonial state. By contrast, governmentality provides a better understanding of power as dispersed and decentred. Unlike post-colonial and Marxist perspectives which emphasise the global centre of power, genealogical governmentality's radical historicism accounts for competing powers above, within, and below the state. This highlights "the diversity and contests that lie behind illusions of unity and necessity" (Bevir 2010, 428).

This thesis leverages governmentality to account for the ways in which SSR is transformed upon its encounter with diverse, state and non-state powers at the empirical site of its application. While maintaining an awareness of the post-colonial context, the perspective of governmentality studies allows this thesis to

undertake an empirical examination of the construction of governmental subjectivities, whereby individuals “may still be agents who can adopt beliefs and perform actions for reasons of their own and in ways that transform the historical context that influences them” (Bevir 2010, 432). By doing so, post-colonial patterns, and governmentalities, cease to be persistent structures, and are instead revealed as evolving “social constructs that arise from individuals acting on diverse and changing meanings (Bevir 2010, 428).

Governmentality studies leverage Foucault’s reconceptualisation of power. Foucault’s fundamental critique of classic theories of power is about their entrenchment in the economy in two ways. First, Foucault rejected the modelling of power on commodity, whereby power has a source and is possessed by Actor A and exercised as repression over Actor B. Second, as mentioned in this chapter, Foucault rejects Marxism’s subjugation of power to economic interests (Foucault 2004, 13). Further, Foucault questions the notion of power as repression, and the notion that power is “a continuation of war by means other than weapons and battles” (Foucault 2004, 18).

Instead, Foucault advanced a conceptualisation of power which, rather than being concerned with the source of power or power interests, is more interested in “studying the ‘how of power’, or in other words trying to understand its mechanisms” (Foucault 2004, 24). Foucault’s conceptualisation of power therefore necessarily amounts to an analytic of power rather than a theory of power. Instead of attempting to pose questions about who has power and what are the intentions of those who have power in SSR’s regime of practices, this governmentality research examines SSR “by looking, as it were, at its external face, at the point where it relates directly and immediately to what we might, very provisionally, call its object, its target, its field of application, or, in other words, the places where it implants itself and produces its real effects” (Foucault 2004, 28).

The implications for this thesis are twofold. First, the understanding of power as dispersed, positive, and manifest through its mechanisms results in empirically rich

research. Governmentality is useful to capture the interwoven power relations at a particular site. Thus, this thesis's application of governmentality offers it the tools necessary to produce an empirically rich examination of SSR application in Tunisia by analysing the capillary nature of its associated power configurations. Within this framework, unlike structural narratives advanced by post-colonial scholarship, Tunisia's post-colonial history is examined in this thesis as being "in a state of constant mutation. It is not a starting point so much as a point of arrival for the analysis of power relations" (Walters 2012, 14).

Second, and consequently, governmentality's focus on the capillary powers in play at the empirical site enables this thesis to highlight subversions of governmental and post-colonial powers within and across the SSR recipient state in ways that are not possible from a Marxist historical determinism or post-colonial standpoint. For Foucault, power implies resistance and therefore resistance to SSR's governmental power is encompassed within this thesis' decentred analytics of power (Legg 2019, 27; Vucetic 2011, 1300). As such, genealogical governmentality allows for an "aesthetic understanding of politics which shows how autonomous movements can disrupt the station-temporal orders defined by governmental rationalities" (Kiersey and Stokes 2011, xix). Through subjectivities, the dispersed understanding of power means that this thesis' empirical study uses governmentality to encompass the agency of and within an SSR recipient state, along with the mutual constitution of governmental power and its subjects. As Rosenow argues, a genealogical empirical investigation "has the advantage of being able to show how different sets of power relations can be seen as interwoven in ways not made evident by their theoretical articulation" (Rosenow 2011, 147). The consequence is an understanding of the mutually constitutive and ever evolving governmental powers shaping our Discourses, practices and subjectivities. As demonstrated through current literature using governmentality in the study of SSR, SSR processes are heavily shaped by memories of colonialism while also dependent on "the myriad ways in which its benefactors internalize and respond to these processes

within the different spheres of socioeconomic, political, and geographic locales in which SSR is applied" (Mustafa 2019, 20).

Conclusion

The SSR concept is the product of a post-Cold War new wave of policy and academic thinking which shifted security's referent object from the state to individuals. The ensuing emancipatory thinking characteristic of the human security discourse driving SSR led to the normative acceptance of SSR's concept and practice and in turn shielded the concept from political and intellectual scrutiny. Therefore, literature attempting to explain the concept's lack of operational success has been limited to blaming recipients due to a perceived incompatibility with liberal governance values, or to critiquing SSR's militarisation in practice. This perpetuates an uncritical acceptance of SSR's conceptual alignment with its stated liberal democratic norms and hinders any attempt at problematising the concept.

This chapter analysed the liberal cosmopolitan underpinnings of predominant SSR literature and revealed three key resulting problems, which combine to promote blinkered explanatory narratives about SSR's concept and impact. First, human security-driven policies, legitimised by CSS's emancipatory thinking, promoted policy and practical prescriptions such as SSR as politically neutral responses to human security problems. As such, a lingering problem-solving approach in CSS led to the depoliticisation of SSR and concealing the hierarchical power configurations driving such liberal governance projects. In turn, this depoliticised narrative stunts any attempt at highlighting the mutually constitutive relationship between universal liberal discourses and practices on the one hand and the issues they problematise on the other.

Second, universalising emancipatory discourses are entrenched in, and perpetuate, the Western-centrism inherent in IR and Security Studies. Despite its emancipatory discourse, liberal cosmopolitanism, and in turn human security and

SSR literature, continue to cling to Western-centric assumptions. The liberal peace project giving traction to SSR is predicated upon the mutual construction of the Western, donor, liberal self and the recipient, derivative, passive, and ethically bankrupt “other.” As a result, problematisations of issues outside the West, such as undemocratic security structures, are traced to “non-Western” factors, therefore concealing the West’s historical role in the establishment and maintenance of these structures. Instead, the West is positioned as the ethical and normative pinnacle and provider of liberal peace assistance, while recipients are stripped of any agency in identifying or addressing their reform needs.

Third, and relatedly, Western-centric security thinking carries implications on how power is shaped, understood, and reproduced on a global scale. Indeed, a historical blind spot in mainstream IR enables the discipline to detach its theories from the colonial history of global power relations. In turn, this obscures the ways in which the West and the rest are mutually constituted, eliding questions about the impact of colonial relations of domination on current hegemonic discourses and practices such as SSR.

With a view to overcoming these problems, this chapter identifies genealogical governmentality as the most suitable alternative, critical, perspective which interrogates and historicises the power/knowledge configurations justifying and upholding SSR, without jettisoning an awareness of the agency of the “weak” or the governed. This chapter argued that a genealogical governmentality framework meets three key criteria enabling this thesis to overcome the liberal cosmopolitan bias and instead scrutinise the normative justifications underpinning the SSR concept and their implications on a state and international level. First, genealogical governmentality’s post-structuralist proclivity provides the appropriate critical perspective from which to denaturalise the concept of SSR, therefore countering the ontological approach marking mainstream academic and policy debates. As such, this thesis joins the nascent wave of scholars applying governmentality to make explicit SSR’s concealed political dimension (Baaz and Stern 2017; Mustafa

2015, 2019). As the next chapter demonstrates, this thesis advances a contribution to this governmentality literature, through applying a holistic, four-level, governmentality framework to SSR in Tunisia.

Second, governmentality's historicism allows it to "reveal the power relations, ideological underpinnings, and deep colonial history of patterns of global governance" (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2010, 10). This chapter argued that, due to its radical historicism, a genealogical governmentality approach is better equipped than Marxist's historical materialism to simultaneously historicise and eventalise unequal power relations in order to account for contingency and historical discontinuities. Instead of adopting Marxism's teleological view which explains current global power relations in linear or causal terms, genealogy highlights the contingent nature of present governmentalities. As such, this thesis' case study illustrates how genealogical governmentality can be leveraged to enrich empirical analysis of post and neo-colonial sites through eventalising post-colonial power configurations rather than viewing them as a structural or fixed object.

Third, a genealogical governmentality framework overcomes the structure/agency dichotomy whereby "decontextualised agency ignores post-colonial and unequal power structures. On the other hand an overemphasis on these structures ignores the ways in which post-colonial "subjects" fail or refuse to "inhabit the subject positions produced" (Baaz and Stern 2017, 211). Instead, this thesis' genealogical governmentality framework accounts for powers and subjectivities that are "at once resisting and resonant of (neo)colonial memories and imaginaries" (Baaz and Stern 2017, 219). As such, governmentality contributes to post-colonial scholarship through highlighting the multiplicity of these subjectivities which are often examined in monolithic terms by post-colonial scholars.

Rather than producing a macro and statist understanding of post-colonial entities, governmentality is capable of complementing its macro-physics of global power with a micro-physics of power within and below the state. This highlights the ways in which post-colonial states can dominate their citizens and how this, and global

powers, are accepted, challenged, and potentially subverted at the site of their application. In other words, governmentality's decentred analysis of state and power is necessary to break down macro structuralist theories' political units of analysis.

The next chapter sets out this thesis' application of governmentality as a theoretical framework for the examination of SSR in Tunisia. This framework is designed to meet the criteria established in this chapter. In turn, as chapter 3 (methodological framework) illustrates, the epistemological foundations of this framework inform this thesis' methodology.

Chapter TWO: Conceptualising Governmentality

Introduction

This thesis adopts Foucauldian governmentality, broadly defined as the conduct of oneself and others' conduct through productive – rather than repressive – power, as a conceptual framework for the examination of the concept of SSR, and for empirical investigation into the effects of SSR practice on security and democratisation in the Tunisian case.

The first section of this chapter outlines this thesis' framing of its governmentality approach. This section discusses this thesis' contribution to governmentality studies through its improvement on Dean's seminal work operationalising governmentality (1999). Indeed, this thesis adopts four levels of analysis to examine SSR through a governmentality framework, respectively outlined in sections two to five of this chapter. The second section examines rationalities of government, understood as the epistemological conditions of possibility for an object under study. This is used in chapter 4 of this thesis to determine the conditions of existence of SSR, this thesis' object of study. Section three examines technologies of government, namely through sovereign, disciplinary, and biopolitics mechanisms underlying power and making it possible. This is applied in chapter 5 through the examination of the mechanisms and techniques through which SSR is exercised and maintained in Tunisia. Section four explores subjectivities as the categorisation of the self and other within a given epistemological and technological field. Chapter 6 undertakes an analysis of the (self)categorisations of Tunisia and SSR donors within the SSR dynamic. The final section examines finalities of government, understood as the plurality of specific aims and consequences of governmentality. Chapter 7 assesses the effects of SSR against its stated security and democratic reform objectives in Tunisia.

This chapter outlines how this thesis' examination of SSR is framed through each of the four analytical levels. However, it is important to note that these analytical

levels are inextricably linked conceptually and that their distinction into four analytical categories serves merely practical purposes.

1. Framing governmentality

In line with its underlying rejection of ontological universals outlined in the previous chapter, governmentality is not to be considered a grand theory in the strong sense of the word due to its unwillingness to offer causal explanations of societal change or to predict the future (Walters 2012, 2). Instead, it can be viewed as an "analytical toolbox" (Rose, O'Malley, and Valverde 2006, 18), a set of tools (Walters 2012: i), or a set of concepts (Miller and Rose 2008: 8-9). As such, this thesis deploys governmentality as "a cluster of concepts that can be used to enhance the think-ability and criticize-ability" of the SSR concept and its application (Walters 2012, 2). Governmentality allows this thesis to understand SSR "not as a set of institutions, nor in terms of certain ideologies, but as an eminently practical activity that can be studied, historicised and specified at the level of the rationalities, programmes, techniques and subjectivities which underpin it and give it form and effect" (Walters 2012, 2). Thus, the application of a governmentality framework enables this thesis to critically engage with SSR by not only examining its practice but by deconstructing its conceptualisation.

This thesis' governmentality approach is based on a critical application of Mitchell Dean's (1999) seminal work establishing an analytical framework for the operationalisation of governmentality. This thesis advances an enhanced adaptation of Dean's framework through a proposed improvement on its first level, which he called the ontological level. Entrenched in an understanding of governmentality as decentred arts of government, Dean's analytical framework encompasses "the forms of knowledge, techniques and other means employed, the entity to be governed and how it is conceived, the ends sought and the outcomes and consequences" (Dean 1999, 18). Therefore, he established a four level analysis: First, his ontological level is concerned with "what we seek to act upon, the governed or the ethical substance" (Dean 1999, 26). Second, his ascetic

level encompasses how we govern, captured in this thesis through technologies of government. Third, his deontological level revolves around who we become when governed, captured in this thesis through subjectivities. Fourth, his teleological level includes why we govern or are governed, captured in this thesis through finalities of government.

This thesis' key critique of Dean's analysis is its prioritisation of an understanding of "how thought operates within our organized ways of doing things, our *regimes of practices*, and with its ambitions and effects" (Dean 1999, 27, emphasis in original). Dean's focus on "thought as it is embedded within programmes for the direction and reform of conduct" (Dean 1999, 27) aligns with governmentality's focus on technologies of government. However, it falls short of effectively capturing another key governmentality aspect which examines the ways in which thought and its subsequent programmes have been rationalised into existence. This thesis' examination of SSR as a governmentality practice begins with an analysis of the ways in which SSR found its epistemological conditions of existence. Therefore, this thesis improves on Dean's analytical framework by including rationalities as the initial, and prerequisite, analytical step of locating the origins and conditions of existence of thought leading to its embeddedness in practical regimes.

2. Rationalities of government

As previously noted, governmentality's epistemological perspective rests on the rejection of universals. This is in direct opposition to the Platonic philosophy claiming that reality is embedded in a world of forms, where non-physical essences of all things exist. While this Platonic philosophy is adopted to a degree by phenomenological perspectives in social sciences, Foucault's thought reverses this paradigm; instead of starting with the assumption that an object of study exists, "which does not mean it is a thing," his starting position is that an ontological object does not exist "but this does not mean it is nothing" (Foucault 2007, 118).

As the universal ontological object is not at the centre of governmentality research, what is pursued instead is the historical and political account of how an object, or knowledge, came into existence. In other words, governmentality assumes that objects and knowledges come into existence only as a result of an "epistemological field" which provides the conditions of possibility for their existence (Foucault 2002b). Therefore, governmentality research engages in revealing "how something which did not exist could come about, how a set of practices were able to come together to produce a regime of truth with regard to these objects" (Walters 2012, 17).

An epistemological field sets out the conditions of existence of knowledges and objects through establishing a Discourse, or what is "true" or "false," within the same field. Therefore, a rationalities analysis goes beyond a simple historical account and enables the discovery of the set of discursive rules which define what is thinkable and "the limits and forms of the sayable. What is possible to speak of?" (Foucault 1991b, 59). For instance, through his work on matters of madness, sexuality, crime, and government, Foucault revealed the Discourses which establish what is true and what is false in these matters (Walters 2012, 17).

As further elaborated in chapter 3 (methodological framework), this thesis adopts the epistemological stance that SSR is not a universal ontological object. Therefore, instead of taking the SSR concept for granted, this thesis traces the emergence of the SSR Discourse, and in turn, SSR rationalities. To do so, chapter 4 (SSR rationalities) employs Critical Discourse Analysis to examine the discursive shifts which brought about the SSR Discourse. This serves to trace and historicise the mutually constitutive relationship between SSR and shifting conceptualisations of security. The use of Foucauldian governmentality therefore enables this thesis to examine the question of how SSR became possible while providing an alternative perspective challenging assumptions about SSR's ontological and normative underpinnings. Instead, this thesis traces the emergence of the concept to its associated discursive productions.

2.1. Discourse and discursive formation

Foucault's investigation of the epistemological fields giving rise to objects, such as sexuality, prisons, medicine, madness, and European asylum, was accomplished though revealing how Discourses shaped and restricted reality and knowledge (Vucetic 2011, 1300). Discourses shape epistemological fields by constituting "subjects – subjectivities, subject positions, identities – in two continuous ways: they enable/constrain what is 'thinkable' in a given discursive context and they reward/punish ideas, institutions, and practices that are congruent/deviant with the pre-set political boundaries of inclusion/exclusion" (Vucetic 2011, 1300). In other words, the discursive formation of Discourses, such as those of madness or sexuality, is accomplished through and reinforces the categorisation of subjects as mad or sexually deviant, with the associated exercise of institutionalising these categorisations through discursive and non-discursive practices. This thesis' examination of SSR rationalities, undertaken in chapter 4 (SSR rationalities), ultimately reveals the mutual constitution of SSR's Discourse and actor subjectivities, as explored in chapter 6 (SSR subjectivities).

Therefore, the discursive examination of epistemological fields does not simply involve the gathering and interrogation of historical or contemporary texts. Rather, Discourse is understood and examined through the culmination of the discursive and non-discursive conditions which made its existence possible. For instance, in order to examine the epistemological field of madness, one must examine the conditions of existence for what is thinkable and knowable about madness in a given moment. Examining discourses around madness involves examining "that which rendered them possible – them and none other in their place: the conditions of their singular emergence; their correlation with other previous or simultaneous events, discursive or otherwise" (Foucault 1991b, 59). In other words, the point is not to question or infer the hidden or silently intended meanings of Discourses. Instead, the conditions of Discourses' manifest appearance are examined. The purpose therefore is "to investigate not the laws of

construction of discourse, as is done by those who use structural methods, but its conditions of existence" (Foucault 1991b, 60).

As previously mentioned, chapter 4 (SSR Rationalities) traces the conditions which enabled the emergence of the SSR Discourse. This is important as the discursive formation of SSR specifically, and no other concept and institutional practice than SSR, engendered specific knowledges, practices, power-effects, and subjectivities. As Foucault noted, "after all, we are judged, condemned, forced to perform tasks, and destined to live and die in certain ways by discourses that are true, and which bring with them specific power-effects" (Foucault 2004, 25). It is worth noting here that what is "true" and "false" is simply constituted as part of the Discourse, at the expense of other, competing or subjugated, discourses and their associated "truths." As further elaborated in this chapter, the notion of "subjugated knowledges" examines discursive formations in their various relationships and struggles for discursive hegemony, and the consequent subjugation of other knowledges and discourses. The notion of subjugated knowledges is employed in this thesis to highlight the discourses (chapter 4), technologies (chapter 5), subjectivities (chapter 6), and desired SSR outcomes (chapter 7), which have been subjugated and marginalised by SSR actors in Tunisia.

A key methodological task in the investigation of an object's Discourse is documenting and locating the manifest shifts in conditions of what is thinkable and sayable within a certain Discourse. This is because such discursive investigations rest on the epistemological assumption that, rather than unconditionally existing in a world of forms, an object goes from non-existence to existence as a result of finding its *a priori* conditions of existence. This holds true for SSR, which first came into existence in 1999. As chapter 4 (SSR rationalities) demonstrates, due to the SSR Discourse being strictly associated with democratising security structures, the conditions of its existence would not have been possible during the Cold War, when non-democratic security structures were actively supported by now SSR donors as part of Western containment policies. As Foucault emphasised,

"discourse is constituted by the difference between what one could say correctly at one period (under the rules of grammar and logic) and what is actually said. The discursive field is, at a specific moment, the law of this difference" (Foucault 1991b, 63). Indeed, as illustrated in chapter 1 (literature review), the end of the cold war enabled a moment of discursive discontinuity, shifting from strictly state security-centric policy debates to a human security framework. Therefore, SSR's Discourse is examined in chapter 4 as the difference between what was sayable and thinkable as "true" at one point in security and development discourses and what was eventually said to engender SSR's rationalities.

Chapter 4 examines the discursive formations that brought about SSR's Discourse through three sets of criteria laid out by Foucault: the criteria of formation, criteria of transformation or of threshold, and criteria of correlation. These criteria "make it possible to describe, as the episteme of a period, not the sum of its knowledge, nor the general style of its research, but the divergence, the distances, the oppositions, the differences, the relations of its various scientific discourses" (Foucault 1991b, 55). Each of the criteria is outlined below, along with how they are deployed in this thesis.

2.1.1. Criteria of formation:

Uncovering a Discourse's criteria of formation involves "*detecting the changes which affect its objects, operations, concepts, theoretical options"* (Foucault 1991b, 56, emphasis in original). Chapter 4 examines key political and discursive changes which facilitated shifts in security discourses and resulted in the emergence of SSR. These changes involve the post-Cold War "problematisation" of undemocratic security structures.

As this thesis adopts a governmentality framework to examine SSR, problematisation is deployed as a key conceptual tool to examine the criteria of SSR's discursive formation. This is based on the understanding that the conduct of conduct requires the establishing of discourses about problems that need to be

conducted. As noted above, undemocratic security structures were not perceived as a problem during the Cold War, but became the subject of SSR intervention in the late 1990s. Problematisation from a governmentality perspective is tightly linked to governing identified problems. In this sense, the purpose of problematisation is to render an issue susceptible to intervention. As Miller and Rose argue, “the solidity and separateness of ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ are thus attenuated. Or, to put it differently, the activity of problematising is intrinsically linked to devising ways to seek to remedy it” (Miller and Rose 2008, 15). Therefore, in order to understand the impetus for the emergence of SSR as a governmentality “solution,” it is imperative to start with its discursive problematisations.

The mutually constitutive relationship between defining a problem and the structures that enable intervention on this problem was best captured analytically by Miller and Rose who established the distinction between “rationalities or programs” of government and “technologies” of government (Miller and Rose 2008, 15). These “indicate the intrinsic links between a way of representing and knowing a phenomenon, on the one hand” (in other words problematising) “and a way of acting upon it so as to transform it, on the other” (Miller and Rose 2008). Rationalities and technologies of government, which distinguish the indissociable processes of thought and intervention (2008, 16) are thus applied together in this thesis to analyse SSR as a governmentality practice.

2.1.2. Criteria of transformation:

Having shaped its objects, subjects, and practices through problematisation, a Discourse is constituted, albeit in an ever-evolving fashion. This is due to “changes which affect the discursive formations themselves” (Foucault 1991b, 56) and which lead it to transform. These transformations can be understood as the processes through which hegemonic Discourses continuously adapt by nuancing, rejecting, or co-opting competing discourses and subjugated knowledges and practices. Discourses therefore adapt through a process of “displacement of boundaries which define the field of possible objects” (Foucault 1991b, 56).

Through Critical Discourse Analysis and analysis of interview data, chapter 4 (SSR rationalities) explores the written and spoken discursive practices transforming the SSR Discourse. Indeed, the international SSR Discourse transformed due to its embeddedness in a network of influential texts expanding its initial scope. Further, analysis of interview data reveals the mutual transformation of SSR's hegemonic Discourse and its subjugated knowledges in the site of its application.

2.1.3. Criteria of correlation:

A discursive formation is considered autonomous if we can define the set of discursive and institutional relationships that delineate and situate it in relation to other discourses (Foucault 1991b, 54). Therefore, it is possible, and expected, to identify changes "which simultaneously affect several discursive formations" (Foucault 1991b, 57). This set of criteria operates at a higher discursive level than the previous two and relates more directly to the epistemological field enabling the conditions of possibility of a set of correlated Discourses (Foucault 1991b, 57).

Through the inquiry into the criteria of discursive correlation, chapter 4 uncovers three key Discourses operating within SSR's epistemological field and affecting its subjectivities, technologies, and finalities in Tunisia. These include Tunisia's institutional context, political landscape, and counter-terrorism Discourse within the country's overall democratisation context.

2.2. Discourses and subjugated knowledges

As argued in chapter 1 (literature review), this thesis leverages genealogical governmentality to historicise and contextualise unequal power relations in order to account for contingency, resistance and agency. Foucault described genealogies as anti-sciences, due to genealogy's antagonistic stance towards totalising scientific discourses (Foucault 2004, 9). This is not to say that genealogy demands ignorance or rejects knowledge. Rather, genealogy's anti-science lies in its "insurrection against the centralizing power-effects that are bound up with the institutionalization and workings of any scientific discourse organized in a society

such as ours" (Foucault 2004, 9). It follows that any truth claim, if not embedded in objective knowledge, is inherently a political or ethical judgment (Vucetic 2011, 1299).

Reflexively, this extends to genealogical claims and discourses, including those made in this thesis. From this perspective, the task of a genealogist is a political and ethical one of desubjugating "historical knowledges, to set them free, or in other words to enable them to oppose and struggle against the coercion of a unitary, formal, and scientific theoretical discourse" (Foucault 2004, 10).

Foucault defines subjugated knowledges as "a whole series of knowledges that have been disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naïve knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity" (Foucault 2004, 7). From this standpoint, genealogy aims at the "removal of the tyranny of overall discourses, with their hierarchies and all the privileges enjoyed by theoretical vanguards" (Foucault 2004, 8) through the rediscovery of subjugated knowledges. Genealogy therefore undertakes the political task of reckoning erudite hegemonic Discourses with local memories, "which allows us to constitute a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of that knowledge in contemporary tactics" (Foucault 2004, 8). This is possible through a series of critical questions, such as "what types of knowledge are you trying to disqualify when you say that you are a science?" and "what theoretico-political vanguard are you trying to put on the throne in order to detach it from all the massive, circulating, and discontinuous forms that knowledge can take?" (Foucault 2004, 10). Chapter 4 examines the knowledges about security and security reform that SSR came to disqualify in the process of establishing its hegemonic Discourse in Tunisia.

As noted above, each context is characterised by various discourses, some more dominant while others are challenging or subjugated (Vucetic 2011, 1300). Within this framework, genealogical effectiveness hinges on accomplishing two aims.

First, genealogy seeks to free knowledge from the stranglehold that hegemonic Discourses have on our present day discursive and non-discursive practices. Second, and consequently, it aims to directly or indirectly bring forth alternative ways of constituting the object under study (Vucetic 2011, 1301). Through genealogy, this thesis' examination of the SSR Discourse is coupled with the unearthing of its subjugated knowledges. Revealing SSR's hegemonic Discourse in chapter 4 enables this thesis to denaturalise the concept. This therefore contributes to SSR scholarship by freeing up the readers' political imaginations to envision more successful governmentality practices. In addition, in chapters 5, 6, and 7, this thesis pursues the local subjugated knowledges overshadowed or absorbed by the SSR Discourse and examines the impact of the dichotomy between the hegemonic and subjugated discourses on the subjectivities, technologies, and finalities of government, specifically on security and democratisation in Tunisia. Achieving these two objectives is important for the effectiveness of this thesis' genealogical undertaking.

3. Technologies of government

The thesis' examination of the sub-question "how did SSR at the international level become possible and taken for granted?" is accomplished through examining SSR on the levels of both its rationalities and technologies. While the analytical level of rationalities enables governmentality research to understand how an object came to exist, technologies enable an understanding of the mechanisms and structures through which an object is exercised and maintained in practice.

The focus on not only rationalities but technologies of government makes governmentality studies more empirical than most post-structuralist approaches, as dissecting techniques and mechanisms of government engages governmentality research in "examining power in its envisioned practical and technical expressions" (Foucault 2004, 31). Indeed, based on the definition of governmentality as the conduct of conduct through productive power, power is central to governmentality studies in two keys ways. First, hegemonic Discourses

such as SSR's are constituted through power/knowledge configurations. Second, power is understood on the level of its mechanisms which are deployed for the conduct of conduct. In other words, power is central to governmentality's understanding of how discourses are both assembled and exercised.

As illustrated in chapter 1 (literature review), instead of attempting to pose questions about who has power and what are the intentions of those who have power, governmentality studies power "by looking, as it were, at its external face, at the point where it relates directly and immediately to what we might, very provisionally, call its object, its target, its field of application, or, in other words, the places where it implants itself and produces its real effects" (Foucault 2004, 28). Therefore, instead of raising the elusive problem of power's centre, governmentality, and this thesis, engages in studying power at its periphery, through examining its mechanisms, relations, and effects. While chapter 4 examines how SSR's Discourse has been assembled, chapter 5 examines the mechanisms through which SSR is exercised in the Tunisian case study.

However, it is important to note that governmentality's examination of mechanisms of power is not limited to institutions. Rather, it is more concerned with analysing a "regime of practices," understood as "places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interact" (Foucault 1991c, 75). Governmentality research is therefore not institution-centric but instead "entails going behind the institution and trying to discover in a wider and more overall perspective what we can broadly call a technology of power" (Foucault 2007, 117).

This distinguishes global governmentality from global governance research. Global governance is limited to the study of the norms, formal institutions and processes beyond the state which aim to manage transboundary and global issues. Conversely, global governmentality refers to "past and present deployments of rationalities and technologies of government that make conventional boundaries and borderlines operate within broader nexus of a general economy of power"

within and outside formal institutions (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2010, 9–10). Global governmentality is therefore better equipped to capture the broader and more subtle power/knowledge configurations that produce and maintain governance and the subjectivities upon which governance hinges. To that end, governmentality's "first methodological principle is to move outside the institution and replace it with the overall point of view of the technology of power" (Foucault 2007, 117). The following section outlines the technologies of power developed by Foucault and deployed in chapter 5 to examine the interplay of power mechanisms ensuring SSR's practice.

3.1. Technologies and mechanisms of power

As argued in chapter 1 (literature review), governmentality challenges traditional conceptualisations of power not only as centred within a transcendent sovereign but also of power as repression. Foucault questions the contemporary utility of the notion of power as repression as perpetuated by mainstream political thought, and the notion that power is "a continuation of war by means other than weapons and battles" (Foucault 2004, 18).

This thesis explores SSR's practical assemblages in chapter 5 through its underpinning in three technologies of power and their associated mechanisms: sovereign power exercised over a territory, disciplinary power exercised over individual bodies, and biopolitics exercised over a population (Foucault 2007, 11). This thesis argues that there exists in literature an implicit and uncritical acceptance of the notion that SSR is conceptually underpinned by a human security, or biopolitical impetus placing the populations under undemocratic security structures as its referent object. Chapter 5 instead highlights the inextricable sovereign, disciplinary power, and biopolitics links characteristic of the SSR concept that critical SSR literature overlooks.

Through a genealogical analysis of power, Foucault advances these three technologies which are to be perceived as reinforcing and capitalising on each other rather than replacing each other. Foucault's use of the example of theft to

illustrate the differences between the three technologies of power and their mechanisms is utilised in each of the below sub-sections.

3.1.1. Sovereign power:

Sovereign power, or what Foucault refers to as the "juridico-political theory of sovereignty" (Foucault 2004, 34), dates back to the Middle Ages and "is constituted around the problem of the monarch and the monarchy" (Foucault 2004, 34). Sovereignty is a central problem in juridical theory whose essential function is "to dissolve the element of domination in power and to replace that domination, which has to be reduced or masked, with two things: the legitimate rights of the sovereign on the one hand, and the legal obligation to obey on the other" (Foucault 2004, 26). Law and sovereignty are therefore intrinsically linked, whereby law represents the mechanism through which sovereign power is enshrined and legitimised. For instance, 16th century juridical mechanisms relating to the problem of theft included a penal law making theft illegal, along with its punishment (Foucault 2007, 4).

Sovereign power is exercised in terms of a distinct sovereign/subject relationship (Foucault 2004, 35). From this perspective, society, and power, are conceptually organised along a centre that monopolises power and exercises it over a principality with the aim of maintaining territory. This power is inscribed in law and exercised as repression or punishment against those who do not obey it. Indeed, the right to take life, or the "right of life and death was one of sovereignty's basic attributes" (Foucault 2004, 240). Chapter 5 explores the sovereign power underpinning SSR through its SSR actors' advancement of donor state security interests.

The theory of sovereign power makes it possible to establish absolute power around a sovereign. However, while this theory "can found absolute power on the absolute expenditure of power," it is prone to missing power-relations below and above the sovereign. Sovereign power thus became unable to "govern the

economic and political body of a society that was undergoing both a demographic explosion and industrialization" (Foucault 2004, 249). As a result, too many questions and issues escape sovereign power's mechanisms "both at the top and at the bottom, both at the level of detail and at the mass level" (Foucault 2004, 249). Therefore, new mechanisms became necessary in the 17th and 18th centuries to enable rationalising and economising on power (Foucault 2004, 36).

Sovereign power alone is hence inadequate at analysing SSR both on the levels of its international regime of practices and its inter and cross-state ramifications and transformations. Chapter 5 examines SSR beyond its sovereign power by investigating its underpinning in disciplinary and biopolitical mechanisms, each outlined below. However, chapter 5 also highlights the inextricable links between sovereign power and biopolitics in SSR. This contributes to SSR literature by challenging its uncritical acceptance of the notion that SSR is conceptually underpinned by a biopolitical impetus placing the populations under undemocratic security structures as its referent object.

3.1.2. Disciplinary power:

Disciplinary power is useful in highlighting the historical and eventalised evolution of power's conceptual scope, as it has been presented in Foucauldian thought as "one of bourgeois society's great inventions" (Foucault 2004, 36). Disciplinary power captures the tools enabling the establishment of industrial capitalism and its consequent type of society beyond sovereign/subject relations (Foucault 2004, 36).

This new technology of power extracts time and labour, rather than commodities and wealth as does sovereign power, through applying primarily to "bodies and what they do rather than the land and what it produces" (Foucault 2004, 36).

This type of power requires the use of mechanisms beyond the juridical body of the sovereign, including through mechanisms enabling constant surveillance. For instance, disciplinary mechanisms include the spatial distribution of individual

bodies as well as attempts to increase productive force "through exercise, drill, and so on" (Foucault 2004, 242).

Therefore, the physical existence of a sovereign is of less importance within this technology than the disciplinary mechanisms which are its cause and effect. Disciplinary power therefore "defined a new economy of power based upon the principle that there had to be an increase both in the subjugated forces and in the force and efficacy of that which subjugated them" (Foucault 2004, 36). In other words, disciplinary power breaks from sovereignty relations of absolute power over land and aims to economise on absolute power while increasing power's reach and effect.

Foucault was interpreted as juxtaposing disciplinary power as the "exact, point-for-point opposite of the mechanisms of power that the theory of sovereignty described or tried to transcribe" (Foucault 2004, 36). However, this overlooks the intrinsic linkages between various technologies of power constituting governmentality. Disciplinary power does not replace sovereign power but builds on it. Using the same example of theft, a disciplinary mechanism will continue to uphold a penal law, in addition to "a series of supervisions, checks, inspections, and varied controls that, even before the thief has stolen, make it possible to identify whether or not he is going to steal" (Foucault 2007, 4). In addition, "punishment will not just be the spectacular, definitive moment of the hanging, fine, or banishment, but a practice like incarceration with a series of exercises and a work of transformation on the guilty person in the form of what we call penitentiary techniques" (Foucault 2007, 4).

Notably, the abovementioned close links between juridical theory and sovereign power continue to give credence to newer technologies of power, through making it possible to "superimpose on the mechanism of discipline a legal system which concealed its mechanisms and erased the element of domination and techniques of subjugation involved in discipline" (Foucault 1997, 33, own translation). In other words, disciplinary power is not to be perceived as negating the need for a

knowledge system to configure and exercise power. Instead, disciplinary power makes use of juridical codes, even expanding them from their original binary crime and associated punishment, in the same way that the legal code concerning theft expanded to include issues related to "not only theft, but theft by children, the penal status of children, mental responsibility" (Foucault 2007, 7). Disciplinary power therefore provides "an analytics for thinking beyond juridical frameworks associated with sovereign power, without jettisoning an appreciation of the role of law" (Legg 2012, 649). Chapter 5 explores the disciplinary mechanisms leveraged by SSR to support its practice, including through its train and equip focus.

3.1.3. Biopolitics:

Foucault traces the emergence of biopolitics as a new technology of power to the second half of the eighteenth century. This technology of power does not exclude disciplinary power "but it does dovetail into it, integrate it, modify it to some extent, and above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it, embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques" (Foucault 2004, 242). Discipline tries to rule over a multiplicity of men through dissolving this multiplicity into individual bodies that have to be rendered useful and docile through training, surveillance, or punishment (Foucault 2004, 242). By contrast, biopolitics address the multiplicity of people "to the extent that they form, on the contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on" (Foucault 2004, 242–43). In other words, while sovereign power and disciplinary power deal with territory and individual bodies respectively, biopolitics coincide with the invention of "the population".

Biopolitics is therefore centred around the problem of life and involves "a set of processes such as the ratios of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction, the fertility of a population, and so on" rendering biopolitics' targets and objects of knowledge the birth rate, the mortality rate, and longevity (Foucault 2004, 243).

Biopolitics introduces mechanisms that are different to disciplinary mechanisms and include “forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures” (Foucault 2004, 246). This aims to control the random events and internal dangers that can affect a population, through trying to predict and modify these events. These events include epidemics and diseases, as well as “accidents, infirmities, and various anomalies” (Foucault 2004, 244). As biopolitics’ aim is to control and mitigate for the dangers facing a population, biopolitics’ mechanisms constitute an apparatus (*dispositif*) of security (Foucault 2007, 4).

It is important to note that security is impossible to achieve completely and that rather, predicting, controlling, and mitigating dangers is biopolitics’ aim. Therefore, biopolitics is a technology which seeks to establish a sort of homeostasis “by achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers” (Foucault 2004, 249). Using the same theft example, biopolitics does not seek to eliminate the danger of theft, but to predict and mitigate its overall impact within an economy of power. As such, the same sovereign and disciplinary mechanisms apply, such as the penal law, punishments, and the same framework of surveillance and correction. Additionally, biopolitics includes new sets of questions, including “what is the average rate of this type of criminality”, “how much does criminality cost society, what damage does it cause, or loss of earnings, and so on?” (Foucault 2007, 5). Furthermore, “what, therefore, the comparative cost of the theft and its repression, and what is more worthwhile: to tolerate a bit more theft or to tolerate a bit more repression?” (Foucault 2007, 5).

This means that instead of relying on sovereign power’s binary division between what is permitted and what is prohibited and the associated punishment, biopolitics “establishes an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and on the other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded” (Foucault 2007, 6). For instance, infant mortality rates are measured and monitored, with the aim of establishing a threshold below which intervention is not rational or

economical. Intervention is only undertaken if the impact of the problem outweighs the intervention cost from an economy of power perspective. In other words, unlike sovereign power, a biopolitical economy of power seeks to minimise the expenditure of power while maximising its impact.

Chapter 5 (SSR technologies) explores SSR's practice through its entrenchment in three interlinked technologies of power. Governmentality's examination of various technologies of power does not preclude the succession of law, discipline, then security. On the contrary, biopolitics allows "the old armatures of law and discipline to function in addition to the specific mechanisms of security" (Foucault 2007, 10). Therefore, just as sovereign power is established and maintained through its association with juridical law, all three mechanisms of power rely on knowledge regimes for their legitimisation. The following sub-section explores the intrinsic links between power and knowledge which are fundamental to governmentality research.

As Chapter 5 demonstrates, SSR's practice is entrenched in juridical rationalisations while capitalising on and propagating disciplinary mechanisms such as surveillance and training, in addition to biopolitical mechanisms such as statistics and reports.

3.2. Power/knowledge

For analytical clarity, this thesis examines rationalities, technologies, and subjectivities of SSR in separate chapters. However, an effective and accurate conceptualisation of governmentality underscores the mutually constitutive nature of these analytical categories through their configuration in power/knowledge combinations which are both government's cause and effect. Similarly, this thesis' examination of the ways in which the SSR Discourse has been assembled (rationalities), is exercised (technologies), and how its actors are shaped and categorised (subjectivities), in chapters 4, 5, and 6 respectively, rests on the key governmentality assumption of knowledge and power as mutually constitutive.

A power/knowledge inspired analysis represents an important distinction from traditional and Marxist analyses that rest on a linear relationship portraying ideology or philosophy (knowledge) at the base of power. A governmentality analysis does not negate the entrenchment of power mechanisms in a discourse of truth rationalising it. However, and simultaneously, power is also examined to establish the "truth-effects that power produces, that this power conducts and which, in their turn, reproduce that power" (Foucault 2004, 24). In other words, there is no exercise of power, and by association no study of power, without a study of the "truth discourses functioning within, on the basis of, and through this power" (Foucault 1997, 22, own translation).

An effective illustration of this relationship can be made through what was discussed in a previous section about the relationship between law and power through the lenses of sovereign power (juridical theory) and disciplinary power. As mentioned above, sovereign power is more conducive to viewing an intrinsic, albeit simplified, relationship between law (knowledge) and punishment (power), whereby the sovereign's right to kill is enshrined in and legitimised by a legal framework. However, a focus on power at the level of its mechanisms and techniques in disciplinary and biopower is better equipped at highlighting the circular and mutually constitutive relationship between knowledge and power. This is because disciplinary mechanisms of power necessarily operate through "creating apparatuses to shape knowledge and expertise, and they do support a discourse" (Foucault 2004, 38). Instead of resting on a code of law, disciplinary and biopower define a code of normalisation, or norms, through referring to "a theoretic horizon that is not the edifice of law, but the field of the human sciences" (Foucault 2004, 38). These norms, or knowledge, which serve to legitimise power, are in turn power's effects while serving to reproduce it. This is captured by Foucault through the triangle of power, law, and truth which he advanced to illustrate this mutually constitutive dynamic (Foucault 1997, 21–22).

Therefore, a power/knowledge inspired analysis of SSR allows this thesis to orientate its research away from conventional analyses of state apparatuses and ideologies and towards "material operations, forms of subjugation, and the connections among and the uses made of the local systems of subjugation on the one hand, and apparatuses of knowledge on the other" (Foucault 2004, 34). Therefore, SSR's rationalities, technologies, and subjectivities both shape and are shaped by each other to produce SSR's finalities.

4. Subjectivities of government

Governmentality highlights the inextricable and mutually constitutive relationship between rationalities, technologies, and subjectivities of government. For instance, the discursive (rationalities) and non-discursive (technologies) formation of regimes of practices, such as those around madness or sexuality, is accomplished through and reinforces the categorisation of subjects (subjectivities) as mad or sexually deviant.

This is consistent with governmentality's expansion on the theory of sovereign power and with Foucault's interpretation and critique of Machiavelli's centralising notions of the Prince's power as well as the subject, and aim, of power. According to Foucault's critique of Machiavellian conceptualisation of sovereign power, this conceptualisation presupposes the presence of the subject which is awaiting its subjectification to the Prince's power. In this sense, both the subject and power are perceived as already existent outside their relationship (Foucault 1997, 39). However, as governmentality rejects the notion that power is a substance which exists independently and which can be conceived and analysed outside its effects, the subject of power is instead viewed as the effect, rather than the pre-existent target, of power. In other words, governmentality rejects the assumption of the existence of objects and subjects of knowledge that are independent of power configurations. Therefore, governmentality's task is "not to ask the subjects how, why, and under what right they can accept being subjectified, but to show how it

is the effective relationships of subjectification that produce subjects" (Foucault 1997, 38–39, own translation).

As an SSR recipient, the Tunisian government is accepting security reform assistance. This implies that, whether through conviction or duress, the Tunisian government accepts its subjectification as a country in need of reform and accepts the objectives of SSR as the ideal for security reform, and in turn accepts the credentials of SSR donors as an authority on security reform. A governmentality analysis allows this thesis to examine the process through which the multiplicity of Tunisian actors inhabit and subvert their subordinate position within the SSR dynamic through examining the power/knowledge configurations at play in the SSR field.

Such an analysis necessarily relates to a relationship of domination, whereby the mechanisms of power at play ensure the subjectification (*assujettissement*) of subjects to others within a discursive and practical field. For instance, the education system operates, and its rationalities are reinforced, through the series of subjectification strategies employed, such as the subjectification of "the child to the adult, the offspring to the parents, the unschooled to the scholar, the apprentice to the master, the family to the administration, etc." (Foucault 1997, 39, own translation).

Therefore, while governmentality rejects the notion of a centralising repressive power, subjectivities are examined as the product of relationships of domination that represent the culmination of decentred "apparatuses of domination" (Foucault 1997, 39). By employing subjectivities, this thesis highlights the relationships of domination which ensure Tunisia's subordinate position within the SSR field. However, as discussed in chapter 1, this thesis' governmentality approach transcends the postcolonial view of subjects as weak and powerless recipients. Instead, this thesis, in its chapter 6, examines the ways in which various actors within Tunisia exercise power over the SSR field and its donors. Therefore, this thesis' investigation of SSR subjectivities gives it the advantage of capturing

the interwoven set of power-relations that shape and transform SSR practice at a particular site in ways not possible through a post-colonial lens. Through the subjectivities analysis undertaken in chapter 6, this governmentality research offers an understanding of politics which is capable of demonstrating "how autonomous movements can disrupt the station-temporal orders defined by governmental rationalities" (Kiersey and Stokes 2011, xix). This serves as an invitation to "open the intellectual and political space for resistance to the dominant regimes of truth and the emancipation of marginalised forms of knowledge" (Vucetic 2011, 1298).

5. Finalities of government

Finalities of government are examined in this thesis as governmentality's analytical category which captures both "the ends sought and the outcomes and consequences" of SSR's regime of practices (Dean 1999, 18). Finalities of government therefore represent another distinguishing feature between governmentality and sovereign theory. From a sovereign theory perspective, the end of sovereign power is that all subjects under the Prince's rule obey the laws set by the ruler. In other words, the end of sovereignty is "in sum nothing more than submission to sovereignty" (Foucault 1991a, 95). Since the end of sovereignty is the same as the exercise of sovereignty, this renders the ends of sovereignty circular (Foucault 1991a, 95).

By contrast, with the expansion of the notion of government from the exercise of the sovereign's absolute power to a plurality of activities and technologies at various societal and political levels, the objectives of government in turn expand to include "a series of specific finalities" (Foucault 1991a, 95). Foucault's understanding of government finalities alludes to an end of government that is "convenient for each of the things that are to be governed" (Foucault 1991a, 95). As illustrated in this chapter so far, governmentality's shift in focus from the sovereign to the individual and then to the population is matched by a shift in the ends of government from being internal and intrinsic to the sovereign to residing

in the things that are to be governed (Foucault 1991a, 95, 100). In other words, the finalities of government, otherwise described by Dean as the “telos of government” are less linked to the survival of sovereign rule than to the “type of person, community, organization, society or even world which is to be achieved” (Dean 1999, 44).

This thesis examines the effects of SSR on security and democratic reform in Tunisia. From a simplistic understanding of governmentality, this can be pursued through the examination of finalities attached to SSR governmentality. However, this risks contributing to a top-down understanding of the conduct of conduct and does not account for the processes through which the rationalities and technologies of government are subverted and transformed at the empirical site of their application. More importantly, such a simplistic application of finalities to both encompass the stated and actual ends of government risks leading to a conflation of governmentality’s Discourse and practice, through viewing its consequences in accordance with the values and norms constructed as part of its rationalities. For instance, SSR’s stated finalities relate to democratising security forces and improving their effectiveness, both established as key objectives within the SSR Discourse. While this thesis acknowledges these objectives as SSR’s stated finalities, this acknowledgement does not extend to the assumption that SSR’s practice is geared towards achieving these stated finalities. In other words, finalities are understood in this thesis as twofold. First, the stated finalities of government are perceived as the set of values advanced by governmental Discourses. Second, the consequences or effects of this governmentality are examined at the empirical site as the actual finalities of the regime of practices. While the stated and actual finalities may coincide, it is dangerous to depart from the assumption that they would, as this is conducive to an examination of government practices “in terms of the values that are claimed or presumed to underlie them” (Dean 1999, 45). In addition, such an analysis risks neglecting the

role played by subjugated knowledges and competing subjectivities at the local site in subverting, resisting, and potentially transforming governmental finalities.

Effectively, this thesis acknowledges SSR's stated finalities of democratising and improving the effectiveness of security forces. However, this finalities analysis frees the thesis from the uncritical reading of SSR practices as necessarily geared towards reaching these finalities. Instead, SSR practice is evaluated in chapter 7 against its consequences, or actual finalities, on the democratic reform and effectiveness of the Tunisian security sector.

Conclusion

This thesis applies a Foucauldian genealogical governmentality analysis to examine how the concept and practice of SSR contribute to state-level security and democratic transition. Governmentality is broadly understood in this thesis as the conduct of oneself and others' conduct through productive, rather than repressive, power. Four levels of governmentality analysis have been outlined in this chapter, through an improvement on Dean's seminal governmentality framework (1999). First, rationalities of government are explored as the epistemological conditions of possibility for an object under study. This analytical level draws on the post-structural rejection of ontological universals and instead examines the historical and discursive conditions leading to the emergence of objects. Therefore, instead of taking SSR conceptualisations for granted, this thesis contributes to and challenges SSR literature through uncovering SSR's Discourse. This chapter outlined three sets of discursive criteria, the tracing of which enables the detection of SSR's Discourse: 1) the criteria of formation involve detecting changes affecting objects and concepts; 2) the criteria of transformation trace the changes that affect discursive formations themselves; and 3) the criteria of correlation explore changes which simultaneously affect several interlinked discursive formations. This thesis' challenging of ontological assumptions about SSR and resistance to the totalising effects of SSR's hegemonic Discourse is accomplished through applying genealogy. This chapter explores genealogical

governmentality's role in uncovering the knowledges that are subjugated or marginalised within a totalising Discourse. This is useful to this thesis' critical examination of SSR and its effects on the empirical site.

Second, technologies of government are examined as the set of techniques and mechanisms through which governmental rationalities are exercised as a regime of practices. After the analytical level of rationalities has enabled governmentality research to understand how an object came to exist, technologies enable an understanding of the mechanisms and structures through which an object is exercised and maintained in practice. Therefore, the first and second analytical levels enable this thesis to explore the sub-question of how SSR at the international level became possible and taken for granted. The focus on not only rationalities but technologies of government makes governmentality studies more empirical than most post-structuralist approaches, as dissecting techniques and mechanisms of government engages governmentality research in "examining power in its envisioned practical and technical expressions" (Foucault 2004, 31). This chapter outlined three technologies of power, shaped by varying mechanisms. Sovereign power and disciplinary power deal with territory and individual bodies respectively, while biopolitics coincide with the invention of "the population." Just as sovereign power is established and maintained through its association with juridical law, all three mechanisms of power rely on knowledge regimes for their legitimisation. Power/knowledge configurations are therefore discussed in this chapter as a central governmentality assumption of the ways in which Discourses are assembled and exercised.

Third, subjectivities of government encompass the processes through which the self and the other are categorised within government's epistemological and technological field. Governmentality highlights the inextricable and mutually constitutive relationship between rationalities, technologies, and subjectivities of government. This analytical level enables this thesis to examine the processes leading to the making of Tunisia as an SSR recipient and the country's acceptance

of this subordinate position and, in turn, its acceptance of SSR's regime of truth and of the credentials of SSR donors as an authority on security reform. Through highlighting competing and heterogenous subjectivities within the empirical site and the ensuing resistance to governmental powers, this thesis' governmentality framework overcomes the limitations of macro and historical deterministic theories through highlighting resistance to and subversion of current macro-level post-colonial power configurations.

Fourth, finalities of government are explored as the set of specific aims and consequences of government. This is an important analytical level for governmentality research as the expansion of the notion of government from the exercise of the sovereign's absolute power to a plurality of activities and technologies is coupled with an expansion of the objectives of government to include "a series of specific finalities" (Foucault 1991a, 95). This thesis applies finalities to investigate the effects of SSR on Tunisia's security and democratisation. In order to do so, finalities of SSR are viewed as twofold: first, the stated aim and objectives of SSR are examined. Second, the actual effects of SSR on Tunisia's democratic transition and security are examined against its stated aims. By doing so, this thesis avoids the assumption that governmentality practices are geared towards achieving their claimed values.

Chapter THREE: Methodological Framework

Introduction

This chapter outlines the research design and provides a rationale for the choice of an interpretivist approach and methods. Interpretivism aligns with governmentality's ontological and epistemological assumptions about the reality status of objects of study, such as SSR, and the researcher's position as shaper, rather than discoverer, of knowledge. This research employs the two research methods of Critical Discourse Analysis and in-depth semi-structured interviews. The choice of these methods is drawn from and reinforces this thesis' interpretivist approach. Notably, due to its underlying epistemological claims, Discourse Analysis is a suitable tool for the enactment of this Foucauldian inspired critical research. Furthermore, interviews enable the operationalisation of an iterative and dynamic research model in which the setting up, data generation, data transcription and analysis are conducted iteratively and inform each other. This enables a combined deductive and inductive analysis whereby fieldwork is both informed by and is used to enrich the conceptual framework.

Reflexivity is a key consideration for this thesis' conceptual and methodological framework. This chapter therefore discusses the role of reflexivity in shaping this research design and engages in self-reflection about the researcher's position within this research project. The final section of this chapter examines key ethical and strategic considerations which have been identified and mitigated in the design of this research project.

1. Interpretivism

This thesis engages in interpretivist research, rooted in both the epistemological and ontological assumptions underlying this project's conceptual framework (Soss 2006, 131). This in turn informs the choice of qualitative research methods (Bevir 2006, 283).

First, this thesis' interpretivist approach reflects its governmentality framework's ontological perspective about "the presupposed reality status" of the object under study (Yanow 2006, 24). Varying ontological perspectives inform a researcher's methodological position depending on "whether the subject of study is considered objectively real in the world, in which case it is believed to be capable of being 'captured' or collected, discovered or found, and 'mirrored' in theoretical writings, or is considered as socially constructed (…) in which case its character may be apprehended only through interpretation" (Yanow 2006, 24). As discussed in chapter 2 (Conceptualising Governmentality), a rejection of ontological universals, rather than a belief in "any objective features of the reality" underlies this thesis' governmentality framework (Marttila 2013). Therefore, as per Foucault's methodological position of "interpretative analytics," this governmentality framework analyses SRR as a socially constructed reality and object (Marttila 2013).

Second, this thesis' intrepretivist approach is determined by governmentality's epistemological assumptions about the "knowability" of subjects of study and the researchers' capacity to either ""generate" or "discover" or "find" or "construct" knowledge about the social webs under their analytic microscopes, and, hence, the character of those claims to knowledge" (Yanow 2006, 23). An interpretivist approach enables the enactment of two key epistemological features underlying this thesis' governmentality framework. First, as discussed in chapter 2 (Conceptualising Governmentality), a central argument in this thesis is the mutually constitutive characteristic of SSR's Discourse (rationalities) and practice (technologies and finalities). This is rooted in Foucauldian dissatisfaction with the historical materialism characteristic of Marxist theories which operated as a universal science and split discourse from practice "and then subordinated the former to the latter" (Monokha 2011, 71). By contrast, this thesis' interpretivist approach "derives from a philosophical analysis of the human sciences" which prioritises "the need to treat data as evidence of beliefs or meanings" (Bevir 2006,

283). Unlike positivist trends in human sciences which differentiate between beliefs and ideas on the one hand and actions on the other, interpretivists "stand out in their insistence that beliefs or meanings form holistic webs that are constitutive of actions and so of practices" (Bevir 2006, 284).

Second, an interpretivist approach aligns with and enacts genealogical governmentality's epistemological assumption about the political and value-laden task of the genealogist. Similarly to genealogy, interpretivism turns "a reflexive eye not only on the topic of study but also on the scientist generating or constructing (rather than "discovering" or "finding") that knowledge and on the language she uses in that "worldmaking"" (Yanow 2006, 6). In other words, this thesis's theoretical and methodological approach rests on the assumption that all claims to knowledge, if not objective, are constructed and heavily influenced by the researcher's interpretation. This is because "whenever we interpret an action by describing the beliefs of the actor, we interpret the actor's interpretation of the world, for their beliefs are, of course, an interpretation of the world" (Bevir 2006, 283). This thesis recognises that the researcher shapes, rather than discovers, knowledge about SSR and its effects in Tunisia through applying her perspective about the world to interpret interpretations of the world. As such, reflexivity, which is discussed at length in the final section of this chapter, is leveraged as a central and essential methodological tool to enacting this thesis' epistemological assumptions.

It follows that, rather than considering subjective knowledge construction a limitation, as is assumed by positivist approaches, this thesis considers it a defining feature of research. Indeed, this thesis rejects "naïve positivism" and advances the assumption that "we cannot have pure perceptions of given facts, but rather must always approach the world with a prior body of theories, concepts, or categories that help to construct the experiences we have" (Bevir 2006, 289).

2. Methods

This thesis' governmentality framework informs the ontological and epistemological assumptions underpinning the research design. In turn, the ensuing interpretivist approach informs the choice of qualitative research methods. As this section illustrates, Critical Discourse Analysis and in-depth, semi-structured interviews are harnessed in this thesis due to their suitability and ability to reflect and reinforce this thesis' epistemological and ontological perspective and arguments. In addition, a tandem and ongoing process of desk research informed the literature review, as well as the sources selected for each of CDA and interview methods.

2.1. Desk review

In order to ensure that this thesis' research design systematically captures key literature on SSR and governmentality, I set up automatic google scholar alerts for the keywords "SSR" and "governmentality." These searches allowed this thesis to identify key writers and current debates on the topics, separately and in relation to each other.

In addition, with a view to keeping abreast with key security and SSR developments and stakeholders in Tunisia. I set up automatic news and google alerts with the keywords "Tunisia," "Tunisia + security," and "Tunisia + SSR" in Arabic and French. In addition, I followed the official social media accounts of key Tunisian governmental and media institutions, such as the Ministry of Interior, the office of the presidency, and the state-owned media Tunis Afrique Press (TAP), in order to receive daily notifications of their official statements and publications. In addition to official sources, I identified and followed prominent investigative outlets, such as Nawaat, Inkyfada, and Alqatiba, with a track record of covering security, security reform, and police impunity issues (Alqatiba n.d.; Inkyfada n.d.; Nawaat n.d.). Further, I followed the official social media accounts of youth social movements against policy impunity, such as the #LearnToSwin and #HoldThemAccountable pages, in order to receive updates about their protest movements.

2.2. Critical Discourse Analysis

2.2.1. Why Discourse Analysis?

Discourse Analysis is an ideal method for this thesis' genealogical inquiry into how SSR became possible on the international level. Whereas other qualitative methods tend to examine the meaning of phenomena while taking their social reality as given, Discourse Analysis is set apart due to its interest in how a concept comes about, "why it has a particular meaning today when, 60 years ago, it had none" (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 7). In other words, while other qualitative methods assume the existence of a social reality and seek to understand and interpret its representation, Discourse Analysis' key contribution is its examination of "how language constructs phenomena, not how it reflects and reveals it" (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 5). It is thus no surprise that Foucauldian genealogical research is often closely associated with Discourse Analysis (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 7). Indeed, Discourse Analysis is common in critical security studies and social constructivist and post-structural IR, due in part to Foucault's influence (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 4; Salter and Mutlu 2013, 113).

2.2.2. What is Discourse Analysis?

This thesis aligns with scholarship that views Discourse not only as a linguistic phenomenon but also a social practice. As such, this thesis defines Discourse not as a series of speech acts, but as systems of practices, involving the exercise of power, which constitute subjectivities and objects (Howarth, Norval, and Stavrakakis 2000, 4; Lindekilde 2014, 4). This captures this thesis' governmentality understanding of SSR's rationalities not as "groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (Foucault 2002a, 54). It follows that Discourse Analysis is able to highlight not only how SSR's Discourse has been assembled, but the constraining effects of Discourses such as SSR's on practices, actors, and social reality. Discourse Analysis is therefore the most suitable method to capture SSR rationalities, defined in chapter 2 as the epistemological conditions of existence of

an object under study. As noted in chapter 2, governmental rationalities are uncovered through an examination of the criteria of their discursive formation. This makes Discourse Analysis the appropriate tool for such investigation due to its sensitivity to the linguistic formation of social phenomena.

Following this broad understanding of Discourse, this thesis uses the term "discourse" in two distinct ways. A "small d" discourse refers to any "spoken, sign-based, or any other significant semiotic markers that provide meaning to the social world surrounding us" (Salter and Mutlu 2013, 113). A "big D" Discourse, on the other hand, transcends "small d" discourse to include an "interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their production, dissemination, and reception, that brings an object into being" (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 3).

Therefore, if Discourse includes texts while encapsulating systems of practices, Discourse Analysis must in turn interest itself with the meanings articulated in a text, in addition to its context, including the practices of its production, dissemination, and reception (Lindekilde 2014, 4; Yanow 2006, 16). In this sense, a single text forms a "discursive unit" necessary to undertake Discourse Analysis (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 3). However, texts cannot individually reveal Discourses. As such, a multi-dimensional Discourse Analysis method is necessary to uncover the interconnection between texts, or intertextuality (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 4; Yanow 2006, 16). In turn, this facilitates an examination of the relationship between text and social context necessary to capture Discourse. The three criteria of discursive formation of SSR's Discourse, outlined in chapter 2 (Conceptualising Governmentality) and applied in chapter 4 (SSR rationalities), call for such a multi-dimensional Discourse Analysis method, as they explore the ways in which SSR's Discourse is shaped through its interconnection with correlating Discourses within an evolving context.

2.2.3. Combining Governmentality with Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis

Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach responds to the demand for a multi-dimensional analysis of Discourse. Fairclough's three-dimensional model, illustrated in Figure 1, views discourse as "a constitutive part of its local and global, social and cultural contexts" (Fairclough 2010, 29).

This thesis also applies Fairclough's CDA due to its key conceptual similarities with Foucauldian governmentality. First, in contrast to non-critical Discourse Analysis approaches, Fairclough's CDA places greater emphasis on the social effects of Discourse and how discursive practices are socially shaped (Fairclough 2010, 26).

Second, Fairclough's CDA model accounts for the central power/knowledge concern underpinning Foucauldian governmentality as he focuses on "discourse within the social reproduction of relations of domination" (Fairclough 2010, 26). He views discursive activity as constituting and maintaining unequal power relations (Wodak and Fairclough 1997). In this sense, Fairclough takes inspiration from Gramscian and Althusserian notions of hegemony to view "discursive orders" as a site of contestation whereby hegemonic Discourses struggle to maintain dominance over competing Discourses (Fairclough 2010, 27; Lindekilde 2014, 11). In Foucauldian parlance, this translates to the struggle between SSR's hegemonic Discourse and its subjugated knowledges and powers within the governmentality framework. As chapter 2 outlines, SSR's rationalities are maintained through the continuous adaptation of SSR's Discourse to maintain dominance through co-opting, disqualifying, or subjugating competing knowledges.

Third, CDA's premise about hegemonic Discourses reveals agents as both socially constrained and wielding causal power within Discourses. In other words, subjects are constructed and constrained by the structure while exercising their agency over the structure. Governmentality accounts for this mutually constitutive

relationship through subjectivities, highlighted in this thesis as both constructed by and influencing SSR rationalities, technologies, and finalities.

Despite their key areas of conceptual overlap, CDA diverges from Foucauldian thought due to Fairclough's emphasis on ideology. Both CDA and governmentality aim to unsettle hegemonic Discourses through "denaturalising" their taken-for-granted feature. However, Fairclough traces this taken-for-granted character to the dominance of "ideological discursive formations (IDF)" (Fairclough 2010, 26). This represents a major area of divergence from Foucauldian thought, which rejects the notion of ideology. What Fairclough views as "naturalised ideologies" resulting from the dominance of an IDF, Foucauldian governmentality instead views as governmental rationalities resulting from the dominance of a hegemonic Discourse (Fairclough 2010, 27,30).

In order to harness their similarities while circumventing their contradictions, this thesis' CDA method combines Fairclough's three-dimensional model with Foucauldian governmentality. This is accomplished through matching Foucault's three criteria of discursive formation outlined in chapter 2 with each of Fairclough's dimensions. As Foucault's discussion of Discourse is abstract and methodologically vague, this combination is necessary to provide this thesis with the methodological tool to operationalise SSR rationalities. In addition, this hybrid application of Fairclough's CDA avoids his focus on ideology.

Figure 1 illustrates Fairclough's three dimensions (Fairclough 1992, 79). These are merged in Table 1 with Foucault's criteria of discursive formation, outlined in chapter 2, to form this thesis' hybrid CDA model.

Figure 1 Fairclough's three-dimensional CDA model



Table 1 Combining CDA and Foucault's criteria of discursive formation

Fairclough dimensions	Corresponding Discursive Criteria	Implication for SSR Discourse
Text (discursive event)	Criteria of formation	Detecting discursive and contextual changes leading to SSR's "discursive formation" (in Foucauldian terms)
Discursive practice (production, distribution and consumption)	Criteria of transformation	Detecting changes within SSR's discursive formation (SSR Discourse's encounter with its competing discourses and the struggle for hegemony)

Social practice (discourse order, social structures, institutions, relations)	Criteria of correlation	Detecting changes simultaneously affecting several Discourses, including SSR's discursive formation

2.2.4. Applying Critical Discourse Analysis

The first step to operationalizing this thesis' CDA is the selection of data to analyse, or the sampling strategy. In order to ensure the internal validity of this thesis' Discourse Analysis, the sampling strategy is informed by the research questions (Lindekilde 2014, 17). Two key considerations are taken into account in the choice of discursive units. First, this thesis's first research sub-question "how did SSR at the international level become possible and taken for granted?" lends itself to genealogical analysis. In line with genealogy's task of uncovering discontinuities and subjugated knowledges, genealogically-inclined discourse analysis "seeks ruptures, silences, breaks, marginalized voices (…)" while giving "careful attention to the disappeared or silenced" (Salter and Mutlu 2013, 114). UK International Development Secretary Clare Short's March 1999 speech, titled "Security sector reform and the elimination of poverty" features the first public mention of the term "SSR" and is thus a key moment of discontinuity which enabled SSR's emergence (Short 1999).

As the CDA model adopted in this thesis starts by examining textual units to identify the criteria of discursive formation, the Discourse Analysis undertaken in chapter 4 starts with a textual analysis of Short's speech to uncover the discontinuity this speech introduced which shifted the focus of development assistance from the narrow lens of reducing military expenditure to linking security and development issues. This textual analysis is undertaken through first interrogating the text genre, meaning types, and social relations enacted by this speech. In addition, this textual analysis examines the ways in which linguistic

choices adopted in this discursive unit shape social agents and social problems, known as problematization in governmentality studies.

To highlight the discontinuity enacted through language in this textual unit, this thesis juxtaposes Short's speech with UN General Assembly Resolution 724A (United Nations 1953), as this resolution represents the earliest discursive manifestation of development's previous focus on the reduction of military expenditure (Brzoska 2003, 5).

As the second level of this CDA model addresses Foucault's criteria of discursive transformation, corresponding with Fairclough's level of discursive practice, through the production, distribution and consumption of texts, two other discursive units were chosen in chapter 4 to examine the intertextuality of SSR's Discourse. Intertextuality refers to "interdependency of the discourse practices of a society or institution: a text always draws upon and transforms other contemporary and historically prior texts (…) and any given type of discourse practice is generated out of combinations of others, and is defined by its relationship to others" (Fairclough 1992, 39–40). Intertextuality can be either manifest, through explicit references to other texts, or "interdiscursive," through "the constitution of a text from a configuration of text types or discourse conventions" (Fairclough 1992, 10). As such, Clare Short's speech is also analysed in its intertextuality with two key SSR policy documents governing SSR donor programming: the OECD DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance (OECD- DAC 2005) and the UN report of the Secretary-General on SSR (United Nations 2008). The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an important institutional actor in promoting an understanding of SSR from a development perspective and in generating joint policy guidelines for its member states, namely members of the Development Co-operation Directorate (OECD-DAC). The importance of this institution lies in its inclusion of 31 Western development donor states that refer to the OECD as a platform to "seek answers to common problems, identify good practice, and work

to co-ordinate domestic and international policies" (OECD 2007, 2). The UN plays an important role in coordinating member state SSR efforts, having established in 2007 an Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force (IASSRTF) including 14 UN entities (International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) n.d.). In order to examine the ways in which the SSR Discourse was transformed through its (re)production in these two discursive units, the CDA exercise undertaken in chapter 4 applied "mediation" as a CDA tool which enables the examination of "the movement of meaning," between one discursive unit and the next within SSR's network of texts (Fairclough 2003, 30).

Notably, as Fairclough argued that "discursive practice is manifested in linguistic form, in the form of what I shall refer to as 'texts', using 'text' in Halliday's broad sense of spoken as well as written language," it was essential to combine analysis of discursive units in this level with analysis of spoken text, collected through interview data (Fairclough 1992, 71). As examined in chapter 4, this revealed the extent and ways in which SSR's hegemonic Discourse is transformed in practice due to its encounter with competing and subjugated knowledges.

Discourse Analysis reveals the ways in which socially produced ideas and meanings are assembled and maintained through language. As such, it is an ideal method to address the first sub-question examining the rationalities of SSR and its conditions of possibility. This is applied in this thesis' chapter 4 (SSR rationalities). However, CDA presents limitations in answering the second sub-question, which necessitates an investigation of SSR's technologies, subjectivities and finalities. Subjectivities and subjugated knowledges are better captured through actor (self) identification, internalisations, and divergence from SSR's hegemonic Discourse, which may not be captured in discursive units. A second method is thus required to furnish the findings of Discourse Analysis with a better understanding of SSR's context, "emanating out of interactions between social groups and the complex societal structures in which the discourse is

embedded" (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 4). Therefore, Critical Discourse Analysis is complemented in this thesis by interviews.

2.3. Interviews

This thesis engages in in-depth, one on one, semi-structured interviews due to their various benefits for this interpretivist research. As mentioned above, in-depth interviews enable this thesis to explore in intricate detail "questions that are difficult to locate in documentary sources" (Soss 2006, 142). In addition, the semi-structured nature of the interviews allows for a high degree of flexibility, control, and detail, through allowing room for probing and rearranging the wording and order of questions depending on interview flow and respondents' time and degree of openness (Soss 2006, 142). This has practical benefits as it allows for more complete data through probing if respondents don't understand a question (Bernard 2011, 190). This, in contrast to quantitative methods, enables the researcher to develop a micro and contextual analysis through gathering rich and deep data.

Notably, in-depth interviews are especially useful for this thesis' inquiry into the subjectivities of various actors in the SSR field thanks to this method's ability to recover and analyse individuals' agency (Soss 2006, 142). In order to establish an understanding of the ways in which particular actors are differentially affected by and (self)categorised within the SSR field, a total of 21 key stakeholder interviews were undertaken in this research targeting four broad stakeholder groups; these included SSR actors, government and security actors, oversight actors (civil society representatives, parliamentarians, and activists), and researchers and consultants. The interviewees were selected based on their proximity to, and expertise on, the Tunisian security sector and security sector reform. These included public figures with past public statements related to the topic of this study. Snowballing was also applied during the interview process to reach new stakeholders beyond my existing interviewee list.

It is worth noting that members of Tunisia's security forces are legally prohibited from talking to the media or to researchers. This impacts on the ability of researchers to interview Ministry of Interior officials, the majority of which are members of the security forces. Through the use of personal connections, one current Ministry of Interior official agreed to an interview on the condition of anonymity. Further, and with a view to providing a holistic and empirically rich analysis which adequately captures the perspectives of security actors despite legal constraints, my research targeted former security officials or ministry officials currently on secondment. In addition, I captured a second-hand account of the lived experience of a police captain through an in-depth interview with his son. When on the record interviews were not granted or when I did not deem them safe for the respondents, I engaged in informal and off the record discussions with security officers and other respondents as deep background. Indeed, in addition to the 21 respondents cited in this research, I formally and informally spoke to an array of individuals with various links to the security sector, including officers and criminals. While these discussions were not recorded or cited in any way in this research, they served to enrich my understanding of, and to triangulate, this thesis' findings. For instance, a two-hour discussion with a drug dealer corroborated this thesis' findings around the preponderance of police members' petty corruption, corporatism, and bribery within and outside prisons. In addition, an off the record conversation with a police officer offered further insight into the inner divisions within the security institution between union and non-union members.

As this thesis is critical of power imbalances underpinning social interactions, attention to centring respondents' agency is both an analytical and practical priority for this research. Analytically, this thesis advances an understanding of SSR subjectivities as simultaneously constructed by and influencing SSR's Discourse and practice. Practically, this research recognises and mitigates the Feminist critique of the imbalanced power relationship that occurs during interviews when the researcher has total control over the agenda of the interview (Hesse-Biber,

2007: 116). This is a risk when structured interviews perpetuate an asymmetrical power relationship between researcher and “subject” (Bryman, 2001: 124). This method can therefore be exploitative by the researcher, treating interviewees as “subjects” or “objects” of investigation while providing nothing in return.

I implemented measures to mitigate the risk of power imbalance inherent in structured interviews. I designed and administered consent forms to minimise the exploitative feel of interviews. This consent form, which was approved by the Research Ethics Committee in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham, includes a list of respondents’ rights and my commitment to their anonymity if they choose it. Notably, while the option for anonymity was offered to respondents, I did not opt for automatic anonymisation of all respondents. This is due to the relevance of respondents’ positionality to this research’s data analysis and conclusions. In addition, the majority of non-anonymised interviewees are public figures or resource people who have a track record of publicly discussing security sector matters and making public statements similar to the ones they are quoted as making for the purposes of this research. Therefore, the risk associated with their names being linked to these statements in this thesis are limited. Importantly, with a view to respecting the agency of each respondent, the choice to de-anonymise some and not the others was left for each respondent. As such, only respondents who stated verbally and in writing that they wish for their names to appear in this research were de-anonymised. This was with the exception of one interviewee, the above-mentioned police captain’s son; I automatically anonymised this respondent, as I judged it best for his and his father’s safety due to his proximity to the security sector.

Further, respondents were informed through the consent form of the possibility to withdraw any or all statements post-interview and of my commitment to destroy any records of their interview if requested before a certain date. Through the consent forms and during all interviews, I informed respondents of their right

to decline to answer any questions or to speak off the record for any portion of the interview.

I developed the consent form in both English and Arabic so that respondents could fully understand their rights. The English consent form is included in Appendix 1. Additionally, at the beginning of the interview, I confirmed with respondents whether they are comfortable with me recording the conversation.

In addition, I designed a semi-structured interview guide for each stakeholder group, rather than a list of structured interview questions, to ensure that the interviews cover key essential themes while being flexible and open to the interviewee responses. All interview guides are included in Appendix 2. The interview guides include the list of potential questions organised by key theme, as well as the rationale for asking the questions and the way it will contribute to this thesis' analytical framework. The order of the questions changed from one interview to the next depending on probing and follow up based on interviewee responses. In all interviews, I endeavoured for both my introduction and the introductory question to establish a power balance and to centre respondents' perspectives and voices. First, my introduction of myself and research includes my rationale for why I am interested in the respondent's professional or personal experience. This introductory portion also highlights how each individual respondent's perspective is essential to my successful research. In order to do so, I researched all public statements made by each respondent prior to interviewing them, as well as researching their current and previous affiliations and their linkages with security and security sector reform. This served to personalise the introductory questions while confirming the relevance of their experiences and perspectives to my research. In addition, this positions each respondent as an active stakeholder in the research, rather than a mere "subject" whose perspective and thoughts I am here to extract with no recognition. Second, my first question asks respondents to introduce themselves and their experience with SSR. Introductory questions can yield spontaneous and rich responses which

reveal the central elements of the subject under study from the respondents' perspective (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, 136). The response to this question often informed my follow up questions and the order of the interview questions, in a way that flowed organically from the respondents' initial introductory response. Therefore, I ensured a balance between covering key predetermined topics and maintaining a conversational feel whereby I exhibit genuine interest in respondents' specific responses.

With a view to building trust at the outset of the interview, the first three substantive questions included in the interview guides for each stakeholder group are general opening questions, such as "in your opinion, what are Tunisia's institutional reform priorities?", "how would you define the security sector in Tunisia?" or "how would you define SSR?" The first question gauges whether security sector reform would be organically brought up by respondents. The second and third allow me to capture respondents' own perspective related to the key concepts of security and SSR, rather than imposing my own built knowledge about these concepts. Further in order to ensure my research remained truthful to respondents' perspectives, I applied "interpreting questions," such as "Am I correct to interpret what you just said as …..?" or "Do you mean that…?" (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). Interpreting questions ensure that I minimise my interpretation of respondents' answers and that I maximise description of their perspectives. This is especially important in questions related to subjectivities, where I endeavour as much as possible to highlight, rather than interpret, respondents' perspectives. In addition, I applied silence as a technique to further the interview (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). This limits the interrogative feel of the interview and allows room for respondents to reflect while avoiding accidentally cutting off their train of thought. The final question for all interviewee across stakeholder groups was consistently "what does successful SSR in Tunisia look like to you?" This served as a wrap up question in which respondents could reflect on and bring together their thoughts from the

rest of the interview. In addition, this question served the analytical purpose of elucidating SSR's ideal finalities, which were compared in this thesis with SSR's actual finalities in chapter 7.

3. Analysis

While some researchers advocate for a linear interview research process (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009), this thesis adopts an iterative and dynamic research model whereby the setting up, data generation, data transcription and analysis are conducted iteratively and inform each other (Barbour 2008).

3.1. Transcription and field notes

Transcription is used in this research as an opportunity to "deepen the method" (Soss 2006, 136). First, rigorous analysis starts with and hinges on timely transcription. I endeavoured to make field notes, transcribe and partly analyse interviews on the same day as each interview. This enabled me to note my initial observations about the interview and the respondents. Ensuring a record of these notes is important as these observations may otherwise fade. In addition, returning to these records after my perspective and familiarity with the research has evolved is important. As Soss notes, the researcher's sense of unfamiliarity during the early days of research provides unique opportunities for observation, which may not be possible in later stages of the fieldwork when the researcher develops blind spots (Soss 2006, 138). Second, transcription sessions offer the researcher an opportunity to reflect and improve on their interview questions and techniques, which informs the ongoing fieldwork (Soss 2006, 136).

Ongoing analysis of interview data led to the emergence of new questions and inquiries, which fed back into the interviews. For this reason, in addition to the deductive analysis and coding, my research design incorporated inductive analysis based on the fieldwork itself. In this sense, the theoretical framework and research design are mutually influencing.

3.2. Deductive/inductive analysis

This thesis' governmentality framework, similarly to governmentality research in general, departs from a "theoretical pre-understanding of the phenomenal structure of government" (Marttila 2013). In other words, this research is deductively limited by the assumption that a regime of practices such as SSR requires rationalities and technologies for its Discourse to be assembled and maintained in practice.

Deductive Analysis requires the listing of all observable implications, or the implications of the theoretical framework that could in principle be observed through data (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 47). Table 2 outlines governmentality's observable implications, which pre-date and inform the fieldwork. These observable implications served as deductive codes and sub-codes informing interview design and analysis. Data analysis using these codes was undertaken with the help of qualitative data analysis software NVivo 12. These codes are shared in this thesis under Appendix 3 to ensure research transparency and replicability.

While the above table is informed by governmentality studies' deductive assumptions, this thesis recognises that highly deductive analysis is a risk and limitation of governmentality research. As Martilla notes, governmentality research is marked by "a notorious reluctance of governmentality scholars to elucidate how the epistemic perspective involved in governmentality research actually influences, structures and limits the range of possible and meaningful empirical observations" (Marttila 2013).

By contrast, this research recognises that some elements of its conceptual framework, such as subjugated knowledges and subjectivities, require genealogical examination of a particular site and therefore lend themselves to induction. Rather than departing from assumptions and hypotheses which it seeks

to test, genealogy generates empirical conclusions through digging up local knowledges and truths.

Furthermore, this thesis' research design recognises that deductive and inductive analysis strategies are "often combined in practice" (Lindekilde 2014, 18). The pre-existing or a priori codes outlined in Table 2 were combined in this research with a data-led or grounded approach, leading to the emergence of inductive conclusions from the data. Inductive analysis enacts an important aspect of this governmentality framework, which is interested in capturing interwoven power relations at a particular empirical site. In this sense, an empirically rich examination of SSR's application and effects in Tunisia is only possible through inductive conclusions about the capillary nature of its SSR's power configurations. This led to granular, empirically rich, inductive analysis in chapter 6, breaking down the subjectivities of previously homogenised actors, such the Ministry of Interior.

4. Reflexivity

Reflexivity, defined as "a critical look inward and reflecting on one's own lived reality and experiences" (Hesse-Biber, 2007: 129) is embedded in this thesis' epistemological perspective and constitutes a central consideration in this research design. This thesis' genealogical examination acknowledges the contested and political nature of truth claims, and reflexive research highlights that "researchers produce a specific version of social reality, rather than one that can be seen as definitive" (Bryman 2012, 33).

Research is therefore partly shaped by a researcher's position, which is determined by their "past experience, education, training, family-community-regional-national (and so on) background, and character" (Yanow 2006, 12). A researcher's task is therefore to recognise and reflect on their positionality and, while recognising the impossibility of completely extricating oneself from interpretive research, seek to apply research approaches and techniques that minimise bias.

I am a Tunisian female who was born and raised in Ben Ali's authoritarian police state. I have witnessed and experienced first-hand police brutality, the abuse of my individual rights and the rights and freedoms of those around me both before and after the 2011 revolution. I share the same feelings of distrust towards the internal security forces and the Ministry of Interior as the majority of Tunisians (Walsh 2019). After the 2011 revolution, despite rhetoric around reform and improved accountability and oversight, I was subjected to illegal detention, interrogation, and stifling of my freedom of speech both as a journalist and an NGO worker. I have also investigated continued practices of torture and abuse of innocent citizens by the police, and their subsequent cover-up by the Ministry of Interior. My lived experience fuels a bias against the security forces and a deep sense of distrust and cynicism regarding the reform of the security sector.

My lived experience shapes my perspective and therefore risks influencing my interpretation of data. To an extent, the choice of my theoretical and methodological framework is due to an awareness of my positioning within this research and the impossibility of separating my lived experience from my interpretation. However, I apply approaches and techniques to minimise the impact of my lived experience on my data collection and interpretation. First, the choice of Discourse Analysis has the added benefit of acknowledging reflexivity. Due to emphasis on the social effects of language, Discourse Analysis reminds readers that "researchers and the research community are part and parcel of the constructive effects of discourse" (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 2).

Second, my interview guides are designed to ensure the neutrality of the language around my questions and avoid inserting any leading phrasing or any built-in knowledge. For instance, for all stakeholder groups, I start with general questions such as "what are Tunisia's institutional reform priorities?" in order to gauge whether security sector reform comes up organically instead of me assuming that respondents agree on the need for security sector reform. In addition, I include questions that seek to capture participants' understanding of the meaning of key

concepts in order to avoid attaching my own perspective on these issues to respondents (Bevir 2006, 155). This includes questions such as "what do you think are Tunisia's security reform needs? How would define SSR? And what does an ideal SSR outcome look like in Tunisia?"

Third, during the interviews, I apply a concept checking technique which minimises my leeway for interpretation and maximises my ability to present the unadulterated perspective of the interviewees. Through the use of "interpreting questions", I recap interviewee responses to key questions and ask them to confirm whether I am presenting an accurate representation of their perspective.

Finally, the application of this thesis' governmentality framework has dictated the need to account for competing and conflicting subjectivities within the SSR field, including the subjectivities of police unions and the security forces. Indeed, this thesis' governmentality framework has minimised the potential bias in my analysis, instead advancing an understanding of the complexity and heterogeneity of the security institution and advocating for SSR actors to acknowledge the grievances of the rank and file within the security sector.

5. Strategic and ethical research considerations

Security and SSR related issues in Tunisia are sensitive and often fraught with opacity. Previous primary research I undertook in 2016 revealed a number of obstacles which require the adoption of strategic and ethical measures to maximise safe data collection. First, former government officials and security officers are primarily targeted for interviews. In addition, serving security officers and officials are legally prohibited from talking to researchers or the media. Previous experience has revealed that former officials are more likely to be responsive to interview requests than current officials or security officers. Second, interview questions and discourses were adapted according to each respondent group. For instance, interview questions targeting government officials were tailored to ensure openness and avoid confrontation or arousing suspicions. In addition, I put in place measures to ensure my safety when conducting interviews.

This included regular check-up calls and emails with my supervisors. I informed family members of the time and location of each interview, and I had check-up calls with my spouse before and after each interview. When conducting an interview at the Ministry of Interior, I emailed my supervisor prior to and after the interview, and informed several family members of my whereabouts and the time of interview. Deep background discussions were held through end-to-end encryption call applications (such as Signal or WhatsApp) or in person in a public location.

Third, given the sensitive nature of the topic, civil society actors may not be fully comfortable going on the record to discuss strategic security issues. As such, written consent forms were not administered to civil society respondents, who may feel more comfortable speaking on a semi-formal basis if written consent is perceived as holding them accountable to the authorities or implicate them legally. In addition, all respondents were given the option to speak off the record or to withdraw written and verbal consent at any point before, during, or after an interview, up to a specified date.

Conclusion

This chapter illustrated the links between this thesis' conceptual and methodological frameworks, which share the same epistemological and ontological assumptions. Interpretivism is adopted in this thesis as an underlying philosophy as well as a practical approach which dictates the use of specific qualitative methods. The methods of Critical Discourse Analysis and in-depth semi-structured interviews are adopted due to their suitability for this thesis' methodological needs. However, in addition to each method's individual merits, the combination of both methods is vital to successfully tackle both research sub-questions and address the four analytical levels in this thesis. Critical Discourse Analysis' interest in the mutually constitutive links between discursive formations and social practices makes it an ideal tool for this thesis' genealogical investigation of the origins of SSR. As such, CDA is adept at addressing the first sub-question:

"how did SSR at the international level become possible and taken for granted?" which corresponds to the analytical level of rationalities. This chapter demonstrated how Fairclough's CDA model is merged with Foucault's three criteria of discursive formation, resulting in a hybrid model capable of operationalising Foucault's abstract examination of rationalities while avoiding the two authors' conceptual contradictions.

However, Discourse Analysis presents limitations in addressing other elements of this thesis' conceptual framework, notably subjectivities and finalities. This is because an empirical examination of these analytical levels requires investigation of SSR's social context and actor (self) identifications within SSR's Discourse, which may not be documented in discursive units. Instead, in-depth interviews are a more appropriate tool to capture actor (self) representations. The choice of semi-structured interviews aligns with this thesis' concern with maintaining flexibility while addressing Feminist critiques of the power imbalance inherent in structured interviews. Furthermore, in-depth semi-structured interviews enable an iterative and dynamic research model in which the fieldwork and framework inform each other.

Reflexivity, as discussed in this chapter, represents an overarching philosophical and practical concern for this thesis. As a Tunisian with strong feelings about my country's security forces and citizen-police relations, this thesis is not born out of mere intellectual curiosity. Rather, my research ambition is as much about dismantling barriers to critical discussion of the off-limits but vital topic of reforming Tunisia's security as it is about the production of rigorous academic work.

Chapter FOUR: SSR Rationalities

Introduction

This thesis' investigation of SSR begins with an examination of the ways in which SSR governmentality has been rationalised into practice. This is an important line

of inquiry, as the prerequisite analytical level of rationalities highlights how "political rationality permits a problem to be articulated and offers certain strategies for solving or managing it" (Lemke 2019, 112). As outlined in chapter 3, this thesis' genealogical tracing of SSR rationalities is predicated on the need to examine the ways in which SSR's hegemonic Discourse was assembled and maintained through uncovering "ruptures, silences, breaks, marginalized voices" while giving "careful attention to the disappeared or silenced" (Salter and Mutlu 2013, 114). Therefore, this chapter uncovers SSR's rationalities through operationalising this thesis' hybrid CDA model, combining Fairclough's three levels of discursive analysis, examined in chapter 3, with Foucault's three criteria of discursive formation, outlined in chapter 2.

The first section operationalises the first level of this thesis' CDA model, which combines Fairclough's textual analysis with the Foucauldian criteria of formation. Two discursive units are juxtaposed in this section with a view to revealing the moment of discontinuity leading to the emergence and acceptance of the SSR concept. First, UN General Assembly Resolution 724A (United Nations 1953) is selected as it represents an early discursive manifestation of development's previous focus on the reduction of military expenditure (Brzoska 2003, 5).This discursive unit acts as the benchmark against which the discursive shift enacted in the second unit is made clear. Second, UK International Development Secretary Clare Short's 1999 speech given at King's College London is examined (Short 1999). This unit was selected as it features the first public mention of the term "SSR" and is thus a key moment of discursive discontinuity which introduced SSR into the policy and academic spheres. However, this unit is not examined in this chapter in a silo. Rather, it is to be understood as representative of policy debates and choices leading up to the emergence of SSR within the Department for International Development (DFID). In addition, this speech is examined as the culmination of the academic and policy context outlined in chapter 1 (literature review), which

enabled liberal cosmopolitan and human security-based policy and practice prescriptions such as SSR.

This process reveals SSR’s criteria of formation, which serve to “*detect the changes which affect [a Discourse’s] objects, operations, concepts, theoretical options*” (Foucault 1991b, 56, emphasis in original). By doing so, this section reveals SSR’s epistemological conditions of possibility, therefore answering this thesis’ first sub question: How did SSR become possible and taken for granted at an international level?

After examining the process of SSR’s discursive formation in the first section, the second section analyses the processes through which this formation is transformed by nuancing, rejecting, or co-opting competing discourses and subjugated knowledges. This section therefore operationalises Foucault’s criteria of discursive transformation, which is merged in this chapter with Fairclough’s second CDA level examining discursive practices, or the ways in which a Discourse evolves in the process of its production, distribution and consumption (Fairclough 1992, 73). For Fairclough, discursive practices manifest in linguistic form, through both written and spoken text. As such, this section traces SSR’s discursive transformation through textual analysis of two discursive units, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance (OECD- DAC 2005) and the UN report of the Secretary-General on SSR (United Nations 2008), and through analysis of in-depth, semi structured interview data. The textual analysis reveals the process and extent to which SSR’s hegemonic Discourse transformed from one discursive unit to another through its (re)interpretation and reproduction by various speaking subjects. This process reveals that the SSR Discourse is so elusive and ill-defined that it is in a perpetual state of discursive formation. The continued practice of SSR despite its conceptual vagueness supports this thesis’ rejection of an ontological SSR object and the understanding of governmental rationalities as a set of discursive moves aimed at

providing the normative underpinning for governmental practices. However, despite the elusiveness of its concept, it is still possible to examine SSR's discursive transformation through an examination of conceptual variations and evolution between discursive units.

In addition to textual analysis, analysis of spoken discursive practices through interview data reveals the extent and ways in which SSR's hegemonic Discourse is transformed in practice due to its encounter with competing and subjugated knowledges.

The third section investigates correlated Discourses which affect SSR's Discourse and practice in the Tunisian context. This operationalises Fairclough's third CDA level of social practice, which is aligned in this section with Foucault's criteria of correlation. By doing so, this chapter examines the democratic transition's institutional, political, and counter-terrorism context in Tunisia in its relation with the security and SSR fields.

1. SSR Discourse's criteria of formation

In order to reveal the discontinuities which led to the emergence of the SSR Discourse, this chapter begins by applying Fairclough's first level of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) through textual analysis. To do so, two discursive units are juxtaposed to highlight the discontinuity leading to the genesis of SSR. International Development Secretary Clare Short's March 1999 speech, titled "Security sector reform and the elimination of poverty" features the first public mention of the term "SSR" and is thus a key moment of discontinuity which enabled SSR's emergence (Short 1999). This discursive unit is juxtaposed in this section with UN General Assembly Resolution 724A (United Nations 1953).

1.1. Text genres, meaning types, and social relations

As the below excerpt illustrates, UN Resolution 724A represents one of the earliest discursive manifestations of development's previous focus on the reduction of military expenditure, which SSR came to replace (Brzoska 2003, 5):

> *We, the governments of the State Members of the United Nations, in order to promote higher standards of living and conditions of economic and social progress and development, stand ready to ask our peoples, when sufficient progress has been made in internationally supervised world-wide disarmament, to devote a portion of the savings achieved through such disarmament to an international fund, within the framework of the United Nations, to assist development and reconstruction in under-developed countries* (United Nations 1953).

The present CDA starts by examining the types of meaning and social relations conjured by the discursive units. Fairclough accounts for three, closely inter-related, types of meaning: *action*, corresponding to what Foucault would call the axis of power; *representation*, which corresponds to the Foucauldian axis of knowledge; and *identification*, corresponding to Foucault's notion of ethics (Fairclough 2003, 28; Foucault 1998, 318).

According to Fairclough, a text's genre is constitutive and revealing of the aforementioned types of meaning (Fairclough 2003, 26). The UN defines its resolutions as "formal expressions of the opinion or will of UN organs" (Kurtas n.d.). UN Resolutions can therefore be classified as non-legally binding commitments on the part of the relevant UN bodies. In the case of Resolution 724A, the issuing organ is the UN General Assembly, therefore reflecting the collective will and policy path chosen by UN member states. The speaking subject is identified in this Resolution as the collective governments of UN member states, while deriving legitimacy from their "peoples" in order to act as an authority on policy prescriptions aimed at assisting "development and reconstruction in under-developed countries." This aligns with the conventional post WWII development dynamic which relied on the UN as a joint venue for state-led prescriptions.

This Resolution set the tone for development's Cold War era security focus and ensuing action, which was limited to the reduction of military expenditure as a means to increasing development. This focus became a central theme by the early

1990s, promoted by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the US Congress, and exemplified in the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programs (Brzoska 2003, 5).

SSR's emergence in the late 1990s was the result of a discursive shift, which was publicly disseminated through Clare Short's speech, delivered on 9 March 1999 at the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College London (Short 1999). The choice of the genre of public speech to present the first public utterance of the term SSR is an action, "which implies a social relation" (Fairclough 2003, 27). A speech indicates the action of informing, implying a social relation between "someone who has knowledge and opinion and someone who is eliciting them" (Fairclough 2003, 27). In this case, the head of DFID, a newly founded development department, is established as "someone who knows", and therefore an authority on the matter and a holder of new and important knowledge and information (Fairclough 2003, 27). On the other hand, Short's academic audience is framed as "someone who doesn't" know, and is therefore eliciting and absorbing the information conveyed in this speech (Fairclough 2003, 27). The choice of a speech, rather than an interview or a lecture followed by Q&A, ensures that the audience is not an active participant in this speech act. Instead, the social relation established through this action is of an academic community passively accepting SSR as a new development prescription. This is reminiscent of the links established between policy and academic circles around human security discourses, which were discussed in chapter 1. As argued in chapter 1, a prevalent problem-solving approach in liberal cosmopolitan academic literature ensures that mainstream problem-solving, and some critical, academia legitimises and perpetuates, rather than challenges, development practice and human security-based policy prescriptions. Specifically, this explains the predominance of problem-solving SSR literature which continues to draw its conceptual grounding from development practice while failing to question its underpinnings. In this sense, the social relation enacted between Clare Short and her audience provides an adequate

representation of the subordination of problem-solving academic literature on SSR to development practice, as illustrated in chapter 1.

In addition, in juxtaposition to the UN Resolution above, this speech marked a shift in identification, through altering the interlocutors on security-related development matters. The collective of UN member states had been previously framed as the speaking and acting authority, with popular legitimacy, on development priorities and needs. By contrast, the conversation has now shifted to development practitioners and academic circles, with the former shaping the latter's opinions, through the abovementioned social relations of holder of information and elicitor of information. Therefore, while states had been identified as the "social agents," through UN auspices, leading the charge in development prescription, Clare Short's speech instead positioned her, in her development practitioner capacity, as a social agent within the emergent SSR Discourse. Fairclough's focus on "social agents" aligns with this thesis' Foucauldian inspired understanding of governmental rationalities and subjectivities as mutually constitutive. Fairclough asserts that "social agents are not 'free' agents, they are socially constrained" while they also wield "their own 'causal powers' which are not reducible to the causal powers of social structures and practices" (Fairclough 2003, 22). This is apparent in the types of semantic relationships and representations advanced by Clare Short in her speech, which are both bound by a social structure which had defined what was sayable to that point, while also transformative of this very structure. This reveals the emergence of the SSR Discourse as the result of the dual process of meaning making on the one hand and harnessing and reconfiguring existing meanings, subjects, and practices on the other.

For instance, Short relied on inter-textuality in her speech to embed SSR's rationale in existing Discourses. Inter-textuality refers to explicit or implicit relations between a text and other texts "which are 'external' to it, outside it, yet in some way brought into it" (Fairclough 2003, 39). This is especially apparent in the

semantic relationships established in the text between SSR and an existing Discourse around “the security-development nexus.” In one instance, Short states “my prime focus is on the link between the security sector and the development agenda.” Later, she states “and obviously security is an essential prerequisite for sustainable development and poverty reduction.” While no attribution was made to any external texts, the first sentence’s use of a definite article in “the link” carries the assumption that such a link between security and development had been established elsewhere and is known to and accepted by the audience. Through the use of the adverb “obviously” in the second sentence, the implication is that no argumentation is needed to support this self-evident claim. The statement in Short’s speech that “twenty of the 34 poorest countries are either involved in conflict or have recently emerged from conflict” can be viewed as an attempt at providing empirical evidence of the security-development nexus. However, by the same token, the remaining 14 “poorest countries” which did not engage in conflict can also evidence the lack of an intrinsic link between development and security.

Short is relying on intertextuality to refer to a growingly accepted “nexus” within policy and academic circles and the official development “report industry” (Stern and Öjendal 2010, 6). Within these circles, “there is a seeming consensus that ‘security’ and ‘development’ are interconnected, and that their interrelationship is growing in significance given the evolving global political-economic landscape” (Stern and Öjendal 2010, 6). However, as security-development nexus critics have pointed, this nexus is less the product of ontological shifts in security and development, than the application of a biopolitical lens to security and development practice, whereby “aid policy itself now attentively focuses on issues of life and community; on how life can be supported, maintained and enhanced; and within what limits and level of need people are required to live” (Duffield 2010, 55). As chapter 1 illustrated, this shift drove the human security and emancipatory intellectual and policy discourses emerging in the wake of the Cold War. As Duffield

argues, the security-development nexus has its origins in shifts in development Discourse leading to the “emergence of concepts such as human development and human security” (Duffield 2010, 55). Therefore, references to the security-development nexus in Clare Short’s speech are more reflective of a shift in DFID’s lens than to a changing security or development landscape in recipient countries. In addition, having employed intertextuality to refer to a supposedly universally understood and relevant “security-development nexus,” Short’s speech elides definitional problems associated with this nexus. Indeed, while consensus is growing in policy circles around the existence of a security-development nexus, “its meaning is surely not ‘a fixed reality’” (Stern and Öjendal 2010, 6). The consequence is that actors, such as Clare Short in her speech, simply draw legitimacy for their policy choices by capitalising on this nexus to unilaterally define “what can/should be done by whom and for whom in the name of such a ‘security–development nexus’” (Stern and Öjendal 2010, 6).

Therefore, the reliance on intertextuality shifts the onus of proving the key assumption underpinning SSR away from the speaker, through establishing “a relation between the text and what has been said or written or thought elsewhere, with the ‘elsewhere’ left vague” (Fairclough 2003, 40). Indeed, Fairclough’s textual analysis establishes a connection between inter-textuality and “presuppositions, logical implications or entailments, and implicatures” (Fairclough 2003, 40). In other words, the implication of the use of intertextuality is that the speaker assumes the object of the speech is common knowledge. Therefore, intertextuality reveals the speaker’s commitment to the belief that what is left unsaid “has been said or written elsewhere, and to the belief that readers have heard it elsewhere” (Fairclough 2003, 40). In this case, Short’s use of intertextuality reveals her commitment to the existence and validity of the assumed link between security and development, and her confidence in the audience’s awareness and acceptance of the security-development nexus claims. This can simultaneously explain the choice of an academic audience and support claims advanced in chapter 1 of this

thesis about the mutual legitimisation of academic and policy circles regarding human security and emancipation discourses. In other words, Clare Short's audience choice is based on the understanding that academic buy-in is both achievable and needed to offer intellectual legitimacy to this speech's implicit assumptions. This aligns with and reinforces this thesis' overarching perspective that a governmentality practice such as SSR requires power/knowledge configurations to rationalise it into existence. Much like the liberal policy constructions which were nested in and legitimised by an academic new wave of critical and emancipatory thinking, as argued in chapter 1, and the intellectual justifications underpinning the *mission civilisatrice* before that, Short sought to establish SSR's intellectual legitimacy through links with academia. Therefore, a knowledge system justifying and underpinning SSR is revealed as crucial to assembling SSR's rationalities, and in turn to upholding its practice. As Short announced later in the speech, "a three-year programme has been agreed with the Centre for Defence Studies here in King's College. The Centre will help DFID with analysis and advice, as well as training and the planning and implementation of programmes in the field."

As a result of the abovementioned assumptions established in the discursive unit, no argument for establishing a link between security and development is fleshed out in the speech. What is referred to instead is an ongoing conversation amongst development actors which led to a shift in practice: "development organisations have in the past tended to shy away from the issue of security sector reform. However, we are much clearer now that conflict prevention and resolution are key to successful development."

This excerpt is critical. In these two sentences, Short exercises social agency through simultaneously stating the current structure dictating development practice to date while signalling its imminent transformation. Two semantic tools are employed in this excerpt. In the first sentence, intertextuality is used to recapitulate, albeit in a depoliticised manner through the use of "shy away," the

Cold War political constraints which limited development actors' venture into security issues to reduction of military expenditure. In the second sentence, Short indicates a change in development practice to account for the need for "conflict prevention and resolution" for successful development. As the objective of this speech is to lay out SSR's scope and approach as a new regime of practices needed to ensure successful development, the second sentence implies a "semantic relation of 'meronymy', i.e a relation between the whole (…) and its parts"(Fairclough 2003, 22). In this example, a relation of meronymy is implied between conflict prevention and resolution on the one hand and SSR on the other, whereby the former are constituent parts of the latter.

Notably, conflict prevention and resolution, two components of the peacebuilding field, are existing development activities and do not constitute a new development focus. This suggests that linking SSR to existing development practices is also limited by development's existing social structure, whereby social agents shaping an emerging regime of practices do so incrementally and in a manner that does not destabilise the current structure within which they are operating. This is evidenced in other parts of the speech, where Short emphasises SSR's alignment with current development guidelines: "DFID activity in this area will, of course, need to be consistent with the Overseas Development Act, which requires that the primary purpose of our aid programme should be the promotion of development in poorer countries." Further, echoes of development's Cold War focus on reducing military spending can still be found across the speech, such as through stating that "reducing excessive or inappropriate military expenditure" is an SSR priority area.

Therefore, SSR's scope is shaped by what is sayable and doable within the current development Discourse. The consequence is that SSR's regime of practices overlaps with existing development activities and it is difficult to discern a meaningful added value for SSR beyond a discursive reconfiguration of existing development practices. Indeed, in addition to co-opting peacebuilding practices of

conflict prevention and conflict resolution, SSR is seemingly based on a continuation of the existing logic and practice of Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR). This is apparent in SSR's stated focus on "support for the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in post-conflict situations."

The above examples illustrate how SSR practice is shaped by Short's attempt to uphold the current development structure through aligning SSR with what is sayable and doable in development. Concomitantly, social structure dictates what is off limits within a given Discourse. For instance, Short emphasises that "of course not all of the activities classified as security sector reform are appropriate to DFID. The Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence have complementary roles," therefore indicating that her SSR venture was not aimed at unsettling the current structures and Discourses upheld by the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. While remaining vague on what SSR activities fall outside the scope of DFID, Short continued by delimiting her agency's role to a focus on "governance, conflict prevention, human rights promotion and post-conflict reconstruction," all of which are development areas predating SSR.

1.2. Social agents and meaning making through problematisation

This textual analysis of Short's speech indicates that SSR's Discourse, and ensuing practice, is limited by social structure and is therefore shaped through a reconfiguration of existing practices and assumptions. Consequently, while the term SSR was new, its components "such as reform of the defense forces, improvement in democratic oversight of armed forces, police reform, etc, were not" (Brzoska 2003, 4). As argued in chapter 2, this demonstrates that SSR as an ontological object does not exist, "but this does not mean it is nothing" (Foucault 2007, 118). Instead, SSR emerges as the result of an "articulatory struggle" leading up to and culminating in Short's speech, the consequence of which is that "new elements are constituted through the redrawing of boundaries between old elements" (Fairclough 1992, 70).

However, a repackaging of existing elements within a given Discourse does not amount to the establishment of a new discursive formation. A new discursive formation hinges on social agents' exercise of power over the structure while being limited by it. Similarly, Short's constraint by the social structure was complemented by a process of meaning making to ensure SSR's discursive formation. While the SSR prescriptions advanced in the speech are nothing new, what is new is the problem SSR is claimed to address.

The governmentality notion of problematisation is applied to Clare Short's speech. This enables an understanding of the processes through which this social agent successfully framed and constructed the "problems" which she sought to intervene upon through the invention of SSR. As explained in chapter 2, problematisation is tightly linked to governing identified problems. As Miller and Rose argue, "the activity of problematizing is intrinsically linked to devising ways to seek to remedy it" (Miller and Rose 2008, 15). It is therefore the process of problematisation which set SSR apart from its constituent parts.

Evidence of problematisation attempts exists throughout Clare Short's speech, the earliest example of which is in her statement "twenty of the 34 poorest countries are either involved in conflict or have recently emerged from conflict. I believe that a security sector of appropriate size, properly tasked and managed, is a key issue. We are therefore entering this new area of security sector reform in order to strengthen our contribution to development." Due to its reliance on implicit assumptions, this three-sentence excerpt seems disjointed and fails to demonstrate a logical flow between each statement and the next. For instance, the flimsy link between the first and second sentence is based on two assumptions: that "poorest countries" suffer from inappropriately sized and unproperly tasked and managed security sectors, and that this is a "key issue" leading to conflict. The link between the third sentence and the first two carries two assumptions: that security sector reform aims at addressing the size and effective tasking and management of security sectors, and that this will contribute to development

while preventing conflict. Therefore, this excerpt advances the earliest evidence of problematisation, whereby “a security sector of appropriate size, properly tasked and managed” is revealed as a key issue facing development and peace and is therefore the problem addressed by SSR.

This “problem” is further developed throughout the speech. For instance, Short later states “there is obviously no question, for example, of development resources being used to strengthen the aggressive capability of military forces.” The implication here is that the problem is oversized security sectors, rather than weak or non-existing ones. This is followed up by “our interest is in helping to secure a security sector of appropriate scale that is properly accountable to democratic, civilian authorities.” This sentence therefore clarifies Short’s previous statement about “a security sector of appropriate size, properly tasked and managed.” It is now clear that by “appropriate size,” the problem at hand is oversized security sectors, and by “properly tasked and managed” the problem is lack of civilian oversight and democratic accountability.

Short reinforces the problematisation process through bringing together the already established security-development nexus assumptions with a now clear problem statement: “we clearly need to address one of the principal obstacles to progress in development and poverty reduction which is the existence of bloated, secretive, repressive, undemocratic and poorly structured security sectors in many developing countries.”

Having articulated the problem to be addressed by SSR, Short uses the example of Sierra Leonne to argue for why intervention on this problem is imperative:

> *The security sector also tends to pose particular problems in post-conflict societies – societies which have undergone a long period of civil war or intra-state conflict. In these circumstances there are often large numbers of ex-soldiers, without employment or the prospects of employment,*

> *marooned in demobilisation camps, waiting – often for long periods – for the chance to return to a normal, civilian life.*
>
> *Where action is not taken to address this problem – and to assist their reintegration into civilian society – there is a very real prospect that demobilised soldiers will resort to violent crime, that the underlying causes of conflict will be reactivated, and that full-scale civil war will recur.*
>
> *This, in part, is the story of Sierra Leone, from which we have much to learn. The first failure in Sierra Leone followed the election of President Kabbah in March 1996. One of the proposals in the peace deal signed between Kabbah and Sankoh was for a programme to restructure the security sector, including the demobilisation of combatants. However, the national and international response to this proposal was very limited -and no real progress was made. This helped to create conditions in which the coup against the Kabbah government took place in May 1997.*
>
> *The second failure in Sierra Leone followed President Kabbah's return to power in March 1998. While some steps were taken by the Government, supported by the international community, to demobilise and reintegrate the rebel forces, the overall response of the international community was too little, too late* (Short 1999).

Interestingly, Short's account of the consequences of failing to take action in Sierra Leone relates more directly to the failure to demobilise and reintegrate soldiers into society, which led to renewed conflict. This does not map out directly with Short's identified SSR problem of bloated and undemocratic security forces. As mentioned above, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-soldiers fall under the existing DDR field. Nevertheless, Short employs Sierra Leone's particular example to advocate for the universal application of SSR. This is an important tool for the establishment of a Discourse's hegemony. As Fairclough argues "achieving hegemony entails achieving a measure of success in projecting certain particulars

as universals" (Fairclough 2003, 41). This is accomplished when "particular identities, interests, representations come under certain conditions to be claimed as universal" (Fairclough 2003, 40). In a likely unintentional meta-engagement with the hegemonising problematisation process taking place in this speech, Short states, "the example of Sierra Leone illustrates the costs of not engaging - sufficiently early and sufficiently proactively – with this issue. And it shows clearly the development rationale for security sector reform."

2. SSR Discourse's criteria of transformation

This chapter's first section applied the first level of Fairclough's CDA to examine SSR Discourse's criteria of formation (Fairclough 1992, 73; Foucault 1991b, 56). Through juxtaposing UN General Assembly Resolution 724A with Clare Short's 1999 King's College speech, this chapter revealed the discursive formation of SSR through a dual process of meaning making and reconfiguration of existing practices within development's social structure. The meaning making demonstrated in Short's speech is limited to her problematisation of "bloated, secretive, repressive, undemocratic and poorly structured security sectors" (Short 1999).

As chapter 2 outlines, a new discursive formation shapes its objects, subjects, and practices through problematisation. However, the ensuing hegemonic Discourses are not stable and are continuously subject to "changes which affect the discursive formations themselves" (Foucault 1991b, 56). These transformations can be understood as the processes through which hegemonic Discourses continuously adapt by nuancing, rejecting, or co-opting competing discourses and subjugated knowledges and practices. Discourses therefore transform through a process of "displacement of boundaries which define the field of possible objects" (Foucault 1991b, 56). Therefore, Foucault's criteria of discursive transformation, as explained in chapter 2, align with Fairclough's second CDA level, which refers to discursive practices, or the ways in which a Discourse evolves in the process of its production, distribution and consumption (Fairclough 1992, 73).

It is important to note that according to Fairclough, “discursive practice is manifested in linguistic form, in the form of what I shall refer to as 'texts', using 'text' in Halliday's broad sense of spoken as well as written language” (Fairclough 1992, 71). Therefore, this section examines both the written and spoken discursive practices transforming SSR’s hegemonic Discourse. First, written discursive practices are examined through textual analysis of two discursive units: the OECD DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance (OECD- DAC 2005), and the UN report of the Secretary-General on SSR (United Nations 2008), with the already analysed Short speech as a benchmark. This reveals the process and extent to which SSR’s hegemonic Discourse transformed from one discursive unit to another through its (re)interpretation and reproduction by various speaking subjects. Second, spoken discursive practices are examined through analysis of interview data with key SSR actors in Tunisia. This reveals the extent and ways in which SSR’s hegemonic Discourse is transformed in practice due to its encounter with competing and subjugated knowledges.

2.1. Written discursive practice transforming SSR’s Discourse

While SSR emerged from Clare Short’s 1999 speech and subsequent DFID policy, it gained popularity and significance within the development field and influential texts of various genres were written on the topic. It follows that SSR’s meaning became embedded not solely in the individual text of the 1999 speech but across the collection, or in Fairclough’s terms “’chains’ or ‘networks’ of texts” (Fairclough 2003, 30). Mediation is used in this section as a CDA tool which enables the examination of “the movement of meaning,” between one discursive unit and the next within SSR’s network of texts (Fairclough 2003, 30). The discursive units of the OECD DAC Guidelines and the UN SSR policy document were chosen due to the important role played by these institutions in shaping SSR practice.

Through textual comparison, two key transformations are revealed. The first affected the object of SSR. In Short’s 1999 speech, she limited her definition of security sector to “the military, paramilitary and intelligence services, as well as

those civilian structures responsible for oversight and control of the security forces” (Short 1999). By contrast, the OECD states that:

> *the security system is broad, going well beyond armed forces and the police. It includes the civil authorities responsible for oversight and control (e.g. parliament, the executive, and the defense ministry), the police and gendarmerie, customs officials, judicial and penal institutions, the armed forces, intelligence services. It also encompasses civil society, including human rights organisations and the press (OECD- DAC 2005, 3).*

Actors explicitly excluded from SSR by Short, through her statement “I am not today discussing the police or the wider criminal justice system,” have become the object of SSR according to the OECD. Further, the OECD provides a clearer definition of “oversight bodies” and includes non-statutory security forces. The UN report aligns more closely with OECD’s broad definition, further expanding it:

> *the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services (United Nations 2008, 5–6).*

Notably, unlike previous definitions, the UN makes explicit reference to “customary or informal authorities,” perhaps accounting for tribal or community leaders, and informal militias and armed groups in countries emerging from conflict.

The second transformation affected SSR's objectives. Short's speech did not explicitly identify SSR's objectives. However, these can be reverse engineered through an examination of Short's problematisation, as outlined in the previous section. By doing so, it can be deduced from Short's speech that SSR aims at ensuring security sectors in under-developed and post-conflict countries are appropriately sized, properly tasked and democratically managed. By contrast, the OECD is explicit on SSR's objective, stating that it "seeks to increase partner countries' ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound governance principles, including transparency and the rule of law" (OECD- DAC 2005, 3). This statement aligns with Short's problematisation of "bloated, secretive, repressive, undemocratic and poorly structured security sectors" (Short 1999). Further, the OECD unpacks the issue of "governance" in a way not done by Short in her speech, identifying "transparency and rule of law" as explicit SSR objectives. Short mentions governance in her speech as part of her agency's interests. However, her exclusion of the justice system and law enforcement from the security sector suggests that rule of law is not part of DFID's SSR objectives. Similarly to the OECD, the UN states that SSR has as "its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law" (United Nations 2008, 6). Therefore, due to the OECD's and UN's expansion of the security sector, SSR's objectives transformed after Short's speech to include rule of law as an SSR governance objective. Beyond explicit delineations of SSR's object, and implicit or explicit commitment to specified objectives, the three discursive units lack a clear definition of the concept of SSR. While the above can be considered objective-centred definitions of SSR, they are insufficient due to their vagueness and breadth and therefore are not useful at delineating the scope, conditions, and practices of SSR. The lack of a clear SSR definition is acknowledged in the UN report, which states that "the meaning of the term is still evolving" (United Nations 2008, 5).

Similarly, the OECD states that "understanding of the basic SSR concept and terminology varies significantly among donors, as do approaches, according to differing institutional mandates, priorities and constraints" (OECD- DAC 2005, 17). This suggests that, due to its continuously elusive scope, the SSR Discourse is in a continued state of formation and it is therefore not ready for transformation. Despite acknowledging that "a common understanding of the concept is needed even if terminology may differ," the OECD fails to advance such a common understanding in the 141 pages of its guidelines (OECD- DAC 2005, 17). Notably, given that SSR is perceived as "a key component of the broader 'human security' agenda" (OECD- DAC 2005, 11), it is not surprising that it suffers the same definitional problem as its umbrella human security Discourse. As some commentators pointed out, human security has come to mean everything, and in turn, nothing (Buzan 2004; Khong 2001; M. Martin and Owen 2010).

This reinforces the argument made in the first section, that the emergence of the SSR Discourse is the result of a mere discursive rearrangement of existing development practices and that, beyond a reframing of existing development objectives through a problematisation process, SSR's Discourse is devoid of meaning. In a 2010 follow up essay to her 1999 speech, Short confirms the flimsiness of SSR's Discourse, stating that "it is worth reminding all who are interested in security sector reform that UK policy was initially written on the back of an envelope" (Short 2010). This statement is especially damning given that UK policy, through DFID with Short at the helm, created SSR which continues to be imposed on developing countries to date.

2.2. Spoken discursive practice transforming SSR's Discourse

The above analysis reveals the elusiveness of the SSR Discourse, as evidenced by the agreement amongst actors shaping it on the undefined nature of its meaning. This renders an examination of SSR's discursive transformation challenging, as it is not possible for transformation to occur through the displacement "of boundaries which define the field of possible objects," if the field of SSR's possible objects is

not defined (Foucault 1991b, 56). However, SSR continues to be undertaken in practice. This confirms this thesis' understanding of governmental rationalities as a set of discursive moves aimed at furnishing the conditions of possibility for governmental practices which otherwise would not exist. Given the elusive nature of SSR's Discourse in written texts, it is worth examining the extent to which local, subjugated, knowledges and actors in the site of SSR's application interpret, consume, and potentially reproduce or transform SSR.

2.2.1. SSR's subjugated knowledges in Tunisia

As argued in this chapter and in chapter 2, a genealogical examination of SSR necessarily requires the uncovering of the local knowledges subjugated, co-opted, or disqualified by SSR's hegemonic Discourse. In turn, uncovering SSR's subjugated knowledges is critical in understanding the ways in which SSR's Discourse maintains its hegemony in the practical site of its application through a transformation process leading to its co-option of subjugated knowledges. As outlined in chapter 3, engaging in in-depth, semi-structured interviews is necessary to uncover SSR's subjugated knowledges in Tunisia which are not available in written discursive units.

An examination of interview data with various actors reveals a general alignment with the OECD's and the UN's expanded scope of the security system to include the police, and Internal Security Forces (ISF) more generally, and the justice system. For instance, the justice system was perceived by most interviewees as part of the security system, unlike Short's initial definition which excluded the justice system from security and therefore from SSR. As lawyer and researcher Mohamed Adam Mokrani emphasised, "judicial reform is linked to the reform of the security system. As a lawyer I am part of the judicial system and I believe security reform is linked to judicial reform. We cannot undertake real security reform without justice system reform" (Mokrani 2021). Other respondents also cite the Ministry of Justice as a component of the security sector (Jrad 2020a; Lamaison (Alias) 2021; Townsley 2021).

In addition, the Ministry of Interior (MoI), which oversees the ISF, is consistently cited as a key actor in security and therefore in SSR. The ISF "controlled by the MoI include the police, the National Guard, the Judicial Police (which operates in the Ministry of Justice and the courts, but is controlled by the Ministry of Interior), the Intervention Forces (Special Weapons and Tactics [SWAT] forces), and the Presidential Guard Forces" (Hanlon 2012, 12). Mokrani argues that "when we talk about the security sector, we talk about Internal Security Forces" (Mokrani 2021). This contradicts Short's definition of the security sector which explicitly excluded the police.

Notably, while Short focused on the military as the main security actor targeted by SSR, respondents made the distinction between the security sector which centres around the MoI and the ISF on the one hand, and the defence sector represented by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which controls the army, navy, and air force. Interview data reveals a lack of agreement amongst various actors on whether the army and the MoD are included in the security sector in Tunisia. For instance, while Mokrani argues that "the army is not part of the security sector, it is part of defence," Mohamed Salah,[3] high ranking official at the MoI, holds that "the security sector includes the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Justice" (Mokrani 2021; Salah (Alias) 2020).

Notwithstanding this inconsistent categorisation of the MoD, respondents from the MoI and outside it agree on the need for the SSR process in Tunisia to focus primarily on reforming the ISF and the MoI rather than on the MoD. Indeed, ISF officers and MoI officials interviewed view the reform of the MoI as a central SSR priority in Tunisia (Debbabi 2021; Ouni 2021; Salah (Alias) 2020). Similarly, parliamentarian Yassine Ayari argues that the Tunisian MoD should not be the main target of SSR "because the Ministry of Defence is not in direct contact with citizens. People are generally not angry with the military" (Ayari 2021). As

[3] Alias

academic and development consultant Pierre Lamaison[4] also holds, “on the ground, [the security sector] consists of the police and the National Guard (…) So I take SSR to specifically mean internal security” (Lamaison (Alias) 2021).

The focus on the police and the MoI as central SSR targets in Tunisia is due to the country’s pre-revolution context, in which the MoI, through the police, was the central tool for the maintenance and resilience of Ben Ali’s dictatorial regime. As Salah recalls, “the security apparatus was the hand of the regime and it was unjust, dictatorial, and oppressive. The three branches of power were in the hands of the regime and the security apparatus was the tool of oppression of the people” (Salah (Alias) 2020). This is echoed by other respondents, suggesting the centrality of the need to democratise the internal security forces, “demands for reform started from stadiums and from people who used to be abused by the police. There was a sense that the police was the repressive tool of Ben Ali. That's why the revolution targeted police stations and the uniform” (Ayari 2021).

Tunisia’s pre-revolution context shaped local knowledges about what constitutes the security sector. In turn, this has implications on reform priorities as articulated at the local site of SSR’s application. Indeed, a key security reform priority expressed by respondents is the establishment of trust between the ISF, mainly the police, and citizens. While the 2011 revolution called for national dignity and demanded a halt to police impunity and abusive practices, lack of trust persists between citizens and the police who are still perceived as oppressive and heavy-handed. This perception exists amongst citizens who witnessed pre-revolution police abuse and younger generations alike. As academic Lamaison recalled, a 19-year-old Tunisian student “once told me that you're not Tunisian unless you've been slapped by a cop” (Lamaison (Alias) 2021). Indeed, abusive police practices are still rampant and widespread. For instance, at the time of writing this chapter, a video is circulating on Facebook and national media showing police officers

[4] Alias

beating and stripping naked a handcuffed underage Tunisian protester in the socio-economically marginalised city of Sidi Hassine in the capital (سيدي حسين : تجريد شاب من ملابسه واقتياده “عاريا” إلى سيارة الشرطة 2021). The protest was triggered by the suspicious death of a young Sidi Hassine resident in police custody. The incident is the latest example of police brutality which simultaneously triggers public outcry and MoI defensiveness and denial. In an official statement, the MoI referred to the documented police abuse of the young protestor as a “rumour and false information” while framing the protest as “attacks on private and public property, causing commotion and chaos” by “groups of young men attacking security units” (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2021).

Establishing trust between citizens and the police is contingent on two key conditions. First, police conduct must be improved in order to ensure a police force that respects and upholds citizens’ rights instead of abusing them. As academic and researcher Lamaison emphasised, aligning police conduct with human rights principles is a paramount SSR priority (Lamaison (Alias) 2021). This can be accomplished through improved recruitment processes and training of the police and MoI accountability. Lawyer Mokrani differentiates between security officers and security agents, “officers are better trained and generally hold a master’s degree. The problem is with agents because they are usually people who did not make it in school. In Tunisia, you decide to be a security agent if you are not very successful in life. They are usually power hungry. And when they wear the uniform and are not provided with adequate training, they cannot differentiate the personal and the professional” (Mokrani 2021). This explains the general perception that security agents “have no emotional intelligence and don't know how to deal with citizens. This means that they use force for everything” (Mokrani 2021). Therefore, improving police conduct through human rights based training is a key priority (Ayari 2021; Debbabi 2021; Ghali 2021; Jrad 2020a; Salah (Alias) 2020; Townsley 2021).

However, training is not sufficient without improved MoI accountability through civilian oversight. Despite a transitional justice process which aimed at documenting pre-revolution police abuses and holding their perpetrators accountable, “we now have about 1000 arrest warrants against security officers charged in Transitional Justice cases, none have been enforced” (Ayari 2021). The result is a general perception that “we live in a state of security thuggery which is posing an obstacle to all kinds of reform” (Ayari 2021). As Amine Ghali, Director of the Al Kawakibi Center for Transitional Justice emphasised, an SSR process in Tunisia must aim for “accountability to have an effective and efficient police which respects human rights” (Ghali 2021). CSO activist and head of a policy think tank Zied Boussen argues that internal oversight mechanisms within the ministry are not sufficient and that “we need more accountability towards civil society, media, and parliament” (Boussen 2021).

Indeed, civilian oversight actors and mechanisms ensuring MoI and police accountability are non-existent or weak. For instance, no Tunisian civil society organisation (CSO) specialises in SSR or ensuring oversight of the security sector. The only Tunisian CSO specialising in SSR, “Reform,” shut down for unknown reasons. Al Kawakibi Director Ghali speculates that this provided the impetus for the MoI to oppose openness to civil society, stating that “some people say that because [“Reform”] failed in its mission, the ministry around 2013/2014 said no more Tunisian CSOs because we tried to work with this CSO but they weren’t worthy” (Ghali 2021).

In addition, the media lacks the capacity to report on security and SSR issues in a professional, objective, and nonpartisan manner. For instance, researcher, security specialist, and SSR project evaluator Eya Jrad argues that media reporting on security issues is “not professional. All they do is reiterate the communiques of the ministries of defence or interior without really looking into them. What usually happens is that the ministries end up retracting what they initially said in the communiques which makes the media look bad for uncritically reporting it” (Jrad

2020a). Jrad further argues that this is due to a combination of lack of technical capacity, intellectual laziness, and the fact that most media outlets “need the ministries so they don’t want to make enemies. They prefer to remain on the safe side so to not create problems with these ministries” (Jrad 2020a).

Parliamentary oversight mechanisms are equally limited, especially with regard to the MoI. As MP Ayari explains, “as an MP you can address written or oral questions to the executive. If you send a written question to a minister and they don't respond, there is nothing you can do. If you address a verbal question to them in a plenary, they can spend their allotted time providing an off-topic answer, so they can get away with not answering the question. So oversight tools are very weak already, and especially more so when it comes to the Ministry of Interior” (Ayari 2021). In addition to the need for Parliament to rely on the good will of the executive to respond to written or oral questions, Ayari also explains that “we are applying executive branch tools to enact our oversight role. So even if an investigation is opened, it is opened by and within the ministry in question” (Ayari 2021). This is especially problematic as the “ministry [of Interior] is really opaque and corporatist so they stick to each other,” which renders internal oversight mechanisms obsolete (Ayari 2021).

Second, and relatedly, a culture of openness and inclusiveness must be promoted whereby all security, governmental, and non-governmental actors engage in an inclusive debate to agree on reform priorities and a reform vision which responds to all actors’ grievances. This is with the understanding that civilian oversight actors are part and parcel of any effective SSR process. Indeed, respondents emphasised that successful SSR in Tunisia hinges on “a diagnosis that includes all stakeholders. We need to have at the same table the lawyer, the security officer, the judges, the Ultras[5], the returnee foreign fighters or former prisoners and they all need to talk to see what is not working within the security institutions. In light

[5] An association of football fanatics with extremist political views

of these discussions we can come up with reform projects" (Mokrani 2021). By the same token, Moez Debbabi, high ranking security official and founder of the CSO "National League for Security and Citizenship" argues that "SSR cannot happen only through the security sector. It needs to be inclusive, hence my CSO which aims to advance a new inclusive approach bringing civil society, judges, lawyers, researchers, security sector, and normal citizens together" (Debbabi 2021). Overall, respondents emphasised that a reform process initiated in exclusive consultation with the security forces is flawed as it fails to be underpinned by a consultative and holistic diagnosis. As explained by Bouraoui Ouni, MoI official currently on secondment with an international NGO working on SSR in Tunisia, a diagnosis is essential to the success of SSR as it allows for an understanding of SSR's expected aims. In other words, "we must understand what kind of security we want in Tunisia, as in define the concept and paradigm of Security. What does it mean for Tunisia to be secure? Is security achieved when there are many police officers roaming the street? Is security achieved with the police alone? Isn't the army part of security? So we need to understand this first part, what is our vision with regards to the big S Security" (Ouni 2021). This diagnosis phase is essential for SSR processes in Tunisia to be geared towards addressing the country's security reform needs. As security official Debbbi argues, "the difference between a good doctor and a bad doctor is the diagnosis. If the diagnosis is accurate, the remedy is the easiest part. If the diagnosis is wrong, any prescribed remedy will be wrong" (Debbabi 2021).

The subjugated knowledges of SSR in Tunisia point to the need for SSR to focus on reforming police conduct, while ensuring MoI accountability and civilian oversight through a prerequisite process of inclusive diagnosis of security reform priorities. The next subsection examines the mutual transformation of SSR's hegemonic Discourse and its subjugated knowledges in Tunisia.

2.2.2. Subjugated knowledges and hegemonic Discourse: mutual transformation

Analysis of interview data reveals that SSR actors in Tunisia are aware of, and adopt, the subjugated knowledges around the centrality of the ISF in security and security reform, and the need to improve citizen-police relations. Indeed, the majority of interviewed INGOs conducting SSR projects in Tunisia view the MoI and the police as a central SSR object. As Leo Siebert, Tunisia Country Manager for the US Institute of Peace (USIP), states, SSR in Tunisia should aim at "making security forces more accountable to citizens, more accountable internally to their superiors, making the Ministry of Interior more transparent and accountable, and ultimately, the end state of our engagement and what we are doing is improving trust and relations between citizens and the state. For so many, the primary interaction that they have with the state is with police officers or national guard officers" (Siebert 2021). Similarly, Search for Common Ground (SFCG) SSR's Discourse in Tunisia is context-sensitive and adapted to the subjugated knowledges at the empirical site. As explained by Hendrick Townsley, SFCG Tunisia Programme Manager, "in our perspective, [SSR in Tunisia] is mainly related to the Ministry of Interior, but not only. Sometimes it also encompasses some aspects of the Ministry of Justice (…). We don't necessarily work with the Ministry of Defence. That does not fall within our scope here in Tunisia. But in other countries, we do work also with armies, sometimes, as part of SSR" (Townsley 2021). This suggests that the lack of a clear definition within SSR's hegemonic Discourse facilitates SSR actors' adaptation to the specific institutional context at the empirical site. As highlighted by Siebert, "I don't think USIP has a clear definition [of SSR]. These days the headquarters' perspective is security sector governance, which is more encompassing term than SSR" (Siebert 2021).

Conversely, the elusiveness of SSR's hegemonic Discourse also enables SSR actors to disqualify or transform subjugated knowledges to align their practices with their institutional priorities and interests or with available donor funding. This was

apparent in Transparency International- Defence and Security's (TI-DS) approach to security reform in Tunisia. TI-DS is a Transparency International global thematic initiative which, according to Najla Dowson-Zeidan, TI-DS Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Programme Manager, focuses on "the defence sector but also the connection between corruption and security or most likely insecurity and instability" (Dowson-Zeidan 2021). Despite operating through "national Chapters," TI-affiliated national CSOS, which are meant to inform TI priorities in their countries of operation, TI-DS's focus on the defence sector shaped their operations in Tunisia to target the MoD. Indeed, TI-DS's focus on the MoD at the expense of the MoI in Tunisia is not due to ignorance of the local context, as Dowson-Zeidan demonstrated awareness of the fact that "the Tunisian MoD is relatively well respected so it doesn't have the same reputation or issues that the internal security would have" (Dowson-Zeidan 2021). Therefore, TI-DS intentionally disqualified the subjugated knowledge articulated by their national chapter, Tunisian CSO "I-Watch." As admitted by Dowson-Zeidan, "when we first talked to the team in I-Watch, they said 'why should we work in defence? Why are you interested in defence?' To be honest, they're very active and they have worked on a lot of sectors but they've never particularly worked on the defence sector because it's not a sector you hear lots of scandals about in Tunisia" (Dowson-Zeidan 2021). This demonstrates that TI-DS's Discourse and practice in Tunisia was not shaped by local demand or knowledge. Rather, it subjugated and disqualified local perspectives for the benefit of imposing TI-DS's institutional and thematic priority.

Similarly, Townsley explained that SFCG's SSR project in Tunisia involves holding local security dialogues, including CSOs, security actors, and citizens, to uncover local security priorities. These priorities then inform sub-grants provided by SFCG to local CSOs to address these security concerns. At face value, this suggests that SFCG's SSR project in Tunisia is geared towards adopting subjugated knowledges and addressing local concerns and reform priorities. However, in practice,

Townsley admitted that project management difficulties and delays on SFCG's part meant that the sub-grants were issued before the conclusion of all security dialogue sessions and that, by the end of the project, only one dialogue session was held. This means that the sub-grants were not informed by local perspectives and needs. Furthermore, the security priorities that emerged from this dialogue session were not organic. Rather, they were shaped by SFCG facilitators whose role was to "clarify what the scope of the project was" (Townsley 2021). As such, Townsley explained that, although issues such as proper equipment of police officers and police stations in local communities were discussed, "this was not part of our funding. And we did not have funding to provide that kind of support" (Townsley 2021). This suggests SFCG's delimitation of their SSR practices based on donor priorities at the expense of subjugated knowledges.

A prominent example of the way INGOs' SSR discourses and programming disqualify local knowledges can be found in Sami Rhili, Project Officer with USIP in Tunisia, leading USIP's Justice and Security Dialogue project (JSD). According to Rhili, JSD aims to "help local actors to solve their local security issues through dialogue sessions" and to "improve the relationship between police and citizens" (Rhili 2021). As already illustrated, these aims constitute the key security reform priorities and needs articulated by respondents, including Rhili. However, Rhili insists that the JSD project does not relate to security sector reform since USIP has a project explicitly named SSR providing technical support to the MoI. Interestingly, Rhili indicated that the security issues identified in his JSD project do not play a role in informing USIP's SSR project, as "sometimes the security problems that are identified do not necessarily have to do with security sector reform because they are identified by the local community" (Rhili 2021). This is indicative of SSR actors' subjugation of local knowledges; Rhili's reform priorities he articulated based on his lived experience as a Tunisian and the security issues uncovered by his own project are at odds with his institutionalised view of what SSR should be, based on the narrow scope of USIP's SSR project.

SSR's hegemonic Discourse is maintained through a continuous transformation process which is enacted through movement of meaning within a network of texts and through its encounter with subjugated knowledges at the site of its application. In addition to the written and spoken discursive practices transforming it from within, SSR's hegemonic Discourse is also exposed to, and affected by, changing and correlated Discourses at the empirical site.

3. SSR Discourse's criteria of correlation

Despite the elusiveness of its meaning, SSR's discursive formation maintains autonomy and hegemony, as evidenced by its continued application in practice. For Foucault, it is possible, and expected, to identify changes in context "which simultaneously affect several discursive formations" (Foucault 1991b, 57). This section therefore investigates correlated Discourses which affect SSR's Discourse and practice in the Tunisian context. As explained in chapter 2, the Foucauldian criteria of correlation operates at a higher discursive level than the previous two as it relates more directly to the overall epistemological field within a given context (Foucault 1991b, 57). As such, this set of criteria aligns with Fairclough's third CDA level, which addresses the social practice in its relation with discourse orders, social structures, and institutions (Fairclough 1992, 79). SSR in Tunisia is undertaken within the larger context of democratic transition. As illustrated in the first section, SSR aims at the democratic reform of security sectors. However, within a democratic transition from an authoritarian police-state, the relationship between SSR and democratic reform is not linear. As lawyer Mokrani contemplates, "in theory [SSR] should have an impact on democratic transition. But this is a debate: do you go from SSR to democratic transition or from democratic transition to SSR?" (Mokrani 2021). This thesis argues that the institutional and political changes undergone by the country during the transition process play a critical role in shaping SSR and other reform processes. In addition, the SSR Discourse is heavily shaped by the correlating counter-terrorism Discourse in post-revolutionary Tunisia.

3.1. Tunisia's institutional context

The revolution provided the MoI with the opportunity to redefine its relationship with the regime and with citizens. In tandem, the reform of the oppressive and opaque MoI and the police was a major revolutionary demand. Therefore, the post-revolutionary moment meant that "from the very beginning, [the MoI] was the object of attention and political maneuvering" (Ouni 2021). Within this context, the MoI underwent institutional changes which have significantly impacted the nature and impact of SSR processes in Tunisia. Notably, the establishment of security unions, previously disallowed under the Ben Ali regime, represented a major factor in institutionalising counter-revolutionary resistance to reform.

Prior to the legalisation of unions, the first post-revolution Minister of Interior Farhat Rajhi exhibited willingness to undertake deep reform and restructuring of the ministry. He dismantled the secret police and fired 42 high ranking security officials, "including all 26 members of the General Directorate of National Security, which had overseen all of the Ministry's operational departments" (Grewal 2018, 2). Further, the opening of investigations over the killing of protestors by the police during the revolution, and the promise of a transitional justice process aimed at ensuring accountability for past police transgressions meant that security officers were feeling targeted and attacked.

Against this backdrop, Presidential decree-law no. 2011-42 dated May 25, 2011 amended the ISF internal statute to allow members of the internal security forces to unionise (Décret-loi n° 2011-42 du 25 mai 2011 n.d.). As a result, over 100 security unions were created by the end of 2011, representing various ISF unions and advocating for their interests (Grewal 2018, 2). As argued in chapter 6 (SSR Subjectivities), the security unions constitute and wield significant power which hinders security reform through maintaining "status quo and resisting attempts to infiltrate [the Ministry] by political parties" (Mokrani 2021).

3.2. Tunisia's political context

In addition to institutional changes affecting the MoI and the reform momentum, the overall instability and fragmentation characteristic of the post-revolution political landscape carries implications on SSR and overall institutional reform processes. As elucidated by MoI official Ouni, "when we engage in big projects like SSR, the political context is important. The larger context is that since 2011 until today, the country is going through what I can't even call a democratic transition, it's more like an arbitrary political turmoil. A democratic transition would have to follow some rules but our transition is anarchic" (Ouni 2021). This landscape poses two key contextual challenges simultaneously faced by SSR and overall reform processes within the country's democratic transition.

First, as further argued in chapter 6 (SSR subjectivities), governmental instability is a prominent feature of Tunisia's post-revolution political landscape, as nine successive governments, each undergoing various reshuffles, held power between January 2011 and July 2021. The lack of continuity between each cabinet and after each ministerial reshuffle has a significant impact on institutional reform processes across sectors. This is in stark contrast to the immediate wake of the revolution, during which the country's institutional stability and a culture of constitutionalism led to a swift constitutional hand over of power. As one observer noted, "there was a sense that nothing and everything had changed at the same time. The key to this transition was a thoroughly institutionalised state" (Omri 2013).

This provided the necessary stability in the aftermath of the revolution for state institutions to function effectively. However, the need for post-revolution unity governments to ensure the representation of a plurality of political actors led to weak and fragmented coalitions, and in turn, governmental instability. As researcher and SSR evaluator Jrad explains, development programming requiring governmental commitment has been impacted by this lack of continuity, "we have had many successive governments. Each new government shows you a degree of openness. Six months later, after you started having your political access and your

network, the government is replaced. This means that the general directors, which are political positions, have also been replaced. So there is no state. There is no continuity" (Jrad 2020a).

Second, post-revolution political compromises, including in the constitution drafting process, have resulted in a political tug of war between the two heads of the executive: the President of the Republic and the Head of Government (HoG). With a view to limiting presidential powers and avoiding authoritarian backsliding, the 2014 post-revolution Constitution sought to limit the President's mandate by stipulating in its Article 70 that "executive authority is exercised by the President of the Republic and by a government which is presided over by the head of the government" (Constitution de la Republique Tunisienne 2014). However, this effort to limit the President's jurisdiction through the establishment of a dual executive system led to constitutional vagueness and ambiguity in the division of mandates between the Presidency and the HoG, especially on internal security matters.

This constitutional ambiguity is leading to an overarching political problem with implications on the security sector and on SSR. In the lead up to his self-coup in July 2021, President Kais Saied attempted what was seen by some as an unconstitutional encroachment (Ayari 2021; Ouni 2021) by claiming that the President, as the Commander of the armed forces, the official name of the army, is by extension responsible for the ISF (Présidence Tunisie 2021). The current positioning of the national guard under the ISF[6] has helped him assert this claim as it is considered an armed force. By contrast, the police and other non-military or

[6] The national guard is a paramilitary force traditionally under the MoD but which was moved to the MoI in the 60s by first post-independence President Habib Bourguiba to avoid a military coup in collaboration between the national guard and the army.

paramilitary forces are not armed forces but are rather "forces bearing arms" (Al Arabiya News 2021; Middle East Observer 2021). As chapters 6 (SSR Subjectivities) and 7 (SSR's Finalities) argue, this political context has significant ramifications on competing powers within the SSR field in Tunisia, and in turn transforms its impact on security and democratic reform. Furthermore, as examined in chapter 6 (SSR's Subjectivities), the entanglement of the security sector in political contestations has consequences on the ways in which actors, such as political parties, parliamentarians, government officials, and the security unions, are (self)categorised within the security and SSR fields.

3.3. Tunisia's counter-terrorism context

The post-revolutionary period in Tunisia was marked by an uptick in terrorism threats, bringing to the fore policy and public debates around counter-terrorism approaches and capabilities. However, it is worth noting that, despite the lack of media coverage under the Ben Ali regime, terrorism was not an exclusively post-revolution phenomenon. Although efficient at monitoring citizens and forcibly limiting freedom of speech, the pre-revolution security forces proved inefficient in countering terrorism. A 2002 attack on the Ghriba synagogue claimed by al-Qaeda and a 2006-2007 terrorist attack during which tens of thousands of police forces required 10 days to neutralise 30 armed Jihadis demonstrated that Ben Ali's police state was ill-equipped to fight terrorism (Ayari 2021; International Crisis Group 2015, 3). Indeed, opposition figures and human rights activists grossly overestimated the power and sophistication of the security forces. Commonly believed to number between 100,000 and 200,000 (Bouguerra 2014, 1), a post-revolution ministry announcement acknowledged that these figures had been inflated (Hanlon 2012, 6). According to government sources, the ISF (police, national guard, and civil defence forces) numbered 49,000 in the wake of the revolution, including 12,000 national guard forces (Hanlon 2012, 6). An additional 12,000 were recruited into the police after the revolution, though their training curriculum remained unreformed (Hanlon 2012, 6).

In addition, the ISF's counter-terrorism effectiveness was severely limited as "their operational capacity and the analytic skills of the intelligence services were weak. Their equipment was defective and inadequate. The competency of new recruits, their professional ethics and their integrity were in constant decline. Corruption was endemic, and interference by the former president's family deepened divisions within the force" (International Crisis Group 2015, 3). Indeed, with a view to maintaining his authoritarian rule, "Ben Ali marginalised the army and all his security efforts were targeting the population through surveillance" (Ayari 2021). While elite counter-terrorism units existed under Ben Ali within the police and the national guard, they were equally dysfunctional. In an interview with International Crisis Group, a former head of an elite national police unit stated "we felt strong because the majority of citizens feared us. In reality, we were weak. Whenever the people were determined to fight, we had to retreat. If we had been efficient and professional, there might not have been a revolution" (International Crisis Group 2015, 3).

Against this backdrop, Tunisia's security sector was ill prepared to address the onslaught of terrorist activities amid a security vacuum caused by the post-revolutionary moment. Indeed, political violence by increasingly hostile Salafist groups evolved into a homegrown Jihadi terrorism threat by 2013 with the high profile assassinations of two leftist opposition leaders (Sayigh 2015, 23). Two major and highly mediatised attacks between March and June 2015 killed 62 people, including 59 foreign nationals (International Crisis Group 2015, i). In addition, repeated terrorist and suicide attacks targeted security forces; in November 2015, a suicide bomber killed 12 Presidential Guards in a then unprecedented attack on the downtown area of Tunis (Amara 2015). This attack was the first of several targeting security forces in strategic locations in the capital. The most recent examples include two suicide bombings in 2018 and 2019 in Tunis' Avenue Habib Bourguiba, home of the Ministry of Interior and the heaviest police presence in the capital and the country (Belaid 2018; Guguen 2019), a 2020 suicide

bombing targeting police patrols outside the US embassy (France 24 2020), and a 2021 attempted stabbing of police officers outside the MoI (Amara 2021).

In addition, Tunisia's post-revolution security challenges were exacerbated by the spill over of civil war across the south-eastern border with Libya, and the uptick in terrorist cell movements across the porous western border with Algeria. For instance, several attacks on security forces in the Mount Chaambi district bordering Algeria, launched by Jihadi groups affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State (IS), caused hundreds of casualties within the security and armed forces ranks (Herbert 2018; Sayigh 2015, 23).

The ensuing counter-terrorism Discourse had an impact on Tunisia's democratisation and security reform context, as calls for improved oversight and accountability were pitted against the need to unconditionally support the security forces. This was most evident in the public debate surrounding the counter-terrorism law, proposed by the government in March 2015 following the Bardo[7] attack and approved by Parliament in July of the same year. Human rights NGOs raised concerns about the anti-democratic tendencies of the law, arguing that it increases the risk of abuse by the security forces and represents an obstacle to reform, as it "grants security forces broad and vague monitoring and surveillance powers, extends incommunicado detention from 6 to up to 15 days for terrorism suspects, and permits courts to close hearings to the public and allow witnesses to remain anonymous to the defendants" (Human Rights Watch 2015). As chapter 6 (SSR subjectivities) and chapter 7 (SSR finalities) argue, the counter-terrorism Discourse shaped the security reform debates, with implications on SSR subjectivities and finalities.

[7] In March 2015, two gunmen opened fire in the National Bardo Museum in the capital Tunis, killing 19 people, including 17 tourists.

Conclusion

This chapter operationalised the first level of this thesis' conceptual framework, governmental rationalities, through the application of a hybrid CDA model to analyse SSR's Discourse. Through combining Foucault's three criteria of discursive formation, outlined in chapter 2, with Fairclough's three-dimensional CDA model, examined in chapter 3, this chapter investigated SSR Discourse's emergence and transformation, both discursively and in practice in the Tunisian context.

The first level of this CDA analysis revealed the emergence of the SSR Discourse as the result of a discursive shift, which was triggered by Clare Short's 1999 speech, at the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College in London (Short 1999). In order to ensure SSR's discursive formation, Short's speech enacted a dual process of meaning making and reconfiguration of existing practices within development's social structure. This means that SSR's scope was largely shaped by what is sayable and doable within the current development structure. The consequence is that SSR's regime of practices overlaps with existing development activities and it is difficult to discern a meaningful added value for SSR beyond a discursive reconfiguration of existing development practices. However, a new discursive formation hinges on social agents' exercise of power over the structure while being limited by it. Short's constraint by the current development structure was therefore complemented by a process of meaning making to ensure SSR's discursive formation. While the SSR prescriptions advanced in Short's speech are nothing new, what is new is the problem SSR is claimed to address. As such, applying the governmentality notion of problematisation enabled this chapter to understand the process through which Short exercised social agency by successfully framing and constructing the "problems" which she sought to intervene upon through the invention of SSR. The meaning making demonstrated in Short's speech is limited to her problematisation of "bloated, secretive, repressive, undemocratic and poorly structured security sectors" (Short 1999).

The second section examined the discursive practices which transform SSR's hegemonic Discourse through its consumption, (re)interpretation, and reproduction. As discursive practices manifest through both written and spoken text, textual analysis is combined in this section with analysis of interview data. Textual analysis of OECD and UN SSR guidelines reveals a lack of a clear SSR definition across key development actors shaping SSR's Discourse and practice. This analysis suggests that SSR's Discourse is so devoid of meaning that it is difficult to examine its transformation, as it is not possible for transformation to occur through the displacement "of boundaries which define the field of possible objects," if the field of SSR's possible objects is not defined (Foucault 1991b, 56). Considering that it is the process of problematisation which set SSR apart from its constituent parts, this raises questions about whether problematisation amounts to meaning making. However, despite its elusive and ill-defined Discourse, SSR continues to be undertaken in practice. This confirms this thesis' understanding of governmental rationalities as a set of discursive moves aimed at providing the normative underpinning for governmental practices.

In addition to examining the written discursive practices transforming SSR's hegemonic Discourse, the second section engaged in uncovering SSR's subjugated knowledges in Tunisia. This is with the understanding that a genealogical examination of SSR necessarily requires the uncovering of the local knowledges subjugated, co-opted, or disqualified by SSR's hegemonic Discourse at the site of its application. This examination reveals that Tunisia's pre-revolution context shaped local knowledges about what constitutes the security sector. Indeed, as the tool for the maintenance of Ben Ali's authoritarian regime, the police and the Internal Security Forces, controlled by the Ministry of Interior, are largely viewed as central in the security sector and a priority target for security reform. In turn, this has implications on SSR priorities as articulated at the local site of SSR's application. The subjugated knowledges of SSR in Tunisia point to the need for SSR to focus on reforming the conduct of the ISF, while ensuring MoI accountability

and civilian oversight through a prerequisite process of inclusive diagnosis of security reform priorities.

This chapter reveals that most SSR actors in Tunisia are aware of, and adopt, the subjugated knowledges around the centrality of the ISF in security and security reform, and the need to improve citizen-police relations. However, analysis of interview data also reveals instances of SSR actors disqualifying or transforming subjugated knowledges to align with their institutional priorities and interests or with available donor funding. Therefore, SSR's hegemonic Discourse and its subjugated knowledges in Tunisia are imbricated in a mutually transformative process, whereby SSR's hegemonic Discourse is both transformative of, and transformed by its subjugated knowledges. This suggests that the elusiveness of SSR's hegemonic Discourse simultaneously facilitates SSR actors' adaptation to the specific institutional context at the empirical site, while enabling them to subjugate and disqualify local perspectives for the benefit of imposing institutional and donor priorities. Therefore, SSR's hegemonic Discourse is maintained through a continuous transformation process which is enacted through movement of meaning within a network of texts and through its encounter with subjugated knowledges at the site of its application.

In addition to the written and spoken discursive practices transforming it from within, SSR's hegemonic Discourse is also exposed to, and affected by, changing and correlated Discourses at the empirical site. This chapter's final section applies Fairclough's third CDA level to uncover SSR's criteria of correlation, or the contextual changes "which simultaneously affect several discursive formations" (Foucault 1991b, 57). This reveals the institutional and political configurations at play in shaping SSR and overall reform processes within the overall democratic transition context in Tunisia. By doing so, this chapter demonstrates that, within a democratic transition from an authoritarian police-state, the relationship between SSR and democratic reform is not linear, whereby SSR leads to the democratic reform of security institutions. Instead, as established in the last section and

further demonstrated in chapters 5, 6, and 7, institutional changes within the MoI, leading to the emergence of security unions, have compounded with political fragmentation to create counter-revolutionary resistance to security reform.

Chapter FIVE: SSR Technologies

Introduction

As chapter 2 outlined, this thesis' examination of the question "how did SSR at the international level become possible and taken for granted?" is accomplished through examining SSR on the levels of both its rationalities and technologies. While the analytical level of rationalities, operationalised in chapter 4, enabled this governmentality research to understand how SSR's Discourse came to exist, this chapter examines SSR's technologies: the mechanisms and practices through which SSR is exercised and maintained in practice in Tunisia. This simultaneously contributes to addressing this thesis's abovementioned first sub-question, while laying the groundwork for addressing the second sub-question in chapters 6 and 7. Indeed, as the second sub-question asks "what effects does SSR have on Tunisia's security and democratic transition?" this chapter's examination of the practices and activities of SSR actors in Tunisia is an important step to ultimately assessing SSR's impact on the country's democratic and security context.

This chapter's analysis of SSR technologies in Tunisia is undertaken through an empirical examination of various practices and activities advanced by SSR actors in Tunisia. This aligns with the empirically-driven governmentality research examination of power at the site of its application. As explained in chapter 2, rather than concerning itself with the centre of power, a governmentality framework seeks to examine power's mechanisms which manifest at the level of its effects. Consequently, this chapter's central pursuit is power, understood in the Foucauldian sense as decentred, capillary, and manifest "in its envisioned practical and technical expressions" (Foucault 2004, 31). This chapter therefore corroborates a key governmentality assumption by revealing SSR governmentality as the conduct of conduct through productive, rather than repressive, power.

The first section examines the current governmental technologies adopted by SSR actors in Tunisia, and distinguishes between sovereign, disciplinary, and biopolitical technologies of power. The second section builds on the subjugated

knowledges uncovered and outlined in chapter 4 to establish the ideal SSR technologies which best meet Tunisia's security reform needs. Uncovering the gulf between the actual and ideal SSR technologies contributes to questioning the vision and approach of SSR actors in Tunisia. Ultimately, this challenges the predominantly problem-solving SSR literature, which "does not question the approach and vision of SSR, only the specific implementation of initiatives" (Kartas 2014, 376).

1. SSR's actual technologies in Tunisia

Desk research and interview data revealed that the majority of SSR programming in Tunisia is undertaken by external actors. As lawyer Adam Mokrani emphasised, "Tunisia now depends so much on donors that we just give them what they want. The Tunisian state has no vision. The Ministry of Interior is just implementing the demands of donors" (Mokrani 2021). This highlights the importance of this chapter's examination of SSR donor technologies, due to their crucial role in shaping SSR processes in Tunisia.

This section examines the various activities and approaches adopted by international SSR actors in Tunisia. As chapter 2 outlined, Foucault's governmentality project accounts for three distinct, albeit closely interwoven, technologies of power: sovereign power, disciplinary power, and biopolitics. Each of these technologies of power is respectively examined in the next three sub-sections, within the context of SSR in Tunisia.

It is worth noting that while Foucault's work was persistently limited to national societies, this chapter's examination of SSR's technologies of power transcends state and national boundaries and instead joins critical security work which employs Foucauldian thought to demonstrate the power/knowledge configurations leading to the construction of the "third world" and development recipients and their subjugation to Western security agendas (DuBois 1991; Duffield 2007, 2010, 2014; Escobar 1984, 2012; Rojas 2004). In the context of

international development and SSR, Foucauldian technologies of power, as outlined in chapter 2, translate to a problematisation of security offering "a powerful point of intersection between geopolitical and biopolitical security analysis" (Dillon 2004, 276). This chapter's tracing of SSR actors' technologies of power in Tunisia is positioned within this Foucauldian-inspired problematisation of international security.

1.1. SSR's sovereign mechanisms

As Doucet and de Larrinaga observe, the externalisation of the concept of "security" to the international system has an impact on the conceptualisation of sovereign power; when sovereign power is projected onto the international system, it shifts from "understanding the interstate in terms of the logic of territorial defense to one in which the concern increasingly becomes the management of power within an international system projected at a global level" (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2010, 13). Most interview respondents posited that Tunisia's peripheral position within this international system means donor states and organisations can use aid conditionality to impose reform processes, including SSR. A Ministry of Interior (MoI) official reflected his awareness of this dynamic, stating that "in order to be part of the international system and have good relations with the West and have the West's blessing, we must subscribe to their system" (Salah (Alias) 2020).

Therefore, conditionality is revealed as a technology of sovereign power, shaping the donor-recipient relationship between SSR actors and the Tunisian government. As academic and SSR project evaluator Eya Jrad explained, when an influential actor such as "the EU is giving Tunisia a grant, they also condition other reforms, especially with counter-terrorism, with some mention of good governance, transparency and human rights. You always find these in agreements with governments" (Jrad 2020b). This explains why most SSR efforts are led by international actors; while the Tunisian government and MoI have little incentive to respond to internal demands for security reform, aid conditionality makes

financial and security assistance out of reach if it is not coupled with government commitment to SSR. As MoI official Mohamed Salah stated "the Ministry of Interior and the country are forced to reform due to pressure from international organisations" (Salah (Alias) 2020).

Conditionality's persuasive power depends on the amount of aid or in-kind assistance received by the Tunisian government and MoI in exchange for reform commitments. This technology of power therefore leads to a hierarchy amongst SSR donors based on the amount of money and range of security equipment they bring. Interview data and secondary literature on SSR in Tunisia reveal that the most influential SSR actors in Tunisia are the ones with the biggest SSR and security assistance budgets, such as the EU, the US, and key UN agencies such as the UNDP (France 2021; Ghali 2021; Jrad 2020a; Kartas 2014; Marks and Khattab 2013; Mokrani 2021; Salah (Alias) 2020). By contrast, SSR actors with limited funding, such as Search for Common Ground (SFCG) and Transparency International-Defence and Security (TI-DS), reported lacking the leverage or access to ensure government, MoI, and Ministry of Defence (MoD) buy-in for their SSR projects (Dowson-Zeidan 2021; Fellah 2021; Townsley 2021; Trapnell 2021). As admitted by an MoI official, these actors are not considered serious partners by the MoI as they "don't spend as much money as the UNDP" (Salah (Alias) 2020). Furthermore, the UK defence attaché to Tunisia, Steven France, observes that the UK's small budget earmarked for security assistance, in comparison with other donors, means they are not an influential SSR actor in Tunisia: "we know that we're not as influential as France, Germany, and America, the latter two having much more money than us. So we know our place" (France 2021). While he traced France's influence to "having the language commonality here," this observation neglects the unequal post-colonial power relations imbrued in and enacted by the continued use of the French language in post-French protectorate Tunisia. In this sense, sovereign power is enacted through neo-liberal conditionality imposed by wealthy states on

peripheral recipients as well as the continuation of (post)colonial relations of subjugation.

In addition to shaping the donor-recipient SSR relationship and ranking donors based on their degree of influence in the SSR field, sovereign power also shapes the types of SSR activities and approaches advanced by SSR actors. Desk research and interview data reveal two key ways in which SSR activities follow the logic of sovereign power in Tunisia. First, as explained in chapter 2, law represents the mechanism through which sovereign power is enshrined and legitimised. Similarly, SSR actors seek to shape the security sector through contributing to new or amended legislation. This is especially apparent in projects advanced by the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which seek to support the MoI in developing a code of conduct for the internal security forces (DCAF 2021; Webdo 2016), as well as international support for a counter-terrorism law, which was passed in 2015 to replace a 2003 law. As MP Yassine Ayari stated, this law was "imposed on us through funding and conditionality" (Ayari 2021).

Second, interview data revealed that most SSR programming adopts a sovereign power logic geared towards reinforcing kinetic state security. Indeed, most interview respondents confirm that border security, counter-terrorism, and equipment, are amongst the main SSR donor priorities. As observed by SFCG Programme Manager Hendrick Townsley, "there's been a lot of assistance that has been provided in terms of just equipping security forces to be able to do hard security approaches to counter-terrorism processes. So that's certainly a big part of the type of support that has been provided to security forces" (Townsley 2021). Similarly, former President of Reform, the sole and now dismantled Tunisian CSO focusing on SSR, argued "all of these international efforts are rooted primarily in programs focused on training and equipping Tunisia's security forces and antiterrorism units" (Bouguerra 2014, 6). As Bouguerra warned, a focus on sovereign mechanisms only in SSR programming risks undermining "a more

comprehensive engagement with the security sector and SSR, which would include steps aimed at improving democratic governance and transparency in the security sector" (Bouguerra 2014, 6). However, while these sovereign power considerations are dominant within SSR programming, the following two subsections illustrate that SSR mechanisms in Tunisia are not limited to sovereign technologies but include disciplinary and biopolitical technologies.

1.2. SSR's disciplinary mechanisms

As outlined in chapter 2, disciplinary power expanded the sovereign power logic through applying primarily to "bodies and what they do rather than the land and what it produces" (Foucault 2004, 36). Interview data reveals that external actors in Tunisia have adopted two key disciplinary mechanisms in their SSR programming. First, constant surveillance is a disciplinary measure aimed at facilitating and ensuring the spatial distribution of individual bodies to better extract time and labour. Interview data revealed that some SSR actors have focused on the introduction of body cams or CCTV cameras in police stations. For instance, the UNDP supports efforts to equip customs agents with bodycams. MP Ayari argued that "this is a very good step. Those agents wearing body cams are less prone to corruption and to abusing their authority" (Ayari 2021). Similarly, a different UNDP project, which launched six "pilot police stations" across the country as part of a community policing project, installed CCTV cameras in these six stations. These pilot stations have the added benefit of separating "the administrative department for ID and passport processing from the criminal department of the police station" (Debbabi 2021). The fact that ID and passport processing falls under the MoI's remit "goes back to the way the system was designed as a police state so that the security apparatus has complete control over citizens" (Siebert 2021). The UNDP project did not lead to a loosening of the MoI's grip on citizens' data so that "a citizen does not have to go to the police station to change their ID or passport" (Jrad 2020b). However, it helped relieve the anxiety felt by citizens who are too apprehensive to enter a police station. As security

official, former security unionist, and current CSO activist Moez Debabbi explained, “many people avoid going to the station to get their ID due to the bad treatment they would receive” (Debbabi 2021). Therefore, separating the administrative and criminal services of police stations is an important first step, as it avoids people having “to deal with the same officer who just finished interrogating someone and who is agitated and ill-tempered and who is now supposed to help you with your administrative request” (Mokrani 2021).

Second, most SSR programming includes various forms of training, whether targeting security officers and agents, or high-level strategic training targeting MoI officials. Indeed, interviews with SSR actors revealed a unanimous emphasis on training. For instance, as per the US Institute of Peace (USIP) Tunisia Country Manager, “what we saw necessary was training reform by completely overhauling the way training is managed, curriculum design, rethinking the role of the police officer post revolution and then redesigning a curriculum or updating it based on this new vision of the police and the national guard” (Siebert 2021). While most SSR actor training efforts had a MoI-centric understanding of the security sector, a minority of donors focused on non-MoI actors. For instance, SFCG’s SSR project included a training element aimed at “improving the ability of the media to report on security sector reform. Also rebuilding skills of journalists and social media actors to report in a non-adversarial way on security sector reform, in a way that would be informative, but at the same time nuanced, enough to not be perceived as biased, but at the same time, that would not aim to increase conflict or grievances” (Townsley 2021). Similarly, through UK funding in 2014/2015, the Media Diversity Institute provided media training in Tunisia aimed at “improving professional and responsible media reporting on security topics to improve public debate” (British Embassy Tunis 2015).

As Foucault’s governmentality project accounts for the interwoven relations between sovereign, disciplinary, and biopolitical power, so too are these technologies intertwined in practice. For instance, while training is a disciplinary

power mechanism which targets individuals, it is deeply entrenched in the sovereign technology considerations examined above, namely through the financial weight of the donor. In addition, as chapter 6 argues, the effectiveness of these trainings is limited by the interests and motivations of their participants.

Notably, the expertise of those delivering such trainings is often universally accepted. As the next subsection argues, the positioning of SSR actors as "experts" and authorities in the field is made possible through a range of biopolitical mechanisms.

1.3. SSR's biopolitical mechanisms

As noted in chapter 2, while sovereign power and disciplinary power deal with territory and individual bodies respectively, biopolitics coincide with the invention of "the population" (Foucault 2004, 242). The biopolitical focus on life and the population requires the establishment and instrumentalisation of "a set of processes such as the ratios of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction, the fertility of a population, and so on" (Foucault 2004, 243). This makes power/knowledge configurations especially detectable in biopolitical mechanisms, as these processes become both the subject of knowledge and object of intervention.

Interview data reveals that SSR actors, especially those with limited financial resources and therefore limited sovereign power through conditionality, rely on biopolitical mechanisms to shape knowledge about the security sector and its reform, while constructing themselves as an authority and experts capable of intervening on the problems they have defined. For instance, according to project staff, the first phase of USIP's SSR project consisted entirely of report writing aimed at establishing an assessment of Tunisia's security sector and the "problems" associated with it and, in turn, the areas for USIP intervention. As USIP Project Assistant Hamza Zaghdoud noted, "that's a lot of evaluation and assessment, a lot of interviewing, bringing in experts that would sit in a class and evaluate then write a report about what works and what should happen" (Zaghdoud 2020). Similarly,

TI-DS relies on an index and reports, both key biopolitical tools as they enact governmentality's simultaneous process of problematisation and shaping intervention. As TI-DS' Head of Research states "the way that we normally get people's attention is through publications. So we do a lot of work to have evidence-based publications and we're going to be moving more towards this direction in the future" (Trapnell 2021). Much of TI-DS's work in Tunisia is based on their flagship Government Defense Integrity (GDI) Index (Dowson-Zeidan 2021; Fellah 2021; Transparency International Defense and Security 2020; Trapnell 2021).

It is important to note that, although indices are a key biopolitical technology, they are intrinsically linked to sovereign power; actors advancing indices do so knowing that "all governments and all countries like to do well on global indices, part of it is PR and part of it is international relations" (Dowson-Zeidan 2021). In this sense, index rankings and scores are leveraged through conditionality to impose governance reform.

Conversely, and perhaps consequently, as TI-DS Head of Research Stephanie Trapnell observed, governments that score too poorly on indices do not show interest in engaging with the index or cooperating with the index authors, therefore rejecting the index's legitimacy in shaping the country's image as poorly governed. By contrast, "usually the only governments that respond to this type of measurement are the middle-income countries who are already doing well on some areas but want to improve on others" (Trapnell 2021). Therefore, for indices to be effective and receive target government response, they need to balance the shaping of problems (problematisation) with ensuring attractiveness to governments. This balance constitutes a biopolitical economy of power decision, which, as explained in chapter 2, seeks to minimise power while maximising its effects. The entanglement of indices with these biopolitical economy of power considerations means that the knowledge advanced by these tools is neither neutral nor devoid of power and politics. The recent external investigation revealing data manipulation in the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index

provides evidence of the malleability of index-driven knowledge and its subjugation to power and political considerations (Sharma 2021).

While the Ease of Doing Business Index achieved its biopolitical economy of power through introducing "data irregularities," USIP and TI-DS relied on "local ownership" to ensure government buy-in of their biopolitical tools. "Local ownership" emerged as an SSR buzzword and was endorsed by the OECD (OECD 2007) on the grounds that "reforms that are not shaped and driven by local actors are unlikely to be implemented properly and sustained" (Donais 2008). Both USIP and TI-DS employed local ownership in the design of their SSR programming in Tunisia. First, as TI-DS aimed to utilise the GDI as "a way to opening doors to work with ministries and governments" while simultaneously providing "a way of suggesting the areas they might want to work with" (Dowson-Zeidan 2021), they needed the Tunisian Ministry of Defence's buy-in. Therefore, as explained by a former member of Transparency International's Tunisian chapter I-Watch and TI-DS project lead in Tunisia Henda Fellah, "our index data gathering process included sending the ministry the filled-out questionnaire and asking them to fact check and provide their feedback on the experts' answers" (Fellah 2021). Similarly, the USIP involved the Ministry of Interior in the production of their initial assessment reports. Siebert explained that the research process included discussions between USIP experts and leadership within the ministry, "so the report that came out from that was not just the observations of the experts of here's your weaknesses and here's what you need to improve. But also, here's what you articulated to us on what should improve and here's how to do it. So the feeling has been that this is a co-designed engagement that is a mix of both reform and professionalisation" (Siebert 2021).

2. SSR's ideal technologies

Analysis of interview data reveals the limits of these current technologies' ability to address security reform priorities in Tunisia, as articulated through the subjugated knowledges outlined in chapter 4. Further, analysis of interview data

reveals alternative technologies which, if implemented by SSR actors, could contribute to bridging the gap between SSR actors' approaches and programming on the one hand and Tunisia's security reform needs on the other.

2.1. Sovereign technologies and the implementation gap

According to some respondents, conditionally imposed SSR reform is not inherently bad. As Director of al Kawakibi Transition Center, Amine Ghali, argued, SSR support is welcome if "there is an intersection between our priorities and the partner offer" (Ghali 2021). Indeed, SSR and security assistance are especially beneficial given the economic constraints faced by post-revolutionary Tunisia and its inability to provide the necessary equipment to face the growing terrorist threat post-2011. As lawyer Mokrani explained:

> "*the geostrategic context of Tunisia after 2011 is sensitive. We have over 800 km of borders with Libya so the security situation is fragile. The ministries of interior and defence did not have the biggest budgets before the revolution. After the revolution, their budgets increased but the Tunisian state still lacks the financial capacity to meet all of its needs, especially in terms of equipment. A huge part of the MoD and MoI's equipment comes from external aid. We even receive bullet proof vans from Turkey"* (Mokrani 2021).

However, the caveat for the recipient is "finding the balance between its national priorities and between where international actors can help" (Ghali 2021).

As outlined in a previous section, a focus on the legal framework is another sovereign power technology adopted by SSR actors. However, as a former legal advisor to the Prime Minister argued, "we are working on the legal framework but the problem is not legal or institutional" (Heni 2021). Tunisian lawyer Mokrani agrees, stating that "we have a problem of legislative glut. We have too many laws and little capacity within the security institution to implement these legal texts" (Mokrani 2021). Some SSR actors are aware of this gap between laws and their

implementation, acknowledging that “one of the frustrations currently in Tunisia in terms of reform is that legislation has gone very fast but application has gone much slower” (Dowson-Zeidan 2021). Therefore, “filling that implementation gap is just as important” as reforming the legal framework (Lamaison (Alias) 2021).

Interview data revealed several examples of this implementation gap. First, Law 2016-5, dated 5 February 2016, stipulates that “if you are held at a police station or summoned there, you have the right to a lawyer” (Mokrani 2021). However, this is not implemented in practice. For instance, protests during the January 2021 anniversary of the Tunisian revolution resulted in “2300 arrests amongst protestors. The vast majority are still arrested and did not have access to a lawyer” (Boussen 2021). Law 2016-5 is not implemented for a variety of reasons. First, advancements in the legal framework are not coupled with the logistical and infrastructure development necessary to ensure the implementation of laws. For instance, as part of Law 2016-5, lawyers

> *have the right to a certain amount of time alone with our clients at the police station. However, police stations are not normally equipped with a designated office where this can be done. When I ask for a private room to speak to my client I’m often told ‘we only have the office of the head of the station, the reception, and the holding cell.’ So the infrastructure is lacking* (Mokrani 2021).

Second, Law 2016-5 has been met with resistance from the police, who

> *are used to undertaking their investigation and interrogation by beating a confession out of suspects. Torture leads to them getting the information they want. Now they find themselves having to ask suspects if they want a lawyer or a medical exam or to call their family. The lawyer comes as a foreign body to the police officer's territory. They don't accept lawyers as they challenge their way of doing things* (Mokrani 2021).

Therefore, without the necessary accountability and oversight, the police lack the incentive to implement this law.

Second, thanks to Law 2016-22, dated 24 March 2016, the legislation on the right of access to information in Tunisia is “pretty progressive compared to a lot of international legislation, but it hasn’t translated to application” (Dowson-Zeidan 2021). While various governmental structures are struggling or unwilling to ensure the implementation of this law, the ministries of defence and interior have used the national security exemption to deny access to information or to ignore access to information requests (Dowson-Zeidan 2021; Fellah 2021). Indeed, several access-to-information requests submitted by Tunisian watchdog organisation I-Watch were met with a blanket refusal by the Ministry of Defence to provide the information on the basis of the national security exemption. When I-Watch appealed, “the ministry did not appreciate this at all and sent us a shocking response. They accused us of spying for an external entity, a crime punishable by death” (Fellah 2021).

While it is not uncommon for countries’ access to information laws to include national security exemptions, Tunisia lacks “guidelines which put the onus onto the ministry to justify when they use those exemptions, as opposed to being able to use them as a first step” (Dowson-Zeidan 2021). In turn, this requires a “redefinition of what we mean by national security,” along with an improved “law on the classification of information” (Fellah 2021). In the absence of adequate checks, the national security exemption has become the rule.

Third, Law 2017-58, dated 11 August 2017, criminalises violence against women (DCAF 2017). Consequently, “every police station is required by law to have a designated agent or officer in charge of cases related to violence against women” (Mokrani 2021). However, this is not always done in practice. Furthermore, when it is implemented, “this role is not given to the most competent officer. It is usually given to officers about to retire” (Mokrani 2021). Mokrani reports encountering cases where “a woman would go to the station to report her husband for beating

her or to report marital rape. Instead of fulfilling their job of listening and following the legal channels, the officer would try to deter the woman from filing charges against her husband" (Mokrani 2021). The consequences for women can be fatal, as was recently evidenced by the case of Refka Cherni, a Tunisian woman who tried to report her husband, a national guard agent, for domestic abuse. Two days after being turned away and persuaded not to press charges, Cherni was killed by her husband, who shot her five times using his service weapon (Boukhayatia 2021).

This reveals that, despite legal advancements, a combination of capacity development and accountability is required to ensure that security forces have a knowledge of the laws they are meant to enforce and are held to account should they fail in their duty to apply the law. As CSO activist and researcher Zied Boussen argued, instead of focusing on creating new laws, SSR actors should focus on ensuring security sector accountability for the implementation of existing laws, whereby "if an officer does not respect Law 2016-5, they would be held accountable" (Boussen 2021). Furthermore, lawyer Morkani pointed to the lack of legal knowledge amongst law enforcement agents and officers. This leads to

> *"agents enforcing their own personal or religious convictions. You can see this in sexual crimes they accuse people of related to what is called public decency. There are many things that are actually not criminalised by law like sexual relations outside of marriage. Only adultery is a crime which implies you are married. But agents would still break into people's homes, which is illegal, for these 'crimes.' If you tell them that what they're doing is illegal they would answer that this not allowed in our religion*" (Mokrani 2021).

This subsection reveals that SSR actors' current sovereign technologies do not align with the ideal or needed technologies articulated by interview respondents. Worse, SSR actors' focus on the state-security, sovereign power logic of providing equipment risks having counter-productive effects. As already mentioned, conditionality is not inherently a bad thing if SSR actor priorities overlap with or

respond to the country's reform needs. However, if SSR assistance is "not beneficial, hopefully we have the courage to reject it"(Ghali 2021). Indeed, Tunisia "has already got a body that is good at oppressing its people. If you give the security forces new toys to oppress citizens, then no, the Tunisian government shouldn't accept that sort of support" (Lamaison (Alias) 2021). This research found no evidence of the Tunisian government rejecting any SSR assistance to date.

As the next subsection demonstrates, improved accountability can be accomplished through disciplinary measures such as improving the recruitment process, continued professional development, and effective monitoring and surveillance. Combined, these measures can ensure that security forces protect citizens rather than violating their rights. In the absence of these SSR ideal disciplinary technologies, the current sovereign mechanisms advanced by SSR actors risk strengthening the oppressive capabilities of security forces while simultaneously entrenching their impunity. As MP Ayari pointed out, "lately a police officer in civilian clothing brandished his weapon in the middle of the road and another one killed his wife with his service weapon. Where were these people trained?" (Ayari 2021; Business News 2021).

2.2. The gap in disciplinary technologies: The missing accountability link

2.2.1 Surveillance and intelligence

Interview data reveals that improved surveillance of the security forces can be a first step to ensuring their accountability. As mentioned in a previous subsection, constant surveillance is a disciplinary mechanism which was advanced, albeit tentatively and partially, by some SSR actors such as the UNDP through introducing bodycams and CCTV cameras in pilot stations. While these are welcome moves, respondents pointed to the need to generalise the practice of monitoring police conduct. As MP Ayari notes "if all police cars and police officers have body cams, then they will be less likely to harass people (…). Imagine if there were cameras in interrogation rooms, they will be a lot less likely to torture people" (Ayari 2021).

Furthermore, while the disciplinary measure of surveillance can contribute to the conduct of conduct as individuals "self-police" when under surveillance, it is not enough to change the oppressive behaviour of Tunisian security forces. This was evidenced when in August 2020 a female lawyer was physically assaulted by the head of a police station while trying to provide legal counsel to a detained citizen, as per Law 2016-5 (Mayara 2020). As lawyer Mokrani explained, "cameras conveniently stop working when they are needed. So when our lawyer colleague was assaulted by the police officers at the station, they did something to the camera so that the footage was there for the whole day except for when the assault happened" (Mokrani 2021). Due to the influence and solidarity of the lawyers' union, they were able to "eventually retrieve the footage after immense pressure" (Mokrani 2021). However, normal citizens who do not have the resources or the legal know-how of the lawyers' union may not be as successful. Furthermore, the existence of video evidence of the assault, which became an issue of public opinion, did not deter subsequent assaults against lawyers fulfilling their duty of legal counsel at police stations (Ben Slimane 2021). This makes surveillance obsolete amid an environment of continued lack of accountability and police impunity.

It is worth noting that, in addition to the meta-surveillance of the police forces, respondents pointed to the need for SSR to account for another type of surveillance reform, namely that of intelligence gathering, which can in turn improve Tunisia's ability to prevent and effectively respond to crime and terrorism. Interview data and desk research point to the need to improve intelligence gathering structures, coordination, and functioning. Indeed, despite Tunisia's pre-revolution police state credentials, and "despite the extreme centralization, accumulation of power and heavy investment in intelligence technologies, the President's paranoid approach to the security sector made the security forces dysfunctional on many fronts, notably in intelligence gathering and analysis" (Kartas 2014, 376). As outlined in the Introduction, pre-revolution Tunisia's

intelligence was geared towards monitoring and cracking down on political dissent, through the “secret police.” The veneer of perpetual control and monitoring of the population was achieved through the omnipresence of the police and the existence of police stations in most neighbourhoods in Tunisia (Hibou 2011). As such, “Tunisia demonstrated that ‘community’ policing without proper oversight, decentralization and participation mechanisms merely results in a hyper-localized form of surveillance" (Kartas 2014, 376). Against this backdrop, while “UNDP is doing community policing because it worked in other countries,” (Salah (Alias) 2020) it is not contributing to ensuring that the post-revolution intelligence services are fit for purpose.

As mentioned in chapter 4, the first post-revolution Minister of Interior Rajhi dismantled the secret police. However, human rights activists are pointing to continued infringements by the MoI intelligence services, mainly through the “General Direction of Specialised Services,” which are reminiscent of secret police practices. These include “wiretapping political actors and gathering intelligence against political rivals for ideological or political purposes” (Souidi and Boushousha 2021). Indeed, MP Ayari recalls, “I have witnessed MPs receiving calls telling them that if they vote on a particular law pictures of their daughter will be leaked” (Ayari 2021). This illustrates the entanglement of the MoI and the intelligence services with political interests, which operate as an obstacle to reform. As MP Ayari argued, “politics in Tunisia is based on having information about your opponents. So everyone wants control over the Ministry of Interior, not because they are interested in security or security reform but because if they have control of the interior then they have dirt on all their opponents” (Ayari 2021).

Notwithstanding the political forces and interests hindering the reform of the security sector, which are further discussed in chapter 6, respondents highlighted the problems of overlap, duplication, and lack of communication between various intelligence units across the ministries of Defence and Interior. UK Defence

Attaché France observed a lack of coordination between the intelligence units of the national guard and the military, noting that

> *it’s a tiny country, and you can’t afford things like having Explosive Ordnance investigation organisations in three or four of these places. You need to be coordinated. And there’s a cultural problem, I think, between the national guard and their intelligence services, and the Ministry of Defence (…). There is a reluctance, for potentially constitutional, historical, pre-revolutionary reasons for these departments to work together* (France 2021).

Indeed, in 2017, governmental decree 71 stipulated the establishment of the "National centre for strategic intelligence" with the task of coordinating between the often poorly aligned and competing intelligence units of the police, the national guard, and the military (MoD). This centre has yet to be launched (Souidi and Boushousha 2021), further highlighting the implementation gap and the need for SSR actors to ensure the application of existing regulation.

It is worth noting that the effectiveness of intelligence gathering is also linked to effective training. As explained by Mokrani,

> *even as lawyers, we trust the investigative units of Aouina [the national guard]; we don't have trust at all in the STUP, economic brigade, and the criminal units of Gourgeni [police], even though they have the same organogram and the same structure. We trust the national guard's investigative units because they are professional which goes back to their training as a paramilitary body* (Mokrani 2021).

2.2.2 Recruitment and training: The professionalisation vs. reform dichotomy

As outlined in a previous section, most SSR actors advance a training element in their intervention which rests on the abovementioned intersection of disciplinary and sovereign power, through conditionality and donors’ financial weight.

However, as the next two chapters demonstrate, the power exerted by sub-groups within the security sector, and SSR actors' accommodation of this power to ensure their continued programming, leads to training efforts being solely shaped by, and undertaken in exclusive partnership with, the MoI. This means that the MoI operates as judge and jury of what security training reform is needed and required. As USIP Tunisia Manager Siebert illustrates, this leads to a blurring between notions of reform and professionalisation, whereby

> *the police can be talking to you about reform but what they actually mean is professionalisation. To them reform is better uniforms, more disciplined police force, more technology, an advanced police force, but not necessarily more democratic or more service-oriented police force* (Siebert 2021).

Indeed, a security reform "white paper" elaborated by Lazher Akremi, Minister of Reform in the 2011 transitional government, and considered by some as the most comprehensive SSR recommendations document in Tunisia (Hanlon 2012, 13; Sayigh 2015, 18), emphasises professionalisation measures, including through establishing a new police academy and advancing new uniforms to ensure the "makeover" of the police force (Tunisiescope 2018). It is worth noting that the delegation of this ministerial position under the auspices of the MoI can explain the MoI-centric SSR recommendations advanced in this white paper.

The USIP's process of shaping their training assistance to the MoI through exclusive consultation with the MoI led to a focus on digitisation of existing training materials. Siebert acknowledges that digitisation is more directly linked to professionalisation than reform as "you can take a bad training and digitise it" (Siebert 2021). Siebert posits that professionalisation can potentially lead to reform, though there is no causal link: "a more advanced police force could lead you to a more democratic police force, but not necessarily" (Siebert 2021).

This tension between professionalisation and reform was articulated across respondents. While the "police may be thinking about professionalisation in a

different way or maybe in a less profound way" (Siebert 2021), others have emphasised the need for training to focus on improved security sector accountability and democratic governance. As former government advisor Wissem Heni argued, this focus must start with an alignment of the recruitment process with democratic principles, as "the recruitment process is not transparent" (Heni 2021). Nepotism has meant that recruitment into the security sector is not based on merit or qualification. Instead, "the judicial and the security sectors prioritise their own families and connections when it comes to recruitment. These people generally don't respond to the criteria for recruitment" (Heni 2021). As MP Ayari asserted, "we have a problem in recruiting the wrong people in the security forces. Although there should be a psychotechnical test, we know very well that there is corruption and nepotism in recruitment in national guard and police. We need objective measures for recruitment" (Ayari 2021).

In addition to nepotism and corruption, recruitment and promotions in the security sector are politicised, whereby "whoever is new in power comes and removes all the people appointed by their predecessor" (Heni 2021). This has been more recently illustrated when, after current president Kais Saied invoked Article 80 of the Constitution to suspend parliament and dismiss the government headed by Hichem Mechichi, "Saied removed all the people appointed by Mechichi in the ministry" (Heni 2021).

A recruitment process based on nepotism and political affiliations leads to inconsistent "standards of the people accepted into the police force" (Lamaison (Alias) 2021). Indeed, as MP Ayari recalls his experience in prison, having been sentenced by a military court in 2014[8] for critical statements he made against the military, "when I was in prison, in the same place you can have an officer who is

[8] Shortly after Kais Saied's "self-coup" in July 2021 which suspend the parliament and revoked MPs' parliamentary immunity, Ayari served another two months in prison for a suspended military court sentence for the same charges. He is currently being investigated for other statements he made on his Facebook page critiquing Saied and his self-coup.

really nice and another with the same rank who is abusive. So there is an individual level to this and it depends on the person" (Ayari 2021).

Therefore, respondents emphasised the need for appointments and promotions to "be based on an objective and agreed upon assessment of performance with clear criteria" (Heni 2021). As police brutality, abuse, and impunity are ubiquitous issues, respondents highlighted the need for rigorous testing and recruitment standards aimed at ensuring that the police force is not populated by "people who were not successful in school, and who have now looked for some sort of power in their life" (Lamaison (Alias) 2021). Indeed, interview data reveals the need to focus on a psychological assessment of new recruits. As Mokrani observed, "when it comes to the psychology of the agent, police agents have no emotional intelligence and don't know how to deal with citizens. This means that they use force for everything" (Mokrani 2021). As such, Heni recommends that a potential technology can be "to include non-security sector officials in recruitment panels, like psychologists who can undertake psychoanalysis of new recruits" (Heni 2021).

In addition to improving the standards of recruitment, data reveals the need to ensure the continued training, professional development, and assessment of security forces, especially the police, in ways that guarantee their respect for the rule of law and human rights. This includes improving their knowledge of the legal system (Mokrani 2021), as well as "the rules and regulations that they have to adhere to when it comes to how people should be treated" (Lamaison (Alias) 2021). Boussen recommends the establishment of "a much more detailed ethical code that every new recruit is bound by, combined with a continuous training system with bi-annual or annual evaluation" (Boussen 2021).

While SSR actors' MoI-centric training priorities have erred on the side of professionalisation, interview data revealed the need for training reform to instead focus on improving police accountability and minimising negative citizen-police interactions with a view to improving trust. Indeed, as per the subjugated knowledges uncovered in chapter 4, changing the security sector's oppressive

mentality and unaccountable practices is a priority to establish trust. MoI official Salah asserts that "even though the revolution happened 10 years ago, the old regime mentality still lingers. A change in mentality takes a long time. Citizens need to heal mentally, and the security forces need to give up their repressive ways (…). INGOs help with equipment but the mentality of security officers needs to change" (Salah (Alias) 2020). Interestingly, Salah's responses revealed the very engrained security sector repressive mentality he denounced. Despite holding a senior position within a MoI department in charge of advancing human rights, and despite demonstrating an awareness of the need for improved police treatment of citizens, Salah still pondered that "citizens have to fear the Ministry of Interior. Security officers became too preoccupied with human rights that they gave up their duties. You can now see citizens destroying property then they complain about human rights abuses if security forces deal with them. Security officers have to operate without fear and citizens need to have fear in order to follow orders" (Salah (Alias) 2020).

Therefore, "an appropriate SSR approach needs to prioritize building capacities for effective participation and external oversight mechanisms for improved community safety" (Kartas 2014, 374). As security official and CSO activist Debbabi advocated,

> *this requires a human rights training to all security officers, whether in their basic training in the academy or in their continued professional development. We need to include training on human rights and freedoms, international standards and conventions, and their rights and duties so that they know that it is a criminal offence to abuse human rights. We need to change the mentalities through awareness raising, incentivising, and monitoring* (Debbabi 2021).

Other respondents echoed the need for training and oversight to go hand in hand, "since we are talking about security sector and an armed structure, I think capacity building with a big accountability mechanism" is needed (Ghali 2021).

Notably, data revealed that effective security sector oversight cannot occur without a stronger and more independent judiciary. As mentioned in the previous chapter, while the post-revolution transitional justice process documented thousands of cases of torture and police abuse of citizens, no indictments have been made to date. Director of al-Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center Ghali argued that "if we see until today no indictment of police violations, the general perception is that the justice system is backing the police, due to fear or lack of power" (Ghali 2021). This further evidences the gap revealed in chapter 4 between SSR's hegemonic Discourse which excluded the justice system from the SSR process, and between the needs and priorities associated with security sector reform in the empirical site.

As will be further discussed in chapter 6, the judiciary's oversight and accountability role is stunted by the immense pressure exercised on judges and courts by the police unions. Indeed, "judges are scared of the police because the police can and have sieged the court and used violence to get their colleagues out. Justice is served over me and you, but not over the police. An MP can be charged and sentenced but not a police officer, no matter their crime" (Ayari 2021). Therefore, in order to ensure accountability of the security sector, "the judiciary needs to undertake its role. If there is a police or security officer who's suspected of brutality or abuse, they need to be tried" (Heni 2021).

2.3. The gap in biopolitical technologies

As argued in a previous section, biopolitical technologies applied by SSR actors in Tunisia, such as reports and indices, appropriate the language of partnership and "local ownership," without engaging in any meaningful multi-stakeholder consultation. While the OECD recommends that "the involvement of civil society in SSR programmes is a precondition for wider and more inclusive local ownership and, ultimately, sustainability," the local ownership advanced by USIP and TI-DS in Tunisia was not geared towards civil society inclusion (OECD 2007, 224). Instead, both actors employed "local ownership" opportunistically, by engaging

government actors in knowledge shaping to ensure the legitimacy of their presence and biopolitical tools. This can have two potential ramifications. First, by leveraging "local ownership" this way, these biopolitical technologies have provided an appropriate mechanism to co-opt the government officials' subjugated knowledges and disarm potential resistance by government entities. Second, by having government and ministry officials as exclusive interlocutors, these SSR actors have further marginalised civil society focused, non-state centric, perspectives and knowledges about the security sector and its reform needs. The marginalisation of oversight actors led MP Ayari to conclude that most "international actors just do reports and conferences and it's all bullshit" (Ayari 2021).

Indeed, in addition to excluding all non-state security sector actors from the creation of knowledge about SSR needs and priorities, interview data revealed that the rank and file within the MoI also feel unrepresented and marginalised by bilateral discussions occurring between the ministry leadership and SSR actors. For instance, as security official Debbabi argued,

> *we need to stop only including people who work within closed offices and have no idea about field security work. We need to include people who work on the ground and who can provide a realistic analysis of what is happening within the security institution and in its relationship with the citizens. We need to include agents and officers who work in direct contact with the citizens. We don't need people who only have theories* (Debbabi 2021).

As the subjugated knowledges uncovered in chapter 4 revealed, a prerequisite condition for the effective reform of Tunisia's security sector is the establishment of an inclusive diagnosis of the vision to be adopted for "Security" and in turn what SSR approaches are the most appropriate. Such an inclusive process can also contribute to improving citizen-(police) state trust, a key security reform priority in Tunisia, as established in chapter 4. In addition, as noted in section 1.3 of this chapter, biopolitical technologies advanced by SSR actors are especially

constructive and reflective of power/knowledge configurations, as they play an important role in shaping the "problems" to be intervened upon. The current biopolitical technologies employed by SSR actors are resulting in knowledge around SSR priorities to be shaped in sole partnership with the MoI. This explains the focus on equipment and professionalisation-driven training, as these are the SSR priorities articulated by the leadership within the ministry.

However, analysis of interview data revealed that SSR programming can be better aligned with an inclusive vision of reform needs if SSR actors leveraged their biopolitical power differently; Instead of employing biopolitical mechanisms to position themselves as holders of expertise in the SSR field, SSR actors can instead help generate knowledge through acting as mediators for multi-stakeholder dialogue. This can help balance the current state-centric SSR approaches with local, subjugated, knowledges. As argued by lawyer Mokrani,

> *we don't need millions of dollars to be put here. We also don't need more legislation. We need a diagnosis that includes all stakeholders. We need to have at the same table the lawyer, the security officer, the judges, the ultras, the returnee foreign fighters or former prisoners and they all need to talk to see what is not working within the security institutions. In light of these discussions we can come up with reform projects. Reform projects initiated unilaterally by the security institution will not work* (Mokrani 2021).

Therefore, while SSR actors may contribute with their expertise about "best practice ideas and bring examples of how they've made it work in other countries, SSR in Tunisia needs to be built upon a bottom-up approach" (Lamaison (Alias) 2021). This is paramount "because the most important thing in reforming the security is the establishment of a participatory approach where the citizen is a partner" (Salah (Alias) 2020).

It is worth noting that this research found evidence of some international actors advancing a consultative, multi-stakeholder approach aimed at improving citizen-security sector trust. However, this approach was not advanced as part of SSR programming, but was rather more characteristic of peacebuilding, conflict transformation, or Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) projects. For instance, SFCG, traditionally focused on PVE and conflict transformation, applies its "common ground approach" to advance programming that "not only relates to conflict management or nonviolent communication, but it also encompasses the ability to collaborate, and to build skills that lead to increased collaboration between any type of actor" (Townsley 2021). In addition, while USIP's SSR project is undertaken in sole partnership with the MoI, another, non-SSR project they are implementing in Tunisia, aims to "improve the relationship between police and citizens" through establishing and organising dialogue sessions between "local community actors, local civil society, and most importantly local security forces representatives. So in the case of Tunisia those would be the police and the national guard" (Rhili 2021).

Conclusion

This chapter examined the sovereign, disciplinary, and biopolitical technologies employed by SSR actors in Tunisia, while evaluating them against the ideal approaches and visions articulated by interview respondents. First, while SSR actors' sovereign technologies focused on equipment and advancing legal reforms, analysis of interview data reveals that a focus on ensuring the implementation of existing laws would be more appropriate and suitable. Furthermore, a sole focus on equipment is potentially harmful considering Tunisia's police state history and the need to ensure effective accountability of armed forces which have historically abused their power and military might to repress and violate citizens. Second, the disciplinary technologies employed by SSR actors focused on surveillance and training. While surveillance of the police force, through body cams and CCTV cameras in pilot police stations is a welcome approach, interview data revealed

the need to generalise this practice, while supplementing it with the necessary accountability mechanisms to ensure police abuses are effectively addressed. In addition, SSR actors' training approaches have been revealed as professionalisation-driven, neglecting democratic reform aspects which are necessary to ensure improved, more human-rights centric, police conduct. Third, SSR actors employ biopolitical tools such as reports and indices to assert their expert position, by shaping the problems upon which intervention is necessary. However, with a view to ensuring the legitimacy of their expertise, SSR actors exploit the SSR principle of "local ownership," deploying it opportunistically to ensure government and MoI buy-in. The result is SSR priorities predominantly shaped by the MoI's perspective while marginalising civil society and oversight actor perspectives. This chapter revealed that SSR actors' biopolitical power can instead be leveraged to broker and facilitate multi-stakeholder knowledge creation around an inclusive SSR vision.

While this chapter focused on SSR technologies by examining the measures and practices applied by SSR donors in Tunisia, the next chapter focuses on SSR subjectivities by examining the interplay between various actors' powers, positioning, and self(categorisation) within the SSR field. Through examining the competing powers at play in SSR practice in Tunisia, the next chapter provides an empirical contribution to the Foucauldian conception of governmental power as mutually constitutive with its resistance. Therefore, this chapter, combined with the next chapter, amounts to a Foucauldian analytic of SSR powers in Tunisia. In turn, chapter 7, which focuses on SSR finalities, examines the impact of SSR on Tunisia's security and democratisation process. By doing so, this thesis' governmentality framework reveals and highlights the mutually constitutive relationship between SSR's Discourse, technologies, and subjectivities and their impact on social reality.

Chapter SIX: SSR Subjectivities

Introduction

This chapter examines the subjectivities, defined in this thesis as the categorisation of the self and other within a given epistemological and technological field, of key security and SSR actors in Tunisia. As chapter 5 argued, the Tunisian government generally, and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) specifically, accept SSR assistance due primarily to the sovereign power associated with aid conditionality. This acceptance implies the (self)subjectification of the MoI as an entity in need of reform, and the subjectification of SSR actors as authorities on and champions of security reform. As explained in chapter 2, a governmentality framework enables the exploration of relationships of domination which transcend the conventional understanding of a centralising repressive power while still ensuring Tunisia's subordinate position within the SSR field. However, the application of the notion of subjectivities in this chapter overcomes the narrow postcolonial view of recipients as weak and powerless subjects. Instead, this chapter examines the ways in which various actors within the recipient state exercise power over the SSR field and therefore shape its technologies and finalities. By doing so, this chapter advances a subjectivities analysis which balances an awareness of the unequal power relations underpinning SSR with an appreciation of the resistance, struggles, and heterogeneity of the governed. This chapter therefore provides an empirical contribution to the Foucauldian conception of governmental power as mutually constitutive with its resistance. As such, this chapter's exploration of the competing subjectivities at play in SSR in Tunisia, coupled with the previous chapter's examination of SSR technologies, amount to an analytic of governmental power.

As the subjugated knowledges uncovered in chapter 4 revealed, reforming the police is a central security reform priority in Tunisia. Therefore, the first section explores the subjectivities of the MoI, the police unions, and judiciary and oversight actors. This subjectivities analysis reveals that security and the SSR field,

and their related subjectivities, are tightly linked to their political context and ensuing power struggles. As this chapter demonstrates, debates around the depoliticisation of security in post-revolutionary Tunisia are deeply entrenched in power politics and revealing of actor subjectivities and interests. Furthermore, this analysis highlights the heterogeneity and competing powers within the MoI. This is consistent with governmentality research which views institutions as sites of contestation in which structure and agency are engaged in a perpetual process of mutual constitution. Notably, this chapter highlights the counter-conduct of youth groups, such as the #Hasebhom and the #LearnToSwim social movements, and links it to their freedom from the constraints of SSR's correlated political and counter-terrorism Discourses.

The second section examines international SSR actors' subjectivities and traces their approaches in Tunisia to three factors, namely donor state interests, competition for positioning, and competition over funding. These factors lead to the advancement of uncoordinated, duplicating, and depoliticised SSR programming which fails to address, and potentially exacerbates, MoI-centric and politicised and counter-revolutionary security discourses. Further, this corroborates this thesis' rejection of problem-solving SSR literature which promotes a depoliticised framing of SSR Discourse and practice.

1. The power politics of security and reform in Tunisia

Section 3 of chapter 4 (SSR rationalities), which examined SSR Discourse's criteria of correlation, explored the effects of the larger context of democratic transition in Tunisia on SSR. As previously outlined, this thesis combines Foucault's discursive criteria of correlation with Fairclough's third Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) level, which addresses the social practice in its relation with discourse orders, social structures, and institutions (Fairclough 1992, 79). The ensuing rationalities analysis demonstrated that within a democratic transition from an authoritarian police state, the relationship between SSR and democratic reform is neither linear nor apolitical. The analysis of SSR Discourse's criteria of correlation revealed that the

institutional volatility and political instability undergone by the country during the transition period play a critical role in shaping SSR and other reform processes.

Notably, as argued in chapter 1 (literature review), this thesis' governmentality analysis sets it apart from constructivist approaches which champion the analytical separation of "the process of identity constitution from the point where identities become fortified to such an extent that they function as fixed in security discourse" (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 215). As such, the analysis in chapter 4 of the institutional and political Discourses correlating with SSR's Discourse is complemented in this section by an analysis of the agents or subjects animating these Discourses. By highlighting the linkages "emanating out of interactions between social groups and the complex societal structures in which the discourse is embedded," this thesis illustrates the mutual constitution and perpetual fluidity of governmental rationalities and subjectivities (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 4).

1.1. The Ministry of Interior

1.1.1. Executive ebbs and flows

As outlined in chapter 4, the Tunisian revolution was followed by a moment of institutional stability which was critical for state continuity and the peaceful handover of power. In addition, this moment of stability, coupled with a general reckoning with the human rights abuses of the police state, was conducive to reform momentum within the MoI; there was arguably a genuine desire within the MoI to transform its relationship with the regime and with the population in the wake of the revolution. As MoI official Mohamed Salah recalled, "after the revolution, the ministry wanted to break away from the traditional perception of the police state and opened up to society and started establishing a participatory approach" (Salah (Alias) 2020). It is against this backdrop that post-revolution interim Minister of Interior Farhat Rajhi (27 January-28 March 2011) undertook what is considered by analysts and interviewees as the most radical reform of the MoI institution, by dismantling the secret police and firing over 40 high-ranking security officials (Grewal 2018, 2). Within the same context, the launch of a

transitional justice process, through the establishment of the Truth and Dignity Commission, aimed at ensuring collective healing from past police abuses through documenting these abuses and seeking to hold their perpetrators accountable. Between 2014 and 2016, the commission received 62,000 submissions and heard 11,000 televised testimonies of old regime, police-state, human rights violations (ICTJ 2016).

However, the abovementioned, short-lived, stability gave way to political and institutional upheavals, fuelled by governmental and parliamentary fragmentation on the one hand and constitutional ambiguity on the other. As discussed in chapter 4, weak and fragmented parliamentary coalitions following the revolution have led to governmental volatility and frequent cabinet reshuffles (A. Martin and Carey 2022). This affected various ministries' ability to set and implement reform strategies, while impeding external actors' efforts to establish and sustain collaborative relationships with state institutions. As Tunisian security researcher and SSR actor/evaluator Eya Jrad emphasised:

> *we have had many successive governments. Each new government shows you a degree of openness. Six months later, after you started having your political access and establishing your network, the government is replaced. This means that the general directors, which are political positions, have also been replaced. So there is no state. There is no continuity (Jrad 2020b).*

Consequently, this executive instability comes with strategic volatility, as the priorities of each consecutive government shift. While post-revolutionary Tunisia saw the succession of nine governments, repeated cabinet reshuffles meant that the MoI was headed by 13 successive ministers between 2011 and 2021. This has an impact on the strategic direction of security institutions and the degree of centrality of reform. For instance, as Jrad argued, while "the priorities of Chahed's government [August 2016- February 2020] included counter-terrorism and countering smuggling, [Head of Government (HoG)] Mechichi [July 2020- July

2021] didn't talk about security issues. His agenda is more socio-economic. So it depends on the person and the head of government's top priorities" (Jrad 2020b).

This evidences, and reinforces, the dependence of state institutions generally, and the MoI specifically, on the political conflicts and power politics characterising the post-revolutionary period. As MP Yassine Ayari asserted, "politics in Tunisia is based on having information about your opponents. So everyone wants the Ministry of Interior, not because they are interested in security or security reform but because if they have control over the interior than they have dirt on all their opponents" (Ayari 2021). As the following sub-sections argue, the positioning of the MoI at the centre of political power struggles leads to the continuation of its subjectivity as a tool of oppression and hinders any attempt at entrenching a culture of accountability.

The centrality of the MoI in power politics was made especially apparent in the entanglement of the MoI in President Kais Saied's power struggle with his consecutive HoGs since his coming to power in 2019. As mentioned in chapter 4, constitutional vagueness around the separation of mandates between the two heads of the executive (the President and the HoG), especially around internal security matters, has led to a political tug of war between consecutive presidents and their HoGs for control over the MoI. As argued in chapter 4, during the Kais Saied presidency, he repeatedly attempted to assert his influence over the MoI. In the Ilyes Fakhfakh government (February- July 2020), Saied appointed his then trusted advisor Hichem Mechichi as minister of interior, later nominating him as HoG after dismissing the Fakhfakh government in July 2020. The ensuing appointments of ministers and general directors within the ministry continued to be fuelled by political considerations. As security official Moez Debbabi explained,

> *the decision to appoint a particular minister for the interior is a political decision. As long as the ruling coalition proposed and appointed a minister, said minister will, if not be loyal then at least aligned with, the vision of the people who appointed him when it comes to managing the ministry (…).*

> *This will cascade down from the minister to the general directors to directors, so it's a whole network* (Debbabi 2021).

Conversely, dismissals among the higher echelons of the ministry are also politically motivated, as evidenced by the transfer of Kamel Guizani, General Director of National Security who was at odds with HoG Mechichi, to the diplomatic mission in the Hague, an act of political exclusion. When Saied and Mechichi's political relationship devolved from alliance to discord, Saied exerted power over the minister of interior, Taoufik Charfeddine, to undertake a reshuffle within the high ranks of the ministry, dismissing several general directors and appointing new ones. In retaliation, Mechichi evoked his constitutional power over the internal security institution, dismissing Charfeddine, overturning his latest appointments, and appointing himself as interim minister of interior instead. In the following months, political competition between President Saied and HoG Mechichi to win over the MoI intensified. As mentioned in chapter 4, Saied attempted what was considered by many analysts, interviewees, and political opposition parties, as a constitutional overreach, declaring during the 65th anniversary of the internal security forces that the President of the Republic, as Commander of the Armed Forced, enjoys constitutional control over the internal security forces. Seen in light of Saied's self-coup which he undertook a few months later – invoking Article 80 of the Constitution to suspend parliament and dismiss the government – this struggle for control over the MoI reveals this institution's centrality as a tool for political control and state capture. As former government legal advisor Wissem Heni argued, this is evidenced by the fact that "whoever is new in power comes and removes all the people appointed by their predecessor. Kais Saied just removed [from the ministry] all the people appointed by Mechichi" (Heni 2021).

This sub-section illustrated the extent to which the MoI, and in turn the security forces, are deeply linked to and dependent on the political balance and power struggles shaping the post-revolution security and reform context. As Debabbi

argued, “general directors or the minister are tasked with implementing the government policy in place. So they cannot escape the vision of the ruling government and take a path that is not in alignment with the ruling party, because they will be kicked out of their position” (Debbabi 2021). However, as the next sub-sections illustrate, research undertaken in this thesis reveals the heterogeneity of the internal security institution, with various competing internal powers, interests, and subjectivities driving the ministry and shaping its reform path.

1.1.2. The price of SSR

As previously argued in this thesis, the institutional and political volatility has led to the absence of a consistent and sustainable security strategy or reform agenda at a governmental or ministerial level. Instead, analysis of interviewee responses from within and outside the ministry points to two main drivers for the kinds of SSR projects accepted by the ministry. First, financial interests are revealed as a key factor leading the ministry to take on externally driven SSR projects. These interests include the provision of equipment as well as more individually motivated interests such as fieldtrips and workshops in up-market hotels. As USIP Tunisia Manager Leo Siebert observed “the limits to [the ministry’s] interest in participating in reform are bound by the material equipment they’re getting out of the exchange” (Siebert 2021). Other international actors “often criticise [the MoI] for a corollary failure: repeatedly giving the same, ‘stiff’ PowerPoint presentation, which they frequently characterised as a “shopping list” including a €40 million request for equipment” (Marks and Khattab 2013, 18). Similarly, CSO activist and researcher Zied Boussen argues that the only reason the MoI accepts SSR actors is “money, and for the other interests like trips and equipment like trucks from Turkey or arms from the US” (Boussen 2021).

This is best captured by what political pundit and political pundit and former government official Tarek Kahlaoui described as “*pause-café*[9] culture” and the

[9] The French term for coffee break.

impetus this provides for ministerial actors to partner with particular SSR actors at the expense of others. In the wake of the revolution and the preponderance of international development actors organising conferences and workshops in high-end hotels, "*pause-café* culture" became a catch-all concept that pejoratively refers to Tunisian civil society or government beneficiaries of development projects who are mainly driven to participate in such events by the attractiveness of the hotel venues and their fancy lunches and coffee breaks. The MoI is no different. As candidly stated by MoI official Salah, the ministry prioritises SSR partnerships with some international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at the expense of local civil society organisations (CSOs) based on how much money they spend on event venues: "INGOs seduce you in the form of assistance. INGOs have a lot of financial capacity and equipment and they meet our needs. Even the conferences they hold are in much nicer hotels than CSOs" (Salah (Alias) 2020). As Kahlaoui sarcastically put it, "it is nice to sit in a fancy hotel in Hammamet,[10] even if the price is to have to listen to some expert for a couple of hours" (Kahlaoui 2021).

Second, and relatedly, accepting SSR assistance has the added benefit of embellishing the image of the MoI, and the government, by presenting the façade of openness to democratic reform (Ayari 2021; Boussen 2021; Heni 2021; Lamaison (Alias) 2021). It is worth noting that this is not a new trend. Rather, "it's no different to what [pre-revolution dictator] Ben Ali used to do. He'd say, 'look, we're a democracy, we're a liberal country, look how many different parties we have, look how many different civil society organisations we have, but they're all co-opted'" (Lamaison (Alias) 2021). Similarly, the MoI accepting SSR assistance "looks good on paper. It looks like they're trying to reform. If anyone ever accused them of not changing enough or not shaking off their old habits of being authoritarian, they'd say, 'look, we have accepted all this aid and we've done all

[10] A beach resort town and touristic destination in the northeast of Tunisia.

this training, we are reforming'. I think it's a façade to show that they are trying to change" (Lamaison (Alias) 2021).

As the next chapter (SSR finalities) argues, while these MoI interests are conducive to external actors being able to advance SSR programming in Tunisia, the power exercised by the MoI shapes SSR practice, severely limiting SSR effectiveness at improving oversight and accountability of the security institution. Indeed, as explained by the al Kawakibi Center Director:

> *I know that the ministry of interior is powerful at negotiating, to the point that it rejects good reform ideas. It imposes its own interests in reform: 'if you want to work on reform with me, give me cars, bulletproof vests and night vision goggles, then we can talk about soft change.' The soft change never happens and never goes through and the project stops or is changed* (Ghali 2021).

This led some interviewees to judge that the relationship between the ministry and international donors is a win-win at the expense of actual reform (Ayari 2021; Kahlaoui 2021). As former government advisor Heni articulated, "I feel like the ministry just wants to keep good relations with donors and partners. But in reality, the projects are meaningless and are only about doing workshops and conferences. They just engage in projects for show" (Heni 2021).

1.2. The police unions

As this chapter has argued so far, SSR practice in Tunisia is shaped by MoI interests within a context of governmental volatility and power politics struggles. However, interview data reveals that the institution's interests and resistance cannot be reduced to its political leadership. Interviews with security officials within the ministry revealed a rift between the ministry's political leadership or "administration", which includes the directors, general directors, the minister and their cabinet on the one hand, and the rank and file on the other. As security official Debbabi argued, "the ministry's administration has political considerations

related to the management of the institution and the state" (Debbabi 2021). However, "sometimes the will of the security institution is completely different from political decisions" (Debbabi 2021). Similarly, USIP Tunisia Country Manager argued that "it's hard to speak about the government or the MoI as a monolith, because there are many competing experiences and priorities and power centres within it who want different things and who have different experiences and different priorities based on that" (Siebert 2021).

Exploring this institutional rift has conceptual and empirical significance. Conceptually, a decentred examination of the MoI aligns with this thesis' overall Foucauldian genealogical approach, as it highlights how "institutions and the concepts on which they are based arise out of the more or less random interaction of numerous micro-practices" (Bevir 1999, 352). Empirically, exploring the contesting subjectivities within the ministry is crucial to understanding the competing powers at play in shaping SSR technologies and finalities in Tunisia. As Siebert explains, political will for security reform must be understood in two distinct ways:

> *One, there is a will to reform at the political level: ministers, parliament. Those are key opportunities to push for meaningful reform. The second governmental challenge is this notion of the deep state and the conflict between the political level and the bureaucratic level of the government* (Siebert 2021).

Notably, as observed by interview respondents, these two levels of the ministry are often at odds, leading to internal resistance. As explained by former MoI official and current SSR actor Bouraoui Ouni, "if one part of SSR is to move a whole unit, such as the judicial police, from the MoI to the MoD, this is a political decision. If I was the director of judicial police, of course I'm going to resist, and my officers will resist, because all change is met with resistance" (Ouni 2021).

It is within this context that the police unions emerged. As outlined in chapter 4 (SSR Rationalities), Presidential decree 2011-42 dated May 25, 2011 amended the ISF by-laws to allow members of the internal security forces to unionise (Décret-loi n° 2011-42 du 25 mai 2011 n.d.). This move was spurred by, and further amplified, calls by security forces to assert their independence from political meddling. Consequently, Article 19 of Tunisia's 2014 Constitution stipulated that:

> *The national security [forces] are republican, they are tasked with maintaining security and public order, protecting individuals, institutions, and property, and enforcing the law within respect for freedoms and with complete impartiality* (Constitution de la Republique Tunisienne 2014, own translation).

The push for the depoliticisation of security was spurred by the security forces' desire to transform their relationship with the regime and the population by avoiding their instrumentalisation as a tool of political oppression. As Heni explains:

> *prior to the revolution, the security forces were in the hands of the regime. Now the security forces are pushing for their independence from politics. The biggest change in the security system in the new constitution is the mention of 'republican security', implying that the security forces serve the republic and not a political party in power. It is neutral and does not follow the instructions of the President of the Republic in terms of targeting individuals who pose a threat to the president's position* (Heni 2021).

Within this context, internal security forces unions were born out of the perception within the rank and file that their grievances related to subpar work conditions and inadequate pay were marginalised by the political leadership within the overall reform discourse. As USIP Tunisia Manager explained, "what you consistently hear is that the police are creating a lot of victims and abusing people, but they

themselves are victims of this police state kind of regime that is abusive and is opaque and is scary to be a part of" (Siebert 2021).

During the Ben Ali police state rule, and with a view to maintaining the appearance of an omnipresent police, "the police force members worked unsustainably long hours, handling enormous workloads" (Bouguerra 2014, 1). Researcher and CSO activist Boussen highlights that "we should improve the work conditions of security forces. Currently, security forces can travel to different governorates for work and can work for 2 to 3 days straight with no sleep and no food provided and in terrible living conditions. When their work trip is over they are left outside the barracks to find their way home" (Boussen 2021). Lawyer and security researcher Adam Mokrani also explained that police stations lack basic means. For instance,

> *some police stations don't have A4 papers to give people their requested ID documents. Someone told me in a focus group that whenever they go to the police station to take out a document, they bring their own A4 papers. Police officers are also not provided with gas for their service vehicles and they have to use their own personal connections to try to get free gas* (Mokrani 2021).

In addition to poor working conditions, security forces are historically underpaid. Ramy Merhez (alias) recalls the difficult socio-economic conditions in which he was raised as the son of a police officer: "we don't own a house or a car or anything and we lived in misery" (Mehrez (Alias) 2021). Addressing these grievances is arguably a security reform priority; recent research reveals that 50% of petty corruption occurs within the security sector (EMRHOD Consulting 2022, 29). Indeed, "bribery is so rampant amongst security forces because their salaries are too low. A cop can't manage to make ends meet on their salary. Police agents receive a 700-dinar salary [£180 GBP] for their first year or so. Therefore, most of them find ways to supplement their income. Not everyone is like that but it's common" (Mehrez (Alias) 2021).

This suggests that union demands to improve the socio-economic and work conditions of security forces align with security sector reform needs as they will result in reducing the incentive for corruption. Notably, security unions were successful at exerting pressure on the executive and the post-revolution National Constituent Assembly, leading to increased hazard pay and compensation for work-related injuries, in addition to a reversal of work termination decisions made against several security officers (Bouguerra 2014, 5). However, improvements made since 2011 to the pay and working conditions within the security forces were not matched by a decrease in petty corruption practices (EMRHOD Consulting 2022, 36). Indeed, as Kahlaoui pointed out, "low pay and bad working conditions are not exclusive to the security sector in Tunisia. Also, the ministry of interior's budget has exponentially increased since the revolution compared to other sectors. So this should not be used as an excuse" (Kahlaoui 2021).

Conversely, as the following subsection elaborates, research respondents linked the growing influence of security unions to an emboldening and increased impunity within the security forces. As al Kawakibi Center Director Amine Ghali argues, "unions are supposed to advocate for the professional aspects of their constituents, but what we are seeing is that unions are interfering in political decisions (…). When we see unions overstepping their role, sieging a court, standing against accountability, we question the positive influence that they are having" (Ghali 2021).

Notably, while the depoliticisation of security is a central police union talking point, it obscures the highly political reasons behind the unionisation of security forces. As MP Ayari recalls, "the genesis of the unions is highly political. When Lazhar el Akremi, the minister in charge of reform in 2011, with Beji Caied Sebsi as Head of Government [both from the Nidaa party], thought [rival Islamist party] Ennahdha was going to win the elections, they decided to allow security unions to form to oppose Ennadha's hold on the security sector" (Ayari 2021). As such, the depoliticisation of security takes on a highly political undertone, whereby security

unions “are political actors and they know it and are deriving strength from this. Of course they are going to say that they are not political” (Ayari 2021).

This suggests that, for security unions, the depoliticisation of security is nothing more than an attempt to assert their power over the political sphere. In turn, this reveals the shifting balance of power between the political leadership on the one hand and the rank and file within the MoI on the other. This is most apparent through the police unions’ demand for the establishment of a police agency, “to gain independence from the mandate of the Ministry of Interior which is a political institution. This will give them financial, administrative, and operational independence. The mentality of security forces has changed from the blind following of the political elites to the questioning of superiors and state strategies” (Heni 2021). Viewed in this light, the demands for a “republican security” and the calls for independence from political interference are “driven by security forces seeking to circumvent reform by manipulating the current political struggles and mediating insecurity to place security above politics” (Kartas 2014, 273). The result is that “security unions became a problem for everyone. This is a pandora's box that let out a monster which is now attacking everyone” (Ayari 2021). As the next subsection illustrates, this context severely limited the ability of oversight and accountability actors to undertake their role over the internal security institution.

1.3. Oversight and accountability actors

As chapter 4 (SSR Rationalities) argues, the SSR Discourse in Tunisia is affected by three correlated Discourses operating within the same epistemological field. The Correlated Discourses section in chapter 4 links these Discourses to the institutional, political, and counter-terrorism context. The subjectivities shaping oversight and accountability actors in the SSR field are tightly linked to these correlated Discourses. Notably, primary research reveals that the political, institutional, and counter-terrorism Discourses have hampered the effective oversight and accountability role of the parliament, civil society actors, and the judiciary.

First, as previously argued, political volatility has led to fragmented parliaments and weak majority coalitions since the 2011 revolution. This has negative repercussions on the overall democratic consolidation process; organic laws and major reforms requiring an absolute parliamentary majority of 109 votes, such as the establishment of a Constitutional Court, have been stalled. The absence of clear majority winners in the 2011, 2014, and 2019 parliamentary elections led parties from opposite sides of the political spectrum to form precarious coalitions. Furthermore, due to the plurality of parties winning a small number of seats, "the absence of a discernible legislative opposition meant that laws that contained anti-democratic elements, such as the 2015 counter-terrorism law (…) were passed by elite compromise with insufficient scrutiny" (A. Martin and Carey 2022).

In addition, primary research revealed that political considerations have deterred parliamentarians from undertaking their oversight role of the security sector or pushing for security reform. As al Kawakibi Center Director observed:

> *The parliamentary security committee is weak and unwilling to get better. Most politicians since 2011 have preferred to maintain good relations with the security sector than to start a reform process with them. Some want to co-opt the police. But we have not found any political entity willing to go towards reform because they know reform will lead to confrontation with the security sector. They want to stay friends with the security sector* (Ghali 2021).

Similarly, MP Ayari points to the role of parliamentary divisions in reinforcing security sector impunity and human rights violations, as political parties compete to weaponise the security forces against their opponents:

> *We are still in the phase of not wanting rights and freedoms for everyone. Everyone wants to use the security institution to attack their ideological opponents. The security institution is loving this because there is always someone encouraging it. This is political* (Ayari 2021).

The political impetus to maintain good relations with the security sector at the expense of accountability and reform was most apparent in debates around a proposed law “criminalising attacks against security forces.” This draft law, which was initially submitted to parliament by the MoI in 2015, was met with wide criticism by civil society actors due to its unconstitutionality, infringement on human rights, and institutionalisation of security forces impunity (Jlassi 2020). However, an updated draft was unanimously approved by the general legislation committee in parliament in July 2020, despite continued civil society and human rights NGO criticism. As Ayari pointed out, “the general legislation committee in Parliament was headed by MP Samia Abbou. She signed her approval on this law. When she became part of the opposition, she became against this law. It's very hypocritical. Whoever is in power wants to be friends with the police” (Ayari 2021). Indeed, other respondents shared the perception of parliamentary party hypocrisy in dealing with security reform, concluding that “politicians have more to gain by staying silent when it comes to the security sector. Just like the Democratic Current party, they approve of the law one day and then when people started protesting, they said they refuse to vote on this law. These are political games. No politician came out talking about reforming the security sector as part of their agenda” (Ghali 2021).

Second, politicians and civil society actors are discouraged from addressing security reform needs due to the terrorist threat faced by post-revolutionary Tunisia, and the ensuing counter-terrorism Discourse. As security researcher and SSR evaluator Jrad highlighted, “the counter-terrorism discourse brought the 2015 law and the 2019 amendment. The law came in a certain context right after a terrorist attack. Whenever there is uproar following a terrorist attack, that’s when counter-terrorism laws are passed which are truly unconstitutional and anti-human rights” (Jrad 2020b).

It is therefore no surprise that despite critiques of the human rights limitations imposed by the 2015 counter-terrorism law, the majority of parliamentarians (174)

voted in favour of it, while only 10 abstained. As former government advisor Heni argues, counter-terrorism Discourse is “geared towards rallying everyone behind the security forces in their fight against terrorism. No one can talk about reform when the country is not stable” (Heni 2021). Political pundit Kahlaoui also argues that “the counter-terrorism discourse is used to resist reform (…). Some influential security unions are propagating the idea that the main priority is not reform, but rather to bring back the old ways. That’s why you have people asking for the return of major Ben Ali security figures, claiming that they know how to fight terrorism” (Kahlaoui 2021).

Against this backdrop, the counter-terrorism Discourse serves as political leverage for the rejection of reform, enabling voices “arguing that countering terrorism requires a bigger mandate, at the expense of individual freedoms” (Heni 2021). Consequently, this leads to the vilification and silencing of civil society actors and voices calling for the reform of the security sector. As al Kawaki Center Director explained:

> *Civil society actors are accused of being terrorism sympathisers when they say that a terrorist or a suspected terrorist should not be tortured and that they have to be treated as human. You get accused of being pro terrorism and that you want the police to die. We see this every day* (Ghali 2021).

Indeed, research data reveals the polarisation engendered by the counter-terrorism Discourse, pitting calls for human rights-based reform against security sector stability in the face of the terrorism threat. Further, as chapter 7 explores, primary research suggests that police unions are central actors in capitalising on the counter-terrorism Discourse to define SSR in narrow sectorial terms. As observed by former police union founder and current CSO activist Debbabi, “union actors are sectorial actors whose sole task is to defend the interests of their sector. They lack a comprehensive vision of the issues facing the whole nation. A unionist cannot be at an equal distance from all actors” (Debbabi 2021). It follows that the police unions “created a lot of animosity between security forces and the rest of

society" (Debbabi 2021). Indeed, MP Ayari articulated the general popular perception of police unions as self-serving, stating that "with the exception of a handful, the most corrupt individuals in the security sector join security unions. They are thugs who intimidate ministers and who have held arms against the President of the Republic" (Ayari 2021).

Third, and relatedly, research data reveals that security unions have capitalised on the institutional dependence of the judiciary on the police to entrench their impunity and resistance to accountability. As explained by lawyer Mokrani:

> *The problem for judges today in Tunisia is that in theory, they have power over the police, but the police unions are rebelling against the judges who are now scared of the unions and of the police (…). For instance, with the recent instances of arrests of many young football supporters, the judges were believing whatever case reports are presented by the police (…). the implicit fear of the judges is that if they go against the police then the police will stop bringing cases to them* (Mokrani 2021).

As argued in chapter 5 (SSR technologies), repeated instances of police unions besieging and storming courts to put pressure on judges means that "judges are scared of the police because the police can and have sieged the court and used violence to get their colleagues out" (Ayari 2021). As lawyer Mokrani recalled, these intimidation tactics were used by police unions during the trial of the officers who physically assaulted a female lawyer at a police station:

> t*he attorney general's office was not willing to cooperate with us. We had to change courts and then the day of the court proceeding there was a clash when police unions surrounded the court. This was the second time they do so in the same Ben Arous court. A third time was in Sousse. Our colleagues were stuck in the corridors of the court building and there was immense pressure on the judge who was left alone by all his colleagues surrounded by the police at 10 at night* (Mokrani 2021).

In contrast to judges, Tunisian lawyers possess the corporatist unity, through the National Order of Lawyers, to muster an effective resistance to police union intimidation in the absence of state protection. As Mokrani explained "judges are not being protected by the state, so they are unable to confront the police. Lawyers have their National Order and it is a very tightly knit profession. Corporatism is not necessarily a good thing, especially in a context of democratic transition, but in this instance, it is helping lawyers protect each other from the police because we are not confident that the Tunisian state will offer us protection" (Mokrani 2021).

Notably, police impunity and resistance to judicial accountability has an impact on civil-(police) state relations, due to the general perception that police forces operate above the law, whereby "justice is served over me and you, but not over the police" (Ayari 2021). Consequently, this has contributed to the emergence of new forms of subjectivities and counter-conduct, embodied by independent youth movements and football fan protestors. For instance, the protests against the proposed law "criminalising attacks against security forces" were led by a group of independent youth which started the #Hasebhom (#HoldThemAccountable) movement (Hasebhom Facebook Page n.d.). The movement quickly garnered a large following, with almost fifty thousand Facebook followers and adopted a confrontational approach towards police unions. In protests outside the parliament during the plenary session meant to vote on the law, young protesters brandished 10-Dinar notes, chanting "10 Dinars and [the law] won't pass," referencing the widely known police practice of demanding 10 Dinar bribes from citizens. While openly provocative, such slogans clearly highlight and critique corrupt security practices in need of reform. The movement's efforts were successful in leading the MoI to withdraw the draft law.

Similarly, the #تعلم_عوم (#LearnToSwim) movement started in response to the March 2018 killing of 19-year-old football supporter Omar Laabidi by the police. Laabidi, who was attending a football match, was forced to jump in a river after

being chased by the police. According to eyewitnesses, police agents chasing Laabidi prevented his friends from helping him. As Laabidi fought for his life, he pleaded with the police that he cannot swim, to which one police agent sarcastically responded with “learn to swim” (Al Jazeera Net 2018). Laabidi’s funeral was attended by thousands of youths from across football fan bases, unifying them to denounce police abuses against young Tunisian men within and outside stadiums (Al Qatiba 2022).

As the trial of the 14 involved police agents progresses, the #LearnToSwim movement members are accomplishing what the judicial system has failed to do: demanding justice for Laabidi and accountability of the agents involved in his killing. Indeed, the ongoing trial has been affected by police union practices of intimidating witnesses and judges, leading to false charges against three witnesses and a slow pace of the trial. After the 14 defendants were absent from the first trial session in January 2022, the #LearnToSwim movement, with support from the #Hasebhom movement, issued a call to protest in front of the Ben Arous court during the second trial session in February. In addition, the movement rallied civil society actors to announce the 31st of March, the anniversary of Laabidi’s killing, as a “national day against impunity” (Ultratunisia 2022).

While these youth-based groups have been spurred by specific events, they are proving to generate the only counter-conduct capable and willing to challenge police union impunity and their chokehold on reform discourses. Foucault elaborated the notion of counter-conduct struggles within governmental power, emphasising their dual effect of “assert[ing] the right to be different,” while attacking “everything which separates the individual, breaks his links with others, splits up community life, forces the individual back on himself, and ties him to his own identity in a constraining way. These struggles are not exactly for or against the ‘individual’ but rather they are struggles against the ‘government of individualization’” (Foucault 1982, 781). Indeed, as previously argued, the rift between ideological and political groups and their desire to instrumentalise the

police against their opponents have led to the individualisation of rights and freedoms, whereby each group is happy for the police to brutalise their opponents. The result is that "the police are abusing everyone and no one enjoys rights or freedoms" (Ayari 2021). By contrast, these youth movements reject this individualisation of rights and freedoms, instead leading a universal plight against police brutality and impunity: in a public statement issued in February 2022, the #LearnToSwim movement emphasised that their protests are not only calling for justice for Omar Laabidi, but to the end of police impunity and accountability for the "dozens of cases related to suspected deaths and torture in detention centres, most of which end in acquittals or in slow, complex trials that lead to misdemeanour charges, thus perpetuating systematic impunity and a culture of covering up the truth" (Ultratunisia 2022). Similarly, the #Hasebhom movement continues its security reform advocacy by documenting abusive police practices and unfair arrests and trials against activists and protestors.

These youth movements provide empirical support for the utility of incorporating the Foucauldian notion of counter-conduct in the study of social movements. Indeed, conventional social movement literature does not engage with Foucauldian thought, perhaps due to the perception of Foucauldian power analytics as neglecting resistance (Death 2010, 236). However, this chapter's examination of youth movements' counter-conduct reveals their resistance as inherent to SSR's governmentality. As such, deploying the notion of counter conduct in the examination of youth resistance in this case overcomes the binary between power and resistance advanced in conventional social movement studies and literature on protests and contentious politics (Chatterjee and Finger 1994; Porta et al. 2004; Porta and Diani 2006; Tarrow 1998; Taylor 1995; Tilly and Tarrow 2015).

Youth movements' counter-conduct is generated by the freedom of these youth groups from the correlated Discourses which affect and limit other oversight actors. For instance, members of the #Hasebhom and #LearnToSwim movements

are unencumbered by political power struggles and interests which lead parliamentarians and political parties to choose silence over calls for security reform. In addition, as the #LearnToSwim movement is overwhelmingly made up of young, mostly male, football fans, this category is already securitised in police and public discourses, as they are continuously framed as thugs and criminals posing a threat to public order and security (Han 2021). Indeed, this securitisation extends to male youths from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds. For instance, as described in chapter 4, the MoI framed youth-led in Sidi Hassine against police brutality and the killing of a young Sidi Hassine resident as led by "groups of young men attacking security units" (Ministère de l'Intérieur 2021). Therefore, while the counter-terrorism Discourse imposes limitations on other civil society actors who wish to avoid accusations of supporting terrorism or destabilising the security sector, these youth movements defy these discursive limitations by inhabiting and instrumentalising their own securitisation.

This section examined the multiplicity of subject positions shaping the security reform Discourse in post-revolution Tunisia. These subjectivities play a key role in shaping the country's overall, and security-specific, democratic reform path. However, as SSR in Tunisia is solely delivered by external actors, an accurate analysis of SSR subjectivities requires an examination of the micro-physics of SSR donor powers.

2. SSR actors' politics

This chapter has illustrated the deeply political nature of power relations in Tunisia and their impact on the security and reform Discourses. As chapter 2 argued, SSR literature's predominant problem-solving approach leads to its neglect of political considerations and struggles related to SSR, instead opting for framing SSR as a purely technical and depoliticised endeavour. Interview data has revealed this to be also empirically true in the case of Tunisia; interview data suggests that SSR actors and their approaches in Tunisia neglect, and potentially exacerbate, the political struggles associated with SSR within the MoI and in the institution's

relation with its overall political context. This is evidenced by the fact that SSR actors undertake their programming in sole partnership with the ministry's leadership, as illustrated in chapter 5. This marginalises oversight and accountability actors, as well as actors within the ministry who see themselves as excluded from the decision making around the reform priorities and projects affecting them. Security official Debbabi complains that:

> *the problem is that major SSR projects are done in sole partnership with the security institution, and by that I mean the administration and not the whole sector (…). So the result is projects that do not necessarily respond to our needs. These projects can then be forced on the actual beneficiaries. As a security officer, I am not necessarily always aware that such project is funded by such organisation. My perception is that this is part of the ministry's budget and they are earmarked based on high level political decisions and therefore I have no right to discuss or give my opinion about these projects* (Debbabi 2021).

By neglecting this inter-institutional tension, SSR actors are overlooking central debates around the political independence of the internal security forces and the power of the police unions in shaping security sector reform. Chapter 7 (SSR Finalities) further explores how police unions hinder efforts to improve accountability of the security sector while defining SSR in their own terms. Notably, as further argued in chapter 7, by failing to acknowledge and address this highly political context, international SSR actors are "unintentionally supporting the increasing autonomy of the security forces," with significant impacts on the security reform process (Kartas 2014, 373).

Interview data reveals three key factors which lead SSR actors to disregard the political context enshrouding the security sector in Tunisia. First, donor state interests are a key factor shaping SSR actor strategies and practices in Tunisia. As USIP Tunisia Manager explained, "even nongovernmental organisations are funded by governments. So no matter who you are, unless you are privately

funded, you are caught up in the geopolitics of your funder and what their expectations are and what their strategic objectives in the country are. So that affects you primarily in what kind of projects you can get funding for" (Siebert 2021).

Indeed, donor states' security interests were consistently raised by respondents as a key impetus for SSR programming. This explains, and reinforces, the counter-terrorism focus of SSR programming in Tunisia. For instance, when explaining the UK's interest in security cooperation and SSR in Tunisia, UK Defence Attaché Steven France stated that:

> *People don't put money into other people's countries just for fun. They do it for good reasons, and the specific reason here is that there are UK interests in Tunisia. There is supposed to be half a million British tourists here every year (…), in this part of the world between Libya, and Algeria (…), where there is a terrorist threat. And the British military needs to have a relationship because of the one in a million chance that something scary happens* (France 2021).

The US's security interest-based SSR programming was also acknowledged by USIP Tunisia Manager, who explained that "the US is interested in creating a prosperous and stable Tunisia that's a strong partner in the region. You have Algeria that no one can work with, you have Libya, which is at war, and you have the Sahel in the south which is ungoverned. So Tunisia is this one place (…) where we could have a stable and prosperous democracy that is a key ally in the Mediterranean or African region" (Siebert 2021).

Governmental and security actors within Tunisia are aware and accepting of this dynamic. For instance, an MoI official highlighted that "western state policies like the US and Europe are reflected in international organisations' policies in Tunisia" (Salah (Alias) 2020). Similarly, security official Debbabi explained that "if there is US funding for instance, this funding will not be in opposition to the US's policy

towards Tunisia. So state relations affect INGOs as well. For instance, the EU approach to violent extremism views that Tunisia is the biggest exporter of foreign fighters. Automatically, their funding is based on this view" (Debbabi 2021).

Notably, this dynamic reveals significant donor state leverage to impose political and security agendas on the recipient state. However, as argued by security researcher and international SSR practitioner Arthur Boutellis, "rarely do international actors use their leverage to achieve genuine security sector reform because it's not in their interests. The outside players are more interested in access to intel and in creating those forces that they'll be able to use for their own purposes" (Boutellis 2021). This propagates the perception that SSR programming serves as a mere façade and a reconfiguration of unequal geopolitical power and security relations, whereby SSR actors may "talk the talk, but they don't walk the walk" (Boutellis 2021). As academic and SSR evaluator Jrad pointedly argued:

> *their [donors'] concern is not really SSR. Their concern is protecting their own citizens. Their concern is counter-terrorism and countering terrorism in specific touristic places. A major part of the UK portfolio is counter-terrorism in touristic areas. Border security assistance is to stop illegal immigrants from reaching their boarders because they are potential terrorists. So what interests them is not really SSR but counter-terrorism, not for our citizens, but the protection of their own citizens. But it comes as a package, they cannot say 'only protect my citizens' so the approach has to resemble SSR at least even though honestly what they're doing is not SSR, it's not even counter-terrorism, it's 'protect my people'* (Jrad 2020a).

Second, SSR actor positioning is revealed as shaping the types of SSR approaches and activities advanced in Tunisia. For instance, in the wake of the revolution, UN agencies and other international organisations competed to "position themselves as the main interlocutors of the Ministry of Interior" (Kartas 2014, 379). Interview data links this donor competition for access to the predominance of SSR

programming established in sole partnership with the MoI. Indeed, former Director of Bilateral Cooperation within the Ministry of Interior explains:

> *The Ministry of Interior has two different types of cooperation. The first is with its counterparts: other MoIs. This is bilateral cooperation. Before the revolution, bilateral cooperation used to make up about 80% of the Ministry's cooperation. The 20% is multilateral cooperation, which includes all MoI activities in the framework of cooperating with international or regional organisations. With the revolution, this 80/20 ratio changed and that 20% increased because there was a flux of international SSR cooperation* (Ouni 2021).

Within this context, seeking MoI partnership became a primary driver of SSR actors, and "organizations like the Geneva Centre on the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) prioritized establishing themselves as the prime experts on SSR and developing privileged relationships with the Ministry of Interior" (Kartas 2014, 378). Indeed, instead of seeking to establish a strategic blueprint, "international organisations fell in[to] the mistake of just wanting to appear active on paper, just so they can write in their narrative reports that they worked in Tunisia with actor X or Y. This is all theoretical, but sometimes in practice, they haven't done anything" (Debbabi 2021).

Conversely, interview data reveals that the political power struggles surrounding Tunisia's security sector are simultaneously exacerbated by and leading to SSR actors' choice of depoliticised and MoI-centric approach. As Ouni ponders, INGOs "thought about it logically and it was beneficial politically to look like they are helping Tunisia between 2011 and 2013. So they decided to circumvent the political mess and still call their work SSR in order to gain political credit" (Ouni 2021). This suggests that SSR practice in Tunisia is transformed by its encounter with competing powers at the site of its application. Indeed, SSR practitioner Boutellis described a tension between "headquarter discourses" and the reality of

SSR intervention once it is confronted with the complex power relations on the ground:

> *the UN headquarters work very much at a normative and strategic level; an almost stratospheric level such as through the development of SSR general guidance, and what have you. In the field, we get our hands a little dirty (…) because you realise in the field very quickly, that in order to get to the big strategic discussions about security sector governance and democratic oversight, and all these things that matter, you have to have entry points* (Boutellis 2021).

Third, competition for funding is revealed as shaping SSR actor programming and activities. As SSR evaluator Jrad argued, “non-governmental actors like UNDP, Search for Common Ground (SFCG), USIP, they are competing in their projects. They’re not doing SSR for the sake of SSR. They are working on it because there is money and funding opportunities” (Jrad 2020b). The result is competing actors implementing uncoordinated programming with limited overall impact. This was confirmed by SFCG Tunisia Manager Hendrick Townsley, who stated that “I know there's a lack of coordination between the institutions and competition for attracting funds and securing technical assistance” (Townsley 2021).

Notably, lack of SSR actor coordination was an issue raised by respondents across stakeholder groups (Boussen 2021; Boutellis 2021; France 2021; Ouni 2021). As chapter 7 argues, this lack of coordination hinders effective reform efforts and the potential impact of SSR programming, as it leads to duplication of efforts and squandering of funds. As Jrad illustrates, “I evaluated many SSR projects. You find that even the beneficiaries are confused about who’s implementing what project. They confuse INGOs because they all do the same thing with the same project structure and same beneficiaries. At the end you find that they’re not doing SSR. They are wasting money on time-bound activities with no sustainability” (Jrad 2020a).

As chapter 7 demonstrates, these SSR actor considerations lead to the subjugation of the political context shaping security and reform discourses, due to the preponderance of a “quick win” approach to SSR programming “before even the mere rudiments of oversight and counterbalance exist within the state and the society” (Kartas 2014, 274).

Conclusion

This chapter employed governmental subjectivities to account for the ways in which SSR is transformed upon its encounter with diverse, state and non-state powers at the empirical site of its application. The first section explored the subjectivities of key Tunisian actors influencing, and being shaped by, the security reform and SSR Discourses. As the police and the MoI were revealed in the subjugated knowledges uncovered in chapter 4 as key security reform priorities, they were explored in-depth in this chapter. A subjectivities analysis of the MoI revealed the entanglement of this security institution with power politics in Tunisia, which in turn shapes the ensuing choices adopted by SSR donors. Therefore, this chapter overcomes the blinkered explanatory narratives advanced by problem-solving SSR literature, which present SSR as a set of technical and politically neutral responses to human security problems. Instead, this governmentality analysis centres politics in the study of SSR governmentality, whereby “to study politics becomes to trace the operation of power as it creates subjects, discourses, and institutions through time” (Bevir 1999, 353). Within the Tunisian context, narratives around “republican security” and the “depoliticisation of security” are deeply entrenched in politics, giving rise to the police unions as a key power resisting reform. Within this context, the positioning of the MoI at the centre of political power struggles leads to the continuation of its subjectivity as a tool of oppression and hinders any attempt at entrenching a culture of reform and accountability. Therefore, as the next chapter demonstrates, SSR actors’ failure to acknowledge and address these political dynamics has significant impacts on the security reform process.

In addition, the first section's focus on the capillary powers in play at the empirical site enables this thesis to highlight subversions of governmental and post-colonial powers within and across the SSR recipient state in ways that are not possible from a Marxist historical determinism or post-colonial standpoint. By doing so, post-colonial patterns, and governmentalities, cease to be persistent structures, and are instead revealed as evolving "social constructs that arise from individuals acting on diverse and changing meanings" (Bevir 2010, 428). For instance, this chapter revealed that SSR's correlated political, institutional, and counter-terrorism Discourses have hampered the effective oversight and accountability role of the parliament, civil society actors, and the judiciary. By contrast, youth movements, which are uninhibited by these correlated Discourses, are revealed as wielding significant resistance power with the potential of dismantling current discursive hegemonies.

The second section explored SSR actors' subjectivities and traced their approaches in Tunisia to three factors, namely donor state interests, competition for positioning, and competition over funding. These factors lead to the advancement of uncoordinated, duplicating, and depoliticised SSR programming which fails to address, and potentially exacerbates, MoI-centric and politicised and counter-revolutionary security discourses. Notably, this section illustrated the ways in which SSR actor subjectivities, and in turn practices, simultaneously influence while being influenced by the complex power relations they encounter at the empirical site. This reveals that, while the different governmentality levels of rationalities, technologies, subjectivities, and finalities are separated in this thesis for practical and analytical reasons, they are deeply intertwined and, read in tandem, provide a holistic understanding of the set of competing power-relations that shape and transform SSR practice, mechanisms, and impact at a particular site.

Chapter SEVEN: SSR Finalities

Introduction

This chapter examines SSR's governmental finalities in Tunisia. As the concept of governmental finalities advances a dual articulation of "the ends sought and the outcomes and consequences" of governmental power, the application of finalities in this thesis enables an understanding of SSR's actual outcomes in Tunisia in comparison to its stated objectives (Dean 1999, 18). Identifying SSR's stated objectives is possible through the SSR rationalities analysis undertaken in this thesis. As illustrated through the Discourse Analysis undertaken in chapter 4 of key discursive units, SSR "seeks to increase partner countries' ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound governance principles, including transparency and the rule of law" (OECD- DAC 2005, 3). Therefore, this chapter evaluates SSR in Tunisia against both its security effectiveness and democratic governance objectives. In addition to comparing SSR's actual finalities to its stated objectives, this chapter advances this governmentality framework's key empirical contribution by evaluating SSR's finalities against the reform needs and priorities articulated through subjugated knowledges in the Tunisian context.

The first section evaluates SSR's impact on Tunisia's security against its stated security-related objectives and against reform priority needs articulated by Tunisian respondents. This section reveals that, while SSR had a positive impact on improving the operational capacity of elite counter-terrorism units, it has failed to address larger questions related to security and security reform in Tunisia, while marginalizing the plurality of needs and subjectivities within the security sector. This is due to SSR actor's over-reliance on state security-centric, counter-terrorism driven programming. Notably, this section reveals that SSR's state-centric, counter-terrorism focus is due to the elusiveness of SSR's rationalities and the lack of agreement on what "security effectiveness" entails for SSR. This section

therefore reveals that the incoherence of SSR's rationalities carries practical implications on its programming and, in turn, on its finalities.

The second section evaluates SSR's impact on Tunisia's democratic governance. This section demonstrates the limitations of conventional development evaluation frameworks which examine development impact in linear terms. Instead, this section advances a genealogical analysis which examines SSR finalities as the culmination of complex relationships between SSR practice and subjectivities within a heterogenous recipient state. By doing so, this section refutes SSR actor claims that higher than national average citizen-state trust in Medenine, a governorate bordering Libya, is attributable to SSR programming. This section advances an alternative explanatory narrative which instead traces these relations of trust to pre-existing subjectivities shaped by historical, anthropological, and geographic factors. Further, this section illustrates that SSR's failure to address the accountability and oversight needs of Tunisia's security sector is leading to counterproductive impacts for both Tunisia's democratic transition and state security. This challenges the predominant security-democracy dilemma advanced in literature and internalised within the SSR Discourse and practice. Instead, this section reveals that SSR's state security objective is undermined by SSR actors' neglect for democratic governance principles.

This chapter therefore reveals that SSR's limited success and counterproductive impacts are a feature of, rather than a deviation from, its governmentality framework. By doing so, this thesis challenges predominant problem-solving perspectives in SSR literature which either critique SSR's practice while taking its Discourse and normative underpinnings for granted, or place the blame for SSR's failure solely on the recipient.

1. SSR and security effectiveness in Tunisia

As argued in chapter 1 (literature review), SSR's epistemological conditions of possibility hinge on the shifting academic and policy context which enabled liberal

cosmopolitan and human security-based policy and practice prescriptions such as SSR. Therefore, SSR's focus on improving the effectiveness of security institutions was shaped by the human security focus of ensuring that security forces protect the rights of citizens under their control. For analytical and practical purposes, this chapter analyses SSR's Discourse as carrying two distinct objectives, respectively related to security effectiveness, examined in this section, and democratic governance, explored in the next. However, as SSR's Discourse problematises "bloated, secretive, repressive, undemocratic and poorly structured" security institutions, security effectiveness is to be understood in human security, rather than state security terms (Short 1999). Therefore, evaluating SSR's impact on security effectiveness in Tunisia must take into account SSR programming's success in improving national, as well as human, security.

1.1. SSR's actual vs. stated finalities: Marginal state-security success

As illustrated in chapter 5 (SSR technologies) and chapter 6 (SSR subjectivities), SSR actors largely promote donor states' security interests while operating in exclusive partnership with the Tunisian Ministry of Interior (MoI). The result is that, rather than advancing a human security-centric understanding and application of security reform, SSR programming in Tunisia largely promotes a state-centric counter-terrorism agenda. Indeed, chapter 5 demonstrated that SSR actors in Tunisia adopt sovereign power mechanisms predominantly geared towards reinforcing kinetic state security. As illustrated in chapter 5 (SSR technologies), within this framework, border security, counter-terrorism, and equipment, are amongst the main SSR donor priorities.

Not all the SSR actors interviewed for this thesis advance MoI-centric or train and equip-focused programming in Tunisia. For instance, Search for Common Ground (SFCG's) SSR project focuses on promoting dialogue and trust between civil society, local communities, local authorities, and security actors. Notably, SSR is not a traditional area of SFCG intervention, as its remit is largely focused on peacebuilding and conflict transformation. While this can explain its ostensibly

human-security focused SSR programming in Tunisia, interview data reveals that the lack of MoI partnership is not by intentional programmatic design; SFCG Tunisia Manager Hendrick Townsley complained that “it is difficult to work with the ministry, unless you also bring some very direct type of support, whether it is in terms of equipment, or whether it is in terms of providing specific tangible benefits to them” (Townsley 2021). As illustrated in chapter 5 (SSR technologies), SSR actors’ influence and access to the MoI depends on the budget these actors have at their disposal for SSR programming, whereby actors with limited budgets, such as SFCG, are not able to wield the necessary leverage to ensure MoI buy-in and partnership. Importantly, SFCG views the lack of direct partnership with the MoI as an obstacle to their programmatic success. As Townsley (2021) argues: “I think the fact that we are not directly working with the Ministry of Interior as others, I would say that this is definitely limiting the impact that we have in the sphere”. This suggests an implicit state-centric understanding of security across SSR actors, including those promoting non state-centric programming.

Interview data and a grey literature review reveals that SSR actors’ MoI-centric approach proved relatively successful at improving the country’s counter-terrorism capabilities. For instance, most interview respondents agree that SSR support in the form of equipment and technical training has led to the professionalisation of specialised police and national guard counter-terrorism units. In turn, the enhanced operational capability of these elite units has led to an overall improvement in MoI capacity to effectively fight the growing terrorism threat faced by the country since the 2011 revolution.

Indeed, the post revolution counter-terrorism context, which was illustrated in chapter 4 (SSR rationalities), brought into stark relief the security sector’s weakness against pre-revolutionary perceptions of a powerful and efficient police state. For instance, during the May 2011 “Rouhia events,” the first post-revolution confrontation between Tunisian security forces and terrorist elements in the northwest of the country, it took hundreds of police, national guard, and army

forces and two helicopters to track and ultimately kill two terrorist fighters, who were armed with hand grenades, Kalashnikovs, and explosive belts (Hamdaoui 2021). As political commentator and former government official Tarek Kahlaoui (2021) argues, "our security forces would use an outdated kind of gun when the terrorists are using Kalashnikovs. There is no way we can face Kalashnikovs with those guns". The Rouhia events resulted in the death of two security officers, including MP Yassine Ayari's father, Tunisian Armed Forces Lieutenant Colonel Taher Ayari, the highest-ranking Tunisian official to be killed in the line of duty. As MP Ayari (2021) highlighted, "we lived under the illusion and fear of the almighty security forces, but in reality, for years after the revolution it was very easy for any couple of terrorists in a mountain to slash a soldier's throat, even though the terrorist cells were rudimentary".

As illustrated in chapter 5 (SSR technologies), addressing the technical and material weakness of Tunisia's security forces is driven by SSR donor state security interests. Indeed, "because this security threat now affects the whole region, the US and the EU spent a lot of money on training and equipment" (Ayari 2021). As outlined in the introduction, major SSR funding and programmes in Tunisia have been initiated in response to terrorist attacks. For instance, the European Union's €23-million SSR assistance programme came as part of an "anti-terrorism package" (De Kerchove n.d., 58) in response to the June 2015 Sousse attack, in which a Tunisian ISIS supporter opened fire on beachgoers, killing 39 mostly tourists (BBC news 2015). This EU-funded SSR programme included counter-terrorism-related material and border security assistance.

While a conventional post-colonial approach to development would reject such interventions on the basis of their subjugation of recipient states to donor states' security interests, this thesis' Foucauldian governmentality framework is more interested in the effects of power than its intentions. Indeed, it is important to note that donor state security-driven SSR programming is not inherently contradictory with Tunisia's immediate security reform needs. As most Tunisian

respondents agreed, addressing the security sector's technical needs, such as providing "equipment, is certainly part of reform" (Kahlaoui 2021). Within this context, SSR's train and equip assistance is welcome and needed, as explained by former MoI official and current NGO actor Bouraoui Ouni:

> *To be clear, everything that has been done has been in response to a need, whatever that may be (…) because the needs were so many. So if the US says they're going to offer internship positions for hostage liberation, the BAT [elite police unit] have been wanting this training for 10 years. If SSR actors build the police's capacity on crime scene handling, or post bombings, these are also still needs. So all that has been done can only be beneficial. If Turkey has a one-year program through which they send 40 people at a time to have two weeks of shadowing in the US or in Germany, these have not been useless. All this has only been useful* (Ouni 2021).

The National Guard's Special Unit, known by its French acronym USGN (Unité Spéciale- Garde Nationale) is an example of successful professionalisation leading to improved counter-terrorism capacity. The USGN was established in 1980 under president Habib Bourguiba within the framework of Tunisian-US counter-terrorism cooperation (El Hassade.tn 2019). Virtually unknown before the revolution, the USGN gained national prominence as the most professional, highly trained, and best disciplined security unit in post-revolutionary Tunisia. The USGN maintains high recruitment and training standards as "only about fifty candidates are admitted annually out of hundreds of highly qualified officers. Successful candidates must undergo continuous psychological tests and intensive and rigorous training in all specialties" (Business News 2017, own translation). In addition to benefiting from state of the art equipment and gadgets received as part of SSR programming, the USGN receives bilateral support in the form of technical training from Western states, including a recent bilateral training with the French national guard's special unit, known by its French acronym GIGN (Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale) (GIGN 2022). In addition, the

USGN maintains a training partnership with the American Navy Seals, which has inspired the USGN's structure and look, as they share the same Multicam camouflage uniforms (Business News 2017). The USGN, which is the only unit trained for ground warfare, parachuting, and combat diving, has successfully undertaken almost 300 operations, which constitutes 70% of Tunisia's counter-terrorism actions since 2011. Between 2011 and 2018, the USGN arrested 312 terrorists and killed another 73 (Amer 2019). This reinforces the perception amongst interview respondents that "our security sector today is following international standards at the level of elite bodies" (Mokrani 2021).

However, as the following subsection argues, effective security in Tunisia cannot be achieved solely through improving counter-terrorism capacity. Indeed, while SSR may have contributed to improving "the security sector's ability to fight terrorism, we can't say the same when it comes to security sector actors dealing with citizens" (Ayari 2021).

1.2. SSR's actual vs. desired finalities: Lipstick on pigs

As outlined in chapter 1 (literature review), one predominant critical perspective in SSR literature attributes the failure of SSR in practice to its "militarisation" as a result of a post 9/11 trend of implementing counter-terrorism driven SSR programmes (Abrahamsen 2016; Albrecht and Stepputat 2015; Sedra 2015). This thesis rejects this perspective due to its failure to critically examine SSR's Discourse and human security underpinnings. Indeed, while this perspective highlights the shortcomings of SSR in practice, it continues to perpetuate the assumption of a normatively justified SSR framework going wrong in practice. As chapter 4 (SSR rationalities) revealed, SSR's Discourse is ill defined and overlaps with existing development practices, such as peacebuilding and conflict resolution. This thesis therefore proves the nonexistence of an ontological SSR object, challenging the false dichotomy between SSR theory and practice. Importantly, as argued in chapter 2, while SSR as an ontological object does not exist, "this does not mean it is nothing" (Foucault 2007, 118). While the definition problem suffered by SSR's

Discourse makes it difficult to assess SSR's impact against its own rationalities, the absence of an explicit agreement on what "effective security" entails for SSR enables the perpetuation of counter-terrorism focused SSR programming, both in Tunisia and globally. Therefore, a critical examination of the mutual constitution of SSR's Discourse and practice enables this thesis to illustrate that SSR's counter-terrorism focus is facilitated by, rather than occurring in spite of, SSR's elusive governmental rationalities. In other words, unlike literature critiquing SSR's militarisation in practice (Abrahamsen 2016; Albrecht and Stepputat 2015; Sedra 2015), this thesis argues that SSR's counter-terrorism focus is a feature of, rather than a deviation from, its governmentality framework. As this subsection argues, this counter-terrorism focus leads to two key limitations, as it fails to respond to the overall security reform needs in Tunisia's post authoritarian police state context generally and within the security institution specifically.

First, this research reveals SSR actors' failure to address larger questions related to security and security reform in Tunisia. As chapter 4 (SSR rationalities) argued, SSR's discursive formation is affected by correlated Discourses related to Tunisia's institutional and political context. Within this framework, SSR's discursive elusiveness is compounded by the lack of a unified vision for what security entails within Tunisia's post-police state context. In turn, this carries implications for SSR finalities. As outlined in chapter 4 and elaborated in chapter 6 (SSR subjectivities), political and governmental instability have led to a lack of any national level security or SSR strategies in Tunisia's democratisation context. As post-revolution Tunisia grapples with collectively healing from its police state past, subjugated knowledges uncovered in chapter 4 (SSR rationalities) reveal the urgent need for an inclusive vision for what security, and in turn security reform, mean for all Tunisians. As Ouni emphasised, it is important to establish whether we are "meant to reform the security sector or to reform our understanding of big S Security" as this will enable us to answer important prerequisite questions for SSR, such as

“what Security it is that we want and what is the organisation we want and what role we want for the security sector” (Ouni 2021).

Within this context, while SSR actors had a positive impact on professionalising elite units, this impact is limited, and potentially undermined, by SSR actors’ failure to broker an inclusive dialogue about security and SSR visions in Tunisia. Indeed,

> *we are still in the process of managing a big structure while we don't know if we need this structure or not. For instance, for crowd control, how do we know that effective crowd control requires 5000 officers (…)? Security remained this big mammoth that was being decorated arbitrarily by SSR actors without really fully changing it. The nature of Security in Tunisia has not changed. Performance remained the same and the way people live and understand security remained the same* (Ouni 2021).

Furthermore, in the absence of a clear security strategy, it is not clear the extent to which all equipment provided through SSR assistance is needed or useful. As UK Defence attaché Steven France explained, military equipment provided by the international community to Tunisia is not free but comes at reduced prices. Therefore:

> *the international community give stuff to Tunisia, and it tends to come with caveats which tend to create bills in the future. This means Tunisia ends up paying for something that it didn't really want, and it isn't coherent with the stuff they've already got. They end up with a sort of a messy scrapyard of all sorts of different, American, Turkish, Algerian or whatever bits of equipment and it's a bit of a mess* (France 2021).

For this reason, respondents highlighted that “we cannot say like the Ministry of Interior and many in the mainstream that SSR is equipment. SSR is also changing laws and procedures and internal chains of command. It’s a lot of training” (Ghali 2021).

Second, interview data reveals SSR's failure to advance a reform agenda which effectively addresses the plurality of needs and subjectivities within the security sector. It is important to note that, as argued in chapter 6, while discourses such as counter-terrorism achieve hegemony and contribute to shaping SSR's technologies and finalities, this is not to say that such discourses are universally accepted and internalised by all actors within the security sector. In fact, interview data reveals that demands within the security sector exist to re-examine the current state-centric, counter-terrorism focused, SSR approach. For instance, security official Moez Debbabi emphasised his dissatisfaction with the current approaches to counter-terrorism. He explained that, for him and a large number of his colleagues,

> *we want to come up with a new approach to deal with suspects of terrorism and violent extremism. We want to give the arrested people their physical and legal rights. We want to stop operating from the logic of intimidation. We have to work based on clear laws and with clear evidence. We should respect human rights. If a suspect is proven guilty, there is rule of law and due process. As long as they are suspect, we deal with them as such while taking into account their human rights* (Debbabi 2021).

Within this context, interview respondents from within and outside the MoI unanimously viewed that an ideal SSR process must lead to the transformation of current citizen-(police) state relations, instead of "making up for the failures in state security with the omnipresence of security forces" (Mokrani 2021). As the al Kawakibi Centre for Transitional Justice Director argued, this is a fundamental need for both Tunisia's security and democratisation, as:

> *for many people, the state is the police. They spend their life seeing the police as the representative of the state. If they are in conflict with the police, they will continue to reject the state. If they are oppressed by the police, they will refuse to pay their taxes, they would hurt the police if they could. If someone offers them something better to become a terrorist, they*

> *will do it. If they find a means to migrate illegally, they will do it. They will break the road so that the police can't come to them. So the relationship between the state and the citizen is ruined because of the link which is the police.* (Ghali 2021).

While SSR's sovereign power focus on equipment goes some way in addressing the security sector's need to improve its operational capacity in order to address the manifestations of terrorism, it only focuses on elite units and neglects security forces who are in direct contact with citizens on a daily basis. As lawyer Adam Mokrani highlighted, "citizens don't deal with elite units. We deal with the police station. So the perceptions of citizens, lawyers, and activists relates to the security forces that continue to operate with impunity. The persistent tension between citizens and state security in a democratic transition can only weaken the democratic transition" (Mokrani 2021). Therefore, the success of current SSR efforts is hindered by SSR actors' failure to address the fundamental and subjugated need for trust-building between citizens and the security sector.

As the next section illustrates, restoring citizens' trust in the security sector is a necessity within the country's democratisation and requires a refocus of SSR programming on democratic governance principles of security sector accountability, oversight, and the rule of law. However, this is not to say that this should come at the expense of security effectiveness. Rather, interview data reveals that trust-building entails an inclusive dialogue which necessarily takes into account all parties' grievances and needs, including those of actors within the security sector. As lawyer Mokrani highlighted, successful SSR in Tunisia hinges on "a diagnosis that includes all stakeholders. We need to have at the same table the lawyer, the security officer, the judges, the Ultras, the returnee foreign fighters or former prisoners and they all need to talk to see what is not working within the security institutions. In light of these discussions we can come up with reform projects" (Mokrani 2021).

Indeed, according to interview data, current SSR actors' efforts have marginalised the grievances and needs of the rank and file within the MoI, with implications for both security effectiveness and democratic governance. Chapter 6 (SSR subjectivities) outlined the security forces' sub-par working conditions and poor pay. These have been identified by respondents as a security reform priority. As academic and development consultant Pierre Lamaison highlights,

> *it is important to consider the position of the police themselves. If they do not have the things that they need to do their jobs properly, then that also needs to be considered. I'm not talking about them having the right riot gear or other weapons and things like that. I'm talking about them having decent working conditions and not being forced to work unreasonable hours. You can't expect the police to treat criminals or suspects with dignity if they don't feel like they're being treated with dignity themselves* (Lamaison (Alias) 2021).

SSR actors' neglect of these grievances limits SSR's impact on both its stated objectives. First, respondents have traced some of the security actors' grievances to ineffective and convoluted security sector bureaucracy. Politician and former government official Kahlaoui sums up the MoI's bureaucratic and institutional reform needs:

> *SSR needs to address the security sector's technical needs. This includes a very large bureaucracy, especially for the MoI which deals with many issues, including issues that it should not have to deal with like national IDs and passports (…). There is no information system within the MoI; they are still using papers and are still extremely bureaucratically rigid. If you are a security officer with a service vehicle which needs refuelling, you have to go to the official gas station in the downtown area of Tunis regardless of where you are. This wastes time and fuel. The bureaucracy is a huge machine that is not working properly* (Kahlaoui 2021).

This research found no evidence of the existence of SSR programming which is specifically designed to address these bureaucratic inefficiencies. The result is that current SSR efforts continue to marginalise the needs and grievances of security forces, consequently failing to enhance the security sector's bureaucratic effectiveness.

Second, poor working conditions exacerbate conflict between citizens and the security sector, therefore undermining the country's state security and democratic transition. For instance, as the son of a police captain, Ramy Mehrez recalls the poor working conditions his father had to endure while securing stadiums during football matches under the Ben Ali regime:

> *my dad is a fan of the Club Africain team, but when he's on duty he's not allowed to be a fan of anything. When Ben Ali was watching a game, my dad and his colleagues had to work at the stadium for two days straight. On the first day, they would spend morning until night-time ensuring the formation of the forces and securing all entrances and exits. On the second day, which would be the day of the game, they would start really early in the morning to prepare for VIP protection and for searching all fans. They used to even perform cavity searches on people to make sure no one is bringing in any illegal substances* (Mehrez (Alias) 2021).

This had an enduring impact on Mehrez and his father, and evidences the continued societal rift it creates, as the former now "hates football, football fans, and anything related to them" (Mehrez (Alias) 2021). In addition, Mehrez recalled the extreme mental and emotional toll these conditions took on his father and his colleagues, stating that "I will never forget when I was a child playing with my favourite remote-controlled car and my dad came home from his second day shift of stadium work. He was in such a terrible mood that the first thing he did was kick my car and break it into pieces" (Mehrez (Alias) 2021). In a similar vein, these poor working conditions, and their ensuing emotional and mental strain on police forces, continue to fuel the persisting conflict between security forces and football

supporters which was outlined in chapter 6 (SSR subjectivities). As Mehrez explained, “a cop would stand there exhausted and overworked and receive abuse from their superiors and the fans, but once they have a chance, they will exact their revenge on the fans” (Mehrez (Alias) 2021).

Interview data and desk research reveal that, while the majority of SSR funding focused on equipment for counter-terrorism, it did nothing to systemically improve the working conditions of police officers and agents in stations and in the field. This can be traced to the subjectivities uncovered in chapter 6 of SSR actors in Tunisia neglecting, and potentially exacerbating, the power struggles and heterogenous needs within the MoI and the security sector. Indeed, chapter 6 (SSR subjectivities) outlined three considerations leading SSR actors to disregard and circumvent the plurality of voices and needs within and outside the security sector in Tunisia, namely the need to satisfy donor state interests, SSR actor positioning vis a vis the MoI, and competition over funding. These considerations lead SSR actors to advance short-term approaches favouring quick wins over sustainable security reform. Indeed, as argued by security researcher and international SSR practitioner Arthur Boutellis,

> *donors like to do short term, you know, things that are visible, even though, often a year later, the motorcycles no longer function and there are no more wheels on the cars. And we know, and we see over and over again, that it's all pointless unless you invest in the whole logistical chain maintenance and human resources, including through training. But again, this is not sexy for SSR actors* (Boutellis 2021).

Further, interview data suggests that security officers feel unheard and marginalised within the general SSR Discourse. As security official Debbabi stated, SRR actors “need to stop only including people who work within closed offices and have no idea about field security work. We need to include people who work on the ground and who can provide a realistic analysis of what is happening within the security institution and in its relationship with the citizens. We need to include

agents and officers who work in direct contact with the citizens" (Debbabi 2021). Indeed, in addition to continuing to erode citizen-police trust, these unaddressed grievances make "policemen feel increasingly insecure and misunderstood. They find that their work is even more difficult, thankless and dangerous than under the dictatorship" (International Crisis Group 2015, 8). As illustrated in chapter 6, these grievances fostered an enabling environment for the emergence and flourishing of security unions. As the next section argues, this in turn had negative implications on the democratic governance of the security sector and on Tunisia's overall democratic transition.

2. SSR and democratic governance in Tunisia

As the subjugated knowledges uncovered in chapter 4 (SSR rationalities) reveal, a central need in Tunisia's post-police state democratic transition is to improve citizen-state trust through enhancing security sector accountability and oversight. This aligns with SSR's stated objective of promoting "democratic norms and sound governance principles, including transparency and the rule of law" (OECD- DAC 2005, 3). Therefore, SSR's stated objectives would ostensibly address Tunisia's democratisation needs. However, as the following sub-section section illustrates, a critical evaluation of SSR's impact on democratic governance requires a genealogical understanding of the complex relationship between SSR practice and subjectivities within a heterogenous recipient state. This is achieved in the following subsection through the rejection of conventional development evaluation frameworks and the advancement of a governmental finalities analysis of SSR at the empirical site of its application.

2.1. SSR and citizen-security trust: Challenging conventional evaluation models

Due to the influence of SSR donor state security interests, SSR programming has largely focused on Tunisian regions and governorates of strategic security interest to donor states, key amongst which is the south-eastern governorate of Medenine, which shares a border with Libya. Researcher and SSR evaluator Eya Jrad explained that,

> *most SSR projects are being implemented in Medenine [capital city of the Medenine governorate], Ben Guerden [town in the Medenine governorate] and Tunis. Places like Kairouan, Sousse, Sfax, or Gabes, have never seen any of these INGOs or projects. It sells to target a border region like Medenine and Ben Guerden and talk about the Ben Guerden events of 2016,*[11] *the donor will give you money. Donors don't care about Kairouan because it's far from the borders or the sea* (Jrad 2020b).

Lawyer and researcher Mokrani further highlighted that Medenine is "a pilot region for SSR because it's a border governorate and it has Ben Guerden and Djerba [tourist destination island in the Medenine governorate] and the Djerba airport" (Mokrani 2021). Indeed, all interviewed SSR actors are implementing programming in Medenine. For instance, the UNDP's pilot police station project, which targets 12 regions, was initiated in Medenine. In addition, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and SFCG are advancing similar projects in Medenine (Jrad 2020b; Lamaison (Alias) 2021; Rhili 2021; Siebert 2021; Townsley 2021). As Jrad characterised it, "all programmes are pushing each other in Medenine. It's like a busy market day" (Jrad 2020b).

Notably, SSR actor research suggests that the governorate of Medenine enjoys better than national average citizen-security relations. Lamaison was recruited to analyse data from an endline perception survey targeting citizens in Tunis, Bizerte, Sousse, and Medenine as part of an internal evaluation of an INGO's SSR project in Tunisia. As explained by Lamaison, "Medenine seemed to be an outlier. More people reported feeling safer at, say football matches, in Medenine (…). People in Medenine seemed to have a better relationship with the security forces. There is a general trend that things in Medenine seem to be a little bit better than the other parts of the country" (Lamaison (Alias) 2021).

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[11] In March 2016, ISIS fighters, including locals and some who infiltrated through the Libyan border, attempted to take control of the Ben Guerden city in Medenine. Security forces foiled the attack with citizen support.

At face value, the correlation between the concentration of SSR programming in Medenine and above average citizen-security relations in that region could be interpreted as an SSR success. Indeed, this is the conclusion drawn by the INGO for which Lamaison undertook the survey analysis. However, such an attribution is erroneous, as "the methodology of the study was quite limited" in a way that made it "difficult to understand any causation" (Lamaison (Alias) 2021). Importantly, the INGO did not collect sufficient baseline data to establish whether citizen perceptions of the security sector improved during the project period. In addition, while the perception study targeted a representative sample from each region, "there are all sorts of reasons why people might change their perception of something; it's not necessarily because the UNDP or USIP have run some project that has suddenly had an impact. People might have had no opinion of the police, and then they might have had a bad run in with a police officer, which would completely change their opinion. So there's no way of really drawing causation from quantitative perception surveys" (Lamaison (Alias) 2021). This finding is indicative of the power/knowledge configurations perpetuated by SSR and development actors, as SSR actors instrumentalise biopolitical power mechanisms, such as reports and quantitative data, to distort governmentality frameworks and maintain their solution-provider credentials.

While an external evaluation of SSR programming may overcome these methodological limitations, conventional frameworks for externally evaluating development programming elide questions about the mutually constitutive relationship between governmental finalities and their objects and subjects. The OECD-DAC criteria for development intervention evaluation represent the most widely employed framework for evaluating development programming and projects (OECD-DAC Network on Development Evaluation 2019). Originally including five evaluation criteria, this framework was revised in 2019 to expand the scope of the original criteria and include "coherence" as a new criterion aimed to "better capture linkages, systems thinking, partnership dynamics, and

complexity" (OECD-DAC Network on Development Evaluation 2019, 3). Despite its enhanced scope, this framework continues to evaluate "effectiveness" as the "extent to which the intervention achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives, and its results" (OECD-DAC Network on Development Evaluation 2019, 9), while "impact" is evaluated through examining "the holistic and enduring changes in systems or norms, and potential effects on people's well-being, human rights, gender equality, and the environment" (OECD-DAC Network on Development Evaluation 2019, 11).

Therefore, unlike the genealogical governmentality analysis undertaken in this thesis, such evaluations largely view development impact in blinkered and linear terms, solely taking into account the ways in which development practice affects its "beneficiaries" and the larger environment. By contrast, this finalities analysis overcomes the limitations of conventional development evaluations and accounts for the transformative effects of the pre-existing and evolving subjectivities within the empirical site on SSR practice and outcomes. Indeed, the above average citizen-security relations in Medenine can be explained by the geographic and anthropological specificities of the region and its population. As lawyer and researcher Mokrani argued, unlike other parts of the country, "tribal connections are still very strong in Medenine" (Mokrani 2021). In addition, Medenine is a border governorate which is largely rural. As such, the national guard is in more direct contact with citizens than the police, who generally operate in urban, non-border, areas. As Mokrani argues, the above average citizen-security trust found in Medenine can be explained by the historical make-up of the national guard and their relationship with tribal communities:

> *The history of the national guard is different [from the police]. In addition to their training as a paramilitary body, the national guard were originally made up of Falleghas.*[12] *In addition, when it comes to conflict resolution on*

[12] Tunisian civilians who organised into armed groups in the early 1950s and resisted French occupation

> *a local and micro level, the national guard tend to avoid repressive measures and opt for dialogue, because the national guard are closer to the communities they serve. They know tribal dynamics and look for reconciliation and mediation methods. This is not an institutional approach. This is something they gained through their work. This is why the national guard usually have the trust of their local communities, more so than the police. The police on the other hand are the state's repressive power which keeps them in constant tension with citizens.*

Therefore, this genealogical governmentality analysis challenges causal links established between SSR programming and improved citizen-security relations in Medenine, instead highlighting the impact of existing subjectivities on the security reform context. The result is twofold. First, instead of advancing a conventional evaluation of development programming which takes SSR practice as its departure point, this thesis views SSR finalities as the culmination of complex power and social relations which simultaneously shape the subjects and impacts of SSR. Second, and relatedly, a qualitative and genealogical understanding of the power dynamics and subjectivities predating SSR practice is important to ensure the design of projects which are adapted to the context and capable of addressing its particular challenges. As lawyer Mokrani argued, “as long as no studies are done to understand how complex Tunisia's anthropological structure is, projects are not adapted to the Tunisian anthropological and sociological context. In general, these NGOs don't undertake qualitative studies. They normally come with a ready-made project concept based on the French, German, British, or American experience. The result is the money is spent on the ground and the results only look good on the outside” (Mokrani 2021). Similarly, SSR evaluator Jrad highlighted that the lack of context sensitivity leads to “a problem with relevance. They [SSR actors] design a project for a specific region but then they decide to pilot it in three other different regions where the rationale of the project doesn’t apply. There’s a lot of money wasted with no efficiency” (Jrad 2020b).

Notwithstanding the limitations of conventional development evaluation approaches, respondents have highlighted the risks associated with SSR actors' excessive focus on one target region. Indeed, current SSR efforts marginalise "other places in Tunisia where people's grievances with security institutions really need addressing and where there is a need to work on police stations and accountability of the security institutions" (Jrad 2020b). As already illustrated, SSR actors' choice of target regions is influenced by donor state security interests, quick wins, and ease of access, rather than by an inductive understanding of reform needs. This was confirmed by USIP project lead, Sami Rhili, who admitted that

> W*e started in the pilot area which was La Marsa;*[13] *very bad choice if you ask me. At first it seemed like the easiest location because the project was still starting so they wanted to the first location to be "easy" and La Marsa was easy because it's close to the office and to the capital and there was a strong presence of UNDP in La Marsa and they do similar work but also kind of different (…). It wasn't the best choice because, when you say security issues, you don't necessarily think La Marsa. When we did the first scoping to choose, which led to the La Marsa choice, there were, in my opinion, regions that were more relevant like Kairouan and like Gafsa* (Rhili 2021).

In addition to failing to target regions most in need of security reform intervention, these SSR actor choices hinder any potential for holistic and sustainable security reform. As researcher and SSR evaluator Jrad argued, "change either happens to everyone or doesn't happen, you can't change three or four people (…). How can you say you reformed an institution if you only reformed it in some places but not in others? This is not reform" (Jrad 2020b). The lack of sustainable SSR programming led respondents to consider projects such as UNDP's "community

[13] Affluent coastal town within the Tunis governorate in the capital

policing project there [in Medenine] a failure. Police officers say it's a very failed project" (Mokrani 2021). As Jrad explains,

> *when you talk to police officers in Medenine, they talk to you about human rights. If you transfer those individuals to Gabes, they will have to start from scratch and all the work will be lost because the context is different. In Medenine, [an agent] has a nice pilot police station equipped with cameras and a smiling receptionist because there are cameras everywhere. So if you take this agent who you spent a lot of money training to another region, he will find himself in a torn down mouldy police station always fighting with citizens and he will go back to how he was and all the work you've done training him will be for nothing* (Jrad 2020b).

Lawyer and researcher Mokrani also noted that, when surveying police officers and citizens in Medenine about the UNDP pilot police stations, "people say it's just decoration that doesn't align with reality. They had a number of pilot police stations. Some did not even last after the donor left. Community policing did not work in Tunisia. These are not sustainable projects" (Mokrani 2021). As the next sub-section demonstrates, SSR actors' lack of sustainable impact on Tunisia's democratic governance is due to the false dichotomy perpetuated by SSR's Discourse and practice between security and democratic reform.

2.2. SSR and the false security-democracy dilemma

As already argued, SSR programming in Tunisia has been largely focused on advancing donor states' counter-terrorism and border security interests. In addition, as argued above and in chapter 6 (SSR finalities), SSR actors' failure to address the political power struggles enshrouding the MoI, coupled with their attendant tendency to marginalise the grievances of the rank and file, has allowed for the police unions to thrive and to mount an effective resistance to democratic reform. The result is "a clear trend towards the autonomization of the Tunisian security sector. The trend is driven by security forces seeking to circumvent reform by manipulating the current political struggles and mediating insecurity to place

security above politics" (Kartas 2014, 273). As this subsection argues, this has negative impacts on both Tunisia's democratic governance and state security.

First, interview data and desk research reveal that SSR actors' focus on kinetic state security has undermined, rather than supported, Tunisia's democratic transition, as it failed to promote the democratic governance principles of oversight, accountability, and rule of law within the security sector. Indeed, as illustrated in chapter 4 (SSR rationalities), while Clare Short's initial SSR definition excluded the justice system from the security sector, the OECD and the UN's expanded definitions include a focus on justice system reform with a view to enhancing rule of law, stating that SSR's "goal [is] the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law" (United Nations 2008, 6). Similarly, as the subjugated knowledges uncovered in chapter 4 reveal, an agreement exists amongst Tunisian respondents, and some SSR actors, on the need for SSR programming to address gaps in the justice system (Boussen 2021; Ghali 2021; Heni 2021; Townsley 2021). As security official Debbabi argued, "we cannot move to a democratic country without justice. Justice starts from security work and security institutions dealing with the citizens and with the law" (Debbabi 2021). Indeed, the link between rule of law, security, and democratic transition was highlighted by respondents. As Amine Ghali, Director of the Al Kawakibi Center for Transitional Justice emphasised, an ideal SSR process in Tunisia must aim for "accountability to have an effective and efficient police which respects human rights" (Ghali 2021).

However, this research found no evidence of SSR actors directly targeting the justice system, or otherwise supporting or building the capacity of any other governmental of non-governmental oversight actors. This has implications on security reform and the overall democratisation process in Tunisia. For instance, as outlined in chapter 6, the ongoing trial of the police agents involved in the killing of Omar Laabidi has brought to the public's attention the failure of the justice

system to hold security forces accountable for abusing their powers, therefore reinforcing the perception of an unaccountable security structure and an overall lack of rule of law. As Ghali argued, “if we see until today no indictment of police violations, the general perception is that the justice system is backing the police, due to fear or lack of power or whatever. But the perception is that the justice system is backing the security” (Ghali 2021). Similarly, former government advisor Wissem Heni emphasised, “the judiciary needs to undertake its role. If there is a police or security officer who's suspected of brutality or abuse, they need to be tried” (Heni 2021).

SSR actors’ failure to address this central security reform need widens the rift and exacerbates animosity between an increasingly emboldened police force on the one hand and voices calling for an end to police impunity on the other. This is evidenced by the uptick in polarised and contentious discourses pitting citizens and the police against each other. For instance, in response to a police union protest chanting hateful threats against “leftists, atheists, and gays,” political pundit and radio host Heithem Makki publicly wrote that “the security apparatus is freely and willingly organising within the framework of unaccountable unions and is undertaking crusades to punish its critics, while getting paid from taxpayer money” (Mejri 2021). Similarly, in a statement by the prominent Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights, they described the police unions as being driven by a “fascist tendency which makes them criminal militias and gangs threatening social peace, the state, and the republican system” (Mejri 2021).

Second, and relatedly, the failure to promote an SSR process which addresses the country’s democratic governance needs has counter-productive impacts on the country’s state security. As outlined in chapter 6, the counter-terrorism Discourse has been leveraged by police unions in Tunisia to promote counter-revolutionary draconian laws and practices while resisting accountability and civilian oversight. As argued in the same chapter, the pitting of human rights against security effectiveness within the hegemonic counter-terrorism Discourse has deterred

oversight actors from publicly denouncing counter-productive state-security approaches. For instance, despite his party, Congrès pour la République (CPR), opposing the 2015 counter-terrorism law, Kahlaoui explained that they did not vote against it in parliament. Instead, they simply "abstained from voting on the law. We agreed with NGOs that this law can lead to counterproductive counter-terrorism measures including stepping over the line when it comes to human rights. We think it will be counterproductive in fighting terrorism and will provide justification to radicalise people" (Kahlaoui 2021). Despite this timid and restrained opposition, detractors of the law were stigmatised by the media and public opinion, as "some Tunisian newspapers, especially the state-owned La Presse, ran a smear campaign against the ten members of parliament, from various parties, who abstained from the vote. They also attacked human rights organisations that expressed concerns, accusing them of supporting terrorism" (Mersch 2015).

Similarly, while SSR's governmental rationalities pay lip service to the link between security effectiveness and democratic governance, SSR's internal logic crumbles as counter-terrorism focused security approaches are consistently pitted against democratic reform principles. As admitted by USIP's Tunisia Manager Siebert,

> *America rhetorically does both: they support their partners in fighting international terrorism by providing security assistance in a joint effort to combat global terrorism. They also realise and recognise that Tunisia has a massive problem in creating terrorists because of the way the police behave. No one denies that. But, in terms of priorities, [security] assistance is the number one priority in this shared partnership* (Siebert 2021).

Notably, interview data and desk research point to the counter-productive effects of a strictly state-security focused counter-terrorism approach which comes at the expense of MoI accountability and democratic governance. Empirical research examining the root causes of radicalisation in Tunisia reveals that a key push factor relates to police brutality and strained civil-state relations, especially amongst socio-economically marginalised youth with low educational attainment (Ben

Mustapha Ben Arab 2018; Consigli 2018). This was corroborated by most interview respondents, who identified a link between hard security approaches to counter-terrorism and increased radicalisation in Tunisia (Ghali 2021; Kahlaoui 2021; Lamaison (Alias) 2021). In this sense, equipment-focused, MoI-centric, SSR programming reinforces the Tunisian government's hard security counter-terrorism approach which "has, for the most part, been reactive and security-focused" (Ben Arab Ben Mustapha 2018: 94). As academic and development consultant Lamaison argued, "if there's a link between the way people are treated by the police, and them becoming a security threat, i.e. them becoming radicalised, then you can't fight that through force" (Lamaison (Alias) 2021). Researcher and SSR evaluator Jrad further argues that:

> *people's grievances against security institutions in Tunisia are a pivotal and crucial and essential element in radicalisation leading to terrorism (…). Still, the ministry and the government are not seeing the link that as a state institution you have to reform along the lines of accountability, good governance, and transparency so that you don't make matters worse and don't push people into radicalisation. There is still a general perception of counter-terrorism as the specific job of a specialised unit in the ministry of interior in which we cannot take part* (Jrad 2020b).

Within this context, interview respondents highlighted the pitfalls of a strictly state-centric approach to SSR and its negative impact on Tunisia's security and democratisation. As security official Debbabi emphasised, "the problem is not in the number of security officers, it is in the legislation, the structure, and the mentality. Security work has a key contribution in a democratic transition" (Debbabi 2021). In the case of Tunisia, "the stalling of SSR reflects the 'successful' resistance of the security forces against oversight and accountability by instrumentalizing the deterioration of security and alleged rise of violent extremist threats" (Kartas 2014, 373). The result is a security sector which exacerbates the root causes of conflict and radicalisation, and in turn, state insecurity.

This finding highlights the fallacy of the security-democracy dilemma rhetoric advanced in the literature (Allison and Beschel 1992; Brownlee 2012; Carothers and Press 2021; David 1997; Durac and Cavatorta 2009; Hatab 2019; Marzo 2020) and internalised within the SSR Discourse and practice, which assumes that democracy promotion and advancing donor security interests are necessarily mutually exclusive endeavours. This chapter disproves this assumption, instead demonstrating that SSR does its security objective a disservice by neglecting to promote democratic governance principles in Tunisia. Indeed, the failure of SSR actors to promote democratic governance had a negative impact on the country's democratisation and in turn carries counterproductive effects on state security.

While security effectiveness and democratic governance constitute the two key objectives of SSR, the false dichotomy between security effectiveness and democratic governance is so deeply embedded in SSR's rationale and practice that a splinter governmentality framework, Security Sector Governance, emerged. As security researcher and SSR practitioner Boutellis explained, "some actors, like DCAF, have begun replacing SSR by security sector governance. Of course, if you call it security sector governance, you are automatically shifting the attention from making the sector effective to making the sector accountable" (Boutellis 2021). This evidences the implicit understanding across SSR actors of the current SSR framework as excluding democratic governance. Further, this highlights, and exacerbates, the lack of meaning and practical relevance of the SSR Discourse. Indeed, without its democratic governance objective, SSR Discourse is a mere repackaging of security assistance. As Boutellis argued, this can be explained by the preponderance of two mutually exclusive categories of SSR actors: "you have either SSR experts out there who are just former military who understand SSR in state security terms, or purely civilians who will not be able to speak to security actors (…). It is hard to find SSR actors who are able to speak in military, police, and state security language, but who can also speak of oversight, accountability, gender" (Boutellis 2021).

Conclusion

This chapter examined SSR's governmental finalities in Tunisia, evaluating SSR's outcomes in Tunisia against its stated objectives. SSR's stated objectives are drawn from chapter 4 (SSR rationalities), which analyses the SSR Discourse and highlights the dual objective for SSR assistance, namely, to support countries in ensuring that their security sectors are simultaneously effective and democratically governed. However, with a view to advancing a critical evaluation of SSR's practice as well as its Discourse, this chapter departed from SSR's stated objectives while comparing SSR's actual impact to its desired impact in Tunisia, as articulated through subjugated knowledges.

The first section examined SSR's impact on security effectiveness. As SSR's Discourse was shaped by the liberal cosmopolitan and human security shift in policy and academia, this section evaluated SSR's impact on state, as well as human, security in Tunisia. This section revealed that the definition problem suffered by SSR's Discourse, as illustrated in chapter 4, makes it difficult to assess SSR's impact against its own rationalities. However, this chapter revealed the practical impact of SSR's discursive elusiveness; the absence of an explicit agreement on what "effective security" entails for SSR enables the perpetuation of counter-terrorism focused SSR programming, both in Tunisia and globally. Therefore, this chapter challenges critical SSR literature which blames SSR failure on its militarisation in practice, while failing to critically examine its Discourse and human security underpinnings. Indeed, this section revealed that while SSR had a positive impact on improving the operational capacity of elite counter-terrorism units, it failed to address larger questions related to security and security reform in Tunisia, while marginalising the plurality of needs and subjectivities within the security sector. In turn, SSR actors' neglect of the needs and grievances of the rank and file within the MoI limits SSR's impact on both its security and democratic governance objectives. For instance, SSR actors' failure to address the persisting poor working conditions of security forces exacerbates conflict between citizens

and the security sector, therefore undermining the country's state security and democratic transition. Within Tunisia's democratisation context where building citizen-security trust is identified as a priority reform need, the unaddressed grievances of the rank and file, and the enduring rift between security forces and the population, have fostered an enabling environment for police unions to mount an effective counter-revolutionary resistance to democratic reform.

Relatedly, the second section evaluates SSR's impact on democratic governance in Tunisia. This chapter rejected conventional development evaluation frameworks. Instead, this section advanced a genealogical finalities analysis capturing the complex relationship between SSR practice and subjectivities within a heterogenous recipient state. By doing so, this section challenged the false causation established by SSR actors who have erroneously attributed above-average citizen-security sector trust in the Medenine governorate to the success of their SSR programming. Instead, by examining pre-existing subjectivities and power relations, this section advanced an alternative explanatory narrative, tracing citizen-security trust in Medenine to geographic and anthropological factors. Indeed, as a rural governorate on the border with Libya, the Medenine population is secured by the national guard, who, in contrast to the police, enjoy a degree of citizen trust due to their affinity with tribal communities and their adoption of nonviolent conflict resolution approaches.

In addition, the second section challenged the false dichotomy perpetuated in the existing literature and SSR's Discourse and practice, pitting security effectiveness against democratic governance principles of accountability, oversight, and rule of law. Instead, this section demonstrated that, due to SSR actors' neglect for the democratic governance needs of the security sector, including through their failure to improve accountability and oversight, SSR is leading to counterproductive impacts for both Tunisia's democratic transition and state security. This is evidenced by the links revealed in this chapter between reactive counter-terrorism approaches on the one hand and security sector impunity and resistance to

accountability and oversight on the other. In turn, this threatens the country's democratic transition, while fuelling radicalisation leading to terrorism.

Some interviewed SSR actors blamed SSR's failure and the false security-democracy dilemma on the recipient. As USIP Tunisia Manager Siebert pondered, "I think that in the MoI there's an evolving recognition which is relatively new that there are alternative ways to do counter-terrorism than the Ben Ali way or the Bourguiba way (…), but again, that's maybe at the political level and here and there within the administration. But when you look at the deep state as a monolith it's still very resistant to change" (Siebert 2021). As argued in chapter 1 (literature review), this is consistent with blinkered explanatory narratives tracing SSR's failure solely to a lack of will or an essentialist incompatibility with democratic governance principles within the recipient state. As chapter 6 (SSR subjectivities) reveals, reticence and political power struggles within and outside the MoI play a role in shaping SSR's practice in Tunisia. However, this thesis' governmentality framework rejects reductionist explanatory narratives which simply attribute SSR's failure to a monolithic recipient, while simultaneously attributing perceived SSR successes to SSR actors. Instead, as this chapter demonstrated, this thesis traces SSR's finalities to a heterogenous and complex set of power relations (subjectivities) and discursive tensions (rationalities). By applying a critical lens onto SSR's governmentality framework and internal tensions, this chapter revealed that SSR programming runs counter to both SSR's hegemonic Discourse and subjugated knowledges in Tunisia. By doing so, this thesis reveals the internal incoherence of the human security and liberal cosmopolitan policy prescriptions underpinning SSR rationalities.

Thesis Conclusion

Introduction

This thesis adopts a Foucauldian governmentality framework to critically examine the emergence of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) Discourse and to evaluate its impact on post-revolution Tunisia's security and democratic reform. This thesis traces SSR's genesis to a post-Cold War new wave of policy and academic thinking giving rise to the human security discourse. The convergence of policy and intellectual debates around emancipatory rhetoric resulted in an implicit acceptance within the SSR literature of SSR's normative underpinning in liberal cosmopolitan principles. The ensuing liberal cosmopolitan bias promotes blinkered explanatory narratives about SSR's lack of operational success. One predominant perspective blames SSR's persistent failure in practice on a culturalist or essentialist incompatibility of recipient states with democratic and liberal values (Alley 2015; Andersen 2011; Boshoff et al. 2010; Hills 2010; Koddenbrock 2012; Kohl 2015). Others have traced SSR's lack of operational success to a post 9/11 trend of militarisation of SSR programming (Abrahamsen 2016; Albrecht and Stepputat 2015; Sedra 2015). Both perspectives advance an uncritical acceptance of a normatively justified and necessary SSR framework going wrong in practice.

Contribution to SSR literature

As chapter 1 (Literature Review) reveals, these limitations in SSR literature are due to, and reinforce, three key problems in IR and security studies, which combine to shield the SSR concept from intellectual and political scrutiny. First, a lingering problem-solving approach in Critical Security Studies (CSS) leads to the depoliticisation of SSR, instead framing it as a neutral technical solution to a human security problem. This stunts any critical examination of the mutual constitution of universalising liberal discourses and the issues they problematise. Within this framework, SSR's normative underpinnings are taken for granted, leading to its acceptance as "both ethical and imperative" (Mustafa 2015, 216). Second, despite its emancipatory discourse, the human security agenda, and in turn SSR literature,

are predicated upon Western-centric assumptions, positioning the West as the ethical and normative pinnacle of liberal norms and, therefore, the provider of liberal assistance. In addition to denying agency to the rest of the world, this Western centrism perpetuates the false notion that the "problems" in recipient states are due to "non-Western" factors. Third, and relatedly, this Western centrism carries implications on how power is understood, shaped, and reproduced on a global scale. This is intellectually and politically problematic; these perspectives elide questions about the West's colonial role in shaping the non-West, while obscuring the unequal power relations embedded in, and reinforced by, dominant liberal policy and academic discourses in the post-colonial present.

This thesis explores in its first chapter conceptual alternatives to overcome the limitations imposed by liberal cosmopolitan-inspired literature and to instead scrutinise the normative justifications underpinning the SSR concept and their implications on a state and international level. Chapter 1 undertook a comparative examination of the perspectives of Marxism, post-colonialism, and post-structuralism in order to identify a suitable alternative, critical perspective which historicises the power/knowledge configurations justifying and upholding SSR, while encompassing the agency of and within the SSR recipient state. This same chapter rejected Marxism's historical materialism, which leads to a universalising and teleological understanding of progress and society and a materialist explanation of global power relations. Instead, this thesis adopted a post-structuralist Foucauldian genealogical perspective, which, due to its radical historicism, overcomes the Marxist developmental historical perspective and instead highlights the contingent nature of the present. By doing so, this thesis' radical historicism resists the Marxist proclivity for causal materialist explanations and linear historical narratives. Instead of viewing global power relations in ontological and structuralist terms, this thesis "eventalises" history, by portraying

the discontinuities and resistance perpetually shaping and transforming SSR and its context.

This thesis' perspective overlaps with post-colonial scholarship by highlighting the ways in which colonial relations of domination are reproduced through more positive and productive technologies of power in liberal post-colonial discourses and practices. However, this thesis' perspective diverges from post-colonialism in its understanding of power and agency. This research rejects post-colonialism's centralising and statist understanding of power as located within a global core and exercised over governed peripheral states. As chapter 1 argued, even when the agency of the governed is evoked by post-colonial scholars, it is often in statist and homogenising terms which are limited to an examination of state resistance or local elite interests upholding the post-colonial order. This risks perpetuating structuralist analysis which elides questions about the various overlapping, conflicting, and contentious powers manifest at the empirical site, which not only contribute to the upholding of post-colonial relations, but also challenge and subvert the national and global status quo.

Based on this critical analysis, this thesis adopted genealogical governmentality as it is better equipped than the macro deterministic theories of Marxism and post-colonialism to simultaneously historicise unequal power relations while accounting for heterogeneity, contingency, resistance, and agency within the recipient state. By applying genealogical governmentality, this thesis harnesses the benefits of critical theories such as Marxism and post-colonialism while avoiding their pitfalls; rather than producing a macro and statist understanding of unequal global and post-colonial power relations, this thesis complements the macro-physics of global power/knowledge configurations leading to the emergence of the SSR Discourse with a Foucauldian analytic of power within and below the SSR recipient Tunisian state. As such, governmentality's decentred analysis of government and power breaks down macro structuralist theories' units of analysis.

This thesis therefore contributes to critical scholarship which employs Foucauldian genealogical governmentality to illustrate the role of liberal global governance processes in the construction of the "Third World" and its subjugation to Western security agendas (DuBois 1991; Escobar 1984, 1995, 2012; Rojas 2004). By leveraging the Foucauldian reconceptualisation of power, this governmentality framework enables this thesis to advance a rich empirical examination of the ways in which the post-colonial "structures" upheld by the SSR Discourse are transformed upon their encounter with the multiplicity of powers, subjectivities, and resistance, within the recipient state. Particularly, this thesis joins the burgeoning wave of literature (Baaz and Stern 2017; Larzillière 2019; Mustafa 2015, 2019) applying governmentality to SSR with a view to "explicitly acknowledging its political dimensions and implications" on global order and the mutual construction of donors and recipients (Mustafa 2019, 29).

Conceptual and methodological contribution to governmentality studies

Chapter 2 (conceptualising governmentality) outlined this thesis' contribution to governmentality studies through advancing a holistic, four-level, governmentality framework in the examination of SSR's international Discourse and impact in Tunisia. Existing literature applying governmentality to SSR remains conceptually and methodologically deficient. Conceptually, the focus of the existing literature (Baaz and Stern 2017; Larzillière 2019; Mustafa 2015, 2019) on SSR's technologies and subjectivities advances an important contribution to scholarly debates which have so far pitted the notion of depoliticised agency against unequal post-colonial power structures. This literature's governmentality framing offers an important lens to understand the non-repressive power mechanisms making SSR a tool for "biopolitical imperialism"(Mustafa 2015, 213). Indeed, governmentality has been productively applied by scholars across "many areas of the social and organizational sciences and the humanities, and tackling a very diverse array of empirical domains and problem sites" (Walters 2012, 1). However, as already

illustrated through governmentality-minded SSR literature (Baaz and Stern 2017; Mustafa 2015, 2015, 2019), applications of governmentality have largely been limited to the use of specific governmentality related concepts such as subjectivities or technologies. This thesis' governmentality framework fills the analytical gaps associated with a focus on subjectivities and technologies alone and, instead, advances a comprehensive governmentality framework which encompasses subjectivities and technologies while including two key governmentality aspects missed by Mustafa, Baaz and Stern, namely rationalities and finalities.

The sole attempt at the design of a holistic analytical framework for the operationalisation of governmentality was made by Dean (1999). In this seminal work, Dean advances four analytical levels aiming to capture governmentality's simultaneous tasks of providing "a language and a framework for thinking about the linkages between questions of government, authority and politics, and questions of identity, self and person" (Dean 1999, 20). However, as argued in chapter 2, this thesis' critical application of Dean's conceptual framework advances a key improvement on his work. While Dean's framework is useful for examining the parts of governmentality more concerned with the technical aspects of knowledge/power, it downplays the need for an extensive analysis and examination of the discursive origins of power/knowledge configurations. In other words, Dean's analysis prioritises an understanding of "how thought operates within our organized ways of doing things, our *regimes of practices*, and with its ambitions and effects" (27, emphasis in original). Dean's focus on "thought as it is embedded within programmes for the direction and reform of conduct" (27) aligns with governmentality's focus on technologies of power. However, as argued in chapter 2, it neglects another key governmentality aspect, that of examining the ways in which thought, and its subsequent regimes of practices have been rationalised into existence.

Therefore, this thesis adapted Dean's analytical framework while improving his first level of analysis. This thesis' examination of SSR as a governmentality practice begins in its first analytical level with an analysis of SSR rationalities, or the ways in which SSR found its epistemological conditions of existence. While this thesis' first analytical level, rationalities, enabled this governmentality research to critically examine SSR's discursive formation, the second level, technologies, enabled an understanding of the mechanisms and practices through which SSR is exercised and maintained in practice. This analysis of technologies therefore aligns with, and enacts, governmentality research's empirically driven examination of power at the site of its application. This thesis' third analytical level examined SSR's governmental subjectivities by investigating the interplay between various actors' powers, positioning, and self(categorisation) within the SSR field in Tunisia. The ensuing analysis provided an empirical contribution to the Foucauldian conception of governmental power as mutually constitutive with its resistance. Therefore, the operationalisation of the analytical levels of technologies and subjectivities amounted to a Foucauldian analytic of SSR power in Tunisia. Notably, the mutual constitution of governmental rationalities, technologies, and subjectivities, culminates in an empirically rich analysis of the multiplicity of discourses, practices, and powers shaping SSR's impact in the site of its application. As such, this thesis' fourth analytical level, examining finalities, accounted for the mutually transformative ways in which SSR rationalities, technologies, and subjectivities, interact within a governmentality framework to produce SSR's effects.

Methodologically, no genealogical governmentality approach has been designed and applied in the study of SSR or human security policy prescriptions. While such an approach was recently advocated by Larzillère (2019), her genealogically-minded examination of SSR was limited to a review and interpretation of secondary literature. As outlined in chapter 3 (methodological framework), a granular and multi-dimensional analysis of SSR's discursive formation is necessary for a sound genealogical undertaking. Therefore, this thesis engaged in the design

and implementation of a tailored Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) method with the specific aim of undertaking an in-depth genealogical analysis of SSR rationalities and epistemological conditions of possibility. Indeed, CDA enabled this thesis to successfully enact this governmentality research's epistemological and ontological assumptions, as it examined "how language constructs phenomena, not how it reflects and reveals it" (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 5). As such, the advancement of a CDA method allowed this thesis to reject the assumption of an ontological SSR object. By doing so, this thesis highlighted the ways in which SSR's Discourse has been assembled and its constraining effects on practices, actors, and social reality. In order to capture the relationship between texts and their social context underpinning the SSR Discourse, this thesis advanced a hybrid CDA model combining Fairclough's three dimensions of Discourse analysis with Foucault's three sets of discursive formation criteria (Foucault 1991b, 55; Fairclough 1992, 79). This was applied in chapter 4 to dissect key SSR-related discursive units in order to trace the ways in which the SSR Discourse has been assembled, therefore answering this thesis' first sub-question: how did SSR at the international level become possible and taken for granted?

As argued in chapter 3, findings from the use of the hybrid CDA model were enhanced through the complementary use of in-depth semi structured interviews. Indeed, while CDA offered an ideal method for this thesis' investigation of the ways in which SSR found its epistemological conditions of possibility, interviews were necessary for this thesis' inquiry into SSR's subjugated knowledges and the subjectivities of various actors within the SSR field. In addition, through an iterative and dynamic process of interview data gathering, transcription, and analysis, this research ensured the combination of deductive and inductive research and analysis. In other words, the process of transcription and analysis was undertaken in a way which fed into the ongoing data collection process. The result is that deductive codes were complemented by new lines of inquiry which emerged from the empirical research process. As such, the interview method was intentionally

implemented in a way that promoted inductive conclusions, therefore addressing a key critique of overly deductive governmentality research (Marttila 2013).

Empirical findings and contributions

As the rationalities analysis undertaken in chapter 4 revealed, the SSR Discourse was enacted through shifts in social relations and identifications coinciding with the end of the Cold War, which positioned development actors, rather than states, as speaking and acting authorities dictating international development priorities. Indeed, through discourse analysis of the speech given by head of the UK's Department for International Development Clare Short in 1999, this thesis revealed Short's positioning as a social agent launching the SSR Discourse. Notably, findings from textual analysis of this speech and interrelated discursive units align with Foucauldian and Fairclough's assumptions of the social agent as simultaneously shaped by, while wielding transformative power over, social structures. The emergence of the SSR Discourse was therefore revealed in this thesis as the result of a dual process of meaning making on the one hand and the harnessing and reconfiguring of existing meanings within the development Discourse on the other.

This thesis' examination of SSR's discursive formation revealed the social relations underpinning, and reinforcing, SSR's Discourse, through revealing the linkages established by Short's speech between development actors and the academic community within the SSR field. This corroborates the governmentality assumption that a regime of practices such as SSR requires power/knowledge configurations rationalising it into existence. Furthermore, this provides empirical evidence to support this thesis' argument that liberal policy constructions in the wake of the Cold War were legitimised by a new wave of critical and emancipatory thinking.

Notably, this thesis revealed that the SSR Discourse is so elusive and ill-defined that it is in a perpetual state of discursive formation. This finding has conceptual

and empirical significance for this thesis. Conceptually, the continued practice of SSR despite its conceptual vagueness supports this thesis' rejection of an ontological SSR object and the understanding of governmental rationalities as a set of discursive moves, enacted through a process of problematisation, and aimed at providing the normative underpinning for governmental practices.

Empirically, this thesis' analysis of SSR's Discourse enabled it to highlight the gap between SSR's hegemonic Discourse and its subjugated knowledges in Tunisia, while simultaneously accounting of their mutual constitution. Indeed, a genealogical examination of SSR's subjugated knowledges in Tunisia reveals that an ideal SSR process must aim to improve citizen-(police) state trust through improving police conduct while ensuring the accountability and democratic oversight of the Ministry of Interior. This necessitates a prerequisite process of inclusive dialogue and diagnosis of security reform needs. Importantly, this thesis revealed that SSR's elusive Discourse facilitates SSR actors' adaptation to the specific reform needs at the empirical site. Conversely, this discursive vagueness has simultaneously enabled SSR actors to disqualify or transform subjugated knowledges in favour of advancing their institutional priorities or pursuing available donor funding.

This thesis' examination of the correlating Discourses shaping SSR in Tunisia revealed the institutional and political configurations at play in influencing the SSR Discourse and the overall security and democratic reform context in post-revolutionary Tunisia. This revealed that, within a democratic transition, the relationship between SSR and democratic reform is not linear. Indeed, "in theory SSR should have an impact on democratic transition. But this is a debate: do you go from SSR to democratic transition or from democratic transition to SSR? We're still going from democratic transition to SSR" (Mokrani 2021).

This thesis' examination of SSR technologies, undertaken in chapter 5, represented an important step to ultimately assessing SSR's impact on the country's security and democratic reform. This technologies analysis, undertaken through an

empirical examination of various practices and activities advanced by SSR actors in Tunisia, revealed that the gap between SSR's Discourse and its subjugated knowledge is coupled with a gap between SSR's actual and ideal technologies. Indeed, while SSR practices advance interwoven sovereign, disciplinary, and biopolitical mechanisms, they are dominated by a sovereign power logic geared towards reinforcing kinetic state security. This is enacted through an emphasis on border security, counter-terrorism, and equipment. This focus neglects the subjugated knowledges around a heavy-handed security force in need of enhanced accountability. As this research reveals, SSR's ideal technologies, as articulated through subjugated knowledges, suggest that improved accountability can be accomplished through disciplinary measures such as improving the recruitment process, continued professional development, and effective monitoring and surveillance of police conduct. In the absence of these ideal technologies, the current sovereign mechanisms advanced by SSR actors risk strengthening the oppressive capabilities of security forces while simultaneously entrenching their impunity. Therefore, through highlighting the gap between the actual and ideal SSR technologies in Tunisia, this research contributes to the critical examination of the vision and approach of SSR actors in Tunisia. Ultimately, this challenges the predominant problem-solving SSR literature, which "does not question the approach and vision of SSR, only the specific implementation of initiatives" (Kartas 2014, 376).

Notably, chapter 5 corroborated the key governmentality assumption about power as decentred, capillary, and manifest "in its envisioned practical and technical expressions" (Foucault 2004, 31). Indeed, SSR governmentality is revealed in this research as the conduct of conduct through productive, rather than repressive power. Within this framework, sovereign power and post-colonial relations of subjugation are reproduced and enacted in the post-colonial world as neo-liberal conditionality imposed by wealthy donor states on peripheral recipients. However, this thesis' analysis of SSR technologies revealed the

limitations of Foucault's rejection of an interest-based analysis of power. Indeed, this thesis revealed that donor states' national security interests have a direct impact on their approach to SSR and the mechanisms they apply. Therefore, this thesis demonstrated that it is not possible to examine SSR technologies independently of donor interests. In other words, this thesis finds that questions about the "how of power" and the "why of power" are more intrinsically linked than it is assumed by a purely Foucauldian analytic of power.

The analytic of power enacted through the analysis of SSR technologies was complemented in this thesis by a subjectivities analysis in chapter 6. Through an appreciation for the ways in which individuals "may still be agents who can adopt beliefs and perform actions for reasons of their own and in ways that transform the historical context that influences them" (Bevir 2010, 432), this thesis balanced an awareness of the unequal power relations underpinning SSR with a recognition of the resistance, struggles, and heterogeneity of the governed. Indeed, by examining the powers and multiple subjectivities within the MoI, while revealing the counter-conduct of youth movements, this thesis contributed to post-colonial scholarship through highlighting the multiplicity of governmental subjectivities which are often examined in monolithic terms by post-colonial scholars. This highlights "the diversity and contests that lie behind illusions of unity and necessity" (Bevir 2010, 428). Notably, as chapter 1 (Literature Review) argued, this thesis' governmentality analysis sets it apart from constructivist approaches which champion the analytical separation of "the process of identity constitution from the point where identities become fortified to such an extent that they function as fixed in security discourse" (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 215). As such, this thesis' analysis of the institutional and political Discourses correlating with SSR's Discourse is complemented by an analysis of the agents or subjects animating these Discourses. By highlighting the linkages "emanating out of interactions between social groups and the complex societal structures in which the discourse is embedded," this thesis illustrated the mutual constitution and perpetual fluidity

of governmental rationalities and subjectivities (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 4). The result is that Tunisia's post-colonial subordination within the SSR dynamic ceases to be a static structure and is instead examined as a snippet of an ever-evolving historical event.

Relatedly, this thesis reveals resistance as inherent to governmental power. This was especially pronounced in this thesis through the examination of the counter-conduct embodied by youth movements such as #Hasebhom and #LearnToSwim. Indeed, these youth movements' willingness to challenge police union impunity and their chokehold on reform discourses provides empirical support for the utility of incorporating the Foucauldian notion of counter-conduct in social movement studies, which conventionally advance a binary between power and resistance (Chatterjee and Finger 1994; Porta et al. 2004; Porta and Diani 2006; Tarrow 1998; Taylor 1995; Tilly and Tarrow 2015).

As this thesis' finalities analysis undertaken in chapter 7 revealed, a critical evaluation of SSR's impact on security and democratic governance in Tunisia requires a genealogical understanding of the complex relationship between SSR practice and subjectivities within a heterogenous recipient state. Therefore, this thesis rejected conventional development evaluation frameworks and instead advanced a governmental finalities analysis of SSR at the empirical site of its application. By doing so, this thesis' governmentality analysis overcame a limitation of conventional frameworks for externally evaluating development programming which view development impact in linear terms, eliding questions about the mutually constitutive relationship between governmental finalities and their objects and subjects. Instead, this thesis' finalities analysis accounted for the transformative effects of the pre-existing and evolving subjectivities within the empirical site on SSR practice and outcomes. This thesis therefore highlighted SSR finalities in Tunisia as the culmination of complex power and social relations which simultaneously shape the subjects and outcomes of SSR.

This thesis demonstrated that SSR actors' failure to promote democratic governance principles in Tunisia has a negative impact on the country's democratisation and in turn carries counterproductive effects on state security. By doing so, this thesis' findings refute the false dichotomy perpetuated in literature and SSR practice positing that democracy promotion and advancing donor security interests are necessarily mutually exclusive endeavours (Allison and Beschel 1992; Brownlee 2012; Carothers and Press 2021; David 1997; Durac and Cavatorta 2009; Hatab 2019; Marzo 2020). Instead, this thesis revealed that, SSR actors' security objectives in Tunisia can only be achieved through a focus on democratic reform.

Implications

This thesis designed and operationalised a robust, four-level, genealogical governmentality framework for the study of SSR's Discourse globally and its practice in Tunisia. This framework is applicable to the study of SSR in other case study countries, while offering an indispensable analytical blueprint for the operationalisation of Foucauldian governmentality to a myriad other global governance fields. The thesis' critical examination of SSR's Discourse and practice in Tunisia supports a key governmentality assumption; while the different governmentality levels of rationalities, technologies, subjectivities, and finalities are separated in this thesis for practical and analytical reasons, this research proves their close linkages and interconnection. Indeed, read in tandem, the four analytical levels of governmentality examined in this thesis provide a holistic understanding of the set of competing power relations that shape and transform SSR practice, subjects, and impact in Tunisia. In doing so, this thesis revealed that SSR's practical failure is due to, rather than occurring in spite of, its discursive underpinning. This in turn contributes to SSR literature through challenging predominant problem-solving approaches which separate SSR's Discourse from its practice by assessing its practical failure independently of its Discourse.

Importantly, this thesis' genealogical governmentality analysis denaturalised the SSR concept by revealing the elusiveness of its Discourse. By doing so, this thesis'

critique of SSR's impact in Tunisia transcends the simplistic explanatory narratives which are limited to operational challenges within the recipient countries. This is important as literature examining SSR in Tunisia continues to overlook the gap between SSR supply and demand in the country, largely placing the blame on the failure of SSR processes on the local context. For instance, a recent report evaluating German SSR assistance to Tunisia focused on internal factors such as "the lack of a Constitutional Court and a disrupted transitional justice process" to claim that "despite this vast international engagement on SSR, different obstacles have prevented Tunisia from achieving a comprehensive reform of its security sector" (Stahl and Treffler 2019, 20). Rather than scrutinising the suitability of SSR intervention to the local context, such evaluations perpetuate the assumption that SSR is an inherently impactful and suitable process, hindered solely by local obstacles.

By contrast, this thesis revealed SSR's regime of practices as overall exacerbating Tunisia's security and democratic reform problems. Therefore, rather than upholding the positionality of donors and SSR actors as neutral providers of technical assistance, which is hampered by the local context, this thesis sheds light on the role of SSR actors in producing and perpetuating the problems they claim to address. Within this perspective, examining the various technologies employed by external SSR actors is paramount to tracing their effectiveness and suitability to respond to the country's reform needs. In highlighting the dichotomy between SSR's current and ideal technologies in the Tunisian context, this thesis challenges problem-solving SSR literature by countering "the self-referential character of foreign aid" (Kartas 2014, 376).

By advancing this governmentality analysis of SSR, this thesis offers an alternative analysis to realist or liberal accounts of international aid respectively as either a Realpolitik instrument or a stimulus for economic development. Instead, this thesis engaged in examining SSR practice through the empirical level of the technologies of power it employs and the finalities it produces. This is consistent with this thesis'

decentred and capillary understanding of power, whereby in contrast to the juridical theory of sovereignty which is "constantly attempting to draw the line between the power of the prince and any other form of power" governmentality establishes "a continuity, in both an upwards and a downwards direction" (Foucault 1991a, 91). Chapters 5 (SSR Technologies) and 6 (SSR Subjectivities) adopted an analytic of power to reveal the various technologies and powers operating between, beyond, and within states that are constituting, maintaining, or transforming SSR practice. By doing so, this thesis revealed SSR not as the result of a unilateral exercise of centred power through repression, but as the result of an intricate interplay and overlap of various contingent technologies and subjectivities of power, with implications on SSR's finalities. The ensuing analysis breaks with the binary and mutually exclusive perspectives of liberal cosmopolitan acceptance of development's normative underpinnings on the one hand and post-colonial rejection of aid as the reproduction of global inequality on the other. While this thesis' finalities analysis is overall critical of SSR's counter-productive impact on Tunisia's democratic reform, and ultimately on security, this did not prevent this research from recognising and highlighting SSR's positive impact on the professionalisation of elite counter-terrorism units.

Indeed, this thesis' genealogical analysis enacts this governmentality framework's rejection of totalising and dominant Discourses by highlighting the multiplicity of conflicting and competing powers, interests, and perspectives within the security and SSR field in Tunisia. The result is a nuanced analysis which breaks with the current polarised and contentious discourses inflicting Tunisia's democratisation path which pit ideological, political, and social groups against each other. In turn, by removing "the tyranny of overall discourses, with their hierarchies and all the privileges enjoyed by theoretical vanguards" (Foucault 2004, 8), the diagnosis resulting from this analysis has the potential to promote a vision for the country's democratic and security reform which satisfies and represents all conflicting perspectives, from police officers and unions to marginalised youth and football

fans. Indeed, as this research revealed, an inclusive and representative diagnosis and vision are an essential pre-requisite for successful security reform and, ultimately, democratisation in Tunisia. Due to their leverage and positioning, SSR actors and state donors are well placed to shift their SSR programming to advance multi-stakeholder venues for the development of such an inclusive vision. As evidenced by this research, the resulting reform will be beneficial for both Tunisia's democracy and donor states' security agendas.

Appendix 1: Interviewee consent form

Interviewee Consent Form

I, ____

☐ I confirm having received a copy of the project summary (below)

☐ I agree to being interviewed for this project.

☐ I understand that I may stop the interview at any point or may choose not to answer any questions if I do not wish to do so.

☐ I agree to this interview being recorded (the recording will be used by the researcher only and will not be shared with any other party).

☐ I understand that I may request that any recordings or interview notes may be destroyed if I request this before 30/10/2021

☐ I agree to my comments and statements being attributed to myself.

Signed ________________________________ Date ____________________

A Foucauldian Governmentality Analysis of Security Sector Reform in Tunisia

Project summary

This project is my doctoral thesis at Nottingham University, England, United Kingdom. This thesis, which will be published in 2022, examines the effectiveness of Security Sector Reform (SSR) policies and practices in post-revolution Tunisia. This work evaluates the impact of SSR projects on SSR's democratic reform objectives and on countering terrorism.

This thesis engages in semi structured interviews (with government officials, parliamentarians, civil society actors, researchers, and SSR actors) to understand the impact of SSR projects on democratization and counterterrorism in Tunisia.

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Appendix 2: Interview guides

I. SSR Actors:

General:

1. Can you introduce yourself and your role within your organization?
2. How would you define SSR?
3. In general, when do you think a security sector should be considered in need of SSR?

(*SSR rationalities: How do SSR actors rationalize their own practice?)*

General Tunisia:

4. What does the security sector consist of in Tunisia?

(Same question across stakeholders. It'd be interesting to see how state-centric SSR actors see the security sector to be, vs. other actors: What discourse about security in Tunisia is SSR supporting/subjugating)

5. Who are the key actors within and outside the government in Tunisia that are involved in SSR?

(Same question across stakeholders. This question is linked to question 10 about which actors they work with. It'll be interesting to see if there is an overlap between the discourse and practice of SSR actors about who are key security players in the country. Do they work with/target the key players they have identified? If not, why not?)

6. In your opinion, what do you think are Tunisia's security reform priorities?
    a. Do you think these priorities are being addressed or talked about by the government or SSR actors?

(Same across stakeholders. I am interested in seeing the difference in perspectives and whether one or more stakeholder groups align or overlap or contradict (and which perspective is more hegemonic)? By comparing the security reform priorities

articulated by SSR actors vs. gov vs. oversight actors, I can tease out SSR's hegemonic discourse about the security reform needs in Tunisia vs. the subjugated knowledges about reform needs in Tunisia)

7. Where have the demands for security reform in Tunisia come from?
    a. Internally and externally?
    b. Why is there external interest/funding for SSR in Tunisia?

(Could be an in to gauging donor interests as a way to establish sovereign power/biopolitical links in SSR: the security-democracy nexus?)

8. What national and international actors do you think are best placed to design and provide security sector reform (in general and in Tunisia specifically)?

(Question to all stakeholders: For chapter 4 on rationalities, this question could serve to show the types of knowledge and actors SSR came to 1) make hegemonic and powerful and 2) disqualify (subjugated knowledges). If there is variation in answers between stakeholders (i e if government/CSO answers include actors that are not mentioned by SSR actors), this could be interpreted as subjugated vs. hegemonic knowledge in the SSR discourse. This can also be useful for subjectivities: How do actors position themselves and others within the security reform field)

Tunisia SSR program specific:

9. Tell me about your SSR programming in Tunisia to date? (when/why it started, objectives, funding, what programs/projects/activities/partners…)

(this will serve to 1) gather data on the kind of "technologies" used by SSR. I can prompt as necessary to get more insight on the kinds of technologies they rely on in Tunisia (statistics, reports, indexes and indicators…). I can also probe to get a better understanding of the alignment of their Tunisia programming with their donor strategy, if an INGO, or their state strategy, if a government development department)

10. Which Tunisian actors do you work with from within and outside the government?

(this will be compared to answer of question 3 to see if SSR actors' discourse aligns with their practice on who they work with in Tunisia. This can also serve to elucidate subjectivities of Tunisian actors from the SSR actors' perspectives)

11. Why didn't you work on Tunisia before 2011?
    a. (Prompt): What were the factors that contributed to your organisation's decision to start SSR programming in Tunisia?

(I'm trying to find out the biopolitical economy of power behind this decision. What were the factors that made SSR donors start working in Tunisia? It cannot only be the undemocratic nature of Tunisia's security as this has been around since the 80's at least. Did the terrorist attacks in 2013/2015 in Tunisia lead to their decision? (in which case this means that SSR's finality is more about the reduction of security threats than the democratisation of security structures), or is it that there was finally some form of interest from the Tunisian government in reform (in which case the economy of power has to do with the political correctness of providing reform assistance only when "invited" to maintain relations with the regime)

12. (How) are your SSR programmes adapted to secure the cooperation of the Tunisian government or to align with Tunisian government interests?

(This can: 1) Indirectly indicate and nuance Tunisian government subjectivities: they are not just passively accepting their subordinate position as SSR recipient but they are taking advantage of the dynamic to dictate their own terms and advance their own interests (more train and equip? More justification for CT discourses impeding calls for meaningful reform?) and 2) Show how SSR is shaped and transformed in practice due to its encounter with competing or challenging powers at the empirical site).

13. Do you think your programme is meeting Tunisia's security reform needs? If so, how?
14. International SSR policies focus on two key objectives: democratic reform of the security sector, and countering terrorism.

a. Do you believe your program is designed to meet these two objectives? If so, how?
b. Do you believe your program actually meets these two objectives?
c. Do you think your other projects contribute indirectly to SSR?

(Questions 13 and 14: finalities of government from SSR actors' perspective: This can show in practice what SSR actors believe their objectives to be (vs. SSR's stated objectives of CT and democratic governance and 2) their perspective about whether or not they are successful (to be compared with other stakeholders' perspectives)

15. What are the obstacles to the application of SSR in the way it is strategized by your organization?
    a. How is the Tunisian government impacting/changing SSR in practice?
    b. What other factors are impacting/changing SSR in practice?

16. What does successful SSR in Tunisia look like to you?

II. Government Actors:

General Tunisia:

(Initial trust building at the outset of interviews with government officials is necessary. The first three are more general opening questions, starting off general and slowly leading towards SSR. It would be interesting to see whether security reform is mentioned organically by respondents in question 1 or not (suggesting whether they believe the security sector needs reforming or not).

1. Can you introduce yourself and your role within your institution?
2. What do you think are the institutional reform priorities in Tunisia?
3. What does the security sector consist of in Tunisia?

(It'd be interesting to see how state-centric government actors see the security sector to be, vs. other actors (SSR actors or CSOs/Parliamentarians). SSR is state-centric in Tunisia, but is that because SSR in general tends to be state-centric or is it because SSR actors in Tunisia are tailoring their offerings to fit Tunisian government interests (therefore indicating that SSR is transforming at its cite of application by coopting government discourse/interests)

4. In your opinion, who are the key actors within and outside the government in Tunisia that SHOULD be included in SSR?

(Same question across stakeholders. Comparison of responses will determine variations between perspectives on what security consists of and who is perceived as an authority or active stakeholder in the field)

Tunisia security reform (rationalities and subjectivities):

5. Is the Tunisian security sector in need of reform? If so, what needs reforming?

(To be compared with SSR's stated objectives and with SSR actors responses (to reveal SSR's subjugated knowledges)). Also, if the answer to this question is that there is no need for reform, this can be followed on by question 9 about why Tunisia is accepting SSR assistance)

6. Where have the demands for security reform in Tunisia come from, both internally and externally?
    a. Why is there external interest/funding for SSR in Tunisia?

(for subjectivities: what interests do recipients think are at play with SSR donors and how does this shape recipients' view of themselves and of donors)

7. What national and international actors do you think are best placed to design and provide security sector reform in Tunisia?

(Useful to compare with SSR actor responses to see each of their subjectivities- and the degree to which they share these subjectivities- and the subjugated knowledges/actors of SSR's discourse (who is an authority or speaking subject on reform of the security structures according to each stakeholder)

8. How would you define security sector reform?

(Here I can start with a general question about what respondents think the process of security reform should look like then probe to more specifically ask what they know about SSR as the international-development led regime of practices. It would be interesting to see if these two overlap/clash: useful for the subjugated knowledges section in rationalities to elucidate that the discourse of SSR and what is true or false about the reform of the security sector in a specific context are often two distinct discourses, the former subjugating the latter)

    a. Probe: How would you describe the international-development led SSR programs? How central are they in Tunisia's security reform efforts?

(Show how important government officials think SSR is within the reform context, therefore nuancing SSR's impact as potentially only one actor amongst many)

    b. Other than international SSR actors, who are the key players in security reform in Tunisia currently?

(By comparing with answers from oversight actors, I can see if the government is missing/ignoring any grassroots or alternative reform initiatives)

9. Why is the Tunisian government accepting SSR programs/assistance?

(This will be important to establish the subjectivities of Tunisia as a reform recipient (why do they accept their position as SSR recipient?)

SSR technologies and finalities:

10. In your opinion, is there a link between reforming the security sector and countering terrorism?
11. Is there a link between reforming the security sector and the democratic transition?

(The above two questions can contribute to technologies: do government officials agree with the connection made by SSR actors between reforming security on the one hand and CT and democratization on the other?)

12. What do you think are the best tools/activities for the reform of the security sector?

(for technologies: to be compared with SSR responses on their activities/projects)

13. How would you evaluate international development led SSR-programmes in Tunisia?
    a. Probe: In your opinion, is SSR contributing to addressing Tunisia's reform needs?
    b. Is SSR effectively addressing its own stated objectives (democratic reform and counter-terrorism)
    c. What does successful SSR look like to you?

(for finalities: to be compared with SSR actors and oversight actor responses)

III. **Oversight actors (CSOs/Parliamentarians and parliamentary staff/media):**

General Tunisia:

(Initial trust building at the outset of interviews with oversight actors is necessary. The first three are more general opening questions, starting off general and slowly leading towards SSR. It would be interesting to see whether security reform is mentioned organically by respondents in question 1 or not (suggesting whether they believe the security sector needs reforming or not). It will also be interesting to see if there is variation of understanding of how broad or narrow the security sector is by stakeholder group. Do government and SSR actors view the security sector from a more state-centric perspective?).

1. Can you please introduce yourself and your experience with security or security reform?
2. What do you think are the institutional reform priorities in Tunisia?
3. What does the security sector consist of in Tunisia?
4. In your opinion, who are the key actors within and outside the government in Tunisia that SHOULD be included in SSR?

Security reform in Tunisia: Rationalities and Subjectivities:

5. Is the Tunisian security sector in need of reform? If so, what needs reforming?

(To be compared with SSR's stated objectives and SSR actors and government responses (to reveal SSR's subjugated knowledges)

6. Do you think the Tunisian government is open to these reforms?
7. Where have the demands for security reform in Tunisia come from, both internally and externally?
    a. Why is there external interest/funding for SSR in Tunisia?

(This is the same across stakeholder groups. It will be interesting to see the different perspectives/knowledges about this. Are SSR actors/government excluding or subjugating voices articulating alternative reform needs or priorities than those advanced by SSR?)

8. I am specifically interested in international-development led SSR programmes: How central do you think they are in Tunisia's overall security reform agenda?

(This can serve to ensure that respondents are aware of what I mean by SSR programmes, to make sure we are on the same page. This can also serve for subjectivities: how central do oversight actors view SSR to be within the overall security reform debate)

9. Why do you think the Tunisian government accepts SSR assistance?

(Different perspective on the government's subjectivities to nuance SSR and government responses)

10. Do you think the Tunisian government should be accepting SSR assistance? Why or why not?

(I am not assuming that all Tunisian actors have a homogenous view of SSR or whether or not it is needed/welcome. It will be interesting to have more nuance to Tunisian subjectivities and subjugated knowledges (and to see which Tunisian actors conform/deviate the most from SSR's hegemonic discourse)

11. Are there any grassroots/national level actors that are promoting alternative/competing reform objectives than SSR actors?

(Subjugated knowledges: What knowledges has SSR come to sideline, and (how) are these knowledges challenging SSR?)

12. What role has (the parliament/civil society/media) played in security reform since 2011?
13. What role has (the parliament/civil society/media) played in counterterrorism since 2011?
14. What role do you think (the parliament/civil society/media) should have in reforming the security structures?
15. What role do you think (the parliament/civil society/media) should have in counterterrorism?

(The four questions above will establish whether oversight actors think they should be involved and whether they are actually being involved in security reform and CT)

16. What national and international actors do you think are best placed to design and provide security sector reform in Tunisia?

(Useful to compare with SSR actor responses to see each of their subjectivities- and the degree to which they share these subjectivities- and the subjugated knowledges/actors of SSR's discourse (who is an authority or speaking subject on reform of the security structures according to each stakeholder)

17. Are you aware of any SSR programs/actors that include your stakeholder group in their programming/strategy consultation?
18. Do you think SSR actors should be including your stakeholder group in their programming/strategy consultation? Why or why not?

(Question 17 and 18 will help establish whether oversight actors' subjugated knowledges are being included/coopted within the SSR discourse, therefore transforming it from within)

Evaluating SSR in Tunisia: Technologies and finalities:

19. In your opinion, is there a link between reforming the security sector and countering terrorism?

(Questions 19 and 20 can contribute to technologies: do oversight actors agree with the connection made by SSR between reforming security on the one hand and CT and democratization on the other?)

Probe: Do you think Counter-terrorism discourses and laws in Tunisia have impacted security reform? How so?

(For finalities of government, I want to determine whether SSR (through its CT focus) inadvertently contributed to the militarization of police/security forces and continued impunity and resistance to reform (thus hampering democratic reform of security structures)

20. Is there a link between reforming the security sector and the democratic transition?
21. What do you think are the best tools/activities/mechanisms for the reform of the security sector?

(for technologies: to be compared with SSR responses on their activities/projects)

22. How would you evaluate international development led SSR-programmes in Tunisia?
    a. Do you think SSR is contributing to addressing Tunisia's security reform needs?
    b. Do you think SSR is effectively addressing its own stated objectives (democratic reform and counter-terrorism)?
    c. What does "success" in SSR in Tunisia look like to you?

(for finalities: do oversight actors agree with SSR's judgment of its own success?)

Appendix 3: Data analysis codes

Code number	Code name	Sub code number	Sub-code name	Sub-code description
1	Rationalities	1.1	SSR's hegemonic Discourse	This sub-code includes data about SSR actors' perspectives on relevant security/SSR stakeholders and reform priorities in Tunisia
		1.2	SSR's subjugated knowledges	This sub-code includes data about Tunisian actors' perspectives on relevant security/SSR stakeholders and priorities in Tunisia
		1.3	SSR in context	This sub-code includes data about the effects of the counter-terrorism Discourse on security reform generally and on SSR specifically in Tunisia
2	Technologies	2.1	SSR's current technologies	This sub-code includes data about the tools and activities currently used

				by SSR actors in Tunisia or generally
		2.2	SSR's ideal technologies	This sub-code includes data about what actors think are the ideal tools and activities for security sector reform in Tunisia or generally
		2.3	SSR's competing powers	This sub-code includes data about what competing powers are affecting/shaping SSR in Tunisia
		2.4	SSR's biopolitical economy of power	This sub-code includes data about the biopolitical economy of power decisions involved in SSR intervention
3	Subjectivities	3.1	Tunisia's subordinate (recipient) position within SSR	This sub-code includes data about how and why Tunisia accepts SSR assistance
		3.2	Tunisia as an influencer of	This sub-code includes data about how Tunisia (Ministry of Interior)

			its own SSR assistance	influences SSR assistance. This sub-code is therefore closely associated with sub-code 2.3 as it touches on competing powers transforming SSR in Tunisia
4	Finalities	4.1	SSR's objectives in Tunisia	This sub-code includes data about how SSR actors articulate their programming and its objectives in Tunisia. This sub-code is linked to sub-code 1.1 as a comparison of the two sub-codes will reveal the gap between what SSR actors think are Tunisia's reform priorities and the priorities their programming is addressing
		4.2	SSR's impact in Tunisia	This sub-code includes data which evaluates SSR's impact in Tunisia

		4.3	Obstacles to SSR's intended objectives	This sub-code includes data on how SSR is influenced/changed on the ground following its encounter with competing powers. This sub-code is therefore closely linked to sub-codes 2.3 and 3.2.
		4.4	SSR's desired outcome	This sub-code includes data discussing what actors perceive ideal SSR should look like in Tunisia. This sub-code is closely linked to and overlaps with sub-code 1.2 on the subjugated knowledges of SSR

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