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MASS MIGRATIONS IN ARGENTINA:
A STUDY ON THE EFFECTS OF MIGRANTS ON
ELECTORAL OUTCOMES

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Abstract

In 1912, the Universal Masculine Suffrage became mandatory and secret in Argentina for natives and naturalised citizens. At the same time, the country was receiving an inflow during the 'Age of Mass Migration', when foreign-born people represented up to by nearly 50% of the population in some departments. These migrants had higher human capital than the Argentine natives. The aim of this paper is to analyse the influence of immigrants on political outcomes. Using data from the Argentine Census from 1895 and 1914, my main hypothesis is that migrants carried with themselves their political preferences and generated cultural spillovers. In particular, I argue that that departments which received more migrants tended to vote more for non-Conservative candidates in the following Presidential Elections. To deal with endogeneity, I exploit the shift-share instrument, first at the national level, and then focusing on the Pampas region. I find that a higher exposure to migrants increases the Socialist Party vote share, whereas it reduces the Conservative Party vote share.

JEL Classification: N36, F22, D72

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Mass Migrations in Argentina:

A Study on the Effects of Migrants on Argentine Politics¹

I Introduction

The aim of this paper is to analyse the cultural spillovers of immigrants on the natives; particularly, the influence on political preferences and electoral outcomes. In 1912, changes in Universal Masculine Suffrage took place in Argentina: vote became secret, mandatory and individual; however, it was allowed only for natives and naturalised citizens. The law was enacted in the context of the First Globalisation and Mass Migrations, period of great international flow of the labour factor. In Argentina, migrant participation with respect to locals reached nearly 50% in some departments. As it will be argued, these migrants had a higher human capital than the Argentine natives. My main hypothesis is that departments which received more migrants tended to absorb more migrant preferences. In particular, I will enquire whether exposure to migrants induced voting for non-Conservative parties in the Presidential Elections following 1912.

1 Motivation

In the period comprised 1877 and 1914, Argentina experienced high levels of migration, whose precedence was mainly from Europe. The main provinces to receive immigrants were located in the *Pampa* region: Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe. Until 1870, these regions were mainly unpopulated or had their population density around port cities, as they used to belong to Native American societies. As such, the newly conquered extensions of land became available to the Argentine state, who sold/assigned parcels of land to the incoming immigrants, according to the 1876 Law which promoted immigration. However, every province in the country was exposed to migrants in a greater or lesser extent.

In the same period, the only party in government was the Conservative Liberals² In 1912, the Universal Masculine Suffrage was introduced under the *Ley Saenz Peña* (hereinafter, the 1912 Law), which mandated a compulsory vote for every Argentine and naturalised male citizen, as well as secret vote. This law came in effect for the first legislative elections in the same year. However, until 1916, all previous presidential elections had been for a reduced group of citizens (qualified vote), who cast their votes publicly. Table 1 presents the magnitude of the change in voting age population:

Even though the 1916 presidential elections were the first where the mass of electors were expanded and votes were cast secretly, the 1912 Law only allowed native or naturalised citizens to vote, thus leaving out all the immigrants who were not politically assimilated into Argentina

¹I would like to thank Sara Lazzaroni for her valuable contributions, and the special guidance of Valeria Rueda and Giovanni Facchini. I would like to thank the University of Nottingham for the ongoing research.

²Economically Liberal and politically Conservative

TABLE 1: ARGENTINE VOTING AGE POPULATION AND TOTAL POPULATION PER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SINCE 1880

Year	Voting Age Population	Total Population	Percentage
1880	52,800	2,640,000	2.0%
1886	61,900	3,094,000	2.0%
1892	77,200	3,858,000	2.0%
1898	89,200	4,462,000	2.0%
1904	143,000	5,716,000	2.5%
1910	199,000	7,092,000	2.8%
1916	747,471³	8,300,000	14.3%

SOURCE: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF LATIN AMERICA, CAP. 34.

³ The voting age population was estimated in 1,189,254 voters, out of which 747,471 actually voted

by 1916. Despite the fact that there was a political incentive for immigrants to adopt Argentine citizenship (allowed by an 1869 Law), evidence indicates that the share of naturalised citizens by 1916 was extremely small, below 5% (Luconi (2015), Devoto (2006)).⁴

The institutional setting of Argentina in this point in time is particularly interesting because it allows to visibly distinguish natives from immigrants. Despite there being a third of inhabitants by 1914 that were born outside of Argentina, none of them could vote unless they were naturalised - a share that was singularly small. This allows to elaborate an in-depth study of the spillover effects of foreigners onto the Argentine political system.

2 Research Questions and Hypothesis

The main motivation behind this work is to observe how the transfer of norms from origin countries and cultural spillovers from migrants have applied to a emerging frontier economy in the early XXth century.

To do so, I have identified the main hypothesis worth testing:

- **Hypothesis 1:** departments receiving a higher share of migrants tended to vote for parties more politically aligned with the political preferences of those migrants;
- **Hypothesis 2:** Moreover, those departments were more prone to have a higher turnout in the ballots;
- **Hypothesis 3:** The main channels of transmission were via cultural norms and spillovers.

I expect that this paper will shed light on the causal effects of Mass Migration on Argentina, particularly its political system, as well as finding the underlying mechanisms.

⁴See Bertoni (1992). Poy (2015) comment that merely 0.23% of male foreigners were naturalised in 1895, whereas this share was only increased to 2.25% by 1914.

3 Literature Review

Often there is a fundamental problem of selection bias in immigration: migrants can self-select into regions. A number of studies have discussed different approaches to capture causal effects on receiver countries.

This paper contributes to the current literature on large-scale immigration and its impact on political outcomes. For instance, [Dinas et al. \(2019\)](#) look into the Syrian refugee crisis in the Greek islands that are close enough to Turkey. The authors study the impact of a sudden inflow of refugees onto the low-densely populated islands, who receive migrants based on their exogenous distance to the Turkish shores. When looking at political outcomes, they conclude that the far-right parties saw their share of votes increase in the islands who most were affected by the sudden immigration, and use as controls other nearby islands who did not receive them because of their distance to Turkey.

Additionally, [Cèfala \(2022\)](#) studies the sudden and exogenous migration of the ‘*pieds noir*’ from Algeria to Southern France, once the former attained independence from the latter. By stating that the time frame of migrating back to France was small, he argues that there was a sudden, massive inflow of Algerian migrants onto Southern France, with climate conditions not too dissimilar to those in Algeria. By looking at political outcomes, he finds that French regions who received most migrants tended to vote more far-right parties, as these migrants had strong connections with these parties.

The study of the ‘Age of Mass Migrations’ is a widely discussed topic. [Hatton and Ward \(2019\)](#) go over the mass migration literature to the Americas on the following aspects: determinants of migration, the development of immigration policy, immigrant selection and assimilation.

One of the most related works is the working paper of [Giuliano and Tabellini \(2021\)](#), where the authors analyse the impact of European immigrants on the US in terms of political preferences, in this case, the Welfare State. They study the persistent effect of exposure to migrants from European countries between 1900 and 1930, and average political preferences regarding the Welfare State. Using a shift-share instrument, they have three main findings: (1) that counties experiencing a higher presence of European migrants have showed on average more liberal views; (2) that there are not any other observable characteristics that could explain where migrants were settled; and (3) that migrants brought with themselves their political preferences. The results suggest that a higher presence of European immigrants not only have a positive effect on the New Deal, but also they have a persistent effect in preferences for having a Welfare State. These findings, along with the explored mechanisms, are key to have a better understanding on how migrants shaped the land where they went. My paper fits in this literature for the Argentine case, where the institutional setting and cultural norms were significantly different to those found in the US in the same period in time.

In the case of Argentina, there is not much available literature on the matter. [Lazzaroni \(2022\)](#) is currently working on the political influences of Italian migrants documented in the

1914 census on the rise of Peronism in the decade of 1940s. Using a shift-share instrument, the author delves into the linkage between Fascism from Italian migrants supporting Mussolini in Argentina and the shared support with Perón, an Argentine charismatic leader who gained significant popularity in the 1940s but shared some policy traits with Fascism. This is done by tracking individuals from their port and region of origin, and exploiting that variability to input the pro- or anti-Mussolini support to Argentina. In terms of the mechanisms, aside from migrants carrying their political preferences, the author argues that newspapers were a key driver of the growing sympathy for Perón by pro-Mussolini Italians. My paper falls in the period comprised in the timeline between Peronism and the Mass Migration, where I take a look on a newly democratic country and their effect on elections.

[Klein \(1983\)](#) compares Italian immigrants in the US and Argentina. Not only does he carefully describe the characteristics of the Italian immigrants, but also, he analyses the selection bias to the country of destination. He finds that in general there tended to be a better economic assimilation of Italians in Argentina relative to the US, who was more marked with British and Germanic heritages. Additionally, in Argentina, Italians had proportionally a higher level of human capital relative to the locals. This is relevant at the time of defining the potential mechanisms behind the cultural transmission of political preferences, given that departments with higher human capital faced more dynamism in the local and regional economies.

When it comes to trade, [De Arcangelis et al. \(2022\)](#) also review the impact of trade once migrants arrived to Argentina, and find that migrants tended to demand more goods from their home countries, increasing Argentine imports (although they cannot find a similar effect with exports). This paper shows the labour factor side of the deeper underlying structural transformation which Argentina was undergoing, as analysed in detail by [Fajgelbaum and Redding \(2022\)](#). In both cases, the authors show the extent to which migrants had an impact on the Argentine economy.

One of the most relevant papers to have discussed the impact of European migrants in Argentina is [Droller \(2018\)](#): using county level data, the author estimates a causal and persistent impact of European settlers from the Mass Migration period on a series of long-term outcomes, including current GDP per capita, human capital, and industrial activities. The author addresses the issue of endogeneity by interacting frontier expansion with migration cohorts, arguing that they happened independently of future outcomes. As for the main mechanisms, the results suggest that literacy, human capital, and industrialisation were key to the long-run economic development of the country, fostered to a fair extent by European migrants in the early XXth century.

In a recent work, [Droller and Fiszbein \(2021\)](#) exploit the exogenous variation in the composition of primary production induced by climatic features, to understand the differences in regional economies between ranching and cereal-producing areas. By implementing instrumental variables, the authors manage to capture the exogenous effect of the chosen primary activity with a series of outcomes, including land concentration, population density, modernisation, and

immigration reception. They conclude that ranching on average performed worse than cereal-based activities, for all the outcomes, and that migrants were not so much prone to engage in ranching activities, focusing in agriculture or human capital activities instead.

The assimilation of immigrants during the Mass immigration has also been widely discussed. Earlier studies such as [Baily \(1978\)](#) and [Baily \(1983\)](#) discuss how Italian immigrants fared in the transition from the XIX to XX century economy, and the role played by newspapers in aiding the cultural assimilation. A number of reasons are explored, namely: that newspapers helped to communicate natives with Italy or their region of origin closer; that they provided information suitable for migrants, reducing the cultural barriers and information costs, e.g. job openings; that they promoted associationism between their co-nationals, among others. Ultimately, the author argues that this resulted in a rich social capital, and Italians could preserve their Italian identity even though they remained immigrants in Argentina.

As for new literature on Italian assimilation, in [Pérez \(2017b\)](#) and [Pérez \(2021\)](#) not only the immigrants are compared in the labour market with the natives, but also, their descendants in first and second generation. He finds that for Italian migrants, there has been indeed significant progress in the job ladder, compared to natives. [Abad et al. \(2021\)](#) study the network effects between the two main immigration nationalities, Italians and Spanish, and show that former managed to build better networks and climb the job ladder, despite having substantially less human capital than the latter.

In particular, the effects of reductions of internal transport costs and its effect on inner migration is analysed by [Pérez \(2017a\)](#); some towns experienced an exogenous impact of railroads built near them, between production and/or distribution centres. Exploiting this variation, he finds that first generation descendants of migrants who located in farms saw the presence of railroads as an opportunity to migrate to nearby larger urban centres. After following their job activities, he concludes that individuals who migrated to cities from nearby towns had on average higher wages and outcomes. For the US, [Abramitzky et al. \(2014\)](#) focus on assimilation of immigrants, and question a former claim in the literature that migrants were significantly underpaid or marginalised in the labour market. According to their results, migrants did not suffer from a penalty vis-à-vis the natives. Although the US and Argentina have had institutional and cultural differences, both countries were indeed major receivers of migrants predominately from Europe in the Americas.

II Historical Context

1 Mass Migrations


In this section, I will discuss the historical context in Argentina at the time of the Mass Migrations, which started with more intensity after the 1876 Law and ended in 1914, due to the outbreak of the ‘Great War’.

a) Institutional and Geographic Background

Since the country's independence, the various Argentine leaders have meant to expand their frontier from the then-smaller country to its present day boundaries. The policy was more successfully undertaken in the second half of the XIX century, where a series of military expeditions were launched towards the so-called 'Desert', comprised by two broad spaces of land: the *Gran Chaco* towards the north of the country, and *Patagonia* towards the South. It is worth highlighting that after their conquest, these territories were incorporated onto Argentina as 'National Territories' and administrated by the National Government, with a politically lower status than the original provinces; thus, the newly conquered territories were excluded from National ballots.

Following the land expansion between 1879 and 1882, there arose new opportunities for agriculture and ranching. The year of the founding of the county can be traced, as shown in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1: COUNTY EXPANSION IN THE PAMPA PROVINCES




SOURCE: [DROLLER \(2018\)](#)

In the same space of time, in 1876 the Argentine Government passed the ‘Law of Immigration’ (hereinafter, the 1876 Law), where the State became an active promoter for migrant reception: it included, among others, migratory procedures for newcomers and arrangements for those who decided to colonise the ‘new’ land. Migration opportunities were also communicated in Argentine embassies across European countries. With vast, fertile yet inhabited fields, the Argentine government sought to attract immigrants to foster exports based in primary goods, practice which had produced significant benefits since independence.

It is worth mentioning that before the period of the Mass Migration started, the population density across the country was significantly low. Figure 2 reflects the evolution of population density from the start of the Mass Migration era, to its zenith by 1914. With the sanction of the 1876 Law, the Argentine state offered available land, either by transference or purchase, to immigrants.

FIGURE 2: POPULATION DENSITY IN ARGENTINA (1869, 1895 AND 1914)



SOURCE: FAJGELBAUM AND REDDING (2022)

At the time, the Argentine government and intellectuals considered that the citizens were not qualified enough to work the land by themselves in the short-run; instead, European *know-how* was more preferable (Alberdi (1854)). Illiteracy rates remained significantly high, with some exceptions in a small subset of big cities. Nonetheless, looking at the long-run, during the 1880’s the Argentine government promoted laws (e.g. 1420 Law) in favour of public, general and secular education provided by the State. With this law dated on 1884, president Julio Argentino Roca -head of the Conservative party- sought to ensure that future generations of migrants born in Argentina had the opportunity to assimilate more quickly into the country. (Campobassi (1956)).

Consequently, this not only raised significantly the literacy rate, but also it allowed a more fluent communication between the descendants of natives and immigrants, the latter which were

TABLE 2: ILLITERACY RATES

Year	Total	Men	Women
1869	78.2%	74.9%	81.8%
1895	54.4%	50.8%	58.5%
1914	37.9%	34.8%	41.5%


SOURCE: [FERRERES \(2010\)](#)

born and raised as Argentines. If the hypothesis holds that political transmission is carried out from one generation to another, then departments more exposed to migrants should observe higher cultural spillovers, which can affect locals - provided they know how to read and write. Table 2 depicts the substantial increase in alphabetism since before the Mass Migrations and its climax in 1914. As I will discuss in the following section, migrants also manifested their views in newspapers, journals, pamphlets, and other mass media available at the time; for instance, the promotion of trade unions.

b) The First Wave (1880-1889)

The main provinces to receive immigrants were located in *La Pampa*: Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Santa Fe and Entre Ríos. Until 1870, these regions were mainly unpopulated or had their population density around port cities, as they used to be under the control of Native American societies. One of the key features of this period is that most immigrant groups formed clubs, associations, and enterprises with other conationals. ([Devoto \(2004\)](#)).


FIGURE 3: TOTAL NUMBER OF IMMIGRANT ARRIVALS TO ARGENTINA



SOURCE: [DROLLER \(2018\)](#)


However, by the late 1880s, commodity prices progressively dropped, generating an unstable environment in the factor markets. Figure 4 illustrates the economic situation in terms of international trade by the end of the decade. Being a country with main export goods from the primary sector, the drop in international demand for commodities relative to supply lowered domestic wages in agriculture (Figure 5). For seasonal migrants, by the early 1890's, there was no strong incentive to continue exerting labour efforts in Argentina.

FIGURE 4: AGGREGATE EXPORT AND IMPORT PRICE INDEXES, AND TERMS OF TRADE



SOURCE: FAJGELBAUM AND REDDING (2022)

FIGURE 5: ARGENTINE REAL-WAGE PREMIA AND IMMIGRATION FLOWS, 1870–1913



SOURCE: [DE ARCANGELIS ET AL. \(2022\)](#)


Notes The authors present a real-wage index, with 5-year centred moving average

Domestically, the economic mismanagement of the Juárez Celman administration (1886 - 1890) ultimately led to the final blow to the Argentine economy, where foreign investment pursued a Ponzi scheme on low quality investments in Argentina. As shown in [della Paolera and Taylor \(2001\)](#), the result was the most important sovereign debt crisis in the century, as financial markets witness a sudden negative shock after the Barings Bank in London nearly declared bankruptcy. The ‘Baring Crisis’, initially a world financial crisis, ultimately led to world economic recession. In turn, the Baring Crisis took its toll in the Argentine economy by depreciating wages dramatically, and thus making it no longer attractive for migrants to enter the country. The political consequences that emerged from the crisis will be reviewed in Section 2.

c) The Sudden Stop (1890-1899)

The 1895 census showed the total Argentine population consisted of nearly four million inhabitants, contrasting heavily with those from the 1869 census, where the amount was 1,830,214. Table 3 depicts the stock of inhabitants in Argentina’s provinces by population composition in 1895, a few years after the world financial and economic crisis.

TABLE 3: MIGRANTS AND NATIVES IN 1895 CENSUS FOR PROVINCES AND CABA




SOURCE: INDEC

For the decade of 1890s, Figures 5 illustrate the low performance of the economy for the labour factor, and Figure 4 present the low international demand at the time. This context is important for the quality of the 1895 Census data given the fact that it captures the migrants who were more likely to be ‘stayers’ in the country, opposed to the *golondrina* that came only for the season. As such, it is possible to argue that the 1895 census has a representative share of migrants who chose to settle in the country.

d) The Second Wave (1900-1914)

With the recovery of commodity prices, international demand reactivated the economic cycle in Argentina. In the second half of the 1890s, migrants began re-entering the country, attracted by the improved factor market conditions.

TABLE 4: MIGRANTS AND NATIVES IN 1914 CENSUS FOR PROVINCES AND CABA



SOURCE: INDEC

Table 4 replicates Table 3 at the peak of the Mass Migrations in 1914. It is worth mentioning that the composition of migrants overall remained similar; however, there were slight differences, like the prominent arrival of Russians (many being Polish or Jewish) and Ottomans (particularly, from the then Syrian and Lebanese regions), as well as Portuguese. More so, the Spanish participation increased significantly compared to the former census by nearly fourfold in the Argentine provinces. In turn, migration from the more industrialised countries which had been more prominent in the XIX century faced a reduction in relative terms. Finally, the Argentine population nearly duplicated in the span of twenty years from 1895 to 1914. This will be relevant at the time of building the main shares for analysis.

With the outbreak of the ‘Great War’ in 1914, international movements of people came to a sudden halt, thus the inflow of migrants dropped dramatically in the following four years, and would never return to its former pre-war levels. Although migration resumed by the 1920s, the actual share was considerably lower than in the preceding years.

2 Political Landscape

a) The Conservative Era (1880-1916)

Since 1880, Argentina was ruled by a unique party: the Liberal Conservatives, known as the PAN (*Partido Autonomista Nacional*). Politically Conservative yet economically liberal, they were in government whilst Argentina saw its unprecedented economic growth which partly motivated the migration.

However, the reason why they stood so long in power was precisely about being politically conservative: voting was cast publicly -i.e. the voter was exposed to public humiliation or




FIGURE 6: ARGENTINE TIMELINE, 1850-1930

threats- and limited to a small share of the population, those who were natives, men, and had reading and writing skills. Moreover, the average Argentine citizen was not too involved in elections or active politics. In any case, the ruling elites were successful in remaining in power for over three decades thanks to the electoral system, often understood as “corrupt”, with practices including repeated voting by the same person, or ignoring the cast vote and replacing it instead with the Conservative party vote. I argue that for these reasons, the incentive to vote was /not sufficiently high by 1912.

But in all those years in power, political stability was not always given. Ever since the recession of the late 1880’s and the final blow on the economy since 1890, a wave of riots and protests emerged all over the country, particularly in the City of Buenos Aires. Some groups even consolidated political organisations; and one of these cases was the Radical Party, founded in 1889 as the ‘Unión Cívica’ (Alonso (2000)). The Radical movement emerged as a response from a somewhat heterogeneous group joining forces to collectively raise their voice to the authorities at the time. In fact, the President Miguel Juárez Celman was the first head of state to leave office whilst in power, as he and his government were blamed for the economic crisis, which involved cheap loans to friends and allies, and public funds mismanagement. The 1890 riot was known as “*Revolución del Parque*” (“Revolution of the Park”).

After its formation in 1889, the Radical Party lead a civic-military uprising in 1893, and would repeat this action in 1905, in addition to smaller or more local riots in the span of time. I argue that these instances raised awareness for natives, who saw the efforts of an emerging party that spoke in favour of political assimilation for immigrants.

b) The Change: *Ley Saénz Peña* (1912) and the Ascension of Radicalism (1916-1930)

Between the political events from the previous decade, and the significant increase in Argentine-born population as well as literacy, the response of the government to these issues was promoting laws which would appease the protesters. Such measures included not only an increase of the voting age population, but also promoting a more proportional system in the electoral colleges.

For instance, by 1903, the Julio Argentino Roca administration passed a law (N° 4.161) increasing the voting age population from the fifteen districts to the hundred-and-twenty *circunscripciones*, or sections, reflecting a more proportional system. Additionally, the law also included the reform of the electoral process: from the pluri-member majority vote to the incomplete list system, which favoured the minorities, as the most voted party could only get two-thirds of the representatives.


Although the law was repealed in 1905 (the same year as the second great uprising from the Radical Party), it would serve the basis for future laws less than a decade later. In 1912, president Luis Saénz Peña carried the motion to reform the electoral system. Belonging to a more moderate wing within the PAN, he sought to resume his predecessor's law, and amid a set of new reform laws, the most noticeable was the law 8.871 (hereinafter '1912 Law'). Among other relevant changes, the key features worth highlighting was the establishment of an electoral hierarchy: with districts at the highest level (the fourteen provinces and the Capital), then followed the sections (i.e electoral colleges), and finally the voting booths⁵. Moreover, votes were to be cast secretly individually, and every native or naturalised citizen was now obliged to vote. The penalty for not voting was set to \$10, accounting for nearly a week's average worth wage.

Despite the attempts for appeasement, the members of PAN could not foresee the results of the elections from the years to come (Devoto (1996)). Figure 7 illustrates the increasing share of the Radical Party (centre-left), in detriment of the Conservative Liberals, in the course of three Parliamentary elections held over five years. Not only did the Radical Party earn a great deal of votes, but also, Socialist parties gained their place as an emerging third force in Parliament. Although this was partly due to the incomplete list system newly implemented, the 1912 Law allowed to channel the political preferences of the voters in fair elections.

Moreover, Cantón (1964) stresses that the Conservative Party was less willing to include immigrants as candidates; unlike the Radicals, the Conservatives actually included immigrants only in the 1916 elections. By 1916, the three main political parties were the Radical, Conservatives, and Socialist parties.

⁵In a later law dating from 1926, circuits would be included between the sections and the voting booths.

FIGURE 7: EVOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT AFTER THE 1912 LAW



The evolution of the Argentine Senate composition since the 1912 Law, with the following colours representing each seat: in lightblue, the Conservative Liberals; in red, the Radicals; in orange, the Socialists; in blue and dark-blue, other Right-wing parties. By 1916, the Conservatives had lost the majority in the Senate. The number 120 reflects the total amount of Senate seats.

The year 1916 marked the first presidential elections since the 1912 Law was in effect, and by a narrow victory, was won by the Radical Party, and President Hipólito Yrigoyen rose to power. In the 1922 elections, the Radical Party won once again, and President Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear took office. Despite having the initial support of Yrigoyen, the two Radical presidents presented a fair share of political differences, leading to a schism in the party: while Yrigoyen led the Left-wing side (*'personalistas'* or *'yrigoyenistas'*), the Right-wing (*'anti-personalistas'*) were led by Alvear. In the 1928 election, both factions competed in the elections. The Conservative party, despite not being able to restore victory, were more prone to take sides with the Right-wing Radicals (Ferrari (2005)). Ultimately, Yrigoyen won the elections, and became President once more. However, the democratic process came to a sudden end in 1930 when internal and external conditions, both political and economical, induce a *coup d'état* by Conservative and military forces, in an attempt to bring back the former corrupt voting practices performed before the 1912 Law.

III Data Analysis

1 Dependent Variables

Because this paper uses historical data, the sources were often not digitised. I have retrieved political votes for each party, including blank votes, at the department level from Cantón (1968), in addition to sources from the National Archive⁶. The available information is at the county level, or *departamentos*⁷. I manually digitised the information for the year between 1912 and 1930, with 1912 being the earliest year of available information. In turn, 1930 was chosen as an upper limit because democratic elections were interrupted that year and did not resume until the 1940s. I then calculated the voting shares for each party and department.

It is worth mentioning that there were some data limitations. Table 13 illustrates the data

⁶Examples include digitalisations of major newspapers of the time: *La Nación* and *La Prensa*

⁷The sections were named differently for CABA and Buenos Aires, where they were named *circunscripciones* and *partidos*, respectively.)

availability for each election year and province. Moreover, between the years, some political forces dissolve only to later join a different party later. As such, a significant challenge comes at the time of defining partisan membership. For instance, whilst in 1916 the Radical Party was predominately Centre-Left wing ([Starosta Galante \(2013\)](#)), by 1928 irreconcilable differences between parties produced a Centre-Right and a Centre-Left wing opposing bands, which competed in the elections of that year.

Furthermore, many parties were autonomous in each province, i.e. they did not respond to a Nationwide party. However, in the second stage of the election at the electoral college, these parties formed coalitions in a united front ([Ferrari \(2005\)](#)). This was especially the case in some provinces like Santiago del Estero with lower political competition, where only the Left-Wing and Right-Wing Radical factions presented themselves at the elections, when the Conservative party used to be predominant. Because of this, the classification of parties was also taken into account based on the dynamics of the electoral colleges.

2 Explanatory Variables

a) Main Regressor

The principal explanatory variable I look at is set of the migrant shares. The data was constructed from the Argentine census from 1895 and 1914, which contain country of origin details. It is worth mentioning that the 1914 census portrays every country in the world based on the political divisions at the time, whilst the 1895 census focuses on a limited selection of European nationalities⁸, encompassing the remaining as ‘Other’. With this information, I later consolidated the individual sums in each department into groups, to avoid losing statistical power.

With this in mind, I started with three groups for the 1895 census: ‘Italians’ (1), ‘Spanish’ (2), and ‘Industrial Europe’ (3), comprising the remaining European nationalities into one group. For non-European groups, the most important shares found in the data are ‘Uruguayans and Brazilians’ (4), as they are dispersed in a great part of the country, thus purposefully suitable for the identification strategy.⁹ In turn, for the 1914 census, I included a new group, predominant only in the 1914 census with a more detailed information of country of origin: ‘1914 Europeans’¹⁰(5). For both census, the remaining nationalities were bundled into ‘Other’ (6). As such, the total amount of shares was six.

Because it is presented at the department level, the tabulations were used as a source of information, and then I calculated the migration shares for each department. I manually digitised the 1914 information census, and the 1895 census data was obtained from [Lazzaroni \(2022\)](#).

From the census, many observable characteristics were recompiled. Table 14 illustrates the

⁸Italian, Spanish, French, British, German, Austrian and Swiss

⁹Other South American countries had specific presence in the Argentine provinces with the shared frontier. For example, Bolivians in Jujuy, Chileans in San Juan and Mendoza, and Paraguayans in Corrientes.

¹⁰Portuguese, Russian and Ottoman

main features being captured in each census. This additional information will be suitable as controls for each department, which shall be the analysed unit level. Other control variables were retrieved from [Edwards et al. \(2020\)](#), [Droller \(2018\)](#) and [Fajgelbaum and Redding \(2022\)](#). I provide a detailed comment on the controls in Chapter IV.

3 Analysis and Statistics

To begin with, it is worth looking at the data to see whether in fact departments which had been migrant receivers in 1895 were also by 1914. Figure 8 depicts the positive correlation. The variability in the data is important as the instrument can exploit this difference in exposure to migrants, as I will comment on Chapter IV. For the Pampa provinces, they appear to have received on average more migrants in 1895 than 1914; conversely, the rest of the country seems to have attracted a higher share of migrants by 1914.

FIGURE 8: CORRELATION BETWEEN EXPOSURE TO MIGRANTS IN 1914 AND 1895






FIGURE 9: SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANTS ACROSS THE ARGENTINE PROVINCES, FOR 1895 AND 1914



Notes The departments presented are based on the 1895 political division following [Cacopardo \(1967\)](#) for the provinces at the time, namely: (1) Buenos Aires, (2) Catamarca, (3) Córdoba, (4) Corrientes, (5) Entre Ríos, (6) Jujuy, (7) La Rioja, (8) Mendoza, (9) Salta, (10) San Juan, (11) San Luis, (12) Santa Fe, (13) Santiago del Estero and (14) Tucumán. The Capital (CABA) is considered the fifteenth section.

From Figures 9a and 9b, it is worth noticing the shift from the Pampas provinces to the rest of the country in the subsequent years following 1895. In other words, there seems to be a wider dispersion of migrants by 1914 across the country. In some examples, like Mendoza, Salta, and Corrientes, migrants came from limiting countries, attracting Chileans, Bolivians, and Brazilians and Paraguayans respectively.


FIGURE 10: SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR EUROPEAN MIGRANTS ACROSS THE ARGENTINE PROVINCES, FOR 1895 AND 1914



Notes The departments presented are based on the 1895 political division following [Cacopardo \(1967\)](#) for the provinces at the time, namely: (1) Buenos Aires, (2) Catamarca, (3) Córdoba, (4) Corrientes, (5) Entre Ríos, (6) Jujuy, (7) La Rioja, (8) Mendoza, (9) Salta, (10) San Juan, (11) San Luis, (12) Santa Fe, (13) Santiago del Estero and (14) Tucumán. The Capital (CABA) is considered the fifteenth section.

More importantly, in terms of political outcomes, migrant presence had correlations with party voting. For instance, the Socialist party presents a positive correlation, whereas conversely the Conservative party faces a negative correlation, as portrayed in Figures 12 and 13 respectively.

FIGURE 11: SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES VOTING SHARES (1916, 1922 AND 1928)



Notes The departments presented are based on the 1895 political division following [Cacopardo \(1967\)](#) for the provinces at the time, namely: (1) Buenos Aires, (2) Catamarca, (3) Córdoba, (4) Corrientes, (5) Entre Ríos, (6) Jujuy, (7) La Rioja, (8) Mendoza, (9) Salta, (10) San Juan, (11) San Luis, (12) Santa Fe, (13) Santiago del Estero and (14) Tucumán. The Capital (CABA) is considered the fifteenth section.

From Figures 11a, 11b and 11c, it is worth highlighting the scales: The Radical party has had a predominant voting share across the years, which is aligned to the fact that the party won all three Presidential elections between 1916 and 1928. For the Socialist Party, the average share was achieved at over 40% in the capital of the country, followed by roughly 30% in a department in Buenos Aires; the rest of the shares are 15% or below. It would be interesting to replicate these maps by taking away the Capital, which is often argued to be an outlier.

FIGURE 12: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MIGRANTS IN 1914 AND SOCIALIST VOTE SHARE





FIGURE 13: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MIGRANTS IN 1914 AND CONSERVATIVE VOTE SHARE



IV Empirical Strategy

The aim of this proposal is to exploit the ex-ante heterogeneous exposition to European immigration, and the incidence they might have had on electoral outcomes by changing the natives' preferences who were voting in the 1916 presidential elections, and the following years.

1 Identification

Despite the fact that every region was subject to migrations, the exposition to migrants differed based on a number of characteristics, especially the availability of land, as presented in Figure 2. Although migrants self-selected into provinces, they usually chose farmland, where the newly conquered land provided plenty of occupations and possibilities of growth. However, it still may be argued that endogeneity remains as an issue; to sort this issue, I use an instrument variable approach. In this case, following the literature on migrations in history, the chosen instrument is the shift-share.

a) The Shift-Share Instrument

Based on the existing literature, an increasing number of papers working on migrations have been opting to work with this instrument. Proposed by [Altonji and Card \(1991\)](#), and later revised in [Card \(2001\)](#), the shift-share instrument has become one of the principal approaches to dealing with endogeneity in migrations. The way it sorts this issue is by constructing a prediction of the shares, which in the observed data have suffered from shocks, i.e. shifts. This way, the analysis is carried out by instrumenting the *prediction* on the actual, observable variables.

In recent years, [Adão et al. \(2019\)](#) present a theoretic review where the authors study the main assumptions and properties, for infinite and finite samples. They especially focus on the [Borusyak et al. \(2021\)](#) approach arguing that conditional on the shares, the instrument is valid if the set of shifters is as-good-as-randomly assigned. That is, endogeneity is allowed within the shares, as long as the shifters are independent across the unit of observation.

I use this approach for my analysis, where the migrant share is built with the set of shares from each migratory group, and exploit the exogenous shifts across departments between 1895 and 1914.

$$\tilde{X}_{dp\tau} = \frac{\sum_j \alpha_{jd} O_{j\tau}^{-d}}{P_{dp}^{1895}}, \quad \sum_{j=1}^J \alpha_{jd} \leq 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha_{jd} \geq 0 \forall j \quad (1)$$

where $O_{j\tau}^{-d}$ represents immigrants with country origin j entering Argentina between τ and $\tau - 1$, net of the immigrants eventually settling in department d ; α_{jd} is the share of immigrants from country j living in department d in 1895; and P_{dp}^{1895} is the 1895 population in each department.

I construct the instrument with the following steps: first, the total amount of immigrants

conditional on their origin are added across all departments, for both 1895 and 1914. Second, to obtain the net immigrant inflow, the 1914 sum is subtracted by the 1895 sum. In an updated version from [Card \(2001\)](#), [Adão et al. \(2019\)](#) recommend a “leave-out” approach of the shift-share, in which the immigrants settling in each department are excluded for each origin. Having the total inflow per each origin net of those that would eventually settle in each department, now the 1895 share for each group and department is used to build the *predicted* inflow of migrants. To obtain the total predicted inflow across all origins, the prediction for each origin is added. Finally, to achieve the fraction of migrants, the total predicted inflow is divided by the 1895 census population for each department. I used the population 1895 year ($\tau - 1$) rather than the 1914 (τ) to avoid reintroducing endogeneity.¹¹

Instrument Validity and Identifying Assumptions

For an instrument to be deemed valid, some assumptions need to hold: the identification assumption and the exclusion restriction.¹² In this case, for the identification assumption to hold, the predicted number of migrants received by a department should not correlate with anything that is not captured by the model; in turn, the predicted number of migrants should not affect in any way the electoral outcomes.


As shown in [Figure 5](#), the fact that the Baring Crisis produced a significant outflow of migrants during the 1890’s allows to think that the migrants captured in the 1895 have a stronger preference to stay in the country despite the low wages and rent prices at the time.

Furthermore, in order for the two-stage least-squared regressions to work, the first stage should reflect that a significant portion of the variability of the endogenous variable is captured by that of the instrument. [Figure 14](#) illustrates the relation between the share of migrants in 1914 with its respective instrument used.

¹¹The baseline population is recommended by [Card and Peri \(2016\)](#) to construct the fraction of immigrants.

¹²[Angrist and Pischke \(2009\)](#)

FIGURE 14: CORRELATION BETWEEN THE SHARE OF MIGRANTS IN 1914 AND ITS INSTRUMENT



First stage: actual versus predicted immigration

2 Specification

The available data of political ballots for party i is at a department level d , within province p . Per hypothesis 1, I will look into transmission of political preferences, observable in National elections; the outcome $Votes$ will reflect the share of votes obtained by the three main parties (i.e. Radicals, Conservatives and Socialists), in the Presidential elections following the 1912 Law, until 1930. Given the data availability, I exploit the departments' heterogeneous exposure to migrants between 1895 and 1914. In a first analysis, I look into departments at the National level. I also study a subset of departments, found in the Pampa region, given the predominance of migrants, as presented in Figure 4. The proposed specification is:

$$VoteShare_{idp} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ImmigrantShare_{dp} + \delta X_{dp} + \mu_p + \epsilon_{idp} \quad (2)$$

Equation 2 reflects the biased, OLS estimation. The IV estimation will instrument the immigrant share with the prediction from the shift-share, thus resulting in an unbiased estimator. I carry out the estimations using robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity, and applying fixed effects at the province level. As for controls, data was collected both at a National Level and specifically for the Pampa region. Aside from the 1914 census data, controls were also collected from Edwards et al. (2020), Droller (2018) and Fajgelbaum and Redding (2022).

For all the province departments, I used the following controls: the urban share from 1914, the population density in 1914 (in logarithm), the length of the colonial post routes, the railway length (in logarithm), the distance in time to the nearest major port, and the distance in time to the port of Buenos Aires. The reason behind these controls is motivated by Figure 2: the population controls capture the variability of the voting shares in case cities and farmland experienced systematic differences across counties, whereas connectivity helps to control for not only capability of migrants to travel, as well as newspapers and correspondence, but also as a proxy of economic activity, where a more integrated region with the world may experience differences in voting patterns. I also include voter literacy rates, per the 1914 National Census.

As for the Pampas region, a richer dataset allows to delve into an analysis with other potentially relevant controls, which are the following: the average farm size (in logarithm), and the total farm size; the urban share in 1914, and the population density in 1914; a series of geoclimatic controls, namely average precipitation, temperature, elevation and ruggedness; the railway density in a five kilometer distance; and the literacy population share by 1914, as well as the total amount of schools per thousand children in 1914.

These controls help to provide a better analysis by capturing other potential sources of selection bias.

3 Potential Mechanisms

To detect mechanisms, it is possible to think of two channels: a direct and an indirect effect. I review the data and the literature to detect the plausible channels of transmission of political preferences and cultural spillovers to locals.

a) Direct Effect

Empirical evidence shows that European immigrants had a higher human capital than the natives residing in Argentina prior to the Mass immigration (Klein (1983)), as Figure 15 can show. As immigrants established in the different regions, new schools were founded, as well as newspapers,¹³ as shown in Figure 16. Examples of these newspapers are *La Questione Sociale*, *Il Paria*, *La Révolte*, and *Il Socialista*. Whilst some of them were printed in Europe, other newspapers were founded in Argentina.

In particular, Italians became increasingly more active in local elections, too. Luconi (2015) explores all the different candidates of Italian origin to occupy a position in some level of State, highlighting the fact that between 1892 and 1896, Pellegrini -from an Italian descendent- became President, marking one of the highest points so far of Italian migrants in the country.

Based on the existing literature, I argue that the higher the presence of migrants, the higher the probability of natives to be able to read and write, given that more schools were founded after


¹²This was created using the amount of farms in each department.

¹²This includes both public and private schools.

¹³Some in Spanish, others in e.g. Italian and French

migrants settled. Consequently, higher alphabetism rates allowed natives to gain information on political affairs, by reading newspapers.

FIGURE 15: LITERACY RATES OF ITALIAN AND SPANISH IMMIGRANTS AND ARGENTINE NATIVES (1895)



SOURCE: [DROLLER ET AL. \(2022\)](#)

Politically, some groups of European immigrants brought with them the new ideas circulating among Europe at that time, which included syndicalism, Leftists tendencies, and anarchists, among others. A higher exposition to these ideas have been another source of influence for Argentines. In particular, following an early cohort of French fleeing from the collapse of the *Commune de Paris* in the 1870s, a more predominant group formed by Italians and Germans ([Starosta Galante \(2013\)](#)), and later, Spanish ([Baer \(2015\)](#)). These countries had new, ‘modern’ governments, which disapproved of the left-wing views, often leading to political persecution, e.g. under the von Bismarck and Crispi administrations in Germany and Italy, respectively. It is worth highlighting that some of the key leaders of the anarchist movements in Argentina were Italian, such as the cases of Ettore Mattei, Errico Malatesta, and Pietro Gori.

In his work, [Baily \(1978\)](#) investigates the role of major Italian newspapers in Argentina. According to his research, newspapers were effective in maintaining the communication between the Italian migrants, regardless of their location across the country. He finds that migrants had two main sources of ideology: either they were Socialist, or they expressed both Liberal and Nationalism thought, following the Unification of Italy in the second half of the XIXth century. Socialist newspapers were ‘of the highest intellectual calibre’, yet often lasted for a brief period, and limited influence. It was these papers that most encouraged political participation in Argentina.

FIGURE 16: MAIN NEWSPAPERS IN CIRCULATION IN ARGENTINA

	1887	1904	Special Editions
La Prensa	18,000	95,000	210,537
La Nación	18,000	60,000	
El Diario	12,500	40,000	
La Patria Italiana	11,000	40,000 (estimate)	60,000
L'Operaio Italiano	6,000		

SOURCE: [BAILY \(1978\)](#)

On the other hand, the most popular newspaper was ‘*La Patria degli Italiani*’. Founded in 1876 as ‘*La Patria*’, it was the third largest newspaper read in the country by 1914. The author argues that the political position had changed over time, at first fully endorsing cultural assimilation, but rejecting social assimilation; that is, that Italians respected and celebrated Argentine holidays and main historic figures, and even learn Spanish ([Italiano-McGreevy \(2013\)](#)), but they strongly worked against losing the identity as Italians. More importantly, until 1916, the newspaper portrayed strong views against political assimilation and naturalisation; the major claim was that migrants would have to give up their Italian citizenship to get the Argentine. This analysis follows closely what is observed in the data: that the rate of naturalisation of migrants was inferior to 2.5%.

I argue that the Argentine natives, who by 1914 had higher literacy rates, observed migrants groupings into trade unions and associations, and read about riots in newspapers and Spanish versions of Left-wing publications. This induced the Argentines to gradually absorb many of the aforementioned aspects, building into their own political preferences.

b) Indirect Effect

The empirical evidence suggests that the higher human capital from immigrants was not only on literacy rates, but also on *know-how* on the primary sector, as well as industry. [Droller \(2018\)](#) captures this information already in the 1935 Industrial Census, implying that migrants not only had higher human capital, but also had the Constitutional freedom to ameliorate their social status, in turn generating positive spillovers. Therefore a plausible complementary mechanism in effect is that immigrants were more productive than saw an increase in their income vis-à-vis the Argentineans, which in turn leads to improved living conditions and quality of life, and the opportunity to access better education. This is particularly relevant because redistributive preferences were common at the time in Europe ([Tabellini \(2020\)](#)), meaning that wealthier immigrants could actually be inclined to vote less Right-wing parties. This is particularly observable in the Pampas region, where Italian migrants were predominant in the 1895 and 1914 census.

V Results

The IV results provide an unbiased estimation through the exogeneity assumption which the OLS cannot uphold. Because of this, differences in magnitude can show the sense of the bias, whether there is a positive or a negative selection. In this case, the primary interest is to identify in what sense could the migrants self-select.

The main outcomes to be reviewed are the average voting shares for the Socialist, Conservative and Radical parties, as well the average electoral turnout. I present the case of the overall migrant share of 1914 in the first place, followed by the major European migrant share. The following tables illustrate the OLS results together with the instrumental variable approach.

Following hypothesis 1, I carried out the main analysis with the overall migrant share by 1914. However, given the prominence of the European migrants in Argentina until 1914, a second analysis was included. As described in Chapter II, of all the migrants that arrived to Argentina by 1914, the majority were from Italian and Spanish origin. By 1895, a relatively minor share of migrants from industrial European countries was also established in the country, and even though the share was smaller by 1914, enough time had taken place in between for the political preferences to be more assimilated in Argentina for the elections following the 1912 Law. Because of this, a separate analysis was carried for migrants arriving from Italy, Spain, France, Germany, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Austria-Hungary.

1 All Migrants

a) Electoral Turnout

TABLE 5: OLS & IV (1895) REGRESSIONS FOR ELECTORAL TURNOUT

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Mig. Share, 1914	0.83428*	0.35750	0.02960			
	(0.49322)	(0.43632)	(0.31414)			
Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				0.38432***	0.36714	0.38722
				(0.14916)	(0.30004)	(0.67270)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		0.05574	-0.01414		0.01581	-0.16635
		(0.04551)	(0.05934)		(0.08345)	(0.22254)
Urban Share		0.04257**	0.05162*		-0.00384	-0.01585
		(0.01953)	(0.02804)		(0.04674)	(0.13774)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		0.00162	0.00770		0.00223	0.00861
		(0.00428)	(0.00528)		(0.00584)	(0.00960)
Post Routes Length		0.00008	0.00010*		0.00003	-0.00001
		(0.00005)	(0.00006)		(0.00007)	(0.00016)
Railway Length (ln)		0.00234	0.00461**		-0.00005	0.00277
		(0.00209)	(0.00224)		(0.00374)	(0.00653)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		0.00007**	0.00007*		0.00004	-0.00002
		(0.00003)	(0.00004)		(0.00008)	(0.00018)
Observations	297	296	147	235	235	112
R2	0.512	0.537	0.577	0.163	0.200	.
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe. Controls for Pampa are presented in the Appendix.

The IV coefficients for the electoral turnout found in Table 5 have all positive signs, reflecting that counties with a higher share of migrants observed a higher turnout in Presidential elections. Results hold in the Pampas region.

b) **Socialist Party**

TABLE 6: OLS & IV (1895) REGRESSIONS FOR SOCIALIST PARTY

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Mig. Share, 1914	0.85443*	0.42467	0.11141			
	(0.45162)	(0.39925)	(0.34372)			
Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				0.35844***	0.49356**	0.70936
				(0.09849)	(0.20338)	(0.79545)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		0.04142**	0.05154		-0.04584	-0.18377
		(0.01905)	(0.04181)		(0.05949)	(0.23624)
Urban Share		0.01938**	0.05238***		-0.03763	-0.07891
		(0.00805)	(0.01896)		(0.03640)	(0.18843)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		0.00428***	0.00786**		0.00318	0.00676
		(0.00143)	(0.00331)		(0.00470)	(0.01587)
Post Routes Length		0.00001	0.00005		-0.00010*	-0.00013
		(0.00002)	(0.00004)		(0.00006)	(0.00022)
Railway Length (ln)		0.00046	-0.00059		-0.00186	-0.00324
		(0.00055)	(0.00129)		(0.00321)	(0.01095)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		0.00005*	0.00009*		-0.00002	-0.00006
		(0.00003)	(0.00005)		(0.00009)	(0.00030)
Observations	297	296	147	235	235	112
R2	0.394	0.474	0.462	.	.	.
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe. Controls for Pampa are presented in the Appendix.

Tables 6 present all positive coefficients, reflecting the positive correlation between migrants and Left-Wing voting share. The point estimates are statistically significant when looking at the entire country; however, when focusing on the Pampa region, the 5% significance is lost, meaning that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. It is worth noting that in the Pampas, population density seem to capture the most part of the variability of the dependent variable.

The positive and significant coefficients are aligned with the fact that migrants were especially involved in the Socialist Party, as leftist tendencies were actively promoted by important members of the political movements in Europe. This matter will be addressed in the next section.

c) **Conservative Party**

TABLE 7: OLS & IV (1895) REGRESSIONS FOR CONSERVATIVE PARTY

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Mig. Share, 1914	-1.06542*	-0.55233	-0.01904			
	(0.57467)	(0.53159)	(0.38916)			
Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				-0.45646**	-0.48215	-0.42598
				(0.18401)	(0.38288)	(0.85097)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		-0.09889	0.05983		-0.03078	0.26517
		(0.06432)	(0.08778)		(0.10687)	(0.28347)
Urban Share		-0.01646	0.00185		0.04416	0.07731
		(0.02790)	(0.04450)		(0.05799)	(0.16696)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		-0.00516	-0.01920**		-0.00636	-0.01961
		(0.00602)	(0.00904)		(0.00770)	(0.01195)
Post Routes Length		-0.00006	-0.00006		0.00000	0.00008
		(0.00007)	(0.00009)		(0.00010)	(0.00021)
Railway Length (ln)		-0.00174	-0.00664*		0.00061	-0.00508
		(0.00285)	(0.00351)		(0.00478)	(0.00767)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		-0.00010**	-0.00006		-0.00005	0.00007
		(0.00004)	(0.00006)		(0.00010)	(0.00020)
Observations	297	296	147	235	235	112
R2	0.772	0.777	0.790	0.665	0.654	0.631
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe. Controls for Pampa are presented in the Appendix.

Results for Tables 7 portray that overall in the country more migrants seem to decrease Conservative voting shares. These lower share for Conservatives is aligned with the historical context provided in chapter II; however, the significance of the complete model for the Pampas is lost. However, it is worth commenting that in the Pampa provinces migrants statistical significance is lost.

d) **Radical Party**

TABLE 8: OLS & IV (1895) REGRESSIONS FOR RADICAL PARTY

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Mig. Share, 1914	-0.10242 (0.49762)	-0.46456 (0.58039)	-0.63482 (0.53069)			
Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				0.04217 (0.24653)	-0.38622 (0.46092)	-0.99333 (1.19617)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		0.05801 (0.08478)	-0.04438 (0.10944)		0.15281 (0.11981)	0.22145 (0.35313)
Urban Share		0.07711** (0.03296)	0.04851 (0.05023)		0.12301* (0.06877)	0.22578 (0.27866)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		-0.00649 (0.00728)	-0.00068 (0.00944)		-0.00659 (0.00802)	-0.00220 (0.02503)
Post Routes Length		0.00014 (0.00009)	0.00019* (0.00011)		0.00023* (0.00013)	0.00034 (0.00035)
Railway Length (ln)		0.00189 (0.00359)	0.00861** (0.00404)		0.00185 (0.00535)	0.01240 (0.01679)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		0.00006 (0.00006)	0.00002 (0.00007)		0.00009 (0.00010)	0.00014 (0.00043)
Observations	297	296	147	235	235	112
R2	0.338	0.366	0.271	0.372	0.180	.
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No		Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe. Controls for Pampa are presented in the Appendix.

For the Radical Party, Table 8 indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, thus that migrants cannot be found to have an effect on the voting share. However, it is important to highlight the fact that the Radical Party's propaganda targeted the Argentine natives proportionally more than immigrants.

2 Major European Migration

a) Electoral Turnout

TABLE 9: OLS & IV (1895) REGRESSIONS FOR ELECTORAL TURNOUT

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1914	0.77669 (0.47541)	0.31496 (0.40688)	0.04088 (0.30674)			
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				1.10662 (2.42760)	-0.74892 (1.56671)	-0.13229 (0.13940)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		0.05664 (0.04543)	-0.01401 (0.05933)		0.19983 (0.33148)	-0.01678 (0.08343)
Urban Share		0.04313** (0.01947)	0.05146* (0.02806)		0.14086 (0.20168)	0.09404* (0.05710)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		0.00170 (0.00425)	0.00766 (0.00519)		0.00902 (0.01381)	0.01004 (0.00640)
Post Routes Length		0.00008* (0.00005)	0.00010* (0.00006)		-0.00000 (0.00020)	0.00002 (0.00007)
Railway Length (ln)		0.00237 (0.00208)	0.00460** (0.00225)		0.00660 (0.01006)	0.00566** (0.00274)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		0.00007** (0.00003)	0.00007* (0.00004)		0.00022 (0.00033)	0.00009 (0.00008)
Observations	297	296	147	235	235	112
R2	0.510	0.537	0.577	.	.	0.423
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe. Controls for Pampa are presented in the Appendix.

b) **Socialist Party**

TABLE 10: OLS & IV (1895) REGRESSIONS FOR SOCIALIST PARTY

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1914	0.84762*	0.43354	0.14343			
	(0.46033)	(0.40677)	(0.35164)			
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				1.08194	-1.10772	-0.25921
				(2.24512)	(2.61380)	(0.27688)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		0.04185**	0.05196		0.21766	0.09483
		(0.01886)	(0.04190)		(0.52155)	(0.14279)
Urban Share		0.01956**	0.05193***		0.17058	0.12799
		(0.00791)	(0.01862)		(0.33772)	(0.08536)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		0.00428***	0.00775**		0.01320	0.00953
		(0.00140)	(0.00321)		(0.02332)	(0.00879)
Post Routes Length		0.00001	0.00005		-0.00015	-0.00007
		(0.00002)	(0.00004)		(0.00034)	(0.00010)
Railway Length (ln)		0.00049	-0.00062		0.00774	0.00220
		(0.00055)	(0.00129)		(0.01692)	(0.00417)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		0.00005*	0.00009*		0.00025	0.00015
		(0.00003)	(0.00005)		(0.00054)	(0.00013)
Observations	297	296	147	235	235	112
R2	0.392	0.475	0.463	.	.	.
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe. Controls for Pampa are presented in the Appendix.

c) **Conservative Party**

TABLE 11: OLS & IV (1895) REGRESSIONS FOR CONSERVATIVE PARTY

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1914	-0.98104*	-0.46752	-0.00565			
	(0.54522)	(0.48072)	(0.36218)			
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				-1.28369	0.91889	0.11494
				(2.79155)	(1.97160)	(0.18260)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		-0.10048	0.05985		-0.26212	0.10897
		(0.06433)	(0.08776)		(0.41844)	(0.11050)
Urban Share		-0.01748	0.00164		-0.13710	-0.03345
		(0.02792)	(0.04463)		(0.25698)	(0.08036)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		-0.00532	-0.01926**		-0.01472	-0.02090**
		(0.00597)	(0.00888)		(0.01752)	(0.00915)
Post Routes Length		-0.00007	-0.00006		0.00003	0.00003
		(0.00007)	(0.00009)		(0.00025)	(0.00010)
Railway Length (ln)		-0.00181	-0.00666*		-0.00770	-0.00799*
		(0.00284)	(0.00352)		(0.01272)	(0.00412)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		-0.00010**	-0.00006		-0.00028	-0.00004
		(0.00004)	(0.00006)		(0.00041)	(0.00011)
Observations	297	296	147	235	235	112
R2	0.771	0.777	0.790	.	.	0.772
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe. Controls for Pampa are presented in the Appendix.

d) Radical Party

TABLE 12: OLS & IV (1895) REGRESSIONS FOR RADICAL PARTY

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1914	-0.13502 (0.49486)	-0.45658 (0.56376)	-0.55085 (0.50528)			
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				0.11351 (0.88232)	0.81156 (2.69391)	0.30908 (0.55936)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		0.05735 (0.08480)	-0.04545 (0.10976)		-0.04455 (0.50007)	-0.15398 (0.24078)
Urban Share		0.07676** (0.03282)	0.04702 (0.05017)		-0.03243 (0.35853)	-0.04609 (0.18899)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		-0.00653 (0.00724)	-0.00114 (0.00938)		-0.01394 (0.02522)	-0.00559 (0.01581)
Post Routes Length		0.00014 (0.00009)	0.00019* (0.00011)		0.00027 (0.00037)	0.00024 (0.00022)
Railway Length (ln)		0.00185 (0.00358)	0.00843** (0.00401)		-0.00530 (0.01778)	0.00525 (0.00773)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		0.00006 (0.00006)	0.00002 (0.00007)		-0.00011 (0.00056)	-0.00012 (0.00025)
Observations	297	296	147	235	235	112
R2	0.338	0.366	0.270	0.338	.	.
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe. Controls for Pampa are presented in the Appendix.

3 Comparison and Discussion

The former results for overall migrants and the major European migrants are consistent with each other. The coefficients share signs, and often significance.

In the case of the Conservative share, when focusing solely in the Pampa region, it is worth highlighting that the absolute value in the IV regressions for major European migrants is nearly three-fold the overall migrant one. This provides a deeper insight behind the fact that a subset of migrants had a more significant impact on the receding Conservative party.

This loss has been mostly attributed to the increasing Socialist and Radical parties' voting shares. In the case of the Radical party, despite point estimates being mainly not statistically significant, the absolute value is considerably higher in the IV regressions for major European

migrant share. These results are consistent with the literature, as the Radical party targeted their campaign more towards the Argentine working class.

However, the coefficients for the Socialist party remain significant and quite alike in the overall country, and increase for the Pampa provinces. Unlike the Radicals, the Socialist Party was backed by the European migrants, with many leaders being foreign. Thus, the appeal from immigrants to vote for Socialism was expectable.

One common denominator to all the analysis is the strength the province fixed effects have. This suggests that there is significant heterogeneity across provinces. However, these are not as relevant for the Pampas analysis, reflecting that the differences may be more interregional.

Another key distinctive feature is the fact that for all cases, IV results are considerably lower in absolute value to the OLS. This suggests the presence of a negative bias for all cases. This can be explained for instance by the fact that migrants can initially self-select to urban districts, where the working class clusters. These places are key for the Socialist Party, inducing a large bias in the OLS results. The fact that the IV point estimates are proportionally smaller helps to reassure that the IV is not capturing this particular phenomenon.

VI Conclusion

1 Further Comments

a) Challenges and Potential Threats

One of the main challenges faced is data wise: measurement errors, missing data, or missing variables pose a threat to the analysis.

In terms of the census data, only the tabulations could be retrieved; a richer analysis would include a smaller unit of observation e.g. at individual level, that is, the survey level. For instance, departments with sharp heterogeneous characteristics between cities and rural boroughs may provide non-representative information.

Also, it could be argued that in the census data there is a problem of selectivity: only the migrant stayers are shown in the data, but migrants that entered the country in 1896 and left by 1913 are not captured by the available information. A tentative way to deal with this is gathering new information from Provincial census in the years comprised between the 1895 and 1914 National census.

Moreover, it could be argued that there is an omitted variable bias. For instance, a clear measure of economic activity could be included¹⁴; economic activity may be another key driver in electoral outcomes, and its omission would lower standard errors. To tackle this issue, proxies were added like railway density and railway length, as a higher presence of railways tend to reflect the dynamics of regional economies.

¹⁴There are no official GDP measurements before the 1930s.

The dependent variables need to be further explored: in the dawn of new political party, boundaries between partisan platforms were anything but stable across time. New alliances and divisions across parties are a threat to clearly identify the ideology of the parties at each election. This measurement error constitutes a major threat to the analysis of the outcomes. This holds more significantly in the case of the Radical Party, where by the 1922 Presidential elections, a division between pro-interventionism and anti-interventionism was accentuated.

Also, due to data insufficiency discussed in Chapter III, there is scarce information from the election years immediately after the 1912 Law. This presents itself as limitation, as the voting shares that changed significantly between 1910 and 1916 are not fully captured, particularly for provinces with an overall lower share of migrants.

b) Next Steps

Insofar, the proposed mechanisms have been mainly descriptive. However, I am currently working in building new databases to look into them. For instance, I plan to look at newspaper penetration to identify the channel of communication. Moreover, I am searching newspapers at the time in both foreign and local languages, to see if there is a transfer of preferences from migrants to natives. Moreover, to test the unionism hypothesis, I will delve into measures of unionism across the departments, focusing especially in the migrant and native shares over the years, to account of cultural spillovers.

In addition to the present analysis, I believe there is plenty of research ideas ahead. For example, it could be further expanded by creating a synthetic measure of each political party; this would partially tackle the threat of the misclassification of political preferences. By knowing where each party lies in the political spectrum, the information could be comprised -together with each voting share- into one variable. The data sources would come from texts from public speeches and newspapers could be. Candidates expressing partisan views are a good source to identify where they lie in the political spectrum. Principal component analysis could be a potentially suitable tool to reduce the dimensionality and create a series of indicators that capture the main variability of the selected predictors.

2 Concluding Remarks

In this work I set to analyse whether the Mass Migration from the turn of the century in Argentina had an impact in political preference of the natives. After the mandatory Universal Male Suffrage was sanctioned by the 1912 Law, all the adult male natives and naturalised citizens were obliged to vote. To observe political preferences in the data, I look at Presidential electoral outcomes in each department after the 1912 Law, until 1930. Based on the literature, my main hypothesis was that a higher exposure to migrants in each department led to a decrease in votes of the Conservative Party, which had been governing the country uninterruptedly for over 35 years, in favour of more left-wing parties, particularly the Socialist (left wing). I claim that the transmission of political preferences have taken place mainly by riots, newspapers and trade

unions, which raised awareness to the locals who would be able to cast their vote after the 1912 Law.

The findings illustrate a new insight behind the political transformation of Argentina at the start of the XXth century. OLS and IV results for Conservative parties suggest that migrants had a negative effect on the parties' votes. Furthermore, the OLS and IV results for the Socialist party present all share positive coefficients, this holds especially at the National level. This is explained by the predominance of migrants in the leftist ideologies. In the case of the Radical party, coefficients are also positive, except that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

I believe this results present an emerging complex picture of the influence of the Mass Migration period on the political landscape of Argentina, by motivating a significant transformation from its foundations, and thus these results require further exploring.

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VII Appendix

TABLE 13: AVAILABLE ELECTORAL INFORMATION BETWEEN 1912 AND 1930

District [N° of Dep.]	1912	1914	1916*	1918	1920	1922*	1924	1926	1928*	1930
<i>CABA</i> [20] ¹	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x
<i>Buenos Aires</i> [118]		x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x
<i>Catamarca</i> [16]			x	x		x		x	x	x
<i>Córdoba</i> [26]	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x
<i>Corrientes</i> [25]			x	x	x	x		x	x	x
<i>Entre Ríos</i> [14]		x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x
<i>Jujuy</i> [15]			x		x	x		x	x	x
<i>La Rioja</i> [18]			x			x		x	x	x
<i>Mendoza</i> [18]			x	x	x			x	x	x
<i>Salta</i> [23]						x		x	x	x
<i>Santiago Del Estero</i> [27]								x	x	x
<i>San Juan</i> [19]						x		x	x	x
<i>San Luis</i> [9]			x		x	x			x	
<i>Santa Fe</i> [19]			x	x	x	x		x	x	x
<i>Tucumán</i> [11]			x		x	x		x	x	x

SOURCE: CANTÓN (1968)

¹ Given the specific characteristics of CABA, the city was analysed as one observation.

* These are all Presidential Election years

TABLE 14: INFORMATION FOUND IN 1895 AND 1914 CENSUS (ARGENTINA)

Variable	1895	1914
<i>Name, Sex, Age, Civil Status, Nationality</i>	Y	Y
<i>Place of Birth (only for Argentine Provinces)</i>	Y	Y
<i>Alphabetism</i>	Y	Y
<i>Occupation</i>	Y	Y
<i>School Attendance</i>	Y	Y
<i>Religion</i>	Y	Y
<i>Years of Marriage</i>	Y	Y
<i>Amount of Children</i>	Y	Y
<i>Property</i>	Y	Y
<i>Buildings</i>	Y	Y
<i>Child(ren) Education - Details</i>	N	Y
<i>Foreigner has become National</i>	N	Y

TABLE 15: OLS & IV REGRESSIONS FOR ELECTORAL TURNOUT IN 1916 (ALL MIGRATION)

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Mig. Share, 1914	0.73537 (0.48203)	-0.05431 (0.49676)	-0.34819 (0.53337)			
Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				0.13572 (0.23577)	-0.07537 (0.34226)	0.25612 (0.80936)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		0.37436*** (0.10046)	0.26618*** (0.09565)		0.31876** (0.12548)	0.26390 (0.25056)
Urban Share		-0.13875*** (0.04958)	-0.13075** (0.05616)		-0.11639* (0.06164)	-0.26554 (0.16917)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		0.00296 (0.00668)	0.01025 (0.01034)		-0.00147 (0.00604)	0.00297 (0.01288)
Post Routes Length		-0.00012 (0.00008)	-0.00008 (0.00012)		-0.00016 (0.00010)	-0.00026 (0.00024)
Railway Length (ln)		-0.00772 (0.00491)	-0.00962 (0.00657)		-0.00658 (0.00538)	-0.00671 (0.00926)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		-0.00011 (0.00008)	-0.00019** (0.00008)		-0.00019** (0.00008)	-0.00033 (0.00022)
Observations	256	254	148	201	200	113
R2	0.141	0.274	0.403	0.110	0.334	0.141
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports IV estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe.

TABLE 16: OLS & IV REGRESSIONS FOR ELECTORAL TURNOUT IN 1922 (ALL MIGRATION)

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Mig. Share, 1914	0.11878 (0.69496)	-0.87012 (0.77983)	-0.90446 (0.65105)			
Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				-0.02916 (0.29216)	-0.67446 (0.79082)	-0.31295 (1.15776)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		0.24664** (0.09839)	0.27942** (0.13946)		0.35595* (0.20586)	0.38104 (0.35549)
Urban Share		-0.04114 (0.05499)	-0.14891** (0.06717)		0.06982 (0.13085)	-0.08012 (0.19795)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		0.00110 (0.01167)	0.00791 (0.01494)		-0.00333 (0.01234)	-0.01052 (0.01414)
Post Routes Length		-0.00026* (0.00013)	-0.00027* (0.00015)		-0.00028 (0.00021)	-0.00047* (0.00026)
Railway Length (ln)		-0.01595*** (0.00517)	-0.01792** (0.00702)		-0.00520 (0.01012)	-0.01242 (0.01019)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		-0.00015* (0.00009)	-0.00025** (0.00010)		-0.00011 (0.00017)	-0.00032 (0.00019)
Observations	268	266	149	211	210	113
R2	0.220	0.316	0.399	0.252	.	0.363
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports IV estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe.

TABLE 17: OLS & IV REGRESSIONS FOR SOCIALIST PARTY IN 1916 (ALL MIGRATION)

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Mig. Share, 1914	0.71491*	0.41307	0.27102			
	(0.38365)	(0.37320)	(0.36213)			
Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				0.32635***	0.49109**	0.97205
				(0.10583)	(0.21183)	(1.13945)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		0.03387*	0.02880		-0.05845	-0.26051
		(0.01722)	(0.02973)		(0.06909)	(0.33579)
Urban Share		0.01791**	0.03647**		-0.04256	-0.12800
		(0.00751)	(0.01678)		(0.04184)	(0.26345)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		0.00322**	0.00373		0.00498	0.00291
		(0.00162)	(0.00343)		(0.00590)	(0.02141)
Post Routes Length		0.00000	0.00002		-0.00009	-0.00020
		(0.00001)	(0.00003)		(0.00006)	(0.00030)
Railway Length (ln)		-0.00000	-0.00052		-0.00163	-0.00396
		(0.00065)	(0.00132)		(0.00416)	(0.01524)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		0.00004**	0.00005*		0.00001	-0.00010
		(0.00002)	(0.00003)		(0.00011)	(0.00040)
Observations	257	255	148	202	201	113
R2	0.767	0.386	0.333	.	.	.
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports IV estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe.

TABLE 18: OLS & IV REGRESSIONS FOR SOCIALIST PARTY IN 1922 (ALL MIGRATION)

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Mig. Share, 1914	0.81543 (0.49692)	0.21328 (0.39119)	-0.10512 (0.35344)			
Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				0.33341*** (0.12654)	0.36859 (0.29698)	0.29095 (0.67443)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		0.05418 (0.03589)	0.06705 (0.06737)		-0.03550 (0.06985)	-0.07901 (0.18710)
Urban Share		0.03393** (0.01367)	0.08834*** (0.02823)		-0.02038 (0.04710)	0.02718 (0.13218)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		0.00706** (0.00278)	0.00629 (0.00461)		0.00498 (0.00435)	0.00439 (0.00720)
Post Routes Length		0.00007** (0.00003)	0.00012** (0.00005)		-0.00003 (0.00009)	0.00004 (0.00016)
Railway Length (ln)		0.00085 (0.00094)	-0.00093 (0.00190)		-0.00245 (0.00356)	-0.00292 (0.00512)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		0.00009* (0.00005)	0.00012 (0.00007)		0.00001 (0.00008)	0.00001 (0.00015)
Observations	270	268	151	213	212	115
R2	0.432	0.409	0.372	.	.	.
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports IV estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe.

TABLE 19: OLS & IV REGRESSIONS FOR CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN 1916 (ALL MIGRATION)

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Mig. Share, 1914	-1.81630*	-0.18973	0.06767			
	(1.00341)	(0.77783)	(0.82011)			
Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				-0.88905**	-0.55435	-0.89560
				(0.35281)	(0.57536)	(1.69102)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		-0.10780	-0.00121		0.03409	0.29556
		(0.09802)	(0.13553)		(0.15247)	(0.50687)
Urban Share		-0.12171**	-0.07172		-0.01397	0.12912
		(0.04950)	(0.07214)		(0.09103)	(0.32928)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		-0.00857	-0.02176		-0.01768*	-0.02879
		(0.00802)	(0.01407)		(0.01028)	(0.02176)
Post Routes Length		0.00004	0.00001		0.00012	0.00021
		(0.00009)	(0.00011)		(0.00014)	(0.00040)
Railway Length (ln)		-0.01470***	-0.02137**		-0.01151	-0.01709
		(0.00547)	(0.00963)		(0.00743)	(0.01633)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		-0.00014**	-0.00011		-0.00008	0.00005
		(0.00007)	(0.00008)		(0.00014)	(0.00039)
Observations	257	255	148	202	201	113
R2	0.811	0.826	0.830	0.615	0.763	0.542
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports IV estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe.

TABLE 20: OLS & IV REGRESSIONS FOR CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN 1922 (ALL MIGRATION)

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Mig. Share, 1914	-0.48505 (1.09324)	-0.30431 (1.18503)	-0.58187 (1.17442)			
Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				-0.13752 (0.51728)	-0.12847 (1.44844)	-0.78030 (3.55530)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		0.05199 (0.08412)	0.00216 (0.11632)		0.11899 (0.27566)	0.27711 (1.05807)
Urban Share		0.00894 (0.03542)	0.04959 (0.05911)		0.01069 (0.19177)	0.16391 (0.60441)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		-0.01025 (0.00638)	-0.00823 (0.01344)		-0.01017 (0.00662)	-0.00976 (0.02240)
Post Routes Length		-0.00024** (0.00012)	-0.00012 (0.00013)		-0.00029 (0.00033)	-0.00001 (0.00077)
Railway Length (ln)		-0.00148 (0.00434)	-0.00923 (0.00812)		0.00099 (0.01294)	-0.00680 (0.02142)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		-0.00007 (0.00006)	-0.00010 (0.00008)		-0.00007 (0.00017)	0.00001 (0.00054)
Observations	270	268	151	213	212	115
R2	0.771	0.774	0.670	0.797	0.803	0.260
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports IV estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe.

TABLE 21: OLS & IV REGRESSIONS FOR RADICAL PARTY IN 1916 (ALL MIGRATION)

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Mig. Share, 1914	0.58682 (1.06784)	-1.62052** (0.67145)	-1.95958*** (0.72621)			
Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				0.65546* (0.33787)	-0.41065 (0.50473)	-1.04346 (1.73488)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		0.05110 (0.11228)	-0.01111 (0.15714)		0.10426 (0.15000)	0.30750 (0.50104)
Urban Share		0.21758*** (0.05112)	0.20638** (0.08150)		0.21725** (0.08671)	0.29244 (0.36748)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		0.00668 (0.00832)	0.01801 (0.01381)		0.00974 (0.00900)	0.02217 (0.02983)
Post Routes Length		0.00020 (0.00014)	0.00027 (0.00019)		0.00016 (0.00015)	0.00023 (0.00044)
Railway Length (ln)		0.01249** (0.00593)	0.02629*** (0.00943)		0.01363* (0.00759)	0.03181 (0.02238)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		0.00016** (0.00008)	0.00018** (0.00009)		0.00014 (0.00015)	0.00028 (0.00052)
Observations	257	255	148	202	201	113
R2	0.464	0.538	0.492	0.290	0.426	.
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No		Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports IV estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe.

TABLE 22: OLS & IV REGRESSIONS FOR RADICAL PARTY IN 1922 (ALL MIGRATION)

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Mig. Share, 1914	-0.52828 (1.25410)	-0.12708 (1.35392)	-0.08835 (1.36782)			
Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				-0.10798 (0.60043)	-0.01654 (1.62689)	-0.19957 (3.41311)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		-0.11350 (0.10116)	-0.05006 (0.15563)		-0.14012 (0.30478)	0.03504 (0.97969)
Urban Share		0.01980 (0.04562)	-0.01231 (0.07405)		0.06924 (0.21509)	0.06668 (0.56107)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		-0.00106 (0.00810)	0.00124 (0.01535)		-0.00273 (0.00913)	0.00040 (0.01838)
Post Routes Length		0.00037** (0.00015)	0.00030* (0.00018)		0.00040 (0.00038)	0.00034 (0.00076)
Railway Length (ln)		-0.00057 (0.00491)	0.00922 (0.00897)		-0.00115 (0.01459)	0.01260 (0.01818)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		0.00006 (0.00009)	0.00012 (0.00011)		0.00011 (0.00019)	0.00022 (0.00048)
Observations	270	268	151	213	212	115
R2	0.489	0.505	0.133	0.492	0.538	0.081
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No		Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports IV estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe.

TABLE 23: OLS & IV REGRESSIONS FOR ELECTORAL TURNOUT IN 1916 (ALL MIGRATION)

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pam
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1914	0.87592*	0.14852	-0.18630			
	(0.47273)	(0.44549)	(0.46922)			
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				0.65094	-0.17611	-0.163
				(1.94322)	(0.81105)	(0.2632)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		0.37238***	0.26616***		0.34319*	0.38194
		(0.10036)	(0.09561)		(0.19889)	(0.1393)
Urban Share		-0.14046***	-0.13334**		-0.09976	-0.169
		(0.04952)	(0.05616)		(0.12986)	(0.1079)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		0.00250	0.00953		-0.00020	0.0041
		(0.00668)	(0.01013)		(0.00740)	(0.0097)
Post Routes Length		-0.00012	-0.00008		-0.00021	-0.0001
		(0.00008)	(0.00012)		(0.00017)	(0.0001)
Railway Length (ln)		-0.00779	-0.00986		-0.00543	-0.004
		(0.00490)	(0.00655)		(0.00819)	(0.0065)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		-0.00010	-0.00019**		-0.00015	-0.0002
		(0.00008)	(0.00008)		(0.00020)	(0.0001)
Observations	256	254	148	201	200	113
R2	0.142	0.274	0.403	.	0.312	0.443
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports IV estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe.

TABLE 24: OLS & IV REGRESSIONS FOR ELECTORAL TURNOUT IN 1922 (ALL MIGRATION)

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Par
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1914	0.21175 (0.68531)	-0.71657 (0.72789)	-0.85221 (0.61955)			
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				0.01631 (1.16828)	0.81060 (1.45211)	0.100 (0.364)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		0.24367** (0.09810)	0.27766** (0.13984)		0.06977 (0.39765)	0.263 (0.186)
Urban Share		-0.04320 (0.05468)	-0.15005** (0.06722)		-0.15024 (0.21174)	-0.168 (0.160)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		0.00079 (0.01163)	0.00753 (0.01479)		-0.01121 (0.01543)	-0.011 (0.013)
Post Routes Length		-0.00026* (0.00013)	-0.00027* (0.00015)		-0.00022 (0.00035)	-0.0005 (0.000)
Railway Length (ln)		-0.01608*** (0.00514)	-0.01808** (0.00698)		-0.01704 (0.01113)	-0.0145 (0.006)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		-0.00015* (0.00009)	-0.00025** (0.00010)		-0.00036 (0.00035)	-0.0004 (0.000)
Observations	268	266	149	211	210	113
R2	0.220	0.315	0.399	0.247	.	0.44
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports IV estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe.

TABLE 25: OLS & IV REGRESSIONS FOR SOCIALIST PARTY IN 1916 (ALL MIGRATION)

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1914	0.68596*	0.38061	0.23852			
	(0.37930)	(0.35957)	(0.34212)			
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				1.07409	-0.90137	-0.29567
				(2.66263)	(1.90924)	(0.32047)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		0.03473**	0.02927		0.24060	0.10106
		(0.01723)	(0.02992)		(0.48739)	(0.16111)
Urban Share		0.01838**	0.03706**		0.14898	0.13215
		(0.00741)	(0.01653)		(0.26768)	(0.09663)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		0.00333**	0.00392		0.00897	0.00507
		(0.00160)	(0.00339)		(0.01637)	(0.01018)
Post Routes Length		0.00000	0.00002		-0.00016	-0.00010
		(0.00001)	(0.00003)		(0.00032)	(0.00012)
Railway Length (ln)		0.00006	-0.00045		0.00826	0.00308
		(0.00065)	(0.00131)		(0.01632)	(0.00465)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		0.00004**	0.00005*		0.00025	0.00014
		(0.00002)	(0.00003)		(0.00048)	(0.00014)
Observations	257	255	148	202	201	113
R2	0.764	0.384	0.332	.	.	.
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports IV estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe.

TABLE 26: OLS & IV REGRESSIONS FOR SOCIALIST PARTY IN 1922 (ALL MIGRATION)

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pam
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1914	0.83107 (0.51567)	0.27067 (0.41561)	-0.01911 (0.37089)			
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				2.29367 (10.24022)	-0.38584 (0.58372)	-0.0859 (0.1715)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		0.05383 (0.03552)	0.06705 (0.06737)		0.10310 (0.14331)	0.0247 (0.0777)
Urban Share		0.03351** (0.01343)	0.08684*** (0.02767)		0.08813 (0.09215)	0.1040 (0.0678)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		0.00697** (0.00273)	0.00592 (0.00448)		0.00858 (0.00719)	0.0047 (0.0049)
Post Routes Length		0.00007** (0.00003)	0.00012** (0.00005)		-0.00004 (0.00016)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Railway Length (ln)		0.00086 (0.00094)	-0.00105 (0.00191)		0.00354 (0.00535)	-0.0009 (0.0028)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		0.00009* (0.00005)	0.00012 (0.00007)		0.00012 (0.00018)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Observations	270	268	151	213	212	115
R2	0.433	0.410	0.372	.	.	0.192
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports IV estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe.

TABLE 27: OLS & IV REGRESSIONS FOR CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN 1916 (ALL MIGRATION)

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pam
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1914	-1.76333*	-0.25081	0.04519			
	(0.99640)	(0.78337)	(0.78470)			
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				-2.99644	1.17645	0.3197
				(7.81312)	(2.10540)	(0.4163)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		-0.10748	-0.00116		-0.33914	-0.050
		(0.09778)	(0.13570)		(0.58167)	(0.2428)
Urban Share		-0.12128**	-0.07136		-0.25320	-0.125
		(0.04939)	(0.07216)		(0.29293)	(0.1698)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		-0.00846	-0.02165		-0.02319	-0.0311
		(0.00798)	(0.01384)		(0.01920)	(0.0161)
Post Routes Length		0.00004	0.00001		0.00023	0.0001
		(0.00009)	(0.00011)		(0.00036)	(0.0001)
Railway Length (ln)		-0.01470***	-0.02134**		-0.02402	-0.0239
		(0.00545)	(0.00956)		(0.01919)	(0.0113)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		-0.00014**	-0.00011		-0.00039	-0.000
		(0.00007)	(0.00008)		(0.00056)	(0.0002)
Observations	257	255	148	202	201	113
R2	0.811	0.826	0.830	.	0.092	0.754
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports IV estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe.

TABLE 28: OLS & IV REGRESSIONS FOR CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN 1922 (ALL MIGRATION)

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pam
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1914	-0.57831 (1.12628)	-0.42954 (1.21471)	-0.78302 (1.20360)			
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				-1.15023 (7.57227)	0.20737 (1.24394)	0.2574 (0.6202)
Voter Alphanetism Rate, 1914		0.05302 (0.08418)	0.00021 (0.11602)		0.05757 (0.24718)	-0.0073 (0.1995)
Urban Share		0.00997 (0.03547)	0.05275 (0.05949)		-0.03807 (0.20012)	-0.0506 (0.2286)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		-0.01006 (0.00640)	-0.00751 (0.01334)		-0.01193 (0.01229)	-0.0109 (0.0167)
Post Routes Length		-0.00024** (0.00012)	-0.00012 (0.00013)		-0.00027 (0.00033)	-0.0000 (0.0002)
Railway Length (ln)		-0.00148 (0.00431)	-0.00904 (0.00804)		-0.00166 (0.01024)	-0.0122 (0.0091)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		-0.00008 (0.00006)	-0.00010 (0.00008)		-0.00013 (0.00028)	-0.0001 (0.0002)
Observations	270	268	151	213	212	115
R2	0.771	0.774	0.671	.	0.786	0.625
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports IV estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe.

TABLE 29: OLS & IV REGRESSIONS FOR RADICAL PARTY IN 1916 (ALL MIGRATION)

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pam
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1914	0.55239 (1.06606)	-1.47114** (0.68246)	-1.81219** (0.69647)			
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				2.25893 (5.93841)	0.56184 (1.95897)	0.2531 (0.5691)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		0.04754 (0.11252)	-0.01497 (0.15825)		-0.10277 (0.46954)	-0.0636 (0.2603)
Urban Share		0.21556*** (0.05113)	0.20347** (0.08157)		0.08485 (0.28637)	0.0339 (0.2073)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		0.00621 (0.00831)	0.01705 (0.01365)		0.00762 (0.01711)	0.0203 (0.0169)
Post Routes Length		0.00019 (0.00014)	0.00027 (0.00019)		0.00018 (0.00036)	0.0001 (0.0002)
Railway Length (ln)		0.01226** (0.00593)	0.02589*** (0.00940)		0.00700 (0.01746)	0.02482 (0.0102)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		0.00016** (0.00008)	0.00018* (0.00009)		-0.00002 (0.00049)	0.0000 (0.0002)
Observations	257	255	148	202	201	113
R2	0.463	0.537	0.491	.	0.231	0.387
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports IV estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe.

TABLE 30: OLS & IV REGRESSIONS FOR RADICAL PARTY IN 1922 (ALL MIGRATION)

	OLS FE	OLS Arg	OLS Pampa	IV FE	IV Arg	IV Pampa
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1914	-0.50222 (1.26578)	-0.12293 (1.35089)	-0.01607 (1.34766)			
Major Euro. Mig. Share, 1895 (IV)				-0.66352 (4.23059)	0.03563 (1.61351)	0.00994 (0.80550)
Voter Alphabetism Rate, 1914		-0.11376 (0.10103)	-0.05005 (0.15572)		-0.14963 (0.32223)	-0.02464 (0.25370)
Urban Share		0.01966 (0.04558)	-0.01357 (0.07425)		0.06162 (0.26140)	0.02941 (0.29772)
Pop. Dens.(ln)		-0.00108 (0.00808)	0.00093 (0.01519)		-0.00302 (0.01537)	0.00045 (0.01889)
Post Routes Length		0.00037** (0.00015)	0.00030* (0.00018)		0.00040 (0.00042)	0.00030 (0.00034)
Railway Length (ln)		-0.00058 (0.00488)	0.00912 (0.00888)		-0.00155 (0.01315)	0.01166 (0.01115)
Time Dist.-Major Port(sqrt)		0.00006 (0.00009)	0.00012 (0.00011)		0.00010 (0.00034)	0.00019 (0.00031)
Observations	270	268	151	213	212	115
R2	0.489	0.505	0.133	.	0.541	0.180
Controls Arg.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Pampas	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports IV estimates with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. The unit of observation is the department d , with province p fixed effects. The Total analysis considers all the 15 provinces which could vote. The Pampa analysis focuses on the following provinces: Buenos Aires (excluding the Metropolitan surroundings), Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe.

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