

A Heritage of Freedom: Monuments and the American legacy in the Philippine memoryscape, 1898-1978

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Abstract

Using a combination of archival, material, spatial and art historical analysis, this thesis examines four monuments constructed or initiated during the colonial rule of the Philippines by the United States (1898 to 1946): the Rizal Monument (1913), the Bonifacio Monument (1933), the Quezon Memorial (1978) and the Pacific War Memorial (1968). I argue that while each of the monuments was used to project an image of the Philippine nation that was shaped by the country's experience of US rule, this was complicated by alternative visions of nationhood articulated by other commemorative groups, including the Philippine government, veterans groups, the Knights of Rizal, artists, architects, as well as community and business leaders. This commemorative pluralism resulted in "polyphonic memoryscapes" around each of the monuments in which competing images of the nation, in part shaped by class, race and religious divides, exist and collide. These multiple networks of memory contest previous scholarship of the US-colonial Philippines, which has focused on the coloniser-colonised dichotomy, revealing that while tensions remained between the legacy of US rule and the assertion of an independent Philippine nationhood, Philippine monument building did not simply take place within a colonial or postcolonial context but connected to a number of global commemorative practices that positioned Philippine nationhood within a transnational nexus of heritages. In particular, the Bonifacio Monument and the Quezon Memorial were each shaped by broader post-revolution and postcolonial memoryscapes, revealing Philippine connections to the Hispanic diaspora, as well as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. This thesis also reveals the Christianised image of the nation that proliferates across Philippine colonial and postcolonial commemoration, belying the country's religious diversity. It also demonstrates the significance of the body and reinterment to this Christian portrayal of the nation and the creation of a sanctified memorial space. Finally, I assert that while the United States used commemoration to depict Philippine independence as a consequence of the US ideal of "freedom", for Philippine commemorative agents, Philippine nationhood was always founded on the country's own "heritage of freedom".

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Introduction

The ongoing Black Lives Matter movement precipitated an international crusade that called into question the memorial landscape and the preservation of monuments to those who have historically oppressed Black lives.¹ This culminated in public demonstrations across the globe, as people called for the removal of monuments to the Confederacy in the United States, those associated with the slave trade in the United Kingdom, and monuments connected to colonial rule in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In the United States, protests against Confederate monuments were met with hostility and violence from white supremacist groups, while local authorities struggled to pass legislation mandating their removal.² The contested nature of these monuments and their perceived power over the historical record and public space underscore the need to examine and reassess such sites. Why are they here? Whose stories do they tell? What impact do they have?

Many scholars have analysed the changes in the memorial landscape, which accompanied the huge global shifts in power that took place over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These changes resulted in occupied territories as well as the creation of new nation states, and several historians have examined how the construction and removal of monuments has been used to both colonise and decolonise the landscape.³ Indeed, Frank and Ristic have observed that in

¹ The Black Lives Matter movement began in the United States in 2013 as a response to the acquittal of a white police officer of the murder of a black youth, Trayvon Martin.

² Gregory S. Schneider and Laura Vozzella, "Robert E. Lee statue is removed in Richmond, ex-capital of Confederacy, after months of protests and legal resistance", *Washington Post*, 8 September 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/robert-e-lee-statue-removal/2021/09/08/1d9564ee-103d-11ec-9cb6-bf9351a25799_story.html.

³ See for example Laragh Larsen, "Re-placing Imperial Landscapes: Colonial Monuments and the Transition to Independence in Kenya", *Journal of Historical Geography* 38, no. 1 (January 2012): 45-56; Y. Whelan, "The Construction and Destruction of a Colonial Landscape: Monuments to British Monarchs in Dublin Before and After Independence", *Journal of Historical Geography* 28, no. 4 (October

reinforcing a particular history and identity to the exclusion of particular groups, monuments themselves function as an occupying force.⁴ Other historians have explored the impact of tourism and foreign aid on the memorialisation of particular historical events.⁵ Some have examined “official” versus “vernacular” memory and localised contestation of state-sponsored memorialising.⁶ Yet others have assessed how changes in government and political regimes have altered the way in which memorial spaces are used and perceived.⁷ Finally, some scholars have examined how colonial memorialising has resulted in the eradication of Indigenous histories from official memory.⁸ Yet despite this widespread postcolonial examination of monuments, a comprehensive analysis of monument building during the United States’ colonial rule of the Philippines, which took place from 1898 to 1946, is missing from the scholarship.

This thesis examines monuments constructed and initiated during the period of US

2002): 508-33; Yoshihisa Amae, “Pro-colonial or Postcolonial? Appropriation of Japanese Colonial Heritage in Present-day Taiwan”, *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 40, no. 1 (March 2011): 19-62.

⁴ Sybille Frank and Mirjana Ristic, “Urban Fallism: Monuments, Iconoclasm and Activism”, *City* 24, no. 3-4: 557-58.

⁵ See for example Sharon Seah Li-Lian, “Truth and Memory: Narrating Viet Nam”, in *Contestations of Memory in Southeast Asia*, ed. Roxana Waterson and Kian-Woon Kwok (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012); Hamzah Muzaini and Brenda S.A. Yeoh, *Contested Memoryscapes: The Politics of Second World War Commemoration in Singapore* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016).

⁶ See for example John Poulter, “The Discursive Reconstruction of Memory and National Identity: The Anti-war Memorial the Island of Ireland Peace Park”, *Memory Studies* 11, no. 2 (April 2018): 191-208; Philip Seaton, “World War II in Japan’s Regions: Memories, Monuments and Media in Hokkaido”, in *War Memories, Monuments and Media: Representations of Conflicts and Creation of Histories of World War II*, ed. Tito Genova Valiente and Hiroko Nagai (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2011); Hue-Tam Ho Tai, “Monumental Ambiguity: The State Commemoration of Hồ Chí Minh”, in *Essays into Vietnamese Pasts*, ed. Keith Weller Taylor and John K. Whitmore (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).

⁷ See for example Pablo Alonso González, “The Organization of Commemorative Space in Postcolonial Cuba: From Civic Square to Square of the Revolution”, *Organization* 23, no. 1 (January 2016): 47-70; Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Post-Socialist Change* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

⁸ See for example Charlotte Macdonald, “The First World War and the Making of Colonial Memory”, *Journal of New Zealand Literature (JNZL)* 33, no. 2 (2015): 15-37.

colonial rule in the Philippines and analyses the extent to which US rule shaped the Philippine memoryscape. Can the monuments built under US rule be seen as a US legacy? To what extent did US colonial rule shape Philippine nation-building? What were the motivations behind the creation of these monuments? What images of the Philippine nation and Philippine citizenship did their creators seek to project? Furthermore, I examine how these monuments were used following Philippine independence in order to analyse their role in decolonial memory-making and nation-building, which reveals ongoing tensions between the legacy of US rule and the assertion of an independent Philippine nationhood. As I hope to show, various groups within the Philippines displayed significant agency in both designing and using these monuments to promote particular agendas about what it actually meant to be “Filipino/a” both during and after the end of US colonial rule.

Although several scholars have examined the proliferation of monuments to the Spanish-executed Filipino, José Rizal, during US colonial rule, they have predominantly analysed their construction as part of the US colonisation of the landscape, without considering the local impetus to commemorate Rizal, or the monuments erected to other figures, and the impact this had on both the Philippine memoryscape and the way in which the country’s identity was articulated under US colonial rule. Prominent examples of such work is that produced by the urban historian Ian Morley, who has looked extensively at the role of American planners in the reshaping of Manila and other cities, though such a focus has also been prominent in the work of Philippine historians such as Mojares and Delmendo, both of whom have stressed the agency of the United States in shaping Philippine identity.⁹ Contrastingly, this thesis not only assesses the colonial government’s use of commemorative practice, but through an analysis of the broader commemoration that was taking place around the monuments, in addition to a comparative analysis

⁹ Ian Morley, *Cities and Nationhood: American Imperialism and Urban Design in the Philippines, 1898–1916* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2018); Resil B. Mojares, “The Formation of Filipino Nationality Under U.S. Colonial Rule”, *Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society* 34, no. 1 (March 2006): 11-32; Sharon Delmendo, *The Star-Entangled Banner: One Hundred Years of America in the Philippines* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004).

between the monuments examined, it reveals other commemorative agents such as the Philippine government, veterans groups, the Knights of Rizal, artists, architects, as well as community and business leaders. I ask how commemoration has been used by these sometimes competing groups within the Philippines, both prior to and following the monuments' inaugurations, identifying the alternative visions of Philippine nationhood that emerged during the period of US colonial rule and afterwards, and how these sought to bridge and mask race, class and religious divides.

This study is not only topical with the current discussions taking place around monuments; it also makes a unique contribution to the study of the US colonial period in the Philippines and its aftermath. A thorough analysis of the development of monuments and wider commemorative practices during the period of US rule has not been undertaken before. Indeed, many of the primary sources pertaining to the design, funding and construction of these monuments are being used for the first time here. Furthermore the monuments I use as case studies have never been considered together. This collective examination enables a greater understanding of how commemoration developed over almost fifty years of US rule, how the Philippines perceived and positioned itself during this time, and to what extent colonial legacies remained following independence.

The Philippines is also a distinctive case study for the analysis of colonial-era monument building. Unlike other colonised nations in Asia, the Philippines was subject to two colonial empires in quick succession, with US colonial rule established shortly following the Philippine Revolution, which sought to overthrow 300 years of Spanish colonial rule in 1896. Distinctly, the Philippines was also briefly an independent republic in between these two periods of colonial rule, with Emilio Aguinaldo inaugurated as president on 23 January 1899, just as the United States began to expand their occupation of the Philippine islands. Unlike other colonial settings such as Indonesia and Vietnam, Philippine sovereignty was not the result of a guerrilla war but a long-held promise of the United States, who in contrast to many other colonial powers, from the beginning of its rule promised eventual Philippine

independence. The US government also sought to distinguish its colonial rule from that of other nations by defining its actions as “benevolent assimilation”.¹⁰ Indeed, US President William McKinley pronounced the US presence in the Philippines as “the realization of the high purpose of this Nation to restore order to the islands and to establish a just and generous Government”.¹¹ Additionally, following independence the Philippines and the United States retained a unique postcolonial relationship through the presence of US military bases, the continuation of US economic aid and other agreements such as the 1946 Bell Trade Act, which granted American citizens equal access to the country’s natural resources.¹² For this reason, an examination of the place of monuments in the colonial and postcolonial Philippines has the potential to test and perhaps even unsettle wider international debates that are ongoing today about fallism, the decolonisation of public spaces and the agency of colonisers.

Over a century after the US Navy arrived in the Philippines, the US government still characterised its “benevolent” rule in the same way. As part of his speech to the Philippine Congress in 2003, US President George W. Bush stated, “America is proud of its part in the great story of the Filipino people. Together our soldiers liberated the Philippines from colonial rule”.¹³ These words were symptomatic of the US government’s persistence in shaping the two countries’ historical record, in which US

¹⁰ “Filipinos Are Informed Just What The United States Intends To Do By A Presidential Proclamation”, *Los Angeles Herald*, 6 January 1899, <https://cdnc.ucr.edu/?a=d&d=LAH18990106.2.5&e=-----en--20--1--txt-txIN-----1>.

¹¹ William McKinley. 1900. “Speech Accepting the Republican Nomination” (speech). In “Presidential Speeches | William McKinley Presidency”. Miller Center, University of Virginia. <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/july-12-1900-speech-accepting-republican-nomination>.

¹² Carl H. Landé, “The Philippines and the United States”, *Philippine Studies* 49, no. 4 (Fourth Quarter 2001): 522; E. San Juan, Jr., *After Postcolonialism: Remapping Philippines-United States Confrontations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 65.

¹³ George W. Bush. 2003. “Remarks by the President to the Philippine Congress” (speech). In “2003 East Asian and Pacific Affairs Remarks, Testimony, and Speeches”. U.S. Department of State Archive. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2003/25455.htm> (hereafter cited as Bush. 2003. “Remarks by the President to the Philippine Congress” (speech)).

colonial rule was rarely characterised as such, and in which the Philippine-American War and the atrocities committed therein remain mostly absent.¹⁴ Additionally, US President Bush's visit to the Philippines in order to gain support for the War on Terror was indicative of the distinctive postcolonial relationship between the two nations, which have remained interconnected in the more than seventy years following Philippine independence in 1946.¹⁵ Indeed, many scholars have described the post-independence Philippines as a "semi-colony" due to the country's continued economic reliance on the United States and most significantly, due to the presence of US military bases on the islands until 1991.¹⁶

An analysis of commemoration in this distinctive context is a significant contribution to the study of colonial and postcolonial monument building, as the US government's depiction of itself as liberator, in addition to the neocolonial dynamic that persisted between the two countries following independence, disrupts the traditional suppositions of monuments as a means to colonise and decolonise the landscape. The United States did not want to overtly colonise the Philippines and likewise following independence, the Philippines' continued dependence on the United States meant that it could not simply dismiss its former coloniser from the historical record, resulting in persistent tensions between the need to accept and to reject US rule. While previous studies of US overseas commemoration have focused primarily on First and Second World War memorialisation, particularly in Europe, this study underscores the significance of island spaces and transnational study to an understanding of the role of commemoration in the geo-political maneuverings of

¹⁴ Delmendo asserts that this is particularly prevalent in contestations between the Philippines and the United States over the official narrative of the Battle of Balangiga, which took place during the Philippine-American War. The dispute relating to this battle is over whether the attack constituted a defence by Philippine forces or a Philippine massacre of US "peacekeepers". Delmendo, *The Star-Entangled Banner*, 168-70.

¹⁵ Bush. 2003. "Remarks by the President to the Philippine Congress" (speech).

¹⁶ See for example Alfred W. McCoy, "Circles of Steel, Castles of Vanity: The Geopolitics of Military Bases on the South China Sea", *Journal of Asian Studies* 75, no. 4 (November 2016): 990; Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, & the Philippines* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2006), 434.

the United States over the course of the twentieth century.¹⁷

In order to provide a context for the focus of this thesis, this introduction will firstly undertake a literature review of how US colonial rule in the Philippines has been approached by scholars, how US rule has been visually analysed through photography, topography, architecture and urban design, and the extent to which the Philippine colonial memoryscape has been examined. Secondly I outline the conceptual framework for my analysis, which includes memory studies and the significance of the body and performance in memory-making. Thirdly I introduce the case studies and the methodology, followed by a detailed chapter plan.

Legacies of US colonial rule

Numerous studies have examined the relationship between the United States and the Philippines and one of the main strands of this literature has been to explore the lasting impact of US colonial rule on the modern Philippine state. Many historians have identified three main components used by the US colonial government to implement and embed its rule of the islands: government, education and the establishment of the Philippine Constabulary, the latter both as an instrument of control and a means to improve the country's communications infrastructure.¹⁸ Historians argue that these pillars of colonial rule sought to unite the nation, produce the next generation of colonial administrators and introduce English as the national language. The colonial impact on the Philippines' political system has been

¹⁷ See for example Sam Edwards, *Allies in Memory: World War II and the Politics of Transatlantic Commemoration, c.1941–2001* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Lisa M. Budreau, *Bodies of War: World War I and the Politics of Commemoration in America, 1919–1933* (New York: New York University Press, 2010); Brian Russell Roberts and Michelle Ann Stephens, *Archipelagic American Studies* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017).

¹⁸ See for example Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017); Cristina Evangelista Torres, *The Americanization of Manila 1898–1921* (Quezon City: The University of the Philippines Press, 2010); Kramer, *The Blood of Government*.

examined by numerous scholars, with many acknowledging the increased democratisation of society that followed greater participation in politics and civic life.¹⁹ However, they have also argued that the new political system intensified existing societal divisions and facilitated an ethnic and class hierarchy that privileged the wealthy and in particular those of white European descent.²⁰ Others have asserted that the strong executive branch of government established by the United States in the form of the Governor General set a precedent for the expanded presidential powers of the Philippine Commonwealth, leading eventually to the extraordinary abuses of power exerted under President Ferdinand Marcos' twenty-year rule.²¹ Additionally, scholars have examined the impact of the US colonial government's bifurcated rule of the Christian and non-Christian populations, arguing that it perpetuated long-standing divisions, resulting in continued violence in the south of the Philippines by Muslim separatists.²²

Many scholars have examined the US economic and military legacy following Philippine independence in 1946. Several have argued that the US development of an agricultural based economy hindered Philippine economic development.²³ Other historians have explored the Philippines' continued reliance on US aid and the

¹⁹ See for example Ian Morley, "Modern Urban Designing in the Philippines, 1898–1916", *Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints* 64, no. 1 (March 2016): 23-24; Jose Rene C. Gayo, "Shaping of the Filipino Nation: The Role of Civil Society", in *Mixed Blessing: The Impact of the American Colonial Experience on Politics and Society in the Philippines*, ed. Hazel M. McFerson (Quezon City: The University of the Philippines Press, 2011), 182.

²⁰ See for example Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 157; Marya Svetlana T. Camacho, "Race and Culture in Spanish and American Colonial Policies", in McFerson, *Mixed Blessing*, 78; San Juan, Jr., *After Postcolonialism*, 88-93.

²¹ See for example Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 153-55.

²² See for example Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 124-25; Raul Pertierra and Eduardo F. Ugarte, "American Rule in the Muslim South and the Philippine Hinterlands", in McFerson, *Mixed Blessing*; Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 208-15.

²³ Renato Constantino, "The Miseducation of the Filipino", in *The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship and Resistance*, ed. Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Roskamm Shalom (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1987), 48. First published 1970 by *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 1, no. 1.

economic impact of the parity clause of the 1946 Bell Trade Act, which granted American citizens equal access to the country's natural resources.²⁴ Delmendo and McCoy have also examined the influence of the 1947 Bases Agreement, which allowed for the presence of twenty-three US military bases in the Philippines for ninety-nine years.²⁵ McCoy argues that the presence of the bases has served to advance American military interests at the expense of true Philippine independence, maintaining that it has been the presence of the bases, together with the US government's "constant quest for geopolitical dominion" that has shaped the post-independence relationship between the two countries.²⁶ Capozzola has noted that the bases have engendered a military co-dependency from the Vietnam War (1955-75) through to Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-14), in which military action took place in the Philippines as well as Afghanistan. However, he argues that despite this, following the Second World War, in which Filipinos served as part of the USAFFE (United States Army Forces in the Far East), an imperial framework persisted which recognised Filipino veterans not as citizens with rights but as foreign aid recipients, resulting in military benefits remaining unpaid until 2009.²⁷

This thesis will challenge this literature's preoccupation with the imperial bond, introducing other transnational relations that shaped Philippine colonial and postcolonial nation-building, such as ties to Mexico, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. While previous scholarship has focused on the US colonial government's exacerbation of Spanish colonial societal divisions, this thesis examines the role of the Philippine government and other commemorative groups in fostering divisions in religion, class and race. While the Military Bases Agreement ended in 1991, the two countries' military entanglement has continued through to 2020 when President Rodrigo Duterte terminated the Visiting Forces Agreement as

²⁴ Carl H. Landé, "The Philippines and the United States", *Philippine Studies* 49, no. 4 (Fourth Quarter 2001): 522; San Juan, Jr., *After Postcolonialism*, 65.

²⁵ Delmendo, *The Star-Entangled Banner*.

²⁶ McCoy, "Circles of Steel, Castles of Vanity: The Geopolitics of Military Bases on the South China Sea", 981.

²⁷ Christopher Capozzola, *Bound By War: How the United States and the Philippines Built America's First Pacific Century* (New York: Basic Books, 2020), 6, 209-11.

he looked to strengthen ties with other nations.²⁸ Thus, the importance of examining the US imperial legacy is paramount as the Philippines continues to extricate itself from its colonial past.²⁹

Visual and taxonomical studies of US colonial rule

While many studies undertaken in a postcolonial vein have focused on the US political and economic impact on the Philippines, several scholars have also examined the use of optical strategies to colonise the landscape and the visual legacies these have left behind. Balce, Brody and Hawkins have all assessed the colonial government's use of visual media such as cartography and photography to locate both the Philippine people and the country's physical terrain within a Western knowledge system. For example, Balce introduces the concept of the "American photography complex", which she argues produced photographs of Filipinos that displayed the country and its people in a way that reinforced American racial and military superiority through images of American masculinity, Filipino death and Filipina docility.³⁰ Hawkins describes how the United States employed a taxonomical methodology to their understanding of the Philippines, believing that in order to rule it, the country had to be made knowable. He cites comments from colonial officials fearing that others would arrive and begin to collect objects and record "features" of the Moro (Muslim) culture before themselves, which he interprets as a wish to control how the culture was interpreted and understood.³¹ Brody discusses US representations of the "Philippine body", which sought to reinforce American racial

²⁸ Karen Lema, Martin Petty and Phil Stewart, "Duterte terminates Philippines troop pact, U.S. calls move 'unfortunate'", *Reuters*, 11 February 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-usa-defence-idUSKBN2050E9>.

²⁹ Ben Blanchard, "Duterte aligns Philippines with China, says U.S. has lost", *Reuters*, 20 October 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines-idUSKCN12K0AS>.

³⁰ Nerissan S. Balce, *Body parts of Empire: Visual Abjection, Filipino Images, and the American Archive* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2017).

³¹ Michael Hawkins, "Imperial historicism and American military rule in the Philippines' Muslim south", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 39, no. 3 (October 2008): 413-17.

superiority, and US cartography, which provided little information on how the landscape was actually used by Filipinos.³² More recently, Pagunsan has examined the colonial government's shaping of the country's biological space through the establishment of the Bureau of Science, which functioned to catalogue and categorise Philippine flora and fauna. Pagunsan argues that the nation-building inherent in this activity through its demarcation of a "geo-body" remained in the post-independence period as the rebuilding of scientific institutions, such as the Natural History Museum, was intrinsically connected with the "salvaging of the national culture".³³

Additionally, Brody and Delmendo have looked at how the media and other publications in the early twentieth century sought to naturalise the US presence in the Philippines through a portrayal of the country as "savage" and "uncivilised", whilst simultaneously obscuring the violent conflict that followed the US acquisition of the islands.³⁴ Delmendo and Kramer have also examined the use of the American flag both as a means to inhabit the landscape and as a tool for nation-building in which the United States sought to portray itself as protector of the Philippines.³⁵ Both Brody and Morley have analysed the use of civic design as a means to establish colonial rule. Both writers argue that the plans sought to elevate the United States in the eyes of the Philippine people by privileging European models of architecture

³² David Brody, *Visualizing American Empire: Orientalism and Imperialism in the Philippines* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 89-107.

³³ Ruel V. Pagunsan, "Nature, colonial science and nation-building in twentieth-century Philippines", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 51, no. 4 (December 2020): 561-78.

³⁴ Brody, *Visualizing American Empire*; Delmendo, *The Star-Entangled Banner*, 60.

³⁵ Kramer argues that the United States also marked their territory spatially through the flying of the American flag, which he states was noted by many at the time to proliferate the space of Manila. He also notes that the United States was often unwilling to use colonial language to describe its relationship to the Philippines, not referring to it as a territory or colony, but using the flag as a euphemism instead, for example, the Philippines fell "beneath the folds of our starry flag". Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 329-30; Delmendo asserts this can be seen in the US recognition of Philippine independence on 4 July 1946, in which she maintains the visual imagery surrounding the event depicted Philippine independence as a consequence of American benevolence. Delmendo, *The Star-Entangled Banner*, 126-28.

over the local.³⁶ Indeed, Morley goes further in arguing that the very layout of streets in Burnham's plans for Manila created sight lines that exposed the new government buildings, leading from open spaces and parks with Philippine statuary, which he claims fostered a sense that a collective Philippine identity and independence could only be achieved under US rule.³⁷

Several scholars have analysed the visual arts produced during the US colonial period. Guillermo and Orig argue that protest art in literature and political cartoons emerged in the first decade of the twentieth century in response to colonial rule.³⁸ McFerson examines the resurgence of the Filipino figure in the visual arts, which she argues is a retaliation against the European "ideal" that prevailed during the Spanish and early US colonial period.³⁹ Mojares asserts that many symbols of Philippine nationalism today, in art, literature and dance, emerged during the US colonial period as numerous Philippine artists sought to establish a "nation-space". He argues that US-founded institutions such as the University of the Philippines and the National Museum helped to foster a national canon of art that included the "collecting" of traditional songs and dances and elevated the work of Filipino artists such as Amorsolo, whose typical works were depictions of rural scenes.⁴⁰ Simultaneously there was also an increase in the "Filipinization" of art and a perceived need to protect Philippine identity against "rapid Americanization".⁴¹ However, Mojares argues that artistic practices during the occupation are not "adequately captured by a simple bipolarity of resistance and submission" and notes

³⁶ Morley, "Modern Urban Designing in the Philippines, 1898–1916"; Brody, *Visualizing American Empire*, 156.

³⁷ Morley, "Modern Urban Designing in the Philippines, 1898–1916", 19.

³⁸ Princess Orig, "Kayumanggi versus Maputi: 100 Years of America's White Aesthetics in Philippine Literature", in McFerson, *Mixed Blessing*, 110-14; Alice G. Guillermo, *Protest/Revolutionary Art in the Philippines 1970–1990* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2001), 17-18.

³⁹ Hazel M. McFerson, "Filipino Identity and Self-Image in Historical Perspective", in McFerson, *Mixed Blessing*, 33.

⁴⁰ Resil B. Mojares, "Guillermo Tolentino's 'Grupo de Filipinos Ilustres' and the Making of a National Pantheon", in "Festschrift in honor of Fr. John N. Schumacher, S.J.", ed. Filomeno V. Aguilar Jr., special issue, *Philippine Studies: Historical & Ethnographic Viewpoints* 58, no. 1/2 (June 2010): 178-79.

⁴¹ Mojares, "The Formation of Filipino Nationality Under U.S. Colonial Rule", 14.

the simultaneous emergence of a Western-Filipino amalgamation taking place in art, or as he terms it, Filipinos “localiz[ing] and vernaculariz[ing]”.⁴² While Mojares, Orig and McFerson portray the development of Philippine art in the twentieth century as very much informed by and responsive to the United States, Guillermo’s approach acknowledges this influence but also emphasises many others, including protest art developed in response to the Marcos dictatorship and inspired by the Chinese Cultural Revolution.⁴³

In this thesis I will be challenging the assumptions of much of this visual, cultural and urban history and particularly scholars such as Brody, Delmendo and Morley. These approaches, while demonstrating the United States’ impact on colonial visual culture, reveal little Philippine agency, and simply interpret such visual culture as a means by which the Philippines, its people and landscape were dominated by the United States. Similarly others such as Mojares, Orig and McFerson characterise colonial visual culture as a product of the Philippine-United States relationship. By examining the broader Philippine colonial memoryscape, which in addition to monuments includes texts, spaces and performances, this thesis reveals the agency of various official and non-official commemorative groups, as well as the US colonial government, demonstrating the limitations of a purely visual analysis. It reveals a colonial monumental aesthetic that expresses tensions between Americanisation and Filipinisation but complicates the binary of coloniser and colonised seen in the studies of Brody and Morley by uncovering associations with Europe, the Hispanic diaspora, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. In doing so, my work aligns with Guillermo’s approach to postcolonial Philippine art, which acknowledges artistic influences that extend beyond the imperial bond, as well as emerging scholarship by historians such as CuUnjieng Aboitiz and Baluyut who have started to widen discussion of the Philippine-United States relationship, and twentieth century

⁴² Mojares, “The Formation of Filipino Nationality Under U.S. Colonial Rule”, 14, 22.

⁴³ Guillermo, *Protest/Revolutionary Art in the Philippines 1970–1990*, 20.

Philippine art, by locating colonial and postcolonial Philippine identity-making within a broader Pan-Asian context.⁴⁴

Philippine memoryscapes

While there has been little analysis of the monuments erected during US colonial rule, several scholars have explored the impact of the United States on broader public memory. Iletto asserts that the colonial government sought to naturalise their rule in the Philippines by actively “reshap[ing] collective memory” following the Philippine-American War. Iletto maintains that in order for the United States to retain control it was essential this war was forgotten and that Filipinos needed to believe a positive future for the country could only be achieved under American guidance.⁴⁵ He outlines four ways in which the colonial government sought to alter memory. The first was to promote figures who had opposed the Spanish regime, such as José Rizal, in order to focus public attention on the successful overthrow of Spanish colonialism, from which the US colonial administration wished to distinguish itself. Secondly Iletto asserts that the United States justified its presence in the Philippines on the basis that Filipinos were not ready for self-rule, portraying existing leaders such as the first Philippine president, Emilio Aguinaldo, as “despotic” and unfit to govern. Thirdly he states that Filipino children were educated to believe that the Philippine-American War was a consequence of a “misunderstanding” by Filipinos of America’s “benevolent” mission, and finally that the United States consolidated their rule by passing several Acts that made it illegal to oppose the occupation. Iletto

⁴⁴ Nicole CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation: A Global Intellectual History of the Philippine Revolution, 1887–1912* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020); Pearlie Rose S. Baluyut, “Occupation, Resistance and Collaboration: Triangulating Japan, the Philippines and Singapore through Fernando Amorsolo’s *Defend Thy Honor*”, in *Visual Histories of Occupation: A Transnational Dialogue*, ed. Jeremy Taylor (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), 97-119.

⁴⁵ Reynaldo Clemena Iletto, “Philippine Wars and the Politics of Memory”, in “Against Preemptive War”, ed. Tani E. Barlow, Yukiko Hanawa, Thomas LaMarre, Donald M. Lowe, special issue, *positions: east asia cultures critique* 13, no.1 (Spring 2005): 217, 222.

argues that the pervasiveness of the image of United States as liberator is testament to the success of their influence over collective memory.⁴⁶ While some of the monuments examined in this thesis, in particular the Rizal Monument and Pacific War Memorial, similarly perpetuate an image of the United States as liberator, others such as the monument to Bonifacio to mark a Philippine-American battle site, reveal a more contested memoryscape than Ileto depicts.

Other historians have also discussed the promotion of Rizal during US colonial rule. Delmendo asserts that Rizal was favoured for commemoration by the US-run Philippine Commission due to his peaceful avocations and that Rizal's image was not expected to incite any violent uprisings.⁴⁷ Mojares similarly assigns the promotion of Rizal to the colonial regime and views the monuments erected in his name as examples of "civic nationalism" or a reduced national identity.⁴⁸ Similarly Morley asserts that the US looked to foster Philippine nationalism and thus consolidate their own colonial rule through "Rizalian unification", which involved the commemoration of Rizal's death at monuments erected to Rizal across the country, as part of an "invented tradition".⁴⁹ Likewise Quibuyen maintains that the "neocolonial state, under the 'tutelage' of America, invented an official nationalism that quickly put up mute statues for its dead heroes to make sure that they, as Benedict Anderson aptly puts it, 'are seen and not heard'".⁵⁰ Without analysing specific monuments Kramer has also examined how Rizal was used by both Americans and Filipinos to advocate for their political agendas, stating that President Theodore Roosevelt used Rizal in his speeches to illustrate how the United States was carrying out Rizal's hopes for his country.⁵¹ However, while this literature simply considers the United States' motivation to construct monuments to Rizal, through an analysis of the Rizal Monument Committee's plans, as well as broader Philippine commemorations of

⁴⁶ Ileto, "Philippine Wars and the Politics of Memory", 216, 222.

⁴⁷ Delmendo, *The Star-Entangled Banner*, 25.

⁴⁸ Mojares, "The Formation of Filipino Nationality Under U.S. Colonial Rule", 12.

⁴⁹ Morley, *Cities and Nationhood*, 80.

⁵⁰ Floro C. Quibuyen, *A Nation Aborted: Rizal, American Hegemony, and Philippine Nationalism* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2008), 281.

⁵¹ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 333-36.

Rizal, this thesis uncovers other incentives to memorialise Rizal, including a wish to commemorate his martyrdom, as well as a desire to prove the Philippines' readiness for independence.

Some scholars have analysed the US impact on the post-Second World War Philippine memoryscape. Ileto and Quibuyen argue that in the early decades of the twentieth century Philippine relations with Japan were generally positive. However, they state that by the time the Japanese landed in the Philippines in 1941, the collective memory had been so altered that Filipinos were willing to aid their existing colonisers against another invasion force.⁵² Quibuyen notes the contrast between the public focus on the atrocities committed by the Japanese during the Second World War compared with those carried out by the United States during the Philippine-American War and argues the latter is a consequence of the US influence over collective memory as opposed to the differences in time period.⁵³ Similarly in his comparative study of Second World War monuments in the Philippines and South Korea, Linantud argues that while the Japanese and Philippine governments have promoted reconciliation between the two nations, "public memories of Japan as a brutal enemy and occupier... haunt the entire region".⁵⁴ In its examination of the post-Second World War US construction of the Pacific War Memorial as well as the wider Second World War Philippine memoryscape, this thesis reveals that while the image of the United States as liberator and Japan as the "brutal enemy and occupier" prevails, Second World War commemoration has also been used by the Philippine government as a means to decolonise the nation's independence.

Other historians have examined the nationalism that emerged in the post-independence years, which sought to depict the US colonial period as part of the

⁵² Quibuyen, *A Nation Aborted*, 352-62, 371-77; Ileto, "Philippine Wars and the Politics of Memory", 225.

⁵³ Floro C. Quibuyen, "Japan and America in the Filipino Nationalist Imagination: From Rizal to Ricarte", in *The Philippines and Japan in America's Shadow*, ed. Kiichi Fujiwara and Yoshiko Nagano (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011), 110-11.

⁵⁴ John L. Linantud, "War Memorials and Memories: Comparing the Philippines and South Korea", *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 14, no. 4 (June 2008): 350.

country's ongoing fight for freedom, initiated by the Philippine Revolution.⁵⁵ More recently Mason and Istvandity have examined the use of Rizal to elide the "colonial continuum" that followed his execution and the beginning of the Philippine Revolution. They assert that the "authorised heritage discourse" presented at the historic sites of Intramuros and Fort Santiago in Manila frames the martyrdom of Rizal as the birth of the modern Philippine state.⁵⁶ Contrastingly CuUnjieng Aboitiz has sought to expand this binary construction of Philippine nationalism through an exploration of the "Pan-Asianism" that preceded and persisted throughout the colonial and postcolonial period.⁵⁷

This thesis uses CuUnjieng Aboitiz's broader conception of Philippine identity-making in the twentieth century as a guide to analyse the monuments produced and initiated under US colonial rule and the connections and frameworks in which they operated to construct images of the nation. Indeed, Till has stated that the presence of monuments or the monumentalisation of a landscape does not necessarily represent a "coherent" agenda but rather these "places of memory... demonstrate the complex ways that nationalist imaginations, power relations, and social identities are spatially produced".⁵⁸ This thesis intends to address the insufficient analysis of the broader Philippine colonial and postcolonial memoryscape. While several scholars have noted the use of commemoration as a nation-building tool, there has not yet been a thorough examination of both United States and Philippine motivations to memorialise. The study of US colonial-era monuments in the Philippines can provide a unique insight both into how colonial power was

⁵⁵ Ileto has explored the use of revolutionary discourse in government nation-building throughout the postcolonial period, which he argues was used to construct a national identity founded on the "people's struggle for liberation". Reynaldo C. Ileto, *Filipinos and their Revolution: Event, Discourse and Historiography* (Quezon City: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 1998), 178.

⁵⁶ Robert Mason and Lauren Istvandity, "Intramuros: Memory, Violence and National Becoming in Manila", *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 24, no. 10 (May 2018): 1053-67.

⁵⁷ CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*.

⁵⁸ Karen E. Till, "Places of Memory", in *A Companion to Political Geography*, ed. John A. Agnew, Katharyne Mitchell and Gerard Toal (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 290.

negotiated and contested but also how the country has sought to define itself at key moments in time and the transnational networks it has used to do this, such as underscoring the Philippine-United States relationship, and Philippine ties to Asia, Europe and the Hispanic diaspora.

Conceptual framework

Memory Studies will provide much of the conceptual framework for this thesis. Halbwachs first introduced the concept of collective memory in 1925. He conceived the idea that memories cannot be maintained or accessed by an individual alone but through the various social groups within which they operate.⁵⁹ Nora too identified frameworks of memory in his concept of *lieux de mémoire*, which he defines as sites where “memory crystallizes and secretes itself”.⁶⁰ These can be spatially specific, for example a monument, or not, for example a remembrance day. Erll advocates a shift from Nora’s concept of sites of memory and Halbwach’s collective memory which she sees as bound within a container-culture to “travelling memory”: memory that exists across and beyond cultures and must be continually in movement both intellectually and physically in order to survive.⁶¹ This thesis will apply Erll’s concept of “travelling memory” to the study of monuments and commemoration in US colonial Philippines in order to contest the Philippine-United States dichotomy by revealing the broader networks of memory to which the Philippines connected, such as Hellenistic sculptural tropes, First World War memorialisation and Hispanicised commemoration.

⁵⁹ Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, trans. and ed. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

⁶⁰ Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire”, in “Memory and Counter-Memory”, ed. Natalie Zemon Davis and Randolph Starn, special issue, *Representations*, no. 26 (Spring 1989): 7.

⁶¹ Astrid Erll, “Travelling Memory”, *Parallax* 17, no. 4 (November 2011): 4-18.

Assmann has also established the concept of the “canon” and the “archive” to describe how cultural memory is perpetuated.⁶² The “canon” refers to those aspects of memory that are actively promoted and maintained, for example, the objects that are selected for display in museums and the aspects of a nation’s past that are written about or depicted in art. In contrast, the “archive” (or what she terms “passive cultural memory”) are those objects or facts that are retained but not displayed or discussed, literally what is stored in archives.⁶³ Nora identified a similarly hierarchical nature to memory-making in his perception of a struggle between memory and history.⁶⁴ This theory has been applied to the way in which heritage sites have been used to foster particular memories and more specifically, how monuments have been used to foster a shared identity or to memorialise an event or person in a particular way.⁶⁵ However, while Taylor has similarly identified a dichotomy in the memory-making process, which she has defined as the “archive” (memory stored in texts) and the “repertoire” (performative memory), she perceives these to exist equally, without one dominating the other.⁶⁶ Indeed, Taylor states that although the “repertoire” is less tangible than the “archive”, she asserts that the archive does not necessarily belong to the powerful and the repertoire to the weak,

⁶² Aleida Assmann, “Canon and Archive”, in *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008).

⁶³ Assmann, “Canon and Archive,” 98.

⁶⁴ Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire”, 12.

⁶⁵ See for example Johnston and Ripmeester whose 2007 study seeks to do this through a series of interviews with the residents of a small Canadian city to gain an insight into the extent to which they engage with a monument to a fallen Canadian soldier erected in the city in 1885. Through these interviews they discover that while most respondents do not identify the subject of the monument or even the war to which it refers, they associate the monument with particular qualities, such as “honour” and “good citizenship”. Russell Johnston and Michael Ripmeester, “A Monument’s Work is Never Done: The Watson Monument, Memory, and Forgetting in a Small Canadian City”, *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 13, no. 2 (March 2007): 128; In their assessment of Hong Kong’s official heritage sites, Teather and Chun argue that while these sites act as a conduit for memory, Hong Kong Chinese identity is more connected to relationships and social events. Elizabeth Teather and Shing Chow Chun, “Identity and Place: The Testament of Designated Heritage in Hong Kong”, *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 9, no. 2 (2003): 94.

⁶⁶ Diana Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).

arguing “performances have often contributed to the maintenance of a repressive social order”, giving examples of state-sponsored torture.⁶⁷ Indeed, in her examination of the collective remembrance of mafia victims, Jerne argues that physical experiences, both in the participation of a collective act and the viewing of victims’ families at the event, is a fundamental part of the commemoration to participants.⁶⁸ This thesis will use Taylor’s approach in its examination of the physical commemorative activities that take place around the monuments, in order to reveal how inauguration ceremonies, parades and burials were often used to contest the image of the nation and citizenship projected by the monuments and in particular foster a Christianised portrayal of the Philippines.⁶⁹

Emde has argued that Halbwach’s concept of collective memory belies the contested nature of memory and argues that what is remembered is the consequence of this conflict. Emde uses the personal recollections gathered at former Khmer Rouge sites in Cambodia to support this, arguing that these interactions create “polyphonic memoryscapes” in which multiple memories exist, collide and are recreated.⁷⁰ This thesis will approach the monument sites used as case studies as “polyphonic memoryscapes” and seek to identify the various strands of memory-making that take place at these locations. This will enable greater insight into the competing images of the Philippine nation that have emerged at different points in time and by different commemorative agents, such as the US colonial government, the emerging Philippine government, veterans and the Knights of Rizal, in order to understand how colonial power has been negotiated and contested. Muzaini has defined the

⁶⁷ Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire*, 22.

⁶⁸ Christina Jerne, “Event-making the Past: Commemorations as Social Movement Catalysts”, *Memory Studies* 13, no. 4 (August 2020): 486–501.

⁶⁹ See for example Larsen, “Re-placing Imperial Landscapes: Colonial Monuments and the Transition to Independence in Kenya”; Y. Whelan, “The Construction and Destruction of a Colonial Landscape: Monuments to British monarchs in Dublin Before and After Independence”.

⁷⁰ Sina Emde, “National Memorial Sites and Personal Remembrance: Remembering the Dead of Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek at the ECCC in Cambodia”, in *Interactions with a Violent Past: Reading Post-Conflict Landscapes in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam*, ed. Vatthana Pholsena and Oliver Tappe (Singapore: NUS Press, 2013), 20, 26.

“memoryscape” as “the various ways in which recollections of the past are translated in, over and through space”.⁷¹ Thus in this thesis the “memoryscape” will include the broader remembrances that take place outside of the physical site of the monument around the figure or figures that are being commemorated.

Much of the existing literature on US overseas commemoration has focused on First and Second World War memorialisation, particularly in Europe. Budreau has asserted that whereas previously, overseas conflicts such as the Spanish-American War and Philippine-American War had been memorialised within the United States through the repatriation of remains, the significantly higher number of deaths in the First World War shifted US commemoration overseas. Budreau argues this transformed memorialisation into a demonstration of how far the American ideal of freedom extended.⁷² Edwards too has noted a similar motivation to showcase American triumph in his examination of US Second World War commemoration in Britain and France. However, he recognises the existence of many commemorative agendas in the development of these memorials, arguing that they were shaped by groups of “commemorative agents” creating “networks of memory”. Edwards breaks these “agents” down into four groups comprising “American military elites”, “American veterans”, “local European community leaders” and “officers of government agencies”; the latter were predominantly American. He outlines two phases of this “transatlantic” memory-making following the War: the first took place in the immediate post-war period to the late 1960s, during which memorials were created with an American agenda but taking forms that were very much shaped by European concerns and the geographical location, resulting in a “commemorative pluralism”. The second phase took place after 1970 and saw an increased American dominance over memorial making and the messages these memorials were designed to convey. Through these memorials the United States aimed to move past Vietnam and look to the Second World War as an exemplar of American triumph and

⁷¹ H. Muzaini, “Making Memories Our Own (Way): Non-State Remembrances of the Second World War in Perak, Malaysia”, in *Geography and Memory: Explorations in Identity, Place and Becoming*, ed. O. Jones and J. Garde-Hansen (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2012), 218.

⁷² Budreau, *Bodies of War*, 101.

justification for its position as a world leader.⁷³ This thesis applies Edwards' concept of "commemorative pluralism" to the monuments examined in order to reveal multiple "commemorative agents" who similarly represent government, veterans and community leaders. However this thesis also expands Budreau's and Edwards' analysis of veteran commemoration, which is examined within the context of a particular conflict: the First and Second World Wars, respectively. I argue that Philippine veteran memorialisation exists within a broader transnational network of memory, in which practices of remembering are drawn from multiple sources and conflicts.

There is also a significant literature on the importance of physical bodies and remains and their use as and within monuments, especially in the scholarship on memory and history in the post-communist world. Despite the very different geopolitical context between 1990s Eastern Europe and US-colonial Philippines, many of the conceptual paradigms that have emerged from such literature have a striking relevance to several of the sites that I examine in this thesis. Verdery, for example, has argued that the presence of a corpse, whether visible or not, within a memorial, has the power to reshape world orders. In particular she considers how dead bodies have been used by governments in post-communist Eastern Europe (from 1989) to re-make society, signaling a break from communism and allowing those in authority, as well as the public, to distance themselves from the recent past. Verdery argues that within this climate bodies function in four ways: to confer a "sacrality" on authority and politics, to give morality to the new order, to reshape space and time within the new order, and to restructure relations and identities, particularly national identity. Verdery maintains her framework is specific to the postsocialist period due to the particular issues that occur simultaneously in the postsocialist state – "property restitution, political pluralisation, religious renewal, and national conflicts tied to building nation states". She also notes that whilst the use of dead bodies to revise the past occurs in other contexts, it is absolutely necessary in the

⁷³ Edwards, *Allies in Memory*, 5, 13, 165-200.

new world-building of the postsocialist era in order to reject the immediate past.⁷⁴ Despite the particularities of the postsocialist world, this thesis uses this framework to analyse the reinterment of remains at the Rizal and Quezon monuments, both of which occurred at a moment of regime change, which presented a similar desire to break with the past. Additionally this thesis examines the impact of absent remains on the perceived significance of the other monument sites, particularly as Inglis has noted the importance of the tomb as “the ritual centre of the nation, receiving obligatory wreaths from every visiting head of state”.⁷⁵

Case studies

The thesis focuses on four monuments, which from the erection of the first to the last, cover a time span of almost seventy years. The first monument analysed is the Rizal Monument, erected to commemorate José Rizal, a Filipino who was executed by the Spanish in 1896. The monument was initiated in 1901, inaugurated in 1913, and stands in Luneta Park, also known as Rizal Park, in Ermita, Manila. This monument is a particularly significant structure as it was the first public monument erected under US colonial rule, under the auspices of the Philippine Commission (the United States’ legislative body in the Philippines) and the Philippine Assembly (the first legislative body comprising elected Filipinos, established in 1907). It was also momentous as it commemorated a Filipino, whereas earlier monuments erected under Spanish colonial rule had commemorated Spanish figureheads. The second monument is the Bonifacio Monument, constructed to memorialise Andres Bonifacio, who had initiated the Philippine Revolution against Spain in 1896. The monument was instigated in 1918, inaugurated in 1933, and stands at a traffic roundabout in the south of Caloocan, Metro Manila. The third monument is the Quezon Memorial, created to commemorate Manuel Quezon, the first president of the Philippine Commonwealth, an administrative body established in 1935 as part of

⁷⁴ Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*, 36, 52.

⁷⁵ K.S. Inglis, *Sacred Places: War Memorials in the Australian Landscape* (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2005), 459.

the country's transition to full independence. The memorial was initiated in 1945, inaugurated in 1978, and stands in the Quezon Memorial Circle, Quezon City, Metro Manila. The final monument is the Pacific War Memorial, which was erected to memorialise the American and Philippine men who had died whilst serving in the armed forces in the Second World War. The memorial was initiated in 1953, inaugurated in 1968, and stands on the island of Corregidor in Manila Bay.

I selected the first three of these monuments as case studies as these were the only three monuments erected during US colonial rule whose development was initiated through legislative decree. Thus they provide a distinct insight into the American and Philippine governments' attitudes towards commemoration and its role in nation-building. Additionally as nationally instituted projects, they received considerable funding and had large numbers of people involved in their development, the analysis of which enables a greater understanding of the broader and contested memoryscape within which these monuments are situated. They were also each given lavish opening ceremonies which enables an analysis of the images of the Philippine nation those responsible wished to project, which was often at odds with the monument itself. While each of these monuments is located in the Manila region, which could be seen as narrowing the focus of the thesis, the figures commemorated – Rizal, Bonifacio, and Quezon – each had a nationally legislated commemorative day. Thus analysis of their commemoration is significant, as they were each used as a means to unite the nation as a whole. Additionally Rizal Day and Bonifacio Day remain on the contemporary Philippine commemorative calendar and therefore understanding their origins and the ways in which they have been used over time is important. However, I do suggest in the conclusion that a future study could analyse the wider colonial and postcolonial memorial landscape beyond the capital region, in order to ascertain whether there are similar commemorative legacies.

The first three monuments were all initiated during US colonial rule, although the Quezon Memorial was not constructed until 1978. Therefore, they provide an insight into the way commemoration functioned during this period. Their initiation and

construction covers the entirety of the US colonial period, enabling an understanding of the extent to which memorialisation evolved over this time. They were also erected at crucial moments politically: the Rizal Monument was constructed following the establishment of the Philippine Assembly, the first Filipino-run national political arena; the Bonifacio Monument was erected shortly prior to the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth, which was intended to pave the way for the country's sovereignty; and the Quezon Memorial was initiated on the cusp of the nation's independence, which was finally recognised by the United States in 1946. Thus analysis of these three monuments enables a unique insight into how commemoration was used to articulate national identity at these key moments. Furthermore the Quezon Memorial's eventual construction in 1978 allows an understanding of how memorialisation continued to operate into the independence period, its role in decolonisation, and to what extent the legacies of colonial commemoration remained.

The Pacific War Memorial is distinct from the first three case studies, as it was not initiated until after Philippine independence. However, its implementation and construction in the post-independence period provides an insight into how the United States continued to shape the Philippine memorial landscape following colonial rule. As noted earlier, many scholars have characterised the Philippines in the immediate post-independence years as a neo-colony of the United States due to its continued economic and military dependence, in addition to the presence of the American military bases. Thus analysis of memorial building during this time enables an understanding of how the US viewed its postcolonial relationship with the Philippines and how this was negotiated and contested within the broader memoryscape of Second World War remembrance. Additionally, the Pacific War Memorial was also distinct from the American cemeteries and other monuments erected to memorialise the dead of the United States following the Second World War. It was built specifically to commemorate the dead of both countries and the relationship between the two and thus is uniquely situated to give an insight into how the Philippines remained integral to American post-war nation-building.

Sources and methods

This thesis combines art historical analysis, archival interpretation and ethnographic research and makes use of primary sources from a number of collections in the Philippines and the United States that have rarely been used in this manner before. I conducted a visit to each site where I undertook an artistic and architectural analysis of the monuments. To support this I also viewed photographs and watched recordings of ceremonies and commemorations that took place at the sites. For each monument, I then conducted extensive archival analysis to establish the motivations for its construction. This involved an examination of pamphlets, publications, correspondence, government reports and legislation relating to the monuments. These were accessed at archives and libraries in both the Philippines and the United States, including the American Historical Collection at Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City; the National Library, Manila; the University of the Philippines Diliman Library, Quezon City; the National Historical Commission of the Philippines Archives, Manila; the National Commission for Culture and the Arts Archives, Manila; the Ortigas Foundation Library, Manila; the Filipinas Heritage Library, Makati City; the Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City; the Cultural Center of the Philippines Library, Manila; the Ayala Museum, Makati; the National Archives, Washington, DC; National Archives II, College Park, Maryland; the Library of Congress, Washington, DC; the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum, Independence, Missouri; and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum, Abilene, Kansas. Additional sources were obtained from the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley; the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts; the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas; the Malacañan Palace Presidential Museum and Library, Manila and the *Official Gazette*, the official journal of the Republic of the Philippines.

To gain an understanding of the broader commemorative landscape around these monuments and the figures they memorialise, as well as the public perception of the monuments, I consulted newspaper archives on site at the American Historical

Collection at Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Yusof Ishak Institute Library, Singapore. As these newspapers were predominantly written in the English language, to gain a broader perspective I have also viewed Spanish and Tagalog newspapers remotely at the University of Santo Tomas Library and Archives, Manila. For an American perspective on the monuments I consulted the archives of prominent newspapers such as the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. Additionally, I conducted site visits to other monuments and memorials commemorating Rizal, Bonifacio, and the Second World War dead, including Liwasang Bonifacio, Ermita, Manila; the Bonifacio Shrine, Ermita, Manila; the Manila American Cemetery; Libingan ng mga Bayani (Heroes Cemetery); Dambana ng Kagitingan (Shrine of Valor); and the Bataan Death March Markers.

For an understanding of the contemporary perception of the monuments I consulted newspaper articles online from a number of Philippine media outlets; I viewed the minutes of town hall meetings relating to some of the monuments, accessed at the National Historical Commission of the Philippines. I also conducted interviews with a number of people involved in the commemoration of Rizal, Bonifacio, Quezon and the Second World War. These included a member of the Order of the Knights of Rizal; a former employee of the National Historical Commission of the Philippines; people who were involved with the *MyRizal150* project, which commemorated the 150th anniversary of Rizal's birth; a representative of the Asian Institute of Tourism, University of the Philippines; the son of an American Second World War veteran, who is involved in the memorialisation of the Bataan Death March; a Professor of History at the University of the Philippines; an architect who worked on the Rizal Shrine in Dapitan; an employee of the Corregidor Foundation, which manages Corregidor, the island on which the Pacific War Memorial is located; and a person involved in the 1986 People Power Revolution. In all cases, my fieldwork research (including interviews) were undertaken in accordance with University of Nottingham ethics guidelines, and a research ethics application was submitted and approved at the School of Humanities prior to the research taking place.

Chapter plan

Chapter 1 gives a historical overview of the Philippines' relationship with the United States in order to contextualise the memoryscape that developed around the construction of each of the monuments. It begins with the start of the Philippine Revolution in 1896 to provide the background to the arrival of the US Pacific Fleet in 1898 and the Spanish-American War. It then moves through the Philippine-American War, the establishment of the colonial government and the concurrent institution of a nationalised commemorative calendar, which was used to embed Philippine heritage within US tradition. The chapter then looks at the significance of commemoration to Philippine nation-building from the gradual "Filipinization" of government in the 1910s to the eventual establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935. The chapter outlines the impact of the Second World War on post-independence Philippine nation-building. It then looks at the persistent tension between the legacy of US rule and the assertion of an independent Philippine nationhood through each of the post-independence presidencies through to President Marcos and the establishment of martial law, which would see him govern the Philippines for over twenty years to 1986.

Chapter 2 analyses the development of the Rizal Monument from its legislation in 1901 through to its inauguration in 1913. It explores the broader commemoration of Rizal that took place alongside this, exploring the tensions between the US vision of Rizal as a pacifist reformer and the ideology of groups such as the Knights of Rizal who wished to commemorate Rizal's sacrifice and martyrdom. It examines the significance of Rizal's reinterment beneath the monument as a means to contest US rule and the US appropriation of Rizal. The chapter analyses the images of the nation and Philippine citizenship projected by the monument, which underscore the significance of an acculturated identity. The chapter then considers how the Rizal Monument has been used and perceived through to the present today, examining its continued reverence and domination over other monuments and commemorated figures, and its promotion of a Christianised image of the nation, which ultimately

masks the country's ethnoreligious diversity.

Chapter 3 examines the development of the Bonifacio Monument from its legislation in 1918 through to its inauguration in 1933. Similarly to the first chapter it explores the broader commemoration of Bonifacio and observes that in comparison to Rizal, Bonifacio became a central figure around which the veterans of the Philippine Revolution gathered. It notes that while much of Rizal's early memorialisation served to obscure memories of the recent Revolution and Philippine-American War, remembrances of Bonifacio brought the conflicts to the fore. These commemorations not only subtly undermined US rule, but served to legitimise the veterans' own service to country and their roles in founding the Philippine nation state. The chapter analyses the design of the monument and locates it within a shared memorial discourse that existed between the Philippines and the broader Hispanic diaspora, which could be connected to a long history of cultural exchange as well as mutual experiences of colonialism. The chapter also examines the image of nationhood and citizenship projected by the monument and its opening ceremony, in which veterans were displayed as a significant component of a nation on the cusp of independence. The chapter then examines how the monument has been used and perceived over time, noting the impact of the absence of Bonifacio's remains on the reduced significance of the memorial site.

Chapter 4 analyses the development of the Quezon Memorial from its legislation in 1945 through to its inauguration in 1978. It examines the memorial as part of a larger plan for the creation of a new capital, Quezon City, which aimed to mark the country's transition to independence, yet was very much informed by the layout of Washington, DC. The chapter explores the tensions around Quezon's early commemoration, which sought to underline the significance of the Philippine-United States relationship while emphasising the country's newly established sovereignty. It assesses the impact of the post-Second World War cult of the fallen soldier on Quezon's remembrance and attributes the memorial's lengthy delay to the differing agendas of the post-independence presidential administrations who each sought to remake the memorial committee in their own image. It examines the

renewed impetus for its construction under President Marcos who sought to use Quezon's commemoration both to legitimise his authoritarian rule and foster his own cult of personality. The chapter analyses the design of the memorial and locates it within the wider cultural projects undertaken by Marcos during this period, as well as within a broader context of 1970s revolutionary and postcolonial monument building. The chapter also examines Quezon's reinterment within the memorial, which served to depict the Philippines as a Christian nation. The chapter notes the obfuscation of Quezon from the memorial's exterior and explores the counter-memorialising within the memorial's museum and mausoleum, which seek to restore Quezon's position as a founding father.

Chapter 5 examines the development of the Pacific War Memorial on the island of Corregidor from its initiation in 1953 through to its inauguration in 1968. The chapter interprets the monument and its accompanying discourses to illustrate how the United States continued to use the Philippine landscape to exert a geopolitical influence in the Asia-Pacific region, long after Philippine independence. It examines how the United States' Cold War foreign policy shaped the memorial committee's vision and looks at how the Pacific War Memorial sought to foster a Christian image of the Philippines, while establishing Philippine freedom as an American legacy. It explores the ongoing promotion of the citizen soldier, the impact of the cult of the fallen on Second World War memorialisation and the persistent significance of veterans to state-sponsored nation-building. The chapter argues that although the US legacy remains on Corregidor, other commemorative narratives have emerged which have sought to decolonise the conflict, resulting in a polyphonic memoryscape.

The conclusion draws together the common themes explored in each chapter such as the United States' influences on commemoration, Philippine government-led nation-building, the projection of a Christian image of the nation, the significance of the body both to commemoration and the fostering of nationhood, the growth of the citizen soldier as the exemplary patriot and the importance of veterans to nation-building and commemoration. I argue that while most of the monuments

were to an extent shaped by US rule in their design and the motivation of the monument committees, the presence of other commemorative agendas reveal a memoryscape in which the Philippine nation is not only connected to the United States but to Spain, the Hispanic diaspora, the Soviet Union and Asia.

Conclusion

By analysing the monuments built during US colonial rule, I explore how the Philippine memoryscape can not only be used to understand the commemorative legacy of US rule but also the extent to which colonial rule shaped the ways in which various groups within the Philippines sought to articulate their own visions of the nation. In so doing I hope to reveal the transnational visual discourse that emerged around Philippine colonial and postcolonial commemoration, which undermined the US colonial government's attempts to shape Philippine heritage in its own image. Previous scholarship such as that of Brody and Morley has focused on the US monopolisation of the visual and urban landscape. By illuminating the commemorative pluralism that took place during colonial rule and its aftermath, I hope to disrupt this binary interpretation of US colonial visual culture. Furthermore, by revealing the complexities of nation-building in the persistent tensions between the legacy of US rule and the assertion of an independent Philippine nationhood, I problematise the traditional concept of monument placement or removal as a means to colonise and decolonise the landscape. This study aims to contribute to the recent scholarship by historians such as Baluyut and CuUnjieng Aboitiz, which looks to transnationalise Philippine colonial history, and enhances an archipelagic understanding of how the US used commemoration to further its geo-political ambitions in Asia over the course of the twentieth century. Thus, by understanding the "polyphonic memoryscapes" that emerged over the course of US colonial rule in the Philippines we can begin to appreciate how the two nations informed each other's ideological and political identities. This facilitates a better comprehension of the complexities of the colonial memoryscape. Additionally, the ways in which the Philippines and the United States shaped the American presence in Asia is relevant

to understanding the future of the United States in the Asia-Pacific, given the perceived withdrawal of American influence in the region and the onset of an “Asian Century”.

CHAPTER 1

Contextualising the Philippine Memorial Landscape: Philippine-United States Relations 1896 to 1986

Introduction

This chapter outlines the Philippine political landscape and Philippine-United States relations from the Philippine Revolution in 1896, through the US colonial period (1898 to 1946), to the end of President Ferdinand Marcos' twenty-year rule in 1986, in order to illustrate the changing context in which the monuments that are featured in this thesis were built. The chapter introduces the significance of commemoration to the US colonial administration's portrayal of Philippine nationhood and traces its continued importance throughout the twentieth century from the nation-building under Japanese colonial rule during the Second World War, through to the nationalism fostered by the post-independence Philippine presidential administrations.

This chapter firstly introduces the beginnings of the Philippine Revolution under Spanish colonial rule, before examining the arrival of the US Navy in the Philippines and the subsequent Philippine-American War. It then analyses the establishment of US colonial rule through to the "Filipinization" of government and the founding of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935. The chapter then discusses the Second World War, outlining the significant conflicts in the Philippines, as well as the Japanese occupation. Following this it assesses the post-independence period, examining the main focuses of each presidential administration, alongside various legislative acts which perpetuated the military and economic ties between the Philippines and the United States. Finally, the chapter examines the presidency and authoritarian rule of Ferdinand Marcos, before briefly outlining the fluctuating diplomatic and military relations between the Philippines and the United States over the last few decades, from the departure of the US Navy in 1992 through to 2016.

The monuments examined in this thesis cover a period of sixty years, the first erected during the second decade of US rule, and the final monument inaugurated more than thirty years into Philippine independence. Understanding the distinctive political context in which each monument was built is not only vital to an appreciation of the differing motivations for each, but an examination of the fluctuating postcolonial relationship between the Philippines and the United States is fundamental to comprehending why monuments erected more than thirty years after US rule could still be shaped by an American legacy.

The Philippine Revolution and the Philippine-American War

In 1896 the Philippines had been a colony of Spain for over 350 years, following the Portuguese-turned-Spanish explorer Ferdinand Magellan's arrival in the islands in 1521. After the introduction of public education, the latter half of the nineteenth century saw a growing sense of nationalism emerge among the Philippine elite. This generated the Propaganda Movement, which was initiated by Filipino expatriates in Europe, including José Rizal, who would write books and articles calling for political reform.¹ In July 1892, Andres Bonifacio, together with Deodato Arellano, Valentín Díaz, Teodoro Plata, Ladislao Diwa, José Dizon and others, established a secret organisation, the Kataas-taasan Kagalanggalang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Honorable Society of the Children of the Nation), otherwise known as the KKK or the Katipunan, of which the latter term will be used throughout this thesis. In contrast to the Propaganda Movement, the Katipunan sought to unite the country as one nation and overthrow Spanish colonial rule through an armed revolution.² On 23 August 1896, following their discovery by the Spanish authorities,

¹ CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*, 44-45.

² Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office, *The Official Calendar of the Republic of the Philippines* (Manila: Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office, 2014), 140, <http://malacanang.gov.ph/77043-official-calendar-ph/> (hereafter cited as *Official Calendar*).

the Katipunan signaled the Philippines' break with Spain and the beginning of the Philippine Revolution when its leader, Bonifacio, and his fellow Katipuneros tore their tax identification cards (*cédulas personales*), an event that came to be known as the "Cry of Pugad Lawin" or the "Cry of Balintawak".³ Despite his position as leader, Bonifacio was gradually eclipsed by the greater military successes of Emilio Aguinaldo, who following the Tejeros Convention on 22 March 1897, was elected as the president of the revolutionary government, which sought to replace the Katipunan. The Philippine Revolution was brought to an end through the signing of the Biak-na-Bato Pact on 15 December 1897, which established a truce between Aguinaldo and the Spanish Governor General, Fernando Primo de Rivera, after which Aguinaldo and other revolutionary leaders went into exile in Hong Kong.

However, following the outbreak of the Spanish-American War on 25 April 1898 the US Navy arrived in Manila, defeating Spain in the Battle of Manila Bay on 1 May. Aguinaldo travelled with the US Navy back to Manila and declared the Philippines to be an independent nation on 12 June 1898. Following the election of a new national legislature in Malolos, a new constitution, the Malolos Constitution, was published on 21 January 1899, after which the First Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated on 23 January 1899 with Aguinaldo as its president. Despite this, Spain, who had surrendered to the United States on 13 August 1898, agreed to cede the Philippines to US control on 21 November 1898, following negotiations in Paris. The handover was finalised in the signing of a peace treaty on 10 December that year.⁴

Despite the Philippines' declaration of independence, following the Paris Treaty, the US Navy began to extend its occupation to the entire archipelago. Aguinaldo threatened "hostilities" if any of the islands were taken by force, and the Philippine-American War began on 4 February 1899 when the US Navy opened fire in Manila on

³ CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*, 80.

⁴ Onofre D. Corpuz, "The Filipino Revolution in Our Collective Memory", in *The Philippine Revolution and Beyond: Papers from the International Conference of the 1896 Philippine Revolution*, ed. Elmer A. Ordoñez (Manila: Philippine Centennial Commission, 1998), 25-32.

Philippine forces.⁵ There are many different accounts as to the duration of the war. However, the height of the conflict took place between 1899 and 1902, during which 22,000 Philippine soldiers and an estimated 600,000 civilians were killed.⁶ With the passage of the Philippine Organic Act in 1902, which formerly established US rule on the islands, US President Theodore Roosevelt declared an end to the war, establishing an American hegemonic narrative that would set a precedent for US-led Philippine nationbuilding.⁷ However, despite Roosevelt's proclamation, a strong guerrilla opposition remained until as late as 1907.⁸

The establishment of US colonial rule

Prior to the Philippine Organic Act, US President William McKinley had appointed what became known as the First Philippine Commission or Schurman Commission, a group led by Dr Jacob Schurman, whose purpose was to report on the conditions in the Philippines and advise on how political governance should proceed. Following their recommendation to establish a civilian government, McKinley appointed future US President William Howard Taft to head the Second Philippine Commission, which commenced on 16 March 1900 and which had legislative and some executive authority. Taft also became the Civil Governor of the Philippines on 4 July 1901, and noted that the inauguration of the new civil government was moved from the 1st to the 4th "with a view of having the change to civil government in some way celebrated".⁹ Thus from its earliest days, the US administration in the Philippines

⁵ Corpuz, "The Filipino Revolution in Our Collective Memory", 32-34.

⁶ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 117.

⁷ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 165; Philippine Organic Act of 1902, ch. 1369, 32 Stat. 691 (1902).

⁸ CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*, 81.

⁹ William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 25 June 1901, image 173, page 6, William H. Taft Papers, Series 8: Letterbooks, 1872 to 1921, Philippine Commission, Vol. 1, 1900 – 12 October 1903 continued, Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mss4223400531/> (hereafter cited as William H. Taft Papers cont.).

used commemoration to connect Philippine political development with the United States.

While the 1902 Organic Act formalised the authority of the Philippine Commission, it also stipulated that a bicameral legislature would eventually be established, with the appointed Philippine Commission as the upper house and an elected Philippine Assembly as the lower house.¹⁰ However, the Act specified that an elected Assembly could only occur following a period of peace, as well as after the implementation of a census, which took place in 1903. Abinales and Amoroso have argued that the 1903 census revealed the Philippine Commission's desire to transform the Philippines into a single ethnoreligious nation, as it removed the racial categories of Filipino (such as "Chinese-Filipino") and connected Filipino nationalism with Christianity by stating that only Christians could be classed as Filipinos.¹¹ Indeed, despite Taft's emphasis on the importance of "freedom of religion", the only public holidays legislated by the Second Philippine Commission, in addition to US specific commemorative dates and Rizal Day, were Christian holy days.¹² Thus US-led commemoration was built around the image of the Philippines the commission wished to shape: a nation rooted in Christianity and US identity and heritage.

Kramer too has noted the commission's division of the Christian and non-Christian populous. He argues that the "wartime discourses of savagery" were projected onto non-Christians, which evolved into a perception of Christian Filipinos as "civilised" and thus capable of working towards self-government under the Philippine Commission, while non-Christians remained under the jurisdiction of the US military, leading to the formation of the Mountain and Moro Provinces.¹³ Abinales and Amoroso have argued that the continuation of military rule in Mindanao served to

¹⁰ Philippine Organic Act of 1902, ch. 1369, 32 Stat. 691 (1902).

¹¹ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 124.

¹² William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 26 November 1902, image 379, page 7, William H. Taft Papers cont.; An Act designating the days which shall be observed as public holidays in the Philippine Islands of 1902, Act No. 345, Second Philippine Commission (1902), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1902/02/01/act-no-345-s-1902/>.

¹³ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 208-09.

separate it from the rest of the country and preserved its “political distinctiveness”. Indeed, as late as 1908 Muslim leaders, as well as US officers, were calling for the region’s cession from the rest of the Philippines.¹⁴ The Philippine Commission also practised a “policy of attraction”, which aimed to solicit the support of the Philippine elite, further embedding Spanish colonial class divisions.¹⁵ Economic growth and educational reform in the latter half of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of a new *Ilustrado* class from the *principalia*, the native elite who were used by the Spanish to govern at a local level.¹⁶ Many of the native elite were also *mestizo*, which in the stratified society of Spanish colonial rule, was defined as the biracial offspring of an *indio* (a native) and a non-*indio*, such as a Spanish or Chinese person.¹⁷ *Mestizos* were perceived to occupy a strata above the local *indio* population and by the end of the nineteenth century Chinese and Spanish *mestizos* had joined the country’s economic elite by prospering as intermediaries in the export trade.¹⁸ Consequently, the first decade of US colonial rule served to cement existing religious and societal divides, problematising any vision of Philippine nationhood which sought to project an image of the country as a single ethnoreligious collective.

However, despite the Philippine Commission’s Christian image of nation, the Catholic Church itself became increasingly alienated from society in the first few decades of the twentieth century. The Philippine Revolution had fostered widespread anticlerical feeling, which also led to breakaway religious movements such as the Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI) (Philippine Independent Church), founded in 1902.¹⁹ There was also an increased separation of church and state under US rule

¹⁴ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 124.

¹⁵ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 112.

¹⁶ CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*, 32; Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 42.

¹⁷ Richard T. Chu, “The ‘Chinese’ and the ‘Mestizos’ of the Philippines: Towards a New Interpretation”, *Philippine Studies* 50, no. 3 (Third Quarter 2002), 328-29.

¹⁸ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 39.

¹⁹ Adrian Hermann, “The Early Periodicals of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente (1903–1904) and the Emergence of a Transregional and Transcontinental Indigenous-Christian Public Sphere”, in “Filipino Catholicism”, ed. Jayeel S. Cornelio, special double issue,

and Taft noted the Catholic Church's frustration with the Philippine Commission at not preventing the founding of the IFI.²⁰ The IFI and the Catholic Church differed in their perceptions of Philippine nationhood too. While the IFI venerated Rizal and commemorated dates associated with the Philippine Revolution, the Catholic Church would later protest against the compulsory teaching of Rizal's novels in schools, perceiving them to be critical of the Church.²¹ Yet catholic churches were also used as sites in which Rizal, and later President Manuel Quezon, were commemorated. Indeed, as will be discussed in chapter 2, the memorialising activities of the Knights of Rizal, an organisation established to commemorate the "martyrdom" of Rizal, were heavily infused with Catholicism, fostering an image of the ideal Philippine citizen as Christian.²²

The "Filipinization" of government

Realising a National Assembly would never be established until opposition was quelled, Ileto argues that those members of the Katipunan who continued to oppose US rule voluntarily surrendered to the United States in 1906.²³ CuUnjieng Aboitiz too has maintained that the Philippine Revolution did not end until the execution of

Philippine Studies: Historical & Ethnographic Viewpoints 62, no. 3/4, (September–December 2014): 552.

²⁰ William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 11 November 1902, image 355, page 2, William H. Taft Papers cont.

²¹ Jose Mario C. Francisco, "People of God, People of the Nation Official Catholic Discourse on Nation and Nationalism", in "Filipino Catholicism", ed. Jayeel S. Cornelio, special double issue, *Philippine Studies: Historical & Ethnographic Viewpoints* 62, no. 3/4 (September–December 2014): 353; Francis A. Gealogo, "Time, Identity, and Nation in the 'Aglipayan Novenario ng Balintawak' and 'Calendariang Maanghang'", in "Festschrift in honor of Fr. John N. Schumacher, S.J.", ed. Filomeno V. Aguilar Jr., special issue, *Philippine Studies: Historical & Ethnographic Viewpoints* 58, no. 1/2 (June 2010): 150.

²² "About", Order of the Knights of Rizal, accessed 17 July 2021, http://knightsofrizal.org/?page_id=2.

²³ Reynaldo Clemeña Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840–1910* (1979; repr., Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1997), 193–95.

Katipunero Macario Sakay in 1907.²⁴ Additionally, the Organic Act's stipulation that a period of peace must be maintained prior to the inauguration of the Philippine Legislature meant that elections to the National Assembly were not held until 1907. After campaigning on an independence platform, the Partido Nacionalista gained the majority of seats. Its leader, the future Philippine president Sergio Osmeña, was elected Speaker of the Assembly and future Philippine Commonwealth president Manuel Quezon was elected as the majority floor leader. From 1909 to 1916 Quezon served as one of two Resident Commissioners to the US Congress where he lobbied for Philippine independence. In 1912 the Jones Bill was introduced to the US Congress, which planned to give full independence to the Philippines on 4 July 1921. However, this was amended in 1914 to stipulate that the United States would recognise the Philippines as an independent nation at an undetermined date once "a stable government can be established".²⁵ The final Bill, known as the Philippine Autonomy Act, eventually passed in 1916. The Bill also increased political freedom through the creation of a national legislature modelled on the US Congress, with an elected lower and upper house, thus ending the Philippine Commission. Quezon resigned as Commissioner in 1916 and was subsequently elected as Senate President, while Osmeña remained as Speaker of the House.

By 1919 Filipinos had almost complete control of internal affairs with Governor General Francis Harrison "seldom" exercising his power of veto. Harrison had also presided over the increased "Filipinization" of government following the passage of the Jones Bill, including the reduction of powers for the office of the governor general so that this was transformed into an almost supervisory role.²⁶ This positive relationship between the United States and the Philippines was also reflected in the 1917 Militia Act, which created a Philippine National Guard. In his 1919 publication, *Self-Government in the Philippines*, Kalaw argued the Act was a demonstration of

²⁴ CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*, 81.

²⁵ H.R. Rep. No. 1115-63, at 1 (1914) (Horace M. Towner, "Views of the Minority [To accompany H.R. 18459]").

²⁶ Maximo M. Kalaw, *Self-Government in the Philippines* (New York: The Century Company, 1919), 42,
<https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/philamer/AHZ9412.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext>.

loyalty to the United States to emphasise the Philippines' worthiness for independence.²⁷ Furthermore, in his annual message to Congress on 7 December 1920, US President Woodrow Wilson stated that as the Philippines had "succeeded in maintaining a stable government", thus fulfilling the Jones Bill's requirements for full independence, "it is now our liberty and duty to keep our promise to the people of those islands by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet".²⁸

However, following the 1920 election of Republican US President Warren G. Harding, and in 1921 Governor Harrison's succession by Leonard Wood, the tide turned against Philippine sovereignty.²⁹ Wood refused to adhere to Act 2803, passed in 1919, which had reduced the authority of the governor general, and instead sought to expand the role, often exercising his power of veto.³⁰ This, in addition to allowing increased foreign ownership of land, resulted in the 1923 Cabinet Crisis, which saw the resignation of leaders of the House and Senate in response to Wood's increased control.³¹ Independence rhetoric then dominated the 1920s. Indeed, Onorato notes the emergence of the progressive Democrat Party in the 1922 Philippine House elections which he argues "forced the Nacionalistas... to appear more radical" on the issue of independence.³² Throughout the decade there were also a number of Independence Missions to the United States, as well as repeated resolutions demanding full independence.³³ In 1923, Speaker of the House of Representatives,

²⁷ Kalaw, *Self-Government in the Philippines*, 61.

²⁸ Woodrow Wilson. 1920. "Eighth Annual Message" (speech). In "Presidential Speeches | Woodrow Wilson Presidency". Miller Center, University of Virginia. <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-7-1920-eighth-annual-message>.

²⁹ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 388-92.

³⁰ This Act was eventually declared unconstitutional by the Philippine Supreme Court in 1927. Michael P. Onorato, "The Jones Act and the Establishment of a Filipino Government, 1916–1921", *Philippine Studies* 14, no. 3 (July 1966): 451.

³¹ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 389.

³² Michael Paul Onorato, "Quezon and Independence: A Reexamination", *Philippine Studies* 37, no. 2 (1989): 222.

³³ The Philippine Legislature issued almost annual resolutions requesting the United States Congress to grant Philippine independence. See for example: Concurrent Resolution Asking The Congress of the United States to Grant the Philippine Islands

Manuel Roxas, led a delegation to Washington demanding Wood be recalled as he was “unfit for high office” and requested independence as the solution.³⁴ Following complaints against Wood a number of pro-Philippine independence resolutions and bills were issued by the US Congress, including the Fairfield Bill in 1923, which proposed independence after a period of twenty-five years but was rejected by the Philippine Legislature as too long a period to wait.³⁵ These recurrent requests for independence were mirrored by the commissioning of reports on the Philippines’ readiness for autonomy by both the Harding and Coolidge administrations, all of which concluded the country was unprepared, citing its ethnolinguistic diversity as evidence of an absence of national cohesion.³⁶ Kramer has argued that this racial profiling of the islands dated back to the beginnings of the US occupation and was used as evidence of the country’s “uncivilised” status and therefore justification for the Philippine-American War.³⁷

These racist attitudes were mirrored in the United States itself. By the end of the 1920s, just over 26,000 Filipinos had migrated to the United States, particularly to California where they primarily worked in agriculture alongside many Mexican immigrants. Gueverra has described how Mexican and Filipino labourers suffered appalling working and living conditions, and were often given the worst jobs as Filipinos were perceived as better suited to “stoop labor due to their size and other

Immediate, Absolute, and Complete Independence, P.L. 24, 7th Philippine Legislature (1925); Concurrent Resolution Reiterating the Petition of the Filipino People for Immediate, Absolute, and Complete Independence, P.L. 29, 7th Philippine Legislature (1926).

³⁴ Michael P. Onorato, “Independence Rejected: The Philippines, 1924”, *Philippine Studies* 15, no. 4 (October 1967): 625.

³⁵ Onorato, “Independence Rejected”, 628.

³⁶ For example in 1926 former Secretary of State Carmi Thompson was appointed by President Coolidge to report on the conditions in the Philippines. He advised the President that the Philippines was not ready for independence in part because of Thompson’s perception that the country lacked national cohesion due to class and religious division, as well as the absence of a national language. Carmi A. Thompson to Calvin Coolidge, “Report on Conditions in the Philippine Islands”, 4 December 1926, pages 5-6, box 197, file HR69A F22.1, Records of the United States Senate 56th Congress, NARA.

³⁷ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 89.

inherent characteristics”.³⁸ The ensuing labour organising by Philippine and Mexican workers to demand better conditions was met with increasing American public hostility, in addition to many white Americans seeing both nationalities as an economic and sexual threat. The end of the decade saw several anti-Filipino riots along the Pacific west coast in addition to the withdrawal of legislative support for Philippine and Mexican labour.³⁹ In 1930, the Californian Congressman Richard Welch introduced a bill calling for Filipinos to be excluded from the 1924 Immigration Act.⁴⁰ Indeed, several politicians in the United States were in favour of Philippine independence, as it would alter the resident status of Filipinos from “national” to “immigrant”, thus making them subject to greater restrictions.⁴¹ However, this “national” status belied Filipinos’ ambiguous US citizenship rights, as while the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act ruled that they were not classed as “aliens”, they were also not recognised as equal citizens.⁴²

At the same time the 1920s saw a rise in popular protests in the Philippines due to dissatisfaction with the political leadership, rural poverty, and the continued control of the landed elites. This culminated in the establishment of the Partido Sakdalista on 29 October 1933, who demanded immediate independence “the abolition of taxes; ‘equal or common’ ownership of land; investigation of remaining friar estates and Church wealth accumulated ‘through dishonest means’; the formation of a Philippine army; the use of local languages in public schools”. They also sought to protect the working classes with increased pay for civil servants, less pay for officials and legal representation for the poor.⁴³ The Association of Revolutionary Veterans,

³⁸ Rudy P. Guevarra Jr., *Becoming Mexipino: Multiethnic Identities and Communities in San Diego* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2012), 27-29.

³⁹ Guevarra Jr., *Becoming Mexipino*, 33, 179-83.

⁴⁰ 74 Cong. Rec. H2683 (daily ed. 20 January 1931).

⁴¹ Guevarra Jr., *Becoming Mexipino*, 34.

⁴² Taihei Okada, “Underside of Independence Politics Filipino Reactions to Anti-Filipino Riots in the United States”, in “Transnational Migration: Part 2: Imperial and Personal Histories”, ed. Filomeno V. Aguilar Jr., special issue, *Philippine Studies: Historical & Ethnographic Viewpoints* 60, no. 3 (September 2012): pp. 307-35; Mae M. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 120.

⁴³ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 148.

led by former Philippine president Aguinaldo, also grew to prominence during this time, as they too called for independence, as well as an end to the mistreatment of Filipinos in the United States.⁴⁴ Thus, as the Philippines moved towards independence, various groups emerged to establish their own hegemonic vision of the nation, such as the veterans of the Philippine Revolution, which marked the significance of veterans to commemorative nation-building. Furthermore, the connections being made between Filipinos in the United States and the Philippines, as well as between Filipinos and Mexicans, signalled the transnational influences that were shaping the independent Philippines.

From the Philippine Commonwealth to the Second World War

Following the 1931 Independence Mission to the United States, led by future presidents Sergio Osmeña and Manuel Roxas, the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill was introduced to the US Congress. This Bill promised a ten-year transition to independence with the provision for the continuation of US military bases. However, the Philippine Senate did not ratify the bill. McCoy has argued that Quezon was torn between his desire for independence and the continuation of US protection, but asserts that Quezon ultimately opposed the bill due to the presence of the bases.⁴⁵ Yet others have argued that Quezon vetoed the bill due to its authorship by political rivals.⁴⁶ Regardless, the Act was amended to stipulate that military bases would be returned to the Philippines and prospective naval presences left to future negotiations.⁴⁷ The final Act, known as the Tydings-McDuffie Act or Philippine

⁴⁴ "Filipinos Observe 'Humiliation Day': 10,000 Gather in Manila to Protest Recent Riots in California. Many Listeners Weep", *Washington Post (1923-1954)*, 3 February 1930,

<http://ezproxy.nottingham.ac.uk/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.nottingham.idm.oclc.org/historical-newspapers/filipinos-observe-humiliation-day/docview/150095654/se-2?accountid=8018>.

⁴⁵ McCoy, "Circles of Steel, Castles of Vanity", 984.

⁴⁶ See for example Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 424; Onorato, "Quezon and Independence: A Reexamination", 223.

⁴⁷ McCoy, "Circles of Steel, Castles of Vanity", 984.

Independence Act, now had Quezon's authorship, and was passed in 1934. Throughout the transition period the Philippines held the status of a "commonwealth nation", during which, and similarly to the political structure of the United States, it was administered by three branches of government: an executive, a national assembly, and a Supreme Court. However, foreign affairs remained under the purview of the US government and the US President retained the power of veto over legislation and the Philippine Constitution, which was adopted in 1934.⁴⁸

Quezon was elected as the first president of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935, having become the leader of the Nacionalista Party in 1922. Abinales and Amoroso have noted that there was a greater centralisation of power under Quezon's commonwealth, as he sought to bring the House and various executive agencies such as the Bureau of the Budget under his control. They argue this stronger executive branch of government facilitated the rise of President Marcos' authoritarian regime over thirty years later.⁴⁹ Quezon is often described as the "Father of the National Language" as in 1937 he issued Executive Order 134 approving Tagalog as the national language of the Philippines. This was following the establishment of an Institute of National Language in which members representing the existing "native dialects" were appointed to select a dialect on which to base a national language. Quezon stated that Tagalog was chosen, as it was "used and accepted by the greatest number of Filipinos not to mention the categorical views expressed by local newspapers, publications and individual writers".⁵⁰ However the nationalisation of Tagalog, the dialect spoken in Manila and its surrounding provinces, served to foster an image of Philippine nationhood rooted in the Luzon-Manila region, which also had a majority Christian population, further marginalising areas such as Mindanao, and masking the country's ethnoreligious diversity.

Although the Philippine Commonwealth was intended to be in place for a period of

⁴⁸ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 425.

⁴⁹ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 153-55.

⁵⁰ Exec. Order No. 134, s. 1937, *Messages of the President* 3, no. 2, (1938): 692-94, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1937/12/30/executive-order-no-134-s-1937/>.

ten years, it came to an end in December 1941. Shortly following its attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan launched an aerial strike and land invasion of the Philippines on 8 December 1941.⁵¹ On the same day the US Congress declared war on Japan, after which Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, bringing the country into the Second World War. On 26 December 1941, after having declared Manila an open city to prevent its destruction by incoming Japanese forces, US General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFPE), together with President Quezon and Vice-President Osmeña, withdrew to the island of Corregidor in Manila Bay. USAFFE forces, which combined all of the US and Philippine forces in the region, also removed to the Bataan Peninsula, which encloses Manila Bay to the east. Quezon had been re-elected as president in 1941 but following his move to Corregidor, was obliged to take his oath of office on the island. Following sustained attacks on Corregidor, the USAFFE evacuated Quezon and Vice-President Osmeña, together with their families, in March 1942. At the invitation of the US government, they travelled to Washington, DC, where together with other members of the House, they established a Philippine government-in-exile. MacArthur himself was ordered by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt to withdraw to Australia, after which he made his renowned promise to the Philippines: "I shall return". The forces on Bataan held out against the Imperial Japanese Army until 9 April 1942, and on Corregidor they did not surrender until almost a month later on 6 May. The nearly 75,000 American and Philippine soldiers taken as prisoners of war on Bataan were forced to walk for several days, covering a distance of about 100 kilometres. Following this, they were loaded into boxcars and taken by train to Capas, in the central Luzon province of Tarlac, where they were interned in a former Philippine military training camp. This enforced march is now known as the Bataan Death March, as between 7,000 and 10,000 died before they reached Camp O'Donnell and a further 17,000 died in the camp itself.⁵² However, although the USAFFE had surrendered, Philippine guerrilla forces continued to organise attacks against the Japanese military throughout the occupation.

⁵¹ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 159.

⁵² Capozzola, *Bound By War*, 156-59.

Following the establishment of Japanese rule in the Philippines, Japan declared the country to be an independent republic, appointing former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, José Laurel, as president on 14 October 1943.⁵³ Having been appointed by Quezon in 1935, Laurel was serving on the Supreme Court when the Japanese invaded. As he had previously worked for the Japanese consulate, Quezon ordered Laurel to stay in the Philippines as he felt he would better serve the country by remaining.⁵⁴ Laurel had been made chairman of the preparatory commission for Philippine Independence in June 1943 and was elected president of the Republic by a general assembly composed of the Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas (KALIBAPI), a political party formed following the dissolution of all previous political parties by the Japanese. Under Japanese colonial rule, commemoration, particularly of José Rizal, remained significant, and his remembrance was used to foster a new Asian-orientated nationalism.⁵⁵

Following Quezon's death at Saranac Lake, in New York State, on 1 August 1944, Vice-President Osmeña succeeded to the presidency. He returned to the Philippines with Douglas MacArthur and the USAFFE forces on 20 October 1944.⁵⁶ On his return MacArthur declared, "I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God our forces stand again on Philippine soil – soil consecrated in the blood of our two peoples... Rally to me. Let the indomitable spirit of Bataan and Corregidor lead on".⁵⁷ For MacArthur, commemoration was also an important device to underline the significance of the relationship between the United States and the Philippines, and he drew on the

⁵³ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 160.

⁵⁴ Rolando M. Gripaldo, "Laurel: The Political Philosopher and the Man", *Philippine Studies* 30, no. 4 (Fourth Quarter 1982): 525.

⁵⁵ See for example, "English translation of the speech in Tagalog of His Excellency, Jose P. Laurel, President of the Republic of the Philippines, delivered at the Luneta, on the occasion of the celebration of Rizal Day, December 30, 1943", Malacañan Palace Presidential Museum and Library, accessed 17 July 2021, <http://malacanang.gov.ph/7089-english-translation-of-the-speech-in-tagalog-of-president-laurel-on-the-celebration-of-rizal-day-december-30-1943/> (hereafter cited as Laurel, Rizal Day speech, 1943).

⁵⁶ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 163.

⁵⁷ Douglas MacArthur, "Proclamations issued by General Douglas MacArthur since his return to the Philippines on October 20, 1944", *Official Gazette* 41, no. 2 (May 1945): 146, *Official Gazette Archive*, AHC.

Philippine-American defence of Bataan and Corregidor to do this. Indeed, as chapter 5 will show, remembrance of these battles would continue to be used to illustrate a meaningful union between the two nations, long into Philippine independence. Additionally, Philippine veterans would unite around the commemoration of Bataan as a means to legitimise their service to the nation. This was particularly significant as despite the Philippine Army's inclusion in the USAFFE, the 1946 Rescission Act prevented them from receiving any US benefit payments.⁵⁸

From MacArthur's landing through to July 1945, a lengthy conflict ensued to retake the Philippines from Japanese forces, including a month-long battle from February to March 1945 to recapture Manila. The Battle of Manila resulted in the deaths of over 1,000 US soldiers, 16,000 Japanese, and an estimated 100,000 Filipinos, as well as the destruction of most of the city, rendering Manila the second most damaged city of the Second World War, following Warsaw.⁵⁹ However, fighting continued, and the Japanese occupation of the Philippines did not end until 5 July 1945. Japan formally surrendered to the United States on 2 September 1945. The Commonwealth Government was re-established in Manila on 27 February 1945 and although the reinstalled Philippine government pushed for immediate independence, Philippine sovereignty was not recognised by the United States until 4 July 1946.⁶⁰

Philippine independence: Roxas to Macapagal

Elections were held shortly before Philippine independence in May 1946, resulting in the election of former Speaker of the House and co-author of the Hare-Hawes-

⁵⁸ Capozzola, *Bound By War*, 209.

⁵⁹ Capozzola, *Bound By War*, 198; Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 163.

⁶⁰ Sergio Osmeña, "President Osmeña's Reply [to Speech delivered by General Douglas MacArthur upon turning over to President Sergio Osmeña the full powers and responsibilities of the Commonwealth Government under the Constitution at a ceremony held in the Reception Hall of Malacañan Palace on the morning of February 27, 1945]", *Official Gazette* 41, no. 1 (April 1945): 90, *Official Gazette Archive*, AHC.

Cutting Bill, Manuel Roxas, to the presidency. Although Roxas had split the Nacionalistas to form the Liberal Party in order to run against the incumbent Osmeña, there was close margin of votes between the two, suggesting much of the country supported Osmeña and the old regime of a strong executive. Yet the success of the Liberals ultimately contracted presidential power, necessitating the use of “elaborate patronage networks” in order to govern.⁶¹

However, despite the Philippines gaining independence, the United States retained territory in the Philippines as a consequence of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement.⁶² The Agreement gave the US government a ninety-nine year lease on twenty-three military bases over which they were to have complete jurisdiction. McCoy has argued that the presence of the bases served to advance US military interests at the expense of true Philippine independence. He asserts that it has been the presence of the bases, as opposed to other arbiters of inequality established during US colonial rule, which has shaped the post-independence relationship between the two countries. McCoy maintains that the bases reduced the country to a “militarized semi-colony”, particularly as the Philippines had no legal jurisdiction over the sites and thus was unable to prosecute any crimes committed against Filipinos on the bases. Additionally, McCoy notes the use of the bases for US conflicts in which the Philippines wanted no part, including the Korean and Vietnam Wars.⁶³ Indeed, in order to secure further US aid, President Marcos sent additional troops to Vietnam shortly following his 1965 election, breaking a campaign promise.⁶⁴

In addition to the economic strain caused by the Philippines’ post-war recovery, the country’s development was also hampered by the parity clause of the 1946 Bell

⁶¹ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 168-94.

⁶² Manuel Roxas, “Especial Message of His Excellency Manuel Roxas President of the Philippines To the Senate on the Agreement Concerning American Military Bases in the Philippines [Released on March 17, 1947]”, *Papers, addresses and other writings of Manuel Roxas*, vol. 2, (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1954), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1947/03/17/message-of-president-roxas-to-the-senate-on-the-agreement-concerning-american-military-bases-in-the-philippines/>.

⁶³ McCoy, “Circles of Steel, Castles of Vanity”, 981-97.

⁶⁴ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 195.

Trade Act, which granted American citizens equal access to the country's natural resources.⁶⁵ The Act also made it cheaper for the United States to import goods into the Philippines, in return for continuing economic aid. Former vice-president Elpidio Quirino, who succeeded Roxas as president following his death from a heart attack in 1948, was re-elected for a full term in 1949. Under Quirino, revised import and exchange controls led to an improved economy, less reliance on imports, greater local manufacturing, and increased taxes. However, these taxes were disproportionately drawn from the middle classes and the poor, with the state refusing to implement direct taxation for fear of losing the support of landed elites.⁶⁶ Several scholars have also pointed to corruption in the Quirino administration, which further hindered economic development through policies that favoured political and business associates.⁶⁷ Merrill maintains that the US government became increasingly frustrated with Quirino, as he sought additional economic aid but would not heed their advice on reforming the Philippine tax system.⁶⁸ Thus, as it had during US colonial rule, the landed elite continued to be a significant force in shaping Philippine society, which as the following chapters will discuss, manifested in a vision of Philippine citizenship, which privileged the commemoration of the elite *Ilustrado* Rizal over other figures.

However, as part of the US Cold War strategy, the Philippines continued to receive aid, gaining \$32 million, in addition to \$49.6 million for military equipment, following the passage of the 1951 US Mutual Security Act, which aimed at preventing further Soviet "encroachment".⁶⁹ Additionally, the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty increased the two nations' military ties in its provision for each country to defend the other in the event of an attack. As part of its fight against communism, the CIA also joined

⁶⁵ Landé, "The Philippines and the United States", 522.

⁶⁶ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 177-78.

⁶⁷ See for example Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 177-78; Dennis Merrill, "Shaping Third World Development: U.S. Foreign Aid and Supervision in the Philippines, 1948—1953", *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 141.

⁶⁸ Merrill, "Shaping Third World Development", 145.

⁶⁹ Mutual Security Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 165, 65 Stat. 373 (1951); Merrill, "Shaping Third World Development", 152.

forces with the Philippine military to suppress the Hukbalahap Rebellion, a communist resistance movement that had originated during the Japanese occupation, and was at its peak during the Quirino administration. The Hukbalahap advocated for land reform as well as the repeal of the Bell Trade Act and the Military Bases Agreement, both of which had been supported by Quirino.⁷⁰ Several historians have argued that Ramon Magsaysay's work with the CIA in fighting the Hukbalahap, as he was Quirino's Secretary of Defence, together with US disillusionment with Quirino, resulted in indirect CIA financial aid for Magsaysay's successful 1953 presidential election campaign.⁷¹

Ileto has noted the emergence of a "new Propaganda Movement" in the early 1950s, which sought to capitalise on the defeat of the Hukbalahap through nation-building based on Philippine heroes and an "unfinished revolution".⁷² He explores how the judicial discourse on the convicted Hukbalahap members denied them their claim to continuing the Philippine Revolution and connected their motivations to the influence of foreign nations. Ileto asserts that in the wake of the Hukbalahap defeat the Catholic Church also sought to mobilise the masses both through education and politics, criticising corruption in the Quirino government and rallying behind 1953 presidential nominee Ramon Magsaysay, who was subsequently elected.⁷³ Keen to strengthen its position as a social institution, following the separation of church and state during US colonial rule, as well as the loss of many of its institutions during the Second World War, the Catholic Church capitalised on Cold War anxieties, describing the separation of church and state as a communist victory.⁷⁴ The Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines also released a statement on nationalism in 1959 in

⁷⁰ Merrill, "Shaping Third World Development", 142.

⁷¹ See for example McCoy, "Circles of Steel, Castles of Vanity", 996; Nick Cullather, "America's Boy? Ramon Magsaysay and the Illusion of Influence", *Pacific Historical Review* 62, no. 3 (August 1993): 326.

⁷² Reynaldo C. Ileto, "Heroes, Historians, and the New Propaganda Movement, 1950-1953", in "Festschrift in honor of Fr. John N. Schumacher, S.J.", ed. Filomeno V. Aguilar Jr., special issue, *Philippine Studies: Historical & Ethnographic Viewpoints* 58, no. 1/2 (June 2010): 223-38.

⁷³ Ileto, "Heroes, Historians, and the New Propaganda Movement", 236.

⁷⁴ Francisco, "People of God, People of the Nation Official Catholic Discourse on Nation and Nationalism", 349-54.

which they placed “Christian traditions and culture” as the foundation of Philippine nationhood.⁷⁵ Furthermore, despite protests from Protestants and other religious groups, in 1956 President Magsaysay consecrated the Philippines to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, in effect proclaiming the country to be a Catholic nation.⁷⁶ Thus, a decade into Philippine independence, the Christianised image of nation continued to be proliferated by the government, aided by the stronger relationship between the church and state.

Magsaysay worked to reform both the economy as well as the presidency, increasing the powers of the executive office, as well as implementing a five-year fiscal plan which was intended to create 1.7 million jobs. He also used the military for civic projects for the first time and worked to reduce the power of the landed elites by establishing a network of presidential agencies that worked directly with local constituents, bypassing local politicians and leaders. However, ultimately, many of these projects were short-lived as they were connected to Magsaysay rather than to the office of the president.⁷⁷ Indeed, despite Magsaysay’s reforms, economic hardship grew with the decrease in US aid following the election of US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had campaigned on conservative fiscal reform.⁷⁸ Despite this, the economy improved again under President Carlos P. Garcia, who succeeded to the presidency after Magsaysay’s sudden death in a plane crash in 1957. Garcia sought to counter the dominance of the United States over the Philippine economy, which had been established through the free trade policies of the Bell Trade Act. Under his “Filipino First” policy, Garcia introduced import controls and promoted Filipino business, which led to a growth in domestic manufacturing and agriculture.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, “Statement of the Catholic Hierarchy of the Philippines on Nationalism”, 3 December 1959, <http://cbcponline.net/statement-of-the-catholic-hierarchy-of-the-philippines-on-nationalism/>.

⁷⁶ Leo A. Cullum, “President Magsaysay’s Consecration of the Philippines to the Sacred Heart”, *Philippine Studies* 5, no. 1 (1957): 45-70.

⁷⁷ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 179-82.

⁷⁸ Cullather, “America’s Boy? Ramon Magsaysay and the Illusion of Influence”, 333.

⁷⁹ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 181-82.

However, there was little reform in terms of social equality and the gap between the rich and poor remained.

Garcia also oversaw renegotiations over the Military Bases Agreement during a visit to the United States in 1959.⁸⁰ This followed demands by the Philippine Congress for greater control over the bases, including having criminal jurisdiction, congressional approval over the use of bases to participate in warfare, and the reduction of the ninety-nine year lease to twenty-five years. While these talks collapsed, three years later the United States agreed to the reduced lease, as well as to Philippine consultation before their use in war, which was finalised in the Ramos-Rusk agreement of 1966.⁸¹ After opposition from American and Chinese business owners excluded under the “Filipino First” policy, congressional impeachment proceedings due to charges of corruption, as well as opposition from senior military officers whose power had significantly diminished following Magsaysay’s death, Garcia lost the 1961 presidential elections to his vice-president and Liberal Party candidate Diosdado Macapagal.⁸²

Following his election, Macapagal worked to implement currency deregulation, which led to an increase in agricultural exports. However, the dominance of the elite prevailed when his campaign against them for tax evasion led to opposition in Congress, as the wealthy leaned on their political connections.⁸³ The 1960s also saw a growth in anti-American Philippine nationalism, with protests against the Vietnam War, as well as an academic reassessment of US colonial rule that placed greater emphasis on the atrocities committed by the United States during the Philippine-American War.⁸⁴ In politics those who had supported Garcia’s “Filipino First” policy

⁸⁰ Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XIX, part 1, *Korea, 1969-1972* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 447, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d447>.

⁸¹ McCoy, “Circles of Steel, Castles of Vanity,” 997.

⁸² Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 184-85.

⁸³ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 185-86.

⁸⁴ See for example Vincente L. Rafael, “‘Contracting Colonialism’ and the Long 1970s”, in “Filipino Anarchs”, ed. Filomeno V. Aguilar Jr., special issue, *Philippine*

also pushed for legislation to limit “alien” land and business ownership, in addition to reducing the tenure of the military bases.⁸⁵ Nationalism was particularly prevalent amongst students, who demonstrated against the bases and called for the “Filipinization” of both the curriculum and staff, as well as for the teaching of José Rizal’s novels.⁸⁶ As part of this anticolonial nationalism, in 1962 Macapagal sought to dissociate the United States completely from Philippine independence by moving the date independence was commemorated from the 4 July to the 12 June, which memorialised the inauguration of the First Philippine Republic in 1898.⁸⁷ Thus, almost twenty years into Philippine independence, commemoration remained a significant part of the government’s nation-building, and reflected the country’s ongoing struggles with the legacy of US rule.

Ferdinand Marcos, Martial Law and the People Power Revolution

Ferdinand Marcos succeeded Macapagal as president in 1965. He came to office with the campaign slogan “this nation can be great again”, promising an end to the charges of corruption that had been levelled at the previous administrations.⁸⁸ His first term was marked by the expansion of the office of the presidency, deploying the military to implement various programmes and thus bypassing Congress. He also

Studies: Historical & Ethnographic Viewpoints 61, no. 4 (December 2013): 480; Reynaldo Clemeña Iletto, *Knowledge and Pacification: On the U.S. Conquest and the Writing of Philippine History* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2017), 152.

⁸⁵ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 186-87.

⁸⁶ McCoy, “Circles of Steel, Castles of Vanity”, 997; Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 186-87.

⁸⁷ Diosdado Macapagal. 1962. “Address of His Excellency Diosdado Macapagal President of the Philippines On Independence Day [Delivered at Luneta, Manila. June 12, 1962], HONOR AND DIGNITY IN FREEDOM” (speech). In *Fullness of freedom: speeches and statements of President Diosdado Macapagal* (Vol. IV) (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1965), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1962/06/12/address-of-president-macapagal-on-independence-day> (hereafter cited as Diosdado Macapagal. 1962. “HONOR AND DIGNITY IN FREEDOM” (speech)).

⁸⁸ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 194.

sought to increase agricultural productivity, which he funded through additional borrowing. However, while Marcos' first term saw significant infrastructural development, it was also marred with corruption, as "officials took kickbacks from construction companies owned by Marcos supporters".⁸⁹ However, despite this, Marcos was re-elected in 1969, the first president to win a successive term since Quezon. Yet this re-election was perceived by many as having been won through a combination of bribery, fraud and intimidation, resulting in mass protests, known as the First Quarter Storm, which saw demonstrators attack the US Embassy and attempt to storm Malacañang Palace, the residence of the Philippine president, in January 1970.⁹⁰ Characterising the growing unrest as a communist insurgency, as many student protesters were members of the newly formed Communist Party of the Philippines, Marcos imposed martial law on the nation in 1972.⁹¹ In 1973 Marcos oversaw the passage of a new constitution, which gave him greater powers and shifted the government to a parliamentary system, making him both president and prime minister. Indeed, Marcos had complete power over legislation, which he used to issue "1,941 presidential decrees, 1,331 letters of instruction, and 896 executive orders" over the Martial Law period.⁹²

For Marcos too, commemoration, particularly of the Second World War, was a significant tool, both for Philippine nation-building and his own self-image. He often sought to underscore his status as a veteran and described himself as the Philippines' most decorated war hero.⁹³ Ileto has argued that this was in part a response to the growing nationalism of the late 1960s which saw Marcos' presidency challenged by students and the intellectual Left. Ileto states that Marcos sought to wrest control of the revolutionary language from the activists, appropriating it to underline the significance and nationalism of his own plans and dismissing their

⁸⁹ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 196-97.

⁹⁰ Raymond Bonner, *Waltzing With A Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy* (London: Macmillan, 1987), 78.

⁹¹ Bonner, *Waltzing With A Dictator*, 116-17.

⁹² Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 206-7.

⁹³ Bonner, *Waltzing With A Dictator*, 14-15

revolution as “unFilipino” and uncondusive to the national interest.⁹⁴ Marcos also used Second World War memorialisation to foster a Christianised image of the nation, building in 1970 Dambana ng Kagitingan (Shrine of Valor), which is dominated by a 95-metre-high Memorial Cross, to commemorate the conflict in Bataan (see Figure 4.10).

Throughout the Martial Law period, US military assistance increased, in part due to Marcos’ threats to renege on the Military Bases Agreement, as well as security concerns over the Communist Party of the Philippines and the rising Muslim-Christian conflict in Mindanao.⁹⁵ The division between the Christian and Muslim populations, exacerbated by US colonial rule, persisted into Philippine independence and Abinales and Amoroso have argued that while Muslim differences were acknowledged and accepted, they were never included within the “national narrative” and greater political assimilation was never fostered.⁹⁶ A crisis was reached in 1972 when a group of students and politicians formed the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which looked to create a republic from the islands of Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago and Palawan.⁹⁷ Following the declaration of martial law a war erupted between the MNLF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which as part of martial law sought to confiscate the MNLF’s weaponry, causing, Abinales and Amoroso argue, the Muslim provinces to “equate the New Society with military rule”. The war resulted in the deaths of an estimated 13,000 people and lasted until 1977 when a ceasefire was agreed.⁹⁸ However, the separatist movement remained and in 1996 the MNLF signed a peace treaty with President Fidel V. Ramos, which established the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In 2019,

⁹⁴ Ileto, *Filipinos and their Revolution*, 186-95.

⁹⁵ Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America’s Empire: The United States, The Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2011), 395; Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 209.

⁹⁶ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 188.

⁹⁷ McCoy, *Policing America’s Empire*, 404-5.

⁹⁸ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 217.

following the introduction of the Bangsamoro Organic Law, the ARMM was replaced by the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.⁹⁹

However, while Marcos discussed ending the Military Bases Agreement, ultimately he protected US interests: sending troops to Vietnam, allowing US nuclear warships to dock at Subic Bay Naval Base and allowing US planes carrying nuclear weapons to land at Clark Air Base; all whilst reassuring the United States that martial law would not interfere with the bases.¹⁰⁰ Several scholars have also noted that despite US President Jimmy Carter's focus on human rights, the Marcos administration continued to receive substantial military aid and loans, while martial law sanctioned torture, extrajudicial killings, and the suspension of habeas corpus.¹⁰¹ Yet despite continuing to court the United States, during the Cold War Marcos also sought rapprochement with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, visiting both countries in 1975 and 1976, respectively.¹⁰²

Following the assassination of Marcos' main political opponent Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino Jr. as he exited a plane in Manila on 21 August 1983, political, business, and remaining public support for Marcos began to wane. The military, formerly a strong supporter of Marcos, also became frustrated with growing corruption and favouritism. Additionally the Catholic Church, which had always been a "critical collaborator" in order to maintain its autonomy, began to turn against the president as criticism from the clergy following Aquino's assassination forced the Church's hierarchy to speak out. Marcos finally called a snap election in February 1986 in which Corazon Aquino, the widow of Benigno Aquino, stood against the incumbent.

⁹⁹ An Act Providing For The Organic Law For The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region In Muslim Mindanao of 2018, Republic Act No. 11054, 17th Cong. (2018), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2018/07/27/republic-act-no-11054/>.

¹⁰⁰ Bonner, *Waltzing With A Dictator*, 133.

¹⁰¹ See for example Bonner, *Waltzing With A Dictator*, 199; McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, 404-5.

¹⁰² "Mao Welcomes Marcos and His Family", *New York Times*, 8 June 1975, <https://www.nytimes.com/1975/06/08/archives/mao-welcomes-marcos-and-his-family.html>; "Soviet and Philippines Agree on Establishing Ties", *New York Times*, 2 June 1976, <https://www.nytimes.com/1976/06/02/archives/soviet-and-philippines-agree-on-establishing-ties-brezhnev-and.html>.

After refusing to accept Aquino's victory, Marcos requested parliament to declare him re-elected on 15 February 1986.¹⁰³

On 22 February 1986 the organisation, Reform the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) Movement (RAM), with its leaders Defence Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile and AFP Vice Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos, launched a coup. However, the attempt failed and the group retreated to two military camps along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA).¹⁰⁴ Cardinal Jaime Sin of the Catholic Church and Aquino supporters called on the public to protect RAM from the president's military forces. The resulting public demonstration, with over a million people coming out to EDSA, became known as the People Power Revolution.¹⁰⁵ By 24 February the majority of the armed forces, as well as the Manila Police Force, had defected from the president, and this together with the final withdrawal of US support by President Ronald Reagan, forced Marcos and his family to flee. They were taken aboard two US helicopters and flown to Clark Air Base, where a military jet then transported them to Hawaii. Aquino was inaugurated as the eleventh president of the Philippines on 25 February 1986.¹⁰⁶ Marcos remained in Hawaii until his death in 1989.

Despite the removal of Marcos, his regime had left the country in a large amount of debt. McCoy argues this forced the Philippines into accepting an aid agreement, the Manglapus-Shultz Agreement, which set annual compensation at \$481 million and gave the United States discretion on disclosing ships with nuclear weapons. However, the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991 forced the United States to withdraw from Clark Air Base, and while President Aquino looked to extend the lease at Subic Bay, congressional opposition led to an end to the Military Bases Agreement and the final departure of the US Navy in 1992.¹⁰⁷ Following the 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001, the two countries became militarily entangled once more as President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo pledged military allegiance to the US-led "war on

¹⁰³ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 221-24.

¹⁰⁴ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 224.

¹⁰⁵ Bonner, *Waltzing With A Dictator*, 435.

¹⁰⁶ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 224-25.

¹⁰⁷ McCoy, "Circles of Steel, Castles of Vanity", 998-99.

terror". This resulted in increased American military aid to the Philippines, with additional assistance in trade policies and development projects.¹⁰⁸ Despite the signing of the Enhanced Defence Co-operation Agreement, which increased the US military presence in the Philippines in 2014, the election of President Rodrigo Duterte in 2016 resulted in tensions once more, with the president announcing a "separation" from the United States, seeking closer ties to China and Russia.¹⁰⁹

Conclusion

From its earliest days, the US colonial administration, through the Philippine Commission, established a distinctive colonial context in the Philippines, both in its plans for eventual Philippine governance, and in its use of commemoration to connect the Philippines to the United States by fostering an image of the country embedded in Christian and US heritage. Commemoration was also employed at several key moments that signalled the two countries' inextricable ties, from MacArthur's memorialisation of the battles of Bataan and Corregidor to President Macapagal's wish to commemoratively disassociate the United States from Philippine independence, more than fifteen years into the nation's sovereignty. This reflected the persistent tension between US rule and the assertion of an independent Philippine nationhood. Yet the US colonial period had also seen the emergence of other commemorative agendas and images of nationhood that existed outside the Philippine-United States dichotomy, represented by the veterans of the Philippine Revolution, as well as developing transnational ties between Filipinos across the Pacific and Filipinos and Mexicans.

¹⁰⁸ Delmendo, *The Star-Entangled Banner*, 5.

¹⁰⁹ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: United States-Philippines Bilateral Relations", 28 April 2014, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/fact-sheet-united-states-philippines-bilateral-relations>; Blanchard, "Duterte aligns Philippines with China, says U.S. has lost".

The Philippine colonial and postcolonial-era was also marked by a growing Christianised image of the nation, which although was rooted in the US bifurcation of the Christian and Muslim populations, continued to be fostered by the Philippine government in its elevation of Tagalog, President Marcos' Christianised commemoration and the marginalisation of the Mindanao region, which eventually came to a peak in the 1970s with the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front. The Catholic Church, despite its weakened position during US rule, was also a prominent influence in post-independence nation-building, particularly during the Magsaysay administration. The landed elite too were a dominant force both during and following colonial rule, promoting a particular vision of Philippine citizenship rooted in the elite *Ilustrado*.

This chapter illustrates the unique relationship between the Philippines and the United States, both in the Philippine transition to self-government during US colonial rule, and the economic and military interdependence that existed long into Philippine sovereignty. President Duterte's recent dissociation from the United States, despite closer military ties, is indicative of the still unsettled relationship between the two nations. Indeed, the US government's persistent unwillingness to characterise its colonial rule of the Philippines reflects this uncertain partnership, as well as the United States' longstanding desire to shape the Philippine memoryscape.¹¹⁰ The following chapters explore this memoryscape and the forces that shaped it through the examination of four monuments constructed across the colonial and postcolonial period, assessing the extent to which each was shaped by America's imperial legacy.

¹¹⁰ See for example Bush. 2003. "Remarks by the President to the Philippine Congress" (speech).

CHAPTER 2

A demonstration of “liberty and progress”: The Rizal Monument

Introduction

As the first national monument to be constructed under US rule in 1913, the Rizal Monument was intended to evidence the success of the colonial administration, as well as signal the country’s aspirations for independence (Figure 2.1). Today it remains equally significant, with its twenty-four hour Marine guard, its presence on the wreath-laying itineraries of foreign heads of state, and its use as the location for the inauguration of almost all Philippine presidents. In 2012, media and public furore erupted following the construction of a high-rise residential tower block, the Torre de Manila, to the north-east of Luneta Park, also known as Rizal Park.¹ The reason for the protests was the structure’s perceived infringement on the integrity of the Rizal Monument, which is situated to the forefront of the building, within Luneta Park itself. While some criticism was more lighthearted, labeling the building a “National Photobomber”, other groups were highly incensed and began legal proceedings against the developers.² The controversy garnered by the development is indicative that, for the public too, the Rizal Monument remains an important landmark. This chapter examines the origins of the Rizal Monument, the divergent motivations behind its construction and the competing visions of Philippine nationhood with which it was associated. The chapter also analyses the monument’s enduring national importance despite its construction under US rule, and considers

¹ For consistency, throughout this thesis I will refer to the park as Luneta Park, which was its official name until 1967, when President Ferdinand Marcos renamed the park “Rizal Park” through Proclamation No. 299. However both names are still currently used to refer to the park. Proclamation No. 299, s. 1967, (4 Oct. 1967), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1967/10/24/proclamation-no-299-s-1967/>.

² Tetch Torres-Tupas, “Torre de Manila developer: Photobombing not against the law”, *Inquirer.net*, 31 July 2015, <https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/709506/torre-de-manila-developer-photobombing-not-against-the-law>.

the motivations of the groups that seek to protect its integrity and the commemorative exclusivity this engenders.

The Rizal Monument commemorates José Rizal, who was born into a relatively wealthy family in Calamba, Philippines, on 19 June 1861. Rizal studied medicine in Manila, specialising in ophthalmology, before moving to Madrid in 1882, where he finished his training. He spent the next ten years living and moving around Europe, writing articles on the poor conditions experienced by Filipinos under Spanish colonial rule, before publishing *Noli Me Tángere* (Touch Me Not) in 1887, a fictional story, which exposed the repressive and corruptive practices of the Spanish colonial regime. A sequel, *El Filibusterismo*, published in 1891, directly advocated for Philippine independence. The publication of both novels propelled Rizal to the figurehead of the Philippine revolutionary movement. Despite the fact that he was not directly involved in the movement itself, Rizal's writing inevitably drew the ire of the Spanish authorities. In 1896, he was arrested en route to volunteering as a doctor with the Spanish forces fighting revolutionaries in Cuba. Found guilty of sedition, he was executed by firing squad on the site of what was then Bagumbayan Field, later Luneta Park, now also known as Rizal Park, on 30 December 1896. On the eve of his execution, he wrote his final work, a poem entitled *Mi Ultimo Adios* (My Last Farewell) in which he bid goodbye to his country, through a loveletter to the Philippines.

Many historians have examined the creation of the Rizal Monument, as well as other monuments to Rizal erected across the Philippines, interpreting them as part of a broader US colonial strategy that sought to foster a collective Philippine identity whilst embedding American rule.³ Quibuyen and Ileto too, while acknowledging various strands to Rizal's commemoration, argue that these did not dominate or

³ See for example Morley, "Modern Urban Designing in the Philippines, 1898–1916"; Mojares, "The Formation of Filipino Nationality Under U.S. Colonial Rule"; Ileto, "Philippine Wars and the Politics of Memory"; Delmendo, *The Star-Entangled Banner*.

completely subvert the American re-making of Rizal as an anti-revolutionary hero.⁴ However, these conclusions do not allow for the existence of competing images of Rizal or a “polyphonic memoryscape”, as well as for the influence of other “commemorative agents”, including the local populace, remembrance-oriented groups such as the Knights of Rizal and the Filipino-founded monument committee.⁵ This chapter seeks to fill this gap in the literature by examining the motivations of the US-run Philippine Commission, as well as other “commemorative agents” who shaped Rizal’s memorialisation, and considers the extent to which the Rizal Monument can be interpreted as a legacy of US rule. The chapter explores the commemoration that took place around the Rizal Monument from its inauguration through to Philippine independence. It considers the extent to which these colonial and decolonising images of the nation persisted in the country’s post-independence nation-building and the role of different commemorative agents in shaping both the portrayal of Rizal and the image of Philippine citizenship with which he is associated.

The chapter begins by examining Rizal’s early memorialisation and the development of the Rizal Monument, exploring the motivations of the Philippine Commission, the Rizal Monument Committee, the Knights of Rizal and the local Manila populace. It then analyses the design of the monument itself and the image of Rizal and nation that it projects. The chapter then examines the ways in which the Rizal Monument has been used following its inauguration, the persistence of competing images of nation, and its enduring ties to Philippine nationhood. Finally, the chapter explores the public perception of the monument since independence and the development of a nationalised space around the monument itself, which has led to a commemorative exclusivity around the figures deemed appropriate to represent the nation state.

⁴ Quibuyen, *A Nation Aborted*, 342-43; Reynaldo C. Ileto, *Filipinos and their Revolution*, 141-42.

⁵ Emde, “National Memorial Sites and Personal Remembrance: Remembering the Dead of Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek at the ECCC in Cambodia”, 20; Edwards, *Allies in Memory*, 5.

This chapter illustrates the tensions around colonial-era nation-building that emerged through the commemoration of Rizal. While the Rizal Monument Committee viewed the Rizal Monument as a symbol of the Philippines' aspirations for independence, ultimately they remained confined within a colonial framework, which framed the Philippines as a successor to an American legacy. These colonial ties persisted into Philippine independence even as the government attempted to decolonise commemoration. However, the sedate image of Rizal perpetuated by the Philippine Commission was contested by groups such as the Knights of Rizal, who sought to emphasise Rizal's sacrifice and martyrdom, revealing a commemorative pluralism around the memorialisation of Rizal. Yet despite these multiple narratives, the Rizal Monument's elevation of acculturated identity and the continued dominance of commemorative groups such as the National Historical Commission of the Philippines and the Knights of Rizal, have also fostered a Christianised *mestizo Ilustrado* image of the nation and Philippine citizenship, which belies the country's ethnoreligious diversity. Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, Rizal has dominated Philippine commemorative culture, both in the remembrance days that honour his personage, and throughout the landscape in the monuments to his figure found across the country. Understanding the many commemorative agendas behind the memorialisation of Rizal, as well as how the Rizal Monument has been used since its inception, can lead to a greater comprehension of its purpose and the memories it continues to perpetuate.

Early commemoration

Verdery has noted that national days of commemoration function to create ties between people through the establishment of a common ancestral past.⁶ Likewise Rizal's earliest commemorations were used immediately to foster a sense of nationhood within the fragile First Philippine Republic. In 1898 the newly inaugurated President Emilio Aguinaldo issued a decree that stipulated the

⁶ Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*, 41.

anniversary of Rizal's death should be observed as "a day of national mourning".⁷ Additionally, Aguinaldo stated that the day was designed to honour other victims of the Spanish regime. This both established a dedicated commemorative space within which those killed by the Spanish colonial government could be remembered, whilst also serving to counter US Memorial Day (30 May), which in the early years of US colonial rule was specifically set aside for the remembrance of the American dead.⁸

Similarly, William H. Taft, head of the Philippine Commission and from 4 July 1901 Governor General of the Philippines, immediately perceived Rizal's commemoration as a tool to foster Philippine–United States relations, whilst entrenching US rule. In a letter to Secretary of War Elihu Root on 31 August 1900, Taft proposed the construction of a conservatory of music entitled the "Rizal Conservatory", stating that it would "greatly touch the hearts of the people" and "materially aid in the pacification of the country".⁹ Taft recognised the cultural significance of Rizal, yet his words also reveal the importance of spectacle to the Philippine Commission's agenda. Indeed, Taft concluded that "these people are emotional and sentimental, and such an act of generosity would touch them more and affect them more than administrative reforms of a much more important kind".¹⁰ Ironically, Taft noted that his house was appropriate for the "entertainments that I hope to give for the purpose of convincing the Filipino families here that we intend to associate with them on terms of entire equality".¹¹ For Taft, it was not the fulfilment but the display of "generosity" and "equality" that was to be a powerful tool in realising the Philippine Commission's agenda.

⁷ Decree No. 22, (20 Dec. 1898), *Official Calendar*, 263, 265.

⁸ "El 'Memorial Day' De Los Veteranos Americanos", *Renacimiento Filipino* 3, no. 143 (21 June 1913), 17, <https://ustdigitallibrary.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/renacifilip>.

⁹ William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 31 August 1900, image 94, page 6, William H. Taft Papers, Series 8: Letterbooks, 1872 to 1921, Philippine Commission, Vol. 1, 1900 – 12 October 1903, Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mss4223400531/> (hereafter cited as William H. Taft Papers).

¹⁰ William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 31 August 1900, image 94, page 6, William H. Taft Papers.

¹¹ William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 18 August 1900, image 86, page 20, William H. Taft Papers.

The significance of spectacle emerged in the government-led commemorations of Rizal Day, the anniversary of Rizal's death, which had been formally legislated as a public holiday by the Philippine Commission in 1902.¹² The 1903 Rizal Day featured a "civic parade", which included politicians, union representatives, and workers from various industries, at the head of which was the US Superintendent of Schools. The parade not only served to illustrate the achievements of the colonial administration, but functioned as a reminder of US cultural dominance, with the accompanying concert featuring the "Filipino Quick Step" followed by the *Star Spangled Banner*.¹³ Furthermore, while Rizal Day was publically commemorated, so too were US specific memorial dates, including Washington's birth date, Independence Day, and 13 August, also known as Occupation Day, which was the date on which Spain surrendered to the United States. Thus, although the observance of Rizal Day indicated that the Commission recognised the date's significance to Philippine national cohesion, the institutionalisation of US commemorative dates illustrates that from its earliest days, the Philippine Commission framed Philippine nation-building within modern American traditions.

While Aguinaldo had established Rizal's commemoration as an opportunity to remember victims of the Spanish regime, at the same time Rizal emerged as an important figure for veterans of the Philippine Revolution. The earliest recorded monument to Rizal was erected in 1898 in Daet, Camarines Norte, by two members of the Philippine Revolutionary Army (Figure 2.2).¹⁴ The Daet monument comprises a three-sided obelisk at the top of which sits a carved metal eight-ray sun. Each aspect of the obelisk also features a raised gold star. Rizal's name is embossed on one side

¹² An Act designating the days which shall be observed as public holidays in the Philippine Islands of 1902, Act No. 345, Second Philippine Commission (1902), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1902/02/01/act-no-345-s-1902/>.

¹³ "Today is Rizal Day: Celebration on Luneta This Afternoon", *Manila American*, 30 December 1903, *Manila American Archive*, ISEAS.

¹⁴ "First Rizal Monument in the Philippines", *National Registry of Historic Sites & Structures in the Philippines* (blog), National Historical Commission of the Philippines, accessed 19 October 2021, <http://nhcphistoricsites.blogspot.com/2011/10/first-jose-rizal-monument.html>.

of the obelisk and the titles of his publications, *Noli Me Tángere* and *El Filibusterismo*, are engraved on its base. While the monument ostensibly honours Rizal, it is overwhelmingly a tribute to the Philippine nation. The eight-ray sun emblem is taken from the official flag of the First Philippine Republic, which was displayed on 12 June 1898 when Aguinaldo declared Philippine independence. The eight rays represent the eight provinces that played a significant role in the Philippine Revolution, while the three stars signify the three main island groups that form the Philippines: Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. The monument's obelisk form also locates Rizal's remembrance within a broader commemorative tradition, as the obelisk had become a popular memorial marker in the nineteenth century, particularly in the British Commonwealth following the Boer War.¹⁵ Although veterans had been largely absent from the government-led commemorations, Rizal's commemoration enabled them to memorialise their own contributions to nation while fostering an image of an independent Philippines.

However, at the same time, the Philippine Commission encouraged the erection of monuments to Rizal across the country as part of their own nation-building agenda.¹⁶ In 1910, a monument to Rizal was inaugurated in Iloilo, Visayas. As part of the opening ceremony, the monument was unveiled from beneath a US flag (Figure 2.3). The symbolism was overt: whilst Rizal's commemoration and a collective Philippine identity were encouraged, Philippine nationalism was a consequence of American leadership.¹⁷ Yet the visual language of the Visayan monument did not depict Philippine nationalism in the same way as the Daet monument. Indeed, the 1910 monument bears a striking resemblance to the Rizal Monument that would be inaugurated in Luneta Park three years hence, depicting the figure of Rizal, dressed in European clothes, standing atop an obelisk. There are no symbols of Philippine nationalism and Rizal's biracial *mestizo* heritage and European travels are emphasised through his Westernised clothing, both of which signal his belonging to

¹⁵ Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 160.

¹⁶ See for example Exec. Order No. 47, *Official Gazette* 879 (17 May 1909); Exec. Order No. 105, *Official Gazette* 1660 (13 Oct. 1909), *Official Gazette Archive*, AHC.

¹⁷ *Renacimiento Filipino* I, no. 24 (28 December 1910): 23, <https://ustdigitallibrary.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/renacifilip/id/774>.

the elite *Ilustrado* class. Thus even before the inauguration of the national monument to Rizal, the image of nationhood with which he was associated was one to which only a minority could subscribe.

This exclusivity also emerged around some of Rizal's Manila-based memorialisations. In 1900, the Philippine composer Marcelo Adonay organised a church service in Quiapo, Manila, on Rizal's birth anniversary, "attended by 80 members of the Orquestra Rizal and ladies of Manila".¹⁸ The reference to "ladies of Manila" immediately implied an elite gathering, while the church setting for Rizal's commemoration, served to Christianise his remembrance. Furthermore, the Orquestra Rizal played a piece of music entitled "Rizal Glorificado", which sought to convey the "heroism and martyrdom of José Rizal".¹⁹ Thus not only was Rizal's commemoration Christianised but the music itself was intended to transform him into a sacred figure. Some of Rizal's early commemoration also took place on the Christian feast of All Saints' Day, with Rizal's remains, interred in an urn at his sister's house in Binondo, Manila, exhibited to the public on this date.²⁰ However, similarly to the Quiapo commemoration, Rizal's Binondo remembrance was also shaped by the local elite. A committee of "Rizalistas" would voluntarily stand guard over Rizal's remains but needed to occupy a relatively high social strata in order to do so as they were expected to pay for memorial offerings themselves.²¹ Thus, while Rizal's

¹⁸ *El Renacimiento* (June 1900) quoted in Leopoldo R. Serrano, "Evolution of Rizal's Birth Anniversary Celebration", in "Historical Bulletin, 1957—2007", ed. Celestina P. Boncan, special issue, *Journal of the Philippine Historical Association*, (2009): 103-4.

¹⁹ "Featured Artist: Marcelo Adonay", Himig Collection, On Philippine History and Culture, Filipinas Heritage Library, accessed 30 June 2021, <https://www.filipinaslibrary.org.ph/himig/featured-artist-marcelo-adonay/>.

²⁰ Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office, "The Centenary of the Rizal Monument", *Official Gazette*, accessed 21 July 2021, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/rizal-monument/> (hereafter cited as "The Centenary of the Rizal Monument", *Official Gazette*); "La Tumba Del Dr. Rizal", *Renacimiento Filipino* I, no. 24 (28 December 1910): 8-9, <https://ustdigitallibrary.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/renacifilip/id/774>.

²¹ "La Tumba Del Dr. Rizal", 8-9; "Rizalistas" is a term now used to denote those who commemorate Rizal in a spiritual manner. Chiara Zambrano, "Rizalistas pay tribute to their 'God' Jose Rizal", *ABS-CBN News*, 30 December 2014, <https://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/12/30/14/rizalistas-pay-tribute-their-god-jose-rizal>.

commemoration was also shaped by those outside of government, this was an exclusive group comprising wealthier Filipinos, as well as Rizal's family, who aligned his remembrance with a Christian image of nation to which not all Filipinos could subscribe.

Quibuyen has noted that while counter-memorialising existed around Rizal, it did not have the power to disrupt the official meaning of Rizal fostered by the US-run Philippine Commission, which he argues sought to culturally embed its rule by using Rizal as a symbol of "independence-orientated" nationalism whose revolutionary roots were eradicated.²² However, these early commemorations and monuments indicate that there was no singular dominant vision of Rizal. While Rizal was co-opted by the first Philippine government and the US colonial administration to foster a sense of communality and Philippine nationhood, his remembrance was also shaped by his family, by the local community and by sections of the Manila populace, who perpetuated Christian commemorative traditions. Additionally, for some veterans of the Philippine Revolution, Rizal was a means through which an independent Philippine nation could be imagined. Furthermore, for each of these "commemorative agents", Rizal's commemoration was not simply a unifying force but fostered a particular hegemonic model of nationhood.²³ While Rizal's localised commemoration looked to Spanish colonial traditions and fostered a Christian image of nation, for the Philippine Commission, Rizal's memorialisation was both a means to embed its rule while positioning Philippine identity within a US commemorative heritage. To what extent this commemorative pluralism shaped the development of the Rizal Monument will be examined in the following section.

²² Quibuyen, *A Nation Aborted*, 312-13, 342-43.

²³ Edwards, *Allies in Memory*, 5.

“Enter[ing] the concert of cultured and civilised nations”:

The development of the Rizal Monument

The beginnings of the Rizal Monument can be traced back to August 1900 when newspaper editor and independence advocate Pascual Poblete approached the Philippine Commission to request that a monument to Rizal be erected.²⁴ Considering his belief in the importance of spectacle, as well as his proposal for a Rizal Conservatory, Taft was unsurprisingly supportive of the project. He wrote to Root that he believed the Commission should “give as much encouragement to this movement as we can, even to the extent of personal contributions of the members to the fund”.²⁵ By the early twentieth century the US practice of repatriation following the Spanish-American War had firmly established commemoration as “an instrument of authority and solidarity”. Indeed, Taft’s later involvement in the American Field of Honor Association, an organisation established following the First World War to establish memorial grounds for the US military dead in France, reveals his personal commitment to commemoration.²⁶ Thus, the opportunity to foster “good feeling”, in addition to facilitating “the pacification of the country”, was instantly seized through the “immediate passage” of legislation that followed.²⁷ Philippine Commission Act 243 was “unanimously passed” in September 1901 and

²⁴ William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 18 August 1900, images 79-80, pages 13-14, William H. Taft Papers; Poblete had founded the pro-independence newspapers, *El Grito del Pueblo* and its Tagalog version, *Ang Kapatid ng Bayan* in 1898. Doreen G. Fernandez, “The Philippine Press System: 1811—1989”, *Philippine Studies* 37, no. 3 (Third Quarter 1989): 317-44; Poblete also worked as a journalist writing articles for *Renacimiento Filipino*. “Periodistas Veteranos”, *Renacimiento Filipino; numero Extraordinario*, 1913, 106, <https://ustdigitallibrary.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/renacifilip/id/4137>.

²⁵ William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 18 August 1900, images 97-80, pages 13-14, William H. Taft Papers.

²⁶ Budreau, *Bodies of War*, 36, 69.

²⁷ Memorandum, 24 June 1902, Box 12, Rizal Monument Folder 1902, CU-5, Records of the Office of the President 1902, UAUCB (hereafter cited as Rizal Monument Memorandum); William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 31 August 1900, image 94, page 6, William H. Taft Papers; Minutes of the United States Philippine Commission, 28 September 1901, Philippine Commission Papers, AHC (hereafter cited as Minutes, Philippine Commission).

“granted the right to use public land upon the Luneta in the city of Manila upon which to erect a statue to José Rizal, the Philippine patriot writer and poet”.²⁸

The language of the legislation contrasted deeply with the emotive language that had been used in Rizal’s Philippine commemorations, which sought to illustrate Rizal as a martyr, reflecting instead the sedate image of Rizal that Taft wished to promote. Taft was keen to “emphasize the distinction between Rizal, who never advocated independence, or anything but reform of government so as to give more individual liberty, and who represents to the people their feeling of bitter resentment to Spanish tyranny, and others who are now in the insurgent ranks”.²⁹ Quibuyen has argued that anti-revolutionaries, such as Dr. Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera and Wenceslao E. Retana, minimised Rizal’s revolutionary leanings to the US authorities, whilst influential American historians also shaped an understanding of Rizal as a reformist as opposed to a revolutionary.³⁰ However, Taft’s serene presentation of Rizal also fostered US “pacification” interests and distinguished US rule from that of “Spanish tyranny”. Taft’s denigration of Spanish rule connected to the “Black Legend”, a term coined in 1913 but which referred to the longstanding portrayal of Spanish rule as repressive and brutal, and which could be traced to the Dutch depiction of the Spanish rule of the Netherlands (1556-1714).³¹ However, Taft still recognised Rizal’s potential for inciting nationalist sentiment and stipulated that the Commission should “probably impose as a condition that no ceremony shall be held in respect to the erection of the monument until it is ready to be unveiled”.³² Nevertheless, despite Taft’s reservations, the monument committee established by the legislation had a particular vision for the Rizal Monument which both advanced Rizal’s religious commemoration, and positioned him as a symbol for Philippine independence.

²⁸ Minutes, Philippine Commission.

²⁹ William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 18 August 1900, images 97-80, pages 13-14, William H. Taft Papers.

³⁰ Quibuyen, *A Nation Aborted*, 43-44.

³¹ A. Gordon Kinder, “Creation of the Black Legend: Literary Contributions of Spanish Protestant Exiles”, *Mediterranean Studies* 6, (1996): 67-68.

³² William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 18 August 1900, images 97-80, pages 13-14, William H. Taft Papers.

The monument committee of “prominent Filipinos” included Pascual Poblete, who had initiated the monument; Paciano Rizal, Rizal’s brother; Juan Tuason; Teodoro R. Yangco, businessman and philanthropist, elected to serve as the Philippine Resident Commissioner in the US House of Representatives in 1916; Mariano Limjap, who served under President Emilio Aguinaldo during the Philippine-American War; Maximino Paterno, an associate of Rizal; Ramon Genato; Tomas G. del Rosario; and Dr. Ariston Bautista, formerly a member of the Malolos Congress.³³ The committee’s structure of “prominent Filipinos” reflected the exclusivity that had marked Rizal’s earliest commemorations, and the continuing role of the Philippine elite in shaping Rizal’s remembrance. However, contrary to Taft’s vision of Rizal, they also sought to advocate for Philippine independence, perceiving the monument as a demonstration “to the entire world... the legality of our aspirations to liberty and progress”. Additionally, they undermined Taft’s muted rhetoric, stating that the monument would also uphold “the doctrines preached by that redeemer of our rights, José Rizal”.³⁴

However, the committee’s language revealed the conflicted nature of nation-building within a colonial framework. While on one hand the committee articulated a desire for Philippine independence, their language also perpetuated a colonial hierarchy, in which the Rizal Monument was to stand as a signal of the Philippines’ “aptitude to enter into the concert of cultured and civilised nations, and partake of their customs”.³⁵ Following the Malolos Congress much of Philippine state-building

³³ Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War, 1908, Part 2, image 653, page 627 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1909), <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/msu.31293108031521> (hereafter cited as Report of the Philippine Commission, 1908, Part 2); An Act granting the right to use public land upon the Luneta in the city of Manila upon which to erect a statue of José Rizal of 1901, Act No. 243, Second Philippine Commission (1901), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1901/09/28/act-no-243-s-1901/>.

³⁴ Rizal Monument Committee, “To The People Of The Philippines”, 4 November 1901, Box 12, Rizal Monument Folder 1902, CU-5, Records of the Office of the President 1902, UAUCB (hereafter cited as Rizal Monument Committee, “To The People Of The Philippines”).

³⁵ Rizal Monument Committee, “To The People Of The Philippines”.

involved foreign travel to appeal for recognition, which Kramer has argued was “waged in the language of ‘civilisation’”.³⁶ Indeed, Aguinaldo, in his inaugural speech as president in 1899, sought to legitimise his government by distancing the state from the Revolution, referring to the Philippines as a “civilised nation... one; worthy, therefore, of being freely admitted into the concerts of nations”.³⁷ Likewise the committee’s legitimisation of Philippine independence was constrained within the colonial rhetoric of “cultured and civilised nations”.

The monument committee’s assertion that the Philippines would “partake of... [the] customs” of “cultured and civilised nations”, also implied that the country’s sovereign identity would be shaped by the traditions of other nations. The committee’s reference to “liberty” implied a shared American-Philippine cultural heritage, with its connotations of the Liberty Bell (1752) in Philadelphia, the Statue of Liberty (1886), and the 1776 Declaration of Independence, in which all men were deemed as entitled to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”. “Liberty” also tied the Philippines to US commemorative tradition, referencing US President Abraham Lincoln’s “Gettysburg Address”, in which he referred to “a new nation, conceived in Liberty”.³⁸ Furthermore, connotations of the Statue of Liberty and its strong association with France and European immigration, as immigrants would enter the United States via Ellis Island on which the statue stands, also inferred racial hierarchies and ideals around American national identity, reflected in the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and the founding of the Immigration Restriction League in 1894.³⁹ The monument committee also intended the Rizal Monument to immortalise

³⁶ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 100-1.

³⁷ Emilio Aguinaldo. 1899. “Inaugural Address of General Emilio Aguinaldo President of the Philippines, [Delivered at Barasoain Church, Malolos, Bulacan, on January 23, 1899]” (speech). In *Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines*, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1899/01/23/inaugural-address-of-president-aguinaldo-january-23-1899/>.

³⁸ Abraham Lincoln. 1863. “Transcript of Cornell University’s Copy of the Gettysburg Address” (speech). In Division of Rare & Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library. https://rmc.library.cornell.edu/gettysburg/good_cause/transcript.htm.

³⁹ An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese of 1882, Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882); Colm Lavery, “Situating Eugenics: Robert DeCourcy

this American-Philippine unity, stating that it would perpetuate both “the memory of one who dared to enter with a firm step into the heaven of immortality... [and] also eternalize the memory of men and nations... who prove that their hearts beat to the same ideals”.⁴⁰ Thus not only was Philippine independence imagined within a colonial framework and hierarchy, but the monument erected to memorialise the country’s sovereignty was intended to permanently enjoin the coloniser and colonised.

However, the use of “liberty” was not simply an Americanism. CuUnjieng Aboitiz has argued that the term “liberty” had also been used by the Katipunan to demonstrate pre-colonial Philippine independence as well as to express a commonality with both the United States and Japan, the latter of whom they looked to as an exemplar of comparative political freedom.⁴¹ Although the committee’s rhetoric aligned the Philippines with the United States and sought to end “any resentment which might exist between Americans and Filipinos”, in subtle ways they also positioned Philippine nationalism within an Asian as well as a Western framework, while the religious rhetoric around Rizal refuted the muted language of the Philippine Commission’s legislation.⁴² This counter-memorymaking and the conflict between Philippine independence and colonial rhetoric would continue through to the Rizal Monument’s inauguration, particularly in the decisions over the monument’s visual language and its representation of Philippine independence.

A competition for “eminent artists and sculptors in Europe and America”

Despite the Philippine Commission’s support for the project and the rapidly introduced legislation, the competition to design the Rizal Monument was not launched until 1905. Indeed, Taft’s recognition of the monument’s ability to incite

Ward and the Immigration Restriction League of Boston”, *Journal of Historical Geography* 53 (July 2016): 54-62.

⁴⁰ Rizal Monument Committee, “To The People Of The Philippines”.

⁴¹ CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*, 78-83.

⁴² Rizal Monument Committee, “To The People Of The Philippines”.

nationalist fervour may have resulted in its delay. In a letter to Root on 13 September 1902, Taft noted that although the “insurrection” was “dead”, the agitation for Philippine independence remained through a “desire to form parties called Nationalist or Independent parties”.⁴³ Furthermore, a strong guerrilla opposition remained until as late as 1907.⁴⁴ However, fundraising for the Rizal Monument had begun and was a serious undertaking for both the monument committee and the Philippine Commission. In the years following Act 243, the annual Reports of the Philippine Commission listed the funds raised for the monument in the main budget of the Report, alongside the figures spent on national infrastructure, education and healthcare.⁴⁵ By 1906 the committee had raised over P100,000, indicating considerable public support for the monument as well as political, with the Philippine Commission contributing P30,000 to the total.⁴⁶

From 1905 to 1907, the committee held an international contest, to which “eminent artists and sculptors in Europe and America” were invited to submit designs for the Rizal Monument.⁴⁷ The prize money for the winning entries was P5,000 for the first place recipient and P2,000 for the second. The final design was also shaped by the Philippine Commission as the jury for the competition was selected and supervised by Governor General Frank Smith.⁴⁸ Jury members included shipping agent John T. Macleod and the American architect William E. Parsons who had worked with Daniel Burnham, the architect responsible for the US colonial redesign of the cities of

⁴³ William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 13 September 1902, image 333, page 1, William H. Taft Papers cont.

⁴⁴ CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*, 81.

⁴⁵ Reports of the Philippine Commission, The Civil Governor, and The Heads of the Executive Departments of the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands, 1900-1903, image 688, page 662 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.tz1ppx>.

⁴⁶ Report of the Philippine Commission, 1908, Part 2, image 653, page 627.

⁴⁷ Report of the Philippine Commission, 1908, Part 2, image 653, page 627.

⁴⁸ “Appointments Made By The Governor General”, *War Department, U.S.A. Annual Reports, 1907, Volume X, Acts of the Philippine Commission Nos. 1539–1800, inclusive, Public Resolutions, Etc., From September 16, 1906, October 31, 1907* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907), 571, <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951d032854000> (hereafter cited as Appointments Made By The Governor General).

Manila and Baguio.⁴⁹ Macleod too represented colonial values, publishing *The Sliding Scale* in 1910, a fictional narrative, which sought to illustrate the dangers of interracial unions.⁵⁰ Thus the Rizal Monument, from the competition through to its design, perpetuated the colonial hierarchy that had overshadowed the monument committee's independence rhetoric, and signalled that Philippine independence and nationhood could only be articulated through Western sculptural rhetoric. The paradox was noted by the *Nation* who commented that "an American sculptor with a sense of irony and pathos could ask no more complex and yet alluring subject than a statue of Rizal to dominate Luzon as she has been Americanized".⁵¹

By 1907, forty entries had been received, from which a shortlist of ten were selected and exhibited in Intramuros, the historic Spanish walled area within Manila (Figure 2.4). Finally, the jury, all non-artists, selected *Al Martir de Bagumbayan* (To the Martyr of Bagumbayan) by Carlos Nicoli of Carrara, Italy, as the winning design (Figure 2.5). His scale model depicted an 18-metre-high marble monument, with ornate neo-classical figures dominating the top and base. However, despite Nicoli being awarded the commission, the eventual contract was given to the second place Swiss sculptor Richard Kissling (1848-1919). Kissling's design, *Motto Stella* (Guiding Star), was far more understated, showing a simple bronze figure of Rizal standing at the base of an obelisk (Figure 2.6). The National Parks Development Committee, who are now responsible for the monument, have stated that Nicoli was unable to pay the construction bond required to build his monument, explaining why his design was ultimately passed over.⁵²

Prior to the Rizal Monument's inauguration on 29 December 1912, Rizal's remains were transferred by an organisation known as the Knights of Rizal from Rizal's

⁴⁹ "Appointments Made By The Governor General", 571.

⁵⁰ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 25-27.

⁵¹ *Nation* 80, no. 2079 (4 May 1905): 343-45, <http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.nottingham.ac.uk/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nih&AN=13870506&site=ehost-live>.

⁵² Paul Alcazaren, ed., *Parks for a nation: The Rizal Park and 50 Years of the National Parks Development Committee* (Quezon City: Media Wise Communications, 2013), 65.

sister's house to Intramuros, where the shortlisted competition entries had been displayed and where Rizal had been held prior to his execution. The Knights waited "on guard" with the remains overnight before taking them the following day, on the anniversary of Rizal's death, to be buried at what was to be the base of the monument in Luneta Park.⁵³ The Knights of Rizal had been founded in 1911 by Colonel Antonio C. Torres in order to commemorate "the execution and martyrdom" of Rizal.⁵⁴ After graduating from Ateneo de Manila University, Torres had studied in the United States before returning to work for the Philippine Commission. Following the election of the First Philippine Assembly in 1907 Torres served as Sergeant-at-Arms and then later as Social Secretary to the Speaker of the House.⁵⁵ In 1916 the Knights of Rizal were formalised into a private non-stock corporation entitled Orden de Caballeros de Rizal.⁵⁶ While the competition and design of the monument may have been overseen by the Philippine Commission, the creation of the Knights of Rizal indicated that Rizal's commemoration continued to be shaped outside of government and by a desire to elevate and sanctify Rizal's sacrifice, perpetuating the Christianised commemoration that had always been part of Rizal's localised remembrance.

Verdery has argued that reburial can re-imbue a corpse with significance, and "(re)sacralises the political order represented by those who carry it out".⁵⁷ By placing Rizal's remains together with contemporary artefacts at what was to be the base of

⁵³ Sandy Araneta, "Knights of Rizal to reenact transfer of hero's remains", *Philippine Star*, 29 December 2012, <https://www.philstar.com/metro/2012/12/29/891061/knights-rizal-reenact-transfer-heros-remains>; "The Centenary of the Rizal Monument", *Official Gazette*; "PH to mark centenary of transfer of Rizal's urn to Luneta", *ABS-CBN News*, 29 December 2012, <https://news.abs-cbn.com/video/nation/metro-manila/12/28/12/ph-mark-centenary-transfer-rizals-urn-luneta>.

⁵⁴ "About", Order of the Knights of Rizal, accessed 17 July 2021, http://knightsofrizal.org/?page_id=2.

⁵⁵ Miguel R. Cornejo, ed., *Cornejo's Commonwealth Directory of the Philippines* (Manila: Miguel R. Cornejo, 1939), 2183-84, <https://www.filipinaslibrary.org.ph/biblio/45342/>.

⁵⁶ "About", Order of the Knights of Rizal.

⁵⁷ Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*, 32.

the monument, the Knights of Rizal not only elevated Rizal but reflected the country's move towards political independence with the 1912 introduction of the Jones Bill, as well as the election of Democratic US President Woodrow Wilson.⁵⁸ Indeed, Ileto has observed that the interment of Rizal's remains beneath the new monument gave additional significance to Rizal Day in 1912, observing its use by the public to express Philippine patriotism and oppositional politics: "The very blessing that the colonialists gave Rizal was exploited; his birth and death anniversaries were very much the scene of the 'other politics'".⁵⁹ The memorialisation of Rizal continued to be shaped by a multitude of "commemorative agents", reflecting ongoing tensions between Philippine nation-building and US rule. Despite the persistence of a colonial framework, which informed the monument committee's aspirations for independence and the physical realisation of the Rizal Monument, the Knights of Rizal took ownership of Rizal's remains and underscored his connection to the country's political sovereignty.⁶⁰ Construction on Kissling's monument took place in Switzerland and it was transported to the Philippines in 1913 (Figure 2.7). The Rizal Monument was finally inaugurated on Rizal Day on 30 December 1913 (Figure 2.8).

The Rizal Monument

The Rizal Monument sits at the edge of Luneta Park facing the busy Roxas Boulevard (Figure 2.9). The monument comprises an unpolished granite plinth and obelisk, the apex of which forms a pyramid. On the anterior peak of the obelisk are three gold stars, while at its base, standing atop the plinth, is a bronze figure of Rizal (Figure 2.10). To his left sit bronze figures of two boys reading and to his right is a bronze likeness of a mother and baby. Each figure is realistically depicted in three-dimensional cast bronze. The monument differs in style to an earlier sculpture by Kissling of the legendary Swiss hero William Tell. Created in 1892 for the town of

⁵⁸ H.R. Rep. No. 1115-63, at 1 (1914) (Horace M. Towner, "Views of the Minority [To accompany H.R. 18459]").

⁵⁹ Ileto, *Filipinos and their Revolution*, 142-49.

⁶⁰ Edwards, *Allies in Memory*, 5.

Altdorf in Switzerland (Figure 2.11), the depiction of Tell is more ornate and neo-classical in style than that of Rizal. However, similarly to the Rizal Monument, Tell is also shown with a young child, suggesting an intention in both designs to establish a narrative around the person depicted. Yet while the absence of classical elements in the Rizal Monument modernises it, its Latin title, *Motto Stella* (Guiding Star), embeds the edifice within Roman classical sculptural tradition. Additionally, the Rizal Monument's central obelisk, similarly to the 1898 monument to Rizal, places the structure within a broader memorial heritage. Indeed, the obelisk had come to dominate the memorial form, particularly throughout the British Commonwealth in the nineteenth century, becoming synonymous with a "non-sectarian... symbol of death or glory".⁶¹ The obelisk as a national symbol also recalls the Washington Monument, which was inaugurated in 1848. Furthermore, while the triad of stars, representing the three main island groups of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, had been a feature of both the Katipunan flag and the Philippine Flag, flown during the First Philippine Republic, they also evoke the symbolism of the Stars and Stripes.⁶² Thus, similarly to the monument committee's textual rhetoric, the Rizal Monument articulates an image of Rizal and Philippine nationhood through Western sculptural practices, positioning Philippine identity within a shared Philippine-United States cultural heritage.

The figure of Rizal is depicted in Western clothing, wearing an overcoat under which can be seen trousers, a waistcoat and a shirt with an ascot collar and cravat (Figure 2.12). There is no evidence as to where Kissling's image of Rizal was derived; however, there is a photograph of Rizal taken in 1892, whilst he was living in Spain, in which he can be seen wearing an almost identical outfit (Figure 2.13). The photograph shows Rizal alongside two other figures, Marcelo H. Del Pilar and Mariano Ponce, each of whom were involved in *La Solidaridad*, a Spanish language journal which was a vehicle for *Ilustrado* writing and expressed hopes for Philippine-Spanish political assimilation.⁶³ The photograph would have been familiar to

⁶¹ Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 160.

⁶² *Official Calendar*, 110.

⁶³ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 50-51.

Philippine *Ilustrados*, the educated elite, who were the main readers of this publication. Additionally, this representation of Rizal was reproduced by Philippine artist Guillermo Tolentino in his 1911 illustration, *Grupo de Filipinos Ilustres*, in which Rizal is shown together with other significant Philippine men (Figure 2.14). Tolentino's image was reproduced as a popular poster, which promoted a Westernised depiction of Rizal.⁶⁴ Kramer has described the original 1892 photograph as a symbol of "civilization" and a "challenge to Spanish imperialists who represented the inhabitants of the islands as 'savage'".⁶⁵ Indeed, similarly to the 1910 Iloilo Monument, the Rizal Monument's depiction of Rizal as a Western educated man underlines his position as a *mestizo Ilustrado*. Thus, Rizal's portrayal on the monument perpetuated the racial hierarchies that existed under Spanish colonial rule, attaching value to an image of Philippine citizenship rooted in an acculturated identity. This reflected both the elite networks that continued to shape Rizal's commemoration, as well as the ongoing tensions between colonial power and national sentiment. However, this elevation of assimilation would be countered in the 1933 Bonifacio Monument, discussed in chapter 3.

Rizal is also shown holding a book, which functions both as a reminder of his publications and his education. Indeed, the monument's portrayal of Rizal is that of a writer and a man of letters, which is reinforced through the figures shown either side of him (Figure 2.15). The two boys on his left are depicted holding a book, referencing Rizal's role as an educator, having established a school whilst he was exiled in Dapitan, Mindanao. In much of his writing Rizal emphasised the importance of education, and the image of the mother and child could also function to underline the value of education, as Rizal personified education as a woman in his poetry, while advocating for educational reform as a means to improve the fate of the country.⁶⁶ This is also reinforced by the Spanish inscription underneath the two boys

⁶⁴ Mojares, "Guillermo Tolentino's 'Grupo de Filipinos Ilustres' and the Making of a National Pantheon", 170.

⁶⁵ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 49.

⁶⁶ José Rizal, "Por La Educación (Recibe Lustre La Patria)", <https://www.joserizal.com/por-la-educacion-recibe-lustre-la-patria/>.

which reads “education leads to great actions”.⁶⁷ Quibuyen has argued the public school “nationalization of Rizal” under US rule served to reinforce American values such as “devotion to God... family values... and obedience to the state” through an emphasis on Rizal’s travels, his role as an educator, and his agricultural work.⁶⁸ The Rizal Monument similarly highlights particular virtues whilst disregarding Rizal’s ideas around Philippine nationalism, his criticism of Spanish rule, and his execution.⁶⁹ Indeed, while the depiction of the banana plant and pot to the rear of the obelisk could be seen as a nationalistic motif, it also serves to domesticate Rizal’s image (Figure 2.16). Rather than being the “apostle” of “liberty” envisioned by the monument committee, Rizal’s portrayal embodies the Philippine Commission’s sedate description of the “patriot writer and poet”.

However, despite this constrained visualisation of Rizal, the plaques positioned at the apex of the plinth serve to present an additional perspective. The first, just below the figure of Rizal, reads:

To the memory of / Jose Rizal / Patriot and Martyr / Executed on
Bagumbayan Field December / Thirtieth 1896. This Monument is Dedicat / ed
by the People of the Philippine Islands.

The second, on the rear of the plinth, is in Spanish and reads:

Este Monumento este dedicado / Al Heroe y Martir / Jose Rizal / Que murió
fusilado por defender las li / bertades de su patria. El día 30 de Diciem / bre
de 1896, en este sitio, campo de bagum / bayan. Ha sido erigido por
suscripción pu / blica. Según La Ley No. 243.

⁶⁷ “De la instruccion hace la grandeza de las haciones”.

⁶⁸ Quibuyen, *A Nation Aborted*, 332-33.

⁶⁹ See for example José Rizal, *Noli me tángere* [Touch me not], trans. Harold Augenbraum (New York: Penguin Group, 2006).

(This Monument is dedicated / To the Hero and Martyr / Jose Rizal / Who was shot for defending the liberties of his homeland. On 30 December / 1896, on this site, Bagumbayan Field. It has been erected by public subscription. According to Act No. 243.)

Significantly, both plaques describe Rizal as a “martyr”, depicting him as the monument committee and the Knights of Rizal envisioned. Additionally, the reference to the manner of Rizal’s death and a subsequent plaque marking the location of Rizal’s “mortal remains” beneath the monument, underlines his martyrdom and challenges the serenity of the writer and poet depicted above. The religious appellation also reflects the Christian memorialisation of Rizal that occurred from his earliest commemorations. Furthermore, the presence of a plaque in Spanish is indicative of the continued prevalence of the language despite the Philippine Commission’s aims to establish English as the national language.⁷⁰ Nonetheless, the American colonial lexicon is ever present. While the first plaque’s dedication “By the People of the Philippine Islands” seems to remove US authorship of the monument, the “Philippine Islands” (or “P.I.”) was US nomenclature for the Philippines at the time. Indeed, the second plaque’s inclusion of former Governor General Taft and the 1913 Governor General William Cameron Forbes alongside the list of the all Filipino monument committee, ensures the monument’s dual provenance is preserved and illustrates the persistent colonial constraints on nation-building.

Brody and Morley have argued that the designs developed by American architects and civic planners for Manila at the start of the twentieth century function as American propaganda.⁷¹ Both writers assert that the plans sought to elevate the United States in the eyes of the Philippine people by privileging European models of architecture over local styles. They argue that government and other official buildings were constructed in Western styles and were made from concrete and

⁷⁰ *Official Calendar*, 67.

⁷¹ Brody, *Visualizing American Empire*; Morley, “Modern Urban Designing in the Philippines, 1898–1916”.

other “Western” materials, whereas residential buildings continued to be built in the local style and from local materials. Indeed, Morley goes further in arguing that the very layout of streets in Daniel Burnham’s plans for Manila created sight lines that exposed the new US government buildings, leading from open spaces and parks with “Philippine” statuary, which he claims fostered a sense that a collective Philippine identity and independence could only be achieved under US colonial rule.⁷² This approach fails to consider the statuary as part of a “polyphonic memoryscape”, and analysis of the Rizal Monument suggests there were other commemorative and nation-building narratives present.⁷³

While the iconography of the monument and the way in which Rizal is depicted foster the sense of a shared Philippine-United States heritage, the emphasis on Rizal’s *mestizo Ilustrado* roots, as well as the persistence of the Spanish language, challenge US hegemony by reconnecting the Philippines with its European colonial heritage. Additionally, the plaques’ emphasis on Rizal’s martyrdom, together with Rizal’s interment beneath the monument, contested the Philippine Commission’s muted portrayal of Rizal whilst ensuring his Christianised commemoration endured. Yet at the same time this Christian and *Ilustrado* depiction of nation also perpetuated Spanish and American colonial hierarchies, whilst producing an image of nation that suppressed its ethnoreligious diversity. To what extent these competing images of Rizal and nationhood persisted following the monument’s inauguration will be examined in the following section.

Commemorating Rizal 1913 to 1939

Following the Rizal Monument’s opening, Rizal Day continued to be observed annually in Luneta Park (Figure 2.17). Similarly to the earlier Rizal Day commemorations, these ceremonies functioned to highlight the achievements of

⁷² Morley, “Modern Urban Designing in the Philippines, 1898–1916”, 19.

⁷³ Emde, “National Memorial Sites and Personal Remembrance: Remembering the Dead of Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek at the ECCC in Cambodia”, 20.

government. In 1915, Rizal Day included a parade which featured various groups and government officials. These included Philippine Revolution veterans, described by the *Manila Daily Bulletin* as holding “the place of honor”; representatives from the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly; Chinese and Japanese community members; delegates from the Spanish Chamber of Commerce; and representatives from the University of the Philippines, the Philippine Normal School and the local press.⁷⁴ Inglis has noted the presence of “the national, the sacred and the military” at memorial ceremonies as part of the display of nationhood.⁷⁵ Yet, while the parade presented a strong image of nation, the presence of the Philippine Commission, as well as representatives from educational establishments founded by the United States, functioned to underline the achievements of US rule, portraying Philippine nationhood as a consequence of colonial rule.⁷⁶

As chapter 3 will illustrate, veteran memorialisation had been growing increasingly prominent around commemorations of the Philippine Revolution and potentially subversive figures such as the leader of the Katipunan, Andres Bonifacio. Thus, the inclusion of veterans of the Philippine Revolution in the Rizal Day parade and in particular their occupation of “the place of honor”, not only brought their remembrances under the purview of the Philippine Commission, but also re-aligned their commemorations to the more acceptable figure of Rizal. It also underscored the significance of veterans to nation-building and to models of citizenship. Yet the distinguishing of Philippine Revolution veterans also functioned to obscure the Philippine-American War and its place in the nation’s heritage. While post-inauguration Rizal Day commemorations allowed for some aspects of Philippine

⁷⁴ Although reclassified as “aliens” under US colonial rule, the Chinese and Japanese communities in the Philippines dated back to the Galleon Trade (1565 to 1815) and they became an integral part of Spanish colonial trade and industry. Chu, “The ‘Chinese’ and the ‘Mestizos’ of the Philippines: Towards a New Interpretation”; “Great Rizal Day Parade Tomorrow”, *Manila Daily Bulletin*, 29 December 1915, *Manila Daily Bulletin* Archive, ISEAS.

⁷⁵ Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 209.

⁷⁶ “A Brief History of the Philippine Normal University”, Philippine Normal University, accessed 17 July 2021, <https://www.pnu.edu.ph/history-and-milestone/>.

nation-building, they also functioned to erase those that undermined the legitimacy of US rule.

However, counter-memorialisation continued to take place. Despite the passage of the Philippine Autonomy Act in 1916, Philippine-United States relations deteriorated in the 1920s following both the appointment of Leonard Wood who sought to expand the Governor General role, and the election of Republican US President Warren G. Harding, who, together with his successor Calvin Coolidge, instituted significant delays to Philippine independence.⁷⁷ The fracturing of Philippine-American relations at home was also mirrored in the United States, with nativist protests over Philippine immigration, as well as the withdrawal of legislative support for Philippine migrant labour.⁷⁸ The end of the decade saw several anti-Filipino riots along the Pacific west coast.⁷⁹ One of these, the Watsonville riot on 23 January 1930, had resulted in the death of a Filipino, Fermin Tobera.⁸⁰ The reaction to the riot and Tobera's death in the Philippines was immediate. The second day of February was labelled a "National Humiliation Day" and was publically observed by 10,000 people who gathered at the Rizal Monument wearing "black mourning bands".⁸¹ Those present included Philippine Legislature member Tomás Confesor, the poet José Cecilio Corazón de Jesús, whose work advocated for Philippine independence, and Jorge Bocobo who had worked with Senate President Manuel Quezon, and also

⁷⁷ As noted in chapter 1, in 1926 former Secretary of State Carmi Thompson advised President Coolidge that the Philippines was not ready for independence in part because of Thompson's perception that the country lacked national cohesion due to class and religious division, as well as the absence of a national language.

⁷⁸ Guevarra Jr., *Becoming Mexipino*, 183; The Tydings-McDuffie Act also restricted Philippine immigration to 50 entrants annually, the lowest of any country. Okada, "Underside of Independence Politics Filipino Reactions to Anti-Filipino Riots in the United States"; Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*.

⁷⁹ Guevarra Jr., *Becoming Mexipino*, 33.

⁸⁰ "Filipino Shot Dead in Coast Race Riot: Mob of 600 Californians Wrecks Several Homes, Beating Occupants. Police Guards Sent Out", *Washington Post* (1923-1954), 24 January 1930, <http://ezproxy.nottingham.ac.uk/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.nottingham.idm.oclc.org/historical-newspapers/filipino-shot-dead-coast-race-riot/docview/150130930/se-2?accountid=8018>.

⁸¹ "Filipinos Observe 'Humiliation Day': 10,000 Gather in Manila to Protest Recent Riots in California. Many Listeners Weep", *Washington Post* (1923-1954).

participated in the 1920s Independence Missions to the United States.⁸² Also in attendance were the Association of Revolutionary Veterans who called on US President Herbert Hoover to protect Filipinos living in the United States, while endorsing the 1924 S.912 bill authored by William King, which would set in motion Philippine independence through the authorisation of a constitutional convention.⁸³ The Association of Revolutionary Veterans, led by former Philippine president Emilio Aguinaldo, would also go on to oppose the 1933 Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, in part due to its provision for the continuation of US military bases, but also its “proposed exclusion of Filipino laborers” which they would assert “wounded... our national feeling as Filipinos”.⁸⁴ Thus, while the Rizal Monument served to sanction colonial rule, it also functioned as a rallying point to display discontent with the US regime as well as present alternative views on what Philippine sovereignty should look like. Furthermore, the concept of “National Humiliation Day” could be traced back to 1915, when it was instituted in Nationalist China as a response to Japan’s “Twenty-One Demands”, which would have seen that country gain increased control over China.⁸⁵ Therefore, similarly to the earlier focus on “liberty” by the monument committee, Philippine commemoration continued to be positioned within Asian nation-building innovations as well as within Western traditions.

Following the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935, Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon expressed a wish for a new capital city for the nearly independent country.⁸⁶ Located near the port of Manila, Quezon City was established in 1939 through the merger of several smaller towns: Novaliches,

⁸² Okada, “Underside of Independence Politics Filipino Reactions to Anti-Filipino Riots in the United States”, 321.

⁸³ “Filipinos Observe ‘Humiliation Day’: 10,000 Gather in Manila to Protest Recent Riots in California. Many Listeners Weep”, *Washington Post* (1923-1954).

⁸⁴ 73 Cong. Rec. S5016 (daily ed. 21 March 1934) (Filipino Veterans’ Memorial Declaration).

⁸⁵ Zhitian Luo, “National Humiliation and National Assertion: The Chinese Response to the Twenty-One Demands”, *Modern Asian Studies* 27, no. 2 (May 1993): 297-319.

⁸⁶ Yves Boquet, “From Paris and Beijing to Washington and Brasilia: The Grand Design of Capital Cities and the Early Plans for Quezon City”, in “City Beautiful: Benedict Anderson: A Symposium”, ed. Filomeno V. Aguilar Jr., special issue, *Philippine Studies: Historical & Ethnographic Viewpoints* 64, no. 1, (March 2016): 53.

Balintawak and San Francisco del Monte.⁸⁷ However, despite the symbolism of a new capital eponymously associated with President Quezon, legislation stipulated that Quezon City needed to remain within 30 kilometres of the Rizal Monument, indicating its continued significance to the country's national and political identity.⁸⁸ Similarly to the sight lines established in Washington, DC between the White House, the Washington Monument and the Jefferson Memorial, Rizal was embedded within the foundations of government. Indeed, in his inaugural address as Commonwealth President, Quezon stated "as we enter the threshold of independent nationhood, let us pause for a moment to pay tribute to the memory of Rizal and Bonifacio and all the heroes of our sacred cause in grateful acknowledgment of their patriotic devotion and supreme sacrifice".⁸⁹ While it had been used to legitimise US rule, as the Philippines moved towards independence the Rizal Monument became a central pillar around which the new nation would be built (Figure 2.18). However, the tensions between colonisation and decolonisation that emerged through Rizal's commemoration would continue through to Philippine independence.

Rizal and Philippine independence

Japan's invasion of the Philippines in December 1941 temporarily ended US colonial rule, as well as the plans for the country to transition from a commonwealth nation to an independent republic. Quibuyen has maintained that under Japanese occupation (1942 to 1945) Rizal was not appropriated by the Japanese authorities as

⁸⁷ An Act to Create Quezon City of 1939, Act No. 502, Second National Assembly (1939),

<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1939/10/12/commonwealth-act-no-502/>.

⁸⁸ An Act to Amend Further Section One of Act Numbered Thirty-Five Hundred and Ninety-Seven of 1939, Act No. 457, Second National Assembly (1939), https://laws.chanrobles.com/commonwealthacts/2_commonwealthacts.php?id=83.

⁸⁹ Manuel L. Quezon. 1935. "Inaugural Address of His Excellency Manuel L. Quezon President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines [Delivered at the Legislative Building, Manila, on November 15, 1935]" (speech). In *Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines*,

<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1935/11/15/inaugural-address-of-president-quezon-november-15-1935/>.

he had been during US rule.⁹⁰ However, both Rizal and the Rizal Monument remained a significant part of Japan's Philippine nation-building, and were used in Japanese propaganda to portray the nation as a "Free Philippines", as well as on Japanese issued peso notes from the period (Figure 2.19).⁹¹ On 14 October 1943, the Japanese government declared the Philippines to be an independent republic, appointing former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, José Laurel, as president. On Rizal Day that same year Laurel gave a speech in front of the Rizal Monument in which he used Rizal to undermine US colonial rule while legitimising Japan's occupation. He stated that the United States did not respect Rizal's dream and that it fell to "another power... [to give] us the freedom which we were not able to obtain by asking". He concluded that "now that we have our own flag and the independence dreamed of by Rizal, it behoves us to make that independence real because that is the fruit of the greatness and patriotism of Rizal".⁹² He not only depicted Philippine sovereignty as a consequence of Japanese intervention but portrayed "independence" under Japan as the particular embodiment of Rizal's vision. Abinales and Amoroso have noted that while Laurel remained loyal to President Quezon, he embraced a form of Philippine nationalism that emphasised the country's Asian heritage.⁹³ Furthermore, CuUnjieng Aboitiz has argued that as Laurel perceived imperialism to be a distinctly Western concept, he saw the creation of the Second Philippine Republic under Japan as an opportunity to decolonise the country.⁹⁴ Laurel also sought to counter the religious commemoration around Rizal, and used his Rizal Day speech in 1944 to warn against turning Rizal into a "pious fetich", arguing that instead he should be revered as "the prototype of our highest endeavor in citizenship training".⁹⁵ This contradicted the actions of the Knights of

⁹⁰ Quibuyen, *A Nation Aborted*, 348-49.

⁹¹ *New China Pictorial* 5, no. 9 (September 1943).

⁹² Laurel, Rizal Day speech, 1943.

⁹³ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 160.

⁹⁴ CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*, 168.

⁹⁵ Jose P. Laurel. 1944. "Statement of His Excellency, Jose P. Laurel, President of the Republic of the Philippines, on the 83rd birthday anniversary of Dr. José Rizal, Manila, June 19, 1944" (speech). In Malacañan Palace Presidential Museum and Library, accessed 17 July 2021, <http://malacanang.gov.ph/5503-statement-of-president-laurel-on-the-83rd-birthday-anniversary-of-dr-jose-rizal-on-june-19-1944/>.

Rizal and the interpretation on the monument itself to enshrine Rizal's "martyrdom" and instead presented a sedate image of Rizal, more akin to the model citizen depicted by Taft and the Philippine Commission.

Following the surrender of Japan in 1945, the Philippine Commonwealth was reestablished under US rule, and plans were made to recognise Philippine independence on 4 July 1946. The independence ceremony took place in front of the Rizal Monument, perpetuating Rizal's role as the symbol of a free Philippine state. Indeed, for Independence Day the Independence Flag Pole was erected at the edge of Luneta Park directly in line with the Rizal Monument, reinforcing the connection between Rizal and the independent nation. However, in a continuation of the colonial-era Rizal Days, the ceremony served as a reminder that Philippine sovereignty was not achieved by Filipinos alone. One Philippine English-language newspaper described the ceremony, "at the foot of a shell scarred monument to the man" as the fulfillment of "a solemn covenant between liberty-loving Americans and Filipinos".⁹⁶ Thus like the rhetoric used by Laurel to depict Philippine independence under Japan, Philippine liberty was portrayed as a consequence of American and Philippine cooperation, as sanctioned by Rizal. Equally, the use of US Independence Day on which to inaugurate the Third Philippine Republic, similarly to the US memorial holidays early in the colonial period, served to embed the independent Philippines within American heritage and the US nation-building narrative (Figure 2.20). In his speech on 4 July 1946, the first US Ambassador to the Philippines, Paul McNutt, declared "America is not retreating from this part of the world. In the Philippines we are entrusting our world mission to the Philippine Republic".⁹⁷ In McNutt's view, the independent Philippines was an American legacy.

Following Philippine independence, Rizal Day commemorations continued to express the tensions around nation-building that had existed since the US colonial period. In

⁹⁶ "Fulfilment Of Covenant Takes Place This Day", *Manila Morning Sun*, 4 July 1946, 1, *Manila Morning Sun* Archive, AHC.

⁹⁷ Paul McNutt, "U.S. To Help P.I.", *Evening Herald*, 4 July 1946, 1, *Evening Herald* Archive, AHC.

1946 President Manuel Roxas described Rizal as “full of the liberal tradition of the western world”.⁹⁸ Yet in the same speech he also expressed displeasure at the Philippines’ continued subjugation, as whilst the country was receiving \$620 million in economic aid from the United States, Philippine development was hampered by the parity clause of the 1946 Bell Trade Act, which granted American citizens equal access to the country’s natural resources.⁹⁹ Additionally, Roxas was also negotiating with the United States over the Military Bases Agreement which would eventually see the US government sign a ninety-nine year lease to retain twenty-three military bases in the Philippines, an outcome that McCoy has argued reduced the country to a “militarized semi-colony”.¹⁰⁰ Roxas concluded in his speech that “economic injustice and oppression are hateful and destructive of the individual. Freedom from want and from economic slavery must be achieved.”¹⁰¹ On Rizal Day in 1947, Vice-President Elpidio Quirino emphasised the country’s debt to Rizal’s “lofty ideals and continued inspiration” and the significance of the country’s freedom: “the Sun and Stars waves proudly alone” (Figure 2.21). Yet he also stated that the “American Occupation of the Philippines was of the highest blessing... America would give us our independence and that more than independence, her laws and philosophy of democracy on which to build our own charter of freedom”.¹⁰² Whilst post-independence Rizal Day commemorations celebrated the nation’s sovereignty, they also continued to reflect colonial-era memorialisations, which had portrayed a nation beholden to the United States. Indeed, despite more than forty-five years having passed, Quirino’s rhetoric bears a remarkable resemblance to the language of the Rizal Monument Committee, who had professed a wish to “enter into the

⁹⁸ Manuel Roxas quoted in “Rizal a True Liberal”, *Philippines Free Press*, 4 January 1947, *Philippines Free Press Archive*, AHC.

⁹⁹ Landé, “The Philippines and the United States”, 522.

¹⁰⁰ McCoy, “Circles of Steel, Castles of Vanity: The Geopolitics of Military Bases on the South China Sea”, 990-92.

¹⁰¹ Manuel Roxas quoted in “Rizal a True Liberal”, *Philippines Free Press*, 4 January 1947.

¹⁰² Elpidio Quirino. 1947. “Rizal Day Speech of Vice-President Elpidio Quirino at the Luneta on December 30, 1947” (speech). In *Official Gazette* 44, no. 1 (January 1948): 208, *Official Gazette Archive*, AHC.

concert of cultured and civilised nations, and partake of their customs”.¹⁰³ Similarly to the monument committee, Quirino not only attributed independence to the United States, but stated that Philippine independence would be realised in the image of its former coloniser.

At the same time, following Philippine independence, the Knights of Rizal continued to play a significant role in Christianising Rizal’s commemoration. The Knights had been granted a legislative charter in 1951, which gave them official recognition as well as greater commemorative authority over the memorialisation of Rizal.¹⁰⁴ On Rizal Day in 1954 they retraced Rizal’s execution route from Fort Santiago to Luneta Park, commemorating each stage and significant moments, such as the time that Rizal had been killed, with either a mass or a prayer.¹⁰⁵ Despite the Philippine Commission’s and indeed President Laurel’s attempts to diffuse Rizal’s “martyrdom”, the practices of the Knights of Rizal continued to bring it to the fore. Their incorporation with government-led nation-building also served to, as Verdery notes, “reinsert expressly sacred values into political discourse”, sanctifying the authority represented.¹⁰⁶ However, the Knights’ Christianised commemoration also fostered a monoreligious image of the nation, which perpetuated the country’s religious divisions, exacerbated by the Philippine Commission’s dual approach to the Christian and non-Christian sections of the populace.¹⁰⁷

Following its inauguration the Rizal Monument became the focus of government-led Rizal day celebrations. While these sought to demonstrate the efficacy and achievements of the bicameral legislature, they ultimately reinforced the success of

¹⁰³ Rizal Monument Committee, “To The People Of The Philippines”.

¹⁰⁴ An Act To Convert The “Orden de Caballeros de Rizal” Into A Public Corporation To Be Known In English As “Knights of Rizal” And In Spanish As “Orden de Caballeros de Rizal”, And To Define Its Purposes And Powers of 1951, Republic Act No. 646, Second Congress of the Philippines (1951), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1951/06/14/republic-act-no-646/>.

¹⁰⁵ The National Rizal Day Committee for 1954, Rizal Day programme, 30 November 1954, (Manila: Bureau of Public Printing, 1954), 10.

¹⁰⁶ Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*, 37.

¹⁰⁷ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 208-9.

US rule. Yet at the same time the Rizal Monument remained a site for counter-memorialising and to express dissatisfaction with delayed independence as well as racial inequality. By the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and the formation of Quezon City, Rizal and the Rizal Day commemorations had become intrinsically connected to expressions of Philippine sovereignty. This continued throughout the Japanese occupation and the Philippine Independence Day ceremonies in 1946. Yet whilst Rizal was used for displays of nationhood, post-independence nation-building continued to express the tensions that existed in the colonial-era, and Philippine identity remained connected to the United States, despite efforts to decolonise. However, the continued involvement of the Knights of Rizal served to underscore Rizal's martyrdom, undermining the sedate image that had been proffered by the Philippine Commission and later President Laurel. Yet the Knights also perpetuated the Christian memorialisation that had existed around Rizal since his earliest remembrances, resulting in a Christianised depiction of the nation state and of Philippine citizenship, to which not everyone could connect. Indeed as the final section of the chapter will demonstrate, the space of Luneta Park has become highly polarised, and while some Filipinos feel excluded, for others Luneta Park remains an inviolable national space that patriotic citizens should strive to protect.

A national space

As we saw in chapter 1, the 1950s and 1960s saw a growth in anti-American Philippine nationalism.¹⁰⁸ From 1957 onwards, President Carlos P. Garcia pursued a "Filipino First" policy, which sought to counter the dominance of the United States over the Philippine economy, facilitated in part by the Bell Trade Act.¹⁰⁹ As part of these broader efforts towards decolonisation, President Diosdado Macapagal sought to disassociate the United States from the country's heritage by moving the date on

¹⁰⁸ See for example Rafael, "'Contracting Colonialism' and the Long 1970s", 480; Ileto, *Knowledge and Pacification*, 152.

¹⁰⁹ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 182.

which Philippine independence was marked from the 4 July to the 12 June, in order to commemorate Aguinaldo's declaration of independence in 1898.¹¹⁰

Around this time the centenary of Rizal's birth was approaching in 1961. The significance of this event to the government's nation-building agenda is evident in President Ramon Magsaysay's creation of the Rizal National Centennial Commission as early as 1954. The commission was given the task of developing a programme of events that would "propagate his [Rizal's] ideas and ideals of private as well as public life for the emulation of his countrymen and of all peoples".¹¹¹ They were also charged with constructing a "grand monument" in Manila, in addition to a "national shrine" which would comprise a library, museum and theatre to be situated on the outskirts of Luneta Park.¹¹² Similarly to Taft's proposal for a Rizal Conservatory, this proposition sought to expand Rizal's memorialisation beyond commemorative events, positioning Rizal as the foundation for Philippine cultural as well as national identity. Additionally, the concept for a "national shrine" could be connected to the US Presidential Library System, which was founded by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1938. Under this system the burial site of the late president is often connected to or in close proximity to the presidential library.

Designed by Filipino architects Juan Arellano, Federico Ilustre and Juan Nakpil, the "grand monument" comprised a steel obelisk that was "superimposed" onto the Rizal Monument, increasing its height from 12.7 to 30.5 metres (Figure 2.22).¹¹³ In response to widespread public criticism, Nakpil argued that the redesign was both classical, due to the tradition of monument alteration, citing Michelangelo's redesign of St Peter's dome as one example, as well as being part of a "modern architectural

¹¹⁰ Diosdado Macapagal. 1962. "HONOR AND DIGNITY IN FREEDOM" (speech).

¹¹¹ Exec. Order No. 52, *Official Gazette* 50, no. 8 (August 1954): 3409-11, *Official Gazette Archive*, AHC.

¹¹² Exec. Order No. 52, *Official Gazette* 50, no. 8 (August 1954): 3409-11; Jose A. Quirino, "Rizal is Everybody's Business", *Philippines Free Press*, 18 June 1960, 10, 70-71, *Philippines Free Press Archive*, LML.

¹¹³ Quirino, "Rizal is Everybody's Business".

trend".¹¹⁴ Yet the public remained opposed. The *Manila Times* used the analogy of "a healthy tooth overlaid with gold", and similarly, the *Philippine Free Press* described the addition as "hideous" and an "eyesore".¹¹⁵ Many also felt the alteration had impacted on the monument's meaning. Jose A. Quirino concluded that "the popular image of the monument was destroyed and rendered meaningless when the original was capped by metalwork".¹¹⁶ Furthermore, the language used to articulate the impact of the changes was deeply emotive. On the shaft's removal in 1963 on Easter Sunday, Secretary of Education Alejandro Roces, who had spoken out against the monument, commented that "the Rizal Monument has also resurrected".¹¹⁷ This rhetoric conveyed the depth of feeling towards the original Rizal Monument but also implied its perception as a sacrosanct space. Similarly to other postcolonial nations, the Philippine government was keen to decolonise commemorative tradition. Yet, although other states sought to remove or reinterpret colonial-era monuments, for many Filipinos the Rizal Monument's original visual identity was crucial to its significance, perhaps because in addition to commemorating a revered Filipino, through the actions of the Knights of Rizal and the presence of Rizal's remains, it has also served as a marker of Rizal's "martyrdom".¹¹⁸

The removal of the steel structure prompted a renovation of Luneta Park, with one prominent critic of the steel addition, a journalist called Valencia Teodoro, raising P30,000 for improvements.¹¹⁹ Eventually trees and flowers were planted, lights were installed in the park, and a cemented pathway laid, leading to the monument itself (Figure 2.23). This was followed by the installation of a twenty-four-hour Marine

¹¹⁴ Jose A. Quirino, "The Controversial Rizal Monument", *Philippines Free Press*, 13 January 1962, Rizal Monument Archive, UPDL.

¹¹⁵ *Manila Times* quoted in Jose A. Quirino, "The Controversial Rizal Monument"; Quirino, "The Controversial Rizal Monument".

¹¹⁶ Quirino, "The Controversial Rizal Monument".

¹¹⁷ Alejandro Roces quoted in "Back where it started", *Graphic*, 1 May 1963, 8, Rizal Monument Archive, UPDL.

¹¹⁸ See for example David A. Johnson, "New Delhi's All-India War Memorial (India Gate): Death, Monumentality and the Lasting Legacy of Empire in India", *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 46, no. 2 (February 2018): 345-66.

¹¹⁹ "The Centenary of the Rizal Monument", *Official Gazette*.

Honour Guard in 1964, which remains to this day (Figure 2.24).¹²⁰ While those opposed to the Rizal Monument alterations may have perceived the space as sacrosanct, the introduction of the military guard confirmed it as such, and also served to mark the monument as a nationally significant site.

This was particularly visible when in 2004 the Department of Tourism pursued plans to erect a statue to Lapulapu in Luneta Park, entitled the *Sentinel of Freedom*. Lapulapu was a Visayan ruler who led the defeat of the Portuguese-turned-Spanish explorer Ferdinand Magellan at the battle of Mactan in 1521 and is perceived by many to be the first Philippine hero.¹²¹ The proposals were blocked by what was then called the National Historical Institute (NHI), now known as the National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP), a government agency “responsible for the conservation and preservation of the country’s historical legacies”.¹²² The NHI opposed what they perceived as the new monument’s infringement upon the “national shrine”.¹²³ They argued that, as Luneta Park is “consecrated to the heroes – both known and unknown – who died there”, a monument to Lapulapu should be erected elsewhere.¹²⁴ Additionally, they were concerned the proposed monument would “dwarf the statue of our national hero... in the park named for him where he should be the central and commanding figure”.¹²⁵ The NHI’s rhetoric conveys their perception of Luneta Park as an exclusive space over which Rizal should dominate. Furthermore, despite construction of the *Sentinel of Freedom* going ahead (Figure

¹²⁰ “The Elite Marines: Honor Guards Feel Honored In Guarding Rizal Monument”, *Manila Chronicle*, 29 February 1964, Rizal Monument Archive, UPDL.

¹²¹ Luis H. Francia, *A History of the Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos* (New York: The Overlook Press, 2013), 54-55.

¹²² “About Us”, National Historical Commission of the Philippines, GOV.PH, accessed 24 October 2021, <https://nhcp.gov.ph/about-us/>.

¹²³ Ambeth R. Ocampo, Chairman, National Historical Institute to Hon. Oscar Palabyab, Undersecretary, Department of Tourism, 26 January 2004, Lapu-Lapu Papers, NHCP (hereafter cited as Ocampo to Palabyab, 26 January 2004).

¹²⁴ Ambeth R. Ocampo, Chairman, National Historical Institute to Hon. Richard J. Gordon, Secretary, Department of Tourism, 5 January 2004, Lapu-Lapu Papers, NHCP.

¹²⁵ Ambeth R. Ocampo, Chairman, National Historical Institute to President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, 14 January 2004, Lapu-Lapu Papers, NHCP (hereafter cited as Ocampo to Macapagal Arroyo, 14 January 2004).

2.25), the statue remains unrecognised by the now NHCP in their designation of national monuments.¹²⁶ Indeed, the only statue of Lapulapu marked as a “national shrine” is located within Cebu, which serves to preserve the exclusivity of Luneta Park and maintain a monumental hierarchy.

However, this demarcation and restriction of Luneta Park as a national space has led to many feeling excluded. There was significant opposition to the NHI particularly from Cebuanos (residents of the island of Cebu, which is located in the Visayas region), who perceive Lapulapu as a “Visayan and Cebuano hero”, arguing that he was “the only Filipino ever to win a battle against a foreign invader”.¹²⁷ Indeed, the proposed inscription for the monument, “Never shall invaders trample our sacred shores”, suggests a perception of Luneta Park as a broader anti-colonial monument, as well as a national space for the commemoration of “heroes of our nation”.¹²⁸ Additionally the NHI’s ruling is perceived by some to preserve a Christianised image of the nation and of Philippine citizenship, with Senator Richard Gordon stating that Lapulapu “best represents the Muslims while Rizal best represents the Tagalog-Christians in the nation’s history”.¹²⁹ The *Sentinel of Freedom*’s current delapidated condition and remote location within Luneta Park preserves this Christianised image of the nation, demonstrating the power of the government’s cultural entities, such as the NHCP, over Philippine national memory and the commemoration of Rizal.

The Rizal Monument’s continued national importance was underlined more recently following the 2012 construction of the Torre de Manila, a high-rise residential tower

¹²⁶ “National Monument”, *National Registry of Historic Sites & Structures in the Philippines* (blog), National Historical Commission of the Philippines, accessed 22 July 2021,

<http://nhcphistoricsites.blogspot.com/search/label/National%20Monument>.

¹²⁷ Bobit S. Avila, “Another defense for Lapu-Lapu vs the NHI”, *Philippine Star*, 19 January 2004, Lapu-Lapu Papers, NHCP.

¹²⁸ Cebu City Vice-Mayor Mike Rama quoted in Bobit S. Avila, “Another defense for Lapu-Lapu vs the NHI”.

¹²⁹ Christina Mendez, “Lapu-Lapu: Symbol of Pinoy pride”, *Philstar.com*, 17 January 2006, <https://www.philstar.com/other-sections/news-feature/2006/01/17/317037/lapu-lapu-symbol-pinoy-pride>.

block to the north-east of Luneta Park and highly visible behind the Rizal Monument itself (Figure 2.26). Building work was halted after the Knights of Rizal filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking for its demolition on the grounds that it violated the constitutional provision on the conservation and promotion of the country's historical and cultural heritage, having been declared a "National Cultural Treasure" by the National Museum. Additionally, they argued the project "brings about dismay to every Filipino who is honoring the memories of Rizal".¹³⁰ For the Knights of Rizal, not only did the Torre de Manila infringe upon the memorialisation of Rizal but impacted upon the monument itself as a cultural landmark. Indeed, in naming the Rizal Monument a "National Cultural Treasure", the National Museum stated that it had become a "preeminent national, political, historical and cultural symbol, evoking the virtues, patriotism, sacrifice, death and legacy of Rizal".¹³¹

Both the monument's landmark status and the petition emphasise the ongoing demarcation of Luneta Park as a national site, whilst the involvement of the Knights of Rizal illustrated their continued role in shaping the significance of the Rizal Monument space. Furthermore, although the Supreme Court ruled against the Knights in favour of the construction company, citing the absence of any law protecting the sight lines of heritage spaces, the influence of the Knights in engaging a Supreme Court ruling reveals an enduring hierarchy around Rizal's memorialisation. Indeed, membership of the Knights is by invitation only, with most "postulants" usually comprising "political, business, or community leaders or figures".¹³² Certainly the persistent dominance of the elite over Rizal's remembrance could be linked to his commemorative endurance as a member of the privileged *mestizo Ilustrado* class.

¹³⁰ "Knights of Rizal maintains Torre de Manila destroying Rizal Monument", *Radyo Natin*, updated 2 June 2019, <https://radyonatin.com/story.php?storyid=8523>.

¹³¹ Maricar B. Brizuela, "Rizal statue now nat'l treasure", *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 31 December 2013, <https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/554937/rizal-statue-now-natl-treasure>.

¹³² Interview with member of the Knights of Rizal, 25 January 2021.

However, Rizal's commemoration continues to be shaped by other groups, particularly the Rizalistas, who first emerged around the commemorative ceremonies that took place at Rizal's remains in Binondo in the early 1900s. Some Rizalista groups operate civic programmes that foster the teachings of Rizal, whereas others worship Rizal as a god-like figure. Rene Samuya, a member of one Rizalista group, described his perception of Rizal as akin to his view of Jesus. He commented, "If Jesus is Jesus Christ – redeemer of sinners, Dr. José Rizal is also the redeemer of the country's slavery and we call him Jose Kristo. So we have two Christs today, Jesus Christ and Jose Kristo".¹³³ Following the government-led commemorations on Rizal Day, Rizalistas visit the Rizal Monument to lay floral offerings, recite poems and sing songs, which include the line "Rizal, our God" (Figure 2.27).¹³⁴ These spiritual elements are combined with national symbolism, as the Philippine flag is flown, and many Rizalistas also wear the colours of the flag.¹³⁵ While these commemorations do not necessarily contest the government's nation-building narrative, their separate activities demonstrate a perceived distinction between national commemoration and religious worship, and function to preserve the Rizal Monument Committee's perception of Rizal as "redeemer".

Conclusion

Quibuyen has noted that Rizal's early commemoration was used simultaneously by the Philippine Commission and by many Filipinos to promote their own agendas: for the colonial administration it was used to foster a sense of nationalism around American values, while the latter sought to express their own "patriotism and to

¹³³ "Kung si Hesus ay Hesukristo, manunubos sa pagkakasala, si Dr. José Rizal naman, siya rin ay isang manunubos, sa pagka-alipin ng ating bansa, tinatawag naming siyang Jose Kristo. Kaya dalawa po ang Kristo ngayon, ang tinatawag na Hesukristo, at Jose Kristo". Zambrano, "Rizalistas pay tribute to their 'God' Jose Rizal".

¹³⁴ Zambrano, "Rizalistas pay tribute to their 'God' Jose Rizal".

¹³⁵ "Worshipping Jose Rizal As God", *Manila Bulletin*, 18 June 2012, <https://ph.news.yahoo.com/worshipping-jose-rizal-god-113159549.html>.

demonstrate against the colonial regime”.¹³⁶ Yet while this can be evidenced, there are also many more commemorative agendas than this inference allows. Indeed, perhaps it was his portrayal as reformer and revolutionary, as well as his *mestizo* heritage that enabled him to be appropriated by many commemorative groups. For Aguinaldo, Rizal’s commemoration was a means to unite the newly established Republic of the Philippines; for the members of the Philippine Revolutionary Army who erected the first monument to Rizal, it was a way to memorialise the Philippine nation; whereas for some of the Manila populace it was a means to honour Rizal and combine his remembrance with Christian tradition. Additionally, each commemorative agenda perpetuated a particular image of the Philippine nation. For Taft and the Philippine Commission, Rizal’s commemoration was part of the administration’s spectacle of “generosity” and “equality”, in which Philippine nationhood was portrayed as not only a consequence of US rule but derived from American tradition. However, Rizal’s Manila and Binondo-based remembrance also projected a Christian image of nation, shaped by the Philippine elite.

These tensions around the Philippine nation-building associated with Rizal persisted in the language of the Rizal Monument Committee, whose articulations of Philippine independence remained shrouded in a rhetoric that perpetuated a colonial hierarchy whilst portraying Philippine sovereignty as an emulation of that colonial order, as the Rizal Monument was to mark the country’s entrance into the “civilised concert of nations”. The monument competition too promoted a racial hierarchy both in its restriction of entries to artists based in Europe or the United States and its supervision by the Governor General and other non-artists appointed by the Philippine Commission. Additionally, the Philippine Commission muted the reverence that had infused Rizal’s localised commemoration, reducing his portrayal to “patriot writer and poet”. However, despite their colonial rhetoric, the monument committee underlined Rizal’s venerated status by stating that the Rizal Monument would memorialise “the doctrines preached by that redeemer of our rights, José Rizal”. Furthermore, by interring Rizal’s remains at the foot of the monument, the

¹³⁶ Quibuyen, *A Nation Aborted*, 297-98.

Knights of Rizal not only claimed ownership of Rizal's commemoration but also brought his "martyrdom" to the fore, whilst underlining the wider political shift towards independence that had taken place.

The Rizal Monument itself can be seen as a manifestation of the monument committee's language. Its architecture and the depiction of Rizal articulates Philippine nationhood within Western, and particularly American, sculptural and commemorative traditions. Furthermore, the portrayal of Rizal promotes the Philippine Commission's representation of him as the "patriot writer and poet", masking the brutality of his execution and the reasons for which he was killed. However, whereas Rizal is subdued on the monument itself, the interpretative plaques, although highlighting US rule, also serve to restore Rizal's martyrdom. Additionally, the emphasis on Rizal's *mestizo Ilustrado* heritage while elevating European civilisation, at the same time projects an image of citizenship and of Philippine cultural identity that exists outside of US colonial rule. Yet the monument also functions to suppress Philippine diversity, reflecting an image of nation based on the elite *Ilustrado* class.

The tensions over the differing images of the Philippine nation continued following the Rizal Monument's inauguration through to Philippine independence. While in the Rizal Days that followed, Rizal was used to present a strong image of nation as governed by the United States, as the country moved towards independence, the monument also became a focal point for those who wished to express opposition to US rule and articulate their own visions of independence. Indeed, the "National Humiliation Day" commemoration connected the Philippines to China's commemorative tradition, positioning Philippine memorialisation within Asian as well as Western tradition. Furthermore, the Rizal Monument became a symbol for Philippine nationhood not only for the Philippines, where legislation stipulated the new capital of Quezon City remain in close proximity to the monument, but for Japan and the United States, both of whom used the monument to symbolise Philippine independence as a consequence of their respective occupations. Following 1946, despite celebrations of Philippine independence, the image of

nation portrayed on Rizal Day remained connected to the United States, with President Quirino portraying Philippine sovereignty as rooted in US heritage, mirroring the rhetoric of the monument commission. However, as the government sought to decolonise commemorative tradition under the Macapagal administration, for many members of the public, alterations to the Rizal Monument were seen as an infringement on its meaning and integrity. Thus while the monument's conflicted image of nation could be seen as a legacy of colonial rule, the monument has also remained symbolic of Philippine nationhood. Indeed for the Knights of Rizal, the construction of the tower block was articulated as an attack on the country's national heritage.

However, the protest by the Knights reflects the longstanding legacy of Rizal's elite commemoration, which can be traced from his early Manila-based commemoration, through to the composition of the monument committee, and is evidenced in Rizal's portrayal as a *mestizo Ilustrado* on the monument itself. Indeed, the controversy over the monument to Lapulapu revealed Luneta Park's ongoing commemorative exclusivity, which has led to some groups feeling excluded from the image of nationhood it is perceived to represent. Thus while the enduring presence of the Knights of Rizal has ensured the preservation of Rizal's "martyrdom", ultimately repudiating the Philippine Commission's muted portrayal, it has also helped to foster an elite Christian image of nation, which masks the country's ethnoreligious diversity. Chapter 3 will examine the impact of the Rizal Monument's Western architectural style and its elevation of acculturated identities on the development and motivations for the Bonifacio Monument, the second national monument built during US colonial rule. However, although its creators wished to establish a new kind of monument, distinct from Rizal's, the power of the Rizal Monument's commemorative space has presented a persistent challenge.

CHAPTER 3

“Ashamed of the stock of monuments of Rizal”: The Creation of the Bonifacio Monument

Introduction

In 2019 President Rodrigo Duterte’s attendance at the national Bonifacio Day commemorations at the Bonifacio Monument in Caloocan City, Metro Manila (Figure 3.1), marked only his second appearance at the site, a fact noted by *Philippine Rappler*, which lamented Duterte’s lateness to the event and the subsequently rushed proceedings.¹ Indeed, while the Rizal Monument was and continues to be revered as a marker of patriotism and nationhood, Duterte’s prolonged absence is indicative of the Bonifacio Monument’s lesser significance to national commemoration, despite its memorialisation of the man who initiated the Philippine Revolution, Asia’s first uprising against colonial rule.² Inaugurated in 1933, two decades following the Rizal Monument, the Bonifacio Monument marked a shift from the Rizal not only in the political moment of its creation, when the Philippines was on the verge of becoming a commonwealth nation, but in the motivations of its designer Guillermo Tolentino, who wished to distinguish the new edifice from the “stock of monuments of Rizal”.³

Born on 30 November in 1863 in Tondo, Manila, Andres Bonifacio would go on to found and then lead the Katipunan, a secret organisation that sought to overthrow Spanish colonial rule through an armed revolution.⁴ However, the Katipunan’s

¹ Lian Buan, “For the first time, Duterte attends Bonifacio Day rites”, *Rappler*, 30 November 2019, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/duterte-attends-bonifacio-day-rites-2019>.

² An Act Making The Thirtieth of November of Each Year a Legal Holiday of 1921, Act No. 2946, Fifth Philippine Legislature (1921), *Official Gazette* XIX, no. 45 (April 1921): 970, NARA II.

³ Guillermo E. Tolentino, quoted in A. V. H. Hartendorp, “Guillermo E. Tolentino: Sculptor”, *Philippine Education Magazine*, August 1929, 21.

⁴ *Official Calendar*, 70.

discovery by the Spanish authorities forced the group into the open, initiating the Philippine Revolution. On 23 August 1896 Bonifacio and his fellow Katipuneros signaled their break with Spain by tearing their *cédulas personales* (tax identification cards), an event that came to be known as the “Cry of Pugad Lawin” or the “Cry of Balintawak”. Despite his position as leader, Bonifacio was gradually eclipsed by the greater military successes of Emilio Aguinaldo, later elected as the first president of the First Republic of the Philippines. However, after continuing to oppose Aguinaldo, Bonifacio and his brother Procopio were eventually arrested and found guilty of treason.⁵ On 10 May 1897, Bonifacio and Procopio were executed by Aguinaldo’s forces at Mount Buntis on the southern shores of Manila Bay.⁶ Following his death, Bonifacio’s memorialisation was led by veterans of the Philippine Revolution who petitioned the Philippine Legislature to erect the Bonifacio Monument. This chapter examines the motivations of the veterans and the artist Tolentino, and considers the extent to which the Bonifacio Monument departs from the earlier monument to Rizal, both aesthetically and in the narratives perpetuated by each.

Although there has been some scholarship on the construction of Bonifacio as a national hero, little has been written on the ways in which Bonifacio has been memorialised in the monuments and particularly the national monument to his name.⁷ Additionally, while several studies have examined the proliferation of monuments to Rizal under US colonial rule, there has been little discussion of the similar number of monuments erected to Bonifacio during this time and the meanings they sought to project.⁸ Indeed, the proposal for the Bonifacio Monument was made only shortly after the Rizal Monument opened, suggesting the country’s impetus for commemoration was not necessarily united behind Rizal. However,

⁵ CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*, 80-81.

⁶ *Official Calendar*, 101.

⁷ See for example Glenn Anthony May, *Inventing a Hero: The Posthumous Re-Creation of Andres Bonifacio* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996).

⁸ See for example Morley, “Modern Urban Designing in the Philippines, 1898–1916”; Roberto G. Paulino, “Monumentalizing Rizal: Representations of José Rizal in Luneta as a Case Study of Public Art in the Philippines”, *Philippine Humanities Review* 9, (2007): 271-296; Iletto, “Philippine Wars and the Politics of Memory”; Delmendo, *The Star-Entangled Banner*.

while the Philippine Legislature supported the development of the monument and instituted Bonifacio Day in 1921, making Bonifacio the only person other than Rizal to have a commemorative day legislated whilst the Philippines was under US rule, Bonifacio remained a subversive symbol, often used as a figurehead by groups opposed to the Philippine and US governments. Despite the construction of the Bonifacio and Rizal Monuments only twenty years apart, the Bonifacio Monument today stands in a very different position to the Rizal Monument, the latter being on the itineraries of most foreign heads of state and over which is mounted a twenty-four-hour armed guard.

The aim of this chapter is therefore to examine the development of the Bonifacio Monument and Bonifacio's remembrance, from the early veteran commemoration, through to the government-led memorialisation at the monument's inauguration and in the years following Philippine independence. It will also analyse the broader memory network around Bonifacio in which he was positioned as a figure of resistance and consider the extent to which this impacted on Bonifacio's centrality to national commemoration. It will do this by focusing firstly on Bonifacio's early commemoration and the development of the monument, exploring the motivations of the veterans of the Philippine Revolution, Tolentino and the Philippine Legislature. It then examines the aesthetics of the monument, using Erll's concept of "travelling memory" to reveal the transnational fluidity of the monument's sculptural language.⁹ The chapter then assesses the gradual diminution of Bonifacio within a broader memorialisation of Philippine heroes and the extent to which his appropriation by subversive groups has contributed to this. Finally the chapter considers recent moves to restore Bonifacio to the national canon of heroes, which has been impacted upon by the continued commemorative dominance of Rizal.

The chapter illustrates how Bonifacio's memorialisation departed from that of Rizal's, both in his increased significance to veteran memorialisation, and in his use to position the Philippines within a transnational nexus of heritages, projecting an

⁹ Erll, "Travelling Memory", 11-13.

image of the nation that lay both within and outside of US rule. However, despite this distinction from the Rizal Monument, the Bonifacio Monument continued to underscore a hegemonic model of Philippine nationhood as Tagalog and Christian. Additionally, the subversive nature of Bonifacio's commemoration, correspondingly resulted in his subsumption within a broader memorialisation of Philippine heroes, both reducing the significance of the Bonifacio Monument itself and the necessity of Bonifacio's commemoration to Philippine nation-building. Understanding these alternative motivations for monuments and memorialisation under US colonial rule can lead to a greater comprehension of the differing images of nation, which evolved as the Philippines moved closer to independence.

Early commemoration

Many historians have argued that the Philippine Commission suppressed public memorialisation of Bonifacio, promoting instead the commemoration of Rizal due to his peaceful appeals for political reform.¹⁰ Indeed May has noted that unlike Rizal, Bonifacio was entirely absent from the US-instituted educational curriculum. May asserts that many Filipinos were also uncertain about commemorating Bonifacio, for while he had led the Revolution, he had also been killed by his former comrades.¹¹ However, while this may have been the case, Bonifacio was a key figure through which veterans memorialised the Philippine Revolution in the early period of US colonial rule. On 3 September 1911, a monument was inaugurated which depicted a single figure of a Katipunero holding a *bolo* in his right hand and a flag in the other (Figures 3.2-3.3).¹² Entitled *El Grito del Revolución* (The Cry of the Revolution), the sculpture was attributed to the Philippine artist Ramon Lazaro Martinez and erected

¹⁰ See for example Morley, *Cities and Nationhood*, 79-80; Delmendo, *The Star-Entangled Banner*, 87.

¹¹ May, *Inventing a Hero*, 27.

¹² Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office, "Monumento", *Official Gazette*, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/bonifacio-150/> (hereafter cited as "Monumento", *Official Gazette*); Kathleen de Villa, "A hero's monument", *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 25 November 2017, <https://business.inquirer.net/241446/a-heros-monument>.

at Balintawak on land donated by Juan Ibañez, a veteran of the Revolution.¹³ While the figure is said to be Bonifacio, the uncertainty around this, together with the monument's title, suggests that what is being commemorated is the Revolution itself.¹⁴ Indeed, in 1913 *Renacimiento Filipino* commented on the absence of a "date similar to May 30, intensely consecrated to the memory and adoration of our beloved heroes who died in the war for our lost freedom".¹⁵ Due to the deficiency of an official date to remember the Philippine war dead, broader commemoration of the Philippine Revolution was emerging around key figures and dates associated with the conflict. Thus although *El Grito del Revolución* may have represented Bonifacio, and indeed, veterans of the Revolution gathered to commemorate Bonifacio's birth date, they also met to memorialise the Cry of Balintawak on 26 August.¹⁶ While Bonifacio was important to veterans, he was only one aspect of Philippine revolutionary remembrance, which perhaps presaged his eventual diminution within the 1933 Bonifacio Monument.

However, whether *El Grito* commemorates Bonifacio or an ordinary Katipunero, the figure's challenging stance immediately distinguishes the iconography of Bonifacio and revolutionary remembrance from that of Rizal, the "patriot, writer and poet" as portrayed by the Philippine Commission. Indeed, it presents a stark contrast to the serene figure of Rizal carved on the Rizal Monument two years hence. Additionally, Bonifacio's character was also distinguished from Rizal. Whilst he was referred to with similar appellations such as "*hero del pueblo*" (hero of the people) and

¹³ National Historical Institute, Identification of Significant Historical Structure NCR ST 002, "El Grito del Revolucion", 27 May 1983, NHCP.

¹⁴ The figure has also been described as a "single-figure prototype of a *Katipunero*", Lisa Ito, "Visualizing the Revolutionary: Representations of Andres Bonifacio in Philippine art history", in *Salita ng Sandata: Bonifacio's Legacies to the People's Struggles*, eds. Bienvenido Lumbera, Judy Taguiwalo, Rolando B. Tolentino, Gerry Lanuza, Gonzalo Campoamer II (Quezon City: BON Books, 2013), 225.

¹⁵ "Fecha semejante a la del 30 de Mayo consagrada intensamente al recuerdo y a la adoracion de nuestros queridos heroes muertos en la guerra por nuestra perdida libertad". "El 'Memorial Day' De Los Veteranos Americanos", *Renacimiento Filipino* 3, no. 143 (21 June 1913), 1641, <https://ustdigitallibrary.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/renacifilip/id/2326>.

¹⁶ In 1962 the date was moved to 23 August following testimony from Katipuneros that the "Cry" took place on this date instead. *Official Calendar*, 123.

“martyr”, his particularly Asian as opposed to *mestizo* heritage was also emphasised.¹⁷ *El Renacimiento* describes Bonifacio as having “embrace[d] / The creeds of Soliman; And proved to be a son / Of the Malayan race!”.¹⁸ This foreshadows the depiction of Bonifacio on the 1933 monument, in which he is shown wearing a traditional Filipino shirt, separating him from Rizal, the *mestizo* of mixed Spanish and Philippine descent, to which Rizal’s European dress on the Rizal Monument also alludes. While Rizal was still clearly revered, *El Renacimiento* calls upon its readers to remember Bonifacio in addition to Rizal. Furthermore, Bonifacio’s depiction and his association with *El Grito del Revolución* suggests he was perceived quite differently from Rizal and represented a more subversive memorial figure, one whose heritage could circumvent 300 years of colonial rule.¹⁹

El Grito del Revolución can also be interpreted as a challenge to American colonial power. The figure’s holding of a flag functioned as a reminder of the 1907 prohibition on symbols of Philippine nationalism, while at the same time its title evidenced the continued prevalence of the Spanish language, undermining the Philippine Commission’s efforts to implement English as the national language.²⁰ The title also recalled “*El Grito de Dolores*”, the battle cry issued by the priest Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla on 16 September 1810, which marked the start of the Mexican War of Independence from Spain. Indeed, only a year before the inauguration of *El Grito del Revolución*, Mexico had commemorated the centenary of its independence, part of which included the inauguration of the Monumento a la Independencia in Mexico City (Figure 3.4). At the foot of the monument is the figure of Hidalgo, who is also holding a flag in his left hand, similarly to the figure in *El Grito*. Additionally the

¹⁷ Fernando M. Guerrero, “Andres Bonifacio: Fundador del Katipunan”, *Renacimiento Filipino*, 7 December 1910, 7-8.

¹⁸ Soliman or Sulayman, was the Rajah of Manila (then Maynila) when the Spanish arrived in the 1570s; Juan Orellana, “Andres Bonifacio”, *Renacimiento Filipino*, 7 December 1910, 14-15, <https://ustdigitallibrary.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/renacifilip/id/1913>.

¹⁹ “El Fundador Del Katipunan”, *Renacimiento Filipino*, 7 December 1910, 3, <https://ustdigitallibrary.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/renacifilip/id/1913>.

²⁰ *Official Calendar*, 67.

Monumento a la Independencia is topped by the winged figure of Victory, a motif repeated in the 1933 Bonifacio Monument.

This shared memorial discourse between two former Spanish colonies may be connected to the long history of cultural exchange between Mexicans and Filipinos that originated during the Galleon Trade (1565-1815). This period saw the movement of both goods and people between the two countries, which resulted in generations of biracial populations residing in both. However, their connection also goes beyond Spain. Gueverra has argued that the two countries experienced a similar colonial relationship with the United States. Following its acquisition of Mexican territory after the United States-Mexican War (1846-48), the United States imported cheap Mexican labour, as it would do with the Philippines following its occupation of the islands in 1898. Whilst immigration policies were used to exclude other Asian nations, Mexicans and Filipinos remained exempt and formed the majority of the labour force for the Californian agricultural economy, particularly after 1910. Many Filipinos had also been educated together with Mexicans in San Diego as part of the Pensionado Program, which intended to educate them for government and civil service posts in the Philippines. Gueverra asserts that although immigration was generally motivated by economic need, most Mexicans and Filipinos were keen to establish homes and relationships, which led to the formation of strong community ties. Additionally their shared experience of racial inequality, along with poor working conditions, brought Filipino and Mexican workers together.²¹ The year 1910 had also seen the start of the Mexican Revolution, which was in part an anti-American conflict. Sympathy had also existed between the Philippines and other nations in the Spanish-American War. Rizal himself planned to volunteer as a medic in Cuba when he was arrested by the Spanish authorities in 1896. There were also connections between what Poblete has termed “US colonial” Puerto Rican and Filipino labourers in Hawaii whom she argues occupied an

²¹ Rudy P. Guevarra Jr., *Becoming Mexipino: Multiethnic Identities and Communities in San Diego* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2012), 8-43.

ambiguous position in being answerable to US authority, yet denied citizen rights.²² Thus, a shared political and visual discourse emerged around the struggles for national independence shaped by the 1898 Spanish-American War.

Whilst it was clearly important to the US-run Philippine Commission and to many Filipinos to commemorate Rizal, as chapter 2 illustrated, the construction of *El Grito del Revolución* in addition to the other commemorations of Bonifacio and key revolutionary dates, illustrate that for revolutionary veterans, Rizal's remembrance alone was not sufficient to memorialise their experiences. Additionally, whereas the Rizal Monument sought to commemorate the country's entrance into the "pantheon of civilized nations" through a sculptural and memorial discourse that located the monument and Rizal within a Euro-United States heritage, *El Grito del Revolución* distanced the country from US rule by positioning the Philippines within the broader Hispanic revolutionary diaspora, presenting an image of nation founded in revolution and the overthrow of a European colonial power. Furthermore, the emphasis on Bonifacio's Malay heritage not only distinguished him from Rizal but also presented an alternative vision of Philippine citizenship, whilst underlining the country's connections with Asia, associations that CuUnjieng Aboitiz has argued had persisted throughout the US colonial period.²³ Bonifacio's early commemoration thus provides an alternative hegemonic model of nationhood from that of Rizal, depicting a country whose roots existed outside of US rule, shaped by transnational connections formed through a shared experience of revolution and resistance.

The development of the Bonifacio Monument

Similarly to *El Grito del Revolución*, veterans were also heavily involved in the development of the Bonifacio Monument. In 1916 an association called Hermanos

²² JoAnna Poblete, *Islanders in the Empire: Filipino and Puerto Rican Laborers in Hawaii* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014), <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nottingham/detail.action?docID=3414355>.

²³ CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*.

de Bonifacio (Brothers of Bonifacio), a group of Katipunan veterans led by General Guillermo Masangkay, made a proposal to the Philippine Legislature that a monument to Bonifacio be constructed.²⁴ In addition to being a former Katipunero, Masangkay became a key figure in the canonisation of Bonifacio, heading a committee to locate Bonifacio's remains in 1918, as well as becoming one of the key interviews for Teodoro Agoncillo's renowned 1956 publication, *The Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan*.²⁵ May has since cast doubt on the extent to which Masangkay knew Bonifacio and the inner workings of the Katipunan.²⁶ Yet regardless of this, his wish to memorialise Bonifacio is indicative of Bonifacio's continued significance to veterans. Additionally, the commemoration of Bonifacio and thus the Philippine Revolution served to legitimise the veterans' own service to country. This would have been particularly pertinent at this time as it was not until 1923 that the Asociación de los Veteranos de la Revolución was founded, which advocated for military pensions for revolutionary veterans, as well as government assistance in purchasing land.²⁷

Whilst veteran Katipuneros remained connected and invested in the project – indeed, Masangkay donated P10,000 to its development – the monument had also become a priority for the Philippine Legislature.²⁸ The government had already broadened the scope of national monuments beyond Rizal, bringing *El Grito del Revolución* under the purview of the Legislature in 1915, when money was allocated for its maintenance as part of a general “national monuments” fund.²⁹ Then in 1918, Act No. 2760 was passed directing the Secretary of the Interior to appoint a

²⁴ Arturo Ma. Misa, “The Story of the Bonifacio Monument”, *Philippines Free Press*, 29 November 1958, 26, LML; *Official Calendar*, 104.

²⁵ Ambeth E. Ocampo, “Bones of Contention: Relics, Memory, and Andres Bonifacio”, *Amerasia Journal* 24, no. 3 (1998): 53; May, *Inventing a Hero*, 118.

²⁶ May, *Inventing a Hero*, 125.

²⁷ Satoshi Ara, “Emilio Aguinaldo under American and Japanese Rule Submission for Independence?”, in “Aguinaldo after 1898: Osias Readers CBCP RH Texts al-Andalus”, ed. Michael D. Pante, special issue, *Philippine Studies: Historical & Ethnographic Viewpoints* 63, no. 2 (June 2015): 164.

²⁸ “Monumento”, *Official Gazette*.

²⁹ An Act Making an Appropriation for Public Works and Permanent Improvements of 1915, Act No. 2494, Third Philippine Legislature (1915).

committee in order to “expedite as much as possible the realization of the plan to erect a monument to the memory of Andres Bonifacio”.³⁰ This was followed in 1921 by the legislation of Bonifacio’s birth anniversary as a legal holiday, making Bonifacio only the second person, following Rizal, to have a national day for commemoration.³¹ The increased government involvement and appropriation of Bonifacio’s memorialisation, which had previously been primarily veteran-led, reflected the aims of the Partido Nacionalista, who were the majority party in the Philippine Assembly following its establishment in 1907. Abinales and Amoroso have argued that as the “radicalism” of the Revolution and the Philippine-American War still resonated with rural communities and the lower classes, it was important for the Nacionalista Party to emphasise its goal of independence and in so doing they established themselves as “heir to the 1896 revolution and the Malolos Republic”.³²

The increased nationalisation of Bonifacio was also connected to the reduced role of the Philippine Commission from 1912 onwards as a consequence of the “Filipinization” of government under Governor General Francis Harrison, as well as the passage of the Philippine Autonomy Act in 1916. Indeed, Kramer has observed that by 1920 the Philippines appeared to be on the cusp of independence.³³ However, as noted in chapter 1, following Republican success in the 1920 US presidential elections, and in 1921 Governor Harrison’s succession by Leonard Wood, the tide turned against Philippine sovereignty, and the relationship between the United States and the Philippines deteriorated throughout the 1920s.³⁴ This was also exacerbated by the denial of repeated requests for independence by the Philippine Legislature, in addition to the publication of several reports by the Harding

³⁰ An Act to Confirm and Ratify All Steps Taken for the Erection, Maintenance, and Improvement of National Monuments and Particularly for the Erection of a Monument to the Memory of Andres Bonifacio, To Authorize the Creation of a Committee or Committees for Taking Up Popular Subscriptions, and to Appropriate Funds Therefor of 1918, Act No.2760, Fourth Philippine Legislature (1918).

³¹ An Act Making The Thirtieth of November of Each Year a Legal Holiday of 1921, Act No. 2946, Fifth Philippine Legislature (1921).

³² Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 126-27.

³³ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 382-88.

³⁴ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 388-92; Onorato, “The Jones Act and the Establishment of a Filipino Government, 1916—1921”, 451.

and Coolidge administrations, all of which concluded the country was unprepared for self-government.³⁵

This fracturing of American-Philippine relations at home, as well as in the United States, with a rise in nativist protests and legislation that sought to discriminate against Filipinos, paralleled lengthy delays in the construction of the Bonifacio Monument.³⁶ Indeed, following the rush of national legislation in 1918 and 1921, no further statutes were issued for another eight years. However, monuments to Bonifacio continued to be erected, with several dedicated in 1925, including a monument constructed on Bonifacio's execution site at Mount Buntis (Figure 3.5).³⁷ This monument was erected by the *Legionarios del Trabajo*, a freemason organisation, which was founded in 1921 "with labor and mutual aid purposes".³⁸ Paralleling the rupture between the United States and the Philippines, the working classes became increasingly frustrated with the Philippine Legislature, as the rural population in particular sought equal land ownership, as well as immediate Philippine independence.³⁹ Thus, despite the Philippine Legislature's co-option of Bonifacio, the erection of the monument at Mount Buntis suggests that he continued to be perceived as an anti-establishment figure and his memorialisation

³⁵ As noted in chapter 1, in 1926 former Secretary of State Carmi Thompson advised President Coolidge that the Philippines was not ready for independence in part because of Thompson's perception that the country lacked national cohesion due to class and religious division, as well as the absence of a national language.

³⁶ The end of the 1920s saw several anti-Filipino riots along the Pacific west coast in addition to the withdrawal of legislative support for Philippine and Mexican labour. Guevarra Jr., *Becoming Mexipino*, 33.

³⁷ A memorial to Bonifacio was erected in Sampaloc, Manila in 1925 and a memorial school building constructed that same year in Caloocan, Manila. An ordinance exempting the entity known as "Bonifacio Rizal Day" in the district of Sampaloc, from the obligation of securing the necessary permit and from the payment of the necessary license fees for the erection of a monument in honor of Andres Bonifacio, Father of the "Katipunan", on Plaza Guipit, Sampaloc of 1925, Ordinance No. 1286, Municipal Board of the City of Manila (1925).

³⁸ Serafin 'Jun' Colmenares, "Filipino Masons in Hawaii", *Cable-Tow* 65, no. 3 (October 2006): 13, <http://www.hawaiianlodgefreemasons.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/CT-Vol65-No3-2006.pdf> (site discontinued).

³⁹ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 148.

did not always align with the government's agenda. Yet with Philippine independence again on the horizon by 1929, as the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which would set a date for independence, was only four years away, the need for another nationalist symbol was paramount and Act 3602 was passed, providing the rest of the funds required for the national monument.⁴⁰

The legislation included funds for a design competition, which received thirteen entries when the contest closed on 15 July 1930.⁴¹ While this was significantly fewer than the forty entered for the Rizal Monument and could suggest there was less interest in the Bonifacio Monument compared to the Rizal, the latter competition, unlike the former, was only open to Philippine entrants. This restriction immediately signaled the Bonifacio Monument's departure from the Rizal Monument, not only as to who was perceived as qualified for its design but the intent of the committee to create a distinctly Philippine monument. Additionally, whereas the committee for the Rizal Monument included business leaders and politicians whose focus had been the monument's message, the Bonifacio Monument competition committee entirely comprised artists and architects, indicating a shift in focus towards artistic merit. Andres Luna de San Pedro, architect and son of the renowned nineteenth century Philippine artist Juan Luna was the committee's chair; and its other members were Tomas Mapúa, architect and founder of the Mapua Institute of Technology, an engineering and technological university in Manila; and the sculptor Vicente Francisco.⁴² Yet while the committee were all Philippine architects and artists, each had some training or experience in Europe or the United States, suggesting an ongoing respect for Western art forms. Tomas Mapúa graduated from Cornell University before working in the Philippine Bureau of Public Works. Andres Luna de San Pedro's father Juan Luna had travelled and exhibited work in Europe from the

⁴⁰ An Act Appropriating the Sum of Ninety Seven Thousand Pesos to Complete the Amount Existing in the Insular Treasury for the erection of a Monument to the Memory of Andres Bonifacio, and for other Purposes of 1929, P.L. 3602, 8th Philippine Legislature (1929).

⁴¹ "Monumento", *Official Gazette*.

⁴² Comité de Programa e Inauguración del Monumento, *Programa De La Inauguración Del Monumento A Andrés Bonifacio* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1933), 9, NHCP (hereafter cited as *Programa De La Inauguración*).

1870s to 1890s, during which time Luna de San Pedro had been born. Vicente Francisco had studied in Madrid and later worked at the University of the Philippines School of Fine Arts where he had taught the competition winner, Guillermo Tolentino.⁴³

The competition's first prize of P3,000 was awarded to the entry *Batang Elias* (Figure 3.6) by Guillermo Tolentino. Second prize (P2,000) was given to *Pugad Lawin*, a collaboration between the architect Juan Nakpil and sculptor Ambrosio Garcia. The judges justified their award of first prize to Tolentino on the basis that "his work as a whole possessed all the necessary requirements, artistic and sculptural, taking into consideration the greatness of the man in whose honor, the monument is to be dedicated". *Pugad Lawin* was commended for being "the most original under the tenets of modern art".⁴⁴ Whilst the committee took into "consideration" to what extent the monument reflected the "greatness" of Bonifacio, it is clear that its significance lay in its "artistic and sculptural" merits, not to mention that Tolentino had been Francisco's student. Additionally, the committee's praise of *Pugad Lawin* was entirely in terms of its artistic qualities and the reference to modern art as a measure of creativity further signalled a new direction for Philippine monuments, which also connected with Tolentino's own motivations. In 1927 Tolentino had noted that despite the lack of "appreciation for real sculpture in the Philippines... people are beginning to have an opportunity to see good work... some of them are becoming ashamed of the stock of monuments of Rizal".⁴⁵ Like the committee, Tolentino intended the Bonifacio monument to be an example of "real sculpture" and a departure from the earlier Rizal monuments. Yet, Tolentino's new direction for Philippine sculpture and monuments was not necessarily contemporary. By 1930 Tolentino was already a well-established artist and had been schooled in classical art, having studied at the Accademia di Belle Arti di Roma.⁴⁶ He had also expressed

⁴³ Luciano P. R. Santiago, "Philippine Academic Art: The Second Phase (1845—98)", *Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society* 17, no. 1 (March 1989): 86.

⁴⁴ Andrés Luna de San Pedro, Vicente Francisco, and Tomás Mapua, Memorandum, "Data on Bonifacio Monument", 30 August 1930, 28, NHCP.

⁴⁵ Tolentino, quoted in Hartendorp, "Guillermo E. Tolentino: Sculptor", 21.

⁴⁶ Rodolfo Paras-Perez, *Guillermo Tolentino* (Makati: Vera-Reyes, 1972), 7.

his own aversion to contemporary art, commenting, “Can you imagine how scared the modern distortionist would be if their creations suddenly came to life?”⁴⁷ Thus, while Tolentino wanted to create “real sculpture”, he did not necessarily wish to innovate.

However, although Tolentino disparaged the “stock of monuments to Rizal”, he clearly had a reverence for Rizal the person. As noted in chapter 2, in 1911 he had produced a drawing entitled *Grupo de Filipinos Ilustres*, a composite illustrating the figures of Philippine artists, writers and revolutionary figures, and which included Rizal and Bonifacio (Figure 2.14). The title for his monument competition entry, *Batang Elias*, also referenced Rizal by recalling one of the central characters in his novel *Noli Me Tángere*, published in 1887. Whereas *Pugad Lawin* alluded to the location at which Bonifacio initiated the Revolution, Tolentino’s title connected Bonifacio with Rizal, pointing to the existence of a heroic lineage or indeed a pantheon of *Filipinos Ilustres*. The character of Elias also reflected that of Bonifacio. In the novel, Elias sacrifices his own life to save the main protagonist, Crisostomo Ibarra.⁴⁸ Additionally, and similarly to Bonifacio, Elias is presented as the native Filipino, whereas Ibarra is the *mestizo*. Although *Noli Me Tángere* had been banned under Spanish colonial rule, by 1930 it had been republished in English, Spanish, Tagalog and several other Philippine dialects and thus would have been well known to the competition judges.⁴⁹ The word *batang* is Tagalog and translates as “young” implying a youthful innocence to Bonifacio, which reflected Tolentino’s wish to illustrate Bonifacio’s emerging leadership, or as Tolentino described it: “the coming of a leader to lead in the fight of an oppressed common mass”.⁵⁰ Indeed, *batang* almost reduces the revolutionary fervor that could be attached to the figure of Bonifacio, rendering him more palatable to the colonial authorities. The use of

⁴⁷ Guillermo E. Tolentino, quoted in Rodolfo Paras-Perez, *Tolentino* (Malolos: National Art Foundation of Malolos, 1976), 113.

⁴⁸ José Rizal, *Noli Me Tángere* [Touch Me Not], trans. Harold Augenbraum (New York: Penguin Group, 2006).

⁴⁹ Anna Melinda Testa-De Ocampo, “The Afterlives of the *Noli Me Tángere*”, in “Rizal@150: 1861–2011”, ed. Caroline S. Hau, special issue, *Philippine Studies: Historical & Ethnographic Viewpoints* 59, no. 4 (December 2011): 497.

⁵⁰ Guillermo E. Tolentino, quoted in Paras-Perez, *Tolentino*, 137.

Tagalog also functions in a similar manner to the Spanish of the earlier *El Grito del Revolución* monument, and rejects the Philippine Commission's imposition of English as the national language.

The presence of Tagalog was also another indicator of the Bonifacio Monument's departure from the Rizal Monument, whose title was in Latin. As chapter 2 illustrated, for the Rizal Monument Committee, of paramount importance was the monument's ability to project the new "civilized" status of the Philippines. Thus the monument's Latin title served to locate the Philippines within a heritage of Western classical tradition. Contrastingly, the use of Tagalog for the Bonifacio Monument implied a departure from tradition, distancing the monument from the country's colonial past and present. The elevation of Tagalog also refuted the Coolidge and Harding administrations' perception of Philippine disunity due to its ethnolinguistic diversity and speaks to a nation on the cusp of independence. Yet in so doing it also masked the country's diversity and perpetuated a Luzon-Manila centric vision of the nation, as Manila and its surrounding provinces are the location in which Tagalog is spoken as the native dialect. Indeed, while Tolentino dismissed the "stock of Rizal Monuments", he still wished to create something that drew on the heritage of classical sculpture and reflected his own artistic training. While the monument had been initiated by the veterans' impetus to commemorate and legitimise the Revolution, and was propelled by the government's nation-building agenda as the Philippines moved towards eventual independence, its eventual manifestation was shaped by a wish to create "real sculpture", a significant work of art that was markedly different from the monuments that had come before.

The Bonifacio Monument

Situated at the intersection of four roads: Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA), MacArthur Highway, Samson Road, and Avenida Rizal, in south Caloocan, Metro Manila, the Bonifacio Monument marks the location of the Cry of Balintawak and the start of the Philippine Revolution (Figures 3.7-3.8). The monument, an almost 14-

metre-high granite obelisk, rises from an octagonal stone base on which is carved an eight-rayed sun (Figure 3.9). The sun was pictured on the official flag of the Katipunan and now forms part of the Philippine flag. The eight rays represent the first eight provinces that took part in the Revolution. The octagon is located within a larger octagonal stone base, on each side of which is written the names of those eight provinces. There are pools of water on two opposite flanks of the octagon, with foliage planted around the remaining sides. At the top of the obelisk sits a bronze winged figure of Victory. The obelisk broadens at the bottom to form an undulating square base. Positioned above the base, around the full circumference of the obelisk, is a group of twenty-three figures cast in bronze. Bonifacio stands in the centre dressed in a *barong tagalog*, an embroidered long-sleeved shirt, with a *bolo* in his right hand and a revolver in his left. Although Tolentino designed the monument and sculpted the figures, its final execution was a collaboration with the Italian artist Francesco Riccardo Monti, who cast the sculptures in bronze, and the obelisk itself was completed by the Philippine architect, and chair of the monument competition, Andres Luna de San Pedro.⁵¹

Despite Tolentino's dismissal of the "stock of monuments to Rizal", upon viewing the Bonifacio Monument the immediate comparison to which one is drawn is the 1913 Rizal Monument. The similarity of the central granite obelisk at the bottom of which stands the figure to whom the monument is dedicated is inescapable. Similarly to the Rizal Monument, the obelisk form connects the Bonifacio Monument to a broader sculptural and memorial heritage. Indeed, as noted in chapter 2, the obelisk

⁵¹ Monti had been a renowned sculptor in Italy, initially creating funerary sculptures before being commissioned to create monuments commemorating the dead of the First World War. In 1929 he travelled to New York where he met the Filipino architect Juan Arellano, with whom he later collaborated on several architectural projects in the Philippines. Herrera has stated that it is unclear as to why Monti was visiting the Philippines but that he arrived in Manila in 1930 and remained until his death in 1958. During this time he worked with Philippine artists and architects on a number of private and government-funded projects. Maria Victoria T. Herrera, *Francesco Riccardo: Monti in the Philippines* (Manila: National Commission for Culture and the Arts, 2005), 8, https://issuu.com/galleriaduemila/docs/book_scan_francescoriccardo_2005; *Programa De La Inauguración*, 9.

itself had come to dominate the memorial form during the nineteenth century and following the First World War the shape became synonymous with a “non-sectarian... symbol of death or glory”.⁵²

However, the obelisk form is where the similarities between the Rizal and Bonifacio Monuments end. A marked difference is the positioning of the winged figure of Victory atop the Bonifacio obelisk. An icon that dates back to the c. 200-190 BCE Winged Victory of Samothrace, a Hellenistic sculpture of a winged woman, Victory continued to be a feature on monuments and memorials from the Roman Empire through to the twentieth century. Indeed, the image of the winged figure had begun to appear on US memorials following the First World War, for example on the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial Cemetery’s commemorative arch in France, which was dedicated by the American Battle Monuments Commission in 1928. It was also appearing in other monuments in Asia during this period, such as the Allied War Memorial in Shanghai (1924), which was initiated by the British Chamber of Commerce (Figure 3.10).⁵³ Additionally, the central obelisk also recalls the Washington Monument, which Tolentino had seen during a visit to the United States more than ten years prior to the Bonifacio Monument’s inauguration.⁵⁴ Thus, the obelisk and the figure of Victory place the monument within a distinctly Western sculptural and commemorative tradition.

This usage of broader memorial tropes connects the Bonifacio Monument to Erll’s “travelling memory”, which posits that memory and memorialisation practices are not tied to a particular place in time.⁵⁵ Yet this “travelling memory” is not simply European and US in origin. Like *El Grito del Revolución*, the stance of Bonifacio and the winged figure of Victory on the Bonifacio Monument are reminiscent of Mexico City’s Monumento a la Independencia, suggesting a complex network of memory

⁵² Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 160.

⁵³ Robert Bickers, “Moving Stories: Memorialisation and its Legacies in Treaty Port China”, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 42, no. 5 (October 2014): 844.

⁵⁴ Paras-Perez, *Tolentino*, 34.

⁵⁵ Erll, “Travelling Memory”, 11-13.

between the Philippines and the broader Hispanic diaspora. The assembly of figures above the base also recalls the collective citizenry portrayed in 1920s and 1930s Mexican muralism, for example Diego Rivera's *Detroit Industry Murals*. The turn towards the Indigenous as opposed to *mestizo* Filipino, also reflects the early twentieth century *indigenismo* movement in Latin America, in which artists and writers turned to the native population as a means to articulate postcolonial society and culture. Yet as Coronado observes, these portrayals were the projections of "others" or outsiders, and similarly the Bonifacio Monument, despite its focus on ordinary Katipuneros was a product of a privileged European educated elite.⁵⁶ However, while Kramer has noted the emergence of a "transpacific Filipino consciousness" in the 1920s and 1930s, as Filipinos on both sides of the Pacific responded to the violence and protests against Philippine immigrants to the United States, the Bonifacio Monument evidences a postcolonial Hispanic consciousness in the shared sculptural language, which not only reflected a mutual experience of revolution and resistance but also expressed the ongoing Philippine-Mexican alliances taking place in the United States at the time.⁵⁷

Despite this transnationalism, the monument is also imbued with distinctly Philippine revolutionary symbolism. On closer inspection, the obelisk is comprised of five layers, which eventually taper outwards to form the undulant base on which it stands. Tolentino stated that the five parts were a reference to "the five aspects of the society [i.e., the Katipunan]". Indeed, its full title comprises five parts: Kataas-taasan Kagalanggalang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Honorable Society of the Children of the Nation). Additionally Tolentino noted that the octagonal base was representative of the first eight provinces that took part in the Revolution and the three steps of the base alluded to the Philippines' three centuries of Spanish colonial rule.⁵⁸ Tolentino also used similar references in other works, such as *Oblation*, which he created for the 1931 National Heroes Day

⁵⁶ Jorge Coronado, *The Andes Imagined: Indigenismo, Society, and Modernity* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009).

⁵⁷ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 429.

⁵⁸ *Official Calendar*, 248.

celebration (Figure 3.11). The figure, an anonymous male with his arms raised, was created 3.5 metres high as indicative of 350 years of Spanish rule. Erll has noted that while travelling memory is “localized”, the local must be seen as “complex constellations of interesting group allegiances, mnemonic practices, and knowledge systems”.⁵⁹ Thus, while Tolentino’s references to the Revolution and the country’s colonial past seek to infuse something endemic, at the same time the Bonifacio Monument reflects the country’s connections to Europe, the United States and the wider Hispanic diaspora.

The classical references are continued in the depiction of the figures at the base of the monument (Figure 3.12). At the forefront of the figures and facing Manila is Bonifacio himself. To his left is a Katipunero carrying the Katipunan flag, and to his right stands Emilio Jacinto, a prominent Katipunero known as the “brains of the Katipunan”.⁶⁰ Either side of them are two *bolo*-wielding Katipuneros, as well as a fallen comrade. On the right hand side, which faces Samson Road, are six figures: two Katipuneros are engaged in a blood compact, which was part of the initiation rites to join the Katipunan, whereby the new member would sign an oath with their own blood; beside them are a family, with the father holding the body of his wife, as his two children look on. On the opposite side, facing EDSA, is another family, with the father, a Katipunero, holding a baby while taking leave of his wife and daughter. Beside them is a tied-up figure. On the opposite side from Bonifacio are the three priests Mariano Gómez, José Apolonio Burgos, and Jacinto Zamora, collectively known as “Gomburza”. These priests advocated for the “Filipinization” of the clergy and were killed by the Spanish colonial government in 1872 for allegedly being complicit in the mutiny of soldiers at Fort San Felipe, Cavite. Their execution was one of the events that initiated the Propaganda Movement (1875-95), which sought to reform Philippine colonial conditions.⁶¹ Gómez and Zamora are shown as dead, while Burgos is depicted in a garrote.

⁵⁹ Erll, “Travelling Memory”, 14.

⁶⁰ Quibuyen, *A Nation Aborted*, 233.

⁶¹ CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*, 33.

Not only are the figures executed in a classical realist style but the very composition of the sculptures around the base is classical in origin, with the figures positioned as if on an ancient Greek temple pediment (see Figure 3.13). The sculptures are seated or prostrate at the rear of the monument, or what would be the corners of the pediment, and they become gradually erect towards the apex or front of the monument with the upright figures of Jacinto, Bonifacio and the flag-bearing Katipunero. Similarly to a pediment, the composition also communicates a narrative. The depiction begins with the execution of the Gomburza at the rear, moves through images of suffering under Spanish colonial rule, before rising in triumph at the apex with the founding and rebellion of the Katipunan. Whilst the execution and configuration again locate the monument within the heritage of classical sculpture, the figurative detail immediately localises the depiction. Tolentino's decision to clothe Bonifacio in a *barong tagalog*, an item of clothing that had originated during the Spanish colonial period and was still used formally, distances Bonifacio from the political leadership during the American colonial period, who were predominantly attired in "Americana" or a Western-style suit.⁶² Furthermore, it underlines Bonifacio's distinction from the *mestizo* Rizal depicted on the Rizal Monument and refutes the colonial ideal of the *mestizo/mestiza*, turning to the native Filipino as a representation of Philippine citizenship. Baluyut has also noted a similar development in the paintings of Fernando Amorsolo produced during the Japanese occupation, in particular *Defend Thy Honor*.⁶³ Additionally, Chua has observed Tolentino's departure from the characteristic portrayal of Bonifacio at the time, "as a man dressed in *camisa de chino* with a *bolo* at one hand and the Katipunan flag on the other, yelling like wild".⁶⁴ The composed depiction of Bonifacio reflects

⁶² Mina Roces, "Gender, Nation and the Politics of Dress in Twentieth-Century Philippines", in *The Politics of Dress in Asia and the Americas*, ed. Mina Roces and Louise Edwards (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2008), 25, https://www.academia.edu/220831/The_Politics_of_Dress_in_Asia_and_the_Americas.

⁶³ Baluyut, "Occupation, Resistance and Collaboration: Triangulating Japan, the Philippines and Singapore Through Fernando Amorsolo's *Defend Thy Honor*", 105.

⁶⁴ Michael Charleston Chua, "SHOUTING IN BRONZE: The Lasting Relevance of Andres Bonifacio and His Monument in Caloocan", *Artes de las Filipinas*, accessed 25 October 2021, <http://www.artesdelasfilipinas.com/archives/52/shouting-in-bronze->

Tolentino's intention of "symbolizing the coming of a leader to lead in the fight of an oppressed common mass".⁶⁵ Furthermore the activity of the figures and single configuration of the piece contrast markedly with the stationary and isolated compositions on the Rizal Monument, again underlining Tolentino's desire for an artistic evolution. Bonifacio's calm stance could also be seen as a challenge to the US characterisation of Philippine warfare as "savage" during the Philippine-American War, which Kramer has argued was used to justify America's own brutal attacks.⁶⁶ Whilst overtly the monument portrays the uprising against Spanish colonial rule, the depiction of Bonifacio, together with the details that differentiate it from the Rizal Monument, also signal a wish to disconnect the Philippines from US colonial rule and break with the established American-Philippine memorial aesthetic.

The representation of various Katipuneros also connects with the work of earlier Filipino nationalists who sought to circulate photographs of prominent figures, which Mojares has argued was a way to combat the "colonialist discourse" that had depicted Filipinos as "an absence".⁶⁷ The depiction of the suffering of ordinary Katipuneros and their families brings the broader sacrifices made to the forefront whilst also connecting with the wider "cult of the fallen soldier" that proliferated memorialisation following the First World War.⁶⁸ Indeed, at the time of the Bonifacio Monument's construction the United States was heavily involved in erecting memorials to its First World War dead in Europe.⁶⁹ Quibuyen too has noted that the US government was fostering a new sense of heroism following the First World War

the-lasting-relevance-of-andres-bonifacio-and-his-monument-in-calooocan.

⁶⁵ Tolentino, quoted in Paras-Perez, *Tolentino*, 137.

⁶⁶ Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 90.

⁶⁷ Mojares, "Guillermo Tolentino's 'Grupo de Filipinos Ilustres' and the Making of a National Pantheon", 176.

⁶⁸ Budreau, *Bodies of War*, 4.

⁶⁹ Inglis has observed a shift in nineteenth century commemoration from memorialising the victor to remembering those who lost their lives. Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 14; Bradley S. Keefer, *Conflicting Memories on the "River of Death": The Chickamauga Battlefield and the Spanish-American War, 1863–1934* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2013), 89,

<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nottingham/detail.action?docID=3120156>; Budreau, *Bodies of War*.

in the naming of a university building after the first Filipino to be killed while serving in the American Expeditionary Forces. He argues this promoted a “new ‘official’ nationalism” in which “dying for America now meant dying for the Philippines as well”.⁷⁰

The theoretical literature on the commemoration of war dead in other parts of the world is instructive. Inglis, for example, has noted the gendered nature of First World War memorialisations, in which nationhood was tied to a particular masculine ideal and the “citizen as soldier” was promoted as the archetypal patriot.⁷¹ Similarly, and in the same manner as the Rizal Monument, the Bonifacio Monument depicts men and women in traditional gender roles. Only the men are shown as Katipuneros; the women depicted on the monument are presented as wives and mothers, despite many having taken up arms in the Revolution.⁷² Furthermore, the image of Victory reflects Inglis’ observation of women portrayed as an abstracted ideal on war memorials. Additionally, Inglis has asserted that First World War remembrance reaffirmed attitudes of racial superiority, particularly in Australia where the achievements of the soldiers were connected with the first settlers.⁷³ Yet, contrastingly, the Bonifacio Monument, erected in a colonised space, emphasises the strength of the Filipino people. This reflects the ethos and continued involvement of the Katipunan in the development of the monument. CuUnjieng Aboitiz has argued that perceptions of race informed the Katipunan’s belief in the necessity of the Revolution, in order to overcome the oppression of the Philippine race by another.⁷⁴ However, despite this, the Bonifacio Monument continued to perpetuate the Rizal Monument’s suppression of Philippine ethnoreligious diversity. The monument’s connections to the Hispanic diaspora underscore Christianity as a foundation of Philippine nationhood, while the focus on the eight Luzon regions that

⁷⁰ Quibuyen, *A Nation Aborted*, 334.

⁷¹ Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 52, 219.

⁷² See for example Francia, *A History of the Philippines*, 126-27; Christine Doran, “Women in the Philippine Revolution”, *Philippine Studies* 46, no. 3 (Third Quarter 1998): 361-75.

⁷³ Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 170-219.

⁷⁴ CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*, 86.

participated in the Revolution, together with the monument's use of Tagalog, presents a Luzon/Tagalog-centred citizenry. Additionally, the "oppressed mass" is shown to be the anguished Katipuneros and the executed priests, with no mention of the suffering that occurred and was still taking place in other regions and against the non-Christian populace. While Tolentino was keen to move away from the "stock of monuments to Rizal", he continued to perpetuate the image of the Philippines as a "single political-ethnic collective", represented by the Rizal Monument and fostered by the Philippine Commission.⁷⁵

The Katipunan ethos is also continued in a marker on the base of the monument, which is entirely written in a Katipunan code (Figure 3.14).⁷⁶ The English translation of which reads:

Bonifacio's Proclamation of August 28, 1896

This manifesto is for all of you: It is absolutely necessary for us to stop at the earliest possible time the nameless oppressions being perpetrated on the sons of the country who are now suffering the brutal punishment and tortures in jails, and because of this please let all the brethren know that on Saturday, the 29th of the current month, the revolution shall commence according to our agreement. For this purpose it is necessary for all towns to rise simultaneously and attack Manila at the same time. Anybody who obstructs this sacred ideal of the people will be considered a traitor and an enemy, except if he is ill or is not physically fit, in which case he shall be tried according to the regulations we have put in force.

Mount of Liberty, 28th August 1896, Andres Bonifacio.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Morley, *Cities and Nationhood*, 79.

⁷⁶ The Katipunan communicated with each other and recorded the minutes of meetings using various ciphers. May, *Inventing a Hero*, 121-22.

⁷⁷ Teodoro A. Agoncillo and S. V. Epistola, "English Translation of Bonifacio's Proclamation", in Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office, "Monumento", *Official Gazette*, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/bonifacio-150/>.

The inclusion of Bonifacio's call to arms reinforces Tolentino's intention to convey the "coming of a leader" and reflects the portrayal of Bonifacio depicted on the monument. Yet the passionate language also belies the calm stance of the Supremo above, suggesting that despite the depiction of his composed leadership, Bonifacio remained the fiery revolutionary often represented in other art works. Through its restricted intelligibility, the code is also framed as a language of power. It not only refutes the US imposition of English as a national language but also undermines US authority by rendering the monument only partially accessible and knowable. Additionally, the code's function as a counterpoint to the serene Bonifacio depicted on the monument itself, is indicative of a sculptural versus textual element also seen in the Rizal Monument, where the plaques function as a reminder of Rizal's martyrdom, which is absent in the monument itself.

The presence of Katipunan iconography within the monument is indicative of the ongoing role the veterans had in shaping the monument, as Masangkay is reported to have signed off on the final design.⁷⁸ Indeed, many former Katipuneros remained in public and often political life during American rule and contributed to the historiography of the Revolution.⁷⁹ Following his capture by US forces in 1901, former Katipunero and president of the First Philippine Republic, Emilio Aguinaldo, remained prominent, supporting groups that called for immediate independence, as well as running for president of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935.⁸⁰ Additionally, future Commonwealth president, Manuel Quezon, was a veteran of the Revolution and had served as personal assistant to Aguinaldo. However, in order to remain in public life, all former Katipuneros and revolutionaries had to take an oath of allegiance to the United States. Prominent exceptions to this were Artemio Ricarte and Apolinario Mabini.

Following their capture by US forces, Mabini and Ricarte were exiled to Guam,

⁷⁸ Misa, "The Story of the Bonifacio Monument", 27.

⁷⁹ May, *Inventing a Hero*, 124.

⁸⁰ Ara, "Emilio Aguinaldo under American and Japanese Rule Submission for Independence?", 161-92.

returning to the Philippines in 1903, where Mabini died shortly thereafter. Following his continual refusal to swear an oath of allegiance, Ricarte spent much of the first decade of American rule in prison in the Philippines, before living in exile in Hong Kong and Japan.⁸¹ While working in exile to establish a revolutionary government, Ricarte continued to observe the national commemorations of Rizal and Bonifacio, suggesting both represented for him an expression of his ongoing allegiance to the Philippines.⁸² Thus both the coded text and Ricarte's own memorialisation of Bonifacio are indicative of Bonifacio's concurrent use as a counter-memorial figure. For those working both within and outside of US colonial rule, Bonifacio represented a challenge to authority and legitimised their own roles in making the Philippine state.

While Tolentino's use of established memorial tropes and references to classical sculpture reflected his own artistic training and can be seen to reflect his wish to produce "real sculpture", they, together with the allusions to Mexico's postcolonial development, sought to project a complexity to Philippine nationhood. While the country's heritage was undoubtedly connected to Europe and the United States, it also occupied a position within the broader Hispanic diaspora. Furthermore, Tolentino's evolution from the sculpture of the Rizal Monument refuted a colonial memorial aesthetic, which in addition to the presence of the Katipunan code undermined US authority and disconnected the Philippines from the United States. However, Tolentino's Luzon-centric narrative also served to perpetuate an image of the nation as a singular ethnoreligious-linguistic collective, fostered by the Philippine Commission and the Rizal Monument. Likewise the monument's opening ceremony, which will be discussed in the following section, also continued to reflect these tensions between US rule and the assertion of Philippine nationhood.

⁸¹ CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*, 160-61.

⁸² Ricardo T. Jose, "Exile as Protest: Artemio Ricarte", *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 8, no. 1-2 (March 1999): 140, 147.

The opening ceremony

The Bonifacio Monument was finally inaugurated on 30 November 1933 with a large ceremony that included speeches, a parade, music, poetry readings and performances (Figures 3.15-3.16). Occurring while negotiations for Philippine independence were still taking place, the ceremony sought to depict a strong image of nationhood.⁸³ Indeed, the parade's inclusion of representatives from various labour unions and manufacturing industries conveyed economic strength and progress. Furthermore, despite the Philippines not yet having any armed forces, the presence of revolutionary veterans in the parade and former Katipuneros who were given "*tendrán sitios reservados de honor*" (reserved places of honour), projected aspirations for military strength, and connected veteran service to Philippine citizenship.⁸⁴ The ceremony also included a performance in which eight women, representing an educational institution from each of the first eight provinces to fight in the revolution, together with eight generals and eight legislators, formed eight triangles on each side of the octagon. Each triangle comprised a woman at the first point, a legislator at the second and a general at the third. The display sought to present an ordered society founded on education, the military and government.⁸⁵

Inglis has noted the masculine nature of memorial opening ceremonies, with women present but silent, and the ceremony did in part perpetuate the gendered depiction of nation presented in the monument, with the speeches delivered by men and the dominant presence of male legislators and veterans.⁸⁶ However, the performance did also include women and projected a symbol of nationhood in which women were

⁸³ Although the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, which provided a date for Philippine independence, had been introduced earlier that year in January, it had not been ratified by the Philippine Senate, with Senate leader Manuel Quezon opposing the bill in part due to its provision for the continuation of US military bases. Thus it would still be another four months before the passage of the Philippine Independence Act in 1934, which would establish the Commonwealth of the Philippines for a ten-year transition period before full independence.

⁸⁴ The Armed Forces of the Philippines was established following the passage of the National Defense Act in 1935.

⁸⁵ *Programa De La Inauguración*, 2-3.

⁸⁶ Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 201.

presented as equal to the political and military establishment. It also challenged the depiction of women on the monument itself. They were not simply wives and mothers or the “abstraction” of womanhood depicted in Victory, but were individuals working towards educational accomplishment.

The contrast between the presence of women in the performance versus their absence in the speeches reveals a visual versus auditory element that can also be seen elsewhere. Indeed, while the performance and parade sought to project an image of Philippine nationhood and national strength, the message from Governor General Frank Murphy and the playing of the “Star Spangled Banner” as well as a selection of American songs on the accompanying radio programme, depicted a nation still tied to the United States.⁸⁷ However, there were also many aspects of the ceremony that sought to undermine American political rule. The display of the Philippine flag in addition to the playing of the “Marcha Nacional Filipina” (Philippine National March), not only referenced the Philippine Legislature’s successful overturning of the 1907 Act that had prohibited them, but directly alluded to the country’s brief period of independence under which the anthem and flag had been created.⁸⁸ Furthermore, although Tagalog and English were used in the ceremony, the dominance of Spanish throughout the programme for the ceremony is indicative

⁸⁷ *Programa De La Inauguración*, 3, 7.

⁸⁸ Display of the Philippine flag and the playing of the Marcha Nacional Filipina had been prohibited under Act 1696 in 1907, which barred the display of any imagery or “devices” that undermined United States sovereignty. An Act to prohibit the display of flags, banners, emblems, or devices used in the Philippine Islands for the purpose of rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States and the display of Katipunan flags, banners, emblems, or devices, and for other purposes of 1907, Act No. 1696, Philippine Commission (1907); Following the Act’s repeal by the Philippine Legislature in 1919, the Marcha Nacional Filipina had once again been adopted as an informal national anthem. An Act to repeal Act Numbered Sixteen hundred and ninety-six of 1919, Act No. 2871, Fifth Philippine Legislature (1919); However, it would not become an official national anthem until 1938, following the Philippines’ transition to a commonwealth nation in 1935. An Act to adopt the original authentic form of the Philippine National Anthem and to appropriate funds for its printing and free distribution of 1938, Act No. 382, First National Assembly (1938); The Marcha Nacional Filipina was commissioned by Aguinaldo and played during the proclamation of Philippine independence on 12 June 1898. *Official Calendar*, 26.

of its continuing prominence despite attempts by the United States to replace Spanish with English as the national language.⁸⁹ Additionally, while the particularly auditory aspects of the inauguration projected an image of nation still undoubtedly connected with the United States, they also depicted a country that had not completely broken with its Spanish colonial roots. Yet at the same time the visual display portrayed an independent country built on the foundations of revolution. Thus, the ceremony projected an image of nation that was at once trying to extricate itself from colonial rule, whilst also remaining firmly attached.

As noted earlier, there was a rise in popular protest in the 1920s and 1930s due to a growing dissatisfaction with the political leadership as a consequence of endemic rural poverty coupled with the continued control of the landed elites. This culminated in the establishment of the Partido Sakdalista on 29 October 1933, who demanded immediate independence, equal land ownership, and sought to protect the working classes with increased pay for civil servants, less pay for officials and legal representation for the poor.⁹⁰ Ileto has argued that the colonial government appropriated Bonifacio in order to subvert his use as “a rallying point for the peasant movement”.⁹¹ Indeed, in 1930, Manuel Roxas, future president but then Speaker of the House of Representatives, organised a “new Katipunan nationalistic organization” which aimed to “unify various elements behind the independence campaign and to prove the islands are economically capable of supporting a government”.⁹² The government’s appropriation of Bonifacio also reflected a

⁸⁹ Philippine Commission Act No. 74 stipulated that English should be the medium of instruction in all public schools. An Act Establishing A Department Of Public Instruction In The Philippine Islands And Appropriating Forty Thousand Dollars For The Organization And Maintenance Of A Normal And A Trade School In Manila of 1901, Act No. 74, Second Philippine Commission (1901), <https://lawyerly.ph/laws/view/l3cf5>.

⁹⁰ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 148.

⁹¹ Ileto, *Filipinos and their Revolution*, 184.

⁹² “20,000 Filipinos Join Katipunans: Flock to Nationalist Banner During Commemoration of Patriot. 30,000 stage parade”, *Washington Post* (1923-1954), 1 December 1930,

broader Philippine turn towards racially-defined nationalist categories of “Malayness” in the 1930s. This was, after all, the decade that witnessed the founding of the Malay Association, Young Philippines, which focused on fostering “the development of the Malay race”, and included in its membership future presidents such as Roxas and Macapagal.⁹³

Nonetheless, while Bonifacio’s commemoration was brought under the purview of government, perhaps due to his continued association with more radical groups and figures such as Ricarte, Bonifacio himself is almost muted within the parade and performance, with little mention or visual representation. However, he remained of significance to revolutionary veterans and they in turn continued to shape the way in which he was memorialised. Several former Katipuneros and revolutionary veterans are listed on the Monument Inauguration Committee, including Faustino Aguilar who headed the committee, and Masangkay who served on the committee responsible for organising the associated exhibition of Katipunan memorabilia. While the circumstances of Bonifacio’s death are mostly absent from his commemoration, indeed, the opening ceremony and Bonifacio’s annual memorialisations took place on his birth anniversary; the inauguration included a period of silence marked by a veteran playing a cornet.⁹⁴ Similarly to the First World War memorial tropes found within the monument itself, the inclusion of a bugle-like sound recalled the broader war memorialisation that was taking place at the time throughout the United States, Europe and the British Commonwealth, and transformed Bonifacio’s death into a similar meaningful sacrifice.⁹⁵ Furthermore, the inauguration programme, which would have been overseen by Aguilar, also brought Bonifacio to the forefront of remembrance (Figure 3.17). It included an account of Bonifacio’s life, a copy of his birth certificate, copies of letters, a manifesto written by Bonifacio, as well as several documents relating to the Katipunan. The inclusion of original documents served to

<http://nottingham.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/20-000-filipinos-join-katipunans/docview/150075318/se-2?accountid=8018>.

⁹³ CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*, 178.

⁹⁴ *Programa De La Inauguración*, 3-25.

⁹⁵ Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 214.

historicise the monument and connected it to a lived reality. Additionally the documents transformed the programme into a memorial itself. The final page of the order of service intones its readers to “preserve this program. It contains data and document worthwhile [sic] remembering”.⁹⁶ The inauguration committee wanted to render Bonifacio and the Katipunan tangible, something remembered and not left at the site of the monument.

Whereas the Rizal Day parades that followed the opening of the Rizal Monument served to showcase the achievements of the Philippine Commission, the Bonifacio Monument opening projected a nation ready for independence with its own political, educational, and military representation. Yet similarly to the monument itself, the ceremony’s auditory and visual elements, together with the combination of Spanish, English, and Tagalog, conveyed an image of the Philippines that remained connected to its colonial roots at the same time as it sought to decolonise. Finally, although the revolutionary veterans formed part of the government’s depiction of the nation and of the citizen as soldier, they also countered Bonifacio’s absence from the parade and performance, restoring him through the veteran commemorative trope of the Last Post, as well as the programme itself. The following section will examine the extent to which this twofold commemoration of Bonifacio continued following the Bonifacio Monument’s inauguration.

Commemoration through independence to the Fifth Philippine Republic

Similarly to the 1920s, the following decade saw the commemoration of Bonifacio extend beyond the national monument to other regions of the Philippines. Newspapers, as well as the records of the Bureau of Public Works, contain references to Bonifacio monuments in southern Luzon, as well as Cebu and Iloilo in the Visayas region.⁹⁷ Thus, while the Bonifacio Monument centred on Luzon and the

⁹⁶ *Programa De La Inauguración*, 11-28.

⁹⁷ See for example the *Bureau of Public Works Bulletin* 18, no. 1 (January 1930): 49, *Bureau of Public Works Bulletin* Archive, AHC.

provinces that had participated in the Revolution, it is clear from the erection of monuments in Visayas that Bonifacio's significance had extended well beyond this territory. Additionally, veterans continued to play a significant role in memorialisation. The monument to Bonifacio in Nahapay, Iloilo, erected prior to the Second World War, was positioned to mark the location at which the local populace "made their last stand" against American troops during the Philippine-American War and became the focus of an annual pilgrimage made by survivors of the conflict (Figure 3.18).⁹⁸ Whereas the Philippine-American War had been entirely absent from national commemorations, the Iloilo monument suggests that memorialisations of the conflict still occurred and that perhaps physical distance from central government enabled some freedom in contesting US colonial power. Furthermore, the use of Bonifacio to commemorate the location of this important battle, despite the fact that he was not involved in the fighting, demonstrates his continued perception as a figure of resistance and the multifaceted memory networks of which the Bonifacio Monument was a part.

While Bonifacio remained significant to veterans and as a counter-memorial figure, following the Bonifacio Monument's inauguration through to Philippine independence, government commemoration of Bonifacio increasingly subsumed him within a broader remembrance of Philippine heroes. From the 1930s to the 1950s, the national commemorations for Bonifacio Day and National Heroes Day, the latter of which had been established in 1931 and was stipulated to take place on the last Sunday of August each year, were often conflated.⁹⁹ Indeed, in 1936 President Quezon led the commemorations for National Heroes Day on Bonifacio Day. Moreover, the main event on this occasion did not take place at the Bonifacio Monument but at the University of the Philippines.¹⁰⁰ In 1948, the National Heroes

⁹⁸ "The Neglected Statue", *Philippines Free Press*, 24 June 1961, *Philippines Free Press Archive*, AHC.

⁹⁹ An Act to Declare the Last Sunday of August of Every Year As An Official Holiday to be Known as the National Heroes Day of 1931, Act No. 3827, Ninth Philippine Legislature (1931), "National Heroes Day", *Official Gazette*, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/featured/national-heroes-day/>.

¹⁰⁰ Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office,

Day events again took place on Bonifacio Day and although they were held at the foot of the Bonifacio Monument, the focus extended far beyond Bonifacio. The title for the day's proceedings was *Mga Kapatirang Alagad ni Bonifacio* (The Brotherhood of Bonifacio), which implied a sense of camaraderie as opposed to the exaltation of Bonifacio. Additionally, the message from President Elpidio Quirino, which was read at the event, stated: "National Heroes Day focuses our thought on those courageous and selfless men who laid the basis of our freedom. Of these heroes, José Rizal and Andres Bonifacio are foremost. They were the founders of our liberty and independence".¹⁰¹ Although it was Bonifacio Day, Rizal remained preeminent, while Bonifacio was positioned as one of many other "courageous and selfless men". Indeed, Rizal's continued dominance was reminiscent of the legislation that stipulated the new capital of Quezon City remain in close proximity to the Rizal Monument. Thus despite the emergence of other "founding fathers", Rizal remained foremost. Furthermore, President Quirino's absence from the commemorations signals Bonifacio's reduced significance to government nation-building.¹⁰²

Bonifacio continued to be evoked as part of a broader memorialisation of "heroes" into the Cold War period. In his 1952 National Heroes Day address, President Quirino stated that "we can group our heroes by their epochs", placing Rizal in the "epoch of idealism", Bonifacio in the "revolutionary epoch", Quezon and Osmeña in the "libertarian epoch", and Roxas in "the present epoch of independence". Additionally Quirino noted other "heroes, including those who died in the Battle of Bataan or

"National Heroes Day", *Official Gazette*,
<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/featured/national-heroes-day/>.

¹⁰¹ "Message of President Elpidio Quirino, read by Executive Secretary Teodoro Evangelista, on the occasion of the National Heroes' Day program of the 'Mga Kapatirang Alagad ni Bonifacio,' held at the foot of the Bonifacio Monument in Balintawak, at 4 p.m., November 30, 1948", *Official Gazette* 44, no. 11 (November 1948): 4257, *Official Gazette* Archive, AHC.

¹⁰² In 1953 Quirino simply sent a wreath. "President's Week", *Philippines Free Press*, 5 December 1953, 56, *Philippines Free Press* Archive, AHC; In 1954 only the First Lady attended and commemorations took place at both the Bonifacio Monument and Fort Santiago, a citadel in Manila built during Spanish colonial period in 1593. "Bonifacio Day", *Philippines Free Press*, 4 December 1954, *Philippines Free Press* Archive, AHC.

Korea or elsewhere”.¹⁰³ Remembrance of Bonifacio became subsumed within a portrayal of a broader Philippine heroic lineage, of which Philippine independence was depicted as a direct outcome. This illustration of a pedigree of Philippine heroism had become increasingly prevalent following the Second World War and as chapter 5 will demonstrate, commemorations of the war were highly significant to the country’s post-independence nation-building. However, the government’s dilution of Bonifacio is perhaps more related to his continued appropriation to subvert authority. Ileto has argued that the Bonifacio Monument became a “focal point for radical labour, peasant, and student movements” who gathered on Labour Day and on the anniversary of the Cry of Balintawak. He maintains that the government sought to displace Bonifacio with Rizal, which manifested in larger commemorative ceremonies on Rizal Day, in addition to the compulsory study of Rizal’s novels in colleges and universities.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore the commemoration of Bonifacio and the Philippine Revolution were significant to the communist movement led by the Hukbalahap, who carried out raids on government buildings on the anniversary of the Cry of Balintawak.¹⁰⁵ In the midst of the Cold War, and with the Philippine government heavily reliant on the US military to suppress the Hukbalahap, Bonifacio’s association with the movement may have tainted his memorialisation both as a means to unite the nation and to project the particular image of nation desired by Quirino.¹⁰⁶

However, while the government sought to reduce the omnipotence of Bonifacio, the revolutionary rhetoric remained. Presidential candidates in 1957 urged the public to continue the unfinished revolution and in 1957 the Bonifacio Day commemorations included a programme attended by “Revolutionary officers and American military

¹⁰³ Elpidio Quirino. 1952. “The President’s National Heroes Day Address, Delivered at the Philippine Normal College Auditorium, August 31 1952” (speech). In *Official Gazette* 48, no. 8 (August 1952): 3324, *Official Gazette Archive*, AHC.

¹⁰⁴ Ileto, *Filipinos and their Revolution*, 184, 242.

¹⁰⁵ Francisco, “People of God, People of the Nation Official Catholic Discourse on Nation and Nationalism”, 348.

¹⁰⁶ Vina A. Lanzona, *Amazons of the Huk Rebellion: Gender, Sex, and Revolution in the Philippines* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).

officials”, during which the Katipunan flag was raised.¹⁰⁷ Despite the Armed Forces of the Philippines being founded in 1935, the prominence of revolutionary veterans alongside the US military suggests the continued importance of depicting the Philippine Revolution as a foundation for the country’s soldierly lineage. Additionally their presence reflected the ongoing significance of veterans to government nation-building, and the endurance of the “citizen as soldier”. Yet even as these revolutionary veterans began to pass away, the Revolution continued to form part of the nation-building rhetoric into the Marcos administration. In 1969 President Ferdinand Marcos used his Bonifacio Day speech to call attention to a “new revolution... that of survival as a nation”.¹⁰⁸ This formed part of Marcos’ approach to commemoration, which he used to legitimise his political authority, more of which will be discussed in chapter 4. Indeed, this statement was made only three years away from President Marcos’ declaration of martial law, which would see him rule for another fourteen years. Yet despite the focus on the Revolution as the foundation for the country’s sovereignty, and the fact that the Philippines was more than ten years into its independence, the 1957 Bonifacio Day commemorations continued to display the connection with the United States that had been present in the monument’s opening ceremony. The illustration of the two countries’ military unity reflected the ongoing Military Bases Agreement, which was established in 1947 and gave the United States a ninety-nine-year lease on Philippine military bases. Additionally, both countries had signed a Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951, which decreed that each would support the other in the event of an attack. While Bonifacio and revolutionary rhetoric continued to be used for nation-building long into Philippine independence, the image of the nation projected in these ceremonies also revealed the enduring ties between the Philippines and the United States.

¹⁰⁷ “Bonifacio Day in Balintawak”, *Philippines Free Press*, 7 December 1957, 33, *Philippines Free Press Archive*, AHC.

¹⁰⁸ Ferdinand Marcos. 1969. “Address of His Excellency Ferdinand E. Marcos President of the Philippines At the 106th Birthday Anniversary Celebration of Andres Bonifacio” (speech). In F. E. Marcos, *Presidential speeches* (Vol. 2) (Manila: Office of the President of the Philippines, 1978). *Official Gazette*, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1969/11/30/address-of-president-marcos-at-the-106th-birthday-anniversary-celebration-of-andres-bonifacio/>.

Bonifacio's commemoration by veterans memorialising the Philippine-American War, in addition to his appropriation by the Hukbalahap and other groups who opposed the country's political rule, perpetuated the subversive aspect to his remembrance that had existed from his earliest commemorations. Thus, although Bonifacio Day remained significant to government-led commemoration, this dissident memorialisation perhaps contributed to Bonifacio's gradual subsumption within a broader commemoration of Philippine heroes. However, as the following section will demonstrate, there remained a section of the populace who wished to elevate Bonifacio to the status of Rizal.

Contemporary significance

The 1990s saw several centenary commemorations, which brought Bonifacio to the forefront of national remembrance. These included the 1992 centenary of the founding of the Katipunan, the 1996 centenary of the Philippine Revolution and the 1998 centenary of the founding of the First Philippine Republic. The significance of these anniversaries were particularly recognised by Bonifacio's descendants who commented that "the centennial celebration of our independence is past [sic] approaching and yet our forefather Andres Bonifacio has not yet been honoured with burial rites appropriate to his achievements".¹⁰⁹ The family requested the government commemorate Bonifacio with "a full honor of burial rites", arguing that as leader of the Katipunan, he ought to be recognised as the first president of the Philippines.¹¹⁰ Some in government also supported the Bonifacio family's actions, and in 1994 Congressman Bonifacio Gillego introduced a resolution to the House

¹⁰⁹ Relatives of Gat. Andres De Castro-Bonifacio to Fidel V. Ramos, 2 May 1994, Manila, Bonifacio Monument Papers, NHCP.

¹¹⁰ Resolution stating the position of the NHI board on the request of the family of Gat Andres Bonifacio represented by Mrs. Simplicia Camacho, for a state burial and the commemoration of the hero's martyrdom, 1994, Bonifacio Monument Papers, NHCP.

requesting Bonifacio be given “formal burial rites with state honors”.¹¹¹ For the family and for Gillego, the Bonifacio Monument alone was an insufficient commemoration of the Supremo’s “achievements”.

The Bonifacio family’s reference to “burial rites” also indicates the significance of the body to commemoration. Chapter 2 explored the consequence of Rizal’s interment beneath the Rizal Monument, noting Verdery’s observation of the importance of the body’s materiality in endowing a site with meaning.¹¹² Yet as Bonifacio’s remains were lost or destroyed during the Second World War, the family’s argument demonstrates the perceived worth of a symbolic burial. This was also recognised by historians Milagros C. Guerrero, Emmanuel N. Encarnacion and Ramon N. Villegas, who, in 1993, put forward a proposal to create a “Memorial to Bonifacio and the Heroes of 1896”. They argued that, unlike Rizal, Bonifacio’s remains were not interred beneath his monument and therefore he had “not yet been honored with burial rites appropriate to his achievements”. However, instead of proposing to bury Bonifacio’s remains at the Bonifacio Monument, they suggested the construction of “a permanent and enduring mausoleum” in Luneta Park, alongside the Rizal Monument so that the two “national heroes” could be “revered and honored side-by-side”. For Guerrero, Encarnacion and Villegas it is the absence of Bonifacio’s remains that reduces the consequence of the Bonifacio Monument. Furthermore, the non-attendance of significant figures is also perceived as diminishing the monument’s worth, as they note “no visiting foreign dignitary or head of state has ever presented him with official honors”.¹¹³ Additionally, and similarly to the proposal for the statue to Lapulapu, their wish to locate the new Bonifacio memorial in Luneta Park reinforces the park’s particular importance to commemoration and its

¹¹¹ Resolution Supporting House Resolution 1096 Introduced By Rep. Bonifacio Gillego, Urging President Ramos To Mark The Centennial of the 1896 Revolution by giving Andres Bonifacio formal burial rites with state honors of 1994, Res. 138, Tabaco City Sangguniang Panlungsod (1994), Bonifacio Monument Papers, NHCP.

¹¹² Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*, 27-28.

¹¹³ Milagros C. Guerrero, Emmanuel N. Encarnacion, and Ramon N. Villegas, “A Concept Paper: A Memorial to Bonifacio and the Heroes of 1896”, 1993, 1-3, Bonifacio Monument Papers, NHCP (hereafter cited as “A Concept Paper: A Memorial to Bonifacio and the Heroes of 1896”).

perception as a national space. Indeed, it is only in Luneta Park that they can visualise a memorial, which expresses “true freedom, sovereignty and nationhood”.¹¹⁴

The Bonifacio Monument’s perception as an insufficient commemoration of the Supremo was brought to the fore in the 1990s by Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim, who initiated a project to create a shrine to Bonifacio in the City of Manila.¹¹⁵ Eduardo Castrillo, the artist commissioned to design the new monument, described Mayor Lim as wanting “the project to be a tribute to Bonifacio as the greatest son of Manila, to emphasize him as a Manileño, and to stop his being grabbed by Kalookan [sic] just because of the Monumento there”. Castrillo also stated that the Mayor felt the existing monument to Bonifacio in Manila (Liwasang Bonifacio, inaugurated in 1963, Figure 3.19), “was too diminutive, not redolent enough with the aura that should surround the Hero of Manila”. Castrillo too had his own motivations for the work. He described how he wished to “rectify” the Bonifacio Monument, in which Tolentino had portrayed Bonifacio as “a Malay with a flat nose”. Castrillo argued “Bonifacio the Spanish *mestizo* could not have looked like that” and so he explained how he gave him “fairer features” and “a straight nose” to better reflect “the only photo of him”.¹¹⁶ Castrillo’s work also reflects more recent scholarship on Bonifacio, which contradicts the popular portrayal of his working class roots by emphasising his education and professional employment.¹¹⁷ Castrillo stated that he “tried to equalize the presentation of his two prime inclinations: towards labor and the masses, on the one hand (the Katipunan); and on the other hand, towards learning and the elite (the Liga Filipina)”.¹¹⁸ Whilst Castrillo may have wished to create a sculpture of Bonifacio that was indelibly his own, his statements and those of Mayor Lim, suggest both a reduction in the significance of Bonifacio’s Malay heritage, and diminution in

¹¹⁴ “A Concept Paper: A Memorial to Bonifacio and the Heroes of 1896”, 4.

¹¹⁵ Caloocan City is part of Metro Manila and is a separate city to the city of Manila.

¹¹⁶ Eduardo Castrillo quoted in Quijano De Manila, “Manila leads the way with the big new Bonifacio Shrine by Eduardo Castrillo”, *Philippine Graphic*, 9 June 1997, 19-27, Bonifacio Monument Papers, NHCP.

¹¹⁷ May, *Inventing a Hero*.

¹¹⁸ Eduardo Castrillo quoted in Quijano De Manila, “Manila leads the way with the big new Bonifacio Shrine by Eduardo Castrillo”, 27.

the singularity of the Bonifacio Monument. Indeed, Castrillo's *mestizo* portrayal not only counters Tolentino's turn to the "native" Filipino as an articulation of nationhood, but implies the *mestizo* ideal continues to proliferate, evidenced in part by the ongoing commemorative dominance of Rizal.

However, despite these moves to venerate Bonifacio in the 1990s, Bonifacio never gained a state burial. Additionally, although Castrillo's new monument was erected (Figure 3.20), Bonifacio remains absent from Luneta Park. Indeed, in 2003, as part of the National Historical Institute's (NHI) arguments against the construction of the statue to Lapulapu, they stated that its erection "could invite partisans of other heroes, Bonifacio, for example, to request similar attention and monuments that will fill Luneta Park which must maintain its open spaces".¹¹⁹ The NHI consigned Bonifacio to a partisan cause as opposed to recognising him as a national hero. Bonifacio's long association with subversive groups, as well as the rural lower classes, have positioned him as dissident figure with the potential to undermine government interests. Despite the fall of the Marcos regime in 1986 and the rhetoric of greater social equality by the succeeding Aquino administration, Abinales and Amoroso have argued that social divisions remained, perpetuated in part by the return to power of old political dynasties following the 1987 local and legislative elections, which ensured little reform to an agrarian system that benefitted the landed elite, of which President Corazon Aquino herself was a part.¹²⁰

Despite this, more recent controversies around the Bonifacio Monument suggest it remains significant to the local population. In 2002, Caloocan Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo proposed the Bonifacio Monument be relocated to Tala, a district within Caloocan City, in order to make way for a planned connection between two of the city's rail networks. From press coverage at the time, as well as documentation by the NHI, the mayor's proposal was strongly opposed by many. One opposition

¹¹⁹ Ambeth R. Ocampo, Chairman, National Historical Institute to Hon. Alberto Romulo, Executive Secretary, Office of the President of the Philippines, 5 December 2003, Lapu-Lapu Papers, NHCP (hereafter cited as Ocampo to Romulo, 5 December 2003).

¹²⁰ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 235.

argument was founded on the belief that the location was fundamental to the meaning of the monument. The NHI stated that the monument would “lose its significance” if it was transferred, arguing that Tolentino positioned Bonifacio facing Manila and that “every piece in the monument was designed to give meaning to the site”.¹²¹ The NHI were also concerned about the monument’s relocation to Tala as “Tala has no reference to 1896”.¹²² Another objection centred on the perceived historical value of the monument itself. Caloocan Congressman Enrico Echeverri stated his opposition to the relocation citing the monument as “probably the only historical landmark of which the city can boast”.¹²³ Similarly, in an open forum held with Caloocan residents, one participant, Reynaldo Ocampo, noted the country’s UNESCO World Heritage Sites were all created during the Spanish colonial period. He argued that contrastingly “the Bonifacio Monument is unique. It is the greatest monument of valor and love of freedom on earth. Why not have something that will point or break away from our old Spanish colonial past?”.¹²⁴ For Ocampo, the monument represented a disconnection from both Spanish and US colonial rule, despite both informing its development.

Other protests against the monument’s relocation were due to its perceived value as a work by Tolentino. Paulo Alcazaren in the Philippine Star stated that the “strength of the monument comes from his [Tolentino’s] genius”.¹²⁵ The NHI also argued that as the monument is “an artistic creation of a National Artist, Guillermo Tolentino. It

¹²¹ Augusto Deviana quoted in Jonathan Mayuga, “NHI bucks transfer of ‘Boni’ Monument”, *Metro Today*, 12 February 2002, Bonifacio Monument Papers, NHCP.

¹²² Augusto Deviana quoted in Maricel Cruz and Joshua Dancel, “Bonifacio not moving after all”, *Manila Times*, 12 March 2002, Bonifacio Monument Papers, NHCP.

¹²³ Enrico Echeverri quoted in Jerry Botial, “Transfer of Boni Shrine opposed”, *Philippine Star Metro*, 6 March 2002, Bonifacio Monument Papers, NHCP.

¹²⁴ Speech given by Reynaldo Ocampo at the public forum on Resolutions on the Proposed Urban Renewal of the Bonifacio Monument Circle and Vicinity, Caloocan City, 18 September 2009, Bonifacio Monument Papers, NHCP (hereafter cited as Speech given by Reynaldo Ocampo).

¹²⁵ Paulo Alcazaren, “Wait a Monument”, *Philippine Star*, 9 March 2002, <https://www.philstar.com/lifestyle/modernliving/2002/03/09/153242/wait-monument>.

should be afforded due respect as such”.¹²⁶ Several of the protests also referred to the monument as having a landmark status. Reynaldo Ocampo stated that the monument “symbolizes... the first national uprising against European Colonial rule in all of Asia. In all of Asia. The monumento has international significance”.¹²⁷ Additionally the National Historical Commission for the Philippines (NHCP) asserted “the monument marks the entrance to Manila from the north... as if welcoming all travellers to Manila in the way that the Statue of Liberty does for New York”.¹²⁸ The NHCP’s framing of the monument through American symbolism recalls the language that had been used to describe the Rizal Monument, which had similarly been compared to the Statue of Liberty. Ocampo too recognised the monument as a symbol of liberty, having described it as a “monument of valor and love of freedom”. While the NHI cited the “desecrat[ion]” of Bonifacio as one of the reasons for their objection to the move, this was not mentioned by most protesters.¹²⁹ Indeed, for most, the monument’s significance lay not in its memorialisation of Bonifacio but its historicity, as a landmark, a work by a revered National Artist, and as a symbol of Philippine exceptionalism.

Despite the monument’s value as a structure, its significance to the national commemorative calendar remains understated. Although official commemorations are maintained and the presidential administration still uses Bonifacio Day to publish a nation-building message, the monument’s inconsequentiality is evident through the frequent absence of the president. Indeed although he took office in 2016, 2019 was only the second time President Duterte attended the commemorations.¹³⁰ Additionally, the Bonifacio Monument is not always the focus of official

¹²⁶ Emelita V. Almosara, Deputy Executive Director, NHI to Arch. Edmundo A. Sadie, City Development Planning Coordinator, 15 August 1996, Bonifacio Monument Papers, NHCP.

¹²⁷ Speech given by Reynaldo Ocampo, Bonifacio Monument Papers.

¹²⁸ Requesting the City of Kalookan to Reconsider its Plan to Relocate the Bonifacio Monument and Instead to Upgrade the Complex as a Park of 2002, Res. 2002-29, NHCP (2002).

¹²⁹ Augusto Deviana quoted in Jonathan Mayuga, “NHI bucks transfer of ‘Boni’ Monument”.

¹³⁰ Buan, “For the first time, Duterte attends Bonifacio Day rites”.

commemorations. In 2010 President Benigno “Noy” Aquino led the Bonifacio Day rites at the 1973 Pinaglabanan Shrine, which commemorates the 1896 Battle of Pinaglabanan, the first conflict in the Philippine Revolution and commemorations also take place at other monuments in and around the capital, such as at Castrillo’s Bonifacio Shrine in Ermita, Manila. The Bonifacio Monument also remains absent from the itineraries of visiting foreign heads of state. Yet despite its lessened significance for government, it remains an important landmark for those connected with the area and an enduring symbol of independence.

Conclusion

Unlike Rizal, whose early commemoration was shaped by a multitude of “commemorative agents”, including the Philippine Commission, the Philippine Legislature, as well as ordinary citizens, Bonifacio’s remembrance was primarily driven by veterans of the Philippine Revolution who both sought a means to commemorate the war dead, as well as legitimise their own contributions to country. In so doing they also shaped a particular vision of Philippine nationhood, which through the creation of *El Grito del Revolución*, underlined the country’s connections with what I am referring to here as the postcolonial Hispanic diaspora (especially via Mexico), dissociating the Philippines from the United States. However, while veterans were also the driving force behind the creation of the national monument to Bonifacio, the final edifice was primarily shaped by Tolentino’s artistic vision. Tolentino’s desire to create “real sculpture” and move away from the “stock of monuments to Rizal” produced a monument, which although at first glance shared a memorial aesthetic with the Rizal Monument, departed from it in every other way. While Tolentino’s composition, depiction of emotions, movement and drapery reflect his classical sculptural training, his allusions to the Monumento a la Independencia, the similarities to Mexican muralism, and the elements that are distinctly Filipino, reject the binary Philippine-United States memorial language of the Rizal Monument. Instead Tolentino’s polysemic aesthetic, similarly to the veteran memorialisations, positions the Philippines within a transnational nexus of

heritages, in part shaped by a shared experience of revolution and resistance. Furthermore, the monument's use of Tagalog and the Katipunan code, also refute the racial hierarchy cultivated by the Latinate Rizal Monument, which sought to evidence the Philippines' ability to enter the "concert of cultured and civilised nations".¹³¹

However, while the Bonifacio Monument distinguished itself from the Rizal Monument and US colonial rule, at the same time the presence of Tagalog and the monument's depiction of events leading to the Revolution projected a Luzon and Manila-centric image of nation, which perpetuated the singular ethnolinguistic nation fostered by the Philippine Commission. The monument also perpetuated the Rizal Monument's Christianised image of the nation through its connections to the Hispanic diaspora, which further excluded the country's Muslim population from Philippine nation-building. While the opening ceremony was used to illustrate a strong image of the nation, it also revealed the country's ongoing ties to the United States. This tension between US rule and Philippine nationhood persisted in the Bonifacio Day commemorations following independence, with the continued presence of the US armed forces.

Yet, although Tolentino sought to distinguish the Bonifacio Monument from the Rizal, it is the Rizal Monument and Rizal himself that remains preeminent; indeed, even in 1948 President Quirino sought to emphasise Rizal before Bonifacio in the Bonifacio Day commemorations. Although the Philippine government's initial appropriation of Bonifacio was a means to bridge the divide between the working classes and the government, Bonifacio remained a subversive figure, commemorated by groups who opposed government interests, such as the memorialisation of the Filipino defence against the US forces in the Philippine–American War and the Hukbalahap raids on dates associated with Bonifacio, which must have contributed to his dilution in government-led commemoration. Additionally, the emergence of other significant commemorative narratives around

¹³¹ Rizal Monument Committee, "To The People Of The Philippines".

the Second World War dead and the death of Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon, also contributed to Bonifacio's diffusion within a wider pantheon of Philippine heroes. Furthermore the proposals to erect a monument to Bonifacio in Luneta Park, not only reinforce its perception as a national space and "hallowed" ground, but also imply the Bonifacio Monument is not perceived as the definitive memorialisation of Bonifacio. Moreover Verdery's observation of the significance of the body to endow a space with meaning is revealed as much by the absence of Bonifacio's remains from the Bonifacio Monument, as it was by the presence of Rizal's at the Rizal Monument. Yet despite this, the monument retains a national significance for local residents who perceive it not only as a marker of Philippine triumph over colonialism but of its distinction from other Asian nations in being the first to overthrow colonial rule.

Veteran memorialising of the Philippine Revolution and Tolentino's wish to distinguish the Bonifacio Monument from the edifices to Rizal both opened a new commemorative space to remember the Philippine war dead. Yet at the same time they also produced an image of the Philippine nation that dissociated itself from US rule, positioning the country within a global nexus of heritages. It reflected the monument's construction on the eve of the country's transition to a commonwealth nation, yet at the same time commemorations could not fully disconnect the Philippines from the United States. Both at the Bonifacio Monument's inauguration and into Philippine independence, Philippine revolutionary veterans remained significant to government-led nation-building, revealing the persistence of the "citizen soldier" ideal as well as the perception of the veteran as integral to a strong image of the nation. Indeed, chapter 4, which examines the creation of the Quezon Memorial, reveals the importance of veterans to the way in which Quezon was memorialised following the Second World War, as well as the continuing tensions around post-independence nation-building.

CHAPTER 4

A Monument to the “Political Progress of the Philippines”: The Quezon Memorial Shrine

Introduction

From the viewing platform atop the 20-metre-high Quezon Memorial, one can see the immediate surroundings of Quezon City and beyond that Manila and Manila Bay. The Quezon Memorial is positioned almost in line with the Rizal Monument, which is sited in Luneta Park, looking out onto the bay (Figure 4.1). This almost-connection to and equivalency with the Rizal Monument is indicative of the narrative of the Quezon Memorial itself. Intended to form the centre of a new city that was itself created to epitomise the dawning of a new era in the Philippine nation, the Quezon Memorial should have elevated the president for whom it was named and secured his place as one of the country’s founding fathers. Yet today, although the memorial and its surrounding parkland is well attended, it is relatively absent from the national commemorative agenda, and in contrast to the Rizal Monument, omitted from the itineraries of visiting heads of state.

Philippine Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon, who had been in exile in the United States following the Japanese invasion of Manila on 8 December 1941, died of tuberculosis at Saranac Lake, New York State, on 1 August 1944. On the anniversary of his death a year later, his former vice-president and now president, Sergio Osmeña, declared that he would mark Quezon’s “imperishable place in our history” alongside “Rizal, Bonifacio, Mabini and our other national heroes... [by] erect[ing] him a monument worthy of his glory”.¹ The initiation of the monument in 1945 marked a key moment in Philippine history. In August the nation had regained its status as a commonwealth protectorate under the United States, following nearly

¹ Sergio Osmeña quoted in “In Memoriam: Manuel Luis Quezon”, *Official Gazette* 41, no. 5 (August 1945): 384, *Official Gazette Archive*, AHC (hereafter cited as Osmeña quoted in “In Memoriam: Manuel Luis Quezon”).

four years of Japanese rule. Additionally, it was also a turning point in the country's long struggle for independence, as just under a year later on 4 July 1946 the United States would recognise the Philippines as a sovereign nation. For Osmeña and the Quezon Memorial Committee, the memorial was intended to stand as an emblem of the country's progress and its close association with the United States. However, the Quezon Memorial was not erected until 1978, when the country was six years into a period of Martial Law instated by President Ferdinand Marcos, which would see Marcos rule for another eight years. This chapter examines the evolution of the Quezon Memorial from its initiation by Osmeña in 1945 and the plans of the Quezon Memorial Committee, through the post-independence presidencies, to its final realisation under President Marcos in 1978, exploring how each used Quezon's commemoration to foster their own image of an independent nation, which in turn continued to be shaped by the Philippines' persistent ties to the United States. The chapter assesses the reasons for the lengthy delay in the memorial's construction, why it was finally realised under President Marcos, and to what extent the Quezon Memorial is a product of the Marcos regime.

The chapter firstly analyses Quezon's commemoration in the pre- and early post-independence years, before assessing the plans and motivations for the Quezon Memorial and the newly formed Quezon City, within which it would stand. It then examines the proposals for the memorial, before exploring its lengthy delay and the ways in which each presidential administration in the twenty years prior to Marcos' election sought to shape the Quezon Memorial Committee to its own ends. The chapter assesses the development of the Quezon Memorial under Marcos, considering its construction in the context of the president's other cultural projects. Finally, the chapter analyses the structure and aesthetics of the memorial, and its interior museum and mausoleum, before reflecting on how contemporary renovations have sought to counter Quezon's absence from the exterior of the memorial itself and his diminished presence in national commemoration.

The chapter illustrates the evolution of Quezon's memorialisation from its use to underline the significance of the Philippine-United States relationship through to

being used to construct an image of the nation that sought to disassociate itself from colonial rule. It reveals Marcos' use of Quezon's commemoration and the Quezon Memorial both to legitimise his authoritarian rule and establish his own cult of personality. Similarly to the Bonifacio Monument, the Quezon Memorial demonstrates that Philippine monument building can be seen outside of the colonial context, as the aesthetics of the memorial reveal connections to broader revolutionary and postcolonial memorial landscapes. However, Marcos' impact on the dilution of Quezon from the memorial is contested within the memorial's museum, which together with the earlier plans for the memorial, have resulted in the production of a "polyphonic memoryscape", in which multiple narratives and remembrances operate and collide.²

Despite the Quezon Memorial's initiation at the end of US rule and its construction more than thirty years after Philippine independence, it remains an important case study with regards to the legacy of colonial rule on Philippine monuments. The plans for the memorial and Quezon City are replete with the colonial ideologies that permeated around the earlier Rizal and Bonifacio Monuments. Additionally, despite gaining its independence in 1946, the Philippines remained ideologically, economically and militarily tied to the United States. Thus, an examination of commemoration in this climate provides an insight into the extent to which postcolonial memorialisation embodied the tensions of colonial-era nation-building, as the Philippines remained tied to, at the same time as it tried to disconnect from, its colonial past. Furthermore, although many studies have examined the Marcos presidency, Marcos' relationship with the United States, and his influence on Philippine cultural life, none have considered the Quezon Memorial within Marcos' cultural agenda.³ Focusing on Quezon's remembrance, alongside the more prominently nationally commemorated figures of Rizal and Bonifacio, enables a

² Emde, "National Memorial Sites and Personal Remembrance: Remembering the Dead of Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek at the ECCC in Cambodia", 20.

³ See for example Pearlle Rose S. Baluyut, *Institutions and Icons of Patronage: Arts and Culture in the Philippines During the Marcos Years, 1965–1986* (Manila: UST Publishing House, 2012); McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*; Guillermo, *Protest/Revolutionary Art in the Philippines 1970–1990*.

greater understanding of the nuanced ways in which the various post-war and post-independence governments sought to come to terms with the country's colonial past.

Early commemorations

Although still in exile in the United States, one of Osmeña's first Acts on becoming president following Quezon's death was to declare Quezon's birthday anniversary on 19 August 1944, as a public holiday "so that Filipinos everywhere may go to their churches to pray for our beloved leader and hold memorial services to honor his memory and extoll his character and public service".⁴ Thus, immediately following his death, Quezon was used to unite a nation still under Japanese occupation, through a shared experience of remembrance. Osmeña also used Quezon's commemoration to legitimise the Philippine government-in-exile whilst undermining the existence of the Second Philippine Republic and the administration of President José Laurel, which had been established under the Japanese occupation. On the first anniversary of Quezon's death in 1945, he stated that "the independence of the Philippines could come only under the United States, and that, obviously, the United States was the only place where we could continue the work of establishing that independence".⁵ Osmeña sought to underline the significant work he and Quezon had undertaken while in exile, but in doing so he also connected Quezon and Quezon's remembrance to a Philippine nationalism that was tied to the United States.

US President Franklin D. Roosevelt's own statement upon Quezon's death also connected Quezon to an American heroic lineage, asserting that Quezon would be "remembered by his people with the respect and veneration that we in the United

⁴ Sergio Osmeña quoted in "Three Years in Review", *Official Gazette* 41, no. 1 (April 1945): 5, *Official Gazette Archive*, AHC.

⁵ Osmeña quoted in "In Memoriam: Manuel Luis Quezon", 382.

States have for the name of George Washington”.⁶ By aligning Quezon with Washington, Roosevelt elevated Quezon to the position of a founding father and connected him with the establishment of an independent nation. Prior to the return of his body to the Philippines in 1946, Quezon was interred at Arlington National Cemetery, for which he was given full military honours, in addition to a wreath laying ceremony (Figure 4.2).⁷ The placement of Quezon within these grounds, alongside military veterans and former presidents, not only emphasised his significance but also embedded him within the fabric of the American nation. Verdery has argued that the burial of a dead body functions to insert “the dead person... within the lineage of honored forebears”.⁸ By placing Quezon within a national cemetery reserved for American heroes of war, the US government installed him as a descendent of their own, strengthening the connection between the two countries at a crucial moment in the Second World War, prior to the US military retaking the Philippines from the Japanese.

Yet while Quezon’s commemoration was imbued with American symbolism, Osmeña’s encouragement to pray for Quezon within a church not only Christianised his commemoration but familiarised it too. This continued on Quezon’s seventieth birth anniversary in 1948, part of the programme for which included masses to be held in all churches in Quezon City.⁹ In this way commemoration was facilitated as both a national and personal event, with the public called upon to engage in “silent prayer”.¹⁰ The encouragement of a personal connection enabled Osmeña to strengthen the connection between the populace and Quezon by embedding Quezon within a religious setting to which many Filipinos would attend.

⁶ Franklin D. Roosevelt quoted in Dina Kalil, “World Mourns Loss of Manuel L. Quezon”, *Bataan: Remember the Philippines*, August 1944, 8, *Bataan: Remember the Philippines* Archive, AHC, (hereafter cited as Roosevelt quoted in Kalil, “World Mourns Loss of Manuel L. Quezon”).

⁷ Kalil, “World Mourns Loss of Manuel L. Quezon”, 7-8.

⁸ Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*, 41.

⁹ *Souvenir Program: 70th Birthday Anniversary Celebration in Honor of the Late President Manuel L. Quezon Patriot – Statesman – Leader* (Manila: Benipayo Press, 1948), 23, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/quezonmemorial/> (hereafter cited as *Souvenir Program: 70th Birthday Anniversary*).

¹⁰ *Souvenir Program: 70th Birthday Anniversary*, 23.

Furthermore, the focus on the church as a place to commemorate Quezon perpetuated the Christianised image of the nation fostered by the Rizal and Bonifacio Monuments, and continued the exclusion of other religious groups from the government's portrayal of Philippine nationhood.

This unified state and church commemoration reflected a renewed relationship between the Catholic Church and the government following Philippine independence. Indeed, although religious commemoration of Rizal existed during the early years of US colonial rule, this was relatively separate to that sponsored by the government, as the period saw an increased separation of church and state as well as a wider disenfranchisement of the clergy that had led to the formation of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI).¹¹ Francisco has asserted that the church was keen to strengthen its position as a social institution as it felt it had lost access to the nation's youth when education had become state-run under US rule. While the Catholic Church in the 1950s came out against the compulsory teaching of Rizal's novels in schools, perceiving the works to be critical of it, they also did not want to seem anti-national.¹² Indeed, the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines released a "Statement on Nationalism" in 1959 in which they did not name any particular national figures but called for the public to "love and cherish our national symbols". Additionally, they placed "Christian traditions and culture" as the foundation of Philippine nationhood.¹³

Contrastingly the IFI had a long history of using its religious texts and calendar to foster nationalist sentiment. The publication of *Pagsisiyam sa Virgen sa Balintawak – Ang Virgen sa Balintawak ay ang Inang Bayan* in 1925, sought to reinforce the IFI's connection to the Philippine Revolution and included prayers and readings that were to be said over nine days, culminating on 26 August, which commemorated the Cry

¹¹ Wilfredo Fabros, *The Church and its Social Involvement in the Philippines, 1930–1972* (Quezon City: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 1988), 15.

¹² Francisco, "People of God, People of the Nation Official Catholic Discourse on Nation and Nationalism", 349, 353.

¹³ Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, "Statement of the Catholic Hierarchy of the Philippines on Nationalism".

of Balintawak.¹⁴ The IFI also advocated for the commemoration of Philippine heroes within its walls, stating: “the undying teachings of Rizal and other heroes will be kept alive by the church and will always echo in its temples, as part of our obligation to God and nation”.¹⁵ Quezon was also a significant part of the IFI’s liturgical calendar. During his lifetime, quotations from Quezon were included within the calendar and, following his death, his birth anniversary was listed in the calendar’s days of commemoration, Quezon being the only Filipino other than those connected with the IFI and Rizal, to be included.¹⁶ Unlike the Catholic Church who did not actively memorialise Quezon, he was clearly a significant figure for the IFI, and was perceived to be part of their “obligation to God and nation”.

Upon the return of Quezon’s remains to the Philippines, following US recognition of Philippine independence in 1946, President Manuel Roxas designated “four days of solemn memorial services” in addition to a state funeral (Figure 4.3). Preserving the significance of Quezon’s death anniversary, reburial was marked to take place on 1 August 1946, with Roxas declaring: “on that day the body of our immortal hero will lie in the earth of his ancestors”.¹⁷ Thus Quezon’s reburial within the Philippines functioned to position him “within the lineage of honored forebears”.¹⁸ However, whereas his early commemoration and burial in Arlington reinforced his connections to the United States, his interment in Philippine “earth” made him entirely Filipino. Not only was Quezon being decolonised but his remembrance in the first few years of Philippine independence was also used to distance the country from its colonial past.

¹⁴ Gealogo, “Time, Identity, and Nation in the ‘Aglipayan Novenario ng Balintawak’ and ‘Calendariang Maanghang’”, 150.

¹⁵ Gregorio Aglipay quoted in Gealogo, “Time, Identity, and Nation in the ‘Aglipayan Novenario ng Balintawak’ and ‘Calendariang Maanghang’”, 155.

¹⁶ Gealogo, “Time, Identity, and Nation in the ‘Aglipayan Novenario ng Balintawak’ and ‘Calendariang Maanghang’”, 162; Iglesia Filipina Independiente, *The Filipino Missal (Book of Divine Office): The Liturgy for the Holy Mass* (Manila: The Supreme Council of Bishops, 1961), XII.

¹⁷ Proclamation No. 3, s. 1946, (25 Jul. 1946), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1946/07/25/proclamation-no-3-s-1946/>.

¹⁸ Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*, 41.

In the legislation for Quezon's reinterment, Roxas stated, "as surely as the humble soldier who died in heroic struggle on the battlefield, President Quezon's life was offered on the altar of national redemption, that his people might realize in magnificent freedom the full independence and true nationhood for which he had fought and worked from his earliest years".¹⁹ Philippine Second World War remembrance, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 5, became an increasingly significant component of the national commemorative calendar and thus Roxas' equation of Quezon with ordinary soldiers served to elevate him, and echoed the post-First World War development of the "citizen soldier" as the archetypal patriot.²⁰ Yet the military analogy also functioned to disconnect Quezon from his close association with the United States and reframe his life as a fight for Philippine independence. Additionally the image of Quezon as a revolutionary soldier who is described as having "fought the Spaniards for Philippine freedom" and "one of the last to surrender to American officers" on the memorial fundraising campaign leaflet further distanced him from allegiance to the United States.²¹

Quezon's commemoration was also being used to decolonise the Philippine historical narrative. President Elpidio Quirino in his public address on the seventieth anniversary of Quezon's birth in 1948 stated, "Rizal died that his people might live... Bonifacio took to the battlefield under a related compulsion... Quezon gave his life no less, but as a dynamic and organised force... the result is our own Republic today, founded solidly on our people's united will and a heroic heritage of freedom".²² By listing Quezon immediately following Rizal and Bonifacio, Quirino not only framed

¹⁹ Proclamation No. 3, (25 Jul. 1946).

²⁰ Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 52.

²¹ Quezon Memorial Committee, "Let Us Have A Quezon Memorial Foundation", n.d., 5, Quezon Memorial Fund Drive Papers, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/quezonmemorial/> (hereafter cited as Quezon Memorial Committee, "Let Us Have A Quezon Memorial Foundation", n.d.).

²² Elpidio Quirino. 1948. "Address of His Excellency, President Elpidio Quirino at the 70th Quezon Birthday Anniversary celebration at Quezon City, at 11:30am., August 22, 1948" (speech). In *Official Gazette* 44, no. 8 (August): 2650-51. *Official Gazette* Archive, AHC, (hereafter cited as Quirino. 1948. "Address of His Excellency, President Elpidio Quirino at the 70th Quezon Birthday Anniversary celebration at Quezon City, at 11:30am., August 22, 1948" (speech)).

his death as an equal sacrifice to theirs but positioned him as successor to a Philippine heroic lineage. While Osmeña reiterated the necessity of the United States to Philippine independence, Quirino depicted the period of US colonial rule as another chapter in the country's continuous struggle for independence. Yet similarly to the post-independence Bonifacio Day celebrations, Quezon's commemorations reflected the ongoing tensions between Philippine nation-building and the US colonial legacy, with the US Army featuring in the seventieth anniversary parade.²³

From the moment of his death, Quezon was used by the Philippine government as a figure through which the Philippine nation could be unified and, importantly, through which they could foster a sense of national progress and delegitimise the nominal independence that had occurred from 1943 under Japanese occupation. Yet whilst Quezon's connection with the United States was underlined by both Roosevelt and Osmeña, the first presidents of the newly independent Republic of the Philippines, Roxas and Quirino, placed Quezon squarely within a Philippine heroic lineage, and used his commemoration to distance Philippine sovereignty from the United States. As had been the case with Rizal, Quezon was used to establish hegemonic narratives that both connected him with and disconnected him from the United States. Yet, like the Rizal Monument and indeed the Bonifacio Monument, the government's encouragement of church remembrance also fostered a national identity that was centred around Christianity, thus perpetuating the religious bifurcation that had existed throughout Spanish and US colonial rule.

“Mov[ing] with the course of civilization”: The Quezon Memorial

Prior to the proposal for the Quezon Memorial, only one monument was erected to Quezon during his lifetime. Inaugurated on 15 November 1936 in Taguig, a city now part of Metro Manila, the monument comprises a small figurative statue of Quezon standing atop a short obelisk set within a wall and was created by the sculptor

²³ *Souvenir Program: 70th Birthday Anniversary*, 52.

Raymundo Moreno (Figure 4.4). The wall occupies one side of Plaza Quezon, which is now used for events, particularly around Buwan ng Wika (National Language Month).²⁴ As noted in chapter 1, Quezon is often described as the “Father of the National Language”, having approved Tagalog as the national language of the Philippines in 1937.²⁵ Taguig’s erection of a monument to Quezon in the early years of his commonwealth presidency suggests the town wished to elevate its profile, subsumed as it is within the wider Manila region, and position itself as part of the new semi-independent nation. The erection of this monument also introduced Quezon as a potential new symbol of the nation, yet the absence of similar commemorations suggests the impetus to honour Quezon was limited and did not extend beyond the capital region.

However, following Quezon’s death and the re-establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1945, President Osmeña introduced the idea for a national monument declaring that “in recognition of the great services which the late President Quezon rendered to his country and people, it is but fitting and proper that a national monument be erected in his honor”.²⁶ Osmeña also established a Quezon Memorial Committee, which comprised “important men from various sectors of the government and the private sector”.²⁷ On the committee were Secretary of National Defense Alfredo Montelibano, who also served as its chairman; Tomas B. Morato, first Mayor of Quezon City; Dr. Pedro J. Velasco; Antonio D. Pagua, an attorney who had also been a labour leader in the 1930s and a supporter of Quezon; Angel Marin; Antonio Rivero; Gil J. Puyat, a former University of the Philippines Professor of Economics whom Quezon named as Dean of the College of Business Administration; Pedro C. Hernaez, a lawyer who was elected delegate to

²⁴ “Taguig Landmarks”, Official Website of the City of Taguig, accessed 15 May 2021, <https://www.taguig.gov.ph/tourism/taguig-landmarks/>.

²⁵ Exec. Order No. 134, s. 1937, *Messages of the President* 3, no. 2, (1938): 692-94, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1937/12/30/executive-order-no-134-s-1937/>.

²⁶ Proclamation No. 32, (17 Dec. 1945), *Official Gazette* 42, no. 1 (January): 18, *Official Gazette* Archive, AHC.

²⁷ Memorandum, “Quezon Memorial Shrine”, n.d., Quezon Memorial Papers, NHCP, (hereafter cited as Memorandum, “Quezon Memorial Shrine”, n.d.).

the Constitutional Convention in 1934 and also served as senator from 1941 to 1947; and Colonel Artemio Nabor.²⁸

The composition of the committee signalled a departure from the artistic motivations of the Bonifacio Monument, whose committee was composed entirely of artists and architects. Instead the representatives of the political, business, education and military establishment recalled the Rizal Monument Committee's "prominent Filipinos", and correspondingly, many on the committee were also personally associated with Quezon. Indeed, Quezon and Morato had been friends prior to Morato's entry into politics.²⁹ In other words, and similarly to the early years of US colonial rule, the newly independent Philippine government sought to deploy commemoration to establish a new image for the nation, one which was not rooted in artistic accomplishment but sought to project a strong government, education and military strength. The absence of a specific artistic vision associated with Quezon becomes evident in the ensuing decade as the frequent changes in presidential administrations caused lengthy delays to the memorial's development, with each seeking to shape the memorial to their own ends.

However, despite this, committee member Pedro J. Velasco had a specific concept for the Quezon Memorial and the committee, describing them as a "foundation...

²⁸ "Alfredo M. Montelibano", Department of National Defense, GOV.PH, accessed 15 May 2021, <https://www.dnd.gov.ph/Postings/Post/Alfredo%20M%20Montelibano/>; Quezon City Public Library, "The Morato Administration", *Quezonian Newsletter*, 24 September 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20150924083509/http://www.qcpubliclibrary.org/qcmanuscript.php#morato_administration; Melinda Tria Kerkvliet, *Unbending Cane: Pablo Manlapit, A Filipino Labor Leader in Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 88; "Pedro C. Hernaez", Senate of the Philippines, GOV.PH, accessed 15 May 2021, http://legacy.senate.gov.ph/senators/former_senators/pedro_hernaez.htm; Exec. Order No. 79, s. 1945, *Executive Order Nos.: 1W – 109*, (1945), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1945/12/17/executive-order-no-79-s-1945/>.

²⁹ Quezon City Public Library, "The Morato Administration".

from which the people will derive many spiritual, moral and material benefits”.³⁰ Although Velasco acknowledged the term “foundation” connoted a practical element that would enable the committee to obtain financial support for the memorial, he also had a grand vision for the memorial, predicting that “we will witness other glories and colossal surprises in regard to the social welfare and educational services that will be rendered to the people by the Quezon Memorial Foundation”.³¹ Velasco equated such charitable activities with “civilised” societies. He asserted, “in almost the majority of progressive countries of advanced culture and civilization exist institutions of social welfare and security, specially in the United States of America”. He perceived these institutions as having the ability to influence the “formation of the National Character”, as well as being a marker of “advanced culture”. Additionally, and crucially, Velasco perceived such progress as intrinsically connected with the preservation of the Philippines as “a Christian people”.³² Thus, and similarly to Osmeña’s creation of a Christian community of mourners, the committee envisioned the memorial as serving a Christian populace, perpetuating the Christian image of the nation fostered through Rizal’s commemoration almost forty years earlier.

In its brief for the competition, whose theme was to be the “Political Progress of the Philippines”, the Committee requested the Quezon Memorial comprise a “Monument and Mausoleum, a Museum Gallery, a Music and Assembly Hall and a Library and Quezoniana”.³³ The mausoleum was to occupy the “place of honor” and

³⁰ Memorandum by Pedro J. Velasco, 9 September 1946, 1, Quezon Memorial Fund Drive Papers, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/quezonmemorial/> (hereafter cited as Memorandum by Pedro J. Velasco).

³¹ Memorandum by Pedro J. Velasco, 1; Pedro J. Velasco to unknown recipient, 29 April 1949, 3, Quezon Memorial Fund Drive Papers, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/quezonmemorial/>.

³² Quezon Memorial Committee, “Let Us Have A Quezon Memorial Foundation”, n.d., 3.

³³ Sergio Bayan, “Rules and Regulations Governing the Competition for the Plan and Design of the Quezon Memorial”, n.d., 4, Quezon Memorial Fund Drive Papers, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/quezonmemorial/> (hereafter cited as Bayan, “Rules and Regulations Governing the Competition for the Plan and Design of the Quezon Memorial”, n.d.); Memorandum, “Quezon Memorial Shrine”, n.d.

would be “simple and dignified” in order to house “the mortal remains of the late President Quezon, with his statue as its dominant feature”. In the background of the mausoleum would be “a sculptural dramatization of the political history of the Philippines”. The Assembly and Music Hall was to be “suitable for large national gatherings of importance”, while the “Library and Quezoniana shall be large enough to hold... volumes and various articles that bear a direct connection with the life of President Quezon”.³⁴ This concept of a cultural centre mirrored the plans of the Rizal National Centennial Commission who similarly sought to establish a library, museum and theatre to be situated on the outskirts of Luneta Park.³⁵ Chapter 2 noted the similarity between these plans and the model of the US Presidential Library System, which likewise often encompasses the associated president’s burial site, together with a library and museum. Here the comparability to the US Presidential Library System also reflects Velasco’s perception of the United States as a model of “advanced culture” to be emulated, suggesting that the “Political Progress of the Philippines” could only be measured in relation to its former coloniser. This marks a significant shift from both the Rizal and Bonifacio monuments, each of which looked equally to Europe and the United States as cultural models. To what extent the impact of the “Black Legend” and the US denigration of Spanish colonial rule, noted in chapter 2, had on this transference is unclear, yet allusions to Europe or Spain are markedly absent. Furthermore, Velasco saw the committee and the memorial as emblematic of a people “who move with the course of civilization”.³⁶ Similarly to the Rizal Monument then, the Quezon Memorial was to stand as a marker of the country’s entrance to the “civilised” world, the model for which was the United States. Despite this, however, in the memorial itself, it was Quezon who was depicted as the root of Philippine development, with his remains occupying the “place of honor”. The creation of new cultural spaces through the inclusion of the Assembly and Music Hall also reflected a broader desire for a new national space for

³⁴ Bayan, “Rules and Regulations Governing the Competition for the Plan and Design of the Quezon Memorial”, n.d., 4.

³⁵ Exec. Order No. 52, *Official Gazette* 50, no. 8 (August 1954): 3409-11; Quirino, “Rizal is Everybody’s Business”, 10, 70-71.

³⁶ Quezon Memorial Committee, “Let Us Have A Quezon Memorial Foundation”, n.d., 3.

the newly independent country. Indeed, the memorial was to be erected in the recently established Quezon City.

Quezon City: “The living symbol of the birth of a nation”

As noted in chapter 1, following the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935, Quezon expressed a wish for a new capital city for the new country.³⁷ There was a practical motivation for the move, with Manila experiencing many housing, traffic and sanitation issues by the 1930s. Additionally there had also been long held plans to relocate the University of the Philippines campus away from Manila due to congestion and to improve facilities.³⁸ However, the creation of a new capital for a nation on the verge of independence was also symbolic for Quezon. He envisioned the new city as a “model community”, as well as a “showplace of the nation... the epitome of culture and spirit of the country”.³⁹ A site was chosen that remained close enough to the port of Manila yet was further inland to reduce the risk of flooding to which Manila was prone, as well as lessen the possibility of attack.⁴⁰ The new city was created through the merger of several smaller towns: Novaliches, Balintawak and San Francisco del Monte, and finally established in 1939.⁴¹ In 1940

³⁷ Boquet, “From Paris and Beijing to Washington and Brasilia: The Grand Design of Capital Cities and the Early Plans for Quezon City”, 53.

³⁸ Michael D. Pante, “Quezon's City: Corruption and contradiction in Manila's prewar suburbia, 1935–1941”, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 48, no. 1, (February 2017): 94, 97.

³⁹ Manuel L. Quezon. 1941. “Message of His Excellency Manuel L. Quezon President of the Philippines To the Second National Assembly On the State of the Nation” (speech). In *Official Gazette*, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1941/01/31/manuel-l-quezon-seventh-state-of-the-nation-address-january-31-1941/>; Manuel Quezon quoted in *The Envisioned City of Quezon* (Quezon City: Quezon City Government, 2018), 1, https://quezoncity.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Eco_Profile_2018_Chapter-1.pdf.

⁴⁰ Boquet, “From Paris and Beijing to Washington and Brasilia: The Grand Design of Capital Cities and the Early Plans for Quezon City”, 55.

⁴¹ An Act to Create Quezon City of 1939, Act No. 502, Second National Assembly (1939), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1939/10/12/commonwealth-act-no-502/>.

Quezon delivered the State of the Nation address from Quezon City, which was the first time it had been held anywhere other than Manila. In 1941 an International Exposition was held in Quezon City to mark the sixth anniversary of the commonwealth.⁴²

From its initiation the new capital was intended to embody the beginning of a new nation state. In 1941 Quezon City Vice-Mayor Ponciano Bernado wrote “in planning Quezon City, the fact has been taken into consideration that the city will be the cultural and artistic center rather than commercial center of the nation. Manila will always be the commercial and industrial center of the nation... This new modern city shall be the living symbol of the birth of a nation, the Philippine Republic that shall come into being in 1946. All the combined will of the Filipino people, all its past and present culture, all its aspirations, which shall soon be gloriously fulfilled shall be embodied within the carefully planned structure of this city”.⁴³ Similarly to Quezon’s vision, Bernado conceived Quezon City as a cultural showcase, reflecting the Bonifacio Monument Committee’s and Tolentino’s perception of art and culture as markers of national identity. While artists and architects were notably absent from the Quezon Memorial Committee, the significance of artistic culture to nation-building under President Marcos would hasten the memorial’s development.

The creation of new capitals had long been established globally, including Canberra (1913) and New Delhi (1931), and in the second half of the twentieth century, when many countries gained independence following colonial rule, several new capitals emerged, including Islamabad in Pakistan (1960) and Dodoma in Tanzania (1974). Despite this international precedent, however, the plans for Quezon City were heavily influenced by the United States. The designs for the city had been completed by William Parsons, an American architect who had worked with Daniel Burnham, who himself was responsible for redesigning Manila and Baguio in the early years of

⁴² Pante, “Quezon's City: Corruption and contradiction in Manila's prewar suburbia, 1935–1941”, 100-1.

⁴³ Ponciano A. Bernardo, “The Building of Quezon City”, in *Souvenir Program: 70th Birthday Anniversary*, 46.

US colonial rule. However, due to Parsons' death, the final design was a collaboration between Harry Frost, an associate of Parsons, Louis Croft, an American landscape architect and planner, and Filipino architect Juan Marcos Arellano y de Guzmán (Figure 4.5). Despite the American-Philippine collaboration, Quezon City's design echoed the layouts of Washington, DC and Paris. Indeed, Boquet has referred to the design as the "Frost Plan", which envisioned the city constructed around an ellipse, from which various roads would emanate.⁴⁴ Within the ellipse was planned a presidential mansion, the Supreme Court, a presidential library, a theatre and a museum. Morley has argued that Burnham's designs for Manila and Baguio sought to distinguish the American regime from the Spanish and emphasise the shift to a democratic, secular and thus greater civilisation, whilst also seeking to unite the country.⁴⁵ Similarly, the plans for Quezon City, in an echo of the plans for the Rizal Monument, on whose jury Parsons had served, aimed to showcase symbols of Philippine government and culture to illustrate the country's "civilised" progress: "its past and present culture, all its aspirations".⁴⁶

During the Japanese occupation, Manila was reinstated as the capital. However, the capital moved again to Quezon City in 1948.⁴⁷ In 1949, the plans for the city were amended by one of the original architects, Juan Arellano (Figure 4.6). However, despite Arellano now taking the lead, the redesigns moved the city closer to an emulation of Washington, DC; government buildings were no longer positioned in the ellipse and instead moved to an area named Constitution Hill. These buildings comprised a House of Congress, a Hall of Fame (which was to be "a memorial for heroes and patriots"), a Library of Congress, the Palace of the Chief Executive (the President) and the Supreme Court. A thoroughfare named "Republic Avenue" was to

⁴⁴ Boquet, "From Paris and Beijing to Washington and Brasilia: The Grand Design of Capital Cities and the Early Plans for Quezon City", 57.

⁴⁵ Morley, *Cities and Nationhood*.

⁴⁶ Bernardo, "The Building of Quezon City", 46.

⁴⁷ Boquet, "From Paris and Beijing to Washington and Brasilia: The Grand Design of Capital Cities and the Early Plans for Quezon City", 58; An Act to Establish the Capital of the Philippines and the Permanent Seat of the National Government of 1948, Act No. 333, *Official Gazette* 45, no. 3 (March 1949): 1184, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1948/07/17/republic-act-no-333/>.

stretch from Constitution Hill to a rotunda, which was to house a “War Heroes Memorial”.⁴⁸ The new design reflected the significance of commemoration to government-led nation-building, with the Quezon Memorial, Constitution Hill and the War Heroes Memorial positioned in a line across the city. Indeed, Quezon would not only form the “place of honour” within the memorial, but the memorial’s symbolic connection to government would forever embed him within the very foundations of the nation. Yet while the positioning of the key buildings were reminiscent of the linearity of Capitol Hill, the Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial, at the same time, Quezon City, situated at the location of Bonifacio’s “Cry of Balintawak” and with its recently added “Katipunan Parkway”, sought to locate the new nation within its revolutionary heritage. The creation of a new presidential palace meant that Malacañang, formerly the seat of Spanish Governors General, would no longer be used by Philippine presidents. Furthermore, the emphasis on Bonifacio and the Katipunan, in addition to the creation of new cultural spaces with the “Hall of Fame”, as well as the Quezon Memorial itself, sought to shift the focus from Luneta Park, which was not only the site of the Rizal Monument but the site on which gatherings of national importance had long taken place, including the transfer of power from the United States to the new Republic of the Philippines in 1946. However, as the following section will examine, not everyone was willing to relinquish old national spaces for new ones.

Memorial proposals

For the Philippine Institute of Architects, the Quezon Memorial Park within which the memorial was to stand was not a new national space but a “counterpart of the Luneta”.⁴⁹ They perceived the park’s beautification as enabling it to become “a fitting memorial to another great Filipino and Statesman Manuel L. Quezon in the

⁴⁸ Boquet, “From Paris and Beijing to Washington and Brasilia: The Grand Design of Capital Cities and the Early Plans for Quezon City”, 59.

⁴⁹ Philippine Institute of Architects Special Committee on the Quezon Memorial Park, *Report on the Quezon Memorial Park and Related Subjects* (Makati: Philippine Institute of Architects, 1969), 5.

same way that the Luneta is to J.P. Rizal”.⁵⁰ Likewise, an early design for the Quezon Memorial by Guillermo Tolentino depicted it as standing within Luneta Park and opposite the Rizal Monument (Figure 4.7). Unlike the Quezon City planners, Tolentino was unwilling to create a national space away from the “hallowed” Luneta Park and the place “where our great Hero, Dr. Rizal was shot and his bones were buried”. For Tolentino, it was still Rizal not Quezon that endowed a space with significance. Additionally, whereas much of the memorialisation of Bonifacio sought to mark the Cry of Balintawak and the start of the Philippine Revolution as the Philippines’ true break with its colonial past, Tolentino reemphasised the United States’ recognition of Philippine independence on 4 July 1946 as “the greatest event in the history of our beloved country”, elevating Luneta Park as the location at which that event took place.⁵¹ Muzaini and Yeoh have referred to this as “locational emplacement”, which they define as the “meaningful experience[s]” visitors gain from the “emotional resonance” of a site “exactly or near where historical events took place”.⁵² Thus despite the symbolic value of Quezon City representing the “birth of a nation”, for Tolentino the suitability of a space for commemoration lay in its perceived historical value, as well as through the presence of the deceased, which as Verdery has noted, functions to “localize” the past, bringing it into the present.⁵³

What is more, Tolentino’s classical design, which is reminiscent of the Greek Parthenon, echoes his temple-pediment-like composition on the Bonifacio Monument. Yet like the Bonifacio Monument, the design is also replete with Filipino imagery, including a frieze depicting scenes from Philippine history. Additionally, and again comparably to the Bonifacio Monument, Quezon is not the sole focus of the memorial. Whilst the site was to include Quezon’s tomb, as well as a marble bust of the president, Tolentino’s central figure is “a standing Filipina Matron proudly

⁵⁰ Philippine Institute of Architects, *Report on the Quezon Memorial Park and Related Subjects*, 5.

⁵¹ Guillermo Tolentino, “Quezon Memorial or Shrine of Freedom”, n.d., Quezon Memorial Fund Drive Papers, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/quezonmemorial/> (hereafter cited as Tolentino, “Quezon Memorial or Shrine of Freedom”, n.d.).

⁵² Muzaini and Yeoh, *Contested Memoryscapes*, 185.

⁵³ Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*, 27-28.

embracing the Filipino Flag”.⁵⁴ Similarly to the Bonifacio Monument and presaging the final design for the Quezon Memorial, Quezon is subsumed within a broader tribute to Philippine nationhood. However, similarly to the US committee’s vision for the Pacific War Memorial discussed in chapter 5, the “Filipina Matron” is described as “a gift of the American people to the young Philippine Republic”.⁵⁵ Indeed Tolentino labels it a “Statue of Freedom”, taking its name from the figure atop the dome of the US Capitol. Thus, similarly to the Rizal Monument, Quezon, and indeed, Philippine freedom and independence, were to be memorialised through a commemorative rhetoric and aesthetic that was overtly American in inspiration. Whilst there is no record of why the Quezon Memorial Committee chose not to use Tolentino’s design, despite the artist’s renown, its proposed location in Luneta Park contradicted Velasco and the committee’s plans for the memorial to be sited in Quezon City. Furthermore, the absence of Quezon from Tolentino’s design was at odds with their intentions for him to occupy the “place of honour”. Yet despite this, the diminution of Quezon within the monument itself would be carried through to the final design for the memorial.

The government’s Department of Instruction had a similar approach to Tolentino in its plans to memorialise Quezon. In 1946 they envisaged the creation of a Roosevelt-Quezon Memorial in order to commemorate “their services to the cause of Philippine-American collaboration”. The Department of Instruction perceived an intrinsic connection between the two figures, describing them as “passionate disciples of freedom and peace”, who had met untimely deaths “just when the dawn of the victory of democracy and of the liberation of the world was breaking”.⁵⁶ However, more than this, they saw the memorial as commemorating both the past and future relationship between the United States and the Philippines. Using language that bears a striking similarity to that of Emmet O’Neal, the head of the

⁵⁴ Tolentino, “Quezon Memorial or Shrine of Freedom”, n.d., 1.

⁵⁵ Tolentino attributed this quote to a “Mr. Robert H. Barrett, the founder of Philippine Foundation of America for the Philippine Cultural Rehabilitation”. Tolentino, “Quezon Memorial or Shrine of Freedom”, n.d., 1.

⁵⁶ F. Benitez to the Department of Instruction, “A Roosevelt-Quezon Memorial”, 17 January 1946, *Official Gazette* 42, no. 1 (February 1946): 195.

committee for the Pacific War Memorial, discussed in chapter 5, the Department of Instruction attributed the “awakening of peoples of the Far East to the ways of freedom and peace” to the “American experiment in the Philippines” and described the Philippines as “the Far Eastern extension of the United States”.⁵⁷ Whilst the memorial did not come to fruition, Roosevelt was eventually commemorated through a street name in Metro Manila and a Manila Light Rail Transit (MLRT) station. However, even this modest remembrance distinguished the Philippines from most Asian nations, as although Roosevelt was commemorated through statues and street names in Europe following the Second World War, the only other street to bear his name in Asia is located in Taipei. This wish to memorialise Roosevelt reveals a desire to highlight the singularity of the Philippine-United States relationship in Asia. In fact, the Department of Instruction sought to underscore the Philippines’ role in bringing “freedom and peace” to the “Far East”. Furthermore, like Tolentino’s proposal, the concept for a Roosevelt-Quezon Memorial reveals the enduring legacy of US colonial rule, both in shaping Philippine identity and the ways in which the Philippines positioned and distinguished itself within Asia. Yet whilst this connected with Velasco’s perception of the United States as a marker of civilisation against which Philippine progress could be measured, ultimately this contrasted with how the government’s post-independence nation-building rhetoric developed.

The competition for the Quezon Memorial launched in 1947, with the final selection made in January 1949. Its purpose, as stipulated by the Quezon Memorial Committee, was to “select the best plan and design for a utilitarian and fitting memorial to be erected in honor of the great Filipino patriot and statesman, the late President Manuel L. Quezon”.⁵⁸ Additionally, while artists had been absent from the jury for the Rizal Monument, like the Bonifacio Monument, the jury for the Quezon Memorial comprised architects and civil engineers. Furthermore, whereas plans for the Rizal Monument had focused on its message, and the Bonifacio Monument

⁵⁷ F. Benitez to the Department of Instruction, “A Roosevelt-Quezon Memorial”, 196.

⁵⁸ Quezon Memorial Committee, “Rules and Regulations Governing the Competition for the Plan and Design of the Quezon Memorial”, n.d., 1, Quezon Memorial Fund Drive Papers, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/quezonmemorial/> (hereafter cited as Quezon Memorial Committee, “Rules and Regulations”, n.d.)

Committee had wanted a monument with artistic integrity, of equal importance to the Quezon Memorial planners was its practicality. The committee stipulated that each competition entry was to be rated according to “Circulation, Access and Orientation; Relative Economy; Unity of Parts and Design; Site Engineering & Landscaping; Adequacy of Spaces and Functions; Appeal, Aesthetics & Originality; Presentation”. Memorialisation would thus be a physical as well as a visual experience. Like the Rizal Monument, the public would have little involvement with only an exhibition of the finalists shown after the award had been made, again reducing the number of “commemorative agents” involved in shaping the project.⁵⁹ However, the competition was open to both Filipino and American architects or civil engineers who were “qualified to practice their profession in the Philippines”, revealing the ongoing significance of the Philippine-United States relationship, as well as underscoring the dislocation of Europe from Philippine national identity.⁶⁰

The launch of the competition, despite the existence of a proposal by Tolentino, a well-established artist and monument creator, attests to the commemorative dominance of the Quezon Memorial Committee in their impetus for a monument that embodied a particular vision of the Philippine nation and which would cement Quezon’s place as a founding father. Yet the plans by Tolentino and the Department of Instruction indicate the presence of other views not only on how Quezon could and should be commemorated but also on the relationship between the newly independent country and its former coloniser. Additionally Tolentino’s focus on Luneta Park not only reflected its ongoing significance but also signalled its future dominance as a memorial space over both the Bonifacio and Quezon Memorials. Federico Ilustre, a graduate of the Mapua Institute of Technology and architect for the Bureau of Public Works, was eventually selected as the competition winner (Figure 4.8). Yet, as the following section will examine, the Quezon Memorial would not be inaugurated for another thirty years.

⁵⁹ Quezon Memorial Committee, “Rules and Regulations”, n.d., 2-3; Edwards, *Allies in Memory*, 5.

⁶⁰ Quezon Memorial Committee, “Rules and Regulations”, n.d., 1.

Monumental delays: commemorating Quezon 1946 to 1965

Despite the plans for Quezon City and the significance of the Quezon Memorial to its symbolism, delays in the memorial's construction ensued following the selection of Ilustre's design. Fundraising began in earnest with Osmeña directing the Quezon Memorial Committee "to conduct a nation-wide campaign for funds until the amount of P250,000 was reached". Following President Roxas' inauguration in 1946, he too authorised the committee to raise funds "without limitation".⁶¹ Additionally, various fundraising events were organised, including a concert and film screening of Quezon's interment in 1947, and the publication of a Quezon Memorial Book in 1952.⁶² However, the country was facing significant reconstruction following the Second World War, particularly as Manila had been so devastated. Additionally, despite the Philippines receiving \$620 million in economic aid from the United States, its development was hampered by the parity clause of the 1946 Bell Trade Act, which granted American citizens equal access to the country's natural resources.⁶³ Merrill has also argued that Quirino's administration hindered economic development through its implementation of policies that favoured political and business associates, leading ultimately to financial crisis in 1951 when the aid was scheduled to cease.⁶⁴

The unprecedented number of presidential administrations within the first eleven years of Philippine independence, following the sudden deaths of Presidents Roxas and Magsaysay, together with the changes in the composition of the Quezon

⁶¹ Pedro G. Tan II, "Objectives and Functions of the Quezon Memorial Committee", n.d., Quezon Memorial Papers, NHCP (hereafter cited as "Objectives and Functions of the Quezon Memorial Committee", n.d.).

⁶² Filemon Poblador, *Quezon Memorial Book* (Manila: Quezon Memorial Committee, 1952), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/quezonmemorial/>; *Program of the Grand Velada and Movies in relation with the Quezon Memorial Fund Drive* (Manila: Quezon Memorial Committee, 1947), Quezon Memorial Fund Drive Papers, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/quezonmemorial/>.

⁶³ Landé, "The Philippines and the United States", 522.

⁶⁴ Merrill, "Shaping Third World Development", 141.

Memorial Committee that accompanied each administration, resulted in the absence of a stable group and single vision to drive the original idea for the monument forward.⁶⁵ In the 1950s, further delays were inevitable as economic hardship grew with the decrease in US aid following the election of US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had campaigned on conservative fiscal reform.⁶⁶ Yet despite this the economy improved again under President Carlos P. Garcia, who succeeded to the presidency after Ramon Magsaysay's sudden death in a plane crash in 1957. Garcia sought to elevate Filipino business following the parity clause of the Bell Trade Act through his "Filipino First" policy.⁶⁷ This could account for Garcia's authorisation of P350,000 (£32,000 today) for the memorial, yet these funds were still "not available" during the succeeding Macapagal administration, possibly due to the country's increasing economic concerns.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ During his presidency, Quirino would alter the composition of the Quezon Memorial Committee four times, most extensively following his re-election in 1949, which saw him remove most of the committee members installed by Osmeña. The new members and representatives from other organisations served to reflect the interest groups supported by the new president and ensured all members were political allies. Exec. Order No. 213, s.1949, *Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines* 45, no. 4 (1949): 1636-37,

<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1949/04/20/executive-order-no-213-s-1949/>;
Elpidio Quirino. 1950. "Address of President Quirino at the opening day of the 11th Biennial Convention and 29th anniversary of the National Federation of Women's Clubs of the Philippines at the Escoda Memorial, March 31, 1950 [Read by Executive Secretary Teodoro Evangelista]" (speech). In *Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines* 46, no. 3 (1950): 915-17,
<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1950/03/31/address-of-president-quirino-at-the-opening-day-of-the-11th-biennial-convention-and-29th-anniversary-of-the-national-federation-of-womens-clubs-of-the-philippines/>. Magsaysay too sought to shape the Quezon Memorial Committee to represent his own interests, including representatives from civic organisations, which reflected his promise to revise the Bell Trade Act. Cullather, "America's Boy? Ramon Magsaysay and the Illusion of Influence", 324; Exec. Order No. 53, s. 1954, *Executive Order Nos.: 1 – 100*, (10 Aug. 1954),

<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1954/08/10/executive-order-no-53-s-1954/>.

⁶⁶ Cullather, "America's Boy? Ramon Magsaysay and the Illusion of Influence", 333.

⁶⁷ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 182.

⁶⁸ "Historical Converter", Fxtop, accessed 9 January 2021,
<https://fxtop.com/en/historical-currency-converter.php>; "Objectives and Functions of the Quezon Memorial Committee", n.d.; Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem, "Technocracy and the Politics of Economic Decision Making during the Pre-Martial Law

Despite this, it was clearly significant to Macapagal to hasten the memorial's development, exhorting all government "officials and employees" to donate to the "first unit" of the memorial ensuring it was constructed in time for Quezon's birth anniversary in 1962.⁶⁹ The commemorations took place at the partially constructed memorial and the service sought to use Quezon to project an image of a united nation with the presence of the president, as well as other political figures, military personnel and representatives of various civic and religious groups. It also served to elevate Macapagal himself, who was welcomed with "full military honors, including a 21-gun salute".⁷⁰ Macapagal also used Quezon's birth anniversary to detach Philippine sovereignty from the United States. Macapagal asserted that "never before in all history did a colony win its independence except by the force of arms. Yet here we were, under the leadership of Quezon, set and determined to blaze a new trail for all mankind to see – a peaceful struggle for independence, not by the use of bullets, but by demonstrating competence in the art of self-government".⁷¹ Independence was portrayed as having been won through Philippine endeavour alone. As noted in chapter 1, the 1960s was marked by a growth in anti-American Philippine nationalism and parallel to this Macapagal had dissociated the United States completely from Philippine independence by moving the date independence was commemorated from the 4 July to the 12 June, which memorialised the inauguration of the First Philippine Republic in 1898.⁷²

Period (1965–1972)", in "Historical Genetics: Kinship and Linguistics Internal Migration Pre-Martial Law Technocracy", ed. Filomeno V. Aguilar Jr., special issue, *Philippine Studies: Historical & Ethnographic Viewpoints* 63, no. 4 (December 2015): 546.

⁶⁹ Memorandum by Amelito R. Mutuc, Executive Secretary, "Enjoining All Officials Of The Government To Extend Wholehearted Support To The Fund Campaign Of The Quezon Memorial Committee", 13 June 1962, *Official Gazette* 58, no. 26 (25 June 1962): 4721, *Official Gazette Archive*, AHC.

⁷⁰ "Official Week In Review", *Official Gazette* 58, no. 35 (August 1962), *Official Gazette Archive*, AHC.

⁷¹ Diosdado Macapagal. 1962. "President Macapagal's Speech on the 84th Birthday Anniversary of the Late President Quezon on August 19, 1962" (speech). In *Official Gazette* 58, no. 36 (September 1962): 5833, *Official Gazette Archive*, AHC.

⁷² Diosdado Macapagal. 1962. "HONOR AND DIGNITY IN FREEDOM" (speech).

While the Philippines' relationship with the United States had shaped Quezon's early commemoration and the initial proposals for the Quezon Memorial, as the Philippines moved into its second decade of independence, Macapagal used Quezon's remembrance to disconnect the Philippines from its colonial past. However, despite the continued significance of Quezon's remembrance to nation-building, economic issues, in addition to the frequent changes in presidential administrations, resulted in long delays to the development and implementation of the Quezon Memorial. However, this would change under the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos who succeeded Macapagal in 1965.

The Quezon Memorial under Martial Law

During his 1965 presidential campaign Marcos sought to differentiate himself from the previous administrations and particularly the accusations of corruption that had marred the Garcia and Macapagal presidencies. To emphasise his separation from Macapagal he switched parties from the Liberal to Nacionalista and ran on the campaign slogan: "this nation can be great again".⁷³ He also capitalised on his Second World War experience, having served as part of the US Armed Forces in the Philippines (USAFP) in Bataan, where he was taken prisoner by the Japanese in 1942.⁷⁴ Indeed, Marcos' experiences as a veteran were incredibly significant to his public persona, although few of his claims can be verified. While USAFP records indicate Marcos re-joined in 1944 and was discharged upon the end of the Second World War in 1945, there are no official accounts of the period in between. He would claim that he spent the intervening years as a guerrilla commander and would also go on to state that he was the Philippines' most decorated war hero.⁷⁵ Jose has noted the significant number of war memorials built during the Marcos regime and

⁷³ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 194.

⁷⁴ Ricardo T. Jose, "Remembering World War II in the Philippines: Memorials, Commemorations and Movies", in *Globalization, Localization, and Japanese Studies in the Asia Pacific Region*, ed. James C. Baxter, vol. 3 (Kyoto: International Research Center for Japanese Studies, 2010), 121.

⁷⁵ Bonner, *Waltzing With A Dictator*, 14-17.

the attention Marcos gave to veterans, many of whom occupied positions in the government and the military.⁷⁶ This also reflected Marcos' close ties to the military, which he used to realise infrastructure projects, bypassing the need for congressional approval, and by so doing enlarging the power of the presidency.⁷⁷ Thus large public projects, a prolific public profile, and increased presidential powers marked the beginnings of the Marcos era.

Cultural projects were of particular significance to Marcos. Following his declaration of martial law in 1972, Marcos promised a "New Society" in which he not only pledged an end to violence, corruption and inequality, but emphasised the importance of building a new cultural identity due to the absence of "pre-colonial traditions" which have "long been buried and forgotten".⁷⁸ Furthermore, Marcos attributed the influence of colonialism on the country as a consequence of "a lack of any significant structure such as the "Taj Mahal... Angkor Wat... Great Wall... to remind the colonial intruder of his insolence in affecting to 'civilize us'".⁷⁹ In order to increase investment, Marcos and his wife Imelda prioritised the improvement of tourism to the Philippines, which led to the patronage of numerous cultural programmes on a scale previously unseen in the country. However, Baluyut has asserted these projects served primarily to emphasise the Marcoses own power and promote themselves as guardians of Philippine culture and art.⁸⁰ A significant cultural project developed during the Martial Law period was the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) (Figure 4.9), which received considerable funding both from the US government and American private donors.⁸¹ Baluyut has shown how the CCP represented the "institutional elaboration of reciprocity" between Marcos and the United States – a topic that I touched upon briefly in chapter 1.⁸²

⁷⁶ Jose, "Remembering World War II in the Philippines", 124.

⁷⁷ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 195.

⁷⁸ Ferdinand Marcos, *Today's Revolution: Democracy* (Manila, 1971), 91; Baluyut, *Institutions and Icons of Patronage*, 11-15.

⁷⁹ Marcos, *Today's Revolution: Democracy*, 92.

⁸⁰ Baluyut, *Institutions and Icons of Patronage*, 6-10.

⁸¹ Baluyut, *Institutions and Icons of Patronage*, 11-35; Bonner, *Waltzing With A Dictator*, 51-53.

⁸² Baluyut, *Institutions and Icons of Patronage*, 16-21.

Marcos' cultural projects were also a means for him to evidence the successes of his Martial Law regime, which is underscored by the significant increase in construction expenditure from 21% in Marcos' first term to 43% by 1980.⁸³ Additionally Marcos used the delays in the Quezon Memorial's construction as evidence of the failures of the pre-Martial Law period.⁸⁴ As part of his tourism initiative, Marcos declared 1977 "the year for a Reunion for Peace" and invited Second World War veterans to visit the Philippines.⁸⁵ He again used his experiences as a veteran and the "poignance and heartbreak" of Bataan to improve his overseas appeal and to connect with veterans as "brothers in arms".⁸⁶ Particularly important to Marcos was showcasing the evolution of the Philippines from "one of the most devastated countries in that war" to being an inspiration for "the potential and actual heights of progress and achievement which peoples can attain in peace".⁸⁷ A significant focus for the veterans' pilgrimage was the Dambana ng Kagitingan (Shrine of Valor) (Figure 4.10), a memorial to the US and Philippine soldiers who had fought on Bataan and which had been inaugurated in 1970. The monument's completion eight years ahead of the Quezon Memorial, despite the latter's initiation twenty years prior to Marcos entering office, is indicative of the importance of Bataan's memorialisation to Marcos, and of cementing an "outstanding milestone in our history" which Marcos "personally experienced".⁸⁸

However, despite this focus on Second World War memorialisation, the Quezon Memorial remained significant to Marcos as part of his creation of a new cultural

⁸³ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society*, 195.

⁸³ Marcos, *Today's Revolution: Democracy*, 212.

⁸⁴ Memorandum, "Quezon Memorial Shrine", n.d., 2.

⁸⁵ Jose, "Remembering World War II in the Philippines", 126.

⁸⁶ Ferdinand Marcos, preface to *The Return To The Philippine Islands*, by the American Defenders of Bataan & Corregidor (1967), box 3, Philippine Burial Benefits folder, Emmet O'Neal Papers, HSTPLM, (hereafter cited as Marcos, preface to *The Return To The Philippine Islands*).

⁸⁷ Letter of Instruction No. 331, s. 1975, (29 Oct. 1975), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1975/10/29/letter-of-instruction-no-331-s-1975/>.

⁸⁸ Marcos, preface to *The Return To The Philippine Islands*.

landscape. Indeed, the establishment or reinterpretation of cultural sites also marked a period of Martial Law in Taiwan (1949-87), as well as the revolutionary regime of Fidel Castro in Cuba.⁸⁹ One of Marcos' first legislative acts the day following the instatement of martial law on the 23 September 1972 was to transfer responsibility for the Quezon Memorial to the National Historical Institute (NHI).⁹⁰ This took place as part of a wider "Integrated Reorganization Plan", which sought to centralise control by reducing the number of government departments in order to "enhance efficiency and effectiveness".⁹¹ The NHI was a new creation by Marcos, and replaced the National Historical Commission, which although created by Macapagal in 1965 had its origins in the Philippine Historical Research and Markers Committee established in 1933.⁹² Similarly to its former incarnations, the NHI was responsible for the preservation and restoration of historical sites, which included the "right to declare historical and cultural sites and edifices as national shrines, monuments, and/or landmarks".⁹³ The NHI was headed by the historian Esteban de Ocampo who had co-founded the Philippine Historical Association (PHA) in 1955.⁹⁴ Like the NHI the PHA also sought to promote and preserve Philippine history, and was behind the passage of Republic Act 1425 in 1956, which made the teaching of Rizal's works compulsory in tertiary education.⁹⁵ Incidentally Ocampo too sought to fortify Rizal's place in Philippine history, later contributing to the NHI's 1993

⁸⁹ Lung-chih Chang and Min-chin Kay Chiang, "From Colonial Site to Cultural Heritage", *The Focus: Postcolonial Dialogues*, no. 59 (2012): 28-29; González, "The Organization of Commemorative Space in Postcolonial Cuba".

⁹⁰ Memorandum, "Quezon Memorial Shrine", n.d., 3.

⁹¹ Albert F. Celoz, *Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of Authoritarianism* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 86; Exec. Order No. 546 (23 Jul. 1979), <https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/Legislation/Philippines/eo546.pdf>.

⁹² "National Historical Commission of the Philippines", Department of Budget and Management, GOV.PH, accessed 28 October 2021, <https://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/OPCCB/OPIF2012/NHCP%20fo.pdf>.

⁹³ Presidential Decree No. 1505, s. 1978 (11 Jun. 1978), https://lawphil.net/statutes/presdecs/pd1978/pd_1505_1978.html.

⁹⁴ "About", Philippine Historical Association, accessed 28 October 2021, <https://pha1955.com/index.php/about/>; Michael "Xiao" Chua, "65 years of the Philippine Historical Association", *Manila Times*, 19 September 2020, <https://www.manilatimes.net/2020/09/19/opinion/columnists/65-years-of-the-philippine-historical-association/769533>.

⁹⁵ Chua, "65 years of the Philippine Historical Association".

publication, *Why is Rizal the Greatest Filipino Hero?*.⁹⁶ Thus, Marcos' creation of the new government agency, in addition to dissolving the Quezon Memorial Committee, not only functioned to bring the entire project under his leadership, removing any connection to previous Philippine presidents, but also ensured the Quezon Memorial would be developed by an organisation with its own agenda for who should be distinguished in Philippine history.

Furthermore, while Marcos was keen to erect the Quezon Memorial, it was no longer to be the cornerstone of a new capital city. Part of Marcos' societal restructure saw the capital move from Quezon City back to Manila in 1976. Marcos stated, "Manila has always been, to the Filipino people and in the eye of the world, the premier city of the Philippines, it being the center for trade, commerce, education and culture... Manila from time immemorial has been the seat of the national government of the Philippines".⁹⁷ Like the creation of Quezon City, the reinstatement of Manila as the capital functioned to symbolise a new era, this time under Marcos. Additionally, Marcos had already subsumed Quezon City within the new region of Metro Manila in 1975, over which Imelda Marcos was installed as Governor.⁹⁸ There is also evidence of Imelda's involvement in the Quezon Memorial, as the Quezon Centennial Committee meeting minutes from 1978 state that plans to make improvements to the Memorial Circle, within which the Quezon Memorial stands, were awaiting approval from the First Lady.⁹⁹ Despite his declaration of a "New Society", Marcos sought to emphasise and position himself within Manila's historical supremacy. This not only reduced the significance of Quezon City but the

⁹⁶ Esteban de Ocampo, *Why is Rizal the Greatest Filipino Hero?* (Manila: National Historical Institute, 1993).

⁹⁷ Presidential Decree No. 940, s. 1976,
<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1976/05/29/presidential-decree-no-940-s-1976/>.

⁹⁸ Bonner, *Waltzing With A Dictator*, 156.

⁹⁹ Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee on MLQ Centennial Celebration Held at the Mayor's Office on 23 May 1978 at 12.00 Noon, Initial Report on 1978 Manuel L. Quezon National Centennial Year [30 June 1978], Manila, 2, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/quezonmemorial/> (hereafter cited as Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee on MLQ Centennial Celebration).

Quezon Memorial itself, which would now be located within a suburb of Metro Manila.

Whilst Marcos lessened the symbolism around Quezon City, Quezon's own commemoration was used to reinforce the necessity of the Martial Law regime. Marcos instituted the Quezon Centennial to mark the 100th anniversary of his birth in 1978, stating that "we have much to learn from the counsel of sustained and effective political action so eminently exemplified by Quezon... for we are now faced in essence by the challenge of national self-strengthening, of building the structures of a new political order on the basis of what we have achieved".¹⁰⁰ Although Marcos underlined Quezon's significance, he sought to rearticulate the national narrative around Quezon, contesting his earlier portrayal as a founding father by removing him as the source of the country's independence, which Marcos suggested was only just coming to fruition.

The Quezon Memorial was finally inaugurated on the centenary of Quezon's birth on 19 August 1978 (Figure 4.11). This coincided with the first elections to take place since the introduction of martial law. In 1973 Marcos had overseen the passage of a new constitution, which gave him greater powers and shifted the government to a parliamentary system. Following the elections in 1978 he became both president and prime minister. Thus similarly to the openings of the Rizal and Bonifacio Monuments, the inauguration took place at a politically significant moment. At the Rizal Monument ceremony the Philippine Commission sought to illustrate the success of the colonial programme, whilst at the Bonifacio Monument opening the image portrayed was of a nation ready for independence. Equally at the inauguration of the Quezon Memorial, it was again important to establish a strong image of the nation. Like the earlier inaugurations this was achieved through the inclusion of national symbols, such as the playing of "Lupang Hinirang" (formerly known as the

¹⁰⁰ *100th Birth Anniversary Manuel L. Quezon*, (Manila: 1978 Manuel L. Quezon National Centennial Celebration Subcommittee on Souvenir Program, 1978), 5, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/quezonmemorial/> (hereafter cited as *100th Birth Anniversary Manuel L. Quezon*).

“Marcha Nacional Filipina”), as well as military and political representatives, with speeches from political figures including Marcos himself.¹⁰¹ Even the local was subsumed within the national narrative with the Executive Committee of the Quezon Centennial requesting that the governments of Baler and Quezon submit their proposed anniversary programmes for approval.¹⁰² However, yet again, Quezon was not necessarily the focus of proceedings. Following a military parade depicting the life of Quezon, Marcos was presented with a “centennial award... for leading the Filipino nation in venerating the memory of the late president on his centennial year”.¹⁰³

The inauguration also included the reinterment of Quezon’s remains into the mausoleum that lay within the monument itself. In a manner reminiscent of Rizal’s reburial, Quezon’s remains were removed from Manila North Cemetery and placed at Quezon City Hall, during which time the Jesuit priest Father Pacifico Ortiz officiated a mass prior to their transfer to the mausoleum.¹⁰⁴ On 19 August 1978 Quezon’s remains were taken to the monument mausoleum where the Archbishop of Manila, Cardinal Jaime Sin, gave a “Requiem Mass” attended by Marcos and Imelda.¹⁰⁵

As noted in chapter 2, Verdery’s argument about religious reburial re-imbuing a corpse with significance, and (re)sacralising “the political order represented by those who carry it out” is useful when trying to contextualise the link between the bodies of dead leaders and monuments built in their honour in the Philippines.¹⁰⁶ With Rizal this served to raise the status of the Knights of Rizal and reflected the Philippines’

¹⁰¹ Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 209; *100th Birth Anniversary Manuel L. Quezon*, 49-51.

¹⁰² Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee on MLQ Centennial Celebration, 3.

¹⁰³ Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee on MLQ Centennial Celebration, 6.

¹⁰⁴ “The Sub-Committees”, Initial Report on 1978 Manuel L. Quezon National Centennial Year [30 June 1978], Manila, 15, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/quezonmemorial/> (hereafter cited as Initial Report on 1978 Manuel L. Quezon National Centennial Year).

¹⁰⁵ *100th Birth Anniversary Manuel L. Quezon*, 50.

¹⁰⁶ Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*, 32.

increasing political representation. For Marcos the reburial functioned to position him as the natural successor to Quezon, facilitated by Imelda Marcos' own juxtaposition with former First Lady Aurora Quezon (Figure 4.12). Furthermore, following the mass the president and First Lady gave a floral offering together with Quezon's children, reinforcing the connection between the two families.

Additionally, the presence of Father Ortiz and Cardinal Sin echoed Quezon's early Christianised remembrance, in which Osmeña encouraged the populace to remember the recently deceased president in churches. This not only preserved the colonial Christian image of the nation but also echoed Marcos' own equation of Christianity with being Filipino, markedly revealed in the cruciform shape of the Dambana ng Kagitingan structure. As noted in chapter 1, Marcos had perpetuated the long-standing divisions between the Christian and Muslim populations. Following Marcos' declaration of martial law, a war erupted between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), formed in 1972, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which as part of martial law sought to confiscate the MNLF's weaponry, causing the Muslim provinces to "equate the New Society with military rule".¹⁰⁷ Indeed, whilst Marcos pledged to support the "Muslim areas" in "catching up with the more developed parts of the country", his first State of the Nation address following the declaration of martial law revealed the distinction he observed between the Christian and Muslim populations, as he distinguished between "the Filipinos and our Muslim brothers".¹⁰⁸ Additionally, Abinales and Amoroso have noted that while Muslim differences were acknowledged and accepted in the post-independence years they were never included within the "national narrative" and greater political assimilation was never fostered.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 217.

¹⁰⁸ Ferdinand E. Marcos. 1973. "Message of His Excellency Ferdinand E. Marcos President of the Philippines To the Congress On the State of the Nation" (speech). In *Official Gazette*, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1973/09/21/ferdinand-e-marcos-eighth-state-of-the-nation-address-september-21-1973>.

¹⁰⁹ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 188.

However, while the presence of the Catholic Church reflected the stronger ties between the church and state following independence, it also maintained a position of “critical collaboration” throughout the Martial Law period, which enabled the church to preserve its autonomy and pursue its own social projects. Yet ultimately the Catholic hierarchy was finally forced to speak out against Marcos following Aquino’s assassination as increasingly more of the clergy denounced him from the pulpit.¹¹⁰ Indeed, Cardinal Sin would become a leading figure in the People Power Revolution of 1986, which resulted in the end of Marcos’ rule.¹¹¹

The completion of the Quezon Memorial needs to be understood within the broader context of Marcos’ rule, as well as within a global trend of cultural landscape reformations, which occurred following significant regime changes in government. Although it was initiated under President Osmeña, and its ideology was shaped by Velasco and the Quezon Memorial Committee, it was constructed as part of Marcos’ cultural transformation in the 1970s. Not only did it serve to evidence the success of martial law but also its inauguration sanctified Marcos’ leadership. Furthermore, the diminished importance of Quezon City together with Marcos’ reshaping of Quezon as a contributor as opposed to founder of the country’s independence, only underscored the importance of the “New Society” and to elevate Marcos’ own place in Philippine history. The following section will examine the Quezon Memorial Shrine itself and to what extent its design reflects Marcos’ ideology.

Quezon Memorial Shrine

Designed by Federico Ilustre, the Quezon Memorial Shrine is comprised of three marble veneered reinforced concrete pylons, each referencing one of the three major geographical areas of the Philippines: Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (Figure

¹¹⁰ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 220-23.

¹¹¹ Bonner, *Waltzing With A Dictator*, 435.

4.13).¹¹² The columns sit atop a triangular concrete base, which itself is modelled after the triangle of the Philippine flag. The pylons are also connected at the top through a covered observation deck. Each column measures 66 metres in height, which corresponds to the age of Quezon when he died, and at the top of each is a “sculptured relief of a winged woman... garbed in the traditional costume of the three regions” (Figure 4.14).¹¹³ Each woman is also holding a sampaguita wreath, which is the national flower of the Philippines. Around the base of the monument is a frieze with panels depicting moments from Quezon’s life, Philippine history and contemporary Philippine life, as well as areas of natural beauty within the country. Within the base is housed a museum dedicated to the life of Quezon and a mausoleum which houses the remains of Quezon and his wife Aurora.

Similarly to both the Rizal Monument and the Bonifacio Monument, the memorial’s architecture draws from Western commemorative traditions with its columnar construction. Further allusions to Western memorial traditions are also made through the inclusion of the winged figures at the top of each pylon. As noted in chapter 3, winged figures of Victory had featured on monuments from the Roman Empire through to the twentieth century, including on US memorials erected following the First World War. Yet here they are also given a Philippine inflection with each figure holding a wreath made from the national flower, the sampaguita. Like the Bonifacio Monument, the Quezon Memorial marks its place within a global architectural heritage through the inclusion of Western commemorative tropes, yet it is also localised through Philippine sculptural language. However, its overall aesthetic is markedly different from both the Rizal and Bonifacio Monuments not only through its art deco rendering but its enormous stature.

Indeed, its gargantuan height dwarfs these earlier monuments and renders the structure more analogous to Marcos’ other cultural projects such as Dambana ng

¹¹² National Historical Institute, Identification of Significant Historical Structure NCR ST 002, “Quezon Memorial Shrine”, 25 April 1988, NHCP (hereafter cited as NHI “Quezon Memorial Shrine”).

¹¹³ NHI “Quezon Memorial Shrine”.

Kagitingan and the Cultural Center of the Philippines. Monumentality characterises the cultural constructions of the Marcos period, reflecting Marcos' wish both to forge a new cultural identity for the country due to "the lack of any significant structure", and as Baluyut notes, to memorialise himself as the "guardian" of such culture.¹¹⁴ However, enormity also distinguishes the monuments that formed part of the memorial landscape transformations seen globally in the latter half of the twentieth century, particularly during the 1970s, including the colossal Lenin head in Ulan-Ude (1970), the Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum in Hanoi (1975) and the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall in Beijing (1977) (Figures 4.15-4.18). Indeed, the enormous bust of President Marcos, erected near the peak of Mount Shontoug in northern Luzon (Figure 4.19), bears a similarity to the Ulan-Ude Lenin head. Marcos' memorialisation projects reflected not just his personal admiration of such colossal projects but also his Cold War manoeuvrings. While Marcos of course courted the United States, he also sought to establish diplomatic ties with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, visiting both nations in the 1970s.¹¹⁵ Thus, while the Quezon Memorial drew from American and European commemorative tradition, it also marked a new era in Philippine commemorative architecture in its reflection of the monumental practices in revolutionary and postcolonial regimes which sought to establish "cults of personality" in order to cement their rule.¹¹⁶

Many of the images included on the frieze also function to elevate Marcos' own role in the nation's evolution. Scenes include the Banaue Rice Terraces (declared a National Cultural Treasure by President Marcos in 1973), and a panel named the "Quest for Philippine Progress", which depicts an aeroplane, a "jeepney" and various

¹¹⁴ Marcos, *Today's Revolution: Democracy*, 92; Baluyut, *Institutions and Icons of Patronage*, 8-10.

¹¹⁵ "Soviet and Philippines Agree on Establishing Ties", *New York Times*, 2 June 1976; "Mao Welcomes Marcos and His Family", *New York Times*, 8 June 1975; Joseph Scalice, "Cadre as informal diplomats: Ferdinand Marcos and the Soviet Bloc, 1965–1975", *History and Anthropology*, Published ahead of print, 28 June 2021, 1-17, 1946053. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02757206.2021.1946053>.

¹¹⁶ See for example Olga Dror, "Establishing Hồ Chí Minh's Cult: Vietnamese Traditions and Their Transformations", *Journal of Asian Studies* 75, no. 2 (May 2016): 433-66.

construction works (Figure 4.20).¹¹⁷ Furthermore, the inclusion of Philippine Second World War scenes is indicative of the broader initiative by Marcos to elevate his own contributions to the war effort. However, like the Bonifacio Monument, these depictions also serve to underline a highly masculine image of the nation. Whilst women are present, for example in a depiction of Gabriela Silang, who led a Filipino revolutionary movement against Spain in 1763, they are predominantly shown in the company of men and are secondary characters, such as First Lady Aurora Quezon, who is depicted at the deathbed of the president, perhaps to signify the dutiful nature of the current First Lady, Imelda Marcos. Although the image entitled “The New Professionals”, includes depictions of women in various occupations, ultimately they are there to reinforce the role Marcos has played in the country’s advancement. Aside from the frieze, the only sculptural depictions of women are the winged figures at the top of each column, which similarly to the Bonifacio Monument, function to portray women as an abstracted ideal.¹¹⁸ Notably there is also a panel depicting the Battle of Tirad Pass, a key encounter during the Philippine-American War, in which the Philippine Army managed to delay American forces and enable President Aguinaldo to escape, reflecting the renewed focus on the conflict within contemporary Philippine historiography. Furthermore, the frieze also contains a depiction of Muslim ruler Sultan Kudurat, who reigned in Mindanao in the seventeenth century and successfully thwarted Spanish forces. However ultimately, like the depictions of women, this is almost imperceptible within the enormity of the edifice.

There are also scenes from Quezon’s life which seek to demonstrate his accomplishments, such as his inaugural speech as president of the Philippine Commonwealth, and an image of him planting rice, which both familiarises Quezon and emphasises his contribution to the country’s agricultural and economic development. Yet, similarly to the Bonifacio Monument, Quezon is not idolised alone but is shown to be part of a heroic lineage. There are images of other Philippine

¹¹⁷ The jeepney is a vehicle that evolved from United States military jeeps and is mostly used for public transport.

¹¹⁸ Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 170-71.

heroes including, Rizal, Bonifacio, and an imagined depiction of a living Rizal together with key figures in the Katipunan in a scene entitled “Revolutionists in Victory”. Reflecting Marcos’ statements around Quezon, which reduced his political significance to having made “valuable contributions... to the political emancipation of our people”, Quezon is almost absent from the exterior of the memorial.¹¹⁹ Whilst Quezon is depicted on the frieze and symbolically alluded to in the physical construction of the memorial, there are no other elements on the exterior to signify the man. Similarly to Bonifacio, Quezon is obscured within a wider memorialisation of Philippine heroes.

Despite this, the memorial’s interior focuses on Quezon alone. Indeed his remains are physically present within the mausoleum, alongside those of his wife, Aurora (Figure 4.21). The mausoleum is located within the triangular base of the memorial and comprises a marble circular chamber with its sides “pierced by entrances”.¹²⁰ A marble sarcophagus is positioned in the centre, raised by two short marble columns that stand on a stepped marble platform in the shape of a decagon. The mausoleum is double height, allowing for a cylindrical viewing platform on the floor overhead, above which is a domed roof with a glass skylight at its centre. On the viewing platform standing atop a marble plinth and set within an alcove is a bronze sculpture of Quezon by Tolentino. Set within an alcove to the side of the sarcophagus is a black marble altar above which a cross is fixed to the wall. Within the altar are the remains of Aurora Quezon. Each tomb features the name of its occupant in bronze raised letters and the years of their births and deaths. Quezon’s sarcophagus has a bronze wreath affixed to each end.

Similarly to the memorial’s gargantuan exterior, the mausoleum also recalls the monumental tombs erected under authoritarian regimes as part of the establishment of “cults of personality”. Mausoleums had been constructed in honour of revolutionary leaders by a number of emerging nation-states across the

¹¹⁹ Proclamation No. 1726, s. 1978, (31 Mar. 1978), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1978/03/31/proclamation-no-1726-s-1978/>.

¹²⁰ NHI “Quezon Memorial Shrine”.

twentieth century, including Sun Yat-sen in Republican China (1929), Lenin in the Soviet Union (1930), Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam (1975) and Mao Zedong in the People's Republic of China (1977). However, the presentation of Quezon's sarcophagus in a circular chamber, on a raised platform, together with the carved wreaths on the tomb itself, also recalls the tomb of Napoleon housed at the Hôtel des Invalides, Paris, which was completed in 1861 (Figure 4.22). This military connection is seen also in the similarity between the carvings on Quezon's tomb and the rendered wreaths on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington, a raised marble sarcophagus that was inaugurated in 1921 (Figure 4.23). As noted earlier Quezon had been interred in Arlington until his body could be transferred to the Philippines. While these military connotations serve to elevate Quezon, locating him within the revered "cult of the fallen", they also function to underline Marcos' own military prowess.¹²¹ Furthermore, like Lenin, Ho Chi Ming and Mao Zedong, Marcos too would lie in state following his death, with his remains displayed in a glass crypt in the Marcos Museum and Mausoleum in Batac City, Luzon, until his reburial in the Libingan ng mga Bayani (Heroes' Cemetery) in 2016.¹²²

However, this honouring of Quezon does not correspond to the public veneration given to his resting place. In his work on war memorials, Inglis has suggested that the "tomb is the ritual centre of the nation, receiving obligatory wreaths from every visiting head of state".¹²³ Indeed, as mentioned in chapter 3, the significance bestowed on a site through the presence of the memorialised person's remains was recognised by the Bonifacio family who continually pressed for a symbolic reinterment. Nonetheless, despite the physical presence of Quezon's remains, there is no honour guard here as there is at the Rizal Monument or instructions as to behaviour, as at the Pacific War Memorial, which will be discussed in chapter 5. As

¹²¹ Budreau, *Bodies of War*, 4.

¹²² Jodesz Gavilan, "From Hawaii to Ilocos Norte: The long journey of Ferdinand Marcos' remains", *Rappler*, 11 September 2016, <https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/hawaii-ilocos-norte-ferdinand-marcos-body>; "Marcos buried at Libingan ng mga Bayani", *Rappler*, 18 November 2016, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/ferdinand-marcos-heroes-burial>.

¹²³ Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 459.

such, there are no restrictions as to how the memorial can be physically engaged with. It is fully accessible, the grass around the memorial can be sat upon and indeed, at the top of the pylons is a viewing platform, which can be reached using a spiral staircase located within one of the columns. Enabling visitors to stand on top of the memorial fosters a sense of ownership as opposed to reverence, and marks the site as a municipal rather than a hallowed space. Additionally, the view of Manila from the top of the memorial emphasises the reduced significance of Quezon City.

While Quezon is memorialised in the Quezon Memorial through its symbolic height, his depiction in the frieze, and importantly in the mausoleum itself, the memorial's enormity, its similarity to Marcos' other cultural projects, as well as its illustrations of the "successes" of martial law, serve as a testament to the Marcos regime. Additionally, although the Quezon Memorial, like the Rizal Monument, was intended to mark the achievements of a political regime, its difference to the earlier colonial-era monuments and its similarity to other monumental projects linked to authoritarian heads of state, reflects Marcos' own political ideology. While Marcos may have courted US interests and continued to foster Philippine-United States relations, he was also attempting to build a new political and national identity that "departs radically from Western, or the old nationalism". Marcos asserted that different circumstances meant that "new nationalism" has had to take a different path and "develop its own societies in far less time... with[out] the exploitative machinery of imperialism".¹²⁴ While Marcos wished to present a strong image of the nation, he also wished to project his own power, which in a departure from the earlier monuments, and indeed, from Velasco's vision for the Quezon Memorial, looked not to American memorial heritage but to the monumental commemorations appearing elsewhere in revolutionary and/or postcolonial communist nations. However, despite Marcos' dominance over the memorial's exterior, inside, the memorial museum functions to embed Quezon within the founding of nation.

¹²⁴ Marcos, *Today's Revolution: Democracy*, 105-6.

Museo ni Manuel L. Quezon and recent memorialisations

Situated in the base of the memorial along with the mausoleum, the Museo ni Manuel L. Quezon opened on the inauguration of the Quezon Memorial in 1978. The museum's organising committee, although chaired by Jorge B. Vargas who had also served on the memorial committee, differed from the latter committee, as it was comprised not of political figures but of people with a background in museums and historical research.¹²⁵ The museum committee ran several art and sculpture competitions during the centennial year, all of which had a Quezon theme, and the winning entries were displayed within the museum. Other exhibits included displays of papers and letters relating to Quezon, photographs of his "political career and social life", dioramas of his life, Quezoniana "memorabilia", and images of sites in Quezon City.¹²⁶ The museum, unlike the memorial, focused almost entirely on Quezon and functioned to forge a connection between the president and the populace through the art competitions. The display of the winners also meant the public had the opportunity not only to visit this new national space but also to be represented within it. Moreover, the depiction of Quezon City signalled the emergence of a localised memorialisation of Quezon, which contested his reduced significance in the national narrative.

In 2015, the museum underwent a renovation by the National Historical Commission of the Philippines (Figures 4.24-4.25).¹²⁷ The redisplay runs in chronological order, with Gallery 1 focusing on Quezon's youth in Baler, his education, role in the Revolution and return to civilian life; Gallery 2 explores his early political career

¹²⁵ The Sub-Committee on Exhibits comprised: Jorge B. Vargas (Chairman); Avelina N. Castañeda (Chief, Special and Commemorative Events Division), National Historical Institute; Carolina Afan (Chief, Filipiniana Division), National Library; Margarito Raymundo (Museum Research Assistant), National Museum; Bonito Cagahastian (Supervising Architect), National Museum. Initial Report on 1978 Manuel L. Quezon National Centennial Year, 14.

¹²⁶ Initial Report on 1978 Manuel L. Quezon National Centennial Year, 1, 14.

¹²⁷ In 2010 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo legislated the reinstitution of the National Historical Commission of the Philippines to replace the National Historical Institute. Incidentally the National Historical Commission of the Philippines had been created under the presidential administration of her father, Diosdado Macapagal.

while the Philippines was under US rule; Gallery 3 concentrates on Quezon's commonwealth presidency; Gallery 4 focuses on the Second World War and Quezon's exile to the United States; and finally Gallery 5 examines the "death and legacy of Manuel Luis Quezon".¹²⁸ Whereas the exterior of the monument separates the scenes of Quezon's life from the displays of "political progress", the museum firmly embeds Quezon within the constitutional narrative. Indeed, his position as a "powerful Senate leader" is credited with "proving the Filipinos' capacity for self-government".¹²⁹ Furthermore, the museum narrative seeks to emphasise Quezon's role in the Philippine-American War, listing his several promotions, roles in different battles and explains his ultimate surrender as only to "verify the report of the capture of President Aguinaldo". It also counters the dominant narrative of Quezon as a beneficiary of US colonial rule, underlining his suffering as he was "imprisoned by the Americans for six months".¹³⁰ Whilst Quezon has sometimes been compared negatively to figures such as Artemio Ricarte, who consistently refused to surrender to the Americans despite repeated imprisonments, the museum depicts him as a reluctant adherent to US rule and his political cooperation a necessity in order to secure the country's independence.¹³¹

Quezon's role in the Second World War is also emphasised. The museum includes a small replica of the Malinta Tunnel, which is located on Corregidor, the location to which the Philippine government withdrew following the Japanese ground invasion in December 1941 (Figure 4.26). The display includes a description of Quezon and Vice-President Osmeña taking their oaths of office in the tunnel whilst being shelled by Japanese forces. The exhibition is careful to underline Quezon's continued involvement in the Second World War whilst the government was in exile in the United States, following his and Osmeña's evacuation from Corregidor in March

¹²⁸ "Museo ni Manuel Quezon", National Historical Commission of the Philippines, accessed 12 June 2021, <https://nhcp.gov.ph/museums/quezon-memorial-shrine/>.

¹²⁹ Exhibition display board, "Mga Misyon para sa Kasarinlan / The Independence Missions", visited 4 March 2018, Museo ni Manuel L. Quezon, Quezon City.

¹³⁰ Exhibition display board, "Mula Opisyal ng Hukbo tungong Buhay-Sibilyan / From Military to Civilian Life", visited 4 March 2018, Museo ni Manuel L. Quezon, Quezon City.

¹³¹ Quibuyen, *A Nation Aborted*, 366-71.

1942, stating “Quezon was kept abreast of the events and news while he planned the economic rehabilitation of the country”.¹³² Embedding Quezon’s biography within the narrative of the Second World War decolonises the conflict, and when taken together with the timeline of the country’s political evolution, transforms the conflict into another battle in the Philippines’ historical struggle for self-rule. This connects with the government’s own decolonisation of the conflict following the war, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.

While the museum re-emphasises Quezon’s role in the establishment of the Philippines as an independent republic, it also takes time to illustrate his part in the founding of Quezon City and its development, indicating the continued significance of localised memorialisation in addition to the national. This is indicative of Quezon’s decentralised commemoration, reflected in the memorial’s absence from the itineraries of foreign heads of states and the presence of Quezon City political representatives at Quezon commemorative ceremonies, as opposed to those from central government. Similarly to the Bonifacio Monument, the memorial is also significant to local residents, particularly to those who perceive its integrity as under threat. The Quezon City government in particular has been accused of overdeveloping the Quezon Memorial Circle, which has been described as a “concrete jungle”.¹³³ Efren C. Jimenez has written that “the Quezon Memorial Circle is supposed to be a public place, a memorial in honour of a great Filipino, offering an atmosphere of rest and quiet, a place to connect and reconnect with Mother Nature... The Quezon City administration should be reminded that it has violated a sacred ground and the memory of a great Filipino”.¹³⁴ While the Quezon Memorial does not have the national significance of the Rizal Monument, or indeed, reside on the meaningful space of Luneta Park, for some it still stands on “sacred ground”. More recently a petition to stop plans to erect an auditorium within the Memorial

¹³² Exhibition display board, “Kamatayan / Death”, visited 4 March 2018, Museo ni Manuel L. Quezon, Quezon City.

¹³³ Neal H. Cruz, “What are they doing to the QC Park?”, *Inquirer.Net*, 19 June 2012, <https://opinion.inquirer.net/31031/what-are-they-doing-to-the-qc-park>.

¹³⁴ Efren C. Jimenez, “Cruz right on Quezon Memorial Circle”, *Inquirer.Net*, 2 July 2012, <https://opinion.inquirer.net/31843/cruz-right-on-quezon-memorial-circle>.

Circle has gained over 6,000 signatures.¹³⁵ Although the motivations for these signatures are unclear, they are evidence of the continued importance of the site.

Conclusion

Similarly to Rizal's and Bonifacio's commemorations, as the Philippines moved closer to and gained independence, Quezon's remembrance was used to project a strong image of the nation. However, while post-independence presidents such as Quirino used Quezon's memorialisation to decolonise the nation's independence by detaching Quezon from his close association with the United States, Quezon's initial commemorations, led by President Osmeña, sought to underline the role of the United States in the country's independence. Indeed, this perception of a momentous connection between the two nations continued through into Philippine independence and was reflected in the memorial proposals of Tolentino and the Department of Instruction. Similarly, Velasco and the Quezon Memorial Committee viewed the United States as the prime example of "advanced culture and civilization" against which Philippine progress could be measured. Although the plans for Quezon's memorial were taking place over forty years after those for the Rizal Monument, the motivations for the Quezon Memorial mirrored those of the earlier monument. Just as the Rizal Monument was erected to mark the Philippines' "aptitude to enter into the concert of cultured and civilised nations", the Quezon Memorial was intended to represent a people who "move with the course of civilization".¹³⁶ Although the Philippines was now an independent nation, the plans for the Quezon Memorial continued to perpetuate colonial-era racial hierarchies that rendered the country unequal to "older civilisations".

¹³⁵ Movement for Quezon Memorial Circle, "Stop Rep. Crisologo's Plan to Build Sports Coliseum in Quezon Memorial Circle", Change.org, accessed 12 June 2021, <https://www.change.org/p/president-rodrigo-duterte-stop-rep-crisologo-s-plan-to-build-sports-coliseum-in-quezon-memorial-circle>.

¹³⁶ Rizal Monument Committee, "To The People Of The Philippines"; Quezon Memorial Committee, "Let Us Have A Quezon Memorial Foundation", n.d., 3.

However, unlike the Rizal and Bonifacio monuments, the Quezon Memorial was instigated by the government, and it is this close association between the presidential administrations and the Quezon Memorial, which partially explains its lengthy delay. The frequent changes in administration, together with each president's reshaping of the Quezon Memorial Committee, resulted in the absence of a central vision, thereby leading to a monument which lacks any single or dominant message. The Philippines' post-war and post-independence economic struggles were another factor, and may explain why the memorial was eventually erected only due to the prolific cultural spending of President Marcos. At the same time, however, the Quezon Memorial's construction must also be viewed alongside Marcos' other cultural projects, which together not only served to legitimise martial law but were also designed to establish Marcos' own significance as both a self-styled guardian and defender of Philippine culture.¹³⁷ Perhaps most surprisingly, the Quezon Memorial can even be read into a global, postcolonial memorial landscape that emerged in the 1970s, sharing its colossal scale with the likes of mausoleums built in memory of other Asian "strongmen" such as Ho Chi Minh and Mao Zedong during that decade. These changes saw enormous edifices erected as new government regimes sought to foster "cults of personality" in order to embed their rule. Whereas the Rizal Monument had been shaped by a European and American memorial aesthetic, the Quezon Memorial reflected the nexus of heritages depicted in the Bonifacio Monument and like the Bonifacio Monument, it similarly drew on broader post-revolution commemorative practices, positioning postcolonial monument building outside of the coloniser-colonised dichotomy. The Quezon Memorial also marked a distinct shift towards a more nationalistic and consciously Asian understanding of Philippine nationalism under Marcos. This reflected Marcos' own political manoeuvrings, as he sought to establish ties with the Soviet Union and China, as well as continuing relations with the United States. The Quezon Memorial was initially designed in the immediate post-independence years to present Quezon as a "founding father", while Marcos' commemorative rhetoric and the demotion of

¹³⁷ Baluyut, *Institutions and Icons of Patronage*.

Quezon City diminished Quezon's political significance in order to present the "New Society" as the real beginning of the nation.

Nevertheless, although the Quezon Memorial was brought under the purview of Marcos, its overall design and the plans for its interior were already in place. These facts alone resulted in a memorial that is replete with competing ideologies, reflecting the commemorative pluralism seen in the Rizal and Bonifacio monuments. While the exterior of the Quezon Memorial obfuscates Quezon behind its elevation of the Marcos regime, the interior recentralises him as one of the nation's founding fathers. His Napoleonic tomb advances him into a global pantheon of heroic figures, yet its similarity to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier also implies a sense of humility and sacrifice. Moreover, the Museo ni Manuel Quezon contests the memorial's exterior, firmly embedding Quezon into a narrative that emphasises his distinct role in the nation's evolution and independence. It also localises Quezon, underlining his contribution to the founding and development of Quezon City (as an alternative to Manila and its important sites of commemoration, such as Luneta Park). This reflects the continued significance of Quezon's regional memorialisation, which is seen in the presence of Quezon City officials at commemorations, as well as in the protests over the perceived overdevelopment of the Quezon Memorial Circle. However, it is this decentralised remembrance, with a public holiday only for Quezon and Aurora Provinces and Quezon City, as well as the memorial's absence from the itineraries of visiting heads of state, which underlines the continuing dominance of Rizal's commemoration and the perception of Luneta Park as the "ritual centre of the nation".¹³⁸ Indeed, while the planners for Quezon City desired a new national space, many held on to the old, including Tolentino, who could only envisage a national monument to Quezon in the "hallowed" Luneta Park.

Marcos' commemoration of Quezon sought to foster a new political and cultural identity for the country, yet his continuation of Quezon's Christianised remembrance not only suppressed religious divides but perpetuated the Christian image of nation

¹³⁸ Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 459.

fostered under US colonial rule and through the Rizal and Bonifacio monuments. Each monument discussed thus far reflects the negotiation of key divisions, and the wish to establish a hegemonic vision of the Philippine nation. The Rizal Monument reflected US and Philippine interests, yet its continued prominence and the exclusion of other perceived national heroes from Luneta Park fosters a Christian and Luzon-centric image of nation. Additionally, while the Bonifacio Monument presented a transnational vision of nationhood, its elevation of Tagalog and connections to the Hispanic diaspora ultimately underscore a similarly Christianised image of the nation. Furthermore the Bonifacio Monument's lesser significance to government-led nation-building together with absence of Bonifacio from Luneta Park reinforces the dominance of Rizal, and the acculturated *mestizo Ilustrado* model of Philippine citizenship he represents. Finally, the Quezon Memorial was a consequence of competing post-independence visions of nation, which ultimately promoted a Christianised populace. Chapter 5 will also assess another post-independence monument, the Pacific War Memorial, which despite its promotion as a means to connect the United States and the Philippines, ultimately advances a US vision of the Philippines as a marker of American triumph.

CHAPTER 5

“The American and Filipino Alliance for Freedom”: The Pacific War Memorial and Second World War Remembrance in the Philippines

Introduction

When President Ferdinand Marcos dedicated the Pacific War Memorial (Figure 5.1) on 22 June 1968, he described it as a “monument to the American and Filipino alliance for freedom”, revealing the enduring connection between the two nations more than twenty years after the United States ended its colonial rule.¹ The structure, which stands on the island of Corregidor in Manila Bay, was particularly significant for an American overseas memorial: it was built to commemorate the Philippine as well as the American forces that had lost their lives in the Pacific theatre during the Second World War. Although distinct from the monuments discussed in Chapters 2 to 4 in its commemoration of collective heroism, the Pacific War Memorial, and indeed, Second World War memorialisation, functioned in much the same way in its use by the US and Philippine governments to foster their own images of the Philippine nation. What is more, the Pacific War Memorial reflects the expansion of commemoration over the course of the twentieth century from the individual to the collective, which Budreau has observed following the First World War, noting that overseas cemeteries and monuments “became instruments of public diplomacy... designed to win sympathy and induce a sense of awe and obligation abroad”.² However, while the United States has built many overseas memorials to commemorate its armed forces, the Pacific War Memorial stands alone both in its location and its character as “much broader than a ‘Battle Monument’... It is a symbol to be erected by the people of the United States and given to the people

¹ Ferdinand E. Marcos, *The Struggle for Peace* (Manila: Office of the President, 1968), 3.

² Budreau, *Bodies of War*, 7.

of the Philippines”.³ Rather than simply commemorating American achievements in battle, it memorialises a relationship and an imperial legacy the United States was unwilling to relinquish in the early decades of the Cold War.

The Pacific War Memorial’s location, Corregidor, marks the last place at which the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) surrendered to the Imperial Japanese Army during the Second World War. Following the aerial bombardment of Manila on 8 December 1941, the USAFFE, led by General Douglas MacArthur, had withdrawn to the island, as well as to the Bataan peninsula. The forces on Bataan eventually surrendered on 9 April 1942 but those on Corregidor persevered until a month later on 6 May. Corregidor was also a significant site in the recapturing of the Philippines from the Japanese, and was reclaimed by the returning USAFFE in February 1945. Although there has been some mention of the Pacific War Memorial in scholarship on Second World War memorialisation, there has been no study of its meaning or the impetus behind its creation.⁴ Additionally, while several studies have examined the role of Second World War memorialisation and its use in southeast Asian national and regional identity building, there has been little discussion of the role US overseas commemoration has played in this, and to what extent these transnational memorials shape – and are shaped by – the host country’s existing and wider remembrances.⁵

³ See for example Edwards, *Allies in Memory*; Handwritten notes by Emmet O’Neal, n.d., page 22, box 1, Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission folder, Emmet O’Neal Papers, HSTPLM (hereafter cited as O’Neal notes, HSTPLM).

⁴ Ricardo T. Jose considers some of its symbolism but uses it predominantly as an example of the various ways in which the Second World War has been memorialised in the Philippines. Ricardo T. Jose, “Remembering World War II in the Philippines: Memorials, Commemorations and Movies”. John L. Linantud mistakenly attributes the creation of the memorial to President Ferdinand E. Marcos, considering it as an emblem of Philippine-American solidarity. Linantud, “War Memorials and Memories: Comparing the Philippines and South Korea”.

⁵ See for example Muzaini and Yeoh, *Contested Memoryscapes*; Seaton “World War II in Japan’s Regions: Memories, Monuments and Media in Hokkaido”; Julia Yonetani, “Contested Memories: Struggles over war and peace in contemporary Okinawa”, in *Japan and Okinawa: Structure and Subjectivity*, ed. Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

Although the Pacific War Memorial was initiated and constructed following US colonial rule, it is included within this thesis as it reveals the ongoing US influence over Philippine commemoration and nation-building long after Philippine independence. The aim of this chapter is to explore the creation of the Pacific War Memorial and the images of nationhood it sought to project. It will also examine Philippine Second World War memorialisation more generally, both in the aftermath of the war and more recently on Corregidor and will assess to what extent it contests the narratives perpetuated by the Pacific War Memorial. It will examine the extent to which Edwards' framework of "commemorative agents" can be applied to the creation of the Pacific War Memorial in the Philippines by the United States and whether its development means it too is evidence of a "commemorative pluralism". The chapter firstly looks at how the war was memorialised in the Philippines in the years leading up to the inauguration of the Pacific War Memorial in 1968. It then discusses the formation of the Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission and the significant role of its Chairman, Emmet O'Neal, in shaping the development and construction of the memorial. The chapter then analyses the design of the memorial itself before looking at its relationship to the wider memoryscape of Corregidor.

The chapter illustrates how the United States was still coming to terms with its colonial legacy in the decades following Philippine independence. This imperial agenda perhaps explains why the memorial has not been the focus of studies of US commemoration overseas, as it contradicts the "contemporary American nationalism" the American Battle Monuments Commission sought to express through its memorialising activities in the years following the Second World War.⁶ The Pacific War Memorial's creation by the Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission, a government agency separate to the ABMC, is indicative of this distinctive agenda. Yet the memorial's position within wider Philippine Second World War remembrance indicates that this agenda was often at odds with the objectives of the newly independent country. Understanding the ways in which these multiple

⁶ Established in 1923, the American Battle Monuments Commission is the US federal government agency responsible for US overseas commemorative ceremonies and memorials; Edwards, *Allies in Memory*, 8.

motivations and commemorations shaped both the Pacific War Memorial and wider Second World War memorialisation can lead to a greater comprehension of how these transnational memoryscapes function within the host nation, and the extent to which they perpetuate a colonial memory, as both the United States and the Philippines sought to establish their place amidst a rapidly decolonising Asia.

Early commemoration of Bataan and Corregidor

Similarly to the early commemorations of President Manuel Quezon, the battles of Bataan and Corregidor were memorialised by the US-based Philippine government during the Second World War, and likewise served to reinforce the exiled government's continuing connection to the Philippine mainland, as well as its aspirations for a "free and independent Philippines".⁷ Additionally, and comparably to Quezon's memorialisation, by taking place on US Memorial Day, they also placed the Philippine war dead within the lineage of American war heroes. On Memorial Day in 1943, President Quezon stated that it was "with their blood they have earned us the respect of the world, the undying friendship of America, the comradeship of thirty-one United Nations".⁸ Not only was commemoration used to emphasise the Philippines' global significance, as Rizal's early commemoration had done, but it fostered a sense of Philippine nationalism that was rooted in the country's ties to the United States. Moreover Bataan and Corregidor were equally significant to US nation-building efforts, with Congressman Hamilton Fish noting that Bataan should be remembered in the same way as "the Alamo in the Mexican War, the *Maine* in the Spanish War".⁹ During Philippine Independence Day proceedings in 1946, US Senator Millard Tydings stated, "Though our governments may sever the political

⁷ Manuel Quezon quoted in "Speeches Honor Unknown Soldier In Memorial Day Ceremonies", *Bataan* 1, no. 4 (July 1943): 12, *Bataan* Archive, AHC, (hereafter cited as Quezon quoted in "Speeches Honor Unknown Soldier In Memorial Day Ceremonies").

⁸ Quezon quoted in "Speeches Honor Unknown Soldier In Memorial Day Ceremonies", 12.

⁹ Hamilton Fish quoted in "Remember Bataan", *Bataan* 1, no. 2 (May 1943): 7, *Bataan* Archive, AHC.

ties which for half a century have bound us together, our governments can never alter or repeal the history of Bataan and Corregidor”.¹⁰ Bataan and Corregidor thus came to represent a momentous connection between the two nations, masking the colonial context in which the United States and the Philippines had originally been joined.

This alliance continued to be reiterated during the anniversary commemorations of Bataan and Corregidor following Philippine independence. In 1952, when President Elpidio Quirino instituted Bataan Day as a national holiday, he justified this decision because “the commemoration of the Fall of Bataan is a fitting homage to the heroism of Filipino and American forces who fought side by side for freedom and is a reminder to Filipinos and Americans alike of their common democratic heritage”.¹¹ Similarly to Rizal’s early remembrance more than forty years earlier, commemoration was used to not only establish a shared culture with the United States but to frame Philippine independence as a consequence of Philippine and American endeavour. However, although remembrance served to reinforce the relationship between the two countries, it was also deployed as part of a Philippine nation-building agenda that sought to decolonise the country from the United States. In 1945, while pushing for immediate independence from the United States, President Sergio Osmeña commemorated National Heroes Day at a former Japanese internment camp, asserting that, “like Bataan, Capas also stands for Filipino courage”.¹² The use of National Heroes Day to remember the Second World War dead placed them alongside Philippine revolutionary heroes such as José Rizal and Andres Bonifacio, whose personages were also honoured on this day, establishing a

¹⁰ “Tydings Pays Tribute to PI”, *Evening Herald*, 4 July 1946, 13, *Evening Herald* Archive, AHC.

¹¹ Proclamation No. 307, (24 Mar. 1952), *Official Gazette* 48, no. 3 (March): 955, *Official Gazette* Archive, AHC.

¹² Sergio Osmeña. 1945. “Address of President Osmeña at Capas, Tarlac, on the occasion of the celebration of National Heroes’ Day, November 30, 1945” (speech). In *Official Gazette* 41, no. 9 (December 1945): 1153, *Official Gazette* Archive, AHC, (hereafter cited as Osmeña. 1945. “Address of President Osmeña at Capas, Tarlac, on the occasion of the celebration of National Heroes’ Day, November 30, 1945” (speech)).

history of Philippine heroism. Thus, similarly to the post-independence commemoration explored in chapters 2 to 4, Philippine Second World War memorialisation was shaped by ongoing tensions between the legacy of US rule and the Philippine government's attempts to project an image of an independent nation.

The rhetoric around the remembrance of Bataan and Corregidor was also heavily influenced by US Cold War perspectives, particularly the Truman Doctrine, which advocated for the containment of Soviet geopolitical expansion by positioning communism in opposition to freedom.¹³ This also reflected the strong military ties the Philippines retained with the United States following independence as a consequence of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, as well as the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, noted in chapter 1. In the first few decades of independence the bases would be used for US conflicts in which the Philippines wanted no part, including the Korean and Vietnam Wars.¹⁴ In 1947, President Manuel Roxas echoed the rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine when he described the Second World War as a "conflict in which the freedom-loving peoples of the world joined hands to defeat the forces of evil which practiced the laws of the jungle to annihilate weak and defenceless neighbors".¹⁵ Additionally, Roxas' language also perpetuated the colonial terminology seen in Rizal's early commemoration, assigning the "forces of evil" to a less "civilised" society who practised the "laws of the jungle". Likewise in 1953 President Elpidio Quirino used similar language to thank the USAFFE for "their epic struggle against the forces of aggression and totalitarianism to preserve our democratic institutions, which today are again under attack at home and abroad...It is fitting and proper that the Filipino people pause to contemplate their priceless

¹³ This was in order to secure financial and military aid to suppress a communist-led rebellion in Greece and Turkey. "The Greek-Turkish Aid Program (The Truman Doctrine)", "The Truman Doctrine" Folder, President's Secretary's Files, HSTPLM, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/truman-doctrine>.

¹⁴ McCoy, "Circles of Steel, Castles of Vanity", 981-97.

¹⁵ Manuel Roxas. 1947. "Memorial Day Speech of President Manuel Roxas at the Philippine Sea Frontier, May 30, 1947" (speech). In *Official Gazette* 43, no. 5 (May 1947): 1782, *Official Gazette* Archive, AHC.

heritage of liberty, peace and democracy”.¹⁶ Similarly to the language used by the Rizal Monument Committee, Quirino framed Philippine culture with the American rhetoric of “liberty” and “democracy”. However, Quirino was also concerned with the threat of communism, spending his presidency fighting against the insurgent Philippine communist group the Hukbalahap, with American aid.¹⁷ Thus, while government-led remembrance of the Second World War revealed the Philippines’ ongoing ties to the United States, it also perpetuated colonial racial hierarchies that similarly to Rizal’s early commemoration, sought to align the country with more “civilised” nations.

Philippine Second World War commemoration also connected to the wider “cult of the fallen soldier”, which had proliferated following the First World War, giving rise to the concept of a “noble sacrifice” as well as functioning to legitimise the nation for whom the sacrifice had been made.¹⁸ When paying tribute to a fallen soldier in 1943 Philippine President Quezon declared, “his was unflinching courage, his was loyalty unto death, his story is written in blood, in the forests and hills of Bataan and the rock that is Corregidor”.¹⁹ Similarly, many Philippine veterans connected their experiences with the pursuit of a higher purpose, forming the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor in 1952, whose aim was to promote “justice, peace and democracy”. They also had personal motivations to “keep alive the memories of our military service together; to help one another and those whom our deceased brothers-in-arms left behind”.²⁰ Like the earlier Veterans of the Revolution, these veterans sought to legitimise their service to nation, particularly in the aftermath of the 1946 Rescission Act, which did not recognise those Filipinos who had served the United

¹⁶ Proclamation No. 371, (17 Feb. 1953), *Official Gazette* 49, no. 2 (February): 442, *Official Gazette Archive*, AHC.

¹⁷ Lanzona, *Amazons of the Huk Rebellion*.

¹⁸ Budreau, *Bodies of War*, 4.

¹⁹ Quezon quoted in “Speeches Honor Unknown Soldier In Memorial Day Ceremonies”, 12.

²⁰ Jose, “Remembering World War II in the Philippines”, 119.

States in the Philippine Army, thus preventing them from receiving any US benefit payments.²¹

Philippine veterans were also particularly focused on the memorialisation of Bataan, petitioning the government to have the anniversary of Bataan's surrender recognised as a national day of commemoration, to which President Quirino agreed in 1952. Following the institutionalisation of Bataan Day, Second World War remembrance became focused on this date. Indeed, the significance of Bataan as a memorial site to the government was evident immediately following the end of the war when President Osmeña set aside land for a Bataan National Park as part of the official commemorations in 1945.²² Jose has argued the Philippine focus on Bataan was due to the large numbers of Filipinos who had fought there, whereas on Corregidor, the majority of soldiers had been American.²³ Furthermore, plans had been laid as early as 1942 for a memorial on Bataan when the then senator and future president Roxas declared that a "big national shrine should be constructed in Mt. Samat to honor all the heroes that have died and are now dying in this battle".²⁴ Thus, before the US government announced its proposal to develop the Pacific War Memorial on Corregidor in 1953, the Philippine Second World War memorial landscape had been shaped significantly and with a notable emphasis on Bataan. Indeed, although the anniversary of Corregidor's fall was also marked, official remembrances of this event eventually became subsumed within the Bataan Day rites.

²¹ Filipino Second World War veterans had to wait until the Obama Administration for their military contributions to be recognised by a benefits payment, which has been given as part of a larger economic stimulus package. Capozzola, *Bound By War*, 209; Hazel M. McFerson, introduction to *Mixed Blessing*, xix.

²² Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office, "Araw ng Kagitingan Legislation", *Official Gazette*, accessed 3 April 2018, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/araw-ng-kagitingan-2013/araw-ng-kagitingan-legislation/> (hereafter cited as "Araw ng Kagitingan Legislation").

²³ Jose, "Remembering World War II in the Philippines", 122.

²⁴ Manuel Roxas quoted in "Araw ng Kagitingan Legislation".

The first memorials erected to the Second World War were primarily instigated by what Edwards has termed “military elites” and the “officers of government agencies”.²⁵ These often marked the location of fallen soldiers in the form that is known as a battlefield cross, a rifle placed part way into the ground with a helmet on the butt of the gun. Later, more permanent markers or plaques were installed by US Army units and marked the location of specific sites of battle, such as Balete Pass in Luzon.²⁶ These followed the tradition established throughout the British Commonwealth following the Boer War, which saw memorials erected for the first time to ordinary soldiers.²⁷ From the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s the Philippine Historical Committee, a government organisation established under US colonial rule in 1933 and reconstituted following independence in July 1946, oversaw the installation of numerous plaques and markers across the country on sites associated with the Second World War. These included Bataan, as well as on the Lingayen Gulf and in Leyte, both of which saw the return of the USAFFE forces. The first marker on Bataan read, “The little mountainous peninsula of Bataan saved democracy and the whole world from the evil hands of the devil”.²⁸ Although infused with US Cold War rhetoric, the emphasis on Bataan’s consequence transforms the conflict into a distinctly Philippine achievement. Its reference to the “devil” also perpetuated the Christianised commemoration that proliferated around the remembrances of Rizal, Bonifacio and Quezon. Thus, echoing the colonial-era monuments, the very first Filipino erected markers to the Second World War were both US and Philippine in character.

Prior to the development of the Pacific War Memorial, the Philippine memorialisation of Bataan and Corregidor was already deeply entrenched. Similarly to the post-independence commemoration discussed in chapter 4, remembrance of

²⁵ Edwards, *Allies in Memory*, 5.

²⁶ Jose, “Remembering World War II in the Philippines”, 116.

²⁷ Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 46.

²⁸ Jose, “Remembering World War II in the Philippines”, 117; “Bataan and Democracy”, *National Registry of Historic Sites & Structures in the Philippines* (blog), National Historical Commission of the Philippines, accessed 2 November 2021, <http://nhcphistoricsites.blogspot.com/2021/07/bataan-and-democracy.html>.

the Second World War reinforced the nation's ties to the United States, at the same time as the government sought to decolonise the image of nation evoked at these ceremonies. The Philippine government's Cold War rhetoric also perpetuated colonial hierarchies, which evoked the much earlier commemorations of Rizal. Commemoration of Bataan and Corregidor also established a new aspect to the relationship between the two nations, depicting a profound bond that had been forged in war. While the significance of this relationship would infuse the development of the Pacific War Memorial, the importance of Bataan to Philippine Second World War remembrance would ultimately be overlooked in the decision to site the memorial on Corregidor.²⁹

"A symbol to be erected by the people of the United States"

In the first few decades following the Second World War the US government through the auspices of the American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) were heavily involved in constructing a number of memorials to the dead in Britain and France, and indeed, the ABMC throughout the 1950s and 1960s was in the process of developing a memorial to the dead at the American Cemetery in Manila. Yet despite this concurrent memorial making, US Congress in 1953 created the Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission (hereafter the Corregidor Commission), to commence a "study for the survey, location and erection on Corregidor Island of a replica of the Statue of Liberty and the use of Corregidor Island as a memorial to the Philippine and American soldiers, sailors and marines who lost their lives while serving in the Philippines during World War II".³⁰ This was instigated by former US Ambassador to the Philippines, Emmet O'Neal who would also serve as chairman on the commission. Altogether the Corregidor Commission comprised nine members including three members of the Senate: Clifford P. Case (Republican, New Jersey),

²⁹ Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission Press Release, "Planning Gets Underway for Pacific War Memorial on Corregidor", 9 October 1964, box 1, Scrapbook folder, Emmet O'Neal Papers, HSTPLM.

³⁰ An Act to Create a Commission to be known as the Corregidor Bataan Memorial Commission of 1953, Pub. L. No. 193, 67 Stat. 366 (1953).

Clair Engle (Democrat, California), Gale W. McGee (Democrat, Wyoming); three members of the House of Representatives: William S. Mailliard (Republican, California), Armistead I. Selden (Democrat, Alabama), Robert L. F. Sikes (Democrat, Florida); and three US citizens: former Marine, John H. Leims (Democrat, Missouri), Frank Hewlett (Democrat, Virginia), an American journalist who had been stationed on Corregidor and O'Neal himself (Democrat, Kentucky). There was no stipulation as to the political composition of the Corregidor Commission, although inevitably following the inauguration of Republican US President Dwight D. Eisenhower on 20 January 1953 and the Republican dominated Senate and House of Representatives in the years that followed, the political make-up altered to a Republican majority.³¹ However, the political composition of the commission did not affect its agenda, as the vision for what would become the Pacific War Memorial was very much O'Neal's from the beginning.

Writing after his death in 1967, O'Neal's family commented that it was during his ambassadorship to the Philippines (1947 to 1948) that he had a "vision" for a memorial on Corregidor.³² Indeed, following his departure from office, O'Neal retained an active interest in the Philippines and in veteran affairs, campaigning for the payment of benefits to Filipino veterans and also seeking to memorialise the Philippine experiences of the Second World War through the publication of Philippine memoirs from the period.³³ O'Neal believed in the positive impact of US colonial rule on the Philippines, and in the significance of the association of the two countries. He wrote: "There is not found in all the history of the world such a relationship as that of America and the Philippines which resulted in the launching of

³¹ Memorandum for Mr. Harlow from Robert E. Hampton, 23 January 1959, box 3, State Department – September 1958 – January 1959 folder, Records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich and Christopher H. Russell, 1952-61, DDEPL.

³² Children of Emmet O'Neal to Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, n.d., box 1, Biographical Information folder, Emmet O'Neal Papers, HSTPLM.

³³ Richard Seelye Jones to Emmet O'Neal, 20 June n.d., box 3, "Stories by Filipinos of World War II" Background Information folder, Emmet O'Neal Papers, HSTPLM.

the Philippines as a sovereign nation”.³⁴ This translated into the importance placed on the battles that had been fought by the USAFFE in the Philippines during the Second World War. As O’Neal stated, “we should not wait longer to memorialize the almost unparalleled deed in the Far Eastern Theater”.³⁵ He believed not only in the distinction of the United States’ Philippine mission but in the merit and morality of its role in the Second World War, asserting that “the United States fought primarily to help other nations live as free men”.³⁶

These ideas informed O’Neal’s vision for a memorial, which initially comprised a replica of the Statue of Liberty. He saw the statue as emblematic both of American achievements in the War and of the historical significance of the country itself. O’Neal wrote: “From Europe the torch of Liberty was handed to America. Now America has an opportunity to hand it on to Asia”.³⁷ As with both the Rizal and Quezon monument committees, O’Neal perceived the United States as playing a momentous role in the progress of civilisation. Furthermore, and again echoing the plans for the Rizal Monument, the very concept of installing a replica of the Statue of Liberty suggests O’Neal’s idea of what a memorial could and should be was distinctly Western, specifically east coast American and European. Additionally, as noted in chapter 2, the Statue of Liberty, even following its gifting from France, retained a strong association with Europe, as European immigrants would enter the country via Ellis Island on which the statue stands. Thus this reverence for the statue is suggestive of ideals around American national identity, as well as racial hierarchies. Ironically, immigration restrictions had curbed Philippine migration to the United States in the 1920s and 1930s and the 1924 Immigration Act’s discriminatory national origins quotas, designed to restrict migration from southern and eastern Europe, persisted until as late as 1965, twelve years after the Corregidor-Bataan

³⁴ Memorandum by Emmet O’Neal, n.d., pages 8-9, box 1, Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission folder, Emmet O’Neal Papers, HSTPLM (hereafter cited as Memorandum by Emmet O’Neal).

³⁵ Memorandum by Emmet O’Neal, 8-9.

³⁶ Emmet O’Neal, “The Corregidor Bataan Memorial”, n.d., page 10, box 1, Bataan-Corregidor folder, Jack Z. Anderson Records, DDEPL (hereafter cited as O’Neal, “The Corregidor Bataan Memorial”).

³⁷ Memorandum by Emmet O’Neal, 17.

Memorial Commission was formed.³⁸ Thus, while the relationship between the two countries was to be memorialised, their colonial racial distinction was to be preserved, with the Philippines as the beneficiary of the “torch of liberty”.

O’Neal responded to calls from both the Philippine and American communities in Manila for a more practical memorial building, such as a theatre or hospital, by articulating the merits of other American memorials. He described those who viewed the Lincoln Memorial and the Washington Monument as “better citizens”.³⁹ O’Neal argued that if France had built an opera house instead of the Statue of Liberty, it would have been “obsolete or discarded by this time”.⁴⁰ Not only was the memorial to be American in its genesis and its ideas then, it was also intended to leave an American legacy, one that O’Neal feared would be forgotten. Furthermore, when in the 1960s, due to the longevity of the Corregidor Commission (it was initially supposed to be in existence for just four years) and to increasing costs, it looked as if responsibility for the memorial could be transferred to the ABMC, O’Neal argued against the transferral. O’Neal saw the memorial as “much broader than a ‘Battle Monument’... It is a symbol to be erected by the people of the United States and given to the people of the Philippines”.⁴¹ This not only hints at O’Neal’s broader vision for the memorial but also reflects his perception of the United States as the conduit of civilisation’s progress. Furthermore, this comment encapsulates the way in which the Corregidor Commission worked with the Philippine government in the construction of the memorial; from the outset it was always to be an American construct, “given” to the Philippines.

Much like the early commemoration of Bataan and Corregidor, the language around the Corregidor memorial was informed by the Cold War rhetoric of the 1950s in its promotion of democracy as way to defeat the “threat” of communism. In a 1958

³⁸ Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924); Capozzola, *Bound By War*, 255.

³⁹ O’Neal, “The Corregidor Bataan Memorial”, 15.

⁴⁰ A.P., “Corregidor-Memorial Plan Causes Dispute”, *Seattle Times*, 8 March 1959, box 1, Clippings Scrapbook folder, Emmet O’Neal Papers, HSTPLM.

⁴¹ Memorandum by Emmet O’Neal, 22.

report the Corregidor Commission declared the purpose of the memorial was “to commemorate the World War II struggle against totalitarianism in the Pacific area”, and to do this, O’Neal stated that it needed to be a “clearly understood living expression of the precepts of democracy and liberty”.⁴² Reflecting colonial racial hierarchies, O’Neal believed that by promoting the success of democracy in the Philippines the rest of Asia would follow, having “few fixed opinions as to governmental forms”.⁴³ This language was informed in part by the foreign policy of the period, as articulated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1959. In his speech, Dulles outlined the “threat of Communism” to a “stable world order” and argued for the “promotion of the concept of human dignity, worth and freedom” as a strategy against this peril.⁴⁴ This partially explains why the Corregidor Commission initially secured the \$7.5 million appropriation for the memorial in Congress during the Eisenhower administration. However, as I will discuss in the following section, with the government operating on a budget deficit due to the Vietnam War, the Bill ultimately failed to pass the Senate.

Although O’Neal’s rhetoric and his plans for the Pacific War Memorial were very much shaped by the US foreign policy of the period, he also had his own desire to commemorate the US legacy in the Philippines, while preserving the colonial relationship between the two nations. Although Edwards views the “officers of government agencies” as a singular “commemorative agent”, it is clear from O’Neal’s agenda and his opposition to the ABMC’s involvement, that he saw their

⁴² Memorandum by A. J. Goodpaster, “Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Project”, 16 October 1958, box 685, OF 154-E-2 World War II, Corregidor, Bataan Memorial Commission (1) folder, White House Central Files, DDEPL; O’Neal, “The Corregidor Bataan Memorial”, 29.

⁴³ “Statement by the Honorable Emmet O’Neal, Chairman of the Corregidor Bataan Memorial Commission, Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,” n.d., page 5, box 1, Bataan-Corregidor folder, Jack Z. Anderson Records, DDEPL.

⁴⁴ Department of State, “Statement by the Honorable John Foster Dulles Secretary of State Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee”, news release no. 31, 14 January, 1959, box 3, State Department – September 1958 – January 1959 folder, Records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich and Christopher H. Russell, 1952-61, DDEPL.

motivations and memorials as very distinct.⁴⁵ Indeed, O’Neal’s unwillingness to compromise on the memorial not only extended to the absence of Bataan and Corregidor veterans from the Corregidor Commission, several of whom either petitioned or were recommended by US government officials to serve on the commission, but was also reflected in the exclusion of the Philippine government from the Corregidor Commission’s plans, as the following section will discuss.⁴⁶

The development of the Pacific War Memorial

Almost simultaneously with the formation of the Corregidor Commission, in 1954 Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay formed a parallel commission entitled the Philippine National Shrines Commission (PNSC). Composed much like the Corregidor Commission (however, in this case its members were all government officials with no ordinary citizens or veterans represented), it used similar rhetoric to outline its purpose. The PNSC sought to “glorify... the memory and scenes of Philippine-American resistance to aggression and to inspir[e]... the nation as well as the rest of the free world into an unrelenting defense of democracy and freedom throughout the ages”.⁴⁷ Similarly to O’Neal, the Philippine government framed the Second World War as a fight for freedom, which they specifically aligned with a democratic way of life. Additionally it was equally important to the Philippine government to commemorate the alliance between the two nations. Indeed, what had been commemorated as Occupation Day during US colonial rule, and which marked the United States’ arrival in the Philippines and the battle of Manila Bay, was

⁴⁵ Edwards, *Allies in Memory*, 5.

⁴⁶ See for example Barry Goldwater to Wilton B. Persons, 8 November 1958, box 3, State Department – September 1958 – January 1959 folder, Records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich and Christopher H. Russell, 1952-61, DDEPL.

⁴⁷ Exec. Order No. 58, s.1954, “Declaring Corregidor and Bataan National Shrines”, *Official Gazette* 50, no. 8 (August 1954): 3416-17, *Official Gazette* Archive, AHC, (hereafter cited as Exec. Order No. 58, s.1954).

transformed under President Magsaysay to Philippine-American Day.⁴⁸ Yet despite the ongoing commemorative ties, the PNSC had its own agenda and was encouraged to develop plans for its own memorials and monuments “wherever they are deemed desirable”.⁴⁹ In fact only if the PNSC deemed it “proper” should they “endeavour to bring about an integration of the plans of both bodies [the Corregidor Commission and the PNSC] into a common project”.⁵⁰

While the PNSC pursued its own plans, the Corregidor Commission’s objectives had broadened in 1955 from the memorialisation of those who had fought in Bataan and Corregidor to the commemoration of “all men who fought under the American flag in the Pacific theater during World War II”.⁵¹ In its statement outlining the objectives of the memorial, the Corregidor Commission stated it would work on three levels. Firstly, it would remember the surviving veterans and the families of those who fought and died, recognising “each man’s contribution” to “beating back an aggressor bent on conquest and tyranny”. Secondly, it would serve as a message to all Filipinos of the United States’ “understanding and appreciation” of the suffering they endured to stand alongside them. Lastly, it would “become a living memorial to encourage the Filipinos and other Oriental nations to work unceasingly in the cause of democracy and freedom”.⁵² Thus, the very genesis of the memorial embodied the Cold War rhetoric of democracy versus communism and underscored the necessity of the American and Philippine relationship to a stable world order. Furthermore, the location of a “Pacific” war memorial in the Philippines reinforced the importance of the country to the United States’ position in Asia: the Philippines held the largest

⁴⁸ Ramon Magsaysay, “Message of His Excellency Ramon Magsaysay President of the Philippines To President Eisenhower”, *Official Gazette* 50, no. 8 (1954): 3531-32, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1954/08/12/message-of-president-magsaysay-to-president-eisenhower/>.

⁴⁹ Exec. Order No. 58, s.1954.

⁵⁰ Exec. Order No. 58, s.1954.

⁵¹ Committee on Foreign Affairs, H.R. Rep. No. 691, (1963) (Armistead I. Selden, “Report to accompany H.R. 7044”), box 002, file 27, Reports on Enrolled Legislation, LBJPL.

⁵² Memorandum, “Corregidor Bataan Memorial Commission”, n.d., pages 25-31, box 199, folder 16, White House Central Subject Files, JFKPLM (hereafter cited as Memorandum, “Corregidor Bataan Memorial Commission”).

US overseas military bases, and from here, American and Philippine troops were sent to Vietnam.

This increased scope had an impact on the form the memorial would take. In 1955 a Bill was introduced into Congress amending the original legislation to alter the replica of the Statue of Liberty to a more general “memorial”.⁵³ Additionally, and similarly to the Rizal Monument competition, the Corregidor Commission in 1957 ran a nationwide competition within the United States, in which forty-eight architects competed, with five finalists chosen by a jury of architects. The winning design was then selected by the commission. The winning entry came from Seattle-based architectural firm, Naramore, Bain, Brady and Johanson, and depicted two “uplifted arms” rising above a “memorial room” (Figure 5.2).⁵⁴ According to O’Neal the “arms” were intended to “symbolize the East and the West, each a separate and distinct entity, yet each equally striving to the highest point; each held to the other by, [sic] an encircling bond without which the structure of their civilization would collapse without the tie between the two”.⁵⁵ Thus the memorial’s composition immediately embodied the agenda of the commission and O’Neal, and reinforced US ties to Asia, of which the Philippines was now perceived as a part.⁵⁶ Yet it also had not lost the imagery of the Statue of Liberty for included in the design was a shaft of light to be emitted between the “arms”, symbolising “the singleness of purpose, shared by both East and West”. This alternative torch of liberty distinguishes the Pacific War Memorial from the eternal flame found in traditional war memorials; this was not to be a reminder of the dead but “a form that somehow would express a

⁵³ A Bill To extend the authority of the Corregidor Bataan Memorial Commission, and for other purposes of 1955, H.R. 5380, 84th Cong. (1955), box 1, Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission folder, Emmet O’Neal Papers, HSTPLM.

⁵⁴ O’Neal, “The Corregidor Bataan Memorial”, 21; Samuel G. Kelly, “The Pacific War Memorial”, n.d., page 1, box 1, Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission Folder, Emmet O’Neal Papers, HSTPLM (hereafter cited as Kelly, “The Pacific War Memorial”).

⁵⁵ O’Neal, “The Corregidor Bataan Memorial”, 22.

⁵⁶ Brody and Delmendo have each discussed the early US colonial perception of Filipinos as “other” and alike to Native Americans, as opposed to having a specifically Asian identity. Brody, *Visualizing American Empire*; Delmendo, *The Star-Entangled Banner*.

future, not a past; a hope, and not a sorrow”.⁵⁷ The Pacific War Memorial was not designed to comfort the bereaved, as both Inglis and Edwards have noted in the first memorials erected to the dead of the First and Second World Wars, but to inspire future generations.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the limitation of competition entries to the United States, not only reflected O’Neal’s ideals around what a memorial should be, with his reverence for Western memorial architecture, but continued to perpetuate the racial hierarchy that had been present in the Rizal Monument competition more than fifty years earlier.

This colonial ideology was also reflected in the absence of the PNSC from the competition and the final selection. However, a delegation from the PNSC was invited to Washington, DC to view the competition finalists in 1957. A letter from its chairman, Eulogio Balao, to O’Neal following the visit confirmed their agreement with the shortlist but underlined their limited involvement, reiterating that the “selection [was] made by you”. Nonetheless, Balao attempted to shape the memorial by requesting the incorporation of a design by renowned Philippine artist and creator of the Bonifacio Monument, Guillermo Tolentino. He noted too that this was “the only design submitted from the Philippines”, inferring the little involvement the country had over the project.⁵⁹ O’Neal’s aim to retain control over the memorial, stemmed not only from his desire for it to be an “American” undertaking and thus a US legacy, but also from his colonial belief of knowing what would best serve the Philippine people. O’Neal commented that the memorial should appeal to “Oriental forms and tastes as well as Occidental” and referenced MacArthur who believed any monument built in the Philippines should be on the “showy side” so as to “appeal” to Filipinos.⁶⁰ Despite a gap of more than fifty years, O’Neal continued to espouse the colonial racial hierarchies manifest in the rhetoric of Governor General Taft,

⁵⁷ O’Neal, “The Corregidor Bataan Memorial”, 22.

⁵⁸ Inglis, *Sacred Places*; Edwards, *Allies in Memory*.

⁵⁹ Eulogio Balao to Emmet O’Neal, 16 May 1957, pages 1-2, box 1, Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission Folder, Emmet O’Neal Papers, HSTPLM.

⁶⁰ O’Neal, “The Corregidor Bataan Memorial”, 19; Emmet O’Neal, “Draft #2 Twelfth Annual Report of the Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission”, 30 June 1965, page 4, box 1, Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission folder, Emmet O’Neal Papers, HSTPLM.

whose belief in the importance of spectacle over substance to Philippine-United States relations was central to his support of Rizal's commemoration.

O'Neal's idea of what Filipinos would "want" translated into his perception of the memorial's audience. In response to criticisms from Philippine newspapers and from the American community in Manila as to the inaccessibility of a memorial on Corregidor, O'Neal argued that the boat trip would be "an asset not a deterrent" as it would constitute part of a day out.⁶¹ In a similar vein, he asserted the Philippines was "90.8% Christian which is man's greatest defence against communism".⁶² O'Neal portrayed an image of Philippine nationhood and citizenship based around the affluent Christian elite, advancing the colonial religious bifurcation of the nation, which had also manifested in the Rizal, Bonifacio and Quezon monuments, while masking the country's religious diversity and inequality. However, ultimately for O'Neal, it was not the audience but the message that was of prime significance. When the Eisenhower administration indicated in 1960 that it would only support a "clean-up" on Corregidor and the erection of a "simple marker and plaque", O'Neal's primary concern was the marker's potential perception as a "Filipino accomplishment" as opposed to "an American memorial to the joint sacrifices of brothers-in-arms".⁶³

However, despite O'Neal's determination, Congressional and White House opposition to his "important matter" resulted in long delays to the memorial's authorisation and construction.⁶⁴ In 1957 a Bill authorising \$7.5 million for the project failed to pass the Senate. Congressman Frank Thompson commented on the

⁶¹ O'Neal, "The Corregidor Bataan Memorial", 29.

⁶² Memorandum by Emmet O'Neal, 12.

⁶³ W.B. Cannon to Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, 19 January 1960, pages 1-2, box 685, OF 154-E-2 World War II folder, Corregidor Bataan Memorial Commission File 3, DDEPL (hereafter cited as Cannon to Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, 19 January 1960, pages 1-2); Emmet O'Neal to P.S. Hughes, 29 January 1963, pages 6-13, box 199, folder 17, White House Central Subject Files, JFKPLM (hereafter cited as O'Neal to P.S. Hughes, 29 January 1963, pages 6-13).

⁶⁴ See for example James C. Auchincloss to Emmet O'Neal, 30 April 1958, box 1, Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission folder, Emmet O'Neal Papers, HSTPLM.

absence of Philippine involvement, remarking in the House of Representatives, “for some strange reason never made public, the contest was confined entirely to the United States. Filipino artists were not invited to compete in the contest nor invited to act as judges of the contest. In other words, the people of the Philippines were presented with an accomplished fact”. Thompson went on to criticise the design, commenting that it was perceived in the Philippines as looking like “a pair of carabao horns”, which he implied was derogatory as it symbolised the “working animal of the Philippines”.⁶⁵ There was also financial opposition from the Bureau of the Budget who in 1958 requested the administration alter its stance on the funding due to the country operating a budget deficit and the Corregidor Commission’s inability to raise money from private sources.⁶⁶ Whilst Edwards has identified “officers of government agencies” as one group of commemorative agents in post-Second World War memorial building in Europe, these criticisms indicate clear divisions within the US government when it came to the Pacific War Memorial, despite its embodiment of US Cold War ideology.⁶⁷ Indeed, the Bureau undermined the very existence of the Corregidor Commission by asserting the ABMC had already carried out its functions of “commemoration” and “promotion of friendly opinion”.⁶⁸

Yet despite these criticisms resulting in long delays, following petitions from Philippine President Carlos P. Garcia, the Lyndon B. Johnson administration was obliged to authorise a final budget of \$1.5 million in 1963 as they feared that “not to approve the bill could lead to bad feeling”.⁶⁹ Edwards argues that a broader “transatlantic memory” emerged as a consequence of memorials being shaped by

⁶⁵ Extract from 86 Cong. Rec. (daily ed. 25 February 1959) (Extension of Remarks of Hon. Frank Thompson, Jr.), box 1, Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission folder, Emmet O'Neal Papers, HSTPLM.

⁶⁶ Roger W. Jones to A.J. Goodpaster, 14 October 1958, pages 1-4, box 685, OF 154-E-2 World War II folder, Corregidor Bataan Memorial Commission File 3, DDEPL (hereafter cited as Roger W. Jones to A.J. Goodpaster, 14 October 1958).

⁶⁷ Edwards, *Allies in Memory*, 5.

⁶⁸ Roger W. Jones to A.J. Goodpaster, 14 October 1958.

⁶⁹ Carlos P. Garcia to John F. Kennedy, 7 February 1961, box 199, folder 16, White House Central Subject Files, JFKPLM; Memorandum for the President by Philip S. Hughes, 21 December 1963, box 002, file 27, Reports on Enrolled Legislation, LBJPL.

“commemorative agents” on both sides of the Atlantic.⁷⁰ In the Philippines, however, the genesis of the Pacific War Memorial was very much formed by the Corregidor Commission, and in particular the vision of its chairman, O’Neal. Indeed, despite the intervention of the Philippines and its clear interest in the memorial as a symbol of “Philamerican unity”, the PNSC was once again excluded from decisions on the redesign with O’Neal writing that they could not be consulted due to their “inability” to schedule a trip to the United States by July 1965 when the judgements were being made (Figure 5.3).⁷¹

Although the PNSC had its own plans for Second World War memorialisation, it and the Philippine government remained mostly excluded from the development of the Pacific War Memorial. Indeed, while each of the monuments discussed in Chapters 2 to 4 to an extent reflect the motivations of the various commemorative groups involved, the Pacific War Memorial remained distinctly under the purview of O’Neal. Furthermore, the exclusion of the Philippine government in addition to the restriction of the competition to the United States not only perpetuated a colonial hierarchy in which the Philippines remained unequal to the United States but resulted in a vision for the memorial that reflected O’Neal’s own perception of the Philippines, in which the religious divisions fostered under US rule remained. The extent to which this is reflected in the final design will be examined in the following section.

A “war memorial, for all men and for all seasons”

The redesign of the Pacific War Memorial by Naramore, Bain, Brady and Johanson comprises a square courtyard, at the centre of which stands a domed memorial

⁷⁰ Edwards, *Allies in Memory*.

⁷¹ Jesus M. Vargos to Emmet O’Neal, 17 March 1959, box 1, Bataan-Corregidor folder, Jack Z. Anderson Records, DDEPL; Emmet O’Neal, “Pacific War Memorial, Corregidor Island”, n.d., page 4, box 1, Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission folder, Emmet O’Neal Papers, HSTPLM (hereafter cited as O’Neal, “Pacific War Memorial, Corregidor Island”).

room, ringed with reflecting pools (Figure 5.4). The room is open on all sides and supported by wide rectangular columns. At the centre of the room is a circular altar, above which the sky can be viewed through a rounded opening in the dome. On the other side of the courtyard is a long walkway, walled in by marble tablets listing each of the major battles of the Pacific conflict (Figure 5.5). Reflecting pools sit on either side of the walkway and the centre contains a rectangular concrete planter, within which local foliage has been planted. The walkway terminates in steps leading up to a raised platform that looks out onto Manila Bay. A bronze sculpture in the shape of a flame sits on the platform. Designed by the Greek American sculptor Aristedes Demetrios, it is entitled the “Eternal Flame of Freedom” (Figure 5.6).

The final design of the Pacific War Memorial communicates much of the Corregidor-Commission’s and O’Neal’s vision. Upon approaching the structure the visitor is confronted with a marble tablet that identifies the title of the memorial and contains the following inscription:

Erected To The Filipino And American Fighting Men Who Gave Their Lives To
Win The Land Sea And Air Victories Which Restored Freedom And Peace To
The Pacific Ocean Area.

This immediately establishes its purpose as a memorial to the Pacific conflict in its entirety, and also reinforces the significant role the United States and the Philippines played in “restor[ing] freedom and peace”. Additionally it underlines the necessity of American and Philippine cooperation, without which, it is implied, this peace would not have been achieved. The marble inscription also emphasises the consequence of this particular conflict; it is an event to be remembered, as O’Neal wished. This sense of permanence is continued as one advances through the memorial. The enclosed space created by the marble walls surrounding the “ceremonial court” is the first area encountered by the visitor, from which one proceeds through a small entry out onto the walkway either side of which are marble tablets listing each of the major battles of the Pacific conflict, including those fought by Philippine guerrilla forces after the surrender of American and Philippine troops in 1942.

Despite the elements of Western neo-classicism – the Travertine marble from Italy and the domed memorial room – there are Philippine elements in the design, such as the local foliage contained within concrete planters to “break the expanse of marble and stone”.⁷² The concrete had a practical function, as the architects wanted materials to be unaffected by the elements, again ensuring the memorial’s longevity.⁷³ The walls either side of the walkway were intended “to screen from view the base of the jungle growth and serve to direct the eye towards the monument at the end of the vista”.⁷⁴ Thus, although Philippine elements are embedded in the memorial, they are very much contained whilst naturally occurring foliage is excluded. The structure is the incarnation of O’Neal’s plan for a monument to be “erected by the people of the United States and given to the people of the Philippines”.⁷⁵ Nothing is included in this memorial that does not serve a specific function. In this case, the pools symbolise the “blood, sweat and tears they [the armed forces] spilled enrich[ing] the soil to make this world a better place to live in”.⁷⁶ O’Neal’s message and the American legacy were paramount.

The feeling of enclosure prior to reaching the open space surrounding the “Eternal Flame of Freedom” sculpture also enables the visitor to physically experience the attainment of freedom that O’Neal intended the memorial to express. As noted earlier, eternal flames are often used in memorials to commemorate loss, however, here the Flame of Freedom marks a presence, America’s gift to the Philippines. While it is not the Statue of Liberty, O’Neal literally ensures the “torch of liberty” is passed from the United States to Asia. If the symbolism was not immediately

⁷² O’Neal, “Pacific War Memorial, Corregidor Island”, 5.

⁷³ Floyd Naramore, William Bain, Clifton Brady, Perry Johanson, “Notes Re: Corregidor-Bataan Memorial”, 28 June 1957, page 2, box 1, Bataan-Corregidor folder, Jack Z. Anderson Records, DDEPL.

⁷⁴ Kelly, “The Pacific War Memorial”, 5.

⁷⁵ Memorandum by Emmet O’Neal, 22.

⁷⁶ National Media Production Center and USIS-Manila, “Pacific War Memorial, Corregidor Island”, n.d., page 10, box 1, Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission folder, Emmet O’Neal Papers, HSTPLM (hereafter cited as NMPC and USIS-Manila, “Pacific War Memorial, Corregidor Island”).

apparent, the description beneath the sculpture reads, “To Live In Freedom’s Light Is The Right Of Mankind”.

The memorial’s inclusion of an altar (Figure 5.7), together with the Corregidor Foundation’s description of the site as a “sacred place”, function to elevate the Pacific War Memorial to a place of worship. This not only reflects O’Neal’s perception of Christianity as “man’s greatest defense against communism” but also his wish that the Pacific War Memorial “inspire a feeling of reverence to the memory of those who died” and convey “the high purposes of the United States” to visitors.⁷⁷ The Second World War is to be understood as having achieved a particular purpose, one that is not simply sacred but Christian. Upon the altar is the inscription:

Sleep, My Sons. Your Duty Done.... For Freedom’s Light Has Come /
Sleep In The Silent Depths Of The Sea, Or In Your Bed Of Hallowed Sod /
Until You Hear At Dawn The Low, Clear Reveille Of God.

This poem, written by the American author N. E. Graham, not only serves to reinforce the attainment of freedom that came as a consequence of the American and Philippine lives lost but also functions to imply that those who died fought for a righteous cause, one sanctioned by God. This is strengthened by the folklore that surrounds the memorial room dome and altar. On a personal visit to the site the guide informed us that the sun shines directly through the hole in the centre of the domed roof and onto the altar on the 6 May, the anniversary of the surrender of Corregidor to the Imperial Japanese Army. This is also repeated in guidebooks and by visitor comments online, although other visitors have reported that they have

⁷⁷ The Corregidor - Bataan Memorial Commission, “A presentation of the concept for the World War II Memorial on Corregidor Island”, n.d., page 16, box 1, Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission folder, Emmet O’Neal Papers, HSTPLM; Emmet O’Neal to Archibald MacLeigh, 4 December 1964, box 1, Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission folder, Emmet O’Neal Papers, HSTPLM; Memorandum by Emmet O’Neal, 12.

waited for such an event to no avail.⁷⁸ However, regardless of its accuracy, the existence of this folklore serves to reinforce the morality of the cause for which these soldiers died. Like the early commemoration of Bataan and Corregidor, the poem also connects to the “cult of the fallen soldier”, which, together with the white altar conveys the idea of a noble sacrifice, glorifying and sanitising the reality of the conflict.⁷⁹ Indeed, the poem is embedded with the language of memorialisation, which Inglis has observed on war memorials since the First World War in their function to “comfort and to uplift, not to instruct in the realities of war”.⁸⁰ Furthermore, in contrast to the Quezon Memorial, and in particular the Rizal Monument, where the presence of Rizal’s remains serve as a reminder of his suffering and martyrdom, the absence of a body enables the Pacific War Memorial to connect to “the myth of the glorious dead”, which Budreau has noted was proliferated by the US government following the First World War in their attempts to prevent families from opening caskets on their return, disconnecting them from the body and thus the real horrors of war.⁸¹

Architecturally, the Corregidor Commission wanted the Pacific War Memorial to be an example of new design, symbolic of the new direction and relationship the United States should have with its former colony.⁸² Thus, although the memorial invokes US memorial tradition in the listing of battles fought, a feature present on most American memorials in Britain and France, in addition to the Christian elements, which can be seen in US overseas commemoration following the First World War, architecturally it is otherwise very different.⁸³ Memorials in France, for example, are either very classical in design, with Doric, Ionic or Corinthian columns, or they simply

⁷⁸ See for example, “Pacific War Memorial”, Lonely Planet, accessed 16 April 2020, <https://www.lonelyplanet.com/philippines/attractions/pacific-war-memorial/a/point-of-interest/1449701/357304>; Christian Lucas Sangoyo, “Corregidor’s Pacific War Memorial”, *Lakad Pilipinas: Stories from the Philippines + Beyond* (blog), 3 November 2010, <https://www.lakadpilipinas.com/2010/11/corregidor-pacific-war-memorial.html>.

⁷⁹ Budreau, *Bodies of War*, 4.

⁸⁰ Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 192.

⁸¹ Budreau, *Bodies of War*, 47-50.

⁸² Fourth Annual Report of the Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission, 5 August 1957, page 9, box 1, Bataan-Corregidor folder, Jack Z. Anderson Records, DDEPL.

⁸³ Budreau, *Bodies of War*, 121-24.

feature an obelisk. Additionally, they all incorporate American motifs such as the flag and the eagle. In contrast, other than the references to the US forces, there are no American motifs present in the Pacific War Memorial. Furthermore, whilst its form is reminiscent of an earlier design by the consulting Philippine architect on the memorial, Leandro Locsin (Figure 5.8), it does not feature any distinctly Filipino architectural elements or motifs.⁸⁴ Yet it does connect to a more global memorial tradition with the reflecting pools around the outside of the ceremonial court and alongside the walkway reminiscent of those found at the Lincoln Memorial and the Taj Mahal, and similarly, the domed rotunda is also present in the Australian War Memorial, which was founded in 1941 (Figure 5.9). However, while the Pacific War Memorial is architecturally distinctive, its American authorship, together with the memorial's Christian elements and the Eternal Flame of Freedom, perpetuate colonial ideologies both around how Philippine nationhood could be articulated, as well as the country's indebtedness to the United States.

Construction on the Pacific War Memorial finally began on the anniversary of Corregidor's surrender on 6 May 1967 and it was inaugurated by President Marcos on 22 June 1968 (Figure 5.10). Inglis has noted that the unveilings of memorials following the First World War usually have three components, "the national, the sacred and the military".⁸⁵ The opening of the Pacific War Memorial was no different, with the presence of national figures including President Marcos, the US Ambassador to the Philippines, G. Mennen Williams, Catholic Church leaders, and both American and Philippine military veterans. Williams used his speech to reiterate the agenda of the memorial as emblematic of American and Philippine "devotion to common ideals of freedom", whilst Fr. Pacifico A. Ortiz reinforced the sacredness of the conflict referring to Corregidor as "hallowed ground" and the military as "those whom God has chosen".⁸⁶ Similarly, the commemorative activities within the

⁸⁴ The Church of the Holy Sacrifice, which was consecrated in 1955 and is located on the campus of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, features a similar domed rotunda to the Pacific War Memorial.

⁸⁵ Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 209.

⁸⁶ G. Mennen Williams, "Pacific War Memorial dedicated today", *Manila Times*, 22 June 1968, box 1, Clippings Scrapbook folder, Emmet O'Neal Papers, HSTPLM;

ceremony also fulfilled this memorial triad, with the raising of flags and the playing of national anthems, in addition to prayers and the laying of wreaths.⁸⁷

Inglis has also noted the masculine nature of these ceremonies, with women present but silent.⁸⁸ Indeed although Imelda Marcos was in attendance, her sole function was to cut the ribbon to open the memorial (Figure 5.11). Furthermore the Pacific War Memorial itself, like those to Rizal, Bonifacio, and Quezon, is a commemoration of masculinity. The tablet at the memorial's entrance is dedicated to the "fighting men" and a booklet produced for the opening ceremony describes the memorial as a "war memorial, for all men and for all seasons", additionally referring to the Philippine and American forces as that "select mold [sic] of men who knew how to die".⁸⁹ Not only does this mask other narratives, such as the women who served on Corregidor as nurses, but it portrays an idealised form of masculinity which it equates with the model citizen. American and Philippine nation-building is a masculine effort.

President Marcos also underscored the masculine nature of nation-building in his speech, "The Struggle for Peace", at the opening, stating that "we have beaten the swords into plowshares, and the spears into pruninghooks; and we are determined that our sons shall not learn war anymore". However, whilst he framed national duty as a masculine struggle, his language also depicted Philippine progress as a singularly Philippine endeavour. As chapter 4 illustrated, commemoration, particularly of the Second World War, was a significant tool for Marcos, both as a means to legitimise his leadership and to present himself as a heroic figure through his own experiences as a soldier. Indeed, despite the PNSC's absence from much of the Corregidor Commission's decision making, Marcos sought to underline the cooperation and

Invocation by Father Pacifico A. Ortiz, "Turnover Ceremonies of the Pacific War Memorial at Corregidor Island on June 22, 1968", Reproduced by the National Shrines Commission, 5 July 1968, pages 1-2, box 1, Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission folder, Emmet O'Neal Papers, HSTPLM.

⁸⁷ "Turnover Ceremonies of the Pacific War Memorial", 22 June 1968, pages 1-5, box 1, Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission folder, Emmet O'Neal Papers, HSTPLM.

⁸⁸ Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 201.

⁸⁹ NMPC and USIS-Manila, "Pacific War Memorial, Corregidor Island", 3.

“dedication shown by the members of the U.S. Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission and the members of the Philippine National Shrines Commission”. Furthermore, the inauguration of the Pacific War Memorial took place at a crucial time for Marcos as he was running for reelection the following year, and he used the opportunity to reiterate the positive changes experienced by the country under his leadership, stating that his administration has worked to “evict poverty out of its old habitations and install in its place new ways of life – comfort and good health and prosperity”.⁹⁰ Additionally, it was important for Marcos to emphasise Philippine independence from the United States, both to nationalists at home but also to other Southeast Asian nations, as in 1967 the Philippines had become a signatory to the Bangkok Declaration, which formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and which stipulated that any foreign bases in an ASEAN country must be temporary.⁹¹ However, while the proceedings were used as part of Marcos’ own nation-building rhetoric, he also continued to use the same rhetoric as O’Neal to describe the relationship between the Philippines and United States, describing the Pacific War Memorial as a “monument to the American and Philippine alliance for freedom”.⁹² Like the post-independence commemorations of Rizal, Bonifacio and Quezon, Philippine Second World War memorialisations exhibited tensions between the US colonial legacy and the assertion of an independent nationhood. Additionally, from Rizal’s earliest commemorations, the concept of freedom had been used to characterise the United States’ role in the Philippines and over twenty years into Philippine independence the connection between the two nations continued to be portrayed in the same manner.

The Corregidor memoryscape

This American and Philippine “alliance” continues to be nurtured through the Sun Cruises Tour of Corregidor, which takes the form of a ferry ride from Manila Bay to

⁹⁰ Marcos, *The Struggle for Peace*, 5, 8.

⁹¹ Bonner, *Waltzing With A Dictator*, 206.

⁹² Marcos, *The Struggle for Peace*, 3.

the island, where several trolley buses meet disembarking passengers to take them on a guided tour (Figure 5.12). Sites visited include the Pacific War Memorial, former military barracks and other sites associated with the Second World War, as well as newer monuments and memorials that have been built since the Corregidor Foundation took over the management of the island in 1987.

As noted in chapter 4, Marcos' position as a Second World War veteran was particularly significant to his public image and in 1977 he launched the "Reunion for Peace" programme in which he encouraged Second World War veterans, including Japanese veterans, to visit the Philippines.⁹³ The inclusion of Japanese memorialising led to the construction of memorials to the Japanese war dead, including on Corregidor itself. These take the form of memorials that have been erected by private Japanese citizens and veterans' groups and are located in the Japanese Garden of Peace (Figure 5.13), which opened in 1997. One of the memorials is dedicated to "the memory of the war victims", in which the dedication includes, Philippine, American and Japanese soldiers. Another is dedicated to "the souls of the Filipino, American and Japanese, soldiers whose lives were given in a battle which occurred here on May 5, 1942" (Figure 5.14).

Yet despite the presence of these Japanese remembrances, they are marginalised on the Sun Cruises tour. Japanese tour groups are separated from the other tourists and throughout the author's tour, the guide frequently made reference to the atrocities committed by the Japanese forces and drew the group's attention to the separation of the Japanese tourists, stating that it was because they would not want to hear about the brutalities that occurred. When the tour arrived at the Japanese Garden of Peace, the guide remarked on incidences of Second World War veterans refusing to enter the garden and one occasion of a memorial being defaced by an American veteran.

⁹³Letter of Instruction No. 331, s. 1975, (29 Oct. 1975), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1975/10/29/letter-of-instruction-no-331-s-1975/>.

Outwardly the Garden of Peace expresses a symbol of renewed friendship between Japan and the Philippines, undoubtedly influenced in part by the Philippines' increased economic reliance on Japan.⁹⁴ Incidentally this alliance is also promoted through the government-led ceremonies during *Araw ng Kagitingan* (Day of Valour), the national commemoration of the Second World War dead, with the presence of the Japanese ambassador alongside their American and Philippine counterparts. However, on Corregidor the touring groups are encouraged to remember the war as the guide suggests, and as it is presented throughout the island: as a scene of American and Philippine suffering at the hands of the Japanese and as a fight for freedom (from the Japanese). The separation of the Japanese tour groups suggests that while alternative remembrances are tolerated, they are not allowed to infringe upon the official narrative of war presented. Indeed, a few of this author's interviewees involved in Second World War official remembrance activities commented on the absence of an apology from the Japanese government for the "atrocities" committed, making it clear this is still a prevalent issue and the narrative of reconciliation is not one subscribed to by everyone.⁹⁵ Despite the presence of Japanese memorials, the Sun Cruises tour continues to reinforce O'Neal's wish to commemorate "the joint sacrifices of brothers-in-arms".⁹⁶

However, despite the proliferation of this narrative, the Pacific War Memorial itself, remains absent from the government-led *Araw ng Kagitingan* commemorations, which incidentally take place on Bataan Day as opposed to the anniversary of the fall

⁹⁴ The Philippines-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, which guarantees free trade between the two countries, has been in force since 2008. "Philippines-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (PJEPA)", Department of Trade and Industry, GOV.PH, accessed 4 September 2021, <https://www.dti.gov.ph/philippines-japan-economic-partnership-agreement-pjepa/>. Additionally, in 2017 the Japanese government pledged 1 trillion yen in aid and investments. "Japan pledges aid, investments for Philippine infrastructure", *ABS-CBN News*, 12 January 2017, <https://news.abs-cbn.com/business/01/12/17/japan-pledges-aid-investments-for-philippine-infrastructure>.

⁹⁵ See for example Linantud, "War Memorials and Memories: Comparing the Philippines and South Korea".

⁹⁶ O'Neal to P.S. Hughes, 29 January 1963, pages 6-13.

of Corregidor. In addition to the ceremonies at the Shrine of Valor on Bataan, erected by President Marcos, on Corregidor, commemorations take place at the Filipino Heroes Memorial, which was inaugurated in 1992 (Figure 5.15). The Filipino Heroes Memorial includes depictions of Lapulapu, scenes from the Philippine Revolution, the Philippine-American War, and the Second World War. It connects to the Philippine government's early commemorations of Bataan and Corregidor, which in addition to underlining the significance of the Philippine-American relationship, also sought to portray a distinctly Philippine heroic lineage. While the Philippine-American alliance narrative may still be strong, it is clear it is not pertinent to Philippine commemorations of the Second World War. Furthermore, a Corregidor Foundation representative explained that services took place at the Filipino Heroes Memorial as opposed to the Pacific War Memorial as the latter was "for the allies", suggesting they do not see the Philippines as part of that group.⁹⁷ Thus, although the anniversary of the Fall of Corregidor itself is remembered at the Pacific War Memorial, its absence when specifically remembering the Philippine dead not only suggests its lack of significance to many Filipinos but its perception as a foreign memorial. Indeed, as O'Neal wished, it is manifestly a monument "erected by the people of the United States and given to the people of the Philippines".⁹⁸

Corregidor's Malinta Tunnel Experience too serves to decolonise the Philippines' involvement in the Second World War (Figures 5.16-5.17). Through a series of films and dioramas, the Malinta Tunnel illustrates the conditions on the island whilst it was under siege from the Imperial Japanese Army. Intertwined with this is the story of Philippine Commonwealth President Quezon, who took his oath of office on Corregidor when the government was forced to relocate to the island following the Japanese invasion in December 1941. The exhibition depicts Quezon's struggle for Philippine independence, from his own participation in the 1898 to 1902 Philippine-American War through to his political career, during which he secured the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which provided for the Philippines to become an

⁹⁷ Corregidor Foundation representative in discussion with the author, 25 January 2018.

⁹⁸ Memorandum by Emmet O'Neal, 22.

independent country after a ten-year transition period. The exhibition culminates on Philippine Independence Day on 4 July 1946. Thus, the Malinta Tunnel Experience serves to localise the Second World War by framing it within the country's historical struggle for self-rule. Together with the Filipino Heroes Memorial, these memorials function much like the Pacific War Memorial in their message of freedom, except here the freedom is not universal, but national, and the Second World War is not a global conflict but the final Philippine Revolution in a centuries old fight for independence.

However, these hegemonic interpretations of the Second World War have been contested by other "commemorative agents".⁹⁹ The past few decades have seen the construction of a number of other memorials funded by private groups, such as To The Angels, a memorial dedicated to American military women (2000) (Figure 5.18) and the Memorial to Jonathan M. Wainwright "Hero of Bataan" (2000) (Figure 5.19). These reveal the lives and voices of those who are forgotten or lost within the Pacific War Memorial itself and indeed, the wider Philippine Second World War memoryscape in which MacArthur is elevated. Furthermore, on speaking to both Philippine and American interviewees involved in Second World War commemoration, the absence of the personal and a distinctly Philippine element in the Pacific War Memorial affects the way in which it is used. Additionally, when speaking to the son of an American veteran about the Pacific War Memorial, he noted the "official" ceremonies that took place there, but more significant to him were the Death March Markers (1967) that line the route of the Bataan Death March, of which his father was a part (Figure 5.20).¹⁰⁰ Thus, whilst official commemorations still take place at the Pacific War Memorial, the absence of other memorialisations – the Filipino commemorations taking place elsewhere, the personal remembrances of the son of an American veteran at the Bataan Death March Markers – suggest its lesser importance to both official Philippine commemorations and personal American and Filipino remembrances of war.

⁹⁹ Edwards, *Allies in Memory*, 5.

¹⁰⁰ Filipino American Memorial Endowment representative in discussion with the author, 9 February 2018.

Conclusion

In the aftermath of the Second World War, a shared narrative of remembrance between the United States and the Philippines emerged around the memorialisation of Bataan and Corregidor. This was used by both nations as a means to convey a profound connection between the two, using the rhetoric of “freedom” to portray an equal partnership which masked the decades of colonial rule that had preceded the conflict. The articulation of the war as a fight between liberty and oppression was informed by US Cold War rhetoric and in particular the Truman Doctrine, which perpetuated colonial hierarchies in its implication that not all nations followed a democratic and thus “civilised” way of life. Following Philippine independence, the government sought to decolonise the war through distinctly Philippine days of remembrance such as National Heroes Day and Bataan Day, and Philippine memoryscapes, such as Capas and Bataan. However, similarly to the post-independence commemorations of Rizal, Bonifacio, and Quezon, memorialisation also sought to reaffirm the country’s ties to the United States, revealing the Philippines’ ongoing struggle towards and against its former coloniser. Additionally, the Philippine memorial landscape was also being shaped by Philippine veterans who, like the Veterans of the Revolution, sought to legitimise their role in the conflict, as well as ensure the dates and places significant to them were being memorialised.

US Cold War foreign policy also shaped the Corregidor Commission’s and O’Neal’s visions for the Pacific War Memorial. Yet O’Neal also had his own desire to memorialise the US imperial legacy. Whereas Edwards notes a collaborative enterprise in the formation of US memorials in Europe, in the case of the Pacific War Memorial, despite some involvement by the Philippine National Shrines Commission, its development was dominated by O’Neal and the Corregidor Commission.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ Edwards, *Allies in Memory*.

O'Neal's rhetoric and ideas for the Pacific War Memorial, like the Cold War informed memorialisation rhetoric, furthered the colonial hierarchies that had been present in Rizal's early commemoration, both in his reverence for US monuments, and in his wish that it be perceived as an American construct, bequeathed to the Philippine people. Like the Rizal Monument, these racial hierarchies manifested in the memorial competition, which restricted entries to the United States, thus denying Filipinos any authorship over the US legacy in the Philippines.

These colonial ideologies are also revealed in the design of the Pacific War Memorial itself. While architecturally the memorial is distinct both from other US memorials and from those built in the Philippines during US colonial rule, ultimately its design reflects O'Neal's agenda. Its Christian elements not only sanctify the Second World War and the US presence in the Philippines, they reflect O'Neal's image of the country which perpetuated the hegemonic Christian model of nationhood underscored by the Rizal, Bonifacio and Quezon monuments. Additionally, O'Neal's characterisation of the war and of the United States' mission in the Philippines as a fight for freedom, is manifested in the Eternal Flame of Freedom sculpture, which also allows for the Statue of Liberty to be partially realised in the Philippines. While President Marcos sought to use the opening to emphasise the singularly Philippine struggle that had taken place as the country rebuilt itself following the war, he also perpetuated this rhetoric of freedom in his characterisation of the relationship between the two nations. While Chapters 2 to 4 illustrated monuments that were themselves sites of contestation, the complex network of the Corregidor memoryscape reveals that counter-hegemonic memory can also exist within a broader space. As although the colonial narrative of shared suffering and an American-Philippine fight for freedom persists on Corregidor, the absence of the Pacific War Memorial from Araw ng Kagitingan remembrance events and the presence of memorials and exhibitions such as the Filipino Heroes Memorial and the Malinta Tunnel Experience disrupt O'Neal's vision. As the government seeks to embed the country's liberty within its own heroic past, freedom is depicted as less a consequence of the American presence but exists in spite of it, as colonial rule is shown to be another obstacle in the Philippines' long struggle for independence.

Although Edwards views the “officers of government agencies” as a singular “commemorative agent”, O’Neal’s specific agenda and his reluctance to involve the American Battle Monuments Commission, in addition to the opposition he received from within several presidential administrations and the US Congress, reveals the US government as a network of various “commemorative agendas”.¹⁰² Additionally, the “assertiveness” noted by Edwards as a key feature of the second phase of American transatlantic memorialisation after 1970, can be seen much earlier in the Philippines, as the United States tried to secure its connection with a rapidly decolonising continent. Although it is distinct from the other monuments analysed in this thesis, both in its subject of commemoration and its design, the Pacific War Memorial was envisioned by O’Neal in much the same way as Governor General Taft appropriated Rizal: as a marker of the liberty the United States enabled the Philippines to have. It is best articulated by Philippine Major General Basilio Valdez, who commented on the selection of 4 July as the date on which Philippine independence would be recognised: “It... was a practical example of what a people, aspiring, to be free and independent can accomplish, if led by a great and democratic nation like the United States of America”.¹⁰³

¹⁰² Edwards, *Allies in Memory*, 5.

¹⁰³ Basilio Valdez, “July 4 Links P.I. Forever with America”, *Philippine Liberty News*, 4 July 1946, A-G, *Philippine Liberty News Archive*, AHC.

Conclusion:

A Heritage of Freedom

Introduction

“We are not static museum pieces and history has never stood still like these statues”, said former New Mexico State historian Estevan Rael-Gálvez.¹ Rael-Gálvez’s comment was in relation to the recent debates over the presence of monuments commemorating Spanish conquistadors in New Mexico. For some of the state’s Hispanic population, these statues represent “resistance to Anglo dominance”, whereas for the Native American population they signify the persecution of the indigenous population by the Spanish colonial administration.² The ongoing disputes over these New Mexico monuments serve as a stark reminder not only of the pertinence of colonial monument research, as Rael-Gálvez questions the Hispanic appropriation of “figures of conquest”, but of the nuances these statues can embody. Like the monuments erected in US colonial Philippines, these statues problematise the coloniser versus colonised dichotomy, as they are engaged with by various groups, each looking to assert cultural agency. Contrary to Rael-Gálvez’s comment, in some ways these monuments have never remained static but are constantly shaped by the multitude of ways with which they are engaged and thus generate evolving debates that cannot simply be resolved through a monument’s removal.

In this extended conclusion I consider the significance of this thesis to this broader dialogue on colonial monuments and how my analysis of monument building in twentieth century Philippines contests previous colonial monument and Philippine-

¹ Estevan Rael-Gálvez quoted in Simon Romero, “Man Is Shot at Protest Over Statue of New Mexico’s Conquistador”, *New York Times*, 15 June 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/15/us/conquistador-onate-albuquerque-new-mexico-unrest.html>.

² Simon Romero, “Man Is Shot at Protest Over Statue of New Mexico’s Conquistador”.

United States scholarship, which has simply focused on the persistence of an imperial dynamic. I also bring together the main themes that have emerged in this thesis: competing images of Philippine nationhood, the shaping of Philippine colonial and postcolonial monuments through US rhetoric and visual iconography; the positioning of Philippine nationhood outside the coloniser-colonised dichotomy; the Christianised image of the nation that has proliferated across each of the monuments, despite their varying agendas; the significance of the body and reinterment to the portrayal of Christian identity and the creation of a definitive memorial space; the evolution of citizenship through each of the monuments from the pacifism of Rizal through to the idealisation of the citizen soldier seen in the commemoration of Bonifacio, Quezon and the Second World War; the duality in veteran commemoration, in which veterans are both integral to government-led nation-building, yet have also used commemoration to contest authority and advocate their own agendas. The conclusion considers the importance of monuments to the study of US colonial rule in the Philippines, as well as the impact of Philippine colonial memoryscape analysis on monument scholarship. Finally, it examines the US and Philippine governments' contrasting interpretations of "freedom", and the use of "freedom" to establish hegemonic visions of Philippine nationhood.

Monumentalising Philippine cultural history

In this thesis I set out to establish the extent to which the United States shaped the monuments that were constructed during its colonial rule of the Philippines and the images of nationhood that each monument projected. Through an analysis of four monuments constructed during US colonial rule and afterwards, I have demonstrated that while each in some way was formed by the Philippines' ties to the United States, they were also shaped by many other groups, such as the emerging Philippine government, the Knights of Rizal, artists, architects, veterans, and indeed President Marcos, each of whom sought to establish their own hegemonic vision of the nation. This commemorative pluralism reveals a complexity

to colonial-era Philippine nationbuilding, formed in part by class, race and religious divides, which contests previous scholarship on colonial-era monuments, such as Larsen and Whelan, who have interpreted monument construction and removal simply as a means to colonise and decolonise the landscape.³ Furthermore, the post-independence use of colonial era monuments in the Philippines to establish a sovereign image of the nation, whilst simultaneously negotiating the legacy of US rule, reveals that decolonisation is not purely about monument removal. My exploration of Philippine agency also contests approaches by historians such as Morley and Brody, who have focused on US colonial visual culture as a means to dominate the Philippine landscape and people. Their preoccupation with a US-Philippine, coloniser-colonised dichotomy, which also characterises the works of Ileteo and Quibuyen, is challenged by this thesis' exposure of Philippine colonial and postcolonial commemorative connections to the Hispanic diaspora, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, revealing that monument building does not simply take place within a national or colonial context but can be situated within a broader transnational network of memory-making.

The emerging scholarship on Philippine cultural history with which I have engaged throughout this work by historians such as CuUnjieng Aboitiz, art historians such as Baluyut and social historians such as Guevarra, has done much to transnationalise the study of modern Philippine history over the last decade or so, and to encourage us to think beyond the confines of the Washington-Manila imperial bond. Such work has forced scholars of the Philippines to rethink the modern history of that country and its ideological, artistic and social connections with places as diverse as Europe, Mexico, China and Japan. A study of commemoration and monuments makes an important contribution to this scholarship, even through an examination of sites so closely associated with the United States' presence in the colonial and postcolonial Philippines, as the interdisciplinary analysis of such sites has enabled the discovery of

³ Larsen, "Re-placing Imperial Landscapes: Colonial Monuments and the Transition to Independence in Kenya"; Whelan, "The Construction and Destruction of a Colonial Landscape: Monuments to British Monarchs in Dublin Before and After Independence".

complex agendas and transnational memory networks. Be it in the classically inspired sculptural language of the Bonifacio Monument, the overt references to the Mexican Revolution found in *El Grito del Revolución*, or the communist-bloc-inspired grandiosity of Marcos-era public works projects, the monuments I have examined in this thesis only emphasise the important message that such recent scholarship has started to project – that even under such intense and direct influence from the United States, which persisted following colonial rule, various groups within the Philippines were able to draw on influences and inspiration from a nexus of heritages to shape their own competing visions of Philippine nationhood.

A “heritage of freedom”

In a speech made on Rizal Day in 1945, anticipating the country’s forthcoming independence, the US High Commissioner to the Philippines, Paul McNutt, stated: “the people of the Philippines have shown their desire and anxiety to build here a monument to democracy and freedom”.⁴ This statement not only underlined the significance of “freedom” to the US government’s portrayal of its role in the Philippines, but was also indicative of the way in which the US colonial government sought to shape Philippine national identity in its own image through commemoration. The national days of commemoration legislated by the Philippine Commission as early as 1902 sought to embed the remembrance of Rizal within a US heritage and position an independent Philippines as the successor to a US historical narrative that begins with George Washington, whose birth date was one of the dates commemorated. Governor General Taft not only perceived Rizal’s commemoration as central to the Philippine Commission’s “pacification of the country”, but he also used Rizal to reinforce an image of the United States as liberator, asserting that only “under the sovereignty of the United States the Filipino

⁴ “High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt’s statement on Rizal Day, December 30, 1945”, *Official Gazette* 42, no. 1 (January 1946): 110-11, *Official Gazette Archive*, AHC.

people can acquire all those liberties which Rizal prized”.⁵ This portrayal of the United States endured in both the US and Philippine commemorations of Quezon and of the Second World War. On the first anniversary of Quezon’s death in 1945, President Sergio Osmeña stated that “the independence of the Philippines could come only under the United States, and that, obviously, the United States was the only place where we could continue the work of establishing that independence”.⁶ US President Franklin D. Roosevelt too used Quezon to underline the connection between Philippine and US heritage, asserting that Quezon would be “remembered by his people with the respect and veneration that we in the United States have for the name of George Washington”.⁷ Likewise President Elpidio Quirino depicted the Philippine-American alliance in the Second World War as a battle for “freedom and is a reminder to Filipinos and Americans alike of their common democratic heritage”.⁸ This rhetoric persisted through to the creation of the Pacific War Memorial, which for O’Neal memorialised the US role in shaping the Philippine nation: “There is not found in all the history of the world such a relationship as that of America and the Philippines which resulted in the launching of the Philippines as a sovereign nation”.⁹ Commemoration for the US government and for the Philippines was used to foster an image of the United States as emancipator, which persisted through to and following Philippine independence. Indeed, US President George W. Bush’s 2003 assertion that Americans and Filipinos “liberated the Philippines from colonial rule” was indicative of this narrative’s pervasiveness over the course of the twentieth century.¹⁰

⁵ Report of the Philippine Commission In Two Parts, 1900/1901, Part 2, image 228, page 192 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1901), <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203989316>; William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 31 August 1900, image 94, page 6, William H. Taft Papers.

⁶ Osmeña quoted in “In Memoriam: Manuel Luis Quezon”, 382.

⁷ Roosevelt quoted in Kalil, “World Mourns Loss of Manuel L. Quezon”, 8.

⁸ Proclamation No. 307, (24 Mar. 1952), *Official Gazette* 48, no. 3 (March): 955, *Official Gazette* Archive, AHC.

⁹ Memorandum by Emmet O’Neal, n.d., 8-9.

¹⁰ Bush. 2003. “Remarks by the President to the Philippine Congress” (speech).

The language of “freedom” and “liberty” also pervaded Philippine articulations of nationhood during colonial rule. The Rizal Monument Committee envisioned the Rizal Monument as a demonstration of Philippine “aspirations to liberty and progress” and signalled the Philippines’ “aptitude to enter into the concert of cultured and civilized nations”.¹¹ Likewise, in his plans for the Quezon Memorial, Pedro Velasco believed the memorial should be emblematic of a people “who move with the course of civilization”, citing the “United States of America” as one of the “progressive countries of advanced culture and civilization” the Philippines should emulate.¹² O’Neal too perceived the Pacific War Memorial as being emblematic of America’s role in the advancement of civilisation: “From Europe the torch of Liberty was handed to America. Now America has an opportunity to hand it on to Asia”.¹³ Thus not only were Philippine expressions of nationalism shaped by an American rhetoric of freedom, but commemoration also placed the country as successor to the United States, reflecting a colonial hierarchy that persisted long into Philippine independence.

This US model of Philippine nationhood also manifested in the competitions for the monuments. The limitation of the design competition for the Rizal Monument, the first national monument erected under US colonial rule, to European and American artists signalled the Philippine Commission’s intent to shape Philippine nationhood in a Western mould. This legacy persisted through to Philippine independence, with the design competition for the Quezon Memorial open to American architects resident in the Philippines, while the restriction of the Pacific War Memorial competition to US architects, reveals the persistent unwillingness of the US government to relinquish its authorship over Philippine nation-building. Indeed, O’Neal feared the loss of US ownership over Second World War commemoration in the Philippines when a “simple marker” was proposed instead of the Pacific War

¹¹ Rizal Monument Committee, “To The People Of The Philippines”.

¹² Quezon Memorial Committee, “Let Us Have A Quezon Memorial Foundation”, n.d., 3.

¹³ Memorandum by Emmet O’Neal, n.d., 17.

Memorial, arguing that it could be perceived as a “Filipino accomplishment” as opposed to “an American memorial to the joint sacrifices of brothers-in-arms”.¹⁴

American and European iconography also shaped the designs of the monuments. The obelisk at the centre of the Rizal and Bonifacio Monuments and the winged figures of Victory featured on both the Bonifacio and Quezon monuments, each locate the structures within Western classical commemorative and sculptural tradition, yet they also invoke US nationhood in the obelisks’ echoes of the Washington Monument and the contemporaneous use of winged figures of Victory on American First World War memorials. US iconographies of freedom also pervaded Philippine monument designs. Tolentino’s proposal for the Quezon Memorial invoked the Statue of Liberty through its “Statue of Freedom” centrepiece and the initial proposal for the Pacific War Memorial was a replica of the Statue of Liberty, which O’Neal saw as the ultimate symbol of the “precepts of democracy and liberty”.¹⁵ The monumental dominance of the Statue of Liberty continues to persist, as almost a century later in the early 2000s, the National Historical Commission for the Philippines likened the Bonifacio Monument to the “Statue of Liberty”, as part of their argument against its proposed relocation.¹⁶ From the beginnings of US colonial rule, commemoration of Philippine figures was not only shaped by US rhetoric and heritage but through a distinctly American visual language, establishing a conjoined Philippine-United States heritage, which persisted through to Philippine independence.

However, notably absent from this discussion is the Bonifacio Monument. Although its invocation of Western classical sculptural tradition is similar to the Rizal Monument, overall its rhetoric and design is markedly distinct from the other monuments. Indeed, its design competition diverged from the others being the only

¹⁴ Cannon to Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, 19 January 1960, pages 1-2; O’Neal to P.S. Hughes, 29 January 1963, pages 6-13.

¹⁵ O’Neal, “The Corregidor Bataan Memorial”, n.d., 29.

¹⁶ Requesting the City of Kalookan to Reconsider its Plan to Relocate the Bonifacio Monument and Instead to Upgrade the Complex as a Park of 2002, Res. 2002-29, NHCP (2002).

one in which entries were limited to Philippine artists and architects, contesting the way in which colonial-era Philippine nationhood had been articulated, as the following section will illustrate.

Competing visions of the nation

While much of the architecture and rhetoric around the Rizal Monument, Quezon Memorial and Pacific War Memorial sought to shape an image of the Philippine nation in the model of the United States, there were also other visual agendas at work, particularly in the creation of the Bonifacio Monument. Indeed, while the vision for the other monuments was very much led by their committees, the Bonifacio Monument was primarily driven by Tolentino's wish to create "real sculpture" and move Philippine art away from the "stock of monuments of Rizal".¹⁷ The Bonifacio Monument also marked a distinct shift from the Rizal Monument in the composition of its committee, which was comprised entirely of artists and architects, signalling a new emphasis on art and culture as markers of national identity. Additionally, the Philippine-based competition for the Bonifacio Monument differentiates it from the other monument contests, and signalled the committee's indigenous approach to the sculptural articulation of nationhood. Furthermore, although like the Rizal Monument, the Bonifacio Monument looked to European sculptural heritage through the figures' neo-classical style, reflecting Tolentino's own European training, the Bonifacio Monument is also infused with Philippine references and Tolentino's own artistic style. Unlike the Rizal Monument, or indeed the Quezon Memorial frieze, the figures depicted on the Bonifacio Monument are emotive and naturally positioned. Moreover while Tolentino presented Bonifacio as a less radical figure, moving away from the more aggressive depiction of him frequently used at the time, he nevertheless promoted an indigenous vision of Philippine nationhood, significantly departing from the acculturated figure of Rizal and contesting the image of the *mestizo Ilustrado* as the ideal Philippine citizen. The

¹⁷ Tolentino, quoted in Paras-Perez, *Tolentino*, 137; Tolentino, quoted in Hartendorp, "Guillermo E. Tolentino: Sculptor", 21.

similarities between the Bonifacio Monument, the earlier *El Grito del Revolución* monument and Mexico City's Monumento a la Independencia also reflected a shared post-revolutionary sculptural discourse between the Philippines and the wider Hispanic diaspora, which together with the Bonifacio Monument's European influences, contested the US image of Philippine nationhood by positioning the Philippines within a transnational nexus of heritages.

The Quezon Memorial too positioned the Philippines partially outside a US-centric image of the nation. Although in the memorial's early development Velasco and the Quezon Memorial Committee had looked to the United States as a marker of "advanced culture and civilization", upon its construction the Quezon Memorial, like the Bonifacio Monument, connected to broader post-revolution commemorative practices. The Quezon Memorial's aesthetic reflected the emerging monumental memoryscapes of other revolutionary and postcolonial regimes, such as China, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, which emerged particularly in the 1970s. The construction of these commemorative edifices formed part of a broader move to establish "cults of personality" in order to legitimise the ruling party and likewise President Ferdinand Marcos looked to not only illustrate the efficacy of martial law but to memorialise his own role in the advancement of the Philippine nation.¹⁸ Furthermore, the large number of cultural entities erected under Marcos is testament to the continued significance of art and culture to nation-building, and like the Bonifacio Monument, the judges for the Quezon Memorial were all architects. However, whereas the sculptural and visual language of the Bonifacio Monument had looked to the United States and Europe, whilst also locating the Philippines within the broader Hispanic diaspora, the visual identity of the Quezon Memorial was largely disconnected from the country's European colonial past. Indeed, unlike the Rizal and Bonifacio Monuments, Europeans were not eligible to enter the design competition for the Quezon Memorial. The changing visual identities seen across the monuments reflects the Philippines' own political shift across the twentieth century from its closer ties to Europe through to the

¹⁸ See for example Dror, "Establishing Hồ Chí Minh's Cult: Vietnamese Traditions and Their Transformations".

establishment of greater connections with Asia under Marcos, particularly following the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 1967.

Yet while visually the Rizal, Bonifacio and Quezon monuments project a particular image of the Philippines, each of them also has a textual element that contests the hegemonic narrative. The Rizal Monument's visual language looks to the United States and to Europe whilst it presents an image of Rizal in the mould of the Philippine Commission's muted portrayal of him as a "patriot writer and poet". However, the plaques on the monument underline the sacrificial nature of Rizal's death, restoring a sense of martyrdom to his memory, which was significant to the commemorative aspirations of the Rizal Monument Committee and the Knights of Rizal. Additionally the plaque written in Spanish serves to contest the Philippine Commission's imposition of English as the national language. Similarly the esoteric Katipunan code on the Bonifacio Monument rejects English as the language of power, while the passionate rhetoric of Bonifacio's call to arms undermines the calm stance of the figure sculpted above. Finally, the Quezon Memorial's Museo ni Manuel Quezon repositions Quezon into the national narrative, contesting his reduced presence in the memorial's exterior, as well as challenging Marcos' own diminution of Quezon's significance to Philippine independence. These more textual elements reveal the competing visions of nationhood and commemorative pluralism present within each monument and the drive for a hegemonic image of the nation.

However, while commemorative pluralism is less discernible in the Pacific War Memorial due to the dominance of O'Neal's vision, it can be seen in the broader memoryscape of Corregidor, as well as within wider Philippine Second World War memorialisation. As Emde has observed, these monuments do not exist in isolation but are part of "polyphonic memoryscapes" in which memories and commemorative agendas intersect and collide.¹⁹ While the Pacific War Memorial underlines American-Philippine unity and seeks to portray freedom and independence as a consequence of the United States' presence in the Philippines, the construction of

¹⁹ Emde, "National Memorial Sites and Personal Remembrance: Remembering the Dead of Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek at the ECCC in Cambodia", 20.

the Philippine Heroes Memorial on Corregidor, at which Araw ng Kagitingan commemorative events take place, in addition to other sites such as the Malinta Tunnel experience, decolonise the Second World War and place it into the context of a singularly Philippine struggle for freedom. Other sites too, such as Dambana ng Kagitingan and the Bataan Death March markers, refocus the narrative of the Second World War onto the Philippine experience and reflect the broader post-war government-led nation-building that sought to disconnect the country from the United States.

Competing images of Philippine nationhood also emerged in the commemorations and inauguration ceremonies that took place around each monument. Although the Rizal Day parade in 1915 was used to demonstrate the achievements of US rule, the presence of representatives from the Philippine Assembly evidenced the country's increased political power. This was demonstrated to an even greater extent in 1933 at the Bonifacio Monument inauguration, which took place shortly before the Philippines became a commonwealth nation. The ceremony sought to demonstrate not only the country's political acumen, with representatives from government, but its military and educational achievements too, with women from various educational establishments and Philippine revolutionary veterans. The inclusion of veterans of the Philippine Revolution at both the Rizal and Bonifacio commemorations not only projected an image of military strength but also depicted an image of the country that had been born in spite of rather than as a consequence of American endeavour. Furthermore, both the Rizal and Bonifacio ceremonies reinforced the country's Spanish heritage through the presence of the Spanish Chamber of Commerce representatives at the Rizal Monument inauguration and the equal use of Spanish, English, and Tagalog at the Bonifacio Monument opening. The inclusion of representatives from Chinese and Japanese communities at the 1915 Rizal Day parade and the later "National Humiliation Day" commemorations in 1930 also reflected the broader Pan-Asianism that CuUnjieng Aboitiz has noted continued well into US rule.²⁰ President Marcos also used the Pacific War Memorial inauguration to

²⁰ CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*.

legitimise his own rule whilst contesting US dominance, declaring that “we have beaten the swords into plowshares, and the spears into pruninghooks; and we are determined that our sons shall not learn war anymore”.²¹ However, while these portrayals of the nation revealed an image of the Philippines that extended beyond the United States, at the same time they belied the country’s ethnic and religious diversity, as the following section will explore.

A Christian nation?

Many scholars have argued that US colonial rule perpetuated the Spanish colonial ethnic and class hierarchy and further segmented the Christian and non-Christian populations, particularly as regions such as Mindanao, which had and has a predominantly Muslim population, remained under the jurisdiction of the US military, while the rest of the population was governed by the Philippine Commission.²² These colonial divisions persisted long into Philippine independence culminating in a five-year war between the Moro National Liberation Front and the Armed Forces of the Philippines.²³ This conflict, together with the resurgence of the Catholic Church following independence, and actions such as President Ramon Magsaysay’s consecration of the Philippines to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, projected an image of the Philippines as Catholic.²⁴

Many of the commemorations that took place around Rizal, Quezon and the Second World War, also fostered a Christianised image of the nation. Rizal’s early

²¹ Marcos, *The Struggle for Peace*, 8.

²² See for example Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 157; Camacho, “Race and Culture in Spanish and American Colonial Policies”, 78; Pertierra and Ugarte, “American Rule in the Muslim South and the Philippine Hinterlands”; Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 208-15; San Juan, Jr., *After Postcolonialism*, 88-93.

²³ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 217.

²⁴ Francisco, “People of God, People of the Nation Official Catholic Discourse on Nation and Nationalism”, 349; Cullum, “President Magsaysay’s Consecration of the Philippines to the Sacred Heart”.

commemoration was heavily shaped by Christian tradition, with remembrances taking place in church and on All Saints' Day. President Osmeña too encouraged the public to memorialise Quezon in churches and Christianity characterised the early memorials to the Second World War, such as the first marker on Bataan, which read, "The little mountainous peninsula of Bataan saved democracy and the whole world from the evil hands of the devil".²⁵ Christianity also shaped the development of the Quezon and Pacific War Memorials, with Velasco and O'Neal equating Philippine prosperity with the preservation of Christianity.²⁶ The Pacific War Memorial was also explicit in its religious invocation through the presence of the altar at the centre of the memorial room. The altar's poetic inscription with its reference to the "Clear Reveille Of God", also served to portray the actions of the American and Philippine soldiers memorialised as righteous, suggesting a divinely ordained mission. While the Rizal, Bonifacio and Quezon monuments were not overtly Christian, the three monuments' veneration of Tagalog-Manila based figures, presents an image of the nation rooted in Luzon with its predominantly Catholic population, denying the diversity of language, religion and culture seen in the country's other regions. Furthermore, the Bonifacio Monument's connections to the Hispanic diaspora also fostered an image of the Philippines as Christian. This constrained image of the nation was brought to the fore in the 2004 proposal to erect a monument to Lapulapu in Luneta Park, which was opposed by the then National Historical Institute (NHI).²⁷ This not only marked the exclusivity of Luneta Park but reinforced the Christian image of the nation it is perceived to represent, revealing the enduring religious divisions reinforced by the Philippine government's continued focus on the Rizal Monument for nation-building.

The presence of Rizal's remains has also functioned to confer meaning onto Luneta Park, supporting Verdery's observation of the significance of the body to

²⁵ Jose, "Remembering World War II in the Philippines", 117; "Bataan and Democracy", *National Registry of Historic Sites & Structures in the Philippines* (blog).

²⁶ Memorandum by Emmet O'Neal, n.d., 12.

²⁷ Ocampo to Palabyab, 26 January 2004.

commemorative nation-building.²⁸ This is evident both in the presence of Rizal's remains at Luneta Park, as well as in the absence of remains at other monument sites. Indeed, for the Bonifacio family and political supporters of Bonifacio, the Bonifacio Monument's importance was reduced by the absence of the Supremo's remains, leading to calls for a new monument in the 1990s, in which his remains could be symbolically housed. The proposals for monuments to Bonifacio and Quezon to be erected in Luneta Park are further testament to the significance of the site, indeed, Tolentino could only envision a monument for Quezon in Luneta Park as it was the place "where our great Hero, Dr. Rizal was shot and his bones were buried".²⁹

While Verdery asserts the reburial of a body marks "a change in social visibilities and values", she maintains that this is specific to post-socialist regime changes. However, this thesis has demonstrated that the process of reinterment has also been a significant part of commemorative nation-building in colonial and postcolonial Philippines. The reinterment of Rizal's remains at the base of what was to be the Rizal Monument functioned as a reminder of his death and sacrifice, contesting the serenity of his depiction on the monument and the Philippine Commission's muted description of Rizal as a "patriot writer and poet". Verdery argues that reburial "(re)sacralises the political order represented by those who carry it out".³⁰ With Rizal's reinterment the Knights of Rizal underscored the country's increased political control following the introduction of the Jones Bill. Likewise Quezon's reburial served to sanctify President Marcos' rule, while the visible gathering of the Marcos and Quezon families following the mass, positioned Marcos as Quezon's direct successor. Verdery has asserted that reburial is specific to post-communist nation-building as these new eastern European nation states used religion to break with an atheist communist past. However, it is applicable to the Philippine colonial and postcolonial context as Christianity framed the nation-building of many commemorative groups, such as the Knights of Rizal and President Marcos, who

²⁸ Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*.

²⁹ Tolentino, "Quezon Memorial or Shrine of Freedom", n.d., 1.

³⁰ Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*, 19, 32, 36.

likewise sought to break with past regimes. While the Rizal and Quezon monuments did not contain the overt Christian references of the Pacific War Memorial, the reinterment of Rizal's and Quezon's remains perpetuated their early Christianised commemoration and underscored Christianity as a marker of Philippine national identity.

Images of citizenship

While the monuments perpetuated a particular image of the Philippine nation, they also fostered a paradigm of the model citizen. For Taft and the Philippine Commission, Rizal was the ideal commemorative figure as not only was he the peaceful "patriot writer and poet" but he had "never advocated independence".³¹ Furthermore the Rizal Monument, with its image of a European-educated Rizal, both exemplified the importance of Western education, and Rizal's own *mestizo Ilustrado* heritage, underlining the value of an acculturated identity. However, this portrayal shifts with the Bonifacio Monument, which instead emphasises Bonifacio's Malay and Philippine heritage, promoting an alternative Philippine-centric vision of citizenship. The assemblage of figures in the Bonifacio Monument, together with the armed depiction of Bonifacio himself, is also heavily shaped by First World War remembrance, with its elevation of ordinary soldiers as exemplary citizens.³² The depiction of the dead on the Bonifacio Monument too connects to the post-First World War proliferation of the "cult of the fallen soldier".³³ This "cult of the fallen" continued to be a significant marker of patriotism in Quezon's commemoration, with President Manuel Roxas equating his death to those who had "died in heroic struggle on the battlefield".³⁴ Likewise the Pacific War Memorial depicts the dead as having done their obligation: "Sleep, My Sons. Your Duty Done". While Rizal, Bonifacio and Quezon continued to be commemorated following Philippine

³¹ William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 18 August 1900, images 97-80, pages 13-14, William H. Taft Papers.

³² Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 52.

³³ Budreau, *Bodies of War*, 4

³⁴ Proclamation No. 3, (25 Jul. 1946).

independence, their remembrance and particularly the remembrance of Bonifacio and Quezon became increasingly intertwined with the commemoration of a broader Philippine heroic lineage. This reflected the impact of the Second World War both on the way in which Philippine patriotism was defined but also on how Philippine independence was articulated by the Philippine government as an outcome of the war. A commonality throughout each monument is the concept of sacrifice, yet while this was sanitised in the Rizal Monument and Pacific War Memorial, the suffering and loss that accompanies sacrifice was brought to the fore by the actions of the Knights of Rizal, and through Tolentino's renderings of the sufferings endured under Spanish colonialism in the Bonifacio Monument. However Rizal's continued commemorative dominance, suggests that despite the evolution of citizenship ideals, the acculturated figure continues to be venerated.

The significance of the war dead to nation-building was also mirrored by the long-standing importance of veterans to government-led commemoration. Veterans of the Philippine Revolution were included in the Rizal Day parades following the inauguration of the Rizal Monument and furthermore given the "place of honor" during the opening ceremony of the Bonifacio Monument. While the US military was also present at these events, the veterans, particularly at the opening of the Bonifacio Monument, were used to project a strong image of the nation, and shown as one of the foundations of the country, alongside education and the government. Following the Second World War, veterans continued to play an important role and were included in government-led war remembrance, which Presidents Osmeña and Quirino used to emphasise "Filipino courage", depicting an image of the Philippines that existed separately from the United States.³⁵ Veterans were also important to President Marcos both in his tourism drive but also in the establishment of his own public persona. When he invited Second World War veterans to visit the Philippines in 1977 as part of his "Reunion for Peace" initiative, he sought to emphasise his experience of the "poignance and heartbreak" of Bataan and connect with veterans

³⁵ Osmeña. 1945. "Address of President Osmeña at Capas, Tarlac, on the occasion of the celebration of National Heroes' Day, November 30, 1945" (speech).

as “brothers in arms”.³⁶ Thus veterans not only enabled the portrayal of a strong nation state but also facilitated Marcos’ own appearance of heroism. Indeed, today the continued presence of military representatives at non-war commemorations, such as the Marine guards at the Rizal Monument, are indicative of the ongoing significance of the armed forces to the image of the modern Philippine nation. The longstanding inclusion of veterans within government-led nation-building also connects to the “citizen soldier” ideal and participation in warfare as a marker of patriotism. Budreau has noted the formation of a “militarized nationalism” in the United States following the Civil War, which continued to be fostered in commemorations of the First World War. However, while the promotion of the “citizen soldier” in the Philippines connects with broader war memorialisation, it also has its roots in the commemorative activities of the veterans of the Philippine Revolution, who sought to legitimise their own contributions to nation, which did not always support the state’s objectives.

Philippine Revolution veterans were responsible for the first monument erected to Rizal, which in addition to commemorating Rizal also featured Philippine national symbols, including the stars on the Katipunan flag, suggesting veterans too were keen to establish their own hegemonic vision of the nation. Likewise veterans led the commemoration of Bonifacio and the Philippine Revolution through the creation of *El Grito del Revolución*, which contested US dominance, while connecting the veterans to the broader Hispanic post-revolution memoryscape. Similarly, the construction of the monument to Bonifacio in Iloilo, marking the point at which the local populace “made their last stand” against American troops, contested the absence of the Philippine-American War from national commemoration.³⁷ Veterans also initiated the Bonifacio Monument and subsequently countered his absence from the inauguration proceedings through the inclusion of copies of personal artifacts in the inauguration programme and the associated exhibition of Katipunan memorabilia. In the 1920s and 1930s the Association of Revolutionary Veterans

³⁶ Jose, “Remembering World War II in the Philippines”, 126; Marcos, preface to *The Return To The Philippine Islands*.

³⁷ “The Neglected Statue”, *Philippines Free Press*, 24 June 1961.

were active in promoting their own vision of the nation, appearing at the “National Humiliation Day” proceedings at the Rizal Monument to advocate for the 1924 S. 912 Bill, which supported Philippine independence and later contested the 1933 Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. Philippine Second World War veterans also collectivised, forming the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor in 1952. Like the Philippine Revolution veterans who instigated Bonifacio’s commemoration, the Second World War veterans led the memorialising of the Bataan conflict, calling on the government to have the anniversary of Bataan’s surrender recognised as a national day of commemoration. In legitimising their service to the nation they also contested the 1946 Rescission Act, which did not recognise those Filipinos who had served the United States in the Philippine Army, thus preventing them from receiving any US benefit payments.³⁸ Veterans and their families have also instituted commemorations that are more meaningful to their own experiences or the experiences of ancestors, such as the Bataan Death March Markers, which also serve to counter the anonymity of the Pacific War Memorial. Thus, veteran commemoration in the Philippines is twofold, although veterans from the Philippine Revolution through to the Second World War served to project a strong image of the nation state, they also worked to legitimise their own experiences, depict their own vision of the country and contest narratives that undermined their experiences.

Together with the rise of the “citizen soldier” has been the proliferation of a gendered image of nation seen in the monuments themselves. From the dedication of the Rizal Monument, the first national monument under US colonial rule, through to the Pacific War Memorial, which was erected to commemorate “The Filipino And American Fighting Men”, the Philippine hero has been distinctly male. However, like the image of the ideal citizen, these illustrations of masculinity have shifted over time. Whereas in the Rizal Monument maleness was centred in education, in the Bonifacio, Quezon and Pacific War Memorials, manhood has been increasingly equated with combat and military service. Bonifacio is shown bearing arms and similarly Quezon, through the mausoleum’s allusion to the tomb of Napoleon, is

³⁸ Capozzola, *Bound By War*, 209; McFerson, introduction to *Mixed Blessing*, xix.

depicted as a military leader. Additionally, when women are depicted on these monuments, their portrayal is mostly limited to a familial role, particularly in the Rizal and Bonifacio Monuments, in which women are shown as wives and mothers. However, there are representations of women on the Quezon Memorial frieze, such as Gabriela Silang, who led a Filipino revolutionary movement against Spain in 1763, and the women shown as part of the “The New Professionals” scene. Yet these remain in the minority and are countered by the depictions of Aurora Quezon as the dutiful wife, as well as by their obscurity within the overall edifice. The “abstractions of women” in the form of the winged figures positioned atop the Quezon Memorial and Bonifacio Monument also contribute to the complete diminution of women in these commemorations of the nation’s history.³⁹ While this has been countered, particularly by the erection of the Memorial to Military Women on Corregidor, the absence of any meaningful representation of women on these monuments is indicative of a prevalent equation between masculinity and patriotism, that has persisted from the Rizal Monument through to the Pacific War Memorial.

A monumental development: Analysing the US colonial legacy through the Philippine commemorative memoryscape

This thesis’ analysis of colonial and postcolonial Philippine monument building reveals that not all debates about monuments are concerned with fallism, the decolonisation of public spaces and the agency of colonisers. Instead monument building can also be about competing groups trying to shape spaces of memory or use those spaces to circumvent official interpretations. Applying the frameworks of Erll’s “travelling memory”, Muzaini’s “memoryscape”, Inglis’ analysis of Australian monument building, Budreau’s examination of US First World War remembrance and Verdery’s analysis of post-communist commemoration, to this study of the Philippine memoryscape, which have not been applied previously, has enabled this analysis to reveal multiple networks of memory in which competing images of the

³⁹ Inglis, *Sacred Places*, 170-71.

nation and citizenship exist and collide.⁴⁰ This transnational approach contests the Washington-Manila binary propagated by Brody, Morley, Ileto and Quibuyen by uncovering Philippine connections to global commemorative practices, such as Hellenistic sculptural tropes, First World War memorialisation and Hispanicised commemoration.⁴¹ Additionally the application of Verdery's framework underscores previously unidentified connections between post-Soviet and Philippine colonial and postcolonial nation-building, both in the mutual desire to break with the past and the wish to establish a new nationalism framed by a religious identity. Edwards' concept of "commemorative agents" coming together to create "networks of memory" can be seen most distinctly in the Rizal and Bonifacio Monuments and their wider memoryscapes with the involvement of many different groups, such as the colonial administration, the Philippine government, Philippine elite, artists, veterans, the Knights of Rizal, as well as Rizal's family and local community.⁴² Indeed, these monuments are a distinct example of the "commemorative pluralism" Edwards identifies in US Second World War commemoration in Britain and France, revealing that this multifaceted overseas commemoration was taking place much earlier in the Philippines. Furthermore, this thesis contests Budreau's assertion that US commemoration expanded following the First World War into an international relations exercise, revealing that this was taking place elsewhere, well in advance of First World War remembrance, and thus demonstrating the significance of archipelagic American Studies to an understanding of US commemoration.⁴³

This thesis has also evidenced the value of comparative colonial-era monument analysis. The scholarship on monument building during US rule has focused on the construction of monuments to Rizal, which has propagated a narrative of US

⁴⁰ Erll, "Travelling Memory"; Muzaini, "Making Memories Our Own (Way): Non-State Remembrances of the Second World War in Perak, Malaysia"; Inglis, *Sacred Places*; Budreau, *Bodies of War*; Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*.

⁴¹ Brody, *Visualizing American Empire*; Morley, *Cities and Nationhood*; Ileto, *Filipinos and their Revolution*; Quibuyen, *A Nation Aborted*.

⁴² Edwards, *Allies in Memory*, 5.

⁴³ Budreau, *Bodies of War*, 101.

commemorative dominance.⁴⁴ However, comparing the monuments and commemoration of Rizal and Bonifacio, much of which was occurring simultaneously, reveals a greater complexity to colonial-era nation-building, which was shaped not only by the colonial administration, but the emerging Philippine government, artists, architects and veterans. While these early monuments served to project a positive image of the colonial administration, they were simultaneously used to build a Philippine nation, as well as fulfil the commemorative motivations of other groups, such as the veterans of the Philippine Revolution, whose aim was not simply to contest colonial rule but to legitimise their own experiences and depict their own images of the nation. The analysis of the four monuments also reveals the significance of veteran commemoration to Philippine and US nation-building across the twentieth century, from the veterans of the Philippine Revolution through to those who had fought in the Second World War, emphasising the importance of veterans to colonial as well as postcolonial nationalism. It also underscores the long-standing mutual dependence between state and veteran memorialisation. Often veteran commemoration, as with Budreau and Edwards, has been examined within the context of a particular conflict, yet this thesis reveals the transnational networks of memory of which veterans are a part, with Philippine Revolutionary veterans drawing on Mexican revolutionary symbolism and President Marcos commemorating his own veteran experiences through connections to a wider Cold War revolutionary and postcolonial memoryscape.⁴⁵

This thesis has also demonstrated the importance of monuments to the analysis of the postcolonial relationship between the United States and the Philippines. Several scholars, including McCoy and Capozzola, have explored the continuation of a post-independence imperial relationship through presence of military bases and the unequal treatment of Second World War veterans.⁴⁶ While the development of the Pacific War Memorial perpetuated a neo-colonial association between the two

⁴⁴ See for example Quibuyen, *A Nation Aborted*, 342-43; Iletto, *Filipinos and their Revolution*, 141-42.

⁴⁵ Budreau, *Bodies of War*; Edwards, *Allies in Memory*.

⁴⁶ McCoy, "Circles of Steel, Castles of Vanity"; Capozzola, *Bound By War*.

nations, analysis of the wider postcolonial monument landscape demonstrates that although Philippine government-led Second World War commemoration sought to underline the significance of the relationship between the Philippines and the United States, it also served to foster an image of a nation that had come to fruition in spite of colonial rule, and which recast the Second World War as another battle for sovereignty. Additionally, late 1960s and 1970s monument building in the Philippines must also be seen in the context of President Marcos' own political agenda. Analysis of the Quezon Memorial contests the rigidity of the postcolonial imperial bond identified by McCoy, revealing that the Philippines was not simply shaped by its ongoing economic and military ties to the United States, but by Marcos' other international relations, as well as his desire to establish his own cult of personality.

However, there remain opportunities to further develop this research. A broader study of monuments constructed outside of Manila during US colonial rule would help to reveal additional motivations for commemoration, alternative images of nationhood and the extent to which Rizal and Bonifacio dominated US colonial-era memory-making. Further analysis of Philippine monument building following colonial rule would also help to reveal other commemorative agendas and decolonising strategies. Additionally, a study of Philippine memorialising overseas, particularly in the United States, during the colonial period and following Philippine independence, would help to deepen comprehension of the transcontinental connections that were being forged at the time. An examination of US memorialisation across Asia would also enable a greater understanding of how the Philippine context connects to the way in which the United States has sought to shape its post-Second World War and postcolonial legacy.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ See for example Immerwahr, *How to Hide An Empire*.

A legacy of colonial rule?

To some extent each of these monuments has been shaped by US colonial rule. The Rizal Monument was developed under the Philippine Commission, it was designed by a European artist and it was used to legitimise the colonial administration. The Bonifacio Monument was also overseen by the Governor General, and its inauguration depicted a nation still tied to the United States. The early development of the Quezon Memorial was shaped by the committee's wish to cement the relationship between the Philippines and the United States. Finally, the Pacific War Memorial served to commemorate not only the alliance between the two nations, but Philippine freedom as a US legacy. Yet, at the same time, each of the monuments was also shaped by a number of other agendas: a wish to commemorate the martyrdom of Rizal, to legitimise Philippine independence, to institute a new precedent for Philippine monument building, to memorialise the veteran contribution to the nation and to establish a cult of personality. The Bonifacio Monument in particular revealed a complexity to Philippine nation-building under US colonial rule, demonstrating that the country continued to be shaped by its Spanish past, whilst simultaneously forging connections to the wider Hispanic postcolonial diaspora.

However, whilst these various strands exist, one distinct narrative dominates. Each monument was designed to represent freedom in some way: the Rizal Monument was a signal to the world of the country's right to independence; the Bonifacio Monument portrayed the Philippine struggle for sovereignty; the Quezon Memorial was intended to symbolise the "Political Progress of the Philippines"; and the Pacific War Memorial commemorated the Second World War as a fight to "restore... freedom and peace". Yet this freedom had many different interpretations. For the US colonial administration, and figures such as Taft and later, O'Neal, this freedom was a US legacy, which is best articulated in a speech given by American Ambassador to the Philippines, Paul McNutt, on Philippine Independence Day in 1946: "Though their land is devastated, the people are determined to rebuild upon the ruins, to raise here upon the ashes of destruction, a shining new nation, worthy of the great

heritage of freedom we have left here”.⁴⁸ However for the Philippine government, the nation’s independence was “founded solidly on our people’s united will and a heroic heritage of freedom”.⁴⁹ This heritage is not specified as either American or Filipino but rather, like the monuments themselves, hints at a multifaceted culture shaped by a nexus of traditions and legacies.

⁴⁸ Paul McNutt, “US To Help P.I.”, *Evening Herald*, 4 July 1946, 1, *Evening Herald* Archive, AHC.

⁴⁹ Quirino. 1948. “Address of His Excellency, President Elpidio Quirino at the 70th Quezon Birthday Anniversary celebration at Quezon City, at 11:30am., August 22, 1948” (speech).

Appendix



Figure 2.1. Richard Kissling, Rizal Monument, 1913, Luneta Park, Manila. Photograph by author.



Figure 2.2. Rizal Monument, 1898, Daet, Camarines Norte. Photograph courtesy of Ringer, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1st_Rizal_Monument.jpg.




Figure 2.3. Rizal Monument, 1910, Iloilo. Photograph. *Renacimiento Filipino* I, no.24 (December 28, 1910): 23, <https://ustdigitallibrary.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/renacifilip>.



Figure 2.4. Exhibition of bozetos, Ayuntamiento de Manila, Intramuros. Photograph courtesy of *Official Gazette*, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/rizal-monument/>.



Figure 2.5. Carlos Nicoli, *Al Martir de Bagumbayan* bozeto, 1907. Photograph courtesy of *Official Gazette*, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/rizal-monument/>.



Figure 2.6. Richard Kissling, *Motto Stella* bozeto, 1907. Photograph courtesy of *Official Gazette*, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/rizal-monument/>.




Figure 2.7. Rizal Monument under construction. Photograph. Bureau of Public Works, *Quarterly Bulletin*, April 1, 1916, 53, Bureau of Public Works Bulletin Archive, AHC.




Figure 2.8. Rizal Monument inauguration, 1913, Manila. Photograph courtesy of *Official Gazette*, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/rizal-monument/>.



Figure 2.9. Rizal Monument and Independence Flagpole, with Roxas Boulevard, Manila. Photograph by author.



Figure 2.10. Rizal Monument, Luneta Park, Manila. Photograph by author.



Figure 2.11. Richard Kissling, Wilhelm Tell, 1892, Altdorf, Switzerland. Photograph courtesy of Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, Washington, D.C., <https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2001703060/>.



Figure 2.12. Rizal Monument detail. Photograph by author.



Figure 2.13. José Rizal (left), Marcelo H. del Pilar, and Mariano Ponce (seated), who worked together for *La Solidaridad*, 1892. Photograph courtesy of Library of Congress, Southeast Asian Collection, Asian Division, https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Jose-Rizal-left-Marcelo-H-del-Pilar-and-Mariano-Ponce-seated-who-worked-together_fig1_277033774.



Figure 2.14. Guillermo Tolentino, *Grupo de Filipinos Ilustres*, 1911, lithograph, Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig, Metro Manila, <https://lopezseum.blogspot.com/2013/06/the-origin-of-filipino-ilustres-drawing.html>.



Figure 2.15. Rizal Monument detail. Photographs by author.



Figure 2.16. Rizal Monument detail. Photograph by author.



Figure 2.17. Rizal Day, circa 1920. Photograph courtesy of John Tewell, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/johntewell>.




Figure 2.18. Rizal Monument, 1924. Photograph courtesy of the Filipinas Heritage Library, Makati, Metro Manila.



Figure 2.19. Japanese government-issued Philippine five-peso note, 1942-45. Photograph courtesy of the National Numismatic Collection, National Museum of American History at the Smithsonian Institution, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:PHI-110-Japanese_Government_\(Philippines\)-5_Pesos_\(1943\).jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:PHI-110-Japanese_Government_(Philippines)-5_Pesos_(1943).jpg).



Figure 2.20. Independence Day ceremony, 4 July, 1946, Manila. Photograph courtesy of *Official Gazette*, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/featured/republic-day/about/>.




Figure 2.21. Rizal Day, 1947, Manila. Photograph. *Philippines Free Press*, 4 January, 1947, 8, *Philippines Free Press* Archive, AHC.



Figure 2.22. Rizal Monument with additional steel pylon, 1961. Photograph courtesy of *Official Gazette*, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/featured/republic-day/about/>.



Figure 2.23. Rizal Monument, 1973. Photograph courtesy of the Filipinas Heritage Library, Makati, Metro Manila.




Figure 2.24. Marine Guard at the Rizal Monument, circa 1970. Photograph. Francis Villegas et al., *Parks for a Nation: The Rizal Park and 50 years of the National Parks Development Committee* (Manila: MUSE Books, 2013).



Figure 2.25. Juan Sajid Imao, *Sentinel of Freedom*, 2004, Luneta Park, Manila. Photograph by author.



Figure 2.26. Rizal Monument with Torre de Manila. Photograph by author.



Figure 2.27. Rizalistas with the Rizal Monument, 2017, Manila. Photograph courtesy of the *Philippine Star*, <https://twitter.com/philippinestar/status/946968436701257728>.



Figure 3.1. President Rodrigo Roa Duterte leads the wreath-laying ceremony during the commemoration of the 156th birth anniversary of Andres Bonifacio at the Bonifacio Monument in Caloocan City on 30 November, 2019. Photograph courtesy of the Presidential Communications Operations Office, https://pcoo.gov.ph/news_releases/bonifacio-inspires-filipinos-fight-social-ills-to-attain-progress-says-president-duterte/.



Figure 3.2. *El Grito del Revolución* inauguration, 1911, Balintawak. Photograph courtesy of Lakansining, <https://lakansining.wordpress.com/2019/09/04/epifanio-de-los-santos-avenue-quezon-city-stories-of-heroism-along-edsa/07-1911-ramon-lazaro-martiniez-monumento-sa-mga-bayani-ng-1896-balintawak/>.



Figure 3.3. Ramon Lazaro Martinez, *El Grito del Revolución*, 1911. Photograph courtesy of Aguiladm03, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=109180340>.



Figure 3.4. Antonio Rivas Mercado, Monumento a la Independencia, 1910, Mexico City. Photograph courtesy of Alejandro Ramirez, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/45726206@N02/9427724161/in/photolist-fn6xWi-8BB2XH-2fiyfEk-8BzZK3-fyXTDp-d6zJLj-d6zM1A-d6zKCb-d6zL6q-d6zHAS-d6zLoy-d6zJaq-d6zMBj-5RW1M-7v7VTW-qmrpwj-PHzDRV-5Q5RRe-cKJ1zh-cKJ1vj-cKJ22w-cKJ1Mj-PHzDKx-PTLoyx-cKJ1jj-cKJ1s7-cKJ1Hm-cKJ1mU-cKJ1XJ-cKJ1DY-4CnkKZ-NEoPYZ-NEoRsa-PHzDAK-cKJ1Ry-PTLpfn-NEoY1k-d2YHm3-cKJ1g3-PQxvdu-NEoR2v-Pk6w5Q-PEXlrU-Pk6mhU-PTLnQZ-3N4ijt-Pk6kpb-PEXMzA-Pk6vPQ-297qkqS>.



Figure 3.5. Monument to Andres Bonifacio, 1925, Mount Buntis. Photograph courtesy of Clemuel Cruz, <https://highlandreflections.home.blog/2019/06/03/historically-significant-summits-ii-walking-with-andres-bonifacio-in-mt-nagpatong-maragondon-cavite/>.




Figure 3.6. Guillermo Tolentino, Bonifacio Monument, n.d., drawing. Image courtesy of Arkitekturang Filipino, <https://www.facebook.com/arkitekturaph/photos/archival-treasures-bonifacio-monument-1933-guillermo-tolentinothe-bonifacio-monu/2237709176251599>.



Figure 3.7. Guillermo Tolentino, Bonifacio Monument, 1933, Caloocan City, Metro Manila. Photograph courtesy of Ramon F. Velasquez, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BonifacioMonumentjf9933_13.JPG.



Figure 3.8. Guillermo Tolentino, Bonifacio Monument, 1933, Caloocan City, Metro Manila. Photograph by author.



Figure 3.9. Bonifacio Monument aerial view. Photograph courtesy of Ann Glass, <https://www.pinterest.com/pin/458100593343783005/>.



Figure 3.10. Henry Fehr, Allied War Memorial, 1924, Shanghai. Photograph courtesy of Robert Bickers, <https://robertbickers.net/2014/10/10/lost-monuments-and-memorials-of-the-shanghai-bund-1-the-war-memorial-1924/>.



Figure 3.11. Guillermo Tolentino, Oblation, 1931, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City. Photograph courtesy of Andrew Moore, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/andryn2006/30854495933>.



Figure 3.12. Bonifacio Monument detail. Photograph courtesy of Mello47, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=21193335>.



Figure 3.13. Bonifacio Monument figures. Photograph. Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office, *The Official Calendar of the Republic of the Philippines* (Manila: Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office, 2014), 251, <http://malacanang.gov.ph/77043-official-calendar-ph/>.



Figure 3.14. Bonifacio Monument markers. Photograph courtesy of Ramon F. Velasquez,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BonifacioMonumentjf9900_02.JPG.



Figure 3.15. Bonifacio Monument, circa 1933. Photograph courtesy of *Official Gazette*, <https://www.rappler.com/life-and-style/arts-culture/monuments-remembering-supremo-andres-bonifacio-day-2020>.



Figure 3.16. Bonifacio Monument, aerial view, n.d. Photograph courtesy of Ann Glass, <https://www.pinterest.com/pin/458100593343783005/>.



Figure 3.17. *Programa de la Inauguración del Monumento a Andrés Bonifacio*, cover. Image courtesy of Official Gazette, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/bonifacio-150/>.



Figure 3.18. Monument to Bonifacio, Nahapay, Iloilo. Photograph courtesy of Guimbal Ipabugal, <https://www.facebook.com/Guimbaliloiloipabugal/posts/736427700305559>.



Figure 3.19. Guillermo Tolentino, Liwasang Bonifacio, 1963, Manila. Photograph by author.



Figure 3.20. Eduardo Castrillo, Bonifacio and the Katipunan Revolution Monument, 1998, Manila. Photograph courtesy of Sharlyne Ang and Karla Redor, <https://www.vigattintourism.com/tourism/articles/Bonifacio-Monument>.



Figure 4.1. Federico Ilustre, Quezon Memorial, 1978, Quezon City. Photograph by author.



Figure 4.2. Manuel Quezon's interment in Arlington National Cemetery, 1944. Photograph courtesy of the Quezon Family Collection, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/quezonfamilycollection/48468482621/in/photostream/>.



Figure 4.3. The hearse carrying the body of Manuel Quezon departs the Chapel of the University of Santo Tomas for Manila North Cemetery, 1946. Photograph courtesy of the Quezon Family Collection, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/quezonfamilycollection/48428238531/in/photostream/>.



Figure 4.4. Raymundo Moreno, Quezon Monument, 1936, Plaza Quezon, Taguig City. Photograph courtesy of the City of Taguig, <https://www.taguig.gov.ph/tourism/taguig-landmarks/>.




Figure 4.5. President Manuel Quezon with an image of the proposed Capitol site by Harry Frost, 1941. Image courtesy of John Paul 'Lakan' Olivares, <https://lakansining.wordpress.com/2020/07/16/quezon-city-the-history-and-art-of-the-quezon-memorial-park/>.



Figure 4.6. Juan Arellano, Proposed Plan for the Capital City, 1949. Image courtesy of *Rappler*, <https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/revisiting-quezon-city-master-plans>.




Figure 4.7. Guillermo Tolentino, Quezon Memorial or Shrine of Freedom Proposal, n.d. Image courtesy of *Official Gazette*, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/quezonmemorial/>.




Figure 4.8. Federico Ilustre, perspective of the Quezon Memorial, 1951. Image courtesy of John Paul 'Lakan' Olivares, <https://lakansining.wordpress.com/2020/07/16/quezon-city-the-history-and-art-of-the-quezon-memorial-park/>.



Figure 4.9. Leandro V. Locsin, Cultural Center of the Philippines, 1969. Photograph courtesy of Michael,
<https://www.flickr.com/photos/sagamiono/4215367181/in/photolist-7quRNv-8oM4p2-7quQCx-7qyNi9-7q2FPF-7q2G3P-8oPPsC-7q6A41-7q2Emg-8oQ9Z3-7q2FJZ-7q6At5-7q6B4J-8oPDmG-7q6myq-7pXSPH-7q6AJE-7pTXCR-2kr6qRj-7pTWAX-7q6ADq-7pTYbx-7q6AX7-7pTVMB-5NxXmv-7pTWeD-7pXS19-3KggeF-AytYR-8oLTJD-cFrH9G-cFrHqo-8ARwWX-5WVsCp-6qyPGX-8oPZ9S-brdEyc-5WZFuC-2aXRqBH-275Cqtr-L74heh-2aTpH5j-Sqaeww-2aTpE6U-Jturf-TGG83V-5WZwcE-2huw6i1-2huthnD-2hutoQP>.



Figure 4.10. Dambana ng Kagitingan (Shrine of Valor), 1970, Mount Samat, Bataan. Photograph by author.



Figure 4.11. Quezon Memorial Circle, circa 1978. Photograph courtesy of Manuel L. Quezon III, <https://mlq3.tumblr.com/post/8512541369/jvlian-cloudguy-quezon-memorial-circle-circa>.



Figure 4.12. Reinterment of Manuel Quezon with Imelda Marcos and Aurora Quezon, 1978. Photograph courtesy of the Quezon Family Collection, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/quezonfamilycollection/48428333667/in/album-72157666405100226/>.



Figure 4.13. Quezon Memorial, Quezon City. Photograph courtesy of *Official Gazette*, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/quezonmemorial/>.



Figure 4.14. Quezon Memorial, Quezon City. Photograph by author.



Figure 4.15. Raoul Otero de Galarraga, Monument to José Martí, 1958, Havana, Cuba. Photography courtesy of amanderson2, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/amanderson/42574356775/in/photolist-CMpfm-8h1BTS-cXKUH7-aHdcfg-3h3CS-214xuPe-KGqx4i-AkEhF-ed8KGC-239ZSX4-2gBZ8XY-2jUFoK7-28hyoFW-a7iPk8-bPJqy-27S9H14-24dkS3j-7wuVai-239ZTn2-27S9GGi-c7DfvY-6qZVSK-CNASH-7V4t7-qDRVvv-2bETbmZ-9XFt4K-88zFu7-HtZQXM-2jiLtHq-eksxGN-2h7b2Tj-c4Gunh-6P61xF-aZSAj2-4pHXCn-aZSAGt-aZSAMX-4ct3pd-7V36f-Co3jJ4-byCn6-bwxPNB-8nEJPM-eksyaC-cfaL6A-8mLSDR-8mQ1h3>.



Figure 4.16. Georgy Neroda, Lenin Monument, 1970, Ulan-Ude, Russia. Photograph courtesy of Marco Fieber, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/marcofieber/8664338253/in/photolist-QYyN3j-JWXB3-6Pg644-6Pg6ip-25H5GJE-iDMNq1-RTcsWU-ecCZUi-RTcw4f-2e2dvk6-ecJDTf-2iEJK2m-8D3EzD-8iKABg-JWX4w-frEZHw-fvsPZ-6PkfNY-2hSTAZG-frqGF8-5mg51-puLTS-FZhBsM-8iNR91-YRdYRo-ZRaBRC-FZhBhr-5mfXV-FZhBcX-5mfXW-ZRaBGE-ZTbjMu-ZRaBNm-99DhJE-5mg4Z-99rUfq-abQTe6-abTHS5-7eM39r-abQSJ4-abTHnj-abTJzf-abQTsB-6P2q5x-nd98gy-7eQWvj-7eQW1J>.



Figure 4.17. Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum, 1975, Hanoi, Vietnam. Photograph courtesy of Lorna, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/lorna87/283410896/in/photolist-r3yBL-P4wugb-MxDYrm-PHAMYt-Qq67t4-9xyEyG-9DSNwW-qavXUd-9xvFcz-VPE74V-9xvFjv-6jDdeU-26C5ZMj-CNqy4o-5PQMS2-BNPfLM-buEVS8-TkYNxw-8q9o8f-aGCv3X-BSXaZi-eamjJT-FndoVs-BMh4L-77Xf4V-9xvFsi-uatXX7-BX8msd-fRRQb6-7U7tUC-21DEn6g-ZiiCvP-bLFjBT-Ziiwmz-Dgkoda-8RRuxr-ZiinJg-DvQ2Z3-21DEfL2-wW1QE-vyMkyz-ZysPrs-bLFjSc-aYpzsX-F7Cehu-ZN9M-6bw9da-ckmgt-9jB7va-bqJ6PJ>.



Figure 4.18. Chairman Mao Memorial Hall, 1977, Tiananmen Square, Beijing, China. Photograph courtesy of Steve Cadman, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/stevecadman/124169710/in/photolist-bYpk5-8HnQA2-bYnRZ-7iq1ka-2kKJPoB-2kKEyeT-5KGK2T-6G51D9-98L7GE-2kKEyW4-5GV9mQ-2kKJjQD-fwRac-2kKJQjC-6vuJyg-26MdZZ3-2kKJR5c-EUgNnb-5gW5PT-2kKEzPS-4VYPcC-8MPxri-23s8Kdf-hy5Ux-4R9sY-7PueKg-cHiBBo-fwRjP-2mzmrSz-22qdZom-apcWBB-LK8jio-EUgMXJ-9yicQL-QJ8pB4-4R9sZ-VsnQrt-8u5TJJ-7h8xQM-7V21ka-DohYYr-HW474-HW47V-5KGKRP-8HWiPQ-fwRfy-fwRdE-2EQL24-fwQSm-fwQE6>.



Figure 4.19. Anselmo Dayag, Bust of Ferdinand Marcos, 1980, Tuba, Benguet.
Photograph courtesy of angust,
<http://web.archive.org/web/20081226053939/https://www.flickr.com/photos/angust/365108015/>.



Figure 4.20. Quezon Memorial with frieze. Photograph courtesy of the National Historical Commission of the Philippines, <https://nhcp.gov.ph/quezon-memorial-shrine-2/>.



Figure 4.21. Quezon Memorial Mausoleum. Photograph courtesy of Gospel Light Christian Academy, <https://www.facebook.com/wearegospelians/photos/quezon-memorial-shrine-is-a-monument-and-national-shrine-dedicated-to-former-phi/2383270575046468/>.



Figure 4.22. Tomb of Napoleon, 1861, Dôme des Invalides, Musée de l'Armée Invalides, Paris. Photograph courtesy of Navin75, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/navin75/14768471685/in/photolist-22Lo4Qr-4XDNZG-aSx8kF-ov3h7a-odxrph-9Q662K-aSx8Jz-aSx8mX-aSx8v6-7Jri4J-6xCYAn-aSx8on-d39317-6xCZtk-grgrG-wDiU-wDfR-4XDKiU-4XDJ2d-2a53F2V-4iuTrb-B2ZoPj-9zusfX-9zus9F-Lj5bQg-dTtiuT-dTyTqJ-dTz1Vd-dTyYsj-dTtdoM-dTtgaX-dTyZRE-dTyVVu-dTtnMZ-vUda2W-2keBaV4-6zVeqF-orJBgV-7JRz2p-36caku-Lj5bRZ-5RbnLp-7kHZMm-yGPf4V-2azeZ-92KWx-2azcg-2azjz-7EEX2-36c9Ss>.



Figure 4.23. Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, 1921, Arlington, Virginia. Photograph courtesy of Tim Evanson, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/timevanson/6954316396/in/photolist-bAwFYQ-2fTs8Qs-2kDesFi-2kTmMdD-Qaww7-2eM6mc9-2k9JwwQ-bAwFXj-bAMdqs-2mgxHi1-bAKeW1-bAKfma-2mgtPrN-2mgtPr7-2mgxHeJ-2mgzwYm-GsgD73-cVAydd-2eM6maq-y6e1rw-8a7HiH-cVAwMo-828uBZ-9ToC4C-xaeaer-2dn9zqs-68VK1G-ygcf9S-9WU7zR-akDe4G-XhAsG-a2tJET-27DBc1z-BGT5fG-25nYGzB-e6RF85-e6RFb5-UY6aTN-iv5GtG-e6L2Gx-noFksu-e6L2Ur-a2tHY2-f6Q88T-2P7T9c-a2tHLB-25eWY3Q-bAwFZU-nGxhSj-yxQYg4>.



Figure 4.24. Entrance to the Museo ni Manuel Quezon, Quezon Memorial.
Photograph by author.



Figure 4.25. Museo ni Manuel Quezon interior, Quezon Memorial. Photograph by author.



Figure 4.26. Malinta Tunnel replica, Museo ni Manuel Quezon, Quezon Memorial. Photograph by author.



Figure 5.1. Floyd Naramore, William Bain, Clifton Brady, Perry Johanson, Pacific War Memorial, 1968, Corregidor. Photograph by author.




Figure 5.2. Winning entry by Naramore, Bain, Brady and Johanson, 1957. Courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. White House Central Subject Files, Box 199, Folder 16, 22, JFKPLM.




Figure 5.3. Redesign by Naramore, Bain, Brady and Johanson, 1965. Courtesy of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library. White House Central Subject Files, Box 377, File 8, LBJPL.



Figure 5.4. Memorial Room, Pacific War Memorial, Corregidor. Photograph by author.



Figure 5.5. Central walkway, Pacific War Memorial, Corregidor. Photograph by author.



Figure 5.6. Aristedes Demetrios, *Eternal Flame of Freedom*, 1968, Corregidor. Photograph by author.



Figure 5.7. Memorial Room altar, Pacific War Memorial, Corregidor. Photograph by author.



Figure 5.8. Church of the Holy Sacrifice, University of the Philippines, Diliman.

Photograph courtesy of Ethel,

<https://www.flickr.com/photos/24847540@N07/2348638084/in/photolist-4zxoh5-4YHXDV-dH6K1-83Kvqz-ahDv4v-ahGhMG-4jy2Rg-ahGhMj-ahGhKL-ahDv5K-ahGhjs-ahGhn1-FApgC-FApt1-FApNy-FApD3-FAruF-4jy348-4jC53C-od2sv-drABk1-ahDv7K-drAWid-cj3yK-drALsg-6dXCbs-drAM7E-drAD2Y-a4S9eC-drADZC-drAFXm-drAxKa-drAP3c-drAyNr-drADTg-drAEKD-drAN2y-drAGRP-drAFwk-drAJZS-drAGbM-drAB8i-drAU6s-drAHzH-drAJg4-drAUGS-drAEXN-drAWXQ-e6BFfg-9PihtB>.




Figure 5.9. Australian War Memorial, 1941, Canberra. Photograph courtesy of Michael Mazengarb,
<https://www.flickr.com/photos/kincuri/4357259693/in/photolist-7D36v8-d14Jb1-rLdBoq-rkW6Q4-7D6UXd-s5Lwgc-cAWn3m-cAWmXb-rkNpg1-rkVCkp-2ihVc6X-9DmBX8-21Mkuw9-21Mkuty-Prq8ry-2murZ6j-21MkuuW-21Mkuxw-rLnpig-f3LbcF-K8wsX-9DeRf7-r6Vv3s-9DeQkq-s3USWk-s5NH9z-CuM3qz-rLu2xM-K8wFt-CTHr2E-aShgVF-f3Lh6X-8tDMLz-s3PBAA-rLtXNe-8xJWPQ-2hHQVd1-9quZrS-9pKWfs-7nYuZz-6Yhcn2-22xUZD6-AgznV-dL63Cx-aShgj6-pBepZb-aShgb6-2hHQVgc-rJxn1a-bifDnM>



Figure 5.10. President Ferdinand Marcos delivering a speech at the Pacific War Memorial, 22 June, 1968. Photograph courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/photograph-records/2013-3136>.



Figure 5.11. Imelda Marcos and Nancy Williams Cut Ceremonial Ribbon for the Pacific War Memorial, 22 June, 1968. Photograph courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/photograph-records/2013-3139>.



Figure 5.12. Sun Cruises Tour trolley bus, Corregidor. Photograph by author.



Figure 5.13. Japanese Garden of Peace, Corregidor. Photograph by author.



Figure 5.14. For The Repose Of Souls memorial, 1991, Corregidor. Photograph by author.



Figure 5.15. Francisco Manosa, Filipino Heroes Memorial, 1992, Corregidor.
 Photograph courtesy of mimiyak128,
<https://www.flickr.com/photos/mimiyak128/8925264099/in/photolist-eAGj4M-GUFBv-h8URtk-7RYpSx-5vJ1KW-nFVgP3-5vxUC4-6KJ5dP-pTk672-VDFDCh-fivb2H-bAwFYQ-4fnqYP-bPDTNZ-bAKeW1-c7aJjS-c7dXLo-fiKDeo-6KJ5dK-fivbTR-5vxUyD-fivnQF-fivcrn-6KJ5dH-6KJ5dM-bAwFXj-bPrk7H-bAwFZU-bAKf3U-bPDTKt-bPDTJp-bPDTGP-dFcVk9-efDcvX-e7MT4v-8R9Uth-fiuUKP-fivdtX-fivrzM-fiKuVJ-fiK94b-c7dXYY-5vxUAt-fiuYVi-3c1mNb-fivpZH-5vCdyA-fiKxE-BBCXf-8R9UrJ>.



Figure 5.16. Malinta Tunnel, Corregidor. Photograph by author.



Figure 5.17. Malinta Tunnel interior with diorama, Corregidor. Photograph by author.




Figure 5.18. To The Angels memorial, 2000, Corregidor. Photograph by author.



Figure 5.19. Jonathan M. Wainwright memorial, 2000, Corregidor. Photograph by author.



Figure 5.20. Bataan Death March Marker, Mariveles, Bataan. Photograph by author.

Archival Abbreviations

AHC	American Historical Collection, Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City
DDEPL	Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum
FHL	Filipinas Heritage Library
HSTPLM	Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum
ISEAS	Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Yusof Ishak Institute Library
JFKPLM	John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum
LML	Lopez Museum and Library
LBJPL	Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library
MPPML	Malacañan Palace Presidential Museum and Library
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NARA II	National Archives II
NCCA	National Commission for Culture and the Arts
NHCP	National Historical Commission of the Philippines
UAUCB	University Archives, University of California, Berkeley
UPDL	University of the Philippines Diliman Library

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John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston MA, USA
White House Central Subject Files.

Library of Congress, Washington DC, USA
Law Library
Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission documents.

Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin TX USA
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National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington DC, USA
Legislative Archives
Congressional Records, House and Senate Journals.

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