Normativity and ethics: the error in the error theory

Lofitis, Kipros (2019) Normativity and ethics: the error in the error theory. PhD thesis, University of Nottingham.

[img] PDF (Thesis - as examined) - Repository staff only - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
Download (1MB)

Abstract

Do moral norms invariably supply agents with reasons? Does the dedicated immoralist necessarily have adequate reason to act morally? Ordinary thought may have it that the answers are yes and yes, but some people think no and no. The error theorist, in particular, thinks so on the grounds that all reasons, weak or strong, are instrumental: necessarily favouring actions that are instrumental to the agent’s own ends. For this reason, she is inclined to impute ordinary thought with error. This thesis examines the error theorist’s grounds for thinking this, and finds none convincing. The resulting conclusion is that — for all we know — moral norms do invariably supply agents with reasons, and that the error theorist herself errs in thinking that they do not. The thesis closes by considering an alternative route to supporting the claim that moral norms do not invariably supply agents with reasons, which even though is rather attractive, is also in dire need of support.

Item Type: Thesis (University of Nottingham only) (PhD)
Supervisors: Sinclair, Neil
Fisher, Andrew D.
Keywords: ethics; normativity
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Faculties/Schools: UK Campuses > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities
Item ID: 55776
Depositing User: Lofitis, Kipros
Date Deposited: 24 Sep 2019 09:28
Last Modified: 06 May 2020 14:31
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/55776

Actions (Archive Staff Only)

Edit View Edit View