How naive realism can explain both the particularity and the generality of experience

French, Craig and Gomes, Anil (2019) How naive realism can explain both the particularity and the generality of experience. The Philosophical Quarterly, 69 (274). pp. 41-63. ISSN 1467-9213

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Abstract

Visual experiences seem to exhibit phenomenological particularity: when you look at some object, it – that particular object – looks some way to you. But experiences exhibit generality too: when you look at a distinct but qualitatively identical object, things seem the same to you as they did in seeing the first object. Naïve realist accounts of visual experience have often been thought to have a problem with each of these observations. It has been claimed that naïve realist views cannot account for the generality of visual experiences, and that the naïve realist explanation of particularity has unacceptable implications for self- knowledge: the knowledge we have of the character of our own experiences. We argue in this paper that neither claim is correct: naïve realism can explain the generality of experiences, and the naïve realist explanation of particularity raises no problems for our self-knowledge.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Craig French, Anil Gomes, How NaÏve Realism can Explain Both the Particularity and the Generality of Experience, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 69, Issue 274, January 2019, Pages 41–63, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy047, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy047. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy047
Depositing User: Eprints, Support
Date Deposited: 30 Aug 2018 10:38
Last Modified: 01 May 2019 12:11
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/53552

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