The formulation of epistemological disjunctivism

French, Craig (2016) The formulation of epistemological disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92 (1). pp. 86-104. ISSN 1933-1592

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Abstract

I argue that we should question the orthodox way of thinking about epistemological disjunctivism. I suggest that we can formulate epistemological disjunctivism in terms of states of seeing things as opposed to states of seeing that p. Not only does this alternati ve formulation capture the core aspects of epistemological disjunctivism as standardly formulated, it has two salient advantages. First, it avoids a crucial problem that arises for a standard formulation of epistemological disjunctivism—the basis problem. And second, it is less committed than standard formulations are in the metaphysics of perception.

Item Type: Article
RIS ID: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/773129
Additional Information: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: The formulation of epistemological disjunctivism. Craig French, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, v. 92, no. 1, p. 86-104, which has been published in final form at doi:10.1111/phpr.12105. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12105
Depositing User: Eprints, Support
Date Deposited: 31 May 2018 13:42
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 17:32
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/52160

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