Naïve realism and diaphaneity

French, Craig (2018) Naïve realism and diaphaneity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 118 (2). pp. 149-175. ISSN 1467-9264

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Abstract

Naïve Realists think that the ordinary mind-independent objects that we perceive are constitutive of the character of experience. Some understand this in terms of the idea that experience is diaphanous: that the conscious character of a perceptual experience is entirely constituted by its objects. My main goal here is to argue that Naïve Realists should reject this, but I’ll also highlight some suggestions as to how Naïve Realism might be developed in a non-diaphanous direction.

Item Type: Article
RIS ID: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/936866
Additional Information: This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society following peer review. The version of record is available online at:https://academic.oup.com/aristotelian/advance-article/doi/10.1093/arisoc/aoy006/5035216
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoy006
Depositing User: Eprints, Support
Date Deposited: 31 May 2018 11:09
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 19:39
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/52142

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