Compatibilism, indeterminism, and chance

Mackie, Penelope (2018) Compatibilism, indeterminism, and chance. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 82 . pp. 265-287. ISSN 1755-3555

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Many contemporary compatibilists about free will and determinism are agnostic about whether determinism is true, yet do not doubt that we have free will. They are thus committed to the thesis that free will is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism. This paper explores the prospects for this version of compatibilism, including its response to the argument (traditionally employed against incompatibilist accounts of free will) that indeterminism would introduce an element of randomness or chance or luck that is inimical to free will and moral responsibility.

Item Type: Article
RIS ID: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/944526
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246118000140
Depositing User: Eprints, Support
Date Deposited: 23 Mar 2018 10:32
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 19:44
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/50622

Actions (Archive Staff Only)

Edit View Edit View