John Lindsay, the Association for a Better New York, and the Privatization of New York City, 1969-1973

The privatization of public safety and public space have become regular features of urban life in contemporary New York City. These trends are evident in the policing of upscale housing projects and cultural attractions or in the proliferation of Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), each with their own private security personnel. While direct city investment in neighborhood policing remains modest – a surprise 2015 budget increase notwithstanding – private consortia such as the New York City Police Foundation, which encourages donors to ‘Invest in a Safe City’, offer substantive private funding for high-profile public safety projects such as the Real Time Crime Center and anti-terror operations at “high-risk” sites such as Times Square or the World Trade Center. Programs such as the Lower and Midtown Manhattan Security Initiative, a network of 5,000 CCTV cameras and monitoring systems funded by the defense contractor Lockheed Martin to protect ‘the City’s major centers of finance, commerce and government… and iconic landmarks’, illustrate that the privatization of safety and space, and its uneven, often inequitable distribution, is here to stay.

Many social scientists have conceptualized the emergence of these public-private partnerships and privatization strategies by aligning them with what Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore identify as ‘the geographies of “actually existing neoliberalism”… a historically specific, ongoing and internally contradictory process of market-driven socio-spatial transformation’. For Brenner and Theodore, cities such as New York have become ‘institutional laboratories’ for this process, creating a brand of urbanism, notable for its uneven and socially regressive impacts, which has transformed labor relations, entrenched inequalities of income, space and service delivery, and fundamentally remade cities as political, economic and cultural entities. Crime control and law enforcement are central elements of these neoliberal projects; anxieties over crime and disorder have often provided the rationale for privatized urban regeneration, and repressive law enforcement and spatial strategies have been pursued to regulate individuals, communities and public spaces.

But up to now the longer-term origins of these projects – and the historical settings in which they were conceived – have received relatively limited attention from historians. In their exposition of neoliberal urbanism, Brenner and Theodore outline its ‘contextual
embeddedness’ and the importance of specific historical contexts in defining the exchanges between older urban regimes – often afflicted by crises of governance and legitimacy – and the neoliberal ones which have emerged to replace them. Historians, with their attentiveness to such moments of transition and their longer-term roots or (dis)continuities, are well-placed to illuminate the specific contexts or crises in which these exchanges took place, and which legitimized or secured consent for new privatized or market-oriented solutions. So how can we historicize this process of transformation in urban centers, and the individuals, ideas and ambitions behind it? Where did it begin, or grow from, and which historical actors, contexts or crises were important in initiating it?

In many studies New York City stands as an ‘iconic case’ in these processes of urban restructuring; its privatization taking root, these works suggest, in two discrete phases. First, in the aftermath of the 1975 fiscal crisis – typically presented by scholars as the critical watershed – a “crisis regime” of corporate interests reoriented the priorities of city government away from the provision of public services and redistributive social programs to the stimulation of private investment and economic development, transforming post-crisis New York from a cradle of egalitarian, public-oriented ‘civic liberalism’ to the privatized, entrepreneurialist ‘neoliberal city’ identified by David Harvey and Jason Hackworth. Second, the later administrations of Rudolph Giuliani and Michael Bloomberg furthered these trends by developing what Alex Vitale describes as a ‘quality of life paradigm’; preserving, even expanding the new regime (and excluding those who threatened to disrupt it) via punitive approaches to crime and disorder and the extensive surveillance and privatization of public space; blurring the lines between crime control and urban development and developing a punitive, rather than ameliorative, role for city government. Taken together, these two phases have contributed to an increasingly ‘privatized’ New York in which, even if crime has been reduced, once-public goods, spaces and services – including, in select parts of the city, the provision of public safety – are now controlled, supplemented or delivered by the private sector; often, as Sharon Zukin notes, at the expense of social equality and diversity.

Yet whilst these developments are vitally important, the roots of New York’s privatization can be traced to earlier than this, and a perhaps unlikely figure. It was liberal mayor John Lindsay, an impassioned advocate of public intervention in urban problems and an inclusive, public city, who, in his partnership with the Association for a Better New York [ABNY] and development of public-private anti-crime initiatives in the early 1970s, initiated the privatization of public
safety and space in New York. Rather than a flailing advocate of an exhausted urban liberalism, as he is often presented, Lindsay offered what Themis Chronopoulos identifies as ‘a new standard of urban governance’ – specifically a sensitivity to the kinds of public-private collaborations, economic development innovations and spatial strategies identified with today’s “actually existing neoliberalism” – in his quest for a vital and prosperous New York.

Lindsay’s outlook as a Republican ‘progressive’, committed to activist government but also the development of business partnerships, complemented many of these initiatives. Yet he also encapsulates many of the “internally contradictory” qualities of urban neoliberalism: a decentralizer of government who expanded its regulatory, even repressive authority; idealistic about the redemptive power of the state but also the private sector; and while genuinely committed to the democratic, public potential of the city, cognizant, as Lizabeth Cohen and Brian Goldstein argue, of the need to preserve New York’s status as a center of private investment and elite consumption.

Thus Lindsay could remain committed to a city in which government served as a vehicle for expanded public participation, whilst also laying the foundations for the privatized New York to come.

Yet while Lindsay’s privatization of crime control and public space was consistent with his own ideological outlook, it was also, to borrow from Brenner and Theodore, contextually embedded: it reflected, and was often driven by, the historically specific environment in which he governed. As mayor Lindsay was confronted by a series of interwoven crises: a gathering fiscal crisis which threatened to rout city budgets and render the costs of existing city services impossible; a crisis of public institutions, notably paralysis and dissent within the public law enforcement agencies for which Lindsay was responsible; and a crisis of crime – heightened public and corporate anxiety over street crime and disorder – which threatened the city’s social and economic health and played into wider anxieties about New York as the exemplar of an intractable “urban crisis”. Severely constrained by these crises, the dynamics of which disempowered public authorities and solutions and embedded a pejorative vision of Lindsay’s “public city” as open, chaotic and unmanageable, the mayor turned to private sources of assistance; sources whose privatist solutions, within that same context, grew to feel increasingly urgent, and whose motivations were far less contradictory.

ABNY was one of New York’s first public-private partnerships, but as with Lindsay its agency in the rise of urban neoliberalism is less well-documented. The few existing accounts of its work have emphasized the importance of image-making activities such as publicity stunts or
urban marketing campaigns, each tantamount to ‘cheerleading’ for New York at a time of severe financial and political uncertainty or, worse, ‘selling snake oil’ – a confidence trick designed to obscure the city’s fiscal realities. Yet while such initiatives were undoubtedly significant, countering pejorative images of New York and buying ABNY influence, the evidence of its efforts to advance, through its own anti-crime programming, the privatization of public safety, space and services, is suggestive of something greater than simply ‘effective PR’. ABNY’s programs were not only symbolic attempts to improve urban life or restore investor confidence in the city, but also ideological projects: a means of visibly asserting the efficacy and authority of private or voluntarist solutions over their public equivalents, reorienting municipal priorities away from redistribution towards the promotion – or protection – of private accumulation, growth and development (often of its own assets), and restructuring New York’s political, economic and spatial order. In its anti-crime collaborations with Lindsay we can identify more than PR or “cheerleading”: a new and often unequal model of public-private collaboration through which private interests could secure policy goals and resources; the formulation, often through highly visible, performative programs and publicity, of a new, assertive and popular “common sense” for urban governance; and an attempt to reclaim or redefine the purpose of the contemporary city. Their collaboration subsequently provided a powerful template both for the post-fiscal crisis restructuring of the late 1970s and 1980s and today’s “actually existing neoliberalism”, anticipating New York’s shift to marketed solutions and privatization.

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John Lindsay was elected mayor of New York City in 1965, at the apogee of the post-war faith in the ability of public policy to confront urban problems and the emancipatory potential of the “public city”. In Washington, Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society committed the nation to a raft of unprecedented federal programming and investment – $14 billion by the end of the 1960s – in the nation’s cities. Johnson’s legislative program sought to eradicate the full gamut of urban ills, from racial and educational inequality to poverty and crime, and communities enjoyed “maximum feasible participation” in the distribution of public funds. Contemporaneously, rights-based social movements sought to expand the definition of the “public” in the nation’s urban areas, opening up cities to new and diverse groups of residents and ensuring their participation in a more democratic, egalitarian urban culture.
The New York Lindsay inherited exemplified many of these trends. Successive administrations committed themselves to the provision of an unrivalled range of publicly-accessible services for a diverse citizenry, offering what Joshua Freeman identifies as a ‘social democratic polity unique... in its ambition and achievements’.

Civil rights protests, including riots which swept through Harlem in 1964, demanded the expansion of the public realm – and public protections – to include racial minorities. After the centralized urban renewal projects of the post-war years, neighborhood activist Jane Jacobs gave voice to a demand for greater public participation in urban planning, transferring power away from the city’s political and financial elites towards communities. At the same time, Jacobs also valorized the public spaces of those communities – most famously the ‘intricate sidewalk ballet’ of her own Hudson Street in Manhattan’s Greenwich Village – for creating a ‘lively, diverse, intense’ urban order. Such an order, she concluded, made for safer, more liveable and above all public cities.

Lindsay, who appointed Jacobs to his first housing task force and had served in the Kennedy and Johnson Congresses, inhabited this same milieu. From his 1965 declaration of candidacy, where he declared, ‘Cities are for people and for living’, to his first day as mayor, where he invited all New Yorkers to attend his inauguration, Lindsay spoke consistently of the importance of public participation in urban life and the need to create a liveable, public city for all. His flamboyant Parks Commissioner Thomas Hoving sought to get the city’s Parks Department ‘out from behind its chain-link fence’ and ‘closer to the people’, organizing public “happenings” in Central Park and replacing the “No” signs in the city’s parks and beaches with “Enjoy”.

Hoving’s successor, August Heckscher, recalled that under Lindsay, ‘People in great numbers and of all varieties came out into the parks and squares and streets, and there they professed the values they lived by, exhibited the latest fads and fashions, paraded, demonstrated, walked, bicycled, made love, just sat.’ Likewise, Mariana Mogilevich has illustrated how Lindsay’s arts policy initially conceptualized the arts as a democratic ‘vehicle of inclusion’ and, in its decentralization of installations and public events, ‘sketched the promise of a better, more inclusive city to come.’ Lindsay’s Operation Main Street, which sponsored new lighting, temporary street festivals and pedestrian malls in fifteen local shopping areas across the city, also reflected the mayor’s desire to open up New York to a diverse citizenry and maximize public participation within it. Even Lindsay himself personified this ideal of an inclusive, public city – in his walking tours of non-white
neighborhoods, or images of the mayor ice-skating or leading a “bicycle be-in” in Central Park – each with the aim of expanding “the public”.

Yet Lindsay was aware that his “public city” could not flourish without the lifeblood of economic investment. While federal urban aid remained forthcoming until the end of the 1960s, structural economic changes and the potential flight of capital and affluent citizens from the city presented public officials with a significant challenge to maintain growth and development. A concomitant, often racialized discourse of “urban crisis” afflicting American cities, symbolized by racial unrest, poverty and crime, established an image of urban areas, and New York in particular, as unstable or unsafe. For Lindsay, these concerns could be assuaged by accentuating the intrinsically positive features of living and doing business in New York (what David Harvey calls ‘the political economy of place’); creating visitor-oriented attractions emphasizing ‘spectacle and display’ (the “happenings”, cycling “be-ins” or pedestrian malls); and forging close links with the city’s corporate sectors – each elements of the ‘entrepreneurial stance’ identified by Harvey and Hackworth as central to neoliberal urban governance. Such initiatives, Lindsay envisaged, would rebut the “urban crisis” narrative whilst retaining his commitment to a public city. And as discussed, they did not conflict with but in fact complemented Lindsay’s own worldview. On the campaign trail in 1965 the would-be mayor blamed industrial relocations on taxes, ‘red tape… and harassment on the part of city government’, praising business as ‘a valued ally’. And in 1966 Lindsay created an Economic Development Council [EDC] with business leaders to secure a ‘favorable business climate’ in New York – a “climate”, the EDC envisaged, of reduced regulation, a reduced municipal services burden, and ‘responsible’ City budgets. This message was reiterated to business leaders throughout Lindsay’s first term via a series of city-sponsored campaigns and appeals – state legislation prohibited direct inducements such as tax incentives – and anticipated his later work with ABNY.

However, Lindsay’s attempts to secure both economic development and an open, inclusive city were not aided by escalating anxieties over New York’s future by the late 1960s. Racial conflict, deindustrialization and suburban flight afflicted many major cities, but New York’s size, visibility and symbolic power – reflected both in its model of “civic liberalism” and Lindsay’s pursuit of a public city – plus its proximity to major cultural and media industries, ensured its difficulties were more widely consumed than others’. Chief among these anxieties was the city’s reputation for crime. In his 1969 treatise, The City, Lindsay wrote: 
‘The key cost of crime is what it does to us as... members of a community. It puts us behind the locked doors of our homes and apartments and turns night time in the city into a time of fear. It... wipes away our legal right to move freely, to assemble, and to use our environment with any confidence.’

For Lindsay, the New York of the 1960s reinforced this privatization of civic life. Violent crime in New York had increased 7 percent year on year during the early 1960s, murders had more than doubled, and sensationalized press coverage established an image of the city as violent and lawless, its citizens helpless in the face of rampant crime. As part of a wider ‘New York City in Crisis’ series in 1965, the New York Herald Tribune luridly documented ‘a city where no one is a complete stranger to violence’, noting a new trend for private security guards and vigilante block patrols; its readers revealed ‘a city besieged’ and frightened, enfeebled residents confined to ‘self-imposed prison[s]’ and ‘afraid of my own shadow’. In truth, the candidate Lindsay had himself helped to construct this image of fear and self-enforced privatization: city streets, he declared during the 1965 campaign, were ‘dirty and unsafe’; crime ‘rampant’; parks and playgrounds ‘dangerous and uninhabitable’. New Yorkers, his own white paper on crime declared, had become ‘prisoners in their own city’. Yet such fears threatened to derail the kinds of public participation Lindsay envisaged for New York, and reaffirm the city’s unwanted exogenous reputation for crime and danger.

Lindsay’s initial prescriptions for combating crime were explicitly public, conveying both his own optimism in the ameliorative power of government and his commitment to a public city. In Brooklyn, Lindsay admonished local residents who had organized a vigilante patrol to deter crime, instead heralding the ability of the state to provide for public safety. ‘Safety is the job of the city, not the individual’, he averred. The mayor pursued crime control policies which, whilst addressing rising crime, would also seek to restore public faith in public institutions and spaces: communication innovations such as the 911 line and SPRINT system to improve coordination between the public and law enforcement, or new technologies such as scooters and one-man patrol cars to increase police visibility in public spaces. Public anxieties would be assuaged through a number of citizen-led crime prevention campaigns, each designed to empower and embolden residents. The 1969 “Lights On” campaign committed business owners to leaving a light on in their stores overnight to deter burglaries, while Operation Main
Street invested in street safety, lighting and shopfront renovation to increase public confidence in their urban environment.  

But Yet by the end of his Lindsay’s first term, Lindsay faced a number of challenges to these assumptions. Many of these explicitly public instruments appeared increasingly unattainable. First, the mayor no longer possessed the public resources to pay for some of his more ambitious initiatives. Between 1961 and 1975, municipal spending, especially on redistributive social welfare programs for a population that was increasingly poor and non-white, more than doubled to 15.4 percent of residents’ income, encouraged by a vocal welfare rights movement. As public expenditure outpaced tax revenues and economic growth, Lindsay was forced to deliver a number of self-proclaimed ‘realistic’ or ‘austerity’ budgets from 1968 that while protecting such programs, reduced spending on policing and crime control. Police officers were withdrawn from the streets, precinct houses merged or closed, and innovative anti-crime technologies deemed unaffordable. In August 1968, Budget Director Frederick Hayes advised Police Commissioner Howard Leary that current city funds were ‘inadequate to continue existing [police] programs at current levels’, even encouraging the Commissioner to ‘take advantage of funding sources other than the City.’ The success of Lindsay’s conservative rivals in the 1969 mayoral election, both of whom linked increased crime to Lindsay’s “permissiveness” on social welfare and urban disorder, indicated a significant number of New Yorkers were increasingly receptive to political messages which suggested an expanded public realm was increasingly irreconcilable with public safety.

Relations between Lindsay and the Police Department were also fraught. Lindsay’s initial attempts to reform an entrenched bureaucracy by rationalizing the allocation of resources and increasing public oversight generated accusations of City Hall interference, culminating in the resignation of his Police Commissioner and other senior officers in 1966. A bruising referendum campaign over a proposed civilian complaint review board the same year, which played on white New Yorkers’ racial anxieties and placed the administration and the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association on opposite sides, ended in a crushing defeat for the administration and increased racial and political polarization, while City Hall and police officers also clashed over an official “restraint” policy in the face of recent riots and disorder. As the credit squeeze worsened the mayor’s attempts to apply a ‘cost effectiveness policy’ to the department conflicted with the police unions’ calls for increased manpower to combat
crime, whilst the breakdown of wage and contract negotiations between city government and the police led to a wave of work slowdowns throughout 1967 and 1968 and wildcat strikes by up to 20,000 officers in January 1971. Such conflict further worsened city-police relations and rendered increases in police manpower politically unfeasible for Lindsay. Public attitudes towards the police also suffered. Many communities, especially those of color, viewed the police with distrust, and at a 1968 city conference on crime, delegates revealed a negative regard for the Police Department and blamed its incompetence and inefficacy – and city government – for the rising crime rate, while press revelations of systematic sleeping on duty (“cooping”) by patrolmen and endemic police corruption entrenched an image of institutional incompetence and venality. Such a context served to diminish many New Yorkers’ confidence in public institutions and officials, rendering attempts at developing citizen-led anti-crime campaigns all the more difficult, and increased public skepticism towards solutions which augmented them.

Finally, Lindsay’s tenure had overseen little in the way of a reduction in crime in the city. The rate of violent, predatory crime had quadrupled in New York during the second half of the 1960s, and by 1969 it ranked fourth amongst American cities for crimes per capita. And rather than opening up the city, many of Lindsay’s crime control innovations conspired to work against his goal of an inclusive, public New York. Initiatives such as the 911 line or one-man patrol cars had transformed policing into a reactive process and distanced the police from the public, increasing fear of crime. In June 1969 the Times documented the effect of these anxieties, privatizing civic life and turning citizens in on themselves:

“The fear [of crime] is visible. It can be seen in clusters of stores that close early because the streets are sinister and customers no longer stroll after supper for newspapers and pints of ice cream. It can be seen in the faces of women opening elevator doors, in the hurried step of the man walking home late at night from the subway… [and] finally it becomes habit.”

Not only had the Lindsay administration proven unable to ease New Yorkers’ anxieties over rising crime, but by the early 1970s these fears were also being articulated by voices from outside the city. Between 1969 and 1972 just three firms moved their offices into New York, compared to 94 leaving, with crime and disorder frequently cited as significant reasons for these trends. A 1970 investigation into the city’s declining share of domestic air travel identified ‘a conscious avoidance of New York by businessmen’, due to ‘the negative image
of New York created by... danger, crime, social unrest’. A 1971 tourism conference convened by the administration revealed considerable tourist anxiety over crime and security in Midtown Manhattan, and discussed a network of buses which would allow visitors to forego its streets. The president of Richardson-Merrell Corp., announcing plans to leave New York, decried the ‘the quality of urban living and the fact that... doing business in New York City affected employees, especially... [retaining] middle and upper-level people’. 46 Lindsay was not blind to the threat these trends posed to his dream of a public and prosperous New York, nor the symbiotic relationship between public perception or fear of crime and economic development.

In the winter of 1969-70 he intervened when realtors and business owners in downtown Brooklyn reported an upsurge in street crime – personally dispatching a police delegation and, breaking from his quest for cost-effectiveness, temporarily increasing police protection – largely to deter relocations. 47 But having sought to establish his vision of New York as a public city, Lindsay now struggled to combat a powerful competing image of the city as unruly, ungovernable, even lawless; out of control; its public officials and institutions, like its citizens, helpless in the face of group conflict, bureaucratic inertia, fiscal turmoil and rising crime. Such an image which reaffirmed the racialized, anti-urban tropes of “urban crisis”, prioritized affluent, often corporate or visitor anxiety over crime and disorder, and threatened the city’s economic wellbeing, even survival. It was apparent that if Lindsay was to retain business confidence and investment in New York, the provision of safety and security had to become the highest of public goods, regardless of the cost to wider public participation in city life.

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Against this backdrop, and with public solutions unfeasible or unavailable, Lindsay turned to a new source: the Association for a Better New York [ABNY]. Established in late 1970 under the leadership of real estate executive Lewis Rudin, this civic advocacy group represented over 300 CEOs from the finance, real estate and hospitality sectors. It boasted a budget of $2.5 million, funded through the individual donations of its members, initially targeted largely towards city marketing and lobbying. 51 Its stated mission was to ‘establish a better positive image for New York’ and reverse the exodus of corporations, investors and tourists from the city. Self-interest formed a large part of the motivation for the group’s formation; many members were realtors whose properties would fall vacant should businesses leave the city and demand for office space fall flat. A telegram inviting business leaders to the group’s first
meeting in December 1970 promised ‘direct and immediate action to hold existing businesses in New York City’ and warned, ‘to protect your investment it is of vital importance you attend.’\textsuperscript{52} Other members envisioned the organization as ‘a vehicle for business’ and realized long-standing policy aspirations – a West Side convention center, abolishing property tax surcharges or relaxing rent controls or zoning restrictions on the construction of luxury housing — could be better advanced through greater cooperation with city government.\textsuperscript{53}

Yet while such imperatives – improving New York’s image, self-interest, business lobbying – demonstrated some continuity from pre-existing public-private collaboration in the city, ABNY also offered something more novel. As its vice-chairman, realtor Rexford Tompkins, outlined, ‘If we’re just going to be a booster club, who needs it? What we’re trying to do is get a “business presence” in New York problems.’\textsuperscript{54} In a number of often performative, visually powerful initiatives, from street-sweeping CEOs and uniformed sanitation teams to private security guards and anti-crime patrols, ABNY was able to assert, even construct, a new “common sense” of private intervention and leadership in combating urban ills, often in contrast to an ineffectual or fiscally and politically constrained city government. It addressed what it defined as ‘the need for positive action by the private sector against forces which threaten the well-being and future of the city’; forces which, its own publicity made clear, represented not only urban problems but a perceived diminution in the power of private interests vis-à-vis public interest groups, unions or city agencies.\textsuperscript{55} Thus ABNY’s programming sought not only to advance aspects of the business community’s agenda, but also reorient policy priorities and power away from public interests towards private actors and fashion an alternative ideological vision for urban governance in New York.\textsuperscript{56}

To develop this legitimacy, early ABNY correspondence constructed its own image of crisis and urgency, and positioned itself as a more knowledgeable and effective instrument than city government for confronting the city’s problems. ‘New York City is in crisis – an ever-deepening crisis – until something is done and done fast to reverse this trend’, declared a letter to Commercial Properties Association members in late 1970. ‘We in the Real Estate industry must now take the lead’. ‘ABNY’\textquotesingle s members knew the root causes for dissatisfaction among corporate executives. They knew what had to be done to make New York better. And they started to do it’, proclaimed its 1972 annual report, contrasting its innate, on-the-ground expertise with the remote, aloof ‘indifference of City agencies.’\textsuperscript{57} While ABNY emphasized the importance of working in partnership with the city to deliver common goals, it also often
deliberately used effective publicity to promote itself as an alternative center of authority in New York. One such example was its recruitment and public presentation of former city officials, including former Lindsay ally and Deputy Mayor Robert Sweet and labor negotiator Vincent McDonnell, as an alternative ‘shadow cabinet’ of consultants.58

ABNY also established popular legitimacy for its initiatives by directing them towards ordinary New Yorkers. While its targeting of political and economic elites through “power breakfasts” and lobbying has been documented elsewhere, ABNY also communicated directly with the public through local media, from newspaper and television interviews to radio phone-ins, establishing a tentative popular consent behind its programs.59 ABNY officials used such settings to defend themselves against accusations of self-interest, instead aligning the interests of the city’s business and real estate elite with that of the city at large. ‘We’re protecting our investments’, Rudin acknowledged when asked to explain ABNY’s intervention in urban problems in a 1971 interview. ‘But if my protecting my investments makes it better for everyone in this town, is that wrong?’ Capital accumulation and the wider policy goals of real estate, in Rudin’s vision, could only be of benefit to the city, regardless of any potentially regressive or uneven impacts.60 ABNY officials regularly identified themselves as ‘citizens’ or ‘taxpayers’, eliding public and corporate interests in opposition to city government; elsewhere, in an interview with WOR-TV’s “New York Report”, Rudin declared that ‘We [ABNY] in essence are the government… You know, we’re the taxpayers and we’re the people’, reconfiguring Lindsay’s vision of a democratic, public city. Many New Yorkers responded positively to such appeals, identifying Rudin as an ally or partner in their correspondence with ABNY and often offering their own personal testimonies of experiences of crime or, in the case of a locksmith or a security company, their own expertise in the fight against it. Local civic groups such as the Murray Hill Association or VITAL (Volunteers to Improve Third and Lexington) volunteered their services in support of ABNY programs.61 Such strategies, exemplified by the recruitment of volunteer “blockwatchers” to combat crime, illustrate ABNY’s conscious effort to assert that their initiatives were as much popular as elite projects.

As if to illustrate this apparent synergy between public and business concerns, crime control – identified by New Yorkers as the number one public problem facing the city – was established as ABNY major area of endeavor.62 It privately cited ‘inadequate police protection (crime and drug problem)’ at the top of a list of city problems, while Rudin publicly declared that ‘crime in the streets’ was central to ‘companies making their decision to move to Stamford [or]
Greenwich’, and that ‘the crime problem’ was the ‘most important priority’, both for public and business interests. ‘There’s no question about it’, he told WOR in January 1973. ‘The answer to safe streets… better services for the citizens, is more involvement on the part of the business community.’ And ABNY again made effective use of both local media and powerful publicity to advance its agenda to a wider public. In late 1972 Rudin and Lindsay unveiled a range of new public-private initiatives against crime at a packed press conference in Midtown Manhattan. But while both men sat next to each other as allies, the contrast between an embattled, constrained city government and an emboldened, optimistic private sector was made evident. Rudin set out the importance of fighting crime to restore business confidence in New York, and the need for private sector leadership in doing so: ‘Crime… is what is hurting our city more than anything else… An all-out commitment of our own resources is mandatory if we want to make New York better.’ He proudly identified ‘a new spirit in the city’, and pledged an ‘open chequebook’ from business to support it. By contrast, the Manhattan district police commander present admitted the city’s 30,000 public police ‘were not able to do the job required’ and Lindsay solemnly predicted the likely worsening of crime as city budgets were cut and services further reduced. Such imagery, both visual and rhetorical, underlined the weakness, inefficacy or constraints of public institutions and the urgency, even “common sense”, of private solutions.

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ABNY consequently developed a number of privatized programs in the areas of crime control and public safety, focusing on three main areas: material investment, spatial restructuring, and labor and hiring. To compensate for the growing gap in city funding, ABNY offered private capital investment in policing. Lindsay had imposed a number of recruitment freezes on the Police Department from 1970 onwards as part of a city-directed program of austerity: new appointments were deferred or cancelled, municipal funding for the city’s auxiliary police terminated completely, and overall officer manpower fell by 6,000 between 1970 and 1972. In early 1970 the administration asked Leary to cut $17.15 million from the police budget – most of it set aside for street patrol – despite the Commissioner’s warning that such reductions ‘would seriously impair departmental operations.’ While unlikely to make up for this shortfall, ABNY donations offered an alternative to Lindsay’s budget cuts, recruiting additional auxiliary police to improve coverage or investing directly in new crime control equipment. Many of these initiatives were typically public-private collaborations designed to augment
rather than undermine city efforts; in 1972 ABNY and City Hall came together to create the New York City Police Foundation, designed to raise funds for policing initiatives deemed ‘impossible to achieve within the department’s budget’. Yet the symbolism of such private investment, especially at a time when Lindsay was in direct political conflict with the police, was not lost on ABNY, and it again made effective use of publicity to illustrate this contrast. In 1972 it sponsored a series of television advertising campaigns designed to celebrate the work done by public safety agencies and promote a better public understanding of the challenges they faced. Elsewhere, in the wake of several violent attacks on police officers, including the lethal shooting of a patrol officer at the New York headquarters of the Nation of Islam, ABNY members used a press conference to present the Police Department with a number of bulletproof vests for their rank-and-file. Despite their undoubted symbolism and opportunism, both initiatives publicly demonstrated ABNY’s commitment to law enforcement at a time of considerable criticism of its actions and effectiveness, whilst also illuminating the breakdown of relations between the mayor and the police – Lindsay had refused to attend the dead officer’s funeral – and the growing breach between city government and the agencies responsible for public safety.

ABNY also developed a number of its own anti-crime and public safety programs, with significant implications for the politics of labor and space in New York. These privatized initiatives, which called upon voluntary and privatized sources of labor, moved to occupy a vacuum created by the retrenchment of police manpower and a collapse in public confidence in police effectiveness during the early 1970s. Not only this, but in focusing resources on the commercial districts of Lower and Midtown Manhattan, they served to privatize previously public spaces and widen citywide inequalities in service delivery.

For example, Operation Interlock, a new private radio frequency paid for by ABNY, enabled private security guards in hundreds of office buildings in Midtown Manhattan to communicate directly with police offers at a police substation in Times Square, twenty-four hours a day. Companies and building owners could opt in to the program for an annual or $2,000 one-off investment in walkie-talkie equipment and technology. In its promotional material ABNY described Interlock as ‘the eyes and ears’ of police, enabling officers to intercept crimes in progress rather than reacting to their subsequent reporting, and boasted that at less than five minutes the response time for calls to Interlock was better than calling 911.
supplementing of publicly-funded patrolmen with private security guards was highly significant, especially at a time of growing public distrust in the NYPD, while the fact that Interlock enabled its users to bypass the public 911 line and gain direct access to police switchboards appeared to legitimize unequal levels of public service provision. The spatial implications of the program – and its intended beneficiaries – were perhaps most evident: 21 of the 35 buildings who participated in the first roll-out of Interlock were located between 46th and 55th Streets – including the Rockefeller Center, the New York Hilton and the headquarters of CBS and ABC – while Rudin informed reporters that Interlock intended to make Midtown ‘a closed neighborhood for criminals’ and ‘open it further for tourists’.74

Elsewhere, ABNY lobbying and investment encouraged Lindsay to establish the Times Square Development Council, a public-private partnership staffed by representatives from the Police Department, city agencies, real estate and business. The TSDC identified itself as ‘working to create conditions which will encourage new economic development and sustain existing enterprises’ in the heart of Midtown: an area home to New York’s entertainment and sex industries but also some of its most valuable real estate.75 The discourses employed by ABNY revealed its ambitions for Times Square; an area which, it complained, had long ‘lapse[d] from liberty into license’, its once free and public qualities now pejoratively translated as ‘wide-open’. ABNY’s Aaron Gural, chairman of Newmark & Co. which owned a number of properties in the Times Square area, described the proposals as a ‘scalpel’ which would surgically remove ‘parasites’ from Times Square; likewise the Council pledged to ‘sanitize’ the area and its ‘visual pollution’ and exclude ‘undesirables’ from its public spaces. Its work began in 1972 with the creation of two police “super-precincts”, Midtown South and Midtown North, to cover the area, doubling the number of patrolmen available. ‘The Midtown area is a unique international tourist and business center and ought to reflect the dignity and spirit of the city’, Lindsay publicly declared, underscoring its centrality to the external image of New York, and he looked forward to it being transferred to ‘good commercial uses’.76 The increased manpower provided by the city and ABNY supported this process of spatial reclamation. Sex workers were covertly surveyed and photographed by a Tactical Patrol Force before being arrested, often without bail.77 The infrastructure of the sex industry was dismantled or requisitioned by police: notorious theatres and hotels were closed down, police substations built on the sites of peepshow halls, and the NYPD Mounted Division opened offices in a former massage parlor. Elsewhere a new police unit, the Office of Midtown Enforcement –
described by one scholar as a ‘tactical, 20-member legal SWAT team’ – was instructed by Lindsay and Police Commissioner Patrick Murphy to ‘saturate’ the area; its ‘battery’ of officers making regular sweeps of street peddlers, panhandlers and the homeless from subway concourses (‘Operation Safe Passage’) and erecting barricades at the entrances to Times Square, reflecting the aggressive repossession, even militarization, of public space. In the following years, this process would be completed via the implementation of anti-loitering legislation, further deployment of private security and, beginning in 1976, the wholesale redevelopment of the area by a new public-private partnership, the 42nd Street Development Corporation.

ABNY’s role in regenerating Times Square did not end there. Together with the Midtown Realty Owners’ Association, it also provided private finance for the installation of 170 high-intensity streetlights and two new gutter-cleaning machines for sanitation workers. So successful were the machines that other private consortia of ‘concerned companies’ in the area, including Bristol-Meyers and American Airlines, sponsored similar private sanitation efforts. And in 1973 ABNY – specifically donations from the Durst and Newmark real estate firms – funded, in partnership with the Shubert Theatre group, the city’s first ever CCTV system, designed to monitor a five-block area of Midtown between 42nd and 46th Streets; Gural described it as ‘equivalent to having a policeman on every corner’. Whilst Lindsay assured reporters that New York remained ‘a public city’, the spatial significance of ABNY’s investment was clear. A once public space, open to those who wished to participate in the city’s public life or, alternatively, pursue their own private desires, had now been reclaimed by private interests – many of them investors in Times Square real estate – keen to regulate its use and the behaviors with which it had become pejoratively associated. Most significantly, provision of public safety in the area, once seen as the responsibility of city government, was now identified by the Council as ‘increasingly dependent on the cooperation and initiative of the private sector’. Even Lindsay himself, while praising ‘the first-rate professionalism of our Police Department and city agencies’, admitted public provision could not do it alone: ‘We need the help of all concerned private citizens, businessmen and civic groups to help in this fight.’ These changing relations were reflected by the fact the city was unable to fund the lighting or cameras itself; its Crime Study Team, which had recommended the cameras as a ‘key priority’ for the city, had been dissolved during a Lindsay austerity drive in 1969.
While the reclamation of Times Square delivered a reduction in levels of street crime in the area, its successes also reflected the changing spatial dynamics of the city. Such was the extent of ABNY’s aggressive programming in the area that the director of Lindsay’s Office of Midtown Planning and Development noted that rival advocacy groups such as the Broadway Association were ‘extremely worried about being squeezed out of [future Times Square development]’. Such testimony illustrated both the inequities of ABNY’s model of private-public partnership, and the limited, often competitive, conception of “partnership” implicit within it. Equally, at a time of scarce police resources the Times Square project threatened to further increase spatial inequalities – especially of service delivery – in the city, focusing law enforcement on central areas popular with tourists, businesses and investors. City councilwoman Carol Greitzer, of Manhattan’s 2nd District, complained foot patrols of police officers would be reallocated to Midtown exactly as ‘hundreds’ of criminals were driven out into Greenwich Village and the Upper West Side. And for many the project appeared to privatize, even criminalize, ostensibly public spaces. The Times Square CCTV cameras, the New York Civil Liberties Union commented presciently, signified ‘a disturbing step toward a society where no one will ever know when he’s free from... surveillance’. The area’s spatial regulation was decried as ‘an improper use of official power’, as was the new emphasis on “quality of life” offences: ‘Unsightliness and seediness is not a crime’, the NYCLU protested, instructing Lindsay he should be ‘deal[ing] with the kinds of crimes that have victims’, not privatizing city life. This criticism, however, rather missed the point; for ABNY, unsightliness was a crime and apparent abstractions such as “quality of life” and “good commercial uses” were genuine victims of Lindsay’s excessively public city.

ABNY also transformed the use of labor in public safety provision in New York. As with Operation Interlock, this included the augmentation (and at times replacement) of public police officers with a private, non-unionized labor force of up to 30,000 volunteer “blockwatchers”, auxiliary police, and security personnel. The project had already been piloted in ABNY’s first sanitation venture, Operation Clean Sweep, in which the owners of 2,000 office buildings used their own staff and volunteers – including many CEOs – to sweep gutters, curbs and sidewalks in Midtown Manhattan. As with many other ABNY projects, Clean Sweep was highly performative, providing a powerful, populist image of the efficacy of voluntarism and private initiative. In December 1972, ABNY extended this initiative into the realm of public safety, establishing a privately-funded ‘auxiliary police army’ of over 7,000 doormen, building
superintendents and private security guards – nearly half the size of the Police Department’s shrinking uniformed patrol force – to police the streets and office buildings of Midtown. As with Interlock, more than 2,000 building owners – many of them ABNY members – contributed their own funds and staff to the scheme, and paid for the blockwatchers’ training: again in contrast to public disinvestment in policing. Six months later Lindsay, flanked by ABNY members and security guards in front of the Rockefeller Center’s Time-Life building, announced plans for a ‘nocturnal anticrime regiment’ of private security guards, equipped with walkie-talkies and weapons. The spatial distribution of the blockwatchers, and their implications for an inclusive, public city, was again clear. Lindsay’s volunteers would concentrate solely on the area of Manhattan from 42nd to 59th Streets and from Second to Seventh Avenues, while a new cohort announced by Rudin the following year pledged to expand the program only to the “regional subcenters” of real estate, business and commerce set out in the 1968 Regional Plan: downtown Brooklyn, Fordham Road in the Bronx and Jamaica, Queens. At the same time, other localities continued to struggle with the impact of city disinvestment in public safety provision and a lack of police coverage or protection. While some more affluent neighborhoods could invest in private security for their building or block, this did not apply evenly to every community.

Set against the backdrop of layoffs and labor conflict, as well as the ever-deepening budgetary crisis, this part-privatization of policing served the immediate fiscal and political interests of Lindsay’s administration. At a time of service retrenchment yet also increased demand for police protection, encouraging the private sector to pay for their own security in a new form of public-private collaboration, exempt from the kinds of collective bargaining agreements and pay structures open to the public police, proved very attractive to City Hall. But such an arrangement also suited ABNY’s wider ideological objectives. In a June 1973 interview to promote the “blockwatchers” program, Rudin underlined its voluntarist, self-help ethos and envisaged ‘no reason why business groups and community groups and block associations should not do the same thing we’re doing.’ ABNY members aligned private initiatives with innovation and efficiency, and juxtaposed them with a sluggish, ineffectual public sector. ‘This is the kind of attitude that the city has wallowed in for years – let the government do it’, exclaimed Alton Marshall, chief executive of the Rockefeller Center. ‘There is no reason... why 30,000 private security people can’t be organized to supplement the police. At Rockefeller Center we have our own security force.’ Both men hinted at a broader ideological shift, away from the state and public interests towards a new “common sense” regarding the agency,
leadership and virtue of the private sector in the identification, design and delivery of urban priorities. In this way, ABNY programs functioned as a form of reclamation, in which private interests regained control of an unruly, costly, “ungovernable” city and reoriented its priorities, be they policy, political, or spatial. Rudin himself made this clear: ‘We’ve allowed the politicians – and some of the other groups, the pressure groups – to create diversions from what is necessary to make this town run properly’, he told WOR Radio. ‘It’s our obligation now to make it run properly.’

ABNY continued to develop its range of urban programs after Lindsay left office in 1973 and as the city’s fiscal crisis – and the retrenchment of city services – worsened. By 1982, Operation Interlock covered over 250 hotels, restaurants and commercial buildings in Midtown Manhattan, compared to 35 at its inception. ABNY claimed it served as a ‘model’ for similar initiatives across the country. ABNY’s 1983 annual report could boast that its private “blockwatchers” had handled 2,860 emergency calls and initiated a record 107 arrests in the city. Such a record compared favorably with that of a straitened Police Department whose manpower levels had been cut by a further third since Lindsay, forcing officers to ignore “low-priority” crimes. Contemporaries, notably the city’s fashion industry, also used ABNY’s programs as a template for their own efforts at public-private collaboration in crime control. The Garment Center Model Security Program, developed in partnership with a new Office of Apparel Industry Planning and Development in City Hall, employed private security and anti-crime technologies to supplement the local Police Department command post (whose manpower was doubled), and a new program of street lighting, two-thirds of which was paid for by industry leaders, was established for the area. The program even encouraged local businesses to invest in new private sanitation teams, each with their own uniforms and trucks to distinguish them from city provision.

Beyond crime and public safety, ABNY’s programming also extended into new areas, from parks and recreation – where ABNY investment in a private Urban Park Rangers Program supplemented that of a city Parks Department whose workforce had been reduced by over 30 percent between 1972 and 1978 – to drug rehabilitation and youth employment. The Park Rangers Program followed a similar practical and spatial template to ABNY’s anti-crime programming, providing ‘a highly visible presence’ to ensure the ‘safety of the parks’ – specifically the high-profile sites of Central Park, Prospect Park and Flushing Meadow – for ‘tourists and visitors’. ABNY officials, including Rudin, were also enlisted to help form the
Business/Labor Working Group – later the New York City Partnership, chaired by David Rockefeller and comprised of major financial executives – providing another advocacy arm for the city’s business and real estate sectors. The Group’s first summary report, published in 1978, echoed ABNY’s earlier approach. Amongst other goals – a West Side convention center, further reductions in municipal spending and an end to rent control – it demanded ‘actions on “quality of life” in the city’ with the aim of ‘increasing focus on maintaining and attracting middle-income families [to New York]’. Crime, it argued, was a ‘basic barrier’ to job creation and economic growth, and was ‘driving away tourists and customers’. In response, the Group anticipated further and ‘increased private sector assistance to crime prevention programs’, including collective security programs for merchants and building owners, increased use of private security and media promotion, and a public-private Crime Prevention Council, emulating the template conceived by ABNY less than ten years earlier.

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To some scholars, the efforts of ABNY in designing and delivering urban programs have appeared as largely symbolic publicity exercises, distinctive for their ‘naiveté’ or worse, “snake oil” quality. Yet while boosterism and image-making were important elements of ABNY’s strategy, to characterize its efforts simply in these terms is to overlook their wider significance. At a time of a multifaceted crisis in public service provision, illustrated by the severe fiscal cutbacks, labor and group conflict and spiraling crime rates of the Lindsay years, ABNY offered active, substantive programs and a new and distinct ideological direction for the city, in which private and volunteer initiative would supplement or even supplant the inefficacy, inertia and retrenchment of the state and confront the symptoms of the “urban crisis”, notably crime and disorder, exacerbated by Lindsay’s excessively public city. While ABNY’s public-private programming was not completely new to New York, its significance lies in the important ideological work it performed: visibly accentuating private sector agency and leadership, illustrating popular consent through public and volunteer participation in its initiatives, and, in so doing, redefining priorities for urban governance and policy. The performative quality of its anti-crime initiatives, their image of effectiveness and action, and their apparent acceptance by both political and business elites and ordinary New Yorkers provided a powerful template for the restructuring of New York’s political economy and modes of governance, even before the 1975 fiscal crisis. Thus while complicating existing narratives of New York’s late twentieth century transformation, ABNY’s efforts also illuminate the later
and wider privatization of the city – its services and resources, its spaces, its labor relations, perhaps even its fundamental purpose – from the late 1970s onwards.

Indeed, the case of ABNY anticipates the later increasing role of the private sector in setting policy priorities for city government and delivering public policy initiatives and even services itself. Drawing successfully on a perceived crisis of public institutions during the 1970s, in particular their ability to finance or manage complex urban problems, ABNY and other private interests developed their own privatist solutions to such problems, developing the legitimacy to advance other aspects of their agenda, from reduced taxes and zoning regulations to tougher approaches to crime, disorder and “quality of life” issues. While many of these solutions have been defined as private-public partnerships, the conception of “partnership” within them is limited; public authorities are typically, in Gregory Squires’ words, the ‘junior partner’ in such arrangements, while as evidenced by the Times Square Development Council, most operate under a model in which partnerships compete with each other to secure investment and resources. These trends can also be identified in the changing management of many parks and public spaces since the late 1970s – again a pattern encouraged by ABNY through its Park Rangers Program or role in Times Square redevelopment – or the contemporary proliferation of BIDs, in which private, place-specific consortia of property and business owners compete to offer their own range of privatized services, including private security, ‘above and beyond’ existing public provision.

ABNY’s work also illuminates the wider privatization of space, and its inequitable distribution, in New York since the 1970s. In their use of electronic surveillance and invasive policing techniques at high-profile sites of commerce or tourism, or their sponsorship of privately-managed urban spaces which merged goals of physical redevelopment with order maintenance and public safety, ABNY’s crime initiatives pre-empted the later privatization of public space in New York. ABNY’s prioritization of public safety programs and resources towards the city center also anticipated the changing spatial order of New York since the fiscal crisis, in particular the process of disinvestment – or ‘planned shrinkage’ – in poor and low-income neighborhoods at the expense of more prosperous or profitable areas. Such efforts have, to a large extent, successfully reduced crime coincided with the reduction of crime in New York and opened up the city, but often in select spaces or to select groups of residents or visitors, while often legitimizing spatial inequalities in service delivery. BIDs are again a contemporary
example of this, with the more affluent BIDs – mainly those in Lower and Midtown Manhattan, where property values are highest – able to offer a wider portfolio of services.103

ABNY’s efforts illustrate the increasingly privatized nature of municipal labor relations in the American city of the 1970s. It is significant that ABNY recruited private security guards or volunteers not only for its crime control initiatives, but also in the hiring of park rangers and sanitation workers. At a time of generous municipal pay settlements, powerful unions and labor conflict and fiscal uncertainty, these privatized workforces, paid for by private sources, presented an attractive alternative to both Lindsay and ABNY: practical, promising to reduce the cost of city service provision, but also ideological, fragmenting the locus of labor power in the city, laying the ground for the trenchant post-fiscal crisis cutbacks in the public sector, and entrenching an ideology of self-help and privatism which has, since then, encouraged further privatization strategies both top-down and at the grassroots.104 Such trends have continued in the years since the 2008 financial crisis, where, as in the early 1970s, discourses of scarcity, privatism and efficiency have continued to be deployed by public and private authorities to reduce the burden of public service provision and to discipline organized labor.105

ABNY’s reoriented ideological vision for New York remains perhaps its most significant legacy. While John Lindsay imagined a truly public city, with the role of government to expand, often through redistributive means, public inclusion and participation within it, ABNY’s conceptualization of New York was very different. ‘New York is a valuable piece of real estate’, Rudin explained, whose residents’ fortunes were tied to its market value; the role of government was thus to promote, and protect, this real estate and its intrinsic value.106 The provision of security and the protection of private property was, in this vision, a vital public good; thus ABNY’s eliding of public and corporate interests and its desire to augment city spending on crime control and public safety, particularly in areas of commercial or financial significance, in opposition to Lindsay’s increasing budgetary restraint. Such a shift in priorities, developed before the fiscal crisis and its attendant ‘crisis regime’, continues to resonate in post-crisis patterns of public investment. While the scope and redistributive vision of city government has largely atrophied dwindled since the 1970s, what remains of public service provision is often concentrated on policing and the protection of property and private investment. Even the current mayor, a purported throwback to the era of Lindsay and ‘ultra-
liberal’ extravagance, has found resources for policing and security in a constrained city budget, the majority of it directed not towards neighborhoods but high-profile sites in areas of premium real estate value and private investment. In this sense, the model developed by ABNY and, ironically, Lindsay, lives on, even at the cost of a truly public city.


5 Brenner & Theodore, ‘Cities and the Geographies of “Actually Existing Neoliberalism”’, p. 351.


14 In this sense, David Harvey’s definition of neoliberalization as ‘a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites’, is persuasive. See Harvey, *Brief History*, p. 19.

15 These features, especially the use of public-private partnerships to focus investment and development on specific areas or places, and the re-articulation of growth as a public good, are indicative of the urban ‘growth coalitions’ identified by John Logan and Harvey Molotch as central to contemporary urban political economies. See Logan & Molotch, *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place* (Berkeley, 1987).

16 Brian Balogh identifies this period as synonymous with a belief that ‘virtually any problem could be solved’ by public policy. Government policy, he argues, served almost as a form of therapy which held ‘the key to satisfaction and fulfillment.’ See Balogh, *The Associational State: American Governance in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, 2015), p. 188.
22 ‘Hoving Planning Park Food Kiosks’, *NYT*, 10 February 1966, p. 39; Cannato, *Ungovernable City*, p. 113; ‘A Happening Called Hoving’, *NYT*, 10 July 1966, p. 184. These public “happenings” included kite-flying parties for children (kites had previously been banned from the park), discos, cycle rides and the public painting of a 105-foot canvas sponsored by the city.
26 For a more substantive discussion of this discourse’s construction during the 1960s, and the conservative and anti-urban ideologies that underpinned it, see Robert Beauregard, *Voices of Decline: The Postwar Fate of U.S. Cities* (New York, 2003), especially pp. 127-178.
29 Lindsay, *The City*, p. 165.
34 Scooters, according to Lindsay’s Law Enforcement Task Force, meant ‘areas of patrol can be transversed [sic] at much more frequent intervals, discouraging the crime prone... and instilling a greater sense of confidence in the public.’ Excerpts from Law Enforcement Task Force Report. Reel 43, Records of Lindsay Administration, Subject Files 1966-1973, New York City Municipal Archives (NYCMA), New York, N.Y.; Memo, Kriegel to Lindsay, 11 April 1969, Lindsay Administration Records, Subject Files – Confidential, 1966-1973, Ibid. For more on these innovations, see Joe Merton, “I Don’t Believe in a Fun City, I Believe in a Safe City”: Fear of Crime and the Crisis of Expertise in New York City’, *Journal of Policy History* 29 (2017), pp. 112-137.


‘Neighborhoods: Maspeth Feels Forgotten’, NYT, 23 Aug 1969, p. 33. For more on the substance of Lindsay’s opponents’ campaigns, which linked crime and welfare, see Merton, ‘I Don’t Believe in a Fun City, I Believe in a Safe City’.

On the conflicting motives behind Lindsay’s attempts to reform the Police Department, see Ibid. On the CCRB campaign, see Cannato, *Ungovernable City*, pp. 155-88.


Indeed, a 1967 memo to the mayor warned that one-man patrol cars had, in removing officers from the streets, only increased citizens’ fear of crime. See Memo, Davidoff to Lindsay, 1 Feb 1967, Box 247, Folder 121, ‘Police Week’, JVL Papers.


Explaining Lindsay’s action, aide Jay Kriegel reported to Commissioner Leary at the time that, ‘the Mayor is deeply concerned that these businesses are not satisfied with the City’s efforts and might move their plants.’ See correspondence in Box 343, Folder 139, ‘Leary, 1970’, JVL Papers.

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Press responses to the 1971 action indicate the depth of public hostility to the police: the Times condemned the striking officers’ ‘contemptuous disregard of their fellow citizens’ for ‘destroy[ing] whatever public confidence still remains in the city’s police force’, while one reader assailed the Department for ‘a lack of discipline [and] a lack of basic integrity.’ Even the Post, normally supportive of the police, described the police’s demands as ‘wild’ and


Unauthored telegram, 1 Dec 1970, Association for a Better New York, Inc. archives [ABNY archives], New York, N.Y.

‘Civic Group is Formed’, NYT, 10 Feb 1971, p. 1.

Draft of copy for ABNY brochure, 14 June 1971, ABNY archives.

ABNY’s vision aligns with the work of Gregory Squires on public-private partnerships, which argues that such instruments have historically functioned as a ‘foil’ for capitalist accumulation, the subsidization of private sector economic activity and the reaffirmation of business power. See Squires, ‘Partnership and the Pursuit of the Private City’, reproduced in Jan Lin & Christopher Mele (eds.), The Urban Sociology Reader, 2nd ed. (Abingdon, 2013), pp. 118-122.


‘Civic Group is Formed’; ‘Militant Moneymen’.

Greenberg, Branding New York, p. 113-115.

‘Militant Moneymen’, Rudin’s vision again echoes that of Logan and Molotch’s ‘growth coalitions’, in which the “ideology of growth” is presented as a collective public good. See Logan & Molotch, Urban Fortunes, pp. 66-84.


‘Voter Surveys in City Rate Crime No. 1, NYT, 22 Sept 1969, p. 27.


‘Fund Begun to Aid Police Programs’, NYT, 4 Jan 1972, p. 30;

‘A Report from Association for a Better New York’, n.d. [1972], ABNY archives. Such an initiative contrasted with the attitude of the Lindsay administration. Aide Barry Gottehrer recalled that the administration retained ‘no real liaison with the Police Department’, and that while ‘The police at the precinct level resented us... [They] hate[d] the mayor and his people and what they believed he stood for’, such attitudes were reciprocated within the administration. See Gottehrer, The Mayor’s Man (Garden City, 1975), pp. 17, 43.


77 Themis Chronopoulos estimates that nearly two thousand people were arrested for solicitation in Times Square in 1973 alone. See Chronopoulos, *Spatial Regulation in New York City*, p. 66.


79 Reichl, *Reconstructing Times Square*, p. 60.


84 Memo, Bardel to Lindsay, 9 May 1972, Reel 9, Lindsay Administration Records, NYCMA.

85 Letter, Greitzer to Lindsay, 8 February 1972, Box 324, Folder 166, ‘Police Preventive Control, New York City’, JVL Papers; Bardel, Follow-up Times Square Progress Report; Letter, Ira Glasser to Lindsay, 6 September 1972, Box 375, Folder 617, ‘Police: Times Square’, Ibid.
89 By contrast, it was estimated that it cost the city $25,000 a year in 1973 to keep one patrol officer on the street. See Ibid., and also Cannato, Ungovernable City, p. 482; Chronopoulos, Spatial Regulation in New York City, pp. 119-20.
90 Rudin interview with WMCA Radio; ‘City-Backed Private Drive’, NYT, 22 Dec 1971, p. 1 [emphasis added].
91 WOR Radio, report on street safety, 9 January 1973, ABNY archives [emphasis added].
92 1982 and 1983 ABNY annual newsletters, ABNY archives. By contrast, it was estimated that during the same period only 2,000 conventional NYPD officers were available to patrol the entire city during any one shift or rotation, and that the average dispatch time for 911 calls in December 1980 was over fifteen minutes. See ‘Police Try Recordings in 911 Calls’, NYT, 9 Jun 1981, p. B1; ‘As More Call 911, Fewer Are Helped’, Ibid., 7 Jun 1981, p. E6.
93 Memo, Saul Nimowitz to Kriegel, 19 July 1971, Box 4, Folder 63, ‘Garment Center, 1971-1973’, JVL Papers, Accession 1998-M-094: Additional material (Jay Kriegel). Reporting on the Office’s achievements, its director, Saul Nimowitz, lauded ‘a new instrument for change in the Garment Center’, which had improved street conditions, increased public safety, and restored business morale and confidence, but also acknowledged the uneven impact of the Office’s initiatives. While security, safety and cleanliness had improved for many businesses in the Garment District – crime was down 20 percent – those in the area which chose not or could not afford to contribute to the scheme reported little improvement in their immediate environment. See Memo, Nimowitz to Lindsay, 22 November 1972, Box 352, Folder 280, ‘Garment Center Progress Report’, Ibid. The Garment Center program also anticipated later business improvement activity by encouraging local businesses to invest in private sanitation teams for the area, each with their own insignia, uniforms and trucks to distinguish them from City provision.
97 Greenberg, Branding New York, p. 122.
99 Squires, ‘Partnership and the Pursuit of the Private City’, p. 119.


The six most affluent BIDs (including the Garment District and Times Square Alliance BIDs) each spend an average of $2.6 million per year on security, in contrast to an average of just $15,000 amongst the three least affluent (each located in outer borough neighborhoods).


Rudin interview with WMCA Radio.

De Blasio is Just Like John Lindsay – And It’s Not a Compliment’, *NY Post*, 4 Nov 2015; ‘Mayor de Blasio Poised to Hire Nearly 1,300 Police Officers’, *NYT*, 22 June 2015.