Institutions and managerial task allocation: evidence from Chinese entrepreneurs

Guo, Di and Jiang, Kun and Xu, Chenggang (2017) Institutions and managerial task allocation: evidence from Chinese entrepreneurs. Journal of Human Capital, 11 (3). pp. 397-422. ISSN 1932-8664

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Abstract

This study presents theoretical and empirical analyses of the time allocation of entrepreneurs as a response to weak property rights protection. Using a nationwide random-sample survey of more than 3,000 entrepreneurs in over 100 cities in China, we find that entrepreneurs, responding to the violation of property rights, spend large proportions of their working time on lobbying activities to protect their businesses at a cost to management time. Moreover, the sensitivity of lobbying time to property rights protection is reduced if the entrepreneur is politically connected or if the firm is larger or older.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: institution, property rights, entrepreneurship, time allocation, Chinese economy
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Social Sciences > Nottingham University Business School
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1086/692844
Depositing User: Eprints, Support
Date Deposited: 27 Feb 2018 13:59
Last Modified: 27 Feb 2018 14:06
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/50060

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