Systemic risk and the optimal seniority structure of banking liabilities

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Bougheas, Spiros and Kirman, Alan (2018) Systemic risk and the optimal seniority structure of banking liabilities. International Journal of Finance and Economics, 23 (1). pp. 47-54. ISSN 1099-1158

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Abstract

The paper argues that systemic risk must be taken into account when designing optimal bankruptcy procedures in general, and priority rules in particular. Allowing for endogenous formation of links in the interbank market we show that the optimal policy depends on the distribution of shocks and the severity of fire sales.

Item Type: Article
RIS ID: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/905832
Additional Information: This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Bougheas S, Kirman A. Systemic risk and the optimal seniority structure of banking liabilities. Int J Fin Econ. 2018;23:47–54. https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.1602, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ijfe.1602/abstract. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
Keywords: Banks; Priority rules; Systemic Risk
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.1602
Depositing User: Eprints, Support
Date Deposited: 13 Dec 2017 15:16
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 19:27
URI: https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/48726

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