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***Programming China:
The Communist Party's Autonomic Approach
to Managing State Security***

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*Programming China:
The Communist Party's Autonomic Approach to Managing State Security*

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Programming China: The Communist Party's Autonomic Approach to Managing State Security, introduces the new analytical framework called China's "Autonomic Nervous System" (ANS). The ANS framework applies complex systems management theory to explain the process the Chinese Communist Party calls "social management". Through the social management process, the Party-state leadership interacts with both the Party masses and non-Party masses. The process involves shaping, managing and responding and is aimed at ensuring the People's Republic of China's systemic stability and legitimacy—i.e. (Party-) state security. Using the ANS framework, this thesis brings cohesion to a complex set of concepts such as "holistic" state security, grid management, social credit and national defence mobilisation. Research carried out for the thesis included integrated archival research and the author's database of nearly 10,000 social unrest events. Through ANS, the author demonstrates that in the case of the People's Republic of China we may be witnessing a sideways development, where authoritarianism is stabilised, largely through a way of thinking that both embodies and applies complex systems management and attempts to "automate" that process through technology designed based on the same concepts. The party's rule of China, thus, evolves away from traditional political scales like reform versus retrenchment or hard versus soft authoritarianism. The ANS framework should be seen not as an incremental improvement to current research of China's political system but as a fundamentally different approach to researching and analysing the nature of Chinese politics.

Preface I

‘I can no other answer make but thanks, and thanks, and ever thanks.’

—William Shakespeare

In 2010, I entered the University of Oxford to undertake an MSc in Modern Chinese Studies with the objective of writing my dissertation on China’s energy security policy in Central Asia. I noticed academic discussion on China’s investment in Central Asian energy projects was limited, even though the investment was seemingly notable enough to merit attention. I expected the research to provide insight into the thinking driving Chinese foreign policy decisions. My research took an unexpected turn during the first term. A course I took, “The Politics and Government of a Major State: The People’s Republic of China” with Professor Vivienne Shue, and a suggestion from my then MSc supervisor and now PhD supervisor, Professor Steve Tsang to “look into the United Front”, led me to approach understanding Chinese foreign policy in a way that was more inclusive of domestic politics than I anticipated. It seemed obvious that domestic politics influenced foreign policy agendas, but I did not yet understand the Chinese Communist Party’s conceptual overlap between internal and external security policy. My MSc thesis, which earned a distinction, found that China’s investment in Central Asian energy projects, was also driven by the Party-state’s attempts to stabilise its volatile western border region. I do not know if I would draw the same conclusions today. In retrospect, however, I realise the findings of this research were the clear basis from which my PhD concept evolved.

The phrase “social management” (社会管理) served as the starting point for this PhD. My first encounter with the phrase was during an internship at the Jamestown Foundation’s *China Brief* in 2011, then under Peter Mattis’s editorship. About a year later Peter commissioned my first article on the topic, “Portents of Change in China’s Social Management”.¹ We both wrote on social management that summer, noting changes in the way social management was being discussed ahead of the 18th Party Congress.² Another motive for writing the *China Brief* article was my work for the company now known as IHS-Markit, which included developing a database of social unrest events in China. The initial questions in my PhD proposal came from this combined work.

¹ Samantha Hoffman, "Portents of Change in China’s Social Management," *China Brief* 12, no. 15 (2012).

² Peter Mattis, "Resolving Contradictions in Social Management," *China Brief* 12, no. 18 (2012); Peter Mattis, "In a Fortnight: Central Party School’s Critiques Suggest New Leadership Dynamics," *China Brief* XII, no. 12 (2012).

I have many people to thank, not only for their support during the process of this PhD but also for shaping me into the person I am today. There are several people I would like to single out.

Firstly, I would like to thank my excellent supervision team: Professor Steve Tsang and Dr Andreas Fulda. I was fortunate going into the PhD to have already worked with Professor Tsang at Oxford. I thank him for supporting my interest in pursuing my PhD. Within the first few weeks of my program, I was fortunate to add Dr Fulda to my supervision team. His encouragement and lead kept me on task even when the going got rough. Meetings with Professor Tsang and Dr Fulda promised lively conversations that offered unique perspectives on research and ultimately enhanced the quality of my work. Our talks always helped me refocus on the discoveries I was making and confirm the next direction I needed to explore. On short notice, I could always count on their availability and sincere interest. Their unwavering support has been key to my success. Thank you also to the University of Nottingham for the Vice Chancellor's Scholarship for Research Excellence, which funded my PhD.

It is truly impossible for me to thank Peter Mattis enough for the support he has given me, first as my supervisor during the aforementioned internship at *China Brief* in 2011, and now a friend and collaborator. Peter has mentored me and helped me become a more skilled analyst, writer and researcher. He also helped me become confident in the perspective I have to offer as a researcher. Peter was always someone I could count on when I needed to test ideas or talk about my research. He read and commented on my drafts. Peter and I have also worked together in researching the Central State Security Commission. My original research around the CSSC and state security, particularly in Chapters Three and Five partly stemmed from our conversations. We published three articles together on the topic. The first two came after we met in Cambridge a few days after the Central State Security Commission was announced in November 2013. We were both about 75% finished with articles on the subject, which were both focused on the social management context of the announcement. So, we swapped papers and published them jointly in *The National Interest* and the *China Policy Institute Blog*. We wrote a follow-up article in *War on the Rocks* in July 2016. I am immensely grateful for this collaboration and friendship.

Most sincere thanks to Nigel Inkster, who I have researched for at the International Institute for Strategic Studies since November 2012. I am extremely grateful for the opportunity to work for Nigel over the past five years, and for the insights he has given me based on his years of experience. There were occasions when he managed to reignite my interest in this research at exactly the right moments. The conversations we had expanded my thoughts on China and led me down new paths of discovery. The research I have done for Nigel and IISS directly contributed to this project—at some point I realised that the research I was doing on social management was more directly connected to military and defence-focused research. Nigel also visited Nottingham for a joint talk with me in December of 2016 on "China's Cyber Power", and chaired an event at IISS for Peter Mattis and I in April 2017, and I am thankful for these opportunities. I would also like to thank my IISS colleague Harriet Ellis for pulling a lot of extra weight on the *Cyber Report* over the past two months so I could finish this project.

Thank you to Professor Rachel Murphy at Oxford, who supervised my MSc dissertation in the final term and with whom I have remained in contact. Her advice and insight has been of true value. A special professor from my time as an undergraduate at Florida State University, Dr. Lee Kendall Metcalf, deserves my sincere thanks. She supervised an independent research course I took while interning in the UK Parliament in 2009, and was a member of my undergraduate thesis committee. She inspired me to seek a PhD. There are many educators to thank, I wish I could name them all. From primary school through to the present day, I have been fortunate to have a dedicated group of teachers and am thankful for all their lessons and encouragement. They are all part of the successful and exciting path that has taken me to the place I am today.

On a more personal note, thank you to my wonderful family. My dad, mom, and twin brother, who have always loved and supported me since day one, and who have always been there for me for all of my ups and downs. Thank you to my grandparents, who are no longer here physically, but who are still with me every day. My parents have always invested everything they could to provide my brother and I with the opportunities to succeed. I would like to say an extra special thank you to my mom, who has always encouraged me to write, and for proofreading every page of this PhD for me! I also want to thank my cousin Steve for always setting the example that hard work and determination pays off, especially when you love what you are doing. Quite simply, I would not be who I am today without them. This PhD is dedicated to them for all they have done for me.

Thank you to my friends Kitsch Liao and Michal Thim for their unwavering support as I completed this project, for reading and commenting on my drafts, and for helping me stay calm as my deadline neared. Thank you to my dear friend Dr Gareth Shaw, not only for being an amazing person, but also for printing and submitting this for me in my absence!

Finally, I would also like to thank a very special group of friends: Bindu and Luke and family, Anja Chong, Johanna Barry, Joyce de Thouars, Mara Tchalakov, Mike Mavros, Rachel Coad, Rebekah Everett, as well as all of my short track speed skating friends.

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List of Abbreviations I

ANS	Autonomic Nervous System
CCCPC	Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
CCDI	Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection
CPLC	Central Political-Legal Committee
CSSC	Central State Security Commission
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CMC	Central Military Commission
MPS	Ministry of Public Security
MSS	Ministry of State Security
NPC	National People's Congress
PAFD	People's Armed Forces Department
PAP	People's Armed Police
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PSC	Politburo Standing Committee
SNDMC	State National Defence Mobilisation Committee
SSLSG	State Security Work Leading Small Groups

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Chapter One I

Introduction

Power is not a means; it is an end. One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes the revolution in order to establish the dictatorship. The object of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture. The object of power is power.

—George Orwell, 1984

In the introduction to *Under Western Eyes*, Joseph Conrad wrote, “These people are unable to see that all they can effect is merely a change of names. The oppressors and the oppressed are all Russians together; and the world is brought once more face to face with the truth of saying that the tiger cannot change his stripes nor the leopard his spots.”¹ Conrad’s statement was provocatively anti-Russian. Yet, the basic idea he communicated can easily be transferred to understand a key predicament of any victorious revolutionary party: Ultimately it may not be materially any different than the suppressor it overthrew. The same tactics the revolutionary party used to overcome a suppressor and seize power can ultimately be used against it, especially if it only becomes the new suppressor. If the revolutionary party’s objective is to maintain a monopoly on power by any means, then the revolution must not end lest it be replaced by another. The revolution must somehow become part of the system itself.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a revolutionary Party. The Party-state leadership’s primary objective is for the CCP to remain in power. Despite succeeding at this objective for 68 years, its fear of legitimacy loss is palpable. Building institutions from which to exercise power does not solve the CCP’s problem. Neither do economic development and nationalism. These are constituent parts of a larger strategy, but alone they do not ensure state security (国家安全), which is the objective that ensures power. The Party-state leadership must constantly ensure that crisis never reaches the point beyond its control. It must maintain a stable enough social and political order so when stability’s boundaries are tested, it can quickly return to a ‘status quo’ state of dynamic equilibrium. The Party-state leadership must constantly engage in a process of shaping, managing, and responding, of both the broad society and the Party itself. Finally, it must constantly pre-empt an integrated set of threats, both inside and outside the Party, and inside and outside the state’s physical borders. This objective of ensuring state security requires a complex systems management process, which is designed to handle

¹ Joseph Conrad, Edward Garnett, and David Garnett, *Conrad's prefaces to his works* (New York,: Haskell House, 1971), 126.

always changing dynamics. The CCP refers to its version of the complex systems management process as “social management” (社会管理). Social management is specifically directed at pre-emptively ensuring state security.

Phrases like “social management”, and the more recent version of the same concept “social governance”, may seem like pseudo-scientific jargon, but China’s top leaders give it clear importance. In September 2017, General Party Secretary Xi Jinping highlighted the concept when he called for: “a more systematic and innovative social governance, stressing the need to improve the capability to predict and prevent security risks.”² Similarly, in 1995, Jiang Zemin said: “...[We must] accelerate realising the informatisation, automation and intelligent-isation of economic and social management.”³ Far from being a narrow, isolated political rhetoric, “social management” gives cohesion to an array of concepts ranging from Hu Jintao’s signature “Scientific Development” to Xi Jinping’s push for military-civil integration, as part of the CCP’s broader power maintenance process.⁴

The Party has also clearly explained that it sees innovating social management as its blueprint for maintaining power. In fact, it can be said that social management is a process that programmes state security. Social management was elevated as a key concept in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011). The plan called for innovating the social management system through the construction of a robust social management structure and innovation of the social management mechanism.⁵ The concept was hardly new in 2011, and in its current conceptual form can mostly be traced back to the Mao era, and in its current functional design to the beginning of the reform era in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As an ideal, social management has always described a process that integrates co-option and coercion in order to function. Understanding the process, which is very wide in scope, requires fully accepting and applying to analysis the paradoxical unity found in the Party-state leadership’s way of thinking.

Programming China: The Communist Party’s Autonomic Approach to Managing State Security, introduces a new analytical framework called China’s “Autonomic Nervous System” (ANS). China’s ANS is a concept, adapted from a computing technology framework. Conceptually, ANS describes how the Party’s Leninist framework continues to influence every aspect of its political system design. ANS goes further to explain how this way of thinking has a natural resonance with complex systems management theories, which are not only applied as concepts informing political system design, but are also directly behind the technologies used to automate the social management process. Through ANS, it is demonstrated that in the case of the People’s Republic of China we may be witnessing a sideways development, where authoritarianism is

² Yan Zhang. "Security Innovation Seen as Crucial." *China Daily*, 20 September 2017. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-09/20/content_32225951.htm.

³ “江泽民同志在全国科学技术大会上的讲话（1995年5月26日）(Comrade Jiang Zemin's Speech at the National Science and Technology Conference (26 May 1995))”, *The People's Daily*, 5 June 1995.

⁴ This, a few other lines, and all of the concepts from my recent China Brief article re-appear in similar and occasionally exact form throughout the PhD. The article was a brief overview of some of the ideas presented in this thesis: Samantha Hoffman, "Managing the State: Social Credit, Surveillance and the CCP's Plan for China," *China Brief* 17, no. 11 (2017).

⁵ ““十二五”规划纲要 (Outline of the 12th Five Year Plan).” 16 March 2011.

stabilised, largely through a way of thinking that both embodies and applies complex systems management and attempts to “automate” that process through technology designed based on the same concepts. The party's rule of China, thus, evolves away from traditional political scales like reform versus retrenchment or hard versus soft authoritarianism.

China's ANS is an effective analytical framework because it offers a model for bringing cohesion to a range of concepts and practices in the CCP, particularly because it combines both the holistic and reductionist approach found in the Party's way of thinking. Thus, it can handle paradox in a way existing analytical frameworks cannot. The thesis applies the ANS framework to explain the social management process that ensures state security. The thesis brings cohesion to a complex set of concepts such as: “holistic” state security, grid management, social credit and national defence mobilisation. The ANS framework should be seen not as an incremental improvement to current research of China's political system but as a fundamentally different approach to researching and analysing the nature of Chinese politics.

[1.1] Literature Review

Adaptation and Authoritarianism

This PhD partially drew from adaptive authoritarian literature, but also found limitations in the way of thinking informing this literature. The strength of adaptive authoritarian models is their capacity to explain the degree of flexibility required for the Party to achieve its power maintenance objective. One of the problems with adaptive authoritarian literature, however, is that it has not changed the binary view of China's future, i.e. the authoritarianism vs liberal democracy dichotomy. This thesis advances the claim that we may be witnessing a sideways development, where authoritarianism is stabilised, largely through technology, and takes on a new form which defies conventional categories such as totalitarianism or hard versus soft authoritarianism.

Leninism matters, and because Leninism matters its key features must be pulled the entire way through analysis, not simply acknowledged. This is why the adaptive model that was most influential in this project was Steve Tsang's “Consultative Leninism”. I make this case not because Steve Tsang is one of my supervisors, but rather because of all of the “adaptive” models—it is the one that most successfully incorporates the Party's Leninist way of thinking. Consultative Leninism identified five key characteristics. My research initially drew from points one, two and three, these are: (1) The Communist Party's primary objective is to remain in power. Maintaining stability and pre-emptively eliminating threats are key; (2) The Party must reform the way it governs, both within the Party and the state apparatus, in order to pre-emptively eliminate social demands for Western-style democratisation; (3) the Party is committed to “elicit, respond to and direct changing public opinion”.⁶ These are all elements found in China's ANS. Most important is the emphasis on a “pre-emptive” elimination

⁶ Steve Tsang, “Consultative Leninism: China's new political framework,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 18, no. 62 (2009): 865-66.

of threats—which can be described as the key feature tying together “social management” and “state security”.

One critical drawback of adaptive authoritarianism as an analytical framework, and its predecessors, is the failure to account for paradox. Usually researchers look for evidence of “hard” or “soft” authoritarianism, as if the two were mutually exclusive. Yet, as this research argues, often co-option and coercion co-exist as part of the same framework. For instance, Richard Baum, included e-government websites used for “public dissemination of administrative information and solicitation of public feedback on government performance” as one of several examples of the development of “soft authoritarianism”, but as Chapter Six demonstrates, the purpose of e-government in China has always been different, and it is equally a development designed to enable “soft” and “hard” authoritarianism, through exactly the same processes.⁷ Coercion is not turned off to allow for co-option, instead the two operate together in unison. It is the same fundamental problem in literature like David Shambaugh’s *China’s Future* which described four “possible pathways” for the CCP to take: ‘neo-totalitarianism’, ‘hard authoritarianism’, ‘soft-authoritarianism’ and ‘semi-democracy’.⁸ The problems in existing analytical frameworks point back to the first binary view of China’s future, (i.e. the authoritarianism vs liberal democracy dichotomy). The CCP has always been explicit that it does not intend to liberalise politically.

Of course, there are notable exceptions, which do acknowledge paradox. Elizabeth Perry’s paper “Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?”, rejected the claim that China’s revolutionary tradition was “fading”, and argued instead that “One might argue instead that China’s stunning economic strides in the reform era can only be understood against the background of a revolutionary history that remains highly salient in many respects.”⁹ In a sense, the Party’s objectives and tactics have not fundamentally changed since 1978. Instead, the same underlying tactics have been substantially refined and broadened. What is interesting on the society-response side of the question is the tactics protesters use, and on the state-response side, how this affects the Party-state’s strategy. When Mao-style mass campaigns ended, they were eventually replaced with new versions of the same concepts and tactics. Anne Marie Brady and Elizabeth Perry have both pointed to the continued relevance of mass mobilisation tactics.¹⁰

Both co-option and coercion are constantly in motion, and constantly acting together as a dual force. The Chinese political system is Leninist, so co-option, although it may appear to indicate elements of liberalisation, always supports the same power-maintenance objectives that coercion supports. Their clear visibility ebbs and flows, their constant presence does not. This feature can be traced to the Mao-era, when mass campaigns were the main tactic employed for power maintenance. Frederick Teiwes

⁷ Richard Baum, "The Limits of Consultative Leninism," *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: Asia Program Special Report*, no. 131 (2006).

⁸ David L. Shambaugh, *China's Future* (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2016), 1-6.

⁹ Elizabeth J. Perry, "Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?," *The China Journal* 57 (2007).

¹⁰ Anne-Marie Brady, *Marketing dictatorship : propaganda and thought work in contemporary China*, Asia/Pacific/perspectives (Lanham, Md. ; Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); Elizabeth Perry, "Moving the Masses: Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 7, no. 2 (2002).

argued that in the reform era, Deng Xiaoping, instead of seeing reform policies as fundamentally new, would have seen reform politics as a return to the political style prior to 1958.¹¹ That period was still marked by coercive authoritarianism. Through these campaigns, social control was largely maintained via tactics best described as state terror. Julia Strauss said in the early 1950s, political campaigns, “concentrated minds around the modus operandi of the new government: paternalist care for those whom it deemed to be within the realm of revolutionary society, terror unleashed against those beyond the pale of revolutionary society, and the coercive power to make both stick.”¹²

Adaptive authoritarian literature focused on elite politics correctly grasps that the CCP is capable of adaptation, but points to the period after Tiananmen massacre in 1989 as the starting point.¹³ The main conceptual problem with all adaptive authoritarian literature is that “authoritarian” has never precluded “adaptive”. Leninism goes a long way to explain how China’s political system works theoretically, because its organisational principles stress the Mass Line and Democratic Centralism. The idea that the vanguard Party leads the masses into prosperity inherently describes the requirement that the Party-state leadership have the capacity to engage in a process of shaping, managing and responding, in order to acquire and maintain power. In this sense, Leninism is inherently adaptable. In the Leninist framework, the practice of adaptability requires both co-option and coercion, even if co-option sits within the coercive frame. The cooperative elements of regime preservation and legitimisation often highlighted in “consultative” or “adaptive” authoritarian models stand out largely because they have been refined since the late 1970s. Such adaptation is not often the reflection of a fundamental structural change. In fact, it can be said that in general literature on Chinese politics tends to undermine continuity in search of change. Adaptive authoritarian literature is perhaps just susceptible to the trend, because by default of its design, it locates change where there is continuity.

Another issue is that by nature, adaptation cannot be unified across China, how it works will depend heavily on local, issue and time-specific conditions. Even though elements of China’s economic reform have required decentralisation, however, there is also an element of centralisation, and processes. For instance, Sebastian Heilmann, has shown in research on China’s experimental governance, there is a “pattern of experimental governance that we find in China’s party-state, experimentation under hierarchy, has distinctive foundations and is not identical with what is treated conventionally under sweeping headings such as decentralization or federalism.”¹⁴ The puzzle is that the CCP must identify how to effectively respond to society, and constantly adapt and engage in a process of governance that is flexible enough to respond to what is happening on the ground.¹⁵

¹¹ Frederick C. Teiwes, *Politics and purges in China : rectification and the decline of party norms, 1950-1965*, 2nd ed ed. (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 1.

¹² Julia C. Strauss, "Paternalist Terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the People's Republic of China, 1950-1953," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44, no. 1 (2002): 81.

¹³ David L. Shambaugh, *China's Communist Party : Atrophy and Adaptation* (Washington, D.C.; Berkeley: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; University of California Press, 2008), 2; Andrew J. Nathan, "China's Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 1 (2003): 6.

¹⁴ Sebastian Heilmann, "From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China's Distinctive Policy Process," *The China Journal*, no. 59 (2008): 5.

¹⁵ Tsang, "Consultative Leninism: China's new political framework."

Social Management

“Social management” (社会管理) and “social governance” (社会治理) are two terms that have the same implication in practice. From this point onward, unless translating a quote exactly or otherwise indicated, the term “social management” is always used. There is a clear political explanation for the shift from “social management” to “social governance” around the 18th Party Congress. The introductions to Chapters Five and Six briefly discuss the subject. The most basic definition of the concept of social management is that it is linked to the CCP’s effort to ensure a level of stability that will guarantee its political legitimacy, and therefore state security. Most literature engaging the phrase would agree on this point, yet this point falls short of defining the concept and contextualising the concept. The two key pieces that directly and specifically engage the concept of social management were written by Frank Pieke and Joseph Fewsmith. Both pick up on and address some key features of social management. For instance, Pieke noted that the CCP has retained its core Leninist principles, which is reflected in social management, and Fewsmith drew attention to the “mechanism” language associated with social management.¹⁶ Yet, both implicitly suggest that social management is more of a tactic or a single policy mechanism, rather than being a broader and central part of the political system. This PhD contends, social management should be understood as a process. This process explains how and why the Party sees innovating social management as its blueprint for maintaining power.

One issue, as the previous sub-section discussed, is the framing of issues like social management in binary terms: liberalisation vs authoritarianism. As this thesis argues, there should be no uncertainty that “social management” is directly derived from Leninism and is an authoritarian process aimed at ensuring the security of the Communist Party-led state. This binary framing is problematic, however, because it leads to an inability to identify and explain paradoxes found in social management. For instance, Joseph Fewsmith noted that although many early efforts to define social management stressed aspects of citizen participation and democratic rights, “strengthening police work will inevitably play a central role.”¹⁷ He later wrote: “The new emphasis on social management suggests that the CCP sees a need to address social issues through a combination of better services and stronger police work rather than through political reform.”¹⁸ Fewsmith, meanwhile, focused on Hu Jintao’s 2010 call for “establishing a mechanism, led by the party and government, that would protect the interests of the masses, as citizens of China” and strengthen and innovate social management. Adding, “Since then, there has been repeated and heightened emphasis on social management by Chinese leaders and in the Chinese media.”¹⁹ Social management is both a social control process, in the coercive sense, and a process to improve the delivery of public services, and cooperative construction of the Party’s

¹⁶ F. N. Pieke, “The Communist Party and social management in China,” *China Information* 26, no. 2 (2012): 150; Joseph Fewsmith, ““Social Management” as a Way of Coping With Heightened Social Tensions,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 36 (2012): 1.

¹⁷ Fewsmith, ““Social Management” as a Way of Coping With Heightened Social Tensions.”

¹⁸ Joseph Fewsmith, *The logic and limits of political reform in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 177.

¹⁹ Fewsmith, ““Social Management” as a Way of Coping With Heightened Social Tensions,” 1.

relationship with “society”. It is not one or the other at a various point in time, rather, has always been both acting together in unison.

A second key issue is that most discussion on social management implicitly accepts the timeline Frank Pieke put forward in his article “The Communist Party and Social Management in China”, which is that the term social management first appeared in official dialogue around 1999 and this stemmed from public management and public administration literature of the 1990s and early 2000s.²⁰ He added: “The term social management itself dates from 1998 as one of the three basic functions of government,” and “Jiang Zemin’s final report as CCP general secretary to the 16th Party Congress in 2002 as more narrowly an aspect of maintaining public order.”²¹ This research found that the accurate origin of the term, which is highly consistent with the current meaning of the concept, is at the very latest 1949. Meanwhile, the current version of the social management as a functional process, i.e. the complex systems management process ANS describes, can be traced to the late 1970s and early 1980s, a concept Chapter Four will introduce in greater detail.

Additionally, Pieke’s main argument is that social management represents a corporatist re-engineering of society. A strand of literature on how the Party has ‘adapted’ is focused on corporatism. In the earliest piece on this topic, Chan and Unger use corporatism “a mechanism through which the state’s grip could be loosened,” to explain that the Party was developing a system that “dominates partly through surrogates,” and to claim the Party-state could not “be classified as a ‘Leninist command’.”²² Their suggestion, and the suggestion of corporatism in general clashes with the nature of the CCP-led system. As researchers have importantly pointed to developments, the Party has developed new ways to assert itself in society. For instance, Patricia Thornton described the development of Party-organised Non-governmental organisations, describing the re-insertion of the Party into grassroots social organisation.²³ Such findings demonstrate that corporatism is an inherently flawed framework.

This PhD, in framing the concept of social management through the analytical framework of the Autonomic Nervous System, rejects the Self-Governance concept autonomy and corporatism imply. Instead, it focuses on the Self-Managing concept, which Autonomic implies. Autonomic can lead to autonomy, but this is explicitly not the CCP’s objective, which is a clear underlying point in all of the following chapters. As Bruce Dickson pointed out, “before societal corporatism replaces Leninism as the defining feature of China’s political system, the party would have to abandon its monopoly on political organization. This is a fundamental change that the CCP has steadfastly opposed.”²⁴

²⁰ Pieke, “The Communist Party and social management in China.”

²¹ Ibid. 155.

²² Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, “China, Corporatism and the East Asian Model” *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 33 (1995).

²³ Patricia Thornton, “The Advance of the Party: Transformation or Takeover of Urban Grassroots Society?,” *The China Quarterly* 213 (2013).

²⁴ Bruce J. Dickson, *Red capitalists in China: the party, private entrepreneurs, and prospects for political change*, Cambridge modern China series (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 69.

Another important strand of literature related to social management is social unrest literature. As Chapter Two will describe, although it is only briefly used in the final version of this PhD, I collected nearly 10,000 social unrest events for a database over a five-year period. One of the major unanswered questions that data shone a light on was that protest response can vary dramatically, between rural and urban China, by event type, by date of occurrence, and by whether it is an ongoing or single event. Much of the protest literature was not very directly related to the research objectives of this project from the outset, because while it describes protest tactics, and response to particular incidents, nothing really describes how protest is managed as a whole. One exception, in *Popular Protest in China*, Yongshun Cai's piece looked at the effectiveness of disruptive action when the state intervenes. Cai's piece included findings from a study on the rationale behind intervention, using analysis of 74 cases of contentious unrest. Part of his conclusion was that "a combination of many participants and the use of disruptive tactics generate serious pressure on local officials because it tends to (or threatens to) trigger intervention for above. Disruptive acts, especially violence, mounted only by a small number of participants are much more likely to be repressed or ignored."²⁵

Finally, one piece that is directly related to the social management topic is Yuhua Wang and Carl Minzer's "Rise of the Security State". While I locate change in slightly different places, and thus have a slightly different take on some developments, (see Chapter Five) their concept that "the response of the authoritarian Chinese regime to the "survival dilemma" goes beyond simply ratcheting up the use of coercion," and is inclusive of "remodelling internal bureaucratic organisation of the Party-state apparatus, incentivised local authorities to respond aggressively to citizen protests... and reworked the Party political-legal apparatus to address citizen grievances in a more flexible and coordinated manner," is important.²⁶ This finding certainly complements some of this PhD's findings.

[1.2] Structure

Chapter Two is on the dissertation's research methodology, and introduces some of the theoretical issues that informed the development of China's Autonomic Nervous System. Chapter Three "Placing State Security within Social Management" provides a systematic overview of Chinese threat perceptions, and it defines the concept of "holistic state security" as it has developed over time. Chapter Four "Constructing an Autonomic Nervous System" defines the original analytical framework. Chapters Five through Eight, apply the framework through the "Four Self-"s of China's Autonomic Nervous System, "Self-configuring", "Self-healing" "Self-optimising" and "Self-protecting" through the ANS framework explain how ideas are connected to institutions and practice. Chapter Nine, the Conclusion, includes discussion on how the ANS framework can be applied in future.

²⁵ Yongshun Cai, "Disruptive Collective Action in China during the Reform Period," in *Popular Protest in China*, K. J. O'Brien (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 164.

²⁶ Yuhua Wang and Carl Minzer, "The Rise of the Chinese Security State," *The China Quarterly* 222 (2015): 340-41.

Chapter Two I

Research Methodology

‘The aim of science is to seek the simplest explanations of complex facts. We are apt to fall into the error of thinking that the facts are simple because simplicity is the goal of our quest. The guiding motto in the life of every natural philosopher should be, seek simplicity and distrust it.’
—Alfred North Whitehead

The prevailing adaptive authoritarianism-based analytical frameworks used to analyse the Chinese political system are limited in their capacity to explain how the Chinese political system functions. While they rightly take into account the concept of adaptation, they do not fully account for the complexities and paradoxes of the Chinese political system. The Party-state leadership may ‘adapt’, but it does so within a system characterised by complex power dynamics, which require non-linear and often contradictory responses. A related problem with existing analytical frameworks used for the study of Chinese politics is the tendency to approach China from either a holistic *or* a reductionist perspective, instead of from a perspective that accepts the (dialectical) unity of the two. These limitations are not found in the field of Chinese studies alone, but are rooted in the Cartesian tradition of empirical science. This tradition comes with a general discomfort with ambiguity and a desire to keep research questions limited in scope—often also confined to a particular field and sub-field. Without Cartesianism, empirical scientists see mass amounts of data as the being “bombarded by an entire universe of disparate, meaningless social facts that must be theoretically arranged and categorized.”¹ Bertell Ollman, whose innovations in the study of Marxism are applied in this thesis to explain the theoretical underpinnings of social management, offered a similar criticism. He wrote: “The existing breakdown of knowledge into mutually indifferent and often hostile academic disciplines, each with its own range of problematics and methods, has replaced the harmonious enlightenment we had been promised with a raucous cacophony of discordant sounds.”² Resolving these problems requires an analytical framework that can focus on the system as a whole, as well as its constituent parts.

¹ Robert A. Gorman, "Empirical Marxism," *History and Theory* 20, no. 4 (1981): 415.

² Bertell Ollman, *Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx's Method*, (University of Illinois Press, 2003), <https://www.nyu.edu/projects/ollman/books/dd.php>. Online copy, quote from: Chapter 1 "The Meaning of Dialectics", Section 2.

As Chapter One stated, Leninism matters.³ For as helpful as the Leninist description is in explaining the CCP's organisational principles, it alone can only provide a basic conceptual framework for understanding how the Chinese political system is designed. What is missing from this framework is a workable explanation for how the CCP's political system can engineer the capacity to respond to and manage the challenges of power-maintenance and governance. Describing these features requires recognition of how the CCP functions as a system that can bring into full range regularly occurring societal changes and stakeholder interactions. Another layer of complexity is added because the options for response to one source of change and interaction are often contradictory to the options for response to another. Without a framework that can accommodate these highly dynamic features of China's political process current research, by default of design, falls short of having the capacity to explain the Chinese political system. As such, many significant questions have been left unanswered, such as: Where do the Party's desire to maintain power, and the contestation for power within that system intersect? Similarly, how and where do the CCP's political system (structure) and political culture (internal politics, issues like factionalism) intersect? Or, how do we explain seemingly contradictory features of the Chinese political system?

Programming China: The Communist Party's Autonomic Approach to Managing State Security, introduces the new analytical framework called "China's Autonomic Nervous System" (ANS). This novel framework is adapted from computing technology research that applies the "Autonomic Nervous System" idea, which itself was adapted from biology. This PhD uses the computing example to explain the CCP's complex systems management process, because, like the computing example with hardware and software constantly interacting, China's ANS is something that must be constructed, and is not naturally occurring. Like Leninism, China's ANS describes the Party-state leadership's ideal system type. ANS goes further to explain how the Party's Leninist way of thinking has a natural resonance with complex systems management theories, which are not only applied as concepts informing political system design, but are also directly behind the technologies used to automate the social management process. China's ANS is an effective framework because it offers a model for bringing cohesion to a range of concepts and practices in the CCP. It integrates holistic and reductionist approaches found in the CCP's thinking and management style, and as such can handle paradox.

[2.1] Theoretical Challenges

This section reviews three key theoretical challenges in the study of Chinese politics, which have been integrated into the China's "Autonomic Nervous System" framework. These are: power, paradox and perspective. It explains the theoretical challenges, and how they are addressed in this thesis. The section also provides definitions for nebulous terms frequently used in this PhD (namely 'the Party leadership', 'the Party masses', and 'society').

³ Tsang, "Consultative Leninism: China's new political framework," 865-66.

Power

The concept that is directly tied to each of the topics discussed over the next several pages is power. Perhaps Richard Baum explained it best when he said of the CCP “Their ideology is an ideology of power and therefore a defence of power.”⁴ Or, as John Wilson Lewis wrote: “The basic leadership theory and operational procedures of the Chinese Communist Party are the principal parts of those dynamics, which at first sight appear to be simply systems of command, but in fact are designed to produce affirmative responses by the Chinese people and cadres to the goals of Chinese communist policy.”⁵ Indeed, the only way to understand the Communist Party and how it rules is through a framework based on power, but that framework is not simple.

Most studies of elite politics in China seem to adopt Weber’s concept of power, therefore, while power is recognised as a social relation, emphasis is generally placed on a narrow range of sources or dimensions of power.⁶ A Foucauldian concept of power is helpful, because it describes that power exists in every relationship. Foucault said: “In reality power means relations, a more-or-less organised, hierarchical, co-ordinated cluster of relations.”⁷ This, however, does not recognise the amount of tangible power the Party-state leadership possesses. It seems a combination of the two is more appropriate. Joel Migdal’s state-in-society concept, helps to overcome this problem. Migdal argued that commonly used Weberian governance frameworks assume states are: “stand-alone organizations with firm boundaries between it and other social forces,” and this leads to “inquiries that zero in on its makeup, into how it is constructed,”⁸ As an alternative to such state-centric approaches, Migdal proposed the “state-in-society” model, where the state is involved in a continuous process of “engagement with other social forces,” recognising the “mutual transformation of the state and other social groups, as well as the limitations of the state.”⁹ He argued that state and society “are not fixed entities” but rather “they both change structures, goals, constituencies, rules and social control in their process of interaction.”¹⁰

In discussing how the CCP remains in power, a top-down approach is not enough. Nor is a bottom-up approach. There are three critical power relationships that should be taken into consideration: [1] the Communist Party’s position in power over the Chinese state, that is the broad power dynamic of the Party over the broad masses (Party and non-Party); [2] the relationship between the Party masses (or rank-and-file) and non-Party masses (or society); and [3] the Party’s management of power within itself.

⁴ Richard McGregor, *The party : the secret world of China's communist rulers* (London: Allen Lane, 2010), XVII.

⁵ John Wilson Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963).

⁶ Max Weber, *On charisma and institution building : selected papers*, ed. S.N. Eisenstadt (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

⁷ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977* ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, et al. (New York Pantheon Books, 1980), 198.

⁸ Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 113.

⁹ *Ibid.* 250.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 57.

This simplification still does not capture important dynamics. The leadership is not precisely uniform, nor is society. As [3] indicated, there are power dynamics within the Party itself. This must be resolved conceptually when explaining the Party's overall power.¹¹ Generally the power dynamics within the Party-state leadership take place within the framework of the Party's power above all else, and political dynamics that sit within it (which, I am hesitant to call factions). The issue reflects the intersection between individual contestation for power and the Party's overall power.

While the Party leadership's interests are fairly straightforward, the masses' interests are more ambiguous. Unlike the Party leadership, the masses are not a single unit and its goals are ill defined. Also, "society" presents its own problems as a concept. The Party, with its 85 million members, is also a major part of society.¹² Even if the Party is removed from society, there would still be great diversity.

Nevertheless, some simplification is required. When this PhD refers to "the Party leadership" or the "Party-state leadership" it is referring to the Politburo level and above. When it refers to the "Party masses", it is referring to officials (Party and state) below the Politburo level. When it refers to the "non-Party masses" or "masses" or "society", it is referring to everyone else. The issue of dynamics is addressed inherently in the ANS framework, which accounts for the need to deal with these issues.

Paradox

As the Literature Review in Chapter One addressed, handling paradox is a problem in Chinese studies. Broadly, this criticism refers to researchers' (collective) inability to rationalise signs of "soft" authoritarianism, "liberalisation" or "civil society" against signs of "hard" authoritarianism, and vice versa. More specifically, it could be referring to paradoxical policy choices. This could be decentralisation and centralisation together. It could be response to unrest. For example, a land protest in rural China is likely to be met with extreme and even deadly use of force. A larger environmental protest in urban China may result in some violent clashes and arrests, but not with the same intensity as land protest. These specific questions are dealt with in the main body of the PhD, and inherently within the ANS framework.

Writing on a theme linked to this problem in December 1976, David Bonavia who was then a correspondent at the *Far Eastern Economic Review* wrote:

Western observers of China – and I do not except myself – have all too often dropped their standards of intellectual enquiry, in response to overwhelming hospitality and good organization on the part of their hosts, historical guilt feelings, and a kind of subtle brainwashing that seems to afflict nearly every foreigner in his first few months in China. Add to that the almost total lack of access to information discreditable to China, and the naive assumptions of many foreigners living in or visiting the mainland are easy enough to understand. Those who wrote "negatively" about China in the fifties and sixties are partly responsible for the fact that in the early seventies an over-rosy picture

¹¹ For a good case study, see: Joseph Fewsmith, "China's Political Ecology and the Fight against Corruption," *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 46 (2015).

¹² "China's Communist Party membership exceeds 85 million," Xinhua, 2013.

has been propagated. People arriving in China expected an oppressive, gloomy atmosphere, and were astonished to see the widespread cheerfulness of the people and hear officials discuss certain questions in a reasonably open-minded way. It is only after longer experience of officialdom in China that one realizes the extent of the untruthfulness to which one is subjected, and the futility of attempting to challenge it directly.¹³

Over forty years since the text was published, and it cannot be said that the general problem outlined has disappeared. It seems a major contributing factor is the binary thinking discussed in the literature review. Broadly speaking, this problem manifests itself an inability to move past personal projections onto China what one wants for its future. Scholars who view progress through modernisation theories assume that the country's economic liberalisation will eventually lead to democracy. Yet, China is exhibiting that this is not the case. Additionally, contrary to the idea that the Party simply moves forward by testing the waters, the Party has actively worked to design a system to prevent power loss (as Chapters Six and Seven demonstrate, the same tools used for economic development and modernisation are also used for social control). Scholars focused on authoritarianism, meanwhile, often locate change in the wrong places, and, in rejecting the nature of some findings from the opposite perspective, also miss key developments.

China's ANS takes into account that the CCP is constructing a system of governance to fit its own strategic objectives. It requires that the Party's way of thinking is understood, and fully applied to analysis on how the Party is constructing a political system based on its own way of thinking. This does not mean accepting that way of thinking, nor does it mean taking the Party's language completely at face value. Rather, it is accepting that the Party has the capacity to design a sophisticated management system, and actively uses that capacity.

Perspective

The CCP often adds the caveat “—with Chinese characteristics” to its statements on policy, which is linked to an intentional effort to make itself inseparable from the concepts of “China” and what it means to be “Chinese”. It is indicative of how, under the People's Republic, the CCP cannot be separated from the Chinese state. The caveat “—with Chinese characteristics” reminds us that the Party deploys language with specific intent to define and advance its agenda.

Western analysts are often inclined to mirror western concepts with the CCP's language, and this is a particular fault when it comes to understanding security, domestic politics and foreign relations in China. In fact, separating these three fields is a mistake because the Communist Party's concept of the issues within these fields of study is heavily intertwined. As this PhD will discuss specifically, phrases such as “state security” (国家安全, not “national” security), “civil military integration” (军民融合) or “national defence mobilisation” (国防动员) are based on nuanced CCP-constructed

¹³ Arne Sovik, David Bonavia, Donald E. MacInnis, Frank N. Trager, Carol H. Ammons, Leonard R. Sussman, Arnulf Baring, and Paul H. Strege, "Reader's Response I: What We Know About China and How We Know It," *Worldview* 19, no. 12 (1976): 38.

concepts. They have similarity to a mirrored concept, assumed based on a literal English translation, but also have a stronger conceptual relationship to “social management” (社会管理) than the literal translation would suggest.

One of the most tangible places where China can be seen as using the same words yet speaking a different language is with the concept of “sovereignty”, which is as much of an ideas space as it is a physical space.

On a similar topic, there seems to be a reluctance to use the CCP’s way of thinking to frame understanding of what the Party is saying. This has a particular impact on assessments of the Party-state’s threat perceptions. Perhaps it is a natural tendency because scholars working on this subject often do not actively seek not to add legitimacy to a system that is built on practices that include state-terror. In political discourse, the thought seems to be that acknowledging the threats the ‘enemy’ or ‘other side’ perceives would give those threats (often perceived as non-legitimate) credibility. Or, perhaps, taking an activist approach based on Charles Tilly’s research findings, many researchers avoid the issue simply because the state’s account is not deemed credible enough. Tilly equated governments to a racketeer, who “as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction”. He added: “Since governments themselves commonly simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate threats of external war and since the repressive and extractive activities of governments often constitute the largest current threats to the livelihoods of their own citizens, many governments operate in essentially the same ways as racketeers.”¹⁴ While there is truth to the assessment, which is useful for understanding processes of state-legitimation particularly when dealing with authoritarian regimes, the view is also incredibly simplistic, because it discounts a state’s (and its leader’s) subjective rationality. Whether or not the perception is “rational” to an outsider is not relevant. Rationality is subjective.

Moreover, whether “rational” or “irrational” the state acts on the threats it perceives. Writing on the issue of deterrence, Richard Ned Lebow said, “if leaders are driven less by the prospect of gain than they are by the fear of lost, deterrent policies can provoke the very behavior they are designed to forestall by intensifying the pressures on the challenger to act.”¹⁵ Similarly, Robert Jervis said, “...if the actor is committed to proceeding, even highly credible threats by the adversary are likely to be missed, misinterpreted or ignored.”¹⁶

The Party-state leadership, in its own view, has a legitimate reason for each threat it perceives, whether or not outsiders agree. Surely, a one-party state whose focus is on maintaining “power” is paranoid, but alone this makes its threat perceptions credible. Rights activists, can (and should) actively delegitimise these perceptions that are used to justify human rights violations. Analysts should not. The Party-state, exaggerated or

¹⁴ Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime ", ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), <http://globalization.qwriting.qc.cuny.edu/files/2010/09/warmaking3.pdf>. 171.

¹⁵ Richard Ned Lebow, "Deterrence: A Political and Psychological Critique," ed. Richard Ned Lebow, vol. 4, *Richard Ned Lebow: Key Texts in Political Psychology and International Relations Theory* (London: Springer International Publishing, 2016).

¹⁶ Robert Jervis, *How statesmen think : the psychology of international politics* Kindle ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 30-31.

not, directly ties these threats to both policy and action. Analysing the threats the Party-state perceives or the language the Party-state uses does not endorse the Party-state's authoritarianism. It is quite simply exercise, using an emic approach, aimed at understanding what is said from the Party's perspective and why.

[2.2] An Inductive Approach

An objective of my original PhD proposal that remained constant was the goal to develop a more nuanced understanding of the Party's thinking, the methods it deploys and how this translates into policy and practice. My research pursued an inductive approach. The process led to the PhD's novel analytical framework, called China's "Autonomic Nervous System", or ANS, which was applied to understand China's social management process.

The problems I located in current research on Chinese politics indicated a new construct was needed to explain Chinese politics. This observation necessitated an inductive approach. My feeling was that the absence of an analytical framework that could truly account for the Chinese Communist Party's *way of thinking*, meant research was being unnecessarily limited in its capacity to explain the dynamics of the Chinese political system. The best explanation for decision is the belief that, in this particular case, reliance on existing constructs, "often amounts to sharpening the wrong tools for gaining bona fide understandings."¹⁷ Another justification for an inductive approach was my intent to understand the concepts "social management" and "social governance" required an inductive approach. To me, both were not abstract ideas. Analysing and understanding them would require an approach that could allow for a focus on dynamics that a top-down deductive approach could not honestly address.

This PhD is a qualitative research project. My resources, described in detail below, were online media based. Although my key sources are media-based, this research is not an analysis of public policy narratives or discourse. My intent was not to explain how the Party uses language, nor was it to explain the power of language itself in shaping policy. The intent was to understand the conceptual and actual implications of what was said around the broad social management and state security topics. The following subsections address four key aspects of this approach: logic, generalisability, use of data and theory.¹⁸

Logic

This PhD topic emerged from research I was already actively engaged with in a professional capacity. My existing research, beyond some direct inquiries on social management, was primarily focused on three areas: [1] Social unrest (as reported through social media) [2] Research on commercially relevant political and violent risk indicators and [3] Research on Chinese military and security policy, with an emphasis

¹⁷ Dennis A. Gioia, Kevin G. Corley, and Aimee L. Hamilton, "Seeking Qualitative Rigor in Inductive Research: Notes on the Gioia Methodology," *Organizational Research Methods* 16, no. 1 (2012): 15.

¹⁸ The organisation of this section is modelled after: John Dudovskiy. "Research Approach." <https://research-methodology.net/research-methodology/research-approach/>.

on cyber security. This work has included two key long-term contracts, one with a global business research provider, IHS, and one with a think-tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). For IHS, my work included producing tailored reports on political and violent risks that affect commercial assets, and collection of political and violent risk indicators. Most importantly, it included the development of a database on social unrest in China, described below. For IISS, I provided research support to the Future Conflicts and Cyber Security, and Defence and Military Analysis programs by monitoring Chinese media for policy relevant information on developments and thinking on China's defence and security policies and capabilities.

Before starting the PhD I had compiled a database of roughly 2,000 civil unrest events. When I stopped collection in late October/early November 2016, the database included roughly 10,000 incidents. Originally, I planned to select case studies from the data to demonstrate how social management process looked (I had permission from the company to use the dataset in my own research). I knew my PhD would become complex—but never imagined that the unrest data collection that I originally wanted to use for a significant portion of the PhD would become largely irrelevant in the final write-up. The data collection was social-media based. Information on protests specifically came from social media outlet *Weibo*, the blog Molihua.org, and the blog Wickedonna.tumblr.com (whose citizen journalist operators were arrested in 2015). The drawback of the dataset was its commercial relevance, meaning I had to write events in a very specific, limiting way. The benefits were that each event was mapped, so I could see geographical spread, and the database's search function was decent. As the person recording the events nearly every day for almost five years, it greatly enriched my understanding of popular contention in China. Without this data collection, I would not have asked many of the crucial questions that drove my research into new directions.

Other sources I regularly consulted before starting the PhD, and throughout the course of the project, included official documents such as: laws, defence white papers, official statements or speeches. This often focused on, but was not limited to, information from the Ministry of Public Security, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection, the State Council, and Ministry of National Defence. Most sources were national-level, not local-level outlets. For instance, I looked through nearly every issue of the *People's Liberation Army Daily*, and looked through media outlets like *The People's Daily*, *Seeking Truth*, *Red Flag*, *The Study Times*, *Xinhua* and *The Legal Daily*, each day.

My initial findings from this research was mostly a semi-unorganised set of thoughts on the Party's use of language. It seemed to me that while the Party's language is oblique and sometimes inaccessible, the more it is read the more it makes sense. Clarity might not be found in individual documents, but themes were clearly communicated. My early thinking on social management was that while it had been described in a way that implied social management was a tool, the actual concept was something that resembled a process or at least something that was all encompassing for a specific reason. I also assumed that social management as a process could help me to explain differing responses to protest, depending on issues like time, location and cause, which I found in collecting the unrest data.

Generalisability

Based on the inductive inferences drawn from the research prior to the start of my PhD, my initial PhD research questions were intentionally broad: What is social management? Does this concept provide answers to how and why the Chinese government appears to respond to different protest types in different ways? How might this explain Chinese politics?

At a very early stage, I had identified a link between the social management process and state security. I was not sure how to define the link, but noticed that it clearly existed. The basic objective was to providing a sound definition of the social management process, and state security. It is also about using the Party's language to understand its way of thinking.

Use of data

As the project progressed, I began to make use of the *People's Daily* archive and *People's Liberation Army Daily* archives, to have better information to supplement my analysis of the historical development of the concepts. My objective was to test whether trends I had noticed in existing data collection also correlated with two state media outlets, one representative of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, and the other of the Central Military Commission, combined the political and defence literature I was decided to draw from.

Initially I created spreadsheets to record data on every article on a particular topic, the date, author, and usage of the searched phrase. It became too time consuming and not very helpful as the project became wider in scope. I continued to record and save articles, but began to select a sample of several from each year covered in the search. If not many articles existed for a particular year, then I would record everything. If there were hundreds, then I would record or at least view a handful for each year represented (but varying some depending on the topic and how much it factored into the final project). The only variation might be if I noticed a particularly revealing series of articles, in this case I would read and record the entire series, but still select a representative sample for the rest of that calendar year.

Very quickly, as I looked through the archival data, I discovered how consistent some of the concepts were over a number of decades. This archival research fundamentally changed the direction of my project. At this point, protests ceased to be a focus. I began to research a wide range of sub-topics, and look for whether there was a connection between topics (like social management and state security). I kept the articles I viewed intentionally broad. In fact, often I would open many at a time to see the context in which the phrase of interest was used, in order to avoid selection bias.

The more I read, the more themes I identified. Broad concepts such as national defence mobilisation or threat perception became important, but I was also looking at specific concepts, like grid management, or perhaps it was the combination of certain phrases, such as "state security" and ideology, morality, trust, loyalty, and so on. I looked at

these as they developed over time chronologically, to identify changes in ways the terms or groups of terms were used. The searches were broad, and exhaustive.

On a related note, in the main text of the PhD, I often choose to quote articles that carried more “authority” than others. Articles signed, for instance, by a newspaper editorial board, or an official sitting on the CCP Central Committee, or for instance, a known leading Party theorist, technically carry more weight. As Miller and Godwin noted with the example of the People’s Liberation Army Daily, published by the PLA’s General Political Department, an “editorial” or “newspaper commentator article” would speak for the institution as a whole. They also noted that the *People’s Daily* is most authoritative because it speaks for the CCP Central Committee, so an article published by the paper’s editorial department would carry more substantial weight than one signed by an individual.¹⁹

However I also often quote articles whose authors I could not get much biographical data on if their article was representative of a clear theme or trend—the value of the exhaustive research I had conducted was in the accumulation of many pieces of consistent evidence over time, which were indicators of long-term or emerging themes.

I also kept my sources for government policy limited to state media, legislation, and Party and government websites. A 2016 Cyberspace Administration of China list provided a useful directory of state-approved websites that was also helpful in confirming the importance of the sources I intended to reference.²⁰

Other sources included the CNKI Database, and copies of books from Chinese publishers associated with, for instance, the Ministry of State Security. Informally I also engaged in conversations with practitioners and journalists.

With each exhaustive search, I began to draw more connections. The biggest initial conclusion was that so much academic literature had located change in places where there were actually continuities. Of course, at each junction I was also conducting background research into each of the themes and trends I was identifying, not only to see where my initial thinking fit into existing literature, but to provide more context around particular periods of time and events. One other area of research involved searching through local government websites for membership information on leading small groups and committees. The (tedious) process involved searching for information on membership, and often also searching biographical data for individuals, since usually both were not simply printed in a membership list. For each assertion, I make using this type of data, namely in Chapters Five and Eight, I can back up the claim with multiple examples more than are cited.

¹⁹ Paul H.B. Godwin and Alice L. Miller, "China's Forbearance Has Limits: Chinese Threat and Retaliation Signaling and Its Implications for a Sino-American Military Confrontation," in *China Strategic Perspectives* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2013), 29-37.

²⁰ Cyberspace Administration of China, "网信办公布最新互联网新闻信息稿源单位“白名单” (Cyberspace Administration Just Released the Latest [Approved] Internet News Information Sources, "The White List")," 9 August 2016.

Theory

As I was initially thinking about how to describe the findings I identified, there were a few theoretical points I kept in mind, other than the three listed in section 2.1, which were drawn from conflict resolution theory.

First, in authoritarian systems like China, the state is by nature both the conflict mediator and a key source of conflict. As it has been stressed above, for the CCP, there is only one acceptable outcome of any social conflict, which is that it remains in power. Without an institutionalized and neutral conflict mediation process, the potential for conflict to become explosive and destabilizing is much higher. It is not that the CCP is seeking to resolve conflict in a way that might compromise its authority. Rather, the ideas behind reducing the risk of destructive escalation of a conflict support the CCP in achieving its desired outcome.

A key question for the state looking to ensure its power is how does it implement social control, so that society responds in the way it wants it to? Even democracies are (consciously or not) operating on the assumption that conflict is inevitable. The difference is that democratic systems are better equipped for handling divisions and conflicts of interest, as Marina Ottaway wrote, “[democracy is] a political system that recognizes there can never be unambiguous of interests and views in a society and therefore creates mechanisms to institutionalize conflict and manage it.”²¹

I also noticed that in many ways, the Party looks to employ strategies to avoid the “destructive escalation” of a social conflict (by pre-emptive coercion and co-option). Louis Kriesberg identified that in the field of conflict resolution, the question is “not about avoiding conflicts but rather how to manage conflicts so that they do not become destructive.”²² The many nodes of real or potential social conflict are constantly being managed to varying degrees at all levels of government to prevent an outcome where the Party loses power. That is, the Party aims to avoid escalation of social conflict to the point that it becomes unmanageable and therefore threatens to remove the Party’s position as the only legitimate authority in power.

I began to think about systems somewhat abstractly as a way to describe social management after rejecting the idea that a description based on the idea of a complex network could explain the findings. After some research, I found the manuscript on autonomic computing, *Autonomous and autonomic systems: with applications to NASA intelligent spacecraft operations and exploration systems*.²³ It addressed all of the key points I had observed but on my own did not know how to conceptualise. From that point, I began to go back to all of the data I collected to build the analytical framework China’s ANS,

²¹ Marina Ottaway, " "Is Democracy the Answer?," in *Leashing the Dogs of War : Conflict Management in a Divided World*, Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 604.

²² Louis Kriesberg, "Contemporary Conflict Resolution Applications," in *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 466-67.

²³ Walt Truszkowski, Lou Hallock, Christopher Rouff, Jay Karlin, James Rash, Michael G. Hinchey, and Roy Sterritt, *Autonomous and autonomic systems : with applications to NASA intelligent spacecraft operations and exploration systems*, NASA monographs in systems and software engineering, (London: Springer, 2009).

as a way to describe the social management process that ensures state security. I decided on the framework almost as soon as I found it and read the aforementioned manuscript. This was around early-to-mid December 2015. I spent the remaining time building the framework into what is presented in this thesis.

Chapter Three I

Placing State Security within Social Management

Any army which does not train to use all the weapons, all the means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses, or may possess, is behaving in an unwise or even criminal manner. This applies to politics even more than it does to the art of war.
— Vladimir Lenin

Tiananmen 2.0 is inevitable. What is unknown is when, where and how, it will take place. Potential threats can be mitigated and pre-empted through the Party leadership's effective management of itself, and through the leadership's effective management and shaping of both the Party masses and society. Still, it would only take the mishandling of one major catalyst event of unknown character and at an unknown time and place for the system to implode. At least, this is the idea guiding the CCP leadership's state security practices. From the Party's perspective, state security is an ideal that can only be achieved through a functioning social management process. This is why, at the third plenary session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCCPC) in November 2013, the social management process was directly linked to the concept of state security. The Party's communique announced the formation of the "Central State Security Commission" (中央国家安全委员会, CSSC) in a paragraph on "social governance".¹ The CCCPC's "Decision on Some Major Issues Concerning the Deepening of Reform" also included the CSSC announcement in a section on "Innovating the Social Governance System".² Despite the social management context of state security, most analysts have been inclined to assess the CSSC within an assumed crisis management framework, as it would be understood

¹ Peter Mattis (Fellow in the China Program at The Jamestown Foundation) and I published three articles on the CSSC between 2013-present and have maintained a regular dialogue and exchanged research on the topic. My original research in this chapter stemmed off of our discussion on the CSSC. I would also like to thank Nigel Inkster and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, for hosting the event with co-speaker Peter Mattis "Managing the Power Within: China's Central State Security Commission" on 4 April 2017, both events were excellent opportunities to discuss some of my research. See: Samantha Hoffman and Peter Mattis, "China's Proposed "State Security Council": Social Governance under Xi Jinping," *China Policy Institute: Analysis*, 21 November 2013. ; Samantha Hoffman and Peter Mattis, "Inside China's New Security Council," 21 November 2013. ; Samantha Hoffman and Peter Mattis, "Managing the Power Within: China's State Security Commission," 18 July 2016. ; "Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China." 15 January 2014. http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/15/content_31203056.htm.

² "中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定 (全文) (Decision of the CCCPC on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform (Full Text))," 17 January 2014.

through the example of the United States' National Security Council.³ In some ways this is understandable, after all, the official English language translation of the CSSC in Chinese media is the "National Security Commission".⁴ The NSC translation, however, does not adequately distinguish the state security concept behind the CSSC. The CSSC should not be equated to a People's Liberation Army (PLA) centric crisis management body. The CSSC is a crisis *pre-emption* body, and the PLA is only one part of it. The CSSC coordinates the work of agencies and ministries charged with ensuring state security, partly to control power within the Party, and partly to realise a system-of-systems function (see Chapter 5). Further, it coordinates the research and drafting of all major state security-relevant legislation and regulations passed under Xi Jinping.

The CSSC's purpose is found in China's definition of state security. China's state security concept heavily emphasises a political stability dimension where the primary goal of the CCP is to protect itself as the head of the political system, rather than protecting the system outside of itself. The State Security Law (2015) said: "[State security is] a state in which the state regime, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, people's welfare, sustained development of the economy and society and other major state interests are relatively not in danger and not under internal or external threat, as well as the capacity to ensure a sustained state of security."⁵ In recent years, the Chinese leadership has declared that the Chinese state security concept is "comprehensive" or "holistic".⁶ One book by a National Defence University scholar said holistic state security emphasises an overall, all-around, connected, systemic way of thinking and grasping of our country's security problems.⁷ To persevere with the holistic concept, he added, is "the practical application of fundamental Marxist principles, [and] is the scientific conclusion we acquired through a profound summary of our Party's historical experience in the defence of state security," and through the analysis of "the new situation and circumstances" facing China's security and stability.⁸ In plain language: state security ensures the PRC's systemic stability and the CCP's legitimacy.

While the Chinese phrase "国家安全" (*guojia anquan*) is often translated as "national security", it is not the equivalent to the US-centric "national security" concept. The US-centric "national security" is broadly about protecting the physical and economic security of the nation and its citizens, as well as the integrity of the system of government and democratic values it stands for. The development of the concept after World War

³Andrew S. Erickson and Adam P. Liff, "Installing a Safety on the 'Loaded Gun'? China's Institutional Reforms, National Security Commission and Sino-Japanese Crisis (In)stability," *Journal of Contemporary China* 25, no. 98 (2016); Weixing Hu, "Xi Jinping's 'Big Power Diplomacy' and China's Central National Security Commission," *Journal of Contemporary China* 25, no. 98 (2016); David M. Lampton, "Xi Jinping and the National Security Commission: Policy Coordination and Political Power," *Journal of Contemporary China* 24, no. 95 (2015); Joel Wuthnow, "Decoding China's New 'National Security Commission'," *CNA Brief* (2013); Joel Wuthnow, "China's Much-Heralded NSC Has Disappeared," *Foreign Policy*, 2016. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/30/chinas-much-heralded-national-security-council-has-disappeared-nsc-xi-jinping>.

⁴"Xi calls for overall national security outlook." *Xinhua*, 17 February 2017. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-02/17/c_136064849.htm.

⁵ 中华人民共和国国家安全法 (*State Security Law of the People's Republic of China*).

⁶ Both 总体国家安全 holistic state security and 国家综合安全 comprehensive state security have the same implication. This PhD adheres to the "state security" translation for "国家安全", except for citations where the publisher's English translation of the term is "national security".

⁷ Daguang Li, 国家安全 (*National Security*) (Beijing: China Yanshi Publishing House, 2016), 14.

⁸ Ibid.

II and at the start of the Cold War responded to advances in technology, namely nuclear weapons and long-range bombers, which meant a devastating attack could take place at any time and with little notice; hence, the window of time to mobilise narrowed and made maintaining readiness at all times the key to ensuring “national security”.⁹ In this version of national security, there was an overlap between internal and external security; largely because economic prosperity was a key element of national security, along with military security and foreign policy.¹⁰

China’s state security concept is not about protecting the nation’s and people’s interests objectively, but these interests as the Party-state leadership defines them. Protecting these interests may not always be an objective process in a western democracy, but instead one driven by particular interest groups. There is still a fundamental difference between a national security concept that is wholly designed to ensure a Party’s all-encompassing power, and a national security policy that by default of systemic design benefits an elected (for better or worse) party or lawmaker’s policy platforms. It could even be asserted instead of having a foreign and domestic security policy, China has a security policy with internal and external elements. Conceptually and practically the China’s state security concept reflects a deeply intertwined internal and external security process, which is not similar to the way internal and external security are combined in the US-centric concept. These are the basic reasons for why “国家安全” should be differentiated from “national security” and translated as “state security”.

The remaining differences are located in two themes. First is the overlapping nature of internal and external security. Second is the functioning of the relationships between the Party leadership, the Party masses, and society. These themes reveal three state security objectives: [1] implementation of a combination of internal security and external security, not unlike the US-centric “national security”; [2] ensuring internal security in terms of management of the general public, i.e. maintaining social stability and social order; and [3] ensuring internal security related to management of the Party itself, i.e. Party loyalty by adherence to the core Party leadership’s authority.

This chapter demonstrates why state security is linked to the social management process. It advances two central claims: First, threats to state security are a combination of four types: hostile internal, hostile external, accidental internal and accidental external. They have become increasingly integrated since 1989. Second, the “holistic” state security concept reflects this integrated threat perception. Holistic state security is inclusive of the pre-emptive management of power within the Party, and the pre-emptive management of the stability of the Party’s relationship with society.

[3.1] Security Threats

Writing on Psychology and National Security, Robert Jervis quoted former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, who said, “Our strategy has to be aimed at what

⁹ David Jablonsky, "The State of the National Security State," *The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters* 32, no. 4 (Winter 2002-03): 5; Michael Warner and J. Kenneth McDonald, "US Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 1947," (Strategic Management Issues Office: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington, D.C. , April 2005), 8.

¹⁰ Jablonsky, "The State of the National Security State," 5-6.

the Soviets think is important to them, not just what we might think would be important to them.” Jervis added, “But this kind of analysis must be carried to its logical conclusion, not stopped at a point that is convenient to the analyst’s political predictions.”¹¹ His point is crucial. Understanding the threats the Chinese leadership perceives is necessary to understand its way of thinking. Applying these perceptions to analysis is crucial for understanding security-related policies and actions.

Existing literature does not systematically address threat perceptions from the Party-state leadership’s perspective. The Party’s wide-range of perceived threat is often dismissed as “paranoia”. True, the Party is paranoid, but the description does not explain why the threats the Party perceives matter to it, nor does the description explain how the threat perceptions are integrated into state security strategy. Most literature attempting to address these issues is PLA-centric. As such, it tends to undervalue or dismiss the direct relevance of politics. Writing in 1996, for example, Allen Whiting discounted “ideological unity, legitimacy to the regime, and other political or economic threats” because “they do not call on the PLA”.¹² He instead focused on external security threats in conflicts involving the South China Sea, Japan, Taiwan and the United States. In other cases, internal threats are not completely dismissed, but the importance is downplayed in relation to external threats. For instance, Andrew Scobell, acknowledging that the PLA is the final guarantor of internal security and the internal-external security overlap, nevertheless focused on the US, Taiwan, and Japan as key external threats.¹³ Even when internal security threats are taken seriously in relation to security policy, focus is usually on social unrest, or how issues like hyper-nationalism would affect Beijing’s policy choices during an external crisis.¹⁴ (An important line of inquiry, but it does not comprehensively describe China’s perception of internal threat.)

The threats the Communist Party perceives are similar to the “hostile” or “accidental” threats any system type faces. Consider the internal and external threats a business IT system faces on a day-to-day basis. These include: fraud, theft, blackmail, sabotage, vandalism, looting, terrorism, natural disasters, communications failures, loss of communication with customers, loss of communications with employees, failures by third party service providers or affiliates, power outages, equipment failures, software failures, transportation system failures, water system disruptions.¹⁵ These fit within four key types: they are either hostile or accidental and they either emerge externally or internally (See Table 1). The major difference in China is the Party is not protecting a political system outside of itself. Threats to the system are anything, alone or in combination, perceived as undermining this system. The idea of “internal” and

¹¹ Jervis, *How statesmen think : the psychology of international politics* 193.

¹² Allen S. Whiting, "The PLA and China's Threat Perceptions," *The China Quarterly*, no. 146 (June 1996): 615.

¹³ Andrew Scobell and Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute., *China and strategic culture* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002), 11-20; Andrew Scobell, *Chinese Army Building in the Era of Jiang Zemin* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000), 20-23.

¹⁴ Peter Hays Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy* (Berkeley ; London: University of California Press, 2004).

¹⁵ Michael Santa Cruz, "Difference Between Internal & External Threats to an IT Database," Houston Chronicle Online, ; Shea Laverty, "Difference Between Internal & External Threats to an IT Database," Tech in Our Everyday Life, ; "Appendix C: Internal And External Threats," in *IT Examination Handbook: Business Continuity Planning*, Federal Financial Institution Examination Council (February 2015).

“external” is determined not only by whether a threat sits inside of China’s claimed physical borders, but also by whether the threat sits inside or outside of the CCP.

Table 1: Threat Perceptions

Threat Type	Definition
Hostile External Threat	From a foreign source, which is intentionally and directly threatening
Hostile Internal Threat	From an internal source, which is intentionally and directly threatening
Accidental External Threat	Emerges as an incidental effect of outside instability
Accidental Internal Threat	Emerges from internal emergencies or vulnerabilities

To be clear, a “hostile force” as the CCP uses the term is integrated into but is not the same as the four threat categories explained in this section. The division of threats into four categories adds greater coherence to the explanation of the types of threats the CCP perceives. In later chapters, this background helps demonstrate how threat types became the highly-integrated threat perception informing the thinking and practice of “holistic state security”. In the following text, references to the Party’s exact language always use the phrase “hostile forces”. Usages referring to Table 1 are capitalised.

Hostile Threats

References to foreign and domestic hostile forces are a regular feature in Chinese state media and in the rhetoric of Party-state leaders and theorists. It is rooted in Marxist language invoking the idea of society being split into “two great hostile camps,”— the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.¹⁶ Vladimir Lenin used the language to justify state terror responding to the “threat of counter-revolution” and ensuring the “revolution did not fall to hostile forces”.¹⁷ Joseph Stalin used the language to justify brutal force in the consolidation of power over the new Soviet republics.¹⁸ In the present-day CCP definition of state security, the usage is strikingly similar to these Soviet justifications. CCP propagandists use the label “hostile forces” (敌对势力) or “internal and external hostile forces” (内外敌对势力) against anything deemed as directly designed to undermine the PRC.

A Hostile External Threat is any outside force the Party-state leadership perceives as intentionally and directly threatening the CCP and the PRC. The United States is the most obvious, but not the only, example. In this example, threats could include the U.S.

¹⁶ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1888), (Kindle Edition: Public Domain Books, 2005). 1.

¹⁷ Steve Phillips, *Lenin and the Russian Revolution* (Oxford: Heinemann Educational, 2000), 129; Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power? (1 October 1917)," ed. George Hanna, trans. Yuri Sdobnikov and George Hanna, vol. 26, *Lenin's Collected Works (1972)* (Published in the Lenin Internet Archive: Marxists.org, November 2000), <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/oct/01.htm>.

¹⁸ Robert Gellately, *Lenin, Stalin and Hitler: the age of social catastrophe* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 404.

Navy's activity in the South China Sea, or US 'collusion' with Internal Hostile Threats, which is perceived as having the potential to encourage a Colour Revolution-type event. China has regularly blamed the United States for being behind the toppling or destabilisation of regimes. For instance, in August 2017, the limited Chinese press coverage of ongoing instability in Venezuela distinctly focused on the concept of US intervention (even prior to U.S. President Trump's public acknowledgment of a military option). One called the situation a US-orchestrated "slow-motion coup", and another said US economic sanctions caused the situation.¹⁹ Such accusations have propaganda value, but are rooted in a very real perception of threat (see Chapter 8).

The Colour Revolutions in Central Europe and Central Asia of the early 2000s are another example. A dimension that made threat perception higher was the speed at which information could spread, as well as its wide reach. Titus Chen concluded that China's leadership and intellectuals saw the Colour Revolutions as being driven by three major factors: "raging domestic grievances, electoral politics exploited by the opposition, and Western powers' (the United States in particular) intervention for geo-strategic interests."²⁰ In reality, this perception was both true and false.²¹ To varying degrees the U.S. government offered rhetorical support, and US-based organisations like the National Democratic Institute promoted democracy, supported activists, provided training and hosted workshops. In the Chinese perspective, however, it does not matter that the U.S. government did not directly intervene (also, because of history, China's leaders may not be convinced that such organisations are not CIA-linked). The willingness to support or act on alternative ideas is seen as most threatening.

A Hostile External Threat is not limited to state actors. A hostile external threat is any individual, group or state that directly challenges the CCP's narrative or conception of how China is defined. The CCP puts considerable effort into the propaganda promoting the idea that "China" and the "PRC" cannot be separated (i.e. the CCP's China is the only China). A breakdown in narrative-control can be the starting point of a "peaceful evolution", Colour Revolution or Jasmine Revolution event. The issue of network security adds an interesting dimension of a boundary-less space to the concept. The description is similar to the way that "information security" in China, or Russia, is not related to western cyber security connotation, but rather is derived from the Soviet Information Warfare concept "in which a state secures its information space to ensure that its narrative goes unchallenged."²²

Meanwhile, a Hostile Internal Threat is usually one Beijing perceives as emerging from inside the state's territorial space and as directly threatening regime security. These are also most likely to interact with a Hostile External Threat. The most relevant example

¹⁹ Earl Bousquet, "The accelerated slow-motion coup against Venezuela," China.org.cn, 15 August 2017; "委内瑞拉乱局 | 内忧外患夹击, 马杜罗解困应先求“安内”?(Chaos in Venezuela | Internal Trouble and External Threats Closing in on Both Fronts, Should Maduro Seek to 'Stabilise the Domestic Situation' First?)," The Paper, 3 August 2017.

²⁰ Titus C. Chen, "China's Reaction to the Color Revolutions: Adaptive Authoritarianism in Full Swing," *Asian Perspective* 34, no. 2 (2010): 1-2.

²¹ For example, for a more balanced examination of the US Role in the Color Revolutions, see chapter two in: Lincoln Abraham Mitchell, *The Color Revolutions*, 1st ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).

²² Nigel Inkster, *China's Cyber Power*, Adelphi (London: Routledge for the Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 2016).

categories are the “three evil forces”, which are anyone the Party-state defines as being a terrorist, ‘splittist’, or religious extremist.²³ This refers to groups known as the “five poisons” (五毒), which include: Uighurs, Tibetans, Taiwanese, democracy activists and Falun Gong (Taiwan is under “internal” because the PRC *claims* Taiwan is part of China).²⁴ Outside of these, anyone within China’s claimed borders who might be accused of “subversion of state power”, such as social activists, be considered a Hostile Internal Threat. Protesters whose acts of everyday resistance challenge the core of the state’s legitimising narratives could also fall into this category.²⁵

Finally, a Hostile Internal Threat includes elements inside the Party accused of threatening the Party’s political security.²⁶ This is more difficult to define concretely, because who is labelled a threat is determined by power dynamics of the time. Yet, it is one of the most critical parts of the definition of a Hostile Internal Threat. It represents where the Party’s objective to maintain power and individual’s desire for power within that system intersect. This type of threat is found in the corruption cases against Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, and Ling Jihua, who Xi Jinping reportedly directly accused of being “engaged in political conspiracy activities.”²⁷ It is worth noting that even if not directly labelled hostile threats like the individuals listed above, officials accused of corruption are also often charged with prostitution. This is likely not simply a statement on their relative moral bankruptcy, but is directly tied to motives for the Communist Revolution, which Mao Zedong outlined in 1939 and included smuggling, pornography and drugs.²⁸ They are among the “six evils” (六害), (prostitution, pornography, the sale of women and children, narcotics, gambling, and profiteering from superstition).²⁹ They have been described as: “the vicious ways in which subversives and saboteurs will corrupt our party, our cadres, and our socialist system.”³⁰

²³ Xinjiang Higher People’s Court, “坚决打击“三股势力” 维护国家安全和社会稳定 (Resolutely Strike Hard Against the “Three Evils” to Safeguard State Security and Social Stability)” 3 July 2017.

²⁴ Hoffman and Mattis, “Managing the Power Within: China’s State Security Commission.”; “多团体要求加拿大政府驱逐中共外交官 (图) (Many Groups Request the Canadian Government to Expel Chinese Communist Diplomat (photo)),” 15 July 2010.

²⁵ Ralph Thaxton, *Force and Contention in Contemporary China: Memory and Resistance in the Long Shadow of the Catastrophic Past*, Cambridge studies in contentious politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 11-20.

²⁶ “全民国家安全教育日 政治安全：国家安全的根本 (State Security Education Day Political Security: The Root of State Security)”, 15 April 2017; “多团体要求加拿大政府驱逐中共外交官 (图) (Many Groups Request the Canadian Government to Expel Chinese Communist Diplomat (photo))”.

²⁷ Shan Gao. “China’s President Xi Jinping Hits Out at ‘Political Conspiracies’ in Keynote Speech.” *Radio Free Asia*, 3 January 2017. <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/speech-01032017123112.html>.

²⁸ Zedong Mao. “Chapter Two: The Chinese Revolution” in *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*, December 1939. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_23.htm.

²⁹ “要重视总结经验 (Must Attach Great Importance to the Summary of Experience),” *The People’s Daily*, 24 February 1990.

³⁰ Nicholas D. Kristof. “Notes on China; Beijing Hopes To Stamp Out The ‘6 Evils’.” *The New York Times*, 26 November 1989. <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/26/world/notes-on-china-beijing-hopes-to-stamp-out-the-6-evils.html?mcubz=3>.

Accidental Threats

The concept of an External Accidental Threat or Internal Accidental Threat is more abstract. In the Party's thinking, these are largely found in discussion on "non-traditional" security. An External Accidental Threat is inclusive of any interference in China's strategic interests, which is not directly hostile but could still inflict harm—for instance, a financial crisis. It also includes externally originating issues such as an oil or water resource supply crisis, or pollution. They can all affect social and economic security in China.³¹ Accidental threats can be malicious, but unlike hostile threats they are not perceived as being directed specifically at the Chinese state. A unique but specific case is North Korean nuclear weapons testing: the act is not directed at China per-se, but has potential to lead to an environmental crisis if radiation eventually spreads.³² Transnational crimes also fall into this category, namely: drug and human trafficking, or criminal (not state-sponsored) data theft and hacking.³³ They can become serious threats if ineffectively managed.

Lastly, an Accidental Internal Threat includes any situation with potential to provoke serious social instability, such as natural disasters and manmade disasters, food and drug safety, and public health crises. An example is the 2008 milk powder melamine poisoning scandal that infected up to 300,000 babies.³⁴ Accidents are also included. There is a long history of CCP cover-up of accidents—handling them is not so much about handling the cause as it is the potential instability linked to them.³⁵ Such cases usually point to serious crimes and negligence, and can be significant sources of instability when poorly managed. Accidental Internal Threats have a different nature than the direct threat of war, but it is important to bear in mind that state security is largely pre-emptive.

Integration of Threats

In practice, considering these four threat types as completely separate entities is usually not practical. The themes of "internal" and "external" threat became increasingly integrated as events and the development of modern technology forced the issue (see Chapter Eight). Additionally, the CCP's actual usages of "internal" (内) and "external" (外), are abstract and can overlap significantly. Internal security and external security

³¹ Baoyu Wang, "'环境危机'与战争" ("Environmental Crisis" and War)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 19 November 2002. ; Newspaper Commentator, "加快核电建设势在必行 (Nothing Can Impair the Speeding Up of Nuclear Power Construction)," *The People's Daily*, 22 July 2004.

³² Stephen Chen. "North Korea's nuclear test site at risk of imploding, Chinese scientist says." *The South China Morning Post*, 4 September 2017. <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2109725/north-koreas-nuclear-test-site-risk-imploding-chinese>; "中国在东北边境启动辐射应急监测 (China Has Activated Its Emergency Radiation Monitoring [Mechanism] at the Northeastern Border)," *China News*, 3 September 2017

³³ Baofu Wang, "以新安全观应对非传统安全威胁 (We Must Respond to Non-Traditional Security Threats with a New Security Concept)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 24 November 2003.

³⁴ Hua Feng, "农业部—把全力以赴抓好奶站整顿等三件大事 作为学习实践科学发展观的具体行动 (Ministry of Agriculture - Focusing on Three Major Issues Including Straightening Out Milk Depots as a Concrete Example of the Party's Action to Implement the Scientific Development Concept)" *The People's Daily*, 11 October 2008. ; Yanzhong Huang, "The 2008 Milk Scandal Revisited," *Forbes*, 16 July 2014.

³⁵ Jeremy Brown, "When Things Go Wrong," ed. Perry Link, Richard P. Madsen, and Paul G. Pickowicz, Kindle ed., *Restless China* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2013).

could imply location either inside or outside of China's physical borders. Internal security and external security could also imply security inside and outside of the CCP. It is the protection of an ideas space as much as it is the protection of a physical space.

The CCP's integrated perception of the four threat types is also directly connected to the "holistic" state security concept. The most severe threats to state security are believed to have 'integrated characteristics'.³⁶ For instance, the Annual Report on China's National Security Studies 2014, by the MSS-linked University of International Relations in Beijing, points to the "three forces" (individuals and groups labelled as terrorists, splittists, religious extremists) accused of conducting terrorist attacks in Xinjiang and Tibet. It said: "behind all of these are extensive international connections, and so relying solely on a few powerful domestic departments is not enough, close cooperation with departments such as intelligence and foreign affairs would also be required."³⁷ Not only are threat sources integrated, but the ability to manage them also increasingly requires combined resources due to the evolution of modern technology, which carries new vulnerabilities. Civilian and military computer networks that rely on the same power source are an example. If the network is severely compromised due to hostile or accidental activity, it could have significant repercussions for state stability.³⁸ It is also a primary reason for the creation of the CSSC, a "top-level cross-departmental and discussion coordination mechanism," which deals with how the holistic state security concept translates into policy and practice.³⁹

[3.2] Holistic State Security

The holistic state security concept under Xi Jinping is inclusive of 11 types of security: political security, homeland security, military security, economic security, cultural security, social security, information security, scientific security, ecological security, natural resources security and nuclear security (see Table 2).⁴⁰ The definition is not really new under Xi Jinping. Instead, it is the reflection of the gradual integration of internal and external security under the single, cohesive "state security" concept.

³⁶ 中国关系学院国际战略与安全研究中心 (UIR Center for International Strategy and Security Studies), *中国国家安全研究报告 2014 (Annual Report on China's National Security Studies 2014)*, Blue Book of National Security (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2014), 133.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Zongzhi Jia, "聚焦网络战 (Focus on Network Warfare)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 12 April 2000.

³⁹ 中国关系学院国际战略与安全研究中心 (UIR Center for International Strategy and Security Studies), *中国国家安全研究报告 2014 (Annual Report on China's National Security Studies 2014)*, 133.

⁴⁰ "把握总体国家安全观的科学内涵 ("Grasping the Scientific Connotation of [China's] Holistic State Security Concept")". *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 2016. http://www.81.cn/jjbjmap/content/2016-02/29/content_2682.htm; Qingjie Pang, "总体国家安全观 领航中国 (Navigate China Forward through the Holistic State Security Concept)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 27 April 2014. ; Zhankui Ma and Cunliang Sun, "坚持总体国家安全观 (Persevere with the Holistic State Security Concept)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 30 July 2014. ; *中华人民共和国国家安全法 (State Security Law of the People's Republic of China)*. Note on Table 2: Definitions for each of the 11 securities formed based on People's Daily and PLA Daily archive searches, as well as general reading of Chinese state media. Definitions are my own. I must thank Peter Mattis for whose phrasing in a message exchange I adapted to explain the "Leninist concept of scientific", as well as Nigel Inkster for contributing to the definition of "information security" during our conversations.

Table 2: Holistic State Security

Phrase	Definition
Political Security 政治安全	Ensuring the Party leadership's authority over the entire Party and society. It is focused on protecting the CCP's political authority from unwanted influences or threats, both within and outside the Party and particularly in the realm of ideas.
Homeland Security 国土安全	Ensuring safety of the homeland, with some similarities to the post-11 September 2001 concept in the United States. It includes non-traditional security issues, such as drug trafficking and disaster relief. It is focused on anti-terrorism and anti-sedition.
Military Security 军事安全	Includes safeguarding national sovereignty, territorial integrity, resisting foreign aggression, and carrying out military modernisation. It is not just the protection of physical territory, but also ensuring the armed forces' loyalty to the Party, and guaranteed participation in political and social crisis prevention and response.
Economic Security 经济安全	Economic development helps to ensure state security and is linked to narratives on the preservation of social order and Party legitimacy. It also includes protecting China's economy from negative trends in the global economy. A stable economy helps the Party co-opt society, thus reducing the capacity for hostile forces to exploit instability.
Cultural security 文化安全	Requires promoting core socialist values, and preventing infiltration or sabotage by outside cultures, particularly western democracies. Cultural power is a key source of sustainable national power.
Social Security 社会安全	Protecting against social unrest and social instability, including tasks such as: crime prevention (including political), public opinion management, dispute resolution, public health and safety and the provision of social services.
Information Security 信息安全	The concept of information security is inclusive of cyber security, and it is mostly about the protection and promotion of the Party's ideas. It is inclusive of protecting a "sovereign" space that is not physically bounded, but rather sits in an unbounded ideas space.
Scientific Security 科学安全	Most clearly about handling the 'double-edged sword' that is science and technology, in relation to security. It is also related to the Leninist "scientific" concept, the scientific management of security and the scientific organisational structure. It implicitly absolves the Party leadership from blame for mistakes in "scientific" law application.
Ecological Security 生态安全	Most directly about environmental protection, but the idea is nebulous. It is about the security of the interactions of all organisms within China, including but not limited to the human relationship with the environment.
Natural Resources Security 资源安全	Stable access to water, oil, natural gas, and other valuable natural resources is not only necessary to ensure a national defence, but is necessary to enable the continued economic and social development.
Nuclear Security 核安全	China maintains that it has a self-defensive nuclear strategy. Nuclear security includes ensuring protection of nuclear facilities from terrorism, accidents and natural disasters. This includes establishing a strong mitigation and response mechanism, and international cooperation on proliferation issues.

This section details the conceptual development of “holistic state security” from the Mao era to present. Rather than describing the concept’s development in conjunction with events (see Chapter Eight), this section is focused on how the holistic state security concept formed over time. The purpose is to demonstrate the effect on pre-emption strategy (see Chapter Six). It is also to demonstrate that the idea of a “rise” of a Chinese security state, under Xi or earlier, is inaccurate.⁴¹ The difference is that an existing perception of integrated threats were gradually placed under a single “state security” concept. The concept is focused on pre-emption, and is now being more systematically applied to institutional design and law (see Chapter Five).

Under Mao Zedong, the term “state security” often referred to “US imperialist aggression” in the assumed external security context, and often related to military threats the US posed to Taiwan, Korea and Vietnam. The term was also a literal translation for the US, or other countries’ national security policy. On the limited occasions where the phrase referred to Chinese national security, it was mostly externally focused. China’s physical sovereignty and border security were included, and were not yet appearing as the integration of internal and external security concerns, and not yet implicitly defining sovereignty protection as being inclusive of an unbounded ideas space. Since the CCP’s Revolution was built on nationalism and anti-imperialism, there has always been a sensitive link between internal political security and external threats.

Under Mao, the concept was most likely related to the national security concept in the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War. This has been described as a combination of socio-political and military-technical dimensions.⁴² For instance, writing on national security in Warsaw Pact countries, F. Rubin noted that the Hungarian Criminal Code under the Socialist Workers’ Party stated:

Internal security depends on the relationship between internal forces which stand behind the State order on the one hand, and those which endeavour to weaken or overthrow this, on the other hand. External security depends on factors outside the state: it can be endangered or threatened by certain acts or actions committed by foreign states or foreign organisations. There is absolutely no doubt, however, that a close relationship exists between internal and external security.⁴³

Clearly the internal security threats found in China’s current definition of state security existed in the Mao era, under the conditions of the time. They were in the form of anything Mao perceived as threatening to his control and the Communist Revolution. These included individuals branded as counter-revolutionary or revisionist, for example, or the targets of the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, the Anti-Rightest Movement, and Cultural Revolution. Controlling of these internal security threats – within the Party and within the state – was also affected by the need to manage external threats. As Timothy Cheek noted, the Korean War and confrontation with the US

⁴¹ Tai Ming Cheung, "The Rise of the Chinese National Security State Under Xi Jinping," *China Policy Institute: Analysis*, 15 December 2016.

⁴² Central Intelligence Agency. "The Nature of Soviet Military Doctrine " April 1989.

⁴³ F. Rubin, "The Theory and Concept of National Security in the Warsaw Pact Countries," *International Affairs* 58, no. 4 (1982): 650-51.

“would cast a pall over the anti-intellectual political movements beginning the next year [1951], as well as anti-corruption campaigns, during the early 1950s.”⁴⁴ Although there was a clear interaction of the perception of threat sources, the integration under a single “state security” umbrella did not yet exist.

Moving into the Deng Xiaoping era, one of the most misleading claims in literature on China’s state security concept is the idea that economic development was promoted in place of state security, which dovetails with the academic and journalistic claim that the Party-state placed its legitimacy solely on economic development from the start of the reform era.⁴⁵ It could be said that state security was seen as a requirement that would guarantee the prosperity found through economic development. It could also be said that economic development is a way of ensuring state security—but economic development was never a priority in lieu of state security. If the Party is the leader of economic growth and development, and without it the ideal cannot be achieved, then naturally the Party and its preservation are the objective economic development serves. Besides, if in the reform and development era it is true that Deng “would not have seen [the style of politics being pursued] as new, but rather as a return to the CCP’s earlier political style,” prior to 1958, then the return was not to a period of tranquillity.⁴⁶ Instead, the return was to a period of power consolidation where, despite the implementation of reforms, the processes of ensuring the Party-state’s security were driven by state terror and violence.⁴⁷ The difference is that instead of deploying a Maoist-type of mass mobilisation tactic, Deng’s focus was broadly on building institutions and practices to enable co-optive governance, while simultaneously using institutions and practices, such as the legal system and law enforcement, to perpetuate state coercion.

As these changes were underway, progress toward the integration of security threats under a single state security concept slowly began between 1979 and 1989. State security was described as the pre-requisite for socialist modernisation.⁴⁸ For example, one 1983 *PLA Daily* article focused on counter-espionage stated:

The state’s security is the guarantee of socialist modernisation construction...We are a socialist country of the people’s democratic dictatorship, and in no way will [we] permit hostile forces and hostile groups to undermine China’s state security... [we will] strike against espionage and counter-revolutionary activities aimed at undermining and subverting our socialist system...⁴⁹

⁴⁴ For example, see: Timothy Check, “Mao and Maoism,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism*, Stephen A. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014), 5-6.

⁴⁵ Cheung, “The Rise of the Chinese National Security State Under Xi Jinping.”

⁴⁶ Teiwes, *Politics and purges in China : rectification and the decline of party norms, 1950-1965*, 1.

⁴⁷ Strauss, “Paternalist Terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the People’s Republic of China, 1950-1953,” 80-81; Frank Dikötter, “The Tragedy of Liberation : A History of the Chinese Revolution, 1945-57,” (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), xi-xvi.

⁴⁸ Siyi Jiang, “军队精神文明建设的根本任务 (The Fundamental Mission of Army Spiritual Civilisation Construction),” *The People’s Liberation Army Daily*, 1986.

⁴⁹ “确保国家安全加强反间谍工作 (Ensure State Security and Strengthen Counter-Intelligence Work),” *The People’s Liberation Army Daily*, 21 June 1983.

The move toward the integrated concept was notable in an increasing volume of discussion on ‘national interests’ (国家利益) throughout the 1980s. Both social order and state security were included. For instance, a 1986 *PLA Daily* article, aptly titled “It is Very Necessary to Think Holistically” said:

Among national interests, the most important are state security interests, namely national independence, territorial integrity and unity, the social system, [preservation of] the national traditional way of life (indicating outstanding tradition, because tradition is not necessary all good), normal social activities and uninjured [national] honour, and so on. Consequently, to reflect on national defence development strategy will place the country's security and the country's war plans as components of a connected section.⁵⁰

The major shift, where internal and external security were unequivocally tied under the same state security concept, took place after Tiananmen. A sudden emphasis was placed on loyalty to the party, particularly among the armed forces, and on social stability (see Chapter Eight). Moreover, the idea that external hostile forces colluded with protest leaders and were behind the movement was perpetuated, reflecting the combined internal and external threat perception.⁵¹ From this point on, the requirements to defend state security and protect social stability were frequently paired, and also described as the responsibility of everyone to defend.

The major issue was “how” to design and implement an effective system to ensure this inclusive version of state security. For instance, speaking to a gathering of Ministry of State Security representatives in February 1992, Qiao Shi, who was a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and director of the Central Politics and Law Commission until 1992, said: “State security work needs to be strengthened, along with the development of national economic construction and changing international circumstances, state security work requires constant reinforcement according to the guidelines and mission set by the CCP Central Committee.”⁵²

Throughout the 1990s, under Jiang Zemin’s presidency, the concept of state security became more cohesive, and very clearly communicated the integrated threat perception. One of the most explicit documents to outline the concept was the 1996 “Ninth Five-Year Plan for the National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China and the Outline of the 2010 Vision”. On the topic of defending social stability and state security, it read:

Maintaining a good social security environment, and ensuring that the masses live in peace and work happily are important responsibilities for all levels of government. To that end, vigorous measures must be taken to strike hard against violent crime, drug crime, rogue evil forces, and criminal gangs

⁵⁰ Yanbin Xu, “很需要作总体思考 (It is Very Necessary to Think Holistically),” *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 25 April 1986.

⁵¹ “中国内政决不允许任何外国干涉 中国决不会屈服于任何外来压力 (China's Internal Affairs Will Not Permit Any Foreign Interference, China will not Surrender to Any Foreign Pressure)”, *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 21 July 1989.

⁵² “坚决贯彻执行基本路线 积极参加支持改革开放 (Resolutely Implement the Basic Line and Energetically Participate in Reform and Opening Up),” *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 14 March 1992.

associated with the criminal underworld, as well as other criminal activities. [We must] continue to carry out "anti-pornography and intellectual piracy" activities, eliminate prostitution, hiring of prostitutes and other ugly social phenomenon, to purify the social environment. [We must] strengthen the comprehensive governance of social order, adhere to the leadership responsibility system, combine specialised work and the Mass Line, and take every measure to implement [this] at the grassroots level, settling disputes in the early stages. [We must] strengthen the management of the floating population, resolve civil disputes in a timely manner, correctly handle the contradictions among the people, and resolve factors of social instability. [We must] strengthen the construction of Political-Legal Affairs units, and improve the political and professional quality of police officers. [We must] strictly implement the security management system to prevent negative incidents such as the occurrence of major fires. [We must] be vigilant and timely in defending state security by crushing all infiltration of hostile forces, subversion, splittists and other types of sabotage.⁵³

The same document also communicated the idea that state security and social stability required inter-agency cooperation and a responsive government—specifically emphasising the role of Political-Legal Affairs committees. Party loyalty and individual responsibility to uphold social stability and state security were also emphasised.

By 2000-2002, a “comprehensive” state security directly inclusive of most of the 11-securities found in today’s “holistic” state security already existed. These were usually presented in the context of a claim that present-day security challenges are greater than in the past. For instance, the 2001 *Science of Military Strategy* said state security is a key “national interest”, and is a “combination of political, economic, military, cultural, information, energy, and biological environment situations.” It added: “While traditional security still exists, we cannot neglect the threat of economic, political, and cultural fields. The security in non-traditional fields such as "economic security," "political security," culture, and others are also important factors of state security.”⁵⁴ Similarly, one *PLA Daily* article from December 2000 said:

China's concept of state security strategy appears to include three parts and six aspects. The three parts are: First, the complete unity of the state's physical space, namely the territorial land, territorial waters and territorial air space, [which] must not be split; Second, no interference in the state sovereignty, no violation of the state dignity, no encroachment upon the state's interests; Third, the state's long-term peace and stability, government orders are smoothly implemented and the people are at peace, economic prosperity and continued stable development. The six aspects are: political security, military security, economic security, scientific security, social security and cultural security.⁵⁵

So, by the third plenary session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2013, the holistic state security concept was already

⁵³ "关于国民经济和社会发展“九五”计划和2010年远景目标纲要的报告 (Report on The Ninth Five-Year Plan for the National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China and the Outline of the 2010 Vision) (Parts 1-4)," *People's Liberation Army Daily*, 19 March 1996.

⁵⁴ Guangqian Peng and Youzhi Yao, eds., *Science of Military Strategy* (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2001).

⁵⁵ Lingtong Kong and Xiaobing Luo, "研讨国家安全战略的现实问题 (Discussing Pragmatic Issues Facing the State Security Strategy)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 13 December 2000.

firmly established. The misplacement of the role of economic development in political legitimacy and state security narratives probably contributes to the vast amount of present-day academic and journalistic literature claiming there is a rise of a “national security state” under Xi Jinping—when in actuality there is no real “rise”.

Another reason that could explain the assumption is the content of “Document 9” circulated within the Party in 2013. It called: promoting western constitutional democracy, promoting “universal values”, promoting civil society, promoting neo-liberalism, promoting the West’s idea of journalism, promoting historic nihilism and questioning reform and opening and the socialist nature of socialism with Chinese characteristics “false ideological trends”. It also said:

In an effort to improve the people’s livelihood, we are putting forth new measures to benefit the people so they may look forward to a better future: disseminating thought on the cultural front as the most important political task; studying, implementing, and advancing the spirit of the Eighteenth Party Congress; rapidly arousing mass fervour, proclaiming that socialism with Chinese characteristics and the Chinese dream are the main theme of our age; expanding and strengthening positive propaganda; strengthening guidance on deep-seeded problems; strengthening the management of ideological fronts; promoting unification of thought; concentrating our strength and implementing the development of a positive atmosphere and providing spiritual strength to the party and nation.⁵⁶

Given the definitions of threat perceptions, and evolution of their integration described in this chapter (and later in Chapter Eight), this document’s content and tone should not have been entirely surprising. Document 9 did represent a development in the consolidation of overall strategy— not a shift in ideology, not a shift in threat perception, and not a significant shift in tactics. This observation is not to deny the palpable situational changes in China since the 18th Party Congress, rather to state that continuity in the evolution of threat perceptions and the concept of holistic state security indicate that actual change is located elsewhere.

[3.3] Conclusion: State Security within Social Management

A November 2015 *People’s Daily* article attributed to Central Political-Legal Affairs committee head Meng Jianzhu explained the meaning of social management and holistic state security, and described the Party leadership’s construction of the mechanisms for both. It tied social management to the objectives state security in the opening line, which stated: “Strengthening and innovating social governance [i.e. social management] is the objective requirement for the regulated development of our country’s socialist society, and important guarantee for the people to live and work happily, for social stability and order, and the state’s long-term peace and stability.”⁵⁷

⁵⁶ “Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation.” *China File*, 8 November 2013. <http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation>.

⁵⁷ “孟建柱：加强和创新社会治理 (Meng Jianzhu: Strengthen and Innovate Social Governance).” *People’s Daily*, 17 November 2015. <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/1117/c64094-27822579.html>.

The most severe threats to state security are perceived as emerging from an integration of internal and external sources. These threats must truly be fought from all sides, because they fall both inside and outside of the Party, and inside and outside of China's borders. Adding to the complexity of this perception is that it is attached not to the security of the Chinese nation alone, but to the security of the People's Republic with the Party firmly at the top. From the Party's perspective, the only way to effectively mitigate threat is through pre-emption. Failure to pre-emptively manage threats could mean that in the event of a Tiananmen 2.0, the Party has already lost before any physical battle actually begins.

Social management has been linked to state security because it is the process stabilising the foundations on which the Party-state's security is built. As the next chapter will describe, social management is best thought of as a complex systems management process. The question is how to design and implement such a system within the confines of the Leninist Party-state. To refer back to the IT application of threat and threat management, a group of Massachusetts Institute of Technology researchers working on the issue of network stability and reliability said a well-designed system "needs to work for all possible strategies for controlling the network."⁵⁸ A well-designed system is one that is reliable despite being located in an unreliable (and unpredictable) network. China's thinking on holistic state security has the same objective. Social management is how the objective will be realised. In this light, the social management process serves as the "programming" of China's state security.

⁵⁸ "Lynch & team develop more reliable adhoc network scheme," Massachusetts Institute of Technology Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Department, 5 August 2013.

Chapter Four I

Engineering an Autonomic Nervous System

‘Sufficiently simple natural structures are predictable but uncontrollable, whereas sufficiently complex symbolic descriptions are controllable but unpredictable.’

-Howard Pattee

Mao Zedong described the “mass line” as the process of the Communist Party taking the “scattered and unsystematic ideas of the masses,” and forming them into “concentrated and systematic ideas,” then taking them back to the masses to “propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own.”¹ In both the Mao era and present-day the Mass Line represents a feedback loop, but this feedback loop does not serve the interests of the masses by design, rather it was then and remains today a “calculated top-down leadership by the Party.”² From Deng Xiaoping to the present-day under Xi Jinping, the feedback loop concept has remained important but acts as an overarching organisational guide for relationship structures in power maintenance rather than as an organisational guide for those structures in revolution as it did for Mao. Consultation does not imply, as some have suggested, a variation of a civil society concept where the Communist Party invokes the Mass Line to solicit feedback on everyday governance issues.³ While not an entirely inaccurate description of *part* of the process, such descriptions do not incorporate the fundamental characteristic that unlike a democratic system of governance, the Communist Party exerts control over the feedback loop. The concept is a Leninist machinery for controlling, shaping and directing public opinion.⁴

Social management is best understood as a complex systems management process through which the Party leadership interacts with both the entire Party and society. The process resembles a feedback loop: i.e. a cycle of shaping, managing and responding. The process is ultimately aimed at ensuring the PRC’s systemic stability

¹ Timothy Heath, "Xi's Mass Line Campaign: Realigning Party Politics to New Realities," *China Brief* 13, no. 16 (2013): 5-6; Zedong Mao. "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership ", 1 June 1943. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_13.htm.

² Frederick C. Teiwes, "Politics at the "Core": The Political Circumstances of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin," *China Information* XV, no. 1 (2001): 8.

³ Bruce J. Dickson, *The dictator's dilemma : the Chinese Communist party's strategy for survival* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 104.

⁴ Tsang, "Consultative Leninism: China's new political framework," 874; Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, *What is to be Done?*, ed. Chris Russell, trans. Tim Delaney (Marxists Internet Archive, 1902), 69-70.

and legitimacy—i.e. state security. This chapter proposes the best way to think about the social management process is to see it as the Party's construction of an "Autonomic Nervous System" (ANS). This chapter will explain why the ANS framework provides the best way to understand how the CCP attempts to organise social management. The theoretical basis for the ANS analytical framework is found through the marriage of Marxist-Leninist thought with traditional Chinese thinking on governance. The structural basis for the analytical framework rooted in the CCP's thinking on cybernetics and complex systems management beginning in the late 1970s.

Biologically, the ANS is a sub-system of the peripheral nervous system. It is a self-managing system that allows individuals to proceed with everyday activity without deliberately focusing on the regulation of important survival processes, such as "heartbeat rate, breathing rate, and reflex reactions upon touching a sharp or hot object".⁵ Within the ANS are the parasympathetic and sympathetic sub-nervous systems. They operate a bit like *Yin* and *Yang*. If a person's heartbeat slows, this is controlled by the parasympathetic nervous system. If their heartbeat increases, this is controlled by the sympathetic nervous system. If the ANS in a healthy body is functioning, the parasympathetic and sympathetic functions are achieving a dynamic equilibrium through an unconscious management process.

The basic feedback structure can be found in the CCP's rhetoric on China's body politic. One well known idea is related to the "core consciousness", and a related analogy describes the hierarchy of the Party as the "core" and "backbone" (see note 6). It can also be said that the Party leadership is the "core" and the remaining Party masses are the "backbone".⁶ In this analogy, one can deduce that the non-Party masses are the remaining organs. Based on this, the relationship between the Party leadership and the Party masses can be understood as the central nervous system. The backbone Party masses serve to relay information on what is happening inside the body to the Party leadership, the core or brain. The Party masses also interact with the non-Party masses in a process that acts like the body's peripheral nervous system. Here the Party masses carry information from the backbone to the rest of the body, and similarly the non-Party masses, the peripheral nerves, carry information from the body to the backbone Party masses. The non-Party masses are not within the direct control of the Party leadership, so in order for the core Party leadership to function properly, it relies on the stability of the relationship between the Party and non-Party masses.

⁵ Truskowski et al., *Autonomous and autonomic systems : with applications to NASA intelligent spacecraft operations and exploration systems*, 179.

⁶ The more specific question in elite politics regarding the naming Xi Jinping as the "core" or the CCP Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping, or Mao Zedong, is not specifically related to my use of the analogy, in context the concept as explained in an article published through the Beijing municipality propaganda website (www.71.cn) and republished on Xinhua is helpful: "For the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese Communist Party is the core and backbone; for the 87,000,000 CCP members, the CCP Central Committee is the core and backbone; and for the CCP Central Committee, General Secretary Xi Jinping is the Core and Backbone. "全党切实增强政治意识、大局意识、核心意识、看齐意识是必然要求 (The Entire Party Earnestly Strengthening Political Consciousness, Consciousness of the Overall Situation, Consciousness of the Core and Consciousness of Keeping in Line, is a Necessary Requirement)." *Xinhua*, 11 April 2016. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-04/11/c_128884192.htm..

This process, however, is only an ideal. Unlike a perfectly functioning body the Chinese Communist Party does not naturally possess the reflex reactions of the biological ANS. The ANS is only emblematic of the type of structure the Party leadership is attempting to construct in order to regulate its own survival process. Because China is attempting the construction of a system it does not naturally possess, this thesis will base China's ANS framework on a quest since the beginning of the 21st century to apply the ANS to computing technology. This took place in response to problems presented by growing computing systems complexities. The chapter is organised by explaining [1] the theoretical basis and [2] the structural basis for the ANS framework, both as found through the Party-state's thinking. It then explains [3] the ANS framework as applied to computing technology, and [4] how the computing technology ANS framework is used to form the organisational and analytical structure for the subsequent chapters, which describe China's engineering of an "Autonomic Nervous System".

[4.1] Theoretical Basis for Applying ANS to China

This section advances two arguments on how Marxist-Leninist theory informs the CCP's social management process. These also explain why ANS is the best way to describe the process. First, the Party's particular way of thinking is found through the concept of dialectics. How this is applied in practice is found through the dialectical unity of holistic and reductionist approaches. This way of thinking reinforces the idea that social management is not in the narrow sense a social control or public administration project, but rather suggests that social management is a complex systems management process echoing a Leninist way of thinking and organisational structure. Second, through this understanding of the Party's way of thinking, how problems are defined and how problems are solved can be connected to practice.

The idea that society is an organism is embedded in Marxism-Leninism. Social management is broad, but not because it is a "magic wand, the cure to the many ills that still plague Chinese society and government".⁷ It is broad because it is a complex system pre-empting a perception of integrated threats. Unlike the Cartesian way of thinking, which approaches parts of a complex problem separately (reductionism), the Party approaches problem solving starting from the view of the organic whole (holism). In the Party's thinking on management methods, the starting point holistic approach is combined with reductionist approaches that address localised complexities. This reductionist approach is never fully separated from the whole because alone the individual parts would not add up to a whole, but rather to a greater whole due to the constant cycle of change and development.⁸ This thinking is connected to natural science, as Lenin wrote: "Natural science leads to the 'unity of matter'," to suggest

⁷ Pieke, "The Communist Party and social management in China," 159.

⁸ For example, the combined holistic and reductionist approach is mentioned in Chinese literature on management. Xiaodong Zhang and Wei Zhang, eds., *中国管理发展报告 2015 (Annual Report on Management in China 2015)*, 管理蓝皮书 (Blue Book of Management) (Social Sciences Academic Press, 2015), 130. This Blue Book covers the broad framework of the CCP's deepening of comprehensive reform to the management of China.

matter is disappearing implies “the limit within which we have hitherto known matter is vanishing and that our knowledge is penetrating deeper.”⁹

Such changes and interactions are a process based on the Marxist perspective of “internal relations”, as opposed to the perspective of “external relations”. Bertell Ollman described the difference as follows: Through external relations, what one would take to be “a ‘thing’ that may or may not undergo change and may or may not have relations with other things” is in the perspective of internal relations seen to be “both a ‘process’ and a ‘relation’.”¹⁰ For example, Xi Jinping, has stressed that comprehensively deepening reform requires systems thinking and structural thinking. He stated: “[China] must focus on the systemic, holistic, and synergetic aspects of the reform, advance the reform of key domains and crucial segments through overall coordination.” He added, “Structural thinking means paying attention to the constituent elements of things, and the relations, order, and proportion among them, it demands the realisation of these things' full potential function through optimising this structure.”¹¹

This was the same thinking behind Deng Xiaoping’s prioritisation of the “Four Modernisations” (四个现代化), i.e. the modernisation of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology. Here, it is instructive to remember Deng Xiaoping’s slogan: “grab with both hands, grasping firmly with both” (两手抓，两手都要硬), which in its various applications always refers to modernizing with one hand while maintaining a strict Leninist management system with the other.¹² When Deng Xiaoping said, “[we must] grasp with both hands”, he meant both economic development and ideology-driven political and social control efforts were required to re-establish the Party leadership’s authority following the Cultural Revolution. Various iterations of the phrase included: (1) “One hand grasps reform and opening up, one hand grasps the attack against all kinds of criminal activity”¹³; (2) “One hand grasps (Socialist) democratic construction, one hand grasps legal construction; (3) “One hand grasps economic construction, one hand grasps education, especially ideological and political education”; and (4) “One hand grasps economic construction, one hand grasps and construction of the spiritual civilisation.”¹⁴ With this phrase, Deng made clear that economic development was a crucial priority, but would not replace the centrality of the Party.

⁹ Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, "Chapter Five: The Recent Revolution in Natural Science and Philosophical Idealism," *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: Critical Comments on Reactionary Philosophy* (1908), <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/five2.htm>.

¹⁰ Bertell Ollman, "Marxism and the philosophy of internal relations; or, How to replace the mysterious 'paradox' with 'contradictions' that can be studied and resolved," *Capital & Class* 39, no. 1 (2015): 10.

¹¹ Yujie Zhao. "习近平治国理政的科学思维方式 (The Scientific Way of Thinking of Xi Jinping's Management State Affairs)." *The People's Daily Online*, 20 January 2017. <http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0120/c40531-29038623.html>.

¹² "两手抓，两手都要硬 (Grab with both hands, grasping firmly with both hands)". *People's Daily Online* 26 July 2004. <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/69113/69710/4725510.html>.

¹³ Crime would mean anything from: violent crime and economic crime to political crime.

¹⁴ Fengcheng Yang. "'两手抓'的源起、内涵与演变 (Origin, Connotation and Evolution of 'Grabbing with Both Hands')." *Guangming Daily*, 23 February 2011. http://epaper.gmw.cn/gmrb/html/2011-02/23/nw.D110000gmrb_20110223_5-11.htm.

Reform initiated in the late 1970s was not the initiation of the process of political liberalisation that would eventually bring with it the potential for democratisation, in the way many western scholars wanted to interpret it at the time. Rather it was bringing back into focus the other critical objectives of the Communist Party that Mao ignored in his perpetual mass movement. After all, the objectives of the Four Modernisations are found in original motives for revolution.¹⁵ In this light, reform was essentially a process of rebalancing that would return focus to the entire process.¹⁶

It is telling that research on the difference in “western” and Chinese approaches to systems management (research specific to engineering but also addressing the social application) has found that “the roadmap of Western systems thinking emerged from reductionism to holism, while the Chinese roadmap emerged from holism to reductionism to dialectic unity of the two.”¹⁷ While this is an accurate depiction of the “Chinese roadmap”, the difference is not as simple as ‘western’ versus Chinese thought. True, holism is a way of thinking with strong roots in traditional Chinese thinking. Holism features in Confucianism, for example, where the “universe is viewed as a vast integrated unit, not as discrete mechanistic parts.”¹⁸ Yet, rather than being a uniquely Chinese way of thinking, the characterisation should be that traditional Chinese ways of thinking have a natural resonance with the theories informing Marxism-Leninism. Marxism is western in origin, and Leninism is a form of totalitarianism, which is also western in origin. The question is not as much of one of cultural difference as it is one of absorption. Therefore, the more sensible conclusion is that given the natural marriage between traditional Chinese ways of thinking and Marxism-Leninism, it may be easier for the CCP’s system planners to begin problem solving processes from a holistic perspective.

The CCP’s way of systems thinking also explains why its problem-solving approach tends to integrate and overlap seemingly unrelated concepts. Bertell Ollman argued that the themes of science, critique, vision and strategy for revolution found in Marxism, are “intertwined and so mutually dependent that it is difficult to separate them completely from each other.”¹⁹ Many scholars either separate or dismiss the individual themes, but as Ollman contended: “It is dialectics, and Marx’s dialectics in particular, that not only allows him to knit together what most others consign to separate mental compartments but actually requires it.”²⁰ For the Chinese Communist Party, dialectics are a way of dealing with complex problems. The concept of dialectics, as applied to society, suggests society consists of many parts that are not independent of each other; rather, they intertwine. When one part changes, others invariably change with it, forming a natural system characterised by a continuous course of interaction

¹⁵ Mao, "Chapter Two: The Chinese Revolution".

¹⁶ For example, see: David S. G. Goodman, *Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese revolution : a political biography* (London: Routledge, 1994), 97.

¹⁷ Xing Pan, Ricardo Valerdi, and Rui Kang, "Systems Thinking: A Comparison between Chinese and Western," in *Conference on Systems Engineering Research (CSER '13)*, ed. Paredis C.J.J., C. Bishop, and D. Bodner (Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA: Procedia Computer Science, 2013), 1033.

¹⁸ Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Berthrong, "Confucianism Introduction," ed. Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Berthrong, *Confucianism and Ecology Volume* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1998), <http://fore.yale.edu/publications/books/cswr/confucianism-introduction/>.

¹⁹ Ollman, *Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx's Method*. Online copy, quote from: Chapter 1, "Introduction: Marxism, this Tale of Two Cities", Section 1.

²⁰ Ibid.

and change. In practice, the dialectical unity of holistic-reductionist approaches – when thoroughly applied – would effectively manage the whole system. This includes the management of the many organs of the state such as the economic system, military system, legal system, cultural system, and so on. Individually, each has its own complex systems management process, but these systems remain within the larger system. Full consideration of the interaction between them is crucial. In other words, recognising the Party’s position at the pinnacle of a system managed through the dialectical unity of holistic and reductionist approaches is not enough. The approach is designed to permeate each part of the whole system. The recognition, therefore, must be applied to analysis of how the concepts are applied in practice. This thinking points to the “system of systems” approach (see Chapter 5).

In the Communist Party’s point of view, to maintain social stability and direct adaptation so the CCP maintains power requires a highly complex system enabling the backbone Party masses to gather and report the changes to the core Party leadership while the core responds swiftly to lead the backbone to respond to the changes effectively– reflecting an ANS in action. More specifically, the social management process as a theory addresses this systemic dynamism, and the central concept informing this way of thinking is dialectics. It is not to suggest that dialectics explains social management as implemented, rather that dialectics provides the necessary frame for explaining the conceptual development of the social management process. Dialectics is a way of thinking that is not limited by an absolute framework, and can be described as bringing “into focus the full range of changes and interactions that occur in the world”.²¹ It is a way of thinking suggesting the ideal of maintaining a dynamic equilibrium. It is a dynamic equilibrium because equilibrium is also a process in a constant state of motion: as soon as equilibrium is achieved it will be quickly followed by disequilibrium.

It would be easy to dismiss this way of thinking as invalid pseudo-science. Whether or not Marxism-Leninism is “science” or “pseudo-science” is not a matter relevant to this particular discussion. What is important is that the CCP’s theorists continue to apply the Marxist-Leninist “scientific” way of thinking. The Marxist-Leninist way of thinking has been updated in the present day to fit current political circumstances. There are also mathematic and scientific concepts that are highly complementary of the Marxist-Leninist way of thinking. The concepts do not “validate” or “invalidate” Marxist-Leninist “scientific” thinking. Instead, they create a natural marriage between broadly accepted scientific and mathematical concepts and the Marxist-Leninist way of thinking.

These broadly accepted mathematic and scientific concepts are applicable to the CCP’s Marxist-Leninist governance theory described in this section. The most relevant specific concepts are [1] coupled harmonic oscillators (think of a mass on a spring, connected to another mass forming a system of masses connected by springs). Movement in one individual piece leads to movement in another. Thus, the entire system moves, describing the concept of [2] normal modes, which are representative of the collective motions the whole system (See Figure 1). So, the individual pieces of a

²¹ Ibid. Online copy, quote from: Chapter 1 "The Meaning of Dialectics", Section 2.

whole system are coupled harmonic oscillators, and the movement of the whole system is represented by normal modes. By studying the normal modes of vibration of a system of coupled oscillators, one is taking a holistic approach to studying the dynamics of a large system, made up of a group of small systems of harmonic oscillators.²²




Figure 1: Coupled Harmonic Oscillators

Source: Neil, Ethan. "Intro to Coupled Oscillators", *Physics 3210: Classical Mechanics and Math Methods II*, University of Colorado, Spring 2014, <http://bit.ly/2wgZdQs>. (Licensed as CC-SA)

More than being scientific concepts that illustrate a way of thinking, these are also the same concepts that are the basis of systems engineering research. These mathematical and scientific concepts are, from the CCP's perspective, easily transferred into the way of thinking behind the CCP's strategy for innovating social management. They are also literally fundamental mathematical and scientific concepts behind the technology being developed to enable the automation of the social management process (see Chapters Six, Seven and Eight). This helps to explain how theoretical discussion on regime security is highly relevant to actual system design in more than one way.

[4.2] Systemic Basis for Applying ANS to China

The scientific development concept (科学发展观) central to Hu Jintao's rhetoric was in the strictest sense first used in 2003. The "scientific" way of thinking, however, is embedded in Marxism Leninism, and the "scientific" concept of development has earlier origins. The concept as used in the present-day specifically emerged in the CCP's thinking in the 1970s under Deng Xiaoping. This section makes the case that the CCP has used modern scientific and technological concepts emerging from systems management theories to reframe the Leninist concepts from which social management is derived. It also indicates that these same concepts are related to the innovation or ("Self-Optimisation" of) social management, which Chapter Seven describes. Just as

²² Thank you to my friend, Dr. Michael Mavros, Harvard University Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology, for explaining the concepts of normal modes and harmonic oscillators to me, and for helping to ensure I correctly applied the concepts. Brendan Cole, "Everything—Yes, Everything—Is a Harmonic Oscillator," *Wired* 18 July 2016; Michael Dubson, Jon Olson, Ariel Paul, and Trish Loeblein, "Normal Modes,"

there was a natural resonance between Marxism-Leninism and traditional Chinese thinking on the theoretical issues behind social management, there was a natural resonance between the theoretical foundations of social management and the new technological revolution (新技术革命).²³

Present-day application of systems management theory in China is based on theories originally developed in mathematics, engineering and technology, during the mid-20th century by people such as: Norbert Wiener, the mathematician and philosopher who pioneered cybernetics; Alan Turing, the mathematician whose many contributions included a theory on the chemical basis for morphogenesis; Claude E. Shannon, the mathematician, cryptographer and electrical engineer who is credited as the founder of information theory; or Edward Lorenz, mathematician and meteorologist who pioneered thinking on chaos theory.²⁴ What these thinkers have in common is their contribution to devising a systematic approach for explaining the capacity of natural phenomena to manage complexities in a self-organising manner, showing adaptation through a non-linear connectivity rather than linearity. For example, Turing's morphogenesis intended to explain natural patterns such as skin pigmentation, while Lorenz attempted to develop a non-linear forecasting model. This linkage to natural science is likely why the ideas had so much resonance when Chinese theorists actively began in the late 1970s to integrate these ideas with Marxism-Leninism to discuss the Chinese brand of systems management, put into practice via social management.

Another major figure in this field of research was Chinese engineer Qian Xuesen (钱学森), who pioneered "engineering cybernetics" in 1954 while at the California Institute of Technology. After being deported to China during the Second Red Scare in 1955, he not only became popularly known as the father of China's modern rocket science, but also became one of the first (if not the first) to advocate the application of systems thinking to the social management process.²⁵ Although application of systems management theories like cybernetics to social management began in the 1970s, after the Cultural Revolution, Qian began suggesting the application of systems theories to social problem solving as early as 1957 during the Hundred Flowers Campaign. He implored the Chinese Academy of Sciences General Assembly to consider "the question of precision within social sciences" and bring "the mathematical analytical tools in the natural sciences into the social sciences," while arguing "the field between the natural sciences and social sciences [was] being ignored."²⁶

In the late 1970s, as Deng Xiaoping consolidated power and the Party leadership worked to regain control over society and itself following the Cultural Revolution,

²³ Referring to the period between the 1940s and 1970s, commonly known as the Scientific and Technical Revolution.

²⁴ Norbert Wiener, *Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal or the Machine*, 2nd revised ed. 1961 ed. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1948); Alan Mathison Turing, "The Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis," *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences* 237, no. 641 (1952); Claude E. Shannon, "A Mathematical Theory of Communication," *The Bell System Technical Journal* 27 (1948); Edward N. Lorenz, "Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow," *Journal of Atmospheric Sciences* 20 (1963).

²⁵ Hsue Shen Tsien, *Engineering Cybernetics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954).

²⁶ "有什么新学问被忽略了? 钱学森提出四个新技术的研究方向 (What new discipline of study is being ignored? Qian Xuesen raises four research directions on new technology)," *The People's Daily*, 28 May 1957.

direct discussion of science and its application to the social management process started to appear in state media articles with greater frequency. In most instances, social management was discussed in context of thinking on how natural sciences can be applied to the modern management of complex systems, including social management. It is exemplified by Qian Xuesen's focus on the idea that subsystems react to changes in their external environments, therefore changing the whole system.²⁷ By the 1980s this systems management thinking, largely derived from cybernetics, was becoming a leading way of thinking.²⁸ In the present day, systems engineering as applied to the CCP's social management process remains based primarily on this way of "systems thinking", which is to "comprehend things, and consider issues through the mutual connection, relative structure, and relative interaction of system and elements, elements and elements, and system and environment."²⁹ In fact, Hu Jintao acknowledged the influence Qian's application of cybernetics theory had on his scientific development concept, saying to Qian in 2008:

In the early 1980s, when I was at the Central Party School, I listened to your report. Your theory emphasised that in order to handle complex problems, [we] must pay attention to grasping [the problem] from the overall perspective, and give overall consideration to all factors involved. This was a very original idea. Now we emphasise scientific development, which is to pay attention to the overall plan, taking into account all factors, and paying attention to all-around coordination to enable sustainable development.³⁰

In systems thinking, a system is defined as an organic whole with specific elements being mutually dependent on each other. The system has "clear integrity, relativity, hierarchy, dynamic equilibrium, open-endedness and sequential nature."³¹ It has a conceptual linkage in Leninism. Where nature consisted "not only in matter, but also in natural laws directing its behaviour, floating somehow in the world as commanders who must be obeyed by the things."³² It means the Party is the "vanguard of the people" – like the "Mass Line Concept" it describes how scientifically guided Party cadres lead the people into the direction of prosperity and social equality. Rejecting these "scientific" laws meant to Lenin, "the denial of nature itself; to make man the creator of natural laws means to him to make human mind the creator of the world."³³

The idea that the social management process should be automated through technology and systems thinking is another critical concept that emerged as early as the late 1970s. It is highly relevant today, as this thinking on automation is the fundamental idea

²⁷ Hongzhang Jin, Jian Guo, Qi Wei, Deming Lin, and Qi Li, "Research on basic characteristics of complex system brittleness" *Journal of Marine Science and Application* 3, no. 1 (2004): 57.

²⁸ Yongzhen Liu, "一门应用广泛的方法性学科: 控制论 (Cybernetics: A Methodological Discipline with a Wide Range of Application)," *The People's Daily*, 10 February 1984.

²⁹ Zhao, "习近平治国理政的科学思维方式 (The Scientific Way of Thinking of Xi Jinping's Management State Affairs)."

³⁰ "深情的关怀 倾心的交谈——胡锦涛总书记看望著名科学家钱学森、吴文俊纪实 (Sympathetic Thoughts, Heartfelt Talks-- A Record of General Secretary Hu Jintao's Visit to Renowned Scientists Qian Xuesen and Wu Wenjun)", *The People's Daily*, 20 January 2008.

³¹ Zhao, "习近平治国理政的科学思维方式 (The Scientific Way of Thinking of Xi Jinping's Management State Affairs)."

³² Anton Pannekoek, *Lenin as philosopher: a critical examination of the philosophical basis of Leninism*, ed. Andrew Tallon, Revised ed., Marquette University Studies in Philosophy (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2003), 129.

³³ *Ibid.* 130.

behind the modern-day iteration of “grid management” (网格化管理, see Chapter Six) and Orwellian “social credit system” (社会信用体系, see Chapter Seven), which are both tools of the social management process. One person to discuss the subject was Yu Guangyuan (于光远), an influential Marxist theorist and economist who helped draft Deng Xiaoping's closing speech at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, “Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts and Unite as One Looking to the Future”. In 1977, Yu wrote that like the application of natural science to Marxism, China’s “modernised production management and social management established based on automation also require widespread application of the technologies stemming from modern natural science.”³⁴ “Automation” of information gathering, so that crisis can be pre-empted and managed, is what makes the newer system conceptually unique compared to previous forms of grid management. In fact, the grid management concept predates the CCP to at least the Song Dynasty that used the *baojia* (保甲) system of communal self-defence, a version of the *lijia* (里甲) system for local self-administration.³⁵

A report made during a Central Party and Government Lecture Series on the New Technological Revolution in 1984 highlighted the idea that within a system, sub-systems must share information in order to adequately solve problems. The report, written by renowned scientist and cybernetics expert Song Jian, said: “leaps and bounds in science and technology” since the 1940s had “influenced or given rise to transformations in the way social management agencies work. The theory and practice, perspective and method of systems engineering was born and developed from these changes.”³⁶ It elaborated that it is impossible to realise management modernisation by managing through experiences and determination of individuals or a small number of people, and, “Only if we fully grasp [the concepts of] information, data, systems analysis, and decision modelling, can we truly possess 'foresight and sagacity', and generate the courage and a bold vision consistent with the flow of history.”³⁷

Systems thinking is key to understanding not only how social credit fits into social management, but it also explains the many other aspects of social management that are required to function in order for social credit to work long-term. The same 1984 lecture series found:

To adopt systems engineering in the social domain, [we] must first settle these problems: First, we must establish an accurate functional definition for systems engineering, define what targets it should reach, establish facilities to ensure

³⁴ Yu Guangyuan, “科学有险阻 苦战能过关 (Only through hard struggles could [we] to pass the scientific challenges posed to us),” *The People's Daily*, 21 September 1977. Yu was also deputy chair and consultant for the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences from 1977-1986, and was the first head of the CASS Marxism-Leninism Institute in 1978.

³⁵ Ulrich Theobald provides an insightful overview of the system. See: Ulrich Theobald. “baojia 保甲, the communal self-defense system.” *ChinaKnowledge.de*, 22 January 2016. <http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Terms/baojia.html>.

³⁶ Jian Song, “系统工程与管理体制的改革 (Reform of Systems Engineering and Management Systems),” *The People's Daily*, 13 September 1984. ; Jian Song, “系统工程和新技术革命 (Systems Engineering and the New Technological Revolution),” *The People's Daily*, 6 September 1984. ; “Song Jian 宋健.” http://www.chinavita.com/biography/Song_Jian/full.

³⁷ Song, “系统工程与管理体制的改革 (Reform of Systems Engineering and Management Systems).”

information flow, and plan and develop methods and procedures for systems analysis. These four measures all require concrete engineering design and implementation plans. Secondly, to establish a functioning long-term systems engineering, requires a professional team, implementing a job responsibility system. Third, is to set up a department – also known as an overall design department – that understands all the management system while possessing the capacity for systems analysis. Without this kind of department, any effective systems engineering would be hard to establish and even less likely to work long-term. Fourth, a senior government official with strong leadership and command ability is required to succeed. The designated system to be governed through systems engineering is usually quite large, the development and implementation of governance plans will unavoidably encounter some difficulties and resistance, including different ideas between the various kinds of personnel. Therefore, whether or not systems engineering is realised depends on leading cadres' vision and sagacity and commanding courage.³⁸

This passage is incredibly relevant to the present day, and strongly related to the system construction that will be described in Chapter 5. At the time, while thinking on systems management in the 1980s was lucid, there was no cohesive national policy system effectively applying the systems management approach to the institutions enabling the social management process. The most significant structural changes began in earnest after 1989.

[4.3] The Autonomic Nervous System Application in Computing

The “Autonomic Nervous System” analytical framework is derived from the Party’s application of systems management to the Marxist-Leninist way of thinking. The ANS is a way of demonstrating the cohesion of concepts, as well as a way of explaining the interaction of continuity and change in policy direction and outcomes. This section describes the computing ANS application. The remaining chapters of this PhD draw from the ANS application in computing to design a framework for understanding how the CCP programmes state security through the social management process.

In computing, hardware and software interact with each other. Hardware components require software to tell it which tasks it must perform. Both the software (programming) and the hardware (system components) have become so complex that it is impossible to manually handle always changing and often conflicting demands, or maintain a dynamic equilibrium, in a timely and decisive way. A specific problem in the information technology industry has been attributed to an “inordinate emphasis on improving hardware performance with insufficient attention to the burgeoning of software features that always seem to require every possible bit of additional hardware power, to the neglect of other vital criteria”.³⁹ The result of the constant cycle of hardware-software upgrades is a complex “systems of systems” that “not only increases the total cost of ownership per computer but also hinders achieving dependability—or a system’s reliability, availability, safety, security, survivability and maintainability”.⁴⁰

³⁸ Song, "系统工程和新技术革命 (Systems Engineering and the New Technological Revolution)."

³⁹ Truskowski et al., *Autonomous and autonomic systems : with applications to NASA intelligent spacecraft operations and exploration systems*, 176.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

A system may be able to manually manage decision making and implementation in dynamic conditions when there are only tens or hundreds of demands, but when those demands multiply, the successful manual management of a system becomes impossible.

By the early 2000s, computer architects were struggling to handle growing complexities and design ways for the components of computer systems to interact and function stably so a system could operate in real time dependably. In 2001, the problem drove International Business Machines (IBM) to coin the phrase “autonomic computing” to describe the vision for developing self-managing computing systems.⁴¹ IBM’s proposal was that complex computing systems should have the ability to independently conduct routine maintenance and optimisation tasks, thus reducing the manual workload system administrators were required to carry out.⁴² The challenge behind achieving ANS for information technology is that a system must be aware of its available resources and components (their desired performance, current performance status, and how they are connected to other systems) and it must have a set of rules and policies for how these can be adjusted.⁴³ The concept includes not only the internal management of routine tasks, but also management of internal and external threats to the system, both accidental and hostile.

A necessary clarification is that, even though the concepts overlap, an autonomic system is not synonymous with an autonomous system. Autonomy denotes “self-governance”, and works through “automation of responsibility including some decision making for the success of tasks”.⁴⁴ Autonomy operates within a set of defined parameters, but when parameters become dynamic, the system may no longer be able to handle challenges. On the other hand, autonomic is classed as ‘involuntary’, ‘reflex’ and ‘spontaneous’. In computing, autonomic is also not the same as automatic, which implies something occurring without human intervention, because an autonomic reaction is triggered by a higher-level guidance of a central entity.⁴⁵ An autonomic system denotes “self-managing” and works through an “automation of responsibility including some decision making for the successful operation of the system” [emphasis added].⁴⁶ An autonomic system operates in a dynamic environment and is effectively able to help reduce burdens on a complex system, through the automation of lower level, but still vital, decision making and implementation.⁴⁷

⁴¹ Markus C. Huebscher and Julie A. McCann, "A survey of Autonomic Computing—degrees, models and applications," *ACM Computing Surveys* 30, no. 2 (2008): 2-3; Paul Horn. "Why autonomic computing will reshape IT." *CNET*, 15 October 2001. <https://www.cnet.com/news/how-autonomic-computing-will-reshape-it/>; Roy Sterritt and Michael G. Hinchey, "Towards Self-Managing Real-Time Systems" (paper presented at the International Multiconference on Computer Science and Information Technology, 2008).

⁴² Huebscher and McCann, "A survey of Autonomic Computing—degrees, models and applications," 3.

⁴³ Truszkowski et al., *Autonomous and autonomic systems : with applications to NASA intelligent spacecraft operations and exploration systems*, 178.

⁴⁴ Ibid. 11.

⁴⁵ M. Behringer, M. Pritikin, S. Bjarnason, A. Clemm, B. Carpenter, S. Jiang, and L. Ciavaglia. "Autonomic Networking: Definitions and Design Goals." *Internet Research Task Force*, 2015. 4, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7575>.

⁴⁶ Truszkowski et al., *Autonomous and autonomic systems : with applications to NASA intelligent spacecraft operations and exploration systems*, 11.

⁴⁷ J.O Kephart and D.M Chess, "The vision of autonomic computing," *Computer* 36, no. 1 (2003): 42.

While individual properties or parts may act autonomously, their role as part of the whole system, as directed by the system controller, is not autonomous. (Autonicity could lead to autonomy, but this explicitly is not the CCP's objective.) The ANS application is not about individual behaviours, but about how they are managed within a system. The analytical framework explains how a system can be designed to function more dependably. The autonomy of the individual or parts is what makes them unpredictable, which is why their management needs to operate as a dynamic rather than as a static control loop. The level of autonomy that an individual has within the system can be adjusted through the system, the judgement on how to adjust the level of autonomy is part of what the ANS itself is designed to perform. In the ideal outcome, the system administrator is required to make minimal interferences in lower-level decision making, but it still guides the overall objectives.

An autonomic system is made up of many autonomic elements. Each element must be self-managing and must function interdependently for the system to achieve equilibrium. In a computing system, all hardware and software parts must maintain equilibrium. The capacity to maintain equilibrium is a system's survivability, which is determined by a processes' success in terms of both internal and external environments. A computing system must find an equilibrium between its internal environment, e.g. functions such as CPU or memory use, and its external environment, e.g. its ability to withstand external attacks.⁴⁸ Each autonomic element consists of a "functional unit" responsible for performing "required services and functionality" and a "management/control unit" responsible for monitoring the "state and context of the element, [analysing] its current requirements and [adapting] to satisfy the requirements."⁴⁹ Achieving the desired performance level will always come with the added stumbling block that the solution to one problem may contradict the solution to another.

To work toward achieving autonomic functions, there are four widely accepted self-managing objectives that must first be realised: [1] Self-configuring, [2] Self-healing, [3] Self-optimising and [4] Self-protecting (see Table 3).⁵⁰ For the autonomic system to function as intended, these four objectives are not independent. They rely on each other to Self-Manage. Each is required to operate within the unified whole system.

The basic requirement of the Four "Self-" objectives is to handle decision making in non-deterministic environments. This means in different scenarios the same algorithm may exhibit different behaviours. It is not the same as operating in a deterministic environment, where no matter the scenario the same algorithm will always exhibit the same behaviours.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Manish Parashar and Salim Hariri, "Autonomic Computing: An Overview," in *Unconventional Programming Paradigms: International Conference UPP 2004*, ed. Jean-Pierre Banâtre, et al. (Le Mont Saint Michel, France: Springer, 2004), 261.

⁴⁹ Ibid. 253.

⁵⁰ Truszkowski et al., *Autonomous and autonomic systems : with applications to NASA intelligent spacecraft operations and exploration systems*, 11-12.

⁵¹ Nicola Capodieci, Emma Hart, and Giacomo Cabri, "Designing Self-Aware Adaptive Systems: from Autonomic Computing to Cognitive Immune Networks," in *SASOW '13 Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE 7th International Conference on Self-Adaptation and Self Organizing Systems Workshops* (2013), 59.

Table 3: The “Four Self-”s

Self-Managing Objective	Definition
Self-Configuring	A process of readjusting automatically “to respond to changing circumstances, or to support the process of ‘self-healing’, ‘self-optimisation’ or ‘self-protection’” ⁵²
Self-Healing	A system’s ability in “the reactive sense” to self-fix faults, and in the “proactive sense” to predict and prevent faults
Self-Optimisation	A system’s ability to “dynamically optimise its own operation”
Self-Protecting	The system’s “capability of protecting itself through perception of potential threats and prediction of outcomes of situations in the environment, and through self-configuring to minimize potential harm”

The success of the self-managing process depends on four enabling attributes, which are applied to each of the “Four Self-”s. The four enabling attributes were initially outlined in an expansion of the Autonomic Computing concept IBM contributed known as “MAPE-K”: Monitor, Analyse, Plan, Execute- Knowledge.⁵³ They are commonly described as:

- [1] Self-aware, which is “of internal capabilities and state of the managed component”, it is **M**onitoring and collecting;
- [2] Self-situated, which is “environment and context awareness”, or **A**nalysing the environment;
- [3] Self-monitor, a process used for **P**lanning and deciding, and
- [4] Self-adjust, which is “through sensors, effectors and control loops and is a process for acting on” and **E**xecuting changes based on the **K**nowledge and decision making acquired through the previous three steps.⁵⁴

These four MAPE-K attributes sit within two channel types. A “sensory channel” and a “motor channel” (see Figure 2). The Sensory Channel combines “Self-aware” and “Self-situated”. The Sensory Channel describes how an attribute has the capacity to sense the state of and changes in its internal and external environment. The Motor Channel combines “Self-monitor” and “Self-adjust”. The Motor Channel describes how an attribute, reacting to and countering the effects of the changes, adapts to maintain equilibrium.⁵⁵

⁵² Truszkowski et al., *Autonomous and autonomic systems : with applications to NASA intelligent spacecraft operations and exploration systems*.

⁵³ IBM. "Autonomic Computing White Paper: An architectural blueprint for autonomic computing." June 2005. <http://www-03.ibm.com/autonomic/pdfs/AC%20Blueprint%20White%20Paper%20V7.pdf>.

⁵⁴ Truszkowski et al., *Autonomous and autonomic systems : with applications to NASA intelligent spacecraft operations and exploration systems*, 11-12.

⁵⁵ Parashar and Hariri, "Autonomic Computing: An Overview," 251-52.

The process is achieved through a system and software engineering process, and adaptive learning. As it evolves, lower level decisions are made and eventually reported to administrators and users, and the information on the impact is used to inform the next cycle.⁵⁶ A system without faults is not the end goal, rather it is a system that is capable of preventing faults and then handling faults when they inevitably occur, so that they do not cause the entire system to collapse.




Figure 2: The CCP's Continuous MAPE-K Control Loop, divided into Sensory Channels and Motor Channels

The clarity of objectives in ANS should not lead to a false assumption that achieving the objectives can ever be simple. The ANS comprises of a “complex interaction between the behaviours of systems and their goals, users, and relationships with the external environment,” and a system can only optimise itself against criteria set by a management system where the criteria must be “explicit, symbolic, and machine-readable rather than embedded implicitly into algorithms.”⁵⁷ A successful system will achieve “dependability” (that is reliability, availability, safety, security, survivability and maintainability). For computers, this means that reliance can “be placed on the service it delivers. That service is its behaviour as perceived by other systems or its human users.”⁵⁸ The fundamental problem is that the benchmark for success continues to be

⁵⁶ Simon Dobson, Spyros Denazis, Antonio Fernández, Dominique Gaiti, Erol Gelenbe, Fabio Massacci, Paddy Nixon, Fabrice Saffre, Nikita Schmidt, and Franco Zambonelli, "A Survey of Autonomic Communications," *ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems* 1, no. 2 (2006): 226.

⁵⁷ Simon Dobson, Roy Sterritt, Paddy Nixon, and Michael G. Hinchey, "The Vision of Autonomic Computing," *Computer*, January 2010, 36.

⁵⁸ Roy Sterritt and Dave Bustard, "Autonomic Computing—a Means of Achieving Dependability?" (paper presented at the 10th IEEE International Conference and Workshop on the Engineering of Computer-Based Systems, 7-10 April 2003), 1.

set higher as systems become more and more advanced, and as such the concept of what it takes to achieve dependability becomes increasingly complex.

[4.4] Conclusion: Engineering China's Autonomic Nervous System

Achieving the Communist Party's "dependability" relies on the Party's ability to successfully shape, manage and respond to social demands. It must effectively pre-empt and manage all threats to state security. In order to continue building dependability, the Party must always revisit the basic requirements of: [1] ensuring that the Party masses are serving the core, and [2] ensuring that the relationship between the Party and non-Party masses remains stable enough, to allow the Party to mitigate and respond to all possible nodes of conflict. These requirements must be met through a pre-emptive process. That process must ensure instability never reaches a point beyond the Party leadership's control. It is another reason why social management, i.e. China's Autonomic Nervous System design, is the process that programmes China's state security.

As this chapter has indicated, there is a strong consistency between the Party-state's Marxist-Leninist ideology and thinking on governance system design. The analytical framework of China's Autonomic Nervous System, adapted from the computing technology version of ANS, is designed to explain how social management as a process is implemented in order to meet the Party-state leadership's state security objective. The ANS framework is not only a useful way of describing a very complex subject. It also has numerous literal connections to the way the Party-state leadership and theorists are attempting to apply both complex systems theories, as well as modern technology, to automate the process of social management. Unsurprisingly, the biggest obstacle is translating theory into practice.

The next four chapters use the ANS analytical framework to explain how China programmes state security through social management. The next four chapters are divided by the ANS "Four Self-": Self-Configuring, Self-Healing, Self-Optimising and Self-Protecting. The subjects of these chapters correspond with the four key objectives for social management system construction outlined in the 2011 12th Five-Year Plan, where "social management" was formally elevated as a key objective.⁵⁹ Chapter 37 of the 12th Five Year Plan, "Innovating the Social Management System", outlined four key objectives: speeding up the establishment of a [1] "social management system" that combines [2] "source governance", [3] "dynamic management", and [4] "emergency response".⁶⁰ At the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, Hu Jintao's report described the objectives in the same way. A *People's Daily* article published in early 2013 referred to Hu's report, and provided specific detail on the meaning of source governance, dynamic management and emergency response.⁶¹

⁵⁹ It is worth pointing out that the chapter structure along the lines of the 12th Five Year Plan was not initially by intentional design. I determined what information would go into each chapter based on my own definition of the parts that make up social management. Much later, I revisited the 12th Five Year Plan and realised the chapter structure was literally described in the plan, which simply re-affirmed my analytical choices.

⁶⁰ "“十二五”规划纲要 (Outline of the 12th Five Year Plan)."

⁶¹ Zhe Tang and Tiezhu Fu. "源头治理 动态管理 应急处置——学习党的十八大精神 (Source Governance, Dynamic Management, and Emergency Response-- Learn the Spirit of the 18th

Chapter Five, “Self-Configuring”, is focused on the concept and development of a governance structure to support construction of the “social management system”. Chapter Six, “Self-Healing”, is focused on the concept and practice of “source governance”. Chapter Seven, Self-Optimising, is focused on the concept of dynamic management. Lastly, Chapter Eight, Self-Protecting, is focused on the concept and practice of emergency response.

Each of the chapters is sub-divided into two substantive sections, one on China’s ANS “Sensory Channel” attributes, and the other on China’s ANS “Motor Channel” attributes. The Sensory Channel sections describe how the Party-state leadership senses the current state and changes of both its internal and external environment. China’s ANS Sensory Channels are broadly focused on problem orientation. The Motor Channel sections describe how it reacts to and adjusts based on this sensory knowledge. China’s ANS Motor Channels are broadly focused on responding to the problems the Sensory Channels identified. Together they demonstrate how the objectives of social management contribute to the attempted construction of the complex systems management process that is best visualised as China’s Autonomic Nervous System.

Given that the descriptions of four objectives of social management – system construction, source governance, dynamic management, and emergency response – directly correspond to the description of the Four "Self-'s", the introduction to each of the next four chapters refers back to the 12th Five Year Plan and *People’s Daily* article on Hu's speech at the 18th Party Congress. The repetitive references to these texts is not because they should be interpreted as the "key" texts on social management, although they are highly important. The purpose of the repetition is to reiterate why a broad range of seemingly disconnected parts actually sit within a cohesive whole, according to the Party’s way of thinking. Referring back to these texts also helps to bring cohesion to what is a necessarily complicated explanation of a complex systems management process. A translation of the full text of Chapter 37 of the 12th Five Year Plan is also located in Appendix I, as an additional reference.

The four social management objectives of system construction, source governance, dynamic management, and emergency response objectives described under Hu Jintao have clearly persisted thematically under Xi Jinping, but the preferred word choices have changed somewhat. Under Xi, the process is explicitly placed within the state security system and objectives through its emphasis on the tasks associated with pre-emption and control. The choice language under Xi is also more strongly correlated with the “automation” objectives (specifically described in the “Motor” channel sections of chapters 5-8), and the applicability of big data and artificial intelligence—particularly as the social credit system is being designed. is often focused on the automation of these tasks. Parts of the same objectives are often referred to through conversation on “perfecting the three-dimensional social order prevention and control

National Congress of the CCP)." *The People's Daily* 25 February 2013. <http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0225/c40531-20586423.html>; "胡锦涛在中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会上的报告 (Hu Jintao's Report at the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party)." *Xinhua*, 17 November 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-11/17/c_113711665_8.htm.

system". In fact, on 20 September 2017, Xi Jinping attended a meeting of the Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security and "called for more systematic and innovative social governance, stressing the need to improve the capability to predict and prevent security risks."⁶² Further reiterating the pre-emptive objectives of the social management system, as they relate to state security objectives.

The descriptions in each of the chapters, out of necessity, cover several decades. This accounts for the historical development of the social management process (as well as the state security objective). Therefore, the historical starting point for each chapter's Sensory and Motor Channels is also slightly varied. The most crucial point to bear in mind while reading these chapters is that the "Four Self-"s objectives can be partially developed separately, but if the ANS ideal is to be achieved they must combine.

⁶² Zhang, "Security Innovation Seen as Crucial."

Chapter Five I

Self- Configuring

‘The tendency has always been strong to believe that whatever received a name must be an entity or being, having an independent existence of its own. And if no real entity answering to the name could be found, men did not for that reason suppose that none existed, but imagined that it was something peculiarly abstruse and mysterious.’
-John Stuart Mill

Deng Xiaoping’s December 1978 speech, “Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts”, said an over-concentration of power had undermined democratic centralism (民主集中制).¹ Democratic centralism is a “process of collective decision making and collective action that can take a variety of forms, corresponding to the development of the organisation and the changing demands of the class struggle”.² Whether the brief “collective” model under Hu Jintao, or personalised centralisation of power under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Xi Jinping, it is intended to enforce unity and mandate the implementation of the Party leadership’s directives, i.e. implementation of the Party leadership-controlled “general-line” (Party line). Invoking the concept serves as a warning that inevitable conflicts within the Party (i.e. opposing power bases), including at the highest levels, should not threaten the current leadership, and ultimately the CCP’s rule. Such conflicts are Hostile Internal Threats, and are reflective of the point where ‘Party’s’ objective to maintain power and individual’s desire for power within that system intersect.

A 2016 book, “Edited Excerpts from Discussions by Xi Jinping on Tightening Party Discipline and Rules” (published by the Central Documents Press) accused Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, Ling Jihua and other anti-corruption campaign targets of “political plot activities” aimed at “wrecking and splitting the Party”.³ The accusations seemingly lend credibility to the rumours that Zhou, who was in charge of the country’s vast internal security apparatus as head of the Central

¹ “Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future.” 13 December 1978. http://cpcchina.chinadaily.com.cn/2010-10/15/content_13918199.htm.

² Marxists.org. “Encyclopedia of Anti-Revisionism On-Line, Bay Area Socialist Organizing Committee: Confronting Reality/Learning from the History of Our Movement.” <https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/nem-7/basoc/ch-5.htm>.

³ Didi Kirsten Tatlow. “In Book, Xi Jinping Taints Ousted Rivals With Talk of Plots.” *The New York Times*, 27 January 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/28/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-plot.html?mcubz=3&_r=0.

Political-Legal Committee (CPLC), and others, made a coup attempt in spring or early summer 2012 ahead of the 18th Party Congress. A similar December 2016 *Seeking Truth* article accused the so-called ‘tigers’ of "violating the Party central committee's strategic decision making in favour of their own agenda, and undermining democratic centralism." The article further claimed their “inflated political ambition” led to political conspiracy, and “undermined the Party's organisation” and unity.⁴ What happened will likely never be known. What is known is ahead of the 18th Party Congress, there was a shift in the way “social management”, a process Zhou largely oversaw as CPLC head, was discussed.

The shift was initially evident through a series of articles in publications like the *Study Times*, *Red Flag* and *Seeking Truth*—all under the Central Party School, whose president was Xi Jinping from 2007-2012.⁵ These articles criticised social management and suggested the coercive security aspects of social management had overshadowed less coercive aspects, such as cadre performance and propaganda.⁶ One *Study Times* article said the problem with Political-Legal Committees (the CPLC and local versions) being in charge of social management was their narrow focus on imposing social order (社会秩序), which was not the same as social management. Other important departments, it said, were left out because they could not be brought into the Political-Legal system. They included: civil affairs, social insurance, letters and complaints, and “other relevant government departments of vital interest to the people”.⁷ Another article on replacing the phrase social management with the phrase social governance, said:

Promoting modernisation of the national governance system and governance capacity allows the Party and government to promptly update the governance concept through innovation and improving construction of economic, political, cultural, social, ecological civilisation. Party-building and other areas of system mechanisms and law and legislation, the elimination of system mechanism abuses to the maximum possible extent, and making all aspects of the system more scientific and more complete, so to achieve the systemisation of governance, scientific(-isation), standardisation, and procedural(-isation) [is required]. The social governance system and governance capacity modernisation will supply a solid and powerful system mechanism to ensure our country's socialist modernisation construction.⁸

⁴ "反对“四个主义” 坚决维护党中央权威 (Oppose the "Four Principles" and Resolutely Safeguard the Authority of the Party Central Committee)." *Seeking Truth*, 31 December 2016. http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2016-12/31/c_1120211702.htm.

⁵ Hoffman and Mattis, "China's Proposed “State Security Council”: Social Governance under Xi Jinping."; Mattis, "Resolving Contradictions in Social Management."; Hoffman, "Portents of Change in China's Social Management."; Mattis, "In a Fortnight: Central Party School's Critiques Suggest New Leadership Dynamics."

⁶ Hoffman and Mattis, "China's Proposed “State Security Council”: Social Governance under Xi Jinping."; Mattis, "Resolving Contradictions in Social Management."; Hoffman, "Portents of Change in China's Social Management."; Mattis, "In a Fortnight: Central Party School's Critiques Suggest New Leadership Dynamics."

⁷ Hu Yinglian. "社会管理谁来管 (Who Manages Social Management)." *Study Times*, 18 June 2012. <http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49154/18220238.html>.

⁸ Guoqi Wang. "从社会管理到社会治理是重大理论和实践创新 (The Move From Social Management to Social Governance is a Great Theoretical and Practical Innovation)." *Xi'an Daily*, 15 March 2014. http://www.qstheory.cn/zl/bkxj/201403/t20140315_330333.htm.

This discussion did not point to a version of social management that was more inclusive of “civil society” as the concept is understood in the west. Instead, it pointed to a central problem in building a social management process to serve the Party leadership’s interests, which is creating a dependable institutional mechanism to support the social management process. The individuals who control the day-to-day operation of social management inherently control a large amount of power and resources for ensuring that power. The system’s structure should, ideally, control that power for the sake of the Party’s own longevity. Social management is also considered a complex systems management process: several sub-systems within the larger political system must interact efficiently to achieve social management’s state security objective. The social management system must optimise interactions vertically (within the Party), and horizontally (between agencies).⁹ The structure must be flexible, given the issue-based, geographical and situational differences affecting how the system can react.

These structural requirements describe the Autonomic Nervous System’s Self-Configuring objective. Self-Configuring requires a system with the capacity to readjust automatically “to respond to changing circumstances, or to support the processes of ‘self-healing’, ‘self-optimisation’ and ‘self-protection’.”¹⁰ The system must configure itself “according to high-level goals, that is, by specifying what is desired, not necessarily how to accomplish it.”¹¹ The ANS Self-Configuring objective requires a central system, which can support the optimal operations of the sub-systems within it.¹² Flexibility is essential to allow construction “based on the needs of the platform and the user.”¹³

The Party has regularly signalled its efforts to design the type of system China’s ANS Self-Configuring objective represents. When the 12th Five Year Plan elevated social management as a key objective, it called for strengthening law, and system and capacity building, in accordance with the requirements of a social management structure. The structure requires the Party [central] committee's leadership, government rule, social cooperation, and public participation. The 12th Five Year Plan also called for “the integration of power” and “the overall coordination of all sides to improve the leadership of society, the organisation of society, the management of society, and the capacity to serve the community”.¹⁴ The 2013 *People’s Daily* article on establishing the social management mechanism according to requirements highlighted during the 18th Party Congress, said the social management mechanism is not only reflective of the “summary and development of the practical experience” of the country’s social management since the reform period began, but also the “basic path and method” for ensuring “people’s safe living and happy working, social stability and order, and the

⁹ Referring to the usage of the terms “纵向” vertical, and “横向” horizontal, or 纵横结合 vertical and horizontal integration.

¹⁰ Truszkowski et al., *Autonomous and autonomic systems : with applications to NASA intelligent spacecraft operations and exploration systems*.

¹¹ Huebscher and McCann, "A survey of Autonomic Computing—degrees, models and applications," 7.4.

¹² Sterritt and Hinchey, "Towards Self-Managing Real-Time Systems," 755.

¹³ Huebscher and McCann, "A survey of Autonomic Computing—degrees, models and applications," 7.4.

¹⁴ ““十二五”规划纲要 (Outline of the 12th Five Year Plan).”

state's long-term peace and stability.”¹⁵

This chapter describes the attempted construction of the ANS Self-Configuring objective. The structure is best explained as the creation of a policy-based autonomic ecosystem employing a “system of systems” approach. Section 5.1, describing the ANS Sensory Channels, is explained through the conceptual development of social management. Section 5.2 on the ANS Motor Channels, focuses how a system that would meet the ANS Self-Configuring requirement is being constructed.

[5.1] Sensory Channels: Self-Aware and Self-Situated

China’s ANS Self-Configuring objective’s ‘Self-aware’ and ‘Self-situated’ Sensory Channels describe the types of resources that must be “configured” to meet the objective (see Figure 3). This refers to the resources that must be configured for social management to effectively programme state security. Sensory Channels must sense changes in the system’s internal and external environment. Self-aware describes monitoring of resources required to build the social management system. Self-situated describes the analysis of the changing environment in relation to structural requirements.




Figure 3: China’s ANS Self-Configuring Sensory Channels

The following subsections demonstrate that social management was not a new concept when it became prominent in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Its elevation brought cohesion to a set of system requirements, which were articulated around the subject between the late 1970s and 1980s. These were also not “new” requirements. They were linked to thinking on how to re-construct methodologies for managing society based on existing social management theory. It demonstrates a growing understanding of how the concept of what was required to build the social management system in order to ensure the state security requirement the social management process supports. The response to these problems is covered more specifically in Section 5.2, where the Motor Channels of the Self-Configuring objective’s control loop appear to be responding to the knowledge gained through Sensory Channels of the Self-Configuring objective’s control loop.

¹⁵ Tang and Fu, "源头治理 动态管理 应急处置——学习党的十八大精神 (Source Governance, Dynamic Management, and Emergency Response-- Learn the Spirit of the 18th National Congress of the CCP)."

Social Management Structure under Mao Zedong

In the Mao era, the term “social management”, although ambiguous and used infrequently, was found in context of writing on the development of a system for social organisation and control. These usually focused on the people’s participation in their own management, and essentially described the construction of the Mass Line process.

In fact, the concept appeared prior to the PRC’s founding. One *People’s Daily* article from 3 August 1949, on establishing the CCP-led government in Hebei, focused on priorities for establishing post-liberation government.¹⁶ The commander of Hebei province military district, Sun Yi, gave a speech on suppressing insurgents against CCP and establishing law and order. Sun said this task should “rely on the masses, mobilising the masses, organising the masses, and combining with various forces to advance the armed suppression.” He added that the old district organisation was being adjusted, and arrangement of a people's militia, strengthening of “social management” and education of the masses on the spirit of the rule of law, were all objectives.

It goes without saying that in the Mao era, social management was largely enabled through coercive force. The Political-Legal System (政法系统) was established in the 1950s. It was in charge of a wide range of departments, including the court and prosecution systems, labour camps, fire departments, border security, secret police, passport issuance, and was expected to find and persecute those deemed “class enemies” during Mao’s mass campaigns.¹⁷ Importantly, however, social management in theory was also inclusive of cooperative control. This theory was found in, and perhaps partly derived from the practices of other Communist states. The concept appeared several times in articles translated into Chinese from these other countries. For instance, a 1956 *People’s Daily* article translated a summary of a report from the former Yugoslavia, said “social management” was the power to mobilise the working people. It also referred to social management agencies as engaging in political work and social-political organisation.¹⁸

A template for how the CCP’s social management process was envisaged is found in social organisation during the Mao era. One 1958 CCP Central Committee directive, during the Great Leap Forward and printed in the *PLA Daily*, said commune members were recruited “extensively to participate in social management”.¹⁹ It added the effort of identifying and absorbing voluntary passion for social management should be conducted to strengthen the Party. In its ideal form, the commune system was a self-managing unit of production. The commune was also directed at the self-management

¹⁶ Ji Chen, “发展生产建设新河北 河北省政府主席杨秀峰等在成立大会上的讲话摘要 (Developing Production and Building a New Hebei, Summary of Chairperson Yang Xiufeng's Speech at the Inauguration of the Provincial General Assembly)” *People’s Daily*, 3 August 1949.

¹⁷ Kenneth Lieberthal, *Governing China : From Revolution through Reform* (New York ; London: Norton, 1995), 200.

¹⁸ “兰科维奇的报告 ([Aleksandar] Rankovic’s Report),” *The People’s Daily*, 16 March 1956.

¹⁹ CCP Central Committee, “中共中央关于今冬明春在农村中普遍展开社会主义和共产主义教育运动的指示 (The CCP Central Committee Instructions Pertaining to Unfolding and Spreading Socialism and the Communist Education Movement in Rural Villages This Winter and Next Spring)” *People’s Liberation Army Daily*, 11 September 1958.

of social life, the allocation of resources, administration and Party-state power.²⁰ Maurice Meisner described communes as originally conceived during The Great Leap Forward as a process of appropriating administrative functions of administrative villages and “making the commune a political unit, ‘performing the functions of state power’ and ‘the most desirable organization form,’ for the period of the transition from socialism to communism.” Meisner added, communes, “were not merely productive organizations but ones which ‘combined economic, cultural, political and military affairs,’ and combined ‘workers, peasants, merchants, students and militia into a single entity’.”²¹ The Great Leap Forward involved the extensive use of violent coercion, and resulted in famine and the deaths of at least 30 million people in rural China, and, if Frank Dikötter’s research is correct, at least 45 million people.²² So, it may not seem logical for the CCP leadership to continue to draw from what is likely the most catastrophic example of failed central planning in modern history. As the following sections will demonstrate, however, most of the key concepts and objectives in this example have remained consistent.

Work units, or *danwei* (单位), in urban China were similarly designed. As Elizabeth Perry and others have described, *danwei* were not only places of work. They were also tools for political mobilisation, which used co-option and coercion. Work unit members were allocated public goods and were classified based on their “good” or “bad” political standing.²³ The division of society into smaller units did not allow autonomy from the Party. Instead, the divisions were directed at the creation of subsystems to enforce political control over a physical space. The process was enabled through economic and social functions.

Considering the use of the phrase “social management” in relation to Mao era political, economic and social units, the modern concept of social management has remained strikingly similar to the Mao era concept. Social management continues to incorporate multiple facets of social, economic and political life. It is made operational through co-optive and coercive tactics. Mass mobilisation is not as visible as it was in the Mao era. The tactics have been redesigned, the objective has not. Social management no longer involves the concept of joining individual units of production to the process of social organisation. As the following chapters will demonstrate though, the Party-state leadership is attempting to integrate social and economic development as a direct way of constructing, and eventually automating, the social management process.

²⁰ Maurice J. Meisner, *Mao's China and After : A History of the People's Republic*, Transformation of Modern China Series (New York: Free Press, 1986), 227-28.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Frank Dikötter. "Mao's Great Leap to Famine." *The New York Times*, 15 December 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/opinion/16iht-eddikotter16.html>.

²³ Perry, "Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?," 11; Wen-hsin Yeh, "Republican Origins of the Danwei: The Case of Shanghai's Bank of China," ed. Xiaobo Lü and Elizabeth J. Perry, Kindle ed., *Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (London; New York: Routledge, 2015). 67; Barry Naughton, "Danwei: The Economic Foundations of a Unique Institution," ed. Xiaobo Lü and Elizabeth J. Perry, Kindle ed., *Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (London; New York: Routledge: An East Gate Book, 2015). 184-86.

Social Management Structure under Deng Xiaoping

As China's social and economic structure was changing throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Party leadership was navigating ways to re-exert control. At this time, as Chapter Four explained, there was discussion on how complex systems theory could be applied to design a social management process. There was also conversation on how technology could be used to support social management, but it was only theory at this stage and not practice. Even if the technology already existed, the basic system for social management would first need to be re-designed.

The early development of a new system for social management is found mostly through the legal system, where in terms of social management objectives, the law is used as a coercive tool for social control. Stanley Lubman has said in the 1980s Party leaders were keen to promote law-focused crime control. Crackdowns like “strike hard” (严打) campaigns were employed. They were justified as being distinct from Mao-era purges, struggles and mass campaigns.²⁴ Lubman quoted an April 1982 decision of the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council, which said:

In dealing blows at serious criminal activities in the economic sphere, we are resolutely against making the work a mass movement...However, in dealing with major and key cases which are relatively complicated and which involve more people, we must completely follow the mass line; that is, we must within a definite scope, mobilise the masses knowing about the cases to factually expose and inform against those who have committed serious crimes.²⁵

Emphasis on the Mass Line concept is important. It highlights that social control via the law was seen as a means to elicit a particular response from society, (and the Party masses). That process is designed to benefit the interests of the Party leadership. In a sense, this could explain how the law functions to control society anywhere. Of course, like the “state security” versus “national security” case, it carries a different meaning.

Social management also directly appeared in the 1979 Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China.²⁶ Chapter Six of the law was on the “Crime of Obstructing the Order of Social Management” (妨害社会管理秩序). Typically, this has been translated as the Crime of Obstructing Administration of Public Order. The translation, while not factually incorrect, fails to capture how the application of the law was strongly related to social management as it was already understood. A crime that obstructed the order of social management could be described as any crime, including political, judged as being harmful to the scientific progress of the CCP-led system. Publicised cases prosecuted under the law were often protest-related, such as labourers' roadblock protests and several included the accusation of ‘fabricating charges’ against local officials.²⁷ Economic crimes were also included because a crime against economic

²⁴ Stanley B. Lubman, *Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 135.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ The law has been amended several times since 1979, most recently in 2015 (at time of writing).

²⁷ “北京市中级人民法院再次开庭 傅月华妨害社会管理秩序被判刑二年 (During a Session of the Beijing Intermediate People's Court Fu Yuehua was Sentenced to Two Years in Prison for Obstructing the Order of Social Management),” *The People's Daily*, 25 December 1979. ; Baya Zheng

order "inevitably damages economic construction," which linked social management to the success of economic reform.²⁸

The relevance of the Mass Line concept is also found in explanations for how the law was designed to reinforce the Party leadership's decision making. Cadre accountability is a part of social management. The requirement has the explicit purpose of defending the Party leadership—it is not designed to elicit actual accountability as it would be understood in the framework of a western democracy. One article said because Party cadres are the "leaders and organisers of the implementation of the law", they must organise the masses in their respective regions and departments by making "good use of legal weapons to achieve social management and economic management tasks".²⁹ This was equally the responsibility of Party cadres and the armed forces. As a *PLA Daily* article in 1988 explained:

One of the most important aspects of the current political system reform is to change the decision-making systems and methods that are not suited for modern requirements. The law includes functions as dictatorial instruments, as well as social management functions. The higher the degree of socialised production, the stronger the function of the law to manage society, and the decisions of leading mechanisms (including the military) at all levels will depend increasingly on the law. Therefore, the decision-making system that is compatible with the modern economy and social management means leading members must themselves possess a strong legal understanding, and possess a firm grasp of the legal knowledge related with their duty, establish a set of strict decision-making procedures and decision support system (namely a consulting, evaluation, control and feedback system). The armed forces, from the bottom to the top, should set up a competent legal services mechanism, both as an attempt to improve the leadership decision making system for the future, and to ensure leaders make decisions in compliance with the law right now.³⁰

By default, the law-focused version of social management required that cadres enforced the law only as perceived problems occurred. Viewed through the lens of social management, there are two problems with this system. First, cadres should, ideally, be held accountable. They are not responsible to the objective "law", but are responsible to the Party leadership. In practice, there is not a strong degree of difference between "law" and "policy"—the Party leadership determines policy and that policy is the law, written or not.³¹ This applies to cadres, including the armed forces, as well as society. Second, the law is largely a tool that allows the social management process to be implemented from the top down via coercion. As its description in the Mao era instructed—a significant part of the social management process is the people's

and Lihua Guo, "上海判处破坏铁路交通罪犯 王长发、朱易胜、徐智经分别判处有期徒刑九年、五年和有期徒刑二年缓刑二年 (Shanghai Sentenced 'Railway Traffic Damage' Convicts Wang Changfa, Zhu Yisheng, and Xu Zhijing to Carry Out Nine Years, Five Years, and Two Years with Two Years Suspended Sentences.)," *The People's Daily*, 14 December 1979.

²⁸ Siqing Zhang, "坚决惩治贪污贿赂等经济犯罪 (Resolutely Punish Corruption, Bribery and Other Economic Crimes)," *The People's Daily*, 1 November 1993.

²⁹ Guiwu Wang, "谈谈干部学法守法执法问题 (Let's Talk About the Problem of Cadres Abiding by and Enforcing the Law)," *The People's Daily*, 14 December 1985.

³⁰ "法律监督服务机构产生的意义 (Meaning of the Establishment of the Legal Oversight Service Mechanism)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 1988.

³¹ "建立公正严格的军事法制权威 (Establish a Just and Strict Military Legal Authority)", *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 3 August 1989.

participation. This requires co-option next to coercion. Neglecting other aspects of social management is to neglect crisis pre-emption.

The modern concept of the Comprehensive Management of Public Security (社会治安综合治理 CMPS) emerged during the same time period, and addressed the problems of law-focused social management. The rise of the CMPS reflected an attempted structural integration of internal security and social resources aimed at producing a more effective social management system. It is an approach that calls on both cooperative and coercive tactics constantly acting together. As Wang and Minzer argued, the rise of the current version of “the Chinese Security State” began with substantial and comprehensive national-level structural changes after Tiananmen in 1989. These changes emerged from a conversation that began in the late 1970s.³² CMPS was piloted at local level governments across the country throughout the 1980s. For instance, Siping City, Jilin Province, reported in November 1981:

In Siping City, experience with the implementation of the Comprehensive Management of Public Security has once again provided proof, that punishment of crime according to the law is required (this aspect of work ought to be strengthened), but only relying on legal sanctions, is not enough, and it is impossible to address the root of the problem [through the singular method of law enforcement].³³

Comprehensive management encouraged Political-Legal committees’ efforts to strengthen grassroots Party construction, ideological and political work, and organisation. It involved mobilisation through the local branches of propaganda departments, the women's federation, the labour federation, and the Communist Youth League. It required their cooperation with relevant local government departments to implement comprehensive management measures.³⁴ Importantly, CMPS was not really an alternative method of social management compared to “strike hard”. CMPS represented a social management concept that was inclusive of strike hard and other coercive policing tactics.³⁵ Instead of over-emphasising reactive crime control, CMPS incorporated pre-emptive methods into the social management process. It was not a dramatic departure from the Mao-era version of the social management concept.

³² Wang and Minzer, "The Rise of the Chinese Security State."

³³ "加强领导动员各方力量 四平市社会治安持续好转 (Strengthen the Leadership [Capacity to] Mobilise All Forces; Siping City [Jilin] Social Order Continues to Improve)," *The People's Daily*, 9 November 1981.

³⁴ "动员和组织各方面力量 认真贯彻综合治理的方针 地处陕晋交界的合阳县社会治安良好 刑事案件逐步减少, 政治形势安定 (Mobilise and Organise All Aspects of Power, Conscientiously Implement Comprehensive Management Guidelines, Located on the edge of Shanxi and Shaanxi, Heyang's Social Order is Favourable, Criminal Cases are Progressively Lowered, and the Political Situation is Stable)," *The People's Daily*, 14 July 1982.

³⁵ "严厉打击刑事犯罪活动保障两个文明建设 (Strike Hard Against Criminal Activities to Protect the Construction of Two Civilisations [Material Civilisation and Spiritual Civilisation])," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 26 August 1986.; Xuecheng Yin, "江苏省委召开 社会治安综合治理工作座谈会 (The Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee Held a Work Conference on the Comprehensive Management of Public Security)," *The People's Daily*, 13 December 1984.

Social Management Structure post-Tiananmen

Tiananmen likely accelerated planned social management reforms, rather than acting as a cause. Some structural reforms to the social management system, emphasising the deeper development of a CMPS structure, were seemingly planned by 1988. For instance, at a December 1988 Civil Affairs Conference in Beijing, it was expressed that civil affairs work's strategic objectives over the next five years were to: "strengthen grassroots level regime building, [by] preliminarily establishing a dynamic, authoritative, and functional grassroots administrative and social management system that fits in with reform and commodity economy development."³⁶

Between 1990 and 1991, CMPS system establishment accelerated. Wai Hei Samson Yuen found that CMPS committees appeared at all levels of government in April 1991 (after the Central CMPS committee was formed) and by 2009 over 100,000 local CMPS offices existed across China.³⁷ The most prominent aspect of the discussion about CMPS and "social management" after Tiananmen was the concept of individual "responsibility". That is, individual responsibility to uphold the Party through "morality", or other means of "participation". Conversation around the issue of Political-Legal Committee system's function and the CMPS system was focused on building the capacity to promote individual responsibility. There was also emphasis on improving coordination of the departments in the Political-Legal apparatus. At a December 1994 national Political-Legal Work Conference, Jiang Zemin said:

As long as we persevere with the Party's basic line, genuinely grasping firmly with both hands, during the course of establishing a socialist market economy, from beginning to end persevere with socialist spiritual culture construction and never loosen (our grasp), pay attention to perfecting all sides of the social management mechanism, strengthen political, ideological, cultural, morality, and legal education, and persevere with the excellent tradition of combining specialist work and the Mass Line, persevere with correct policy and tactics, mobilise each government department and the broad masses, fully implement every measure of the social law and order, as well as comprehensive governance. Then the national growth of criminal cases will surely slow down, and social law and order can clearly improve.³⁸

The Political-Legal system above CMPS has always been the most powerful system behind social management (minus its brief collapse during the Cultural Revolution in 1966 until 1969). It was elevated in 1980 as a Politburo-level committee, and except briefly becoming a leading group again from 1988-1990, its status has fluctuated between the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee.³⁹ Membership has

³⁶ Linsheng Qiao, "第九次全国民政会议在京召开 (The Ninth National Civil Affairs Conference was Held in Beijing)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 18 December 1988.

³⁷ Wai Hei Samson Yuen, "The Politics of Weiwen: Stability as a Source of Political Legitimacy in Post-Tiananmen China," in *Regime Legitimation Through Institutional Reform: Analysing its Dimensions and Effectiveness* (Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca 2014), 14-15.

³⁸ Zhenying Liu, Aiguo Zou, and Jiazheng He, "江泽民李鹏等与全国政法工作会议代表座谈强调高度重视切实抓好政法工作不能保一方平安的领导, 不是一个称职的领导 (Talks between Jiang Zemin, Li Peng and other National Political-Legal Work Conference Representatives: Emphasise Attaching High Importance to having a Reliable Grasp on Political-Legal Work A Leader Who Cannot Ensure Safety for His Domain is Not a Competent Leader)," *The People's Daily*, 24 December 1994.

³⁹ Wang and Minzer, "The Rise of the Chinese Security State," 343.

generally always included representatives from the People's Armed Police, the Ministry of Public Security (police), Ministry of Justice, People's Liberation Army General Political Department, Ministry of State Security (intelligence) and Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCP anti-corruption agency). This system was also strengthened significantly following Tiananmen. By the mid-1990s, the Party leadership increasingly perceived the need to enhance these departments' coordination in order to create a more effective social management structure. The Ninth Five-Year Plan for the National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China and the Outline of the 2010 Vision, indicated that the Party was planning to improve Political-Legal Affairs committees' capacity to implement a strong social security and state security management pre-emption system, it read:

[We must] persevere and perfect the CCP's multiparty cooperation and the Political-Legal Affairs consultation system, and consolidate and develop a broad patriotic United Front. [We must] establish a robust scientific decision-making, democratic oversight procedures and systems and improve efficiency of handling [these tasks], must fully implement the party's ethnic policy, religious policy and overseas Chinese policy. [We must] adhere to and improve the system of regional ethnic autonomy, consolidate and strengthen ethnic unity. [We must] strengthen the construction of grassroots political power, the development of grassroots democracy. Strengthen legislative, judicial and law enforcement work, strengthen the comprehensive governance of social order, to defend long-term social stability, protect the masses [so they can] live in peace and work happily... and implement comprehensive governance of social security measures at [all] urban and rural grassroots units, among national staff and Communist Party members, especially the leading cadres, to comply with national laws and regulations.⁴⁰

The development of CMPS system responded to issues in coordination between the Political-Legal departments and the Party's grassroots system. The Political-Legal system became steadily more powerful throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s. As surveillance technology improved (see Chapter Six), and was placed in the direct control of the Political-Legal apparatus the Party leadership's need to manage power within the Party became increasingly important.

Sensory Channel Knowledge

China's ANS Self-Configuring Sensory Channel found that in order to create an effective social management system that will ensure state security, the Party-leadership must manage two main relationships. First, is the management of power within the Party. Second is management of the Party's relationship with the masses. The system designed to support the social management system must have the capacity to both preemptively and reactively address problems at their point of origin, handle continually changing circumstances, and handle emergencies. Such a system requires a strong leadership from the top down, but it also requires cooperation between all stakeholders in the social management process.

⁴⁰ "关于国民经济和社会发展“九五”计划和2010年远景目标纲要的报告 (Report on The Ninth Five-Year Plan for the National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China and the Outline of the 2010 Vision) (Parts 1-4)."

[5.2] Motor Channels: Self-monitor and Self-Adjust

The ANS Self-Configuring objective's Motor Channel describes the process of configuring resources at the system (central) and sub-system (provincial and local) levels, and how their operations are coordinated. The Self-monitor attribute describes a vertical and horizontal structural integration, which enables coordinated planning, and coordinated responsibility dissemination. The Self-adjust attribute describes how the system-of-systems structure enables the coordinated implementation of these tasks (see Figure 4). The Motor Channel symbolises efforts under Xi Jinping since the 2013 creation of the Central State Security Commission (CSSC) to design a holistic state security structure, enabling the social management process to function as intended. This means the system would have the capacity to pre-empt and directly respond to regular social problems, as well as threats of all types. Changes since 2013 point to what, within the ANS framework, can be described as a policy-based autonomic ecosystem, which uses a "system of systems" approach.



Figure 4: China's ANS Self-Configuring Motor Channels

In the system of systems approach, the Party-state leadership, i.e. the overarching "system", sets national objectives. The objectives are "specified through high-level incentives", implying the "policy-based" feature of the autonomic ecosystem. This process is largely directed through the "incentives" of co-option and coercion, rather than through "concrete, precise targets".⁴¹ The structure grants subsystems under the state security apparatus enough flexibility to account for issue-based, geographic and situational differences. Like an ecosystem, the system of systems "is governed by laws of nature".⁴² In this case "the laws of nature" are the Party leadership's directives. Like an ecosystem, this structure is hierarchical. These "laws" are designed to be passed down vertically to the Party leadership at provincial and municipal, and then local levels. They are implemented within a horizontal structure of inter-agency and departmental groups. The functioning process would allow the Party leadership to strengthen its capacity to control the entire Party, and consequently, society.

⁴¹ The UK National Research Institute. "Software Engineering in the System-of-Systems Era." <http://lscits.cs.bris.ac.uk/docs/systems.pdf>.

⁴² Ibid.

For the process of broad policy formation, the CSSC is structurally designed to pull the CPLC under its control as a subsystem of the larger state-security system. The CSSC also includes the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and likely, although not confirmed, Ministry of State Security (MSS, intelligence agency). The structural change does not remove or vastly change the functional responsibilities of the CPLC structure. Instead, it makes the CPLC structure just one – significant – substructure of the state security apparatus. It changes the previous structure where the CPLC was the main body in charge of the state security process at the central level. At the provincial and municipal level, and for many large cities, State Security Work Leading Small Groups (SSLSG) have been created to mirror the central-level design. Meanwhile, at the local levels, districts, townships and so on, SSLSGs sit within Political-Legal structure.

The relevance of these changes in terms of social management policy is found in the resituating of central level control over the state security apparatus. The apparatus is now placed directly under Xi Jinping, the 'core'. As Chapter Three explained, social management is the most vital process to ensuring state security. It is designed to preempt and manage threats of all types. In theory, and from the perspective of the Party-state leadership, placing social management functions directly under the rubric of "state security", more clearly defines the objectives of social management and the path for achieving those objectives. Placing the process of policy design directly under a concentrated core makes the social management process more controllable (in theory). As such, the objectives of the ANS social management process become more attainable.

To clarify, the CSSC has low public visibility but this does not mean it does not exist or has failed.⁴³ In fact, all available evidence points to the opposite conclusion.⁴⁴ As this section will show, the CSSC is analogous with the leading small group system—informal Party bodies that "advise the Party Politburo on policy and coordinate implementation of policy decisions made by the Politburo and supervised by the Secretariat."⁴⁵ As such, most available information is ambiguous. The claims in this section are substantiated through research focused on two connected topics: [1] The CSSC and SSLSG system structure, membership and functions; [2] The State Security Law (2015) and other state security-linked legislation and "sub-system" development.

The CSSC System Structure

The CSSC appears designed to solve structural problems identified in summer 2012, which called for the integration of power and overall coordination of social management work. The CSSC acts as an overarching policy formation and crisis pre-emption body. The CSSC's primary function is the coordination of the work of key agencies and ministries charged with ensuring state security.

What is taking place structurally through the CSSC is not far removed from the government structure Kenneth Lieberthal described in *Governing China* through his explanation of "gateway" (口) and "system" (系统) configurations, organising Party-

⁴³ Wuthnow, "China's Much-Heralded NSC Has Disappeared."

⁴⁴ Hoffman and Mattis, "Managing the Power Within: China's State Security Commission."

⁴⁵ Alice Miller, "The CCP Central Committee's Leading Small Groups," *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 26 (2008).

government power and vertical and horizontal interaction. Lieberthal explained each “gateway” is usually led by a Politburo Standing Committee member. The state security “gateway” is inclusive of the military, public security, and state security apparatuses.⁴⁶ Each gateway usually consists of a small office, with a leading small group directly underneath. Below the “gateway”, are “systems”, and usually “sub-systems”, including the Central Political-Legal Affairs system, which bring together bureaucracies to handle-task oriented issues.⁴⁷

With Xi Jinping as CSSC chairman, the committee centralises policy design and coordination efforts at the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC)-level directly under the “most powerful” person in the Party. Xi Jinping and his network of close advisors, directly control the state security policy design and implementation strategy design. “Close advisors” include Li Zhanshu, who is reportedly the director of the CSSC’s General Office, which conducts its regular work.⁴⁸ It also includes leading CCP theorist Wang Huning. Notably Wang was directly behind the drafting of Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” and Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Development Concept”.⁴⁹ He is also director of the CCP Central Policy Research Office, and was reportedly behind the CSSC’s design. Both appear to sit on the CSSC standing committee (see Figure 5).

Below Xi on the CSSC are two vice-chairmen, Premier Li Keqiang and NPC Chairman Zhang Dejiang. No official membership list beyond these three exists, but membership can be deduced. In February 2017, Xi chaired a state security work conference in Beijing.⁵⁰ The report on the meeting said it was attended by the other members of the CSSC. The likely standing committee were sat at the main table during the meeting and included the major “internal” and “external” security organs except Minister of State Security (MSS) Chen Wenqing, who was seemingly absent. It also includes Li Zhanshu, Wang Huning and four provincial and municipal party secretaries (see Figure 5). Representatives of “relevant” provincial, municipal and autonomous region departments, People’s organisations, financial institutions, important firms, and relevant higher education and military units, also attended. They likely represent the CSSC’s expanded membership.

⁴⁶ Lieberthal, *Governing China : From Revolution through Reform*, 193.

⁴⁷ Ibid. 194-203.

⁴⁸ Zi Yang. "The Éminence Grise of Zhongnanhai." *The Diplomat*, 19 January 2015. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/the-eminence-grise-of-zhongnanhai/>; Zi Yang. "Meet China's Emerging Number 2: A biography of Li Zhanshu, the right-hand man to Xi Jinping." *The Diplomat*, 5 May 2017. <http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/meet-chinas-emerging-number-2/>.

⁴⁹ Yuanxi Huang. "Wang Huning, often seen at the side of two presidents." *The South China Morning Post*, 11 October 2012. <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1058180/wang-huning-often-seen-side-two-presidents>.

⁵⁰ "习近平主持召开国家安全工作座谈会 (Xi Jinping Presided Over the State Security Work Conference)," 17 February 2017.



Figure 5: The Central State Security Commission, likely standing committee membership as at February 2017. *General Fang Fenghui was since replaced by General Li Zuocheng.

The CSSC reportedly consists of a standing committee, and several sub-committees which are either formed on a permanent or ad-hoc basis, and it is designed to coordinate work on state security.⁵¹ According to the Annual Report on China's National Security Studies 2014 (published by the Ministry of State Security-linked University of International Relations) the committees could include, but are not limited to: a military security committee, an information security committee, a national defence industry security committee, an economic security committee, an ecological security committee, a social security committee, a cultural security committee, a 'strike hard against organised crime' or terrorism committee, an international security committee, and others that could be issue based.⁵² They are cross-agency and departmental, horizontally coordinating work on an issue-basis. The CSSC enables the optimisation of interactions vertically (within the Party), and horizontally (between agencies).

⁵¹ 中国关系学院国际战略与安全研究中心 (UIR Center for International Strategy and Security Studies), *中国国家安全研究报告 2014 (Annual Report on China's National Security Studies 2014)*, 149.

⁵² Ibid.

Vertical management is intended to serve as a political management of the Party, and horizontal management is intended to coordinate agencies in order to produce a more effective and efficient management of society beneath the Communist Party.

The CSSC's work includes coordination of research and drafting of all major state security-relevant legislation, policies and regulations.⁵³ Legislation has included: the Counter-Espionage Law (2014), the State Security Law (2015), the Foreign Non-Governmental Organisation Management Law (2016), the Cyber Security Law (2016), and the Intelligence Law (2017), among others. The State Security Law provides verification of this CSSC function. Article 5 said the "central state security leading mechanism" is in charge of setting state security policy.⁵⁴ To clarify, the "central state security leading mechanism" is synonymous with the CSSC.⁵⁵ The reason is the CSSC is not directly named in the legislation was passed under the National People's Congress, which sits under the state apparatus. The CSSC is under the direction of the Politburo Standing Committee, i.e. the Party apparatus. While there is no genuine separation of Party and state, the laws produced under state apparatus do not directly name party groups. It is a legislative distinction that does not exist in practice.⁵⁶

State Security Leading Small Groups

The CSSC structure is replicated across the country, creating a vertical integration from the Party leadership down to grassroots-level. Provincial and municipality, city, county and district governments, have established State Security Work Leading Small Groups (SSLSGs). SSLSGs occur at township, village and street levels, but may vary between leading groups and single representatives reporting to higher-level leading groups. Each SSLSG also appears to be attached to a State Security Leading Small Group "Office" (办公室), presumably responsible for the day to day work of the State Security Leading Small Group. The membership of these is almost never listed, but there is some indication that the director of the SSLSG Office is a CCP political department official (not the same as the Political-Legal committees).

Based on reporting, these committees hold expanded meetings a few times per-year, possibly on a quarterly basis.⁵⁷ Presumably "expanded meetings" implies that in addition to the leading small group's standing committee, members of the numerous sub-groupings that sit within the SSLSGs are also in attendance. It is assumed that the

⁵³ 中华人民共和国国家安全法 (*State Security Law of the People's Republic of China*).

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ "全民国家安全教育日 这 20 个法律知识你懂吗? (National State Security Education Day: Do You Understand These 20 Legal Trivia?)." *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 7 April 2017. http://www.81.cn/2017gjaqjyr/2017-04/07/content_7553451.htm.

⁵⁶ Samantha Hoffman and Peter Mattis, "Chinese Legislation Points to New Intelligence Coordinating System," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 5 September 2017.

⁵⁷ Referring to analysis of a few dozen articles, basing on formation date, and how many times the committee was said to have met. For instance: "北京市国家安全工作领导小组召开第六次扩大会议 郭金龙讲话 (The Beijing [Municipality] State Security Work Leading Small Group Convened its Sixth Expanded Meeting, Guo Jinlong Gave a Speech)." *Beijing Daily*, 2016. <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0420/c64094-28289256.html>; "市国家安全领导小组第七次全体(扩大)会议召开 ([Hangzhou's] State Security Leading Small Group Held its 7th (Expanded) Meeting)". *Hangzhou Daily*, 28 June 2017.

http://www.hangzhou.gov.cn/art/2017/6/28/art_812258_7971667.html.

standing committee and CSSC sub-systems meet individually more frequently, in order to work on implementation in their specific task areas. The state security committees are involved in the coordination of propaganda campaigns—such as the annual State Security Education Day.⁵⁸

Most SSLSGs appear to have been established between the 1 July 2015 passage of the State Security Law and the first annual State Security Education Day on 15 April 2016. Although some were established as early as 2013, and possibly as late as 2017.⁵⁹ In fact, the 2015 State Security Law dedicated “Chapter IV” to the topic of the State Security System’s construction. Article 44, for instance states: “The central state security leading mechanism implements a security system and working mechanism that combines unified and independent [management] with highly effective coordination.” Similarly, Article 49 states: “The state establishes coordination and linkage mechanisms on state security between the centre and local [levels], between departments, between military and localities, and between regions.”⁶⁰ According to normal leading group structure and like the CSSC, provincial and municipal level SSLSGs are also directly under the provincial/municipal Party committee. Provincial/municipal Party secretaries are always the head of the provincial SSLSGs.

An October 2016 meeting of the Guizhou province SSLSG provided significant detail on the likely membership at the provincial level.⁶¹ The provincial Party secretary is the leading group’s chairman. One vice-chairman is a deputy provincial Party secretary and Guilin city mayor. Another vice-chairman is a deputy provincial Party secretary and the provincial Political-Legal Committee head. The assumed SSLSG standing committee members, are also on the provincial Party standing committee. These included: the head of the Provincial Organization Department and Party School; a deputy provincial Governor and a deputy secretary of the Party Leadership Group; the Propaganda Department head; the Vice Governor and Government Party Leadership Group leader; the Provincial Military Commander; the Provincial Party Secretary-General; and the Provincial Vice Governor and Poverty Alleviation department head. All provincial court, Procuratorate, provincial military district and armed police unit leading representatives. The Politics and Law Committee head and MSS department head for each city, prefecture and Gui’an New District also attended.⁶²

⁵⁸ “国家安全教育日广东披露一批窃密策反案件 (State Security Education Day in Guangdong Reveals Several Cases of State Secrets Theft and Attempts to Instigate Defection).” *Chenghai, Shantou, Rule by Law Small Leading Group Office*, 18 April 2016. http://www.gdga.gov.cn/zxbd/aqjy/news/201704/t20170410_788662.html.

⁵⁹ Examples of an earlier leading groups at the county-level city and street levels: “古交市国家安全领导小组办公室挂牌成立：化解社会矛盾 维护政治稳定 (Gujiao City [Taiyuan, Shanxi] State Security Leading Small Group Office Established: Resolving Social Contradictions and Maintaining Political Stability).” *Taiyuan Daily*, 17 July 2014. <http://sx.people.com.cn/n/2014/0717/c361862-21693222.html>; *ibid*.

⁶⁰ *中华人民共和国国家安全法 (State Security Law of the People's Republic of China)*.

⁶¹ “陈敏尔：牢固树立总体国家安全观 切实加强各领域国家安全体系建设 (Chen Min'er: Firmly Establish the Holistic State Security Concept, Solidly Strengthen Each Domain of State Security System Construction).” *Guizhou Daily*, 20 October 2016. http://www.gz.xinhuanet.com/2016-10/20/c_1119752692.htm.

⁶² I verified the existence of an SSLSG for nearly every province, municipality and autonomous region. I verified the claim that the Party secretary for each was in fact the apparent SSLSG leader, and recorded partial standing committee membership data for about half (always requiring additional research for each name listed in a notice, as often names are listed and positions are not).

The SSLSG structure appears the same across all larger cities. In several cases, a deputy Party secretary is also the Political-Legal Committee secretary. In Jiangsu province, for instance, the Party secretary is the chairman of the provincial SSLSG, and its vice-chairman is also the provincial Political-Legal Committee director.⁶³ The SSLSG structure only appears to change at the county-level city or district-level and below. Here, SSLSGs appear placed next to CMPS bodies, and located under the local Political-Legal affairs office.⁶⁴ One reason appears to be that at the lower level of government, the same person who is head of the local Political Legal committee is also head of the SSLSG, CMPS, 610 Office, and other security-relevant offices. This person is also always on the local Party standing committee. Effectively, this individual is coordinating state security policy in conjunction with the existing Political-Legal and grassroots coordination structure (CMPS). The SSLSG and CMPS bodies at this level appear also to jointly coordinate State Security Education Day activities, pulling CMPS work directly into the state security apparatus.⁶⁵ As tedious as these details are, they only begin to explain what is a far more complex “system of systems”. Each SSLSG consists of subcommittees, covering the various areas of state security—like political security and cultural security. These committees have a separate membership, and are tasked with carrying out the state security work specific to their policy area: systems within systems.

State Security Legislation and Sub-System Construction

The CSSC system also requires the construction of issue-based subsystems. These should operate as their own self-managing autonomic units. They operate under the high-level objectives specified through the CSSC-SSLSG system. To reiterate, in the “policy-based autonomic ecosystem” system of systems structure, the Party-state leadership, i.e. the overarching “system”, sets national objectives that are “specified through high-level incentives”. In this case, the Party-state leadership is exercising its capacity as the primary system through the CSSC structure. The CSSC sets high-level objectives pertaining to state security. The structure grants subsystems under the state security apparatus enough flexibility to account for issue-based, geographical and situational differences.

The CSSC has been behind the drafting of all major state security legislation passed under Xi Jinping. The State Security Law (2015) describes “mechanisms” being improved and constructed for each of the “11-securities” under the holistic state security concept.⁶⁶ The best way to locate the construction of these sub-system

⁶³ “李强主持召开省国家安全领导小组成员会议强调: 全面贯彻落实总体国家安全观 统筹做好各领域国家安全工作 (Li Qiang Presided Over the Provincial State Security Leading Small Group Member's Meeting, and Emphasised: [We] Must Comprehensively and Thoroughly implement the Holistic State Security Concept, [and] Give Overall Consideration to Conducting Each Domain of State Security Work Well),” 13 April 2017.

⁶⁴ “南京市建邺区委政法委 2017 年部门预算公开 (Public Disclosure of Jianye District Committee, Nanjing, Political-Legal Committee's 2017 Departmental Budget),” 17 February 2017.

⁶⁵ “关于在全市开展第二个“4·15”全民国家安全教育日活动的通知 (Notice on Carrying Out The City's Second (Annual) “4·15” National State Security Education Day Activities),” 31 March 2017.

⁶⁶ 《中华人民共和国国家安全法》(State Security Law of the People's Republic of China). It is highly likely that sub-committees on the individual “11-securities” topics exist, but very little information providing clarity on their membership and activities is available. At one point I had membership data on

“mechanisms” is through other recent state security-linked legislation and leading groups. Other than the State Security Law, this has included: the Counter-Espionage Law, the Cyber Security Law, the Foreign Non-Governmental Organisation Management Law, and the Intelligence Law. The wording of each piece of legislation points to state security guidance, which comes through the CSSC as the leading body for state security and the organisation. Each piece of legislation also calls on coordination between relevant departments to optimise related work.

Most information on sub-system design is found through the cyber and information security structure, as it seems more developed. A Central Leading Small Group for Cyber Security and Informatisation was established in 2014. The committee’s membership is also overlapped with the CSSC membership. Like the CSSC, Xi Jinping is the chairman, and Premier Li Keqiang is a vice-chairman. Liu Yunshan, the Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of propaganda, is also a vice-chairman. Importantly, both Wang Huning and Li Zhanshu are members, as well as CPLC director Meng Jianzhu, and other ministers in state-security linked positions, such as Minister of Culture.⁶⁷

Like other leading small groups, it has a general office in charge of day-to-day operations. This was formerly known as State Internet Information Office, and is now known as the Cyberspace Administration of China. Leading small groups have been established across China to mirror the Central Cyber Security and Informatisation Leading Small Group structure. There is overlap between the membership of the cyber and state security leading small groups.⁶⁸ This is of course related to the design of the leading group system, which is directly subordinate to the standing committee. This feature alone is important, because it represents realisation issue-based vertical and horizontal structural integration objective.

State Security Leading Small Groups are also responsible to implement the state security law, which is directly inclusive of network and information security. Article 25 of the State Security Law said the “State establishes a network and information security safeguard system”, which was for strengthening the capacity to protect network and information security, research and development on usages for network and information technologies, and improving network management among other things.⁶⁹

Similarly, the State Security Law had a dedicated section “Intelligence Information”, which called for the state to establish a “system for intelligence information gathering, assessment, and use, that is unified and centralised, responsive, accurate and efficient;

a "Political Security" committee located within a district or county-level city SSLSG. Unfortunately, I lost access to the link before saving it (at one point, multiple local government webpages became inaccessible to me, I later realised my IP address was somehow blocked).

⁶⁷ Rogier Creemers, "Cyber China: Upgrading Propaganda, Public Opinion Work and Social Management for the Twenty-First Century," *Journal of Contemporary China* (2016): 10.

⁶⁸ "吉林省委网络安全和信息化领导小组召开会议 (The Jilin Provincial Committee Cyber Security and Informatisation Leading Small Group Held a Meeting)," Cyberspace Administration of China, 29 June 2017; "吉林省国家安全工作领导小组召开会议 (Jilin Provincial State Security Leading Small Group Convened) ", 2017.

⁶⁹ *中华人民共和国国家安全法 (State Security Law of the People's Republic of China)*.

and establishes an intelligence information work coordination mechanism for prompt gathering, accurate assessment, effective use and sharing, of intelligence information.”⁷⁰ In the June 2017 the National Intelligence Law, there is a strong indication that a specific structure for coordinating intelligence is being designed and will be overseen by the CSSC.⁷¹ Article 3 states:

The State establishes a national intelligence structure system that is centralised and unified; coordinates the division of work; and is scientific and highly efficient. The Central State Security Leading Mechanism will exercise unified leadership over state intelligence work, formulate state intelligence work principles and policies, plan the overall development of state intelligence work, establish a robust state intelligence work coordination mechanism, according to an overall plan coordinate each domain of state intelligence work and research and decide on the important matters of state intelligence work. The Central Military Commission unifies leadership and organizes military intelligence work.⁷²

The creation of subsystems, like through the cyber security and foreign NGO small leading groups could create the horizontal and vertical integration China’s ANS Self-Configuring objective requires. As the system has time to develop, more information should become available. It is expected that most data on the sub-system structure will remain hard to find, due to the low-profile nature of leading small groups. Any data on leading group activity matched against relevant legislation will likely be most revealing.

[5.3] Conclusion: China’s ANS Self-Configuring Objective

Ahead of the 18th Party Congress, the Political-Legal Committee system (the CPLC and local versions) was criticised for its narrow focus on social order in the implementation of social management. The CSSC was created in the context of these critiques and announced in a paragraph on “social governance” (social management) in Third Plenary Session documents.⁷³ As Chapter Three instructed, state security covers a wide range of intertwined internal and external security threats. Social management’s task is to pre-empt and manage these threats.

The CSSC could achieve the Motor Channel process of designing a system of systems, but this attempt is still under construction. If the findings in the Sensory Channel process were any indication, the process of change can take decades. The next three chapters explain how the construction of the ANS Self-Configuring objective – if it is ultimately successful – will support the remaining objectives of China’s Autonomic Nervous System. These are processes of: ‘self-healing’ (source governance), ‘self-optimisation’ (dynamic management) and ‘self-protection’ (emergency mitigation and response).

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Hoffman and Mattis, "Chinese Legislation Points to New Intelligence Co-Ordinating System."

⁷² 中华人民共和国国家安全法 (*State Security Law of the People's Republic of China*).

⁷³ "Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China."; "中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定 (全文) (Decision of the CCCPC on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform (Full Text))".

Chapter Six I

Self-Healing

*「Every morning I jump out of bed and step on a landmine. The landmine is me.
After the explosion, I spend the rest of the day putting the pieces together.」*
-Ray Bradbury, *Zen in the Art of Writing*

In April 1956, Mao Zedong wrote: “Since man lives in society, he reflects in different circumstances, and to varying degrees, the contradictions existing in each form of society. Therefore, not everybody will be perfect even when a communist society is established.”¹ According to Mao, the successful management of contradictions required the ability to adopt different methods for resolving them. One rigid method cannot solve all conflicts. He said contradictions can be divided into two broad categories of struggle: antagonistic or non-antagonistic.² Antagonistic contradictions are characterised by an external clash between two opposite sides, and their resolution is mainly through a form of external conflict. Non-antagonistic contradictions are mainly between two opposite sides who share a common objective, so they do not need to erupt into an external conflict.³ This way of thinking remains relevant in the present-day. In January 2015, Xi Jinping called for studying and grasping the “basic tenants of the movement of material contradictions”⁴ Xi stressed: “Problems are the forms in which material contradictions manifest themselves, when we emphasise that we must strengthen our consciousness of problems and persevere with problem-guided orientation, this is to recognise the universality and objectivity of contradictions, and requires us to be good at understanding and dissolving contradictions.”⁵

When Central Party School publications began explaining the logic for moving from the phrase “social management” to the phrase “social governance” in summer 2012, a

¹ Zedong Mao. "无产阶级专政的历史经验 (On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat)." *The People's Daily* 5 April 1956. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-7/mswv7_466.htm.

² Siqi Ai. "Antagonistic and Non-Antagonistic Contradictions" (1957) a translation of "艾思奇全书 (Ai Siqi's Complete Works)." <http://marxistphilosophy.org/AntagonisticASQ.pdf>.

³ Ibid.

⁴ "习近平: 坚持运用辩证唯物主义世界观方法论 (Xi Jinping: Persevere with Using the Methodology of a Dialectical Materialist World View)." *Xinhua*, 24 January 2015. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-01/24/c_1114116751.htm.

⁵ Ibid.

similar rhetoric was used. As Chapter Five described, the discussion focused on how coercive tactics for implementing the social management process overshadowed cooperative techniques.⁶ The rhetorical shift was about creating a more dependable institutional mechanism to support the social management process. On the surface, however, the conversation could have been interpreted as the Party deciding between two different approaches to “resolving contradictions”. Chinese scholar Yu Jianrong seemingly described the same idea in 2013 when he distinguished between “rigid” and “resilient” stability. Rigid stability, he said, is “centralised and closed, static and fluctuating, violent and coercive”.⁷ Resilient stability, on the other hand, would allow for rights protection, improved institutional effectiveness and response to social demands. “Under dynamic stability not only is grievance articulation permitted, but reasonable demands are approved and institutions are adjusted.”⁸

This conversation, however, was not about making a choice between two different ways of maintaining stability—at least not from the Central Party School’s perspective. The reason is that the two approaches are not seen as mutually exclusive. For the Party leadership, “soft” and “hard”; “resilient” and “rigid”; or “coercive” and “cooperative”, all co-exist and often overlap. They represent a paradoxical unity in the CCP’s way of thinking, which is critical for understanding the Party-state leadership’s approach to managing “contradictions”. As Chapter Four described, dialectics informs the way of thinking behind social management. It is a way of thinking that does not have an absolute framework, but brings “into focus the full range of changes and interactions that occur in the world”.⁹

China’s “stability” in the ANS framework is best defined as how quickly a system can “mitigate faults” and return to a new version of its original [dynamic] state”.¹⁰ Stability can only be achieved through an organisational design that has the capacity to respond to multiple (and never uniform) sources of contradiction, and preferably in a pre-emptive fashion. The organisational design must function in a way that takes the Party leadership’s objectives for the entire system to the source of the contradiction and eliminate that contradiction by pulling it into the system itself. The CCP’s way of thinking on organisational design and function is derived from Leninism. Lenin’s early thinking on the idea of the vanguard Party leading the masses is found in the essay, “What is to Be Done?”. Lenin wrote:

Anyone can participate in the spontaneous birth of a new social order... Not to counteract, but to declare inopportune, and to declare it in such a way that unsystematic and defensive terror does not come within the scope of the

⁶ Hoffman and Mattis, "China's Proposed "State Security Council": Social Governance under Xi Jinping."; Mattis, "Resolving Contradictions in Social Management."; Hoffman, "Portents of Change in China's Social Management."; Mattis, "In a Fortnight: Central Party School's Critiques Suggest New Leadership Dynamics."

⁷ Jianrong Yu. "当前压力维稳的困境与出路—再论中国社会的刚性稳定 (Reassessing Chinese Society's 'Rigid Stability' Stability Preservation Through Pressure, Its Predicament and the Way Out)." *The China Story*, 27 January 2013. <https://www.thechinastory.org/2013/01/chinas-rigid-stability-an-analysis-of-a-predicament-by-yu-jianrong-%E4%BA%8E%E5%BB%BA%E5%B5%98/>.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ollman, *Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx's Method*. Online copy, quote from: Chapter 1 "The Meaning of Dialectics", Section 2.

¹⁰ Chris Schneider, Adam Barker, and Simon Dobson, "A Survey of Self-Healing Systems Frameworks," *Software-- Practice and Experience*, no. 45 (2015): 1378.

“resolution”...But what else is the function of Social-Democracy if not to be a “spirit” that not only hovers over the spontaneous movement, but also raises this movement to the level of “its programme”? Surely, it is not its function to drag at the tail of the movement. At best, this would be of no service to the movement; at worst, it would be exceedingly harmful.¹¹

This thinking directly influenced Mao’s Mass Line concept. To reiterate, the Mass Line describes the vanguard Party taking the “scattered and unsystematic ideas of the masses,” and forming them into “concentrated and systematic ideas,” then taking them back to the masses to “propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own.”¹² The way of thinking describes mass mobilisation tactics. Mass mobilisation is no longer a highly visible part of the CCP’s toolkit, but it is still a deeply embedded and central tactic.¹³ It is fully integrated into the social management process, because it is part of the Party-state leadership’s toolkit for manipulating the interactions between the Party masses and society. The Party-state leadership must design a system that is capable of shaping thinking from below to support the objectives and policies directed from the top. It is similar to how the CCP organised its leadership during the Communist Revolution. Instead the method is now used to support the existing system.

This description of contradiction management through source governance is directly related to the Self-Healing objective of China’s Autonomic Nervous System. Self-Healing can be defined as: “In the reactive sense, the capability of self-fixing faults” and, “in the proactive sense, the capability of predicting and preventing faults”.¹⁴ The object of self-healing is to identify problems, preferably pre-emptively, and fix them. Self-Healing, in its ideal form, relies on “heuristic algorithms to correct or change behaviour without human intervention.”¹⁵ The Self-Healing function would maximise its effectiveness through “learning methodologies that optimise when and how instructions are executed,” and “[using] methodologies that programme ways to improve and evaluate behaviours.”¹⁶ For this to work, some human interaction within the feedback loop mechanism is required, which is known as “supervision”.

China’s ANS Self-Healing objective is the source governance aspect of social management. It is aimed at enabling the social management system’s capacity to manage the Mass Line relationship. The 12th Five Year Plan, which elevated social management, described the objective of strengthening “source governance” as: “[paying] more attention to the construction of civil utility and institutions, [and persevering] with scientific and democratic decision-making according to law, to prevent and reduce the emergence of social problems.¹⁷ Similarly, the 2013 *People’s Daily* article on establishing the social management mechanism according to requirements highlighted during the 18th Party Congress, described how this would

¹¹ Lenin, *What is to be Done?*

¹² Heath, "Xi's Mass Line Campaign: Realigning Party Politics to New Realities," 5-6; Mao, "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership".

¹³ Also see: Brady, *Marketing dictatorship : propaganda and thought work in contemporary China*; Perry, "Moving the Masses: Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution."

¹⁴ Truszkowski et al., *Autonomous and autonomic systems : with applications to NASA intelligent spacecraft operations and exploration systems*, 266.

¹⁵ Schneider, Barker, and Dobson, "A Survey of Self-Healing Systems Frameworks."

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 1388.

¹⁷ ““十二五”规划纲要 (Outline of the 12th Five Year Plan)."

look in practice. It said source governance requires "paying attention to building [the well-being of] people's livelihoods and system construction, to prevent and reduce the appearance of social contradictions." Strengthening source governance, the article said, requires the comprehensive implementation of the "scientific development concept" in order to solve outstanding problems in economic and social development, it also requires system construction, adhering to rule [by] law, and striving to safeguard the "legitimate rights and interests" of the masses, while "defending social justice".¹⁸

This chapter describes China's ANS Self-Healing objective through the attempted realisation of social management's source governance objective. Section 6.1, on the Sensory Channels, is framed through discussion addressing the rise of "social management" as a prominent key objective by 2011, as it relates to threat management. Section 6.2, describing the Motor Channels, explains how the CCP system planners are attempting to "automate" the Self-Healing objective. Understanding this requires accepting the paradox that improving governance capacity takes place, ideally, through the same processes, which enable both cooperative allocation of services and coercive control.

[6.1] Sensory Channels: Self-Situated and Self-Aware

China's ANS Self-Healing objective's Sensory Channels describe the capacity to sense state changes in the internal and external environment, which impact the effectiveness of source governance (see Figure 6). The Self-aware attribute is focused on internal capacity to monitor threats of all types (internal, external, accidental and hostile). The Self-situated attribute refers to the Party's analysis of the environment, and context awareness. This is characterised by an analysis of how to design and manage the component parts supporting social management's source governance objective. The first sub-section offers an alternative perspective on the significance of reported protest figures in China, to add more context to the rise of social management as a frequently articulated concept in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The second sub-section proposes a reframing of the unrest issue as it relates to social management. Instead threat perceptions explain how contradictions are handled through social management.



Figure 6: China's ANS Self-Healing Sensory Channels

¹⁸ Tang and Fu, "源头治理 动态管理 应急处置——学习党的十八大精神 (Source Governance, Dynamic Management, and Emergency Response-- Learn the Spirit of the 18th National Congress of the CCP)."

Rising Unrest

Social management became a prominent concept between the mid-to-late 1990s and early 2000s. Comparatively, the phrase was infrequently used prior to this time, but the concept behind the phrase clearly did not alter significantly over several decades. A correlation between social stability preservation and social management has been drawn, which is accurate but not complete. In drawing this connection, some have pointed to rising social unrest in China as a driver for social management. Joseph Fewsmith, for instance, pointed to unrest figures of 87,000 to 180,000 per year between 2005 and 2010, compared to 8,700 in 1993.¹⁹ Undoubtedly, unrest management is a part of social management, but it is not an explanation for social management's prominence under Hu Jintao. There are two primary reasons why this assumption is problematic: First, the notion that unrest was steeply rising at the turn of the century should be called into question. Protest may be increasing, but perhaps not at the suggested rates. Second, even if unrest was actually rising at the reported rates, it does not explain social management's prominence in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The Ministry of Public Security released the last official statistic of 87,000 "public order disturbances" per year – or 238 per day – in 2005.²⁰ In 2010, Zhu Lijia at the Chinese Academy of Governance claimed the number of "mass incidents" (群体性事件) doubled between 2006 and 2010.²¹ In 2011, Tsinghua University professor Sun Liping supported Zhu's claim, and said the number had reached 180,000 per year.²² The Chinese government has never publicly refuted the claim. Based on this number, an average of 493 protests involving one-hundred or more people (assuming the Chinese Academy of Social Science definition of a "mass incident") would have to take place in the country every single day.²³ As others have pointed out, China is a large country with a population of 1.37 billion people, so it is possible this amount of unrest could occur, and not significantly disturb the 'normal' social order.

There are some problems with the figures and assumptions, however, which merit some discussion. First, there is not a clearly stated explanation of the time period in question. It cannot be argued that any decade before 1989 were more objectively 'stable' periods in Chinese history. The 1950s-1970s including the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution cannot be described as 'stable' by any definition. Unrest was not low in 1980s, even though there are no (known) figures available. Ralph Thaxton, for

¹⁹ Pieke, "The Communist Party and social management in China," 155; Fewsmith, "'Social Management' as a Way of Coping With Heightened Social Tensions," 3.

²⁰ "Ministry of Public Security Reports Rise in Public Order Disturbances in 2005."

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 30 January 2006.
<http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/ministry-of-public-security-reports-rise-in-public-order>.

²¹ Oriental Outlook interview with Zhu Lijia. "未来 10 年群体性事件成执政最大挑战 (In the next 10 years of mass incidents will become the government's greatest challenge)." *Tencent QQ News*, 26 January 2010. <http://news.qq.com/a/20100126/000954.htm>.

²² Liping Sun. "社会失序是当下的严峻挑战 (Social Disorder is a Serious Challenge of the Moment)." *Economic Observer Online*, 28 February 2011.
<http://www.eo.com.cn/zt/lhqh/bza/2011/02/28/194614.shtml>.

²³ Liqiang Hou. "Report Identifies Sources of Mass Protests." *China Daily*, 9 April 2014.
http://www.chinadaily.com/china/2014-04/09/content_17415767.htm.

instance, pointed to “ostracism, beatings, arsons and threats of extinction against local Party leaders and their clients,” in rural China in retribution for the Great leap era.²⁴ Furthermore, Thaxton asserted that, the rights consciousness of the villagers he interviewed had pre-1949 roots, contradicting the findings like O’Brien and Li’s “rightful resistance”, whose research focused on the period after 1979 and a growing “rights consciousness”.²⁵ In this example, it can be argued that unrest in rural China, directly challenged the state’s legitimation, because it challenged the state’s claim on maintaining a stable social order.

If the assumption is the unrest rise comparison covers the post-Tiananmen time period only, and focused on the transition from the 1990s to 2000s, there are two problems. First, the window of time under consideration is very small. To claim a sudden rise in protest accepts that a significant enough decline existed, and implies that this decline represented meaningful long-term change. Second, there are figures reported for the 1990s, and they show more consistency than a dramatic increase. Patricia Thornton, who importantly made note of the “long tradition of collective action” in China as a reason not to be surprised by the volume of unrest in China, cited a 1993 Chinese government report cited by a Hong Kong periodical, it said: “over 1.5 million cases of protest had occurred in rural [Mainland China] areas that year alone, over 6,000 of which were officially classified as “disturbances” by mainland authorities.”²⁶ (In this example, 6,000 is assumed to be the number that the 87,000 or 180,000 is compared to, not 1.5 million.) The number increased to 60,000 in 1998 and 110,000 in 1999, according to a Taiwan Mainland Affairs council figure.²⁷ If these external numbers were correct, and are compared to the last official statistic of 87,000, then protests were actually decreasing by 2005.

The social unrest dataset the author collected alongside this PhD research included about 10,000 incidents covering a five-year period between 2011-2016.²⁸ To be clear, this data does not claim to account for every protest in China, only a small fraction of what was known to take place. Furthermore, the data covers the five years after the last semi-official statistics were reported. One of the main sources used to collect this data in the last two years covered was the blog *Wickedonna*. In 2015, the blog recorded 28,950 incidents, a 34 percent rise year-on-year. The majority of disputes involved labourers, property and land rights, investors, and the environment.²⁹ Based on the blog’s daily content, actively viewed every day to inform the dataset the PhD draws on, the vast majority of these protests were too small to be officially counted as “disturbances”. Most involved just a few people to a few dozen people, rather than the 100 or more required to count as a disturbance. It seems that the actual number of protest events involving

²⁴ Thaxton, *Force and Contention in Contemporary China: Memory and Resistance in the Long Shadow of the Catastrophic Past*, 26; Note: This type of incident still occurs today. Samantha Hoffman, "Escalating Land Protests in Yunnan," *China Policy Institute: Analysis* (6 November 2014).

²⁵ Thaxton, *Force and Contention in Contemporary China: Memory and Resistance in the Long Shadow of the Catastrophic Past*; Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, *Rightful resistance in rural China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

²⁶ Patricia Thornton, "Comrades and Collectives in Arms: Tax Resistance, Evasion, and Avoidance Strategies in post-Mao China," ed. Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen, *State and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention and Legitimation* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), Kindle Edition. 87.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Unrest databased the author compiled for IHS-Markit and former Exclusive Analysis.

²⁹ "2015 年统计 (2015 Statistics)," 5 January 2016.

100 people or more, likely lies somewhere between the 6,000 “disturbances” reported in 1993, and the 87,000 reported in 2005. Any higher figure would have to assume inclusion of smaller incidents.




Figure 7: Social Unrest Heat Map, representing data collected for IHS-Markit/former Exclusive Analysis. Source: *Jane's Intelligence Review*, April 2015. Reprinted with permission from the *Jane's Intelligence Review* editorial staff.

Another issue is, why are official numbers readily accepted? Perhaps, the assumption among many researchers is the figures are more likely to be falsely lowered, than falsely increased. Yet, this assumption would ignore valid reasons for inflating the statistics. One justification is higher protest figures could justify a larger budget for the public security apparatus, which under Zhou Yongkang's direction was reported to increase exponentially to a rate higher than the reported budget for the People's Liberation Army.³⁰

Unrest Management vs Threat Management

The protest figures alone suggest, or at least call in to question, that the degree of unrest in the early 2000s was not enough to trigger the rise of social management as a concept directed specifically at a version of stability maintenance directly correlated with rising unrest. Alternatively, social management's prominence does correlate with the development of the Party-state leadership's integrated perception of threat. The difference is nuanced, because unrest is clearly included as a significant part of the CCP's threat perceptions. Yet, as Chapter Three also explained, there are differences in the way threat types are perceived. Within a complex system, there must be different ways of managing those threats, particularly when they are perceived as being

³⁰ Yuwen Wu. "Profile: China's fallen security chief Zhou Yongkang." *BBC News*, 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26349305>.

integrated. It helps to explain how social management's source governance objective operates and the overlap between cooperative and coercive features of social management. It also helps to explain why unrest is treated in different ways depending on time, location and cause, or size and tactics.³¹

On the issue of social "contradictions", the Party-state leadership sees itself as constantly managing smaller sources of social conflict to control social stability. Managing these contradictions is not a linear process, not least because issue areas inevitably overlap. The optimal decision for managing one source of contradiction may present a conflict of interest in managing another simultaneously occurring contradiction. What is perceived as, or is in actuality, an antagonistic or non-antagonistic contradiction is never fixed.

When it speaks on contradictions, Party leadership is not talking about "protest" alone, or even simply solving social disputes. Instead, it is focused on threat management, based on the perception of hostile external, hostile internal, accidental external and accidental internal, including the integration of these sources. The best solution is to address problems from underneath— using "source governance" as a process of pre-emptive shaping. For this reason, the idea of "managing contradictions" should not be conceived of narrowly as social unrest management. Instead, it should be placed in the framework of a mostly pre-emptive threat management.

In the Party leadership's perspective, the most severe threats to state security emerge from an integration of internal and external sources, both inside and outside of China's physical borders and from both within and outside of the CCP. Depending on the threat type, the challenge for the Party leadership is not always about eliminating threats completely, but rather managing them so they do not reach a point beyond its control. This is very similar to a concept in conflict resolution theory of "avoiding destructive escalation of a conflict". To avoid destructive escalation of the conflict, the Party can undertake actions unilaterally by "planning for many contingencies", "conducting coercive actions very precisely", avoiding "arousing intense resistance and creating enemies from groups that had not been engaged in the conflict", and avoiding "overreach".³² The Party's self-identified way of managing this task is "source governance", which requires addressing 'both the symptoms and root causes' of problem," but which "emphasises root causes".³³

For these reasons, "source governance" has been directly linked to different aspects of the Holistic State Security concept. For instance, one article described a police inspection on the "Cultural Market" in Guangzhou, Guangdong, in February 2017. It called for:

³¹ Yongshun Cai, *Collective resistance in China : why popular protests succeed or fail*, Studies of the Walter H Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010), 164.

³² Kriesberg, "Contemporary Conflict Resolution Applications," 463.

³³ Peilin Li. "努力完善中国特色社会主义社会治理体系 (Strive to Perfect the Socialist Social Governance System with Chinese Characteristics)." *Seeking Truth*, 15 February 2017. http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2017-02/15/c_1120454551.htm.

Putting particular emphasis on monitoring the content of performance market, internet establishments, and politically harmful publications, through carrying out issue-specific rectification activities as the primary method, combining strict inspections and enhanced education, *connecting source management with enhanced monitoring*, severely investigated and dealt with the illegal and criminal activities in the culture market.³⁴

This effort describes both cooperative methods like “education”, and coercive measures like “strict inspections”. The “Cultural Market” has been explicitly linked to China’s state security concept. A 2006 article on a speech Hu Jintao gave at Yale University focused on Hu’s discussion on “culture”.³⁵ The article argued that the country’s entry into the World Trade Organisation was positive, as were cultural exchanges between China and the West, but added: “under the Western civilisation-centred ideology, aggressive Western culture can erode and threaten the independence and diversity of our national culture through excessive cultural exchanges.”³⁶ This was not a new concept after China’s entry into the WTO. For instance, Xiaomei Chen described the “He Shang” (River Elegy)” television show, which aired in China in 1988, as an example of “anti-official Occidentalism” where Western culture and politics were promoted as “superior to China”.³⁷ In context of perceived integrated security threats, like a Colour Revolution event, this version of source management is a far more holistic approach to using the social management process to ensure state security.

Other tactics for source governance include the Party developing its capacity and establishing itself, particularly through organisation of large population centres. This process is now being automated through “grid-ised” management, an electronic surveillance-enabled version of a system, with conceptual roots that date to the Song Dynasty.³⁸ It is a process that was also employed during the Mao era. Shen Chuanliang, a Central Party School professor in the Department of Party History, explained how in 1927 Mao began establishing Party branches in military units to “manage the army and develop the Party”.³⁹ Similarly, Shen added: “To deal with problems affecting its grassroots organisations, the CCP pursued a grid management system whereby the whole of China was divided into grids.”⁴⁰ The other way the Party has developed this capacity is through the Comprehensive Management of Public Security offices described in Chapter Five. Street and neighbourhood or residents committees are also responsible for CMPS. These committees also consist of representatives of mass organisations, as well as public health, public safety and other representatives, all with the capacity to address various threats—from the source, and either through cooperative control or coercive control. They provide social services, but also function

³⁴ “排查治理文化市场安全生产隐患 (Removing and Managing Potential Security Risks in the Culture Market).” *Guangzhou Daily*, 28 December 2016.

³⁵ “Speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao at Yale University,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Philippines, 23 April 2006.

³⁶ Hongguo Zhao. “文化产业不能只看 GDP：论全球化条件下文化开放与文化安全 (Cultural Industries Cannot Simply be Evaluated by GDP: Open Culture and Cultural Security Under Globalisation).” *People’s Daily*, 17 May 2006.
<http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49157/49165/4379224.html>.

³⁷ Xiaomei Chen, *Occidentalism: a theory of counter-discourse in post-Mao China* (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 28-29.

³⁸ Theobald, “baojia 保甲, the communal self-defense system.”

³⁹ Chuanliang Shen, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Self-Management ” 2011.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

as a surveillance unit. Section 6.2, and Chapter Seven describe this process in more detail.

Sensory Channel Knowledge

The Self-Healing objective's source governance is not narrowly focused on unrest. It is more broadly focused on the concept of threat. Threat is perceived in many forms, and are often integrated. This requires that China's ANS Self-Healing objective automate in order to maintain enough stability, such that when a destabilising event occurs, the system can quickly return to a new version of the "status quo".

[6.2] Self-Monitor and Self-Adjust

China's ANS Self-Healing objective's Motor Channels describe the use of technology to pre-emptively identify and manage threats. This requires a model of strengthening governance capacity that is simultaneously directed at improving services and control. The project involves using the same resources to expand both cooperative and coercive tactics. The developments in this section are best thought of as the attempted "automation" of social management's source governance objective. Self-monitor represents the development of technology with the capacity to enable problem identification. Self-adjust describes the integration of this technology into the social management process, which is already beginning to automate aspects of source governance.



Figure 8: China's ANS Self-Healing Motor Channels

This section chronologically describes the initial development and use of the technology intended to enable the source governance function of social management. After discussion reviewing the early connection of complex systems engineering research and social management, it discusses implementation through the Golden Projects and grid management.

Early Theoretical Developments and Research

The time period between the late 1970s and the 1980s is the origin of the present-day concept of the automation of social management. Party-state theorists were already directly contemplating how modern technology could be applied to the social

management process. As Chapter Four described influential theorist Yu Guangyuan, discussed modernising production management and social management based on “automation” and the “widespread application of technologies stemming from modern natural science.”⁴¹ At this stage, the ideas were theoretical. Investment into the necessary research and development of science and technology was only beginning.

In 1980 and 1981, leading scientists Song Jian and Qian Xuesen co-authored a revised edition of Qian’s *Engineering Cybernetics* in two parts 1980 and 1981.⁴² This appears to be the most critical starting point in the elaboration for how systems theories could be applied to construct a process for automating social management. Chapter Four also highlighted a Central Party and Government Lecture Series on the New Technological Revolution in 1984.⁴³ The lecture series was summarised in two articles printed in the *People’s Daily*, which were both authored by Song Jian. One outlined four steps for adopting systems engineering in the social domain (quoted directly in Chapter Four). To review, it said:

- [1] A definition for systems engineering is required to: define what targets the system should reach, set up facilities to allow information flow, and plan and develop methods and procedures for systems analysis.
- [2] Establishing systems engineering with long-term effectiveness in mind requires a professional and *responsible* team to implement the system.
- [3] An “overall design department” is needed, which both understands the management system (and objectives), and has the capacity to do systems analysis. This is required if systems management is to work in the long term.
- [4] Strong leadership from a senior government official is required for the system to succeed. The system will be large, and there will be difficulties including conflicts [within the Party leads and cadres] on the implementation.⁴⁴

Stemming from this conversation a specific research area developed in the 1980s focused on “soft science” (软科学). The field was largely used as a path to find solutions to complex problems brought about by reform and economic development through technological innovation. A 1986 *People’s Daily* newspaper commentator article described the study of soft scientific approaches as being crucial for helping systems managers make decisions.⁴⁵ The article said over 400 “soft science research institutions” were already established throughout the country.

⁴¹ Guangyuan, “科学有险阻 苦战能过关 (Only through hard struggles could [we] to pass the scientific challenges posed to us).”

⁴² Feiyue Wang, “从工程控制到社会管理: 控制论 Cybernetics 本源的个人认识与展望 (From Engineering Cybernetics to Social Management: Personal Take on the Origin and Prospects of Cybernetics),” *Control Theory & Applications* 31, no. 12 (2014): 1621, 24.

⁴³ Song, “系统工程和新技术革命 (Systems Engineering and the New Technological Revolution).”

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Newspaper Commentator, “研究软科学, 促进决策民主化科学化 (Research Soft Science in order to promote Democratic and Scientific Decision-Making),” *The People’s Daily*, 27 July 1986.

Such institutions still exist, and specific soft science research funding is allocated for projects with a comprehensive application of natural sciences, social sciences and other interdisciplinary knowledge, to science and technology, economic and social development. Awarded projects in the present-day range from specific IT innovations in areas such as artificial intelligence to broader subjects like disaster response planning, legal systems, public services allocation, and food safety research.⁴⁶ These each have direct relevance to social management process. Yet, in the 1980s, the automated social management concept was largely science fiction. The intent to turn theory into reality was clear, but the basic infrastructure did not exist.

The Golden Projects and E-Government

Between 1984 and 1990, the State Council approved of plans to develop national information systems covering about a dozen areas, including: the economy, banking, electrical power, civil aviation, statistics, taxation, customs, meteorology and disaster mitigation.⁴⁷ At the time, government departments were only beginning to install computer networks. Like many other governments around the world, China's e-government plans were directed at utilising technological developments to improve 'real world' interactions. Specifically, e-government denotes realising technology's "ability to transform relations with citizens, businesses, and other arms of government".⁴⁸ As this sub-section will argue, however, the Chinese government has also clearly articulated an intended application of these informatisation efforts to social management. This has taken place both directly and in its discussion on recognisable e-government topics like building accountability and improving public administration. If the ideas were only theoretically connected from the late-1970s to the early-1990s, then specific plans to connect economic and social development through e-government "-with Chinese characteristics" existed by the mid-to-late 1990s.⁴⁹

In 1993, the government initiated a series of national economic informatisation systems engineering projects. This marked the beginning of the formal construction of technology that would enable the informatisation of social management. These projects were initially known as the "Three Golden" projects: "Golden Bridge", a national information network and communications project; "Golden Gate" a customs informatisation project; and "Golden Card", related to credit card and electronic

⁴⁶ Examples: Henan Provincial Department of Science and Technology, "关于申报首批河南省软科学研究基地的通知 (Notification Regarding Submitting Proposals for the First Batch of Henan Province Soft Science Research Base)," 2014; Science and Technology Innovation Committee of Shenzhen, "2016 年度软科学研究项目申请指南 (Guidelines for Application to 2016 Soft Science Research Categories)," 2016; Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China, "关于申报 2005 年度软科学计划的通知 (Notification Regarding Submitting Proposals for 2005 Soft Science Projects)," 2005.

⁴⁷ Yu Xu and Hongren Zhou, *中国信息化形势分析和预测 (2010) (Analysis and Forecast on China's Informatisation (2010))*, 信息化蓝皮书 (Blue Book of Informatisation) (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2010), 8.

⁴⁸ The World Bank. "e-Government." <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/ict/brief/e-government>.

⁴⁹ Gao Xinmin, "电子政务进入新阶段 (E-Government Enters a New Stage)," *The People's Daily*, 11 May 2002.

banking development.⁵⁰ The “Three Golden” Projects represented just the first phase of the multi-phased implementation of the Golden Projects. Gradually the initiative expanded to about a dozen projects between 1995-1999. These included, “Golden Tax”, “Golden Health”, and “Golden Sea” among others. The Golden Projects continue to advance in the present-day as technology advances.⁵¹ For instance, in the 1990s Golden Tax, helped to improve value-added tax compliance. In 2016, a third stage of the project was being implemented with “more sophisticated functionality that ultimately will be integrated with all industries, tax categories and tax administration areas.”⁵²

Most relevant to social management’s “Self-Healing” objective is Golden Shield, which was initiated sometime around 1998 or 1999. The Golden Shield Project is not an internet monitoring project updating the Great Firewall (online censorship), nor is it an alternative name for the Great Firewall. Like the other Golden Projects, it is a multi-staged e-government project. Golden Shield created an organisational network connecting the Ministry of Public Security with its local-level bureaus, and it was already widely employed at provincial and city levels by 2002.⁵³ This was only a starting point. Writing on Golden Shield in 2001, Gregory Walton said: “Ultimately the aim is to integrate a gigantic online database with an all-encompassing surveillance network – incorporating speech and face recognition, closed-circuit television, smart cards, credit records, and Internet surveillance technologies.”⁵⁴ The major contribution of the initial stages of the Golden Shield Project to the overall social management programme the construction of pre-requisite infrastructure and resource integration capacity, which could enable Grid Management and Social Credit (see Chapter Seven).

Golden Shield was never the only Golden Project designed to have a social management application. Similarly, e-government in China has always been designed to improve governance capacity and social management functions. Importantly, these ideas have clearly existed at the highest levels of authority. Jiang Zemin spoke directly on concept of the “automation” of social management in 1995. He stated:

[We must] attach particular importance to arming the base industry and mainstay industry with modern technology, accelerate realising the informatisation, automation and intelligent-isation of economic and social

⁵⁰ Hongren Zhou, Hongyuan Xu, Yuxian Zhang, Changsheng Wang, and Xinhong Zhang, *中国电子政务发展报告 No.1 (China E-Government Development Report No. 1)* 电子政务蓝皮书 (Blue Book of Electronic Development) (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2003); *中国电子政务发展报告 No. 2 (China E-Government Development Report No. 2)* ed. Chengsheng Wang, 电子政务蓝皮书 (Blue Book of Electronic Development) (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2005), 134.

⁵¹ *中国软件和信息服务业发展报告 (2011) (Report on China's Software and Information Service Industry (2011))*, ed. Ying Li, 软件和信息服务业蓝皮书 (Blue Book of Software and Information Service Industry) (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2011), 72.

⁵² Deloitte. "Global Newsflash: China." <https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/jp/Documents/tax/it/jp-it-tax-globalnewsflash-china-30august2016-en.pdf>.

⁵³ Peter Mattis, "China's Adaptive Approach to the Information Counter-Revolution," *China Brief* 11, no. 10 (2011); Yu Jijun, "公安部推广使用“城市公安综合信息系统” (Ministry of Public Security to Promote the Use of "Urban Public Security Comprehensive Information Systems)," *The People's Daily*, 26 April 2002.

⁵⁴ Greg Walton, "China's Golden Shield: Corporations and the Development of Surveillance Technology in the People's Republic of China," International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 2001.

management. [We] should treat with great importance questions of science and technology in the realm of social development, such as environmental protection, reasonable natural resource exploitation and use, disaster prevention measures, population control, people's health, make contributions to improving our ecological environment, raising the people's quality of life and health, promoting the continued coordination of economic and social development.⁵⁵

E-government was also always seen as having the potential to accelerate economic development while simultaneously improving central control over the entire complex systems management process that is social management. Practically, this required a level of decentralisation to allow for economic growth, while simultaneously strengthening central control. The technology and e-government systems engineering projects are important and notable on their own in terms of their relevance in maintaining economic development and continued modernisation. In an ideal form, these processes will eventually be linked to the larger social management project. The key to success in both the economic development and social management objective is to enhance coordination, and to develop the vertical and horizontal integration described in Chapter Five. In one 1993 *People's Daily* article Hu Qili, who in 1993 was Minister of Electronics Industry said:

Under the unified leadership and planning of the State Council, with each of the ministries and commissions, and all localities working closely together with a common purpose, jointly promote economic and social informatisation to strengthen the national willpower, play the role in the government's overall planning, organization and coordination, is the important guarantee of promoting informatisation. The National economic informatisation is a cross departmental, cross sectoral, cross-regional, cross century, great social engineering (project) employing many kinds of technology, and comprehensive and integrated services, it requires the strong leadership under the State Council, an unified programme, unified command, unified pace, good coordination of all aspects of all relationships, displaying a central and local, enthusiasm of relevant departments and enterprises, cooperation in the division of labour, and strong coordination, in order to [ensure] smooth implementation. We should actively take the initiative with relevant departments to strengthen coordination, and for the State Council's staff to do a good service.⁵⁶

The government has actively designed systems enabling economic development and overall modernisation so that they simultaneously strengthen the centre's capacity for control. By 2000, as a direct result of the Golden Projects, every province, autonomous region and municipality across the country had established an office automation system (an intranet), connected to a State Council hub.⁵⁷ Since that time, the Golden Projects have allowed initial development of the "unified planning", "unified standards", "unified coordination" and "unified deployment", of policies driving informatisation of

⁵⁵ "江泽民同志在全国科学技术大会上的讲话 (1995年5月26日) (Comrade Jiang Zemin's Speech at the National Science and Technology Conference (26 May 1995))".

⁵⁶ Hu Qili, "发展信息产业和经济信息网 促进国民经济信息化 (Developing the Information Industry and Economic Information Networks, Promoting the Informatisation of National Economy)," *The People's Daily*, 17 June 1994.

⁵⁷ Xu and Zhou, *中国信息化形势分析和预测 (2010) (Analysis and Forecast on China's Informatisation (2010))*.

government departments across the country.⁵⁸ This directly benefits the social management process.

The linkage between e-government and social management specifically includes the operation of the Mass Line feedback loop. It is important to remember the feedback loop is not simply between the Party-state and society. It is a feedback loop between the Party-state leadership and the Party masses, and it is a feedback loop between the Party (mainly the Party masses) and society. In its earliest forms, e-government was often described in relation to improving official accountability. Similarly, in 2004, Premier Wen Jiabao tied e-government to government administrative system reform.⁵⁹ Accountability does not imply true transparency, and calls for accountability are not about objective anti-corruption efforts. Instead, it is about the Party masses being accountable to the centre and its demands. It is also about ensuring the Party masses effectively managing relations with society, using both cooperative and coercive means.

Grid Management and Social Organisation

The Golden Projects provided the infrastructure to automate social management, but not the enabling process. ANS Self-Healing objective takes place within a defined real or virtual space, like a grid. Grids are: “voluntary collections of physical systems that share resources and typically consist of multiple, heterogeneous configurations.”⁶⁰ As Section 6.1 described, Self-Healing’s source governance function requires a full integration of resources so the improvement of services and the enhancement of control take place through a simultaneous process. Grid management is the early manifestation of the automation of that function.

Grid policing was being implemented no later than between 2001 and 2002 in separate localities across the country. In this early stage, it was characterised mostly by enhanced monitoring and surveillance and more efficient data sharing within a designated area and within public security bureaus. One of the first openly reported examples of modern grid(-ized) (网格化) policing was in Shanghai.⁶¹ It was described as a development that allowed preventative police actions to move from acting as a “passive force” to acting as an “active force”. As a result, it was described as enabling a move from a “static” system of management to a “dynamic” system of management.⁶² By 2001, public security officials claimed the grid policing system caused the overall number of criminal cases to decrease by 20.9 percent Huangpu district, Shanghai, and

⁵⁸ 中国软件和信息服务业发展报告 (2011) (*Report on China's Software and Information Service Industry (2011)*), 73.

⁵⁹ 中国电子政务发展报告 No. 2 (*China E-Government Development Report No. 2*) 153.

⁶⁰ Schneider, Barker, and Dobson, "A Survey of Self-Healing Systems Frameworks," 1378.

⁶¹ Lei Mao, "社会治安保持平稳防控能力得到提高上海严重刑事犯罪发案数下降 (Social Security and Order Remain Steady; the Prevention and Control Capacity has Improved; the Number of Serious Criminal Cases in Shanghai have Decreased)," *The People's Daily*, 3 August 2001. ; Jinyi Zhao, "上海治安启示录 (The Revelation of Shanghai's Public Security)," *The People's Daily*, 22 August 2001. ; Ye Yang, "严密治安防控的成功实践——上海警方打击街面“两抢”犯罪纪实 (Successful Implementation of Strict Law and Order Prevention and Control -- Accounts of Shanghai Police Striking the Streetside "Two [kinds of] Robberies")," *The People's Daily*, 14 August 2002.

⁶² Wenke Xin, "让人民满意 (Satisfy the People)," *The People's Daily*, 14 August 2002.

to decrease by 40 percent in Hongkou district, Shanghai.⁶³ These developments in grid policing described the early result of the Golden Shield project being put into action.

Grid policing's attempt to automate social management significantly expanded under Hu Jintao. This project was largely under the direction of Zhou Yongkang, Minister of Public Security (2003-2007) and head of the Central Political-Legal Affairs Committee (2007-2012). Within a few years of grid policing's initial appearance, the more encompassing "grid management" (网格化管理) began to publicly emerge. Grid management enabled the organisation of data to generate better situational awareness and predictive capacity, as well as enhanced tracking and monitoring of individuals.⁶⁴ It physically and virtually separated areas into grids for surveillance and knowledge building to serve both cooperative and coercive functions. Grid management represents the initial effort to integrate technology to support the whole social management process. The intent of grid management was made very clear. A 2006 *People's Daily* article said:

[We] Should establish a public sentiment collection and analysis mechanism through improving e-government and important information systems, thus strengthening [our] capability to maintain social stability and increase the standard of social management; utilize information technology to establish an 'emergency response logistical mobilisation command system' and social warning system, forming an emergency response mechanism with a unified command, comprehensive function, agile reactions, efficient operation, to raise the capacity for protection of public security and emergency handling; attach importance to improving the 'Golden Shield' project, and improving the informatisation level of CMPS works, strike against all kinds of illegal activities, and ensure people's lives and property are safe.⁶⁵

A more recent article from 2016, produced by the Party School of the CCP Committee in Yichang, Hubei, described:

Since the 1990s, with China's economic transition and social transformation, urban social management is also experiencing a structural transition from "overall control" to "technological governance". Urbanisation and the rapid development of urban areas has brought new problems to management research. Complicated urban daily affairs and sudden public emergencies have required innovations in systems and mechanisms. Grid-isation offered the technical underpinning for the refinement of urban management. Under such circumstances, Grid-ised Management was born.⁶⁶

⁶³ Zhao, "上海治安启示录 (The Revelation of Shanghai's Public Security)."

⁶⁴ Jie Li and Changrong Qu, "警力下沉 网格布警 科技强警 郑州筑牢社会治安防控体系 今年前八月各类刑事案件同比下降两成多 (The Police Force Goes Grassroots; Grid Deployment of the Force; Scientifically Strengthen the Force; Zhengzhou Building a Sturdy Social Security Prevention and Control System, For the First Eight Months This Year, Criminal Cases Have Declined by Twenty Percent)," *The People's Daily*, 15 October 2006.

⁶⁵ Renzhou Xin, "发挥信息化对提高执政能力的作用 (Fully Realising the Effect Informatisation Has on Raising Governance Capacity)," *The People's Daily*, 4 June 2005.

⁶⁶ Guoxiang Zhang, Chengzhen Yang, and Qing Gao, "展领域 拓展地域 实现网格化管理新优化 (Developing Domains; Expanding Districts; Achieving New Optimisation of Grid Management)," CCP Committee Yichang, Hubei, Party School, 2016.

The first place where “grid management” was openly implemented was in 2004, in Dongcheng district, Beijing; so far, the project can be divided into four stages.⁶⁷ In the first stage of Dongcheng’s grid management project, the district was divided into 1,593 grid cells, according to a *People’s Daily* report, grid managers were each allocated group of households within each grid area.⁶⁸ Grid managers help collect data, and pre-empt and solve problems within their allocated grid space. Grid managers are members of community and street-level committees.⁶⁹

Grid management platforms, used in their ideal form, provide the government a support system for timely and accurate implementation of social management responsibilities. Everything from birth, grade school, university, military, employment, marriage, childbirth, old age, straight to death and funeral, can be tracked and managed. DNA records, fingerprints, and other personal data are all integrated through information system.⁷⁰ The photographs and videos police take at the scene of almost every protest are another example of the kind of data that can be fed into the grid system.⁷¹ Software applications were developed to integrate “Real name” registration for travel booking, telecom services, and other services. Information provided at hotel check-in or at customs clearance all could be linked directly to law enforcement grid management databases. In Dongcheng, after seven to eight months of implementation, authorities claimed to have gathered 8,400 pieces of information on “public opinion” and claimed to have resolved 630 disputes, resulting in Beijing’s lowest “incident rate”.⁷²

In the second stage of Dongcheng’s grid management project, after the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 17th Party Congress, grid management began to introduce social services as part of the grid programme. Grid managers are part of the Comprehensive Management of Public Security (CMPS) system. The involvement of community and street-level committee members indicates how social management is not only automating coercive management, but also cooperative management. Public security

⁶⁷ Jinzhu Yue, ““网格化+”城市服务管理的探索与展望 (‘Grid + ’ Urban Services Management: Exploration and Prospects),” *Social Governance Review*, no. 4 (2016).

⁶⁸ “曾培炎春节慰问北京市市政管理职工时强调 运用现代信息技术 提高城市管理水平 改善社区人居环境 (On Her Visit to Meet the Beijing Municipal Management Workers During the New Year, Zeng Peiyan Emphasised Using Modern Information Technology to Improve the City’s Management Level and Make the Community’s Living Environment Better),” *The People’s Daily*, 19 February 2007.

⁶⁹ “上海市静安区人民政府江宁路街道办事处主要职责和机构设置 (Principal Responsibilities and Institutional Set-up of the Jiangning Street Sub-district Office, Jing’an District People’s Government, Shanghai),” Jingan, Shanghai (Government Web Portal), 21 August 2015.

⁷⁰ Yewang Yang, Ming Lei, and Tingjun Huang, “与时俱进构建现代警务机制, 警方形成以指挥系统为龙头, 点线面结合、专群结合、人防物防技防结合的防控网络, 这是为了——让上海越来越安全 (Keeping Up With the Times: Establishing a Modern Policing Mechanism, Police Forming A Prevention and Control Network Headed by The Command System; Integrating the Dot, Line and Surface [of the Grid System], Integrating Professional Education, And Integrating Prevention Control of People, Objects and Technology --This is to Allow Shanghai to Become More and More Secure),” *The People’s Daily*, 2002.

⁷¹ “发挥城市基层网格化管理的联动效应 (Fully Realizing the Linkage Effect the of Urban Grassroots Grid Management),” 24 May 2017.

⁷² “曾培炎春节慰问北京市市政管理职工时强调 运用现代信息技术 提高城市管理水平 改善社区人居环境 (On Her Visit to Meet the Beijing Municipal Management Workers During the New Year, Zeng Peiyan Emphasised Using Modern Information Technology to Improve the City’s Management Level and Make the Community’s Living Environment Better).”

organs may dominate the process, but it is also inclusive of health and other social services. All services to improve people's lives and the government's capacity to deliver services, while simultaneously coercively controlling them. In fact, public administration projects like "One Office, Three Centres" are also integrated through the electronic grid mechanisms. Their integration is directed building a comprehensive government services platform.⁷³

Grid management systems are now in use across the entire country, but the system is not yet complete. It does not yet function as a cohesive whole. For instance, in 2017 the system was criticised for not providing even enough connectivity between grassroots and relevant functional departments.⁷⁴ Therefore, the next steps in the grid management project require further linkage. In Dongcheng, Beijing, the third stage of the district's grid management project involves "deepening construction" to create the "scientific" integration, and comprehensive integration of the city grid areas by the end of 2017. The objectives were set forth in an August 2015 "1+3" document, which called for urban and rural areas to be linked, use of the Internet of Things, and full integration of urban services into the grid system.⁷⁵

A fourth stage, is also underway. It involves expanding the system to a regional level, allowing for integration of departments, and improving the information platforms used in grid management command centres by 2018. It seems likely, however, that this integration process can only truly function at an optimal level if China's ANS Self-Configuring objective, described in Chapter Five, also functions at an optimal level.

[6.3] Conclusion

The Self-Healing objective, from the Party state leadership's perspective, has likely generated a more reliable way of source governance. This success taken alone, however, would not allow China's ANS system to function as a cohesive whole. Further integration is required. It could be said that grids are an early attempt at an automated version of a concept achieving the same objectives of the commune and *danwei* systems without defined work unit and physical space. Social Credit, described in Chapter Seven, is the next logical step.

⁷³ Wuxi City Huishan District Government Service Center, "惠山区政务服务中心 2016 年度部门预算 (Huishan District Government Services Centre, 2016 Departmental Budget)," 6 March 2016.

⁷⁴ "发挥城市基层网格化管理的联动效应 (Fully Realizing the Linkage Effect the of Urban Grassroots Grid Management)".

⁷⁵ Yue, "'网格化+'城市服务管理的探索与展望 ('Grid + ' Urban Services Management: Exploration and Prospects)," 107.

Chapter Seven I

Self-Optimising

「Control is as much an effect as a cause, and the idea that control is something you exert is a real handicap to progress」
-Steve Grand

During a February 2015 visit to Yan'an, Shaanxi, where the Red Army had its headquarters after the Long March from 1936-1948, Xi Jinping reflected on his time as a Party Secretary of a local village. He said: "I stayed for seven years, from 1969 to 1975, and when I left, I left physically, but my heart remained behind."¹ In a previous interview, from 2004, Xi said: "Even now, many of the fundamental ideas and basic features that I've developed were formed in Yan'an."² Similarly, in 2008, Hu Jintao visited a county in Yan'an while promoting the 'scientific development concept'. Hu invoked the concept of the Mass Line in conversation with a villager, saying: "I believe that with the good policies of the Party and the hard efforts by the villagers, you will lead a better life in the future."³ In fact, Yan'an is the location where Mao's Mass Line theory of governance originated. References to Yan'an or "The Spirit of Yan'an" have long had propaganda value for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). One way the concept has been used is in connection to thinking on the people's participation in social management and individual responsibility. The utopic version of Yan'an, depicts a community where the Chinese CCP used "populist, [and] mobilizational strategies for the remaking of Chinese society on democratic and egalitarian principles."⁴ In its ideal form, it has been described as: "A financially straitened party-state had to rely on the resourcefulness of grassroots village builders and could not but allow them some idiosyncratic licence and independence."⁵ Despite this image, the CCP also used strongly coercive tactics to maintain power in Yan'an.⁶

¹ Chris Buckley. "Chinese President Returns to Mao's (and His) Roots in Yan'an." *The New York Times*, 13 February 2015. https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/chinese-president-returns-to-maos-and-his-roots-in-yanan/?mcubz=3&_r=0.

² Ibid.

³ "Hu Jintao visits county to promote ideological campaign." *The People's Daily Online (English)*, 18 November 2008. <http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90785/6535378.html>.

⁴ Pauline Keating, "The Yan'an Way of Co-operativization," *The China Quarterly* 140 (1994): 1025.

⁵ Ibid. 1050.

⁶ Mark Selden, "Yan'an Communism Reconsidered," *Modern China* 21, no. 1 (1995): 40.

After Tiananmen in 1989, literature on social management began to focus heavily on the topic of the people's participation. In this propaganda push, the Yan'an was invoked. One *People's Daily* article said:

Within the Spirit of Yan'an, the idea of the masses as a historical subject, and to organise the people to participate in social management and competence, is unprecedented in the history of China. The Mass Line is our party's consistent line, in the Yan'an period it had new development and new growth. During the War of Resistance against Japan, Comrade Mao Zedong has a famous saying "The People's Militia is the Foundation for victory, the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the People."⁷

Ultimately, it implies that every Chinese citizen, whether they are located inside or outside of the Party, is tasked with fulfilling the responsibility to uphold the Communist Party's leadership. In fact, this obligation also applies to Chinese located inside and outside of China's physical borders.⁸ The idea of responsibility is directly linked to the Communist Party's efforts to optimise the Mass Line process of shaping, managing, and responding. The direct objective is to require the people to support the Party-state system, and is an objective that requires both cooperative and coercive control.

The Party-state embeds thinking on responsibility into its social control theories, which directly inform the construction of the social management process. One journal article on applying cybernetics to social control efforts related to documents control (censorship) cited Chinese legal scholar Jiang Chuanguang, described social control concepts as a dialectical interplay: (1) "Positive Control" and "Negative Control", positive control being defined as guiding individual behaviour, and negative control as restricting, punishing and using fear of punishment (2) "Formal Control" and "Informal Control", formal control being defined as the mechanisms and organisation of social control through things such as the law, and informal control being things that are not directly contained like standards of morality and (3) "External Control" and "Internal Control", external referring to use of direct social norms restricting actions and includes the national legal system and rules on social organisations, as well as morality standards and internal referring to social intervention in people's subjective consciousness, it is the internalisation of social norms.⁹

As Chapter Four described, dialectics is a way of thinking not limited by an absolute framework. It can be described as bringing "into focus the full range of changes and interactions that occur in the world".¹⁰ Dialectics describes a process of interactions that are in the state of dynamic equilibrium. As soon as equilibrium is achieved it will be quickly followed by disequilibrium. In reality, the concept of dynamic equilibrium

⁷ Jibao Li, "延安精神必将在新一代青年中发扬光大 (The Yan'an Spirit Will Be Developed and Carried Forward in the New Generation of Young People)" *The People's Daily*, 2 September 1991.

⁸ Nick McKenzie, Sashka Koloff, Richard Baker, and Chris Uhlmann. "China's Operation Australia: The Party Line." *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 2017. <http://www.smh.com.au/interactive/2017/chinas-operation-australia/soft-power.html>.

⁹ Yongfu Jiang and Yue Meng, "社会控制论视角的文献控制论述略 (Brief Literature Review of the Document Control Theory from the Perspective of Social Control Theory)," *Journal of Academic Library* 3 (2016). Authors associated with the Research Center of Information Resource Management, Heilongjiang University.

¹⁰ Ollman, *Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx's Method*. Online copy, quote from: Chapter 1 "The Meaning of Dialectics", Section 2.

is not even about maintaining a single dynamic equilibrium, but about maintaining multiple dynamic equilibria within a single system.¹¹ For dynamic equilibrium to be maintained in the long-term, the Party must Self-Optimise its Mass Line interactions.

This thinking describes the ANS Self-Optimising objective, which in the Party's language is known as the "dynamic management" objective of social management. Self-Optimising describes maximising resources and pre-emptively "initiating a change in itself to improve performance or service quality."¹² In ANS, the Self-Optimising objective has the capacity to measure its current performance against that ideal, and have defined policies for attempting improvements.¹³ Another part of the Self-Optimising function is "workload management", which is a process that "seeks to tune control parameters," which is aimed at providing "the best possible service to a given workload or set of workloads, taking into account any trade-offs that have been specified in policies."¹⁴ This process also includes the provision of additional resources, "when they are needed to meet performance objectives, and to remove those resources when they are needed elsewhere more urgently."¹⁵ These are objectives that must be specified by the system manager, in the China's Autonomic Nervous System, this describes the Party-state Leadership.

The ANS Self-Optimising objective's "dynamic management" represents the third key objective the Party describes in explanations of how the social management system is being constructed. When the 12th Five Year Plan elevated social management as a key objective, it called for strengthening the "display the government's leading role, strengthening social management and public service functions, building a service-oriented government and raising service-oriented management capacity." The plan said the process should be achieved through "dynamic management", which involves "equally communicating and consulting with" the masses, resolves their "lawful demands" and promptly dissolves social contradictions.¹⁶ The 2013 *People's Daily* article on establishing the social management mechanism, according to requirements set during the 18th Party Congress, described how "dynamic management" would look in practice. It called for creating a robust social contradiction detection and mediation mechanism, placing social contradictions into the state of dynamic equilibrium, dynamic coordination of affairs, and intensification of regular research on "social contradictions under new circumstances".¹⁷

This chapter focuses on the construction of the Party-state's engineering of the Self-Optimising objective. Section 7.1, describing the Sensory Channels, explains the Party-

¹¹ Jeremy Pitt, "Introduction: The Computer After Me," ed. Jeremy Pitt, *The Computer After Me: Awareness and Self-Awareness in Autonomic Systems* (London: Imperial College Press, 2015). 12.

¹² IBM, "Autonomic Computing White Paper: An architectural blueprint for autonomic computing," 5; Huebscher and McCann, "A survey of Autonomic Computing—degrees, models and applications," 7.4.

¹³ Sterritt and Hinchey, "Towards Self-Managing Real-Time Systems."

¹⁴ Jeffrey O. Kephart, "Research challenges of autonomic computing" (paper presented at the 27th International Conference on Software Engineering, ICSE 2005., Saint Louis, MO, USA, 2005), 19.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ "“十二五”规划纲要 (Outline of the 12th Five Year Plan)."

¹⁷ Tang and Fu, "源头治理 动态管理 应急处置——学习党的十八大精神 (Source Governance, Dynamic Management, and Emergency Response-- Learn the Spirit of the 18th National Congress of the CCP)."

state leadership’s reliance on a “responsibility” mechanism, which is focused on pre-emptively shaping and directing behaviours. Section 7.2, on the Motor Channels describe the attempted automation of this responsibility mechanism. If successful, this would enable the social management objective of “dynamic management”, which Self-Optimising describes.¹⁸

[7.1] Self-Aware and Self-Situated

China’s ANS Self-Optimising objective’s ‘Self-aware’ and ‘Self-situated’ Sensory Channels describe the capacity to understand what resources should be “optimised” in order to realise dynamic management (see Figure 9). Self-aware describes monitoring of resources required to ensure responsibility, which include efforts to build “morality” and “trust”. Self-situated describes analysis of efforts to reinvent the mass mobilisation tactics.




Figure 9: China’s ANS Self-Optimising Sensory Channels

The knowledge gained through these Sensory Channels inform the attempt to “automate” the responsibility system, via the Motor Channels of the Self-Optimising objective’s control loop described in Section 7.2.

The People’s Participation in Social Management

Social management’s definition has always emphasised “public participation” and “self-management”. In the Mao era, this included campaign-style Mass mobilisation. At the start of the reform era, this management system changed but did not disappear. It has, over time, been incrementally adapted to fit within the current context. Social management is the management of the entire society, and also a management that is participated in by the entire society. It is not a form of liberalisation, but rather a form of control that incorporates both positive and negative reinforcement.

¹⁸ I introduced the ideas found in section 7.2 in an article for China Brief, published on 17 August 2017. Unavoidably, there is some repetition of my own language between that article and this chapter section. I also published some early thinking about 'individual responsibility' and social management in a separate 2015 China Brief article, and a 2016 piece for The National Interest. Hoffman, "Managing the State: Social Credit, Surveillance and the CCP’s Plan for China." Samantha Hoffman, "Ensuring Comprehensive State Security in the “Ideological Battleground” Online," *China Brief* 15, no. 22 (2015); Samantha Hoffman, "'Dangerous Love': China's All-Encompassing Security Vision," 2016.

The tactics are, in many ways, updated versions of Mao-era mobilisation tactics. They are designed to meet the requirements of modern information society, modern integrated threat perceptions, and the modern movement of people. In the Mao era, mobilisation tactics were employed to advance economic development and consolidation of the Party's political power.¹⁹ As Elizabeth Perry has argued, Maoist mass mobilisation tactics have been re-branded in the reform and development period (and have not disappeared, as is often implied in Chinese studies literature).²⁰ According to Perry: "A large part of the complex answer to this question [of how China has developed post-Mao] lies in the retention – and reinvention – of many elements of China's revolutionary heritage."²¹ After Tiananmen, considerable attention was paid to improving grassroots organisation with the objective of controlling the process from a "source governance" and a "dynamic management" perspective, although the efforts began in the 1980s. Like with the establishment of the Comprehensive Management of Public Security (CMPS) system, Tiananmen was not a cause for these reforms, but it was likely a catalyst to speed-up implementation efforts.

One 1993 *People's Daily* article, for instance, expressed the perception that the legal system and social management was falling behind in its work. It said as production activity accelerated and income gaps increased, spiritual culture building, ideological and political work were weak, and that people's values and morality have decayed. It added: "Some grassroots leadership is weak, opinion poll organisation is incomplete, grassroots level Political-Legal department coordination is not close enough, and the capability to mediate disputes is lacking, these all to a certain extent related [to the problems]."²² It is important to emphasise the direct connection of morality and values to "spiritual culture" and ideological and political work. It is important because this draws the linkage between concepts that now appear in language on the "Social Credit" system, discussed in section 7.2. The reference to a "spiritual culture" in the *People's Daily Article*, for instance, is a propaganda effort that began in the 1980s in response to popular disillusionment with the CCP and attraction to foreign ideas (similar to the He Shang controversy mentioned in Chapter Six).²³ Anne Marie Brady explained these Spiritual Civilisation offices were established within propaganda offices, replacing Mao-era political education, and "were in charge of spiritual matters such as public education on ethics and morals."²⁴

For the Party, improving Spiritual Culture through social management involved re-inserting the Party into society. Along with the rise of the CMPS system, to coordinate grassroots and political and legal committees, other efforts were shaping. Most notable was the re-strengthening of street and community level (or residents' and neighbourhood) committees. Street committees are a level higher than the community

¹⁹ Perry, "Moving the Masses: Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution," 113; Teiwes, *Politics and purges in China: rectification and the decline of party norms, 1950-1965*, 83-86, 296.

²⁰ Perry, "Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?," 5-6.

²¹ Ibid. 7.

²² Zulong Chen, "民间纠纷新探 (New Exploration of Civil Disputes)," *The People's Daily*, 1993.

²³ Brady, *Marketing dictatorship: propaganda and thought work in contemporary China*, 25; Xueliang Ding, *The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis, 1977-1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 123.

²⁴ Brady, *Marketing dictatorship: propaganda and thought work in contemporary China*, 26.

(residents/neighbourhood) committees. Initially during the reform period, residents' committees declined. By the mid-1980s, however, there was an effort to reinvigorate them.²⁵ In December 1989, the "Organic Law of the Urban Residents Committees of the People's Republic of China" was adopted. It called for "improving the urban residents' committees as an institution, enabling urban residents to administer their own affairs in accordance with the law" and said "urban residents' committees shall be a mass organisation for self-government at the grassroots level, in which the residents manage their own affairs, educate themselves, and serve their own needs."²⁶

The effort was explicitly linked to optimising social management's capacity to maximise resources and pre-emptively initiate changes to improve the Party's control at the "source" level through behavioural control. In a 1991 meeting with a street sub-district office, Politburo Standing Committee member Song Ping explained:

The cause of socialism is the cause of the masses themselves, we must mobilise and rely on the masses to actively participate in social management, and truly exercise their rights as the people in charge. As high level Party Committee Members and the Government, [we] should put more emphasis and care on the street works, actively solving difficulties for our comrades on the streets, and create the necessary precondition for their work.²⁷

Part of the effort to re-strengthen the committees in the 1990s was to diversify the volunteer force that largely make up these committees. Typically, retired women would fulfil these roles.²⁸ One 1996 *People's Daily* article focused on "constructing a social management combined mechanism" called on young volunteers to become involved. It said the social management system involves various social relationships—the street and neighbourhood committee systems should provide social security services. It said "young volunteers" should be inseparably close with personnel, civil affairs, industry and commerce, labour, women and branch offices.²⁹ Groups, like the All-China Women's Federation, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, All-China Youth Federation and All-China Students Federation, are all represented in these committees. These same mass organisations were used to mobilise the masses to participate in political campaigns, and thought reform.³⁰ This organisation mirrors many tactics for optimising social management under Mao. Participation can be elicited through services, like the provision of public goods, elections and through the coercive policing side of management. The concept was to bring these groups into the street-level governance system where both control and services would be provided through the same system.

²⁵ Allen C. Choate, "Local Governance in China, Part II," *The Asia Foundation Working Paper Series*, no. 10 (1998): 10.

²⁶ *Organic Law of the Urban Residents Committees of the People's Republic of China*.

²⁷ He Ping, "宋平会见街道办事处主任培训班学员 代表党中央、国务院向在街道及居委会工作的全体同志致以问候 ([Politburo Standing Committee Member] Song Ping Met with Street Sub-District Office Director and Trainees and on Behalf of the CCP Central Committee and State Council [and] Expressed Regards for Street and Neighbourhood Committees' Work)," *The People's Daily*, 8 November 1991.

²⁸ Choate, "Local Governance in China, Part II."

²⁹ Jianhua Lu, "加强机制建设注重持久实效 (Strengthen Mechanism Construction and Pay Attention to the Lasting Effectiveness)," *The People's Daily*, 1996.

³⁰ Brady, *Marketing dictatorship: propaganda and thought work in contemporary China*.

Efforts focused on improving the functionality of these responsibility mechanisms within the social management process became clearer under Hu Jintao. Social management was often described in relation to an objective of becoming more “service-oriented”.³¹ One 2005 *People’s Daily* article on the government becoming less “management oriented” and more “service oriented”, explained:

[We must] strengthen the social service management capacity of group organizations. People’s organization such as the Labour Union, Communist Youth, and Women’s Union are the bridges to the government linking and servicing the people, and to a great extent function as social organizations. To strengthen and innovate social management, [we] must fully utilize the existing organization system of the group organizations. Currently, the key lies in robustly strengthen the group organization’s capability to innovate by themselves, to perfect its function in organizing the crowd, leading the crowd, serve the crowd, and maintain the crowd’s legal rights and privileges.³²

The implication is far from what might be understood through a “civil society” concept, as defined in western democratic terms. For the Party co-governance, people’s participation, and other similar language might sound like liberalisation. Yet, the self-management they describe is precisely the opposite. As the ANS framework instructs, autonomic systems are self-managing. Autonomic is not autonomous. “Public participation” has always implied a process similar to a Mass Line feed-back loop, which means the Party leadership’s promotion of the people’s participation is inherently designed to co-opt them into operating within the Party’s ideas space. The major difficulty is Self-Optimisation’s primary objective of dynamic management – enforcing the people’s participation in social management – is not effective.³³

Sensory Channel Knowledge

The Self-Optimising objective is focused on responsibility because it is the task that would optimise the relationships between the Party-state leadership, Party masses and society. One 2016 article described how social management’s final shape would be a “social ‘jointonomy’ or co-governance”, which described each member of society being integrated into the social management process. It includes encouraging participation through “expressions” and “urging” relevant departments to pay some more attention [to a cause]. It elaborated: “Then society’s self-management ability will not only improve, but also force greater professionalisation of institutions.”³⁴

Participation in co-governance cannot be a choice, rather it is a responsibility to the Party, as the Mass Line concept instructs. The Sensory Channels found, however, that

³¹ Hongyan Wen, Chunmei Feng, Hongtao Cao, and Lingjuan Cao, “政府：从“管理型”到“服务型” (Government: From a "Management Model" to a "Services Model"),” *The People’s Daily*, 11 March 2005.

³² “充分发挥群众参与社会管理的基础作用 (Fully Realise the Fundamental Function of Crowd Participation in Social Management).” *The People’s Daily Online*, 17 December 2012. <http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2012/1217/c352852-19921717.html>.

³³ Jude Howell, “Adaptation under scrutiny: peering through the lens of community governance in China,” *Journal of Social Policy* 45, no. 3 (2016).

³⁴ “不是骗子不狡猾而是被骗者太执着 (It is not that the Swindler is not Devious, but that the Deceived were too Stubborn).” 26 January 2016. http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2016-01/26/c_1117891607.htm.

people are not willing to be co-opted through these mass mobilisation efforts alone. Therefore, another mechanism must make participation an unavoidable part of their routine lives.

[7.2] Motor Channels: Self-Monitor and Self-Adjust

The Motor Channel for China’s ANS Self-Optimising objective describe the attempted “automation” of responsibility (see Figure 10). Self-monitor describes planning for the automation of responsibility through the creation of a new legal framework clearly tying state security and social management to the concept of individual responsibility. Self-adjust describes the execution of plans to attempt the automation of responsibility, via the Social Credit System. If the Motor Channel control loop succeeds in the automation of responsibility as planned, it would create a mechanism for “dynamic” social management, which, in its ideal form, would have the capacity pre-empt and respond to threats of all types.




Figure 10: China’s ANS Self-Optimising Motor Channels

In addition to the difficulties in realising the full linkage of grid management, described in Chapter Six, another problem is, by default of design, grid management represents a virtual replica of a physical space. In this sense, grid management alone cannot comprehensively cover every aspect of social life, it remains largely a highly-sophisticated surveillance and coordination network.

Economic development and mobility associated with it require people to regularly move outside of physically defined spaces. Moreover, with the development of technology, society occupies both the virtual and real worlds. While surveillance and censorship can help realise the ANS Self-Healing objective, by self-fixing, or predicting and preventing faults, it only can serve as the basis for the Self-Optimisation function, if the is to proactively manage and maximise resources.

The Law and Individual Responsibility

As Chapter Five described, the Central State Security Commission's work includes coordination of research and drafting of all major state security-relevant legislation, policies and regulations.³⁵ This legislation has included: the Counter-Espionage Law (2014), the State Security Law (2015), the Foreign Non-Governmental Organisation Management Law (2016), the Cyber Security Law (2016), and the Intelligence Law (2017), among others.

The state security law and other state security relevant legislation developed under Xi Jinping notably focus heavily on the concept of individual responsibility. For instance, article 11 of the State Security Law (2015), clearly stated on “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China, every state organ and the armed forces, each political party, the militia, enterprises, public institutions and social organizations, all have the responsibility and obligation to maintain state security.”³⁶ Similarly, article 74 of the State Security Law states:

Citizens and organisations shall perform the following obligations to maintain state security: (1) Obeying the relevant provisions of national laws, regulations regarding state security, (2) promptly reporting leads on activities endangering state security; (3) protecting and truthfully providing evidence of activities endangering state security (4) providing conditions to facilitate state security efforts and other assistance; (5) keeping state secrets they learn confidential; (6) providing public security organs, state security organs or military organs with relevant data, information or technical support; (7) other obligations provided by the law. Individuals and organisations must not act to endanger state security, and must not provide any kind of support or assistance to individuals or organisations endangering state security.³⁷

This subject is also relevant to the extensive discussion in Chapter Seven, for now, it must simply be emphasised that the importance of this legislation is it that social management is now explicitly linked state security under Xi Jinping. These laws technically do not change the status quo—individuals were already held accountable for state security. For example, the 1993 State Security Law already to an extent dealt with the issue of individual responsibility.³⁸ However, the new state security legislation, and Central State Security Committee and leading group system, now directly connects the social management process to state security. In that sense, these developments further emphasise the urgency of the individual responsibility requirement.

Changing Behaviour through Social Credit

China’s social credit system has received a considerable amount of media attention over the last couple of years. Many, rightly, see the Orwellian features of the system. While others have looked at it as a simple credit scoring and accountability mechanism. The issue with this binary way of thinking about social credit is, quite simply, social credit is not one or the other. It is both. Granted, the more optimistic view sits squarely within the Orwellian view. The reason goes back to the very fundamental explanation that

³⁵ 中华人民共和国国家安全法 (*State Security Law of the People's Republic of China*).

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ *State Security Law of the People's Republic of China (1993)*, Order No. 68 of the President of the People's Republic of China.

social management is linked the optimisation of the Mass Line. The Self-Optimisation objective related directly to responsibility suggests that behaviour must be shaped, so the Mass Line process could be optimised. Social credit is the process that achieves this function. Optimisation is inclusive of cooperative and coercive tactics. This subsection is not focused on the development of the system individually, and instead is focused on two points: how social credit “automates” responsibility and how social credit still requires the China’s entire ANS requires multiple stages of development which include support from the other three of the Four “Self-’s” to truly achieve Self-Optimisation.

The introduction of the grid management system improved public security efforts related to enforcement and surveillance, which involves both co-option and coercion. The cooperative side was weak, however, because on its own grid management does not pre-emptively change behaviour. The social credit system relies on the technology enabling and the organisational capacity created through the grid management system. Therefore, if social credit is to function, grid management’s integration must first succeed.

The 2014 Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020) highlighted the joint role society plays in the process, like responsibility mechanisms, as a key objective of the social credit system:

Government promotes, and cooperates with society to build [the system] jointly. Give full rein to the organizational, guiding, promoting and demonstration roles of government. The government is responsible for formulating and implementing development plans, completing regulations and standards, fostering and supervising credit service markets. Focus on giving rein to the role of market mechanisms, coordinate and optimize resource allocation, encourage and muster social forces, broaden participation, move forward together, shape joint forces for social credit system construction.³⁹

Effectively “social credit” is the technological marriage of individual “responsibility” mechanisms and social control methodologies described, such as those described through grid management. Society is co-opted to participate because the same technology is directly linked to conveniences that improve everyday life, for instance electronic payment. Society is coerced to participate, for instance by self-censoring online, because increasingly technology systems are improving the government’s capacity to enforce “responsibility” to the party-state. Not participating could have consequences not only for the individual but also their personal networks. As part of the social management mechanism, social credit directly serves state security objectives.

In the early 2000s, there was a clear thinking that the Party found social trust low. At this time, there was a discussion on establishing social credit ratings system, directly focused on finance and aimed at improving trust. Even at that time, however, that “trustworthiness” ratings would incorporate elements of cooperative and co-coercive control of the society, was clear. Issues of trust and morality in Chinese society are not

³⁹ "社会信用体系建设规划纲要 (Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020))," China Copyright and Media, 2014.

ever separated from the Party. One People's Daily article from April 2001, for instance, linked the issue of trustworthiness to ideology and morality, stating:

Fundamentally speaking, trustworthiness belongs to the realm of ideology, it is a concept and awareness rooted deep within people's hearts. Consequently, simply ensuring it through a system is not enough, [we] also need to strengthen the moral construction of the market economy, and let the ideal of "Be honest and keep your word" deep into people's hearts. To rule with morality, first [we] have to strengthen education in trustworthiness, nurture the ideal of "Trustworthiness First" in the awareness of the people and social morality; second [we] must strengthen the correct guidance of public discourse, forming the moral atmosphere of "Keeping your word is honourable, and betraying trust is shameful", making people truly appreciate the importance of trustworthiness. The Government plays a key role in the process of protecting social trustworthiness. The government must push forward with the establishment of a unified social credit system, perfect legal codes, ensuring strict enforcement and carry out moral construction, and so on.⁴⁰

It could be said that social credit in its ideal form is the attempt at an automated version of a concept achieving the same objectives of the commune and *danwei* systems without defined work unit and physical space. Grid management, as the previous chapter described, would be an early attempt. Here, it is important think about the joint economic and social development concept discussed in the previous chapters. Particularly beginning in the early 1990s, as the integrated concept of state security was becoming clear, social stability and state security were often linked to the economic and social development objectives. In part, it is because state security, even in an objective sense not inclusive of the Party, is needed for economic development to succeed. However, it is also because the same resources being designed for economic development, could also provide technical solutions for China's social management and state security system. For instance, one article explained how state security and social management required an integration mechanism:

Additionally, in China's current state security system, social management especially social management innovation, is a very important [part] of activities ensuring state security. Therefore, we must not only list social management and social innovation in activities ensuring state security, but also include "social organisation" in the hardware of mechanism ensuring state security, and in the software of mechanism ensuring state security, include "social insurance mechanism" and a "social supervision mechanism."⁴¹

The idea of Self-Optimisation of responsibility would require the Self-Healing automation mechanism's grid system to become fully integrated, as Chapter Six discussed this is an on-going project. Social credit requires the integration of information resources and interoperability of platforms, in addition to the credit ratings system design and implementation. Eventually, the same technology applications used to provide social and commercial services will feed directly into government

⁴⁰ Tao Liu, "树起信用大旗——整顿规范市场经济秩序述评之三," *The People's Daily*, 5 April 2001.

⁴¹ Yuejin Liu, "国家安全体系中的社会安全问题 (The Social Security Problem within the State Security System)," *Journal of the Central Institute of Socialism*, no. 2 (2013).

information gathering and sharing processes.⁴² These are on-going projects, like the Golden Projects and Grid Management, require multiple phases of development.

[7.3] Conclusion

Rather than being relatively new conceptions, modern surveillance techniques and social credit are merely the newest developments in realizing the automated social management objective. What social credit adds is a performance optimisation. In an emergency, this could mean that resources are allocated more efficiently, according to the definition of Self-Optimisation.⁴³ China's ANS Self-Optimising objective has the potential to achieve dynamic management through the automation of responsibility. As a result of automation, the Party-state, in the ideal outcome, pre-empts threats while efficiently managing resources.

⁴² Yue, "“网格化+”城市服务管理的探索与展望 ("Grid + " Urban Services Management: Exploration and Prospects)."

⁴³ Kephart, "Research challenges of autonomic computing," 19.

Chapter Eight I

Self-Protecting

It is not worthwhile to try to keep history from repeating itself, for a man's character will always make the preventing of repetitions impossible. 』

-Mark Twain

During the Gutian Congress in 1929, Mao Zedong said the Red Army, “besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength,” was responsible to “shoulder such important tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, organising the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary political power and setting up Party organizations.”¹ The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has always been a political force. It should not have been surprising when, in November 2014, Xi Jinping said to a gathering of about 420 senior military and armed police officials in Gutian, marking the 85th anniversary of the 1929 congress: “The Party commands the gun,” and, “We must profoundly recognise the important role of political work in the army building [task] and pass on to following generations all the great traditions which were forged in blood by our ancestors.”² Loyalty is key. Although the PLA has engaged in extensive modernisation, and is primarily focused on fighting external wars, nothing has negated the PLA’s core role as the Party’s Army. In the hierarchy of response to a domestic crisis scenario, the PLA is not the first called upon, but in the most serious crisis type –one where the Party’s rule is directly challenged – it would be called upon. In that case, the PLA may be the only thing standing between the Party and its demise. The People’s Armed Police (PAP) and other public security organs are equally responsible to the Party. Together, the security forces (albeit the PLA mostly externally facing, and the PAP and other public security organs mostly internally facing) serve one basic mission: protect the Communist Party.³

¹ The Red Army was name of the People’s Liberation Army prior to its nationalisation with the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Zedong Mao. "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party." December 1929. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_5.htm.

² "Xi stresses CPC's absolute leadership over army." *China Daily*, 2 November 2014. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-11/02/content_18843109.htm; "在古田会议光芒照耀下继续前进——习近平主席出席全军政治工作会议侧记 (Continue to Advance under the light of the Gutian Conference-- Chairman Xi Jinping attended the [PLA] Political Work Conference)." *Xinhua*, 3 November 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-11/02/c_1113081042.htm.

³ I would like to thank Dr Andrew Monaghan and Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, co-speaker and host for the event “State Security and National Defence Mobilisation in Russia and China” on 27 January 2017. When Dr Monaghan contacted me in July 2016 about scheduling the talk, I had very recently started to make the connections between national defence

The requirement to defend the Party is directly integrated into Chinese security strategy. Dennis Blasko emphasised the continued relevance of the People's War (人民战争) and Active Defence concepts, writing the key principles embedded in both include: mobilising the entire country to "achieve the military objectives defined by the Party", and requiring that all members of the armed forces are loyal to the CCP.⁴ Blasko is also among several authors in the volume *China's Evolving Military Strategy* who described the concept's relationship to present-day strategy, namely deterrence and military-civil integration. Timothy R. Heath's chapter, for example, noted: "Both the central and military leaders employ directives, strategic concepts, party theory and guiding principles to articulate strategic guidance," and People's War is among those strategic concepts.⁵ Separately, James Mulvenon said China's national defence mobilisation concept draws "a clear lineage to the 'People's War' strategy of the Mao era".⁶ All drew attention to important PLA-focused dimensions of the concept, but one critical element is largely missing from existing analysis, which further supports the claim of the concept's continued relevance, that is the Communist Party's political security.

The CCP has called People's War the, "Magic Weapon for our victory over the enemy *at home and abroad* and the victory of the revolutionary war [emphasis added]."⁷ Party leaders from Deng to Xi have successively drawn attention to the centrality of the 'scientific' concept. For instance, in April 1998, President Jiang said, "We have relied [on the methods of] the People's War to fight in the past, and we have to fight the People's War in the future. The People's War is where our real power lies."⁸ More recently, at the 90th Anniversary of the PLA's founding, Xi Jinping said: "To promote the cause of a strong military, we must wholeheartedly adhere to the fundamental objective 'Serve the People', and always be the sons and daughters' army that have the people's trust, the people's support, and the people's love... The mighty force of the People's War originates with the great power of the people."⁹ Perhaps the greatest indicator of Xi's intended message was the inclusion of the Maoist slogan, "Serve the People". At its origin, the slogan's key points were: "destroying self-interest", living and dying for the people, "doing what is right and correcting what is wrong" [i.e. engaging in criticism and self-criticism], and, in Mao's words, "the unification of our country,

mobilisation and social management. The opportunity to speak at Chatham House on the topic thankfully forced me to continue to pursue the connection. Thank you to Nigel Inkster and Peter Mattis for some very helpful comments on this draft. Finally, thank you to Dennis Blasko, who provided some helpful suggestions as I was initially making the People's War connection.

⁴ Dennis Blasko, "The Evolution of Core Concepts: People's War, Active Defense, Offshore Defense," in *Assessing the People's Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era*, Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2014), 84.

⁵ Timothy R. Heath, "An Overview of China's National Military Strategy," in *China's Evolving Military Strategy*, Joe McReynolds (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation 2016), 14-15. Also see chapters in the volume by: Dennis Blasko, M. Taylor Fravel, Andrew S. Erickson, Joe McReynolds and Michael S. Chase, for discussion on the topic.

⁶ James Mulvenon, "2010 National People's Congress Highlights: Defense Budgets and the New National Defense Mobilization Law," *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 32 (2010).

⁷ Zhenjiang Fan, "我国国防活动的指导原则 (Guiding Principles of China's National Defence Activities)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 20 April 1995.

⁸ Guoying Lü, "国防后备力量走向强大 (National Defence Reserve Capacity Marches Toward Greatness)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 20 October 2002.

⁹ "习近平在庆祝中国人民解放军建军 90 周年大会上的讲话 (Speech given by Xi Jinping at the Chinese People's Liberation Army's 90th Anniversary Assembly)," The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 1 August 2017.

unity of our people, and the unity of our various nationalities.”¹⁰

Like the concept of state security, national defence is not the defence of the Chinese nation outside of the CCP, it is the defence of the *People’s Republic* of China, with the CCP at the helm. The People’s War is a theoretical concept guiding the PRC’s construction of a mobilisation mechanism that ensures the Party can both mitigate and respond to crisis of all types. The emergencies China prepares for range from isolated but large-scale unrest events, to massively destabilising unrest events, like a Colour Revolution or Jasmine Revolution. They also include wars, not just over disputed territory like the South and East China Seas, but also an attack on the Chinese mainland by a foreign military, particularly in a scenario like the Kosovo War where a domestic conflict could be a justification. It is part of why multiple defence white papers point to “signs of increasing hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism.”¹¹ Others have claimed: “[China] faces strategic manoeuvres and containment from the outside while having to face disruption and sabotage by separatist and hostile forces from the inside.”¹²

As Chapter Three explained, the CCP perceives, and acts to mitigate and respond to, an integrated concept of internal and external threats. Threats are both internal and external to the Party, and threats emerge from inside and outside of China’s physical borders. The People’s War concept brings cohesion to the design and practice of national defence mobilisation (国防动员), national defence education (国防教育) and military-civil integration (军民融合). Each point to a largely pre-emptive management strategy. Whether these pre-emptive efforts are successful will only truly be known in the event of a crisis substantial enough to call upon the full resources of the reactive side of the system, but as Section 8.1 describes, the CCP has reason for a sense of unease.

The role of the regular armed forces is only part of the effective defence of state security. Society is a vital part of the process of building national defence on the “basis of the strength of the people”.¹³ It is not simply because society would be called upon in the event of a war to support the war effort. Maintaining a readiness ‘consciousness’ supports loyalty efforts aimed at crisis mitigation. The national defence mobilisation system design creates a political and technical capacity to better guarantee rapid, cohesive, and effective response to an emergency in compliance with the core leadership’s orders. This description also ties the People’s War strategy behind national defence mobilisation directly to social management, which specifically calls for strengthening the emergency response mechanism.

¹⁰ "Study "Serve the People"." *Peking Review*, 1967.
<http://massline.org/PekingReview/PR1967/PR1967-02e.htm>.

¹¹ "中国武装力量的多样化运用 (The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces)," (Information Office of the State Council, The People’s Republic of China, 2013); Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. "2000 年中国的国防 (China’s National Defence in 2000)," October 2000.

¹² Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. "中国的军事战略《2008》 (China’s National Defence in 2008)," January 2009.

¹³ Fan, "我国国防活动的指导原则 (Guiding Principles of China's National Defence Activities)."

The Autonomic Nervous System's Self-Protecting objective is aimed at programming a pre-emption and response mechanism for all types of crisis. The ANS Self-Protecting objective describes "a system's capability of organizing its own efforts," and it is "often used relative to networks and communications".¹⁴ The ANS Self-Protecting objective must pre-emptively and autonomously tune itself to "achieve security, privacy and data protection."¹⁵ It must also "anticipate security breaches and prevent them from occurring in the first place."¹⁶ For the objective to succeed, it must protect itself from both hostile and accidental threats— internal and external.¹⁷

China's ANS Self-Protecting objective represents the fourth key objective the Party regularly describes in explanations of how the social management system is being constructed. The 12th Five Year Plan that elevated social management as a key objective called for strengthening emergency response capacity as part of social management system construction.¹⁸ The 2013 *People's Daily* article on establishing the social management mechanism, according to requirements highlighted during the 18th Party Congress, provided an unambiguous description of what this means in practice. It said the objective of strengthening emergency response requires emergency capacity-building and an effective response mechanism for sudden public incidents, including each of the following: a crisis prevention mechanism, a contingency plan management mechanism, a resource sharing mechanism, a command linkage mobilisation mechanism, an information dissemination mechanism, a propaganda and education mechanism, a legal protection mechanism, an emergency rescue mechanism, and an aftermath handling mechanism.¹⁹

This chapter is focused on the construction of the Party-state's emergency response mechanism, which the ANS Self-Protection objective describes. Section 8.1, describing the Sensory Channels, explains how the Party-state leadership assesses threats in relation to the ANS Self-Protecting function. As the People's War concept indicates, this is related both to ensuring the loyalty of the armed forces to the People's Republic, as well as the capacity to mobilise. It is also quite strongly related to the "individual responsibility" described in Chapter Seven. Section 8.2, describing the Motor Channels, explains how, based on negative assessments of these abilities, the Party-state is developing a coordinated system with the capacity to operate effectively and decisively in response to all emergency and crisis scenarios.

[8.1] Sensory Channels: Self-Aware and Self-Situated

China's ANS Self-Protecting objective's 'Self-aware' and 'Self-situated' Sensory Channels describe how internal and external threat perceptions affect the Party-state's

¹⁴ Truszkowski et al., *Autonomous and autonomic systems : with applications to NASA intelligent spacecraft operations and exploration systems*, 266.

¹⁵ Julie A. McCann and Markus Huebscher, "Evaluation issues in Autonomic Computing " in *Grid and Cooperative Computing*, Jin H., et al. (GCC 2004 Workshops. GCC 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3252., Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer: 2004), 597.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ "“十二五”规划纲要 (Outline of the 12th Five Year Plan)."

¹⁹ Tang and Fu, "源头治理 动态管理 应急处置——学习党的十八大精神 (Source Governance, Dynamic Management, and Emergency Response-- Learn the Spirit of the 18th National Congress of the CCP)."

understanding of its emergency mitigation and response preparedness (see Figure 11). Self-aware is the monitoring of internal capabilities. It refers to the threats the CCP-leadership is monitoring and using to assess its capacity to respond in an emergency situation. Self-situated refers to the Party's analysis of the environment, providing context awareness. This describes how the CCP analyses its crisis pre-emption and response capacity based on the threats it perceives. The knowledge gained through these Sensory Channels inform how emergency response capacity is designed via the Motor Channels of the Self-Protecting objective's control loop described in Section 8.2.



Figure 11: China's ANS Self-Protecting Sensory Channels

The type of security threats the Party-state perceives have not changed drastically since the Mao era. What changed, particularly after 1989, was the *integration* of internal and external security themes under the umbrella of “state security”, and then later the *degree* to which the internal and external security threats were integrated under state security in practice. This section has four case studies: Tiananmen (1989), the Gulf War (1990-1991), the Falun Gong crackdown (1999), and the NATO intervention in the Kosovo War (1999). They describe the link between the CCP's threat perceptions and crisis mitigation and response planning. The cases were chosen because each corresponds with the evolving conversation on threat perception identified in Chapter Three on state security. Two issues stand out: [1] Each internal crisis raised the issue of loyalty within the security forces; and [2] each external event increased Party-state's sense of urgency to ensure a rapid response capacity. This had a direct impact on the Party-state's crisis and emergency mitigation and response planning process, which is the subject of Section 8.2.

Tiananmen

A memo was issued after a 1987 Central Military Commission meeting, and later released to the whole party in 1990, “On Strengthening and Improving the Military's Political Work on a Number of Issues Under the New Situation”. It was entirely focused on ensuring the PLA's absolute loyalty to the Party, in the “new situation”. One point, for instance called for, “[cultivating] cadres in strict accordance of both talent and integrity principles, and [to] guarantee that [those] grasping the barrel of the gun are politically reliable.”²⁰ The document's release to the whole party came after the

²⁰ Wenhui Yao, “《全军政治工作会议纪要》注释条目 (Annotations to the Minutes from the PLA Political Work Conference),” *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 29 May 1990.

military's political reliability was put to a serious test during Tiananmen. Deng Xiaoping made the decision to end the protests with force no later than immediately after Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's four day visit from 15-19 May 1989. A declassified U.K. document from 20 May 1989, the day martial law was declared, citing both U.K. and U.S. intelligence sources said: "The Chinese government has decided that there is no way to avoid bloodshed. The government has recalled government hospital workers to their work units. The military has been instructed to do what is necessary to put down the situation."²¹

The memo also conceded there was a slight chance bloodshed could be avoided because there may still be "voices within the leadership counselling moderation."²² For the purpose of this research, it is important to focus on the issue from a chain of command perspective, and from the perspective of then-Paramount Leader Deng. At the time, domestic security forces lacked the equipment and training required to effectively deal with the crisis, which is what required the PLA to step in. On 21 May 1989, the day after martial law was declared, the People's Liberation Army Daily published an article reminding the PLA that it is the People's Republic of China's armed force and the main pillar of the people's democratic dictatorship, further stressing:

The military has the responsibility and obligation to play its role in ending unrest, reinstating order and defending social stability. All military cadres and soldiers must closely unite around the CCP Central Committee, State Council and Central Military Commission, maintain a high degree of centralism and unification, carry on with CMC Chairman Deng Xiaoping's 'Five Types of Revolutionary Spirit', resolutely defend the party's and government's absolute authority, and spare no effort to satisfactorily fulfil the military's sacred mission in the constitution.²³

While bloodshed was a clear outcome to Deng on 20 May, his decision was met with meaningful resistance. This was located not only within the Party leadership structure, but also within the PLA. This is well-documented. It included General Xu Qinxian, commander of what was then the 38th Group Army commander in the Beijing Military Region, who refused to give his troops the order to enforce martial law, reportedly "feigning illness". Xu was arrested on 23 or 24 May 1989.²⁴ It also included General Xu Feng, commander of what was then the 116th Infantry Division of the 39th Group Army of the Shenyang Military region, who also disobeyed Deng's orders.²⁵ Others who resisted feared repercussions of enforcing Deng's order, namely the prospect that

²¹ UKE Beijing to FCO. "Chinese Internal Situation [US believes "Chinese Government has decided that there is no way to avoid bloodshed"] " Archive, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, PREM19/2597 f148. 20 May 1989 [declassified 2016]. The Bush Presidential Library in Houston, Texas, is believed to have now declassified documents further confirming this point. However, I have not yet personally been able to visit the archive to locate and cite the material directly.

²² Ibid.

²³ "维护首都和全国稳定的重大措施 (Important measures to defend the stability of the capital and entire nation)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 21 May 1989.

²⁴ Roderick MacFarquhar, *The politics of China : sixty years of the People's Republic of China*, 3rd edition ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 449.

²⁵ Renhua Wu, interview by Yaxue Cao, 2016. <https://chinachange.org/2016/06/04/the-historian-of-the-tiananmen-movement-and-the-june-fourth-massacre-an-interview-with-wu-renhua-part-two-of-two/>.

a violent response would trigger a foreign invasion.²⁶ Others, for various reasons, “passively resisted”. This included General He Yannran, commander of what was then the 28th Group Army of the Beijing Military Region, as well as Zhang Mingchun, its political commissar, Lieutenant General Zhou Yibing, commander of the Beijing Military Region, and Lieutenant General Yan Tongmao, a deputy commander of the Beijing Military Region.²⁷ A petition also circulated, and was signed by seven senior military commanders. It called for the withdrawal of troops and reportedly read: “The people’s military belongs to the people, and cannot oppose the people.”²⁸

In the end, the PLA did follow through with Deng’s orders. Those who did not comply were arrested, court-martialled and demoted. There will likely never be a conclusive answer to the question of whether or not the degree of dissent was significant enough to truly threaten the enforcement of the Party leadership’s will. But, it would become increasingly significant that it took two weeks from the time martial law was declared to fully implement Deng’s orders. If dissent was not meaningful, why prolong what to Deng, by 20 May, considered inevitable? Most importantly— what if the PLA did not follow through with Deng’s orders? The question is not posed to suggest an exercise in counterfactual history, rather it is to ask, “From the Party leadership’s perspective: What would happen in the event of a Tiananmen 2.0? Would the security forces step-up a second time? If so, would they do so in time?”

In the months after the massacre, the *PLA Daily* published numerous editorials praising the PLA for following through with the Party leadership’s demands to, at all costs, suppress the unrest. For example, one unsigned *PLA Daily* article published on 1 October 1989, marking the 40th anniversary of the PRC’s founding, after praising the army for its role in suppressing the “counter-revolutionary riots” and discussing hostile forces’ attempts to subvert the socialist system in the reform period, said:

The reason for bringing up the fact that we must eternally meet the political requirements before the comrades of the entire armed forces, is also dictated by the fundamental functions of our Armed Forces. Our constitution provides that countering foreign invasion and countering internal attempts to overthrow (the Party) are the People’s Liberation Army’s fundamental functions. For a time, the people’s understanding of the Armed Force’s functions with regard to anti-sedition has been quite weak...Domestic and foreign hostile forces always regard our military as the greatest barrier to successful “peaceful evolution” and bourgeois liberalisation, so on one hand, they advance malicious attacks on the people’s army and make its actions appear in the worst possible light, and on the other hand they make every attempt to infiltrate our military, incessantly making “psychological attacks” and “inciting rebellion”, trying in vain to wear down our army’s Fighting Spirit and manufacture “splittism”. At the same time, the army is not living in a vacuum, the trend of bourgeois

²⁶ Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley. "Tales of Army Discord Show Tiananmen Square in a New Light." *The New York Times*, 2 June 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/03/world/asia/tiananmen-square-25-years-later-details-emerge-of-armys-chaos.html?_r=0.

²⁷ MacFarquhar, *The politics of China : sixty years of the People's Republic of China*, 449; Wu, "The Historian of the Tiananmen Movement and the June Fourth Massacre – An Interview With Wu Renhua (Part Two of Two)."

²⁸ MacFarquhar, *The politics of China : sixty years of the People's Republic of China*, 448-49; Jacobs and Buckley, "Tales of Army Discord Show Tiananmen Square in a New Light."

liberalisation will inevitably influence and erode the thinking of some comrades.²⁹

Internal and external threats are directly linked, and the PLA's loyalty to the Party must constantly be reinforced in case it is called upon again to defend the Party leadership. After Tiananmen, the People's Armed Police (PAP) were better trained and equipped to fulfil the emergency response function. Thus, the internal security forces' capacity to respond effectively before events reached a point necessitating PLA intervention was improved. This does not change the urgency of loyalty, and the fact that the PLA still might be called upon at any time. The issue is particularly relevant given that internal and external threats are seen as combined, meaning an emergency scenario may require simultaneous response to both internal and external threats, calling on both internal and external security forces. It is highly consequential that after Tiananmen, in language as explicit as possible in a closed and power-obsessed Leninist regime, a few articles even went so far as to imply that compliance with the Party's internal security directives was not a guaranteed outcome. Their message was that measures must be taken to ensure the army would once again step up, whenever the next crisis unfolds. One of the most explicit was a March 1990 *PLA Daily* article, authored by then-PLA Major General Wang Cunzhu:

In order to stop last spring's turmoil and counterrevolutionary rioting, many of our troops shouldered (the burden) of implementing martial law in parts of Beijing. At that time, some capitalist class (bourgeoisie) liberals advocated the claim: the army should not be used in internal state affairs. This raised a grave problem: In addition to possessing an external enemy fighting role, should the military fulfil its internal function or not? On this question, both theory and practice have a positive answer...Our military is the People's Army under the Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, it is the main pillar of the People's Democratic Dictatorship; it equally possesses the two functions of defending and resisting against enemy invasions; ensuring state security and territorial integrity externally; while internally it stops subversion by hostile forces, defends the people's peaceful labour, and brings peace and stability to the state...At the same time, domestic class struggle is always interacting with the international class struggle system. International capitalist reactionary forces have not for a single day stopped attempting to infiltrate our country's political, ideological and cultural (systems), and have not for a single day stopped supporting and assisting the growth of any kind of anti-Party or anti-socialist power...To consolidate the socialist regime and ensure social stability requires various means and pre-conditions, among these, the army is the means and pre-condition that provides a backup and also is the most decisive one in its function. Under ordinary circumstances, defending social order and normal order is the undertaking of the Ministry of Public Security police forces and the People's Armed Police, and the army is not required. However, in the case of a serious turmoil, especially a counter-revolutionary riot or armed rebellion, where social order has been sabotaged, and the regime has been seriously threatened, and where simply relying on the power and law of the social order system and administrative strategy cannot settle the problem, the army shall immediately intervene, and act in accordance with the decision of the Party Central Committee, State Council, and Central Military Commission, and contain the situation's development, rapidly stop the turmoil, implement the dictatorship's function, and resolutely end rioting or armed rebellion. During

²⁹ "坚持党的绝对领导 保证我军在政治上永远合格 (Presevere in Adhering to the Party's Absolute Leadership and Guarantee that Our Armed Forces are Always Politically Qualified)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 1 October 1989.

last year's serious turmoil and counter-revolutionary rioting, if not for Comrade [Deng] Xiaoping's and older revolutionaries' firm decision, and prompt ordering of the army's intervention and implementation of martial law in parts of the capital city, not only could there have been even greater damage, but also there might have been unimaginable consequences. Practice already shows that stopping turmoil, ending counter-revolutionary riots, and crushing hostile forces' subversion plots, is our army's most preeminent mission in fulfilling its internal function...We must remember without fail this divine mission our army shoulders, and make preparation to ensure the successful completion of its mission through ideological and operational preparation at all times.³⁰

This goes a long way in explaining a large increase in the mentions of “loyalty” in articles on state security after Tiananmen. Remove the euphemism, and the passage stated: During the Tiananmen crisis, not all troops were willing to implement martial law as directed by Deng Xiaoping. Most followed through (luckily), because otherwise there would have been grave consequences to regime security. The PLA must be loyal to the Party. The Party leadership decides what the masses think. The PLA is not the first called upon in a crisis, but it is the last. Its role is decisive. If it does not rapidly mobilise to end rioting and rebellion, the party-state's security is in jeopardy. Loyalty of the armed forces in both times of war and peace is essential, as hostile forces internal and external will never cease attempting to overthrow the regime.

The Gulf War

Just over a year later, in August 1990, the first Gulf War started after Iraq invaded neighbouring state Kuwait. On 17 January 1991, a US-led coalition began aerial bombardment over Iraq after Saddam Hussein refused to withdraw from Kuwait. The aerial bombardment relied heavily on electronic warfare to attack enemy weapons systems. After 38 days of aerial attacks, the US-led coalition's ground invasion began on 24 February. Only about 100 hours later, on 28 February, Iraq agreed to a ceasefire.

Western literature on the PLA has correctly focused on the Chinese perception of how the technology-enabled rapid defeat of Saddam Hussein's forces changed modern warfare—and, more importantly, how the PLA needed to prepare to fight this kind of war.³¹ An overlooked angle of the same discussion is related to internal politics, likely because this is often embedded in euphemism. China's national defence mobilisation concept is not just about mobilising civilian resources to convert into wartime readiness on demand. It is also political, which is inclusive of pre-empting ideological threats, ensuring the masses defend the Party, and ensuring the Party can rely on the PLA to defend it.

Rapid mobilisation is not only a matter of technical capacity, it is a matter of guaranteeing the armed forces will obey the Party leadership and immediately follow through with orders. As stated above, one of the objections PLA commanders had to

³⁰ Cunzhu Wang, "坚持履行人民军队的对内职能 (The Internal Function of the People's Army Shall Be Fulfilled)" *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 27 March 1990.

³¹ Dean Cheng, "Chinese Lessons from the Gulf Wars," ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen, *Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples' Wars* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1090.pdf>.

enforcing martial law during Tiananmen was it could be used as a pretext for a western invasion or initiation of armed conflict. It is especially relevant considering that after Tiananmen, adherence to the Party leadership's demands was not seen as a guaranteed outcome. This thinking was very quickly reflected in discussion on mobilisation and the People's War. In March 1991, Jiang Zemin spoke to provincial military, government and party officials in the Hunan Military district:

[To fight] a future war of aggression [we] can not only rely on high tech, sophisticated, and cutting edge weapons, more importantly, we have to rely on the political quality of the people, and rely on the "Magic Weapon that is the People's War to defeat the enemy and achieve victory. With the People's Liberation Army, armed police, militia reserve personnel and the broad masses armed with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, any hostile forces' plot to subvert, penetrate or conspire to create a "peaceful transition" in China cannot succeed.³²

One discussion in China, Dean Cheng rightly noted, was centred on Saddam Hussein's domestic legitimacy. Cheng wrote: "Some of the Iraqi failures [in the Gulf War] are attributed to conditions unique to their political situation...For example, Iraq clearly had not engaged in sufficient preparations for war."³³ The technology enabling the US-coalition's rapid victory in the Gulf War presented a real threat. Part of countering this threat required significant advances in education and modern technology, but all while adhering to the Party-line, and within the frame of the vanguard Party leading the masses to prosperity.³⁴ For instance, an August 1992 *PLA Daily* article focused on the relative lack of education among Iraqi soldiers compared to the US-led coalition. It criticised the "level of achievement in scientific culture" of the Iraqi forces. This particular article appeared largely fixated on the widespread illiteracy of Iraqi soldiers, and their inability to use modern technology.³⁵ Education, and a high standard of scientific and technological knowledge, is required to have the advantage in modern war, this is clearly a critical part of the Chinese discussion. But, as often is the case in CCP rhetoric, there is embedded meaning which is important when the same concept is applied to China. In this example, embedded meaning is found in the word choice "scientific culture" (科学文化). On one hand, scientific culture as discussed in China during the 1980s and 1990s referred directly to the technological and educational advances needed to realise the success of the "Four Modernisations". On the other, attaining a high level of scientific culture is seen as necessary for ideological and political work to succeed. Mobilising both Party cadres and society to embrace their responsibility to improve their level of attainment in scientific culture also implied forcing compliance to the CCP Central Committee's objectives and the Party-line. They are ideas that are included in the current definition of holistic state security,

³² Lü, "国防后备力量走向强大 (National Defence Reserve Capacity Marches Toward Greatness)."

³³ Cheng, "Chinese Lessons from the Gulf Wars," 166-69.

³⁴ "全国党员教育管理研讨班提出 提高党员理论科学文化素质 积极投身改革开放经济建设 (National Party Member Education Management Seminar Proposal on Improving Party Member's Cultural Inner Quality on Theoretical Science and Actively Throwing Themselves [into] the Construction of Reform and Opening Up)," *The People's Daily*, 14 August 1992.

³⁵ Bolin Sun and Deyuan Ji, "军队质量建设与科学技术进步 (The Armed Force's Qualitative Construction and the Progress of Science and Technology)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 7 August 1992.

namely through cultural security and scientific security. As one article described:

For the masses to experience ideological realisation and raise their moral standards, certain educational standards are required. It's hard to imagine that the people of a country with low scientific culture and full of illiterates, would be able to cast away stupidity, and form a high level of ideology and moral fashion in the entire society. Of course, we cannot say that the higher the cultural standard is, the higher the ideological level and moral standard is. Because a nation's ideological level and moral standards are influenced by complicated factors other than cultural conditions; but without a certain level of scientific culture, and by relying simply on the innate plain class sentiment, it is almost impossible to possess the communist realisation and moral standard. The worker class cannot generate communist ideology by themselves, they rely on the proletariat political parties to infuse them with Marxism. But if they did not possess a degree of cultural standards, such infusion work would also encounter enormous difficulty.³⁶

Another dimension of the Chinese discussion, which Dean Cheng also pointed out, is that Saddam Hussein's domestic legitimacy was weakened by "his actions against Kurdish and Shi'ite population," and, "ensured the nation would not be unified when confronted with an external threat."³⁷ Like Iraq, China has unity problems. Most threatening from the Party-state leadership's perspective are Xinjiang, Tibet, and, albeit a different scenario, Taiwan. The focus on "unity", both military-government and military-civilian, is not only about a military-civil integration in terms of technical capacity but one in terms of political capacity. Writing in 2002, Chi Haotian, a CMC vice-chairman from 1995-2002, said:

It is necessary to further strengthen unity of nationalities, and military-government and military-civilian unity, and lay the political foundation for security and stability in the northwest (Xinjiang). We should extensively publicise the Marxist nationalities theory and the Party's nationality policy, increase military-civilian concept of defending national unity, and consciously fight against nationality splittism. We should look at and deal with the problems of military-government and military-civilian relations from the political point of view, and create a strong atmosphere for the armed forces to love the people, and for the people to support the armed forces. Strengthening cooperation between the armed forces and the local government, promoting economic and social development and army building. Party committees and government offices at all levels should, as always, be concerned about supporting the armed forces construction, preparing the stationed military forces for military struggle, and improving capacity for creating the conditions to "win" (wars).³⁸

The Gulf War highlighted the PLA's technological backwardness and inability to rapidly mobilise. To the Chinese leadership, advancing the military's technological modernisation was only part of what was required to assure an effective Self-Protecting mechanism. It was seen that even if China had a military of equal capability to the

³⁶ Yumin Bai and Fenggui Jiao, "提高全民族的科学文化水平 (Improving the Standards of Scientific Culture for the Entire Nation (People))," *The People's Daily*, 8 November 1982.

³⁷ Cheng, "Chinese Lessons from the Gulf Wars," 166-69.

³⁸ Hui Cai, "深入贯彻“5·31”重要讲话精神积极推进国防和军队建设 (Thoroughly Implement the Spirit of the Important Talk of 5·31 [Jiang Zemin's 31 May 2002 Speech] and Actively Promote National Defence and Army Construction)" *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 25 June 2002.

United States, this would mean very little if the people controlling that equipment were not ‘making the right decisions’. Similarly, in a time of crisis, even if China’s armed forces did not yet possess technological superiority, the Party-state leadership could rely on the political quality of the armed forces and the people to ‘make the right decisions’ – according to the Party leadership’s demands – in defence of the Party-state. This is the main purpose of National Defence Education, it is also part of military-civilian integration objective.³⁹ Moreover, as a political security and military security-tied mobilisation objective, it is inherently aimed at avoiding crisis.

Falun Gong

On 25 April 1999, around 10,000 members of the Falun Gong spiritual sect organised a one-day peaceful sit-in demonstration near Zhongnanhai, the government leadership residential compound in Beijing. The subsequent crackdown Jiang Zemin initiated against the organisation has continued to the present day. There are many explanations for why the apparently peaceful spiritual organisation could be deemed threatening to the Leninist Party-state. No single reason offers a full explanation. This sub-section focuses on an underappreciated facet: how the 25 April incident impacted the CCP’s perceptions of its own capacity to mobilise in response to a crisis.

Writing on the ‘legitimacy crisis’ Falun Gong posed, Vivienne Shue argued, “in the patterns of contentious politics that surround state legitimation and de-legitimation in the Chinese context, it is the government’s capacity to sustain stability and social order that is generally held up as the touchstone value.”⁴⁰ If true, then in practice the ‘capacity to sustain stability and social order’ must be inclusive of the security system that enforces that order. Against the background of Tiananmen and the Gulf War (and also the collapse of the Soviet Union) considerable efforts were made to improve the Party-state’s Self-Protecting function. In 1989, the PLA was mobilised because the domestic security forces did not have the equipment and training to respond decisively. This changed as the PAP were equipped and trained to handle serious domestic security events. Similarly, the Gulf War propelled military modernisation efforts. Both events also contributed to the advancement of national defence education, and the patriotic education campaign, which were used to instil a national defence consciousness, as well as national pride. The Falun Gong demonstration proved, however, that efforts made since 1989 were not enough to guarantee state security.

Falun Gong’s followers included up to millions of Party members, and of those up to thousands of members of the security services, including in high-ranking positions. John Pomfret, who uncovered the extent in 1999, quoted a Chinese source who said: “It’s not just that millions of Falun Gong practitioners are party members,” but, “it’s that

³⁹ Luguowu, “何谓“国防教育”？(What is “National Defence Education?”),” *The People’s Liberation Army Daily*, 30 November 1990. ; Huaqing Liu, “坚定不移地沿着建设有中国特色现代化军队的道路前进 (Unswervingly Following the Path of Building a Modern Army with Chinese Characteristics),” *The People’s Liberation Army Daily*, 6 August 1993. ; Yuwen Luo, “全国军政军民团结大好局面更加巩固 (The Country’s Military and Government and Military and Civilian Unity Is More Consolidated),” *The People’s Liberation Army Daily*, 31 July 1995.

⁴⁰ Vivienne Shue, “Legitimacy crisis in China?,” in *State and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention and Legitimation*, Peter Hays; Rosen Gries, Stanley (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).

many of them work for the security services. That's the really scary phenomenon."⁴¹ Pomfret's sources said one member included a major general, albeit retired, "who worked as a senior officer in the military intelligence section of the general staff department". This major general, along with other Falun Gong followers, met with government officials as the demonstration was taking place on 25 April. Another known high-ranking Falun Gong supporter was General Li Qihua, who was in charge of the 301-military hospital, who wrote a letter to Jiang arguing against the persecution.⁴² Meanwhile, Falun Gong had thousands of supporters among active enlisted men and junior officers.

As Joseph Fewsmith observed, the most threatening aspect of the movement was its, "obvious ability to mobilize the people quickly, and its deep penetration into the military and security ranks, which potentially diluted the Party's ability to control those important pillars of rule."⁴³ And, as Nigel Inkster has emphasised, they used modern communications technology to organise the event.⁴⁴ The issue is not simply that a hierarchical group, could enter and win support from the highest ranks of the Party. It is that they did so with a large support base from the security apparatus designed solely to defend the Party. The same group the Party expects to rapidly mobilise in order to *counter* such a movement, were direct supporters of the same movement. Moreover, because the 25 April demonstration's organisation involved the exploitation of modern communications technology, and given that senior members of the Party were involved, ostensibly the organisation effort included the direct use of state information technology resources.

In fact, Ministry of Public Security official Li Chang, along with three other officials, was the first to be publicly charged for Falun Gong involvement. The accusations against Li included, "organising a cult to undermine implementation of laws," and "theft of state secrets".⁴⁵ Propaganda efforts in the armed forces coinciding with the crackdown focused on the issue of loyalty. Several *PLA Daily* articles in 1999, highlighted propaganda and education campaigns in the armed forces, which focused on countering the theft of state secrets.⁴⁶ One excerpt mentioned a division where "no officers and men" were accused of being involved in Falun Gong, and said: "In the struggle to expose "Falun Gong", the broad masses of officers and men resolutely supported the CCP Central Committee's wise decision, and with scientific theory as a sharp weapon, stripping away the painted skin that is Li Hongzhi 's false and harmful teachings."⁴⁷ Perhaps the "broad masses" of the armed forces were not Falun Gong practitioners, but given that at least several thousand were, the CCP-leadership's threat

⁴¹ John Pomfret. "China Sect Penetrated Military and Police." *The Washington Post*, 7 August 1999.

⁴² Seth Faison. "Ex-General, Member of Banned Sect, Confesses 'Mistakes,' China Says." *The New York Times*, 21 July 1999. <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/31/world/ex-general-member-of-banned-sect-confesses-mistakes-china-says.html>.

⁴³ Joseph Fewsmith, *Elite politics in contemporary China* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 145.

⁴⁴ Inkster, *China's Cyber Power*, 24.

⁴⁵ John Pomfret. "China Charges 4 Sect Leaders: Trial Would Be First in Beijing During Crackdown on Falun Gong." *The Washington Post*, 1 November 1999.

⁴⁶ Shouqing Zhu, "坚决维护国家安全和社会稳定 (Resolutely Safeguard State Security and Social Stability)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 29 October 1999.

⁴⁷ "党对军队的绝对领导是永远不变的军魂 (The Party's Absolute Leadership Over the Army is the Eternally Unwavering Soul of the Army)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 15 September 1999. Li Hongzhi is the founder and leader of Falun Gong.

perception was high enough to justify a long-running propaganda effort. The direct anti-Falun Gong campaign in the armed forces continued well into the early 2000s. One *PLA Daily* article from January 2001, entitled “Be on Alert Against “Falun Gong’s” Vicious Political Intentions in Order to Safeguard State Security and Social Stability” focused on a People's Armed Police and military political education campaign against the ‘evils’ of Falun Gong. Learning focused on the armed forces remaining loyal and uniting around the CCP Central Committee with Jiang Zemin at its core.⁴⁸

It also gives more context to the renewed emphasis on the armed forces role to defend the state against subversion and sabotage by hostile forces in China’s national defence white papers (published since 1998). The 2000 version, under the sub-heading “Formulating the concept of comprehensive security and effectively conducting military operations other than war (MOOTW)”, said:

China’s armed forces adapt themselves to the new changes of security threats, and emphasize the employment of armed forces in peacetime. They actively participate in and assist China’s economic and social development, and resolutely accomplish urgent, difficult, hazardous, and arduous tasks involving emergency rescue and disaster relief. As stipulated by law, they perform their duties of maintaining national security and stability, steadfastly subduing subversive and sabotage attempts by hostile forces, cracking down on violent and terrorist activities, and accomplishing security-provision and guarding tasks.⁴⁹

Similarly, the 2002 version said:

China’s Constitution and laws prohibit any organization or individual from organizing, plotting or carrying out armed rebellion or riot to subvert the state power or overthrow the socialist system. China opposes all forms of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Regarding maintenance of public order and social stability in accordance with the law as their important duty, the Chinese armed forces will strike hard at terrorist activities of any kind, crush infiltration and sabotaging activities by hostile forces, and crack down on all criminal activities that threaten public order, so as to promote social stability and harmony.⁵⁰

The assessment that the security forces’ loyalty to the Party was a key issue driving Jiang’s crackdown is supported by his 10 June 1999 creation of the Leading Small Group for Preventing and Dealing with the Problem of Heretical Cults”, also known as the 610 Office. Unlike other security organs, it did not sit within the state apparatus, but is a Party organ coordinating the state offices responsible for security, usually under the direction of Political-Legal affairs offices. As Sarah Cook and Leeshai Lemish wrote in 2011, the vast participation of the security establishment members in Falun Gong, “contributed to a sense that Falun Gong had quietly infiltrated the CCP and state apparatus. Jiang may have felt the need to create a trusted network of security agents

⁴⁸ “警惕“法轮功”险恶政治用心 维护国家安全与社会稳定 (Be on Alert Against “Falun Gong’s” Vicious Political Intentions in Order to Safeguard State Security and Social Stability),” *The People’s Liberation Army Daily*, 15 January 2001.

⁴⁹ Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “2000 年中国的国防 (China’s National Defence in 2000).”

⁵⁰ Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. “2002 年中国的国防 (China’s National Defence in 2002),” December 2002.

to counter Falun Gong's influence."⁵¹ Given that by 1999 internal security resources were less an issue than in 1989, it seems the only reason to create an organisation outside of the existing system and directly under Party control, instead of a taskforce within the existing system, is that the ANS Self-Protecting mechanism was not deemed capable of handling the problem according to the Party's leadership's requirements.

Kosovo

On 7 May 1999, only a couple of weeks after the 25 April Falun Gong demonstration, NATO forces bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three, injuring five and prompting large-scale nationalist protests in China. It occurred during a NATO-led 78-day aerial bombing campaign over Yugoslavia. The NATO campaign was executed without UN sanction on humanitarian grounds, and aimed at protecting a secessionist force, the ethnic Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army, physically located within UN member state Yugoslavia.

China opposed the intervention, and, along with Russia, threatened to veto any UN Security Council resolution sanctioning military action. China also supported a failed Russian-drafted UN Security Council resolution on 26 March, two days before the campaign began, calling for "the immediate cessation of the use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia".⁵² In a 27 March speech, Jiang Zemin said intervention violated the fundamental values of China's foreign policy, namely those found in the five principles of peaceful co-existence: mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence.⁵³

Like the Gulf War, the NATO intervention in Kosovo demonstrated significant technological advances in warfare, including improved precision weaponry and network-centric warfare. June Teufel Dreyer observed three themes in Chinese thinking on the campaign: The first focused on US airpower and technological superiority; the second questioned "the wisdom of trying to counter the United States weapon for weapon"; and third, the campaign proved the People's War was still relevant. She concluded that over time these themes were more complementary of each other than competitive.⁵⁴ She also found that the campaign contributed to thinking on the relevance of the People's War in improving National Defence Mobilisation, including through PLA-centric strategies like the "three warfares" (i.e. media, psychological and legal warfare).⁵⁵ The national defence mobilisation process is not PLA-centric. It is a military-civil integration effort that is largely a pre-emptive political process, and not simply a process to convert from peace to wartime capacity (Section 8.2). Therefore, the same conversations Dreyer analysed simultaneously pointed to

⁵¹ Sarah Cook and Leeshai Lemish, "The 610 Office: Policing the Chinese Spirit," *China Brief* 11, no. 17 (2011).

⁵² Adam Roberts, "NATO's 'Humanitarian War' over Kosovo," *Survival* 41, no. 3 (1999): 104-05.

⁵³ Zemin Jiang, "推动裁军进程维护国际安全 (Promote the Disarmament Process and Safeguard International Security)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 27 March 1999.

⁵⁴ June Teufel Dreyer, "The People's Liberation Army Lessons from Foreign Conflicts: The Air War in Kosovo," ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen, *Chinese Lessons from Other People's Wars* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2011). 41-49.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 55-56.

thinking on the problems found in the Party-state's ANS Self-Protection objective through the Tiananmen, Gulf War and Falun Gong examples.

The 2001 *Science of Military Strategy*, in a section on rapid mobilisation and war under high-tech conditions, stated:

A country, which invades the territorial land and territorial water of another country, the hostile forces, such as, religious extremist, ethnic separatists, [and] international terrorists, who challenge the sovereignty of a country, can be considered as firing the 'First shot' in politics or strategy. The other side can have the right to implement self-defence and counter-attack, as to when and where, using what measures to counter-attack must be decided on the judgment of the strategic decision-makers.⁵⁶

What is most interesting about this passage is its implicit inclusion of internal and external hostile forces. It makes discussion on strategy on responding to a "First shot" clearly inclusive of domestic political instability incidents, like what unfolded in Kosovo. The domestic scenario described is not limited to Taiwan, but also – and perhaps even to a greater extent – inclusive of Tibet and Xinjiang. One *PLA Daily* "newspaper commentator" article on defending national sovereignty and state security, and focused on Tibet, cited the Kosovo War as a cautionary tale. It quoted Jiang Zemin as saying: "[China must be vigilant of] domestic and foreign hostile forces are waiting for the opportunity to create disorder in China and conspire to undermine our socialist modernisation, we must remain constantly vigilant." It further emphasised the patriotic responsibilities of the armed forces, stating a "sense of responsibility to [the *People's Republic of China*] is the glue that binds the millions of [Chinese] people."⁵⁷

The perception also appeared in thinking on interventions and "local turmoil". China's 1998 Defence White Paper, released prior to the March 1999 launch of NATO air strikes, said "hegemonism" and "power politics" were "the main source of threats to world peace and stability". Yet, it also stated: "The international community is making more and more efforts to mediate [territorial, resource, ethnic and religious] disputes, with its capability to do so improving constantly."⁵⁸ The next white paper released in October 2000 made a subtle yet notable shift in tone when it said, "There are signs of increasing hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism. Local turmoils occur frequently. Hot-spot issues keep cropping up. Traditional and non-traditional security challenges interweave and interact."⁵⁹ As the Tiananmen and Gulf War cases highlighted, Chinese monitoring of the state's defence mobilisation capacity located faults in loyalty, which could affect rapid response and implementation of strategic decisions. When the 25 April Falun Gong demonstration and NATO intervention in Kosovo coincided, the same issues once again overlapped. What would happen in a crisis like Kosovo requiring China to respond rapidly and decisively after receiving the

⁵⁶ Peng and Yao, *Science of Military Strategy*.

⁵⁷ Newspaper Commentator, "爱国奉献的一面旗帜 (A Flag of Patriotic Devotion)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 18 July 1999.

⁵⁸ Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. "中国的国放《1998》(China's National Defence in 1998)," September 1998.

⁵⁹ Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "2000 年中国的国防 (China's National Defence in 2000)."

‘first shot’? What would happen if, in another domestic scenario, the armed forces were called upon, and their loyalty to the Party-state leadership is not guaranteed?

It adds more political context to Jiang’s 2001 introduction of the Three Represents, which described the Chinese Communist Party representing three key themes: the development trends of China’s advanced productive forces, orientation of China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people.⁶⁰ The Three Represents theme was applied directly to national defence mobilisation efforts.⁶¹ The 2002 Defence White Paper explained:

The PLA has actively studied and implemented the important thought of the "Three Represents," organised the rank and file to study the Constitution and other state laws, the Party’s basic theories, and scientific and cultural knowledge, and conducted education in patriotism, collectivism and revolutionary heroism by establishing military history museums in units at and above the regiment level, and honour exhibition in companies. The PLA has issued an ethical code for servicemen, organised the composition of moral songs, set up a PLA-wide propaganda, cultural and information network, improved cultural facilities in barracks, set up cultural clubs in companies, and established cultural centres in units at and above the regiment level. The PLA has carried out psychological education and legal consultation, and has established psychological education and legal consultation mechanisms that rely mainly on brigade or regiment political organs and grassroots political officers and integrate the political work system with the related specialty system.⁶²

Clearly, the effort was aimed at controlling loyalty within both the armed forces and the masses. It was not simply to ensure a rapid transition from peace to wartime, but also to demand loyalty and pre-empt threat of all kinds.

Sensory Channel Knowledge

The cases demonstrate that the Party’s sense of urgency has increased over time—either because a sense of urgency supports mobilisation objectives, or because modern technology has heightened threat perceptions. Most likely, it is a combination of both. The same problems have continued to repeat. For example, crisis mobilisation inefficiencies were highlighted during the SARS crisis in 2002, which included the accusation that military hospitals hid the breakout.⁶³ Events like the Colour and

⁶⁰ "What Is "Three Represents" CPC Theory?,"

⁶¹ Baoyin Zhang and Chengshan Hu, "迟浩田在黑龙江吉林调研时强调大力推进国防动员建设的改革创新 (During a survey in a Heilongjiang [province] and Jilin [province] Chi Haotian Emphasized [the importance of] Vigorously Promoting Innovative Reform of National Defence Mobilisation Construction)," *The People's Daily*, 20 October 2002. ; "中宣部、国家国防动员委员会发出通知要求 各地认真组织开展全民国防教育日活动 (The Central Propaganda Department and National Defence Mobilisation Committee Issued a Notification Calling on all Parts of the Country to Diligently Organise and Promote National Defence Education Day)," *The People's Daily*, 17 May 2002.

⁶² Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "2002 年中国的国防 (China's National Defence in 2002)."

⁶³ John Pomfret. "Doctor Says Health Ministry Lied About Disease." *The Washington Post*, 10 April 2003. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/04/10/doctor-says-health-ministry-lied-about-disease/e7772f16-1d55-41b6-bd39-8421e2739c19/?utm_term=.8e1e100f48f2; Susan M. Puska, "SARS 2002-2003: A Case Study in Crisis Management," ed. Andrew Scobell and

Jasmine Revolutions, added further complications due to the use of modern communications technology to organise protests. The question for the Party leadership is how to control inevitable weaknesses and pre-empt crises, or, when crises do take place, prevent them from reaching a point beyond the Party’s capacity for control. The knowledge gained from the ANS Self-Protecting Sensory Channel, is that in the context of China’s threat environment, the Party leadership does not perceive that it possesses a strong enough capacity to respond to a crisis of any type.

[8.2] Motor Channel: Self-Monitor and Self-Adjust

The development of China’s ANS Self-Protecting objective’s ‘Self-monitor’ and ‘Self-adjust’ Motor Channels are exemplified in practice by the National Defence Mobilisation system (see Figure 12). Self-monitor describes how, in part, the system is used to pre-emptively respond to loyalty and rapid mobilisation problems by focusing on systems coordination. Self-adjust describes crisis-response capacity. This side of the national defence mobilisation system is largely about technological cohesion and integration, which will ensure rapid logistical mobilisation in the time of crisis.



Figure 12: China’s ANS Self-Protecting Motor Channels

The section will first examine the mobilisation system as a structure, which includes a pre-emptive design. The second demonstrates how this system relies in large part on the same social management automation systems described in Chapter Seven to ensure rapid mobilisation in the event of any type of crisis.

Defence Mobilisation Structure

National Defence Mobilisation is a complex systems engineering project falling within the wider social management (and state security) complex systems engineering project. National defence mobilisation is ‘scientifically’ divided into two parts. There is a military function and government function. They are separate parts of the same system. While the parts are capable of functioning independently they are designed to function as a whole.⁶⁴ The system should handle crisis of all types and at all levels, including:

Larry M. Wortzel, *Chinese National Security Decisionmaking Under Stress* (Carlisle: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2005).

⁶⁴ Yushu Chen and Shandong Li, *富国强军——军民融合深度发展 (Enrich the Country, Empower the Army-- on the Deep Development of Military-Civil integration)* (Beijing: Changzheng Publishing House, 2015), 133.

small localised unrest, a natural disaster or public health emergency, or serious crises including large-scale unrest directly threatening the Party, and war. The system is mobilised depending on severity and crisis types, and based on a four-level system outlined in the 2006 National Emergency Response Plan.⁶⁵

While some researchers have accurately described the system's design, existing analysis has overlooked the fundamental characteristic that the national defence mobilisation system sits within the social management process.⁶⁶ The most critical point is the system is largely pre-emptive, and so its functions include advancing political work, and cooperative and coercive social control. Although the PLA does not step in for handling of day-to-day unrest – because the PAP is now trained and equipped to do so decisively – it trains for the time it might be called to defend the Party. The system is designed to handle every contingency. These tactics are, to reiterate the point from Chapter Seven, are, updated versions of Maoist mobilisation tactics. They are designed to meet the requirements of modern information society, modern integrated threat perceptions, and the modern movement of people. In this sense, the social management functions of cooperative and coercive social control, as well as the grid management and social credit systems that attempt to automate this process are connected to the national defence mobilisation system.

In the late 1980s, national defence mobilisation was a part of the Party and military leadership's discussion on national defence modernisation. Even then, prior to Tiananmen, defence mobilisation maintained its political relevance. Responsibility to the Party leadership was a clear part of the concept. For instance, one 1988 article explained that advancing the entire population's national defence education, and “settling leadership awareness problems” should take place at all levels. Further, it said, national defence mobilisation should be prioritised during times of peace.⁶⁷ The combination of Tiananmen, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Gulf War, likely created a greater sense of urgency.⁶⁸

A defence mobilisation committee system was initiated in 1994.⁶⁹ It created the State National Defence Mobilisation Committee (SNDMC), which is under the joint

⁶⁵ “全国应急预案体系初步形成(附图) (Preliminary Draft of National Emergency Response Contingency System (Diagrams)),” 1 September 2006.

⁶⁶ Chengkun Ma, “PLA Responses to Widespread Internal Unrest in the Han Homeland,” ed. Andrew Scobell, et al., *The People's Liberation Army and Contingency Planning* (Washington, D.C. : National Defense University Press, 2015). 188-96; Jonathan Walton, “China Plans for Internal Unrest: People's Armed Police and Public Security Approaches to “Mass Incidents”,” in *The People's Liberation Army and Contingency Planning*, Andrew Scobell, et al. (Washington, D.C. : National Defense University Press, 2015).

⁶⁷ “增强国防意识 提高全民素质 (National Defence Awareness and Raise the Entire Population's Inner Quality),” *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 1 April 1988.

⁶⁸ It should also be noted that in the late 1980s and 1990s, there was a seemingly strong push to pass a National Defence Mobilisation Law, but this was only finally enacted on 1 July 2010. Perhaps the reason it took so long is related to the questions of power this PhD also addresses (which are the same justifying national defence mobilisation committee system). The National Defence Mobilisation concept and its objectives have not changed from the 1980s to the present-day. The structural implementation seems to have further consolidated under Hu Jintao, and especially under Xi Jinping, along with other “system of systems” type reforms.

⁶⁹ “国务院、中央军委关于 成立国家国防动员委员会的通知 (Notice From The State Council and Central Military Commission on the Establishment of National Defence Mobilisation Committees).” 1994. http://www.gov.cn/jxgk/pub/govpublic/mrlm/201108/t20110812_63985.html.

leadership of the State Council and Central Military Commission (CMC) (see Figure 13).⁷⁰ A partially separate structure sits within the PLA. With the 2016 military reforms, defence mobilisation in the PLA is directed through the CMC Defence Mobilisation Department. Its director (who at September 2017 is Lieutenant General Sheng Bin, (盛斌) is simultaneously a deputy director of the SNDMC. The SNDMC-led system is located at the national; provincial and municipal; city and district levels; and county levels, with national defence mobilisation responsibility at the street level through community management committees. The structure is mirrored, creating a horizontal and vertically connectivity from the national down to local levels (see Figure 11).⁷¹ The chairman of the local-level national defence mobilisation committees is always simultaneously the leader of the local government (who is also usually a deputy Party secretary), and a “first” director is often also appointed, who is the party secretary at the same level. Vice-chairmen of the local national defence mobilisation committees are always deputy leaders of the local government, and the principal leader of the military organ (who is often the area’s PLA or People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFD) political commissar).⁷²

The SNDMC structure is designed for the integration, balancing and coordinating of overall national defence mobilisation, and to ensure that the system is capable of “unifying all plans, unifying all organizations, and unifying all actions in order to improve the efficiency of mobilisation.”⁷³ The unification of military and government functions further ensures the interests of pre-emptive Party-state security. It is particularly meaningful, as the next section will demonstrate, that at the lowest level, street management committees, the same officers in charge of the cooperative and coercive social management functions, including grid management, are also in charge of national defence mobilisation. Street-level mobilisation functions include to carry-out political and ideological work, such as civil affairs, cultural, health and family planning, education, and spreading “scientific common sense”.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ “国家国防动员委员会 (State National Defence Mobilisation Committee).” 2016. http://www.gfdy.gov.cn/org/2016-09/28/content_7281555.htm.

⁷¹ Analysis here and data in Figure 3 based on membership of committees at all levels. Collected as available, usually found in committee meeting announcements or local government webpages. Dates of most current information varied, mostly between 2011-2017. Below national level, the membership/director/deputy director positions vary slightly. All is reflected in Table 3. For example: “关于调整区国防动员委员会成员的通知 (Notice on Changes to the Membership of the District National Defence Mobilisation Committee)”, Wujiang District Government Information Disclosure, 17 April 2015; “湖北国防动员委员会第九次会议召开 王国生讲话 (Speech by Wang Guosheng during the 9th Meeting of the Hubei [Province] National Defence Mobilisation Committee),” (20 July 2012); “关于调整区国防动员委员会成员的通知 (Notice on Changes to the Membership of the District National Defence Mobilisation Committee)”, Hetang District People's Government, 7 November 2011; “上海市静安区人民政府江宁路街道办事处主要职责和机构设置 (Principal Responsibilities and Institutional Set-up of the Jiangning Street Sub-district Office, Jing'an District People's Government, Shanghai)”.

⁷² Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, “2002 年中国的国防 (China's National Defence in 2002).”

⁷³ Chen and Li, *富国强军——军民融合深度发展 (Enrich the Country, Empower the Army-- on the Deep Development of Military-Civil integration)*.

⁷⁴ “上海市静安区人民政府江宁路街道办事处主要职责和机构设置 (Principal Responsibilities and Institutional Set-up of the Jiangning Street Sub-district Office, Jing'an District People's Government, Shanghai)”.

National

- Director: Premier (as at September 2017, Li Keqiang)
- Deputy Directors: State Councilor and secretary of the Work Committee for CCP Central Government Organs (as at September 2017, Yang Jing) ; State Councilor and Minister of Defence (as at September 2017, Chang Wanquan); and head of the Central Military Commission National Defence Mobilisation Department (as at September 2017, Lieutenant General Sheng Bin)
- Membership: Relevant functional departments of the CMC; Organisation Department of the CCP Central Committee; Central Publicity Department; Central Institutional Organisational Commission; National Development and Reform Commission; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Science and Technology; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology; Ministry of Public Security; Ministry of Civil Affairs; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security; Ministry of Land and Resources; Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development; Ministry of Transport; Ministry of Commerce; Ministry of Culture; State Administration for Press, Publication Radio, Film and Television; National Bureau of Statistics; All-China Federation of Trade Unions; Communist Youth League; All-China Women's Federation
- Central Military Commission: The CMC National Defence Mobilisation Department was created in January 2016 under new military reforms. It replaced the General Staff Department Mobilisation Department. Under this structure, the General Staff Department deputy director in charge of mobilisation sat on the National Defence Mobilisation Committee.

Provincial and Municipal

- Director: Governor and Deputy Party Secretary
- Deputy Directors (usually all concurrent standing committee members): Executive Vice Governor; Vice Governor and United Front Work Department Head; provincial Military Commander; head of Propaganda Department; provincial military Political Commissar; Political-Legal Affairs Department Head
- Membership: Unconfirmed, but given membership at other levels officials, likely mirrored. Additionally, some city and district representatives are likely among the 'other relevant departments' attending higher level meetings.

City, District and County

- Director and First Director: Deputy Party Secretary/Mayor, and Party Secretary
- Deputy Directors: Standing Committee Member/District People's Armed Forces Political Commissar; Deputy Mayor/Public Security Bureau director; head of People's Armed Forces
- Membership includes either directors or deputy directors of about 20-25 departments and bureaus, usually a combination of: Party and government general offices; People's Armed Forces Departments; Ministry of Public Security; Political-Legal Affairs Committee; Party Work committees; Publicity Department; Development and Reform Commission; National People's Congress; Cultural offices; Economic and Informatisation Committee; Financial Bureau; Human Resources and Social Security; Housing and Urban-Rural; Civil Defence; Civil Affairs Bureau; Education; Health and Family Planning; Road Transport; Science and Technology; Food Bureau; Market and Quality Supervision; Federation of Labour; Communist Youth League; Women's Federation; a representative of telecommunications or logistics sector state-owned enterprise.
- Committees usually have seven to nine sub-offices, including: General Office, Armed Forces Office, Economic Mobilisation Office, Civil Air Defence Office, Traffic Readiness Office, Political Mobilisation Office; Technology Mobilisation Office, Information Mobilisation Office, and Equipment Mobilisation Office. Each has their own staff, which includes the above full committee members.

Urban-Street

- Street Level Committees have a national defence mobilisation role, which includes promotion of people's participation and 'self-governance'.
- Grid managers specifically take national defence mobilisation training, and have been reported to double as militia members

Figure 13: National Defence Mobilisation Committee System Structure

The placement of the military and state system ensures all national defence mobilisation committees at levels of government agencies can effectively implement national defence mobilisation in times of war or domestic crisis where the PLA is called upon. This creates the organisational system where the military submits national defence mobilisation requirements, the national defence mobilisation committee handles the coordination, and the governments at various levels handle implementation.⁷⁵ The military also is engaged in pre-emptive work. Political commissars or political work department officers from the PLA or PAFD are one of the key military representatives on each committee.⁷⁶ In the PLA, political commissars are assigned to all organisations at the regiment level and above. Their responsibilities include working with other aspects of the Chinese political system, in addition to implementing party decisions, party discipline, and party education of the PLA.⁷⁷ At the lower levels, members of the PAFD sit on the committees with the same function, serving as the coordinator between the PLA and militia.⁷⁸

Military-Civil Integration for Rapid Mobilisation

There is a direct link between the discussion social management automation processes in both China's ANS Self-Healing and ANS Self-Optimising objectives, and the automation of the ANS Self-Protecting objective's mobilisation system. As the national defence mobilisation structure at the local government levels indicates, military-civilian integration serves pre-emptive functions. The structure is also designed to enable more effective and rapid defence mobilisation and logistical mobilisation for any type of crisis. For example, this *PLA Daily* article highlighted the nexus between civil and military mechanisms in a wartime scenario:

Whether it is the militarisation of functions of some social mechanisms, or the socialisation of non-military functions of the armed forces, all carry heavy and extensive social responsibilities, all require social security to be policy based, comprehensive and concrete. Therefore, military reform should be transformed into national will, bringing into the scope of government responsibilities, to form a beneficial situation where the military system takes the lead, while the local efforts ensure its logistics.⁷⁹

Technology is being designed to add further cohesion and coordination to the system. Eventually, it will enable a comprehensive "smart mobilisation" system, which utilises

⁷⁵ Chen and Li, *富国强军——军民融合深度发展 (Enrich the Country, Empower the Army-- on the Deep Development of Military-Civil integration)*, 133.

⁷⁶ Note: According to Connor Kennedy and Andrew Erickson, People's Armed Forces Departments include the PLA, People's Armed Police, and the militia. County-level PAFDs are active-duty personnel, and grassroots are non-active duty "staffed by 'full-time people's armed forces cadres' (专职人民武装干部) who represent the direct interface between the militia and the PLA chain of command." Connor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, "Hainan's Maritime Militia: China Builds a Standing Vanguard, PT. 1," 2017.

⁷⁷ Kenneth Allen, Brian Chao, and Ryan Kinsella, "China's Military Political Commissar System in Comparative Perspective," *China Brief* 13, no. 5 (2013).

⁷⁸ Kennedy and Erickson, "Hainan's Maritime Militia: China Builds a Standing Vanguard, PT. 1".

⁷⁹ Huijun Fu, "注重统筹兼顾坚持协调发展 (Pay Attention to the Overall Plan and Persevere with Coordinated Development)," *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 10 February 2004.

grid management systems.⁸⁰ The objective is to “organically integrate” the national defence mobilisation network and the [military] command network. It would allow for “holistic” unification and coordination to solve problems related to interconnectivity, intercommunication and interoperability.⁸¹

For instance, by 2007, Shandong's national defence mobilisation committee set up an information network to gather voice, images, and data. It allowed for the exchange of information “as part of an integrated whole system”. For the military there is a vertical video-conferencing network, command automation network, and all army military affairs information network connection. Horizontally, the military network is capable of connecting to local government national defence mobilisation networks. Other locations, have referred to this vertical and horizontal integration process as a “Grid(-ized) Management Service System” to expand a new channel for “double support”, which implies a mechanism designed for military-civil integration.⁸² The intended combined function is demonstrated through training. For instance, the Shanghai “Hudong-2015” wartime national defence mobilisation exercise, involved the city and district mobilisation committees, relevant Party and government committees and ministries, and township and street level management committees, enterprises and institutions. It was a comprehensive drill practicing the defence mobilisation command mechanism. Drills have been held for other scenarios such as natural disasters, reflecting preparation for any category of emergency.

Similarly, systems that could have usages in any type of crisis scenario aide in day-to-day social control mechanisms. Changsha South Railway Station, a transportation hub, has a joint logistical and joint mobilisation command centre, with “flat” command systems, a joint services mechanism, and video surveillance technology (found in the grid systems). In 2017, CPLC Secretary Meng Jianzhu visited the site and said the joint logistical and joint mobilisation system solved communication problems with information resources, strengthened the “whole combat ‘joint’ mechanism”, and realised the “same” of targeting procedures. He said the command centre exemplified the technological concept related to the comprehensive governance of social order.⁸³ Additionally, Meng said:

We hope that they will play a role in coordinating, further concentrating the power of resources, establishing a robust information sharing, unified command, cooperative combat mechanism, constantly improving the reaction speed and capacity, and strive to locate all kinds of security risks early, preventing them in advance, and with minimum effort.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Wutao He, Yu Wang, and Xingliang Wu. “小网格里的大动员——湖北省武汉市江汉区探索推进“智慧动员”闻思录 (Massive Mobilisation In a Small Grid-- Exploring the Advancement of “Smart Mobilisation” in Jiangnan District, Wuhan, Hubei).” *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 19 September 2016. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-09/19/content_156954.htm.

⁸¹ Chuanfu Zheng, “简论快速动员 (On Rapid Mobilisation),” *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 2 August 2005.

⁸² “浙江嵊泗加强军民融合 海疆要塞双拥潮涌 (Strengthen Military-Civil Integration In the Coastal Stronghold of Shengsi, Zhejiang with “Double Support”),” 7 March 2015.

⁸³ “孟建柱：不断提高社会治理科学化法治化智能化水平 (Meng Jianzhu: Continuously Improving Social Governance's Scientific(-isation), Rule of Law(-isation) and Intelligence(-isation) Standards),” 24 March 2017.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

Military-civil integration is not simply taking place as a necessary process given that military and civilian systems rely on the same technology, for better or for worse. Rather, it is because the system is being designed and optimised to ensure that national defence mobilisation's technical and logistical side can operate as a whole system when it is called upon, for any scenario.

Grid management systems have an existing joint logistical and joint mobilisation function, which is being optimised as technology improves. Grid managers also receive national defence mobilisation training, and have also been reported as members of local militia units.⁸⁵ This explains why dozens of local governments have described objectives to improve the social management grid management system construction next to objectives to improve emergency response systems.⁸⁶ The same systems are used to mobilise and coordinate response to unrest. Depending on severity, regular police, SWAT teams, and PAP units are required to coordinate.

On 16 May 2015, in Linshui, Sichuan, a large scale and violent protest took place in opposition to plans to re-route a planned high-speed rail project away from nearby city Guang'an. It involved up to tens of thousands of participants, and up to hundreds were injured. Some arson and vandalised government vehicles were photographed, as well as roads that appeared damaged from debris of thrown bricks and other objects. The protest escalated enough to call on regular police, swat teams, and a People's Armed Police unit. The PAP unit appeared to block a highway to contain the protest, while swat teams and regular police were engaged in violent confrontations with the protesters.⁸⁷ The emergency scenario likely called on the county's grid system, which like all others across the country has an emergency management function (which is also being strengthened through further integration and technology advancements).⁸⁸ There was no need to call on the PLA in this case, but in the event of an extremely serious domestic crisis, or a situation on Chinese soil like the Kosovo example, the military and civilian systems would be required to function together. This is a primary reason for why the systems are partially integrated technologically, and where the national defence mobilisation system coordination would enable a cohesive process.

[8.3] Conclusion

The development of China's ANS Self-Protecting Objective's Motor Channel is clearly a long-term process dependent on the development and integration of modern technology. Ultimately, the success of the ANS Self-Protecting objective depends on the control loop's pre-emptive capacity to monitor threats and determine how these affect the capacity to respond to any type of crisis. It brings the Party-state leadership straight back to the problem highlighted in 1989: loyalty.

⁸⁵ "武汉市江汉区依托网格化推行“大数据动员” (Pushing Big Data Mobilisation through Grid-isation in Jianghan District, Wuhan City) ." *The People's Liberation Army Daily*, 11 January 2017. http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2017-01/11/content_7446932_4.htm.

⁸⁶ "2017 年尧都区政府工作报告 (2017 Yaodu District [Shanxi] Government Work Report)", 2017; "2017 年株洲市政府工作报告 (2017 Zhuzhou [Hunan] Government Work Report)", 27 February 2017.

⁸⁷ "Linshui, Sichuan ", Wickedonna, 16 May 2015.

⁸⁸ "水县：“八项工作”精准发力“项目年”里开好局 (Linshui County: Precision Efforts Applied to the "Eight Works" A Good Beginning For the Project Year)," 19 February 2016.

Perhaps, given that national defence mobilisation committees rely on PLA and PAFD political commissars and logistics officers, this gives new meaning to the anti-corruption campaign in the armed forces under Xi Jinping. Most of the targets have been in political and logistical roles. It is not simply because, these positions lend themselves to corruption. The same can be said about the Politics and Law apparatus that largely controls the grid management mechanisms. In the event of a crisis, these are the individuals the Party relies on the most. Likewise, they are the same individuals who are expected to lead crisis pre-emption work.

Chapter Nine I

Conclusion: Programming China

Let us not, however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human conquest over nature. For each such conquest takes its revenge on us.
—Friedrich Engels

Orrwell's 1984 closes with protagonist Winston Smith learning to accept totalitarian control: "He gazed up at the enormous face. Forty years it had taken him to learn what kind of smile was hidden beneath the dark moustache. O cruel, needless misunderstanding! O stubborn, self-willed exile from the loving breast! Two gin-scented tears trickled down the sides of his nose. But it was all right, everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother". In the 'ideal' authoritarian system, coercion and cooption are combined to create the 'perfect' social control. What is developing in China, however, defies conventional categories such as totalitarianism or hard versus soft authoritarianism. Conceptually, it describes Mao's mass line perfected in both its cooperative and coercive aspects. Through the attempted construction and automation of the ideal Autonomic Nervous System, it can be seen that in the People's Republic of China we may be witnessing a sideways development, where China's Leninist system thus takes on a new form. Authoritarianism is stabilised, largely through the embodiment and application of a way of thinking that applies complex systems management processes, and further attempts to "automate" these processes through technology designed based on the very same concepts.

The problem for the Party is that a tiger cannot change its stripes. This means that the internal obstacles to the Party achieving the ANS ideal, will always be present. Beyond managing society, the Party must manage itself. These reasons combined are why "holistic state security" is seen as critical to the Party-state's survival. In September 2017, General Party Secretary Xi Jinping called for: "a more systematic and innovative social governance, stressing the need to improve the capability to predict and prevent security risks."¹ At its core, social management is the process that programmes state security. In essence then, Xi's statement describes the requirement of China's Autonomic Nervous System.

¹ Zhang, "Security Innovation Seen as Crucial."

As the concept of “holistic state security” instructs, the most severe threats to state security are perceived as emerging from an integration of internal and external sources. In engineering the ANS process to achieve state security, the Chinese Communist Party is not protecting a political system outside of itself. Threats to the state’s security are anything, alone or in combination, perceived as undermining this CCP-led system. The idea of “internal” and “external” is determined not only by whether a threat sits inside of China’s claimed physical borders, but also by whether the threat sits inside or outside of the CCP. From the Party’s perspective, the only way to effectively mitigate threat is through pre-emption. Failure to pre-emptively manage threats could mean that in the event of a Tiananmen 2.0, the Party has already lost before any physical battle actually begins. Therefore, the process of ensuring that the Party remains in power will likely always require a huge amount of the Party leadership’s resources, even if the “automation” objective succeeds.

One of the challenges described in achieving the computing application of the ANS ideal is that, given the system is being constructed, and especially given that it is being constructed on top of “legacy systems”, the construction is not even between the four self-managing functions, i.e. the Four “Self-’s”. These objectives cannot be fully achieved without each other. Self-Configuring, Self-Healing, Self-Optimisation and Self-Protection must all operate together, because without integration the system is not operating as a cohesive whole. Therefore, the autonomic functions would not succeed. On this topic, it can be said that China’s ANS and the computing application of ANS face the same predicament:

The main new research challenge introduced by the autonomic computing initiative is to achieve effective interoperation among autonomic elements. In order for this to happen, product developers must look beyond their natural product-centric tendencies and cultivate a more holistic, system-level point of view. In other words, specific autonomic elements must be designed with a greater awareness of the fact that they will be situated in autonomic systems and intercommunicating and interacting cooperatively with other autonomic elements.²

Theoretically, the Party is already attempting this much, but in practice it must simultaneously address the threats that would disrupt the process.

The ANS framework should be seen not as an incremental improvement to current research of China’s political system but as a fundamentally different approach to researching and analysing the nature of Chinese politics. Therefore, the analytical framework “China’s Autonomic Nervous System” framework as described and applied in this thesis should not be understood as a final statement. In fact, it is merely a starting point. It would be possible for future researchers to replicate this framework as it is outlined in Chapter Four, and applied in Chapters Five through Eight. It can either be done through a broad study of other aspects of China’s political system and through more nuanced studies of different aspects of the system.

² Kephart, "Research challenges of autonomic computing," 16.

China's ANS is an analytical framework specifically designed so other observations related to the processes of social management and state security can be described more effectively. With the ANS framework, a wide range of topics, from something as specific as a particular unrest event to something as broad as "social credit" (in more detail than Chapter Seven allows space for), can all be described with more cohesion in relation to China's political system.

In future applications of the ANS framework, the history covered in the previous chapters is not necessarily required (but encouraged to a degree because one of the most important findings in this PhD is there is more conceptual continuity than change). In theory, the framework can also be applied separately. That is to say, one paper could focus primarily on one of the "Four Self-"s, given that in the analysis the objective is placed within the context of the whole ANS system. How a particular objective is or could be affected by the other three is important. The main point of the ANS framework is to bring cohesion to a set of broad and hard to navigate subjects, and to force thinking from the combined holistic-reductionist approach required to understand the CCP's language and concepts in practice.

Appendix One I

The 12th Five Year Plan: Chapter 37

第三十七章:创新社会管理体制	Chapter 37: Innovating the Social Management System
坚持多方参与、共同治理, 统筹兼顾、动态协调的原则, 完善社会管理格局, 创新社会管理机制, 形成社会管理和服务合力。	Persevere with multilateral participation, joint-governance, overall consideration, and the principle of dynamic coordination, to improve the social management structure, innovate the social management mechanism, and form the joint forces of social management and services.
第一节: 健全社会管理格局	Section One: A Robust Social Management Structure
按照健全党委领导、政府负责、社会协同、公众参与的社会管理格局的要求, 加强社会管理法律、体制、能力建设。坚持党委的领导核心作用, 总揽全局、把握方向、整合力量、统筹各方, 提高引领社会、组织社会、管理社会、服务社会的能力。发挥政府的主导作用, 强化社会管理和公共服务职能, 建设服务型政府, 提高服务型管理能力。发挥人民团体、基层自治组织、各类社会组织和企业事业单位的协同作用, 推进社会管理的规范化、专业化、社会化和法制化。广泛动员和组织群众依法有序参与社会管理, 培养公民意识, 履行公民义务, 实现自我管理、自我服务、自我发展。	We should strengthen social management law, institution and capacity building in accordance with the requirements of a social management structure with the Party [central] committee's leadership, government responsibility, social cooperation, and public participation. Persevere with the leadership of the core Party [central] committee by acting on the responsibility to the overall situation, grasping the direction, the integration of power, the overall coordination of all sides, to improve the leadership of society, the organisation of society, the management of society, and the capacity to serve the community. Display the government's leading role, strengthen social management and public service functions, build a service-oriented government, raise service oriented management capacity. Display the synergy of people's organisations, grassroots self-government organisations, all kinds of social organisations, enterprises and institutions, promote standardisation, specialisation, socialisation and legalisation of social management. Extensively mobilise and organise the masses to regularly participate in social management, cultivate citizen's consciousness to fulfil civil obligations, realise self-management, self-service and self-development.
第二节 创新社会管理机制	Section Two: Innovating the Social Management Mechanism
加快构建源头治理、动态管理和应急处置相结合的社会管理机制。加强源头治理, 更加注重民生和制度建设, 坚持科学民主依法决策, 防止和减少社会问题的产生; 加强动态管理, 更加注重平等沟通和协商, 解决群众合法合理诉求, 及时	Speed-up the establishment of a social management mechanism combining 'source governance' [i.e. polices and efforts that address problems at their source, preemptively], dynamic management, and emergency response. Strengthen source governance, pay more attention to the construction of civil utility and institutions, persevere with scientific and democratic decision-making according to law, to prevent and reduce the emergence of social problems; strengthen dynamic management, pay more attention to equality

<p>化解社会矛盾；加强应急处置，更加注重应急能力建设，有效应对和妥善处置突发公共事件，最大限度地增加和谐因素，化解消极因素，激发社会活力</p>	<p>in communicating and consulting with the masses, resolve the reasonable and lawful demands of the masses, and promptly dissolve social contradictions, strengthen emergency (response) capacity-building, effectively responding and properly handle sudden public incidents, maximise the increase of harmony factors, dissolve passive factors and arouse social vitality.</p>
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