INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE
CONTRACTS: REFLECTIONS ON A
PROSPECTIVE UNCITRAL PROJECT

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Abstract: IP licenses are the leading lady of the information age. The economic and strategic significance of this contract archetype have grown exponentially over the past 40 years. Under this glaring spotlight, it has become progressively more apparent that the legal framework governing these transactions is ill-suited to the role that they play in the modern digital environment. The applicable norms are scattered throughout diverse areas of the law, rendering a holistic appraisal onerous, and causing both doctrinal underdevelopment and legal uncertainty. Moreover, a comparative analysis of IP licensing regimes across jurisdictions reveals a jarring lack of alignment that severely hinders international transactions. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has been contemplating the possibility of a project in this area of the law for over a decade. Though Member States have battled lingering reservations, support has been increasing steadily among practitioners and academics, and is verging on achieving critical mass. This paper provides the necessary theoretical infrastructure for this initiative by expounding its possible scope, content and form. The objective is not to articulate or advocate a single, concrete proposal, but rather to identify the categories of legal issues that UNCITRAL Member States would face in the elaboration of this project and lend color to the types of decision-making processes required to attain consensus solutions. On the basis of this analysis, a strategy to advance this project to its next phase is proposed.

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INTRODUCTION

The sale of goods contract archetype has played a cardinal socio-economic role since the adoption of currency.¹ Throughout history, this prominence has prompted numerous legal systems to develop bespoke rules for such transactions, supplemental to general contract law.²

¹ For an analysis of the impact of currency on both private bargains and the broader economy in ancient civilisations, including Mesopotamia under the Code of Hammurabi (2123-2081 BCE), and ancient Egypt see Paul Einzig, Primitive money, (1947). For a rich analysis also considering religious ancient sources see Benjamin Geva, From Commodity to Currency in Ancient History–On Commerce, Tyranny, and the Modern Law of Money, 25 OSGOODE HALL LJ 115 (1987).

² On the development of commercial law throughout history see generally JAMES MACKINTOSH, ROMAN LAW OF SALE (1892) (on the history and development of Roman law of sale); JOHN BARON MOYLE, THE CONTRACT OF SALE IN THE CIVIL LAW (1892) (for a rich comparative analysis between Roman law and 19th century English law); Alan Rodger, The Codification of Commercial Law in Victorian Britain, 109 L.Q. REV. 570, 574 (1992) (charting the history of the English commercial law codifications of the 18th century); Mary Arden, Time for an English Commercial Code, 56 CAMB. L.J. 516, 518–522 (1997) (reflecting on the possibility of a modern codification of English commercial law); ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, TREATISE ON THE CONTRACT OF SALE (Luther S. Cushing tran., 1839) (on the birth and development of the French law of sale); Ernst Freund, The New German Civil Code, HARV. LAW REV. 627 (1900) (discussing the history of commercial and civil law in Germany); REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE NEW GERMAN LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (2006) (analysing the most recent developments in German commercial law); BASIL S. MARKESINIS, HANNES UNBERATH & ANGUS C. JOHNSTON, THE GERMAN LAW OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE (2006) (comparing German civil and commercial law to the common law).
Their purpose is to serve the peculiar issues encountered by both sellers and buyers, increasing systemic efficiency and legal certainty. From a comparative perspective, national laws governing sales have become increasingly aligned over the course of time. Concurrently, intergovernmental initiatives have progressively crafted a legal framework for international sale contracts, culminating in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980) (CISG).  

In the information age, intellectual property (IP) licenses have become increasingly ubiquitous and their economic significance has ballooned. Digital technologies have disrupted numerous commercial sectors and enabled new business models that depend on IP license agreements rather than sale of goods contracts. As the world advances towards an ever more digital future, it seems probable that such trends will only amplify and proliferate. This forecast is further supported by recent attempts to commoditize non-exclusive license contracts and publicly trade them on regulated exchanges.  

In every jurisdiction, the legal regime governing IP licenses is the product of intersections between multiple normative streams, including contract law, IP law, labor law, competition law, and other domains.

6 For a primer see generally Gerald F. Davis & J. Adam Cobb, The virtual corporation, in MIT CENTER FOR ADVANCED ENGINEERING STUDY (1992); Henry Chesbrough & Kevin Schwartz, Innovating business models with co-development partnerships, 50 RES.-TECHNOL. MANAG. 55 (2007); David J. Teece, Business models, business strategy and innovation, 43 LONG RANGE PLANN. 172 (2010).  
law and consumer law. Consequently, the applicable rules and principles are difficult to appraise holistically, as they are scattered throughout diverse areas of the law. Identifying meticulously all the tesserae of this mosaic, deciphering completely the order in which they come together and comprehending the resulting picture is extremely challenging. This results in both legal uncertainty and doctrinal underdevelopment.

A comparative analysis of the national regimes for IP licenses reveals marked divergences. Across jurisdictions, there is a jarring lack of alignment of both the relevant branches of the law and the manners in which they intersect. Moreover, while multiple international projects have harmonized the foundational tenets of national legislations regulating the most prominent


11 See generally De Werra, supra note 8; Michael Anthony C. Dizon, The symbiotic relationship between global contracts and the international IP regime, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. LAW PRAC. 559, 564 (2009).
IP rights archetypes, similar initiatives devoted to the law governing contractual dealings involving IP rights and license agreements have borne meagre fruit. Legal practitioners, academics, non-governmental entities and international organizations alike have long mooted ameliorations to the legal framework governing IP licenses both nationally and internationally. In some jurisdictions, this has led to government-commissioned reviews, which scrutinized the extant body of rules and recommended legislative interventions. Among international organizations, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Laws (UNCITRAL) has cautiously yet persistently expressed interest in a future work exploring the legal framework of IP license contracts. Despite this, none of the UNCITRAL


13 For one of the few examples of intergovernmental initiatives focused on licensing law see the WIPO SUCCESSFUL TECHNOLOGY LICENSING GUIDE (http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/licensing/903/wipo_pub_903.pdf).


17 At the time of its foundation, UNCITRAL identified nine subject matters for its future endeavors, including Intellectual Property; see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Third Session, Supplement No. 16
Member States (henceforth: Member States) have yet explicitly championed such an initiative nor shown willingness to submit an official proposal for the consideration of the UNCITRAL Commission.\footnote{For an examples of recent Member State proposals see Proposal by Switzerland on possible future work by UNCITRAL in the area of international contract law A/CN.9/758; Proposal by the Government of the United States regarding UNCITRAL future work A/CN.9/789.}

At the UNCITRAL Fourth Colloquium on Secured Transactions,\footnote{UNCITRAL Vienna 15-17 March 2017, programme available at \url{http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/colloquia/4thSecTrans/4th_Int_Coll_on_ST_2017_r.pdf}. This Panel continued developing themes initially explored during the UNCITRAL Third International Colloquium on Secured Transactions, March 1-3, 2010, Vienna, where a panel titled “Concept Proposal for a Model Intellectual Property Contracting Law” was held, programme available at \url{http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/colloquia/3dint.html}.} panelists discussed the topic of “IP licensing”,\footnote{The panelists were Jeff Dodd (Chair), Lorin Brennan, Thilo Agthe and Andrea Tosato. All materials are available at \url{http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/colloquia/security.html}.} examining the problems fettering the law regulating these agreements in many jurisdictions and focusing on the oft-fraught dialogue between contract and IP law. This was followed by a debate on a hypothetical UNCITRAL project on the law of voluntary IP licenses (henceforth: the Project), which would be aimed at fostering improvements to national legal regimes and stimulating international harmonization. This paper aspires to advance the aforementioned discourse.

It would be entirely premature to formulate a precise and detailed proposal for the Project at this stage. This paper instead ventures to examine methodically three salient points that are logical prerequisites to crafting a conscientiously-formed proposal. First, attention will be devoted to the potential scope of the Project. Secondly, a comparative analysis of the substantive rules governing IP license contracts will be conducted, for the dual purpose of providing representative examples of the types of legal conundrums that Member States would have to tackle at the heart of the Project and expounding the decision-making processes required to conceive consensus solutions. Thirdly, an assessment will be conducted of the possible, alternative forms that the Project could assume and their associated ramifications. Lastly, concluding observations will recommend a strategy for the advancement of the Project to its next phase.

I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROJECT

As a logical antecedent to any foray into matters of substance, Member States would be required to define the scope of Project. As IP license contracts are a vast and diverse archetype, this determination would be demanding. It is submitted that a scrupulous decision-making process would involve an assessment of two distinct legal dimensions.

\footnote{\(A/7216\) (1968), paras. 40 and 48. Future work on the legal framework of IP licenses at both national and international level has been under consideration at UNCITRAL for some time: see UNCITRAL Report of Working Group VI (Security Interests) on the work of its fourteenth session A/CN.9/667, para. 141; Report of Working Group VI (Security Interests) on the work of its fifteenth session A/CN.9/670, paras. 123-126: “With respect to a contractual guide on intellectual property licensing, it was observed that it would be an extremely important project, which would address key issues of law relating to intellectual property”; Planned and possible future work A/CN.9/774 para 11; Planned and possible future work A/CN.9/807 para 13; Planned and possible future work A/CN.9/841 para 14.}
First, IP licenses impact a sweeping range of socio-economic interests, giving rise to legal issues that differ in nature and are thus governed by rules that stem from multiple areas of the law. Structurally, IP licenses are binding promises between persons; they generate private law questions that are answered by contract law. Functionally, they are dealings for the purpose of exploiting IP rights; they engender issues that are proprietary in nature and fall within the realm of IP law. Concurrently, IP licenses can also attract the attention of competition law, labor law, consumer protection law and international private law, depending on the content of the undertakings stipulated by the parties.

In approaching this dimension, it would be for Member States to decide whether the Project should engage with all these branches of the law or rather concentrate on a narrower selection. At first glance, it might appear unproblematic to exclude delimited areas *a priori*, such as consumer protection or unfair competition. A more rigorous analysis, however, reveals that compartmentalizing IP license contracts is conceptually Gordian, as issues pertaining to discrete branches of the law can be closely intertwined and difficult to address in isolation. This would be especially true with regard to contract law and IP law, as license agreements are often characterized by a coalescence of obligatory and proprietary profiles, owing to the nature and function of these transactions.

Secondly, IP licenses cannot be described as a homogeneous category. These contracts all share a functional core: the licensor grants to the licensee a form of permission to perform actions that would otherwise be an infringement of the licensed IP. Nevertheless, the rights and obligations of the parties vary markedly depending on multifarious structural elements. The nature and quantity of the licensed IP rights, the breadth and limitations of the grant, the compensation structure, and the legal status of the parties, can all profoundly affect the respective legal spheres of the licensor and licensee.

In approaching this second dimension, it would be for Member States to deliberate whether the Project should encompass all license agreements without exception, or rather delve into a sub-group of this category. In the former case, the Project would seek to articulate a ruleset that concentrates on the functional core of IP licenses, yet eschew delving into the singularities of the many existing incarnations of these contracts. Its emphasis would be on pinpointing problems and elaborating solutions that apply to all types of IP licenses uniformly. Coextensively, caution would be required to ensure that unintended consequences were not inflicted on the regime of any one type of license agreement.

Alternatively, if Member States decided that the scope of the Project should be confined to licenses with particular attributes, the objective would be to conduct an exhaustive study into the designated subject matter; for example, Member States might elect to focus exclusively on licenses that involve a pre-determined form of IP, are international in nature, are entered into by legal persons, or have a specific commercial structure. The notable advantage of limiting the types of licenses encompassed by the Project is that it would mitigate the risk of unintended consequences arising from the broad-brush strokes required when addressing all these transactions as a unitary subject matter. Nevertheless, it would be challenging to target a subgroup of licenses characterized by socio-legal singularities sufficient to merit its own set of rules and the associated systemic fragmentation cost.

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22 This common functional core is recognized ubiquitously; Guibault and Hugenholtz, *supra* note 9 (for a European law perspective) 3.2.2; *NIMMER AND DODD, supra* note 8 § 1:2 (for United States perspective); Xue, *supra* note 9 (for a Chinese law perspective); Krishnamurthy, *supra* note 9 (for an Indian law perspective); in Japanese law Teramoto, *supra* note 9.
Thus, the determination of the scope of the Project would present Member States with a vast spectrum of options. At one extreme, a wide remit embracing all license types and the totality of legal issues that they elicit, regardless of the area of the law to which they pertain. At the other, a narrow scope, comprising only licenses with very peculiarities attributes and only tackling profiles that relate to one branch of the law. This would be a cardinal policy choice with far-reaching ramifications, as will be shown in subsequent paragraphs devoted to substantive rules.

II. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROJECT

It would be beyond the editorial limits of this contribution to explore exhaustively all facets of the body of rules governing IP license agreements that the Project may investigate.

Attention will be directed to seven problematic areas that possess doctrinal complexity, carry commercial relevance and are indicative of the conceptual challenges faced by Member States. For each area, this paper will conduct a tripartite analysis: first, describing briefly the current state of the law across jurisdictions; secondly, assessing whether the current rules realize a satisfactory legal regime and appraising the degree of international dissonance; thirdly, theorizing the methodological approaches that Member States might adopt to confront these issues in the Project and, to a lesser extent, the type of substantive rules they might consider.

A. Licensing of jointly owned IP rights

It is uniformly accepted that rights-holders can license their IP. However, the legal regime for the licensing of jointly-owned rights varies markedly across jurisdictions. From a systemic perspective, most states establish special IP rules to regulate the licensing of jointly-owned IP rights, yet there are some in which such matters are governed by general property law tenets; these norms are typically subsidiary in nature, yet there are exceptions. Crucially, with regard to substance, most jurisdictions lack a unitary approach, adopting heterogeneous regimes for different types of IP rights. In some, licenses can be granted by

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23 IP licensing has ancient roots, dating back to the Venetian Patent Statute of 1474; see generally J. Kostylo, Commentary on the Venetian Statute on Industrial Brevets (1474), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (Lionel Bently & Martin Kretschmer eds., 2008) (detailing the 1474 Venetian patent system). For a historical analysis of copyright licensing predating the statutory introduced in the 18th Century starting with the watershed of the Copyright Act 1710 8 Ann C. 19, see HARRY HUNT RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE: AN ESSAY ON AN ACT FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF LEARNING, 1710 (1956).


one co-owner, absent the consent or knowledge of the other joint owners. In others, the consent of all co-owners is a validity requirement. In others still, this prerequisite only covers exclusive licenses. The resulting legal landscape is disjointed and beset with legal uncertainty, increasing transaction costs, elevating market-access barriers, and obstructing innovation.

The Project should consider advocating a normative approach to the licensing of jointly-owned IP rights. It would be for Member States to consider two distinct, yet logically contiguous issues. First, they would have to decide whether a right-holder can ever grant a license without the consent of their joint-owners. The cardinal query is whether it is acceptable for a joint owner to suffer a detrition of their exclusive right without their consent, even at the hands of one of their fellow co-owners. Systemically, the competing legal interests are the erga omnes nature of IP and the right to exploit and dispose of these rights. If an affirmative answer were provided to this cardinal query, Member States would be faced with the task of defining precisely the circumstances in which a right-holder is at liberty to grant licenses. As national laws lack alignment on this matter, compromise would not be easy.

Secondly, it would be for Member States to regulate the position of a person who enters into a license agreement with a right-holder who failed to obtain the required consent of their joint-owners. Here, the tension is between co-owners unwilling to suffer a deterioration of their exclusive right and licensees who have legitimate expectations of exploiting the permission they have contractually obtained. In this context, The rival legal interests are, on one hand, upholding the “certainty” of the absolute nature of IP rights and, on the other, ensuring the “certainty” of commercial dealings. Mutatis mutandis this is a conundrum analogous to that

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29 In the United States, this is the regime applicable to jointly owned patents under 35 U.S.C. § 262 (1994), copyright
30 For example, in the United Kingdom, the consent of all co-owners is required for the granting of patent licenses under section 36 United Kingdom Patents Act 1979 [henceforth UK PA]; the same is true under section 173(2) UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988] [henceforth CDPA]; the same is true under section 50 of the India Patents Act 1970 and the Australia Patents Act 1990 § 16.
31 This is the regime governing licenses of jointly-owned copyrights in the United States, under 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1978), as held in Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2008); see MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 6.10-611 (2013) (“one joint owner may grant a nonexclusive license in the entire work without consent of the other joint owners”). This is also the principle governing the licensing of jointly-owned patents in China under Art 15 Chinese Patent Act (2009); for an in-depth analysis see Yunling Ren & Yan Hong, Rights of Joint Patent Owners in China, 11 JOHN MARSHALL REV. INTELLEC. PROP. LAW [i], 622 (2011).
32 This sentiment was strongly voiced in several AIPPI Q194 national reports, supra note 24.
33 These issues are particularly noticeable in markets where entrants require multiple licenses to compete with the incumbents; see generally Hargreaves, supra note 15 at 5; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8-11,24-26, 29-32 (2000); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the patent thicket: Cross licenses, patent pools, and standard setting, 1 INNOV. POLICY ECON. 119 (2000) (suggesting strategies to efficiently collect the required licenses); Sonia Baldia, The transaction cost problem in international intellectual property exchange and innovation markets, 34 NW. J. INTL. BUS. 1 (2013) (who highlights that the territoriality characterizing IP licensing increase uncertainty and costs).
34 For a law and economics perspective on this general conundrum see Clifford G. Holderness, Joint ownership and alienability, 23 INT. REV. LAW ECON. 75 (2003) (dividing all possible regimes for jointly holding property into four classes); for an analysis of the legal regime of joint ownership of copyright moral rights, see Peter H. Karlen, Joint Ownership of Moral Rights Part I, 38 J. COPYR. SOC. USA 242 (1990).
35 The dichotomy between ‘certainty of rights’ and ‘certainty of transactions’ has been explored thoroughly in German legal scholarship; seminally see Victor Ehrenberg, Rechtssicherheit und Verkehrssicherheit, 47 JHERINGS JAHRBB. 273 (1904); for a common law perspective see Mitchell Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La Possession Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REV. 589 (1931).
faced when elaborating principles to adjudicate conflicts stemming from transfers of title by non-owners (tradtio a non domino); with the crucial distinction that a licensee in this position cannot acquire material and exclusive control of the subject matter of a license due to its intangible nature but merely venture to perform activities falling within the scope of the improperly licensed IP.

In principle, there is an ample spectrum of possible solutions. At one end, unreserved protection of the property rights of the non-consenting joint-owner, directing the licensee to take action against their injudicious licensor; at the other, unexempted upholding of the granted license, eroding the breadth of the proprietary right of the nonconsenting joint-owners and granting them recourse against the licensors. Amid these extremes lie a multitude of intermediate solutions, allowing for exceptions in scenarios where, for example, the non-consenting joint-owner failed to act promptly, the licensee was misled, the license was not granted for value, or the licensee had knowledge of the existence of the joint-owners.

Faced with such a broad variety of possibly normative solutions, it is submitted that a two-stage decision-making process would be apt to steer Member States towards a consensus. At the outset, a fundamental decision would be required, deliberating whether the interest of the licensee or that of the non-consenting co-owner should be favored, as a general rule. This would be followed by the careful integration of exceptions aimed at mitigating the inflexibility that would otherwise flow from an unrestricted application of the adopted general norm. These choices would greatly benefit from a law and economics approach of the alternatives under consideration, coupled with a comparative assessment of the positive law in force across different jurisdictions.

Interestingly, the licensing of jointly-owned IP rights furnishes a felicitous example of the type of issue that would be at the heart of a broadly-scoped Project. Member States, fueled by

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37 See Mary-Rose McGuire, Intellectual Property Rights: ‘Property’ or ‘Right’? The Application of the Transfer Rules to Intellectual Property, in Rules for the Transfer of Movables: A Candidate for European Harmonisation or National Reforms? 217–236 (Wolfgang Faber & Wolfgang Faber eds., 2009); Alice Haemmerli, Why Doctrine Matters: Patent and Copyright Licensing and the Meaning of Ownership in Federal Context, 30 Colum. J. Arts 1 (providing a primer of the bona fide purchaser rules applicable to copyright and patent assignments in the United States and hypothesising their applicability to licenses). Interestingly, the Italian Copyright Statute, Law No. 63 of Apr. 22, 1941 [hereinafter Italian Copyright Law], article 167 appears to draw an analogy between the legal positions of a good faith purchaser in possession and that of a person who exercises copyright de facto; see Ubertazzi, supra note 9 commentary to article 167 Italian Copyright law.

38 These are some of the factors most typically considered by national legislations when dealing with the conflict between a dispossessed owner and a good faith purchaser; see generally Dari-Mattiacci and Guarriero, supra note 36 (providing a law and economics analysis); Sacco, supra note 36 (for a comparative approach in the context of international sales); Salomons, supra note 36 (for a normative approach to the conundrum of bona fide purchasers vis-a-vis unlawfully dispossessed owners).
frustration with present levels of national fragmentation and international disharmony, might find a unitary approach to this matter singularly palatable.

B. Pre-contractual negotiations

Private law has traditionally taken a keen interest in pre-contractual negotiations, yet the approaches adopted vary markedly, both methodologically and substantively, across jurisdictions. Historically, IP legislation has not introduced special rules for the negotiations of license contracts; even in legal orders with a propensity to scrutinize negotiations closely, IP law has not strayed from the general contract law regime.

In the past, IP license negotiations predominantly took place either between businesses, or individual IP rights holders and businesses. These transactions were largely domestic, featured grants over a small number of IP rights, and involved a linear compensation structure; typically, such agreements were preceded by interactions of limited profundity that involved insubstantial exchanges of information.

Over the past fifty years, the landscape of IP license negotiations has evolved. In the high-volume, low-value market segment, the mass distribution of digital products and services has

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irreversibly brought consumers into the factual matrix of IP license negotiations;\textsuperscript{42} the feverish propagation of the internet of things will further promulgate this trend, as sales contracts for tangible goods will be increasingly coupled with grants of licenses over the associated IP.\textsuperscript{43} In the low-volume, high-value market segment, international licensing and cross-licensing deals of entire IP portfolios have acquired substantial strategic significance. Parties’ interactions preceding these transactions involve exchanges of large quantities of information, and can give rise to confidentiality issues.\textsuperscript{44}

In recent past, European jurisdictions have begun to recalibrate their consumer protection legislation to address this new environment, also reviewing pre-contractual interactions preceding IP licenses.\textsuperscript{45} Concurrently, academics have begun to query more insistently whether extant private law rules possess sufficient elasticity to accommodate these developments.\textsuperscript{46}

Thus, the Project may consider whether the legal framework of IP licenses might benefit from special rules governing pre-contractual negotiations. It is submitted that this determination would be buttressed by a decision-making process divided into two logically-distinct stages. In the first, it would be for Member States to ascertain the existence of untoward conduct patterns during negotiations of IP licenses that are inadequately regulated by typical private law safeguards; for example, especially uneven bargaining positions or idiosyncratic information


\textsuperscript{45} The European Union has been leading the way on this particular front; see \textbf{HANS SCHULTE-NÖLKE, CHRISTIAN TWIGG-FLESNER & MARTIN EBERS, EC CONSUMER LAW COMPENDIUM: THE CONSUMER ACQUIS AND ITS TRANPOSITION IN THE MEMBER STATES} (2008) (for a comparative European law primer); \textbf{STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EU CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY} (2013) (for a systematic analysis of European Union consumer law); Peter Cartwright, \textit{Redress compliance and choice: Enhanced Consumer Measures and the retreat from punishment in the Consumer Rights Act 2015}, 75 CAMB. LAW J. 271 (2016) (examining recent UK law reforms).

asynchronies that fundamentally skew the balance of the ensuing agreement, encouraging rent seeking and engendering market failures.47 If this enquiry were unanimously answered in the affirmative, the subsequent step would be to identify normative interventions capable of remedying these mischiefs and ultimately, a selection of the preferable options.48

Notably, the scope of the Project would markedly affect the palatability of a set of special rules governing negotiations of IP licenses. If its remit were broad, both in terms of relevant areas of the law and license types, the magnitude and diversity of the subject matter under consideration would render the recognition of common issues challenging. A wide range of transactions would need to be parsed, alongside extensive empirical evidence from an array of subjects and economic sectors. In similar vein, the divergences that exist between the legal approaches adopted across jurisdictions to regulate negotiations would render agreement on the substantive rules to be adopted by the Project arduous to achieve.

If the scope of Project were narrow, the aforementioned difficulties would be markedly reduced. Analyzing a subset of transaction archetypes would simplify the task of identifying legal wrongs and the agreement of substantive rules to resolve them. However, it should be noted that introducing special rules that only regulate negotiations of a small group of IP licenses would carry a hefty price for systemic fragmentation.

C. Formation

Contract formation is shaped by private law tenets. Though there are differences between common and civil law systems, a degree of conceptual uniformity does pervade across jurisdictions.49 IP law establishes but few exceptions to this body of rules, otherwise conforming to it unreservedly.50


48 For example, in the United States, in the limited context of software licenses, the American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02(c) (2009) [henceforth ALI Software Contracts Principles] have suggested that information disclosure obligations should be imposed on licensors. The merits of this approach have been the object of a lively debate, see Robert A. Hillman & Maureen A. O’Rourke, Principles of the Law of Software Contracts: Some Highlights, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1519 (2009) (for a general overview of the ALI Software Contracts Principles); Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O’Rourke, Defending Disclosure in Software Licensing, UNIV. CHIC. LAW REV. 95 (2011) (lending support to the approach of the ALI Software Contracts Principles); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI’s” Principles of the Law of Software Contracts “, UNIV. CHIC. L. REV. 165 (2011) (raising doubts on the efficacy of precontractual disclosure in online contacts, and suggesting alternative approaches); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The failure of mandated disclosure, UNIV. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011) (criticizing the efficacy of precontractual disclosure); Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Troszen, supra note 43 (suggesting that precontractual disclosures have limited efficacy, based on empirical evidence). See infra part II.C.2.


50 See NIMMER AND DODD, supra note 8 at Ch 3 (for United States law); Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9 (for a comparative study of copyright laws in Europe).
In this brief contribution, it is not possible to conduct an exhaustive inquiry into all facets of the formation of IP license contracts that Member States could explore. The following analysis will concentrate on two topics: consent in standard form IP license agreements and form requirements. The former involves exploring a thorny intersection between IP law and contract law, and affords the opportunity to revisit a well-trodden issue with fresh eyes. By contrast, form requirements present legislative policy challenges in the broader context of international harmonization.

1. Consent: standard form IP contracts

Consent\(^{51}\) lies at the heart of modern contract law theory.\(^{52}\) In the eyes of the law, an agreement is binding only if the parties have assented\(^{53}\) to its terms and thus their minds are \textit{ad idem}. Private law establishes the criteria pursuant to which the presence of consent is ascertained.\(^{54}\) Historically, IP law has not sought to depart from these general rules.

Over the course of the 20\(^{th}\) century, standard form contracts have permeated almost every facet of commerce.\(^{55}\) In the realm of IP, this trend has been especially apparent in the technology sector.\(^{56}\) Among legal scholars, one long-held thesis contends that standard form contracts sit

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\(^{51}\) Since the times of Aristotle, consent is seen as a combination of knowledge and reasonable alternatives see KE NNETH A. TELFORD, COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS III, 1 (2013).

\(^{52}\) Despite growing in importance in the late empire, consent was not at the heart Roman contract law; see REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 560–565 (1990) (observing, however, that most “individual parts” of modern contract law theory were present in the Corpus Juris Civilis); DAVID J. IBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 7–10, 71–76, 130–135 (2001). The idea of consent as the cardinal element of a contract flourished with natural lawyers, see Samuel Pufendorf, On the general duties of humanity, III in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF SAMUEL PU FENDORF , 166 (Craig L. Carr ed., Michael J. Seidler tran., 1994) (“But the things which I owe another from pacts and agreements, these I owe for the reason that he has acquired a new right against me from my own consent.”); JEAN DOMAT, LES LOIX CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL; LE DROIT PUBLIC, ET LEGUM DELECTUS, livre preliminaire, introduction (1777); POTHIER, supra note 2 at 17. On consent in modern contract law theory, see generally AW Brian Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth-Century Contract Law, 91 LAW Q. REV. 247 (1975) (detailing the historical evolution of consent in English law during the 19th century); PATRICK S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981) (for a modern English law perspective); JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1993) (for a philosophical analysis); Joseph M. Perillo, The origins of the objective theory of contract formation and interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (2000) (providing the biography of this notion in United States contract law); Brian Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT 251 (Franklin Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010).

\(^{53}\) The words “consent” and “assent” are used synonymously throughout this paragraph.

\(^{54}\) For a comparative overview of both common and civil law jurisdictions see FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 50. For an overview of the approaches to ascertaining consent in European civil law jurisdictions see D.C.F.R, supra note 40 at Art II. – 4:102; Timothy A.O. Endicott, Objectivity, Subjectivity, and Incomplete Agreements, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 151–171 (2000) (for an English law perspective); Perillo, supra note 52 (for the United States perspective).


\(^{56}\) Focusing specifically on IP standard form contracts, see generally Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A brief defense of mass market software license agreements, 22 R UTGERS COMPUT. TECH LJ 335 (1996); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-form contracting in the electronic age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002); Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743 (2002); Elizabeth
uneasily with the consent paradigm as formulated by classical contract law theory.\textsuperscript{57} This submission has its roots in the empirical observation that offerees generally do not read the terms of standard form contracts and offerors do not expect them to do so.\textsuperscript{58} From this premise, proponents of this view posit that offerees cannot be held to have consented to undertakings the content of which was unknown to them\textsuperscript{59} and conclude that standard form contracts are unenforceable.\textsuperscript{60}

Though lingering notes of discontent have continued to chime,\textsuperscript{61} the largely prevailing stance among courts and commentators internationally is that standard form contracts are binding.\textsuperscript{62} Two submissions are advanced in support of this conclusion. The first is that offerees who “manifest” their assent to be legally bound by the terms of a standard form contract are deemed to have consented from an objective perspective, even if they failed to read them in fact.\textsuperscript{63} The second submission is that offerees who accept a standard form contract are deemed to have given “a blanket assent … to any not unreasonable or indecent terms … which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.”\textsuperscript{64}

This debate has resurfaced with renewed fervor in respect of IP licenses, owing to the widespread use of “shrinkwrap” “clickwrap” and “browsewrap” standard forms for these agreements (henceforth: Wrap Licenses).\textsuperscript{65} Legal scholars have emphasized that the


\textsuperscript{57} See seminally Edwin W. Patterson, *The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts,* 64 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 833 (1964) (who imported into American scholarship both the qualified “adhesion” and the notion that these contracts require special rules of interpretation owing to their peculiar formation process); Kessler, supra note 56 (denouncing form contracts as affording private parties de facto law-making powers and warning that American contract law lacked the doctrinal tools to regulate them).


\textsuperscript{59} This argument bears the influence of subject consent theory; see Perillo, supra note 52 at 429–432; Randy E. Barnett, *Consenting to form contracts,* 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 629–630 (2002).

\textsuperscript{60} For a detailed explanation of this argument see Barnett, supra note 59 at 628–629; Perillo, supra note 52.

\textsuperscript{61} An example is found in Rakoff, supra note 58 (highlighting that conceptual infrastructure of general contract law struggles to accommodate comfortably the realities of standard form contracts).


\textsuperscript{63} See Barnett, supra note 59 at 634–636; Bix, supra note 52 at 264–265. Seminally on the notion of “manifest” consent JUDAH PHILIP BENJAMIN, *A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY: WITH REFERENCE TO THE FRENCH CODE AND CIVIL LAW* 357–358 (1868).


\textsuperscript{65} There is no longer reason to treat these three contracts as distinct archetypes, as in current online practice they have become a single model; see Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, *From Lord Coke to Internet Privacy: The Past, Present, and Future of the Law of Electronic Contracting,* 72 MD L. REV 452 (2012) (who cogently argue that differences between these types of licenses have disappeared). For a thorough analysis of Wrap Licenses see Michelle Garcia, *Browsewrap: A Unique Solution to the Slippery Slope of the Clickwrap
idiosyncratic formation process of Wrap Licenses greatly magnifies the consent dilemma afflicting traditional standard form contracts. Moreover, they observe that the terms of these agreements are especially problematic, as they confer far-reaching rights to the offeror that are often entirely unanticipated by the offeree and raise grave systemic concerns. These scholars question whether traditional theses designed for paper standard form contracts can be adapted to accommodate Wrap licenses adequately; nevertheless, they ultimately agree that the presence of consent in these agreements cannot be called into question. Despite this, proponents of this view strongly advocate the introduction of special rules either regulating pre-contractual negotiations preceding these contracts or their substance, especially if consumers are involved.

The law governing Wrap Licenses is in a state of flux across jurisdictions. In some, courts do not admit challenges to their enforceability based on a lack of consent, only timidly contemplating the possibility of invalidating individual terms, based on doctrines governing substantive fairness. In others, Wrap Licenses can be successfully challenged judicially for lack of consent and the substance of the stipulations therein can be questioned penetratingly.

66 See generally Batya Goodman, *Honey, I shrink-wrapped the consumer: the shrink-wrap agreement as an adhesion contract*, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319 (1999) (ultimately holding that shrinkwrap licenses are adequately governed by the framework for contracts of adhesion); Richard H. Stern, *Shrink-wrap licenses of mass marketed software: enforceable contracts or whistling in the dark*, 11 RUTGERS COMPUT. TECH L.J 51 (1985) (describing as “unsettling” the notion that opening a package manifest consent to terms inside of it); Katy Hull, *The Overlooked Concern with the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act*, 51 HASTINGS L.J 1391 (1999) (emphasizing how all these contract forms place offerees in a “take-it-or-leave-it” predicament); Kim, * supra* note 66 at 35–87 (providing an extensive account of the history and development of these licenses); Mark A. Lemley, *Intellectual property and shrinkwrap licenses, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1994) (providing a map of the conceptual problems raised by these licenses). For a European perspective see N. Helberger et al., *Digital Content Contracts for Consumers*, 36 J. CONSUMER POLICY 37 (2013); Lucie Guibault, *Copyright limitations and contracts: are click-wrap licenses valid?* 2 Journal of Digital Property Law 144 (2002).


68 For a comprehensive analysis of the case law in the United States see NIMMER AND DODD, * supra* note 8 §§ 3:32-3:34.

69 See * supra* note 47 on the pre-contractual disclosure for digital, standard form IP licenses; on substantive controls on the terms of IP licenses see infra Part II.D.

70 Following initial uncertainties, this is the position in the United States, see NIMMER AND DODD, * supra* note 8 § 3:33 (providing a detailed analysis of the relevant judicial authorities).

The resulting international legal framework for these IP licenses is piecemeal and riddled with uncertainty. This is particularly problematic at a time when standard form terms are offered to a global audience of potential licensees over the internet at an ever-accelerating pace and in an increasing number of sectors.

The Project might consider addressing this contentious matter. It is submitted that it would be for Member States to initially agree whether standard form IP licenses are capable of being vitiated by a lack of consent that undermines their enforceability. If such a concern were unanimously shared by Member States, the circumstances in which acceptance of a standard form IP license gives rise to concerns regarding the consent of the licensee would have to be defined precisely; for example, it could be agreed that this is only the case if the license is entered into remotely and a consumer were involved. The final step would be for Member States to elaborate substantive rules to address the aforementioned deficit of consent.

Notably, the scope of the Project would once more be of decisive importance in shaping this discussion. Though imperfect assent beleaguers Wrap licenses generally, the intensity of this issue varies markedly depending on the subjects involved in the transaction and the type of IP licensed.

2. Form requirements

Private law establishes tenets that govern form requirements for all contracts. IP law commonly provides supplementary rules for assignments, licenses and other contractual dealings.

The intersection of these two normative streams produces a markedly different landscape across jurisdictions. In some, strict and onerous formalities are required: IP contracts are void unless in writing and signed. In others, form requirements are entirely absent. In others still, formalities are only required ad probationem. License agreements for different IP rights are

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72 Form requirements were paramount in ancient legal cultures and Roman law, see ZIMMERMANN, supra note 52 at 546–549. Over the centuries, however, mandatory formalities have become exceptional in nature, yielding to the principle that parties are free to choose the expression they prefer for their agreement. For a primer on form requirements in European contract law see D.C.F.R, supra note 40 at Art II. – 4:101 (as a general rule there are no form requirements, yet most jurisdictions contemplate exceptions for special contracts). For an Anglo-American perspective, see generally Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39 (1974); Eric Posner, The decline of formality in contract law, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 61–77 (Frank Buckley ed., 1999); Patrick S. Atiyah & Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law a Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions, (1987).

73 See generally Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9 § 3.3 (providing an overview of the European landscape); NIMMER AND DODD, supra note 8 §§ 3:44-3:49 (offering a primer of the law in the United States).

74 For example, this is the case in the United Kingdom for patent (section 30 UK PA), trademarks (section 28 United Kingdom Trade Marks Act 1994) [henceforth UK TMA], and copyright licenses (sections 92, 101A CDPA). The same is true in Spain for patent article 74 Ley Nº 24/2015, de 24 de julio, de Patentes [henceforth Spanish Patent law], and article 46 of Ley Nº 17/2001, de 7 de diciembre de 2001, de Marcas [henceforth Spanish Trademarks law]; notably, registration in the patent registered is contingent on the license being in the form of a deed under article 74 Spanish Patent law.

75 This is the case in Austria, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden; see Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9 § 4.1.3.

76 For example, this is the case in Belgium (Article XI.167 Belgian Code of Economic Law), Italy (article 110 Italian Copyright Law) and Luxembourg (Article 12 Loi du 18 avril 2001 sur les droits d'auteur, les droits voisins et les bases de données) [henceforth Luxembourg Copyright and Related Rights Act]
often subject to contrasting form requirements within the same jurisdiction. Additionally, a veritable cacophony of rules, regulations and standards surround electronic documents and signatures.

This cacophony can be explained by the profoundly conflicting attitudes that exist towards form requirements internationally, both in contract law and IP law. Regardless, legal scholars have been unequivocal in denouncing the extant legal framework for its high transactional costs and legal uncertainty.

The Project should consider recommending a uniform legal regime for the form requirements for IP license agreements, to promote international harmonization. Member States would undertake to seek equilibrium between two polarized impulses. At one extreme, the impetus to expedite contract formation and reduce transaction costs by minimizing form requirements. At the other, the desire to increase legal certainty and foster transparency by imposing formalities that require extensive disclosure of sensitive information.

It is submitted that this balancing assessment and ensuing policy decision would be best informed by a comparative appraisal of the current state of the law across multiple jurisdictions and empirical data collected from stakeholders. Notably, the scale and complexity of this inquiry would differ substantially depending on the scope of the Project.

D. Content: rights and obligations of the licensor and licensee

It is a widely-accepted principle that persons can freely decide whether to enter into a contract, with whom and under which terms. Nevertheless, the content of the synallagmatic nexus agreed by the parties does not exist in a vacuum but is rather affected by two distinct categories of legal rules.

77 For example, in the United States exclusive licenses must be in writing, while non-exclusive licenses do not; see generally NIMMER AND NIMMER, supra note 32 § 10.03; NIMMER AND DODD, supra note 8 §§ 3:44-3:49, 5:59; it should be noted however that written form is relevant for non-exclusive copyright licenses to resolve priority disputes under 17 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2010). In the Netherlands copyright licenses need not be in writing, while a written instrument is required for a license of neighboring rights (article 9 of the Act of March 18, 1993, containing Rules on the Protection of Performers, Phonogram Producers and Broadcasting Organizations and Amending the Copyright Act 1912) [henceforth Dutch Neighboring Right Act]. In France articles L131-2, L-132-7, L212-3 Code de la propriété intellectuelle (version consolidée au 17 mars 2017) [henceforth French Intellectual Property Code] establish variable set of formalities for copyright related contracts. See generally Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9 §§ 4.2.3, 4.3.3.

78 This an area in which the United States benefits from a degree of clarity from The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign) 15 U.S.C. 96; on this statute see generally Robert A. Wittie & Jane K. Winn, Electronic Records and Signatures under the Federal E-SIGN Legislation and the UETA, BUS. LAWYER 293 (2000) (providing an analysis of this statutory instrument). Across the world, however, there is substantial disharmony. See generally Donnie L. Kidd Jr & William H. Daughtrey Jr, Adapting contract law to accommodate electronic contracts: Overview and suggestions, 26 RUTGERS COMPUT. TECH L.J. 215 (1999) (suggesting that often adapting existing contract law doctrines is sufficient to accommodate the needs of electronic transactions).

79 See Brennan and Dodd, supra note 15 at 258, 264.


81 See generally Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and paternalist motives in contract and tort law, with special reference to compulsory terms and unequal bargaining power, 41 MD. L. REV.563 (1981) (discussing how the dividing line between mandatory and default rules might, in practice, become blurred).
The first are mandatory rules (henceforth MRs). MRs curtail party autonomy by imposing non-derogable rights and obligations on contracting parties; they are typically either prescriptive or proscriptive in nature. The second category consists of default rules (henceforth DRs). DRs establish rights and obligations that apply to the contracting parties only in so far as they have not agreed otherwise; the defining feature of these rules is that they are presumptive. Both MRs and DRs can originate from many branches of the law and express a broad range of policy concerns; some apply to all contracts homogenously, while others only extend to contracts with determinate features.

Parties who stipulate IP licenses are subject to MRs and DRs that apply to all binding pacts generally. Their agreement is also influenced by MRs and DRs specific to these contracts; the latter group of rules stems primarily from IP laws, yet can also emerge from other branches of the law such as competition law and consumer law. A comparative analysis of the rules impacting the content of IP licenses reveals marked differences in their prevalence, substance and intensity across jurisdictions. Notably, disharmony is most pronounced in relation to copyright licenses.

With regard to MRs, some jurisdictions establish a thicket of rules that severely limit the freedom of the parties to architect their own agreement. Others contemplate but few MRs of proscriptive nature, allowing ample space for the parties’ contractual creativity. These conflicting approaches are an external manifestation of the degree of proclivity of the legal order in question to encroach on private transactions and, more generally, the value attributed to freedom of contract. By contrast, across jurisdictions there is a relative paucity of DRs specifically addressing IP licenses; when they are present, they tend to address matters of secondary importance. Notable in its absence is a discernible systemic approach.

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82 These are sometimes alternatively referred to as “immutable” or “coercive”.
83 In this paragraph, the expression “freedom of contract” and “party autonomy” are used as synonymy.
84 See Kennedy, supra note 81 at 595–596; Philippe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal restrictions on private contracts can enhance efficiency, 6 J. LAW ECON. ORGAN. 381 (1990) (arguing that certain mandatory rules can enhance efficiency).
85 These are sometimes alternatively referred to as “non-mandatory”, “presumptive” or “terms implied in law”.
87 For a systemic map of mandatory rules Storme, supra note 86 at 239–247; for a systemic European perspective see Martijn W. Hesselink, Non-Mandatory Rules in European Contract Law, 1 EUR. REV. CONTRACT LAW 44 (2005).
88 For an exhaustive analysis of this topic see Paul Katzenberger, Protection of the author as the weaker party to a contract under international copyright contract law, 19 IIC 731 (1988); for a comparative analysis between the United States and select law jurisdictions see Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS ENT LJ 1 (1994).
89 In the United States, the most notable attempts fill this lacuna are Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) and the ALI Software Contract Principles. On UCITA and its troubled history see generally Amelia H. Boss, Taking UCITA on the Road: What Lessons Have We Learned Symposium - Information and Electronic Commerce Law: Comparative Perspectives, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIV. L. REV. 167 (2001); Nim Razook, The Politics and Promise of UCITA Legal Issues Facing Corporations, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 643 (2002). On the ALI Software Contract Principles see generally Hillman and O’Rourke, supra note 49; Juliet M. Moringello &
It is almost a foregone conclusion that Member States would devote significant attention to the consideration of possible MRs and DRs that would affect the content of IP license agreements. Negotiations would likely be challenging, owing to the substantially different approaches that exist at national level. Though MRs and DRs combine to create unitary body of rules, it is submitted that Member States would benefit from considering them separately, owing to the profound ontological and functional differences that characterize these two categories of rules.

1. Decision-making process for mandatory rules

In principle, there are two bases of adoption for a MR: protection of an interest of either one or both the contracting parties; and protection of an interest of persons not privy to this contract: society at large or a segment thereof. Crucially, the threshold of adoption is high: the interest under consideration must be deemed of such systemic importance as to warrant the introduction of a non-derogable rule that either restricts or completely precludes the parties’ autonomy to dispose of it contractually.

A cursory comparative analysis reveals that MRs applicable to all contracts typically protect general interests such as legality, the integrity of consent, and reliance.90 By contrast, MRs that apply to determinate contracts safeguard interests that are vital to their context of application. In the realm of copyright, MRs that nullify any attempt of an author to assign or license their moral rights are a revelatory example of an intervention aimed at protecting an interest deemed to be of critical importance.91

Thus, in developing MRs, it would be for Member States to define first which of the types of interests described above the Project should seek to protect when regulating IP license contracts, and their respective order of priority. This discussion would involve legal, political, social, and economic considerations. It should, however, be shaped by the observation that the function of MRs is to protect interests deemed systemically significant rather than reduce minor legal or economic inefficiencies. Thereafter, Member States should dissect the structure of IP license agreements to ascertain which segments lend themselves to stipulations capable of undermining those interests that have been identified as worthy of protection if left entirely to unrestricted party autonomy.

Any excursion that sought to venture beyond methodological observations would be premature if conducted prior to deliberations establishing which interests Member States wish to shield from absolute freedom of contract, and their respective order of priority. Nevertheless, based on a comparative analysis of IP-specific MRs most frequently encountered across jurisdictions, it is submitted that the following are examples of types of norms that Member States might consider: limitations to the breadth and depth of the license grant that the parties can agree,92 a standard of conduct in performance for the rights and obligations stipulated under the IP contract.


90 For a detailed analysis see Storme, supra note 86 at 244–251.


92 For example, in many European jurisdictions, copyright laws contain MRs limiting the licensing of future rights, for a comparative analysis see Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9.
license, a warranty regarding the quality and title of the licensed IP right, and restrictions on terms the effect of which is to magnify the scope of protection of the licensed IP right beyond statutory confines.

2. Decision-making process for default rules

The bases for the adoption of DRs are a highly contentious topic, which has spawned vivacious discussions and vast literature. Legal scholars, philosophers and economists are deeply divided with regard to the policy aims that should inform these rules. The most widely-supported theory is that DRs should promote economic efficiency; among its proponents, however, there is marked disagreement concerning the manner in which these norms should achieve this objective. Alternative views have been posited, including suggestions that DRs should be grounded in the customs, usages and practices of the parties’ community (henceforth Conventionalism), formalities, the consent of the contracting parties or morality. Recently, two further foundations for DRs have been proposed: the history of the legal order in question and its constitution.

In light of such profoundly diverging stances, Member States would face a schismatic decision in electing the bases of adoption for the DRs to be included in Project. One possibility might

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93 For example, many European jurisdictions contain a general MR that applies to all contract, requiring parties to perform their contract in good faith; for a comparative European analysis see REINHARD ZIMMERMANN & SIMON WHITTAKER, GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (2000) (providing both a theoretical analysis and case studies). In similar vein, albeit with substantial differences, the Uniform Commercial Code establishes a duty to perform contracts in good faith, see generally Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, VA. L. REV. 195 (1968); Atiyah and Summers, supra note 72; Steven J. Burton, Breach of contract and the common law duty to perform in good faith, HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980); Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1981). Notably, the ALI Principles of Software Contracts chose to retain the general UCC obligation to perform contractual obligations in good faith; for commentary see Hillman and O’Rourke, supra note 48 at 1533–1534 (providing an overview of this issue).

94 For example, see ALI Software Contracts Principles § 3.05b; for a detailed commentary Hillman and O’Rourke, supra note 49 at 1534–1535; NIMMER AND DODD, supra note 8 §§ 8.5-8.30.


96 The bibliography on this topic is vast. See generally Ayres and Gertner, supra note 86 (arguing that in specific situations, it is efficient to impose a penalty default rule to discourage strategic information withholding); Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA ST UL REV. 563 (2005) (arguing that penalty default rules don’t exist).

97 For an overview of the theories that have been advanced over the course of time see Craswell, supra note 86 § 3; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 434 (1992) (for an explanation of the ‘Majoritarian’ or ‘Market-Mimicking’ thesis); Ayres and Gertner, supra note 86 (for the ‘Information-Forcing’ or ‘Penalty’ Default Rules thesis).


99 See generally Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and form, 41 COLUMBIA L. REV. 799 (1941) (suggesting that default rules should induce parties to express their intentions in a manner that could be recognized by courts easily).

100 For an explanation of this thesis and a cogent critique, see Christopher A. Riley, Designing default rules in contract law: Consent, conventionalism, and efficiency, 20 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 367, 370–375 (2000).

101 See Burton, supra note 98 (default rules should be based on the coordinating principle of fairness). For a comprehensive bibliography see Craswell, supra note 86 § 12.

be to embrace one of the aforementioned theories. In principle, such a choice would be elegant and offer consistency; in practice, it would be both politically and substantively problematic to realize, as reaching a consensus on the principle to be followed would be wearying. Alternatively, Member States could opt for an “eclectic” method that takes into account multiple bases concurrently.\(^\text{103}\) This strategy would make allowances for a range of views and sensitivities, though it would saddle Member States with the heavy burden of formulating an order of priority among the chosen principles.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the intergovernmental and international nature of the Project would intrinsically simplify this decision-making process. In the ambit of negotiations involving a large number of sovereign entities with profoundly different histories, social norms and traditions, striving to ground DRs in historical, constitutional or moral considerations would be unrealistic. Accordingly, the most viable bases of adoption to be considered by Member States would be economic efficiency and Conventionalism.

\textit{E. Canons\(^{104}\) of interpretation\(^{105}\)}

In every legal system, private law establishes principles and rules of construction that apply to all contracts in every legal system.\(^{106}\) In many jurisdictions, IP law provides ulterior hermeneutical canons that address idiosyncratic aspects of assignments and license agreements.

The ubiquitously-recognized aim of contract construction is to establish the intention of the parties.\(^{107}\) Despite this, there is imperfect alignment between the rules, principles and processes that jurisdictions apply in pursuit of this core objective. \textit{Inter alia}, the extent to which the common intention of the parties is construed subjectively or objectively varies significantly.\(^{108}\)

\(^{103}\) See Riley, \textit{supra note} 91 at 389–390; Hesselink, \textit{supra note} 87 at 69.

\(^{104}\) The words canon is used here to include both rules and principles of interpretation.

\(^{105}\) For present purposes, the words construction and interpretation are used as synonymy. The terminological convention according to which “interpretation” designates the operation to discern meaning, while “construction” identifies process to establish legal effects is not accepted in this paper; see The Restatement Second of Contracts para 200.


\(^{107}\) Generally, see E. Allan Farnsworth, \textit{“Meaning” in the Law of Contracts}, 76 YALE L.J. 939 (1967); Alfred Thompson Denning Baron Denning, \textit{The Discipline of Law} 32–50 (1979), in the United States see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 200 (1981); for a European perspective see D.C.F.R, \textit{supra note} 40 at II. – 8:101 (providing a primer of the canons of interpretation in European jurisdictions).

\(^{108}\) See Vogenerauer, Burrows, and Peel, \textit{supra note} 106 at 124–128 (explaining the underlying theoretical differences and comparing the law in England, France and Germany); D.C.F.R, \textit{supra note} 40 at II-8:101 (for a primer of the different hermeneutical matter in European jurisdictions); Perillo, \textit{supra note} 52 (explaining the
as do the precepts guiding completive interpretation and recourse to good faith as a hermeneutical device. Even where jurisdictions share common principles and rules of construction, their method of application differs. Moreover, while interpretation is a matter of law in some legal orders, it is one of fact in others.

IP law canons of construction for license agreements are supplementary in nature, as they complement the general rules and principles laid out by contract law. Notably, their scope of application varies. Some apply horizontally to licenses regardless of the type of IP involved. For example, there are jurisdictions where a principle has emerged which suggests that both ambiguous and unclear terms in such contracts should be interpreted in favor of the licensor. By contrast, in most jurisdictions, the substantial majority of established IP canons of construction have a narrower scope, confined to agreements that involve a particular form of IP. This is especially apparent in the realm of copyright. For example, in France, Belgium, trajectory of objective interpretation in United States contract law; David McLauchlan, Common Assumptions and Contract Interpretation (1997), 113 LAW Q. REV. 237.


On good faith as an interpretation prism, see classically FRANZ WIEACKER, ZUR RECHTSTHEORETISCHEN PRÄZISIERUNG DES §§ 242 BGB (1956) (who drew an analogy with Papinianus’ conception of the ius honorarium (or ius praetorium) as adiuvandi vel supplendi vel corrigendi iuris civilis). For European perspective see Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker, Good faith in European contract law surveying the legal landscape, in GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 1-25 (Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker eds. 2000); Martijn Hesselink, The Concept of Good Faith, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 619 (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds. 4th edn, 2010). For an EU perspective NORBERT REICH, General principles of EU civil law 189-213 (2013).


See Vogenauer, Burrows, and Peel, supra note 106 at 129–136; BURTON, supra note 97 at 1.

For a thorough explanation of this topic and a comparative analysis across jurisdictions see Vogenauer, Burrows, and Peel, supra note 106 at 129–130; D.C.F.R, supra note 40 at II-8:101 (providing a comparative overview of European jurisdictions).

In the United States, alongside contract law principles of individual states, the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 has also influenced the interpretation of IP licenses; see GOMULKIEWICZ, supra note 9 at 5–6; NIMMER AND DODD, supra note 8 § 4.2.

Notably, in the United States, contract law of individual states typically holds that ambiguous terms must be construed contra proferentem; see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1981). However, this canon is often disregarded in IP licenses following the principle that such stipulations should be construed in favor of the licensor, see GOMULKIEWICZ, supra note 9 at 12–13 analysing this principle of construction and the relevant case law.


Article XI.167 Code de droit économique (version consolidée de 2016) [henceforth Belgian Code of Economic Law].
Luxemburg and Spain, ambiguous terms must be interpreted in favor of the author (in dubio pro autore). In France, Belgium and, to a lesser degree, the United States the scope of copyright licenses is interpreted strictly and limited to the rights expressly mentioned in the agreement. Germany, Greece and Italy have established a construction rule according to which the scope of copyright licenses must be determined in light of the purpose of the transaction. In Hungary, licenses to produce a copyright-protected work are construed generously to include permission to distribute copies if stipulations on this matter are unclear. Conversely, there are also jurisdictions in which no such special canons of construction have emerged for IP license contracts and general contract law principles and rules of construction apply almost unwaveringly.

Thus, the legal framework governing the interpretation of IP license agreements displays a distinct lack of uniformity at an international level. To some extent, this can be overcome by way of dexterous drafting and by taking advantage of choice of law rules, yet this can be a source of costly uncertainty.

The Project may consider exploring this nuanced facet of the legal framework governing IP licenses. It would be for Member States to develop bespoke hermeneutical rules and principles

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117 Article 12 Luxembourg Copyright and Related Rights Act.
118 Articles 43, 76 Texto refundido de la Ley de Propiedad Intelectual, regularizando, aclarando y armonizando las Disposiciones Legales Vigentes sobre la Materia (aprobado por el Real Decreto legislativo Nº 1/1996 de 12 de abril, y modificado hasta la Ley Nº 12/2017, de 3 de julio de 2017) [henceforth Spanish Copyright Law].
119 On this principle of interpretation, see generally Strowel and Vanbrabant, supra note 9 at 40; Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9 §§ 4.2.6, 4.3.6, 4.7.6 for a detailed analysis in France, Belgium and Spain respectively.
120 Article L122-7(4) Code de la propriété intellectuelle (version consolidée au 17 mars 2017) [henceforth French Intellectual Property Code]; notably, the Cour de Cassation Cass. 1re.civ., 30 Sept. 2010, CCE, 2010, comm: 199, held that this interpretation rule is non-derogable for the parties
121 Article XI.167 Belgian Code of Economic Law; see generally Alain Strowel, Belgium, 1 in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (Melville B. Nimmer & Paul E. Geller eds., 1999).
122 This canon of construction stems from 17 USC § 201(d)(2) (1978). Ginsburg, supra note 6. However, commentators have observed that United States courts have not always adopted a consistent approach to the interpretation of the scope of copyright licenses; see generally Stacey M. Byrnes, Copyright Licenses, New Technology and Default Rules: Converging Media, Diverging Courts, 20 LOY ENT REV.243 (2000) (suggesting that there are no clearly affirmed rules of construction followed consistently).
123 See § 31 (5) German Copyright Act. For an explanation in English of the Zweckübertragungstheorie, see Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9 § 4.4.6; in German see generally STEFAN SCHWEYER, DIE ZWECKÜBERTRAGUNGSTHEORIE IM URHEBERRECHT (1982).
124 Articles 15(4), 34(1)-(2) Law No. 2121/1993 on Copyright, Related Rights and Cultural Matters (as amended up to Law No. 4281/2014) [henceforth Greek the Copyright Law]; generally see LAMBROS E. KOTSIRIS, GREEK COPYRIGHT LAW (2012); Dionysia Kallinikou, License Contracts, Free Software and Creative Commons in Greece, in FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE (FOSS) AND OTHER ALTERNATIVE LICENSE MODELS 227–234 (Axel Metzeger ed., 2016); GEÖRGIOS KOUMANTOS & IRINI A. STAMATOUDI, GREEK COPYRIGHT LAW (2014).
125 See article 119 Italian Copyright Law; in depth, see ALESSANDRO COGO, I CONTRATTI DI DIRITTO D’AUTORE NELL’ERA DIGITALE 200-220 (2010).
126 According to Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9 §§4.6.4, 4.7.6, this principle of construction appears to also be judicially accepted in Austria, see OGH, 21 March 2000 (Für Katalog und Folder), GRUR Int. 2001/2, p. 186-187. See also: OGH, 23 March 1993 (Corporate Identity Programm), GRUR Int. 1994/08-09, p. 758, and Portugal appears to have progressively followed suit. Interestingly, though Dutch law recognises this canon of construction for copyright assignment contracts it does not extend it to licenses; see generally Frederik W. Grosheide, Dutch Report on individual contracts of authors & performers, 253-281 in ALAI CONFERENCE 1997 MONTEBELLO, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS COWANSVILLE (QUEBEC) (Gildas Roussel ed., 1998).
127 Article 47(4) Act No. LXXVI of 1999 on Copyright (consolidated text of January 1, 2007) [henceforth Hungarian Copyright Act].
128 See generally Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9 § 4.9.6; COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 9 §§5-233-5-240.
that would be conducive to reconstructing the intention of parties to IP licenses. Regrettably, in light of the profoundly diverging national approaches to contract construction generally and IP licenses specifically, it is submitted that agreeing both the approach and substance of such canons would be challenging. Additionally, Member States would face one particularly significant conceptual obstacle: any rule or principle of interpretation developed would need to be compatible or at least not at odds with general contract law canons of interpretation from across a vast number of jurisdictions.

Notably, the scope of Project would decisively affect endeavors addressing canons of construction for IP licenses. If its remit were broad, Members States would face a uniquely demanding challenge, as they would have to elaborate high-level construction principles, focusing on the interpretation of the functional core of IP licenses. If the scope of the Project were narrow, Member States might encounter fewer difficulties in crafting canons of interpretation that methodically target precisely-delimited issues of construction germane to the type of license under consideration.

F. Registration

Registration systems are a staple of most legal orders. Typically, they record information such as the existence of goods deemed to be of elevated socio-economic importance, the identity of persons, both legal and natural, and systemically relevant transactions. Their social, economic and political purposes can be immensely diverse, as can be their legal nature and function.


130 For natural persons, beyond the obvious example of birth registers, it should be noted that registration systems have been instrumental to operating ad hoc legal regimes for special groups of individuals; outlaws registers are a pertinent example Ralph B. Pugh, Early Registers of English Outlaws, 27 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 319 (1983); Jane Y. Chong, Targeting the Twenty-First-Century Outlaw, 122 YALE L.J. 724, 743–750 (2012) (for a schematic and precise historical account).

131 For example, secured transactions registers, see Giuliano G. Castellano, Reforming Non-Possessory Secured Transactions Laws: A New Strategy?, 78 MOD. L. REV. 611 (2015) (for a rich bibliography on secured transactions registers, their systemic function and relevance for law reform); Marek Dubovec, UCC Article 9 Registration System for Latin America, 28 ARIZ J INTL COMP L 117 (2011) (identifying the cardinal elements of the UCC 9 registration system).


133 Even limiting comparisons to IP, the differences in legal nature and function of patents and trademarks international registration systems are stark. For a systematic comparative analysis, see FREDERICK ABBOTT,
IP legislation has a long history of establishing registration systems, tailored to the needs of the intangible goods in question. These systems have not remained static over the course of time, as the policy objectives and legal function attributed to registration have evolved. New registers have been created to accommodate novel forms of intellectual property and technologies, while registers that were once pivotal have been shuttered.

In the 19th and 20th centuries, multilateral conventions both ushered in the creation of international IP registration mechanisms and promoted the harmonization of fundamental aspects of national registers. Notably, these initiatives did not extend to the rules governing the registration of contracts involving IP rights and, thus, the international landscape remains profoundly disjointed. These discrepancies are especially evident when comparing the legal regimes applicable to license agreements. In some jurisdictions, registration of these contracts is optional and purely carries a function of public notice. In others, registration is required for licenses to be effective against third parties and may also serve as a priority

THOMAS COTTIER & FRANCIS GURRY, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 2–3 (3 ed. 2015); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4 ed. 2015).


135 For example, registration systems for plant varieties have been introduced worldwide over the past thirty years, see MARGARET LLEWELYN & MIKE ADOCK, EUROPEAN PLANT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2006) (for the EU legal framework); Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, US Plant Variety Protection: Sound and Fury...?, 39 HOUST. L. REV. 727, 739–745 (2002) (for the United States registration system); S. K. Verma, TRIPS and plant variety protection in developing countries, 17 EUR. INTELLECT. PROP. REV. 281 (1995) (for a comparative international perspective).

136 A pertinent example is the copyright register that used to be held at Stationers’ Hall in England. It ceased to function in its legal capacity in February 2000, after almost three centuries of service. On its history see CYPRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS’ COMPANY. A HISTORY 1403-1959 (1960); JOHN FEATHER, A HISTORY OF BRITISH PUBLISHING (1988); SHERMAN AND BENTLY, supra note 41 at 71, 181, 184. Notably, for a brief time, Stationers’ Hall also served as a “quasi-official” register for trademarks, see TRUEMAN WOOD, THE REGISTRATION OF TRADE MARKS 21-22 (1875).

137 However, the recent WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning Trademark Licenses (available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/marks/835/pub835.pdf) might signal a change of direction.

138 On these international conventions see RICKETSON AND Ginsburg, supra note 12; REINBROTHE AND VON LEWINSKI, supra note 12; VON LEWINSKI, supra note 12; RICKETSON, supra note 12; STAUDER, supra note 12; NELSON, supra note 12; WINNER AND DENBERG, supra note 12; BEIER AND SCHRICKER, supra note 12; MALBON, LAWSON, AND DAVISON, supra note 12; for a recent systemic overview CALBOLI AND WERRA, supra note 12; for critical reflections on the harmonization of substantive IP law in the European Union see PILA AND OHLY, supra note 12.


140 For example, this is the case in the United Stated for patent, trademarks licenses; see 35 USC § 261 (2002); 15 USC § 1060 (2002). Licenses can be recorded for public notice, as detailed in Title 37 — Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights. Copyright Office regulations codified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) – Part 3 (2014).

141 For example, this is the case in the United Kingdom for patents and trademarks licenses under section 33 UK PA and section 25 UK TMA. The same is true in Spain under article 79 Spanish Patent law, and article 46
point in the resolution of conflicts between competing *ayants cause*.\(^{142}\) In others still, registration is required for a licensee to be able to bring actions against infringers.\(^{143}\) Notably, a small number of jurisdictions establish that licenses with defined attributes must be registered to be effective between the parties.\(^{144}\)

Academics, practitioners and international organizations concur that this legislative discord is a source of both uncertainty and elevated transaction costs. Opinions are deeply divided regarding the legal function that should be attributed to the registration of IP contracts generally, and license agreements in particular.

One view is that registration should be required in order for IP licenses to be effective against third parties. The ratio is that documenting these transactions and the associated interests increases legal certainty systematically; moreover, it promotes the commercial exploitation of IP rights, by increasing the amount of information available to the public and facilitating regulatory supervision.\(^{145}\)

A different view is that registration of IP licenses should be optional. Proponents of this thesis suggest that such filings are time-consuming, costly and a source of administrative complications. They suggest that registration often fails to provide reliable information, as parties limit their disclosures or take steps to conceal their identity to keep their dealing confidential. Furthermore, they argue that the negative effects stemming from innocent failure to register IP licenses vastly outweigh the alleged benefits of compulsory registration.\(^{146}\)

The Project should consider formulating recommendations to harmonies this legal framework. It is submitted that conventional thinking is unlikely to garner consensus among Member States, as existing views are profoundly divergent and deeply entrenched. The Project should be mindful of the history of registration systems, yet should strive to look beyond the orthodoxy surrounding this topic. The operation and legal function of IP license registration would have

\(^{142}\) An important distinction needs to be drawn between two different approaches. Some legal systems set the priority point at the time of registration; for example, this the case under articles 138-140 Italian Industrial Property Code. Other jurisdictions establish that the priority point for third party effectiveness is moment when the license agreement was concluded, provided that the agreement in question has been subsequently registered; this is the case under section 33 UK PA and section 25 UK TMA. In the United States, there is no mandatory registration for copyright licenses, both non-exclusive and exclusive; however, under 17 USC § 205 (2010) recording of an exclusive license serves as constructive notice to third parties; moreover, under USC § 205(d) (2010) it is held that between conflicting transferees (including exclusive licensees) a later recorded interest prevails over a prior unrecorded interest, provided that the latter has not been registered within one month after its execution. See generally Nimmer and Dodd, supra note 8 § 5:59.

\(^{143}\) For example, registration is required in Spain, see AIPPI Spain Report 190 available at https://aippi.org/download/committees/190/GR190spain.pdf.


\(^{145}\) This is the view espoused in AIPPI Resolution to Q190, available at http://aippi.org/wp-content/uploads/committees/190/RS190English.pdf.

\(^{146}\) This is the view championed by the International Trademarks Association, as reflected in “Board Resolution: Elimination of Mandatory Trademark License Recording Requirements” available at http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Pages/EliminationofMandatoryTrademarkLicenseRecordingRequirements.aspx.
to be considered prospectively. Crucially, in an increasingly digital economy, transaction-recording systems could be built on decentralized, automated ledgers populated by self-executing contracts. This type of registration system would introduce dynamics and mechanisms that differ profoundly from those associated with paper and electronic registers presently in operation. Legal thinking should not lap erratically at the coat-tails of technological innovation, but rather harness it resolutely to leverage its potential.

G. Private international law: applicable law rules

Domestic legislation establishing private international law rules is typically shaped by international law instruments. In the past, these sources did not dedicate special attention to IP contracts, including licenses; by contrast, in recent times, legislatures, international organizations and legal scholars have reversed this trend, striving to develop the private international law legal framework for these agreements.


148 This paragraph focuses exclusively on private international law rules that are relevant to the law of obligations and IP law. Private international rules regulating branches of the law that are tangential to the Project, such as criminal law, are not considered.


IP licenses are not ontologically transnational. The licensor, licensee, licensed IP rights and contract performance can all be tied to a single jurisdiction and thus subject to its law. Historical sources indicate that the overwhelming majority of transactions adhered to this paradigm throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. However, the past fifty years have heralded a progressive internationalization of these agreements. Increasingly, IP licenses involve parties located in distant jurisdictions, multiple IP rights protected by different States, and cross-border performance. The concurrence of these features breeds conflicts of laws, the disentanglement of which can be laborious.

It is an established private international law tenet that a distinction must be drawn between proprietary and contractual matters when determining the law applicable to IP contracts. Proprietary matters are those that concern the IP right itself, including its existence, validity, scope of protection, duration, whether it can be assigned and licensed, and the registration requirements for these dealings. The orthodox position is that the law applicable to these issues is that of the State protecting the IP right object of the contract (lex loci protectionis); parties are not at liberty to postulate otherwise.

Contractual matters are those that concern the mutual rights and obligations stipulated by the parties and the constituent elements of their agreement, including formation, interpretation, performance, breach, nullity and remedies. It is generally accepted that the law applicable to these facets is that governing the contract (lex contractus). Save for international mandatory provisions, parties can elect for their contract to be governed by their law of choice.

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151 See generally, SEVILLE, supra note 41 (providing insights into copyright licenses); Oren Bracha, United States Copyright, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW 335–372 (Isabella Alexander & H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui eds., 2016) (offering an insight into copyright and licensing in the United States, prior to the twentieth-century).

152 See generally SHERMAN AND BENTLY, supra note 41; SEVILLE, supra note 41; Granstrand and others, supra note 41; Aoki, supra note 41; W. R. Cornish, The International Relations of Intellectual Property, 52 CAMB. L.J. 46 (1993); David, supra note 41.

153 For example, in the United States see (section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts); in the
In the absence of such a designation, *lex contractus* is established pursuant to the presumptive rules of the jurisdiction in question.\(^{159}\) Crucially, this is a source of divergences internationally, as shown by the following examples.

In the United States, private international law rules are established at the federal level.\(^{160}\) Thus, the law applicable to a contract in which the parties have not stipulated a choice-of-law clause is determined pursuant to the rules each individual state. Crucially, states do not share a unitary approach in regulating this issue. A minority of states\(^{161}\) adhere to the *lex loci contractus* rule,\(^{162}\) largely following the principles established in sections 325-326 of the Restatement (First) of Conflicts.\(^{163}\) By contrast, a larger group of states\(^{164}\) have adopted rules that follow section 188 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts.\(^{165}\) This provision establishes that the applicable law to determine the rights and obligations of the parties “with regard to contractual issues” is governed by the law of the state which has “the most significant relationship” with that issue.\(^{166}\) Such a relationship should be assessed taking “into account” the following non-exclusive list of “contacts”: “(a) the place of contracting; (b) the place of negotiation of a contract; (c) the place of performance; (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract; and (e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, as well as place of business of the parties.”\(^{167}\) As a final principle, this section provides that if a contract were negotiated and performed in one state “the local law of this state will usually be applied.”\(^{168}\)

In the European Union, the relevant rules are found in the Rome I Regulation. Art 4(1) establishes fixed rules to ascertain the applicable law for a list of nominate contracts.\(^{169}\) Art...
Article 4(2) holds that the applicable law to all other contract archetypes is that of the country where the party required to effect the characteristic performance has its habitual residence. Art 4(3) completes this provision, establishing an escape route: if the contract manifestly exhibits a “closer connection” with another country, its law will apply. In practice, the intricate nature of modern IP licenses results in the frequent application of the closest connection rule.

In Switzerland, the law applicable to IP contracts is that of the “place of habitual residence” of the transferor or licensor. In Japan, absent a choice-of-law clause agreed by the parties, the law applicable to an IP license agreement is that of the state with which there is the closest connection; however, neither rules nor guidance are supplied for the execution this assessment.

In light of this fragmented international legal framework, the Project may consider examining conflict of law rules applicable to IP license contracts. Member States would indubitably accept axiomatically the principle that proprietary matters are governed by lex loci protectionis, while contractual issues are regulated by the lex contractus. Similarly, they would accept unquestioningly that the parties are free to designate a law of their choosing for their agreement. Attention may instead be gainfully directed to two contentious problems that beset the application of these principles.

First, the Project could elaborate guidelines to streamline and rationalize the process of characterization required to distinguish between matters that are deemed proprietary and those which are deemed contractual in IP license contracts. Though this distinction appears pellucid in theory, its clarity can be fatally wounded in the maws of a complex transaction in practice.

Secondly, Member States could consider developing a special rule for IP license agreements to determine the law governing contractual matters, absent a choice-of-law clause. In this task, they would have the opportunity to benefit from the conceptual arsenal developed by several others.

170 Article 4(4) establishes that the “closer connection” criterion also applies if the applicable law if the applicable law cannot be determined pursuant to either article 4(1) or 4(2).
174 In depth see KONO, supra note 158 at 13.2.2.
175 Historically, UNCITRAL has primarily focused its effort on substantive rules. Nevertheless, in recent past, Member States have shown growing sensitivity towards private international law profiles. For example, see UNCITRAL “Supplement on Security Rights in Intellectual Property” Recommendation 248, Adopted by UNCITRAL in July 2010, Report of UNCITRAL on the work of its forty-third session, A/65/17, para. 227. This was a supplement to the UNCITRAL “Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions”, adopted by UNCITRAL in December 2007, Report of UNCITRAL on the work of its resumed fortieth session, A/62/17 (Part II), paras. 99–100.
176 See Torremans, supra note 150 at 398–402; De Miguel Asensio, supra note 150 at 314–318; Otero García-Castrillón, supra note 153 at 424; KONO, supra note 158 at 11–13 (discussing the issue of characterisation exhaustively).
academic endeavors that have already preceded them on this journey over the past two decades: the American Law Institute (ALI) Intellectual Property Principles,\textsuperscript{177} the European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (CLIP) Principles,\textsuperscript{178} the Korean Private International Law Association (KOPILA) Principles,\textsuperscript{179} the Joint Japanese-Korean (J-K) Principles and the Transparency Proposal.\textsuperscript{180}

Each one of these academic endeavors contains a bespoke provision for the determination of the law applicable to IP contracts bereft of a choice-of-law clause. On the surface, they all accept the closest connection rule as the solution best suited to resolve the private international law conundrum under consideration.\textsuperscript{181} Alas, for the operation of this principle they rely on presumptions and interpretative factors that are not aligned and thus can yield diverging outcomes.\textsuperscript{182}

Ultimately, it would be for Member States to decide whether to espouse one of the approaches developed by any of these academic endeavors or ambitiously attempt to craft an alternative ruleset that bridges the chasms dividing them. It is submitted that this would not be a challenging decision in terms of its process; all attention could be devoted to substantive discussion. Regrettably, it is hard to imagine that consensus would be easily won on a battlefield upon which positions have been entrenched for the past two decades.

Notably, the scope of the Project would decisively influence the approach to the present topic. An applicable law rule for IP licenses would not even be considered if private international law issues were out of scope. Furthermore, if the Project had a narrow scope, the palatability of this topic would be significantly reduced, as the notion of developing an applicable law rule restricted to a sub-group of all IP license agreements would imply increasing fragmentation in an area where harmonization is desired above all.


\textsuperscript{178} PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (CLIP) (2011). For detailed commentary see EUROPEAN MAX PLANCK GROUP ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE CLIP PRINCIPLES AND COMMENTARY (2013).

\textsuperscript{179} PRINCIPLES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY approved by KOPILA on March 26, (2010). For commentary see KONO, supra note 158 at 11–16 (comparing these principles to the Waseda, CLIPs and ALI Principles).

\textsuperscript{180} JOINT PROPOSAL DRAFTED BY MEMBERS OF THE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION OF KOREA AND JAPANESE WASEDA UNIVERSITY GLOBAL COE PROJECT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES (2010). Published in CGOE Quarterly Review of Corporation Law and Society, 112 (2011). See \textit{Id.} at 11–16. (comparing these principles to the CLIPs and ALI Principles); Otero García-Castrillón, supra note 153.

\textsuperscript{181} See section 315(2) ALI Principles, article 3:502 (1) CLIP Principles, article 23.1 Kopila Principles, article 306 (3) Transparency Proposal, and article 20.2 Waseda Principles.

\textsuperscript{182} For a detailed analysis see De Werra, supra note 8 at 332–333; Otero García-Castrillón, supra note 153 at 442–445 (accepting De Werra’s analysis and expanding it).
III. THE FORM OF THE PROJECT

The preceding discussion on scope and substance offers a robust foundation from which to consider the form that the Project might assume and the associated implications.

Over the past fifty years, UNCITRAL has developed and adopted “texts” that can be divided into three distinct form-categories: legislative, contractual and explanatory. The first, UNCITRAL texts in legislative form, are addressed to legislatures and are designed to be adopted by states through the enactment of domestic legislation. The three most common incarnations of UNCITRAL texts in legislative form are: conventions, model laws and legislative guides. The trait that distinguishes them is their manner of interaction with the legal order of states.

If the Project were conceived as a convention, it would be configured as a multilateral instrument establishing a set of binding rules across ratifying states. Its function would be to repeal the rules currently governing IP license agreements at national level, replacing them with an internationally uniform legal regime.

If Member States opted for a model law instead, the Project would be developed as a soft law instrument setting out a “pattern” for a domestic statute. It would serve as a prefabricated template that states could unilaterally inject into their legal orders, according to their own timetable and priorities. Even for states not interested in adopting the entirety of this hypothetical model law, such a document would yield useful points of reference for less ambitious reform interventions.

Alternatively, the Project could take the form of a legislative guide. Such a text would table a reasoned commentary on the legal issues presently affecting IP license agreements, consider alternative normative approaches, and articulate principles and recommendations to overcome them. If the Project were realized as a legislative guide, it would serve as a comprehensive

\[\text{\textsuperscript{183}}\text{ UNCITRAL has also adopted model provisions, albeit infrequently; see for example Provisions on a universal unit of account and on adjustment of the limit of liability in international transport conventions (1982), Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-Seventh Session, Supplement No. 17 and corrigenda (A/37/17 and Corr.1 and 2), para. 63.}\]


\[\text{\textsuperscript{185}}\text{ As described by UNCITRAL at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts_faq.html}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{186}}\text{ Notably UNCITRAL model laws are frequently accompanied by guides to enactment that provide extensive explanatory information. For example, the UNCITRAL Model Laws on Electronic Commerce; the UNCITRAL Electronic Signatures; Cross-Border Insolvency; the UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions were all supported by \textit{ad hoc} guided to enactments.}\]

source of information for states considering legal reform initiatives and facilitate international
harmonization.\textsuperscript{188}

Looking to the second form-category, UNCITRAL texts in contractual form are addressed to
contracting parties, providing them with model contract clauses or special rules.\textsuperscript{189} Texts in this
form rely entirely on party autonomy: they offer model terms or rules that can be directly or
indirectly incorporated into contracts without modifications.

If Member States chose this form for the Project, they would craft model clauses, based on
recognized international best practices, which licensors and licensees could include in their
contracts to govern specific issues.\textsuperscript{190}

The third form-category, UNCITRAL texts in explanatory form, expressly target contracting
parties and aim to provide them actionable indications regarding select international trade law
transactions. Texts in this form typically appear in one of two\textsuperscript{191} possible embodiments: legal
guides or practice guides. The primary difference between them lies in the type of information
that they include.

If the Project were structured as an explanatory legal guide, it would offer a comprehensive
analysis of the negotiation, drafting and performance of IP license agreements based on the
extant legal framework. By contrast, if it were fashioned as a practice guide, the emphasis of
the Project would be on elucidating practical aspects of these transactions, such as detailing
conduct that parties can follow to expedite negotiations and simplify contract performance.

Having reviewed the different forms that can be assumed by UNCITRAL texts, attention can
turn to the process for their selection. Member States are not bound by established rules or a
mandatory procedure; their decision is customarily based on a plethora of considerations that
includes social, political, economic and legal factors. Though any prediction regarding the
dynamics of this decision-making process is necessarily conjectural, one might speculate that
it would break down into two stages.

Member States would be required to choose which form-category would be best suited to the
Project. It is submitted that a rigorous decision-making process would be contingent on two
connected decisions.

First, UNCITRAL texts in legislative form differ ontologically from those in a contractual and
explanatory form. The former are addressed to institutions that hold legislative power. Their
purpose is to inspire law reform across jurisdictions, achieving both amelioration of national

\textsuperscript{188} For example, such a text would follow the steps of Such a project would follow the examples of the
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Parts I and II (2004) available at
Insol-Part3-ebook-E.pdf, the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part IV available at

\textsuperscript{189} A Guide to UNCITRAL Basic facts about the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law para 50,

\textsuperscript{190} For example, such a text would follow the steps of The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976, revised in 2010)

\textsuperscript{191} A third type of explanatory text are interpretative declarations. These instruments provide the official
interpretation of a previously adopted UNCITRAL instrument. To date none have yet been adopted.
legal frameworks and international harmonization. This nature is shared by all incarnations in which UNCITRAL texts in legislative form are expressed, despite the differences in the manners in which they pursue law reform. By contrast, UNCITRAL texts in contractual and explanatory forms accept the existing national legal frameworks and refrain from attempting to amend them. Their purpose is to influence both the manner in which private parties structure and perform their transactions, and how the judiciary approaches their enforcement. The ultimate ambition is to improve and harmonize business practices.

It would be for Member States to appraise where the greater benefit might lie: in an UNCITRAL text addressed to legislatures and focused on legislative reform, or on one directed to private parties and aimed at influencing their market behavior. At first glance, it might be tempting to favor a form-category that does not require legislative reform, owing to the well-documented difficulties associated with such processes. Nevertheless, a Project concentrated on influencing how parties structure and perform their IP licenses might have limited traction due to the varying limitations imposed by national legislations on the initiatives of licensors and licensees. Accordingly, heedful consideration of the intended scope of the Project would be paramount to any discussion on its form.

Secondly, once agreement had been reached on the form-category for the Project, it would be for Member States to assess which incarnation would be best suited for its purposes. If they opted for a text in legislative form, it is submitted that neither a convention nor a model law would be an adequate choice. These instruments do not afford the degree of flexibility that Member States would require to arrive at compromise solutions bridging the divergences that presently characterize the international landscape for IP licensing.

Only a legislative guide would offer the necessary elasticity for a positive outcome. Notably, the legislative recommendations enshrined in instruments of this type are expressed in looser terms than those demanded by the articles of a model law or a convention; similarly, a legislative guide can recommend a range of alternative normative solutions to address contentious policy choices, rather than having to establish a single rule, as is the case in conventions and model laws. A model law, and perhaps even a convention, might follow in the future, but a legislative guide would have to serve as a bridgehead towards consensus.

By contrast, if Member States decided that the Project should not take a legislative form, it is submitted that a text in explanatory form structured as a legal guide would be the preferable option. The rationale is similar to that previously offered in support of a legislative guide. The Project would greatly benefit from assuming a form that allowed for flexibility, favored compromise solutions and offered Member States the opportunity to explain their policy choices in accompanying commentary. Neither a contractual text nor an explanatory practice guide would satisfy these requirements.

IV. CONCLUSION

IP licenses are the leading lady of the information age; the strategic and economic significance of this contract archetype have grown exponentially over the past 40 years. Under this glaring spotlight, it has become progressively more apparent that the legal framework governing these

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transactions is ill-suited to the role that they play in the modern digital environment. As the world becomes ever more connected, the shortcomings of this body of rules will grow ever more apparent, and calls for reform ever louder.

UNCITRAL has been quietly appraising and evaluating the international legal framework governing IP license contracts for the past ten years, with Member States pondering the features that a project in this area of commercial law might assume.

At present, this initiative remains at an early stage of its gestation. In the hope of nurturing its growth, this paper has ventured to explore its possible scope, content and form. The objective has not been to articulate or advocate a single, concrete proposal, but rather to first identify the categories of legal issues that Member States would face in the elaboration of this project, then lend color to the types of decision-making processes required for consensus solutions.

In charting the hypothetical scope of such a project, it was submitted that Member States should assess two legal dimensions coextensively. One would involve electing either to examine all rules governing IP licenses holistically, or to limit the ambit of the analysis to those stemming from predetermined branches of the law. The other would require choosing whether to bring all license types into scope, or merely those with a predetermined set of features.

Subsequently, attention shifted to substance. Select facets of the legal regime governing IP licenses were reviewed, ranging from the norms regulating the licensing of jointly-owned IP rights to the conflict of law rules that apply to these agreements, encountering pre-contractual negotiations, formation, content, contract construction and registration along the way.

Three issues emerged consistently. First, the body of rules governing licenses suffers from a degree of under-elaboration, as the intersections of IP and contract law frequently fail to generate norms that adequately cater to the peculiarities of these transactions. Secondly, national laws governing different types of IP rights establish licensing rules that diverge far more than can be justified by underlying distinctions in the protected immaterial goods. Thirdly, crucial aspects of IP licensing agreements are regulated heterogeneously across jurisdictions, severely hindering international transactions.

Two indications surfaced in the appraisal of the types of decision-making processes that would be conducive to the elaboration of unanimously-agreed solutions. First, the scope of the project would profoundly affect the types of issues confronted by Member States and the range of available normative solutions. Secondly, as Member States would often be addressing issues that arise at the intersection of multiple branches of the law, substantial effort should be devoted to the isolating the conceptual formants of the matters under consideration.

The lattermost element of this inquiry analyzed the possible alternative forms that this project might assume. The three form-categories developed by UNCITRAL for its texts were expounded in turn. It was posited that the main hurdle for Member States to overcome would be reaching a consensus on the angle from which they wish to approach the legal regime for IP license contracts. This issue is one of reform strategy. It would be for Member States to establish whether it would be more palatable to tackle the extant shortcomings of the framework for IP licensing by advocating legal reform, or rather through the development of model license agreements that rely on private law-making.

The preceding analysis provides fertile ground for reflection on potential future developments. It is submitted that the next step to advance the cause of an UNCITRAL project on the law of IP licensing is to articulate a concrete proposal. Ideally, it should be jointly authored by a group
of Member States; alternatively, it could be prepared by NGOs or a group of academics and practitioners, then submitted for the attention of UNCITRAL Member States.

Based on the findings of this paper, such a proposal should be built on two pillars. First, it should incisively delineate a scope that is both precisely defined from a legal perspective, and socio-economically palatable. As this would be UNCITRAL’s first foray into the law of IP licensing, temptations to cast this net too broadly should be resisted staunchly. Crucially, with regard to the areas of the law to be covered, it might be advisable to focus solely on contract law, IP law and international private law; areas such as competition law, consumer law and labor law might be best left aside, owing to the elevated number of additional variables that they would bring to the fore. Equally, it might be advisable to exclude licenses which carry features that are treated in multifarious, manifestly different ways at a national level, as to include them would create difficulties irreconcilable a priori.

Secondly, this proposal should state pellucidly the form-category that this project should assume, and substantiate its choice robustly. Based on the level of disharmony that presently characterizes national legal framework governing IP licenses, a text in legislative form might be the preferable option. It seems unlikely that an explanatory or contractual UNCITRAL initiative would successfully circumvent the obstacles raised by the numerous mandatory rules presently characterizing the law of several jurisdiction.

This proposal should also devote attention to substance. At this stage, it would be adequate to confine discussion to simply identifying the relevant subject matter to be covered within the suggested scope. The aspiration would be to express a level of detail sufficient to describe the key matters that would be covered, yet does not deprive Member States of the necessary maneuvering space during subsequent negotiations.

Finally, as ever in international legal projects of this nature, political will and conviction would be integral to the favorable reception of this proposal by UNCITRAL. Any project seeking to address the law of IP licensing would inevitably encounter thorny negotiations, as it would be impossible to circumvent historically contentious legal postulates. This may at first glance render this project unappealing, particularly for those Member States that may be bruised by past, failed attempts to reform domestic IP licensing laws. Nevertheless, complexity alone should not deter Member States from striking boldly down this path, as the anticipated benefits of a coherent legal regime in this space would by far outweigh the hardships encountered in their pursuit.