Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting

Montero, Maria (2014) Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting. In: Voting Power and Procedures: Essays in Honour of Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. Studies in choice and welfare . Springer, Berlin, pp. 309-321. ISBN 978-3-319-05157-4

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Abstract

This paper discusses whether the equilibrium of a popular formal bargaining model due to Baron and Ferejohn (1989) satisfies the postulates that Felsenthal and Machover (1998) consider essential in any power measure. It is well known that the equilibrium does not satisfy two adequacy postulates, namely ignoring dummies and vanishing only for dummies. This paper shows that it does not respect dominance either. It is also argued that the equilibrium displays one of the less intuitive instances of the paradox of new members.

Item Type: Book Section
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Identification Number: 10.1007/978-3-319-05158-1
Depositing User: Montero, Maria
Date Deposited: 13 Oct 2017 12:35
Last Modified: 14 Oct 2017 09:34
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/47213

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