Complicity without connection or communication

Barr, Abigail and Michailidou, Georgia (2017) Complicity without connection or communication. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 142 . pp. 1-10. ISSN 0167-2681

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Abstract

We use a novel laboratory experiment involving a die rolling task embedded within a coordination game to investigate whether complicity can emerge when decision-making is simultaneous, the potential accomplices are strangers and neither communication nor signaling is possible. Then, by comparing the behavior observed in this original game to that in a variant in which die-roll reporting players are paired with passive players instead of other die-roll reporters, while everything else is held constant, we isolate the effect of having a potential accomplice on the likelihood of an individual acting immorally. We find that complicity can emerge between strangers in the absence of opportunities to communicate or signal and that having a potential accomplice increases the likelihood of an individual acting immorally.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Complicity; Lying; Die under the cup task
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Identification Number: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.013
Depositing User: Barr, Abigail
Date Deposited: 14 Sep 2017 07:39
Last Modified: 14 Sep 2017 18:38
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/46092

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