On 10 September 1876 Francis Joseph, emperor of Austria and king of Hungary, arrived at Hermannstadt/Nagyszeben/Sibiu train station to be greeted by a town bedecked with flowers and a platform full of dignitaries. Hermannstadt was a provincial military and bureaucratic centre of about 20,000 people in the south-eastern corner of the sprawling Habsburg Monarchy. It had majority of German speakers (70%), traditionally known as Saxons, who were mostly adherents to the powerful Lutheran Church. Despite the German-Lutheran dominance, Hermannstadt’s population was very diverse with significant numbers of other language groups – Romanian (20%) and Hungarian (10%) – as well as a wide range of religious communities.

One of the many official delegates greeting Francis Joseph on the train platform was the Lutheran bishop Georg Daniel Teutsch (1817-1893). Subsequently, while viewing the local secondary school and Church, the following conversation was purportedly held:

Francis Joseph: It is astonishing how the [Saxon] nation has remained really so German at this distance and in these surroundings….

G.D. Teutsch: That is the result of the special German laws and rights [municipal laws] from the Crown, which have been so effective as a shield.
It was an ironic and pointed reply from Teutsch, since Francis Joseph had just signed the Hungarian law that had swept away Saxon municipal autonomy and integrated the particular Saxon land, Königsboden/Pământul crăiesc/Királyföld, into the administrative system of the greater Hungarian state. At the time Teutsch had asked Heinrich Treitschke, the influential German journalist and historian at the University of Berlin, for help in publicising the Saxon cause in the recently founded Imperial Germany.⁴ Treitschke wrote back on 2 December 1876 that ‘I think it is finally time for the German press to speak openly about the arrogance of the Magyars and the subjugation (Vergewaltigung) of our loyal Saxon compatriots (Landsleute). I will personally say a few words in the December edition of the Preussische Jahrbücher.’⁵ Despite Treitschke’s attempts and the various publications on the Saxons appearing in Germany around this time, there was no significant response from the German public or government.

This article investigates these two intertwined, concurrent issues. First was the protracted question of Saxon municipal autonomy on the Königsboden. The Hungarian elites, in the political ascendancy after the formation of Austria-Hungary in 1867, argued for a unitary, standardized, ‘modern’ nation-state encompassing all territories of greater Hungary, including Transylvania. Saxon legal and administrative traditions, which had helped maintain their language and culture over five centuries, were, according to this line of thinking, historical anomalies and should be gradually phased out. Second was the potential Saxon tactic of appealing for support from Imperial Germany. Aid might come either from the large German public – which had the potential to be a valuable source of cultural, moral and financial strength – or from the German government, which could apply official pressure on the Hungarian government through diplomatic channels.
These two issues are refracted through the lives, thinking and actions of G. D. Teutsch, his friend Jakob Rannicher (1823-1875) and the slightly younger Guido Baussnern (1839-1908) as they navigated the political changes – the 1867 dualist compromise, German unification, loss of autonomy – that would form the basis of Saxon politics until the outbreak of the WWI. Teutsch was an important focal point for potential help from Germany. In his formative years he had studied history, geography and theology in Berlin and had many contacts in Germany, mostly through his work as a respected medieval historian but also through the Lutheran Church, especially his involvement in the *Gustav-Adolf Verein* – an association that aided Protestants worldwide. Along with these German connections, Teutsch was intimately involved in local Saxon political and public life. As Bishop of the Lutheran Church in Transylvania he had direct access to Francis Joseph and to the Hungarian government in religious and cultural matters. He regularly stayed in Vienna and Budapest, where he had many friends and colleagues. An active and engaged public figure, Teutsch participated in associations, official appointments, cultural issues, Church visitations and numerous other Saxon matters. Teutsch’s rich life was an example of the multiple, intersecting links and loyalties within the layered web of Saxon politics.

Jakob Rannicher – a long-term Saxon political leader – was similarly at the centre of Saxon life, as a politician, bureaucrat, Church figure and member of many associations. Over time he took a more pragmatic stance than Teutsch and argued that the Saxons had to accept being a very small minority in a larger Hungarian polity. Since Rannicher’s connections were primarily in Budapest and Vienna, Germany barely impacted on his political thinking. The final figure, Guido Baussnern represented another viewpoint. Baussnern’s opinions were changeable but he generally regarded Transylvania and its Saxons as an integral part of Hungary. He, in
turn, conceived of Imperial Germany and Hungary within the wider international landscape, in particular the upcoming clash between European culture and Asiatic barbarity. Thus Baussnern advocated a permanent alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary arguing that a unitary, powerful Hungary was vital for the interests of Germany and the wider German Volk (people).\(^7\)

The three individuals demonstrate that it was a difficult task articulating clear political viewpoints while negotiating loyalties towards the German ‘Motherland’, Imperial Austria (whether in the forms of the monarch or the idea of a unitary state or Gesamtstaat), Hungarian ‘Fatherland’, Saxon ‘nation’ and local traditions.\(^8\) Teutsch slowly moved from mild opposition against the Hungarian government towards an acceptance of the general situation. Rannicher went through this process slightly earlier and had to endure a vote of no confidence from his Hermannstadt electors and considerable animus both personally and from the Saxon press in the early 1870s. Baussnern constantly adjusted his views as he was pulled in different directions by his ideas, loyalties and the changing events. In Saxon politics, changeability (both in opinions and political allies), disunity, individuality and specific context were ever present.

Taking into account these factors and processes means rethinking the conceptual framework for Transylvanian Saxon history in the late nineteenth century, including the place of German nationalism both in Imperial Germany and in South-Eastern Europe.\(^9\) The prevailing historiography on the Transylvanian Saxons emphasizes the gradual development of German nationalism coupled with growing links to Germany.\(^10\) Friedrich Teutsch, the son of G. D. Teutsch, played a key role in shaping this historiography.\(^11\) He followed in his father’s footsteps – as an extremely active community leader, a prominent historian and eventually also as Bishop of the
Lutheran Church from 1906 to 1932. This article argues that there is no teleology of rising German nationalism or, indeed, one specific path for Saxon history. There was considerable disunity amongst the Saxons, characterized by contrasting regional and municipal traditions, local conditions, political viewpoints, religious affiliations, social groupings and personal rivalries. In a retrospective article on 3 January 1894 the main Saxon newspaper, the *Siebenburgische-Deutsche Tageblatt* (SDT) described the strong individualism of the Saxons as the ‘inner disease that plagues us Saxons’. The pro-German viewpoint of the Teutschs (father and son) was only one viewpoint within the broad spectrum of Saxon politics. For some Saxons, Imperial Germany was merely a minor, insignificant factor in everyday politics since concrete reality was life under a dominant Hungarian government. These pragmatic Saxons were often drawn towards finding some sort of compromise or *modus vivendi* with the Hungarian government, rather than assertive German nationalism with the support of activists in Imperial Germany. German nationalism in Transylvanian Saxon politics was merely one strand amongst many and needs to be both contextualized and placed in perspective.

This approach also poses questions about framing Transylvanian Saxon life and politics as part of a German ‘diaspora’. German nationalism varied across the Saxon spectrum and changed over time. Moreover, the long history of Saxons in Transylvania meant fierce pride in specific Saxon traditions and particularity. For many, this meant a mental universe framed by local and regional life with little reference to the wider German-speaking world. Of course, some Saxons (especially from the elite educated classes) had links with and strong sentiments towards the German ‘motherland’. These should not, however, obscure important Saxon relationships with other nationalities (often friendly and co-operative, especially with
Romanian speakers) and with various authorities (whether at a Transylvanian level, in Budapest or Vienna). Another historiographical viewpoint, which links regional tropes and loyalties to wider nation-building projects, similarly does not easily fit the Saxon example.\(^{15}\) Both as German speakers and Lutherans, the Saxons were very distinct from potential nation-building projects in the region, primarily Hungarian (1867 to WWI) and Romanian (post-WWI). At various points in time, different Saxon politicians argued that the Saxon particularity and traditions could potentially harmonize with and contribute to Habsburg imperial aims, Hungarian unitary nationalism, Romanian nation-building (after WWI) as well as pan-German dreams (especially in the 1930s and during WWII). Equally, Saxon particularity could lead to an inward focus on perpetuating Saxon life and traditions, especially when there was a perceived threat from a centralizing state. Rather than as nascent ‘diaspora’ or ‘ethnic’ identity, Saxon history from the mid-nineteenth century onwards can be interpreted as an attempt to retain Saxon particularity and traditions under the strains of economic modernization and assertive, centralist state-building. Difficulties and disappointments coalesced into the slow, multi-directional formation of an embattled ‘minority’ mentality. Viewed in this fashion – as the development of a minority on the ‘margins’ – Transylvanian Saxon history can be illuminating for German, Hungarian, Romanian, Habsburg and Transylvanian historiographies.

For example, the actual nature of pan-German nationalism and its importance both in Germany and amongst the Transylvanian Saxons takes a different hue when context, perspective, division and flexibility are kept in mind. The existing historiography, mostly dealing with the 1890s onwards, has stressed the importance of the pan-German nationalism in Imperial Germany and its successors – its access to decision-makers and its framing of the wider discourse.\(^{16}\) According to this line, the
Transylvanian Saxons were an important grouping within the widespread, fragmented German-speaking populations in Eastern and South-East Europe. Indeed, the Transylvanian Saxons were involved in the foundation of the Allgemeine Deutscher Schulverein and were the subject of the first sustained appeal to its members.\textsuperscript{17} Yet, this is only one side of the story. Both in Imperial Germany and for the Saxons, it was often the limitations and constraints on German nationalism – such as diplomacy, indifference and pragmatic politics – which prevailed.\textsuperscript{18} G. D. Teutsch’s, move from initial optimistic hopes for German support towards gradual sober acceptance of the status quo was largely prompted by general indifference towards the Saxon cause from the German government and the German public.

In short, Transylvanian Saxon history in the late nineteenth century should be seen ‘in the round’ with its multiple loyalties and connections, disunity, changeability and local issues placed within the wider institutional, political, diplomatic and international context. If this is done, then the strand of German nationalism in Transylvanian Saxon politics and history is not foregrounded or placed in a pan-German teleology. There were parallel, intersecting, overlapping strands in the complex Transylvanian Saxon political web, translating into changeable, varied and differentiated positions amongst Saxon politicians.

For the Transylvanian Saxons, who could trace their origins in the region to the 12\textsuperscript{th} century, the years around the 1867 Compromise were a tumultuous and defining period. Politics broadened in the more open environment of representative bodies, uncensored press and flourishing associational life. There were a number of
overlapping and competing levels of authority – local, sub-regional (Saxon), regional (Transylvania), Hungarian and Imperial. The particular configuration could be subject to sudden and dramatic changes. For example, in the course of just seven years from 1860 to 1867, there were four major changes to the governmental system: from neo-absolutism through the October Diploma, the February Patent, the suspension of the February Patent and, finally, to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. Each change could emphasis a particular level of authority, which in turn would have different and far-reaching consequences for Saxon politics and administration.

Looking at the levels in turn, at the lowest was the celebrated Saxon local autonomy. By the nineteenth century there were eleven Saxon municipal administrative units (nine seats – grouped around and including Hermannstadt – and two districts – Kronstadt/Brașov/Brassó and Bistritz/Bistrița/Beszterce). The separate Saxon legal and administrative system traced its formation to medieval grants of lands to German settlers. This autonomy lay at the very heart of the Saxon narrative of origins. Each municipality had its traditional privileges covering the administration of justice, the appointment of officials, economic matters and internal regulations. In general, the citizens would meet at regular public meetings to decide on local matters and to elect their own Mayor and officials. Demographics differed between municipalities, but generally consisted of majority Saxon populations with substantial Romanian and Hungarian minorities. While there was a common experience of local autonomy, the historical traditions were diverse, as were the social and economic conditions. For example, in his evocative memoirs, Karl Ernst Schnell described Kronstadt, a bustling business and trading town, as dominated by the local Freemason lodge. In Bistritz, by contrast, important decisions were made in the Trade Association (Gewerbeverein). Hermannstadt’s focal point was the Lutheran Church
and its circle (especially around Teutsch), reflecting its institutional and bureaucratic character. The shared formal German language (*Hochdeutsch*) provided a limited bridge for the various Saxon towns and localities, since the local spoken Saxon dialects were often very different, to the point of mutual incomprehensibility.\(^22\)

The next level was the *Universitas Saxonum* that consisted of elected representatives from the eleven municipalities meeting as a collective body under the aegis of an elected Saxon Count. This unified legal and administrative area was officially recognised and codified by the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus in 1476 and often carried the name of *Königsboden*. For much of its existence it was responsible for taxes and military recruits as well as constituting the highest form of legal court for the territory. There had been notable disruptions to the *Universitas* in the 1780s under Joseph II and the 1850s under neo-absolutism, both times due to centralizing pressures from Vienna. The combination of municipal autonomy and the *Universitas* formed the bedrock of specific Saxon institutions and Saxon self-perception as a distinct people and nation.

Turning to the level of Transylvania, the region had a long and distinct history as a political and administrative unit within, successively, the medieval Kingdom of Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy. The key representative body was the Transylvanian diet. Since 1437 the Transylvanian Saxon burghers had been included as one of the three privileged estates (or *natio*) – the other two being the Hungarians nobles and the *Székely* border guards (who spoke a form of Hungarian). The Romanian population were traditionally not represented as a corporate body in the diet, even though they were the most populous language grouping within Transylvania. The approximate figures for Transylvania according to the 1880 census were Romanian-speakers 57%, Hungarian-speakers 30%, German-
speakers 10%. It should be kept in mind that many inhabitants were bilingual or trilingual and national categories were not clear or fixed. In the nineteenth century, the diet had declined in importance and was subject to manipulation from the two higher levels of authority – the kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg monarch. From the mid nineteenth century until 1867 both tried to assert power over Transylvania, often through the diet, and the Saxons were caught in this power struggle. This triangular relationship of Transylvania, Hungary and Imperial Austria dominated, even defined, Saxon political life through to the early 1870s. There were, for example, two very different Transylvanian diets convened in succession during the turbulent mid-1860s. The first was called by the centralist Viennese government and met in Hermannstadt. Romanian participation, for the first time, was facilitated, while the Hungarian politicians boycotted. The second was convened to reconcile Hungary with the Monarch and the central state. This diet had an overwhelming Hungarian majority and, significantly, met in Klausenburg/Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár. It had just one item on the agenda: Transylvanian union with Hungary.

Amidst the many changes, Jakob Rannicher was emerging as a respected Saxon political leader. During the 1848-9 revolutions, Rannicher had fled to Vienna where he joined the Imperial civil service. In 1856 he returned to Transylvania as secretary to the governor, while simultaneously being envoy of the education and religious ministry (run from Vienna) and a member of the upper consortium of the Transylvanian Lutheran Church. Rannicher, along with his friend Teutsch, participated in the long genesis of the 1861 Protestant constitution for the Transylvanian Lutheran Church. As an active politician he was elected to the Hermannstadt diet, where he took a leading role especially in promoting Romanian interests, and to the Viennese parliament from 1863 to 1865. At the same time, he was
heavily involved in the revived *Universitas Saxonum*. Rannicher’s multitude of positions and tasks was typical for a Saxon politician – Teutsch was another similar example – and hardly surprising given the many levels of government and administration as well as the importance of the Lutheran Church.

At the Klausenburg diet of 1865 Rannicher gave the majority Saxon address, where he raised concerns about Transylvania’s incorporation into Hungary. Rannicher and the Saxons feared that ‘[i]n an assembly [a parliament in Budapest] where our fate will be decided, the lonely voices of the Saxon and Romanian representatives will disappear unnoticed in the desert.’ Hungarian pressure for Transylvania union provoked the formation of rough political groupings. The ‘Old Saxons’ (including Rannicher and Teutsch) looked to Vienna and argued for a defense of traditional Saxon autonomy, principled opposition to Hungarian centralization and a continued belief in an overarching *Gesamtösterreich* (integrated Austrian state). By contrast, the ‘Young Saxons’ (which would eventually include the young Guido Baussnern) advocated co-operation with the Hungarian elites on the basis of progressive reforms, liberal tolerance and a commitment to the construction of the Hungarian state. There was often bitter conflict between the two sides including personal attacks, stone throwing and street fighting, even though individuals like Baussnern would maneuver between groupings and even switch allegiances. The split between ‘Old Saxons’ and ‘Young Saxons’ was exacerbated by a contest over railway routes. Throughout the 1860s and 1870s there were discussions in parliament and official circles, first in Vienna then in Budapest, about the railway route from Vienna-Budapest to Bucharest (and the Black Sea). There were two possible routes: one going through Kronstadt (the stronghold of the ‘Young Saxons’), the other going through Hermannstadt (dominated by ‘Old Saxons’). This had been a major topic of Saxon politics for two
decades until the Hungarian government eventually decided for the Kronstadt route in 1868/9. Rannicher, in particular, was heavily involved in the debate through the various representative bodies and in Budapest.

Baussnern was only just beginning his political career but wrote prolifically on the events of the time. Already he was showing a capacity for sudden changes of opinion. In 1866, amidst the real possibility of union with Hungary and a dualist settlement, he published a pamphlet in favour of a federal, decentralised system within an overarching Austrian Gesamtstaat allowing the Saxons considerable autonomy – a position similar to Rannicher’s. In his next brochure, published shortly after the Compromise, Baussnern changed opinion and gave qualified support to the recently installed dualist system. His explanation was that one simply had to accept history’s judgment; in this case, the dualism had favoured the Germans and Magyars. Baussnern justified this result by praising the level of culture and civilisation of both peoples, especially in comparison with the Slavs and Romanians. This idea of a natural harmony between German and Hungarian interests would become a constant of his political thinking through his many changes of opinion.

Teutsch was also negotiating the many changes to Saxon life. He was involved in nearly every major Saxon issue of the time. Compared to Rannicher and Baussnern, Teutsch had the most direct contact with Germany and the strongest attachment to its culture and learning. This was largely through his academic contacts as a historian and his frequent visits to Germany. His most important historical writing appeared in the 1850s, including edited documentary collections and the hugely influential and popular Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen. All of his historical research conceived the Transylvanian Saxons as one entity, while also emphasizing the links to the German ‘Motherland’. In 1858 Teutsch returned to Germany for the first time.
since his student days. He wrote excitedly that ‘Now my burning, long held wish has been fulfilled – I am again in Germany … our spiritual homeland.’

In the 1850s Teutsch was a teacher at the secondary school (Gymnasium) of his hometown Schässburg/Sigşoara/Segesvár. On 21 April 1863 Teutsch was elected priest in Agnetheln/Agnita/Ongenitlea, a small town between Hermannstadt and Schässburg. Shortly afterwards, on 19 September 1867 he was elected bishop of Hermannstadt and leader of the Lutheran Church in Transylvania, the highest ecclesiastical position in the Saxon community. In his confirmation audience with Francis Joseph in Vienna, Teutsch mentioned the new dualist system and hoped that the Saxons’ living conditions would not be touched. Francis Joseph replied: ‘Certainly, certainly’.

At the outset of dualism, the Hungarian government pursued a cautious, differentiated policy towards the Saxons. In the Nationalities Law (1868) cultural and linguistic rights were recognised, though premised on a unitary state with Hungarian as the official language. The Union Law (1868) formally incorporating Transylvania into Hungary provided for equality of religions and promised a separate law to secure Saxon self-administration on the Königsboden. The Saxon representatives in the Budapest parliament, including Rannicher as one of the leaders, sat with the main government party, known informally as the Deák Party (after the Hungarian political leader and architect of the 1867 Compromise, Ferenc Deák). One of Deák’s closest associates, the cultural and religion minister József Eötvös – a prominent intellectual and a liberal parliamentarian – offered Rannicher a post in the education ministry, which he accepted. In a letter to Teutsch, Rannicher explained that he wanted to protect Saxon schools and ‘the “flourishing” German oasis behind the mountains [in Transylvania]’. Increasingly he viewed the autonomy of the Saxon church and schools as vital protection against the prevailing attitude in
Budapest about ‘unity of the Empire, nation, language, supremacy, centralisation’; in other words, the construction of a unitary Hungarian nation-state.\textsuperscript{38} Within the education ministry Rannicher worked on drafts of the elementary school law, while in parliament he negotiated with Deák about the exact terms of the nationality law. He was also assiduously learning Hungarian, which progressed quickly, to the extent that he could soon give long speeches in parliament.

While Rannicher tried to accommodate to the realities of Hungarian dominance, Teutsch believed the dualist system would not last and continued to lay his hopes in a constitutional, federalist Gesamtstaat with Saxon autonomy.\textsuperscript{39} He, too, fought for Church autonomy and improvements in the school system, while remaining extremely influential behind-the-scenes in Saxon politics. One example was his encouragement for the foundation of the Saxon newspaper, the Siebenbürgisch-Deutsche Wochenblatt (SDW), the forerunner of the SDT. The first issue on June 1868 contained a programme that reflected Teutsch’s position. The newspaper aimed to secure the rights and the preservation of the Saxon people and proclaimed proudly that the Saxons ‘are German and want to remain German’, yet lived in ‘another home’ and would never be German citizens.\textsuperscript{40} Teutsch’s influence extended to a regular Thursday evening reading group that met at the Bishop’s residence for cigarettes and conversation, a ritual Teutsch had initiated as a schoolteacher in Schässburg.\textsuperscript{41} Teutsch assembled the best of Saxon intelligentsia around him and dominated the discussions. The political talk was of the fight between Magyars and Saxons. Teutsch often asked the journalist Karl Wolff about what the ‘bad Magyars’ were writing. Even here, in the privacy of his home and surrounded by fellow Saxons, there were differences of opinion. Wolff, who would take over editorship of the SDW when it became a daily, was described as knowledgeable, nationalist-minded and ready to
fight. By contrast, Friedrich Müller, the Hermannstadt local priest, and Oskar Meltzl, an economist and politician, were more conciliatory.\textsuperscript{42}

II

Around the time of the Franco-Prussian war and subsequent German unification in 1870-1, the Hungarian government was in the gradual process of constructing and securing the dualist system through numerous laws and institutions. As Rannicher observed, the principles of state sovereignty and ‘modernization’ were often invoked to justify the goal of building a unitary Hungarian state. In general, this meant policies of standardisation and Magyarisation, though there was room for negotiation and the rates of implementation varied from sector to sector, region to region. Increasingly, Saxon rights, traditions and everyday life were affected. This was the situation when Wilhelm Wattenbach, a medieval historian at Heidelberg University, stayed with Teutsch during the summer of 1869. Upon Wattenbach’s return to Heidelberg, he held a series of lectures about the Saxons.\textsuperscript{43} The final published pamphlet mixed popular history, political commentary and traveller’s impressions. After a cursory overview of Saxon history, Wattenbach portrayed the current situation as Saxon defence of their church and schools against an assertive Hungarian state.\textsuperscript{44} The Saxons, according to Wattenbach, were merely asking for the necessary freedoms and independence to remain Germans – which any Hungarian Comitat (county) could demand. His characterization of ‘Hungarian freedom’ was scathing, describing it as freedom solely for Magyars plus ‘arbitrary domination over others’.\textsuperscript{45} Ultimately, Wattenbach recognized that in national matters the Saxons were not strong enough to confront the Magyars, yet pointed to the Church and education as the keys to retaining German
consciousness and a sense of community. He argued for a vigorous Saxon defence of their German character and continued educational links to Germany. Undoubtedly, his ideas had been shaped by conversations with Teutsch.

Many universities in German had long and close links with Transylvanian Saxons since study at the Protestant Universities of Heidelberg, Göttingen, Tübingen, Leipzig, Jena, Halle and Berlin was a common route for the Saxon elite, especially the priests. In the 1860s and early 1870s Heinrich Treitschke was a professor at Heidelberg (he would later move to Berlin in 1874) and a close friend of Wattenbach. It is possible that Wattenbach initiated Treitschke’s contact with Teutsch. In any event, Treitschke began commissioning and publishing essays on the Transylvanian Saxons in the *Preussischer Jahrbücher*, where he was an editor. In a letter dated 15 April 1872 Treitschke wrote to Teutsch that: ‘I hold it as our duty to support the threatened *Deutschtum* (Germandom) in the Carpathians ... the Transylvanian problem is as good as unknown in the [German] Reich’. In many of his subsequent letters Treitschke mentioned the lack of knowledge in Germany concerning the Transylvanian Saxons and the general situation in Hungary.

Treitschke was, in fact, a keen observer of the Habsburg Monarchy, despite his historic advocacy of a Prussian-led ‘small Germany’. In December 1871, Treitschke wrote a perceptive long article entitled ‘Austria and the German Reich’, where he called the Saxons ‘the hardest working of the German peoples (*Stamme*) in the South-East’. The article contained two potentially contradictory ideas that would dominate Treitschke’s thinking on Hungary and the Transylvanian Saxons. First was the diplomatic consideration of the Habsburg Monarchy as an integral, stabilizing force in the region and in Europe. This implied German non-interference in Hungarian domestic affairs. Second was the German cultural perspective that the
Magyars were abusing their power and placing undue pressure on the Transylvanian Saxons.\textsuperscript{51} This implied possible intervention on behalf of German-speaking minorities. These two strands remained delicately balanced in Treitschke’s mind. In conclusion Treitschke counseled non-interference by the German government.\textsuperscript{52} Thus, around the time of German unification, three themes in German thinking on the Transylvanian Saxons were forming. First, there were the notions of a wider German world based on language, culture and religion. Common terms used by Wattenbach, Treitschke and others, such as ‘Motherland’, ‘German Volk’ (people), ‘German culture’, ‘German science’ and ‘Western civilization’ all referenced this framework of thinking. There were a number of nebulous concepts behind this viewpoint. For example, there were ideas of a shared linguistic and cultural heritage based on a perceived integrated, medieval, Christian German-speaking people.\textsuperscript{53} Wattenbach in particular portrayed the Saxons as part of the great medieval colonizing mission by Christian, German-speakers.\textsuperscript{54} Layered onto this conception was the shared German heritage of the Protestant Reformation, since the vast majority of Saxons were Lutheran. An additional layer came from the idea of an enlightened, cultured, scientific-minded, German-speaking elite community. Teutsch’s attitudes incorporated these different aspects to form an idealized image of a common, progressive, humanist, Christian German cultural world encompassing the Transylvanian Saxons as proud, distinguished representatives in the East.\textsuperscript{55} A second theme in German attitudes to the Transylvanian Saxons was the rising importance of diplomatic considerations.\textsuperscript{56} The formation of Imperial Germany fundamentally changed the European state system. Germany, forged after three wars and situated in the heart of Europe, had to negotiate a charged situation. Attitudes towards distant, isolated communities such as the Transylvanian Saxons became increasingly refracted
through official state interests and channels.\textsuperscript{57} This pragmatic German policy, coupled with Vienna’s passivity under dualism and effective ceding of domestic matters to Budapest, meant the Saxons were largely left alone by Vienna and Berlin. The third and final theme was indifference.\textsuperscript{58} The German public never really adopted the Saxon cause, despite attempts to rouse interest and sympathy. There were a number of factors to explain this indifference. The German public had a multitude of pressing issues in the wake of unification. Moreover, the German government did not articulate any official position on the Transylvanian Saxons and maintained a neutral silence. Treitschke struck a resigned tone in letter dated 23 April 1875: ‘What should we do against [Magyar arrogance]?’ he wrote. Neither the German public nor official opinion wanted any intervention in internal Hungarian affairs.\textsuperscript{59}

These three themes of cultural affinity, diplomatic considerations and general indifference also influenced Saxon attitudes towards the new Imperial Germany. This was illustrated in the Saxon discussions of (or lack of interest in) the Prussian victory over France and subsequent unification of Germany. For some, such as Teutsch, these events were an example of what the German spirit could achieve or in the words of an exultant SDW: ‘judgment day for France had arrived ... [and] never has world history spoken such a harsh, destructive judgment’.\textsuperscript{60} The newspaper continued in this vein:

The greatest [result] is that in the dark night of the present, a new hope has been illuminated. The true, deep consecration of this momentous action is that the united spirit of the German people (\textit{der geeinigte deutsche Volksgeist}) – the soul of this living people and creative, cultural power – has defeated, with bloody punishment, the dark demons of Gallic arrogance and Napoleon self-deification which had wanted, with deep scorn, to kick into the sand all future demands of [German] self-respect.\textsuperscript{61}
Teutsch shared these opinions and wrote a number of celebratory articles for the SDW. For him and the SDW, the German spirit was associated with progress, civilisation and truth.

Guido Baussnern followed events closely and took a broad geopolitical perspective coupled with cultural arrogance. He outlined his viewpoint in a passionate appeal to Hungary at the outset of hostilities between Prussia and France. For Baussnern, the key was that Russia and the Slavs in general were Hungary’s real enemies. With the formation of Austria-Hungary, the Monarchy was now, according to Baussnern, internally structured along the lines of Germans and Magyars against the Slavs. A strong, united Germany would serve as the natural ally of Austria-Hungary against pan-Slavism. In other words, ‘Hungary’s interests in relation to Eastern Europe coincide with those of Germany’s – Hungary’s natural ally is therefore Germany and Hungary’s future depends on the natural unification of the German people’. In conclusion, Baussnern evoked the familiar struggle of European civilization against Asiatic barbarism. Thus Baussnern, like Treitschke, places the Transylvanian Saxons in the wider perspective of European diplomacy and the historical process of clashing peoples and cultures. For Baussnern there was no apparent contradiction between Saxon, German and Hungarian loyalties since in geopolitical terms a strong Hungary would be good for the German state and people.

Yet, as the Saxons celebrated both the victory over France and the unification of Germany, these events had little concrete effects on Saxon political or daily life. The unification of Germany, while welcomed, did not substantially obtrude into the practical issues of adjusting to a dominant Hungarian government. The mental horizons of many Saxons, including politicians, continued to be their locality and region in relation to the larger Hungarian polity and, more distantly, the Monarch in
Vienna. For example, in Jakob Rannicher’s correspondence around this time, there is barely a mention of the Franco-Prussian War or the unification of Germany. Instead there are long discussions of educational policies, official appointments, ongoing divisions within the Saxon community, railway politics, parliamentary tactics, the upcoming municipal law, local business initiatives, Church affairs and various personal matters.\(^6^4\) Rannicher was absorbed in daily political matters and did not consider any potential support from Germany or diplomatic pressure on the Budapest government.

III

Throughout this time there was intense discussion about the Hungarian government’s reform to the autonomous institutions and practices on the Saxon Königsboden.\(^6^5\) This issue would dominate Saxon politics for the next five years and would initiate the first concerted Saxon appeal to Imperial Germany. It illustrates the new matrix of Saxon politics: a powerful Hungarian government, an acquiescent Monarch in Vienna and the potential outside influence from Imperial Germany.

In the years leading up to 1876, the Hungarian government produced successive drafts for legislation concerning the Königsboden, generally in the direction of increased centralisation in an attempt to create a standardised, unified political and administrative system across greater Hungary.\(^6^6\) Under the 1868 Union Law and the 1870 Municipal Law, Transylvania (including the Saxon Königsboden) was to be subject to its own law. After much manoeuvring and outlining of respective positions, a government draft was published in March 1871. The SDW, representing the ‘Old Saxon’ viewpoint, opposed the draft and based its arguments on legal
precedents and continuity.\textsuperscript{67} On the other hand, the ‘Young Saxon’ leaders, including Guido Baussnern, portrayed themselves as a liberal, democratic party willing to co-operate with the Hungarian government.\textsuperscript{68} The Universitas Saxonum met to prepare for consultation over the upcoming reforms. Under new Universitas electoral regulations, decreed by the Hungarian government, many more Romanian voters were included than before. Coupled with the subtle influence of the newly appointed Saxon Count Moritz Conrad, this produced a slight pro-Hungarian majority consisting of ‘Young Saxons’, sympathetic Romanians and one Hungarian. Baussnern celebrated the majority in the Universitas as the ‘solid advocacy of all nationalities for the Hungarian state idea’.\textsuperscript{69}

Almost immediately, however, Baussnern began to move towards opposition, possibly concerned over the lack of consultation and increased Hungarian centralist sentiment. Baussnern would eventually become a strong voice against the government’s Königsboden law. At the same time he was also attempting to achieve some political unity within the Saxon camp, especially in light of the upcoming 1872 parliamentary elections. Baussnern described his position in a personal letter: ‘I have not become an “Old Saxon”, but I am no longer a “Young Saxon”. Rather I am only a Saxon and it is my conviction that this standpoint must be the one of every loyal son of our [Saxon] nation, if our unity shall become a reality.’\textsuperscript{70} Considering the division and rancour within the Saxon camp, it is no surprise that political unity and a common programme proved difficult to achieve. There were numerous discussions and drafts (including one from Baussnern) in the early months of 1872. After weeks of meetings in the small town of Mediasch/Mediaș/Medgyes a common programme was eventually issued on 5 June 1872.

The Mediasch programme was an awkward mix of ideas.\textsuperscript{71} The dualist system
and Transylvania’s union with the Hungarian state were not directly challenged; indeed there were clauses calling for a true Rechtstaat (rule of law), full realisation of the 1868 Nationality Law and general good governance. Saxon autonomy and the continued unity of the Universitas were defended as compatible with a modern, progressive Hungarian state. Further clauses called for municipal and local reforms in accordance with Clause 10 of the 1868 Union Law including open elections for important official positions rather than appointments by the government. Stress was laid on the Universitas as the correct party for negotiations about any administrative reforms. The Mediasch programme contained nothing about relations with Imperial Germany or support from the wider German-speaking world.

Rannicher had participated in some of the background discussions to the Mediasch Programme but was preoccupied by his work within the system. He struck a moderate tone in his report to his electors on 16 June 1872. He talked about Hungary’s modernisation in the direction of Western culture, but described the municipality law as the ‘sword of Damocles’ hanging over the Saxon people. Upon the Budapest parliament convening in September 1872, the Saxon delegates, who as a bloc still remained in the government party, presented the Mediasch Programme to Deák. The moderates in Deák’s party were still prepared to listen to Saxon viewpoints and the final terms had not been settled, though the Minister of the Interior, Vilmos Tóth, was preparing a new draft. Here were the everyday realities of Saxon politics – fragile unity masking deep internal divisions, while in negotiation with a powerful Hungarian government.

By November, the Saxon delegates in Budapest were already disagreeing about tactics and starting to go their separate ways. Some such as Teutsch, the SDW and the committed ‘Old Saxons’ stressed historical rights and promises. This was
often coupled with an appeal to the German government and public for support. Others such as Rannicher wanted to work from within the Deák party to obtain some concessions for the Saxons. Previously, for example with the 1868 Nationalities Law, Rannicher had spoken privately with Deák, who had been prepared to compromise. These tactics did not involve any appeal for wider support from the German-speaking world since this may displease the Hungarian government. Another camp was the ‘Young Saxons’, who believed wholeheartedly in the Hungarian state idea and conceived Saxon life largely as a personal matter, subsumed within a greater Hungary.

Teutsch, in particular, began to place hope in Imperial German support. In the early to mid 1870s he published a number of essays, anonymously, in Treitschke’s *Preussische Jahrbücher* trying to mobilize German official and public opinion. The first essay appeared in 1872 portraying the Saxons as an upstanding *Bürgervolk* (citizenry), progressive Protestants and proud Germans. Teutsch was highly critical of the present Hungarian state claiming it was ‘a chauvinist power which struggled for sole dominance, which wanted to destroy the presence and the roots of the vigorous German tree’. The Hungarian state idea, which professed liberalism and reform, in fact operated as absolute parliamentary control over the state with no rights for the minorities. The Saxons, for instance, were ‘denounced as traitors to the Fatherland and as reactionaries’. In conclusion, Teutsch called for support from the ‘Motherland’ (a term he constantly used for Germany) but also peaceful co-existence with the Hungarian state based on respect for Saxon rights and laws. There was an echo in certain journals, such as *Die Grenzboten*, which published two articles mirroring the ideas in Teutsch’s essay.

In the meantime, Hungarian politics was in a state of flux moving in the
direction of increased centralization and more strident nationalism. Many of the older,
more moderate Hungarian political leaders were leaving the national political stage
for various reasons. Gyula Andrássy, the first Prime Minister under dualism, became
foreign minister of Austria-Hungary in 1871. József Eötvös died in the same year.
Deák retired from public affairs in 1873 while his supporters were moving towards
Kálmán Tisza’s more assertive, Hungarian nationalist Left-Centre party, eventually to
fuse in 1875. Gyula Szapáry, a distinguished technocratic liberal politician, took over
as Interior Minister on 10 March 1873 and made reform to the Königsboden an urgent
matter of state. Parallel to Hungarian party consolidation, many Saxons were
strengthening their opposition to the government. In the Universitas there was now a
solid majority insisting on continued Saxon autonomy. Baussnern, for instance, had
changed sides and now strongly opposed Magyarisation in general and the specific
reforms to the Königsboden. The Universitas presented two majority petitions
(December 1872 and December 1873) to the Hungarian Interior Minister asserting the
Saxon oppositional viewpoint. Essentially, the petitions affirmed the unity of the
eleven Saxon municipalities as represented in the Universitas, the election of officials
(rather than appointments) and continued self-administration. The 19 December 1873
petition, in particular, stressed that any changes should be negotiated through the
Universitas and the municipalities. In an open letter dated 23 May 1874 Baussnern
wrote of ‘the almost unbearable conditions …that have generated the feeling of bitter
disappointment’. These strong sentiments placed considerable pressure on the Saxon
parliamentary representatives in Budapest to leave the fracturing Deák Party and enter
into official opposition.

A number of heated meetings both in Budapest and in Saxon towns about
moving into open opposition placed enormous pressure from below on the Saxon
parliamentary representatives. Divisions amongst Saxons were particularly evident within localities. This was, to a large extent, a continuation of the bitter struggle between ‘Old Saxons’ and ‘Young Saxons’, though some individuals had swapped sides, like Baussnern. Prominent ‘Young Saxons’ such as Friedrich Wächter, a representative from Kronstadt, and Karl Fabritius, a Priest from Schässburg, were not prepared to break with the government party, despite considerable pressure from sections of the Saxon public and press. Both Wächter and Fabritius would eventually vote in support of the 1876 Königsboden law. Jakob Rannicher and his moderate position suffered amidst the rancour and hardening of stances. In March 1874 when ten Saxons finally left the Deák Party, Rannicher remained. At a meeting in Hermannstadt his actions were denounced by his electorate and there was an effective vote of no confidence in him. Allegations were made that Rannicher’s position in the education ministry meant he could not challenge the government. Rannicher denied this. Privately, Rannicher counselled moderation, flexibility and understanding with the Hungarian government and politicians, rather than the desperate politics of ultimatums. In a long letter dated 31 March 1874, Rannicher summed up his views in the following words: ‘We Saxons are not in the position to burn the bridges behind us’. Rannicher instinctively looked to negotiate with the state authority – whether in Vienna or Budapest – rather than turning outwards to Germany for support. Rannicher described the oppositional stance as useless isolation ‘finally turning one’s back and breaking all bridges to a possible understanding’. He would die shortly afterwards of tuberculosis on 8 November 1875, greatly troubled by the events of the last two years.

In the heated political environment, many Saxons placed their hopes on possible help or influence from Imperial Germany. At one of the preparatory meetings in November 1873 about the SDW becoming a daily newspaper, Baussnern proposed
a clause on promoting and caring for the spiritual connection between the Saxon people and Germany.\textsuperscript{89} It was adopted by the meeting. The editorship was offered to Karl Wolff and, in the lead article of the SDT’s first edition, he struck a new note of passion. He wrote of ‘forced language use’ (\textit{Sprachenzwang}) and the ‘hot blooded chauvinism of the Magyars’.\textsuperscript{90} Wolff counselled a defence of municipal and Church autonomy in the struggle ‘for the just existence (\textit{Dasein}) of a people’.\textsuperscript{91} Around this time there was a concerted wave of publications in Imperial Germany about the Transylvanian Saxons. Teutsch’s personal connections were important. He published another article in Treitschke’s \textit{Preussischer Jahrbücher}, while a new German edition of his general history was reprinted (arranged by Wattenbach through his publisher Samuel Hirzl).\textsuperscript{92}

Two substantial books on the Transylvanian Saxons intended for the general German public also appeared in 1874, including one anonymously written by Guido Baussnern. In a private letter Baussnern described his hope that the ‘moral intervention of the German \textit{Volk} would settle matters in favour of the small Saxon house.’\textsuperscript{93} The book begins with Baussnern expressing his disappointment at Hungarian policy. After the great hopes of 1867 and the reputation of Hungarians as lovers of freedom, the subsequent years had witnessed the Pest parliament relentlessly pursuing a policy of Magyarisation.\textsuperscript{94} Baussnern argued that:

[The Saxon nation] demands nothing more or less than the recognition of those rights, which are inscribed in inextinguishable words within the foundation documents of each nation and nationality, and which are also written in the modern spirit in the laws - the right to live and to develop in accordance with its own character.\textsuperscript{95}

The desirability of assimilating into Magyar culture and society was firmly rejected.
Baussnern confidently proclaimed the Magyar cultural level as being far below that of the German people. Why would a Saxon want to assimilate into Magyar culture and society? Baussnern asked. It was not a world language, had no high literature, nor culture, nor ethics, nor administrative talent, he asserted. There was no Shakespeare, Byron, Voltaire, Mirabeau, Schiller, Goethe or Humboldt. Certainly, the Hungarians could offer a love of freedom, Baussnern conceded, yet there was also a tendency towards totalitarianism. Baussnern, under the cloak of anonymity, called Magyarisation ‘a formal war of extermination against all’. In fact, he was so worried over these strong statements that he expected to be jailed for the publication of the brochure if his identity was revealed. Nevertheless, Baussnern had not lost all hope of cooperation and concluded his book by calling for a common Magyar-German cultural mission to the East.

The other book came from the pen of Franz Löher – a native of Paderborn, a veteran German democrat from 1848 and now a respected historian in Munich. Löher had also written the foreword to Baussnern’s book. Löher’s own book, entitled ‘Die Magyare und andere Ungarn’, condemned the recent tyranny of the government and its policy of Magyarisation. Löher characterised the Magyar attitude as follows: ‘I am in charge of this land. Learn the Magyar language if you want to speak in public then leave your mother tongue at home’. Yet for Löher (and for Baussnern) this made little sense because the existential threat to Hungary came from Russia and in a future battle of the races (Völker) only Germany could protect Hungary. Indeed Löher argued for increased trade and general links between Germany and Hungary.

Löher’s book provoked a spirited response in a brochure entitled Der Kampf der Siebenbürger Sachsen für die Überreste des Feudalwesens, which set out the Hungarian case. The Transylvanian Saxons were portrayed as uncommitted to the
Hungarian state idea, while other German-speakers in Hungary, more open to assimilation and freedoms, were praised as the “most patriotic, hard-working, loyal sons of Hungary”. Saxon antiquated privileges and special rights were contrasted with the Hungarian aim of a modern legal system based on liberal institutions and the equality of rights. As evidence of Hungarians’ modernising convictions, the author cited the voluntary end to Hungarian noble tax exemptions, which had been in accordance with the spirit of the age. The Universitas Saxonom, on the other hand, was branded a ‘mummy from medieval times’. No mention was made of the contradiction, pointed out by an article in the Preussische Jahrbücher that the Hungarians had relied on historical rights in their fight against Vienna yet condemned traditional Saxon rights as outdated privileges. As for appeals to fellow Germans, Saxon politics within Hungary was, according to the brochure, not a matter for Imperial Germany or its people.

The German government indeed remained silent, though the foreign ministry was informed about the Hungarian government and their policies. There were a series of detailed reports from the General Consul in Budapest, Ludwig Wäcker-Gotter, addressed to Bismarck that plot and explain the various changes in Hungarian politics. In a report from 2 March 1875 Wäcker-Gotter commented favourably on the formation of one Hungarian liberal party under Tisza. Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy would be more stable, he reasoned, and this was of primary importance for Germany, rather than the plight of fellow German-speakers in faraway south-eastern Europe.

The municipal laws eventually came up for parliamentary debate in March 1876. Kálmán Tisza, now Interior and Prime Minister as well as leader of the dominant parliamentary party, was personally responsible for the legislation. The
proposed laws reduced the jurisdiction of the *Universitas Saxonum* to cultural matters and to administration of its property, rather than any form of political, administrative or legal authority. Moreover, the interior minister would have oversight of its operations at all times. The *Universitas* would, however, continue to fund and administer schools from the considerable income of Saxon property. Finally, the Saxon administrative districts would be redrawn to harmonise with the Hungarian *Comitat* system, meaning a dilution of Saxon control through the incorporation of more Romanian and Hungarian speakers.\textsuperscript{115} Similar standardization and rationalization processes were used across Transylvania, including the *Székely* autonomous areas. The majority of Saxon parliamentarians (14 out of 16) were determined to fight the legislation, even though there was an overwhelming Magyar majority in parliament and no chance of stopping its adoption.\textsuperscript{116}

In the debate Baussnern began his speech stating that in the Hungarian parliament there was no observance of law (*Gesetzachtung*) or feeling for rights (*Rechtsgfühl*).\textsuperscript{117} These were sensitive topics for the legal-minded, combative Hungarian politicians – of whatever political stripe – and Baussnern was called to order by the Speaker of the House. When he continued, Baussnern asserted that the Saxon nation’s existence was contained in the laws and associated promises. These were not being upheld or kept, according to Baussnern, since, in contravention of the laws from 1791, 1848 and 1868 guaranteeing Saxon political and territorial integrity; Hungarian parliament and law were dismembering the *Königsboden*. His arguments and Saxon opposition in parliament were to no avail. Once the law came into effect, Friedrich Wächter, who had prominently supported and voted for the law, received his reward: the post of Saxon Count and Hermannstadt lord lieutenant. He thus also
became head of the surviving *Universitas Saxonum*, a poignant snub to the campaigners against the 1876 Law.

The parliamentary debate about the *Königsboden* law was followed by the German consul Wäcker-Gotter and covered in a report dated 25 March 1876. Wäcker-Gotter expressed some sympathy for the Saxon plight. He described the Saxon speeches as ‘uncommonly passionate’ and opined that ‘certainly what is happening to them is unjust’. Nevertheless, Wäcker-Gotter balanced these sympathies with the acknowledgement that historical privileges had to fall in the interests of modern state development. In particular the old *Königsboden* administrative territorial divisions were described as ‘geographically impractical’ and ‘parcels and enclaves’. In conclusion he pondered how the Saxons would fare outside of their ‘medieval bulwark’. As a minority, perhaps their education and wealth would make them leaders of the other nationalities. Indeed, the Saxons may even ‘increase in power and influence’. Overall Wäcker-Gotter presents a balanced assessment of the law and certainly does not demonstrate overly strong support for the Saxons. Clearly the German government had no intention of intervening in a domestic matter, especially for a region where continued stability was the priority.

After the passage of the 1876 municipal law, Teutsch wrote bitterly to Treitschke about the end of Saxon local autonomy. Privately, Teutsch continued to want an end to the dualist system. Treitschke was more circumspect in his replies. In particular, he was worried about the instability in the Balkans where an uprising against the Ottoman Empire was unfolding. In a letter dated 5 August 1876 he stated his belief that it would be unpatriotic to write about Bismarck’s foreign policy, especially at a time of changing alliances and the possibility of a Balkan War. However, in his later letter of 2 December 1876 Treitschke wrote that it was now
finally time for the German press to fight the ‘arrogance of the Magyars’. As ever, Treitschke was balancing between two positions: on the one hand, non-intervention for the sake of regional security and German diplomatic interests; on the other hand, intervention to aid fellow German-speakers and to protect the threatened Deutschtum in the East. In any event, the next sustained campaign in Germany to support the Saxon cause occurred in 1881 with the formation of the Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein (ADS) in Berlin, which also foundered on official silence and general public indifference.

IV

After the fight against the 1876 Königsboden law there were many Saxons who believed continued struggle was useless and that an agreement with Hungary was needed. Baussnern was now counselling reconciliation with the Hungarian government. He stood down from his Mediasch parliamentary seat in April 1878, since he had been elected on the platform of opposition to the government. In his resignation speech Baussnern stated that after the unsuccessful fight against the Königsboden law it was time to ‘finally make peace’ with the Magyars. Baussnern even opined that perhaps a compromise in the municipal autonomy question would have been better than hard opposition – this from one of its strongest advocates who had even contemplated going to jail for the Saxon cause! For Baussnern, the instability in the Balkans and the military actions of Russia were of overwhelming importance. The real threat to Saxon existence, according to Baussnern, came from the Slavs and the best Saxon policy was friendship and solidarity with the Magyars. Baussnern was immediately re-elected to parliament in nearby Agnetheln as a
government candidate. He then sat with and supported the Tisza government in parliament over the next decades. For Baussnern, the signing of the dual alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary on 7 October 1879 was the culmination of his principal political goal and affirmation for his recent switch to the government ranks. By 1889 Baussnern could assert that ‘the Magyars in Austria-Hungary are the strongest and most secure support for the German alliance’ and that the only means to secure the existence of the Saxons was through the Hungarian state idea. While Baussnern supported and served the Hungarian government and state, he did so as a Saxon and German.

Teutsch, too, was starting to move away from oppositional tactics. In 1882, after the events surrounding the ADS, Teutsch spoke with the Hungarian cultural and education Minister Ágoston Trefort about the need for peace. Throughout the mid to late 1880s Teutsch attempted to bring about some understanding with the Hungarian government, though Tisza’s considerable presence proved a stumbling block. In the course of the 1880s, Karl Wolff, who had now become one of the acknowledged Saxon leaders both as editor of the SDT and as a parliamentarian from 1881, also moved from political opposition towards a more conciliatory position. He resigned from the editorship of the SDT in 1885 to become the director of the Hermannstädter Allgemeine Sparkassa (Hermannstadt General Savings Bank), then left parliament in 1887. Eventually Teutsch, Wolff and Baussnern (the latter from the government benches) began working behind the scenes for an understanding with the Hungarian government and a unified Saxon stance of reconciliation, which was achieved at the 1890 Saxon Day.

Many of the individuals in this article began their political careers with Saxon defence, opposition to the Hungarian government and desire for German support, then
moved gradually to an acceptance of the existing conditions and resignation at the Saxon position. The reasoning varied according to each individual depending on their own mix of belief in common German culture, political possibilities, geopolitical considerations and widespread indifference to German-Transylvanian Saxon links. Teutsch held to his pro-German convictions the longest and had the closest personal connection with Imperial Germany, but eventually accepted the situation (and Imperial German indifference) – as did Karl Wolff. Similar processes were occurring in Imperial Germany amongst the sympathisers and advocates for the Saxons. Wattenbach retained an interest in Saxon affairs and revisited Teutsch in 1881. Shortly afterwards he became involved in the formation of the ADS and its initial campaign to aid the Transylvanian Saxons. His final published piece in the late 1890s was a review of a book edited by Friedrich Teutsch, who had been his lodger while a student in Heidelberg. He called the recent history of the Saxons ‘a history of suffering’ but also acknowledged that both externally and internally the Saxons now accepted dualism and had to make the best of the situation. Treitschke, too, continued to be interested in Transylvania, visiting in 1887. He later thanked Teutsch, writing that ‘it was, for me, an inexpressible joy to see the best Germans of Austria, there, in the far Carpathian lands’. However, he did not publicly advocate the Saxon cause strongly after his initial attempts in the mid 1870s.

The dualist system and the unification of Germany brought about fundamental changes to Saxon politics. Hungarian political dominance and potential aid from Imperial Germany became fixed points in the Saxon political matrix. German state and diplomatic pragmatism allied to a general public indifference meant, after initial hope and a push for support, there was little chance of concrete benefits or any alleviation of the Saxon situation from Imperial Germany. Yet notions of German
solidarity did not disappear after its failure as a political tactic. Abstract ideas of a common shared culture with the wider German-speaking world persisted, though now divorced from the official policies of the German state. Vague pan-Germanism found some followers, especially around Kronstadt and the ‘Green’ movement, in the last decade of the nineteenth century, partly in response to the conciliatory stance at the 1890 Saxon Day. The ‘Blacks’, mostly based in Hermannstadt, continued to counsel conciliation. Others, including Baussnern, gradually assimilated into the Hungarian elite. Thus the German nationalist element in Saxon politics changed and transformed, waxed and waned, seemed all-important for some or irrelevant for others. It was one of the many factors and possible tendencies for Saxons as they adjusted to the post 1867-71 situation: subsumed within a powerful Hungary, detached from other German-speakers within the Habsburg empire, neglected by an acquiescent Monarch in Vienna, subjected to demographic and economic pressures, then shorn of autonomy and largely ignored by Imperial Germany. The period in the wake of the dualist settlement and the unification of Germany was a turning point in the slow emergence of Saxon self-perception as an embattled minority on the borderlands of Western civilization.

---

1 Place names can be a contentious issue in Central and Eastern Europe scholarship. In this article, for readability, at the first mention the place name will be given in the form German/Romanian/Hungarian and thereafter the German version will be used. Some place names normally not given in German will be in Hungarian or Romanian. For towns and cities with a commonly used English place name, then English will be used. The decisions on place names are based solely on readability and convenience.

2 The religious make-up of Hermannstadt in 1887 was Lutherans (46%), Catholics (25%), Eastern Orthodox (15%), Greek Catholic/Uniate (7%), Reformed/Calvinist (5%) and Jews (1.5%).


12 See Friedrich Gottas, ‘Die Deutschen in Ungarn’ in A. Wandruszka and P. Urbanitsch (eds.), Die Habsburger Monarchie Vol. 3. Die Völker des Reiches (2 Vols., Vienna, 1980), I, p. 387. Winson Chu’s work on German speakers in Poland during the inter-war and Nazi time also highlights this aspect, though there were different conditions, traditions and dynamics. Winson Chu, ‘”Volksgemeinschaften unter sich”: German minorities and regionalism in Poland, 1918-1939’ in Neil Gregor, Nils Roemer and Mark Roseman (eds.), German history from the margins (Bloomington, 2006), pp. 104-20 and idem, The German minority in interwar Poland (Cambridge, 2012).


16 This is especially the case for the inter-war period, but it is questionable whether it should be read back into the nineteenth century. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe (Cambridge, 1996). See also Günter Schödl, Alldöutscher Verband und deutsche Minderheitenpolitik in Ungarn 1890-1914. Zur Geschichte des deutschen ‘extremen Nationalismus’ (Frankfurt am Main, 1978) and Roger Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most German. A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886-1914 (Boston, 1984).


18 For the importance of diplomatic and state considerations see Hermann Oncken, ‘Deutschland und Österreich seit der Gründung des neuen Reiches (1871-1911) in idem, Historisch-politische Aufsätze


24 The importance of the Hermannstadt diet for the Romanians, the first time they were accepted in the Transylvanian diet as equals, is highlighted in Keith Hitchins, ‘The Rumanians of Transylvania and constitutional experiment in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1860-1865’, *Balkan Studies* 5 (1964) 1, pp. 89-108 and idem, ‘The Rumanians of Transylvania and the Ausgleich, 1865-1869’, in L’udovít Holotík, ed., *Der österreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich* (Bratislava, 1971), pp. 860-96. See also Simion Retegan, ‘Die Siebenbürgischen Landtage 1848 bis 1865’ in Helmut Rumpler and Peter Urbanitsch (eds.), *Die


28 There is a large collection of pamphlets on the subject, mostly from the 1860s, in Rannicher’s personal papers. SJAN, Col. Bruckenthal, Nachlass Jakob Rannicher, H. 1-5/225/ 1862-1865. The railway question was a constant theme in his correspondence.


32 Guido Baussnern, ‘Mahnruft an Ungarn’ in idem, *Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn*, pp. 47-57.

33 See the discussion in F. Teutsch, *G. D. Teutsch*, pp. 122-8. As Marilyn McArthur has noted, this historical work moved away from the traditional Saxon emphasis on source work and legal history, instead emphasizing the common language, culture and Lutheran religion of the Transylvanian Saxons.

34 Ibid, p. 135.


41 Teutsch, *G. D. Teutsch*, p. 97 and 435-8. Franz Zimmerman, the newly arrived archivist and the son of an old friend of Teutsch’s, has left a vivid description of these meetings from around the time 1875-76. Franz Zimmermann, *Zeitbuch. Autobiographische Aufzeichnungen eines Hermannstädters Archivars (1875-1925)* (Cologne-Weimar-Vienna, 2013), pp. 81-4.

42 Zimmermann, *Zeitbuch*, p. 82.

43 The lecture on 20 November 1869 at the local museum provoked a letter to the editors of the *Heidelberger Zeitung* defending the education and culture of Transylvanian Romanians. Wattenbach in an undated letter to Teutsch was apologetic for his negative remarks about the Romanian population


49 Ibid, pp. 211 and 222.


55 See, for example, Georg D. Teutsch, Rede zur Feier des hundertjährigen Geburtstages Friedrich Schiller’s an dem evangelischen Gymnasium zu Schässburg im Siebenbürgen den 10. November 1859 (Kronstadt, [1859?]).


59 Vlaicu, Briefe an Georg Daniel Teutsch, p. 222. Teutsch was more optimistic in the reply. SJAN, G.D. Teutsch Nachlass, 34/340, 1874-1876. Teutsch to Treitschke, 25 June 1875.

60 SDW, 7 September 1870 ‘Wochenschau’.

61 SDW, 7 September 1870, ‘Zum zweiten September’.


63 Baussnern, ‘Mahnuruf an Ungarn’, pp. 47-57 at 56.

64 Rannicher, Briefe und Reden, I, pp. 269-302.


67 SDW, 11 January 1871 ‘Rechtsboden’ and SDW 22 March 1871.

68 Gustav Lindner and Guido von Baussnern, Bericht der Abgeordneten der sächsischen Nations-Universität (Schässburg [?], 1871[?]).

69 Lindner and Baussnern, Bericht (undated).


71 For the full programme see Ernst Wagner, ed., Quellen zur Geschichte der Siebenbürgen Sachsen (Cologne-Vienna, 1981), pp. 235-41.


74 Josef Gull to G.D. Teutsch, 29 November 1872 and 28 December 1872 in Vlaicu, Briefe an Georg Daniel Teutsch, pp. 199-203. Göllner is uncharacteristically misleading here when he stated that the distinctions between Old and Young Saxons had disappeared. Göllner, ‘Erwartungen und Enttäuschungen’, p. 31.

75 Rannicher, Briefe und Reden, I, pp. 292-4. Rannicher to G. D. Teutsch, 6 November 1868.


77 Ibid, p. 629.


81 See for example his electoral speech for the Reps seat in SDW, 29 May 1872 ‘Wochenschau’.

82 SDW, 31 December 1873 ‘Repräsentation an Graf Szapary’.

83 DPHG 1 (November 1921) 3-4, pp. 16-19. Open letter Baussnern to Theil, 23 May 1874. The open letter was published by Karl Wolff in the SDT.

84 For example, in Hermannstadt Gustav Kapp (Young) confronted Jakob Rannicher (Old), in Schässburg Josef Gull (Old) opposed Karl Fabritius (Young) and in Kronstadt Emil Trauschenfels (Old) faced Friedrich Wächter (Young). See the interesting report drafted by Baussnern for his electorate dated 18 April 1875 in DPHG 2 (March 1922) 3, pp. 12-22 at 20-2.


86 Rannicher, Briefe und Reden, I, pp. 304-6. Rannicher to Johann Goett, 15 March 1874.


88 Ibid, p. 313.


90 SDT, 1 January 1874, ‘An unsere Leser’.

91 Ibid.


93 DPHG 1 (November 1921) 3-4, p. 19. Baussnern to Theil, 24 May 1874


95 Ibid, p. 6.

96 Ibid, p. 33.

98 Ibid, p. 43.

99 Ibid, p. 29.

100 DPHG 1 (November 1921) 3-4, p. 14-15. Baussnern to Theil, 2 March 1874.

101 [Baussnern], Das Erwürgen der deutschen Nationalität, pp. 56-9.


103 Ibid, p. 298


106 [Jakab Elek], Der Kampf der Siebenbürger Sachsen für die Überreste des Feudalwesens (Budapest, 1874).


111 [Elek], Der Kampf der Siebenbürger Sachsen, p. 9.

112 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz (GStA.PK), Gesandschaft Dresden nach 1807, 299/A1333, 2 March 1875; A 2587 22 May 1875; A6149 16 December 1875. Other reports about Hungary and its government were also received at various times from Hans Lothar Schweinitz, the German ambassador in Vienna (for example, A1220 1 March 1875).


114 See also the comments in Manz, Constructing a German Diaspora, p. 53, 84 and 236 and Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, p. 114-5.

115 The exact provisions can be found in Municipal und Gemeinde-Gesetze in Ungarn. Ein Zusammenstellung geltender Gesetze (Hermannstadt, 1876).


GStA.PK, Gesandschaft Dresden nach 1807, 299/A1649, 25 March 1876.

SJAN, Nachlass G.D. Teutsch 34/340 1874-1876. Teutsch to Treitschke, 14 July 1876.

SB. PK, Nachlass Treitschke 17/32/1. Treitschke to Teutsch, 5 August 1876. See also Vlaicu, *Briefe an Georg Daniel Teutsch*, p. 221-2. Treitschke to Teutsch, 23 April 1875.

SB. PK, Nachlass Treitschke 17/32/5, Treitschke to Teutsch, 2 December 1876.


Baussnern, *Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn*, pp. 73-82.

Ibid, p. 230 and 239.


Winson Chu also discusses the importance of ‘state-oriented thinking’ in forming conceptions of ‘Germanness’. Chu, *The German Minority in Interwar Poland*, pp. 105-6.