FULHAM 878–79: A NEW CONSIDERATION OF VIKING MANOEUVRES

John Baker and Stuart Brookes

In 878, Alfred experienced perhaps the most significant set-back of his reign followed by one of his greatest triumphs. Early in the year, a great Viking army under the leadership of Guthrum invaded Wessex, driving many of its inhabitants overseas, and forcing the king to take refuge in the remote marshlands of Somerset.

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Abstract: This paper uses evidence from a variety of disciplines in order to re-evaluate an apparently enigmatic event reported in several early sources – the landing of a Viking force at Fulham in 878. It examines the vocabulary of written accounts of their activities, sets archaeological evidence for a military camp at the site within a wider context, and gives further consideration to the strategic background of that location within a military landscape. These combined approaches, it is argued, allow a more detailed picture of this Viking war-band and its military significance to emerge.

Keywords: Anglo-Saxon Chronicle; Fulham; Viking Camp; hlōþ; military strategy
By spring, however, Alfred seems to have been in a position to retaliate, and
advancing through Somerset and Wiltshire he took on and defeated the Vikings at
*Ehandune*, probably Edington in Wiltshire (878 ASC A; Stenton 1971, 255–57).

Guthrum’s Viking army, so recently victorious, spent much of the summer
surrounded, probably at Chippenham, and finally retreated north of the Thames to
Cirencester in the autumn (878 ASC A). The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* reports the
arrival in the Thames, at about the same time, of another Viking force and its
encampment at Fulham. For the next year, these two war-bands remained in place
before Guthrum led his army to East Anglia to settle the land, and the Fulham Vikings
departed for Ghent and the continent, to initiate a new phase of raiding on the other
side of the Channel.

The final months of 878 were, therefore, a momentous time for Alfred and
Wessex, and Guthrum’s invasion earlier that year was perhaps a seminal moment in
the evolution of West Saxon military strategy, if nothing else. In spite of Guthrum’s
retreat to Cirencester, the arrival of more Vikings at Fulham is generally considered to
have ushered in a period of extreme danger for the West Saxon kingdom. Indeed,
insofar as they have commented on the Fulham Vikings, most authors have seen their
arrival and departure as a reaction to West Saxon affairs, to a greater or lesser degree.
In discussing the context of Edington, Whitelock felt that the Fulham army was
‘uncomfortably close’ to Wessex, and together with the force at Cirencester made the
year 878–79 ‘an anxious one for the West Saxons’. With regard to authorship of the
*Chronicle*, she seemed to imply, moreover, that the movements of the Fulham army
were so closely tied in with Alfred’s activities, that the *Chronicle*’s failure to explain
the former’s departure was demonstrative of its not having been compiled under the
instruction of the West Saxon king (1977, 8–9).² Why omit the details that emphasized Alfred’s military virtue if the Chronicle’s primary aim was to extol his prowess? For Smyth, the report of the Fulham Vikings’ exit from the Insular scene set the seal on Alfred’s victory over Guthrum (1995, 101),³ and he is joined by Peddie in viewing this ultimately as a result of Alfred’s improved military position after success in battle at Edington (2001, 146–47, 149). Similarly, Charles-Edwards discusses the movements of the Cirencester and Fulham armies as a product of the terms of Guthrum’s treaty with Alfred (1998, 49), again therefore linking activities at Fulham with Alfred’s changing military and political position. Haslam goes much further, intimately linking the departure of the Fulham Vikings with Alfred’s construction of a series of strongholds across Wessex (2006). He argues that the immediate impulse for the inception of this system was the positioning of Viking forces at Cirencester and Fulham, which it was intended to counter and dislodge, and that it was essentially successful in this aim.

Two points are clear from previous analyses. Firstly, few authorities have commented on the episode involving the Fulham Vikings as an independent event, but have focussed instead on its role as a sub-plot within a wider military or strategic interplay. Secondly, these commentaries almost exclusively present it as an episode

² Had the chronicler been writing under Alfred’s supervision, Whitelock supposed, ‘we might have known by what means the two Danish armies were persuaded to leave Mercia’.

³ Note also, ‘[i]t may say something of Alfred’s ability to make the peace with Guthrum stick, that the newcomers at Fulham decided against staying in England’ (Smyth 1995, 87).
relating foremost to West Saxon history. Since the events of 878–79 are best known from the accounts of the *Chronicle* and Asser, it is to be expected that they are presented from a West Saxon viewpoint. These are texts that originated in Wessex, and there is an unfortunate dearth of contemporary Mercian commentaries. It is more surprising that modern historians have tended to follow the contemporary sources in interpreting them primarily from an Alfredian angle, especially given that both Cirencester and Fulham were within territory that might have been considered to be part of Mercia – or at least part of Mercian interests – at times during this period. As Abels has cautioned, the movement of the Fulham force might have been a response to activities beyond the West Saxon frontier (1998, 163). Apart from the geographical

4 This is not to imply that the *Chronicle* and the *Life of Alfred* necessarily expounded an official version of events as dictated by the rulers of Wessex (Wallace-Hadrill 1950, 212–14, 216–17; Davis 1971); but whatever the motives behind the works of Asser and the early chroniclers, they were clearly written under West Saxon auspices and were presumably more easily provided with sources from Wessex than from elsewhere (Keynes and Lapidge 1983, 39–41 and 283, n.14; Keynes 1998, 40–45; Kershaw 2001). In general, these works are more likely, therefore, to present a West Saxon interpretation of events than a Mercian one.

5 Kelly 2004, 23–24 summarizes the fluctuating position of London and Middlesex during the second half of the ninth century. That the arrival and departure of the Fulham Vikings warrant only brief mention in Walker’s detailed monograph on Mercia (2000, 151), and are overlooked by Zaluckyj and Zaluckyj in their outline of the independent Mercian kingdom’s final years (2001), may also be symptomatic of a dominant assumption that the events were primarily of West Saxon interest.
limitations of the main sources, a key reason for the prevalence of a West Saxon perspective on the Fulham Vikings in particular seems to be an unstated but persistent assumption that the Vikings who arrived at Fulham in 878 constituted a major army. This must be the implication of Stenton’s description of the event, in which the army seems to be fully assembled before entering the Thames, and indeed two centuries ago Turner (1836, 575) described the Vikings that arrived at Fulham as ‘a large fleet of Northmen’. The assumption that the Fulham army was a sizeable and formidable foe already in 878 surely underpins the analyses of other scholars who view the movements of the Fulham force as part of a direct interplay with Alfred – its arrival a threat to his position; its departure a mark of his triumph. This is far from being an untenable position in relation to the written sources, but, as is discussed below, a more nuanced interpretation is possible and perhaps preferable.

Although the broad chronology of these events is well established, their full significance depends on our reading of the contemporary or near-contemporary accounts, both textual and archaeological; and on an interpretation of the strategic

6 ‘Before Guthrum’s army had completed that occupation of East Anglia, another Viking force was coming together in northern waters. In the autumn of 878 this new army entered the Thames and took winter quarters at Fulham’ (Stenton 1971, 257).

7 ‘A large fleet of Northmen arrived in the Thames, who joined Godrun, as if desirous to unite with him in a new warfare; but, Alfred having pacified his ambition, these adventurers found no encouragement to continue here. They wintered at Fulham, and then followed their leader, the famous Hastings, into Flanders; and remained a year at Ghent.’
landscape of Mercia and Wessex. The assumption that a significant army of Vikings arrived in the Thames in 878, and therefore the assumption that it directly threatened Alfred and Wessex, fail to take full account of the range of evidence available. In fact, the key narrators of the events of late 878 seem to be in disagreement about the nature of the Viking army that set up camp at Fulham, and no account of the latter’s interaction with Guthrum, Alfred, or the Mercians can properly progress without careful appraisal of the relevant texts and an evaluation of their conflicting reports. Furthermore, careful analysis of the material remains left by the Vikings can help to provide a more nuanced appreciation of their activities (e.g. Brooks and Graham-Campbell 1986), especially given recent advances in available data brought about by the Portable Antiquities Scheme.

The present discussion employs a fully multidisciplinary approach to understanding the manoeuvres of the Fulham Vikings, taking textual, linguistic, archaeological, and topographical evidence into consideration, and setting the arrival and positioning of that war-band into a clear strategic framework. It gives greater emphasis to the Chronicle’s account than has sometimes been the case, establishes the archaeological evidence for Vikings in the Fulham area, and analyses the landscape setting and military potential of the location, attempting to redefine the threat faced by the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms in light of these. A fresh consideration of the nature of the Fulham force sits more naturally within a framework that places Mercia, rather than Wessex, at the centre of events.

**Characterizing the Viking Force at Fulham**

A crucial element to any appraisal of the Vikings at Fulham is an understanding of the nature of their force, especially its size. In this respect, as should be expected,
archaeological and onomastic approaches can add little. According to the *Chronicle*, the Vikings remained at Fulham only for about a year, as an encamped army rather than as colonizing settlers. This is unlikely to have been enough time to leave an indelible mark on local toponymy. At the same time, identified archaeological remains are at present insufficient for an estimate of the community’s size. However, it may be possible to assess the nature of the force by a detailed consideration of the Fulham Vikings in ninth- and tenth-century consciousness.

At first glance, it seems clear that the Viking war-band ensconced at Fulham at Christmas 878 was a large expeditionary force. Asser, writing of its arrival, emphasizes the size of the Viking army, which he calls *magnus paganorum exercitus*, literally ‘a great army of pagans’, presumably in other words ‘a great Viking army’ (Stevenson 1959, 47; Keynes and Lapidge 1983, 85). The *Annals of St Vaast* describe how the same band of Vikings arrived on the continent ‘with an infinite multitude’ (*cum infinita multitudine*; Whitelock 1979, 137; Dehaisnes 1871, 299), after leaving Fulham, and the A text of the *Chronicle*, describing its departure from Fulham in 879, calls the band a *here* or ‘army’. These descriptions set a precedent that is generally followed by later chroniclers.

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8 A recurrent military presence at or association with a site might be recognized in local place-names (e.g. Hill and Sharp 1997; Reynolds 1999, 92–94; Baker forthcoming), but a single, brief stay by a Scandinavian army is very unlikely to have been recorded in this way, and almost certainly would not have resulted in Scandinavian settlement-names.

9 ‘7 þy ilcan geare for se here ofer sæ þe ær on Fullan home sæt on Fronc lond to Gend, 7 sæt þær an gear’ (And the same year the raiding army which had earlier
A problem arises when these accounts are compared with the *Chronicle* annal 879, which details the entry into the Thames and settlement at Fulham of the Viking force late in 878 thus: ‘7 þy geare gegadrode on hloþ wicenga, 7 gesæt æt Fullan hamme be Temese’ (And that year a gang of vikings gathered and settled [sojourned?] at Fulham on the Thames’; ASC A; Earle and Plummer 1892, 76; Swanton 1996, 76). Swanton’s use of ‘settled’ is unfortunate; ‘remained’ is probably a preferable translation here (cf. Garmonsway 1972, 76), or even perhaps ‘sojourned’.

10 The chronicle ascribed to John of Worcester states that ‘a great pagan army (magnus paganorum exercitus) from beyond the sea sailed into the River Thames, and joined the former army (adunatusque est superiori exercitu); however it wintered in the place called Fulham, near the River Thames’ (Bray et al 1995, 312–13), and Simeon of Durham records that ‘there came an immense army of pagans (immensus venit paganorum exercitus) from foreign regions into the river Thames, who, forming a junction with the aforesaid body, became banded together (qui adunatus est supradicto cuneo, complices effecti), as is the manner of the wicked’ (Stevenson 1858, 80; Arnold 1885, 84–85). Note, however, Henry of Huntingdon’s less specific description: ‘Eodem anno Wicingi collegerunt nouum exercitum, et manserunt Fulanham iuxta Tamesim’ (the same year the Vikings gathered a new army and stayed at Fulham on the Thames) (Greenway 1996, 288–90). William of Malmesbury simply states that: ‘[t]he remnant of the Danes (*Ceteri ex Danis*), who had refused to become Christians, crossed the sea with Hæsten, and the damage they did there is well known to the inhabitants’ (Mynors et al 1998, 184–85).
Christine Fell drew attention to the language of this annal, noting its use of wicenga (Latin piratę in MS F), a genitive plural form of OE wicing (1986, 304–07). This is a term very rarely used in the Chronicle. Rather than being a way of identifying Scandinavians by nationality, wicing seems to have been used to distinguish piratae from an exercitus, in other words groups of pirates from larger war-bands.

As Fell noted, choice of the word hlōþ may also be significant, here employed rather than the more usual here, which is used to describe Guthrum’s army at Cirencester, and, as we have seen, the Fulham Vikings on their departure. This point is worth pursuing. OE hlōþ is a term with several possible meanings, including ‘a band, a company of people’ (Bosworth and Toller 1898; Roberts and Kay 1995, 1082), and it is used again in the Chronicle to describe the Viking bands active in Kent in 893. The sense there is certainly one of small groups of armed men rather than of large armies (Earle and Plummer 1892, 84; Swanton 1996, 84).

The Old English Orosius, which probably comes from a similar scholarly milieu to the ‘890 Chronicle’ (Bately 1980, xciii), uses hlōþ three times. The phrase


12 The term is also used of ‘booty, spoils’ and ‘wrongful taking, theft’ (Roberts and Kay 1995, 1082), and occurs in various compound nouns.

containing the first example, ‘hloðum on hie staledon’ (Bately 1980, 55, ll. 18–21) is translated by Bosworth as ‘stole up on them with small bands’ (1855, 98). The context of a later instance seems to suggest a style of guerrilla warfare that might well have involved the use of small bands of soldiers rather than a large army:

Philippusse gefuhte þa þæt he leng mid folcgefeohtum wið hie ne mehte, ac oftrædlice he wæs mid hloþum on hi hergende, & onbutan sierwende op hie eft totwæmde wæron, & ða on ungearwe on Ahtene mid firde gefor. (Bk III, 7; Bately 1980, 65, ll. 9–10),

(Philip then thought that he could no longer withstand them in a pitched battle; but he often harassed them by foragers (mid hloþum), scouting about, till they were separated, and he then suddenly marched with his army upon Athens’ (Bosworth 1855, 108–09).

The third, ‘[h]e þa his here on tu todælde: sum ymb þa burg sætt; & he mid sumum hloþum for, & monega byrg bereafode on Cheranisse, Creca folce’ (Bk III, 7; Bately 1980, 64, ll. 10–11) (He then divided his army (here) into two parts: some he set round the city, and with other bands (mid sumum hloþum) he went and plundered many cities of the Chersonesians, a people of Greece) (Bosworth 1855, 107) is remarkable in drawing a clear distinction between the army and its subdivisions; the full-strength force is called here, while smaller units that make up the army are referred to as hlōpas. Bateley (1980, xciii) points out that the Old English Orosius is a paraphrase rather than a literal translation, but it is worth noting that the Latin text at this point categorizes Philip’s actions as piratical (piraticum adgressus est). After looting some ships, he is described as dividing up the army (diuisit exercitum) in order to maintain the siege and undertake further plundering (propter agendam praedam et
curandam obsidionem) at the same time (Arnaud-Lindet 1990, 157–58, Book III.13, 3–4).

The word hlōþ was also used in the law-code attributed to Ine specifically to define a group of bandits not more than thirty-five in number (Liebermann 1903, 94), from which Sawyer controversially argued that a here might be of very limited size (Sawyer 1962, 120). It seems unlikely that the chronicler had this legalese in mind when describing the arrival of the Fulham Vikings, and we should be careful not to assume that a hlōþ necessarily numbered fewer than thirty-five; but the term clearly could be used specifically to describe smaller war-bands. The Dictionary of Old English Corpus lists only five other texts that use the uncompounded word hlōþ, and in at least three of these the context suits a sense ‘band, company’.

There is therefore reason to believe that hlōþ could apply to a smaller band of people, and in two instances – one legal, one poetic – it is used specifically in contrast to the term here.

Where the size of Viking fleets is given in numbers, the accuracy of the Chronicle’s estimates has been robustly defended (Brooks 1979, 2–9), and although terminology may have a more nuanced usage than numerals, it is possible that a scribe’s choice of words reflects knowledge of the relative size or status of Viking war-bands. Abels (2003), for example, has argued that the chroniclers’ use of the term here to describe Viking armies has specific connotations, contrasting with the

14 Bradley translates ‘throngs’ (hloþum), ‘the crew of men’ (secga hloþe) and ‘in swarms’ (hloþum) in Guthlac, Juliana, and Soul and Body respectively (1982, 271, 318, 361). The other two instances (one in the poem Christ, the other in the Old English Bede) may carry the sense ‘booty’ or ‘spoil’, rather than ‘band of people’ (Bradley 1982, 236; Miller 1999, 70).
organized and legitimate fyrd, and in particular that the perception of a single, unified ‘army’ operating at Fulham in 879 may be a more recent construct based on doubtful preconceptions about the nature of Viking war-bands (271). He also notes the tendency of disparate Viking raiding groups in Francia to coalesce on occasion in order to tackle larger targets, and warns against interpreting their organization in England any differently (Abels 2003, 271–72, 279). In that case, the Chronicle’s choice of hlōþ in this instance may also be significant.

It would be wrong to put too much emphasis on a single word, but even the verb chosen by the chronicler seems incompatible with the arrival of a large, composite army. The verb in question is gegadrian (preterite gegadrode) ‘to gather, assemble’ (Healey et al 1986–), which is also used, for example, to describe Alfred’s assembling of the fyrd in 893. In the language of the Chronicle, established Viking armies, including Guthrum’s, tend to ‘come’ and ‘go’ (OE cuman and faran). In other words, the Chronicle annal seems relatively clear about what was happening at Fulham: it was not, in the chronicler’s view, the arrival of a fully-formed and large army or here, but the assembling of a relatively small group of pirates, perhaps still in the process of gathering together after they arrived at Fulham. The implication may well be that Fulham was used as a mustering point for various groups active in western Europe, and perhaps also new recruits from Scandinavia.\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\) The former Munster House, just to the northeast of Fulham Palace (the label is partly visible on Fig.1), may be significant. It seems to be associated with Mustow (1397), the most likely explanation of which is OE (ge)mōt-stōw ‘assembly-place’. A little way to the north, Normand Park preserves part of the name Noemansland (1492) ‘no-man’s land’ (Gover, Mawer, and Stenton 1942, 102, 105). The names may be
It is easy to overlook this account as an aberration and to give priority to the more widely shared assessment of the size of the Fulham force – that is to say, that it was a major army. There are two very good reasons, however, why this lone contradictory voice should be heard. Firstly, as has been demonstrated, the language of this annal seems so specific in its implication, that it is hard to imagine that the scribe responsible did not intend to propound the view that the Fulham Vikings arrived at first as a small band. Secondly, of all the sources for this event, the ‘890 Chronicle’ is closest to the action both temporally and spatially.

In one sense, the accounts can be reconciled quite easily. The discrepancy with the subsequent annal in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle and with the continental witnesses is easily overcome if it is assumed that the first Viking arrivals at Fulham were small in number, but were in the process of recruiting; by the time they departed the following year, and certainly by the time they reached Francia, they were indeed numerous. We know that the personnel of this Viking host changed over the ensuing decade and a half (Smyth 1995, 116; Abels 2003, 275), and there is no reason to assume that its composition was stable between 878 and 879. As already stressed, the implied sense of the 879 entry, covering the events of late 878, is that Viking warriors were gathering near Fulham; by the time they departed for Ghent, they seem to have been a formidable host, but in 878 it may indeed have been little more than a gang of indicative of a local tradition of neutral ground and public assembly, and therefore perhaps also of military muster. It is impossible to say if this tradition goes further back than the fourteenth century, but it would not be the only time that a Viking force camped at an established Anglo-Saxon site of assembly (cf. 1006 ASC and S 1454; Gelling 1973–76, 481–82; Reynolds 1999, 80).
pirates that made the initial landing at Fulham. This may seem like a small point, but an army that was recruiting through the course of 879 is unlikely to have been a significant strategic threat to Alfred’s Wessex until perhaps a year or more after his victory at Edington.

A further divergence from Asser’s description is worth noting. According to Asser (Life of Alfred, ch. 58) the Fulham Vikings made contact with Guthrum’s army, a claim reiterated in John of Worcester’s chronicle (Bray et al 1995, 312–13; see fn9), but not mentioned in other more nearly contemporary works. In one sense, there is no need to dismiss this assertion simply because Asser’s assessment of the size of the Fulham force differs from that of the Chronicle for late 878. In talking about a large force, Asser was if anything guilty of simplification, not out and out error. It is important, however, to consider the different backgrounds to the Life and the Chronicle. The original annalist for the entry covering late 878, and (if different) the scribe who compiled the ‘890 Chronicle’, would have experienced the events directly or indirectly from a West Saxon viewpoint, and may have relied on West Saxon sources in compiling that section of the Chronicle. Asser, on the other hand, was not present in Wessex at the time of the events (Keynes and Lapidge 1983, 27, 213–14 n24). He may have been in receipt of reports from Mercia and Wessex before his arrival at Alfred’s court, but he was probably further removed from the events than the chronicler was.

Any meeting between Guthrum and the leaders of the Fulham Vikings presumably took place on the Thames, or in the remnants of Mercia, perhaps somewhere between Cirencester and Fulham. In the latter case the meeting is more likely to have gained renown in Wales through Mercian channels – perhaps even from noble or ecclesiastical refugees – than through West Saxon ones; but Asser
presumably also communicated with the Mercian scholars at Alfred’s court in the 890s. If it was of strategic importance to the West Saxons, we might expect them to have been aware of it as well. It is of course conceivable that the two Viking groups formed a military alliance against Wessex (Haslam 2006, 124), but there are other possible reasons for making contact. Guthrum was perhaps the most significant potentate in Mercia, and the Fulham leaders may simply have been making peace, obtaining permission to remain unmolested, or establishing spheres of activity. They may even have been on a recruitment drive. It should not, however, be forgotten that by the time Asser was writing, the Fulham war-band had evolved into a vast army and spent many years pillaging in Francia. Most tellingly, its latest incarnation had returned to southern England only months before Asser completed his Life of Alfred in 893 (Keynes and Lapidge 1983, 53). Late in 892, the army led by Hæsten – apparently consisting of eighty ships – had sailed up the Thames, landed somewhere near Milton Regis, and proceeded to make contact with another, larger army already in situ (ASC A s.a. 893; Stenton 1971, 265–66). In other words, Asser’s description of the Fulham army and its behaviour in 878 is a direct echo, albeit on the other side of the Thames, of the behaviour of its successor in the months immediately before he wrote his account.

It is surely significant that the view apparently expounded by the Chronicle is that the Viking band at Fulham in late 878 was not especially imposing, at least from a West Saxon viewpoint. The description given in the 879 annal is specific enough (perhaps unusually so) and sufficiently unequivocal not to have been a mistake – had the scribe been at all unsure, he would surely have assumed that the Viking host arrived fully assembled, in the normal manner, and was of considerable size. It seems equally unlikely that the Chronicle scribe was intentionally misleading, since in the
context of West Saxon literary output of this kind, it would presumably have been
more acceptable to overestimate the hostile fleet than to minimize it. Of course, all the
accounts were written with the benefit of hindsight and in most cases this may have
had an important influence on perceptions of the 878 landing; but of all the narratives,
the *Chronicle* surely has the best claim to authority.\(^{16}\)

*Landscape, Location, and Strategy*

If the written sources tend not to be explicit about strategy, they certainly pay
considerable attention to location. By detailing the movements of both Vikings and
Anglo-Saxons, and by naming the places at which they set up camp, they allow us to
develop a picture of the wider strategic context. Furthermore, by examining this
information within a landscape of movement and defence identifiable through
archaeological, topographical, and toponymic study, we are able to build some
understanding of the strategic priorities of the various protagonists.

There are clear reasons to doubt the immediate territorial threat posed to Wessex
by the Fulham Vikings. The strategic significance of the geographical positioning of
the Fulham force, which has been described by Haslam, for example, as a position
from which it could ‘directly threaten Wessex’ (2006, 125–26 and 126–27), may be

\(^{16}\) It may be worth noting, as Campbell did (1962, 43 fn2), that Æthelweard
omitted to mention the band’s arrival at all, describing only its departure, and giving
little indication of the size of the army concerned. If this was not simply an oversight,
then perhaps he knew from other traditions that the advent of the band was less clearly
defined than has been inferred from the *Chronicle* and from Asser’s account – that the
precise date of its arrival was harder to identify than that of its departure.
questioned on three fronts: firstly, by setting the archaeological evidence for the Fulham encampment within a comparative context, taking into account other Viking bases; secondly, by analogy with other military actions involving river crossings; and thirdly, by consideration of the distribution of West Saxon defensive investment.

**Archaeology of the Fulham Vikings**

In assessing the scale of the Viking war-party at Fulham it is useful to consider the pattern of Viking activities in England and Francia during the ninth century. From *Chronicle* descriptions of military engagements over these years, key distinctions emerge in the tactics deployed by the Vikings depending on the size of their war bands, which can in turn be related to archaeological evidence. Smaller raiding parties, ranging in size from four to sixteen ships (perhaps in the order of 160 to 640 men), such as those recorded for the years 882, 885, or 896, are described only as naval engagements; there is no indication that they built or exploited fortified bases to make sorties inland. By way of contrast, the strategies of the so-called Great Armies of 865–78 and 892–95 are clearly to be seen as determined efforts at conquest, in which tactical manoeuvres focussed on gaining and holding major large-scale fortified sites, in particular former Roman towns and *villae regales*. Evidently, these large Viking forces did also engage in fortification work of their own. Asser states in chapter 35, that the Viking force using the royal vill of Reading as a base in 871 constructed a *vallum* ‘rampart’ on the southern side of the estate between the rivers Thames and Kennet, though this may well have been an elaboration of defences which already existed at the site (Yorke forthcoming). Similarly, the *Chronicle* notes
that the Vikings ‘made forts’ (*worhte him geweorc*) at Milton Regis and Appledore in Kent in 892, a middle Anglo-Saxon royal vill and minster respectively.\(^\text{17}\)

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\(^\text{17}\) We might compare these with continental examples, where aggressive Viking forces made use of or added to existing fortifications at Nimwegen (Netherlands) in 880, Asselt on the Meuse (Netherlands) in 882, and at Louvain on the River Dyle (Belgium) in 891 (*Annals of Fulda* trans. Reuter 1992, 104, 121–23). Similar sites are known also from Ireland (Griffiths 2010, 30–32).

In both Kentish cases archaeological evidence for a Viking camp is equivocal, and several possible locations suggest themselves. Tradition maintains that a ‘castle’ stood where Appledore church now stands, but that this was destroyed in 1380 (Gould 1908, 440); according to Kilburne in 1659 ‘upon the ruines of that Castle the present Church was builded (the situation whereof rendreth the same probable).’ However, both Hasted (1797-1801) and the *Victoria County History* have suggested Kenardington c. 3km to the northeast of Appledore as the possible location of the camp. In the late Anglo-Saxon period this site would have lain on the waterway most probably used by the Vikings (Baker and Brookes forthcoming; Brookes forthcoming). From Kenardington church, the ground falls away to the east to a small cove, and to the south to the river. Around the church are still visible some earthworks, of possible Anglo-Saxon date, presumably demarcating an ecclesiastical enclosure. Halfway down the slope to the waterfront is a substantial bank and ditch, both above a previous fence-line. This bank peters out to the north, but the area circumscribed is still bounded on the north-western corner by a substantial holloway, which makes a dog-leg around the church precinct.
The most famous example of Viking fortification work in England is the D-shaped enclosure at Repton, Derbyshire, used as a winter-camp by the Great Army in 873–74 (Biddle and Kjølbye-Biddle 1992; 2001) (Figure 1). This earthwork encloses an area of c. 1.46ha on the former river bank of the River Trent and comprises a large bank and v-shaped ditch dug to incorporate the Anglo-Saxon minster (now parish church of St Wystan) as part of its circuit. Similar D-shaped enclosures attached to a river bank have been identified elsewhere in England perhaps indicating the widespread use of this type of fortification by the Vikings (Spurrell 1885, 293–95; Allcroft 1908, 379–99; Dyer 1972; Richards 1991, 23); indeed this design appears to have been utilized also by English forces during the late ninth and early tenth centuries (Dyer 1972, 226; Rodwell 1993, 77–80).18

Yet more confusion surrounds the Viking camp at Milton. Peddie (1999, 175) critiques the generally-held assumption identifying the camp with the earthworks at Castle Rough, 2km north-east of the present-day settlement. This small rectangular site has been shown through excavation to be a moated and fortified manor house of 13th- or 14th-century date (Mills 1973). Spurrell prefers Bayford Court 1km east of Milton as the Viking camp (Spurrell 1885, 293). A moat extending for 330m encloses the remains of the earthwork on three sides, though the planform resembles an 18th-century moated site.

18 In this regard it is worth noting that excavations of the Repton ditch in 1979 showed it to have been recut on four successive occasions, suggesting that it was a relatively long-lived defensive stratagem, the precise originator for which remains unknown.
An extension of the policy of fortified bases on major waterways was that of using offshore and estuarine islands as over-wintering sites; a strategy pursued by forces which were – presumably – middling in size, at Dublin from 841, Noirmoutier from 843, Thanet in 851, and Sheppey in 855; as well as by much larger armies, again at Thanet in 864, Mersea in 894, and Benfleet and Shoebury in 893, where it seems that fortifications were also built.\(^1^9\) These locations were clearly chosen as suitable

\(^1^9\) Spurrell suggests that it was possible in his day to define earthworks at Benfleet village surrounding the churchyard and village (1885, 294). Indeed the First Edition O.S. map of Benfleet does suggest that there may have been a curvilinear enclosure defined by the Benfleet creek and tributary at this point. Spurrell further states that ship remains and human skeletons were found at this location c. 1855 during the construction of a railway bridge (1885, 294), which would place it quite close to the location of the present railway station. Similar evidence was recorded at Shoebury. Gould noted that half of the banks of a D-shaped enclosure remained visible until the late 19th century but were subsequently destroyed by the Water Office authorities (1903, 286–87). According to Allcroft, these defences originally ran for c.853m from Rampart Street in the north to include visible ditch remnants in the west and south (1908, 338). At this point the bank was some 2.4m high with a shallow ditch of c. 12m width. The First Edition O.S. map does not show this feature, but there remains a hint of a D-shaped planform in the street morphology of Shoebury.

Evidence for Viking defences on the isles of Mersea and Thanet is lacking.

It should be noted that Iron Age antecedents are possible for at least some of the D-shaped enclosures listed by Dyer, and accepted uncritically by Richards. In particular, the large and more complex circuit of Wimblington (Figure 1) finds close
bases for raids further afield. In 893 Hæsten is recorded as attacking Mercian lands held by Ealdorman Æthelred from his fortification at Benfleet, but it may be significant that in both 893 and 894 Viking forces retreated to islands following military defeats, even though in the case of the latter, a suitable Viking base lay at Benfleet just over 30km away. Though it would be unwise to use this evidence as a hard-and-fast rule, there is a hint in this pattern of events that Viking fortification building was only undertaken by large offensive forces.

It is against this evidence that we must set that for a base at Fulham, though this remains sadly enigmatic. The core of the medieval settlement at Fulham lay on the north bank of the River Thames close to the bridge abutment with Putney Bridge, on an island of stable terrace gravels formed between two forks of a tributary to the Thames which sprang at Colehill (Emery and Mayo 2008, 328). This location is near the southern point of a large meander of the river and is believed to have been a fording point of the river certainly by the Roman period, when it lay on the line of a Roman road recorded on the southern bank of the Thames in Putney (Emery and Mayo 2008 327; Mills and Whipp 1979). Research on the palaeoenvironmental characteristics of the Thames suggests that over the course of the first millennium AD tide levels rose relative to the land, submerging much low-lying ground and backing analogues with Late Iron Age enclosed oppida such as Dyke Hills, Abingdon (both Oxfordshire), and Salmonsbury (Gloucestershire), as well as – potentially – Fulham itself (cf. e.g. Lambrick and Robinson 2009, 363).

To Thorney Island, one of the islands of the River Colne, located about 10km from the confluence with the River Thames in 893, and Mersea Island at the mouth of the River Blackwater in Essex in 894.
estuarine waters further up the Thames and its tributaries, especially after the fifth century (Branch et al. 2010, 273; Thomas, Cowie, and Siddell 2006, 40–41). Whilst it is therefore unlikely that the Roman ford continued into the ninth century, it is possible that this route remained important as a ferry crossing, as this is mentioned in Domesday Book and household accounts of Edward I (1272–1307) (Lysons 1810, 311).

The topography of medieval Fulham is dominated by Fulham Palace (Figure 1). This was known as a bishop’s residence in 1141 (Emery and Mayo 2008, 328), and perhaps originated as an estate granted to Waldhere, bishop of London in 704x709 (Sawyer 1968, charter no. 1785). Fulham Palace is set within a large trapezoidal moated enclosure of c. 14.5 ha which extends across much of the original island defined in the west by Bishops Avenue, and the east by Fulham High Street (Arthur and Whitehouse 1978, 46). The possibility that this moat was built by Vikings was already voiced by Féret in 1900, who drew attention also to the unusual place-name Comedanewharf mentioned in ‘a View’ of 1446 or 1447, and referring apparently to land on the river bank beside the moat, north of Putney Bridge (1900, 144–45, 213). The name itself is not a reference to the Danes, as Féret supposed, but was clearly interpreted as such due to modern folk-etymology.  

21 On the basis of a single form, no reliable attempt can be made to suggest a genuine etymology of Comedanewharf. As interpreted by Féret, it would be a landing-place (OE hwearfl/ME wharf ‘wharf’) qualified by a welcoming exhortation consisting of the imperative of OE cuman/ME comen, the verb ‘come’, with an ethnonym OE Dene/ME Dān/Dānes ‘Dane(s)’. For such a place-name to have developed into the recorded fifteenth-century form is phonologically improbable if
enclosure is datable to the late Roman period and potentially the Iron Age.

Excavations on the moat in the south-eastern corner of the enclosure in 1972–73 showed that along the Thames river frontage the moat was backed by a five-metre-wide bank of dump construction containing material datable to the third quarter of the fourth century AD (Arthur and Whitehouse 1978, 50–56). The close proximity of this feature to the conjectured river crossing suggested to the excavators that the Palace enclosure may have originated as bridgehead defences for the Roman settlement on the southern bank at Putney (Arthur and Whitehouse 1978, 56), which also may have had prehistoric antecedents (Emery pers. comm.). If this is the case, settlement in the late Anglo-Saxon period was at least partly contained within the south-east corner of the earlier earthwork (Cooper 2003, 41). The parish church of All Saints’ lies

not impossible, and Féret’s interpretation in any case reflects a place-name type for which there is little if any evidence. It is almost impossible to find parallels for such a construction. The most likely place to find them would be in field- or (ecclesiastical and secular) house-names, but even here the exhortations are usually to better yields or economic prosperity; cf. Pay My Cost field in St Erth, Cornwall (Field 1993, 112), or Dieulacres Abbey in Staffordshire (Horovitz 2005). There are no records of place-names of this type being coined in Old English. In other words, the likelihood of an OE or ME place-name meaning ‘come-dane(s)-wharf’ is practically zero, and Féret’s folk-etymologized proposal should be left to one side. In that case, the name is of interest to the present discussion only insofar as it reflects modern local folklore concerning the Viking stay at Fulham. There can be no certainty that the tradition was continuous from the medieval period, unless its context was the presence of learned members of the Bishop of London’s staff.
immediately outside the Palace enclosure on the south-eastern corner of Fulham island close to the later Putney Bridge, in an arrangement strikingly akin to the enclosed manorial sites of Faccombe Netherton, Goltho, and Trowbridge (compare Reynolds 2003, 116). Indeed, a number of finds and artefacts of late Anglo-Saxon date have been recovered from across the moated enclosure; particularly the extreme north and south-west corners of the enclosure where an assemblage of Anglo-Saxon pottery has been uncovered (Cooper 2003, 41). To these should also be added a ninth-century Anglo-Saxon spear, found just downstream from Fulham in 2008 during clearing on the Thames (Portable Antiquities Scheme find number: LON-920814).

The overall impression is that the Vikings chose Fulham as an island site, making use of existing earthworks, but not constructing new ones as a sign of aggressive intent.22

The Thames crossing

22 The island location is of course reinforced by the place-name Fulham *(Fulanham 704x709 (17th) S 1785; (of/aet/on) Fullanhamme c.890 ASC)*, derived from a personal name *Fulla* and OE *hamm* ‘land hemmed in by water or marsh’ (Gover, Mawer, and Stenton 1942, 101; cf. Gelling and Cole 2000, 49). Late medieval and modern local toponymy is also characteristic of a marshland environment. The Eights, an earlier name for the Palace grounds, is derived by Féret (probably correctly) from ModE *ait* (ME *æite*, OE ëged) ‘an island’ (1900, 144; cf. Smith 1956, 148). The field-names *le Fen* (1271), *Stroda* (1189–99), and *Cherloumersh* (1489) are also relevant (Gover, Mawer, and Stenton 1942, 215, who connect these with Fan Meadow, Stroud Mead, and Charley Mead).
As some have emphasized (e.g. Dumville 1992, 5–6; Abels 1998, 163; Haslam 2006, 125), Fulham is in Middlesex, which is generally considered to have been part of Mercia by the ninth century; in other words, it was on the ‘Mercian’ side of the Thames. Of course, during the ninth century London (and perhaps Middlesex) came at times under West Saxon control; but by the summer of 878, Alfred’s involvement in London had already probably been temporarily downgraded to an ideological rather than a practical claim, so it is hard to see the Fulham Vikings as a menace to his interests there, at least in the short term. Haslam points out their apparently strategic position on the Roman road leading to Staines and the associated Thames crossing, but there is no evidence that the Roman bridge survived (Jones 1982, 190; Jones 2010, 44) and the crossing of the Thames in that area could be a difficult one, as the Chronicle implies when it specifically comments on the absence of a ford for a band of Vikings that crossed the river somewhere near Staines in 893 (ASC A; Stenton 1912). The bounds of the Chertsey foundation charter (S 1165) mention the existence of a herepæð-ford ‘army-road ford’, and this seems to survive in the name Harpesford.

Evidence from the London mints suggests that Alfred held the city in the mid to late 870s (Blackburn 1998, 118–20) and had perhaps done so ever since the demise of his kinsman Burgred. Towards the end of the 870s, London seems to have switched back to Mercian control, with Ceolwulf minting coins in his own name there (Blackburn 1998, 116–23). It is conceivable that Alfred held onto London until Guthrum’s invasion of Wessex at the start of 878. The Chronicle makes it clear that Wessex was subjugated and many West Saxons were driven into exile, so the maintenance of Alfredian control of places such as London in the immediate aftermath is difficult to imagine.
in Egham, probably referring to the point at which the London to Silchester road crossed a small stream in the Virginia Water area (Gover et al 1934, 121; Smith 1928, xlv). If a similar ford across the Thames existed, its name has been lost; and it is perhaps best to assume no ford. This may be negative evidence, but the great number of fords recorded further up the Thames in charters and place-names can be compared with the plethora of local place-names in OE hūð ‘landing place’ around Egham, such as The Hythe (huþe) and The Glanty (Glenthuþe), both first mentioned in a charter of 672x674 (13th, S 1165) along with the lost wealas huþe,24 which rather suggest that travel on the Thames at this point normally required a vessel of some kind. The archaeological and environmental evidence discussed above also suggests that the Thames in the vicinity of the Viking encampment was traversable only by ferry, rather than by ford.

In fact, the prelude to Viking attacks on Wessex south of the Thames was usually a Viking landing – or relocation – within West Saxon territory on that side of

24 The fords around Wallingford are discussed by Dewey 2009, 18–19; these and other river foot-crossings are also discussed in Anderson 1939, 216; Gelling 1953–54, 19, 186, 327; 1973–76, 392, 400–01, 446–47, 507, 527–28, 531–32, 535–36, 731, 754; Gover et al 1939, 42; Smith 1964, 38, 40; Watts 2004, 168. For the hūð names, which are in fact relatively common along the length of the middle and lower Thames, see e.g. Gover et al 1934, 27–8, 121–22; Gover et al 1942, 85–86; Gelling and Cole 2000, 83–89; Baker and Brookes forthcoming.
This was the case in 850, when Athelstan *cyning* and Ealdorman Ealhhere defeated a Viking host at Sandwich; in the 870s when the Vikings took up quarters variously in Reading, Wareham, and Chippenham, and when another Viking host landed in Devon; and in the 890s, when Viking forces set up camp at Milton and Appledore. On every occasion when the Vikings landed on the north bank of the Thames, their initial target seems to have been Mercia. Of particular note is the crew of the three hundred and fifty ships reported to have raided the lower Thames in 851, stormed London and defeated Beorhtwulf of Mercia, only later crossing south of the Thames and meeting its match at *Acleah*. When in 871 the host that had spent the campaigning season in Wessex left Reading and headed for London, the Mercians were forced to make peace with it. In 877, Guthrum’s relocation from Wessex to Gloucester initiated a renegotiation of Ceolwulf’s position in Mercia. Later still, in the 890s, Hæsten’s stronghold north of the Thames at Benfleet, albeit in territory nominally under West Saxon rule, seems to have been used as a base for raiding in Mercia, not Wessex south of the river (893 *ASC A; Æthelweard Chronicon*, IV, 3).

There were strong practical reasons for this. River crossings are potentially a very considerable challenge for campaigning armies. A number of pre-modern

25 North of the Thames, Essex had been a West Saxon territory since the 820s; but non-West Saxon control of Middlesex must have made its position insecure at times, especially in the 870s (Dumville 1992, 3–6).

26 Von Clausewitz comments on the role of rivers as blockades against the movement of modern armies (1832, 522–38, 643–45). In the eighth and ninth centuries, the Carolingians also recognized the difficulties associated with leading armies across rivers and the need to provide a secure means of making such crossings.
accounts of river-crossings emphasize the logistical complexity and the importance of preparation, especially where the transportation of equipment and horses was required. River-currents can be strong and treacherous, sometimes making crossings technically difficult and time-consuming undertakings. The Fulham Vikings (e.g. *Royal Frankish Annals*, s.a. 789 and 808, in Scholtz 1970, 68; Bachrach 2001, 221, 254–55). Even earlier, there are examples of Roman military campaigns beginning with the construction of impressive bridges (Goldsworthy 2000, 181). Towards the end of the tenth century, we hear again of the difficulties associated with crossing relatively narrow bodies of water, when a small section of Byrhtnoth’s army at Maldon was, according to poetic tradition, able to prevent the entire Viking force based on Northey Island from crossing over to the mainland (Bradley 1982, 521–22).

27 For example, Hannibal’s crossing of the Rhone in 218 BC (Polybius, *The Histories*, Bk 3, 43; Paton 1922, 111–15; Dio, *Roman History*, Bk 14; Cary and Foster 1914, 87–91), the migration of the Tervingian Goths across the Danube in 367 AD (Ammianus Mercellinus, *History*, Book 31, 4.5; Rolfe 1964, 402–03), or Louis IX’s progress through the Nile Delta in 1249 AD (Joinville, *Life of Saint Louis*, chapter 6; Shaw 1963, 213, 218).

28 The strength of the river currents are said to have troubled both Carthaginians and Goths (Polybius, *The Histories*, Bk 3, 43; Paton 1922, 111–15; Dio, *Roman History*, Bk 14; Cary and Foster 1914, 87–91; Ammianus Mercellinus, *History*, Book 31, 4.5; Rolfe 1964, 402–03). An account of a modern army’s approach to a river-crossing is provided by Sherman (1875, II, chapter 18, 536–43). It is worth noting that his crossing of the Chattahoochee in 1864 was a very time-consuming operation, requiring several days’ preparation. Ammianus’ account of the Danube crossing may
presumably already had sufficient boats to transport themselves across the river, having arrived at Fulham by water, and this would have obviated one of the major logistical difficulties – that of obtaining adequate numbers of craft. Nevertheless, the speed of the operation would have been limited by the availability of suitable space for landing and embarkation/disembarkation on either side of the river. The possibility of the southern bank’s being patrolled by West Saxon troops must also be taken into account. Stretches of water could of course be crossed by resourceful commanders, especially if they were able to surprise their enemy in doing so; but by landing on the northern bank, the Viking forces at Fulham would have given Alfred crucial time to mobilize his forces, at the same time unnecessarily complicating their own route of entry into his kingdom. In 878, with Alfred recovering from Guthrum’s invasion, a

of course exaggerate in order to emphasize the number of ‘future destroyer[s] of the state of Rome’ that made the crossing, and we do not know how many Goths were involved in the migration; but it is clear that a ferry crossing by a large body of people could be a lengthy process.

For example, German auxiliaries are said to have swum across a river during the Claudian conquest of Britain, against native expectations (Dio, *Roman History*, Bk 60, §20; Cary and Foster 1924, 416–19), and Tacitus (*Agricola*, §18; Mattingly and Handford 1970, 69) claims that some of Agricola’s men swam across the Menai Strait with their horses, in order to take the inhabitants of Anglesey by surprise in 78 AD.

The presence of hostile forces on the opposite bank made it hard for both Hannibal and Louis IX to effect their crossings of the Rhone and Nile Delta respectively (Polybius, *The Histories*, Bk 3, 42–44; Paton 1922, 115–17; Dio, *Roman History*, Bk 14; Cary and Foster 1914, 87–91; Joinville, *Life of Saint Louis*, chapter 6;
landing south of the Thames was perhaps feasible, but it would not have remained so for long, as Alfred took back control of his kingdom.

**West Saxon defensive arrangements**

If a hostile force at Fulham, and specifically the Vikings of 878–79, had any significant impact on West Saxon strategic planning, it should be possible to identify this within the framework of defensive arrangements that can be adduced within the West Saxon kingdom south of the Thames. Haslam has argued that the series of strongholds named in the Burghal Hidage and usually attributed to Alfred and his son Edward, or at least the system that incorporated them, was set up within a short period from 878, and constituted a key factor in dislodging the Fulham war-party (2006). This claim has been questioned elsewhere (Baker and Brookes 2011; forthcoming), and can be dealt with relatively briefly in the present discussion. It is not obvious that the Thames crossings at Staines or Fulham/Putney were a serious concern to West Saxon military planners. The major investment in Thames strongholds came further upriver where crossings could be made on foot (Wallingford, Cricklade, Oxford), and on easily defensible islands to control movement along and across the river (Sashes) or to prevent easy access from the estuary to the southern road network (Southwark). (Shaw 1963, 213, 218), and also posed difficulties for Louis the Pious at the Rhine in 839, according to the *Annals of St Bertin* (Nelson 1991, 41). The Carthaginians required a careful flanking manoeuvre to cross the Rhone. It is worth noting again the events of 851 in southern England, when the Viking army that had been victorious north of the Thames crossed to Wessex and was defeated at *Acleah*, the West Saxons presumably having had time to prepare their forces.
These strongholds may in fact have been constructed sometime after the departure of the Fulham Vikings, but they reflect the strategic landscape. The point where the London to Silchester road passes over the river is the only major Thames crossing not to have been the site of a Burghal Hidage stronghold. The royal residence of Old Windsor seems to have been deemed adequate for the purposes of policing the Staines crossing, suggesting that it was not a high strategic priority.

**Activities of the Fulham Vikings**

Against this strategic landscape, as far as it can be reconstructed, providing as it does considerable clues to the intended purpose of this Viking band, it is worth reviewing the limited evidence of their activities during the period of their sojourn at Fulham. We may in fact have some evidence that the Fulham Vikings were raiding north rather than south of the river. Writing about a century later, Æthelweard (*Chronicon* Book 4, Chapter 3) provides extra information about this episode. Of course, Æthelweard is not a contemporary witness and must be treated with some caution, but his account may preserve contemporary traditions. He states that Guthrum left Cirencester and went into East Anglia (*ad Orientalium Anglorum partes*), and brought the inhabitants of that land (*illius terrae*) under his subjugation. This, he tells us, took place fourteen years after the Vikings wintered in the aforementioned country (*terrae prædictae*) and were provided with horses (i.e. late 879, fourteen years after they had wintered in East Anglia (865–66); cf. *Chronicon* Book 4, Chapter 2; Campbell 1962, 34–35). He then relates that in the same year, the Vikings who had camped at Fulham departed for Ghent, but not before the aforementioned land (*tellus prædicta*) had been ‘subjected to them’. Campbell translates *tellus prædicta* as ‘the country in question’ (1962, 43), but there is surely an
echo of the *terra prædictæ* of the previous sentence, which Campbell renders as ‘the
above-mentioned country’, that is to say East Anglia. In Insular medieval Latin, *tellus*
and *terra* seem to have been more or less synonymous (Latham 1965, 477–78, 481).
In other words, although it is possible that Æthelweard intended to signify the lands
around Fulham, it seems equally plausible that he meant the area of England to which
Guthrum had retreated.

Either way, there is no implication that the Fulham army was active in Wessex
south of the Thames. Given Æthelweard’s use of *Occidentales Angli, Orientales
Angli*, and *Australes Angli* to denote West, East, and South Saxons, alongside
*Orientales Angli*, which he also uses to describe the East Angles (Campbell 1962, li;
Brooks 2003, 49–50), it is quite possible that Æthelweard had in his own mind
conflated East Angles and East Saxons, and that the Fulham army was active in
Essex. Fulham was, after all, probably within the boundaries of the Anglo-Saxon
diocese of the East Saxons (Brooke and Keir 1975, 16–17; Hill 1981, 148, figs. 238–
41; Yorke 1990, 46–47; Bailey 1994, 129–31; Taylor 2004, 11–12). In any case, the
most likely scenario based on Æthelweard’s account, is that the Fulham Vikings were
raiding in eastern England north of the Thames, perhaps in Essex, parts of East
Anglia, and parts of eastern Mercia.

This also makes more sense in the prevailing political context. For one thing,
Mercia at that time seems to have been in political turmoil;31 what Keynes has

31 For discussion of the exile of Burgred, from the so-called B-dynasty, and of
Ceolwulf II’s status as king and possible member of the suggested rival C-dynasty,
It is not clear what became of Ceolwulf, but he disappears from the record and may
described as a political vacuum (2001, 328). We know there was external interference in Mercian affairs, from Guthrum and Alfred, and it should be no surprise if a group of adventurers also seized the opportunities presented. In the wake of Guthrum’s invasion of Wessex, Essex may also have been vulnerable to outside forces. Viking leaders throughout the period showed themselves to be politically astute and well capable of exploiting civil divisions (e.g. Lund 1989; Nelson 1997, 22–26; Coupland 1998), and the evidence suggests that these Vikings were no different. The *Annals of St Vaast* are instructive, relating how the Vikings crossed from England to the continent in 879 as a result of hearing reports of discord within Francia (Dehaisnes 1871, 299; Whitelock 1979, 137; Charles-Edwards 1998, 49–50). If Mercia was in the kind of turmoil that seems likely late in 878, it would have provided a relatively safe haven for a new raiding army to muster and for opportunist Vikings to profit from the political vacuum. If, on the other hand, the Fulham Vikings arrived with intentions on Wessex, they landed at the wrong time in the wrong place. Six months earlier Alfred would have been virtually incapable of barring their entry into Wessex, but by the end of 878 his position had strengthened considerably after success at Edington. The Fulham Vikings arrived just as Guthrum was retreating from Chippenham to Cirencester, and the fact that they chose Fulham as their destination rather suggests an intention to avoid Wessex. In this context, there is no reason to assume that a Viking

well have ceased to rule by the end of the decade. A Mercian regnal list dated to the tenth century accords him a reign of five years – that is, up to 879 or 880, if the list is taken at face value (Hearne 1723, 242; Stenton 1958, 372; Dumville 1976, 29–31 fn3; Keynes 1998, 12–13). Whether he abdicated, died, or was killed is unclear, and any of these scenarios is possible (Keynes 1998, 13–14; Walker 2000, 74).
fleet that landed at Fulham had designs exclusively (if at all) on Wessex, and strong reasons to suppose that its primary targets were Mercian.

Conclusions

The Fulham episode is accorded only a few lines in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, yet behind this brief account was a complex and important sequence of events intimately tied in with the shifting political landscape of southern England and continental Europe. Close analysis of the vocabulary of the Chronicle entries, evaluation of the archaeological evidence for Viking activity at Fulham, and consideration of the strategic context of that location within a wider military landscape, allow a relatively detailed picture of this Viking war-band to emerge, one which makes much more sense of subsequent written accounts of their activities. We are in fact lucky in this instance to have such a wide variety of evidence bearing on our understanding of a single event; it is consequently incumbent on us to make the best use of the information it provides.

This multidisciplinary approach allows us to draw several key conclusions. Firstly, it is probably misleadingly simplistic to talk of the Viking party that arrived in 878 as if it were already the major military force it would subsequently become. It would of course be dangerous to place too much weight on an interpretation of the term hlōþ, but it certainly could connote a force of limited size and the language of the 879 annal as a whole seems compatible with such a sense. It is worth noting that a gathering force would have presented a different order of threat from an already established one; more vulnerable and less imposing at the outset, it would have been easier for local counter-measures to be put in place before it became a major menace. The further implication is that the Fulham Vikings were actually growing in strength
during this period, rather than standing still while Alfred’s power increased. It is surely significant firstly that the perception among West Saxons seems to have been that the Fulham force late in 878 was of no great size, and secondly that the Viking company in question may have departed from Fulham just as it reached full capacity. In these respects, it is tempting to question whether Wessex was ever its primary target. That it received any notice in the Chronicle at all is perhaps in recognition of its later importance, rather than its immediate significance to Wessex in 878.

Secondly, it is probably wrong to assume that the Viking position at Fulham presented a major strategic challenge to the West Saxons. By camping on the north bank of the Thames they placed themselves in Middlesex close to but outside West Saxon territories in Essex, and south of the Thames. Furthermore, tactically, the Fulham force was entirely predictable, and this in itself may have served to mitigate the West Saxon response. In keeping with established patterns elsewhere, it is extremely likely that the Fulham Vikings re-used pre-existing defences on a fluvial island in the Thames, close to the tidal head of the river and the limit of easy navigation, but did not build offensive fortifications of their own. Nor was this position occupied to gain easy access to West Saxon lands. If it had been the intention of the Vikings to threaten Wessex directly, a far better island enclosure, suitable for over-wintering, could be found just 8.5km to the east on Thorney Island, overlooking the Thames crossing at Vauxhall and Margary 15 beyond.\(^{32}\) The Roman road from [Roads are numbered here in keeping with the system of enumeration established by Margary 1955. Those prefixed by ‘X’ are amendments to Margary as compiled by Keith Briggs’ ‘Map of Roman Roads in England’](http://keithbriggs.info/Roman_road_maps.html), accessed 11.06.2012).
Putney (if it still existed at all in the ninth century) was only a minor arterial route. Fulham did allow the Vikings to gain access to the Silchester Road (Margary 4a), but given the difficulties of the Staines crossing at this time, the main purpose of this route – at least in military use – must have been for traffic to join the bundle of track-ways through the Goring Gap (Margary X39, X21) and to the west.

Thirdly, later testimony, perhaps drawing on contemporary sources, actually places the activities of the Fulham Vikings north of the Thames. This seems perfectly rational in light of the two previous points. The choice of Fulham as a base makes more sense within a landscape context and against the background of recorded Viking activity, if the intention was to raid north of the Thames rather than to the south. Moreover, the timing of the Viking arrival is incompatible with a West Saxon target, coming some months after Alfred’s reassertion of his authority; but is logical if the opportunities the war-band sought lay north of the Thames in Mercia.

What this event appears to confirm is that Viking forces needed to be both militarily and politically attuned to the subtleties of late Anglo-Saxon physical and social geography. However threatening they may appear to modern eyes, by wintering at Fulham the Viking war-band seems deliberately to have adopted policies designed to avoid directly threatening West Saxon interests and thereby provoking a military response. One reason for this is perhaps that they were too small in number in 878 to contemplate in all seriousness taking on the West Saxons; another reason is probably that rich pickings were to be had much more easily in a politically unstable Mercia. In essence, the events were played out principally against a Mercian and continental background, rather than a West Saxon one.

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FIGURE CAPTIONS

*Figure 1:* Fulham Palace as shown in John Rocque’s map of 1746 and comparative plans of Viking camps at Repton and possible unexcavated examples at Woodmer End, Shillington (Bedfordshire), Wimblington (Cambridgeshire), and Shoebury (Essex) (after Biddle and Kjølbye-Biddle 1992; Dyer 1972, 228; and Allcroft 1908).