The new a-theory of time

Tallant, Jonathan (2015) The new a-theory of time. Inquiry, 58 (6). pp. 537-562. ISSN 1502-3923

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Abstract

The New A-theory of Time (TNAT) is the view, to be elaborated and defended in this article, that many times exist, and that time is real in virtue of every moment in time bearing each of the so-called A-properties: past, present and future. I argue that TNAT is at least as theoretically virtuous as mainstream views in the philosophy of time and may have some claim to being our best theory of time. I show that the properties ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ can be understood as compatible intrinsic properties. Having demonstrated that this account of the A-properties is coherent, I go on to demonstrate how TNAT can give us an account of passage, change and the truth-conditions for temporal sentences. In the final section of the article, I develop a tentative argument in favour of TNAT, though concede that we have to settle for the result that TNAT is on a par with our other theories of time. In the remainder of this opening section, my aim is to situate the current proposal as a direct response to McTaggart’s infamous argument against the reality of time.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry on 21 August 2015, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/0020174X.2015.1069067.
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Identification Number: 10.1080/0020174X.2015.1069067
Depositing User: Zimmerman, Emma
Date Deposited: 27 Jul 2017 09:57
Last Modified: 27 Jul 2017 10:03
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/44438

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