Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization

Montero, Maria (2017) Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 12 (3). pp. 325-346. ISSN 1554-0634

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights. This condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for coalition partners. An implication of this condition is that Snyder et al.'s (2005) result, that payoffs are proportional to weights in large replicated games, does not necessarily extend to the smaller games that arise in applications. Departures from proportionality may be substantial and may arise even in well-behaved (homogeneous) games.

Item Type: Article
RIS ID: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/889530
Keywords: legislative bargaining, weighted voting, proportional payoffs
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00016019
Depositing User: Montero, Maria
Date Deposited: 20 Jul 2017 08:34
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 19:14
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/44275

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