Team incentives and leadership

Drouvelis, Michalis and Nosenzo, Daniele and Sefton, Martin (2017) Team incentives and leadership. Journal of Economic Psychology, 62 . pp. 173-185. ISSN 0167-4870

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Abstract

We study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team performance and how a team chooses between alternative mechanisms. We study a group incentive mechanism (team output is shared equally among team members) and a hierarchical mechanism (team output is allocated by a team leader). We find that output is higher when a leader has the power to allocate output, but this mechanism also generates large differences between earnings of leaders and other team members. When team members can choose how much of team output is to be shared equally and how much is to be allocated by a leader they tend to restrict the leader’s power to distributing less than half of the pie.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Team Production; Leadership; Reward Power; Delegation; Experiment
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Identification Number: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.07.002
Depositing User: Eprints, Support
Date Deposited: 14 Jul 2017 10:43
Last Modified: 12 Oct 2017 23:40
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/44193

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