"The East Anglian Railways Company; A Study in Railway and Financial History"

by

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VOLUME 2

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Chapter 6

Frustration and Bitterness

(1845-1847)

Introduction

It was only natural in view of Williams' position in the Lynn companies that he should press for further extensions after 1845, for each would bring a vast influx of business to himself and his partners in law. It would also seem that he was developing what might be described as illusions of grandeur, seeing himself perhaps as a second Hudson, and as such genuinely interested in private 'empire building'; public references to "my railways"[1] and his over-riding interest in the east to west trunk route both lend strong support to this supposition. But in the absence of any personal investment his position depended entirely on maintaining the complete confidence of both the share-holders and of Lynn. To any real self-assertion by the former he must yield (hence his greatly reduced influence by the summer of 1847), the latter he did not dare to offend. At the same time his plans had to be completely realistic in relation to other railway projects in his chosen area. At any stage a failure before Parliament would undermine the confidence placed in him, waste at least a year, and substantially reduce the profits he and his fellows could expect. It says much for Williams' consummate skill that only once in 1845 was the fundamental divergence of interest between himself, the shareholders and the town allowed to become briefly apparent.

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[1] Cf. the Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 8th November, 1845; Williams at a Town Meeting of the 5th November in connection with the projected East Coast Railway Company.

Section 1: The 1846 Bills

A. The Intentions

Four sets of circumstances combined to favour an expansionist policy in the summer of 1845. First, the general financial scene remained eminently advantageous, and, secondly, the credit of the Lynn lines themselves continued to stand high; in the last week of July L & E shares (£2/10 called) stood at £6/12/6, those of the E.& H (£1/5 called) at £2/7/6.[1] Thirdly, the events of the 1845 session had left the wide areas to the west of the L & E mainline, and the districts between Ely and Bury St.Edmunds untouched by railway enterprise and ripe for exploitation. Lastly, the Eastern Counties Railway appeared for the moment to be a~~i~~miably disposed towards its new neighbours; already, on the authorisation of the former's new line between Chesterton Junction (near Cambridge) and St.Ives, an agreement had been signed under which E.C.R. trains would be permitted to work over E & H metals between St.Ives and Huntingdon.

Williams' primary concern at this stage was the furtherance of his grand trunk project to link Yarmouth and Norwich to Manchester. This involved first a revival of the Direct Norwich & Dereham project, secondly a L & E extension bill to extend the Wisbech line to Spalding, and thirdly consolidation of the agreements made with a group of northern and midland companies seeking powers to build eastwards to Boston and Spalding.

It was in the eastwards extension to Norwich that the greatest difficulties were to be anticipated. Already in 1845 the Board of Trade had

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1 See the weekly returns in the leading railway journals of the period; the L & D shares were as yet unregistered and so were not officially quoted, but when they appeared in the lists a little later in the summer a similar high premium obtained.

opined that the country through which a direct line between Dereham and Norwich must pass was too sparsely populated to support a railway,[1] and the sanction given to the Norfolk Railway's line had provided for through communication between the two places; moreover, the Direct Norwich & Dereham had already failed in 1845 (before the Standing Orders Committee), and when Lynn Corporation had sought to oppose the Norfolk Railway scheme the Commons Committee had judged its interests to be too far removed to be heard.[2] Probably with such considerations as these in mind Williams dropped his original intention to enter a Lynn & Dereham extension bill, "by which means a direct communication between Yarmouth and Norwich and northern and midland districts will be completed",[3] and instead elected to dissociate himself from possible failure by lending support to a revival of the Direct Norwich & Dereham, which had undertaken to lease itself, if successful, to the Norfolk Railway.[4] The days of close alliance between that latter company and the Eastern Counties Railway were still in the future, and so the arrangement could be completely acceptable to Williams, who, in any case, depended on the Norfolk for the last link of his trunk route, that between Norwich and Yarmouth. From the Norfolk's viewpoint the inevitable losses on the Wymondham line would be more than compensated by gains from the trunk line. Williams' principal role in this area thus became one of enlisting all possible support from Lynn and the Norfolk landowners for the Direct Norwich & Dereham line which he represented as being of vital importance to the whole county.[5]

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1 1845 Board of Trade Report on the Various Schemes for the Extension of Railways in the Counties of Norfolk and Suffolk, 1845 (88) xxxix.
2 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 7th June, 1845.
3 Ibid., 23rd August, 1845.
4 Lewin, op.cit. p.163.
5 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 13th September, 1845.

The concept of the Wisbech to Spalding extension (to meet the midland lines, and possibly the Leicester, Melton Mowbray & Spalding Junction) was rendered complex by the conflicting nature of other independent projects involving the area[1], and by the veritable certainty that Parliament could not be trusted to take a comprehensive view of the situation and see the L & E bill as part of a far wider project. It followed that Williams was obliged to enlarge his original conception so as to provide insurance against all possible contingencies. First was added a branch to run from near Wisbech to Holbeach by way of Sutton Bridge[2], where dock development was in contemplation. By this would be obtained the locus standi necessary to oppose the Huntingdon, St.Ives, Wisbech & Sutton Union[3], a promotion which favoured Wisbech, and, by offering a shorter route to Huntingdon, threatened to undermine the mainlines of both the Lynn & Ely and the Ely & Huntingdon. In addition to this the branch would constitute a useful feeder to the trunk line, and also assure Williams of a firm footing in the vital area immediately to the west of Lynn. Looking further ahead it could be that if the Holbeach & Spalding[4] came to fruition, that line together with the Holbeach - Sutton portion of the branch would provide a substantial basis for a further line into Lynn from the Great Northern Railway at Spalding; such a line would be quite distinct from the more southerly trunk route, which, as will be indicated below, Williams was already secretly planning to divert away from Lynn. One other important factor remained, however. If the East Coast Railway (Boston to Lynn) were successful in obtaining its act, its line would occupy the route between Holbeach and Sutton already selected by Williams. This, however, was welcomed

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1 A comprehensive list of projects designed for this area at large is to be found in Appendix K. Only lines directly affecting Williams' own plans are mentioned in the text.

2 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 16th August, 1845.

3 An amalgamation of the Wisbech & Huntingdon (ibid., 1st November, 1845) and the Isle of Ely,Wisbech & Lincolnshire Junction (ibid.,13th September,1845).

4 Ibid., 15th November, 1845.



Diagrammatic Representation of Lines referred to in the text

Abbreviated Table of Principal Opening Dates

1843	29th March	London-Colchester	E.C.R.
1844	1st May	Norwich-Reedham-Yarmouth	Yarmouth & Norwich (later the Norfolk Railway)
1845	30th July	Bishops Stortford-Brandon	E.C.R.
"	" "	Trowse (Norwich)-Brandon	N.R.
"	15th Dec.	Trowse-Norwich Thorpe	N.R.
1846	15th June	Colchester-Ipswich	E.U.R.
"	30th Nov.	Ipswich-Bury	I & B (later E.U.R.)
1847	14th Jan.	Ely-Peterborough	E.C.R.
"	15th Feb.	Wymondham-Dereham	N.R.
"	11th March	Reedham-Lowestoft	N.R.
"	3rd May	March-Wisbech	E.C.R.
"	17th August	Chesterton Jnc.-St.Ives	E.C.R.
1848	1st March	St.Ives-March	E.C.R.
1849	7th November	Completion of the E.U.R.line from Haughley Jnc.to Norwich.	

by the solicitor, who, in the November of 1845, clearly indicated that in such an eventuality his own branch would be made to terminate at Sutton.[1] There was no mystery in this for the East Coast Railway was needed to afford a second means of access (at Boston) to the system that was being planned to come eastwards from Nottingham.

Four companies in the Nottingham area were originally involved. With two of these, the Nottingham, Erewash Valley, Ambergate & Manchester and the Nottingham, Vale of Belvoir & Grantham, Williams had, in the August of 1845, effected an agreement under which their joint line would be extended to Spalding to make contact with the L & E extension from Wisbech; one third of the additional capital necessitated was to be reserved for the proprietors of the L & E and the L & D.[2] This agreement was perpetuated when the two midland companies, late in 1845, joined with the Nottingham & Boston & Eastern Junction and the Grand Union Extension Railway[3] (Nottingham to Ambergate) to form the Ambergate, Nottingham & Boston & Eastern Junction Railway Company. If this company, the Direct Norwich & Dereham, the Lynn & Ely and the associated Manchester, Buxton & Matlock & Midlands Junction Railway were all successful in their applications to Parliament in 1846 the result would be a route from Norwich to Manchester "under the control of parties working in the most friendly concert"[4], with additional advantages deriving to Lynn itself from the junction at Ambergate with the Midland Railway line to the coal pits of Clay

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 8th November, 1845; Williams at a Town Meeting of the 5th November. 2 Ibid., 23rd August, 1845.

3 The title refers to the Grand Union Railway (Norwich Mercury, 1st November, 1845) which intended to construct a line between King's Lynn and Nottingham on a capital of £1,500,000. This was a purely 'bubble' project, and did not even survive long enough to reach Parliament in 1846. The separate Extension promotion was in a sense based on the same concept as that of Williams, planning as it did to effect a junction at Ambergate with both a line to Manchester and with the Midland Railway.

4 Herapath, 20th September, 1845; Lacy at the L & D meeting of the 18th September.

Cross (Derbyshire) and elsewhere; it would incidentally mean that the Lynn & Dereham would be compensated for the inevitable loss of traffic in the event of the newly floated and independent Lynn & Fakenham line proving successful.[1] The enthusiasm of Williams, and indeed of Lynn, was matched by that of the midland companies; indeed, the Grand Union Extension Railway had already used the Norfolk Estuary Cut and the possibility of through communication with Yarmouth as its most cogent arguments in seeking support.[2]

Back in the Wisbech area Williams was meanwhile obliged to formulate a bill for a separate L & E extension from Wisbech to March.[3] Primarily this was a counter to the Wisbech, March & St.Ives promotion,[4] the work of Mr.Day,[5] a St.Ives solicitor who was also prominent in the Norfolk Estuary Scheme,[6] and designed to link "the great cattle market of St.Ives"[7] with the port of Wisbech through which the farmers of the area habitually sent their corn (to the value of £33,820 per annum by 1848).[8] This line, representing "one of the very few railways originating with landowners in an agricultural district",[9] was to take its metals to the waterfront of Wisbech harbour; it could never be forgotten in Lynn that its own harbour was further from London than that at Wisbech. From such a line, it was feared, Wisbech would gain at the expense of Lynn, and the traffic prospects of the Ely & Huntingdon would be practically destroyed. Moreover, the Eastern Counties Railway, anxious to reach the Wash on its own lines, was already contemplating the negotiations which in 1846

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 25th October, 1845.
2 Ibid., 3rd May, 1845; the company's prospectus.
3 Ibid., 16th August, 1845.
4 Ibid., 15th November, 1845; originally the company was the Wisbech & St.Ives.
5 Second Report of the Lords' Select Committee of 1849; Appendix A, p.357ff.
6 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 15th February, 1890;memoirs of Thew.
7 Second Report of the 1849 Select Committee; Appendix A.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.

were to lead to the purchase of the Wisbech, March & St.Ives, a possibility no doubt appreciated in Lynn and one that should be avoided at all costs. The entry of the extension bill gave the L & E a locus standi in opposing the independent promotion before Parliament. In a more positive sense the line envisaged would afford a more direct route between Peterborough and Lynn than that by way of Ely, and thus enable traffic entering East Anglia by way of Peterborough to be diverted more easily towards Lynn. Such traffic was likely to increase in the coming years, for in addition to the companies already established at Peterborough the plans for the 1846 session included not only the deferred bill of the London & York, which this time was virtually certain to succeed, but also a Wolverhampton, Walsall, Stamford, Peterborough & Norwich Junction,[1] and the Boston, Stamford & Birmingham,[2] both planning lines to the city. Finally, it might be hoped that the provision of the short and eminently reasonable Wisbech to March line would prejudice the chances before Parliament of the Lynn, Wisbech & Peterborough, Midland Counties & Birmingham Junction Railway[3] (which would ruin both the mainline and the Wisbech branch of the L & E), and discourage the Boston, Stamford & Birmingham, and, yet another promotion, the Wisbech, Peterborough & Birmingham Junction[4] from attempting to implement their respective intentions of constructing between Peterborough and Wisbech. Both these would serve the Wisbech branch of the L & E, but would be gravely detrimental to its mainline between Watlington and Ely. Williams himself was prevented from selecting their routes for his own extension by the primary need of checking the Wisbech, March & St.Ives.

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 4th October, 1845.
2 Ibid., 26th April, 1845; the prospectus of this date described the company as planning to build from Broughton Astley (on the Midland Railway) to Boston, by way of Market Harborough, the Welland Valley, Stamford and Spalding, with a branch from Stamford and Peterborough to Wisbech.
3 Ibid., 4th October, 1845.
4 Ibid., 13th September, 1845.

Finally must be mentioned the revival of the original concept of extending the Ely & Huntingdon line from Brampton (Huntingdon) to Bedford;[1] warmly approved by the E & H proprietors on the 30th July, 1845,[2] the implementation of this project had been rendered possible by the agreement reached with the Bedford Level Drainage Commissioners, and by the more welcoming attitude of the London & York,[3] now, with its rivals of 1845 broken, confident that the 'Chaste Petition' could do it little harm and that its act would be obtained in 1846. No doubt, too, the landowners along the route, now seeing the possibilities open to them in the matter of compensation, had had time to repent their intransigence of twelve months earlier. The purposes of this bill were clear; not only would it safeguard Lynn's markets in the south-east midlands, it would also invest the E & H, and therefore the lines to be amalgamated with it, with far greater significance and potentiality in the eyes of both Parliament and the investing public.

An amalgamation bill was in fact prepared, but as it was entered too late for consideration in the 1846 session its content and background will be examined in a later context. Similarly a L & E bill, entered in the name of the nominally independent Ely & Bury Railway, to counter the encroachment of Ipswich into an area to which Lynn was accustomed to send some 10,000 tons of coal and general merchandise per annum,[4] by river, was prepared too late for entry, and so also will be considered in a later section.

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 15th November, 1845; in earlier notices (e.g. ibid., 13th September) a branch to Biggleswade had been included, but without any explanation being given this was dropped by the time that the bill was entered.

2 Herapath, 2nd August, 1845; E & H meeting of the 30th July. The draft of the bill was approved with equal enthusiasm on the 9th April, 1846 (Railway Gazette, 11th April, 1846, p.864).

3 Herapath, 2nd August, 1845.

4 Armes, op.cit. p.14.

B. Preparation

Of willing financial support for the various extension bills there could be little doubt. The apparent benefits and prospects of each were obvious, and throughout the autumn of 1845 high premiums continued to exist on the shares of the three Lynn lines. Any doubts were likely to be resolved by the strong lead given by some of the principal figures amongst the existing shareholders in the three companies. Thus, for example, Lacy subscribed £4,800, and Whiting £3,000 to the E & H extension, while Bruce, rapidly coming to the forefront of company affairs, put £4,000 in the Spalding line as well as £2,880 in that to Bedford.[1] As was usual well-timed 'puffs' in the press kept the public informed of each progressive step that was taken from the August of 1845 onwards.[2] On the 31st December, 1845 the proprietors of all three companies enthusiastically endorsed the principles of the bills, as on the 9th April, 1846 they welcomed the detailed contents.

But even so there had been some disturbing moments for Williams. There had been, for example, the threat posed by the independent Lynn, Wisbech & Peterborough, Midland Counties & Birmingham Junction Railway (planning to construct from Lynn to Peterborough). Williams had to ensure that the inhabitants of Lynn saw this not so much as a direct route to the midlands as a major advantage to the harbour at Wisbech. The whole hearted approval given to the project at a Town Meeting in Wisbech helped him in this, but his real opportunity came when the representatives of the promoters were so incautious as to attempt to repeat their success in Lynn. The merits of the scheme were immaterial to the unanimous decision reached at the second of two

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1 Accounts & Papers 1846 (473) xxxviii.1.

2 Cf. the Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 4th October, 1845, when the L & E surveyors were reported as being busy in the Spalding area.

meetings (6th October, 1845) that the line was "uncalled for"[1], for from beginning to end both the meetings were dominated by Williams and his associates - Folkes of the L & E was in the chair. The first (30th September) was turned into "an uproarious affair"[2], the second into a demonstration of hostility, whipped up by Williams himself, directed against Wisbech, and against a line which, like that proposed in 1844 by Robert Stephenson but found "unpalatable" by Lynn[3], would finish on the wrong side (that is the west bank) of the Ouse, opposite to the harbour.

To the East Coast Railway the Williams group, at a Town Meeting of the 5th November[4], ensured a warm welcome, for in seeking powers to link Lynn and Boston that company was providing a second means of access to the Ambergate, Nottingham & Boston & Eastern Junction, and thereby an insurance against the possible failure of the Wisbech to Spalding extension bill of the L & E. As an additional source of trade it recommended itself also to the town, and so it required little effort on the part of Williams to guide the meeting to the adoption of unanimous resolutions (both on the motion of Lacy, who was described here as being second only to Hudson)[5] to the effect that the East Coast Railway was of "vital importance" to Lynn, and worthy of the town's "most strenuous support"[6]. Even the Corporation eventually waxed enthusiastic, for, after displaying its characteristic caution and hesitation in deferring a decision when first approached on the 10th November[7], it petitioned the Commons in favour of the line on the 6th March, 1846[8]. But its motives, and those of

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 11th October, 1845.
2 Ibid., 4th October, 1845.
3 Ibid., Williams.
4 Ibid., 8th November, 1845.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Guild Hall Book, 10th November, 1845, p.766.
8 Ibid., 6th March, 1846, p.795.

the town at large, were not those of Williams, and of this, and of the need for caution, he was given clear warning at the meeting of the 5th November.

The discord arose from the direct accusation that Williams was secretly planning to by-pass Lynn with a direct line from the Wisbech branch to Narborough (on the L & D) - a logical step that would shorten the trunk route by some eight miles - and from some strongly expressed doubts as to whether the Wisbech branch was in fact worth building. Probably the two were connected, for without the Wisbech line the former would be pointless. To the charge that land had already been purchased between Watlington and Narborough Folkes returned an "unequivocal denial",[1] attributing the whole idea to an unfounded rumour deriving, or so he implied, from the fact that at one stage the East Coast Railway had contemplated a line from Wisbech to Swaffham (via Marham and Beechamwell, a few miles to the south of Narborough), a concept since abandoned. But Folkes obviously knew more than the temper of the meeting allowed him to admit. In particular did he avoid any reference to a rather curious L & E announcement of a Downham Market - Swaffham branch (presumably to be coupled with a triangular junction at Watlington) which had appeared in the Railway Times during the September, and which was to make one brief reappearance in the local paper on the 15th November.[2]

Clearly a link was in Williams' mind, although popular rumour had attributed to it the wrong terminal points; the choice of the Downham to Swaffham route instead of the more direct one between Watlington and Narborough no doubt represented a compromise with the otherwise highly desirable East

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 8th November, 1845.
2 Ibid., 15th November, 1845.

Coast Railway, which was bent on reaching the central areas of Norfolk by the most profitable route available in terms of local traffic. Indeed, Williams warned the meeting that if his Wisbech branch were not implemented Lynn would soon have an independent promotion between Wisbech and Swaffham with which to contend. This convinced the town of the need for the Wisbech branch, which Williams further justified by references to the Spalding and Sutton extensions, but nothing would reconcile it to a line which avoided Lynn. In view of this Williams was wise to let the matter drop, for after all the L & D line between Lynn and Swaffham offered an acceptable alternative, and the extra link was one that could easily be added at any favourable time in the future. Thus no more was to be heard of the avoiding line, except for the further single announcement of the 15th November, for which the culpable carelessness of someone in either the railway or the newspaper offices must be held to account.

C. The Bills in Parliament, 1846.

The outcome of the hopes and planning of 1845 was, however, one of severe disappointment to both Williams and the companies. Only the E & H bill went through unimpeded and uneventfully, the Royal Assent to the Bedford extension being received on the 27th July, 1846 (9 & 10 Vic.c.cclxx). The act authorised the creation of a further £120,000 capital (section 2), and the raising of £40,000 in loans and mortgages (4). It was ironical that, although the capital was to be raised, this one successful bill was destined never to be implemented.

The Spalding and March bills came first to the Lords[1] where all the stages

1 In view of the considerable number of railway bills before Parliament in 1846 many were first presented in the Lords to relieve pressure on the Commons, and to speed the whole process.

were safely passed. In the Commons, however, matters did not go as expected. First, the L & E allowed itself to be prevailed upon by the Eastern Counties Railway to withdraw the Wisbech - March bill, after its second reading, in favour of the Wisbech, March & St.Ives promotion. Already the E.C.R. was negotiating with the latter to effect a purchase; proposals to pay £4 for each share (£2 called) were received with delight by the smaller company, and in fact the transaction was completed as soon as its act (9 & 10 Vic.c.ccclvi) was obtained in the August.[1] The E.C.R.'s intentions were to reach towards the Wash with its own lines in order that any future incursion into Norfolk by the London & York might the more easily be blocked; it also presumably wanted an assured footing on Williams' intended trunk route. In approaching the L & E, however, the emphasis was more on the folly of having two lines running parallel for the whole or part of their routes,[2] and on the "most advantageous terms"[3] that the E.C.R. was prepared to offer, these including running powers for the L & E over the Wisbech, March & St.Ives, and a firm promise of E.C.R. support for the Spalding extension bill.

In accepting these terms Williams was perhaps motivated by the fears of what the Eastern Counties could do to his bills in Parliament, and to the L & E at Ely, if once thoroughly antagonised, and thus may have felt the terms offered to be more than generous. But even so it was a bad bargain for both the L & E and Lynn. The former saved the trouble and expense of construction, and gained a second means of access to the E & H (which, in fact, was to turn out to be the only one), but in so doing left itself in a position where, if

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1 Appendix A of the Second Report of the 1849 Select Committee of the Lords, a transcript of the report of the 1848 E.C.R. Committee of Inquiry.
2 Cf.Lewin, op.cit. p.163.
3 Railway Gazette, 29th August, 1846, p.195; Folkes at a L & E meeting of the previous week.

the Spalding bill failed, it would be completely hemmed in to the west by the E.C.R. The E & H would of course still provide an independent outlet, but one that was of little use in the development of northern traffic. To Lynn the agreement meant a company, which cared nothing for the town of Lynn, in rival Wisbech, with powers to build to the harbour there, and the offer of a shorter route to London than that enjoyed by itself; in addition the opportunities of diverting to itself the east-bound traffic through Peterborough must be counted as considerably reduced. That Williams could do this showed how little he really cared for the interests of Lynn as such, but the problem he had created for the L & E was to be his own as well as the events of 1847 were to show. From every point of view he had for the first time done the wrong thing, even though from motives of caution. In view of the uncertainty of Parliamentary verdicts and of railway politics in general, and because of the solid backing of the proprietors, and the great prospects at stake, he would have done better to have stood his ground and fought the Wisbech, March & St.Ives. Even if he failed his nuisance value to the E.C.R. would have increased, while, as events were to transpire, the situation could not have become worse than it had done by the autumn of 1846.

The gamble that the Spalding bill would succeed in fact failed. Although "strenuously" supported by the E.C.R.[1] its preamble was rejected by the Commons committee without any reason being offered.[2] It must be assumed that the committee saw the line in isolation and judged it to be unjustifiable in terms of local traffic; undoubtedly the L & E case must have been weakened by the facts that the midland company it was to meet had yet to be

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1 Railway Gazette, 29th August, 1846, p.195; Folkes at the L & E meeting of the 27th August.

2 Ibid.

authorised, and that the Wisbech line was as yet unstarted.

However, some hope was allowed to remain for the future in that the Ambergate, Nottingham & Boston & Eastern Junction received its act on the 16th July, 1846 (authorising it to build from Ambergate to Spalding with branches to Sleaford and Boston), the success being in no small part due to Hudson,[1] who was already planning to utilise the midland company in his comprehensive schemes to strangle the London & York at birth; because of this it could reasonably be assumed that he would lend a sympathetic ear to a revival of the Spalding bill in 1847. Some such consolation was indeed needed, for the East Coast Railway had come to nothing, and, to the east, the Direct Norwich & Dereham had gone down for a second time, its traffic potential remaining as poor as when first reported on by the Board of Trade in 1845; nor could the very incomplete state of the Lynn & Dereham and the rapid progress being made on the Norfolk Railway's Wymondham line have helped its case. Almost as if to underline this failure the Norfolk's extension bill from Dereham to Fakenham was sanctioned, a cruel blow not only to the L & D but to the town of Lynn as well.

Section 2: The Months of Revolution (August 1846 to January 1847)

A. The Issues Involved

With the bills of 1846 largely in ruins something of a revolution occurred in both the structure and policies of the E.A.R. lines. Williams himself lost no time in preparing a further group of bills for presentation in the 1847 session, but before that was reached the shareholders, and some at least of the directors, had at long last begun to assert themselves. While welcoming the plans for extension this latter group saw them primarily as a

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[1] Grinling, op.cit. p.60.

means to obtaining better guarantees in the lease to the Eastern Counties Railway on which it had now determined, as representing the only sure form of future security. In turn, Hudson of the E.C.R. was so interested in the contents of the extension and development bills, and in some cases so alarmed by them, that he found it worth his while to prepare, by the offer of suspiciously generous terms, an elaborate trap for the East Anglian. Into this the Lynn lines fell, and were consequently crippled. Meanwhile, in the shadow of the long drawn-out negotiations Williams and his partners were obliged to efface themselves and, to an increasing extent, leave control to the directors. Those members of the boards who were the nominees of Williams were left in something of a dilemma. If they opposed the lease and were successful they appreciated the possibility that they would be left at the head of an impecunious company facing complete ruin at the hands of a fierce rival, while if they accepted the lease and it was implemented their 'golden days' would be over. The only satisfactory escape was to hope that the extensions would succeed, for then the prospects of the line would be vastly improved, and the lease could be avoided, or, if made, broken. In the event, however, the extensions failed, and so, in the August of 1847 with the effective end of Williams' control, Everard, Cresswell, Folkes and Seppings all resigned. Complex as the issues already were, however, they were rendered more so by the insistence that both groups manifested on obtaining terms from the E.C.R. that matched their respective concepts of the value to be placed on the East Anglian system.

B. The Background Features; the Eastern Counties, Norfolk and Great Northern Railways.

Both geography and prudence dictated that the East Anglian should turn to the Eastern Counties Railway. Touching the East Anglian lines at Ely, St.Ives and Wisbech, and with detailed plans for northern extensions, it lay astride the vital routes between Lynn and London, and the industrial midlands and north on which the future of Lynn and its harbour depended. It was also a large concern in 1846, already operating 126 route miles and with another 500 or so planned or partially implemented. Under Hudson, chairman from October, 1845 to February, 1849, who had insisted on entire control of the management as the condition of his acceptance of the chair, the company had acquired an appearance of strength lacking in earlier years. To some[1] it might be

> "the undertaking which has excited more attention, caused more alarm, created more correspondence, and unhappily witnessed more accidents than any other in the country"

and its reputation for sharp practices, poor operating standards,[2] high working expenses and notorious extravagance remain,[3] but by 1846 and in 1847 the visible evidence was pointing the other way. In the latter half of 1847 Hudson could boast that whereas in the second half of 1846 827,000 persons had been carried, in the first half of 1847 the total had been 1,056,000, and that without an accident to a single passenger,[4] but the most striking evidence was afforded by the dividends that were now being paid. After the maximum of 1½% declared on ordinary shares between 1842 and 1844, 6% had been paid

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1 Francis, op.cit. Vol.1, p.242.
2 Cf. the Railway Times, August, 1845, p.1773.
3 Cf. the £93,234/17/5 spent on Peterborough station, and the £81,511 on that at Ely; Second Report of the 1849 Lords Select Committee, Appendix A.
4 Railway Times, 1847, p.1039.

in the December of 1845 and the June of 1846, 6½% in the December of 1846, 5% in the June of 1847, and 4% in the December of 1847 and the June of '48.[1] Not until the end of 1848 did the E.C.R.'s Committee of Inquiry confirm what only a few had suspected, that the E.C.R. was already encumbered with too many costly leases,[2] and that the dividend rates on which so much store had been set in fact arose from totally inadequate ~~chronic~~, even fraudulent,[3] book-keeping methods and derived from capital; indeed, the 6% of December, 1845 had been declared before the books had even been made up.[4]

But during 1846 and '47 matters had to be judged by their face value, and so assuming that the E.C.R. was in fact in a strong financial position the main emphasis in East Anglian thinking had to be placed on other aspects. For two main reasons it seemed that the E.C.R. must be conciliated, for otherwise it was in a position to inflict crippling damage on the East Anglian. If the tactics practised at Colchester against the Eastern Union (between which and the E.C.R. existed "a spirit of hostility and retaliation")[5] of running slow and dirty trains at awkward times in connection with its rival's services[6] were applied at Ely a fatal blow could be struck at the development of through traffic along the L & E mainline. If the Norwich - Ely - Peterborough line were operated in a hostile, competitive spirit not only would Lynn be effectively severed from its markets to the south of it, but also the Lynn & Dereham would be rendered virtually valueless.

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1 Scrivenor, op.cit. p.72.
2 Cf. Appendix A of the Second Report of the 1849 Select Committee of the Lords; for further details see below.
3 Ibid. Also the Railway Times, 12th January, 1856, p.37; Bruce at an E.A.R. meeting of the 10th January, 1856.
4 C.J.Allen, op.cit. p.16; 9/- per share was paid where only 4/10 was justified.
5 Appendix A to the 1849 Select Committee of the Lords Second Report.
6 Ibid.

Even more serious, however, was the increasing hold that the E.C.R. was obtaining on the ports of East Anglia. In that the traffic of Lynn harbour must come to the E.C.R. at Ely that company had it in its power to make Lynn the most expensive harbour in East Anglia by the simple expedient of offering cheaper inland rates from everywhere else. So far the threat was more potential than real, but each month the menace increased. The purchase of the Wisbech, March & St.Ives in 1846 (opened to traffic on the 3rd May, 1847) had brought the E.C.R. into Wisbech; to the end of 1848 this was dubbed "an unfortunate transaction"[1], but powers existed for taking the line over the river there and to the harbour - only the financial difficulties of the E.C.R. had so far prevented the expenditure of between £60,000 and £80,000 needed to implement them.[2] Further south the E.C.R. was actively interested in the development of Harwich harbour, its ambitions for it clashing directly with the interests of Lynn as the 1848 report of the Committee of Inquiry clearly showed[3]:

> "Harwich may again be the point of embarkation to Rotterdam, to Bremen and Hamburg, and through the last named city, by way of Lubeck and by Kiel to the Baltic and to northern Europe."

In fact shortage of money and conflict with the Eastern Union were to mean that it was 1854 before the railway reached Harwich, but in the intervening years the threat was constantly there. Meanwhile, nearer to Lynn, there was the much more immediate and pressing danger represented in the increasing degree of control being acquired by the E.C.R., through the Norfolk Railway, over the harbours of Lowestoft and Yarmouth.

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1 Appendix A to the 1849 Select Committee of the Lords Second Report.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.

The Norfolk Railway (an amalgamation - 30th June, 1845 - of the Norwich & Brandon and the Norwich & Yarmouth Railways), 94 route miles in all (1848),[1] was a reasonably sound and profitable line paying dividends of 5, 6, 7, 6 and 5% (rate per annum) for the successive half years respectively between December 1845 and December 1847;[2] its total share capital and loans at the outset of 1849 amounted to £2,094,055.[3] Already constituting a threat to Lynn and its railways with its Wymondham - Dereham branch the dangers were increased by the power of lease it acquired over the Lowestoft Railway & Harbour Company whose line to Reedham was opened to goods traffic on the 11th March, 1847. While the Norfolk remained completely independent the conditions of fair competition would obtain, and so the dangers to Lynn be reduced, but in fact from 1845 onwards the Norfolk Railway and the Eastern Counties moved ever closer together, a circumstance dictated by the otherwise isolated position of the former, and by the fears of the latter that the Norfolk might join the Eastern Union against it - indeed, during 1846 and '47 abortive discussions were conducted between the N.R. and the E.U.R.[4] As early as the summer of 1845 there had been an agreement that the E.C.R. should work its Norwich trains only as far as Ely rather than Brandon, a matter of economy in locomotive utilisation; this was revoked on the 2nd March, 1846, as the Norfolk Railway was short of locomotives, but only as part of a closer working arrangement. In 1848 the E.C.R. was to go further and offer complete

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1 Appendix A to the 1849 Select Committee of the Lords Second Report.
2 Scrivenor, op.cit. p.72.
3 Ibid.
4 C.J.Allen, op.cit. p.30.

amalgamation;[1] until the necessary act could be obtained the Eastern Counties took over the Norfolk under the legal fiction that the latter had leased itself to three members of the E.C.R. board. The East Anglian was to oppose the union with some vigour, reserving its heaviest attacks for the clauses that would have allowed higher maximum rates on the lines affected.[2] Parliament, fearful of monopoly, persuaded that amalgamation would injure the East Anglian, and angry that for twelve months the E.C.R. had in effect been working an illegal lease and advancing money to the Norfolk Railway,[3] disallowed the amalgamation bill although sanctioning a formal lease. But to the East Anglian the overall effect had been the same whatever the guise under which the agreement was operated; the Wymondham - Dereham line was taking traffic from the L & D, and feeding it either to Norwich or to the E.C.R. at Brandon, while the latter company poured money into the development of Lowestoft harbour and established preferential rates for the traffic to and from there.

Little need be said at this stage of the Great Northern Railway (formerly the London & York) except that, having obtained its act in 1846, it became the object of Hudson's implacable hostility. He saw in it the end of his own schemes to extend the Eastern Counties to the northern coalfields, and a fierce rival to his midland and northern lines. By the time that the Great

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1 The E.C.R. was to apply for the necessary act each year until it was obtained; meanwhile the Norfolk Railway was to be worked by the E.C.R., and under the control of a joint committee. On amalgamation the E.C.R. was to assume responsibility for all N.R. loans etc., and N.R.proprietors were to be placed on the same footing as those of the E.C.R. The latter company was to purchase the Norfolk's rolling stock etc. at cost price (a transaction completed by the 4th July, 1850), but if no act was secured the Norfolk was to repurchase it at the same price in 1855.

2 Herapath, 17th November, 1849, p.1157; E.A. Directors' Report of the 23rd August.

3 Ibid., Marriott at the E.A.R. meeting of the 23rd August, 1849.

Northern opened in 1850 Hudson himself had been removed from the scene, but meanwhile he had spared no pains to destroy its future expectations of traffic indeed, with that end in view, he placed no less than 13 bills before the 1847 session of Parliament.[1] A particular fear, and one affecting the East Anglian, was that the Great Northern would seek to extend into Norfolk; in 1847 his fears were given substance for the G.N.R. did in fact enter a bill for a line from Peterborough to Sutton Bridge (where docks were to be developed) and Lynn. To Hudson this constituted not only a serious incursion into E.C.R. territory, but also the danger that if the East Anglian joined with the intruder the former would escape from his grasp, especially so if the E & H were completed as well. It is with this in mind that Williams' extension plans for 1847 and the associated lease negotiations have to be viewed.

C. <u>The East Anglian Bills for 1847</u>

Williams, the directors and the proprietors alike were determined to put the failures of the 1846 session behind them, and ensure that their system broke free of its narrow confines.[2] The programme of extensions and developments heartily approved at the three meetings of the 2nd December, 1846[3] was comprised as follows:[4]

<u>In Group 12</u>

L & E Extension from Ely to Bury St.Edmunds £464,800 + loans of £154,900

<u>In Group 14</u>

L & E, E & H and L & D Amalgamation Bill £382,000 + loans of £127,400

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1 For further details see below.

2 Railway Gazette, 27th August, 1846,,p.195; Folkes at the L & E meeting of the 25th.

3 Ibid., 5th December, 1846, pp.670f.

4 Report of the Commissioners of Railways on certain Railway Bills comprised in Groups Nos. 12, 14 & 27, 1847 xxxi(17)-164 II.

In Group 27

L & E Extension to Spalding and Holbeach	£373,800 + loans of £124,900
L & E Deviation and Lynn Docks	£144,000 + loans of £ 48,000
L & E Lynn & Wormegay Navigation	£ 36,000 + loans of £ 12,000

Noteworthy by its absence was any bill for a further attempt to gain sanction for an extension from Dereham to Norwich. After two failures the Direct Norwich & Dereham had transferred its plans to the Ipswich, Bury & Norwich, which had offered a better set of lease terms than the Lynn & Dereham.[1] This put it beyond the power of Williams to act, although in fact the Ipswich company did nothing.

Apart from certain curious aspects of the financial sections of the bills, to be discussed fully below, this programme requires little explanation. The Ely & Bury promotion,[2] stimulated by the incorporation of the Ipswich & Bury in 1845 (its line was opened on the 7th December, 1846), simply represented an attempt to preserve to Lynn the traditional markets of Bury and central Suffolk from the developing competition of Ipswich. Formed too late to enter its bill in 1846 (although a vain attempt had been made) the Ely & Bury was in fact independent in name only. The prospectus of the 11th October, 1845 showed the Provisional Committee to include a substantial proportion of East Anglian men, for example Folkes, Everard, Cresswell, Seppings, Lacy, Ingle, Partridge, Abdy and Whiting,[3] while the principal subscribers were Lacy with £5,200, W.Birch with £3,600 and Sir Henry Calder with £2,200.[4] Even if Williams had not been responsible for the actual conception of this line his influence and interest in it will be apparent from the names cited above. Generally speaking the company had the support of

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1 Lewin, op.cit. p.163.
2 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 30th August, 1845.
3 Ibid.
4 Accounts & Papers 1846 (473) xxxviii.1.

Lynn, the Corporation petitioning the Commons in its favour in 1846[1] (in the vain hope that the lateness of the application would be overlooked), although even now a number of the more prominent merchants stood aloof.[2] From the outset it had been clear that the L & E would take the new company under its wing, and thus it was no surprise when, late in 1846, responsibility was formally assumed and the bill entered in the name of the L & E. It was unfortunate that the application for the 1846 session had been too late, for by the following year the area around Bury had become "hotly disputed",[3] the L & E now having to compete against the schemes of both the Ipswich & Bury and the Newmarket Railways[4] for reaching Ely from the south.

The Spalding and Holbeach bill represented merely a revival of the abortive bill of 1846. The Docks bill, however, was a totally new departure, and one designed primarily to add to the intrinsic value of the Lynn railways by the encouragement of trade. During the late autumn of 1845 a Lynn Dock Company had announced its intention of providing Lynn with a long needed wet dock.[5] Goodwin, Partridge & Williams had been the solicitors to the concern.[6] However, nothing more of the project had been heard, the citizens of Lynn no doubt recalling the total failure of the Bagges' dry dock constructed shortly after the turn of the century, and preferring to wait until the Norfolk Estuary Cut assumed the appearance of reality before parting with their money. It would seem that Williams had now taken the original project virtually as

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1 Guild Hall Book, 26th February, 1846, p.792.
2 Armes, op.cit. p.12. 3 Lewin, op.cit. p.308.
4 The Newmarket Railway was incorporated on the 16th July, 1846 to construct from Chesterford to Newmarket, with a branch from Six Mile Bottom to Cambridge. It was now planning to enter bills for 1847 permitting extensions from Newmarket to Bury, Thetford and Ely. An object of acute interest to the E.C.R. this small company was already working closely with the Ipswich & Bury.
5 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 15th November, 1845.
6 Ibid.

it stood, and had persuaded the L & E board to implement it as a railway promotion. The "large single dock" envisaged, connected to the Ouse by a lock just to the south of the harbour branch and the River Nar,[1] would occupy land already owned by the railway, and would provide revenue both in its own right and as a source of rail traffic; the harbour branch was to be extended to run alongside the ships in the dock.[2] To ensure a plentiful supply of fresh water for steamers in the dock, to ensure freedom from silting and its working independently of the tides[3] there was the Lynn & Wormegay Navigation bill, providing for the construction of a short canal or viaduct from the River Nar at Wormegay (6 miles S.S.E. of Lynn) to the new dock.

Included with the Dock plans were those for a short deviation of the L & E mainline in the immediate vicinity of Lynn.[4] This was a slight matter involving the abandonment of slightly over six furlongs of the existing route in order to take the line by a more easterly curve (seven and a half furlongs) beyond the limits of the 'New Walks', the pride of Lynn Corporation, and to a station site rather nearer the centre of the town and on a field belonging to the Corporation. The matter is both small and obscure; it is interesting to note, however, that the new line cut through the 'Chase' where Williams himself lived[5] - the idea that he thereby gained compensation is an attractive one that cannot be entirely dismissed for lack of proof.

Finally there was the Amalgamation Bill which already had a lengthy history behind it, and which the Eastern Counties now required as an essential

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1 Parliamentary Papers 1847 xxxi (17)-164 II; also the plans deposited in the Norfolk County Offices on the 30th November, 1846. 2 Ibid.
3 Herapath, 6th November, 1847; E.A.R. Directors' Report at the meeting of the 3rd November, 1847.
4 See the plans preserved in the Norfolk County Archives.
5 See White's Norfolk Directory 1845.

preliminary to any lease agreement. Evidence before the Commons committee on the L & E in 1845 had established that together the three lines were complete and integrated,[1] and had revealed the intention of the promoters that they should be amalgamated as soon as they were open for traffic.[2] From the outset the closest possible liason had obtained, extending from the duplication of directors to the pooling of rolling stock[3] and administrative staffs. Indeed, the Rule Book of 1846 had anticipated events by appearing under the title of the East Anglian Railways Company, although inside it still distinguished between the three individual companies.[4] At the initial company meetings of August, 1845 the proprietors were informed that the timing and details of the amalgamation were up to them.[5] Then, on the 31st December, 1845, it was unanimously determined by all three bodies of shareholders that the union should be effected without further delay,[6] a decision based on a general feeling of common interest and a desire for the strength of unity in any possible future negotiations with the Eastern Counties rather than on any sense of weakness or urgency. There was of course no opposition from the solicitors. The original purposes of having three separate companies had been achieved, and now the business of amalgamation would provide them with further pickings. There was, however, some slight opposition from a section of the L & E proprietors who, while approving the principle of amalgamation, feared that the superior potential of their holdings might not receive due recognition, but they were mollified by the assurance that it would be within their power to reject unsatisfactory terms,[7]

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 21st June, 1845. 2 Ibid.26th July, 1845. 3 Ibid.21st June, 1845. 4 In a private collection in Lynn.
5 Herapath, 7th August, 1845; L & D meeting of the 2nd August, 1845.
6 Railway Gazette, 5th December, 1846, p.672; the chairman to Hagarty of Manchester at the E & H meeting of the 2nd December.
7 Ibid., 29th August, 1846, p.195; L & E meeting of the 27th August, 1846.

Any further incipient opposition was finally stifled by the decision of the E & H to leave £79,000 of the £120,000 authorised in 1846 to its partners for distribution after amalgamation,[1] for at that time the shares of all three still stood at a premium. Application for the necessary act was in fact made in 1846, the directors hoping (indeed anticipating) that as the bill concerned no one but the existing proprietors the Standing Orders Committee would overlook the extreme lateness of the bill's entry,[2] but, very properly, this was refused. Desirable in 1846 amalgamation had by 1847 become "essential to the interests of the three companies".[3] Motives of efficiency and economy[4] had become secondary to the need for strength in the current lease negotiations, while the desire of the Eastern Counties to gain control of the Ely & Huntingdon indicated that there would be better terms for all if united.

D. The Eastern Counties Lease Negotiations to January, 1847

The question of leasing the Lynn lines to the E.C.R. was first discussed, and approved in broad principle, at the meetings of the 31st December, 1845, alongside the decision to amalgamate the three companies as soon as possible. For some months nothing was done, although the L & E's undertaking to drop the Wisbech - March bill in the April of 1846 indicated that some degree of cautious understanding was being reached with the Eastern Counties. However, the failures of the 1846 session, the gain by the E.C.R. of a footing in Wisbech, and the potential isolation of the three companies lent urgency to the issue. Williams' nominees on the boards were foremost amongst those who now looked to the E.C.R. for security, arguing, on the premise that the latter would not run down its own property, that it was their duty as

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1 See Below.
2 Railway Gazette, 29th August, 1846; L & E meeting of the 27th August.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 5th December, 1846, p.672; E & H meeting of the 2nd December.

directors to save what could be saved,[1] although, as has been indicated above, it is probable that they would reverse their policy if all went well in the 1847 session. They, of course, viewed the problem in their dual character as both the friends of Williams and as business men of Lynn, but in turning to the E.C.R. they found powerful support from Bruce and the northern shareholders who saw things strictly from the viewpoint of the railway as such, and who cared for the value of their shares above all else. Bruce had studied rural lines in both Britain and Belgium, and had come to the conclusions that not only did single lines rarely pay good dividends, but also that it was going to take the East Anglian at least two years to develop its traffic.[2] He did not enter publicly into the details, but it is obvious what was in his mind. Even by the February of 1847 only 14 miles of the L & E and $8\frac{3}{4}$ miles of the L & D were open to traffic; the E & H was barely commenced. Yet, leaving aside the £120,000 authorised in 1846 for the Bedford extension, to achieve even that had involved such expenditure that only a round £270,000 of the original capital so far uncalled, £90,000 in reserve borrowing powers and an existing balance of £113,541, in all some £480,000, remained to build and equip another 58 miles of railway, much of which had still to be commenced. In contrast to the financial storms that obviously lay ahead, the E.C.R. under Hudson who was at the height of his reputation and paying 6% in the June of 1846 on its ordinary shares seemed to offer a haven of refuge.

Accordingly, "cap in hand",[3] Folkes led a deputation to Hudson[4] offering the East Anglian to the Eastern Counties for a guaranteed rental of 7% per

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1 Railway Gazette, 5th December, 1846, p.670; Folkes at the meeting of the 2nd December.

2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., Lacy.

4 Herapath, 16th December, 1848, p.1296; 'Quiet Observer'.

annum; Hudson accepted the principle of the lease but refused to give more than 6% (a difference of just under £9,000 per annum in terms of existing capital). In considering this the three boards split, and it was by a majority decision only that they determined on acceptance.[1] On the 28th November the heads of the agreement were drawn up, although nothing was signed,[2] and on the 2nd December were presented to the proprietors at the three separate meetings with the recommendation that they be endorsed; Hudson, feeling his strength, stipulated immediate acceptance.[3]

The essence of the agreement lay in certain secret terms to be considered below, and in order to gain the concessions therein Hudson had felt obliged to offer an extremely attractive facade:[4]

1. The agreement was to apply to all East Anglian lines "except such portion as lies between St.Ives and Ely which the E.A.R. are not bound to construct".
2. The lease was to run for 999 years, the E.C.R. paying an annual rental.
3. The E.A.R. proprietors were to be guaranteed 5% per annum on their original capital of £884,400 for three years from the commencement of the lease, then 2% less than the dividend paid on the E.C.R. £20 shares, but in any case never less than 6%.
4. The lease was to be operative from the opening of the L & E line, but from then 5% was also to be paid on the sums expended by the other two.
5. The E.C.R. was to take over all loans contracted by the E.A.R., pay the interest and eventually repay the principal.
6. Amounts raised by the E.A.R. were not to be questioned.
7. The E.C.R. was to finance works necessary for the completion of the E.A.R.
8. The E.A.R. was to be free to apply for extensions as required, and the E.C.R. would meet expenses, and finance and execute the works.
9. The E.C.R. was to have full use of the harbour branch at once, and was to take over each section of the lines ascompleted.
10. The E.C.R. was to purchase plant and stock at cost price.
11. The E.A.R. was not to be bound to construct double track.
12. Existing powers of the E.A.R. were not to be affected except as detailed in the agreement.

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1 Railway Gazette, 5th December, 1846, p.670; Lacy at the L & E meeting.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.

13. The E.C.R. was to pay £800 per annum for the upkeep of the books and administrative costs.
14. The chairman of the South Western Railway was to act as arbitrator in all matters of dispute.

The question of whether the lines were worth more than 6% apart, the safety from competition, the guaranteed dividend, the shedding of responsibility for loans and a carte blanche for further extensions, together with the decent veil to be drawn over transactions so far, constituted a bait highly acceptable to both the Williams group and the more articulate amongst the shareholders. But a bait it was. Hudson was not the man to offer such terms to untried lines, which in any case were virtually at his mercy, without having deep ulterior motives. In fact he had little intention of honouring his proposals except in direct necessity, and it was only the faint possibility of such necessity that had imposed any realistic limitations on his offer at all.

Waddington, the vice-chairman of the E.C.R., was to claim in later years that he had opposed the offer on the grounds of improvidence,[1] but this must be doubted in view of the compelling nature of Hudson's motives and fears, and the fact that Waddington owed his position entirely to Hudson.[2] In the first place the latter was greatly alarmed by the promotion of the Boston, Stamford & Birmingham company of a line from Peterborough to Wisbech, for this would connect with the London & York and so give that company access to Norwich by way of Lyhn, the Lynn & Dereham line and the Norfolk Railway.[3] The L & E, again promoting its own Spalding line, had the locus standi from which to oppose this; the E.C.R. did not.[4] Thus, although the line would have greatly

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1 Railway Times, 11th August, 1860, pp.892-6; E.A.R. meeting of the 9th August, 1860.

2 He had been made vice-chairman and placed in control of traffic as soon as Hudson assumed the chair of the E.C.R. in the October of 1845.

3 Railway Times, 11th August, 1860, p.892; Waddington at the E.A.R. meeting of the 9th August, 1860.

4 Ibid.

benefited Lynn,[1] the L & E must be induced to oppose it.[2] But further than that the E.C.R. needed the opportunity to break the agreement, of April, 1846, that it would not oppose the L & E's Spalding line,[3] for now it desired to construct its own route from Wisbech to Spalding,[4] the purposes of which were too vital to be entrusted to other hands. In the first place it was to link up with the Ambergate, Nottingham & Boston & Eastern Junction (a second bill for the same end was to obtain powers for a line from Etton to Folkingham) so cutting clean across the route of the London & York and connecting the E.C.R. with the Midland Railway.[5] In the second place the line was designed to combat the London & York promotion of a line from Gosberton (near Spalding) to Holbeach and Lynn[6] and the dock there that the L & E itself was proposing to build. Thirdly Hudson felt it essential that he increase his strength in the area in which the London & York was seeking to seduce Wisbech by the promise of docks,[7] and where the Boston, Stamford & Birmingham was hoping to effect similar developments at Sutton Bridge (to be reached by an extension from its branch at Wisbech).[8] Further motives still were that Hudson was seeking a more profitable place on the cross country trunk route conceived by Williams, and required a footing in Spalding itself as a base for an intended E.C.R. promotion to Newark to join the Midland Railway, and so tap the northern coalfields to the further detriment of the London & York.[9]

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1 Railway Times, 11th August, 1860, p.892; Waddington at the E.A.R. meeting of 9th August, 1860. 2 Ibid. 3 Lewin, op.cit. p.310.

4 This does not invalidate the remark that the E.C.R. needed the L & E in order to exploit its locus standi; both bills had been entered on the 30th November before there was any agreement between the companies, and it was intended that they should run side by side until the committee stage, each providing an insurance against the failure of the other.

5 Altogether Hudson launched 13 bills (with a total capital of £5m.) based on the general concept of cutting across the route of the London & York or otherwise diverting its future traffic.

6 Lewin, op.cit. p.311. 7 Gardner, op.cit. pp.78-9.

8 Lewin, op.cit. p.311.

9 Ibid.

From these various considerations it followed that the first of the secret agreements, on which the lease to the Eastern Counties of the East Anglian was made conditional, was that the L & E should be prepared to drop its Spalding bill as required by the E.C.R., and to oppose any bill as directed by that company; the E.C.R. undertook to repay all expenses incurred by the L & E in this latter course. To the East Anglian directors it may have seemed that the line to Spalding was to be obtained without the trouble and expense of the actual construction (note, however, that there would still be high legal charges involved in the preparation of the bill); only the following months were to show what a sorry service they had rendered to both the railway and the town.

Obviously the E.C.R.'s Spalding line would be of diminished value if the Wisbech branch, as yet uncommenced and threatened by mounting financial problems in the company, were not built. Also Hudson wished to ensure that the resources of the E.A.R. were speedily exhausted (see pp.333-4). Thus, the E.C.R. "said unless the branch was made the lease to them of the Anglian lines could not go through".[1] Construction was to commence without further delay, and indeed did so by the spring of 1847. The real problem, however, as Hudson well knew, was that of from where the money was to come, the bridges on the mainline having exhausted the L & E resources. The answer was provided by Duncan, the E.C.R. solicitor and principal intermediary in the whole negotiation; £100,000 of E & H capital was to be diverted for the purpose.[2]

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[1] Herepath, 10th March, 1849, p.254; Bruce at the E.A.R. meeting of the 28th February, 1849.

[2] Railway Times, 15th September, 1860, pp.1043-7;E.A.R.meeting of the 9th September,1860. Bruce described at this meeting how after he came on the board he asked where the E & H money was, and was informed that Duncan had acted, on the instructions of the E.C.R. board, in the way described above. This was denied by Waddington, in 1846 the vice-chairman of the E.C.R.,but there can be no reason to doubt the truth of Bruce's statement. Waddington, by 1860, was a shareholder in the E.A.R., and anxious for a seat on the board; he was thus anxious to minimize the part he had played in the events of 1846.

Only one part of that line, the section between St.Ives and Huntingdon, was of positive use to Hudson's plans,[1] for this short stub would serve his Cambridge - St.Ives, - March line while providing a possible basis for further extensions across the path of the London & York. It had already been agreed between the E.C.R. and the E & H that construction of the latter's line would commence with this section. But of infinitely greater importance to Hudson was that the remainder of the line, the much larger section between Ely and St.Ives, should never be built, for if it were the London & York would be in a position to gain direct access to Lynn harbour, and the opportunity, if working in close liason with the East Anglian, for a large scale incursion into Norfolk. It was to avoid this possibility that Duncan came to the three boards, and, with some force, after insisting on amalgamation (which was to be implemented in any case) proposed that under its cover the funds of the E & H should be diverted to the Wisbech branch, already made an indispensable condition of the lease. Dazzled by the terms of the lease agreement offered, holding the E & H low in the scale of priorities and fearful of the wrath of the E.C.R., the boards thereby agreed to a course of action as regards the E & H far stronger than the "are not bound to construct"[2] which the proprietors were led to believe was the case. In so doing they were sacrificing, even if unwittingly, their last independent outlet, and with it the last chance of an independent future. Bruce later complained that he could not understand why the E.C.R. had insisted on the Wisbech line (which barely met its working expenses) when it already had a line there,[3] but the simple answer was, of course, that at one and the same time that company was gaining what might well prove to be a useful asset, and ensuring that those sections of the E & H, so

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1 Folkes admitted as much at the L & E meeting of the 2nd December, 1846; Railway Gazette, 5th December, 1846, p.670f.
2 See Section 1 of the agreement as given to the proprietors, p.329 above.
3 Herapath, 10th March, 1849, p.254; E.A.R.meeting of the 28th February.1849.

dangerous to itself, that might aid the London & York, not only would, but could not be built.

When the proprietors considered the terms of the lease offer on the 2nd December, 1846, they were of course unaware of these undercurrents, and so discussion centred on the level of the guarantee that Hudson had offered. The reaction was generally one of indignation that the directors should be prepared to sacrifice what had once been an $8\frac{1}{2}$ - 10% line for a mere 6%. The directors, however, were singularly uncommunicative, declining to offer an explanation, refusing to admit to past mistakes[1], and rejecting the demand that they should disclose the names of the minority on the boards who had voted against acceptance.[2] Lacy, however, was one of those who made no secret of his position, emphatically insisting that the line was worth far more than 6%[3]; on the one hand he glibly rationalised the companies' difficulties in terms of the purchase of excess land, the delays imposed by the Bedford Level Corporation and the rising iron prices[4], but on the other he quite failed to indicate how in view of the ever rising expenditure the lines could be either completed, or made to pay anything like 6%. Even so the discontented proprietors rallied to him in condemning the "precious document"[5], noting the fact that here was a man who had held 500 shares at a premium of 400% and still held them.[6] They were not to realise that, while Lacy was in part genuine in what he said, his main concern was that of bluffing the Eastern Counties into making a higher offer by causing the rejection of the existing terms, and so went on from folly to pathetic folly, recalling the 150,000 tons per annum of coal excluded from the L & E traffic estimates[7], comparing the 300 ton

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1 Railway Gazette, 5th December, 1846, p.670f; L & E meeting of the 2nd December. 2 Ibid. The names were demanded by Puncher.
3 Ibid. L & D meeting. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. A L & E proprietor.
6 Ibid. Lechmere at the L & D meeting; he went on to add that without Lacy the lines would not have got underway at all.
7 Ibid. L & E meeting.

limitation on vessels in Wisbech harbour with the 1,000 tons of Lynn,[1] and, indeed, envisaging the harbour of the latter as the very cornerstone of the E.C.R.'s future prosperity.[2] Puncher summed up for almost all those present when he opined that if the East Anglian stood out the Eastern Counties would eventually offer as much as 10%.[3] The E.C.R. itself was assailed from all sides for its notoriously bad bargains, sharp practices and broken promises (e.g. the proprietors of the Maldon, Witham & Braintree had been promised 8-10% by the E.C.R. but had never received it)[4] - indeed, feeling ran so high at the L & D meeting that Lacy had to intervene and remind his over-enthusiastic supporters that it was after all the E.A.R. companies that had broached the matter in the first place.[5] Apparently it occurred to nobody that if the E.C.R. were so untrustworthy there was little point in pressing for a higher guarantee; even if it were the outspoken comments on the E.C.R. indicated a far from cordial agreement, whatever the actual terms might be.

In similar illogical vein the massive capital engagements of the E.C.R. were taken not as an indication of the need for caution, but again as a justification for demanding more than had been offered. The situation as apprehended was:

Eastern Counties capital	£2,841,600	
Northern & Eastern capital	£1,180,000	
To which must be added	£ 326,107	bonus issue (1846) by which £14/16 shares were credited with £20 on payment of 24/-.
	£5,435,131	
In addition	£1,920,000	Nos. 1 & 2 5% Extension Stock
	£7,350,000	
+	£1,600,000	in capital of companies already on lease to the E.C.R.

1 Railway Gazette, 5th December, 1846, p.670; Shepherd of the L & D.
2 Ibid. L & E meeting. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. Puncher of the L & E.
5 Ibid. L & D meeting.

Comment centred principally on the bonus issue which, in the East Anglian view, served to dilute all but £3.5m. of the totals given above (i.e. the Extension Stock and the capital of the lines held on lease), and led to the conclusion that the E.C.R. should pay the East Anglian proprietors at a rate 1% below its own £20 shares and not 2% as had been offered. In that the dilution had been effected since the terms had been discussed in the earlier autumn of 1846 the East Anglian proprietors had some justification for their attitude, but none for ignoring the obvious fact that the necessity under which the E.C.R. had been obliged to do it was in itself a warning signal of dangers ahead. Rather, for the moment, was the Hudson image of solid prosperity accepted without question, a situation indicated by the fact that at no stage did anyone raise the question of the order of priorities in which the E.C.R. would meet its obligations (i.e. as between loans, preference shares and the various guaranteed returns to companies on lease to it).

Inevitably the terms were rejected, but in so doing each meeting unanimously adopted Lacy's resolution[1] that negotiations should continue on a basis of 5% being paid until the lines were fully open, then 6% for three years, and then 7½% in perpetuity.[2] This placed what the proprietors considered to be a more realistic valuation on their lines, and overcame what many considered to be the most repugnant feature of the original terms, a variable dividend under the control of others. The Eastern Counties was given a mere four weeks, until the 1st January, 1847, in which to make up its mind.[3]

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1 Railway Gazette, 5th December, 1846, p.670f; identically worded resolutions were adopted at each meeting.
2 Railway Gazette, 5th December, 1846, p.670.
3 Ibid.

It was now up to Hudson to determine just how much of this resolution was pure bluff, and how far he could trust the directors to manage their proprietors in future meetings. In this he may well have taken into account the barely discernible hints of doubt and insecurity that had crept into the meetings of the 2nd December. There had been, for example, the L & E shareholder who had assumed that such humiliating terms would be acceptable only to the E & H (a striking illustration of the ignorance under which the proprietors still laboured), or the E & H proprietor who, in supporting the rejection of the terms, had emphasised that if the E & H stood by its partners now it must be assured that it would not be abandoned by them in the future. On the other hand there had been just the slightest trace of suspicion and innuendo directed against the boards. This had arisen when Puncher had launched into an otherwise completely pointless narrative on the Maldon, Witham & Braintree Company, describing in a wealth of detail how the E.C.R. had offered that company a 10/- premium on each share, and how the directors, many of whom were over-burdened, had led the proprietors into acceptance, one member of the board in question having been overheard to say, "I hold 500 shares. Do you think I am such a fool as to pay on them? Why, I should be obliged to mortgage everything".[1]

But Hudson could guess, Williams and the directors knew, the true state of East Anglian affairs, so that the former called the bluff, and the latter came before their proprietors better prepared. The day set for an E.C.R. reply went without any further development.[2] A week later, the 8th January, the E.C.R. proprietors were told of the East Anglian's attitude, and also

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1 Railway Gazette, 5th December, 1846, p.670.
2 Herapath, 9th January, 1847, p.26; E & H meeting of the previous week.

informed that new terms were on the way in a letter from Waddington,[1] the contents of which were then published in a printed circular of the 16th January.[2] This contained an outright rejection of the demand for 7½%, but an offer of 6% after one year instead of three as hitherto.[3] Little else was changed except that whereas the L & D proprietors were to receive 5% on paid up capital from the date that the lease commenced (with the opening of the L & E mainline throughout), those of the E & H were to get only 1½%, the 3½% with which they had been credited from the outset now being deducted.[4] With these proposals came definite intimation from Hudson that under no circumstances was he prepared to go further;[5] this was counter-bluff on his part for he still needed control of the East Anglian as badly as ever, but at the same time still had to reckon with the remote possibility that if things went badly for him he might be obliged to honour what he proposed.

Knowledge of Hudson's firmness would probably have been enough to change the minds of the proprietors at the meetings now held (18th and 26th February, 1847), but this time the directors came armed with a detailed case for acceptance, and, in the event of that failing, 5,911 proxies, representing more than half the capital. With such a reserve of strength the directors had little to fear, and their arguments that the proposed Wells & Fakenham, and the Dereham & Fakenham (authorised in 1846), as well as the Wisbech, March & St.Ives would seriously derange traffic expectations carried confidence, as their explanation that passenger receipts had originally been estimated at 2d. per mile rather than the average 1d. now obtaining carried conviction. In positively recommending the lease laboured comparisons were

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1 Herapath 9th January, 1847, p.26; E & H meeting of the previous week.
2 Ibid., 16th January, 1847.
3 Ibid., 20th February, 1847; meeting of the 18th February, L & D.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 6th March, 1847; Bruce at the L & E meeting of the 26th February.

produced to demonstrate that the 50% working expenses of the E.C.R. were not in fact particularly excessive. Lacy contended that 40% would be ample, but apart from that one flicker now acquiesced in the new proposals, saying that while the line was still being "given away" the lease would benefit both E.C.R. and E.A.R. in terms of general traffic and economy of working, and that if the lease were rejected and things went badly in the future he did not want to be blamed.[1] In short his bluff had been called, and at only small cost to the E.C.R.

Taking their lead from Lacy the bulk of the proprietors dropped their former hostility. Only at the L & E meetings were there angry scenes at the "abominable bargain",[2] and unsuccessful attempts first to carry a vote of no confidence in the directors and then, when that had failed, a vote of thanks to Lacy only. But these were the efforts of a small minority only, and Tinker, an original shareholder and a member of the powerful Manchester group, was enabled to announce that the "great body of proprietors he represented were satisfied".[3] Indeed they should have been. Their bluff had failed, but they had received the promise of terms far better than the state of the companies justified. In passing it should also be remarked that the directors had good cause to be thankful in that their secrets (i.e. their undertakings with the E.C.R. over the abandonment of the E & H line) had remained miraculously undisclosed, a fact that in itself suggests how Lacy had been bluffing on the 2nd December. So, with acceptance, the matter for the moment rested, except that sections to allow the lease were now added to the Amalgamation Bill.

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1 Herapath, 6th March, 1847; L & D meeting.
2 Ibid., L & E meeting.
3 Ibid.

Section 3: Deception and Disaster (February to October, 1847)

A. The Unfortunate Characteristics of the E.A.R. Bills

At a time when simplicity of approach would perhaps have served the Lynn companies best, the directors committed the cardinal error of over-subtlety couched in gross clumsiness, and thereby succeeded only in prejudicing Parliament against them. It was in the curious financial manoeuvres associated with the 1847 bills that the Railway Commissioners found much to question. First there was the discrepancy between the capital sum of £382,000 sought in the Amalgamation Bill and the £265,600 which in their returns to the commissioners the companies declared as being the sum they actually intended to raise.[1] To this objection the companies had replied that at the time that the bill was formulated the £120,000 authorised by the E & H act of 1846 had not been created, and therefore, as the Amalgamation Act would cancel the earlier authority, it was necessary to renew the former powers in the name of the East Anglian Railways Company.[2] This sum of £120,000 when added to the £262,000 estimated as being necessary for the completion of works and the provision of certain double tracks gave the £382,000 specified in the bill. But then, after the bill had been deposited, £40,197/10 of the 1846 authorisation had in fact been issued, the balance of £79,802/10 being reserved for the proprietors of the L & E and the L & D after amalgamation had been effected; it was therefore to be proposed in committee that a suitable reduction be made. In strict logic this reduction should have been to £262,000, but in fact, to make for more equitable distribution amongst the shareholders, the sum actually sought was to be £265,600 (plus £88,500 in loans).[3] Confused and indicative of the lack of coherent planning

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1 Report of the Commissioners of Railways on certain Railway Bills comprised in Groups Nos.12,14 & 27; Accounts & Papers 1847 xxxi(17)-164 II.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

as this was, the explanation could still have been acceptable if not coupled with certain striking irregularities, which could not but leave the impression that either the E.A.R. directors were singularly ignorant of procedure - which they were not - or that they were hoping somehow or other to get away with far more than would normally be allowed.

In particular there was the fact that in order to insure against the possible failure of the Amalgamation Bill[1] the Bury and the Spalding bills each contained provision for the raising of capital £134,800 in excess of their respective estimates; likewise the Dock and Wormegay Navigation bills included excesses of £23,700 and £4,700 respectively. For this the Railway Commissioners could find "no good reason" and flatly condemned the practice. The three boards made matters worse by the folly of their excuses; they said, for example, of the excess over estimate in the Navigation Bill that it would[2]:

> "..enable the promoters to execute works which, although not necessary in the actual construction and use of the waterway, may be found useful in carrying the same into execution, or may be required in the passing of the bill through Parliament."

This was of course mere verbiage. In all four cases the real intention was to raise, by hook or by crook, the capital necessary to complete the system without having to have further recourse to Parliament. The whole practice was contrary to the 34th Standing Order which required full and detailed estimates for each and every new undertaking, and it was little wonder that the Railway Commissioners felt obliged to call the attention of Parliament to the whole matter as "an unusual if not an irregular proceeding."[3]

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1 Accounts & Papers 1847 xxxi(17)-164 II.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.

The Railway Commissioners also complained that of the £1,015,600 nominally sought only £549,000 had been subscribed, and that in the names of only eight persons, all directors; it followed that the deposits had been paid from the directors' own pockets, or, as would seem more likely, from company funds. The situation could be described as objectionable because "no guarantee is offered but the subscriptions of the directors on behalf of the company".[1] The device may well have reflected the growing difficulty of attracting railway investment, and by 1847 was by no means uncommon,[2] seeking as it did to present the would be investor with a company safely past the hazards of Parliament, but even so it directly contravened section 58 of the Company Clauses Consolidation Act (1845) which was expressly designed to prevent the unfair monopolization of shares by directors and their friends.[3] That such was a possibility envisaged by at least some of the directors is a consideration not to be entirely overlooked. The total subscribed was also, of course, far below the 75% required by Standing Orders, but in that the Amalgamation Bill was safely passed through Standing Orders as a bill of the third class, that is one requiring sanction for "no further works than such as was authorised by a former act",[4] and therefore no estimates or subscription contracts, the required proportion was achieved. This, of course, raises the possibility that the list of subscribers was restricted so as to avoid complications with the public when the capital requirements were reduced in the Commons, but it could be argued with even greater force that if the excess capital were authorised the possible aims outlined above could still be achieved without difficulty.

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1 1847 xxxi(17)-164 II.
2 Report of the Commissioners of Railways for 1848, Accounts & Papers 1847-8 xxvi, p.41,quoted by H.Pollins,'The Marketing of Railway Shares in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century', Ec.H.R.,2nd Series,Vol.VII,No.2, 1954,fn. to p.235.
3 Cf. Clifford, op.cit.Vol.1, p.130.
4 1847 xxxi(17)-164 II.

B. The 1847 Bills in Parliament

But in spite of all these manoeuvres nothing other than humiliation, emphasised by small and hollow victories, awaited the East Anglian. First, before committee, the Bury bill failed, preference being given to the Newmarket Railway's scheme for linking Newmarket and Ely, the Ipswich & Bury having made an agreement with the Newmarket to build a spur to the latter's extension and withdrawing from the contest. The L & E's pleas that its line would be $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles shorter than the Newmarket route, and that it alone planned to take in the Lark Valley and Mildenhall were quite disregarded[1] by a committee that was under strong pressure from Ipswich Corporation.[2] It has been argued that the reason for preference being shown to a small and isolated company such as the Newmarket was the existence of a friendly understanding with the E.C.R.,[3] but then the same could be said to apply to the L & E. It therefore seems likely that the committee judged the lines on what it conceived to be their relative merits, and that, if anything, the knowledge of the lease negotiations between the L & E and the E.C.R. served only to stimulate that fear of monopoly still so strongly entrenched in many official quarters. As it happened the Newmarket company was soon to run into acute financial difficulties (it actually closed down for 10 weeks in the summer of 1850)[4] and it was not until the 1st April, 1854 that the Newmarket - Bury line was opened, and 1879 before the Great Eastern Railway finally filled the gap to Ely. In the remaining years of its independence, that is until 1862, the East Anglian remained far too weak to take advantage of the failure, with the result that Lynn's former markets in the Bury area were lost irretrievably to Ipswich, in rail contact with Bury St.Edmunds as from the 30th November,1847.

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1 Herapath, 6th November, 1847; Directors' Report at the E.A.R.meeting of the 3rd November.

2 Armes, op.cit. p.12.

3 Cf.Lewin, op.cit. p.308.

4 J.Simmons, op.cit. p.201.

Indeed, as early as 1852 Armes reported that Lynn's trade with Bury had dwindled to "scarcely anything".[1]

As had been arranged with the E.C.R. the Spalding bill was withdrawn after its second reading. The E.C.R.'s own bill for a Wisbech - Spalding line was thus enabled to go on to receive the Royal Assent as 10 & 11 Vic.c. ccxxxv.[2] In terms of traffic Lynn and the E.A.R. would have lost little by this if Hudson had not then declined to make the slightest effort to implement his new act; even by the close of 1848 nothing had been done beyond the purchase of a single house at Spalding.[3] The truth was that the line was no longer necessary to Hudson's central strategy. Despite the support of Lynn Corporation, which petitioned the Commons in its favour on the 10th February, 1847,[4] the Great Northern Railway (formerly the London & York) was not authorised to construct to Lynn. Aided by the L & E, as had been agreed whatever the attitude of Lynn might be, Hudson triumphed in his opposition to this Spalding - Lynn line, and managed to ensure that by its act obtained on the 22nd July, 1847 the Great Northern was restricted to the small and isolated section between Sutton St.Mary and Sutton Bridge, this to be reached by running powers over the E.C.R.'s Wisbech - Spalding line (which Hudson did not intend to build). The Wisbech - Sutton line of the Boston, Stamford & Birmingham was also authorised in this session, but was made conditional on the failure of the Eastern Counties to implement its own construction between Wisbech and Sutton (part of the line to Spalding).[5] This was in fact allowing Hudson to buy time. As long as his Spalding line was not built the G.N.R. was excluded

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1 Op.cit. p.14.
2 This and the Shelford-Bedford bill were the only ones to be approved of the 13 entered by Hudson.
3 Appendix A to the Second Report of the 1849 Select Committee of the Lords.
4 Guild Hall Book, 10th February,1847, p.829.
5 Lewin, op.cit. p.311.

from the area; three years or more must elapse before the conditional clauses binding the Boston, Stamford & Birmingham could become operative, and by then Hudson could reasonably hope that his victory over the G.N.R. would be so complete as to be beyond reversal. In its other aspect the victory in this area, when coupled with the impending abandonment of the Ely - St.Ives section of the E & H, meant that the danger of the E.A.R. being able to turn to the G.N.R. was now averted, for in view of the developments of 1847 there could be no physical connection between them. In effect the E.A.R. had placed itself completely at the mercy of the Eastern Counties, and the reasons for the highly favourable lease terms were being made increasingly clear.

In respect of the place of the Wisbech to Spalding line in the trunk route concept Hudson could afford to wait and see how matters went in the west before commencing construction. Events may be anticipated here to say that the whole trunk project was shortly to collapse of its own accord and independently of developments in the Spalding area. Its realisation had in any case been rendered extremely unlikely by the fact that on the 9th July, 1847 the Great Northern had obtained an act empowering it to purchase the Ambergate, Nottingham & Boston & Eastern Junction (a shrewd blow at Hudson who was compensated only by the success of his Wisbech - Spalding bill), but even so the Manchester, Buxton & Matlock & ~~Eastern~~ Midlands Junction was overwhelmed with financial difficulties and achieved nothing but the $11\frac{1}{2}$ miles section between Rowsley and Ambergate, while the A.N. & B & E.J. itself, with similar problems and encumbered by heavy canal commitments forced on it by Parliament, was obliged to announce on the 19th May, 1848 that it could finance no more than the 22 miles between Nottingham and Grantham - the remainder was abandoned under the statute of 1850. Certain loose ends still remained. In 1850 an

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alliance was formally negotiated between the G.N.R. and the A.N. & B & E.J. by a Mr. Hutchinson, a G.N.R. shareholder who had also created a corner in the latter's shares, on the basis of a 4% guaranteed return for the proprietors of the smaller concern.[1] The 'Euston Confederacy' delayed, but could not prevent, the implementation of this agreement.[2] Meanwhile the Great Northern had inherited the powers of the Boston, Stamford & Birmingham (it had been authorised to purchase that company by the same act of the 9th July, 1847) to construct from Peterborough to Wisbech. In 1849 the E.C.R., recently freed of Hudson and his obsession with the G.N.R., and weary of constant strife and expenditure, offered the Great Northern running powers over its own Peterborough - Wisbech line if the latter would undertake not to construct between the two places. This was agreed.[3] This arrangement was designed to bring at least partial peace between the E.C.R. and the G.N.R., but, ironically, was to provide the East Anglian with the opportunity to promote a round of conflict between the two that was to be even more fierce than any that had gone before.[4]

Before turning to the fate of the Amalgamation Bill the success of the Dock and Navigation bills should be recorded. However, these constituted empty victories, for without the extension lines to Bury and Spalding the developments envisaged in them lost much of their immediate value, and, in any case, could not be implemented because of the general deterioration in the

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1 Grinling, op.cit. p.116.

2 Comprising principally the London & North Western, the Midland and the Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire this alliance aimed to exclude the G.N.R. from Lancashire and Scotland and to hamper it in every way. The entry of the first G.N.R. train into Nottingham was the occasion of the famous incident in which the G.N.R. locomotive was surrounded by Midland engines and forced into a shed, the rails in front of which were then removed.

3 Lewin, op.cit. p.455.

4 See chapter 7 below.

financial scene[1]; Lynn Corporation, with its vested interest in the Harbour Dues (likely to be diminished by a railway dock) would certainly not assist. Indeed, it was something of a surprise that the bills had passed at all. Lynn Corporation's role had been merely to appoint a committee to watch proceedings,[2] and then a deputation to wait on Parliament to safeguard its own interests[3]; moreover, in addition to drawing attention to the financial irregularities, the Railway Commissioners had commented that[4]:

> "The expediency of conferring upon railway companies powers of this kind which relate to matters not immediately connected with their ordinary functions, or to the purposes for which they are incorporated, appears to be a question of considerable importance, especially when it is proposed to give such companies the exclusive control over docks or canals."

and had gone on to say that authorisation of such powers ought to be exceptions from the ordinary rules of legislation, and that each application should be treated as a special case. Whether or not the East Anglian applications in any way constituted special cases was not made clear, but in signifying approval Parliament was doing no more than give expression to the growing recognition that, the dangers of monopoly or not, railway companies to be fully efficient must be permitted to develop their resources independently of the whims and the profits of others; here then was one early example of what was to become a long series of acts authorising railway docks (e.g. Heysham, Immingham) locomotive and rolling stock works, steamship services and hotels etc. The Dock & Deviation Bill in this case was sanctioned on the 7th July, 1847 (10 & 11 Vic.c.clxx) with an authorised capital of £120,300 (section 26) - to be compared with the £144,000 originally sought - and borrowing powers of £40,100. Three years were allowed for the purchase of any necessary lands

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1 Herapath, 6th November, 1847; Directors' Report of the 3rd November, 1847.
2 Guild Hall Book, 4th February, 1847, p.826.
3 Ibid., 9th April, 1847, p.835.
4 1847 xxxi(17)-164 II.

(22) and five for the completion of the works (23). The Wormegay Navigation Bill received the Royal Assent on the same day (10 & 11 Vic.c.clxxi) with an authorised capital of £31,300 (compare the £36,000 sought) and borrowing powers of £12,000. Three years for land purchase (16) and five for completion (17) were allowed, and provision was also made for the erection of company warehouses (18) and quayside tramways (24).

The Amalgamation Bill received the Royal Assent on the 22nd July, 1847 (10 & 11 Vic.c.cclxxv), but only after suffering severe mutiliation; amalgamation itself followed on the 9th August, 1847[1] after certification by the Railway Commissioners that half of the authorised capital had been paid up and expended, a formality required by section 61 of the act. The first blow had fallen when the committee of the Commons (comprising Colonel Rolleston, the Messrs. Gregory, Horseman and two others) had struck out all sections relating to the raising of additional capital. As the other bills had either failed or had had the amount of capital sought reduced this meant that the East Anglian was left with nothing but the unappropriated portion of the 1846 authorisation with which to complete its works. This £79,802 was to be issued on the same terms as the old shares (24), to the existing proprietors if at a premium (25) or as the directors saw fit if not (27); the loans so far contracted and the reserve borrowing powers were confirmed (28). For this disaster the East Anglian had only itself to blame, and the committee cannot be criticised for ensuring that it was not being hoodwinked. For the company the chance of obtaining sufficient funds to complete its works and create a comfortable reserve was gone, and the only course left open to it in the years

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1 Herapath, 6th November, 1847; Directors' Report of the 3rd November, 1847.

that followed was the creation of expensive preference stocks, and then, after that, further enlargement of the total of ordinary share capital. Each such creation was of course a public and humiliating confession of failure that caused the company's credit to sink ever lower.

Even more serious, however, was the deletion in committee of the three clauses which would have allowed the lease to the Eastern Counties; indeed, the committee had flatly refused to hear either the case or the witnesses for the lease.[1] Lacy asked a member of the committee why, and received the startling answer that it was because the two lines ran parallel; to Lacy's further inquiry as to whether the member had ever looked at a map the answer was that in fact he had done so on the very morning of the decision.[2] Bitterly, Lacy rejoined that if the witnesses had been permitted to produce a map the outcome must have been very different.[3]

What could this patently inadequate explanation be made to mean? The answer that the E.C.R. had intimated to the committee (Hudson and Waddington were both M.P.s) that it did not wish the lease to go on represents one possibility, but one, depending on the privately spoken word, that is beyond either proof or denial. In more general terms the matter may be seen as yet one more example of the current indecision in the whole question of amalgamation (in any form) and its relationship to the dangers of monopoly - a situation in which each individual committee became its own arbiter of the issue. Certainly the fact that the lease would virtually end the element of competition for the traffic between Norwich and the midlands and the north

1 Herapath, 19th February, 1848; E.A.R. meeting of the 16th February, the company solicitor to Copeland.
2 Ibid. Lacy.
3 Ibid.

must be taken into account, especially so when it is seen that, as if to counter the withdrawal of the L & E's Spalding line (a move which would in any case reduce such competition), the committee inserted a section (54) enjoining on the East Anglian the fullest co-operation with the Boston, Stamford & Birmingham at Wisbech. Fear of possible monopolies had been evident in many decisions of the 1845 committees, although numerous companies had been empowered to offer themselves for lease as they saw fit in the future - the L & E (section 74) and the L & D (43) had been limited to five years in this, but the E & H (59) had been restricted in no way whatsoever. Then, hot on the heels of such provisions, had come the Railway Leasing Act of 1845 (8 & 9 Vic.c.96) revoking all earlier leasing authorities.[1] Even so, in the following session, Parliament had permitted five amalgamations, two joint leases, four leases, one lease then purchase, twenty purchases, ten absorptions and three take-overs,[2] ~~and by the end of the 1848 session 159 companies had been involved in amalgations approved by Parliament, reducing their number to 22.~~[3] ~~Amongst these were~~ The Lynn lines were doubtlessly permitted to unite in view of their common interests and antecedents, because each depended on other lines and themselves lay in two different directions so that amalgamation could in no sense constitute a threat to the public interest, and because their organisation precluded the common difficulties of redundancy of high officials[4] and the serious problems of equalization of stock. But apparently in the view of this particular committee that must be as far as the matter was to be allowed to go. Further union with neighbouring companies might well lead to

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1 Herapath, 19th February, 1848, p.202; E.A.R. meeting of the 16th February, the company solicitor to Copeland.
2 Kirkaldy & Evans, op.cit. pp.45-6.
3 ~~E.Carter; An Historical Geography of the Railways of the British Isles, p202.~~
4 Cf. Kirkaldy & Evans, op.cit. pp.45-6.

the bad services and high rates from which many felt it was the duty of Parliament to protect them.[1] The bad reputation of the Eastern Counties would lend some substance to this supposition. A final consideration is that some element of fraud was suspected, for "it is in the purchases and amalgamations that the greatest frauds on the public may be perpetrated and future proprietors subjected to the greatest injury".[2] Indeed, the committee members may well have noted with some surprise the nature of the terms offered by the Eastern Counties and the very favourable effect that these had had on East Anglian share quotations; in view of the secret agreements and the enthusiasm with which some of the directors recommended the lease to the proprietors as a prelude to their own withdrawal (probably involving the sale of their shares) from company affairs it cannot be said with any certainty at all that such suspicions would have been unfounded. It must not be forgotten that the lease if implemented would have rendered the detection of earlier malpractices extremely unlikely, and that a guaranteed dividend would have done much to counter their effects.

It was, however, only as the years went by that real suspicions formed, for until the revelations on the conduct of Williams and his partners became common knowledge in the mid-1850s there were few solid grounds for such. In 1859 Bancroft was to declare of the amalgamation and the lease negotiations that, "more shameful proceedings I never heard of in any company",[3] and in 1860 Lisley detected the "seeds of fraud" in the arrangements made for the E & H at that time.[4] At the actual time, however, the principal critics were the former

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1 The 5th Report of the 1852/3 Select Committee on Railway and Canal Amalgamations (Cardwell's Committee), p.3.
2 Morrison, op.cit. p.52.
3 Railway Times, 19th March, 1859, pp.324-7; E.A.R. meeting of the 11th March.
4 Ibid., 15th September, 1860, pp.1043-7; meeting of the 11th September, 1860.

proprietors of the Ely & Huntingdon who complained bitterly of section 30 of the act which prohibited the further payment of interest on calls; Broadbent in particular spoke bitingly of those directors who had promised that the interests of the E & H proprietors would be protected and had then "permitted a lawyers' job" to be carried out in the amalgamation[1] - the irony of the remark was quite unintentional. The attack was somewhat unjust in its context, for during 1847 Parliament had prohibited the practice altogether, but neither this nor the fact that in 1846 the Eastern Counties had undertaken to continue the payment of interest on E & H calls under the lease arrangements (this was brought in as evidence of good faith on the part of the East Anglian directors)[2] afforded any real consolation. As will be seen the steps taken to equalize the stocks of the three companies only served to aggravate the grievance further.

Whatever the ulterior motives and shortcomings, however, the amalgamation remained the wisest step that the early boards had taken. Herapath might sneer at the "pretentious title"[3] adopted by the new formation, but without the unity that lay behind it the three individual companies involved just could not have survived in face of their massive expenditure and poor returns, and while under the shadow of a hostile Eastern Counties. Amalgamation did at least mean that two out of the three lines would continue.

C. The End of the Lease Negotiations (October, 1847)

The close of the Parliamentary session of 1847 had indeed left the East Anglian in a sorry plight; but the worst was yet to come. Naturally enough

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1 Herapath, 6th November, 1847; meeting of the 3rd November, 1847.
2 Ibid., Bruce.
3 Ibid., 6th November, 1847; the first of a series of three articles on the East Anglian Railways Company, all highly critical in tone.

the board at once determined to re-open lease negotiations with the E.C.R.,[1] and to formulate a bill for 1848 that would allow the lease to go through.[2] Accordingly, on the 22nd October, a deputation went to London to meet the E.C.R directors, but to its complete amazement was informed that the latter wished the matter to proceed no further.[3] This was driven home on the 27th October when Hudson and Waddington failed to appear at the banquet marking the completion of the L & E mainline, although both had previously accepted the invitations.[4]

The Eastern Counties explained its apparent change of policy on the grounds that while the depression continued it must decline to enter into any further undertakings,[5] an excuse conveniently forgotten a few months later when it saved the Norfolk Railway "from perdition"[6] by taking it on lease.[7] For the most part the real reasons have already been indicated. The E.C.R. now had control of the vital Wisbech - Spalding link, and, for the moment, the Great Northern was excluded from East Anglia in that area. The same now also applied in the Huntingdon area where the East Anglian had been tricked into the abandonment of the main part of the Ely & Huntingdon line, and the committal of the latter's funds to the Wisbech branch, now commenced. In later years Waddington was to describe how the abandonment of the E & H came to him as the best news he had ever heard while connected with the E.C.R.[8]

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1 Herapath, 6th November, 1847; Bruce at the E.A.R. meeting of the 3rd November.
2 Ibid., Directors' Report. 3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 30th October, 1847, p.1230.
5 Ibid., 19th February, 1848, p.202; meeting of the 16th February, the company solicitor to Copeland.
6 Ibid., 'Investigator', 30th December, 1848, p.1350.
7 The illegal lease of 1848.
8 Railway Times, 11th August, 1860, pp.892-7; E.A.R. meeting of the 9th August, 1860.

Better still, the section of the E & H that the E.C.R. did want was now complete (since the 17th August, 1847), and, inevitably so because of its isolation from the parent system, was already being worked by the Eastern Counties. Surrounded and confined the East Anglian had placed itself at the mercy of Hudson; if it did well he and the E.C.R. would benefit from the through traffic, if it failed the E.C.R. would be spared the cost. Failure was expected. On the pretext of preparing for the implementation of the lease, the E.C.R. had, before breaking off the negotiations, gone carefully into the books of the three companies, compiling detailed lists of their assets and liabilities.[1] Despite the confusion in the accounts the evidence must have been plain to one such as Hudson. He would be amply justified in believing that so bad was the state of the East Anglian that, deprived of any possibility of help from the Great Northern, within a very short space of time it would be obliged to beg the E.C. to take it over on almost any terms.

D. The Consequences of the Deception

Hudson's duplicity cost both Lynn and the railway company dearly. To the former it meant that, at a crisis point in its history, the railways on which it had placed so much hope were become a broken reed. In the years that followed until 1852, while the E.C.R. contrived by every means in its power to hasten the capitulation of the East Anglian, the town's economy stood still while Ipswich, Lowestoft, Yarmouth and Wisbech, all enabled to shake off the effects of the general depression more quickly, forged ahead and gained a clear and well established lead in exploiting the years of prosperity that lay ahead. Especially did this arise from the system of rates devised

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1 Railway Times, 15th September, 1860, pp.1043-7; Bruce at the E.A.R.meeting of the 11th September, 1860.

by the Eastern Counties to draw traffic away from the East Anglian, and thereby Lynn. Meanwhile, by their failures and errors of policy, the railway directors had cost the town its former markets in and around Bedford, left those of Suffolk unprotected, and sacrificed the opportunity of developing contacts for the town in the midlands and north.

To the railway itself was left the choice of humiliating surrender or a future of bitter struggle. It cannot be blamed for adopting the latter alternative, for the events of 1847 had clearly shown how far the Eastern Counties was in fact to be trusted; indeed, the last cut from that concern was perhaps the unkindest of all, for on the "miserable plea" of ultra vires,[1] that the agreement of 1846 was without sanction, it refused to pay the Parliamentary expenses - £28,421 in all[2] - incurred by the East Anglian in opposing the bills that it had directed that company to oppose.[3] But, on the other hand, for the revival that the East Anglian must stage if its intrinsic value were to be increased[4] the starting point could not have been more unfavourable. Saddled with costly and incomplete works, and with £60,000 worth of double track (ordered in expectation of the increased traffic that the lease would bring) it did not want,[5] prevented by Parliament from raising the additional capital it so desperately needed, its one independent outlet given up for the sake of a branch which yielded hardly any return, its first traffic receipts a shattering disappointment, and with the Eastern Counites watching and waiting at every turn for its fall, the road ahead could not be anything but hard and bitter.

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1 Railway Times, 19th March,1859,pp.324-7;Bruce at the meeting of 11th March.
2 Herapath, 6th November,1847; Bruce at the meeting of the 3rd November.
3 Railway Times, 15th September,1860,pp.1043-7;Bruce on the 11th September.
4 Herapath, 19th February,1849,p.201;Wheeler on the 16th February.
5 Ibid., 6th November, 1847; Directors' Report of the 3rd November.

If revival were to come more capital must be had, but the proprietors were disillusioned and public credit was gone. Under the stimulus of the "lease in posse"[1] the company's £25 shares had attained to a quotation of £27 in the spring of 1847, and many, in the search for security amidst the general wreckage of depression, had bought largely, one Mr.Harrison obtaining 1,200, and so becoming the largest single holder in the company.[2] But then had come the reckoning with prices falling from £21 in the October to £15 and then £12 in the November, and to £10 in the January of 1848. Sarcastically, 'Quiet Observer' commented how on his purchases and subsequent speedy resale he had lost only £1,200 and so had "no reason to complain",[3] but Harrison, who held Hudson "morally responsible" for his loss,[4] and many others did not sell, and remained to become a highly articulate and forceful pressure group in company affairs. For these men, and increasingly so the solid men of business such as Bruce who had invested in earlier years, the interests of Lynn as such were of little account. This, coupled with the withdrawal of most of the Lynn directors, but not Whiting and Self, and the smaller fry of the area was to mean that the parochial voice virtually disappeared. Amongst the first achievements of the 'new men' was the elevation, in the summer of 1848, of Bruce to the chair. It was he, jealously watched by the proprietors, who was to undertake with almost unbelievable success the task of putting the East Anglian on its feet, so rebuffing the taunting challenge of Herapath in November, 1847:[5]

> "Try again, great East Anglian Railways, and see if the Eastern Counties Railway will give you 2½% for your line. In all you have about 100 miles of railway (sic) running here and there, yet scar~~f~~cely anywhere; what think you these hundred miles will be worth when they are made?"

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1 Herapath, 'Quiet Observer', 16th December,1848, p.1296.
2 Ibid., 10th March,1849, p.254; E.A.R. meeting of the 28th February.
3 Ibid., 'Quiet Observer', 16th December, 1848, p.1296.
4 Ibid., 10th March,1849, p.254; E.A.R. meeting of the 28th February.
5 Ibid., 6th November, 1847; the first of three articles devoted to running down the East Anglian.

Chapter 7

The Struggle to Survive

(1847-1852)

Section 1: The Changes in Leadership (November, 1847 to November, 1849)

A. The Directors

The angry determination of the proprietors to make their investments pay obviously required that sacrifices be made; equally so new men were needed to deal with the off-shoots of the "seeds of evil" sown by the "ignorance, extravagance and peculation" of earlier days.[1] The power of Williams was of course ended. The discredit attached to his policies, the loss of his 'mouth-pieces' on the board (August, 1847) and the new self assertion of the proprietors destroyed the ground under his feet. Now, from amalgamation on, he and his partners were reduced to the subordinate role of company solicitors and no more, continuing, however, the over-charging if, for lack of opportunity, not the peculation of earlier years.

Previous sections have shown how the first board of the amalgamated company was constituted, the exodus of Folkes, Everard, Cresswell and Seppings being the principal point of interest. In the August of 1848 Bruce displaced the fumbling Lacy at the head of affairs, but still the proprietors were not satisfied; but Bruce had nothing to hide and actively welcomed and encouraged the establishment of an independent Committee of Inquiry "got up" in the north by the indefatigable Broadbent[2] early in 1849. Like most committees of its kind this one could only report long after the features it criticised had been recognised, and where possible rectified, by those in authority. The report

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1 Railway Times, 4th August, 1860, p.875; editorial.
2 Ibid., 19th March, 1859, pp.324-7; Bruce at the meeting of the 11th March, 1859.

itself (August, 1849), which in spite of its great bulk[1] proved to be a "very flimsy and imperfect" statement,[2] dealt with little but a host of superficial details; a Manchester accountant had been engaged to inspect the books but had found nothing amiss (despite what Bruce later described as errors "if not worse"),[3] a judgement which in the light of later discoveries was to render the report "the ridicule of the railway world".[4] But even so it aimed some hard and effective blows at the directors, claiming for example that the existing level of traffic, not to be taken as a criterion of the line's capabilities, suffered partly from the slow habits of change in an agricultural community, but much more from the lack of business direction.[5] Broadbent himself believed that a small dividend could be produced in two years,[6] while Pares, "an experienced person"[7] no doubt but one whose reputation was at stake, insisted in a special report of his own that under good management the traffic could be doubled.[8] Just as in the previous year Puncher had held that it was still not too late to restore the effects of a "grievously wasteful expenditure by a well timed economy and a faithful balance sheet",[9] so the 1849 report insisted that with "rigid economy and energetic management" the company could pull through and even consider the completion of the E & H.[10] With this latter conclusion and the general dissatisfaction with the traffic level Bruce emphatically concurred.[11]

In anticipation of the report Lacy, Sir Henry Calder and Foster Reynolds left the board in the February of 1849. It was then decided to reduce the

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1 Cf.Broadbent himself:- "We in Manchester condensed the voluminous statements", Herapath, 17th November, 1849, p.1157.
2 Ibid. 3 Railway Times, 19th March, 1859, pp.324-7; Bruce at the meeting of the 11th March. 4 Ibid. 5 Herapath,17th November, 1849, p.1158.
6 Ibid.,16th June,1849,p.596; meeting of the 13th June,1849. 7 Ibid.,Bruce.
8 Ibid.,17th November, 1849,p.1158. 9 Ibid., 2nd September, 1848.
10 Ibid.,17th November, 1849,p.1158. 11 Ibid., 16th June, 1849; Bruce.

number of directors to ten.[1] In the summer Carden and Wheeler were forced to resign by Broadbent and his friends,[2] although of the former Bruce said in later years that "a more able financier did not exist in the City of London",[3] and of the latter that "no man was better acquainted with railway contracts".[4] Carden's offence in the eyes of the investigators appeared to be that of successful speculation; he admitted that he had bought and sold thousands (sic) of East Anglian shares, but insisted that that was only before he became a director, a dubious honour which, he claimed, had cost him £5,000.[5] When it became known that in addition to his earlier speculative dealings he now held 1,000 preference shares over and above his portion - a "juggle" Stephens called it[6] - his condemnation was complete, and after rashly stating that he would resign if only three proprietors asked him he had to go.[7] Wheeler's sins were not disclosed, but it would seem that the board was the poorer for the departure of the two. The men on whom Broadbent should have concentrated had already resigned, and now he was carrying his 'witch-hunt' too far.

This became more obvious when the difficulties of replacement were encountered. The critics had complained that only three directors gave regular attendance to company affairs[8] (presumably Bruce, Self and Whiting), but all the members of the Committee of Inquiry approached by Bruce declined his invitation to join the board,[9] and also failed to offer the names of any likely candidates.[10] In the end those elevated had to be Tinker of Hyde (who, unknown to the proprietors, had once been £721 in arrears on his E & H calls,

1 Herapath, 17th November, 1849, p.1158.
2 Railway Times, 19th March,1859,pp.324-7; meeting of the 11th March. 3 Ibid.
4 Ibid. 5 Herapath, 16th June,1849,p.596; meeting of the 13th June.
6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid.
10 Railway Times, 19th March,1859; Bruce on the 11th March.

but so far from paying the 5% penalty had actually received the 3½% interest on the arrears)[1], Chadwicke of the Manchester group, Flint of Hull and Bates of Leeds, the three latter all being described as men of business and, apparently proof of bona fide intentions, as having no connection with the Eastern Counties Railway[2]. Thus the ground was cleared, but fundamentally the situation remained as it had done since the August of 1848 with Bruce, Self and Whiting at the very nerve centre of the company and effectively controlling its affairs.

This triumvirate indeed made the best of the appalling situation. In 1851 Bruce was enabled with justifiable pride to draw the attention of the proprietors to the contrast between the existing situation and that of 1848. In the earlier year the case had appeared hopeless with a half finished line and all the funds gone, but now, in 1851, there were 68 route miles of line in excellent order with traffic at last following a rising trend[3]. In 1850, in similar vein, he had offered telling proof of economic management. He pointed out that in the first report made by the board after he had joined it (that of the 16th February, 1848) a total of £1,062,700 had been expended, with £90,000 contracted in debts, £91,000 involved in works then under construction, and £67,000 as the sum estimated as being necessary for lands, sidings and other works essential to the profitable operation of the line, in all £1,310,700[4]; then, in happy confirmation of this, came the report of February, 1850, showing the capital expenditure, with all the lines complete, and including cash at the bankers, to be £1,309,000[5]. Of course, none of

1 Herapath, 14th March, 1857, pp.396-7; meeting of the 10th March, 1857.
2 Ibid., 17th November, 1849, p.1158; E.A.R. meeting of the 23rd August, 1849.
3 Ibid., 6th September, 1851, p.947; E.A.R. meeting of the 23rd August, 1851.
4 Ibid., 24th August, 1850; meeting of the 21st August, 1850.
5 Ibid.

this helped to solve the major problem of producing a return on this massive capital, but at least it may be said that the board had earned the £1,000 voted to it, at Bruce's request, in the August of 1851[1], the first remuneration that the directors had received in four years.

B. <u>The Tasks of the New Board</u>

In the years immediately after amalgamation little but the immediate problems of survival could claim attention. An act obtained in 1849 (12 & 13 Vic.c.lii) extending for a further period of five years the company's powers to construct the E & H line between Ely and St.Ives[2] was merely a token gesture indicating the hope that better times lay ahead, and condemnation of the "scandalous manner" in which the funds for that line had been diverted[3]. Indeed, much time was to be consumed in bemoaning that cardinal error of policy which had cost the company its independent future and, so it was later believed, the opportunity of making itself a 5% concern[4].

The first obvious task of the directors was to get their lines completed and opened to traffic whatever the cost. The manner in which this was done has been described in chapter 4, so that the various stages of completion may be summarised here in tabular form:

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1 Herapath, 6th September, 1851, p.947.
2 Determined upon on the 3rd November, 1847 (Herapath, 20th November, 1847, p.1314) the bill was actually considered at a meeting of the 13th June, 1849 (ibid., 16th June, 1849, p.596).
3 Railway Times, 19th March, 1859, pp.324-7; Bruce at the meeting of the 11th March.
4 Ibid., 15th September, 1860, pp.1043-7; Bruce at the meeting of the 11th September; also on the 28th February, 1849 - Herapath, 10th March, 1849.

East Anglian lines already open to traffic by the 9th August, 1847

L & E	E & H	L & D
Lynn-Downham 27.10.1846		Lynn-Narborough 27.10.1846

Lines opened after amalgamation

Downham-Ely 26.10.1847	Huntingdon-St.Ives 17.8.1847	Narborough-Swaffham 10.8.1847
		Swaffham-Sporle 26.10.1847
Wisbech Branch 1.2.1848		Sporle-Dereham 11.9.1848

To this table may be added the short extension at Huntingdon, involving a further viaduct (much askew to the course of the Ouse)[1] at one third of the estimated cost of £5,000,[2] in 1851 to facilitate the junction with the Great Northern line; coupled with this was the establishment of a permanent station at St.Ives at an estimated cost of £4,000.[3] To these self imposed items of expenditure (connected with the 1851 lease of the E.A.R. to the Great Northern) should also be added the £10,000 spent in replacing the original timber bridges on the Wisbech branch with more solid and permanent structures.[4] By 1850 the Midland Level Drainage Commissioners (their cut having been completed in 1847 at a cost of £650,000)[5] were pressing for these as was their entitlement under the L & E act of 1845; it was fortunate for the company that contractor's concessions following the adoption of modern equipment allowed the replacements to be made at a 50% saving on the original estimates of £20,000.[6] But such a concession was a mere drop in the ocean after the expenditure already incurred. In all the system had cost £24,800 per mile,[7]

1 Sess.Papers 1852 (173) - Admiralty Inquiry into the proposed works.
2 Herapath, 30th August, 1851, p.947; the Directors' half yearly report.
3 Ibid., 24th August, 1850, pp.828-9; E.A.R. meeting of the 21st August, 1850.
4 Ibid.
5 Whites Norfolk Directory 1864, p.720.
6 Herapath, 24th August, 1850, pp.828-9.
7 Railway Times, 26th September, 1856, pp.1174-5; Lynn & Hunstanton meeting, Simpson, chairman of the L & H, but also vice-chairman of the E.A.R.

although the outstanding debts were by no means settled in this period to 1852. The most prominent amongst the items involved in this massive and disproportionate expenditure were the Wisbech branch at £170,000,[1] and the E & H where two acres of land and $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles of track had overall averaged £25,000 per mile.[2]

Associated with these constructions came the formidable task of paying for them. How this was done forms the subject of the following section. The third task, that of developing the traffic, is considered in section 3 of the present chapter.

Section 2: Financial Policies and the Capital Debt (1845-1852)

A. The Background to Railway Investment (1845-1850)

Unfortunately for such as the East Anglian the national enthusiasm for railway investment manifest in 1845 proved to be of relatively short duration; moreover, the reaction against it continued to develop beyond the short but sharp commercial crisis of 1847/8. Thus the Railway Share Index (in which June 1840 = 100) fell from the 149 of 1845 to the 95.5 of 1848, but then still further to the 70.4 of 1850 (compare the 89.2 of 1840),[3] although by the latter year money had become "very plentiful".[4] These averages, however, were borne up by the well established lines (e.g. London & Birmingham shares stood at a premium of 26% in the autumn of 1848)[5] even though the shares of the leading ten companies depreciated £78m. in the four years after 1845,[6] and concealed the desperate plight of the vast majority of the new companies, the shares of which even by the October of 1847 Herapath found it "most distressing" to

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1 Herapath, 10th March, 1849, p.254; meeting of the 28th February, 1849.

2 Railway Times, 19th March, 1859, pp.324-7; Bruce at the meeting of the 11th March.

3 Gayer, Rostow & Schwartz, op.cit. p.437.

4 Third Report of the 1849 Select Committee; minutes of evidence, Q.2623, Sir John Easthope.

5 Pratt, op.cit. p.275

6 Morrison, op.cit. p.49.

record were almost invariably at a discount of 50% or more.[1] Especially was this discrimination felt by the agricultural lines.[2] Only the E.C.R. lease negotiations enabled the East Anglian £25 shares to hold up as long as they did; with the breakdown of talks they lost £11 in just over two months in falling to the £10 quotation of January, 1848. By the December of that same year they were at a discount of over 80%, and the company was being cited as an example that ought to bring the public to its senses about agricultural lines.[3]

The reaction first set in with the raising of the Bank Rate from 2½% in the October of 1845, and the warnings in the 'Times', in the November, of the "most ruinous, universal and desperate confusion"[4] if the number of projects for the 1846 session were not drastically curtailed; according to the paper 1,263 projects were involved, these requiring an immediate outlay of £50m. although in fact the country could afford no more than £30m.[5] At once the effects were evident amongst those shareholders who, having bought their shares at a high premium, were fearful of being caught in possession of securities that might now well depreciate. These, together with those who had invested beyond their means to pay, and those on whom the practice, necessitated by 'Mania' conditions, of applying for far more shares than were either wanted or expected had rebounded,[6] made haste to sell. Rapidly this trend became a veritable "contagion of fear" in which there was no voice of authority to call a halt and restore calm. As a class the directors of the

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1 Op.cit., 23rd October. 2 This was nothing new. Cf. 'A Subscriber' (Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 18th January, 1845) who had complained that L & E shares with 25/- called stood only at 70/-, whereas similarly paid shares of other companies more favourably placed were at £6 or £7.

3 Herapath, 30th December, 1848, p.1350; 'Investigator'.

4 Op.cit. Editorial of the 17th November, 1845, in commenting on the tables of Mr. Spackman in the same issue which purported to show a total capital of £701,243,208 involved in 1,428 projects either complete, under constrction or planned for 1846.

5 Ibid. 6 Cf. Francis, op.cit., Vol.2, p.197, and D.M.Evans, op.cit. p.28.

railway companies singularly failed to stop the rot, largely because many of their number were themselves obliged to sell; at least one contemporary observer argued from this that a major cause of the collapse in public confidence was the low investment qualification imposed on directors.[1] In addition to this it may also be said that as the panic developed far too much notice was taken of the Stock Exchange,[2] into the mysteries of which many had only recently been initiated,[3] and far too little of the condition of the individual companies involved.

As 1846 progressed the fact that only 270 of the 815 projects before Parliament were sanctioned (the 'Times' articles had caused many of the 1,263 to be weeded out)[4] – with a total authorised capital of £132.9m. – was offset by the first symptoms of the impending crisis of 1847. As this itself developed it adversely affected revenue returns and the amount of capital available for the meeting of calls, and so precipitated further depreciation in railway share values. It was unfortunate that because of the inevitable lapse in time between authorisation of a railway scheme and its implementation on the capital market that the depression should have coincided with the peak period of railway calls, so much so that contemporaries can hardly be blamed for seeing the calls and the depression as a case of cause and effect. Between the December of 1843 and that of 1848 calls amounted to £112.5m.[5] (the aggregate total of the nation's personal income in 1845 when the bulk of this was planned was about £500m.p.a.);[6] the worst year was 1847 when to the end of September £28,583,523 had

1 'An Answer to a Letter of George Carr Glyn by John Whitehead of the London Stock Exchange',London 1848,p5.

2 Ibid. 3 Gayer,Rostow & Schwartz,op.cit.p440. 4 Clapham,op.cit.527.

5 Cf.the £44m.to the close of 1843 (A & P 1847–8/viii/Part III,p524, quoted by Matthews,op.cit.p21) and the £156,508,578 to the end of 1848 (A & P 1854–5 xlviii).

6 'George Carr Glyn and the Railways';The Three Banks,No.46,June,1960,p37.

been called (plus £6,238,000 on foreign lines)[1], the worst month January, 1847 when £6,150,000 (including £1,650,000 on foreign lines) fell due[2]; the figure for September, 1847 was £4,125,874.[3] This coincidence of deep depression and heavy calls inevitably created serious problems for many individuals who were faced with the dismal alternative of either selling at a ruinous loss or of being taken to court by the railway companies for their non-payment of calls.[4] Their dilemma was both painful and visible and undoubtedly contributed to the general reluctance of the public to consider further railway enterprise. Others sapped confidence in railway securities by selling some to pay on other shares[5], while others served to create general suspicion by withholding their signatures from deeds of contract so avoiding payment of calls with impunity.[6] And then too were the dreadful examples of those who had been caught with obligations far beyond their means to pay - Francis recorded one man as having received 400 writs.[7] But of course most paid what they could or else sold at heavy loss to themselves. It was the unhappy circumstances of the former which caused many incidences of local turbulence in the economy at large and so, in light of the current depression, did so much to bring the railways into discredit as the cause of all the economic troubles of the time. If 'shares' be substituted for 'scrip' the evidence of A.W.Roberts, the London banker, before the Select Committee of 1846, may be taken to describe the situation of 1847/8.[8]

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1 Herapath, 18th September, 1847, p.1096.
2 Clapham, op.cit. p.530, following D.Evans.
3 Herapath, 18th September, 1847, p.1096. 4 Cf.Francis, op.cit.Vol.2, p.197.
5 Gayer, Rostow & Schwartz, op.cit. p.439, quoting from Tooke & Newmarch, p.361, who in turn were quoting from the 'Economist'.
6 Cf.Francis, op.cit.Vol.2, pp.125-6. 7 Ibid., p.197.
8 Minutes of Evidence to the Second Report, Q.1247.

"It is an almost everyday occurrence speaking from my observation; people come to me saying, "I am sorry to apply to you but my traveller is out in the country and cannot get any money"; the parties to whom he has applied say they have their money locked up in scrip; and (there are) instances I know where parties, instead of sending remittances of cash, have sent remittances of scrip to be disposed of for whatever it would fetch in the market, and they might as well have sent us so much blotting paper."

There was a time in 1848/9 when experts believed that the continuing depreciation in railway shares would be arrested,[1] for, they believed, public feeling had spent its fury,[2] statements were revealing that after all companies were not in ruins, press irritation (a potent force) had been soothed, calls were diminishing as more and more lines were completed, and, overall, there was growing evidence of more prudent management. But to expect a revival was mere wishful thinking, for suspicion and fear had become too deeply etched in the public mind. As indicated above central to this was the blame attached to the railways for causing the crisis of 1847/8; as Lacy put it in the October of 1847 it was "rather the fashion to decry railway companies, as if they had caused all the mischief that was abroad".[3] A Select Committee of 1847/8[4] laid the prime blame for the crisis on the unprecedented export of bullion to pay for the food imports necessitated by the crop failures of 1845 and '46 (bullion reserves at the Bank of England did in fact fall from £14.8m. to £10.8m. before rising to £13.9m. in 1848), and found the diversion of capital to railways only a subsidiary cause, alongside the undue expansion of credit (especially in the Far East), the over-capitalisation of industry in general in 1845 following exaggerated expectations of trade, and the

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1 Scrivenor, op.cit. p.22.
2 'Letter to George Carr Glyn Esq.,M.P. on Some Points of Railway Management in Reply to a Late Pamphlet' by Capt.Mark Huish, London,1848, p.4.
3 Herapath, 30th October, 1847; Lacy at the banquet of the 27th October held to mark the completion of the L & E mainline.
4 Parliamentary Papers 1847-8/viii.I/pp.iv-vi.

deficiency of the American cotton crop[1], but the public had been conditioned to think otherwise.

During the summer of 1845 the "oracular wisdom" of alarmists such as the 'Economist' and the 'Times' had gone largely unheeded[2], but their warnings were remembered when the collapse they forecast did in fact come. That their prophetic analysis might have erred (e.g. the 'Times' had assumed that 90% of the 1846 projects would be successful) was not taken into account. For this Morrison must bear much of the blame, for he, M.P. for Ipswich and chairman of the 1846 Select Committee, more than anyone, in countless speeches and his book of 1849, gave articulate expression to, and a rallying point for, public suspicions. But his was a subjective case designed to find in events justification for his prophecies of twelve years (since 1836/7)[3] that without some form of government supervision railway development and finance would ultimately precipitate disaster. To him the railway calls were the source of all the trouble, for it was[4]:

> "the inexorable necessity for continued outlay at a time when means to meet it were so straitened that constituted the distinctive features of railway demand and gave it so overwhelming an influence in crushing trade."

It was because of these calls, he argued, that there was such pressure on the money market that for months interest rates were 10% or more (at one time reaching even 20%)[5], so that, interest exceeding likely profits, commerce could not compete for what capital there was[6]. His argument appeared to be logical and powerful, but in fact was open to serious objections. Above all

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1 To which might be added the effects of the 1848 revolutions in Europe; Bruce cited these as a cause of the failure of the 1848 E.A.R. Preference share issue (Herapath, 16th June, 1849; E.A.R. meeting of the 13th June, 1849).

2 D.M.Evans, op.cit. p.13.

3 Morrison, op.cit. p.1.

4 Ibid., p.81.

5 Ibid., p.67.

6 Ibid., pp.6-7.

he overlooked the fact that railway calls were almost always the prelude to their immediate expenditure, so that the large sums involved were without delay being placed back into free circulation through payments to landowners, solicitors, iron and coal concerns, contractors and the manufacturers of railway plant; in a more dispersed form the money was also coming back into circulation as the wages of the 200,000 or so then employed on the construction of the railways. The high interest rates, of which he made so much, were not the fault of the railways so much as the result of the general shortage of capital and the natural reluctance of the public to invest what resources it had in a time of general recession. From another aspect this latter factor may be seen as a reappraisal by the public of its profit expectations - the Select Committee bore witness to the fact that these had been over-sanguine only two years before. Especially was this true of the railways, for this may be seen as a period in which the value of railway securities had to be deflated in order to establish a proper relationship between railway investment and that in other branches of industry; in this sense it may be described as a period of "necessary retribution"[1] for the folly and avarice of 1845, but this is to explain the depression in railway shares in particular; in fact the same general principles, ignored by Morrison, were operative throughout the whole economy. Hence, his attempts to place the whole blame on railway investment were totally unjustifiable.

Morrison's whole thesis rested on the assumption that railway calls diminished the supply of free capital that could have saved other branches of industry from depression and its effects. But, in fact, in only one

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1 Gayer, Rostow & Schwartz, op.cit. p.316 fn., quoting from the 'Economist', 21st October, 1848, pp.1186-8.

particular aspect was this in any way true,[1] and that was the fault of Parliament and its Standing Orders rather than of the railway companies per se. Standing Orders required a deposit of 5% of the capital sought in each new bill to be lodged with the Court of Chancery during the February of the session in which the bill was to be considered; there the money involved might lie frozen until the late summer. In 1846 £11m. to £12m. was so withheld from circulation, causing some stringency and forcing the Discount Rate up to 5%;[2] in 1847, the nadir of the depression, just over £4m. were frozen in this way (i.e. 5% of the £82,553,150 sought).[3] A.W.Roberts told the 1846 Select Committee that while the calls were "very alarming" he and others in the City "viewed that deposit with a great deal of alarm and a great deal of anxiety", and were "persuaded that there would have been the most awful consequences" if it had not been for the "very favourable state of the exchanges and the general disposition of the Bank to view the matter in a liberal manner".[4] Taken with the findings of the 1847/8 Select Committee these comments in themselves are sufficient refutation of Morrison and the attitude of the general public.

But all such suspicion would have been dispelled if only the railways in general had paid the returns so confidently expected in 1845. In any case too high, these expectations could not be fulfilled while the system was incomplete and hampered by the general industrial recession of 1847/8. Moreover, faulty estimates had given a misleading guide to the future, while rising prices during the period of construction, together with the necessity

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1 Expenditure on Baltic timber is ignored as being only marginal; so also are foreign investments, only a small proportion of the whole, as these were largely spent in this country.

2 Clapham, op.cit. p.527.

3 Accounts & Papers 1847 (168) lxiii.

4 First Report of the 1849 Select Committee of the Lords; Minutes of Evidence.

for many companies to promote unproductive lines to avert competition (G.C.Glyn laid the primary blame for the collapse on Parliament for failing to adopt a firm policy in this)[1], had led to a degree of over-capitalisation that must be reflected in diminished dividends for years to come. Thus, for the first half of 1848 no more than 1.81% (£3/12/4.8d.% per annum) could be paid on the aggregate £148m. then invested in railways; even with the non-paying lines deducted the return on the remainder was only 2.09% or £4/3/7.2d.% per annum.[2] Such returns could not bear comparison with other industrial investments once industry in general began to revive in 1848.

Poor returns led to close scrutiny of management, and, from this, further loss of confidence. It was ironical that many of the deficiencies should be brought to light by the very shareholders' committees of inquiry that were seeking to arrest the decline in the values of their investments; indeed, the long lists of extravagances, unsound bargains and irregularities that became public knowledge at this time were more than sufficient to undermine any revival that there otherwise might have been. Really appalling scandals such as that on the North Wales Railway[3] (disclosed by the Lords Select Committee of 1849) were rare despite Morrison's rather sweeping strictures,[4] but revelation of Hudson's methods in 1849 brought further general and severe loss of confidence[5] - in fact the shares of the York, Newcastle & Berwick were said to have lost £3m. (this can only refer to aggregate sales) in the course of 1849 alone.[6] Behind these features and indeed most of the

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1 Railway Times, 19th February, 1848; quoted by Gayer, Rostow & Schwartz, op.cit.p.439, also by Cleveland Stevens, op.cit.p.166. See also pp.15-16 above.

2 Herapath in the September of 1848, and reprinted in the Quarterly Review, No.167, December, 1848, p.83. 3 For details see Appendix M.

4 Cf.op.cit. p.57 where he writes of directors buying up discredited shares for resale after careful propaganda had done its work.

5 Cf. Gayer, Rostow & Schwartz, op.cit. p.439.

6 Third Report of the 1849 Select Committee of the Lords; Minutes of Evidence, Q.2623, Sir John Easthope.

irregularities (many of them being quite innocently conceived) lay the inadequacy of railway accountancy, already discussed at length. Improvements came after 1849 but the old suspicions must have inevitably lingered on; to that date at least because of it "it is not surprising that confidence must be diminished in all cases and lost in some", so that "railway property is thus rendered precarious, insecure and suspected; the permanent investment of capital is checked and violent fluctuations are produced", repelling the prudent capitalist and tempting the speculators.[1]

A further important factor in explaining the continued depreciation of ordinary railway shares after 1848 was the creation of an increasing number of preference shares, which in effect served to widen the gulf between the holder of an ordinary share and any prospect of obtaining a dividend. As the panic had developed each call had become a time of potential danger to the company making it; at a very early stage reluctance to press for arrears had become manifest "for every turn of the screw drives down the shares to a greater discount", and if leniency were not shown that discount might become 50% or more.[2] But money had to be raised to overcome the deficiencies of the original estimates, and to avert "what was equivalent to confiscation of the large sums already advanced",[3] even if such in the view of Morrison and others like him was investment without proper expectation of return,[4] and as such "at variance with all sound principles of business and commercial morality".[5] Most companies would have preferred to raise the additional capital in the form of loans, but were prevented by the limitations on borrowing power

1 Third Report of the 1849 Select Committee of the Lords, p.xii.
2 Ibid., Qs.2196, 2197, Huish and Booth.
3 Morrison, op.cit. p.81.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p.60.

contained in their individual acts, and by the Usury Laws which allowed a maximum of 5% interest and no more. Thus, by 1850 over 100 companies had been obliged to issue preference shares,[1] bearing in that year an average interest of 5.61%[2] - in 1847 18% of the £39.5m. sanctioned by Parliament was in the form of guaranteed preference shares, 51% of the £15.3m. of 1848 and 66% of the £3.9m. of 1849;[3] to these figures should be added the unknown total of preference shares issued without Parliamentary sanction (a practice considered in a subsequent section below). There were allied forms of raising additional capital. Some companies issued ordinary shares at a discount (as permitted by the Company Clauses Consolidation Act when the current market quotation was below par), others, the E.C.R. and E.A.R. amongst them, raised the nominal value of shares in return for a relatively small additional payment, or issued shares with a higher nominal value than the amount that was actually to be called; the Great Northern split its individual shares so that one half bore a guaranteed 6% preference, the other half deferred interest,[4] but whatever the device employed it could serve only to reduce confidence further. There was also the very real danger at this time that investment might be in lines that would never be completed. Of the 9,792 miles authorised between 1844 and 1850 2,272 went by default, and another 1,492 under the authority of the 1850 Railways Abandonment Act (13 & 14 Vic.c.83).[5] In law subscribers to such lines were of course entitled to return of investment (by return of unexpended cash and realisation of assets), and the case of Walstab v Spottiswoode had settled the right of return of funds where works were not commenced,[6] but this was little comfort where huge

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1 G.H.Evans, op.cit. p.149. 2 Ibid., p.108. 3 Ibid., p.91.
4 Grinling, op.cit. p.78.
5 Clifford, op.cit. p.83 - the figures are taken from Captain Galton's returns to the Board of Trade.
6 D.M.Evans, op.cit. p.29.

sums had been irretrievably swallowed in Parliamentary expenses, directors' fees etc.

Who then did hold railway shares in these difficult years, and invest in further creations to the extent of £39.5m. in 1847, £15.3m. in 1848, £3.9m. in 1849 and £4.1m. in 1850? Particular reference to the East Anglian shows what general evidence indicates to have been the pattern in the nation at large. First there were the dwindling numbers of original investors who had a genuine faith in their lines, and were willing to risk further capital on the strength of that faith; with these may also be classed those of sufficient means and just sufficient confidence in their lines to avoid selling when the value of their shares declined. Secondly were the speculators who came and went with the various fluctuations in the individual company's credit (see chapter 6 above for examples of this in connection with the E.C.R. lease negotiations) - these were frequently large groups, and very often the most vociferous in a company. Thirdly were the shrewd and substantial business men, particularly from Manchester and the north, who took up the reasonably secure guaranteed preference shares, as well as ordinary shares at a discount if in their view the line in question was ever likely to pay. In East Anglian affairs, and in those of many other companies, such men as these constituted the most powerful group, a status acquired not only by the size of aggregate holdings, but, and more important, by the relative permanence of their investments.

B. The Original Capital (1845-1847)

1. The Shares

As recorded in an earlier chapter the subscriptions to the three Lynn lines were raised without the slightest difficulty in 1844, and until the later months of 1847 the shares of the three companies were continuously quoted at a premium rate, although, as public confidence in railway investment diminished, this followed a steadily falling trend. The chronological history of the three blocks of the original shares was as follows:

	L & E		E & H		L & D	
Share Capital:	£300,000		£194,400		£270,000	
	12,000 x £25		10,800 x £18		10,800 x £25	
Expectation:	8½-10%		9%		9%	
Calls:[1]	Deposit	£2-10s	Deposit	£1- 5s.	Deposit	£1- 7-6d
	1.10.1845	£2-10s	1.10.45	£3-15s.	1.10.45	£3-12-6d
	5. 3.1846	£5	9. 4.46	£2-10s.	5. 3.46	£5
	11.5.1846	£5	1.11.46	£5	1. 7.46	£5
	1. 1.1847	£5	31.3.47	£2-10s.	31.3.47	£5
	1. 5.1847	£5	16.8.47	£3	2. 8.47	£5
		£25		£18		£25

The only unusual feature contained in the above was, in each case, the lightness of the calls throughout the middle and later months of 1846, this arising from the rather ignoble desire to delay demands on the proprietors until a date as near as possible to the commencement of the intended Eastern Counties lease, when, of course, 5% interest was to be paid on them.[2] It will also be observed that after the calls of the 1st October, 1845 (to meet expenses and enable deposits to be placed on land) there was an increasing tendancy to stagger the dates of the calls as between the three companies, a device employed, no doubt, to ease the burden on those with shares in more than one of the lines. The fact that E & H shares were called in almost the same period as those of its two partners, despite the retarded state of its works, derived from the requirements of the Amalgamation Bill that all three

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1 Scrivenor, op.cit. p.353.
2 Railway Gazette, 29th August, 1846, p.195; L & E meeting of the 27th August, 1846.

blocks of shares must be fully paid-up as soon as possible after amalgamation; the insertion of this provision reflected not only the desire to facilitate the equalisation of stock, but even more, the eagerness of the boards to have the funds of the E & H in hand for the construction of the Wisbech branch.

Despite the worsening situations of both the companies and the general economy surprisingly little difficulty was encountered in the collection of the calls. With the E & H the interest of 3½% on calls, which was not paid when a proprietor was in arrears,[1] was a powerful inducement to prompt payment, while the proprietors of the L & E and the L & D were encouraged by the fact that their first trains were running after only the third call. In addition the boards acted with commendable firmness. A 5% penalty charge on those in arrears,[2] sharp letters,[3] and a refusal to allow those in default to keep their shares as long as the interest was paid to the company (this was said to encourage non-payment)[4] proved adequate safeguards. The figures of arrears given from time to time were in fact of little significance without a detailed study of their context, and so were open to entirely subjective interpretation. For example, in the August of 1847 the aggregate arrears of the three companies were £36,000 on £764,400 called. In the November Herapath described this as "deplorable", and quoted the 'Sheffield & Rotherham Independent' in citing this as proof that the East Anglian proprietors were not prepared for further excess[5] (he was referring to the creation of further capital by the E.A.R.). But in fact, even as he wrote, £6,000 was in and most of the remainder was soon to follow, the relatively high total of the

1 Herapath, 6th November, 1847, pp.1253-4; Lacy at the E.A.R. meeting of the 3rd. 2 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 6th September, 1845.

3 Herapath, 6th November, 1847, pp.1253-4; Lacy at the meeting of the 3rd November. 4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., 20th November, 1847, p.1311.

31st August (which was still being quoted in the November) deriving principally from the fact that then only four weeks had elapsed since the most recent call on L & D shares and only two since that on the E & H proprietors. Delays there may have been, but the only really fair way to judge the situation at this time of depression was to consider the final outcome; there, as on the 31st December, 1848, the situation was that the L & E were but £165 in arrears (4th and 5th calls), the E & H £674/5 (3rd, 4th and 5th), and the L & D £1,295 (4th and 5th). One could well agree with Lacy who, in November, 1847, reporting that the total arrears of the E.A.R. were no more than 2%, claimed that no company in the kingdom was better paid-up.[1]

Only in certain rare instances had harsh measures proved necessary in achieving this very successful result. The L & D accounts for the February of 1847 showed 260 shares as having been forfeited to the company,[2] but these were resold without any real difficulty, as were between 80 and 90 of the E & H in the same period (only the deposits had been paid).[3] Earlier, in November, 1846, the latter company had taken a Mr.Ryder into the Sheriff's Court in respect of 106 shares on each of which £2/10 was owing (£273/7/7 in all when the 5% interest charge was added);[4] he suffered judgement to go by default and so forfeited his shares, but these, with others to a total of 180 in all, were readily taken up.[5]

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1 Herapath, 6th November, 1847, pp.1253-4; meeting of the 3rd November.
2 Ibid., 6th March, 1847, p.302; L & D meeting of the 26th February, 1847.
3 Ibid., 6th November, 1847, pp.1253-4; Lacy at the meeting of the 3rd November, 1847.
4 Railway Gazette, 28th November, 1846, p.648; meeting of the 21st November.
5 Herapath, 6th March, 1847, p.302; E & H meeting of the 26th February.

2. The Debenture Loans

Meanwhile, to avoid further calls while the E.C.R. lease was in prospect[1] and to create a reserve of funds that would bolster public confidence, the L & E and the L & D had embarked, in the June of 1846,[2] on a costly and ill-advised policy of meeting current expenditure from loans in preference to share capital. This their respective acts permitted them to do after 50% of the latter had been called. Authorised to raise £100,000 in loans and mortgages the L & E in fact contracted a debenture debt of £99,750 by the summer of 1847, at a cost to itself of £619/17/10 in commissions and debenture stamps;[3] in the same period the L & D borrowed in debentures £62,250 at a cost of £479/10.[4] In both cases the loans were to bear an interest of 5%, the maximum allowed by the Usury Laws. If the lease to the Eastern Counties had gone through the proprietors of the two companies would have gained some advantage by this policy, but as events were to turn out the borrowing of money at a high rate when large amounts of share capital remained uncalled was to prove a costly error. On two main counts could the policy be faulted. First there was the high 5% rate of interest. Admittedly the money market was growing difficult, but not yet sufficiently so to justify the maximum level of interest without some attempt to gain more favourable terms being made; especially was this so when the continuing high premiums on the companies' shares were taken into account. In 1848, when these loans were still operative, the average rate of interest being paid by all companies was only 4.62%,[5] and that figure covered the loans raised after the latter half of 1846 when the money market was still relatively favourable. The fact that

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1 Railway Gazette, 29th August, 1846, p.195; L & E meeting of the 27th August.
2 Ibid.
3 Herapath, 6th March, 1847, p.302. 4 Ibid.
5 G.H.Evans, op.cit. p.108; based on P.P. 1854-55 (1965) xlviii,p.xvii.

Everard, Cresswell, Goodwin, Partridge, Valentine (the engineer) and Seppings, the director, all made loans to the company[1] is not without considerable significance in explaining this costly policy. But much more serious were the dates set for the repayment of the loans. The L & E debenture debt (raised in sums of between £200 and £5,000) was so divided that £53,250 fell due for repayment in three years, £20,600 in five, and £25,900 in seven years[2]; the L & D debt, contracted in sums of between £200 and £3,000) involved the repayment of £2,200 in three years and the rest in five[3]. Thus the two companies together had saddled themselves with repayments of £55,450 in 1849/50, £80,650 in 1851/2, and £25,900 in 1853/4.[4] For companies which were nowhere near completion, and which had committed themselves to dividends of at least 6-7% this was gross folly that can only be explained on the grounds that it was intended under the lease to the Eastern Counties to make that company assume the whole burden.

But even if this were the case the directors damned themselves by acting towards the borrowing powers of the E & H as if an entirely independent future was envisaged. Empowered to borrow (in the acts of 1845 and '46) £104,800, the E & H in fact preferred to meet all expenses from share calls. A positive decision to that effect was in fact made in the August of 1846, and was to apply until the future of the line was clearly settled[5]. Uncertainty was only one reason, however, and, if the E.C.R. were to take over the loans of the three companies without question as in fact it undertook to do, one that hardly applied. Much more important was the forthcoming amalgamation, and the need arising from it to keep the debenture debt of the united companies within

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1 The evidence for this is not entirely conclusive; primarily the statement rests on the E.A.R. Cash Book for July, 1856, p.206 (B.T.C.Archives) which proves that debentures were held at that time. But as most had been renewed, and in view of strands of evidence contained in the following text the statement may reasonably be accepted as it stands.

2 Scrivenor, op.cit.p.353; also A & P 1847 xxxl(17)-164 II

3 Ibid.

4 The double date is given as the loans were raised over a period of months.

5 Railway Gazette, 29th August, 1846, p.195; meeting of the 27th August, 1846.

reasonable bounds. A further decision, made in the January of 1847 on the motion of Lacy, that £64,800 should be borrowed at a maximum rate of 5%[1] represented merely the boards' desire to have the authority to draw on a ready source of funds if required; in fact the E & H was to borrow nothing before its independence was lost.[2]

C. The 6% Preference Issue of 1847

1. The Origins

Prior to the last call on the original shares of the E & H that company, as recounted in the previous chapter, had added £120,000 to its capital authorisation (to be issued as 34,285 shares of £3/10 and one of £2/10) in respect of the Bedford extension. Almost immediately, however, in the August of 1846, the proprietors determined that these new shares should not be issued without their express consent.[3] The motives were those of caution. It would be foolish to commit further capital until the future of the line was known,[4] or before the attitude of the E.C.R. to the proposed extension was declared. In addition it had to be ensured that if the eventual issue were to lead to any advantages it would be the existing proprietors who reaped the benefit. This was followed in the December of 1846 by a resolution that the newly authorised works were for the moment neither necessary nor expedient, and that their implementation should be shelved until after amalgamation.[5]

But then the matter became more complicated. In the February of 1847 Everard and Self proposed and had carried motions to the effect that £40,197/10 of the £120,000 should be raised without further delay. This would involve the issue of 11,485 shares of £3/10 on the basis of one new

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1 Herapath, 9th January, 1847, p.26; meeting of the 7th. 2 Scrivenor, op.cit, 359
3 Railway Gazette, 29th August, 1846, p.195; meeting of the 27th. 4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 5th December, 1846, p.672; E & H meeting of the 2nd December, 1846.

for each existing £18 share, with 685 left over to be issued at the discretion of the directors. The balance of £79,802/10 was to be reserved for issue to the proprietors of the L & E and the L & D after amalgamation, again on a basis of one for one, the number of unappropriated shares exactly equalling the number of existing £25 shares in those two companies. The bait offered by the directors in proposing this was that after amalgamation the new shares would have a preference status with a guaranteed fixed dividend of 6%.[1]

The motives that lay behind this curious manoeuvre of partial issue may only be surmised. By this stage the three boards had of course committed themselves to the abandonment of all but a small section of the E & H, and to the diversion of that company's funds to the Wisbech branch. The partial issue would ensure that ready funds were available for that latter work which had just been commenced, and also insure against any possibility that in considering the Amalgamation Bill Parliament would cancel the 1846 capital authorisation. In addition, the prospect of an issue of preference shares, in all probability at a premium, would be sufficient to quell any incipient or belated opposition to the amalgamation and its implications amongst the proprietors of the L & E and the L & D. The immediate effect was certainly beneficial to the existing E & H shares. These, with £12/10 called, had certainly declined significantly to par during the last three weeks of January, 1847, but in the February attained again to quotations of between $13\frac{1}{4}$ and 14. This may in part be attributed to the E.C.R. negotiations, but more particularly to the seemingly positive indication that, after all, the

1 Herapath; Supplement of the 20th February, 1847, p.248; E & H meeting of the 18th February, 1847.

E & H was not in any way to be sacrificed. Such an impression may well have been confirmed on the 26th February, 1847 when it was resolved that no more calls should be made before July; this was in part so as to gain the fullest benefit from the 5% to be paid by the E.C.R., but also to allow time for the holders of the new shares to convert them, if they so wished, from guaranteed preference into ordinary shares[1] - the implication that ordinary dividends would exceed 6% was plain for all to see. As it happened, however it was to be the 3rd November before the first call on the new shares could be made (the first of three calls of £1 after an initial deposit of 10/-)[2]; it was not until that date that the proprietors of the amalgamated companies could be assembled to give their authority to the proposals of the board and confirm the preference status of the new shares.

2. Summary of the Situation on Amalgamation

The cash accounts to the 31st August, 1847 showed the following situation[3]:

Calls received	£728,069 5s.	
Debentures raised	£190,000 0s.	(including further L & D loans)
	£918,069 5s.	

Expenditure to that date was £909,891/19/11, so leaving a cash balance in hand of £9,177/5/1. Reserve borrowing powers amounted to £104,800 (but in view of the heavy burden of debt already assumed the raising of only a small portion of this could be contemplated), and uncalled shares, including the authorisation, to £156,300, both totals excluding the sums authorised to be raised in respect of the Dock and Wormegay Navigation projects. A sum of £302,300 was estimated as being necessary for completion, but, as Herapath

1 Herapath, 6th March,1847, p.302; E & H meeting of the 26th February,1847.
2 Scrivenor, op.cit. p.359; the subsequent calls were made on the 11th December, 1847 and the 12th February, 1848.
3 Herapath, 6th November, 1847, pp.1253-4.

reported, the secretary, W.W.Williams, would not make himself available to discuss this figure.[1] Perhaps this was as well, for in view of the state of the books and the number of as yet undisclosed debts little faith could be placed in any of the calculations made at that time. By the November Lacy was publicly stating that £41,000 for the L & E, £48,000 for the L & D and £20,000 for the E & H would be sufficient to secure completion,[2] a calculation that in aggregate bore a suspiciously close relationship to the £120,000 of the E & H's 1846 shares. This was a totally erroneous estimate as events were to show, but it did at least establish the one certain fact that more capital was needed than the company then possessed. The only course was to issue in full the £120,000, the use of which had been confirmed to the East Anglian by the Amalgamation Act of 1847, although all must have realised that enormous revenue returns would be needed to pay even 1½% on the capital already expended.[3]

3. The Proposals and the Reaction

The new E & H shares were first quoted on the 24th August, 1847, and during the same month all the proprietors of the former L & E and L & D received a circular offering them the balance of the new issue. This was an error in tactics, subsequently admitted to by Lacy,[4] for at that time the proprietors were not made aware that the preference rate promised could not apply until the shareholders as a body had authorised the whole procedure, or that the directors intended that it would not apply until all the shares had

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1 Herapath, 6th November, 1847, p.1264; the first of three articles on the E.A.R. The figure quoted may be compared with the £284,200 stated by the companies to the Railway Commissioners to be involved in works in progress at the beginning of 1847 (A & P 1847 xxxi(17)-164 II).

2 Herapath, 6th November, 1847, pp.1253-4; E.A.R. meeting of the 3rd November.

3 Ibid., 13th November, 1847, p.1287.

4 At the meeting of the 3rd November, 1847.

been fully paid in the February of 1848 (see below). Unwittingly numerous proprietors paid over their deposits at once, only to find subsequently that they were no better off than those, more cautious, who held off until the end of the year.[1] It also seems that the offer of preference shares came as a rude shock to many proprietors, for the first time opening their eyes to the true situation of their company; as one wrote, he had bought 60 £25 shares in the expectation of 8 to 10%, "when instead, and to my surprise, Preference Shares of £3/10 each were offered to me" - these he declined.[2]

Not until the 3rd November were the proprietors assembled to hear and approve the details of the proposed new issue. In their presentation these were carefully prefaced by both a suitable eulogy on the prospects of the company, and a justification for the board. The former dwelt on the high revenue potential of the line, the cheapness with which it could be run and the great excellence of its plant,[3] the latter on excessive land costs (already £239,357,[4] although originally £101,250 had been estimated as sufficient for the three lines together), the addition of 20 miles of double track, the rising iron prices and the high Parliamentary expenses of 1847;[5] in respect of the latter the £28,421 dishonestly withheld by the Eastern Counties was cited as being a major cause of the present embarrassment.[6]

In view of these factors and the need for further capital to complete the lines the directors now proposed:[7]

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1 Herapath, 6th November, 1847, pp.1253-4; E.A.R. meeting of the 3rd November, 1847.
2 'A Distant Registered Shareholder', Herapath, 22nd January, 1848.
3 The Directors' Report on the 3rd November, 1847; also Lacy.
4 See the accounts to the 31st August, 1847; ibid.
5 Ibid., Directors' Report.
6 Ibid., Lacy.
7 Ibid.

1. To raise £79,802/10 by the issue of 22,800 shares of £3/10 and one of £2/10, the latter to be disposed of as the board saw fit.
2. To offer 12,000 of the shares to the proprietors of the L & E.
3. To offer 10,800 of the shares to the proprietors of the L & D.
4. That the newly created 22,800 shares, plus the 11,485 E & H £3/10 shares should bear a guaranteed 6% preference dividend without any further participation in profits; holders of the new shares to have the option of exchanging them for E.A.R. ordinary shares at six months' notice on or before the 31st December, 1852.
5. That L & E proprietors be credited with £2 on the payment of a £1 deposit on each new share taken up.
6. That L & D proprietors be credited with £2 on the payment of a deposit of £1/3 on each new share taken up.
7. That deposits be paid on or before the 11th December, 1847, and the balance on or before the 12th February, 1848, from which latter date the 6% interest would be payable.
8. That the directors be empowered to dispose of unsold shares within 21 days of the meeting.

To dispose of the second half of the proposals first, the point of the discount, described by Herapath as "enormous"[1], to the L & E and the L & D proprietors was nominally to secure the subsidiary purpose of equalising the stock of the three companies; it would, however, not be unjustly cynical to say that it was also intended to encourage the shareholders to take the new shares. The justification was that if the L & E and the L & D had been allowed to pay 3½% interest on calls as had been done by the E & H the amount due per share would now have been £1/0/0¾. to the L & E proprietors, and 17/- to those of the L & D.[2] Technically this issue at a discount was legal as the existing shares were now being quoted at a level below par, but it was an error of policy that caused much bitterness amongst the proprietors of the former E & H. They argued, quite justifiably so in view of the fact that the proprietors of the L & E and the L & D had known the relative difference in terms (although the clause to allow the payment of interest on calls in the latter's bill had been lost in committee), that the new issue of 22,800 shares

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1 Herapath, 20th November, 1847, p.1311; the third article and quoting from the Sheffield & Rotherham Independent.

2 Ibid. 6th November, 1847, pp.1253-4; meeting of the 3rd November, 1847.

would swamp those taken up in good faith in the February of 1847 so that the latter, because of the discount, would be devalued.[1] Those who had come forward then to help the line were in fact no better off than those who took the shares now; in fact they would be worse off, and more than likely disinclined to meet further calls. This critical attitude was further justified by the directors' lack of logic in the whole matter, for while arguing that the discount represented a substitute for the payment of interest on past calls they also refused to pay interest as such to those holders of the original shares who declined their allocation of the new preference shares.[2] Despite such considerations, however, the board had sufficiently emphasised the urgency of the situation to carry the day, and a motion that the new shares be issued at par but with a 7% guarantee to apply for ten years (so achieving the same purpose as the discount from the L & E and L & D viewpoints) could only muster five votes in its support. Mr. Hall of the E & H summed up for many when he admitted that, while he might well feel that he had "an axe to grind", he could not in view of all the circumstances oppose the board, and on the whole found its proposals to constitute an "honourable agreement".[3]

Honourable it may have been, and practical it certainly was, but there must be a grave doubt as to whether or not the discount while observing the letter of the law did not contravene its spirit. Certainly, under the provisions of the Company Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, the discount as such was legal in as much as that the existing shares of the company were currently being quoted at a level below par. Yet, against this, the 1847 Parliament had emphatically prohibited the payment of further interest on

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1 Herapath, 6th November,1847,pp.1253-4; meeting of the 3rd November,1847.
2 Ibid., Lacy to a proprietor.
3 Ibid.

calls. What in fact the E.A.R. was now doing in respect of its L & E and L & D proprietors was to follow a legal course, but on grounds, dictated by necessity and the need to equalise the stocks of the three companies, that were now totally illegal. In addition, in the case of the L & D, a payment was in flat contradiction of the decision of the Commons committee of 1845 that had considered the company's bill.

In offering a 6% guaranteed dividend, and thereby admitting the urgency of their need, the directors were being no more than realistic in their assessment of the situation in a year in which the Bank Rate reached 8% and the Bank Charter Act of 1844 had to be suspended. In effect the terms constituted a public admission of failure, although the option of exchanging the preference shares for ordinary indicated the continuing hope that the dividends on the latter would one day exceed 6%. But the implied paradox could not stand up to critical examination. As Herapath demanded to know, what use was a guaranteed preference rate, be it even 10%, if there was no revenue profit[1] - so far the traffic returns were very disappointing and the future prospects were "far from bright"[2]; moreover, there was the real danger that even heavier preference shares would come to out-rank these in precedence[3]. The shareholders were in a situation of dilemma for[4]:

> "...(if) it should turn out the undertaking is utterly profitless it follows that those holders of old shares who take up the new preferential or guaranteed ones will simply be in the process of having been lugged into a heavier dead expenditure."

In effect the offer of these preference shares, coupled with the discount, was a form of subtle blackmail in which the existing proprietors were being asked to take one more chance or run the risk of losing everything. If the proprietors refused the chance their prospects of ever obtaining a dividend

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1 Herapath, 20th November, 1847, p.1311; the third article, and quoting from the 'Sheffield & Rotherham Independent'.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.

were rendered even more remote; traffic so far was very poor and if others came into the company by taking up the new shares it would be they who received whatever small profit there might be; once promised 10%, then 8%, now 2½% if anything at all[1] such proprietors were in an unenviable position. This was made even worse when, as Carden and others had correctly forecast, the fact of the barrier between the holders of ordinary shares and the prospect of a dividend plus the "present of £22,000" in discount (representing a perpetual charge of £1,300 per annum in interest against company profits)[2], coming on top of the breakdown in the lease negotiations, proved to be more than the credit of the East Anglian's ordinary shares could stand. The £25 shares (fully called) were at £21 at the beginning of October, 1847, but by the end of the November were down to £12, and then £10 by the January of 1848. Officials of the company explained this catastrophic fall by saying that it was "on account of Herapath having run down the railway by two or three of his articles"[3]; while this was a gross over-statement it did contain one element of truth, for until his "parental caution"[4] was published there were undoubtedly many who were ignorant of the true seriousness of the East Anglian's position.

Whatever the merits and demerits of the issue, however, and despite the condition of the capital market, the new shares were taken up; to existing proprietors who could afford them they represented the only possible means of obtaining any return on their original investments; newcomers to the company, against the security of the lines being actually open for traffic, found in

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1 Herapath (in the third article, of the 20th November) suggested 2½%; others put it lower - cf.'An East Anglian Shareholder', ibid.,15th January, 1848, p.52, who put his expectation between 1% and 1½%.
2 Herapath, 6th November, 1847, pp.1253-4; Tinker at the meeting of the 3rd.
3 Ibid., 'Quiet Observer', 16th December, 1848, p.1296.
4 'E.A.Shareholder'.

the 6% guarantee a reasonably secure prospect. To encourage investment it was conceded, at the wish of the proprietors, that the new shares might remain as scrip until the 31st December, 1852, thereby facilitating conversion into ordinary shares if prospects should improve.[1] Even so there was some slight degree of initial hesitation; on the 31st December, 1847 £3,447/13 in deposits still remained unpaid[2] (at that time £2,154 was also in arrears on the first call of £1 made on the proprietors of the former Ely & Huntingdon)[3], but eventually all were taken, yielding by the 31st December, 1848 a total of £119,889 (of which £22,000 was nominal only). Quotations on the new shares held up well, although the issue obviously contributed directly to the deep depression of the ordinary shares; when £2 was called on the former (at the close of 1847)[4] they stood at £1/17/6, the ordinary (£25 called) at £12/12/6. Twelve months later the former (£3/10 paid) held to £2/17/6, but by then the latter were down to £4/15.

In conclusion it is interesting to note that although the shares were thus accepted and remained unchallenged they were in fact illegal, not having the sanction of Parliament. Numerous companies had, however, adopted a similar course, finding their sanction in a liberal interpretation of sections 57 and 120 of the Company Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845[5], and in the terms of individual company acts which permitted the distribution of new shares at a discount, or on other t~~h~~erms approved by the directors, if existing shares were currently being quoted below par. Section 57 of the 1845 act, really concerned with shares raised in lieu of the implementation of borrowing

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1 Herapath, 19th February, 1848.
2 Ibid., Directors' Report of the 16th February. 3 Ibid.
4 Calls fell due on the 11th December, 1847 and the 12th February, 1848, the former being for £1 (L & D £1/3.), the latter for £1/10.
5 See Appendix N for the full wording of the sections concerned.

powers (it is to be read with section 56), authorised directors, on the understanding that such new shares "shall be considered as part of the general capital", to call the newly created shares in different amounts and at different intervals to those laid down for the original shares; section 120 directed that prior to each ordinary meeting at which a dividend was to be declared the directors should prepare a scheme for the distribution of the profits, if any, for the approval of the shareholders; in reality this latter section was intended to lay down no more than the simple mechanics of declaringa dividend on ordinary shares, and never envisaged a permanent structure of preference shares being arranged before any dividends at all had been paid. When challenged in the courts (cf. Henry v the Great Northern Rail Company, 1857) this interpretation of section 120 was condemned out of hand and strict observance enjoined, while similarly, as late as 1863, section 57 was being declared to mean no more than it literally said.[1]

D. The 7% Preference Issue of February, 1848

By the time of the ordinary meeting of February, 1848 a number of important developments had taken place in East Anglian affairs. Of these the most significant were the self assertion of Henry Bruce (on the board since the previous August) and, through his efforts, the partial unravelling of the company's accounts. From the latter, and from a growing awareness of the true extent of the problems created by the lease negotiations and the unfortunate character of the direction prior to amalgamation,[2] it was at last possible to see where the company really stood. Bruce was full of indignation. He claimed that he had been "seduced" on to the board by a false

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[1] G.H.Evans, op.cit. p.154.
[2] Herapath, 16th June, 1849, p.596; Directors' Report of the 13th June,1849.

balance sheet[1], being assured at the time that the existing balance of £115,000 would be ample to complete the lines, for even after deducting the money for extra works and the completion of the E & H section 93,525 would be left.[2] But then "several gentlemen" had applied to the company for the settlement of debts - one for £16,000 when the books showed only £6,000, and a number of whom the books contained no record at all.[3] In short £130,000 was owed, but with all the capital either spent or mortgaged[4] - of this Bruce had "known nothing".[5] "The other directors wished him to keep it a secret",[6] but this he refused to do, nor would he sell his shares for that would have constituted robbery of the purchaser.[7] Eventually he overruled the board[8] (probably the event which precipitated the departure of the Lynn directors) and, insisting that the company's situation must be made public knowledge, took the lead in proposing a further preference issue[9] despite the storm that such a proposal must arouse.

As Bruce, he and his fellow directors claiming "clean hands and clean hearts",[10] apprehended the situation the necessary expenditure on bridges, sidings, sheds, pens and extra rolling stock, all essential if the line were to be put into a "dividend producing state", and in the settlement of all outstanding debts would require the £14,890 then in arrears on calls, the £49,000 in reserve borrowing powers, the £53,561 still to be yielded by the 6% issue, and then a further £131,111.[11] The total of £248,562 so represented arose from the £89,862 liabilities so far unknown to the proprietors, the

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1 He said this in 1855 - cf.'An E.A.Sufferer by the Waddington Policy', Railway Times, 4th August, 1860, pp.877-8. 2 Herapath, 10th March,1849 p.254; meeting of the 28th February,1849. 3 Cf.the Railway Times, 4th August,1860,pp.877-8; 'An E.A.Sufferer by the Waddington Policy'. 4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 11th August,1860,pp.892-6; Bruce at the meeting of the 9th August.
6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid.
9 Herapath, 10th March,1849, p.254; Bruce at the meeting of the 28th February.
10 Ibid.,19th February,1848; meeting of the 16th.
11 Ibid., Report.

£67,300 needed for the additional works, and £91,400 in respect of the works already in hand.[1] This money had to be found, although capital expenditure had already reached (to the 31st December, 1847) the appalling total of £1,062,741/11/2. Bruce therefore proposed the creation of 22,760 shares of £5, and 10,800 of £3/10, in all £151,600, to be issued on the basis of one for one of the existing £25 and £18 shares respectively; the new shares were to bear a guaranteed 7% preference rate in perpetuity as from the 1st January, 1849, but were to have no further participation in profits.[2] No portion of the newly created capital was to be applied to the Dock or Navigation projects, or to the completion (St.Ives-Ely) and extension (Huntingdon-Bedford) of the Ely & Huntingdon.[3]

The proprietors were faced with an agonizing choice. "So sure, in my belief, the shareholders will never receive a ¼d. dividend",[4] wrote one, who doubted whether the 7% could be paid without illegal recourse to capital,[5] that he held it to be imperative that there should be a full attendance at the meeting of the 16th February to prevent the creation of further preference shares,[6] for otherwise even the poor consolation of a possible future 1½% would be denied to the wretched holders of ordinary shares.[7] His main point was easy to discern, and received wide recognition,[8] for with the new issue the East Anglian's commitments in annual interest charges would equal £32,000 (£15,000 on the debenture debt of £300,000 at 5%, £7,200 on the 6% shares, and now £10,500 on the 7%); against this formidable burden the current revenue returns averaged no more than £416 per week; £844 would be needed to meet the

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1 Herapath, 19th February, 1848; meeting of the 16th; Report.
2 The matter was not raised, but it is probable that the holders would have no right of participation in new issues. G.H.Evans (op.cit.p.163) claimed that the shares had no voting rights, but this is incorrect - see chapter 8.
3 Herapath, 19th February, 1848; answer to a question on the 16th February, 1848
4 Ibid., 15th January, 1848, p.52; 'An East Anglian Shareholder'. 5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., 29th January, 1848, p.115. 7 Ibid., 15th January, 1848, p.52.
8 Cf., for example, 'Observer', ibid., 18th March, 1848.

interest charges and cover working expenses (assuming the unlikely low figure of 40% for the latter), £1,138 per week to pay 1% on the ordinary shares.[1] Yet, in face of even this the directors were still prepared to say, when pressed, that the company was not a bankrupt concern, and that, with patience, it would prosper[2] and pay 4-5%.[3]

Some considerable fury was generated amongst the shareholders, but, significantly, this expressed itself more as personal abuse of the directors than as opposition to the actual proposals which, on the whole, were glumly accepted as a necessity. Copeland, the most furious, and one who claimed to have met all his calls and never sold a share, was in fact the only one to vote against acceptance;[4] and an amending motion proposed by Puncher was heavily defeated (hence the latter's complaint that the "supineness" of shareholders in not attending meetings was a major cause of the depression in railway securities).[5] Even so, the fact, admitted by Bruce, that only one director, Carden,[6] had taken up the new stock left considerable bitterness, especially so because it was also discovered that only a minority of the board held any of the 6% shares. The excuse that to have taken up the preference issues would have involved the directors in the selling or their ordinary shares and so "pulled down the market"[7] was an interesting revelation on the folly of fixing the qualification for a seat on the board at such a low level; it was a genuine excuse, but one that was not sufficiently strong to avert the charge of "flagrant injustice" in that the board had not taken up the 6% stock and was now destroying it[8] by granting the new issue a prior claim on profits.

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1 Herapath, 18th March, 1848; 'An East Anglian Shareholder' - the first letter of the 15th January, p.52. 2 Ibid., 19th February, 1848; meeting of the 16th February, 1848. 3 Ibid., 'Observer', 18th March, 1848.
4 Ibid., 19th February, 1848; meeting of the 16th February.
5 Ibid., 2nd September, 1848; letter. 6 Carden's speech on the 16th February.
7 Ibid., 19th February, 1848; Bruce on the 16th February.
8 Ibid., Stephens.

The proprietors toed the line from the force of sheer necessity; if any comfort there was it was to be found in the opening of the Wisbech branch two weeks before the meeting. But this time the response to the new issue was poor from both proprietors and public. Of the sum sought only £70,873/10 was in fact subscribed (10,919 x £5, 4,651 x £3/10)[1] - all by the end of August, 1848.[2] By the 31st December, 1848 £57,790/10/9 was in,[3] and £12,000 was anticipated, but already £1,080 had been written off as irrecoverable arrears.[4] By the February of 1849 all hope of issuing the balance of £80,726/10 had been abandoned, although the capital so far raised had been wisely used in the paying off of as many debts aspossible.[5] The main problems still remained, and it was only small comfort to hold that the failure of the issue served to confine the annual interest liability to only £26,000, for the revenue was still too small to cover even that.[6]

Why was there this reluctance after the previous willingness to take up the 6% issue of 1847? Bruce himself blamed the failure on the upset in commerce caused by the revolution of 1848 in France,[7] but against that the depression in the economy at large was already lifting. It may be argued that the state of the company was sufficient explanation in itself, but much more to blame was the general reluctance to invest in railway securities as a whole, a matter examined in a previous section. A simple hypothetical example illustrates this latter feature, and also helps to explain the increasing strength of the Manchester and northern elements in the company's affairs at this time - the frequency of quotations in the London Stock

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1 Preamble to the E.A.R. Act 1853 (16 & 17 Vic.c.cxciii).
2 Herapath, 2nd September, 1848, p.925; meeting of the 30th August, 1848.
3 Ibid., 10th March, 1849, p.254; meeting of the 28th February, 1849. 4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., Directors' Report. 6 Ibid., 'Proprietor', 23rd December, 1848, p1330.
7 Ibid., 16th June, 1849, p.596; meeting of the 13th June, 1849.

Exchange in the early part of 1848 indicates that a fairly brisk business was in fact done in East Anglian shares. If an investor took one ordinary share at £9 (February), one 6% share at £3/7/6 (that is at £1/17/6 with £1/10 still to be called), and one each of the 1848 shares at par, £5 and £3/10 respectively, his total outlay would be £20/17/6, on a nominal investment of £37. He was assured of 6% on the 1847 issue, say 4/3, 7/- on his £5 share and 5/- on his £3/10 share, in all 16/3 on an outlay of £21, a yield of 3.9%– the later he took up the ordinary share the greater the yield with the constant possibility that its value would rise and so allow for profitable resale. On the other hand the original investor who paid £25 for his original share and then took the new shares as they came (allowing for a £1 discount on the 1846/7 issue) would have a yield of 16/3 on £36, a mere 2.4%. It was thus that the tendency for northern control received its stimulus.

E. Summary of the Capital Account at the close of 1848[1]

Receipts:	£	£		
L & E capital	300,000			
Less arrears on the 4th & 5th	165	299,835	0	0
L & D capital	270,000			
Less arrears on the 4th & 5th	1,295	268,705	0	0
E & H capital	194,400			
Less arrears on the 3rd,4th & 5th	674 5s.	193,725	15	0
E & H new capital (6% preference)	120,000			
Less arrears on the final call	119	119,889	0	0
L & E new capital (7% preference)				
10,919 x £5, £1 deposit called	54,595			
4,651 x £3/10, £1 deposit called	16,278 10s.			
	70,873 10s.			
Deduct arrears on the £5 calls, 1st £2072, 2nd £2,100, 3rd £2,475, 4th £5,248/9/3. on the £3/10 calls, ditto, arrears of £45, £65, £327/10, and £752.	13,082 19s. 3d.	57,790	10	9
		939,945	5	9

c/fwd to p.396.

[1] Herapath, 10th March,1849,p.254; meeting of the 28th February,1849.

	£		
b/fwd from p.395	939,945	5	9
Loans on debenture	275,911	0	0
Profit on sale of forfeited shares	1,962	19	2
Transfer fees	64	7	6
Bills payable	16,040	4	3
Net revenue £7,134 6 8½. Less a/c on 31.12.48 £1,539 4 3½.	5,595	2	5
Balance of accounts placed to credit but not yet paid	8,904	0	10
	1,248,422	19	11

Of the above all but £976/11/5 (cash in the bank) had been expended.

Notes on the Capital Account

A. In respect of the E & H new capital either the total of arrears or the total received, probably the former, must be incorrect; hence the discrepancy of £8.
B. The purpose of the reference to the £1 deposits in respect of the new L & E capital is obscure; calls were in fact made to fall due on the 31st March, the 31st May, the 31st July, the 30th September and the 30th December, 1848; in the case of the £5 shares these were 5 calls of £1, in that of the £3/10 shares either £1 or 10/-.
C. The profit on the sale of forfeited shares arises from the fact that after default money already paid could not be recovered by the shareholder; thus as a number of shares were reissued at par value the company ultimately received more than the nominal value.
D. The Transfer Fee claimed by the company for the registration of new proprietors was 2/6 per transaction - thus the figure indicates 515 block sales of shares prior to the 31st December,1848. (cf.Scrivenor,op.cit.p349)

F. The 7% Preference Issue of February,1849

The figures quoted above did little but reveal the massive capital engagement into which the East Anglian had already entered; they failed to indicate the three exceedingly serious problems that confronted the board by the close of 1848. Of these, two stemmed from the continually disappointing traffic receipts. From the initial openings of the 26th October,1846 to the 30th June,1848 gross receipts had amounted to £20,398/8/5½, which after the deduction of working expenses left a net profit of £9,087/7/8.[1] From the 1st July to the 31st December, 1848 the gross return was £18,968/7/11½ leaving a net working profit of only £7,134/6/8½.[2] These sums were of course nowhere near sufficient to pay off the debts of the company or the full interest on both the debenture debt and the guaranteed preference shares. In that creditors and debenture holders must have priority over preference share holders, the directors were therefore left, as much as they "deeply deplored" the necessity,[3] with no option but to override the 6% shares and not cancel but defer interest payments on both these and the 7% shares[4] (for which funds were available)[5] until all debts had been paid. Pressed to pay out of capital the directors refused to abandon this "prudent and perhaps honest" policy,[6] claiming that they "could not admit that any motive of supposed expediency can justify a board in stepping beyond the line of duty prescribed by the law, or resorting to fictitious means to sustain the company's credit in the market";[7] dividends could only be paid from profits, and those were not enough.[8] Announced in the December of 1848 this decision caused consternation; the £25 ordinary shares of the L & E and the L & D fell to 4¾, and the £3/10 6% shares themselves came down to 2¾. As Herapath commented, how the Eastern Counties must now be "chuckling".[9]

But besides this a second problem of major dimensions was now developing and contributing to the "extraordinary difficulties"[10] of the company, for in the December of 1848 the first of the bonds, to the total value of £22,000,

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1 Herapath, 2nd September, 1848, p.924; meeting of the 30th August, 1848 - for comment on the figures see chapter 5 above.
2 Ibid., 10th March, 1849; meeting of the 28th February. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 30th December, 1848, p.1348; article. 6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 10th March, 1849; Directors' Report of the 28th February, 1849. 8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 30th December, 1848, p.1348; article.
10 Ibid., 16th June, 1849, p.596; Bruce at the meeting of the 13th June, 1849.

matured,[1] and a further £55,200 were due for repayment during the course of 1849. From the October of 1848 the directors had been making desperate efforts to negotiate renewals, but had had little success[2] in view of the company's position, the general discredit of all railway securities[3] and the alternative of more profitable fields of investment opened up by the general revival of 1848. Court proceedings against the East Anglian were pending for the March of 1849, and if these went in favour of the debenture holders the company would be left with no future but that of bankruptcy and final collapse, such being to a background of costly law suits.

The third problem was the old one. If the lines were ever to pay still further expenditure would have to be incurred on works of "immediate urgency".[4] Works already in hand would require £52,000 at stated intervals between the March and August of 1849, and a further £67,300 was required for the sidings, sheds, rolling stock and pens still needed to put the Ely and Dereham lines "into good working condition".[5] When added to existing liabilities, which could reach but would not exceed £28,000, and to the deferred interest payments these various requirements meant that in all £181,262 was urgently required.[6]

The directors were in a thankless position. On the one hand they could "emphatically declare, as they have done aforetime, that they are not responsible for the debts or liabilities incurred before they entered office"[7] (it was at this stage that Bruce agreed to the independent shareholders'

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1 Herapath, 16th June, 1849, p.596; Bruce at the meeting of the 13th June, 1849.
2 Ibid., 10th March, 1849; Directors' Report of the 28th February, 1849.
3 Ibid., 16th June, 1849, p.596; Bruce at the meeting of the 13th June, 1849.
4 Ibid., 10th March, 1849, p.254; Bruce at the meeting of the 28th February.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., Directors' Report.

committee of inquiry),[1] and justly claim that they had done their duty and put the lines into "working condition",[2] but on the other they must incur all the odium attached to the painful steps that circumstances forced on them. In Bruce, however, was a man of immense courage and honesty who in no way flinched from what had to be done in a policy which made the payment of debts "paramount" amongst all other considerations.[3] His solution was the capitalisation of part of the company's debt by the creation of yet further preference shares, to have priority over those of 1846/7 and 1848, and so safeguard all classes of creditors.[4] This may have seemed to be a case of merely postponing the day of reckoning, and in a sense it was, but in the absence of funds - there was now no hope of raising the balance of the 1848 creation on the existing terms - it was the only alternative to a series of utterly ruinous law suits.[5] The conversion of part of the loan debt into share capital would prevent "any future creation of stock with a priority attached to it",[6] and would also, by raising funds to meet loans as they fell due for repayment, raise the company's credit "and enable (it) the more readily, and on more equitable terms to obtain a renewal of loans".[7] As the law stood one third of the borrowing powers of a company could be taken up either as loans or covered by the issue of new shares, or alternatively converted to stock when existing stock was at a discount.[8] But even so Parliament's consent was this time to be sought.

The details of the proposed creation were complex to a degree, but must

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1 Herapath, 10th March, 1849, p.254; Directors' Report.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., Bruce.
4 Ibid., Bruce.
5 Ibid., meeting of the 28th February, 1849.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid. See also Appendix N.

be summarised as indicating the fix that the company was in. The following is a summary of the resolutions adopted at the meeting of the 28th February, 1849; immediate settlement was imperative as the first court decisions were expected during the course of the following week.[1]

1. That it is expedient to provide from general capital for the repayment from time to time of loans amounting to £294,800 as they fall due, and on which arrangements for renewal cannot be made.
2. For the purpose of conversion to capital under the E.A.R. act any borrowed money is to be paid off out of the deposits and calls on capital hereby created by the issue of 37,552 shares at £7/17.
3. To meet the payment of present debts and liabilities not otherwise covered, and to meet future necessary expenses on the railway and works, shares should be created to the value of £80,726/10, such a sum equalling the unissued portion of the 7% shares created on the 16th February,1848.
4. In the case of an act being obtained in this present session which instead of raising this 7% issue of £80,726/10 authorises the raising of the sum by new stock with equal rights to the additional capital to pay off the loans, then from the date of such act the 37,552 shares at £7/17 shall become shares of £10, and the holders thereof entitled to such shares shall have the same rights and liabilities in respect of the said £10 shares as if each had originally been £10, provided that the amount to be raised by them does not exceed the aforesaid sums of £294,800 (i.e. the amount involved in section 1) and £80,726/10.
5. The 37,552 new shares to go to existing proprietors who shall accept and to holders of scrip, in the proportion of one new for two old shares, who claim within 21 days.
6. On the new shares a deposit of £1 to be paid on the 31st March,1849 and a call of £1 on the 1st June,1849; therafter calls to be made at the discretion of the directors.
7. As from the 1st July,1849 7% to be paid in perpetuity on deposits and other moneys called on the 37,552 shares, but the holders to have no further participation in profits. The payments would be made half yearly and charged on profits after the payment of the interest on loans (and, from time to time, sums to be paid in respect of other securities and bonds) but bearing precedence over all classes of existing share capital.
8. Interest at the rate of 5% per annum to be paid on all sums paid to the company in anticipation of expected deposits and calls.
9. Until the act be obtained in the present session no portion of the money raised in respect of the new shares should be used for anything except the repayment of bonds or mortgages as they fell due.
10. No more of the 1848 7% shares should be issued until it was known whether Parliament would sanction the new shares.
11. The Directors should be free to renew mortgages and bonds at their discretion.

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1 Herapath,10th March,1849,p.254; meeting of the 28th February,1849.

In short, it was proposed to capitalise the company's debt at 7%, or at least to obtain the potential power to do so if and when circumstances demanded it, by the issue of the balance of the 1848 creation plus the new shares at £7/17, or alternatively by the issue of 37,552 shares at £10 each. The great virtue of the new creation was that it was to be called only as necessary, and would probably involve no more than £100,000[1] if sufficient bondholders could be persuaded to renew their loans on the strength of the company's improved credit.[2] The great disadvantage was that proprietors who had taken up the earlier preference issues but could not afford the new ones would be penalised, but this was something that could not be avoided; the agonized appeal of 'Justice' that the new creation be offered at 8% but made to rank third in precedence[3] was wisely ignored.

The meeting of the 28th February,1849 provided, not unexpectedly, "a long and rather acrimonious, and not very orderly discussion",[4] but as in 1848 recognition of the company's immediate peril proved to be the dominant factor. It was realised that to all intents and purposes the ordinary shares would now be finished,[5] but that, while cheap money would of course be desirable, the company must offer "such terms as should not fail in operation"[6] - therefore 7% was essential. If the bill were passed it was to be expected that the debenture holders would renew at 5% or less.[7] When Alberga moved that the interest be 7% for five years and then 6% in perpetuity he received little support, for as Carden demanded to know, "would they then for £2,000 per annum keep the company in difficulties which must sink it?" Even less

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1 Directors' Report, 28th February,1849.
2 Herapath,16th June,1849,p.596; meeting of the 13th June,1849 - Bruce.
3 Ibid.,24th February,1849, p.188.
4 Ibid.,10th March,1849; meeting of the 28th February,1849. 5 Ibid.Puncher.
6 Ibid., Carden.
7 Ibid.

support (6 votes) was received for a later attack in the June of 1849 when, after seeking to raise opposition by the use of advertisements in the 'Times'[1], a Mr.Ashton promised that he and his friends "would institute every opposition open to them in Parliament" if the "preposterous, extravagant" terms approved, to the grave detriment of the holders of ordinary shares, in the February were not amended to strike out "in perpetuity" and substitute the right of the company to return capital if the holders would not agree to any rate that the company might from time to time dictate[2]. To Ashton and his supporters 7%, "in (the) present state of the money market", was tantamount to a declaration of insolvency[3], but in this they were completely unrealistic, for in fact the new measures represented the only available means of gaining any kind of security at all for the future of the company.

Parliament displayed a most amenable attitude on this occasion, for with just a few minor modifications the East Anglian's proposals were accepted. By the act of the 13th July,1849 (12 & 13 Vic.c.lii) the unissued balance of the 1848 creation was cancelled, but the company was empowered to raise at its discretion either 37,552 shares at £7/17 and an equal number at £2/3, or £37,532 at £10; either way there was to be a guaranteed 7% dividend ranking in precedence over all other share capital. The money raised, as was in fact intended by the company, was to be used solely for the discharge of debts. In effect the East Anglian had been authorised to mortgage each section of its debt to pay for the remainder[4] and at the same time raise an additional £80,726[5] (the balance of the new shares, if raised in full, over the total of the bond debt).

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1 Herapath,16th June,1849,p.596; Wheeler on the 13th June,1849. 2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., Maxwell in seconding Ashton's resolution.
4 Railway Times,15th September,1860,pp.1043-7; meeting of the 11th September, 1860, Bruce from the chair.
5 Herapath,17th November,1849,p.1157; meeting of the 23rd August,1849,Bruce.

Section 3: Bankruptcy

Although the creation of the 1849 preference shares was to prove to be the foundation stone on which eventual recovery was based it certainly did not appear to be so at the time, for throughout the remainder of that year difficulties continued to mount. The response to the new shares was singularly disappointing, and by November all hopes of a full issue had to be abandoned.[1] Despite the exertions of Bruce and Wheeler on behalf of the bill[2] the proprietors did not come forward as they should have done, and, indeed, when asked for £70,000 not one individual responded.[3] In fact only 12,259 of the shares were subscribed, a fact partly explained by the wretched condition of the East Anglian itself, but one that was probably almost equally attributable to the public reaction against railway securities that had followed the exposure of Hudson earlier in the year. It was clear that the maximum £3 calls envisaged by the board on the new shares would be nowhere near sufficient to solve the company's problems.[4]

The situation, briefly stated, was that £59,000 was owed on overdue bonds,[5] with a further £15,200 maturing on the 31st December,1849, £10,300 on the 30th June,1850, and £10,700 on the 31st December,1850 (the balance of £195,600 would come up on various dates between June,1851 and October,1854);[6] in all 191 bondholders were involved in a total debt of about £280,000.[7] Simple contract debts amounted to £30,000, £24,000 was urgently needed for the Wisbech branch bridges[8] (the cost was later reduced - see section 1 above),

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1 Herapath,24th November,1849,p.1179; meeting of bondholders,21st November.
2 Railway Times,19th March,1859,pp.324-7; meeting of the 11th March,- Bruce.
3 Ibid.,15th September,1860,pp.1043-7; meeting of the 11th September,-Bruce.
4 The company solicitor on the 23rd August,1849.
5 By the 21st November the figure had risen to £62,000.
6 Herapath,22nd December,1849,p.1285; meeting of the 17th December.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.

and money had to be found to pay the interest arrears on preference shares for 1848, and also for the arrears on servants' wages that had now developed; in all something over £70,000 was needed at once (hence the appeal to the proprietors - see p.407), quite apart from the repayment of matured loans. But meanwhile the revenue position was worse than ever. The profit from the first half of 1849 was only £5,762[1], that for the second half, better but still very low, £8,327[2]. Bruce, however, was not without hope that traffic would improve (especially with the opening of the Great Northern Railway)[3], and, having found the majority of the bondholders to be "indulgent"[4], felt that he could rely on the common sense of the company's creditors to realise, as Herapath expressed it, that "if they go to law they will waste the resources of the company, and in the end perhaps get 10/- in the pound or less; but if they are quiet, the company may recover with the revival of trade and be able to pay all"[5].

But for some meanness of spirit was a stronger motive force than common sense, and in the November of 1849 seven of the bondholders (with an aggregate holding of £17,600)[6] and two of the simple contract creditors[7] sought to gain an advantage over their fellows[8] by taking the East Anglian to court. Already the board had had to take the precaution of saving the company's plant from actual physical seizure by creditors through the expedient of leasing it to two of its own servants, Clay and Bond (see section 4 below), but here was a threat that could not be averted. Judgement was expected early in 1850, so prompt action was imperative. Accordingly, to devise

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1 Herapath, 17th November, 1849, p.1157; meeting of the 23rd August, 1849.
2 Ibid., 28th February, 1850; meeting of the 23rd February, 1850.
3 See section 4 below. 4 Meeting of the 23rd August, 1849.
5 Herapath, 12th December, 1849, p.1281; article.
6 Ibid., 22nd December, 1849, p.1285; meeting of the 17th December.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 24th November, 1849, p.1179 - article.

terms which would at one and the same time give the company a breathing space and the creditors some degree of insurance Bruce and Wheeler went in person to Manchester to attend a meeting of bondholders and simple contract creditors (with an aggregate interest in the company of about £100,000) convened by the bondholders for the 21st November,[1] 1849.

Bruce's own proposals to the Manchester meeting were simple and direct.[2] He asked for two things, a seven year extension of the bonds as from the 1st January,1850 and the acceptance of a deferment of interest payments - nothing to be paid on the 31st December,1849, but twelve months interest at the end of June,1850. In return the company would guarantee the prompt payment of interest. Meanwhile, the revenue profit since the 1st July,1849 being sufficient for the eventual payment of bond interest, all profit after the 4th November,1849 to the end of the year would be devoted to small tradesmen's accounts and arrears on servants' wages; simple contract debts of under £100 were to be settled on the 30th June,1850 without the addition of interest, while debts of over £100 were to be paid off in 25% instalments. Such interim measures would have served well until more far reaching proposals could have been devised, but Bruce was not allowed to have entirely his own way, for the meeting appointed a committee with the immediate task of examining Bruce's suggestions but with the more general charge of exercising a careful watch on all developments connected with the company's finance. Comprised of eight members (with a £27,000 interest in all), namely Russell, Everard and Seppings (the former directors), Sugars (the contractor), Simpson (later chairman of the company, and subsequently of the Great Eastern Railway), Noble, Scott, Hall

1 Herapath,28th February,1850; Directors' Report at the meeting of the 23rd February.
2 Ibid.,24th November,1849, p.1179; meeting of the 21st November,1849.

and one other,[1] this committee was now to exercise a powerful influence on company affairs; it was considerably aided in that four of its number were actually resident in or near Lynn.[2]

With one exception its first proposals were eminently reasonable, and had the backing of about £200,000 of the bonded debt. Estimating the total debt of the East Anglian to be £307,000 (including £279,000 in bonds and £7,000 in overdue interest),[3] the committee recommended that all legal proceedings against the company be abandoned at once - the company was to pay the costs - and withheld until the 1st January,1857. Secondly, until settlement, all debts, whether interest bearing or not, should receive interest from the 31st December,1849 at the rate of 5% per annum, to be paid half yearly. So far so good, but it was also proposed that a committee of eight of the largest creditors should join the directorate while the agreement remained in force.[4] No payments were to be made without the concurrence of the committee so envisaged - supplies were to be paid for fortnightly or monthly as suited the individual tradesmen - the members of which would also act as the trustees of the creditors, having regular amounts paid into their account at Everard's bank (in Lynn) to provide the fund from which the interest would be paid.[5] The objections that might have been raised to this arrangement were that it introduced the principle of divided rule and clearly implied lack of trust in the board; the committee of inquiry had already purged the board, and the new proposals, favouring as they did a sectional interest, could hardly be expected to improve the company's public credit. In addition they ignored the solid worth of Bruce and contributed to making his task even harder.

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1 Herapath,24th November,1849, p.1179; meeting of the 21st November,1849.
2 Ibid.,28th February,1850; Directors' Report on the 23rd February,1850.
3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid.,p.288.

But the directors had but little option to accept, and the committee commenced its work with the board on the 1st January,1850, acting on the clear principles that all creditors were to be held to be on the same footing, and that the money first received be devoted to the payment of overdue interest.[1] The new arrangements worked well until the June of 1850; £6,745 had been paid over to the trustees, and there remained enough uncollected at different stations to pay all the interest on the bonds and simple contract debts which were represented by the deed of arrangement.[2] But then arose the issue of priorities between the various classes of creditors which once again threw the company's affairs into turmoil.[3] Section 31 of the Amalgamation Act, and indeed common usage, had established the precedence of bondholders and simple contract creditors over all classes of preference share holders, but there was no clear ruling as to priority as between the two. In the June of 1850, "a few" of the simple contract creditors determined to take matters into their own hands and gain total settlement for their debts. To prevent these few "tearing stock in pieces"[4] (i.e. removing company equipment to the value of their claims) the committee, with the full consent of the board (which held it their duty) were reluctantly obliged to apply in the Court of Chancery for an Official Receiver[5]; ironically, only the day before the interest warrants had been issued. The necessary securities were lodged on Saturday, the 29th June,1850, and the same day the Receiver (W.Seppings of Lynn) took possession of all the East Anglian's property. It therefore became impossible to pay the interest on the bonds on the 1st July, as had been promised in the previous December.

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1 Herapath,22nd December,1849, p.1285; meeting of the 17th December - Russell.
2 Ibid.,24th August,1850,pp.828-9; meeting of the 21st August,1850, the Report.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.; the Report.

Now, all plant bore the Receiver's labels and sheriff's men rode on each train.[1] But even this did not prevent the determined minority from attempting to take possession of the plant in the custody of the Receiver. In self defence the company was compelled to turn to the costly processes of the law and enter a motion against them in the Vice-Chancellor's Court "to commit to the Sheriff for contempt". Once before the court, however, the defendants fought with skill and caused the case to be extended to cover the vital questions of whether in fact bondholders did have a prior lien over simple contract creditors, and whether the former could lawfully lay claim to anything other than tolls.[2] The bondholders were disappointed on both counts by Vice-Chancellor Knight, and so made a direct appeal to the Lord Chancellor himself, before whom, on their behalf, Sir Fitzroy Kelly opened on the 7th August,1850. The Lord Chancellor, however, although leaving the bondholders confident that he would find in their favour and reverse the decision of the lower court,[3] deemed the issues at stake to be of such fundamental importance that he postponed any decision until the 2nd November, 1850. This gave the company the breathing space it needed, the opportunity to so arrange matters that it could preserve the rights of its creditors, but at the same time escape "the fangs of the law", and so end the ruinous waste of money that legal proceedings involved.[4]

The proprietors were offered two possible means of exploiting the totally unexpected advantage, one by Bruce, and the other by the committee of creditors. Each may be briefly summarised, as being relevant to what was to

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1 Thew; Recollections; Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,15th February, 1890.
2 Directors' Report, 21st August,1850.
3 Herapath, 24th August,1850, p.824; Article.
4 Bruce on the 21st August,1850.

follow. Bruce's proposals, unknown to the committee or its solicitors, but backed by the holders of original and preference shares in London and Hull (striking evidence of the disadvantages of divided rule, and the dangers of sectional conflict), were specifically designed to end law suits, restore a par quotation to shares, and to guarantee the regular payment of interest.[1]

1. All bonds should be extended for six years (except as in 3 below).
2. Bond interest to be reduced by consent of the holders to 4% on condition that arrears of interest were paid off, and future payments made punctually.
3. The bond debt should be reduced to £250,000 - that is just over 10% should be redeemed.
4. No more simple contract debts should be incurred - that is all supplies should be paid for within a short time of delivery.
5. 90% of the simple contract debts should be paid off immediately.
6. The 1849 preference shares should be reduced from 7% to 5%.
7. A further 20,000 of the 1849 preference shares should be taken up - the maximum calls to be to a total of £3/10 and spread over 3 years. (With a further call of 15/- on the shares already taken up this would provide the money to effect points 3 and 5).

It would follow that if the revenue profit reached £15,000 per annum (a target within reasonable distance in view of existing traffic conditions - see section 4 below) £10,000 would be available for the bonds (4% on £250,000) and £5,000 for the 5% preference shares (formerly 7%), with any balance remaining for the 1846/7 6% shares and the 1848 7% shares (in that order - as confirmed by the East Anglian Act of 1851).

Bruce's proposals were realistic and attractive, but if anything, favoured certain classes of creditors to the exclusion of others; to this Russell and the committee of creditors were opposed. Their proposal was that both the bondholders and the simple contract creditors (£30,000 in all), both to retain the same footing, should be given a 5% guaranteed status. They agreed with Bruce that the 7% preference shares of 1849 should be reduced to 5%, but on the grounds that under the existing circumstances 7% was a

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1 Herapath, 24th August, 1850, pp.828-9; Bruce at the meeting of the 21st August.

worthless guarantee. Finally, £24,000 (compare the £77,000 suggested by Bruce) must be raised on the 1849 shares to complete the works (£18,000 was required for the Wisbech branch bridges and the junction with the Great Northern Railway at Huntingdon).[1] The most obvious criticism of these proposals is of course that apart from the reduction on preference share rates they envisaged no forward step; in effect they would have served to confirm the existing situation rather than improve on it. Their weakness was that neither simple contract creditors nor bondholders dared to give the other the least advantage while the decision of the Lord Chancellor was pending. Their requirements, however, did not end there, for it was also proposed that the board be reconstituted so that all members but one should be nominated by the preference interest; the one was to be the single crumb thrown to the holders of ordinary shares, who, for the moment at least, had been abandoned to their fate.

Fortunately, both sides displayed a willingness to compromise, and the debate continued over several months. By the September of 1850 the committee had introduced considerable modifications into its scheme,[2] the most significant being that creditors should accept the 1849 preference shares in settlement of their claims; also slightly less demanding claims were made in respect of the composition of the board - now it was proposed that until full dividends were paid in two successive years, or after such a period when dividends fell under 5% again, and then for two years on, two thirds of the board should be nominated by those having preference claims, at all other times one third. Bruce rightly opposed this unjustified attempt to monopolize the management by a sectional interest, and he complained that now

1 Herapath, 24th August,1850,pp.828-9; meeting of the 21st August,1850.
2 Ibid.,21st September,1850, p.933; meeting of bondholders on the 18th September,1850 - Everard in the chair.

£87,000 would have to be raised instead of the £77,000 that his own scheme involved; he also continued to insist on the limitation of the bond debt to £250,000, but he did agree to the principle of converting liabilities to shares, and it was here that the eventual salvation of the company began to take shape.

For some months more the company struggled on as details were settled. By the March of 1851 the total debt had been slightly reduced to £317,000 and liabilities for works in hand to £20,000 (Wisbech branch bridges, the Great Northern Junction, and land compensation). "By great effort" calls on the 1849 shares had been confined to £2 (most of which had been paid), and now there were to be no more calls without the express consent of the holders.[1] In the months since September Bruce had been exceedingly active in contacting the holders of these shares, and preparing the way the first and most decisive step in recovery, the reduction of their preference guarantee to 5%. On the supposition that this would be agreed he had also been approaching the company's creditors and bondholders, sounding out the feeling as regards the acceptance of shares at 5% in liquidation of debt (i.e. unpaid arrears of interest etc.). To the March of 1851 creditors, with a total interest in the company of £240,000 had signified assent,[2] so displaying their recognition of the nicety of balance then existing between company liabilities, existing traffic, the possibility of an agreement with the Great Northern Railway (see section 5) and future prospects. Very few of the bondholders had declined the offer; of these the great majority were trustees who were legally precluded from acceptance, but as a token of their good will most had consented to renew their bonds for seven years at 4% (some even at 3½%).

1 Herapath, 22nd March, 1851; meeting of the 7% holders on the 19th March - Bruce.
2 Ibid.

It was therefore possible to propose that all debts (bond and contract) should be included in the scheme, except for the £70-£80,000 that were legally precluded from participation. Preference share holders would rank as preference creditors, safe in the knowledge that the company, having made an immediate saving of between £70,000 and £80,000, would be enabled to meet all its obligations. Another important step was to be the consolidation of the 1849 shares by effecting a reduction in their numbers - 10 would be reduced to 5, and £2 paid on 10 would be computed as £4 on 5; the holder of 10 would thus be theoretically liable to calls for £30 (5 x £6) and not £80 as hitherto. When called together the 7% holders found the various proposals put before them to be "fair and equitable" and carried them by a large majority.[1] They had been quick to see that such concurrence on their part would benefit everybody concerned; for themselves an uncertain 7% would become a certain 5% if the company were thus enabled to free itself from the burden of repaying in cash the principals of matured loans, and the market quotations on their stock could then be expected to improve accordingly.

Parliament's sanction was obtained in the East Anglian Railways (Further Powers) Act, obtained on the 24th July,1851.[2] Amongst other provisions this authorised the directors to make a reduction in preference interest rates (section 3), and, at a later date, make the shares themselves subject to redemption; shares unissued so far could be reduced on issue, and the company was empowered to accept the surrender of issued shares and then reissue them at a reduced rate as redeemable shares (section 51), although those reissued were not to bear a rate higher than that of the lowest reduced level (section 8); those with the reduced rate were to have the same priority as the original 7% shares (section 7). The only major alteration enforced on the company's

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1 Herapath, 22nd March,1851; meeting of the 7% holders on the 19th March,1851.
2 14 & 15 Vic.c.ci.

bill was the rejection by the Lords committee of the clause, insisted on by the committee of creditors, that two thirds of the board should be nominated by those with preference claims on company profits.[1] It followed that a new agreement would have to be made (in fact it never was), although Bruce could reasonably hope of the creditors that they would "put an end to that ruinous waste of money in law which has, during the last twelve months, absorbed an amount equal to half a year's interest on all the lines of the company"[2]; in fact the company's law costs had already reached £11,000, with the result that interest was half a year in arrears.[3]

By and large, the 7% holders, impelled by self interest, honoured their agreement, although inevitably there was some initial hesitation as each waited for the other to act, studied the attitude of the creditors, and watched the situation as regards the Great Northern Railway lease negotiations. But on the whole good progress was made. As early as the August of 1851 it was reported that former opponents of the scheme were coming forward to surrender their shares for conversion,[4] although this had to be qualified by the admission that surrender was conditional on the acceptance of the shares by the creditors; unfortunately, in respect of the latter, there was some considerable delay caused by the physical difficulties involved in obtaining signatures.[5] By the April of 1852 the holders of about half of the shares had agreed[6]; by the summer of 1853 the final position was revealed as being 32,237 shares (£322,270) standing at 5%, and 5,315 (£53,150) at 7%,[7] the former including all the shares that had been accepted by the company's former creditors.

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1 Herapath, 6th September, 1851, pp.947-8; meeting of the 30th August, 1851.
2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. Bruce. 5 Ibid. Bruce.
6 Ibid., 1st May, 1852, p.472; meeting of the 24th April, 1852.
7 Preamble to the East Anglian Act, 1853, 16 & 17 Vic.c.cxciii.

The final stages of the East Anglian's financial policies will be considered in their proper context, in the next chapter, but two matters may be briefly dealt with in anticipation at this stage. The Official Receiver was removed in the July of 1851 at the commencement of the Great Northern lease arrangement. To him, W.Seppings of Lynn, "to whom all...are much indebted for the manner in which he performed the responsible duties of his office and for having relinquished his claim for commission", £500 was voted to cover his outlay.[1] A similar sum was also voted to cover the expenses of the committee of creditors[2] which now disbanded of its own accord. There was, however, to be a postscript. During the mid-1850s when detailed investigation of past accounts was undertaken in connection with proceedings against the company's former solicitors, certain discrepancies in the accounts of the committee of creditors were also brought to light, the auditors feeling that the £405/6/7 returned to the company as the balance after the deduction of expenses was less than it should have been.[3] Russell prevaricated; a suit was opened against him.[4] This proved to be lengthy and complex, but resulted in the return to the company of £1,751/9/6. (including £405/6/7 from Everard and £346/2/1 from Seppings) in anticipation of the court's decision.[5] There was no reason, however, on this occasion to suspect deliberate dishonesty, for the complicated mass of claims and counter-claims for expenses in connection with the court proceedings of the earlier period would have provided a major puzzle for any qualified accountant.

No praise is too high for what Bruce had achieved thus far. Hampered

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1 Herapath, 6th September,1851, p.947; meeting of the 30th August. 2 Ibid.
3 Lynn Advertiser, 31st March,1855; meeting of the 29th March,1855. 4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.,15th September,1855; meeting of the 11th September,1855.

by petty criticism and the interference of the committee of creditors, he had overcome the immediate consequences of the defective direction prior to 1847 and placed the company in a position from which it could progress. He had completed the lines, come to terms with the creditors and bondholders, and rescued the company from both bankruptcy and the law. In these things his honesty, patience and lack of dogmatic assertion had been or paramount importance, and were to continue to be so in facing the problems of the future, in particular that of developing the revenue sufficiently to meet the massive interest charges to which the East Anglian was committed and yet find something for the holder of the ordinary shares. Thus, the remainder of this chapter and much of the next must be concerned with the varied aspects of that task; the difficulties outlined in the next section of the present chapter will serve as the introduction to this, but in particular they will emphasise further the full measure of Bruce's achievements in the financial field to 1851.

Section 4: The Revenue (July,1848 to July,1851)

1. Local Circumstances

The circumstances of the local economy could not have been more unpropitious than they were when the East Anglian commenced its struggle to survive, for although the general industrial depression had lifted in 1848, that in agriculture in fact worsened, the nadir, as far as the grain farmers of the eastern counties were concerned, being between 1850 and '52 consequent upon a combination of abundant harvests and low prices; it could be little comfort to either the railway or the farmers that these conditions were central to the recovery of the economy.[1] That free trade in corn would inevitably mean some

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[1] F.M.L.Thompson; English Landed Society in the C19, London 1963, p.242.

immediate hardship for the grain farmers of the eastern counties has already been established (see p.139f above); the degree of that hardship may be discerned from the following table of prices, it being remembered that the majority of the farmers of the Fens were "entirely dependent" on their wheat and barley,[1] and many of those of western Norfolk largely so.

Average Wheat Prices 1848-1852[2]

Year	Average (per qut.)	Highest	Lowest	Quts. imported
1848	50/6	56/10	46/10	11,184,156
1849	44/3	49/1	38/9	16,663,305
1850	40/3	44/1	36/11	16,202,312
1851	38/6	43/6	35/6	16,518,701
1852	40/9	45/11	37/2	13,261,161

The national figures given in the first column agree exactly with the figures for Norfolk itself provided by the Rev.Kitton in 1856 (Statistical Tables of the Norfolk County Rate), except for 1851 when the Norfolk figure was higher than the national average at 39/5, and 1852 when at 39/10 it was slightly lower.[3]

A striking improvement was to follow, the average prices reaching 53/3 in 1853, 72/5 in 1854 and 74/8 in 1855 - for discussion of this see chapter 8 below.

Average Barley Prices 1848-1852[4]

Year	Average (per qut.)	Highest	Lowest	Quts. imported
1848	31/6	34/1	29/-	3,765,264
1849	27/9	30/8	25/3	4,932,172
1850	23/5	26/4	21/5	3,699,653
1851	24/9	27/1	22/7	2,962,729
1852	28/6	31/-	26/3	2,234,071

As with the wheat prices these continued to rise during the following years, the average national prices being 33/2 in 1853, 36/- in 1854 and 34/9 in 1855.

To the farmers these prices meant not ruin but a period of strict economy in which extensive capital expenditure was quite out of the question. Hardest hit were the tenant farmers, complaining bitterly of their rents. Visiting Huntingdonshire in the February of 1851 (in an area where the rents stood at around 30/- per acre)[5] Caird found:[6]

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1 Caird,op.cit.p.183.
2 Parliamentary Papers 1878-9/lxv.
3 Op.cit.,Table 85,p.105.
4 Parliamentary Papers,1878-9/lxv.
5 Caird,op.cit.p.469.
6 Ibid.,p.472.

"Near Godmanchester and in the neighbourhood of Huntingdon....the farmers, though not complaining quite so loudly as those of Cambridgeshire, declare their inability to go on with the present rents and prices. One third of them, it is said, must give up the business if prices do not improve; and the rest, who feel that their only remedy, supposing low prices to continue, is in increased production, declare that they will not lay out their capital unless the landlords reduce their rents 25%."

A very similar situation had obtained on the Fens when he was there during the previous year. To add to the misfortunes of the farmers there the 1849 wheat crop, on the heavy soils, had fallen eight bushels per acre short of the usual average,[1] but even so "no reduction of rent of any importance" had taken place[2] - the local rents varied between 27/- and 40/- per acre[3] - and one group of tenants who made representations on the subject were actually served with notices to quit.[4] Also in the Fens many small proprietors shared the miseries of the tenant farmers in that their lands were heavily mortgaged.[5] For both classes the case was that:[6]

"Where drainage has not been done, the farmers are rapidly losing money; even where it has this land is so entirely dependent on the price of grain that the present situation is telling seriously on them".

Undoubtedly it was the farmers of the heavy soils who were suffering the worst; those who worked the lighter soils of western Norfolk were also encountering difficulties from the low prices sufficient to induce considerable caution in regard to expenditure, but their compensations included a lower cost of wheat production than on heavy soils,[7] an above average wheat crop in 1849[8] and the profits still to be made from the stock and sheep farming[9] which they had been showing an increasing tendency to adopt for some years past.

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1 Caird, op.cit.p.184.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.,p.183.
7 Ibid., p.476.
8 Ibid., p.184.
9 Ibid., p.476.

Inevitably the East Anglian Railways suffered from the restricted expenditure of the farmers brought about by this "unparalled depression" in agriculture.[1] Bruce could only hope, and, as it transpired, correctly so, that eventually the removal of protection would stimulate the farmers to enterprise and an increased demand for such articles as artificial manures.[2] Meanwhile there was little that could be done to improve traffic, for the problems of the farmers were reflected throughout the community. All those who served them in a multitude of specialised tasks had to expect a reduction of income, while it was, of course, the labouring community that suffered the most severely of all. The average Norfolk labourer's wage fell in 1850/1 from 8/- per week to 7/-,[3] a reduction made easy for the farmer by the redundancy of labour consequent upon the rising population of the county and the inhibiting influence of the Law of Settlement;[4] 'task work' became more prevalent, as did the vicious gang-system in which children tended to find employment more readily than adults.[5] In Huntingdonshire, where wages were already down to 7/- per week in 1851 and where cottage rentals varied between 40/- and 100/- per annum,[6] acts of incendiarism were an almost daily occurrence,[7] an accurate reflection of the current poverty and misery. Statistical evidence of the situation in Norfolk provides further striking confirmation of these features, the former of which militated so strongly against the efforts of the railway company to develop its traffic; in the figures below the correlation between crime and depression is too striking to be ignored, even

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1 Herapath,16th June,1849,p.596; meeting of the 13th June,1849. 2 Ibid.
3 Caird, op.cit. p.175, said that such a reduction was being spoken of (April, 1850), and G.Edwards ('From Crow Scaring to Westminster',p.2) provides direct evidence that the cut was in fact made.
4 Cf.Caird,op.cit. p.176. The labourer was bound to his parish except in the Docking Union where settlement was extended to all parishes in the Union.
5 See chapter 2 above.
6 Caird,op.cit. p.467.
7 Ibid., p.472.

when every allowance has been made for the changing concepts of punishment.

Norfolk Crime Statistics 1845-1853

Source: Rev. H.Kitton, Statistical Tables Illustrative of the Receipts and Expenditure of the Norfolk County Rate; Norwich,1856.

Columns: A: committed to prison for felonies and misdemeanours.
B: committed to prison for debts. C: transportations.
D: fined offences. E: offences against the Game Laws.
F: assaults.

Year	A	B	C	D	E	F
1840	1,310	55	62	737	259	145
1841	1,483	52	66	1,297	461	316
1842	1,550	51	51	916	321	262
1845	1,394	17	41	618	258	135
1846	1,443	36	47	657	318	153
1847	1,517	28	31	573	265	174
1848	1,671	89	28	757	335	229
1849	1,714	84	32	741	311	220
1850	1,830	108	64	822	355	233
1851	1,957	101	56	843	328	278
1852	1,645	87	60	787	323	237
1853	1,473	103	41	649	232	155

(N.B. the period 1840-1842 is included to allow comparison with the previous period of deep depression.)

The effects of the agricultural depression were also evidenced in the declining volume of imports entering Lynn Harbour, a matter of vital concern to the East Anglian. To be noted particularly was the sharp drop in coal imports as between 1850 and 1851, this being the first visible effect of the opening of the Great Northern Railway (1850), which was to prove to be, in the words of Armes, the "finishing stroke" to the coal staple of the harbour.[1] It is to be remembered that a large proportion of the imports were intended for Lynn itself, or for areas outside the reach of the railways; what there was for the west and south had to be competed for against strong opposition from the river interests of the Nar and the Ouse respectively.

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1 Op.cit. p.15.

Imports into Lynn Harbour 1845-1851

Year	Coals imported (tons)	Other merchandise (tons)
1845	302,463	141,935
1846	208,392	120,468
1847	264,271	107,948
1848	232,831	82,386
1849	233,279	64,459
1850	252,234	70,534
1851	178,613	69,838

Source: W.Armes; The Port of King's Lynn,p.56.

The spread of inland coal in Lynn's former markets and the general depression in local agriculture were the principal factors in the decline shown above, but further potent causes were the tax of 4d. per ton levied by Lynn Corporation, from 1849 on, on 'foreigners' to finance its £60,000 contribution to the Norfolk Estuary Cut,[1] and the unfortunate fact that that work was still far from completion. The necessary act had been obtained in 1846,[2] but the state of the money market had prevented its immediate implementation. In 1848, in order to raise public credit, Robert Stephenson was invited to join the company to work alongside Rennie, and in the same year Folkes (formerly chairman of the Lynn & Ely) became chairman, remaining so until his death in 1860. In 1849 a new act (12 & 13 Vic.c.xcv) was obtained, empowering Lynn Corporation and the Eau Brink Commission each to contribute £60,000 towards the cost of the cut, but this gain in financial strength was almost immediately offset by the high costs of 'buying off' opposition in Parliament and land compensation. Even so a contract was made with Peto & Betts under which, for a sum of £143,000, the works were to be completed within three years of the possession of the land being gained. The first sod

1 Cf.Herapath,9th October,1852; Bruce at the meeting of the 31st August,1852; for full details of the terminology etc. of the Lynn toll system see chapter 1 above, and Appendix A.

2 The general details are derived principally from White's Norfolk Directory, 1864, pp.723-5.

was cut on the 8th November, 1849, and between 1850 and 1852 the work was pressed on with vigour; but then, in the February of the latter year, completely contrary to its own self interest, the Eau Brink Commission filed a petition in the Court of Chancery against the company, and obtained an injunction against the method of construction, part excavation, part tidal scour, on the grounds that it would tend to raise the outfall and reduce the drainage outflow. For sixteen months work came to a standstill until the deadlock was broken by a further act of 1853 (see chapter 8 below). Meanwhile, the Lynn Corporation levy discouraged trade, and all the old delays and inconveniences of Lynn Harbour continued unabated, with vessels often being held up for three or four days with the result that freightage rates via Lynn were between 1/- and 2/- per ton higher than elsewhere.[1] But in these matters the East Anglian was powerless to act.

A final factor of importance from the railway's point of view was that the termination of the harbour branch on the opposite side of the Nar to, and, in some cases, several hundred yards from the quays necessitated extensive and expensive handling and cartage of goods between the ship and the railhead; the effects of this were felt particularly in the timber trade, where such cartage could represent as much as one third of a load of timber's total conveyance costs;[2] in the outward direction it frequently proved cheaper to cart corn the whole way to the ship than to make use of the railway.[3] The answer was a swivel bridge over the Nar and a quayside tramway (first suggested in 1849),[4] but to 1852 the financial condition of the company was such that the work could not be contemplated in any practical sense.

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1 Herapath, 9th October, 1852, pp.1120-1; meeting of the 31st August, 1852 - Bruce.

2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.

2. The Attitude of the Eastern Counties Railway

While the various circumstances outlined above took their toll, there was concomitantly a deliberate move afoot by the Eastern Counties Railway to rob the East Anglian of its traffic. The motives of the former were not just to develop its own traffic, for the whole policy was clearly designed to weaken the resistance of the East Anglian to a lease on terms dictated by the E.C.R. The weapons were special contracts with traders (to be considered in chapter 8) and preferential tolls in favour of ports such as Yarmouth and Wisbech and lines in competition with those of the East Anglian; minor irritants included the refusal of the E.C.R. to give through bookings to East Anglian stations. The stimulus to their use was the growing danger that the East Anglian might turn to the Great Northern Railway. The victims were not only the East Anglian but also the economy of Lynn.

One of the first acts of Wentworth Clay, after assuming office as General Manager of the East Anglian in September,1849, had been to make an agreement with the Traffic Manager of the Eastern Counties, Moseley, that the latter company would henceforth charge the same overall rates on general freight and livestock from both Wisbech and Lynn to London.[1] For some months the E.C.R. observed this agreement until, pleading competition from the Great Northern Railway,[2] it began, in the October of 1850, a systematic violation of both the spirit and the letter of its undertaking without a single step to inform the East Anglian of its intentions.[3] Rates were cut on the Peterborough - Norwich line to the detriment of the Lynn and Dereham route, but

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1 Herapath,15th March,1851, p.309; in answer to a notice of the E.C.R. in the 'Times' during the previous week the E.A.R. published the whole correspondence between Clay and Moseley. In this case, Clay's letter of the 27th November,1850.

2 Ibid.,Moseley on the 11th November,1850.

3 Ibid.,Clay on the 19th October,1850.

much more serious were the changes made on the London - Ely - Wisbech route. Instead of at the agreed figure of 10/- per beast (except bullocks at between 3/- and 7/-)[1] the Eastern Counties began to carry at the rates of 38/- per cattle truck (i.e. 6/4 per head) for the 97 miles between Wisbech and London - at the same time the rate for sheep was brought down to 68/- per truck load or 1/- per head. But at the same time the rates from Ely to London, only 72 miles, remained at 7/- per beast and 1/- per sheep for the East Anglian[2] (this continued to remain true even in the February of 1851 when the rate for beasts other than those coming from the E.A.R. line was further reduced to 6/- per head).[3] There was no room for the East Anglian to cut its own rates between Lynn and Ely, for even if the cattle traffic was carried free of charge it would still be more expensive than the journey from Wisbech. There could only be one result. Large numbers of cattle and sheep were now driven past Lynn and Downham direct to Wisbech for transit to London,[4] and East Anglian traffic returns began to show an alarming decline.[5] Similarly the E.C.R. began to carry and deliver in London potatoes from Wisbech at 11/- per cwt., but the rate on those from Lynn remained at 11/8 for carriage to the London terminal alone.[6] Meanwhile, at the beginning of December,1850, the E.C.R. cut its rates from Fakenham and Dereham to London.[7] For general goods from Dereham to London via Lynn the rate remained at 15/- per ton, but the E.C.R. now offered to carry the same goods via Wymondham and Ely for a mere 11/8,[8] and, on the grounds that there had been no traffic for two years, sought to deny that the route via Lynn was one to be recognised.[9] To further aggrevate the situation the E.C.R. persisted in levying a charge of 6d. per ton on all minerals passing the junction at Dereham.[10]

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1 Herapath,15th March,1851, p.309; Clay on the 27th November,1850. 2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.,Clay on the 24th February,1851. 4 Ibid.,Clay on the 27th November,1851.
5 Ibid.,Clay on the 9th November,1851. 6 Ibid.,Clay on the 27th November,1850.
7 Ibid.,Clay on the 3rd December,1850.
8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid.

Connected with the same general campaign the Eastern Counties refused to issue through passenger tickets from its own stations (and those of the Norfolk Railway) to those of the East Anglian. The inconvenience to passengers that this would cause obviously discouraged travel.[1] The East Anglian complained long and bitterly from the 1st January,1850 onwards.[2] Eventually, in the August, the E.C.R. recognized that this aspect of its policy was self damaging except where the station involved was actually served by the trains of either itself or an associated company. Thus concessions were made in a letter from Richardson, the General Manager of the Eastern Counties, on the 19th August,1850, but only in terms of naked challenge:[3]

> "I am in receipt of your favour of the 16th inst., and have given instructions for tickets to be prepared, and, if possible, we will commence booking through to Lynn, Downham and Swaffham from London, Cambridge, Norwich and Yarmouth on Monday, but not to Dereham for which you have given me fares. Let this be distinctly understood, that we will neither receive nor issue Dereham tickets, nor in any way recognise through rates from our stations to Dereham or visa versa".

The point was, of course, that Dereham could be reached by way of the Norfolk Railway, now on lease to the Eastern Counties, and while that alliance remained and the East Anglian continued independent, there would never be any concession.

Despite its complaints, however, the East Anglian was in a very weak position from which to challenge the conduct of the Eastern Counties. That company was under no obligation, moral or otherwise, to favour the East Anglian; from the commercial viewpoint it was entitled to develop its own

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1 Cf.the evidence of Captain Laws (5th Report of the Railway Committee of 1844, Minutes of Evidence,p.480) on the methods by which one company drives another into its arms,e.g."inflict a degree of inconvenience upon the passengers by making them get in and out of the carriages and stopping in certain places in a way that would be nearly a perfect bar to anyone taking his family."

2 Herapath,15th March,1851; Clay on the 3rd December,1850.

3 Ibid.,Clay was quoting from Richardson's letter.

traffic by any means in its power in order to meet its obligations to the proprietors. The agreement with the East Anglian to offer equal rates from Lynn and Wisbech was in this case in conflict with that latter consideration, and although in an ideal world it would have probably been considered as a moral obligation, in the jungle of railway politics where it was each for itself (the East Anglian was concerned only for itself and Lynn at the expense of the Norfolk Railway, Wisbech and the E.C.R.) it had to be sacrificed. Certainly from the commercial viewpoint the Eastern Counties was justified. A central axiom of railway operation is that "if you have a regular traffic which gives a through haul, full truck loads and but little handling, you get a maximum of economy and a minimum of expense".[1] If the E.C.R. found that block loads could pay at the rates quoted from Dereham and Wisbech it was fully entitled to offer them in order to encourage traffic - the same applied whether block loads could be obtained or not; conversely, if under normal traffic conditions the traffic from Ely would bear the rates quoted above the company was justified in making these its standard rates and in treating the Wisbech traffic as a special case. In this the East Anglian was in fact in a cleft stick, as Moseley was not slow to point out. On the 23rd November, 1850 he wrote:[2]

> "Your proposition (i.e. the demand for equal milage rates) seems to me to partake of a new idea in the adjustment of railway rates; take for instance a tradesman sending goods from Dereham to Ely, and you charge him 2d per mile; he turns round and says why you only charge 8/- per ton from London to Lynn, which includes terminals; it is only 1d per ton per mile between Lynn and Ely, and upon these terms my goods must be carried, say 2d, from Dereham to Lynn and thence 1d to Ely."

This, he justly claimed, was a fair comparison with the East Anglian demands.

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1 Kirkaldy & Evans, op.cit.p.34.
2 Herapath, 15th March, 1851.

on the Lynn to London rates. Admittedly, the E.C.R. was, as a matter of policy, seeking to cripple the East Anglian and bring it to terms, but in the railway world of the 1840s and '50s there was nothing unusual in that. The reason was plain, for the E.C.R.'s own committee of inquiry in 1849 had recognized the probability that Lynn would soon by one of the best ports on the east coast[1] and it therefore followed that, quite apart from its value per se to the E.C.R., it had to be kept from the clutches of the Great Northern. The only weakness in the E.C.R.'s present policy was that by it so much harm might be done to Lynn's trade that it would not recover when the E.C.R. had gained the control it sought.

3. The level and the Character of the Revenue, 1848-June, 1851

A. The Opening (27th October, 1846) to the 30th June, 1848

The gross return for this lengthy period during which all the system except for the last portion of the Lynn & Dereham line was opened was £20,398/8/5½, which, after the deduction of working expenses, left a working profit of £9,087/7/8.[2] The suspect nature of the calculation of working expenses and the reasons for the low gross return have been examined at length in a previous chapter, and it is sufficient to remark at this stage that the period included the creation of both the 1847 and 1848 preference shares as well as the raising of some £290,000 in loans. In all, if all the 1848 7% shares were taken up £32,700 per annum would be required in interest payments alone, quite apart from working expenses.

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1 Appendix A to the Second Report of the Lords Select Committee of 1849.
2 Herapath, 2nd September, 1848, p.924; meeting of the 30th August, 1848.

B. 1st July, 1848 to the 31st December, 1848

The gross income for this, the first proper period of six months, was £18,968/7/11½ of which working expenses claimed all but £7,134/6/8½.[1] The only comfort was that for only 14 weeks had the Lynn & Dereham line been in full operation.

C. 1st January, 1849 to the 30th June, 1849

This was, of course, the first period in which the system was fully open, and it began with high hopes on the part of the board. As early as the end of February a good harvest was being forecast to follow the bad one of 1848,[2] and great satisfaction was found in the upward trend over the first seven weeks of the year as compared with the corresponding period of 1848 in both passenger (particularly the upper classes) and local goods traffic.[3] This was partly propaganda to aid the issue of the new 1849 7% shares, but it also reflected a perfectly genuine confidence. In fact the gross revenue was even lower than that of the previous six months, reaching only £17,965; working expenses were £12,232 and so the net profit was only £5,762.[4] The most serious diminuation was in passenger traffic which had yielded only £6,066 as compared with the £6,757 of the previous period.[5]

Overall, the bad harvest of 1848 and the reduction of water rates on the Ouse were adduced as the primary factors in the failure to better the previous period, but also there were the first effects of free trade which since the February of 1849 "so far as it had gone...had acted most prejudicially to the trade of the port of Lynn" and precipitated an "unparalleled depression" in

1 Herapath, 10th March, 1849, p.254; meeting of the 28th February, 1849.
2 Ibid., Bruce.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 17th November, 1849, p.1157; meeting of the 23rd August, 1849 - Bruce.
5 Ibid., Directors' Report.

the farming of Norfolk and Cambridgeshire.[1] Also there was the hostility of the Eastern Counties now becoming manifest through the alteration of rates, the refusal to give through bookings and the demand for advances in respect of the through conveyance of coals and other goods.[2] Hope for the future was still to be found, however, in the approaching opening of the Great Northern, in the Norfolk Estuary Act of 1849, the signs of a good harvest for 1849,[3] and the possibility that depression and the end of protection would spur the farmers to new efforts. A small but important point was that the roads leading to the stations of the Wisbech branch, hitherto so bad as to be impassable for grain carts in periods of prolonged rainy weather,[4] were at last being repaired with chalk (some of it from the Swaffham cutting) and gravel carried by the railway itself at "very moderate" rates.[5]

D. <u>1st July,1849 to the 31st December,1849</u>

Happily these six months saw some slight improvement, £19,153 being received,[6] which, after the usual deductions, left a net profit of £8,327.[7] The principal grounds for hope, however, were that to the 11th November the gross total had been only £14,240, the proportional increase after that date being taken as a very real sign of improvement. Moreover, the E & H remained an unrealised asset as terms for the renewal of services had still not been arranged with the Eastern Counties, and for this period had been totally unproductive.[8]

In more detailed terms it could be seen that over the last weeks of the year as compared with the same weeks of 1848 there had been a significant change in the pattern of revenue:[9]

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1 Herapath,16th June,1849,p.596; meeting of the 13th June,1849 - Bruce.
2 Ibid.,17th November,1849,p.1157; Directors' Report of the 23rd August,1849.
3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.,16th June,1849,p.596;meeting of the 13th June,1849-Bruce.
5 Ibid.,17th November,1849,p.1157;Directors' Report on the 23rd August,1849.
6 Ibid.,28th February,1850,p.288;meeting of the 23rd February,1850. 7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.,24th November,1849,p.1179; meeting of creditors,21st November,1849.
9 Meeting of the 23rd February,1850 - Bruce.

1st class passengers were 14% up in number and 42% in yield.
2nd class passengers were 5% down in number but 35% up in yield.
3rd class passengers were 1¼% down in number but 18¼% up in yield.

The yield from parcels was 35¼% up, from cattle 140% and from local goods, lime and coals 72% or more; the overall average of increased yield for the eight weeks was thus 29% as compared with an average 16% on other lines.[1] The board made great play with these apparently encouraging figures, but unfortunately it was being deceived. Comparison with national trends reveals some surprising differences, although of necessity figures for a whole year are having to be compared with those of local application for a period of only two months in two successive years.

Table of % increases over the previous year: England and Wales[2]

Year (to June)	Mean length of lines open	Passenger Receipts	Parcel Receipts	Goods Receipts	Total Receipts
1847	23.62	17.40	7.23	16.27	10.61
1848	22.90	11.44	8.77	25.78	15.46
1849	20.20	0.92	4.14	16.27	9.34
1850	17.72	14.37	5.44	14.85	9.70
1850 compared with 1846					
	114.99	51.03	28.05	95.32	53.21

Proportion of Passengers in each class: England and Wales[3]

Year (to June)	1st	2nd	3rd	Parliamentary	Mixed	Numbers
1846	15.977	39.135	32.943	9.935	2.010	35,398,403
1847	14.412	38.414	30.364	15.481	1.329	41,560,342
1848	13.580	40.539	24.558	21.202	0.121	46,316,540
1849	12.920	39.976	20.808	26.926	-	46,745,033
1850	12.306	38.078	21.321	28.295	-	53,463,787

1 Meeting of the 23rd February, 1850 - Bruce.
2 Report of the Commissioners of Railways for 1850, p.xxiv.
3 Ibid., p.xxix.

Table of % Proportion of Receipts: England and Wales[1]

	Passengers	Goods
To June, 1846	62.59	37.41
" " 1847	60.68	39.32
" " 1848	57.17	42.83
" " 1849	54.45	45.55
" " 1850	52.32	47.68

N.B. Actual receipts for the year to June, 1850 were £5,588,569 for passengers and £5,093,400 for goods.[2]

Many lessons of national application are to be learnt from these figures. In the first table the most obvious feature is the manner in which the annual increase in receipts was dropping further and further behind that in milage; behind this lay the consequences of depression, but more particularly the fact that more and more subsidiary or secondary lines (compare the E.A.R. itself) had been opened to supplement the great trunk routes. In both the first and the third tables the steadily increasing importance of goods traffic is to be noted - a matter discussed at some length in chapter 1. In the second table the most obvious factors are the decline in the proportion contributed by the first class, the tendency of the second class to fall, and the strongly marked trend towards increase in the third (when combined with the Parliamentary class for this purpose); these aspects are particularly noticeable as between 1848 and 1849 when the total numbers of passengers carried remained very much the same. Now, in contrast, the East Anglian experience was that first class travel was increasing, that of the third class - in numbers - falling. In that fares had been slightly raised the increased amount produced by the latter is in part explained, but putting both circumstances together the most likely explanation, remembering the poverty of the labouring classes in the villages, is that there was a standstill, if not an actual decline, in the number of short local journeys, in many ways the

1 Report of the Commissioners of Railways for 1850, p.xxv.
2 Ibid., p.xxx.

bread and butter of the East Anglian at this stage. The rise in the first class, contrary to national trends and at a time of growing agricultural depression, indicates more than anything else that so far - despite the favour shown to it[1]- this level of traffic had not been fully developed by the East Anglian. The same was true of the rises recorded in general goods traffic - in the latter part of 1848, the basis on which the increased were calculated, cattle, coals and merchandise together had contributed only 36% of the total revenue (£7,210 out of £18,968)[2] whereas the national average (July,1848 to June,1849) was 45.55%. Of all companies, the East Anglian, serving an area devoid of large centres of population and dependent on agriculture, should have been one to be above the national average in this vital field.

The lesson that should have been learnt by the East Anglian board was that the increases of which it made so much were more a striking commentary on the undeveloped state of traffic rather than a really significant gain. This was especially true in that many of the factors on which the increases were based were of a purely temporary nature; even in the absence of the general figures that much should have been recognized. It was the season of the year when river transport was approaching its most unattractive state, and when, just prior to Christmas, enormous quantities of poultry etc. were being despatched to the London market. Further to these factors the transportation of road materials to the Wisbech branch was another only temporary gain. That there should be some gain in general traffic was reasonable in that the industrial depression had lifted, but this was to be offset by the deepening slump in local agriculture.

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1 Herapath,10th March,1849, p.254; meeting of the 28th February,1849 - Bruce.
2 Ibid., accounts presented with the Directors' Report.

E. 1st January, 1850 to the 30th June, 1850

As if in confirmation of the arguments advanced above the total yield for the first half of 1850 was considerably down on that of the previous six months; this time it was £18,829, from which was derived a net profit of £7,014/7/10.[1] Compared with the first six months of 1849 passenger takings had declined by £1,052 (£8,520 to £7,468) and the actual number of passengers from 114,872 to 104,641; goods' traffic had increased by 15,152 tons, and the takings from it £1,415.[2] These figures were particularly disturbing in that they included the revenue from the Ely & Huntingdon line which had now resumed workings with its horse drawn omnibus and two daily E.C.R. steam goods' trains.[3] The various explanations offered by the directors must all be judged as sound. The deep agricultural depression and the obvious distress of the area were beyond any dispute, and at the back of this was to be discerned the consequences of free trade in corn. But in addition water rates had been further reduced on the Ouse, the harvest of 1849 had been bad (it was good on the lighter soils of western Norfolk but below average on the heavier soils of the Fens), and still the Eastern Counties refused to make through bookings even though the East Anglian had now gone as far as offering money in advance.[4] But still the optimists found grounds for hope, this time in the fact that at a meeting of the 22nd February,1850 the Norfolk Estuary Company, with only a very small minority against, had determined, despite its mounting difficulties, to proceed with its works, and in the opening of the Great Northern, expected in the autumn of that year, which would, although slightly longer, provide an alternative route between Lynn and London, and

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1 Herapath,24th August,1850,pp.828-9; meeting of the 21st August,1850.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.

a means of escape from the deliberate obstruction of the Eastern Counties.[1]

F. 1st July,1850 to the 31st December,1850

The various factors that had hampered the development of revenue in the previous period were still operative, and the outcome for what was usually considered to be the better half of the year was a net profit of no more than £7,129/8/10½.

G. 1st January,1851 to the 30th June,1851

The figures for this period represented the last return of an absolutely independent East Anglian company, for they were the immediate prelude to the ill-fated lease agreement with the Great Northern Railway which in turn led directly and immediately into a lease to the Eastern Counties. In fact the returns themselves were a major reason for the abnegation of independence, being the worst yet. From all sources a total revenue of £17,566/15/10½ had been derived, passenger traffic contributing £8,405/5/5½ of the total, freight £8,470/16/9. While the return was lower working expenses were rather higher than usual; they amounted to £12,179/18/9 so leaving only £5,386/17/10½ as the net profit on six full months of operation.[2] Again the same general factors were to blame, but this time there were also the "extreme mildness" of the winter, and the "turn-out" over several weeks of the Lynn sailors and porters, both of which affected the coal trade very severely,[3] to be taken into account. It was a sad commentary on the precarious nature of East Anglian revenue that factors such as the two latter could cause such havoc.

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1 The fact was not mentioned that for several weeks there had been a strike of locomotive men on the E.C.R. Trains continued with scratch crews, but there was obviously some minor damage done to traffic; 'Labour Relations on the Railways,1835-75', P.W.Kingsford, Journal of Transport History,Vol.1,No.2, November,1953,p.66.

2 East Anglian Directors' Minute Book,6th March,1858, p.73.

3 Herapath,6th September,1851, p.947; meeting of the 30th August - Directors' Report.

4. Working Expenses

It will have been observed that one of the few favourable factors in the previous section was that over the period, and except for the very last section, working expenses as a proportion of the total receipts had tended to diminish, although remaining high at some 60% or more. The basic difficulty was of course that economy had been carried to its furthest point, so that the stage had been reached where no further savings were possible without grave detriment to either safety or public service. It was a simple application of the fundamental principle of railway economics that certain basic costs are inescapable whatever the traffic or the return. The only comfort could be that if and when revenue did rise the working costs would not increase proportionally.

"Unceasing attention" to current expenditure was the constant theme of Bruce's board.[1] Considerable savings were made by the use of Mr.George England & Company's light engine which, for a trial period, was put to work on the Wisbech branch during the winter of 1848/9.[2] Inclusive of steam raising its coke consumption was only 8 lbs. per mile - an amount which Valentine claimed could be further reduced by minor alterations - so that a saving of 50% was possible on light trains.[3] Financial stringency, however, precluded adoption, a sad decision as the engine in question went on to gain great successes on the Glasgow & Edinburgh and then the Dundee & Perth lines, reaching speeds of 60 m.p.h. on an average consumption of only 8 lbs.3 ozs. of coke (compared with the 29 lbs. 1 oz. usual on those lines),[4] and showing

1 Herapath,10th March,1849, p.254; meeting of the 28th February,1849 - Bruce.
2 Ibid. - Valentine.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., News Item,3rd August,1850, p.299.

itself easier to stop and less liable to slip than other locomotives.[1] On several occasions the East Anglian proprietors urged the use of smaller engines, but Bruce, no doubt bearing in mind that an engine and tender could cost anything up to £2,000,[2] was obliged to insist that while savings would be possible with engines of 9" or 10" cylinders they would not be as great as was imagined,[3] and therefore, presumably, would not justify the capital expenditure involved. Similarly, the installation of the telegraph would have effected savings, but could not be afforded.[4]

The most important single step towards economy was the appointment as General Manager, from the 1st September,1849,[5] of the experienced Wentworth Clay in place of Hughes of Manchester, whose "heart had been broken" by the treatment he had received from the Eastern Counties Railway.[6] Clay's appointment was on a contractual basis (the details are nowhere extant) by which in effect he (and a Mr.Bond) took the East Anglian plant on lease. The purpose of this was primarily to create a legal barrier between the creditors and the seizure of company property,[7] but, rightly so, great economies were expected as a result of the arrangement - at the same time the maintenance of 61¾ miles of track (not the E & H section which was maintained by the E.C.R.) was let out on contract for one year for a sum of £2,704, although this did not include the cost of ballast, bridges and gates.[8]

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1 Herapath, News Item, 3rd August,1850, p.299.
2 Cf. 'A Letter to George Carr Glyn Esq.,M.P., on some points of Railway Management, in reply to a late pamphlet', Capt.M.Huish, London,1848, p.13.
3 Herapath,24th August,1850, p.828; meeting of the 21st August,1850.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.,17th November,1849, p.1159; Directors' reply to the Committee of Inquiry.
6 Railway Times,15th September,1860, pp.1043-7; meeting of the 11th September-Bruce.
7 Herapath,24th November,1849, p.1179; bondholders' meeting of the 21st November, W.W.Williams.
8 Ibid.,28th February,1850, p.288; meeting of the 23rd February,1850.

The results of Clay's appointment and of greater experience in the management of stores and machinery[1] became increasingly evident as time went on. By the early part of 1850 locomotive costs had been reduced to 5½d. per mile and fuel consumption to 22½ lbs.[2] (19½ lbs. after July,1850)[3], a substantial improvement on the 6½d. and 25 lbs. of only eight months previously.[4] Extensive renovation, strengthening and enlargement of rolling stock played an essential part in securing greater utilisation of plant[5], and such features as reduced train weight and frequencies, and did much to overcome the chronic shortage of vehicles that had so severely hampered the development of traffic; the imposition of demurrage charges in 1850 put an end to the Eastern Counties' deliberate policy of keeping East Anglian wagons on its own lines for longer than was in fact necessary.[6] Staffing establishments were extensively reduced to the lowest level consistent with safety, the weekly wages bill being cut in the February of 1849, when a whole batch of notices expired, from £450 to £380.[7] Clay continued further with this policy, for whereas on the 1st May, 1848 there had been 331 men and boys employed to work 56 miles 30 chains of line and 22 stations[8], by the 3rd June,1851 the total was down to 231, although the milage had by then increased to 66 miles 70 chains, and the number of stations to 24[9], an average of four men per mile which compared starkly with the national figure of 9.56 for 1850 (10.27 in 1849)[10], and which was made possible only by the low volume of traffic and the low ratio obtaining between stations and milage. The top-heavy administrative staff was also cut,

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1 Herapath,10th March,1849; meeting of the 28th February - specified by Bruce.
2 Ibid.,28th February,1850, p.288; meeting of the 23rd February,1850.
3 Ibid.,30th August,1851 - for the period 1st July,1850 to the 9th July,1851.
4 Ibid.,17th November,1849, p.1157; meeting of the 23rd August,1849.
5 For full discussion of this matter see chapter 4 above.
6 Railway Times,15th September,1860,pp.1043-7; meeting of the 11th September, 1860, Bruce - this is what had broken Hughes' heart.
7 Meeting of the 28th February,1849. 8 Sess.Papers 1849 (249), p.2.
9 Sess.Papers 1852 (153), p.2. See Appendix J.
10 Report of the Commissioners of Railways, 1850, p.ix.

although until 1851 three offices were maintained where one would have done.[1] Between 1848 and 1851 the number of secretaries was reduced from two to one, the eight superintendants were all dismissed as were the two departmental managers, and finally the company dispensed with the services of a full time engineer, thereby saving itself £1,000 per annum.[2] In other directions too savings were made. The establishment of the brick yard has already been discussed[3], but to it should be added a mention of the 24 contractors' coke ovens which went into service near the coal depot during the summer of 1849. At one stage there was also discussion of whether or not to obtain carting facilities on contract for the journeys between the quays and the harbour branch, but although negotiations were begun[4] there is no record of their outcome - as will be seen what evidence there is indicates that they in fact failed, although for a time the company provided its own service.

By and large the directors of the East Anglian, sooner or later, did all that they could to reduce running costs, but they failed to convince the proprietors that this was in fact the case. Indeed, it was almost a general rule at this time of depressed railway securities that shareholders should grumble at the level of working expenses, whatever it might be. Frequently, higher rates and fares were demanded[5], although such were contrary to the already well proven precepts of Peto and others that in agricultural districts especially fares and rates must be low in order to attract the maximum traffic[6], that if low ones would not pay then neither would high ones[7], and

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1 Cf. the letter of 'Veritas', Herapath, 3rd August, 1850, p.752.
2 See ~~Appendix Q. p.~~ ~~273 above~~ 3 See chapter 5 above.
4 Herapath, 10th March, 1849; meeting of the 28th February, 1849.
5 'Letter to George Carr Glyn Esq., M.P. on some points of Railway Management in reply to a Late Pamphlet', Captn. M. Huish, London, 1848, p.4.
6 First Report of the 1846 Select Committee; Minutes of Evidence, Peto, Q.3444.
7 Ibid., Qs.3422-24, and p.12 of the report. However, an act of 1850 did allow higher maximum fares in recognition of the erroneous estimates of 1845/6.

that high construction costs were no excuse for high charges.[1] Another favourite argument, heard in the East Anglian and countless other companies, was that fewer trains should be run, a view that ignored the facts that basic working costs (e.g. as in track maintenance) would be diminished only slightly, and that to thwart public convenience was hardly the way in which to encourage additional traffic. Both arguments of course displayed the ignorance of the majority of railway shareholders as regards the intricacies of railway operation, and were coupled with the short-sighted objection that "the accommodation of the public has been the primary consideration and the remuneration to the shareholders has been lost sight of"[2]- this was in ironical contrast to the public's common complaints of monopoly, poor services and high fares.[3] The East Anglian board received its full share of complaints and suggestions, and it is to its credit that it disregarded all but the most practical of them. Extremists such as 'Veritas', who wanted the whole system to be worked by horses,[4] were easy to disregard, but harder to bear was the continual irritation of petty carping which not infrequently took the form of personal attacks on Bruce and his co-directors. Typical of such was that launched by Broadbent of Manchester in the August of 1849, when he rounded on Bruce for ignoring suggestions, for failing to come to terms with the Eastern Counties, and for dismissing servants without warning.[5] Of these the first was untrue for Bruce was always willing to accept reasonable ideas, the second unjust for Bruce could do nothing while the E.C.R. was set on crippling the company, and the third unfounded; challenged on this latter

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1 First Report of the Select Committee of 1846, p.16.
2 'Railway Property as it is and as it should be, by a Member of the Institute of Civil Engineers', London,1848, p.5.
3 Huish, p.4.
4 Herapath,3rd August,1850, p.752.
5 Ibid.,17th November,1849, p.1158; meeting of the 23rd August,1849.

point, Broadbent could only produce the name of Hughes, his fellow Mancunian - in fact he had resigned of his own accord,[1] even if there had been some pressure on him to do so for the good of the company.

Section 5: Entanglement with the Great Northern Railway and Lease to the Eastern Counties Railway; the events of 1851/2

1. Agreement with the Great Northern Railway

While the events and circumstances outlined above were taking their toll of the East Anglian the principal reaction on the part of Bruce and the board was that of ever increasing resentment against the Eastern Counties Railway. Tireless in its efforts to promote a good understanding with that company, and to avoid any acts of provocation, as it was, the time inevitably came when mere bitterness on the part of the board gave way to a positive desire to hit back to some purpose. First evidenced in the publication of the Waddington/Moseley - Clay correspondence (on the advice of Bruce),[2] this led naturally to the serious consideration of an alliance with the Great Northern Railway - opened in 1850, and the hated rival of the E.C.R. - as first suggested by Puncher in 1848. But great care and secrecy had to be exercised, because there were some amongst the East Anglian proprietors who had investments in the Eastern Counties as well, just as others had a Great Northern interest; then again there were the disinterested who feared the open hostility of the Eastern Counties and argued that the longer Great Northern route to London would bring no advantages; yet a further reason for secrecy was that the agreement, whatever form it eventually took must not appear to be a lease, an amalgamation or a purchase, as all of these would involve a costly approach to Parliament, and give the Eastern Counties ample time in which to prepare its

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1 Herapath, 17th November, 1849, p.1158; meeting of the 23rd August, 1849 - Bruce.

2 Railway Times, 15th September, 1860, pp.1043-7; Bruce at the meeting of the 11th September, 1860 when defending his conduct of company affairs during the previous years against the northern shareholders (for which see chapter 8 below).

counter-measures. Thus it was that for months rumours only abounded, with no knowledge to substantiate them. In the August of 1850 Herapath, usually a mine of detailed knowledge, could go no further than to report that "something is going on" between the Great Northern and the East Anglian following the failure of the latter to make a friendly alliance with the Eastern Counties "who are said to have thrown every and most needless obstruction in their way".[1] He even committed himself to a limited blessing on the union[2] - later he amplified this by opining that the East Anglian would gain through rates and a guarantee from a company whose sole interest was to develop traffic[3] - but sounded the warning that "if either or both are thinking of amalgamation, our advice is that they at once proceed to think of something else".[4] Even by the February of 1851 the same journal could do no more than report on the increasing speculation that flourished in the absence of a single positive detail.[5] Indeed, so far there was nothing to be taken as a guide at all except possibly the fact that during the summer of 1850 the East Anglian had obtained the land for the junction with the Great Northern at Huntingdon[6] - but this had always been intended.

But behind the rumours lay months of solid, detailed negotiation between Williams of the East Anglian and Baxter of the Great Northern, with constant comings and goings between the two boards. These bore fruit when a general agreement was reached in the April of 1851.[7] The boards settled the final details on the 16th May, on which date the deed of contract was also signed;[8]

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1 Op.cit.,31st August,1850, p.824; News Item. 2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.,22nd February,1851,p.190; News Item. 4 Ibid.,31st August,1850, p.824.
5 Ibid.,22nd February,1851, p.190.
6 Herapath,24th August,1850,p.828; meeting of the 21st August,1850.
7 Ibid., Notice of the 19th April,1851, p.448.
8 Ibid.,6th September,1851; meeting of the 30th August,1851 - Directors' Report.

this came into effect on the 10th June,1851, and into actual operation on the 10th July,[1] the month in between being necessary for the removal of the Official Receiver, whose departure was slightly delayed by the insistence of some of the creditors on receiving deposits on their claims.[2] The agreement itself, devised in the sure fear of opposition and probably litigation, was exceedingly long and complex, and was condemned by the East Anglian auditors because of the "apparent conflicting nature of many of its provisions ...and its extreme verbosity".[3] Bruce insisted that it had been seen and approved by a number of leading lawyers, that there was a precedent for it in the agreement between the Oxford, Worcester & Wolverhampton and the London & North Western, and that it was conceived in the spirit of the Company Clauses Consolidation Act (by which companies could be permitted to work lines that were not their own),[4] but also had to admit that "he had been informed by most eminent gentlemen at the bar, Parliamentary agents and conveyancers that in the present state of the law no agreement could be drawn up which would not be open to litigation".[5] However, presumably to reduce the risk, the agreement was not to be printed.[6]

The agreement, as read aloud to the proprietors on the 30th August,1851[7] (that is over seven weeks after it had come into effect) laid prime emphasis on the argument that this was not a lease - in addition it was "not to be construed into a lease, or an agreement for a lease". In this could be clearly seen the fears attaching to any application to Parliament after the

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1 Herapath,6th September,1851; meeting of the 30th August,1851 - Directors' Report. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.,Bruce. [5] Ibid. [6] Ibid.
7 All factual references in this paragraph are taken from Herapath,6th September,1851,p.947; East Anglian meeting of the 30th August,1851; this includes the reference made to the objections raised at the Great Northern meeting of the same month.

cost and the many disappointments of the previous years, but no matter how strong the disclaimers the provisions made read remarkably like a lease and aroused doubts as to the legality of the agreement in both the East Anglian and Great Northern camps. By it the Great Northern was to work the East Anglian for 21 years and pay a guaranteed minimum rental of £15,000 per annum for the use of it; all receipts in excess of expenses were to belong to the East Anglian. It seems that as this rental was being described as in lieu of tolls for the use of the line the term 'lease' could be technically avoided. Other terms and conditions there were in abundance. The East Anglian was to complete its station at St.Ives and the junction with the Great Northern at Huntingdon, and to put the whole line into a state of good repair (thereafter the Great Northern was to maintain the permanent way). All East Anglian rolling stock was to be purchased at valuation (in fact the value was appraised by Valentine and Cubitt - with a Mr.Gregory as umpire - during the summer of 1851) and paid for at the expiration of the agreement when this, all the stations and all the plant (a report on the condition of these was drawn up for reference in 1872) were to be returned in the state in which they were taken over. The Great Northern was to complete all the works of the system, using the money that otherwise would have been paid over as the annual rental; if this should prove insufficient the necessary balance would be lent by the Great Northern at 5% interest, and then deducted from subsequent annuities. In contrast to this, and this is the sort of thing that the East Anglian auditors had probably found so confusing, the annuity was always to be the first charge on traffic, and any deficiencies in one year were to be made up from the excess of another. Thus in the one document the guarantee was made absolute, then its diversion was provided for, and then finally deficiencies were envisaged which were to be made up out of money that, as an excess, already belonged to the East Anglian. Stripped of all its complexities and contradictions, however, what the agreement implied was that from now on the East Anglian proprietors could hope for a distribution of £15,000 per annum amongst themselves (after the bondholders had received their due), with the hope of higher returns as soon as traffic and the completion of outstanding works permitted.

So confusing was the agreement that it is not surprising to find that both boards felt that they had made a good bargain - in fact when Bates of Leamington an East Anglian director and a G.N.proprietor - emphatically declaimed to a meeting of the Great Northern proprietors that the East Anglian was being given away, he was informed that the formers' board viewed it as "a particularly good bargain".[1] And in many ways it was. Provided that the East Anglian line was worked economically the £15,000 per annum should prove no great burden in view of traffic returns that were already within striking distance of £36,000 a year; even if the guarantee did have to be made up from G.N.R. funds it would be only to the extent of a few thousands, and that would be a small price to pay for access to the harbours of Lynn and Wisbech (the latter indirectly) and a firm footing in the territory of the company that was determined to ruin it.

The only weakness in the Great Northern's position was the impossibility of knowing just how and with what effect the Eastern Counties would be enabled to strike back, but from the East Anglian's viewpoint the fact that the guarantee would obtain irrespective of what happened between the two former made the agreement a very good one indeed. Moreover, the level of the guarantee was higher than any net annual profit so far recorded, and with it

[1] Herapath,6th September,1851,p.947; meeting of the 30th August, and in reference to the G.N.R. meeting a few days previously; also cf.Herapath's editorial comments on the East Anglian meeting, 6th September,1851,pp.954-5.

went the prospect of future increases as traffic developed under the shelter of a company large enough and strong enough to contain the unbending hostility of the Eastern Counties. Public confidence in the East Anglian, which of course was before the agreement in the hands of the Official Receiver, had never been lower - £25 ordinary shares were being quoted at £2/15 in the January of 1851 - and the company could count itself lucky to have obtained such terms. But it was future prospects that excited the most. As Bates put it, rather £15,000 from the Great Northern than £20,000 from the Eastern Counties, for the former wished to put traffic on the lines, the latter (apparently) to take it off.[1] The Great Northern would obviously be concerned to develop the harbour trade of Lynn, and it followed that the town, and therefore the East Anglian, could look forward to the development of new markets in the west (e.g. in the Nottingham area), especially so with the completion of the G.N.R.'s 'towns line', anticipated for the spring of 1852.[2] But beyond these factors the alliance would mean that the Norfolk Estuary Cut could be properly exploited, and with that and the help of the G.N.R. Lynn made into the chief port for the Baltic.[3] There was also the hope that cross-country traffic by way of Lynn could be considerably developed. At first this was thought to depend on the rather unlikely circumstance of being able to wean the Norfolk Railway from its adherence to the Eastern Counties, but then hopes were raised by the promotion of the independent Eastern Union & Great Northern Junction Railway from Lakenham (just outside Norwich) to Dereham;[4] the promoters intended to gain running powers over the East Anglian, and the overall effects would have been to establish firmly the importance of the latter, while breaking the back of the Eastern Counties. The line in

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1 Herapath, 6th September, 1851, p.947; meeting of the 30th August, 1851.
2 Ibid., Directors' Report. 3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 22nd November, 1851, pp.1234-5; meeting of the 19th November, 1851 - Bruce.

fact was never to materialise, but during 1851 its projection was an important element in the thinking of the East Anglian board. Finally, it may be said, in summary, that all these varied advantages could be expected to compensate the East Anglian and Lynn for the harm that must inevitably be done to the coal staple of the latter's harbour by the coming of the Great Northern's mainline.

At first sight it might seem that the arguments in favour of the Great Northern alliance were so compelling as to still all opposition, but in fact this was not so. The East Anglian board had balanced the gains against the effects of the E.C.R.'s hostility and found in favour of the former. The opposition, a solid body of both original and preference share holders, largely from the north, admitted the advantages but found them to be outweighed by the harm that the Eastern Counties, tapping the East Anglian at every point,[1] could do, and by the fact that the route between Lynn and London would be 15% longer,[2] thereby giving a definite advantage to Wisbech and its E.C.R. route to the latter. Its concern was more with the future development of traffic than the immediate security of the guarantee. It believed, correctly so, as events were to prove, that the Eastern Counties would be so anxious to remove the Great Northern menace from its territory (the immediate danger might be contained, but what if the G.N.R. planned further extensions?[3]) that it would be prepared to offer the East Anglian better terms than the Great Northern, with a guarantee of £5,000 to £7,000 more.[4]

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1 Herapath,15th March,1851, p.302; 'A Large Shareholder'.
2 Ibid., editorial, 6th September,1851, pp.954-5.
3 The subsequent existence of the Midland & Great Northern Joint Railway (see chapter 8), stretching across Norfolk, was perhaps confirmation that such fears were not without foundation.
4 Herapath,15th March,1851, p.302; 'A Large Shareholder'.

The opposition did have something on which to work, for on the 17th April, 1851, while the agreement was still shrouded in mystery and uncertainty, Waddington told a meeting of the E.C.R. proprietors that he himself would have been prepared to offer the East Anglian better terms than those given by Hudson in 1846/7[1] (as seen in the previous chapter, on another occasion he claimed that he had opposed these on the grounds of improvidence). This was a carefully planned remark to keep the hopes of the opposition within the East Anglian alive. Already a body of East Anglian proprietors, acting independently of the board, had waited on Waddington to open lease negotiations. These men Waddington had declined to see[2]; this was a sound tactical move. He had seen that he could stimulate discord, and that the machinery through which he could later negotiate was already in existence, but at that stage he had no need to commit himself, for there was yet a good chance that the agreement, of which the details were still unknown, would fail to come to fruition. His hint on the 17th April, coupled with threats of open warfare against the East Anglian, was clearly designed to leave the door open for both the directors and those who opposed the Great Northern alliance.

Also in the April of 1851 a body of the shareholders, including Simpson[3], soon to be vice-chairman of the company, made an appeal to the Chancellor on the grounds that section 87 of the Company Clauses Consolidation Act was being stretched too far; little progress could be made, however, as the details were still unknown. During May deputations representing the London and Manchester proprietors met to discuss means of preventing the agreement,

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1 Herapath, 19th April, 1851, p.441; E.C.R. meeting of the 17th April.
2 Ibid.
3 Railway Times, 5th January, 1856, pp.8-9.

whatever it was, on the grounds that better terms could be obtained elsewhere.[1] But even if there had been a leak of information at this stage, matters had gone too far for such intervention to be effective.

2. The Agreement in Operation

Faced with the reality of the agreement in operation, as from the 10th July,1851, Waddington proceeded to live up to his threats of the 17th April, although he did not have to go as far as implementing his promises to build docks at Ely and obtain barges to bring potential Great Northern traffic along the Ouse.[2] His plans were simple. All the while encouraging the rebellious shareholders of the East Anglian he had first to make the agreement unworkable, and then offer better terms than those of the Great Northern. The latter had to be done, for while the East Anglian proprietors were guaranteed £15,000 per annum they would never be totally reduced to submission. Circumstances played directly into Waddington's hands. The Great Northern's only direct contact with its new acquisition was at Huntingdon. But as the short E & H line was separated from the remainder of the East Anglian system, and as, because of the form of the agreement the G.N.R. could not invoke the running powers possessed by the East Anglian over the E.C.R. lines between Wisbech and St.Ives, this was in itself useless. It followed that reliance had to be placed on the Great Northern's own undeniable running powers over E.C.R. metals from Peterborough to March and Wisbech - these had been obtained in 1849 in return for the surrender of the right (inherited from the Boston, Stamford & Birmingham)[3] to construct from Stamford to Wisbech.[4] But,

1 Herapath,17th May,1851, p.547; Notice.
2 Ibid.,19th April,1851, p.441; E.C.R. meeting of the 17th April; also ibid., editorial of the 9th August,1851, p.836. 3 See chapter 6 above.
4 Ibid.,22nd November,1851, pp.1234-5; meeting of the 19th November, - a copy of a letter from Baxter to Broadbent (17th November) read to the proprietors.

unfortunately, there was doubt as to whether these powers had even been meant to include the half mile section, belonging to the Eastern Counties, which linked the East Anglian station at Wisbech to a point on the latter's line just short of its own station there.

The G.N.R. and the E.A.R. claimed that running powers over this section were covered by a "sealed agreement" with the E.C.R.,[1] but the latter thought otherwise, and as it was the company in possession it was an easy matter from the very outset for it to set the junction points permanently into its own station so that no through service between the Great Northern and East Anglian systems was possible. Thus the through Peterborough - Lynn service that had been intended could not be operated, and passengers were obliged to leave their train at the E.C.R. station and proceed by omnibus to that of the East Anglian; by the same means the through movement of freight was rendered absolutely impossible. Inevitably this gross inconvenience discouraged travel by way of the East Anglian and drove traffic on to the Peterborough - Ely line of the E.C.R. At the same time the latter intensified its rates' war to draw traffic away from the East Anglian, and persisted in refusing through bookings from its own system to that of its victim (there is no evidence on the matter, but it is probable that the few concessions previously made in this were now withdrawn).

The result was unmitigated disaster for the East Anglian. The first four days of the agreement's operation indicated what was to follow, for in them only £254 were taken, an average of £7 per mile per week[2] as compared with the £11 of the previous year. In the week ending the 27th September,

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1 Herapath, 22nd November, 1851, pp. 1234-5; meeting of the 19th November - copy of a letter from Baxter to Broadbent (17th November) read to the proprietors.

2 Ibid., 9th August, 1851, p. 835.

1851, only £573 were taken, as against the £865 of the corresponding week in 1850,[1] and so it went on. So bad did the results become that their weekly publication ceased, and by the November were appearing only once every three weeks or so. As if the total loss of traffic via Wisbech and the tapping by the E.C.R. were not enough on their own, the 1851/2 winter proved to be very mild, so having serious repercussions on the coal trade.[2] The final position was eventually shown to have been as follows; the very unfavourable comparison with previous half years, and the distance by which the net profit fell short of the £15,000 guarantee are to be particularly noted.

East Anglian Revenue Account,10thJuly,1851 to the 4th January,1852[3]

(i.e. from the commencement of the G.N.R. agreement to the date on which the E.C.R. took over the workings of the line)

Receipts	£	s	d	Expenses	£	s	d
Passengers	8,442	19	7	Locomotive expenses	2,612	14	6
Goods/cattle	6,616	13	6	Wages	2,353	4	9
Mails	61	10	0	Salaries	407	1	6
Milage/demurrage	248	12	9	Wisbech omnibus hire	127	6	9
Rent of sidings,				Clearing House	50	0	0
wharfs etc.	107	16	1	Fire Insurance	37	10	0
Transfer Fees	28	10	0	Rates and taxes	337	3	0
				Passenger Duty	255	10	4
	15,506	1	11		5,180	10	10

The East Anglian and Great Northern boards fought as hard as they could against the Wisbech obstruction, confident that there could be no doubt whatsoever that it would eventually be removed.[4] First there came protracted proceedings with the Railway Commissioners, who themselves took the

1 Herapath,22nd November,1851, p.1249.
2 Ibid.,3rd April,1852,pp.374-6; Directors' Report on the 28th February,1852.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.,6th September,1851, p.947; meeting of the 30th August,1851 - Directors' Report.

initiative in seeking to resolve the deadlock, but in the course of these the latter found to their surprise that the disputed section had never in fact been approved by them, and that its construction was at variance with Parliamentary plans - this was rectified, but the Railway Commissioners declined to take any further part in the main issue[1], partly, no doubt, because by then the injured companies had taken the whole matter into the Court of Chancery. Vice-Chancellor Turner's judgement, delivered in the November of 1851, dealt the fatal blow to the hopes of the plaintiffs. His finding was that the Eastern Counties was in fact bound to allow the free passage of Great Northern trains, but, and here was the sting, he could not and would not issue an injunction against the Eastern Counties as he had grave doubts as to the legality of the G.N.R./E.A.R. agreement; in fact he believed that this was in essence a lease, and that if this was so, in its existing form and without Parliament's sanction, it was "contrary to the spirit of railway legislation and therefore, in his opinion, illegal".[2] There was little point in attempting to fight further against such a finding, especially so as even in the first part of his judgement, that favourable to the East Anglian and the Great Northern, the Vice-Chancellor had indicated certain major reservations in his mind; in the first place the connecting line was not in accordance with Parliamentary plans, secondly the junction had been put in only for the purpose of allowing East Anglian trains to travel over E.C.R. metals to St.Ives, and thirdly he was by no means certain that the G.N.R. had the right to turn off the E.C.R. line short of that company's station when exercising its running powers under the 1849 agreement.[3]

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1 Herapath, 22nd November, 1851, pp.1234-5; meeting of the 19th November - copy of a letter from Baxter to Bruce (17th November) read to the proprietors.
2 Ibid. Also cf.Lewin, op.cit. p.455.
3 Ibid., 3rd April, 1852, pp.374-6; meeting of the 28th February, 1852 - Directors' Report.

The East Anglian's reaction to the situation was a strange one, explicable only in terms of the bitter dislike and distrust felt towards the Eastern Counties. Instead of recognizing the destructive power of that company and breaking free of the Great Northern, Bruce and the board determined to persist with the latter, on the strength of the belief that if a revised agreement were properly sanctioned the Wisbech obstruction would have to be removed. Ideally this was probably a sound solution, for in time Lynn and its railways would receive great benefits from the Great Northern alliance. But some years must pass before these could become a reality, and in the meantime it was almost a certainty that the through traffic between Lynn and Peterborough would not be sufficient to compensate for the heavy losses endured elsewhere. In essence Bruce was seeking to alter an economic pattern that had obtained for centuries by diverting Lynn's attention to the west and north and away from the traditional markets to its south (except that the vital London link would be retained unimpaired). But all this would need time to achieve, and in any case depended on the completion of the Norfolk Estuary Cut. Meanwhile, even assuming that the G.N.R. would go on making up the guarantee out of its own funds, the East Anglian could not go on losing at the rate it had been since July if traffic ever were to be improved. To continue with the Great Northern was to throw a hopeless challenge in the face of the logic of historical development, and to ignore the hard realities of commercial life, and was a course that could never succeed.

So much was recognized, and had been so all along, by powerful elements within both the East Anglian and the Great Northern. Thwarted in its main purpose of preventing the Great Northern agreement in the first place, the

Manchester group of East Anglian shareholders and bondholders was determined to end it at the earliest possible moment; efforts were redoubled when its gloomy forecasts as to the effect of E.C.R. hostility were found to be fully justified. By the October of 1851 a committee of Manchester men, Bancroft, Haseltine, Newbury, Carbutt and Simpson was busy sounding out the feelings of fellow investors.[1] There was no doubt about the nature of the response. A large majority joined the Manchester group in condemning the G.N.R. agreement on grounds of geography and ruinous competition; the E.C.R. was generally held to be much more likely to develop the line.[2] In the same month a private meeting of bondholders declared itself in favour of approaching the Eastern Counties.[3] On the 27th Haseltine, of his own initiative[4] but sure of powerful and widespread support, wrote to Waddington, chairman of the E.C.R., offering negotiation and asking for terms. This was what Waddington had been waiting for, an approach from the other side. Declaring that the Vice-Chancellor's decision allowed for "honourable negotiation", and describing Haseltine as a "peacemaker"[5] Waddington offered a complete set of lease terms. Whatever its wishes in the matter the board could not ignore these. For the moment the initiative lay with the proprietors who, in the names of 200 shareholders (all individuals and not acting in concert)[6] and 150 bondholders, requisitioned a special meeting for the 19th November,1851 in order to consider Waddington's proposals.

3. Lease to the Eastern Counties Railway,1852

There could be little doubt as to how the special meeting so called would end. The proprietors were fearful in the extreme of further competi-

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1 Herapath,22nd November,1851,pp.1234-5; meeting of the 19th November, - Simpson.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.,25th October,1851,p.1147; also an article of the 15th November.
4 Bruce on the 19th November,1851.
5 Meeting of the 19th November.
6 Ibid.

tion from the Eastern Counties, and angry with the board for having done so much in respect of the Great Northern agreement without consulting them.[1] As long as Waddington's terms offered more than the G.N.R. was prepared to give the acceptance of them was a foregone conclusion. That is not to say that Bruce's proposals were entirely without merit, far from it, but they suffered from the defects noted above, and were in contrast with the eminently practical and immediate means of escaping trouble.

Having already informed the Great Northern that it accepted that the agreement of the 16th May was illegal, and that it could not continue under it,[2] the East Anglian board now proposed terms that would allow the company to be either leased or sold to the former. Under them[3] the two companies were to make a joint application to Parliament for the authorisation of a 21 years working contract with, as before, a £15,000 guarantee, plus the power (this was new) to transform the arrangement into a formal lease. Until the act was obtained the Great Northern was to have running powers over the East Anglian lines, but the East Anglian itself was to continue to work the system. If the act were refused the Great Northern were to work over the system for 21 years under the East Anglian, the latter being enabled to end such agreement by the purchase of Great Northern stock on the lines. There was some considerable subtlety in these proposals which were expressly designed to overcome all the legal objections to the former agreement. Sanction for a lease, if and when desired, was sought, but if it were refused, or simply not implemented after being authorised, the old arrangement could be continued under the fiction that the East Anglian was still running its own lines. Taking the Vice-Chancellor's judgement as a guide this would be

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1 Meeting of the 19th November.
2 Herapath, 22nd November, 1851, p.947; meeting of the 19th November - Bruce.
3 Ibid., the proposed terms as described by Bruce.

sufficient to ensure that the Eastern Counties would have to remove the Wisbech obstruction. One further important aspect of the new proposals was that the Great Northern should purchase East Anglian rolling stock at half the agreed valuation figure (i.e. at about £26,000) but that payment should be made at once, instead of the full value after 21 years as had hitherto been agreed. This would enable the board to secure the plant from certain pressing creditors (because it would then belong to the Great Northern), would allow for those creditors who were demanding settlement most insistently to be paid off, and would also provide funds for the completion of various sundry works - any balance in respect of the latter would be covered by the issue of Great Northern bonds.

The alternative, the terms offered by Waddington, was, in broad summary form, as follows:[1]

1. The Eastern Counties was to take the East Anglian on lease for 999 years, purchasing the stock at the recent valuation figure (as well as paying half of the cost of that valuation) and paying tolls for the use of the line.

The sum realised by the sale of the stock, to be paid for at once and in cash, was to be applied to the expenses of bridge renewal on the Wisbech branch, and the balance to the settlement of claims (on a pro rata basis) of trade creditors and bondholders.[2]

2. The Eastern Counties was to guarantee the 5% interest on bonds or, if converted, preference shares to the extent of £17,000 per annum, and if in any one year the E.A.R. earnings were insufficient for such interest the E.C.R. was to have no right to deduct the amount it had to find from its own resources from the earnings of the East Anglian in any future year.

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1 Herapath, 22nd November, 1851, p.947; meeting of the 19th November, 1851.
2 Ibid.

3. All traffic revenue except debt expenses and working expenses was to belong to the East Anglian. Working expenses were to be calculated at the level of those on the Eastern Counties as a whole, but in assessing the East Anglian entitlement this level would never be more than 50% of the balance after the guarantee had been deducted.

Thus the guarantee was £2,000 up on that which the Great Northern was prepared to offer, although the E.C.R. was to enjoy the benefit of any reduction of interest rates below 5%.[1] The question of working expenses appeared to be very adequately covered, but in fact was to constitute a constant course of friction in the years that followed to 1862. At that time the offer seemed to be a very attractive one, as it appeared (quite falsely) that the E.C.R.'s working expenses were in fact down to no more than 43% of receipts (actually the figure for 1852), and there was every confidence that these would soon be reduced to as little as 40%.[2] In general, so far, Waddington's offer indicated the possibility of considerable expansion of East Anglian revenue, and even a dividend on ordinary shares, provided that certain details, hitherto matters of dispute, could be settled. Thus the offer continued:

4. The Eastern Counties was to provide all rolling stock for both local and through services.
5. Through Lynn - London services were to be run as required.
6. The East Anglian was to have credit for 50% of all the traffic from Dereham to and beyond Ely and Wisbech, and visa versa - the Eastern Counties was to charge through rates from East Anglian stations at the lowest level that it charged from its own.
7. The East Anglian was to have free use of E.C.R. stations at Ely, Dereham and Wisbech, and the Eastern Counties of the former's stations at Dereham and Wisbech.

Thus, all the obstacles placed in the way of traffic development in recent years were to be removed, and by gaining credit for 50% of the traffic from Dereham the East Anglian had the opportunity of a real and tangible gain in the face of otherwise impossible competition. Both the railway company and Lynn would gain from the offer on through rates. Finally there were certain

1 Herapath, 22nd November, 1851, p.947; meeting of the 19th November, 1851.
2 Railway Times, 3rd September, 1859, pp.992-3; meeting of the 2nd September, 1859 - Bruce.

matters concerning the implementation of the terms and the relations between the two companies.

8. The act necessary to sanction the proposed arrangement was to be applied for by and at the expense of the Eastern Counties each year until it was obtained.
9. Arbitration procedure was to be arranged between the two companies.
10. Two directors chosen by the East Anglian were to be included on the board of the Eastern Counties.
11. If accepted by the E.A.R. proprietors the agreement was to come into operation as soon as possible, and prior to the act being obtained.

Bruce was of course the key figure on the 19th November, just as Lacy had been in the events of 1847. Expressing surprise that the two sets of terms were being compared, as if the East Anglian was trying to play one company off against the other (for such would be destructive of all confidence between companies), he admitted the "large and beneficial character" of the E.C.R.'s offer, and announced his conclusion that perhaps after all the Eastern Counties was better placed than the Great Northern to develop East Anglian traffic. Both he and the proprietors, however, obviously needed final reassurance, and that was provided by Waddington who attended the meeting in person. He began by making disparaging references to the previous refusals of his own board to deal justly with the East Anglian, and went on to promise "future liberality to atone for the errors of the past"; he pointed to mutual advantages in the offer for the two companies and assured the meeting that it was not the wish of his board to make anything out of the East Anglian - indeed the company was to have all its earnings, and if working expenses were reduced from 40% to 30% it would gain great ben efit; the town of Lynn could not but help benefit. These were, of course, only words, inspired by the urgent need to expel the Great Northern from Norfolk, but they were sufficient to settle the issue beyond doubt in the minds of the proprietors, by this time rendered desperate by the "baneful" effects of E.C.R. competition.

Indeed, the shareholders fell over themselves in their efforts to see virtue not only in the terms but in their own board as well. Bancroft of Manchester, having heard so many complaints against the latter in the north, had come in person to investigate, but was now satisfied that the chairman had judged rightly and "had acted the part of a man of honour". To grant running powers in perpetuity to the Great Northern, he argued, would have constituted a grave dereliction of duty on the part of the board, but now the legal condemnation of the arrangement with that company had rendered the whole situation open and left the East Anglian bound by neither legal nor moral bonds. Bruce and his co-directors would have been more than human if such arguments, when coupled with absolution, had not influenced them in their decision to turn to the Eastern Counties rather than renew negotiations with the Great Northern. For the rest it was a matter of mere rationalization, born of the fear of further destructive competition, as speaker after speaker expressed confidence in both the terms and the future, and a great willingness to overlook the past conduct of the Eastern Counties.

It might be asked how the Great Northern stood in all this. The answer is simply that in view of its experiences of the previous months it was as glad to let go of the East Anglian as that company was to be freed of it. Made by the G.N.R. chairman, Denison, that "first class fighting man"[1], through the company's "ever zealous agent", Baxter[2], both concerned above all to deal a hurtful blow at the Eastern Counties, the proprietors had known nothing of the agreement until it was actually in operation[3], and, now, they keenly resented both the £15,000 guarantee and the manner in which it had been made[4].

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1 Grinling, op.cit. p.107. 2 Ibid.

3 Herapath, 15th March, 1851, p.299; article, 'Great Northern Guarantees', largely a commentary on the G.N.R. meeting of the 8th March, 1851.

4 Grinling, p.107.

The failure of the agreement because of the blockage at Wisbech had brought them to the point of open revolt against Denison. It was not so much his strategy that they opposed, but rather the whole principle of guarantees, a favourite weapon of Hudson's, and with him brought into bad repute.[1] The G.N.R. had dabbled freely in such guarantees and had suffered some 'confessedly bad bargains".[2] In the half year ended December,1850 the company had had to find £10,200 to make up its guarantee to the East Lincolnshire Railway, £1,790 on the Royston-Hitchin line of the Oxford & Cambridge, and £4,223 on that to the Fossdyke & Witham Navigation; it was anticipated that the eventual balance that would have to be made up in respect of the South Yorkshire would be in the region of £28,000 per annum.[3] By the November of 1851 most G.N.R. proprietors felt of the East Anglian as Herapath had felt in the April, that it was "the very last line they should have meddled with", in that it served a poor district in which, in terms of competition, the Eastern Counties had every advantage.[4] They objected too to the calculations on which the level of the guarantee had apparently been based.[5] East Anglian takings had averaged no more than £8 per mile per week, but experience had shown that on the branches of the larger companies, over a reasonable period of time, working expenses alone came to £15 per mile per week. Taking into account the guarantee and all other relevant factors it therefore seemed that the agreement would cost the Great Northern something like £37,000 per annum.[6] The accuracy of the premises on which this result was calculated need not be discussed, nor need the various stages of the calculation be shown, for the one fact that mattered was that the G.N.R. had come to believe that this was

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1 Grinling. p.107 2 Ibid.
3 Herapath,15th March,1851 p.299; Grinling,op.cit. p.61 et seq.
4 Ibid.,19th April,1851, p.448.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid. A 1% dividend on G.N.R. privileged stock would cost only £48,000.

the true assessment of the situation. It may be said, however, in view of the evidence of earlier sections, that the figure would not have been very far out when the time for track renewal etc. came along.

The abandonment of the East Anglian was made certain when, in fear of what the Great Northern had already done, the Eastern Counties so far relented of its hostility to that company as to suggest, in the autumn of 1851, a general settlement of all outstanding disputes. A 'peace treaty' was in fact drawn up,[1] quite apart from the immediate issues both sets of proprietors being heartily sick of the constant expenses attached to the feud, and was further extended in 1852;[2] it was agreed that its terms should be binding for a period of 14 years. The settlement covered many points of detail, but its main importance from the point of view of this work is that it made for complete peace in the area east of the Great Northern mainline between the Thames and the Wash - the Eastern Counties agreed to take the Royston-Hitchin line off the hands of the G.N.R., and the latter agreed to the lease arrangements between the E.C.R. and the East Anglian. Thus it was that the Great Northern offered full co-operation in handing the East Anglian over to its former rival, and as early as the 20th December,1851 dropped the practice of including E.A.R. traffic returns with its own.[3] So anxious were the three companies involved that there should be no hitch in the transfer that it was possible to settle all the Great Northern accounts in respect of the East Anglian entirely without recourse to lawyers.[4] The E.C.R. commenced operation of the E.A.R. lines on the 5th January,1852.

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1 Grinling, op.cit. p.109. 2 Ibid., p.188.
3 Herapath,20th December,1851, p.1352.
4 Ibid.,9th October,1852,pp.1120-1; Directors' Report, 31st August,1852.

The decision to go to the Eastern Counties had been made just in time for the appropriate bill to be entered for the 1852 session. Both the Eastern Union, fearing for its traffic on East Anglian lines if under the control of the rival E.C.R., and the Norfolk Railway, fearing probably that Lynn might now be favoured to the detriment of the ports on its own system, opposed the bill before committee. The E.C.R. fought hard, however, and so managed the opposition that both companies were left fully satisfied with the outcome.[1] The Eastern Union, although it did not gain running powers over the Norfolk and East Anglian systems, was placated by the insertion of clauses providing for and protecting facilities for its traffic while under the control of the E.C.R. (the actual details were to be decided by the Board of Trade); the Norfolk Railway was made content by the insertion of clauses to the effect that it should have a twelve month period from the time of the bill's passage in which to opt for complete amalgamation with the Eastern Counties (to which it was already on lease); if it so decided the terms were to be settled by arbitration, but in any case the East Anglian lease would then no longer be considered as binding; likewise, if the E.C.R. refused amalgamation the lease would automatically become void.[2] This left considerable power in the hands of the Norfolk Railway, and while the twelve months lasted the East Anglian board had a very difficult task persuading potential takers of its bonds that they were in fact an unexceptional security.[3] However, nothing occurred in the year to June,1853 that made the Norfolk Railway feel that it must sacrifice its independence (or rather semi-independence) completely, and therefore the arrangements between the East Anglian and the Eastern Counties continued undisturbed under the terms laid down by the act of the 4th July,1852 (15 & 16 Vic.c.cviii).

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1 Herapath,9th October,1852,pp.1120-1; Directors' Report,31st August,1852.
2 Railway Times,17th September,1853,pp.971-2; Directors' Report,14th September,1853.
3 Ibid.

Meanwhile, the East Anglian's own bill for deviations and new works at Huntingdon, St.Ives, Wisbech, Lynn and East Dereham (estimated at a total cost of £35,000),[1] involving in each case minor alterations or junction constructions (for the most part arising from expectation of a continued agreement with the G.N.R.), plus the power to use certain lines and works of the E.C.R. and the Norfolk Railway, passed the committee stage of the Commons on the 22nd April, but was then immediately withdrawn,[2] the initiative on the part of the E.A.R. no longer being needed under the terms of the E.C.R. agreement.[3] The works were now either unnecessary or would be paid for out of the sale of rolling stock to the Eastern Counties; in fact of the sum so raised £10,000 was allocated to the bridges on the Wisbech branch, £9,000 to the completion of works for the accommodation and development of traffic (that is, half the total needed; the remainder was raised in company bonds), and the rest to the settlement of debts.[4]

And so the East Anglian entered on the last stage of its independent history, on lease to the Eastern Counties Railway and with Bruce and Simpson now on the board of that company (as arranged for in both Waddington's offer and the terms of the act) to ensure if possible fair play for the smaller concern. The foundations had been laid for a period of real improvement, the nature and limitations of which will provide the subject of the next chapter; certainly, after the unending series of major crises through which the East Anglian had passed since 1846 it deserved better fortune.

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1 Herapath, 7th February,1852, p.149. 2 Ibid.,1st May,1852,p.473.
3 Ibid.,9th October,1852,pp.1120-1; Directors' Report of the 31st August,1852.
4 Ibid. Originally it had been estimated that the bridges on the Wisbech branch would cost £20,000 (Herapath,28th February,1850, meeting of the 23rd February), but subsequent reduction had been made possible by improved techniques in bridge construction, in this particular case by the use of Warren's Patent by the contractors, Messrs.Fox, Henderson & Company.

Chapter 8

The Final Years

(1852-1862)

Section 1: Introduction to the Period

There would be little value in a detailed chronological survey of the East Anglian's last ten years of independent existence. Its attempts to reshape the pattern of the local economy were now of the past, for in these years it became the servant rather than the arbitrator in such. The crucial year was 1854, for then Parliament determined that in 1862 the company was to be amalgamated with the Eastern Counties, the Eastern Union, the Norfolk Railway and the Newmarket Railway to form one giant concern embracing virtually the whole of East Anglia. From that point on the dominant concern was that of improving the system, and especially so its traffic, so that neither the proprietors nor Lynn, the interests of which in this case coincided with those of the railway, would suffer by the terms or the outcome of such enforced union. The preparation involved not only positive thinking towards both the present and future, but also renewed efforts to rectify the many weaknesses inherited from the past.

Central to East Anglia's railway politics between 1851 and 1854 were the efforts of the Eastern Counties, under Waddington, to secure itself against the "ruinous competition" of its neighbours.[1] As has been seen the lease taken of the East Anglian on terms which the Eastern Counties considered "not unfavourable" for itself,[2] even though they involved "the principle of paying a toll for all traffic passed on that line",[3] and the 'treaties' of 1851 and

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[1] Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 29th December, 1855; Waddington's defence against the charges of the E.C.R.'s shareholders' Committee of Inquiry, 1855.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

1852 with the Great Northern Railway were important steps towards security. But there still remained dangers from other directions. The Eastern Union, in 1851, was trying to obtain running powers for itself over E.C.R. lines to the west of Colchester, and meanwhile was operating steamship services between Ipswich and London, for which it offered combined rail/ship tickets from all its st tions;[1] this practice was causing serious loss of traffic to the E.C.R. which controlled all the lines from East Anglia into London. In addition relations with the Norfolk Railway were "far from cordial" in 1851, and the E.C.R. had to reckon with the uncomfortable knowledge that the existing agreement between them was to expire in 1855;[2] this was particularly alarming in that during 1851 the Norfolk, the Eastern Union, and the Newmarket Railway (subsequently purchased by the E.C.R. to keep it from the Great Northern) were actually talking of amalgamation.[3]

But the Eastern Union and the Norfolk were, because of their geographical isolation, essentially weak, and therefore unable to maintain any protracted degree of effective opposition. So, in 1853, the Eastern Counties was enabled to arrange with both a 999 years' lease, under which the E.C.R. was to purchase the stock of the Eastern Union (it already owned that of the Norfolk), work both systems as part of its own at an agreed maximum of 46% working expenses (compare the 50% agreed with the East Anglian), and divide the balance of the revenue between the three in the ratio of 5:1:1. Final agreement was made on the 6th February, 1854,[4] after the necessary bill had already come before Parliament. In the Commons it came before a committee headed by Lord Redesdale, a man of strong views on the subject of railway

1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 29th December, 1855; Waddington's defence. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.
4 Preamble to the Great Eastern Railway Act, 1862.

p464 Top line: words omitted

The passage should read:

legislation. In 1851 he had written, "I shall....endeavour to prevent our private legislation becoming worse and more complicated by insisting on all bills being....

~~legislation becoming worse and more complicated by insisting on all bills~~ so framed as to stand alone".[1] Now, in 1854, he found himself so very annoyed by the number of acts and agreements cited in connection with the E.C.R. application, and no doubt also by the record of feuds and litigation attached to them, that he insisted that future amalgamation of the companies concerned must be the condition on which the bill would be passed.[2] In effect he was recognizing that through a combination of historical and geographical circumstances the juxtaposition of and relationships between the main companies in East Anglia were such that there could never be peace, and therefore proper service to the community, without a unity forced from without. For once Parliament failed to raise the usual alarms about the dangers of monopoly, and so the bill became law on the 7th August,1854 (17 & 18 Vic.c.ccxx), confirming all existing lease agreements (including that affecting the East Anglian) but leaving the five companies no power to oppose the principle of future amalgamation. The Eastern Counties was charged with the task of preparing the necessary bill and depositing it prior to the 31st December,1861, after the five companies had settled all details between themselves, under, where necessary, the arbitration of the Board of Trade.[3]

Responsibility for preparing the East Anglian for this union lay squarely on the shoulders of the board, reduced to five members between 1852 and 1861, and particularly so on those of Bruce (chairman until 1861) and his Vice-chairman, Lightly Simpson, a Manchester chemist, who, after coming into

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1 Select Committee of 1852/3 (Cardwell's); Second Report, Minutes of Evidence Q.1; G.Pritt reading a letter from Redesdale to Cardwell of the 13th November,1851.

2 Railway Times,19th March,1859,pp.324-7; Meeting of the 11th March - Bruce.

3 See Appendix P for further details.

prominence through the Manchester committee of 1851[1], came on to the board on the 28th February,1852, replacing Bates who had had "some remarks of a personal nature" with a group of Leeds shareholders[2] (presumably these wanted to maintain the connection with the Great Northern). Simpson was in fact a great gain, and the ideal partner for Bruce, matching him in integrity and determination, but displaying a rather greater degree of imaginative thinking.[3] Like Bruce he also had a seat on the board of the Eastern Counties under the terms of the 1852 act. For the rest names are largely unimportant. Right until 1862 Self of Lynn continued to serve, the only one of the original directors to survive, a fact pointing to considerable integrity and perseverance in his character, and to a genuine concern for the welfare of the company in his attitude. Like Bruce and Simpson he was indefatigable in the performance of his duties, hardly ever missing a meeting.[4] Tinker kept his seat until the March of 1857 when his failure to refund the £245 received as 3½% interest years before on his E & H shares even though he had in fact been ~~£1,000~~ over £700 in arrears became public knowledge (this coincided with the company's suit against its former solicitors and the detailed investigations that went with it), and he was replaced by Kittrick of London.[5] In 1860 Newbury of Ingatestone, an E.C.R. proprietor, also a member of the 1851 committee and a man of "great experience in amalgamations"[6], replaced Chadwicke of Manchester who found it inconvenient to attend meetings[7], but who came back

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1 See chapter 7 above. 2 Herapath,3rd April,1852, pp.374-6.
3 For full assessments of Simpson, Bruce and others see chapter 9 below.
4 Reports on general meetings indicate this, but more particularly so the Directors' Committee Minutes extant in the B.T.C. Historical Archives, London. For example Simpson claimed on the 1st January,1856 that he had attended 136 of the 145 board meetings, and 141 of 144 committee meetings (Committee Book,1st January,1856).
5 Herapath,14th March,1857,pp.396-7; meeting of the 10th March.
6 Railway Times,10th March,1860,p.275; meeting of the 6th March - Bruce.
7 Ibid.

in the May of 1861 when the number of directors was raised to seven. With this, and the resignation of Bruce, both in 1861 the final composition of the board was Simpson (Manchester), chairman, Shaw (Manchester) vice-chairman, Chadwicke (Manchester), Kittrick, Wilkinson (both of London), Newbury (Ingatestone) and Self of Lynn; it may be fairly said that in geographical terms the composition of the board properly represented the distribution of investment.

The proprietors were by and large content to leave matters in the hands of the board while things went well, although from time to time there were hints of a lingering hostility. In the August of 1852 Bruce all but resigned when a motion for the payment of £50 in directors' fees at first found no seconder; in the following February the proprietors so far relented as to vote the board as a whole £500 per annum, but at the same time they stopped the payment of travelling expenses incurred by the directors while attending meetings.[1] After 1857, when revenue returns were tending to fall, the proprietors, once again led by the Manchester element, displayed their old hostile self-assertion, precipitating three major storms in successive years between 1859 and 1861, in the second of which was Waddington, by then expelled from the E.C.R. board and an East Anglian shareholder, attempting to exploit the discontent and gain personal control of the company for himself.

Section 2: Revenue and its background, 1852-1857

A. The Figures

The great hopes entertained of the 1852 agreement[2] were at first sight

1 Railway Times, 5th March,1853,pp.246-7; meeting of the 26th February,1853.
2 Herapath,3rd Aoril,1852,pp.374-6; Directors' Report,28th February,1852.

amply justified by the steadiness with which the revenue increased between 1853 and '57. In fact, however, the Eastern Counties, apart from the obvious benefits conceded by it in the agreement and by the removal of the Wisbech blockage, hindered development almost as much as it helped it - this will be the theme of section 3; the great rises recorded below were due to a variety of causes, in particular to the revival of agriculture[1], the completion of the Norfolk Estuary Cut (followed in subsequent years by quite substantial improvements in Lynn Harbour), and the construction by the East Anglian of tramways along the quays at Lynn; other contributory factors will be noticed in passing.

Table of Revenue Returns, 1853-1857[2]

N.B. In each year A denotes the period from the 1st January to the 30th June, B that from the 1st July to the 31st December.

Period	Passengers	Parcels/horses etc.	Goods/livestock/coal	Mail	Total	Year
	£	£	£	£	£	£
1853A	8,078	542	9,835	62	18,518	
1853B	9,795	598	10,508	62	20,964	39,472
1854A	8,720	544	11,838	62	21,165	
1854B	10,368	656	11,462	62	22,550	43,715
1855A	8,937	653	13,363	60	23,014	
1855B	10,742	619	12,256	60	23,679	46,694
1856A	9,621	644	14,678	106	25,050	
1856B	11,114	741	14,212	87	26,155	51,206
1857A	9,677	611	16,757	84	27,131	
1857B	11,299	919	13,601	85	25,906	53,037

Notes 1. The total revenue for 1851 was £32,657, that for 1852 £36,926.
2. In the passengers' column each period B is higher than A, but in each year the return is higher than that for the corresponding period of the previous year. This confirms the pattern of travel established in earlier years - it would largely be explained by the payment of harvest wages and the temporary relative prosperity of the labouring classes, also by the increased travelling done at Christmas.

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1 Railway Times, 9th July, 1853; meeting of the 6th July, 1853 - Bruce.
2 Cf. the half yearly returns in Herapath, the Railway Times etc. and also the Directors' Committee Minute Book, 6th March, 1858, p.73.

3. In goods/livestock/coal it is the other way round, with the first half of the year generally yielding the better return. This follows naturally from the movement of the harvest during the winter and of livestock to the grazing grounds (from the midlands and Lincolnshire) in the spring. Coals of course gave their highest return during the worst months of the year.
4. In considering these annual increases the effects of depression and of the Crimean War have to be remembered. The pattern was:

1852	1853	1854	1855	1856	1857
Prosperity	Pause	Depression	Distress	Distress	Distress and commercial collapse.[1]

Thus, the pattern of East Anglian revenue increases was, until the latter part of 1857, contrary to the general economic trend. This indicates clearly the extent to which local agriculture had revived, the extent to which traffic had hitherto been undeveloped, and the tremendous impact of the Norfolk Estuary Cut (1853), the harbour tramway (1855) and the harbour improvements (1856/7).

B. The Norfolk Estuary Cut, 1853[2]

As has been previously mentioned work on the Estuary Cut had been brought to a complete standstill in the February of 1852 when the Eau Brink Commission had successfully, but foolishly, obtained an injunction against the construction methods of part excavation, part tidal scour, on the grounds that the outfall was not thereby being lowered. In addition to halting progress the court had also insisted on the construction of expensive dams to exclude the Ouse from the partly completed channel, and so had added considerably to the already serious financial difficulties of the Estuary Company.[3]

However, on the 9th May, 1853, a further act was obtained by the promoters specifically allowing the previous construction method to be used. In the June work was recommenced after a break of 16 months. On the 21st/22nd July the tide was allowed into the new channel for the first time; on the 25th November the old course of the Ouse between Lynn and the sea was finally

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1 Poor Law Report, 1909; Parliamentary Papers 1909/xxxviii.
2 See the sketch map below.
3 Whites Directory of Norfolk 1864, p.725.

closed, and the new channel was brought into full operation, although vessels had been using it for two months or more. The result was that the former dangers of the approaches to Lynn Harbour were totally swept away. Large vessels could now enter the harbour on any tide,[1] and Lynn was at last enabled to compete on an equal footing with Lowestoft, and with the advantage against Wisbech. There still remained, however, much work to be done on the harbour itself before the new works could be fully exploited,[2] and so far the railway itself was not in a position to benefit from the increased harbour trade that was to be expected.

C. The Harbour Tramways, 1855

As indicated in earlier sections, perhaps the greatest single defect of the East Anglian system was that the harbour branch terminated on the wrong side of the River Nar, so that there was no direct connection between the railway and the harbour quays. This, and the distance of the railhead from the warehouses involved expensive handling and cartage of goods so that often there was no advantage to be had in using the railway. The only immediate contact between the railway and the vessels was in the Nar itself, but this river was so low even at ordinary tides that vessels were frequently delayed there for three or four days, and coal boats discharged their cargoes into lighters on the Ouse rather than come into the Nar and transfer them to the railway.[3]

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1 Whites Directory of Norfolk 1864, p.725.

2 Cf. Bruce at the E.A.R. meeting of the 14th September, 1853, Railway Times, 19th September, 1853, pp.971-2.

3 Railway Times, 9th July, 1853, p.703; meeting of the 6th July, 1853.

Sketch-map of the southern end of Lynn Harbour



The defect had long been appreciated. As early as the May of 1848 the newly reformed board had proposed to Lynn Corporation that a tramway be built from the Harbour Branch ~~along~~ to King's Staith Quay, but the Corporation, concerned as ever for its own rights and those of the Nar Navigation, had hesitated to promise either co-operation or direct assistance[1]; the railway company, then in desperate financial straits, had been in no position to press the matter further. But by 1853 the improved revenue position and the prospects of the Norfolk Estuary Cut had given it new heart[2], and the result was a bill in that year which sought powers for a line over the Nar and along the quays. Thus it would be possible to bring vessels of "considerable size" alongside the trucks[3], and so afford such facilities for the

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1 Guild Hall Book, 20th May, 1848, p.22.
2 Railway Times, 9th July, 1853, p.703; Bruce on the 6th July.
3 Ibid.

landing and dispatch of ships that Lynn would be able to compete successfully with neighbouring ports and attract to itself the improved class of steam coastal vessels then coming into use (especially so to and from the north);[1] moreover, the town would be enabled to claim a share in the trade with numerous continental ports that was currently being developed by the use of steam vessels.[2] The railway company itself anticipated a general increase in its traffic, especially in lime, coal, timber and general merchandise;[3] it was also estimated that corn dealers would henceforth save themselves 2/- per quarter by using the railway.[4]

The act was obtained on the 15th August,1853 (16 & 17 Vic.c.cxciii).[5] It authorised the East Anglian to expend £18,000 in constructing a tramway from the Harbour Branch to and along King's Staith Quay with swing bridges over the Nar and the Mill Fleet (section 25); horse power was to be used, locomotives being prohibited (10); two years were given for purchase (8), and three for construction (11). The company was empowered to fix reasonable landing tolls (34), but any attempts to levy tolls on the Nar, or any instances of obstruction of that river for longer than was necessary for the passage of a train were to render it liable to a £10 fine plus any further damages there might be.

Construction was somewhat delayed by the inevitable haggling with those whose premises lay along the quay, but by the March of 1855 the two swing bridges were nearly complete, and an opening before the end of May was

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1 Railway Times, 9th July,1853, p.703; Bruce on the 6th July.
2 Ibid.,5th March,1853, pp.246-7; Bruce on the 26th February,1853.
3 Ibid.,9th July, 1853.
4 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 31st March,1855; Bruce on the 29th March.
5 For the important financial provisions of this act see below.

was expected[1]; by the September Robert Stephenson had granted a certificate of worthiness to the two[2], and the tramway itself had been extended as far as the "owners of the frontages" desired[3]. The work had not exceeded £14,000 in its cost to the company - it would seem from a remark passed by Bruce to the effect that sums had been received "from other quarters"[4] that some of the frontagers themselves had contributed to a work which was obviously going to be of enormous benefit to them. Indeed, the company's efforts were construed as positive evidence of its good faith and sincerity towards the town as a whole[5]. That was a gain in itself, but not so solid as those which were now to stem from the construction.

The impact of the tramway and the Estuary Cut are obvious from the figures given above, although the rise in the latter part of 1855 and during 1856 was in part due to the removal of certain circumstantial inhibitions that had somewhat retarded natural growth during 1854 and much of 1855. First there had been an exceptional frost in the early months of 1854 which had kept ships ice-bound in the harbour for five whole weeks[6], and then later in the year traffic had suffered as a large part of the barley crop had been attracted via Yarmouth for distilling purposes in Holland and Belgium, where, for a time, spirits had been fetching abnormally high prices[7]. In addition high coal prices had caused large accumulations of stocks, which in turn had reduced the free flow of that vital source of revenue[8].

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 31st March,1855; Directors' Report on the 29th March.
2 Ibid.,15th September,1855; Directors' Report of the 11th September. Subsequently one bridge had to be lifted, as it was too difficult for one man alone to work (Committee Book, 20th October,1856). 3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.,Bruce on the 29th March,1855. 5 Ibid.,31st March,1855 - editorial.
6 Hillen,op.cit. p.668.
7 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,31st March,1855; meeting 29th March, 1855 - Directors' Report.
8 Ibid.

With these factors removed, and with the completion of the Estuary Cut and the harbour tramways, and despite the general onset of depression in the economy at large, 1856 proved a "splendid year"[1] for the railway; £51,206 was received as against the £46,694 of the previous year, while 1857 was to yield £53,037, the highest in the company's history. In the opinion of the Eastern Counties Traffic Manager the increases were directly attributable to the Quay Tramway, particularly so in grain and oil cake (not so much coal), as hitherto cartage had represented an almost complete barrier. But the interesting factor is that on the basis of rather incomplete statistical evidence it would seem that, despite the Estuary Cut, Lynn Harbour's volume of trade was showing no appreciable increase so far; rather was it displaying a tendency to fall:[2]

	1852	1853	1854	1855	1856
Coals imported (tons)	187,514	201,236	172,589	158,536	163,370
Goods imported (tons)	79,075	76,886	66,712	61,973	70,204

The conclusions from this evidence must be that the effect of the tramways was to increase not the total volume of Lynn's trade, but only the share of it that the railway obtained for itself; neither the railway nor the Estuary Cut were so far attracting new trade to the town, and that in turn implied that the revenue position of the company was still highly vulnerable, in that it was still closely tied to the fortunes of Lynn, the future of which depended on a variety of circumstances outside the control of the East Anglian.

As will be seen in the final chapter they were also largely outside the control of Lynn itself, but for the moment the town was rallying under the double stimulus of the Estuary Cut and the tramways and preparing to do its

1 Railway Times, 13th September, 1856, pp.1087-8; meeting of the 9th September.
2 Hillen, op.cit. p.606.

part in securing the future. Everywhere in the town was an "improved feeling"[1], local trade was increasing and showing every sign of continuing to do so, and oil and other manufacturies were being established there[2] (e.g. J.Turner, an engineer and machinist in the March of 1855)[3]; also in 1855 had come the first electric telegraph, operated by the Electric Telegraph Company, from Wisbech.[4] But these agreeable features counted for little unless the spirit of improvement were extended to the harbour so that the potential gains offered by the Estuary Cut and the tramways could be confirmed and consolidated.[5]

D. Harbour Improvements, 1856-1857[6]

Early in 1855 the Lynn Corporation, in fulfilment of a long delayed promise to Bruce[7], stirred itself from its habitual lethargy to consider actively the quaying of the Boal[8], and so make possible the full exploitation of the railway's tramways.[9] With typical caution the Corporation first sought the opinion of counsel (Sir Fitzroy Kelly) as to the means of raising the money before determining on the 30th March,1855 to proceed with the work. To the September no start was actually made, but the East Anglian board was assured that it would be carried out as soon as possible.[10]

At last a start was made by H. & M.D.Grissell of London, working under the supervision of W.Plews of Lynn (who was later employed in the making of London Bridge)[11], and by the September of 1856 was well advanced. The new

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1 Railway Times,13th September,1856,pp.1087-8; Directors' Report on the 9th September,1856.
2 Ibid.
3 See advertisement in the Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,17th March, 1855.
4 Hillen,op.cit.,p.602.
5 Cf.Bruce on the 9th September,1856.
6 See sketch map on p.470.
7 Directors' Report, 29th March,1855.
8 Ibid.
9 Simply a matter of proportion;for a little extra expenditure on the tramways there would be a greatly increased amount of quayside space for them to serve.
10 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,15th September,1855;meeting of the 11th.
11 Ibid.,Thew,15th February,1890.

quay lay near both the warehouses and the tramway, and three powerful cranes had been purchased and installed on it[1] (two steam at £900 each and one ten ton hand crane at £390 - all from the Kerstall Forge Company of Leeds)[2]; the additional work of quaying the Marine Parade was also all but complete. But then began the inevitable haggling that was seemingly inseparable from the dealings of Lynn Corporation. Perhaps concerned at the costs already incurred[3] (£4,076 for the Boal and £2,901 for the Marine Parade)[4] the Corporation insisted that if the tramway be extended to the Boal the railway company, claimed to be the principal beneficiary, must repay the Corporation all its costs; if the offer were accepted, as well as a ground plan which the latter believed to be superior to that of the East Anglian's, then the Corporation would at once repair the Mill Fleet Quay[5], the decrepit condition of which was a major source of complaint on the part of the railway company. This petty blackmail succeeded, the company stood to gain too much to refuse, and on the 17th December,1855 the laying of tracks on the Boal commenced[6] under the guarantee that the East Anglian would meet all expenses in its own name[7] (as opposed to that of the Eastern Counties). Concurrently certain improvements and alterations were being made in the lay-out of the original tramways, including the addition of a line down the south side of the Mill Fleet[8], and an extension from that to the premises of W.Marsters - the work was conceived by him to be of such importance that he paid for it himself[9], and when he grew impatient at the slow progress in construction he finished it himself[10] -

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1 Railway Times,6th September,1856, p.1054.
2 Hillen,op.cit. p.784.
3 E.A.Committee Book,15th October,1856.
4 Hillen,op.cit. pp.590-1.
5 Committee Book,15th October,1856.
6 Ibid.,17th December,1856.
7 Ibid.,20th December,1856.
8 Ibid.,24th October,1856.
9 Committee Book,24th October,1856.
10 Ibid.,2nd March,1857.

while the Mayor, also at his own expense, extended the system directly into his mill.[1] And so rested this invaluable work, the only complaint being that it did not extend beyond the King's Staith Quay,[2] but this it was beyond the legal power of the East Anglian to do.[3]

E. Other efforts to develop traffic

In many other directions besides those noted above there were attempts by the tireless Bruce and Simpson to stimulate the revenue. Special agreements were made for the conveyance of block loads, for example the carriage of two million bricks into London during 1853 (it was hoped that this would develop into a regular source of revenue and that earth from the company's lands would be used for brick making,[4] but there is no record to suggest that either hope was fulfilled); similarly, in 1855, agreement was reached that the company should convey all the traffic to and from certain big mills at St.Ives.[5] Intelligent use was made of cheap fares within the rates' structure so that, for example there were cheap day returns into Lynn on market days, and such special concessions as the return journey into Lynn being allowed for the single fare during the period of the Mart.[6] During the summers enterprising use was made of cheap rate excursions to such places as London, Yarmouth and Lowestoft.[7] More imaginative still were the special arrangements by which the company was to work in conjunction with a steamship built by Smith for the Newcastle - Lynn run, but unfortunately, after two most promising voyages, the vessel concerned was chartered by the government for use in the Crimea,[8] and no more was heard of it. A more reliable source

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1 Committee Book, 18th February,1857.
2 Cf.ibid.,4th February,1857.
3 Ibid.,2nd March,1857.
4 Meeting,14th September,1853.
5 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,31st March,1855; Directors' Report of the 29th March,1855.
6 E.g. the notice of the 10th February,1855, ibid.
7 Ibid.,16th June,1855.
8 Ibid.,Directors' Report of the 29th March,1855.

of revenue was the increasingly profitable leasing of company lands to private business; the Committee Book abounds in such instances.

In two cases highly enterprising suggestions by Bruce and Simpson were blocked by the reluctance of the proprietors to take the slightest risk with their capital.[1] In the case of the promotion of the Lynn & Hunstanton Railway (this is dealt with at appropriate length in a later section), largely the idea of Simpson who wished to create out of nothing a holiday resort to the north of Lynn, and also to counter the Wells & Fakenham line, the delay was only temporary as the proposed line was in fact to be authorised in 1861, but in that of the proposals to capture a share in the North Sea fishing trade for Lynn (and therefore, of course, the railway) a great opportunity was lost. Efforts to divert fishing vessels into Lynn at the expense of Yarmouth were continuous, and achieved their greatest success, although only a temporary one, between 1852 and the autumn of 1853 when the amount of fish carried by the East Anglian increased ten-fold.[2] So exciting was the prospect that the company carried out a detailed survey to establish whether or not Lynn was in a position to compete in the fishing trade with other east coast ports.[3] The result was apparently favourable, for the board then, by 1855, got as far as receiving definite promises that steamers would be put on to bring fish to Lynn if the company would put up the capital.[4] This, however, was beyond the East Anglian's existing powers, and although Simpson pleaded with the proprietors to advance the necessary sums in their private capacities they flatly refused, and so, after 1855, no more was heard of the idea except in subsequent recriminations from the board.

1 Cf.Bruce,2nd September,1859; Railway Times,3rd September,1859,pp.992-3.
2 Ibid.,17th September,1853,pp.971-2; meeting,14th September,1853.
3 Ibid.
4 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,31st March,1855; Directors' Report at the meeting of the 29th March,1855.

Section 3: The Relationship with the Eastern Counties Railway to 1857

A. The Points at Issue

~~As~~ Good as the revenue increases were they could have been better if the Eastern Counties had faithfully observed clause 18 of the 1852 agreement to the effect that it would make "the utmost reasonable endeavours so as to manage, arrange and regulate the trains and tolls (so) that the traffic of the East Anglian shall be developed and increased to the utmost extent".[1] So ran the complaint of the East Anglian proprietors between 1853 and 1855. Whether or not it was justified depended entirely on subjective interpretation. In effect the East Anglian was implying that of all the interests of the Eastern Counties it itself should come first; the logical termination of its argument was that not only should the E.C.R. sacrifice the Norfolk Railway, the Newmarket Railway and the Eastern Union, but also its own best interests for the sake of the East Anglian and Lynn. As will now be shown, the case, raised by Bruce to the level of a moral issue,[2] was not quite so untenable as at first sight it may appear, but the main conclusion to be drawn from the study of the circumstances is that the sooner the amalgamation of the railways of East Anglia came about the better it would be for every interest concerned, including that of the general public. In what now follows the damage being done to the interests of Lynn is constantly to be borne in mind, for in this case what hurt the railway also hurt the town. As the editor of the Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald expressed it in 1855

> "For years...the port and town of Lynn has been sinking, under the destructive pressure of influences from without, from its once 'high estate' towards a position which we are almost afraid to characterize in plain language - suffice it to say to a most undesirably low level in the scale of commercial importance."

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1 Letter of Simpson to the shareholders, Railway Times, 5th January, 1856, pp8-9.
2 Ibid., Bruce; also Bruce on the 9th September, 1856, ibid., 13th September, 1856, pp.1087-8.

In this context the writer[1] implied many things by "pressure" (e.g. the influence of the Great Northern Railway on harbour trade), but he was at pains to show that the greatest of them was the tolls policy of the Eastern Counties Railway. From the railway's point of view Bruce saw the same thing as a policy of favouritism to the Norfolk and Eastern Union companies.[2]

At the root of the trouble lay two agreements - described by Simpson as "pernicious"[3] - made between the E.C.R. and two separate coal companies, that of Barrow, and that of E & A Priors. Both had originated during the period of conflict with the Great Northern Railway when every means possible was being used to divert potential traffic away from that company's line. The first of them dated from the May of 1850 when the railway company undertook to convey Barrow's coals from Peterborough to London, in his own wagons, at a preferential rate of ¾d. per ton mile, plus 4d. per ton terminal charges; a minimum volume of 300 tons per week was specified.[4] Then, in the December of 1850, came the agreement with the Priors by which their coals were to be carried inland from Lowestoft at ½d. per ton mile plus one eighth of a penny per mile for wagon hire;[5] it was also agreed that for the future no dealer should ever enjoy better terms than the Priors - if a more favourable contract were ever made with anyone else the rates paid by the Priors were to be reduced as necessary.[6] In practice, allowing for the 5% weight advantage in favour of the coal company, the amount actually paid by the Priors was "upwards of ½d." per ton mile[7] (the 1855 inquiry assessed the figure as 7/16d.

1 Op.cit.,editorial,6th October,1855.
2 Railway Times, 5th January,1856, pp.8-9. 3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p.3; Waddington's reply to the Committee of Inquiry.
5 Ibid., 13th September,1856, pp.1087-8; E.A. meeting of the 9th September.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., Priors' evidence before the 1855 Committee of Inquiry (E.C.R.)

per ton mile), plus terminal charges (2d per ton in London, and 3d elsewhere).[1] Meanwhile, in the March of 1852, Barrow had complained that in view of the shorter route to London afforded by the Great Northern (76 miles as compared with the 101 miles of the E.C.R.) he was losing trade.[2] Accordingly, in the December of 1852, he was offered and accepted the same terms as the Priors, who by then had formed themselves into the Norfolk & Eastern Coal Company and gained permission to use the name of the E.C.R. on their advertisements.[3]

The effects of these agreements on the coal revenue of the Eastern Counties were quite startling;[4] the income derived from Barrow alone rose 400% between 1852 and 1855.[5] According to Waddington, the coal traffic in 1846 had amounted to only 350 tons per week, but in 1854 it was 1,545 tons, the great bulk of which was carried in contractors' wagons.[6] In terms of revenue there had been an increase of over 400% between 1849 and 1854:[7]

1849	£17,564	1852	£32,023
1850	£21,249	1853	£43,712
1851	£22,483	1854	£80,581

Most of the 2,000 wagons involved in this traffic belonged to the contractors, so that in achieving these results the E.C.R. had been spared a capital expenditure of some £140,000.[8] Amongst these were 200 formerly used on the Blackwall Railway, but now rented out, very profitably, to the Priors, the rent paid for the 18 months between January,1854 and June,1855 amounting to £4,988. In addition, although these 200 had originally been very dilapidated and had had to be repaired by the E.C.R. the costs of such repairs had been met by the coal company.[9] So far so good, for revenue had risen despite the

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1 Railway Times,5th January,1856,p.3;Waddington's reply to the committee of inquiry. 2 Ibid.,13th September,1856,pp.1087-8; E.A. meeting of the 9th September,1856. 3 Ibid.,5th January,1856,p3; Waddington's reply.
4 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,3rd March,1855; E.C.R.meeting of the 27th February,1855 - Waddington. 5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.,29th December,1855; Waddington's reply.
7 Ibid.,3rd March,1855; Waddington at the E.C.R.meeting of the 27th February.
8 Railway Times,5th January,1856,p.3; also ibid, 29th December,1855.
9 Ibid.

reduced rates while proper charges had been made for terminal facilities, the use of sidings and the maintenance of plant.[1] As chairman of the Eastern Counties Waddington was fully entitled to make any contracts he liked provided that such led to an increased revenue. The weaknesses in his position, however, were the difficulty attending the proper assessment of the actual profit on the contracts - Waddington said that it was 70%,[2] but this was a gross over-estimate - and the corruption that was currently endemic in the affairs of the Eastern Counties. It was on these features that the East Anglian was eventually to fasten.

Before considering the position of the East Anglian and of Lynn in relation to the situation outlined above, brief reference should be made to certain other causes of dispute which, while not immediately connected with the main issues at stake, embittered the atmosphere between the East Anglian and the Eastern Counties, and which further contributed to the difficulties of Lynn. There was, for example, the fact that under the 1852 agreement between the Great Northern and the latter the junction at Huntingdon was totally disused, with the consequence that the line from St.Ives to it had been reduced virtually to the status of a siding and nothing more.[3] A constant source of friction was the inadequate number of trucks which the Eastern Counties supplied to Lynn; often these were so far below requirement that trade was driven to the water.[4] A third matter existed as yet (1855) only on paper, and concerned the Wells & Fakenham Railway, which in fact did not open its line until the 1st December,1857. During 1855 its promoters had made an agreement with the Norfolk Railway which can be described by no

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1 Railway Times,5th January,1856,p.3; Waddington's reply.
2 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,3rd March,1855; Waddington at the E.C.R. meeting of the 27th February,1855.
3 Railway Times,11th August,1860,pp.892-6; meeting of the 9th August - Chesshire.
4 Committee Book,15th October,1856.

other word than that of "extraordinary",[1] and explained in no other way than by saying that the Norfolk Railway would do anything to keep the new traffic from the Dereham - Lynn line of the East Anglian. Under it the Wells & Fakenham wasto be guaranteed $\frac{3}{4}$ of the gross receipts on traffic it originated and passed on to the Norfolk system.[2] Thus, for traffic from Wells to Norwich the Wells & Fakenham would receive 1/5d. per ton, the Norfolk Railway 6d. (plus the usual terminal charges),[3] although the distances covered on the lines of the two companies were $8\frac{1}{4}$ miles and $33\frac{3}{4}$ miles respectively. The same principle was to apply in respect of traffic between Wells and Brandon. The result would be a tremendous stimulus to the small harbour of Wells to the further detriment of that at Lynn for merchants trading through the latter would be quite unable to compete with the lower prices made possible for those who used the harbour at Wells.[4] The Eastern Counties was not a party to this arrangement, but in view of the relationship it had with the Norfolk Railway under the act of 1854 it was obvious to all that it could not have raised any objections. It followed that the East Anglian must raise the matter with the Eastern Counties and ensure that the agreement was ended before it ever had a chance to come into operation.

The self-interested motives that lay behind the opposition of the East Anglian and of Lynn to the coal contracts are easily understood, and in some respects worthy of sympathy. The cheap facilities for the conveyance of coals from Lowestoft diverted traffic away from Lynn and helped to swell the revenues of the Norfolk Railway and the Eastern Union at the expense of that

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,15th September,1855; Bruce at the meeting of the 11th September,1855.
2 Railway Times,13th September,1856,pp.1087-8; meeting of the 8th September - Bruce.
3 Ibid.,5th January,1856,pp.8-9; Simpson.
4 Ibid.,13th September,1856,pp.1087-8; Bruce on the 9th September.

of the East Anglian; those from Peterborough, where the E.C.R. had been obliged to lay extra sidings,[1] similarly, or so it was claimed, took trade away from the harbour and the railway. The concept is best expressed by reference to actual rates, Lynn traffic in coals being charged at nearly the maximum permitted of 1d. per ton mile plus terminal charges.

Comparative Coal Rates (per ton) as obtaining in 1855[2]

To	From Peterborough		From Lynn	
	Miles	Rate	Miles	Rate
Cambridge	45	2/10	42	4/6
Audley End	59	3/4	57	5/11
Newport	61	3/5	59	6/2
Bishops Stortford	63	3/11	66	6/8
London	101	3/6	100	6/8 (special rate).
Dereham	83	3/6	27	3/2
Fakenham	97	3/6	41	3/10

Also consider: Lynn to Dereham (after some reduction had been made), 27 miles, 2/10, but Dereham to Lowestoft, 45 miles, also 2/10. Meanwhile Lynn to Fakenham 3/10, but from Lowestoft 3/6 per ton.

Special Note:[3] The rate quoted from Peterborough to Bishops Stortford applied only when contractors' wagons were used; if use were made of E.C.R. stock the charge was 5/4.

There was nothing very subtle about the complaints of Lynn itself. The situation was seen in terms of the 20,000 tons of coal per annum sent inland from Peterborough that could be handled in Lynn Harbour, Some 1,200 vessels would be involved and lead to an expenditure of £50,000 or so in the town[4] - it was estimated that one of the larger vessels, 200 tons, would leave £40 to £50 in a port.[5] A direct and important complaint was that contract coal was leading to reduced prices at which the Lynn merchants could no longer compete; thus Shaw was no longer able to send the 5-10,000 tons per annum

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 15th September, 1855; E.A. meeting of the 11th September, 1855.

2 Derived principally from a Lynn Town Meeting of the 1st October, 1855 called to consider the evidence that should be sent to the E.C.R.'s committee of inquiry - ibid., 8th October, 1855.

3 Railway Times, 5th January, 1856, pp. 8-9; Simpson.

4 Lynn Town Meeting of the 1st October, 1855; Shaw (coal merchant).

5 Ibid., 13th October, 1855; Shaw at the second Lynn Town Meeting-8th October.

that he had been accustomed to despatch to the Bury and Newmarket districts.[1] In London the coal conveyed under contract was 20% cheaper than its competitors.[2]

The principal demand of the East Anglian itself was for equal milage rates. This was constantly represented to the Eastern Counties board by Bruce and Simpson, with the additional backing of Broadbent (a large holder in both the E.A.R. and the E.C.R., who sat on the latter's board in his own right and not as a representative of the former as did the other two), but three voices amongst fifteen[3] (East Anglian traffic as such was managed by a joint committee of three directors from each board)[4], especially when under the chairmanship of Waddington whose salaried position (£2,000 per annum) was found to act most prejudicially against the interests of individuals on the board.[5] On grounds of principle the East Anglian board objected to what it called the "obnoxious doctrine" of higher tolls in non-competitive areas,[6] and pleaded that the preference shown to Lowestoft and Yarmouth was a sin against both common sense and the 'Rule of Three'.[7] As indicated previously Bruce was prepared to raise the whole problem to the level of a moral issue, but thereby left himself wide open to Waddington's charge that this was simply naked self-interest clothed in high-sounding principles, for the East Anglian simply wanted more traffic for the sake of the increased total of tolls that the E.C.R. would then have to pay.[8]

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 13th October, 1855; Shaw at the second Lynn Town Meeting of the 8th October, 1855.
2 Railway Times, 5th January, 1856, p.3; Waddington's reply; the report of the committee (ibid., 19th January, 1856, p.56) had made much of the apparently unfair competition that was developing in the coal trade.
3 Ibid., pp.8-9. Only 8 of the 15 represented regular E.C.R. interests, for besides the two E.A. members there were five from the Northern & Eastern.
4 Herapath, 3rd April, 1852, pp.374-6; meeting of the 28th February, 1852.
5 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 1st December, 1855; report of the committee of inquiry.
6 Railway Times, 15th March, 1856, p.353; meeting of the 11th March, 1856.

Continued at the foot of p.485

It will by now have become obvious that the key to the whole situation lay in the 1854 act, under which, while preparing for amalgamation, the Eastern Counties had assumed responsibilities towards the Norfolk Railway and the Eastern Union, in addition to those which it had had since 1852 towards the East Anglian. Why should Lowestoft be preferred to Lynn as the chief port of the E.C.R. system? Firstly it was because since before 1852 and the agreement with the E.A.R. the Eastern Counties had been expending large sums of its capital in the development of the harbour there;[1] not only was this expenditure to be safeguarded (and Lowestoft, by virtue of its position, was much more susceptible to natural competition than was Lynn), but use was to be had there of facilities far more modern than those of Lynn. Secondly, and even more important, under the terms of the 1852 and 1854 agreements respectively the Eastern Counties "divided" revenue profits with the East Anglian (where tolls were paid on the traffic passed), but "shared" them with the Norfolk and the Eastern Union (in the proportion of 5:1:1).[2] Why, the obvious reasons apart, should the East Anglian, as opposed to Lynn, object so strongly? Again the reason lay with the 1854 agreement. As East Anglian traffic increased so would the value of its stock, but conversely that of the Eastern Counties would depreciate, and so it would be the holders of the former who reaped the benefit in the compulsory fusion of 1862. By the same token Waddington could justly argue that the constant East Anglian demands

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1 Railway Times,12th January,1856,p.37; Bruce.
2 Ibid.,28th July,1860, p.845 - editorial. On one occasion (date untraced) Waddington had used the words "divide" and "share"; the editorial (concerned with the latter's attempt to gain control of the company - see below) called it "fantastic cheek", but in fact it was an accurate description of the situation.

(Continued from the foot of p.484)
7 Ibid. The 'Rule of Three' refers to a method of finding a number that bears the same ratio to one given as exists between two others given (i.e. in this case the reference is to the E.C.R., N.R., E.U.R. and E.A.R.).
8 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,29th December,1855; Waddington.

for equal milage rates constituted an unfriendly act towards the Norfolk Railway.[1] Any attempt to turn the argument against Waddington by saying that, with similar motives, he was trying to run down the East Anglian stock could be disposed of by simple reference to the tremendous increase evidenced in East Anglian revenue since 1852.

Thus, Bruce and Simpson were on very doubtful ground in opposing the preferential rates as such. Their self-interest was too obvious; their failure to appreciate the need for Lynn Harbour to adapt itself to new conditions too complete, for even if they did swing the balance from Lowestoft back in favour of Lynn, how long could they hope to maintain the old coal staple of the harbour against the competition of the Great Northern? In fact it was remarkable that the coal traffic was holding up as well as it was. On more particular grounds they failed to appreciate that coal rates must be governed by those of coastal shipping, and that Lynn was the furthest of the East Anglian ports from London. Equally they failed to realise that the preferential rates offered from Peterborough were the only alternative to losing a large proportion of the coal traffic to the Great Northern; most certainly Lynn Harbour could be ruled out as a possible alternative.

But, as it happened, the East Anglian did not have to rely entirely on unproductive frontal attack, for closely connected with the foregoing issues, but also a subject for concern in its own right, was the whole question of E.C.R. working expenses. It will be recalled that under the 1852 agreement East Anglian expenses were to be calculated as being those of the Eastern Counties system as a whole (subject to a maximum of 50%), so establishing a

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1 Railway Times, 5th January, 1856, p.3; Waddington's reply to the committee of inquiry.

common interest in the question between the two companies. Thus, a 10% reduction was estimated as being worth up to £5,000 to the East Anglian proprietors, and as nearly £100,000 to those of the E.C.R.[1] Besides the question of the immediate return the East Anglian proprietors also had to bear in mind that the level of working expenses would be reflected in the assessment of their stock in relation to the value of that of other companies involved that would have to precede the amalgamation of 1862.

E.C.R. working expenses in 1852 had been 43%, with eventual reduction to as little as 40% being anticipated.[2] During 1853 the figure actually fell to £41/8/5d%,[3] but for the second half of the following year had risen to £43/12/3d% so that the net profit gain to the East Anglian, despite its greatly increased traffic, was only £711/17s.[4] Then came a most disturbing rise to £47/15/2d% for the first half of 1855.[5] This formed the subject of most "anxious attention"[6] for although the Crimean War had caused prices to soar (oil and tallow between 50% and 60%)[7] the rise had been only short-lived, and costs had been coming down as early as the March of that year.[8] It soon became obvious that little decrease in working expenses was to be anticipated for the second half of the year, and suspicions of bad, or even fraudulent, management by the E.C.R. began to mount. To the East Anglian the rise of 6% in only two years was inexplicable,[9] for since the 43% recorded for the first half of 1853 goods rates had gone up 10% and everywhere traffic was increasing in volume;[10] the Eastern Counties itself affirmed that train costs per mile over

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1 Railway Times, 5th January, 1856, pp.8-9; Simpson. 2 Ibid., 3rd September, 1859, pp.992-3; meeting of the 2nd September, 1859 - Bruce.
3 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 15th September, 1855; meeting, 11th September, 1855 - Bruce. 4 Ibid., 31st March, 1855; meeting of the 29th March.
5 Ibid., 15th September, 1855; meeting of the 11th September. The increase involved a loss of £1,480 to the E.A.R., £37,000 to the E.C.R.
6 Railway Times, 15th September, 1855; meeting of the 11th September, 1855.
7 Ibid., 15th March, 1856; meeting of the 11th March, 1856.
8 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 31st March, 1855; meeting, 29th March, '55.
9 Ibid., meeting of the 11th September, 1855. 10 Ibid.

the period had risen no more than from 29d. plus a fraction to 29½d., but as Bruce rightly complained such a small increase should not have made such a great difference to the overall percentage of working expenses.[1] Other factors apart, Bruce and the board were confident that the coal contracts must be being run at a ruinous loss, despite the assurances of Gooch, the E.C.R. locomotive superintendant, that the coal traffic was being worked at 30% of the receipts.[2]

B. The Explosion

The signal for open rebellion on the part of the East Anglian came in the summer of 1855. On the 14th June Simpson, at an E.C.R. board meeting, moved the resolution "that an equal milage rate for goods and cattle be charged from Lowestoft, Yarmouth and Lynn to all parts of the lines of the three companies"[3] (i.e. the E.C.R., the E.A.R., and the Norfolk); a new scheme of rates was also proposed, and it was anticipated that this would gain the East Anglian some £3-400 per annum.[4] These proposals were carried by three votes to two, Bruce, Simpson and Broadbent against Waddington and Fane. But thereupon Waddington flatly refused to implement the decision, demanding to know whether the E.C.R. was to be run by the East Anglian or in its own best interests.[5] Apparently, for the moment, it was to be the former, for although Waddington could quite correctly argue that "what those East Anglian shareholders desired was to increase their receipts at the expense of yours"[6] (i.e. the Eastern Counties), the rupture on the board coincided

1 Bruce at the meeting of the 11th September, 1855; Waddington subsequently claimed that these figures had been given to the E.A.R. in error.
2 Ibid.
3 Railway Times, 5th January, 1856, pp. 8-9; Simpson.
4 Ibid.
5 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 29th December, 1855; Waddington's reply.
6 Ibid.

with a rising wave of suspicion, directed against Waddington, within the Eastern Counties itself. At the E.C.R. meeting of the 8th September,1855 this was skilfully exploited by the East Anglian element (Waddington went further by saying that this group "opened it all up").[1] The result was such an outburst of fury that a committee of inquiry was appointed, and many of the directors withdrew, leaving only the rump, including of course Bruce, Simpson and Broadbent, to assist it in its inquiries. Then, on the 7th December,1855, amidst a "perfect scene of uproar and confusion",[2] worse even than at the most excited anti-Hudson meetings,[3] Bruce was appointed vice-chairman with the responsibility of approving all directions from Waddington before such could be implemented.[4] If Waddington failed to desist from meddling each station on the line was to be instructed to ignore him;[5] to his credit Waddington, although his time in the chair had not expired, acquiesced in the arrangement.

What an opportunity this was for the East Anglian cause, its own men at the head of the Eastern Counties and the additional facility of a committee of inquiry through which to vent its grievances. Unfortunately, however, Bruce and his colleagues marred their good records by allowing much that was purely spiteful in nature to creep into their evidence to the committee. Bruce was not above reminding it and anyone else who would listen that in 1849 Waddington (then the vice-chairman) had been expelled with Hudson for chronic mismanagement and allowing faulty and fraudulent bookkeeping,[6] while

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald; editorial of the 15th December,1855.
2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.
4 Railway Times,12th January,1856, p.36; Waddington.
5 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,22nd December,1855 - extract from Herapath's Journal.
6 Railway Times,12th January,1856,p.37.

the fruit of Broadbent's researches was that Gooch, the locomotive superintendant of the E.C.R., was a partner in the Priors coal company;[1] the "vindictive imputation"[2] that lay behind this was too obvious to be missed, but Broadbent had over-stepped the mark - Waddington had not been chairman at the time of either Gooch's appointment (May,1850) or the making of the initial Priors' contract (December,1850). By acting in this way, and by pushing the East Anglian view too hard the directors and supporters of that company provided Waddington with the opportunity of making a really effective defence, even though he had less than two weeks in which to prepare it.[3] So good was it that the 'Times' for one found itself unable to pronounce a judgement.[4] As it commented:[5]

> "We should have an Augean stable to clean if we undertook to lay bare the secret springs of railway management, the petty motives, the party interests, the individual ends that influence directors."

But despite these criticisms much eventual good did come out of the findings of the committee. As for Waddington himself it would seem that he had been badly served, although his ignorance of the fraud and corruption under him cannot excuse him from bearing the ultimate responsibility. Before he had become chairman Gooch had been employed in the locomotive department on a five year contract - from the 31st May,1850 - which stipulated that he was to receive no salary until a reduction in expenditure of £10,000 per annum had been effected in his department. Then he was to receive £600 a year, plus 5% of everything he had saved over £10,000.[6] In

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 29th December,1855; Waddington's defence.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., quoting from the 'Times'.
5 Ibid., from the 'Times'.
6 Ibid., Waddington's defence.

the terms of this peculiar arrangement lay many seeds of evil, for it was clearly in Gooch's interest to represent enormous savings where in fact none had been made - hence his assurances that the coal traffic was worked at 30% of the receipts, and his claims that since 1851 train expenses had been reduced from 46.51d. per mile to 27.87d., and locomotive costs from 17.84d. to 9.66d. per mile;[1] in all Gooch had submitted claims for £20,000 over and above his salary during the period of his office.[2] Meanwhile, in the stores' department, such frauds were being perpetrated in the books (e.g. goods bought shown at 10% to 40% over price, new goods sold by the department, but entered in the books as old ones etc.)[3] that during 1855 Waddington's own investigations, carried further by the committee, resulted in several E.C.R. servants finding themselves in the dock of the Old Bailey and sentenced to transportation.[4] As regards track maintenance Waddington had been repeatedly assured (up to the 21st August,1854) by Ashcroft, the engineer, that all was in good order, but when Bruff replaced the latter his first report, that of February,1855, revealed a sorry state of repair - a verdict which Hawkshaw, called in to give a second opinion, confirmed;[5] it was now estimated that £150,000 would be needed on outstanding repairs and replacements.[6] As if Ashcroft's neglect were not enough on its own, as the committee now found, the permanent way expenses that had in fact been incurred had been shown in the books at only 25% of the actual cost, so rendering the accounts farcical and the accurate calculation of profit and loss impossible.[7] The balance of the permanent way expenses had in fact been coming from a 'Depreciation Fund'

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,29th December,1855; Waddington's defence. 2 Ibid.,1st December,1855; report of the committee of inquiry
3 Ibid. Waddington claimed his share of the credit for the discovery on the 29th. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid.,29th December,1855; Waddington.
6 Ibid. Report of the committee.
7 Railway Times,13th September,1856,pp.1087-8; meeting of the 9th September - Bruce.

in order that a dividend could be provided, a sad departure from the principle that such should derive only from current profits.[1] It was ironical that the East Anglian should discover that the working expenses over which it had engendered so much bitterness should in fact have been higher all the time. Now they would have to be. During the years in which the track had been neglected the average expenditure, from revenue and the depreciation fund together, had averaged £45 per mile; after Bruff's report this had risen to £97 (still below other lines) in the latter half of 1855[2] - this was, of course, the principal reason why the fall in prices during that year had not been reflected in the working expenses charged to the East Anglian.

Against this background of discovery it was at last possible to calculate the real level of Eastern Counties working expenses. It was found that the reports of a 50% increase in train milage and with it vastly improved business since 1851[3] were in fact grossly misleading. During the second half of 1855 the net profit on each first class passenger was only 0.09d per journey, that on each second class fare only 0.5d. In the first half of 1856, in spite of the increased care in economy, the 13,000 trains run by the E.C.R. during the six months averaged a profit of only 5½d. each; many ran at a loss, and even more at practically 100% cost.[4] Heavy track costs were partly to blame (the committee's estimate of £150,000 proved grossly inadequate - by the September of 1856 £175,000 was being spent on one small part of the system alone, and much more was to be anticipated),[5] but there were also many operating practices at fault. For example, much of the

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1 Committee Book, 15th October, 1856; Simpson.
2 Railway Times, 15th March, 1856, p.353; Directors' Report of the 11th March.
3 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 15th September, 1855; meeting of the 11th September.
4 Railway Times, 13th September, 1856, pp.1087-8; meeting of the 9th September - Bruce.
5 Ibid.

increased milage was totally unprofitable and run by combinations of engine plus carriage plus brake which cost little less than a full train to operate[1]; unnecessary milage also resulted from the E.C.R. practice of imposing a 25 truck limit on goods' trains (compare 30 on other lines).[2] Another factor that added to working expenses was that of accident compensation; this tended to be high[3] as a result of the E.C.R.'s unenviable record for mishaps.

Following the report of the committee of inquiry came a period of no little anxiety for the East Anglian as it waited to see how the Eastern Counties would react, especially as it was now seen that there were tremendous possibilities if what the E.A.R. called "fair play" was given in rates and tolls.[4] But at first matters did not promise too well. Waddington's skilful defence and a natural resentment amongst the E.C.R. proprietors that their affairs were virtually being run by the East Anglian group led to Bruce being voted out of the vice-chairman's seat on the 8th March,1856, although at the same time 1,800 of the proprietors asked him to stay on the board.[5] As Bruce stepped down he did manage to have the last word however, claiming that he withdrew in protest against the payment of dividends from capital[6] (that was of course the net effect of the Depreciation Fund). Meanwhile Waddington continued in office with his policies largely unchanged. But then the delayed consequences of the report of the committee of inquiry took effect, for in the summer of 1856 Waddington was at last quietly voted out, and a new board was constituted. Now, the East Anglian directors considered,

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1 Railway Times,13th September,1856,pp.1087-8; meeting of the 9th September - Bruce.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.,15th March,1856,p.353; Directors' Report of the 11th March,1856.
4 Ibid.,13th September,1856,pp.1087-8;meeting of the 9th September,1856.
5 Ibid.,15th March,1856,p.353; E.A.R. meeting of the 11th March - Bruce.
6 Ibid.,meeting of the 9th September,1856 - Bruce.

was the time to strike; feeling in the company ran high, some talking of leaving that "disreputable company" (the E.C.R.) and going to the Great Northern, although others were in favour of complete amalgamation before 1862 to end constantly injurious contests.[1] So far Bruce and Simpson had opposed suggestions that the whole relationship between the two companies should be brought before the Court of Equity,[2] firstly because of the expense,[3] secondly because the 1852 agreement offered many advantages if the preferential contracts were once ended,[4] and thirdly because Bruce claimed to have a moral majority for his policy amongst the E.C.R. proprietors, arguing that many of the largest holders were behind him, so displaying that "spirit of Englishmen" which would make them adhere to the high principles on which commercial credit was founded.[5] It therefore seemed that a little bluff would not be out of place.

Thus it was that on the 30th September,1856 the new Eastern Counties board found itself served (by Messrs. Scott & Coy. for the East Anglian) with notice to the effect that the E.C.R. had "systematically violated" 13 sections of the 1852 agreement. The preferential rates and tolls, the carrying of permanent way expenses to the Depreciation Fund (it was insisted that all the expenses of a half year must be charged to the revenue of that half year), the lack of trucks and the use of the East Anglian seal without the concurrence of that company were the principal complaints cited, with, for good measure, the additional one that the E.C.R. had failed to maintain bridges and paintwork (all of which now needed attention).[6] It was hoped that compliance would be accorded without the need for legal action.[7]

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1 Railway Times,15th March,1856; meeting of the 9th September,1856 - Bruce.
2 Ibid.,meeting of the 11th March,1856.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.,meeting of the 9th September,1856.
5 Ibid.,meeting of the 11th March,1856.
6 Committee Book,15th October,1856.
7 Ibid.,Simpson.

It is hard to say whether or not this ponderous bluff was really necessary, for already, in the same September, the new E.C.R. board had increased the coal rates from Lowestoft.[1] Certainly, however, from now on it did its utmost to maintain cordial relations with the East Anglian, even if, on occasion, referring it to "the four corners of the agreement".[2] On the 1st May, 1857 the new chairman, Mr. Love, instituted a totally new structure of equal and remunerative coal rates for the whole system including the East Anglian,[3] and the E.C.R. began to send as many trucks as it could to meet the requirements of Lynn[4] (subsequent deficiencies were the result of simple shortage rather than of any awkwardness).[5] A fair apportionment of receipts was assured to the East Anglian,[6] and additional services were introduced as and when that company required, although some of these resulted in loss and subsequently had to be withdrawn.[7] Working expenses remained high, as they were bound to be in view of the heavy arrears of maintenance work, but the E.C.R. did everything it could in the way of economic management to reduce them. By the March of 1857 preferential rates had been raised to a clearly remunerative level - e.g. £10 where £6 had been charged before - so that the coal traffic would now yield 60% on the receipts rather than 34%. In the July of 1857 preference rates were ended altogether,[8] and for the second half of that year working expenses, now accurately computed, were down to £45/13/8d%.[9] For the latter half of 1858 they were £45/17/6d%,[10] for the first half of 1859 £47/13s%; this latter was a frustrating result for had it not been for the £12,946 that had had to be paid in compensation after the

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1 Railway Times, 13th September, 1856; meeting of the 9th September.
2 Ibid., 11th August, 1860, pp. 892-7; meeting of the 9th August, 1860. 3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 5th September, 1857, p. 1274; meeting of the 4th September, 1857.
5 See section 5 below. 6 See Appendix Q.
7 Railway Times, 11th August, 1860, pp. 892-7; meeting of the 9th August; see also Appendix R. 8 Herapath, 14th March, 1857, pp. 396-7; meeting of the 11th March.
9 Railway Times, 13th March, 1858; meeting of the 12th March.
10 Ibid., 12th March, 1859.

Leabridge accident the expenses for the period would have been no more than £45/14s%.[1] But as it was something always occurred to frustrate hopes of a major fall, and, of course, at this time the E.C.R. was just about 20 years old so that the need for heavy expenditure on the replacement of worn-out plant had to be accepted;[2] so it was that the proportion deducted in the first six months of 1860 was £48/1/10d% (£3,300 had been lost in robberies, and a number of wooden structures were having to be replaced by iron),[3] and then £49/11/11d% for the second half of the year;[4] to July,1861 the £49/18s% was all but the maximum level as far as the East Anglian was concerned.[5]

Section 4: Stability in Finance (1852-1862)

While the stirring events described in the previous section had rather filled the stage, the quiet and unspectacular work of putting the company on a sound financial basis had continued, and successfully so, on the basis described at length in chapter 7. As early as the February of 1852 a much stronger position could be announced.[6] On the 1st January of that year £340,000 had been owing, and much of it was pressing, but Bruce's diligent efforts (helped by the fact of the agreement with the E.C.R. and the removal of the Wisbech blockage, but hampered by the power of the Norfolk Railway to end the 1852 lease) had over two months reduced the total debt to £285,000,[7] and except for about £6,000 due on the 30th June,1853 and £7,000 in 1854 had

1 Railway Times,3rd September,1859,pp.992-3; meeting of the 2nd September.
2 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,16th March,1861; meeting of the 8th March,1861. 3 Railway Times,15th September,1860,p.1052.
4 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,9th March,1861; meeting of the 8th March,1861.
5 Ibid.,7th September,1861; Directors' Report of the 6th September,1861.
6 All the details of the position in February,1852 given on this page are derived from Herapath,3rd April,1852,pp.374-6;meeting of the 28th February.
7 By the August of 1852 about £11,000 of this, in bonds, had been negotiated at 4%; Herapath,9th October,1852,pp.1120-1; meeting of the 31st August,1852.

managed to postpone the repayment of debentures until 1855, the last bond agreement to that effect being made on the 28th February, 1852. In achieving this no more than £19,000 of the new 5% preference stock (formerly the 7% of 1849) had been issued, while of the 12,000 shares originally issued at 7% about half had been surrendered to the company for conversion to 5%, the holders thereby gaining the consolidation of five shares on each of which £2 had been paid into one share of £10, deemed to be fully called. There were strong grounds for believing that the remainder of the issue would soon be surrendered for such conversion and consolidation. All arrears had been collected, and as the consolidated shares were fully paid there was every reason to believe that a premium would soon be attached to them in the open market.

Before stability could be finally achieved, however, a solution had to be found to the problem of the arrears of interest payments on the company's preference shares - on each £5 share 28/- was now due, on each £3/10s share 16/6.[1] Payment in cash was obviously still out of the question, and at first it was decided that, to avoid further pressure on ordinary shares, 4% bonds should be issued in lieu of unpaid interest (Parliament had permitted this in the case of the Caledonian Railway),[2] but the rapidly improving revenue position and a very natural reluctance to avoid the assumption of any further preference charges (there must have been pressure here from the holders of the existing preference shares, as interest on bonds always had precedence over their claims)[3] led eventually to an entirely different solution, namely an

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1 Herapath, 3rd April, 1852, pp. 374-6; meeting of the 28th February, 1852.
2 Ibid.
3 There is no contradiction here. Revenue was improving but not sufficiently so for holders of preference shares to be indifferent to the further issue of bonds. The point that holders of the guaranteed shares must be fully protected had been strongly urged on the 28th February, 1852.

application for an act to permit the capitalization of the arrears by means of a fresh creation of ordinary shares.[1] Authorisation to do this was to be sought in the same bill as that for the construction of the harbour tramways. Meanwhile warrants for the payment of interest arrears to the 31st January, 1852 had been issued in respect of the £10 converted shares in order to assimilate them to shares of the same creation (1849) issued to creditors (at 5%) and bearing interest from that date.[2] At the same time, February, 1853, it was resolved that the existing balance in hand (i.e. £5,167/0/6d left for the preference holders after payment of interest to the bondholders in respect of the half year's revenue to the 31st December,1852) should be applied to interest due on the new 1849 stock to the 31st January,1853.[3] Thus, stage by stage, the troubles of the past were being resolved while at the same time a relatively firm foundation for confidence in the future was being laid.

The 1853 act (16 & 17 Vic.c.cxciii, the 15th August) authorised the East Anglian to raise £269,206/10s. in ordinary shares (section 40)[4] in order to capitalize interest arrears on the preference shares to the 31st December, 1853, and to finance new works (i.e. £18,000 for the harbour tramways also sanctioned in this act). The order of priority of claims on profits (as from the 31st December,1853) was finally settled as:

1. Mortgages and bonds.
2. Interest on calls paid in anticipation.

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1 Railway Times,5th March,1853, pp.246-7; meeting of the 26th February,1853.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 The final structure of the E.A. finances is given in tabular form in Appendix S.

3. 'A' Stock: 32,237 £10 shares at 5%, 5,315 £10 shares at 7% (i.e. the 1849 creation part converted); in all £375,520 (nominal).[1]
4. 'B' Stock: £120,000 at 6% (i.e. the 1846/7 creation).
5. 'C' Stock: £70,873/10s. at 7% (i.e. the 1848 creation).
6. Ordinary stock, now standing at £1,033,606/10s.

Other sections allowed for the further diminishing of interest rates on the preference shares if 80% of the holders agreed (this was never implemented), and for alternative methods for the distribution of surplus profits after all guarantees had been met.

The new shares were issued at a nominal 75% discount, in that about £40 was given in lieu of £10 interest arrears on the preference shares.[2] The effect was to place East Anglian finances in as sound a position as those of any company in the country, for now all debts were provided for, and the amount borrowed was relatively small in proportion to the extent of the system.[3] The most important single result was that in the January of 1855, although because of the Crimean War the money market was difficult, and though many did not like the security offered, all but a few of the £250,000 in bonds that fell due were renewed out of gratitude for the manner in which bankruptcy had been avoided.[4]

The remainder of the East Anglian's financial history is purely a matter of detail, and as such as been relegated to the appendices.[5] It is sufficient to mention only certain major features at this point. The first is that in every half year from 1854 on the company was enabled to pay the interest on the bonds and 'A' Stock in full; 'B' Stock also received full payment of

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1 In actual cash this stock represented £96,420, of which, by 1862, all but £9,780 had been converted to 5%.
2 Railway Times, 17th September, 1853, pp. 971-2; meeting of the 14th September.
3 Ibid., 9th July, 1853, p. 703; meeting of the 6th.
4 Ibid., 11th August, 1860; meeting of the 9th August - Bruce.
5 See Appendix T.

6% except in the first half of 1855 when the rate was only £5/15s% per annum. In that half year the holders of the 'C' Stock of course received nothing; their return fluctuated considerably between the rate of £2/10s% per annum in the first half of 1856 to full payment on two occasions, namely the first half year periods of 1857 and 1862. The holders of ordinary shares received nothing, although in the first half of 1857 (for which the revenue reached its record height at £27,131) it was possible to set aside £632 to start a fund from which it was hoped an ordinary dividend would eventually be paid. The second main feature is that the East Anglian board managed to keep the bond debt under control, and even improve on the situation of 1853, for by 1862 it had been reduced to about £279,000, of which a sum just under £200,000 was bearing an interest rate of only 4½%. On the Stock Exchange 'A' and 'B' Stocks naturally held to a reasonable premium, quotations on 'C' fluctuating considerably. For the vast bulk of the period, ordinary shares, consolidated into £100 units, were quoted at between 10 and 20, a fair reflection of their continuingly miserable prospects. In short the company had achieved stability without affluence, a condition fairly reflected in that at the amalgamation (see section 7 below) the holders of ordinary shares were guaranteed 1%.

Section 5: The Approach to Amalgamation (1857-1861)

The sole concern of proprietors and board alike during these four years was to ensure that the line was so developed as to bring entirely satisfactory terms in the amalgamation of 1862. The principal theme in this section is therefore that of revenue, although the possibility of new lines in the area provides an important subsidiary interest. Almost inevitably these were stormy years for, as was so often the case, the proprietors persisted in demanding the impossible of the board.

A. The Manchester Revolt: 1859

The first half of 1857 had produced the record revenue return of £27,131, and so crowned the progression in which receipts had risen steadily each half year since 1852. The company radiated confidence. At the March meeting of 1857 an increase of 10-12% on the traffic of the corresponding months of the previous year was reported; daily, the quay lines were proving themselves to be a really sound investment, and enabling new sources of traffic to be developed. The confidence of Lynn merchants was growing, for now the town was developing new markets, and, overall, serving a larger area than four years before; its manufactures were increasing in number, this with the incidental result that the East Anglian was being enabled to lease certain of its surplus lands on most favourable terms.[1] Moreover, the new E.C.R. board was sending more rolling stock to Lynn, and spending a large sum on the improvement of the coal facilities there.[2] There was every reason to believe that these happy trends would continue, for since the opening of the Estuary Cut steamers were coming regularly from Hamburg and elsewhere with full cargoes (this trade was inhibited only by the lack of return cargoes), seed and oil cake were being imported in increasing quantities, and miscellaneous goods were arriving in Lynn from as far afield as Hungary.[3]

But then came events that indicated that all these favourable developments meant no more than at last Lynn and the East Anglian were making the most of themselves, and that it was still beyond their power either to increase the area's potential or to arrest its inevitable decline. For the second half of 1857 the receipts were only £25,906, £1,200 down on the

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1 Railway Times, 14th March, 1857, p.396; meeting of the 10th March, 1857.
2 Ibid., 5th September, 1857, p.1274; meeting of the 4th September, 1857.
3 Ibid.

previous half year, and £249 down on the corresponding period of 1856.[1] In retrospect the decline may be seen as a small one, especially when set against the circumstances of a world depression, but to the proprietors it seemed to be no small matter. The slump was evidenced particularly in declining corn and meat prices. The price fetched by a quarter of wheat in Lynn fell from 58/- in 1856 to 44/- in 1857[2] (averages over the respective years), and as the cost of wheat production had remained at 40/- per quarter the price fall cut the farmers' profits dramatically; stock farmers found themselves in much the same difficulties, for in the summer of 1857 they found themselves having to sell best fat stock at the same prices they had obtained for lean meat at the beginning of the season, only a few months earlier.[3] At the back of this of course, lay a combination of imports from abroad, and over-production at home; the quantity of wheat in hand (March, 1858) was greater than usual. The railway suffered because the wheat traffic was not flowing to the same extent as usual, and because, everywhere and in every way, farmers were economising in their purchases.[4] In addition, the general commercial crisis of 1857 had destroyed credit and deprived many small dealers in East Anglia and elsewhere of their usual facilities; the consequences of this were still being felt in the Lynn area in the March of 1858, although by then the crisis at large was over.[5] Another contributory factor in the East Anglian revenue decline was the mildness of the early part of the 1857/8 winter which had seriously affected coal consumption, and retarded the recovery from the disruption in coal traffic caused in the north by the 1857 crisis.[6] It was little comfort that nearly all companies (including even the great London & North Western)

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1 Railway Times, 13th March, 1858, pp. 307-8; meeting of the 12th March, 1858.

2 The fall was gradual but very steady, and therefore such as to check any speculation - Bruce on the 12th March, 1858.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Railway Times, 13th March, 1858, pp. 307-8; meeting of the 12th March - Bruce.

6 Ibid.

had suffered a decline in receipts for the period, or that the drop on the Eastern Counties had been six times worse than that on the East Anglian.[1]

It may be briefly mentioned that at this stage suspicion of the Eastern Counties once again began to appear.[2] It was murtured on small incidents, such as when the company refused (April,1857) to reduce its rates for the removal of 2,000 tons of stone from the Watlington gravel pit,[3] and when (August,1857) Harding of Lynn had to give up making bricks as he could not get the E.C.R. to carry them.[4] But in fact these incidents amounted to absolutely nothing, and led to suspicion, as ever with the forthcoming amalgamation in mind, simply because the proprietors were frustrated and uncertain where to turn. Indeed, there was nothing that could be done. A proposal, this time from the proprietors who had opposed the same thing when it came from the board (see section 2 above), that as the East Anglian had a port it should set itself up as a coal dealer (compare the Great Northern)[5] had to be dismissed by Bruce, on the grounds that the company had no capital for screw steamers; again, however, he expressed the willingness of the board to co-operate with any company that had.[6]

Sooner or later there inevitably had to come trouble from the proprietors. They had restrained themselves in their comments on the results for the latter half of 1857, but those for 1858, £24,493 and £25,017, were more than they could stomach. It was clear that the blame for the fall was to be pinned firmly on someone. Normally the Eastern Counties would have been the object of attack, but, for the moment, that avenue happened to be closed.

1 Committee Book,6th March,1858.
2 Ibid., in several speeches.
3 Committee Book,30th April,1857.
4 Ibid.,25th August,1857.
5 Meeting of the 12th March,1858 - Billings.
6 Railway Times,13th March,1858,pp.307-8; meeting of the 12th March,1858.

In the summer of 1858 the Manchester proprietors, who were now again at the centre of the disturbance, had pressed on the board that some expert be employed to ensure that traffic was really being developed to the utmost. The board had over-looked the implied slight, and in consultation with the E.C.R. had chosen a man named Hayes, who was "of considerable experience" in such matters.[1] Hayes had spent several months on the line and had reported in the October of 1858. The report had nothing to offer in the way of constructive suggestions; its main theme was exoneration of the Eastern Counties (at least since 1856) which had always been willing to co-operate with "a fair and reasonable proposition" from the East Anglian, besides allowing that company advantages that could have been refused, such as access to the midlands.[2] This rather tied the hands of the Manchester group, and diverted its attention and hostility towards the East Anglian board.

The revolt that now occurred was in fact sparked off by a misconception. Early in 1859, at the same time that East Anglian figures had been produced to show a net gain of £24 in the second half of 1858, Eastern Counties returns had appeared displaying a £14,000 increase as between the two halves of the year. In fact the latter had been published before settlement with the Clearing House; that settled, the net gain was only £1,930, and of this £1,160 was accounted for by increased mail receipts, and £341 by an increase in cartage rates.[3] The result of the misconception was that during the February a hostile deputation of nine Manchester proprietors had waited on Bruce to present the conclusions reached the previous week by a private meeting of all those interested, this having been held in Manchester.[4] The leader was

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1 Railway Times, 19th March, 1859, pp. 324-7; meeting of the 11th March, 1859.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., Bruce.
4 Ibid., Bruce.

Bancroft (a Manchester alderman and a director of the London & North Western) who, however, disclaimed any interested motives in that he was only a small holder with no active concern in the management, justifying his role on the grounds that letters of complaint had reached him from all over the country, it being presumed that because he had played a leading part in securing the 1852 agreement he knew the Eastern Counties.[1] He denied any unfriendly spirit towards the directors, indeed he praised Bruce as one to be respected, but insisted that a deadlock had been reached in company affairs and that nothing more could be achieved with the existing board.[2] The essence of the whole matter was, of course, that the 1862 merger was to be by value; the company had over £1m. in ordinary shares, which, so far, had neither dividends nor prospects - hence all negotiations would have to be based on their imaginary value. Clearly, the arbitrators would be more impressed if there was a steady upwards trend in traffic.[3] To obtain this there had to be new ideas and energy;[4] that meant experiments with new officers. If these failed the proprietors would at least have the satisfaction of knowing that they had tried everything possible.[5]

There was "an unusually large attendance"[6] for the meeting of the 11th March,1859, and there is no doubt that dramatic events were anticipated. But in fact nothing at all decisive was done. The truth was that the Manchester group had no more to offer in the way of constructive suggestions than Hayes had had in his report of the previous October. As for the immediate issue of the current decline in revenue, the continuing depression in grain prices (by now wheat in Lynn had reached the unprecedented low of 34/- to 36/- per

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1 Railway Times,19th March,1859,pp.324-7; meeting of the 11th March - Bancroft
2 Ibid., Bancroft. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.,13th March,1859,pp.324-7; meeting of the 11th March - Bancroft.
6 Ibid., Editorial.

quarter)[1] and its effects could not be gainsaid. Carriers' carts in the area had ceased to work, and the reduced number of farmers' carts on the roads had caused a big drop in the takings at toll bars; the Eastern Counties report for the latter half of 1858 showed passengers to be 200,000 fewer than in the same period of 1857, and, in general, a decline in all classes of traffic connected with agriculture - second class receipts (mostly from farmers) were £5,250 down, goods £3,269 and cattle £4,450.[2] The depression had many ramifications as far as the East Anglian was concerned. There was the example of barley which in 1858 in Norfolk was both poor in quality and low in price; the consequence of these two factors was that farmers were retaining it for feed, and thereby depriving the railway of revenue from the outward conveyance of the crop as well as that derived from the inward carriage of oil cake.[3] It could only be hoped that the current influx of gold would lead to "fair" prices for agricultural produce, and that the farmers, with the prospect of a reasonable harvest for 1859, would, despite the low prices, soon put their stores of grain, from 1858, on to the market.[4]

The wider issue was whether or not everything possible had been done in order to develop the lines. Herapath described it as "lachrymose" to believe that it had been,[5] but that was to take a very narrow view. The fact that the company was in the very uneasy position of having to combine service to the old order of things while hastening the development of the new. Bruce, unconsciously, displayed the nature of this dilemma, in saying in one breath that the farmers "often held their grain when they ought to sell it and sold when they ought to hold it",[6] but then in the next going on to describe how he

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1 Bruce on the 11th March.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Railway Times, 19th March, 1859, pp.324-7; meeting of the 11th March - Herapath.
6 Ibid.

was scheming to capture the recently developed corn imports, particularly barley for the midlands, from the Baltic and the Black Sea into Lynn[1]; in another instance he described as "wonderful" the way in which the coal traffic of Lynn was holding up, explaining it on the grounds that coal owners preferred the railways to coastal shipping as on the former their coals were less subject to both delays and breakages[2]. He apparently failed to appreciate the logical conclusion to this argument, advanced in defence of the board, that sooner or later coals would be sent all the way by rail to the exclusion of Lynn Harbour. It should not have been forgotten by the proprietors that in face of difficulties such as intense competition from the river interests (e.g. coals could be taken from Lynn to Cambridge for 3/- per ton)[3] and coastal shipping, Simpson, in charge of traffic, had, without extra milage and with very little increase in the area's population[4] (that of Lynn was actually in decline) raised the revenue from £30,000 to £50,000 per annum. This was a remarkable achievement as the old staples of the area showed signs of failing without the new economic departures yet having taken an established form. As for the lack of ordinary dividends the blame was to be laid simply and solely on the massive expenditure in construction, and on "those proceedings of the earlier days", which Bruce looked on with "shame and indignation", when the proprietors had been truly robbed by "iniquitous law charges and worse"[5].

The truth of these contentions might well have been accepted in time, had not the receipts for the first half of 1859 showed a further decline, to £24,459 (the worst since 1855) and so stirred up further antagonism against

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1 Railway Times, 19th March, 1859, pp.324-7; meeting of the 11th March-Herapath.
2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.
4 Reckoned as 95,490 in terms of the 1851 census; Ibid., 11th August, 1860; meeting of the 9th August, 1860 - Bruce. See also chapter 9.
5 Railway Times, 19th March, 1859, pp.324-7; meeting of the 11th March.

the board. The real reasons for the decline were not hard to find. The depression in grain and general merchandise continued (passengers, parcels, coals and cattle were, together £695 up),[1] and in the aftermath of the 1857 collapse, when there had been great abuses of credit (as late as the August of 1860 bankruptcies to the extent of £2m. were just coming to light),[2] trade was still disturbed; in addition, the Wells & Fakenham line was now developing its traffic and competing strongly against the East Anglian line from Lynn to Dereham.[3] The board had done all that was in its power to counter these various adverse factors, particularly so by running cheap excursion trains (to Cambridge and elsewhere) on the principle that if people could be persuaded to travel once by train then they would do so again.[4] Thus, once again, Bruce had a strong case, but this time the Manchester men refused to be placated. Frightened off their initial suggestion that there should be a committee of inquiry (first made in the March and then again in the September) by Bruce's threat that he would resign if such were appointed[5] (a most significant pointer to the fundamental uncertainty of the discontented proprietors) they compromised by insisting that the board must appoint their nominee, Mr.Elwin, as its Traffic Agent, at a salary of £400 per annum plus expenses.[6] It needs to be noted at this point that Elwin also had some paid connection, the details of which have not been ascertained, with the Great Northern Railway. The Manchester men recommended him as being of great ability and experience in railway matters.[7]

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1 Railway Times, 3rd September, 1859, pp.992-3; meeting of the 2nd September - Bruce.
2 Ibid., 11th August, 1860, pp.892-6; meeting, 9th August - Directors' Report.
3 Ibid., Love.
4 Ibid., Bruce on the 2nd September, 1859.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., meeting of the 9th August - Bruce.
7 Ibid., 3rd September, 1859, pp.992-3; meeting of the 2nd September.

Elwin's appointment proved to be a fiasco. Bruce and Simpson played their part admirably, going in person with him to Lynn to introduce him in the corn market and elsewhere, and informing all the merchants that they should take their complaints directly to him; men were paid to "beat up" coal traffic for him. Elwin's proposals, showered on to the board, often with five or six letters in one post, proved to be either "utterly impracticable", or "injurious", or founded on erroneous data; in short, they were for the most part "absurd". In one particular instance he devised a remarkable means by which coals could be sent via Lynn at a rate of 2/7d per ton less than via Peterborough. Such was of course fantastic nonsense, and based purely on wishful thinking. The board knew it, but, eager to co-operate, sent him to Coote, a leading dealer who was reputed to know more than anyone alive about the coal trade, and also to Mr.Young, a rich and able man who owned a small fleet of screw steamers at Wisbech; although a saving of 6d per ton was commonly reckoned to be sufficient to divert the coal trade, the board received no answer from either gentleman.[1] Then, in the November of 1859, Elwin committed the crowning folly. In an emergency, but without authority, the E.C.R. station master at Lynn took some Great Northern trucks for use on the East Anglian. Claiming that he was as much the servant of the Great Northern as of the East Anglian,[2] Elwin took it on himself to inform the former of the irregularity. No doubt he was right in principle, but the action was more than a by now thoroughly exasperated board could be expected to tolerate. So, "for the interest of the company", his resignation, as it

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1 Railway Times, 11th August, 1860, pp.892-6; meeting of the 9th August, 1860. Many references were made to Elwin at different times, but the summary given on this page represents the most complete and concise account of his work. It came from Bruce who was engaged in defending the board from the charge that it had failed to give Elwin proper co-operation. To that extent the summary was self-interested, but there is no doubt whatsoever of the accuracy of the assessment.

2 Ibid., Bruce.

was euphemistically termed, was accepted during the November; the fact that his salary was to continue for a further three months[1] sufficiently indicates the nature of the circumstances surrounding his 'resignation'. This incident apart, it cannot be a matter for surprise that Elwin had failed so utterly, for under the circumstances there was little that anyone could have done to improve traffic further.

B. The Waddington Conspiracy,1860

Waddington, the erstwhile chairman of the Eastern Counties and subsequently a shareholder in the East Anglian, had never forgiven Bruce for stirring up the E.C.R. shareholders' revolt of 1855 which had led in the following year to his exclusion from office. In precipitating a similar revolt of the East Anglian shareholders in 1860 Waddington and his immediate followers (Shaw of Manchester, Wretham and six others)[2] sought first to gain suitable revenge on Bruce by obtaining complete power in the company for themselves, and secondly to use that power to exact revenge on the Eastern Counties itself, from which Waddington had been "so ignominiously and yet so righteously expelled"[3], by joining the East Anglian with the "desperadoes" of the Norfolk Railway and the Eastern Union in forcing better amalgamation terms at the E.C.R.'s expense.[4] Waddington's personal followers were nonentities who moved only in his shadow. In seeking power they relied primarily on the apathy of the majority of the East Anglian proprietors, and secondly on that discontented element which had been deflated but not entirely convinced by Elwin's failure; in fact Waddington used that failure as a major weapon in seeking to prove that it arose only from the board's unwillingness to co-operate. Support was also to be had from a number of

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1 Railway Times,11th August,1860,pp.892-6; Bruce on the 9th August.
2 Ibid.,18th August,1860,p.939; editorial.
3 Ibid.,11th August,1860,pp.905-6; editorial.
4 Ibid.

speculators who had recently taken up ordinary shares at about £17 (for a £100 consolidated share) in the hope that amalgamation would shortly give them positive value; these newcomers to the company were in fact amongst the principal agitators in support of Waddington.[1]

Both the stimulus and the opportunity for Waddington's actions had really come with the announcement on the 31st December, 1859 that in the amalgamation bill then being prepared the Eastern Counties was proposing to evaluate the stocks of the various companies involved by reference to the average receipts of each over the three years prior to 1861.[2] The East Anglian board utterly rejected this, but even so the very fact of the proposal was sufficient to cause alarm in the hearts of timid proprietors. As it happened Waddington believed that, while above all helping himself, he had the means to assist not only the East Anglian but also the Norfolk Railway and the Eastern Union to better terms; it should be noted that he had intimate connections with the extremer elements of both the latter, although he was trusted by neither.[3] The means in question consisted of the Norwich & Spalding Company, "a wretched scheme",[4] the work of pure speculators such as Cobbold (the promoter of the Eastern Union), Cayley, Kitton and Bruff (the E.C.R. engineer of 1854), who still controlled it in 1860 and with whom Waddington had both personal and financial connections. The company had received an act in 1853 to construct from Holbeach to Wisbech where a junction would be made with the E.C.R. line. Not until the early months of 1859, however, did the company manage to open any portion of its line, that being the $15\frac{1}{2}$ miles section between Holbeach and Sutton; in the same year, although

1 Railway Times, 18th August, 1860, p.939; editorial. 2 See Section 6 below.
3 Railway Times, 28th July, 1860, pp.845-6; editorial.
4 Ibid., 11th August, 1860, pp.908-10; editorial.

granted an act for the extension of time in construction, the company came to a complete standstill for want of means, credit and employment[1]; at this time it became clear that it would never have any prospects unless completed to Wisbech. It was Waddington's intention "to foist..this abortion" on the East Anglian[2], representing it as a great benefit to that company if extended to the East Anglian line at Wisbech. He argued that the result would be a through line from Nottingham to Dereham by way of Lynn and the East Anglian; if the E.C.R. refused facilities for through traffic at Dereham the E.A.R. must promote its own direct line to Norwich. He admitted that he had been wrong in opposing Williams' ill-fated schemes to the same end in 1846 and 1847[3]. There was, of course, much in what he said, although a direct line from Sutton to Lynn would have been more beneficial to both the town and the East Anglian. But, the Norwich & Spalding would save money by implementing powers that already existed and secure traffic from both ports, not just Lynn. Waddington's whole purpose was to open up the Norfolk and Eastern Union systems to the Great Northern (from Spalding), so enabling them to obtain better terms in 1861/2. The same would of course apply to the East Anglian, but benefits to that company would be incidental only, for in essence it was being used to further the ends of the promoters of the Norwich & Spalding[4], and of the Norfolk Railway and Eastern Union.

The Norwich & Spalding naturally took active steps to render itself an attractive proposition to the East Anglian. For the 1860 session it entered a bill to extend itself to Wisbech and a junction with the E.A.R.[5] Bruce and the board gave the bill a qualified welcome only, obviously

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1 Railway Times, 11th August, 1860, pp. 908-10; editorial. 2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., 10th March, 1860, p. 275; at the East Anglian meeting of the 6th March.
4 Ibid., the editorials of both the 4th and 11th August, 1860.
5 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 10th March, 1860.

suspecting that all was not quite as it seemed and preferring that the line envisaged should come directly to Lynn instead of via Wisbech.[1] However, the bill in fact failed before committee, partly because the East Anglian failed to back if with sufficient force,[2] but more especially because it was strongly opposed by Wisbech on the grounds that the line would block navigation at Sutton Bridge and would in any case run parallel to the existing road.[3] Indeed, it would seem that the corporation of Lynn was not the only one that could act with culpable lack of foresight - within twelve months Wisbech was to repent its folly in turning the railway away most bitterly (see sub-section D below). Neither Lynn nor the East Anglian could really regret the failure, for it was hoped that it would convince the promoters of the need to "go for the complete line (i.e. direct to Lynn) and nothing short of it", for a measure of that character "could not fail to be eminently beneficial to Lynn and the whole of the district".[4] The promoters were not in fact prepared to concede this, for they wanted the traffic of both Wisbech and Lynn, but Waddington let it be known that if he assumed control of the board then the East Anglian itself would enter a bill to fill the gap between Lynn and Sutton.[5]

Waddington's programme within the East Anglian was to cause the proprietors to consider the state of the company, to have them appoint a committee of inquiry, "although (the company's) affairs are known as intimately to the latest visitor to the share list as to the chairman himself",[6] and then take such steps, namely the elevation to the board of Waddington and his friends, as they deemed necessary. In careful preparation, after

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 10th March, 1860; meeting of the 6th March, 1860.

2 Railway Times, 11th August, 1860, pp. 892-6; meeting of the 9th - Chesshire.

3 Ibid., Bruce.

4 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 28th April, 1860; editorial.

5 Railway Times, 11th August, 1860, pp. 908-10; editorial.

6 Ibid., 28th July, 1860, pp. 845-6; editorial.

misrepresenting his purposes to obtain 60 signatures to a requisition for a special meeting on the 9th August, 1860[1] (although the ordinary meeting was only two weeks away), Waddington and his friends had been busily collecting proxies[2], some by the "most contradictory and even fraudulent" pretences[3]. In addition plans were made by Wretham, Waddington's scrutineer, to prevent, if necessary, the preference share holders, whose stock maintained "a respectable premium"[4], from voting[5]. But this, based on a prejudiced and quite indefensible interpretation of the company's constitution, failed, and Waddington's motion that a committee of inquiry be appointed was defeated by 7,376 votes to 6,968. This was in fact a very narrow escape for the board from a "long planned and deeply laid conspiracy"[6], for in terms of individual proprietors and of actual holdings the motion would in fact have been carried by 286 to 204, and £423,656 to £292,030 respectively. The actual details, as given on the 11th August, 1860 (so allowing the scrutineers two days in which to complete their report) were thus[7]:

Motion: That a committee of inquiry be appointed.

Class of Holdings	For		Against	Neuter
Ordinary shares	£367,548 = 4,002	votes	£202,228 = 2,692	£463,694
Class 'A' 5%	£ 4,941 = 237	"	£ 14,600 = 548	£ 22,450
Class 'A' 7%	£ 1,645 = 149	"	£ 4,048 = 373	£ 4,127
Class 'B'	£ 23,199 = 1,452	"	£ 53,222 = 2,746	£ 44,579
Class 'C'	£ 26,888 = 1,128	"	£ 17,932 = 1,017	£ 26,653
	£423,656 6,968		£292,030 7,376	£561,503

Proprietors: 286 for; 224 against.

Little can safely be deduced from these figures except that Waddington's principal ally was indeed apathy. It may, however, be assumed that those who did not vote were by and large satisfied, and that, on the basis of

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1 Railway Times, 4th August, 1860, p.877; letter from E.Chesshire.
2 Ibid., 28th July, 1860. 3 Ibid., 11th August, 1860, pp.905-6; editorial.
4 Ibid., 18th August, 1860, p.939. 5 Ibid., 11th August, 1860; editorial.
6 Ibid.
7 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 18th August, 1860. The totals derive from the Railway Times of the same date, p.939.

these figures, the active bitterness within the company was confined to no more than one third of the proprietors, many of whom had been stirred into a restless mood by Waddington, without having any deep convictions of their own. This proportion could be further reduced in respect of those who had given their proxies to Waddington after being misled as to his true purposes. Naturally, the principal support for him had come from the holders of ordinary shares (no dividends) and of the 'C' stock (fluctuating dividends and often below the guaranteed level). On the whole it would seem that the holders of the 'A' and 'B' stocks were satisfied, the defections from their number being no doubt attributable to the holding of more than one kind of share by many individuals.

It was fortunate for the board that revenue had taken an upward turn during the previous twelve months. The latter half of 1859 had yielded £25,121, the best result since the latter part of 1857; the first six months of 1860 produced a revenue of £26,400, a figure that had been exceeded only in the first half of the "balloon year", 1857.[1] The 1859 result would have been better still had it not been for a ~~chronic~~ deficiency in the number of available Eastern Counties trucks.[2] Particular examples included that of the day when 73 had been required at Lynn, but only 43 were sent, another instance when 58 were asked for but only 27 received, and, worst of all, the day when 69 were needed, but only 5 arrived and these at 4.50p.m. when the business day was over.[3] Such failures caused "serious damage"[4] to the East Anglian, for they had made many traders reluctant to use Lynn,[5] and had driven others

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1 Railway Times, 11th August, 1860, pp. 892-6; meeting, 9th August - Bruce.
2 Ibid., 10th March, 1860, p. 275; meeting, 6th March - Directors' Report.
3 Ibid., 3rd March, 1860, p. 242; summary of the report.
4 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 10th March, 1860; meeting, 6th March.
5 Ibid.

to the water.[1] The experience of Curzon of Lynn was typical of many:[2]

> "I have been very much annoyed lately for want of trucks. On the 13th inst. (i.e. December,1859) I applied to the company for trucks as I had nearly 200 tons to forward to Ely and only got 3 trucks on the 24th and therefore was obliged to send the remainder by water."

There had also been a partial revival by the Eastern Counties of practices that "favoured some parties to the injury of the fair trader",[3] for the East Suffolk Railway was having its coals carried from Peterborough at $\frac{5}{8}$d. per ton mile in order to give it the advantage over sea rates.[4] And then had come the fine result for the first half of 1860, arising principally from the success of the East Anglian in persuading the Eastern Counties that large numbers of new trucks would have to be purchased,[5] and which would have been better if bad weather had not marred the success of an extensive programme of excursions, cheap fares and pleasure trips[6] (e.g. for Whitsun,1860 return journeys were offered at single rates, and there was a special excursion train from Lynn to the brass band contest at Peterborough).[7]

All these considerations constituted powerful reasons why Waddington's motion should be defeated, but in view of the large number of proxies that he had obtained prior to the 1860 figures becoming public knowledge they were not sufficient by themselves to carry the day in favour of Bruce and the board. Bruce had been abroad until the day prior to the meeting[8] and had been unable to muster full support; thus, the key to his success lay with the handful of proprietors at the meeting who had initially supported Waddington, but then defected. The editor of the 'Railway Times' took the credit for

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1 Railway Times,10th March,1860,p.275. 2 Committee Book,4th January,1860; copy of Curzon's letter. 3 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,10th March,1860; meeting,6th March. 4 Ibid.

5 Railway Times,10th March,1860,p.275; meeting,6th March.

6 Ibid.,15th September,1860,pp.1043-7; meeting,11th September.

7 Cf. the advertisements in the Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, May and June,1860.

8 Railway Times,11th August,1860,pp.892-6; meeting,9th August - Bruce.

this entirely to himself,[1] having been at pains to post to each individual proprietor a copy of his editorial of the 28th July,[2] in which he had laid bare Waddington's motives, and gone on to describe that gentleman's "audacity" and "effrontery" as "marvels even in these days of unblushing arrogance and shameless presumption". It is most probably true that his interference was just sufficient to tip the scales against Waddington, who was certainly very bitter about the whole incident. Just how the editor obtained the addresses of all the shareholders remained a mystery, although Waddington was prepared to attribute the responsibility to the actions of someone in the company's office.[3]

C. The Watkin Report and Bruce's Resignation, 1861

With the failure of the "concluding attempt" of Waddington to sustain himself as a public man before the railway world,[4] it might have been hoped that peace would at last reign in the affairs of the East Anglian; certainly, as amalgamation approached, complete unity was more to be desired than ever. But such was not to be. Unfortunately, the revenue for the latter half of 1860 was only £24,357, a total just over £2,000 down on that for the first half of the year. The decline was to be attributed to the poor weather of the summer which had rendered the harvest deficient in both quantity and quality (much of the grain was unfit for ordinary purposes), and to the increase in excursion fares imposed by the Eastern Counties; a July excursion from Lynn to London had carried 300 passengers, but one in August only 16 because of the higher rates.[5] The severe weather of the 1860/1 winter precluded the possibility of any striking recovery during the first months

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1 Railway Times, 4th August, 1860, p.875. 2 Ibid., 28th July, 1860.
3 Ibid., 11th August, 1860; meeting, 9th August.
4 Ibid., 4th August, 1860, p.875; an editorial which spoke of the failure as if it were a foregone conclusion.
5 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 9th March, 1861; meeting, 8th March.

of 1861,[1] and once again active discontent was stirred. At the centre of it was Shaw of Manchester, one of Waddington's personal followers, but even before that a centre of unrest in the company (see, for example, the crisis of 1859). On the rejection of the proposal for the committee of inquiry Shaw, or so he claimed, had been approached by a prominent London proprietor and asked to set on foot a move for an independent inquiry.[2] Accordingly, on the 12th October,1860 three or four of the largest holders had met at Stafford and a committee had been formed, eventually comprising 21 members with an aggregate holding in the company of £100,000.[3] To the East Anglian board the name of Watkin, the chairman of the Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Railway, was proposed as a suitable investigator. He himself was willing provided that the board approved. It did and so did that of the Eastern Counties. Watkin visited the line on the 18th February,1861 and enjoyed the fullest possible co-operation, all his questions being answered and a special E.C.R. train being provided. His lengthy report was presented on the 14th March.[4]

Discussion of this report must be, however, based largely on deduction, for it was secret and remained so despite the demands of the proprietors that they be informed of its contents.[5] Watkin wanted it so on the grounds that it could well provide the brief for future legal proceedings.[6] Presumably these were to be against the Eastern Counties, for on the 5th April the East Anglian shareholders were informed that the former's board was considering the "complaints" against it derived from the report.[7] But for the most part the

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,7th September,1861; meeting,6th September. 2 Ibid.,9th March,1861; meeting,8th March. 3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.,16th March,1861; meeting of the 15th March - Bruce.
5 Ibid. 6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.,13th April,1861.

proprietors were left in ignorance of what those complaints were. Months later Simpson let it out that there had been an inquiry into the E.C.R.'s accounts on the suspicion that large sums due to the East Anglian in respect of through traffic had been withheld from it by the E.C.R., but that despite Watkin's opinion to the contrary there were in fact no grounds for complaint.[1]

At the time of the report's appearance the only positive information had come from Bruce, who, until he had it pointed out to him, had failed to note the heading of 'Confidential'; but as he had received the report only a matter of hours before he spoke the information he gave could be no more than very general in character. He agreed with Watkin's findings that working expenses were too high, but disagreed with the opinion that the company ought to oppose the Mid-Eastern & Great Northern Junction promotion (Lynn to Spalding - see sub-section D below). Much more significantly he went on to explain why the Great Northern Junction at Huntingdon was not in operation, the reason being that the G.N.R./E.C.R. agreement (expiring in 1865) precluded its use; appeal to the courts would no doubt cause it to be opened, but only at the cost of future reprisals from the Eastern Counties.[2] It was clear from this and from other hints dropped by Bruce that the whole theme of the report was one of hostility towards the E.C.R., and that the principal recommendation was for extensive legal action against that company.

This course of action Bruce refused to contemplate, and rightly so. Over the years he had built up a reasonable and just relationship with the Eastern Counties Railway, and his success was reflected in the extent to

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 14th September, 1861; meeting of the 6th September.
2 Ibid., 16th March, 1861; Bruce at the meeting of the 15th March.

which revenue had increased since 1852; it would have been sheer folly to have thrown away the solid gains of ten years by recklessly antagonizing the E.C.R. at that stage with final amalgamation so near. But Bruce was by now an old man, his capacity for fighting much diminished by the successive crises of the previous years; now, further conflict was being thrust upon him, while immediately ahead lay the inevitably long and difficult amalgamation negotiations. So, on the 15th March,1861, without any bluff or argument, saying that he was unable to implement the report and must leave affairs to other hands, he resigned from the chair and the board. As it was this action proved the last great service he rendered to the company, for under its shadow no attempt was subsequently made to attack the Eastern Counties in the manner that Watkin advised. If he had stayed the matter would have remained a living issue causing a serious rift in a company that needed unity of purpose above all else. A proper appreciation of this very fine man will be found in chapter 9.

D. Other Companies affecting the position and prospects of the East Anglian on the Eve of Amalgamation.

a. The Mid-Eastern & Great Northern Junction Railway

Notice has been taken in a previous section of the Norwich & Spalding line from Holbeach to Sutton, and of its attempts during 1860 to extend to Wisbech rather than Lynn. Later in the same year, however, appeared a company, sponsored by Mr.Waring, a well known railway contractor[1], which promised to fill the gap between Sutton and Lynn. This was the Mid-Eastern & Great Northern Junction Railway which proposed to build from Sutton on the Norwich & Spalding to a junction with the L & E mainline at Lynn, from which

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[1] Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,22nd March,1862; evidence given on the 17th March to the Commons committee on the E.C.R. Amalgamation Bill.

junction a spur was to be thrown to the L & D line ¾ mile from the station, so forming a large triangular junction; running powers were to be sought as far as Swaffham, from where independent construction was to be continued to Thetford (on the Peterborough - Ely - Norwich line) and then on to Bury St. Edmunds.[1] The project was warmly welcomed both by the East Anglian and by Lynn. To the former it represented a steady influx of traffic from the midlands and north, and therefore a valuable bargaining point in the assessment of East Anglian stock for the purposes of the amalgamation; to the latter it represented the opportunity to regain the lost markets of Suffolk, and also the means to bring back to Lynn the annual influxes of northern cattle which in recent years, in the absence of a direct line from Boston and Sleaford, had gone increasingly to Peterborough and Norwich.[2]

The East Anglian petitioned against the bill of 1861 to secure its own interests and not to defeat it,[3] Simpson having in mind the possibility of making the new company double those portions of the East Anglian system over which running powers were sought.[4] The outcome was that Parliament allowed the bill, even conceding a bridge over the Nene at Sutton Bridge (which it had refused to the Norwich & Spalding the previous year), but only in respect of the portion of line between Sutton and Lynn. The East Anglian secured the right to subscribe £50,000 of the £100,000 capital, and was to provide half the directors;[5] in effect the East Anglian was to have absolute powers over the new line. But despite Simpson's optimism that "limited liability" had removed all the terrors from railway investment[6] the East Anglian was not

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 10th November, 1860.
2 Ibid., 8th December, 1860; Drake at a Town Meeting of the 5th December, 1860.
3 Ibid., 13th April, 1861. 4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 7th September, 1861; Directors' Report of the 6th September, and the 22nd March, 1862 - evidence before the Commons committee on the Norwich & Spalding bill on the 17th.
6 Ibid., 13th April, 1861.

able to provide its share of the capital, with the result that the Lynn & Sutton Bridge (the promotion's new name) promised to hand itself over to the Eastern Counties on completion.[1] In fact it subsequently turned to the Great Northern.

One consequence of the Lynn & Sutton Bridge's success was that the Norwich & Spalding (which in 1861 completed its links to the west by absorbing the Spalding & Bourne, a company sanctioned in 1862)[2] revived its Wisbech extension, and entered a second bill for the 1862 session. This time Wisbech sang a very different tune, Young, the mayor, telling the committee of the Commons that Wisbech's trade had been "considerably diminished" by want of adequate railway communication, and that it would be further so if no direct link to Spalding, and by there to Goole and Hull, were allowed.[3] But the matter had by now passed beyond considerations of local economy, and into the sphere of railway politics. It was abundantly clear that the Norwich & Spalding company, now worked by the Great Northern Railway, was seeking to destroy the Lynn & Sutton Bridge, and, by if possible working G.N.R. trains over the East Anglian and the Norfolk Railway into Norwich, spread discord amongst the parties to the forthcoming amalgamation.[4] It was considerations such as these that led the Commons committee to reject the bill for the second time.

b. The Lynn & Hunstanton Railway

If the Lynn & Sutton Bridge added to the potential of the East Anglian during the amalgamation discussions much more so did the Lynn & Hunstanton

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 22nd March, 1862; N & S bill.
2 Ibid., 19th April, 1862.
3 Ibid., 22nd March, 1862; evidence before the Commons committee on the 17th.
4 Ibid., Slade on behalf of the Lynn & Sutton Bridge.

Railway, authorised in 1861 and opened in 1862. Already cited as an example of directorial enterprise that had not been backed by the proprietors of the East Anglian, this company had first been projected in 1853, definite plans being prepared in the hope that backing would be forthcoming.[1] It was not, and so it was 1856 before the company was actually floated, with Goodwin, Partridge & Edwards (who gave 5 acres of land to the company,[2] perhaps in reparation for what they had done to the East Anglian) amongst the promoters. Simpson of the E.A.R. was chairman, and Self one of the directors. The concept was simple but daring. A 14 miles line was to be built to Hunstanton, a village of under 1,000 inhabitants, with the express intention of converting it into a major holiday resort. The omens were favourable, for Hunstanton was healthy and bracing, labour and dwellings were cheap[3] and there was no other holiday resort between Yarmouth and Bridlington; in addition the village of Snettisham through which the line would pass was capable of being developed into a deep-sea fishing port, the local land contained much high quality sand that could perhaps be sent away for glass making, while in other parts the soil was suitable for a much more intensive cultivation of barley and potatoes than was so far practised.[4] Because the line would depend primarily on holiday traffic it was essential that it be of cheap construction.[5] Because there was some slight element of risk and East Anglian finances were still not entirely stable, the new company was to be absolutely independent and receive nothing from East Anglian funds.[6]

Not until 1859 did events really begin to gather momentum, although as

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1 Railway Times, 17th September, 1853, pp. 971-2; E.A. Directors' Report at the meeting of the 14th September, 1853.

2 Ibid., 15th September, 1860, pp. 1043-7; meeting (E.A.R.), 11th September.

3 Ibid., 10th November, 1860, p. 1264; letter, "An E.A. Shareholder".

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., 17th September, 1853; Directors' Report, 14th September.

6 Ibid.

early as 1856 a Lynn Town Meeting had declared in favour of the line,[1] the E.C.R. had indicated its willingness to work it at cost price without profit to itself,[2] and Simpson had gone out of his way to impress on the East Anglian proprietors the extent of the benefits that would derive to them from the construction of the line;[3] at that time, the summer of 1856, the East Anglian was already subsidizing two omnibuses between Lynn and Hunstanton.[4] By the September of 1859, the money market then being considerably easier, Simpson felt confident of being able to obtain the necessary capital, and it remained only to see how much support the shareholders of the East Anglian were willing to offer.[5] During 1860 positive facts and figures began to emerge. So helpful had been the attitude of the landowners that much of the land was being given to the company and the whole cost was now estimated as being no more than £80,000;[6] in addition, Le Strange, the principal landowner in Hunstanton, had agreed to erect the elements of a new town, especially lodging houses, on his own account.[7] During the year some delay occurred when the Eastern Counties apparently forgot its earlier promise and sought to tighten up on the terms that it had originally offered, but the East Anglian offered its mediation, and an acceptable solution, terms very similar to those on which the East Anglian itself was worked, was achieved.[8]

Meanwhile, subscriptions to the new line had not been coming in quite as hoped, despite the many favourable circumstances, and so the Lynn & Hunstanton determined on a positive approach to the East Anglian, proposing that it should contribute £20,000, if similar amounts were raised, £20,000 in each

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald; Lynn Town Meeting of the 26th September, 1856. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.
5 Railway Times, 3rd September, 1859, pp. 992-3; meeting, 2nd September.
6 Ibid., 11th August, 1860, pp. 892-6; meeting, 9th August. 7 Ibid.
8 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 11th August, 1860.

case, in debentures, from the contractors and promoters and from the general public.[1] The East Anglian proprietors now showed rather more interest, and the question immediately arose as to whether or not such a contribution could be provided from a further issue of 'A' stock, of which £45,000 was still available.[2] On the 21st August, 1860 a special committee of proprietors agreed to this, but only on the condition that the promoters and contractors took £25,000 in shares and the portion allotted to the general public be reduced to £15,000. If the public wanted more any excess over that amount was to be deducted from the debenture issues.[3] Such caution was understandable, for as amalgamation drew near it would have been sheer folly to assume additional interest burdens[4] without full assurance of safety in the event of total or partial failure of the company.

Even though Le Strange threatened (September,1860) to withdraw his offer of free land because no act had been obtained in 1860,[5] and the 'Railway Times' sounded powerful warnings to the effect that the new line was being overrated,[6] the East Anglian proprietors did the completely sensible thing, for only four of their number failed to approve the further issue of the 5% shares and the revised proportions for contribution.[7] That was in the November of 1860, and thereafter all was plain sailing. The bill passed unopposed in 1861, including the necessary authorization for the East Anglian contribution, and the line itself, built by the contractor, Simpson under the engineer, Valentine, was opened for traffic on the 3rd October,1862 (then, of course, as part of the Great Eastern Railway). In the months prior to the

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1 Railway Times,15th September,1860; meeting,11th September (E.A.R.)
2 Ibid.,11th August,1860,pp.892-6; meeting of the 9th August. It had been understood that this reserve should be kept "sacred" until the means for using it to develop traffic appeared (ibid.)
3 Ibid.,15th September,1860; meeting,11th September. 4 Meeting,9th August.
5 Ibid.,29th September,1860,p.1104; News Section.
6 Ibid.,15th September,1860.
7 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,17th November,1860; meeting,15th November.

opening the directors of both the L & H and the E.A.R. had been amongst those subscribing capital towards the erection of additional lodging houses, and elaborate plans and guide books were widely distributed to give the resort the widest publicity possible. It may be indicated here that the line was destined to be a complete success, the seal on this being set when early in 1863 the Prince of Wales purchased Sandringham House and so caused public attention to focus on the area, hitherto so neglected. As will be briefly indicated in the final chapter the fusion of the Norwich & Spalding, the Lynn & Sutton Bridge and other railways west of Lynn in the years that followed served to provide Hunstanton with ready access from the midlands. While these were circumstantial factors the expectation of eventual success added greatly to the East Anglian's hand during the amalgamation negotiations which are now to be briefly examined.

Section 6: The Amalgamation,1862

It is completely unnecessary to enter into the mass of detailed arrangements and disputes that attended the formation of the Great Eastern Railway in 1862. Its inception was compulsory under the terms of the 1854 act, and thus negotiations contained few matters of principle. There was no opposition to amalgamation from within Parliament itself, and the only real contemporary excitement, outside the localities with special interests in the matter, was in the rather specialised field of finance, and concerned the manner in which the stocks of the companies, £13,396,884 in all,[1] were equalized. Most of the parties involved could see the great advantages to be derived from amalgamation provided that there was suitable protection for

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1 See the Preamble to the Great Eastern Railway Act,1862; also the Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 8th January,1862, a letter entitled, 'A Warning about Railway Amalgamation'.

individual interests. To the East Anglian it offered hopes of increased revenue and diminished expenditure,[1] the former because traffic would be free from competition and arbitration, the latter because combined trains could be run, and £1,000 per annum saved on management; it was also anticipated that a ½% saving on loan interest would be possible.[2] Lynn welcomed it because it would end the situation where "the depreciation of your neighbour's traffic is a more prominent idea than the development of your own".[3] This latter comment was of great interest, indicating as it did that free competition was not always the unmixed blessing that opponents of monopoly liked to believe; as suggested in section 1 above it was recognition of this situation in East Anglia that had led Parliament in 1854 to insist on the amalgamation.

Even so the East Anglian and Lynn were both amongst the 41 petitioners against the bill,[4] and the former amongst the 15 represented by counsel, Denison Q.C. appearing for both it and the Great Northern. The East Anglian's opposition was in some of its elements just, and some very important concessions were gained, but for the sake of gaining additional force it was based on grounds that were totally unjustifiable. The principal cause of alarm was that initially the Eastern Counties was intending to assess the relative values of the stocks of the companies involved on the basis of the individual company's average receipts over the three preceding years, although the East Anglian proprietors were, exactly as it was under the 1852

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 22nd March, 1862; meeting, 14th March - Simpson. 2 Ibid., 14th September, 1861; meeting, 6th September, 1861.
3 Ibid., 22nd March, 1862; editorial.
4 Also including such as Norwich, Ipswich, Dereham, Peterborough, Glasgow (for the coastal shipping interests) etc., the East Suffolk, the Norfolk Railway, the Northern & Eastern, the Wells & Fakenham, the Midland, the G.N.R. etc. the shipping interests of London and Hull, and many others.

agreement, to be guaranteed a minimum £17,000 per annum, anything above that being subject to deduction of working expenses calculated as before to a permissible maximum of 50%.[1] With the great development in revenue that had taken place since 1852, and in view of the great prospects opened up by the Lynn & Sutton Bridge and the Lynn & Hunstanton lines the East Anglian naturally resented the fact that the guarantee offered was no more favourable than that of 1852. A third factor in the resentment was of course the harm that the E.C.R. had done the company in the past, and so it was that the East Anglian came before Parliament determined to show "how it had been cheated, injured and defauded in every way, and how it had been oppressively dealt with during the ten years it had been worked by (the E.C.R.)".[2] From this it was but a short step, but one that made the company go too far, to challenge the principle of the amalgamation itself, on the particular grounds that the new bill simply sought to re-enact the act of 1852 while dissolving the company,[3] and that, this was the more important, the act of 1854 in which the principles of the amalgamation had been laid down had itself been invalidated by subsequent events. Amongst other things it had been laid down in 1854 that each company must agree with the E.C.R. as to the terms affecting itself before the bill was submitted to Parliament; the Board of Trade was to sanction such details and also act as the arbitrator in cases of deadlock. It was to be the claim of the East Anglian that it had not agreed to the terms of the bill, and that the Board of Trade had not been called in; it therefore followed that the bill before Parliament was not in keeping with the terms of the 1854 act, thus the amalgamation as such could be opposed,[4] and was purely Eastern Counties in its interests.

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1 Railway Times, 11th August, 1860, pp. 892-6; meeting, 9th August.
2 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 22nd March, 1862; meeting, 14th March - Simpson.
3 Ibid., 8th March, 1862; report of the proceedings before committee - Scott (for the E.C.R.) on the 4th March.
4 Ibid.; Denison before the committee on the 4th March.

What had in fact happened was that the E.C.R. had offered the initial proposed terms to the companies concerned on the 31st December, 1859.[1] On the grounds indicated above the East Anglian found these unacceptable,[2] as did also the Eastern Union and the Norfolk Railway.[3] Accordingly, in the May of 1860, the Eastern Counties asked the Board of Trade to step in.[4] It was, however, not until the 31st July that the latter wrote to the East Anglian asking the company to state its own terms before the 28th August.[5] The board, in consultation with a committee of several of the largest shareholders, refused to comply with this request, arguing that it might be injurious to the East Anglian to reveal its hand so far in advance.[6] The Eastern Counties, as it was obliged under the 1854 act to do, went on with the preparation of the bill, the East Anglian representatives deliberately standing out[7] of the negotiations after discussions on the fusion of the capital had finally fallen through[8] although its representatives on the framing committee continued to be present at each meeting.[9] Thus, the East Anglian complaint to the effect that it had been excluded from the committee[10] was totally unfounded, and if the company suffered from the lack of participation in framing the bill it was entirely its own fault. This the Commons committee accepted after hearing positive evidence from Maynard, the E.C.R. solicitor, and others to the effect that the East Anglian had in fact been represented at each meeting.

A similar dismissal awaited the linked complaint that the Eastern

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 8th March, 1862; Scott on the 4th March for the E.C.R.
2 Railway Times, 10th March, 1860, p.275; meeting, 6th March, 1860.
3 Ibid., 3rd March, 1860, p.242; News Paragraph.
4 Scott before the committee on the 4th March, 1862.
5 Railway Times, 11th September, 1860, pp.1043-7; meeting, 6th September.
6 Ibid.
7 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 22nd March, 1862; meeting, 14th March - Simpson.
8 Ibid., 8th March, 1862; Scott on the 5th March.
9 Ibid., Maynard (E.C.R.)
10 Ibid., meeting, 14th March, 1862.

Counties had caused wilful delay in the completion and submission of the bill in order to avoid reference to the Board of Trade.[1] But it was clear from the evidence that the bill had only been drawn up after many substantial concessions had been made (on the 21st November,1861) to the East Anglian and others.[2] Delays had been absolutely unavoidable in view of the massive size of the task - the bill contained over 340 clauses and cited nearly 100 acts[3] - and the number of objections. Denison's charge that requests for the bill had been met with "nothing but evasive answers" from the E.C.R.[4] was totally unjust. It was in fact as much the East Anglian's fault as anyones that the bill in its final form had been received only five days before it was deposited, namely on the 26th December,1861.[5]

While the claim that the East Anglian had not been properly consulted could be easily demolished, the associated attack on the principle of the amalgamation was almost too weak to stand at all. The arguments were that the 1854 act had contemplated a revision of existing terms, but that as far as the East Anglian was concerned the present bill merely sought a re-enactment of the 1852 agreement, and secondly that the 1854 act had in any case been invalidated by the fact of subsequent agreements between the companies involved; in particular Denison sought to make play with the fact that in the May of 1861 the Eastern Counties and the Norfolk Railway had come to a new agreement as regards the calculation and division of working expenses,[6] as a result of which the bill included a clause allowing for the payment of £27,000 (retrospective settlement) to the Norfolk.[7] Such a narrow

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1 Contained in the E.A.R. petition and referred to by Scott on the 4th March.
2 Scott on the 4th March, for the E.C.R.
3 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,7th June,1862; E.C.R. meeting of the previous week.
4 Scott on the 4th March,1862.
5 Ibid.
6 Scott on the 5th March,1862.
7 Ibid.

interpretation of the 1854 act by the East Anglian was absolutely ridiculous, for examination shows that it was never meant to preclude alterations in existing working arrangements; indeed, as Scott put it, to argue so "was about as bold a proposition to maintain in the face of an Act of Parliament as he had ever heard in his life".[1] The committee could not but agree with him, and so the East Anglian was left with no option except to accept the principle of the amalgamation,[2] and turn its attention to detailed matters. So far it had done itself little good, although the largeness of the concessions that it was now to gain (in spite of which Simpson still complained that the East Anglian had been cheated)[3] suggests that its nuisance value might have been far out of proportion to the merits of the case so far presented.

As a result of detailed negotiation outside the committee room the position of the quayside lines at Lynn Harbour was assured, and the principle of charging by "geographical distance" (as opposed to actual railway milage) from Wymondham and Dereham was conceded;[4] thus, there would be no disadvantage in respect of cost by making use of the Lynn - Dereham line as compared with that by way of Ely. In company with Lynn and other interests the East Anglian protested against the sections of the bill which would have allowed the Great Eastern to operate steamship services from Lowestoft. The opposition was successful and the offending clauses were struck out by the

1 Scott on the 5th March,1862.
2 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,14th March,1862; editorial. In the same week the Norfolk Railway also climbed down (ibid.) as did the East Suffolk which had been conceded its claim to immediate amalgamation - without such it feared that it would be run down before being absorbed (committee,7th March,1862) - and was given a guarantee of £27,000 per annum although its annual traffic had so far averaged only £25,000. (ibid.,19th April,1862; Town Council Meeting of the 14th April,1862).
3 Ibid.,9th August,1862; meeting of the 8th August (E.A.R.).
4 Ibid.,15th March,1862; editorial.

committee.[1] Similarly the East Anglian joined in the almost general protest against the new scales of maximum charges for which the bill sought sanction. In this partial success was achieved; the maximum rate for coals was to be 1.125d. per ton mile, and not 1.5d. as had been wanted,[2] and instead of a 25% or more rise in general freight rates an increase of ½d. per ton mile on dung, lime and manure was all that the committee would allow; the cost for conveying private carriages was to go up only 50%, not 100%,[3] sheep and cattle rates were to be left as they were,[4] and so were maximum passenger charges (the bill sought a 20% increase) except that the first class fare between Lynn and London was to be 4/- more.[5] All these restrictions reflected Parliament's desire not to leave the area at the mercy of the giant railway company that it was convinced it must permit. The opposition from without was well founded in that the competition from river and coastal navigation had still to be overcome - the inland towns had of course an obvious and special case - although it is to be emphasised that the proposed rates were maxima, and not necessarily the actual rates that would have been charged.

But these concessions and gains paled into significance, as far as the East Anglian was concerned, besides the revised financial terms that the harassed Eastern Counties eventually produced in the March of 1862 to still the insistent demands of the East Anglian and the Norfolk Railway for fusion of capital and fixed interest rates. Both were conceded, so that at long

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 15th March, 1862; editorial.
2 Cf. the 'Letter to George Carr Glynn Esq., M.P., on Some Points of Railway Management in reply to a Late Pamphlet', Capt. M. Huish, London, 1848, p.17:- "the rates for the carriage of coal (although yielding a profit) are lower than ought to be imposed on railway companies. Parliament, at the instance of the Coal Owners' Association has reduced the tolls unfairly." This remained true in 1862 (when the maximum rate was still 1d per ton mile), but sounded strangely coming from a company which had been, and still was, in so much trouble over preferential coal rates.
3 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 19th April, 1862; Town Council meeting of the 14th April, 1862. 4 Ibid., 29th March, 1862; editorial.
5 Ibid., 19th April, 1862; Town Council Meeting of the 14th April, 1862.

last the vexed question of fixed annual guarantees (e.g. the £17,000 that had initially been offered to the East Anglian) could fade into oblivion. It also meant of course that individualism was truly to be submerged in the new Great Eastern, and in view of the events of the past ten years that can hardly be judged as anything but a major gain. As regards East Anglian stock the guaranteed preference shares were now to be fused into one stock, in order to facilitate marketing,[1] and, as was only to be expected, were to receive dividends as from the 30th June,1862.[2] What was new, and a startling triumph for the East Anglian, was that as from the 1st January,1863[3] the ordinary shares themselves were to receive a guaranteed dividend of 1% per annum, plus 2/5 of any dividend over 3% paid on E.C.R. original ordinary shares.[4] Above all this may be seen as the monument to Bruce's labours, the acceptance in the railway world at large that even the despised ordinary shares of the East Anglian had a positive value; Bruce's efforts had raised them to the point where they might be considered, the Lynn & Sutton Bridge and the Lynn & Hunstanton had together ensured that at the final settlement they would be. Little more could have been either asked or expected; for years the shares had been quoted at a discount of 80% or more, and a dividend of any kind would be "an entirely new sensation".[5] It remains to be noted that under the Great Eastern Railway the arrangements were altered, although the essential principle remained. At a special meeting held on the 22nd September,1863 it was resolved to divide the East Anglian ordinary shares into two classes, one, to be called No.1 Stock, amounting to £206,721, to be entitled to fixed dividends at the rate of 5% per annum, and the other, East

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,22nd March,1862; meeting of the 14th March - Simpson.
2 Ibid.,9th August,1862; meeting,8th August,1862. 3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.,22nd March,1862; meeting,14th March - Simpson.
5 Ibid.,editorial.

Anglian No.2 Stock, amounting to £826,885, to be entitled to a dividend half that paid in excess of 3% on the Great Eastern ordinary shares (e.g. the original ordinary shares of the Eastern Counties). This was implemented by the issue of £20 of No.1 and £80 of No.2 stock for each £100 of the old East Anglian ordinary shares. However, in that 5% on £20 would yield £1 per annum, and as half the excess over 3% as paid on the Great Eastern ordinary shares would be the same on £80 as 2/5 had been on £100, there was in fact to be no difference at all in actual return to the proprietors of the former East Anglian company. It may be noted in conclusion that these proprietors were to be represented on the Great Eastern board (15 seats in all, and a minimum holding qualification of £2,000) by two directors,[1] and that in Simpson they were in fact to provide a future chairman of that company.

A final word should be said as regards Lynn's interest in the Amalgamation Bill. Like Dereham,[2] and various other towns, for example Ipswich and Norwich, Lynn appreciated the potential dangers that a railway monopoly might bring. For all the set-backs and irritations that the competition of previous years had brought it was generally felt that the prospect of amalgamation in the future had stimulated the companies to greater activity and better service than might otherwise have been the case.[3] Rendered nervous by the belief that the Eastern Counties had never shown any "predeliction" for Lynn in the past,[4] the town sought only proper protection in the bill, and disclaimed any wish to oppose the Eastern Counties as such,

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 9th August, 1862; meeting of the 8th August, 1862 - Simpson.

2 Cf. ibid., 22nd February, 1862; the Town Meeting in Dereham on the 14th February.

3 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 8th January, 1862; 'A Warning about Railway Amalgamation' - letter.

4 Ibid., 1st March, 1862; Town Countil meeting of the 24th February - Moyse.

for after all that company had brought great benefits to the eastern counties as a whole.[1] The Corporation petition against the bill was therefore only to gain the locus standi necessary if security in details were to be obtained.[2] Armes held that the bill already gave such, and that the outcry against the Eastern Counties was totally unfair;[3] if tolls went up Lynn would increase its water trade.[4] But wisely the council over-rode him. It insisted on opposing the increased maxima in the proposed new scales of rates, for with them "Lynn (could) hardly escape damage".[5] It feared also the proposals for railway steamer services from Lowestoft.[6] On both these points the town, along with the East Anglian and many others, gained complete satisfaction. A further objection was that the bill might lead to the "nursing of towns of less importance into artificial prosperity",[7] the occasion for this being a clause guaranteeing express trains from Bury St.Edmunds. A similar concession to Lynn was gained. Finally, Lynn was concerned to keep the Lynn & Sutton Bridge Railway out of the amalgamation arrangements, so that the Great Eastern would always have to reckon at Lynn not only with the competition from coastal shipping and the river navigation, but also with that from an independent line leading directly to the Great Northern Railway. The concept appealed to the committee, and the clauses allowing the expenditure by the Great Eastern of £50,000 to purchase the Sutton Bridge line were expunged.[8]

On the 7th August,1862, by virtue of the act 25 & 26 Vic.c.ccxxiii, the independent existence of the East Anglian Railways Company came to a close. It now remains to assess its significance in the life of the area, and its place in railway history.

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,1st March,1862; editorial.
2 Ibid.,Council meeting of the 24th February. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.,22nd February,1862;letter - 'Looker-on'. 6 Moyse on the 24th February.
7 Ibid.,1st March,1862; editorial.
8 Ibid.,19th April,1862; Town Council meeting of the 14th April.

Chapter 9

Assessments

Section 1: The East Anglian Railways and King's Lynn

Undoubtedly much had changed in King's Lynn between 1845 and 1862, and in terms of wealth and importance the town was "not what it was".[1] Market trade was somewhat down in volume, "somehow or other" the deal trade had come to centre on Wisbech,[2] activity in the harbour was reduced, and the shipbuilding industry had for the moment ceased. Population, 16,039 in 1841, and then 19,148 in 1851, had declined by 1861 to 15,981. There were more shops and other facilities than in 1845 but fewer people to patronise them. Competition had cut available profits so that there were "half filled pockets", and because of this and "want of employment" people were "constantly drifting off to other towns and foreign countries".[3] As early as 1851 the pinch had been felt, for in that year Armes had recorded his distress at seeing old friends "who had been enjoying a comfortable living" leave the town, and those who stayed following "a profitless profession".[4] As people left the town property values had depreciated[5] (in 1861 there were 481 houses standing empty as opposed to 143 in 1851), and there were granaries "enough and to spare; yards and warehouses in abundance to let".[6] There remained from former years "a great deal of ...opulence",[7] but in terms of the individuals who enjoyed such, "merchants too rich to care about their neighbours",[8] it was "unaccompanied with the slightest degree

1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 1st February, 1862; editorial.
2 Herapath, 1st February, 1862; Simpson at the Lynn & Hunstanton meeting of the 24th January, 1862.
3 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 11th January, 1862; 'The Population and Trade of Lynn', letter of 'XYZ'.
4 Armes, op.cit.p15.
5 Letter of 'XYZ'
6 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 24th March, 1860; letter of 'Mercator'.
7 Ibid., 15th February, 1862; letter of 'Crito', 'The Trade of Lynn'
8 Ibid.

of energy".[1] As for general activity Simpson could still say of Lynn in 1862 that "there is no place in my experience as little frequented as this".[2] Features such as these and the fact that in 1863 Poor Law expenditure in the Lynn Union (£9,398) was to exceed the average for the years of 1831 to 1834 (£9,220)[3] naturally caused general alarm. The most hopeful observor could say no more than that the town's economy was "stationary",[4] while the more widely held view was that the town was in the "slough of despond", having failed to "keep pace with the times".[5]

But if every symptom of total decay appeared to exist in 1862 they were belied by the future. Population rose from the 15,981 of 1861 to the 16,363 of 1871, the 18,539 of 1881, the 20,288 of 1901 and the 26,173 of 1961; now the town is to receive a substantial number from the London overspill schemes. As mentioned in an earlier chapter a temporary revival in Lynn's fortunes during the 1850's had led to the establishment of certain new industries,attracted there by the prospects that the E.A.R. and the Norfolk Estuary Cut seemed to offer. Such hopes were not to be disappointed, for in the more important instances at least, development and prosperity were to follow. In particular should be mentioned the two firms of engineers, Alfred Dodman & Coy.Ltd., and Savages; the former was enabled during the 1860's to turn to specialisation in steam boilers and engines, and the latter, established in 1850 and today occupying 4½ acres, was enabled to establish a national reputation in marine and general engineering with particular emphasis on agricultural and fair ground machinery. Other newcomers

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1 'Crito'.

2 Herapath,1st February,1862;Lynn & Hunstanton meeting of the 24th January.

3 White's Norfolk Directory 1864,p712.

4 'Crito'.

5 'XYZ'

in the two decades after 1850 included a tobacco factory under Hilton, and a paper mill under Munn of Thetford, (although the latter was extinct by 1890), while in the same period Manning did much to revive the wine importing business of the harbour.[1] Traditional trades and manufactures associated with the farming community survived and expanded in the years after 1862, and were greatly added to in 1872 by the establishment of the West Norfolk Farmers' Manure and Chemical Co-operative Company's plant in the town. Later still came(in 1893) the Cooper Roller Bearing Company, and also a revival of shipbuilding in one yard, which continued into the 1930's when the site was taken over by Lincolnshire Canners Ltd. (Lincan). Other developments have included the establishment of a sugar beet factory on the east bank of the Ouse and also Cornish Manures Ltd. In more recent times Campbells (soups etc.), Dow Agro, Fro-pax and Mars have all come to the town, which can now contemplate a period of considerable expansion and prosperity. Central to this healthy growth now spread over a century have been the town's railways, the docks and the harbour. Although the Midland & Great Northern system was closed except for certain local sections in 1959 the Beeching economy plans have so far spared all Lynn's lines, and their future would now seem to be assured. The same is even more true of the docks. These, two of them, the Bentinck and the Alexandra, the need of which had been so keenly felt, and which the Lynn & Ely itself had sought to provide (although on a different site) came at last in 1865 and 1883 respectively, but so much did trade and the size of ships increase that even by 1900 they were felt to be too small.[2]

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,15th February,1890;Thew.
2 Hillen,op.cit.p604.

Today the same objection still applies, but even so trade,including the dispatch of barley to distilleries in Scotland and Europe and of wheat to northern England, plus general traffic in timber, grain, petroleum and general merchandise to and from Holland, Germany, the Baltic, the White Sea and elsewhere, exceeds 500,000 tons per annum and involves the clearance of about 1,000 vessels each year.[1] A small coal traffic survives still, and until recently there was a hydraulic hoist used for bunkering and loading. Much of the harbour is still in use, especially so the Boal and the South Quay, the former handling cargoes of phosphate from North Africa, potash from Europe and pyrites from Spain.[2]

It will be seen from the above that the period between 1840 and 1870 was one of very severe transition for Lynn. It will now be argued that had it not been for the East Anglian Railways it would in fact have represented the initial stages of a process of all but total decay. Inevitably the coming of "railways in the distance"[3] meant ruin for the existing economy of Lynn. This had depended too much on the security afforded by its commercial monopoly, which in turn had been based on river communications and the then severe limitations of land transport. Opportunities of gaining assurance of a positive future had been grossly neglected by the ruling families. The improvement of the harbour and its approaches had been left almost too late, the possibilities of using coal imports (in 1852 best coal was only 3/- per ton dearer in Lynn than in Birmingham)[4] to manufacture local wool,[5] to make agricultural machinery

1 Guide Book to the Port of King's Lynn,p18.

2 Ibid. 3 Armes,op.cit.p13. 4 Ibid.p30.

5 This experiment was attempted by one factory in Norwich which from the 1830's to 1850 employed power driven machinery. It failed because of the coal transport which made it impossible to compete with Yorkshire woollens or the cheaper Lancashire cottons. Lynn,however,would have been able to obtain coal rather more cheaply and easily.

on a large scale or to revive the glass making industry of the eighteenth century overlooked. In the latter case at least the possibilities should have been obvious, for much high quality sand was regularly exported to Newcastle and Sunderland for glass making[1], and the local industry had become extinct during the eighteenth century only because at the time coal had been so difficult to obtain[2]. Fishing had not been fostered despite the large local markets, and so in the 1850's Grimsby boats were enabled to fish Lynn waters for whelks and land them in the town (for despatch by rail to London) without encountering any serious or organised local opposition[3]. Also in the 1850's shipbuilding was allowed to become, for a time at least, extinct, the last vessel of which there is a record being the 400 ton brig 'Harcourt' launched in 1856. That with determination and drive this industry could have survived is implied by Armes in his account of the steam driven 'Fairy' on the Lynn - Hull - Newcastle run, for the iron moulds of this were made in Staffordshire, taken by rail to Newcastle, and thence by barge to South Shields where the vessel was assembled[4]. This could have been done equally well in Lynn where timber (local and foreign) and coal were easily to be obtained.

When railways were built from Ipswich, Norwich, Wells, Ely and Peterborough Lynn's traditional markets could not but be severely contracted, and the harbour feel serious competition from new rivals that were now entering the field[5]. When the Midland and then the Great Northern railways began to offer cheap facilities for coals and corn

1 Armes,op.cit.,p31.

2 Hillen,op.cit.,p735.

3 'XYZ'

4 Op.cit.,p38.

5 Ibid.,p24.

the harbour and indeed coastal shipping in general could not avoid damage. Thus it was that Lynn, being without reserves of any kind, suffered far more than the vast majority of towns of commensurate size and importance from the introduction of the railway system at large. The repeal of the Corn Laws was only a subsidiary factor, for surplus corn continued to come to the town and grew in amount as yields increased; meanwhile additional traffic in fertilizers, oil and seed cake and imported foreign corn offered a quid pro quo for what it had lost in corn exports through the harbour. Armes wrote in 1852 that "nothing, that I am aware of, has occurred to affect the naturally favourable position of Lynn but the introduction of the railway system"[1], and Thew, looking back from 1890 over the events of the previous fifty years, held that:[2]

> "the declension and almost total extinction of the nautical business to which Lynn owed its prosperity during several centuries was caused by the introduction of the railway system diverting the course of traffic into new routes, and for a while leaving this and other ancient mercantile entrepots stranded".

As these factors began to take their toll there had come the East Anglian, in part a measure of self defence. Some saw the company in its apparent and costly failure as itself a cause of the town's decline, arguing that in "sustaining a body of smoke hunters" Lynn had neglected the Ouse, its "principal artery"[3], and pointing to its failure to preserve for Lynn the markets of Bury and Bedford. It was of course unfortunately true that the failure of the East Anglian to produce

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1 Armes, op.cit.p12.

2 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 15th February, 1890.

3 Ibid., 'XYZ'

dividends had made some wary of further enterprise,[1] the refusal of most to back the company's proposals for fishing development[2] and of some to support the Lynn & Hunstanton project(even though 300 local men would be employed on construction)[3] were the obvious examples, and was responsible for the small but powerful body of opinion which held to the "timid and nervous policy comprehended in the maxim that the commercial interests and general prosperity of a town must necessarily be confined within the limits of its municipal boundaries".[4] But these detrimental consequences were far outweighed by the positive benefits bestowed by the company. When Simpson joined the East Anglian board in 1852 his oldest friend, seeing the company at war with its creditors and with Lynn, had said, "Give it up; it is a hopeless job; Lynn is gone for ever",[5] but Simpson did not give up, and in 1854, as E.A.R. traffic returns began to mount, was able to tell a Lynn audience that "although Lynn may have suffered from the adoption of the railway system generally, had it not been for the making of your railways you would have suffered much worse".[6] In 1862 he returned to much the same theme in reference to the Great Northern Railway and its effect on coastal trade by saying, "it would have been much more damaging if (the town) had not had direct communication and participated in the benefits as well as the drawbacks of the system then introduced".[7] What Simpson could not then know was that in fact the E.A.R. had assured the town of a prosperous future based on the mutually interdependent triple foundations of railway,

1 Cf.Herapath,1st February,1862;Simpson at the Lynn & Hunstanton meeting of the 24th January,1862.
2 Ibid.
3 Cf.Herapath,1st February,1862;Simpson at the Lynn & Hunstanton meeting of the 24th January,1862.Also see the Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk editorial of the 1st February,1862 directed against those who opposed the Lynn & Hunstanton project.
4 Simpson at the L & H meeting of the 24th January,1862.
5 Town Meeting of the 26th September,1854 to discuss the L & H. 6 Ibid.
7 At the L & H meeting of the 24th January, 1862.

Norfolk Estuary Cut and docks, the last of these still to come, but when they did through the medium of the Great Eastern Railway. With such an outcome in mind it is now possible to see the individual ways in which the E.A.R. ensured that the town would recover after its period of transition, this outcome being opposed to one of total decay into the status of a small country town at the end of a branch line from Wisbech, its citizens powerless to help themselves.

The first great service of the E.A.R. to the town was to preserve a strong nucleus of Lynn's former economic activity. In so doing it placed a brake on the forces of change and thus permitted the town more time in which to adjust itself to changing conditions. In particular the effect of the Dereham line was to preserve west and much of central Norfolk from the encroachments of Norwich, that of the Ely line to keep the trade of the eastern Fenlands from Wisbech. In addition the very fact of the railways allowed the harbour to continue with an extensive trade and ensured that eventually full benefit could be derived from the Norfolk Estuary Cut.

As a market centre Lynn remained the "grand emporium" for extensive areas[1] despite losses to the railways in the south and east and the fact that the value of the lease of the market tolls declined from the £500 of 1845 (a figure still obtaining in 1854)[2] to £345 in 1860.[3] Here there was loss, but at the same time evidence of a strong survival element. A very similar situation is to be discerned in respect of the volume of corn transactions, although in considering the reduction in these the effect of the repeal of the Corn Laws in

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1 White's Norfolk Directory 1854. 2 Ibid.

3 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 24th March, 1860.

stimulating the trend to mixed farming is to be taken into account. In 1843 107,267 quarters of wheat (at an average price of 47/10d) and 784,672 of barley (28/8d) changed hands in Lynn. In 1853, after the first shock of free trade in corn had been absorbed, 92,603 quarters of wheat and 70,035 of barley were sold in Lynn at average prices of 37/10¼d and 25/9¼d per quarter respectively;[1] in that year 800,000 quarters were exported through the harbour,[2] the majority coming there directly by rail without reference to Lynn markets. In 1860 the amount of corn sold, affected by bad weather, comprised 79,229 quarters of wheat (49/8¼d) and 46,407 of barley (35/4½d);[3] in 1863 the totals were 88,108 quarters of wheat (44/10¾d) and 88,779 of barley (35/7d).[4] It should be noted in connection with the very heavy fall in barley transactions that one effect of the railways had been to cause a dispersal of maltings and breweries along the new lines, and in fact the number of the latter in Lynn itself had dropped from 60 in 1838 to 39 in 1859. It may also be said in partial explanation of the still substantial figures for wheat that because of Lynn's railway facilities and harbour improvements Wisbech was no longer able to maintain as a regular thing the price advantage that it had enjoyed in 1845. For example, in the last week of 1854 Lynn wheat stood at 73/11d per quarter as opposed to the latter's 71/9¼d, in the last week of February, 1855 it was 64/10¾d as against 62/10½d, and in the last week of 1859 41/9d as opposed to 40/9d in Wisbech.[5]

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1 White's Norfolk Directory 1854,p577. 2 Ibid.

3 Calculated from weekly returns in the Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald. During the year wheat prices ranged between 60/11¾d and 40/4½d, those of barley between 46/8d and 26/-.

4 White's Norfolk Directory 1864,p729.

5 These and many other examples are derived from weekly returns in the Lymn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald.

As will be seen in the next section the E.A.R. did much to make possible the increased concern of the Norfolk farmers for livestock farming. The result of the facilities offered to them by the E.A.R. was to more than compensate Lynn markets for the losses sustained through the fact that the absence of a direct line to the town from Boston and Sleaford had caused much livestock to be taken directly to the Norwich and Peterborough markets, as a preface to fattening for the London markets.[1] Thus the figures for 1843 and 1860 may be compared to show one great benefit bestowed directly by the East Anglian; in both years the figures exclude sales in the free markets outside the town.

Livestock Sales in Lynn [2]

	Pigs	Sheep	Beasts
1843	25,172	53,665	16,863
1860	17,146	112,550	18,622

The importance of the East Anglian in helping towards the increases noted above and in maintaining corn and general market trade at reasonable levels cannot be denied. It was because these things were achieved that the town continued in the face of every difficulty to offer a vast range of services to a large area of surrounding countryside; it was on this hard core of former prosperity that new departures could be based, the first signs of this being the appearance in the 1850's of some of the new enterprises noted in a previous paragraph.

In respect of the harbour, so vastly improved by the Norfolk Estuary Cut and the railways own activities on the quaysides, the

[1] Ibid., 8th December, 1862; Drake at the Town Meeting of the 5th December.

[2] The 1843 figures are from White's Norfolk Directory 1845, those for 1860 are compiled from weekly returns in the local press.

'braking' effect on change of the East Anglian is to be seen with equal clarity. Here it was to be expected that the crushing effect of the Great Northern Railway on coastal shipping and the rates' war waged by the Eastern Counties on behalf of Lowestoft might have involved utter ruin for the harbour. In fact the improvements made there by the railway company, the facilities it offered through the harbour branch, and the part played by Bruce and Simpson in overturning Waddington's board together saved the day and gave positive value to the Norfolk Estuary Cut. In one sense the effects of inland railways on the harbour at Lynn certainly were decisive, for they swept away the old, clumsy and slow wooden vessels, the 'Bee', 'Gem', 'Volusia' and the rest[1] described in an earlier chapter, and for the rest caused either diversion to foreign trade[2] and, or, replacement by modern iron ships[3] such as the 'Fairy' which sailed weekly to Hull and Newcastle; the London passenger service entirely ceased;[4] this in face of competition from the East Anglian and the Eastern Counties combined. Numerous examples of trading figures and sources of traffic have been discussed at length in previous chapters, and so only certain salient features need to be summarised here. The most striking feature was of course the manner in which, largely because of the E.A.R.'s efforts, the coal trade had kept up. Totals included the 187,514 tons of 1852, the 201,236 of 1853, the 172,589 of 1854, the 158,536 of 1855 and the 163,370 of 1856.[5] These figures are to be

1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 24th February, 1872; reprint of the lecture delivered by Armes in 1858.

2 Hillen, op.cit.p604; also cf. Bruce's remarks on the revenue of 1856 and 1857.

3 Hillen, op.cit.p604.

4 Armes in the lecture of 1858.

5 Hillen, op.cit.p606.

compared with an average of about 220,000 tons per annum in the years prior to 1845. Obviously there had been heavy loss, and the figures quoted indicate overall a declining trend which was to continue in later years as coastal shipping with its heavy capital cost, the extra handling involved in it and its liability to delay, plus the fact that coals were susceptible to extensive breakage when using it, was quite unable in the long run to compete with inland railways. It is to the credit of the East Anglian, in an ironical alliance with the Lynn ship owners, that the decline was to be extended over many years.

Luck of course played some part in this, in that both the Great Northern Railway and the Midland Railway over-reached themselves in their commitments and in their anxiety to offer cheap conveyance when a steady and gradual approach would have been just as effective in the long run. Even by 1852 the Great Northern Railway could not meet its contracts in London[1] where since the traffic began in the Spring of 1851 coal prices had fallen from 30/- per ton to 17/-;[2] in the July of 1860, as a result of a Chancery suit, the company was obliged to give up the sale of coal in its own right.[3] The market in East Anglia was inevitably upset by the excessively cheap rates of ½d per ton mile offered by the G.N.R. and the Midland Railway,rates which for a time caused a "fever for cheap inland coals",[4] but the lack of profits in this meant that within a very few years coal rates had risen to an economic level; thus early in the 1850's certainly by 1852, a balance was being struck where "inland coal cannot pass Peterborough (for the Lynn area) to advantage against sea coals".[5]

1 Armes,op.cit.p21.

2 Grinling,op.cit.p102.

3 Ibid.,p188.

4 Armes,op.cit.p15.

5 Ibid.,p19. He quotes the example of Wellingborough where sea coal was 14/6d per ton,but railway coal 17/-.

Thus, while the E.A.R. offered cheap and adequate facilities, Lynn could continue to supply a still extensive area more cheaply than could be done entirely by rail. Only the areas south of the Peterborough – Ely – Norwich line need be a total loss, while certain areas in central and northern Norfolk would become a matter for competition with Yarmouth, Lowestoft and Wells. What was to finish off the coal staple of Lynn Harbour entirely was the opening of the March to Lincoln line in the 1880's.

This loss of markets and the low prices did have the effect, however, of emptying the Ouse of the Humber keels[1], a development which displeased the Corporation because of the lost tolls but vastly pleased the Lynn shipowners, as did also the fact that as a result of the Lynn & Ely line the danger of vessels passing directly to Ely had been finally averted.[2] Because of these factors, and in spite of the wholesale displacement of the old fashioned ships, it was a curious by-product of the East Anglian Railways, perhaps because it served to concentrate opposition in one quarter, that Lynn shipping was to a certain extent stimulated when in the hands of enterprising individuals; one such, T. Williams, actually maintained a fleet of 100 sail during the early 1850's[3], and the number of vessels registered in Lynn rose from 173 in 1852 to 182 in 1853.[4]

The resilience of Lynn shipping, the threat to the coastal trade, the Norfolk Estuary Cut and the facilities afforded by the East Anglian together led to exploitation of Lynn's favourable geographical position

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1 Armes, op.cit.pp17–18.

2 Armes in his 1858 lecture.

3 Armes, op.cit.pp17–18.

4 Hillen, op.cit.p606.

in relation to the continent and to the development of a new harbour trade. This was along the lines indicated in previous chapters and comprised principally the importation of foreign corn and timber, fertilizers, oil and seed cake and a wide range of miscellaneous goods - all this in spite of the levy of 4d per ton imposed by the Corporation on the ships of all 'strangers'. General traffic in and out of the harbour thus totalled 79,075 tons in 1852, 76,886 in 1853, 66,712 in 1854, 61,973 in 1855 and 70,204 in 1856.[1] This period of fluctuation in turn gave way to a rising trend (in addition to the extra traffic which came to the Bentinck dock), evidenced as early as 1866[2] and reflected in the harbour tolls which yielded £1,585-2-9d in 1869 and £2,286-15-8d in 1879. Thereafter they fell to £1,486-11-4d in 1889[3] (when they were abolished as acting prejudicially to trade), but by then, in any case, the second dock and the line from March to Lincoln had both been opened. As for actual shipping figures in the years to 1862 the impression given is one of brisk traffic at nearly all times, although always the unfortunate discrepancy, a major weakness in the port's economy, between the numbers of laden ships arriving and those of laden ships leaving the harbour is to be observed.[4] In the three years of 1852 to 1854 coastal arrivals (excluding those carrying sand) totalled 1,584, 1,578 and 1,351 for each year respectively, but laden departures were no more than 508, 416 and 340. Foreign arrivals in the same period were 182, 170 and 175 as

1 Hillen, op.cit.p606.

2 Memoirs of J.W.Aiken.

3 Hillen, op.cit.p602.

4 For evidence that contemporaries were conscious of this defect see Armes, op.cit.p22.

against departures of 11, 2 and 15.[1] The impression of a steady and brisk trade is stronger in the later years before 1862 as may be seen by particular reference to the weekly returns printed in the local press; for example, between the 6th and the 12th January, 1860 33 vessels arrived (28 of which were in coals) and 26 left (10 in ballast); during the first week of 1862 itself there were 32 arrivals (25 of which were in coals);[2] in the April of 1862 itself the arrival of two Oporto and Cadiz wine ships provided a sound indication of further revival.[3] For this and much else the East Anglian deserved the thanks of the town. It is to be remembered that when figures are quoted, in terms of registered tonnage, to show that Lynn was once the fifth port of the kingdom, but that by 1801 it had become the twenty-first and by 1872 the thirty-eighth,[4] that the apparent decline is in fact only in relationship to the growth of others, and in reality concealed quite substantial growth. In this particular context it is worth mentioning that events over the years had largely served to allay the town's former fears of Wisbech, and it had been realised that with sufficient trade for both the two could live side by side as did, for example, Liverpool and Birkenhead, or Grimsby, Goole and Hull.[5] Untrammelled by old charters and Corporation rights Wisbech had certainly made great strides, the local merchants themselves lending strong financial support to river and harbour improvements, but, as seen in earlier sections, despite the loss of much of the deal trade, Lynn's averages had been maintained,[6] and

1 Hillen,op.cit.p606.
2 See the weekly returns in the Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald.
3 Ibid.,26th April,1862;editorial entitled,'A Revival'.
4 Cf.Hillen,op.cit.p602.
5 Cf.Armes,op.cit.p25.
6 Ibid.,p26.

when depression came both suffered equally.[1]

The second group of services rendered by the East Anglian Railways to Lynn concerned its effect on the social structure and outlook of the town, although again the railway is not to be viewed in isolation or apart from the Norfolk Estuary Cut. As shown in earlier chapters, Lynn's potential economic progress had long been inhibited by the almost total social, civic and commercial power wielded by a small group of families. In the social sense the construction of the railways and the Estuary Cut works had truly opened "a breach in the town walls" allowing strangers of all kinds to pour in.[2] At the same time the old 'high caste' families were already reeling under the repeal of the Corn Laws which had made them, believing that trade was gone,[3] shelve their capital,[4] withdraw partly from business and pay increasing attention to their country estates, so becoming "tradesmen, half gentlemen and half farmers" without further economic ambition.[5] In the commercial field the newcomers, who intended to exploit the boom that the railways were expected to bring, constituted "a newer race of bustling individuals"[6] who, in their business enterprises, completed the rout of the old "gentlemanly merchants" by adopting a policy of "small profits and quick returns".[7] There was some degree of recovery for a time, and then a long and lingering rear-guard action, but even so it was clear that the Lynn townsmen at large had of necessity "given up all idea of a future close corporation".[8]

1 Armes, op.cit.p27.
2 Armes, the lecture of 1858.
3 Armes, op.cit.p22.
4 'XYZ'
5 'Crito'
6 Thew's Memoirs, 1890.
7 Memoirs of J.W.Aiken, 1866.
8 Armes, lecture of 1858.

The recovery had come early in the 1850's after the first shock of the repeal of the Corn Laws had worn off and trade had begun to creep back. Armes wrote in 1852 that "there are now no granaries of importance to be let"[1], and he confidently forecast that the worst of the depression was over[2]. That he was wrong in this has already been shown, for a long period of low corn prices was still to come, but it was in that period as the construction works were finished and people began to leave the town, so causing harsh commercial competition within Lynn, that the newer men established their ascendancy and so ensured an enterprising future for the town. In 1854 the council still contained representatives of the Bagge and Pitcher families, but also such men as William Everard, Lionel Self, Francis Cresswell, Seppings and Goodwin, all members by birth of the old guard, but as individuals the ones who had accepted change, and who had gone at least part way with the railways in fact and the whole way in principle. But most significantly of all the council now contained men of the type of William Armes and Sugars, the building contractor. Death had also played a part, for by 1862 Goodwin, Folkes, Cresswell, William Everard, Bircham, Edward and Richard Bagge, Platten, Bowker, G.Hogge and Seppings were all dead (Edward Everard died in 1864, Pitcher in 1867); what is important is that their places were taken by men whose names were new ones and who have no place in this story except that their opportunity was created by the coming of the East Anglian railways. Some complained that the encouragement of strangers was detrimental to Lynn[3], but in fact it was the town's great gain, for amongst the newcomers was to be found the

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1 Armes, op.cit.p22

2 Ibid., p15.

3 Cf. 'XYZ'

flickering but surviving spirit of enterprise and resilience which, as shown in the early paragraphs of this chapter, was so obviously lacking amongst many, if not most, of the older inhabitants of Lynn. The fostering of this spirit was the third major service rendered by the East Anglian to the Lynn community.

Initially this had been done by the concept and establishment of the railways as such, for, as Lacy expressed it in 1847, it was "unparalleled" for Lynn to do anything like it had done in 1845.[1] The coming of the railways then gave the essential stimulus that carried the flagging Norfolk Estuary Cut project to completion, so providing Lynn with the second of the three foundations (the third was the docks) on which its future prosperity was to be based. Later, as seen in an earlier chapter, it was the persistent pressure and example of the East Anglian which at last brought the Corporation to the quaying of the Boal and other harbour improvements. It was these various factors, plus the revival in agriculture, which accounted for the improved spirit of Lynn and the establishment of new industries there during the 1850's and 1860's. It was this, central to the railways, that made the Great Eastern Railway feel in 1863 that it was worthwhile to invest in proper docks at Lynn, the concept itself a legacy of the Lynn & Ely. In fact the Great Eastern offered £40,000 if the Corporation would do the same. Lingering defeatism amongst some members of the council caused the rejection of this,[2] but even so the first of the two docks still came in 1865. The determined example of the East Anglian and the relative success it had achieved despite the enormous difficulties encountered

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1 Herapath, 30th October, 1847, p1230; Lacy at the banquet of the 27th October, held to mark the completion of the mainline to Ely,

2 White's Norfolk Directory 1864, p740.

played a major role in creating the attitude of mind that made this so. The East Anglian had made the town see, at least the more thoughtful members of the community had been made to see[1], that docks were imperative to complete the re-equipping of Lynn; by its example and achievements it had given substance to the feeling that the worst was in fact over by 1862 and that prosperity could lie ahead.[2] By its history it had brought realisation of the essential fact that Manchester men and other industrial capitalists would only help Lynn if the town first helped itself.[3]

One other, and rather strange, facet of East Anglian influence may be cited in this general context. Despite words and business attitudes of general pessimism concerning Lynn's future the old guard throughout this period still showed itself as willing to expend time, energy and even its own capital on the further development of town facilities, so indicating that some degree of hope remained alive even in the most unlikely quarters, and that the concept of total decay had not really been accepted. Thus Lynn gained during these years a new wing to the West Norfolk & Lynn Hospital (1852)[4], the Athenaeum (1853), St.John's School (1853), the Lord Stanley Library (1854), a new workhouse (at a cost of £9,915)[5] as well as a new Corn Exchange erected in 1854 at a cost of £986-13s.[6] There was also an unsuccessful building speculation

1 Cf.the Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald editorial of the 10th March,1860,'Crito' on the 15th February,1860,and others.

2 Cf.J.W.Aiken in 1866. 3 Cf.'Crito'. 4 Hillen,op.cit.p583.

5 Ibid.,p595;also cf.'XYZ'.

6 Ibid.,p614.

in the form of the public baths opened in 1856 at a cost of £1,250.[1] These hopeful signs were of course accompanied by such purblindness as the tax of 4d per ton levied on 'strangers' using the harbour[2] and the continuation in all its costly and discouraging complexity of the system of harbour tolls. They were also essentially non-productive, placing a further burden on the general rate,[3] which in 1862 at 11/4d in the pound was at the highest level ever.[4] Moreover, in 1859, despite widely expressed wishes for centralisation and economy in town services, £1,200 was expended in obtaining a further Improvement Act, although in 1856 a project for obtaining a permanent water supply to the town at a cost of only £10,000 had been rejected on grounds of cost.[5] This was a strange mixture indeed. Basically it represented uncertainty as to the future, and illustrated the fundamental issue that perplexed the older men - was the town in fact doomed to decay or was it simply that change and readjustment in the town had not yet gone far enough? That the issue was eventually resolved in favour of the latter alternative was due in no small part to the presence and example of the East Anglian Railways.

The last major contribution made by the E.A.R. to Lynn was to provide the town with the opportunities for further invaluable railway development in the future so that it could share fully in the benefits

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1 Memoirs of J.W.Aiken,1866.For other examples see Appendix U.

2 This was to pay the town's contribution to the Norfolk Estuary Cut.In itself it proved to be insufficient,and in 1855 part of the town estate had to be mortgaged as a security against a loan taken up by the Mooring Commissioners (Hillen,op.cit.p591).

3 Cf.'XYZ'

4 Hillen,op.cit.p664.

5 Not until 1863 was the necessary machinery obtained;this was not put into use until 1866,and even then the town was without water on Sundays and daily from 5.00 p.m. to 7.00 a.m.(Hillen,op.cit.P797).

deriving from the railway system at large. The part played by the East Anglian in launching the Lynn & Hunstanton Railway has already been described at length, and it is therefore sufficient to say here that right from its opening it justified the expectations of its promoters, and has served to bring thousands of holiday makers into and through Lynn. Like the L & E and the L & D lines it has so far escaped the threat of closure, and Hunstanton today stands as a flourishing resort with a population of nearly 4,000. Eventually to be of equal importance was the Sutton Bridge line, also helped into existence by the East Anglian. Significant enough from the outset, when it offered Lynn an independent outlet to the Great Northern Railway, its importance to Lynn was further enhanced when it became a central link in the system of companies that in 1893 joined to form the Midland & Great Northern Joint Railway, a network (see the map on p.557) giving Lynn through and direct communication with centres such as Peterborough, Nottingham and Birmingham, and alternative routes to Norwich, Yarmouth and London. In all this the East Anglian had done more than provide the actual physical foundation for further developments. It had also led to the realisation that the town's prosperity depended on railways,[1] and that a town could not have sufficient lines of internal communication.[2] From this it arose that Lynn allowed no more opportunities for bettering its railway position to slip by, a matter of common sense and necessity of which it was warned by Armes in 1860.[3]

Before attempting a final assessment in this section brief note should be made of a number of ways in which, other than by major benefits,

1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,1st February,1862;editorial.
2 Ibid.,8th December,1860;Armes at a Town Meeting of the 5th December.
3 Ibid.

The Midland & Great Northern Joint Railway System



The first constituent member of the above was the Spalding & Holbeach in 1853 (see chapter 8), subsequently extended to Sutton Bridge (as the Spalding & Norwich) by an act of 1859. At Sutton Bridge this was joined by the Lynn & Sutton Bridge, incorporated by an act of 1861 (see chapter 8). Both were worked from the outset by the Great Northern Railway, and in 1877 amalgamated with the Spalding & Bourne to form the Midland & Eastern. At Sutton Bridge was a junction with the Peterborough, Wisbech & Sutton Bridge, incorporated in 1863 and worked by the Midland Railway. Next were formed the Lynn & Fakenham (finished in 1880), the Yarmouth & North Norfolk and the Yarmouth Union which in August, 1882 amalgamated to form the Eastern & Midlands Railway (this was before the two latter were complete). On the 1st August, 1883 the Eastern & Midlands Railway absorbed the Midland & Eastern. Both the Great Northern and the Midland had interests involved and, after some years of conflict, jointly took over the lines west of Lynn in 1889, those to the east in 1893 at which time the Midland & Great Northern Joint Railway was formed.

N.B. The Eastern & Midlands Railway had wanted its own station at Lynn, but was short of money; as a result a line was laid from Bawsey Sidings near Gayton Road to the L & H line and so into the former E.A.R. station. The line was lifted in 1886 when the West Lynn station was also closed.

the East Anglian affected Lynn. Amongst such may be rementioned the boon to Corporation finances provided by the money paid by the railways in compensation for Corporation land; many of the developments mentioned in earlier sections concerning the development of town facilities were made possible by this; other uses of the railway money are specified in an appendix. A further aid to the Corporation, and presumably to many private persons as well, was that the value of lands near the lines generally rose, in some cases quite substantially. Examples of this became apparent in 1862 when a number of leases from the Corporation expired. A 5 acre property now was leased at £33 instead of £23, one of 13 acres for £42 and not £24; the rents of 3 acres on the Chase rose from £12 to £18, and those of 6 acres (three pieces in all) near the Harbour Junction from £20-5s to £27. The increases applied also outside the town; a 7 acre piece was now let at £34 and not £30-12-3d as hitherto, another of 9 acres for £45 and not £38, both properties lying adjacent to the Lynn & Ely line and near Middleton Stop Drain.[1] In other ways the East Anglian assisted the town to weather the storm of changing conditions. Local contractors, for example Sugars, and those who built the houses to cater for the influx of population during the construction period, received work, some, with investments in the preference shares, an income. A few local men found employment in construction, some 80 or so regular work on the finished lines.[2]

For the sake of completeness two or three destructive results should also receive brief mention. Coachmen and many carriers were put

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 8th March, 1862.

2 Cf. the 1861 Census, Vol.2, p315; living in the borough were 17 drivers etc., 19 officials, 19 servants and 15 others in railway employment.

out of work, although even as late as 1864 some 53 villages and towns were still linked to Lynn by the latter,[1] and some services continued at least until 1939. A second effect of this nature was that felt by the traditional markets and fairs of the town; in this Lynn institutions shared the fate of many throughout the country. Thus, the Lynn Mart, still continuing today, became a pleasure fair only; the Cheese Fair (17th and 18th October) suffered the same transformation, until eventually being abolished as a nuisance in 1878. The St.Valentine's Fair and Market disappeared altogether. These changes occurred because of the increased accessibility of Lynn, but by the same token the regular Tuesday and Saturday markets continued and grew, and indeed flourish today. Finally should be mentioned the partial loss sustained by the Corporation, although this was amply compensated in other directions, in the reduced value of the lease of the ferry rights over the Ouse as a result of the Wisbech branch and, later, the line from Sutton Bridge; in 1850 these rights were let for £370, in 1851 for £400 (but this lease was to Peto & Betts during the construction of the Estuary Cut) - in 1869 the figure was no more than £180.[2]

These minor destructive effects, however, barely deserve mention when finally assessing the relationship between Lynn and the East Anglian Railways. This company had acted as a brake on the forces of change and so provided the town with sufficient time in which to readjust itself to changed conditions; in this readjustment it had played a central role in all calculations and planning; in the future it was to prove the lifeline of the town's new prosperity. To place

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1 White's Norfolk Directory 1864,pp771-2.

2 Hillen,op.cit.pp717f.

both the company and Lynn in a wider context the relationship between them may be seen as part of a general process in the breakdown of the old inhibiting monopolies of commerce and the establishment of a freer commercial atmosphere in which all, even the agricultural labourers, had a more reasonable chance of coming to share in the growing national prosperity. The country at large gained enormously from such changes in industry, communications and commerce and it was the role, however ironical, of companies such as the East Anglian to ensure that these were achieved with the minimum of localised economic and social dislocation. Railways should "make all begin again" said Armes in 1852[1], and, although Lynn was not stimulated into extensive manufacturing enterprise as he hoped[2], his judgement proved to be sound when applied to matters of attitude, which, in the end, proved to be of equal importance.

The East Anglian lines did not achieve all that they set out to do. That would have been an impossibility as industrial and transport changes could never have been either confined to or excluded from any given area. The lines were moreover couched essentially in the conditions of the pre-railway age, and these were doomed even before construction of the Lynn lines had commenced. The agonies of the East Anglian reflected the realisation of and adjustment to the realities of the situation. If the company had failed to survive Lynn's plight would indeed have been a sorry one, for it is very doubtful whether any further capital would have been risked to save what could be no more than a dying community. Such a thought naturally gives rise to the issue of whether or not railways should be regarded as a public service

1 Op.cit.p27

2 Ibid.,p28.

as opposed to a business organisation to be judged solely by the extent of its profits; this question will be considered in the final section of the present chapter.

It remains to ask whether or not the East Anglian could have done more for Lynn. The answer must be an unqualified negative, despite the company's failure to extend to Bury, Bedford and Spalding during the years reviewed. The might of the Eastern Counties and the stranglehold that that company was enabled to exercise against the East Anglian, the new patterns of trade being imposed by the opening of the Midland and the Great Northern railways, the complexities of railway power politics, the loss of public confidence in railway investment after 1846, the failure of Lynn itself to respond with sufficient force, and the long delays before the completion of the Estuary Cut (plus the failure of the docks scheme to materialise) together constituted well nigh overwhelming odds. In this light the failures of the East Anglian were understandable, its achievements beyond reasonable expectation, and it is by the latter that it must be judged.

The East Anglian's monument was "the illimitable inland communication now enjoyed by the port" (Armes,1852)[1]; or,as White said in 1864, "the great railway facilities" possessed by Lynn.[2] To claim as Armes did, in apparent self-contradiction, that the lines were "tortuous" in character[3] was sheer folly; it was established in the first chapter of this work that with the exception of the Wisbech branch the wisest routes possible were chosen, this being so whether the question be viewed from the

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1 Op.cit.p24. 2 White's Norfolk Directory 1864,p711.

3 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,8th December,1860,Town Meeting of the 5th December.

standpoint of 1844 or that of future developments. In any case, whichever alternatives had been adopted in 1844 there would have been losses to counter the gains. To say, as some did, that the lines were too short and served too meagre a district to succeed from either their own or Lynn's point of view[1] took cognizance of the fact that lack of headway militates against fully effective operation,[2] but, unbeknown to contemporary observers, was in effect illustrating the development of the rift between railway proprietors as such and mercantile interests that had remained so completely unsuspected during the early period of the promotions; the argument also pointed the way to future amalgamations for the sake of adequate headways and fully economical workings rather than the furtherance of purely parochial interests as such.

Section 2: The East Anglian Railways and the Countryside

A. The Farmers

For most of the period covered by this study the farmers of Norfolk and the Fenlands had suffered from the depression in corn prices (in 1850 these were at the same level as in 1770) brought about by free trade in corn and a combination of lesser factors. In retrospect, however, these years were to be seen as the preface to an era of considerable prosperity, namely that of 'High Farming', when rationalisation of methods and the application of scientific principles allowed for the maximum exploitation of the naturally fertile land and the advantage against foreign competition. To this happy situation as it applied in Norfolk and the Fens the East Anglian had made important contributions; in particular had its lines provided a direct aid to recovery and a

1 Herapath, 1st February, 1862; quoted by Simpson at the L & H meeting of the 24th January, 1862.

2 Railway Times, 11th August, 1860, pp892-6; meeting of the 9th August - Bruce. Headway refers to the maximum distance between terminals.

basis for expansion.

In the first place it had afforded ready access to accustomed markets, especially so those of London at a time when railways in general were serving to make the whole of the eastern counties the "garden"[1] of the capital; at the same time, because of the E.A.R. and its connections new markets could be sought out in the midlands and the north.

Secondly the railways facilitated the conversion to mixed farming which was to prove the salvation of the area's agricultural economy. In particular this arose from the elimination of the slow and costly droves to London on which sheep had lost 7 lbs. in weight and bullocks 28 lbs.[2] Through the prevention of this waste and because of the possibility of sending bullocks to London at between 9/- and 12/- per beast,[3] and despite the bruising of livestock commented on from time to time, Hudson of Castleacre (near the Lynn & Dereham) was enabled to save £600 per annum.[4] Other consequences of cheap and rapid transit were that sheep could be sent to market at an earlier age and land, hitherto deemed inferior, could be brought into use as profitable permanent pasture. Turkeys once

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1 Cf.Lives of the Engineers by Smiles(Popular edition,London,1904),intro. p.xxvii. Cf.also White's Norfolk Directory 1845,p37,quoting from Barugh Almack who speaks of the plentiful and superior poultry sent to London in large quantities from Norfolk especially at Christmas;also cf.the Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,7th January,1861,where a list of produce carried into London by the E.C.R. between the 17th and 24th December,1860 includes 213 tons of fish,297 tons of meat,243 tons of poultry,16 tons of oysters,11,166 turkeys,13,660 geese,1,600 pheasants, 4,141 sheep,1,892 sacks of potatoes,14,259 of flour,40,916 quts.of milk etc.etc.

2 Caird,op.cit.p169.

3 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,22nd February,1862;Freeman at the East Dereham Town Meeting of the 14th February.

4 Caird,op.cit.p169.

sent "on the hoof" to London were carried by train from 1850[1], while in that same year Mr.Overman of Weasenham was enabled to commence the regular despatch of butter to the capital[2]. In the reverse direction the railway ensured that the large quantities of seed and oil cake (also fertilizers for root crops) so essential if more animals were to be kept could be cheaply and readily obtained. The Farmers knew when they were well off, for the possibility that bullock rates to London might be raised (e.g. those from Dereham to 20/-) was the principal cause of local opposition to the Eastern Counties' Amalgamation Bill of 1862.[3]

A third most important contribution made by the East Anglian was the means it afforded to farmers to improve on crop yields by bringing to their doors the new fertilizers, especially guano, nitrate of soda and super-phosphates, that were coming into extensive use by 1850. Many also benefited from the cheap coal necessary for the new steam machinery (itself brought by rail) ranging from field appliances to the steam pumps on the Fens. What these benefits meant to the individual farmer may be gauged from the expansion achieved by John Hudson on his land at Castleacre.[4] Two other persons had refused the 997 acres of Lodge Farm before he took it over in 1822; then the average yield per acre had been no more than 20 bushels of wheat and 24 of barley, while the root crops that could be grown were sufficient to support only ten beasts through the winter. As late as 1847 the four course rotation

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1 G.E.Fussell,'High Farming' in the East Midlands and East Anglia,1840-1880,Economic Geography,Vol.27,No.1,January 1951,pp85-7.

2 Caird,op.cit.p170.

3 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,22nd February,1862;Town Meeting at East Dereham on the 14th February,1862.

4 The information is derived principally from Caird,op.cit.p169f.and G.E.Fussell,'High Farming' in the East Midlands and East Anglia,1840-1880,Economic Geography,Vol.27,No.1,January,1951,pp85-7.

was being practised, but this had given way to the five course by 1869. By then £2,000 or more per annum was being spent on oil cake, and £800 to £1,100 on artificial manures, so that it had become possible to maintain between 100 and 140 steers through the winter, the exact number depending on the yield of the root crops. Grass lands had been improved by feeding cake to sheep on them. All crops were heavily manured, and modern machines were in use, for example the Burgess & Key reaping machine, steam threshers, and, after 1864, a Fowler steam cultivating set. In addition 400 breeding ewes were kept, and lambs fed off to the London market at 10 to 12 months. Between 1855 and 1860 36 to 40 bushels of wheat and 40 to 50 of barley per acre were being grown.[1] Such an increase, largely attributable to the extensive application of manures and fertilizers, was achieved by many others; for example, Overman of Weasenham was averaging 36 bushels of wheat and 45 of barley per acre by 1848, as against the 25 and 31 respectively yielded during the 1830's.

It may be said with confidence that while the recovery and then the further development of Norfolk and Fenland farming rested essentially on purely agricultural factors they could not have taken place without the railways. The East Anglian Railways offered by the cheap transportation of livestock the direct means and encouragement to escape from serious and prolonged depression in corn prices. It then afforded to the farmers the opportunities of obtaining the necessities for progressive and intensive cultivation. Finally, it continued, by the

1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 24th March, 1860; Hudson to a meeting of the Central Farmers' Club.

dispersal of produce, to maintain and expand the range of markets open to the farmers of the areas it served. By that stage its role had become subsidiary and taken for granted, but the fact remains that in the crucial aspect of timing its advent and operation had been for a period of some years all-important in the recovery.

B. Towns and Local Industries

A major effect of railways at large in rural areas such as the eastern counties was to accentuate changes that were already becoming clearly marked in the field of industry. In Norfolk the railways finally ended the domestic industries and the manufacture of wool and worsted (these had virtually disappeared by 1870)[1], and led to the concentration of industrial activities into fewer centres.[2] At the same time Norfolk and Suffolk gained from a second trend made possible by railways, and encouraged by cheapness of land and labour, for industries such as silk and printing to move out of London into the rural areas; the years after 1850 also saw the establishment of horse hair weaving and brush making industries in the two counties designed to meet the needs of railways and urban populations.[3] Ease of obtaining raw materials and of distribution led to the growth of engineering in connection with agricultural machinery, particular centres of this being East Dereham, Thetford (1860), Diss and King's Lynn; of these the two former also became, by 1900, important as centres of a malting industry[4] that remained widespread but which had in the intervening years gravitated to towns and villages directly served by rail. In short, by their creation of

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1 T. Eastwood, Industry in the County Towns of Norfolk and Suffolk (the report of a survey conducted in 1946-7), Oxford University Press, 1951, p9.

2 Ibid., p47. 3 Ibid., p9. 4 Ibid., p10.

markets on a national scale, railways ended the manufactures which were in competition with those of a similar kind in better favoured areas (e.g. local woollens in competition with those of Yorkshire), but led to the development of activities, in this case light industries in the main[1], suited to the needs and resources of the rural areas. With particular reference to Norfolk it appears to have been a common feature that the first impact of railways led to a growth of population in towns served by rail greater than elsewhere or in the county as a whole. Norfolk increased its population from 412,664 in 1841 to 442,714 in 1851[2], a rise of 7.2%, but in the same decade that of Lynn rose from 16,039 to 19,355 (17.2%), that of Swaffham 3,358 to 3,858 (15%), that of Dereham from 3,837 to 4,385 (13%) and that of Downham Market 2,953 to 3,262 (10%); in the same years the population of Norwich rose from 62,344 to 68,195 (10%) and that of Yarmouth from 24,259 to 26,880 (10%). This feature is to be explained partly by natural growth, but more especially by reference to the new industries, the construction of the railways themselves, and to the fact that the coming of the railways apparently led to a greater degree of market business and concentration of services in certain of the more accessible centres[3]. In the following decades this tendency developed further so that many of the Norfolk market towns ceased to grow and declined steadily in significance. Each one again tended to fall within the sphere of one or other of the larger towns, but with the significant difference as compared with the situation in 1845 that now such spheres were delineated by the convenience and quality of service

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1 A recent survey shows that in modern Norfolk there are 2,545 small industries employing nearly 10,000 people in more than 40 trades; this excludes the main industries of the larger towns.

2 The Annual Register 1862, p278 gives a revised figure of 434,798.

3 For list of Norfolk market towns and population changes (1841 to 1851) see Appendix V.

offered rather than by lack of alternative.

The effects of the East Anglian on Lynn and Wisbech have been studied, the former at length. Little need be said of Ely which flourished and grew as a railway junction of some significance without any noteworthy departure in the economic field. As seen above Swaffham and Downham Market both registered an increase in population, but in the absence of new industries this must be attributed to natural growth and increased business attracted to the two towns, especially the former, as railway centres. But as the East Anglian became established these increases no more than balanced the losses suffered at the hands of Lynn in terms of market trade;[1] even today the population of Swaffham is no more than 2,900, that of Downham Market 2,800.

It was in East Dereham that the principal effects of the railway were to be seen. In 1845, when its population was 3,837, it already had several brewers and malthouses, a sack manufactory, two iron foundries, an agricultural implements maker, an establishment for making mill machinery and two others for making carriages.[2] By 1854, the population now something approaching 4,500 (4,385 in 1851), all these remained, but had been added to by a steam saw mill, two more iron foundries and further engineering establishments where agricultural implements were "extensively" made.[3] Old and new industries were booming, and White recorded how "the trade of the town has considerably increased since the opening of the railway."[4] Another development had been the erection of "extensive granaries" near the station, through which "extremely large"

1 Cf. White's Norfolk Directory 1854 in respect of Downham's losses.

2 White's Norfolk Directory 1845.

3 White's Norfolk Directory 1854, p802.

4 Ibid.

quantities of corn were despatched by rail.[1] Indeed, as the junction for three lines, Dereham possessed every advantage that railway communication could bring, and in the years that followed continued to develop. Today its population numbers some 6,400, and besides the older industries the town contains Jentique Ltd.(furniture), Hobbies Ltd.(handicrafts) and Cranes Ltd. (vehicle manufacturers), as well as continuing as a major centre in the Norfolk malting industry.

C. The Villages and the Lives of the People

Changes in village life come only very slowly, and detailed examination of some 18 Norfolk villages directly affected by the East Anglian lines has revealed surprisingly few changes of real significance between 1845 and 1864. It is because of this that detailed figures have been relegated to the Appendix,[2] and only certain overall features retained in the text. The most obvious change is the increased number of general stores in the villages contained in the study; those described as shopkeepers rose from 11 in 1845 to 21 in 1864, those as grocers and drapers from 10 to 14. However, it must be added that there were no less than 16 different designations employed by White in his directories of 1845 and 1864 to indicate various kinds of shopkeeper, and if all be taken into account the increase during the period is only one of from 60 to 67. Even so the larger number, especially in general stores, is there, and it may safely be assumed that the greater ease and cheapness with which stock could be obtained by rail played a major part in this trend. The suggestion is given emphasis in that over the same period the aggregate population of the 18 villages declined from 9,466

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1 White's Norfolk Directory 1854,p802.

2 Appendix X.

to 8,806 (see below). The trend for corn to be sent directly to the markets by rail instead of being ground locally is reflected in the fall in the number of millers in the sample villages from 7 in 1845 to 4 in 1864 (of whom one had also become a corn merchant), plus three millers and bakers combined in place of one. Despite the falling off in road traffic (see sub-section D below) the number of innkeepers showed no significant change over the period, nor did that of village craftsmen, although certain specialised travelling tradesmen, for example cider makers, disappeared within a few years of the railways' coming.[1]

It would therefore seem, and this is confirmed by abundant living evidence of conditions prior to 1914, that contrary to what might be expected the East Anglian Railways did not break down the old economic structure or the independence of the village communities, and that a strong sense of parochialism was left entrenched. Certainly the railways made the villages more susceptible to outside influences, but generally these were absorbed in the existing frameworks. Natural reluctance to change, continued poverty and almost total dependence on an agricultural economy explain this situation, but at the same time the railways did offer many of the more enterprising individuals the opportunity to break away altogether, especially so by emigration to the midlands and north. Between 1841 and 1851 an average of 4,521 youths left the county each year,[2] and between 1851 and 1861 the overall population of Norfolk actually fell by 8,000. It is no coincidence that the villages experiencing the most obvious falls or checks in growth were generally those near the railways.

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1 Cf.W.G.Clarke,Norfolk and Suffolk,London,1921,p262.

2 1851 Census Report,p.cvii.

At the root of this exodus from the county and of the lack of change in village life lay the continuing poverty of the working classes. The increased number of shops, the East Anglian's revenue returns and indeed common sense - e.g. coal, no longer at the mercy of the weather, maintained a steadier and lower price because of the railways[1] - all suggest some augmentation of material comforts amongst the working classes, but the available evidence points conclusively to the fact that this was strictly limited, at least until the late 1860's. G.Edwards, in his autobiography, tells how in 1850 his father's wage had just been reduced to 7/- per week as a bullock feeder working 7 days a week and all the daylight hours[2], how generally the repeal of the Corn Laws led to cut wages but no fall in food prices, and how married men's rates were cut from 9/- to 8/- per week, those of single men from 7/- to 6/-.[3] In 1854 came starvation prices with a 4 lb loaf at 1/-, sugar 8d per lb., tea 6d. per oz., and cheese 7d. to 1/6d per lb. This was followed by a return to 9/- per week for the married men but no increase for the single. In 1856 Edwards, at the age of 6, took part in his own first harvest, at 3d. per day for making bonds.[4] As has been seen earlier Fred Roof had much the same story to tell. In 1865 Walter White reported that wages were back to 10/- per week[5], but commented unfavourably on the contrast between the living standards of the farmers, now comfortable in pocket, and those of the labourers; he also remarked that East Anglia was "not yet by any means a model district generally as regards rustic dwellings", although the influence of Coke was spreading.[6]

1 Smiles,op.cit.,introduction,p.xxvii.
2 G.Edwards,M.P.,O.B.E.,From Crow Scaring to Westminster,London,1922, pp 18-19.
3 Ibid.,p20. 4 Op.cit.,p24.
5 Eastern England from the Thames to the Humber,Vol.1,p75.
6 Ibid.,p221.

While corn prices continued low there could of course be little alleviation of conditions, and Caird, in 1850, implied some degree of unemployment in Norfolk by reference to the facts that these were causing many jobs to be left undone[1], that 12.8% of the Norfolk population were paupers and that the average Poor Rate in the county was 2/2d. in the pound.[2] The grim outlook was starkly implied, although unintentionally, by the 1851 Census Report, which estimated that at the age of 20 a Norfolk labourer's future possible earnings amounted to about £482, of which subsistence, at the existing level, would claim £248[3]; all very well for a single man, the outlook for a man with a young family to support was frightful. The position was much the same in the Fenlands, where, for example, during the week ending the 18th February, 1862 there were 1,002 inmates in the Marshland Union workhouses, and, 1,181 in that of the Wisbech Union; in the same week of the previous year the joint total had been 2,512.[4] The Poor Rate in both unions was something like 2/- in the pound. It is clear that only very slowly were the benefits and profits of 'High Farming' passed on to the labouring classes, and that for many years to come their conditions, although tending to improve, remained very poor indeed. The railways helped indirectly to gradual improvement in that they had helped to make 'High Farming' possible, and that this, on the large farm at least, meant "an increased staff of hands, supplemented by the highest possible development of machine labor (sic) operating upon a highly manured soil and repaid by more numerous crops and increased production".[5] The labourers remained poor, but did

1 Op.cit.p184 2 Ibid.,p514. 3 Report,p.cvii.

4 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald; weekly returns.

5 G.E.Fussell, op.cit., quoting from F.Clifford, The Agricultural Lockout of 1874, London, 1875.

at least gain something from this, especially as after 1861 their numbers tended to fall:[1]

	1841	1851	1861	1871
Men	39,757	47,693	49,533	41,269
Women	890	2,157	3,258	1,860

However, at the very time that all the signs pointed to a real improvement of living standards there came the great depression of the last quarter of the nineteenth century which for a further two or three generations retarded social progress.

Sufficient will have been said to show that the failure of the East Anglian to lead to any substantial improvement in the lot of the working classes came about first because of the effect of low corn prices, secondly because of the surplus labour in the areas which was reflected in wage levels, and thirdly because of the reluctance of the farmers to diminish their own new found prosperity (in the late 1850's and 1860's) by sharing of profits with their workers, a possibility that was also militated against by the need for continued capital expenditure during the adoption of 'High Farming' techniques. It may also be added that the tenant farmers continued to have their own grievances in respect of rent levels. The bitterness obtaining in 1850 has been amply illustrated by examples from Caird in previous sections, and there are signs that this continued for some years after that date. In the 18 villages selected for special study to obtain comparisons between 1845 and 1864 it was found that whereas there were 34 principal landowners in 1845 of which only nine had changed by 1864 (that is change of family) the number of farmers while increasing from 134 to 145 contained no less

[1] See the Census Reports for the years cited.The continued rise to 1861 is not to be taken as necessarily implying continuous full employment.

than 96 new names by the latter year. Firm conclusions from these figures are vitiated by the unknown incidence of death and expiration of leases, but it does seem likely that while general prosperity increased many did find the struggle of transition too much for them - that this was likely to be the case had of course been suggested by Caird's findings.

D. Local Transport

The effects of the East Anglian Railways on local transport services existing prior to the opening of the railways contain few surprises, except perhaps in the survival of river navigation as a major facility for some considerable period. Although there had been a wide extension of Macadam roads in the area by 1860[1] the coach and van services had disappeared within months of the railways being opened.[2] This was a matter of common experience and no loss to the community, although in the case of the Ely road there was the unusual development of the poetic coach driver, Tom Cross, unsuccessfully petitioning Parliament for compensation for his lost livelihood. Carriers' services declined in number, but many were still left plying between railway stations and outlying villages, and a number continued in indirect competition with the railway by concentrating on communities far removed from stations, or, as between Dereham and Norwich, taking direct routes untouched by railways. In Lynn, Swaffham, Downham and Dereham omnibus services, probably sponsored by the hoteliers, were introduced to meet

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1 Hillen, op.cit.p664

2 Cf.Armes in his lecture of 1858.

each train. As was only to be expected the turnpikes suffered very severely (7% of Norfolk's roads were maintained under this system) and in 1882 the last one (Hockwold - Mildenhall) disappeared. The following table, derived from Parliamentary Returns, illustrates both the first sudden impact of the railways, and then the long decline experienced by a selection of Norfolk trusts.

Norfolk Toll Income (in pounds)

Trust	1840	1845	1850	1860	1870
Lynn & Wisbech	4,460	2,686	2,123	1,756	1,422
Lynn (South Gate)	1,702	1,701	1,081	1,030	1,063
Lynn (East Gate)	1,744	1,706	1,537	1,676	1,126
Norwich-Swaffham	1,028	1,318	710	823	751
Norwich-Yarmouth	852	730	375	454	665
All Norfolk Trusts	14,390	15,123	10,542	10,655	8,959

As has already been shown, one of the difficulties encountered by the East Anglian in the development of its traffic was the ability of the Ouse navigation interests to cut their rates to a level at which the railway could not compete.[1] But in so doing they deprived themselves of profits, and therefore reserves, and as a consequence were unable to continue with effective competition once the traditional conservatism of the area began to break down. For some years the river retained much of its traffic, its retention of timber and coals causing particular annoyance to the E.A.R.;[2] but as early as 1852 Armes was saying that the river could not take the volume of traffic already being sent by rail,[3] and as the total volume of available trade increased, and as railways developed further around Lynn, Cambridge and Bedford all serious competition ceased, the river interests having to be content with an

1 Railway Times,19th March,1859,pp324-7;Bruce on the 11th March.

2 Ibid.

3 Op.cit.p13.

ever dwindling traffic that came to it from pure convenience. It may safely be assumed that each difficult winter resulted in further permanent loss to the railway by the Ouse navigation. The four Wiggenhalls, where river boats had regularly tied up for the night, entered their long period of decline in the 1860's,[1] and many river men had to seek alternative employment. The rate and extent of the decline of the Ouse traffic may best be measured from the yield of up-river tolls at Lynn, the Tollbooth, of which the Duchy of Cornwall received one quarter. Once leased at £200 per annum this produced an average profit of only £190 per annum in the five years ending May,1861; in 1896 the Duchy received only £29-4-11d., in 1897 only £17-7-8d.[2] By 1889 petty dues (for which see Appendix A) were down to a yield of under £4 per annum, and by the King's Lynn Conservancy Act of 1898 (section 47) were finally abolished as acting prejudicially and preventing merchants from using the waterway. Meanwhile the Nar Navigation had struggled on, bolstered mainly by the Marriotts' own traffic, until an unexpected blockage of the Nar at the Lynn end in connection with the erection of a sluice led to total abandonment in the early 1880's. It is interesting to note, however, that sections 166 and 167 of the Great Eastern Railway Act of 1862 re-enacted that any impediment caused to the passage of the Nar by the railway should be compensated to an average level based on the tolls of 1843/4.

E. General

The importance to the rural communities of the East Anglian Railways may be summarised thus. It assisted the farmers to weather the storm of the repeal of the Corn Laws by providing the facilities for large scale

1 Cf.W.G.Clarke,op.cit.p26.

2 Hillen,op.cit.p484.

conversion to a mixed farming economy. It provided an essential foundation for the prosperity of the 'High Farming' period. It contributed to the growth of diverse industries in Dereham and elsewhere. Overall, while providing the opportunity for change, progress and subsequent prosperity it did not in itself bring any of these three, nor did it in itself solve the social and economic problems that had dogged the area since the years around 1845. In the long run, however, it was to play a major part in the solution of these. More immediately, in the period up to 1862, as with Lynn, the company had performed a great public service despite its own lack of profitability.

Section 3: Policies and Men of the East Anglian Railways

A. The importance of the E.A.R. to its area in future years, and the continued survival of its lines even today (except for the Ely & Huntingdon section) serve in many ways to make the bankruptcy of 1850/1 rather unreal, for indeed, as Thew wrote in 1890, "the contrast presented by the present throng of traffic is a remarkable one"[1]. Yet the bankruptcy remains a fact, and the wonder is that the company ever survived it; alternatively it may be felt that if the system were indeed so valuable then the wonder is that it ever came to such a sorry pass. It is very hard to say which is the more appropriate question, for the company both contributed to its own difficulties and was called upon to face massive problems beyond its power to control. Basically the theme of its history is one of adjustment to realities from an initial conception that was fundamentally false; this is complicated by the fact of general enforced transition in the economy of the eastern counties at large.

[1] Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 15th February, 1890.

To a very large extent circumstances dictated the course of events - e.g. the construction of distant railways, the crop failure of 1845, the commercial collapse of 1847/8 and so on - but there remained much room for the individual to impose his own concepts on the development of the company. If such a one flouted the external forces too violently he was bound to fail, if he did it less dramatically he would create serious difficulties for himself and his successors and court disaster, but if the individual had a realistic awareness of the multiple aspects of the wider context and was prepared to conform with them then, and only then, could success follow. In Williams, Lacy, Bruce and Simpson were four men of widely different background, character and alertness, representing policies that in turn illustrated these respective possibilities. All the most serious errors were made in the early years through misconception of realities, and it was the fact of these that alone modified or restricted the later success of Bruce and Simpson. It was fortunate for the East Anglian that power was passed on so smoothly between these four men, and that circumstances prevented any one of them from holding on to it for too long. In their respective turns Lacy and Bruce both did an immense service to the East Anglian by withdrawing at the times they did. It is with considerations such as these in mind that a final assessment of the company's leaders may be attempted after first briefly drawing attention to what may be considered as the principal errors in policy made by the various East Anglian boards.

These errors may be quickly summarised as the policy of expensive construction, this including the later decisions to lay down much unnecessary double track, the choice of route (but not the overall concept) for the Wisbech line on which train after train regularly came in devoid of either passengers or goods,[1] the termination of the harbour branch on the wrong side of the Nar, the employment of small contractors, the bulk buying of materials, the failure to keep a proper check on the solicitors, the trust placed so wrongly in Hudson and the Eastern Counties Railway leading to the abandonment of the full Ely & Huntingdon concept and of the bill for the Spalding extension, the failure to stagger the debenture debt, and lastly the failure to make a common front with the Norfolk Railway against the Eastern Counties. More debatable than these was what Bruce described as that "rediculous scheme" of bringing the L & E mainline to the town centre instead of to the harbour as was originally intended.[2] It must, however, be held that on this occasion Bruce was wrong in his judgement, for although the one mile extension involved cost over £60,000[3] it would have weighed heavily against the company in subsequent years if the terminus had been remote from the town. What the company needed were lines to both town and harbour, and in the course of time both were obtained. It might also be argued that the agreement made with the Great Northern Railway was an error of policy in that it provoked the full blast of E.C.R. hostility, but it is to be remembered that in principle the concept was sound, and that in practice it at least forced the Eastern Counties to realise the potential nuisance value of the East Anglian and accordingly treat it with a great deal more respect.

B. J.C.Williams

Sufficient has been written in earlier chapters to show what manner

1 Railway Times, 19th March, 1859, pp324-7; meeting of the 11th March-Bruce.
2 Ibid., 11th August, 1860, pp892-6; meeting of the 9th August - Bruce.
3 Ibid.

of man this solicitor was. His actual role may well be a matter for controversy, for the view taken in this work that he was a self seeking adventurer of uncommon skill who for a time became genuinely concerned in his creations (seeing himself as a second Hudson) may be felt by some to be too harsh in as much as it has been made clear that his work survived and proved an inestimable benefit to the community he claimed from the outset to serve. But in the face of his financial activities and exploitation of the East Anglian, his own failure to invest in the railways he promoted, and his withdrawal when things went wrong, it is very hard to take the charitable view, even when his subsequent flight abroad to escape justice for massive peculation and fraud against his partners is left out of the consideration.

Essentially he was an opportunist who exploited the needs of his fellows with uncanny skill. It was natural in the spirit of laisser faire that such men as Williams should from time to time arise, for while social ethics imposed fairly strict standards they also allowed for much unethical conduct in the name of 'sound business'. As long as reasonable caution was employed so that the means to success were not too blatantly displayed it was the end product by which a man was largely judged. In a totally different field one may think of Richard Arkwright's success, or of the exploitation and then neglect of other inventors by textile manufacturers. In the railway world there was of course George Hudson.

If Williams is then to be judged as an individual, the question might rightly be asked whether without him there would have been anyone else to provide the Lynn area with the lines that it so urgently needed.

In this the balance of probability inclines towards a negative answer, for as has been shown the general attitude amongst the wealthy of Lynn was one of defeatism, and there is no evidence to suggest that anywhere was there a likely alternative to Williams. To that extent it is true to say that without Williams Lynn would have been ruined, its only railway connection being that of a branch line coming to it through Wisbech.

In the initial stages of his enterprises Williams moved within the space that circumstances still allowed to the individual, but when after 1845 he sought to expand further by developing his concept of the great trunk route from east to west he was flying in the face of logic and of events. Already the line from Peterborough to Norwich was imposing its own pattern on the general economy, and there was nothing to suggest that the traffic could be found to justify such a concept as Williams had in mind. Moreover, it would involve the attempt to reverse the industrial and commercial trends of a century or more, and in particular a revival of the Norwich textile industry to such a state that it could effectively compete with the northern industries; all these were beyond the bounds of reasonable possibility.

Thus, this individual may be left as one who within a limited sphere, and from purely selfish motives rendered a great public service. Morally he represented the darker side of laisser faire, but, ironically, achieved something that planned enterprise by a public body should but never would have attempted.

C. H.C.Lacy

Lacy remains a somewhat enigmatic figure, but as argued in earlier sections it is virtually certain that any appearance of guilt surrounding him is more apparent than real. It was his unfortunate role to preside over the difficult infant stages of the company, to be backed before amalgamation by certain inexperienced and credulous directors, and to be influenced unwittingly by the sinister Williams. In more than one sense he appears to have been an innocent. Under him all the worst and most costly mistakes were made or condoned. He was largely responsible for the massive capital debt which thereafter made the payment of ordinary dividends an impossibility, this arising from expensive construction, costly applications to Parliament and failure to know what was being done under him. But in financial terms he was to suffer from these mistakes as badly as anyone, holding on to his extensive investments when no one could have blamed him for selling. Throughout, his personal confidence in the future of the company burned brightly, but he lacked experience and depth and was a mere lamb before the cunning of Hudson. In short he was a figure of an older generation making valiant attempts to adjust himself to the conditions of the new age but failing to appreciate what was and what was not practical in it.

D. Henry Bruce

Here was a man admirable in every sense, a figure of an older generation who successfully adjusted himself to the conditions of the new age, displaying courage, skill and the capacity for self sacrifice to a very high degree after having been "seduced" on to the board by a false balance sheet.[1] For 13 years he laboured to rectify the errors of his predecessors and to put the company on its feet, all the while being assailed by the Eastern Counties Railway, and, whenever things went wrong, by his own shareholders. His weapons were "stern integrity",[2] kindliness,[3] an impacable determination to resist both the rash and the cowardly course, and a consistent faith in both his lines and his principles. He set a fine example by his refusal to sell shares, by the personal loss of £70 per annum incurred when preference share interest was cut from 7% to 5%,[4] and by his steady faith in the ultimate rectitude of the Eastern Counties. By his "laborious exercise of shrewd intelligence and strict impartiality" he "reanimated expectation of a yet possible future",[5] and almost single handed brought the company from ruin to stability. He made mistakes, but his work is to be judged not by these but by the terms on which the East Anglian entered the amalgamation of 1862. In the years prior to this he had taken the company, and, by the exercise of that shrewdness and honest impartiality for which he was "so eminently distinguished",[6] had been able "to purify (it) and set (it) in the economic way of management as well as of fair and reciprocal dealing".[7] Even Bancroft was ultimately won over to praise him,[8] and Love came to say, "I desire no more honest, well intentioned and energetic chairman".[9] By 1860 Bruce was undoubtedly getting old in years, and

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1 Railway Times, 4th August, 1860, p877-8; letter of 'An East Anglian Sufferer by the Waddingtonian Policy'.

2 Ibid., 28th July, 1860, p845; editorial. 3 Ibid., 4th August, 1860, p877; Chesshire.

4 Ibid., 11th August, 1860, pp892-6; meeting, 9th August, Bruce.

5 'An E.A. Sufferer by the Waddingtonian Policy'.

6 Railway Times, 11th August, 1860, pp905-6; editorial.

7 Ibid., 28th July, 1860; editorial.

8 Ibid., 11th August, 1860, pp892-6; meeting, 9th August. 9 Ibid.

possibly outlook, and it may be understood why some felt that a more adventuresome chairman was needed as the amalgamation negotiations developed.[1] But, simple and solid, lacking in both romance and desperation as he may have been, he represented the best of Victorianism in an age of laisser faire when departure from the strict path of morality, if cleverly contrived, could so easily reap the quick reward. In his personal conduct he shone in contrast to men such as Hudson and Waddington, and it is almost a morality tale to relate how his honesty overcame the evils produced by such shabby adventurers as Williams and Waddington and their followers.

Bruce's many services to the East Anglian have been examined at length, and so may be quickly summarised at this point. It would be almost invidious to attempt any kind of relative assessment for each in its turn was opportune and vital to further progress. Even so nothing compares with the skill and patience by which he extricated the company from the financial morass in which he found it with the result that satisfaction was given to its many creditors; by courage, steadiness and personal contact he secured the prolongation of the debenture loans, probably his greatest single service to the company. But this is not to overlook his role in the latter years of keeping at bay those who wished to attack the Eastern Counties Railway, or in earlier times his willingness to break with the Great Northern when he appreciated his error, his part in the harbour tramway, his work in making the lines operationally sound, his devotion to the cause of finding and developing new sources of revenue, his determination in overthrowing Waddington on the E.C.R.

1 Railway Times, 11th August, 1860, pp905-6; editorial.

board, and much else. Overall Bruce succeeded because of what he was, but also because, being no kind of doctrinaire, he accepted the forces of change, realised their strength and sought to co-operate with them rather than attempt the impossible task of diverting them to his own ends or those of any sectional interest.

The nation owes a great debt to Bruce and men like him in the railway world. The immense advantages derived from railways by the nation at large may be taken for granted at this stage, but it is to be remembered how easily many of them could have been lost. Many local lines, founded in fraud, false expectations and ill conceptions during the 1840's, could have foundered in the dark period of depressed railway securities had it not been for men such as Bruce who, with equal or lesser integrity, kept their lines alive and prepared them for the easier years ahead. In terms of difficulties overcome relative to resources and circumstances Bruce and his kind deserve to hold an honoured place in railway history, and be removed from the shadow of such as Hudson, Denison, Moon, Huish, Watkin and others, better known and working on a larger stage, but of no greater merit.

B. Lightly Simpson

Simpson, the Manchester chemist who followed Bruce into the chair after having been his principal deputy from 1851, and who was also the chairman of the Lynn & Hunstanton and some years later of the Great Eastern Railway, represented a younger generation, one formed in the early railway age and attuned to it and its complications. It was for such men as he, perhaps more bold and imaginative than those who had gone before, to take over where the generation of Bruce had left off, and to provide a more than adequate superstructure where the latter had consolidated the foundations. It was fitting that Simpson, who had backed Bruce so very ably, should undertake the amalgamation negotiations, for these themselves were symbolic of the new concept of railways as something independent and self contained and quite free of the former parochial limitations. In its essentials Simpson's work for the East Anglian was the continuation and development of that of Bruce, and it is in his role as the leading promoter of the Lynn & Hunstanton, a bold and novel enterprise, that the true measure of the man is seen to the best advantage.

Section 4: Why the East Anglian Railways Survived

The story of the East Anglian is one of successful struggle against seemingly overwhelming odds. How it survived has been made apparent in the narrative, and in this particular note is to be made of the work of Bruce and Simpson, of the fine balance achieved in which the case for cutting losses by complete abandonment was just outweighed by the possibility that something could yet be done, and of the relative security found in the lease to the Eastern Counties Railway. This latter and the earlier reconstruction of the board in 1848/9 may be taken as the two decisive turning points in the company's history. Why the East Anglian succeeded where so many others failed is a slightly different matter.

The first general consideration in explaining the survival is that the company met the needs of a sufficiently comprehensive cross-section of the community. Farmers and merchants, harbour interests, town and country, upper and lower classes, for various reasons all needed the services offered by the East Anglian Railways. Lynn alone could not have supported the railway for it lacked sufficient substance and was too far removed from other centres of consequence; the rural areas would also have been incapable of sustaining the system. But because both the town and the country areas needed the railway and had the ability to exploit its services (e.g. the latter by the adoption of a more broadly based economy and of the principles and practice of 'High Farming') the latter received the support, developed by skilled management, sufficient to justify its continuance. Initially there had been enough local backing to attract the necessary outside capital; subsequently there was sufficient traffic to allow the company to meet at least some of its obligations to investors. As Lynn and the farmers of the area readjusted themselves with the help of the railways to changing conditions, and as such developments as the Estuary Cut and the harbour tramway were realised, traffic receipts and prospects came to follow an improving trend, and even when this temporarily ceased, as it did in 1857, they still maintained an adequate level. This may have been too low to satisfy the holders of the ordinary shares, but was high enough to ensure the survival of the lines. Finally, the coming of the line from Sutton Bridge and the creation of that to Hunstanton guaranteed a reasonably prosperous future. Recognition of this was embodied in the guarantee of a 1% dividend to the holders of ordinary shares in the amalgamation of 1862. In the previous years the crucial factor had been that because of the various favourable aspects mentioned above the company had been enabled to pay all its loan interest and most of the dividends on its guaranteed shares from revenue.

The second reason for survival is that the company, partly by chance, but on a broadly based foundation of public need, was enabled to develop through, and embody in itself, a series of changing concepts. Put in another way it may be said to have found its proper level. In 1845 the company's lines were launched in the eyes of Lynn as parochial weapons and arbiters of the economy; to the principal promoter they were above all to be a source of great personal gain. The ambitious programme of extensions for 1846 and 1847 represented the epitome of such concepts, and it is perhaps itself a reason for the company's survival that it failed, for if it had not the company would have found itself attempting the impossible task of seeking to reverse every current trend in the area's economic development. Then had come financial failure and with it humiliation before the ambitions of the Eastern Counties Railway, a company conducted as a railway in its own right. The power of Williams, the exercise of which had already done so much harm, could at this stage have wrecked everything, yet, ironically, it now revealed its one virtue, and one that was to save the company. So obtuse had been his method of control that now it was easy for him, howbeit partly from force of circumstances, to slip away, so leaving the company in a state of flux in which it was possible for the genuine representatives of the proprietors to gain control, and, in protection of their investments, come to conceive of the company as something that must stand in its own right with all other considerations, parochial or personal, obliterated or subordinate.

In the amalgamation of 1847, the leases to the Great Northern and the Eastern Counties, and finally in the events of 1862 the company gave unspoken recognition to both the needs of railways to be free of all forms of direct control from other economic spheres, and to the concept that closer union of railway companies to form large units was the only way in which maximum efficiency and economy could be achieved; needless to add this latter has now been taken to its ultimate logical conclusion with the formation of British Railways. In the wider field of the general economy the same willingness to conform to and not fight against powerful trends may be recognised as contributing substantially to survival. With the withdrawal of Williams there ended the serious talk of great trunk lines, of dock construction and of making Lynn a leading continental and Baltic port. Bruce pursued none of these ideals except in a purely empirical sense. Perhaps subconsciously he realised that East Anglia could at least as yet experience no rapid growth of industrial activity, and that the Eastern Counties Railway and the Norfolk had already provided all the facilities that east to west traffic would ever require. He accepted that the role of the company was to serve and not to dictate, seeking to preserve the essential elements of the old while developing the new but never carried away by wild fancies.

This introduces the final factor that explains the survival of the East Anglian and its triumph over difficulty after difficulty, namely the essentially practical and realistic attitudes brought to bear by Bruce on company affairs. It will have been observed from the preceding chapters that his work was free of sweeping long-term general plans - especially was this so in the stages by which the final financial solution was reached. His were more the policies of day by day, detail by detail, step by step, achievement by achievement, all empirical, all flexible, all limited in scope, but all part of his single abiding aim of one day seeing the East Anglian Railways Company standing firmly as a solvent concern. Under the conditions of constantly changing circumstances, variable factors such as revenue returns and the state of necessary transition both within and without the company no other approach could have succeeded.

Section 5: The East Anglian Railways and Railway History

Railway history is a massive and complex subject, and, because of this, one that has tended to become centred on the major companies. Small concerns are usually treated in article form only; the subject of this present study has in no discovered instance been awarded more than a dozen pages or so.[1] And yet the smaller companies can offer many valuable lessons, in some cases to confirm accepted ideas, in others perhaps to cast doubt or to open up new fields for exploration. Above all, detailed studies of the smaller companies, comprising secondary lines and without pretensions to grandeur, emphasise the essential individuality, derived from shifting complexes of variable factors during the formative years, that must be held to be characteristic of each section of the overall national railway network. In the absence of parallel studies it is unsafe to make generalisations from this particular work which, basically, can claim only to indicate how one group of lines was formed and established in relation to its enviroment. However, it is fortunate that few issues of the day left the E.A.R. untouched, and that numerous contacts

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1 Principally in C.J.Allen's 'The Great Eastern Railway',and two articles (superficial and inaccurate) in the G.E.R.Staff Magazine.

with such differing concerns as the Great Northern, the Eastern Counties and the Norfolk Railway were established, as well as with such figures as Robert Stephenson and George Hudson.

In matters of detail light has been shed on the motives and attitudes of the railway promoters of the period, and especially so on those of the solicitors involved who have been frequently referred to in general histories but rarely examined. In the example of Williams has been found a profitable study of the darker side of laisser faire in action, but also an illustration of the fact that under it disreputable motives could lead to results highly beneficial to the community at large. The widening horizons of Williams may indeed be seen as a working of the force which ensured general social progress in an essentially individualistic society. On the same theme the business morality associated with the railways is seen here in a perhaps rather startling light, although the coincidental combination of Hudson and Williams in one study could well give an unbalanced view. However, although the genuine and high principles and conduct of Bruce are to be recalled, it does seem that the attitudes and activities covered here were not untypical of this period of railway history. Nor, it may be said with confidence, was the strong element of bitterness found in the history of the East Anglian both in railway politics and amongst the individual company's shareholders.

Of equal importance in shaping the future was the conflict so often present between the personal, the communal and the investors' concepts of the railways which in effect were united only in the period of initial construction. Indeed, the diversity of motives connected with the formation of railways and the struggle between different sectional interests, as well as that in many cases directed against external forces, are factors that should never be overlooked in railway studies. It is clear from this particular work that these struggles could be resolved in many different ways, and these not always the best; it is also clear that they influenced the most fundamental matters such as the choice of routes and the very characters of the companies involved. It seems clear that many of the lines faced with extinction today owe their precarious position to weaknesses inherited from the early days, weaknesses that could be tolerated or which lay concealed only until the motor vehicle attained to large scale development as it has since 1945.

As for the construction period itself, the dead weight of land compensation, the effects of rising prices, the general state of the economy as a whole and the validity or otherwise of the estimates are to be seen as having profound influence on the development and character of individual lines. Perhaps the most lasting and significant difficulties arising from these factors were those connected with the often grossly unsound and inadequate estimates of cost, for these, related to the amount of capital authorised, left companies with so little room in which to manoeuvre that to ensure completion they had to resort to costly loans and guaranteed preference shares. This was primarily the fault of Parliament. Indeed, Parliament emerges from this study with little credit in respect of its policy towards railways. Its lack of decision and firm guidance caused confusion and uncertainty leading to many unnecessary lines and an incredible waste of money. Its system was costly, slow and inconsistent, and riddled with loopholes. It failed to prevent the excesses of the 'Mania', but in seeking to do so placed massive burdens on all lines, irrespective of merit. Its requirements of new companies were archaic, so causing faulty surveys and undue haste in the preparation of schemes, its powers of judgement in matters of both broad policy and detail were gravely deficient. Legislation was defective, especially so the Land Clauses Consolidation Act. Before the first sleeper of a new line had been laid a company had been doomed by its very application to Parliament to a heavy burden of dead capital expenditure, and there was the prospect of more to come on land. With the landowners, Parliament must indeed be seen as one of the chief villains of the railway world, this being especially true where small companies were concerned.

It is hoped that this study will have illuminated some aspects of railway financial history. Above all else, the debt of the national railway system, both literally and in terms of gratitude, to the capital markets of London and the northern industrial centres, especially those concerned primarily with textiles, has been confirmed; the view that companies far removed in distance from these sources depended largely on local capital has been further discredited. From this it is a short step to appreciate the relationship existing between railway investment and general economic conditions, although fluctuations in the value of railway stock also depended in a large part on a variety of other factors, these including the very important question of public attitude, dependent on a host of both rational and irrational motivations, towards railway securities in general at any given time. A further aspect of importance shown in this work is the very great extent to which a company's finances could come to depend on guaranteed preference shares and loans rather than on ordinary shares. In the period covered it would seem that the latter often launched the lines but were insufficient for completion; then, unless the revenue position of the company concerned was exceptionally strong, they tended to become primarily the concern of speculators content to deal at a very low level of prices. Inevitably this tended to create immense tensions within companies such as the East Anglian, for the principal effect was to divide the shareholders into those who were secure because of fixed guaranteed returns and those with the original shares who were bound thereby to the contemplation of heavy loss. As has been seen the appearance of a third, the speculative, group served only to confuse the issues arising between the two former; of this, the best example presented is of course that of the Waddington affair, but the Watkin inquiry and the disputes involved in the amalgamation negotiations also illustrate the point.

From this and from what has been discussed in previous chapters the fundamental weaknesses of the railways' financial structure may be readily discerned. First there was this division of interest within a company, in essence attributable to the shortcomings of Parliament and arising from the necessity to assume heavy burdens of fixed interest charges on a permanent basis simply because ordinary shares could not be stretched to cover all initial costs; this situation was exacerbated in the cases of the 1845 and 1846 lines by the fact that projects conceived in boom conditions had for the most part to be completed in those of severe slump, with the result that the necessary additional capital was particularly expensive to obtain. Other weaknesses included the inevitably protracted interval that must elapse between investment in a new line and any return (a condition directly encouraging the speculative market), with the associated injustice that under the circumstances of the time the last to join a company (that is the holders of preference shares or of new debentures) were frequently the first to derive benefit - that is why the order of precedence of the three issues of preference shares by the East Anglian had been a question of such vital importance. Then should also be added some reference to the complex interaction of the general economic situation, the fortunes of individual companies, and the blanket prejudice or favour, affected by rumours, scandals or sheer nervousness, extended by the public towards railway investment, which together determined the current value of stock. To this gloomy list, and with particular reference to the 1840's and '50's, can further be added the perils of defective accountancy, the possibility of total abandonment at any stage of construction, and the danger of becoming the victim of such practices as the manipulation of shares by directors in their own favour or that of their friends. Certainly, in view of all these considerations, Bruce's patience and skill in making the East Anglian a solvent concern cannot be too highly praised. The only permanent factor in his favour was the very negative one that once capital had been called investors would generally rather pay more if they could afford it than lose what was already committed.

Lack of experience in railway finances on the parts of both Parliament and the companies and the over-sanguine hopes of the investing public are reasons that may be advanced in explanation of the very unsatisfactory situation outlined above; it may also be held that the complexities of the subject and the inadequacy of existing legislation in controlling it provided direct incentive to massive speculation, in itself a major factor of weakness. Only time and hard-won accumulated experience were to place the complex on a sound foundation. However, many of the defects would have been rendered nugatory if only the early revenue returns had come anywhere near the original expectations. It was common experience that they did not, and even when they did the inflation of construction costs meant that they were still inadequate. Moreover, a lesson to be learnt from the story of the East Anglian is that traffic did not always come naturally and of its own accord to a railway, but that it sometimes had to be encouraged or even fought for. Only hard experience in matters of rates structures and train densities and timings could bring eventual success. Further, a company had to be able to recognize its proper role in its particular enviroment and act according to that and not to one that it may previously have envisaged for itself.

The history of the East Anglian also indicates that railways were not always as sweeping in their immediate effects as has sometimes been assumed. Only in association with other factors could their full potential for effecting change be realised. Some companies, particularly those providing trunk lines between London and the north and those linking the industrial centres of the midlands and the north, found everything in their favour, the factors including existing industries and established streams of traffic as well as dense pockets of population, and so were enabled to transform and develop with ease and rapidity, but for many others the full exercise of their power was not so easy. The East Anglian would have come to little had it not been for the Estuary Cut, and the subsequent construction of docks at Lynn; nor would it have succeeded without the current developments in agriculture. The example of the Lynn & Hunstanton might be cited as an exception, but it is to be remembered that the existence of the East Anglian provided it with a good starting point, and that the company in setting out to create a new town was embracing far more than the mere construction of a railway. In short, railways such as the East Anglian provided what were essentially long-term opportunities for development of the local economies, the immediate benefits being unspectacular although vital to future growth, the immediate visible impact being relatively slight. Indeed, it may be said of the East Anglian that it was something that grew within and was absorbed by the local economy, imparting to the latter increasing strength and stature, forcing from it the old fashioned and superfluous, and constituting a vital and integral part in the formation of a new and forward looking character. This was not what the founders of the company had envisaged, but nothing could have surpassed the invaluable and lasting boons that the East Anglian did in fact confer on its whole area.

Section 6: Profits and Public Service

The East Anglian Railways and the Norfolk Estuary Cut together ensured Lynn and its area of a prosperous future. Yet, in 1862 24 shares in the latter, nominally worth £50 each and with £36-10s. paid, were sold for 1/- each![1] Early in the present century Hillen wrote:[2]

> "The incalculable benefits which our town and the adjacent Fenlands derived from the bold enterprise inaugurated and carried out 50 years ago have not proved very encouraging to the private speculators. The vast acreage, which, according to Kinderley's calculation, ought now to reward them for the sacrifices they made is non-existent. The process of accretion is demonstrated to be not only remarkably slow but painfully disappointing. About 2,500 acres have as yet been reclaimed, and, assuming Mr. Wheeler's theory to be correct, it would be wise if the promoters of the scheme were to anticipate the fruition of their dream two thousand years hence."

Clearly, private investors had proved to be public benefactors at a cost to themselves that they had never even contemplated.

By any modern standards the East Anglian system would have been abandoned in 1851. If it had been Lynn and the whole area would have suffered tragic decline. Historical circumstances have dictated from the time of the earliest British railways that the latter should primarily be judged as profit making businesses. Today, in the face of massive competition from the roads, this applies with double force despite the transfer of the ownership of the railway system from private to public hands. So far the Lynn & Ely and the Lynn & Dereham lines continue to serve, and do not figure in Dr. Beeching's list of closures, but ultimate survival is in the balance for it is unlikely in the extreme, despite the current efficient and economical workings, that they could escape inclusion in the second list of closures hinted at in the doctor's report. Bruce found in 1851 that a fresh and vigorous approach could lead his

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1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 1st February, 1862.

2 Op. cit. p784.

company to stability, having recognised that the railway did not pay but only so in its existing form. Although conditions are of course vastly different today, the moral of this could well be noted and the principle of regeneration rather than of abandonment applied to many of the lines the futures of which are in the balance.

It is clear from this study that profits are not everything, for in this case because of a railway which lost heavily other important sectors of the same general economy were enabled to overcome their problems and thrive. Today, many of the village children attending the schools of Downham, Dereham, Swaffham and Lynn, the students of the Lynn Technical High School, many daily commuters between Lynn and the surrounding villages, the R.A.F. personnel of Marham, the R.A.F. authorities who make regular use of Narborough station for transit of stores, the sand works at Middleton, the industries of Lynn and Dereham, the flourishing sugar beet industry of the area, farmers and horticulturalists, the shopkeepers and stall holders of Lynn, Swaffham, Dereham and Downham, the docks authorities of Lynn, the holiday trade of Hunstanton, thousands of annual holiday makers, countless individuals of the area in their daily lives, and most recently of all the planners concerned with the London over-spill problem are all amongst those who have continued reason to be grateful for the speed, cheapness and bulk conveyance of railways in general, and for the perseverance of the now forgotten East Anglian Railways Company in particular.

The Table of Appendices

N.B. There is no Appendix L or Appendix O

Appendix A
Lynn Harbour Tolls

'Free'ships were those belonging to Lynn freemen; 'Unfree' were vessels that were British owned or those of foreign nations with which reciprocity treaties had been signed (in this latter case Trinity House made good the difference between the 'Unfree' and 'Foreign' rates). The designation 'Foreign' covered all other ships.

Tonnage rates applied to all goods except coals and grain, lastage to grain, meal and flour. The maximum levels of the tolls were fixed by various Royal Charters, and the Corporation was powerless to increase them.

Table 1: Tonnage Rates - applicable in full only to inward bound vessels; those outward bound paid beaconage and stakage only, but at the same rates.

Toll	'Free' rates	'Unfree' rates	'Foreign' rates
Beaconage (per ton of cargo delivered)	$\frac{1}{2}$d.	1d.	$1\frac{1}{2}$d.
Stakage	Half the beaconage, plus one fifth if the vessel delivered at or above the Boal.		
Anchorage	NIL	6d. per vessel per voyage, in or out.	
Ballast	NIL	4d. per 3 tons	8d. per 3 tons
Bulkbreak	NIL	3-4d. for every vessel not belonging to Lynn arriving from a foreign port.	

Table 2: Lastage Rates

Toll	'Free' rates	'Unfree' rates	'Foreign' rates
Beaconage (per last of 10 quarters)	1d.	2d.	3d.
Stakage	Half the beaconage, plus one fifth if the vessel delivered at or above the Boal.		
Ballast	NIL	For vessels bringing in grain and taking ballast away, the weight of grain was calculated and charged as tonnage.	
Anchorage	NIL	6d. per vessel per voyage.	
Bulkbreak	NIL	3-4d. per vessel not belonging to Lynn and arriving from a foreign port.	
Lastage	1d. per quarter on all grain not belonging to a Lynn freeman shipped out, i.e. if a freeman sells and ships a quantity of grain to a merchant at another port this due is charged; but if shipped as the 'Property and Adventure' of the freeman it is not liable.		

Table 3: Coal Rates (on coals, cinders, culm and coal dust)

Toll	'Free' rates	'Unfree' rates	'Foreign' rates
Beaconage	½d. per chaldron of 25 cwts.	2/- per score of chaldrons of 25 cwts. each.	
Stakage	Half the beaconage, plus one fifth if the cargo be discharged at the Boal; this heading also included the 6/- per vessel levied as Town Dues.		
Anchorage	NIL	6d. per vessel per voyage.	
Ballast	NIL	5d. per chaldron delivered.	
Groats	NIL	4d. per chaldron delivered and payable only by non-Lynn boats. Money collected under this toll was used for the relief of the poor.	
Bellman's Groats	NIL	4d. per vessel not belonging to Lynn. The money collected was paid to the Town Crier who was then obliged to cry coals for sale without further payment.	

Certain petty dues, additional to the above, were levied on outward bound cargoes, for example 3d. per load of timber and 2d. per sheet of wool if sent coastwise. There were also the Mooring Dues charged at the rate of 2d. per ton of the vessel's cargo, a levy raising some £2,000 per annum.

The yields from these tolls between 1844 and 1848 were as follows:-

Year	Town Dues	Groats
1844	£3,042- 4-5	£543- 1-0
1845	£4,211-14-3	£646- 5-0
1846	£3,262-10-2	£435- 1-4
1847	£3,473-15-0	£458-16-4
1848	£3,220- 9-0	£375- 7-4

River Tolls:

100 deals or bundles of lathes	6d.	Flagstones (per dozen)	4d.
100 battens	3d.	Soap (per chest)	4d.
Timber or bark (per load)	3d.	Nails or shot (per bag)	1d.
Logs (each)	1d.	Hops (per sack)	1d.
Wool (per pack)	3d.	Beer, tar, pitch (per barrel)	1d.
Crates or hampers (each)	2d.	Sheep or calf skins (per 100)	6d.
Plaster, slates, iron or stone (per ton)	8d.	Rub or whetstones (per 1000)	8d.
Hemp or cork (per ton)	2/8d.	Scythes, sickles, spades or slit iron (per bundle)	1d.
Lead (per ton)	9d.	Furniture of all kinds	8d.
Wine, oil, vinegar (per ton)	8d.	Salt, pipeclay or cobbles (per ton)	2d.
Spirits, cheese or rags (per ton)	1/-	Corn (per quarter)	1d.
Bottles (per gross)	2d.		
Hogsheads	4d.		

Sources: For all matters relating to the Harbour Tolls, the Admiralty Preliminary Inquiry into the Norfolk Estuary Bill, 1849, Appendix 5, p66, and also the Minutes of Evidence to the same, p29f., the evidence of E.Lane Swatman of Lynn. The River Tolls are derived from Hillen, op.cit.p485.

Appendix B
King's Lynn Borough Council, 1844/5

Mayor	H.Pitcher (1802-67)	Attorney
Aldermen	F.Cresswell (d.1861)	Banker. Formerly a captain in the R.N. A director of the L & E.
	J.Wayte (d.1847)	Physician
	J.Dillingham	Manager of Bagges' brewery which was partly owned by two of that family on the council.
	J.P.Blencowe	Banker in partnership with E.Everard, and a relative by marriage.
	E.Eyre	Brewer, malster; corn, seed and cake merchant.
	G.Hogge (d.1847)	Brewer, malster; coal, wine and timber merchant.
Councillors	Boys Aldham	Attorney
	R.Bagge	Brewer
	E.Bagge (1813-1845)	Brewer; owner of Islington Hall and 1,400 acres in Gaywood.
	C.Burcham	Civil engineer and surveyor; not quite of the 'high caste' (Armes).
	G.Saunders	No details ascertained.
	T.A.Carter	Ship builder; also a coal and seed & cake merchant.
	W.Clifton	Ship owner; also coal, seed & cake, wine and spirit merchant; again not quite 'high caste'.
	W.Jeffrey	Corn, seed & cake merchant.
	C.Goodwin	A solicitor in "large practice"; the senior partner in the firm to which Williams belonged; a man of great wealth.

J.P.Saddleton	Gentleman of independent means, but not quite 'high caste'.
S.Phipps	Wool and linen draper.
E.Everard (1794-1864)	Brewer, malster, rope and twine maker, wine, coal and timber merchant, banker; resident at Middleton Hall; the elder brother of William Everard.
J.Bowker (1790-1846)	Corn, seed & cake merchant.
L.Self	Corn, seed & cake, coal and timber merchant.
F.Hulton	In partnership with L.Self, and also a relative of the Bagge family.
J.Platten (1787-1860)	Attorney.
W.Bonner	Coal, corn, seed & cake merchant.

Sources: The information is derived from a wide variety of sources, of which the principal ones are White's Norfolk Directory 1845, individual's obituary notices in the local press and wall tablets etc. in various churches in and around Lynn.

Appendix C
The Composition of the Provisional Committees

	L & E	E & B	L & D
From Lynn			
Viscount Jocelyn (M.P. for Lynn)	*		
Sir W.J.H.B.Folkes (D)	*		*
Lord G.Bentinck	*		
R.Bagge			*
W.Bagge (M.P.)	*		*
J.Bowker	*	*	*
C.Burcham	*	*	*
T.A.Carter	*	*	*
F.Cresswell (D)	*		
W.Everard (D)	*	*	*
M.Folkes	*		
W.Seppings	*		*
H.Pitcher		*	*
W.Clifton			*
E.Manning			*
W.Shipp		*	*

		L & E	E & B	L & D
From Norfolk and the area of the lines				
W.Birch	Wretham Hall	*	*	*
J.Calthrop	Stanhoe Hall	*		*
H.Coldham	Anmer Hall	*		
R.Dewing	Ashwicken	*		
J.E.Everard	Congham	*		*
Col.Fitzroy	Sennowe Lodge	*		
J.Hudson	Castleacre	*		
W.Layton	Ely	*	*	
Col.Mason	Necton Hall	*		*
H.C.Partridge	Snarehill House			*
H.S.Partridge	Hockham Hall	*		*
J.Beauchamp St.John	Gayton Hall	*		
E.R.Pratt	Downham	*		
C.Neville-Rolfe	Sedgeford Hall	*		*
Lord W.Powlett	Brandon	*		
Sir C.M.Clarke	Little Dunham	*		*
W.L.Chute	M.P. for W.Norfolk	*		
A.Hammond	Westacre	*		
W.L.Jones	Hilgay		*	
F.W.Keppel	Lexham Hall	*		*
Capt.Marriott	Wells-next-the-Sea	*		
H.Villebois	Marham	*		
T.Wythe	Middleton	*		*
T.H.Wythe	Bilney Lodge	*		*
J.Dalton	West Bilney			*
H.R.Haggard	West Bradenham			*
J.Hastings	Longham Hall			*
E.Howes	Leziate			*
W.Lowton Jones	Hilgay			*
J.T.Mott	Barningham Hall			*
C.B.Plestowe	Watlington Hall			*
T.S.Darnell	St.Neots		*	
J.H.Day	St.Neots		*	
T.Elgood	Huntingdon		*	
Capt.Green	Buckden,Hunts.		*	
R.Hopkins	St.Ives		*	
T.Lindsell	St.Ives		*	
D.Martin	Godmanchester		*	
M.R.Osborne	St.Ives		*	
J.Payne	St.Neots		*	
J.Slack	Abbots Langley		*	
From Manchester and district				
W.Hall	Grappenhall,Warrington		*	*
H.C.Lacy (D)	Kenyon House,Manchester	*	*	*

		L & E	E & B	L & D
From London and district				
J.Fry		*		
F.Reynolds			*	*
J.Wilson		*		
From Hull and district				
W.Ayre		*		
J.Gee		*		
Sir W.Lowthrop		*		
The Mayor (name unknown)				*
From Yorkshire				
T.Dyson	Pontefract	*	*	*
Others				
The Earl of Leicester (lands in Norfolk)		*		
Lord Charles Townshend				*
Rt.Hon.Lord Sondes		*		*
Lord Bayning				*
Hon.C.S.Cowper		*		
Sir Lawrence Jones				*
T.N.Abdy M.P.	Albyns,Essex			*
B.S.Fowler	Tamworth		*	*
W.Freeman	Oxford			*
Lt.Col.Raynardson	Lincolnshire			*
General Birch	Lincolnshire		*	

Sources: L & E:- Herapath,4th May,1844,and the company prospectus.
E & B:- Ibid.,21st September,1844,and the company prospectus.
L & D:- Railway Times,19th October,1844,and the second version of the company prospectus.

N.B. Those marked (D) subsequently served as directors.

Appendix D
The 1845 Subscription Contracts

E & H shares are shown at their original £25 value.

M = merchant	L = solicitor etc.	B = banker
A = accountant	S = stockbroker	E = engineer

T = connection with the textiles industry
P = no occupation, but only status, given
* = member of one of the three Provisional Committees

A. Manchester and district

		Amount in pounds		
		L & E	E & H	L & D
Critchley	M	3,750	2,000	
Kennerdine	Bank Clerk	750	500	
A.Liebert	M	4,125	2,000	2,500
B.Liebert	M	1,875	2,000	
Magnus	T	1,875	500	1,250
Parry	T	1,875	2,000	2,500
Schwabe	T	3,750	2,000	

Plus those who invested in only one of the three companies:

L & E: Armstrong (M), £1,875; Madin (P), £3,750.
E & H: Allen, innkeeper, £2,500; Atkinson (M), £2,000; Barker (M), £2,000; Binyon, tea merchant, £3,750; Buck, engineer of the E & H, £1,250; Buley (T), £2,000; Coates (M), £2,500; Kennedy (T), £2,500; Lawton, surveyor, £1,000; Meyer (M), £2,000; Nicholls (M), £2,000; Whitehead (L), £6,250.
L & D: Barber (T), £1,000; Parry (P), £500; Tootal (T), £1,250.

B. Liverpool and district

		L & E	E & H	L & D
Dawson	S	1,875	2,500	
Garratt	A		625	2,500
Hornby	Clerk	1,875	625	1,250
Oddie	Farmer		625	2,500
Willinck	M	3,750	1,000	1,250

L & E: Fellows (P), £1,500; Fellows (P), £950.
E & H: Dawson (P), £625; Gilham, manufacturer, £500; King (S), £1,000; Marsh, farmer, £250; Marsh (L), £1,250; Sands (M), £3,500; Sands (M), £2,000.
L & D: Bower (P), £1,250; Cassin (P), £1,500; Christian (S), £250; Comber (P), £500; Dawson, farmer, £3,750; Douglas (M), £2,500; Duncan (M), £1,250; Dutton (M), £1,250; Game (P), £1,250; Hore (M), £2,500; Horne (M), £2,500; Jee (S), £2,500; Johnson (M), £500; Jones (P), £1,700; Jones (P), £1,750; Kay (A), £500; Kenworthy (A), £1,250; Laycock (M), £2,500; Overton (M), £1,250; Pigot (P), £1,250; Reddish (M), £1,250; Roddie (P), £2,500; Salkeld (P), £1,000.

C. Lancashire and Cheshire		L & E	E & H	L & D
Beaumont	L	375	250	
Elias	Excise Officer	1,125	250	250
Garside	Bailiff	375	250	
W.Hall *	P	3,750	3,750	1,250
Hall	P		500	500
Hall	A	1,125	500	1,250
Lacy *	P	3,750		10,000
Milne	P	1,500	625	
Wagstaff	L	1,875	1,250	
Whitehead	L	1,875		1,250
Tinker	Doctor	750	375	

L & E: Gedder, tea merchant, £1,875; Marsh (L), £1,875; Wetherell, farmer, £375.

E & H: Cawley (P), £375; Hall (P), £2,500; Heckdale, tea merchant, £500; Nicholson (L), £375; Sanderson (E), £1,000; Woodcock (B), £500.

L & D: Marsh, farmer, £250; Turner (T), £250.

D. London		L & E	E & H	L & D
Baldock	P	3,750	895	
Beeston	P	1,100	2,000	1,000
Bruce	M	1,500		1,250
Bucknall	P	750	250	
Green	S	1,875	875	
Jones	S	3,750	875	
Lacklow	S		2,000	2,500
Milne	P	3,750	875	
Salmon	P	1,875	250	
Scott	P	3,750	2,000	
Shepherd	S		2,000	2,500

L & E: Barber, clerk, £375; Bevan (M), £750; Birch (P), £150; Birch (P), £150; Bunyon (P), £3,000; Chapman (P), £1,875; English (P), £1,875; Francis (L), £375; Fry (P), £750; Fry (L*), £1,875; Goodchild (P), £150; Miles (L), £3,750; Reynolds (M*), £1,250; Robinson (L), £3,750; Shelton (P), £1,500; Spinks (L), £450; Spurgeon (L), £300; Weston (M), £1,125; Wing (L), £375.

E & H: Barnett (S), £1,250; Bigge (P), £2,000; Binyon (P), £1,000; Butcher, clerk, £500; Conquest, doctor, £2,000; Ellis (S), £1,250; Fowler (P), £2,000; Laycock (L), £2,000; Masterman (E), £2,500; Morrison (P), £625; Salmon, soldier, £875; Scott (P), £2,000; Tucker (S), £2,500; Thomas (B), £2,000; Young (S), £500.

L & D: Anderson (P), £1,250; Ashton (P), £1,250; Cockswell, surgeon, £750; Cook (S), £1,250; Cooper (P), £750; Dawson (P), £5,000; Eastgate, coachsmith, £2,500; Edwards (P), £6,000; Freeman (P), £500; Giles, surveyor, £1,250; Lloyd (P), £5,000; Lloyd (P), £15,000; Mayne, clerk, £1,125; Moore (P), £1,250; Norman (M), £2,000; Railton (P), £1,250; Rooke (A), £750; Smith (M), £750; Sylvester (P), £750; White (P), £1,500.

E. Hull

Sir William Lowthrop (*) subscribed £1,875 to the L & E and £500 to the L & D; Calder subscribed £1,250 to the L & D. Apart from these all the subscriptions were to the L & E.

L & E: Ayre (L*),£375; Ayre (P),£950; Baynes,clerk,£150; Beadle (M),£2,500; Carhill (P),£750; Carrick (M),£950; Cookman (P),£1,125; Digby (B), £750; Earle,manufacturer,£750; Eggington (M),£750; England (L),£750; Garbutt (M),£750; Gee (M*),£3,750; Gordon,doctor,£950; Hubersty (M), £375; Jarratt (L),£300; Locking (P),£750; Lunn,doctor,£950; Pease (B),£750; Robinson (B),£375; Sampson,shipowner,£125; Saxleby (L), £500; Shaw (M),£750; Spence (M),£750; Tapp,wharfinger,£750; Uppleby (L),£375; Whitaker (M),£750; Wood (M),£950; Wrightson (P),£250.

F. The West Riding		L & E	E & H	L & D
Dyson	E*	1,875		1,000
Stanfeld	M	1,125		1,000
Stead	Carrier	1,875		1,250
Wade	P	375		375
Wade	P	375		375
Wade	M	750		1,000
Watson	S	1,500		750
Watson	P	1,250		750

L & E: Glover (T),£750; Hudson (M),£2,500; Raywood (T),£1,500; Simpson (S), £750; Smeeton (P),£1,875.

E & H: Barff (T),£2,000; Barff (T),£2,000;Dyson (P),£2,500; England (M), £1,875; Garnett (P),£250; Megson,railway agent,£500; Pitt (P),£2,000; Simpson (T),£2,000; Tattersall,malster,£1,000; Watson (M),£250; Wilkes,innkeeper,£500; Vodez (P),£750.

L & D: Carbutt (T),£1,000; Chadwicke (M),£750;Cunnington (P),£500; Garnett, paper maker,£2,500; Jowett,paper maker,£500; Lindley,farmer,£500; Oates (P),£750; Statter (P),£1,250; Whitesmith (P),£500; Woods, manufacturer,£375.

G. Kings Lynn		L & E	E & H	L & D
W.Everard	M & B *	3,000		500
Morphew	Clergyman	1,750		1,000
Pindar	Shipowner	950		2,500
Platten	P	150		2,625
Sheppherd	P	7,875		2,500
Whiting	Surgeon	1,500	2,500	2,500

L & E: Armes,sack maker,£175; Blott,shopkeeper,£50; Boardman,£150; Birch, £100; Candler,ship builder,£50; Cary (P),£50; Cary (P),£100; Cook, auctioneer,£100; Cooper,shopkeeper,£175; Cooper (M),£125; Creak (P),£300; Cresswell*(B),£2,000; Folkes.W*(P),£900; Folkes.M.(P), £225; Garland (A),£125; Lowe,baker,£200; Pitcher (L*),£250; Reynolds, shipowner,£175; Saddleton (P),£250; Southwell,clerk,£375; Sugars, builder,£950; Woods (P),£150.

E & H: Nil.

L & D: Cooper,oil merchant,£250; Pindar,£625; Platten,farmer,£125; Platten (P),£625;

H. Norfolk: in this section F=farmer.

Coulcher, a lawyer, subscribed £750 to the L & E, and £1,500 to the L & D; Birbeck, a banker, £750 to the former and £500 to the E & H; Lock, a farmer, put £100 in the L & E and £125 in the L & D, but for the rest there were subscriptions to one line only.

L & E: Ashley (F), £100; Bale (F), £100; Barnham (L), £175; Bate (F), £375; Carter (F), £150; Clowes (P), £150; Coe (F), £750; Dyson (P), £1,500; Edwards, cleric, £50; Emmett (M), £750; Finch (P), £300; Francis, cleric, £50; Hankinson, cleric, £375; Hardy, grocer, £500; Hare, cleric, £375; Harvy (P), £375; Hoste (P), £50; Howlett (F), £1,000; Hunter, doctor, £75; Johnson, teacher, £300; Kenney (T), £250; Mack (P), £375; Mumford (A), £50; Norgate (M), £1,500; Platten (F), £150; Plestowe*(P), £375; Porter (F), £250; Powlett (P), £750; Pratt*(P), £500; Pratt, cleric, £200; Reynolds (L), £1,875; Sherringham (F), £1,500; Southwell, clerk, £175; Villebois*(P), £750; Wilson (B), £1,125; Wing, steward, £150; Wing (L), £375; Wiseman (F), £375; Wood (F), £50; Wythes, contractor, £375.

E & H: Patteson (P), £1,500; Routh (E), £375.

L & D: Birch (P), £2,500; Birch (P), £750; Clifton, brewer, £375; Partridge (L), £500; Rippingell, clerk, £1,000.

I. Other areas

			L & E	E & H	L & D
Finlayson	Royal Navy	Cambridge	175	125	
Gilbert	L	Wiltshire	1,500		1,000
Lloyd	B	Birmingham	1,875	750	
Parry	P	Northants	750		500
Taite	P	York	1,750	500	
Teather	P	Carlisle	1,875		2,500
Timmins	P	Wolverhampton	2,500	375	750
Wilson	Doctor	Staffordshire	1,500	625	

L & E: Beard (S), Essex, £750; Beard (S) Bury St.Edmunds, £750; Boorman, £3,750; Busted, cleric, Dorset, £3,000; Butts, cleric, Suffolk, £2,250; Cartmell, cleric, Cambridge, £1,125; Fawcett, bank clerk, £375; Fisher (B) Cambridge, £3,750; Fisher (B) Cambridge, £3,750; Fowler, cleric, Birmingham, £1,875; Fry (P), Somerset, £1,500; Gee (E), Nottingham, £2,000; Hamilton (P), Birmingham, £750; Hansell, shipowner, North Shields, £750; Hurst, doctor, Sussex, £300; Johnson, cleric, Cambridge, £375; Johnson, doctor, Colchester, £375; Morrison, L & B Rly.servant, £375; Pearson (S), £750; Shaw, cleric, Cambridge, £750; Stockdale (M), £750.

E & H: Rooper, cleric, Sussex, £1,000; Walker (P), £2,000; Wilson (P) £500.

L & D: Abdy M.P.*, Essex, £1,250; Chatterton (P), Hastings, £2,000; Foster, innkeeper, £500; Fowler (P*), Tamworth, £2,500; Goldsmith (P), £1,250; Gough (P), Surrey, £2,000; Lewis (P), Shrewsbury, £5,000; Shepherd, (P) Sussex, £1,250; Simpson (P), Surrey, £1,250; Smith (P), Penrith, £500; Stanley, (P), Hampshire, £2,500; Stanley (P), Southampton, £1,250; Teather (P), Carlisle, £1,250.

Comments on the above additional to those made in the main text:

1. The details given are derived from Accounts & Papers 1845 (13) xl, and 1845 (317) xl, these being alphabetical lists of subscribers to the 1845 schemes to amounts above £2,000 and below £2,000 respectively. They come together in a massive volume of closely printed lists which has to be examined minutely in order to isolate each reference to any individual company. Without what would literally be weeks of work it would be impossible to guarantee that the lists given above are complete. Moreover, the returns in question are themselves defective, containing misprints and some duplications. Despite these limitations,however, it may be held that what is given here does represent the general shape of investment at the time that the Subscription Contracts were signed.
2. In as much as many shares had already changed hands in the form of scrip issue there is nothing in these lists that may be used to challenge the claims of the companies in respect of initial local support,or the view that the bulk of local support was fundamentally short-term and speculative in nature.
3. Considerations of space have precluded more detailed references to individual addresses. On examination,however, these do suggest the importance of family and business relationships in the choice of investments. This personal factor in the overall pattern would justify a special study of its own.
4. The Lynn,Norfolk and Hull lists indicate by the low level of many of the individual subscriptions that real efforts were made to accommodate applicants from the locality and from areas more distant that would be directly affected by the lines. The exhaustion of resources available for railway investment in these areas is suggested by the greater dependence of the E & H and L & D on outside sources than is the case with the L & E. It is also possible that while local financial backing was offered to the two former companies it was withdrawn more quickly, an indication of what were held to be the relative prospects of the three.
5. The number of stockbrokers in the above lists is somewhat confusing; it is unlikely that the companies were using them as agents,for this was done only occasionally by companies in general and in these particular cases the evidence is virtually conclusive that issues were kept directly in the companies' hands. It therefore seems that the stockbrokers must be considered as investors in their own right. For full discussion of this subject in its general application see H.Pollins:The Marketing of Railway Shares in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century,Economic History Review, Second Series,Vol.VII,No.2,1954,p239.

The Initial Directors

Sir J.W.H.B.Folkes,W.Everard,F.Cresswell,W.Seppings,J.B.Whiting,F.Ingle, E.Self (all of Lynn),H.Partridge (Norfolk),T.Abdy M.P. (Essex),Sir Henry Calder (Hull),H.Lacy M.P.(Lancashire),F.Reynolds (London).

Appendix E

Principal Railway Schemes for Norfolk and Suffolk in 1845 (plus certain associated lines)

Sources: Report of the Railway Department of the Board of Trade on the Schemes for Extending Railway Communication in the Counties of Norfolk and Suffolk - 1845 (88) xxxix.
Report from Group K (4th August,1845) - 1845 (620) xxxix.
Lewin: The Railway Mania & Its Aftermath,pp30f.

"We cannot but remark on the extent to which railway speculation has gone for the construction of lines in this district,and the improbability of the Legislature sanctioning at present more than a small portion of the projects which we have enumerated". (Board of Trade Report)

A. Schemes to connect Norwich and London

a. London & Norwich Direct - rejected.
b. Diss & Colchester Junction (in connection with the Norwich & Brandon scheme for a line to Diss) - rejected at Standing Orders.
c. Ipswich to Norwich - Eastern Union Railway - 2 bills,both withdrawn.

B. Branch Schemes in the Central Areas

a. Ipswich & Bury - authorised.
b. Diss,Beccles & Yarmouth - withdrawn.
c. Lowestoft Railway & Harbour (with a branch to the Yarmouth & Norwich line at Reedham) - authorised.
d. Colchester to Bury - E.C.R. - withdrawn.
e. Cambridge to Bury - E.C.R. - rejected.
f. Cambridge to St.Ives - E.C.R. - authorised.
g. Ely & Huntingdon - authorised.

C. Norfolk

a. Direct Norwich & Dereham - rejected at Standing Orders.
b. A short extension of the Yarmouth & Norwich into Norwich - authorised.
c. Wymondham to East Dereham - Norwich & Brandon - authorised.
d. Extension to Diss by the Norwich & Brandon - withdrawn.
e. Wells & Thetford - withdrawn.
f. Lynn & Dereham - authorised.
g. Lynn & Ely - authorised.

Appendix F
Transport Facilities at Dereham in 1845 and 1854

A. Coaches

In 1845: Mail to Lynn & Birmingham (from Norwich) at 9 p.m. daily.
Mail to Norwich (from Birmingham & Lynn) at 4 a.m. daily.

Lynn to Norwich:
The Day Coach – to Norwich at 11.15 a.m. daily, to Lynn at 6 p.m.
The 'Union' – to Norwich at 6.45 p.m. daily, to Lynn at 10.45 a.m.

To London
The 'Regulator' daily at 9.00 a.m.; on return, extended to Holt on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays at 6 p.m.

Beetley to Norwich
The 'Earl of Leicester', Saturdays only, leaving for Norwich at 8.00 a.m. and returning at 6.00 p.m.

Also the 'Self Defence' leaving for Norwich at 9.00 a.m. on Mondays and 8.00 a.m. on Wednesdays and Saturdays, returning the same day.

By 1854 all the coaches had been withdrawn in face of railway competition.

B. Carriers, Vans, Gigs etc.

In 1845: To London: Green & Archer (twice weekly), Swann (thrice weekly) Hacon & Ball (twice weekly). There was no regular service offered on Wednesdays or Fridays.

To Norwich: Barnes (daily), Carter (twice weekly), Farrow (twice weekly) – the two latter both on Wednesdays and Saturdays. Also Cockett (Tuesday) and Twaites (Wednesday); in addition those passing through Dereham on the way to Norwich and providing services in the reverse direction – from Heacham, Towler (Fridays), from Lynn, Selfe (Tuesdays and Fridays) and Brett (Wednesdays, Fridays and Saturdays), from Swaffham, Lawn (Mondays, Wednesdays and Saturdays) and Allen (Tuesdays and Fridays).

Others: Castleacre – Boddy (Thursday) – also Norwich on Fridays; Downham – Oakes (Thursdays) – also Norwich on Wednesdays; Wells and Fakenham – Raven (Fridays); Holt – Green & Archer (Tuesdays and Fridays); Thetford and Watton – Woolsey (Tuesdays and Fridays) plus a daily mail gig; also Betts from Lynn twice weekly, and a variety from outside villages to and from Dereham.

On the basis of this evidence it may be held that Norwich would appear to have a greater hold on Dereham than Lynn could claim, but the absence of evidence of deep penetration into the villages of the north, south and west is to be noted as redressing the balance somewhat. Many of the villages that might have been expected to be closely linked with Dereham in fact had strong links with Lynn through carriers' services etc. Hence the contention in the text that the central areas of Norfolk were still in the balance in terms of the competition between Lynn and Norwich.

By 1854 a much simplified and modified pattern had emerged; the number of weekly services are shown in brackets.

Bury (1),Downham (1),Hellhoughton (1),Holt (2),Litcham (2),Lynn (1), Norwich (6),Rudham (1),Setchford (1),Swaffham (2),Swanton (2),Thetford (1),Pentney (1).

Sources: White's Norfolk Directory 1845, and the same,1864.

Appendix G
The Tender on which the Contract for the L & E Construction from Lynn to Denver (13 miles 726 yards) was based

The original has been examined in the Lynn offices of Bantoft,Broadley & Ward (solicitors).

	£	s.	d.
All fencing	8,180	4	2
Occupation Crossings	2,920	0	0
Public road level crossings (temporary roads included)	2,534	0	11
12' timber bridges over drains	667	10	8
15' timber bridges over drains	205	0	6
Road bridges etc.	1,906	5	0
18" culverts complete			
2'	41	9	7
3'	52	11	0
4' (permanent way)	983	11	0
6'	983	11	0
8' (included in the bridges)	365	0	0
Occupation Roads	340	4	4
Timber bridge over Middleton Top Drain	240	4	4
Timber bridge over Puny Drain	127	0	4
Timber bridge over Nar (at 3 mls.)	2,380	15	9
Timber bridge over Polver Drain	267	8	2
Timber bridge over Nar (Harbour Br.)	1,680	0	0
Earthwork	6,713	9	5
Ballast (laying and finding)	9,547	13	0
Unsoiling,resoiling,dressing of slopes	523	8	4
12 months' maintenance	2,000	0	0
Unforeseen circumstances	1,433	16	2
	48,347	10	8

N.B. The contractors were to supply everything except the actual track.

Appendix H

Wheat, Barley and Oats Prices, and Volumes Imported, 1852-1862

A: Highest weekly average   B: Lowest weekly average   C: Average for year

1. Wheat

Year	A	B	C	Vol. imported (cwts.)
1852	45/11	37/2	40/9	13,261,161
1853	73/7	43/3	53/3	21,300,197
1854	83/3	52/5	72/5	14,868,650
1855	83/1	66/6	74/8	11,560,042
1856	77/10	59/8	69/2	17,648,943
1857	63/10	47/5	56/4	14,897,814
1858	48/8	40/-	44/2	18,380,782
1859	54/4	39/10	43/9	17,337,329
1860	62/11	43/6	53/3	25,484,151
1861	61/6	50/-	55/4	29,955,532
1862	62/1	45/7	55/5	41,033,503

2. Barley

Year	A	B	C	Vol. imported (cwts.)
1852	31/-	26/3	28/6	2,234,071
1853	42/3	28/11	33/2	2,943,110
1854	43/-	29/2	36/-	1,974,900
1855	42/5	29/9	34/9	1,246,822
1856	47/6	35/6	41/1	2,612,186
1857	47/3	35/9	42/1	6,076,679
1858	37/6	29/9	34/8	5,933,543
1859	36/5	29/-	33/6	6,170,910
1860	41/4	32/5	36/7	7,546,185
1861	40/7	28/3	36/1	5,001,518
1862	37/3	31/6	35/1	6,625,143

3. Oats

Year	A	B	C	Vol. imported (cwts.)
1852	20/8	17/4	19/1	2,720,539
1853	26/3	17/9	21/-	2,828,125
1854	30/8	24/7	27/11	2,791,110
1855	29/3	24/10	27/5	2,842,749
1856	27/11	22/9	25/2	3,153,832
1857	28/7	22/8	25/-	4,703,322
1858	28/5	21/9	24/6	5,104,773
1859	26/3	20/10	23/2	4,613,358
1860	28/2	21/-	24/5	6,300,115
1861	26/10	21/6	23/9	5,114,398
1862	26/3	20/4	22/7	4,426,994

Source: Accounts & Papers 1878-9 lxv.

Appendix I

The East Anglian's Classification of Merchandise

Classification of merchandise for the purposes of calculating conveyance charges was,as indicated in the text,an immensely complex problem,and one in which sound principles could only evolve from long experience. Numerous factors had to be taken into account,these including weight,bulk,the amount of handling required and the need for any special facilities,as well as the characteristics of delicate or perishable articles; each article also had to be seen in terms of economical wagon loading. In the lists given below no clear principles are readily discernable,for apart from these complications across the whole structure cuts the company's concepts of what individual items of traffic would bear and also of the likely incidence of individual types of traffic. Thus the lists contain many puzzling inclusions,while the absence of any reference to the units on which charges would be based further obscures the issue.

If anything the first class merchandise appears to involve articles of both bulk and weight that were likely to be offered frequently,provide economical wagon loadings (either as individual items or mixed with others) and be relatively easy to handle. Section 49 of the 1847 Amalgamation Act allowed a maximum charge of 1d. per ton mile for these to cover just tolls and conveyance,but the company charged more than this as the classification structure was related to the permitted scale of charges for "toll,locomotive power,wagons,sheets,ropes,clerkage and porterage at the termini." In the second class, 1½d. per ton mile for tolls and conveyance,are found many weighty articles of greater bulk (e.g.piping and machinery) and articles of particularly heavy weight (e.g.marble in blocks) likely to preclude full wagon loadings. In the third group,2½d. per mile, are numerous small items requiring careful handling,although why hay rakes are here and spades in the second it is impossible to say. The only element of apparent consistency in the fourth class,4d.per ton mile,is that many of its constituents represent articles of a delicate or perishable nature,or those that require speedy transit (e.g.fresh meat,fish,luggage etc.) and,because of this or for other reasons,wagons to themselves,but the appearance of marble in cases again presents a difficulty. The fifth class,for which no provision was made in the 1847 Act,obviously constitutes articles requiring very careful,and in some cases excessive,handling.

Before giving the lists the following items from the 1847 Act and company regulations should be noted.

The 1847 Act

Section 46;Maximum Tolls

Coals,dung etc.	1d. per ton mile	Carriages of more than two wheels to 1½ tons	5d.p.ml.
Grain,iron etc.	1½d.per ton mile		
Sugar,flour	2d. per ton mile	Carriages of two wheels	4d.p.ml.
cotton	3d. per ton mile		

Section 47

Boilers etc. of 5 to 8 tons	6d.per mile
Boilers etc. of over 8 tons	as the company thinks fit

Company Notice dated the 1st November,1847
Remarks on the Classification of Goods

1. Carriages and horses conveyed by goods' train to be charged one third less than the advertised scale of charges by passenger train.
2. Boilers occupying more than one truck carried a distance under 80 miles to be charged at £2 per truck,and over 80 miles £3 per truck.
3. Packets of hops,hat boxes and other such like bulky goods,when in single packages for separate consignments,to be charged not less than 1/2 each.
4. Coach and cab bodies to be charged no less than 10/- each; when more by weight to be charged 5th class.
5. Invalid chairs to be charged as in no.4 above.
6. Rowing boats to be charged not less than 20/- each.
7. Wheat,rye,beans,peas and tares are calculated and charged at 5 quarters to the ton, barley 6 quarters,malt and oats 8 quarters,bran 10 quarters, flour at 8 sacks to the ton.
8. Bricks are calculated at 2½ tons weight per thousand. Special class: 1¼d. per ton mile including toll,locomotive power and wagons only.

The Classification

First Class

Ale,alum,anvils,ashes in casks.asphaltum,bacon,barrel staves,beer,bones, bran,bricks,butter in casks,carrots,carrot seed,cement,chains,chalk, charcoal,cheese,chicory,cinders,clay,coffee,coke,copper (brass or any metal other than iron),corn,culm,currants in butts,deals,dye woods,earthenware, flags,flints in casks,flour,Fullers earth, gas tar,broken glass in hogs-heads,grain,grease,greaves,guano,hams,hemp,hides,hoofs.horns, wrought iron of all descriptions,iron castings not manufactured into utensils or other articles of merchandise,scrap iron,jute,lard in casks,lead,linseed,logwood, mahogany in logs,mastic,malt,mangel wurzle (and its seed),meal,metals other than iron,molasses,mustard seed,nails,oil cake,oil in casks,peas,pelts, pipe staves,pitch,plaster,pollard (to be charged the actual weight),porter in casks,potatoes,provisions (salt), railway bars or chairs or pins or wheels or axles or turntables, rape cake, rape cake seed,rice,resin,rye, rye grass seed,sacks (new),saltpetre,sand,shot,slates,soda,soap in chests, speltre,sugar,stones or blocks or slabs, ditto for pitching,building and paving,tallow,tar,tares,tiles,timber,turnip seed,turnips,vetches,vices, vinegar,wheat.

Second Class

Alabaster in blocks,bark in bags,bleaching powder,canary seed,candles, canvas,carraway seed,clover seed,coach and cart springs,colours,copper and brass tubing,copperas,raw cotton,divi divi,felt,flannels,flax,fruit (dried), gas pipes,glass bottles in crates,grindstones,gum,hardware,hay,hemp seed, hoopwood,manufactured iron,ditto into utensils,window frames,wire,bedsteads, juice,lath wood,lead pipes,leather,linen,liquorice,machinery,Manchester packs,marble in blocks,oakum,paper,drain pipes,rags,register stoves, safes scythes,shumack,smaltz,spades and shovels,stones (worked in cases),straw, terra japonica,tin (in boxes),tobacco leaf,tools,tow,trefoil,whiting,wire rope,wooden blocks for paving,wool.

Third Class

Almonds,anchovies,annatto,apples in casks,articles not specified,archil, argols,beer in bottles,bees wax,bellows,berries,blacking,bristles,brooms, carpeting,cider in wood,coach wheels,cocoa,cordage,corkwood,cream of tartar, door mats,drapery,drugs,drysaltery,dye-lac,dye goods,eggs,emery,fat in sacks,fenders,fire irons,figs,fish (dried),flocks,fruit (ripe),galls, ginger,glass in crates,groceries not specified,glue,gum stocks,haberdashery, hair in bales,hay rakes,honey in pots,hops,hosiery,hurdles,indigo,ink, isinglass,lard in bladders,lemons,madder,millboards,mustard,naptha,needles, nutria skins,nuts,nutmegs,oil in jars,onions,oranges,oxalic acid,osiers, paper hangings,patent medicines,pepper,perry in casks,pickles in bottles, pins in boxes,powder (blue),quills,quicksilver,rabbit skins,rushes, safflower,seal skins,seeds (garden),sheepskins,shel-lac,shoes in hampers, silk (waste),size,slates (writing),snuff,soda water,spirits or wines in casks or hampers,stamps,starch,stationery,tea (tins and jap ware),tobacco (manufactured),tool chests,trees and shrubs (nurserymen's),types,veneers, weighing machines,whale bones,vegetables,yarn.

Fourth Class

Alabaster slabs in cases,baskets,cochineal,cream cheese in boxes,cigars, corks in bags,elephants' teeth,fish (fresh),floor cloth (lengths exceeding 12' not carried)if uncased),feathers,game,garden plants,garden seats, luggage,marble in cases,meat (fresh),oysters,pianofortes,poultry,salmon in boxes,sponge (Turkey),straw (plait),silk (raw and manufactured),tortoise shell,toys,turtle.

Joiners' work carried for no less charge than one ton.

Fifth Class

Chairs,china,clocks,hats,household furniture,lace,millinery,organs, pictures.

Sources: The 1847 Amalgamation Act (where specified); the remainder from an East Anglian Notice of the 1st November,1847 (now privately owned in Lynn).

Appendix J

Notes on the Sites of the East Anglian's Intermediate Stations

The East Anglian lines were typical of the period in that they followed the most direct route possible between the terminal points, the only major concession being the southerly diversion of the L & D to bring in Swaffham. As a result many of the intermediate stations were ill-placed in respect of the villages they nominally served, and without significance in relation to the overall pattern of the local road systems. However, it is not possible to say that the East Anglian failed to open a station in any worthwhile place; indeed, almost the opposite is true, for stations appeared wherever there was the remotest chance of obtaining regular traffic. That all but three survived to very recent times is in itself an indication of the railways to the scattered communities they served. The question of the sites is important in that the facts help to explain the difficulties encountered in building up traffic, and also the very high proportion of the receipts absorbed by working expenses.

In the following lists population figures are given only for places of over 1,000 (1841 Census).

1. The Lynn & Ely line
   Average distance between stations: 3¾ mls.
   Flat, open Fen, sparsely populated; villages small, compact and few; scattered and isolated farms; few large houses; traffic area restricted by the close proximity of the northern section of the line to the Ouse.

Station	Remarks
Watlington	6 mls. from Lynn; junction for the Wisbech line; ¼ ml. from village - 1 ml. Wiggenhall St. Mary (over the Ouse) - 1¼ mls. Tottenhill, 1½ mls. Runcton Holme - 2½ mls. Setchey; cultivated Fen; roads of local significance only.
Stow	8½ mls. from Lynn; ½ ml. Stowbridge (over the Ouse) - 1½ mls. Wimbotsham - 2 mls. Stow Bardolph.
Downham Market	10¾ mls. from Lynn; population 2,953; station ½ ml. from the town centre; roads to Lynn, Swaffham, Thetford, Ely and Wisbech; 2½ mls. Crimplesham - 3½ mls. Nordelph; two weekly markets in this period.
Denver	12¼ mls. from Lynn; 1 ml. Denver, but otherwise an almost completely isolated site; in 1882 became the junction for the branch to Stoke Ferry.
Ouse Bridge	Just over 14 mls. from Lynn; completely isolated site - 1 ml. to the hamlet of Fordham.
Hilgay Fen	15½ mls. from Lynn; on a road doing no more than link isolated farmsteads; 1 ml. the hamlet of Ten Mile Bank, 3 mls. Hilgay - 3½ mls. Southery.

Littleport	$20\frac{3}{4}$ mls.from Lynn;until about 1826 the terminal point for larger vessels on the Ouse;a bridging point;a small town completely surrounded by large tracts of Fenland containing only isolated farms and associated cottages.

With the exception of Downham none of the above represented a junction of traffic streams;all lay near the Cambridge to Lynn road and the Ouse. Population in all cases was scanty and revenue inevitably depended for the most part on through traffic. From the viewpoint of initiation of traffic by intermediate stations passenger traffic would inevitably be thin,and freight traffic seasonal.

2. The Lynn & Dereham line

Average distance between stations: $3\frac{1}{2}$ mls.
Varied and undulating countryside,in many parts wooded,but virtually all intensively farmed; many more villages than in the L & E area;many large houses.

Station	Remarks
Middleton	$3\frac{1}{4}$ mls.from Lynn;on Middleton ($1\frac{1}{2}$ mls.) to Leziate ($1\frac{1}{2}$ mls.) road – $2\frac{3}{4}$ mls.Blackborough End;relatively isolated site;importance later enhanced by development of large sand quarries adjacent to the station;numerous farms.
East Winch	$5\frac{1}{4}$ mls.from Lynn;$\frac{3}{4}$ ml.to village – $1\frac{1}{2}$ mls.Ashwicken – $2\frac{3}{4}$ mls.Gayton – $4\frac{1}{2}$ mls.Grimston.
Bilney	Nearly 7 mls.from Lynn;on the main Lynn-Swaffham road, but an isolated site;$\frac{1}{2}$ ml.to village – $1\frac{1}{2}$ mls.Pentney.
Narborough	$8\frac{3}{4}$ mls.from Lynn;terminal of the Nar Navigation;$\frac{1}{2}$ ml. village and less to maltings – $1\frac{1}{4}$ mls.Pentney – 2 mls. Narford – 3 mls.East Walton – $3\frac{1}{4}$ mls.Westacre – $4\frac{1}{2}$ mls. Marham (by road);well sited station.
Swaffham	$14\frac{1}{2}$ mls.from Lynn;population of 3,358;well sited station on the edge of the town;generally the centre for Breckland and extensive farming areas; $3\frac{1}{2}$ mls.Castleacre (1,495) – 3mls.Southacre – $3\frac{1}{2}$ mls.N.Pickenham – 4 mls. S.Pickenham;road junction,and from 1875 that for the line to Thetford.
Dunham	$18\frac{1}{2}$ mls.from Lynn;$\frac{1}{2}$ ml.Little Dunham – $\frac{3}{4}$ ml.Great Dunham – 2 mls.Necton (996).
Fransham	$19\frac{3}{4}$ mls.from Lynn;$\frac{1}{2}$ ml.Great Fransham – $1\frac{1}{2}$ mls.Little Fransham – $1\frac{1}{2}$ mls.Great Dunham.
Wendling	$22\frac{1}{2}$ mls.from Lynn;station at centre of village;2 mls. Scarning – $2\frac{1}{4}$ mls.Longham – $3\frac{1}{2}$ mls.East Bradenham – $3\frac{1}{2}$ mls.West Bradenham;many small hamlets within 5 miles.

3. The Wisbech Branch

Bare Fen - hardly any settlement along the line except at Emneth - the cluster of well populated villages between Lynn and Wisbech lay 2 mls. or more to the north of the line; for details of the road conditions see the text.

Station	Remarks
Magdalen Gate	$7\frac{1}{4}$ miles from Lynn; $\frac{1}{2}$ ml.Wiggenhall St.Mary Magdalen.
Middle Drove	$10\frac{1}{4}$ miles from Lynn;a mere hamlet near the station; a wide open area; 2 mls.Tilney St. Lawrence - $2\frac{1}{2}$ mls.Terrington St.John.
Smeeth Road	12 miles from Lynn;numerous hamlets within four miles,but no more.
Emneth	$13\frac{1}{4}$ mls.from Lynn; 1 ml.Emneth (1,065) to the south,open Fen to the north.

Appendix K
List of the Principal Promotions affecting the E.A.R. area in 1846

Principal Sources: Lewin:The Railway Mania & Its Aftermath,and the Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald in which many of the companies mentioned below published their notices.

Lines Sanctioned:

London & York (Great Northern)	
Newmarket & Chesterford	Mainline,and branch from Six Mile Bottom to Cambridge
Ipswich & Bury	Haughley Junction to Norwich and a branch to the Norfolk Railway at Trowse
Norfolk Railway	Dereham to Wells
Wisbech,St.Ives & Cambridge Junction (otherwise Wisbech,March & St.Ives)	
Boston,Stamford & Birmingham	Helpston to Wisbech
East Lincolnshire	Boston to Grimsby
Ambergate,Nottingham,Boston & Eastern Junction	
Stamford & Spalding	
Ely & Huntingdon	Bedford extension
Manchester,Buxton & Matlock & Midland Junction	

Rejected or Withdrawn

Norfolk Railway	Line from near Wymondham to the I & B at Stowmarket,also a line from Thetford to Reedham via Diss and Bungay
Thetford,Bury & Newmarket	
Ipswich,Norwich & Yarmouth	Ipswich to Bungay and from thence lines to Norwich and Reedham
Direct Norwich & East Dereham	

Rejected or Withdrawn (continued)

East Coast Railway	Boston to Lynn
Lynn & Ely	Lines from Wisbech to March and Spalding, with a branch from the latter to Holbeach

Holbeach & Spalding
Huntingdon, St. Ives, Wisbech & Sutton Union
Ely & Bury
Lynn, Wisbech & Peterborough, Midland Counties & Birmingham Junction
Wisbech, Peterborough & Birmingham Junction
Wolverhampton, Walsall, Stamford, Peterborough & Norwich Junction
Leicester, Melton Mowbray & Spalding Junction

Appendix M
The North Wales Railway Scandal

Source: First Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Audit of Railway Accounts, 1849, pp.iii-xv.

This was a special case which "no honourable man can hesitate to condemn" (Report, p.iii), but a brief summary of the irregularities will serve to illustrate the very imperfect state of the then existing law concerning railways and their accounts.

The company was incorporated in 1845 (8 & 9 Vic.c.cvi) to construct a line from Port Dynaen to Bangor. Its authorised capital was £46,000, issued in £1 shares.

During 1845 the board lent £20,000 of the company's capital to the South Western Railway (individuals were directors of both) on the security of promissory notes of individuals. The loan was repaid on the 3rd April, 1846, but the incident had defeated the whole purpose of the Act of Incorporation.

Next, four directors, who were also on the board of the Richmond Railway lent £25,000 to that company from the N.W.R.'s funds; neither party had the legal right to enter into such a transaction (the Richmond had not then raised half its capital). The loan extended from the 3rd April, 1846 to the 8th January, 1847 and carried 4½% interest. Thus:

> "The funds...raised and appropriated by Parliament for North Wales were applied to the construction of a railway in Surrey, and the security taken for the capital illegally lent was only the notes of hand of three individuals."

(Report, p.vi)

The chairman of the company had been absent at the time of the loan and was known to be opposed to a "misapplication of the funds". The board arranged the loan in his absence on the evening of the 2nd, but did not send him the minutes of the meeting until the following evening. The chairman received the minutes on the 4th, the same day as the board met to confirm the resolution of the 2nd. It was physically impossible for him to be present.

On his return the chairman asked for copies of the minutes of all meetings held in his absence. When this was refused he resigned, and was replaced by Chadwick, who was also chairman of the Richmond Company.

"A new series of indefensible arrangements was then commenced" (Report, p.vii). £5,500 of company money was lent to the son of a director; he was under age, yet his note of hand was passed by his father as a legal security. Railway shares were used as a collateral although at a discount. £4,000 was lent to a Mr.Richards, and a similar amount to a Mr.Waghorn, the latter loan being against a collateral of Thames Haven shares that were unsaleable by the latter period of the loan. £2,850 was lent to T.Sodie and £4,50 to a Mr.Birkenshaw, both offering collaterals of railway shares, and the latter also a note of hand. £8,000 was advanced to the respectable firm of Overand, Gurney & Coy. on a commercial bill during 1847.

Archer and Herapath, as shareholders, exposed these irregularities. At first both were refused the opportunity to examine the company's books as was their entitlement under the Company Clauses Consolidation Act. When at last they did see the books it was to find that £21,908-12-8d. of the company's money was out in loans. The transactions had been entered in secret books in cipher (of which the key was concealed) and had never been examined by the auditors; the company's bookkeeper had never even seen the secret ledger.

During 1847 the directors decided that the line was useless, but kept quiet as they hoped to sell it. In 1848 a bill was drawn up to dissolve the company and distribute the capital, but this was withdrawn when the House of Lords demanded to see the accounts. Even so illegal distribution of capital did take place. In this distribution one of the directors, Marsden Shaw, ran the line down publicly, then bought up large blocks of shares at 5 to 10 shillings each share, and then received 20/- from the company. Landowners, contractors and dissident proprietors were sacrificed, and as the company transferred shares into the names of paupers, creditors were left with no legal remedy.

Appendix N
Sections 56,57 and 120 of the Company Clauses Consolidation Act,1845

56. It shall be lawful for the Company, if they think fit, unless it be otherwise provided by the special act, to raise the additional sum so authorised to be borrowed, or in part thereof, by creating new shares of the Company instead of borrowing the same, or having borrowed the same, to continue at interest only a part of such additional sum, and to raise part thereof by creating new shares, but no such augmentation of capital as aforesaid shall take place without the previous authority of a general meeting of the Company.

57. The capital so to be raised by the creation of new shares shall be considered as part of the general capital, and shall be subject to the same provisions in all respects, whether with reference to the payment of calls or the forfeiture of shares on non-payment of calls, or otherwise, as if it had been part of the original capital, except as to the times of making calls for such additional capital, and the amount of such calls, each respectively, it shall be lawful for the Company from time to time to fix as they shall think fit.

120. Previously to every ordinary meeting at which a dividend is intended to be declared the directors shall cause a scheme to be prepared, showing the profits, if any, of the company for the period current since the preceding ordinary meeting at which a dividend was declared, and apportioning the same, or so much thereof as they may consider applicable to the purposes of dividend, among the shareholders, according to the shares held by them respectively, the amount paid thereon, and the periods during which the same may have been paid, and shall exhibit such scheme at such ordinary meeting, and at such meeting a dividend may be declared according to such scheme.

Appendix P
The Background to the Amalgamation of 1862

Extract from the Preamble to the 1862 Act forming the Great Eastern Railway (25 & 26 Vic.c.ccxxiii)

And whereas by an Agreement dated the 6th February, 1854 between the Eastern Counties Railway and the Eastern Union Railway and the Norfolk Railway.......it was agreed that the Eastern Counties Railway should work the Eastern Union Railway and the Norfolk Railway upon the terms therein mentioned, and provision was made for the future amalgamation of the Companies thereto. And whereas by the Local Act 17th & 18th Vic.ch.220 relating to the Eastern Counties Railway, the East Anglian Railways, the Newmarket Railway and the Eastern Union Railway and the Norfolk Railway the recited agreements of the 2nd February, 1852 between the East Anglian Railways and the Eastern Counties Railway, the 6th February, 1854 between the Eastern Counties Railway and the Eastern Union Railway and the Norfolk Railway, and the 30th March, 1854 between the Newmarket Railway and the Eastern Counties Railway were confirmed, and the said companies were authorised to enter into agreements for any of the purposes of this Act; and it was amongst other things enacted that the Eastern Counties Railway should deposit.......for the session after the 31st December, 1861 a bill for the amalgamation of the five companies.

Appendix Q
Examples of the Distribution of Receipts as between the East Anglian and the Eastern Counties Railway

Source: The E.A.R. Committee Minutes, 22nd November, 1856, p15.

The E.A.R. secretary had examined the E.C.R. accounts to ensure that a fair share was being apportioned. The figures selected were those for the division of coal receipts during the July of 1856.

A. Lynn Harbour and Cambridge
101 tons 10 cwt.

	£	s	d
Freight	22	16	9
Terminals at 9d. per ton -£3/16/2 each end	7	12	4
Amount to divide	15	4	5
Miles E.C.R. 16	6	1	9
" E.A.R. 24	9	2	8
40	15	4	5

This + £3/16/2 gave £12-8-10d. as the E.A.R. entitlement.

B. Peterborough and Dunham
4 tons 18 cwt.

	£	s	d
Freight	1	9	0
Terminals (3-8d.x 2)		7	4
Amount to divide	1	1	8
Miles E.C.R. 28		8	5
" E.A.R. 44		13	3
	1	1	8

This + 3-8d. gave 16/11 as the E.A. entitlement.

Similar calculations gave the East Anglian £15-5-9d. for the conveyance over the two lines of 150 tons of coal between Lynn Harbour and Baldock, and for the June of 1856 and in connection with general freight £4-10-2d. in respect of 11 tons 3 cwt.8 lbs. between Lynn and Cambridge, and £23-14-9d. for the movement of 66 tons 9 cwt. 1 qu. 3 lbs. between Lynn and Norwich. As a result of this investigation there were no complaints against the Eastern Counties.

Appendix R
Example of a Withdrawn Service

Source: Committee Book, 20th May, 1857

Simpson had written to the E.C.R. to inquire why, from the 1st October, 1856, the first Lynn-Wisbech and the last Wisbech-Lynn services had been withdrawn. Robertson replied with the following figures for the week ending the 17th August, 1856 (the height of the season):

7.05 a.m. Lynn-Wisbech	76	passengers	£4-4-8d. receipts
8.00 p.m. Wisbech-Lynn	96	"	£7-6-0d. "

The first gave 10½d. per train mile in receipts, the second 1-6¾d.

Appendix S

Summary of the Capital Structure of the E.A.R. (sums actually raised)

A. Ordinary Shares

1845	L & E	8 & 9 Vic.c.lv	£300,000	
1845	E & H	8 & 9 Vic.c.xlviii	£194,400	
1845	L & D	8 & 9 Vic.c.cxxvi	£270,000	
			£764,400	£764,400
1853	E.A.R.	16 & 17 Vic.c.cxciii	£269,206/10	£269,206/10
				£1,033,606/10

The 1845 creations were for the original construction purposes, that of 1853 for further construction (harbour tramway etc.) and capitalisation of the company's debt.

B. Preference Shares

1846 1847	E & H 9 & 10 Vic.c.cclxx Taken over by the E.A.R. in 1847 and converted to preference shares; originally for the Bedford extension but used for original constructions and to facilitate equalisation of stock.	£120,000	6%	Class B
1848	E.A.R. No act. Stock of £151,600 created to cover debts and costs of construction. Only £70,873/10 issued, the balance being cancelled by the act of 1849 below.	£70,873/10	7%	Class C
1849	E.A.R. 12 & 13 Vic.c.lii £375,520 authorised to pay debts and deferred interest, but only £96,420 raised. The act of 1851 14 & 15 Vic.c.ci allowed for the reduction of the interest rate from 7% to 5%.	£96,420	7%/5%*	Class A
		£287,293/10		

* By 1862 the division was £86,640 at 5%, £9,780 at 7%.

In addition the East Anglian was entitled by its various acts to borrow on mortgage or bond a total of £345,200. In 1862 the sum actually borrowed was about £279,100.

N.B. The authority to raise £151,600 in ordinary shares in respect of the dock and navigation schemes (1847) was never implemented.

Appendix T
Brief Summary of East Anglian finances,1854-1862

1854 (second half): Interest on bonds and'A' and 'B' stocks were paid in full,leaving £1,002-1-9d.available for 'C' after deduction of stamp costs and bankers' charges on new bonds,a rate of $2\frac{3}{4}$% per annum.

1855:All but a few bonds fell due in the January (£260,000) and were replaced by a new 5% issue,the best terms possible in view of the political situation even though by now no company was clearer of debt than the East Anglian(cf.Directors' Report,29th March,1855, L.A.& W.N.H.,31st March). The maturity dates of the new issues were staggered(cf.meeting of the 11th September,1855;L.A.& W.N.H.,15th September). The revenue profit for the first half of the year after deduction of bond and 'A' interest was only £3,460,so allowing only £5-15s.% per annum on 'B' and nothing on 'C'. In the second half of the year things improved so that 'B' stock was paid in full and 'C' received interest at the rate of £2-18-4d% per annum.

1856:In the first half of the year 6% was paid on 'A' and 'B' and £2-10% per annum on 'C' (£883 in all). In the second half the two former received full payment,and 'C',the best yet,£4-15% per annum. (cf.Railway Times,13th September,1856,mt.of the 9th September, and Herapath,14th March,1857,mt.of the 10th March,1857).

1857:The first half of the year saw revenue reach its peak. Not only was it possible to pay all classes of interest in full,but also £632 was put aside as the start of a fund for ordinary dividends. Panic in the money market did not prevent the company from either meeting or arranging renewal of evry bond falling due in the period,even if the latter had to be at 5%.It was a source of annoyance,however,that at the same time the E.C.R.,now with a reformed board,was raising money at $4\frac{1}{4}$% (Herapath,5th September,1857;Simpson at the E.A.meeting of the 4th).Meanwhile work went steadily on in the consolidation and conversion (to 5%) of the 'A' stock. In the second half of the year revenue fell slightly,but it still remained possible to pay 'A' and 'B' in full and 'C' at the rate of £6-15s% per annum. The general crisis in the money market,however,had left its marks,delaying the further conversion of the 'A' stock and necessitating the repayment of £50,000 of the bonded debt;every demand had been promptly met, however,with the result that company credit had improved and there was the prospect of raising money on easier terms than before (Railway Times,13th March,1858;mt.of the 12th March).

1858:In the first half 'A' and 'B' were paid in full and £2,117 distributed amongst the 'C' holders. In the second half 'A' and 'B' were again paid in full,and £2-3s% per annum on 'C',the available funds for the latter having been reduced by a payment of £4,934 to the former solicitors in final settlement of law claims dating from before 1853. At the end of the year the bond debt had risen slightly to £278,465. For details see the Railway Times,19th March,1859, pp324-7.

1859: The effects of somewhat diminished receipts became evident during the year, and to the 30th June only £3-5s% per annum could be paid on 'C'. In the May ordinary shares sank to a discount of $86\frac{3}{4}$%, the £100 consolidated units being quoted at £13-5s. Even so the credit of the bonds and the preference shares stood high, and it was possible to reduce an increasing volume of the former to $4\frac{1}{2}$%, £159,235 having been so converted by the end of the year (Railway Times, 3rd March, 1860, p242); the remainder continued at 5%. For the second half of the year 'C' stock received interest at the rate of £4-7-6d.% per annum. In the same period £40 of 'A' stock was paid off and cancelled, and the bond debt reduced by £7,145; interest added to the ordinary dividend fund raised its level to £646-4-2d. (See Railway Times, 3rd March, 1860, p242).

1860: In the first six months full interest was paid on 'A' and 'B', £6-4s.% per annum on 'C'. Increased working expenses alone prevented the addition of a further £316 to the ordinary fund (Railway Times, 15th September, 1860). By September the bond debt had become £194,189 at $4\frac{1}{2}$% (cf. £171,243 in the February) with only £84,583 remaining at 5% (ibid.). In the second half of the year £2-10s% per annum was paid on 'C' after all other interest had been paid in full; with interest the ordinary dividend fund now stood at £675-5-8d. The year also saw some improvement in share prices. Starting at 14 to 15 (per £100 share) they reached $18\frac{1}{2}$ in April and then steadied at between 16 and $17\frac{1}{2}$ for the rest of the year.

1861: With amalgamation negotiations at their keenest this was a critical year. In the first half interest on 'C' was paid at the rate of 4% per annum, in the second half at £6-5s.% per annum. The Bond Debt was now at £275,314 (cf. £268,818 in the March), but renewals and new issues were all at $4\frac{1}{2}$%. See the Railway Times, 22nd March, 1862, meeting of the 14th March.

Appendix U
Examples of the Expenditure of Lynn Corporation in Relation to Moneys received from the Railway in Land Compensation

Source: Hillen, op.cit. p601

In all the Corporation received £21,814-7-6d. from the railways in land compensation. Subsequently some land was repurchased, but at a lower price than the railways had paid. As seen in chapter 9 the value of many Corporation lands was enhanced by the coming of the railway. These various factors meant that both income and expenditure rose in this period, the key to the situation being that the lands sold to the railways achieved prices out of all proportion to former value.

Examples of Expenditure

Paid off on bonds due	£10,000	
Lent on Estuary Bonds, 1852,less repaid £3,000	£4,000	
New Corn Exchange	£3,039	16s. 7d.
Purchase of lands	£1,993	13s. 8d.

Sundry Items,1845-1855

Rebuilding of Framlingham Almhouses	£2,797	7s. 6d.
Extension of St.James' cemetery	£836	3s. 0d.
Decoration of Assembly Rooms	£426	7s.10d.
Aid to Public Baths	£300	
Aid to Great Exhibition	£50	
Aid to Telegraph Office	£55	
Grants to churches and church schools	£3,792	
To various schools	£65	
Palisading St.John's churchyard	£371	15s. 2d.
Purchase of the Advowson of North Lynn church	£1,162	
Grant to St.Margaret's organ	£100	
Grant to the alteration of St.Nicholas's church	£100	

These are just a few examples to be contrasted with the acute financial difficulties being experienced by the Corporation in 1842. The importance of the railway money and of the railways in increasing land values is emphasised by the fact that the expenditure noted above could take place at a time when Harbour Tolls,so far the largest single item of income, were down on former years.

Appendix V
Norfolk Market Towns;Population Changes as between 1841 and 1851

Sources: Census Reports and White's Norfolk Directories,1845 and 1854

If a railway came to the town during the period the date is shown in brackets after the name.

Town		1841 Pop.	1851 Pop.
Attleborough	(1845)	1,959	2,324
Aylsham		2,448	2,741
Buckenham	(1844)	1,255	1,401
Burnham		1,126	1,241
Cley		828	995
Cromer		1,240	1,366
Diss	(1849)	3,205	3,637
Downham	(1846)	2,953	3,262
Dereham	(1847)*	3,837	4,385
Fakenham	(1849)	2,158	2,240
Foulsham		1,048	1,077
Harleston		1,762	1,795
Harling	(1845)	1,062	1,198
Hingham		1,691	1,698
Holt		1,604	1,726
Loddon		1,197	1,211
Lynn	(1846)	16,039	19,355
Norwich	(1844)	62,344	68,195
Stoke		663	820
Swaffham	(1847)	3,358	3,858
Thetford	(1845)	3,934	4,075
Walsham		613	689
Walsingham		426	476
Watton		1,188	1,353
Wells		3,504	3,675
Wymondham	(1845)	5,179	5,177
Yarmouth	(1844)	24,259	26,880

Aggregate totals in towns without railways: 19,338 and 20,741; 7% increase
" " " " with railways: 131,542 and 145,961; 10% increase

Detailed studies of the circumstances of each individual town would be needed before any firm conclusions could be drawn from this,but,even when allowing for the inclusion of the larger centres in the second group,the figures give general support to the contentions advanced in the main text that the railways attracted population and led to greater concentration in certain key towns.

* The first railway at East Dereham was that from Wymondham,not the L & D.

Appendix W

Details of Norfolk Villages Selected for Special Study, all being within easy reach of either the L & D or the L & E line

Supplementary to p.569

* denotes actually on the railway
Families (not individuals) new to any category are shown in brackets – this to be taken as part of the total shown.
Population figures are for 1841 (A) and 1861 (B), but other columns refer to 1845 (A) and 1864 (B).
The table is based on a detailed comparison of the 1845 and 1864 editions of White's Norfolk Directory.

Village	Population		Landowners		Farmers		Millers	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Middleton	867	894	1	(1)	15	10 (8)	1	2
Leziate	172	197	3	3	3	(2)	–	–
East Winch*	440	434	4	4 (2)	7	7 (3)	–	–
West Bilney*	298	253	1	1	3	6 (5)	–	–
Narborough*	360	387	1	(3)	2	(1)	1	–
Pentney	592	642	See fn.		16	14 (6)	1	–
Marham	817	870	3	3	6	12 (5)	–	–
Castleacre	1,495	1,405	1	1	4	2 (1)	–	3
Westacre	490	415	1	1	4	(5)	–	–
Southacre	100	92	1	1	2	2	–	–
Lt.Dunham*	298	295	4	2 (1)	3	(2)	–	–
Gr.Fransham*	329	295	3	3 (1)	11	12 (9)	–	–
Wendling*	330	370	2	1	11	12 (1)	1	–
Watlington*	502	588	1	1	2	(11)	1	–
Stow Bardolph* & Stow Bridge	1046	1,090	1	1	33	28 (20)	–	–
Stanhoe	445	468	2	2 (1)	3	5 (4)	–	1
Binham	502	512	1	1	6	7 (6)	1	1
Langham	383	399	4	3	3	8 (7)	1	–
	9,466	8,806	34	32 (9)	134	145 (96)	7	7

N.B. 1. The 7 millers for 1864 include 3 millers and bakers combined.
2. Pentney: in each year about one quarter of the 2,534 acres belonged to the Rev.Dr.Thackeray of Cambridge, the remainder to a large number of smallholders.
3. It would be wrong to base really firm conclusions on this table as White tended to change his designations, and gave no clue as to his concept of a principal landowner. However, the general picture shown does lend weight to the arguments advanced in the text, especially so is this true of the population figures which of course may be independently checked.

Appendix X

E.C.R. Timetable for the East Anglian Lines, 1st December, 1854

Dis.	Station	1 London Goods	2 Local Goods	3	4	5 Local Goods	6	7	8	9	10	11 Sunday
-	Ely dep.	5.00	6.30	Market Days & Saturdays Only			11.00		2.14		7.20	5.45
5¾	Littleport	5.30	6.55				11.16		2.28		7.33	5.58
11¼	Hilgay Fen	5.55	7.15				11.30		2.41		7.44	6.11
12¾	Ouse Bridge	....	7.25				11.34		2.44		7.51	6.18
14¼	Denver	....	7.35				11.38		2.51		7.56	6.25
15¾	Downham	6.15	7.50				11.45		2.56		8.01	6.30
18¼	Stow	....	8.20				11.50		3.03		8.08	6.40
20¾	Watlington	....	8.25				11.55		3.11		8.16	6.52
26¾	Lynn arr.	7.00	8.45				12.10		3.30		8.35	7.10
	Lynn dep.			7.40	9.15	11.10	12.20		3.45	5.25		7.15
29¾	Middleton			7.49	9.23	.....	12.29		3.54	5.33		7.24
31¾	East Winch			7.55	9.29	11.25	12.35		4.00	5.39		7.31
33¾	Bilney			8.02	9.35	.....	12.42		4.07	5.41		7.38
35¼	Narborough			8.08	9.41	1140	12.48		4.13	5.46		7.45
41¼	Swaffham			8.22	9.55	12.10	1.02		4.27	6.00		7.59
45¼	Dunham			8.32	10.05	12.25	1.12		4.37	6.10		8.10
46½	Fransham			8.38	10.10	12.35	1.18		4.43	6.15		8.17
49½	Wendling			8.47	10.18	12.45	1.27		4.52	6.23		8.26
53½	Dereham			8.56	10.30	1.00	1.40		5.05	6.35		8.40

Notes

No.2 Goods Train brings passengers from Ely to Lynn on Tuesdays

No.5 Goods Train not to leave Lynn on Saturdays until after the arrival of the 9.00 a.m. from Dereham. It will call daily at the Lime Works if required.

The engine of No.1 Goods Train to leave Lynn for the Harbour at 7.00 a.m. and 4.30 p.m. with empty wagons.

Dis.	Station	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19 Local Goods	20	21 London Goods	22 Local Goods	23	24 Sunday
-	Dereham dep.		8.20	9.10	10.00			1.15	1.40	4.15			7.10	2.30
4	Wendling		8.32	....	10.18			1.27	1.52	4.23			7.16	2.41
7	Fransham		8.43	....	10.24			1.33	2.02	4.29			7.23	2.51
$8\frac{1}{4}$	Dunham		8.49	....	10.27			1.39	2.14	4.32			7.39	2.56
$12\frac{1}{4}$	Swaffham		9.00	9.45	10.35			1.50	2.40	4.40			7.50	3.07
$18\frac{1}{4}$	Narborough		9.15	10.15	10.48			2.05	3.15	4.54			8.05	3.22
$19\frac{3}{4}$	Bilney		9.22	.....	10.55			2.12	....	4.59			8.12	3.29
$21\frac{3}{4}$	East Winch		9.29	.....	10.59			2.19	3.35	5.04			8.19	3.36
$23\frac{3}{4}$	Middleton		9.34	.....	11.05			2.24	....	5.09			8.26	3.43
$26\frac{3}{4}$	Lynn arr.		9.50	10.30	11.10			2.40	4.15	5.20			8.35	3.55
$26\frac{3}{4}$	Lynn dep.	7.30		Cattle markets & Saturdays only	11.20					5.30	5.45	6.10	Markets and Saturdays only	4.00
$32\frac{3}{4}$	Watlington	7.45			11.35					5.45	6.10	6.30		4.16
$35\frac{1}{4}$	Stow	7.53			11.40					5.54	....	6.40		4.27
$37\frac{3}{4}$	Downham	8.00			11.46					6.01	6.30	7.00		4.35
$39\frac{1}{4}$	Denver	8.05			12.03					6.09	....	7.15		4.42
$40\frac{3}{4}$	Ouse Bridge	8.10			12.08					6.16	....	....		4.49
$42\frac{1}{4}$	Hilgay Fen	8.14			12.13					6.22	6.50	7.30		4.56
$47\frac{3}{4}$	Littleport	8.26			12.27					6.39	7.15	7.50		5.10
$53\frac{1}{2}$	Ely arr.	8.45			12.40					6.55	7.40	8.10		5.36

The Wisbech Branch

Dis.	Station	25	26	27	28	29
-	Lynn dep.	7.15	10.00	11.40	1.45	6.05
6	Watlington	7.27	10.12	11.52	1.57	6.17
7¼	Magdalen Gate	7.32	10.17	11.57	2.02	6.22
10¼	Middle Drove	7.40	10.25	12.05	2.10	6.30
11¾	Smeeth Road	7.44	10.29	12.09	2.14	6.34
13¼	Emneth	7.48	10.33	12.13	2.18	6.43
15½	Wisbech	8.00	10.45	12.25	2.30	6.50

N.B. No.27 on market days and Saturdays only.

Dis.	Station	30	31	32	33	34
-	Wisbech	8.10	12.50	4.15	4.40	8.00
2¼	Emneth	8.22	1.02	4.27	4.52	8.12
3¾	Smeeth Road	8.26	1.06	4.31	4.56	8.16
5¼	Middle Drove	8.30	1.10	4.35	5.00	8.20
8¼	Magdalen Gate	8.38	1.18	4.43	5.08	8.28
9½	Watlington	8.43	1.23	4.48	5.13	8.35
15½	Lynn arr.	8.55	1.35	5.00	5.25	8.45

N.B. No.33 on market days and Saturdays only.

Bibliography

The following lists of principal sources consulted in the course of preparing this work are sub-divided as follows:

A. Acts of Parliament
B. Parliamentary Papers and Reports; Official publications
C. East Anglian Railways documents
D. Manuscript sources other than in C
E. Contemporary newspapers,journals,records etc.
F. Contemporary pamphlets and papers
G. Printed Books (each section divided where appropriate into pre-1870 and post-1870),and modern magazines,journals etc.
   1. General Railway Histories
   2. Histories of individual companies
   3. Biographies
   4. Railway economics and operation;equipment
   5. Parliament and Law
   6. King's Lynn,Norfolk,Wisbech,the Fenlands etc.
   7. Norfolk agriculture;labouring life
   8. Economic history
   9. Miscellaneous
   10. Modern magazines and journals
H. Miscellaneous sources

A: Acts of Parliament

1. General

1845	Company Clauses Consolidation Act	8 & 9 Vic.c.16
1845	Land Clauses Consolidation Act	8 & 9 Vic.c.18
1845	Railway Clauses Consolidation Act	8 & 9 Vic.c.20

2. The East Anglian Railways

1845	L & E	Incorporation	8 & 9 Vic.c.lv
1845	L & D	"	8 & 9 Vic.c.cxxvi
1845	E & H	"	8 & 9 Vic.c.xlviii
1846	E & H	Extension and further powers	9 & 10 Vic.c.cclxx
1847	L & E	Docks and deviation	10 & 11 Vic.c.clxx
1847	L & E	Wormegay Navigation	10 & 11 Vic.c.clxxi
1847	E.A.R.	Amalgamation	10 & 11 Vic.c.cclxxv
1849	E.A.R.	Further powers	12 & 13 Vic.c.lii
1851	E.A.R.	" "	14 & 15 Vic.c.ci
1853	E.A.R.	" "	16 & 17 Vic.c.cxciii
1862	G.E.R.	Incorporation	25 & 26 Vic.c.ccxxiii

3. Other Companies

1846	Wisbech,St.Ives & Cambridge Jnc.	Incorporation	9 & 10 Vic.c.ccclvi
1847	E.C.R.	Wisbech and Spalding line	10 & 11 Vic.c.ccxxxv
1852	E.C.R.	Use of the E.A.R. system	15 & 16 Vic.c.cviii

4. Norfolk Estuary

1846	9 & 10 Vic.c.ccclxxxviii
1849	12 & 13 Vic.c.xcv
1853	16 & 17 Vic.c.xiv
1857	20 & 21 Vic.c.cxlvi

B: Parliamentary Papers and Reports; Official Publications

This section is divided into Railways and Other Matters. House of Commons references are given unless otherwise stated.

Railways

1. Reports of Select Committees

1844	S.C. of the Commons on Railways (6 reports)	1844 xl
1845	S.C. of the Lords on Compensation for Lands Taken for or Injured by Railways	1845 x
1845	S.C. of the Lords on the London & York Subscription List	1845 (480)..
1846	S.C. of the Commons on Railway Acts Enactments (or Amendments) (2 reports)	1846 xiii
1846	S.C. to consider the Principle of Amalgamation as applied to Railway and Canal Bills	1846 xxxii (Lords ref.)
1846	S.C. of the Commons on Railway Labourers	1846 xiii
1846	S.C. on Railway Bills Classification (3 reports)	1846 xiii
1849	S.C. of the Lords on the Audit of Railway Accounts (3 reports)	1849 x
1852/3	S/C on Railway Companies and Canal Amalgamation Bills (5 reports)	1852/3 xxxviii
1854	S.C. on Railway and Canal Bills	1854 vii
1862	" " " " " "	1862 xvi
1872	Jnt.S.C. on Railway Companies Amalgamation	1872 xiii

2. Board of Trade, Admiralty Reports etc.

1845	Report of the Railway Department of the Board of Trade on the Schemes for extending Railway Communication in the Counties of Norfolk and Suffolk	1845 (88) xxxix
1845	Ditto. Kent	1845 (23) xxxix
1845	Names of Railway Bills or Projects on which Committees have made reports at variance with the Reports made on the same by the Railway Department of the Board of Trade	1845 (548) xxxix
1845	Return from Group K (schemes for the eastern counties)	1845 (620) xxxix
1845	Report of the Railway Department of the Board of Trade on the Proposed Amalgamation of Railways	1845 (279) xxxix

3. Reports on Specific Companies

1847	Reports of the Commissioners of Railways on Certain Railway Bills comprised in Group Nos. 12,14 and 27. (This includes a lengthy section on the L & E bills of 1847)	1847 (17) xxxi
1852	Report on the E.A.R.	1852 (173-4) xxvi

4. Statistical Returns etc.

1845	Alphabetical list of Persons subscribing £2,000 or upwards to Railway Schemes deposited for consideration in the 1845 session	1845 (317) xl
1845	As above but under £2,000	1845 (13) xl
1846	As above for sums of £2,000 and over in 1846	1846 (473) xxxviii
	Returns of the Number and Descriptions of Persons employed on each of the Railways in England & Wales, Scotland & Ireland respectively	
	1847	1847 (579) lxiii
	1849	1849 (249) li
	1850	1850 (165) liii
	1851	1851 (102) li
	1852	1852 (153) xlviii
1847	Account of Capital and of the Sums to be Borrowed in the Railway Bills deposited with the Commissioners of Railways for the Present Session of Parliament	1847 (168) lxiii
1847/8	Return of Railway Amalgamations in Great Britain & Ireland and Notices given this session for the Amalgamation of Railway Companies	1847-8 (510) lxiii
1847	Return of the Number and Nature of Accidents (1st July-31st Dec.1846)	1847 (240) lxiii
1847	As above, Jan. to June, 1847	1847 (707) lxiii
1849	Return of all Appointments of Umpires made by the Board of Trade or the Commissioners of Railways in Questions of Disputed Compensation	1849 (69) li
1850	Amount of Taxes paid by Railway Companies in England and Scotland for the year ending the 5th April, 1849	1850 (710) liii
1849	No. of passengers carried to December, 1848	1849 (79) li
1851	" " " 1850	1851 (602) liii
1852	" " " 1851	1852 (313) li
1849	Returns of Companies' Capital	1849 (535) li
1851	" " "	1851 (187) li

Reports of the Commissioners of Railways

1847-8	1848 (938) xxvi
1849	1849 (1061) xxvii
1850	1850 (1249) xxxl
1851	1851 (1332) xxx

1852	Report to the Lords of the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and Foreign Plantations of the Proceedings of the Department relating to Railways for the year,1851	1852 (1533) xlviii

Other Matters

1. Social

1843	Report of the Special Assistant Poor Law Commissioners on the Employment of Women and Children in Agriculture	1843 (510) xii

10th	Annual Report of the Poor Law Commissioners	1843
11th	" "	1844
12th	" "	1845
13th	" "	1846
14th	" "	1847
1st	Annual Report of the Poor Law Board	1848
2nd	" "	1849
3rd	" "	1850
4th	" "	1851
5th	" "	1852

Poor Law Report,1909 — 1909 xxxviii

2. Financial etc.

1846	An Abstract of the General Statements of the Income & Expenditure of the Several Turnpike Trusts etc.	1846 xl
1846	An Abstract of Returns Relative to Rates for the Year ending 30th September,1843	1846 xl

3. Inquiries into Works etc.

1849	Admiralty Preliminary Inquiry into the Norfolk Estuary Bill	
1852	Report of the Admiralty on the Nene Valley Drainage and Navigation Improvements Bill	1852 (173)
1833	Inquiry into the Existing State of the Municipal Corporations in the Boroughs of England and Wales*	

* Sections relating to Lynn printed in pamphlet form in Lynn,1834; a copy has been examined in the Reference Section of the Borough Library.

4. Hansard – especially Vol.82 (4th July,1845 to 9th August,1845) for the tables showing the passage of the Lynn bills.

5. Census Reports and Tables
1841, 1851, 1861, 1871.

C: East Anglian Railways Documents

L & E Prospectus	Castle Museum, Norwich
E & B "	" "
L & D "	" "
E.A.R.Rules Book (1846 - sic)	Private collection in Lynn
Public Notice of Conditions of Carriage and Classification of Merchandise, 1847	" " "
L & E Deviation & Dock Plans entered in November, 1846	Norfolk County Offices
L & D plans etc. entered in 1844	" " "
Indenture or contract for the construction of the Lynn to Denver section of the L & E (1847)	Bantoft, Broadley & Ward, solicitors of Lynn
Directors' Committee Minute Book (1856-1862)	B.T.C. Archives
Cash Book (1850+)	" "
L & E Surveyor's Map (1844)	Writer's collection

D: Manuscript Sources (other than in C above)

Guild Hall Book of the Mayor and Burgesses of Lenne Regis, Vols. 14 & 15

General Committee Minutes of Lynn Corporation, Vol. 3

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Parish Registers of Narborough and Narford

Copy of John Marriott's letter (1922) to Hotblack of Narborough (in a private collection)

E: Contemporary Newspapers, Journals, Records etc.

1. Railway Journals etc.

Herapath's Railway & Commercial Journal; weekly - covers the whole period

Railway Times; weekly - covers the whole period

Railway Gazette; short-lived but useful for 1845 and 1846

Bradshaw's Railway Shareholder's Manual, 1862

2. Newspapers

Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald

N.B. Certain alterations in the title of this paper at the end of the period have been ignored.

Mackie's Norfolk Annals
This provides a useful collection of nineteenth century extracts from Norfolk newspapers.

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C.Edwards M.P. From Crow Scaring to Westminster (London 1922)

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H. Miscellaneous Sources

Invaluable in preparing this work has been travel along the lines concerned and extensive walking and cycling in the areas alongside them, both with the help of the appropriate one inch Ordnance Survey Maps.

Church plaques and memorials, and even gravestones, have yielded a surprising amount of clues and information on individuals.

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