

Outsourcing Sustainability in
US Expeditionary Operations:
The Contribution of Private Military and Security Industry in
Phase IV Operations in Iraq 2003-2011

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Abstract

This thesis examines the contribution of the Private Military and Security Industry (PMSI), as an element of the United States (US) total force, to the US military capability in pursuing Phase IV Operations in Iraq from 2003 until 2011. In order to do so, the study proposes a typology of five types of contribution categories which define the link between the ends demanded by the US government (strategic goals) and the use of the PMSI as a tool to help achieve them. By incorporating a model from the operations management field, the Hayes and Wheelwright's Four-Stage model, this thesis identifies the categories of Assistant, Implementer, Crucial Supporter, Driver, and Spoiler as distinct forms of engagement, constituting a framework for the assessment of the nature of the relationship between the contractors' activities and the strategic goals they sought to help achieve.

Applied to the case studies of armed private security services and base support services, this framework reveals that contractors became the Crucial Supporter of the US military efforts in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. In the aftermath of the ill-planned regime-change, followed by unforeseen operational circumstances on the ground, and constrained by the US domestic policy reservations towards prolonged nation-building efforts, the US government found both armed security contractors and base support contractors to be a critical asset of the US military strategy on the ground. Through their constructive contribution towards the size of the deployable force, the available timeframe, the objectives and the strategic goal of these operations, they became a key partner of the US military

efforts in Iraq. Utilising a descriptive and exploratory approach, and relying on a range of sources, including official documents, semi-structured interviews and publicly available video testimonies of US veterans from Iraq, this thesis highlights the PMSI's strategic value in a complex expeditionary operation while providing a detailed insight in the complexity of modern warfare.

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Abbreviations

APSCs	Armed Private Security Companies/Contractors
BAPSC	British Association of Private Security Companies
BSCs	Base Support Companies/Contractors
CBO	Congressional Budget Office
CENTCOM	Armed Private Security Contractor
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CWC	Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
DoD	Department of Defense
DoL	Department of Labor
DoS	Department of State
EO	Executive Outcomes
EU	European Union
FM	Field Manual
FOB	Forward Operating Base
GAO	US Government Accountability Office
GWOT	Global War on Terror
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ISF	Iraq Security Forces
IPOA	International Peace Operations Association
ISOA	International Stability Operations Association
IVAW	Iraq Veterans Against the War
IW	Irregular Warfare
JP	Joint Publication
KBR	Kellogg Brown & Root
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
MEJA	Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
MCFs	Military Consultant Firms
MPFs	Military Provider Firms
MSFs	Military Support Firms
MSPs	Military Service Providers
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MOSW	Military Operations Short of War
MPRI	Military Professional Resources Incorporated
MRE	Meals Ready to Eat
NGO	Nongovernmental Organisation

OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
PLS	Private Logistics Sector
PMCs	Private Military Companies/Contractors
PMSCs	Private Military and Security Companies/Contractors
PMFs	Private Military Firms
PMSI	Private Military and Security Industry
PRS	Protective Services
PSCs	Private Security Companies/Contractors
PSMCs	Private Security and Military Companies/Contractors
PSS	Personal Security Specialist
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RSSS	Reconstruction Security Support Services
SI	Sandline International
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SOC-SMG	Special Operations Consulting-Security Management Group
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SRA	Social Research Association
TCNs	Third Country Nationals
TWISS	Theater Wide Internal Security Services
UCMJ	The Uniform Code of Military Justice
UK	United Kingdom
UNITA	The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WP	Weinberger-Powell
WPPS	Worldwide Personal Protective Services
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

I. Introduction

The international system has undergone significant changes since the end of the Cold War. One of the areas where these changes have become most obvious is international security. While previously national security had been understood as the sole responsibility of state militaries, in the turbulent twilight years of the Cold War, many western capitalist governments increasingly approached privatisation, defined as transfer of control of activities from a public agency to the private sector, with a new confidence, laying the foundations for a major global economic phenomenon of the 1990s (Guislain, 1997: 1-6, 10-12). Although governments continue to rely on their military to protect borders and pursue vital interests, together with privatisation of range of services including healthcare, education, telecommunication, transport, banking, postal services, and energy, privatisation of military and security services (military outsourcing¹) has become one example of a much broader trend of global privatisation that was introduced within the new international system (Savas, 2000).

¹ 'Outsourcing' (also known as 'contracting out') refers to obtaining goods or a service by contract from an outside supplier (Oxford dictionaries, no date a). 'Military and security privatisation' (also known as 'Contingency contracting') refers to a process of obtaining goods, services, and construction from commercial sources via contracting means in support of contingency operations. Contracts used in a contingency are for professional services that are directly or indirectly linked to warfare and include theatre support, systems support, and external support contracts (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014: 1-2-3; Krahmann 2010: 1-2).

As a body of privately owned companies, Private Military and Security Industry (PMSI)² provides military and security services, including information services, logistics, reconstruction, and security services in conflict zones (Thibault et al. 2009: 3; Perlo-Freeman and Sköns 2008: 1). Emerging through the diversification of established arms-producing companies into military services, or as brand new specialist military services companies, the PMSI represents a rapidly expanding segment of the arms-industry preoccupied with the provision of services to meet a wide range of military and non-military needs (Perlo-Freeman and Sköns, 2008: 12). For more than three decades now, the US Department of Defense (DOD) has delegated a vast variety of its function to contractors rather than hire government employees (Bruneau, 2011: 3). Nowadays, dominated by the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) companies, the security landscape in many countries around the world is populated by hundreds of companies working for governments, international institutions, corporations and non-governmental organizations providing them the assistance they need.

These companies frequently find their business opportunities working with and for states and non-state actors engaged in relief, reconstruction and recovery efforts, often in circumstances of weakened governance where the rule of law has been undermined due to human actions or natural disasters. Having to operate in such unstable and

² The Private Military and Security Industry comprises of body of privately owned companies which provide military and security services that include information services (information technology and equipment maintenance), logistics (facilities management and operational support logistics), reconstruction, and security services in conflict zones. (Perlo-Freeman and Sköns, 2008: 4-7)

dangerous environments, a small proportion of these companies has specialised in providing security services in support of humanitarian, diplomatic, and military efforts, and protecting commercial activities including rebuilding of infrastructure. Although very few companies are willing to engage in any sort of activity resembling actual combat operations, they are often seen as problematic and perceived with deep suspicion due to their superficial similarities with mercenaries (Kinsey, 2009; Singer, 2007; Kinsey, 2006; Avant, 2005; Leander, 2005).

The great political theorist Niccolo Machiavelli famously wrote in 1513 that mercenaries are dangerous and not to be trusted; a perception that is invoked again in current literature on PMSI (Bruneau, 2011: 109). Following the 2003 US invasion, these negative perceptions of the industry were reinforced by reported instances of wrongful behaviour during the occupation in Iraq. The torture of Abu Ghraib prisoners, involving contractors from CACI International Inc. and Titan Corporation, and the infamous 2007 shooting of 17 innocent Iraqi civilians in Nisour Square, Baghdad, have for many become the embodiment of the image of the whole industry.

Nevertheless, the PMSI is a very diverse and complex object of analysis encompassing a wide variety of types of services, including base support, security, linguist services, construction, transportation, logistics/maintenance, communication and training (Schwartz and Swain 2011: 16; Thibault et al. 2009: 3). Although often referred to as a homogenous unity, it is clear that such an understanding is only

theoretical and disregards the important variety within the industry.

Based on the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) reports, in the case of Phase IV Operations³ in Iraq from May 2003-December 2011, the multi-billion dollar PMSI supported the US military with services in all of these areas. In fact, despite the hype about armed security contractors, the CENTCOM reports show that in reality the majority of the assignments outsourced by the US military lay in the category of base support, that typically involves mundane tasks such as cooking or cleaning for US military forces (Thibault et al., 2011: 23).

In terms of numbers, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in August 2008 reported that the ratio of contractors to military personnel was about one-to-one (Contractors' Support of US Operations in Iraq, 2008: 13). Although the deployment of non-military, non-American support force along with US troops in military operations is nothing new and has been the adopted practice of the US government continuously since 1776, the extent of the involvement of the industry as the second largest member of the Coalition of the Willing after the US military, and the sheer scale of its involvement meant that Iraq was the most extensive representation of the military-outsourcing trend in a conflict zone in recent decades (Thibault et al., 2009: 3; Sperling, 2009: 187-188; Avant, 2005: 8). Even using the Pentagon's lower estimate, contractors provided

³ Phase IV Operations, also known as stability or transition operations, are complex, multifaceted, hybrid civilian-military operations, as exemplified in the aftermath of US-led invasions in Afghanistan 2001-2014 and Iraq 2003-2011. Defined as activities conducted after decisive combat operations, although while significant fighting can still occur, their purpose is to stabilize and reconstruct the area of operations (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014: V-5-9).

three times more armed personnel than was the number of British troops, the third largest force contribution (Cameron, 2006: 546).

In addition to bringing more manpower on the ground, contractors also constituted over 25 per cent of those killed in action in Iraq, which reduced the political resources required to maintain public support for the conflict (Hammes, 2011: 28). Indeed, between January and June 2010, more contractors died in Iraq and Afghanistan than US military troops (Schooner and Swan, 2010: 16-18). In regards to these reports, it is important to add that contractors casualties were not reported through DOD, but the Department of Labour (DoL), which reported only the deaths that resulted in insurance claims. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the full number of killed contractors is unknown and most likely higher than reported (Hammes, 2011: 28). Because they bore such a large proportion in terms of their support to the US military efforts and the ultimate sacrifice, it is not unreasonable to assume that their presence and activities made a difference to the US military capability to pursue Phase IV Operations in Iraq. Hence, the interest of this thesis is to answer the research question: 'What kind of contribution have the presence and activities of the PMSI made to the US military capability to pursue Phase IV Operations in Iraq from May 2003-December 2011, from the declaration of Mission Accomplished until the withdrawal of the US military from Iraq?'

There are three main reasons why this issue is worth studying:

Firstly, there is the magnitude and versatility of the industry. The PMSI comprises hundreds of companies operating worldwide, and working for governments, international institutions and corporations to provide combat support, including training and intelligence provision, operational support, strategic planning and consultancy, technical assistance, post-conflict reconstruction and a wide range of security provision (Mathieu and Dearden, 2006: 2; Stanger and Williams, 2006: 6-7). The sheer range of the industry suggests that it is likely to be involved across various types of military, humanitarian, non-governmental and commercial activities and its presence is to be noted in more than just one crisis management situation. Rather, it is fully embedded in how the international system works both in times of crises and relative peace.

Secondly, while there is an increasing trend in military spending of most central European and some Nordic countries, in most western European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and others), there is a growing pressure to use the private sector due to the continuing focus on austerity and deficit reduction policies (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015: 7). With reference to the UK and the US as the fore-runners of military and security privatisation, the long term trend of reliance on private providers for aspects of their defence policies has become deeply embedded in the way both countries operate (Krahmann, 2010: 84-155; Isenberg, 2009: 43-49). It is sensible to believe that the volatile security situation in many parts of the world provides an endless number of potential future international crises and, at the same time, employment and growth opportunities for the highly flexible and easily

adaptable global industry (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015: 7).

Thirdly, even though the industry has been the focus of an intensive media campaign and there have been some excellent books written by academics on the subject, there is still a lot that remains unknown about the companies and the industry in general. Even some basic questions, such as what these companies do, who runs them, how they work internally and what impact they create, remains unclear. It is the combination of these three reasons that makes the research topic of this thesis timely and relevant to the current global security environment.

This thesis has the ambition to provide an account of the ways in which the presence and activities of the PMSI made a difference to the US military capability in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. This will help to provide realistic expectations as to likely contribution in future endeavours. Designed around the assumption that their involvement alongside US military troops is based on the DOD contract management process, it is believed that through the very same process it can be shaped or altered (increased or limited) to suit the aims of a similar operation in the future. By highlighting the factors that influence or shape the contribution the industry makes, greater certainty about its behaviour and activities would provide guidance for policy makers in regards to how to employ them in the future to get the desired benefit, harmonize mutual expectations between contractors and policy makers and help policymakers make informed choices. The ultimate aim of this research is to provide an

analytical tool that would help to maximise the degree of conformity between the expectations of the benefits of using contractors and their actual contribution.

The rest of the introductory chapter is further divided into the following sections. The section entitled 'Aim and Research Questions' describes the main objectives and identifies the main and subsidiary research questions that this thesis seeks to answer. The 'Methodology' section presents the methodology for conducting the research and identifies three data sources to ensure the maximum validity and reliability of the research outcome. The section on data explains the range of sources of information, including primary and secondary textual resources, interviews, and personal testimonies of Iraq veterans, consulted for the purpose of this research project. 'Contributions of the Study' presents the areas that this research seeks to add to in terms of scholarly writing, as well as its practical value as policy advice. Finally, 'Thesis outline' provides a detailed guidance of the thesis content highlighting the logical order of the subsequent chapters.

I.I. Aim and Research Questions

The scholarly literature on the presence and activities of the PMSI in modern warfare is rich, but at times also chaotic and difficult to navigate. Although the US military has a long history of relying on supporting elements in its expeditionary operations, many basic questions about the nature of the industry remain unanswered. This research project

seeks to build on the available scholarly writings by addressing an important but under-investigated aspect of the industry - its contribution in Phase IV Operations in Iraq 2003-2011. In order to do so, the thesis organizes the overwhelming amount of data from government reports and audits in a logical and coherent manner and provides lenses to better understand the issues that have been touched on in other studies of security contracting. To this end, it designs an original approach to determine the contribution of PMSI in Phase IV Operations in Iraq that goes beyond a simplistic black-and-white (positive versus negative) assessment. Instead, this research project is concerned with the PMSI, as a foreign policy tool, and its contribution as a form of engagement within a strategy whose achievement it is meant to facilitate.

This thesis comprises three research objectives:

The primary objective is to problematize the concept of contribution and develop a useful framework applicable to the Phase IV operations in Iraq from 2003-2011, which would enable a systematic and effective evaluation of the PMSI contribution. For this purpose, this thesis develops a Conceptual Framework, in chapter 4, offering a range of five different contribution categories - Assistant, Implementer, Crucial Supporter, Driver and Spoiler - to guide a better understanding of the contractors' involvement on that unique occasion.

A secondary objective is to investigate and contribute to the knowledge and understanding of the military outsourcing trend in modern

US strategy. Using the military concept of the Phase IV Operations and looking at the US institutional incentives as well as the operational needs for the use of contractors in Iraq, this thesis pays close attention to both the industry as a whole and the rich variety of contractors and their peculiar services found within.

The tertiary objective is to demonstrate that research on the contribution of the PMSI in a particular military operation which must take in account the broader context within which it takes place and evolves. This analysis seeks to better integrate the areas of modern US military capability, the specificities of modern military interventions, and abilities and resources the PMSI offers as three interrelated fields for understanding not only how, but also why, private actors gained such prominence in the US operations in Iraq. To provide a better understanding of the recent development towards intensified military privatisation in US expeditionary operations, a broader perspective where the contribution of PMSI is seen as a reflection of the nature of the relationship between the military strategic aims and its available means, is placed at the forefront of the investigation. To achieve this aim, the following questions will guide the investigation.

The primary research question is: 'What kind of contribution have the presence and activities of the PMSI made to the US military capability to pursue the Phase IV Operations in Iraq from May 2003-December 2011, i.e. from the declaration of Mission Accomplished until the withdrawal of the US military from Iraq?'

The subsidiary research questions serve to both provide answers for the elements of the primary research objective and present detailed empirical evidence for a credible contribution story.

The subsidiary research questions are:

1) 'Did contractors provide services that can be considered 'main contribution' or only 'additional contribution'?"

The framework distinguishes between two levels of contribution – main contribution and additional contribution. The logic behind this distinction is based on the assumption that the additional contributions do not have the potential to have a detrimental impact on the US military capability to achieve the strategic goal of the mission, but they have both positive and negative impacts on the implementation of the strategy how to achieve its strategic goal.

Table 1 – Contribution Level

Contribution level	Additional	Main
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2) 'What was the difference that the presence and activities of the contractors have made on the size of the deployable force, mission's available timeframe, desired objectives, and strategic goal in the given context?'

Through assessment of the significance of a particular type of service or a set of services needed for the execution of US military strategy in Iraq, the thesis differentiates between

- ‘optional additional services, which were replaceable with no or minor changes to non-core aspects of the strategy’,
- ‘essential additional services, which were replaceable with major changes to non-core aspects of the strategy’,
- ‘indispensable additional services, which were replaceable with major changes to core aspects of the strategy’
- ‘indispensable main services, which were irreplaceable without changing the whole strategy’.

Table 2 - Significance of the Provided Service

Significance of the provided service	Optional Additional Services	Essential Additional Services	Indispensable Additional Services	Indispensable Main Services
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3) ‘What was the prevailing value of the service provider's contribution in the given context? Did the provider advance or undermine the US military capability to achieve its strategic goal?’

In this regard the thesis differentiates between a constructive contribution (advancing the US strategy) and a destructive contribution (undermining the US strategy).

Table 3 - Prevailing Value of Provider's Contribution

Prevailing value of provider's contribution	Constructive (Advancing the strategy)	Destructive (Undermining the strategy)
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Based on the analysis framed by the above mentioned research questions, this thesis argues that the PMSI, through its robust sustainment capability, became a major supporting tool in the hands of the US administration – ‘Crucial Supporter’ – effectively enabling it to endure an eight-years-long mission that was otherwise politically and operationally unsustainable. This research explores how the US government took advantage of the contractors in order to mitigate the consequences of a foreign policy fiasco in Iraq and utilized their support to bring its troops to a dignified exit.

The aim of this research is neither to promote, nor dismiss, the private industry or its individual companies. Instead, the goal is to demonstrate that the increased reliance and dependence on PMSI in the US foreign policy context is by no means inevitable or irreversible. Instead, it highlights the inherently political nature of the decision to contract out the sustainment of the US Phase IV operations to the private sector to avoid the full weight of the consequences of an ill-planned mission.

In order to provide a complete picture of military outsourcing in Iraq, this thesis adopts a simplified approach of looking at the problem through three different perspectives – the overall industry view discussed

in relation to the Weinberger-Powell⁴ (WP) doctrine principles to guide a successful US military intervention (Private Military and Security Industry); the largest group among the types of services (Base Support Contractors); and the most controversial type of service (Armed Security Contractors).

Although, the overall industry level does not make part of the empirical chapters, it provides a context and an institutional perspective onto the many issues discussed in greater detail in the ensuing empirical chapters. In particular, it discusses the PMSI and the feasibility of the campaign on the whole, and explores the broader strategic implications that drove the planning and execution of the campaign. The chapter further argues that the industry effectively allowed the US to sustain its military presence for eight years without either resorting to the draft or leaving Iraq in the midst of a civil war. Using the WP doctrine as a set of guiding principles for the use of military force established in wake of the Vietnam War, it demonstrates that while failing on each of the WP doctrine tenets, the US avoided what would have been an outright fiasco due to the extensive reliance on the industry.

In the empirical chapter on the base support contractors and their contribution in Phase IV Operations in Iraq, this thesis explores the variety of functions and responsibilities delegated to the industry in the area of facilities management that became the backbone of the US operations in

⁴ The Weinberger-Powell doctrine (known also as Powell doctrine), named after General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1989-1993), is an integrated body of thought relying on six elements that extrapolate how and under what circumstances the United States ought to commit itself and its military forces to war (Powell, 1992/93).

Iraq. This chapter concludes that due to the specific requirements of this type of operations, base support contractors proved an indispensable and irreplaceable asset – Crucial Supporter - of the operations, which allowed the US military to devote its available force to other functions, deemed more appropriate for military troops.

In the chapter on Armed Private Security Contractors and their contribution, this thesis looks into the most-controversial aspect of the US military outsourcing in Iraq - armed contractors. Through the examinations of their activities, the chapter discusses the ‘cowboy’ stereotype of armed contractors and argues that despite all the controversy associated with their presence in Iraq, they were an indispensable and irreplaceable asset - Crucial Supporter - of the US military efforts.

I.II. Methodology

The main task of this section is to outline the methodological choices behind the empirical part of the thesis. In order to do that, it will present the basic techniques employed to collect and analyse the data required to answer the research questions. In addition, it will discuss potential problems linked to the methodological choices and describe how to mitigate them.

This study addresses the main research question by adopting a descriptive and explanatory approach, which are concerned with descriptions and explanations of the PMSI’s contribution in the Iraq

context. According to Sandra Halperin and Oliver Heath, a descriptive approach serves to describe the characteristics of something or how something works or behaves, while an explanatory approach is used to explain what factors or conditions are causally connected to a known outcome (Halperin and Heath, 2012: 116-117). For the purpose of this thesis, the descriptive approach is required to answer the research questions enquiring the type of relationship dynamics between the US military strategy and the PMSI. Similarly, the explanatory approach is required to answer the research questions enquiring why that relationship dynamic exists in the first place. The combination of the two approaches serves to provide a deeper insight into both the characteristics of the nature of the contribution of PMSI in Phase IV Operations in Iraq, and also why a certain contribution characterisation is more appropriate than the others in a given context.

In terms of data-gathering strategies, the empirical part of the projects relies primarily on a qualitative analysis of textual sources and an exploration of central themes and concepts relevant to the issue of military and security privatisation through semi-structured elite interviews and publicly available video testimonies of US veterans. The qualitative research strategy has been chosen as preferred strategy due to the nature of the research topic, the specific aim of the research question and the character of the conceptual research framework which rely on examination and interpretation of the available data. To explain these choices in more detail, the following sections will deal individually with

the issues of case selection, data availability and collection, and data sources and analysis.

I.II.I. Case Selection

The empirical part of the thesis is a single-case study of military outsourcing by the US administration in Iraq during the Phase IV Operations, delineated by the statement of Mission Accomplished by President Bush on May 1st 2003 on one side, and the withdrawal of US military troops from Iraq in December 2011 on the other. It focuses on the issue of the contribution, examining the relationship dynamics between the US administration and the PMSI that was to support the US military forces on their operations in Iraq.

There are several arguments that justify the choice of Phase IV Operations in Iraq as the sole case of this project. The Iraq War has been seen as a pivotal moment for the emerging industry (Kinsey, 2009; Alexandra et al., 2008; Perlo-Freeman and Sköns, 2008; Singer, 2007; Singer, 2003). The heavy reliance on the private military and security industry to provide support to armed forces and enable reconstruction in such a complex environment provides a unique insight into the dynamics of the relationship between the US administration and the PMSI as commercial actors in US foreign policy application. Furthermore, due to its notoriety, this case has potential to directly or indirectly influence the perception of the desirability, utility and legitimacy of this practice among other states and organisations in the future.

In addition, the focus on the US approach to military privatisation in Iraq makes good sense since the United States is the largest purchaser of defence equipment and services and its defence budget associated with contractor spending is the largest in the world, accounting for approximately 50 percent of global procurement spending (Schwartz et al., 2015: 3-11). In respect to the Phase IV Operations in Iraq, many of the largest and most successful Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) engaged there were of British or American origin, and they emerged as a response to market demands dictated by the US involvement (Singer, 2003: 75, 243-248). Hence, exploring military outsourcing in Iraq bears significance beyond the case study itself and uncovers valuable insights about military outsourcing as a foreign policy tool, as well as the industry as a body of private actors operating in complex security environments.

On the other hand, a few arguments could be raised against the case of Iraq as a strategic choice case study for the purpose of this thesis. It may be argued, for instance, that Iraq is an exception and that many aspects of military outsourcing are unique to the circumstances of the case and therefore unlikely to reoccur in the future. However, this is one of the reasons this research focuses on Iraq. It is the adopted view that one case cannot be representative and its specific characteristics do not translate well to other similar cases. Yet, the choice of Iraq as a unique case study is justifiable because developing a general conclusion about the contribution of PMSI based on a single one case is not desirable anyway.

The debate on military outsourcing is often highly polarised between contractors as technical and military experts versus incompetent cowboys; professional businessmen versus exploiting war profiteers; noble humanitarians versus uncontrolled abusers, or proud patriots versus dirty mercenaries (Kruck and Spencer, 2013; Brooks, 2000). Images of private contractors often tend towards extremes – military outsourcing as either good or bad; either desirable, or undesirable; economically effective, or ineffective, clouding a deeper understanding of the grey area in between (Avant, 2005: 254). As a result of these simplified classifications, many aspects of military outsourcing remain poorly understood. The aim of this research is to remedy this deficiency by highlighting the versatility and variety within the PMSI, rather than offering polarised denominations of it.

It may be suggested that examining more than one case (e.g. adding Afghanistan) would remedy at least some of these drawbacks of a single case study, and create a comparative study that would be more revealing in terms of how the nature of the contribution changes under different circumstances. This is a valid point. A comparative approach might provide a different insight into the issue of relationship dynamics between the US military strategy and the contribution of PMSI, but it would also mean significant time constraints for each case and less detailed analysis as a result. As such, a comparative study using a similar approach could be the subject of future research building onto the thesis. As a result, focussing on the contribution of PMSI within the single case of Iraq is the preferred strategy in spite of acknowledging the above shortcomings. It

provides an opportunity to build a more comprehensive picture of military and security privatisation based on a case that is unique and an important instance of a large scale private sector involvement in long-term sustainment of US expeditionary operations.

I.II.II. Data Availability and Collection

There are many obstacles to systematic research on military and security privatisation that limit the range of viable methodological choices (Berndtsson, 2009: 19-24; Kinsey, 2009: 191; Kinsey, 2006: viii, 1-8, 196; Singer, 2003: viii-x). Firstly, secrecy, sensitivity and confidentiality are key characteristics of the private military and security industry and PMSCs are excluded from the transparency required of government agencies, although the vast majority of their income comes from these agencies, who are also their main clients. Their internal records, policies and documents are considered private property and the Freedom of Information Act does not apply to them, unlike government agencies and the US military. In consequence, even basic issues such as the number, size and structure of companies, as well as the specific contents of business contracts, remain often inaccessible (Ibid.).

Some of these gaps have been seemingly bridged in the recent years by extensive reporting of many old as well as newly-created federal institutions and mechanisms to carry out audits and investigations into this matter. To name just a few, the allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse by contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan prompted the Congress to create

the *Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction* (SIGIR) in late 2003; the independent *Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations* (Gansler Commission), named after its chair, Jacques S. Gansler, in 2007; followed by *Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan* (CWC) in 2008. In addition, other already established research and oversight bodies, including *Government Accountability Office* (GAO), *Congressional Budget Office* (CBO), and *Congressional Research Service* (CRS), started to focus their attention on this issue which resulted in a considerable stream of audits, reports and analytical studies.

Despite all the significant effort, it must be stressed that the available data creates more questions than it provides answers. Bruneau (2011: 108) pointed out, that the difficulty of getting reliable data and then organizing it in a way that facilitates meaningful analysis impedes making sense of the contracting phenomenon. As it will be stressed repeatedly throughout this thesis, while data appears to be available in abundance at least in recent years, its reliability and verifiability is problematic. The biggest issues with the available data can be summarised in three points.

Firstly, contractors are private businesses and government transparency rules do not apply to them. As profit-making businesses, to succeed, they must be entrepreneurial and hence are very sensitive about releasing commercial information into the public domain (Kinsey, 2006: 2). Secondly, the post-Cold war military privatisation is a fairly recent and evolving phenomenon and the nature of the industry, the way it operates

and the swift expansion in the past decades has exceeded the available mechanisms of oversight (Berndtsson, 2009: 15). In addition, as these companies may take on whatever mission they seem fit, it is problematic to make comparisons between the companies, their activities, or draw any meaningful general conclusions about them (Ibid.). The contractors' business responses to supply and demand of the market and adapts its areas of activity accordingly to where and when it sees opportunity. In addition, each contractor offers different services, which are diverse and extremely dynamic, and whole companies are sold and acquired depending on market forces. A single contractor may well have programmes in different places around the world, providing different services for different customers at the same time. With hundreds of PMSCs based both in the United States and around the world, it is extremely difficult to keep track of industry trends and developments.

Even looking at the most prominent ones, such as Olive Security, Erinys International, Rubicon, and Control Risks Group, which secured large contracts to provide security in Iraq, they represent only the tip of the iceberg as most of the companies which acquired large contracts in Iraq subcontracted dozens of smaller firms to assist them with completing the work. The CBO report, 'Contractor's Support of US Operations in Iraq' from August 2008, highlights the complex issue of coordinating the huge variety of contractors across a number of different areas. The authors of the report, based on the data available to them, conclude that they cannot determine the numbers of contractors or classify the functions provided by about one-fifth of obligations for contracts performed in the Iraq

theatre over the 2003-2007 period (Congressional Budget Office, 2008: 7). As they explain, it is due to the fact that hundreds of different firms employ tens of thousands of people of various nationalities to work on dynamic contract work assignments that continually awarded and completed. In addition, many of the prime contractors subcontract significant segments of their contracts to other companies and this process of subcontracting may run several tiers deep, further decentralizing the administration of the contract and obscuring the accurate account of the contractor personnel, their whereabouts and responsibilities (Ibid.: 8).

Although this clearly weakens the reliability and verifiability of the collected data in the publically available reports, the Iraq mission was after all an expeditionary mission requiring contingency contracting. That means that it was given by the circumstances of the mission that the contract work took place in problematic, dynamic, and very complicated environment that was characterised by high levels of violence and where high level of flexibility and adaptability was crucial. The overview of such contracts administration is, therefore, by definition an uneasy endeavour and as many experts observed, in the case of Iraq, the overall contract management process simply failed.

DoD was severely handicapped at managing oversight by lacking both in terms of the required number of personnel and their core competencies. The Gansler Commission report highlighted that while the workload for the contract management workforce increased sevenfold in the workload since 1990s, the actual workforce to handle the huge change

remained practically the same (Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations (Gansler Commission), 2007: 30). As the report further elaborates, the overwhelming majority of contract managers were civilians whose deployment to areas of ongoing violence is much more difficult than of the military personnel (Ibid.: 35-38). According to the Gansler report, this miscalculation resulted in the situation that most of the contract managers supposedly overseeing the contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where doing so from their offices in the United States (Ibid.).

Thirdly, there is no single source of verifiable data. As Kinsey (2006: 2) points out, accurate statistics in regards to the nature of the PMSI is non-existent. This concern has been echoed in many other scholarly publications and government papers. This is largely assigned to the fact that obtaining information about PMC abroad is difficult and often unreliable. Most reported numbers are mere estimates and, therefore all the attempts to quantify the market have been tentative at most (Ibid.).

I.II.III. Data Sources and Analysis

Two central concepts in research are validity and reliability. Validity means that correct practices have been undertaken in order to answers a research question and reliability refers to the quality of such practices that enable repeatability and accuracy verification (Halperin and Heath 2012: 166-167). As mentioned earlier, hypothesis testing and evaluation is difficult due to the current status of limited data availability

and quality, and more research into access to valid and reliable data is needed. Although many excellent studies on the nature and logic of privatisation and its potential consequences have been written in recent years, many basic questions remain unanswered.

This thesis seeks to develop a theoretical and empirical understanding of the nature of the contribution of military outsourcing, focussing on two different types of services. By this, it seeks to generate new insights into basic dynamics of the relationship among the US government, US military and contractors, and highlight the factors that shape it. Acknowledging the problematic status of data in this field, this thesis does not seek to test causality. However, it discusses potential impact and effects of military privatisation on stability operations, which are acknowledged to be necessarily preliminary and tentative.

The sources drawn upon in this project may be divided into three main types: documents, interviews, and video testimonies of Iraq veterans.

This project draws on a wide variety primary textual sources:

- official documents and reports produced by various state agencies and nominated authorities, including the Coalition of Provisional Authority (CPA), Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), United States Central Command (CENTCOM);
- records from proceedings in the US Congress and its various committees;

- reports, hearings and analytical studies by a wide range of research and oversight bodies, including Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC), Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Congressional Research Service (CRS), Government Accountability Office (GAO), Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, USAID Office of Inspector General, and U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General;

In addition to these, international legal documents, including the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, have been used. Also, this study uses information from numerous US research institutions, such as the Brookings Institute, Federation of American Scientists and RAND Corporation, since they provide key insights into the area and most of their publications are publicly available online.

The secondary sources that support the analysis in this thesis, include newspaper and magazine articles, material published online and reports from NGOs. They often serve to provide the background information of particular events in order to offer additional viewpoints and to fill in some of the gaps and omissions in the primary documents, interviews and video testimony data. Such sources have been used to provide a fuller picture of the background of the Iraq War, its development, the US military strategy in Iraq, as well as particular events involving contractors on the ground. As such, these sources complement the data available in the primary resources by providing further details

and offering various alternative perspectives on how to interpret the primary data.

As Kinsey (2006: 6) pointed out, many sources reporting on PMSI in a conflict zone are heavily biased and their credibility as sources is questionable. Therefore, it has been the utmost priority and adopted practice of this research project to carefully select sources and check them against each other to avoid biased or untrue information. As such, this project relies on multiple sources of data and methods of data collection to approach the research problem from different angles. Known as 'triangulation', this approach was adopted primarily to increase the reliability of both the data and the process of gathering it (Halperin and Heath, 2012: 177-178). Hence, in addition to primary and secondary textual sources, data have been collected from different sources such as the semi-structured elite-interviews and Iraq Veterans Against the War (IVAW) video testimonies.

In terms of interviews, the basic idea was to conduct a smaller number of in-depth interviews with people knowledgeable about PMSI and the services it provides.⁵ The majority of the interviews have been with individuals placed in unique positions to provide an elaborate insight based on their personal experience. Firstly, these interviews served as sources of information on how the companies worked and how the process of military privatisation developed on the ground. Secondly, they provided insights into how the interviewees themselves viewed and

⁵ The list of the interviewees consulted for the purpose of this research, including their formal affiliation and the date of the interview, can be found in the Appendix A.

understood the contribution of PMSI within the US strategy based on their unique point of view, often based on a first-hand experience. To avoid unethical treatment of interviewees, this project has followed the ethical guidelines outlined by the Social Research Association (SRA) (Social Research Association, 2003: 52-55). Guided by the four main principles of information⁶, consent⁷, confidentiality⁸ and usage⁹, this research has taken the utmost precaution in treating the interviewees in accordance with these ethical guidelines (Halperin and Heath 2012: 178-180).

Another valuable source of data were unedited, video-recorded personal testimonies of US veterans who spoke about their experiences during the Iraq War and the War in Afghanistan at the three-day event Winter Soldier: Iraq & Afghanistan - Iraq Veterans Against the War in March 2008.¹⁰ In particular, eighteen individual testimonies stand out in regards to Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the veterans' individual experiences with how these were understood and upheld during their tours in Iraq.¹¹ These testimonies are used in order to obtain the difficult to get hold of personal accounts of the reality of warfare, and are treated as substitute for personal interview with Iraq veterans.

⁶ Prospective interviewees should be given detailed information about the project, its purpose and the terms of their participation before they are asked to participate in the study (Social Research Association, 2003: 52-55).

⁷ Prospective interviewees reserve the right to decline participation in the study. Prospective interviewees should also be informed about their right to drop out of the study at any point if they wish (Ibid.).

⁸ Ethically sensitive information about interviewees should be treated as confidential (Ibid.).

⁹ The information about persons collected for research may be only used in research and not for commercial or other purposes (Ibid.).

¹⁰ Transcripts of the testimonies are available in Iraq Veterans Against the War and Glantz (2008).

¹¹ The list of the Iraq Veterans Against the War, including their formal affiliation, can be found in the Appendix B.

Although this research project has sought to ensure the best methodological approach in terms of compiling and analysing data on the issue, it is possible that generating more primary data through extended field research during Phase IV Operations in Iraq, including observation and more in-depth interviews, would have provided additional insights into the matter. Such an approach was not possible as at the time of the beginning of the project in autumn 2011, the US military was in the last stages of its withdrawal from Iraq. In any case, it is apparent that the situation on the ground during the Phase IV Operations in Iraq was dangerous and would have made such kind of research extremely risky, if not impossible.

I.III. Contributions of the Study

In academia one of the areas of growing importance is policy engagement and practical-impact potential of research (Gerring 2001: 251). While not every academic study will have direct policy relevance, social science research should seek to contribute to provide answers to issues of pressing concern that both citizens and policy makers care about (Ibid). This research project is driven by such ambition and seeks to deliver a timely analysis merging three highly relevant themes of international politics in the twenty-first century – military outsourcing, Phase IV Operations and the US-led war in Iraq 2003-2011.

While there are vast resources on contingency contracting, the practical challenges and opportunities for the use of PMSI remain a vastly

under-developed area. Building on the research on PMSI in military operations, the thesis aims to advance this research and focuses on a more specific aspect of modern military operations – Phase IV Operations. It seeks to bring attention to PSMI's contribution in Iraq 2003 – 2011, as example of an occasion when stability operations ran simultaneously along combat operations and the contracted force represented the second largest manpower on the ground (Mandel 2012: 13; Avant 2005: 8).

In this respect, this work provides leaders, policy planners and operational commanders with a practical and innovative contribution to a vast, but unsystematic, scholarly field of military privatisation. It seeks to provide a coherent picture of what the contribution of PMSI was in the Phase IV Operations in Iraq and how the understanding of these entities can be further developed. It extends the understanding how theoretically, as well as practically, PMSI's contribution can be shaped, acknowledging the threats and opportunities that arise from military outsourcing as a foreign policy tool in complex expeditionary operations.

Since national armies seem no longer capable of independently dealing with some of the man-made crises of failed states and large-scale civilian violence, a knowledgeable approach to use of PMSI is not only desirable, but imperative. As the idea that the key players in the military privatisation business (US and UK) would abandon privatisation in the near future seems unlikely, academic research is especially important, since there is abundant information with little thorough analysis or deeper understanding of it. This work has the potential to speak to the military,

policy-makers, academics and general public, highlighting the perils and benefits of military outsourcing that has already become a widespread reality.

The general applicability of the research findings might be a potential limitation. This thesis acknowledges that the focus on a single case in order to provide a detailed, in depth-knowledge of military outsourcing in Iraq cannot yield conclusions with general applicability to other cases. Embracing this potential limitation, this study does not seek to provide a formula for complex Phase IV Operations in the future acknowledging the uniqueness of each conflict's dynamics. Instead, it is the Conceptual Framework which can serve as a transferable tool to provide an insight into the dynamics of the relationship between the PMSI and states on an individual basis.

I.IV. Thesis Outline

This thesis is divided into eight chapters that together form the theoretical part (Part I) and the empirical part (Part II). Part I consists of the Introduction, Research Context, Literature Review and Conceptual Framework. Part II consists of three empirical chapters – The Institutional Factors Shaping the PMSI Contribution to Phase IV Operations in Iraq; Base Support Contractors and Their Contribution to Phase IV Operations in Iraq; and Armed Security Contractors and Their Contribution to Phase IV Operations in Iraq – and Conclusion.

In Part I, so far, the Introduction chapter has introduced the military and security privatisation trend and has outlined the research questions that this thesis answers in the following chapters. In addition, it has outlined the conceptual basis of the ensuing analysis, the thesis' methodology, case selection, data availability and sources, and, last but not least, the contributions of the study. Chapter II, Research Context, places the research question at the intersection of three broad areas – military outsourcing, Phase IV Operations and US strategy in Iraq. It highlights the most important elements of these themes to be brought forward in the analysis within the subsequent chapters. Chapter III reviews the scholarly literature on military and security privatisation until today and delineates how the issue of the PMSI contribution has been investigated and highlights potential weaknesses of prior research. Subsequently, chapter IV develops a framework for understanding the contribution of the PMSI in the US Phase IV Operations that incorporates observing four critical features of how the PMSI could have made a difference to the US capability on the ground. These four features, which lie at the core of the proposed Conceptual Framework are: the size of deployable force, available timeframe, desired objectives, and desired strategic goal of the operations.

In Part II, Chapter 5, The Institutional Factors Shaping the PMSI Contribution to Phase IV Operation in Iraq, traces the origins of the political constraints on US military expeditionary operations and how they influenced the US operations in Iraq. The Weinberger-Powell doctrine is used to highlight some of the most prominent challenges that the US military faced as a consequence of the US government ignoring the lessons

learned from US foreign policy over the last few decades. The analysis of this chapter thus highlights both institutional constraints that govern the use of the US military force and how they were circumvented by the heavy reliance on the PMSI in support of the PMSI Phase IV Operations.

Chapter 6, *Base Support Contractors and Their Contribution to Phase IV Operations in Iraq*, examines the contribution made by Base Security Contractors to Phase IV Operations in Iraq. It reinforces the findings of the previous chapter on US foreign policy constraints and assesses in what ways the Base Support Contractors helped to surpass them. This chapter breaks away the Base Security Contractors from the broad PMSI in order to describe the scope and the explosion in their numbers, particularly in Iraq.

Chapter 7, *Armed Security Contractors and Their Contribution to Phase IV Operations in Iraq*, introduces the category of armed security contractors and the specific issues surrounding their presence and activities in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. It begins by discussing why their category has become so controversial in the context of expeditionary operations, and continues by highlighting the scope, causes and implications of their presence and activities in Phase IV Operations in Iraq.


Chapter 8, *Conclusion*, completes the picture by providing a reflection of the conceptual aspects raised in this thesis, along with directions for future research in the field of military outsourcing in US contingency operations. The evidence, gathered from a rich collection of public and private sources, clearly demonstrates that the PMSI has

provided the contribution of Crucial Supporter which signifies that it made a tremendous difference to the US military capability to pursue Phase IV Operations in Iraq following the unexpected unfolding of the events following the invasion in 2003. The contention of this thesis is that the intensity of the military and security privatisation witnessed in Phase IV Operations in Iraq is not an unpredictable instance based on particular circumstances of a unique military operation. Instead, it is a demonstration of long ongoing developments in the US military capability in expeditionary operations that is to become a predominant experience rather than rare occasion in the future.

II. Research Context

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce three broad themes that this research brings together and thus lay the foundations of the empirical analysis that is to follow. Sitting at the intersection between Military Privatisation in the US, Phase IV Operations and the (Second) Iraq War (2003-2011), this research project blends together three highly topical themes in the field of international security. Before elaborating on the particular details of the individual concepts, a broader overview of how they relate to each other is in order. The research question, ‘What kind of contribution have the presence and activities of the PMSI made to the US military capability to pursue the Phase IV Operations in Iraq from 2003-2011?’ requires a clear determination of what is understood by the individual terms and their mutual interconnectedness. In broad terms, this thesis seeks to assess the contribution of a particular instrument (within a larger group of instruments) to operations undertaken as part of a broader mission. This mission is then defined by its strategic goal whose achievement is based on the execution of a strategy based on a strategic plan. The following depiction captures the correlations between the individual elements of the analysis.

Figure 1 – Correlations of the Individual Elements



According to the depiction above, a strategy, defined as ‘a carefully planned method for achieving a particular goal usually over a long period of time,’ represents a link between the strategic plan and the strategic goal (Merriam-webster.com, no date). In the military environment, a strategy is understood as a sequence of carefully planned actions by military command, executed by military forces to meet the enemy in combat under advantageous conditions over a period of time to achieve certain objectives (Ibid.). As such, a strategy represents the link between the strategic plan (the plan of actions) and the strategic goal (the aim of the mission), and encompasses the individual operations including their particular objectives which seek to contribute jointly to the achievement of the mission’s strategic goal. Each operation is then an umbrella term for individual activities that have their own objectives and which, ideally, indirectly advance the execution of the strategic plan towards the achievement of the strategic goal of the mission.

Table 4 – Key Concepts and Their Application in This Thesis

Mission	a specific task with which a person or a group is charged
Strategic goal	something to be done or achieved
Strategic plan	an envisaged set of actions that have been thought of as a way to do or achieve something
Strategy	a combination of carefully planned operations executed by the available instruments to achieve a particular (strategic) goal usually over a long period of time
Operation(s)	a mission on a smaller scale; a specific task with which a person or a group is charged, forming part of a larger mission seeking to contribute to achieving the strategic goal
Instruments	the available tools to be employed to execute the operations

Applied to the context of the research question, mission represents the Phase IV Operations in Iraq from 2003-2011 providing both the context for the strategy and its operations, and setting the character of the US military efforts. Strategic goal is the ultimate aim of the US military efforts and can be seen as the US leadership expectations translated into a militarily achievable outcome. Strategic plan is a plan of steps in order to achieve that desired militarily achievable outcome taking into consideration relevant obstacles and influencing factors. Strategy is then the practical application of the strategic plan which is more flexible and adaptable to the operational circumstances on the ground. Operations is an umbrella term for all the activities which on their own seek to make an indirect contribution to the achievement of the strategic goal of the mission. There has been an innumerable range of various military

operations taking place in Iraq between 2003 and 2011, from the ones lasting a few hours and focused on a particular target to the ones that went on for years and sought to bring about a more wide-impact change to the environment. One such example was the Operation New Dawn lasting from February 2010 until December 2011 seeking to stabilize Iraq prior to the US military departure. And lastly, instruments are the available tools of the US government to be utilised to execute these operations, including US military forces, US civilian force, international partners (allies), humanitarian organizations, and the private sector.

The research goal is based on the DoD military understanding of the concept of a force multiplier as key elements employed to increase total force capabilities at the decisive time and place in order to achieve strategic goals. The concept of force or combat multipliers, defined according to the US military is

‘(a) capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment’ (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007: GL-11).

There are many ways to categorise force multipliers, which can include human (e.g. leadership, morale, training, and fitness), environmental (e.g. terrain), organisational (e.g. force structure), and behavioural traits and elements, some of which can be quantified and some which cannot. It is assumed that contracting support then can be an

effective force multiplier as it seeks to increase the overall capability of a military force.

Alternatively, there also exists an opposite value, a force 'demultiplier', which decreases the total force capabilities of a military and is understood as a spoiling factor for potential capability of a force (Simpkin, 1985: 85). Seeking to develop this logic further and apply it to this thesis, the research aim is then to examine how PMSI, defined as potential sustainment force multiplier, increased the capability of the US military and optimised, if at all, specific capabilities to be successful within the constraints and restraints of Phase IV Operations in Iraq. If the essence of operational art is the concentration of superior capability against the enemy to achieve success, then the concept of force multipliers should be at the very centre of any operational planning process which aims to concentrate such superior capability. Force multipliers are thus useful as they provide essential guidelines for what can and must be done to optimize force capabilities. It is believed that the analysis along the lines of the concept of force multipliers is especially valuable in complex expeditionary operations where unique restraints and constraints will govern the use of military force. Such operations pose a complex challenge for military planners as they require rapid projections of capabilities into a hostile environment followed by continuous sustainment of extremely diverse mixture of activities where the need is to increase, optimize and amplify the capabilities of the often limited forces to achieve the desired state of the contingency. The aim of this thesis is then to export this logic further and provide a better understanding how PMSI, as sustainment

force multiplier, contributed to optimise and enhance US military capabilities in Phase IV Operations.

The remainder of this chapter focuses on the first two themes individually – Military Privatisation in the US and Phase IV Operations - and then brings them together in the context of the Iraq War to demonstrate their relevance to the assessment of the contribution of the PMSI in Iraq. Beginning with the theme of Military Privatisation in the US, this chapter discusses the economic, military and political factors that paved the way for US large-scale military outsourcing as a foreign policy tool in Iraq. Next, Phase IV Operations are defined as an inseparable part of modern US military operations and their earlier versions are presented with the aim of explaining their increasing importance within modern warfare. The last section, The US Strategy in Iraq, brings these two themes together and discusses them in the context of the Iraq War 2003-2011. Its aim is to present the most relevant aspects of the war that intensified the reliance of the US government on contractors. Starting with an explanation of the Iraq War and the Bush administration's decision to invade the country in the context of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), this section seeks to highlight how and why the US resorted to relying on contractors during the war to such a large extent.

II.I. Military Privatisation in the United States


The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 marked the establishment of the concept of a sovereign state which requires a monopoly on the use of force

exercised by the state's military (Bruneau, 2011: 108-109) This notion spread globally during the 20th century and came to include professional military, state control intelligence and police organisations (Ibid.). In stark contrast, the PMSI has been slowly rising over the last 30 years, prompted by changes in political, economic and social structures across the Western world. Despite being viewed as an unaccountable scourge by its critics and as a great new solve-it-all invention of modern warfare by its proponents, offering twice the capability for half the cost, the truth is somewhere in-between. Although cost savings together with increased effectiveness are generally considered the primary justification for outsourcing, the true financial implications of hiring contractors versus resourcing capabilities from within the US military are still unclear as any conclusive assessment of various agencies' expenses from the last decade remains yet to be seen. Although supporters of the privatisation trend argue that hiring contractors only when needed is cheaper in the long run, rather than maintaining a permanent in-house professional military capability, such claims have not been verified yet (Isenberg, 2010).

Economically viable or not, despite the sudden attention that the large scale military outsourcing during the Iraq War brought about, the US military has been using private contractors to support its military operations since the American Revolution (Thibault et al., 2009: 21; Singer, 2003: 19-39; Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, no date). Although the process of contracting and contracted responsibilities have undergone a significant evolution since the early days, there is no major war in the history of the United States that would have not been

fought with the support of private contractors (Isenberg, 2009; Kinsey, 2009; Singer, 2003). The recent observations that PMSI has become such an important part of the US way of war that it would struggle to wage a war without it, ignore the fact that the US has never waged a war without a significant support of contractors in its history. The graphic below illustrates the evolution across time from Simple Services, such as medical and laundry to Complex Services like construction or security, as part of the contracted services in direct support of the US military across its history from American Revolution to the Iraq war.

Figure 2 - Evolution of Contracted Support in US Military Operations



Source: Thibault et al., 2009: 21; Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, no date.

Therefore, while the extent of involvement of the PMSI in Iraq received a lot of attention during the GWOT, it was neither an unprecedented nor unexpected development in the history of US expeditionary operations.¹ According to the figure above contractors have been an asset throughout US history and the gradual development of the activities that were added to their responsibilities is a reflection of the increasing conflict complexity and modernization of warfare (Thibault et al., 2009: 21; Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, no date). Indeed, the current situation can be seen as a return to the past, when western military forces on the battlefield ('warriors') used to be supported by a large force of 'camp followers,' who provided a whole range of services including supply, support, medical care, maintenance and 'entertainment' (Miller, 2006). As Dunigan and Masterson (2014: 201-202) describe, it was common, in the past, for an army on the march to consist of 10 to 20 percent of soldiers while the rest were camp followers taking care of the camping equipment and the soldiers and only some of the most disciplined and self-sufficient armies were an exception to this rule.

As such, since its founding, the United States has had an intimate relationship with contractors in wide range of functions, and the US reliance on them has been integral to its historical development. In modern era, already during the World War I (WWI) contractors played an

¹ During the Revolutionary War, for example, the Continental Army hired wagon drivers and contracted beef suppliers; the support also included clothing, weapons and basic engineering services (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, no date)

important role by providing large-scale military support as the US military became overwhelmed with transporting and supplying the American Expeditionary Forces across Europe. Ultimately, over 85,000 American and foreign contractors filled the void by crewing ships, constructing railroads, administering post offices and providing other general logistical support (Fontaine and Nagl, 2010: 8).

With the new technological revolution in military hardware taking place in preparation and during the World War II (WWII), the range of potential functions for contractors broadened to other areas, such as maintenance of newly designed military aircraft and technologically advanced weapons systems (Bokel and Clark, 1997: 97-144).

Furthermore, the demand for labour outstripped the available uniformed personnel supply resulting in some 730,000 civilians supporting the 5.4 million American soldiers deployed overseas (Fontaine and Nagl, 2010: 10). The reconstruction of Japan and post-war Europe under the Marshall Plan, the largest reconstruction effort until post-2003 Iraq, provided additional requirements on the US military that required the involvement of large-scale contractors (Conway and Toth, 1997: 193-264).

Following the demobilization after WWII, the military-to-contractor ratio rose to 2.5:1 during the Korean War, where some 156,000 contractors, mostly in construction and engineering roles, supported 393,000 US military personnel on the battlefield (Ibid). Furthermore, the decision not to mobilize reserve units during the Vietnam War led the US military to contract large American companies in order to satisfy a vast

demand for physical infrastructure construction in Vietnam. They built new, or had refurbished, canals, roads and bridges, residential areas, hospitals, port facilities, airfields and more (Carter, 2004: 45). An estimated 130,000-150,000 contractors worked on a staggering array of construction projects aimed to prepare Vietnam below the 17th parallel for a major US military presence (Ibid.: 46). Following the end of the Vietnam War and the end of conscription in 1973, the US military embarked on consistent efforts to 'do more with less'. This has led both to a dramatic decrease of the size of the US military over the years and to the prominence of technology in the way in which the US fights in modern warfare.

Later on, in 1990s, contracting out national security and defence functions became especially relevant with the unrelenting drive to 'privatize' government services during the William J. Clinton administration, and even more so during the George W. Bush administration (Kosar, 2006: 9). Much of it initiated in the early 1990s by Dick Cheney, who as the Secretary of Defense under the Presidency of the G. W. H. Bush sought to find a way how to comply with US Congressional demands to downsize the military and its enormous Cold War budget while preserving its bold strategic interests (Chatterjee, 2009: xi).

During the First Gulf War, the Army employed just 9,200 contractors in support of US combat units, but it was US operations in the Balkans during the mid-1990s which represented a whole new level in military contracting in modern history (Fontaine and Nagl, 2010: 10). In

1995, Cheney, this time as chief executive officer of Halliburton, oversaw the first major deployment of contractors into support services for the military in the former Yugoslavia (Chatterjee, 2009: xi). Unlike the First Gulf War, the character of the environment in the Balkans called for the provision of a large array of logistic and other services with the ratio of contractors to military personnel approximately 1:1 (Ibid.). According to Pratap Chatterjee, the war in the Balkans was 'the first time that the contractors would allow soldiers to be wholly spared the dreadful monotony of cooking and cleaning up after themselves' (Chatterjee, 2009: xi).

This inclination to military outsourcing was fully embraced by Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, with Cheney as Vice-President, under the G. W. Bush administration in 2001 (Ibid.). Rumsfeld (2001-2006) wanted to demonstrate that the Iraq invasion in 2003 could be accomplished with a lean fighting force and the most modern military technology. In a Department of Defense Briefing in March 2003, he famously argued that '(o)ur military capabilities are so devastating and precise that we can destroy an Iraqi tank under the bridge without damaging the bridge' (Mockaitis, 2012: 115). Encouraged by the vice president Cheney, Rumsfeld was convinced that a success in Iraq would become the seal of approval for the plans for defence transformation over a traditional build-up of forces (Ibid.).

As Richard N. Haass points out, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a 'war of choice' rather than of necessity, to test this theory and prove

Rumsfeld's point. The relatively low number of American troops together with few coalition partners were not in position to control the situation once the major combat operations concluded and were about two-thirds short of the estimated number of personnel required for the war according to the plans developed at Central Command in the late 1990s (Haass, 2009: 253-254). As a result, once the war started and the US found itself scrambling for additional man force needed on the ground, more and more tasks were contracted out to civilians and the military relied more on contractors to provide day-to-day assistance in the zone of conflict (Lovewine, 2014: 10; Rostker, 2007: 5-10).

As a result, it is estimated that during the Global War on Terror over 250,000 contractor employees across the Middle East and Southwest Asia provided support in a whole range of PMSI services, such as information services (information technology and equipment maintenance), logistics (facilities management and operational support logistics), reconstruction, and security services (including armed security services) in conflict zones (Perlo-Freeman and Sköns, 2008: 4-7). This provided the US military with operational flexibility to reorganize its limited forces and increase its capabilities to pursue its strategy both in Iraq and Afghanistan (Lovewine, 2014: 9-11). In this respect, military privatisation re-emerged as a solution for bridging the gap between US foreign policy aims and means, at least in short term.

The lack of awareness about how the US historically profited from military outsourcing leads to a false impression that the most recent

demonstration in Iraq and Afghanistan was unusual, unprecedented or even unexpected. The particularities of the military contracting continue shifting over time, but recognizing the long-term tradition of an intimate relationship between US governments and contractors is imperative to inform future debates about the trend and how to respond to it.

II.II. Phase IV Operations

US military doctrine has been preoccupied with conventional warfare, concentrating on overwhelming mass, mobility, and technology. World Wars I and II (and even Korea) demonstrated the effectiveness of the American 'way of war' as a combination of these elements (Taw, 2012: 12). However, as David Ucko (2011: 16) points out, the understanding of war as a conventional and decisive military confrontation taking place on an isolated battlefield is nothing but a simplified recollection of single historical events. He further explains that such view obscures the fact that even predominantly conventional wars have had a less conventional phase where the combat achievements consolidation required some form of stabilization, political support, capacity-building, or reconstruction (Ibid.).

As a matter of fact, US troops have been repeatedly employed in various roles, including peace operations, counterdrug operations, counterinsurgency efforts, and stability and reconstruction missions. American armed forces have been involved in hundreds of expeditionary operations and only eleven conventional wars (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008: I-1). Reconstruction entailed extensive nation building in post-

World War efforts in both Europe and Japan, followed by South Korea and Vietnam, not to mention all the stability operations that have been conducted as elements of COIN, disaster relief or peacekeeping around the world (Dobbins et al., 2008).² Between 1992 and 1998 the US Army conducted twenty-six operations 'other than war', and between 1989 and 2000 the Marine Corps conducted sixty-two contingency operations across the world including peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, disaster relief and counterterrorism (Taw, 2012: 18-19). Therefore, while the US military has had a preference for conventional warfare, it has been extensively involved in operations 'other than war' for decades.³

Despite this, the US military's thinking has been permeated by the artificial bifurcation of wars as either conventional or irregular. In the American experience, each encounter with counterinsurgency and similar missions (peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, disaster relief, and counterterrorism) has provoked such false dichotomy, where the complexity and difficulty of the non-combat aspect of the operations made the US government seek to avoid them and develop a different type of military strategy. In the Vietnam War, the US military, armed and trained for conventional warfare, realised the limits of conventional warfare against both insurgents and conventional forces

² For details on the US previous experiences, including Panama, Haiti, the Balkans, the Philippines, Germany, and Japan, see Crane and Terrill (2003).

³ In the past, Peace Operations, as precedents to modern Phase IV Ops, were regarded as 'someone else's job', an unwanted burden, a sideshow that soldiers performed exceptionally and under particular circumstances. As Carafano observed, when US military forces undertake such missions, they try, as much as possible, to make them mirror traditional military warfare (Carafano, 2008: 2-3).

operating in impassable jungles and populated areas. Further complicated by American political ambiguity, competing strategic and practical imperatives, and the complexity of the conflict itself, the Vietnam War demonstrated the limitations of the American 'way of war'.

Illogically, the civilian and military leadership's response to Vietnam was not to better prepare the army for such operations. Instead, it led to a rejection of such operations altogether and a return to a stronger preference for conventional warfare relying on high technology as an equation for military success. The few post-Vietnam contingency operations were, therefore, downplayed, conducted by proxy, justified as necessary exceptions or even conducted as conventional operations (Taw, 2012: 15). As such, the Vietnam War has particular significance in the context of Phase IV Operations as it soured American support for long-term military non-conventional commitment which lie at the core of Phase IV efforts.

Indeed, the US military has a long history of redefining non-combat operations successively as Small Wars, Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC), Military Operations Short of War (MOSW), Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and Irregular Warfare (IW) (Taw, 2012: 42; Ucko, 2011: 16; Kagan, 2006: 168-169). Throughout all those stages these operations have been distinguished as operations 'other than war', and even as recent as early 2000s, the US military made it clear what type of operation it identifies itself with most. According to US Army Field Manual 3.0, Operations, from June 2001,

‘Fighting and winning the nation's wars is the foundation of Army service - the Army's non-negotiable contract with the American people and its enduring obligation to the nation’ (Department of the Army, 2001: 1-2).

The manual adds that although the Army recognises that soldiers will perform a wide range of military activities across the spectrum of conflict, the institutional emphasis is on fighting wars (Ibid.). As a result, two years before the war in Iraq, this doctrine re-stated the understanding that despite war’s diversity, ‘real’ war is primarily a conventional type of war and the US military has, therefore, always seen its primary mission as fighting and defeating the enemy.⁴ As such, at the start of the 21st century, the Army (similarly to other branches of the US military) did not perceive Stability operations as integral part of war and, rather they were seen as an unnecessary distraction and a diversion of essential resources from the principal mission – combat.

Nevertheless, Iraq and Afghanistan caused the military to re-assess its lessons learned from history and formulate a new vision of war which is more appropriate to the present circumstances (Linn, 2011: 33). The US military has learned that winning wars and consolidating victory and

⁴ Conventional warfare is not found as a term within Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint Publication 1-02 defines the term conventional forces as, ‘1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces’ (US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010(2015): 51).

preventing the renewal of conflict are two distinct matters. In the wake of the unfolding civil war in Iraq, the Army has been criticised for its traditional ignorant view and urged to alter its doctrine and training programmes so that combat units would have skills both to fight and to conduct stability operations.

As a result of this, in 2005, the US Department of Defense released Directive 3000.05, elevating Stability Operations to be on a par with offence, defence and civil support, as one of the four equally important elements within the new doctrine of full spectrum operations (Department of Defense, 2005). Redefined as 'military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states and regions', the acknowledged importance of Stability Operations signified a dramatic change in the military's perception of its role and responsibilities in 21st century warfare (Department of Defense, 2005: 2). Their immediate goal (security, restore essential services, a viable market economy, and meet humanitarian needs) together with the long-term goal (to create opportunities for economic growth, begin the process of rebuilding, and limit the likelihood of renewed violence) are far beyond the traditional understanding of what the military's responsibilities in US expeditionary operations are (Ibid.; Taw 2012: 3).

In addition, in 2006, the Army and the Marine Corps published a new Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, Joint Publication 3-24, emphasizing the importance of stability operations for success in COIN

(Department of Army 2006: 1-19, 2-5).⁵ Less than two years later, the Army published a new version of the capstone doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, and a keystone stability operations manual, FM 3-07, Stability Operations, to re-emphasise the importance of full spectrum operations including offence, defence, stability and civil support operations, which was already stated in DoD Directive 3000.05 from 2005 (Department of the Army, 2008; Department of the Army, 2008b). Iraq and Afghanistan are thus at the roots of the transformation of the military's evolutionary doctrine that reflects the next steps of the military's development in a new strategic environment (Taw, 2012: 5). To what extent these changes in approach are truly transformative and long-lasting is yet to be seen, but at least conceptually the debate has been opened.


In the context of the Iraq War, the Stability Operations Manual 3-07 and the Counterinsurgency doctrine 3-24, provided a critical contribution to the US military's understanding of Stability Operations as a transitional process to make sustainable peace a possibility. Explicitly stating the requirement for building the capacity of a state to function as a necessary pre-condition for the elimination of violence, Stability Operations developed from an optional addition into a crucial phase that 'makes or brakes' US expeditionary operations (Department of the Army, 2008b: 3-14). Although offensive and defensive operations are deemed integral to

⁵ A number of important books detail the disagreements between civilian and military leaders and the struggle to implement the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in Iraq (Jaffe and Cloud, 2009; Ricks, 2009; Robinson, 2008; Ricks, 2006).

COIN operations according to the 2006 COIN military manual, the publication recognizes the necessity of Stability Operations an inseparable component of all full spectrum operations executed overseas Department of Army 2006: 1-19).

According to the DOD's 3000.05 Directive definition, the immediate goal of Stability Operations is to 'provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs ' (Department of Defense 2005: 2). In the long-term, they seek to 'develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy rule of law democratic institutions, and a robust civil society' (Ibid.). The Notional Operation Plan Phases versus Level of Military Effort, from Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, illustrates where such operations fit within a conflict continuum (plan phases).

Figure 3 - Notional Operation Plan Phases versus Level of Military Effort




Source: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011: V-6.

This model depicts the importance of coordination and collaboration of entities involved in particular phases across the military continuum vertically, as well as the Level of Military Effort horizontally. Beginning with Phase 0 (Shape), through Phase I (Deter), Phase II (Seize Initiative), Phase III (Dominate), Phase IV (Stabilize) and Phase V (Enable Civilian Authority), this model acknowledges that different phases of the conflict coexist both horizontally and vertically at all times and the individual phases are only characterised by their dominance, not their exclusivity. Therefore, Shaping, Deterring, Seizing, Dominating, Stabilizing

and Enabling Activities play important roles across the whole spectrum of phases, from the beginning until the end of military operations.

As such, Phase IV Operations are not just one type of operations, rather, because of their wide range of possible inputs, they can take any of the following forms: security; humanitarian assistance; economic stabilization and infrastructure; rule of law; and governance and participation (Department of the Army, 2011: III-1-59). The broad range of tasks and activities within the group of operations include establishing civil security, establishing civil control, restoring essential services, supporting governance, supporting economic and infrastructure performing information engagement tasks (Ibid.).⁶

Figure 4 - Essential Stability Tasks



Source: Department of the Army, 2008: 3-19.

⁶ For detailed outline of Stability Operations activities divided within Essential Stability Tasks categories, see Appendix C.

As the Army Field Manual 3-07 stipulates the aim of Stability operations is to create an environment which enables the host nation to begin resolving the root causes of conflict (reconciliation among local or regional adversaries) and create conditions for establishing legitimate host-nation governance, a functioning civil society, and a viable market economy (Department of the Army, 2008: 3-2). Within this broad range most important military contribution to stabilization of the environment is defined as 'to protect and defend the population, facilitating the personal security of the people and, thus, creating a platform for political, economic, and human security' (US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011b: vii).

While in theory, the distinction between the phases' domination periods is clear, the war in Iraq highlighted the complexity and difficulty of distinguishing between various phases of complex military operations. As they do not have a clear beginning or end, they cannot be constrained to a specific time period. Thus, when referred to as a specific period in time, it must be understood that in that period they featured as significant, not pre-dominant or exclusive. Instead, they must be conceptualised more broadly and based on their unique focus.

In this regard, Phase IV Operations can be viewed as a critical step away from sustained combat operations towards focus on provision of essential government services, reconstruction of emergency infrastructure, and humanitarian relief at the centre of the efforts to build a safe and secure environment and restore local political, economic, and infrastructure stability. Although, in the Iraq context, Phase III and Phase

IV were extremely difficult to separate, Stability Operations jumped to the forefront following Bush's declaration of Mission Accomplished in May 2003 and terminated with the US military's withdrawal at the end of 2011. In this regard, while both phases - Dominate and Stabilize – were prominent in the early post-major combat years in Iraq, Stability Operations represented the all-important effort to create viable conditions for the US military to begin its withdrawal and allow the progress towards Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) leading to complete disengagement. The US military experience in Iraq is thus one of the most recent demonstrations that major combat operations and stability operations overlap and must be conducted simultaneously throughout the course of a conflict to achieve the desired results.

Although it became an often repeated cliché that Phase IV Operations is where wars are won, it appears to be rather where the militaries hope to avoid quagmire by engaging in mission creep, defined as 'a gradual shift in objectives during the course of a military campaign, often resulting in an unplanned long-term commitment' to mitigate consequences of an ill-plan operation (Cambridge.org, no date). Phase IV Operations, however, cannot avert or change the course of an ill-fated mission and to claim the contrary would be to overestimate what they can do. As such Phase IV Operations are not a new invention or a cookbook solution instant remedy for complex military interventions. Instead they represent a structured approach to understand how complex the mosaic of every post-conflict situation is and what areas come to the forefront when rebuilding a nation.

To place stability operations within a broader strategic context, the US experience in Iraq clearly constitutes a case study for why the US needs an effective Stability Operations doctrine and capabilities. While not a type of operation, it is a phase (an element) of each and every operation. Ultimately the term refers to the application of operations in support of establishing and maintaining order, which are to be shared between the military and the civilian component of the intervening state. Whilst Stability Operations remain a less preferable type of military engagement, in the environment where more security threats are associated with failing, rather than aggressive states, Phase IV Operations represent an inseparable element of modern military operations and require the US military to adapt accordingly. To understand the elevated importance of Stability Operations in the US military's doctrine, one must understand the operations in Iraq as being at the heart of the recent conceptual transformation.

II.III. The US Military Strategy in Iraq (2003-2011)

Prior to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Washington's interests in the Persian Gulf were long-standing and well known. The Bush administration proclaimed that the immediate goal of the invasion of Iraq was to remove the oppressive regime of Saddam Hussein, including destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists, and build 'a new Iraq that is prosperous and free' (Dale, 2009: 31). Masked behind the official declarations, various strategic

and economic incentives to dispose of the regime of Saddam Hussein were on the table many years before the iconic terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in the New York City (Office of the Press Secretary, 2003).

Preoccupied with the security of the region's oil supply and its continued free flow of at market prices, the continued freedom of navigation by US and Western shipping in the Gulf itself, and maintaining strong allies in the region, the Bush administration decided to seize the momentum and order the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to begin on March 19, 2003 when the US led a multinational effort to remove Saddam Hussein's regime from power.⁷

On the second day of the invasion, 21st March 2003, Bush's Defense Secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld, then laid out eight specific objectives by which the Bush administration would define victory (Shanker and Schmitt, 2003). These were: to end the regime; eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction; capture or drive out terrorists; collect intelligence on terrorist networks; collect intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction activity; secure Iraq's oil fields; deliver humanitarian relief and end sanctions; help Iraq achieve representative self-government and insure its territorial integrity (Ibid.). However, there was a more general and overarching aim that the US administration sought for Iraq. Not only was Iraq going to undergo a democratic transformation, it was also to become the first phase of a large mission to reconstruct the Middle East (Office of

⁷ For analysis of the background of the Iraq war as a war of choice, see Hinnebusch (2006). For an overview of evidence regarding the oil factor in the war, see Duffield (2005). For an overview of evidence that the neo-cons, intimately connected to the Israeli Likud party, were pushing the war on Israel's behalf, see Bamford (2004), Berber (2003), Farer (2004).

the Press Secretary, 2003b). In President Bush's own words, a new Iraq 'would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region' (Ibid.). In simple terms, what the US really sought to achieve by going to war in Iraq was to create a new regime 'acceptable to the US, if not actually designed by the US government itself' (Stansfield, 2005: 131).⁸


In terms of the actual planning for the war, the responsibility for the campaign fell on the shoulders of the DoD, which adopted a narrow vision of a swift military operation from the start (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2008: 7-8). The whole planning for the operation was based on the principles of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), emphasizing speed, lethality, accuracy, flexibility, and information dominance, all rooted in modern technology (Shimko 2010: 1-24). Officials at the highest levels of the decision making process, including President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, rejected the possibility that the post-invasion transfer of power and responsibility to Iraqis could present a major issue (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2008: 31-45)⁹. According to their vision the US would be welcomed as liberators, and Iraq would naturally develop into an exemplar democratic regime in the Middle East (Metz 2008: 132; Rice, 2011: 90-97; Rumsfeld, 2011: 479-485).

⁸ Also see Klein (2008: 331); Wimmer (2003: 111); Byman (2003: 47-48).

⁹ For an insight into the planning for the Iraq War from the perspective of its architects, see Cheney (2011), Rice (2011), Rumsfeld (2011) Bush (2010), Haas (2009) and Franks and McConnell (2004).

The reality on the ground turned out to be very different to what had been expected, and despite the relatively easy victory against the Iraqi military, Iraq plunged into civil war. The start of 2004 was marked by a relative lull in violence as insurgent forces reorganised during this time, studying the tactics of the multinational forces and planning a renewed offensive (Franks and McConnell, 2004: 432-477). During the spring of 2004, the violence began to rise and the insurgency slowly grew into a full-blown civil war causing a large number of casualties among Iraqi civilians (Dodge, 2012: 53-74). Below, Figure 5 - Documented Civilian Deaths from Violence Perpetrated by Anti-Government/Anti-Coalition Forces (All Iraq, Any Weapons) illustrates the increased number of violent civilian deaths recorded between 2003 and 2005, its steadily high level until the second half of 2008, which then significantly decreased and remained low until 2011.

Figure 5 - Documented Civilian Deaths from Violence Perpetrated by Anti-Government/Anti-Coalition Forces (All Iraq, Any Weapons)



Source: Iraq Body Count, no date.

Following the US military approach of 2003-2004 focussing on 'killing or capturing' insurgents and the development of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to become capable of fighting insurgents and securing the country, in 2005 the US realized the need to change the strategy. In order to increase security, US and Iraqi forces established a limited counterinsurgency (COIN) approach with the objective of controlling movement and access to certain areas (Pirnie and O'Connell, 2008: 35-50). Using a system of vehicle searches and security passes for residents within and around cities, the US established a new strategy known as 'Clear, Hold, Build' which sought to bring Coalition forces among the population and, thus, create a greater sense of security (DeFronzo, 2010: 225-249; Dale, 2009: 67-68). However, by 2005 most coalition forces were pulled back to relative large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) – secure and separate from the local population (Dale, 2009: 20).

In terms of military operations during this period, they were designed as a close cooperation between the Coalition and the Iraqi Security Forces. Under the 'Operation Together Forward', the Iraqi forces were in the lead, supported by the coalition (Ibid.: 68). The effort included clearing operations, as well as a series of new security measures including extended curfews, tighter restrictions on weapons ownership, tips hotlines, and expanded checkpoints and police patrols (Ibid.). By the end of 2006, it became clear that this approach has limited utility as the levels of violence were continuing to climb and the US found itself trapped in a war it did not want to lose, but was unable to win (Franks and McConnell, 2004: 432-477). Regardless of whether the original plan of the US was

overly ambitious, it became obvious that to leave behind a chaotic Iraq in the midst of raging sectarian violence was not an option. As Toby Dodge observed, such an outcome would have plunged an already destabilized Middle East into deeper instability which would have further undermined the US position in the region (Dodge, 2004: 6).

This sentiment about the necessity to turn the developments in Iraq around was shared by many of President Bush's close advisers. As Frederick W. Kagan, one of the intellectual architects of the 'surge' strategy in Iraq, argued, establishing an enduring relationship with Iraq is a strategic imperative for the United States and a lack of thereof will likely lead to regional conflict, humanitarian catastrophe, and increased global terrorism (Kagan, 2007: 1, 3). As a result, several strategic reviews were conducted in parallel, options were considered, and a decision to pursue government to take several sharp policy transformations was made (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004: 226-32).

What was perhaps not a vital interest in the first place became imperative as the US military did not want to leave humiliated in the midst of a civil war (Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro, 2012; Kagan, 2006). Lacking the strategy, the manpower, or the domestic support to decisively prevail, it sought to find a compromise. The ensuing counterinsurgency strategy was an attempt to provide a way for the US military to leave a stabilized, but unresolved, Iraq with dignity as opposed to speedy withdrawal accompanied by outright humiliation.

In January 2007, the Administration established the New Way Forward National Strategy as the new US policy toward Iraq. By shifting the focus towards providing security for the population instead of fighting insurgents, the US military had to adapt the way it used to engage with the locals. The new strategy thus relied extensively on the use of concrete barriers, checkpoints, curfews, and biometric technologies for identification to improve security (Dale, 2008: 71). Previously, the Iraq strategy viewed security, political and economic elements as mutually reinforcing and sought to implement them simultaneously. The New Way Forward agreed that all of these elements, but argued that security was a prerequisite for progress in the other areas (National Security Council, 2007: 12, 18-20). As President Bush stated in his address to the nation in January 2007, 'The most urgent priority for success in Iraq is security' (Office of the Press Secretary, 2007). This focus on population security marked an important shift from previous years, when the US priority was to quickly transition security responsibilities to Iraqi security forces (Katzman, 2009: 37-38).

'The New Way Forward' embodied more robust COIN operations that required more troops on the ground. For that purpose, in January 2007, Bush ordered the deployment of more than 20,000 soldiers into Iraq, five additional brigades, the majority of which was sent to Baghdad. He also extended the tour of most of the troops in the country and some of the Marines already in the Anbar Province area. With the new approach, under the command of General Petraeus, the US military attempted to 'win the hearts and minds' of the Iraqi people through building relationships,

preventing civilian casualties and compromising with, and even hiring, some former enemies (Office of the Press Secretary, 2007; Office of the Press Secretary, 2007b; National Security Council, 2005).

The major element of the new strategy was a change in focus for the US military 'to help Iraqis clear and secure neighbourhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security' (Office of the Press Secretary, 2007). The President stated that the surge would then provide the time and conditions conducive to reconciliation between communities (Ibid.). Petraeus recognised the need for realistic and achievable goals in terms of military campaigns in his 2008 testimony to Congress when he said that Iraq would not become a Jeffersonian democracy. He characterised the Iraq war as follows:

'The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This competition will take place, and its resolution is key to producing long-term stability in the new Iraq. The question is whether the competition takes place more – or less – violently' (Petraeus, 2007).¹⁰

While running for the U.S. presidency in 2008, Obama repeatedly criticised foreign policy of his predecessor and drew a link between the chaos in Iraq and the neglected original invasion of Afghanistan. Citing the

¹⁰ For a detailed analysis of the Iraq socio-political development and the role of Ba'athism in it, see Terrill (2012).

human costs of war, the US military overstretch, the financial burden and the strain on relationship with US allies that the war caused, he promised to reorient the attention and resources from Iraq back to Afghanistan to prevent the resurgence of al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Gregory, 2011: 2)

Although Bush signed the Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and thus set a timetable for withdrawal in December 2008, once Obama became elected he introduced a new strategy for the Iraq War in the early 2009 entitled 'Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq' which aimed at ensuring the safe withdrawal of US forces from Iraq while maintaining a certain level of stability. In the words of Joe Biden, then U.S. Senator from Delaware, later Vice President in Obama's administrations, the aim of the United States was to 'leave Iraq without leaving behind a civil war that turns into a regional war, endangering America's interests, not for a year or two, but for a generation' (Biden, 2007). The new approach provided the guidance to the new mission under the banner Operation New Dawn that was to put in place processes necessary for the US military to be able to live up to the tenets of the US-Iraq Security Agreement of 2008 and withdraw all its military forces by the end of 2011.

Operation New Dawn, which started in September 2010, thus marked a distinct change in the US mission in Iraq characterised by reduced role of US troops in securing the country and the withdrawal of those forces from Iraq (Dale, 2009: 25-27). The new military mission, reflecting degrading military capabilities to response to a crisis within the

country, signified the end of US combat operations and transition of the remaining US military forces to an advice and assist roles with Iraq's security forces (Odierno, 2010: 97-98; Obama, 2010).

Despite the fact that the FM 3-24 acknowledges the high level of importance given to the measured application of force, the elevation of the protection of the local population as the primary concern in the COIN operation further solidifies the significance of the military force as the main instrument in COIN (Department of the Army, 2006: 2-1-2). While the FM 3-24 promotes the unity of effort by integrating civilian and military activities, it stresses that controlling the level of violence is a key aspect of the operations and an essential COIN task for military forces remains to fight insurgents (Ibid). Referring to COIN as 'being fought among the populace' or 'being the battle of ideas,' the language of the manual further highlights the approach adopted by the US military that COIN operations are primarily, though not exclusively, a military mission (Department of the Army 2006: 2-2). This could be ascribed to the range of responsibilities the manual assigns to Counterinsurgents, where '(s)ecurity from insurgent intimidation and coercion, as well as from non-political violence and crime' is listed at the top and also appears to be the closest to traditional military capabilities (Ibid.).¹¹

¹¹ The remaining responsibilities of Counterinsurgents according to FM 3-24 include the following: Security from insurgent intimidation and coercion, as well as from non-political violence and crime; Provision for basic economic needs; Provision of essential services, such as water, electricity, sanitation, and medical care; Sustainment of key social and cultural institutions; Other aspects that contribute to a society's basic quality of life (Department of the Army 2006: 2-2).

In the face of the clear demonstration of the limits of conventional military power in Iraq, the elevation of Stability Operations to a primary mission alongside offence, defence and civil support represents a new approach in the US military doctrine for future expeditionary operations. Based on inadequate planning reinforced by a poor understanding of the challenges accompanying regime change, Stability Operations emerged as an avenue for a dignified exit of the US military from an outright fiasco. As such, the introduction of the concept of Phase IV operations in the US military doctrine with the experience from Iraq represented a swing from emphasizing fighting and winning the nation's wars to the embrace of long-term complex civilian-military operations that seek to provide room for negotiation, as opposed to straightforward solutions.

With the all-volunteer force, privatisation of national defence became necessary. Rather than an Iraq-war-related revolution, the evolution of a long trend of military and security privatisation has been underway for decades as force structure reductions greatly reduced the service's ability to support long-term complex expeditionary operations. Since the end of the Cold War, the US Army went from 738,000 active personnel in 1990 to 481,000 in 2001, to 490,000 in 2015 (Heritage foundation, no date). The unanticipated need for large numbers of logistics and security personnel accompanied by the serious shortage of troops available due to conscious decisions by civilian policy makers and the experience with military outsourcing in the Balkans caused the Pentagon to turn to contractors to fill the immediate needs (Hammes, 2010: 1-2). Contractors were thus employed to fill the vacuum that at least in the case

of Iraq appears to be a result of deliberate policy miscalculations rather than solely exigency of a very dangerous and violent environment (Bruneau, 2011: 123).

II.IV. Conclusion

The Operation in Iraq is probably the most spectacular recent example of a mission creep. While the original intent of the mission was to plant a seed for spread of democracy across the Middle East, motivated by specific strategic and economic calculations of the US, within few months following the invasion the situation on the ground span out of control and unleashed a unexpected level of violence and chaos (Bowman, 2007: 1-6). Since the late fall of 2004, US forces supported by the Iraqi military engaged in counterinsurgency operations with mixed results due to the reason that despite the operations were militarily successful, the Iraqi security forces were unable to keep the cleared areas under control (Ibid. 5). The ensuing military surge and intensified counterinsurgency campaign focussed on Baghdad, Anbar province, and areas immediately north and south of the capital but brought hardly any long-term achievement.

The gradual, evident shift from the nebulously defined goal of regime change into an unclear, unplanned and unwanted effort to rush plans for Phase IV Operations based on the counterinsurgency strategy as the pinpoint of the new redirected objectives is clearly apparent. Shaped by innumerable factors, including the US leadership expectations, the

dynamics of the operational circumstances on the ground, the dynamics of domestic Iraqi politics and the US domestic policy, including Obama's presidential campaign based on the promise of the withdrawal of the US troops in Iraq and reorientation of the US military efforts on Afghanistan, the ultimate strategic goal of the US military became to make Iraq stable enough to enable dignified exit for the US military and redirection of efforts towards fostering stability in Afghanistan instead (Gregory, 2011:2-3).

Taking into account the many contextual factors on the tactical, operational, strategic and even institutional level, it would be unfeasible to discuss them all in depth in this chapter. Instead, the aim of this chapter was to present the three main areas that provide the setting of the assessment of the contribution of PMSI in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. The combined realities of US experience with military privatisation, the demands of the modern US expeditionary operations and the US strategy in Iraq are the three determining elements that set the background for the US dependency on PMSI within this military campaign. This chapter firstly explained the trend of military outsourcing and its relevance to the historical development of the United States. Secondly, it looked at the conceptualisation of modern expeditionary operations and the US military attitude to the MOOTW. Thirdly, the development of the US strategy vis-à-vis the circumstances on the ground in Iraq was presented as the background of the analysis presented in this thesis.

III. Literature Review

The body of literature on private military and security companies is relatively young and emerged as a distinct sub-field of international security in the aftermath of the Cold War in the 1990s. Initially focussed on the actions of a few notorious companies, the field grew rapidly, reflecting the growing numbers of companies and their involvement in the affairs of states, particularly in foreign military interventions. Quickly, the emergence of the private military and security industry became a matter of a great interest for academics, journalists, and practitioners alike, further stimulating the evolution and diversification of the research in this area.

There are various ways to approach the review of the literature. The first option is to view it chronologically as an evolutionary process which reflects developments within the industry and can be presented in three subsequent phases: 1) from the 1990s to 2003, 2) from 2003 to late 2000, and 3) from late 2000 until today. Alternatively, it can be seen through five dominant themes which intertwine across all three periods. These are: 1) the nature of the industry, 2) normative and ethical concerns of governmental outsourcing (the states' control of violence, civil-military relations, the morality of privatised war), 3) the contribution and impact of private military and security contractors on military operations, 4) non-state contracting, and 5) laws and regulation. As these themes often relate, even overlap with each other, this literature review will proceed by

outlining past research priorities in chronological order, highlighting which issues received most attention and in what context.

In addition, this chapter seeks to provide a critical reflection on how contribution has been understood in the context of the participation of PMSI in Phase IV Operations in Iraq from 2003 to 2011. Identified as a gap in the literature, this chapter argues that despite the preoccupation of the academic literature with identifying the contribution of contractors across various contexts, there is a lack of a deeper understanding of the meaning and its full potential in explaining the form of engagement of contractors in modern warfare. As this chapter will present, the vast majority of the literature identifies contractors' contribution in a superficial and unspecific sense, often black or white, which diminishes the utility of such analysis. As a result, although the academic discourse about the contribution of contractors is rich, its conclusions provide little utility for policy-makers when it comes to decision-making about their use. To address this weakness in the academic literature on PMSI, this chapter highlights the need to redefine the meaning of contribution and broaden the understanding of factors and elements which come into play when assessing the contribution of contractors on the ground in various contexts of modern warfare.

The rest of the chapter is organised as follows.

First, this chapter begins with definitions and typology of PMSI as found in the literature and argues that one of the major obstacles for

assessment of the contribution of contractors in various environments is the ambiguity surrounding the PMSI's own conceptualisation. The various definitions of different companies under the umbrella of the private military and security industry are discussed and, in particular, it is highlighted that the often utilised reference to 'mercenaries' is not only misapplied but stands in the way of effective and objective analysis of these international actors.

Second, the first wave of the scholarly literature will be presented. Focussed on the few notorious companies and their involvement in Sierra Leone, Angola, Papua New Guinea and former Yugoslavia, empirically, the first wave focussed on the negative cases. These cases reinforced pre-existing prejudice against these companies based on their predecessors from the Middle-Ages. Conceptually, the first wave is based on the tremendous changes of the post-1990s where the earlier known individual 'soldiers of fortune' transformed into organised and registered businesses with potential impact on state sovereignty and international affairs.

Third, the chapter proceeds with presentation of the second wave of the scholarly literature on the military and security privatisation. In this phase the discussion moves from individual acts of mercenary-like activities in mostly third world countries to the issue of powerful Western capitalist democracies hiring these companies as part of their foreign-policy military instruments. Empirically, the case studies of Iraq and Afghanistan provide the core sources of data on the evolution of the industry, while conceptually the scholarly focus lies with the issues how

the massive reliance of the Western superpowers on contractors impacts on their sovereignty.

Fourthly, the third wave of the scholarly literature is presented. Emerging with the wind down of the US military presence in the Middle East and the related limited scope and scale of its activities there, the third wave literature broadens its focus to include issues that emerged in the aftermath of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as new areas of contractors utilization that were previously overlooked. In this regard, issues such as the value of contractors' sacrifice, their mental health and the ugly side of importing cheap labour to warzones related with possible human trafficking, are only some of the issues that came to light. In regards to contractors' old-new ventures which became more prominent in the literature with the fading interest in Iraq and Afghanistan, their use as an alternative for police or prison guards domestically, maritime order enforcer providing security for shipping cargo through high-risk waters and, lastly, private intelligence are just a few examples. Conceptually, the third wave can be seen as moving from the idea that military and security privatisation is imposed on the state, to the view that the state is an active instigator and implementer of the trend. Furthermore, looking at the issue from a different perspective than state centrism widens the angle and offers more nuanced insights into identifying and managing risks and implications for different stakeholders.

The ensuing section, 'Contribution', concerns categories, labels and characterisations of private military and security companies across all

three phases of the scholarly literature. It seeks to highlight the gap that this thesis seeks to fill. Going a step further from a discussion on the positive and negative impact of contractors in military operations, the chapter will identify how the (specific) contributions of PMSI have been described in the academic literature. There are four different ways observed: 1) Contribution as characteristics of the general trend towards military outsourcing, 2) Contribution as an area of activities, 3) Contribution as occupations and 4) Contribution as functions. By systematising the up-to-date writings on contractors, this section makes an argument for a more structured analysis of contractors' presence and involvement in modern operations.

Finally, the conclusion creates a bridge to the subsequent chapter, 'Conceptual Framework', which serves as lenses for an assessment of contribution of contractors, as a form of engagement, in Phase IV Operations in Iraq.

III.I. Definition and Typology of PMSI

During the last four decades, 'privatisation' emerged in public discussion referring to a wide range of activities which imply a transfer of the provision of goods and services from the public to the private sector. The breadth of activities covered under the umbrella term 'privatisation' varies greatly and it is not surprising that government officials, politicians, economists, scholars, even journalists tend to understand privatisation differently. Privatisation can cover, for example, the sale of public assets to

private owners, the contracting out of services formerly provided by state organizations to private producers, or the entry by private producers into markets that were formerly considered a public monopoly.

The privatisation of military and security services by the United States government, here understood as the use of private firms to provide this type of services, emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s. On the one side, there were the proponents arguing that privatisation is the answer to the purported failures of 'big government', while the critics, on the other side, opposed that privatisation can have unforeseen and undesirable consequences (Kosar, 2006). Already in the early-post-Cold War years, several important studies analysing the trend have been written and those by Paul C. Light (1999) and John D. Donahue (1989) are particularly noteworthy. While Donahue (1989) presents the evidence and arguments for and against privatisation while including case studies of Pentagon and private prisons, Light (1999) focusses on the extent to which the federal government embraced privatisation in the post-Cold War years. He argues that the official reported numbers are much lower than the reality and that the true head count of non-federal employees working under federal contracts remains obscure (Light, 1989: 5-7). Light introduces the term 'shadow government' to reflect the fact that many people employed through federal contracts, grants, or mandates remain unaccounted for and he points out that the contractors are consciously pushed into the shadows by the government in order to make it appear smaller while increasing its productivity (Ibid.: 5-7, 37-44). More recently, the metaphor of 'shadow government' has been extrapolated onto

contractors in regards to their involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and numerous references to 'shadow force', 'shadow army' and 'shadow soldiers' can be found in the literature (Isenberg, 2009; Rosen, 2007; Scahill, 2007; Zabci, 2007; Schumacher, 2006)

The debate on private companies doing business in the area of military and security emerged in late 1990s. It brought along distinct focus on the procurement and delivery of services, such as training, base support, and facility management, rather than production and procurement of hardware.¹ Although the full range of contractors services has been examined only later with the variety and diversity of services provided by contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, the change in the focus from military hardware to military support services is apparent.

Although defining the object of enquiry is one of the basic steps when proceeding with research, to provide an accurate definition of PMSCs is a complex exercise surrounded by numerous obstacles. Firstly, the ability of individuals with a range of military skills to move between individual companies creates fluidity in the industry and accordingly increases or decreases the range of activities a company can offer, which is ultimately reflected in the types and quantity of contracts it can undertake. Secondly, the blurred line between various activities that a company can deliver in a conflict zone stems from the wide range of capabilities the companies claim to possess and which they adapt accordingly to business opportunities and the risk environments they operate in (Holmqvist,

¹ For literature on production and procurement of military hardware, see e.g. Karpoff et al. (1999), Ruttan (2006), Hartung (2011).

2005: 5). As Moesgaard (2013: 6) argues: 'The terminology is at best imprecise and at worst confusing.'

As a result, various terminologies may be encountered in the body of literature on private military industry and its subjects: private military firms (PMFs), private military companies or private military contractors (PMCs), private security companies (PSCs), military service providers (MSPs), risk consultancy firms (RCFs), private security and military contractors (PSMCs), private military and security companies or private military and security contractors (PMSCs). To illustrate some of these examples, Wulf (2002: 97-98), for instance, distinguishes between five categories of private military actors – private security companies (PSCs), defence producers, private military companies (PMCs), non-statutory forces, and mercenaries. Singer (2003: 91), on the other hand, uses a general label 'private military firms (PMFs)' which he further divides into Military Provider Firms (MPFs), Military Consultant Firms (MCF) and Military Support Firms (MSFs) distinguished according to their proximity to the actual fighting (the 'front line'). Kinsey (2006: 9) proposes four categories in his PMSI typology that is based on whether the object to be secured lies in the public or private domain and whether the means of securing the object are lethal or not. He distinguishes between private combat companies (PCCs), private military companies (PMCs), private security companies (PSCs) and freelance operators (mercenaries) (Ibid.). Isenberg (2009: 11) uses the overarching term 'private military contractors (PMCs)' which he divides into Military Combatant Companies

(MCC), Military Consulting Firms (MCFs) and Military Support Firms (MSF) according to the type of services they provide.

Some authors, such as Lovewine (2014), maintain a distinction between PMCs providing military support services related to warfare, and PSCs performing security duties. Nevertheless, demarking the limits between military companies and security companies is an uneasy task as many companies often offer both military and security services or they subcontract the services they do not provide in order to appear more robust and capable of fulfilling contract responsibilities (Moesgaard, 2013: 6). Large companies such as DynCorp, KBR, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), Aegis and Vinnell have a record of fulfilling large, multi-task government contracts across a wide spectrum of activities (O'Brien 2007: 39-40). Isenberg observes that it is natural for the companies to react to market demands and be as flexible and dynamic as possible and win over their tough competition (2007: 82-93). Therefore while the heterogeneous and dynamic nature of the industry is a perfect businesswise solution, it renders any efforts to categorise the PMSCs misleading and generally unhelpful. Nonetheless, as Kinsey (2006: 8) points out, 'not to attempt to categorise companies will leave those who want to understand the nature of the business even more confused'.

While there is no generally accepted all-inclusive definition of private military and/or security companies in the PMSI literature and different authors use various definitions. The Montreux Document, from 2008, ratified by seventeen countries including the United States, United

Kingdom, and Iraq, is the most comprehensive effort to define PMSCs and can serve as an example of a broadly accepted definition (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2008). According to the Montreux Document PMSCs are:

‘private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places, maintenance and operation of weapons systems, prisoner detention, and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.’
(UN General Assembly – Security Council, 2008: 6)

As in the Montreux Document, to get around the unclear distinction between the PMCs and PSCs definitions, this thesis adopts the term ‘private military and security companies’ (PMSCs) as an overarching term for private companies providing military support services related to warfare, including logistical support and technical assistance, and security services, including armed security services. Although this thesis uses the terms private security contractors (PSC) and armed private security contractors (APSC) it acknowledges it as an artificial theoretical distinction only to highlight the nature of the services that some companies may specialize in temporarily, rather than attempting to create any firm categories of the companies.

This thesis concentrates on PMSCs which were contracted by the United States governmental agencies Department of Defense and Department of State to perform various functions on behalf of the United States government in its involvement in stability operations in Iraq. PMSI, private military and security industry as defined in Chapter I, is understood in this thesis as an overarching umbrella term for a type of industry which operates internationally and brings together private companies providing military and security services to states and non-state legitimate actors.

In this regard, one of the main reasons why the literature on PMSI remains ambiguous and full of contradictions is that there is no consensus on the PMSI origins, shape or form, and, therefore, its definition. While some authors focus on the military privatisation trend (encompassing the whole PMSI), others focus only on specific sectors (logistics, security, communication and others), specific services (intelligence, armed security, translation and interpretation) or even individual companies, such as Blackwater USA (Krahmann, 2010; Kinsey, 2009; Pelton, 2006). One of the defining features of the literature is then the variety of perspectives on the origins and subsequent definitions of the industry, including individual PMSCs as its subjects. The various perspectives on the origins of the industry and the academic definitions of the PMSI and PMSCs vary according to the perspective on the presumed legacy of traditional mercenaries as the predecessors of modern PMSCs. Indeed, the overarching theme in most publications within the first and second wave is the link between traditional mercenaries and modern PMSI.

Many view the recent large-scale employment of contractors alongside the US military in Iraq as an unprecedented development and the consequence of the political, economic and social structures after the end of the Cold War, and the public perception of wars that accompanied these changes (Kinsey and Patterson 2012: 3; Isenberg 2009: 1; Singer 2003: 49-60). At the same time, the available data shows that civilian contractors have been a part of every major US military operation since 1776 (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, no date). Jeffrey Herbst (1997: 110) noted already in 1997, '(d)espite the claims in dozens of repetitive articles... there is, in fact, nothing novel about the subcontracting out of violence to private firms.'

Looking into history, Carafano (2008: 15-16) further explains that by the 15th century, mercenaries in Italy were entrenched in the military structure of the various Italian city-states, and similar practices can be traced to Prussia and Great Britain, who were using mercenary troops well into 18th century to strengthen their military force.² Kinsey (2006: 16) supports this assertion and points out that in the eighteenth century, half of the Prussian army and one third of the French military forces were composed of hired soldiers. The nationalisation and centralisation of military force under state authority following the French Revolution at the end of 18th century then led to a new phenomenon: the rise of national state armies accompanied by a progressive decline of mercenarism as a

² The history of condottieri, as they were called in Italy during the Middle Ages, is still relevant in the academic discourse about PMSCs and reference to it, as an earlier version of PMSCs reappears in numerous contemporary publications on the topic (Krahmann, 2010: 1, Isenberg, 2009b: 17, Carafano, 2008: 17, Wolf, 2006: 105, 112, Smith 2002/2003: 320).

conventional way to wage war (Ibid.).³ Percy (2007: 68), who traced the history of the mercenary norm, explains that with this change states began to control the market for force and either engaged in the trade of units themselves or permitted the contracting of mercenaries within their territory only under strict license.

However, mercenarism in its traditional form never really ceased to exist and reappeared during the 1950s and 1960s, notably in the Congo, and in the 1970s and 1980s in Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Benin, Togo, the Comoros Islands and the Seychelles (Adams, 2008: 55). It was in the 1960s and 1970s that the brutal methods used by the so called ‘soldiers of fortune’ earned them the label of *les Affreux* – the ‘terrible ones’, in French (Spearin, 2010: 41). The examples of involvement of Cold War PMSCs, such as now defunct Sandline International and Executive Outcomes continue to affect the perception of the PMSI today, leading to the establishment of an omnipresent association with mercenaries, seeing PMSCs as operating inherently outside the law and being motivated exclusively by financial gain.⁴ Although the Middle Ages mercenaries are a question of the past, even today the debate on private contractors is still overshadowed by the spectre of mercenaries. This is most apparent in regards to the questions related to the (re-)entrance of private entities in conflict zones, merits and disadvantages of the use of contractors, their reliability, legality, and their position in relation to the military and the

³ For more details on the history of mercenarism, see McFate (2014), Hunt and Carson (2013), Percy (2007), Kramer (2007b) and Fowler (2001).

⁴ For critical accounts of the PMSI industry as descendants of traditional mercenaries, see Fainaru (2009), Scahill (2008), Geraghty (2007), Adams (2008).

sovereign states. Nevertheless, as the following paragraphs highlight '(l)abelling all private force as mercenarism is not only a simplification, it is also a falacy' (Moesgaard, 2013: 9).

Among scholarly writings, three major positions can be identified in this regard: 1) the negative approach highlighting the negative aspects of PMSCs and their similarities with traditional mercenaries; 2) the neutral approach acknowledging similarities with traditional mercenaries but stressing the modern corporate character of these entities; 3) the pragmatic approach accepting vague links to traditional mercenaries but emphasizing the merits of PMSCs and their potential as a versatile solution for a number of international security issues and an 'indispensable' asset of many modern Western militaries.

The amount of academic literature that holds a predominantly negative view on PMSCs is rather small. In this group, for instance, Kateri Carmola points out 'they are merely modern versions of the age-old mercenary fighter, a throwback to the day of mercenaries and pirates' and recommends an outright ban on any armed private security contractors (2010: 12, 156). Mathieu and Dearden (2006: 745-746) see them as 'mercenary corporations' which 'provide a wider array of services than traditional mercenaries and employ better public relations machines'.

The legal definition of a mercenary serves as a useful guiding principle for determining to what extent modern private military companies correspond to the legal description of necessary parameters of a concept that they are so often associated with. There are two

international conventions that specifically aim to criminalize their activities. These are the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries and the former Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa which are together known as the mercenary conventions (Cameron, 2006: 577; UN General Assembly, 1989; Organisation of African Unity, 1977). Last but not least the Additional Protocol I. of the Geneva Conventions deals with mercenaries in international humanitarian law (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1977).

Since most of the later mercenary conventions adopt a definition of mercenaries similar to the one established in Article 47 of Protocol I, it serves as a universal reference points to the legal definition of a mercenary. Article 47.2 of Additional Protocol I (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1977) stipulates:

‘A mercenary is any person who:

- (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
- (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
- (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
- (d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;

(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and

(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.’

Not only the definition of mercenary, as in Article 47 of Additional Protocol I, concerns solely individuals, but even if artificially applied to corporate entities, it is widely considered unworkable (Tonkin, 2011: 17-27, 181-182; Carmola, 2010: 43). Brooks (2000: 132) uses the term of ‘freelance mercenaries’ in contrast to PMSCs and states that they are ‘very different from PMC/PSCs in terms of operations, clients, accountability and the capacity of the international community.’ In his view, security contractors, as those who are most likely to be seen as ‘mercenaries,’ work in organized companies with ‘dependable income, organized support, and benefits such as emergency medical care and evacuation’ (Brooks, 2000: 132). He asserts that most contractors would not deliberately resort to becoming freelancers, only when employment in a private company is not an option (Ibid.).

The second approach in the PMSI literature accepts that there are some similarities between traditional mercenaries and PMSCs, but acknowledges them as new, different entities in the international security environment. Brayton (2002: 305) presents four points that distinguish PMCSs from mercenaries: 1) clear presentation of business image, 2) open defence and propagation of utility and professionalism, 3) using

internationally acknowledged legal and financial resources for realisation of the business and 4) support only for internationally recognised governments avoiding dubious internationally unrecognised communities. In a similar way, Singer (2003: 46) contends that the rise of the modern corporation has established a different operating context for private combatants. As he explains, in this new context it is difficult to label PMSCs, whom he calls Private Military Firms, mercenaries:

‘...PMFs (Private Military Firms) are considered legal entities bound to their employers by recognized contracts and in many cases at least nominally to the home states by laws requiring registration, periodic reporting, and licensing of foreign contracts... This status differentiates them... from mercenaries’ (Ibid).

This view that PMSCs employed by governments in Europe and North America behave more like typical multinational businesses and less as conventional mercenaries is also shared in, for instance, Krahmann (2010: 5-6), Kinsey (2007: 585), Krahmann (2005: 248), and Lilly (2000: 13).

The underlying dominant attitude in this approach is to move away from the emphasis on links to mercenarism in favour of a more sophisticated and complex analysis of the ‘new’ entities within various contexts. For instance, Kinsey (2009) distinguishes between armed and non-armed contractors and highlights the importance of contractors

supplying equipment and manpower services to ensure that militaries get the supplies they need to go to war. Similarly, Avant (2009) dismisses the label of mercenaries and argues that '(t)oday's private security companies are corporate endeavours that perform logistics support, training, security, intelligence work, risk analysis, and much more.' This does not mean that the authors within this category are supporters of PMSCs, it only means that they acknowledge the breadth and depth of the PMSCs involvement in all types of settings.

Finally, the third category that can be distinguished in terms of approaches to the industry is the pragmatic (potentialist) approach. This approach is the least preoccupied with the arguable links to traditional mercenarism and focusses instead on contractors' future as a versatile solution to many problems states may encounter in large scale military operations. Its growth has been stimulated by the extent of the US reliance on contractors in Iraq (2003-2011) and Afghanistan (2001-2014) and the vast amount of government and non-government reporting documenting the magnitude of this trend within these interventions. As an illustration, despite pointing out a number of serious issues related to the industry, David Isenberg (2009: 49) concludes that the US cannot operate without contractors and that they are an indispensable part of all US military endeavours in the future due to the disconnect between U.S. geopolitical ambitions and the resources provided for them. Perceived as the nexus between the military needs and its in-house capabilities, the services provided by contractors are deemed indispensable to warfighting operations (Singer, 2007; Commission on Army Acquisition and Program

Management in Expeditionary Operations (Gansler Commission), 2007: 3). Therefore, although many social scientists, journalists, and members of the general public view contracting out functions in national security and defence as anomalous, even shady, the US government has slowly fully embraced it and has come to view it as a necessary part of policy (Bruneau, 2011: 211).

III.II. The First Phase – Notorious Post-Cold War Companies

The first attempt to open the debate about the emerging trend of military and security privatisation can be traced back to 1990s when some of the first observations of companies making profit by providing combat advisory and security services in the zones of conflict emerged. It was the involvement of Executive Outcomes (EO) and Sandline International (SI) in Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone and Angola which brought the issue of contracting for military and security services to the spotlight. SI was contracted in 1997 by the government of Papua New Guinea to train and provide logistical support to the government's defence force and one year later, in 1998, in Sierra Leone to help restore the elected president to power after he had been ousted in a military coup led by the Sierra Leone Army (Hirsch, 2001, Tonkin, 2011: 41-47). EO's first major contract was to protect oil installations in Angola against the rebel group UNITA (The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and between 1993 and 1994 it was contracted to train about 4,000 to 5,000 Angolan government troops and 30 pilots and ultimately became involved in

military operations of the three-year long civil war (Isenberg, 1997; Cleary, 1999: 161).

Although they were hardly a new phenomenon on the international stage, preceded by others, such as WatchGuard, KAS Enterprises or Saladin Security, they received increased attention as their activities became discussed in the context of the concept of 'corporate mercenarism' and their undermining impact on African security (Francis, 1999). Kinsey (2006: 25-28) explained the re-emergence of these business entities on the African continent as a consequence of the Western reluctance to get involved in bloody civil wars on the continent, which opened the door for a market solution. The most notorious companies of this early stage were EO, Sandline International, Defense Systems Limited, Gurkha Security Guards, and MPRI, which became well-known following its involvement in the former Yugoslavia (Mehlum et al., 2002: 447-448). The case studies of these prominent companies received attention as the governments of the concerned states hired these companies not only to train their military forces but occasionally also to support direct offensive operations (Avebury, 2000; Francis, 1999; Lock, 1998; Dinnen, 1997). As such, the first wave is dominated by writings covering the activities of these most prominent companies of this period, the incentives for their re-emergence, and problematizing their impact on the understanding of state sovereignty.

In regards to identifying the sources of the re-emerging phenomenon, there is a consensus in the literature that many external

factors come in play and they reinforce each other towards the same direction – large scale military and security privatisation. The end of the Cold War and the associated loosened influence over previously controlled spheres of influence appears to be the most important structural incentive which put in motion many other related developments. One of the highlighted issues are then the post-Cold War military downsizing and budget cuts which resulted in large numbers of ex-military professionals made available to work outside of national military structures (Singer, 2001: 194, Kinsey, 2006: 28-31).

In the context of the United States in particular, this labour pool has been further enriched by the US government decision to abandon the Draft following the Vietnam War and the ensuing gradual professionalization of the All-Volunteer US military force (Carafano, 2008: 29-56). The limited available force, in addition to other more contentious issues, such as possible domestic public political backlash, ‘western’ casualty sensitivity, and the reluctance to get involved in potentially risky missions, is then often connected to the general unwillingness to deploy military force in conflict environments only vaguely related to states national interests (Mandel, 2002: 55-71). This lack of western willingness then presumably created a security vacuum in many of the instability-prone environments which were enthusiastically filled in by the emerging PMSI (Lovewine, 2014: 2-5).

Finally, the impact of the early private military and security companies on the sovereignty of the state received most attention in the

first wave scholarly writing on military and security privatisation. It is important to note that the initial focus was on outsourcing by weak, mostly African, states which were plagued by violence and lack of military capability to establish order on their own territories. Although these early private military and security companies demonstrated valuable skills, adaptability, and agility in deploying a body of force into unstable violence-prone environments, their long-term strategic impact was regarded as dubious and most-likely undermining the sovereignty of the states. In many cases, they were able to do what the UN peacekeepers were unable and unwilling to do: take sides and quickly achieve stability (O'Brien, 2000b: 71). However, such externally imposed termination of the regional conflict often proved short-lived and counterproductive for achieving long-term stability (Ibid.).

Facing growing domestic problems and increased levels of violence in an environment where powerful states and regional or international organisations are unable or unwilling to provide outside security assistance, many weak states do not have other options than to turn to such private security providers as the means of ensuring their own stability and, indeed, continuity (Mandel, 2002: 61). As O'Brien (2000: 71) summarised:

‘The international community has demonstrated time and again its unwillingness to become involved in regional conflicts where Western foreign policy concerns are not threatened directly;

this gap will continue to be filled by private military company.'

This simplified narrative does not capture the complexity and variety of the academic literature emerging in its first phase of scholarly writings on this topic in the early Post-Cold War. Nevertheless, it highlights the main areas that grabbed attention and were to be further explored later on in the second and third phase.

III.III. The Second Phase – The Iraq and Afghanistan Boom

The range of issues raised in the 1990s about the growing trend of military and security privatisation was significantly widened and deepened with the US intervention in Iraq. Before then, studies covering the emerging military privatisation in developed countries were non-existent, and if mentioned at all, it was only to establish the background of some of the notorious companies which had headquarters either in the US (MPRI) or the UK (Sandline International). The invasion of Iraq signified a dramatic shift in the focus, both geographically and substantially, of the scholarly literature on military privatisation in the Western world and was predominantly concerned with issues surrounding the US use of contractors, exploring the breadth and depth of their involvement to sustain its military operations across Iraq and Afghanistan (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007).

In the previous phase the argument for contractors' deployment in civil conflicts of weak and unstable states was discussed by many authors as a potential solution to avoid mass-civilian deaths or genocide (Bures, 2005; Cilliers, 2002; Brayton, 2002; Brooks, 2000; McIvor, 1998). On the contrary, the massive contractors' deployment in support of the US military operations in the Middle East became viewed as a strategically calculated decision to reduce the military footprint and minimize the domestic political costs associated with large long-term military deployments against the public approval. Closely linked to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the then emerging literature was mostly concerned with issues surrounding the US use of contractors, exploring the breadth and depth of their involvement to sustain the US military operations across the Middle East. Although contractors were employed robustly also in the War in Afghanistan, it was the War in Iraq which sparked the debate. The monographs of Kinsey (2009), Isenberg (2009), Carafano (2008), Pelton (2006), Chatterjee (2004) and Singer (2003) elaborate the growth of the PMSI across its three most prominent sectors, including reconstruction, logistics and security, and reflect on the US military needs created by the invasion of Iraq.

Representing the two countries with the largest number of private military and security companies' headquarters registered in their territories, the US and UK quickly became the prime focus of researchers to investigate the development of the trend. The volume of contractors involved in the operations on the ground in both Iraq and Afghanistan quickly became one of the key features of the scholarly publications.

Debates on US military dependency on contractors providing logistics support opened the door for a discussion about how much impact contractors have on US operations and how much influence they exercise (Singer, 2007).

In addition, a number of highly publicised incidents involving armed security contractors came to light in 2003-2004, including the Abu Ghraib prisoners' abuse and the notorious Blackwater-Fallujah ambush. Later, in 2007, the infamous Nisour Square massacre which left 14 civilians dead and at least 17 wounded, spurred interest in military and security privatisation by established democratic states and called into question the issues in regards to industry regulation, control, and accountability.

As such, the most prominent feature of the literature in this phase is the discussion on the issues related to international and domestic law and regulation. Most studies point out that the available regulatory regimes are insufficient to address the perceived legal void in regards to private military and security companies employed along US military forces in the zones of conflict and analyse the difficulties in applying them in situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most publications address the issues of jurisdiction – sending state or host state, legal code – the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) or the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), or the contractors immunity from prosecution, such as the Provisional Authority Order 17 in Iraq, which exempted all Coalition personnel from Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to the terms

and conditions of their contracts (Rubin, 2007). De Nevers (2009), Lehnardt (2008), and Dickinson (2005) provide insightful overviews of the position of PMSCs in currently available legal frameworks. Lehnardt (2008: 1031) concludes that contrary to the public perception of non-existence of applicable law, appropriate law is available but applicable with great difficulties and therefore, not enforced. A self-regulatory framework in the form of corporate social responsibility and required industry standards were proposed as an alternative to the currently available, unsuitable, legal framework (Kinsey, 2005; Cockayne, 2007: 205-208). Kinsey (2005) suggested introducing a voluntary code of conduct, but points out that while it may encourage companies to perform their services in line with collectively agreed standards, it does not provide states with real sanctioning options in case of misconduct and, therefore its disciplinary value is dubious. Similarly, de Nevers (2009b: 515-516) concludes that the industry does not exhibit the capacity to adopt and implement effective self-regulation on its own due to the nature of the industry and the context it mostly operates in, and adds that participation in the design and oversight of self-regulation must be broadened beyond private security companies alone if it is to have any practical value.

The efforts to design a new regulatory framework can be also understood as a major step away from the first-phase condemnation of contractors as mercenaries towards a more pragmatic approach which views them as legitimate businesses whose activities need to be regulated. It is also in this phase when the industry sought to institute itself as a

legitimate and professional business sector by establishing trade associations such as the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA) formerly known as International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) founded in 2001 in Washington D.C., and the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC) in 2006 in London (Moesgaard, 2013: 11). These efforts send a clear message to both scholars and political decision makers that the emerging industry is serious about distancing itself from the negative associations ingrained in the label 'mercenary' by promoting its professional corporate character (Ibid.).

The legal discussion also brought to the front the related questions of moral, normative and ethical concerns in regards to the employment of PMSCs along state's military forces. Given the circumstances of the stability operations and counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan at that time, the questions on the use, implications and impact of contractors in these type of operations became particularly prominent. The discussion on the positive and negative aspects, the good and the bad, of their involvement are a common trait of many publications from this period, including Hammes (2011), Isenberg (2009), Avant and Nevers (2013), and Carafano (2008). Following the various incidents contractors were involved, it became clear that contractors' presence and activities on the ground in US expeditionary operations is not inconsequential and that responsible contractor behaviour makes important contribution to how the US-led coalition force is presented and perceived by the host state's population.

The US Armed Forces went through a learning process with the COIN strategy in Iraq and the change of strategy in 2007 had profound implication for their operations and rules of engagement. At the heart of the new strategy for the Surge was the fight for legitimacy, upholding the rule of law, and holding its violators accountable. In this new environment, the potential confrontational or threatening image of contractors was seen particularly problematic to the overall aims of the new strategy. For instance, Fitzsimmons (2013: 707-708) argued that 'Blackwater maintained a relatively bellicose military culture that placed strong emphasis on norms encouraging its security teams to exercise personal initiative, proactive use of force, and an exclusive approach to security, which together motivated its personnel to use violence quite freely against anyone suspected of posing a threat.'⁵

Overall, the preoccupation with the industry regulation, control, and accountability, particularly zoomed in on the US-led intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan was clearly a shift of the geographical and substantial focus. While in the first wave, the debates focussed on the involvement of the newly emerged companies in weak African and Balkan countries stimulated by the Western reluctance to intervene in their conflicts, the second wave, focusses on military outsourcing by Western countries with strong armies in their wars of choice. Driven by the maturity of the PMSI markets in the two countries and the availability of the information on the involvement of the companies with their

⁵ For further discussion of this topic, see Carafano (2008), Dunigan (2011), Fainaru (2009), Scahill (2008), and Isenberg (2009).

headquarters there involved in the US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 89 per cent of the studies on Western military outsourcing between 2003 and 2012 focus on military and security privatisation in the US and UK. Although isolated case studies of Canada, Sweden or Germany also emerged, the almost exclusive focus on the US and UK is overwhelming (van Meegdenburg, 2015: 332).⁶

III.IV. The Third Phase – Post-Iraq War

As the US military official involvement in Iraq was completed in 2011, with the drawdown of the forces a new phase in the scholarly literature emerged. Although the focus on the US and UK remained the dominant geographical focus, issues other than regulation, control and accountability also emerged. Possibly the most significant trait that distinguishes this phase from the previous one is the realization and acceptance that the PMSI covers a multitude of services across diverse environments and is not simply engaged with armed security services in conflict zones. Although the focus on the more controversial type of contracting, armed security contracting, has originally sparked the interest of both academics and practitioners, today it can be argued that there is a better balance between research focussing on the front security functions as well as the rear-support functions. This step appears particularly pertinent as the largest proportion of the services contracted by the US in

⁶ For examples of non-UK/US case studies see: Canada – Perry (2009), Sweden – Berndtsson (2013), and Germany – Krahmann (2010) and Krahmann (2005b).

Iraq fell in the category of support and facility functions (Thibault et al., 2011: 23).

This new, re-balanced focus on understanding of the participation and its implications of both front and rear-support functions, led to more discussion on the involvement and labour conditions of Third Country Nationals often from low-wage countries, who represented the majority of rear-support functions in Iraq and Afghanistan (Stillman, 2011, Newman, 2012). As Chisholm (2014), pointed out there was gender and racial hierarchy of security contractors in Afghanistan which resulted in vastly different possibilities depending on the contractors' histories and nationalities. Torture and human rights abuse issues were replaced by investigations into possible human trafficking and poor working conditions of contractors responsible for services such as food preparation, waste disposal, and cleaning based on their race and origin, which opened a new, unexplored avenue in this dynamic research field. McCoy (2010) pointed out that Third Country Nationals represented the majority the PMSI labour force in Iraq and Afghanistan which enabled the PMSI to operate low-wage policy in regards to the migrant labour force that proved economically efficient for the companies and, by extension, the contracting states.

In close relation to these, a relatively new area of research studies focusses on gender studies, represented by the work of Higate (2012), Joachim and Schneiker (2012), and Eichler (2015). They address the questions of masculinity and race among the contractors workforce, issues

of the masculinized 'othering' and subordination of TCNs working as security guards, as well as, re-examine the stereotypical associations of gender and roles (female protected versus male protector) within the private military and security industry context. Among these, the issue of image, perception and self-perception is particularly interesting. The research of Joachim and Schneiker (2012) studies how PMSCs seek to create an image of themselves as legitimate and acceptable contract parties, while presenting themselves as 'new humanitarians' by forging alliances with more traditional humanitarian actors and increasingly growing their involvement in this field.

Similarly, Kruck and Spencer (2013) point out the contradiction that can be seen in regards to the PMSCs' image portrayed by the media and themselves. While the media portray them as incompetent cowboys, mercenaries and human rights abusers, they perceive themselves as, and seek to persuade others about being, technical and military experts, professional businessman, even humanitarians (Kruck and Spencer, 2013). Relevant other writings examine not only how contractors are viewed by civilians, but also by their counterparts, the national troops. Issues of competition, antagonism and lack of trust have been examined in great detail by, for instance, Cotton et al. (2010), Petersohn (2011) and Petersohn (2013). Kelty and Bierman (2013), another example, study how the presence of contractors influences civilian and military personnel and conclude that there are mixed results. While flexibility and effectiveness are marked relatively positive by the men and women working with contractors in active theatres of war, the views on efficiency and cost

savings are less optimistic (Ibid.: 22). This is certainly a pertinent avenue for further research as it is highly relevant to the issue of how contractors are perceived not only when employed by nation states in military operations abroad, but also domestically and by their counterparts whose efforts they ought to complement.

In regards to issues other than gender, image and perceptions, the questions related to the consequences of contractors' employment alongside the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, mental health and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) syndrome among contractors in particular are another new highly pertinent direction. Related to the earlier mentioned debates about the varied experiences of contractors based on their race, gender, and origin, Dunigan et al. (2013) sheds light on how variations in preparation, levels of combat exposure, and living conditions can make difference on contractors' deployment experiences. Among other things, the study concluded that according to the survey completed for the purpose of this study, 25 percent of the contractors sample met criteria for probable PTSD, 18 percent screened positive for depression, and 50 percent reported alcohol misuse. In addition, it points out that transportation contractors ranked on the top of all those affected, most likely due to greater combat exposure than other categories (Dunigan, 2013). Although PTSD and related mental health issues among military troops have been the focus of scholarly research for decades, the Dunigan et al. (2013) study clearly marks a new chapter in the research on military and security privatisation and the breadth and depth of its 'human' implications.

Outsourcing in conflict zones by other entities than nation states is another avenue to be more deeply explored in the current scholarly literature on the military and security privatisation. Non-state, intergovernmental actors as well as private corporations such as oil and maritime companies, and state-independent NGOs are one of the potential other avenues how to widen the scope of research beyond the usual nation states. In particular, international bodies, such as NATO, the European Union Police Agency (EUROPOL), and the UN are known to be relying on the services provided by a wide range of contractors and they are worth to be explored further. Leander and Krahmann's project on contracting during UN, NATO, and EU interventions in Congo, Afghanistan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina looking at regulatory, operational, and representational procedures and the cooperation of these intergovernmental organisations with the PMSI, is one of the very few large projects in this area (Research Councils UK, no date).

The main contribution of this phase was placing the concept of private force into a wider context and defining PMSCs in military, security but also societal dimensions capturing the breadth and depth of the phenomenon. Although scholarly writings often claim to present findings that concern Western states, North America and Europe, in fact, only the US and the UK case studies have been examined to some detail until today. The newest stream of research began to expand the view beyond these usual suspects by including Germany (Krahmann, 2005b; Krahmann, 2010; Krahmann, 2013), Sweden (Berndtsson, 2013; Berndtsson and Stern, 2013), and France (Olsson, 2013), which confirm that their extent

and type of reliance on contractors differs greatly from the US and UK. It is then desirable to seek to broaden the insight into the situation in other parts of the world to further advance the understanding of the implications of defence commercialization globally and gain valuable findings for broader set of potential scenarios in the future.

III.V. Contribution

Despite the inconclusive discussion about the various aspects of PMSI in modern warfare, there appears to be widespread agreement, that contractors are not inconsequential (Hammes, 2011; Isenberg, 2009; Avant and Nevers, 2013; Carafano, 2008). Despite different assessments and different characterisations, a large proportion of the up-to-date literature agrees that contractors served as enablers in the US War in Iraq, but also an enabler of the US global presence while waging a war simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan. They enabled the US to fight in two theatres simultaneously with a relatively small force against a complex insurgency (Ibid.).

When it comes to assessing the contribution of PMSI to modern military operations, the PMSI literature distinguishes four major forms – 1) Contribution as characteristics of the military outsourcing trend, 2) contribution as an area of activities, 3) contribution as occupations and 4) contribution as functions. As a result, this chapter attempts to present and systematise the up-to-date writings on contractors and make an argument for a more structured analysis of their presence and involvement in

modern operations. The section presents how different authors characterise the contribution of PMSI, why it is considered insufficient and how this thesis seeks to address the insufficiency.

In respect to PMSI literature, while contractors' contribution is the invisible thread across many writings on PMSCs, it is often given scant theoretical attention. Most authors refer to it in somewhat unclear and undefined manner that has a very limited usefulness for some broader understanding of its meaning and its implications. The main issue with inconsistent contribution identification is that it can lead to false expectations in terms of their potential costs and benefits of using PMSCs in various operations. In order to provide a more systematic and in depth overview, this chapter identifies four dominant ways how the up-to-date discussion on PMSCs' contribution can be viewed in the PMSI literature: 1) contribution as characteristics of the military outsourcing trend, 2) contribution as an area of activities, 3) contribution as occupations and 4) contribution as functions.

Description of the characteristics of the outsourcing trend is the most basic understanding of contribution that can be identified in the academic literature on PMSI. Associating the emergence of the PMSI with the end of the Cold War and its establishment as a key component of US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the academic literature focussing on the contribution of PMSCs is full of terms broadly characterising the outsourcing trend. At least two types of characterizing

the trend of military and security outsourcing can be distinguished:
describing the process and describing the state.

In terms of describing the process, some of the common terms used to describe the contribution of PMSCs are captured through describing the extent to which they involved in modern military operations. These include: larger, increasingly important, emerging, expanding, and changing. As this is the most superficial engagement with the understanding of contribution, it is also the most common across the PMSI literature. For instance, Krahmann (2013: 165, 168, 174) characterises the contribution of PMSCs as 'growing', Mathieu and Dearden (2007: 748) refer to the PMSCs' contribution as 'larger,' Kinsey (2006: 3) notes it is 'expanding', and Avant (2004) points out that the today's contribution of private security firm is 'changing'. In respect to describing the state of the trend, some of the terms used to describe the contribution of PMSCs are: vital, decisive, critical, controversial, crucial, substantial, significant, prominent, strategic, and instrumental. Avant (2007: 459) and Isenberg (2009: 17, 44) describe the contribution of contractors as 'significant', Pattison (2014: 21) characterises the contribution of contractors who provide security services as 'controversial', Cotton et al. (2010: 32) assess their contribution as 'decisive', and Lovewine (2014: 66, 70, 104, 112, 133, 149) uses the term 'substantial' and 'prominent' in reference to their contribution in GWOT.

In terms of contribution as a description of an area of activity, some of the common terms used to describe the type of contribution PMSCs

make in operations are: combat, civilian, civil-police, logistical/logistics, reconstruction, intelligence (gathering), training and security contribution. This approach is one step above the most simplistic understanding of contribution as a description of the privatisation trend and focusses on the breadth of contractors activities, highlighting the variety of their skills and abilities in both military and non-military operations. Efflandt (2014: 49, 55) discusses the post-9/11 use of private security companies in what he deems a 'new combat role'; Hedahl (2009: 24) argues that the use of military contractors in 'security' roles will be increasingly problematic with increasing levels of contractors on the battlefield. Cotton et al. (2010: 3) contend that the recent dramatic rise in the use of armed private security personnel in military and nation-building operations is the result of post-Cold War privatisation of many 'military, security and training roles' that are now performed by contractors.

Description of the PMSCs occupations is another example of the way contribution has been used in the PMSI literature. As a step above a description of an area of activity, it attributes a specific meaning to the contribution by defining the activities contractors perform. Some of the common terms used to describe the contribution of PMSCs as an occupation within this category are: interpreter(s), translator(s), bodyguard(s), (armed) security contractor(s), and analyst(s). In particular, using the term armed security contractor(s) or security contractor as a denomination of their contribution is very common in the PMSI literature (Isenberg, 2009; Elsea, 2010; Schwartz, 2010). Schumacher (2006: 15) provides a number of contributions contractors provide based on their

occupation: 'construction contractors', 'trucking contractors', 'training contractors', 'technical assistance contractors' and 'security contractors.'

Finally, description of the PMSCs functions as contributions is the last distinct example of the way contribution has been used in the PMSI literature, and the most advanced in terms of providing understanding of their contribution as a characteristic form of engagement. This approach is more specific than a mere description of PMSCs area of activities or occupations, as it takes into consideration other aspects of the contribution such as the purpose of the activity, the quality of performance and/or the impact of the activity within a set context. As such, the use of contribution to describe the functions of PMSCs is the most advanced understanding of contribution within the PMSI literature and reflects an expected behaviour pattern within a certain context. Some of the common terms used to describe the contribution of PMSCs within this category are: (military) competitor(s), force multiplier(s), peacemaker(s), spoiler(s).

Cotton et al. (2010: 2) investigates whether PMSCs were a 'force multiplier' in Iraq, characterised 'by providing skills and services that the armed forces lack, and by providing surge capacity and critical security services that have made Operation Iraqi Freedom possible.' Avant (2009: 104) investigates how PSCs fit in the context of state-building and notes that despite the increasing tendency to resort to PSCs for military and security training, 'PSCs pose dilemmas to would be state-builders.'

Although she does not provide a specific definition of the function of 'peacemaker' or 'spoiler' used in the title, she explains that PSCs can be seen both 'as an avenue to fix broken security institutions in the face of the

shortage of western troops (or will)' or 'as an option that increases the chance for opportunism' preventing an establishment of effective security institutions (Ibid.). Although her analysis reveals that she seeks to examine the impact PSCs make on state building through creating the link between micro-institutional setting and the strategic action, she does not provide any deeper understanding of why she chooses to distinguish only between the two polarised types of contribution or what their specific attributes are (Ibid.: 106).

A similar logic can be seen in Brooks (2000: 129), who proposes a polarised distinction between 'messiahs' and 'mercenaries' in reference to private companies that provide military services worldwide. Similarly to Avant, although his title suggests an analysis distinguishing between two different contributions to be associated with contractors, he only provides a definition of 'freelance mercenaries' as 'private individual soldiers that offer military services on the open market to the highest bidder' and fails to explain why the analysis is limited to two types of contributions, supposedly the complete opposites, and what are the traits of those contributions in more detail.

Bruneau (2011) assigns a curious denomination of contribution to contractors labelling them 'patriots for profit', presumably merging together the polarised categories identified by Avant (2009) and Brooks (2000), however, without providing any concrete definition of what such label entails. Similarly, Singer (2003) uses the term 'corporate warriors', Mayer (2010) calls them 'peaceful warriors', and Prince (2013) labels

them 'civilian warriors' presumably pointing out the contrast of civilian and military nature of responsibilities combined in the activities of PMSCs in Iraq. Nevertheless, it remains unclear the specific attributes of such denomination and how it could be used effectively in the area of policy-making.

III. VI. Conclusion

This chapter has provided an insight into how the literature on the PMSI has developed and diversified following the end of the Cold War. This literature review sought how to present the ongoing academic debate on military and security privatisation in terms of its scope, gradual growth and relevant circumstances shaping its development. It has offered both a chronological and thematic perspective on the major areas and how they have been approached in the research of military and security privatisation. As to the discussion of the PMSI contribution in various contexts, four major categories were identified: contribution as characterisation of the outsourcing trend, as an identification of area of activities, as an occupation, and as a function. While these approaches are certainly useful for conveying the magnitude of the contractors' involvement (breadth and depth) across a wide range of modern military and non-military operations, they are limited in their application for policy-making seeking to optimize the use of PMSCs to achieve the most balanced outcome. As such, this chapter identified a gap in the literature, understood as a lack of a systematic framework for contribution

assessment in the context of military and security privatisation that would be universally applicable to a wide range of different contractors and their services within various contexts.

To circumvent these obstacles and develop a more fitting framework to assess the contribution of the PMSI in Phase IV Operations in Iraq, this thesis uses the Four-Stage Hayes and Wheelwright model from the field of operations management, elaborated in the next chapter, as a point of departure. This model: 1) opens a way for a formation of a typology that is hierarchically structured based on the significance of the subject and the difference it makes towards achieving a defined strategy; 2) rests on the characterisation of the individual type of contribution by a number of clearly defined observable indicators that define each contribution and which are common across the typology range, and thus 3) enables to highlight the diversity within the typology and enables a comparison of traits of the individual contribution categories across the framework.

IV. The Contribution Framework

Before proceeding to analyse the kind of contribution contractors made in Iraq from 2003 until 2011, it is vital to clarify basic concepts and theories that assist in identifying the research problem and frame its analysis. As the literature review (Chapter III) highlighted, there is a particular gap in the scholarly literature on military outsourcing that this thesis seeks to address: the lack of critical understanding of the kind of contribution the PMSI made to the US military's capability in Phase IV Operations in Iraq (2003-2011). In order to fill this gap, this thesis proposes a typology of five possible contribution categories – Assistant, Implementer, Crucial Supporter, Driver and Spoiler – as a tool to analyse the difference contractors made in the US military operations in Iraq beyond the usual black or white, good or bad-impact, evaluation.

The aim of this framework is to argue for an association between the presence and activities of the PMSI and a set of relevant observable attributes of the Phase IV Operations in Iraq, based on systematic enquiry. To do so, this chapter utilizes the logic described in the Hayes and Wheelwright Four-Stage Model. This operations management model describes a potential evolutionary role of manufacturing within a business strategy, going through four stages, from merely ensuring operations are coherent with business objectives, all the way to using operations as a source of competitive advantage (Wheelwright and Hayes, 1985: 99). This

descriptive framework for understanding how manufacturing contributes to overall strategic goals of an organisation is then adapted to assess the contribution of the PMSI to the US military's capability in Phase IV Operations in Iraq 2003-2011.

Accordingly, this chapter is organised under the following sections.

First, the Hayes and Wheelwright Four-Stage Model is introduced. This model, from the field of operations management, is used as the basis for the Conceptual Framework of this thesis due to its simple logic and versatility, which allows to develop it further, broaden it and adapt it to fit the purpose of this project. The original model describes four different stages for the Operations Function and three possible contribution categories which can be deduced from it – to implement, to support, and to drive the Operations Strategy. These can be then translated into contribution categories of Implementer, Crucial Supporter and Driver. In order to provide a more complete range of contribution categories, this section proposes to broaden the range by adding the categories of Assistant and Spoiler. Assistant represents the category of contribution smaller than Implementer and Spoiler is the sole category which permits to consider potentially destructive, undesirable contribution, undermining the strategy and the potential to achieve the strategic goal. Adding this category is particularly pertinent for studying the contribution of PMSI, because an often held view is that they are 'spoilers' and have a negative impact (as discussed in the literature review). Introducing this additional

category and comparing it to other possible categories allows to present a more well-rounded view on their contributions.

The following section, the Contribution Framework, introduces the three levels of the framework, which consist of assessing the contribution level, the significance of the provided service, and the individual observable indicators of the significance of the provided services specific for each contribution category. In the first instance, the distinction between main and additional contribution is explained and how it is related to the proposed typology of contributions. Secondly, the significance of the provided service to the employed strategy is presented and the related characteristic of the significance, according to the individual contribution categories, is highlighted. Finally, the indicators of significance of the provided service for the strategy are established as the key elements of the framework which enable to operationalise the empirical analysis in the subsequent chapters.

The third section of this chapter, Conceptual Framework Application, then brings all the elements of the Conceptual Framework together and demonstrates how it will be applied in the empirical chapters. It takes the two types of services selected for empirical chapter analyses and demonstrates how the framework will be applied to each of them. It briefly outlines why these two types of services have been selected for the empirical analysis, presents the key questions that the Conceptual Framework requires to answer and highlights potential issues when applying this framework and how to mitigate their impact.

Last, the Conclusion completes the chapter by providing an overview of the framework elaborated within this chapter, highlighting the new insights and benefits for our understanding it provides.


IV.I. The Hayes and Wheelwright Four-Stage Model and Its Adaptation

Operations management is a sub-field of business studies that scrutinizes the design and management of products, processes, services and supply chains in order to create the highest level of efficiency possible within an organization. It is about how organisations create and deliver services and products their clients want, considering the acquisition, development, and resources application that they need to fulfil that goal (Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2010: 89-90)¹. In simple terms, the main concern of operations management is converting materials and labour into goods and services as efficiently as possible to maximize the profit of an organization. In order to do so, every organisation has three core functions: an Operations Function responsible for the creation and delivery of services and products based on customer requests; Marketing Function responsible for presenting and promoting the organisation's services and products to its markets in order to generate customer requests; and Product/Service Development Function responsible for developing new and modified services and products in order to generate future customer requests (Ibid).

¹ See also Jones and Robinson (2012); Mahadevan (2010); Barnes (2008).

In order to assess the contribution of the PMSI in the US Phase IV Operations in Iraq 2003-2011, this thesis uses the Hayes and Wheelwright Four-Stage Model (Wheelwright and Hayes, 1985; Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984) as its point of reference. Based on this model it conceptualises the typology of five distinct categories of contribution and deduces individual characteristics for each type. Due to its simple logic and broad versatility, the original Hayes and Wheelwright model has achieved widespread acceptance in the operations management field and beyond, as a valuable analytical tool for understanding the ability of any operation (or an element, in general) to contribute to organisational aims of any type of company. The model traces the progression of the Operations Function from an internally-neutral-impact contribution, at the stage 1, to an externally-supportive-impact contribution, at the stage 4, where it becomes the central (driving) element of the competitive Operations Strategy. The model traces the progression of the Operations Function within four different stages - from being the main challenge (holding the organisation back) to becoming the driver of the Operations Strategy (giving an operations advantage) (Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2010: 71). The following graph captures the core of the Hayes and Wheelwright model.

Figure 6 - The Hayes and Wheelwright Four Stage Model




Source: Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2010: 89-90.

Stage 1 (Internal neutrality) is a very poor level of contribution and the function has very little positive to contribute towards competitive success of the company (Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2007: 37). Paradoxically, its goal is 'to be ignored' and improve by 'avoiding making mistakes' (Ibid). At Stage 2 the Operations Function's aim is to help the company to gain and maintain parity with its competitors by slowly improving its performance, trying to implement best practice ('being externally neutral') (Ibid). By Stage 3, the Operations Function's performance is assessed as 'internally supportive' and provides credible support to the Operations Strategy (Ibid.: 38). In other words, at this stage the Operations Function makes the strategy happen by translating strategic decision into operational reality. At Stage 4, by being 'externally supportive', the Operations Function provides the foundation for the competitive success of the company through its innovative, creative and proactive approach that drives the company's strategy (Ibid.). At this

stage, the Operations Function provides the means to put the company in a favourable or superior business position vis-a-vis its competitors.

The Hayes and Wheelwright Model provides an insight into how the Operations Function can improve its role in a business environment through increasing its contribution to Operations Strategy, by increasing its strategic impact (vertically) and increasing its operations capabilities (horizontally) (Ibid.: 37-38). Based on this logic, the Hayes and Wheelwright model suggests that an Operations Function can implement strategy, support strategy or drive strategy (Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2010: 89-90).


Figure 7 - The Hayes and Wheelwright Four Stage Model (Main Functions)



Source: Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2010: 89-90.

According to the Hayes and Wheelwright model, implementing business strategy by adopting best practices is the most basic contribution of the Operations Function in an organisation and creates the link between Stage 1 and 2 in increasing contribution to the Operations Strategy. The next level, supporting strategy, goes beyond simply implementing strategy and it links strategy with operations, which allows the organization to improve and refine its strategic goals. When an Operations Function is supporting strategy it is moving from Stage 2 towards Stage 3 in increasing its contribution to the Operations Strategy. Ultimately, driving strategy is the most significant contribution of the Operations Function and provides a foundation for the success of the Operations Strategy (Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2010: 71). The three core abilities of the Operations Function and their location in terms of the Hayes and Wheelwright Four Stage Model are presented below.

Figure 8 - Increasing Operations Capabilities across Four Stages




Source: Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2010:89-90.

According to this model, the Operations Function can improve its contribution to the Operations Strategy by increasing its strategic impact (vertically) and increasing its operations capabilities (horizontally). Distinguishing among the various stages of the progression, the model

suggests that an Operations Function can ‘implement’, ‘support’ and ‘drive’ strategy (Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2010: 89-90). From this model, three individual contributions categories can be derived – Implementer, Supporter and Driver.

Figure 9 - Increasing Operations Capabilities and Corresponding Contributions




Source: Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2010: 89-90.

In addition, the model makes it clear that even at Stage 1, the Operations Function ‘contributes’ towards the Operations Strategy. Although it is viewed as being a very weak contribution, leading to very little positive impact on the competitive success of the Operations Strategy, it is nevertheless a stage in the process that represents a particular category of contribution (Ibid.). This Conceptual Framework, therefore, widens the original Hayes and Wheelwright spectrum of contribution categories and adds Assistant as a contribution category smaller than the one of Implementer. Thus, the scale of contributions deduced from the Hayes and Wheelwright Four-Stage Model ranges from

no contribution (Stage 0)² through Assistant, Implementer, Crucial Supporter³ to Driver, which is the most significant contribution towards advancing a strategy. Below, a depiction of the range of contributions is followed by definitions, as well as implications, of those characteristics.

Figure 10 - Range of Contributions across Stages (1)



Assistant is the Stage 1 and it is the least significant contribution, where in order to even be a part of the scale it needs to contribute in some, however small, way towards the implementation of the overall strategy. Once the Assistant acquires the ability to impact on the strategy in however small way, it can develop into Implementer (Stage 2) who provides more substantial support and who makes strategy happen by translating strategic decisions into operational reality. This contribution category could be labelled as an Effector, as, in fact, the contribution that is made at this stage makes the strategy materialize.

One step above the Implementer is Crucial Supporter (Stage 3), characterised by the ability to support the strategy. Crucial Supporter goes beyond simply implementing the strategy and it provides additional

² 'No Contribution' is characterised by a complete non-involvement and does not exhibit any activities that would be considerate in any way linked to the strategy.


³ The contribution of Supporter is accompanied by the adjective 'Crucial' in order to be clearly distinguished from the contribution of Assistant and to highlight its superiority.

capabilities which allow the strategic planner to refine and broaden its strategic goals. Driver (Stage 4) is then a superior stage of the whole scheme, with a game-changing significance for the strategy, as it is the main instrument for the success of the strategy. The activities performed by the Driver project a substantive element of independence and are the most significant, underpinning the whole strategy. This contribution category thus could very well be labelled as the Leader, as the contribution at this stage drives, or leads, the whole strategy towards its strategic goal.

While this model provides a wide range of contributions on the scale from No contribution to Driver, it is incomplete without a category that has the potential to challenge the achievement of the strategy (undermine the strategy). In this regard, based on the assessment of the prevailing value of the provider's contribution to the US military capability in Phase IV Operations in Iraq, this framework provides an opportunity to distinguish between a predominantly constructive (advancing) and destructive (undermining) type of contribution. The value of the provider's contribution can rarely be solely constructive or destructive. To the contrary, the provider's contribution can be looked at many different levels (tactical, operational, strategic) and can be assessed in short-term, mid-term, and long-term perspective, giving innumerable combinations of how it can be defined and understood. The proposed framework is applicable to analysis on any of these levels and any time length perspective, provided that only one level of analysis and one perspective are applied at one time. In this thesis, the strategic level analysis combined with long-term perspective is utilised to answer the research question.

In order to provide a complete picture, the category of Spoiler is added to the Contribution typology to encompass the whole spectrum. The provider may either advance or undermine the strategy as depicted in the table below. For this reason, the contribution of Spoiler is added to the Framework as the only category with a predominantly negative impact on the efforts to achieve the strategy goals. While Assistant, Implementer, Supporter and Driver are positive categories advancing the strategy with their respective levels of predominantly positive contributions, Spoiler is the sole category undermining the strategy by providing a predominantly negative contribution.

Figure 11 - Range of Contributions across Stages (2)



In addition, the category of Spoiler hierarchically corresponds to the category of Driver, with the difference of the prevailing negative value of contribution, as only the Spoiler has the potential to 'spoil' the strategy.⁴ This creates additional dimension to the framework as by defining the

⁴ Prevailing negative value of subject's contribution in the category of Assistant, Implementer and Crucial Supporter will slow down and complicate the process of achievement of the strategy, but a subject in any of these categories does not have the influence to prevent accomplishment of the strategy or directly impact on the potential to achieve the strategic goal of the mission.

contribution of Spoiler as a reflection of the contribution of Driver only with negative prevailing value, the framework distinguishes between two large contribution categories: constructive and destructive. While the contributions of Assistant, Implementer, Crucial Supporter and Driver can be occasionally undermining of the US military's capability to achieve its strategic goal, the overall value of the contribution is constructive, hence enhances the US military capability. In this case it means that the occasional negative contribution does not have enough importance to significantly hinder the US military's capability to pursue its mission or influence the overall feasibility of the mission.

Therefore, while the categories of Driver and Spoiler have the potential to have a detrimental impact on the US military capability to achieve the strategic goal of a mission, Assistant, Implementer and Crucial Supporter have only an impact on the implementation of the strategy pursuing that goal. In simple terms, while Assistant, Implementer and Crucial Supporter influence how the mission will be implemented to varying degrees through their impact on the size of the deployable force, available timeframe and desired objectives of the individual operations, the achievement of the strategic goal cannot be accomplished without the Driver, and will not happen with the Spoiler. As such, based on the Conceptual Framework, PMSI can be assessed as to whether it assisted, implemented, crucially supported, drove or spoilt the US military's capability to pursue Phase IV Operations in Iraq, covering the full spectrum of categories of the potential PMSI contribution to the US military's capability in Phase IV Operations in Iraq.

IV.II. The Contribution Framework

Building on the preceding paragraphs, this section introduces the Contribution Framework, its five distinct categories and explains their characteristic traits. Informed by the Hayes and Wheelwright Four-Stage Model, this framework features five distinct contribution categories – Assistant, Implementer, Crucial Supporter, Driver, and Spoiler – and can be presented on three levels: 1) contribution level, 2) significance of the provided service, and 3) observable indicators of the significance of the provided service for the strategy. Each of these levels are intrinsically linked to each other and are a drill-down approach to the core of the framework. These are explained individually in turn in the following paragraphs.

Contribution Level

The framework distinguishes between two levels of contribution – main contribution and additional contribution. While Assistant, Implementer and Crucial Supporter belong to the category of ‘additional’ contribution, Driver and Spoiler sit in the ‘main’ contribution category. The logic behind this distinction is based on the assumption that the additional contributions do not have the potential to have a detrimental impact on the US military capability to achieve the strategic goal of the mission, but they have both positive and negative impacts on the implementation of the strategy how to achieve its strategic goal. Therefore, while the Driver’s and Spoiler’s presence and activities have

direct impact on whether the strategic goal of the mission can be achieved, the Assistant, Implementer and Crucial Supporter can only influence the means *how* this goal is to be achieved indirectly. The major distinction between these two levels is depicted below.

Table 5 - Two Levels of Contribution

Contribution	Assistant	Implementer	Crucial Supporter	Driver	Spoiler
Contribution level	Additional contribution			Main contribution	

Therefore, in alignment with the descriptions of the characteristics of the individual contributions informed by the Hayes and Wheelwright framework and introduced in the section above, this thesis proposes a distinction between two separate levels of contributions – the first has an impact solely on the strategy (how the strategic aim will be achieved), while the second influences both the strategy and the strategic goal itself. The first level includes the contributions of Assistant, Implementer and Crucial Supporter as contribution categories with significant impact only on strategy. On the second level, encompassing the categories of Driver and Spoiler, the subjects in these categories have impact on both the strategy and on the achievement of the strategic goal of the mission. As such, within this framework, the main instrument corresponds to the contributions of Driver and Spoiler, as they are the only two contributions that have the potential to impact on success or failure of the mission in long-term. The whole framework is thus based on a simple distinction of

two main types of contribution categories of contractors in US military operations – to have an impact on the process of how a strategic goal is to be achieved (additional instrument), or both how a strategic goal is to be achieved and what can be achieved as a strategic goal (main instrument).

Starting from the assumption that the US military was the main instrument of US military operations driving the US military strategy in Iraq⁵, the puzzle of this thesis is to assess how the PMSI compared to the US military in terms of its contribution. Answering this puzzle will then by default shed some light on the issue of to what extent the PMSI supplemented the US military in its operations. In this context, to supplement means to amplify force capabilities by being an additional instrument of US military strategy and taking responsibility over some aspects of the strategy. A supplement, therefore, takes over a share of the total effort to achieve the strategy by generating and applying capabilities to sustain the effort and effectiveness of the main instrument. By contrast, to substitute is an extreme end on the supplement scale and signifies taking over the responsibility for the main aspects of the strategy and becoming the single main instrument, the Driver. Of course, the question of whether PMSI have made additional or main contributions, supplemented or substituted soldiers, is not an either-or issue, but should be viewed as a continuum. Although highly unlikely, if the US military

⁵ Despite the evolution in the US military doctrine on Stability Operations recognising their importance in modern warfare, ground troops remain an indispensable element of such operations and the majority of avenues for a conflict resolution within the 3-07 Stability Operations Manual directly or indirectly requires the involvement of ground troops (US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008). Note that requiring the involvement of ground troops does not necessarily mean requiring combat operations.

troops were to be 100 per cent substituted by PMSI, it would mean that the US military is no longer the Driver of the strategy and that its duties and responsibilities for accomplishing the strategic goal have been delegated entirely to the PMSI. Clearly, these two distinct functions – to supplement or substitute - have diametrically opposed implications for the execution of the strategy and achievement of the strategic goal of a mission. That is why the distinction between the main instrument and the additional instrument needs to be developed further.

Significance of the provided service

The main criterion for the assessment of the contribution is the significance of the provided service for the achievement of the strategic goal of the mission. This thesis differentiates between ‘optional additional services’, ‘essential additional services’, ‘indispensable additional services’ and ‘indispensable main services’; each of which corresponds to a different contribution category. The following table clarifies which characteristic corresponds to which contribution.

Table 6 - Significance of the Provided Service and Corresponding Contribution

Additional Contributors	Assistant	Implementer	Crucial Supporter
Significance of the provided service to the employed strategy	Optional Additional Service The service is eliminable with no or minor changes to non-core aspects of the strategy.	Essential Additional Service The service is eliminable with major changes to non-core aspects of the strategy.	Indispensable Additional Service The service is eliminable with major changes to core aspects of the strategy.

Main Contributors	Driver	Spoiler
Significance of the provided service to the employed strategy	Indispensable Main Service The service is non-eliminable without changing the whole strategy.	Indispensable Main Service The service is non-eliminable without changing the whole strategy.

Assistant provides optional additional services that advance the strategic goal. Owing to its small input, the optional additional services may or may not be provided without affecting the potential to achieve the strategic goal. In case of Implementer, the significance of the service

provided is elevated one step higher to essential additional services, where the type of services is no longer optional; instead they represent important services that advance the achievement of the strategic goal. One step above Implementer is Crucial Supporter which is the highest level of significance of services in the 'additional instrument' category. The service provided by Crucial Supporter is classified as indispensable additional services. The indispensability of the service is also a common feature for the Driver and Spoiler category, however, the contribution itself differs, as the Driver's and Spoiler's indispensable services correspond to the service of the main instrument. Unlike in the case of Crucial Supporter and indispensable additional services, Driver and Spoiler perform indispensable services that form the backbone of the whole strategy.

In Iraq, for example, Single Digits, iDirect Government Technologies and DRS Technical Services, Inc. were involved in ensuring that soldiers had access to a variety of communications, including personal email, chatting with family and friends at home, browsing the Internet, and in some locations using Web cameras (iDirect, no date). Although in today's technological era it may be seen as indispensable, 24/7 internet access for troops in the middle of a warzone was introduced only about a decade ago. Prior to 2003, a soldier's only means of staying connected with loved ones were letters or the occasional phone call. In situations such as military deployments in Iraq or Afghanistan, where separation from family was usually for a year at a time, introducing facilities managed by contractors can positively stimulate the soldier's mental condition therefore, advancing the strategy of boosting troops' morale on a battlefield. As a

result, while the provided service is relevant for the fulfilment of the mission, it remains optional, since troop morale is neither directly nor wholly dependent on the provision of the service. The PMSCs responsible for this service are an example of Assistant type of contribution and are thus replaceable with no or only minor changes to non-core aspects of the strategy because their absence equates solely to less manpower involved in the pursuit of the strategic goal on the ground.

Implementer is one step above Assistant. Owing to the significance of its services, it cannot be replaced or eliminated without major changes to the non-core aspects of the strategy. Non-core aspects of the strategy for this contribution correspond to the size of the mission (the level of manpower) and the length of its duration over a period of time. As such, the significance of the service provider for the contribution of Implementer, is 'replaceable with major changes to non-core aspects of the strategy' which means that the absence of a service provider in this category would impact on both the size and timeframe of the mission. If the provider of the services offers essential additional services and can be replaced only with major changes to non-core aspects of the strategy, in this case both the size and timeframe of the mission, it provides the contribution of Implementer.

In the same context and with the same strategic aim in mind, it could be argued that the PMCs responsible for the provision of hot meals twice per day (or managing dining facilities in general) provide the contribution of Implementer. As is the case with 24/7 internet access,

access to hot meals twice per day for troops in conflict zones was introduced with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meals Ready to Eat (MRE), originally introduced in 1982, have been subjected to a wave of criticism regarding the quality of food following the First Gulf War. Since then, the Pentagon has been working relentlessly on improving the quality of food provided to troops, which was seen as an important factor of boosting their morale and enhancing their performance (Kilborn, 2003). While the introduction of hot meals within the US military bases in Iraq and Afghanistan does represent a significant improvement from MREs and it is an essential type of service, it can hardly be assessed as being indispensable. Note the difference between two hot meals per day and no meal at all, which would, without a doubt, elevate the contribution of the food contractors to Crucial Supporter.

Crucial Supporter, which occupies the position between Implementer and Driver within the Contribution Framework, provides Indispensable Additional Services. Replacing or eliminating it thus results in major changes to the core aspects of the strategy. Core aspects of the strategy for this contribution category correspond to the combination of three elements: the size, timeframe and objectives of the mission. If the provider of the services offers Indispensable Additional Services and can be replaced only with major changes to the core aspects of the strategy, the size, duration and objectives of the mission, it provides the contribution of Crucial Supporter.

PMSCs providing maintenance services to US military vehicles on their expeditionary operations serve as an excellent example of Crucial Supporter. While these services are seemingly not provided directly to the troops but their equipment, the quality and reliability of their services in high-risk environment is critical. The lives of troops are directly dependent on the availability and condition of military equipment, serviced by PMSCs, when on duty. A lack or malfunction of such equipment could lower not only the morale of the troops, but also their operational readiness, to such an extent that it may become impossible to complete the mission.

The two remaining contribution categories to be explained are the categories which potentially substitute the main instrument of foreign policy - Driver and Spoiler. Driver, which is the main instrument of the strategy, provides indispensable main services and is irreplaceable if the strategic goal is to be accomplished without altering the whole strategy. As such, the significance of the service provider for the contribution of Driver is reflected in the size, timeframe, objectives and feasibility of the mission, since the type of the services provided, indispensable main services, are at the core of the mission itself.⁶ While the Crucial supporter

⁶ Although Phase IV Operations in Iraq were adopted as a decisive phase for a dignified US military withdrawal, they were largely overlapping with Phase III (Dominate) Operations. Previously often mistakenly simplified as two different types of operations - conflict and post-conflict operations, the Iraq scenario demonstrated the cohesion of the two phases. Even more, the Phase III operations were often a pre-condition for the Phase IV to take place, preserving the leading role of the US military as the Driver of the US strategy. As the COIN Field Manual FM 3-24 specified, in a COIN environment, it is vital to adopt appropriate and measured levels of military force and apply that force precisely avoiding unnecessary loss of life or suffering (Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2006: 1-25). In this regard, the manual clearly identifies the significance of the military as a key element of the strategy – Driver.

is still replaceable and the strategy's goal cannot be achieved in its absence without major changes to the strategy, Driver is simply irreplaceable without changing the strategy completely, because without its services and its input, the strategy ceases to exist. In this regard, the US military represents the contribution of Driver as in its absence, the Phase IV Operations in Iraq would cease to exist.

In this depiction Spoiler sits separately from all the other potential contributions, as it is the unique category where the prevailing value of its contribution is negative. Sharing all the other features with the contribution of the Driver, Spoiler is an alternative to Driver where the negative impact of its presence and activities prevails over the positive. This condition is unique to Driver as it is the only contribution category where, if its impact is predominantly negative, it undermines and ultimately prevents the achievement of the strategic goal. In other words, the presence Spoiler directly inhibits the achievement of the strategic goal. In contrast, if the prevailing impact of Assistant, Implementer, or Crucial Supporter turns out to be negative, it only has the potential to infringe on the strategy *how* the goal will be achieved but it does not prevent the achievement of the goal per se. This means that for a service provider to become a Spoiler, it first needs to be the Driver of the strategy, because only in a situation where the Driver has a prevailing negative contribution to the strategy will it become Spoiler. In other words, Spoiler is Driver which pulls the strategy away from the strategic goal, unlike Driver who directly contributes to it.

As such, the higher the significance of the provided services, the greater the risk for the subject to become a Spoiler. While the subject in the category of Assistant has a very small potential to prevent the strategy from being fulfilled even if providing a predominantly negative impact, the subject in the category of Driver (being irreplaceable and providing Indispensable Main Services) poses a high threat to the strategy, should it create a predominantly negative impact. For that reason, Spoiler is an undesirable contribution category for PMSI regarding the US military strategy in Iraq, as, by definition, it works against the achievement of the strategic goal, and its presence and activities on the ground have a largely negative impact on the US military's capability in Phase IV Operations in the established timeframe.

Observable indicators of the significance of the provided service for the strategy

The same way there are different degrees of substitution of the services delivered by the US military from 1 to 100 per cent, the same way distinction between 'optional additional services', 'essential additional services', 'indispensable additional services' and 'indispensable main services' is a broad spectrum of undefined lines and depends on the perspective. In order to streamline the framework as much as possible and provide some guidance how to filter the available evidence, each of the individual contribution categories has been defined using the same

criteria across the spectrum of contribution categories in order to define some observable indicators which would enable a meaningful analysis.

Selecting any type of metrics for centralised quantitative assessment is tricky, if not impossible and can be hugely misleading. Not only the metrics needs to be directly relevant to the desirable outcome of the analysis, but the data for assessment using such metrics has to be available, reliable, and verifiable. In complex expeditionary operations such as Iraq 2003 – 2011, the availability and reliability of data is limited and can be considered a major obstacle to fully operationalize the analysis according to the Conceptual Framework. At the same time, even having had access to unlimited, reliable and variable data and selecting a set of core metrics to measure the contribution of any type of contractors to eight-years long dynamic engagement of the US military in Iraq, would not likely provide any more clarity or noteworthy lessons learned for future US military engagements.

Lack of centralised control over the collection and reporting of data on the activities of the PMSI in such complex, dynamic and diverse environment inherently diminishes the reliability of any measurement and the validity of potential findings. Breaking through the complexity of stability operations reporting with aim to provide useful analysis is thus extremely challenging. This does not mean that such subject is not worth the efforts; it only means that the friction points between theory and reality shall be acknowledged and needs to be approached with caution. In this regard, this framework cannot and does not seek to measure, prove or

determine the contribution that the PMSI has made to the US military's capability in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. Instead, it seeks to analyse the available data to present a plausible association between the presence and activities of the PMSI and the development the US military strategy in Phase IV Operations in Iraq underwent from 2003-2011.

Rather than developing quantitative metrics, inherently impracticable for complex expeditionary operations, this thesis uses a set of indicators of change at the theatre level which remain intentionally vague and serve to highlight the difference contractors made to the US military's capability, rather than seeking to measure their impact or evaluate their performance in Phase IV Operations. These four criteria for characterising the contribution categories are the size of the deployable force, available timeframe, objectives and the strategic goal of the mission, and are based on the analysis of key elements of Phase IV Operations applied to the Iraq war case, discussed in detail in chapter 2.

In a broad overview, the Assistant contribution category is characterised by provision of optional additional services, which represent only small input in efforts to achieve the strategic goal. This means that although the Assistant's provided services are seeking to advance the achievement of the strategic goal, should the services become unavailable, only the size of the deployable force (understood as manpower) will be affected. That also means that neither the expected length of the mission, its objectives nor the strategic goal will be significantly influenced.

In the case of Implementer, the significance of the service provided is elevated one step higher to essential additional services, where the type of services is no longer optional; instead they represent important services that advance the achievement of the strategic goal. This means that although in its absence the objectives and the overall strategic aim is likely to remain intact, the lack of the services will be reflected in smaller size of force utilized to accomplish the goal and will also make a difference to the expected timeframe of the mission. In the absence of the services of the Implementer, the most likely consequence, next to decreased size of the deployable force, would be the extended duration of the operation as there would be a strain on the human resources to take on additional responsibilities to accomplish the mission based on the original strategic plan.

One step above Implementer is Crucial Supporter which is the highest level of significance of services in the 'additional instrument' category. The service provided by Crucial Supporter is classified as 'indispensable additional services' which suggests that the provided services provided critical contribution to the strategy to achieve the mission's strategic goal. This means that in the absence of these services not only the size of the force and expected timeframe for the accomplishment of the goal would be adversely affected, but also the objectives of the operation which constitute the mission would be compromised and would have to be altered.

The indispensability of the service is also a common feature for the Driver and Spoiler category, however, the contribution itself differs, as the Driver's and Spoiler's indispensable services correspond to the service of the main instrument. Unlike in the case of Crucial Supporter and 'indispensable additional services', Driver and Spoiler perform indispensable services that form the backbone of the whole strategy. In essence the services provided by Driver and Spoiler are the critical activities that seek to execute the strategy according to the strategic plan. The only significant difference is that in the case of Driver, these activities enhance the likelihood of achieving the strategic goal, while in the case of Spoiler they in fact prevent the achievement of the goal. While elevating the PMSI or any of its particular sector to the contribution of Driver, including delegating it the full responsibility for certain types of operations, can have huge benefits for the US military, it is also accompanied by many risks. One of them is simply that it becomes the main instrument of the US government to pursue a particular type of operation and it may ultimately render the military dispensable in certain contexts and environments. In addition, being on the same level as the US military implies the PMSI would be an independent alternative foreign policy instrument that the US military does not have any control over. Finally, and most importantly, assuming the position of Driver of a strategy in a particular operation on behalf of the US military, bears the inherent risk of possibility to become the Spoiler.

Table 7 - Characteristics of the Provided Service

Contribution	Assistant	Implementer	Crucial Supporter
Characteristics of the provided service	In the absence of the service, only SIZE of an operation (size of the manpower) will be compromised.	In the absence of the service, SIZE (manpower) and DURATION of an operation will be compromised.	In the absence of the service, SIZE (manpower), DURATION and OBJECTIVES of an operation will be compromised.

Contribution	Driver	Spoiler
Characteristics of the provided service	In the absence of the service, SIZE , DURATION , OBJECTIVES and STRATEGIC GOAL of an operation will be compromised.	In the presence of the service, SIZE , DURATION , OBJECTIVES and STRATEGIC GOAL of an operation will be compromised.

In a broad overview, the Conceptual Framework for assessment of the contribution of an instrument (in this case the PMSI) to the US military strategy in Phase IV Operations in Iraq is composed of three interlinked levels – the level of contribution, the significance of the provided service of the instrument to the employed strategy, and observable indicators of the significance of the service provided by the instrument to the strategy. The Contribution Framework, therefore, is based on the assessment of the

significance of the provided service to the US military capability to pursue the planned strategy in order to achieve the desired strategic goal. The following table provides an overview of the levels and links between them within the Conceptual Framework typology of contributions of the PMSI towards the Phase IV Operations in Iraq.

Table 8 - Contribution Framework Summary

Type of Instrument's Contribution	Assistant	Implementer	Crucial Supporter
Contribution level	Additional (instrument)		
Significance of the provided service of the instrument to the employed strategy	Optional Additional Service The service is eliminable with no or minor changes to non-core aspects of the strategy.	Essential Additional Service The service is eliminable with major changes to non-core aspects of the strategy.	Indispensable Additional Service The service is eliminable with major changes to core aspects of the strategy.
Characteristics of the service provided by the instrument	In the absence of the service, only SIZE of an operation (size of the manpower) will be compromised.	In the absence of the service, SIZE (manpower) and DURATION of an operation will be compromised.	In the absence of the service, SIZE (manpower), DURATION and OBJECTIVES of an operation will be compromised.

Type of Instrument's Contribution	Driver	Spoiler
Contribution level	Main (instruments)	
Significance of the provided service of the instrument to the employed strategy	Indispensable Main Service The service is non-eliminable without changing the whole strategy.	Indispensable Main Service The service is non-eliminable without changing the whole strategy.
Characteristics of the service provided by the instrument	In the absence of the service, SIZE, DURATION, OBJECTIVES and STRATEGIC GOAL of an operation will be compromised.	In the presence of the service, SIZE, DURATION, OBJECTIVES and STRATEGIC GOAL of an operation will be compromised.

IV.III. Conceptual Framework Application

In order to apply this Framework accordingly, it is necessary to extrapolate the key questions that the ensuing empirical chapters will seek to answer. This thesis applies the Conceptual Framework on two particular case studies – Base Support Contractors and Armed Private Security Contractors. The specific service represents the narrowest scope of analysis, while the Base Support Contractors represents the widest scope of analysis of the contribution of contractors on the modern battlefield, based on the experience in Iraq. The reason to examine the contribution of APSCs is that they are a specific service that can be uniquely defined in terms of its nature of responsibilities within the context of Phase IV Operations. They provide armed static security, convoy security and personal details, and although they are a subsection of a broader Security Sector, the APSCs provide a unique type of services within the sector and within the industry in general, as they are the most similar to combat troops and they are the only subject of the PMSI authorised to use force under certain circumstances (Isenberg, 2009: 151-152). On the other side, the much broader category of Base Support Contractors, a representative of the logistics sector, was continuously the largest type of service engaged in Phase IV Operations providing support services for the US military efforts (Thibault et al., 2011: 23).

While the general characteristics and justification for the selection of these particular cases are dealt with in the respective introductions of these chapters, it is important to provide an insight in how the framework

will be applied. Similar to the approach applied to the APSCs, the broader sector level analysis seeks to highlight the significance of logistics services to the US military capability to pursue its strategy in Iraq. By illustrating the specific characteristics of the Phase IV operations, which require a lengthy and resource-intensive support, both empirical chapters focus on the ability of the contractors to complement the US military force capabilities and effectiveness of the US military during US expeditionary operations. Having presented the US military expectations for the size, duration, objectives and strategic goal at the start of the Phase IV Operations in Iraq in the Chapter II of this thesis, the ensuing empirical chapters focus on answering the following questions in the context of the developments the US strategy underwent, taking into consideration the operational circumstances encountered on the ground:

The first empirical chapter, the Base Support Contractors chapter, takes the research question and adapts it particularly to its case. In this sense the question becomes: 'What kind of contribution have the Base Support Contractors made to the US military capability to pursue Phase IV Operations in Iraq?'

1) Have the provided Base Support services made a significant, constructive or destructive, contribution to the size of the deployable force in US Phase IV Operations in Iraq?

2) Have the provided Base Support services made a significant, constructive or destructive, contribution to the available timeframe in US Phase IV Operations in Iraq?

3) Have the provided Base Support services made a significant, constructive or destructive, contribution to the desired objectives in US Phase IV Operations in Iraq?

4) Have the provided Base Support services made a significant, constructive or destructive, contribution to the desired strategic goal in US Phase IV Operations in Iraq?

Likewise, the second empirical chapter, the Armed Private Security Contractors chapter, takes the research question and adapts it particularly to its case. In this sense the question becomes: 'What kind of contribution have the Armed Private Security Contractors made to the US military capability to pursue Phase IV Operations in Iraq?'

1) Have the provided Armed Security services made a significant, constructive or destructive, contribution to the size of the deployable force in US Phase IV Operations in Iraq?

2) Have the provided Armed Security services made a significant, constructive or destructive, contribution to the available timeframe in US Phase IV Operations in Iraq?

3) Have the provided Armed Security services made a significant, constructive or destructive, contribution to the desired objectives in US Phase IV Operations in Iraq?

4) Have the provided Armed Security services made a significant, constructive or destructive, contribution to the desired strategic goal in US Phase IV Operations in Iraq?

Answering these questions will shed light onto the type of contribution these contractors made, as well as what type of foreign policy instrument they represented.

IV.IV. Conclusion

The Hayes and Wheelwright Model from the operations management area which provides a number of transferable elements which are crucial in answering the research question of this project. Derived from the understanding of Operations Strategy as 'the total pattern of decisions and actions that position the organisation in its environment and that are intended to achieve its long-term goals', it can be applied to the US military strategy in Iraq as a combination of decisions and actions that the US military undertakes in a particular environment (Phase IV Operations) to achieve an overarching goal (creating the long-term stability to allow a dignified exit) for the US military (Pycraft et al., 2000: 71). While Operations Strategy 'concerns the pattern of strategic decisions and actions which set the role, objectives, and activities of that

operation,' the US military strategy in Iraq concerns the pattern of strategic decisions and actions which set the role, objectives, and activities of the US military (Main instrument), but also other subjects (Additional Instruments) that are part of the effort (Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2010: 89-90). These additional instruments include other Coalition forces, US civilian forces, Host Country forces, and US outsourced forces as the four most prominent partners of the US military in pursuing the US military strategy in Phase IV Operations in Iraq.

The aim of this chapter was to establish a conceptual platform upon which an empirical investigation can be launched. The Hayes and Wheelwright Four Stage Model, creates a solid base for developing a typology framework for the assessment of contribution of the PMSI in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. The descriptive, organisational, and explanatory potential it offers fits very well with the purpose of this research and provides an original insight into the dynamics of the relationship between the US administration and the PMSI as an additional tool of its foreign policy and how it played out in the unique operational circumstances of the Phase IV Operations in Iraq. Moving beyond the literature on positive and negative impacts of the PMSI on military operations based on simple good-or-bad, black-or-white labelling of the industry, this is the first study that articulates a specific typology of contribution categories for the PMSI and its smaller segments (particular sector or service) to be utilised to offer a fuller insight into the potential purposeful employment of the private sector in US expeditionary operations.

Chapter V. The Institutional Factors Shaping the PMSI Contribution in Phase IV Operations in Iraq

Few administrations have embraced the undying belief in the efficacy of conventional military power as strongly as the G. W. Bush administration at the start of the second millennia (Brigham, 2006: 149). Although the American experience during the Cold War, Vietnam in particular, proved the limits of the US military power vis-a-vis complex protracted military conflicts, the Bush administration insisted that America's promotion of democracy in the Middle East was part of a larger strategy to maintain US great power position in the post-cold-war system and many of his close advisers believed this could be achieved through military means only. Nevertheless, despite its capacities to benefit from the overwhelming force, technological superiority, and rich investment into military programmes, the US invasion of Iraq evolved into a political and military nightmare where the US found itself struggling to end the war on acceptable political terms (Dodge, 2010). By rejecting the lessons of Vietnam and pursuing a war of choice in Iraq, the United States was relearning the same lessons from decades ago the hard way. Despite the hype about re-learning how to operate in complex civilian-populated zones of conflict, these lessons were not constrained to 'how to operate in Counterinsurgency missions' only, in

fact, they concern much broader, institutional limitations that have an impact on the use of US military power in the realm of foreign affairs.

Appearing already in the 1950s, after the end of the Korean War, and strengthened following the termination of the Vietnam War in the mid-1970s, both the US military and the US government were left with a cautious approach to counterinsurgency and stability operations (Ucko, 2009: 25-46; Marston and Malkasian, 2008; Herring, 2000: 56-84). It became the prevailing opinion that the US must avoid prolonged, costly, unpopular and inconclusive military operations in the future (Nagl, 2002: 191-212). Reinforced by the ill-fated US peacekeeping intervention in Lebanon in 1982-1983, which further exemplified the trap of an open ended approach to the use of military force, Caspar Weinberger, then Secretary of Defense, drafted a list of six tests to be considered when planning the use of US combat forces abroad (Herring, 2000: 74; O'Sullivan, 2009: 30). Almost a decade after the presentation of the Weinberger doctrine in 1984, the same philosophy was reinforced by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Weinberger's former co-writer (Powell, 1992-1993). This doctrine, known as the Weinberger-Powell doctrine consists of the following pre-conditions to be considered in terms of a viable military operations.

- Either the United States' or its close allies' vital national interests had to be at risk;

- Decisive force should be employed in the pursuit of clearly defined political and military objectives;
- The war had to be fought 'wholeheartedly, with the clear intention of winning';
- The US must constantly reassess whether the use of force is necessary and appropriate;
- There must be a 'reasonable assurance' of Congressional and public support;
- Force should be used only as a last resort (Weinberger, 1986; Record, 2007: 126).

Far from being a rigid instruction on when to employ US troops on the ground, this doctrine was formulated as an insight into the US practical experience with expeditionary operations and the risks they encompass (Record, 2007: 117-129). Using the doctrine as the lens for understanding the PMSI contribution in Iraq highlights the dependence of the US military on contractors in the unpopular, protracted and mostly unconventional war (Hastedt, 2015: 327-328). Setting aside the first, fourth and sixth principle of the WP doctrine, which become irrelevant once the military engagement has commenced, there are three major principles that the PMSI helped to bypass: clear political and military objectives, wholehearted commitment, and support of the American people and the Congress.

Focussing on the bigger picture of the US administration's overall ability to pursue its chosen strategy in Iraq, this chapter looks at the institutional limits imposed by the US short-sighted approach to the planning for the war, the lack of wholehearted commitment and considerable domestic scepticism and opposition towards the war, as the main reasons for the indispensability of the PMSI as an additional foreign policy tool in Iraq. In particular, this chapter argues that the significance of the PMSI in the Phase IV Operations in Iraq resulted from the US government deliberately disregarding historic lessons learned in Korea, Vietnam, and Lebanon, all contained in the Weinberger-Powell doctrine from 1992. As a consequence, the PMSI became a major supporting tool in the hands of the US administration, which effectively enabled the US to avoid the full weight of the consequences of its otherwise politically and operationally unsustainable military presence in Iraq from 2003-2011.

In order to support this argument, the rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section I, Clear Objectives, opens the discussion by pointing out the short-sighted approach of the US administration to the Iraq war as the key factor for the chaotic situation that emerged shortly after the invasion, and the lack of US capacity to respond to it adequately. Section II, Wholehearted Commitment, presents the lack of manpower and various specialised capabilities that the US went to war with and how the PMSI filled in the gap and helped the US to sustain its operations despite its limited resources. Section III, Support of American People and Congress, analyses how the anonymity of

contractors' casualties provided a political advantage to the US administration in presenting the mission both domestically, as well as internationally. A brief conclusion (Section IV) discusses why the WP is still relevant and why its lessons are likely to be relearned by the US in the future.

V.I. Clear Objectives

Within the DoD, the responsibility for the planning for the Iraq war was granted to central command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy Franks (Franks and McConnell, 2004: 441). As explained earlier, the CENTCOM plans for the Iraq war consisted of unrealistic political and unspecific military objectives (O'Hanlon, 2004-2005). The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, had a clear vision about the war, informed by views about the modern nature of military power, which were supported by many thinkers in and out of the US Government and the armed services (Franks and McConnell, 2004: 441). As a result, the military campaign in Iraq was designed based on the principles of 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) which promoted swift, smooth and a highly technological style of warfare, with the aim of destroying the enemy's capabilities with minimum losses to the intervening force (Cordesman, 2003: 58).

This style of warfare - a reliance on speed and air power, smaller and more agile forces, a rapid deployment without long build-ups, and a desire to avoid lengthy and costly occupations - had been tested

previously in the First Gulf War against Iraq (Operation Desert Storm), in 1991, and in the eyes of many senior DoD officials proved successful (Clodfelter and Fawcett, 1995). The low cost military campaign in Afghanistan in 2001, and the perceived success of putting together a post-Taliban government to lead the country, appeared to be even more persuasive and encouraged Rumsfeld to believe that the same could be replicated in Iraq (Metz, 2008: 131).

This RMA approach to the Second Gulf War did not envisage any need to prepare for Phase IV Operations and, therefore, most likely did not anticipate any unusual level of contractors either (Bensahel et al., 2008: 5-17). A number of senior military personnel became outspoken since the beginning of the DoD Iraq war planning, arguing that the 1991 experience was not likely to be replicated under the 2003 circumstances, with significantly different mission goals. Colin Powell famously warned that, '[w]hen you take out a regime and you bring down a government, you become the government' (Mitrovich, 2014). The main difference was then that unlike in 1991, the mission in 2003 was to create a democratic regime from the rubble of a destroyed and defeated dictatorship (Galbraith, 2006: 81-82).

There was detailed military planning for, and assessment of, a regime change scenario in Iraq. In late April 1999, CENTCOM led by Marine General Anthony Zinni (rtd.), conducted a series of war games known as Desert Crossing (OPLAN 1003-98) to assess potential outcomes of a military intervention and a regime change in Iraq

(Galbraith, 2006: 89; Fitzgerald, 2013: 123; Bensahel et al, 2008: xviii, 6-10). The planning outlined the need for close to 400,000 soldiers to take part in the war and retain control of Iraq after the end of major combat operations, to enable political processes leading to a democratic regime, to take place (Galbraith, 2006: 89; Fitzgerald, 2013: 122-125). Although it is unknown to what extent the plans relied on the support of contractors, due to the historical reliance of the US military on civilian support during expeditionary operations, it is reasonable to assume that the Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) III from 1997 was part of the picture (Congressional Budget Office, 2008: 2-12).

Shortly before the war in 2003, during his testimony before members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Army's Chief of Staff at that time, General Eric K. Shinseki, said that several hundred thousand American troops could be required to provide security and public services in Iraq after a war to oust Saddam Hussein and disarm his military (Schmitt, 2003). Distinguishing between liberating a country and occupying it, as two different missions, he argued that '(w)e're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems' (Ibid.). Therefore, although the vision of a quick, smooth and victorious regime change in Iraq relying mostly on the capabilities of modern military technology was shared among many within the inner circle of the president Bush, there were many voices warning against the overly optimistic view of the prospect of the war.

Despite the misgivings about no planning for the nation-building being made prior to the invasion, a number of government agencies committed resources to several post-conflict Iraq war initiatives that considered potential difficulties in implementing a quick and smooth transition between the two extremely different political regimes within a short period of time (Fitzgerald, 2013: 122-125). They were either disregarded or simply not taken seriously enough. The Future of Iraq Project, Parade of Horribles memo, Eclipse II, The Perfect Storm; all were attempts at deliberations about the post-war Iraq, however, with no impact on the actual Phase IV planning (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2008: 13-15). The Parade of Horribles memo, from October 15, 2002, is particularly noteworthy. Also known as 'Iraq: An Illustrative List of Potential Problems to be Considered and Addressed,' the brief memo spelled out twenty-nine potential problems to be encountered if the President authorized military action in Iraq, including ethnic strife among Sunni, Shia and Kurds; requiring a commitment of up to 10 years; or being perceived as war against Muslims. Although ignored at the highest levels of DoD prior to the war, '[i]n retrospect, the memo proved remarkably prescient' (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2008: 13-15).

Dismissing such views, the senior DOD officials adopted a vision that once the war would be over, originally expected to last no more than a few months, the Iraqis would establish a new democratic regime with the help of the United States quickly without any major obstacles (Galbraith, 2006: 87). The US vision for Iraq was that after removing

Saddam Hussein, the US would assist the new pro-American Iraqi government in creating a neo-liberal state with a minimal presence in society and the economy (Dodge, 2010: 1277). This orientation is in line with the US National Security Strategy from 2002 which boldly states that '[the US] will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world' (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002: 1). Nevertheless, these objectives came into conflict with Iraqi realities as the aftermath of the regime change delivered very different consequences to what had been expected. Although the strategic goal of the US administration for Iraq remained unchanged from the invasion through the first years of the US presence on the ground, the individual objectives how to achieve this end state changed in major ways.

Indeed, since the early stages of planning the Iraq War, the US administration, the senior DoD officials in particular, adopted a narrow vision of a swift military operation where the US would be welcome as liberators, and Iraq would naturally develop into an exemplary democratic regime without the need for an extensive nation-building mission. The non-existing strategy for the employment of contractors can only be seen as a practical outcome of this approach. As Gates (2014: 223-224) observed in his memoir, contractors presence developed in Iraq only after the original invasion and 'grew willy-nilly as each US department or agency contracted with them independently'. In addition, he notes '(t)here was no plan, no structure, no oversight, and no coordination' (Ibid.).

The US military planners assumed that the Iraqi Security Forces would remain on duty and maintain public order (Metz, 2008: 132). However, once the regime in Baghdad fell and the US post war administration began to assert itself, the first weeks of its presence were very chaotic and ineffective. Once the Ba'ath Party was ousted from power, a vacuum of political authority and disorder in the streets emerged. In the atmosphere of lawlessness, most of the infrastructure was destroyed, sabotaged and systematically looted while the American troops stood by (Diamond, 2005: 10). As many as 17 out of 23 Iraq government's central ministry buildings were completely destroyed and the total cost of the damage was estimated equivalent to one-third of Iraq's annual gross domestic product, around \$12 billion (Dodge, 2010: 1279). Considering that Iraq had been subjected to 13 years of crippling UN sanctions before the war in 2003, the mass looting and ensuing anarchy represented a major blow to the state's nationwide institutional capacity (Ibid.). Although the US quickly put in place the Coalition Provisional Authority to act as the occupation administration, it had already failed in restoring and maintaining order in the first weeks of its occupation which had long term irreversible consequences for the rebuilding of the political institutions later on.

Although the LOGCAP III, awarded exclusively to Halliburton/KBR in 2001 to support GWOT, was already well in place by that time, the involvement of contractors in the early Iraq war went very much under the radar until later in 2003. Prior to that, the use of contractors by the US military was rather associated with the government's highly

controversial Plan Colombia aiming to combat Colombia's role in the cocaine trade. Due to the limits placed by the Congress on the number of US personnel permitted to operate in Colombia, the government resorted to contract several large PMSCs, including MPRI and DynCorp to assist the Colombia's security forces (Mathieu and Dearden, 2006: 11). Only later in 2003, the media became flooded with accounts of the abuse and torture of prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in which some contractors were implicated (Schwartz et al, 2010: 15-20).

The US had never seriously considered the possibility of an extended occupation or a potential need to rebuild Iraq prior to the intervention. Rather, the expectations were limited to a swift military intervention to remove the regime followed up by a fairly quick power handover to an Interim government led by Ahmed Chalabi and other pro-democracy exiles who would ultimately establish the new pro-US oriented government (Packer, 2005: 127; Chandrasekaran, 2007: 34, 57). Nevertheless, in the face of the worsening security situation on the ground, the US was forced to abandon its strategy for a quick withdrawal and had to change its plans into much more robust ones including a few years long occupation to restructure and revive the Iraqi nation. As Rumsfeld pointed out in May of 2003, facing the realities on the ground, the US would have to engage in 'hands-on political reconstruction' of Iraq in order to achieve the stated US objectives (Dobbins et al., 2009: 40).

Following his appointment as the occupation civilian administrator in May 2003, despite being hastily assembled, Bremer's plans for the Iraq transformation were surprisingly ambitious. As he contends in his memoir, next to the military and political aspects of the rebuilding process, he believed that a stable Iraq will need a vigorous private sector, moving economy, and solid civil society in order to turn it into a functioning democracy (Bremer, 2006: 19). He outlined his 'seven steps to Iraqi full sovereignty'¹ plan publicly in the Washington Post in September 2003 and boldly asserted that

'[Iraq faces many problems, including decades of under-investment in everything from the oil industry to the sewer system. Security issues are a matter of grave concern. There are other problems as well, but knowing how to turn Iraq into a sovereign state is not one of them' (Bremer, 2003).

Nevertheless, facing the widespread insecurity mostly caused by the rising terrorist, insurgent and criminal violence and frustration with the slow paced economic reconstruction, the confidence in the Interim Government was very low and the Iraqi frustration with the minimal

¹ These seven steps are: 1) creation of a 25-member Governing Council broadly representative of Iraqi society; 2) nomination of a preparatory committee to devise a way to write a constitution; 3) nomination of 25 ministers to put day-to-day operation of Iraqi government in the hands of Iraqis; 4) writing Iraq's new constitution; 5) popular ratification of the Iraq's new constitution; 6) election of a government; 7) dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority (Bremer, 2003).

progress made became obvious. At that point, there was no appropriate military strategy, and there were no tangible political goals (Bensahel, 2006: 453-462). The consequences of underestimating the importance of Phase IV planning, the unrealistic expectation about the security environment, and the dissolution of the Iraqi Military and Security Forces after the removal of the Baathist regime, resulted in unexpected consequences for the US military.

Politically motivated violence spread rapidly across Iraq in 2003 and in July of that year the insurgency began to use roadside Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) against the US military vehicles and convoys (Hashim, 2003: 8-9). The rising number of US casualties forced General John Abizaid, the then American general responsible for the Middle East, to admit that the US was facing a 'classical guerrilla-type campaign' in Iraq (Packer, 2005: 302). The increasing US casualties and an US presidential election a little over a year away led to the US government decision to hand back the Iraqi sovereignty to Iraqis in June 2004 to seemingly limit the involvement of the US troops in Iraq without compromising the original strategic objective of a new reformed pro-American Iraq (Feldman, 2004: 114). Following intense discussions in Washington, it was decided that the Coalition Provisional Authority will hand power to the new Interim Government of Iraqi exiled politicians on 28 June 2004 with aim to secure the reform of Iraq through them. (Dodge, 2010: 1282).

One month before the June handover, Bush shifted the responsibility for Iraq from the DOD to DOS and named an American Ambassador John Negroponte as the new highest US representative in Iraq in order to preside over the new developments. Working together with General George Casey, they both sought to shape the US military strategy in order to achieve the strategic goal. In mid-June 2006, Casey drafted a new joint campaign plan which mandated three-stage transfer of power in Iraq: 1) stabilization to early 2007, 2) restoration of civilian authority to mid-2008, and 3) support to self-reliance through 2009 (Woodward, 2008: 32). Dubbed 'the leave-to-win strategy', the new plan sought to limit the number of US casualties and stop the expansion of the security vacuum by rapid training of the Iraqi army and handover of the battlespace control to Iraqi forces by the end of 2006 (Dodge, 2010: 1283).

Next to the US military casualties, the numbers of Iraqi civilians killed was rising steadily from 2003 to 2005, increased rapidly at the start of 2006 and reached a peak in October 2006 (Dodge, 2007: 89; Ricks, 2009: 33). The public announcement of 'The New Way Forward' by Bush in a televised speech in January 2007 heralded a major rethinking in Washington and a complete change in US strategy in Iraq. It became clear that the US military strategy in Iraq was failing and there was a pressing need to review the applied policies to fill the security vacuum and stop Iraq's descent into a civil war (Mansoor, 2013: 54-56). The centrepiece of the new strategy was the surge of the US troops in and around Baghdad by little over 20,000 men with the aim to

apply the strategy of 'clear, hold and build' to rebuild the institutional capacity of the Iraqi state (Petraeus, 2013; Woodward, 2008: 32). Anchored in the rediscovered counterinsurgency doctrine and the army's new COIN manual, the new approach was the last serious attempt to bring a halt to the downward spiralling situation in Iraq and avoid the almost certain defeat that loomed in 2006.

Although the number of the documented civilian deaths dropped down significantly in the second half of 2007, the effect of the surge remains ambiguous. For the most part, it remains to be seen above all as an attempt to draw down the violence temporarily and let the Bush administration hand the problem off to his successor (Bolger, 2014: 352-353).² As Walt (2009) pointed out 'Washington never had a plausible plan for reconstructing a workable Iraqi state once it dismantled Saddam's regime — and it will be up to the Iraqi people to work it out amongst themselves.' Under such circumstances, the U.S. military forces began to withdraw from Iraq in December 2007 with the end of the Iraq War troop surge.

Bush's successor in the White House, Barack Obama, opposed the war before it began and made clear that he believed that the war was a grave mistake and distraction from the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Obama, 2008). Although by the time he entered the Office in January 2009, the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq had begun in December 2007 with the end of the infamous Iraq surge, he

² For different perspectives on the success of the surge, see Petraeus (2013), Walt (2009), Beinart (2015), Kingsbury (2014), and Bolger (2014).

extended the original date of withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq of 30 June 2009 for an additional 10 months, to 31 August 2010 (Obama, 2009). By doing so, Obama sought to pursue the strategy dubbed as 'responsibly ending the Iraq war' which consisted primarily of the paced removal of US combat brigades from Iraq and ending the combat mission by 31 August 2010, accompanied by supporting the Iraqi government and training, equipping, and advising its Security Forces in taking absolute lead in securing their country in order to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011 (Obama, 2009).

In regards to the WP doctrine and the necessity of establishing clear, unambiguous and military achievable objectives, this section presented that the US military strategy in Iraq had a wide range of objectives that had to be adapted in the face of the many unfavourable circumstances on the ground. The deepening quagmire set in motion by the US intervention and accelerated by widespread looting, disbanding the Iraqi security forces and purging of the civil service of the senior members of the Ba'ath party, required a gradual withdrawal in order to prevent a strategic backlash (Dodge, 2010: 1286). The lack of preparedness, clear achievable objectives and capacity to get the worsening situation under control, led to US government to ultimately seek ways to terminate its involvement over an extended period of time and without having achieved its strategic goal.

V.II. Wholehearted Commitment

Often understood as the principle of 'overwhelming force', the requirement of wholehearted commitment is tightly linked with the US experience in Korea and Vietnam where the US military believed its chances to win were fatally undermined by various politically motivated constraints placed upon the military by the US government (Snow et al, 2015: 297). For the fear of triggering a direct confrontation with China, the US military did not have its full capacity and unrestricted use of force available which in retrospect was by many viewed as ineffective prosecution of hostilities which made such wars longer and end without the desired outcome (Ibid, p. 297-298; Herring, 1994: 34). Clausewitz wrote that:

'Superiority of numbers admittedly is the most important factor in the outcome of an engagement, so long as it is great enough to counterbalance all other contributing circumstances. It thus follows that as many troops as possible should be brought into the engagement at the decisive point' (Clausewitz, 2001: 194-195).

Although this insight was well understood in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, it was often ignored due to wider political and strategic reasons. In the case of Iraq in 2003, the US force was undermanned throughout the operation deploying as a maximum 150

000 troops, despite the estimates that around 400 000 were needed (Hughes, 2013). While it may be argued that the WP principle of overwhelming force is counterproductive and inappropriate to guerrilla warfare, the issue is more complex. Although excessive use of power is likely to create resistance, new recruits for the insurgents, and may undermine domestic support for the war by creating large scale civilian casualties, it is mostly associated with overwhelming kinetic force (Crane, 2010: 70). The concept of overwhelming kinetic force on its own, seen through the lens of application of firepower, is not suitable in the context of counterinsurgency (Ibid.).


However, large numbers of troops are needed in combating the early stages of an insurgency, by policing the population and generally demonstrating the power and resolve of the authorities (Pirnie and O'Connell, 2008: 49-52, 69, 80). The usefulness of large numbers of troops may dwindle over time as consent for occupation decreases, and large numbers of troops may in fact prove a burden as the native armed forces and government tend to rely more on outside assistance than they do on developing their own institutions and capabilities (Paris and Sisk, 2007: 4-5). However, an overwhelming presence in the early stages of insurgency has been viewed as a mitigating factor, preventing insurgency from spinning out of control (Hughes, 2013, Brooks, 2013).

It is not by coincidence that one of the key approaches applied with the COIN strategy under the leadership of General David Petraeus was 'Clear-Hold-Build' (Ucko, 2009: 74, 84; Pirnie and O'Connell,

2008:37). This strategy was successfully developed by the British in Malaya, less successfully applied by the Americans in Vietnam and re-applied in Iraq in 2007 (Ucko, 2009: 74, 84). The logic behind the strategy dictates that one has to stay behind and maintain peace and security to create a positive long-term legacy. Such endeavour necessarily requires a massive use of personnel (Ibid.: 84.)

The numbers supplemented by PMSI to compensate for this critical insufficiency are not clear. The official source on DoD contracting in Iraq, CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports, has been reporting consistently the level of contractors in Iraq from August 2008 (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, no date). The available data from this source cover only contractors operating under DoD contracts, nevertheless, these made the absolute majority of all US-agency funded contracts overseas (Congressional Budget Office, 2008: 3, 8). Including the levels of the US military in Iraq in the picture, the following graph demonstrates the level of DoD contractors in Iraq from 2007-2011.

Figure 12 - Number of Contractor Personnel in Iraq versus Troop Levels




Source: Schwartz and Swain, 2011: 15.

The PMSI contribution was immense and provided indispensable support. While the Bush administration did envisage a large scale involvement of various military contractors in the support of the US strategy in Iraq to enable big companies to get big profits, the rest, were seen as optional supplements for the US strategy, not the building stones (Biddle, 2013, Brooks, 2013). It was only in the early stages of the post-conflict situation that the necessity of the contractors was fully revealed and their relevance has dramatically altered the understanding of how the United States military is dependent on support of the PMSI in modern war (Kinsey, 2009: 22, 71; Tonkin, 2011: 1).

The proportions of the services are not static and they mirror the developments of the levels of the troops and the strategy of the US military in Iraq across time (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, no date). The graph bellow shows the development of the various services contractors provided from 2008 until the US military withdrawal in 2011.

Figure 13 - Trend analysis of DoD Contractor Personnel Working in Iraq (by Service Type), 2008-2011



Source: Schwartz and Swain, 2011:26.

The industry encompasses a number of different types of services, including base support, transportation, logistics/maintenance, security services construction, translator/interpreter, communication or training (Schwartz and Swain, 2011:26). For instance, the

counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq created a large demand for the linguist and military-interrogators' services, that the US military could not provide (Zachary, 2007; Simpson, 2007). As the US military's need for these services became particularly acute due to the reliance on population-centred counterinsurgency, human intelligence became a critical component (Cassidy, 2006: 162; Ackerman, 2013). The US troops were not equipped with Arabic language skills and depended on the contracted linguists to accompany them in civilian neighbourhoods provide (Zachary, 2007; Simpson, 2007) The Congressional Research Service estimated that there were 9,128 translator/interpreter contractors in Iraq as of June 2009, or 8% of the total contractor personnel there (Fontaine and Nagl, 2009: 8; Schwartz, 2009: 6).

As it will be elaborated in the ensuing empirical chapters, the PMSI provided critical support in sustaining the US military operations well beyond the expected scale, timeframe and objectives, and in 'ending the Iraq war responsibly' (McMahon, 2013; Hammes, 2013; Diamond, 2005: 13-14). Following from the previous section about Clear Objectives, it is clear that the US troops were unprepared for pursuing the nation-building strategy which required them to broaden their understanding of the operational environment. Without any specialised training, they were sent on patrols into neighbourhoods with the aim of better intelligence gathering, increasing the perception of security and possibly to gain the trust of the locals. But no matter how brilliant the manual, counterinsurgency policy was implemented by average American soldiers who were predominantly trained for

combat operations and not to patrol as community policeman in the middle of a war zone in a country whose language or culture they did not understand (Ricks: 2007: 267, 272). In other words, the objectives in presidential speeches and military doctrines were not necessarily clear for the individual troops on the ground and the lack of clear translation of those objectives into straightforward military tasks had serious and unintended consequences.

But perhaps most importantly, one of the major obstacles for the US military in Iraq was its hesitant approach to embrace Stability Operations as these were perceived as going against the US military culture (Guttieri, 2006: 219-222). The US military is based around a strict division between the military and civilian world together with cultural differentiation between military personnel and civilians. Until recently, the main US military mission was understood as to fight and win wars, which reflects a deeper seated set of convictions about how the world works. This perceptual dichotomy of the military versus civilian world became apparent when military staffs were to translate policy goals into military objectives and pursue these goals in the civilian realm of stability operations (Ibid.: 220). The US troops in Iraq were geared and trained to fight and kill the enemy and the multinational, multi-dimensional efforts of small units of operating within the civilian population present special problems for the US military (Ibid.: 223).

In regards to the following section, US domestic and Congressional support, the links between all three sections appear to be straightforward. Both Public and Congressional Support and Wholehearted commitment are more likely to be amassed around ideas that can be clearly put across, have a clear purpose and appear feasible given the tools available for their pursuit (Clear Objectives). As these two sections have demonstrated, the US objectives in Iraq underwent major transformations in the face of the operational circumstances on the ground and went well beyond the US military comfort zone of the type of operations it trained for. As a consequence, the US military found itself unprepared, understaffed and at unease about how to achieve them. As the following section will elaborate, the lack of US domestic and Congressional support represented the last of the three major institutional factors which had constraining impact on the US military capability to pursue its strategy and resulted in the need of contribution by the PMSI to sustain its efforts.


V.III. Support of the American People and the Congress

Traditionally, Congressional and public support throughout any military campaign has been deemed essential for a number of reasons – the troops' morale, the war's legitimacy and the availability of resources committed to the war by the nation (Howell and Pevehouse, 2007). According to the democratic peace theory, public opinion is central in regards to a decision to go in war as the perspective of unsuccessful war

and related electoral penalty acts as a powerful restraint against it (Chan and Safran, 2006: 137). Before the US- led invasion was launched on March 19, 2003, 57 per cent of those Americans surveyed were in favour of the war and 38 per cent were against (Ibid.: 138). Although in many other states, the popular opposition to the war commanded a majority, it did not stop the US and UK from asserting a unilateral right to pre-emptively strike another sovereign state, without the approval of the United Nations (Ibid.)

Based on dubious intelligence that has since been widely discredited, the Iraq war gradually lost the US domestic support and according to a Pew Research Center survey, by 2008 an increasingly large proportion said that the initial decision to go to war was wrong (Public Attitudes Toward the War in Iraq: 2003-2008, 2008). While in the first two years of the conflict (until February 2005) a clear majority of the surveyed Americans backed the decision to use force in Iraq, during the third and fourth year (from February 2005 until mid-2006) public opinion on this question was divided and from early 2007 the increasing majority was against the Iraq War (Ibid). The evolution of the US domestic public opinion in regards to the decision to go to war is depicted below.

Figure 14 - Public Attitudes Toward the War in Iraq: 2003-2008



Source: Schwartz and Swain, 2011:26.

According to Chan and Safran (2006: 137), there is a tendency for the public to decrease its support for conflict if it becomes protracted and when its financial and human costs begin to mount. In the case of the US, ever since the Vietnam War, the US public has been extremely cautious about the use of its military in high risk environments, and neither the public, nor the military were prepared to sacrifice a large number of its soldiers or reintroduce the draft in a war of choice vaguely related to the US national interest (Hinnebuch, 2006; Kriner and Shen, 2010: 161-165). In order to circumvent this constraint, the US government resorted to an extensive reliance on contractors which provided an important political advantage of speeding policy response while limiting public input into the policy-making process (Krahmann 2010: 238-240).

While the public support for the Iraq war was strong at the beginning, it waned throughout the years, making it harder for the US government to maintain support for the operation (Newport and Carroll, 2005). The Congressional support of the war was similarly elusive. While at the start only a few were against, with increasing years and further complications, many argued against sustaining the war and the commitment of further resources (Kriner and Shen, 2014). The second Bush administration was forced to fight a series of political actions to repel Congressional attempts to tie further funding of the war to a specific time frame for withdrawal (Baker, 2007). Therefore, as the insurgency grew, the US mobilised private forces with little or no public knowledge, let alone consent (Avant and de Nevers, 2013: 136). As the negative reaction for a mere 20 000 troops for the 2007 surge suggests, the president may well not have been able to deploy additional personnel if he had been required to assess exact needs and obtain Congressional permission earlier in the operation (Shanker and Myers, 2008; Coll, 2008; Lendman and Asongu, 2007: 185-191).

Although the security situation in Iraq was central to the plan, it was framed within the broader outlook of the US mission in Iraq in the face of declining US domestic support for the war (Fitzgerald, 2013: 143). General Casey in June 2005 wrote that the military campaign's 'centre of gravity' was US public opinion, rather than increased security in Iraq (Ibid.). Casey's worry about public opinion stemmed directly from a certain set of lessons from Vietnam that were deeply anchored in the WP doctrine and which sought to limit the numbers of US soldiers

killed in action (Gelpi et al, 2009: 23-66). As such, the small number of US deaths of uniformed personnel in Iraq (less than 4,500 in eight-year-long war) was a result of the increasing emphasis on force protection and the extent to which other allied forces and contractors participated in the war alongside the Americans (Burns, 2007). While the US military carefully counted its uniformed dead in Iraq and human faces of each of these individuals appeared in the US media throughout the war, a full and accurate accounting of killed contractors was not done by the Pentagon, Department of State or USAID, although the Congress had instructed those agencies to do so (Schooner, 2008: 78; Lutz, 2013: 2).


The most reliable data on contractor fatalities in Iraq were collected by the US Labor Department, based on insurance claims if the family or employer of a killed contractor seeks insurance compensation, (Schooner and Swan, 2010: 17). Although it is seen as a positive step towards increasing the public's awareness of contractor casualties, in reality the actual number of contractor fatalities was estimated to be much higher than reported (Miller, 2009). This misperception thus led to a false impression that the war has been far less costly in human terms than it in fact has been. As Schooner noted: 'The public continues to fail to understand how contractors' personnel are increasingly making the ultimate sacrifice alongside, or in lieu of, service members' (Schooner and Swan, 2010: 16).

As a result the use of PMSI in support of US Phase IV in Iraq allowed the US government to mislead the public and hide the accurate tally of the true human toll of this conflict (Schooner and Swan, 2012: 3, Singer, 2007: 4). As the military assigned more contractors to perform dangerous yet vital tasks, contractors were inevitably bearing a larger proportion of the casualty rate without the public being aware of it. Contractors have thus increasingly absorbed the most significant cost of the US misadventure in Iraq – the ultimate sacrifice (Ibid.: 7). The fact that private security solutions could be amassed quickly and without the need for oversight and approval if they cost up to \$50 million made them even more attractive (Kinsey, 2006: 137).

In addition, to keep the political and economic cost of contracting at the minimum, the DoD's contingency contractor force comprised largely of non-US citizens (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, no date). Therefore, should they have become injured or kill, there was a much lower risk that they would have been a US citizen, as these represented a minority of the contracted force. The international profile distributions for the DoD's contractor employees in Iraq reported by CENTCOM provides some evidence.³

³ The individual details on the levels of DOD Contractor Personnel in Iraq divided according to nationality is available through CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, no date).

Figure 15 - Number of DoD Contractor Personnel in Iraq (by Nationality), 2008-2011⁴



Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, no date.

This is very important because, as the United States now operates an all-volunteer armed force, it is hard to see the kind of mass public reaction that was seen in response to US policy in Vietnam. During Vietnam the US Armed Forces met its manpower requirements due to a draft. This meant that, at least in theory, every US male between the ages 19 and 25 had an equal chance of being drafted to serve in the US military (Congressional Budget Office, 2008: 5). This gave a vast part of the population a direct stake in what US policy towards Vietnam was, as it did not only concern the people who served

⁴ For the background values of this graph, see Appendix F.

but also their families and friends (Ibid.). Today, despite the fact that the US military has recently been engaged in the longest period of sustained conflict in the nation's history, just one-half of one percent of American adults has served on active duty at any given time (The Military-Civilian Gap: Fewer Family Connections, 2011). In the context of all volunteer army, the individual citizen is as involved in national defence as he or she chooses to be. According to a survey of a nationwide representative sample of 510 adults age 18-24 in the continental United States from 2006, six in ten individuals could not find Iraq on a map although the U.S. troops had been involved in a major war there since 2003 (National Geographic-Roper Public Affairs, 2006: 8).

In a sense, the biggest act of protest against US policy was the decreasing rate of recruitment rather than the kind of massive protests that characterised the Vietnam War era. The voluntary system meant that the vast majority of the American public had not had an experience of what military life is like beyond the mediated experience of reading a newspaper or watching television news. This means that, although the public may be sympathetic towards the troops and the sacrifices they make, they have little to no understanding of what these sacrifices mean in a practical sense which has a clear political advantage. The surge in PMSI numbers, which preceded the US troops' 2007 surge, was barely noticed by the general public, as the data and coverage of the PMSI numbers and activities in Iraq were sporadic. In addition, the deaths of private contractors, for reasons mentioned above, were not a

politically sensitive issue, in contrast to troops' casualties. Therefore while the US troops were strengthened enormously by the private sector, it all went under the radar of the US media and the public in general, as reinforcing the troops by other troops was not really deemed an option.

V.IV. Conclusion

Among the cases when the international community was called upon to rebuild a shattered state and build a nation after a conflict, Iraq stands out as a state which has not collapsed due to a civil war or internal conflict but as a consequence of an external military intervention which had sought to change its regime (Diamond, 2005: 9). Every post-conflict environment is unique and evolves based on the particular circumstances on the ground shaped by political, economic, religious, and social context of the environment, nevertheless, there are significant institutional factors that shape the intervention on the side of the intervening force as well. In the post 9/11 strategic environment, the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, as a collection of basic principles for future military expeditionary operations based on the lessons learned from Vietnam in particular, was cast aside and the invasion of Iraq went ahead without any serious consideration of any of its six principles. It is an irony that it was General Colin Powell who gave the UN Security Council speech on February 2003 arguing for the Iraq war which was at odds with the principles that the doctrine, named after him, spelled out

a decade earlier (Schwartz, 2013). This fundamentally flawed thinking about future war set the US up for many of the difficulties it would encounter in the Iraq war, where PMSI became an immediate and short-term remedy to the blatant failure on the highest levels.

The robust sustainment capability provided by PMSI gave the US military increased capability, adaptability and agility to sustain Phase IV Operations for as long as it takes and to continue operating without running out of necessary items or services. Not only they replenished items such as food, fuel, and ammunition, but they also provided communication, linguist services and training – all types of services critical to the success of the civilian part of Phase IV Operations. Although the views on success or failure of the US military operations in Iraq are open for debate, it is reasonable to argue that the Phase IV Operations would not have taken place without the extensive support of the PMSI and that the PMSI became the vehicle of adaptability (and continuity), enabling the US military to sustain its presence and activities on the ground in Iraq for eight years, when the original military plans were shattered shortly after the invasion. The PMSI became a backbone of the US efforts to bring the intervention to an acceptable conclusion and, ultimately, a dignified exit, by providing the means to adapt to the dynamic situation on the ground. To this end, the PMSI became an indispensable supportive asset of US foreign policy which effectively enabled the US to bypass the WP doctrine and avoid the full weight of the consequences of otherwise politically and militarily unsustainable operation.

Chapter VI. Base Support Contractors and Their Contribution in Phase IV Operations in Iraq

The previous chapter discussed the institutional factors shaping the PMSI contribution in Phase IV Operations in Iraq and pointed out that the indifference to the lessons learned from the US military operations during the Cold War led the US government to extend its commitment in Iraq beyond the expected size, timeframe, objectives and even the strategic goal of the mission. This chapter concerns the category of Base Support Contractors (BSCs)¹, as a large body of PMSCs specialised in logistical support services and the largest type of service contractors operating in Iraq from 2003-2011 along the US troops. And seeks to provide answer to the adapted research question: 'What kind of contribution have the Base Support Contractors made to the US military capability to pursue Phase IV Operations in Iraq?'

¹ This thesis distinguishes between three sectors: reconstruction, logistics and security. This categorisation corresponds to the three major contingency-contracting areas identified by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (Thibault et al, 2009: 8). It must be noted that any clear-cut distinction between the sectors is only a theoretical exercise as many activities belong to more than one sector and most companies provide a wide range of services across the three sectors. In addition, companies tend to expand or contract their activities depending on their financial situation and instantaneous opportunities, therefore, any fixed distinction between the sectors would be unrealistic (Kinsey, 2009: 6).

In line with the Conceptual Framework (Chapter IV), this chapter argues that the BSCs represented the contribution of Crucial Supporter as they became a critical asset to the US military's capability to adapt its strategy to end Iraq responsibly and leave with dignity as opposed to a hasty withdrawal in the middle of a civil war. This contribution is characterised by three main features: 1) provision of indispensable additional services; 2) being replaceable only under the condition of major changes to the core aspects of the US government's strategy, including the size, length and objectives of the military mission; and 3) creating a prevailing positive impact.

To frame the discussion accordingly, Section I of this chapter explains the choice of logistics for this chapter analysis. Section II shows the breadth and depth of the services provided by the BSCs and explains their significance for the US military strategy in Iraq. Building on the analysis of the importance of the BSCs services, section III provides an assessment of the significance of BSCs as an alternative instrument in US Phase IV Operations. It explains the specific position of KBR, as the major logistics providers in Iraq, where other alternative sources for provision of such services were very limited, if not non-existent. In section IV, discussing both the positive and negative aspects associated with the large scale employment of logistics contractors in Iraq, it is argued that, although large PMSCs have exploited the US government's contracting system through fraud, mismanagement, and misappropriation of government funds, the BSCs have not undermined the overall effectiveness of the US fighting forces. Indeed, it provided prevailing positive

contribution in making the Phase IV Operations sustainable across an extended period of time. Finally, the conclusion discusses why the contribution of Crucial Supporter is the most fitting category for BSCs in the given context and creates a bridge to the next empirical chapter.

VI.I. Context of the Analysis

The CWC reported that two-thirds of the US government spending on contingency contract support in Iraq and Afghanistan was for services (Thibault et al, 2011: 23). As an illustration, for instance, in 2006, out of the total of \$295 billion DoD awarded 48% to equipment and supplies, 13.5% to research development testing and evaluation, and 28.5% to 'other services', understood as military services (Perlo-Freeman and Sköns, 2008: 8). Within this group, the top ten services, that the US government agencies obligated the most dollars for, account for 44% of total service obligations (Thibault et al., 2011: 23). While the Logistics support services clearly dominate the ranking in terms of government spending, the range of services provided by the whole industry is much broader. These top ten services performed in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (FY 2002 through mid-FY 2011), and acquired through contingency contracts, are listed in the table below.

Table 9 - Top 10 Services Acquired through Contingency Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan

Service description	Total (in billions)
Logistics support services	\$46.5
Construction of miscellaneous buildings	10.5
Technical assistance	5.5
Other professional services	5.2
Guard services	3.8
Maintenance and repair, alterations of office buildings	3.5
Construction of office buildings	2.9
Lease-rent or restoration of real property	2.8
Facilities operations support services	2.5
Program management/support services	2.4
Total obligations for top 10 services	\$85.6

Source: Thibault et al., 2011: 23.

Despite the popular image throughout the Iraq War (and its aftermath) implying that the US military was supported by an ‘army of contractors’ or an ‘army of mercenaries,’ such a portrayal is misleading (Bowman, 2011; Gordon, 2010). In the military sense, the term ‘army’ represents a large body of people organized and trained for land warfare, often understood as the entire military land forces of a country (Oxford Dictionaries, no date b). While the use of the term in the context of military outsourcing creates catchy titles, it also evokes the wrong image that contractors in Iraq were a large military-like, armed body of individuals engaged in combat.

The official source on DOD contracting in Iraq, CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports, has been reporting the level of contractors in

Iraq from August 2008.² While it reveals that the number of contractors in Iraq surpassed the number of the Coalition forces in 2008 and again from 2010 onwards, differentiating between the various types of provided services is key (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, no date).³ This is especially because the category of heightened controversy that came to represent the image of the industry - armed contractors, was in fact a minority (Brooks, 2013). As Stillman (2011) explains, it was an army of 'hired hands', rather than 'hired guns' that formed the bulk of contracted support for the US military operations in Iraq.


The example of the CENTCOM Contractor Census Report from 2011 illustrates the variety of services within the PMSI, distinguishing at least eight different types (Schwartz and Swain, 2011: 16, Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011: 233). These categories include base support, security, translator/interpreter, construction, transportation, logistics/ maintenance, communication, training and 'other' (Ibid.). The chart below shows the proportion of each of the service type based on the number of contractor personnel in Iraq at that time. From the graph it is clear that base support (61%) represents the majority of all services and its proportion is at least three times bigger

² For the first three years of Operations Iraqi Freedom, the US government had no count of its contractors either in Iraq or Afghanistan. The approximate estimates of independent commissions and media vary widely, the CENTCOM reports represent the most insightful and consistent insight into DoD contracting for the period 2008-2011 (Isenberg, 2009b: 29).

³ For a comparison of CENTCOM reported estimates of DoD total contractors and total troops between September 2007 and March 2011 in Iraq, see Appendix D.

than the second largest service type – security (18%) (Schwartz and Swain, 2011: 16).

Figure 16 - Number of DoD Contractor Personnel Working in Iraq (by Service Type), March 2011



Source: Schwartz and Swain, 2011: 16.

Although the specific numbers may slightly vary depending on the exact definition of the service type, the CENTCOM reports for the period between March 2008 and March 2011 demonstrate that the proportion of the most controversial, armed contractors working for the US government in Iraq was only a small subsection of the overall contracted support (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel

Readiness, no date).⁴ Instead, the largest proportion of contractors in Iraq provided base support services, which constitute the core of the Private Logistics Sector.

Private Logistics Sector, (PLS), as understood in this thesis, is then an umbrella term for technical and service support contractors, sometimes referred to as logistical support companies or simply PMSCs (Kinsey, 2009: 4). This chapter focusses on the three most prominent services within the PLS, which are base support, transportation and logistics/maintenance (Thibault et al., 2011: 23). As in practice these three types of services very often merge together, this thesis uses Private Logistics Sector (PLS) and Base Support Contractors (BSCs) interchangeably (Schwartz and Swain, 2011: 16). The main reason supporting the choice of PLS as the main object of analysis on the sector level is its sheer size, the breadth of the provided services, representing the largest sector in support of Phase IV Operations in Iraq in personnel proportion (Schwartz and Swain 2011: 26).

Under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program III and IV (LOGCAP III and IV)⁵, programmes administered by the US Army to provide contingency support to augment the Army force structure, the US

⁴ For a comparison of CENTCOM reported estimates of DoD contractors based on the service type between March 2008 and March 2011 in Iraq, see Appendix E.

⁵ The first LOGCAP contract (LOGCAP I) for combat support services in Iraq consisted of a cost-plus-award-fee contract for one year followed by four option years, and was awarded in 1992, to Brown and Root Services, who later became Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR). This contract was used to support US operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Hungary, Saudi Arabia, Haiti, Italy and Rwanda. The second LOGCAP contract (LOGCAP II), a cost-plus award fee contract for one base year followed by four option years was awarded to DynCorp in 1997. This contract was used to support US operations in the Philippines, Guatemala, Colombia, Ecuador, East Timor, and Panama (Congressional Budget Office, 2005: 2-9; Grasso, 2010: 6-9; Mobley, 2004: 23; Grasso, 2007: 2-5).

outsourced a vast majority of support services required for its operations to contractors in Iraq. The LOGCAP III, awarded exclusively to Halliburton/KBR in 2001 was primarily aimed to support the Global War on Terrorism and the following LOGCAP IV from April 2008 widened the number of LOGCAP prime contractors, adding two more companies - DynCorp International LLC and Fluor Intercontinental Inc. (Congressional Budget Office, 2005: 2-9; Grasso, 2010: 6-9; Mobley, 2004: 23; Grasso, 2007: 2-5). The more recent contract, LOGCAP IV, differed greatly from its three predecessors, in that multiple contracts were awarded, to KBR, DynCorp, and Fluor, and the three companies had to compete for task orders that represented particular services that the US Army needed (Ibid.).

During the Phase IV Operations in Iraq, LOGCAP III provided the major instrument for the US military to acquire civilian contractors in order to support its Phase IV Operations. Halliburton/KBR became the LOGCAP III prime vendor and the main logistics contractor for the US government (Congressional Budget Office, 2005: 2-9). Initially, the contract was aimed at developing a contingency plan for extinguishing oil well fires in Iraq, but the actual responsibilities that Halliburton/KBR later performed included housing for troops, preparing food, supplying water, and collecting trash (Grasso, 2010: 8, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2006: 15-17).

The way the company operated was to subcontract the bulk of its responsibilities to hundreds of other firms, many based in the Middle East,

but effectively all around the world (Stillman, 2011). This process was repeated by the Halliburton/KBR subcontractors to narrow down, divide or effectively outsource the large amount of workload they received. The subcontracting mechanism across a number of levels effectively created a web of 'manpower agencies' supplying the workforce from across the globe to meet the US government operational needs in Iraq (Ibid.).

In accordance with the Conceptual Framework, this chapter proceeds with answering three main questions which help determine the contribution the BSC represented in the US Phase IV Operations in Iraq: Firstly, what type of services did the BSC provide to augment the US military capability in Phase IV Operations in Iraq? Secondly, to what extent did the US government depend on the provision of these services in order to sustain its military efforts in Iraq? Thirdly, what was the prevailing value of the BSC' presence and activities in the context of the US efforts in Iraq?

VI.II. The Nature of Base Support Contractors' Services

This section demonstrates that the BSC were Crucial Supporter due to the extent and value of the services, indispensable additional services, they provided under the contract to DoD to support US Phase IV Operations in Iraq. The main motivation behind the US government employment of logistics contractors was to supplement the US military by civilian forces to fill the gap between increasing mission requirements and limited military personnel levels on the ground (Lovewine, 2014: 9, 79;


Rostker, 2007: 5-10). With scarce military resources and an ever-increasing counterinsurgency mission, the US military sought to increase its combat power by using logistics PMSCs in functions that were no longer perceived appropriate for the US troops (Brooks, 2013; Carafano and Rosenzweig, 2005: 37, Singer, 2003: 522).

The BSCs became effectively a force multiplier, enhancing the US military fighting capability, while providing the flexibility to redirect limited assets to meet key mission requirements on the battlefield (Thibault et al., 2009: 60, 72; Lovewine, 2014: 10, 81; McMahon, 2013; Cotton et al., 2010: 45-47) One such example is the replacement of military transportation units in Iraq, usually responsible for delivering supplies in convoys, with PMSCs such as KBR and its subcontractors. Miller (2006: 127) calls them 'the unsung heroes' of the war in Iraq and points out that, despite being an easy target for insurgents, more than seven hundred KBR trucks were operating daily on the dangerous roads around Iraq, providing fuel, water, food and many other crucial supplies for the US military.

The breadth and depth of the range of services provided by contractors in Phase IV Operations was immense as they were involved in almost every aspect of the US government efforts in post-conflict Iraq (Hughes, 2013, Brooks, 2013). The CENTCOM reports illustrate the changing level of all DoD contracted support for the period of 2008-2011. Although the available data from this source cover only contractors operating under DOD contracts, these made up the absolute majority of all

US agency funded contracts overseas (Congressional Budget Office, 2008: 3, 8). Figure 2 shows the various services contractors provided from 2008 until the withdrawal in 2011 and highlights that the three main PLS services together – base support, transportation and logistics/maintenance - represent the largest proportion of all DoD contracted services from March 2008-2011.

Figure 17 - Trend Analysis of DoD Contractor Personnel Working in Iraq (by Service Type), 2008 - 2011




Source: Schwartz and Swain, 2011: 26.

This graph also corresponds to the assessment of the amount of US government spending on contracted support in Iraq. According to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan and its report in 2011, between 2002 and 2011, logistics support services were

on the top of the ten most acquired services through contingency contracts, performed in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan with \$46.5 billion spent in that period (Thibault et al. 2011: 23). Construction followed second with \$10.5 billion, and technical assistance services with \$5.5 billion complete the top three services provided by contractors in Iraq in that period based on US government spending (Ibid.).

The indispensability of the services provided by PLS can also be illustrated through the quantitative assessment of logistics contractors' presence, where large numbers of contractors are perceived as sufficient evidence to indicate their utility. Depicted together with the levels of the total troops and total DoD contractor personnel in Iraq, the following graph illustrates the level of DoD PLS personnel in Iraq from 2009-2011.

Figure 18 - Trend Analysis of Total DoD Contractor Personnel, DoD PLS Personnel and Total US Troops



Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, no date.

In terms of specific PLS services, the two major logistics task orders relevant to US military operations in Iraq were LOGCAP III Task Orders 130 and 151. Both task orders were awarded to KBR to provide support services to the Chief of Mission and Multi-National Force-Iraq personnel in Baghdad and other key locations across Iraq including Basra, Al Hillah and Kirkuk (Grasso, 2010: 20). KBR was responsible for facilities management, laundry, food service, sanitation, maintenance, power and water generation, fuel services, waste and sewage management and transportation (Thibault et al, 2009: 1).

Next to this range of PLS services that the US military traditionally considered indispensable to operate, there is a significant number of services that the US military did not put much emphasis on in the past or simply did not exist. In Iraq, these services, often within the category 'morale, welfare and recreational activities,' were perfected through the use of contractors. They represent additional services aimed at soldiers' happiness to provide them with more pleasant warzone experience. These services include shopping areas, gyms, fast food vendors, cinemas and many others (Chatterjee, 2009: 7-9, 188-189, 213). The US military contracted such services because the operational environment of the Iraq war dictated that the war was less about intensive combat and more about the US military ability to sustain its presence across an extended period of time. In order to do so, the US military, operating as a voluntary force, tried to make the experience more likeable (Ibid.).

Following the Vietnam War and the abolishment of the draft, the relationship between the US military and contractors changed. Unlike during the draft, in the post-Vietnam War period, soldiers were not joining because they had to, but because they wanted to and the military began to feel the pressure to recruit them and also to make them stay (Rostker and Yeh, 2006: 5-10).

The conditions of soldiers' everyday life began to improve in 1990s, following the complaints of soldiers serving in Operation Desert Storm during the 1991. The Army responded by putting more efforts and resources into finding out a better way to support troops in the field. One of the key stimuli which paved the way for contractors overtaking the logistics aspects of US military operations was the concept of prefabricated military bases, which would become a cornerstone of LOGCAP (Chatterjee, 2009: 57). Force Provider was a one-size-fits-all prefabricated base-in-a-box that could be shipped or airlifted anywhere in the world in a standard container. With instructions simple enough for anyone, the need for military engineering experts was eliminated (Ibid.). Providing capacity for 550 soldiers in comfortable climate-controlled tents with facilities including showers, kitchens, laundry rooms, and many others, these mobile bases in containers were the first step for contractors to immerse themselves into the wide possibilities of service contracting in contingency operations (Ibid.).

Once the basic living conditions of soldiers improved, it unlocked a whole range of other improvements to make a volunteer soldier combat-

ready and happy. One of them is certainly food. As Chatterjee described, not that long ago, during the First Gulf War in 1991, most troops lived off Meals Ready to Eat (MRE), which were ready meals in a pouch (Chatterjee, 2009: x; Perry, 2003). In contrast, the dining facilities built and ran by KBR in Iraq offered a great variety of food and sizeable portions (Chatterjee, 2009: xi, Smith, 2012: 85-86). The change in the way the US military fed its troops with the support of contractors in Iraq has been so dramatic that it became a running joke that while in the past troops lost weight on their deployment, in Iraq they gained it (Chatterjee, 2009: 6).

In addition, while some troops lived among the local population, a large majority lived or even operated from the large number of US military bases in Iraq. Many of these bases also had a mini military mall selling a wide range of products. Major U.S. bases also included jewellery stores, souvenir shops, beauty salons and fast-food courts featuring Taco Bell, Subway, Pizza Hut, Cinnabon, Burger Kings, KFCs, McDonalds and many others (Stillman, 2011).

Logistics contractors also provided a wide range of entertainment facilities for troops across Iraq, including open-theatre, video games, personal video-watching stations and movies, pool tables, table tennis, events nights with Latin dancing, and karaoke nights (Chatterjee, 2009: 6-7). According to Susman (2007), the military considered retail centres and food courts crucial to boosting military morale, particularly in places such as Iraq, where every trip outside the military base was rife with risk. This led to the creation of small American towns in the middle of the Iraqi

desert, such as Camp Liberty, Anaconda or Balad Air Base (Ricks, 2006b; Stillman, 2011).

This approach highly valuing soldiers' welfare in warzone was criticized by many, including General Petraeus, as largely counterproductive and creating a gap between the troops and the local population. In contrast, many others within the military saw it as necessary to provide the troops with some level of comfort, hoping to make their deployment a positive experience, in order to retain them (Susman, 2007). Tim Horton, the former head of public relations for LSA Anaconda, provided a simple explanation that this was driven by a clear economic calculus where the US all-volunteer army operates as any other corporation seeking to recruit off the street and give soldiers a reason to stay in by providing all those extra services. While these services do not come cheap, as Horton added, it is better for the military to spend some extra money to keep a volunteer army happy, rather than spend another \$100,000 to train every replacement soldier (Chatterjee, 2009: 10).

In line with the Conceptual Framework chapter, this section highlights the differences between the supplement and substitute approaches in regards to the assessment of contractors' contribution and makes clear that the responsibilities contracted to PLS were indispensable, but only additional, services to contribute to the US military capability to sustain its military mission in Iraq. As discussed above, throughout the period from 2008-2011, base support contractors represented the largest segment of contracted force in Iraq, accounting for

more than all other DOD contractors combined. Although they even outnumbered the US military at certain points, the majority of its services were only to increase the effectiveness and flexibility of the military and not to replace it by taking over its responsibilities. As such, the purpose and nature of the majority of PLS' services is distinct from the purpose and nature of the US troops in stability operations and hence the BSC cannot challenge the US military to represent the contribution of Driver. As a result, PLS could only provide the contribution of Contributor, Implementer, or Crucial Supporter depending on the level of significance of the type service to the overall US efforts – from optional, through essential to indispensable additional services which is elaborated in the following section.

VI.III. The Significance of Base Support Contractors' Service for the Sustainment of the US Phase IV Operations In Iraq

The potential significance of the Base Support Contractors as the main provider of the logistics services ranges from being 'replaceable with no or minor changes to the non-core aspects of the strategy' (Contributor) to 'irreplaceable without major changes to core aspects of the strategy such as the size of the available manpower, available timeframe and desired objectives of the mission' (Crucial Supporter). The level of significance is determined based on the assessment of how much the US military depended on the PLS in order to sustain its efforts in Iraq. In terms of the US Phase IV Operations in Iraq, KBR as the main logistics

provider stands out as a Crucial Supporter that proved replaceable only under the condition of major changes to the core aspects of the US strategy. This means that in its absence the US would most likely not have been able to sustain its operations in the face of the unexpected operational circumstances that unfolded on the ground soon after the invasion.

Under the LOGCAP III programme, the Halliburton-KBR received the largest contract in the GWOT - to provide Iraq mission's logistics, as well as the efforts to restore the Iraqi oil system and build more than 60 locations throughout the Middle East and South Asia (Singer, 2003: 136-148; Thibault et al., 2011: 23). To put the extent of the US reliance on this particular contractor in perspective, no one has benefited more than KBR, who was awarded at least \$39.5bn in federal contracts related to the Iraq war 2003-2011 (Fifield, 2013). By way of comparison, the amount paid to two Kuwaiti companies, Agility Logistics and the state-owned Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (the second and third-biggest winners based on all federal government contracts awarded for performance in Iraq and Kuwait), was reported \$7.2bn and \$6.3bn respectively (Fifield, 2013). Without these companies, the robust logistical support required to enable the US military to operate most likely would not exist.

Without the large scale of support services provided by KBR and its subcontractors, the ability of the US military to perform certain functions would be severely limited, and possibly many important aspects of the mission would be significantly degraded. This fact was acknowledged in

the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, where civilian contractors are categorised as one of the four major components of US Total force together with its active and reserve military components, and its civil servants (Department of Defense, 2006: 75, 81; Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007: 9; Schwartz and Church, 2013: 16).

The need for the large number of logistics contractors and their services stemmed from the decision to deploy a small military force in a complex military operation and the subsequent aim to avoid the negative consequences of that decision. In order to provide the US military leaders the flexibility to redirect limited assets to meet the missions requirements and thus enable the US troops to focus on addressing urgent operational concerns, the US military incorporated the PMSCs as substitutes for uniform military personnel (Petersohn, 2007: 4-5; Lovewine, 2014: 80). As Singer (2003: 244) points out, there were other options to resolve the problem of insufficient forces from - but they were politically problematic. Setting aside the option of a complete and immediate withdrawal of the US military in the face the increasingly complex post-major-combat situation in Iraq, there were three other unlikely alternatives to strengthen the Coalition force. These were to send additional regular troops, full-scale call-up of the National Guard and Reserves, or persuading other allies to send their troops (Ibid.).

The obvious option would have been to send at least twice as many regular forces, beyond the original 135,000 soldiers. This would have

required a public admission of the administration's earlier miscalculations (Ibid.). The idea of such re-enforcement ignores the fact that the regular force was already stretched by the simultaneous war in Afghanistan and other global commitments (Ibid.). The broad opposition of the Congress and general unease for President Bush in obtaining the additional 21,500 combat troops for the Surge in 2007, indicates the reluctance of the US Congress to commit any more troops to Iraq, even under critical circumstances such as the peak of the civilian violence in Iraq in 2006-2007 (Shanker and Myers, 2008; Coll, 2008; Lendman and Asongu, 2007: 185-191). This leads to a conclusion that to substitute the functions of PMSCs in their full extent by more US troops would have been politically non-viable.

Furthermore, the US military did not dispose of such numbers of regular forces to be deployed to Iraq, even if the political constraints were not present. Upon his arrival in office in early 2009, President Obama articulated in his New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, that the War in Iraq drew the dominant share of US troops, resources, diplomacy, and national attention at the expense of the much needed US commitment to the War in Afghanistan (Lee, 2009). Ferguson observed that executing simultaneous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan exposed the US personnel deficit, citing the 500,000 deployable troop limit which he said was not sufficient to win 'all the small wars' the United States was waging and possibly would have to wage in the future (Fergusson, 2005). Already in 2005 the US had approximately 137,000 troops in Iraq where 43% were drawn from the Reserves or the National Guard (Ibid.). This was a

sensitive measure as even larger-scale call-up of the National Guard and Reserves meant widespread outcry among the public as the war effects would have been on the shoulders of the US population (Singer, 2003: 244).

The last option was to negotiate additional troops from US allies to spread the burden. From the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 until the end of 2008, by which time most of the smaller contributors had withdrawn, ground troops from forty-nine countries deployed alongside U.S. forces (Beehner, 2007). Even at its most robust, many of the smaller allies committed only non-combat troops ranging from a few dozens to a few hundred for training and advisory purposes (Ibid.). Since the invasion of Iraq 2003 was highly controversial from its outset, lacking the UN specific endorsement for direct US military action, the little global support for the war is hardly surprising. Some of the traditional US allies, such as Germany, France and Turkey opposed the war and conformed to the prevailing opinion of their domestic audiences. Others, including, for instance, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain decided to go against the domestic opinion of their citizens and follow the US into the war (Hinnebusch, 2006: 454). The public resistance to the Iraq War was unprecedented and large-scale protests took place in many cities across the world before and after the invasion began. The media reported that during one particular weekend before the invasion, 15th and 16th February

2003, a collective protest of up to 30 million people took place against the impending war in Iraq (McFadden, 2003; Chrisafis et al, 2003).⁶

In contrast, the PLS option offered to supplement the US military at almost no political cost (Singer, 2003: 245). It provided the additional manpower without any public outcry about when and where they would be deployed. Also, once the war already started PLS alleviated the pressure on the US government about the execution of the war. As Schooner points out, the US government was balancing the operational need for personnel against the gradual death toll among American troops that threatened to further diminish public approval for the whole military mission (Schooner, 2008: 78, 84, 89). As contractors casualties were not counted in official mission reports, the public had little awareness about the magnitude of their support and their losses (Singer, 2003: 245, Schooner, 2008: 78, 84, 89).

It is worth noting that despite this arrangement between the government and the private sector, the US military was overstretched since the early stages just to maintain the U.S. presence in Iraq, resorting to extending tours of duty and retaining personnel due to be discharged (Fergusson, 2005). First, as early as in 2003 the media reported that the US army would extend Iraqi tours of The National Guard and Reserve troops to a year deployment. Signing up for service with the expectation that they would serve on weekends and for annual training, more than

⁶ For more details and individual insights into what motivated so many people to protest against the Iraq War on February 15, 2003, see the recent, highly acclaimed documentary by Amir Amirani, *We Are Many* (We Are Many, no date).

128,000 were assigned to active military duty both overseas and in the US (Cloud, 2007). Second, in 2007, then-Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, announced three months extension on the standard one-year tour for the Army active duty forces in order to help the US military supply enough troops for ongoing operations (O'Bryant and Waterhouse, 2008: 5; Jeffrey, 2014).

This meant that active-duty soldiers spent more time at war than at home - 15 months on deployment and 12 months at home.⁷ Gates justified this move as the only way to maintain force levels adequate to the US military commitments without having to resort to prevent many soldiers from having less than a year at home between combat tours, designed to rest, retrain and re-equip before having to go back (Cloud, 2007; Tyson and White, 2007). Years later in his memoir, Gates (2014: 58) reflects on the decision to extend the standard one-year tour to 15 months deployment and, although seen as necessary, he admits that he believes that these long tours significantly aggravated PTSD and contributed to a growing number of suicides among soldiers.

In contrast to the early years in the war when the goal for active-duty troops was to spend two years at home for every year deployed, this middle ground solution was preferred to shortening the 'at-home period,' risking to damage morale, undermining recruiting and retention efforts (Cloud, 2007; Tyson and White, 2007). By ordering longer tours for all

⁷ This measure was in place throughout the Surge until July 2008, coinciding approximately with the moment when the US combat troops began their withdrawal from Iraq in the context of the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement's negotiations that set the timeline for U.S. troop withdrawal (O'Bryant and Waterhouse, 2008: 5; Jeffrey, 2014).

active duty Army units, the Pentagon sought to maintain stable force levels and still give soldiers at least a full year at home (Ibid.). By outsourcing logistics on a large scale where the ratio of civilian contractors to US troops remained close to 1:1 (with base support, transportation and logistics/maintenance contractors representing more than 60%), PLS contractors supplemented the US military force and enabled it to sustain its presence and activities. In its absence, it is likely the US military would have had to change substantially its mission objectives.

It is also worth pointing out that the decision to extend the length of Army military deployments came three months after President Bush put forth his new security plan for Iraq to deploy additional troops in support of the Surge (Gates, 2014: 56-61). It reflects the reality that the new strategy, counting on the support of PLS, was still 'unfeasible' without introducing longer Army tours (Tyson and White, 2007). According to O'Bryant and Waterhouse, originally, the additional forces needed for the Surge were to be accomplished primarily by a stepped-up pace of military unit rotations into Iraq and a delay for some personnel departures from that country (O'Bryant and Waterhouse, 2008). Nevertheless, this was circumvented by the extended deployment of the Army active duty forces (Cloud, 2007). Considering that the reported contractors' numbers at that time already surpassed the number of troops, with logistics representing as many as 150 000 depending on the stage of the war and the narrowness of the category's definition, it is possible to conclude that they were irreplaceable in terms of the US strategy in Iraq (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, no date). Using

the categorisation of the Conceptual Framework from chapter IV, it is argued that they were irreplaceable without major changes to the core-aspects of the US strategy, including the size, length and objectives of the mission.

VI.IV. The Impact of BSCs on US Efforts in Phase IV Operations

The two previous sections established that the services provided by BSCs were indispensable additional services and the US military could not operate without the BSCs in Phase IV Operations in Iraq, unless it was willing to compromise the size of available manpower, timeframe and objectives of its mission. This section focusses on the assessment of the prevailing value of its contribution through discussion of the potential impact of its presence and activities on the US strategy.

Unlike the armed security contractors, the logistics sector is a broad area where contractors perform diverse activities that can have different potential impact. In contrast to the APSCs which through their performance of military-like activities have the potential to advance or undermine the US military strategy through affecting the US military standing among the local population, the PLS' are not armed and hence do not have a direct lethal impact on the Iraqi population. Their added value is then demonstrated through their performance to increase the overall capabilities and effectiveness of the US military forces in terms of its overall capacity to execute the mission. As such their potential underperformance impacts directly the US military operational

capabilities and may have more significant and far reaching consequences on the feasibility of the mission than any alleged misconduct of the APSCs.

The final report from the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, evaluating the involvement of BSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan, concluded that although PMSCs performed vital tasks in support of the US military mission, its large-scale employment was surrounded by massive waste and fraud that damaged the US objectives in both countries (Thibault et al, 2011: 1-3). The authors of the report argued that their 'sobering, but conservative estimate' is that 'at least \$31 billion, and possibly as much as \$60 billion, has been lost to massive contract waste, fraud and abuse in America's contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan' (Ibid.: 1, 68-97). Poor planning, management, and oversight of contracts were identified as the main impediments of effective contingency contracting and ultimately threatening US objectives (Thibault et al, 2011: 1-3; Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007: 1-5).

Allegations of fraud, mismanagement, and misappropriation of government funds in regards to US contingency contracting in Iraq have been covered extensively by many authors (Chatterjee, 2009; Singer, 2003: 151-168; Kinsey: 2009: 69-90; Rasor and Bauman, 2007; Miller, 2006, Smith, 2012: 83-100). Among the contractors who provided logistics support in Iraq between 2003 and 2011, KBR gained the most money, \$40.8 billion, and a particularly negative reputation (Thibault et al, 2011: 25). The company was contracted to ensure the flow of supplies, such as

ammunition, fuel, and food, from the US military installations in Kuwait and Jordan into and throughout Iraq, but its performance was often associated with allegations of poor quality, bribery, fraud and false claims and the audit of KBR services in Iraq by the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction revealed many drawbacks (Smith, 2012: 83-100, 141; Feinstein, 2011: 272; Hartung, 2011: 82; Thibault et al., 2011: 67-94). The investigation of KBR records and activities revealed a number of issues with respect to accountability of food, fuel and billeting (Hedgpeth. 2007) For instance, inspectors found that KBR could not account for items with a potential value of up to \$100 million, maintained inaccurate billing records used to overcharge the government resulting in \$221 million in excess KBR fuel payments, and also provided low quality services leading to death of at least twelve US soldiers by electrocution from KBR's faulty equipment (Thibault et al., 2011: 83, 88; Risen, 2008; Bronstein, 2009)

One of the major issues identified in regards to the large scale mismanagement of US government funds in Iraq by logistics contractors was the contracting system under which they operated (Thibault et al, 2011: 1-3; Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007: 1-5). LOGCAP III was the single largest cost-plus award fee contract based on the system where contract fees rose with contract costs (Grasso, 2007: 26). Sometimes referred to as a 'blank check' from the government, under such contract, increased costs also meant increased fees for the contractor (Briody, 2004: 185). Although widely criticised as an irresponsible practice, it was defended by others as it provided contractors with the necessary

flexibility to support operations in quick-pace environments where mission requirements changed fast and frequently (Singer, 2003: 141, Grasso, 2005: 25).

Some contracts are impossible to be set in stone or with a concrete price due to the nature of the environment and factors that may influence it. The Gansler Commission (Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007: 14-15) illustrates that, for instance, a service contract to provide food to war fighters in a remote and dangerous location must often be administered in a very short period of time, with very little information or local resources to rely on. Time is crucial in such situations and any substantial background research is often impossible. As he explains, '[t]he Soldier expects the food services to be provided where they are needed, when needed, and in the quantities needed' (Ibid.: 15). As a result, service contracts that support contingency operations are more complex than service contracts in any other environment. In addition, because not all service contracts are the same even within one country, the process is further exacerbated by the diverse local circumstances that drive unique contracting requirements. As a result, the costs of services become unpredictable and they create an environment prone to overcharge by the companies for goods and services they provide.

However, there is also another, more human, aspect of potential negative impact of the logistics contractors in Iraq, which is human trafficking. Due to its nature, often relying on less qualified cheap labour

force as an integrated mechanism within the sector, logistics contracting can involve human trafficking and exploitation.⁸ Stillman (2011), who exposed the poor treatment of foreign workers on U.S. military bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, explained that tens of thousands foreigners lured by the promise of lucrative jobs, became victims of illegal and fraudulent employment practices. The workers, that Stilmann calls ‘hired hands,’ were primarily from South Asia and Africa and they represented more than 60% of the total contracting force in Iraq (Ibid.). According to her findings many of these third-country nationals (TCNs) were robbed of wages, injured without compensation, subjected to sexual assault, and held in conditions resembling indentured servitude by their subcontractor bosses (Stillman, 2011, Newman, 2012). Likewise, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, reported that during its investigation in Iraq ‘uncovered tragic evidence of the recurrent problem of trafficking in persons by labor brokers or subcontractors of contingency contractors’ (Thibault et al., 2011: 159). At Camp Liberty, one of the small American towns built near Baghdad during the occupation, the contractors’ population at its peak surpassed 100,000 (Vicky, 2012). While they made up 59% of the workforce, handling vital services including catering, cleaning, and electrical and building maintenance, many described their living conditions as modern-day slavery (Vicky, 2012, Newman, 2012, Stillman, 2011, Ross, 2011).

⁸ For a detailed report on human trafficking related to the U.S. government contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, see Human Trafficking: Oversight of Contractors’ Use of Foreign Workers in High-Risk Environments Needs to Be Strengthened (Government Accountability Office, 2014).

Unlike in the case of armed contractors, PLS contractors do not have the daily opportunities to kill local civilians while on duty. Instead it is the vulnerability of the employees within a dysfunctional contracting system that could prove potentially corrupting the US efforts (Thibault et al., 2011: 92). Although increasing the capabilities and effectiveness of US forces at low cost by hiring TCN may seem a practical solution, the scandalous reports on how the modern day slavery enabled the US military to sustain its operations in Iraq are far from being without an impact. To say the least, it further undermined the United States' reputation of the bearer of the free and democratic world (Thibault et al., 2011: 92, Davidson, 2012; Newman, 2012).

With reference to the Conceptual Framework, the prevailing value of PLS contribution must be viewed in a broader strategic context. Large scale mismanagement, fraud and underperformance by PLS in Iraq are undeniable and the investigations of KBR operations revealed excessive government costs and mismanagement of the allocated funds (Hedgpeth, 2007). Nevertheless, no hard evidence has been found to prove that the above discussed areas of concern had the potential to cause the failure of the US mission in Iraq. While they are clearly unsettling, there is no substantial empirical ground to claim that the problematic issues related to contingency contracting discussed in this section were the primary cause of the US limited accomplishment in Iraq. In this regard, this section argues that the PLS did not have a prevailing negative impact on the US military efforts in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. Instead, there is a bulk of evidence that their support made a constructive contribution to the US

military capability to sustain its operations well beyond the expected scope.

VI.V. Conclusion

Setting aside sensational stories about APSCs, and focusing on more mundane examples of services that lie within PLS, this chapter has shown the centrality of contractor support to the conduct of the Phase IV Operations in Iraq. From the media perspective, base support, transportation and logistics/maintenance services may appear less exciting than armed contractors, but while the latter is an exceptional occurrence, the former has become standard fare and a central enabling factor for US global military deployments.

As this chapter demonstrated, the decision to employ logistics contractors on such a grand scale came from the ever expanding operational needs of the US military efforts. Time and again the overstretched military faced a situation where a need cropped up that the military did not want to or could not divert limited forces to satisfy (Singer, 2003: 245). For this reason, PMSCs were hired to supplement the US forces to amplify their capabilities in their efforts. Although the majority of their services may be perceived as menial, the long and extensive military campaign proved that the ability to sustain the US military force logistically is a major task. In this sense, the PLS was the additional US government asset, which effectively sustained the US military in Iraq for eight years without a major logistical crisis.

The extensive outsourcing of wartime logistics—first put to the test during the Clinton Administration, in Somalia and the Balkans—was designed to reduce costs while allowing military personnel to focus on combat. In practice, though, military privatisation has produced convoluted chains of foreign subcontracts that often led to cost overruns and fraud as pointed out by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in its final report (Stillman, 2011; Thibault et al, 2011: 67-95). As the investigations into the overcharging, corruption and missing funds reveal, the inability of the US military to manage the activities of PLS contributed to the industry's questionable actions during the operations in Iraq (Ibid.).

In recent years, following the withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, the US has been very careful not to get engaged in extended stabilisation efforts anymore. Despite the arguable need for stability and reconstruction operations in various countries around the world, the most recent military efforts, in Libya and Syria, have been executed as air operations with the explicit refusal to put 'boots on the ground' or to get involved in drawn-out stabilisation efforts, which appears to be the adopted approach for the near future. In such environment, the scope for logistics contractors' involvement is unlikely to grow beyond what has been witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan where the utility of military force tended to be limited and extended civil-military operations were required (Kinsey and Patterson, 2012: 2). Should the current climate change, the US military will inevitably depend on contractors to assist them in conducting complex missions on the ground involving the whole spectrum of operations.

This dependence has been particularly manifested in the post 9/11 Phase IV Operations. The DoD reported to Congress in April 2008 that the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan were the first expeditionary operations to reflect the full impact of the shift to heavy reliance on contractor personnel for critical support functions in forward operating areas (Department of Defense, 2008: 2, 10, 11). As such, despite serious shortcomings in the US contingency-contracting system, the federal government is unlikely to terminate its reliance on the industry, as it proved to be a crucial provider of supporting services that the coalition forces did not have the capacity to fulfil on their own (Kinsey and Pattersohn, 2012: 2).

Chapter VII. Armed Security Contractors and Their Contribution in Phase IV Operations in Iraq

This chapter concerns the contribution of armed security contractors in support of the US Phase Operations in Iraq. It argues that, according to the Conceptual Framework, APSCs represented the contribution closest to that of Crucial Supporter, which is characterised by three main features: 1) provision of indispensable additional services; 2) being replaceable only under the condition of major changes to the core aspects of the US government's strategy, including the size, length and objectives of the military mission; and 3) creating a prevailing positive impact.

This chapter begins by explaining the choice of APSCs as a subject for this chapter analysis and presents the range of activities that it became involved in in Iraq. It proceeds with an analysis of how the specific type of service provided by APSCs - armed security services - became indispensable to the US strategy in the context of the large scale civilian violence which erupted in the early stages of the post-major combat operations in Iraq. The chapter argues that APSCs occupied a special position where other alternative sources for the provision of armed security services were very limited, or even non-existent. This chapter continues with a discussion of the third element of the contribution assessment: the impact of APSCs on the US efforts in Phase IV Operations

in Iraq. By comparing the conduct of the APSCs and the US troops, this section seeks to demonstrate that both APSCs and the US military followed an identical approach of putting force protection as the absolute priority in order to minimize casualties. As a result, it is argued that, in contrast to the portrayal in much of the literature on the subject, the misconduct of APSCs was not worse than the misconduct of the US military and thus APSCs did not have a distinguishable negative impact on the US Phase IV Operations in Iraq. The conclusion summarizes why the contribution of Crucial Supporter is the most fitting category for APSCs in this context and explains its implications.

VII.I. Context of the Analysis

During Phase IV Operations in Iraq, military outsourcing was undertaken across a wide range of activities in support of US military operations. Nevertheless, very few people outside the contracting industry paid attention to who these contractors were or what they did before March 31, 2004 (Carmola, 2010: 84-85; Dale, 2009: 64; Carafano, 2008: 67). On that day four American security contractors accompanying a shipment of kitchen equipment were brutally killed and hung from a bridge by a cheering crowd in the city of Fallujah in central Iraq. This event represented a watershed moment in public awareness about the extent of military outsourcing in modern US military operations (Ibid.).

The four men were employees of Blackwater USA, a private security company, which was providing specialised armed security services to the

US government, US military and numerous others actors in Iraq.¹ This incident gained such importance because it was the first major reported lethal attack on US contractors in Iraq that revealed a fundamental shift in American warfighting as armed civilians found themselves in the middle of a warzone fulfilling responsibilities under fire on behalf of the US government (Fainaru, 2009: 70).

For the purpose of this chapter, a distinction is made between Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), Private Security Companies (PSCs) and Armed Private Security Companies (APSCs). Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), defined in Chapter III, are understood as companies providing military support services related to warfare, including logistical support and technical assistance, and security services, including armed security services. Private Security Companies (PSCs) are a particular subset of PMSCs specializing in security services, land-mine clearance, military intelligence and/or military and police training (Holmqvist, 2005: 3-6). APSCs are a narrow sub-category of PSCs, who specialize in, or a significant bulk of their work is concentrated on, the provision of armed security services (Dunigan, 2011: 1-2). The activities of the APSCs can be categorised as follows: the provision of armed personal security details, armed static security and armed convoy security (Thibault et al., 2011: 66; Ortiz, 2010: 6-7).

In Iraq, APSCs were hired by many different actors. Next to the US Government, PSCs worked for many other different clients, including the

¹ For a detailed account of Blackwater USA and its involvement in the Iraq War, see Scahill (2008).

British and Iraqi government, large corporations (providing logistics, reconstruction and others), non-governmental organisations, private companies doing business in Iraq, and even the media (Glantz and Lehren, 2010). The DoD established two acquisition contracts, the Theater Wide Internal Security Services (TWISS) contract and Reconstruction Security Support Services (RSSS) contract (Lovewine, 2014: 9, Thibault et al., 2011: 66-68).

The key element of the TWISS contract was the contracting of armed static security services for US military installations and facilities throughout Iraq and Afghanistan, including many large and medium-sized Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). This contract was awarded to Aegis Defense Services, Limited, EOD Technology, Inc., Sabre International Security, Special Operations Consulting - Security Management Group (SOC-SMG) and Triple Canopy (Lovewine, 2014: 8). The RSSS contract, on the other hand, awarded to companies such as Aegis Defense Services and Global Strategies Group (Integrated Security), was primarily concerned with protection of non-military convoy movements and ongoing capacity-building projects (Ibid).

However, the security services that the contractors in Iraq became most well-known for were the armed protection services provided to DoS. The DoS history with security contractors goes back to in mid-1980s, when the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security began using civilian contract personal security specialists (PSS) at US overseas missions, including Haiti, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Israel and Iraq (Isenberg,


2009: 30). Recognising the persisting need, in 2000, the DoS developed the Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS) contract as a tool for using PSS on its missions in former Yugoslavia, the Palestinian Territories, and Afghanistan and for the US embassy in Baghdad, when it opened on July 1, 2004. Because the original and sole prime contractors, DynCorp International, was unable to meet the full requirements of the DoS' expanding mission, two more companies were contracted to work the DoS – Blackwater USA and Triple Canopy (Ibid.).

To reflect an increasing requirement for protective services throughout the world, in 2005, the DoS replaced its existing WPPS with WPPS II contract to provide personal security services for its employees in Iraq who were not under the protection of DoD (Dale, 2009: 1-6, 48-49; Elsea et al. 2008: 7). The new contract with all three companies, Blackwater USA, Triple Canopy and DynCorp International, served for a provision of a narrow range of tactical duties, including protection of certain foreign heads of state, high-level US officials (including members of Congress) and US diplomats under Chief-of-Mission authority in places such as Jerusalem, Kabul, Bosnia, Baghdad, Basra, Al Hillah, Kirkuk and Erbil (Isenberg, 2009: 30). While these above named companies became the most prominent in Iraq as the DoD and DoS prime contractors, many others worked for these ones two, three, four or even more levels down the contracting chain (Ibid, 2009). The use of APSCs by the US government under the multiple contract vehicles (TWISS, RSSS, and WPPS) together with numerous subcontractors has made discriminating between the empirical data on individual APSCs virtually impossible. As such, the data

utilised in this chapter encompasses APSCs working across Iraq, looking at their services as armed security contractors, rather than classifying them according to their individual employer.


It is important to note that while APSCs worked for both DoD and DoS there are important differences in the significance of this type of service for the individual departments. Majority of contractors in Iraq were employed by DoD; the Congressional Budget Office estimated that in 2008 their number was approximately 149,400 contractor personnel (including subcontractors) (Congressional Budget Office, 2008: 9). Of this number, more than one-half of the contractors performed base support functions, 20 percent provided construction services and less than 10 percent belonged to security services (Ibid., 8-10). In contrast, the DoS reported estimates from late 2007 highlight that about 40 percent of the approximately 6,700 contractors working for the department in Iraq were providing security, with the next highest percentages working for the police and correction advisors' services and administration (Ibid.: 11). The two graphs below illustrate these proportions. They seek to demonstrate that while security services represent the main function among DoS contractor personnel, in the case of DoD they are only a small minority. Also, it is important to stress that not all Security services contractors provide armed security. In April 2008, 5,613 of DoD's 7,259 security contractor personnel in Iraq were authorized to be armed (Ibid.: 19).

Figure 19 - Number of DoD Contractor Personnel Working in Iraq (by Function), 2008



Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2008: 10.

Figure 20 - Number of DoS Contractor Personnel Working in Iraq (by Function), 2007



Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2008: 11.

The reasons supporting the choice of APSCs as the main object of analysis is the unique nature of their services and the amount of detailed empirical data available on their specific activities. APSCs are the closest type of service resembling the regular military troops and as the only service-providers who are armed, they stand separately from the rest of

the outsourced services in Iraq (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2003). Owing to their unique position they also have the potential to kill or cause serious bodily harm in the line of duty. As such, they may make an impact on the efforts of the US military to create an environment favourable for military operations in Iraq, in particular, with respect to the strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’ of the local population (Lovewine, 2014: 17-49; Hammes, 2011: 29-30; Elsea et al., 2008: 3).

In accordance with the Conceptual Framework, this chapter proceeds with answering three main questions which help determine the contribution the APSCs represented in the US Phase IV Operations in Iraq: Firstly, what type of services did the APSCs provide to augment the US military capability in Phase IV Operations in Iraq? Secondly, to what extent did the US government depend on the provision of these services in order to sustain its military efforts in Iraq? Thirdly, what was the prevailing value of the APSCs’ presence and activities in the context of the US efforts in Iraq?

VII.II. The Nature of Armed Private Security Contractors’ Services

According to the Conceptual Framework, the significance of the provided service can be differentiated in two steps. To start with, a distinction between additional service (to supplement the US military) and main service (to substitute the US military) must be made. Next, the level of significance can be determined based on the assessment of whether the service provided was optional, essential or indispensable.

Both the nature and type of services provided by APSCs were fundamentally distinct from the main services provided by the US military in Phase IV Operations. APSCs' main duties were to provide armed protection for convoys, to safeguard a heavy presence of diplomats and reconstruction experts, and to offer static security for facilities across Iraq, including US military bases (Brooks, 2013). By contrast, the core of US military's involvement in Phase IV Operations in Iraq consisted predominantly of activities such as foot/mounted patrols, checkpoints, raids, and house-to-house searches in civilian neighbourhoods in order to find specific individuals and/or to collect evidence of conspiracy by the locals against the US military presence, which was deemed as supporting the insurgency (Mortillo, 2008; Hicks, 2008; Hurd, 2008; Kochergin, 2008). Such responsibilities were located at the heart of the Counterinsurgency strategy (activities equal to 'Main services') and were never entrusted to APSCs (Brooks, 2013; Thibault et al., 2011: 66; Ortiz, 2010: 6-7). Therefore, APSCs did not act as a substitute for the services of the US military; instead they supplemented them.

As a result, APSCs could only represent the contribution of Contributor, Implementer, or Crucial Supporter depending on the level of significance of their service to the overall US efforts – from optional, through essential to indispensable additional services. The significance of the outsourced armed security services during Phase IV Operations in Iraq is to be found in the provision of the three vital additional services in a high risk environment: protection to convoys, personal security details, and static security for facilities across Iraq.

The main reason for the significance of the armed security services in Phase IV Operations in Iraq was the high level of violence that spread across the country soon after the end of major combat operations (Brooks, 2013; Hughes, 2013; Hammes, 2013). The US government envisaged and prepared for the involvement of a reconstruction and logistics force, since it assumed that Iraq would need large scale reconstruction after the conflict. However, the US did not envisage the high risk environment that unfolded after the fall of Baghdad. The US had prepared for a peaceful reconstruction of Iraq with a 'light footprint'; the complete opposite of the extremely dangerous environment it found itself in (Ibid.).

Until the end of 2003/ beginning of 2004, the US was in insurgency denial mode. The military's main goal was to capture or kill terrorists, while the US government was pressurising reconstruction companies to do their job of rebuilding the Iraqi infrastructure (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2008: 276-278). As such the major problem this strategy was facing was how to proceed with the reconstruction when operating in a high risk environment where widespread violence occurred daily. The increased insecurity became a major challenge for aid workers and private contractors operating in Iraq, raised unease about personal safety and created delays in the progress of work (Brooks, 2013).

At the same time, it was the US government's policy that contracts needed to be delivered, in spite of the insecurity as completed civilian projects were seen as a pre-requisite to mitigate the insurgency (Brown:

2005: 761-763). The political climate and the level of violence were seen as being directly related, as uncompleted reconstruction projects left Iraqis frustrated and sceptical of the aims of the US occupation, and of the legitimacy of the new provisional government (Hughes, 2013; Bremer, 2013).

In response to the fragile security, the US military responded with efforts to ensure safety by requiring the contractors working for the US government to coordinate all trips with the American military and be escorted by military vehicles or private security companies. Because of the overwhelming need for security all over Iraq, this was not always feasible (Hammes, 2013; McMahon, 2013). It quickly became apparent that criminal gangs were kidnapping foreigners and selling them to terrorist groups. Fearing for their lives, many of the contracted employees left or refused to work outside the military bases, which had a limited positive impact on the life of ordinary Iraqis (Flaherty and Spinner, 2004).

According to the USAID reports, between May 2003 and 2004 the number of contractors decreased by 30% and, although the exact data is unavailable, this estimate reflects the reality that contractors in Iraq were a high target (Ibid.). The insecurity of contractors was acknowledged as a serious issue both for the various companies operating in Iraq but also for the US military relying on their services (Hammes, 2013; Brooks, 2013)

This led to a situation where, very early in the post-conflict environment money was being spent on security instead of reconstruction, which created a large number of opportunities for security services

contractors (Spinner, 2003). This was further stimulated by the fact the major US-funded rebuilding companies were required to provide their own security, and owing to their type of contract with the government, cost-plus type contract, money was not an obstacle (Grasso, 2010: 24-26). Smaller subcontracting firms were also hiring armed protection, which created more demand for the services. Soon the demand for security contractors was so high that companies were hiring employees from their competitors inside Iraq by offering them more lucrative pay (Scahill, 2007).

The major problem for the reconstruction contractors was that they were not permitted to carry weapons and the US military did not have the capacity to provide them with security (Congressional Budget Office, 2008: 19). Providing protection for agencies and contractors who were not DoD civilian personnel or who were not directly supporting the military mission has never been part of the US military's stated mission. On the contrary, the reconstruction contracts were agreed on the premise that the reconstruction contractors' security would become their own responsibility. With increasing levels of violence, a large number of employees refused to work outside of bases. The lack of progress was detrimental to US strategy and its goal to leave Iraq in the hands of the new Iraqi government (Hammes, 2013, Bremer, 2013).

Uninterrupted and completed reconstruction projects were deemed essential for the US strategy in Iraq, as an intricate part of the US efforts to stimulate Iraqi development towards an independently

functioning regime (Bremer, 2013; Hughes, 2013). For this reason, especially in the early stages of the post-combat environment, providing security to the large reconstruction endeavour was one of the major areas of APSCs employment, where the US efforts to rebuild Iraq were an inseparable part of the US military strategy. Thus, the provision of armed security services for the reconstruction projects had a direct relevance to the broader counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. As RAND's Reconstruction under Fire report identified, the provision of essential services, specifically electricity and the associated critical infrastructure, was one of the three crucial interrelated foundation stones for the development of Iraqi society (Gompert et al, 2009: 117-118). Similarly, the US government and military studies shared the view that the lack of basic services, among other things, was one of the major obstacles towards a positive development (Henderson, 2005: 1-2).

In this high-risk environment, reconstruction companies had no choice other than to subcontract and rely on the services of APSCs. Although the US military retained the responsibility for protection of its own personnel to a certain extent, its aim was to delegate the responsibility for armed security provision of a vast number of logistics and reconstruction contractors to other contractors. The unfulfilled expectations regarding the smooth transition into democracy, and a great misjudgement of the level of organized resistance following the fall of Baghdad, caught the US military by surprise, and APSCs became a fitting solution providing exactly what the US military was in need of.

Moving material for reconstruction and sustaining troops through highly insecure and actively hostile areas, providing close protection of civilian and non-government officials working on the rebuilding projects and sustaining the work on broader nation-building objectives, were the main reasons why the US resorted to the private sector for the provision of armed protection (Hammes, 2013; Hughes, 2013). Furthermore, from the military perspective, this was welcomed, as it freed up the regular troops from such responsibilities. From the beginning of Phase IV Operations in 2003, a number of US commanders expressed their frustration with the insufficient manpower that was available on the ground and delegating some of the military responsibilities provided a much needed relief for the overstretched US military forces (Mayer, 2013; McMahon, 2013).

Similarly, in the logistics sector, the companies were largely dependent on the services of APSCs. The US Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) managed the use of contractors by the DoD in logistics support to contingency mobilizations (Lovewine, 2014: 102-104; Singer, 2008). DynCorp International, Fluor Corporation, and KBR were the prime LOGCAP contractors that were also responsible for providing for their own security, which led these companies to subcontract the armed security services on a lower level (Brooks, 2013). In terms of convoy security, APSCs such as ArmorGroup with its 9000 men, provided protection for about one third of all non-military supply convoys in Iraq (McKenna and Johnson, 2012).

This overwhelming demand for armed security services was mirrored in the growth of the whole sector of the industry, which saw many small or medium companies develop into major corporations between 2003 and 2005 (Brooks, 2013). Many established companies in other sectors reacted to the opportunity by focussing on armed private security services or adding them to their list of services. One example was DynCorp International, a 60-year-old firm that diversified into armed security with the war in Iraq (The Economist, 2013). Several others, such as Triple Canopy, were founded to take advantage of the Iraq situation as the demand for security services was unprecedented (Ibid.).

In Iraq it was Blackwater which gained most attention through protecting high-profile people such as Paul Bremer, the head of the transitional authority after the invasion of Iraq, and other senior State Department employees. On their visits to Iraq, then Senators Joe Biden, Chuck Hagel, John Kerry and Barrack Obama, during his presidential candidate trip to Iraq were all protected by Blackwater (Prince, 2013: 254). While Blackwater was not the only service provider available, it became the preferred armed security contractor for the US government for high-profile visits. This was even the case for high military-ranking officials (Scahill, 2007). As such, the APSCs provided indispensable additional services that underpinned American efforts to subdue resistance and establish control in Iraq.

VII.III. The Significance of Armed Private Security Contractors'

Services for the Sustainment of the US Phase IV Operations In Iraq

According to the Conceptual Framework, the significance of the provider ranges from 'replaceable with no or minor changes to the non-core aspects of the strategy' (Contributor) to 'irreplaceable without major changes to core aspects of the strategy such as the size of the available manpower, available timeframe and desired objectives of the mission' (Crucial Supporter). The significance of APSCs is determined based on the assessment of the extent to which the US government/ military depended on the APSCs providing those services in order to sustain its efforts in Iraq.

The unrealistic expectations of the US government about the post-major combat environment in Iraq was the main reason for the lack of preparedness of the US military and the pressing need for the armed security services in order to sustain the US rebuilding efforts (Biddle, 2013; Hammes, 2013, Brooks, 2013). The lack of an adequate number of US troops on the ground in Iraq, the incapability of Iraqi military and security forces, and the limited support offered by the Coalition members are identified as the main reasons why the APSCs became irreplaceable unless the US military was willing to alter its strategy (Ibid.). APSCs as a Crucial Supporter were one step above being a mere Contributor or Implementer, as their services were indispensable to the rebuilding efforts, but, at the same time, they did not carry out the indispensable main services provided by the US military. Therefore, while the replacement of the APSCs as main providers of armed security services

was possible, the US military could not operate without the APSCs in Phase IV Operations in Iraq, unless it was willing to compromise the size of available manpower, timeframe and objectives of its mission, therefore having to make major changes to the core aspects of the strategy.

APSCs became a Crucial Supporter because the US lacked adequate numbers of combat troops to execute a full military occupation (McMahon, 2013). The US military planning for the Iraq war did not consider the scenario of a military occupation as realistic and gave preference to planning for a light intervening force implementing the strategy of rolling-start deployment which envisaged equally quick withdrawal once the Iraqi regime fell (Bensahel, 2006: 453-462). In the face of the worsening security situation, US military commanders became outspoken about the difficulties to get the situation under control with the limited numbers of US forces available (McMahon, 2013; Hammes, 2013; Diamond, 2005: 13-14).

The US military had two other options regarding the APSCs: to substitute them with Iraqi military and security forces, or with combat troops from other Coalition forces. Neither of these was possible.

The first option, using Iraqi military and security forces, proved to be a non-viable option as none of Iraq's pre-war security forces or structures were left intact or available for duty after major combat operations (Hughes, 2013). US pre-war planning had foreseen an immediate and practical need for law enforcement as some challenges to law and order were expected after the collapse of the old regime.

However, pre-war planning had erroneously assumed that Iraqi local police forces would be available to help provide security for the Iraqi people (Ibid.). The US military pre-war planning assumed that Iraqi military units would be available for recall and reassignment after the war, and included options for using some of these forces to guard borders or perform other security tasks (Dale, 2008: 61).

Instead, on May 23, 2003, the Coalition provisional Authority issued CPA Order Number 2, which dissolved all Iraqi military services, including the Army. It remains unclear why this decision was made as there are contrasting views on its source and intended purpose (Bremer, 2013; Hughes, 2013). Ultimately, the consequences of that decision had resulted in unintended consequences which hampered the option of unit recall to support security or reconstruction activities, or to rebuild a new Iraqi army (Dale, 2008: 75). In response to this, the development of the ISF and the ministries of Defence and Interior to oversee them became a critical component of the US Strategy in Iraq evolving according to events on the ground (Ibid.).

Recognizing the pressing need for security providers in Iraq, the US military launched police training initiatives, initially in the form of three week courses, with the goal of quickly deploying newly trained Iraqi personnel at least on temporary basis (Ibid: 76). In his Iraq memoirs, Ambassador Bremer, quotes Doug Brand, the Senior Adviser to the Interior Ministry, during one of their meetings to discuss police training. When describing the situation, Brand said that under the order from the

highest military levels, '(t)he Army is sweeping up half-educated men off the streets, running them through a three-week training course, arming them, and then calling them 'police'' (Bremer, 2006: 183). As a result of this approach, in 2008 DoD reported that there were approximately 615,000 members assigned to the Iraqi Security Forces (Dale, 2009: 93). Although the significant numbers of ISF personnel are revealing in terms of the quantity of potentially available security providers, some qualitative insight is needed to provide a more complete picture of the complexity of building independent and self-sustaining Iraqi security forces.

Based on the 2007 Congressionally-mandated report by the Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq (Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 2007), it appears that while there was a continuous improvement in ISF readiness and capability, it was not seen as being able to operate independently.² Troubled by corruption, desertion and sectarianism, and mostly seen as a hollow army, the Iraqi Security Forces were largely unfit to replace the APSCs in their responsibilities (Cordesman, 2011: 3-4).

Additional Coalition forces as an alternative to APSCs were not feasible owing to the limited interest of the US Coalition partners to contribute troops on the ground. The original list of countries who supported, militarily or verbally, the military action and subsequent military presence in Iraq included 49 members (The White House, 2003). The contributions of the Coalition forces in terms of the number of

² For details on Iraqi Security Forces and their development, see Cordesman et al. (2013) and Cordesman and Baetjer (2006).

countries and troops reached its peak in the early post-major combat period when thirty-eight countries supplied around 25,000 forces (Beehner, 2007). Since then, the size and scope of the coalition was continuously diminishing across time. Prior to some major withdrawals in 2008, the most significant allies in terms of the size of their troops' contribution, ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand troops, were the United Kingdom, Italy, South Korea, Poland, Australia, Georgia and Romania (Ibid.). The largest and longest non-US Coalition partner throughout the operations was the UK, which at its peak contributed 7100 troops, which by summer 2009 were down to 400 soldiers (Ibid.). In addition, most of the allies operated in a non-combat function and focussed on other supporting activities such as training of Iraqi security forces or assisting with reconstruction efforts (Ibid.). The high number of APSCs compared to the contributions of coalition partners highlights the irreplaceable nature of the contractors in the US military's mission in Iraq.

In the case of DoS, the magnitude of its mission in Iraq, assessed as 'the largest nation-building effort since World War II', overwhelmed its capacity to provide security for its own personnel and preference was given to APSCs as an immediate solution to the problem (Brennan, 2013: v; Elsea, 2008: 6-7). Even when allegations of APSCs' misbehaviour in Iraq appeared and the Iraqi government demanded ban on the use of APSCs in Iraq, the US government continued to entrust them with responsibilities (Shane, 2008). DoS could not operate without them as in their absence, DoS personnel could not leave the military bases and the DoS had to stop its activities outside the security of military installations (Kramer, 2007).

The disparity between the public condemnation of those companies by the US government and their continuous employment illustrates ‘how hamstrung American civilian officials *were* in Baghdad without private security contractors’ (Ibid.)

VII.IV. The Impact of APSCs on US Efforts in Phase IV Operations

The first section demonstrated how the specialised services of APSCs were indispensable especially in the early stages of Phase IV Operations due to the hostile nature of the environment. The second section illustrated the dependence of the US strategy on the APSCs as exclusive providers of those services due to the limited availability of other alternatives for their replacement. This section looks at the impact of the companies as the agents of these services on the ground, acknowledging their controversial reputation that many believe put US efforts in jeopardy.

Their impact can be assessed through the lens of their conduct on the ground in comparison to that of the US regular troops, whose efforts they were to support. Differentiating between conforming to (advancing the US military efforts) or deviating from (undermining the US military efforts) the behaviour of the US military makes possible to assess the impact of APSCs’ activities according to the Conceptual Framework.³ This section provides evidence that both groups, often deliberately and

³ It needs to be acknowledged that this thesis refrains from any assessment of the US military conduct per se, as it is not the focus of this thesis. For discussion of the US military conduct in Iraq and its implications, see Maestrovic (2009) and Kennard (2012).

consciously, took advantage of the benevolence of the accountability system in place, which impacted negatively on the Phase IV Operations operational environment.

The contrast between the potential operational benefits and risks of contracted services, could not be seen any more starkly than in the narrow scope of activities of APSCs in Phase IV operations. Like regular troops, these companies operated most of the time outside of the relative security of military bases, were equipped with firearms, and most of them were in direct daily contact with the local population (Hammes, 2011: 29-31). Thus, their responsibilities led them to work in a high risk environment full of civilians, where their main aim was to protect a person, a site or an object, and, ultimately, their own life. Similar to the troops, their conduct outside of the relative security of the military bases was much more significant for the US military effort than the professional conduct of any other type of services contracted by US government.

As the chapter on research context outlined, from the US military perspective COIN is a population-centred strategy, where winning the moral ground (and thus the sympathy of the local population) is the centre of gravity. As Kilcullen (2006: 8) noted 'counterinsurgency is armed social work; an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at.' In such environment, restraint is considered an important element of military operations due to the increased potential for an individual soldier's actions at the tactical level to have magnifying political consequences at the operations and strategic levels (Ruffa et al., 2013).

The COIN strategy is based around the principle that the side supported by the population, will be the side that eventually prevails and losing the moral ground in COIN appears to be a core problem of modern warfare (Pennekamp, 2013: 1633; Department of the Army, 2006: 7-2).

Although APSCs did not provide combat services in Iraq, the focus of their activities often placed them in harm's way in order to fulfil their contract and allowed them to be armed and use lethal force in their defence (Elsea, 2010: 6). In this respect, APSCs arguably had the potential to influence how the occupation force was perceived through their everyday activities among the local population, which sometimes led to civilian casualties. Often described as brutish and amateurish, some observers raised concerns about these actors being an impediment to the success of the operations they were meant to support (Hammes, 2011; Glantz and Lehren, 2010; Singer, 2007: 2). Pointing out examples of their misbehaviour in Iraq, many observers argued that their reckless behaviour puts US military objectives at risk as the local population did not make any distinction between armed contractors and the US military (De Nevers, 2009: 183; Elsea et al., 2008: 36; Dale, 2008: 72). As a result, armed contractors were largely condemned as operating without any concern for the US larger strategic goals and having detrimental negative impact on the US mission in Iraq (Fainaru, 2007).

The media, in particular, fuelled this negative perception by providing detailed accounts of individual cases of contractor abuses in OIF and linking them the mercenary companies of the Cold War years, such as

the now defunct Executive Outcomes and Sandline, which were hired for military operations in Africa during the 1990s (Murphy, 2004; Burns, 2007). Their alleged lack of restraint and cultural sensitivity toward the local population gained them a reputation of being trigger-happy, firing first in the majority of their 'escalation of force' incidents (Ryan, 2007). Blackwater had the worst reputation, which may have resulted from it providing security for many very important individuals and operating in more dangerous areas than its competitors, notably in central Iraq including Baghdad. However, other contractors have similar records. Reports about bullying, abuse, intimidation and even killing of local civilians by APSCs appeared regularly in the media covering the situation in Iraq. For example, in August 2007, an employee of Triple Canopy was accused of shooting at two civilian cars in Baghdad the previous year, after telling his colleagues that he wanted to 'kill somebody' before leaving the country on vacation (Burns, 2007)

As Hammes (2011: 5) argues, the fact that the US armed and authorized them to use deadly force in its name had a serious negative effect during counterinsurgency operations. In his view, which is shared by many others, the lack of effective control over the quality of the contractors and their actions led to the local population perceiving the US government as being responsible for everything the contractors did or failed to do (Ibid.). Any possible misdeeds on behalf of the contractors then arguably worked against the goals of the military forces, rather than helping and enforcing them (Ibid.). They arguably caused the military

force to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the local population resulting in anti-American sentiment being directed towards the troops (Ibid.).

This view echoes Singer's earlier observations that the use of contractors have hindered rather than helped US counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq (2007: III). As he explains, contractors 'inflamed popular opinion against, rather than for, the American mission through operational practices that ignore the principles of counterinsurgency' and they 'participated in a series of abuses that have undermined efforts at winning the 'hearts and minds' of the Iraqi people' (Ibid.).

In contrast to these views, this chapter contends that the whole logic of the argument that the presence and activities of APSCs threatened the US strategy of 'winning hearts and minds' is flawed. The proposition that APSCs had the potential to make substantial negative influence on how the US military was perceived in Iraq suggests that the local population had either positive, or at least neutral, feelings towards the occupying forces in the first place. In this regard, it implies that as a reaction to the APSCs activities the population may have swung away from the Coalition forces to side with the insurgents instead. Only under this condition could the population possibly be alienated and antagonized. Most importantly, it stipulates that the professional conduct of the APSCs was significantly different (worse) from the one adopted by the US military. This chapter shows that neither of these assumptions can be proven.

There have been a number of reported misconduct incidents on the side of APSC; most of them went unnoticed and caused little attention until September 2007. The Nisour square incident became an iconic moment in terms of the face of military outsourcing, had long-term consequences on the US-Iraqi relations, and was allegedly the cause why the Iraqi government did not grant the US troops legal immunity after 2011 (Risen, 2014). For many people it came to represent the characteristic behaviour of private armed contractors during the Iraq war and it anchored the label of 'mercenaries' for the whole industry, which the industry found very difficult to get rid of. It would appear that the Nisour Square incident must have been the biggest, bloodiest, or the most unusual incident of misconduct in Iraq; however, it was not. While it remains the most notorious incident and in the view of many people it characterises the type of APSCs' behaviour, its general significance to the war effort is overestimated.

The Nisour Square incident has been described as the most controversial incident due to the numerous accounts about what happened that day. According to the most recent trial, the essence of the story is as follows: Four Blackwater security contractors killed seventeen civilians and wounded dozens during a shooting at a Baghdad road junction on September 16, 2007. The shooting followed an explosion of a bomb which coincided with the contractors' convoy approaching the junction at Nisour Square. The four Blackwater guards claimed they believed they were under attack by an insurgent car bombing attempt, however, no weapons or explosives were found on any of the dead Iraqis,

despite an extensive FBI investigation.⁴ Instead, the official US investigation led to three men facing manslaughter charges, one being accused of murder, and a fifth admitting the manslaughter and testifying against his former colleagues (Roberts, 2014). It is not the purpose of this chapter to analyse how and why this particular incident happened. Instead, this chapter argues that it is just a drop in the ocean of APSCs incidents of misconduct in Iraq. More importantly, this type of misconduct was not exclusive to the APSCs.

While it is one of the incidents that caused a media frenzy and sparked a heated debate in the US about who the APSCs and the rules they were governed by were, the incident remains one of many similar or worse ones perpetrated not just by APSCs, but by the US military as well. A closer look into the reported misconduct incidents and the testimonies of Iraqi veterans analysed in this thesis shows that the APSCs did not have the negative strategic impact which was often assigned to them.

Comparing the US military and APSCs conduct, there is one important difference to be noted. On the whole PSCs do not seek to conduct combat operations or catch insurgents (Brooks, 2013). They are not assigned to potentially lethal military operations and their biggest risk to cause civilian casualties is when escorting convoys or important people (Ibid.). As a result, the main difference is that the US military, while executing its mission of capturing and defeating insurgents, actively seeks and plans for confrontation. As part of their duties, US patrols intentionally

⁴ It needs to be added that a thorough investigation and collection of evidence from the scene by the US government did not start less than 2 weeks after the incident (Dickinson, 2011: 60).

and routinely drive through or are sent to high-risk places in an attempt to capture particular insurgents or catch them planting bombs or when involved in other suspicious hostile activities (Hamilton, 2008; LeDuc, 2008; Childers, 2008). In contrast, APSCs' primary responsibility is to stay away from potential danger and complete the mission with an unharmed client (or undamaged goods) (Brooks, 2013).

Therefore, the operational logic of the two groups is significantly different. One seeks out a potential hazard, the other tries to avoid it completely. Also, once confronted, the military is likely to move in and attempt to capture the insurgents for intelligence purposes, while APSCs are trained to move away from any suspicious activity as fast as possible, using covering fire, if needed (Ibid.). It is usually this covering fire, in highly populated areas, that leads to allegations that they are reckless.

The general US military's approach was to pursue the enemy following an ambush (Washburn, 2008; Turner, 2008; Lemieux, 2008). One such example was when US troops responded to an IED explosion by raiding a nearby complex of civilian houses on November 19, 2005 in Haditha, a city in the western Iraqi province of Al Anbar. The incident, in which 24 unarmed Iraqi men, women and children were killed by a group of US Marines, was later referred to as 'Haditha Massacre' (Ricks, 2006). The biggest controversy surrounding this incident is that the dead included several children and elderly people, who were shot multiple times in the head and chest at close range, execution style (Ibid.). It has been alleged that the killings were retribution for the IED attack, which

had killed one of their comrades as they were driving in a convoy in close proximity to the civilian houses (Poole, 2006).

The most noteworthy point about this incident is that it went largely unreported until March 2006, when Time magazine wrote that ‘the details of what happened that morning in Haditha are more disturbing, disputed and horrific than the military initially reported’ (McGirk, 2006). The subsequent media coverage revealed that the Marine officer in charge of the battalion involved in the Haditha killings did not consider the deaths unusual and it took several months for the U.S. military chain of command to react to the event and initiate an inquiry (Ricks, 2006). In addition, following years of investigations, all the charges against the eight Marines involved in the Haditha killings were dropped, except in case of Staff Sgt. Frank Wuterich, who was the only defendant to stand trial for the killings. Even in his case the charges of assault and manslaughter were ultimately dropped and he was convicted only of negligent dereliction of duty receiving a rank reduction and pay cut as a punishment (Perry, 2012). The most interesting aspect of this whole case is that the many in the military viewed such incidents as unfortunate consequences of the Marines following ‘the rules of engagement during a difficult day on a chaotic battlefield’ (Ricks, 2006). This has been echoed in many of other US military veterans who acknowledged that similar incidents were common and took place daily.⁵ Jason Hurd (2008), an Iraq veteran, added, ‘We act out of fear and cause a complete and utter destruction.’

⁵ Iraq vet, Clifton Hicks, described an incident when a military Humvee gets ambushed by an IED, and the Marines proceeded with raiding a house nearby, killing many civilians, including a

Similar observations about the US military approach on the ground in Iraq were derived from other investigations of US military conduct in OIF (Hoffman, 2006). Garfield (2006: 18, 23-25) in his comparative study of British and US approaches to stabilisation and reconstruction overtly criticized the US approach and pointed out its deficiencies in terms of its cultural awareness, use of minimum force, and winning the support of the local people. The report, based on British interviewees comments, described the US troops in Iraq as employing excessive lethal force, with woefully inadequate cultural understanding and stated that they did not fully accept the limits of military power against an asymmetric adversary, which was reflected by an overly aggressive attitude from individual soldiers and they showed elitist behaviour towards all foreigners not just Iraqis (Ibid.: vii).

Based on other testimonies of some UK personnel serving alongside the US military troops in the early stages of the Iraq war in Iraq, problematic behaviour including ‘over-aggressive tactics, indiscriminate shooting in residential areas and a quick reliance on lethal force’ was observed in the conduct of US soldiers from the beginning of the operations (Human Rights Watch, 2003). It appears that the problematic character often ascribed to APSCs was shared by the US military, which considered ‘force protection’⁶ an absolute priority. The increasing level of

seven year old girl. After the killing, following the instructions of their commander, they just rode off (Hicks, 2008).

⁶ An approach valuing the saving of American lives above avoiding risk to innocent civilians, which has its origins in Vietnam, where the appalling American combat losses left succeeding generations of American commanders with an instinct to apply rapid increments of firepower – what the military calls ‘escalation of force’ – with the goal of sparing American casualties (Burns, 2007).

security threats led to a 'force protection' approach being adopted as the principal mission of US forces in Iraq (Kenneth et al, 2011: 77-79).

The adoption of this force protection principle is, however, not new or exclusive to the Iraq environment. According to Egnell (2009: 59), the US military has been criticised for its conduct in other peace operations, such as Bosnia, Somalia, and Kosovo for its inflexibility, overemphasis on force protection and an indifference to mission success. The US operations in these countries were characterised by a propensity for the maximum use of force, an over-reliance on technology, and an aversion to military casualties, which are all rather typical elements of US expeditionary operations in the post-Cold War era (Ibid.)⁷

This perception was widely echoed in the testimonies of the Iraq veterans in their experiences on the ground. Steven Mortillo (2008) said, '(t)here was an understanding that we were gonna do anything we could to take everyone else back home.' According to Clifton Hicks (2008), this meant that the only thing to do to survive was 'to put them in dirt before they put you in dirt.' While one may argue that this is unsurprising or not unusual in a war situation, such an approach is certainly problematic in urban warfare, such as Iraq, where the US mission was based on the population supporting the US military instead of backing the insurgency.

As some observers pointed out, the Fallujah ambush and killing of four American Blackwater employees had a very negative effect on the

⁷ For more discussion on the US 'force protection' approach in other conflicts, see Gentry (2012), Mockaitis (2004), and Cassidy (2004).

whole situation in Iraq. The brutality of the attack intensified the perceived threat posed by Iraqi civilians and both APSCs and the US military approached all Iraqis as potentially highly dangerous. This led to a paradox situation where both the Coalition forces (especially the Americans) and APSCs adopted a high-alert approach where their own security was a priority and every potentially dangerous situation was solved through a disproportionate reliance on firepower and other military means (Chatterjee, 2004: 116).

This was confirmed in the testimonies of a number of US veterans who had served in Iraq, who described the Rules of Engagement (RoE) as broadly defined and loosely enforced to protect the soldiers at the expense of Iraqi civilians to the extent that they 'could shoot anyone who came closer to [them] than [they] felt comfortable with' (Lemieux, 2008; Turner, 2008; Laituri, 2008; Washburn, 2008). As many pointed out, this vicious circle of alienating the local population through protecting oneself in an irresponsible manner, led to increased hostility and more attacks on both contractors and Coalition forces (Emanuele, 2008). This approach was widely encouraged by the chain of command, according to many of the Iraqi veterans, and carried out even in so called 'staged killings of Iraqi civilians'⁸ as common practice when soldiers killed civilians unjustifiably either by mistake or simply for entertainment (Washburn, 2008; Turner, 2008).

⁸ Staged killing of Iraqi civilians was described by US veterans as placing a weapon or a shovel on a body and make them look they were the insurgent (Washburn, 2008).

APSCs' main duties were personal security detail, convoy protection and the static protection of fortified positions. The military's responsibilities, including patrols, checkpoints, raids and house-to-house searches, by contrast, were most likely much more risky and under the circumstances given in Phase IV Iraq much more lethal to the civilian population. As the Iraq veterans recalled, these activities were another example how they terrorised the local population and of the many incidents of misconduct which occurred. As Hart Viges, testified: 'We never went on a raid where we would have got the right house, much less the right person. Not once' (Viges, 2008).

This was echoed in the testimony of another two Iraq veterans, Steven Casey (2008) and Matthew Childers (2008), who explained that the US military routinely went on night raids at around 3 a.m. in the morning in civilian neighbourhoods, scaring civilians, destroying their houses with no respect for anything and barely ever finding anything. Casey added that such raids 'were not an isolated incident.' Jon Turner (2008), another Iraq veteran, summarized the approach of the US military during the raids as follows: 'What we would do is to kick in the door and terrorize the families.' As Maestrovic (2009: 36) describes, those incidents reveal more than instances of misconduct of a few young soldiers in a combat zone. More likely, as is shown in the testimonies of many of the Iraq veterans, the troops were not prepared for the reality of guerrilla type warfare. The prevalence of improvised explosive devices and near absence of actual combat engendered frustration, which some described as sitting and waiting to be blown up. Indeed, many veterans confirmed that most of the

time in Iraq nothing was happening for days or weeks and then for a few seconds 'hell broke out' (Hicks, 2008; Mortillo, 2008). This reportedly led to low morale and widespread misconduct (Mortillo, 2008).

While operating in a highly dangerous and lethal landscape, Blackwater earned a reputation as a company that would take the most difficult assignments and could fulfil contracts fast. While some authors including Scahill (2008) and Fitzsimmons (2013) argue that Blackwater was the most aggressive and 'mercenary-like' company, it is important to add that, based on the DoS contract with Blackwater, Triple Canopy and DynCorp, Blackwater was the one that had frequently operated in the most violent area (central Iraq including Baghdad) and provided security to high-profile civilians and military persons, including Members of Congress, DoS personnel, even military generals. Starting with Paul Bremer, Blackwater was later awarded the contract to provide security to all of the State Department's personnel in Baghdad. As John Poncy, the former chief executive officer of SOC-SMG, another PSC working in Iraq, stated 'Blackwater was willing to go into places other people weren't, and figure out ways to go in fast and in force, and they could bring a lot of resources to bear' (Bennett, 2014) David Isenberg, an author who has written extensively on the PMSI believes that there was 'a sort of hypocrisy with regard to the contractors' (Ibid.). He claims that while the DoS pretended it is deeply concerned for contractors to respect host country sentiments, they told privately to Prince to '(j)ust do what you have to do' (Ibid.)

As this section illustrated, the US moral ground in Iraq was dubious. If there was any moral high ground, it was lost at the tactical level, owing to its widespread and systematic abuse of Iraqi civilians' human rights. The reckless and insensitive type of behaviour that is often being associated with the conduct of APSCs, can be found in the accounts of Iraq military veterans, who stressed that this type of behaviour was demonstrated repeatedly throughout their deployments in Iraq (Viges, 2008; Hicks, 2008; Casey, 2008; Mortillo, 2008; Hamilton, 2008; Kokesh, 2008; Hurd, 2008; Emanuele, 2008; Kochergin, 2008; Washburn, 2008; Lemieux, 2008; Turner, 2008; Laituri, 2008; Reppenhagen, 2008; Totten, 2008; LeDuc, 2008; Casler, 2008; Childers, 2008) While over-aggressive tactics, indiscriminate shooting in residential areas and a quick reliance on lethal force can be assigned to both contractors and the US military, terrorising and harassing people during raids, house-to-house searches, foot/mounted patrols and at checkpoints are types of activities that APSCs did not participate in. If the population had not been already antagonized by the conduct of the US military from the early stages of the post-conflict environment, the reported misconduct of APSCs was unlikely to have worsened the situation fundamentally.

VII.V. Conclusion

The US military never foresaw its role in policing Iraq or committing its military forces to anything other than combat (Brooks, 2013; McMahon, 2013; Biddle, 2013). Instead, the US military's planning

relied on the assumption that following the fall of Baghdad, security and maintaining order would be in the hands of the Iraqi military and security forces (Ibid.). Although the importance of APSCs was unpredicted, their number quickly grew and soon represented the second largest foreign security group in the country (Singer, 2007). Providing the contribution closest to Crucial Supporter, the US government, particularly the DoS, became dependent on APSCs as a supporting tool for the US efforts in Iraq. Without their support, the US government would have had to alter the core aspects of the US strategy, including the size of available manpower, timeframe and objectives of its mission.

At the same time, criticism emerged regarding their conduct, notably in relation to human rights abuse and its implications for the US COIN in Iraq. As this chapter demonstrated, the view that APSCs significantly contributed to, or could have been responsible for, any anti-American sentiment of the Iraqi population towards the troops as a result of their misconduct and human rights abuses, is overstated. The misconduct record comparison between the US troops and the APSCS indicates that the US military record of systematic abuse and misconduct towards the local population has been nowhere near the scale of occasional 'bad apples' in a good barrel. On the contrary, the available data suggests that both the military and the APSCs are guilty of carrying out a large number of human rights abuses and inflicting civilian casualties on the side of Iraqi population.

This chapter provides compelling evidence that large-scale misconduct was not an exclusive problem of APSCs and, therefore, they most likely did not have significant negative impact on the objectives of the US Military in Phase IV in Iraq. While the aim of this chapter is not to deny or trivialise the seriousness of the misconduct cases committed against the Iraqi population by the APSCs by any means, it is considered important to present the whole picture in order to provide a balanced insight into the contribution of APSCs. Focussing solely on the misconduct attributable to the APSCs, as a potential game-changing factor for US Phase IV Operations in Iraq, is misleading. It gives a false impression that APSCs simply need to be held accountable or eliminated from the modern battlefield to make the US military more successful in its potential future expeditionary operations.

In this respect, this chapter shows that the Iraqi population could not be further antagonized by the behaviour of APSCs, as the US forces already had committed and continued to commit the same, if not worse incidents of misbehaviour. While APSCs, such as Blackwater DynCorp International, Triple Canopy, Aegis Security and Erinys International were responsible for numerous cases of human rights abuse in Iraq, it seems that it largely mirrored the malpractice of the US military and that, as Tyler (2007) points out, 'what is wrong with Blackwater may, most of all, mirror what is wrong with Uncle Sam.' this chapter demonstrated that the significance of the armed security services within the Phase IV Operations context in Iraq exceeded being of 'optional' or 'essential' significance and represented 'indispensable additional services.' Therefore, the

contribution of APSCs is most closely relatable to the category of Crucial Supporter demonstrating the provision of indispensable additional services, being replaceable only under the condition of major changes to the core aspects of the strategy, and having a prevailing constructive impact.

VIII. Conclusion

During the Cold War years, the security environment forced the US to place a strong emphasis on strategic deterrence, nuclear warfare and conventional interstate warfighting capabilities (Carafano and Rosenzweig, 2005; Le Prestre, 1997). While the current post-Cold War environment demands that the US military remains capable of conducting large scale conventional operations, US national security interests require it to broaden the scope of its capabilities to include a wide range of missions and tasks grouped under the heading of Phase IV Operations (Taw 2012: 2, 36-37) This new strategic environment envisions a world of increased uncertainty and complex situations, demanding military forces to anticipate and adapt rapidly to constant change, and apply selectively different capabilities based on the mission's progress (Ibid.: 60).

The emergence of the PMSI in the Post-Cold War environment is the result of economic, military and political changes associated with the end of the old system. These changes paved the way for military outsourcing as an additional foreign policy tool in support of national militaries (Singer 2003: 49-60). The rise of non-state violence, the availability of military weapons for large scale violence among private actors and a declining willingness of the great powers to intervene in civil conflicts, are some of the most prominent factors that had a stimulating effect on the demand for private military and security services and the

establishment of PMSI early in the post-Cold War period (Kinsey and Patterson 2012: 3; Isenberg 2009: 1; Singer 2003: 49-60).

Following 9/11, the US Global War on Terror presented an expanding set of security threats that the US, even supported by its allies, had limited resources to address (Department of Defense, 2006: 75, 81; Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007: 9; Schwartz and Church, 2013: 16). In such an environment, the nascent PMSI provided an instant remedy for the lack of planning for the complex military operations in Iraq and enabled the US military to adapt and sustain its presence for much longer than had been originally anticipated (Petersohn, 2007: 4-5; Lovewine, 2014: 80).

Drawing on the recurrent theme of the contribution of PMSCs in modern warfare in the literature on military outsourcing, this thesis argues that there is a lack of practical understanding of the contribution the PMSI made in Iraq from 2003 to 2011. Although a substantial body of literature has been developed to date, relatively little effort has been dedicated to investigate the contribution of PMSCs in Iraq in a deeper and systematic manner. This study sought to fill this gap by defining a typology of contributions and applying it to the presence and activities of PMSCs in Phase IV Operations in Iraq.

Inspired by the Hayes and Wheelwright Four-Stage Model, this thesis developed the Conceptual Framework as a guiding tool for defining the contribution of a policy instrument within a particular strategy (Slack,

Chambers and Johnston, 2010: 89-90). This framework identifies the potential contributions of Assistant, Implementer, Supporter, Driver and Spoiler and its aim is to provide a policy-relevant insight into military outsourcing to create an avenue for better aligning contracting resources with the mission requirements of US expeditionary operations. Through this framework, this thesis provides an insight into the nature, dynamics and implications of the dependency of the US government on military outsourcing in expeditionary operations based on the case study of the contribution of PMSCs in Phase IV Operations in Iraq.

VIII.I. Theoretical and Empirical Contribution of the Thesis

This thesis increases the level of knowledge about military privatisation through both a theoretical and empirical contribution to the body of literature already available on this subject. Regarding the theoretical contribution of this thesis, there are three important areas to be highlighted.

Firstly, this thesis expands and deepens the meaning of contribution attributed to it in the literature on PMSI. The available scholarship in the area of military privatisation can be viewed through four approaches towards the understanding of the industry's contribution in modern military operations: as the characteristics of the military outsourcing trend, as an area of activity, as a specific occupation, or as a function (Avant, 2009: 104; Isenberg, 2009; Elsea, 2010; Schwartz, 2010; Pattison, 2014: 21). Unlike the previous efforts, which focus only on one

aspect of the presence and activities of PMSCs, the Conceptual Framework represents a three dimensional typology of five potential categories that considers: 1) the significance of the provided service(s), 2) the significance of the provider itself, and 3) the impact of the provider's presence and activities on the main instrument's strategy in a given context. The range of the five different contribution categories is thus differentiated according to these three dimensions where an individual characteristic is attributed to each particular contribution category.

Assistant is the least important contribution. It is characterised by providing optional additional services, being replaceable under the condition of no or minor changes to non-core aspects of the strategy (size of the deployable force for the mission) and having a prevailing positive value in terms of its contribution to the achievement of the strategic goal. Implementer, one step above Assistant, is characterised by providing essential additional services, being replaceable under the condition of major changes to non-core aspects of the strategy (size of the deployable force for the mission and expected timeframe of the mission) and having a prevailing positive value in terms of its contribution. Crucial Supporter, the last category that completes the range of the three categories that supplement the main actor of the strategy, is characterised by providing indispensable additional services, being replaceable under the condition of major changes to core aspects of the strategy (size of the deployable force for the mission, expected timeframe of the mission, as well as objectives of the mission) and having a prevailing positive value in terms of its contribution.

The two remaining contributions of the Conceptual Framework, Driver and Spoiler, are the only two categories that correspond to the contribution of the main instrument of a mission and which respectively have the potential to drive, or spoil, the strategy. While both are characterised by providing indispensable main services and being irreplaceable without changing the whole strategy, they are complete opposites in the area of the prevailing value of their contribution to the achievement of the strategic goal. While Driver's prevailing value of contribution is positive, therefore advancing the strategy, Spoiler's prevailing value of contribution is negative, therefore, undermining the strategy. The most significant assertion this framework introduces is that in order for an instrument of a mission to become Spoiler, the instrument who undermines the strategy, its input must be equal to the one of Driver (Main instrument) to be able to spoil the mission, i.e. prevent the achievement of its desired strategic goal.

In contrast to using the term contribution in a generic and undefined form, this framework provides a step towards a deeper understanding of how PMSI fits in a particular operational environment considering the nature of its services, its (ir)replaceability as the provider of those services, and the impact of its presence and activities on the strategy. Unlike previous approaches that have provided only two extreme, often undefined, opposites (force multipliers; peacemakers versus spoilers; messiahs versus mercenaries), this framework provides a range of types of contribution where individual categories can be compared and contrasted against each other based on the common

criteria (Cotton et al. 2010; Avant 2009; Brooks 2000). As such, this framework enables not only determination of the most likely contribution PMSCs made in a given context, but also highlights both the potential risks and benefits of using contractors in a particular set of circumstances. By doing so, it provides a platform for understanding how to actively shape the operational circumstances in order to achieve the desired outcome of using PMSCs in support of a military strategy in modern warfare.

Secondly, this thesis makes an important theoretical contribution by bringing the context of PMSCs' presence and activities to the forefront of its contribution assessment, while acknowledging that Iraq (2003-2011) was a unique environment and any generally applicable lessons learned would be misleading. As a result, this thesis moves beyond the efforts to establish a universally valid denomination for all contractors, either positive or negative, and limits the assessment of their contribution to two types of services (Base Support Contractors and Armed Private Security Contractors) within the immediate circumstances of the environment that they are placed in.

This thesis employs the existing US military doctrine on Stability Operations and the Weinberger-Powell doctrine as the key guiding principles that shaped the operational environment in Iraq. Acknowledging not only the post-Cold War changes and their impact on the establishment of PMSI, this thesis traces the broad implications of some former US foreign policy misadventures (Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon)

as the potential causes of setting the US on the path of large-scale military privatisation in modern warfare (Ucko, 2009: 25-46; Marston and Malkasian, 2008; Herring, 2000: 56-84). Including the WP doctrine and Phase IV Operations military manuals in the analysis uncovers an important link between some of the persisting US foreign policy guiding principles and the everyday operational challenges in Iraq, which the Base Support Contractors and Armed Private Security Contractors helped to overcome.

Thirdly, despite the unavailability of lessons learned readily applicable to future contexts, the ultimate value and theoretical contribution of this framework is its potential transferability across a wide range of settings. Not only is it applicable as an insight tool into the contribution of PMSCs in other cases and different environments, it can also be applied to other actors. It could, for instance, be utilised to assess the contribution of humanitarian actors to peacekeeping operations, private intelligence contractors to national security, or maritime security contractors to preventing piracy. More broadly, it can be used in any other similar context where the point of enquiry is the contribution of an entity and its form of engagement within a clearly defined context.

The empirical value that this thesis adds to the area of military privatisation is equally threefold.

Firstly, this thesis addresses directly the two most debated issues regarding the involvement of PMSI in US expeditionary operations: the level of US dependency on contractors and the potential negative impact their employment may create (Avant, 2009; Isenberg, 2009; Bruneau, 2011; Pattison, 2014; Lovewine, 2014). Both of these issues are studied using the Conceptual Framework which demonstrates that across the two types of services studied in this thesis, Base Support and Armed Private Security, contractors became an indispensable additional asset with prevailing positive value towards the US military efforts to achieve its desired strategic goal.

In particular, the first empirical chapter, concentrating on the Base Support Contractors, considers both the core support services, as well as some non-standard services to 'keep soldiers happy', and argues that BSCs became Crucial Supporter in the US Phase IV Operations in Iraq. The chapter illustrates that the services provided by PLS belonged to the category of indispensable additional services as the US military's ability to sustain its operations to achieve its strategic goal was directly dependent on them (Shanker and Myers, 2008; Coll, 2008; Lendman and Asongu, 2007: 185-191). This significance stemmed from the US military's operational needs in an extended low-intensity-combat military commitment where the sustainability of the mission was at the core of the US strategy (Nagl, 2002: 95-98; Ucko, 2013). Furthermore, as the sector directly responsible for ensuring the US military operational effectiveness by providing a wide range of services, including housing, food, and ensuring comfort for the US troops, the BSCs provided an irreplaceable

asset of the US strategy (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, no date). Their monopoly on the large-scale provision of these services, made it impossible to be replaced without having an adverse impact on the size of deployable force, available timeframe and potential to achieve desired objectives in Iraq. The US did not employ such measures.

In addition, the analysis of the third dimension of the BSCs contribution, its impact, reveals that despite the enduring failure of some major logistics providers to fulfil their duties properly, their underperformance in the Phase IV Operations in Iraq did not limit the US military capability to prevent the US from achieving its strategic goal. Instead, the BSCs demonstrated a prevailing positive impact on the efforts of the US, vitally sustaining US military operations and enabling the US military to focus on what it considered its core responsibilities. As such, in line with the Conceptual Framework, BSCs became Crucial Supporter. At the same time, their services were not indispensable main services equal to the contribution of main instrument of the mission (Driver), the US military, and the BSCs were not irreplaceable in terms of the feasibility of the mission. Likewise, the BSCs cannot be identified as the Spoiler of the US strategy in Phase IV Operation, as in order to acquire the potential impact to become the major obstacle for the US to achieve its strategic goal, they would have had to acquire the position of Driver first.

The second empirical chapter, concentrating on the contribution of Armed Private Security Companies (APSCs) in Phase IV Operations in Iraq,

illustrates that armed security services provided by APSCs belonged to the category of indispensable additional services in terms of the US military strategy. Their significance stemmed from the necessity to ensure protection for a wide range of actors and facilities within the high-risk environment of Iraq, including businessmen, NGO workers, construction workers, US government civilian personnel, and even high-ranking US military officials (Glantz and Lehren, 2010; Hammes, 2013; Hughes, 2013). Furthermore, identified as providers of a unique type of service which bears the greatest significance to the activities of US combat troops in a high risk environment, the APSCs became irreplaceable additional assets the US strategy because they allowed the US to pursue its strategy without having to diminish the size of deployable force, available timeframe, or to compromise the potential to achieve desired objectives in Iraq (Hammes, 2013; Hughes, 2013).

In addition, the analysis of the third dimension of the contribution of APSCs, their impact, reveals that despite their negative reputation perpetuated by the media, APSCs did not create a prevailing negative impact on the US strategy as their alleged misconduct has not superseded the inconsiderate treatment of the local population by the US military. Therefore, despite the convincing allegations of misconduct by APSCs against Iraqi civilians, the impact of such misbehaviour cannot be considered more significant than the one reported in regards to the US military' own conduct. As such, in coherence with the Conceptual Framework, APSCs became Crucial Supporter. As their services were not equal to the services associated with the contribution of the main

instrument of the mission, the US military, and they were not irreplaceable in terms of the feasibility of the mission, APSCs cannot be identified as the Spoiler of the US strategy in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. In order to acquire the potential impact to become the major obstacle for the US to achieve its strategic goal, they would have had to be in the position of Driver first.

Secondly, this thesis provides a unique perspective approaching the research problem across different viewpoints. Focussing on the Base Support Contractors and Armed Private Security Contractors, it highlights the important differences that concern the wide range of contractors in military operations and highlights the complexity and diversity of the industry as a whole. The occasional difficulty of separating the PMSI into distinct sectors or individual services, experienced during the analysis, only confirms that the various elements of the industry are closely related to each other and should be studied together.

Thirdly, this thesis relies on a wide range of primary and secondary resources, including official reports, semi-structured interviews and video-testimonies of US veterans as the source of new data and evidence for the assessment of the PMSI contribution in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. This project draws on a wide variety primary textual sources:

- official documents and reports produced by various state agencies and nominated authorities, including the Coalition of Provisional Authority (CPA), Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS),

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), United States Central Command (CENTCOM);

- records from proceedings in the US Congress and its various committees;
- reports, hearings and analytical studies by a wide range of research and oversight bodies, including Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC), Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Congressional Research Service (CRS), Government Accountability Office (GAO), Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, USAID Office of Inspector General, and U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General;

In addition, international legal documents, including the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, have been used. Also, this study uses information from numerous US research institutions, such as the Brookings Institute, Federation of American Scientists and RAND Corporation, since they provide key insights into the area and most of their publications are publicly available online.

Next to these, the testimonies of the Iraq War veterans about the reality of the war on the ground through the eyes of individual soldiers, are immensely important with respect to the perceptions of PMSCs as spoilers or mercenaries. Portraying the everyday struggle and obstacles encountered by individuals (military personnel, contractors, and Iraqi civilians) by sharing their personal stories of authentic scenes, these veterans paint an honest picture of the complexity of war in a way which is

distinct from a policy analysis, military strategy or even an academic narrative of the conflict.

Personal interviews with individuals who were involved in working with or alongside contractors in Iraq complement the range of original sources consulted for this research. Although text analysis remains the primary source of information, the use of testimonies and interviews is what sets this piece of research apart from the available literature on military privatisation.

VIII.II. Areas for Further Research

This thesis argues that the PMSI became Crucial Supporter of the US military efforts in Phase IV Operations in Iraq, representing an indispensable source of continuity that allowed the US military to endure an eight yearlong military engagement that would otherwise have been both politically and operationally impossible. By bypassing the WP principles stressing the necessity of clear objectives, wholehearted commitment and support of the American People and the Congress, the PMSI gave the US the necessary stamina, persistence and capacity to complete an otherwise non-viable military mission (Mayer, 2013; McMahon, 2013).

This thesis confirms the unprecedented dependency of the US military on contractors and asserts that they were an integral and mostly positive component of the US military efforts in Iraq (Hammes, 2013; Hughes, 2013). The limited scholarly insight into this research problem,

further exacerbated by the media providing oversimplified and misleading information to create a worldwide sensation, inevitably led to false perceptions about the whole industry. By providing a more systematic insight into the contribution of PMSCs as an alternative tool of US foreign policy in this particular context, this thesis refutes these misperceptions and fills in the gap in the existing literature on military privatisation.

The elevation of Phase IV Operations on to a par with the offence and defence capabilities of the US military, as well as the introduction of the Counterinsurgency doctrine as the silver bullet of modern warfare, were seen conceptually as the ultimate lessons learnt from US military involvement in Iraq (Nagl, 2002; Kilcullen, 2009: 294-305; Ucko, 2013). Although both Iraq and Afghanistan are now largely regarded as misadventures, at one point they symbolised the prototype of future warfare and the academic literature was preoccupied with concepts such as New Wars, Fourth Generation Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Stability operations. Despite the lack of an outright victory, Western military thinking appeared to be adopting at least portions of the lessons learned and adapting its forces for potential similar military engagements in the future.

Today, it is clear that the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts did not become the prototypes of how to carry out potentially similar operations more effectively in the future. Instead, they became negative experiences of what the US military appears to never want to repeat (Allin and Jones, 2012: 96-98). While this does not mean that the use of military force is

necessarily off the table entirely, it seems that the non-conventional, lengthy, and resources intensive military commitment was largely discarded. This could be observed with the non-intervention policy, in terms of boots on the ground, in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, and Iraq. Current military thinking, shaped by the experience in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular, demonstrates a new direction seeking to remedy America's strategic overextension and features considerable internal resistance to potential future counterinsurgency operations, viewing them as highly problematic (Linn, 2011: 40-41, Allin and Jones, 2012: 96-101).

While under the current climate, it is difficult to imagine the US military becoming involved in a conflict of choice that would be anywhere close to the magnitude and nature of the Iraq misadventure, PMSI is unlikely to depart from the international stage and will remain a critical component in times of war and peace. In fact, the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan in 2014 is likely to have accelerated the diversification of industry activities into new geographical regions and services. Today, the majority of international organisations, NGOs, private voluntary organisations and private companies find it difficult, if not impossible, to operate in many high-risk areas without the involvement of PMSCs (Avant, 2009). As one of the post-Iraq example of PMSI employment, off the Somali coast, for instance, private security companies proved essential in preventing pirate attacks on Western cargo vessels navigating through that area (Isenberg, 2012).

More recently, the crisis in Ukraine confirms, that the focus on Western PMSCs is more relevant than ever, as it was reported that there was 'evidence' that individuals from Western European countries were involved in the conflict on the side of the Ukrainian military forces (Sengupta, 2014). Although the approach of this thesis is limited to offering a unique insight into the research problem of the contribution of PMSCs in Phase IV Operations in Iraq, this study could be a starting point to explore the contribution of contractors in different contexts in which they are used. The Conceptual Framework provides a platform to be applied to other settings and situations around the world to assess the involvement of various instruments in pursuit of a clearly defined strategy.

There is every reason to believe that US armed forces will eventually face situations in which the requirements of war and peace cannot be separated. In the light of the recent events, including the Arab Spring, the rise of the Islamic State and the war in Ukraine, all of which are potentially relevant to US strategic interests, there is good reason to believe that the close cooperation of the US with the private military and security industry will continue. It is, therefore, advisable to study further the contribution contractors make across different levels of analysis and a wide range of contexts to create a better understanding of the risks and benefits that partnering with these actors entails.

Appendices

A. List of interviewees

Biddle, Stephen

Adjunct Senior Fellow for Defence Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University, interviewed in Washington, DC, 24 October 2013.

Bremer, Paul

American diplomat, former Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq 2003-2004, interviewed in Washington, DC, 23 October 2013.

Brooks, Doug

Consultant, President Emeritus, International Stability Operations Association, interviewed in Washington, DC, 8 October 2013.

Hammes, Thomas X

retired U.S. Marine officer, distinguished research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, interviewed in Washington, DC, 14 October 2013.

Hughes, Paul

Col. (Ret.), former senior staff officer for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and later with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, United States Institute of Peace, interviewed in Washington, DC, 11 October 2013.

McMahon, K. Scott

Senior Defence Research Analyst, RAND, interviewed in Washington, DC, 17 October 2013.

B. List of Iraq Veterans Against the War

Casey, Steven, Specialist, United States Army

Casler, Bryan, Corporal, United States Marine Corps

Childers, Matthew, Corporal, United States Marine Corps

Emanuele, Vincent, Private First Class, United States Marine Corps

Hamilton, Jesse, Staff Sergeant, United States Army Reserve

Hicks, Clifton, Private, United States Army

Hurd, Jason, Specialist, Tennessee Army National Guard

Kochergin, Sergio, Corporal, United States Marine Corps

Kokesh, Adam, Sergeant, United States Marine Corps Reserve

Laituri, Logan, Sergeant, United States Army

LeDuc, Michael, Corporal, United States Marine Corps

Lemieux, Jason Wayne, Sergeant, United States Marine Corps

Mortillo, Steve, Specialist, United States Army

Reppenhagen, Garrett, Specialist, United States Army

Totten, Michael, Specialist, United States Army

Turner, Jon Michael, Lance Corporal, United States Marine Corps

Viges, Hart, Specialist, United States Army

Washburn, Jason, Corporal, United States Marine Corps

C. Essential Stability Tasks - Field Manual No. 3-07: Stability

Operations

ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Enforce Cessation of Hostilities, Peace Agreements, and Other Arrangements• Determine Disposition and Constitution of National Armed and Intelligence Services• Conduct Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration• Conduct Border Control, Boundary Security, and Freedom of Movement• Support Identification• Protect Key Personnel and Facilities• Clear Explosive and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Hazards
ESTABLISH CIVIL CONTROL	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Establish Public Order and Safety• Establish Interim Criminal Justice System• Support Law Enforcement and Police Reform• Support Judicial Reform• Support Property Dispute Resolution Processes• Support Justice System Reform• Support Corrections Reform• Support War Crimes Courts and Tribunals• Support Public Outreach and Community Rebuilding Programs
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provide Essential Civil Services• Tasks Related to Civilian Dislocation• Support Famine Prevention and Emergency Food Relief Programs• Support Non-food Relief Programs• Support Humanitarian Demining• Support Human Rights Initiatives• Support Public Health Programs• Support Education Programs
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Support Transitional Administrations• Support Development of Local Governance• Support Anticorruption Initiatives• Support Elections

SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support Economic Generation and Enterprise Creation • Support Monetary Institutions and Programs • Support National Treasury Operations • Support Public Sector Investment Programs • Support Private Sector Development • Protect Natural Resources and Environment • Support Agricultural Development Programs • Restore Transportation Infrastructure • Restore Telecommunications Infrastructure • Support General Infrastructure Reconstruction Programs
INFORMATION ENGAGEMENT TASKS	

Source: Field manual No. 3-07: Stability Operations (Department of the Army, 2008: III-1-59).

D. CENTCOM reported estimates of DoD total contractors and total troops in Iraq between September 2007 and March 2011

Quarter Ending	Total Contractors	% Total Contractors	Troop Levels	% Troop Levels
Sep. 2007	154825	48%	169000	52%
Dec. 2007	163591	50%	165700	50%
Mar. 2008	149388	48%	160500	52%
June 2008	162428	51%	153300	49%
Sep. 2008	163446	53%	146800	47%
Dec. 2008	148050	50%	148500	50%
Mar. 2009	132610	48%	141300	52%
June 2009	119706	47%	134600	53%
Sep. 2009	113731	47%	129200	53%
Dec. 2009	100035	47%	114300	53%
Mar. 2010	95461	50%	95900	50%
June 2010	79621	47%	88320	53%
Sep. 2010	74106	60%	48410	40%
Dec. 2010	71142	60%	47305	40%
Mar. 2011	64253	58%	45660	42%

Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, no date)

E. Number of DoD Contractor Personnel in Iraq by Type of Service Provided

Date	B	S	T/I	CS	TP	TN	CM	L/M	Other
Mar.2008	53,7%	4,9%	5,4%	20,0%	5,2%	0,0%	3,4%	0,0%	7,4%
June 2008	55,2%	5,7%	5,2%	22,3%	4,7%	0,0%	2,5%	0,0%	4,4%
Sep. 2008	55,3%	7,7%	5,4%	18,1%	4,8%	0,0%	1,8%	0,0%	6,9%
Dec. 2008	54,7%	5,7%	6,3%	14,0%	4,5%	0,0%	0,5%	0,0%	14,4%
Mar.2009	58,6%	7,9%	7,0%	15,0%	1,8%	0,0%	1,1%	0,0%	8,7%
June 2009	60,0%	11,0%	7,6%	8,4%	1,3%	0,0%	1,8%	0,0%	9,8%
Sep. 2009	57,8%	11,2%	7,7%	8,7%	1,2%	0,0%	2,6%	0,0%	10,8%
Dec. 2009	61,7%	11,1%	8,4%	3,4%	2,1%	1,5%	2,4%	6,1%	3,4%
Mar.2010	65,3%	12,2%	8,0%	2,3%	1,9%	1,0%	1,1%	3,9%	4,5%
June 2010	61,9%	14,3%	6,5%	1,7%	2,2%	0,7%	0,8%	0,6%	11,3%
Sep. 2010	59,0%	15,7%	6,2%	3,7%	1,5%	0,8%	0,9%	0,6%	11,6%
Dec. 2010	59,6%	17,9%	6,2%	1,6%	1,5%	0,8%	0,7%	0,6%	11,0%
Mar. 2011	60,6%	16,3%	6,4%	1,3%	1,9%	0,9%	0,8%	0,5%	11,3%

B - Base Support

TP- Transport

S - Security

TN - Training

T/I - Translator/Interpreter

CM - Communication

CS - Construction

L/M - Logistics/Maintenance

Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, no date)

F. DoD Contractor Personnel in Iraq, Aug. 2008 – Oct. 2011 by Nationality

	US citizens	Third Country Nationals	Local/Host Country Nationals
Aug. 2008	29611	62650	70167
Nov. 2008	28045	72109	63292
Feb. 2009	39262	70875	37913
May 2009	36061	60244	36305
Aug. 2009	31541	56125	32040
Nov. 2009	29944	53780	30007
Feb. 2010	27843	51990	20202
May 2010	24719	53549	17193
Sep. 2010	22761	46148	10712
Dec 2010	20981	42457	10668
Jan 2011	19943	40776	10423
Apr. 2011	18393	36523	9337
Jul. 2011	18900	34974	8815
Oct. 2011	16054	29213	7370

Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, no date)

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