Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests

Possajennikov, Alex (2017) Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests. In: The theory of externalities and public goods: essays in memory of Richard C. Cornes. Springer, pp. 85-105.

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Abstract

In a semi-aggregative representation of a game, the payoff of a player depends on a player's own strategy and on a personalized aggregate of all players' strategies. Suppose that each player has a conjecture about the reaction of the personalized aggregate to a change in the player's own strategy. The players play an equilibrium given their conjectures, and evolution selects conjectures that lead to a higher payoff in such an equilibrium. Considering one player role, I show that for any conjectures of the other players, only conjectures that are consistent can be evolutionarily stable, where consistency means that the conjecture is, to a first approximation, correct at equilibrium. I illustrate this result in public good games and contests.

Item Type: Book Section
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Possajennikov, Dr Alex
Date Deposited: 07 Apr 2017 13:46
Last Modified: 13 Oct 2017 01:16
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/41786

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