Registered replication report: Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012)

Bouwmeester, Samantha and Verkoeijen, Peter P.J.L. and Aczel, Balazs and Barbosa, Fernando and Bègue, Laurent and Brañas-Garza, Pablo and Chmura, Thorsten and Cornelissen, Gert and Døssing, Felix S. and Espín, Antonio M. and Evans, Anthony M. and Ferreira-Santos, Fernando and Fiedler, Susann and Flegr, Jaroslav and Ghaffari, Minou and Glöckner, Andreas and Goeschl, Timo and Guo, Lisa and Hauser, Oliver P. and Hernan-Gonzalez, Roberto and Herrero, Anthony and Horne, Zachary and Houdek, Petr and Johannesson, Magnus and Koppel, Lina and Kujal, Praveen and Laine, Tei and Lohse, Johannes and Martins, Eva C. and Mauro, Carlos and Mischkowski, Dorothee and Mukherjee, Sumitava and Myrseth, Kristian Ove and Navarro-Martinez, Daniel and Neal, Tess M.S. and Novakova, Julie and Pagà, Roger and Paiva, Tiago O. and Palfi, Bence and Piovesan, Marco and Rahal, Rima-Maria and Salomon, Erika and Srinivasan, Narayanan and Srivastava, Ajita and Szaszi, Barnabas and Szollosi, Aba and Thor, Karoline Ø. and Tinghög, Gustav and Trueblood, Jennifer S. and Van Bavel, J. Jay and van ‘t Veer, Anna E. and Västfjäll, Daniel and Warner, Megan and Wengström, Erik and Wills, Julian and Wollbrant, Conny E. (2017) Registered replication report: Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012). Perspectives on Psychological Science . ISSN 1745-6924

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Abstract

In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Cooperation, Social heuristic hypothesis, Decision making, Economic games, Social psychology, Replication
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Social Sciences > Nottingham University Business School
Identification Number: 10.1177/1745691617693624
Depositing User: Eprints, Support
Date Deposited: 28 Mar 2017 13:26
Last Modified: 18 May 2017 13:09
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/41615

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