Belief and Bounded Rationality

Jago, Mark (2006) Belief and Bounded Rationality.

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Predictive accounts of belief ascription, either following the principle of charity or Dennett's intentional stance, have proved popular recently. However, such accounts require us first to treat agents as perfectly rational agents and then revise this assumption as appropriate. I argue that such downwards revision is no easy task and that several proposed accounts are not satisfactory. I propose a way of characterising agent's belief states which shares Dennett's approach but avoids treating agents as perfectly rational, and develop a formal account in terms of fan models.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:Belief states, belief ascription, intentional stance, bounded rationality, epistmeic logic, resource bounded agents
Schools/Departments:Faculty of Science > School of Computer Science and Information Technology
Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
ID Code:395
Deposited By:Jago, Mark
Deposited On:15 May 2006
Last Modified:09 Oct 2007 16:52

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