Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement

Jansson, Lina (2014) Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement. Philosophy of Science, 81 (3). pp. 332-348. ISSN 1539-767X

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When evaluating the success of causal theories of explanation the focus has typically been on the legitimacy of causal relations and on putative examples of explanations that we cannot capture in causal terms. Here I motivate the existence of a third kind of problem: the difficulty of accounting for explanatory disputes. Moreover, I argue that this problem remains even if the first two are settled and that it threatens to undercut one of the central motivations for causal accounts of explanation, namely, the causal account of the directionality of scientific explanation.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2014 by the Philosophy of Science Association. Accepted for publication by Philosophy of Science on 01/01/2014
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham UK Campus > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
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Depositing User: Jansson, Lina
Date Deposited: 12 Jul 2016 11:02
Last Modified: 17 Sep 2016 15:24

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