Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better

Jansson, Lina and Tallant, Jonathan (2016) Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science . ISSN 1464-3537

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Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories. We extend previous work on quantitative parsimony by offering an independent probabilistic justification for preferring the more quantitatively parsimonious theories in particular episodes of theory choice. Our strategy allows us to avoid worries that other considerations, such as pragmatic factors of computational tractability and so on, could be the driving ones in the historical cases under consideration.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science following peer review. The version of record Jansson, L. and Tallant, J. (2016) Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science is available online at: http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/02/22/bjps.axv064.abstract
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axv064
Depositing User: Jansson, Lina
Date Deposited: 12 Jul 2016 10:38
Last Modified: 14 Sep 2016 02:02
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/34876

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