Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better

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Jansson, Lina and Tallant, Jonathan (2016) Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science . ISSN 1464-3537

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Abstract

Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories. We extend previous work on quantitative parsimony by offering an independent probabilistic justification for preferring the more quantitatively parsimonious theories in particular episodes of theory choice. Our strategy allows us to avoid worries that other considerations, such as pragmatic factors of computational tractability and so on, could be the driving ones in the historical cases under consideration.

Item Type: Article
RIS ID: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/775571
Additional Information: This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science following peer review. The version of record Br J Philos Sci (2016) doi: 10.1093/bjps/axv064 is available online at: http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/02/22/bjps.axv064
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axv064
Depositing User: Eprints, Support
Date Deposited: 05 Jun 2016 09:52
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 17:36
URI: https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/33739

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