Nefarious presentism

Tallant, Jonathan and Ingram, David (2015) Nefarious presentism. Philosophical Quarterly, 65 (260). pp. 355-371. ISSN 0031-8094

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Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, face a problem concerning truths about the past. Presentists should (but cannot) locate truth-makers for truths about the past. What can presentists say in response? We identify two rival factions: ‘upstanding’ and ‘nefarious’ presentists. Upstanding presentists aim to meet the challenge, positing presently existing truth-makers for truths about the past; nefarious presentists aim to shirk their responsibilities, using the language of truth-maker theory but without paying any ontological price. We argue that presentists should be nefarious presentists.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Philosophical Quarterly following peer review. The version of record Tallant, J. and Ingram, D. (2015). “Nefarious Presentism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 65(260), pp. 355-371 is available online at:
Keywords: Presentism; truth-making; the truth-maker objection to presentism
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
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Depositing User: Eprints, Support
Date Deposited: 05 Jun 2016 10:57
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 17:09

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