Monism: the islands of plurality
Baron, Sam and Tallant, Jonathan (2016) Monism: the islands of plurality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93 (3). pp. 583-606. ISSN 1933-1592
Priority monism (hereafter, ‘monism’) is the view that there exists one fundamental entity—the world—and that all other objects that exist (a set of objects typically taken to include tables, chairs, and the whole menagerie of everyday items) are merely derivative. Jonathan Schaffer has defended monism in its current guise, across a range of papers. Each paper looks to add something to the monistic picture of the world. In this paper we argue that monism—as Schaffer describes it—is false. To do so we develop an ‘island universe’ argument against Schaffer’s monistic theory.
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