Violence on the Chile-Peru Border: Arica 1925-2015

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the paradox of the Chile-Peru border, and specifically the Chilean border city of Arica, between 1925 and 2015. Through an eclectic mixed method ‘collage’, primarily relying on archival research and extended interviews, the richness of the lived experience of the border comes to the fore. Arica has been a space of violence since it was appropriated from Peru by Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) and I am interested in how this violence has lingered and manifested itself in various ways since Arica officially became Chilean territory in the 1920s. This violence often stems from a performance of Chilean machismo at the border. Arica is a space of contradiction. A space of extreme nationalism but also of rejection of the Chilean state, of being central to the Chilean nation but also of being peripheral and abandoned. Over five ‘border moments’ over ninety years Arica oscillates between centrality and marginality dependent on threats to Chilean sovereignty at the border.

Through a chronological and multi-disciplinary arc the history of violence in Arica can be better understood. The thesis begins in 1925 when the United States became involved in the dispute over the Chile-Peru border that hadn’t been settled since the War of the Pacific. Violence permeated the region and made an attempted plebiscite impossible and although the border was demarcated through other means in 1929, Arica soon became ignored by the Chilean state. A state of abandonment remained until the 1950s when economic initiatives enacted at the regional level succeeded in raising the prospects and spirits of Arica, purging the area of violence, until the 1970s when General Pinochet’s new economic plan reversed Arica’s progress. Arica instead became a military space in this decade as tensions arose between Pinochet and Peruvian dictator General Velasco and international violence returned. This international level is then contrasted with violence at the corporeal level in Arica in the 1980s when HIV/AIDS and abortion both became increasingly pertinent at the border. The thesis closes with how violence remains present in Arica today, particularly as seen through the 2014 maritime border dispute.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Ultimately this thesis is dedicated to Arica and its people. This work would not have been possible without the stories that so many Ariqueños so generously shared with me so muchísimas gracias to all my research participants. Additional thanks to Hector González, Jennifer Cancino, Rossana Testa and Mariela Villalobos, all whom taught me so much about Arica. Todxs ustedes me han enseñado como ser Ariqueña de corazón.
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## GLOSSARY

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<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ariquenio</td>
<td>Of Arica, usually referring to local citizens</td>
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<td>ASINDA</td>
<td>The Association for Industry in Arica</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>US Government Central intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPROCA</td>
<td>The Confederation for Commerce and Production in Arica</td>
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<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>The Association for Industry in Arica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDAP</td>
<td>Development Corporation of Arica and Parinacota</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRIPAC</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS community centre in Arica</td>
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<td>Decree 303</td>
<td>Legislation creating the puerto libre of Arica</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone (maritime area)</td>
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<td>ENAMI</td>
<td>The Chilean National Company for Mining</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>US Government Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection</td>
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<td>IBRU</td>
<td>International Boundaries Research Unit, located at the University of Durham</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations</td>
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<td>ISI</td>
<td>Import substitution industrialization economic model</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAA</td>
<td>Junta de Adelanto de Arica, board of development in Arica 1958-1976</td>
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<td>Law 13.039</td>
<td>Legislation creating the JAA</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
<td>Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender</td>
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<tr>
<td>nm</td>
<td>Nautical miles</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>US Government National Security Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>US Government Office of Strategic Services</td>
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<td>SAG</td>
<td>Servicio Agrícola y Ganadero (Agricultural and Livestock Service)</td>
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<td>SEGA</td>
<td>Executive Secretary of the Provincial Government of Arica</td>
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<td>SERMENA</td>
<td>National Health Service for Employees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tacneño</td>
<td>Of Tacna, Peru, usually referring to local citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Unidad Popular/Popular Unity, political party</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAT</td>
<td>Value Added Tax</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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sent the intended meaning and so translations are not always strictly literal. Any errors are the fault of the author.

Note on terminology:
The term ‘Arica’ can refer to the city of Arica, the region of Arica, and also the department of Arica. Chile is divided into 15 regions corresponding to internal political units that have a system of more or less autonomous administration, although working in coordination with the ministries and national government bodies. Each region, in turn, is divided into provinces and departments. Until 2007 the city of Arica belonged to the Region of Tarapacá. In early 2007 however the Chilean government decided to create a new region in the northernmost territory of the country for reasons of greater autonomy named the Region of Arica & Parinacota. The region is made up of two provinces, Arica and Parincota each of which have two departments, Arica and Camarones, and Putre and General Lagos, respectively.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

A Story of Five Border Moments

One

Sitting in the Library of Congress in Washington DC a year stretched out ahead of me. These solemn archives were the beginning of twelve months spent on fieldwork in pursuit of understanding the Chile-Peru border and the Chilean city of Arica in particular. The year would include nine months living in Arica, a decision I began to question the deeper I delved into the extensive records of the archives. I had become engrossed in two diaries in the Library’s collection, those of General John J. Pershing and his aide Major Quekemeyer who had spent several months living in Arica between 1925 and 1926. They and many other American citizens were sent there by the US President in order to resolve the fifty-year border dispute between Chile and Peru. Their plan was an attempted plebiscite to decide the sovereignty of the territories of Arica and Tacna that had been taken by Chile from Peru in the War of the Pacific. In their diaries Pershing and ‘Quek’ criticised every possible aspect of Arica, from the ignorance and ugliness of the local people to its unattractive situation on the edge of the Atacama Desert and both rejoiced when they were freed from their duties and could return to ‘God’s country’. Could Arica really be so unpleasant? Their stay certainly hadn’t done their health any good, Pershing was forced to leave Arica due to hypertension and an oral infection and Quekemeyer tragically died young from pneumonia very shortly after leaving Arica.
I hadn’t expected the archives to force me to confront my feelings about the lived experience of fieldwork, that I would follow in the footsteps of these American diplomats and like them embed myself in the community in order to understand the legacy of violence on the border and how it can be resolved. The Americans encountered extreme violence, so severe was the persecution of Peruvians by Chileans that the plebiscite could not be held and the border issue was not solved until three years later. However the Arica of 1925 was not the Arica which I would come to know, ninety years of history, of vastly shifting politics, of life had shaped a city which would have been unrecognisable to Pershing. The Americans had travelled down to
this foreign, dusty town in an attempt to heal the border, to nurse the gaping wound that the Chile-Peru border had become. A wound that I discovered over the following year could not and likely would never completely heal.

Two

On my first day in Arica I walked up the Morro, an enormous headland that towers over the otherwise flat city and the strategic point from which Chile had captured Arica from Peru in the War of the Pacific. It was under the midday sun that I trekked up to the top and had my initial view over the city, of the endless Pacific stretching out westwards, of thousands of buildings packed together from the foot of the Morro out into the hazy desert that embraces Arica. In this very beige view the port, of which I had read so much, stood out with its brightly coloured shipping containers. I walked down to the port and was surprised at how compact it was, a mix

Figure 2: Panorama of Arica from the Morro. 2013. Author’s photo
of small fishing boats, larger tankers, a colony of enormous sea lions, and another of pelicans all vying for scraps. I knew that the port had been Arica’s very reason for existence and source of prosperity for hundreds of years but what existed today didn’t seem extensive enough. I began to realise that all the infrastructure I encountered in my daily life carried this same sense of faded glory, buildings which would have been cutting-edge in the 1960s seemed a little tired now. The bus station, the shopping centres, the football stadium which was right next to my house, the university where I came to be based, even the beaches called back to a once-modern past. The connection became clear once I learnt of the extent of the Junta de Adelanto de Arica, a board of development that existed between 1958 and 1976 and had built the entirety of the city’s primary infrastructure. The JAA was exalted by locals as bringing the ‘golden years’ or ‘heyday’ to Arica, raising the poverty stricken area out of its malaise and bringing peace to the area so marred by conflict. What I couldn’t understand was why did this project end? What happened at the border to mean that economic progress was no longer the priority when a populated and prosperous border region is one of the best border defences?
Three

One of the interviews I conducted while on fieldwork was with an older Ariqueño who had an interesting revelation for me, in the 1970s under Pinochet’s dictatorship he had been asked by high-ranking officials to work as a spy when he was traveling to Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina for work. The military was gathering information on resources and personnel in these neighbouring countries in case of military warfare. I was well aware of the political turmoil within Chile in the 1970s but was rapidly learning about Pinochet's foreign policies during the decade as well. Arica, despite its relative economic irrelevance was a symbolic trophy for Chile and desired by Peru and Bolivia and one Peruvian dictator, Juan Velasco Alvarado, made his dreams of recovering the city before the 1979 centenary of its theft by Chile very clear indeed. What happened in Arica as it became a pawn in this game of national pride between
Chile and Peru? What was it like to live on such a vulnerable border? Why did this war, so resolutely calculated by Velasco, never come to pass?

Four

In one week I had three revelations regarding health at the border. The first time I actually encountered the Chile-Peru border crossing, a small collection of buildings named Chacalluta about halfway between Arica and Tacna, I noticed some banners at the border rising awareness about HIV/AIDS and the importance of getting tested. A couple of days later I was talking to a Spanish teacher who said to me, ‘do you know where the highest rate of HIV in Arica, and possibly in Chile is?’ I said I had no idea and she told me ‘your workplace, the university’. It was then shortly after this conversation that I read a newspaper article about a young woman who had been searched at Chacalluta border crossing and was found to be carrying her own aborted foetus. When questioned by officials she explained that she was returning to Arica from Tacna where she had gone to have an abortion and had to bring proof back for her boyfriend that she had gone through with the procedure. These three events so close in proximity to one another forced me to consider the effect this border was having on the real lives and health of everyday people, why does Arica have an HIV/AIDS rate so much higher than the national average? What led to this young Chilean woman crossing the border to her home country with her aborted foetus?
Whilst living in Arica I would go to various cultural events, partly as a form of ethnographic research to better understand the city and its citizens but also with friends and two celebrations stuck with me. The first was carnival, or to give it its proper title, *carnaval andino internacional con la fuerza del sol*, a three day party with ten thousand dancers mainly from Peru, Bolivia, and Chile performing traditional dances in groups through the streets of the city with the hopes of bagging a top prize. Now one of the biggest carnivals on the continent the event has only existed since 2002 when it was established to celebrate the Andean heritage and culture present in the north of Chile which is so closely entwined with Peru and Bolivia but is non-existent in the rest of Chile. The booming percussion, extravagant costumes, and warlike dances were alien to my British senses but not to the tens of thousands of spectators.
who would jump in from the sidelines to dance with the performers and have their photos taken with them.

Figure 5: A group dances at carnival. 2014. Author’s photo

The other big event in Arica’s dancing calendar is the National Cueca Championship that takes place in June and has been part of Ariqueño culture since 1968. The cueca is the national dance of Chile, enacting the courtship ritual of a cockerel and a hen, dancers wear traditional Chilean huaso clothing of a poncho, riding boots and spurs and it embodies the southern Chilean countryside. It was therefore odd for me to see this dance of the lush green pastures performed in the barren desert of Arica after the Andean drums of carnival. While carnival was a recent invention to rewrite Chile’s difficult and racist relationship with the extreme north, the installation of the cueca championship in Arica in the 1960s had been the opposite, it was a stamping of the most Chilean of traditions on the one city in Chile which refused to conform to Chile’s particular performance of nationhood.
It was this juxtaposition between these two faces of Arica that interested me, how Arica has ongoing international territorial disputes, national struggles for recognition and continuing corporeal violence. Arica is a place where the border is crossed on a daily basis, where Peruvian food is enjoyed with gusto and Ariqueños feel more in in tune with Tacneños than with Chileans in the south, yet Arica is also the centre of Chilean nationalism as portrayed by the 2014 maritime border dispute and a continuing legacy of racism and xenophobia. A year after sitting in those serious archives of Washington DC I had lived this crazy paradox of the border, I had seen how exclusion and inclusion could coexist but never happily, and I was beginning to understand the never-quite-healed line in the sand which separated and joined Chile and Peru.

**Making Sense of the Border Stories**

Each of these five episodes in the history of Arica examined throughout the thesis are rich enough to be the subject of a thesis in their own right but I have a different aim; to show how through ninety years of history the border has oscillated between being central but also marginal to the Chilean state, that the border has been a cause for violence but also an opportunity to escape it, that the border is an everyday lived space but also a space of spectacle and event. It is these five moments as a whole that highlight the incongruities, paradoxes, and stark weirdness of borders. As the Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa (2008) has argued, Latin America is a continent infused with paradoxes and I argue that the border is the exemplar par excellence of this. The border is a space central to the nation, which must be secured at all cost yet is also peripheral, marginal, abandoned by the state when sovereignty is not being
threatened. The Chilean state would like the Chile-Peru border to be a simple dividing line between the modern, homogenous Chile and the ‘other’ to the north yet in reality the borderlands are too complex and paradoxical to just be a line. The border constricts inhabitants of the borderlands into hyper-nationalistic roles, living in a dangerous threatened area. However at the same time the border offers opportunity, creates cultural hybridity, and means citizens can escape the confines of their nation. Due to these paradoxes it becomes impossible to speak of one border identity, rather it is individual experiences which tell the richest stories, whether of the famous American General Pershing so far from home, a poor fisherman trying to feed his family, a prostitute evading HIV, a young soldier terrified of war, or a woman desperately seeking an abortion. There can be no homogenous border identity with different bodies affected by the border in such different ways.

The thread that connects the five border moments is violence. Violence will be considered here through various definitions, from international warfare to disease to racism, as well as attempts to eradicate violence from Arica. The border as a space of violence is often knotted with the border as a space of machismo; a particular performance of Chilean masculinity that has oftentimes led to outbursts or threats of violence or dangerous ideologies. The changes in what violence means and how it is implemented or quelled is studied chronologically with the first empirical chapter looking at the 1920s, the second at the 1950s until 1976, the third at the 1970s, the fourth at the 1980s until the present day with the final chapter examining Arica today.

The quirkiness of Arica as a border city becomes the focus, tracing how over the time period, at the international, national, and corporeal scales, violence or its pacification can be studied through different geographical lenses. This thesis is as much concerned with the verb ‘to border’ as it is with the noun ‘border’. The thesis
begins with the process of demarcating the Chile-Peru border in the 1920s but demarcation does not mean the end of the process of bordering, it is in this case an ongoing practice that is as present today as it was in the 1920s. Boundary disputes are never truly ‘settled’ or ‘closed’; the process of bordering continues whether at the international level, the state level, or through the lived experiences of those at the border. These scales are inherently interconnected; global political shifts occur due to individual’s decisions, bodies are affected by global changes. Rachel Pain’s work on the scales of violence and the interweaving of military and intimate themes from a feminist perspective underpins my work on scale. Pain (2015) discusses both domestic violence and international warfare to draw out the intimate-geopolitical. Interestingly Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) has used the phrase ‘intimate terrorism’ to describe the experience of living in the borderlands between a ‘Third World’ and a ‘First World’ country. Pain makes a strong case for the intimate as not being ‘dripped down upon’ by geopolitical processes but instead conceptualises them as part of a single complex of violence. Pain (2014) successfully argues that it is impossible to assign terrorism, whether everyday or global terrorism, different levels of importance or to separate them into hermetic scales. The intimate and the global are instead part of the same structures that interweave, connect, and disconnect and are far from being binary oppositions (Pain and Staeheli 2014).

Borders seem vital to order, to making sense of the world we have inhabited but as this thesis shows there is nothing clean cut or ordered about borders, they are messy, precarious spaces, not just abstract lines on a map. While for Santiaguinos or Limeños the border may be a far-off line, for those who inhabit the borderlands the border is a way of life, a threat to life, an escape from the state, and home. Just as the border has multiple personalities as does this thesis and it is precisely in jumping
between historical geography, economic geography, political geography, health geography, and cultural geography that the true richness and complexity of the border can emerge. Due to this interdisciplinary jumping the register and writing style necessarily shift in order to better represent each particular topic, the content, and the methodologies used. Latin American studies has a particularly strong tradition of interdisciplinarity which has been hugely influential to my work and it is in this tradition that I write, not being bound by any singular discipline. This is also reflected in the mixed-methods employed which in their totality act as a ‘collage’.

This thesis is an experiment in new ways of looking at the border. My approach of drawing from traditional historical archives, in-depth interviews, and social media across wildly different themes such as international diplomacy, economic initiatives, fishing, racism, and abortion is experimental ‘crazy geography’. The Chilean writer Benjamín Subercaseaux (1940) was the first to use the phrase *loca geografía* with regards to Chile and I use it here to describe the border but also to describe my research approach. It does initially appear ‘crazy’ to attempt to bring together five border moments that at first glance have little in common but I argue that this radical methodology enables a new way of understanding violence at the ‘crazy’ border. My experimentalism is inspired by certain writers who have played with, across, and through boundaries in the pursuit of new perspectives. These writers include Cynthia Enloe with her inspiring work with feminism and politics, Gloria Anzaldúa who works on feminism, queer theory, and borders, and a whole raft of magical realist Latin American writers who give space to the fabulous, to the seemingly unreal, and to crazy geography. Arica’s ‘craziness’ emerges in how it is portrayed nationally and internationally. The city often makes headlines for strange events surrounding national border demarcation, drugs, or the sensationalist 2015 story of a
malnourished two-year-old boy being breastfed by a local dog. This northernmost Chilean city has always had an air of mystery and weirdness surrounding it.

The metaphor of the ‘wound’ runs throughout the thesis influenced by key writers. Again, my argument owes a lot to Gloria Anzaldúa’s work on the border as una herida abierta [an open wound] but also to Mark Salter who conceptually the border as a ‘suture’. The wound metaphor aptly describes two areas tearing away from one another, often due to violence, but also invokes the metaphor of healing. Anzaldúa (1987) uses the terms ‘scab’ and ‘hemorrhage’ to explain the borderland that forms a ‘third country’. The two sides can become knitted back together even if this inevitably leaves a scar. The Chile-Peru border is envisaged as a wound that various actors have attempted to heal while others have contributed to the aggravation of the wound. Another writer working through the metaphor of the ‘wound’ is Karen Till whose description of places, cities and landscapes as ‘wounded’ configures the relationships between memory and place. For Till “[p]laces described as wounded are understood to be present to the pain of others and to embody difficult social pasts” (2012:108). This recognition of the importance of history in the present landscape gives an element of temporality to the border that, particularly in this thesis is as important as its spatiality. By thinking about a place as wounded, those who inhabit that place can begin the difficult work of mourning loss (Till 2005).

This thesis aims to investigate how and why a culture of violence has been created and maintained yet also contested at the Chile-Peru border. Violence is a scalar phenomenon at the Chile-Peru border and so the international, national, and corporeal scales will be interrogated to better understand the use, threat, or suppression of violence. The third and final aim is to understand how a sustained culture of border violence has affected the city of Arica and its inhabitants from 1925
to 2015. The contribution of this thesis to geography will be to bring the citizens of
the borderlands back into border studies in the vein of more anthropological work
being done in Latin America. I am interested in what it means to live on a border
which was demarcated in the 1920s but which never stops going through the process
of bordering. I am interested in how violence has never really left the border and how
this violence has been imbued with machismo. Through empirical research this thesis
highlights the paradoxical and contradictory nature of borders that oscillate in
international and state importance depending on external threats.

These ideas, of the complex and ongoing processes of bordering, of fundamental
violence at the border, of the interlinked scales at the border, and the impact this has
on real lives, are studied predominantly through feminist theory and critical theories. I
employ intersectional feminism to better understand the relationships between
multiple identity variables such as race, ethnicity, class, sexuality and gender as well as
to investigate masculinity and violence. I additionally use critical borderlands and
critical political theories to build on this and interrogate paradigms of power and
privilege. My year of fieldwork in the United States, Chile, and Peru was roughly split
between archival research and ethnographic research, mainly oral histories.
To situate this thesis in a historical and geographical context, although the area has been settled by humans for 10,000 years, Arica as a town was founded by Spanish conquistadors in 1541 as a port for exporting the silver mined in Potosí in present-day Bolivia (Andrien 2001; Cobb 1949). Arica was part of the nascent Peruvian republic from 1821 and subsequently, as Fifer (1964) states, with the discovery of guano (seabird excrement) in the 1840s and nitrates in 1866, Arica slowly grew as prospectors moved to the Atacama region to seek their fortune. This competition for resources led to persistent territorial claims between Peru, Bolivia, and Chile that culminated in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883).

The War of the Pacific was declared on the 1st March 1879 and at heart was about the fight for resources in the Atacama Desert, namely guano and nitrates. Beyond resources, Bolivia and Peru had bitterly envied Chile for its material...
prosperity, orderly political life without revolutions, and uninterrupted growth (Baptista Gumucio 1980). Nitrates were little valued in the colonial era but in 1809 their value as a fertiliser became known (López Urrutía 2008). Chile began exploiting the nitrate reserves in the Atacama Desert to great financial benefit, exacerbating Peruvian and Bolivian resentment. In 1878 Bolivian President Hilarión Daza imposed a tax upon Chilean nitrate companies that heightened tensions between the nations and Bolivia declared war against Chile. By April 1879 Peru had sided with its ally Bolivia on the basis of a secret pact the two nations had signed. Subsequent battles saw Chile claim swathes of territory from both Bolivia and Peru, reaching as far as the Peruvian capital of Lima.

The consequences of the War of the Pacific were that, as Chile had taken Bolivian territory, Peru and Chile became neighbours; Chile expanded its territory by a third; and the history of animosity between Chile and the two defeated nations deepened. According to Milet (2004) a dichotomy between Chile and Peru was born; the winner and the loser, the invader and the invaded, the prosperous and stable country in contrast with the volatile country wracked with poverty. The War of the Pacific is one of the most significant events in Peruvian collective memory with Chile becoming the ‘perpetual enemy’, the counterpoint to which the Peruvian identity is formed (Miyahira et al. 2010). According to Van Der Ree (2010), the War of the Pacific was a double blow for Peru and Bolivia, firstly losing territory and then seeing Chile exploit the nitrates below the ground to great economic gain. Both Peru and Bolivia were humiliated and Chile’s marker as being an imperialist neo-liberal state was born. Chile’s victory in war and occupation of the north was fundamental to its reconfiguration as a culturally, racially and morally homogenous nation-state (Tamborino & Guizardi 2014).
On the worldwide stage, the War of the Pacific tended to divide opinion with countries siding with either Chile or with Peru and Bolivia. Europe and North America favoured the smaller Chile with its perceived stable democracy and Anglo-Saxon influences. On the other hand, most Latin American nations sided with Peru and Bolivia as Chile had come across as overly aggressive and with a predominantly white population in comparison with the more indigenous other countries of the continent (Encina 1954). This has not been helped by Chilean declarations of superiority, labeling themselves as more progressive and civilised, leading to the title ‘the English of the south’ (Klaiber 1978). Peru had been weak and unable to contest Chile’s land grab of the war and so agreed to sign a treaty with Chile. The 1883 Treaty of Ancón granted Chile ten years to remain in the Tacna and Arica provinces that it had appropriated from Peru, after which time a plebiscite would be held to decide ownership (Borchard 1922). However the plebiscite did not take place after the ten years and in order to create a population which had far weaker Peruvian sympathies, over the decades that followed, Chile began its aggressive ‘chileanisation’ policies of closing private schools, suppression of the Peruvian press and churches, the deportation and murder of Peruvians, and the relocation of Chilean nationals into the provinces (Skuban 2007). The thesis begins at this point in the 1920s when Peru and Chile decide to end the five decades of border dispute with the involvement of the United States.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Imagine a contested border region. It might be anywhere in the world. There are a range of ways to settle the issue: violence, a referendum, international arbitration. Whatever means are adopted, or imposed, the outcome will have consequences for people on both sides, depending on who they are. While some will accept it, some may not. Populations may move, towns and regions may be ‘cleansed’, genealogies may be rewritten. The boundaries of the collectivity may be redrawn.

R. Jenkins 2004:3

This thesis examines the processes and effects of bordering in one city, Arica on the Chile-Peru border.¹ This is not with the aim of making sense of the border or borders in general but to illustrate the nonsensical strangeness and inherently paradoxical nature of borders, spaces that are at once integral to the nation and at the same time are peripheral extremities. This thesis unpicks this nonsensical strangeness by drawing on what appear to be vastly different themes in vastly different registers but which one by one add to the richness of the border. Borders are spaces where patriotism and loyalty to the nation are exalted but are also hybrid spaces, taking on characteristics from across the border. Chile, a country which stretches over 4,300km in length but whose average width is just 177km is a border in itself, buttressed by Argentina to the east, the Pacific Ocean to the west, and

¹ The Chile-Peru border is examined as a border and not a frontier because the latter tends to be posited as the vast and empty spaces which are technically within the country’s borders but lie beyond the limit of the nation state. As this thesis will argue, Chile’s borderlands are not beyond the limit of the state.
Bolivia and Peru to the north. Chile is an anomaly in world geography, clinging onto the side of South America thanks to the protection of the Andes and the indomitable Atacama Desert. Chile’s impenetrability has created a ‘crazy geography’, a bizarrely shaped nation-state that has persisted in spite of its small population. In order to understand borders in this context, this review will cover border studies but then move on to topics which have influenced this thesis in a more profound way, namely Latin American studies, theories of violence, and work on bodies and identity.

**Border Studies**

The field of border studies has been dynamic and shape-shifting, developing throughout the twentieth century but thriving since the 1990s. In the 1980s, border studies had become more interdisciplinary and then prospered within academic departments in Europe and North America during the following decade. The 1990s saw a spate of arguments denouncing borders as porous, permeable, and increasingly irrelevant in the new globalised world order (Ohmae 1990; Friedman 2005; Caney 2005; Welchman 1996) However this thesis joins the multitude of work opposing this view, arguing instead that borders are becoming increasingly important, controlled, and strengthened, and at an increasing rate since 9/11. We live, according to Blake (2000), in a time when borders worldwide are more difficult and dangerous than they have ever been. In 2011, approximately 20,000km of the world’s borders were marked by walls or borders with an additional 18,000km with security features such as surveillance and patrols (Diener & Hagen 2012). Even ‘border walls’ (Vallet & David 2012), border barriers with fixed masonry foundations, are being re-built despite the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent boom in cyber technologies and free movement of capital which led to the borderless world theories.
However, not all borders are homogenous and there are huge differences between securitisation and movement of goods and people between borders. Not all individuals are equally mobile and detached from place in our globalised world; rather, globalisation has been economic, not social, increasing the mobility of goods across borders while hampering the movement of all but select bodies. Paasi (2005) argues that borderless world theories are damaging to the nuanced, unique experiences of border regions and we need instead a less universalising view of boundaries. This rests on Anderson’s (1996) work that argues that, far from being abstract lines in the sand, boundaries are central to political life and are intrinsically related to notions of identity, citizenship, statehood, and inclusion and exclusion. Such processes of identity and difference at the border, claims Yuval-Davis (1997b), determine spaces of agency, how citizenship is performed and what this shows about practices of belonging.

Since the late 1980s there has been a shift to research on the processes of bordering rather than the borders themselves. As Popescu writes “[b]orders are never finished; instead they are always in the making, always being imagined and reimagined. What matters more is the border-making process rather than the shape borders assume at one time or another” (2012:21). Rebordering is not only about the reinforcement of existing state borders, but also about different ways of bordering that include new types of borders and new border functions (Walters 2002, 2006).

Much of this thesis contemplates the historical geography of bordering, beginning in the 1920s, which raises different questions about global connections and their effects on bordering processes. International influences impacted the Chile-Peru border in remarkably different ways throughout the ninety years studied. My research is therefore dependent on an understanding of border theory that takes
borders seriously in this ‘globalised borderless world’ and understands them not as simple lines differentiating two places but as differentiated places themselves. Places where new identities are created, where multiplicity is recognised, where nationalism can be celebrated or disparaged, where a distinctive culture emerges, and where borders are experienced and crossed. It is important to note however, that shifts in border locations means that borders can cross people; it is not just people who cross borders. This can be seen through examples of Europeans who have never moved out of their village yet have lived in various countries as borders were redrawn throughout the twentieth century, and at the Chile-Peru border whereby territorial appropriation switched the nationality of communities who remained rooted.

Border demarcation as an act has been so concretised in human societies that it seems a natural and inevitable undertaking and we define nations and territories by where they begin and where they end (Agnew 2007; Grosby 1995). The state wields power over space and border making or breaking is part of how the state configures its spatial domination. State boundaries thereby become a limit of state control to be maintained by force or threat of force. Overt displays of power at the border are often how states cement their long-term goals of standing firm and displaying one’s potential influence in what Snyder and Diesing have termed “reputation for resolve” (1977:185). Popescu also acknowledges the power intrinsic to border demarcation and writes; “[i]n order to unearth the power of boundaries, we need to ask whose interests are being served by the imposition and maintaining of various borders” (2012:23). When such displays of power are questioned they can be contested and subverted.

While border studies has given this thesis an important theoretical basis, I aim to go beyond this field which can fail to appreciate the nuance, history, political
situation and individual experiences which make borders such rich and interesting spaces. Border studies is too often tired, reverting back to platitudes about how borders always have dual sides or that borders connect as well as separate and so this study is firmly situated in multidisciplinary work which engages with colonialism, critical politics, identity studies, and feminism. Some notable work has successfully worked away from traditional border studies to provide new and fresh perspectives. In *Border as Method* (2013) Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson assess the proliferation of borders and a renewed focus on their complexity in the modern world. They argue that violence is intrinsic to shaping the lived experiences of borders, using the example of migrants dying crossing borders. By taking the border as an ‘epistemic angle’ Mezzadra and Neilson provide a new way of looking at power, capital and sovereignty.

Even though border studies has largely moved away from the border as a line, I argue that the spatial characteristics of borders are still important. Whether biometrics at airports, lethal journeys across seas or deserts, or a passport control checkpoint, space remains central. I am wary of arguments that ‘borders are everywhere’, an assumption that can delegitimise the experiences of those whose lives are shaped, twisted, or even ended by borders. While there are strong arguments that globalisation has led to the ubiquity of borders, I remain interested in the human-ness of state borders and the role of state power in the borderlands in an attempt to validate the lives of borderland citizens, especially those who due to factors such as gender, class, race, ethnicity, and sexuality experience increased violence at the border. The following sections therefore explore how borders can be understood through Latin American history, the relationship between violence and borders, and where bodies and individual experience come to the fore.
Borders in Latin America

The term ‘Latin America’ emerged in France in the mid-nineteenth century, used at a Paris conference in 1856 by Chilean politician Francisco Bilbao and in 1861 in *Le revue des races Latines* (García San Martín 2013). Other early recorded accounts were by the Colombian José María Torres Caicedo and the Argentine Carlos Calvo. The term ‘America’ itself is thanks to the Italian explorer Amerigo Vespucci who landed on what is now Brazil in 1499 and whose name inspired German cartographer Martin Waldseemüller to add the term to a map in 1507 (Dunkerley 2004). The Mexican historian Edmundo O’Gorman, in an early 1958 work deconstructing European colonial discourse initiated the idea of the invention of Latin America by Europe in place of the discovery of Latin America. John Phelan (1968) made the distinction between two Americas, the Latin and the Saxon and followed O’Gorman’s notion of Latin America as a European invention. Phelan argued that it was conceived in France to position the French as the leader of a Latin ‘race’ pitched against the Anglo-Saxon and Slavic ‘races’.

For Argentine semiotician Walter Mignolo ‘America’ is the European invention of the first modernity with ‘Latin America’ being the second modernity. The first modernity corresponds with the colonial era while the second is a different type of coloniality altogether, as he writes, “The ‘idea’ of Latin America is that sad one of the elites celebrating their dreams of becoming modern while they slide deeper and deeper into the logic of coloniality” (2005:58). Therefore for Mignolo, Latin America is more than just a name to designate an entity or to express an identity, it’s a ‘political project’. In *The Idea of Latin America* Mignolo debunks ‘the ontology of continental divides’ and instead shows how Latin America is a constructed, prescriptive idea with a highly racialised history. Modernity is inextricably
intertwined with coloniality, and not just the colonial occupation of territory by Europeans but in an ongoing sense of political and economic control. For Mignolo there is no modernity without coloniality, “[i]f we...stop seeing 'modernity' as a goal rather than seeing it as a European construction of history in Europe’s own interests” then the essence of a decolonial shift could occur (2012:xix). Border thinking is, for Mignolo, “the necessary epistemology to delink and decolonize knowledge and, in the process, to build decolonial local histories, restoring the dignity that the western idea of universal history took away from millions of people” (2012:x).

Mignolo (1996) has been interested in the shift in colonial relations in Latin America from European ‘decadent colonialism’ towards a new breed of imperial colonialism wielded by the United States. The continent does not therefore have one experience of postcolonialism; it has been multifaceted and historically dependent. Europe and the United States, especially after the Second World War, have exerted power, primarily economic, over the territories to their south. Latin America’s borders were demarcated and mapped by Europe and the United States, dictating nationality, movement, and spatial identities from afar and positing Latin America as a distinct place south of the US border. This unusual border history of colonial demarcation has profoundly marked the experience of being Latin American. The Peruvian author Mario Vargas Llosa (2008:7) notes this impact;

“What does it mean to feel you are Latin American? It means being aware that the territorial boundaries dividing our nations are artificial, imposed arbitrarily during the colonial years. And neither our leaders during the emancipation period nor the republican governments that followed bothered to correct that situation. In fact, they often worsened things by further separating and isolating societies whose commonalities were deeper than their petty differences.”
The whole continent has been defined, argues Larry Herzog (1990), by the U.S./Mexico border and Richard (1996) even goes as far to call the whole of Latin America a border, as it is so often perceived as being culturally peripheral in the global imagination. These often arbitrarily demarcated borders created national obsessions with promoting a national identity in the scarcely populated ‘frontier’ borderlands (Baud 2000). The bordering of Latin America first occurred in the imagination of early European explorers and the subsequent mapping of physical borders made it a continent “fashioned rather than found”, according to Merrell (2004:4). Latin America was imagined as a counter-space to Europe, a remade world, a promised land. Much of this creation of a ‘new’ space was rooted in racial othering and this often became embedded within Latin American societies. Orlove’s (1993) work on order in colonial and postcolonial Peruvian geography conveys historical shifts in the enactment of power over the physical terrain but also the peoples of Peru. Orlove tells how “colonial orderings emphasized historicized racial differences among persons within a relatively balanced and homogeneous space, while postcolonial orderings stressed naturalized regional differences among places within a homogeneous, though covertly racialized, population” (1993:301). Environmental determinism was employed as a way to represent ‘indians’ in geographical discourse, people were seen as shaped by the geographical spaces they inhabited.

The complex history of colonialism and violence in Latin America has resulted in difficulties over the rights and responsibilities of demarcating and crossing borders. It was after the collapse of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires in the nineteenth century that nation building in South America truly began despite military leader Simón Bolívar’s attempts to keep Spanish-speaking territories unified. Various
conflicts took place between the fledgling nations in order to assert power and define borders such as the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) and The War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870). Colonial borders were rarely demarcated and were, according to Bruslé (2007) relatively permeable frontiers.

Present day state borders in Latin America exist largely thanks to the principles of *uti possidetis juris* (legal possession) and *uti possidetis de facto* (effective possession) which were held up in struggles for independence from colonial powers. Simón Bolívar emphatically pursued *uti possidetis juris* to temporarily fix Spanish administrative units that could then be reworked and demarcated as appropriate (Parodi 2002). Yet these administrative units have persisted beyond Bolívar’s expectations and many of these boundaries that were drawn from afar by colonial powers with little knowledge of the territories remain. Border theorists must be wary of overthinking this persistence however due to the prevalence of Latin American scholars falling into what John Agnew (1994) terms the ‘territorial trap’; of trusting too much in the supposed fixity of territory, of states, and of identities.

Even after independence border demarcation in Latin America was prohibited, to a substantial degree, to the physical geography of the continent with impermeable tropical forests and towering mountain ranges (Amilhat-Szary 2007). Mandel (1980:429) claims that less economically developed countries “tend to rely more on territorial concerns for the pursuit of their national interests. And in cases where a colonial power determined their boundaries prior to independence, there is a particular urgency to the full attainment of border claims”.

Borders in South America are “pressure points” (Bolin 1992:172) and with over 18,000 miles of borders they are undoubtedly central to the history, geography, and character of the continent. Border disputes have been rife in Latin America with 83
territorial claims between nation-states between 1816 and 1992 on the continent (Hensel 2001). Yet while forces have often been deployed and conflict has occurred, the escalation to full-scale war has been rare and in global comparison the continent was relatively free from interstate warfare during the twentieth century (Domínguez et al. 2003). The legal principle of *uti possidetis juris* has been key in the management of Latin American border conflicts. The idea of a shared commonality, particularly in South America, has also helped deter leaders from armed conflict in favour of a Bolivarian entity based on a balance of power for mutual benefit. However, although war due to border disputes has been rare, border disputes have persisted on the continent. These border disputes have mainly stemmed from the colonial demarcation of sparsely populated areas that became increasingly settled and known, but more recently maritime border conflicts have been more prominent since the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas raised the issue of limits in the seas.

The difficult geography with border areas often in mountain ranges, rainforests or deserts has made previous mapping and reconnaissance of the borderlands challenging. Peaceful diplomacy has been the ideal solution for these disputes often with a neutral third party involved. Throughout Latin American history the neutral party has varied between the British monarchy (Chile-Argentina Beagle Conflict, 1978), the Organiztion of American States (particularly in Central America) and with many being resolved at the International Court of Justice at The Hague. The Tacna-Arica border issue is one of the longest running in the history of Latin America and, to refer back to the quote by Jenkins that opened the chapter, violence, a referendum, and international mediation have all been employed to end the dispute.
Chile’s unusual shape originated in the sixteenth century when conquistadors came down from Peru in search of riches and settled in the now-central region of Chile where Santiago was founded. When Chile won independence from Spain in 1818 it was roughly a third of the size it is today but in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) Chile expanded to the north appropriating territory from Peru and Bolivia and around the same time gradually took more and more land from the indigenous Mapuche to the south. Chile slowly elongated, unable to move eastwards due to the Andes, and the ribbon shape Chile holds today emerged.

Political terrain on the continent has been largely conceptualised through geopolitics, an approach that has influenced thinking about how states should behave and assert their spatial power, and a term whose use has been well mapped out by Les Hepple (1986). Since independence from Europe the military has tended to hold positions of power and influence in Latin America with military state leaders drawing upon geopolitics. This became increasingly so in the twentieth century in Chile where General Augusto Pinochet taught geopolitics at the Chilean War Academy and published books on the subject (Dodds 1993).

Borders in Latin America have been demarcated and contested often due to very conscious ideas about state power and domination over certain territories. Kjellen and Ratzel’s geopolitical theories of organic state growth were popular on the continent when post-independence nations were contemplating the stretching of their borders into the sparsely populated peripheries (Hepple 2004). The metaphor of the state as an organ was employed by military leaders to legitimate military intervention against external threats but also ‘cancerous cells’ within the state that were harmful to the organ as a whole (Hepple 1992). Les Hepple’s study of the application of Halford Mackinder’s ‘Eurasian heartland thesis’ to South American
geopolitics argues that Lewis Tambs, academic and American Ambassador to Colombia, had been the first to locate the Bolivian triangle as the ‘South American heartland’. Tambs (1965) cited certain geographical features that gave him reason to label Bolivia as a pivot area and believed that communists would target the area in order to gain control of the continent. Mackinder was clearly widely read in Latin America as shown by the fact that Pinochet’s 1968 book *Geopolitica* included in the appendix a Spanish translation of Mackinder’s seminal 1904 paper ‘The geographical pivot of history’.

In Chile the idea of nationalism is deeply linked to the idea and physical space of territory. The historian Mario Góngora (1981) has therefore argued that Chile is by essence a country of war; the desire for and practice of historical territorial expansion has defined the country that Chile is today. It would seem that in Chile geography and militarism remain intertwined as seen through the controversy over the International Geographical Union (IGU) holding the 2011 regional meeting at the Military School in Santiago, a space of torture and murder under the Pinochet dictatorship. In spite of an international petition to change the location of the meeting, the IGU did not directly address the issue (Hirt & Palomino-Schalscha 2011).

**Violence: from Borders to Bodies**

Violence is spatially located and is disproportionately located at borders and in border cities. Various scholars have explored the causes of violence and the different types of violence such as behavioural or structural (Jacoby 2008; Collins 2008; Scheper-Hughes & Bourgeois 2006; Zizek 2008) but I am more interested here in the
link between violence and power. Violence in Latin America is fuelled by the desire for domination that is in turn often fuelled by an expected performance of masculinity. Throughout twentieth century Latin America, argues Biron (2000), the cliché of using violence against women to prove male virility has been ubiquitous. The strength and identity of a nation-state is defined and established by its national masculinity and, argues Biron, violence often occurs due to a crisis of masculinity. Violence as tied to masculinity or machismo can be employed at the broadest to the most intimate scales as will be explored later. Violence is simultaneously present at international borders, in cities, and in bodies as outlined here.

While this thesis is a study of the varying forms of violence that have been enacted at the Chile-Peru border, the escape from or pacification of violence is a phenomenon that has also been enacted at the border. Pacification can be a positive process in search of peace or non-violence and pacifism as a political movement spurns the use of violence. However pacification can also be used to refer to a more insidious policy of suppressing certain groups. James Dunkerley’s (1994) work on Central America posits pacification as political transition rather than a permanent institutionalisation of democracy. Pacification in Latin America often refers to the subjugation of indigenous peoples by European colonisers or Latin elites, such as the attempted pacification of the Mapuche in Southern Chile. In this thesis the verb ‘to pacify’ will be used with respect to attempts to calm the border, to reduce conflict, whether by the local community or the state.

Borders in Latin America have been so formed by and charged with violence that attempts to bring peace to the borders is an overt act, it is not a passive obliviousness to violence but an active working towards peace. Latin America has often been described by scholars such as Imbusch et al. (2011) as the world’s most violent
region with violence being an endemic aspect of everyday life which has resulted in the overlooking of periods of peace and democratisation which is why here the history of violence on the border is examined inclusively, with its moments of both violence and peace encompassed. While Chile is one of the least violent countries in Latin America by homicide rate not all types of violence are so quantifiable with structural violence being pervasive on the entire continent. Structural violence refers to conditions of exclusion and poverty that limit health, opportunity, and access to vital public services (Briceño-León & Zubillaga 2002).

Peace will be regarded here as the ‘absence of violence’ (following Galtung’s 1996 argument) despite it being a notably more complex concept. However, talking about peace in this way necessitates a definition of violence, a complex term that many have attempted to define. It is defined by the World Health Organization (1996) as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, which either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation” and allows flexibility for interpersonal or collective violence at various scales. This is a particularly useful definition when examining the nuances of violence such as its threat, its attempted suppression, and health policy as violence as in this thesis. George Kent (1993) defines violence as doing harm to another in the pursuit of one’s own preferences which, although being a limited definition, importantly incorporates power, and an interrogation of who wields and who benefits from the enactment of violence runs throughout the thesis.

This thesis draws heavily on the work of Mark Salter who uses the metaphor of the border as a suture. For Salter “the suture- as a process of knitting together the inside and the outside together and the resultant scar- better evokes the performative
aspects of borders” (2012:734). This is a useful way to understand how meaning is given to borders due to the ways in which they are delimited and transgressed. Violence is an inherent part of creating the border, the suture, but the very existence of the border thereby works to naturalise the violence employed to create it. Salter draws on the work of Giorgio Agamben, Rob Walker, and Carlo Galli in creating an idea of the suture that better examines the role of borders in the creation of both sovereign states and the system of sovereign states. Salter begins with the assumption that all borders are performative; it is through delimitation and transgression that they are created and given meaning. This idea will run throughout the thesis because it effectively allows for border demarcation to be a complex and unfinished process. As Salter argues “[s]utures are never always or completely successful, just as stitches in a wound may lead to healing but also leave a trace of their own through the scar” (2012:735). Importantly, Salter keeps humans to the fore; “[b]orders then knit the world together, but also knit us as subjects into the bordered world” (2012:736). The inhabitants of the border are unavoidably stitched into the border itself. The ongoing process of the suture and the scar it creates that affects the citizens of the borderlands becomes a particularly useful way for understanding the Chile-Peru border which oscillates between being a space of rupture and repair.

As well as being about the border, this thesis examines a border city and so an understanding of the nature of cities provides a useful background. As Stephen Graham (2010) has illustrated, cities worldwide are being increasingly recognised as battlegrounds of political violence. Graham argues that bordering has been integral to this at scales from international borders to the construction of borders between the rich and poor within cities. A reading of Latin American cities cannot be complete without the Brazilian ‘geographer’s philosopher’ Milton Santos. Through his life and
work Santos (1996) fought against discrimination and for equality and respect for diversity. He was interested in the social construction of space but also in the temporal dimension of space, arguing that space changes its characteristics throughout time periods. Santos was interested in globalisation which he argued has the effect of making urban networks more complex and that the more places globalise, the more unique they become. Territories will develop a specific combination of components that will not be found anywhere else. Santos’ work can thereby become highly useful for examining an urban network that lies on an international border.

Conflict and development have rarely been studied together, rather it is often assumed that conflict is a moment of crisis and development begins when the crisis ends. Some work however has recognised the relationship between underdevelopment and the likelihood of conflict (Collier 2000). MacGinty and Williams’ (2009) book on conflict and development has been particularly useful in writing the human dimension back into conflict studies and offers a critical perspective to highlight that development can in fact cause conflict and have negative consequences. The role of gender in conflict has been highlighted by Bouta, Frerks & Bannon (2005) who emphasise how gender roles change throughout conflict and into the post-conflict stage. During conflict women can be empowered by taking on roles that were previously filled by men who then become engaged in warfare. These are roles that tend to disappear once the conflict ends.

Much of the discussion around power and violence returns to issues of sovereignty and territory. Claudio Minca and Nick Vaughan-Williams analyse borders through a Schmittian lens and argue that “the principle of sovereign power is based on an original act of violence, a revolutionary act, and the border represents
in many ways the spatialisation of this very violence” (2012:760). They argue that for Carl Schmitt the border is an integral part of a nation’s territory but is also inescapably exceptional, a ‘zone of anomie’. It is in this zone that the state enacts violence and this can be seen spatially through the existence of the border. Conflict and violence are catalysts for change, often leading to new borders or new manifestations of power. As John Dewey has argued; “[c]onflict is the gadfly of thought. It stirs us to observation and memory. It instigates to invention. It shocks us out of sheep-like passivity, and sets us at noting and contriving. Not that it always effects this result; but that conflict is a sine qua non of reflection and ingenuity” (1922:300). This contriving that Dewey mentions can often be an extension of control or domination over extended bodies, territories, or processes. For Colin Flint conflict is inherently territorial, as he has written, “war, whether interstate or guerrilla, is a political process that has as its purpose the control of territory to enable subsequent projections of power” (2005:6).

Stuart Elden has successfully brought a deeper understanding to the term ‘territory’ within geography, arguing that the historical dimension and complexities of territory have been neglected (2010a;2010b;2013b). Elden has detailed the development of the idea of territory within Western political thought and stressed that territory is more than ‘land’ and ‘terrain’ but is still related to both ideas. Territory cannot refer to a homogenous idea but instead territory “…is geographical, not simply because it is one of the ways of ordering the world, but also because it is profoundly uneven in its development” (2010a:812). Elden has made the argument that we should not define territory simply as a bounded or bordered space, or at least not without unpacking the terms ‘boundaries’ and ‘space’ conceptually and historically. Just as bordering has been seen as a process, so too has Elden
conceptualised territory, writing that “[t]erritory is a process, not an outcome; not so far from what is increasingly being understood as an assemblage, continually made and remade” (2013a:36).

State building has been violent throughout the world’s history and Latin America is certainly no exception; “Statebuilding involves imposing a unified, centralized state and pacifying autonomous regions, seizing border areas, and imposing regulation, taxation and territorial control” (Newman 2013:141). The borderlands become a space of subjugation and control at the moment of territorial expansion but that does not mean that violence ends once the territory is consolidated under the nation-state. I am interested in these ideas in as far as how this act of subjugation has been felt by the people subjugated, not just as an abstract act. In his seminal 1987 work Michael Taussig examined colonialism in South America and the imposition of colonialism on the ‘wild’ indigenous population, specifically with regards to rubber plantations in Colombia. This area, the Putomayo region, became a ‘space of death’ whereby British capitalists inflicted a reign of terror against indigenous people, their culture, and their collective memory. It is this effect of violent statebuilding or colonialism on bodies that becomes pertinent.

Violence at borders is ripe for study within geopolitics and international relations, theorising the historical and contemporary shifts in power and domination over the globe. This often focusses on the military, a topic that Rachel Woodward has argued needs to be studied in more thoughtful, precise ways. Woodward (2005) believes that to better understand broad themes such as power and violence we should examine the mundane and routine activities of militarism with the aim of pursuing a critical military geography. Also aiming to problematise preceding research on militarism, Jennifer Fluri has called attention “to the need for additional
research on the corporeality of battlegrounds from within the theatres of war as well as the corporeal markers and their displacements and meanings in different spatial contexts” (2011:291). Despite historical changes in violence and warfare that have arguably created some distance in combat, the body remains tied to warfare in multiple ways. As Fluri has written, “[t]he body is often the battleground onto which violence is orchestrated, and rights and victimization-based discourses are expounded to shape public opinion, policy and political action” (2011:291).

Much scholarship on violence and the body has been informed by Elaine Scarry’s The Body in Pain (1985) which analyses the nature and reality of pain and the implications of pain in warfare and torture. Being in pain, she says, causes us to be our least human because we are least able to express ourselves and share ourselves with others. Inflicting pain is an illegitimate and unjust way of gaining power over other human beings because in essence we obliterate their ability to be human.

Scarry’s work is working from and speaking to Hannah Arendt’s writings on the political implications of the imcommunicability of pain, although Scarry is more interested in pain as a private, human experience. Arendt’s seminal On Violence (1970) argued that power and violence are completely antithetical; they are not the same, they are in fact direct opposites. Where there is the absolute domination of one, the other cannot exist; violence appears when power is threatened. For Arendt, “[p]ower is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together… without a people or group there is no power” (1970:45). To turn Arendt’s ideas to gender, for Raewyn Connell “[v]iolence is part of a system of domination, but is at the same time a measure of its imperfection. A thoroughly legitimate hierarchy would have less need to intimidate.
The scale of contemporary violence points to crisis tendencies (to problematise a term from Jürgen Habermas) in the modern gender order” (1995:84).

Another philosopher who has contributed immensely to geographical understandings of violence, control, and corporeality has been Michel Foucault. Among his many significant contributions, that most pertinent to this thesis has been biopolitics. Following the work of Foucault, biopolitics is a term denoting social and political power over life and was first discussed during his lecture series Society Must Be Defended given at the Collège de France from 1975–1976. Foucault described biopolitics as “a new technology of power...[that] exists at a different level, on a different scale, and [that] has a different bearing area, and makes use of very different instruments” (2003:242). Foucault argued that with the development of technology authorities improved their potential to control subjects “through general hygiene programmes, or more general policies regarding sexuality, it is also achieved through city planning, insurance schemes and education” (Legg 2005:141). The far-reaching implication of this is, argue Rabinow and Rose (2006), that through the implementation, or lack of implementation, of this control biopower can be read as the state’s authority to ‘let die’ as much as to ‘make die’.

Highly influenced by Foucault, Judith Butler’s work has been important in examining violence, discussing in Precarious Life (2004) the value of human life and the social justice implications of mourning. Butler’s work is also important here in terms of her earlier work Gender Trouble (1990) where she problematised hegemonic understandings of gender as based on innate, natural differences between two sexes and instead proposed that constructed gender difference has created sex difference. Butler has argued that gender and sexuality rely on being repeatedly performed or
‘cited’ in order to function as mutually constitutive categories of subjectivity and this has great implications for masculinities studies and how masculinity is accomplished.

The relationships between gender, violence, and war have been successfully mined by scholars at various scales. For example, for Cynthia Enloe (1983) the military is the epitome of patriarchy and she argues that the oppression of women is a fundamental part, not just a consequence, of the militarist ideology. Enloe has been influential in disrupting the ‘natural’ status quo of military regimes to fully understand the gendered dynamics of the military at a much broader scale than first imagined.

The philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2005) also studies the broadest scales and has written about violence against women’s bodies arguing that it is a global issue affecting every single woman whether that violence is rape, domestic abuse, forced prostitution, sexual harassment, stalking, the undernutrition of girls or myriad other forms. Nussbaum argues that not all women are equally vulnerable to violence; it affects women at varying magnitudes due to factors such as nation, culture, and class, but affects all women regardless. There has been some suggestion that with greater gender equality in a society the less likely military action is to be taken to solve international disputes (Caprioli 2000). However such claims have been disputed by feminists who argue that this only reinforces the gender binary argument that men are inherently aggressive and women pacific. Tickner (2002) claims that this idea disempowers women by rendering them as idealistic and utopian. It also suggests that women are naturally disconnected from the military, something Enloe (1983) has impressively argued to be far from the truth.

However, we can also understand these relationships at precise locations and at the scale of the body. For example, Sharon Pickering (2010) has argued that extra-
legal border crossings have significant gendered dimensions and this often entails gender-based violence as a means of control. In terms of corporeality, in their study of Sri Lankan women, Hyndman and De Alwis (2004) found that bodies are the most immediate and delicate scale of politics as corporeal sites and markers of gender and national identity. The authors examine relations of gender and nation within the context of conflict and contend that a feminist approach is crucial in order to understand the gendered processes of identity construction in the context of competing militarised nationalisms. Wartime is highly gendered with rape being one of the most effective weapons in wartime but Jelke Boesten (2010;2014) has argued that gendered violence is more complex than ‘rape-as-weapon’; gendered violence cannot always fit a neat narrative of rape as a political strategy during conflict. She has examined the differences between wartime violence and peacetime violence through her work in Peru where she found that the state forces were the main perpetrators of sexual violence, reproducing institutionalised structures of violence and inequality. Boesten argues that sexual violence continues post-conflict and that “peace’ is not necessarily the right term for the state in which many women live” (2010:114).

As this overview of violence and borders has shown, violence often intersects with certain identities, whether gender as mentioned previously or sexuality or ethnicity among many others and this is an intersection that is prevalent throughout the thesis. It is therefore imperative to understand identity formation at the border.
**Borders, Bodies, and Identities**

To continue this theme of borders and bodies away from an explicit focus on violence, the way in which individuals view themselves and how they are seen and portrayed by others is key to this thesis. Work from and about Latin America has been exceptional in this area and has been enormously influential to my work. To speak of a border identity recognises the simultaneous collective border identity felt by communities residing in the borderlands but also the individual border identities based on unique experiences and positions.

Gloria Anzaldúa’s conceptualisation of the ‘border identity’ stems from the US Southwest-Mexican border but is constructed through psychological boundaries such as ethnicity and sexuality, resulting in a place of neglect and peripherality. As she writes; “[a] border is a dividing line, a narrow strip along a steep edge. A borderland is a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary. It is in a constant state of transition. The prohibited and forgotten are its inhabitants” (1987:3). The population of the borderlands inhabit a ‘third country’ that is different from the two countries either side of the border but they learn cultural expectations from both. Anzaldúa’s semi-autobiographical work experiments with poetry and prose and weaves between Spanish and English which she argues is the only way to describe the US-Mexico border experience. Also working on the US-Mexico border, Pablo Vila’s work has emphasised the multiplicity of borders and border identities; “[n]ot only different people construct distinct borders and disparate identities around those borders, but those different borders acquire a distinct weight in relation to the different subject positions (and the different narratives within those subject positions) people decide to identify with” (2003:611). Vila argues that there is no unified culture in the borderlands but rather border inhabitants configure their
sense of identity around multiple factors such as nationality, ethnicity, and race on top of regional factors.

A third US-Mexico border theorist, Arturo Aldama, has worked extensively on the border and chican@ identities and has argued that the border is a free-zone of violence, at least for those traveling north from Mexico and the violence does not end by ‘making-it’ to the US. Instead the border is infinitely elastic and inescapable for Latinos who confront racism and sexism as immigrants. The difference entailed by being a border-crosser is unavoidable, as Aldama describes it, “[l]inguistic violence- the creation of the Other- interanimates violence on the body” (2002:58).

This focus on how the border has been experienced by those who inhabit the borderlands that really began in the 1980s has been influential in my work such as the study of the US-Mexico border by Mario Ojeda (1981) that focusses on power and how borders are spaces of asymmetrical power. Jorge Bustamante (1989) has extended this idea to processes of ‘othering’ on the US-Mexico border and examining the reasons for why people cross the border. Borders are often seen to create binaries of ‘them’ and ‘us’, ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’. This necessitates some level of power, the concept of creating borders as protection is inherently colonial with the powerful able to dictate rules of exclusion (Balibar 2004; Mignolo and Tlostanova 2006).

Recent scholarship on borders and bodies has focussed on the relationship between bodies and biometric borders, how corporeal mobilities are being governed and monitored in the post 9/11 world (Amoore 2006; Muller 2010; Epstein 2007). However, in other ways, bodies at the border have remained remarkably unchanged despite technological advancements in governance; certain bodies are still excluded.

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2 The symbol '@' or the letter 'x' is sometimes used in place of the letters 'o' and 'a' which denote gender in the Spanish language. This can be used as shorthand for both 'male and female' or to resist gender binaries.
in an old-fashioned way from crossing borders for being too brown, too poor, too ‘other’.

Nira Yuval-Davis in her work on identity, gender, borders, and ideas of ‘belonging’ (1997a;1999;2004) has emphasised how the process of constructing borders determines the nature of belonging, creating an ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy. Yuval-Davis takes an intersectional approach and argues that the nature of belonging is determined by various positionings such as gender, class, and ethnicity. These differences are what determine state borders according to Diener and Hagen who write that “[t]he formation of state borders generally results from unequal power relationships that both reflect and cross various social boundaries” (2012:70).

A constructivist approach to borders and territory argues that the segregation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ across territory cannot be explained by characteristics such as race, ethnicity, language, or religion but occurs due to and through unequal power relations within and between social systems.

However, simultaneously, despite these notions of borders separating ‘belonging’ and ‘not-belonging’, borders are also “a place of feedback, exchange and process”, a place where hybridization and cultural overlap can occur (Welchman 1996:178). For Newman, “[h]ybridization takes place in contact zones, where people from different groups or territories begin to cross borders and where they experience processes of mutual adaptation negotiated through daily working relations with each other” (2003:19). The ‘us’ and ‘them’ do not always act against one another but can blend and merge and influence the ‘other’ across the border.

The apparent paradox between borders as a space of difference but also as a space of hybridity has been an interesting point of departure for many academics. Henk Van Houtum along with colleagues at the Nijmegen Centre for Border
Research in the Netherlands have since 1998 been critically studying borders in terms of identity, sovereignty, and the tension between borders as spaces of exclusion but also as a space of hybridity and meeting. Borders are ‘Janus-faced’, they cannot be easily mapped or compartmentalised, they are inherently ambiguous, “poised between openness and closure, inclusion and exclusion, fear and desire” (Van Houtum, Kramsch, & Zierhofer 2005:12). The process of bordering occurs in order to create territorial order but paradoxically creates new, differentiated space and identities (Van Houtum & Ton Van Naerssen 2002).

On a similar note political geographer John House has been important in understanding how frontier zones that are peripheral economically, socially, and politically suffer from underdevelopment as a result of their distance from the societal core. He states that frontier zones can be “the focus for political discontents, nurtured by isolation, deprivation, a sense of cultural identity, or trans-frontier affinities” (1980:458). House recognises that as well as being potential spaces of conflict, “the frontier is also an international meetingplace and, as such, potentially a launching-pad for international cooperation to mutual benefit” (1980:457). House advocates policy intervention to mitigate the problems felt so keenly in frontier zones with the added benefit of increasing international cooperation and encouraging peace. The complexities of national borderlands are also shown by John Augelli’s statement that they “tend historically to be zones of cultural overlap and political instability where the national identity and loyalties of the people often become blurred” (1980:19).

When speaking of identity and ‘othering’ in Latin America, debates over race and ethnicity are highly important. Much of the most interesting work on race and ethnicity has come from Latin American scholars such as Alfonso Múnera in his
2005 book on the construction of race and geography in nineteenth century Colombia. Múnera provides a detailed argument of how racial categorisation was fundamental to the creation of the nation-state. For an understanding of the relation between Latin America and the rest of the world it is imperative to study work emanating from the continent. Néstor García Canclini (1999;2002) for example is an Argentine anthropologist and philosopher whose work on globalisation and interculturality has been vital to cultural studies and the relations between Latin America, Europe, and the United States, and among Latin American countries. Latin American scholars are also significant for their commitment to real change and progress on the continent. Rossana Reguillo (2012) is one such scholar-activist whose work on youth, urban spaces, and fear has led to social change. Additionally, fore-mentioned Milton Santos believed in the transformative power of geography, the power of geography to take Brazil out of its underdevelopment and he systematically searched for coherent geographical theories that could have practical implications for global underdevelopment.

Borders are, therefore, rich spaces for academic research whereby identity and culture can be studied especially due to the intersection of the corporeal, national, and international scales which all become so salient at the border. It is the literature that breaks out of the often dry field of border studies and instead looks at power and violence and people which is most useful here. This thesis is therefore part of this important body of work begun by critical theorists, feminists, and philosophers that is unavoidably multidisciplinary and always calling back to the importance of Latin America.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

This section explains the epistemological and practical research strategies adopted by setting out the methodology and methods of the project. The methodology consists of the principles that guide the research, it “refers to the rationale and the philosophical assumptions that underlie any natural, social or human science study, whether articulated or not” (McGregor & Murname 2010:2). The methods chosen for which to conduct the research are directly influenced by the methodology. Considering that the research examines ninety years of violence in the border city of Arica a variety of methods were necessary to reflect both the chronology and area of study. In order to investigate the aims of my research, a combination of archival and ethnographic methods were employed to study both the historical and cultural significances of the border. In contrast to the official narrative predominantly found in the archives visited- what economic policies were employed in Arica, how the military was employed in the far north and so on- ethnographic fieldwork provided nuance and unofficial narratives, it allowed me to understand what it is like to live in a border city, in a contested territory, in a city on the periphery of a nation.

The earlier chapters rely more heavily on archival documents produced and collected at the time whereas later chapters are additionally based on interviews and social media. The methods chosen throughout the research reflect the appropriateness, relevance, and access issues of the chronology and varying topics. For example it was necessary to study documents and diaries from the 1920s due to none of the actors being alive and when studying abortion, interviews and media
reports were necessary because, due to abortions being illegal, there are no official documents or statistics. Again, I used oral history and newspaper reports to study the almost-war of the 1970s due to the lack of an official narrative. This mix of methods reflects the complexity of Arica and the Chile-Peru border and the aim was to produce a ‘collage’ whereby fragments from seemingly vastly different methods create a new picture. The resulting collage provides a clear picture made up of small scraps of knowledge, to borrow Aristotle’s overused but useful platitude, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Each of the five chronological border stories sheds light on the often-contradictory nature of the border and the bringing together and overlaying of mixed methods through collage was perfectly placed to capture this. The aim of the chosen methodology and method was to study violence in Arica through depth and detail rather than to provide a representative and statistically valid picture of Arica.

The fieldwork took place between 20th August 2013 and 20th August 2014 beginning with six weeks in Washington DC, six weeks in Santiago de Chile and the following nine months in Arica with visits to Peru.

**Critical Perspectives**

Just as Cynthia Enloe (1983) asked herself ‘why should a feminist study the military?’, I have asked myself, ‘why should a feminist study dead white men?’ I consider myself to work as a feminist geographer yet unlike the majority of feminist research I am not explicitly studying gender. Therefore, what does it mean to be a feminist geographer? And in particular what does it mean to be a feminist geographer working in Chile on topics which are on the whole not explicitly feminist? Feminism for me cannot be an afterthought, a late addition to the ‘add and stir’ method to augment diversity. The numerous labels designating various types of feminism “signal
to the broader public that feminism is not a monolithic ideology, that all feminists do not think alike, and that, like all time-honored modes of thinking, feminist thought has a past as well as a present and a future” (Tong 1998:1). Coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991) intersectional feminism studies social, cultural and biological factors-in the case of this study that includes poverty, class, race, sexual orientation, gender, illness- and how they create nuanced experiences of oppression and discrimination. Intersectionality is a perspective which aids the study of how gender intersects with other identities and how these intersections result in unique experiences (Morris 2007) and my own views and the views which influenced this thesis came from my experiences of fieldwork, it was over the year of research that I fully understood the importance of intersectional feminism at the border. It also demonstrated to me how feminism is about more than just women’s issues and that gender inequality cuts through all arenas of social existence, even violence at an international border.

Working as an intersectional feminist geographer involves drawing on the work of writers such as Gloria Anzaldúa, bell hooks, and Linda Smith (2012) who argues for ‘decolonising methodologies’ which necessitates the insertion of Indigenous principles into research methodology so that research practices can play a role in the assertion of Indigenous people’s rights and sovereignty. In practice this demands an emic focus, research led by the participants rather than by myself, in an attempt to better understand the local perspective. As much power as possible was shifted over to the researched and not the researcher. This however can bring its own challenges as I am allowing various voices to speak but many of the voices in my work are powerful, often white, men. Yet I do not allow this to undermine my work. Perhaps Stanley and Wise (1993:66) put it best when they said; the “western industrial scientific approach values the orderly, rational, quantifiable, predictable, abstract and theoretical:
feminism spat in its eye”. Just by looking at the contradictory, paradoxical nature of Arica I am working as a feminist geographer. There is no denying that the resulting thesis reflects my position and choices, I select the quotes which to include which brings its own issues, as others (Opie, 1992; Stacey, 1988) have pointedly questioned, are these extracted quotes really giving a voice to ‘others’ in any meaningful way? Working as a feminist geographer necessitates grappling with such questions.

My intersectional feminism is also present in the way I understand moments of transnationalism in the history of the border, how at various points the US and Europe have become involved in Arica and the paternal discourses this entails. Skinner et al. argue that “what is particular in feminist research is that the approaches adopted should come at the topic under investigation in a way that is... likely to reflect the experiences of women and children, rather than distorting them” (2005:17). In that vein I sought out voices of women who had been silenced in the archives or society, attempting to round out the history of Arica with their stories included. According to Maguire “feminist research...consists of no single set of agreed upon research guidelines or methods. Nor have feminists agreed upon one definition of feminist research” and so, despite the fact that my thesis much more than a study of gender in Arica, feminist geography is consistently present in my research (1987:74).

Feminist research goes far beyond adding women into research, as Zelewski & Parapart (1998) have argued in their study of international relations, if the discipline is constructed around men and masculinity it is necessary to destabilise the subject of ‘man’ in order to destabilise international relations. Masculinities studies really emerged in the 1990s with growing awareness that not just women are affected by patriarchal control and regulation of gender. Thinking about masculinity raises questions about power and privilege and whether all men wield power, how
masculinity is performed across time and space, and how masculinity is plural and dependent on many other factors. A study of violence necessitates an understanding of hegemonic masculinity (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005) and I attempt to unpack the role of masculinity and machismo in the persistence of violence on the Chile-Peru border.

Machismo is the stereotype of hypermasculinity associated with Latin American maleness which developed, argues Hardin (2002), due to Spanish conquistadors’ reaction to indigenous gender and sexual expression. Studies of machismo, masculinity, and violence often focus on on-on-one violence, gangs, and sexual abuse but less attention has been paid to the wider scales of international and state decision making which this thesis taps into. For Connell “in a globalizing world, we must pay attention also to very large-scale structures. An understanding of the world gender order is a necessary basis of thinking about men and masculinities globally. Hegemony in the contemporary gender order is connected with patterns of trade, investment, and communication dominated by the North” (2005:369). This large-scale process has defined what it means to perform Chilean masculinity which in turn “has often furnished governing elites with a powerful rhetoric for dignifying the political order” at the level of the state (Tosh 2004: 50). A feminist perspective is therefore useful here in examining the institutional and international scales of machismo as well as the individual scale.

However, no researcher works from just one position and my work is strongly influenced by critical borderlands theories. Critical borderland studies tends to disrupt the traditional view of borders as static and natural by illustrating how this is disrupted by communities and individuals who relate to borders in alternative ways, living across them, on them, or between them. Noel Parker and Nick Vaughan Williams
(2012) argue that critical borderlands studies has shifted focus to the processes of bordering as opposed to the concept of the border, an idea discussed in the previous chapter. The multitude of actors and the different ways in which they engage in ‘borderwork’ (Rumford 2012) is, for me, an important way of approaching the study of a border. Citizens on the border, particularly indigenous communities, have far too often been ignored from work on borders in Latin America and so these border subjects become central to my work. This is entwined with a critical political perspective which “questions the privileged forms of representation whose dominance has led to the unproblematic acceptance of subjects, objects, acts, and themes through which the political world is constructed” (Shapiro 1989:13).

This questioning takes seriously unchallenged notions of truth and theory and problematises them by examining power. The presence of violence in this thesis is therefore understood through overt or covert power relations at the international, state, or local scales. Parodi has written that “from a critical perspective, geopolitics is not an aberration, but provides almost the perfect example of how theory is linked to power” which is particularly pertinent in Latin America where a strong geopolitical tradition has historically been disseminated through certain institutes of power including military and diplomatic institutes (2002:38). Due to these influences power within Latin America must be critically examined, not just the oppression of the continent and its peoples by colonial and imperial powers which while being supremely important can neglect the histories of the “suppression and disappearance of indigenous cultures and enslavement of black populations” by white urban elites in Latin America as highlighted by Radcliffe and Westwood (1996:13). By employing a feminist perspective, a critical political perspective, and a critical borderland
perspective it becomes possible to look beyond the status quo and to find ways to break down unquestioned paradigms.

**Doing Research ‘There’**

Following Cindi Katz’s demand that researchers interrogate a “conscious awareness of the situatedness of our knowledge”, my status as a white, middle-class, young British woman greatly affected my research (1992: 498). My nationality is especially important in a region with a strong history of anti-British, anti-imperialist uprising in the nitrate fields of northern Chile (Skuban 2008). However, I was easily assimilated into life in Arica due to contact I had made with academics at the history and geography department at the Universidad de Tarapacá in Arica. I became more involved in the department than I had anticipated and was provided with an office, was able to discuss my work with knowledgeable colleagues, and lectured on cultural geography and academic English as well as helping on fieldtrips. This provided me with privileged opportunities when attempting to access archives, government documents, or interviews as, unlike the University of Nottingham, it is an institution familiar to and integrated into the local community.

According to Haraway, this interrogation that Katz emphasises is vital because “positioning is…the key practice grounding knowledge”; the results of my research are enabled by power relations due to my unique positioning (1991:193). In the US archives I was treated as just one of many British researchers without interest while in the Chilean archives I was more of a rarity. Various employees wanted to know how I had come upon my topic of study and why on earth I would want to leave the UK to live in Arica.
Acknowledging my positionality became a daily task as the Spanish language necessitates a positioning of oneself in relation to others in the way certain terms are used. I used the formal ‘usted’ with most contacts I made throughout my research due to them being older than me or being in a professional setting but with some, for example in some interviews, I used ‘tú’ or shifted from ‘usted’ to ‘tú’ as the interview progressed and familiarity was gained. Some treated me in a highly professional manner, using ‘usted’ with me, with the interviews taking place at their place of work or in my office at the university. Others were much more informal and I was invited into their homes to share once (an evening snack) and the interviews were relaxed, often veering off-topic to ask questions about the UK, to play with grandchildren, or to complain about Chile. The informality of these interviews led to candidness with some interviewees opening up to me and disclosing highly personal information, likely sensing a freedom with a young European researcher which isn’t so readily found in wider Chilean society.

As Gade (2001) and Watson (2004) set out, learning a second language for fieldwork is enormously difficult and time-consuming but has extensive benefits for both the research and the researcher. Learning a language “may be a step towards shifting the balance of power between researched and researcher, and may help generate insights that could otherwise be ignored” (Watson 2004:62). I undertook extensive language courses in Spain and Chile as, argues Veeck (2001), the greater the competency of the researcher’s language skills, the more comprehensive and accurate the results. Starting a new language from scratch was a daunting process and so I proceeded on sound advice that successful language acquisition necessitates being child-like, being vulnerable, being willing to make a fool of yourself, to open yourself up with awe and wonderment. The consequences of this approach were
embarrassment and mortification but also a strong command of the language. My being ‘there’ was necessary in order to visit certain archives and conduct ethnographic fieldwork but it also affected me and influenced my work in ways I hadn’t previously considered. The countless hours of research I had done on the place I would call my home for nine months couldn’t match up to the feel of a place which can only be understood through personal experience.

**Historical Archives**

The archives I accessed throughout my year of fieldwork varied enormously in every way. My research began with five weeks in Washington D.C. at the Library of Congress and the National Archives, College Park, Maryland. In these US archives I studied holdings such as the papers of John J. Pershing, Calvin Coolidge, and William Smith Culbertson all of whom were involved in the border demarcation process in the 1920s, Classified Salvador Allende Files, United States Consular Records for Arica and Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State 1788-1990. Both archives required a face-to-face application process and the provision of paperwork to prove my status as a PhD student. The archives were large, imposing, over air-conditioned, and with strict security procedures. I was scanned, my bags were checked, and my notes were inspected on departure. I was surrounded by calmly busy researchers and I blended into the masse. The type of materials accessed varied from personal diaries, official letters and memos to microfilm reproductions. The latter made concentration difficult, without the physicality of turning pages, of taking photos, of changing the boxfiles. As Arlette Farge laments, “these systems of reproduction are useful for preservation, and undoubtedly allow for new and fruitful ways of questioning the texts, but they can cause you to forget the tactile and direct
approach to the material, the feel of touching traces of the past. An archival manuscript is a living document; microfilm reproduction, while sometimes unavoidable, can drain the life out of it” (2013:15). The only tangible experience with the microfilm and break in the monotony of scrolling came once in the sudden snapping of a microfilm roll and the rewinding of dozens of metres of film by hand.

The Santiago archives (Biblioteca Nacional, Archivo Nacional, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Banco Central) were a very different environment, when I was allowed into them. Between long siestas, feriados (national holidays) and strikes, access was sporadic. At each archive I was immediately given a meeting with an employee to whom I explained my research and who gave me advice on what collections to investigate. Every single one suggested I would be better off visiting one of the other archives. This was my first experience in Spanish language archives, a linguistic challenge that slowed my progress until I had memorised all the legal jargon only found in the archives and never in the classrooms in which I had learnt the language. Many leather bound books had been poorly kept previously and disintegrated as I opened them, causing me to sweep leather crumbs off the table when the archivist wasn’t looking.

The archives in Arica brought yet another archival experience. The archives are at the local government level, holding documents about affairs relating to the province as well as local newspaper records. Through looking at archives at different tiers of administration, from national to local, distinctions between what information about Arica is deemed important could be uncovered. As Miles Ogborn wrote, “The historical geography of the archive is also the historical geography of processes of centralisation and of local autonomy” and this can be clearly seen through the geographies of the Chilean archives that have been under the governance of vastly
different government administrations since their inception (2011:90). Located on the top floor of the Universidad de Tarapacá library, one employee runs and supervises the Archivo Histórico Vicente Dagnino. I was granted permission to look at any files I wanted and began to plough through the collections during the university summer break. I was almost always the only researcher with the one employee opening the archive just for me. I sat, looking over the city from one of the few tall buildings, with a fan at full blast, riffling through fileboxes packed with hundreds of loose papers in various stages of legibility.

The newspapers had all been digitally captured which meant I spent weeks sitting at a computer in the archive, scrolling through thousands of images, scanning for key words, and print screening relevant articles. Far from the highly regulated archival spaces I found in the US, Chile gave me freedom, to be alone with the documents, to spread multiple boxes on the vast tables around me, to control the temperature and lighting of my workspace. Access was unproblematic across all institutions I visited, my status as a researcher from a prestigious British university and my link with the Universidad de Tarapacá meant that I was accepted into all with only the minutiae of bureaucratic procedures to contend with.

In contrast to these archives, social media, a burgeoning resource in geographical research, also became a useful source of secondary documents, generating an archive space entirely different from the official institutions I had visited. The entirely Internet based resource of the social media site Facebook was potentially vast (with over 1.2 billion monthly active users) and so I located certain Facebook groups in order to generate an archive of discourse surrounding Arica. This was facilitated by certain groups which were established to encourage discussion such as ‘Ese Arica de Antes’, ‘Viví en Arica en los años 70’ and ‘Arica Estado Independiente’. This meant that I
could find a pool of information regarding the history of Arica, those who lived in Arica during the 1970s, and the movement calling for independence of the region generated by people interested in these topics. The benefits of using these groups are that discussions are real-time and timings of posts can be checked to the minute, postings and comments are entirely unaffected and unprompted by myself as a researcher and neither am I imposing bias by selecting participants. Collective experience and sentiment can be witnessed, especially as Facebook can be antagonistic and many people get fired-up and enthusiastic in their postings.

This does of course bring disadvantages as well as individuals may over-react, playing up to a part in a way they may not do in real life situations, as Gosling et al (2011) found, extroverted individuals use Facebook more frequently than introverts. Despite this, Back et al. (2010) concluded that Facebook tends to act as a true extension of one’s actual personality, not a self-idealised one. Another disadvantage is that although Chile has a very high level of Internet use with 90.7% of Internet users using Facebook, these Facebook groups are lacking viewpoints from those without internet or who choose not to comment on the site.\(^1\) Using Facebook as an archive can bring other challenges such as struggling to locate relevant posts or by its nature escaping neat geographical boundaries. However in this case these were not obstacles as the Facebook groups, expressly about Arica, meant that posts were conveniently on-topic about my area of study, to the extent that the groups’ administrators swiftly delete non-Arica posts. Using Facebook does raise some ethical questions particularly regarding consent and privacy, as explored by Zimmer (2010), and so any comments reproduced here are anonymous, with no identifiable details, and translated from Spanish to English making any quotations untraceable.

Textual analysis was used to uncover themes and meaning in the archives in what McKee describes as “an educated guess at some of the most likely interpretations that might be made of a text” (2003:1). While the majority of the documents studied in the archives were texts, images, mostly photographs, were analysed as well. Photographs contain meanings, symbols and signs that give us a glimpse at a historical past that would otherwise be hidden from us. Yet at the same time the image was purposively constructed and the camera registers what has been chosen to register (Alía 2005). Images must therefore always be studied in context, with an understanding of the lifecycle of the image. This lifecycle passes through three principal stages; the moment it is created, the moment it becomes an artefact, and the moment it is re-examined. Rather than being an objective representation, the images have elements of both ‘record’ and construct’ (Van Leeuwen & Jewitt 2001). Felix Driver (2003:228) has outlined the visual nature of geography and stated that “the “visual” has, in fact, long been scrutinised by geographers and others interested in the history and forms of geographical knowledge”. The bulk of the images used in this research were from a board of development in Arica which ran from 1958-1976 and are comprised of photos taken by representatives of the board to show progress and modernity, the successes of the board, making it necessary to be sceptical over what they therefore do not show.

Archives are a space of memory (Ogborn 2010) and this memory is highly constructed. Through the process of archival research “…a new object is created, a new form of knowledge takes shape, and a new ‘archive’ emerges. As you work, you are taking the preexisting forms and readjusting them in different ways to make possible a different narration of reality” (Farge 2013:63). The records kept are of those in power, official state and municipal records, newspapers which dictated the
contemporary discourse, even personal diaries were only kept of those in important positions, General John J. Pershing and his secretary, Major Quckemeyer. Throughout my investigations into the content of these archives the context remained key; why certain documents are or are not there, what has been destroyed and how this has been structured by the power relations of state, colony, and empire (Duncan 1999). As illustrated by my use of social media, the archive has expanded in its definition (DeSilvey 2007) and the archive has now become an object of study for the researcher in itself. As Carol Steedman has written, “the Archive is made from selected and consciously chosen documentation from the past and also from the mad fragments that no one intended to preserve and just ended up there” (2001:68). Particularly with the government sources I was mindful of Baker’s statement that “no source should be taken at face value: all sources must be evaluated critically and contextually” (1997:235).

As Arlette Farge convincingly argued in her elegant portrait of French historical archives “[p]rinted texts seek to make an announcement and create a certain belief, to modify the state of things by advancing a particular narrative or commentary. They have been ordered or structured according to systems that are more or less easily discernable, and whatever form they might have taken, they have been brought into existence to be convincing and to change what people think” (2013:5). Farge later writes; “[a] historical narrative is a construction, not a truthful discourse that can be verified on all if its points” (p.95). There are distinct power relations at play in archives, argues Duncan (1999), which tend to be constructed by elite white men, the recognition of this and attempts to manage it through additional ethnographic research has been crucial. Many newspaper documents were used throughout the thesis with the local Arica newspaper *La Defensa* being used the most due to the full and
consistent record that has been preserved by the Archivo Histórico Vicente Dagnino. However, this historical narrative constructed by La Defensa must be critiqued as it was an overtly right wing political newspaper writing within a bounded environment, particularly post 1973 when the Pinochet administration decimated freedom of the press. Numerous newspapers were destroyed and an unknown number of journalists were killed under the regime. An awareness of the limitations placed on the media is therefore present throughout my historical analysis, particularly from 1973 to 1990.

In 1988 Gillian Rose and Miles Ogborn lamented the lack of feminist historical geography scholarship arguing that while scholarship was being done, it was not being done by geographers. They argued that “historical geography's ignorance of feminism has resulted at best in the marginalisation of women, and at worst in their total exclusion from the histories which are created and taught by historical geographers” (1988:405). While this has changed to a large extent, feminist approaches are still much needed within historical geography and political geography too. A decade after Rose and Ogborn opened this debate, Karen Morin and Lawrence Berg (1999) assessed how the discipline had responded to their call to understand past societies through a feminist lens. Morin and Berg conclude that British feminist historical geography has tended to focus on the discipline of geography, geographical knowledges, and colonialism/imperialism as seen through the work of Mona Domosh (1999) and Alison Blunt (1994) who have examined the not always positive roles of women in Empire.

A later 2003 paper by Mona Domosh and Karen Morin built on the 1999 survey of the discipline by highlighting in what ways much of feminist geography is already historical and in what ways much of historical geography is already feminist while remaining critical of the scholarship still lacking. Feminist historical geography has
been challenging from a methodological standpoint because historical geography has tended to emphasise archives that are generally constructed and controlled by elite, usually white, men. Therefore the materials available to the researcher will only offer certain perspectives. The danger of looking for women’s stories and women’s spaces, argues Mona Domosh (1997), is that it bolsters notions of separate women’s and men’s spaces instead of conducting a feminist analysis of historical landscapes, the constructions of which were predominantly by men.

*Ethnographic Research*

In order to provide a more local, less elitist, and more nuanced perspective I also undertook semi-structured interviews “organized around ordered but flexible questioning” (Dunn 2010:110) with a specific focus on more personal, less structured oral histories. Oral history became an influential academic research method in the 1970s and 1980s (Riley and Harvey 2007) and, according to Smith and Jackson (1999), is a politicised enterprise of ‘writing culture’ and uncovers not only individual identity but also collective identities (Perks and Thomson 2006). All narratives are ‘narratives of identity’ (Anderson 1991) and oral histories provide “a context in which identity is practiced” (Friedman 1992:840). Mario Garcés, a Chilean historian, defines oral history as “a history that is born of individuals’ memories of their past and is normally expressed as testimony to significant experiences of the personal and collective past” (1996:191). According to Gómez-Barris the value of oral history “goes beyond an often ill-defined or excessively narrow ‘duty to remember’, for its intent is not to immortalize a given view of events but to retrieve the richness of a given period through the experiences of those who, though they played the central roles in it, are often presented as an inert and amorphous mass” (2010:61). Oral history work allows
for participants to speak with their own voice, to narrate their own experiences that, as post-colonial theorists such as Edward Said (1993) and Homi Bhabha (1990) have argued, are central to human dignity.

Twenty-two in-depth interviews/oral histories (see table below) were carried out and an additional five short interviews were also taken with healthcare providers in Tacna, Peru. Living and becoming involved in community life in Arica was an integral part of the research. My field diary and photographs became important records of participant observation. According to Hammersley & Atkinson, “ethnography usually involves the researcher participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, and/or asking questions through informal and formal interviews, collecting documents and artefacts – in fact, gathering whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the emerging focus of inquiry” (2007:3).

As previously mentioned, speaking in Spanish means automatically considering ones positionality depending on who I was interviewing. My position shifted between the interviews and in some, Geiger’s claim that “a young researcher will find herself in the position of being considered a daughter” rang true (1990:176). However usually, despite my age I was often regarded as a privileged ‘expert’, interviewees did not ‘dumb down’ their language for me despite it being obvious that I am not a native Spanish speaker and my views were invited and respected. Although some people may have felt antagonistic toward me due to my undoubted privileges this was never made known to me and did not appear to negatively affect any of my interviews. I was aware that trust may be difficult to form with participants after reading a Chilean Health Ministry study which found that “Only 16 percent of Chileans considered others trustworthy” but again, I did not see this adversely affecting my research.
Consent forms were filled out by interview participants who chose varying levels of anonymity depending on the sensitivity of the topic discussed. Some, especially those in professional positions such as healthcare workers were happy to be filmed (in order to aid transcription) and to use their real names whereas others, principally regarding the topics of spying and abortions asked not to be recorded or for their real names to be used. In these cases I took notes. However, all interviewees have been given pseudonyms in order to protect the identities of those who did not wish to be named. The interviews that were recorded, either with a dictaphone or videocamera,
were transcribed in order to be analysed. I took as few notes as possible when they were being recorded so that I could focus on the interview but took notes on emerging themes, key points, and body language. Data has been stored anonymously and password secured.

The ethnographic side of the research raised some ethical concerns especially as some interviews touched subjects such as espionage and illegal abortions as previously mentioned. The research was conducted in a way as to minimise the exposure to psychological harm following my belief that sensitive issues should not be skirted around by researchers just because it entails more work on ethical approval. I ensured that the participants fully understood the nature of the study and that their participation was voluntary. A statement was made that confidentiality of recovered data would be maintained at all times, and that identification of participants would not be available during or after the study if they so chose.

There were very few ‘neutral spaces’ to choose from as an interview location, many people would be uncomfortable to be seen to be interviewed in a public place and those being interviewed in a professional capacity wanted to be interviewed at their place of work. Non-professional interviews tended to take place in the interviewee’s homes which I only did if I felt safe, if contact had already been made with the interviewee, and if the address had been passed on to a friend or colleague. Elwood and Martin “…suggest that the interview site itself produces “micro-geographies” of spatial relations and meaning, where multiple scales of social relations intersect in the research interview” (2000:651). Entering the interviewee’s home became a form of participant observation whereby I was able to glean more information and understanding of them and how they lived.
Most interviews were semi-structured, I wrote some questions in advance particular to each interviewee but did not adhere to them entirely, I followed new avenues when they came up and abandoned some areas of enquiry if they became irrelevant following recommendations by Valentine (2005). The interviews were always led by the interviewee as much as possible, my questions were open-ended, allowing them to answer how they wanted and at length, with some interviews lasting for well over two hours. Sensitive subjects were approached with caution and only after trust had been gained and the interviewee was certain that they were comfortable discussing the topic. The interviewee’s for the most sensitive topics were accessed through gatekeepers rather than approached directly.

While access was not a problem with the archival research, ethnographic research proved more complicated. Considering that the thesis covers such vastly different ground my interviewees were also vastly different, spanning military personnel, healthcare workers, historians, a journalist, a young woman who sought an abortion, and housewives. I set out knowing that I wanted to speak to Ariqueños from a wide spectrum of society but getting in touch with potential participants and encouraging them to talk to me was another matter. Due to these difficulties I began by interviewing professionals who spoke to me from the perspective of their job and were therefore easier to find by email.

Living in Arica I was often meeting people and the subject of my research came up quickly due to me being something of an anomaly as a young British woman in the region. Through quotidian activities I met research participants or people who could put me in touch with participants. I also used social media to find participants, posting appeals for participants on Facebook groups about Arica. Facebook groups are a useful way to engage with hard-to-reach groups and can be an effective way to make
contact with potential participants because, Baltar and Brunet (2012) argue, the researcher is showing their personal information through their profile and participating in the groups which are of interest to the potential participants. This ‘purposive sampling’ (Cameron 2005) was necessary in order to find participants relevant to my research instead of a representative sample of the population. Following Valentine “the aim of an interview is not to be representative (a common but mistaken criticism of this technique) but to understand how individual people experience and make sense of their own lives” (2005:111).

I therefore chose not to use computer programs to code my data as I actively did not want to quantify the data in any way. It is, therefore, unavoidable that I am interpreting the data collected through a unique and biased lens; I construct a certain reality of the history of violence in Arica. The histories collected are also incredibly subjective and of course, certain events may be remembered incorrectly by participants. My empirical chapters are quote-heavy, taking an emic focus preferring to relay the thoughts and experiences of my research participants and subjects as independently as possible even though the quotes and their length were mediated by myself. I actively chose to limit the use of the first person in the empirical chapters.

The thesis began with very broad ideas and it was only by living in Arica, exploring documents and speaking to those who live there that the five chronological themes set out in the thesis emerged. Qualitative data analysis did not therefore begin once all data had been collected and formally organised but was a fluid process which began as soon as I began generating data (Stake 1995). This means that an enormous amount of information was generated, far more than could be included in the thesis. Interviews were transcribed into Spanish and only the quotes extracted for use in the thesis were translated into English. Once transcribed all interviews were carefully
studied for key themes and these themes were compared across the interviews, looking for linkages, similarities, and differences as well as in comparison to data generated through the archival research where relevant. Quotes were extracted to illustrate and better explain the key themes. Feminist methods have been much more intertwined with ethnographic research than with historical geography and I feel that my approach to the interviews conducted and the topics addressed came naturally from a feminist standpoint.
CHAPTER FOUR

RE-PRESENTING INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY ON A GLOBAL STAGE: THE TACNA-ARICA SETTLEMENT OF THE 1920S

“Volumes could be written about it and [even] then only a small part could be told”

- John J. Pershing, October 2nd 1925

Figure 7: Map showing disputed area, 1925. 'Orders plebiscite in Chile-Peru Tilt' The World, New York, 10th March 1925
Arica in the 1920s was experiencing great stress as the axle of a grave diplomatic problem. Arica was stuck literally and metaphorically between Chile and Peru, not official sovereign territory of either. After the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) Peru and Chile signed the Treaty of Ancón on the 20th October 1883 that granted Chile rights over Tacna-Arica for 10 years after which a plebiscite would be held for the citizens of the provinces to decide sovereignty. Peru had not wanted to sign the treaty but felt pressured to as during the war Chilean forces had invaded Lima and this appeared to be the only way to ensure their departure. This ten-year period was allotted in order to provide enough time to establish the necessary bureaucratic conditions for the plebiscite (González Miranda 2008; Calderón 2000). Despite the fact that there were several attempts to reach a diplomatic solution to the dispute, including the almost-involvement of the Queen of Spain Maria Cristina, the proposals were thwarted again and again and plebiscite began to lose validity as an effective method of resolution (Álvez Marín & Irarrázaval Gomien 2000; Soto Lara 2014a).\footnote{In 1898 the Billinghurst-Latorre protocol was signed under which three representatives, from Peru, Chile, and Spain would organise appropriate conditions for the plebiscite with Spain as arbiter. It was eventually rejected by Chile.} Between 1895 and 1898 Chile offered alternative proposals to Peru such as buying the provinces outright, dividing them with Arica going to Chile and Tacna to Peru, or changing the area in which the plebiscite would be held. Peru refused all proposals, insisting that the Treaty of Ancón must be upheld (Wambaugh 1933). The primary problem was that neither Chile nor Peru seemed particularly disposed to setting a date for the plebiscite and every discussion led to disagreement over particulars such as who would be eligible to vote (Ruz & Díaz 2011; Calderón 2000).

A sizeable proportion of the local population were indigenous, primarily Aymará, communities who did not hesitate to express their intention in voting for Peruvian sovereignty in the plebiscite (Díaz, Galdames & Ruz 2013; Galdames & Díaz 2007).
In 1894, when the plebiscite was due to be held under the terms of the Treaty of Ancón, the population of the region under dispute was 80% Peruvian. By 1917 the Chilean and Peruvian population of Arica were roughly equal which would result in a ‘dead heat’ if the plebiscite were held that year. In order to increase the number of Chilean voters and decrease the number of Peruvian, the Chilean state began a process of ‘Chileanisation’. This policy significantly shifted the demographics of the provinces through the closing of Peruvian schools, churches and press, added military presence, the bolstering of a Chilean press system, the deportation of an estimated 40,000 Peruvians, and a colonisation policy for Chileans (Reyes & Espinoza 2007; Skuban 2007; Cadiz 2013). Violence had not left the provinces after the War of the Pacific, instead they remained in a state of emergency whereby previous legislation and jurisdiction was suspended for almost five decades. The region was militarised just as it had been decades earlier in the War of the Pacific just without the signifiers of uniforms and battlefield maneuvers.

Until 1910 the state of pax castrense had been largely peaceful and non-eventful but it was after this date that the Chilean government began to chileanise the territory more aggressively and that Peruvians became ingrained as the absolute enemy in Chile. Peru did the same and envisaged Chile as a ferocious monster positing the return of the ‘captive provinces’ of Tacna and Arica as a moral imperative. The dehumanisation of the other by both Chile and Peru was widespread and in all forms of media apart from in the provinces of Tacna and Arica where Chile had full control over all disseminated materials. Chile was so determined to retain these territories, not for their resources which were negligible, but to act as a buffer to protect the rich

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³Out of a population of 12,871, 41% of citizens were Chilean, 44% Peruvian, 11% Bolivian and 4% were of other nationalities. Diaz Araya (2010)
⁴The situation of Chileans and Peruvians living side-by-side in these provinces has been termed pax castrense by Chilean historian Sergio González Miranda (2004), describing enemies living together in the same territory.
nitrate territories to the south which had been taken in the War of the Pacific. This was a space absent of sovereignty and bringing Tacna-Arica into the official territory of the nation-state became of utmost importance for both Chile and Peru.

It wasn’t until July 1922 that the border issue, often described as the ‘Alsace-Lorraine of South America’, was addressed in any serious way when the United States with President Warren Harding became the formal arbitrator for the dispute at the request of the contesting countries (Diaz Araya 2014; Borchard 1922). This decision to resolve the dispute was largely economic, the pending issue was hurting Chilean and Peruvian trade, particularly since the Panama Canal opened. The involvement of the US as mediator was an endeavour to heal the rift between Peru and Chile, to finally settle the territorial problems remaining after the War of the Pacific. Peru had long favoured outside arbitration and specifically by the United States whereas Chile had some doubts as to the involvement of the US as Chilean military aggression in the Pacific would make international diplomacy difficult and was unsure as to US interests in the region (González Miranda 2004). However it was deemed that only a highly respected nation such as the US could influence the situation as every time that Chile and Peru met alone the situation would worsen.

Chile was not the only one with misgivings, US Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes requested that the matter not be submitted to the President of the United States but instead proposed that it be presented to a board of distinguished jurists. However, “the parties would not hear to it. They insisted that the President should be the arbitrator… Secretary Hughes was very reluctant to agree to this, but when both parties declared that there would be no arbitration unless the President were the

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5 In 1920 Peru turned to the League of Nations to ‘reconsider and revise’ the Treaty of Ancón but later withdrew the demand, possibly due to pressure from Washington.
7 Letter from Freyre to Secretary of State, 20th October 1911. Box 723. 2515/241. RG 59 Department of State Decimal File. US National Archives, Maryland
arbitrator, the Secretary found himself face to face with the alternative of blocking the only possible basis of agreement, or of yielding to the firm request”. President Harding acceded and in 1922 drew up an award and plan for progression at the joint cost of Chile and Peru.

When Calvin Coolidge took the Presidency in 1923 he officially accepted the office of Arbitrator and in 1925 stated that a fair and honest plebiscite would be able to be held in the disputed provinces of Tacna and Arica, a statement which surprised many considering Chile’s aggressive Chileanisation policies. Peru was initially unhappy with Coolidge’s plan, arguing that the plebiscite shouldn’t be held and instead the US should exercise total civil and military control of the provinces to the exclusion of Chilean civil and military forces. Violent demonstrations took place in Lima with natives of Tacna-Arica petitioning the government with changes that they deemed would be necessary in order to make the plebiscite fair (Wilson 1979).

Peru’s contention was that the Treaty of Ancón stated that the plebiscite should have been held exactly ten years after the treaty was signed whereas Chile understood the treaty as stating that the plebiscite could be held anytime after the ten-year period. Peru therefore believed that because the plebiscite had not been held on the ten-year date, it could not be held at all. Meanwhile, in Chile, the award was received with much excitement and an official holiday was proclaimed. Peru’s complaints were disregarded and Coolidge appointed General John J. Pershing as President of the

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9 The cost of US involvement estimated before the commission began was US$60,000 to be paid by both Chile and Peru directly to the US which would be US$800,000 at today’s rates. [Letter from Frank B. Kellogg to President Calvin Coolidge. 1st June 1925. Calvin Coolidge Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC] By August 1925 the Plebiscitary Commission demanded another US$132,000 (US$1.8 million at today’s rates) split between the two countries to cover mounting costs. [Letter from Frank B. Kellogg to President Calvin Coolidge. 12th August 1925. Calvin Coolidge Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC]
10 ‘Tacna-Arica complicatons’. Washington Post. 30th March 1925
Plebiscitary Commission. His acceptance of the position was seen as a coup for the diplomatic process and great enthusiasm surrounded his appointment.\(^{11}\)

The term plebiscite, which is formed of the roots for ‘people’ and ‘decree’, is a vote in which the electorate chooses to support or reject a proposal, usually on the matter of sovereignty. In the interwar period plebiscites were seen as a scientific, rational way to settle disputes as opposed to hot-headed jingoism. An orderly plebiscite was posited as the antidote to the *caudillismo* plaguing South America, the persistence of military leaders who gained support based on their charismatic image but acted as authoritarian warlords or dictators. American political scientist Sarah Wambaugh became the world’s leading authority on plebiscites as she had been involved in the implementation of many, including the Tacna-Arica plebiscite. Wambaugh believed in the power of plebiscites as a fair and just way to solve the proliferation of border disputes, especially after World War I, she stressed that a fair plebiscite depended upon the territory being neutralised which is why a neutral party should be involved. This idea goes back to the Treaty of Versailles, the agreement at the end of World War I that officially ended the state of war between Germany and the Allied Powers.

Although the redrawing of international borders in Europe by plebiscite often created new ethnic tensions, the approach remained popular in Latin America and plebiscites were seen as an effective way to democratically settle border disputes. Wambaugh believed in attempting to gain an understanding of the area in dispute and her method was “…interview[ing] peasants and high officials alike in an effort to

\(^{11}\) “It was stated at the White House that the President was very much pleased that such an eminent citizen of the United States of world wide reputation was willing to accept the position which is considered one of the most important offices of public trust which an American citizen can be called upon to discharge.” POTUS press release. 23\(^{rd}\) March 1925. Reel 114. Calvin Coolidge Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC
learn the sentiment in areas where plebiscites are held.” Plebiscites were becoming an expert process and relied on the involvement of knowledgeable outsiders such as Wambaugh.

The Tacna-Arica plebiscite was meant to be a truly democratic process, giving local citizens the power to have their say in world politics. This ideal of bottom-up power was however dashed by national and international politics that came into play. The plebiscite was theoretically a fair and people-led way to heal the fractured and violent border region. To borrow from Mark Salter’s (2012) metaphor of the border as a ‘suture’ the diplomacy enacted here was the attempted suturing of a wound that had been open for almost fifty years. Two sides, Peru and Chile, were aggressively tearing away from one another and the plebiscite was seen as the operation to bring the sides closer and knit them neatly together.

Although the dispute and the attempted plebiscite are unknown now, they were significant international events at the time, described in the Argentine press as; “undoubtedly one of the events of deepest significance in the international relations of this continent in recent years”. The dispute had global reach but fundamentally changed both Chile and Peru as nations. Fighting for Arica and Tacna led to a spiritual refounding of Peru as a nation, Peru was reborn as a nation during the War of the Pacific and the half a century of territorial dispute that followed became the basis for Peru’s national identity (Zapata 2011). The fore-mentioned comparison of Tacna-Arica with Alsace-Lorraine originated from the territories in both cases being seen as a prize for the conflicting nations, arguing that the citizens of the areas rightfully belonged to one nation more than the other, and campaigns to instill nationhood more profoundly in the territories (by the French and Chileans in these

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12 ‘Woman is expert on plebiscites’. *The Washington Post* 6th December 1931

cases). Just as political elections had been a key way for citizens of Alsace-Lorraine to assert their civic sentiments, the idea of the plebiscite served to galvanise patriotism in both Peru and Chile, the former desperate not to lose national territory and the latter determined to retain its hard-won war booty.

Peruvian resistance against the Chilean occupation of Tacna and Arica after the War of the Pacific was irrepressible and Peru’s most well known historian, Jorge Basadre, who was born in occupied Tacna wrote about his experiences attending a secret Peruvian school where they would patriotically sing the Peruvian national anthem (Basadre 1982). Peru used the War of the Pacific as a symbol of great injustice around which to form a unified national identity. Chile on the other side of the border used her victory in the War of the Pacific as the justification for Chilean ownership of Tacna-Arica and staged events such as reunions of war veterans to bolster these sentiments (Figure 8). Even though the monetary worth of the provinces could not justify both countries’ efforts to claim sovereignty, with the American Ambassador to Peru describing the situation as two bald-headed men fighting over a comb, in terms of patriotism and pride Tacna-Arica could not have been more valuable.14

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14 Letter from Moore to Secretary of State, 12th April 1929. Box 723. 2515/3335. RG 59 Department of State Decimal File. US National Archives, Maryland
This chapter will argue that studying biography is a rich and novel way to understand the Tacna-Arica territorial dispute and introduce the key actors whose actions were so influential. The chapter will then outline Pershing’s experiences of arriving in Arica in 1925 to a violent situation that had been little understood by officials back in Washington. The Americans’ views of Latin Americans, women, and other Americans as well as how the local communities viewed them in turn are then examined. The final sections will assess why the plebiscite was a failure and how the dispute was finally resolved.

Pershing & Quekemeyer

Studies of how the plebiscite was observed have been examined from the perspectives of Chilean and Peruvian media, the Spanish press, and the New York Times and Washington Post in the United States, yet personal diaries and American
correspondence have not been critically examined (Skuban 2007; Soto Lara 2014a; Llanos Sierra 2011). This chapter is based predominantly on the diaries of General John J. Pershing and his secretary Major John George Quekemeyer who were living in Arica from August 1925 until January 1926. Pershing was head of the Plebiscitary Commission leading a team of Americans who worked alongside a group of Chileans and a group of Peruvians who had been assigned by their respective governments. The idea was that these men and their employees would take initiative and work together to create an atmosphere conducive to a free and fair plebiscite in Tacna-Arica. Through Pershing’s meticulous diaries which run from the 2nd August 1925 until the 20th January 1926 when he returned to the United States due to illness and was replaced by Major General William Lassiter, we can follow the painstaking details of the attempted plebiscite, relationships between diplomatic professionals, and the personal experiences of an American based in Arica. Quekemeyer’s diaries on the other hand show the social life of Americans in Arica as well as the trials of keeping the peace in an unstable diplomatic situation.

Pershing arrived in Arica aged 64, he was at this time General of the Armies, a position to which he had been appointed in 1919, a war hero and highly respected military man. His position in Arica was widely celebrated but the difficulty of the challenge was noted. The Lewiston Daily Sun described Pershing’s appointment as an “undertaking he knows will involve heavy responsibilities and much labor. He must defer indefinitely the retirement he has enjoyed in name only since he relinquished his post as chief of staff of the Army”. Pershing’s fame, despite his illustrious career and significant impact on world politics, has diminished greatly since his death and he does not hold a prominent place in historical consciousness in comparison to other figures whom he outranked. His biographer attributes this to the fact that “Pershing

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15 Lewiston Daily Sun, 24th March 1925
was not likable in the least. He was instead an insufferable nitpicker obsessed with the smallest detail of military regimentation” (Perry 2011:xiii). His strict moral code superseded any care for what others thought of him.

The diaries of Major John George Quekemeyer that are kept as part of the Pershing archive at the Library of Congress provide an interesting counter-perspective to that of Pershing. Quekemeyer was Mississippi-born and graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1906. He acted as aide-de-camp to Pershing during the First World War and became so indispensible that he worked for the General for the rest of his life. Unfortunately, in February 1926, just one month after being released from his work in Arica, Quekemeyer contracted pneumonia and died, aged just 41. His mother, heartbroken, died the following day and a double funeral was held. Pershing wrote a heartfelt letter to the mother of his dear friend and confidant, but the letter was never read.

Quekemeyer’s diaries show a different side of life in Arica for the Americans, the Major paints a sociable picture of dinner parties, multiple poker nights every week, films brought over from the US for everyone to watch, making cocktails, having to put up with prohibition on the US boats, who likes to play tennis or go horse riding, who got burnt sunbathing at the beach, and who goes to the café Los Baños for dancing on Sunday afternoons. Quekemeyer took on great responsibility for the precise social protocol that could have knocked the delicate balance in Arica. He struggled with seating plans multiple times, the politics involved of who is talking to who, who could not possibly be sat next to who became a headache for Quekemeyer. Through the diaries of both men we see how ‘Quek’ became an invaluable confidant and sounding-board for the General, as the major wrote; “On these [horse]rides and other times when we are alone he tells me everything that has been said in the different
conferences that he has had”.\textsuperscript{16} However, the content of Quekemeyer’s diaries is likely to have been consciously edited due to the fact that “at any rate a copy of this diary will go to mama so she will get a little idea of what I am doing”.\textsuperscript{17} Therefore politically sensitive comments and other personal events may have been purposively omitted.

The use of biographical approaches in this chapter allows us to reconstruct a key historical moment in Peru and Chile’s nation building and identity formation and a significant attempt at Pan-American diplomacy to soothe a highly violent region. Notions of Pan-Americanism were fervent in the twentieth century and the Tacna-Arica dispute arose at an ideal time (Whitaker 1954). While scrupulous descriptions of the plebiscite have been recounted elsewhere, this chapter attempts to see the plebiscite through the perspective of General Pershing and other Americans involved; how those in Arica felt burdened with an impossible task, abandoned by Washington, stuck between the combatant plenipotentiaries of Chile and Peru in a continent they didn’t understand, and with Pershing’s health failing.\textsuperscript{18} This chapter acts as a case study illustrating the subjectivity, prejudices, and performances that underpin and problematise international diplomacy, diplomacy that was enacted to dissipate the burgeoning violence on the border.

\textit{Actors in the Theatre of Diplomacy}

Questions of international peace, continental stability, and local harmony were being battled over in one city during the ‘darkest time in Arica’s history’ (Soto Lara 2014b). A group of powerful men performed a play; a tragic story of blood, intrigue, lies and deception which finally lowered its curtains in 1929 with “the type of

\textsuperscript{16} 21st August 1925 Quekemeyer personal diary entries, Container 335, John J. Pershing Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC [hereafter the date and diary author (Pershing or Quekemeyer) will be used]
\textsuperscript{17} 22nd August 1925 Quekemeyer
\textsuperscript{18} See: Dennis (1931), Wilson (1979) and Yepes (1999) for detailed precedings of the plebiscite.
diplomacy which has been the dream of world statesmen since the World War”.

The provinces of Tacna and Arica act as a stage upon which both official and unofficial actors play certain pre-written roles where human-ness and personality take a significant role in diplomatic outcomes and how diplomatic processes are perceived by invested audiences, in South America and the world.

The official actors, the ones who were visible on the global stage, were the appointed bureaucrats involved in attempting to hold a plebiscite to determine the sovereignty of the Tacna and Arica provinces. Pershing, with all his prestige was undoubtedly the star of the show, he was given “the best residence in the port”, the official residence of the general manager of the Arica-La Paz railway as his living quarters and was courted by numerous South American statesmen and officials. Pershing travelled to Arica with a large American Delegation who numbered 120 in total at one count in March 1926. A presence that in a relatively small city must have been considerable. Many of the other Americans appointed to the Tacna-Arica plebiscite had previously worked in the Panama Canal Zone, likely chosen for their language skills and knowledge of Latin America. Jay J. Morrow who was entrusted with the drawing of the boundary lines had been governor of the Panama canal and men were sent from Panama to Arica in August 1925 to assist with interviewing, translating and generally to aid the American team.

Often the American delegation was performing a miniature play just for the Peruvian and Chilean officials. General Pershing, with his American Delegation, arrived in Arica on 2nd August 1925, resolute to do their utmost to oversee a ‘free and
fair plebiscite’ whereby the citizens of Tacna and Arica would vote to decide who was the rightful sovereign of these contested provinces. Pershing’s diaries show that from the very first days of their arrival in Arica it was overwhelmingly evident that underhand and violent behavior from the Chilean state and local civilians would mean that the plebiscite could not be free or fair for Peruvian citizens. Nevertheless, the Americans had no choice but to work towards creating an environment whereby the plebiscite could be held, however fruitless this endeavor seemed, through arduous conferences, ultimatums to the Chileans, and the collection of testimonies of the systematic abuse of Peruvians. Pershing and his team were forced to perform this role under immense pressure, impotent to engage in real diplomatic work yet having to appease their Chilean and Peruvian counterparts. Cables from the US State Department show how fragile the situation was with the US terrified that the slightest wrong move would ruin their influence in South America.23

The Chilean member of the Plebiscitary Commission, Agustín Edwards Mac-Clure (1878-1941) was a Chilean lawyer, diplomat and businessman, who also founded the Santiago edition of El Mercurio newspaper in 1900. He had inherited the Valparaiso edition of El Mercurio from his father, both of which were traditionally conservative newspapers and later played significant roles in the ascent of Pinochet’s military government. Edwards held various political offices including Minister of Foreign Affairs, Plenipotentiary to Great Britain, and was elected President of the General Assembly of the League of Nations from 1922 until 1923.24 In the diaries of Pershing and Quekemeyer, Edwards is portrayed as a forthright man who is not afraid to make his views heard. Pershing sees him as unctuous and sometimes

23 Personal diary entries, Container 334, John J. Pershing Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC
24 The Tacna-Arica region was not part of Chile and so was governed by the Chilean Foreign Office, which was headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Edwards.
backhanded but also admires his character and enjoys his company in social situations. On the other side of the dispute was the Peruvian member Manuel de Freyre y Santander (1872-1944). Freyre was a Peruvian diplomat who spent the majority of his working life as Peruvian minister in foreign posts such as China and Japan, Argentina, the United Kingdom and the United States. Having been born in Washington D.C. and spending many years abroad, Freyre was seen to have a detachment from the Peruvian people, portrayed as British of character, an elegant and well-spoken diplomat without the superciliousness of Edwards.

The idea was that Pershing, Edwards, Freyre, and their employees would work together to create an atmosphere conducive to a free and fair plebiscite in Tacna and Arica. Unfortunately these three men in charge admitted to their lack of suitability to the task, as Pershing wrote; “We chatted in very cordial fashion each of us in turn avowing ignorance of plebiscites, Mr. E. being a banker, Mr. Freyre an engineer although Ambassador to Argentina, and I having no other than military experience. If
expressions of wishes to carry out the plebiscite in good faith and give every voter a
fair deal could have determined the matter all would have ended well then and there”.
Expressions of good faith however proved to be insufficient.

These three elite cosmopolitan men, Pershing, Edwards, and Freyre, were the
public faces of the Tacna-Arica Plebiscitary Commission yet this story of powerful
men in their starring roles veils the local truth. There was an abundant mass of other
performers who have largely been erased from the great Tacna-Arica show. The
inhabitants of the provinces were not a passive audience; they played a significant role
in shaping the diplomatic landscape through acts of defiance, contestation, and
resistance. Far from the confidential cablegrams and banquets of ambassadors, the
local citizens of Tacna and Arica were fighting, less visible on the global stage, but
with no less vigour that the government officials. This chapter seeks to examine how
international diplomacy to suppress violence is performed on a global stage to a
watchful public, the enactment of which often masks the complexities of the
micropolitics that are really at play behind the scenes.
The presence of all these actors, finding themselves together in the Tacna-Arica provinces make up a transnational geopolitical assemblage of the kind theorised by Jason Dittmer. Dittmer (2015) argues that a focus on the microscales of politics at the local, national and global scales has become increasingly popular in political geography in a movement away from state-centred discourse. For Dittmer (2014), assemblage is a ‘bottom up’ process. While the meetings of the Plebiscitary Commission led by Pershing, Edwards, and Freyre are an obvious political assemblage it is the added mix of other Americans, Chileans, and Peruvians who converged on the provinces as well as the citizens who had already been living there who formed this bottom up process of assemblage. ‘Unofficial’ diplomacy can play an enormous role in political action following the work of McConnell, Moreau and Dittmer (2012). They emphasise the power of mimicry in legitimising the official
narrative. Costas Constantinou (2006) has coined the term ‘homo-diplomacy’ in order to better address the inter-personal, experiential and experimental dimensions of diplomacy. Diplomacy as simply intergovernmental ignores the richness and complexity of the reality of enacted diplomacy. Taking a different perspective, Merje Kuus (2008) has focussed her attention on the ‘intellectuals of statecraft’, those powerful individuals who hold considerable power in diplomacy. She emphasises that this is not to assign superior knowledge to them but to recognise the influential roles they play in world history and politics. With an awareness of this previous work it is possible to combine a study of official diplomacy by governmental actors who are inescapably influential and the non-official voices of local citizens and women that are not readily found in historical narratives. In order to gain a rich understanding of diplomacy at the border it is necessary to explore the human and personal as well as the wider geopolitical events.

The plebiscite was an attempt at pacifying the border between Chile and Peru and ending a decades old dispute. However, the deployment of international diplomacy does not always mean the absence of violence, violence, or at least the threat of its use, is inherent in political relations (Hauriou 1980). Diplomatic action is not always an innocent tool to soothe violence but can be its own form of violence in pursuit of a certain national or international order. Pershing’s lexicon used to describe the attempted plebiscite hints at being playful but more often veers toward violence. The idea of the diplomatic proceedings as a boxing match between Peru and Chile is a common trope in his diaries with phrases such as “opening bout”, “final showdown” and “spar for advantage”. This suggests violence but within accepted boundaries; the countries can all play by the rules and a champion can legitimately emerge. However other instances show a more volatile violence with “we have fired all batteries”, that
“a state of war practically exists now” and that “it would be as impossible to get these two men [Edwards and Freyre] together as it would be to settle a row between two bull terriers”. To reiterate, this vocabulary was not used in reference to the physical violence existent in the territories but to the meetings and speeches undertaken in the name of international diplomacy.

Yet in contrast to this there are other moments where the plebiscite appears to be a game between the international officials as shown by “they may be only bluffing—and it is up to us to call the bluff” and “he will turn and try to read me limb from limb but that is part of the game”. Violence is constant in this attempted diplomacy through physical violence and threats against all actors whether Chilean, Peruvian, or American. This is present in the persistent violent language used within diplomacy and the sexism and racism employed by the white American men living in Arica between 1925 and 1926.

**First Impressions of Chilean Tyranny**

As soon as Pershing stepped off the USS Rochester, on 2nd August 1925, Arica struck him as an overwhelmingly Chilean city. He wrote:

As viewed from the ship, the town of Arica seemed to be in gala attire. Two United States flags were seen floating above the two houses that had been set apart and out on order for our use. All the other flags seemed to be Chilean. Indeed Mr. Edwards said in our conversation that there were very few Peruvians in Arica, and further, that everything was arranged for the plebiscite and that it should not take long to get through with it, as about 80% of the population were Chileans. He said they wanted to remain under Chile… There were no evidences of Peruvians in the crowd, the atmosphere feeling entirely Chilean.25

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25 2nd August 1925, Pershing
Charles Evans Hughes as US Secretary of State had declared in 1922 that a free and fair plebiscite could be held in Tacna-Arica, a statement corroborated by President Coolidge, but Pershing immediately began doubting this possibility on his arrival. Straight away Pershing sensed that the lack of Peruvians in Arica may have been due to certain actions on the part of the Chileans. Pershing was exasperated with the task that lay ahead and described the problem as a “quarrel between Chile and Peru over a piece of territory which intrinsically is hardly worth the price of the plebiscite. But sentiment which plays such a large part in the actions of both people prevents either from yielding or at least has done so for some 30 years”. The arid provinces of Tacna and Arica had not been seen as of interest until the discovery of nitrates which saw a surge of economic activity by Chile, Peru and Bolivia in the Atacama Desert, usually funded by European merchants. This richness of resources was the primary cause for the War of the Pacific but fifty years on when the plebiscite
was attempted, patriotism and national pride became the primary motivators for the dispute between Peru and Chile. Both nations so vehemently hated the other, at least in the metropoles, that neither could lose face by relinquishing the symbolic territories.

Just three days after arriving in Arica, on the 5th August, Pershing was fully aware of the problems of holding a plebiscite and that it appeared to be impossible;

I am not a defeatist but this old difference has existed so long and so much bitterness has been engendered that all sense of fairness is entirely lacking in reality. They both see things through intense hatred and both views are very much prejudiced... Under the conditions that now exist a fair plebiscite is impossible, and many changes will be necessary to make it possible.

Pershing refers to the plebiscite as “impossible” 49 times in his diary due to the systematic violence employed by Chileans against Peruvians that “was worse than in Soviet Russia” and “a story I believe unparalleled on this continent for persecution, coercion, intimidation and deportation”. Pershing lists many atrocities committed against Peruvians such as deportations, physical assaults, rape, and murder and Quekemeyer described that Peruvians “are actually afraid to show their heads above water”.27

Violence became entrenched in the Tacna-Arica provinces when the territory was appropriated by Chile in the War of the Pacific and only became more systemic in the fifty years until the attempted plebiscite in the 1920s. The Chilean populations of Tacna and Arica forced the Peruvian or pro-Peruvian populations into submission with the hope that Chile would easily win the plebiscite but the result was that, due to their actions, the plebiscite could never be held. Hostilities were also aimed at the Americans which by September 6th 1925 had become so pronounced that Pershing

26 2nd October 1925, Pershing
27 10th August 1925, Quekemeyer
withdrew his subordinates from the field for their own safety. In one incident, an American woman, Jackie Deitrich, was even fired at.

These violent acts were carried out by individuals and groups, most notoriously ‘the cowboys’, a gang of Chileans from the ‘Tacna and Arica Society’ who rode on horses, dressed identically, armed and looking for trouble. Chilean gangs would even tar houses in Tacna-Arica occupied by Peruvians with a black cross to allow Peruvians to be victimised easily and accurately (Figure 12). It appears that many of the protagonists of the worst cases of violence against Peruvians were Chileans from the South, namely Santiago 2000km from Arica who migrated to the provinces in order to add to Chilean votes (González Miranda 2004b).

It is important therefore to point out that while the state officials were the most prominent actors in the Tacna-Arica dispute, the inhabitants of the provinces were not a passive audience, they played a significant role as actors in shaping the diplomatic landscape through acts of defiance, contestation, and resistance. Whether ‘cowboys’ terrorising Peruvians, Peruvian victims of systematic violence, or Aymará communities who felt no ties to either nation, the citizens of Tacna-Arica were actively engaged in Pershing’s attempted plebiscite. This sense of purpose, however violent, had the effect of uniting local citizens across class divisions (Soto Lara & Pizarro Pizarro 2014). These united Chileans were then able to ‘construct an ‘other’ across the border, to define their local and national identity in direct opposition to the enemy Peru (Galdames Rosas, Ruz Zagal & Meza Aliaga 2014).

28 Box 6, RG 76 Records of boundary and claims commissions and arbitrations. Tacna-Arica Arbitration 1925-1926, US National Archives, Maryland
29 15th November 1925, Quekemeyer
As well as violence carried out by individuals or informal groups, other atrocities were carried out by the Chilean authorities such as one case of a Peruvian woman whose husband travelled from Tacna to Arica for business where he was taken by the authorities, put on a steamer south and prohibited from returning. The woman went to speak with the governor of Arica who said she should be glad her husband’s throat wasn’t cut. She was left helpless in Tacna with four small children.31

Other violations included the Chilean government censoring all mail passing from Chile to Peru and Peruvians living in the provinces were threatened with having to join the Chilean military, as those born there were forced to do from 1912.32 All celebrations or carnivals had to be cleared with the Chilean authorities and only those events that were concurrent with nationalist ideals were permitted (Díaz Araya 2006).

It was, therefore, highly difficult for pro-Peruvian groups to organise although there

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31 13th August 1925, Quekemeyer
32 Letter from Douglas Potts to President Calvin Coolidge. 12th August 1925. Calvin Coolidge Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Box 132. RG 76 Tacna-Arica Arbitration. US National Archives, Maryland
were dynamic leaders resisting Chileanisation particularly in rural parts of the territories (Díaz Araya, Ruz Zagal & Mondaca Rojas 2004). Chile also began establishing its own national infrastructure such as the first Chilean school in the rural indigenous interior in 1905 (Tudela 1993). Education was strictly in Spanish with indigenous languages prohibited (Díaz Araya 2006). More Chilean schools quickly spread across the indigenous communities acting as a vehicle through which to disseminate Chilean culture, norms, and values. Teachers became the propagators of national Chilean identity and patriotism in the extreme north.

Peruvian press was eradicated as the Arica and Tacna Provinces became a hotbed of Chilean publishing, churning out leaflets and newspapers, making their loyalties clear and creating a one-dimensional voice in Arica. The Chileans were urgently producing Chilean propaganda such as Figure 13 showing a typical Chilean roto embracing two women, one labeled Tacna and the other Arica, both caressing him with a Chilean flag behind. The roto who symbolises the common Chilean and is a source of national pride is capable of retaining and caring for his two women (Klaiber 1978). Meanwhile, those selling the Peruvian newspaper, La Voz Del Sur, never lasted as sellers on the streets of Arica for very long despite the paper being moderate and not containing provocative articles according to Freyre.33 When Freyre appealed to Pershing to control the Chilean press, his Chilean counterpart Edwards defended the ‘liberty of the press’ that is guaranteed by the laws of Chile.34 Edwards’ response was not surprising given that his family owned El Pacifico, one of the three primary Chilean newspapers in Tacna-Arica.

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33 Box 132, RG 76 Records of boundary and claims commissions and arbitrations. Tacna-Arica Arbitration 1925-1926, US National Archives, Maryland; Box 7, RG 76 Records of boundary and claims commissions and arbitrations. Tacna-Arica Arbitration 1925-1926, US National Archives, Maryland
34 ibid.
This violence against Peruvians was inescapably racist and xenophobic. Lighter-skinned Chileans treated the indigenous populations as passive subjects; they were expected to assimilate to Chilean culture and norms (Aguirre Munizaga & Mondaca Rojas 2011). Chilean machismo feminised indigenous bodies, casting them as weak and submissive and thereby appropriate passive subjects. The advent of the Chilean government completely changed existing governing structures in indigenous communities, destroying civic networks. The provinces at the time also had sizeable populations of African descent who were also subjugated in the same way, non-Chilean cultural expressions whether Aymará or black were regarded as Peruvian (Vergara 2012). Indigenous communities who actively resisted Chileanisation found that rebellion brought far more problems than benefits (Soto Tancara 2014). Chile was refiguring itself as a homogenous nation, one ethnicity, one culture, and so the
indigenous communities of northern Chile had to be assimilated. It is in this way that these actions on the part of the Chilean state can be seen as a form of internal colonialism; occupying the northern territories and controlling its citizens through violence and terror (González Casanova 2003).

Despite the extreme threat to their safety, hundreds of Peruvians born in the region descended on Tacna-Arica in preparation for the vote and due to the scarcity of accommodation they were provided with an encampment in the Chinchorro area of Arica (Figure 14). The stipulations for who would be able to vote were complex but broadly applied to men over twenty-one who were not criminals, insane, or working in certain public institutions unless they had been born in Tacna-Arica. Peruvians born in the provinces were technically free to return to Tacna-Arica to vote but the Chilean control and violence in the area complicated this supposed freedom.

Figure 14: Peruvian encampment, 1926. Ese Arica de Antes, Facebook group. [accessed 17/11/2013]

The Chilean member, Agustín Edwards, dismissed criticisms of the violence between Chileans and Peruvians by saying that such clashes “are frequent in all countries” and gave the example of violence between prohibitionists and anti-
prohibitionists in the US.\textsuperscript{35} The Chilean authorities refused to carry out requests by the Plebiscitary Commission which would make Tacna-Arica a less violent region or carried them out without really changing the situation. For instance the commission requested that Bustos, the Governor of Arica be removed which the Chilean government did but reappointed him to be Intendente of the Province of Tarapacá, the area to which he had deported Peruvians so he could, therefore, ensure that they would not be returned to Tacna-Arica.\textsuperscript{36}

The violence carried out by Chileans served to undermine the Chilean cause, legitimise Peruvian claims and ultimately led to the Americans declaring a free and fair plebiscite impossible. This entirely counterproductive situation can be rationalised by Hannah Arendt’s theory of power and violence whereby “[r]ule by sheer violence comes into play where power is being lost” (1970:47). Arendt argued that power and violence are completely antithetical; Chile’s sovereign power was under threat in the Tacna-Arica provinces and so violence became a means to stabilise this loss of power. Therefore, Pershing’s first impressions of Arica and the prospective plebiscite were not hopeful and only worsened during his stay. An unfortunate combination of factors; a poorly drawn award, bitter rivals, and systemic violence meant that the Americans were presented with an insurmountable task.

\textit{Relationship with the US State Department}

This ‘impossible’ and violent situation encountered by Pershing was worsened by the ineptitude of the United States government whose “heads are in the sand on this subject” of the realities of the plebiscite. Pershing did not hold back in his scathing

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{35} Address of his Excellency Senor don Agustín Edwards, Chilean member of the Plebiscitary Commission at the Session of the Commission, 5\textsuperscript{th} June 1926. Container 5, Francis L. Parker Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC

\textsuperscript{36} ‘TACNA-ARICA FIASCO PICTURED BY DELEGATE’. Wambaugh. S New York Times. 29\textsuperscript{th} August 1926}
remarks, especially against Charles Evans Hughes who devised the award, writing that; “It all goes to show what too much theory and too little practical experience combined can perpetrate” and that “of all the idiotic schemes for running a plebiscite this in the most so”. As a highly practical man, Pershing was frustrated by US lawyers who had never seriously considered how the 1922 award could be applied on the ground. On top of their “ignorance of South American elections” the US State Department that for Pershing “seems to me something like a kindergarten” was also prone to “meddling without my request” and putting too much trust in Chilean officials in Washington. Meanwhile in Chile, this meddling Chilean official, politician and lawyer Barros Jarpa was lauded by citizens of Arica for his role in fighting the Chilean cause in Washington.

Regarding the practicalities of the Plebiscitary Commission and the US State Department, Pershing could not have been more pessimistic. Soon after arriving in Arica, Quekemeyer had been optimistic and wrote; “[i]t looks like Washington intends to back up the General in whatever he does so that is most encouraging” but he was disillusioned by December when he wrote; “A cable arrived from the states and it looks to me as if our own state department is not going to back the General up as they should. I fear that that bunch of “boobs” up there would sacrifice the General on the slightest provocation”.\textsuperscript{37} Quekemeyer dismissed “the usual wishy-washy stuff from the State Department” but also became frustrated with the American legal advisors based in Arica, Dennis and Kreger, of whom he wrote; “The more I see of lawyers, the less real common sense I think they have”.\textsuperscript{38} This highlighted the problem of US intervention; those located in Washington couldn’t understand the

\textsuperscript{37} 19th August 1925, Quekemeyer; 8th December 1925, Quekemeyer
\textsuperscript{38} 9th December 1925, Quekemeyer; 16th September 1925, Quekemeyer
situation as it was in the provinces. The gulf between appearance and reality was just too great.

In September 1925 Pershing received a cable from US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg saying that while the State Department appreciated the General’s efforts in creating a fair plebiscite he should accept that fairness will never be achieved so it would be better to “approximate them as nearly as practicable and still be consistent with the terms of the award”, adding that it would be unfortunate for the commission to leave without completing its mission.39 This angered Pershing who wrote on the matter; “I shall not stand for an election that has not even the semblance of fairness”.40 Kellogg strongly recommended that Pershing give “careful considerations” to “any reasonable suggestions” from Chile.41

This raises questions over the true interests of the United States State Department. While Pershing was striving for principles of fairness and equality the State Department wanted the plebiscite to take place in spite of Chilean terror. Could the United States have wanted a Chilean victory in the plebiscite in order to stabilise their considerable economic interests in the region? Perhaps the US government wanted the plebiscite to occur whatever the cost to democracy. From the beginning of the War of the Pacific both the US and Britain wanted peace in the region so as not to compromise their industries in South America and when supplemented by continued US involvement in Chile as outlined throughout the thesis, this idea does not appear too far-fetched.

Due to the apparent ineffectuality of the plebiscite, very soon after the American Delegation arrived in Arica they discussed with Washington alternative routes to

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39 Cable from Kellogg to Pershing, 18th September 1925. Box 723. 2515/1613. RG 59 Department of State Decimal File. US National Archives, Maryland
40 23rd September 1925, Pershing. Underline by Pershing.
41 5th September 1925, Pershing.
settling the dispute. On the 15th August 1925, less than a fortnight after arriving, Pershing discussed the idea of a treaty with Salomón, an adviser to the Peruvian Commission. Two days earlier Pershing had mentioned to Freyre the possibility of dividing the territories with Arica going to Chile and Tacna to Peru. However, a common feature of the attempted plebiscite, both Peru and Chile were adamant that they would not lose national pride nor take any blame and so neither country wanted to be the one to call the plebiscite a failure and suggest outside settlement. Edwards told Pershing that dividing the territories would be impossible because Tacna, due to its dependency on the port of Arica, would economically collapse. Salomón suggested to Pershing that one solution to this could be for the President of the United States to propose the idea of a treaty to both Peru and Chile simultaneously.

It seems that both countries were searching for an excuse to call off the plebiscite despite their refusal to admit it publicly. Freyre, the Peruvian commissioner, told Pershing that a reason needed to be found for abandoning the plebiscite but Pershing replied saying that Chile would not agree to this and instead “we should have to find a formula that would satisfy both and at the same time saving their faces” and together discussed how this could occur. A month later, in October 1925, Freyre was requesting neutralisation but Pershing informed him that this would not be possible under the 1922 award. Despite these attempts it seemed that the problem could only be solved through a plebiscite and so the officials ploughed on.

**Chile, Peru, and the Local Communities**

The benefit of studying personal diaries is that Pershing and Quekemeyer include private perceptions that they undoubtedly would not have wanted public at the time. The delicate act of diplomacy rested upon social niceties and displays of respect
between the US, Chile, and Peru even when this was palpably difficult for those involved. Pershing’s diaries include many descriptions of the Chilean member, Edwards, with far fewer of his Peruvian counterpart, Freyre. Pershing’s first impression of Edwards was that he “has all the suavity of manner of the Latin and the appearance of an Englishman. His long experience in Europe as Ambassador has left him extremely polite and smooth no doubt his having been president of the League of Nations also gives him confidence in himself and much prestige among his own people”. Pershing was torn between liking Edwards who has “an attractive personality” yet also “has a way of pushing his face close to yours when he is speaking to you which is most annoying”. Despite Edwards being “slippery and untrustworthy” and conducting himself in an “oily style” a kind of friendship appeared to blossom between the two men and Pershing understood that although the two men played warring parts in the play of diplomacy, it is not personal and the two men shared similarities such as “the same energetic manner at times”.

In contrast to Edwards, Freyre is drawn by Pershing as an easily wounded and heartfelt character who earnestly appeals to Pershing on the fate of the Peruvian people. Freyre was known to speak English faultlessly and to assume an aristocratic manner, he determinedly stuck by his principles refusing all offers of help from the Chileans, even in assistance finding accommodation in Arica which meant the Peruvians had to stay living at sea on their ship, the Ucayali. The two enemies, Edwards and Freyre, personally got on very well according to Pershing, yet on the battleground of the commission meetings they fought hard to “differ on every point”, they had to play the part of the ruthless fighter for the audiences in their respective countries. Both men saw themselves as protectors of their respective nations, masculine Latin men who refused to back down on their demands.
Pershing found nothing positive to say about Chileans or Latin Americans in general in his Arica diaries, yet expressed his views that, for example, the Chileans “are a queer lot and their minds, like the minds of all Latin’s, move almost at right angles to our own”. Pershing also asserted that the Chileans are “entirely untrustworthy… deceitful, given to false statements, misrepresentation and lacking in all those qualities which we as Anglo-Saxons stand for and live for”. This view was supported by Quekemeyer who said of the Chileans; “Dirty sort of people to deal with, I must say and I’m sorry we ever got mixed up in this”. The manner in which Pershing spoke of the Chileans and his statements regarding the plebiscite has meant that Pershing is generally seen by Chilean historians as sympathetic to the Peruvians (González Miranda 2008). Chileans have been convinced since the 1920s up to the present day that Pershing showed favouritism toward the Peruvians due to the rumour that he had a Peruvian mistress, a rumour which cannot be traced through any documents, not even his personal diaries. Yet Pershing did have a reputation as a womaniser, albeit a discrete one, and it remains unknown whether this gossip has any basis in fact.

Edwards and Freyre, who had spent considerable time in the United States and Europe, were regarded more or less as intellectual equals to the Americans but the local citizens were considered to be ignorant children who couldn’t be expected to understand the lofty cerebral ideals of a just plebiscite. Pershing’s views of the communities living in the Tacna-Arica provinces are unsurprising for a white elite American. He stated his desires for an ‘ideal plebiscite’ “but that this was impossible here where most of the people were ignorant being of indian blood”. On Pershing’s first visit to Tacna he claimed that of the local population, just “2% was of the white race of which the Chileans sometimes boast”. On another nearby town, Quekemeyer

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42 28th November 1925, Quekemeyer
wrote; “Tarata is nothing more or less than an Indian village of nearly 2000
inhabitants… I suppose the natives were all very much interested in the affair, that is,
as much as you could interest these un-educated Indians in anything of this sort”. These communities of “Indian villages” were at odds with Chile’s ideals of whiteness,
modernity, and development at a time when Chile automatically classified all Chilean
citizens as ‘white’. These communities, whose stories are much harder to uncover
than those of the white elites, appear to have been somewhat disconnected from
notions of states and nationhood as Pershing remarks, “it did not seem to me that the
transfer of territory meant much to the Indians”.

Other reports from the time similarly describe the indigeneity of the residents of
the Tacna and Arica provinces many of whom only spoke Aymará (Basadre 1975). These communities tended to adopt Peruvian national identities as a reaction against
the violent and intrusive chileanisation policies and were, therefore, enemies of the
Chileans during the era of the attempted plebiscite (Díaz Araya, Galdames & Ruz
2013). While Chile fought tirelessly to remain in control of the territory, many
inhabitants of the provinces were at odds with Chile’s plans of progress and
modernisation, a problematic situation for Chile. This Chilean view of exceptionalism
on an ‘Indian continent’ appears to have translated to the Americans as in a report
given to the Americans before their departure for Arica to brief them on the climate
and living conditions of Arica it is stated; “the Chileans are more intelligent and keep
their persons and dwellings much cleaner than the native Peruvians and Bolivians
who are generally dirty and indifferent”.44

43 31st August 1925, Quekemeyer. During the War of the Pacific Chile had also appropriated the smaller region of
Tarata but Coolidge’s award had already stipulated that this territory be immediately handed back to Peru as it
could not be legitimately claimed by Chile. The official ceremony to repatriate Tarata occurred a few weeks after
the arrival of the Americans in Arica.
44 Living, climatic and other conditions in Tacna-Arica with reference to the plebiscite commission. Egmont C.
Von Tresckow. 19th April 1925. Box 5. General Francis L. Parker Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, DC
While indigeneity was an arena of violence for the local populations, it was a space of experimentation for the Americans. There was a sense that when the Americans were abroad they could transgress social norms that they could not in the US. Quekemeyer played tennis with another American, Dennis, and two Chileans who turned up at the courts of whom he remarked; “well the girl and man both looked just like mulattoes and I know if any of my Yazoo friends had seen me playing with them, they never would have allowed me to come home again”. US imperialism of the time was tied to racist ideologies of white superiority as increasing numbers of non-white people were coming under US domination all over the globe. However, in Arica, so far from Mississippi, Quekemeyer could cross ethnic borders.

Despite not understanding the local population, when Pershing left Arica in January 1926 his leaving statement was directed towards the inhabitants of the provinces as he reaffirmed his deep interest in the fair completion of the plebiscite, that the wellbeing and happiness of the residents of Tacna-Arica has come to be his most sincere wish (Medina 1926). Even though he believed certain citizens were not his intellectual equals, Pershing still recognised their right to a free and fair democracy.

**Women in Tacna-Arica**

Along with the indigenous population as a whole, women fail to be regarded with any high esteem in Pershing’s diaries. He personally found indigenous women unattractive stating that “I must say that a homelier bunch of women would be hard to find anywhere in the world”. Likewise, Quekemeyer’s views on local women were similarly disparaging, he wrote; “I seldom ever see a woman except the natives who

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45 16th September 1925, Quekemeyer
are dark in color and all look as if they need baths” but was happily surprised one day when “Cox, Jones and I dined with Mr. Claro at the Chilean Embassy. He had half a dozen very attractive Chilean women present- I didn’t know that there were as many attractive women in this neck of the woods”. 46 Peruvian and Chilean women generally seem to either add local colour; “Passing through the Indian villages people especially women and children were grouped here and there along the road, saying ‘buenos dias’ and some throwing flower petals at us”; be presented as victims, as in one case where a Peruvian woman was raped in front of her husband by a Chilean police officer; or be a source of annoyance, “[t]he governor’s wife (Mrs. Bustos) being my especial burden”.

American-born women aren’t represented in a much better light, even those who were knowledgeable professionals in their own right. The stories of four women involved in the Tacna-Arica question are included here as an act of rebalancing the official, male-driven narrative that has persisted since the 1920s. Sarah Wambaugh, Annie Smith Peck, Maggie Conroy, and Jackie Deitrick provide a counter-view yet still give a specific, privileged perspective. Women are rarely included in formal peace processes but when they are involved they are likely to make a different contribution to the peace process (Bouta, Frerks & Bannon 2005). In contemporary peace processes there is little equality of voice meaning women’s views are not as widely invited, listened to, or appreciated and this was far more unequal in 1920s South America.

The first female voice is that of Sarah Wambaugh who was employed by the Peruvian government due to being “an authority on plebiscites”, in fact the world’s leading expert, possessing knowledge Pershing, Edwards, and Freyre all noticeably

46 12th August 1925, Quekemeyer; 6th September 1925, Quekemeyer
lacked. Yet she was infantilised by Pershing who stated that he couldn’t imagine she would be of much use to the Peruvians. The US State Department had, before the Americans left for Arica, obtained materials from Sarah Wambaugh on the basis of her knowledge yet refused her involvement. Wambaugh had potentially caused problems for herself with the US government a year earlier when in 1924 she had written a letter which was published in the New York Times criticising President Coolidge for taking credit for the reconstruction of Austria whereas Wambaugh argued that the President only hindered the situation. Consequently Peru capitalised on the Americans’ rebuff of Wambaugh by employing her as a valuable member of their plebiscitary team even awarding her the Order of the Sun.

Wambaugh was a vocal critic against Chile during the attempted plebiscite and wrote passionate articles demonstrating her view in *The New York Times* based on her ten months living in the region with reports stating that “every Peruvian ship that left the territory looked like a hospital. Men, women, and children, with bandaged heads and lacerated limbs, victims of Chilean policy, crowded their decks. In certain cases, she says, the Chileans even resorted to torture”. She believed that US prestige in the area had been greatly undermined by the farce and argued that the provinces of Tacna and Arica should be immediately handed over to Peru. Yet she nevertheless admired Pershing and wrote; “I have seen something of diplomats and consider that he belongs in the first rank. The problem given him was one impossible of solution”.

The American team also rejected the offered assistance of Annie Smith Peck who had extensive experience of South America and was fluent in Spanish yet was deemed
unnecessary by Pershing. Peck wrote to Pershing offering her services in the Tacna-Arica plebiscite (Figure 15), demonstrating her clear knowledge of the situation having met Peruvian refugees who had been deported from Arica. Pershing was warned that “Miss Peck has already poured out her soul on the Tacna-Arica Arbitration in letters to the President and the Secretary, both of which received a routine acknowledgement only. She is apparently anxious to get into the limelight and of course would be absolutely unsuited for work on the Commission. May I suggest that you thank her for her interesting letter and for her offer to be of service in the forthcoming plebiscite”. Pershing did reply to Peck remarking that her comments were interesting and appreciated and that he would “keep in mind” her offer of service in connection with the plebiscite. This theatre of international diplomacy was a man’s world and Quekemeyer made his views very clear when he stated; “Personally I cannot see why American women would want to get mixed up in this affair down here”.

Like Wambaugh, Peck also wrote letters to the New York Times on the subject of Tacna-Arica and argued that the provinces should be returned to Peru. Her opinion on why the plebiscite failed was that it never should have been allowed so long after the Treaty of Ancón, she believed that “[t]he most tactful and skillful diplomat could not have brought it to pass. The opportunity for diplomacy was before the ordering of the plebiscite”. Another admirer of Pershing she wrote that “[t]here was no failure

55 15th November 1925, Quekemeyer

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in diplomacy at Arica by General Pershing. The colossal diplomatic blunder, unfortunately, was made in Washington”.58

Figure 15: Pamphlet sent by Peck to Pershing. Letter from Miss Annie Peck to Pershing. 12th April 1925. Container 338. John J. Pershing Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC

Just as Peru had seen the value of Wambaugh’s expertise, another woman employed by the Peruvians was Maggie Conroy, an interpreter who spent an entire year on the cruiser Ucayali off the coast of Arica, she and Wambaugh being the only

women aboard. Described as cheerful throughout and with unrelenting faith that the border issue would be solved peacefully she similarly held Pershing in high esteem. In one interview she said; “Gen. Pershing won my undying admiration by the part he played in the negotiations… He was in a very difficult and delicate position, but he carried it off splendidly… Pershing, of course, leaned toward military precision and order, and Freyre toward diplomatic dignity. Edwards was much more discoursive- a different type entirely”.39

The fourth woman written out of, or never written into, this historical event was Jackie Deitrick, an American journalist who was employed to cover the plebiscite for the South American English-language newspaper the West Coast Leader as well as Peruvian paper La Prensa. Deitrick had been residing in Panama but had never been to South America and “[l]ike the majority of her countrymen and women, she knew of Tacna-Arica only as an obscure territorial controversy which the President of the United States had been called upon to arbitrate somewhere in South America” (Deitrick 1926:iiv). She joined the Peruvians aboard the Ucayali, becoming friends with Wambaugh, and despite being surrounded by Peruvians, was adamant that her views would remain neutral writing in one article; “I’m here to state that I don’t know the first thing about the situation and don’t, as a matter of fact, give a darn. It’s not my squabble”, and in another; “there’s one thing I’m quite certain of; nothing shall influence me toward any stand but a neutral one. As I said before, it’s not my fuss”.60 Deitrick expected to stay in Arica for ten days but, like the other actors involved, became drawn into the complexities of the situation and quickly found that she could not be an impartial observer.

39 ‘Peruvian woman leader, touring U.S. looks forward to seeing two world's fairs'. The Washington Post. 12th March 1939
In her later articles Deitrick described herself as “Peruvian by sympathy” and that she can no longer remain unprejudiced after interviewing local citizens and hearing shocking stories of violence and abuse of Peruvians by Chileans.\textsuperscript{61} Her work even gives us greater insights into the lives of local women, telling stories of victimised Peruvian women but also mentioning in one article that some of the Chilean spies in Tacna-Arica were women.\textsuperscript{62} Deitrick later became an almost-victim of the intense violence herself when she and some Peruvians were shot at when seeking out a Peruvian man who had been attacked by Chileans. She claimed that the American lawyers tried to convince her to confess that she hadn’t actually been shot at but had only heard a firework or car backfiring, once again raising questions over American subterfuge and duplicitous influence.

\textsuperscript{61} 11\textsuperscript{th} September 1925. Deitrick, J. (1926) \textit{What Price Tacna-Arica?} The West Coast Leader: Lima, Peru
\textsuperscript{62} 13\textsuperscript{th} October 1925. Deitrick, J. (1926) \textit{What Price Tacna-Arica?} The West Coast Leader: Lima, Peru
The inclusion of these four women is important to the Tacna-Arica story, while these four women’s voices tend to be harder to find in archival research when they can be located they provide important perspectives on the case and can be used to rewrite women back into a narrative from which they have been silenced. This is a contentious point however, have women been actively silenced or have they been subject to strategic forgetting or even byproducts of cultural forgetting? Women are always ‘there’, as Cynthia Enloe (1989) has very effectively illustrated, but their legacies are less consistent, to what extent has this been engineered? Moreover, of these women included, three are American and Conroy was an elite Peruvian, where are the voices of local women, particularly indigenous women who have for so long been silenced? It remains that indigenous women have been written out of the archives as well as out of history. They exist as traces, mentioned by those more privileged, whether Pershing commenting on their looks or Deitrick alluding to their presence. Machismo was dominant in 1920s South America and women were not to be part of the official narrative, local women had no voting rights in the plebiscite and even the most expert of women were ignored. This has remained to large extent as the thesis, particularly chapter seven, will illustrate.

**The Portrayal of the Americans**

In contrast to the ‘indians’ who couldn’t understand democracy and the women who so tiresomely meddled, the American men in Arica and Pershing in particular were exalted by themselves as all-American heroes. Self-assured machismo was not solely the domain of the Latinos. Pershing remains steadfast to his principles of just diplomacy, stating: “I should be willing to stay here until Doomsday if I thought a fair
plebiscite could be held”. 63 This was reinforced by Quekemeyer who admired Pershing’s work and wrote; “Our chief is certainly showing his wisdom and by little private talks of hard common sense is beginning to bring light out of darkness”. 64 Quekemeyer also made it clear that Pershing would not be easily swayed by Chilean rhetoric, as he said of a conversation with Van Dyke, an adviser to the Chileans; “they seem to forget that the General is down here to see that this election is conducted in a fair way and its my guess that it will be pulled off that way or not at all”. 65 Pershing was frustrated that the citizens of Tacna-Arica were blinded by nationalism and that “…neither party has any other idea than that one must be on one side or the other. They have not the slightest notion that one can be neutral and just”. 66 Pershing was also irked by Americans who did not meet his approval, his opinion of Van Dyke, the American lawyer employed by the Chileans was that “[h]e would be sufferable if he would refrain from going about criticizing our own countrymen”. 67 If the Americans in Washington weren’t quite so righteous, Pershing was committed to upholding his sense of American duty.

With the Americans’ views on the local communities and other Americans very apparent, how did the Chileans and Peruvians view the Americans? The South American elites involved in the plebiscite held Pershing and the other Americans in high esteem, having pleaded for Coolidge’s involvement despite his reluctance. In the initial stages of the plebiscite both Chile and Peru saw the Americans as on their side but Edwards often became frustrated when Pershing began to criticise the violence of the Chileans. The Americans certainly attempted to regulate local opinion of them as shown by lengthy discussion over the US navy in Arica. A US cruiser, the Rochester,

63 14th November 1925, Pershing
64 16th August 1925, Quekemeyer
65 11th August 1925, Quekemeyer
66 7th December 1925, Pershing
67 7th October 1925, Pershing
remained stationed at Arica during the majority of the time period which was strongly recommended by Pershing and much enjoyed by Major Quekemeyer who relished the company of more Americans and the American goods they could provide. However the State Department was anxious that “psychologically it might have a bad effect in South American countries… it seems possible that both Chile and Peru may misinterpret the presence of an American cruiser during the plebiscitary period. There is also the possibility that other Latin American countries may feel that the United States is carrying out its Award by force”. Nevertheless the Rochester remained at Arica apart from trips to re-coal in Callao, Peru and no bad feeling on the part of the local communities was apparent.

What the non-elite Chileans and Peruvians thought of the Americans was largely influenced by the local press. Chilean press was often critical of the Americans with Quekemeyer writing; “It being two months since our arrival here, the Chilean papers this morning are all carrying articles more or less criticizing us for the delay in the actual conduct of the plebiscite”. The anti-American tone taken by Chilean newspapers was however dropped when the failure of the attempted plebiscite became apparent in June 1926. Chile had been complaining about US involvement, using the slogan *Latin America for Latin Americans* but this wasn’t going down well with neighbouring countries who placed the failure of the plebiscite firmly on Chile.

Along with disparaging articles the Chileans also circulated anti-American and anti-Peruvian propaganda such as the following postcard that came into the possession of one American (Figure 17). The postcard shows cartoon versions of Edwards, the Chilean Member sodomising Freyre, the Peruvian member while

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68 Letter from Frank B. Kellogg to President Calvin Coolidge. 2nd July 1925. Calvin Coolidge Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC
69 3rd October 1925, Quekemeyer
70 ‘Chilean Press Drops Anti-America Tone’ *Washington Star* 21st June 1926
Pershing and Leguia, the Peruvian president urinate. Leguia is saying to Pershing, “it looks like Edwards put it all in, [while] we conform to the league that rules us”. Pete Sigal has argued that in Latin American cultures, a man penetrated by another man is effeminate, and lacks valour and honour. However, a man penetrating another man can be seen as embodying extreme male dominance (Sigal 2003). The passive homosexual in this machismo dichotomy thereby becomes feminised. In this context therefore, Edwards is not weakened by a homosexual act but is humiliating and dominating feminine Peru. While studies have shown that in lived experiences of gay Latino men the binary of active/passive is far more complicated than this stereotype, prevailing machismo ideas of homosexuality in the 1920s were bounded by this dualism (Vidal-Ortiz, Decena, Carrillo & Almaguer 2010).

Figure 17: Chilean propaganda postcard. 16th February 1926. Box 5. General Francis L. Parker Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC

Another less vulgar cartoon was used by a satirical Chilean magazine founded by Agustín Edwards, Corre Vuela, to portray the situation of Pershing in Arica with its high proportion of cholos (Figure 18). Cholos are Latin Americans of indigenous descent,
often used specifically for Peruvians, potentially in a derogatory way (Klaiber 1978).

The caption reads:

“Cholo: You, General, like a good protestant are always reading the Bible.

Pershing: Yes, and since coming to Arica and needing to understand you lot, I keep finding myself reading the same chapter.

Cholo: Which?

Pershing: Which has it been? That of Job…”

Figure 18: Conversation between Pershing and a ‘Cholo’. Cover image. *Corre Vuela*, Santiago de Chile. 3rd November 1925

The cartoon is referencing the theme of the Book of Job of ‘why do the righteous suffer?’ Pershing, by no fault of his own has been plunged into a nightmarish situation
of violence and frustration with no solution to the Tacna-Arica dispute being apparent. A third cartoon (Figure 19) portraying Pershing was published by Chilean magazine *Sucesos* and shows the General as sympathetic to the Peruvian cause. Peru is represented by a prostitute pleading to Pershing:

“for forty-five years I have been a victim of that bad man [Chile]. He took the two girls away from me and refuses to give them back, claiming that I declared war on him, and that he sacrificed thousands of lives and spent many millions”

Pershing, crying, responds:

“your grief touches my very soul. And you have only to see what I am capable of when something affects me so deeply”

These three cartoons along with numerous newspaper articles, whether through attempts to humiliate the Americans or Peruvians or with racist depictions, will have influenced how everyday citizens viewed the Americans and their role in the plebiscite. The Americans, seen as righteous saviours of the backwards Latin Americans in their own eyes but as arrogant meddlers in the eyes of Chile and Peru were given a futile task; sent by their government to organise a plebiscite which should never have been declared possible it was hardly surprising when the idealistic project fell apart. These cartoons of Pershing highlight how Tacna-Arica was a place where Chilean political opinion was openly shared, both in the official press but also with covert propaganda. Chilean images were shared freely in a way Peruvian propaganda couldn’t be and this availability remains in the archival record. Although Chileans had initially been happy with Coolidge’s 1922 award they soon became disgruntled with Pershing’s attitude and, in their opinion, unfair favouring of the Peruvians.
Figure 19: Cartoon of Pershing. Cover image, *Sucesos*, Santiago de Chile 3rd December 1925
The Plebiscite Disintegrates

Pershing had been hoping to leave Arica as soon as possible to escape the nightmare of the failing plebiscite and to see his son Warren, but in January 1926 he was forced to return to the United States for urgent medical treatment. He was suffering from an oral infection of the jaw that had dangerously increased his blood pressure. Pershing’s doctor’s opinion was that “General Pershing has hypertension which is progressive partly due to stress and strain of plebiscite and also doubtless to oral focal infection”. Quekemeyer rejoiced at being finally freed from Arica and the plebiscite and wrote on their day of departure; “My last day in Arica- thank goodness, Hurrah!” and; “After the departure of General Lassiter we ‘upped anchor’ and started for God’s Country, home. There is no country like it. As for Arica, I hope to never see the damn place or its rotten people again. I never remember leaving a place before where I felt less sorry to be going”. Meanwhile, Pershing wrote of their impending departure the brief; “thanks to God”.

There was some skepticism over Pershing’s claim of ill-health with one Florida paper reporting that “[p]ress cables from South America indicating surprise that Pershing is regarded here as a sick man added to the feeling in many quarters that the general is the victim of a diplomatic illness”. This was refuted in the same paper a few days later stating, “[o]fficials in Washington are exceedingly emphatic in their assertion that Pershing’s illness is in no sense a “diplomatic sickness” and point out that such a statement is most unfair and ungenerous to Pershing”. Once in the United States Pershing made statements that a free and fair plebiscite seemed unlikely and the press increasingly began to speculate on the chances on him ever returning to

72 27th January 1926, Quekemeyer
73 ibid.
74 Evening Independent, 30th December 1925
75 Evening Independent, 5th January 1926
Arica. By February 1926 the US press was reporting the plebiscite as a failure with the *New York Times* running an article describing Pershing’s views of the plebiscite being impossible while the Chileans continue with their behaviour against the Peruvians. Pershing resigned on 27th February 1926, ruling out his return to Arica for good.

As Pershing left Arica he was replaced by Major General William Lassiter, former Commander of the American forces in the Canal Zone, who soon held the same sentiments as his predecessor regarding the impossibility of the plebiscite. Pershing’s departure left both Chile and Peru unhappy, saddled with a new President of the Commission and further than ever from reaching a solution to the territorial dispute. Chile was upset with Pershing’s interference in their plebiscite which it seemed from the outset would run in their favour. The Chilean commission was not pleased with the decision made by Lassiter and Pershing with Edwards complaining that Pershing’s Committee of Investigations never once investigated the deaths of Chilean citizens and police at the hands of Peruvians and were from the outset in favour of Peru (Edwards 1926). They accused Pershing and later Lassiter of partiality towards Peru and suggested the intervention of the League of Nations. The United States was strongly against this idea that could contradict the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. Instead, on 14th June 1926, General Lassiter, with the support of General Pershing, submitted a substantial report to the Department of State and with powerful conditions of violence described, the plebiscite was abandoned that very day. The declaration that the plebiscite was unviable was a pyrrhic victory for Peru, they had international recognition of the tyranny imposed by Chile in Tacna-Arica but the provinces remained under Chilean control. Peru had a diplomatic triumph, with perverse thanks to the violence of the Chileans, but didn’t make any real gains in terms of reclaiming the much-desired provinces of Tacna and Arica.

76 *New York Times*, 10th February 1926
There were four potential solutions after the plebiscite was abandoned; that the provinces remain in the hands of Chile; the division of the region possibly with a corridor to the sea for Bolivia; the neutralisation of the region either as an independent state or under the jurisdiction of another power; or it could be ceded to a third party.\textsuperscript{77} Sarah Wambaugh was a strong advocate of returning the provinces to Peru but making Arica a ‘free port’ allowing Bolivia an outlet to the sea sharing its administration with Peru.\textsuperscript{78} Neutralising the territory would have provided a free port for the area seen as the ‘heart of South America’, ideally located for maritime transit with the whole west coast of the continent into the Pacific as well as inland South America.

\textsuperscript{77} Latin America Border Disputes’ Container 183. Charles Evans Hughes Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC
\textsuperscript{78} ‘THE TACNA-ARICA MATTER’. Wambaugh, S. \textit{New York Times}. 19\textsuperscript{th} December 1926
Mr. Stabler, the Secretary General to the Plebiscitary Commission, explained in a letter that he would not be opposed to the idea to the territory being neutralised and adds an idea to “blow up the ‘morro’ with high explosives so as to destroy the cliff which has caused so much trouble and has and will always be pointed to as the ‘rock of contention’ between Chile and Peru. The material could be used for a breakwater and a lighthouse or a monument could be erected to San Martin on the site of the ‘morro’”.

The ‘morro’ is the prominent headland dominating the otherwise remarkably flat urban landscape of Arica. Much of the dispute had centered around symbolism and national pride, focussing on imagery such as the morro and veteran soldiers from the War of the Pacific. The Chilean press at the time declared that “[t]he Tacna and Arica affair has been exploited, and not so very long ago, President Leguia declared that it had been used as an instrument of agitation in the internal politics of Chile, and Peru, and it has also been used as a diplomatic arm in the relations of Chile and Peru with other Republics”.

Even as early as 1924 the fight over Tacna and Arica was described as a ‘hackneyed political weapon’ (Álvarez 1924). The value of the territory was monetarily worth far less than the efforts and expenses of the attempted plebiscite would suggest but national pride and political one-upmanship more than made up for this disparity.

A Resolution is Found

The resolution of the Tacna-Arica dispute, after decades of violence and international diplomacy, was somewhat anti-climatic. There was no great war between Peru and Chile as some had predicted, the territory was not dramatically

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passed over to Bolivia or made into an independent state. In fact, progress was made far from Arica, on a journey to Havana for the Sixth American Conference that Chilean diplomat Carlos Silva Vildosola met with delegates from Peru. Mr. Francis White, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, was attending the conference “and talked with them more or less about a settlement”.81 This was, therefore, a great shift in the power of the decision making process over the border dispute. While it had earlier seemed that the citizens of the provinces would draw the border of the Tacna-Arica provinces through a plebiscite, its failure transferred the power to choose to the top of the pile, to the national heads of state and government officials.

In July 1928, and with the involvement of US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, came the surprising announcement that Peru and Chile were to resume diplomatic and commercial relations after a hiatus since 1910 and the path to peaceful negotiation began. Then, on the 17th May 1929 President of the United States Herbert Hoover announced a final settlement of the dispute and the Treaty of Lima was signed in June 1929. The Treaty awarded the province of Arica to Chile and Tacna to Peru with Chile paying six million dollars to Peru in compensation along with a significant number of provisos (St John 2000). Forty-five years after the Treaty of Ancón, the pending issue of Tacna-Arica finally had a solution.

Former Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes declared that “[t]he settlement was well received by the majority of the people both in the nations involved and in foreign countries. By it, Peru recovered Tacna, which contained the major portion of her former citizens. Chile retained Arica, where the population brought there for government and railroad work was largely Chilean. Peru had discharged her duty

toward her lost citizens, and Chile was relieved of anxiety over her northern frontier”\(^\text{82}\). It seemed that finally peace had arrived at the border.

Figure 21: The official delivery of the province of Tacna to Peru. 28th August 1929. AHVD Fondo Sergio Chacón

Although the lucky encounter in transit to Havana was the turning point for the Tacna-Arica resolution, no single actor can be pinpointed as responsible for this diplomatic success. Instead it was a dialogue between certain key players. William Smith Culbertson, American Ambassador to Chile, outlines the three men who he believes can be credited for the settlement; US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, Chilean President Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (1927-1931) and Peruvian President Augusto Leguía (1919-1930)\(^\text{83}\). It is undeniable that the actors taking the final bow, showered with praise and written into the history books were the official statesmen and government officials of the United States, Peru, and Chile. Culbertson’s view completely removes the individuals who attempted the plebiscite, now seen as an embarrassing failure. However, as Sarah Wambaugh (1933) argued, the settlement


\(^{83}\) Reels 15-41, Frank B Kellogg Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC
would not have occurred without the attempted plebiscite, the action of the plebiscitary commission forced Chile to accept a compromise settlement. Despite all of Pershing’s and his team’s hard work in Arica, and the splitting of the territories being an alternative settlement which Pershing himself desired, the eventual resolution in 1929 was distanced from the aborted plebiscite and even in biographies of Pershing, Arica only ever awards a brief mention, if at all. Moreover, the totality of this assemblage of actors, with the local communities and women who undoubtedly shaped events in Tacna-Arica never found their voices in the official story.

**Conclusions**

Since the War of the Pacific the provinces of Tacna and Arica had been characterised by violence, first by international warfare and territorial appropriation and subsequently by almost five decades of systemic violence against Peruvians in the name of ‘chileanisation’. The involvement of the United States in the 1920s to aid the completion of the plebiscite was an act of pacification, a way to suture the wound and put an end to the simmering tension in the disputed provinces of Tacna and Arica, although diplomacy brought its own type of violence. These disputed territories became central to the Chilean nation-state as a symbol of national pride and honour and the border was at the forefront of national consciousness. While the team of Americans headed by Pershing attempted to determine the appropriate regulations for the plebiscite, the extreme violence in the territory meant that no free and fair plebiscite could be held and so US involvement was terminated.

The diaries of John J. Pershing and John Quekemeyer as well as numerous other documents included here provide a rich addition to previous work on the Tacna-Arica dispute, giving a more personal insight into the diplomatic efforts that ultimately led to
failure. The plebiscite, although futile, shows us the struggles of vastly different actors working together; Americans attempting to impose notions of voting which had never before existed in Chile or Peru, white elite officials in a land of “Indians”, a culture of extreme violence which meant no-one was safe. All these struggles were watched closely by expectant audiences; Chileans, Peruvians and Bolivians whose entire futures would be determined by the plebiscite, and Americans, fascinated by the work being done down in South America by their hero, General Pershing. Personalities, particularly those of Pershing, Edwards, and Freyre indisputably affected the diplomatic process through the roles they performed and their personal interactions. In this way, geography and biography truly are closely connected.

A resolution to the Tacna-Arica question was eventually found, years after Pershing set sail for his beloved homeland statesmen from the US, Chile and Peru agreed upon a settlement which Pershing himself had proposed, giving Arica to Chile and Tacna to Peru. With the Treaty of Lima Arica became a border city overnight, and the Tacna-Arica region that for so long had been a unified, interdependent space was rudely divided. It would seem that that this troublesome border issue had finally been laid to rest and Chile could officially embrace the province of Arica into the Chilean nation. However the 1929 settlement did not create lasting peace within the province of Arica or between Chile and Peru. As this thesis will go on to illustrate, violence has never left Arica and this can be seen through different scales from the international to the national to the corporeal.

Chile’s potential sovereignty over Tacna-Arica was tantalisingly close at the beginning of the 1920s and the Chilean state was prepared to fight for it at the cost of international disapproval over the state’s aggression and the daily reality of violence in the territories. Chile’s northern border became central to the state’s geopolitical ideas
of state expansion with a healthy state being an organism that grows. The loss of this territory would have been a crushing defeat and so Tacna-Arica shifted from being an ambiguous grey zone on the edge of the Atacama to the region defining the ideals of the Chilean state in the 1920s. Arica was put, quite literally, on the Chilean map.
CHAPTER FIVE


"La Junta lo hizo todo, menos el Morro"

“The Junta made everything, except for the Morro”

Throughout the 1920s the provinces of Tacna-Arica had been at the forefront of Chilean national consciousness. The country was asserting itself as a modern powerful nation and demarcating its northern border became central to this project. However, as soon as Arica was brought officially into the Chilean state in 1929 the borderlands, no longer under threat, immediately lost their urgency and Arica became a forgotten northern city. Arica fell from being the most important centre of Chilean-ness to the least. The Chilean state had had no official development plan for Arica beyond populating the northern territories with as many Chileans as possible and eradicating Peruvian influences. Unfortunately the incorporation of Arica into Chile coincided with the 1929 financial crisis during which the nitrate industry of northern Chile was the most affected industry in the country and the region fell into poverty.

Throughout the 1930s and 1940s Arica remained in a state of neglect; the town had 20,000 inhabitants and lacked basic services such as schools, lighting, safe drinking water, a harbour, and workers' quarters (Ríos Flores 1992). Arica was just a small border port which those in the rest of Chile knew little about, the state had been
so preoccupied with integrating the northern territory into the state in the 1920s but failed to concern itself with the wellbeing of the country’s northernmost provinces once they were officially Chilean. The residents of the department of Arica had been so overwhelmingly patriotic, to the extent of murdering those who wouldn’t vote in favour of Chile, yet the state apparently did not harbour the same sentiments of loyalty toward its own citizens.¹

Figure 22: Port of Arica, 1930. AHVD Fondo Sergio Chacón

Investment by the Chilean state in the 1930s was limited and the decade saw orchestrated breaks in the relationship between the previously closely related cities of Tacna and Arica. The free movement of goods to the now Peruvian Tacna was prohibited, completely changing the relationship between the provinces which until

¹ The term ‘department’ is used to describe the region of the city of Arica and its surroundings, forming one third of the Province of Tarapacá. Arica remained as part of this province until the Arica and Parinacota Region was created on October 8, 2007 under Law 20.175 by Michelle Bachelet.
1929 had been complementary with many families residing between both regions with movement free and fluid. The cities had always had a symbiotic relationship and the establishment of a regulated international border between them was detrimental to the development of Arica. It wasn’t until 1942 that a commercial treaty was signed between Tacna and Arica that allowed for some movement of goods across the border (Pizarro Pizarro & Ríos Bordones 2005).

The 1930s and 1940s were therefore quiet years in Arica with those who had fought so passionately to make the city Chilean frustrated by its lack of development. These citizens were not ones to take this abandonment lightly and systematically campaigned the Chilean government to intervene in the stagnation of the department. The city, during its years of economic inertia and lack of development became one of the most politically active regions of Chile, which was expressed through numerous political groups calling for help.² This frustration can also be seen through the local press. In 1931 local newspaper *El Ferrocarril* reported that Arica’s Chamber of Commerce appealed to the President of Chile to intervene in “some measures to save the situation… that Arica is not alive, it survives almost entirely on the transit of goods and passengers from… Bolivia and to a lesser extent the provinces of Southern Peru and it’s little life consists only in the agriculture of its small neighbouring valleys…”³

The *Encyclopaedia of Arica* stated; “The rest of the country made progress toward development but no-one showed any real interest in including the city of Arica in this development. Without doubt it was a difficult, complicated region and everyone shunned it” (Velez Coke & Castex Marambio 1972:xiii). These arguments were substantiated by statistics reported in 1936 by *El Ferrocarril* regarding the discrepancies

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² For example, the Comité Pro-Defensa de la Crisis (1931), el Comité Pro-Defensa Proletaria (1931), Liga de Arrendatarios (1931), Cámara de Comercio (1929), Comité Arica Pro-Puerto Libre (1933), Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile (1936), and the Comité Pro-Resurgimiento de Arica (1937), among others. Ríos Flores, M. (1992) p. 14

³ *El Ferrocarril*, 12th June 1931
in Chilean government investment in the three departments of Chile’s northernmost province, Tarapacá:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government investment in Tarapacá province 1936 (US$)⁴</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Arica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Pisagua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Iquique</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

President Carlos Ibáñez del Campo had taken an interest in the city during his 1927-1931 presidential term, being the one to sign the 1929 Treaty of Lima, but had failed to make the region thrive. And so, when he returned to the presidency 1952-1958, the development of Arica became a priority. Chile was undergoing changes in the mid twentieth-century and Arica was the perfect blank slate to convert into a laboratory of modernity.⁵ However, it was the will and action of the political groups that prompted the President to take notice of Arica. One group, Comité de Defensa de Arica, after traveling to Santiago and having their pleas for support ignored, declared on the local radio that if the Chilean government didn't assist it would write a formal statement declaring that Arica wished to be assimilated into Peru. The severity of this ultimatum worked, local pressure and the fear of Arica being lost to Peru was successful and legislative changes began.⁶ Consistently throughout the history of Arica the Chilean state has only taken an interest in Arica when national sovereignty is threatened.

The first changes came with Arica’s transformation into the ‘puerto libre’ of Chile, the ‘free port’ whereby all goods that entered the port would be free of import or landing taxes. This was followed up in 1958 by the ‘Junta de Adelanto de Arica’

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⁴ El Farrocarril, 15th March 1936  
⁵ Modernity is used here in terms of faith in science and technological development, a move towards capitalism, industrialization and urbanization. Modernity in Chile became fortified with Pinochet’s government 1973 onwards with its conviction in the benefits of the neoliberal economic model.  
⁶ Interview, Sebastian Rojas. 8th August 2014
(JAA), a board of development that was created to catalyse Arica’s development and to raise it up to the Chilean national level.

The Junta de Adelanto de Arica acted as a form of economic pacification of the northern border bringing hope and prosperity to the languishing region and lifting it out of its violent and troublesome past. Just as international diplomatic action had attempted to ‘suture’ the border politically, from the 1950s onwards local citizens attempted to do so through economic development. The border once again was becoming a centre, not just a forgotten periphery. This isolated city became more fully integrated into the Chilean national imagination, at times displaying overt Chilean-ness, while at the same time bourgeoning its own regional identity that was often in direct contrast to the hegemonic national identity. The paradox of the border as a space of nationalism but also of intense regionalism is ever-present. Much to the dismay of the citizens the JAA was disbanded in 1976 and Arica has not reached these days of glory since. Due to political and economic changes in Chile during the 1970s, the JAA was dissolved and progress and development in Arica ground to a halt. Industries that had brought necessary funds to Arica either left or collapsed and, even after 18 years of the JAA, Arica was unable to be an economically self-sufficient region without the special measures that brought into being the puerto libre and the JAA.

Luis Galdames (2005) has argued that the inhabitants of Arica were passive, waiting for solutions to arrive from Santiago, and lacking a strong cultural formation. This chapter however argues that while the state created the laws for the puerto libre and JAA it was the citizens who mobilised and put these plans into action. The region had been suffering due to its border location, a characteristic of the region that was non-existent prior to 1929, as well as regional isolation and distance from Santiago. This chapter assesses how economic development, authorised by the state but carried
out by those in Arica, attempted to soothe Arica’s violent past and create a healthy prosperous region for all sectors of society.

The chapter draws from archival materials such as JAA official documents, the JAA photographic archive, and newspaper records of the time and is supplemented by oral histories collected by those who worked for the JAA or lived in the city during its lifespan. These oral histories include two JAA employees, Franco Muñoz and Alejandro González, who were able to contribute information about the JAA from the inside as well as numerous citizens whose lives were affected by the organisation. This combination of sources portrays a rich picture of Arica during the years of the JAA, showing its dreams and successes but also its hiccoughs and failures that are notably absent in the public imagination today but became apparent during analysis of newspaper records.

Unfortunately only one newspaper archive makes up the bulk of newspaper records; La Defensa de Arica, a right-wing paper that favoured the military government. This is clearly apparent in articles after General Augusto Pinochet’s coup d’etat which describe Marxist President Salvador Allende’s government as “decadent and chaotic to the extreme” and “the darkest and most corrupt phase in Chile’s political history” with Pinochet bringing in “the second national independence”.7 Fortuitously for this chapter, the JAA remained as separate from politics as it could be in the circumstances and articles about the JAA, which was popular amongst all political factions, often relay information about projects and meetings without opinion or political bias. It did also publish separate opinion pieces that span a variety of political views. While using just one newspaper source is not ideal, La Defensa provides an important perspective on JAA activities as well as public opinion.

7 La Defensa. 31st December 1973
The use of three different photographic archives from the Archivo Historical Vicente Dagnino (Fondo Edmundo Flores, Fondo JAA and Fondo Sergio Chacón) provides a picture of the JAA which the organisation wanted outsiders to see, one of dynamism, progress, and modernity, thereby necessitating a critical analysis. This one-sided view of the JAA hides failures, mundane meetings, and discontent. These humdrum meetings can however be seen through the JAA official documents which are kept at the Archivo Historical Vicente Dagnino and include minutes, acts, telegrams and many more documents from the day-to-day work of the JAA which provide information such as exact dates, details of who made decisions, dissenting opinions within the JAA, and how decisions were made. It is therefore important to combine the inevitable biases of all methods, oral histories, newspaper records, official JAA records, and photographic archives in order to uncover the most rounded view of the JAA and its impact on Arica as possible.

**The Puerto Libre**

On the 25th July 1953 President Carlos Ibáñez del Campo signed Decree 303 that designated Arica as a puerto libre that allowed goods to enter the port of Arica without taxes. Decree 303 marks the beginning of a process of overt support of Arica by the Chilean state through tax exemption laws, customs allowances and special treatment in order to revive the economy and create a pole of attraction with economic influence in the northern region (LeBlanc 2006). This had enormous benefits in Arica including economic prosperity, receiving immigrants from Chile and

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8 ‘Puerto Franco’ may be a more appropriate term as ‘Puerto Libre’ technically denotes a lack of customs duties but also the absence of any fiscal control whereas a Puerto Franco more accurately represents Arica where there was a lack of customs duties but with some fiscal control remaining. However, the term used in Arica is ‘Puerto Libre’ and is therefore used in this study.
other countries, and consequently saw development in terms of housing, sanitation, education, and other services.

Ibáñez’s new policy brought a wave of hope to Arica, it “opened the doors to progress for our city, so repeatedly abandoned due to centralism and lack of understanding” (Velez Coke & Castex Mambrio 1972:x). Don Alejandro Gallo, diputado for Arica, expressed in the House of Representatives that “Arica needs to develop its temporarily halted progress through the construction of roads and bridges, mining, the irrigation of valleys, cultivating sugarcane, etc. To bring about all these major projects, our government finds itself with empty coffers but declaring Arica a puerto libre would radically change this situation”.9 Decree 303 gave Arica the opportunity to draw away from its symbiotic dependency on Tacna, to differentiate itself from Iquique, the more prosperous Chilean city to the south, and to integrate

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9 “El Ferrocarril”, 26th February 1932 A diputado is comparable to a British Member of Parliament
itself more effectively into the Chilean national economy (Podestá 2004). According to the *Encyclopaedia of Arica* “[i]t was no longer an anaemic village, lost in its solitude, veiled in old glories. Its population grew hour by hour. Those who visited- and it was thousands every day- returned surprised and enchanted” (Velez Coke & Castex Marambio 1972:43-44).

In the popular imagination the most explicit demonstration of the success of the puerto libre was the growth in population from 23,033 in 1952 to 46,659 in 1960 but this had geopolitical ends (Galdames 2005). The impact of the puerto libre was described by Ariqueño writer Alfredo Wormald Cruz as a “huge advance for Arica” which transformed a “quiet and lifeless city” into “a whirlwind of activity” which was “the surest way to ensure sovereignty at the extreme of this country” (Wormald Cruz 1968:216 Emphasis added). A populated and economically successful border city was seen geopolitically as an effective deterrent to an outside border invasion. The puerto libre had a colossal impact on the economy of Arica as shown by the following comparison of economic figures between 1953 and 1957.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1957&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salaries</strong></td>
<td>70.000</td>
<td>727.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Customs income</strong></td>
<td>15.800</td>
<td>154.700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Municipal income</strong></td>
<td>12.500</td>
<td>92.500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hope was that the decree would give Arica the foundations to become self-sufficient in fifteen years and that merchants from all of Chile would be attracted to Arica to buy imported products at a reasonable price. However, despite the indisputable successes, in 1958 it was deemed that the puerto libre had not reached its goal that had been to create a consolidated industrial core and to be relatively

autonomous. The decree was only able to provide temporary development and a ‘moment of splendour’.\textsuperscript{11} The solution therefore was to repeal Decree 303 and instead create a new entity that would take a holistic approach to the development of the department; and it was named the Junta de Adelanto de Arica.

\textit{The Birth of the Junta de Adelanto de Arica}

President Ibáñez signed Law 13.039 on the 15\textsuperscript{th} October 1958 which aimed “to develop the production and progress of the Department of Arica and consequently grow and consolidate the population of the border area” through “true administrative decentralisation”.\textsuperscript{12} This was to be done through the work of the Junta de Adelanto de Arica, a decentralised public service with legal and financial autonomy. The JAA was created in order to meet or directly control the needs of a public in terms of the social, economic, political and cultural environment of Arica (LeBlanc 2006). One government minister stated that this decentralisation was crucial in order to give remote Arica the necessary advantages to compete with favoured, central regions.\textsuperscript{13} These two legal exceptions for Arica, Decree 303 and Law 13.039 have concreted President Ibáñez, ‘The General of Hope’ as a legendary figure in the Ariqueño collective imagination, the only statesman to give the region the chance the citizens so strongly believed it deserved. \textsuperscript{14} Ibáñez’s lasting status can be seen through a monument in the city to his honour (Figure 24).

\textsuperscript{11} Interview, Vicente Díaz. 12\textsuperscript{th} August 2014
\textsuperscript{12} Interview, Franco Muñoz. 30\textsuperscript{th} June 2014; \textit{La Defensa}. 16\textsuperscript{th} October 1971
\textsuperscript{13} AHVD \textit{Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA}. 297. Acuerdo 411, 1966
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{La Defensa}. 15\textsuperscript{th} October 1974
The JAA was financed through collecting import and sales taxes in the region and instead of giving all funds to Santiago who would then distribute the total countries resources as the government saw fit, Law 13.039 gave preference to Arica as the only department allowed to keep its own resources and spend as JAA
representatives chose.\textsuperscript{15} The law had the dual objective of developing a struggling city but also to quell the discontent of the far north with the heavily centralised government that was unable to meet the needs of Arica. The geography of Chile, with such extreme length and thinness, plays an enormous part in the failure of centralism in Chile and “has been a problem that has been faced throughout its history”.\textsuperscript{16} It is a prevailing assumption that the more compact and circular in shape a state, the easier it is to govern with ease of transport and communication, greater control over the population and minimal borders. Chile’s geography could not be further from this. Borders were heavily contested throughout Latin America in the twentieth century and it made sense to populate and economically strengthen Arica in order to fortify Chile’s northern border. It was hoped that Law 13.039 would heal the wounds left by centralisation and give increased power and responsibility to Ariqueños.

The JAA worked explicitly for the region and its people and effectively disseminated information to the public so that they had a full understanding of the works of the JAA (Figure 26). This was done almost daily through local channels of communication, primarily newspapers, as well as by inserting information into the landscape such as through public display boards (Figure 27).

\textbf{Figure 26:} JAA slogan; ‘An Ariqueño organisation servicing the region and the country’. \textit{La Defensa}. 31\textsuperscript{st} December 1968

\textsuperscript{15} Interview, Alejandro González, 18\textsuperscript{th} June 2014
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{La Defensa}. 13\textsuperscript{th} October 1975
The structure of the JAA was split between a finance team and a team who focussed on the implementation of projects with a total of roughly 200 employees ranging from architects to gardeners.\textsuperscript{17} Within this second team there was a council consisting of representatives from the areas of mining, industry, and commerce and they worked together, looking at what the community needed, what funds were available, and to decide which projects to implement.\textsuperscript{18} These employees were commended for directly instigating the success of the JAA with one article stating, “[t]hanks to this institution, and the vision and regionalist spirit of its directors and personnel, in just sixteen years the once small city of 20,000 inhabitants with the appearance and air of a village, has been transformed into a thriving urban centre, with over 150,000 inhabitants… No city in Chile has been able to grow so quickly, in

\textsuperscript{17} Interview, Alejandro González, 18\textsuperscript{th} June 2014
\textsuperscript{18} ibid.
fact at a national record”.\textsuperscript{19} It was important that the JAA was led by those within Arica. The Mayor of Arica, Santiago Arata stated in one JAA meeting; “The region will progress on the basis of its own men”.\textsuperscript{20} In comparison with the power wielded over Arica by state officials and international diplomats in the 1920s, the future of Arica was finally in the hands of its own citizens.

While the JAA acted within the physical municipality it was separate to the municipal government, although they did collaborate on occasional projects such as parks and public lighting (Figure 28).\textsuperscript{21} It was not an easy relationship between the JAA and the municipal government but in 1965 it was declared that “finally the JAA and the municipality march in full agreement”.\textsuperscript{22} After a period of disagreements both groups made a deal to work together on mutually beneficial projects such as parking, a small shopping mall, a theatre, and other buildings.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure28.png}
\caption{Public street lighting project in Arica, 1965. \textit{La Defensa}. 10\textsuperscript{th} May 1965}
\end{figure}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{La Defensa}. 15\textsuperscript{th} October 1974
\textsuperscript{20} AHVD Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA. 297. Acuerdo 411, 1966
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{La Defensa}. 18\textsuperscript{th} January 1964
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{La Defensa}. 12\textsuperscript{th} March 1965
\end{flushright}
The JAA was born in a spirit of optimism and this was carried through the implementation of various projects such as industry, health, education, the 1962 world cup, transport, tourism, and in the rural interior. Each of these projects is critically examined for its purpose and success.

**Industry at the Northern Border**

Prior to President Ibáñez’s laws of the puerto libre and the Junta de Adelanto, industry was not significant in Arica:\(^{23}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment in Arica by Industry in 1946 (^{24})</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agriculture</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communications and Commerce</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Service Industry</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Industry</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mining</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, this changed with the puerto libre and opened the region up to national and international trade, making the port of Arica a prime location for export and import. This meant industry could flourish through importing raw materials and parts and exporting products to other parts of Chile or Latin America and the port as the vital hub of industry in Arica was heavily protected and modernised.\(^{25}\) The President of ASINDA (The Association for Industry in Arica) stated that “Arica’s geographical position will be vital for industrial exchange”, he claimed that Arica

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\(^{23}\) Industry here is defined as economic activity concerned with the processing of raw materials and the manufacture of goods in factories.

\(^{24}\) Keller (1946) p.43

\(^{25}\) For example the expansion of the commercial port in 1962 (AHVD. *Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA*. 94. 1962) and a large breakwater constructed south of the port in 1966 to reduce the rough waters found at the port. (AHVD. *Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA*. 297. Acuerdo 2.533, 1966)
benefited from a “privileged location” and that “we want not just to sell to our neighbours but rather to establish a favourable exchange from every point of view”.

When the puerto libre was followed by the JAA “the general survey of all natural, terrestrial or maritime resources in the area, and to plan on using the resources located” became a key objective of the organisation. For example, the JAA became increasingly interested in the mining industry (Figure 30), working alongside ENAMI (The National Company for Mining) to explore mining options in the rural interior. There were great hopes that copper, the primary mineral of Chile, would be found. The precordillera was prospected for copper and geochemical investigations were to take place in the region of Belén-Ticnamar where a variety of minerals were hoped to be found. Unfortunately while some mining was possible no great reserves such as those which exist south of Arica were located.

Figure 29: Port of Arica, 1964 Ese Arica de Antes, Facebook group. [accessed 27/15/2014]

26 La Defensa. 20th April 1970
27 Ministerio de Hacienda. 1938. Ley 13,039 crea la Junta de Adelanto de Arica. Art.2.
28 La Defensa. 25th March 1971
29 La Defensa. 31st December 1975
The JAA was dreaming of a big industrial future for the region, one local newspaper declared that “Arica marches to the goal of a great industrial empire, with the mobilisation of big capital and the deployment of technical and human forces like never has before been seen at this far end of the country”. 

Arica was determined to be a frontrunner in technological modernity, particularly in electronics and automobile manufacture. To fulfil this dream the JAA gave out credit and loans to support industry and enterprise as well as creating a city for workers with all the housing and services necessary (Velez Coke & Castex Marambio 1972). Manufacture was integral to Chile’s import substitution industrialisation (ISI) model which had shaped the Chilean economy since the 1930s, a model that advocated replacing foreign imports with domestic production based on the ideology that a country should attempt to reduce its foreign dependency through the local production of

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La Defensa. 11th September 1968
industrialised products. Arica therefore imagined a future for itself as the production centre of Chile’s ISI economy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>1,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>8,885</td>
<td>27,147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The success of these efforts was visible in Arica as seen in the above table. Imports increased so drastically because Law 13.039 meant that any item manufactured in Arica could leave the city without taxes. The tax on luxury items at the time was enormous making many products a distant dream for all but the super-rich. As one citizen describes it “having a TV back then was like having a really good car nowadays” until Arica put such items into the hands of the average Chilean.

Many automobile manufactures, most famously Citroën, opened assembly plants in Arica as, if any stage of manufacture took place in Arica, the vehicles could be sold tax-free. By 1962 20 automobile manufacturers had plants in Arica that by 1964 produced 7,797 vehicles annually meaning that same year only 8 passenger cars were imported into Chile (Bizzarro 2005). The mayor of Arica, Santiago Arata, even stated the importance of the automobile industry for strengthening ‘Chilean-ness’ in the region. Arica had become the automobile centre of the country, industry was not just affecting the region itself, but the whole of Chile.

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31 The ISI model remained in Chile until the free market neoliberal economy was brought in by Pinochet’s government.
33 Interview with Tomas Bradanovic 21st April 2014
34 AHVD Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JIL. 297. Acuerdo 411, 1966
In fact the JAA became so fundamental to industry that COPROCA (The Confederation for Commerce and Production in Arica) declared that the “Junta de Adelanto must exist at all costs”. Arica’s population was expanding rapidly due to employees being attracted to the plentiful work opportunities and patterns of consumption had changed in the whole country. It therefore became necessary to sustain industry in Arica for the benefit of all.

Photographic archives suggest that women were employed by industries in Arica, although no official statistics exist. Figures 32 and 33 below show female employees representing industries in Arica. Traditional gender roles and an ingrained culture of machismo in Chile have meant that women’s participation in the workforce outside of the home has historically been low but did augment nationally during the active years of the JAA. Women's workforce participation in the period 1960 to 1982 fluctuated between 20.9 and 26.5% and rose to 30.7% at the end of 1984. Between 1960 and

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35 *La Defensa*. 8th June 1963
1982 there was a 25% increase in the proportion of married women in the Chilean labour force (Muchnik de Rubinstein et al. 1991). The increase in low-skilled, low-paid work, although some women did hold skilled roles, in manufacturing in Arica saw a growing number of women enter the workplace.

Figure 32: Women at a stand at an industrial fair, Arica. Date unknown. AHVD EF

Figure 33: Female employees at an electronics company. Date unknown. AHVD EF

Through support and encouragement from the JAA many industries from electronics to mining enterprises were able to develop and flourish at the border, trading across international borders. The presence of large companies such as Citroën
were a great advantage to the Ariqueño economy but Arica also had a great quantity of small light industries who in their mass brought a great dynamism to the city. The production of goods free from exorbitant taxes affected Chileans all over the country and “allowed Arica to permanently integrate itself into the productivity of the country”. Law 13.039 was the key to unlocking this wave of industry but it was the work in Arica by the JAA that led to its success. Jobs were created for Ariqueños, taking them out of the previously precarious employment market that had relied heavily on agriculture.

**A Healthy, Educated Workforce**

As industry grew in Arica so did its population, from 1952 to 1960 Arica had the highest rate of growth through migration in Chile, reaching 71% and by 1971 the total population had reached 105,000 (Oyarzú 1962). The region encouraged this migration with Arica’s mayor, Santiago Arata, declaring, “we open our doors to all of Chile to come and collaborate with us”. Both Arica’s health and education systems were failing to cope with the city’s booming population and so the JAA focussed on expanding and improving the regions infrastructure. Health and cleanliness became an important signifier of modernity in Chile, an expression of progress in contrast with the country’s perceived ‘backward’ neighbours Peru and Bolivia (Tomic et al. 2006). Arica’s proximity to these countries with its international borders and higher than average levels of international migration, increased the challenges of managing the health of the region.

Improving the health of Arica’s population was near impossible with the existing infrastructure whereby in 1961 the hospital could only perform emergency surgery

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36 *La Defensa*. 19th December 1975  
37 *La Defensa*. 25th March 1971  
38 AHVD Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAL. 297. Acuerdo 411, 1966
due to lack of adequate equipment.\textsuperscript{39} This was an unacceptable situation and so investment in health services became a key priority. The JAA immediately injected funds into health related projects increasing the number of hospital beds, supporting the work of the Red Cross in the rural areas of the department, and working with SERMENA (National Health Service for Employees) to provide the necessary equipment and funds to aid the employees of Arica-based companies (LeBlanc 2006).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INVESTMENT IN HEALTH (USD)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S.C.E.H.</td>
<td>7.665.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERMENA</td>
<td>25.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RED CROSS</td>
<td>23.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7.713.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This focus on health can also be seen with the construction of the Juan Noé hospital which began in 1966 (Figure 34) and health education in the urban centre of Arica and also in the Andean towns and villages where the population was mainly Aymará (Figure 35 and Figure 36).\textsuperscript{40} The two most important projects in the rural altiplano were the multi-use clinic and boarding school in Putre whose aim was to give schooling to rural children who lived too far away from day-schools but could receive an education, meals and a home in Putre.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{39} La Defensa. 1\textsuperscript{st} July 1961
\textsuperscript{40} La Defensa. 12\textsuperscript{th} March 1965
\textsuperscript{41} Interview, Franco Muñoz, 30\textsuperscript{th} June 2014
Figure 34: Hospital Dr. Juan Noé, Arica. Date unknown. AHVD EF

Figure 35: Baby being seen by a nurse. Date unknown. AHVD JAA
Infrastructure was also key with potable water and effective sewage systems vital to improving the health of the citizens. Health improved so greatly that in the early 1970s Arica was deemed to be the best fed city in Chile (Velez Coke & Castex Marambio 1972). This was linked at the time due to high levels of employment with good wages whereby families could afford to nourish themselves and their children. Moreover, by 1975 health provision in Arica was delivering services never before seen in the far north. This situation was a far cry from the Arica before the JAA that lacked healthcare services and health education. Just decades earlier Arica had been a place of extreme violence and danger but this was arguably changing through development.

As well as care directly through healthcare services, there was an important drive to increase the physical activity of citizens to improve overall health and wellbeing. Sport became the emblem of a healthy city and through an investigation of the photographic archives it is possible to see just how this was enacted. From projects

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42 Such as for tuberculosis treatment, care for infants with diarrhoeal or respiratory illnesses and children specific treatments as well as encouraging better hygiene, protection against zoonosis’, and industrial safety. La Defensa. 8th August 1975
such as children’s sports clubs (Figure 37) to women’s sports clubs (Figure 38) there was a clear drive to encourage the citizens of Arica to become more physically active. The JAA built many sports grounds and venues such as a gymnasium and basketball courts in 1963, athletics grounds and equipment in 1965, boxing grounds in 1969 with the pièce de résistance being the 1972 Olympic sized swimming pool described as “one of the most beautiful in all of Chile” (Figure 39).  

Figure 37: Young boys play football. Date unknown. AHVD EF

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43 La Defensa. 20th October 1975; La Defensa. 19th April 1963; La Defensa. 29th May 1969; La Defensa. 6th June 1965
Figure 38: Women’s volleyball team. Date unknown. AHVD EF

Figure 39: Divers at the Olympic swimming pool. Date unknown. AHVD EF
The role of sport in modern societies has been theorised as being an expression of sexuality by Freud to a form of modern warfare by George Orwell but for the JAA, sport was a democratising and potentially geopolitical force. The organisation particularly promoted team and collective sports that would unite citizens in the region across socio-economic boundaries. Ariqueño teams would compete against other regional teams, helping to forge relationships with other provinces and create a strong Ariqueño identity, as well as strengthening national identity with international competitions, particularly with Tacna. Ariqueños competing against Tacneños became a way to continue the rivalry between the two cities but this time in a non-violent manner.

With the health and wellbeing of the city improving the JAA also had to deal with the results of young healthy workers migrating to Arica; children. The JAA invested in education due to its long-term approach to development as can be seen through the 1961 scheme of vocational workshops for school students with workshops on industry, commerce, typewriting, dressmaking, and homemaking.44 This was to produce the next generation of workers for this modernising city, young adults to work in the growing factories and businesses quickly springing up. For the JAA, development could not be successful without education.

Roughly 10% of JAA funds were devoted to education which included building schools in sectors of the city which were rapidly springing up on the outskirts, taking control of the educational structure which was at times restructured but generally follows German and French education models, and providing equipment such as tables, chairs, and blackboards in the city and rural interior.45 The JAA also contributed to the financing of a children’s home “for the treatment of youth in

44 La Defensa. 2nd August 1961.
45 AHVD. Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA, Vol. 180, 1977; La Defensa. 20th March 1974; La Defensa. 24th July 1973; La Defensa. 4th May 1962
irregular situations” which was a part of a wider South American project to rehabilitate children.\textsuperscript{46} As well as school-level and vocational education, higher education was a priority for the JAA. The campuses and infrastructure of three universities, Universidad del Norte, Universidad de Chile Sede Arica and INACAP, were funded by the JAA (Figure 40 and Figure 41), attracting academics, staff and students from elsewhere in a bid to raise the cultural capital of the region, as well as providing a good higher education to the citizens of Arica.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{46} La Defensa. 31\textsuperscript{st} December 1969; La Defensa. 12\textsuperscript{th} December 1969
\textsuperscript{47} Interview, Alejandro González, 18\textsuperscript{th} June 2014
Therefore, health and education were highly important for the JAA as part of their vision for creating a healthy and happy working population. While industry was crucial in generating funds for the JAA, those funds were for social projects such as these that improved the livelihoods of all Ariqueños, whether rich or poor.

**Arica and the 1962 World Cup**

One of the most exciting and community-uniting projects created by the JAA was the Carlos Dittborn Football Stadium that came to be the base for Group 1 (Uruguay, the Soviet Union, Colombia, and Yugoslavia) during the 1962 World Cup hosted by Chile.

Arica was not originally due to be a World Cup host but the 1960 Valdivia earthquake, the largest ever recorded, destroyed swathes of southern Chile and meant that original host stadiums could not be repaired or rebuilt in time. A late stand-in and 2000km from the other stadiums this was nevertheless perfect timing for Arica,
the JAA had had four years to make a significant impact on the standard of living in Arica, show off its work so far to the rest of Chile and the world and make people aware of this growing northern city. While other cities applying to be replacement hosts had to request funds, Arica offered to pay all costs from the JAA and was already in the process of building a new stadium.\textsuperscript{48} This stadium was intended for 3000 spectators but when Arica was selected as a World Cup city the design had to be altered to hold 20,000. Many modifications had to be made to the original design to vastly increase seating capacity, and add cabins for press and radio, an area of seating for journalists, and offices for all the additional staff. One year before the World Cup there were some worries that Arica would lose its place as a World Cup host because the construction wasn’t progressing quickly enough and there were claims that the JAA didn’t care enough about the event which spurred on the JAA who gave “its full support” to “do all in their power to ensure success with the tournament”.\textsuperscript{49}

The world cup acted as a catalyst for development in Arica with citizens calling for redevelopments before thousands of tourists were due to arrive.\textsuperscript{50} The works were finished in time however and the president of the Yugoslav selection committee applauded Arica during the World Cup stating, “we are amazed that the organisers have been able to construct such a magnificent stadium and such a magnificent pitch. We congratulate them sincerely on their efforts”.\textsuperscript{51} As well as the stadium, the JAA built housing for the players and tourists who would arrive, lengthened and improved the street ‘18 de septiembre’ which gave access to the stadium, and improved the road ‘Diego Portales’ which would be used by tourists coming from Peru.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{48} Interview, Sebastian Rojas. 8\textsuperscript{th} August 2014
\textsuperscript{49} La Defensa. 28\textsuperscript{th} July 1961; La Defensa. 17\textsuperscript{th} August 1961
\textsuperscript{50} La Defensa. 8\textsuperscript{th} June 1961
\textsuperscript{51} La Defensa. 24\textsuperscript{th} May 1962
\textsuperscript{52} Interview, Franco Muñoz, 30\textsuperscript{th} June 2014
Arica prepared for 8000 visitors to descend on the city for the World Cup, season tickets were put on sale with 15,000 allocated for residents and 10,000 for tourists. To plan for these tourists 936 short-term housing units, predominantly pre-fabricated units, were planned. Unfortunately during the tournament 400 of these new constructions were left empty as a great number of Peruvians crossed the border for the match and returned to Peru the very same day. Despite the expansion of the stadium to hold 20,000, the average number of spectators for the six group stage matches that were played in Arica was only 8,590. However, the quarter final match on the 10th June between Chile and the Soviet Union had 17,268 spectators, a figure that still pales in comparison with the 76,594 who saw the semi-final between Chile and Brazil at the National Stadium in Santiago (Rematal 2006). The audience fell so

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53 *La Defensa*. 3rd July 1961
54 *La Defensa*. 4th June 1962
far below capacity because it was necessary to buy tickets for all of the matches
together which, with the higher cost, priced out many potential fans.

Nevertheless when the World Cup finally began in May 1962 local press quickly
proclaimed; “It is indisputable: Arica is the best group of the World Cup”. The city
was said to be “vibrating” and Arica’s hosting of the World Cup meant that Arica
appeared in the news on a global level. There’s no doubt the world cup increased
national awareness of Arica, “until then Arica practically didn’t exist for anyone
else”. Arica was aware at the time of the impact a successful World Cup could have
on its future. One article stated “if all goes well, tourism could stay for the future, now
that Arica has left an impression as a port of exceptional climate on the visiting
deleagates and the few foreigners”. One year on from the tournament, it was declared
that the 1962 World Cup left a great legacy in Arica with the new constructions such
as the stadium, paved roads, modern communication systems, offices and luxury
hotels even if some of these had not been vital during the tournament.

In terms of creating a sense of community, while some locals felt left out of the
World Cup due to high ticket prices, others benefited from the improved
infrastructure and sense of excitement with citizens able to interact with the international players.60 Football has been heavily linked to civic participation in Chile. Political participation was expanding in mid-twentieth century Chile and football was positioned as a neutral entity that could cut across class and political divisions but with significant place-based ties to regions, cities, or suburbs (Elsey 2011). One writer exclaimed at how during the World Cup, no-one from any political faction dared speak of politics.61 Ariqueños could be proud of their region and, despite their isolation, feel part of Chile in this hyper-nationalistic sporting event. The whole country was for once united in football fever, finally Arica, the difficult northern border city was integrated into this national event.

**Transport & Tourism**

With industry booming, a growing healthy population, ever-expanding city limits and recognition of its existence, a good transport network and its sustainable future increasingly became a priority. Improved transport within and to Arica was greatly beneficial to industry, tourism and local citizens who were kept abreast of progress (Figure 44). There were five main projects that served to develop transport; the new airport in Chacalluta, the Rodovario bus terminal, the Chacalluta and Tambo Quemado customs controls, railway developments, and improvements made to the port to receive maritime passengers as well as facilitating industry.

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60 The Yugoslavian team particularly integrated themselves into Arica. *La Defensa*. 4th June 1962
61 *La Defensa*. 13th June 1962
### INVESTMENT IN TRANSPORT (USD)$^{62}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Investment (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMMERCIAL PORT</td>
<td>15,715,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROADS</td>
<td>11,216,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEROPORT CHACALLUTA</td>
<td>5,213,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAILWAYS</td>
<td>2,754,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RODOVIARIO BUS TERMINAL</td>
<td>1,084,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>35,982,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{62}$ Memoria SEGA. April 1978. AHVD EF

Figure 44: JAA transport projects information stand. Date unknown. AHVD EF
This transport plan therefore served the region at three levels; the Andean macroregion taking advantage of Arica’s triple-border location covering Peru and Bolivia (Figure 45), the national level connecting Arica with the rest of Chile, and at the local level improving transport within the city and region itself (Figure 46 and Figure 47). The JAA was also in the primary stages of constructing a road from Arica to the Brazilian port of Santos that would open up the region internationally, allowing for trade routes across the Atlantic. The JAA was using transport to realise its dream of a highly internationalised and prosperous Arica. This focus on transport was also a sign of the JAA’s dream of modernity. Arica had become the centre of automobile manufacture for the entire country and so the latest technologies to transform Arica into a hyper-connected, cosmopolitan city through ‘corridors of modernity’ were a fitting addition. Car ownership became an emblem of modernity in Chile and roads were necessary to shuttle citizens quickly and efficiently around cities and the country (Trumper & Tomic 2009).

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63 Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA, 466, 1975 AHVD.; Interview, Sebastian Rojas. 8th August 2014
Figure 45: Installing a sign along the international road between Arica and Bolivia. Date unknown. AHVD EF

Figure 46: Underpass at Tucapel roundabout. Date unknown. AHVD EF
Roads in the rural altiplano were all greatly improved and from 1964 the JAA began its ‘vast interior road plan’ to connect rural villages and towns such as Ticnamar, Chapiquiña and Belén with Arica and with one another.\textsuperscript{64} The JAA’s reason for this road network was to favour the development of settlements whose potential riches could determine the future of the province.\textsuperscript{65} It was hoped that the roads could stimulate the population growth of certain areas as well as economic growth as some small mines could be extracted which would “give new life to places which today suffer from isolation and helplessness”.\textsuperscript{66} In this helpless interior, the JAA was seen as the only possible life-giver with one newspaper headline reading; “Only the JAA can help the abandoned region of General Lagos”, the poorest part of the department of Arica.\textsuperscript{67} The roads connecting Arica to Peru were also of great

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{64} Interview, Franco Muñoz, 30th June 2014; \textit{La Defensa}. 17th April 1964  
\textsuperscript{65} \textit{La Defensa}. 5th June 1967  
\textsuperscript{66} ibid.  
\textsuperscript{67} \textit{La Defensa}. 16th May 1967
\end{flushleft}
importance along with the necessary border control as in February 1964, 3000 people were crossing the Chacalluta border every day (Figure 48).\textsuperscript{60}

Figure 48: Chacalluta Border Control, late 1960s. Ese Arica de Antes, Facebook group. [accessed 19/07/2014]

In addition to improving the lives of the citizens of Arica, the JAA wanted to bring more people to the region and so good transport links were essential. The JAA used incentives, such as the National Cueca Championship founded in 1968 and held in Arica every June, to increase spending and therefore the VAT that would be received by the JAA.\textsuperscript{69} They aimed to “take advantage of the particular climate conditions of the area and especially the modern network of hotels, to benefit from the affluence of tourists”.\textsuperscript{70} Arica capitalised on “archetypes which form part of an idealised Chilean tradition” that originated in southern Chile such as the cueca, ramadas (fairs) and huaso clubs to insert a highly traditional way of performing Chilean-ness into a region that had previously been Peruvian (Díaz Araya 2010:14). This served to create a sense of belonging and affinity with the Chilean nation for the citizens of

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{La Defensa}, 25\textsuperscript{th} February 1964
\textsuperscript{69} Interview. Alejandro González. 18\textsuperscript{th} June 2014
\textsuperscript{70} \textit{La Defensa}, 9\textsuperscript{th} November 1963
Arica, many of whom were immigrants from the south, as well as attracting tourists who, whether Chilean or not, could come to Arica to enjoy a full manifestation of traditional Chilean identity. Since the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) when Chile took control of Arica, the state has struggled with how to incorporate such a Peruvian and Bolivian identified region into the Chilean nation. Until 1929 Chile took an aggressive approach, eliminating traces of Peruvian identity such as schools, press, and churches but this changed as the JAA opted to promote Chilean culture through sponsored events and education. This served to distance Arica from its ‘sister city’ Tacna across the border in Peru and instead create links with Santiago, over 2000km to the south, and the rest of Chile.

The JAA also invested in services to attract tourists such as by giving loans to hotels and building a casino, the second in all of Chile. Although the casino was expensive to build it was estimated that within a year of its opening it was able to

make back that expenditure in takings.⁷¹ A 1976 memo indicated a US-Chile ‘international venture corporation’ that would grant a US firm 100 spaces on LAN-Chile flights to bring gamblers from foreign countries to Arica every week. Chilean officials estimated that this would bring US$7 million per year not including gambling expenditure.⁷² These schemes were clearly successful because by 1970, Arica was “after Viña Del Mar, the city which offers the greatest hotel options and even when it has tried to increase this capacity, it is still pales in the face of the growing demand for accommodation”.⁷³ The JAA also wanted to make it easier for tourists to visit the rural interior and so accommodation was built in Putre and Codpa (Figure 51).⁷⁴

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⁷¹ *La Defensa*. 1st September 1961; *La Defensa*. 25th February 1964
⁷² {{WikiLeaks cable|id=1976SANTIA01579_b }}
⁷³ *La Defensa*. 16th October 1970
⁷⁴ ibid.

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Figure 50: Casino of Arica. Date unknown. AHVD EF
There was a desire to make Arica as beautiful as possible, which prompted investment in parks, gardens and beaches (Figure 52). The JAA supported Arica’s entry into a national floral competition with plants grown mainly in the Azapa valley. This was seen as a worthwhile investment of funds as “the tournament is of not just national importance but also of international and touristic importance.” 75 One open letter to the JAA stressed the need to improve the aesthetics of the port and primary streets visited by tourists in order present the best possible face of Arica. As the city was rapidly growing the streets “from the colonial era, [were] narrow and completely inadequate for the current traffic”. 76 The need to re-construct the city was seen as so great that Chile’s Director for Architecture declared that a “whole new city needed to be built, with every kind of services and with a view to the future to house 200,000 inhabitants”. 77

75 La Defensa. 21st November 1963
76 La Defensa. 21st July 1961
77 La Defensa. 22nd June 1961
Figure 52: Construction work on Lisera Beach. Date unknown. AHVD EF

Figure 53: Judging the ‘Queen of the Beach’ beauty contest. Date unknown. AHVD JAA

The new Chacalluta airport replaced the older El Buitre to bring these tourists in to the region and half of the costs of its construction were supplied by the JAA. The growing airline industry played a key role in promoting the region and various offers were presented to citizens to encourage them to travel (Figure 54). In the 1960s LAN
offered a discount on flights of 40% to students from the very far north in Arica and the very far south in Punta Arenas. This served to unite the country in a way that had never before been possible before long distance mass transit systems.

Figure 54: Promotional tool from LAN Airline highlighting Arica as a tourist destination, 1955 when the city was served by the airport in El Buitre. The region is represented by the famous Hotel Pacifico and the Tacora volcano. Ese Arica de Antes, Facebook group. [accessed 20/09/2013]

Figure 55: LAN advertisement. La Defensa. 20th January 1966
Transport provided the necessary links to connect Arica with Peru and Bolivia, to the rest of the country and also within the city and wider region. This was vital for imports and exports as industry was prospering but also helped to develop the new industry of tourism. The integrative approach including investment in hotels, entertainment venues such as the popular casino, leisure activities such as the beaches that were especially attractive to Chileans from the colder south, and the invention of Chilean-ness with events such as the national cueca championship, boosted visitor numbers, which ploughed even more money back into the local economy.

**The Rural Interior**

The majority of JAA funds were funneled into urban development schemes in the city of Arica but rural areas, despite only having a tiny fraction of the department’s population, were not ignored. In fact, the abundance of photographs of the rural interior located in the archives suggests that the JAA purposefully wanted to celebrate the unique culture of the highlands and the projects that they were implementing there. Indigenous citizens were included in ceremonies and photographs to make it clear that the department of Arica did not end at the city limits (Figure 56 and Figure 57). Many urban citizens of Arica feel a strong connection with the interior and were fully in favour of schemes to preserve and support the rural villages yet modernity in the form of transport, health, and Chilean state education was unstoppable. However, despite this outward display of rural projects, just 1.2% of total JAA expenditure was directly invested in rural towns and villages. Due to a problematic past relationship with indigeneity and ethnicity in Arica these projects must be analysed critically.
Figure 56: An indigenous woman cuts the ribbon at an inauguration in the rural interior. Date unknown. AHVD EF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL FIGURES (USD) 78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGRICULTURE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDUSTRY</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINING</td>
<td>4,695,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOURISM</td>
<td>9,839,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>21,590,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOUSING</td>
<td>60,373,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEALTH</td>
<td>7,713,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSPORT</td>
<td>35,982,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RURAL TOWNS/VILLAGES</td>
<td>2,557,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>4,087,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB TOTAL</td>
<td>169,940,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>213,968,400</td>
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78 Memoria SEGA. Abril 1978
In 1962 the JAA published its plan for the development of the interior that focussed on education, agriculture and farming, health and medical assistance, social assistance, and legal advice. This spanned from improving existing schools (Figure 58 and Figure 59), to classes for illiterate adults, to theatre groups, to classes on hygiene. The fact that these communities are almost entirely of indigenous origin raises questions about what projects should and shouldn’t be held in the interior. For example there were campaigns using traditional songs to discourage the consumption of coca, a leaf that is a very important part of Quechua and Aymará culture and is used for religious, medical, nutritional, and cultural purposes (Figure 60). The leaf is a symbol of indigeniety that was not compatible with the Chilean state and so plans to eradicate its use were widespread. While the aim of the JAA was to benefit all citizens of the department, the example of the coca leaf shows that only one specific idea of progress was encouraged and indigenous culture was not fully a part of this. The JAA

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79 *La Defensa*. 18th July 1962
is viewed so uncritically by local citizens, as a universally beneficial part of Arica’s history, but the projects in the rural interior suggest another side to the popular narrative.

Figure 58: Inauguration of a school in the rural anterior. Date unknown. AHVD EF

Figure 59: Students at a school in Belén singing for the governor of the province. Date unknown. AHVD EF
Many people who lived in the interior did not feel a strong Chilean national identity or identified more strongly with Peru or Bolivia, a trend that had existed since the territory changed sovereignty.\textsuperscript{80} JAA projects were therefore a way to impose Chilean identities and ways of living onto these communities as the state had better control of education, teaching Chilean-ness to young children (Figure 61), in the systematised national style of education in the Spanish language (Figure 62), and encouraging indigenous citizens to enrol in national schemes such as educational diplomas (Figure 63). It wasn’t until the 1980s that schools began bilingual educational systems in the interior that included Aymará alongside Spanish (Mondaca Rojas & Gajardo Carvajal 2013).

\textsuperscript{80} Some rural communities formed political groups to actively resist Chileanisation in the years 1883-1926. Díaz Araya, Ruz Zagal & Galdames Rosas (2013)
Figure 61: Young children waving Chilean flags in Visviri, a village located on the tripartite border between Chile, Bolivia and Peru. Date unknown. AHVD EF

Figure 62: The Governor of the Province visits a school in the rural interior. 15th July 1976 AHVD EF
In the mountainous interior, between 1961 and 1965 the JAA focussed primarily on agricultural schemes to improve irrigation and production such as new fertilisers, novel management techniques and the introduction of species as well as providing agricultural loans (Quiroz Thompson et al. 2011). This plan was reformulated in 1967 to work closely with the Plan Andino, a department of the JAA that took a more holistic approach to the rural interior. These rural projects were concentrated in the largest town in the interior, Putre, and were based on JAA representatives traveling to the interior and asking ‘what do you need?’. The schemes that were most successful were those that improved irrigation which was a constant battle in the most arid part of the world, and taught the proper handling of livestock such as the 1967 Putre project which built communal corrals for 5,500 sheep and 750 cattle. These were

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81 AHVD. Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA, Informe Esquema de Planificación del Desarrollo Agropecuario de Arica, 1962.
82 Interview, Sebastian Rojas, 8th August 2014
prestigious breeds including cows from Holland and karačul sheep.\textsuperscript{84} The JAA also altered the agricultural business model as previously “the wool produced in the altiplano was bought by Bolivian or Chilean traders, being in reality unfair as they paid below market value or bartered for goods”.\textsuperscript{85} The JAA brought thousands of plants to the rural villages including 112,500 in LLuscuma, 57,500 in Ticnamar, Oxa and Lupica and 6000 in Chapiquiña to introduce species such as almonds, apples, pears and peaches.\textsuperscript{86} These non-endemic species meant that experts were needed to teach local citizens how to produce new crops as well as how to face specific problems. To this end a soil microbiologist improved irrigation in Arica based on his experience in the United States and another expert in olive cultivation gave courses to olive farmers in the Azapa and Lluta valleys.\textsuperscript{87}

Figure 64: Cultivation of onions at 3900 metres above sea level. February 1968. AHVD JAA

During the lifespan of the JAA, 1958-1976, rural areas witnessed substantial depopulation as agricultural workers migrated to Arica. This was a side effect of

\textsuperscript{84} Interview, Sebastian Rojas. 8\textsuperscript{th} August 2014  
\textsuperscript{85} AHVD. Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA, Vol. 146, 1972.  
\textsuperscript{87} La Defensa. 20\textsuperscript{th} August 1963
greater communication with the city of Arica where a modern city with amenities, jobs, beaches, and an enviable climate were attractive to those scratching a difficult agricultural life in the cold, high-altitude interior. When the JAA began the interior was only accessible by mule and as the JAA started to build roads that connected the villages with Arica the interior began to depopulate. This had begun during the era of the puerto libre when Aymará families began to relocate to the coast (Quiroz Thompson 2014). These migrants were on the whole adolescents and young adults who became employed in manual labour, in low-skilled industry, and in domestic service (Choque Mariño 2009).

Alejandro González recognises that this may have been to the benefit of individuals as “it changed their lives, it connected them to life today”. However, depopulation was also a problem for rural development and also geopolitically as urban migration would leave the north-eastern corner of Chile which borders Peru and Bolivia, vulnerable. The presence of patriotic citizens acts as a fortification of a border especially in isolated, more vulnerable areas such as the department of Arica. A 1976 report by the US Department of State stated that the “primary rationale [of the development of Arica] has been political: to attract and hold Chileans in order to secure this former Peruvian territory against any effort to regain it”. An earlier cable from 1974 shows that the US Department of State was aware of the benefits that strengthening the local population would bring; “Chile's military government is headed by a general who prides himself on being a geopolitician, and he must believe that a vacuum inside Chile cannot but attract an historical enemy”. Throughout Latin American history, state elites have been wary of indigenous communities in borderlands who they see as having a strong attachment to their locale but no

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88 Interview, Alejandro González, 18th June 2014
89 {{WikiLeaks cable|id=1975SANTIA00909_b}}
90 ibid.
attachment to the nation. Projects such as the Plan Andino are therefore more than just about bodies at the border but about *nationalistic citizen-soldier* bodies at the border. Just as indigenous communities in the 1920s were violently coerced into either declaring themselves Chilean or leaving the territory, these communities were coerced through cultural and economic means to align themselves with the Chilean nation.

The JAA was not a politically neutral entity.

Thus the JAA sought to populate the interior, or at the very least create a presence there with the establishment of public services, security agencies, and military with increased transport routes. The Plan Andino focussed on indigenous populations and aimed to improve the lives of those who lived in the interior, to prevent them from being forced to migrate to the coast or to misplace their national identity. The aforementioned projects, from seeds and machinery to credit systems and all the health and education schemes in the interior were enacted to this aim.

**Relationship with the Citizens**

Demographically and culturally Arica became unrecognisable; even though population growth was predominantly by in-migration from southern Chile the region developed a very strong sense of local identity. Rapid population growth breathed life into Arica, creating a sense of community that hadn’t previously existed. In 1954 the ‘hymn of Arica’ was written and has been sung since that date in schools, patriotic events, and other celebrations (Velez Coke & Castex Marambio 1972).

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92 *La Defensa*, 31st December 1964
HIMNO DE ARICA

Es tu lema la paz
y es tu grito libertad,
tierra señalada de inmortalidad.
Es tu Morro imponente
besado por el mar.
Símbolo de gloria, patria y lealtad.
En nuestro corazón
hay un himno vibrante para ti.
Clamor de multitud,
juramento de fe en el porvenir.
Tu noble pabellón
con las glorias de Junio se cubrió,
¡Arica! ¡Siempre Arica!
¡Siempre Arica hasta morir!

Your motto is peace
and your cry is freedom,
land designated for immortality.
It’s your imposing Morro
kissed by the sea.
Symbol of Glory, homeland and loyalty.
In our hearts
there is a vibrant anthem for you.
The roar of the crowds
pledging faith in the future.
Your noble flag
with the glories of June it covered,
Arica! Always Arica!
Always Arica to the death!

Figure 65: Hymn of Arica. La Defensa. 29th October 1968

On another cultural aspect, it became necessary to speed up the process of bringing television to Arica when there were “over one hundred televisions in Arica which exclusively received cultural, news, historical and patriotic programs from Channel 2 in Tacna [Peru]”. It was seen as so unacceptable that Peru would have this hold on contemporary culture in Arica that something had to be done to bring the technology that existed further south in Chile up to the border. The Universidad del Norte took up this challenge and obtained licences to install and use Chilean TV in Arica. This is part of a legacy of Tacna and Arica aiming to become more attractive than the other. Ever since the Treaty of Ancón was signed in 1883, these two provinces have attempted to lure in residents, initially with the hope of persuading

93 La Defensa. 14th April 1966
94 ibid.
the citizens to vote for Peruvian or Chilean sovereignty in the plebiscite and later to increase their populations and prosperity and ensure sovereignty long-term.

The JAA is revered by Ariqueños as bringing the ‘golden age’ to Arica and benefiting the lives of local citizens. Job provision was a primary way in which citizens’ lives were affected, “For some ariqueños the JAA means the ‘boom years’ for others it meant employment. The JAA began after the closure of the nitrate industry whereby many people lost their jobs, so the JAA meant a new era of industry and employment for those who had been affected”. Jobs were so plentiful that it was reportedly very unusual to see a beggar or homeless person on the streets during the JAA years. Other benefits extended to potable water, electricity, social centres, beaches, parks, and sports facilities which means that “today (especially the older populations) feel true nostalgia for the JAA, for the benefits which they received”. This can be seen nowadays through the oral histories of citizens and through documents from the time such as the following poem dedicated to the JAA.

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95 Interview, Alejandro González, 18th June 2014
96 Interview, Sebastian Rojas, 8th August 2014
97 Interview, Franco Muñoz, 30th June 2014
One function of the JAA that affected citizens everyday was the development of housing. The JAA was obliged by Law 13.039 to spend 5% of its total expenditure on low-income housing drastically improving the lives of the poorest citizens (LeBlanc 2006). The JAA always surpassed the stipulated 5% and thousands of homes were built predominantly in the areas of Juan Noé, Santa María, Lastarria, and Nueva Imperial. In 1974 housing was the largest area of investment for the JAA as shown by the planned investments below which promised 21.23% of all spending for housing.
Housing was not always just a functional way to shelter families but a way to project the JAA’s vision for the city of Arica. 1971 was known as “the year that Arica built vertically” as for the first time, with a rapidly increasing population, the JAA decided to build apartment blocks. Apartment blocks were described as “the aspiration and dream of numerous urbanites”, showing Arica to be a real modern Chilean city.99 The JAA, moving away from the traditional Andean adobe and wood that had previously defined the city built mainly with reinforced concrete with a style of architecture referred to as *brutalismo* (Galeno-Ibaceta 2013). Arica can be seen as a ‘laboratory of modernity’ that was sustained by the Puerto libre and the JAA, a small fishing village that had the potential to be transformed into a bustling metropolis on an international border.

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98 Planned 1974 expenditures. *La Defensa* 24th July 1973
99 *La Defensa*. 12th March 1971
This modern concrete metropolis was planned for every sector of society, the JAA aimed to be inclusive with statements such as “that there be light for everyone!”,
dream which was assured in March 1969 with the comprehensive ‘Electrification
Plan’, and “vast plan of works to benefit all sectors”. The JAA was nicknamed at
one point the “rich aunt” for how it had improved the lives of Ariqueños and “had
not neglected any sector and had given preference to those who needed it most”. One article summed up the impacts of the JAA writing; “Workers, professionals,
housewives, students, all arrived to an Arica which offered excellent universities…
schools… medical clinics, centres of recreation, and a high standard of living in
general in a modern and beautiful city of large parks and gardens”.

Therefore, for the citizens of Arica, the JAA created a cultural community,
brought television, built parks and gardens, and provided homes. However, despite
the nostalgia felt by citizens today, during the years of the JAA there was not universal
agreement on the role the organisation should take and how funds should be spent.

**Discontent & Criticisms**

Talking to current citizens of Arica, the JAA is remembered as perfect in every
way with no criticisms ever to be found. While the JAA was enormously successful
documentary sources suggest there were criticisms at times, some projects were
deemed ‘controversial’, and citizens did feel poorly treated or ignored on occasion.
These discontentes have been written out of history but were important at the time.
Part of using critical theoretical approaches is to question the popular narrative.

There were instances when citizens complained about the rightful spending of
JAA funds. In contrast to the earlier description of the JAA as a ‘rich aunt’ it was
declared elsewhere that the “JAA has been the poor parent in an orgy of millions of

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101 *La Defensa*. 31st December 1971
102 *La Defensa*. 19th December 1975
103 AHVD *Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA*. 297. Acuerdo 411, 1966

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dollars” as money was being squandered on useless projects.\textsuperscript{104} During the creation of Parque Brasil JAA representatives travelled to Brazil and brought back authentic Brazilian plants to adorn the park. This was seen as a wasteful luxury by some citizens who still lacked basic services and believed that that JAA should “work only for the progress and wellbeing of Arica and its inhabitants for whom the Junta de Adelanto was created”.\textsuperscript{105}

Beautification of the city was a contentious issue with the citizens of Arica, while some were calling for money to be spent solely on sanitation, housing, and other basic necessities others wanted parks and gardens to enjoy and to attract tourists. One advisor to the JAA presented a statement arguing why the beautification of the Morro would greatly benefit Arica, particularly for reasons of tourism, with greener, better-irrigated spaces.\textsuperscript{106} Even though the popular saying of Arica is, “The JAA made everything except the Morro”, even the morro was put under the guardianship of the organisation that was “initiating a program that should end with the total beautification of the Morro, as such turning it into a place of great tourist attraction and historical veneration”.\textsuperscript{107} This beautification was not an easy task in Arica, the driest city in the world, where irrigation was no small feat when Arica was in a constant “fight against the desert”.\textsuperscript{108} This shows the tension between citizens, some who argued that parks and trees were not necessary when people still lived in poverty, while others proclaimed the cultural, historical, and economic benefits of beautification.

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{La Defensa}. 30\textsuperscript{th} July 1973
\textsuperscript{105} \textit{La Defensa}. 1\textsuperscript{st} July 1961; During these trips to Brazil JAA employees were given 32,000 pesos per day, a figure which greatly upset many Ariqueños who, despite improvements in employment, were earning just a fraction of this. \textit{La Defensa}. 30\textsuperscript{th} June 1961
\textsuperscript{106} \textit{La Defensa}. 13\textsuperscript{th} July 1961
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{La Defensa}. 5\textsuperscript{th} February 1970
\textsuperscript{108} \textit{La Defensa}. 29\textsuperscript{th} October 1963
There were also complaints that the JAA was giving “huge amounts of funds to a very small number of business owners instead of helping others who are more in need”. In one case, a group of ninety families from one sector of the city, *El Esfuerzo*, formed a group to voice their grievances that the JAA was ignoring their petitions to improve their area that was becoming unsanitary due to swampy ground leading to illness in 80% of children. This suggestion of cronyism with the favouring of few business owners was exacerbated by journalists complaints regarding the JAA’s lack of freedom of information whereby certain JAA departments had never shared information publicly and all JAA sessions were held in secret.

The transformation of Arica from a small fishing town to a dynamic city came with downsides as well as positives for residents. One article declared that; “The zona franca has been a sad reality for the majority of the old Ariqueño residents”; citizens

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109 *La Defensa*. 1st September 1961
110 *La Defensa*. 6th July 1961
111 *La Defensa*. 9th May 1962
are being “displaced to the suburbs of the city” and “just want to be left alone in peace”.\textsuperscript{112} Moreover, having a prosperous port located near two international borders opened Arica up to new levels of crime. Arica arguably became the drug centre of South America as will be discussed in chapter seven and in 1961 authorities had to buy twelve new vehicles, mainly jeeps, for the sole purpose of combatting the high amounts of contraband flowing into Arica’s port.\textsuperscript{113}

Furthermore there was discontent with how the JAA changed as an organisation during its lifespan. In 1972, Antonio Weinborn who had been heavily involved in the JAA at its inception, bemoaned what the organisation had become, describing it as having been “eaten by termites”. “The termites that the JAA brings and nourishes in its bowels, are they patriots or sectarians? Have they forgotten that Arica is a border city- an island between two countries with different economies- in which only the impetus and vitality of our Junta de Adelanto can shape the pace of progress that Chile and we need?”\textsuperscript{114} Archival records therefore show the criticism faced by the JAA at the time even though this discontent is now currently absent from the popular narrative.

\textbf{Relationship with the Government}

Shifting administrative power from Santiago to a region 2000km from the capital was a bold move by the Chilean government but the “JAA [was] considered one of the most successful experiments in administrative decentralisation”.\textsuperscript{115} This entrustment was taken very seriously, as described in one article that; “From its

\textsuperscript{112} La Defensa. 24\textsuperscript{th} June 1961
\textsuperscript{113} La Defensa. 30\textsuperscript{th} October 1961
\textsuperscript{114} La Defensa. 15\textsuperscript{th} May 1972
\textsuperscript{115} La Defensa. 15\textsuperscript{th} October 1974
formation the Junta de Adelanto began to exercise a positive influence on the development of the department because the members of its advisory board took firmly the task of immediately making operative the powerful legal instrument which had been put into their hands”.\textsuperscript{116} Moreover, it was not simply that the projects that the JAA undertook were successful, virtually every type of development that occurred in Arica between 1958 and 1976 was instigated by the JAA. As one journalist put it; “It’s important to remember that 99\% of the works, activities and initiatives of progress and development in all sectors of Arica have arisen from the initiatives and support of the Junta de Adelanto, in all we can say with fairness that it is the motor neurone and heart of progress of this port of northern Chile”\textsuperscript{117}

As soon as the JAA was established it was made clear that it would run autonomously or semi-autonomously. Arica, so against the centralisation that had led to its abandonment after its incorporation into the state, actively distanced itself from the rest of Chile. As one JAA adviser stated, “local commerce must unite ourselves against the enemies in the south”.\textsuperscript{118} The spirit of autonomy was paramount and the confidence of the state in the JAA was key to its success. President Eduardo Frei declared on a visit to Arica in 1968 that “I have wanted to come here to reiterate my trust in the actions of this organisation… the Junta de Adelanto is one of the first autonomous organisations that has worked in this country based on an effective administrative decentralisation”.\textsuperscript{119}

In a similar vein, Luis Beretta Porcel, JAA President, stated that; “The autonomy of the JAA is the generator of progress” and that “the laws of exception of some years ago were not a gift but rather the necessary measurements to allow for community.

\textsuperscript{116} La Defensa. 15\textsuperscript{th} October 1968
\textsuperscript{117} La Defensa. 10\textsuperscript{th} October 1974
\textsuperscript{118} La Defensa. 6\textsuperscript{th} October 1961
\textsuperscript{119} La Defensa. 13\textsuperscript{th} December 1968
planning and to progress with adequate development”. It was also reiterated that the JAA would not be tied to any political party or stance and would act only to serve Arica. Antonio Weinborn, a JAA councillor, stated that “The JAA cannot be the political instrument of anybody... Arica is a national economic island even if centralism doesn’t understand it. And all of this without selling-out or political manoeuvring”. Elaborating on how this worked in practice, JAA employee Franco Muñoz explained that “[t]he JAA was linked to the Chilean Government through the Minister of Housing and the General Treasury... In terms of decisions about investment in infrastructure, housing and local development the JAA had a fair amount of autonomy”.

It appears that this autonomy and centralisation was not welcomed by all in Santiago with Franco Muñoz considering that, “I think the autonomy of the JAA bothered the post-Ibáñez governments (various ministers visited Arica to request financial support for projects which the government wanted)”. However despite considerable autonomy and these claims of political neutrality the JAA did not function entirely separately from the Chilean state. The President and Vice President of the board were the province’s governor and mayor and the port and railway administrators were also appointed by the government, even though these roles were more decorative than functional. Official JAA documents do however show the presence of senators and diputados at JAA sessions. The Chilean state also approved budgets and requested that certain projects were initiated such as the port, a

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120 *La Defensa*. 25th June 1974
121 *La Defensa*. 13th December 1968
122 Interview, Franco Muñoz. 30th June 2014
123 ibid.
124 For example; AHVD *Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA*. 297. Act 411, 1966
power plant in the rural interior, and stating that 5% of the budget must be used on housing.¹²⁵

Figure 70: Poster celebrating the 17th anniversary of the JAA, the ‘first experience of decentralization in Chile’. 1975. AHVD.JAA

¹²⁵ Interview. Alejandro González. 18th June 2014
Chile in the time period of the JAA, 1958-1976, experienced dramatic political upheavals; from the arrival of the world’s first democratically elected Marxist President, Salvador Allende in 1970 to the military overthrow by Augusto Pinochet in 1973. With the government of Salvador Allende, there were, according to Franco Muñoz some significant problems because Allende wished to take absolute control of government at every level and his involvement in various industries led to production problems that, therefore, led to a decrease in JAA funds. However, Allende did noticeably increase the number of JAA employees.

There were more serious problems with the advent of Pinochet’s military administration in 1973 as the new General eliminated all ‘special articles’ and ‘special laws’ (under which the JAA had been created) and used the funds for other ends. The ‘Chicago Boys’ who Pinochet had called in for economic advice told Pinochet that these articles and laws “did not contribute to the spirit of governing a country in a centralised manner and instead the funds should be distributed as the central government deems appropriate”. These changes by Pinochet led to the eventual dissolution of the JAA three years after the military coup. However, according to Alejandro González, during these three years the advent of the Pinochet dictatorship brought no changes to the everyday functioning of the JAA. No employees represented a political party and so a separation between the JAA and the government could be maintained. Through looking at archival sources the reliability of González’s claims can be doubted as Pinochet is photographed at numerous JAA meetings (Figure 71) and visiting JAA officials and projects (Figure 72) and so complete immunity from political influence is unlikely.

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126 Interview, Franco Muñoz, 30th June 2014
127 ibid.
128 Interview, Alejandro González, 18th June 2014
Thus, despite outward claims that the JAA was autonomous and the everyday running of the organisation took place in Arica, there were undeniable links to the government through decorative roles and funding stipulations. The JAA dreamt of full autonomy but this was not practical, especially in times of financial crisis when the organisation needed financial support.
Dissolution of the JAA

With all the aforementioned projects in the fields such as industry, transport, and health, the JAA appeared to be hugely successful, the citizens were delighted with the impacts on the region, despite the noted criticisms, and the region was booming. It was declared by local press in 1974 that; “Owing to the activities of the Junta de Adelanto, Arica boasts the highest levels of demographic, economic, industrial, schooling, health and per capita income growth. For these reasons and an infinite number of others, Arica is currently one of the most important tourism and industrial centres in our nation”. 129 The JAA even had impacts beyond Arica with other Chilean provinces taking great interest in the idea as well as Peruvian ministers who visited in 1962 who left “very impressed” with the JAA. 130 The United Nations visited Arica to look at the work of the JAA, German Ambassador Dr. Rudolf Salat visited Arica and was impressed by its development calling it “a faithful expression of the Chilean miracle”, and two Spanish advisors were sent by General Franco’s government to co-operate with officials in Arica on tourism plans. 131

Due to the successes of the JAA, the Pinochet government aimed to apply the strategy to the whole northern province of Tarapacá as well as the southernmost province of Magallanes. The two extremities of this long country were seen as the most in need of decentralisation and investment. 132 The JAA therefore became a model for other regional development bodies such as La Corporación de Magallanes, La Junta de Desarrollo Industrial del Bio-Bío, Malleco y Cautín, La Corporación de Desarrollo de Valparaíso y Aconcagua and la Corporación de Atacama y Coquimbo, among others (LeBlanc 2006). Alejandro González remarked that although the JAA

129 La Defensa. 15th October 1974
130 La Defensa. 4th July 1962
131 La Defensa. 7th July 1964; La Defensa. 16th August 1969; La Defensa. 22nd August 1969
132 La Defensa. 21st March 1974
served as a model for these other regions, they failed to replicate its success due to Chile’s rampant nepotism. Other development boards would elect individuals for their family ties as opposed to their experience or skills that has therefore affected their efficacy.

However, despite all this apparent success, on the 10th December 1976, the JAA was officially declared dissolved. This news came as a shocking blow to the region though prior governmental changes were rocking the stability of the JAA. Citizens were hugely disappointed at the news as the JAA had played such a significant role in the development of the community. One citizen elaborated; “Obviously everyone was sad when it ended, it was an institution which carried the city forward and when it went the city began to fall, industry left, and the city fell into the abandonment which exists until today”.

In 1974 General Pinochet, who had taken power in September 1973, stated that the JAA had fulfilled its plans in Arica and should now widen its remit to the whole province, which went far beyond the department of Arica. It was declared that “now Arica will work in close integration and interdependency with Iquique, as its current status as head city of the First Region and the resource budget will be divided virtually in half, giving each region those resources for their own plans of development”. 1974 seemed to be a year of great optimism for the JAA with successful meetings with Pinochet’s government in Santiago and many plans laid out. Jorge Dowling, governor of the province, announced in January 1975 that “I have

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133 Earlier, on the 12th January 1962 a new law had appeared, Law 14824, which aimed to establish new rules for imports and exports and had had a notable impact on port prosperity. In 1972 came the first scares that the VAT in Arica would be altered by which Arica would be forced to give all VAT collected in the department to Santiago. “For Arica it is fatal and maybe the grave for the JAA” declared the local press. La Defensa. 31st July 1972 Nevertheless Arica was riding a wave of progress and these regulations didn’t dissuade manufacturers who had moved there.

134 Interview, Vicente Díaz. 12th August 2014
135 Interview, Constanza Sepúlveda. 10th July 2014
136 La Defensa. 2nd February 1974
137 La Defensa. 28th October 1974
total confidence in the future of the JAA” and that “the Junta is a prestigious and far-reaching entity known country-wide for its fruitful labour for the benefit of this region and its inhabitants”.138 Dowling stated that the JAA would continue “even if the name is changed for legal reasons relating to the regionalisation of the country, its objectives will always remain the same and its works will continue in the same manner”.139

The truly fatal changes came as Pinochet began radically restructuring the national economy. Favouring free markets and neoliberalism, all special laws and decrees for economic development were dissolved in the belief that success should be based on competition and merit, not state-propped subsidies. Pinochet’s government, and also the preceding administrations of Salvador Allende and Eduardo Frei, relied on a body of technocrats involved in the highest-level policy decisions (Silva 1991). Pinochet employed young neoliberal technocrats trained in economics at the University of Chicago to design and execute economic policy and formulate an official ideological discourse. Disciples of Milton Freidman, the ‘Chicago Boys’ believed that a competitive free market economy would be the only effective solution to Chile’s development issues. Presented as modern and scientifically sophisticated, this economic strategy won support with detractors quickly dismissed as ignorant or pursuing covert interests.

This is not to suggest that Pinochet was the first President interested a high-tech economy, as seen through the work of the JAA Chile was concentrating on modernity throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In 1971 Allende initiated the innovative Project Cybersyn, an information based network which forecast economic models and thereby manage the Chilean economy most effectively (Medina 2011). The project allowed for a decentralised, more democratic implementation of socialism than

138 La Defensa. 30th January 1975
139 Ibid.
Soviet-style top-down systems. This experiment in technology, decades before its time, was cut short prematurely by Pinochet’s 1973 coup.

These economic changes reversed Law 13.039 and without the income from customs taxes, the JAA stopped receiving funds. Pinochet removed the high import duties that had existed in Chile, and to which Arica had been exempt, which opened up industries such as electronics and automobile manufacture to the global market, a market on which Arica could not compete. This meant that Arica, which had previously been the automobile manufacturing capital of the country had just two companies remaining by 1977. Gradually fewer and fewer parts of the manufacturing and assembly process took place in Arica until it was just the final stage; “to assemble a car in Arica only meant air [into the wheels] and water [into the radiator]”. The owner of ‘Bicicletas Oxford’, one of largest factories in Arica during the 1970’s, warned that the reason for industrial decline was the removal of financial incentives as businesses moved south to more attractive climes. The automobile and electronics industries that had been so prosperous in Arica moved south to other parts of the country after these changes to the economic model and Arica no longer held its earlier benefits. Arica was unable to compete on the worldwide free market with manufacturing locations within or outside of Chile.

To add to this loss of industry, on the 25th June 1975, Iquique was declared the capital of the province of Tarapacá, a city well-known to be one of Pinochet’s favourites, which pushed Arica back out to the margins. The final nail in Arica’s coffin was that on the 28th October 1975 Iquique was declared a ‘Zona Franca’, making it the new go-to destination for imports and cheap products in Chile. This focus on Iquique was a direct prejudice against Arica and business owners, traders, investors

140 Interview, Alejandro González, 18th June 2014
141 *La Defensa*. 1st February 1978
142 Interview with Sergio Giaconi of CORDAP. *El Mostrador*. 29th January 2014
and entrepreneurs followed the economic incentives to Arica’s rival port. Consequently, with industry failing and with Arica sandwiched between two thriving areas which benefited from heavy state investment, Iquique to the south and Peruvian Tacna to the north, the JAA was unsustainable, without income its objectives were impossible, and the organisation was dissolved at the end of 1976.

It is important to question here what Pinochet’s rationale was in decimating Arica’s economic development. He would undoubtedly have been aware of the devastating effect the dissolution of the JAA would have on the progress of the department as well as the geopolitical benefits of a prosperous and populated border region. Pinochet’s favouring of Iquique suggests that he could have continued to support Arica. Did Pinochet not value Arica as Chilean territory in comparison to Iquique? Did Pinochet fear the temptation for Peru and Bolivia of an economically healthy Arica? Was he confident that the border was safe regardless of its state of development? The following chapter will address these questions.

Jorge Dowling’s earlier claims that even if the JAA continued under a different name, the running and objectives of the organisation would remain the same turned out to be unfounded. In a speech in Arica on the 2nd December 1976, Pinochet declared that with the dissolution of the JAA all assets would be transferred to the private sector including the Hippodrome, the casino, and the swimming pool. The profits from these now privately-run facilities would be invested into development in Arica by an organisation known as SEGA (Executive Secretary of the Provincial Government of Arica). Among SEGA’s responsibilities was to manage the assets left after the dissolution of its predecessor and administer all properties for the state. SEGA was described by Alejandro González as “born dead. Stillborn because it had capital, it had all the assets of the JAA, they were selling some buildings, renting out

143 *La Defensa*. 2nd December 1976
others, they had a steady income. But it couldn’t actually do anything, it couldn’t spend the money. So SEGA lasted until 79 or 78 and then all assets were passed over to the treasury”. Another citizen, government employee Sebastian Rojas believed that “SEGA was just a step in the process of eradicating the JAA”. SEGA acted as a puppet during the difficult transitional years, proclaiming to be acting in the interests of the region but in reality being an impotent office.

The effects of the dismantling of the JAA were felt promptly and keenly. By 1978 it seemed that Arica’s golden years were already fading with local press pessimistically proclaiming: “Industry is leaving Arica and won’t return”. The dissolution of the JAA caused anxiety for residents, many had had their lives vastly improved by the JAA and it was unclear whether these benefits would remain or not. This was felt particularly acutely by the now defunct employees, one of whom stated that the way they were “treated showed ingratitude for all that we have done over so many years…[and that they have been] transferred to other jobs where the salaries are inferior to those paid by the ex Junta de Adelanto”. Current residents see December 1976 as the quick and precise end of the golden years for Arica. In the words of Alejandro González, when the JAA ended “it was a huge blow for Arica. Because when the JAA finished, Arica was paralysed, Arica died. I would even dare to say that since then it hasn’t recovered”. Alejandro González claims that the JAA did not disappear because the military government wanted it to, it was a secondary effect of modifications which were made to the economic system. Even if this secondary effect was not intentional it remains that, despite the success of Arica being

144 Interview, Alejandro González, 18th June 2014  
145 Interview, Sebastian Rojas, 8th August 2014  
146 La Defensa. 1st February 1978  
147 La Defensa. 4th January 1977  
148 Interview, Alejandro González, 18th June 2014  
149 Ibid.
directly attributed to the work of the JAA, it was government action that put an end to the region’s prosperity and progress.

**Conclusions**

Arica, after being officially incorporated into the Chilean state in 1929, was ignored by the heavily centralised government and was languishing economically and socially, much to the chagrin of the small but forceful population. The presidency of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo attempted to reverse this fate firstly through Decree 303 and the puerto libre and later in 1958 with Law 13.039 and the creation of the Junta de Adelanto de Arica. Through projects to boost industry and use these funds for social schemes such as health, education, transport, tourism and housing, Arica became synonymous with progress, modernity and prosperity. Citizens rich and poor benefited from the JAA, however schemes in the rural interior were potentially discriminatory against indigenous communities as traditional customs such as coca chewing were discouraged in favour of Chilean western-based forms of education and health. Overall the JAA was enormously popular with local citizens and many declare that it directly benefited their lives. However, although in the collective imaginary of Arica the JAA is sanctified and never faulted, looking back on documents from the duration of the JAA, there was some discontent and criticism coming from citizens.

With the advent of the Pinochet government in 1973 and a move back to centralisation and towards neoliberal free markets by the Pinochet government, the JAA became unsustainable. The organisation was unable to survive without the special laws that allowed industry to grow and for funds to remain in the region. The economy of Arica fell back into stagnation with the dissolution of the JAA, while the organisation had done wonders for the region during its existence, there was not a
firm enough productive base to keep up the momentum of industry and progress begun by the JAA. For this reason the JAA can be seen as ‘fictitious development’ as the region’s leap into modernity was temporary and could not outlast the JAA. Therefore while the JAA aimed to heal the troubled and violent past that Arica had had with economic development and while these injuries faded into the background, the perennial issues of abandonment and lack of investment remained.

The JAA was an attempt at bringing modernity to an abandoned and impoverished town, to use economic development as a tool to raise Arica out of its desperate situation, creating a unique regional identity while at the same time integrating itself into the Chilean nation. The organisation had succeeded in integrating the department of Arica more fully into Chile as well as vastly increasing its population which acted to strengthen the country’s northern border. This proved to be necessary with the political turmoil that was to arrive at the border during the 1970s.
In 1973 Chile and Peru were headed by Generals Pinochet and Velasco, military dictators and political enemies who squared off on the border, entangled in global Cold War geopolitics that disrupted Chile-Peru relations. The centenary of the 1879 War of the Pacific was approaching and the Peruvian dictator was obsessed with reclaiming northern Chile as Peruvian no matter how many lives would be lost in doing so. As the decade progressed Chile fortified its frontiers and the border city of Arica became heavily militarised. Far from the earlier attempts at economic pacification by the Junta de Adelanto de Arica, the threat of violence returned to Arica in full force. Through empirical research various narratives appear, local citizens who had no idea they were in any danger, military officials who were certain Peru would successfully capture the territory, state representatives who organised grand displays of bi-national friendship and spies who sought to deceive the enemy and find out their secrets.

These narratives tell a complex story about what the border really means for different actors, while the state was at a point of ‘almost-war’, the citizens of the
border region moved freely and lived in a spirit of friendship with their neighbours. Empirical research illustrates a picture of military posturing, deception, and a spectacle of war that permeated the military. Tensions reached an all-time high with the approach of the centenary of the War of the Pacific in 1979 but a multitude of factors meant that the threat of violence gradually dissipated. The 1970s saw overt displays of friendship, covert deception, and the configuring of where the border really lay, questioning whether Arica may have been a ‘grey zone’. International violence was returning to Arica and far from a ‘suture’ to heal the Chile-Peru border, the old wound was being dangerously picked-at and reopened under the threat of war.

The causes and effects of the military tension between Chile and Peru exist at varying scales. The issues began largely due to global geopolitical changes, notably Cold War politics driven by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This was exacerbated by national political changes in Peru and Chile both of which came to be headed by military dictators with conflicting ideological beliefs and affected those who inhabit the borderlands at the corporeal scale, their bodies shaking with fear and military manoeuvres. This chapter begins with a lengthy introduction to the geopolitical climate of the time but this is in order to better understand the violence that appeared as a result on the Chile-Peru border.

These scales can be seen through two main methods; oral histories and newspaper reports. The oral histories focus on those who were in the armed forces during the 1970s, who, with sufficient distance from the events talk with remarkable openness and honesty. One interviewee was even a former spy who, with the promise of anonymity, was happy to talk about his relationship with the military and his role in information gathering. Oral histories were also collected from civilians in order to
investigate to what extent those who had no ties to the military were aware of any possible military threat from Peru. Certain details are provided by General Odlanier Mena through secondary sources when he gave interviews before his death in 2013. Mena was the key military figure in Arica during the 1970s but was later arrested for human rights violations and was imprisoned from 2009 until his suicide. Mena’s statements are included due to his importance in the region. Newspaper reports, predominantly from the right-wing pro-military *La Defensa*, were very important in showing the everyday reporting on Chile-Peru relations.

As mentioned in the previous chapter *La Defensa* is a right-wing Arica-based newspaper that made overt statements in favour of Pinochet’s military junta; “The junta is not a soothing remedy but rather an effective drug that will take away the evil so that the illness will cease forever”.¹ However, all such reporting must be viewed critically as there was very little freedom of press during these years. Moreover, the press was kept in the dark about any rumours of war even going so far as to report on what the foreign press was reporting about tensions between Chile and Peru.² The local press in Arica distracted the citizens of the region from the problems at the border through articles about the good relations and ‘brotherliness’ between Chile and Peru. The notoriously secretive Pinochet regime never revealed official documents and so oral histories and newspapers are integral to uncovering this little-known historical event.

¹ *La Defensa*. 9th January 1974
² For example in 1974 *La Defensa* quoted a Brazilian newspaper who were reporting on the Soviet Union supplying tanks to Peru in “unknown quantity” in an act of “the Soviets installing an armaments agency in Latin America”. *La Defensa*. 21st March 1974
The tensions that were to emerge on the Chile-Peru border during the 1970s were heavily embedded in global Cold War geopolitics. The late 1960s and early 1970s in Latin America can be crudely characterised by a leaning towards either the Soviet Union or the capitalist United States. These rival powers appealed to Latin American governments through economic claims, each offering a better future than the other. The US and USSR competed for favour in the Third World with the former showing that liberal capitalism can bring wealth and political stability while the latter aimed to prove that state-directed socialism could bring about economic equity and social justice (Brands 2012).

The work of Guillermo O’Donnell (1973) has argued that South American military regimes existed to advance US global capitalism and eradicate left-wing politics on the continent. However these regimes were not tools at the disposal of Washington, dictators had their own ideas and strategies. It is posited here that events in Chile were driven by these global factors but that Chile was not passive, the nation also managed to have worldwide influence. Chile, which felt its first effects of the Cold War in 1947, has been described as a “Cold War battleground”, a space where global superpowers were fighting for ideological hegemony but where Chile was also able to be a viable actor in the global balance of power itself as this chapter will argue (Rinke 2013). Moreover, the Cold War superpowers undoubtedly shaped world affairs but most citizens experienced the Cold War through the behaviour of their own governments as opposed to through global affairs.

The most notable episode of Cold War geopolitics affecting Chile was the United States’ involvement in Chilean politics. The United States has been involved in Chilean affairs, whether overtly or covertly since the War of the Pacific when the US

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3 Memoria Chilena, Biblioteca Nacional de Chile [http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-3460.html]
attempted to bring the war to an end in order to protect US business interests in the region and prevent Britain gaining more economic control (Clayton 1999). US influence may even have begun earlier during Chile’s fight for independence from Spain in 1811. Throughout the history of the Chile-Peru border, the United States is always in the background. The US government and in particular the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been actively engaged with Chilean political parties since the Second World War and “…had had a presence in Chilean politics dating back to before 1940” but became increasingly involved with the ascent of Marxism and Communism in the 1960s (Fermandois 1998:6). All political parties in Chile, from the 1930s until the 1980s at some point favoured US involvement but, far from a homogenous leaning to the US, Fermandois has argued that most political parties had also been involved with the USSR at some point.

Dr Salvador Allende, when he was elected President of Chile in 1970 with Unidad Popular (UP or Popular Unity), believed that the USSR would support Chile in breaking its political and economic dependence on the US (Nogee & Sloan 1979). However, although the Soviets were in favour of engaging in mutually beneficial projects with Chile, they did not want to take political, military, or economic risks in order to aid another country towards socialism. The Soviets were glad that Allende had taken power but would not commit themselves to aiding the survival of Popular Unity. The USSR had little real influence on policy in Chile but Chilean communists did become increasingly interested in Moscow. Many travelled or studied there, and between 1945 and 1975, roughly 2,000 army and nearly 400 navy officers received postgraduate training in the USSR (Bawden 2009). Fermandois has stated that “the local communists developed a high degree of faith in Moscow, and the fixation on the Soviet model and the orthodox Marxism acted as a heavy ballast in the national
political game” (1998:20). Latin America was never a high priority for the USSR, it didn’t rely on the continent for raw materials or foodstuffs, nor did Chile need goods from the USSR (Nogee & Sloan 1979). Therefore, the USSR was only really interested in creating problems for the US, they were willing to provide some resources to the communists and they offered loans to the army, but they were not prepared to subsidise the Chilean economy as they had done with Cuba. Particularly after 1970, the USSR became increasingly focussed on détente with the US and involvement with Allende’s socialist regime could have seriously compromised this aim.

When Salvador Allende became the world’s first democratically elected Marxist President in 1970 the US dropped its official aid to the government and vastly increased its unofficial aid to centre and right-wing political parties and businesses due to the fact that the State Department described Allende as “a threat to the entire Hemisphere”.4 Pre-Allende the US invested huge sums of money into Chile with the unofficial figures predicted to be far higher (Nogee & Sloan 1979). By 1970, the United States had invested $1.1 billion in Chile out of an estimated total foreign investment in Chile of $1.7 billion (Nogee & Sloan 1979:346).

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<tr>
<th>Fiscal Years</th>
<th>Total US Economic Aid to Chile (Millions of US$)</th>
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<td>1953-1961</td>
<td>339.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
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This support ended once Allende took power but the new Chilean president faced more than just a lack of support, he was actively victimised by the US. The 1975 Church Commission Report that was organised to investigate troubling reports of illegal activity conducted by the CIA, NSA, and FBI and found that covert US involvement in Chile during Allende’s presidency was extensive and continuous. US President Richard Nixon persecuted the Allende government by disrupting the Chilean’s plans to nationalise several US corporations and the copper industry and directed that no new bilateral economic aid commitments could be undertaken with Chile. Nixon was adamant he didn’t want Chile to become ‘another Cuba’ due to the worldwide influence it could have thanks to its geography. Chile’s location could have given it influence into the heart of South America but also well into the Pacific due to its extensive coastline.

The CIA which was established in 1946 (and its predecessor the OSS) used militaristic techniques abroad in order to shape world politics in favour of the US.

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3 U.S. Senate, 1975: 34
7 The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the CIA’s predecessor and was established during wartime from 1942 until 1945 and carried out espionage and propaganda for the US armed forces. American geographers were some of the key players in the OSS with roles in administration, writing regional reports and in cartography with the OSS being the single most important government institution employing American geographers during the war. Barnes (2006)
namely by eradicating communism. By 1954 the CIA had become an integral part of American foreign policy and therefore by 1970 the organisation had extensive knowledge and experience of operations in Latin America. The CIA directly financed the Chilean newspaper *El Mercurio* owned by Agustin Edwards, the grandson of the Agustin Edwards who was the Chilean Member of the 1925-1926 Plebiscitary Commission (Kornbluh 2003). Edwards played a large role in Chile-US relations, lobbying US officials to help prevent Allende’s rise pre-1970 and encouraged US President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in their support of military action against Allende once he was elected. This is one example of how Chile was not a passive ‘pawn’ in the Cold War but an active player.

Post-1970, Nixon’s administration acted to “make the Chilean economy ‘scream’… spread “black” propaganda, and Washington finally goaded the Chilean army into the coup of 1973” (Kornbluh 1998). Declassified memos illustrate the US’s vehemently anti-Allende stance such as when “On Sept. 16, CIA director Richard Helms informed his senior covert action staff that “President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile was not acceptable to the United States”’” (Kornbluh 1998). The US was threatened by the problems occurring in its own ‘backyard’ where their prestige and interests were being affected materially. The manner in which Nixon acted in Chile has been described as disproportionate and inappropriate due to the lack of evidence that the USSR was abetting Allende’s Marxist administration “the nature of the Soviet-Chilean relationship could hardly justify U.S. policies toward Allende’s Chile” (Domínguez 1999:10).

The extent of the CIA’s involvement in the events of September 11th 1973 when the military junta headed by General Pinochet Ugarte took control of the country has been well documented, especially since the Clinton administration declassified

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8 Trevor Barnes has documented how this occurred in Europe. Barnes (1981); Barnes (1982)
However, it must be emphasised that the US did not create the Pinochet government or its neoliberal policies, in fact the US failed more than it succeeded; Allende was never meant to take power in the first place. The State Department had attempted and failed to have congress choose presidential candidate Jorge Alessandri instead of Allende despite the public vote.\(^9\) The US aided Pinochet and the Chilean military but that is not to say that Chileans were the docile puppets of Nixon. Moreover, Allende’s government did not fall solely due to the “not-so-covert machinations of the Nixon administration”; its own failings played a significant part (Brands 2012:4). The brutality of the ensuing Pinochet administration should not lead to the uncritical adulation of Allende in comparison.

General Pinochet was an admirer of the United States describing it as “a young country of great economic potential, [which] is capable of exercising an indirect political-economic control over large areas of the world…Every day there appear new zones that feel the impact of this great State’s power” (Pinochet Ugarte 1981:61). However, against Pinochet’s wishes, US-Chile relations did shift again throughout the 1970s as Pinochet’s human rights violations and the now-confirmed murders of thousands of Chilean citizens and the torture of many more made open US support of the military dictatorship problematic.\(^10\)

For instance, in October 1974 the United States Senate voted in favour of stopping all military support to Chile, set an arms embargo in 1975, and the Carter Administration (1977-1981) in particular distanced itself from Chile.\(^11\) In 1976 a meeting took place between Pinochet, the Chilean foreign minister, and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (Bawden 2012). Pinochet tested the waters as to whether

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\(^10\) As outlined by the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación or the “Rettig Commission”) between 1990-1991 which was established to investigate human rights abuses that occurred during the Pinochet regime.

\(^11\) La Concordia de Arica. 2nd October 1974
Chile could rely on the support of the US if war was to break out with Peru and Kissinger’s non-committal response was a forewarning for the Chilean General who had previously been supported by the US. The perceived abandonment of Chile by the US angered Chileans. One article in the Arica press warned that the US “turning its back on this small but exemplary country” is “playing with fire” and later “they will complain of Marxist penetration”. The article decried that the US “has an obligation to support the first country to achieve freedom from tyranny” although adding that “it is not to criticize, but to regret the possible consequences that may come as a result… at a time when the Marxist battle flags are waving everywhere”. The length of Chile, including Arica, was aware of US influence.

In terms of Peru’s relationship with the Cold War superpowers, Chile’s northern neighbour was much more involved with the USSR than Allende had been. Peru has had close relations with the USSR from 1969, with only Nicaragua and Cuba having closer relations. General Juan Velasco Alvarado’s administration (1968-1975) rejected both capitalism and communism in favour of a nationalistic and non-aligned foreign policy, he was keen to escape foreign domination and US influence in the country. The CIA had been present in Peru since the mid-1960s when they set up military training camps and provided arms to the Peruvian government to combat guerilla forces. Velasco refused to accept this and expelled US military advisers, removed the Peace Corps presence, and nationalised US businesses but his links with the USSR remained based in mutual interest and financial benefits rather than Cuba-style involvement.

Peru-USSR relations became closer with the government of General Francisco Morales Bermúdez (1975-1980) who deposed Velasco and who engaged in more trade with the USSR than any other Peruvian president. Much of this trade was in

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12 La Concordia de Arica. 5th October 1974
military equipment that was instigated by Peru, and the USSR responded favourably by offering low prices and generous credit terms (Berrios & Blasier 1991). In the mid-1970s, one-fifth of arms being imported to Latin America were destined for Peru, with half of Peru’s arms imports originating from the USSR.

When Velasco in Peru had closer ties to the USSR than Allende ever did, why did the US become actively involved in overthrowing Allende whereas they favoured the path of negotiation in Peru? One reason may be because the Peruvian dictators never seized power on communist ideology whereas Allende was outspoken about his politics and was elected democratically, with a substantial number of voters behind him. The CIA believed that the USSR and Peru had close military ties but that Peru remained at a pragmatic distance, shown by the fact that it purchased military equipment from France and the US as well as from Moscow and that the Peruvian navy tended to be more anti-communist and so kept a detachment from the Soviets, preferring to buy weaponry from Europe and the US. The Peruvian military claimed that a populist movement away from both communism and capitalism was the only way to prevent a Castro-style revolution. Chile was therefore seen as a threat that required direct US intervention whereas Peru could be reasoned with and so its considerable ties with the USSR were tolerated.

**Pinochet & Velasco: Ideological Enemies Face Off**

The governments of Marxist Allende in Chile and left-wing dictator Velasco in Peru were civil during their period of overlap, 1970-1973. Both were focusing on agrarian reform, the nationalisation of resources, and the control of business. Allende

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13 Although notably not a majority, On 4 September 1970, Allende obtained a narrow plurality of 36.2% 
recognised that although they had taken power differently, the Chilean through
democratic means and Velasco through a military coup, both were “leading their
people to the great avenues of authentic democracy and freedom” (Rodríguez
Elizondo 2004:559). This sense of unity between the two countries even meant that
when the United States threatened Allende with the embargo of Chilean copper,
Velasco offered to pass Chilean shipments off as Peruvian (Castillo & Zarzuzi 2005).
Allende, being fervently against North American imperialism was keen to maintain
good border relations in order to keep the US from meddling in South American
affairs. Both nations had signed the Andean Pact of 1969 along with Bolivia,
Colombia, and Ecuador that aimed to give a strong base of economic and political
power free from control by the US.15 Peruvian historian Hernán Rodríguez who lived
in Tacna throughout the period of tension remembered how Peruvian press was
favourable toward Allende with positive reporting of political events in the southern
neighbouring country.16

However, relations between Peru and Chile were transformed overnight when
Pinochet overthrew Allende’s government in Chile. The tensions on the border began
on the day of the military coup in Chile; the border was closed and an arms race
began. The appearance of the fervently anti-communist right in Chile caused the
Soviet Union to intensify ties with Peru and over the following six years sold 250 tanks
and 36 supersonic bombers to Velasco financed by loans at a low interest rate
(Meneses 1982). Since Velasco seized power in 1968, military strength became a key
priority for Peru and in 1969 Peru bought planes from France, the first Latin
American country to buy such sophisticated weaponry. Chile in contrast was weak

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16 Interview, Hernán Rodríguez. 31st July 2014
militarily with its equipment languishing in poor condition. However, Peru was claiming that Chile ‘started it’ by being the first to buy weapons; “We are not going to wait around with our hands in our pockets,” proclaimed Velasco in 1974, “while our neighbors make their purchases of equipment.” Peru’s military spending, which was concentrated between 1974 and 1977, soon became disproportionate to its economy, between 1968 and 1977 Peru’s per capita GNP rose only 40 percent, yet per capita military expenditures increased by over 80 percent (St. John 1992).

Figure 73: General Pinochet and General Velasco. La Defensa. 5th February 1975/La Defensa. 5th February 1974

Pinochet and Velasco were ideological enemies and the friendly relationship between Chile and Peru could not remain. These differences in ideology between the dictators led to increased tensions at the Chile-Peru border. Chile withdrew its relations with other Latin American countries by exiting the Andean Pact and severing relations with Cuba worried about the island nation’s growing influence on

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17 Chile had sourced military equipment from a variety of countries including the US, Great Britain, Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, Austria and Spain.

18 ‘U.S. Reports Arms Buildup in Chile, Peru’. Los Angeles Times 17th January 1974
the continent. Seeing the “growing influence of the USSR” in Peru, the junta reversed Allende’s policy of building ties with Lima, and relations between the two countries soon deteriorated into talk of war (Brands 2012:157). Velasco no longer had reason to maintain friendly relations with Chile and Pinochet’s administration had roots in geopolitical theories of lebensraum and territorial space as a signifier of a healthy state.

The Chilean army had been historically moulded in the tradition of the Prussians in terms of aesthetics but also hierarchy, discipline, and theory. Geopolitical strategy and theory was central to this ‘Prussianisation’ (Bawden 2012). Pinochet and navy commander José Toribio Merino Castro, the two most influential members of the 1973-1990 military government were both highly influenced by German geopolitical ideas that posited the state as a living organism striving to survive. Pinochet taught geopolitics and published books such as Síntesis Geográfica de Chile, Argentina, Bolivia y Perú (1953), Geografía Militar (1957) and Geopolítica (1968), which illustrated his theories of geopolitics as a scientific explanation of the lifecycles of states and how states can be reordered to augment ‘national power’. Pinochet believed that his 1973 coup was a necessary part of Chile’s lifecycle of renewal and regeneration in the tradition of Ratzel’s ideas about the state as a living organism. Chilean professors in the military academy would use the metaphor of Chile as a body, with the central valley surrounding the capital being the heart, Santiago the brain, and the border zones as extremities in need of extra protection (Bawden 2009). Industry was the driving force of this body as the two World Wars had shown how important a strong industry was for sustaining long periods of war which led Chilean military strategists to encourage the strengthening of industry in Pinochet’s Chile as Argentina and Peru, Chile’s most likely enemies, had both larger economies and populations.
The National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation has made public the brutal violence of Pinochet’s dictatorship whose project to rid Chile of the ‘bad Chileans’, the Marxists and Communists, is now well known. Pinochet’s pacification strategy meant the subjugation of leftists through military force in order to create a politically homogenous nation under his ideals. This violence was fed by Chilean machismo as Pinochet defined the nation as a family consisting of La patria/la mujer (the female nation), el ejercito (the male army), and their offspring, the Chilean youth. Pinochet posited himself as the generous, benevolent, and strong father of this nation-family. Under Pinochet Chile was a heterosexual, traditional nation led by the army and the ruling administration was fuelled by machismo in order to protect the nation from the menace of outside threats. Pinochet embodied the supreme stereotype of Latin machismo. He was the authoritarian and all-powerful man who guaranteed stability and security at the price of liberty and human rights. His wife Lucía openly encouraged women to take a secondary role in support of their husbands. Women were severely oppressed by the state during these decades with violent sexual crimes rampant. Protecting the nation using control and oppression both within and without the state borders therefore became a key way to protect Chilean masculinity and violence would be readily employed to uphold this. This was not solely Pinochet perpetuating machismo through violence; he made the entire nation-state complicit.

*Trouble Arrives in Arica*

11th September 1973, the confluence of the opposing ideologies of Pinochet and Velasco had direct impacts on the border separating the dictators. The leaders in Santiago and Lima, two capitals located so far from the border joining the enemies, brought their politics to the previously marginalised extreme zones of Arica and
Tacna. Political beliefs promulgated by technocrats needed to be spatially located and so the physical border became the meeting point between the neoliberal Chilean and the left-wing revolutionary. Echoing the events of the 1920s in Tacna-Arica, once again the border became the symbolic centre for both nations where nationalist ideals could be celebrated and fought for.

The day of Pinochet’s coup was seen as a point of extremely high tension at the border by General Odlanier Mena, the official in charge of protecting Arica in the 1970s. The 11th “was an extremely delicate moment, because we were on the brink of war, where Peru was armed as never before in its history and General Velasco Alvarado had clearly stated to his people that he wanted to act on his aspirations... that aspiration was the city of Arica”. Peruvian revanchism permeated the nation-state, all Peruvians knew the history of Tacna-Arica and refused to accept that Arica would remain in Chilean hands.

The rise of Pinochet became the ideal time to act on this revanchism. Hernán Rodríguez explained that Velasco saw Pinochet’s coup as a moment whereby the border would be weaker; “Chile was a country divided in half, those who supported Popular Unity and those on the right so it was the perfect moment for Peru to attack and to recover the territories taken a century earlier”. The international border with Peru was immediately closed and “invasion was imminent. Peru had transported 400 tanks south from Arequipa”. Arica was vulnerable due to the lack of human capital at the border, the US Secretary of State warned in 1974 of that dangers of leaving the extreme north of Chile depopulated and so without a large population, Arica needed to be militarised against the northern enemy.

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19 ‘Las memorias del general (R) Odlanier Mena: Ex jefe de la CNI escribe un libro con su historia.’ La Segunda. 22nd September 2012
20 Interview, Hernán Rodríguez. 31st July 2014
21 Interview with General Odlanier Mena. La Estrella de Arica. 19th March 2006
22 {{WikiLeaks cable|id=1975SANTI00909_b}}
General Odlanier Mena, a key actor in the almost-war of the 1970s was directly in charge of the military forces on Chile’s northern border. He arrived at the Rancagua Regiment in Arica on the 9th January 1973 and in his words, “the mission I was given was to defend the territory against a massive armoured invasion by Peru, which could occur at any time”.

Unlike other officials in the military government who wanted conflict, Mena strived for peace at the border and his later displays of friendship proved crucial to upholding this aim, “I directed my efforts all day and often at night, fixating myself of the missions of trying to avoid war to the extent that I could. My mission was to defend Arica for seven days, at least. And I wasn’t sure that I would be able to do so for two days, due to the disproportion [in military strength]”.

The Chilean military was not a homogenous mass, while some officials certainly wanted to invade Peru before they could strike to take the upper hand, namely General Forrestier in Iquique, others such as Mena viewed war as unnecessary and costly. With Mena’s attempts to hold the border, the city of Arica became imbued with military life;

Arica as a city, it’s terrible to say, is a very important anti-tank obstacle. We made uniforms so that the school children were dressed like War of the Pacific soldiers and carried items and had first aid training, because we were thinking of a real war. If we lost Arica, we would never recover it, so we wanted to make sure it never happened. There were artillery sites in schoolyards and the public was informed to the necessary extent of where they had to go and what they had to do. The military families, around the Rancagua Regiment were evacuated to the rural interior more than once, because the regiment would be the target of Peruvian air attacks... But I

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23 Interview with General Odlanier Mena. *La Estrella de Arica*. 19th March 2006
24 For example General Forestier who was based in Iquique didn’t want to end his military career without a war under his belt. Interview with Tomás Morales. 23rd July 2014; Interview with General Odlanier Mena. *La Estrella de Arica*. 19th March 2006
had to prepare for war in spite of everything, because I was in charge of the border and I couldn’t neglect the defences.25

Arica was therefore immediately transformed under Pinochet’s government and Mena’s command, the usually fluid border crossings between Arica and Tacna were immobilised and the city became a space of questionable security. The Pinochet regime resulted in a ‘state of exception’ whereby previous norms and rules did not apply (Klein 2008). To create order in a disordered zone, Mena designed a plan of national unity to fortify civil cohesion, reinforcing patriotism and close civil-military collaboration.26 From the 1920s the attempted plebiscite and later the JAA worked to create order in Arica in terms of a shared national identity, this was continued into the 1970s but with a heightened edge, unity and civilian strength were necessary to protect Arica against the Peruvians.

Politics in the city were complex. Mena claimed that he “…had excellent relations with the socialist governor Mr. Rubilar, and communist Mayor, Mrs Maria Elena Diaz... She was great, she helped me with the construction of the Museo El

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25 Ibid.
26 Interview with General Odlanier Mena. La Estrella de Arica. 19th March 2006
Arica was not a homogenous military space but was comprised of multiple actors and viewpoints probably because “…the contra-Allende faction in Arica was quite small, likely due to the established leftist consciousness and practices in the city” (Chovanec 2009:23). Mena, keen on avoiding war at the border employed tact and diplomacy in managing right-wing militarism in a largely left-wing city. Chilean rule in Arica was under threat from outside but also inside, Chile needed to assert its authority at the border where there were young Chilean socialists who actively wanted Peru to invade because they preferred to be Peruvian than to live under a dictatorship. That’s not to say the Pinochet didn’t have supporters in Arica. He often received a warm welcome when he visited the region and continues to have supporters there today.

**Securing the Border through Strength and Deception**

The mid 1970s saw Pinochet travel to Arica many times, a trend that decreased noticeably once relations with Peru improved. The greater the threat from Peru at the border, the more involved Pinochet became. On the 31\(^{st}\) January 1974, General Pinochet, accompanied by other officials, travelled to Arica to meet with local citizens and the municipality to learn about Arica’s specific needs and requirements. During the visit Pinochet held meetings with workers and women to discuss future plans for Arica. Pinochet’s third presidential visit to Arica on the 6\(^{th}\) June 1974 was declared to be “a demonstration that [Pinochet] has a lot of affection and appreciation for the city of Arica” which was reasoned to be because he had spent a significant part of his

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27 ‘Las memorias del general (R) Odlanier Mena: Ex jefe de la CNI escribe un libro con su historia.’ *La Segunda.* 22\(^{nd}\) September 2012
28 Interview, Hernán Rodríguez. 31\(^{st}\) July 2014
29 *La Defensa* 28\(^{th}\) January 1974
30 *La Defensa.* 31\(^{st}\) January 1974
military career in the province.\textsuperscript{31} During the visit, Pinochet spoke from the top of the Morro, the geographic point where on the 7\textsuperscript{th} June 1880 Chile successfully captured Arica from Peruvian control. This week, known as the ‘week of Arica’ is celebrated every year with great fervour with battle re-enactments, dances, parades and a fair. Pinochet took another trip to Arica on the 6\textsuperscript{th} February 1975, the city had been decked out in flags and triumphant arches, pasted with the phrase ‘Welcome President’.\textsuperscript{32} Other subsequent trips taken by Pinochet, often accompanied by ministers, variously “revitalized the hopes of Arica”, allowed Pinochet to visit military bases and construction projects, visit a military base in Putre in the interior, and to visit public works and Putre.\textsuperscript{33} The frequency and timing of these visits illustrate the waxing and waning of the geopolitical significance of Arica in direct relation to potential conflict with Peru. The Chilean government had been almost blinkered to Arica until Chilean sovereignty was threatened.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Arica.jpg}
\caption{Arica decked out for the arrival of President General Pinochet, 6\textsuperscript{th} February 1975. \textit{La Defensa}. 5th February 1975}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{La Defensa}. 1\textsuperscript{st} June 1974; \textit{La Defensa}. 6\textsuperscript{th} June 1974
\textsuperscript{32} \textit{La Defensa}. 5\textsuperscript{th} February 1975; \textit{La Defensa}. 6\textsuperscript{th} February 1975
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{La Defensa}. 2\textsuperscript{nd} December 1976; \textit{La Defensa}. 10\textsuperscript{th} February 1976; \textit{La Defensa}. 29\textsuperscript{th} December 1977; \textit{La Defensa}. 27\textsuperscript{th} January 1979
The concerns on the part of the Chilean military were based in military strength, namely the weakness of the Chileans in respect to the Peruvians and the readiness
that the Peruvians were displaying. Chile was more industrialised, urbanised, and
with a growing middle class but Peru was ruled by the agro-exporting elites and the
military (Rock 1994). When Pinochet took power, Peru’s military force exceeded that
of Chile and so the latter was forced into a game of posturing and deception in an
effort to appear larger and stronger than its northern neighbour. The Chileans
struggled to arm themselves with modern weapons in the way that Peru had due to
the arms embargoes imposed on Pinochet by the US and Britain. The Chilean
regime therefore looked abroad for examples of successful examples they could
emulate from Israel’s 1967 victory against a coalition of Arab states to the 1965 Indo-
Pakistan war (Bawden 2012). Chile related such examples to their own terrain,
equipment, and military strategies.

As one interviewee stated, “Peru did not need to cheat, they had the strength,
three to four times that of the Chileans” but they would demonstrate their strength by
“taking their tanks and cannons to the border and shooting… Peru from the other
side would shoot cannons all night, saying they were doing exercises but it was to
show what they had”.34 Peru was engaging in a spectacle of war in a tangible fashion,
literally shaking the earth with their power, the Chileans could feel and hear
manifestations of strength. Another citizen remembered how “[t]here was always the
latent possibility of war, so of course there was fear. Chile had a clear military
disadvantage. And you could see [Peruvian] tanks on the hills in front of you”.35 In
August 1974 there were rumours that Peru was stationing their Russian-bought tanks
at the port of Ilo, 100km from the border with Chile. Chile shrugged off these

34 Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014
35 Interview, Nicolás Soto, 31st May 2014
rumours but press assured citizens that “Chile is ready for any scenario, as is the duty of the armed forces”.

A January 1977 article by TIME entitled ‘Girding for a bloody anniversary’ compared the respective military capabilities of Chile and Peru and declared that Peru had the advantage and would be able to take 50 kilometres of Chilean territory in a rapid attack yet strategists declared that Chileans would be the better fighters.

On one side of the frontier, the Peruvians have been moving troops, Soviet-built T55 tanks and American-made armored personnel carriers into burgeoning military bases in the southern border provinces. On the other side, the Chileans, bracing for a possible invasion, are mining the desert, implanting tank traps and building fortifications… If war broke out, Peru’s armor and modern planes would probably blitz about 25 miles into the Atacama. But the Chileans, regarded by some military men as the better fighters and tacticians, might be able to regroup and eventually push back the Peruvians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chilean Military Expenditure 1972-1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of armed forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Spending, millions of US Dollars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36 La Defensa. 28th August 1974
37 La Defensa. 4th January 1977
38 Time Magazine. 10th January 1977. ‘Latin America: Girding for a Bloody Anniversary’
39 Muñoz (1982)
## Military Balance, Chile-Peru 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Chile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army Personnel</strong></td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>53,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy Personnel</strong></td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>20,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force Personnel</strong></td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>15,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tanks</strong></td>
<td>466</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Armored Vehicles</strong></td>
<td>475</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Field Artillery</strong></td>
<td>419</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Naval Combatants</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Submarines</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Combat Aircraft</strong></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Helicopters</strong></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Figure 78: Photo of Peru’s Soviet-made tanks. *Time Magazine*. 10th January 1977. ‘Latin America: Girding for a Bloody Anniversary’

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In the face of this clear Peruvian strength, one way in which Chile attempted to appear more threatening was to play into the Cold War race for power, claiming that Chile had the full backing of the US. Pablo Martínez, an interviewee who was a soldier at the time reported how the Chilean army “lied to the Peruvians, they said that Chile was full of Americans, that the Americans supported us. The Peruvians are very naïve and many believed them”.\(^{41}\) Wikileaks cables of 1974 suggest that Peru was to some extent taken in by Chile’s claims of US backing as Peru was interested in US naval capacities stationed in South America as part of UNITAS sea exercises.\(^{42}\) The Chilean navy believed that Peru would attack Arica by sea and for this reason Peru was scouting out its opposition, not knowing for certain whether the US would support Chile in military conflict or not. This was backed up by false radio communication by the Chileans to trick the Peruvians into believing that the Chilean military was speaking to Americans. The Chileans “had a guy who spoke very good English, so in these times he would speak on the radio… as if he were an American and making things up, and it was all a lie”.\(^{43}\) The difference here is that while Chile had to lie about US support, Peru truly was receiving support from the USSR in the form of military equipment; they “sold Peru all the armaments they needed”.\(^{44}\)

The Chilean’s also used spying as a military tactic, Pablo Martínez whose work in the 1970s entailed trips abroad to Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina was employed by the military to bring back information which could give Chile an advantage if war came. The interviewee, who had experience flying planes was also asked to fly to foreign locations when he had legitimate reasons to travel abroad for work but to take detours and record information about military bases and so on, a request he refused.

\(^{41}\) Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014
\(^{42}\) {{WikiLeaks cable|id=1974CARACA12018_b}} (Cable codes used to search for records within the Wikileaks database) UNITAS are sea exercises and in-port training involving several countries in North, South and Central America, conducted by the USA since 1959 in support of the US policy.
\(^{43}\) Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014
\(^{44}\) Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014
Another interviewee, Nicolás Soto, who was in the armed forces during the 1970s claimed that “Of course both Chile and Peru had spies, but spying was more of a Peruvian practice, to have many Chileans under surveillance”. Both sides were playing a game of deception at the border. Intelligence became the most valuable resource in the battle to uncover the strategy and military strength of the enemy and so fooling the other side and infiltrating their ranks became necessary.

Arica therefore became imbued with espionage during the 1970s. As Sam Goodman (2015) has argued, spying tends to be an urban phenomenon, spies move comfortably and surreptitiously in urban environs. Espionage in popular culture takes place in cities such as Vienna, Berlin, and London; the urban is an arena for clandestine activities. Tangier, Morocco is another city long associated with espionage with its reputation as a safe house for international spying activities as during the Cold War it was a space of political neutrality and commercial liberty. Arica can be seen as a smaller version of these large and mainly capital cities where both Chileans and Peruvians were seeking to gather as much information as possible in order to gain the upper hand.

As well as espionage, in order to appear larger and stronger to the Peruvians, the Chilean military employed other strategies. One now legendary example was that the military would buy many cheap Citroën cars which were manufactured in Arica during the JAA years, paint them camouflage and add barrels on top to make them look like tanks from afar. The Chileans also constructed a fake airport in Zapahuira which one interviewee claims still exists today as well as wooden planes so that the Peruvians would believe that the Chileans posed a substantial military threat. The Chileans were constructing a ‘spectacle of war’ in a covert manner, this was not

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45 Interview, Nicolás Soto, 31st May 2014
46 Interview, Tomás Morales. 23rd July 2014
47 Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014
posturing for the view of all and certainly not for the Chilean civilians, the audience remained confined to the Chilean military and to any Peruvians engaging in surveillance. Far from Peru and their unleashing of military power, Chile was forced to leave clues for the Peruvians, to create military traces in the desert.

This use of camouflage and deception has roots in other military nations. The British Army had been convinced of the need to blend more seamlessly into battle surroundings during the Indian Mutiny in 1857 and the South African War 1899-1902 but it was during World War I that the British really began to experiment with camouflage (Rankin 2008). They had previously felt unfavourably towards methods to trick the enemy, preferring to rely on superior physical strength and endurance. However, as technology improved, British attitudes towards deception softened. During World War II, strategies to mislead the enemy, to make them believe one thing was happening when in fact the opposite was true, became increasingly ingenious and experimented with (Rankin 2008).

Camouflage in the desert in World War II saw the British challenged by the open smooth plane of the desert, with sand which constantly shifted, they were forced to hide verticality in cunning ways (Forsyth 2014). However, in the 1970s the Chileans wanted Peru to see their military equipment, or false representations of it. The Chileans were using the open plain of the Atacama as the perfect display board for these wooden airports and tanks made out of cars. The aim was not disguise, but exposure. This tactic had been earlier employed by the British who used deception, not concealment to fool the enemy (Rankin 2008). The British in WWII used dummies in the desert that required careful construction to “appear lively, yet not too overt and visible from the aerial view. In other words, the enemy still had to think that some effort had been made to camouflage and hide; if the dummy was too starkly
visible the enemy would most likely ‘smell a rat’” (Forsyth 2012:237). Likewise, the Chileans had to camouflage their fakery just enough to look real but still to be seen by Peruvian eyes. Together with espionage, Arica became a city of pretence, of subterfuge through deception, the city needed to appear as something it wasn’t; a militarily strong, war-ready city.

*Where Was the Border?*

The military strategy of the Pinochet administration raises questions over where the border really lay. While the official international border followed the boundary set by the 1929 Treaty of Lima, it can be posited that Arica was a ‘grey area’, a frontier zone of questionable security as opposed to a well-defended military line. There are many theories that the ‘true border’, the border that the Chilean military would actually protect in case of military conflict was at Camarones, 80km south of Arica. Oral histories provide statements such as “they began to defend the country from Camarones”, “the border really lay at Camarones”, and “since the 40s, the strategic idea for the area was designated as an open city and to retreat to Camarones, defending it from there”.48 One journalist described the situation as, “[f]aced with a war scenario in the north, parallel with Argentina, Pinochet designed a geopolitical strategy where Arica was lost and Chile retreated to Camarones. And there was the great dismantling of Arica and everything was moved to Iquique”.49

Similarly, Senator Alejandro Guillier Álvarez pronounced Arica in the 1970s as a ‘zone of sacrifice’ so the Chileans “took the border down to Iquique, we would have lost Arica in the first days of battle, so they made Iquique the centre of everything and

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48 Interview, Eduardo Hoyos, 18th June 2014; Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014; ‘Las memorias del general [R] Odlanier Mena: Ex jefe de la CNI escribe un libro con su historia.’ *La Segunda.*
Arica has remained abandoned and it still is today”.\footnote{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N6q00SGRN-M} Arica was soon becoming a no-man’s land yet at the same time territory that was filled with bodies; an impossible situation if war came. Interviewee Sebastian Rojas saw this as due to Pinochet’s geopolitical strategy, that it was not worth wasting resources defending an area that was so vulnerable to Peru, “Arica was just seen as an instrument of war”.\footnote{Interview, Sebastian Rojas. 8\textsuperscript{th} August 2014} Arica was too difficult to hold, so close to the Peruvian border, and so the city would be lost and Chile would attempt to regain control later. As one interviewee stated:

Arica at this time was like a fuse to Chile, it was thought that it would be taken by Peru in the early days of the conflict but that we would recover it within a week with forces that would come from Iquique or from further south. The population of Arica would be transferred to the village of San Miguel de Azapa where there would be hospitals, and to be away from the frontline of the battle. The truth was that Arica was not safe.\footnote{Interview, Nicolás Soto, 31\textsuperscript{st} May 2014}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure79.png}
\caption{Map showing the Chile-Peru border (red) the Chile-Bolivia border (green) and the Department of Camarones (blue). Google maps.}
\end{figure}
Joaquin Pérez was a member of the Chilean army in the 1970s and when asked whether Arica would have been safe in the event of war with Peru, answered “no, emphatically no, in the army contingent in which I worked, we were well aware that in the case of a war with Peru, Arica would be invaded and after that we would stage a counterattack to recover it and invade southern Peru”.\textsuperscript{53} According to one Ariqueño who was heavily involved with the military, Tomás Morales, at the time of the military coup in 1973 Arica was not seen as highly important, military troops were stationed in the far north but without necessary auxiliary services such as a medical unit. In fact, the military only existed in its full strength as far north as Antofagasta, 580km south of Arica.\textsuperscript{54}

Therefore from 1973 while Arica was becoming militarised, the Chilean military would have focussed its efforts on holding the line at Camarones in the event of an armed invasion by Peru with the expectation that Arica would be lost. However, as the 1970s progressed and relations with Peru worsened, Pinochet and his government became increasingly keen to defend Arica and so strengthened the international border. Eventually the military brought the largest regiment, Rancagua, to Arica and built military complexes and defences and an air base was constructed at Iquique, 100km south of Arica.\textsuperscript{55} According to the interviewee, Pinochet did not want a war with Peru and militarily, was not prepared to lose Arica, “when you look at what the government did, they bought the largest military regiment to Arica, you can see equipped military complexes, bunkers and defenses from that era”.\textsuperscript{56} In one interview General Odlanier Mena recollected showing Pinochet his plan for defending Arica and telling him that if Chile lost Arica they would not recover it. Arica became seen as

\textsuperscript{53} Interview, Joaquin Pérez, 7th June 2014
\textsuperscript{54} Interview, Tomás Morales, 23rd July 2014
\textsuperscript{55} Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014; Interview, Tomás Morales. 23rd July 2014
\textsuperscript{56} Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014
a vital stronghold that could not be relinquished to the Peruvians who could remain there and then move further south.\textsuperscript{37} Elsewhere Mena stated that;

I sped up the combat preparation of all personnel under my command: 56 officers, 560 NCOs and around roughly 2,500 conscripts... Furthermore, I set demanding goals of instruction and we reinforced the territory on a huge scale. The first mines on the border with Peru are mine. I had to prevent the invasion.\textsuperscript{58}

Pablo Martínez, who moved as a young man to Arica in 1974, claimed that “1976 was the year that changed everything”, “in 76 it seems Peru bought armoured tanks, lots of weapons, Velasco Alvarado said that he would recover Arica and a lot of regiments came to Arica, it was filled with soldiers”, he estimates around 2000 military personnel were stationed in Chile’s northernmost province.\textsuperscript{59} Martínez stated that when he was a conscript in 1976 the Chilean army feared that Peru had around 500 state of the art tanks when they, Chile, only had 50 out-dated models. Chile began to lay mines along the border with Peru to prevent Peruvian tanks from making it to Arica and by the 1980s, 70,000 mines, notably designed to maim not kill, had been laid at the border (Castillo & Zarzuzi 2005). This act of laying mines shifted the nature of the Chile-Peru border; from a political border, to a militarised one (Holahan 2006).

The geopolitical position of Arica changed throughout the 1970s, from a vulnerable, indefensible city to increasingly fortified and militarised, ensuring that it wouldn’t be lost in the event of conflict with Peru. Colonel Juan de Dios Barriga said in a press conference “Arica is one of the most important and sensitive borders in Chile. No-one can be indifferent to what happens here and it is a place which currently has a special validity”. He went on to report on how there would be a severe

\textsuperscript{37} ‘Las memorias del general (R) Odlanier Mena: Ex jefe de la CNI escribe un libro con su historia.’ La Segunda. 22\textsuperscript{nd} September 2012
\textsuperscript{38} Interview with General Odlanier Mena. La Estrella de Arica. 19\textsuperscript{th} March 2006
\textsuperscript{39} Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21\textsuperscript{st} April 2014
crackdown in Arica on delinquency, homosexuality, prostitution and drug trafficking in order to ensure that Arica was ‘a strong and healthy city’.\(^{60}\) Arica needed to be a militarised city of machismo, not a weak disordered borderland.

This can be made sense of through understanding Pinochet’s geopolitical strategy. Pinochet’s presidency was focused on order and strength and this, especially at the borders, relied on the military. As he wrote in *Introduction to Geopolitics,* “the best frontier in our times is that providing strategic security” as well as that “economically desirable borders are dangerous from the standpoint of security” (Pinochet Ugarte 1981:169). This therefore answers the question posed in the previous chapter; why would Pinochet allow the dissolution of the JAA in the knowledge that it would destroy industry at the border? He arguably believed that Peru would be more inclined to invade Arica if it were economically successful and so when tensions with Peru began he allowed Arica to descend into abandonment. Instead Arica needed to be fortified with weapons and military bodies. As previously mentioned through the work of MacGinty and Williams (2009) who focus on violence around the world, mainly civil wars, development can actually have the effect of triggering or sustaining conflict through factors such as resource competition, depletion, or the greater movement of people. It is particularly the unevenness, or perception of unevenness of development that exacerbates conflict. For Pinochet, borders’ resistance “corresponds to the degree of strength in the vital nucleus” so events on the borders wouldn’t affect just peripheral regions but would additionally show Chile’s neighbours that the core was weakened (Pinochet Ugarte 1981:29). Pinochet would not have wanted to accept this humiliation by having his and his nation’s masculinity threatened.

This desire for order in Chile had distinct racial overtones. Indigenous groups suffered significantly under Pinochet’s rule and the dictator’s configuration of the

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\(^{60}\) *La Defensa,* 1st March 1977
borders and territory was a way to control the ‘correct’ white Chilean within the nation-state protected from the inferior rest of Latin America. Pinochet displaced indigenous communities such as the Mapuche and cut off their links to natural resources which were privatised under his administration. In his study of postcolonial Peruvian geography, Orlove (1993) links the desire and pursuit of order with the process of ‘othering’ in Peru that had distinct racial implications. In the same way, this ordering of Chile, with a firm, impenetrable border was a way to create a distinct line between what was Chilean and what was not, between a white modern nation and an indigenous, backward Peru.

Therefore, the troubles on the border began when Pinochet’s military government took power and clashed with Peru’s left-wing dictator Velasco. An arms race began between Pinochet and Velasco and Chile, the weaker of the two, used certain tactics to appear stronger than it was in reality. The city of Arica was increasingly militarised as the Peru-Chile border gradually came to be seen as a line that must be held at all costs. Pinochet’s border policies were focussed on protection, not integration. The dictator was willing to economically abandon Arica through the demise of the Junta de Adelanto de Arica that had had a symbiotic relationship with Tacna across the border and instead chose to militarise the border with thousands of mines and troops.

Declarations of Peace: The Public Message

Oral histories have shown the tension that was felt by those in the Chilean military and the measures they took in order to deceive the Peruvians and appear to be militarily resilient. The study of newspaper articles from the time, however, tells a very different story. La Defensa ran numerous articles describing the ‘fraternal’
relationship between Chile and Peru and documenting the many official events marking this good neighbourliness; under the Pinochet dictatorship Peru and Chile were heralded as “the best of friends”. These messages were highly engineered, the lack of freedom of press resulted in a space whereby knowledge was mediated and processed before being disseminated and consumed. The military government was able to dictate which stories would become known to the public and the tone which would be used. The fear of repercussions if the government’s wishes were not fulfilled was enough to give Pinochet total control of the press.

Most articles about good relations between Chile and Peru avoided the question that it could ever be otherwise apart from some exceptions which reference reports of problems such as one article which alluded to “malicious rumours” circulating about “possible difficulties at the border”. The vast majority of articles reported on positive aspects of border relations. At one meeting of Chilean and Peruvian military officials in 1975, Iquique based General Jorge Dowling told the press, “today we are united with our brothers to the north, just as we always are. It’s not an occasion that has been specially prepared but it is the coexistence that exists between those present here, the reciprocity and friendship that we have with our dear friends in Tacna, Peru is permanent”. Many such declarations were made by military officials on both sides of the border. In a statement to the press, Velasco was recorded as saying;

Happily the Chilean government and the Chilean people know deep down that Peru does not want war. Just as they don’t want it. But as are these merchants of the freedom of the press of large countries, imperialist countries principally, they’re trying to make trouble. They try to play these countries off one another, especially countries which are insubordinate. But

61 La Defensa. 29th August 1974
62 La Concordia de Arica. 23rd March 1974
63 La Defensa. 18th July 1975
the truth is that there’s nothing. These imperialist countries would rejoice if Peru and Chile cross one another.\(^{64}\)

One Peruvian general was reported in the Chilean press as stating that “war between Peru and Chile is impossible” and any rumours are just “fantasies”.\(^{65}\) In a similar vein, in 1975 “Pinochet told a public rally...that only a madman would lead his country into war in South America. Pinochet rejected any possibility of military conflict, not mentioning Peru by name, but did refer to the government of Lima to discussing the purchasing of weapons by the neighbouring country”.\(^{66}\) On the 153\(^{rd}\) anniversary of Peruvian independence, Chile and Peru celebrated jointly in Tacna in “an eloquent display of friendship”. A soiree held “was exceptional in its climate of heartwarming friendship and cordiality”.\(^{67}\) On the 18\(^{th}\) March 1974, Commander in Chief of the First Division of the Armed Forces of Antofagasta, Brigadier General Rolando Garay Cifuentes spoke publicly on rumours that had been circulating about Chile’s relations with its neighbouring countries. He stated that;

> All the rumours about alleged difficulties with neighbouring countries are unfounded, I deny this malicious rumour. Relations with Peru and Bolivia are friendly and there are no elements that can be considered as adversary. Everything is a product of international Communism to create problems within Chile and uneasiness with our neighbours with the purpose of gaining traction in other countries.\(^{68}\)

This theme of an evil ‘other’, whether inside or outside the country, attempting to stir trouble was repeated on the 29\(^{th}\) March 1974 when Peruvian president General Velasco was quoted as saying “Peru has no border issues with its neighbours, which it

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\(^{64}\) *La Defensa*. 10\(^{th}\) August 1974  
\(^{65}\) *La Defensa*. 30\(^{th}\) April 1974  
\(^{66}\) *La Concordia de Arica*. 6\(^{th}\) February 1975  
\(^{67}\) *La Defensa*. 29\(^{th}\) July 1974  
\(^{68}\) *La Defensa*. 18\(^{th}\) March 1974
considers its sister nations in the Latin American agreement”, and that any claims to
the contrary are fictitious attempts to create friction between Chile and Peru.69 On
the same day, speaking in Santiago, Chilean Minister for Foreign Relations,
Viceadmiral Ismael Huerta Diaz denounced attempts to undermine friendly
Peruvian-Chilean relations as ‘Marxist action’ when in fact the neighbouring
countries share a common goal and have more similarities than differences including
origins, language, traditions, religion, and membership of political and economic
agreements.70 Economic relationships were actively sought with meetings held in
Arica and Tacna by government officials to encourage trade and business relations
between the two cities and therefore countries.71 Strong economic relations between
Arica and Tacna, “geographic brothers”, were posited as mutually beneficial to both
countries.72 Cultural as well as economic links were made, the relationship between
Chile and Peru “has been strengthened by shows of fellowship between Chile, Peru
and Bolivia”, argued one newspaper article, such as the meeting of military chiefs in
Brazil and a South America football tournament whereby one of Peru’s matches took
place in Arica with 5,000 Peruvians in attendance.73

Beyond kind words being said about one another, members of the armed forces
of Peru and Chile held many ceremonies and meetings “to reaffirm ties”, the largest
and most well-known of which was the ‘Abrazo de Concordia’.74 On the 16th
November 1974, the armed forces of Chile and Peru sealed the fraternal relationship
between both countries with the ‘abrazo’, a symbolic show of friendship on the border
(the Concordia) to which all citizens were invited.75 More than six thousand

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69 La Defensa. 29th March 1974
70 ibid.
71 La Defensa. 2nd December 1974
72 La Defensa. 5th December 1974
73 La Concordia de Arica. 23rd March 1974
74 La Defensa. 11th November 1974
75 La Defensa. 14th November 1974
Peruvians and Chileans travelled to the border to watch the solemn affair that was held by some of both countries’ most important military officials. The event consisted of parades, the singing of national anthems, and the planting of an olive tree to symbolise the lasting peace between the two countries.

To conclude the ceremony there was a ‘cordial embrace’ and an exchange of medals between Peruvian General Artemio Garcia and Chilean General Odlanier Mena. Garcia stated that the event “sealed the agreements of an indestructible brotherhood between both armies and neighbouring peoples”.76 This act was deemed to be “a beautiful lesson in creating a new meaning of relations between countries and people… [and the] ‘Concordia Embrace’ reaffirmed the traditional friendship between Chile and Peru and opens a new door for mutual co-operation to face underdevelopment”.77 Odlanier Mena was key to this message of peace and described how he managed to avoid a warmongering agenda without revealing the relative military weakness of Chile:

General Morales Bermúdez was in my house and he said to me ‘Look, Odlanier, you’re absolutely right and I congratulate you on your idea and support. What do you think about taking tanks to the ceremony, I put 40 or 50, whatever you want and you put a similar amount.’ I said to him ‘Francisco, do you think it would be better to do something symbolic? With bands, banners and a platoon of 30 men, what would we be doing with demonstrations of force?’ In reality, I didn’t have any other alternative, because we only had two tanks in the regiment and that was the truth. With these gestures we avoided the war, because Morales Bermúdez was opposed to it, despite communist influences from Cuba. Before becoming president he was invited to Cuba where they offered him everything necessary to invade Chile, also sponsored by Russia. But he was scared because he said why are we pushing for a war if we know how to start it but not how to end it?78

76 *La Defensa*. 16th November 1974
77 *La Defensa*. 19th November 1974
78 Interview with General Odlanier Mena. *La Estrella de Arica*. 19th March 2006
Figure 80: Military chiefs from Tacna and Arica, Peruvian General Artemio Garcia and Chilean Colonel Odlanier Mena, ceremonially embrace on the border between Chile and Peru. *La Defensa*. 16th November 1974

This ceremony was a performance with a variety of end goals. The two nations were performing sovereignty at the border, affirming their geographic limits for their own national security. This was also for local populations to see the authority of their state on the land they ruled but in a secure, peaceful setting. Through the Abrazo de Concordia both Chile and Peru could broadcast a message of goodwill but also of assured sovereignty and strength.

With this successful display of fraternity with the Abrazo de Concordia, Mena in Chile and Garcia, his counterpart in Peru maintained a friendly relationship, attempting to avoid the conflicts that their superiors seemed to at times encourage. Mena recollects that earlier, on September 11th 1973, the day of Pinochet’s coup, Mena had called Garcia in Tacna “to tell him “look, this is happening in Santiago and I called to tell you, on my word of honour, that it has nothing to do with you. I’m
going to close the border and you will see movements of troops but it has nothing to do with you, it’s to prevent anything from happening here within the country.”

This resulted in a feeling of reciprocity which meant that “In 1975, when General Morales Bermúdez decided to depose President Velasco Alvarado, he was in the house of Artemio in Tacna, with 16 generals and he called me and said, “I am returning the favour, we will take charge of the Government tomorrow in Lima”. “Then Morales Bermúdez took the phone and said, “Odlanier what Artemio says is true, tomorrow we will take the Government in Peru”.” This reciprocity was staged by the two generals as a performance, image and spectacle plays such an important role in conflict or potential conflict, as can again be seen through the following recollection of Mena:

at one point when General Artemio Garcia phoned me and told me. “Odlanier, you have to help me, because I am in a very serious situation here in Peru. I am frightened by the imminent possibility of war, the industries in Tacna were moving to Lima by plane, by land and with their families. If this exodus continues I am going to lose the race and another general could arrive here who has a different view and things could get worse again”. “Look Artemio,” I said, “you are receiving the reflection of the situation that you yourselves create. Chile has never thought of invading, we are happy with our border, we have no territorial interest of any kind. But something occurs to me. I'm going to go to Tacna today, alone and as a civilian, driving myself. Wait for me in the square, tell some journalists to come and see us, see us hug, buy some books and have lunch together”. So we did, and gestures like these were repeated many times and had a great effect because they calmed the tense atmosphere. If the two commanders who were supposedly enemies walked together as friends then we couldn’t go to war.”

79 Interview with General Odlanier Mena. La Estrella de Arica. 19th March 2006
80 ibid.
81 Interview with General Odlanier Mena. La Estrella de Arica. 19th March 2006
Figure 81: Chilean General Hector Bravo Muñoz and Peruvian General Francisco Morales Bermúdez meet in Arica, November 1974 “looking at their common destiny of brotherhood and mutual collaboration, both committed to fight together against underdevelopment”. *La Defensa*. 12th November 1974

What effect did all this talk of friendship have on local citizens? All of this positive reporting and engineering of media was for the benefit of the Ariqueños who were living on this tense border. Were solely newspaper archives studied it would be impossible to know how close Peru and Chile came to war. While it cannot be said that Ariqueños were entirely oblivious to any changes in the relationship between Chile and Peru it is unlikely that citizens knew the scale of risk. Their perspective of the border and knowledge of Peru-Chile relations was being controlled by the military government who did not want the public to be aware of the potential conflict. One interviewee who was a citizen but who had close links to the armed forces stated that normal citizens “had no idea how serious the situation was”.82 There was a gulf of

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82 Interview, Tomás Morales. 23rd July 2014
difference between relations of Chile-Peru as states and relations between Chilean and Peruvian citizens in the border region.

Pablo Martínez stated that citizens had no idea about the tension with Peru; he only realised it when he was conscripted in 1976. He says he learned years later that his Peruvian friends were more worried and wrote their wills, ready to come over to Arica to fight while Chilean citizens had no clue. “The only ones who knew were in the military, on the tip of the Morro there was a star with a bulb, enormous, and no-one knew why sometimes it would light up, sometimes turn off. Then I had no idea but the bulb was a call to quarters, the star was lit and the military personnel ran over there, it was like a siren but silent”.

Joaquin Pérez also reflected on the difference between his civilian and his later military life stating, “in military circles we spoke a lot about the potential of the Peruvian army but in my civil life in Arica before I joined the army, the issue of Chilean-Peruvian relations was completely ignored”. This situation of how the military was keenly aware of the potential conflict whereas most civilians were not was summed up by one interviewee who said, “there was a palpable change in the atmosphere, not so much among the civilians but among the armed forces of both countries. There came a time when everyone knew a break in relations or the outbreak of hostilities was coming”. Armed forces personnel were prohibited from crossing the border to Peru or Bolivia but civilians could cross the border without problems once the immediate fears of the 11th September 1973 had passed.

The civilians who remained unaware of the dangers at the border were sheltered from the anxieties of living in a potential warzone, one citizen Sebastian Rojas remarked that there was some news being disseminated in the press about the

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83 Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014
84 Interview, Joaquin Pérez, 7th June 2014
85 Interview, Nicolás Soto, 31st May 2014
situation but the city was so militarised that everyone felt safe.\textsuperscript{86} Citizens in Arica remained largely oblivious to the danger they were in, they were aware of the growing military presence at the border but it coincided with the ascent of Pinochet’s military government so it didn’t appear singular to their city. Others vividly remember living in fear if they learnt something of the situation, one, Vicente Díaz remembered “[t]here were some moments of fear during the 1970s when there were a lot of military exercises, lots of troop movements, when it felt like military conflict was close, luckily it never happened”.\textsuperscript{87}

Another, Constanza Sepúlveda, the wife of a soldier had greater knowledge of the risks and so recalled how “It was impossible to live calmly, because the order could come at any moment and the city would be evacuated and the vulnerable people would have to leave the city. And I, as a military wife, was a priority to be evacuated, I don’t know where to, it was so confidential that no-one knew, only the bosses knew. It’s too delicate”.\textsuperscript{88} Her husband remarked as he listened in on the interview that “the whole city was militarized” as the situation came very close to war, “there were many things that civilians had no idea about”.\textsuperscript{89} The bodies of both civilians and the military were at risk whether they were aware of it or not.

In spite of this proximity to war there was little animosity between the citizens of Arica and Tacna. In fact, border movement seems to have been common and fluid, the animosity was between the two military governments. One citizen stated that “the reality is that we never thought that something would happen with the Peruvians, because we had good relations with them”.\textsuperscript{90} However, this does not mean that the citizens always lived peacefully alongside one another, issues particularly arose with

\textsuperscript{86} Interview, Sebastián Rojas, 8\textsuperscript{th} August 2014
\textsuperscript{87} Interview, Vicente Díaz. 12\textsuperscript{th} August 2014
\textsuperscript{88} Interview, Constanza Sepúlveda. 10\textsuperscript{th} July 2014
\textsuperscript{89} Interview, Husband of Constanza Sepúlveda. 10\textsuperscript{th} July 2014
\textsuperscript{90} Interview, Alejandro González, 18\textsuperscript{th} June 2014
the authorities. One interviewee recalled how Chileans and Peruvians would be accused of espionage if visiting the other country, Peruvian police harassed Chileans in Tacna and that Peruvians would erect signs reading “Arica, captive, will return to the homeland”.91

Peruvians appeared to have felt more unwelcome in Chile during the 1970s as in 1975 the number of Peruvians in Arica fell by half, from 60,000 to 30,000, largely thought to be for economic reasons as Chile became just too expensive but also possibly for fear of being Peruvian in Arica. In direct contrast, when Chilean relations improved with Bolivia, the number of Bolivians in the city increased.92 However, by the end of 1976, Chile-Peru relations improved and the annual number of Chileans crossing over to Peru reached 122,000 (Castillo & Zarzuzi 2005). By 1980 an average of 2800 people were crossing the border every day and between January and September 1980 1,123,686 tourists and residents crossed officially from Chile to Peru.93 One writer in La Defensa, Jorge Bravo Tordoya, remarked on Chile-Peru relations, stating that “the constant and routine flow of persons, groups of people and families that daily and, particularly during weekends and holidays, travel in both directions, leading to the cultivation of friendships whose feelings deepen with time and frequency. Tacneños and Ariqueños open their homes with affection with great displays of neighbourliness and open and unreserved understanding”.94

91 Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014
92 La Defensa. 3rd January 1976
93 La Defensa. 1st March 1980; La Defensa. 15th October 1980
94 La Defensa. 4th November 1974
At the beginning of the 1970s the cities of Arica and Tacna became increasingly dependent on one another as the scarcity of certain goods under Allende’s government 1970-1973 fuelled the black market trade between Chile and Peru with necessities such as sugar, butter, and cigarettes, although of lower quality than of their Chilean counterparts, welcomed in Arica to satisfy Chilean needs. There were regulations on what could be taken across the border, for example in 1979 it was prohibited to take electronic items, even those for personal use, pharmaceuticals, artisan goods, or confectionary from Chile to Peru. This did not mean they were not transported however, one interviewee admitted to funding his university studies by smuggling calculators across the border despite knowing the danger he was putting himself in. This was a genuine danger as the border was closely monitored as shown by one case in January 1974 when a Peruvian medical student attempted to drive across the border with a lorry with posters and images of Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara posted on the side, a common practice to protect the vehicle from dust. On noticing this unwelcome marketing, one border official was quoted as saying “know sir, that in

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95 *La Defensa*. 8th June 1979
96 Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014
Chile every type of political propaganda has been terminated so get rid of that immediately and leave our territory and border”\textsuperscript{97}. Local media predominantly tells a story of peaceful, fraternal relations between Chile and Peru with ceremonies such as the Abrazo de Concordia much discussed. This appears to have had the effect of protecting the citizens of Arica from fear of invasion from Peru, they were largely unaware of the reality of the potential conflict between the two countries.

\textbf{The Centenary Approaches}

Chile’s northern neighbour underwent political changes when Peru’s dictator Velasco, whose leftist politics had clashed so greatly with Pinochet’s, became very ill and many of his colleagues lost faith in him. Velasco had been popular within the armed forces but also with poor Peruvians who saw him as ‘playful but paternal’ (Rodríguez Elizondo 2004). Peru’s own spectacle which relied on a charismatic, passionate dictator was at risk.

Disabled and psychologically unwell, the 64-year-old general became increasingly violent every day. Sometimes he closed up in long sullen silences, other times he had profound attacks of anger... He went for long periods without sleep, suffering from severe pain in his amputated leg and suspicious of everything and everyone... It was all proof of the progressive deterioration of the man who was nicknamed in his heyday, ‘Juan without fear’\textsuperscript{98}.

As Velasco’s poor health became increasingly apparent, on the 29\textsuperscript{th} August 1975 General Francisco Morales Bermúdez staged a military coup against Velasco and assumed the presidency. Bermúdez drew away from Velasco’s socialism and

\textsuperscript{97}La Defensa. 9\textsuperscript{th} January 1974
\textsuperscript{98}Valdés (1993) p.1
declared a ‘second phase’ that would return Peru to democracy. However this change in Peruvian politics did not immediately improve relations at the border.

Under Pinochet, the government was no stranger to elaborate displays of nationalism and military force, particularly on dates such as the anniversary of the 1973 coup.\textsuperscript{99} With the centenary of the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) approaching, the military in Arica organised a huge march at the hippodrome as well as with military parades in the rural interior.\textsuperscript{100} Once again, the Chileans reverted to tricks and spectacle to appear stronger than they really were, in the words of two ex-soldiers:

There was a parade at the hippodrome which started at midday and guys marched out and when they went out they went to a warehouse, changed their uniform and returned, they were marching until about 8pm, marching thousands, thousands of people, really impressive and it came out in the newspaper that they were running around, entering the warehouse, changing uniform and continuing to march, they spent hours marching, they were exhausted.\textsuperscript{101}

Of course I remember the centenary of Arica, there were celebrations throughout the week of Arica that year which had a special Chilean flavour. Pinochet organized the largest military parade in the history of Chile, almost 80,000 soldiers, although in reality there were less, but they all marched twice to make a greater number of participants.\textsuperscript{102}

In contrast to these, albeit partly fictional, displays of strength and preparedness, the military officials of both countries continued to pronounce the friendship that

\textsuperscript{99} On the first anniversary of Pinochet’s coup, 11th September 1974, the celebrations, which took place in the packed Carlos Dittborn stadium, the earlier location of the 1962 World Cup, were described as “the first anniversary of the liberation of our homeland. They consisted of marches by all of the armed forces and police, other civil groups such as fire officers, the Scouts and the Red Cross as well as representatives from every school in Arica and a number of patriotic anthems to accompany them”. \textit{La Defensa}, 29th August 1974

\textsuperscript{100} Interview, Joaquin Perez, 7th June 2014

\textsuperscript{101} Interview, Pablo Martinez, 21st April 2014

\textsuperscript{102} Interview, Nicolas Soto, 31st May 2014
existed between Chile and Peru. In November 1978, Peru’s Minister of Foreign Relations, General Jose de la Puente Rabdill, spoke about the upcoming centenary and made a call to commemorate the anniversary “with a profound reflection of peace and the coexistence of sister countries” and that “with constructive dialogue, peace can be maintained in this part of the world”.

The centenary saw not only symbolic displays but also an influx of economic development. In February 1979 Pinochet unveiled his ‘Plan Arica’ as the province had been failing since the demise of industry and the Junta de Adelanto de Arica leaving 22% of citizens unemployed, the highest rate in the country. The plan included improvements to the coastal road, investment in the poorest areas of the city, forestation schemes, and roads and investment in the rural interior. Pinochet declared that he “has great affection and wonderful memories” of Arica and was “very concerned with the socioeconomic problem of the province and I come here to work with the Intendente and Governor to see to these problems”.

The message of progress continued with the Governor of the province Colonel Victor Contador declaring; “We have to have faith in Arica, the city has to keep growing. We can see progress happening and you are not all as badly off as you believe… Here you need solid, established, permanent things [as opposed to the economic initiative of the Puerto Libre]. Businesses have to accept the reality, which is not a state of risk”. As the centenary was approaching and it became clear that Peru would not invade the focus could shift away from immediate military protection and toward long-term development that would strengthen Arica for the future. Once Pinochet no longer feared Peru being tempted by the economic success of Arica,
economic development could begin again. Raising Arica’s poor economic situation after the demise of the Junta de Adelanto de Arica became a renewed goal.

Although there was tension with the approach of the centenary, it was the passing of the date that led to the dissipation of tension; “it was a psychological date, it was an important date, reaching 100 years”. In February 1979 Pinochet claimed that relations with Chile’s neighbouring countries were improving, “some wanted to provoke an explosive situation on our part, but we have stayed calm and now the wave is passing”. By 1980 the tensions of the centenary had diminished and Peru and Chile co-operated to intensify commercial relations between the two countries even creating a Chilean-Peruvian Chamber of Commerce that would “normalize our relations and establish solid links to mutual benefit”. Again, as Chilean sovereignty was no longer being threatened at the border, an integrationist, rather than a protectionist strategy could be pursued.

Pinochet continued to visit Arica, although not with the same intensity as with the run up to the centenary, “to renew hopes for local citizens about the future of the region, in the face of uncertain economic prospects that affect various sectors especially industry, whose recession all are aware of”. In the end, all of the resources spent on armament and displays of military strength were wasted, no war ever came. TIME magazine summed up this fruitlessness writing, “…both countries have already suffered a defeat- wasting valuable resources on arms at a time when the money could have been spent on advancing their underdeveloped economies”.

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107 Interview, Pablo Martinez, 21st April 2014
108 La Defensa. 6th February 1979
109 La Defensa. 6th October 1980
110 La Defensa. 24th October 1980
111 Time Magazine. 10th January 1977. ‘Latin America: Girding for a Bloody Anniversary’
**Border Problems Elsewhere**

The passing of the centenary was a significant reason why Peru and Chile never went to war over Arica but it was overall due to a combination of factors. These include the increasing difficulties of obtaining arms as Chile was hit with another arms ban by the US in 1979 so they couldn’t buy spares or new equipment. Likewise to the north, Peru had stopped buying so many armaments and some of its weapons were now becoming outdated. Peru’s military spending was concentrated between 1974 and 1977 which meant that by 1979, the weaponry which was still fairly up-to-date when bought second-hand from the USSR was quickly falling behind technological advancements (St John 1992). As Paul Virilio wrote; “history progresses at the speed of its weapon systems” and Peru’s dreams of rewriting history and recovering Arica were becoming increasingly unlikely as weapons-buying ground to a halt (2006:90). Furthermore, both countries were having issues along their other borders, Peru was having problems with Ecuador and Chile with Bolivia and Argentina.

Chile, with its extraordinary geography and almost impossible proportion of border to land surface area meant that the ribbon-shaped country was not only having border issues with Peru in Arica, but also with its other two neighbours, Bolivia and Argentina. These other threats increased the strain on the Chile-Peru border but also resulted in the eventual dissipation of tensions and avoidance of full-blown war. This is a situation that Chile had experienced one hundred years earlier. In the 1870s Chile was having border issues with Argentina in the South over guano rich islands yet because Chile was fighting the War of the Pacific in the North an 1881 treaty with Argentina was signed to avoid conflict on all borders at once.
Chile-Bolivia relations had been poor since the early nineteenth century and only worsened with the War of the Pacific. The war took away Bolivia’s coastline, a grievance that Bolivia has actively tried to rectify since and every 23rd March, on ‘the day of the sea’ Bolivians remember this injustice done by Chile. Diplomatic relations between Chile and Bolivia were severed in 1964 but resumed by Pinochet and Hugo Banzer, Bolivia’s military dictator 1971-1978. On the 16th March 1974, Pinochet and Banzer held a meeting in Brazil with the hope of re-establishing official relations that had been broken the decade earlier. Friendly relations between the two dictators resulted in a meeting on the border, named the ‘Abrazo de Charaña’ and a soft agreement to hand over a narrow strip of territory between Arica and the Peruvian border to the Bolivians.

The ‘Abrazo de Charaña’ “brought in a new era of Chilean-Bolivian friendship” and saw Pinochet and Banzer meet on the Chile-Bolivia border for an official handshake, a lunch where they would discuss “materials, problems and common aspirations” and then travel to the town of Visviri. Peruvian President Bermúdez intervened, refusing to allow Bolivia to take the narrow corridor to the sea on the basis of it being unlawful under the 1929 Treaty of Lima, “one reason for its objection is that Peru opposes the creation of a buffer between it and Chile”. The treaty stated that any territory within the provinces of Arica or Tacna ceded to another nation must have the full agreement of both Peru and Chile. Bermúdez’s predecessor, Velasco was also against this proposal and stated his belief that “Bolivia has every right to demand an exit [to the sea] from Chile but warned that Peru would not allow this exit to pass through territories that were taken from Peru during the War of the

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112 *La Defensa*. 14th March 1974; *La Defensa*. 16th March 1974
113 *La Defensa*. 9th February 1976; *La Defensa*. 9th January 1976
114 *La Defensa*. 9th February 1976; Visviri is a small town on the Chilean department of General Lagos, located on the tripartite border between Chile, Peru and Bolivia.
115 *Time Magazine*. 10th January 1977. ‘Latin America: Girding for a Bloody Anniversary’
Pacific a century ago”. A following article in the same newspaper reported that Velasco was not alone in his sentiments and that he had the backing of all of Lima, that any exit to the sea would have to be taken from territory that once belonged to Bolivia, not Peru.

Figure 83: Potential corridor to the sea for Bolivia. Map used by La Defensa. 28th January 1976

This refusal by Peru was somewhat surprising as earlier it had seemed that giving Bolivia access to the sea would be possible as the “1929 treaty has flexibility” and local press had reported that a corridor to the sea for Bolivia would be seen

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116 La Concordia de Arica. 29th March 1974
117 La Concordia de Arica. 31st March 1974
favourably, even by Peruvians, as progress which would bring mutual benefits. The breakdown of this agreement led to the severing of relations once again between Bolivia and Chile in 1978. The inability of Peru and Chile to agree on a solution to Bolivia’s lack of access to the sea was seen as a factor in the escalation of tension on the Peru-Chile border. The centenary of the War of the Pacific had been of great importance to Bolivia as well as to Peru and Chile as shown by Banzer’s statement in 1975 that “Bolivia expects to regain access to the Pacific before 1979” and as early as 1974 Banzer remarked that he “felt very close to the exit to the sea”.

Relations remained tense as shown by claims by Chile in October 1979 that Peru and Bolivia drew up an anti-Chilean resolution to propose to the Organisation of American States (OAS), a move that would ‘internationalise’ Arica and give Bolivia greater access to the sea. Chile had rejected the idea in 1976 and therefore saw it as unjust that it should be presented to the OAS. However, talks between Banzer and Pinochet probably led to a closeness that meant that Peru and Bolivia never formed a dangerous coalition.

To add to these problems in the north, in 1978 Chile was having other border issues further south where it was in conflict with Argentina over three islands in the Beagle Channel. These events took precedence as the primary border issue in the national imagination, as one interviewee said, “When I travelled down to Santiago to visit family, everyone there talked about and was worried about the conflict with Argentina, about the British arbitration award, that gave Chile sovereignty over the islands of Picton, Nueva and Lennox at the Southern tip of Chile”. Chile had occupied these islands since 1892 but Argentina held maritime rights (Lindsley 1987). The latter first raised complaints about Chilean activity in the area in 1915 and

118 *La Defensa*. 19th January 1976; *La Defensa*. 14th January 1976
119 *La Defensa*. 25th June 1975; *La Defensa*. 13th December 1974
120 Interview, Joaquin Pérez, 7th June 2014
political stalemate ensued until 1971 when the dispute was submitted for arbitration by British monarch Queen Elizabeth II.

By 1977 when the British submitted their judgment, Chile and Argentina were being led by military governments, Augusto Pinochet and Jorge Rafael Videla respectively (Domínguez 1999). As another interviewee stated, “the atmosphere was tense in southern Chile, the problems with Argentina which were as serious as the problems with Peru... Chile had a military government, which held legislative power, and Argentina also had a military government”.121 This complicated the issue and it was decided that the International Court of Justice at The Hague would lead the case and their findings would be discussed with Queen Elizabeth II. Argentina was unhappy with the ICJ’s award, declaring it ‘invalid’ and arguing that it favoured Chile. Both countries began to initiate military action.122 Tensions remained high until Pope John Paul II agreed to mediate; Catholicism being a shared ideal of both countries and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was ratified by Argentina in 1984, giving the islands to Chile but maritime rights to Argentina (Church 2008).

Chile’s problems with Argentina were closely monitored by the media of Peru and Bolivia, it is likely that Chile’s northern neighbours were excited by the prospect of a weakened, distracted Chile, especially with the approach of the centenary of the War of the Pacific.123 For Chile the Beagle Channel was just too important and their attention was drawn away from northern border that had the effect of making the Chileans act more calmly in the north to avoid conflict on all borders just as had occurred in the 1870s.

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121 Interview, Nicolás Soto, 31st May 2014
122 *La Defensa*. 14th January 1978
123 *La Defensa*. 10th January 1978
Conclusions

The tensions that surrounded the Peru-Chile border and the city of Arica in the 1970s were bound up in global Cold War geopolitics but had impacts at the local scale, on the city of Arica. There were vast differences between how the two military governments related to one another, how military officials in Arica and Tacna communicated, and what life was like for the citizens of Arica during the decade. These varying perspectives were largely engineered; local media was employed as a channel through which to disseminate certain messages that created a space of perceived peace and harmony for the citizens of Arica.

Pinochet and the two Peruvian presidents, Velasco and later Bermúdez were pitted against one another by polarised Cold War politics but were also actors independent of Washington and Moscow, acting on their own ideological terms. The opposing views of Peru and Chile resulted in bitterness and antagonism, the result being an arms race and threat of violence on the Peru-Chile border. The Chilean military changed its stance towards the city of Arica throughout the 1970s, at first seeing it as a dispensable frontier zone but later fortifying it and pledging to hold the country’s borders from there.

Chile was fully aware of Peru’s military advantage, largely an effect of Cold War affiliations, and so Arica became a place of military deception. From fake airports in the desert to fictional radio communication with the United States and later bogus military parades, Chile constructed a spectacle of war and presented an image of force and might in an attempt to convince the Peruvians to not risk military conflict.

Alongside these imaginings of force were declarations of peace and friendship between Chile and Peru. The official message was one of fraternity as disseminated through local newspapers even if the actions of the military governments suggested
otherwise. These newspaper reports assured the citizens of Arica that the border was calm and many citizens had no idea of the danger that their lives were in. Despite the potential for war as the centenary came and went, the tensions began to dissipate and Arica was no longer in danger. Part of this dissipation is due to Chile’s other border problems with Bolivia and Argentina. Pinochet became increasingly aware that it would be incredibly dangerous to have potential conflict on every border.

Arica once again became a space of violence due to its border location. The city was vulnerable and could have been easily recouped by Peru until Pinochet and Odlanier Mena militarised the border and the city. Consistent with the earlier history of Arica as a border city, this shows the relationship between threats at the border and the interest that the Chilean government showed in the city. Arica was not seen as of importance until the gravity of the threat from Peru became clear when Pinochet began to make more visits to the region and military defences were installed. As the following chapters show this is a trend that continues through the history of Arica, the citizens feel abandoned by the Chilean state until Chilean sovereignty is endangered.
CHAPTER SEVEN

BIOPOLITICS AT THE BORDER:
HIV/AIDS & ABORTION IN ARICA 1980s-

In the 1970s Arica became the stage for international geopolitics involving Chile, Peru, and the United States just as it had been in the 1920s. However, these geopolitical events still affected the citizens of Arica in a corporeal sense, their bodies were at risk. This chapter further unpacks the corporeal effects of larger scale political decisions. The Chile-Peru border is a biopolitical border and through two examples the body is examined in terms of how the border both facilitates and hinders the body’s health. The Chilean state exerts biopolitical control over its subjects but only to a (geographical) limit; both the border and the body can be spaces of resistance.

The border continues to be a space of contradiction; a space heavily controlled and monitored by the Chilean state while also being a point of escape, on the periphery of state control. This exemplifies the ‘crazy geography’ of the border. It is a space where whether studying international diplomacy, geopolitics, or biopolitics, violence is the thread that illustrates the paradox of the Chile-Peru border. A movement from the broad international scale to the corporeal scale may seem unconventional but it is this experimental register that uncovers the wider picture.

This chapter begins from the assumption that poor health is a type of structural violence. Health is an instable variable that can be controlled to a large degree by the state. Therefore, the implementation of health policies can be a violent act even though they are commonly seen as beneficial measures. There are strong parallels
between peace studies and health studies, argues Galtung (1996; Webel & Galtung),
with the same diagnosis-prognosis-therapy idea applicable to both. In fact this can be
seen through Pinochet’s geopolitical lexicon with regards to ‘healthy states’, ‘sickness
in society’, and evils within the population who threaten the health of the nation. It is
in this way that to speak of the health of the border population in relation to how it is
affected by the border and state policy at the border is not such a great leap from the
previous chapter on international geopolitics.

Two events in the 1980s led to changes in the health of the citizens of Arica;
firstly the HIV/AIDS epidemic arrived in Chile and secondly Pinochet’s government
tightened abortion legislation making the procedure illegal in every single
circumstance. From the 1980s onwards the border is a paradoxical space of health; it
puts the body in danger at times and provides an opportunity to reclaim the right to
the body at others. This chapter draws on these two examples to discuss biopolitics at
the border.

The first example examines how Arica’s border location has resulted in the
region having by far the highest rates of HIV/AIDS in the country. Interviews with
healthcare workers and HIV/AIDS campaigners suggest that these reasons include
sex work, the cheap availability of drugs which lead to riskier behaviour, and a large
floating population of miners and migratory workers. An estimated 1.5 million adults
and children live with HIV/AIDS in Latin America, 23,000-59,000 of whom live in
Chile (Aggleton et al. 2003).¹ It is a highly stigmatised condition with many Chileans
lacking knowledge of the facts surrounding HIV/AIDS and there is reluctance against
testing. Governmental, societal and self- control promote or prohibit certain
behaviours which have resulted in Arica’s high rate of HIV/AIDS.

The second example examines another way in which bodies in Arica have been

¹ United Nations AIDS estimates 2013
biopolitically controlled but have also resisted this control. For decades Chileans have crossed the border for medical treatment due to the lower costs in Tacna, the Peruvian city 58 km from Arica. Yet one key border crossing has been generated as a response to Chile’s restrictive legislation on abortion, women travel to Peru to undergo abortions that are strictly illegal in Chile. Interviews with both medical professionals and those who travel for healthcare highlight the violent repercussions of healthcare legislation on women’s bodies. State legislation has made women’s bodies into biopolitical spaces in ways that cannot be legally contested. Women are being put in a position by the Chilean state whereby exerting rights over their own body means committing a crime. If they want to escape state control over their reproductive organs they are forced to cross a border. Travel is an act of resistance for women seeking autonomy over their own bodies.

Sex can be dangerous in Arica, in particular sex that is not between monogamous heterosexual couples in the pursuit of children. In this chapter, violence against the body at the border is not directed homogenously at all bodies but is concentrated on certain bodies due to factors such as gender, class, sexual orientation, ethnicity and privilege. At the border these real or perceived identities become exacerbated and bring increased levels of violence. The privileging of some bodies over others is embedded in the potential disciplinary control of biopolitics.

This chapter posits that the Chilean state and other plural, decentralised agents wield social and political power over the health of the inhabitants of the Chilean borderlands, with violent repercussions. Foucault’s theory of biopolitical power, outlined in chapter two, comes from everywhere, often deployed vertically from the state but also by social groups such as religious or charitable organisations (Elbe 2005). Foucault was largely interested in the population as a collective, how a group is
controlled as opposed to individual bodies but the effects of these politics is felt in individual human bodies (Nilsson & Wallenstein 2013). In Arica it is deviant bodies that are disproportionately subject to violence, namely poor, homosexual, transgender, and underprivileged citizens. For Jennifer Fluri “[t]he body is often the battleground onto which violence is orchestrated, and rights and victimization-based discourses are expounded to shape public opinion, policy and political action” (2011:291). HIV/AIDS and abortion therefore transform bodies into battlegrounds and the way in which individuals are treated has biopolitical implications, whether these are positive or negative.

In order to understand the nature of biopolitical control in Arica it is necessary to understand the mentality of the governing system that was established by Pinochet’s military government and remains highly influential and largely unchanged today. This can be seen through the reproductive control of women’s bodies whereby HIV positive Chilean women have been compulsorily sterilised and women are prohibited from having an abortion under any circumstance. Biological reproduction is central to the idea of a political citizen in a modern biopolitical state and particularly one so dependent on machismo and these examples highlight how that power can be wielded. Ruth Miller (2007) has discussed the idea of the ‘biopolitical womb’ whereby women’s wombs are the commodity of the government which can draw up laws and regulations for certain social engineering projects. As soon as a woman has a foetus growing inside of her the womb becomes a separate legal arena, taking precedence over the rights and decisions of the woman. Through the act of becoming pregnant women’s bodies become subject to political discussions on life and death, race and nation, citizenship and motherhood, and the right of life of the foetus.
The HIV/AIDS Problem in Arica

The HIV epidemic arrived in Chile in 1984 through an individual who was infected outside of the country. The first case in northern Chile was diagnosed in 1987 and immediately the director of Arica’s hospital, Dr. Oscar Torrealba, declared that Arica’s medical services were ready to attend to anyone affected by HIV/AIDS. Arica’s susceptibility to the virus was quickly noted and Torrealba stated that “due to being an area of ports and borders, and for being close to Brazil, a country with significant cases of AIDS, health authorities in Arica are concerned about the situation”. Government intervention began in Arica in November 1988 when an event organised by the Universidad de Tarapacá and The Health Service of Arica aimed “to analyse the problems of AIDS in great depth”. At this time the northernmost province of Chile had confirmed three cases of AIDS, one in Arica and two in Iquique. All three had died by the time the meeting took place. In the present day, the region of Arica and Parinacota holds the highest rate of HIV/AIDS in the country, see Figure 84 and Figure 85.

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2 Gobierno de Chile, Ministerio de Salud, Vig. Épi. VIH/SIDA, 2010
3 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014
4 La Defensa. 17th June 1987
5 La Defensa. 2nd November 1988
Figure 84: Rates of HIV notifications in Chile by region 1986-2010. Arica & Parinacota, the northernmost region, emerges after 2001 as the region with the highest HIV rate. Ministerio de Salud de Chile “Evolución del VIH/SIDA Chile”

Figure 85: Accumulated rate of HIV/AIDS in Chile by region 1984-2006. Informe Nacional Sobre Los Progresos Realizados En La Aplicación Del UNGASS. Chile. (2010) Gobierno de Chile Ministro de Salud y ONUSIDA
Since the first case was detected in the region HIV/AIDS cases have grown exponentially in every age group including in the last five years an increase in cases of individuals in their seventies and eighties. The very young are also a high-risk group with those aged 10-19 having a risk rate 4 times higher than the national average. One healthcare worker reported that while the overall rate is higher for men it is growing more quickly with women which is due to physiological factors, women are two to four times more susceptible to the virus than men, and cultural factors such as gender based violence, economic dependence, and unequal power dynamics which exacerbate this risk. The female mortality rate in Arica and Parinacota is currently five times higher than the national average. This tends to occur when women aren’t tested and so only discover they have the virus when they develop complications in the later stages of AIDS when the chances of survival are lower. Some cases are only detected post-mortem.

This reluctance to be tested stems from the high levels of stigma and abuse which affect the lives of Chileans with HIV/AIDS; it is not uncommon for HIV positive Chileans to lose their jobs, suffer a lack of privacy due to the existence of a name-based system of national reporting, and to feel crippled by machismo, homophobia, and family honour (Aggleton et al. 2003). The fact that the health crisis began in Chile in the homosexual male community only served to reinforce machismo and the ‘othering’ of Chilean homosexuals. The ‘small-town’ nature of Arica is often cited as a barrier to people taking the test as it is difficult to keep one’s HIV status private. An HIV/AIDS specialist in Arica, Valentina Araya, reported that “there are people don’t think they are at risk, they only have one sexual partner, so they don’t think it’s

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6 Interview, Catalina López. 21st March 2014
7 ibid.
8 ibid.
important to take the test, they don’t feel ill, so they don’t see it as important, or they’re scared of it, knowing that they’re vulnerable, they prefer not to know”.\footnote{9} This lack of testing means that an estimated 23,000 to 25,000 people are living with undiagnosed HIV/AIDS in Chile worsened by poor education on the subject with many Chileans confused about the facts surrounding HIV/AIDS \cite{MunozMerkle2012}. Many women believe that it is possible to become infected from using public toilets or that it is possible to tell by someone’s appearance whether they are HIV positive.\footnote{10}

HIV positive women in Chile have received a disproportionate amount of stigma and abuse as shown by cases of forced sterilisation of HIV positive women. Daniel Valenzuela, an HIV/AIDS specialist in Arica, specified that “when the first HIV-positive women began appearing in the late 90s and early 2000s, they were sterilized without their consent because they were seen as a danger to the public”.\footnote{11} This occurred in Arica and a large-scale investigation was undertaken when these cases became public knowledge. The result was a report entitled \textit{Dignity Denied} that laid out how women had been sterilised without their knowledge or consent or sterilised under pressure.\footnote{12} The report details the experiences of an HIV positive 26 year old woman from Arica who was told she was not allowed to hug or kiss her newborn baby because she might infect him. These women were biopolitically controlled by the state in order to extinguish their reproductive potential. Despite other options being available including non-invasive reproductive management or the women’s choice being factored into the decision, HIV positive women have been abused, humiliated, and violated in Chile.

\footnote{9}{Interview, Valentina Araya. 22\textsuperscript{nd} April 2014}
\footnote{10}{Figures estimated by the United Nations. Gianelli, Ferrer & McElmurry (2008)}
\footnote{11}{Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014}
The rate of HIV/AIDS in the region of Arica and Parinacota is not homogenous as very few people in the rural interior contract the HIV virus. Daniel Valenzuela said that in his 14 year career working in HIV/AIDS, only two patients from the interior contracted the virus.\textsuperscript{13} The majority of those who live in the interior are Aymará and have a very different worldview when it comes to sex than what is deemed to be the modern Chilean norm. Valenzuela stressed that sexuality encompasses much more than sexual intercourse and it is therefore difficult to talk “directly about sexual acts, that HIV is transmitted through penetrative sex without a condom by ejaculation, to them it’s terrible to talk openly about it”. In some ways the city of Arica is posited as a corrupting force, as cities have always been seen, bringing evils to the pure rural interior. This purity of rural life clashes with the urban:

Condoms are unknown to them, they’re better known amongst Aymará youth who come down from the interior to study here [Arica], they become somewhat urbanized, they take with them the culture of the city... It’s the grandparents who pass on the traditions, who still cultivate the language and stories, they are the patriarchs, the matriarchs, they set the rules, laws, so when they [the youths] are born, it’s a bit difficult to talk about sexuality or the subjects themselves... The youth grow up with the Aymará worldview, but when they come here they still live with that worldview but the Aymará culture comes to a junction with Chilean culture, it’s a culture shock. And many begin to explore themselves sexually, they have their first sexual experiences and very often without protection because they don’t have the information.\textsuperscript{14}

Due to Arica’s status as the region with the highest rate of HIV/AIDS numerous government mandated investigations have attempted to tackle the problem and

\textsuperscript{13} Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014
However it is important to note that apart from HIV/AIDS the Aymará population in Arica suffers from far higher rates of mortality and morbidity that non-indigenous groups. Perfíl epidemiológico básico de la población aymara del Servicio de Salud Arica. (2006) Serie Análisis de Situación de Salud de los Pueblos Indígenas de Chile N.1 Ministerio de Salud de Chile.

\textsuperscript{14} Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014
healthcare programs have been established. Arica and Parinacota is the only region
with a designated HIV/AIDS community centre, CRIPAC. The centre works
towards the prevention and reduction of HIV transmission mainly through access to
information, counselling, HIV testing, and condom distribution in the region. CRIPAC is centrally located in the city and is open until late at night, 16:00-23:00, to
provide resources for those who are unable to visit during traditional hours such as
working mothers or sex workers.

CRIPAC employees also target locations that have been identified as potential
risk spots, for example employees go to an infamous nightclub ‘Martes Hot Night’
which is well known for its live sex shows to disseminate condoms and safe sex
information. They target community events such as the indigenous dance festival
which takes place every February, set up debates and film screenings, and run stands
and campaigns in public places (Figure 86, Figure 87 & Figure 88). The centre’s
director recorded that they test 2,800 people every year but reach over 9,000 people
in the region through their work. These interventions can be read as biopolitics in
action through the formal channels of government funding and initiatives. CRIPAC
and the regional ministry of health seek to influence the health of the population
through these centres and schemes.

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15 Interview, Paulina Fuentes. 14th March 2014
16 ibid.
17 ibid.
18 ibid.
Figure 86: Community event in Arica called “Join the Positive Culture” to spread awareness of HIV/AIDS in the region with an information stand, music, advice about the HIV test and artistic projects. 
Figure 87: A CRIPAC information stand disseminating material about HIV/AIDS.

Figure 88: CRIPAC workers at the dance festival ‘Arica con la fuerza del sol’.
HIV/AIDS and Sex Work

When it became apparent that the rate of HIV/AIDS in Arica surpasses that of any other region it was initially thought that the cause was men traveling to Peru where they had unprotected sex with Peruvian sex workers and contracted the virus. This idea has been ruled out as the primary cause of HIV transmission yet there is still a significant amount of cross-border sexual activity. The regional ministry of health in Arica and Parinacota worked with the United Nations in May 2010 to investigate the issue of sex tourism across the Chile-Peru border and its relationship with HIV/AIDS. The results of the study highlighted the differences between the sex industries of Arica and Tacna. The director of the municipal health service Catalina López reported;

“here it is more residential, arranged by telephone. There, in Tacna, there are established places, cabins with many women. We went to an area called Cucardas where there are three big commercial sex venues and they have cubicles next to each other, about thirty, and all day long one client leaves and the other enters, at a very cheap price, 2000 or 3000 pesos. Each of the men of our group, there were about four, each asked about six girls whether they would have relations without a condom and none accepted. This corroborates with what the health authorities in Tacna say, that no-one will have sex without a condom.”

Christian Hernández, a healthworker who has worked in various HIV/AIDS roles confirmed that Chileans traveling to Peru to visit sex workers “is well-known as something commonly practiced by the population of Arica, they take more precautions with using condoms there but tend not to use them in Arica”. In a culture of machismo condoms are seen as emasculating, ineffective, and a barrier to pleasure and women’s power to negotiate the use of condoms is limited. Valentina

19 Interview, Catalina López. 21st March 2014
20 Interview, Christian Hernández, 23rd April 2014
Araya stated that the likelihood of a Chilean man practicing safe sex with a sex worker in Peru ‘depends on the context’; “there are men who always take precautions, and men who never do, there are men who think some women are safer than others, maybe a difference between a sex worker who they frequently visit will be perceived as safer because they know her for example”.21 It would, therefore, appear that while Chilean men do visit sex workers in Tacna it has not led to an increase in HIV transmission as they practice safe sex on the whole.

However, not all men travel to Peru to visit sex workers, it is much easier and quicker to stay in Chile especially for those with wives or families and sex workers are cheap and easy to find. Although prostitution is illegal it is widely advertised in the local newspaper La Estrella de Arica. It has been estimated that between 450 and 600 sex workers publicise in the newspaper with adverts such as:

- 2 friends, pretty, slim, affectionate, sweet, everything included, 6.000
- Nataly. Sensual, 100-60-100, boyfriend treatment, with lingerie. Own home
- Mature Chilean, 34, homes, motels, room. Own transport.

It is common to see an emphasis placed on the transaction being an ‘affectionate’ one with many offering the ‘boyfriend treatment’ which means sweet words and caresses as well as intercourse. Many of these sex workers are not Chilean. On a sample from one day there were 48 adverts for sex and 18 explicitly stated that were not Chilean, for example:

- 18 years old, Yenifer, beautiful Bolivian, spectacular figure, boyfriend treatment
- Argentinian. Esteffí beautiful, boyfriend treatment open to everything, sexy
- 5.000 Bolivian Sandra, new, young, pretty, slim, obliging, amazing attention

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21 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014
• Peruvian, 19, recently arrived, extrovert, open to everything. Homes, motels.\textsuperscript{22}

A significant proportion of sex workers in Arica are estimated to be foreign immigrants from nearby countries. Of immigrants as a whole in Arica and Parinacota, 88\% are from Peru and Bolivia, with the rest predominantly from Colombia and Ecuador.\textsuperscript{23} Daniel Valenzuela explains why many of these immigrants find themselves in sex work;

“In Arica, we’re a border region, there are lot of immigrants in transit because Arica isn’t a region to live in or where the immigrants stay, because it’s a small city with a small labour force...every immigrant always goes to the capital because they see it as the best destination, so Arica is a city of transit, where often many foreigners carry out sex work or they are brought here to do it, they bring them to secret locations”.\textsuperscript{24}

While it is known that there are foreign sex workers in the industry, whether voluntary or coerced, the HIV/AIDS rate of foreigners living in Chile is difficult to estimate because only those foreigners who have Chilean residency or nationality can access the health services in Chile.\textsuperscript{25}

The true figures regarding the number of sex workers in Arica is difficult to estimate. The director of CRIPAC explained that “[a]ccording to official statistics there are only about 30 sex workers in Arica, being monitored, but when there are estimates of 450-600… There are also those who work just occasionally, sporadically, to pay university fees, to buy clothes, or whatever, so the figure of 30 is far too low”.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, sex work may take place not for money but for drugs or other favours and these encounters often are not undertaken safely.\textsuperscript{27} The regional ministry of health is

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{22}http://www.estrellaarica.cl/impresa/2014/10/02/full/18/ [accessed 02/10/2014]
\textsuperscript{23}Interview, José Tomas Vicuña. 1\textsuperscript{st} April 2014
\textsuperscript{24}Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12\textsuperscript{th} August 2014
\textsuperscript{25}ibid.
\textsuperscript{26}Interview, Catalina López. 21\textsuperscript{st} March 2014
\textsuperscript{27}Interview, Paulina Fuentes. 14\textsuperscript{th} March 2014
\end{footnotesize}
aware of the locations where sex work takes place “so we can make a map of the places where there are nightclubs and where the trade goes on, in those places you always find foreigners…there are Colombian girls, Peruvian girls, Peruvians more than any other”.

This lack of information on Arica’s sex industry is relatively new due to the elimination of mandatory control of sex workers in 2004. The decree required monthly health checks for sex workers and for them to carry a card proving that they were healthy which the authorities could check at any time. Valentina Araya stated that the decree was dissolved “because groups of sex workers in Santiago were saying they were being abused by the authorities, with excessive force, lots of violence, when they were obliged to be monitored, so it seemed from the view of human rights that it would be better to make the monitoring voluntary and get rid of the power of those authorities”. Daniel Valenzuela referred to the biopolitical nature of the decree which “was very negative, it was saying, you sold your body so we have to control you, you couldn’t control yourself, you didn’t have the right to sell your body… the checks were a form of punishment, they gave you a card saying if you were suitable, it was signed and stamped to say you could work”. Valentina Araya recalls the impact of the changes in the health checks:

since this switch the health checks dropped drastically, there were about 120 women being monitored, now we have 30, it’s very few…. This violence wasn’t in Arica, there were no problems… the problems were in other cities so the decision was made at a national level, but it hit us in a really negative way… When we had that large number of women being monitored there was virtually no incidence of disease, the only time I saw a sex worker with HIV she had not been infected by a client but by her partner.

28 Interview, Catalina López. 21st March 2014
29 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014
30 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014
31 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014
Sex workers in Chile are a highly discriminated-against group, especially if the sex worker is also transgender, but this has resulted in a higher level of awareness about safe sex practices. Christian Hernández believes that “sex workers usually have greater awareness about condom use than the general population, so I think the general population have a greater risk of contracting HIV/Aids than sex workers”, an idea elaborated by Daniel Valenzuela who stated “I think those in Arica with the greatest knowledge [of HIV/AIDS], and out of all the sex workers are transwomen, health checks aren’t obligatory for them but they still get them done… it’s to do with the stigma”. Gabriela Torres, another HIV/AIDS expert also believed this is true but with the exception of “the younger ones just beginning in the industry of 14, 15 who are less aware”.

The result of this is that throughout South America female sex workers have low prevalence of HIV/AIDS compared to homobisexual men in the continent and sex workers on other continents (Montano et al. 2005). Stigma is imposed on certain groups of people and originates from a wide range of sources with the result of biopolitical control. Sex workers and transgender and homosexual individuals are disqualified from full social acceptance through social checks (Goffman 1963). The discrimination, abuse, and stigma faced by these ‘deviants’ is not directly from one agent or state organisation, it becomes embedded in societies and communities.

The Peruvian government still has compulsory health checks which is seen by some as one of the reasons why Peru has a lower HIV/AIDS rate than that of Chile. Valentina Araya stated that the “control of sex workers is stricter I think in Tacna because it’s mandatory, they have a large number of people being monitored which

32 Interview, Florencia Espinoza. 11th April 2014; Interview, Paulina Fuentes. 14th March 2014
33 Interview, Christian Hernández, 23rd April 2014; Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014
34 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014
35 The term ‘homobisexual’ is rarely used in English but was commonly used by the interviewees in Spanish and adequately refers to men who may engage in exclusively homosexual or bisexual activity.
36 0.5 prevalence rate in Chile. 0.4 prevalence rate in Peru. Source: United Nations AIDS
doesn’t happen here and there they are having regular health checks, giving out condoms, in every sense the monitoring is better there”. The HIV/AIDS rate in Tacna is, agreed Daniel Valenzuela, “lower than ours…they have better methods of prevention than we do, they invest a lot of money in prevention and promotion whereas Chile is totally the opposite, it spends more money on medical attention than on prevention”. The Peruvian government uses biopolitical control to manage sexual health at the border.

Due to the initial thoughts that the reason for Arica and Parinacota’s high rate of HIV/AIDS was cross-border sex tourism, links between the health ministries of Arica and Tacna were established. When Arica works with Tacna it tends to be more focussed on attending patients rather than prevention but the two regions have “developed some strategies of prevention at the border, at Chacalluta, distributing condoms or putting up signs so people see that information when they’re traveling through”. Healthworker Valentina Araya who co-ordinates these links stated that “we have a campaign every year which we conduct jointly with Tacna, in the context of the Border Integration Committee, and we disseminate information about where you can take the test, preventative measures, and we have activities at the border control Chacalluta, giving information to those who pass through, entering or leaving Chile”.

Therefore, while the border is not a highly significant cause of Arica’s high HIV/AIDS rate in terms of Chileans acquiring the virus in Peru, the border is highly significant in being a place with a high number of unmonitored sex workers, many of whom are immigrants. However, studies have shown that sex workers in Chile tend to

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37 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014
38 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014
39 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014
40 Interview, Catalina López. 21st March 2014
have greater awareness of safer sex practices than the average population and so other reasons for the high figure must exist.

HIV/AIDS and Drugs in Arica

Another factor in the high level of HIV/AIDS in the region is the plentiful and cheap supply of drugs. Local health experts have argued that the high levels of drug use in Arica increases the probability of risky sexual behaviour and consequently the chances of transmitting HIV. Arica’s border location is the cause of the quantity and affordability of the drugs. Intravenous drug use accounts for 5% of HIV transmission in Chile, a low figure compared to its neighbour Argentina where the rate is 41.9% but drug use increases the likelihood of HIV transmission through unsafe sex (Magis Rodríguez, Fernando Marques & Touzé 2002). Previous studies have found that HIV prevalence in South America is higher for men who use marijuana, cocaine, and alcohol (Montano et al. 2005). As Valentina Araya stated;

“Drugs and alcohol lower your perception of risk, if before you were aware of how to look after yourself, when you’re under the effect of substances you become unaware or you don’t care, so you do things that you wouldn’t do were you not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. You lose your inhibitions and in this context are more likely to have relations without taking precautions”. 41

Drugs have been a major problem for many decades in Arica as shown by a 1976 conference of Bolivian and Chilean narcotic officials in Arica to address the major cocaine trade between the two countries in the area. 42 Arica is perfectly located as a centre of the global drug trade, being located near the coca leaf growing fields of Peru and Bolivia which provide the raw material for cocaine and its narcotic relations and

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41 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014
42 {{WikiLeaks cable|id=1976SANTIA09385_b|}}
with the port opening South America to the world. One Ariqueño, Pablo Martínez, claims that Arica in the 1960s and early 1970s was in fact this global centre, producing cocaine and shipping it to the US until 1973 when Pinochet immediately cracked down on Arica’s drug lords, handing them to the drug enforcement agency of the United States.\(^43\) This was during the period covered in the previous chapter when Pinochet was concerned with creating an ordered, militarised border region. Pablo believes that had Pinochet not intervened, Arica would have been Latin America’s cocaine capital, a badge taken by Colombia when production was stifled in Chile.

A 2008 report by the US Ambassador to Chile illustrates that drug trafficking at the borders continues to be a problem with “drug traffickers us[ing] false compartments in suitcases and cars and body cavity smuggling to sneak drugs- almost entirely cocaine- into Chile via the Tacna-Arica border crossing. “Mules” also cross the land borders on foot at night, and some smuggle drugs by boat”.\(^44\) The majority of these ‘mules’ are indigenous Peruvian women, many of whom are apprehended meaning that over half of Arica’s female prison population is Peruvian. Drug smugglers will send mules across the dangerous border, riddled with mines, whose survival or not will show the danger points. It is believed by the drug lords that those who live in the Andes make the most proficient smugglers as they are accustomed to the high altitudes and can outrun law enforcement officers from the coast.\(^45\)

Drug enforcement is difficult in Arica being so isolated, in the desert, and with borders with both Peru and Bolivia, resulting in it being seen by traffickers as one of the easiest transit routes from South America to the US and Europe. Over 70% of all

\(^{43}\) Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21\(^{st}\) April 2014
\(^{44}\) \{WikiLeaks cable id =08SANTIAGO942_a \}
\(^{45}\) ‘Cocaine invades Chile, scorning the land mines’. Nathaniel C Nash \textit{New York Times} 23\(^{rd}\) January 1992
the cocaine products that flow through Chile pass through the region of Arica and Parinacota, totaling 2,409 kilos of cocaine and 1,738 kilos of pastabase.46

Drug enforcement agencies have therefore had to improve their detection efforts for example by introducing new scanners at the Chile-Peru border that examine about twenty people per day and in their first 9 months of operation discovered 90 kilos of cocaine in the stomachs of 65 different traffickers.47 However as border checks have become increasingly innovative so have methods to smuggle drugs. For example in 2015 a lorry was found to be carrying 33 kilos of cocaine formed into spheres, bathed in mustard, and covered in onion skins making them appear remarkably identical to real onions. They were only discovered when the goods were x-rayed at a border crossing.48

While Arica is usually a transit point between South America and the US and Europe, a significant amount of drugs remain in Arica, leading to by far the highest addiction rate in the country. One of the most common drugs is pastabase, a cheap but highly toxic and addictive intermediate byproduct from the production of cocaine hydrochloride and similar to crack. Daniel Valenzuela reported:

Here in the region the consumption of pastabase is really high, it’s one of the cheapest drugs, its easily accessible, there’s a lot of it in the city. Arica is the cheapest city in which to buy drugs, for example a wrap for two cigarettes with pastabase costs a thousand pesos, in other cities it costs five thousand, ten thousand, but this is a transit city where everything comes in from Peru or Bolivia... A significant number of people here acquire HIV from sexual relations under the effects of alcohol or drugs or to obtain drugs or alcohol.49

46 {{WikiLeaks cable|id = 171980_Chile and Drug Trafficking.doc}}
47 {{WikiLeaks cable|id = 2042935}}
48 ‘Falsas cebollas con cocaína fueron descubiertas en Arica’ Soyarica.cl 24th March 2015
49 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014
The small white bags that hold the pastabase are a common sight on the streets of the poorer parts of Arica and it has been estimated that every night as many as 11,000 youths smoke *monos*, cigarettes made of pastabase and tobacco. Youth drug addiction is shockingly high in Arica. Florencia Espinoza stated that “drugs were one of the first things that caught my attention when I came to Arica, because my work involved adolescents and drugs, it really struck me that there was high a level of drug use from adolescence and drugs that are very cheap, very poor quality, and very addictive”.

Youth gangs have existed in Arica since the 1980s, predominantly comprised of adolescents from poorer families, and become spaces of alcohol and drug consumption. These are male dominated gangs with women and girls playing a passive role as girlfriends or aiding in some crimes (Cayo, Benabarre & Garcia 2001). This culture remains today and “young people are consistently the high risk group, because of unsafe sex and heavy drinking”. This unsafe sex is exacerbated because to avoid becoming pregnant many young heterosexual couples are engaging in anal sex yet not using protection. There is also an increasing trend in Arica of young girls exchanging drugs for sexual acts, often without protection, from as young as eight or nine.

These reports from healthworkers illustrate how Arica’s border location has led to a culture of drug abuse; a large number of young people are taking advantage of the cheap and accessible although highly dangerous drugs such as pastabase. This is supplemented by a drinking culture which together result in a high level of risky sexual behaviour. Arica’s perennially warm climate and beach culture means that it’s

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51 Interview, Florencia Espinoza. 11th April 2014
52 Interview, Christian Hernández, 23rd April 2014
53 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014 HIV infection through anal sex is many times that of transmission through vaginal sex.
54 Interview, Florencia Espinoza. 11th April 2014
normal and socially acceptable to party on the street or the beach and drink throughout the day.\textsuperscript{55} This drinking culture means that in 2015 the National Commission for Transport Security named Arica as the Chilean city with most traffic accidents due to alcohol.\textsuperscript{56}

Alcohol is dangerous in numerous ways as it increases the likelihood of risky sexual behaviour but also facilitates the development of AIDS by acting as an immunosuppressor. Moreover, those who consume alcohol whilst being treated for HIV/AIDS are more likely to abandon their treatment; the allure of drugs tempts individuals living with HIV/AIDS away from their antiretroviral treatment that they abandon to often fatal results (Rosenbloom et al. 2007). Arica’s border location has therefore created a dangerous situation for those susceptible to drug and alcohol use who are more likely to become victims of substance abuse, accidents, and sexually transmitted disease.

**Migratory Workers**

Arica’s location on the border with Peru and Bolivia has resulted in the movement of sex workers and cheap drugs but also of migratory workers. The region of Arica and Parinacota has a large number of migratory workers, or a ‘floating population’ which is estimated to be 20\% of workers, comprised of those who work in mining, in transport, in agriculture, and other industries (Cortes at al. 1992). Many of these workers are Chilean as the national population is concentrated in the central region and so more workers are required in certain parts of the north. Many are also foreign as 27\% of foreigners living in Chile are located in the extreme north in the

\textsuperscript{55} Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11\textsuperscript{th} July 2014

\textsuperscript{56} ‘Arica es la ciudad de Chile en que hay más accidentes de tránsito por conductores alcoholizados’ La Estrella de Arica 28\textsuperscript{th} July 2015
three provinces of Arica and Parinacota, Tarapacá, and Antofagasta.\textsuperscript{57}

This is an at-risk population because the way of life of migrant workers is comprised of a series of factors that make them particularly vulnerable to HIV/AIDS (Campbell 1997). These risk factors are economic, social, and psychological elements that arise with migration. Migrant workers often spend months or years far from their families and so some workers, and/or their partners, visit sex workers or establish second homes while others work in the sex industry to relieve financial pressures. It then becomes more likely that if they contract the virus they will spread it as they move elsewhere (Parker et al. 2000). One study of migrant workers in Arica found that they are an at risk population due to spending long periods away from home, having multiple sexual partners and sex without protection and have low rates of HIV testing (Conley 2012).

One example of this has been the mining industry in Chile, which employs a vast number of migratory workers in the extreme north, many working in shifts of ten days on, ten days off which can contribute to sexual promiscuity.\textsuperscript{58} Mining in the north is a masculine industry whereby off-shift socialising is characterised by displays of male dominance, sexual prowess, and virility (Salinas Meruane et al. 2012).\textsuperscript{59} Chilean machismo is embodied in the northern miner, a man who can take care of his family, is virile and promiscuous, and engages in homosocial activities such as drinking, watching football, and gambling. Risky sexual behaviour among miners is concentrated on certain dates, namely the end of the month when there is an increase in mobility which is pinpointed as a period of increased sexual encounters.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{57} ‘Día del Inmigrante: ‘Chile es un País Abiertamente Discriminatorio y Racista.’’ Radio.uchile.cl. 18 December 2011
\textsuperscript{58} Mining exports accounted for 65.2\% of export value in 2007 and are concentrated in northern Chile. The industry in the region of Arica extracts non-metals, particularly clays and boron. Instituto nacional de Estadísticas, Santiago, Chile
\textsuperscript{59} Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11\th July 2014
\textsuperscript{60} Interview, Paulina Fuentes. 14\th March 2014
Another at-risk group of migratory workers is those in the transport industry. Many transport workers pass through Arica due to its port and location on the border. Valentina Araya told me how transport workers often have multiple sexual partners in their regular locations of travel, others will visit sex workers when they travel. They are a similar group to those in mining she argued. The Ministry of Health conducted an investigation in 2014 into lorry drivers, sampling around 100 individuals for HIV using a fast test that gives the result in fifteen minutes. No positive cases were found but the results are unlikely to be representative believed Daniel Valenzuela because participation was optional and so anyone who suspects they may be HIV positive would not choose to have the test. An HIV positive transport worker would be highly stigmatised because “Chilean lorry drivers are really discriminatory, against homosexuals, against those living with HIV, against transwomen or women”. In this way Chile’s culture of machismo exacerbates an already perilous health situation as it reduces rates of testing.

There is another group of workers who share many of the same characteristics as migratory workers in industries such as mining and transport yet do not officially show significant rates of HIV/AIDS; the armed forces. Military personnel in Arica are predominantly young men from regions far from Arica, many miles away from their families and yet they do not share the HIV/AIDS rates of other floating populations. Since the militarisation of Arica in the 1970s the region has had a great number of military personnel and so the absence of HIV/AIDS seems surprising. Is this an element of hope proving that certain groups can protect themselves from HIV or is there more to it than meets the eye?

61 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014
62 Interview, Catalina López. 21st March 2014; Interview, Paulina Fuentes. 14th March 2014
63 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014
Valentina Araya believed that compulsory testing and effective education has resulted in soldiers having greater awareness of the risks of unprotected sex and that is why they don’t acquire HIV;

The military take a compulsory test when they enter the military and it’s very important for them to take precautions... Educational workshops in the institutions [means they] seem as a whole to have a better understanding of taking precautions. I think it has to do with the weight of the institutions, if they contract HIV they won’t be fired but their bosses will find out, their colleagues too probably... the military are supposed to meet the standards of the institution... they have more awareness, more self-regulation because the institution demands it.64

This view was substantiated by a young soldier I interviewed who believed that the event of a soldier testing HIV positive “has not happened. Never in my career have I seen a soldier who is sick with AIDS and has to leave their job and the institution”.65 The soldier deemed this to be due to the education they receive in the military; “methods of prevention are recommended for people ... especially when you get to the unit, the brigade here, there are talks about prevention, about places, saying beware of certain sectors”. Perhaps education about HIV/AIDS really can work.

However, not everyone thinks that military personnel receive such effective education about safe sex that not one has ever acquired HIV. As one friend said to me “Everyone knows those in the military have HIV, it’s linked in our minds, military=HIV”. Gabriela Torres, an HIV/AIDS professional in Iquique confirmed that she did know of HIV cases in the military but often soldiers who test positive for HIV are moved to administrative roles in Santiago, “to a role away from the macho, boots on ground role. There is punishment and separation”.66 An HIV positive

64 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014
65 Interview, Matias Silva. 28th June 2014
66 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014
soldier is not seen as a reliable defender of the nation. Chilean legislation means that no-one with HIV/AIDS can be barred from a job or studying due to their health status but the armed forces is an exception to this. Compulsory health tests are undertaken once or twice a year in the military and HIV positive soldiers can be legally fired. The effect of this was explained by Daniel Valenzuela who clarified:

so the official figure of soldiers with HIV is zero, because they fire them, so when they come to the public health system they’re classed as civilians because they’re no longer soldiers… In the past year the rate of sexually transmitted diseases amongst conscripts has risen sharply… the conscripts are boys of eighteen, youth who come to the city, from the south of Chile, they begin having sex, they don't have a lot of information about where to find things such as free condoms so they get STD’s.67

This view suggests that the notion that no soldier ever acquires HIV is false, but instead that if a soldier does acquire the virus, they cease to be a soldier and appear as civilians in the health records. This highlights the difficulties in studying the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS in Chile, with inaccessible statistics and studies, such as of the transport workers, which are challenging to conduct. While exact figures cannot be currently known, certain risk factors suggest that migratory workers are disproportionately likely to acquire the HIV virus and that Arica as a region has a high number of migratory workers due to its border location. It can therefore be postulated that these migratory workers may contribute to Arica’s high rate of HIV/AIDS.

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67 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014
**HIV/AIDS in the Homobisexual Population of Arica**

While the previous examples of sex workers, drugs, and migratory workers are factors relating to the border that have resulted in Arica’s high rate of HIV/AIDS there are two other factors which do not relate to the border but are still important. In Chile more than 50% of new cases of HIV/AIDS between 2000 and 2009 were homobisexual men, in the Arica and Parinacota region alone, HIV cases increased by 36.7% among gay men and 52.6% among bisexual men between 1984 and 2009.\(^68\) For the first fifteen years of the epidemiology of virus in Arica only homobisexual men became infected.\(^69\) While there has been a rapid increase in cases attributed to heterosexual transmission, with a corresponding increase in the proportion of infections occurring among women, male-to-male transmission predominates in Chile (DeCock & Weiss 2000).

There is a great deal of stigma surrounding homosexuality in Chile with its culture of machismo that leads to covert and therefore riskier sexual behavior, as Valentina Araya described:

> homosexual relationships are much more hidden, they are not permitted…so that prevents them from accessing the health services that are available. Our society is very discriminatory, also because Arica is a relatively small city, people are going to be seen…it’s hard to go completely unnoticed. The same goes for sex, sometimes there are secret relationships, casual encounters so it’s really difficult in those situations to be conscious and aware about condom use and sexual health care… I couldn’t say that they use condoms less than heterosexuals, who also commonly have this kind of encounter… but among the homobisexual population this type of encounter is more common, they’re unable to establish a relationship like a normal couple…so they have these hidden relationships where the risks are higher….

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\(^69\) Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014
At every level there’s stigma so they distance themselves from taking tests.\textsuperscript{70}

While there are LGBT anti-discrimination laws in Chile they hold little power in reality and many services and institutions can turn people away based on their real or perceived sexuality. The Chilean state claims to be secular but again, this does not translate to practice.\textsuperscript{71} What does this mean for the lives of LGBT identified individuals at the border? LGBT individuals in Arica report less homophobic aggression than those in Santiago, however, those in Santiago report lower levels of discrimination and better social wellbeing than those in Arica (Barrientos-Delgado et al. 2014). This discrimination means that many men in Chile have sex with men but do not identify as gay and engage in homosexual activity secretly while in heterosexual relationships. This has contributed to the fact that most Chilean women who become infected with HIV do so by their husbands or long-term partners who contracted the virus outside of the relationship (Cianelli et al. 2008).

As in North America and Europe, the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Latin America was similar in that the initial cases were among homosexual men and injecting drug users and while in Chile the number of cases from intravenous drug use has been low, infections amongst homobisexual men has remained significant (DeCock & Weiss 2000).

\textbf{Child Sex Abuse and HIV/AIDS in Arica}

The other factor that influences the high HIV/AIDS rate in Arica but does not relate to the border is child sex abuse. Children and adolescents in Arica are at risk of contracting HIV due to high levels of child sex abuse, as Daniel Valenzuela reported;

\textsuperscript{70} Interview, Valentina Araya. 22\textsuperscript{nd} April 2014
\textsuperscript{71} Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12\textsuperscript{th} August 2014
“there are girls and boys of ten years of age who have contracted HIV through sexual transmission”.

There is a systemic problem in Chile highlighted by a 2006 UNICEF study on child abuse that reported that 75.3% of Chilean children interviewed had experienced some kind of physical or psychological violence by their parents. Chilean police statistics report that 4,500 sexual crimes are committed against children every year but the estimated figure is seven times that.

Child sex abuse is the most commonly reported crime in the courts of Arica (Galleguillos 2007). In the region of Arica and Parinacota in 2013, 608 individuals were arrested for domestic violence or ‘crimes against the order of the family’ including 32 cases of child sexual abuse. 1634 cases of domestic violence were reported to the police but did not result in one arrest. Once again statistics are limited, Daniel Valenzuela reported that information on HIV positive minors doesn’t give exact age or how the child acquired the virus, all raw information collected is sent to Santiago, processed and then sent back to Arica.

An influencing factor in the high rates of child abuse is the lack of information regarding sex and the rights of children, sex education does not begin until age 15 in Arica and private institutions have the power to prevent any sex education. While contracting HIV/AIDS is no longer a death sentence with appropriate treatment, it disproportionately damages the lives of children. According to Betancur Muñoz “children who live with HIV/AIDS suffer from high levels of prejudice and discrimination, in environments that do not know how to properly care for them” (2008:62).

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72 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014
74 Encuesta Nacional de Seguridad Urbana, 2012, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Santiago
75 Informe Annual Carabineros, 2013. Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Santiago
76 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014
77 ibid.
These factors that potentially contribute to the HIV/AIDS situation in Arica highlight the role of the border in health. Numerous state initiatives such as the regulation of sex work, the provision of resources for health campaigns, and with the mining industry, have either helped or hindered the HIV/AIDS rate. It is the combination of state initiatives with cultural and societal norms regarding sex, homophobia, and machismo that has created a certain biopolitical situation at the border that is highly violent against certain bodies. The second example of biopolitics at the border will take a different perspective to understand resistance at the border.

**Border Crossings for Healthcare**

The border through multiple factors has affected the health of a significant number of northern Chilean bodies with HIV/AIDS yet the border has also acted as a means of aiding healthcare provision for Chileans. An estimated 200 Chileans cross the border to Tacna in Peru in order to visit the doctor, dentist, and optician every day.78 Ariqueños place great value on the medical attention that can be found in Tacna; Chileans say they are well treated, consultations are quick, with accurate diagnoses and all at a low cost. The most common medical reasons are cardiology and ophthalmology (Podestá Arzubiaga 2011). Christian Hernández stated that “people travel to Peru for healthcare in abundance, I think our country is lacking in that area in terms of quality, cost and accessibility of healthcare”.79 Valentina Araya reported that Peru is popular for healthcare because it’s cheaper than in Chile, in Tacna’s Hospital de la Solidaridad, Chileans can be seen by a doctor for just US$4 and because it’s easier to book a consultation with a specialist.80 As Gabriela Torres

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78 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9SUT234auas&list=TLIDJuJ_lK2z0&index=8
79 Interview, Christian Hernández, 23rd April 2014
80 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014
recounted, the whole of northern Chile lacks specialists and so citizens are forced to travel to Peru. She believes that a lot of Chileans would pay for these specialists were they to exist in the north but instead Tacna has both the specialist and the lower prices.\textsuperscript{81}

These statements were supported by Florencia Espinoza who argued that healthcare is of comparable quality either side of the border but the Peruvians win on price and speed. In Tacna multiple tests can be taken on the same day that would be spread out over weeks in Chile.\textsuperscript{82} My own experience of buying prescription glasses was that I could have an eye test, choose the frames and the glasses were made all within the hour for a total price of under £35 for two pairs.

There has been some contention that Chileans are overcharged with Peruvians being charged less. This issue has endured for decades, for example a 1981 newspaper article in the local Chilean press that reported that for a medical consultation in Tacna a Peruvian would be charged 2500 soles and a Chilean 4000 soles.\textsuperscript{83} I spoke with a number of health clinics in Tacna and all assured me that today Peruvians and Chileans are charged exactly the same prices.\textsuperscript{84} Their businesses clearly rely on Chilean custom as all but one clinic stated that at least fifty percent of their clients were Chilean. The one clinic that claimed that very few Chileans visit was an obstetric-gynaecologist and the employee I spoke to was nervous to speak with me and clearly didn’t want me asking questions. Another obstetric-gynaecologist I spoke to said many Chilean women visit, either for gynecological check-ups or for ultrasound scans of their pregnancies.

\textsuperscript{81} Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11\textsuperscript{th} July 2014  
\textsuperscript{82} Interview, Florencia Espinoza. 11\textsuperscript{th} April 2014  
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{La Defensa}. 14th February 1980  
\textsuperscript{84} This finding is unsurprising as they knew or could easily guess that I lived in Chile.
Whether or not Chileans pay more than Peruvians, they still pay a lot less than they would in Chile with one Chilean woman claiming she has to pay 30,000 pesos to see a doctor in Chile but pays 2,400 pesos in Peru while another claims that “The people with money stay there [in Chile] but the people with less come here”. 85 This was corroborated by Constanza Sepúlveda a financially secure citizen of Arica who told me, “I don’t go for medical treatment in Tacna, I don’t trust it. I go to my doctor here, if I can buy medicines cheaper there though I will buy them in Tacna”. 86 Sergio Giaconi, General Manager of the Development Corporation of Arica and Parinacota (CORDAP) believes that these low prices are not a coincidence but are “a deliberate policy to attract people with cheap health services” as Tacna’s economy benefits enormously from Chilean spending in the region. 87 Therefore, due to pricing differentials between the two countries and the fact that Arica due to being located so far from the central region lacks specialists there is a significant amount of cross border activity for healthcare.

**Abortion in Chile**

However, not all of these visits across the border are for simple health check-ups or a new pair of glasses. Due to restrictive anti-abortion laws in Chile, some women cross the border from Chile to Peru in order to seek abortions.

Chile is one of 5 countries in the world with a total abortion ban; the others are El Salvador, Nicaragua, Malta, and the Vatican. Unusually, Chile has not always had a total ban. Abortions had been legal in some circumstances since the Health Code of 1931 and the medical community vastly improved women’s rights with regards to

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85 “Arica Chile es ensombrecida por progreso de Tacna Perú”
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BiNfJueKM1E&feature=share
86 Interview, Constanza Sepúlveda. 10th July 2014
87 El Mostrador. 29th January 2014.
reproduction throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. However, on the 15th September 1989 Pinochet’s military government, on the eve of their departure from office, imposed draconian abortion laws making the practice illegal in every circumstance including to save the life of the mother or for a baby with terminal abnormalities. From 1931 until 1989 therapeutic abortion, to save the life or health of the mother was permitted but one of the main players in Pinochet’s regime, Jaime Guzman, vowed to eradicate therapeutic abortion claiming that women should instead choose to be martyrs and confront death for their unborn child (Casas Becerra 1997). Pinochet deemed abortions to be an unnecessary evil due to advances in medicine and also restricted women’s access to contraception in the 1980s, a move that saw the incidence of abortion increase (Paxman et al. 1993).

Defying the legislation is dangerous for Chilean women; illegal clandestine abortions are significantly riskier to the health of the woman and the primary cause of maternal mortality in Chile is complications arising from clandestine abortions (Blofield 2008). Although mortality as a result of abortions has decreased in Chile, the number of abortions remains high and still contributes to a significant number of deaths (Szot & Moreno 2003). In 2003, 48% of all abortions worldwide were unsafe, and more than 97% of all unsafe abortions were in developing countries (Sedgh et al. 2007). Additionally, mortality due to abortion is between 10 and 100 times higher in Latin America than in most European countries (Paxman et al. 1993).
The United Nations identifies unsafe abortion as a major cause of maternal mortality with additional consequences including economic costs to health systems and families, stigmatisation, and psychosocial effects on women (Sedgh et al. 2007).\footnote{Unsafe abortion is defined by WHO as any procedure to terminate an unintended pregnancy done either by people lacking the necessary skills or in an environment that does not conform to minimum medical standards, or both.}

The medical cost of complications resulting from unsafe abortions can be enormous, in 1990 it was estimated that the cost of treating complications arising from abortions in Chile amounted to US$142 per patient (Gayán 1990). Beyond economics it is also highly traumatic for women to be forced to commit an illegal act because an abortion is not legally available, this is a double trauma of having to make the decision to undergo the abortion but also to commit a crime. Due to the illegality of the process women become vulnerable to other illegal activities and risky situations. One study of abortion in Chile found that three women she interviewed were told that the abortion provider required oral sex as well as cash payment. Others tell of dillitage and cutterage without anaesthetic, unsanitary conditions, and botched abortions (Casas...
Becerra & Vivaldi 2013). Women cannot report these to the authorities for fear of being prosecuted for seeking to terminate their pregnancy.

Abortion in Chile is as much about class as it is about gender. Illegality increases the cost of a safe abortion which means that in Chile, a country of high economic inequality, a safe abortion is prohibited to many poorer women. A safe abortion in Chile can cost US$500-1000 which is beyond the means of many Chileans, forcing them to seek unsafe, clandestine abortions, creating a distinction between poorer and wealthier women (Franceschet 2006). This has direct impacts on health as 3.8% of urban non-poor women who undergo abortions in Chile are expected to require hospitalisation compared to 37.5% of urban poor women (Singh & Wulf 1994). Historically the rate of abortion in Chile has been highest in unskilled manual workers (Armijo & Requeña 1968). Moreover, poorer women and girls in Chile are less likely to use contraception, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will become pregnant. In one harrowing study by Casas Becerra (1997) of dozens of women who were prosecuted for having had an abortion, for illegally performing abortions or for being accomplices to an abortion found that it was overwhelmingly poor women who were prosecuted. Casas Berreca concludes that abortion prosecution is discrimination on the grounds of poverty; middle and upper class women who can afford safe procedures are much less likely to suffer complications and find themselves in hospital.

Poor women who have no other choice than to undergo high-risk, unsafe abortions are far more likely to require post-abortion treatment in public hospitals where they can then be turned in to the authorities and prosecuted. In the 1990s, an estimated 150,000 women in Chile underwent abortions, 23,024 of whom were hospitalised. With an estimated 70,000 abortions currently taking place in Chile every year criminalising abortion does not prevent its occurrence but forces it underground
making it unregulated, dangerous, and more expensive, disproportionately affecting poorer women.

Judicial punishment is a significant risk faced by these women as abortion is criminalised in the articles 342, 343, 344 and 345 of the penal code, as an ‘illegal practice’ and the punishment for having an abortion in Chile is three to five years imprisonment and 541 days to three years for those who perform an abortion. Chilean legislation prohibits and punishes whoever carries out an abortion as well as the woman who consents to its undertaking (Szot & Moreno 2003). The Chilean state holds the power to decide what happens to women’s bodies. Biopolitical control means that if a woman attempts to take control of her own body she could become swallowed into the control of the regulatory state. The illegality of abortion in Chile drives pregnant women to face unsafe procedures; Blofield (2008) found that prohibitive laws on abortion correlate with high abortion and hospitalisation rates. CEDAW’s recent ‘Concluding Observations to Chile’ expressed concern that “abortion under all circumstances remains a punishable offence under Chilean law, which may lead women to seek unsafe, illegal abortions, with consequent risks to their life and health, and that clandestine abortions are a major cause of maternal mortality.”

Women are quite literally dying due to this legislation.

Penalisation of abortion does appear to be low in Chile, “although Chilean medical professionals should by law report illegal abortions to the authorities, less than 1% of women in hospital with abortion complications are reported” (Shepard & Casas Becerra 2007:206). This low reporting is likely due to the contradictions in medical professionals’ rights and responsibilities. While on one side of the debate, medical professionals are legally obliged to report possible crimes, they are also legally excused

from providing information in court which had been divulged under patient confidentiality. 99.5% of Chilean doctors and midwives cite the main reason for not reporting women who undergo abortions as due to medical ethics, with other professionals fearing that the more women fear being reported the less likely they are to seek treatment when they can still be helped (Shepard & Casas Becerra 2007). However, many women have still been penalised for having abortions in Chile and, when hospitalised, at a higher rate than in other Latin American countries (Blofield 2008).

Since the tightening of legislation by Pinochet the relaxing of abortion legislation has been attempted three times in 1991, 2001, and 2006-07 but all have been unsuccessful. Chile’s current president Michelle Bachelet, a socialist physician, has publicly stated that she will not support a change to the country’s laws on abortion, arguing instead for tackling the problem of preventing unwanted pregnancies from occurring in the first place (Franceschet 2006). While in 2015 there have been discussions over changing the law in exceptional circumstances, such as to save the mother’s life “because we’re talking about restoring a law which previously existed, its not anything new”, argued Daniel Valenzuela, but a change which would give women the option of an abortion because they “just do not want [a baby], because it is not in their plans, this issue will not be discussed at all…they’re not going to have a real discussion about the right to an abortion” 90 The debate is ongoing in congress at this time.

Many politicians choose to avoid the subject, as one Chilean senator stated, “the problem of abortion is already solved in Chile, because “everyone knows a doctor”” (Blofield 2008:414). This is untrue as it tends to be only better off women who know and can pay a confidential doctor. This type of statement negates the seriousness of

90 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014
abortion in Chile and acts to further control poorer women. While there have been protests and lobbying, the class divisions, whereby middle class women can afford safe abortions while poorer women can’t, mean there has been no solidified base of pro-choice activism.

One of the most common arguments for changing the law is that abortions are carried out regardless of the legal situation, about a third of all Chilean women have one or more induced abortions during their childbearing years and an estimate from 2008 calculated that nearly 40,000 teenage girls become pregnant and 35 percent of all pregnancies are terminated illegally each year in Chile (Hudson 1994).\(^1\) Chile’s abortion rate of 45.4 per 1000 women of childbearing age is, therefore, vastly higher than Catholic European countries such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal which have rates of 9.3, 6.4, and 11.6 respectively (Blofield 2008). Due to the inevitability of abortions occurring, some studies on abortion in Latin America have stressed that the most important challenge is not changing abortion legislation but by making the abortions which do occur safer, and improving treatment of women who develop problems after seeking an abortion (Winkinoff et al. 1991).

Catholicism is a primary obstacle to the lack of change in legislation in Chile. Legislation remains unchanged due to conservative Catholic elites in Chile but interestingly abortion rates are higher for Catholic women than for Protestants (Armijo & Requeña 1968). One study by Requeña (1965) found that the likelihood of having had an abortion actually increases with the Catholic woman’s degree of religious fervour. The ingrained cultural ideals of Catholicism, machismo and marianismo, have conflated womanhood with motherhood in Chile and made the reproductive rights of women a highly contentious issue. Chile is trapped between wishing to portray an international image of modernity and progress and being

\(^{91}\) ‘The slow life; The rights of Chile’s women’ The New York Times 1 May 2008
socially conservative as shown by the fact that divorce remained illegal in the country until 2004.

**Abortions Across the border**

This status of illegality, insecurity, and unlikely change in abortion legislation forces women to seek non-official solutions to unwanted pregnancies. In the northernmost region of Chile women have the opportunity of crossing the border to Peru easily and quickly to Tacna where abortion options are more plentiful and cheaper. It may seem surprising that women would choose to travel to Peru for an abortion where the procedure is illegal except in case of the threat to the life or health of the woman. A woman that consents to an abortion can be sentenced to up to two years in prison while anyone who performs an illegal abortion can be sentenced to one to six years in prison in Peru. As Gabriela Torres corroborated; “If a Chilean is found having an abortion with a provider in Tacna it is prison for the both of them”.

However, despite this abortions are more easily accessible, cheaper, and punished less often than in Chile. Healthworker Alejandra Flores suggests that women can find a level of anonymity in Peru that is almost impossible in Arica; “it’s more accessible, no-one asks any questions”. Clinics which practice abortions are also much more visible in Tacna, such as this clinic (Figure 90) which offers solutions for ‘late periods’ [retraso menstrual], a term commonly known to be a codeword for clandestine abortions. Codewords allow practitioners to deny that they practice abortions but also illustrate how the topic is often spoken around rather than directly with many people aside from healthworkers recoiling from terms such as ‘abortion’.

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92 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014
93 Interview, Alejandra Flores 22nd July 2014
These clinics can be run either by licensed physicians “who dedicate themselves just to [abortions], but there also a lot of people without medical training who practice abortions”. This creates a risk for women unsure of whether the procedure would be undertaken by a professional or not. Due to abortion still being illegal in Peru, women cannot use official channels to find an abortion provider. Recommendations tend to be word-of-mouth. Alejandra Flores stated; “I think you begin to ask. ‘Hey, do you know?’ So for example if I had a friend who went. It starts with contacting the friend of a friend of a friend of a friend who says go to the market, to I don’t know,

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94 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014
whichever street, there you ask for a certain woman, she tells you it costs 200,000 pesos for example”.95 Ana Castillo, an Ariqueña interviewee who had herself undergone an abortion in Tacna told me how she knew where to go because her aunt knew the system; “it’s popular knowledge, she was a direct source, she had taken people before, I knew I could trust her”.96 Ana was lucky enough to have financial and emotional support, her father paid the 100,000 peso fee (roughly US$145), and her mother and boyfriend accompanied her to Tacna.

Abortions in Peru are regarded by some as commonplace and safe with Alejandra Flores stating; “Of the few people I know who’ve been, no-one has had complications, as if they went for it over there and came back bleeding, they do it very well”.97 However, other views suggest otherwise, Gabriela Torres said; “I know it’s a risk that the standards of hygiene there aren’t the best, or so I have been told, that they’re scary places, but the situation is very… I don’t know. People are dying to have an abortion in Tacna, it’s not in the media, its not really spoken about. But everyone knows that people go to Tacna to do it”.98 Daniel Valenzuela raised concerns about the safety of abortions carried out in Peru; “they’re less regulated there, they don’t have the best conditions but still people from here and other parts of the north want to go to Peru for abortions. Because they know that even if it isn’t regulated, if it isn’t the safest they still go because at least it’s a possibility there… There a lot of people who go, to the places that aren’t the best, they’re clandestine, and after there are complications and they have to go with these complications to the health services in Chile”.99 Ana Castillo, the Chilean who underwent an abortion in Tacna recalled “obviously I was scared for my life, ay, it was awful, yeah I was terrified, it’s like these

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95 Interview, Alejandra Flores. 22nd July 2014
96 Interview, Ana Castillo. 17th August 2014
97 Interview, Alejandra Flores. 22nd July 2014
98 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014
99 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014
are things that aren’t legal you know, anything illegal is going to scare you because it’s not safe, you can’t go to someone if it goes wrong, you don’t have that right, there is no right to an abortion”. She described that the overwhelming fear was for her physical safety but her family were concerned about legal repercussions, speaking in low voices but in the gynaecology clinic “everyone knows what happens there and they protect each other”.

Women are deeply affected by this experience of having to cross the border, it is a trauma inscribed onto their bodies but is also emotionally traumatising. They are opening themselves up to risks and further violence. The work of Sharon Pickering (2010) has highlighted how women when forced to undertake extra-legal border crossings experience violence during the journey as well as at their destination. This also speaks to Arturo Aldama’s (2002) notion of the border being elastic, the border-crosser does not escape the border just by transgressing it physically, Chilean women seeking abortions in Peru are easily distinguished as vulnerable and more easily exposed to risks.

These examples show the lengths women are forced to go to due to the restrictions placed on them by the Chilean government. Valentina Araya suggested that the government’s stance on abortion is making a safe procedure, using medication, into an unsafe one. She remarked; “if the abortion medication is taken under the supervision of a doctor it’s a good method but if you do it alone its very risky, but as it isn’t permitted in Chile you’ll never be able to do it under the supervision of a doctor”. Better off women in northern Chile did previously have an alternative option under the supervision of a doctor, as Gabriela Torres who is a healthcare worker in Iquique reported; “in Iquique there was one gynecologist who

100 Interview, Ana Castillo. 17th August 2014
101 ibid.
102 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014
was effectively undertaking abortions, at a high cost, but he died, it was all undercover. His consulting room was always full but he died last year so now the women don’t have any other option but to travel to Peru”.

A very common abortion method for Chileans in Peru is misoprostol, a medication suitable for early-term pregnancies. Misoprostol can be administered orally but is more effective when administered vaginally with a reduction in the need for surgical intervention and the quicker onset of abortion after administration (El-Rafaey et al. 1995). If complications do arise from using misoprostol, the results are indistinguishable from that of a natural miscarriage meaning that the women can seek medical treatment without fear. Misoprostol is legally available in Chilean pharmacies for the treatment of stomach ulcers and is available on the mainly internet-based Chilean black market for between US$73-100, a lot of money for poorer Chilean women (Shepard & Casas Becerra 2007). It is therefore common for women to self-administer the pill in Peru where it is cheaper and more accessible or smuggle it back into Chile. According to testimonies collected by one organisation which helps women access safe abortions, Women on Waves, misoprostol “is very difficult to get” in Chile whereas in Peru “misoprostol is easily available under the brand names Cytootec and Misoprolen”.

Catalina López stated that “there are no official statistics about women who travel to Tacna for abortions but it is commonly known that abortion medications enter Arica, one called misotrol which terminates pregnancies before 12 weeks. It is relatively easy to bring them across the border because the SAG only looks at large quantities of products and one can pass through with medicine for personal

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103 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014
105 The brand name for misoprostol in Chile
consumption. Especially as Misotrol can be used to treat gastric diseases. But usually the customs have no idea, people put them in the bra, or wherever, in the wallet or purse because no one will check the body”. The advantageous location of Arica on the border in accessing misoprostol was mentioned by Valentina Araya;

“It’s common, I remember from my university days a lot of friends or acquaintances did it and it was known to be easy to go and get the medication to do the abortion… in Tacna because here in Arica, in Chile, the drugs were prohibited, they couldn’t be advertised or sold… if you go online sometimes there are offers selling them, but they’re very expensive, now in Arica it’s not necessary to buy them from the internet because you can travel easily to Peru and buy it there much cheaper. But in other parts of Chile they have to use the black market online.”

The wider awareness and availability of misoprostol through the Chilean black market or from Peru has made abortions much safer (Casas Becerra & Vivaldo 2013). A women’s collective run a telephone hotline providing advice about misoprostol to women seeking abortions. The network run by ‘Lesbians and Feminists for the Right to Information’ launched in 2009 and has received more than 10,000 calls, up to 15 a day. They are obliged to follow a lawyer-approved script that keeps them on the right side of the law.

Women can also find out information about using misoprostol safely though the Dutch organisation Women on Waves, best known for their ship campaigns whereby they take women outside the territorial waters of their country and perform legal abortions under Dutch law. Additional information can be found on blogs, free online books, Facebook groups, and through graffiti in public spaces (Figure 91, Figure 92 & 93).

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106 SAG is the Chilean equivalent of the UK’s Department for Food Environment and Rural Affairs
107 Interview, Catalina López. 21st March 2014
108 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014
Abortion is clearly a contentious issue in Chile and individuals or groups appearing to promote the procedure come under severe criticism. The dialogue between pro-life and pro-choice is literally taking place in the streets; Figure 92 shows a poster with an image of a foetus, interestingly a symbol usually employed by pro-life groups, with the words ‘this is not a human being’. A passerby clearly disagreed with this message and scrawled under it in marker pen ‘neither are you’. With official means of changing abortion legislation stalling at every attempt, activists employ alternative methods to show that not all Chileans agree with the status quo. Graffiti, an illegal act in itself, is used to spread information about abortions and resistance to Chilean legislation.

Figure 91: Graffiti written by a safe abortion hotline.
http://abortoinformacionsegura.blogspot.nl/?zx=fb31e2651c2ffef0 [accessed 25/09/2014]
Figure 92: Pro-choice poster. 2014. Author’s photo

Figure 93: Graffiti proclaiming 'LEGAL ABORTION NOW!’ 2014. Author’s Photo
There are no available statistics regarding the number of abortions carried out and even healthcare professionals cannot estimate the number. When Alejandra Flores, a healthworker at a university in Arica was asked whether students travel to Peru to undergo abortions, she replied; “At least we have not had a situation in which a student has had an abortion which has had consequences, or we don’t know. The midwife would see her and all that information is confidential and stays between them and the patient. I have no more information than that but I know that many people go to Tacna to have abortions”.110 Valentina Araya provided the following comment on Arica’s border location in relation to abortions in Peru; “there probably are more abortions in Arica with its proximity to Tacna but like I say, I don’t know the national statistics, so I couldn’t say for sure more or less, I just know that its easier here”.111

The only statistics available are for situations when complications occur. Valentina Araya stated; “there are no statistics, nowhere to search and review the information, but you find in the emergency services women arriving with complications from abortions or incomplete abortions, usually with more advanced pregnancies, bleeding problems, sometimes the doctors report it, often they don’t, they just sort the problem”.112 Daniel Valenzuela declared that “[l]ast year [2013] here in Arica they saw to around 300 and something abortions, girls who had done the abortion in some clandestine way here or in Tacna and unfortunately some residue remained”.113 The vast majority of these did not result in prosecution and in Arica in 2013, 2 individuals were arrested for crimes relating to abortions out of 14 nationally.114

Despite the lack of access to abortion statistics, Florencia Espinoza believed that

110 Interview, Alejandra Flores 22nd July 2014
111 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014
112 ibid.
113 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014
114 Informe Annual Carabineros, 2013. Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Santiago
fewer women may be seeking abortions due to the decreasing stigma surrounding teenage mothers. She stated; “I think the number of abortions has actually fallen, it used to be a bad thing to be pregnant so they would have an abortion but now there’s a lot more acceptance of unmarried mothers or adolescent mothers… there are also rumours that abortions there haven’t been good, so they run a risk by going there”.115 Arica now has the highest number of teenage pregnancies for girls under 15 in Chile and in 2010, 15.1% of girls fell pregnant between the ages of 10-19.116

The Chile-Peru case is not alone in terms of cross-border reproductive care, a trend that has risen globally seeing families crossing borders for fertility treatments, often to fertility centres in countries with less restrictive regulations (Gunnarsson Payne 2013). This ‘new reproductive mobility’ stands in stark contrast with the reproductive mobility that occurs between Chile and Peru yet also shares similarities in terms of state regulation and choice. The US-Mexico border also sees women crossing for abortion, either American women seeking access to abortions in Mexico when access has been denied to them in their own country or Mexican women seeking safe abortions in the US (Ojeda 2006). Canadian women have also contested the illegality of abortion in their own country by traveling to Japan, Poland, Sweden, Mexico, and Switzerland for abortions (Sethna & Doull 2012).

A case that shares some similarities is the restrictive abortion laws in Ireland that has resulted in a history of women traveling to Britain in search of the procedure. Approximations as to the number of Irish women seeking abortions in Britain vary. In 2001 an estimated 7,000 women travelled abroad to obtain an abortion and 2015 estimates suggest that at least ten women a day travel from Ireland to Britain for

115 Interview, Florencia Espinoza. 11th April 2014
116 Soy Arica. 7th August 2014; Subsecretaría de Salud Pública. Programa Nacional de Salud Integral de Adolescentes y Jóvenes
abortions. Many more purchase abortion medication on the Internet and self-administer. Various cases have gone to the Irish Court regarding the right of a pregnant woman to travel abroad in search of an abortion. The main difference with the case of Ireland is that Irish women travel to Britain where safe, legal abortions can be found while Chilean women travel to Peru where abortions are still illegal in most cases and visit unregulated clinics of unknown quality. Another difference is that Irish women, regardless of their location within Ireland are required to undertake a significant journey to Britain, across the sea. However, while most Chilean women cannot travel to another country easily and cheaply, those in northern Chile can travel to Peru very quickly and affordably.

Legislation allows the state to assert its power over its territory; the Chilean government dictates behaviour up to the edges of its borders. In this way, crossing the border becomes a space of resistance for Chilean women, a way to contest the restrictive laws on abortion decreed by Pinochet’s government and unchanged by consequent administrations. Usually undertaken out of desperation rather than as a subversive political act, these women are nevertheless opposing the suffocation of their biopolitical agency through refusing to be the passive subjects of the state’s reproductive control.

Conclusions

The border has not just been a space of violence at the national and international level, with almost-wars and damaging state policy, but is also a violent space at the level of the body. Individuals, especially those who are poor, LGBT, and otherwise marginalised are more likely to be victims of this violence due to biopolitical control.

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117 ‘Abortion in Ireland’. The Economist, 24 January 2002; ‘At least ten women a day travel from Ireland to the UK to have an abortion’. The Independent, 9 June 2015
The 1980s were a bad time for health in Arica, the HIV/AIDS crisis emerged and women’s bodies became increasingly regulated and controlled. The border provides the perfect conditions for violence in the form of HIV/AIDS with increased international movement, migratory workers, and cheap drugs but the border also provides an escape for women trapped by the state’s prohibitive abortion legislation as they can travel to Peru for the procedure. Through both these examples the act of sexual intercourse brings violence and danger to those inhabiting the borderlands. Sex comes with potentially fatal risks.

The region of Arica and Parinacota suffers from the highest rate of HIV/AIDS in the country and the border plays a significant role in this. The sex industry has become an unknown entity in Arica with the dissolution of monitoring and fluid population of foreign sex workers as well as those who do not identify as sex workers but engage in occasional paid sexual activity. The border also means that a large quantity of cheap and toxic drugs can be obtained in Arica leading to risky sexual behavior in which the HIV virus is more likely to be acquired. This risky sexual behavior is more likely to be concentrated in some groups more than others and migratory workers, of which there are many due to the region’s border location, tend to engage in unsafe sex practices due to being mobile and away from home for extended periods of time. Despite not being affected by the border, homobisexuality and child sex abuse are both factors that also influence the region’s rate of HIV/AIDS.

Unprotected sex brings another danger in Arica with the possibility of unwanted pregnancy. Chile’s machismo culture with many men and boys unwilling to practice safe sex and the lack of female sexual agency means that a large number of women and girls find themselves pregnant in a country which does not permit abortions.
under any circumstance. While economically privileged women can use contacts and money to obtain safe abortions with impunity this option is not available to many poorer women. Women in the north of Chile are in a unique position whereby they are easily able to travel to Tacna in Peru for cheap, available, although illegal and risky abortions. The most common choice is the drug misoprostol that is more easily available in Peru than in Chile and is safe if administered correctly.

These two examples of health crises on the border highlight the role of the state and society in regulating and punishing sexual deviancy. Arica’s border location has created conditions which are conducive to violence against the body in the form of HIV/AIDS but the border also allows women to escape from the repressive abortion laws in Chile, illustrating the inherently contradictory nature of Arica as a border city. Violence at the Chile-Peru border exists at multiple scales but these scales are not hierarchical, instead they are intertwined in a way that makes the international, the state and the body tied together in the same violent processes.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE MARITIME BORDER DISPUTE &
THE LEGACY OF VIOLENCE IN ARICA

Figure 94: Graffiti by Accion Poetica ‘That violence ceases to be tradition’. Acción poética
www.facebook.com/accionpoeticaenchile [accessed 09/03/2015]
The preceding four chapters have shown how the Chile-Peru border has oscillated over the past ninety years between being central to the Chilean state and at other times abandoned. Arica as a border city can epitomise the strongest sense of Chilean nationalism but also rejection of the Chilean state. This fifth and final empirical chapter first examines the 2014 maritime border dispute between Peru and Chile and then unpacks the three scales that have been present throughout the thesis; the international, national, and corporeal, to examine how the legacy of violence still exists today on this paradoxical border. These are presented together to illustrate the effect of ninety years of violence on the border, how bordering is an ongoing process and to emphasise the incongruity of Arica being both central and marginal to the Chilean state. Violence is always just below the surface in Arica, it flares up at key moments when sovereignty is threatened and is suppressed at times by the state and at other times by local citizens.

**Maritime Border Disputes**

Maritime border disputes are interesting phenomena that juxtapose the fluidity of the ocean with the challenges of demarcating a fixed line between sovereign states. The ocean is fluid in its transitory resources, its meteorological processes, and just by its very nature and due to this fluidity and wetness of the ocean. The oceans do divide, argued Hartshorne (1953), but they do not separate. Struggles over sovereign rights in the ocean are relatively new as the ocean became constructed “as an unboundable and empty space of movement- an external counterpoint to the emergent idea of the territorial state as a bounded area of control and development-in-place” (Steinberg 2009b:485). The ocean has been externalised, a counterpoint to the bounded, terrestrial state. In spite of the fluid nature of the oceans nation-states are increasingly
fixated on extending land boundaries into the sea and discovering that the sea brings distinctive challenges. This is contrary to how lines in the ocean have historically often acted to illustrate connections, with seafaring routes and passages rather than being lines of division (Steinberg 1999).

A historical interest in oceans has burgeoned in recent years with the *Journal of Historical Geography* and the *American Historical Review* both publishing special issues on the ocean in 2006. This scholarship “combines to demonstrate that different cultures produce different, and often contradictory, views of the ocean, all directly linked to, and produced by, different political-economic systems” (Reidy & Rozwadoski 2014:339). In the nineteenth century the world’s oceans became a space of scientific enquiry and intrigue with Britain and the United States leading this exploration. The doctrine of the freedom of the seas became pervasive and “the ocean was constructed as a space amenable to control by any nation that could master its surface and use its resources effectively” (Reidy & Rozwadoski 2014:350). Over the century nation-states began to assert exclusive rights over areas of or passages through the oceans resulting in border disputes such as this one.

States have traditionally been the format for conceiving of the world, neat territorial boundaries, rooted in terra, yet maritime disputes highlight that oceans too are sovereign spaces on which authority must be stamped. However, the ocean is not just a space for territorial conflict, it is a space in which politics are created. Since the 1990s geography has seen a turn to the hydrosphere particularly strongly within historical and cultural geography. Phil Steinberg’s *The social construction of the ocean* was the first major work to understand the sea as a historical and social space. Steinberg has addressed how the ocean is a social space which is not only ‘used by society’ but is ‘a space of society’, acutely involved in human lives (2001:6 original emphasis).
Politics are not only enacted, but also constructed in oceans, oceans are not separate from social life, argues Steinberg (2010; 1999), they shape and are shaped by socio-physical processes. It is a pertinent issue as only one third of potential maritime borders between states have been officially demarcated (Diener & Hagen 2012). Coastal waters tend to be the part of the ocean which sees particularly intense human-environment interactions due to the proximity between human settlement and spaces of rich resources (Viles & Spencer 1995). This is the key interaction that has caused the most controversy in the Chile-Peru maritime border dispute.

Kim Peters (2010) has called for more social and cultural insights into geopolitical situations and ‘legal’ geographies, which this chapter attempts to at least in part address. Peters is particularly interested in the ship as a legal space traversing the ocean whereas this chapter examines the legal geographies of border-making in the oceans. The Law of the Sea may be defined as the specialised set of decisions dealing with the nature and extent of control exercised over the marine environment (Alexander 1968). The legalities of the sea have become increasingly pertinent in recent decades as technology has developed allowing a greater quantity of resources to be extracted from the oceans and seabed and states therefore have greater incentive to claim exclusive rights over maritime territory. This growth in legal contestation can be seen by an increased focus on the maritime by groups such as the IBRU (International Boundaries Research Unit) who dedicated one of the five volumes in their 1991 World Boundaries Series to maritime boundaries.

While there are arguments against state-delimited maritime boundaries in favour of a more environmentally aware global structure the popularity of demarcation among states appears to be growing (Charney & Alexander 1991). The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into force in November
1994 and has been enormously influential in the settlement of international disputes with extensive provisions for dispute-settlement procedures.¹ Under UNCLOS over four hundred pending maritime boundaries became evident leading to the growth of demarcation even between states that hadn’t placed importance on the boundary (Alexander 1986). Chile and Peru however had previously been engaged in managing the boundary between them and UNCLOS made the situation problematic.

Maritime border disputes share some similarities with land border disputes yet there are some key differences such as physical demarcation of the border, differences in the concept of ‘volume’ below and above either the land or sea, and with very different resources involved. It is due to these differences that the maritime border dispute of the twentieth century cannot be seen as a simple extension of the land dispute addressed in chapter four but is a singular phenomenon. Parallels can be drawn in terms of the use of international diplomacy to settle a border dispute but the specifics show some important distinctions.

**The Chile-Peru Maritime Dispute**

The maritime border dispute between Peru and Chile formally began in 1985 with a statement by the then Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations Allan Wagner who raised his country’s displeasure with Chile’s unwillingness to open up a dialogue about the border. It came to international attention the following decade when Chile ratified UNCLOS in 1997 and, in accordance with its rules, in September 2000 Chile provided the UN with their maritime limitation documents which showed the parallel 18°21'00" as the maritime border between Chile and Peru. Peru voiced its disagreement with this border through a formal note sent to the United Nations on 7th

¹ UNCLOS is the international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place between 1973 and 1982. Boyle (1997)
January 2001, reiterating that it did not recognise the limitation claimed by Chile. In 2006, when the Chilean Senate approved the creation of a new region, the region of Arica and Parinacota, the northernmost boundary of the region was stated as ‘Hito 1 [Boundary Marker 1] in the Chilean sea’. This caused upset with the Peruvians who did not recognise Hito 1 as being in Chilean territory. On the 16th January 2008, the government of President Alan Garcia of Peru officially requested the involvement of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague, in the Netherlands. The ICJ is seen as the ‘go-to’ arbiter for maritime border disputes, which are the most common litigation submitted to the Court.

This preoccupation with maritime borders is consistent with other Latin American states who during the twentieth century were at the forefront of pushing for maritime legislation such as the EEZ and other territorial sea claims. The dispute was over 38,000km² of maritime sovereignty between Chile and Peru who claim, Chile from a legal standpoint and Peru from a geographical one, that it is rightfully their national territory. Chile claimed that the border runs parallel from the legally defined land border whereas Peru claimed that this is nonsensical and ignores the geographical bend in the coastline and so it should run equidistant between the states (Figure 95). According to Charney & Alexander (1991), when a maritime boundary dispute is being mediated the first point of consideration is the geography of the coastline and the second is the equidistant line. From the outset therefore Peru appears to have the upper hand before the ICJ based on its geographical claim.

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2 Exclusive Economic Zone’s (EEZ’s) were established by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and covers the area of ocean between 12 and 200 nautical miles off a country’s coastline and areas of the seabed between 12 nautical miles and the limit of the continental shelf (if further than 200nm from the coast). Morris, M. (1986) p.43
This is rooted in historical agreements that are retrospectively disagreed about by the nations. Both parties signed agreements in 1952 and 1954, which Chile argues were demarcations of territorial limits while Peru argues they only demarcated fishing rights and not sovereignty. The 1952 agreement also included Ecuador, the states trilaterally declaring claims to 200nm territorial seas, and Chile and Ecuador both claimed that maritime boundaries were established. These parallel boundaries agreed in 1952 are much less advantageous to Peru than lines of equidistance (Donaldson & Pratt 2005). The 1954 agreement created a special maritime frontier zone between Chile and Peru whereby “[t]he accidental presence in the said zone of a vessel of either of the adjacent countries shall not be considered to be a violation of the waters
of the maritime zone” and a map was produced illustrating the border that Chile claimed (Figure 96).³

Figure 96: Map showing the maritime frontier zones which Chile argued had been agreed between Chile and Peru in 1954. United States Department of State, Office of the Geographer, Limits in the Seas. No. 86 (Chile-Peru) 1979. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38820.pdf

These 1952 and 1954 agreements were drawn upon for Chile’s defence but Chile’s argument recalls numerous other historical agreements illustrating that Peru had agreed to the maritime limits they complained to the ICJ about on numerous occasions including the 1883 Treaty of Ancon, the 1929 Treaty of Lima, the 1947 declaration of 200 nautical miles of sovereignty and jurisdiction, the 1955 Peruvian statement, and agreements of 1968 and 1969. Chile’s defence was “[h]ence there should be no legal controversy as raised by the Peru on maritime boundaries, as these

were already established and respected”.

Peru had contested Chile’s claims in documents in 1968 and 1969 but nevertheless conformed to the agreed boundary limits and with Chile built lighthouses at the maritime border, the parallel passing through ‘Hito 1’ [Boundary marker 1] (Santis Arenas & Gangas Geisse 1995). Chile took this building of lighthouses at an agreed location as confirmation of the official maritime border between the states (Infante Caffi 2014:16).

With this history of the dispute and Chile refusing to recognise Peru’s claims, some kind of third party settlement had to be sought. But why was the International Court of Justice (ICJ) chosen by Peru? For the Peruvian state it was unavoidable that Peru would have to seek peaceful mediation due to Peru being a signatory of both the UN Charter and the Pact of Bogotá. The UN Charter prohibits the use or threat of force in order to solve disputes and instead states that; “The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice”.

The American Treaty on Pacific Settlement or Pact of Bogotá of 1948 that was signed by both Peru and Chile likewise obliged the parties to seek pacific means to their dispute. The Peruvian government legitimised the need to use international mediation by arguing that its claims have ‘constantly met with a refusal from Chile to enter into negotiations’, and that since 2004, the Chileans officially have closed the door for future negotiations. Moreover, settlement by the ICJ tends to be cheaper than a tribunal organised independently by both parties and has the benefit of authority and

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4 ‘La Defensa de Chile en la Corte Internacional de La Haya’ (2012) Libertad Y Desarrollo Temas Publicos 1091
5 United Nations Charter Chapter VI, Article 33
6 ICJ Peru Institutes Proceedings against Chile with Regard to a Dispute Concerning Maritime Delimitation between the Two States. Press release, 16 January 2008
a reputation as a fair and independent organisation. Chile as a nation has historically prided itself on its respect for order, institutions, and stability, which may account for Chile’s willingness to conform with Peru’s application to the ICJ (Van Der Ree 2010). There are clear parallels here between the 2014 maritime dispute mediated by the ICJ and the involvement of the United States in the 1920s plebiscite as seen in chapter four. Chile and Peru, so emotionally tied to the territory between them were unable to reach a compromise themselves and so looked abroad to a respected international third party who could deliver the necessary detachment and fairness. Yet again, international mediation was being employed in order to ‘suture’ the border, the wound of the Chile-Peru border that refuses to heal.

As gleaned from interviews with citizens of Arica, some saw the dispute as detached from their daily lives at the border and more about point-scoring between Santiago and Lima. Nationalism and disputes with long-time enemies are a useful strategy employed by governments to quell social discontent within a country. Both Peru and Chile are politically divided countries with high levels of social inequality; the protraction of territorial disputes with one another could serve their presidents well. General Odlanier Mena, head of the army for many years in Arica said on the issue:

A section of the Peruvian government, non-military curiously, are always looking for things that could hinder the relationship, because it’s a way to maintain national unity. I don’t know how it will finish, because it’s a claim that has no international legal grounds but I think we have to keep a cool head and think about what we gain from a new demand, that just creates problems... I don't think it will end in anything, it can’t end in anything.7

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7 Interview with General Odlanier Mena, La Estrella de Arica 19th March 2006
Matias Silva, a young soldier I had interviewed reported that; “[on the day of the ruling] It was completely normal, in fact there is, we... I could see through the TV, but the army never had a degree of readiness, not even a rumour. Everything was normal and peaceful. It was totally normal, at no point did we prepare for anything, or were ready for something”.

However, some citizens expressed an element of fear over the dispute, aware that Arica would be the centre of any military action were it to occur. On a personal note I was warned to stay at home and avoid the city centre on the day of the ruling. The tensions on the matter rose to such heights that newspapers started speculating about an armed conflict. I spoke to Felipe Ramírez who is engaged with migrants and their struggles every day in his work with a Jesuit organisation, Ciudadano Global, which fights for migrants’ rights. Ramírez indicated how nationalist sentiments emerge during disputes even on a peaceful border; “we have a relationship of fluidity across the border with Tacna but with the situation with The Hague, these nationalist sentiments resurfaced, ‘ah these Peruvians’, yet you have this great human stream through Chacalluta between Chile and Peru, a flow of trade”. The group most concerned were Arica’s fishermen, who didn’t know what would happen to their prime fishing grounds if the maritime border was changed.

Whether seen as a nationalistic chess game or a real threat to the livelihoods of locals, there was no doubt that as the dispute heightened, the more prominent Arica became in the national imagination. As has happened on numerous occasions in the history of Arica, this marginalised border city has only been defended and supported by the state when it has been threatened by an outsider. The dispute became a national pastime for both Chilean and Peruvians, with citizens and organisations from both

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8 Interview with Matias Silva. 28th June 2014
9 Interview with Felipe Ramírez. 1st April 2014
states putting forward their arguments as to why their position is correct. One very
persuasive tool in these arguments was maps of the disputed maritime area. For
example, the two maps below (Figure 97 and Figure 98) from a Peruvian lawyer and a
Chilean nationalist group show the differences in how cartography can be used to
persuasive effect. The Peruvian map skews the compass to point North-West so that
the parallel that Chile argues is the maritime limit appears to divert away from the
Chilean coast while the Chilean map uses persuasive language in the legend to
legitimise Chile’s claim and to downplay Peruvian ‘allegations’.

Figure 97: Map presented to the ICJ by Peruvian lawyer Alain Pellet showing the persuasive power of
maps. The Map points North-West making it appear that Chile’s claim for maritime territory is more
Persuasive maps are, put simply, maps designed to promote one viewpoint or perspective over another (Tyner 1982). While they have been popular throughout the history of cartography they are increasingly easy to make and to disseminate to a large global audience thanks to technology and the Internet (Muehlenhaus 2014). J B Harley (1989) has been influential in problematising the ‘scientific’ or ‘objective’ claims of cartographers and instead used deconstruction to break the assumed link between reality and representation. Influenced by Foucault and Derrida, Harley has shown how space is not represented equally in maps, rather maps emphasise power. Power is exerted on cartography and with cartography and this can be seen through the Chilean and Peruvian maps presented here. By choosing specific language, symbols, shading, scale, or perspective the map makers are able to promote their viewpoint over another and reach a worldwide audience rapidly online.
The Ruling and its Impacts

On 27 January 2014, the International Court of Justice delivered its judgment on the maritime boundary dispute between Peru and Chile (Peru v. Chile, Judgment, General List No. 137), detailed legal accounts of which can be found elsewhere (Riesenber 2014; Ahumada & Pardo 2010). The Court had to determine first whether a maritime boundary existed between Peru and Chile and if so, to consider the nature and extent of the boundary. After years of deliberation the ICJ closed the case by defining “the course of the maritime boundary between the Parties without determining the precise geographical co-ordinates. It recalls that it has not been asked to do so in the Parties’ final submissions. The Court, therefore, expects that the Parties will determine these co-ordinates in accordance with the Judgment, in the spirit of good neighbourliness”. The course of the new boundary is shown below in Figure 99.
The ICJ recognised Chile’s claim that Peru had agreed to the prior border demarcation based on the 1952 and 1954 agreements as had the international community and therefore Chile could invoke the doctrine of estoppel in order to prevent any change to the current status quo. However the ICJ was unable to find concrete proof that Chile and Peru had agreed upon the parallel line argued by Chile as being the maritime boundary between the two countries “and since no maritime delimitation has ever been effected, Peru considers that this dispute is to be settled pursuant to Articles 15, 74, and 83 of UNCLOS in so far as they constitute customary international law and concern States with adjacent coasts. This, in manifest rejection

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11 Estoppel precludes "a person from denying, or asserting anything to the contrary of, that which has, in contemplation of law, been established as the truth, either by the acts of judicial or legislative officers, or by his own deed, acts, or representations, either express or implied". ICJ Press Release. Maritime Dispute (Peru vs. Chile) The Court determines the course of the single maritime boundary between Peru and Chile. 27th January 2014
of the method of the geographical parallel which, according to Chile, forms the alleged existing maritime boundary” (Horna 2009:9).

Chile and Peru both accepted the ICJ’s decision and began making changes to legislation and the border demarcations. Peru is not a signatory member of UNCLOS and so had to change its maritime legislation to allow for the free navigation of maritime traffic of either state or third party without prior notification. Chile, as an UNCLOS member state, only had to make minor adjustments to its legislation. Shortly after the ruling, on the 25th March 2014, Peru and Chile worked together to agree on the co-ordinates of the maritime border, an act of co-operation that took place promptly and efficiently.

However, not all of the legal repercussions have gone smoothly. As has continuously occurred in the history of the Chile-Peru border, one issue was left pending; ‘Hito 1’ [boundary marker 1]. The problem with Hito 1 is that it is located inland and so there is a dispute over whether the maritime boundary should begin geographically parallel to Hito 1 or follow the agreed international border- the line of Concordia. This leaves 3.7 hectares in dispute, 300 metres of coast that has been dubbed a ‘dry coast’ (Figure 100). It means that the land territory is under Peruvian sovereignty but they cannot enter the sea on those 300 metres as it belongs to Chile. In another example of maps being used as tools of persuasion, map Figure 101 by a Chilean nationalist group uses language and cartographic techniques to ridicule Peruvian claims to the ‘dry coast’.

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12 La Estrella de Arica. 29th January 2014
Figure 100: Map showing the triangle of ‘dry coast’ in dispute. Author’s own.

Figure 101: Map created by ‘Defense of Sovereignty Corporation’ which uses techniques such as placing the label ‘Chile’ over territory claimed by Peru and marking Peru’s claimed border landmark as ‘false Concordia point’.
http://www.soberaniachile.cl/argumentos_contra_la_pretension_peruana_de_alterar_el_limite_maritimo.html [accessed 26/03/2014]
Officials from both Chile and Peru have been vocal about Hito 1. The then Chilean President Sebastian Piñera said The Hague declared that “the maritime boundary begins at the parallel Hito 1, [and so] confirms the Chilean terrestrial domain of the respective triangle”. Meanwhile, Chilean ex-Prime Minister Eduardo Frei responded to Peruvian claims over the 3.7 hectares saying that “I consider the attitude of the Government and the Peruvian Foreign Ministry not only unfriendly, but aggressive”. On the other side of the border Peruvian President Ollanta Humala dismissed the significance of this saying that the ICJ had to state Hito 1 as the boundary because the Court did not have the jurisdiction to rule on land borders while Peruvian Foreign Minister Eda Rivas downplayed the ‘dry coast’ saying that there are six other such coasts in the world and so the “triangle is not in dispute”.

Aside from the Hito 1 controversy, the general atmosphere in Arica with the ruling appeared to be that it was a shame that Chile lost territory but “it wasn’t as bad as it could have been”. As one Peruvian historian has concluded, the decision made by The Hague could be an opportunity to close the historical conflict with dignity and open a door to a future of co-operation between the two states (Zapata 2011). However, on the day of The Hague’s ruling there was civil disturbance in the city of Arica with a “small mob of residents including fishermen… [that] grew to four thousand people” thought to be unhappy with the fact that territory was ceded to Peru, five of whom were detained by police. The Peruvian press tended to focus on the high number of angry protesters while in contrast, the Chilean press estimated that just 200 residents of Arica were protesting and the demonstration lasted “a couple

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13 Expresidente chileno acusa a Perú de actitud ‘agresiva’ e ‘inamistosa’” RPP 27th August 2014
14 ‘Los movimientos peruanos que apuntan a recuperar Arica el 2050 y el abandono en que la tiene Chile’ El Mostrador 29th January 2014
15 ‘Pescadores de Arica: “Hubo un fallo adverso, pero no tan malo como esperábamos”’ La Tercera 27th January 2014
16 El Comercio. Lima, Peru. 27th January 2014
of minutes before rapid intervention from police, who used a water cannon to disperse the people”.17

Figure 102: Demonstrators dispersed with a water cannon. ‘Fallo de La Haya: más de 200 personas protestaron en Arica y hubo disturbios’ Soyarica.cl 27th January 2014

The demonstration was led mainly by fishermen but amongst the general public the decision was taken calmly, with over 90% of the Chilean public thinking that the decision of the ICJ should be respected.18 Another questionnaire of citizens in Arica found that Ariqueños see the ICJ ruling as insignificant in comparison to other challenges faced by the region (Figure 103). Likewise, the ruling has been seen by politicians and business leaders as an opportunity to forget the past conflicts between Chile and Peru and to focus instead on the ever-growing ties between the countries. Bilateral trade has grown to over US$3 billion a year, Chilean companies have invested over US$13 billion in Peru, and 158,000 Peruvians live in Chile.19

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17 ‘Fallo de La Haya: más de 200 personas protestaron en Arica y hubo disturbios’ Soyarica.cl 27th January 2014
19 ‘A Line in the Sea’ The Economist. 1st February 2014
One article in the local press after the ruling stated that; “In day-to-day terms the limits continue to be used the same as they have been for 50 years because the implementation of the ruling will be yet still another process that will have to be solved with the Incan country”. 20 This appears to be true to some extent as a year after the ICJ ruling it was noted by one newspaper that the implementations promised by Chile and Peru still had not been carried out. 21 Another article wrote-off the significance of the ICJ decision, declaring that the border dispute was not settled and that by 2050 Arica would be Peruvian through way of peaceful negotiation. This was deemed to be due to the fact that Arica feels abandoned by the Chilean state while the

20 La Estrella de Arica. 29th January 2014
21 ‘A un año de La Haya: El entrampado camino de Chile y Perú para implementar el fallo.’ Emol 27th January 2015
Peruvian government “has spared no efforts in promoting Tacna in view of a great future”.

Chile has felt that it has been treated unfavourably by the ICJ on a number of occasions. For example losing the Laguna del Desierto area to Argentina, the possibility that Chile will lose more territory to Argentina in the Southern Patagonian icefields, and could potentially also cede territory to Bolivia who have presented a case for access to the sea to the ICJ. While the focus of this thesis is the Chile-Peru border, the influence of Bolivia is never far away. In 2013 Bolivia filed the case to the International Court of Justice in an attempt to reclaim access to the Pacific Ocean that was lost in the War of the Pacific. Bolivian President Evo Morales is convinced that his people have a rightful claim and is confident that the ICJ will recognise Bolivian sovereignty. Chile meanwhile is refusing to engage in dialogue with Bolivia instead arguing that the 1904 Treaty of Peace ratified by both nations asserted Chilean sovereignty and therefore the ICJ will not accept Bolivia’s dismissal of the Treaty. In May 2015 Chile officially requested that the ICJ declare that Bolivia’s claim is not within the jurisdiction of the Court, a request refuted by the ICJ in September 2015. The case will unfold over the next few years and it could have impacts on both land and maritime boundaries between Chile and Peru. If the ICJ rules against Chile in these pending cases, may Chile withdraw from the ICJ and refuse to recognise ICJ rulings? There is a chance that Chile, which has traditionally been open to international mediation, may become hostile to foreign intervention and any Chilean politicians showing strength by standing up to outsiders are likely to be met favourably by Chileans.

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22 ‘Los movimientos peruanos que apuntan a recuperar Arica el 2050 y el abandonó en que la tiene Chile’ El Mostrador 29th January 2014
Artisanal Fishermen in Arica

As previously mentioned fishermen made up a large proportion of those who demonstrated against the ICJ ruling, with the majority of these being artisanal fishers. There have been debates as to the extent to which fishermen have suffered from the ruling. With this focus on fish we can see the ways in which nationalist discourses can run alongside practical, resource-based claims. Maritime resources have long been a source of contention between nations, from the British-Icelandic Cod Wars, as well as the Northern Atlantic more generally, numerous problems border issues with fishing rights in the Indian Ocean and the USA-Canadian shared Salish Sea (Cushing 1979; Archer & Scrivener 1982-1983; Wadewitz 2012). The immediate response from Chilean officials was relief that fishermen in Arica hadn’t lost their valuable fishing grounds, arguing that the majority of fish caught is within 60 nautical miles of the coast. Peru was granted control over 50,000 km² of open ocean, but Chile retained its hold over 16,000 km² of the disputed waters, including the rich fishing grounds closer to shore. The Chilean Minister for the Interior declared that ‘practically 100%’ of the fishing in Arica occurs within the 80-mile limit. Anchoveta, the fish with the greatest catch in Arica was deemed to be unaffected as 58% is found within 10 miles of the coast and 80% found within 20 miles, and other widely caught fish such as Pacific pilchard and mackerel also remain in Chilean waters (Alessandri 2014; Infante Caffi 2014). One port worker I spoke with some months after the ruling stated that “absolutely nothing has changed, absolutely nothing, it’s too far out to make any real difference”.

24 The term ‘artisanal’ is translated from the Spanish ‘artesenal’ which denotes small-scale, craft based fishing.
25 ‘Chadwick: “Casi el 100% de la actividad pesquera de Arica está debidamente resguardada y protegida”’ El Morro Cotudo 27th January 2014
26 Interview, port worker. 11th August 2014
However, on the contrary, other artisanal fishermen in Arica have asserted that they have been adversely affected by the ICJ decision and have attempted to seek compensation from the Chilean government for their losses. They had been pessimistic even before the ruling claiming that they could be affected “in a direct and irreparable way”. The day of the ruling, fishermen took to the streets in their hundreds claiming that Chile should not accept the ICJ’s decision. There were reports of racist anti-Peruvian chants alongside the signing of the hymn of Arica and the


28 ‘Pescadores artesanales de Arica esperan con pesimismo el fallo de La Haya: “Sería un terrible daño”’ *Soyarica.cl* 27th January 2014
waving of Chilean flags. The group marched to the local regiment barracks where they were promptly dispersed by armed forces.29

Figure 106: Fishermen and others demonstrate on the day of the ruling. The placards read; “No more abandonment”, “Centralism won’t shut us up” and “Not even one metre of sea to Peru”. ‘El día de furia de los pescadores’ El Morro Cotudo 28th January 2014

Figure 107: One demonstrator holds a placard reading “Now Chile remembers Arica” ‘El día de furia de los pescadores’ El Morro Cotudo 28th January 2014

29 ‘El día de furia de los pescadores’ El Morro Cotudo 28th January 2014
Five months after the ruling, artisanal fishermen demanded compensation from the government to make up for their losses resulting from the change in the maritime border. One fisherman claimed; “We believe it is the obligation of the state to protect our people. We hope that the highest authority in the country knows of our demand so that they can help us”.\(^\text{30}\) The president of the local fishing union said; “We are not asking for money, we have to make that perfectly clear; but we are looking at how we fish, it’s our way of life”.\(^\text{31}\) He also asserted that local fishermen fish beyond the 80-mile limit much more frequently than claimed by the Chilean government and due to the ruling stating that territory beyond 80 miles is now Peruvian, fishermen in Arica have lost 60-65% of their catch.\(^\text{32}\) The Chilean government did set out a plan for local

\(^{30}\) ‘Pescadores artesanales de Arica piden compensaciones tras el fallo de La Haya’ *El Morro Cotudo* 28\(^{\text{th}}\) June 2014

\(^{31}\) ‘Tripulantes de naves especiales de Arica solicitan ayuda por pérdidas tras fallo de La Haya’ *El Morro Cotudo* 9\(^{\text{th}}\) September 2014

\(^{32}\) ‘Pescadores artesanales de Arica y fallo de La Haya: “Hemos sufrido pérdidas entre 60% a 65%’ *El Morro Cotudo* 21\(^{\text{st}}\) February 2014
fishermen immediately after the ICJ ruling promising benefits to artisanal fishermen such as better job security, pensions, and a ‘sea mall’ for selling their catch.\textsuperscript{33}

However, since the ICJ ruling, fishermen have continued to feel prejudiced with government plans to move the fishing port used by artisanal fishermen. They claim that they, who fish for local human consumption are being moved out to make more space for the industrial multinational companies who produce fishmeal. They see it as a decision from Santiago by people who are unaware of the needs of Ariqueños.\textsuperscript{34} Fishermen complained that the Chilean state never took any notice of them until the ICJ ruling.\textsuperscript{35} To make matters worse, Peruvian President Ollanta Humala boasted about Peru’s territorial gains, bragging that they now held the once-Chilean rich fishing grounds. This was noted as an attempt by Humala, whose popularity had been taking a steep decline, to win back the nationalist support.\textsuperscript{36}

Another local fisherman claimed that the abandonment and decimation of the artisanal fishing industry has nothing to do with the ICJ ruling but with the Chilean fishing industry and in particular the monopolisation by a few elite-owned companies, CORPESCA being the largest in Arica.\textsuperscript{37} Unsurprisingly, with its huge proportion of coastline to landmass, Chile is a country that relies heavily on marine exploitation, with Chile’s commercial catch in 2010 being the seventh largest in the world.\textsuperscript{38} Fishing is mainly controlled by a very small number of large industrial firms but Chile still has 86,000 independent fishermen.\textsuperscript{39} However, due to the large-scale aggressive

\textsuperscript{33} ‘Gobierno presentó plan de compensación a pescadores ariqueños por fallo de La Haya’ \textit{El Morro Cotudo} 30\textsuperscript{th} January 2014

\textsuperscript{34} ‘Pescadores Artesanales de Arica rechazan plan que los saca del muelle pesquero’ \textit{El Morro Cotudo} 9\textsuperscript{th} August 2014

\textsuperscript{35} ‘Los movimientos peruanos que apuntan a recuperar Arica el 2050 y el abandono en que la tiene Chile’ \textit{El Mostrador} 29\textsuperscript{th} January 2014

\textsuperscript{36} ‘World Court decision on Peru-Chile border fails to quell nationalist rivalries’ \textit{World Socialist Web Site} 4\textsuperscript{th} February 2014 http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/04/peru-f04.html

\textsuperscript{37} ‘Pescadores de Arica y Parinacota preocupados por el monopolio de Corpesca’ \textit{El Morro Cotudo} 24\textsuperscript{th} January 2014

\textsuperscript{38} ‘Fishing in Chile: Net Profits’ \textit{The Economist}. 11\textsuperscript{th} August 2012

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{ibid.}
operations carried out by the industrial firms, artisanal fishermen are struggling to catch enough to make a living.\textsuperscript{40} Artisanal fishers catch on average the same amount in one year as one industrial trawler catches in just one day. The majority of the catch is exported or processed into products such as \textit{harina de pescado} [fishmeal] to increase its potential export value, the national production of which is centred in the north around Iquique and Arica.

The discontent among fishermen with the ICJ ruling is just one issue of contention they have with the Chilean state. The fishing industry and the laws surrounding it have been declared as corrupt by some sectors, particularly after the 2013 law promulgated by former finance minister Pablo Longueira. The law safeguarded fishing rights for seven families who control four commercial fishing firms for the next twenty years (accounting for 92\% of the national industry) and Longueira himself has been identified as one of the greatest beneficiaries of the legislation for his role in one of the four firms, the Angelini Group. This disproportionately affects northern Chile where the Angelini Group controls 90\% of all fishing quotas, working through companies they own such as Corpescsa, Orizin, and South Pacific Korp. The Angelini Group is currently the world’s second largest producer of fishmeal. Accusations of bribery became public knowledge in May 2013 with proof that certain governmental ministers in the north had been bribed to back legislation that would benefit these large fishing companies. In one well-known case, Marta Isasi, a deputy in the national parliament, received a US$50,000 payment from fishing giant Corpescsa SA ahead of the vote on the fisheries law.\textsuperscript{41} Isasi faces fraud charges that are ongoing.

Another claim is that the law has made indigenous groups ‘legally invisible’ by stripping them of their access to fishing grounds and of their rights to fish in

\textsuperscript{40} ‘Industrial fishing threatens Chile’s fishermen’ \textit{TIME Magazine}
\textsuperscript{41} ‘Chile: Artisan Fishermen vs. Industrial Fishermen’ \textit{Pulitzer Center} 20th June 2013
traditional ancestral ways. Artisanal fishers are penalised by aspects of the new law such as mandatory GPS on every boat and licenses that are a great expenditure and disadvantage many fishermen. As one artisanal fisherman stated; “The ships that go after all the large fish, they have radar they have everything they need to capture the big ones and follow the schools of fish, they always take the biggest ones and leave the smallest ones, these are what they leave, the fish for the people, the rest are for foreigners, they are industrial fishermen, we are artisanal fishermen, and these are the only fish left for us”.

Proof of this closed, corrupt market is, argues another source, the fact that Chile has the 7th largest national catch in the world yet this amounts to just 0.4% of GDP. The profits of fishing are clearly going elsewhere than into the national purse. This has raised debates over whether fish and other marine resources are public or private property in Chile, one view is that the process is “applying capitalism to living resources”. The advance of neoliberal administrations since 1973 in Chile and 1990 in Peru has been pinpointed as the cause of marine overexploitation in both countries. Trade liberalisation has meant that Chilean fisheries production but also overfishing has increased considerably since Pinochet took office. His belief that fish stocks were copious and that market-based solutions could solve any problems led him to remove access restrictions in the 1970s (Ibarra et al. 2000).

Longueira claimed that his changes to fishing legislation would benefit artisanal fishermen by giving them exclusive rights to the first mile from the coastline (even though the prior rights were to the first five miles) and that the law was necessary in

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42 ‘El Caso Penta y la Ley Longueira de Privatización Pesquera’ Radio Del Mar January 2015
43 ‘Chilean Government Set To Approve Law Local Fishermen Say Would Harm Their Livelihood’ Mint Press News 15th July 2012
44 Miguel Angel Maureira, Artisanal Fisherman, Caleta Membrillo, Valparaiso ‘The Privatization of Chile’s Sea’ The Real News 18th January 2013
45 ‘Ley de Pesca, una gran mentira a revelar en el Senado’ Chile Pesca. 25th October 2014
46 ‘Chilean fishermen forced to take the bait for big business’ Equal Times 18th March 2013
order to ensure the sustainability of the fishing industry, which has faced severely diminising yields in recent years due to overfishing.\textsuperscript{47} The decline of resources which have traditionally been found in Arica such as clams, scallops, and oysters due to this overfishing has been keenly noted by some citizens of Arica as shown by the following posts on social media:\textsuperscript{48}

- “I remember when we would find mountains and mountains of clams… clam empanadas all week long… parmesan clams…. Clams with lemon.. uff!”
- “It was a familiar scene for many, unfortunately their overexploitation has led to their extinction.”
- “There was no regulation!!!! Too bad Playa Las Machas [Clam beach] now only has the name and not the clams”
- “Damn there used to be loads of clams and now nothing, so sad”
- “the clams were taken indiscriminately and then came the El Niño current with its warm waters and gave the final blow”
- “Does anyone know why there are no clams at Playa Las Machas [Clam Beach] and who caused it?”
- “Unfortunately it was us who went and caught them without thinking about the future”
- “Hmmm the fishermen also took tonnes and took them to Procemar… where they were processed”
- “When loads of people got fired from the fishing industry they set themselves to finding clams to sell and to support themselves without thinking that they were extinguishing the resource”
- “It was at the beginning of the 80s… with the first El Niño current… after that the system never recovered”
- “from what little remained in the 90s, companies such as Procemar came to take everything that was left”
- “We didn’t know how to care for our own heritage, it was abused by everyone!”
- “It wasn’t the ordinary citizen taking them for personal consumption, or the El Niño Current. It was industrial exploitation.”

\textsuperscript{47} Comisión de Pesca alcanza acuerdo en tramitación de nueva regulación para el sector' \textit{Emol} 11\textsuperscript{th} July 2012; ‘The Privatization of Chile’s Sea’ \textit{The Real News} 18\textsuperscript{th} January 2013
\textsuperscript{48} Comment on Facebook group ‘Ese Arica de Antes’ 4\textsuperscript{th} February 2015
https://www.facebook.com/groups/95300224419/?fref=ts
While local citizens and artisanal fishers suffer from depleted resources, the Longueira scandal continues with the length of the country witnessing demonstrations and marches against the legislation.

Across the border, Peru’s fishing industry has historically been the most developed in the region but overfishing has been an issue. The industry is dependent on one species, the Peruvian anchovy which was almost fished to extinction in the 1970s and is used to make fishmeal. Since then the fishmeal and fish processing industry has been managed by Pescaperú, which was founded in 1973. Peru is the country most vulnerable to El Niño events in the world, which causes the disappearance of anchoveta and a sharp fall in the catch of other species (Ibarra et al. 2000). The Chilean and Peruvian coasts are both heavily affected during El Niño years, the irregular climatic event that affects the cold nutrient-rich waters that are needed to support the fish reserves. This means that during El Niño events certain fish stocks that are reduced come under threat of extinction. Chile has therefore imposed restrictions on fishing during some years to counter these effects. Due to its economic dependence on the ocean’s resources, at 8% of GDP, Peru has stalwartly protected its maritime borders such as in 1952 and 1954 when Argentine and US fishing fleets respectively entered Peruvian fishing grounds and shots were fired. In subsequent decades various US fishing boats have been apprehended for fishing in Peruvian waters.

Water and the resources they hold are likely to become increasingly valuable throughout the twenty-first century as global climatic changes take place. While declining freshwater availability is the most pressing concern for many nation-states they are also looking to the ocean’s resources. Legal changes such as UNCLOS and EEZ’s have shifted responsibility for the ocean’s resources away from fishermen and
companies onto nation-states that has in turn raised the issue of resource management at maritime borders. As EEZ’s became recognised the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN (FAO) had to assess fish stocks by EEZ rather than by region in spite of incomplete maritime border delimitation. Peru and Chile were in fact two of the first countries to recognise the outside threat to the resources, particularly whales, they viewed as rightfully in their maritime territory instigating them to claim a 200-mile territorial sea jurisdiction in 1947. This was later established in the 1952 Santiago Declaration signed by Chile, Peru and Ecuador. Chilean and Peruvian territorial sea claims thereby began the worldwide shift towards the adoption of the EEZ.

The mobility and transboundary nature of fish that move through governed spaces has been highlighted by the FAO as one reason for the failure of effective fisheries management. Article 118 of UNCLOS, for example, declares that states fishing on the same living marine resources or in the same area of the high seas shall cooperate in the conservation of these resources. The management of transboundary resources tends to be by national governments even when regulated by international treaties and bi or multinational conservation across maritime boundaries has been common since the 1990s (De Jong 2008). Rather than focussing on conservation, Chile and Peru’s transboundary fisheries management has centred more on the protection of the rights of fishermen. In 1954 Chile and Peru signed the Special Maritime Zone Agreement which created a buffer zone along the maritime boundary which at the time Peru and Chile referred to as the parallel extending 12 miles beyond the coastal line. This meant that fishermen who had strayed out of their own territorial waters would avoid sanctions.

49 UNCLOS, Articles 63(2) and 64(1)
Despite traditionally relaxed movement of both Chilean and Peruvian fishermen along the maritime border the arrival of the dispute at the ICJ seemed to make the situation tenser. In 2014 ten fishermen were apprehended and couldn’t leave Arica until Chilean and Peruvian officials could come to an agreement, fifty-five days after they were captured. They were given refuge by the Artisanal Fishermen of Arica Syndicate which further shows the contradiction of the border. These Peruvian fishermen were being cared for by Ariqueño fishermen at the very same time that nationalists were demonstrating against Peruvian gains awarded by the ICJ. As highlighted previously there is a huge difference in how locals treat their neighbours across the border and how the two nations relate to one another. The Peruvians worked in the port of Arica painting boats, carrying ice, and shucking mussels in order to buy food to eat and to attempt to pay off the fine imposed on them by the Chilean government of 60,000 Peruvian soles (US$18,000). Due to this impossibly high fine two of the detainees fled home to Peru.

This case study of the maritime border dispute between Chile and Peru highlights how violence through xenophobia or anger at the Chilean state remains present in Arica today. The tension between Chile and Peru which has existed since before the War of the Pacific and has waxed and waned ever since, though never disappearing, is clearly still present. The nationalistic and at times racist sentiments expressed by politicians, organisations, and individuals ran through the maritime dispute. Another issue that reappears is the feeling that Arica is being abandoned by the Chilean state. The country took notice of Arica on the day of the ruling when it was under threat and local citizens took this as an opportunity to voice their dissatisfaction with this abandonment. Fishermen in particular felt abandoned, angry

50 ‘Chile dejará sin efecto denuncias contra pescadores peruanos’ El Comercio, Peru 7th February 2014
51 ‘Peruanos detenidos por pescar en aguas chilenas ya cuentan con un albergue en Arica.’ Soy Arica 21st January 2014

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that the Chilean state made no effort to protect the fishing grounds so vital to their livelihoods. This was worsened for them by the prejudice they have faced by a corrupt fishing law that protects the rights a few industrial firms to the detriment of artisanal fishermen. Bodies also became a space of contestation during the dispute, whether those demonstrating against the state and being dispersed by water cannons or the fishermen claiming to have had their maritime mobility unfairly restricted, meaning they can’t access the resources they desperately need.

**The Legacy of Violence in Arica**

So far this thesis has examined historical moments in Arica, beginning in 1925, but what has the inheritance of this history been? How is violence still present in Arica today? The following sections examine the other ways, beyond the maritime dispute, that the legacy of violence remains in Arica at the international, national, and corporeal levels. The first scale addressed is the international and how the relationship between Chile and Peru is enacted today. Secondly, at the national level the Chilean state has, in the eyes of many Ariqueños, continued to abandon or even victimise Arica. Thirdly, at the corporeal level the body remains under threat of violence whether this is the risk of landmines at the border or epistemic violence in the form of racism.

To address these three scales separately is not to suggest that they exist independently nor that they act as a ‘trickle-down’ hierarchy with the international influencing the national that acts on the corporeal for instance. Instead they are equally tied up with and acting against one another. The power and supremacy of violence indeed comes from the way in which violence is simultaneously acting at multiple scales.
The International Level

The maritime border dispute is a perfect example of the current situation at the Chile-Peru border with continued antagonism between the two states but good neighbourliness between the residents of the borderlands. We have seen the tension between Chile and Peru at the border in Arica emerge at various points; with the attempted plebiscite in the 1920s, the almost-war in the 1970s, and the maritime dispute of 2014. Even since Chile’s return to democracy in 1990, the country has continued to have problematic relations with its northernmost neighbours, Peru and Bolivia (Van Der Ree 2010). Chile’s neo-liberal identity, which it has actively pursued since Pinochet’s regime, has only increased tensions with these neighbours who have portrayed Chile as imperialist and aggressive. The return to democracy after the Pinochet dictatorship in 1990 did however see a return to the integrationist policies at the border that Pinochet had broken.

While relations between Chileans and Peruvians on the border have generally been positive, the nationalistic displays of the two states have used Arica as a theatre of jingoism and one-upmanship. This has meant that Arica, which Peru has dreams of one day reincorporating into its national territory, remains in a precarious position, its safety relying on the good-neighbourliness of Chile and Peru. Over the time period examined here, 1925 to 2015, Chile and Peru have had many issues pending. Outstanding problems that should have been settled by the Treaty of Lima in 1929 took many decades to resolve with the maritime border dispute still with its own issues pending. For example the wharf, a railway station, and a customs house that Chile promised to build in Arica in the Treaty of Lima were only addressed in 1999. The stipulations were to build a dock, offices, and a railway station to be used freely by Peru and to construct a statue of Jesus Christ atop the morro with his arms
outstretched, one arm pointing to Chile and the other to Peru (Figure 109) (Bitar 2011). However, despite being symbolically important, the infrastructure provided for Peru in reality is little used. Although it must be noted that other infrastructure between Chile, Peru, and Bolivia has been improved and in 2012 a paved road from Arica to the port of Santos in Brazil, a dream of the JAA, was completed.

Figure 109: Statue of Christ on the summit of the morro. 2014. Author’s photo

One interviewee, Constanza Sepúlveda, summed up the view of many Ariqueños when she said; “is Chilean sovereignty in the region secure? The truth is I don’t know.
Peru is never going to stop saying they want to recover Arica”. Endangering the spirit of good neighbourliness, both Chilean and Peruvian officials or those close to them, have been prone to making inappropriate and aggressive statements. In Peru much of this has centred around provocative Peruvian President Ollanta Humala, for example his brother has stated “I will go to Arica, but only mounted on a tank” and his father, Isaac Humala, gave an interview to a Chilean magazine in 2006 where he stated that “the invasion of Chile [by Peru] would be by rifle and penis… Chile deserves to be peruvianified… nine months after invasion you would have so many Peruvians”. Just as after the War of the Pacific Chile ‘chileanised’ Arica, Humala dreams of revenge through Peruvians raping Chilean women who would give birth to half-Peruvian children. The culture of machismo so present in Chile and Peru equates the domination of the enemies’ women with domination of territory. Worsening the situation, in 2007 Ollanta Humala led a nationalist march to the border with Chile ‘to defend national sovereignty’. He has also been open about his beliefs that Peru had acted in a cowardly manner in the face of the maritime border issue with Chile, allowing Chile to consolidate its position. Another international gaffe occurred in 2008, when Peruvian Army Chief Edwin Donayre was seen on video saying that Chileans should not be allowed into the country, and that should they enter their bodies would have to leave in ‘boxes’[coffins] and, when these ran out, in ‘plastic bags’.

Chilean officials have tended to be more careful with their language, but other signs of potential aggression have been noted. The Council on Hemispheric Affairs referred to Chile’s defence ’spending spree’ in 2007, reporting that Chile was worrying

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52 Interview, Constanza Sepúlveda. 10th July 2014
53 Interview with General Odlanier Mena, La Estrella de Arica 19th March 2006; ‘Una invasión a Chile sería con fusil y con pene’. The Clinic Online 6th June 2011
54 ‘La guerra de Humala contra Chile’ El País 4th April 2007
55 ‘Humala dice que Perú muestra cobardía ante Chile en tema marítimo’. El Pais 23rd March 2007
56 ‘Video Strains Peru-Chile Relations’. Reuters 30th November 2008
its neighbours Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina. Chile’s armed forces are semi-autonomous and receive 10% of export earnings from state-owned copper company CODELCO, the largest copper company in the world, meaning that in 2008 the armed forces received US$1 billion from the copper agreement alone (Villa & Weiffen 2014). This highly controversial ‘Ley Reservada del Cobre’ was introduced in 1958 to maintain the armed forces and each year CODELCO deposits the funds into the army, air force and navy ‘secret’ accounts at the Central Bank of Chile. This is a controversial arrangement because it is outside of democratic control, it does not need to compete for funds against other sectors, and spending decisions are unsupervised and lack accountability.57 Increases in the value of copper have provided the armed forces with vast sums of money that has been spent largely on expanding and improving arms (see

Figure 110). This has led to concerns over the military balance in the region and whether Chile is preparing for “War of the Pacific: Part II”.58

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58 ‘Chile’s Aggressive Military Arm Purchases are Ruffling the Region, Alarming in Particular Bolivia, Peru and Argentina’. COHA. 7th August 2007
A lot of this weaponry goes straight to Arica, which Chile has also maintained as a heavily militarised city, as one soldier explains; “There are many soldiers in this city, mainly because it is the city bordering Peru. It isn’t that the army of Chile seek a war or the army of Peru seek a war either. But things have been this way for so long”. This defence spending and militarisation of the border doesn’t aid a situation whereby Chile is often seen as arrogant, distancing itself from its South American neighbours. How Chile has been perceived by its neighbours has been impacted by its “geographical location, ‘locked in’ by the Andes mountains to the east and deserts to the north, has given the country an historic orientation towards the Pacific Ocean, ‘looking away’ from the other Latin American countries” (Van Der Ree 2010:209). Chile’s historical racism, xenophobia, and aggression have created a complicated present.

There is clearly violence bubbling just under the surface at the Chile-Peru border with Peruvians speaking of rape and armed invasion and the Chileans silently holding their military strength. Ariqueño academic Vicente Díaz sees this as inevitable stating, “[b]order regions between two countries will always have tension, it’s one reason why Arica hasn’t been able to develop”. Some of this tension is insidious and not immediately visible. For example, to increase efficiency of border travel local mayors have had the ‘Tacna-Arica Agreement’ since 2003, which has improved the co-

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59 Interview, Matias Silva. 28th June 2014
60 Interview, Vicente Díaz. 12th August 2014
operation of transport services ferrying thousands of travelers across the border every day. Initiatives include improving infrastructure at the terminals and eradicating hawkers and homeless people who previously congregated at the Peruvian bus terminal. A transit law signed by the governments of Chile and Peru in 1983 explicitly stated that better transport between Tacna and Arica was important for the ties of friendship and good neighbourliness between the nations.

This agreement allowed nationals to travel between Chile and Peru just with an identification card and for seven days with no further paperwork. It is not prohibited to work during those seven days but this is a rule commonly flouted particularly with Peruvians who work as manual labourers, in agriculture, in hospitality, or in domestic service during the week and return to Tacna at the weekends. Peruvians crossing with their identity card can cross to Arica but cannot travel further into Chile without special permission given on proof of a passport and US$1000. On the other hand Chileans can travel much further into Peru with just the identity card. An interior border checkpoint between the Chilean cities of Arica and Iquique at Cuya ensures that Peruvians aren’t traveling further into Chile unauthorised. The tension is therefore this inequality imposed on Peruvians and Chileans, they are seen differently when they cross the border. A Peruvian in Arica looking for work is more likely to be seen as a potential criminal, as a drain on Chile’s resources. A Chilean in Tacna is seen as an opportunity; they go to Peru to spend money whether on healthcare, goods, or eating out. The way that border checks are carried out means that while Chileans are treated as tourists, Peruvians are treated as immigrants.

However, as has been noted at various points, there is a gulf between the relationship between officials in Santiago and Lima and the sentiments held by the citizens. Chile and Peru have a long history of perceived antagonism that has long
threatened their relationship but Arica has exemplified the possibilities of a healthy relationship between the two nations (Rehren 2004). After all, “Ariqueños and Tacneños have been, historically, crossers of borders, constantly travelling between one city and the other, for reasons of commerce, recreation, health, education or to visit family” (Podestá Arzubiaga 2011). Interview participants provided views such as; “There has always been friendship between the citizens of Tacna and Arica, always…Arica was Peruvian, there are descendants of Peruvians here, in Tacna there are descendants of Chileans, there are families that cross the border”.61 And; “Arica and Tacna are sister cities, when one lacks something the other gives it, that’s how its always been and that’s how it’ll be until the end of times”.62 In one study, 82% of Peruvians asked claim to be “in total agreement” that both countries “should think of a future of co-operation” which 72% of Chileans answered the same. Furthermore, 78% of Chileans and 76% of Peruvians asked claim to be “in total agreement” that the two countries “should increase their commercial and economic relations” (Alessandri 2014:12).

In contrast, studies of Chileans and Peruvians as a whole and not just those who live on the border show that they still see their neighbour negatively. For instance, Peruvian feeling against Chile as measured in 2008 has shown that neither the increase in commerce and investment, nor the increased movement of people has improved historic distrust (Eckholt Ithurralde 2012). Moreover, various videos on the video sharing website ‘Youtube’, often produced by local news channels, have discussed the relationship between Arica and Peru. For example, one video entitled ‘Arica Chile is overshadowed by progress of Tacna Peru’ is enlightening in the

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61 Interview, Vicente Díaz. 12th August 2014
62 Interview, Hernán Rodriguez. 31st July 2014
Due to the boundless, online nature of the videos they are watched by Chileans and Peruvians alike, this video appeared to attract the interest of many Peruvians in particular who contributed comments such as;

- “EX-PERUVIAN BROTHERS ARE WELCOME”
- “ARIQUENOS, YOU ARE AND WILL BE PERUVIAN, ITS JUST A MATTER OF TIME THAT YOU WILL RETURN TO BE PART OF OUR LAND, WHERE YOU BELONG. FAR FROM THE THEIVING AND ELITIST CHILEAN GOVERNMENT”
- “What they don’t know that every pill for the Chileans has a little dose of cyanide”
- “Oi, don’t tell them all!”
- “he’s just being sarcastic, and the others too, Tacna benefits from the money left by Chileans just as the Chileans benefit from lower hospital prices and good quality products.”
- “Sooner or later Arica will return to Peru, it’s just a matter of time. Have faith Peruvians.”
- People from Arica, Tarapaca, Iquique are seen in Tacna. It seems good to me, and I think they are very welcome, as their ancestors were Peruvians and Peru does not forget, you must never forget.”
- “Welcome Chilean brothers, always welcome in our country, we are brothers and I hope your situation improves Arica. Long live Latin America!”
- “The love that Peru has for Arica will exist forever, even if it stays Chilean.”
- “ALL OF ARICA WILL BE GREEN, WITH PERUVIAN WATER... THEY WILL MAKE CANALS... ARICA WILL PROSPER WITH PERU... A VERDANT PARADISE... IN CHILE THERE IS NO WATER NOR WILL THERE EVER BE”
- “Arica and Tarapacá would be very well received and welcomed by us here in Peru. Greetings.”
- “ARICA AND TARAPACA WILL LIVE FOREVER IN THE HEART OF EVERY PERUVIAN. WE WILL NEVER FORGET.”
- “Eventually Arica will return to us, for better or worse…”

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In order to soften these sentiments and encourage the positive views of future cooperation, groups and organisations are attempting to improve cross-border relations between Chile and Peru. One Jesuit organisation, Rompiendo Fronteras [Breaking Borders] runs workshops for youths from Chile, Peru, and Bolivia. A Jesuit spokesperson celebrated the understanding and enjoyment that can be gained from diversity, coexistence, and multiculturalism, stressing that differences are an opportunity, not a barrier.\(^6^4\) As well as cultural initiatives, the economy continues to play a huge part in improving Chilean-Peruvian relations. The border is heavily crossed today with more than 4,000,000 annual border crossings.\(^6^5\) In November 2009, US Ambassador to Chile, Paul Simons visited Arica to better understand Chile-Peru relations at the border. Cables released by Wikileaks illustrate that Simons found “close integration between people and business and excellent law enforcement cooperation”, that “the border region does not share the tension that exists in the two capitals that has been the topic of news headlines” and that “Chileans and Peruvians alike regularly travel between the two cities for tourism, shopping, dining, and business opportunities, and local leaders only expect that those ties will continue to grow”.\(^6^6\)

While Arica and Tacna were similar economically in 1990, strong investment initiatives by the Peruvian government have increased activity and seen a boost in population, meaning that by 2010 Tacna was economically far more successful than Arica. Furthermore, in a complete turn-around for the area, in recent years, Arica can now be seen to be being ‘Peruvianised’, the dream of many Peruvians as quoted in the above YouTube comments. During the fifty years between the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) and the 1929 Treaty of Lima, Chile systematically ‘Chileanised’ Arica

\(^6^4\) El Morro Cotudo. 24th September 2011
\(^6^5\) {{WikiLeaks cable|id=09SANTIAGO1170_a}}
\(^6^6\) {{WikiLeaks cable|id=09SANTIAGO1170_a}}
through murders, deportation, and epistemic violence. Now, through the regional impact of globalisation, the prolonged economic crisis in Arica, the accelerated economic growth of Southern Peru, the outdating of the classical geo-political approach, and the influence of new educational programs, what is now a Chilean city is seeing a growing influence of Peruvian culture. This was confirmed by Tacneño historian Hernán Rodríguez who stated; “It’s strange now how it has changed, that Arica is now being peruvianified, they’re eating Peruvian food, they prefer the food, Peruvian music, dances”.67

Even though the long intertwined territories of Tacna-Arica had been pulled apart in 1929, their interdependency and cultural overlap cannot be prevented. Interestingly however, while Peruvian culture is becoming more permeated in everyday life in Arica, southern Peru has very little Chilean culture. A large reason for this is that northern Chileans who associate themselves with Andean culture are more likely to engage with this culture in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador where it is more strongly realised. It has been estimated that 3,000-4,000 Tacneños work illegally in Arica and commute home on the weekends which, added to those living in the city legally, creates a large proportion of Peruvians.68 Chileans have looked to the success of Tacna, a city that benefits from significant investment by the Peruvian state, which has boomed while Arica has struggled, with a growing population that has been described as a ‘human shield on the border’.69

There has been talk of Peruvian investment in Tacna as a long-term strategy whereby Peru will encroach south and take Arica by peaceful means before 2050. Peru want to show that they can care for the area better than Chile can, and that

67 Interview, Hernán Rodríguez. 31st July 2014
68 {{WikiLeaks cable|id=08SANTIAGO931_a}}
69 ‘Los movimientos peruanos que apuntan a recuperar Arica el 2050 y el abandono en que la tiene Chile’ El Mostrador 29th January 2014
Arica would have a more prosperous future in the hands of its former sovereign. Sergio Giaconi, general manager of the Development Corporation of Arica and Parinacota (CORDAP) has stated his concerns about 2029, the year in which Arica will celebrate its centenary of being officially Chilean. Giaconi believes that Arica will be noticeably underdeveloped in comparison to Tacna in Peru and the rest of Chile, which would encourage Ariqueños to feel more open-minded to the idea of Peru reclaiming the region. Giaconi stressed that the situation must be reversed if Chile is to ensure its sovereignty.\textsuperscript{70}

This illustrates some of the issues which have prevented a more amicable relationship between Chile and Peru; a history of antagonism has lingered which causes officials from both nations to speak or act in hostile ways even though relations between Chileans and Peruvians on the border remains largely good-natured. This has raised concerns in recent years however, that Arica is gradually becoming ‘peruvianified’ as it’s distance from Santiago and proximity to Peru takes its toll.

\textbf{The National Level}

As highlighted by the fishermen during the maritime dispute, unless Chilean sovereignty is at stake at the border, Arica has felt abandoned by the Chilean state. Even as far back as 1954 Gabriela Mistral, winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature, wrote after her visit to Arica, “Arica deserves a greater and better future”. This has continued into the present-day and in 2008 the region had a poverty rate of almost 19\%, five points higher than the national average, disproportionately affecting indigenous Ariqueños and children. Moreover, the region of Arica and Parinacota suffers from the highest rate of unemployment in the country nor has the region been

\textsuperscript{70} ibid.
performing well economically, a government investigation in 2009 found that out of the eleven sectors of industry, nine were in decline.\textsuperscript{71}

The most significant move by the Chilean state to recognise Arica was in April 2007 when President Michelle Bachelet signed law Number 20.175 which created the region of Arica and Parinacota, splitting the former Province of Tarapacá into two. This separated the extreme north into two administrative regions, with two capitals, Arica and Iquique. The reason for this split was given on the 21\textsuperscript{st} October 2005 when Bachelet stated; “Regarding the Region of Tarapacá, there was, from the date of its creation, frustration and complaints from the community of the Province of Arica who argued that they met the requirements for regionality and had sufficient capital to become a region itself based on its economic, demographic, territorial, historical and institutional characteristics” (González Miranda & Ovando Santana 2010:64). This has been seen as a move of decentralisation to give more autonomy to a region that “has characteristics which are unique in the territory and national society, both in its origin and in its historical development” (González Miranda & Ovando Santana 2010:61).

The creation of this new region was recognised as some compensation for the unfortunate situation of Arica being sandwiched between two territories which have been strongly supported by their respective governments; Iquique to the south and Tacna to the north in Peru. Both of which “have grown extraordinarily supported by favourable legislation with powerful commercial and industrial scope and therefore whose populations have consequently boomed, drawn by work, commerce and the standard of living”.\textsuperscript{72} The preference of Iquique began, as mentioned in chapter five when it was made a \textit{zona franca} in 1975 which aided Arica’s decline which was then

\textsuperscript{71} {\{WikiLeaks cable|id=08SANTIAGO931_a\}}; Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas. Santiago, Chile
\textsuperscript{72} Interview, Franco Muñoz, 30\textsuperscript{th} June 2014
worsened by Tacna being also made a *zona franca* in 2002, “[t]he result of which has been to prevent Arica being the natural centre of commercial, industrial and cultural integration between Chile, Peru and Bolivia”. 73

The favouritism of Iquique to the detriment of Arica can be seen through economic statistics. The region of Arica and Parinacota consistently has the lowest or second lowest gross domestic product of regions in Chile whereas the region of Tarapacá tends to have the second highest of the country’s fifteen regions. In 2012 income per capita was US$5,884 in Arica but US$20,427 in Iquique. 74 Moreover, in 2013 the region of Tarapacá received twice as much government investment as the region of Arica and Parinacota. 75 This economic advantage began under Pinochet and may be the reason for the differences in population growth between the capitals of the two regions, Iquique and Arica, since Pinochet took power. To add to this economic difference between the two northern cities, in the 1988 plebiscite which led to Pinochet eventually standing down, citizens were given the choice to vote ‘si’ if they wanted Pinochet to remain in power or ‘no’ if they wanted a democratic election to be held. Iquique, the city economically favoured by Pinochet overwhelmingly voted ‘si’ while Arica overwhelmingly ‘no’ (Bitar 2011). This has led to a divide in the north with Arica feeling cut off from the region to its south economically and politically.

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<tr>
<th>Population of Iquique</th>
<th>Population of Arica</th>
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<td><strong>1973</strong> 60.000</td>
<td>160.000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2013</strong> 300.000</td>
<td>210.000</td>
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74 Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Chile
75 Sociedad de Fomento Fabril. http://web.sofofa.cl

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As previously mentioned, many Ariqueños point to the possibility of war as the reason for the neglect of Arica. One interviewee, Florencia Espinoza, stated; “I feel that this is a city neglected in terms of investment, I have always wondered why when it has potential in tourism, in mining, from agriculture, but various governments haven’t been willing to invest in Arica. I have heard that this was maintained as a state policy because of potential conflicts with Bolivia or Peru, that Arica is a dispensable city and therefore not worth investing in”.\footnote{Interview, Florencia Espinoza. 11th April 2014} Florencia believed that it was an intentional act to make Arica poor and therefore less desirable to the Peruvians. On the question of why Arica has been so abandoned, Alejandro González replied; “I would dare to say that it’s due to a fear that there could be a problem with the Peruvians, that we will be the first to suffer because it is us they will bomb or whatever”.\footnote{Interview, Alejandro González. 18th June 2014} This view was echoed by a newspaper article entitled ‘Why doesn’t Chile feel affection for the north?'; a question answered by one ex-senator as that “it is territory won in war and so it could be easily lost in the same way”.\footnote{‘Por qué Chile no siente cariño por el Norte?’ El Mercurio de Antofagasta. 6th June 2014} As illustrated in chapter six there was a strong argument in the 1970s that Arica was a ‘grey zone’ that wouldn’t have been defended by Pinochet with all the military’s potential. This argument appears to remain as seen by a confidential cable written by US Ambassador Paul Simons in November 2008. Simons learnt from government officials that the military deemed Arica too difficult to defend in the case of an attack and so the hardline for defence would be just north of Iquique where Chile's fleet of 28 F-16 fighter aircraft are stationed. However, these government officials, Diputado Paredes and District Attorney Jorge Valladares, do not warrant this as serious as armed conflict is unlikely.\footnote{\{WikiLeaks cable id =08SANTIAGO942_a \}}
Drugs are a serious problem in Arica and this has led some citizens to feel victimised by the Chilean state. Interviewee Constanza Sepúlveda described drugs as the worst thing about Arica and that “[i]f you travel from Arica to Iquique it’s like crossing an international border, all your bags, everything are checked… it’s like we’re in a prison but within the prison we’re free”. Just as Peruvians cannot travel further into Chile than Arica without authorisation, Chileans are also subjected to internal border checks due to Arica’s reputation for drug trafficking. Constanza’s husband elaborated saying; “in other parts of the country you say you’re from Arica and they’re going to say ‘ah you’re a drug trafficker’”. Since the War of the Pacific the Chilean state has attempted to create a homogenous nation and yet those in the extreme north are still ‘othered’ and lack the same treatment as those in more central areas of Chile.

When Ariqueños blame the Chilean state for this abandonment they’re not always referring to decisions made by Santiago but often point to politicians in Arica as the culprits. As the US Ambassador to Chile noted; “In a country that is consistently ranked by Transparency International as Latin America's least corrupt, this city of 200,000 is responsible for a disproportionate share of Chile's relatively few scandals. A number of local politicians, including the former mayor, have been convicted of embezzling and misuse of public office, often related to municipal services performed by their businesses”.

The Ariqueño-Aymará community has been left out of political decisions and has therefore mobilised to peacefully contest political issues. This combined with corruption has created a culture of mistrust between local citizens, especially those of indigenous origin, and politicians.

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80 Interview, Constanza Sepúlveda. 10th July 2014
81 ibid.
82 {{WikiLeaks cable|id =08SANTIAGO942_a }}
The result of abandonment, along with poverty and unemployment, is that Arica has been forced into closer relationships with Peru and Bolivia. One interviewee who has lived in Arica for sixty years contemplated; “Maybe our proximity to neighbouring countries, Peru and Bolivia, makes us more international and live like them in a different world. It’s so much easier for us to go to Tacna than to Iquique. I can’t go to Iquique, it’s my country and everything, but it’s 300km away, that’s the next city! Tacna is just 40km. So our connection is more with other countries than with our own country. And Chile thinks the same way about us, Chile ends at Iquique”.\textsuperscript{83} Tomás Morales who has lived in the region for many decades posited; “Arica isn’t Chilean, Arica is Andean”, explaining that Arica is so culturally different from the rest of Chile due to influences from Peru and Bolivia that Chilean governments “don’t know what to do with Arica”.\textsuperscript{84} Due to its geographical position, cut off by the Andes the rest of Chile does not have simple access to other countries whereas Arica has access to both Peru and Bolivia.

Another result of abandonment has been the birth of a grassroots movement fighting for independence or autonomy from the Chilean state. The centre of this movement has been on social media with Ariqueños sharing comments, photos, and ‘memes’ regarding independence.\textsuperscript{85} In one online discussion on the Facebook group \textit{Arica Independiente} as to whether inhabitants of Arica felt themselves to be more Chilean or Ariqueño, a variety of responses were offered including:

- “I think the people are discontented because of how the city has been forgotten, and for the centralism which makes us feel more Ariqueño than Chilean”
- “Arica, always Arica!”
- “I feel Ariqueño, I WILL NEVER FEEL REPRESENTED BY A STATE WHEREBY THE CONSTITUTION WAS CREATED BY A

\textsuperscript{83} Interview, Alejandro González. 18\textsuperscript{th} June 2014
\textsuperscript{84} Interview, Tomás Morales. 23\textsuperscript{rd} July 2014
\textsuperscript{85} A meme is an image, video, or piece of text, typically humorous in nature, that is copied and spread rapidly by Internet users, often with slight variations.
DICTATORSHIP… EVEN LESS WHEN THE CHILEAN STATE HAS ROBBED US”

“To follow up the political themes of my friend above, the traditions of the centre and south of the country are really different, they teach us the cueca and huasos that simply don’t belong here, they should teach us of the Aymará, the chinchorro, guano, our own things. Another point is the strategic abandonment of the city by the centralist state, but we must also remember that we Ariqueños continue making mistakes with our representatives, once people begin voting for people that have Ariqueño hearts, things can change.”

“AYMARA ARIQUEÑO FOR ALWAYS, LONG LIVE ARICA… THE MORE IT IS ABANDONED BY CHILE THE MORE I LOVE MY ARICA”

“Ariqueña 100% there’s no city like this”

“From Serena down they don’t know the battle of the morro for Arica, nor our traditions, why do we worship their traditions on the 18th [September] if they don’t recognise ours? And to be a true Ariqueño isn’t about blood or ancestry, it is purely a question of identity and affection for the city”

“Ariqueño, but it isn’t to do with feeling neglected at the central level, here there are structural and physical elements. Maybe we are more tacneño than Santiaguino or Limeño, it’s difficult to promote national identity from over 1000km, even more so if it’s based on xenophobia and centralism.”

“Ariqueño, unfortunately our city doesn’t have value or importance. Arica is known for its high quantity of drugs, maritime conflict, natural disasters… and maybe nothing else. At 41 I see a city that doesn’t improve, it doesn’t grow, it doesn’t take flight like other cities”

“Ariqueña and proud to be so. Daughter of an earth rich in a mixture of races and cultures. Blessed to have been born where the coast, valley and altiplano meet”

“Ariqueño for always, Chilean by bad luck”

“Always Ariqueño and proud to have Aymará blood, Chilean by defect, Bolivian for pleasure and Peruvian because once upon a time by ancestors were too”

“I was born and raised in this beautiful city, for me we lost the nationality when the dictatorship took away the resources given to the Junta de Adelanto, what progress we had in that time, since then all the governments we’ve had have put as at a standstill, but it’s also our fault for being led by politicians from elsewhere who don’t fight for us”

These comments span the multitude of sentiments felt by Ariqueños; affinity with Peru, abandonment by Chile and centralism, and disconnect with Chilean nationalism. Social media has been used to organise demonstrations and marches for the independence cause (Figure 112), share important signifiers such as the regional flag of Arica and Parinacota (Figure 113), reinforce collective beliefs, and make humorous social commentary on the situation of Arica and its poor management by the Chilean state (Figure 114, Figure 115 & Figure 116). The group will also rally around specific issues such as calling for the flag of Arica to fly atop the Morro where currently stationed is one of the largest Chilean flags in the country, 18 by 12 metres. Some citizens have complained about the huge Chilean flag, arguing that placing a flag does not mean integration and believe instead that the flag of Arica should replace, or one of equal size be flown alongside, the national flag.

Figure 111: Imagined map of South America with Arica included. Facebook group ‘Arica Independiente Estado’ https://www.facebook.com/arica.independiente?fref=ts [accessed 26/04/2015]
Figure 112: Image used in Facebook group calling for those in favour of regional autonomy to a demonstration in downtown Arica. Facebook group ‘Arica Independiente Estado’

Figure 113: “A Chile without centralism. In favour of regional autonomy, Arica and Parinacota” Image used in Facebook group calling for autonomy. Facebook group ‘Arica Independiente Estado’
Figure 114: “We were Peruvians, almost Bolivians, now Chileans, but always Ariqueños”. Facebook group ‘Arica Independiente Estado’ https://www.facebook.com/arica.independiente?fref=ts [accessed 27/04/2015]

Figure 115: “Ariqueños are used to… seeing how Chile cares about Iquique, seeing how Peru invests in Tacna, seeing how Chile shuts us up with a mega flag on the Morro. Regional autonomy for Arica and Parinacota!! Wake up idiot ariqueñ@” Image used in Facebook group calling for autonomy. Facebook group ‘Arica Independiente Estado’ https://www.facebook.com/arica.independiente?fref=ts [accessed 26/04/2013]
As shown by these ‘memes’ humour is commonly used by Chileans to highlight serious issues. One article chose to take the satirical approach with a spoof headline stating; “Government authorities discover the existence of Arica” and tells the story of a government minister who was studying a geography textbook and found Arica. This fake minister is quoted as saying at a press conference “[w]e never thought cities existed north of Americo Vespucio [the ringroad surrounding Santiago], we always heard our grandparents referring to a northern city where the War of the Pacific was fought, but we didn’t think it really existed. This discovery will change public policy in Chile, now that we are certain that there is human life in the north of our country.”

One argument for the use of humour in human societies is for aiding us to overcome sociocultural inhibitions and relieve tension caused by fear. Therefore, the humour

88 ‘Autoridades de gobierno descubren que existe Arica.’ La Legal 11th December 2014
applied to Arica’s abandonment through memes and articles shows what a worrisome issue it is.

Debate over what can be done about this issue, or whether it will ever change is common in Arica, through the radio, newspapers, social media or in conservation. One ex-employee of the JAA, Alejandro González, stated his belief that the only way for Arica to recover would be to become the recipient of a special law such as the ones that supported the JAA from the 1950s to the 1970s. Arica cannot compete against two areas that benefit so much from state investment, Iquique and Tacna, and so some incentive for industry or tourism is necessary.\textsuperscript{89} The possible answer to this call came in June 2014 when Michelle Bachelet launched a ‘special plan for the extreme region of Arica and Parinacota’ which has been described as “the closest thing to the Junta de Adelanto” and will give a billion US dollars to the region over six years with a strategic focus on tourism, heritage, identity, agriculture, commerce, and education services.\textsuperscript{90} The three main foci of investment are housing, public works, and education. The plan is that the scheme will give the region the kick-start is has so desperately needed and encourage private investment in the area. Opinions have been mixed as shown by the pie chart below (Figure 117). There does remain an element of optimism however with 45\% of citizens feeling hopeful about the Special Plan.

\textsuperscript{89} Interview, Alejandro González. 18\textsuperscript{th} June 2014
\textsuperscript{90} ‘Plan Especial Arica y Parinacota: entre la apuesta histórica y la falta de capital humano regional’ El Morro Cotudo 4\textsuperscript{th} July 2014
The Corporeal Level

As a result of past conflict in Arica, the border remains dangerous today especially for certain bodies. The previous chapter discussed this through HIV/AIDS and abortion border crossings but the fact remains for the whole of the time period studied. For example, due to the history of militarisation on the border, particularly under Pinochet, the border remains militarised today, with landmines still maiming those who attempt to cross the border illegally. According to current estimates, 71,732 of Pinochet’s mines still lie beneath the desert, constantly moving with groundwater flow and earthquakes. As reported by the National Demining Commission, between the 1970s and 2014, 140 people have died or suffered bodily injury as a result of

91 ‘Estas minas se van de Arica! Ministros llegaron a desminar la frontera’ El Morro Cotudo 11th September 2014
landmine or undetonated military explosives on the Chile-Peru border. These cases tend to involve non-Chileans such as a 21 year old Colombian man and a 32 year old Peruvian man who were both injured in 2013, a case whereby two people died when a vehicle drove over an anti-tank mine smuggling contraband across the border in 2012, and a 20 year old Colombian man who lost his left foot after standing on a mine attempting to leave the country illegally from Chile to Peru in January 2015. The Governor of Arica has voiced his concern over the removal of these mines as he argued it would encourage more people to cross the border illegally. In this way a brutal remnant from Pinochet’s dictatorship is allowed to remain precisely due to the violence it continues to wield.

Another form of violence against the body in Arica has been racism. Racism is a form of epistemic violence that occurs when certain subject positioning’s are oppressed, excluded, or silenced. Epistemic violence more generally is the use of law and language to marginalise or victimise specific people and groups. Arica has always been an ethnically diverse region, as shown by the following classification of ethnicities in 1871 (Figure 118) but it has also been a region with racism. Racism has been a system of power wielded by white Chileans against indigenous communities, Peruvians, and Bolivians in the far north.

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92 ‘Las minas antipersonales y la militarización en zonas fronterizas del país’. *PTR* 27th January 2015
94 Gobernador Patricio López afirma que el desminado en la frontera promueve el paso ilegal de personas’. *El Morro Cotudo* 25th March 2013
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Number of People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Mixed Race</td>
<td>1251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Indians” or “Indian Mixed Race”</td>
<td>4064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7844</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 118: Ethnic groups in Arica, 1871

Arica has a racialised history, having been settled by indigenous groups since at least 10,000BC these groups were subjugated by European white colonisers from the sixteenth century onwards. Racial prejudice against Peruvians and Bolivians did exist in Chile before the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), but Chile’s victory in the war confirmed, strengthened, and popularised those prejudices. Meanwhile in Peru, the defeat served to strengthen the myth of Peruvian inferiority (Klaiber 1978). Whiteness was seen by some Chileans as the reason for Chile’s military successes, due to homogenous ethnicity free from indigenous blood (Donoso 1942). Meanwhile conversely Chilean historian Francisco Encina believed that Chile’s military strength came from the mixture of Araucanian (Mapuche) blood with that of the European colonisers. The Mapuche were much respected for their resistance of colonisation and admired for their aggression and tenacity. Therefore this combination of Europeans with the Mapuche who had “greater physical strength than all other Hispanic mestizos” resulted in a ‘military race’ (Encina 1954:48).

In the 1920s, Chile’s racial classification in the national census catalogued ‘the totality of the Chileans from the south’ as white whereas Peruvians were given one of five classifications; blanca, mestizo, indigena, negra, or amarilla (Skuban 2008). This was part of Chile’s reconfiguration of nationhood, of portraying itself as a modern,

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95 Velez Coke & Castex Marambio (1972)
white nation, different from Peru and in fact different to every other country in Latin America. While across the continent *mestizaje* was being celebrated, Chile was engaged in a project of racial whitening.\(^96\) Discourses during the twentieth century continued to be exceedingly derogatory toward indigenous communities, for example Peruvian writer Alejandro Deustua (1937:68) claimed that it is impossible to educate indigenous Peruvians because “[t]he indian is not, nor can be, more than a machine”. The extreme north was in contrast with the rest of Chile however, in 1923, the Chilean politician Luis Barceló (1924) wrote a ‘racial description’ of the population of the Chilean controlled Arica, Tacna and Tarapacá concluding that the local people differ from the rest of Chile, being predominantly Aymará and speaking Aymará with only those in urban centres also speaking Spanish. In spite of significant indigenous populations spanning the length of Chile the indigenous movement didn’t really galvanise until the 1980s and serious problems of racism persist today (ChoqueMariño 2009).

Interviewee Florencia Espinoza described that other areas of Chile have greater ethnic blending but in Arica there are clear differences between ethnicities. She points out the victims of racism in Arica; “those of Chinese descent from Chinese slaves, people of black origin too, the Aymará are also highly discriminated against, to say nothing of the Peruvians, it caught my attention when I moved here [from the south], how badly treated the Aymará are, independent of whether they’re Chilean or not, plus with the terrible discrimination against Peruvians, I was shocked, it us who are on their land, we are invading their space, their land, their territory”.\(^97\) The discrimination is systematic, she continued, “I have seen it on the street, how people mistreat Aymará or Peruvians, usually in groups, Chileans shrink when they are

\(^{96}\) For a thoughtful examination of *mestizaje* in Latin America see Wade (2005)

\(^{97}\) Interview with Florencia Espinoza. 11\(^{th}\) April 2014
alone, except for when there is alcohol, which makes them bold and self-confident”. Felipe Ramírez who works with a Jesuit organisation that engages with refugees explained that discrimination against those with darker skin can be seen as an on-going process of Chileanisation.\textsuperscript{98} His work involves promoting a culture of hospitality for immigrants in Arica, rather than discrimination, which is challenging in a culture that teaches racist attitudes very early on in life. He clarified; “Children in kindergarten here, at five or six were taught to kill Peruvians, because Peruvians are bad, to a child of five! They believe so early on that the other is the enemy. It’s also a product of the economic policies of the last thirty years, there are commercial relationships but there is no Latin American integration... and now we are seeing ghettos of foreigners in various sectors of Arica”.\textsuperscript{99}

This legacy of violence against certain bodies is therefore a direct product of Arica’s violent past; the militarisation of the region in the 1970s under Pinochet during the period of almost-war with Peru and the racism which stems from the War of the Pacific during which Arica was taken from Peru.

\textbf{Conclusions}

The maritime border dispute between Chile and Peru has been a useful illustration for many of the problems faced by Arica as a border city today. The border dispute, which formally began in 1985, has been a bone of contention between the two countries who disagree upon where the maritime border lies on geographic and legal principles. Peru submitted the dispute to the International Court of Justice in a move reminiscent of the international mediation by the United States as examined in chapter four, and the ruling was given in January 2014. The ruling

\textsuperscript{98} Interview with Felipe Ramírez. 1\textsuperscript{st} April 2014
\textsuperscript{99} ibid.
awarded territory to Peru but left Chile with its richest fishing grounds. While the rest of Chile breathed a sigh of relief and forgot about the ruling, artisanal fishermen in Arica could not overlook the loss of territory. The fishermen claimed to have lost access to the grounds necessary for the livelihoods and voiced their anger against the Chilean state’s inertia, which, after fishing scandals favouring industrial companies, has just been another nail in the coffin of their industry.

Looking beyond the maritime dispute, to other ways in which violence lingers in Arica today, it can be noted at international, national, and corporeal levels. The international level shows how even now there are pending issues between Chile and Peru, that both sides have spoken or acted aggressively and Peru still harbours hopes of recovering Arica. However, there are prospects of positive bi-lateral co-operation in the future. The Ariqueño identity has been palpably formed by the region’s relationship with its neighbours to the north and this could be the key to Arica’s future especially seeing as at the national level Arica continues to feel abandoned by the Chilean state particularly in comparison to Iquique to the south and Tacna to the north in Peru. This has been attributed to the precarity of Arica in the case of war and has resulted in a situation whereby Ariqueños feel closer to Peru or Bolivia or have felt the need for independence. Finally, at the corporeal level, the military history of Arica has created a situation in which landmines maim or kill multiple people every year and significant levels of racism permeate society today.

Arica has oscillated between moments of violence and moments of pacification through international diplomacy and economic schemes. The socio-economic history of Arica has been described dramatically by historian Galdames Rosas as “in perpetual movement between heaven and hell, between hope and desperation” (2005:12). The border has been a space of contradiction, creating violence with Peru
and oftentimes Bolivia as well, but it has also been a space of fruitful co-operation and understanding between Chileans and Peruvians. The way Santiago sees Peru is often completely at odds with the lived reality of the border. Despite this co-operation, violence still remains, Peru and Chile have historically found one issue after another to create problems, the maritime dispute just being the latest. The future for Arica is uncertain; it’s possible that Bachelet’s latest economic plan will lift Arica out of its stagnation and a thriving cosmopolitan city will return to its heyday. Another potential situation could be that Peru will recover the region taken by Chile, either by military force or pacifically, swooping in to save Arica from the mismanagement of the Chilean state. Or maybe those calling for autonomy will be heard and Ariqueños will be able to take their future into their own hands. However, the general feeling in Arica is that nothing much will change, Arica will continue to be abandoned by the Chilean state, Peru will always be talking about recovering Arica without acting on their claims, and Arica’s golden age will remain a story to tell the grandchildren.
CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has illustrated the paradoxical nature of the Chile-Peru border focusing on the border city of Arica. Over ninety years of history, from 1925 until 2015, Arica has been abandoned but militarised, forgotten but fighting, over various cycles of boom and bust dependent on international geopolitical and state forces, moulded by a Chilean flavour of machismo. These changes happen in waves; Arica has oscillated chronologically between violence and pacification, between growth and stagnation. This has shown how international borders can be central to the state’s notion of territory, vulnerable frontiers which must be protected when sovereignty is threatened from outside but also how when the border is perceived to be secure, the borderlands can be neglected without fear. This was especially noted with Pinochet’s fear that an economically strong border is more attractive to outside usurpers.

The importance of the border to the nation has been highlighted in the thesis during the 1920s when Chile aggressively fought to win the attempted plebiscite in Tacna-Arica, in the 1970s with the almost-war with Peru and in 2014 with Peru’s claim to maritime sovereignty. It was argued that Arica was conversely abandoned post-1929 when Arica was officially incorporated into Chile until the Junta de Adelanto de Arica committed to raising the region out of its precarious situation ‘on the basis of its own men’, and since the 1980s when health at the border has progressively worsened and the region became plagued by drug abuse, racism, unemployment, child abuse, and corruption. Arica has waxed and waned between
being the ‘centre of Chile’ when the idea of the nation is threatened and a poor, dusty, peripheral fishing town when sovereignty can be ensured. The theme running through the five ‘border moments’ studied in this thesis has been violence. This has rarely meant individual-on-individual violence or even international warfare but has tended to be the ongoing threat of such warfare, of biopolitical control over individual bodies, and of epistemic racialised violence. The violence studied here can often be traced back to masculinities and the Latin American performance of *machismo*.

The first empirical chapter, chapter four, examined the role of the United States government in the attempted plebiscite of 1925-1926, showing the global significance of the border through the perspective of a handful of Americans living in Arica, namely General Pershing and Major Quekemeyer. This was the most violent episode in Arica’s history and the international effort was to pacify this violence through diplomacy and the act of drawing borders and while the plebiscite failed due to Chile’s overt aggression, the border was eventually demarcated and in 1929 Arica the region became Chilean and Arica the city became a border city.

The fifth chapter charted the decline of Arica’s national importance after 1929. State legislation allowed for the creation of the Puerto Libre in 1954 and the Junta de Adelanto in 1958 which saw local citizens build a more prosperous and thriving region. This was pacification through economic development. However, while the state had allowed these changes for the better, the state also brought about the dissolution of the JAA with General Pinochet’s economic restructuring of the country, driving Arica back into economic precarity at the end of the 1970s.

Chapter six focussed on other changes which occurred in Arica during the 1970s, while it was abandoned economically, the border became increasingly militarised as the two *macho* dictators, Pinochet in Chile and Velasco in Peru, began an arms race.
with the latter aiming to recover Arica at the centenary of the War of the Pacific. In fact the border may have been abandoned economically precisely to allow for Arica to become a military space. Arica once again became a place of violence, even if this time only through threat. Due to the spectre of Peruvian revanchism Arica had shifted in its importance and sovereignty in the north needed to be maintained against hostilities from Peru.

Chapter number seven picks up chronologically from the previous chapter but with a very different perspective on violence, this time not in terms of international conflict but at the scale of the body. Once again illustrating the paradoxical nature of the border the chapter examines the role of the border in Arica having an unusually high rate of HIV/AIDS but also how this same border has been the route of escape for women with unwanted pregnancies seeking abortions that are easier to obtain in Peru.

The final empirical chapter, number eight, seeks to understand violence at the border in the present day. The recent Chile-Peru maritime conflict exemplifies how international conflict and the threat of violence at the border is persistent and constant and how at state and corporeal scales the bordering of Arica is an ongoing process affecting the lived experiences of those who inhabit the borderlands. Corporeality and biopolitics become highly significant at the border; the lands where the state and the ‘other’ across the border determine who and who cannot be located in certain spaces. This has been seen through the historical time period studied from voting rights in the 1920s, military positions, abortion rights, and fishing grounds in 2014.

Each of these moments creates layers of meaning, each one stacked upon another but they are also intertwined. Over the past ninety years the richness and complexity of the border has been added to so that Arica is not just the territory battled over in
the 1920s, or a laboratory for urban development mid-century, or the location of an almost-war, a space of illness, or a maritime dispute. Arica is all of this history and is informed by this history, it is a multi-dimensional border city.

This thesis set out with three aims; the first was to investigate how and why a culture of violence has been created and maintained yet also contested at the Chile-Peru border. The primary way that Arica has experienced violence has been economic abandonment by the Chilean state due to its peripheral location and militarisation due to international threats to national sovereignty. The impacts of this has led to the vulnerability of Arica as a region against territorial claims by Peru but has also harmed the bodies of local citizens, often fatally. However, I also found out how violence, while it has been created and maintained due to Arica’s border location, has also been contested with efforts, mainly from local citizens but also at the international level, to soothe the area’s violent history.

The second aim was to examine how actors at the international, national, and corporeal levels have been involved in violence or its suppression at the Chile-Peru border. This is more complicated and depends on the actors more precisely and at what time period, for example the United States was involved in the attempted plebiscite of the 1920s which aimed to put an end to local violence but later in the 1970s aided Pinochet in his 1973 coup d’état. The United States has been a constant presence at the Chile-Peru border whether overtly or covertly. Additionally, at the border, local citizens often have a healthy cross-border relationship which contrasts with the Peruvian government which has threatened to regain Arica through military force. The Chilean state meanwhile has contributed to situations of violence through abandonment, leading to Arica’s poverty and poor health while at other times approving legislation in favour of Arica and protecting the border when it was most
under threat. The local municipality and individuals have borne the brunt of the violence but have also resisted it most effectively through forging Arica’s modern industrial identity under the Junta de Adelanto, forming the independence movement, or defying the state by traveling Peru in search of abortions.

The third and final aim was to understand how a sustained culture of border violence has affected the city of Arica and its inhabitants. Present-day Arica with its poor health, racism, drug abuse, corruption, unemployment, and poverty can be seen as a result of the past ninety years of violence at the border, because of its border location at one extreme end of a ribbon-shaped country. Despite initiatives to raise Arica out of its stagnation and to protect Arica against outside threats, none has been successful long-term and both Peru and Bolivia still retain dreams of taking Arica for their own.

While this thesis has taken violence as a lens through which to understand the role of the border in Arica I do not wish to portray the region as violent or unsafe. Daily lives in Arica feel in fact far from violence, it is a city with low-crime, a relaxed ‘beach-bum’ lifestyle and enormous regional pride just unfortunately located between the two prosperous cities of Iquique and Tacna and dreaming of the golden heyday years of the Junta de Adelanto.

In order to study the varied themes covered in the thesis it was necessary to use a diverse set of methodologies. This was a form of collage to build up ninety years of border history in Arica to view bordering over time and the lived experiences of the border at different scales. This necessitated tailoring methodologies to the specific event or time period of study and therefore spanned historical personal diaries, newspapers, photographs, official records, interviews/oral histories, and social media.
Using any fewer could not have built up the rich and diverse empirical data that I collected over a year in the United States, Chile, and Peru.

Certain concessions had to be made due to the ambitious themes and timeframe studied. Each empirical chapter is arguably worthy of deeper individual study at doctoral or postdoctoral level and great insight could be made from each. There are avenues within this thesis which could be pursued further in order to arrive at practical, policy recommendations particularly with the themes on economic development schemes, HIV/AIDS, abortion, and maritime disputes but the objectives of this thesis did not provide space for appropriately thorough recommendations to be made. In the current world order states cannot decide whether or not they have international borders but they can choose how to govern those peripheral borderlands. However, my aims were to go beyond an in-depth study of one issue to instead explore what can be gained from bringing together such different themes.

As well as looking at the ‘border moments’ individually, the thesis as a whole could arguably be broadened, extending the same themes to the other side of the border, to Tacna in Peru. This would give fresh insights into the experiences of Arica as well as providing the silent voice in this thesis, the Peruvians, the constant ‘other’ living across the invisible line in the sand. While this thesis has taken the Chile-Peru border as its object of study, Arica has also been shaped by another border, that of Chile-Bolivia, to which I have been unable to give fair attention due to the scope of the project. However this is a salient time for Chile-Bolivia relations as Bolivia takes its claim for a right to the sea (potentially through Arica) to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. As of September 2015 the ICJ has declared that it has jurisdiction to rule on Bolivia’s claim to a six mile strip of land that would run along the present Chile-Peru border. Finally, this thesis also comes from a very specific
standpoint from my personal position as a researcher and while this could never be undone, the border can never be seen truly objectively, it is nevertheless imperative to note.

The contribution of this thesis to geography has been to add to work that focusses on the processes and lived experiences of bordering after a border has been demarcated. Through empirical research it also highlights the persistent violence of borders and the paradoxical and contradictory nature of borders that rise and fall in international and state importance depending on external threats. There can be no universalising theory of borders all of which are wacky and unique due to their specific histories and geographies but borders can tell us important stories about resistance and determination against violence at international, state, and corporeal scales.

Mark Salter’s analogy of the border as a ‘suture’ seems a particularly apt way to theorise the Chile-Peru border. For Salter (2012:734) the suture is “a process of knitting together the inside and the outside together and the resultant scar”. This emphasises that the border is not a non-place, it is not a dissolute imaginary line in a globalised world, it is the legacy of a violent wound, the result of a process that is never quite finished. The border is always in process, the scar can continue to heal, it can be slowly picked at and irritated, or it can be brutally ripped open and these happen in different ways for different actors at the border. There can be no homogenous border identity when the lived experience of the border differs so drastically; an Aymará family who have left the highlands to make a better living in the alien city, descendants of white Chileans relocated to populate the north, a newly-buzzcut soldier of 18 stationed to protect the border while spending his weekends enjoying the cheaper amusements of Tacna, artisanal fishermen trawling for anything
the corporations haven’t swept away, a gay man living with AIDS and daily discrimination, a pregnant teenage girl desperately searching for a solution. All equally inhabit the border even if the border and border polices don’t affect them in the same way.
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  - Calvin Coolidge Papers
  - William Smith Culbertson Papers
  - General Francis L. Parker Papers
  - William Smith Culbertson Papers
  - Frank B. Kellogg Papers
Newspapers

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