Protecting buyers from fine print

D'Agostino, Elena and Seidmann, Daniel J. (2016) Protecting buyers from fine print. European Economic Review, 89 . pp. 42-54. ISSN 0014-2921

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Buyers typically do not read the …ne print in contracts, providing an incentive for a monopolist to draft terms which are unfavorable to buyers. We model this problem, proving that trade must then be inefficient. We show that regulation which mandates efficient terms raises welfare. More interestingly, regulations which prohibit the least efficient terms may reduce welfare by inducing the monopolist not to other favorable terms. We extend these results to markets in which some buyers are naive, showing that prohibiting the least efficient terms may also harm the naive buyers.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: fine print; regulation
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Identification Number:
Depositing User: Eprints, Support
Date Deposited: 17 May 2016 17:29
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 20:00

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