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A Realistic Evaluation of Integrated Offender Management in one English County: A Partnership for Desistance?

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Abstract

This thesis presents the findings of an in-depth realistic evaluation of the Integrated Offender Management (IOM) approach in one English county. IOM is a multi-agency approach, promoted by government, to managing prolific offenders, with the aim of moving them towards desistance from crime.

Drawing on qualitative and quantitative methods the findings demonstrate that IOM can be effective in supporting desistance, and is associated with reductions in the level and severity of reoffending and improvements in the circumstances and risk level of offenders. Using the realistic evaluation approach, three generative mechanisms were identified to explain these findings: the intense and structured approach to supervision; close multi-agency working; and caring and trusting relationships between practitioners and offenders. The findings also underscore the importance of offender readiness for change. This research confirms previous findings regarding the influence of interventions such as IOM on desistance and also identifies ways in which the operation and effect of IOM can be undermined. The confounding issues identified concern both the internal operation of IOM and the ways in which it fits into the wider criminal justice system, both locally and nationally.

This research makes three contributions. Firstly, it adds to the literature and theory of IOM and assisted desistance within a multi-agency setting, through the development of a realist conception of the approach. Secondly it contributes to the literature on the use of realistic evaluation, an approach not employed in previous IOM evaluations. This research develops a method of presenting findings from realistic evaluation which reflect both generative mechanisms and ways they are confounded. Finally, it contributes to the policy and practice of IOM, and similar approaches, by outlining both its possibilities and limitations regarding offender rehabilitation and desistance. These findings are therefore of use to practitioners and policy makers in this constantly evolving field.
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Chapter 1. Introduction to the Research

This research is concerned with offenders, and ways in which they can be supported out of crime. Specifically this thesis concerns an evaluation of Integrated Offender Management in one English county. The focus of this research is a distinct group of offenders, who due to the nature and extent of their offending, have become subject to Integrated Offender Management (IOM). The research aims to understand how this approach operates and what impact it has upon those subject to it, regarding their offending and circumstances. It is less concerned with offences committed, their definitions and characteristics.

IOM uses multi-agency teams to draw upon the expertise and resources of a number of different professionals to intensively manage and support offenders. It is aimed at groups of particularly persistent offenders, selected by local teams of professionals. It builds on over a decade of attempts to reduce the offending of particularly persistent offenders. However, evidence of the effectiveness of these attempts has been limited, mixed and difficult to quantify (Farrall et al, 2007, p. 358). Furthermore the current, limited, research evidence on IOM is itself similarly mixed (Annison et al, 2015, p. 401). The research outlined here adds to this body of evidence. The approach taken within this research is a mixed methods case study, employing realistic evaluation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). In this way it aims to explore how and why this particular intervention works and to what extent it could be expected to the reduce reoffending of the offenders at which it is targeted. Such an approach aims to produce a programme theory that can be utilised by researchers in the same or related fields.
This research was commissioned following the process evaluation of the six national IOM pioneer sites, one of which was the current research site (Senior et al, 2011). Local criminal justice agencies commissioned this separate evaluation, to understand their IOM approach in more detail and to assess its effect. This is why the research took place in the site it did, with local agencies part funding it\(^1\). The researcher therefore worked closely with an advisory team of representatives of local agencies, who were able to support access to people and data within the site. The agencies received progress reports every six months and a final report on the findings (in addition to this thesis) which was presented at a series of meetings.

There are implications of this background to the research. Wong has noted that there can often be more of a requirement to validate an intervention than evaluate it (2013, p. 70) and that the evaluation evidence will be only one source of information that determines decisions made about it. Therefore it is important to state that the researcher determined the research scope, questions and methods, and experienced no interference from local agencies during the course of the research. Local stakeholders were indeed open to recommendations for change and acted upon those proposed by the research (please refer to Chapter 7 for more details).

Had this research developed in the opposite direction, with the researcher seeking access to a site to conduct research on a topic of their choosing, they would have been subject to access or other limitations placed on them by local agencies, and requirements to share findings. Having local agency support for the research restricted any such limitations only to the capacity of the researcher.

The next section outlines the development of IOM, considering the three public policy concerns that drove this. This chapter will then outline the

\(^{1}\) Funding amounted to one third of the cost for three years, with the rest of the costs being met by the University
questions this research answers and the contributions it makes, before presenting an outline of how IOM operated within the research site. The chapter closes by presenting an outline of the rest of the thesis.

**IOM Development**

IOM was codified by the last Labour Government in 2009 (Home Office, Ministry of Justice, 2009) formalising work that was already being undertaken by practitioners across criminal justice agencies responsible for prolific offenders. In this sense it is more of a locally defined approach than a definite programme (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p. 13), and has no statutory status and is not legally mandated. Its operation is based on a set of principles that include: multi-agency working; a focus on local crime issues; providing both support and monitoring for all identified offenders, regardless of their position within the criminal justice system; and utilizing current best practice (Home Office, Ministry of Justice, 2009, p. 3).

There are three main policy concerns that gave rise to IOM. These are firstly how to reduce re-offending or recidivism, especially amongst the most prolific offenders; secondly the lack of support provided upon release for those serving short custodial sentences (fewer than 12 months); and finally the debate over how, and by whom, offenders should be managed.

Regarding the first concern to reduce levels of reoffending, IOM is a recent development in a series of criminal justice policies that have aimed to target resources upon offenders who are particularly persistent or problematic, or chronic in the language used above regarding criminal careers, and therefore at greater risk of re-offending. The root assumption of such policies is that reducing the criminal behaviour of these offenders can be expected to have a disproportionately beneficial effect on overall levels of both reoffending and crime, because such offenders account for a substantial proportion of
offending (Dawson and Mead, 2005, p.2; Dawson and Cuppleditch, 2007, p.1; Owen and Cooper, 2013, p. 4). The recent IOM inspection echoed this argument stating that one of the, ‘most efficient ways of preventing crime is to rehabilitate those who are most likely to commit it’ (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p.4). In this way IOM is a preventative intervention, so called ‘tertiary prevention’ referring to the prevention of re-offending (McGuire, 2002, p. xiv).

This is borne out by official figures that show that in the year from January 2011, overall just over a quarter of offenders reoffend within one year (Ministry of Justice, 2013a, p. 8); however this rises to 75% for those characterised as prolific, who committed over 5% of total reoffences, despite comprising fewer than 1% of all offenders (Ministry of Justice, 2013a, p. 21).

In 2004, the then Labour Government published a National Reducing Re-offending Action Plan (Home Office, 2004a). This recognised the need for a number of central government departments to work together in order to tackle re-offending and introduced seven “pathways”, cutting across the areas of responsibility of many different departments, as a means of doing this. These were areas in which work was to be undertaken with offenders, having been identified as criminogenic, or likely to affect the risk of re-offending. They are: accommodation; education, training and employment; mental and physical health; drugs and alcohol; finance, benefit and debt; children and families; and attitudes, thinking and behaviour. These are used within IOM to organise the support given to offenders (Home Office, 2010a, p. 5) by pathways officers (see below).

In particular, IOM can be seen as bringing together the Prolific and other Priority Offender (PPO) Programme and the Drug Intervention Programme (DIP). The national PPO programme was launched in the same year as the
Action Plan. It was composed of three different but inter-related ‘strands’.

These were:

- **Prevent and Deter** – aimed at identifying young offenders at risk of becoming prolific offenders
- **Catch and Convict** – the enforcement side of the programme, it involved identifying PPOs and then targeting them through greater police attention, closer scrutiny of licence conditions and quick recalls to court or prison if necessary; the so called ‘premium service’ (Home Office, 2004b, p. 12).
- **Rehabilitate and Resettle** – this was the other side of the ‘premium service’ in which the probation and prison services aimed to support offenders while in custody or upon release to move away from offending.

The Home Office issued guidance on how to operate each of the three strands (Home Office, 2004b; Home Office, 2004c; Home Office, YJB, DfES, 2004) and local Community Safety Partnerships, established in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, were made responsible for the functioning of PPO schemes. The identification and management of PPOs made use of a ‘scoring matrix’ (Home Office, 2004b, p. 11) applied to those who had been referred to the scheme from local criminal justice agencies to ensure the most prolific offenders received this “premium service”.

The Drugs Intervention Programme (DIP) was launched a year earlier in 2003 and was targeted specifically at offenders misusing Class A drugs (specifically heroin, cocaine and crack-cocaine), who were at a greater risk of committing acquisitive crimes like burglary or theft, and moving them into treatment. Such offenders were managed by multi-agency Criminal Justice Intervention Teams, established in local areas (Home Office, 2011, p. 1). These teams followed cases throughout their criminal justice journey, whether in custody or in the community, to ensure consistent care.

There is a clear overlap between the offenders who qualified for the PPO programme and DIP, due to the influence of a Class A drug addiction upon involvement in offending (Home Office, 2009, p.2). Therefore central government sought to align the two schemes, to ensure that all suitable
offenders were supported by all relevant agencies, that duplication of effort was minimised and information sharing improved. This had already begun in local schemes and was the starting point for IOM (Home Office, 2009, p. 9). IOM is positioned in this statement as an umbrella term for all work aimed at reducing the re-offending of prolific offenders through the work of multi-agency teams (Home Office, Ministry of Justice, 2009, p. 6).

These programmes are examples of what Worrall and Mawby term third generation adult intensive supervision initiatives. They argue the first generation initiatives, developed in the 1970s, focused on probation treatment of offenders, whilst the second generation, developed in the 1980s sought to provide treatment as well as surveillance and control (2004, p. 270). This change in emphasis mirrored wider changes to the probation service outlined in the next chapter. The third generation combines the theoretical underpinnings, aims and means of the first two, as well as providing specific resources for the monitoring of offenders. These initiatives therefore provide, ‘a mix of frequent contact, access to treatment (particularly drug treatment) and community facilities, and constant monitoring’ (Worrall and Mawby, 2004, p. 270), which describes IOM well.

In this way the aims and approach of interventions such as IOM draw upon ideas from classical criminology which prioritises the need to treat or support offenders, and those, such as positivist criminology that focus upon crime opportunities and how these can be limited (Matza, 1964, p. 2; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990, p. 14; Miller, 2014). Thus, they have been described as a ‘sophisticated amalgam’ (Farrall et al, 2007, p. 357), that can be evidenced by the range of the aims outlined for IOM in the government statements on it (see below). Worrall, Mawby and Farrall have noted that the fact that a swift return to custody is considered as much of a success as the rehabilitation of offenders, the so-called “win-win” aspect of these initiatives (Worrall and Mawby, 2004, p. 270), is problematic, because it can limit the ambitions of
such an approach with regard to offender rehabilitation. Indeed, Farrall and colleagues query whether these types of initiatives are compatible with desistance theory (Farrall et al, 2007, p. 373). However, as will be outlined in the next chapter, it is argued in this thesis that they are, or could be.

The second concern that underpins the development of IOM is with improving the management of those sentenced to short custodial terms. Statistics on proven re-offending (re-conviction within one year) produced by the Ministry of Justice show that rates are twice as high for those released from short custodial terms as the average for all adult offenders, with over half reconvicted within one year (Ministry of Justice, 2015, p. 6). Short custodial terms are also a commonly used sentence with 60,000 adults receiving them each year, the majority sentenced to only three months in prison (NAO, 2010, p. 4). There has long been a recognition that offenders perpetually serving such “revolving-door” sentences are at a high risk of re-offending and in need of additional support (Home Office, Ministry of Justice, 2009, p. 5).

This distinction between sentences of under and over 12 months was introduced in the Criminal Justice Act 1991 which spilt the custodial sentences between prison and community supervision. This made probation supervision compulsory, but only for those offenders who had been sentenced to 12 months or more (Maguire et al, 2000, p. 234). Those sentenced to short terms could access only voluntary support from the probation service, which the Home Office’s research found had little capacity due to the increase in caseloads brought about by the formalisation of post release supervision for those serving longer terms (Maguire et al, 1998, p. 1; Maguire et al, 2000, p. 237).

Research undertaken later by the Labour Government in 1999 found that more formal probation supervision was more successful in maintaining
contact with prisoners post release than were the more voluntary arrangements in place (Lewis et al, 2003, p. 64). Furthermore, the results of a one year reconviction study published later found that these offenders had lower reconviction levels, particularly if they had worked with the probation service both in prison and post release (Lewis et al, 2007, p. 47). The authors concluded that continuity of support “through the gate” was important in reducing reconviction (Lewis et al, 2007, p. 47). Two further reports published around the same time by the inspectorates of the Prison and Probation services (HMIP, 2001) and the Social Exclusion Unit of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (SEU, 2002) noted the poor level of provision, but the high level of need amongst this group of offenders.

Thus, at the turn of the century there was concern over the impact of short-term sentences on offenders’ abilities to cease offending and reintegrate into the community. The 2001 Halliday Report, which reviewed the sentencing framework in England and Wales, reported similar concerns stating that the most compelling reason for changing the sentencing framework was the, ‘inability of short prison sentences ... to make any meaningful intervention in the criminal careers of many of those who receive them’ (Halliday, 2001, p. ii). The review recommended that community sentences should be considered in place of short prison sentences, and where they were used they should contain a period of statutory community supervision, termed ‘custody plus’ (Halliday, 2001, p. 19) and was due to be implemented through powers introduced in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Home Office, 2004a, p. 3). However, such powers were never enacted, and custody plus was never introduced (Lewis et al, 2007, p. 48).

It was not until the introduction of the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014 that prescribes a period of statutory post release supervision for all offenders sentenced to a fixed period of custody greater than one day that this difference in the treatment of short prison terms was ended (The Stationary
Until this recent change IOM had been a way to formalise non-statutory supervision for prolific offenders. It, like the PPO programme before it, drew on the lessons learnt regarding “through the gate” support and extended support throughout an offender’s journey through the criminal justice system, providing more consistent support with the aim of reducing the high levels of reoffending of this group.

The third concern underpinning the development of IOM was with the way community supervision is undertaken. Alongside particular approaches to offender supervision, such as IOM and PPO before it, the operation and effect of supervision itself is little researched, especially in comparison to the operation and effect of custodial supervision that are in fact less commonly used (Pearson et al, 2011, p. 74; Robinson et al, 2013, p. 336; McNeill and Beyens, 2013, p. 3).

The 2003 Carter Report that reviewed correctional services (the courts, prison and probation services) made two key recommendations; firstly the creation of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), bringing together the management of the prison and probation services, with the aim of, and responsibility for, reducing re-offending (Carter, 2003, p. 5). The second was the creation of the role of “offender manager”; in much the same way as probation officers, offender managers were to oversee offenders in the community and manage whatever interventions were deemed appropriate. However, in a change from previous practice, both the offender managers and the interventions delivered to offenders could be provided by those employed by the public, private or third sectors. This notion of ‘contestability’ was introduced in the report (Carter, 2003, p. 34, 37) and meant that managing offenders was no longer the preserve of only the probation service and could instead be provided by a mixed economy of providers. The partnership working this involves is the subject of Chapter 3.
NOMS was duly established in 2004 with the structure envisioned by Carter, including the use of services outside the public sector, and the notion of offender management was subsequently codified in the National Offender Management Model (Grapes, 2006) as the ‘single concept’ to be used by a range of service providers (Grapes, 2006 p. 2).

The practice in IOM of managing offenders within overtly multi-agency teams throughout the criminal justice process is a result of the reforms brought in following the Carter review, such as a concern with ‘end to end’ sentencing (Carter, 2003, p. 34) codified in the National Offender Management Model. The three policy concerns that underpinned the introduction of IOM also reflect wider changes to the police and probation service and the aims and extent of offender rehabilitation; these are discussed further in the next two chapters.

The initial government policy statement outlines the following aims for IOM:

- Reduce crime and re-offending, improve public confidence in the criminal justice system, tackle the social exclusion of offenders and their families and drive improvement in organisational performance delivery
- Address potential gaps and overlaps between existing approaches and programmes to manage offenders
- Align the work of local criminal justice agencies and their partners more effectively, and expand and improve partnerships that already exist at the local and regional level to work with targeted groups of offenders
- Simplify and strengthen governance, to provide greater clarity around respective roles and responsibilities, with regards to leadership, operational decision-making and allocation of resources.


A recent Home Office survey of IOM arrangements (Home Office, 2013) found that 98 per cent of local authority areas that responded (63%) reported that they had IOM arrangements in place. Of these, 79 per cent were reported to be fully established, an increase from 31 per cent in 2011 (Home Office, 2013, p.3). Indeed, since its introduction IOM has remained in place supported as best practice by subsequent governments. For example in 2010 the provisions
of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 came into force, which placed a statutory
duty upon Community Safety Partnerships to reduce re-offending, alongside
crime and disorder. To support this, the probation service was made a
‘responsible authority’ within the partnerships, along with the police, local
authority, health and fire services (Fox, 2010, p. 17).

Since 2010 the government has proposed a so-called ‘rehabilitation
revolution’ in relation to the way services are provided and funded (HM
Government, 2010, p. 23; Ministry of Justice, 2010b, p. 2; Flynn, 2011, p. 82)
and more recently to the need to “transform” rehabilitation (Ministry of
Justice, 2013b). In particular this refers to ways of reducing re-offending
through the greater use of the private and voluntary sectors in offender
supervision and innovative means of funding work with offenders. This led to
the introduction of the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014 which allowed
private and voluntary organisations to bid to provide the majority of offender
supervision services directly, including those concerned with IOM. As in
previous Government statements on offender rehabilitation, the Ministry of
Justice’s operating model for the new probation providers referred to IOM as
good practice, to be maintained and used by new providers (Ministry of
Justice, 2013c, p.37).

This research has therefore been undertaken at a particular point in a shifting
policy environment, an issue that is discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7 and
in Evans (2015). IOM continues to be supported within government policy
statements and the recent joint inspection of IOM recognised it as a
‘significant element of the Home Office and Ministry of Justice strategy to
prevent crime and reduce reoffending’ (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection,
2014, p. 4). This emphasises the need for research and evaluation, such as
realistic evaluation employed here, that aims to uncover the theory of the
approach, making it applicable beyond the particular research site and policy
approach operating at the time.
Recently the key principles for IOM were revised and an additional aim, to achieve ‘long-term desistance from crime’, in other words ending an individual’s involvement in crime, was introduced (Home Office, Ministry of Justice, 2015a, p. 3). The aims for IOM outlined above are clearly wide ranging and beyond the scope of this research. This research will, as noted above, focus upon understanding how IOM operates in the research site and the effects it has on those subject to it. In particular it will explore the ways and extent to which IOM is able to achieve desistance for those subject to it.

The effect of the criminal justice system on desistance has been described as ‘highly controversial’ (Farrington, 2005, p. 8; Piquero et al, 2003, p. 390) recognising that it may in fact interrupt desistance efforts or compound criminal involvement, rather than enabling offenders to exit from it, for example by limiting legitimate opportunities (discussed further in the next chapter). It is this that this research will explore, with regard to IOM, in order to provide research findings that can support future policy making regarding IOM and alternative forms of offender supervision.

Research questions and contributions

The overall aim of this research is:

*To evaluate IOM as a means of supporting desistance amongst prolific offenders and so inform IOM policy and practice.*

In order to meet this aim, the main research question is:

*To what extent and in what circumstances can an IOM approach support desistance amongst prolific offenders?*

This question will be answered by providing answers to the following supplemental research questions:

1. How and why do (prolific) offenders desist or reduce their offending?
2. What is IOM and how does it operate as a partnership?
3. To what extent does IOM reduce the reoffending, and support the desistance efforts of the offenders subject to it?
4. How useful is the realistic evaluation methodology to research in this area?

This research is situated within the literature and debates regarding partnership working, and offender rehabilitation, specifically desistance (or the process of withdrawing) from crime. In particular, this research aims to contribute to the small literature on assisted desistance by assessing whether and in what ways IOM might support desistance amongst those subject to it. The effect of offender supervision generally (Pearson et al, 2011, p. 74) and ways in which desistance specifically can be supported or assisted is little researched with only a handful of published studies (Shapland et al, 2012, p. 20 and 22; McNeill and Weaver, 2010, p.11; McCulloch, 2005, p. 12). This research contributes to this literature and understanding of this process.

Furthermore none of these previous studies have explored assisted desistance in a multi-agency setting. As noted above, previous evaluations of multi-agency programmes to reduce reoffending have not necessarily found them to be effective at reducing reoffending (Farrall et al, 2007, p. 358). Furthermore prevention of crime or reoffending, particularly as a responsibility of the police, has been noted as an area where both evidence and performance data are lacking (College of Policing, 2015, p. 16; National Audit Office, 2015, p. 9). The literature on partnership working, generally and within criminal justice, has found it to be an often used approach, despite a lack of evidence of its effect (Audit Commission, 1998, p. 26; Rumgay, 2007, p. 554). This research will therefore contribute to the debate regarding the implications and actual effects of this way of working.

This research makes these contributions by considering the operation and effect of IOM, itself under researched with only five published studies into the approach (Senior et al, 2011; Dawson et al, 2011; Hallam Centre for Community Justice, 2012; Williams and Ariel, 2013; Annison et al, 2015). A
recent joint inspection of IOM found that whilst it is an approach that is supported by practitioners as making common sense, there is as yet, ‘no definitive body of peer reviewed academic research to draw upon’ (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p. 50). Only one of these studies (Dawson et al, 2011) has considered both processes and outcomes, and did so within a newly established IOM pilot, as opposed to a well-established county wide approach as is the case with the site for this research.

In addition none of these studies have explicitly drawn on a theory-led approach to evaluation, such as the realistic evaluation approach of Pawson and Tilley (1997) employed in this research. This approach is used to understand what the effects of the IOM approach are, and how and why these were brought about. In this way it aims to outline the key components of the approach and so enable future studies to build on these findings. The research is also able to make a second contribution to current debates regarding the application of this approach (Marchal et al, 2012; Astbury and Leeuw, 2010).

Finally, this research makes an empirical contribution with regard to offender management practice and policy. A number of authors in the desistance field have written specifically about its implications for the practice of offender management (McNeill, 2006; McNeill and Weaver, 2010; Weaver and McNeill, 2007). As IOM is an approach which aims to support desistance amongst offenders, this research considers to what extent desistance practices are in operation and their implications. These findings will be of benefit to practitioners and policy makers especially as IOM, as noted above, continues to be supported and promoted by government.

**The Operation of IOM in the Research Site**

This section outlines how IOM operates within the research site, which as one of the six national IOM pioneer sites (Senior et al, 2011) was well established
at the time of the research. The local IOM approach grew out of a previous priority offender programme that was also in place before the national roll out; multi-agency ways of working with prolific offenders have a long history in the site. It was noted above that IOM is an approach that developed in different local areas and was later approved rather than mandated by central government, the approach within this site is therefore likely to be different from that in operation elsewhere.

The research site remains anonymous in this research primarily to ensure the anonymity of research participants who due to their job role could be identified if the research site was known.

Local IOM Scope and Organisation

In the research site the IOM approach is aimed at offenders convicted of serious acquisitive crime, as defined by the Home Office which include robbery, burglary, theft, supply of drugs and theft of, or from vehicles; a traditional focus of priority offender programmes. It also allows for the management of “non-statutory” offenders who had served short custodial sentences and were not (under the legislation at the time) subject to post release supervision.

Figure 1.1 outlines the structure of IOM provision in the research site and the resources available to it. It shows three levels of: IOM provision, the teams of police, probation and drugs workers that provide the supervision of offenders; IOM management that oversee the provision of the three key agencies; and IOM governance that oversee the approach. The organisation and provision of IOM remained stable across the fieldwork period.

As the Figure shows, the day-to-day work of IOM is provided by four local teams, each with a geographical area of responsibility. The staff in these
teams are split between two different functions: enforcement and pathways. The enforcement staff consist of police officers overseen by and located with a police sergeant within a police station. These officers are responsible for trying to reengage offenders who are failing to comply with IOM through curfew checks and also for arresting offenders who are in breach of conditions or who have committed further offences. There are also police officers who perform a pathways role along with those from the other IOM agencies. The pathways staff are responsible for the management of offenders whilst they comply with IOM. These staff are co-located in probation premises or partnership buildings along with a senior probation officer and drug team leader.
Figure 1.1: IOM Organisational Outline

IOM PROVISION
Roles/Responsibilities:
Day-to-day supervision and management of IOM offenders, weekly team meetings and monthly selection and deselecting meetings (chaired by Police Inspector)

IOM MANAGEMENT
Roles/Responsibilities
Management of IOM teams

IOM GOVERNANCE
Roles/Responsibilities
Governance, Performance and Monitoring of IOM

IOM Teams * 4
Leadership:
Senior probation officer / Police sergeant / Drugs team leader
Composition:
Police: Pathways police officers / Enforcement police officers / Prison liaison officer
Probation: Probation officers / Probation service officers
Drugs treatment service: Drugs workers
Note: Probation and drugs workers are not exclusive to IOM.

Supporting services
(not exclusive to IOM)
Prescribing services
Education, training and employment workers

Information Team
(not exclusive to IOM)
Management: Police sergeant
Composition:
Police staff / Probation staff
Electronic monitoring representative

Probation management
(not exclusive to IOM)
Probation directors * 2

Police management
(not exclusive to IOM)
Chief Inspector
Inspectors * 2

Community Safety Partnerships
Coverage: Separate City and County Boards, not exclusive to IOM

Reducing Reoffending Board
Coverage: City and County. Focused on various approaches to offender management including IOM

Local Criminal Justice Board
Coverage: City and County, not exclusive to IOM
Within these buildings the IOM staff tend to be located together, away from those managing other offenders. The exception is one team piloting an arrangement whereby pathways staff are embedded within generic probation teams organised geographically.

All those working within IOM teams fulfil other roles aside from IOM. For example, the probation staff are based in teams that also deal with other, non-IOM offenders who’s offending also tends to be linked to substance misuse issues like those subject to IOM. They are therefore not dedicated to IOM offenders, but largely focused on a caseload of prolific, acquisitive offenders as opposed to a generic caseload. Similarly the substance misuse workers also work with clients not subject to IOM or indeed to any statutory intervention. Whilst the IOM police resources, both enforcement and pathways are meant to be dedicated to IOM, in practice both are involved in other work that does not always link to IOM work, such as the policing of local town centres at the weekend or large sporting or other public events. The use of a dedicated (as far as possible) enforcement team is not a part of all IOM teams nationally, where Neighbourhood Police Teams or other local resources are used (College of Policing, 2013, p. 65; Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p. 38).

The work of the teams is managed primarily through weekly team meetings. These involve a review of each offender subject to IOM managed by the team that tends to be around 60 to 80 offenders, with a maximum of around 400 offenders on IOM at any time. The meetings provide an opportunity for all team members (pathways and enforcement) to provide updates on an offender and it is on the basis of this information that decisions are made about the management of the offender. Those in prison and not due for release in the near future are not discussed in any detail, with most time being spent on those in the community and causing issues. A red-amber-green rating system is used to classify offenders, from those for whom there
is a warrant issued for recall or new offending who are passed to the enforcement teams, to those not causing any concerns managed by the pathways teams. This rating is reassessed in every meeting, and indeed between meetings.

These teams are supported by services generally available within probation and drugs services, including prescribing services for offenders in need of methadone or substances to support withdrawal, and education, training and employment services. In addition, the IOM teams are supported by a multi-agency information team. Their remit also extends beyond IOM but provides a daily briefing to the four teams on all IOM offenders, including intelligence reports and information on arrests, incidents or crimes, breaches of curfew and upcoming prison releases. This draws upon data provided by all IOM agencies, which is shared with the teams. This team also scores the offenders nominated for IOM using the agreed matrix; this flow of information is represented by the arrows in Figure 1.1.

Unlike the staff within the IOM teams, those in management roles are neither co-located with each other, nor with the local teams. The probation staff are the responsibility of two directors whose responsibilities are split geographically and extended beyond IOM. This was similar in the case of the drugs workers. Similarly the police lead for IOM, a Chief Inspector, holds wider responsibilities. They are supported by two inspectors, who at the start of the fieldwork were responsible for different geographical areas, but during the fieldwork were split between tactical and strategic issues.

Regarding the governance of IOM, Figure 1.1 shows that this is shared between three different boards: firstly the Reducing Reoffending Board a multi-agency body made up of representatives of the police, probation service, local community safety partnerships, health services and other partners chaired (during the research period) by the local chief probation
Officer; the multi-agency community safety partnerships; and the Local Criminal Justice Board that includes representation from the courts and prison. The probation directors and police chief inspector were represented at these meetings, along with their managers. None of these groups takes precedence over any other, and share some of the same membership, nor is IOM the sole topic of interest for any of these boards.

**Offender selection, supervision and deselection**

Offenders can be nominated for IOM by anybody working within any of the partner organisations, using a standard form that is then submitted to the information team. Those offenders nominated are then scored using a locally defined matrix weighted towards the serious acquisitive offending defined above. The scoring considers an offender’s convictions over the last five years (excluding time in prison) and arrests over the last 12 months. This provides two scores, at least one of which has to be over a certain threshold for the offender to be put forward to one of the monthly meetings that manage the intake and exit of offenders, although some flexibility is provided for those who do not score highly enough and nominating officers can make a case for the inclusion of offenders based on local intelligence or information about the offender.

These meetings, covering different geographic areas, are chaired by the operational inspector for IOM and attended by various members of local IOM teams including representatives of the three key agencies, and those from the information team. At the meeting each new nomination is considered, ideally involving the practitioner who nominated them. A decision is then made about whether to accept them. This is made ultimately by the Inspector and is primarily driven by the offender’s scores. Thus, offender consent is not sought, although offenders are provided with information outlining the implications of becoming subject to IOM.
Once accepted on to the scheme, an offender will be allocated a probation worker, pathways police officer and drugs worker. Those offenders not subject to any statutory supervision and subject to IOM voluntarily (known locally as Level 3) are assigned a probation service officer. Those offenders subject to IOM on post custody licence or court order (known locally as Levels 1 and 2 offenders respectively) are assigned a fully qualified probation officer. As well as determining the nature of the supervising officer, this difference in statutory status also determines the frequency of appointments and whether individuals are subject to additional or bespoke licence conditions.

Those offenders able and willing to work with IOM and managed primarily by the pathways teams are provided with support along seven nationally identified pathways outlined previously: accommodation; education, training and employment; mental and physical health; drugs and alcohol; finance, benefits and debt; children and families; and attitudes, thinking and behaviour. This involves offenders meeting with team members up to four times a week both at local offices and at their home for either direct support, or signposting to other parts of the probation organisation or external support agencies. Those offenders who do not engage with IOM become subject to the enforcement side of the approach. Teams of enforcement police officers, will attempt to reengage offenders through house visits, or will follow up on further intelligence or offending so that they are returned to prison or court as appropriate.

The weekly team meetings are used to monitor offenders and once there has been a period of at least three months with indicators such as good compliance, clean drugs tests, no further arrests or intelligence, an offender can be nominated back to a monthly meeting to come off IOM. As with acceptance on to the scheme this will be discussed around the table and approved by the IOM Inspector. Once removed from IOM an offender will either have their management transferred to a mainstream team within
probation, if they are still subject to a statutory order, or if this has come to an end or had never been in place their supervision will cease. Offenders who are deemed to be in need of IOM supervision at the end of their statutory supervision can be moved to non-statutory status at one of these meetings. In the run up to de-selection those managing an offender will start to reduce the frequency of contact so that there is no sudden loss of contact at that point.

Outline of the thesis

Following this introduction the rest of the thesis is presented as follows; the next two chapters provide a literature review. In Chapter 2 this covers offender rehabilitation, desistance and offender management. It outlines how both the concept of rehabilitation and the practice of supervision have altered over time, and how during the same period the notion of desistance and research into it has gained more attention. It outlines findings from a range of research traditions that provide insight into the processes of rehabilitation and desistance and how these can best be supported. The implications of these findings for this research are outlined.

Chapter 3 concerns partnership working, both generally and within criminal justice. It outlines how interest in and use of partnerships has grown, especially since 1997 in a range of policy fields, and how this has not necessarily been supported by evidence of their effectiveness. The chapter considers both the benefits of and problems with the use of partnerships within criminal justice, and again outlines the implications of these findings for this research.

Chapter 4 considers various ways in which the task of evaluation can be conducted. It outlines evaluation as a specific form of research activity and considers the link between it and public policy. The chapter concludes that the realistic evaluation approach (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) is the most
appropriate for this research. This is for two reasons, firstly realistic evaluation understands the operation of a programme not as a closed and inaccessible “black box”, but as a series of interactions between actors in particular contexts. Secondly it is an approach concerned with uncovering the “mechanisms” at play within an intervention, as a result it is better placed to understand how and why IOM might work. Realistic evaluation is an approach that was developed in the field of criminal justice (Pawson and Tilley, 1994) and that has been identified as relevant to the study of desistance (Farrall, 2002) and IOM in particular (Wong, 2013).

Chapter 5 discusses the methods used in this research. The research used a mixed methods approach within a single case study design. Interviews with IOM staff, offenders and those with a national IOM role, along with observations of IOM processes and analysis of quantitative data on a cohort of offenders were used to assess the processes and outcomes of IOM. The findings are discussed in Chapter 6 which are organised using the realistic evaluation notion of a programme theory. This chapter outlines the three generative mechanisms identified, concerning the intensity and structure of IOM, the effect of close interagency working, and the relationships established between offenders and IOM staff. It discusses how these mechanisms alongside the readiness of individual offenders, can support rehabilitation. This chapter starts within an initial, and ends with a revised, programme theory for IOM.

Finally, Chapter 7 provides a concluding discussion regarding the above research questions. In addition the research contributions and implications for further research are presented.
Chapter 2. Offender Rehabilitation, Desistance and Offender Management

This chapter outlines the literature on offender rehabilitation and desistance, the ultimate aim of IOM, and how the supervision of offenders can influence this process. The next chapter will consider the partnership literature in this field and the issues it raises for practice and outcomes.

This chapter first considers the changing nature of the probation service and offender supervision. This outline explores how theory and practice have developed such that the understanding of desistance has become more important and received more attention. The various explanations for this common, but complex process are explored, before considering how it can be assisted through offender management practice. Findings from research into probation supervision in general, and evaluations of particular interventions or programmes including IOM, are outlined. These provide guidance on how offender rehabilitation can be effectively supported towards desistance. Finally, the chapter considers the implications of these findings and the literature in this field for this research.

Offender Rehabilitation and Probation Supervision

For over one hundred years, until the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014, the provision of rehabilitation support to offenders had been provided primarily by the Probation Service. The legislative framework for the service was established through the 1907 Probation of Offenders (No.2) Bill (May and Annison, 1998, p. 158; Mair and Burke, 2012, p. 121) formalising what had been a voluntary mission. During this time the approach, role and purpose of
the organisation as well as the support it provides has altered alongside changes to criminal justice policy.

Raynor and Robinson (2009) chart the changes in the Probation Service, alongside approaches and attitudes towards offender rehabilitation as an ideal. They note that rehabilitation had a central role in probation work of the 1960s and 1970s, but fell out of favour in the 1980s after research seemed to conclude that “nothing works” in rehabilitation. In particular the work of Robert Martinson was linked to the sense that interventions used by the probation service or others were not able to reduce offending rates (McGuire, 1995, p. 4; Raynor and Robinson, 2009, p. 65). Whether interpreted correctly or not, these findings also tied into wider political changes, in the UK in particular, towards the treatment of crime and offending as something to be primarily punished, as opposed to treated (Burnett and Maruna, 2004; Healy, 2012; Canton, 2013). In the 1990s however there was a revival in the possibility of rehabilitation through the “what works” approach to rehabilitation.

The “what works” approach to rehabilitation, and indeed to criminal justice policy more widely, assumes that interventions can bring about reductions in offending and crime, and seeks to better define and refine these interventions, so that only the best interventions are used to achieve reduction in crime and offending. Initially known as the Effective Practice Initiative, reflecting the fact that practitioners had kept faith with the idea that their work could affect change (Burke, 2010), it is focused on the practice, as opposed to the philosophy of intervention (Raynor and Robinson, 2009, p.112). It was supported by statistical developments, particularly the development of meta-analysis during the 1980s and 1990s and their use in disciplines outside of medicine and psychotherapy. This allowed previous research to be reanalysed to show that some of the programmes or “treatments” used during the 1960s and 1970s had in fact had a positive
impact for some groups. This allowed Martinson’s “nothing works” conclusions to be overturned, in part by his research (Tilley and Clarke, 2006, p. 519). On average it was found that reductions in recidivism of around 10-12% were achieved (McGuire, 1995, p. 8-9), which given the high social and monetary costs of crime (Brand and Price, 2000; Cohen and Piquero, 2009) amounts to a considerable reduction in both costs to criminal justice agencies and harm to individuals and communities.

This fitted well with the explicit commitment to evidence based policy by the Labour government first elected in 1997 (Raynor and Robinson, 2009, p. 105). This commitment moved a “what works” approach to policy within government circles (Goldblatt and Lewis, 1998), with the then Prime Minster personally stating that in social policy, ‘what matters is what works, not the delivery mechanism’ (Blair, 2003, in Corcoran, 2008, p. 36).

The rise and fall of the notion of rehabilitation mirrored, and indeed affected, the fortunes of the probation service. In the 1990s, when the notion of rehabilitation was coming back into fashion, the probation service was itself facing a crisis with calls for the service and the name to be abandoned (Robinson et al, 2013, p. 321). However, by the turn of the millennium the phrase “what works” and the notion that rehabilitation was both possible and a necessary policy focus can be found in a number of key documents that discussed concerns regarding levels of reoffending especially amongst offenders sentenced to short custodial sentences (Halliday, 2001, p. 6; HMIP, 2001, p. 23; Carter, 2003, p. 5; Home Office, 2004a, p. 3 & 41; Grapes, 2006, p. 7; Lewis et al, 2007, p. 34).

However, this period of revival in the fortunes of the probation service saw changes in its focus and approach. The “what works” approach came to be defined by an emphasis on public protection and risk management (Raynor and Robinson, 2009, p. 87; McGuire, 1995, p. 20; Canton, 2013, p. 578). The
Probation Service became concerned with ‘categories or aggregates’ of offenders (Raynor and Robinson, 2009, p.87) as opposed to individual clients (May and Annison, 1998, p. 163; Kemshall and Maguire, 2001, p. 248) and with ‘managerial’ goals over ‘rehabilitative’ or ‘transformative’ optimism (Raynor and Robinson, 2009, p.87; Williams, 1992). This was linked to an increase in formal rules and performance monitoring and a decrease in professional discretion (May and Annison, 1998, p. 168; Annison et al, 2008, p. 259; Home Office, 1998). This altered the approach of the service (Williams, 1992) from the traditional mission to ‘advise, assist and befriend’ (May and Annison, 1998, p. 158) which was common until the 1980s, to being a part of the available framework of punishment, as opposed to an alternative to it (Canton, 2013, p. 578).

Robinson and colleagues therefore argue that probation is still used as much as it is, with more people subject to probation than are in custody in Britain (Robinson et al, 2013, p. 322), because of the way it has changed and adapted with the policy climate. They argue that the single overarching ideal, or purpose of rehabilitation, has been lost in the late-modern period, replaced by ‘multiple, various and fluid’ adaptations (Robinson et al, 2013, p. 324; Healy, 2012). They identify four different current ‘visions’ of probation; managerial, punitive, rehabilitative, and reparative (Robinson et al, 2013, p. 325), these are outlined below.

Firstly managerial, in which probation services, along with other criminal justice agencies are drawn into a single system, underpinned by partnership working, aimed at managing the risk of offenders for the purposes of reducing reoffending and public protection (Canton, 2013). This is based on the assumption that crime and offending are everyday elements of life in society which cannot be eradicated, but can be managed, preferably without great cost (Raynor and Robinson, 2009, p.87). Thus, probation becomes a means of punishment in the community, either instead of, or following, a custodial
sentence (Robinson et al, 2013, p. 325; Nash, 2008, p. 304; Home Office, 1998, p. 15). Raynor and Robinson argue that this vision of probation is demonstrated firstly by the introduction in 1996 of the Offender Group Reconviction Scale or OGRS (Copas and Marshall, 1998; Howard et al, 2009); a statistical tool which allowed a score measuring risk of reconviction to be assigned to every offender based on standardised predictors, and thus categorised and managed appropriately. Secondly the creation of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) in 2004. This brought a change in emphasis for the probation service, focused more on successful processes than outcomes and indeed a change in the name of the managing organisation to reference offender management rather than probation (referred to in the previous chapter).

The second vision is of probation as a punitive or retributive force; used as a punishment in the community, probation supervision becomes part of the hierarchy of punishment, rather than apart from it. Indeed as Canton (2013, p. 578) notes, punishment is enshrined at all stages of the National Offender Management Model (Grapes, 2006), developed to underpin the work of NOMS. It is therefore the experience of all offenders supervised by the service. This has led to the rise of more intensive and demanding forms of supervision with a greater number of requirements, and a breach process which can punish infractions more quickly (Robinson et al, 2013, p. 328). This echoes the work of Crewe (2011) on changes to the way offenders are managed and the rehabilitative work done within the prison estate.

Crewe draws on previous prison research defining the pains of imprisonment as firstly, ‘depth’, or the extent of control felt within the prison, and secondly, ‘weight’, or the quality of the regime and relationships with staff. Crewe adds to these a third pain of ‘tightness’ (2011, p. 522), or the degree to which there is freedom within the regime and a clear sense of how prisoners should be progressing through the system. Crewe argues that the quality of this third
pain has changed more recently, with prisoners now left unsure what they must do in order to be considered eligible for parole, subject to greater demands to work at their own rehabilitation within prison, and to demonstrate that this work is being done. He characterises this as a ‘lighter but tighter’ regime (2011, p. 524) in which control is less imposed externally and more the responsibility of the individual prisoners. Crewe also suggests that this tightness characterises community sanctions, highlighting more restrictive licence conditions and a ‘more enforcement-orientated probation culture’ as examples (2011, p.525). This echoes older ideas from Foucault about how the character of punishment had changed in the twentieth century. Foucault describes a ‘new type of supervision – both knowledge and power – over individuals who resisted disciplinary normalization’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 296), requiring ‘procedures of individualization’ (1991, p. 305). Crewe notes that Foucault’s work raises the question of whether less physical, but more individually ‘penetrative’ punishment is in fact more humane, or simply more efficient (2011, p. 510). Indeed, Foucault argues that the difference between the institutions of rehabilitation and punishment is (and must be) ‘scarcely perceptible’ (1991, p. 302).

The third vision of probation proposed by Robinson and colleagues is explicit about the idea of rehabilitation, although not as an end in itself, but as a way of ensuring public protection and preventing reoffending (Robinson et al, 2013, p. 330; Canton, 2013, p. 582). As Annison and colleagues argue, ‘rehabilitation has come to represent reducing recidivism’ (2008, p. 263), as opposed to longer term change. Thus, there is a greater focus on cognitive behavioural programmes, which focus on individual responsibility and change as opposed to the need for social change (Robinson et al, 2013, p. 331), echoing the previous vision of probation. The authors argue that the “what works” approach of the 1990s and the focus now on a ‘Rehabilitation Revolution’ (as outlined in the previous chapter) is for the good of communities, not the good of offenders. They further argue that the
rehabilitative support offered by the probation service is apportioned on the assessment of risk, ensuring the resources are provided to those at the greater risk of offending, as outlined in the National Offender Management Model (Grapes, 2006; Annison et al, 2008, p. 260), echoing the first vision of probation. There are thus clear links between these three conceptions of probation involving notions of risk management and personal responsibility. These are all in evidence within IOM and the programmes which came before it, developed during the “what works” period, reflecting some of the changes to probation supervision and rehabilitation policy outlined above. For example, they are managerial interventions, targeted at groups of offenders, based on assessments of their level and type of offending. Their high level of risk of reoffending justifies the provision of additional support and resources, but this is done not as an end in itself, but to reduce levels of crime and reoffending. Furthermore IOM contains a punitive element through the involvement of the police to ensure breaches in compliance and further offending are more likely to be punished.

The final vision of probation is termed ‘reparative’ (Robinson et al, 2013, p. 332) and is somewhat different, being concerned with the link between individual offenders and the communities in which they live. The authors note that community sanctions, such as unpaid work (previously community service) have been used by the probation service for many years and unlike the sanctions outlined above involve active participation from the offender in activity which seeks to make redress to the community for the offences committed. Carlen (2013, p. 89) argues that so important is this aspect of supervision that rehabilitative work be replaced with reparative work, which offers the chance for offenders in poor communities to make a positive addition. However, Robinson and colleagues note that in England in particular, unpaid work has been characterised as a punishment; making the work of low status and publically identifying and shaming those taking part (2013, p. 333). Despite this, Robinson and colleagues like Carlen highlight this
as the most positive future direction for probation and community sanctions, as it allows redress to be made by offenders, who benefit from this alongside their communities (Robinson et al, 2013, p. 335). Similarly Farrall offers the following conception of probation:

‘If, as seems reasonable, we accept that social circumstances are an integral element of what helps probation supervision to ‘work’, then ‘the community’ becomes an integral and constitutive component of probation supervision. Giving those found guilty of offending, by way of probation supervision, the chance to address these circumstances is a crucial part of what probation ‘is’ and what sets it apart from other sentences – most notably imprisonment’ (2002, p. 215, emphasis in the original)

This active and social aspect of rehabilitation is explored further in the discussion regarding desistance.

The four conceptions of probation outlined by Robinson and colleagues highlight how ‘elastic’ probation has been in its organisation and aims, enabling it to maintain a stake in the criminal justice system (Robinson et al, 2013, p. 335). Robinson and Ugwudike do note though that however probation is conceived, it is unlikely to be accepted in a form which is not tough and robust, given that it now makes up part of the available hierarchy of punishment (2012, p. 312). Despite this, Ugwudike (2011, p. 245) cautions against assuming that because national policy has moved away from a social work model of probation, that one can assume that individual probation officers have changed in their practice (Kemshall and Maguire, 2001, p. 249; Healy, 2012, p. 382; Mawby and Worrall, 2011a, p. 91). Instead, practices of professional resistance (Ugwudike, 2011, p. 247) or ‘creative compliance’ (Robinson and Ugwudike, 2012, p. 306) to new regimes have been observed within research.

In a study which asked recently qualified, training and student probation officers about their motivations for pursuing probation as a profession, a ‘persistence of the traditional humanistic values of the Probation Service’ was
found, including wanting to work with people and to help offenders (Annison et al, 2008, p. 263-4). Annison and colleagues recognise the tension between these responses and a more managerial approach such as that outlined above (2008, p. 261). This demonstrates the importance of understanding what Ugwudike refers to as the ‘micro dynamics of supervision’ (2011, p. 255) or the ways in which the practice of supervision actually occurs.

As noted above, the way or ways in which probation operates is linked to the way or ways in which rehabilitation is conceived. Alongside Robinson and colleagues’ (2013) four co-existing and inter-related conceptions of the probation service, McNeill similarly outlines four different but interrelated understandings of rehabilitation: personal or psychological; judicial or legal; social; and moral (2012b, p. 1). He argues that the notion of rehabilitation is itself varied and complex, but that often simple or inadequate conceptions lead to paradigm conflicts between differing approaches (2012b, p. 1; McGuire, 2004, p. 342). McNeill argues that a ‘more fully interdisciplinary perspective’ on rehabilitation is required in order to understand and achieve it (2012b, p.2). These conceptions are outlined below.

McNeill argues that personal or psychological rehabilitation has been the main approach within the “what works” revival of rehabilitation. Focused on individual offenders and changes to their views and behaviours regarding offending, this approach is seen in the growth of cognitive behavioural programmes (2012b, p. 14) and a narrow concern with reduced reoffending (McGuire, 2004, p. 342). This reflects the work of Robinson and colleagues above regarding conceptions of probation, three of which focus on how the individual offender is managed, punished or supported.

This approach to rehabilitation has been most clearly enshrined in the ‘risk-need-responsivity’ or RNR approach, developed by Andrews, Bonta and Hoge. This was part of the research which brought faith in the possibility of offender
rehabilitation back into public policy, by demonstrating the effectiveness of certain interventions upon reoffending, and contributed to the “what works” agenda (Day et al, 2010, p. 4). The approach has three principles (Ogloff and Davis, 2004; Bonta and Andrews, 2010), which are, firstly that the intensity of an intervention should be informed by an assessed level of risk of reoffending. This should be based primarily on an individual’s dynamic risk factors, those that can be altered, such as the circumstances in which an individual is currently living. The identification of such factors and the development of such an assessment is where most progress has been made (Day et al, 2010, p. 4). The second principle is that the content of an intervention should be focused on criminogenic needs, or those dynamic risk factors which are linked to offending. These include attitudes to offending and patterns of behaviour, relationships and links to employment and substance misuse (Bonta and Andrews, 2010, p. 27). The third principle, responsivity, is concerned with an individual’s response to, and the efficacy of an intervention, based on internal or personal, and external or social factors which can affect a person’s ability to act on the risks and needs identified.

The influence of this approach is reflected in the development of the Offender Management Model and OGRS mentioned above and the Offender Assessment System (OASys) used by the probation service to determine levels of risk and need along the pathways outlined in the National Reducing Reoffending Action Plan and used within IOM. The approach has been shown to bring about reductions in recidivism, on average, across different settings, of 28 percentage points above “untreated” offenders (Bonta and Andrews, 2010, p. 32). These results have been gained primarily through cognitive behaviour type interventions, in part because it was these approaches which were the first to be introduced into the probation service on a large scale in England and Wales, and so allowed for evaluation of their impact (Hollin et al, 2004, p. 14). These early successes slowed refinements of the interventions that continue into the present day (Travers et al, 2015, p. 3), and investigation
into other types of treatments (McGuire 2002, p. 30), and led to the RNR model becoming associated, in practice rather than in theory, with a narrow focus on individual offenders, their assessment and treatment using cognitive behavioural methods.

The second conception of rehabilitation, judicial or legal rehabilitation is concerned more with the official status of offenders, and how people convicted of offences can be de-labelled and officially accepted back from this stigmatised status (McNeill, 2012b, p. 14). Concern with this form of rehabilitation is driven by the impact that such a status can have on people’s ability to secure employment, accommodation or other requirements for a life away from offending. The third and fourth conceptions of rehabilitation, social and moral, are concerned more with the relationship between the individual offender and the community (McNeill, 2012b, p. 15). Thus they are concerned with ways in which offenders can make redress or pay back to their communities, such as, as above, through unpaid or other reparative work, and how this can lead to their acceptance back into a community.

This more broad conception of rehabilitation sees it as both a ‘social’ and ‘personal’ project (McNeill, 2012b, p. 14), demanding work be conducted not only with individual offenders, but with their wider social group, making such work the concern of those beyond the criminal justice system. As a result, McNeill suggests a ‘Copernican ‘correction’” (McNeill, 2012a, p. 97) in which rehabilitation involves the individual offender supported by a wider range of services, and a local community that is cast as ‘reintegrating’ as opposed to ‘exclusionary’. Similarly Raynor and Robinson stress the importance of rehabilitation as a relational process, involving the individual’s family, probation officer and wider community (2009, p. 163; Flynn, 2011, p. 88).

These more social conceptions of offender rehabilitation are reflected in the development of the Good Lives Model (GLM), that started to some extent as a
response to the application of the RNR approach (Ward and Brown, 2004; Ward and Maruna, 2007). The GLM, developed by Ward and his colleagues, mostly in relation to sex offenders, offers an approach to rehabilitation which goes beyond the aim to reduce offending and a focus on criminogenic factors. Instead it aims to provide a “value-base” for working holistically with offenders and is concerned with the practice of offender rehabilitation (McGuire, 2004, p. 338). It does this through a focus on individual strengths (as opposed to risks and needs), recognitions of the complex contexts in which individuals exist and the importance of motivating working relationships between offenders and practitioners (Ward and Brown, 2004). Specifically, it promotes ‘primary human goods’ (Ward and Maruna, 2007, p. 108) such as relationships, belonging, purpose and autonomy, and the techniques to approach and acquire these. In this way the GLM draws on much older philosophical ideas of the “good life” composed of both personal happiness (pleasure) and purposeful or meaningful activities (virtue) (Ward and Maruna, 2007, p. 109). In this model, crime is an attempt to meet such needs, in ways not approved by society, and whilst it also aims to reduce the type of dynamic risk factors which are the focus of the RNR model, this is thought possible only when individuals are able to see a reason to engage in it (Ward and Maruna, 2007, p. 120).

Like McNeill’s call for rehabilitation to be conceptualised more holistically, the originators of both the RNR approach and GLM, and others, have shown how they could, and should, be integrated. For example, it has been argued that the strengths of individuals should be considered in assessments made and work done (Ogloff and Davis, 2004, p. 237) and that the GLM can support the development of the relatively under-developed responsivity element of the RNR approach that, whilst detailed in the theory has been implemented to a lesser degree (Ward and Brown, 2004, p. 245; Ogloff and Davis, 2004, p. 238; McGuire, 2004, p. 341). Indeed Bonta and Andrews recognise that the greatest challenge for RNR is transferring it into real world settings (2010, p.
35) and thus the importance of organisational settings, programme delivery and implementation; those aspects dependent upon the skills of practitioners. These have been a focus of the GLM (McGuire, 2004, p. 341) and findings regarding offender motivation and readiness can support this (Day et al, 2010, p. 60).

Regarding readiness, Day and colleagues have drawn on work by Ward and colleagues to define it in the following way:

‘To be ready for treatment means that the person is motivated (i.e. wants to, has the will to), is able to respond appropriately (i.e. perceives he or she can), finds it relevant and meaningful (i.e. can engage), and has the capacities (i.e. is able) to successfully enter the treatment programme’ (2010, p. 11)

This definition encompasses notions of motivation and meaning from GLM and also of responsivity from RNR, and is used within the GLM to understand better how to prepare offenders for treatment, or in the case of probation, interventions or supervision.

This section has considered ways in which offender rehabilitation and supervision have been understood and utilised both in public policy and practice within probation. It has noted that since the development of the “what works” approach in the 1990s a narrow application of the RNR model has informed both of these. However, more recently it has been argued that both require a deeper conceptualisation with broader aims. This has also been the conclusion of research into and theory regarding desistance, to which this chapter now turns.
Desistance

Desistance, in the context of offending, refers to offenders withdrawing from crime and becoming ex-offenders, or becoming defined in some other way. In this way the study of desistance is a key element of the study of rehabilitation, and indeed for McNeill desistance sits at the centre of the various conceptions of rehabilitation outlined above, supported by them (2012b, p. 1). In addition, authors in the field of rehabilitation have noted the possibilities of using desistance theory to understand policies based on the more pragmatic RNR approach of “what works” (Rex, 1999; Farrall and Maruna, 2004; Maguire and Raynor, 2006; Flynn, 2011, p. 84). Indeed, Farrall and Maruna have commented that the theoretical work on desistance is of use to the empirically grounded but ‘theoretically lacking’ “what works” approach (2004, p. 360). Furthermore, Maguire and Raynor have suggested that bringing the “what works” and desistance literatures together is a ‘promising approach for future research’ (2006, p. 32). Similarly, Ward has argued that desistance can add to the ‘theoretical coherence’ of the GLM and inform the practice of offender rehabilitation (Ward, 2010, p. 58). Canton argues that by being focused on offenders’ lives beyond their contact with criminal justice agencies, the GLM is similar to desistance which has no fixed end point and is not an aim to be achieved directly, being essentially the absence of offending. Both desistance and a good life are instead achieved obliquely or indirectly through perusing meaningful aims and purposes (2013, p. 589).

With regard to IOM specifically, as noted in the previous chapter, achieving desistance from crime is now a specific aim of the approach (Ministry of Justice, Home Office, 2015a, p. 3) and so the definitions and debates regarding desistance are important in understanding and evaluating the approach.
Farrall and Maruna (2004, p. 358) note that the word “desistance” began to be used within research during the 1970s and 1980s, for example amongst those exploring the extent to which crime, its persistence and desistance, is a rational choice and can be explained through the decisions of individual offenders, as influenced by external events (for example Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Cusson and Pinsonneault, 1986). It was also an idea of interest to those researching criminal careers, exploring aspects of such careers including identifying those participating in criminal activity, measuring the frequency, duration and patterns of such activity as well as how such careers come to an end, and recognising that ‘different offending careers may entail different trajectories of desistance’ (Farrall et al, 2014 p. 280; Piquero et al, 2003; Farrington, 2005; Owen and Cooper, 2013).

However, these authors noted that little was known about how such careers come to an end, especially beyond adolescence, identifying desistance as the ‘least studied criminal career dimension’ (Piquero et al, 2003, p. 415). One of the reasons for these gaps in knowledge is due to desistance being the lack of an activity (offending), and the associated difficulties in being able to determine when activity has in fact stopped (Piquero et al, 2003, p. 379). Research specifically into desistance has developed and expanded in the last few decades and as a result has now been approached from a range of different perspectives, leading to a range of different explanations for it. The debates regarding the definition of desistance and explanations for it are outlined below.

**Defining Desistance**

Researchers have defined desistance variously (Piquero, 2003, p. 388 and p.416; Laub and Sampson, 2001). Some have considered periods in which offending ceases to indicate desistance. Periods of cessation have been characterised as ‘primary’ desistance (McNeill, 2006, p. 47), and whilst a
Desistance has also been conceived of as a process or mechanism of change for the rehabilitation of offenders. This has been termed ‘secondary’ desistance (McNeill, 2006, p.47), and focuses not on the outcome (a period during which offending does not occur) but the process through which people go, to no longer offend and to no longer be offenders. In this way Laub and Sampson distinguish between ‘termination’, the point at which offending stops, and ‘desistance’, the process through which one goes to arrive at termination (2003, p. 21). This process carries on past termination to prevent a return to offending. Periods of primary desistance then, do not guarantee that a person has been able to make a decision to change their behaviour and will not, when able, return to offending. However, the sequential way in which these types of desistance have been portrayed, with periods of primary desistance leading possibly to more meaningful secondary desistance, has been challenged. Recent research suggests that periods of primary desistance do not have to occur prior to moves towards secondary desistance, and may persist once these moves have been made (King, 2013b, p. 150).

This distinction in the definitions of desistance echo the older work of Lemert (1967) who distinguished between primary and secondary deviance, the former being an occasional and short lived behaviour, the latter becoming a way in which an individual is defined (King, 2013b, p. 149). Taken as a whole, the process of desistance has been recognised to be a long and complex one, in which change does not happen in a linear or straightforward manner (Devlin and Turney, 1999, p. 31; Farrington, 2005, p. 8; Piquero et al, 2003, p. 379-80). As such different explanations for it have been proposed, these are outlined in the next section.
Explanations for Desistance

Research into desistance was prompted in particular by a long recognised and often striking correlation between age and involvement in offending (Shover, 1985). Overwhelmingly, rates of offending peak in the late teens (Devlin and Turney, 1999, p. 24) and then decline through people’s thirties. Sampson and Laub (2003, p. 569) note that studies of persistent offenders have found that even those who have continued to offend until later in life, will come to desist in time. This pattern is present regardless of the way in which re-offending is plotted against age, for example as a rate or a frequency (Bottoms and Shapland, 2011, p. 44). Indeed, so striking is the “age-crime curve” that it has led to the conclusion by some that desistance is an inevitable process (Sampson and Laub, 2003, p. 569), and that desistance is a ‘naturalistic’ form of rehabilitation, one that does not require the intervention of a third party (Raynor and Robinson, 2009, p. 137).

This could be seen to undermine interest in desistance and the need for research into it. However, crime and offending harm both those involved, as offenders and victims, and the communities in which they occur. The study of desistance is therefore of use as it can help to identify factors that can support and quicken its pace. This was termed by Glueck and Glueck, who conducted one of the first studies into desistance (Glueck and Glueck, 1952), as ‘forcing the plant’ (Farrall and Maruna, 2004, p. 361).

Desistance research has therefore been concerned with the identification of reasons for, and factors which support, the end of an involvement in offending. There are generally agreed to be three key explanations for desistance, those concerned with maturation or ageing, those concerned with social bonds or connections and those concerned with narrative or personal perceptions (McNeill, 2012a, p. 9). These have developed roughly chronologically and are presented and explored below.
Initial explanations of why people desist from offending took the “age-crime curve” as a starting point and suggested that this offending is simply a behaviour that people grow out of. Glueck and Glueck (1952) argued that ageing and maturation were key to explaining the decline in crime. Laub and Sampson note that the Gluecks reasoned that because desistance is expected, it is the norm, the majority of juvenile offenders would desist as they aged and matured. Those who did not could be characterised by delayed maturation. Whilst age and maturation are linked, they were conceived of as different and separate processes, maturation being the key to understanding reduced offending and being defined as the development of ‘physical, intellectual, and affective capacity and stability’ (Glueck and Glueck, in Laub and Sampson, 2003, p. 26; Shover, 1985, p. 27).

Thus, those who did not desist from crime had in some way failed to mature, and therefore were likely to remain involved in offending. This explanation assumes persistent differences between offenders and non-offenders, referred to by Piquero and colleagues as ‘persistent heterogeneity’ (2003, p. 390). Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) argue from this position that offenders are defined early in life by low levels of self-control alongside opportunities to commit crime (Piquero et al, 2003, p. 383). This rejects any notion of a criminal career that changes through time or differentiation amongst groups of offenders (Farrington, 2005, p. 2; Piquero et al, 2003). The drop-off in offending with increasing age is explained by a lack of opportunities or of capacity to commit crime. It has been argued that such explanations based on hard distinctions between offenders and the law-abiding are inadequate, failing to explain what it is about ageing or maturing which would result in a withdrawal from offending (Matza, 1964, p. 22; Laub and Sampson, 2003, p. 28).

The age-based explanations of desistance have been developed by Moffitt (1993) who argued for the existence of two different populations present in
an age-crime curve. Firstly, ‘adolescent-limited’ offenders, who due to the turbulence experienced in the transition into adulthood commit offences, but who, with the onset of adulthood and due to the responsibilities this brings, desist from offending and settle into a more stable life. This echoes earlier work from Matza regarding young delinquents and their “drift” into crime. He argued that young people engaging in offending or deviancy do not necessarily become career criminals or defined as such, indeed he points to ways in which they conform to other social norms in their social and family life. He defines these “drifters” as ‘those who have been granted the potentiality for freedom through the loosening of social controls but who lack the position, capacity, or inclination to become agents on their own behalf’ (1964, p. 29).

Secondly, Moffit identified a group she termed ‘life-course persistent’ offenders, who also begin offending at an early age, but who continue to offend during their adult life. Piquero and colleagues (2003, p. 399) argue that unlike Gottfredson and Hirschi’s view of a single static group, Moffit’s is backed up by research evidence on the patterns of criminal careers. Indeed whilst it accepted that age and crime are linked, how this link acts is a debate that is linked to the nature of the data used to explore this issue. Ezell and Cohen (2005, p. 4) highlight that Gottfredson and Hirschi’s view is dependent on there being fewer crimes committed by the group of people who are inevitably offenders. Others, notably Blumstein and Farrington, have instead argued that this link is due to fewer people becoming involved in offending past adolescences or young adulthood, and the desistance of the majority who began offending. In this understanding of the curve, it is possible that like Moffitt, some offenders continue to offend, at a steady rate throughout their lives or criminal careers. However, in Ezell and Cohen’s study, using longitudinal data, they found evidence that rates of offending do fall as people age, even amongst the most persistent (2005, p. 259).
Thus, Piquero and colleagues state, ‘criminologists have long recognised that a small group of individuals is responsible for a majority of criminal activity. This finding is one of the key foundations of the criminal career paradigm and its resultant policies’ (2003, p. 462). It also underpins IOM which is focused upon those high frequency offenders who commit a disproportionate amount of crime (Cox, 2010, p.17). Unlike Gottfredson and Hirschi however, this group is not considered to be indefinitely and inevitably committed to offending, regardless of other changes in their lives. Indeed, research into maturation processes has found a link between delayed maturation and contact with the criminal justice system, which can for example adversely affect the likelihood of gaining employment and housing (Rocque, 2015). It is these sorts of social bonds that are the subject of the second type of explanation of desistance.

This approach suggests that during the transition to adulthood a reshuffling takes place where opportunities to form social bonds (such as employment or relationships) are taken up in different ways and to different degrees by individuals. Those who do not form such bonds lack a stake in society and so have less to lose from involvement in crime. Conceived of in this way, crime is not committed by a subset of people who are in some way inevitably beholden to a life of crime until such time as they are no longer able to take part in it, it is a possibility open to all depending on the circumstances one finds oneself in. Thus, Devlin and Turney state ‘it is clear that the more people have to lose and the more they become stakeholders in society – not just in monetary terms but by being valued in their work and in their relationships – the less likely they are to reoffend’ (1999, p. 31-2).

Laub and Sampson have written extensively within this field (Sampson and Laub, 1993, 1995, 2001, 2003, 2005; Laub and Sampson, 2003; Laub, Nagin and Sampson, 1998), and much of their work has been a reanalysis of the Glueck’s 1952 data and a further follow up of their sample. This led to the
development of a life-course theory of crime described as an ‘age-graded theory of informal social-control’ (Laub and Sampson, 2003, p.5). In this understanding of desistance, social ties, such as marriage and employment (including job stability) are important to protect against involvement in crime and to support desistance from crime.

Such a view of desistance highlights the importance of particular ‘turning points’ (Laub and Sampson, 2003, p. 35) in the lives of individuals described as those which, ‘in turn, constitutes a change in the individuals’ offending’ (Carlsson, 2012, p. 3). Turning points are therefore a first step in a complex and often not straightforward process of desistance (Carlsson, 2012, p.8; Farrington, 2005, p. 252). This approach has been described by Piquero and colleagues as a ‘dynamic general’ theory, as opposed to the ‘static general’ theory of Gottfredson and Hirschi (2003, p. 403). Of these, empirical evidence, especially that which has made use of longitudinal data, has tended to favour Laub and Sampson’s more ‘middle-ground position’ (Piquero et al 2003, p. 403; Ezell and Cohen, 2005). Thus those who persist and desist in offending can be argued to be at different points in a complex and individual process, rather than being different types or categories of people.

With regard to the particular circumstances that are most associated with desistance, empirical research has found associations between desistance from crime and gaining employment (Sampson and Laub, 1993), completing education (Farrington et al, 2006), getting married (Laub, Nagin and Sampson, 1998) alterations in friendships (Warr, 1993) and the link between the two (Warr, 1998), as well as becoming a parent (Farrall and Bowling, 1999) and military service (Farrington, 2005).

However, Maruna (1999, p. 5) criticises these ‘social bonds’ explanations noting that empirical work has in fact often produced contradictory evidence with the same triggers operating in different ways for different groups of
people. Such criticism led to a third key theoretical development in understanding desistance. This conception of desistance focuses on individual offenders and the importance of cognitive changes through which they must go in order to conceive of themselves differently, i.e. as not an offender. This way of approaching desistance demands a greater focus on identity and individual agency. Indeed, Vaughan (2007, p. 390) couches social bond and identity or narrative understandings of desistance as the difference between structure and agency. Maruna (1999) draws upon work by Anthony Giddens that argues that personality and one’s conception of oneself is not static but constantly performed for others and reinvented. There is therefore scope for altering how we conceive of ourselves and the image we convey to others. It has been noted that this is linked to ageing in the sense that the passage of time can support this process (Shover, 1985, p. 83).

Maruna’s study of desistance (2001) sought to compare the ways of thinking and mindsets amongst a matched sample of desisting and persisting ex-prisoners, and so to explore whether ‘mindset’ could be implicated in the process of desistance (Maruna et al, 2004b, p. 223; Maruna, 2001, p. 6).

Using a series of ethnographic observations, in-depth semi-structured interviews and standardised questionnaires, individual psychological traits were explored. Differences were found between the samples, with desisters and persisters using different “scripts” to describe themselves and their offending. Persisters were characterised primarily by a ‘condemnation script’ (Maruna et al, 2004b, p. 225) in which they are resigned to their lives as offenders and to all that implies. Interviews with this group found little belief that they were able to stop offending and little planning for the future. Vaughan (2007, p. 397) draws upon the work of Margaret Archer (see Chapter 4) in describing people in this situation as ‘fractured reflexives’, those who have lost a capacity for reflexivity. Whereas those in the desisting sample were found to use various ‘reform narratives’ (Maruna et al, 2004b, p. 225) to
explain their offending as being different from who they were now. It was found that those able to explain good events in their lives with reference to characteristics internal to themselves, as opposed to external elements, such as luck, were more likely to be desisting from crime (Maruna, 2001, p. 196-7).

The study concluded that mindset was indeed a useful variable to consider in the study of desistance. Maruna and colleagues noted that, given the similar circumstances in which members of both samples found themselves, it was those who were successfully desisting from crime who took the most explaining given their circumstances could, for example through the social bonds thesis, easily explain their continued offending (2004, p. 225). Similar findings have been reported from desistance research undertaken by Giordano and colleagues (2002; 2007; 2008) which also focuses on the mindset of individuals, examining the ways in which ‘cognitive transformations’ (2002, p. 991) undertaken by individuals can support changes in behaviour. Like Maruna’s work, it is an approach concerned with individual agency and its interaction with the circumstances and environments of individuals (Giordano et al, 2002, p. 999).

The theory of cognitive transformation proposed has four consecutive stages (Giordano et al, 2002, p. 1000-1002); firstly, openness or readiness to change when a person becomes willing to try and change their behaviour. This echoes the importance noted above of the position the individual is in by Day and colleagues (2010) and others concerned with the GLM. Secondly, the identification of hooks for change, such as employment, significant relationships or parenthood, that can be used, if the individual is receptive to them, to create a replacement self or shift in identity which is ‘fundamentally incompatible’ with future offending (Giordano et al, 2002, p. 1056). This is the third stage in the process that leads to the final stage, the individual redefining their deviance and having a negative view of previous behaviour. An example of this process would be, beginning a new relationship. This may
be a way in which a person is able to move away from offending, but only if: that person is willing to become involved in a new relationship; the person with whom they start the relationship is able to offer a way out of past behaviour, or has a different ‘normative orientation’ (Giordano et al, 2002, p. 1045); and so provides a means of conceiving of both themselves and their past actions differently.

Vaughan (2007, p. 393-4) outlines a similar process of cognitive transformation that involves three stages of discernment or recognition of possible opportunities for change, deliberation on these various opportunities and comparing them to the status quo, and finally dedication to the new commitments these opportunities provide. Vaughan states, ‘[t]o establish desistance, agents must regard their new identity – the commitment that they have chosen – as incompatible with ongoing criminality’ (2007, p. 394). This theory of desistance, like that of Giordano and colleagues stresses the ‘subjective powers of agents’ (2007, p. 395) and the importance of the internal change individuals have to go through, affected by and affecting their social circumstances, in order to achieve a new, non-offending identity. Vaughan draws on Margaret Archer’s notion of an ‘internal conversation’ in which individuals, interacting reflexively with their circumstances, judge the extent to which their current situation and decisions do or do not match their ‘ultimate concerns’ (2007, p. 393).

Understanding desistance processes through this cognitive transformation reveals that the presence of an opportunity to move away from offending is not sufficient; if the individual is not willing or able to recognise it or utilise it, it will fail to effect change in their lives. Thus, Giordano and colleagues recognise the interaction between agency and environment and that therefore a certain level of access to external resources is required by individuals, before they can begin this process (2002, p. 156). They argue that the openness to change required will be influenced by beliefs over the
possibility of change that will need to be evident or demonstrated to the individual.

This links desistance to the social reactions to it and the need for communities to accept offenders back as was emphasised in the social conceptions of rehabilitation outlined by McNeill (2012b); as Healy notes, desistance is ‘a journey towards social inclusion’ (2012, p. 377). This links research into desistance with the ideas of stigma and labelling. Drawing on older work by Lemert, Maruna notes how the adoption of “deviant” or “offender” as an identity occurs in part because of the effect of labelling by others, closing off other identity labels and feeding back into the opportunities and behaviours of individuals. Thus desistance research recognises the need for a de-labelling or certification process (Maruna et al, 2004a, p. 274-5), which can publicly and officially mark the change in status of a person. Prior work on desistance has noted the relevance of stigma, especially for those offenders whose criminal careers persisted beyond the adolescent years when such behaviour could have been discounted as normal (Shover, 1985, p. 71). Whilst these writers recognise that stigma can fade over time, a longer criminal career provides less time for this and to acquire legitimate identities.

Giordano and colleagues position their theory as occurring prior to the sorts of changes seen in Sampson and Laub’s work above. Giordano and colleagues suggest that the work undertaken by individuals during these cognitive transformations is the precursor to the processes that Sampson and Laub uncovered. They state,

‘the environment can thus provide a kind of scaffolding that makes possible the construction of significant life changes. Nonetheless, individuals themselves must attend to these new possibilities, discard old habits, and begin the process of crafting a different way of life’ (Giordano et al, 2002, p. 1000; Warr, 1998).

Similarly, in outlining the role of ‘turning points’ in their age-graded theory of social control, Laub and Sampson state that they open up the possibility of
‘identity transformation’ (Carlsson, 2012, p. 3), thus they see cognitive change as important in the process of desistance, but as driven by external changes in social circumstances, rather than a precursor to them. Similarly, research into desistance from cannabis use (Liebregts et al, 2015, p. 629) argued that desistance is induced by life events that become turning points, but only in those who are at a point where they are able to make use of them in forming a new identity and meeting new goals.

This interaction between structure and agency is echoed in Healy’s work, in which she finds the creation of a meaningful and credible future self, supporting individual agency, to be the key to desistance (2014, p. 886). Thus, she recognises that even initial agentic moves, those which are not mirrored by changes or successes in social bonds, perhaps those seen in instances of primary desistance, are important to the process of desistance and should be recognised as such (2014, p. 887; King, 2013b, p. 161). However, she links the ability to create such a self to the explanations outlined above regarding maturation and social bonds, stating, ’it is likely that agentic action is supported by a range of cognitive, emotional and social resources that mature during the transition to adulthood’ (Healy, 2014, p. 874).

There is therefore recognition that the most complete understandings of the desistance process incorporate aspects of all three of these explanations, although ordered or interacting in different ways. Indeed Burnett and Maruna argue that there is a need to understand the, ‘complex and incremental nature of the interaction’ (2004, p. 393). This has been noted in desistance research for some time (Shover, 1985, p. 124; Cusson and Pinsonneault, 1986, p. 74). Indeed, findings from a reanalysis of Burnett’s 1992 Dynamics of Recidivism study (Burnett and Maruna, 2004; LeBel et al, 2008) found that variables linked to individual agency, which they define as hope, are useful predictors of desistance, but that they interact with other variables such as social bonds and stigma. Thus, those who were more hopeful were better
able to deal with problems experienced, within limits, which echoes the findings of Giordano and colleagues (2002) outlined above.

This interaction has been particularly emphasised most recently with those in the field arguing that the process of desistance, ‘is produced in the interplay between these three sets of factors’ (McNeill, 2012a, p. 95, emphasis in the original; Rocque, 2015; Gadd and Farrall, 2004; Farrall, 2002; Farrall and Bowling, 1999). Thus, in Bottoms and Shapland’s study of desistance (2011; Bottoms et al, 2004) they develop a model to describe the process which requires an initial trigger, followed by a change in the way a person thinks of themselves and their surroundings. This process is theorised to be inevitably interrupted by obstacles that can result in a relapse into offending, or if overcome, moving out of the cycle, into a crime free life. This process is theorised to be underpinned and affected throughout by an individual’s circumstances and history and the social capital available (Bottoms and Shapland, 2011, p. 70).

Like the recognition noted above of the mutual support the RNR approach and GLM can provide each other in understanding rehabilitation, theorists in desistance have also come to see competing explanations as part of an overall complex process that can best be understood by drawing on all the research and theories available. This is important both for understanding the processes themselves, and also how they might be supported. This is the subject of the next section and draws on the findings from assisted desistance and “what works” research as well as PPO and IOM evaluations to date, which can also be considered assisted desistance studies (Shapland et al, 2012, p. 22).
Supporting offender rehabilitation and desistance

McNeill draws a distinction between ‘pure basic’ desistance research - studying the process to understand its workings, the key findings of which are outlined above - and ‘assisted desistance’ research - that sets out to explore what might help or hinder the process of desistance (2012b, p. 12). This latter type of research he characterises as ‘use-inspired research’, that builds upon pure basic research to contribute to the body of knowledge about how this can be best supported (McNeill, 2012b, p. 12). Farrall and Bowling note the importance of such work, stating that a, ‘theory of desistance is not a criminological luxury’ (1999, p. 254), instead it can help improve the work of criminal justice agencies aimed at reducing reoffending.

The assisted desistance literature is small with only six such studies having been undertaken (Shapland et al, 2012, p. 20 and 22; McNeill and Weaver, 2010, p.11; McCulloch, 2005, p. 12). The first such study was conducted in New Zealand by Leibrich (1993) and was based on in-depth interviews with a random sample of 48 people (male and female in roughly equal proportions) who had been sentenced to supervision (probation) for a variety of offences in a particular region of the country and had subsequently been conviction-free for around three years. As well as exploring their offending and desisting, the interviews asked about respondents’ experiences of supervision, not to assess its effectiveness per se, but in part to influence the methodology of future effectiveness studies.

In her discussion of the experience of supervision that her respondents had, Leibrich notes that only a very small number (six of the 48) ‘spontaneously’ mentioned the supervision they had received as ‘something which helped them go straight’ (1993, p. 172). She then went on to explore with them aspects of their supervision. The vast majority, 80% of respondents, stated that they felt their sentence was fair (Leibrich, 1993, p. 172) and over 60% (30
people) made ‘mainly positive comments’ about their last probation officer (Leibrich, 1993, p. 173). The following aspects of a good probation officer/offender relationship were identified by interviewees:

- Establishing rapport
- Adapting to individual needs
- Taking risks, going the extra mile and spending quality time
- Being genuine and being honest about the relationship
- Empowering the offender
- Balancing care and control

(Leibrich, 1993, p. 191)

Interviewees praised officers who drew clear boundaries, but who were flexible and understood personal circumstances. Correspondingly the most common negative comments were in cases where people felt they had been simply processed and ‘treated without concern’ (Leibrich, 1993, p. 176). Leibrich notes that these were similar to aspects of the relationship identified by officers in an earlier study of hers and so showed a level of agreement between officers and probationers about the content of a successful relationship.

When asked if anything could have been improved during their supervision, fewer than a third of interviewees identified anything, and almost all of these felt that more effort could have been made to get to know them as individuals and help them resolve their problems, for example by spending longer with their officer (Leibrich, 1993, p. 179). When asked if interviewees felt they had gotten something out of supervision, half did, and half did not, with those who did more likely to be those desisting from offending (Leibrich, 1993, p. 182). Of these, over half (13) said supervision ‘had something to do with them not getting into further trouble,’ for example by having the chance to talk things through and so find the cause of their offending or because they felt they were being ‘watched over’ (Leibrich, 1993, p.182). Leibrich concludes that people need to want to change before change can occur and that ‘the goal of reducing reoffending could only be realised in a limited way,
given the many other influences on people’s lives’ (Leibrich, 1993, p. 192). She also suggests offenders and supervisors could be matched in some way to make it more likely that they find supervision useful.

The second study in the assisted desistance literature is that of Rex (1999) and involved semi-structured interviews with 21 probation officers and 60 of their probationers in two areas in England. The study aimed to bring together the “what works” and the “criminal careers” paradigms in the study of re-offending outlined above. Rex reports that the vast majority of probationers understood that their probation officers were seeking to reduce their reoffending, and furthermore a majority (68%) stated that their experience of probation had reduced their likelihood of offending or engaging in activity likely to lead to offending, such as substance misuse or loss of temper (Rex, 1999, p. 369). As a qualitative study these statements were not checked against offending data, however the ways in which this link was felt to operate were explored. Probationers stated that probation officers with the following qualities were supportive in their efforts to desist: those who were empathetic, good listeners, interested and understanding, respectful and experienced (Rex, 1999, p. 371). Indeed, officers noted that probation was an active and participatory experience, rather than one simply focused upon monitoring of offenders (Rex, 1999, p. 370).

With regard to the means used within probation, three areas of work were the main focus; firstly, addressing offender decision making, indicative, Rex argues, of the fact that the research was conducted during the “what works” approach to offender rehabilitation (1999, p. 373), which as noted above tended to focus on personal, psychological approaches to rehabilitation. Secondly, officers provided guidance and problem solving help regarding personal and social issues, although importantly, it was advice and guidance rather than direct assistance for which probationers were grateful (Rex, 1999, p. 374). The final areas of work concerned reinforcing pro-social behaviour
through encouragement and motivation. The importance of this was
downplayed by probation officers, but probationers suggested that they
would be happy to receive more directive advice on this issue (Rex, 1999, p.
375) although not support which appeared ‘authoritarian’ (Rex, 1999, p. 377).
Rex states that in part this willingness to accept advice from officers was
based upon a ‘personal loyalty’ developed by probationers (1999, p. 379).

By focusing her research on whether and in what ways interviewees felt their
experiences on probation affected their desistance from crime, Rex aimed to
recommend ways in which probation officers could work to bring about
reductions in crime (1999, p. 366). It was therefore one of the first studies to
consider ways in which probation could become ‘desistance focused’
(McNeill, 2006 p. 49). Rex concludes that probation supervision could indeed
help to support attempts to desist from crime (1999, p. 380). She notes that
this is a difficult move for offenders to make and that the motivation and
encouragement of probation officers could help support probationers
attempts to change (Rex, 1999, p. 380). However, she notes that work
between individual probationers and officers is necessary but not sufficient,
highlighting the need to tackle the social circumstances that offenders live
within (Rex, 1999, p. 380).

Farrall’s study of a cohort of probationers is the third study in this literature
and is the largest and most comprehensive of the assisted desistance studies;
begun in 1997 it is still ongoing (Farrall, 2002; Farrall et al, 2014). At the start
of the study the cohort were all aged 17-35 years, ages at which it was
thought likely that they would experience life changes related to desistance,
and were serving a community order of between six and 24 months in six
similarly deprived areas of England. The study drew on interviews with
probation officers and offenders, the latter conducted at the start, during and
at the end of the order and then followed up around five and 12 years later,
as well as quantitative measures of reoffending.
The study aimed firstly to understand how the direct support of a probation officer could support desistance and secondly whether probationers and their officers were able to work together on a set of shared goals for change. Regarding the second aim, the study found that probationers and officers did not necessarily agree on the obstacles to desistance faced by probationers. For example, almost half (49%) of probationers stated that they had no obstacles, whereas only 9% of officers stated probationers faced no obstacles. Furthermore probationers were less likely to list personal characteristics as obstacles than officers, 10% of probationers did so compared to 30% of officers (Farrall, 2002, p. 74). Farrall states that these different perceptions of obstacles risked officers and probationers being unable to work together to deal with them, and suggested lack of awareness by probationers of the difficulties they faced and the work needed to overcome them (2002, p. 76).

Regarding the first aim, where probationers did recognise a particular obstacle, they were asked how they might resolve them. Farrall notes that only one probationer responded that they would approach probation. Most commonly probationers stated they would find their own ways to cope with or solve the problems (2002, p. 77), although 50% reported that they had received support from their officer, which tended to be in the form of ‘advice’ (Farrall, 2002, p. 92). However, the deciding factor in whether obstacles were solved and offending reduced, was the motivation of the probationers (2002, p. 89 and p. 93), that was found to be influenced by the extent of past offences and current social circumstances such as issues with accommodation, employment and substance misuse (Farrall, 2002, p. 104). Thus, those probationers in the best position to seek help and act upon it were the most able to resolve identified obstacles (Farrall, 2002, p. 142).

Farrall describes one of the study’s clearest findings as:

‘probation interventions appear in many cases to have had little impact on either the obstacles faced by probationers or their lives
more generally. The explanations for this would appear to be that much probation work is negated by aspects of the probationers’ lives, is aimed at tackling obstacles which are enduring and therefore very difficult to address or that the proposed solutions and the manner of their delivery appeared to be irrelevant to the needs of the probationers’ (2002, p. 116).

Farrall links this to the limited time that officers spend with probationers, estimating, on strict application of and compliance with the Probation Service’s national standards, that probation appointments composed only 0.33% of the ‘waking’ time of a probationer in the space of a year (2002, p. 175; Healy, 2012, p. 390). This paints a rather bleak picture for the effect of probation support. However, like the other assisted desistance studies, Farrall does suggest that support from officers can supplement the work of probationers (2002, p. 162). He characterises the outcome of probation supervision as ‘the result of a series of interactions between motivation, probation supervision and social and personal contexts’ (2002, p. 164). He therefore concludes that the focus within probation on improving cognitive skills and employability can only support their desistance efforts so far (Farrall, 2002, p. 219). Without parallel work to build up social capital and so embedding individuals within wider society, ex-offenders will have few forums in which to use their newly learnt skills. Therefore, like Rex (1999) Farrall recommends that the probation service should focus not on ‘offence-related’ factors, but rather, on ‘desistance-related’ factors’ (2002, p. 220, emphasis in the original), widening the remit of officers.

Taken at this point, the findings of Farrall’s study echoes the findings of the fourth study considered here; a small but long term study undertaken by Healy in Ireland. The study re-interviewed 14 of an original sample of 73 adult men subject to probation between 2003 and 2004 six years later to assess the impact of their supervision. It was found that those who had been able to build a good working and caring relationship with their probation officer, in which they were able to contribute to their own change, and who felt that
their officer had been able to offer practical help for problems they had faced, not just monitoring, were more likely to have desisted (2012, p. 389). The study similarly casts probation in an indirect and supportive role, for example creating some of the hooks for change identified by Giordano and colleagues and outlined above (2012, p. 389). However, Healy does recognise that the full impact of such supervision may manifest later (2012, p. 385) and this is indeed what Farrall and colleagues have found in the latest stages of their long term follow up of probation supervision.

In the later findings from this study, Farrall and colleagues (2006; 2014) are more optimistic about the positive effect that probation supervision can have. They characterise the advice given by officers as being ‘stored away’ and drawn upon when it was useful and suitable to the personal circumstances of the probationers (Farrall and Calverley, 2006, p. 48). They note that rather than fading away over time as had been assumed, the effect of probation supervision ‘grew and was useful to those wishing to change their lives’ (Farrall et al, 2014, p. 281-2). They conclude that, ‘probation supervision was amongst the things that assisted some of the men and women we interviewed to stop offending. It was not the only thing that ‘made a difference’, but it must be clearly stated that it did aid desistance’ (Farrall et al, 2014, p. 290, emphasis in original).

The fifth assisted desistance study was undertaken in Scotland by McCulloch (2005). This was a small scale study involving interviews with six probationers and their probation officers based in different offices in one area. The study aimed to understand the ways and means by which probation officers helped probationers deal specifically with social problems that they faced (McCulloch, 2005, p. 12).

Probationers reported that being listened to, being able to talk about problems within the supervisory relationship and advice and guidance received from officers were the most useful in helping them to address social problems faced. Probationers reported that they did not want their officers to
solve their problems for them, but rather wanted advice, support and encouragement to allow them to do this for themselves. McCulloch argues that the supervisory relationship, established through listening to probationers, was a key part of probationers then being willing to receive advice and support (2005, p. 15), and indeed to resolving for themselves what their problems really are and what help and support they might require (2005, p. 16). Therefore McCulloch argues that officers combined talking methods with more cognitive and problem solving techniques, suggesting that, ‘talking to probationers about their problems can be a more complex, structured and useful process than is often assumed’ (2005, p. 19). Interviews also revealed the involvement of family members in a number of cases, an approach reported less frequently in other studies, but found to be of benefit to problem solving by probationers in this study. With regard to practical assistance, probationers reported that they did require this, at least to a certain degree, but that they believed this was not necessarily the job of their probation officer.

Officers interviewed reported that despite work focused on the social problems of probationers, they achieved limited success in resolving these, but that they felt they had supported improvements in concert with other actions and processes in the life of the probationer (McCulloch, 2005, p. 15). Furthermore McCulloch, like Farrall above, reports that the sorts of social problems that received attention from officers did not necessarily match those prioritised by probationers, such as problems with boredom or employment (2005, p. 14).

The final assisted desistance study outlined focuses specifically on the support that probation supervision can give to primary desistance (King, 2013a). Based on interviews with 20 offenders, the study found that the vast majority spoke positively about probation supervision and their probation officer, recognising that they were trying to assist them, which most linked ‘directly
to a reduction in offending behaviour’ (King, 2013a, p. 140). Although offenders also recognised the surveillance and control aspects of their supervision, it was found that probation supervision supported both individual motivation and self-confidence. For example, it was found that probation supervision could help, ‘develop particular skills and capacities that are likely to be of assistance during the desistance process’ (King, 2013a, p. 147). Whilst this study would seem to reach more positive conclusions than those outlined above, in concert with these other studies it was found that this support can only support and facilitate desistance moves that individuals are capable of making and is also less able to impact upon wider social or structural issues which may affect an individual’s ability to desist (King, 2013a, p. 147).

The small number of studies on assisted desistance outlined above offer some common themes on the effect of probation supervision upon desistance. It is primarily cast in a supporting role, alongside work by probationers and based upon supporting relationships developed between officers and probationers. In addition, the influence of personal and social contexts upon probationers and the extent to which they impact upon desistance are recognised as important. McNeill has summarised the findings of desistance research by identifying six key principles for work with offenders:

- Desistance is an individualised process and thus should take into account identity and diversity
- To support desistance processes practitioners need to focus on the maintenance of motivation and hope
- Desistance can be supported by human relationships
- As well a focus on risks and needs, a focus on the strengths and resources of offender is useful
- Desistance efforts need to respect self-determination and the agency of individuals, working with offenders, not on them
- Interventions should work on developing the human and social capital of offenders

(McNeill, 2012b, p. 10)
The assisted desistance literature therefore highlights the complex and interconnected nature of rehabilitation and processes of desistance as noted above. It has also produced findings which can underpin probation practice, indeed the list above echoes the Council of Europe’s rules for probation regarding personalisation and working relationships (Healy, 2012, p. 382; Canton, 2013, p. 585). Similar findings have come from research undertaken on the issue of offender supervision and rehabilitation, by those not within the assisted desistance field. For example, these findings mirror those from research into offender behaviour change amongst young male offenders using the Theory of Planned Behaviour, which draws on Bandura’s notion of self-efficacy (Forste et al, 2011; Kiriakidis, 2008 and 2010). Similarly research from both the “what works” and GLM traditions have stressed the importance of a working or therapeutic alliance between officer and offender, using techniques such as motivational interviewing to support individual change (McGuire, 2004; Annison et al, 2008, p. 267; Ward and Brown, 2004, p. 254; Kozar, 2010, p. 198). Indeed, overall the findings of the “what works” research were that skills based, cognitive-behavioural programmes, focused on offenders’ ways of thinking and acting, had consistent positive effects on reoffending (McGuire, 1995, p. 16, Robinson and Raynor, 2009, p.109, McGuire, 2002, p. 21-22). However, these were supported by a motivating relationship with officers, based on continuity, openness and flexibility to individual needs and strengths (Harper and Chitty, 2005, p. 28; Fleet and Annison, 2003, p. 134).

Indeed an evaluation of a “what works” cognitive-behaviour informed approach to probation supervision, known as Citizenship (Pearson et al, 2011; 2014) has shown the importance of both these aspects of supervision. Citizenship draws on RNR principles that the dosage of the intervention increases alongside the level of risk assessed using OASys, and that supervision should be focused on assessed criminogenic needs. In addition the importance of the skills of probation officers in addressing such needs,
using motivational techniques and the resources and skills of those in specialist external agencies, were also stressed. Indeed, by training officers in these techniques and increasing the use of external agencies, the intervention altered the way offenders were supervised (Pearson et al, 2011, p. 81).

Using a retrospective comparison of those subject to Citizenship with those who had been supervised prior to its introduction, the approach was found to be effective; fewer of the Citizenship sample had reoffended at the two year follow up point; 41% as opposed to 50% of the comparison group. They had also committed fewer violations of requirements and their first offences occurred later (Pearson et al, 2011, p.88). In addition, the approach was found to be cost effective (2011, p. 96). Subsequently, using a randomised control design in a second site, a reduction in recidivism was again found, in this case a difference of 20% was observed, but this was not found to be statistically significant, nor did the effect of external agency support show a significant influence (Person et al, 2014, p. 16). This was ascribed to stronger research design and lower levels of treatment applied in this test site (Pearson et al, 2014, p. 19).

The findings from research into compliance with community penalties, the setting within which most offender supervision occurs, are also relevant. Robinson and Ugwudike (2012, p. 305) report mixed findings from research on this issue, with some studies reporting that strict enforcement of conditions leads to higher levels of reconviction and others that it produces higher levels of desistance (Robinson and McNeill, 2008, p. 443). Ugwudike found that probation officers used discretion and knowledge of the circumstances in a probationer’s life to offer a personalised approach, a so-called ‘contingency-based strategy’ of enforcement (2011, p. 249) to ensure that probationers saw this action as fair (2011, p. 252). This was underpinned by the importance attached by officers to the relationships they established with their probationers, and how these can be damaged, and further
compliance jeopardised, if they apply too mechanistically the requirements of an order (Ugwudike, 2011, p. 250; Williams, 1992, p. 273).

Indeed, Robinson and Ugwudike note that research regarding the legitimacy of sanctions and conditions would suggest that responses to a breach of conditions, felt to be unreasonable or illegitimate, would be more likely to lead to further non-compliance (2012, p. 305). In addition, echoing the social bonds research above, it was found that those offenders considered to have gained something from conforming with social rules and norms, were more likely to comply with an order (Robinson and Ugwudike, 2012, p. 304).

Much of the compliance considered within probation settings is not voluntary; rather it is coerced or pressured in nature. Research by Day and colleagues has found that this does not, in itself, result in lower levels of compliance or higher levels of reoffending (2004, p. 266). They note that offender perceptions of levels of coercion are not always accurate, nor are they stable over the course of an intervention, and cite a number of factors that influence the extent to which an intervention is considered coercive. These include whether there has been agreement over, and information about the intervention and, as above, the quality of the relationship established with practitioners, particularly the level of trust present, echoing other findings (2004, p. 264). They argue that use of these factors can encourage compliance in pressured or coercive situations in a positive rather than a negative way.

This in turn reflects research into compliance with the law in general; both specific rules and the agencies that impose them; specifically Tyler’s notion of procedural justice (2003), which has been found to explain a great deal of this compliance. Research by Tyler and others, mostly concerning the police and courts (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012, p. 121) has found that the fairness of the treatment and decision making of such agencies, the processes used and
whether these are understandable are more important in understanding compliance than the threat of punishment. Indeed even if individual outcomes do not appear fair, if the processes used to arrive at them are, then these decisions are more likely to be accepted (Tyler, 2003, p. 293). This idea is therefore closely linked to trust; Tyler states, ‘people perceive procedures enacted by those they trust as being fairer, and authorities become more highly trusted when they are seen to exercise their authority in fair ways’ (2003, p. 299). Both these factors go on, through a ‘spiralling effect’ (2003, p. 287), to influence the acceptance both of the decision made in a specific encounter, and also longer term compliance with decisions and with the organisations which make them.

Tyler’s findings have been confirmed and expanded by prison researchers (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012, p. 122; Williams, 1992, p. 263) and in the field of probation supervision through research into the Hawaii Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) project (Hawken and Kleiman, 2009). The project makes use of aspects of the procedural justice approach, specifically clearly explaining expectations to offenders and ensuring decisions are defensible and parsimonious, and therefore fair. Offenders are required to attend more frequent probation appointments which include random drug tests. Instances of non-compliance or failed drug tests are brought back to court quickly and result in a short stay in prison; this is non-negotiable and not at the discretion of probation officers, and replaces a system where a number of breaches of conditions were eventually punished by the revocation of a probation order and a long prison sentence. The approach has been demonstrated to produce reductions in substance misuse, non-compliance and arrest, when compared to a comparable group of offenders (Hawken and Kleiman, 2009, p. 4).

Robinson and McNeill (2008, p. 441), building on earlier work by Bottoms, suggest that there are three levels of compliance: short term or formal,
substantive and long term. They argue that criminal justice policy has been concerned with the first level, for example stipulating the amount of contact probationers and officers should have, but not the other levels, for example by defining the content or quality of such sessions. They argue that this is risky, both because this potentially renders compliance a superficial exercise of simply showing up, something which those not committed to compliance can fake, and also because it does not permit scope for discretion for those committed to compliance, but prevented by circumstance from reporting (Robinson and McNeill, 2008, p. 442).

This concern with the quality of supervision and the skills needed to deliver it has been the focus of recent work sponsored by the Ministry of Justice, as well as in America and Canada (Burke, 2010). The Offender Engagement Programme (Robinson et al, 2014; Shapland, 2012) draws on work regarding the different ways in which supervision can be delivered in different fields (Raynor, Ugwudike and Vanstone, 2014; Heath, 2010; Kozar, 2010) to understand how the quality of probation supervision can be defined and assessed. This led to a second programme, Skills for Effective Engagement Development and Supervision (SEEDS), which concerns the skills needed to provide such high quality supervision (Rex and Hosking, 2013). The training programme covers a range of skills drawn from both the RNR and GLM approaches outlined above, such as how to structure sessions and cognitive behavioural techniques, as well as relationship building and motivational interviewing (Sorsby et al, 2013, p. 1). In this way it supports the work done with and by offenders, drawing on assessments of them (Sorsby et al, 2013, p. 8; Rex and Hosking, 2013, p. 334).

The research outlined above provides a range of ways to understand and improve offender supervision and rehabilitation. However, they concern the impact of, or compliance with, generic supervision, by offenders in general; they are not concerned with a specific form of supervision, nor a specific
group of offenders, which is the case with IOM. It has also been argued that desistance should be studied amongst those who have reached ‘some reasonable threshold of frequent and serious criminal offending’ (Laub and Sampson, 2001, p. 12; Giordano et al, 2002, p. 1005). The small number of evaluations of the PPO programme and its predecessors and those of other IOM approaches is therefore of particular relevance.

The two key studies of the PPO programme, the precursor to IOM (Dawson and Mead, 2005, Dawson and Cuppleditch, 2007) were, due to methodological limitations, unable to assess the extent to which changes in offending by PPOs were attributable to inclusion on the scheme, as opposed to other factors. The studies did find support for the approach amongst practitioners (Worrall and Mawby, 2004, p. 270). A Ministry of Justice commissioned rapid evidence assessment regarding persistent offenders schemes sought to provide further evidence on whether such approaches were effective (Perry et al, 2009).

The assessment included 20 evaluations, mostly from America, and involved a series of meta-analyses. The findings suggested that interventions addressing substance misuse and cognitive skills could support reduced re-offending. Again however, conclusions about these interventions were affected by the low methodological quality of the studies. This meant there was insufficient evidence about other types of intervention such as case management, increased levels of probation supervision and the use of employment services, to reach any conclusions. This was also the case in the government commissioned evaluation of the Intensive Supervision and Surveillance Programme, a precursor to the PPO programme, targeted at those aged under 18 (Gray et al, 2005). The evaluation found reductions in the frequency and seriousness of offending by both the treatment and comparison groups. The authors suggest that this could be the result of a regression to the mean.
effect, where offenders are brought on to a scheme at the peak of their offending and so almost inevitably commit fewer crimes following this.

Thus, the evidence base for these intensive, multi-agency schemes is far from clear and positive. This however has not prevented their persistence and indeed their continued support by central government, such as IOM. To date there have been five evaluations of the IOM approach that provide the final research evidence outlined in this chapter regarding how offender rehabilitation and desistance can be supported.

As outlined in the last chapter, the process evaluation of five of the IOM pioneer sites was concerned with implementation and processes rather than outcomes. It found support for the approach from practitioners, but found variations with regard to the definition of IOM used, the make-up of caseloads and governance structures (Senior et al, 2011, p. ii-iv). A more recent study of IOM in Thames Valley (Annison et al, 2015) has also considered process issues using surveys, focus groups and some observations with practitioners. The scheme is focused on serious acquisitive offenders and involves local police, probation and drug treatment services in co-located teams. This was found to have improved information exchange and indeed similarly to the pioneer sites evaluation, the scheme was found to be popular among practitioners (issues that are discussed further in the next chapter). However, the research found a lack of additional support for offenders beyond enhanced substance misuse and employment support and extending support for those offenders currently in prison. The authors argue that the scheme did not meet the needs of the cohort, and could negatively impact upon them by applying the label of a “prolific” offender on them (Annison et al, 2015 p. 401), echoing the issue of stigma noted above.

The evaluation of the sixth pioneer site in London known as the Diamond Districts Initiative (Dawson et al, 2011) compared six London boroughs where
IOM was implemented to six matched boroughs where it was not. It remains the most comprehensive evaluation of IOM (Dawson and Stanko, 2013, p. 294). Using a mixture of methods including staff surveys and interviews, offender interviews and analysis of offending data, it assessed both processes and outcomes. It found, with regards to the establishment of the pilot, initial difficulties with issues such as inter-agency working (Dawson et al, 2011, p. 33). Despite this, the pilot was found to have been successful in recruiting offenders, including the most problematic offenders in local areas, with the model used to engage offenders considered to be successful (Dawson et al, 2011, p. 51). Indeed, there was reported to be more demand for the service than had been anticipated (Dawson et al, 2011, p. 30).

However, the key finding from the outcome evaluation was that IOM had not been able to demonstrate an impact upon re-offending rates compared to the control sites (Dawson et al, 2011, p. 43). No differences were found in relation to the speed at which those subject to Diamond reoffended, the number or the seriousness of offences committed (2011, p. 48). This was despite much lower reconviction rates at the six month mark (2011, p. 65). This could be linked to the fact that interventions offered were found not to be targeted at identified client needs (Dawson et al, 2011, p. 27).

It is important to stress that the evaluation was conducted only two years after the initial establishment of the pilot which meant there was little time to work through initial teething problems before the start of the evaluation (Dawson and Stanko, 2013, p. 294). The evaluation reported that the practical and motivational support provided was, ‘appreciated by participants and that honest and trusting relationships had developed, sometimes from an apprehensive starting point’ (Dawson et al, 2011, p. 35). However, the ultimate conclusion from the evaluation, and the one taken away by decision makers (Dawson and Stanko, 2013, p. 294) was that this approach did not work.
In contrast to the Diamond evaluation, a small study examining the Bristol IOM approach (Williams and Ariel, 2013) demonstrated a positive effect of IOM upon recidivism. The study compared the number of arrests within six months of ending contact with the approach and the severity of the offence for which an arrest was made for a cohort of offenders selected for IOM (Williams and Ariel, 2013, p. 127). A quasi-experimental method was used, comparing those offenders who received the whole IOM approach, defined as both carrot and stick, and those who received only the intensive police attention, or stick aspect of IOM. This has been described as a less rigorous approach by those involved in the Diamond evaluation (Dawson and Stanko, 2013). Comparison of these two groups suggested that those subject to the complete IOM approach (carrot and stick) had lower post-IOM arrest rates than those who received only increased police attention (stick) (Williams and Ariel, 2013, p. 128). In addition, the seriousness of post-IOM arrests for those who had been subject to IOM as a whole were found to be less serious than those who were only subject to greater police attention (Williams and Ariel, 2013, p. 129).

The final evaluation of IOM available to date considers the scheme in Sussex (Hallam Centre for Community Justice, 2013), and has also suggested that IOM can impact positively upon levels of reoffending. The scheme predominantly targets those convicted of property offences and the study examined the levels of reconviction of a cohort of offenders, all those registered at a certain date, two years pre and post IOM. Like the study in Bristol, it did not provide information on processes within the approach. In the two years pre-IOM, 45% of the cohort had been convicted, compared to 19% post-IOM, a statistically significant fall, based on time at liberty. The average number of reconvictions also fell from an average of 1.24 offences at two years pre-IOM to 0.42 in the two years post-IOM. Comparing the OGRS of the cohort pre and post IOM pre showed a 78% reduction in actual reoffending, compared to the predicted level, again a statistically significant
In addition this study included a cost-benefit analysis, which suggests that IOM is cost effective. The study calculated that an estimated £1.59 was saved from the predicted reductions in crime committed, for every £1 spent in the cost of delivering IOM, projected over a five year period for a cohort of IOM offenders.

As a current approach to offender rehabilitation, supported by government policy statements, IOM has also been researched in other sites, without the findings being made public. For example, Annison and Hocking (2012) conducted quantitative analysis over a period of 12 months on a cohort of 100 offenders subject to the IOM approach in an undisclosed research site. Whilst not a full evaluation, the findings from this research mirror some of those outlined above. Over the analysis period the number of offences committed by the cohort fell by just over 41%, with 10 offenders committing no further offences. In addition, there were improvements observed amongst a proportion of the cohort regarding their level of substance misuse and involvement in training or employment. However, the authors noted the difficulties in tracking the progress of such a prolific cohort with a variety of needs, and so highlight the need to recognise normative assessments of progress.

This section has outlined a small but growing body of research on IOM specifically. The studies vary in their size and focus, as do the IOM schemes themselves and have provided somewhat conflicting results. As a result the authors of the most recent study have argued that there is a ‘need to disentangle further the mechanisms and components through which interventions ‘work’’ (Annison et al, 2015, p. 401). This research aims to contribute to this, drawing on the findings present in this chapter regarding offender rehabilitation and desistance and supervision. The implications of these are presented in the final section below.
Implications for this research

This chapter has outlined the ways in which offender rehabilitation, desistance and offender management have been conceived in research and policy and how these have altered over time. These are important for the current research because they form the context in which IOM operates and describe its ultimate aims.

Regarding offender management the chapter has outlined how the probation service, formally the primary deliver of such work, has altered in its aims and operation due to wider changes in public policy regarding the criminal justice system. Whilst offender supervision in the community is still commonly used it looks very different from the way it did even twenty years ago. IOM is one of the newer ways in which this takes place, although it draws upon at least a decade of similar approaches that have their roots in personal conceptions of rehabilitation, epitomised by the RNR and “what works” approaches. However it also reflects Crewe’s concerns (2011) that regimes in both prison and probation are becoming ‘tighter’ or more extensive, and the responsibility of individual offenders.

Understandings of offender rehabilitation and desistance, processes that are interlinked, have also developed to recognise their complexity and the extent to which they involve individual offenders, a wide variety of agencies within and beyond the criminal justice system and wider society. A wide range of empirical research has explored ways in which these processes can be supported through supervision. The small number of assisted desistance studies have demonstrated the importance of the following aspects of supervision:

- The need for interventions to be considered fair by those subject to them, including the ways in which breaches of conditions are handled
- The importance of the relations established between offenders and their supervisors, and how this is underpinned by consistency and a sense for offenders that officers care about them
• The provision, within such a relationship, of opportunities to talk through problems in order to understand how they can be resolved, as well as advice, guidance, support, hope and motivation
• That officers provide practical support, either directly or indirectly through referrals to other agencies
• That officers provide an individualised and flexible service that is responsive to changes in circumstances
• That the effects of supervision can be demonstrated long after the supervision has ended.

However, it has also noted the often complementary or supportive role that supervision is able to play, alongside the work and decisions of individual offenders. In addition, research into issues such as compliance, especially coerced compliance, and the legitimacy and fairness of punishments has shown how processes can be vital in affecting the outcomes of supervision, as can the quality of the supervision and how it is enacted. It is this research that can be used to assess the likely effectiveness of IOM in managing prolific offenders to achieve long-term desistance and rehabilitation.

As outlined in this chapter, there have been a small number of studies which have already explored the impact of IOM on reoffending, rehabilitation and desistance. These have used a variety of approaches and been concerned with different aspects (processes and outcomes) and have produced somewhat conflicting results. Whilst this is to be expected of research conducted in different sites it is also, as Annison and colleagues (2015) have noted, due to the need to consider further how IOM operates and why and to what extent it could be expected to “work”. This is what this research aims to contribute; as outlined in the previous chapter it will employ a realistic evaluation approach, which at core seeks to understand the mechanisms which allow intervention to “work”. This research will draw on the research outlined above, particularly the findings regarding how to support rehabilitation and desistance, to underpin the research approach and its instruments which are described in Chapters 4 and 5. The next chapter outlines the key issues regarding multi-agency or partnership working, which
like rehabilitation and desistance, underpin the practice of IOM and contribute to understanding how it operates and can be effective.
Chapter 3. Partnership Working and Criminal Justice

As noted in the introduction to this thesis, one of the defining features of IOM is that it seeks to work with offenders using a multi-agency partnership. This chapter explores partnerships and partnership working generally and specifically within criminal justice.

Just as current approaches to offender supervision have developed from older ideas and debates, so partnership working within public services in Britain draws upon a similar history. The presence of partnerships in social life and social policy predates the state provision of welfare (Balloch and Taylor, 2001, p. 2; Pycroft, 2010, p. 10) and the push towards them has been occurring for around fifty years (Diamond, 2006) due to concerns about both the issues with which public sector agencies were faced and their ability to tackle them.

This chapter examines the nature of partnership working and its growth since the 1980s, and particularly since the election of the Labour government in 1997 when a growing consensus saw partnerships developed in all main areas of public policy, including criminal justice (Diamond, 2002). Whilst this research and this chapter focus on these changes as they have occurred in the UK, it is important to note that these have been global changes (Pycroft, 2010, p. 8). Furthermore whilst the focus of this research is criminal justice, these changes have been observed in work on urban renewal and development, services for children, regional level work (Diamond, 2006, p. 281) and health care (Ferlie, 2010).
This chapter firstly considers why this consensus formed, leading to the growth in the use of partnerships, and secondly the issues around defining a partnership. It then considers partnerships specifically in the field of criminal justice, the reasons for their growth and both the benefits and potential issues with this way of working. Finally, the chapter outlines the implications of the literature on this subject for this research.

The growth of partnerships

Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) see the move towards partnership working as one of the consequences of wider changes in the nature of governance more generally. They argue that the role of the state has moved from ‘overloaded’ in the 1960s and 1970s when central government took responsibility for a wide range of different functions including policy delivery through the use of bureaucracies linked to elected officials, so called traditional public administration, to ‘hollowed out’ in the 1980s. Using a term taken from the work of Rod Rhodes (1997), they recognise the introduction of markets and quasi-markets into government under what came to be known as new public management. This separated policy making from policy delivery, through the introduction of a fragmented array of arms lengths organisations such as QUANGOs and other single issue bodies, devolved administrations and supra-national organisations such as the EU (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p. 17). These became increasingly controlled through the use of performance management and target setting (Ferlie, 2010, p. 28). From the late 1990s the state is characterised as ‘congested’, where a plethora of different agencies are involved in policy and delivery, working in partnerships conceptualised as network governance (Skelcher, 2000; Bevir, Rhodes and Weller, 2003; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000; Pycroft, 2010; Ferlie et al, 2010).

This national or state level of analysis does provide a number of explanations for the rise in the use of partnerships. Firstly, the lack of state capacity and
resources to deliver public policy goals (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p. 2); the route by which partnerships have come to be more common, marketisation and privatisation, means that the state has a reduced capacity to act in the ‘congested’ era there is now. Secondly, the nature of the problems currently faced by governments and societies, described as ‘sufficiently complex in scope and scale as to require the involvement of range of actors with complementary perspectives, expertise and resources’ (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p. 3; Hudson and Hardy, 2002, p. 51) has also led to the increased use of partnerships. Similarly, Powell and Glendinning argue that rationales for partnership working include the added value they can bring, being greater than the sum of its parts and finally budget enlargement (2002, p. 5), or as Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) recognise, opportunities to reduce duplication and share overheads. Finally there is also the fact that central government may mandate a partnership for a particular issue perhaps to ensure a way of working which could include members of the public or service users (Audit Commission, 1998, p. 9-12).

It is important to recognise that the three conceptions of the state and its role and extent presented above are ideal types; it is not argued that there has been a neat and complete transition between each conception of the state and each form of organisation such that a delivery is now based on a partnership. Indeed, Rummery (2002, p. 230) argues that ‘the British welfare state probably never exhibited ‘pure’ forms of either bureaucratic or marketised methods of governing, and is probably also unlikely to exhibit ‘pure’ forms of networked governance’. Instead Cope argues that any such system is likely to be ‘characterised by a mix of these three coordinating principles, with perhaps one such principle dominant’ (2001, p. 1). Thus Rummery (2002, p. 243) argues that the partnerships established under the last Labour government exhibited ‘a mixture of quasi-market-style incentives with bureaucratic, statist controls’ and Ferlie and colleagues (2010) report examples of managed networks in the field of healthcare research, with
elements of both networks and hierarchies which can support work on cross-cutting issues.

Such intersections can create problems for partnerships. For example, partnerships with private companies, a great number of which were used under the Labour Government, may look more like contracts than partnerships (Powell and Glendinning, 2002) in which data and information on resources, approaches and outcomes become commercially sensitive, undermining collaboration and information sharing. Similarly the tight control of local performance, so-called ‘hyper-accountability’ (Walshe et al, 2010, p. 1) can undermine the needs of partnerships to respond flexibly and responsively to changes in the environment in which they operate.

It has also been noted that partnerships can be subject to different forms of governance at different stages of their development and operation. For example Sullivan and Skelcher propose a life-cycle of partnerships which sees them move from a preparatory stage during which network governance supports the forming of a partnership, at which point a more formal and hierarchical mode of governance can bring the partnership into being. During partnership delivery a market or quasi-market mechanism could be used if tendering of contracts is involved, which can be supported by networks. Finally at the point at which a partnership ends or develops beyond its original remit, network governance can re-emerge to maintain commitment between parties (2002, p. 122-3).

Whilst partnerships have become more common since the 1980s, the 1997 election of the Labour government can be considered something of a watershed moment, with partnership a central tenant of the new government’s approach, conceived as a different way of arranging delivery to markets and contracts (Balloch and Taylor, 2001; Hudson et al, 1999; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). Powell and colleagues recognise partnership as the
‘zeitgeist of the Labour government’ (2001, p. 39) which supported and encouraged partnerships at a local level across the board (Balloch and Taylor, 2001, p. 2), in some cases enacting legislation which placed statutory duties on state organisations to work in partnership with each other (Powell et al, 2001, p. 40).

Official documents published shortly after the election demonstrated their commitment to partnerships. For example, in 1998 the Audit Commission published a guide to partnership working, which outlined the benefits of this way of working and noted that mandatory partnerships would be expanded in the future. The White Paper *Modernising Government* (1999), which recommended the greater use of evaluation (the subject of the next chapter), also promoted partnerships as a means of delivering services, the document states the government will, ‘deliver a big push on obstacles to joined-up working, through local partnerships, one-stop shops, and other means’ (Cabinet Office, 1999, p. 7).

Sullivan and Skelcher therefore argue that partnerships created post 1997 were different to those created before; they had a greater focus on delivering outcomes or solutions to improve the well-being of certain target groups and were based on longer term commitments and were organised at a higher level such that work across a local authority area could be organised and integrated (2002, p. 21-22). Despite this, Dowling and colleagues (2004, p. 315) note how research into partnership ways of working has focused more on their processes than on outcomes and point to an emerging view that partnerships are only proving successful in relation to processes and that there is a lack of evidence that partnerships do in fact impact positively upon the issue or problem they have been established to solve (Rummery, 2002, p. 242; Audit Commission, 1998, p. 26; Rumgay, 2007, p. 554; Welsh, 2008, p. 173; Rosenbaum, 2002, p. 192). This echoes findings from the literature on the failure of performance management regimes, which were also a feature
of new public management, likewise developed under the Labour government to, it was claimed, inevitably improve services (Pycroft, 2010; Harvey et al, 2010).

Regardless of such findings Dowling and colleagues note that during those Labour governments, ‘the ideological environment is uncritically pro-collaboration’ (2004, p. 310). This lack of evidence may stem from the complex nature of the problems which partnerships are established to tackle (Audit Commission, 1998, p. 11), which are difficult to assess, especially through short term evaluations, where positive change cannot easily be ascribed to any particular intervention. However Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) and Powell and Dowling (2006) link this lack of evidence of successful outcomes to a failure to employ theoretical groundings for partnerships. It is for this reason that it is important to examine the ways in which partnerships are defined, and so understand what they might achieve as well as the reasons for their use and so any benefits or issues that could be expected. It is these issues which are explored below.

**Definitions of partnerships**

The outline above of the growth in the use of partnerships has referred not only to partnerships but cross-departmental, multi-agency and inter-agency working and collaborations. These terms are used somewhat interchangeably in the literature, but however it is labelled, the definition of the type of working referred to in this chapter needs consideration. This section outlines the ways in which such arrangements have been defined and the different approaches that have been taken to this.

In general it is noted that partnerships have been considered to be an intuitively good idea having ‘acquired a strong normative and virtuous
association’ (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p. 5), without, necessarily, any
decisive attempt to define them, or attempts made, finding the task too
difficult (Powell and Glendinning, 2002, p. 2). This means that anything
defined by those involved as a partnership, becomes understood to be a
partnership. Thus Mackintosh stated, ‘the concept of “partnership” contains a
very high degree of ambiguity’ (1992, p. 210) and noted that, ‘theoretical
frameworks for understanding partnerships are not well developed’ (1992, p.
211). Similarly, Powell and colleagues argue that the use of the term by the
Labour government was vague and lacked precise definition, they state
‘partnership is a word in search of ways of giving it effective meaning in
practice. In government circulars and ministerial policy pronouncements, it is
largely a rhetorical invocation of a vague ideal’ (2001, p. 39). Indeed Diamond
has suggested that the term be avoided (2006, p. 285).

Partnerships have been defined on the basis of their extent, for example
Liddle and Gelsthorpe distinguish between five levels of partnerships:
communication between agencies who recognise an area of overlap between
them but go no further than agreeing to communicate on the issue; co-
operation where agencies agree to work together on a mutually defined
problem; co-ordination where agencies work together in a more systematic
way; federation in which agencies share a central concern and provide
integrated services; and finally merger in which agencies become
indistinguishable from one another (1994b, p. 2). In this way the term
partnership applies to ways of working (Diamond, 2006, p. 278), but can also
be an organisational structure (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998, p. 314).

The extent to which partnership are able to affect the problem they are
concerned with will depend, in part, on the extent of their operation. Hughes
and McLaughlin (2002 p. 162) differentiate between ‘multi-agency’ working,
in which different agencies work together on a specific issue without affecting
the agency as a whole, for example the first two levels of joint working in
Liddle and Gelsthorne’s model above, and ‘interagency’ working, reflected in the latter three levels of the above model, where the normal internal workings of the agencies involved are affected (Barton and Quinn, 2001). Balloch and Taylor however have suggested that partnerships tend to exist on the margins of their home organisations, without bringing about major change to its core activities (2001, p. 6-7).

Lying behind these different approaches are assumptions that organisations with some common interest will come together in order to avoid duplication, improve efficiency and access to information and seek to collaborate on mutual issues rather than compete, and in some cases provide greater involvement for the public or service users (Diamond 2006, p. 278). Indeed, Rosenbaum argues that the underlying assumptions for partnership working include the notions that having more agencies involved can produce new and innovative approaches to problems, can increase the dosage of an intervention and can better coordinate resources, to produce a better quality intervention (2002, p. 177). Partnerships then need to agree in regards to three factors: policies, such as goals, values, means and ends; processes or mechanisms; and resources, including staffing and money, but also trust and information (Powell et al, 2001, p. 44). Ultimately then partnerships can be considered to rest on trust, equality and reciprocity (Powell and Glendinning, 2002, p. 3), or interdependence (Rummery, 2002, p. 232), without which the reason for partnership working and the ability to make is operate are missing.

The optimistic view of partnership working assumes that if these factors are in place and are guided by reticulists, those partnership members who are skilled at developing relationships and identifying available resources, then partnerships can produce their desired outcomes or improvements (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p. 37). The role of reciprocity within a partnership recognises that the power of individual agencies is an important factor which can determine the success or failure of a partnership (Painter and Clarence,
In order to achieve the benefits of a partnership, each agency must give up some power to the common effort. However, agencies will enter partnerships with different levels of power, which can affect all aspects of a partnership, including determining which agencies are included and excluded (Diamond, 2006, p. 278), as well as the scope and priorities and resources deployed. This has been a particular concern of the pessimistic view of partnerships which assumes they are used by organisations to maintain or enhance their own position and to achieve their own ends (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p. 40).

The realist approach considers partnerships to be a response to new requirements or contexts which are affected by institutional factors such as levels of trust and organisational culture which will in turn affect the actions of the individuals within them (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p. 53). As Liddle and Gelsthorpe note ‘relations between particular agencies involved in multi-agency crime prevention are highly complicated, seldom static, and influenced by a variety of institutional, individual and local/historical factors’ (1994b, p. 26). Realists recognise that both positive factors, such as altruism, and negative factors, such as individual gain, can be present within collaborations. Furthermore realists recognise that once established, the relationships which form a partnership will persist and will influence the context in which it exists and the outcomes it generates. In this way the Audit Commission (1998, p. 49) notes that partnership working requires effort, resources and skills to keep it going, with no promise of obvious or short term outcomes.

Such an approach to partnerships can help to explain why different partnerships produce different outcomes. For example, it has been found to be important to consider from where the idea for a partnership has come; if imposed from above it may have organisational support but fail to be implemented on the ground (Pearson et al, 1992, p. 62), whereas those
partnerships which have started at street level can often require reform within participating organisations to allow the partnership to work (Rosenbaum, 2002, p. 188). Regarding trust, Rummery argues that it cannot be legislated for, and that attempts to do so can undermine partnership working. However, Ferlie and colleagues in the field of healthcare have found that in fact mandated partnerships working to achieve national objectives were able to maintain engagement and ownership at a local level (2011, p. 321). This approach can also explain how relationships between parties can alter at different points in the life-cycle of a partnership. Sullivan and Skelcher argue that the development of a partnership can be supported by trust and a sense of common purpose, but that this can be lost during the formalisation of the partnership and the programme of delivery due to parties seeking to assert their own status and so disrupting established networks. It is however possible for openness and trust to be re-established once this delivery programme ends and partners consider whether or how to take the partnership forward (2002, p. 122-3).

It is this realist approach to partnerships which this research draws upon. In the same way as the realistic evaluation approach (outlined in the next Chapter) it stresses the need to surface the assumptions underlying partnerships in order to understand how they are expected to operate and the mechanisms by which they bring about effects observed. This, Rosenebaum argues, can advance understanding and theory of partnerships (2002, p. 178). Despite its contested nature the term partnership remains useful, especially regarding an approach such as IOM which is explicitly multi-agency. Indeed it is this distinction which this research uses; that IOM is a partnership approach (governed in turn by other partnerships) and acts, to varying degrees, in a multi-agency way. IOM is not an organisation, but is instead a partnership approach amongst various agencies, contributing again, to different degrees.
Partnerships in Criminal Justice

There has been a long history in the UK of collaborative approaches to the issue of crime and offending. This makes sense as crime has been defined as a “wicked problem” (Rittel and Webber, 1973) or a cross-cutting issue requiring input from a range of agencies (Hughes and McLaughlin, 2002, p. 155; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p. 64; Diamond, 2006, p. 280; Rumgay, 2007, p. 551; Rosenbaum, 2002, p. 174). The probation service has a long history of working with other organisations (Gough, 2010, p. 21) both formally and on a voluntary basis. This has been formalised and mandated more recently through the notion of contestability, which introduces a mixed economy into service provision (Carter, 2003). As noted above, this is common under new public management. Regarding the police, since the 1960s they have been involved in partnership work aimed at crime reduction and the control of crime (Berry et al, 2011, p. 2), primarily through increased numbers of police officers detecting crime and supporting the prosecution of offenders through the courts. However, the budget pressures created by rising levels of crime and in turn a rising prison population led to more of an emphasis on crime prevention through the 1980s and 1990s (Hughes and McLaughlin, 2002, p. 151; Crawford, 1994, p. 498; Pearson et al, 1992, p. 46). Whilst crime prevention is the first duty of the police (HMIC, 2014c, p. 4) it is recognised to be a task requiring the involvement of a number of agencies, and so in turn a growing emphasis on partnership working emerged.

Indeed, crime prevention itself is wide ranging aim, incorporating varied activities and approaches. Partnerships in this field can therefore involve a focus on the victims of certain types of crime, such as domestic abuse, community problem solving (Murphy and Lutze, 2009) or community approaches to policing (Byrne and Hummer, 2004). These various issues require different partnerships operating in ways to achieve various outcomes. Therefore, the purpose of the partnership is an important consideration, as
outlined above they cannot be assumed to be in an inherently good thing (Blagg et al, 1988, p. 205). This research is concerned with partnerships providing enhanced supervision and tertiary prevention (prevention of reoffending) through the use of a range of agencies (Parent and Snyder, 1999). The sections below explore the reasons for the growth of partnership working on this issue, the potential benefits and issues of this way of working, specifically considering the partnerships between the police and probation services focused on offender supervision, which underpin IOM.

**Background to Partnership Working**

Just as partnership working in public policy in general has become increasingly common in Britain since the 1980s, and most especially since 1997, a similar pattern has been observed in the field of criminal justice (Pycroft and Gough, 2010, p. 245). This has been supported by the Home Office (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994a and 1994b) and international bodies such as the UN (Rosenbaum, 2002, p. 173). The pressure towards and support for partnership working in crime prevention can be evidenced in a series of developments and documents.

The first of these is the establishment in 1983 of the Home Office Crime Prevention Unit. The unit worked across central government departments and with agencies in the private and third sectors to try and prevent crime (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p. 66), again epitomising a mixed economy approach. The following year government circular 8/84 was issued by five major government departments (Home Office, Welsh Office and Departments of Education and Science, the Environment, and Health and Social Security). It confirmed the government’s support for multi-agency approaches to crime prevention, in part to avoid duplication of effort (Crawford, 1994, p. 498; Blagg et al, 1988, p. 204; Holdaway, 1986). Two Home Office run programmes were then launched to demonstrate such an approach and gather evidence
on them, these were the Five Towns Experiment in 1984 and the Safer Cities Project in 1988. They focused resources on particular areas deemed to be in need and provided a local coordinator to draw together a local partnership of agencies (Tilley, 1992, p. 1). Finally in 1990 the Home Office published Partnership in Crime Prevention, which provided examples of partnership working, gathered from around the country and Partnership in Dealing with Offenders in the Community promoting partnerships with private and voluntary agencies (Gough, 2010, p. 22).

In 1991 the Morgan Report was published by the Home Office, described as ‘a key text and a crucial moment in the evolution of partnership approaches to crime’ (Hughes and McLaughlin, 2002, p. 155). The report, Safer Communities: The local delivery of crime prevention through the partnership approach was the result of the department’s Standing Conference on Crime Prevention, and can be seen as the culmination of the programmes and reports noted above. The Report collected evidence from various agencies working in the field of crime prevention and made a series of recommendations on how best to proceed on this issue. It was explicitly in favour of multi-agency working because, as noted above, crime and offending and the factors which lead to them are not the responsibility of a single organisation or government department. The report states furthermore that the work of individual agencies, ‘will inevitably be enhanced by working in a multi-agency setting’ (1991, p. 15, emphasis added). This is interesting given that the report also notes that, ‘the case for the partnership approach stands virtually unchallenged but hardly tested’ (1991, p. 3), reflecting the authors outlined above who question this inevitability. The report’s two key recommendations were, firstly the use of the term community safety as opposed to crime prevention in order to draw in a wider range of agencies (Squires and Measor, 2001, p. 226), and secondly that local authorities are placed at the centre of local partnerships, which in turn are placed on a statutory footing (Hughes and McLaughlin, 2002; Holdaway, 1986).
In the same year as the Morgan Report was published, the Home Office’s Crime Prevention Unit published a paper entitled *Probation Practice in Crime Prevention* (Geraghty, 1991), which reported on a survey which asked about the crime prevention work probation services were undertaking alone and in partnership. The paper and its publication recognised the wider role of the probation service in preventing crime, building on calls for a greater involvement of the probation service around the same time, and attempted to improve this through dissemination of good practice (Geraghty, 1991, p. 1). Geraghty concluded, in concert with Morgan, that crime prevention was not the concern of any one agency, and so required a partnership of statutory and independent organisations and the local community (1991, p. 22). Thus, the two key organisations in crime prevention and offender supervision were being pushed from government level to work in partnership with others and with each other.

Sullivan and Skelcher note that the response to the Morgan Report was ‘not universally positive’, with the Home Office rejecting the recommendation to create statutory partnerships, confident that the voluntary arrangements which existed were sufficient (2002, p. 68). Indeed, the creation of such partnerships had to wait until after the election of the Labour government in 1997 and the passing of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act which created such partnerships within local authority areas, and making local authorities the coordinating body, both recommendations of the Morgan Report (Hughes and McLaughlin, 2002, p. 154).

Indeed this Act put in place other recommendations from Morgan including supporting data sharing between agencies and the need to undertake local crime audits. As a result of this Act McCarthy and O’Neill (2014) argue that partnership working is now an ‘institutionalized part of everyday police work’ (p. 243). The Act is considered by Diamond to be an example of the government’s willingness to force partnerships across public, private and
third sectors (2006, p. 280; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p. 71), a characteristic more typical than under previous governments (Kim et al, 2010). In the same year the government consulted on the closer working of prisons and probation, in a document which also supported the ongoing partnerships with the police (Home Office, 1998). However, the Morgan Report recommended the following representation for the local partnerships: police, local authority, probation service, voluntary sector and businesses (1991, p. 14), and whilst most of these organisations were included in the 1998 Act, the probation service were included only as a statutory partner with the introduction of the 2009 Policing and Crime Act.

Despite this development and persistence of multi-agency working in criminal justice, recent government publications show that there remain issues with its implementation (Committee of Public Accounts, 2014, p. 5). Furthermore, research reveals a lack of strong or consistent outcomes, of evidence based practice and of evidence that partnerships “work” or are effective both in Britain (Rumgay, 2007, p. 543; Rummery, 2002, p. 231; Rummery, 2006, p. 224; Gilling, 1994, p. 246) and America (Kim et al, 2010; Parent and Snyder, 1999). Thus, Powell and Glendinning argue that gains made in the field, could have been made in spite of them (2002, p. 11; Diamond, 2002, p. 298).

More recently Berry and colleagues (2011) have provided the first systematic attempt to assess the impact of these ways of working in this field. Their rapid evidence assessment identified nine studies of good enough methodological quality (involving the use of control group and quantitative statistical testing) to be included in the review. All the studies were from North America and focused on a range of different partnerships including those targeting violent crime, including domestic violence and gun and gang violence. Five of the nine demonstrated a positive, significant impact of the use of partnership working. The authors concluded that, overall, there was evidence that partnership working was effective in the field of crime and disorder (2011, p.
Three studies were focused on offender recidivism or the provision of services on release from prison, of these one showed no demonstrable impact, one showed a positive but not significant impact and a third, focused on first time violent offenders, did have a significant positive impact. Thus for the type of work undertaken by IOM, there remains a lack of evidence of impact.

**Potential benefits of Partnership Working**

The potential benefits of partnership working can be considered both in relation to the organisations involved and the recipients of their services (Heath, 2010). Firstly regarding the organisations involved, a number of researchers have highlighted key benefits for this way of working. Parent and Synder (1999) note that partnerships enable organisations to use complementary powers to the same ends, and therefore have a greater potential to achieve mutual goals (Murphy and Lutze, 2009; Gilling, 1994). Kim and colleagues (2010) similarly recognise instrumental benefits including access to additional staff, resources and information (Nash and Walker, 2009, p. 173). In addition closer working can also improve relations between agencies, due to increased insight and trust (Parent and Synder, 1999, p. 2; Kim et al, 2010, p. 526) which in turn can introduce new ways of thinking and working and support joint requests for wider resources or recognition. Gilling (1994) recognises that partnerships also play well in the media.

Even when partnerships contain parties opposed on issues strengths can be drawn from them being able to draw upon the views of a wider range of actors (Crawford, 1994, p. 505; Gilling, 1994, p. 250; Rumgay, 2007, p. 552; Mawby and Worrall, 2011a, p. 89; Pearson et al, 1992, p. 70; Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994a, p. 31). With regard to IOM the Home Office has sought to explore how involvement from the community and voluntary sector could be improved. The findings from the research commissioned showed that clarity
on roles and responsibilities, representation on governance boards and good information sharing arrangements can be beneficial (Wong et al, 2012 p. 24).

Gilling also notes that regardless of benefits (but presumably because of them) there is simply a need to comply with central government insistence on working in partnership (1994, p. 247). Nash argues that such enforced partnerships between the police and probation services have been mutually beneficial; for the probation service they provide a role for a service whose purpose had been questioned (2008, p. 306; Chapter 2 of this thesis). Indeed it could be argued that changes which have taken place within the probation service, increasing the focus on risk management, compliance, public protection and reducing reoffending (Murphy and Lutze, 2009, p. 65; Parent and Snyder, 1999) has made partnership working with agencies such as the police more likely (Blagg et al, 1988, p. 208). This did, however, remove it from integration with the wider field of social work (Pycroft, 2010, p. 9). For the police such partnerships offer additional support and expertise for new responsibilities regarding offenders, particularly sex offenders, in the community (Nash, 2008, p. 305), and for community involvement through neighbourhood policing (Murphy and Lutze, 2009, p. 65) and early intervention work (McCarthy and O’Neill, 2014, p. 244).

Indeed McCarthy and O’Neill (2014) who have considered partnership working amongst the police found support for partnership working at both operational and strategic level and evidence that this way of working fits police culture because it supports better outcomes and save police resources (2010, p. 245). They note that this runs counter to much previous research (some of which is outlined in the next section) which has found hostility to this way of working. They explain this difference through it being conducted with response or patrol officers, who tend not to encounter other agencies regularly. They note that the police are in favour of successful pragmatic approaches, and if they are experienced first-hand by officers they will be
shared with colleagues. This in turn can support an altering of their task focused, short term approach (2010, p. 246; O’Neill and McCarthy, 2014; Sampson et al, 1991).

Research has however noted some prerequisites to achieving these benefits: firstly partnerships are more likely to succeed if they are focused on specific issues, which are locally defined and take account of local capacity and resources (Pearson et al, 1992, p. 58). Secondly, there is a need for a consistency of representation from agencies. This enables an understanding of ways of working and available powers to be achieved (McCarthy and O’Neill, 2014, p. 247), which if supported by organisational learning processes can be used by partner agencies to improve services and performance (Walshe et al, 2010; Harvey et al, 2010). Thirdly, Ferlie and colleagues have also noted that partnerships benefit from joint IT systems, to allow them both to share information and to develop joint recording and monitoring processes (2011, p. 309).

Regarding those receiving such partnership services, the primary benefit recognised is the provision of a better more complete service, likely to better meet the needs of recipients, due to the improved effectiveness, economy and efficiency of partnership over individual organisation (Corcoran and Fox, 2013; Senior and Kinsella 2014). In the same way partner organisations are more likely to access additional resources and services, so are those in receipt of services.

Potential issues of Partnership Working

However, despite the acceptance of partnership working as a model within the field of crime and community safety, and some evidence that this model is effective (Berry et al, 2011), this way of working is not unproblematical. Three key potential issues faced by partnerships in this, and other fields, are
discussed in this section; firstly the effects upon the accountability of the organisations involved; secondly the way in which the roles and responsibilities of those working within partnerships can be altered; and thirdly the power held by different organisations and how this affects the operation of a partnership. These issues are interrelated and important to consider in a policy climate which remains in favour of this way of working.

Firstly, regarding the accountability of organisations involved in a partnership; it has long been noted that the factors needed to create successful partnerships, trust, interdependence and reciprocity discussed above, rest in part on personal relationships and informal decision making. Indeed, in research in the field of criminal justice, partnerships are reported by participants to only be meaningful if they operate on an informal, flexible, day-to-day basis (Pearson, 1992 p.64). This however, can in turn reduce the accountability of the individuals and organisations involved (Sampson et al, 1988, p. 491; Crawford and Jones, 1995, p. 21).

Accountability through performance management data and processes has been a feature of partnerships created under new public management as discussed above. The Morgan Report itself recognised this by warning of the consequences of a performance management culture which encouraged only activities which could be easily monitored, as opposed to those dealing with longer term needs, and measuring intermediate not final outcomes (1991, p. 22). However, there are also problems created by the limited understanding of how such performance data influences changes or improvements in organisational performance and how the different regimes of different organisations interact with and possibly undercut each other (Walshe et al, 2010, p. 6).

In the field of criminal justice in particular, where partnerships can be focused on particular groups of offenders, bringing together information about them
and different powers to punish or restrict them, specific issues regarding confidentiality are raised (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994a; Heath, 2010) and the accountability of individual organisation becomes more important. In research concerning partnership working between the police and social services Holdaway noted that concerns were expressed that because the partnership involved the police, it increased social control on offenders (1986 p. 139). Research on multi-agency work regarding violent or dangerous offenders (Nash and Walker, 2009) has raised similar concerns, that agencies in the same partnership can use additional information and intelligence to recommend a sanction, and then act upon it. In this way the partnership itself becomes the location of authority, justified by the importance of the aims (Kemshall and Maguire, 2001, p. 257). This echoes Foucault’s concerns from the previous chapter, that the increased reach of an organisation or partnership with regard to power and knowledge can adversely affect the subjects of that power (Ferlie et al, 2010).

Thus, whilst ensuring that individual partners do not act in ways which go beyond their remit depends on strong accountability within each organisation, the operation of the partnership can itself undermine this. Indeed changes to organisations like the probation service which demand that resource is targeted at need, determined for example through assessment tools such as OASys, means there is a routine collection of greater amounts of data (Bellamy et al, 2005, p. 53). Thus there is a tension between improving the function of a partnership, for example with integrated IT systems, as outlined above, to try and prevent crime, and the rights of those subject to these practices.

The second issue considered in this section also concerns ways in which bringing together different agencies to achieve a mutual aim can create difficulties for the individual agencies. A number of authors have written of the effects of partnership working on blurring the lines between different
agencies by bringing together practitioners to do similar roles. Crawford refers to this as ‘interpenetration’ and notes that, as above, it raises questions over the independence and accountability of each agency (1994, p. 506; Pearson et al, 1992, p. 65). Indeed Diamond has argued that moves towards partnership working have foreshadowed the creation of generic practitioners (Diamond, 2006, p. 281).

It is important for partnership agencies to be able to understand each other and work together, indeed the evaluation of the London Diamond Districts IOM pilot found that cultural tensions between police and probation officers made it difficult to meet offender needs (Dawson and Stanko, 2013, p. 293). However, concerns have been raised regarding ways in which partnership working has merged the roles of police and probation officers, particularly with regard to the supervision of particular groups of offenders. For example, Nash posited the existence of what he termed a ‘polibration officer’ (1999, p. 361) due to the extent that partnership working had reached in the late 1990s. In a similar vein Kemshall and Maguire referred to the “policification” of probation’ (2001, p. 252). However, Nash’s research concluded that at that point the joint role was not widely in evidence, although he identified those practitioners responsible for particularly dangerous offenders as most likely to see its emergence.

In 2004, as a result of the rise in the number of joint and indeed co-located police and probation projects, particularly to tackle prolific street offending, such as the DIP and PPO programme outlined in the previous chapter, Mawby and Worrall (2004) reassessed Nash’s ‘polibration’ term. They concluded, like Nash, that the polibration officer did not as yet exist, but that it remained a possible future for the services. In later research Mawby and colleagues (2007) posited the creation a ‘prisi-polibration officer’, incorporating the role of the prison officer. However, as with the 2004 research, the authors note that neither a single seamless offender management officer nor organisation
has been created (Mawby et al 2007, p. 131; Mawby and Worrall, 2011a and 2011b). They ascribed this to issues around roles and cultures and historical differences, as well as variance in geographical coverage and availability of resources and differing institutional performance management systems (Mawby et al, 2007, p. 128). Instead they described the situation as a federation rather than a merger, using the terms from Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994b) above, in which distinct roles are maintained, but regularly brought together in various partnership arrangements (Mawby and Worrall, 2011a, p. 91).

Interestingly, in commenting upon this update to his work, Nash (2004) suggests that the projects examined by Mawby and Worrall do constitute polibation. Indeed, Mawby and Worrall observed a merging of cultures between the police and probation services, one which moved closer towards to the police and away from the social work ethos of the probation service. In later work on joint teams dealing with violent and dangerous offenders Nash argued that polibation officers did exist, within polibation teams (Nash, 2008, p. 308). This was demonstrated by the fact that police officers in such roles describe their roles as offender management, the thing that had defined the role of a probation officer (Nash and Walker, 2009, p. 175). Thus, it is not just that probation officers have become more enforcement focused, police officers have also become concerned with offender management and its ‘social service/caring function’ (Millie, 2013, p. 150).

Regarding IOM specifically, the recent thematic inspection report found that in some areas, police officers were responsible for the supervision and management of offenders, especially non-statutory offenders. This was an issue of concern for the Inspectors who were keen for police officers to focus upon intelligence gathering and enforcement action (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p. 30) and for IOM arrangements to preserve the skills and roles of each agency (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p. 35). Indeed
they cite the role of police intelligence in disrupting further offending and reducing crime as possibly ‘the best argument for the continued development of IOM’ (2014, p.50).

This echoes the views of Worrall and Mawby whose recent research into probation workers and their occupational cultures considered multi-agency partnerships. They were also concerned to find police officers responsible for the support and management of offenders, especially as this tended to be conducted in a police service “can do” way, wanting to take over and act quickly, without the subtlety of a probation officer’s approach (Worrall and Mawby, 2011a, p. 90). They conclude that these partnerships could ‘bring benefits for the effective management of offenders especially when complementary skills are acknowledged’ (2011a, p. 89, emphasis in the original; Kim et al, 2010, p. 625; Parent and Snyder, 1999, p. 2; Heath, 2010, p. 197; Rosenbaum, 2002, p. 174).

It is when different skills are combined that partnerships can become more than the sum of their parts (Kemshall and Maguire, 2001, p. 255). It is for this reason that Nash considers the ‘polibation’ officer to be a threat to partnership working because it risks practitioners becoming too similar and so unable to make different contributions (Nash, 2008, p. 303). Therefore, as above regarding issues of accountability and confidentiality, the use of formal and clear systems for partnership working which ‘clarify the boundaries between different agencies … and enable agency members to articulate their specific identities, tasks and responsibilities’ (Pearson et al, 1992 p. 65) have been recommended.

The coming together of the roles of police and probation officers around offender supervision has also been found to create issues for the individual officers, particularly police officers, undertaking this work. Murphy and Lutze for example found that police officers felt their role within a partnership was
not “real” police work, and was not considered as such by their organisation, who could pull them out and back into other roles when required (Kemshall and Maguire, 2001; Welsh, 2008; O’Neill and McCarthy, 2014). Findings from older research show that the police officers who undertake this work are often part of a small discreet team who operate separately from the rest of their colleagues (Holdaway, 1986, p. 146). Whilst a separate team and different role names can be a way for officers to find an identity outside of their own organisation (Annison et al 2015, p. 403), it can also undermine the ability or desire for the home organisation to recognise and work alongside the partnership team. This sense of difference can be compounded by the fact that partnership team members tend not to be representative of their wider organisation with regard to their gender, age, experience or perspective (Crawford and Jones, 1995, p. 28).

Thus without wider, more senior support, partnerships can become staffed by practitioners who are not understood by their own organisation (O’Neill and McCarthy, 2014). Furthermore, this means that the work of these officers can be undermined by colleagues working outside the partnership, who do not understand its work or its impact, so-called intra-organisational conflicts (Pearson et al, 1992, p. 65). Liddle and Gelsthorpe note that in large agencies such as the police such conflicts, or lack of ‘vertical agreement’, are common and driven by competition for status and resources (1994b, p. 27). This can lead to unevenness of commitment and ownership of a partnership depending on the relative status of partnership working within each organisation.

The third issue with partnership working discussed in this section is that of power within a partnership and the agencies which form it. Whilst this can be excluded from the more practical, check-list partnership literature from within central government (Audit Commission, 1998) it is linked to the two previous issues and indeed is key at all points within the formation and
operation of a partnership. The operation of power can be observed both by
the ways in which a partnership is used by those involved, and by those who
are and are not members of a partnership.

Considering the first of these points, Crawford noted that power was of prime
concern in his research into multi-agency partnerships in the field of crime
prevention, regarding defining agendas, priorities, resources and indeed what
constitutes crime as well defining those issues which would be ignored and
left unresolved (1994, p. 503; Crawford and Jones, 1995; Kim et al, 2010).
Similarly Diamond (2002) notes that the level of power held by members of a
partnership is key to understanding how it operates and whether it succeeds.
This is important on both an organisational level and with regard to individual
representatives. For example, Blagg and colleagues (1988) found problems
created when those attending partnership meetings did not have the level of
power required to make decisions and act as a representative of their
organisation.

This is complicated in that the aims and objectives of partnership agencies
can, to some extent, undermine each other. For example Murphy and Lutze
note that probation and prisons, whilst both concerned with offenders and
criminal justice can have conflicting aims; to enforce violations and further
offending, resulting in offenders being sent to prison, and to reduce
overcrowding (2009, p. 66). A similar issue affects IOM due to the differences
between tackling crime, the focus of the police and reoffending, the focus of
the probation service (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p. 17). As a
result Murphy and Lutze describe definitions of success as both a key factor in
the success of partnerships, but also ‘a delicate philosophical balance’
dependent upon the relative priority of the goals of each agency (Murphy and
Lutze, 2009, p. 66; Pressman and Wildavsky 1984, p. 98). Failure to decide
upon and work to mutual goals risks creating what they term ‘mission
distortion’ (2009. p. 67) which can in fact be harmful to offenders and
communities. This can be further complicated where priorities are established by legislation, which can limit the ability of agencies to act differently. For example Sampson and colleagues note that ‘one of our most consistent findings is the tendency for inter-agency conflicts and tensions to reappear, in spite of co-operative efforts, reflecting the oppositions between state agencies at a deep structural level’ (1988, p. 482 emphasis added; Pressman and Wildavsky 1984, p. 87). This lack of obvious or clear cut aims and objectives are a feature of “wicked problems” which Rittel and Webber characterise as involving disagreement over goal-formation, problem-definition and location (1973, p. 156).

Much has been written in the criminal justice partnership literature regarding the specific implications of working in partnership with the police. As an organisation perceived to have a lot of power with regard to legal capabilities, resources and as noted above, a “can do” culture, they tend to be involved in partnerships, but in a way which has been considered to create problems for other agencies.

Indeed, partnership working involving the police has long been cited as a way for the police to use the resources and access of other agencies to pursue their own aims, meet their own objectives and expand their sphere of influence and control (Sampson et al, 1988, p. 480). Indeed one way of describing partnership work is as ‘third party policing’ (Mazerolle, 2014), in which relationships are established between the police and a third party agency which has access to other legal levers which can help the police in their work. Mazerolle argues that this can be seen as a way to sustain partnerships long term because it makes use of the third party’s legislative responsibilities (2014, p. 353). As a result Hughes and McLaughlin (2002) argue that in reality many such partnerships are in fact driven by the police’s concerns and that where there are fundamental conflicts between relevant agencies the police’s will tend to dominate (Sampson et al, 1988, p. 479),
indeed the partnership can be used to legitimatise their current ways of working and to manage demand on the service (Squires and Measor, 2001, p. 228).

For example, Murphy and Lutze’s research in America found evidence of police officers using probation officers as a way to enter homes, as their barrier to entry was lower, or to see probation interactions with offenders as a source of additional intelligence for the police (2009, p. 71; Kim et al, 2010, p. 631). Sampson and colleagues go on to state that ‘[t]he police are often enthusiastic proponents of the multi-agency approach, but they tend to prefer to set the agendas and to dominate forum meetings and then to ignore the multi-agency framework when it suits their own needs’ (1998, p. 491; O’Neill and McCarthy, 2014, p. 152).

Power can also be observed in who is, and is not, permitted to join a partnership, and indeed who chooses and does not chose to join, especially if membership is not mandated by statutory requirements. For example O’Neill and McCarthy have found that partnerships can exclude those agencies not thought to ‘pull their weight’ (2014, p. 156) and Welsh reported with regard to partnership approaches to domestic violence, that attendance if not mandated for particular individuals, depended on what agencies thought they could get from and provide to a partnership and its meetings (2008, p. 178). Indeed, partnerships can create specific difficulties for third sector organisations taking part in partnerships with state agencies. Whilst they may be there to provide a different perspective, this may not carry as much weight and they may be co-opted into a system with which they may disagree (Gough, 2010). Similarly, Crawford states that the requirement to be able to reach agreement and consensus on issues often excludes groups or representatives of local residents or service users who tend to be less organised or considered ‘troublesome’, but who tend to have the most first-hand experience of the issues considered (Crawford, 1994, p. 510). Thus
Pressman and Wildavsky note that where there is a likelihood of a conflict over goals, a call for coordination ‘becomes another term for coercion’ (1984, p. 133), coordination becomes a form of power and a way of avoiding problems (1984, p. 134).

This means that often partnerships in criminal justice and offender supervision, including IOM, do not extend beyond the police and probation service (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p.24). Although the 2013 Home Office survey of IOM arrangements found that just over half involved third sector representation (Home Office, 2013, p. 4). Where this is not the case, this can limit their effectiveness given, as noted above (and in the previous chapter) the complexities of desisting from crime (Byrne and Hummer, 2004, p. 62). As Rosenbaum has noted, a key lesson from such partnerships is that ‘a room full of law enforcement officials will inevitably result in a law enforcement solution to the problem’ (2002, p. 190).

Researchers in this field have concluded that the problems created by power and its operation and the other problems considered in this section can be resolved through both trust between agencies, and in support of this, structures to oversee the work of partnerships. Indeed Nash and Walker note that trust can be undermined by partnerships creating problems around issues such as a loss of agency identity and a challenge to agency values, risks to confidentiality without recognition of the benefits of partnership working (2009, p. 177; Harvey et al, 2015, p. 505). However, trust can be built up through a consistent commitment to joint working, for example meeting attendance (O’Neill and McCarthy, 2014, p. 150), co-location (Diamond, 2006 p. 283), specific performance measures (Murphy and Lutze, 2009, p. 75; Diamond, 2002, p. 299) and the use of a programme of training for new members of a partnership (Murphy and Lutze, 2009, p. 75; Nash and Walker, 2009, p. 178; Kim et al, 2010, p. 631). Indeed the IOM thematic inspection
recommends training for those involved (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p. 30).

All of these issues are recognised in the 1998 consultation on closer working between prisons and probation (Home Office, p. 5), but remain an issue for criminal justice partnerships. If partnerships are agreed to be a useful way to approach complex and “wicked” problems then organisations entering into them must consider both the theoretical and practical issues raised by them and recognise that entering into a partnership can both enhance and undermine the ability of organisations to provide their own services. The ways in which this can occur and how negative consequences can be avoided should influence the practice of partnerships (Pycroft 2010, p. 10; Diamond, 2006, p. 281).

The review of partnerships in criminal justice conducted by Berry and colleagues (2011) identified the following five mechanisms, found to be associated with better partnership working. Firstly, strong leadership, including shared vision, values and norms, integrated into the partner agencies’ mainstream work. Secondly, regular data sharing and a problem focus with clarity over the aims of the project and continued evaluation with researcher support. Thirdly, good communication and co-location, ensuring a presence at a local level and regular face to face contact. Fourthly, flexible and appropriate structures, involving all relevant agencies, with continued monitoring and clear accountability mechanisms. Finally, past experience of partnership working, as well as the careful selection and joint training of staff (Berry et al, 2011, p. iii). These are similar to the “hallmarks” promoted by the Home Office in guidance on successful partnership working released in 2007 to support the implementation of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (Berry et al, 2011, p. 2) and in echoing the findings from previous literature can be used to judge partnerships against.
Implications for this research

This chapter has outlined how the use of partnerships has grown in a range of policy areas including criminal justice since the 1980s, but particularly since 1997. This is due to the types of issues governments face, so-called “wicked problems” which require the joint action of a range of agencies, which are compounded by the fragmented landscape of government and arm’s length organisations which are responsible for the provision of services. Partnerships therefore provide the potential for additional resources, capabilities and legal powers to tackle problems, and in some instances have been legally mandated.

Whilst these have been assumed to be an intuitively good idea, this chapter has also shown that there are a range of different understandings of the term, based on its extent and characteristics and that they operate in different governance environments. It is thus not guaranteed that a partnership will have positive effects, indeed there is a risk that partnerships become routes for organisations to achieve only their own objectives in a more efficient way, rather than supporting other organisations in achieving joint objectives.

A realist conception notes the possibility for positive and negative, expected and unexpected outcomes and seeks to understand particular partnerships in particular contexts. Diamond therefore recommends the study of individual partnership to understand them (2006, p. 279), which is the aim of this research.

In the field of criminal justice, research has struggled to demonstrate a positive impact of this way of working. The previous chapter outlined how this is also the case with regard to IOM where research to date has shown that practitioners are mainly positive about the IOM model of joint working, particularly in the longer running programmes (Senior et al, 2011; Annison et
al, 2015), but that the evidence of impact upon reoffending has been mixed (Dawson et al, 2011; Williams and Ariel, 2013; Hallam Centre for Community Justice, 2013). This reflects the variance between the effect of partnerships on practitioners and on the issues at which they are directed.

This chapter has outlined ways in which partnership working in this field in particular can be particularly problematic given the extent to which different agencies are working to different aims and targets, and have different levels of power to define and run partnerships. In cases where partnerships do operate effectively they can have such a range of powers that they raise questions of accountability.

Despite this, partnerships continue to be promoted and in the case of IOM insisted upon. The IOM government policy statement has a section entitled, ‘The case for working together’ which states that, ‘more coherent joint working can help partners to make the best use of their resources’ (Home Office, Ministry of Justice, 2009, p. 4-5).

Further research then is required both into the nature, extent and operation of IOM partnerships as well as the perceived and realised benefits. Understanding the mechanisms by which partnerships work and bring about their effects will be key to this, as outlined by the realistic approach and indeed by Berry and colleagues (2011), whose research provides indicators of what is required for partnerships, at least in some areas, to be successful. These mechanisms will be used to understand to what extent the IOM partnership is beneficial to the aim of reducing reoffending and how it can be expected to impact upon it, rather than simply being assumed that this is the case or being beneficial only to the aim of establishing a partnership.

In particular, this research will be concerned with the following issues raised in this chapter: the operation of the police within the partnership, given
historical issues between this and other organisations; the impact, if any, of
the non-statutory nature of IOM on the way it is approached by partners; and
the extent to which the close working between police and probation officers,
and indeed drugs workers, on a relatively small group of offenders is affecting
their roles along the lines of the probation officer discussed above.
Chapter 4. Evaluation Approach and Theoretical Framework

This chapter discusses the evaluation approach for this research. The previous chapters in this thesis have outlined the development of IOM and the literature and debates that have informed its creation and can be used to judge its effect. The last two chapters have concluded that the aims and objectives of IOM, reductions in reoffending, rehabilitation and desistance, are complex and multi-facetted and also that the use of partnerships to achieve these is not a guarantee of success and can create additional difficulties. Therefore the evaluation approach for this research needs to be able to accommodate the complexities of IOM and the processes in which it is involved with offenders and practitioners.

The last chapter highlighted how a realist approach to the partnership literature can appreciate the various influences on, and the effects of an intervention, if close attention is paid to its particular operation, and how understanding the mechanisms that underpin an intervention can reveal why it may or may not achieve its aims. Thus a partnership is not, in itself, a solution to a problem. This echoes the findings from the desistance literature that offender rehabilitation programmes, however well designed, are also not a complete solution; desistance as an active process is dependent on the interactions between individuals and social structures. It is this realist approach, that attends to the theory of an intervention, that this chapter concludes is of use for an evaluation of IOM.

This chapter firstly defines evaluation as a particular form of applied research activity, distinct in both its purpose and use. The key methodological approaches to evaluation are outlined, including experimental and
constructionist approaches, that differ in the extent to that they employ the methods of the natural sciences, as well as pluralist and theory-led approaches, that are concerned less with particular methodologies and more with appropriateness and explanatory power of the approach.

The chapter then considers the link between evaluation and policy and the way that this has developed, like partnership working, since the new public management era of the 1980s and more particularly since 1997. This section discusses the complex link between the two and how this is affected by both supply and demand issues. The section illustrates why evaluation findings tend not to be reflected straightforwardly in policy decisions, a fact that has been reflected in the findings of the previous two chapters.

**Defining Evaluation**

Evaluation can be differentiated from other forms of research activity in two ways; firstly that evaluation seeks to ascribe value to the subject of the evaluation, and secondly that the results of evaluation are intended for use within decision making processes, for example by policy makers or local practitioners. Pawson and Tilley summarise this in the following way, evaluation, ‘purports to offer the universal means with which to measure ‘worth’ and ‘value’. Evaluation, in short, confers the power to justify decisions’ (1997, p. xii); it is therefore an applied form of research (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 214; Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p. 249; Weiss, 1990, p. 171; Mark and Henry, 2006 p. 317).

With regard to ascribing worth and value, authors in this field distinguish between that which is context specific and that which is more generic. Guba and Lincoln distinguish between merit, context-free value, and worth, that is more context dependent (1986, p. 550). Similarly, Fischer (1995, p. 241-242)
distinguishes between empirical or programme evaluation, that judges to what extent a programme or policy fulfils a standard or norm, and normative or policy evaluation that is concerned with determining the appropriateness of the standard or norm used in an empirical evaluation (Howlett et al, 2009, chapter 8; Becker et al, 2012, chapter 1). In this way, evaluation is not a research activity limited to a technical assessment of the operation or effectiveness of a policy or program, but can also assess the implications or appropriateness of the policy or programme itself.

With regard to supporting decision making, a further distinction can be drawn between formative and summative evaluations. Summative evaluations are concerned with determining whether an intervention or programme has achieved its intended outcomes, whereas formative evaluations are concerned with processes operating within a policy or programme (Palumbo et al, 1981, p. x). Hudson and Lowe (2009, p. 272) argue that these types of evaluation tend to differ with regards to methodologies used, with summative approaches tending to use more quantitative methods, and formative approaches, more qualitative methods. However, this chapter argues that evaluation activity of either sort can be strengthened by avoiding this somewhat artificial, methodologically driven division, and instead employing theory-led approaches.

There is some disagreement in the literature regarding what is an appropriate subject for an evaluation. Guba and Lincoln argue that policies are not an appropriate subject for an evaluation these being decisions rather than the expressions of them through programmes for example (1986, p. 550; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). However, this is not a universally accepted distinction, Nutley and Webb (2000, p. 15) and Knox and McAllister (1995, p. 413) refer to ‘policy evaluation’ and Shadish, Cook and Leviton have noted how authors such as Cronbach (1991, p. 334) and Weiss (1991, p. 190) have stopped drawing distinctions between evaluation, policy research and applied
social science, due to their overlapping nature. This research is concerned with IOM, an approach that is driven by certain policy decisions, and this is common in evaluation in the field of public policy.

This research is concerned with evaluating IOM to understand how the IOM approach operates and why observed outcomes are produced, it is therefore both formative and summative. It seeks to both support improvements in its delivery and so inform decision making and develop knowledge about offender rehabilitation and supervision within partnerships and so determine the worth or value of the approach. There have been various approaches to these tasks proposed in the evaluation literature; the key approaches are outlined in the sections below.

**Key Approaches to Evaluation**

There has been, and remains, much disagreement over how evaluation should be conducted. Such debates are similar to the methodological debates or ‘paradigm wars’ over how to approach research more generally, with lines drawn between positivist and social constructionist approaches (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 2; Pollitt, 1999, p. 88). Along this spectrum are other evaluation approaches, those referred to in this chapter are the ‘pluralist’ approach of Cronbach and the theory-led approaches to evaluation of Pawson and Tilley, Weiss and Chen and Rossi. These are summarised in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: A summary of approaches to evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Approach</th>
<th>Key Authors</th>
<th>Epistemology</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experimental</td>
<td>Campbell, Cook, Stanley, Farrington</td>
<td>Positivist</td>
<td>Experimental or quasi-experimental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructionist/Responsive/Naturalistic/Fourth Generation</td>
<td>Guba and Lincoln, Stake, Patton</td>
<td>Constructionist</td>
<td>Qualitative methods; continuous engagement with stakeholders, seeking consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralist</td>
<td>Cronbach</td>
<td>Concerned with external validity</td>
<td>Qualitative and quantitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realistic Evaluation (theory-led)</td>
<td>Pawson and Tilley</td>
<td>Realist</td>
<td>Mixed, driven by programme theory and needs; use of within-sample comparison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory of Change (theory-led)</td>
<td>Weiss</td>
<td>Positivist</td>
<td>Mixed, driven by programme theory and needs; concerned with consensus amongst stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory Driven (theory-led)</td>
<td>Chen, Rossi</td>
<td>Theory driven positivism</td>
<td>Mixed, driven by programme theory and needs; does not reject experimental approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These are the key approaches to evaluation in the social sciences and are outlined below.

**Experimental Evaluation**

Experimental evaluation is based on the logic of the scientific experiment, being overtly positivist it draws on the approach and techniques of the natural sciences. Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) are the purest form of this approach, involving random assignment of subjects to experimental and control conditions to ensure that causation can be demonstrated. However, in social research, such as in the field of criminal justice this is often not possible or appropriate and so quasi-experimental approaches are more common, especially in the UK where the commitment to RCTs has been less overt than in the United States (Tilley and Clarke, 2006, p. 518). These experiments use matched experimental and control groups, and further
statistical techniques and procedures are used to exclude all but the variables reflecting the intervention under evaluation.

This approach to evaluation is based on principles from writers such as Campbell and Stanley (1966) and Campbell and Cook (1979); the founding evaluation authors. Chen and Rossi argued in 1983 that evaluation methodology had been ‘dominated by the paradigm of the randomized controlled experiment’ with alternative methodologies judged against this standard, or devised in opposition to it (1983, p. 283). Indeed Chapter 2 outlined the importance of the findings of experimental techniques to the re-emergence of rehabilitation as a public policy concern and to the identification of those approaches, such as cognitive behavioural interventions, that can support rehabilitation.

In the field of criminology, Farrington has been a particular proponent of experimental methods and indeed of ‘experimental criminology’ (Sherman, 2012, p. 244). He has written extensively on the methodology of research and evaluation in criminology (1997, 1998 and 1999). For Farrington, experimental designs are the best for evaluating interventions, indeed he states, ‘in many ways, a randomized experiment is the most convincing method of evaluating any crime prevention program’ (1997, p. 160; Sherman, 2009). He recognises however that these are not always feasible or appropriate for some interventions, where quasi experimental approaches can be applied. In setting out his ‘criminological research agenda for the next Millennium’ (Farrington, 1999), he specifically states that there is a need for experimental research in order to assess the effectiveness of measures aimed at preventing offending.

This is because an experimental approach has high levels of internal validity and so can demonstrate ‘the extent to which any change in an outcome measure can be unambiguously attributed to the effects of the intervention
program’ (Farrington, 1997, p. 163; Farrington, 1998, p. 208). By ensuring that subjects are either randomly assigned to control and test groups, or ensuring these groups are carefully matched so as to be similar on what are considered to be important variables, any difference observed can be assigned to the intervention being evaluated.

The experimental approach to evaluation is therefore concerned with identifying the counterfactual, or ‘what would have happened in the absence of the program intervention’ (Hollister and Hill, 1995, p. 158). Indeed, those in this tradition argue that other, non-experimental methodologies are unable to calculate the counterfactual and so are of less use in reaching conclusions about a programme or intervention. Thus Hollister and Hill describe random allocation as the, ‘nectar of the gods’ (2005, p. 158) and state that ‘when the random assignment of individuals to treatment and control groups is precluded, no sure-fire method exists for assuring that the evaluation will avoid problems of selection bias’ (2005, p. 153). Discussing evaluations of partnership in the field of criminal justice specifically, Rosenbaum notes how they can pose particular issues for evaluators given their complex nature and operation. However, he argues that they should still hold to the tenets of experimental research, such as the exploration of the counter-factual (2002, p. 192).

For those in the experimental tradition, not using the model of test and control samples opens up an evaluation to a number of threats to internal validity. Farrington outlines six such threats that include, the influence that history or pre-existing trends may have outside of the effects of the programme, the effect that any ‘pre’ testing may have on ‘post’ testing and the effect of changes in measurement, the effect of regression to the mean, where a programme is introduced at the peak of an issue, that then inevitably declines and the movement of individuals in or out of the experimental sample. Largely, Farrington argues that a design that includes one or more
pairs of well-matched and geographically close samples can help control for these threats to internal validity (1997, p. 163-164).

Internal validity however is not the only concern of experimental evaluators. Farrington notes that Cook and Campbell recognised three other forms of validity: statistical conclusion validity, concerned with whether there is sufficient statistical power to detect an effect in the experimental site; construct validity, or whether there is a ‘causal chain or mechanism’ linking the intervention and the expected outcome; and external validity, or the extent to which findings can be generalised or are affected by local context. As a result, Farrington concludes that both process and outcome evaluations are useful (1997, p. 165-7).

This concern within experimental evaluation for both mechanisms (construct validity) and contexts (external validity) to some extent answers critics of the experimental approach that its focus on internal validity creates a narrow focus upon outcomes without an understanding of how or why they are achieved. Indeed Farrington states that ‘it is desirable to establish what works, for whom, in what circumstances and, hence, that it is desirable to study mechanisms and contexts’ (1998, p. 206), a statement that uses the language of theory-led evaluation and in particular Pawson and Tilley’s realistic evaluation (outlined below). Campbell, one of founding writers on quasi-experimental methods, was accepting of qualitative methods and of researching processes in order to gain access to the ‘black box’ of an intervention (Shadish et al, 1991, p. 133; Cornish and Clarke, 1972). Shadish, Cook and Leviton state of Campbell that he accepted, ‘that all measurement is theory-laden and that objective knowledge is impossible if it is understood as theory-neutral, pure glimpses into the social world’ (1991, p. 133; Sanderson, 2002, p. 18; Julnes et al, 1998, p. 486).
However, Farrington goes on to state that in his view determining whether a programme works, for whom, and in what circumstances is a two stage process involving establishing first whether a programme works or not and then, if it does, to explore the mechanisms at work and the impact of the context (1998, p. 207). This, as Chen highlights, is due to the primacy of internal validity within experimental evaluation (1990, p. 59; Shadish et al, 1991, p. 368, McGuire, 2004, p. 340). Similarly Campbell felt that there was little point in ensuring that findings could be generalised, before one had determined that the programme in question has an effect (Shadish et al, 1991, p. 127). This is different from the position stated by theory-led evaluators Pawson and Tilley, who argue that knowledge of why and in what circumstances an intervention works is needed before it can be said to work (1994, p. 292; Matthews, 2009, p. 355). It differs further still from the constructionist approach to evaluation that exists at the opposite end of the spectrum from experimental approaches and is considered in the following section.

**Constructionist Evaluation**

The constructionist approach is underpinned by an ontology that defines the world as being created through the meanings of those within it, as opposed to there being an external reality beyond such meanings. This then mandates a type of evaluation that uses methods (mainly qualitative) which allow access to these meanings or constructions (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 18). This approach is termed ‘fourth generation evaluation’ by Guba and Lincoln (1989) and is one in which no attempt is made to undertake evaluation as a scientific or rationalist activity, but instead approaches evaluation as interactive and collaborative. They state, ‘to approach evaluation scientifically is to miss completely its fundamentally social, political, and value-orientated character’ (1989, p. 7). This approach has also been termed ‘naturalistic’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p. 19), ‘interactive’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p. 8) and
‘responsive’, a term taken from work by Robert Stake on which fourth generation evaluation is based (Greene, 2008, p. 1362).

Guba and Lincoln define their fourth generation approach against what they consider to be three previous generations of evaluation, of firstly measurement, secondly description and thirdly judgement (1989, p. 8). These three preceding generations of evaluation are traced through the history of education research within the United States that provides a particular chronology of evaluation research. All three are positivist approaches to evaluation, that van der Knaap argues are portrayed as ‘fairly simplistic caricatures’ of a rationalist approach to evaluation (2004, p. 28). Guba and Lincoln argue that these previous generations of evaluation are still present today, but that fourth generation evaluation is a development upon them.

Guba and Lincoln note three key problems with the preceding generations of evaluation. Firstly, that they tend towards managerialism, by which they mean the evaluation’s client or manager is elevated to a position of power, that in turn disempowers both stakeholders and the evaluator and encourages ‘collusion’ with the client (1989, p. 34). Secondly, that such evaluation fails to accommodate different or plural values, because of an emphasis on rational, value-free scientific methods. Finally, and linked to the previous point, that such evaluations are overcommitted to the scientific paradigm and the possibility of gathering objective value-free data from an external reality. This in turn leads to a stripping away of context through the use of statistical controls in order to aid generalisations, and removes responsibility from the evaluator for the findings produced, as these are uncovered or gathered rather than created.

Guba and Lincoln define fourth generation evaluation as characterised by two key elements, ‘responsive focusing’ and a constructivist methodology (1989, p. 11). Responsive focusing refers to their view that all stakeholders must be
involved at all stages of the development and design of the research, so that the evaluation becomes an iterative process of responding to the ‘claims, concerns and issues’ of stakeholders. Stakeholders are defined broadly by Guba and Lincoln, as anybody who is involved with the phenomena evaluated, or who are its beneficiaries or victims (1989, p. 40). Claims, concerns and issues also have specific definitions: those things that can benefit (claims), negatively affect (concerns) or be negotiated with (issues) stakeholders (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p. 39). Guba and Lincoln are critical of evaluations that are based on what they term as a ‘cosy’ relationship with the client (1989, p. 9) where the evaluators will be led to focus only on those issues of concern to a manager. Fischer makes a similar point, arguing that evaluators, particularly those analysing policy, had by the 1980s become more like lawyers than scientists, ‘merely advancing argument that suited the needs of their clients’ (1995, p. 9).

In this way Guba and Lincoln criticise previous evaluation approaches as being disempowering to stakeholders, and moreover as being ‘not only morally and ethically wrong but also politically naïve and conceptually narrow’ (1989, p. 15). This close and persistent involvement of stakeholders in the research process gives evaluators access to the broad range of information stakeholders have. In this way fourth generation evaluation echoes action research (Guba and Lincoln, 2008, p. 256) in which stakeholders are much more actively involved than simply providing data or answers to questions from the researchers.

This approach to evaluation gives evaluators a different role from that conceived of in more ‘realist’ approaches to evaluation. Guba and Lincoln conceive of evaluators as ‘collaborators’ and ‘negotiators’ (1989, p. 19); as the ‘orchestrator of the negotiation process’ (1989, p. 10). Alongside this, stakeholders are offered ‘a full measure of political parity and control’ such that the final product of the evaluation is a ‘joint construction’ and consists
not of a set of conclusions and recommendations but, ‘an agenda for negotiation’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p. 11, emphasis in the original). Thus evaluation is a more on-going process, driven by the evolving claims, concerns and issues of all stakeholders (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p. 43).

Authors who subscribe to other evaluation approaches, such as Patton and Weiss, also advocate working closely with stakeholders, in order to ensure that evaluation is ultimately utilised. Patton considers the aim of evaluation to be ‘utilization’, defined as ‘intended use by intended users’ and so recommends that evaluators agree with users what the outcomes of an evaluation should be (Patton, 1990a, p. 192). Weiss has also written about the need to involve stakeholders in both defining the scope of the study and also in interpreting the results by reporting back to them regularly, while the study is in progress (1998, p. 30). She also specifically notes that this participation should be extended to the clients of the programme being evaluated in order that the findings do not simply continue the status quo with minor improvements, when more radical change could improve the outcomes for clients. Like Patton, this participatory involvement is done with aim of seeing the evaluation results used and so has a different driver from Guba and Lincoln, but it does lead to the same outcome; the closer involvement of stakeholders than is necessarily the case in more experimental evaluation for example.

This element of fourth generation evaluation has been criticised by other writers. Sullivan and colleagues argue that insisting that evaluation findings flow up from stakeholders may exclude the knowledge of the evaluator or existing theory (2002, p. 209). The process of engagement with practitioners to uncover and agree the theories at work in the programme can also struggle against time pressure and requirements to show ‘quick wins’, that may affect the quality of any consensus reached by, for example, excluding dissenting voices or not exploring disagreements to any great depth (Sanderson, 2002, p.
Indeed Nutley and Webb are wary of consensus because it can result in the removal of, ‘sharp corners and uncomfortable comparisons’, resulting in ‘vagueness and fudge’ (2000, p. 363; Pollitt, 1999, p. 86).

Weiss recognises the shortcomings of this wider participation in evaluation. Primarily her concern is that by widening participation to a range of stakeholders throughout the process, the evaluation moves from being a process led by evaluators in which stakeholders are involved, to being a process led by stakeholders in which evaluators are involved (Weiss, 1998, p. 31). Whilst Guba and Lincoln may consider this to be unproblematic, Weiss notes that this may limit the scope of the evaluation, as programme staff may have a vested interest in limiting the evaluation to issues of their concern. Instead she suggests that the evaluation and the participatory exploration of the findings could be two separate activities, with the findings of evaluation being one of a number of different sources on which decision makers draw, in conversation with clients and other stakeholders (1998, p. 31).

The second element of fourth generation evaluation, constructivist methodology, follows, Guba and Lincoln argue, inevitably from their conception of evaluation as a joint, negotiated activity. Indeed, rather than evaluation findings being external facts or truths, they are instead created through interaction and so are shaped by the values of those who construct them and the context in which they exist. In this way Guba and Lincoln reject the possibility of evaluation being a value-free neutral activity (1989, p. 8). Ontologically, fourth generation evaluation takes a relativist as opposed to realist position, accepting that there are multiple socially constructed realities (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p. 84).

Thus, in this approach to evaluation there is no place for formalised experiments and the research process is less a linear process from hypothesis development to generalised findings (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p. 165). This does not necessarily mean that quantitative methods have no place in fourth
generation evaluation, indeed Guba and Lincoln have noted that whilst different paradigms will have their own views on the possibilities of research and evaluation, all can make use of various methodologies (Guba and Lincoln, 2008, p. 265). However, the process through which evaluation findings are generated means that they are applicable only in the setting and context in which they were generated, although they may act as starting points in other contexts (1989, p. 263).

This aspect of the constructionist approach has also been critiqued by other evaluation authors. For example Weiss states that it threatens to undermine the whole purpose of evaluation if the findings are of no value elsewhere (Weiss, 1998, p. 29; Davies et al, 2000, p. 253). Thus Pawson and Tilley argue for using multiple evaluations on an issue; as a process of theory refinement (Pawson and Tilley, 1998a, p. 89; 2001, p. 322) the fact that similar polices are rolled out in different spheres of policy is useful for evaluators who can test the same ideas in different contexts and so ‘discover when and why policy really works’ (Pawson and Tilley, 2001, p. 324). This concern with the applicability of evaluation findings beyond individual studies is key to the pluralist evaluation approach, developed and driven by Cronbach.

Pluralist Evaluation

Cronbach’s approach has some aspects in common with Guba and Lincoln’s constructionist approach, as well as theory-led writers as it positions itself against the experimental focus on internal validity.

Shadish, Cook and Leviton (1991, p. 331) note that early in his career, Cronbach was concerned with formative, or process focused evaluations and critical of the focus only on summative or outcome evaluations, using exclusively quantitative methods. In Cronbach’s view, such an approach limited the outcomes that could be measured that were in fact plural and
‘multidimensional’ (Shadish et al, 1991, p. 332). Furthermore, outcomes of evaluations should, in his view, be gathered ultimately in order to improve the programme under review, a process better supported by formative approaches. He states that experimental designs are not necessarily the most useful, reducing the evaluation to comparing one programme with another (Shadish et al, 1991, p. 333). Instead, he suggested that comparing within programmes, rather than between them could be of more use making use of ‘natural variability’ (Shadish et al, 1991, p.339), similar to Pawson and Tilley’s approach outlined in the next section.

Cronbach was also critical of the experimental focus on internal validity that seeks to establish if there is a causal relationship between the treatment and the outcome. Instead, his main concern was with external validity; understanding the processes of the programme that may have contributed to the outcome in order to make evaluation findings generalizable and transferrable. For Cronbach this is a key purpose of any evaluation that, as an applied activity, should seek to inform developments and improvements (Shadish et al, 1991, p. 338). Cronbach characterises Campbell’s notion of a focus on internal validity as trivial (Shadish et al, 1991, p. 344) being bound to the single evaluation conducted and so useless to the wider purpose of evaluation.

The generalisation from the programme evaluation being conducted, to wider application is explained by Cronbach through the acronym ‘utos’, that stands for, the unit of analysis; the treatment or programme; observations of various inputs and outputs; and the setting or context of the particular programme under consideration (Shadish et al, 1991, p. 343). In lower case this refers to the findings from the programme under study, in uppercase it refers to the population from which the sample evaluated was drawn and, star-UTOS refers to a wider population. Cronbach draws this distinction because of his concern with the generalisation of evaluation findings beyond those
populations to which they directly relate, achieved through the cumulative findings of a number of programme evaluations (Shadish et al, 1991, p. 343). For Cronbach this is not achieved through a meta-evaluation approach, that focuses on the treatment effect size or outcome measures, but through evaluations informed by underlying theory (Shadish et al, 1991, p. 362). Evaluations then should be concerned with understanding how and why a programme has or has not worked, in order to support the use of the programme in other contexts (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 27).

In this sense Cronbach’s approach is the antithesis to Guba and Lincoln’s context bounded approach. However in other ways there are similarities with the constructionist approach; Cronbach values both qualitative methods (Chen 1990, p. 22), and stakeholder engagement and feedback (Shadish et al, 1991, p. 359). Cronbach’s evaluation approach therefore stands at the intersection of constructionist and theory-led approaches (the concern of the next section). Pluralist evaluation is conceived of at a considerable level of detail, described as ‘comprehensive and empirically grounded’ (Shadish et al, 1991, p. 375). However, both Pawson and Tilley (1997, p. 28) and Shadish, Cook and Leviton argue that his approach has been difficult to use in practice, with the ‘utos’ terminology finding little purchase and the approach described as ‘too general and complex’ and ‘not readily attuned to what evaluators might do’ (1991, p. 376). However, its focus on external validity and qualitative methods has influenced both theory-led approaches and constructionist approaches, and indeed evaluation more generally. Shadish, Cook and Leviton state of Cronbach that he saw evaluations as contributing to ‘enlightened discussion of alternative paths for social action, clarifying important issues of concern to the policy-shaping community’ (1991, p. 338).
Theory-Led Evaluation

Theory-led evaluation approaches explicitly seek to move away from a focus on methods, that divides experimental and constructionist approaches to both evaluation and research more generally. An approach that stresses a particular methodology is subject to the weaknesses of that methodology, as Sanderson states, ‘constructivist approaches (like experimentalism) ultimately fail to provide generalizable findings that can guide policy makers as to what is likely to work (or not) in particular practical situations’ (2000, p. 437).

Pawson and Tilley’s theory-led realistic evaluation approach critiques the experimental approach on three points. Firstly, they refute any suggestion made by Farrington above that an experimental approach can properly take into account the effect of context upon the programme, arguing that such an approach instead reduces the influence of context to a ‘confounding variable’, and seeks to ‘flatten out’ its influence upon the outcomes of the programme (1998a, p. 81). Secondly, they argue that no two programmes and no two contexts will be ‘sufficiently alike’ to allow one to be a control for the other (1998a, p. 83). Finally, they argue that unlike their realistic evaluation approach, in which the mechanisms and theories underlying a programme are made explicit prior to the evaluation, in an experimental approach, these are left implicit, because they are not the focus of the research (Pawson and Tilley, 1998a, p. 85). The realistic evaluation approach therefore seeks the ‘richer’ information required when exploring complex social issues, such as crime, recognised by Rittel and Webber (1973, p. 166).

In the same way theory-led evaluation also rejects the ‘goal-free’ approach to evaluation of Scriven (1994). He argues, as have other evaluation authors, that it is the primary aim of evaluation to ascribe value to an intervention and judge its outcomes, but considers it unnecessary to understand the aims of the interventions and the processes that resulted in their outcomes. For him
this leaves the evaluator free to consider outcomes (Browne and Wildavsky, 1984, p. 193; Chen and Rossi, 1980, p. 108). Chen (1990, p. 20) identified Scriven as a writer on evaluation who considered it to be a methodological process, not necessarily a theoretical one, and has queried how decisions about an appropriate method could be made without this theoretical knowledge (Chen and Rossi, 1980, p. 108).

This section discusses the following writers who advocate a theory-led approach to evaluation; Chen and Rossi, Weiss and Pawson and Tilley. Whilst these writers do, to some extent hold divergent views on how a theory-led approach to evaluation should be conducted, they hold certain aspects in common. Primary amongst these is, as noted above, a move away from method-driven approaches that Chen, for example, argues leads to a ‘competition of research methods’ (1990, p. 24). Thus Chen and Rossi have argued that it is not that there are problems with particular methods, but rather with the extent to which researchers match them to appropriate evaluation issues (1980, p. 107; Mark and Henry, 2006, p. 327).

Thus, a theory-led approach to evaluation chooses the methods best suited to verifying the theory underpinning the programme (Chen, 1990, p. 84; Chen, 1994 p. 82). The programme theory, or the underlying assumptions and expectations of a programme, may be stated explicitly or may have to be teased out or ‘surfaced’ (Weiss, 1995, p. 67) from implicit assumption, she states ‘theories represent the stories that people tell about how problems arise and how they can be solved’ (1995, p. 72). These then form the focus of the evaluation; the evaluation’s aim is to test whether these theories are operating as expected in the programme, and whether they do (or indeed can) bring about the anticipated outcomes. Chen argues that a focus on the theory underpinning a programme can, ‘provide guidelines for identifying which issues are most important in an evaluation, determining what method
or methods are most relevant to address these issues, and suggesting how to apply the best method or methods for dealing with these issues’ (1990, p. 28).

Lipsey (1993, p. 12-3) describes three sources of programme theories; firstly, existing theory described as ‘off-the-shelf’, of which he argues, there is a lack; secondly theory developed prior to the evaluation in other studies but that is useful to the current evaluation; and finally, implicit theory from practitioners. Chen and Rossi, however, advocate the creation of theories by those evaluating programmes, as opposed to testing pre-existing theories or making use of the theories from designers or policy makers that they describe as the ‘current folklore of the upper-middle-brow media’ (1983, p. 285).

Pawson and Tilley however seek to draw from both the ‘folk wisdom of the practitioners as well as the formal knowledge of the academy’ (1997, p. 104). Indeed Weiss argues that policy itself is a theory, given that it contains assumptions about the likely effect of an intervention on a problem (1995, p.72). It is these that underpin programmes that operationalise these theories (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984, p. xxiii). Chen characterises these evaluation theories as often being both descriptive or causative, concerned with what is, and prescriptive or normative, concerned with what should be (1990, p. 40).

Writers who take this theory-led approach to evaluation conceive of these programme theories in a similar way; not as global, grand or overarching, such as those concerned with the workings of society, but as ‘middle-range’ (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 116), ‘prosaic’ (Chen, 1990, p. 285), and ‘small’ (Lipsey, 1993, p. 11), that can help to explain the operation of a programme. Pawson and Tilley describe them as, ‘abstract enough to underpin the development of a range of programme types yet concrete enough to withstand testing in the details of program implementation’ (1997, p. 116). Indeed, Lipsey states that such theories do not have to be detailed or complete, as they will be built upon by the evaluation (1993, p. 12).
Lipsey (1993, p. 15) argues that theory is useful in each of four key elements of evaluation: firstly, creating a design that is based on relevant constructs and variables and that has ‘global plausibility’, a term taken from Chen and Rossi, or makes intuitive sense. As Weiss states, ‘there has to be some reason – some theoretical justification – to expect a program to succeed ... it is in probing the theoretical premises of the program that evaluation can ultimately become most practical’ (1972, p. 84). Secondly, the appropriate detection of the important and significant outcomes following treatment; and thirdly, the attribution of those outcomes to the treatment. Here theory is useful because it underpins the logic of internal validity, and so can provide clues to the operation of causality, such as the temporal order of effects or the co-variation or congruity between variables, although this can be difficult when the causal chain is long and complex (Hollister and Hill, 1995, p. 132). Thus Welsh and Rocque argue that in the ‘absence of sound theory, social programs stand little chance to bring about social good and may even cause harm’ (2014, p. 262). The final use for theory is in the interpretation of an overall pattern of results. This can go beyond the outcome of a traditional experimental evaluation of the acceptance or rejection of a hypothesis, and help to decide whether the outcome resulted from a failure of evaluation, implementation, treatment or theory, and so have more practical implications (Rosenbaum, 2002, p. 206). This wide ranging use of theory leads to the often quoted contention that there is ‘nothing as practical as a good theory’ (Lipsey, 1993, p. 9; Weiss, 1995). Lipsey concludes,

‘the simple one-shot, independent-variable/dependent-variable experiment that coincides well with the generic black box depiction of cause-and-effect relations is empirically meagre as well as conceptually thin by the standards of theory-orientated treatment research’ (1993, p. 33).

In contrast, Weiss notes how a theory-led evaluation is able to attend to the ‘life course of a program’ – its structures, the views of its staff, the recruitment of participants, the delivery of services and how these change over time, the responses of participants and their views of the programme
(Shadish et al, 1991, p. 203). Furthermore, as a result theory-led evaluation enables the results of a range of evaluations to be synthesised, making the results more widely applicable.

In 1990, Chen stated that there was a growing trend in theory driven evaluation because of these benefits over experimental evaluation. Chen and Rossi were amongst the first to draw on the idea of programme mechanisms as a way to understand how and why outcomes were brought about. However, it was Pawson and Tilley who explored the notion more deeply (Astbury and Leeuw, 2010, p. 366).

Pawson and Tilley’s realistic evaluation approach to evaluation developed around the same time as Chen and Rossi’s theory-driven approach and shares the same basic underlying approach to that of other theory-led authors. For example Pawson and Tilley argue that in order to evaluate a programme effectively one must understand the theory upon which a programme is based and hence the processes and mechanisms in play within it. Pawson and Tilley’s realistic approach has explicitly pitched itself against experimental and constructionist, methods based approaches (Julnes et al, 1998, p. 484), that Pawson and Tilley conclude have led to evaluation ultimately failing to live up to its expectations, of supporting better and more effective public policy decision making that would solve social problems, or reduce social ills (1997, p. 2). However, they do not rule out the use of experimental methods completely, as has been argued by some (Rosenbaum, 2002) but rather demand that methods are applicable according to the subject of study and theories implied (Julnes, et al, 1998 p. 491; Tilley and Clarke, 2006, p. 524).

Pawson and Tilley outline three bases for their realistic approach. Firstly that ‘evaluation deals with the real’ (1997, p. xii). Such realities are not entirely socially constructed, nor are they unproblematically available to evaluators devoid of social and power relations. Secondly, that ‘evaluation should follow
a realist methodology' (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. xiii) or a scientific methodology. This accepts the need to be objective, indeed they highlight this as an ideal (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 29), but also sees a role for theory alongside measurement. Thirdly, that evaluation should be realistic because evaluation is an applied form of research, undertaken to have an effect upon 'policy makers, practitioners, program participants and public' (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. xiii). They state that it should therefore be modest and honest about the limits of its findings and be focused on establishing the effectiveness of programmes directed at particular problems.

Realistic evaluation draws upon notions of realism from the philosophy of science, using ideas from writers such as Roy Bhaskar and Rom Harre that avoid the 'traditional epistemological poles of positivism and relativism' and stress the 'mechanics of explanation' (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 55). It does so much more explicitly than the other proponents of theory-led evaluation covered here, and as such provides a deeper justification for their approach.

The realist approach to the philosophy of science has been termed critical realism and there are a range of authors and opinions within it and the wider philosophy of realism (Julnes et al, 1998, p. 486), particularly regarding how to approach the social sciences. Benton and Craib argue that Bhaskar’s approach is one of the more ‘systematically developed and influential’ accounts (2011, p. 120; Sayer, 2000, p. 2). Critical realism assumes an independent, knowable external world that is also open to change through the actions of those living in it, thus there is a reflexive relationship between actors and social structures. Critical realism’s philosophy of science first considered the natural sciences, but argues that the same approach is applicable to the social sciences (termed critical naturalism by Bhaskar), although employing different methods. This is linked to the different objects of study within social sciences. Unlike the objects of natural science that tend to exist independently and across time (Bhaskar, 1998, p. 37), social reality is
characterised by its changing nature and the interaction between it and individual actors. Reality then is stratified or hierarchical with natural and social objects different in nature, and those experienced different from (and a subset of) the total that exists (Sayer, 2000, p. 12).

This is a different conception of the social world from either experimentalists or social constructionists and indeed is based on a critique of these positions. Specifically it maintains a distinction between structures and actors by arguing that social structures are both the outcomes of, and create the conditions for, human agency. This describes Bhaskar’s transformational model of social activity (Bhaskar, 1998, p. 34); that structure and agency are independent but interacting. This differs from other attempts to find a route through positivism and constructionism that arguably elide structure and agency into one another. Matthews argues that this distinction is useful as a way of describing social phenomena such as crime itself, that ‘is neither a ‘top down’ construction imposed by the criminal justice system nor a ‘bottom up’ process involving certain ‘acts’ or ‘behaviour’ or changing levels of tolerance, but a complex relation between these different determinants’ (2009, p. 356).

Archer’s work in this field seeks to align her morphogenetic (referring to change through the actions of actors) model to Bhaskar’s transformational model of social activity by providing a methodological approach consistent with the central arguments of critical realism (1995, p. 16). This methodological approach reflects the fact that objects of social inquiry exist in open systems that alter through the interplay of structures and actors, and tend not to be directly observable, only becoming apparent through their effects. Thus, the aim of social science, and in this case evaluation, is to uncover mechanisms that can explain observed results and the creation of appropriate ways to test their existence (Benton and Craib, 2011, p. 12; Bhaskar, 1998, p. 3; Matthews, 2010, p. 131; Matthews, 2009, p. 352). The type of ‘experimental closure’ available within the natural sciences is not
possible (Benton and Craib, 2011, p. 134), but it is possible for social science to develop objective explanatory theories about the social world. Its changing nature however means that these theories cannot be predictive (Bhaskar, 1998, p. 46; Archer, 1995, p. 294), nor grand, universal theories (Archer, 1995, p. 343) as noted above, but rather specific, empirical and theoretically informed theories, useful to the real world and generalisable on the basis of the mechanisms identified.

Bhaskar’s work has moved on beyond these basic and applied versions of critical realism, but these remain useful to social science (Benton and Craig, 2011, p. 203) and realistic evaluation, that Sayer notes is a somewhat limited instance of critical realism, primarily concerned with the operation and effect of particular policies or approaches (2000, p. 23). Pawson and Tilley employ two key ideas from critical realism. Firstly, the notion of generative causation that argues that the effect of a programme is caused by those operating within it and so evaluation needs to assess whether circumstances are in place to allow this to happen or not (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 215). Secondly, the idea of ‘ontological depth’ (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 216; Matthews, 2009, p. 352; Sayer, 2000, p. 15); given the stratified nature of reality noted above, an evaluation needs to be concerned with aspects of an intervention beyond observable inputs and outputs. These include, ‘attitudinal, individual, institutional, and societal processes’, as outcomes are affected by ‘a range of macro and micro social forces’ (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 216).

Pawson and Tilley’s view of causation sees programmes not as something external, applied to subjects, and instead recognises that programmes can only “work” if ‘subjects chose to make them work and are placed in the right conditions to enable them to do so’ (Pawson and Tilley, 1994, p. 294). Pawson and Tilley draw upon the critical realist view of causation that is generative rather than successionist that underpins traditional experimental evaluation
outlined above (1997, p. 30). Successionists view causation as occurring externally to the variables in play, meaning that causation is not directly observable, and can only be inferred from the ‘constant conjunction’ of the variables, a term taken from David Hume (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 33). This assumes a closed system, or a reproduction of one (such as an experiment) for such a regular conjunction to be possible (Sayer, 2000, p. 14). It also assumes that reality is undifferentiated and unchanging across time which Bhaskar rejects given the reflexive interplay between structures and actors outlined above. In the view of critical realism, constant conjunction limits positivists to observable events and constructionists to making only restricted claims (Archer, 1995, p. 34).

Generative causation on the other hand, accepts that the internal characteristics of the variables will also affect any possibility of causation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 34). Thus, Pawson and Tilley state, ‘a key realist aphorism is that ‘it is not programs as such that work but the generative mechanisms that they release by way of providing reasons and resources to change behaviour’” (1998a, p. 79). This gives much more weight to actions of individual actors in understanding effects and outcomes of any such programme (Vaughan, 2007, p. 395). In this way it is possible to understand how Martinson’s “nothing works” conclusions were overturned by research (some of it Martinson’s own) that showed that some interventions worked, sometimes, for some groups, as detailed in Chapter 2 (Tilley and Clarke, 2006, p. 519). Furthermore it echoes the concern of desistance theorists that researchers need to attend to the active involvement of individuals in this process. For example, McNeill has called for a shift or ‘Copernican ‘correction” (2012a, p. 97) in desistance research, from the programmes applied to offenders, to the individual offenders who are the subject of such programmes.
These more nuanced questions of why does a programme work, for whom and in what circumstances (Tilley, 2005, p. 13; Tilley and Clarke, 2006, p. 522) guide realistic evaluation. This is done by generating what Pawson and Tilley refer to as Context, Mechanism, Outcome Configurations (CMOCs) (Tilley, 2000, p. 100; Julnes et al, 1998, p. 488). These are programme theories based on the realist notion that, ‘programs work (have successful ‘outcomes’) only in so far as they introduce the appropriate ideas and opportunities (‘mechanisms’) to groups in the appropriate social and cultural conditions (‘contexts’)’ (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 57). The aim of evaluation then is to refine these programme theories.

Since the development of realistic evaluation some have attempted to add to these components of a CMOC the idea of mediators and moderators (Dahler-Larsen, 2001), more familiar to experimental evaluation in order to emphasise the social constructionist concern with context. Mediators, variables through which others act in a causal chain, and moderators, variables that affect the relationship between two other variables (Mark and Henry, 2006, p. 331) have been defined by Chen as different types of mechanism (Astbury and Leeuw 2010, p. 366). However, Astbury and Leeuw note that these are variables, not mechanisms (2010, p. 367), and thus are best defined within realistic evaluation as ways in which mechanisms interact with context. Pawson and Tilley recognise both problem and blocking mechanisms arguing that mechanisms can be established or embedded in a way which sustains a problem, and can be altered or overturned by mechanisms brought about by the intervention or programme (1997, p. 75). In this way blocking mechanisms are the solution to problem mechanisms and need to be disentangled from each other during the course of an evaluation. Pawson and Tilley therefore use the CMO language flexibly, recognising both positive and negative combinations. Indeed in their research they often propose a whole range operating within the same programme (Tilley and Clarke, 2006, p. 523.
regarding domestic violence; Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 78-81 regarding CCTV).

Indeed Chen and Rossi do not seek to reject experimental methods, but to use them only once a theoretical understanding of the programme has been developed. They argue that the focus on the experimental paradigm has meant less focus on what, in their view, is a more important task of developing theoretical models so that evaluations can explore how a programme operates and can tell implementation or operational failure from a theoretical failure of the programme’s underlying assumptions (1983, p. 284; Chen, 1990, p. 17; Chen, 1994, p. 81; van der Knaap, 2004, p. 22). This distinction is important as the quality and results of an evaluation will be affected by the quality of the programme or policy and the strength or integrity of its implementation. It has been noted that this is often missing from debates concerned more with the conduct of the evaluation itself (Davies et al, 2010, p. 202; Rosenbaum, 2002, p. 207) and was key to understanding the lack of clear outcomes from previous evaluations of probation supervision (Pearson et al, 2014, p. 20) and IOM (Dawson and Stanko, 2013, p. 290).

As a result Chen and Rossi (1983, p. 294) argue that knowledge gathered from a theoretically informed evaluation is much easier to generalise to other settings, stating, ‘a randomised experiment that takes into account existing theory and knowledge can have considerably more power than a black box randomised experiment’ (1983, p. 292). In this way ‘black-box’ explanations of programme successes and failure can be avoided and the programme can be assessed more effectively (Chen and Rossi, 1983; Chen, 1990). Thus, Chen and Rossi argue that they can bring together the experimental concern for internal validity, and external validity, that noted above is concerned with the use and application of research findings (1987, p. 96; van der Knaap, 2004; McGuire, 2004). They argue that the use of theory should highlight threats to
validity, whether internal or external, and enable the researcher to deal with these.

A recent example of such an experiment concerns an American prisoner re-entry programme, similar to IOM providing increased access to support for those released, that used a RCT design, but also measured the delivery and operation of the programme for both the test and control groups (Duwe, 2013). As a result of this approach, the finding that those subject to the programme had lower levels of reoffending could be linked to the increased employment and social support received, rather than drug treatment, the provision of which was found to be no different between treatment and control groups (2013, p. 147). Duwe notes that this level of detail can be missed in black box designs and that it is more important when considering interventions that are complex and varied (2013, p. 150).

Pawson and Tilley also advocate ‘within-program experimentation’ as it allows different theories about the interaction of contexts and mechanisms on outcomes to be examined for different groups subject to it (Davies et al, 2000, p. 266; Chen and Rossi, 1980, p. 117; Rosenbaum, 2002, p. 195). An example of the use of this is provided by Duguid and Pawson (1998) regarding a prison education programme and its effect upon reoffending. Interviews with staff were used to draw up hypotheses about the programme that were then tested using quantitative analysis. The programme overall was found to reduce levels of post-release recidivism, but considerable variation within those taking part was found, due to interactions of the programme and its mechanisms with the wider prison organisation and factors in the lives of the participants. This underscores the realistic evaluation view that it is not the programme, but the resources it offers to participants and their capacity to make use of them, or not, that is of interest (1998, p. 492). Similarly Farrall’s long term study of the effect of probation discussed in Chapter 2 (2002; Farrall et al, 2014) also employed within case comparison and specifically
notes the influence of critical realism and realistic evaluation on the study (2002, p. 31-38).

In this way realistic evaluation shares a common concern (whilst not a common approach) with the constructionist approach of Guba and Lincoln (1989) regarding context. Both approaches consider context to be an important part of understanding the operation of a programme (Dahler-Larsen, 2001), rather than background noise that should be controlled for. As Sanderson states, ‘approaches to evaluation which seek to isolate policy instruments or programmes in controlled situations will produce results of limited usefulness because they are context-bound, lacking the basis for generalization to guide action in other contexts’ (2000, p. 445).

Having considered the key approaches to evaluation above, it is to the issue of the use of evaluation within public policy that this chapter turns next.

**Policy and Evaluation**

The definitions of evaluation discussed above recognise evaluation as an applied form of research that intends to impact the world of decision making. The implications of this for both how evaluation should be conducted and how its findings should be used have been a topic for a number of writers in this field. Rossi (Shadish et al, 1991, p. 381), Weiss (1972, 1979, 1990, 1998) and Patton (1990a) have all considered the political nature of how evaluation is conducted and used and the implications of this for evaluators.

Weiss characterises the influence of evaluation findings on policy as a cumulative and indirect process of ‘enlightenment’ (1990, p. 176; 1979, p. 429). Enlightenment describes the way in which, over time, evaluation findings, generalisations, ideas and concepts become known to policy makers
via for example their staff, the media, interest groups or networks (Chen, 1990, p. 32). This is similar to Rossi’s term ‘demystification’ that describes a general rather than a specific use of evaluation findings (Shadish et al, 1991, p. 411). Thus Cullen states, ‘the ultimate link of knowledge to policy also is typically a loosely coupled, imperfect relationship’ (2005, p. 2). This is similar to older ideas from writers such as Lindblom on ‘muddling through’ and ‘disjointed incrementalism’ that explain policy as a series of negotiations and rounds of bargaining between various different interest groups that is influenced by political concerns more than by information and evidence (Becker et al, 2012, p. 33; Davies et al, 2010, p. 202). This is a less straightforward understanding of the use of findings than that of Pressman and Wildavsky who characterised evaluation as, ‘a method of inducing learning within an organisation geared for implementation’ (1984, p. xviii). This can in part be explained by the fact that recipients of evaluation findings especially public service or government organizations ‘operate in complex and multi-valued environments’ (Harvey et al, 2010 p. 78).

Whilst this view of policy influence does suggest that the “truth will always out”, Weiss notes that this model does risk the spread of misunderstood and overly generalised ideas (1979, p. 429). Dispersed into the policy sphere, through undirected channels, research and evaluation findings can in fact result in ‘endarkenment’ as opposed to enlightenment (1979, p. 429). For example Eaton (1962) notes that the findings of evaluation research will determine how they are disseminated, with practitioners, perhaps unsurprisingly, being more willing to act on positive evaluation results than negative ones. Eaton argues that often this leads to a symbolic rather than a scientific use of results, in which results are not used to solve problems or improve conditions, but are instead used only to show a commitment to and support of undertaking research. This was reflected in the reaction to the findings of the London Diamond IOM evaluation for example (Dawson and Stanko, 2013).
This is not to argue however for evaluators to be made responsible for, or to be placed within decision or policy making roles. This risks evaluators becoming technicians, applying appropriate tools to whatever problem is raised by the commissioners of research (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 17), who also have the power to control the way the research is undertaken and communicated. As it stands, in the criminal justice field most evaluation funding comes from within government and so has been focused on their interest; namely the effectiveness of attempts to control crime and offenders (Tilley and Clarke, 2006, p. 512). Instead evaluators should act as informed, critical and independent practitioners. This echoes the risks outlined above of seeking to work closely with research participants to reach consensus on a topic. For example, a Treasury publication on policy evaluation frames it as an activity that will improve the management and accountability of the civil service and central government (1988, p. 2). However a later Cabinet Office publication Professional Policy Making for the Twenty First Century states, ‘evaluators need to tailor their work to the needs of their customers’ (1999, p. 59). Therefore, Browne and Wildavsky propose that evaluation and implementation remain connected but separate activities, referring to what they consider the ‘utilization virus’ (1984, p. 184).

Like many of the issues and developments referred to in this thesis, there has been increased interest in, and use of, evaluation since the 1960s. This has been linked to increases in public spending in this period and concerns over its use and effect. This was particularly the case in America (Browne and Wildavsky 1984, p. 181) but is also relevant to the UK. Indeed a key message of the Labour government, was that ‘what counts is what works’; this implied a pragmatic and evidence based approach to policy and policy making (Cabinet Office, 1999b, p. 35) that elevated the role of evaluation in that process in Britain in particular (Solesbury, 2001). Indeed, links can be drawn between the increased use of evidence in policy making and both the
development of new public management and networked governance discussed in the previous chapter. For example it has been noted that new public management reforms were, ‘intended to motivate public sector organizations to enhance their understanding of the needs and priorities of their users and, on this basis, to improve continually the design, management, and effectiveness of service delivery’ (Harvey et al, 2010, p. 78). Hence the rise in performance management targets that must be reported against (Tilley and Clarke, 2006, p. 513). In the same way more networked or partnership approaches to governance have required monitoring and evaluation due to the range of agencies involved (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p. 9).

The term ‘evidence-based policy’ whilst often used now, is rarely defined (Sanderson, 2002; Howlett et al, 2009, p. 181; Becker et al, 2012, p. 31). Sanderson states that it usually refers, firstly to using evidence of the likely effectiveness of a policy to inform policy decisions, and secondly to using evidence from evaluations of policies to judge whether to continue a policy or refine it, that in turn informs future policy decisions. What it tends not to involve is the identification of problems or needs that require policy intervention, nor objective setting for such policies (2002, p. 4). This echoes the concerns of Rittel and Webber (1973) that modern policy concerns, or “wicked problems”, form where there is disagreement over goal-formation, problem definition and location. These sorts of problems cannot be tackled, and never ultimately solved, in their view using traditional scientific methods, applicable to more discreet and specific issues, and attempts to do so have been a serious error.

However, the way that social research can draw upon a variety of theories and methods, as discussed above, means that findings do not often sum into a cohesive picture, at least not in the short term (Talbot, 2010, p. 285). This can make it more difficult to draw findings into such discussions, in comparison to medical research for example that has a clearer ‘hierarchy of
There have been attempts to provide a pool of what can be considered high quality evidence from the study of crime and justice. One example is the What Works Centre for Crime Reduction hosted by the College of Policing. This centre was established with others under the coalition government of 2010-2015 in an effort to ensure that key areas of public policy had access to relevant evidence (HM Government, 2013). They were modelled on the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NIHCE) in medicine that has existed for some time (Pawson, 2006, p. 3).

A second example is the development of the Campbell Collaboration’s Crime and Justice Group (Tilley and Clarke, 2006, p. 514) that seeks to provide high quality systematic reviews in the field. The studies submitted are, again, intended to provide a source similar to the Cochrane Collaboration in the field of medicine and healthcare and so enable evaluations to be used not just to assess current policy, but to inform future policy (Pawson, 2002a). The systematic reviews of the Campbell Collaboration include only those experimental and quasi-experimental studies that have met specific inclusion criteria. Indeed the focus of meta-analysis is to compare the shared quantitative outcome measure across the studies, to try and provide more comprehensive evidence of a particular approach or intervention (Pawson, 2006, p. 11).

Therefore Sanderson notes that the rise of a concern for evidence-based policy has led to a renewed focus upon quantitative approaches to, and quantitative concerns with evaluation, such as reliability and internal validity. The role of qualitative methods is limited to understanding processes and to occasions when quantitative methods cannot be used. In his view, evidence-based policy retains experimental approaches as the gold standard for producing evidence (2000, p. 436; 2002, p. 6). Indeed, Tilley has noted that the ‘research standards’ issued by key government agencies in the field of
criminal justice (the Home Office, Ministry of Justice and National Offender Management Service) all ascribe to the ‘orthodoxy’ of experimental approaches to research exemplified by the randomised controlled trial (Tilley, 2009, p. 143). This privileging of experimental evidence brings with it the issues identified above such as an oversimplification of outcomes, the concealment of programme contexts and insufficient attention paid to mechanisms at play within programmes (Pawson, 2002a, p. 163). In response Pawson developed ‘realist synthesis’ (Pawson, 2002b; Pawson, 2006) derived from realistic evaluation. This is concerned with uncovering the generative mechanisms in play within an intervention or programme and understanding the context in which it is operating to develop a transferable theory as to what might work, for whom, in what situations (Pawson, 2002b, p. 342; Tilley, 1993; Matthews, 2010; Wong et al, 2010).

For Sanderson this focus on experimental and quantitative approaches to evaluation is based on an understanding of the policy making process as a ‘rational cycle of goal specification, design, implementation, evaluation and redesign’ (2000, p. 437; 2002, p. 5), referred to in Treasury publications as the ROAMEF policy cycle, composed of defining policy rationales and objectives followed by policy appraisal, monitoring, evaluation, and feedback (HM Treasury, 2003, p. 3; HM Treasury, 2011, p. 7; HM Treasury, 1988). This approach to planning, Rittel and Webber have argued, is unattainable and possibly undesirable with regard to complex social problems, where the definition of a solution depends upon, and is part of, the definition of the problem, rather than a separate stage in a straightforward process with clear notions of what the problem is, how it can be resolved, and how this resolution might be evidenced (1973, p. 159). The way in which research and evaluation evidence should be used in policy decisions is therefore more complicated than it forming one stage in a linear process (Davies et al, 2010, p. 200). Indeed it is more complicated than evaluation results being used to pursue or stop a particular policy or practice on the say so of individual policy
makers or practitioners that is recognised within government publications (HM Treasury, 2011, p.15; Hallsworth et al, 2011, p. 5).

Despite this, and over a decade of emphasis on evidence based policy within government, ministers and civil servants still see it as an area of weakness (Rutter 2012, p. 4; Hallsworth et al, 2011, p. 7). Furthermore, both the Home Office and Ministry of Justice lack a central policy unit and a ready pool of policy makers to consider upcoming policy areas (Hallsworth, 2011, p. 10). Rutter has identified some supply side problems that may explain this. These include the timeliness of research, engagement by research providers with the policy process, policy issues not being conducive to testing, and a lack of baseline data (2012, p. 4). However, she argues that demand side problems were more significant, as these can suggest politically risky policies, or clash with policies that are more value driven, despite the supposed value neutral tones of the “what works” approach (Solesbury, 2001, p. 5). Indeed the primary reason uncovered for a lack of evidence use within policy was a lack of demand. This is linked to a lack of civil service skills and culture for using evidence; policy making was found to be a ‘generalist’ activity as well as adversarial both between political parties and government departments (Rutter, 2012, p. 29).

This runs counter to the findings of Solesbury (2001, p. 9) that evidence based policy was more demand than supply driven, and suggests changes in the approach to evidence and its use by government in the time between these two studies. Thus Rutter suggests that those commissioning research need a greater understanding of its possibilities and skills in its use (Tilley and Clarke, 2006, p. 529), in which she sees an opportunity for the Treasury to provide incentives to departments (2012, p. 5; Pawson, 2006, p. 175). On the supply side, Rutter suggests that evidence needs to be better incorporated into the policy process, although independent from it still, with longer term funding (2012, p. 5). Furthermore she suggests that they need to engage more with
the values and ideas of policies, rather than presenting technocratic findings (2012, p. 29).

On this last point, Matthews (2009) argues that those on the supply side of evidence can improve the quality and relevance of their work, and can be ‘utilization-focused’ in Patton’s terms (1990), without bending its findings and approach to the will of commissioners. This can be supported by the use of a realist approach (Julnes et al, 1998, p. 498; Chen and Rossi, 1980, p. 110; Wong, 2013, p. 72); Matthews notes that research that favours statistical analysis over theory reduces its utility outside the narrow context in which it has been conducted, in part by limiting the understanding of its commissioners of how it can used. The production of more theoretically informed ideas could have more impact on the understanding of the problem and possible solutions, and would also enable research studies to build upon each other (Matthews, 2009, p. 343; 2010, p. 136; Pawson, 2006, p. 169).

**Implications for this research**

This chapter has defined evaluation as a specific form of research activity that is concerned with the ascription of value and worth, and supporting real world decision making. The key evaluation approaches were outlined, demonstrating differences in both methodological approach and theoretical underpinning. Theory-led evaluation that sees evaluation as a process in theory development and refinement was identified as the most appropriate in the case of this research; specifically, the realistic evaluation approach of Pawson and Tilley, that draws on the philosophy of critical realism and critical naturalism of Bhaskar. The key reasons for this are summarised below.

The experimental evaluation approach has been, and in some quarters still is, considered the gold standard of research and evaluation. However, the extent
to which it is applicable to complex social programmes that differ greatly from experiments in the natural sciences, has been debated. For example, the use of the randomised controlled trial becomes much more difficult and controversial in social settings. Even if this particular method is set aside in favour of quasi-experimental approaches, the creation of control groups is difficult when a programme operates throughout a geographical area, as in the case of IOM.

Aside from concerns over the practicality of the methods involved, the experimental approach is primarily concerned with determining whether a programme has ‘worked’ or not. Whilst Farrington notes that those in this tradition are also interested in how and why a programme has worked (1997, p. 167; 1998, p. 206), these are secondary concerns. Given that one of the main purposes of evaluation is to aid and support decision making, issues of how and why a programme did or did not work should be fundamental. As a result, an evaluation approach that seeks to explain the way in which the context and mechanisms of programme affect its outcomes, in a single process seems more suited to the task of an evaluation in such a setting.

The constructionist approach takes a position at the opposite end of the epistemological and methodological spectrum to experimental evaluators. As a similarly particular approach to evaluation it demands a specific methodological approach and one that like the experimental approach is not appropriate for this research. Pawson and Tilley (1997, p.20) as well as other authors (Sanderson, 2002; Nutley and Webb, 2000; Pollitt, 1999), note the requirement within fourth generation evaluation to reach a position of consensus with all relevant stakeholders and demands that they all approach the evaluation with similar or at least comparable positions on an issue, that is not possible in all situations, especially in contested area of public policy. This process also risks the ultimate consensus being the “lowest common dominator” or “least-worst option” acceptable to all parties concerned. This,
and the limits Guba and Lincoln place on the applicability of findings beyond individual studies, constrains the nature of the recommendations and conclusions that can be provided, and potentially undermines the purpose of the evaluation, to assess value and aid decision making. Whilst this is stressed within the pluralist approach to evaluation, it has also been noted to be difficult to operationalise and may not be appropriate for a single evaluation of an established approach, such as the IOM approach in the research site of this study.

As noted above, there are a number of different theory-led approaches including those of Chen and Rossi, Weiss and Pawson and Tilley. The central idea underpinning all of these approaches is to start an evaluation with an understanding of the theories, or mechanisms at the root of the programme. The key differences between the approaches concerns reaching consensus between stakeholders, and the use of different sources for programme theory and of experimental methods. For example, Weiss’s theory of change approach does seek a consensus between stakeholders as a basis for the evaluation and as outlined previously this is an issue for evaluations on issues unlikely to find consensus between parties involved. Pawson and Tilley instead accept that different stakeholders may view programmes or interventions differently, and allow the evaluator to draw upon these understandings, but to reach their own conclusions.

Regarding the other issues, Chen and Rossi remain supportive of experimental methods, albeit more theoretically informed; whilst Pawson and Tilley do not reject outright the use of these methods, they propose the use of internal comparisons from within a programme, using both qualitative and quantitative methods (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 113). Regarding programme theories, Chen and Rossi advocate the creation of theories by evaluators, whereas Pawson and Tilley support the use of pre-existing theories from social science, or those gathered from stakeholders.
The use of critical realism by Pawson and Tilley is the most likely approach to produce a useful and applicable assessment of the effect and value of IOM. This is in particular due to the use of the notions of generative causation and ontological depth that recognises that those within interventions are active in generating the outcomes observed. As a result, interventions can have different results for different groups. This approach has been found useful by other research in the field of offender rehabilitation (Duguid and Pawson, 1998) and assisted desistance (Farrall, 2002; Farrall et al, 2014) and has been proposed as an appropriate approach to the evaluation of IOM (Wong, 2013). Indeed it is an approach to evaluation that was developed in the field of criminal justice (Pawson and Tilley, 1994) and remains useful within it (Matthews, 2009; Matthews, 2010).

Thus, this chapter argues that realistic evaluation is the most appropriate approach for this research. The next chapter outlines how this approach was operationalised in the methodology of this research study.
Chapter 5. Research Design and Methods

The previous chapter concluded that the theory-led realistic evaluation approach of Pawson and Tilley (1997) is the most appropriate for this research. This chapter outlines how the realistic evaluation approach was operationalised in this research.

As outlined in the introduction, this research was conducted in a single site and so uses a case study design. It draws on a range of methods, both qualitative and quantitative, to understand and assess the IOM approach in the research site. The particular methods and how they were employed are discussed below before considering the ethical and procedural aspects of conducting this evaluation.

As a sponsored research project that was expected to make recommendations to the sponsors, the researcher recognised the need to establish relationships with stakeholders. This was done through conducting early initial conversations, providing regular updates and attendance at meetings. However, due to the various geographical locations in which IOM teams were based, the researcher was not based within any particular team during the fieldwork. Bauwens notes that fieldwork depends in no small part upon ‘building rapport and developing trust’ with research participants (2010, p. 48) and this was felt to be especially important in this research.

The sponsored nature of the research also ensured good access to people, meetings and documents. As Rex notes (1999, p. 368), it was still necessary to explain the research to all participants to ensure that access was based on knowledge and trust, and not the insistence of senior practitioners.
Operationalising Realistic Evaluation

The realistic evaluation approach is represented in Figure 5.1 below. It shows that it is concerned with explaining social regularities, or phenomena, represented by the line between points X and Y, in this case offender rehabilitation, by identifying and understanding the mechanisms (M) generated by a programme or approach, in this case IOM, seeking to attend to that regularity. Realistic evaluation is concerned with how the interaction between mechanisms and regularities produces outcomes (O), within a particular context (C) represented by the oval (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 58).

Figure 5.1: Representation of Realistic Evaluation terminology

*REMOVED*

Source: Pawson and Tilley (1994, p. 300)

Pawson and Tilley note that contexts can operate at different levels (1997, p. 88; Pawson, 2006, p. 31) from individual, concerned with the capacities of key actors, to institutional, including the culture, character and ethos of the setting and infra-structural, or the wider institutional or sector support to the programme. Those that are relevant relate to the unit of analysis in the programme under consideration. In the case of IOM, this would be the individual offenders.

For Pawson and Tilley programmes do not work in spite of, but through and because of, the choices and decisions of those subject to them (1997, p. 38; Duguid and Pawson, 1998, p. 492). Evaluation conceived of in this way, makes experimental and quasi-experimental designs drawn from the natural sciences less useful because the particular context of a programme is key to understanding its impact, not superfluous background that has to be controlled for in the analysis. Tilley therefore criticises quasi-experimental
approaches that ignore context in order to generate ‘off the peg’ programmes that can be applied in any context (2000, p. 100). Instead Pawson and Tilley see the aim of evaluation as the production of Context, Mechanism, Outcome Configuration (CMOCs), that describe the theory behind the intervention, and that can be compared to other evaluations.

In this research, the fieldwork started with a number of initial conversations about the research site and the organisation of IOM there; in total sixteen initial interviews took place with IOM management, team leaders and practitioners in specialist roles. It was these alongside the literature review (presented in Chapter 2 and 3) that were used to generate the understanding of the operation of IOM in the research site and the initial CMOC outlined in the next chapter. This was then used as a guide during the remaining fieldwork and analysis, with a revised version developed as a result of the research that is presented at the end of Chapter 6.

The previous chapter gave examples from Pawson and Tilley about the use of their approach. Yet although there is a large literature on approaches to evaluation including those that are theory-led (Astbury and Leeuw, 2010, p. 363), relatively few have actually employed theory led or realistic evaluation. For example, just 45 studies were found in a survey by Coryn and colleagues across social and natural sciences between 1990 and 2009 (Marchal et al, 2012, p. 197). In the review of literature regarding offender rehabilitation and supervision presented in Chapter 2, only Farrall’s project tracking probationers has explicitly noted the influence of realistic evaluation (2002, p. 32). Other studies such as the government funded evaluations of the previous PPO schemes or interventions within the “what works” tradition, have tended to draw on more traditional experimental approaches.

Use made of this approach by other researchers in various fields has raised two key issues with its application. Firstly, where such an approach is used, it
tends to be applied in a limited or linear fashion rather than throughout the research design and implementation (Marchal et al. 2012, p. 197). Furthermore, the experiences of the researchers in using the approach are often not reported, limiting information on this issue (Marchal et al., 2012, p. 202). For example, Ho outlined a possible CMO for use within urban regeneration projects, but does not propose one for a particular project, noting that CMOs can be complicated where different programmes in the same location interact and affect each other (1999, p. 434).

Secondly, particular problems have been experienced when the approach is applied. For example, in a review of the use of realistic evaluation in health research, issues were found with CMO terms used interchangeably and a lack of agreed understanding of the philosophical basis of the approach (Marchal et al., 2012, p. 202), issues that have also been found with the use of theory-led evaluation and the development of programme theories more generally (Astbury and Leeuw, 2010, p. 365). There is particular confusion regarding defining contexts, as different from mechanisms, and mechanisms as different from activities (Astbury and Leeuw, 2010, p. 367; Davis, 2005, p. 291). Furthermore, various different types of mechanism have been identified, including harmful mechanisms defined as unintended effects (Astbury and Leeuw, 2010, p. 376), disabling and enabling mechanisms for which no clear definitions are provided (Kazi, 2003), and offensive and defensive mechanisms (Davis, 2005, p. 284) depending on when in the lifecycle of a policy or problem they are used.

As a result, Astbury and Leeuw argue that the debate over the definition of mechanisms in theory led evaluation threatens to overshadow the use and usefulness of the term (2010, p. 368). Davis argues that realistic evaluation requires additional resources if it is to be of use within policy evaluation, such as an inventory of relevant aspects for others to draw upon, linked to the lack of linear link between mechanisms and outcomes (Davis, 2005, p. 287).
These difficulties are perhaps to be expected in evaluations of complex interventions operating in environments that feature other equally complex interventions. However, for this research it was considered a useful and usable approach. In reflecting upon his evaluation of IOM in Sussex, Wong agrees that it is inappropriate to apply scientific methods, such as randomised control trials, to the study of social phenomena. He concludes that the approach of Pawson and Tilley ‘may be more appropriate than the experimental and quasi-experimental approach’ that has been employed in previous evaluations of similar interventions (2013, p. 73).

In this research, realistic evaluation was employed throughout both as an approach to the fieldwork and to the conceptualisation and reporting of findings. Regarding the issues with terminology and defining aspects of an intervention, the CMOC was found to be a useful way to organise research findings. Pawson and Tilley recognise the existence of two different types of mechanism; problem and blocking, or solution, mechanisms (1997, p. 75), and this distinction is used in the presentation of findings in the following chapter. The focus on getting at what it is was thought to enable IOM to “work” is key to realistic evaluation, and indeed evaluation as an activity, and was found to be a useful focus in this research. The final chapter in this thesis reflects further on the experience of applying realistic evaluation.

**Research Design**

Overall the research took a mixed methods approach making use of qualitative interviews and observations, documentary analysis and analysis of quantitative data drawn from various sources. Evaluation research often employs a mixed methods approach; Teddlie and Tashakkori highlight evaluation research as one of the starting points for mixed methods research. This is due to a pragmatic concern with both whether a programme or intervention had worked (summative evaluation), but also to understand how or why it had succeeded or failed (formative evaluation) (Teddlie and
Tashakkori, 2011, p. 286). Indeed the realistic evaluation approach recommends the use of any appropriate methods, determined by the subject of the research and the questions to be answered. Pawson and Tilley state that one of the implications of a realistic evaluation approach is to, ‘use multiple methods and multiple data sources in the light of opportunity and need’ (2001, p. 322-323; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2011, p. 286; Bryman, 1988, p. 127; Murphy and Dingwall, 2003, p. 181). Echoing the critical realist philosophy on which realistic evaluation is based, Matthews notes that mixed methods allow for both a consideration of agents and structures and how they interact (Matthews, 2009, p. 352).

Regarding previous evaluations of IOM, mixed methods were employed in the first two evaluations of the national IOM pioneer sites (Dawson et al, 2011, p.13; Senior et al, 2011, p. 4-5), since when evaluations have relied on either qualitative (Annison et al, 2015) or quantitative (Williams and Ariel, 2013; Hallam Centre for Community Justice, 2013) methods to assess the IOM approach. Mixed methods were also employed in evaluations of IOM’s predecessors PPO (Dawson and Mead, 2005) and ISSP for young offenders (Gray et al, 2005).

Regarding previous studies of assisted desistance, the vast majority have involved the use of only qualitative methods, specifically interviews with either samples of offenders (Leibrich, 1993; Healy, 2012; King, 2013a) or offenders and their probation officers (Rex, 1999; McCulloch, 2005). Only Farrall’s long term tracking study (2002; Farrall et al, 2014) has employed mixed methods, including interviews with probation officers and offenders, the latter at various points, as well as quantitative measures of reoffending. Indeed, Farrall (2002) notes that to understand desistance one must consider both objective changes in an offender’s life and their subjective opinion of the value of these changes. This provides support for utilizing mixed methods in research into the process of desistance and how it can be supported.
A key benefit of employing a mixed methods approach is the triangulation of data that is made possible by the different methods employed, creating what Bryman calls a ‘diversity of perspective’ (1988, p. 62) or ‘mutual corroboration’ (1988, p. 132). Bauwens notes that there are different types of triangulation, those which employ: different data sources (such as different groups of interviewees); different methods; different data types (such as qualitative and quantitative); data collected by different researchers; and different theoretical or disciplinary starting points (2010, p. 40-41). This research made use of all but the last two of these types of triangulation by using different sources and methods to generate different data types.

This research employs this mixed methods approach in a single research site, and is therefore an evaluation of a case study. Case study research fits well with a realistic evaluation approach on two key points. The first relates to the role of theory in case study research; Yin notes that the approach implies the creation of an initial theory to both inform the research (2009, p. 35), and enable the findings to be applicable beyond the research site (2009, p. 38) echoing the use of the CMOC by Pawson and Tilley. The second point relates to the use of mixed methods; Yin’s first principle for data collection in case study research is, ‘use multiple sources of evidence’ arguing that one of the strengths of case study research is its use of multiple types of data (2009, p. 114).

The case study design was also appropriate for this research specifically for two further reasons, firstly the way IOM differs across different sites, and secondly, the way it is applied is in local areas. Regarding the first concern, IOM was established as a ‘local response to local problems’ (Home Office, Ministry of Justice, 2009, p. 8). As such offenders targeted by IOM are locally defined, that makes the use of a comparison site difficult, as was noted by Senior and colleagues during their evaluation of the five IOM pioneer sites.
(2011, p. 12). Research into other probation interventions has noted that the content of probation supervision is not necessarily standardised, making the creation of comparison groups difficult (Pearson et al 2011 p. 75). The one previous evaluation of IOM that has used comparison sites, the Diamond Districts (Dawson et al, 2011) was able to do so because IOM at that stage was a pilot in London. It was therefore rolled out to a limited number of boroughs, so it could be compared with similar boroughs yet to introduce IOM.

Regarding the second concern, IOM is targeted at all those offenders identified as suitable for it in a particular geographical area. Therefore whether offenders engage or not, they remain the subject of it because they have met locally defined criteria. This makes the creation of an appropriate control group difficult. This is demonstrated in the lack of control group comparisons used in previous IOM evaluations apart from that undertaken in London (Dawson et al, 2011). As a result the other IOM evaluations that have assessed outcomes have employed pre and post comparison (Hallam Centre for Community Justice, 2013; Williams and Ariel, 2013). These within-individual comparisons are used in the quantitative analysis of this research, and are favoured by Pawson and Tilley (1997, p. 113). Such an approach has also been employed with the criminal careers paradigm (Farrington, 2005), whilst Kazemian has noted that research into the process of desistance has tended to lack studies that focus on within-individual comparison. She notes that these can explore the internal and external factors that promote or undermine the desistance process, ‘crucial to the development of efficient post-onset intervention initiatives’ (2007, p. 11), such as IOM.

Within the research site IOM was delivered by four local teams with other processes organised along geographic lines. The design of the research therefore ensured that interviews and observations were undertaken in each team. It was thought that this would provide one way of undertaking internal
comparison, however the fieldwork revealed few differences between the four teams. Internal comparison was however undertaken through the use of different groups of offenders. The particular methods employed in this research are outlined and discussed in the following sections.

Qualitative Methods

In this research the particular qualitative methods employed were documentary review and analysis, semi-structured interviews and observations. The reasons for this selection and its implications are discussed in the sections below.
Primary documents and secondary literature

This research began with a structured literature review of relevant secondary sources regarding offender supervision and rehabilitation, desistance and partnership working. The findings from this and the phase one staff interviews supported the development of the initial CMOC. The collection, review and analysis of relevant literature continued during the fieldwork period. This supported the analysis of findings from the other primary methods employed, and the refinement of the IOM programme theory.

In addition primary documentation relating to IOM in the research site was gathered and analysed throughout the fieldwork period. Access to such documentation was provided by the commissioned nature of the research, meaning that managers from the IOM organisations were prepared to share key documents. Knowledge of such documents was also supported by the interviews, that revealed the existence of some documents, and the observations at which some of these documents were distributed. These documents included local strategies and manuals produced to support the operation of IOM, as well as other internally commissioned research into current and previous partnership approaches to prolific offenders.

The usefulness of access to such primary documentation has been noted by other authors in this field. For example, Tilley and Clarke note that in evaluating interventions with known offenders, ‘understanding something about the processes through which certain interventions work with certain types of offender is essential’ (2006, p. 526). Similarly, in research on partnership working in healthcare, Ferlie and colleagues made use of both documents and observations to ‘get a sense’ of a research site and its processes (2010, p. 49). Finally, in research concerned with partnership working in the field of criminal justice, Liddle and Gelsthorpe noted the
relevance of documentary review in particular, because of the often changing nature of such partnerships. They state,

‘... we also tried to adopt forms of data-collection that are sensitive to process and change over time; in this regard, documentary material of the sort referred to above was of special significance to our analysis. Documentary material can serve a crucial ‘cross-checking’ function, and thus help to balance out some of the vagaries of interview data’ (1994a, p. 4 emphasis in the original; Rosenbaum, 2002, p. 197).

It is the interviews conducted in this research that are the concern of the next section.

*Semi-structured interviews*

As outlined above studies of assisted desistance have often made use of interviews with offenders and, in some cases, probation officers. Furthermore, the research into desistance processes themselves has seen a growing role for interviews. As outlined in Chapter 2 the move from age-related, to social bonds, to identity based understandings of the desistance process saw a growth in the use of interviews because they are able to explore individuals’ own understandings of themselves and their identities. Indeed, Giordano and colleagues note of their desistance research that qualitative approaches can ‘provide a window on mechanisms/processes that may be more difficult to elucidate using traditional quantitative procedures’ (Giordano et al, 2002, p. 998). This research employed a series of semi-structured interviews with various groups, including IOM offenders, practitioners, managers and national actors.

Interviews can be undertaken in different ways regarding the level of structure imposed on the questions asked and the answers required. For example, unstructured interviews will have only a very broad idea of the information required of the participants, who are able to lead what becomes
more of a conversation focused upon topics of interest or concern to the interviewee. On the other hand, structured interviews resemble more of a face to face questionnaire or survey, with a set of clearly defined questions asked of interviewees and a more limited scope for them to open up new areas of questioning.

Semi-structured interviews fall in the middle of these two approaches, taking benefits from both. They make use of a defined set of questions, or topics for discussion, that allows the views of different interviewees to be compared on the same topics. However, they allow scope for interviewees to explore their views in some depth, and to guide the direction of the interview to some extent. This interview approach has been used in all of the assisted desistance studies undertaken to date and in both of the evaluations of the IOM pioneer sites. They were considered to be most appropriate for this research because both IOM as an intervention and assisted desistance as a process have been little researched, and so semi-structured interviews would avoid closing down opportunities to discuss issues of interest to interviewees, whilst ensuring discussion of issues raised through the literature review.

Unstructured interviews can also raise practical issues; these include the time involved in data collection (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2011, p. 295) and the wealth of data that is produced (Giordano et al, 2002, p. 991), and the accompanied difficulties with data analysis (Plummer, 1983, p. 99). There are also particular ethical issues raised by particularly in-depth unstructured interviews, such as life history interviews that range across a participant's life story (Maruna, 2001). This relates to the much greater extent to which the interviewer becomes involved in the life of the participant (Plummer, 1983, p.138) and the difficulties in ensuring anonymity and confidentiality for interviewees about whose life so much is known, especially if that life involves illegal activity (Plummer, 1983, p.142).
The primacy of theory creation and refinement in realistic evaluation influences its approach to interviews, with Pawson and Tilley outlining a particular approach, stating ‘the researcher’s theory is the subject matter of the interview, and the subject (stakeholder) is there to confirm, to falsify and, above all, to refine that theory’ (1997, p. 155). Pawson and Tilley define the role of the evaluator as a ‘teacher-learner’, both communicating to participants their theory of the programme, and gaining from participants their own understanding of it (1997, p. 165). In this way interviewees are asked questions that relate to the evaluator’s theory of the programme and gain answers that illustrate the theory of the interviewee (Rosenbaum 2002 p. 198). This enables respondents to answer more fully, because they know what is being sought and why. This approach also suggests a more semi-structured approach in which the interview is structured enough to provide a framework in which the interviewer can present their theory, but loose enough for a discussion of this with the interviewee.

Pawson and Tilley also recommend that different groups are interviewed in order to ensure that as full a picture as possible of an intervention is gained. They distinguish between the following groups: subjects, in this case offenders; practitioners, or those providing the intervention; evaluators, including the researcher and past relevant research; and policy makers (1997, p. 160-1). Pawson and Tilley recognise that there will be a ‘division of expertise’ (1997, p. 161) amongst these groups, with different groups able to provide different pieces of information and insight to the research (Matthews and Pitts, 2000, p. 138). As will be outlined below, representatives of all of these groups were interviewed in this research.

Whilst semi-structured interviews are considered to be the most appropriate for this research, they do also have limitations that need to be considered. Firstly, interviews are only able to capture views and opinions at the time they occur. In this research the vast majority of interviewees were interviewed
only once, apart from six staff members who were interviewed twice. In the case of offenders in particular, this means they are being asked to comment upon IOM and its effect on their efforts to move away from offending, at one point in an ongoing desistance process. Whilst this means their current experience is captured, without asking interviewees to reflect back at some distance, it does mean that the interview can only capture a partial view. It is for this reason that Farrall and colleagues have returned to speak to the same group of offenders on a number of occasions (2006; 2014). This was not possible given the timescale of this research, but the analysis of the cohort of offenders on whom quantitative data was captured does allow more long term assessments to be made. This underscores the benefit of the triangulation gained from a mixed methods approach.

Secondly, as it is often not possible to interview all those involved in the intervention evaluated, those that are interviewed are often selected by a gatekeeper (Rex, 1999; King, 2013a; McCulloch, 2005), and this was the case in this research; practitioners were selected by team managers and offenders by their offender managers. It is therefore possible that the more positive practitioners and compliant offenders were selected. However, the observations undertaken allowed the research to assess whether there were differences between opinions expressed and practices observed. In the case of those in more senior roles where there were only a small number of individuals, all those deemed relevant were targeted for interview.

All of the interviews in this research were conducted face-to-face and one-to-one (with four interviews with practitioners or managers conducted two-to-one). Focus groups were therefore not employed, contrary to the process evaluation of the IOM pioneer sites (Senior et al, 2011) and study of IOM in Thames Valley (Annison et al, 2015). As a partnership intervention, focus groups could have been used to explore how different organisations understood IOM. However, such focus groups could have been dominated by
the representatives of one organisation and risked producing a consensus view on issues, as opposed to exploring them in depth. This was thought to be better achieved through one-to-one discussion that also impacted less on the local IOM teams, most of which were small. Inter-agency dynamics were instead explored through observations of multi-agency meetings that are outlined in the next section.

Observations

The final qualitative method employed in this research was a series of observations. Observations have been used in previous studies of partnership working within criminal justice, usually in combination with interviews (O’Neill and McCarthy 2014; McCarthy and O’Neill, 2014; Sampson et al, 1988; Pearson et al, 1992; Crawford and Jones, 1995; Rosenbaum, 2002). Observations are particularly useful in researching partnerships, when the operation of its defining feature can be witnessed in meetings and other forums. However, Bauwens notes that observations are not often used in qualitative probation research, that are more commonly based on interviews alone (2010, p. 39). Indeed, they have been used in only one of the previous IOM evaluations (Annison et al, 2015) and none of the previous assisted desistance studies.

The purpose of undertaking these observations was to gain a better understanding of the operation of IOM. Peck and colleagues (2004, p. 101) note that formal meetings are not solely an instrumental means of working and can have wider symbolic and social functions in creating and sustaining cohesion in the partnership, and are therefore an important aspect of the operation of IOM. In addition the observations support the qualitative interviews and quantitative analysis. For example, undertaking the observations meant that the reports of interviewees of the operation or processes of IOM were not the only experience of them available to the
research. This provided an opportunity to observe whether there was agreement or disjuncture between views and actions (Pearson et al, 1992 p. 50), and allowed interviewees to refer to meetings or processes that they knew had been observed by the researcher, and for the researcher to do the same. This is similar to the approach taken by Murphy and Lutze and they note that the observations gave context to their findings, and increased the ‘comfort level’ between researcher and subjects, allowing interviewees to elaborate on beliefs and actions (2009 p. 68). They report that this triangulation increased their confidence in their findings.

Regarding the quantitative analysis, the observations provided another source of information, in addition to the interviews, to help explain outcomes revealed in the analysis. By supporting the ability of the research to understand IOM processes, the observations could help explain the quantitative findings, another way in which triangulation of these methods is possible.

As will be outlined below, three key IOM meetings were observed for different periods of time, depending on the frequency with which they took place; for example, weekly meetings were observed for a shorter period than those that took place quarterly. This means that the observations of these meetings, and the other informal interactions that took place around them, were only available to the research for a limited period. Furthermore, only a partial set of the meetings that take place within IOM were observed. In particular, two types of meeting were not observed: those that took place within a single organisation making up IOM, such as the police or probation service; and supervision meetings between practitioners and offenders.

Regarding the first set of meetings, there were a large number of potentially relevant meetings taking place within IOM that the capacity of researcher and the individual organisations could not support and so only the most relevant
meetings were selected. It was felt that these were the multi-agency meetings, during which decisions relating to the selection and management of offenders were made. Regarding the supervision meetings with offenders, these were felt to be inappropriate to observe, firstly, because of the personal and private nature of what was discussed, and secondly because of the greater likelihood of the content of these meeting being altered by the presence of the researcher.

Ugwudike refers to the need to understand the ‘micro dynamics of supervision’ (2011, p. 255) or the ways in which the practice of supervision actually occurs. It was decided that this could best be obtained from interviews with different groups and observations of multi-agency meetings, despite the distance that these methods entail. It is possible, and indeed likely, that all meetings observed were altered by the presence of the researcher; however it was felt that this risk was reduced in the case of the larger multi-agency meetings in which the researcher’s presence was less obvious, although still overt. By attending them regularly and the fact that the membership of some groups overlapped, meaning that some of the practitioners saw the researcher regularly, it was thought that this impact could be lessened. This would have been more difficult to achieve in the case of individual supervision meetings.

Quantitative Methods

As an evaluation of the impact as well as the operation of IOM, the research also draws upon quantitative data. This allows the evaluation to make an assessment of IOM’s effect upon re-offending and circumstances. As noted above previous assisted desistance studies have made less use of quantitative methods, whilst three of the five IOM evaluations (Dawson et al, 2011; Williams and Ariel, 2013; Hallam Centre for Community Justice, 2013) have made assessments of reoffending outcomes, to various different extents.
The approach to quantitative methods in this evaluation is most similar to that of the evaluation of IOM in Sussex (Hallam Centre for Community Justice, 2013), that as outlined in Chapter 2 involved pre and post IOM comparisons regarding levels of offending and changes in circumstance, drawing upon data from both the probation and police service, as well as locally gathered data from the IOM teams. In addition it draws on the standardised Offender Group Reconviction Score (OGRS), a tool that has been validated separately (Copas and Marshall, 1998; Howard et al, 2009) and used in other evaluations of probation interventions (Pearson et al, 2011 p. 75; Pearson et al, 2014, p. 8) to assess changes in risk of reoffending. This approach is judged by Wong to be the most appropriate to the intervention being evaluated, and of sufficient methodological quality to allow conclusions to be reached (2013, p. 66).

The quantitative data collected in this evaluation was on a cohort of offenders who had completed a period of IOM that ended at least one year before the data was collected. This way of selecting the offenders meant it was essentially a census of those subject to IOM during the period and made use of the longest follow up period possible. It took an ‘intention to treat’ approach, with all those taken to IOM included in the cohort, regardless of their subsequent experience of it (Pearson et al, 2011, p. 87). Thus, unlike the offenders interviewed, those less engaged with IOM remained part of the cohort for quantitative analysis. There were limitations to this method as well; firstly the follow up period of one year is too short a period over which to assess whether desistance has occurred, that arguably would require follow up for the rest of an offender’s life. It is however considered long enough to show indications of an effect, and its direction and nature. As Rosenbaum has noted, short term and intermediate outcomes can be of use if the long term outcomes are complex (2002, p. 208).

Secondly, the cohort of offenders was relatively small in size with 98 offenders included, due to a recent change in the way in which local records
were kept. This does make particular sub-samples small and more difficult to analyse with missing data likely to reduce the representativeness of the sample. However, this is the complete cohort on whom data was available, and is sufficient to reach initial conclusions.

Finally, the use of reoffending data drawn from the Police National Computer (PNC) has some particular limitations. Police crime data, by its very nature, can only report what has been reported to and recorded by police forces, which tends to vary according to the crime type (HMIC, 2014, p. 27). As a result police recorded crime statistics lost their National Statistics status from the UK Statistics Authority in January 2014 (HMIC, 2014, p. 21; ONS, 2014, p. 6). Despite these issues, police recorded data are the only nationally available data that can provide offending information on named individuals, that can then be linked to other records. In this research these included those from the probation service regarding sentencing and OASys assessments. PNC data were therefore considered the most suitable data source for this research. Asking offenders to report their own offending was deemed unsuitable given the need for accuracy regarding the dates on which offences occurred, so that a pre and post-IOM comparison could be made. Offender recall over a two year period was considered unlikely to be sufficiently accurate to allow these data to be suitable for use.

This section has outlined the particular methods chosen for this research, their strengths and limitations. The following section details how these methods were employed in this research.
Application of Selected Methods

Table 5.1 below displays the stages of data collection in this research. There were three such phases: firstly, as noted above, eight initial conversations and interviews were conducted with staff in senior or key positions between October 2011 and January 2012. A further eight interviews took place in July 2012; it was the findings of these, along with the findings from the literature review, that were used to create the initial IOM diagram and CMOC presented at the start of the next chapter. Later in this stage, pilot interviews were held with five IOM offenders supervised by one of the local teams in March 2013.

In the second stage the rest of the interviews were conducted with the following groups: IOM practitioners, team leaders and managers, IOM offenders, and those who hold a national IOM portfolio. These interviews took place between June and October 2013, with each group interviewed approximately sequentially. In this phase 40 interviews were conducted with IOM practitioners, team leaders and managers.

The observations were also undertaken during this period. The three monthly selection meetings were observed for six months from April 2013. The quarterly reducing reoffending board meetings were observed as part of the fieldwork for eight months between May 2013 and January 2014, although attendance continued at these meetings until October 2014 to maintain contact, observe developments and ultimately to feed back findings. The weekly team meetings in each of the four teams were observed for a period of one month in June 2013. In addition a small number of national IOM meetings were observed and the national IOM conference was attended in 2012 and 2013.

In the final third stage of data collection, quantitative reoffending data was collected. This took place in two periods with the local IOM data and the
majority of the probation data collected in the summer of 2013 and the Police National Computer data received in November 2013. Using such a phased or sequential design (Small, 2011, p.67; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2011, p. 289) allowed each stage of the research to inform the next. For example, the outcome of the initial interviews and conversations informed the questions asked in the second stage, and the findings of these interviews and observations informed the analysis conducted in the third stage. Throughout the research process primary documents and published research were collected and considered.

Table 5.1: Data Collection Stages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase One</th>
<th>Initial practitioner interviews 16 in total</th>
<th>Initial offender interviews 5 supervised by one of the teams</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase Two</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Practitioner Interviews 6 roles across the 4 teams, plus 2 additional practitioners 26 in total</td>
<td>Weekly team meetings Observed in all four teams for 1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Team leader interviews 7 in total</td>
<td>Monthly selection meetings All three meetings observed for 6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Management Interviews 7 in total</td>
<td>Quarterly Board meeting Observed for 8 months (with continued attendance afterwards)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offender interviews 18 across all four teams</td>
<td>National IOM meetings Attended twice in 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Actor Interviews 5 in total</td>
<td>National IOM conference Attended in 2012 and 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase Three</td>
<td>Quantitative data collection from the IOM information team, the probation service and the police national computer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Throughout the fieldwork</td>
<td>Collection of primary and secondary documents and sources</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The detail of the application of these research methods is outlined in the following sections.
Semi-structured interviews

As outlined above, interviews with different groups were scheduled sequentially so that the programme theory of IOM could be developed using Pawson and Tilley’s teacher/learner approach to interviews (1997, p. 165). None of those approached refused to be interviewed and in total 82 interviewees took part in this research.

An initial sense of the operation of IOM in the research site was established during the initial phase one interviews that is reflected in the initial IOM diagram (see Figure 6.1 in the next chapter); this was refined and revised by the researcher during the phase two interviews with practitioners and offenders. A revised IOM diagram was then presented to and discussed with IOM team leaders and managers in their interviews, with a final IOM diagram prepared (see Figure 6.2 in the next chapter).

The IOM programme theory was therefore developed and revised by the researcher using the feedback from the groups of local interviewees. Using interviews in this way allowed, ‘the creation of a situation in which the theoretical postulates and conceptual structures under investigation are open for inspection in a way that allows the respondent to make an informed and critical contribution to them’ (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 182). The interviews with national portfolio holders were scheduled after this process so that the local approach could be compared with their views on IOM.
IOM practitioners, team leaders and management

Table 5.1 above shows that these interviews took place in two phases. Table 5.2 below shows the role and number of the staff comprising IOM in the research site, as well as the numbers of those from each organisation and in each role interviewed across the two phases. In total 54 IOM practitioners, team leaders and managers were interviewed across the three key agencies in phases one and two, with six interviewed twice\(^2\). The large number of people working within IOM meant that not all could be interviewed. It was decided that IOM management, those in one-off roles and a cross section of those in key roles in each team would be interviewed.

\(^2\) Four interviews involved two interviewees.
### Table 5.2: IOM Staff interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Role and No. in role (No. in role across research period)</th>
<th>No. interviewed (Repeat interviews)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>IOM lead - Chief Inspector (2 in post during research period)</td>
<td>2 interviewed (1 repeat interview)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOM Inspectors x 2 (6 in post during research period)</td>
<td>4 interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOM Team sergeants x 4 (6 in post during research)</td>
<td>5 interviewed (3 repeat interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOM enforcement PCs x 28 (approx.)</td>
<td>4 interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOM pathways PCs x 13 (approx.)</td>
<td>4 interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOM enforcement sergeant (City) x 3</td>
<td>1 interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City Youth Offending Team PC x 1</td>
<td>1 interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOM prison link PC x 1</td>
<td>1 interviewed (1 repeat interview)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information Team sergeant x 1</td>
<td>1 interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Police interviews</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probation</td>
<td>IOM lead – Director (3 in post during research period)</td>
<td>3 interviewed (1 repeat interview)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOM area managers x 2</td>
<td>1 interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOM Senior Probation Officers x 3 (6 in post during research period)</td>
<td>5 interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prison Senior Probation Officer x 1</td>
<td>1 interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOM Probation Officers x 19 (approx.)</td>
<td>4 interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOM Probation Service Officers x 19 (approx.)</td>
<td>5 interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education, Training &amp; Employment workers x 5 (approx.)</td>
<td>5 interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Probation interviews</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug treatment service</td>
<td>Team leaders x 3</td>
<td>3 interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Team staff x 24 (approx.)</td>
<td>4 interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Drugs Staff interviews</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of IOM staff</strong></td>
<td><strong>132 (approx.)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number interviewed</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As outlined above, 16 interviews were conducted early on in the research, to build an understanding of the local IOM approach. These phase one interviews were conducted in two groups, firstly between October 2011 and January of 2012 and secondly in July 2012. They involved IOM management, and team leaders and practitioners in specialist roles. The interviews were concerned with understanding what IOM in the research site “looked like”, the background to IOM’s development there, and how it had changed over time. In addition interviewees were asked about other people, documents or
data that would be of use to the research (Interview topic guide at Appendix A). These interviews therefore provided grounding for the subsequent phases of work.

Phase two interviews were conducted between June and September 2013 and involved IOM managers, team leaders and practitioners across the four IOM teams. Regarding practitioners, representatives of the six key roles within each IOM team were interviewed: probation officer, probation service officer, drugs worker, pathways police officer, enforcement police officer and education training and employment worker. In addition the team leaders, senior probation officers and police sergeants, who oversee these teams, and two practitioners in specialist roles, were also interviewed. As noted above, where more than one individual undertook each role their team leaders were approached to propose an interviewee. These interviews lasted for around one hour.

As with the phase 1 interviews, the topic guide for these interviews asked practitioners and team leaders to describe IOM in the research site, its processes, aims and objectives and their experiences of working within it. Drawing on findings from the phase one offender interviews (outlined in the next section) it also asked the use of the terms “IOM” and “PPO”. These interviewees were also asked to make an assessment of IOM as an intervention, both in general and how it is employed locally, whether it could be improved, and to what extent it fitted with their own knowledge and experience of offender rehabilitation and desistance and indeed their views on research findings regarding desistance. Finally these interviewees were asked for their views on the Transforming Rehabilitation changes to the probation service (Ministry of Justice, 2013c), discussed in Chapter 1, that at that point were being proposed and consulted upon (please see Appendix B for topic guide). Team leaders were also asked to comment upon the second version of the IOM diagram prepared, as described above.
The IOM managers interviewed in phase two were asked a similar set of questions to the practitioners and team leaders, although concerned less with the day-to-day practice of IOM. Managers were asked for their assessment of IOM as an intervention, ways it could be improved, constraints imposed upon it, and the extent to which it fitted with their experience of rehabilitation and desistance. Managers were asked specifically about desistance research and their views on the *Transforming Rehabilitation* changes. In addition they were asked to comment upon the third version of the IOM diagram, updated from the interviews with team leaders (please see Appendix B for topic guide). As above, these interviews lasted for around one hour.

As noted above, some of the IOM team leaders and managers were interviewed twice. The advantage of interviewing the same people at two different points in the research was that it allowed deeper information gathering than would have been possible from a single interview and to a limited extent allowed for a type of longitudinal research. As a current intervention that experienced changes in personnel, resources and other developments, it was important for the research to be able to keep up to date with changes, and the second interviews were one formal way in which this can be done.

However, it was recognised that in returning to speak to the same people, that the second interview would be affected by the first and the rapport or relationship established; the interviewee would already be aware of the purpose of the research and so may have tailored their answers to what they thought was its purpose. They may also try to ensure their answers tailed with those given in the first interview, so as not to appear inconsistent. Despite these risks it was considered useful to speak to this small number of interviewees in key positions more than once, in order to gather as full a picture of IOM as possible.
Table 5.2 above shows that interviewees were drawn from those whose roles related directly to IOM, although in most cases their roles also extended beyond IOM (as outlined in Chapter 1). For this reason interviews were not conducted with those outside of IOM teams, nor with representatives of organisations outside of the three core IOM agencies. The findings about how IOM practitioners fit into their wider organisations, or how these organisations engage with those outside the core agencies, are therefore gathered from within IOM, rather than outside it. This provides a particular view on these issues. However, those within IOM were considered to be well placed to discuss the operation of IOM and their experience of working within their own organisation and in partnership with others. The observations of the Reducing Reoffending Board meetings and interviews with national IOM portfolio holders were able to provide some external reflection on these issues.

**IOM offenders**

As those subject to IOM and experiencing it first-hand it was considered important to speak with offenders. Of the previous IOM evaluations, only two (Senior et al, 2011; Dawson et al, 2011) have employed offender interviews, and like this research fewer offenders than staff members were interviewed. This differs from assisted desistance studies, of which only three interviewed staff members, and two of these (Farrall, 2002; Rex, 1999) involved a larger number of offender interviews than staff. As an evaluation, this research sought to understand the operation and effect of IOM from a number of different perspectives. It was therefore considered important to interview staff members from the different organisations providing IOM, across the different local teams and in different roles within each organisation. This allowed the research to draw out the expertise and insights of each group as outlined by Pawson and Tilley above (1997, p. 161).
In phase one, five interviews were conducted with offenders subject to IOM. To make selection more straightforward, these were all supervised by one of the local IOM teams. This accounted for around half of all IOM cases and so was thought likely to provide a variety of cases. These interviews asked about the previous offending of interviewees and their current experience of IOM, including how it compared to previous experiences of supervision and their relationships with staff. Interviewees were also asked about their future, and what their aims were for the future, generally and with regard to offending (Interview topic guide at Appendix C).

These interviews acted as a pilot for those conducted in phase two. Following these interviews some amendments were made to the interview procedure and questions. Regarding the procedure, in order to avoid, to a certain extent, an association between the interview and a normal supervision appointment, the researcher avoided sitting on the opposite side of the desk in the interview room as the interviewee, and instead sat the same side as them. In addition it was found that the term ‘integrated offender management’ or ‘IOM’ was not known or meaningful to the interviewees, who instead used the older terms of ‘PPO’ or ‘prolifics’ which was how they defined themselves and the approach. As a result the wording of the questions in phase two was altered.

In addition, the phase one interviews were shorter than originally anticipated, with an average length of just under 20 minutes. Whilst producing useful data, they also provided an insight in how to re-design the interview questions to increase the information elicited. As a result questions more widely focused on offending and desistance, rather than IOM specifically, were included in the subsequent interviews (Interview topic guide can be found at Appendix D). These interviews were subsequently longer than those in the first phase, with an average length of just under 30 minutes.
However, offenders were still asked predominantly about their own experience rather than about the approach as a whole. In the initial offender interviews it was found that this was the best way to get offenders to talk about IOM. As is noted by Pawson and Tilley,

‘... participants normally experience only one moment or one slice of a program, but they know a great deal about that. They are important sources for validating, arbitrating, and refining others’ theories about why they will or will not change their behaviour’ (1997, p. 209).

The offenders were therefore not asked to comment on the IOM diagram, but their responses were reflected in its design and development.

Sampling for these interviews was important given the small number conducted. At any one time there were around 400 offenders subject to IOM locally, although a proportion of those were in prison. Two sets of criteria were developed for selecting offenders. In line with the theory led, realistic evaluation approach taken, a sample of offenders was sought who, according to desistance literature, could be expected to have different experiences of IOM. Thus the primary criteria for interviewees were based on the three key explanations for desistance: ageing, social bonds, and narrative understanding as outlined in Chapter 2. Secondary criteria were used to generate a diverse sample of individuals interviewed; these were based on factors known to influence offender rehabilitation (Dawson et al, 2011, p. 9).

The practitioners supervising offenders, through whom offenders were recruited for interview, were given the following outline of the criteria:
Primary Criteria:

- Older and a younger offender
- Offender with social ties or bonds and one without – social ties refer to things such as links into and support from their families or partners and/or current education, employment or training.
- Offender defining themselves as an ex-offender and one who does not – meaning those who have identified themselves as ready to change or move away from offending, those who want to use IOM as a way to make a change in their lives, as opposed to those who do not.

Secondary Criteria:

- Female and male offender
- Offender from an ethnic minority and white British offender
- Offender with experience of substance misuse and without
- Offender with experience of homelessness and without
- Offender with particularly extensive criminal histories and with less extensive histories

It was made clear to practitioners that the primary criteria were of more importance than the secondary, but that it was recognised that the two sets would be closely linked, with offenders meeting more than one criterion. The aim in the phase one interviews was to interview five offenders. Practitioners nominated ten offenders from which five were selected on the basis of these criteria. In the phase two interviews the aim was to interview 20 offenders, a further five from each of the four teams. It proved more difficult to gather nominations from practitioners in this phase. The criteria were shared with staff and these were discussed when nominations were made, however due to drop out rate of interviewees, in practice those nominated and who were available for interview became the sample in this phase. Interviewee drop out was for a number of reasons, including changes in circumstances or availability or simply failure to attend at the agreed time.

In total 18 offenders were interviewed, with only three further interviewees drawn from the team that had nominated the first five. No inducements were offered to interviewees in order to avoid this being the reason for agreeing to be interviewed. However, practitioners did agree with interviewees that the
time spent in interview would count towards their time in supervision. The majority of interviewees were on IOM as part of a licence and so there was some leverage for practitioners to encourage them to engage with the research. For this reason only two of the interviewees were subject to IOM voluntarily.

The characteristics of the offenders interviewed showed that variety with regard to the criteria was achieved to a certain extent. Regarding the primary criteria, there was a range of ages interviewed, from 21 to 42 years. Regarding social bonds, most offenders reported that they were supported to some extent by family members or partners, but it was less common for interviewees to report being in employment. With regard to their personal mindset, interviewees were reported to be at different points in their engagement with IOM.

Regarding the secondary criteria, all interviewees were male, as there were reported to be no female offenders subject to IOM at the time of the interviews. The majority of interviewees were from a White British ethnic background, with only four interviewees from a different ethnicity. The majority of those interviewed, 20 of the 23 reported or were reported to have issues with substance misuse, which given the acquisitive nature of the offending IOM targets might be expected (Dawson et al, 2011, p. 9; Ministry of Justice, 2013a, p. 21). Ten offenders either currently had or had just recently had issues with housing, and were living in temporary accommodation, such as in a hostel or with friends. With regard to their previous offending, almost all offenders reported having been involved in offending and being labelled as a prolific offender for a number of years, again as might be expected from those selected for such an intensive form of supervision.
Whilst IOM applies both in custody and upon release all offender interviews were conducted in the community rather than in a custodial setting. This was for three key reasons; firstly, the key difference between IOM and standard probation supervision is its increased intensity, like that expected under the previous PPO programme. IOM staff visit offenders in prison to introduce the approach and themselves, but it is upon release that they become subject to the greater demands. It was therefore felt that a better picture of the experience of IOM would be gained from interviews in the community.

Secondly, in the closed environment of prison, the interviewees would be asked what they intended to do on release, perhaps based on what they had done the last time, rather than being able to explore what was happening currently. Burnett and Maruna, reporting on interviews done in the *Dynamics of Recidivism* study outlined in Chapter 2, note that the first set conducted in prison shortly before release meant that offenders were, ‘speaking in the abstract, in the ‘comfort’ of a prison-based interview situation (away from the realities of ‘the streets’ or various pressures to which they were about to be returning)’ (2004, p. 395).

Thirdly, there were practical issues with accessing offenders within prisons. Gaining access to the prison estate would have involved a separate approval process in addition to that which granted access to the probation service. It may also have been necessary to gain access to more than one establishment. As the prison service was not one of the agencies that sponsored the research, a new relationship would have to have been established and this was considered too time consuming to be practical. Interviewing offenders in prison would also have raised difficulties in recording the interviews.

Consequently, almost all of the offender interviews took place in interview rooms in the buildings occupied by the IOM teams, where interviewees come for supervision. Whilst this was both safe for the researcher and convenient for interviewees, it was not neutral. Therefore, the researcher made clear at
the beginning of the interviews that they were independent of the local agencies. This was also made clear in the information sheet and consent form used (please see Appendix E). Two interviews were conducted away from IOM buildings: one interview was conducted at an offender’s home, with the researcher accompanied by a drugs worker. This was after repeated attempts to interview the offender in an office, which was hampered by miscommunication amongst team members. A second interview was conducted in a church, used for meetings by one IOM team. This offender had recently ended their involvement with IOM and again was accompanied by a member of the local IOM team. In both interviews the same processes were used regarding the information sheet and consent form, and the workers were asked to observe the confidentiality of the interviewees and interviews.

All offenders interviewed were aged over 18; whilst IOM can apply to prolific young offenders, due to the criteria for inclusion they make up only a small proportion of the caseload. Of the cohort of 98 offenders on whom quantitative data was collected for this research, only 12 (12.2%) were aged under 18 when they started IOM. Those aged under 18 were included in this analysis, but there were practical and ethical issues regarding interviewing such offenders. Firstly, this would have required the involvement of the local youth offending services, which like the prison were not involved in commissioning the research and were not formally involved with it. Secondly, the consent of the parents or guardians of offenders would have had to have been sought, that would have made recruitment of interviewees more difficult. Therefore this group was excluded from the interviews. The police officer responsible for these offenders in one local team was interviewed, and confirmed that the approach to their supervision and management was similar to that of adult offenders.
National IOM portfolio holders

The final group of interviewees in phase two were those with a national portfolio for IOM. Five such practitioners were selected for interview, recommended by local IOM managers and based on their attendance at national IOM meetings and events, at which recruitment for interview took place. All held responsibility for IOM in organisations including the Probation Chief’s Association, the Association of Chief Police Officers, the College of Policing, the Home Office and third sector organisation NACRO. Three of these interviewees represented the two key IOM agencies, the police and probation service, with an additional interviewee representing one of the government departments that oversees IOM. The final interviewee represented a third sector agency which whilst promoted in government policy (Wong et al, 2012) is largely missing from the formal organisation of IOM locally. All of these interviews took place at their place of work and lasted on average for around one hour.

These interviews were conducted towards the end of the fieldwork period, after the majority of local interviews had been completed. These interviews provided a perspective on IOM outside of the research site from a national perspective, and so were able to set practice in the site in context. Pawson and Tilley note the importance of policy level interviewees to evaluation research, given its real world application, and in particular their assessments of interventions as a whole, as opposed to the details of their delivery (1997, p. 202). This influenced the nature of the questions asked of this group, that focused on the following topics: the development of IOM, the extent to which it is consistent with their own understanding and experience of offender rehabilitation and the desistance and assisted desistance literature, ways in which it can best be used and also gaps in current provision and likely impact of future changes in government policy, including Transforming Rehabilitation (Interview topic guide at Appendix F).
Observations

The observations undertaken in phase two were of the three key formal IOM meetings that took place locally. Firstly, the IOM selection meetings at which decisions are made as to which offenders to accept onto and remove from the approach. Three of these are held monthly and are chaired by a police inspector and attended by team members including the senior probation officer and sergeant from each team. These meetings provided an insight into the process of offender selection and deselection and the interaction and data exchange of staff and management from the three key agencies. These meetings were observed for six months between April and September 2013.

Secondly, the four weekly local team meetings were observed for a period of one month in June 2013. These meetings are used to discuss all current cases, their progress and approach to their supervision. Observations of these meetings afforded an opportunity to observe the ways in that individual offenders were being managed by the teams, and the operation of its multi-agency nature. For example, it showed the differing priorities of the different agencies and the availability of data from each agency.

Thirdly, the quarterly Reducing Reoffending Board meetings, that oversee IOM as well as other intervention concerned with reducing reoffending. These meetings were observed formally from May 2013 for eight months. Attendance at this meeting continued into 2014 as a way of staying in touch with the site, learning how IOM was operating and changing and finally feeding back findings from the research. This meeting is concerned with IOM’s governance and performance and is attended by representatives of a wide range of agencies whose agendas concern reoffending. Observations of the meeting provided an opportunity to see how IOM was considered by those agencies and how the governance and performance is undertaken and managed.
In addition, the commissioned nature of the research allowed access to two national IOM meetings in 2013, the national IOM conference in both 2012 and 2013 and various one off meetings locally, including a visit from the College of Policing. Attendance at these meetings, like the national portfolio holder interviews, provided a national perspective on the local approach and a view on plans for the future of IOM.

The observations of these meetings were recorded using field notes as opposed to audio or video taping. No specific schedule was created, instead the notes taken captured information on the attendance, location, frequency, length and content of these meetings. Regarding content, the observations did not seek to record the detailed interactions between attendees but rather the topics discussed, and indeed those expected but not discussed, and the views of the various attendees on these.

**Qualitative Data Analysis**

Almost all of the interviews conducted were digitally recorded. The exceptions were the very first initial conversation held with the police IOM lead and the two interviews conducted with staff based in the local prison, which it was not possible to record. In these cases detailed notes were taken and in one case, a second, recorded interview took place in phase two (see Table 5.2 above).

All of the staff and national portfolio holder interviews were transcribed by an external transcriber. The majority of the offender interviews were transcribed by the researcher, with a small number undertaken by the external transcriber. All of the transcripts produced were then checked by the researcher against the recordings, both to check the accuracy of the transcript and to listen again to the sense of the comments made. The field notes made
from the observations of the various meetings attended were written up by the researcher.

These notes and transcripts were coded and analysed using the NVivo software package. Both deductive and inductive coding were employed; the former comparing the content of interviews to a pre-existing framework, based on the interview topic guides, that in turn drew on previous relevant research and literature, and the latter involving thematic analysis, looking for issues or concerns that may not have come through in previous work (Bauwens 2010, p. 42-43).

Table 5.3 below outlines the node structure created in Nvivo to analyse the qualitative data. It shows that different nodes were used for analysing the responses of the different groups of interviewees (local staff, offenders, and national portfolio holders), although there was some overlap with the codes ascribed to each group used to distinguish responses. The table also shows the number of interview transcripts or observation files to which each node relates (sources) and the number of times each node was coded (references). Examples of the coding undertaken are presented in Appendix G, using excerpts from interviews with an IOM practitioner, an offender and the notes from one of the weekly team meetings observed.
Table 5.3: Nvivo coding structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top Level Node</th>
<th>Second Level Node</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desistance</td>
<td>Ageing</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Local staff respondents)</td>
<td>Narrative</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Bonds</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interplay</td>
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<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cause of offending</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of IOM</td>
<td>Waiting vs Speeding up Change</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Local staff respondents)</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience of IOM</td>
<td>Barriers / Problems</td>
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<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Offender respondents)</td>
<td>Disadvantages</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experience of Multi-Agency working</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fairness</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relationships with staff</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Work done</td>
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<td>73</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Example of one organisation leading</td>
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<td>Separation from home organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mechanisms / why?</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Local staff respondents)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(National actor responses)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Local staff respondents)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Finishing IOM</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hope / Motivation</td>
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<td>66</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Introduction of IOM</td>
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<td>Differences between Ls1&amp;2 and L3</td>
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<td>Organisation of IOM</td>
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<td>Performance</td>
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<td>Personalisation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Work done with offenders</td>
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</table>
The research findings presented in the next chapter draw directly, through the use of quotes, on the views of only a proportion of these interviewees, due to the limitations of space. Of the 24 probation employees interviewed, 10 (42%) are directly cited, as are 15 of the 23 police interviewees (65%) and five of the seven drugs workers (71%). All but one of the five national portfolio holders and all but three of the 23 offenders interviewed are cited. Overall the views of two thirds of interviewees are explicitly reported in the next chapter. Quotations were selected for the findings chapter on the basis of their representativeness and indeed all opinions expressed in the fieldwork are reflected to the extent that they were expressed. Relevant findings from the review of the documents gathered are also presented.

Quantitative data

Phase three of the fieldwork involved the collection and analysis of quantitative sources of data. As noted above this phase of the research was conducted after the interviews and observation, in order that the findings from these could inform the quantitative analysis. This mirrors the approach to data collection used in the evaluation of a prison based education programme undertaken by Duguid and Pawson (1998), which allowed them to draw on the opinions and theories of practitioners when assessing the effect of the intervention. As a result, the cohort of offenders on which this quantitative analysis was undertaken was not the same as the sample of offenders interviewed. Use of both sources of data allowed the research to gather the views of current IOM offenders, and to assess the outcomes for those who had already completed their experience of it.

This phase of the research drew on three key sources of data. Firstly, the database maintained by IOM’s local information team, that contained the details of all those offenders considered for IOM. The database records the movement of individuals on and off the scheme along with various details
about them at the start and end of their time on IOM. This has been used by the Information Team since April 2011 and was accessed by the researcher in the August of 2013 and therefore contained data on those offenders referred to a selection meeting during this period.

The database was used to identify the cohort of offenders on whom data was gathered. In total the database contained information on 681 individuals, of these, 231 individuals had both start and end dates listed for a period of IOM. Of these, 98 individuals finished a period of IOM at least one year prior to the data collection, before the end of September 2012. It is this cohort of 98 on whom data was collected and analysis undertaken in order to allow for a reasonable follow up period. This database had only been in use since April 2011 and so restricted the possible length of the follow up period and size of the cohort.

Data from two other sources were used; the second was data held on probation service systems. These included the case recording system (CRAMS, later replaced by nDealius), that provides the probation record of offenders, and the Offender Assessment System (OASys), that measures the circumstances, and change in circumstance of offenders in twelve different aspects of their lives, as well as their level of motivation. The system then generates the Offender Group Reconviction Score (OGRS) referred to previously that measures the statistical likelihood of reconviction within either a one or two year period. These data were collected in the summer of 2013.

Finally, complete records for offenders in the cohort were gathered from the police national computer, detailing their offending history from their first offences. These data were used to make an assessment of the offending committed by the cohort of offenders prior to, during and following their time
on IOM. These data were received in November 2013, with analysis undertaken between December 2013 and January 2014.

Data from all of these sources were gathered for a period of at least 12 months both prior to and following an individual’s time on IOM, as well as during periods of IOM. Eleven offenders in the cohort were taken back on to IOM for a second period within the 12 month follow up period. These offenders were not excluded from the cohort and their offending and circumstances during this period were classed as ‘post-IOM’. As those offenders were deemed suitable for IOM again they were likely to be the most prolific, and excluding them would potentially skew the cohort towards those more successful at moving away from offending.

The analysis undertaken on these data involved pre, during and post IOM comparisons on issues such as levels of reoffending and arrest, type and extent of reoffending, changes in circumstances and risk and time at liberty.

As outlined above it was considered inappropriate to compare this cohort with a comparison group, either from within the research site or from another IOM approach.

In addition, it was considered inappropriate to assess the effect of IOM simply on the binary measure of whether offenders had or had not offended in the follow up period. The use of these three datasets meant that a number of different outcomes could be used, reflecting the discussion in the previous chapters that intermediate changes in circumstances and offending are of use when studying rehabilitation and desistance. This reflects Chen and Rossi’s view that theory-driven evaluation should determine which outcomes are most appropriate to measure based on understanding the intervention under study (1980, p. 111; Rosenbaum, 2002, p. 208). A similar approach was used in the Diamond District evaluation of IOM in London that considered reoffending with regard to its speed, amount and seriousness (Dawson and
Stanko, 2013, p. 293). As Matthews and Pitts have noted, ‘too many promising initiatives have been sacrificed on the altar of recidivism’ (2000, p. 136). They argue that there is a need to move away from the idea that ‘the aim of rehabilitation programmes is to turn bad people into good people or committed criminals into law-abiding citizens’ (2000, p. 137); instead the aims should be more modest and diverse, a view that is reflected by local practitioners in the next chapter.

Fieldwork processes and ethics

The sections above have outlined the research design and the use made of the various methods employed. This section provides details on the processes in the fieldwork period used to ensure that the research was conducted in a safe and fair manner. As noted previously, as a commissioned piece of research, the researcher was required to update stakeholders from the local police and probation service at six-monthly meetings and to provide a final report of findings and recommendations. It has been noted that such a context for the research could create particular pressures on the researcher to produce positive results, praising IOM locally (Wong, 2013, p. 70; Tilley and Clarke, 2006, p. 527). However, in this case the commissioners and local staff were found to be keen to support the research, for example by ensuring access, to receive the results without seeking to influence them, and to act upon recommendations made (please see Chapter 7 for further details).

The design of the research and the fieldwork proposed was outlined to two ethics committees within the University, one for each school through which the researcher was supervised (the Business School and School of Sociology and Social Policy). Both committees approved the research. In addition permission was sought from the National Offender Manager Service through the Integrated Research Application System. No separate approval process
was required by the Police Service in addition to the agreement between it and University when the research was commissioned.

A key issue raised by this process was how to deal with offenders disclosing involvement in offences that were unknown to the police, or making serious threats to be involved in future offences in interviews. A decision was made not to disclose such admissions to the police or probation service, beyond the legal requirement to disclose instances, or risks, of harm or abuse to children aged under 18 years or other child protection concerns. This was reflected in the consent form and the participant information sheet so that the extent of confidentiality was made clear to participants at the outset of the research. The fact that the offenders interviewed in this research were prolific, acquisitive offenders meant that it was to be expected that they would have been involved in more offences than have come to the attention of the police and may continue to be involved in offending.

Indeed, interviews with this group involved some precautions to ensure the safety of the researcher. As outlined above the majority of interviews took place in the environment of IOM buildings where offenders are normally supervised. These are equipped with safety devices to ensure that staff are kept safe and safety procedures were observed during these interviews, such as carrying an alarm and informing staff of the location of an interview. In the case of the two interviews conducted elsewhere, both were undertaken in the company of a member of staff, again to ensure researcher safety.

Regarding confidentiality and anonymity, it was noted in Chapter 1 that the research site has been anonymised. This was to ensure the anonymity of the research participants, some of whom could have been identified by their job role. This enabled all views and opinions expressed in interviews or meetings to be reported. Furthermore, confidentiality and anonymity was ensured for all those involved in the research. At the start of interviews, interviewees were
informed of the scope and purpose of the research through an information sheet and a consent form was used to ensure interviewees understood the purpose of the interview and how the information they provided in it would be used (please see Appendix E). In the case of the offenders interviewed, extra care was taken to ensure the information sheet and consent form were understood. The transcriber selected for this researcher was chosen in part because they have been approved by the University, and so were subject to a non-disclosure agreement.

Regarding those observed during the meetings and the cohort of offenders on whom offending data was collected, a consent form was not used. Instead, attendees at observed meetings were informed of the researcher’s presence, and in all cases agreed to the observations. In part this was supported by the commissioned nature of the research. Regarding the cohort of offenders analysed, it was not considered practically possible to obtain their consent to use their data. However, permission was sought from the probation and police services providing this data. The requirements for how this data should be handled and stored were followed.

All of the data gathered during the research was stored in ways that could not be accessed by anyone other than the researcher, and so that individuals could not be identified. An electronic list of the names of those interviewed or on whom data was collected was maintained, that ascribed each individual an identification number; it is this that is used to identify interviewee quotes in the next chapter. This list was password protected and kept separately from the rest of the data. The data stored, such as that on the cohort for analysis and the recordings of interviews, used these numbers for identification and therefore did not identify by them by name. This data was kept in password protected files, on password protected computers or, if in written or printed documents, in locked drawers. Following completion of the research, all data collected and generated will be held in these secure conditions for at least
seven years, or a longer period if appropriate, after which it will be destroyed. Only the researcher had access to the data generated, apart from the external transcriber. As noted above the transcriber used was University approved and subject to a non-disclosure agreement. In addition, they were not provided with data that could identify interviewees.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has outlined the research design and methods employed in this evaluation of IOM. This evaluation is a mixed methods case study, a design deemed most appropriate for the nature and organisation of the intervention researched. Furthermore, this evaluation employs a realistic evaluation framework throughout the fieldwork, analysis and presentation of results; this is considered the most appropriate framework for the intervention researched, as outlined in the previous chapter.

The chapter has detailed the particular methods employed including a review of relevant local documentation, qualitative semi-structured interviews with key groups of local staff, offenders and national stakeholders, and observations of key local meetings. The evaluation also employs quantitative data to study the within-individual change of a cohort of IOM offenders. The organisation of the fieldwork into sequential phases ensured that the methods were able to support and triangulate each other. Indeed, whilst the specific limitations of the methods employed have been discussed, their combination is able to produce both summative and formative findings on which conclusions about IOM can be reached.

The approach used in this research has been compared to both previous research into assisted desistance and evaluations of IOM. The use of both interviews and observations, and of both qualitative and quantitative data sources has been undertaken in a minority of such studies, meaning that this
research is amongst the more comprehensive, and one of only two studies (Farrall, 2002) to make explicit use of realistic evaluation to understand why and in what ways the intervention “works”. The following chapter outlines the findings of the research. It begins with an initial, and ends with a revised, Context Mechanism Outcome Configuration detailing the programme theory for IOM.
Chapter 6. Research Findings

The previous two chapters discussed the evaluation approach selected for this research and the methods and data sources used. This chapter presents the findings of this research. It begins by outlining the initial Context Mechanism Outcome Configuration (CMOC) developed from the literature and first stages of the fieldwork. This CMOC was then explored and developed in the main period of the fieldwork, with a revised configuration presented at the end of this chapter, outlining the programme theory underpinning IOM.

The research findings are organised using the same Context, Mechanism, Outcome structure, to allow those aspects of IOM found to be most important to be explored in detail. The findings regarding context are therefore discussed first and they consider the importance of offender readiness. The chapter then examines the three mechanisms that were identified by the fieldwork to be in operation within IOM; firstly, the intense and structured nature of IOM, allowing a greater degree of personalised support than would be the case under standard probation supervision; secondly, the effect on offenders of the close multi-agency working that underpins IOM, increasing the amount and timeliness of information available to all agencies; and thirdly, the caring and trusting relationships established between offenders and staff. The chapter then outlines the findings regarding the outcomes of IOM, including the nature and extent of offending, risk and circumstances post-IOM compared to that pre and during IOM.

This chapter also highlights areas where this CMOC is prevented from operating fully. Drawing upon the literature on the application of the realistic evaluation approach, outlined in the previous chapter, these confounding aspects of IOM recognise that the operation of the identified CMOC can be
undermined. For example authors have identified ‘harmful mechanisms’ (Astbury and Leeuw 2010, p. 376) or ‘disabling mechanisms’ (Kazi, 2003, p. 812). In this chapter these are referred to as confounding issues to denote that these are not separate mechanisms, but rather are instances of a mechanism unable to operate to its full extent. These confounding issues highlight ways in which the current operation of IOM could be improved.

As outlined previously, this research was conducted during the consultation for and early phases of the Transforming Rehabilitation changes to the probation service, introduced through the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014. These changes were found, through interviews with local and national staff at all levels, to be likely to alter the operation of IOM. The findings regarding these likely impacts are discussed alongside the revised CMOC towards the end of this chapter. Whilst these findings were not the main focus of the research they, like the confounding issues, highlight areas of risk for IOM and so can support decision making about the approach. This chapter closes with conclusions on the research findings.

In this chapter practitioner views are more often presented prior to those of offenders. This organisation allows the views of practitioners to provide an outline of the operation of IOM, which is then illustrated and challenged by offender experiences.

**Initial Context Mechanism Outcome Configuration**

There is debate amongst those who have employed realistic evaluation as to how it can best be operationalised and the definition of the component parts of a CMOC. In this research two tools were used to both conceptualise the CMOC within IOM and to describe it to others. The first of these was a process diagram, the initial version of which is presented below at Figure 6.1. Diagrams have been used in other studies employing realistic evaluation
(Marchal et al, 2012, p. 204), and Astbury and Leeuw argue that there are no rigid procedures for outlining mechanisms and argue one should avoid being mechanistic, recognising that the mechanisms are generative (2010, p. 374).

This version of the diagram was developed following the phase one interviews with staff members and the literature review. In the diagram the grey box represents the work that goes on within IOM, starting with the group of offenders selected (the white text on the far left of the diagram) flowing into the two sides of the approach: pathways, for those offenders complying with the requirements of the approach and enforcement for those who are not. This split is shown because different practitioners work on the different sides of the approach, although the diagram shows that there is movement of offenders between these two sides. Indeed the diagram shows that IOM is underpinned by multi-agency working and co-location. It illustrates that it is the context of the offender at the start of their time on IOM that determines which side of the approach they experience and the range of activities each side involves. For example, those placed on IOM when not ready to change, for whatever reason, still experience IOM but generally only the enforcement elements of it. The diagram also shows that the side of IOM that offenders experience also determines outcomes for offenders. For example those engaging with the approach are, ideally, supported into reduced offending, or a change in circumstance along the reoffending pathways. Those experiencing the enforcement side of the approach tend to experience breach or other enforcement action, for example following a further offence.

Finally, the diagram recognises that the operation and effect of IOM is affected by factors beyond the control of IOM agencies, in particular changes in other aspects of an offender’s life, which impact upon their readiness and ability to engage.
Underpinned by multi-agency working and co-location
Leading to a greater intelligence picture on all offenders and their associates

Potentially affected by changes in the lives of individuals, both positive and negative
e.g. growing up / maturing, moving away, starting or ending a relationship, becoming a parent, family breakdown / bereavement

**Pathways**
- Complying
  - *Motivated to change*
  - *In stable accommodation*
  - *Willing to engage in supervision and (where appropriate) substance misuse treatment*

- Not complying
  - *Chaotic*
  - *Continuing to offend*
  - *Not engaging with treatment / supervision*
  - *Homeless / in inappropriate accommodation*
  - *Are unwilling to change or unable to meet the greater requirements of IOM*

**Enforcement**
- Not complying
  - *Not complying*
  - *In a number of different settings, from a number of different agencies based within small teams*
  - *In a tailored and individualised way, four times a week*

- Complying
  - *Support, guidance, motivation, practical help along the reoffending pathways*
  - *Additional attention from enforcement police (IOM teams and beyond) e.g. bail checks, enforcement of warrants, surveillance, intelligence gathering*
  - *Through the use of home visits, patrolling, surveillance, information exchange and intelligence systems*

**Versions of success**
- *Swift breach action and recall*
  - *Swift and stricter response to further offending e.g. bespoke licence conditions*

- *Increased compliance*
  - *Movement along reoffending pathways*

- *Reduced reoffending (amount, severity, speed)*
  - *Movement along reoffending pathways*

**Movement between the two sides of the approach**
The second tool used to outline the initial CMOC is the table below. This is the way in which Pawson and Tilley outline the CMOCs in their work (1997, p. 101) using the format: Context + Mechanism = Outcome.

Like the diagram above the mechanisms are based on the understanding of the local approach gained from the initial interviews with practitioners and the outcomes reflect the various ways in which success could be measured.

This initial CMOC table distinguishes between various levels of context within IOM reflecting the conception of Pawson (2006, p. 31) outlined in the previous chapter. In this table the levels of context are concerned with the individual offenders, the organisations that provide IOM and the relationships between the practitioners involved. The different individual level contexts reflect the different factors in the literature that support desistance. The more institutional level contexts reflect the partnership working literature and are concerned with the way in which the IOM approach operates. The layout of the table may be seen to imply that the categories of offenders are mutually exclusive; however, this is not what was assumed within the research. Instead the CMOC uses the findings from the desistance literature to show that such processes can operate in different ways for different people.
### Table 6.1: Initial Integrated Offender Management Context Mechanism

**Outcome Configuration (CMOC)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>=</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenders with ‘social bonds’ / stakes in a community such as employment, family or children</td>
<td>Can use opportunities provided by IOM to support changes they are making to their lives, including relationships with staff</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Reduced actual reoffending or risk of reoffending (as measured through OGRS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenders able to move away (geographically, socially) from their previous offending behaviour</td>
<td>Can use opportunities provided by IOM to support changes they are making to their lives, including relationships with staff</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Progress regarding intermediate outcomes (employment, housing, family relations, substance misuse) Expressing desire to reduce reoffending.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenders at a point where they are willing or able to change (e.g. no longer want to risk prison)</td>
<td>Can use opportunities provided by IOM to alter their lives, including relationships with staff. Can use the need to attend IOM as an excuse to friends/associates still involved in offending</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenders engaged in a long term process of desisting from crime</td>
<td>Can use opportunities provided by IOM to support changes they are making to their lives, including relationships with staff</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenders currently engaged in high levels of serious acquisitive crime offending</td>
<td>Can use opportunities provided by IOM to alter their lives, including relationships with staff. Future offending is more likely to be detected, increasing the risks of offending. Management is provided throughout the CJS and regardless of statutory status</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interpersonal Relationships</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-located teams of police and probation officers and drug workers (in most teams)</td>
<td>Good partner working relationships and information exchange – around potential and current IOM candidates</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Swift reactions to changes in offender circumstances / further offending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A relatively long standing approach</td>
<td>Good partner working relationships and approach understandings, systems and practices</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>A well implemented and successfully operating approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infra-structural system</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level support from relevant agencies supporting the approach</td>
<td>All agencies able to target resources to the approach</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>A well implemented and successfully operating approach, with participation from relevant agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As outlined in the previous chapter, this initial set of CMOCs along with the diagram acted as a way to organise thinking about IOM prior to the main period of the fieldwork. This enabled the initial IOM programme theory to be discussed with local practitioners. These discussions in turn produced a revised CMOC and a revised diagram presented at the end of this chapter. The findings presented are organised using this revised CMOC and so differ from the one outlined in Table 6.1.

**Context - Offender readiness for IOM**

This section explores the importance of the context in which offenders come to and experience IOM. In contrast to the initial CMOC developed, the findings presented here consider context at the level of the individual offender. As discussed previously contexts can operate at different levels, but those that are most relevant relate to the unit of analysis of the programme under consideration (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 88); in the case of IOM, this is individual offender. To make the unit of analysis the IOM partnership itself, risks it being judged a success by the extent to which it operates successfully as a partnership, rather than the extent to which it positively affects the offenders subject to it. This was a concern noted in the literature review on partnership working outlined in Chapter 3 (Rummery, 2002). Therefore, in this section the context of the individual offenders, recognised as important in the initial IOM diagram, above (Figure 6.1), is the focus of attention.

In particular, the concern with individual offender context is a concern with their level of ‘readiness’ (Day et al, 2010, p. 11; Kozar, 2010, p. 195). As discussed in Chapter 2 the notion of readiness has been used in previous desistance research. Giordano and colleagues defined openness or readiness to change as the first stage in their theory of cognitive transformation (Giordano et al, 2002, p. 1000; Vaughan, 2007). It is a useful way to conceive of the relevant level of context for the work of IOM.
It is important to recognise that the offenders subject to IOM have particularly extensive offending histories. The cohort of offenders on which the quantitative analysis was conducted had been convicted of an average of 45 offences (range 0 – 230) throughout their offending career prior to acceptance on to IOM, with 15 convicted of over 100 offences. On average this group of offenders were 15 years old when they committed their first offence (range 8 to 47 years) and were 24 years old when they were accepted on to IOM, although 24% were aged 30 or over. There was therefore an average of just over 9 years between a first conviction and being taken onto IOM (range 1 month to 20 years).

The offenders in the quantitative cohort had tended to commit the types of serious acquisitive crime that are the focus of IOM (burglary, robbery, theft and drugs offences). They had to a lesser extent also been involved in offences of violence, fraud and criminal damage (refer to Table 6.8 below in the Outcomes section), echoing the lack of specialisation in offending careers noted previously in Chapter 2 (Piquero, 2014). The acquisitive nature of their offending was often linked to substance misuse, with 13 of the 18 offenders interviewed in the second wave highlighting drugs as a cause of their offending. Practitioners did note that IOM also targets offenders who commit acquisitive crimes simply to make money, very much as a career.

In interviews with IOM practitioners and managers the importance of an offender’s readiness or context was recognised. They reported that offenders who had reached a point where they wanted their lives to change and move away from offending, would get the most from IOM. This is reflected in the following quotes:
‘... the bottom line is they’ve got to want to do it and it is down to the individual. It doesn’t matter what services are offered or not, unless the offender themselves want to change then they won’t change and all that will happen is that they’ll continue on the cycle. And the difference is with IOM that they’ll commit less offences while they’re out because we’ll lock them up straightaway’ (Staff Interview 47 - IOM Sergeant)

‘We all know the theories of desistance, you can’t make somebody want to change’ (Staff Interview 46 - Education, Training and Employment officer)

‘... if they’re not bothered, they just won’t engage, they just won’t come to their appointments and then they’re breached quite quickly’ (Staff Interview 36 - Probation Service Officer)

There was a similar recognition of the importance of context from offenders interviewed. One offender reported that the first time he was placed on IOM he deliberately failed to report for appointments in the knowledge that he would be recalled to prison. He stated that, ‘I don’t think I were ready then you know’ (Offender 6), citing the large number of appointments as one cause of his non-compliance. A second offender comparing his success on IOM this time to his previous experience stated, ‘I like completed it, didn’t get like recalled or owt like that. But that’s because obviously I knew what was expected of me and I knew all about it, instead of just being like thrown into something that you’re not really prepared for’ (Offender 15).

There was therefore a sense from some offenders that they needed to experience IOM before they understood what was required of them. One senior probation officer stated that having to experience IOM before fully understanding it could be linked to the learning style of offenders. She described them as ‘activist learners’ (Staff interview 51); those who learn by doing.

Thus, individual context or readiness are important within IOM and are recognised as aspects that cannot be easily altered by external forces.
However, there is a recognition of an interplay between readiness and an intervention such as IOM, that can encourage readiness. The means by and extent to which this is possible within IOM is discussed in the next section, drawing out the importance of both motivation and fairness.

The capacity to influence context

As outlined above, a number of practitioners argued that it was not possible for individual change to be imposed externally on individuals. However, practitioners did see a role for influencing and motivating offenders. This section explores the views and experiences of practitioners and offenders on this issue. The following quotes from practitioners from each of the three key IOM agencies show similar approaches on this issue:

‘... we’re trying to get them to the point where they’re motivated to change all the time... when they’re at the place where they’re motivated to change, all the support is there, all the resources are there, all the relationships and the consistent support and trust is there and they know that’ (Staff Interview 40 - Probation Service Officer).

‘... it is a waiting game, a lot of it is to try and talk to people isn’t it and to find what motivates them and try and speak reason’ (Staff Interview 22 - Enforcement PC)

‘... they’re the only ones that can do that but it’s about setting that seed in them in each time by using that motivational interviewing and mapping and goal-setting, just develop that discrepancy where they think you know they can see what they’re doing wrong and this is what they can achieve if they change it’ (Staff Interview 45 - Drugs worker)

These comments from practitioners note the importance of encouragement and motivation when aiding offenders in making changes. Practitioners were asked whether they felt their role involved motivational work with offenders and the majority stated that it was a key part of their role and something they used their contact with offenders for. This is reflected in the comments below from representatives of the three key IOM organisations:
‘... it’s about setting that seed in them in each time by using that motivational interviewing and mapping and goal-setting, just develop that discrepancy where they think you know they can see what they’re doing wrong and this is what they can achieve if they change it’ (Staff Interview 45 - Drugs worker).

‘... you have to be tenacious and keep your motivation up and carry on going because ... because of their nature they’re more difficult to get through to, just more difficult to get through to, like children’ (Staff Interview 40 - Probation Service Officer).

‘... a lot of it is you have to sit and you listen to them moan about how life’s unfair and a lot of the times you’ve got to bite your tongue but yeah, it is motivating them to try and do something and it’s whether they’re prepared to be motivated’ (Staff Interview 31 - Pathways PC).

These quotes suggest that practitioners recognise the value but also the work required to maintain motivation among offenders. One Education, Training and Employment officer recognised the importance of maintaining motivation that might have been built up in prison, which it can then be difficult to maintain in the community,

‘I always say that the [prison] gate is like a magnet; it sucks all the motivation out of somebody that they’ve had for maybe two years. Because what’s out there has been forgotten about. All the associations, all the problems, all the children, all the baby mothers, etc are still there which they’ve been able to keep kind of at a distance’ (Staff Interview 56)

The Offender Assessment System (OASys – outlined in Chapter 2) used by the probation service, captures data on how motivated the offender manager assesses offenders to be. Table 6.2 below presents data on the motivation level of 37 of the cohort of 98 offenders on which quantitative data was collected, those for whom both pre and post data was available. The table shows that seven offenders improved their level of motivation (those whose scores appear above the shaded diagonal line), five worsened (those whose scores appear below the shaded diagonal line), whilst the majority, 25 offenders, or two thirds, remained the same with regard to their level of motivation (those whose scores appear within the shaded diagonal line), with
the most common assessment being that individual offender was ‘quite’ motivated. This mirrors the comments of one IOM Inspector who argued, ‘I think we don’t create motivation, that’s quite difficult. I think we can sustain it. But if somebody doesn’t want to stop committing crime they’re not going to’ (Staff Interview 55).

Table 6.2: OASys motivation assessments at start and end of IOM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IOM Start</th>
<th>Not at all motivated</th>
<th>Quite motivated</th>
<th>Very motivated</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all motivated</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite motivated</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very motivated</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings suggest that whilst there is a need for an individual to want to change before change can occur, it is also possible for motivation levels to change and to encourage change through motivational working. A number of practitioners stated that this can be supported by the enforced compliance (Day et al, 2004) which IOM requires for those subject to it through a licence or court order. One Pathways PC stated, ‘we’re telling them what they’re going to do and they don’t have any choice in it’ (Staff Interview 23). Whilst it was not thought that change itself could be enforced, enforced contact did provide opportunities for such motivational work to occur, as the quotes below outline:

‘... with prolifics they do have to turn up. So you’ve got that kind of window where you can do the motivational work with them and then hopefully shift them into wanting to change. So that’s the kind of beauty of it really, the enforcement side of it’ (Staff Interview 32 - Drugs worker)

‘... you need a level of coercion where people’s lives are so chaotic and they are so damaged that if you’re going to move them out of that, sometimes you need to start on the basis of ‘we require you to do this’ and you move through into some sort of state where people are motivated to change’ (Staff Interview 3 - Probation Director)
‘... with the IOM nominals it might be the day that I knock on the door and that might be the day where they’re sick to death of their life, they do want to change, they’re at a very low ebb but if you don’t keep knocking on the door you might miss the opportunity. And that’s the only way I can describe what I do really’ (Staff Interview 26 - Pathways PC)

Whilst IOM allows for personalised and innovative supervision (outlined in the next section), for those subject to IOM through a statutory order or licence, some activity will be enforced and not open to negotiation. For example, all offenders are subject to the same standards on warnings and breaches covering the whole of the probation service.

This element of coercion is to some extent missing with those offenders subject to IOM on a voluntary basis. As a result practitioners often identified non-statutory or voluntary (Level 3) offenders as more difficult to work with as there is no way to compel them to engage. Instead they had to rely on offenders being ready to engage. One pathways PC noted:

‘... your Level 3s who aren’t under anything, they’re a bit of the attitude of well I’m not doing anything, so why would I suddenly volunteer myself to be supervised?’ (Staff Interview 26)

For this reason the level of engagement with Level 3 offenders was often lower, as the following drugs worker commented, ‘the Level 3s I think unless you’ve got a particularly good relationship with them already, involvement is minimal’ (Staff Interview 24).

There was little difference in the approach to this issue from the three key agencies operating IOM. Indeed a senior probation officer and an IOM sergeant, based in different teams, had similar views on the way in which individual change occurs and the extent to which an intervention like IOM can have an effect:

‘... there is a lot of waiting for people to be in the right place at the right time and you can’t change an individual, you can’t. You can
support them in their decision to change and you can give them the skills that they need, but they will change. And you may be in a position where that person’s not ready but if something just hooks, if you find a hook and you can pull that’ (Staff Interview 51 - Senior Probation Officer)

‘What we’re doing is trying to exercise control and support and you’re trying to control the behaviour so they’re using the control options to shove them away from offending and using support to stabilise them in that midpoint. And that for me is offender management, that’s what we’re doing ... They might stop offending at some point but that’ll be their decision and not something we’ve done’ (Staff Interview 7 - IOM sergeant)

Both of these practitioners recognised a role for an intervention such as IOM, but only as a support to an individual’s process of change, that they both note may well be influenced by factors external to the intervention. IOM therefore may act as a trigger or catalyst for change, or may be a support to those who have decided to change. Similarly one of the national actors interviewed stated of changes made in people’s lives, ‘the reality is it’s because of the combined interventions [such as IOM] but predominantly because the individual had made that decision. And that individual would have been supported and motivated in making that decision by a number of different factors’ (National interviewee 3). It is for this reason that the conception of IOM presented above at Figure 6.1 recognises the influence of factors external to IOM.

This interplay between interventions and individual readiness is reflected in the views of those offenders interviewed. Firstly regarding the importance of readiness:
‘All I can say obviously like people that are willing to change it does help them’ (Offender 3)

‘If you want to change, do you know what I mean, this is brilliant you know, it is, it is a brilliant project... but if you’re not bothered it’s just ... you see it as more of a hindrance than help’ (Offender 6)

‘... there’s the support there but you know, initially it’s got to be down to the individual to engage and down to the support workers to make sure that there is a concern there and you know’ (Offender 18)

Secondly, some offenders noted how an intervention such as IOM could contribute to altering readiness. The two offenders below stated that their placement on IOM supported a change in behaviour:

‘... it just gives you a kick up the backside to do something about your drug use and that’ (Offender 12)

‘I had probation before I got put on PPO should I say. I used to still do what I was doing, but when this, like the screws are tight and they monitor you but it’s for the best like’ (Offender 22)

Linked to offender readiness and motivation, is the perceived fairness of their placement on IOM (Tyler, 2003). In the second wave of interviews offenders were asked directly if they considered their placement on the scheme to be fair. Analysis of the responses found that offenders were split equally between those who considered being placed on IOM fair, and those who did not. Those who felt that their placement on IOM was fair tended to feel that their offending had been of a nature and an extent that justified the decision; they fitted the bill for an approach of this type. This is reflected in the comments of the two offenders below:

‘... yeah. I committed crime, so do the time you know really’ (Offender 19)

‘... yeah I did, yeah, as the name suggests it’s for prolific offenders and I committed a few offences so it stands to reason that I should be put on something like this’ (Offender 20)

Those who argued that their placement on IOM was not fair tended to state that they did not feel their offending was of a level to warrant such a level of
supervision, especially when compared to other offenders they knew, who they claimed were more prolific. This is reflected by the comments of the three offenders below:

‘I wouldn’t say it was fair to stick me on a PPO licence because it was a burglary charge that I got done with it was my first strike, first jail first sentence really and straight away I got put on as a PPO’ (Offender 10)

‘I wouldn’t say it’s fair because I’d say there was a lot more, I wasn’t the biggest cause for concern compared to other people, it wasn’t like I was on my third strike and then I came out as a PPO, it was my first ever offence like. I had minor charges before, but the first custodial sentence I got I was released on a PPO licence straight away sort of’ (Offender 11)

‘Prolific offender means someone constantly committing crime. I’m not constantly committing crime so I shouldn’t be a prolific offender’ (Offender 21)

The data collected for this research used different groups of offenders for interviews and reoffending data, which means that it is not possible to assess whether those offenders who considered their placement on IOM to be fair, had better outcomes than those who considered it unfair. However, it is possible to use the self-reported effects or outcomes of IOM given in the interviews. Of the nine offenders who stated it was not fair for them to have been placed on IOM, five reported a positive outcome from their time on IOM, stating that they had found the scheme useful in some way. This compared to six of the nine offenders who stated that had been fair to place them on IOM.

This comparison suggests that whether offenders consider IOM to be fair does not necessarily affect their opinion of the impact of the scheme. Offenders tended to assess the usefulness of IOM by what they had gained from it, such as help with employment, accommodation or substance misuse issues. Those who felt that IOM had involved only greater scrutiny from criminal justice agencies were less likely to state it had been of use to them.
This is an issue explored further in the section below considering the intense nature of IOM.

The findings above have illustrated the importance of offender readiness, and its interplay with IOM. Practitioners recognise readiness cannot be imposed but do see part of their role to encourage and motivate offenders to make use of the opportunities offered on IOM. Despite this, it was found that IOM processes failed to take readiness into account in any formal way; this confounding issue is explored in the next section.

Confounding Issues

This research uncovered two aspects of the organisation of IOM that undermine the work outlined above to support offender readiness: firstly there is little formal consideration of readiness within IOM selection processes. This is as a result of the second confounding issue; that the primary focus of IOM is the individual offender, as opposed to their wider context.

Regarding the first issue, IOM selects offenders primarily on the basis of their current and historical offending. At the formal monthly IOM meetings selection is based primarily on the scores achieved by offenders on a matrix concerned with their offending history and recent arrests. Observations of these meetings revealed that the two scores generated by this matrix were the main data used in decision making. Practitioners interviewed were supportive of this structured method for selecting offenders, because it meant there was a defensible reason for any selection that could be shared with colleagues and offenders. Indeed, when asked what they had been told about IOM, one offender stated, ‘they said there’s names and that go onto database and computer picks you out if you’re a prolific’ (Offender 17). This echoes the findings of the “what works” programmes; for work with
offenders to be effective it must be targeted at those who are appropriate for it (Raynor and Robinson, 2009; Hollin et al, 2004).

A number of police officers interviewed reported that some nominations from their colleagues outside the IOM teams had been rejected because they did not reach the threshold for IOM. In their view this demonstrated that IOM only selected the most prolific offenders from across the local area, rather than those individuals who were only thought to be a problem. As a consequence this tended to mean that only the small number of practitioners working within IOM teams nominated offenders, despite trying to promote the nomination process to others.

The nomination form for IOM requests no contextual information and so excludes any assessment of a person’s readiness for IOM. Whilst contextual information could be offered at IOM selection meetings from practitioners who have knowledge of a particular offender, it was the quantitative scores on which decisions were made. Practitioners interviewed noted that they then responded to the readiness and engagement of offenders for IOM by utilising either the pathways or enforcement activities and staff as appropriate.

As an approach targeting the most prolific offenders locally, it is clear that a selection process that excludes those not deemed ready for it is not appropriate, and as outlined above, enforced compliance can in fact support offender readiness. However, context is recognised as part of the change process by IOM practitioners, and it has also been shown above that those less ready can be expected to manage less well on IOM, at least initially. At one observed IOM selection meeting three offenders were removed from IOM and were listed as having reduced their offending. The IOM Inspector chairing the meeting offered congratulations to the staff involved, to which the police officer involved responded they could not claim credit, describing
the offenders as ‘disengaged with pathways’ with ‘limited motivation to change’. Whilst the offenders had not been arrested recently and there was no current intelligence about them, they were not considered a “success” for IOM by this officer, because their change in behaviour was deemed to have little to do with it.

The second confounding factor regarding context is that IOM is concerned primarily with individual offenders and their personal rehabilitation, rather than broader understandings of rehabilitation. This in turn is largely due to the fact that the three key IOM agencies sit within the criminal justice sector, and so have a primary responsibility for reducing recidivism as opposed to wider rehabilitation.

IOM does undertake some work with offenders’ families or partners to try and re-establish contact. Three offenders stated that the conditions of IOM, including regular drug tests and updates from IOM staff on home visits, were a way for their family members to trust that they were complying and in turn ensured that either family members or social services were happy for them to have contact with their children. This is explained in the quote from one offender below:

‘I think because of this it has helped, because the only person that did speak to me was my grandma, and obviously when I got out I showed her my licence and she read it and everything and she was getting on at my mum all the time and she was saying ‘oh no he’ll never change’, and eventually my grandma got it into her head that I was doing this that I was coming here four times a week and this, that and the other so it slowly but surely got us speaking again’ (Offender 7).

As a result of this contact with his mother, he is now able to have supervised contact with his seven year old son at his mother’s house for the first time in five or six years. It is these relationships that he cites as his main reason for not re-offending.
However, this work does not tend to reach further than the immediate family. This would require the involvement of other agencies beyond the criminal justice system to reach more widely into the community. The importance of these agencies is picked up in the section below that discusses multi-agency working. The probation service does provide some support to connect offenders into the wider community, for example Education Training and Employment officers support offenders into voluntary or paid work or education. In addition it was reported that some of the IOM pathways police officers were starting to engage offenders in restorative justice meetings with victims. In this way, there are limited attempts by the criminal justice agencies to extend rehabilitation beyond a narrow focus on an individual’s offending.

This focus on reducing reoffending and individual rehabilitation was commented upon by some offenders, who noted that by offering a more holistic approach offenders might benefit more from their time on IOM. One offender compared IOM to the activities available in prison and on his previous experiences of probation supervision:

‘... in jail they make you work ... and the jail’s making profit off you working because they’re selling stuff out there ... so for things we were doing for community service like building the bikes I don’t understand why they don’t start some of that up where people can get signed on to that where its probation time, classed as a probation appointment ... and you’re learning, you’re learning things basically aren’t you’ (Offender 3)

Two offenders supervised by a different IOM team stated that this was a change from their previous experience, when there had been greater support in accessing housing and driving lessons and local gyms. This change was linked by them to cuts in funding for IOM, as the quotes below demonstrate:

‘... there’s no funding there anymore for anything. You know before when it first started it were like a carrot and a stick thing, we can guarantee we’ll get you somewhere to live you know, we can do this, this and this, we’ll give you a gym pass and blah-blah-blah... But now
because of all these cuts you know, there’s no money there is there? It’s a lot harder for them to keep people on an even keel’ (Offender 6)

‘... the last time I stayed clean off drugs for two years was when I knew when I was doing my driving lessons and every week I had that to look forward to because I do actually get a buzz off of driving and I think if they had more funding, if they had funding to give people driving lessons and what not it would be better’ (Offender 7)

This change in funding levels was not mentioned by staff in this team, beyond the more general pressures on funding experienced, nor was it the view of all offenders, indeed another offender stated,

‘... this probation service does quite a few things like … it does computer courses and it does like other things like that massage and things like that, so obviously you can take part in things like that if you want to’ (Offender 4).

All of these comments do demonstrate that the provision of this wider support is welcomed by offenders and helps to support their rehabilitation from offending.

Summary

This section has outlined how the context of individual offenders, and their readiness for change, is important to the operation and effect of an intervention such as IOM. This is understood by both practitioners and offenders; practitioners see their role, in part, to encourage readiness through motivational work and provision of practical support. It is recognised that readiness cannot be imposed externally and that it relies on the interplay between individual offenders and the support of practitioners. This is supported by the motivation data presented on the quantitative analysis cohort from the OASys system.

This section has also illustrated that despite the recognition of the importance of readiness, it is not used to assess which offenders to accept onto IOM.
Instead selection is based almost exclusively upon an assessment of an individual’s offending. Individual context could be used to understand how offenders might respond to IOM, how they could be best supervised and supported and to understand if and how IOM “works”. Furthermore, IOM has been found to be targeted primarily at reducing that individual’s offending. This is understandable given the remit of those organisations providing IOM, however this section has also shown how offenders recognise the benefits of a holistic approach that supports not only their personal rehabilitation but their return to living and working in the community.

This chapter now considers the three generative mechanisms identified during the fieldwork. As with context, these differ from those identified in the initial CMOC. The first concerns the greater contact between offenders and the agencies providing IOM.

**Mechanism One - The intense and structured nature of IOM**

One of the defining features of IOM is that it is a more intense intervention than regular probation supervision. Offenders selected for IOM are expected to engage with staff regularly and in a variety of settings, including home visits. Failure to comply, results in warnings and breach proceedings and monitoring by the police enforcement teams. As the local IOM manual states:

‘[Offenders] are offered an intensive level of supervision to support desistance and therefore reduce the number of victims which has a tangible impact on local communities; the alternative is swift enforcement for non-compliance’ (2013, p. 1).

This increased intensity was the most frequently cited difference between IOM and standard probation supervision by practitioners, and was, as the quotes below suggest, identified as one of the mechanisms that make IOM “work”: 
‘I’m sure it’s just down to the intensity of the supervision they can get and the fact that they’re being selected for attention’ (Staff Interview 29 – Pathways PC)

‘... everywhere they go they are being picked up you know, they’re being managed everywhere they go. And every single day they’re learning more about that offender’ (Staff interview 9 – IOM Sergeant)

‘I do think given the level of support that they’re given, that helps them’ (Staff Interview 36 – Probation Service Officer)

One offender described how IOM had come to structure his days stating:

‘Like every morning I wake and think what have I got to do today I’ll ring probation first call 9 o’clock in the morning, have I got an appointment today? If so, what time?’ (Offender 8)

Another offender noted that, ‘if you mess up you don’t just get told off by one person you get it three times, four times, it’s like or they all come at once’ (Offender 23). This approach acted as an incentive not to fail on IOM.

Interviews with practitioners and offenders explored what this additional contact was used for. When offenders were asked what their time on IOM had involved, the provision of practical support was often mentioned. This is perhaps because practical support is more tangible and easier to identify than work regarding attitudes towards offending or victims, at least in the short term. The most commonly mentioned practical support was usually provided by probation Education, Training and Employment workers. This support included, help looking for work through job clubs and preparing CVs, funding and help to apply for particular qualifications, driving licences and attend college courses. Practitioners from these services often characterised their role as sitting outside direct supervision. As such they were seen as more of a benefit, rather than part of the enforceable engagement. This might be one reason why offenders are more ready to mention the benefits, as noted by this worker:

‘... it’s the positive side of probation in a way because you know, we don’t have the powers to breach as such or to recall people to prison
but we’re very much on the positive side of trying to help them as an intervention between offending again’ (Staff Interview 27 - Education, Training and Employment worker)

The support offered by other practitioners was also noted. Practical help received from probation officers included help with housing such as checking availability with providers, putting offenders forward for vacancies and providing items once accommodation was secured. One offender (Offender 23) reported a successful example of such work with an external housing provider; probation workers arranged a meeting with a local housing provider in order to assure them of the monitoring to which the offender was subject and so supported his housing application that was at risk of being rejected due to his criminal record.

In addition to this practical support, more regular meetings with staff were reported by practitioners to provide offenders with opportunities to talk through problems, whether during appointments or whenever an issue arose. There were examples during the fieldwork of offenders contacting IOM practitioners at times when they needed support or information. For example, at one offender interview the interviewee, Offender 13, reported that on the previous day he had contacted his drugs worker because a problem with his prescription caused him to fear he was at risk of relapse. He was able to explain the problem to his worker over the phone and so understood that it would be resolved quickly. As a result he did not relapse.

This describes the support available through the pathways elements of the approach. There is also an enforcement element to IOM. Whilst these two aspects of the approach can be seen as alternative ways of managing offenders, practitioners who were interviewed noted that rather than IOM offering either the ‘carrot’ of support or the ‘stick’ of enforcement, it is more a balance between the two. This is highlighted in the following quote from an IOM practitioner:
‘... they run together, there’s always support, it’s not like you’d be a good boy and you’ll get some support ... it’s not a carrot, it’s not a reward for good behaviour ... the same stuff’s available for you whether you’re out burgling every night or whether you’re trying to sort yourself out... And the control side of it isn’t a stick, we don’t beat people up... it’s like the control’s always the same you know, you break the law or it looks like you’re breaking the law and you’ll get this. That is always there. So for me they both run together. So it’s control and support all the time. And obviously you’re trying to move that offender into the midpoint where they’re balanced and leading an offence-free life you know, that’s what offender management is all about’ (Staff interview 44 - IOM sergeant)

That this considered view of offender management is provided by a police sergeant is indicative of the way in which IOM can alter a practitioner’s view. This is explored further in the section below considering the effects of multi-agency working.

The discussion so far has illustrated the way that IOM demands a greater degree of supervision of offenders that enables provision of practical support and time for discussion. The key aspects of this mechanism are that this supervision is both bespoke to individual offenders and sequenced. These aspects are outlined in the next section.

**Provision of bespoke and sequenced supervision**

It was common for practitioners to describe IOM as a tailored and bespoke intervention, using the additional contact with offenders to develop individualised support. Practitioners from all three agencies stated that the support IOM offered would reflect offender context and readiness, as discussed above, and aimed to help them achieve their own goals. So for example a Probation Service Officer interviewed stated that, ‘I think with [IOM offenders] it needs to be more of an assessment of what they need’ (Staff Interview 40). Furthermore when asked about the work done with offenders on IOM, a drugs worker stated, ‘depends on the client. It’s all about
clients’ needs... It depends on what stage a person’s at in their treatment’ (Staff Interview 60). This was also the case with the education training and employment services of the probation service as these quotes demonstrate:

‘... we don’t have a specific target for people that walk through the door. They have a specific target. We are here to help them to achieve their personal goals’ (Staff Interview 35 – Probation Service Officer).

‘... like I say with the action plan, is tailored to each individual offender and their needs’ (Staff Interview 27 - Education, Training and Employment worker).

Whilst offenders subject to standard probation supervision can develop good working relationships with those supervising them, there are more opportunities for contact with a variety of professionals within the IOM approach. This way of working is achieved through having lower caseloads for each offender manager and multi-agency teams, meaning that offenders are seen by various members of the team, that take place both in office and home settings. Together this allows each offender to be seen more frequently, with around four appointments a week expected for those subject to IOM on a prison licence or court order. Practitioners reported that this allowed more opportunities for work with offenders based on the needs and goals of individual offenders, identified either by themselves or by assessments undertaken. This in turn allows for a more complete picture of an offender to be shared with other relevant agencies, as outlined in the next section regarding multi-agency working.

One element of this supervision was the ‘sequencing’ of interventions (Heath, 2010, p. 196). This refers to the need to manage the work undertaken with offenders carefully, ensuring that interventions were delivered in an appropriate order to allow them be to as effective as possible. This was characterised as working with offenders, ‘in a bespoke way that brings about the best opportunities or chances for an offender to turn away from offending’ (National Interviewee 5).
This involves for example, not asking an offender to undertake in-depth work on their attitudes to offending or victims, while they were homeless or at a stage in their substance misuse that would undermine this work. The term ‘sequencing’ was not used in practitioner or management interviews in the research site. It was instead used by two national actor interviewees, both of whom work in the same geographical area. However, the ethos of sequencing was present in the research site, as the quote below shows:

‘...it’s all about us as a statutory sector, especially, tailoring it and getting it right... If they don’t keep appointments, you can’t just write them off, you’ve got to make the appointments easier to take because otherwise pathways aren’t real pathways’ (Staff Interview 55 – Police inspector)

Indeed this technique would be used within standard probation supervision, but there is scope to work more regularly in this way with those subject to IOM. The revised national IOM principles specifically refer to the need to provide ‘sequenced rehabilitative interventions’ to offenders (Home Office, Ministry of Justice, 2015, p. 3). This recognises the importance of this way of working, by those overseeing IOM nationally.

National interviewees also highlighted that the multi-agency nature of IOM can make the sequencing of supervision more difficult:

‘... if you’ve got a number of agencies all doing different things with somebody, they don’t always know that. And so ensuring that somebody’s drugs intervention is fitting with their employment, training and education needs, their home needs, their own needs you know, actually putting it into a sense that makes sense for the person, takes quite a lot of doing with this very chaotic group because they’re not straightforward people by any means’ (National Interviewee 4).

The issues created by the multi-agency nature of IOM are discussed later in this chapter.

The intensity of the contact within IOM does create potential confounding issues for offenders, these are discussed in the next section and include the stress created by the additional conditions and requirements of IOM, a focus
on the needs of offenders rather than understanding their strengths and finally, the lack of any clear end point to IOM, making it difficult to mark or formally recognise the success of individual offenders.

Confounding Issues

A number of offenders stated in their interviews that being subject to IOM had been stressful. Five of the 23 offenders chose to describe IOM as stressful or a source of worry in their lives. This was due to the number of appointments they had to attend, and the knowledge that failure to attend could result in a return to custody. Indeed, Offender 18 argued the intensity of the approach made his placement on it unfair, because it made it more likely that he would be returned to custody because he would be unable to comply with the requirements.

Another offender described how his experience of IOM had changed when he became a voluntary Level 3 as this lessened the worry he felt at missing appointments. Whilst subject to IOM on a statutory basis he stated:

‘… some weeks I can have four appointments a week, whereas normal probation it’s one a week, then it’s like one a fortnight after so long and then one a month, but I haven’t managed to do that … all my licence has been a minimum of two appointments all way up to a maximum of four or five if they want me to have that many’ (Offender 23)

Furthermore, interviewees noted that the IOM appointments often came on top of those from other agencies, particularly job centres, and so were not the only requirements with which they had to ensure they complied. One offender stated ‘sort of feels like my life sort of revolves around this’ (Offender 20).

As a response to this level of required contact and the risks of a failure to comply, a number of offenders stated that whilst they had been offered
opportunities or support, they had chosen not to take them to avoid the added stress of IOM. For example one offender stated:

‘I can remember the first time I was on it, I tried to do everything to please them, everything they were suggesting ... But that was one of the reasons what I realised afterwards, I was just doing it and putting myself under pressure ... so, like I’ve come out this time and I’ve told [my probation officer], I’ve said ‘Look yeah, I know what’s expected of me ... I’m just going to take things in stages’’ (Offender 15).

Some offenders noted that the number and unsocial time of home visits was causing problems with family members or friends with whom they were living, some of whom they were only recently back in touch with. This was the experience of the offender quoted below.

‘I didn’t know they were coming like I just woke up at my mum’s house and me and my mum had only just started speak again and I come out the toilet and there’s two police officers there’ (Offender 7)

This offender did not mind the visit, but did resent the lack of notice and the difficulty this could have created for his new relationship with his mum. A similar issue was raised by Offender 9, who reported the impact on him and his family: ‘when I was living with my mum’s they were coming around at silly o’clock, half past five, five o’clock, half four sometimes three o’clock do you know what I mean?’ He reported that the police team provided him with a mobile phone and that they would ring when they arrived for a visit, enabling him to present himself and avoid affecting his mother. However, not all officers used this process, which in his view was due to an “if I’m up, then you’re up” attitude from some officers. He reported that this had ‘messed things up’ with his mother, noting:

‘...obviously my mum’s got neighbours and sometime they’d be up do you know what I mean watching the police going round there every, all the time, knocking on the door you know what I mean, my mum was getting worried thinking they’re going to sign a petition and all this do you know what I mean, so she was panicking about it’ (Offender 9)
A third offender noted problems created with his girlfriend and his employer by the required level of contact. He noted regarding his girlfriend:

‘... it’s caused problems with me and my girlfriend it’s stressed her out ... you know sometimes when you don’t want to have your phone turned on for a day because you’re having a bad time, that can’t happen when you’re doing this [IOM], you can’t have a bit of ‘me time’ because these want to know what you’re doing’ (Offender 14)

With regard to his employer, he disclosed his offending and status as an IOM offender to his manager, but did not want his colleagues to know, and as a result he noted:

‘I have to be secretive in work, do you know what I mean, when I’ve got the police ringing me up and stuff I have quickly run off and, I feel like I’ve lied to people that trust me’ (Offender 14)

In addition to the requirements to attend IOM appointments, some offenders noted other aspects of IOM that were stressful. One of these was the way in which being on IOM raised an offender’s profile amongst the police force as a whole. This meant they were more likely to be stopped and questioned by officers. A number of offenders interviewed commented that they had been arrested for offences or stopped by officers because of this raised local profile, and not necessarily because they had been involved in new offending or had breached their conditions. This was justified by practitioners as part of the increased monitoring of offenders assessed as prolific enough to warrant an intervention such as IOM. However, it does risk an intense intervention becoming intrusive and counter-productive.

The second confounding issue relates to the lack of focus on the strengths of offenders. Drawing upon the findings from the literature detailed in Chapter 2, interviews with staff asked whether work done with offenders focused upon their strengths as well as identifying and responding to their needs. It was rare for practitioners to state that they did. Coding of the interviews revealed only 12 references to working with an offender’s strengths (see Table 5.3 in the previous chapter). Indeed when asked, some interviewees felt
that the prolific nature of their offending and the chaotic nature of their lives limited the possibility of working in this way with IOM offenders. Furthermore, echoing the literature on the changing nature of probation supervision (Robinson et al, 2013; Healy, 2012; Raynor and Robinson, 2009), it was noted that OASys does not ask about strengths but instead aims to identify needs or deficits in a person’s life.

However, when asked, there was support for working in this way. It was found that Education, Training and Employment officers were most likely or had the most opportunity to work in this way. For example they draw upon previous education and work experience when preparing plans with offenders. In doing this, they would try and use offender’s experiences of crime in a positive way. One officer helped an offender with a history of drug dealing who felt they had nothing to put on a CV in the following way, ‘so I said ‘You’ve got sale experience, you’ve got customer service experience, you’ve got money-handling experience’, he was like ‘Wow, I have haven’t I?’” (Staff Interview 27). This echoes the views of a probation officer who stated, ‘we do try to sort of focus on the things that they’re good at but that they’re not perhaps using in the right way’ (Staff Interview 39).

Regarding the final confounding issue, some practitioners interviewed noted that the intensive nature of IOM risked creating dependent relationships with offenders subject to it. As a result, this made the ending of IOM a potentially risky time and one that needed to be managed well. However, one national interviewee suggested that good exit strategies were not in place to the extent they should be: ‘if you look at IOM/PPO what that does is set them [offenders] outside of the community. This little world that happens in a very focused way... the one thing you don’t see with PPO and IOM sentence plans is exit strategy’ (National Interviewee 3). In order to reduce this risk local practitioners reported that they tended to withdraw IOM support gradually as offenders started to make progress, to ensure that their support was not
removed suddenly. In addition other teams of partner agencies could be asked to support offenders, such as local neighbourhood beat officers being asked to check in on offenders from time to time.

There were difficulties in formally marking the end of an individual’s time on IOM and signifying the removal of the ‘IOM label’ from them. This is due to the way the approach stretches throughout the criminal justice process and is not necessarily tied to the period of a court order or prison release licence. Thus it has no distinct end point beyond that chosen internally by practitioners that can be at the end of all statutory interventions.

Indeed, once an offender is removed from the IOM caseload there is no formal process to mark this with the offender. Practitioners reported that if they were able, they would tell offenders either that they had been removed or were going to be recommended for removal and would make it clear that this was a positive achievement. However, there can be logistical issues with this. If it was agreed to remove an offender from IOM at the end of their statutory order or licence it could be difficult to get back in touch with an offender when they were no longer required to attend appointments or were subject to IOM voluntarily. Alternatively an offender might be transferred to a mainstream probation team to finish their order or licence. This team may be based in a different building, making follow up contact difficult.

Those practitioners who worked in small geographical areas where they were likely to see offenders again mentioned that they would reiterate to offenders how well they were doing. This lack of follow up was found to be an issue with the completion of exit interviews. A questionnaire was developed by local practitioners during the fieldwork period, but it was reported that these were often not completed, due to such logistical difficulties.
As an intense intervention, offenders tend only to remain on IOM when they are most in need or at risk of reoffending. Observations at IOM selection meetings and interviews with practitioners suggested that offenders would be withdrawn once they were starting to reduce their offending and stabilise. However, it was also observed that decisions to remove an offender from IOM often had to be reversed, because of a change in circumstance or a new arrest. It was not uncommon for practitioners at IOM selection meetings to request that offenders who had been put forward, were not taken off IOM. This is perhaps unsurprising given the extent of offending and the complex process of change in which IOM offenders are engaged. However, these changes in circumstances also complicate the process of declassifying an offender.

It was difficult to get information from offenders about the ending of IOM as almost all the interviewees were currently subject to it, and in most cases had been for some time. In some cases this whole period was considered by them as one experience. For example, offenders may have been returned to custody a number of times for breaching one licence period or been in a cycle of prison and probation on release with no sustained gaps in between. However, one offender (Offender 12) underlined the lack of any formal declassification when he reported that he had previously only discovered he was no longer on the scheme as he was released from prison and asked the staff about his post release conditions and found that they did not include IOM.

Summary

This section has illustrated that a defining aspect of IOM is that it involves a greater degree of contact between offenders and practitioners. It has described how practitioners consider this to be one of the three mechanisms that makes IOM “work” for offenders. This increased contact has been shown
to enable practitioners to provide a more individualised, bespoke and
sequenced support to offenders than would be the case in more generic or
mainstream teams. This support is always provided in conjunction with an
element of enforcement, which rather than being conceptualised as a carrot
and stick, have been described as complementary aspects of IOM.

However, the research has also shown that this level of contact brings with it
risks for offenders and for IOM. For example, a number of offenders
interviewed described finding IOM intense and stressful given the risk of
returning to prison if they fail to comply. It can also risk putting family
relationships under strain at a time when they may have only been newly
established. In addition the focus on offender needs, as opposed to strengths
risks limiting the ways in which IOM can operate as a bespoke and
personalised intervention. Finally, the way in which IOM operates throughout
the criminal justice system and does not necessarily mirror periods of
statutory support, was found to create difficulties in marking the end of
involvement with IOM. This prevents practitioners from being able to mark a
successful completion with an offender, and formally de-labelling them as a
prolific offender.

**Mechanism Two - Close multi-agency working**

IOM is intrinsically multi-agency both locally and nationally. The IOM
government policy statement states, ‘IOM provides a comprehensive and
coordinated response, recognising that more coherent joint working can help
partners to make the best use of their resources’ (Home Office, Ministry of
Justice, 2009, p. 4-5). A recent national inspection of IOM defines it as:
‘... a multi-agency approach promoted by the Home Office and the
Ministry of Justice ... the principles of Integrated Offender
Management emphasise that all partners should cooperate in working
with offenders’ (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p. 7).
This view is reflected at a local level within the research site with the local IOM documentation states:

‘Integrated Offender Management is based on the recognition that no one agency alone can reduce reoffending’ (Local IOM Document, 2013, p. 1)

This section draws upon interviews with local IOM practitioners and national actors as well as observations of local meetings to explore how this multi-agency working operates, and offender interviews to understand how it is experienced and understood. In addition it highlights some aspects of the operation of IOM that undermine this joint working.

There is a long history of joint working on prolific and priority offenders locally. The local roll out of both PPO and IOM predated the respective national policies. One interviewee noted that joint working on this issue between the police and probation service dated back to the early 1990s under the banner of a specific project. This predates even the statutory obligation of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Some interviewees, both practitioners and offenders still referred to the initial project and this long history of multi-agency working, with each team having members who have been involved in IOM (and PPO before it) for a long time. As a result of this early adoption of multi-agency working the research site was made one of the pioneer areas for IOM and so included in the national evaluation (Senior et al, 2011).

The way in which multi-agency working regarding prolific offenders emerged before the advent of central government guidance mirrors the way IOM emerged elsewhere. Indeed, a national interviewee, who was based in central government, was clear that IOM was not a Whitehall invention and that it began in various local areas as a result of their experience in the previous multi-agency DIP and PPO programmes. This was then codified and promoting by the Home Office and Ministry of Justice. As a result the interviewee noted,
‘IOM doesn’t and probably never will look the same if you go to different places because it relates to the circumstances, the history and the priorities of local areas’ (National Actor 2).

Practitioners from the key IOM agencies who were interviewed recognised both the importance of working with each other to achieve goals that could not be achieved alone and the interdependence between agencies that this requires. The two interviewees quoted below, one from the police and one from probation, both made reference to the added value brought by working in partnership:

‘I think the key is that these individuals many of them are very, very complex cases and so ultimately one agency alone couldn’t probably provide the response that they need to stop them reoffending. So actually we acknowledged that we’re better off working in partnership with others and sharing that information’ (Staff Interview 17 - IOM Inspector)

‘... it is no good one agency just dealing with them [offenders], they need a comprehensive response and for me this is what IOM does... well my theory is you know, the best work anyone ever does is when it’s integrated. The worst work is when it’s disintegrated’ (Staff Interview 3 - Probation Director)

Practitioners interviewed and the IOM meetings observed revealed that the key element of this mechanism and the key benefit to working in this way is that it increases the amount and timeliness of information available to all agencies about offenders and their circumstances. This affords practitioners a more complete picture of offenders and supports the intense supervision and management outlined above. This was thought to reduce the opportunity for offenders to disengage and return to offending, or to increase the likelihood of them being caught. This is in turn built upon trust between co-located teams of practitioners.

In this way IOM provides opportunities for engagement with and also surveillance of offenders beyond what is possible under standard supervision. This element of surveillance and its effect was noted by the following interviewee:
‘... if those people know they’re under surveillance, and every chance they step out of line there’s a high chance their going to be caught, more of a chance they’ll decide, ‘best keep me head down for a while’’
(Probation director 3)

It can also provide an alternative to traditional police surveillances of offenders, or complement it by providing more information about the location and associates of offenders. For example one national interviewee who works in the police service commented that,

‘There’s a natural surveillance in IOM as well, which by having a regime of interventions appointments and home visits, housing appointments etc. it brings about what I would term a natural surveillance’ (National interviewee 5)

The above has outlined how multi-agency working underpins IOM and how it is understood by practitioners. The next section considers its operation in practice.

The experience of multi-agency working

Regular face to face meetings and the fact that each team is co-located and overseen by a police sergeant and senior probation officer allows teams to move flexibly between an enforcement and a pathways approach depending on the circumstances of the individual offender.

It was noted by some practitioners that co-location was particularly effective in open-plan offices, where comments made between workers or overheard conversations could be picked up easily. These less formal methods of information exchange were useful for two reasons. Firstly, the speed at which the circumstances of IOM offenders can change and secondly, because this enabled concerns or ideas to be shared at an earlier stage than they might have been if they relied on practitioners being sure enough of them to log them formally on a system. The free flow of relevant information is taken seriously by IOM staff; one IOM sergeant noted, ‘I get cross if information sits
somewhere for an hour within this building and it’s not shared’ (Staff Interview 4).

However, it was clear from meetings observed and from practitioners interviewed that the focus of this information exchange was managing IOM offenders. Practitioners understood that agencies may be told things by offenders that were not relevant to this aim and therefore, did not need to be shared. For example, drugs workers were careful that only relevant information was shared, as opposed to that related to health concerns of offenders. A drugs agency team leader noted, ‘confidentiality-wise you know, we don’t want anybody knowing about their Hep C or HIV or whatever ... But other than that, I think the information-sharing between all parties now is really good’ (Staff Interview 25).

Offenders were asked what being managed in a multi-agency team was like and whether they had noticed differences from previous experiences of standard probation supervision. Offenders were aware of the multi-agency nature of IOM, as the comments of this offender demonstrate:

‘Obviously they all work together don’t they so they all know what their saying to each other, so they know what [information] to let go and what not to let go’ (Offender 10)

In addition, the greater access that IOM practitioners had to offenders and information about them was also acknowledged:

‘... other police are trying to drive information out of you all the time do you know what I mean, like ‘who have you being hanging round with?’ and all that, you don’t get none of that, because these ones already knew it all do you know what I mean because they deal with us all the time don’t they’ (Offender 14)

Some differences were found between the different enforcement teams. These related to whether officers wore uniform and whether they operated overtly as police officers targeting IOM offenders specifically, or undertook general patrolling of local areas. The decision on how the enforcement teams
approached their work was often taken by team sergeants who were informed, in part, by requirements within the local areas, but also by how they wanted the team to work and be considered by other police colleagues. For example one of the teams whose sergeant had chosen to operate in uniform felt that this made the team accessible to other police colleagues.

With regard to the management of a particular offender, where police and probation workers had a difference of opinion, there were opportunities for this to be discussed. At one observed team meeting probation workers raised concerns about an offender who was required to attend a placement in a location that was difficult to access. The probation workers were keen to move the placement to enable the offender to comply. Police officers however were sceptical that this was needed, commenting that the offender had not needed help to access the sites where he committed crime. The probation workers explicitly noted as part of their concern their need to support the compliance of offenders, as this is one of the ways in which they were assessed, which is not the case for the police.

Indeed, in interviews, probation workers commented that working in a multi-agency team did alter the way in which they managed individual offenders. This was due in part to the greater amount of information they had available to them but also the input of different workers. One senior probation officer commented that this sometimes meant taking a course of action different from that which an individual worker would have chosen, ‘You may not agree with a course of action but you have to stand by it and that’s about trust and respecting your team’ (Staff Interview 51). This was echoed by an IOM team police sergeant who stressed the importance of sticking by decisions taken jointly:

‘... the whole thing for me is that we ... don’t do anything that’s not been agreed with Probation. Because otherwise they won’t trust us and they won’t tell us anything ... they trust you to do what you say you’re going to do in the meeting and then they’re happy to share information with you because they know that you’ll not abuse it and
Interviews with practitioners showed that prior to PPO and IOM, interaction between criminal justice agencies particularly the police and probation service had been rare and characterised by a lack of trust. Trust has now grown to a point where it was reported by interviewees to be key to the functioning of IOM. This has been a result of the development of PPO and IOM that required practitioners from these agencies to work closely together in the same office, supervising the same offenders. It was noted by interviewees that this had taken time and willingness from those involved. For example one drugs worker noted that colleagues of hers, who do not work with criminal justice clients, are wary of her close working relationships with agencies in that sector, she stated: ‘a lot of drug workers who might think ‘oh my goodness, how on earth can you share information with Probation and the Police?’ It’s absolutely fine because you have to learn to trust each other’ (Staff Interview 32 - Drugs worker). These relationships do therefore require a willingness and belief in their purpose. This was reflected in comments by a probation interviewee on the work required to build trust:

‘... one of the things that we’ve learnt is that actually multiagency working and communication and information-sharing are quite difficult. You know, it takes a long time to set those things up, it takes a long time to build those relationships of trust’ (Staff Interview 52 - Senior Probation Officer)

The particular importance of trust within multi-agency working was expressed by a second probation interviewee who noted its importance with regard to the informal data sharing noted above. This concerned information that is not yet appropriate for formal systems, but which none the less is important for the management of offenders. The interviewee stated:

‘... reducing reoffending comes out of us working together and sharing information together. And very often that information is the sort of soft intelligence that you will only share with people that you trust’ (Staff Interview 3 - Probation Director)
Trust and close team working was demonstrated in more than one team meeting observed where IOM police officers criticised or expressed doubts over intelligence submitted by non-IOM police officers on IOM offenders. There was a sense from IOM team members that they were best placed to assess intelligence on “their” offenders and a willingness from IOM police officers to query information given by those outside of the team. This demonstrated an IOM team identity, rather than a police organisation one (Annison et al, 2015). This did not mean however that IOM teams ignored intelligence provided from external sources. For example, at the team meetings of one team the arrest of an IOM offender was discussed. It was thought by the team that the offender was unlikely to have committed the offence for which he had been arrested, based in part on the information they had about his movements. It was thought the police officers who had arrested him had assumed his involvement based on his previous offending. It later turned out that he had indeed committed the offence and breach proceedings were started. In part the suspicion of the IOM team of this arrest comes from the sense some IOM police officers have that the wider force does not understand IOM and are themselves suspicious of it. This confounding issue is discussed in the following section that explores some of the obstacles faced by multi-agency working.

Confounding Issues

There were a number of incidences reported where the multi-agency working underpinning IOM faced problems. In the main these were the result of tensions between the IOM teams and the actions or objectives of the agencies from which these teams are drawn, or a lack of understanding of IOM. This is further affected by the limited extent of the IOM teams, and a lack of clear strategic direction and management for IOM that can leave this way of working unsupported.
With regard to tensions between IOM teams and their wider organisations, it was common for practitioners to comment that their colleagues outside of IOM did not understand the work they did, and in some cases were suspicious of it. As noted above drugs workers commented that their colleagues were wary of their close contact with the police and probation services. Likewise, police officers noted that other police colleagues could be suspicious of the work they did, especially the pathways roles, as it looked so different from a more traditional response role. To them IOM police officers were working within the ‘alien philosophy’ of probation, as it was termed by one the probation directors interviewed (Staff interview 3), and were no longer undertaking “real” police work echoing the findings of previous research into multi-agency working by the police (O’Neill and McCarthy, 2014). In both interviews and meetings observed, IOM police officers would note how they felt they had to defend IOM and its work to police officers and managers outside IOM.

In part this was due to the sharp distinction drawn between pathways and enforcement teams, which is not the case in all IOM areas (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p. 39-40). It was also in part due to the fact that at the time of the research, the line management of the operational IOM staff within the police was held by a different team from that of the senior IOM staff. This meant that IOM police officers effectively had two line managers, both of whom would task them. This made it more likely that IOM officers could be asked to do tasks away from their IOM role. The rank structure in the police made it difficult for officers to manage this confusion.

This lack of knowledge of IOM even extended to the one IOM team that was based within a probation team. This team had been organised by geographic area rather than role, in order to better integrate the IOM workers who were dispersed into teams for each local area. However, practitioners in this IOM team did not necessarily think this had improved the knowledge of IOM
amongst generic probation officers nor increased the level of nominations into IOM.

The physical location of IOM teams can however affect their work (Farrall et al., 2007, p. 367). At the time of this research IOM teams, with the exception of the enforcement police officers, were based in either probation offices or partnership buildings. The enforcement officers were based in police stations, where the teams had previously been based. Practitioners stated that this move had been due to a need to ensure co-location of the three key agencies and to try and bring IOM closer together with mainstream probation teams. Limitations of space and shift patterns meant that enforcement officers remained in police stations, coming to the new buildings for meetings. Probation practitioners noted that these buildings were a better environment for offender reporting, noting that ‘police stations aren’t designed for interviewing offenders other than in particular circumstances’ (Staff Interview 3 - Probation Director). Indeed, some enforcement officers reported using police stations for IOM teams made it easier to arrest offenders, should that be required.

However, some pathways police officers noted that being separated from other police colleagues in fields such as intelligence can limit the contextual information they have about offenders or areas in which they are working. By being based in police stations some enforcement officers were co-located with local CID teams, which they stated, provided useful information exchange about offenders and patterns of offending. IOM team sergeants reported that they attended various meetings to ensure that information on IOM offenders was shared with others and that they were made aware of intelligence held by other teams. In a partnership approach such as IOM, the physical location of practitioners is important and can affect the operation of the approach. Constraints on resources and space may limit the extent to
which co-location can take place, and the most effective set up many not be as simple as having all practitioners based in the same location.

In addition to the problems IOM practitioners faced in explaining and justifying their work to their wider organisations, practitioners noted that their work can also be undermined by the work of other parts of their own organisation. IOM police officers noted that officers whose concern was with a particular neighbourhood or a particular crime type can undermine the work of the IOM team whose concern is a group of particular offenders.

One example of this was given by an interviewee who worked for a third sector housing provider that was housing IOM offenders in a particular area. They reported that they had had to arrange a meeting between two police officers, one in the IOM team and one responsible for the local area. The latter thought that the offenders housed in his area were causing a rise in local crime and was keen to move the offenders to a different location. The IOM officer however was keen to have the offenders housed in a stable situation, to allow the IOM practitioners to work on other aspects of their lives and offending. Both of these approaches are understandable given the responsibilities of the police, but they directly contradict each other. A second example was provided by an offender, who outlined the following experience he had had with non-IOM police officers:

‘...last time I was out, it was about a year and a half ago, it was my first job and I was about 20 at the time, 21 and I got a job and I was working for about 4-5 weeks. I got stopped [by the police] in the car on way coming back and when the police on my area found out they phoned up the work place and said you know I’m on licence and I’ve just come out of prison and they sacked me’ (Offender 22)

The offender reported this to his IOM police officer who complained on his behalf within the Force. These examples demonstrate the potential outcomes of attempting to solve a “wicked problem” (Rittel and Webber, 1973) such as...
crime. The same agency can be legitimately concerned for a local area or an individual offender, and so produce conflicting outcomes.

There were other examples of the various responsibilities of the police impacting upon the organisation and operation of IOM identified during the fieldwork. At the beginning of the fieldwork, it was reported that the police had recently decided to change the way in which they organised the geographic force area covered for internal, operational reasons. This had meant a similar change being made by the probation service to support IOM and other forms of partnership working. Rather than agreeing and jointly undertaking this reorganisation, the probation service was reacting to the police’s decision. Similarly, towards the end of the fieldwork period, the focus of IOM widened from those committing serious acquisitive crimes to all prolific offenders, regardless of the type or seriousness of the crime they were committing. Local police managers stated at meetings observed that this change had been prompted by a fall in the crime types that IOM had targeted and a rise in others, such as violence. There had also been wider moves within the police force to focus on preventing crime. Again, this seemed to be a decision taken internally within the police, that as a hierarchical, rank-structured organisation, the service was able to enact relatively quickly, but which had implications for their IOM partners.

These examples highlight the effect organisational structure and culture can have upon partnership working. It can also be seen as an example of the police making use of the partnership to achieve its own ends, as opposed to those of the partnership as a whole. Local IOM documents identify the police as the lead agency for IOM, and with regard to resources, the police provide the largest number of dedicated (as far as possible) officers. Furthermore, some of the practitioners interviewed, from all three agencies, reported that the drugs services are considered to be a secondary partner in IOM. Identifying a lead agency for a partnership approach such as IOM risks
undermining the important working relationships that support it by permitting that agency to make unilateral decisions to which the other partner organisations have to respond.

This highlights the need for strong leadership for a partnership such as IOM where the approach is not the ‘overall mission’ (Murphy and Lutze, 2009, p. 66) of the organisations involved. The governance and accountability of IOM as a whole is shared between three different bodies, a Reducing Reoffending Board, the Local Criminal Justice Board and the local Community Safety Partnership Boards. It was noted by IOM management that none of these groups has primacy over IOM, and that they share membership, that makes ownership of the approach confused, as the following quotes suggest:

‘… really I think the doing bit is far more advanced than the governance structure’ (Staff Interview 11- IOM Police Manager).

‘I think one of the things that we have never properly resolved is governance’ (Staff Interview 3 - Probation director)

The issue of defining and measuring performance has been a key area of work over the course of the research for the Reducing Reoffending Board. As a result monitoring of IOM performance was not fully in place during the fieldwork period, with the relevant data only starting to become available towards the end of this period. One interviewee, who had visited a number of other IOM approaches nationally noted that this was not only a local issue, but one that is faced by other IOM approaches, ‘there’s a performance management gap … nationally performance management is a problem for IOM’ (Staff Interview 54 - IOM Inspector).

Interviewees noted that measuring performance was affected not only by access to data and analytical capacity, but also by the more fundamental need to agree measures of success. IOM sits on the fault-line of a wider issue; that the aims of the police and probation service can conflict and undermine each other through a lack of goal congruence. The focus of the police service, as
directed by the Home Office, is a reduction in crime, whilst the aim of the probation service and Ministry of Justice is to reduce reoffending. Whilst the two aims may seem to be linked, they can result in actions that conflict. For example, the actions of the police in focusing upon detection of crime may increase the rates of reoffending that are used to judge the probation service.

This issue is compounded by a lack of statutory status for IOM. Whilst there is encouragement from central government to employ an IOM approach, there is no requirement to do so. The way the PPO programme became IOM was also found to cause confusion for the offenders involved. During the research it was noted that the term IOM is rarely used by offenders, tending instead to use the term ‘PPO’ or ‘prolifics’ to refer to the approach and themselves. Practitioners also used these terms, in no small part because the terms still have meaning in the criminal justice system. This inconsistency in terminology could create confusion when explaining IOM to other parts of home organisations or to other partner organisations, who had been familiar with the older PPO label and the “premium service” it implied.

The final confounding issue covered in this section is the lack of formal engagement between IOM and of some other key agencies that lie outside the criminal justice system. The IOM partnership exists formally between the police, probation and drugs services, practitioners from which make up the co-located teams. Whilst there is co-location, data sharing and joint working in place between the three core IOM agencies within these teams, interviewees regularly noted that their work with offenders involved them working with other agencies outside of this core team. The most commonly noted additional agencies were: housing providers or local authority housing departments; job centres and the Department for Work and Pensions regarding benefits; local authority social services departments; and mental health agencies. In addition, it was noted that links to local prisons and courts
were important. To this end the presence of an IOM coordinator police officer in the local prison was often noted a useful link.

With regard to housing and benefit agencies, practitioners interviewed noted that they often did not have a direct or formal route into such services and used the same access routes as the general public. Where there were examples of better working relationships these depended upon personal contacts established with a particular agency or project. These were therefore vulnerable to either party moving on creating the risk for ‘disordered delivery’ (Harvey et al, 2015, p. 507). Indeed there was little or no evidence of such agencies present at weekly team, IOM selection or Reducing Reoffending Board meetings observed. This is of particular importance with regard to housing and benefit agencies, as secure housing and stable finances were agreed to be key foundations on which work with offenders could be based. Without such things in place practitioners interviewed noted that any work with offenders on other issues, including substance misuse or attitudes to offending, was much more difficult.

The issues outlined in this section highlight how multi-agency teams can exist in a liminal position, removed from their home organisations through their responsibilities and location, but in need of their support especially on issues where priorities conflict or to develop relationships with other relevant organisations.

Summary

This section has considered the mechanism of close multi-agency working within IOM. The fieldwork interviews and observations revealed that there is a long history of partnership working locally predating more national, government backed programmes. In addition, and due to this long experience, there was reported by practitioners to be trust and
interdependence between different agencies and their workers. Information sharing was observed during team and monthly meetings and more informally in the co-located offices. Offenders interviewed were also aware of this and practitioners reported that their supervision of individual offenders was altered by it.

However, this multi-agency working was found to be operating mostly at the day-to-day tactical level, rather than strategically. During the fieldwork period there was a lack of a clear performance management, and the governance of IOM is split between different partnership bodies leading to a lack of clarity. As outlined above those working within IOM teams can find themselves isolated from their wider organisation, both physically and with regards to their focus and duties. This is particularly the case in the police, where IOM officers can find their work with offenders undermined by other police officers with different priorities and targets. In addition it was found that the police are tacitly understood to be the lead IOM agency, and have made unilateral decisions that impact IOM and the other partner agencies.

This reflects a wider, national difficulty created by the two government agencies with responsibility for IOM, the Home Office and Ministry of Justice, working towards potentially contradictory objectives, namely a reduction in crime and a reduction in reoffending.

Thus far this chapter has highlighted the importance of the context in which offenders come on to IOM and the mechanisms concerning the intense and multi-agency way in offenders are supervised. The third and final mechanism operating within IOM concerns the importance of supportive working relationships established between IOM offenders and staff, and so draws together the previous sections.
Mechanism Three - Caring and trusting relationships with offenders

Good working relationships between staff and offenders provide the link between the intense supervision offered to prolific offenders by the multi-agency teams and the outcomes of IOM. The way in which these are influenced by the experience and training of practitioners, and how they are experienced by both practitioners and offenders are explored in this section, along with the difficulties they can create.

The relationships established between staff and offenders can be key to the process of offender rehabilitation. This is particularly the case if they move beyond monitoring compliance and demonstrate genuine care (Canton, 2013, p. 590; Shapland et al, 2012, p. 42; Robinson et al, 2014, p. 127) something recognised by the IOM thematic inspection (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p. 29). Within the local IOM approach there is recognition of the importance of establishing working relationships with offenders. As a result, the way in which IOM is introduced to offenders and the first meeting were considered important by practitioners interviewed. Practitioners noted how an introduction letter is used to explain to offenders why they have been selected for IOM and what it will involve. Many practitioners stated that it was important to meet offenders coming on to IOM whilst they were still in prison. This meeting provided an opportunity to outline what IOM will involve and means that offenders will at least be meeting with workers known to them upon release. As one interviewee noted:

‘I will always try and visit people in prison before they come out because you’ve got a captive audience, it’s the best way to get somebody to engage, it’s the best way of building up a relationship, so that when they do come out the relationship is already established and I’ve got a better chance then of them continuing their engagement with me’ (Staff Interview 26 – Pathways PC)

Offenders were asked about their relationships with IOM workers and in particular the police officers, who undertake a somewhat different role from
the police officers they may have previously encountered. Offenders recognised IOM police officers to be part of the overall police force. Some offenders reported that this can cause them to be unwilling to open up and share information about themselves, and particularly about others. For example:

‘... [my Probation Service Officer] she hits the mark, I can tell her things. Cos she’s not the police, but [Pathways PC], she is the police, so I have to be careful, do you know what I mean ... I know she’s got her job, but in my eyes she the police, I’m saying that, but me, I have to be careful what I say’ (Offender 16).

‘I don’t think I hold back on what I say to them and you know I don’t tell them about people committing stuff or anything, or offending, you know I wouldn’t tell them anything’ (Offender 13)

This aspect of the relationship between offenders and police officers was also recognised by practitioners as the following quote suggests:

‘... sometimes this idea of like the nice pathways officer goes round and makes sure you’ve got enough milk in your fridge and all that, they’re not stupid you know, they know that everything they say to that person is fed straight back into the intelligence system. If they tell them the wrong thing they’ll get their door put in, so they’re not going to tell them that... they’re never unaware of the fact that we’re cops anyway, so the relationship is always going to be within the bounds of offender and police officer’ (Staff Interview 7 - IOM Sergeant)

A number of offenders therefore drew a distinction between the IOM police officers and the drugs and probation workers, even though they were aware that they worked in the same team in the same office. Practitioners reported that they do make this clear to offenders.

Offenders were asked about the different role of the pathways police officers specifically and their experience of them. The following quotes show that offenders did consider these officers to be different and they treated them as such:

‘... the police that work with probation are alright, they’re all sound they’re just the same as probation officers really. Obviously they haven’t been made to come and work here they chose to come and
work here off their own backs and help people stay out rather than locking them up’ (Offender 8)

‘... normal coppers are completely different to these guys’ (Offender 14)

‘... deep down I know he’s a copper, but you know it does feel slightly I don’t know, it does feel different from the usual bobbies that you see on the beat, you know he’s working through probation I know he’s there to help’ (Offender 20)

‘I don’t even look on him as a police officer, he used to be’ (Offender 22)

The above quotes suggest that offenders do draw distinctions between IOM pathways officers and all other police officers; for example IOM officers are considered to be more polite, which echoes the findings of procedural justice research (Tyler, 2003). The fact that officers in some IOM teams wore plain clothes was also mentioned by some offenders who appreciated that this made less of an impact upon their families and less of an impression of their neighbours when home visits were made.

Relationships with staff were reported to be supported by continuity in the officers. For example two offenders stated:

‘I requested the same drug worker, when I was in prison ... because I had a relationship with her beforehand, I wanted to see someone who sort of I’d seen before and sort of knew me and all the rest of it and that was ok ... getting to know someone is about trust as well and trust and I felt that I had done that’ (Offender 20)

‘I like [Pathways PC and Probation Service Officer] to come because I talk to them and I tell them everything ... cos I know them and I tell them everything ... but people who I don’t know, that’s why I don’t like different people coming... I won’t tell anybody I’d used and owt like that and I’d rather tell [Pathways PC and Probation Service Officer] or ring them’ (Offender 12)

This second offender was visited at home by two different workers, while his regular workers were on leave, together with the researcher (to conduct an interview). The interview was not conducted until a later date, during which
the offender stated that he had lied to these workers about his substance use that week because he did not know them. Whilst this lie would have been picked up by the drugs test conducted at the visit, it does demonstrate how consistency in supervising staff can aid the work done with offenders.

Practitioners made clear that the relationships established with offenders are not without purpose on either side. They are not friendly, personal relationships, but professional relationships, with opportunities for both sides and work is required to continue them. For practitioners these relationships were based on openness and honesty so that offenders know the professional basis on which any relationship stands and the fact that enforcement action will be taken for failure to comply with requirements or further offending.

However, there were examples observed during the fieldwork of genuine concern for offenders. Prior to one offender interview a pathways police officer brought the interviewee some clothes and food that they had collected because the offender was moving into a property after a period of homelessness and had very few possessions. A second offender reported that their father, with whom they lived, was terminally ill and that his pathways PC and probation officer had taken it upon themselves to try and teach him some of the life-skills he would need if living alone; he stated, ‘I’ve been in jail so long all I know is jail, and they try telling me things; how to put electric on, how to put gas on and I don’t know how to do food’ (Offender 16). As outlined above there were also a number of reports from offenders and practitioners of offenders ringing practitioners when they felt they were at risk of returning to drug use in order to receive support and motivation.

Offenders subject to IOM are therefore aware of the multi-agency nature of the teams that supervise them. They report that this can lead them to interact differently with the various practitioners. Interviews with and observations of these teams were used to explore whether practitioners also approached
these relationships differently. These findings are presented in the following section.

**Different organisational approaches to relationships**

Interviews with practitioners revealed that there were indeed different institutional understandings of the nature of these relationships. Some IOM police officers, particularly those in enforcement roles, understood relationships in a very different way from other IOM practitioners. Probation officers and drugs workers tended to view relationships in a similar way; as ways to demonstrate to offenders that they cared about them and a means to support their moves away from crime. The following quotes from a probation director and a drugs worker demonstrate the way in which they see and use relationships with offenders; as a positive structure on which changes in their lives can be built:

‘I think that’s crucial that you’ve got a relationship with somebody who you think will care if you lapse... you have to have a sense of feeling that this person, as a human being, really does want me to do this. And that demands you know, a genuineness on the part of the worker about what they’re doing and how they approach it’ (Staff Interview 3 - Probation Director).

‘I always find when I work with a client, I always try and make them understand that I do actually care about what they’ve done or what happens. Because a lot of them haven’t had any of that you know ... it takes a lot to get any kind of respect from clients you know, you have to work really, really hard... relationships are really, really important’ (Staff Interview 24 - Drugs worker).

Whereas some of the IOM police officers viewed relationships with offenders as sources of intelligence that were useful both in reducing crime and also in managing offenders. Relationships with offenders thus become not frameworks for changes in a person’s life but sources of intelligence that can inform enforcement action as required:

‘... they’ve all got that one chink and it’s about finding it. Some are more difficult than others to find. Some people are too stupid to know
that they’ve actually got a chink in the armour, so we do find that …’If
they’ve got a dog, is that dog being kept well? Can the RSPCA come in?
If they’ve got a grandma, is she claiming benefits? You know,
everything … push the boat out because these people do not care two
shits about anything’ (Staff Interview 9 – IOM sergeant)

‘… we had one [offender] who’s MO if you will was to effectively be a
driver. He was involved with a group of nominals who committed
commercial burglaries but he had access to a car and he was
legitimate and he used to drive them around to different offences.
And we did a little bit of work and got his car crushed’ (Staff Interview
15 – IOM enforcement sergeant)

This difference in approach may be expected given the different training
police officers will have received from probation or substance misuse workers
and indeed the different role that police officers fulfil within IOM. This reflects
the discussion in Chapter 3 about the need to be clear about the role of each
agency and have an agreement over the aims and objectives of the
partnership. For example, when discussing relationships with offenders one
IOM sergeant noted:

‘From a Police perspective that’s all I’m bothered about is are they
offending or not? … I have to dissociate myself from those people a
little bit because it’s nice that they’re doing well but that’s not my job;
my job is to limit their offending. So if they’re not offending, that’s
good. I’m not too bothered about how they’re not offending you
know, if they’re drinking 25 cans of Special Brew a day but not
offending, that’s alright as far as I’m concerned’ (Staff Interview 7 -
IOM Sergeant)

For this officer a holistic view of an offender’s life is not their responsibility;
their concern is only to manage their offending. The quotes above show that
there are institutional understandings of relationships between offenders and
practitioners. This was not necessarily a cause for concern. Practitioners and
national actors interviewed were clear that there was a need for each
individual organisation to maintain their own focus with particular
responsibilities and roles. In a project requiring close and intense multi-
agency work with a relatively small group of offenders and staff, there is a risk
that roles become blurred between the agencies involved leading to the
creation of what has been termed a ‘polibation officer’, the combination of a police and probation officer (Nash, 1999, 2004, 2008; Mawby and Worrall, 2004, 2011a, 2011b). During the fieldwork evidence of whether this was occurring was looked for and practitioners were specifically asked about whether this was happening.

In the case of this IOM approach, despite close joint working in co-located teams, interviewees did not feel that this had led to a merging of roles within the teams or the creation of a ‘polibation’ officer. For example, it was common for police officers to comment that they remained a police officer, although one pathways officer did comment that they were ‘affectionately known as the good cop’ (Staff Interview 26). Thus, workers from each agency still brought to their role the training and skills from their home organisation. This was also seen in multi-agency meetings when IOM team members from different organisations would recommend different courses of action. Indeed as noted above practitioners regularly commented in interviews that working in such a team meant that they took different decisions than might have been the case if they did not.

The roles within IOM teams that seemed most likely to experience this ‘polibation’ effect were the pathways PCs and the probation service officers who are both engaged in day-to-day support of offenders. Some pathways officers did comment that they felt they had had to change the way in which they worked when they took on the role, for example one such officer commented:

‘When I first started I really couldn’t get my head around it because I was sitting in a room with a person who I knew uses heroin and was discussing their heroin use with them but not locking them up … you’re sitting there thinking right you’ve come out of prison because you’ve done 20 burglaries I know you’re using drugs but I can’t prove anything and I’ve now got to try and convince you to stop committing burglaries and stop using drugs and it is really hard. And the more you do it the easier it gets’ (Staff Interview 31 - Pathways PC)
There was an awareness amongst practitioners that the pathways role will not suit all police officers. Indeed there was more than one instance reported of a police officer being moved from a pathways to an enforcement role or vice-versa, and then having difficulties in adjusting to their new role. This is perhaps compounded by the lack of specific or joint training for IOM staff. Instead staff are supported when new in their roles by more experienced colleagues.

However, practitioners interviewed did feel that each agency and each role contributed differently to the team. It was also noted that whilst the pathways PC role was clearly different to a response officer role, there were similarities to the role of police field intelligence officers concerned with gathering information and intelligence not available to other practitioners (Annison et al, 2015, p. 398). In addition as a warranted police officer the pathways officers were available to arrest offenders when appropriate and use powers not available to other agencies.

Furthermore, there was no desire amongst local or national interviewees for the creation of such a ‘polibation’ officer. Managers of the local IOM approach were clear that the benefits of the partnership came from each agency contributing their own experience and skills. Probation directors talked about the ‘professional challenge’ that came from a multi-agency approach to IOM and commented that:

‘... for me, the absolute really fundamental bit about it is saying we don’t have to do each other’s jobs but we do have to work together ... I don’t need police officers to be social workers’ (Staff Interview 3 - Probation Director).

This was mirrored by comments from national actors interviewed, none of whom felt that IOM would benefit from a merging of the roles of those agencies involved. Instead the benefits lay in having different agencies and different professionals each contributing by undertaking their own role in a joint team (Worrall and Mawby, 2011a, p. 89). For example one national
interviewee stated, ‘I think it’s about keeping people’s professional role and the powers that they hold in their role quite distinct but well-understood across an integrated team’ (National Interviewee 4). Other national interviewees outlined this as probation taking on the responsibility for the management of offenders, and police officers being responsible for the gathering and sharing of information and intelligence. In this way the different institutional views regarding relationships with offenders outlined above, could be interpreted as further evidence of a lack of merging roles.

Confounding Issues

The section above has demonstrated that practitioners from different agencies interpreting their relationships with offenders differently is not necessarily an issue for IOM. However, the way in which police resources devoted to IOM are split between pathways and enforcement roles was thought by some interviewees to be an unhelpful and inefficient use of resources.

Some interviewees were keen to keep the organisation as it currently is with different police officers fulfilling the enforcement and pathways roles. This was often due to the need to build and maintain good working relationships with IOM offenders, and a concern that a role which involved both pathways and enforcement work would undermine such a relationship. This allows the enforcement officers to focus on different types of activity and by being “in-house” ensures that it does not get lost in the array of other duties fulfilled by police officers. In addition, and on a practical note, the shift patterns that the officers work are based on the differing demands of the two roles. Pathways staff work hours that allow them to be in contact with offenders and partner agencies during office hours, whilst enforcement officers work later in the evening and night, monitoring curfews and executing warrants.
However, other police interviewees felt that this distinction between the two teams was an artificial one and limited the work of the officers on each team. It was noted that probation staff have responsibility for both supporting offenders and the enforcement actions regarding warnings and breach proceedings. It is therefore possible to form working relationships with offenders in a role that includes both support and control. Indeed the importance of IOM providing both support and control together was outlined above by an IOM sergeant. It was demonstrated above that the fact that offenders know pathways officers are police officers does tend to limit the extent to which they will disclose information to them, although it did not mean that offenders were unable to form a working relationship with someone they knew to be a police officer.

An approach such as IOM, that seeks to support and control prolific offenders, needs to ensure the skills and experience of practitioners from a range of organisations are used in the most appropriate way. As outlined above, IOM has been successful in this and has avoided blurring responsibilities between organisations. However, the separation between the pathways and enforcement police officers in this site could to be too sharp a distinction. Offenders are able to understand that their probation officers will both support them and enforce the conditions of their licence or court order and that their drugs worker will report any positive drugs tests. It should then be possible for the same police officer to offer support and advice as well as executing warrants when appropriate as long as the extent of their role is made clear to offenders at the beginning of their engagement with IOM. The key would be to maintain their role as a police officer, labelled as such, and to avoid, as found in other IOM research, the creation of role that is more ‘polibation’ than police officer (Annison et al, 2015, p. 398). There would also be a practical issue of shift patterns that would need to be organised such that officers were available both to engage with other practitioners and undertake those enforcement activities that take place outside office hours.
The sharp distinction currently in place may be compounded by the lack of a formal programme of joint training for IOM practitioners. This means it can be difficult for police officers who join the teams to develop the new skills they need, and perhaps reinforces the view that officers should either support or enforce. A greater understanding of the role of probation practitioners would show how the two roles can be delivered. This would need to emphasise the benefits of each agency, rather than risk a blurring of roles. Despite this, national actors interviewed expressed no desire to implement a national IOM training package, preferring instead to let local areas decide what is appropriate for them.

Summary

This section has outlined how important supportive working relationships are considered to be by both practitioners and offenders to the process of rehabilitation. However, it has also demonstrated that the nature of these relationships is affected by the different organisations from which practitioners are drawn and the skills and experience they have. As a result the ways in which probation and drugs workers view offender relationships vary from those of enforcement police officers. Pathways police officers understand the importance of supportive offender relationships, but also view their role as distinct from that of probation or drugs workers, avoiding the risk of becoming a ‘polipation’ officer, that is present in multi-agency approaches such as IOM.

However, the sharp split in the roles of IOM police officers between pathways and enforcement may not be the best way to use these resources and may compound some of the difficulties with multi-agency working outlined in the previous section, with pathways officers considered too different from “real” police officers. It is argued here that police IOM resources could be better utilised by relaxing this distinction allowing police officers to have a more
holistic role within IOM. Although, care would need to be taken to retain the benefits of having dedicated police resources with regard to ensuring enforcement activity was undertaken. This would take careful planning of shift patterns, and could be supported of multi-agency training.

Outcomes

The sections above have outlined how the context and mechanisms underpinning IOM operate and to some extent are confounded by wider processes and working practices. In this way some of the outcomes generated from the individual mechanisms have been explored. These include the creation and maintenance of working relationships, the intense and personalised support provided within them, as well as instances where the mechanisms are not resulting in desired outcomes. This section uses the quantitative and qualitative data gathered to assess the overall outcomes of IOM regarding changes in extent and type of offending. The follow up period for offenders in the quantitative analysis was limited to one year. This makes the above understanding of how IOM operates, based on the qualitative data, key to understanding the results outlined below.

As noted in Chapter 2, individual change is a complex process, composed of different elements. As a result this assessment of the effect of IOM does not focus on a simple, binary assessment of whether those subject to IOM reoffended following their removal from it or not, but also considers other aspects of the effect that IOM can have (Flynn, 2011, p. 86). This is important given that the groups of offenders subject to IOM are prolific, often long term offenders who will not find the process of rehabilitation straightforward. This was recognised by local practitioners, who argued that a complete cessation of offending was not a sensible measure on which to judge IOM. One IOM sergeant argued that instead IOM should be, ‘about extending periods of non-
offending, it’s not about turning people into model citizens because they’re not going to be model citizens’ (Staff Interview 7).

Indeed a number of offenders interviewed noted that their period of IOM had been “the best they had done” since becoming involved in offending. This did not mean they had had no problems during that time, such as warnings, breaches, further offending or positive drug tests, but was more of a relative assessment of their own progress. The data gathered allow outcomes on reoffending, risks of reoffending and offender circumstances to be analysed, and these are presented below.

The effect of IOM upon reoffending

Table 6.3 below uses police national computer (PNC) data to show the number and proportion of offenders in the quantitative cohort convicted of zero, at least one and at least 10 offences in the 12 months before being taken on to IOM, during the IOM period and in the 12 months following IOM. It shows that a greater proportion of offenders were convicted of no crimes during and post IOM than pre, and correspondingly, that fewer offenders were convicted of at least one and at least 10 offences after being taken on to IOM.

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1In the data presented here the post IOM period is 12 months measured from the point an offender was removed from the caseload; 11 offenders started another period IOM during this 12 months, this is counted within the post period, as outlined in the previous chapter.
Paired samples T-tests were conducted to assess whether the differences in the number of offenders before, during and post IOM were statistically significant. The results are presented in Table 6.4 below and show that there were statistically significant differences in the number of offenders when comparing numbers pre and during IOM and pre and post IOM, these differences were significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively. The difference between the numbers of offenders in the during and post IOM periods were not found to be statistically significant. That the comparisons between offenders both pre and during and pre and post IOM are statistically significant could suggest that the effect of the approach lasts beyond direct experience of it.

Table 6.4: Change in numbers of offenders before, during and after IOM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Offences</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥1</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5 below displays the percentage and rate of offenders offending in each of the three periods considered.
Table 6.5: Offenders and offences pre, during and post IOM period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre</th>
<th>During</th>
<th>Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of offenders</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of offenders</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of offences</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of offences per offender</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the offenders in each period may have been different individuals. However, by being accepted on to the IOM cohort ensures that all individuals had offended prior to their start on the approach.

The figures in the above table can be compared with national data from the Ministry of Justice on those classified using the older PPO label that like the IOM approach studied targeted prolific acquisitive offenders. The proportion of PPO offenders reoffending within one year was 75% with an average of 4.77 subsequent offences (Ministry of Justice, 2013a, p. 21). The IOM cohort in the research site compares well to these figures, with 45.9% of offenders reoffending in the post period, with an average of 3.1 offences per offender. However, an additional six month data checking period is used in these national data (Ministry of Justice, 2013a, p7) compared to the 12 month period used in this research, allowing more time to register subsequent offences.

As outlined above, offenders are taken on to IOM on the basis of either the number of convictions in the past five years or arrests in the last 12 months for the serious acquisitive offences that form the criteria for IOM. Offenders are assigned scores based on the number of such offences for which they have been arrested or convicted, and on the basis of that score are classified red, amber or green. Table 6.6 below displays the arrest scores of the cohort of offenders in the quantitative analysis at both the start and end of their time on IOM. The conviction scores are not included as these will be slower to alter as they are measured over a longer period of time, whereas change will more readily be observed in the arrest scores that are measured over twelve months. The table shows an increase in the number of offenders in the green
category and a decrease in the number of offenders in the amber and red categories at the end of their IOM period.

### Table 6.6: IOM arrest scores at start and end of IOM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Start of IOM</th>
<th>End of IOM</th>
<th>% change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green 0-14</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>85.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amber 15-19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-40.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red 20+</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-45.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>98</strong></td>
<td><strong>98</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amongst the cohort of offenders analysed using the quantitative data there was a wide range of periods spent on IOM, from 28 to 980 days (2.7 years). The average time spent on IOM was 214 days or just over 7 months, although 13 individuals in the cohort (13.3%) were on IOM for over a year. This wide range is to be expected with an approach such as IOM that constantly assesses the suitability of offenders for it, and moves offenders in and out of teams depending on their level of risk or need. Thus post-IOM reoffending was not found to be statistically associated with having spent a certain number of days on IOM (judged using groups of days from under 30 to over 365). There is therefore no clear link between the “dosage” of IOM and reoffending. Given the findings outlined in this chapter and throughout this thesis, that offender rehabilitation is a complex and individual processes that will depend on an offender’s own readiness and circumstances, this is to be expected.

However, Table 6.7 below shows the number of days between the ending of IOM and the next offence committed. The analysis is limited by the fact that the follow up period is one year, but it does show that 62.2% of these further offences occurred within six months of finishing IOM. Indeed of the ten offenders whose further offence occurred within one month of finishing IOM, seven committed this offence within two weeks of finishing IOM. It does
therefore seem that the risk of further offending is greater just after finishing on IOM that may be linked to the way some offenders disengage from IOM once their statutory involvement ends.

Table 6.7: Days between ending IOM and next offence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Days from end of last IOM period to first offence</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 30 days</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-90 days</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91-180 days</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181-365 days</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When considering offending it is important to consider the time an individual has spent at liberty, as opposed to those periods spend in custody, where further offences are largely prevented. Table 6.8 below displays the average number of days spent at liberty in the pre, during and post IOM periods. It shows that the proportion of time offenders spent at liberty increased in the during and post phases when compared to the pre phase. Therefore, it was not necessarily the case that offending in these periods was lower because it was prevented by offenders being incarcerated.

Table 6.8: Time spent at liberty pre, during and post IOM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre IOM</th>
<th>During IOM</th>
<th>Post IOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average days spent at liberty</td>
<td>275.6</td>
<td>170.7</td>
<td>293.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of days spent at liberty (per 365 days / average time spent on IOM)</td>
<td>75.50</td>
<td>79.77</td>
<td>80.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Risk of offending

In addition to the scores calculated locally by the IOM information team to decide whether to move an offender on or off IOM, use can also be made of the Offender Group Reconviction Score (OGRS, version 3). As outlined in Chapter 2 this uses data on factors known to be linked to offending including sex, offence type, age (currently and at first conviction) and extent of offending history, to calculate a risk of reoffending over a set time period. This is then expressed as a percentage likelihood of committing a further offence over that period.

Table 6.9 below shows the change in this score for the quantitative cohort between the start and end their time on IOM (assessments made closest to the start and end of an IOM period were used). Scores were not available for all offenders in the cohort and so the table below displays the results for a sample of 45 individuals (almost half of the cohort) where both a pre and post IOM score was available. This type of standardised assessment of risk has been used in evaluations of programmes with similar aims to IOM (Duguid and Pawson, 1998; Pearson et al, 2014) and in a previous evaluation of IOM (Hallam Centre for Community Justice, 2013) and has been recognised by those who have used it as a useful comparison to the arguably weaker pre/post comparison (Wong, 2013; Pearson et al, 2014).

With regard to the timeliness of the assessments, 60% (27) were conducted up to six months prior to starting or after completing the IOM period. A small number of assessments were conducted during IOM (10 of the pre assessments and 12 of the post assessments), the rest (eight) were conducted more than six months either side of entering or leaving IOM. The OASys assessments that generate these scores are undertaken at certain points within a period of supervision. This does not necessarily fit in with the decision to take an offender onto or off of IOM, especially given that IOM
offenders may not be subject to statutory supervision that would determine when OASys assessments were completed.

The OGRS is grouped into low, medium, high and very high risk scores, Table 6.9 below shows where the scores at the end of IOM fall into a bracket that is lower (those below the shaded diagonal line), the same (those in the shaded diagonal line) or a higher (those above the shaded diagonal line) than at the start of IOM. At the start of their IOM period a majority of offenders fell into the medium or high bands, which is to be expected given the extensive acquisitive offending that had made them IOM targets. The table shows that over the course of the IOM period the majority of offenders do not alter their OGRS band, with eight assessed as a lower risk and five a higher risk at the end of their time on IOM. Indeed, paired samples t-tests used to assess the statistical significance of these changes showed no significant changes in the OGRS as shown in the table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IOM Start</th>
<th>&lt;50 Low</th>
<th>50-74 Medium</th>
<th>75-89 High</th>
<th>90+ Very High</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>p-value (2-tailed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;50 Low</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-74 Medium</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-89 High</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90+ Very High</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The OGRS displayed in the table above is over a two year period (the percentage risk of reoffending within two years); this is the standard way in which these scores are used, because of the long term nature of rehabilitation. However, scores for the risk over one year are also produced, and assessing the change in these pre and post IOM allows them to be compared with the PNC data presented above.
This analysis required the individual OGRS values, rather than the band, to be available both pre and post for the same individual; this again reduced the sample of offenders, this time to 17 offenders (of the 98 in the cohort). When these pre and post scores are compared it shows that around the start of IOM as a whole, 57.9% of this group were assessed as likely to reoffend within 1 year, at the end this had fallen to 54.5%. In itself this suggests a slight reduction in risk following IOM. However, as shown above in Tables 6.3 and 6.5, 38.8% of offenders in this cohort had in fact reoffended within a year, an improvement on the statistical prediction. It should be noted that one year ORGS tend to be lower values than the two year scores, because of the shorter period over which risk is assessed, but this again suggests a positive effect of IOM upon reoffending.

Change in offence type

Table 6.10 below displays the types of offences committed before, during and after IOM periods by those in the quantitative cohort. It shows that comparing the pre and post offending, there were reductions in the overall number of offences (see also Table 6.5 above). In addition there were reductions in both burglary and robbery offences, both of which were part of criteria for acceptance on to IOM.

There were rises in the proportion of violence against the person and motoring and drugs offences in the post period, although the actual number of offences in these categories fell. The proportion of theft and handling stolen goods offences rose slightly across the two periods. Further analysis of this category showed that the specific offences committed in the pre and post IOM periods changed. In the pre IOM period the most common offence types were ‘stealing from shops and stalls’ and ‘stealing from vehicles’, comprising 29.3% and 22.2% of offences in this category respectively. In comparison, in the post-IOM period, ‘stealing from shops and stalls’ comprised 46.5% of
offences in this category with the next most common being ‘stealing from vehicles’ and ‘going equipped for stealing’, both comprising 11.6%. It is conceivable that the closer scrutiny to which IOM offenders are subject could in part be responsible for the rise in convictions for ‘going equipped’. The increase in shop theft offences was observed locally and informed the creation of a specific IOM intervention for prolific shoplifters towards the end of the fieldwork period.

Not all of the offences within the theft and handling stolen goods category are criteria for entry on to IOM. Considering only those more serious offences that are, their proportion in the pre IOM period was 48.5%, compared to 27.9% in the post-IOM period. This suggests that whilst this category, as a whole, remained as prevalent in both periods, the specific offences did alter, with a decrease in the number of the more serious offences. In particular there was a decrease in the number of thefts from vehicles (from 22 offences to five). Considering those who committed offences in the post-IOM period, only 18 offenders (40.0% of those offending in the post-IOM period), were convicted of further serious acquisitive offences. The remaining offenders were convicted of other types of offending, suggesting that IOM also affects the types of offences committed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence Category</th>
<th>Pre IOM Offences</th>
<th>During IOM Offences</th>
<th>Post IOM Offences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft and handling stolen goods</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breach offences</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug offences</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motoring offences</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle related offences</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal damage</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against the person</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud and forgery</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offences relating to bail</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other violence offences</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug test offences</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disclosure, obstruction, false or misleading statements</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms offences</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publishing offences</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absconding from lawful custody</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal offences</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intoxicating liquor laws</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual offences</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vagrancy offences</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle insurance offences</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affray</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court related offence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackmail</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conspiracy to pervert the course of justice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>339</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>156</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Paired samples T-tests were conducted to assess whether the differences in the number of offences committed before, during and after IOM were statistically significant, these results are presented in Table 6.11 below. It shows that there were statistically significant differences in the number of offences when comparing numbers pre and during IOM and pre and post IOM, these differences were significant at the 1% level. The difference
between the numbers of offences committed during and post IOM were not found to be statistically significant, a similar result to that in Table 6.3 above regarding the number of offenders.

Table 6.11: Change in numbers of offences before, during and after IOM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
<th>Test statistic</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>p-value (2-tailed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pair 1</td>
<td>Pre Offences / During Offences</td>
<td>5.097</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pair 2</td>
<td>Pre Offences / Post Offences</td>
<td>4.558</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pair 3</td>
<td>During Offences / Post Offences</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>.555</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p < .01

The changes in offending outlined above took place during a period when overall crime and most of those offence types targeted by IOM were falling, both locally and nationally, as measured by police recorded crime figures and reports of crime measured by the Crime Survey for England and Wales (a victims survey previously known as the British Crime Survey). This is displayed in Table 6.12 below, that shows the number of offences, of an acquisitive nature in 2009/10 (around one year prior to the cohort starting IOM) and 2012/13 (around one year after finishing IOM), in England and Wales, the local county and amongst the quantitative cohort.

The table uses data, where possible, from both the Crime Survey and police records due to the limitations of each, as outlined in the previous chapter. It should be noted that the different methodologies used means the survey data are not directly comparable with police recorded data. For example, different crime types will be reported to the police more readily than others (Flatley et al, 2010, p. 26). This means that the amount of crime recorded by the two methods can be different, in addition crimes can be categorised differently; the most recent versions of the survey do not report robbery as a separate category, as a result the table below report on ‘theft from person’, that in fact rose over the period.
However, what is of interest here is the percentage change. When comparing the police recorded national and local figures, those in the research site have fallen by a greater percentage for the offences of burglary and robbery than those nationally, although by a less degree for theft offences. The figures for the IOM cohort have fallen by a greater percentage than those for the area as a whole and nationally. The table therefore shows that whilst crime was predominantly falling nationally across the period concerned, it fell further locally and amongst the, admittedly much smaller, IOM cohort, regarding the crime types targeted by IOM.
Table 6.12: Crime Survey and Police recorded crime, 2009/10-2012/13 compared to offending by IOM cohort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crime Survey reports</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>England and Wales</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household &amp; personal theft(^4)</td>
<td>3,908,000</td>
<td>3,952,000</td>
<td>4,126,000</td>
<td>3,756,000</td>
<td>-3.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>659,000</td>
<td>745,000</td>
<td>701,000</td>
<td>649,000</td>
<td>-1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft from person</td>
<td>525,000</td>
<td>563,000</td>
<td>625,000</td>
<td>555,000</td>
<td>5.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of selected categories</td>
<td>5,092,000</td>
<td>5,260,000</td>
<td>5,452,000</td>
<td>4,960,000</td>
<td>-2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Police recorded crime</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>England and Wales</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft offences(^5)</td>
<td>1,532,459</td>
<td>1,528,408</td>
<td>1,522,561</td>
<td>882,684</td>
<td>-42.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary (dwelling and non)</td>
<td>540,655</td>
<td>522,640</td>
<td>501,053</td>
<td>459,796</td>
<td>-14.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>76,101</td>
<td>76,179</td>
<td>74,690</td>
<td>65,156</td>
<td>-14.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of selected categories</td>
<td>2,149,215</td>
<td>2,127,227</td>
<td>2,098,304</td>
<td>1,407,636</td>
<td>-34.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local County</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft offences(^6)</td>
<td>26,655</td>
<td>23,654</td>
<td>22,362</td>
<td>18,021</td>
<td>-32.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary (dwelling and non)</td>
<td>14,514</td>
<td>11,690</td>
<td>9,871</td>
<td>8,529</td>
<td>-41.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>1,455</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>-51.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of selected categories</td>
<td>43,099</td>
<td>36,799</td>
<td>33,369</td>
<td>27,494</td>
<td>-36.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IOM Data</strong></td>
<td>Pre IOM</td>
<td>During IOM</td>
<td>Post IOM</td>
<td>% Difference Pre – Post IOM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft and handling stolen goods</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-68.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-78.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-85.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of selected categories</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-73.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from: Flatley et al, 2010; Chaplin et al, 2011; ONS, 2012; ONS 2013, including additional local data tables.

\(^4\) Composed of: vehicle related, bicycle and other household theft, theft from person and other theft of personal property

\(^5\) Composed of: offences against vehicles plus other theft

\(^6\) Composed of: offences against vehicles plus other theft
Change in circumstances

Data from OASys enables changes in circumstances of offenders to be observed between the start and end of their time on IOM. The data presented in Table 6.13 below shows the average scores for offenders in the quantitative cohort on eight sections of OASys. These data were not available in all cases and so the data below are based on a sample of 25 individuals where both a pre and post score was available. These scores are based on the answers to a series of questions in each section that assess the extent to which each of the eight areas of an offender’s life are posing a problem and whether these problems are linked to offending. These questions refer both to historical facts, such as the age at which substance misuse started or the extent of education or qualifications, and also to current circumstances such as current levels of drug and alcohol use, and current patterns of thinking and behaviour.

The higher the score for each section, the greater an issue it is. The table displays the range within which scores can be given (for example 0-8) and the cut-off point for each section or the score at or above which the issue is considered to be a problem for the individual. For example, the accommodation score is determined on the basis of questions that cover whether an offender has accommodation, its suitability, location and permanence. Scores of between zero and eight can be given with scores of two or more considered an issue.
Table 6.1: OASys average raw scores at start and end of IOM and change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OASys Section</th>
<th>Accommodation</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Training and Employment</th>
<th>Relationships</th>
<th>Lifestyle &amp; Associates</th>
<th>Drug misuse</th>
<th>Alcohol Misuse</th>
<th>Thinking &amp; Behaviour</th>
<th>Attitudes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>0-8</td>
<td>0-8</td>
<td>0-6</td>
<td>0-6</td>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>0-8</td>
<td>0-8</td>
<td>0-8</td>
<td>0-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut-off</td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>3+</td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>4+</td>
<td>4+</td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre average score</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post average score</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td><strong>2.28</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.72</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.88</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.200</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>.376</td>
<td>.295</td>
<td>.430</td>
<td>.664</td>
<td>.342</td>
<td>.584</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>-28.13</td>
<td>-12.70</td>
<td>-5.17</td>
<td>-8.24</td>
<td>-11.48</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>-7.92</td>
<td>7.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data in the table show that in all but two of the sections the average score at the end of IOM is lower than at the start. The two sections in which post-IOM scores are higher are alcohol misuse and attitudes (the bolded scores). The rises are small and in the case of alcohol misuse remains below the cut-off point of 4. In addition the row of the table that shows the results of paired samples t-tests, to assess whether the changes in the scores pre and post IOM were statistically significant show that none of the results were found to be significant at the 5% or 1% level.

The rise in scores for attitudes is however a concern, given their importance as outlined in the desistance literature in Chapter 2, and below in the following section. This could be an artefact of the close attention and more regular contact practitioners have with IOM offenders, meaning that the post score is more accurate than the pre score. It should also be noted that the score for thinking and behaviour, the other less practical and more internal section, did fall to below the cut off of 4 in the post period.
In the case of all sections bar alcohol misuse (as noted above) the score prior to starting on IOM was above the relevant cut-off point. In the case of the post scores, three sections were below the cut-off point, alcohol misuse as before although with a slightly higher score, and accommodation and thinking and behaviour (the underlined scores) that fall below the cut-off point in the post scores. The scores for the remaining sections, education training and employment, relationships, lifestyle and associates and drug misuse (the scores in italics) fell between the start and end of the IOM, but did not fall below the cut-off point for each section.

However, considering the percentage change in scores, the table shows that largest decreases can be observed in more practical issues such as accommodation (28% fall in scores), education training and employment (13% fall in scores) and drug misuse (11% fall in scores), the exception being alcohol misuse. Sections that measure an individual’s attitudes or thinking about offending, or that involve others, such as relationships and associates, have fallen less far between the start and end of IOM. This may be because they are more entrenched or more difficult to alter in the short term (Farrall et al, 2014) than the practicalities of where a person lives. This reflects the discussion above regarding readiness and the sequencing of an intervention. Whilst an intervention such as IOM can support offenders through change, it cannot impose change on them, and in order to be effective it must improve the practical circumstances for offenders before it can affect their attitudes and behaviours. These findings may also suggest that an intervention such as IOM can speed up the type of practical changes that primarily concern only the individual offender, such as their accommodation, education training and employment and, due to random drug testing, their substance misuse. Those aspects that rely on the actions of others or require more fundamental change in individuals, take longer.
Subgroup analysis

The analysis presented above has considered the IOM cohort mainly as a whole; the realistic evaluation approach however favours the comparison of sub-groups. This is somewhat limited in this analysis because of the small size of the cohort, however in this final outcomes section three such subgroups are investigated.

As outlined in Chapter 2 findings from ‘pure’ desistance research has highlighted the importance of three factors, age, social bonds and mindset in the ability of an individual to move away from offending. The quantitative and qualitative data are used to assess whether post-IOM reoffending differs along these factors and what explanations there might be for these differences.

The data gathered from the OASys probation system allows for each of the three factors to be operationalised for the cohort of offenders on whom quantitative data has been collected, and to be compared against the PNC data on offending. With regards to age, offenders aged over and under 30 were compared. This age limit was based both on previous research literature and the views of practitioners that 30 marked a point at which offending begins to tail off and attitudes start to shift. This analysis was inconclusive. The proportions of those aged 30 and under offending in the post period was 41%, compared to 65% of those aged over 30. This is a somewhat counterintuitive finding, that may reflect the more entrenched offending careers of those subject to IOM meaning they make take longer to withdraw from it, and the smaller number of older offenders in the cohort (78 aged 30 and under compared to 20 aged over 30).

With regard to social bonds, their presence and extent for each offender were assessed using the OASys sections concerned with education, training and
employment and relationships. The less of a problem these aspects of their lives were deemed to be, the more likely that social bonds are to be in place. There was little difference found in the extent and nature of post-IOM offending amongst those assessed as having social bonds and those without.

The quantitative data did however show some differences with regards to mindset. Analysis of the OASys data on offender attitudes and motivation showed that offenders with attitudes not supportive of offending and who were assessed as being quite or very motivated were less likely to offend in the post-IOM period; 50% of those classed as not at all motivated went on to commit further offences compared to 34% of those who were motivated, and 57% of those with attitude problems committed further offences compared to only 10% of those without such issues. This analysis suggests that aspects of mindset and individual agency have a more obvious influence on offending than the two other factors of age and social bonds. This reflects the findings of Duguid and Pawson who found that age per se was not directly related to recidivism after an education programme delivered in prison; rather their stage in moving away from offending and offending peers was more important (1998, p. 482). This highlights again the importance of offender readiness for an approach such as IOM.

The ways in which these different desistance factors were thought to affect offender change were also explored in interviews with practitioners and offenders. Interviewees from both groups tended to see desistance and rehabilitation as supported by more than one factor, often conflating an explanation from one factor into another. With regard to practitioners, almost all agreed that the three factors of age, social bonds and mindset played a part in the process of desistance, and that these factors interacted with each other. However, there were some differences between agencies, with police officers tending to focus on those explanations linked to ageing and social bonds, and running these two together, as in the following quotes:
‘… a lot of them it will be ‘Yeah, I’ve been in and out of prison for the past 18/20 years, I’ve got a kid who’s 8-years-old who I’ve seen for a total of a year you know, I’ve got a decent girlfriend or wife, it’s time I grew up’’ (Staff Interview 31 - Pathways PC)

‘There has to be something and generally it’s something that’s going to cost them something; I’ll lose my kids, I’ll lose my house, I’ll lose my life. And that sort of degree of self-interest is almost developing some self-interest because most of your young offenders have got no interest in their own safety or anything else’ (Staff Interview 55 - IOM Inspector)

There was less mention by police officers interviewed of an offender’s mindset, and in those examples where there was, it was linked to the other two factors, as in this example:

‘… it’s the mindset isn’t it of these people I think, they reach a stage whether they’ve had a baby with a partner or you know, something’s happened in their lives to make them think right, I need to sort myself out’ (Staff Interview 22 - Enforcement PC)

This may be because this is not the area of work in which police officers are engaged, nor their area of expertise. This is rather the role of probation staff, as in this example:

‘… that is the hardest bit to deal with, those attitudes and they’re fundamentally what leads to the offending anyway. If you can’t change the attitude, it doesn’t really matter what else you do. And you know, that’s the battle for us all the time really’ (Staff Interview 39 - Probation officer).

Similarly, offenders also tended to link ageing and social bonds together as an explanation for desistance but to also recognise the importance of individual choice as the following quotes demonstrate:

‘I’ve been doing it for too long you know … I look at you know, people that I were at school with and they’re all driving around in cars you know, they’ve got houses, they’ve got kids, they’ve got a missus and I’ve got what I stand up in’ (Offender 6)

‘… you calm down a bit as you get older don’t you, you can’t be arsed with it no more, when you’re a young lad and you’ve got no family and that, not much else to be bothered about is there, I’ve got family now of my own, that’s me biggest incentive’ (Offender 14)
‘I’m 42 now and I have a little boy, he’s down in Cornwall I don’t get to see him very often, I did the last time I was out, but eventually I would really like to have some sort of relationship with him, he’s 14 now going on 15, I’ve missed such a huge part of his life already its time, its time I woke up and sorted my life out’ (Offender 20)

All three offenders stated that they themselves had to do something different with their lives, but that this was linked to getting older and with having or wanting their own family. In this way these offenders tend to reference the different desistance factors in various different orders, conflating them into one reason for wanting to move away from offending. In an attempt to break down the interplay of desistance factors further, analysis of the interview data was undertaken in the same way as the quantitative data above to explore whether the three desistance factors could be linked to an offender’s experience of IOM. Practitioners were asked to select offenders for interview using criteria that aimed to generate a sample of offenders with different experiences of the three desistance factors. As a result those interviewed were hoped to be able to provide views from different points on these desistance factors.

With regard to age, offenders aged under 30 and those aged 30 and over were compared, as with the quantitative data above. There is some suggestion from the interviews that those offenders aged 30 and over were more likely to speak positively about their IOM experience than the younger age group. However, those expressing negative views of IOM were in a minority in either age group. Despite being part of the criteria for interviewee selection, the vast majority of interviewees had some form of social bond including employment, parents, partners, children or friends. It was unusual for offenders not to mention their families or employment with regards to their offending; 15 of the 23 offenders interviewed mentioned this.

The final desistance factor, individual mindset was operationalised for interviewee selection by asking practitioners to select offenders who they
deemed to be more or less ready to leave offending behind. Of the 23 offenders interviewed, only seven were assessed by their supervisors not to be ready to change. Their responses to interview questions, particularly about their confidence at the future, tended not to show much of a difference from those given by the rest of the interviewees with a similar stress on it being a time to change and a desire to stay out of prison in the future. This therefore shows less of a difference than the quantitative data on mindset, possibly skewed by the selection of interviewees.

The findings of this analysis provide some evidence of both the interplay between the three desistance factors, and the importance of the willingness of individuals to change. There was less evidence of the individual influence of age and social bonds. This was affected by the data available to the research, but also by the interaction of these factors with each other and with mindset.

**Summary**

The analysis of various outcomes in this section has shown that when the pre and post IOM periods are compared there is evidence of a positive effect of IOM on those subject to it. There is a statistically significant reduction in the amount of offending that outstrips falls in crime nationally and locally. In addition there is an increase in time spent at liberty and a change in the nature of offending pre and post can be observed; there is a decrease in the categories of serious acquisitive crime that IOM targets, such as burglary, robbery, certain theft offences and drugs offences.

Analysis has also shown a fall in the number of arrests by the time offenders are removed from IOM, that is to be expected as this is one of the ways in which offenders are assessed as suitable to be removed. There was little evidence of a change in the risk level of offenders post-IOM when considering the two-year OGRS, however considering one-year scores showed that risks
for IOM offenders dropped during their time subject to it, and that actual levels of reoffending were lower than predicted. There were also changes observed in the circumstances of offenders in most of 12 categories for which data are captured in OASys, although these were most marked in practical aspects of an individual offender’s life, such as accommodation and education training and employment.

The sub-group analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative data showed that the three factors identified in the literature of ageing, social bonds and mindset do indeed interact with each other, with some evidence of the importance of individual mindset to a reduction in offending.

The research findings outlined in this chapter were used to revise the initial conception of IOM and proposed CMOC presented at the start of this chapter. This is discussed the in the following section.

**Revised IOM Context Mechanism Outcome Configuration**

The ultimate aim of a realistic evaluation is to produce a revised programme theory or CMOC detailing the ways in which an intervention operates, and for whom and in what contexts it “works”. The findings from the fieldwork, presented in this chapter were used to revise the initial CMOC presented above. This, as with the initial CMOC, is presented using both a diagram showing the operation of IOM and a table that lays out the constituent parts of the configuration fit together in the format:  

\[ \text{Context + Mechanisms = Outcomes} \]

The initial diagram of the operation of IOM presented above at Figure 6.1 was, as outlined in Chapter 5, revised and adapted following interviews with IOM practitioners and offenders and the observations of the workings of IOM. This was then shared with the IOM team leaders interviewed (sergeants and
senior probation officers) and revised further. This third version was shared with IOM managers and senior officers interviewed, producing the final version presented below in Figure 6.2. This therefore drew on the “teacher/learner” approach to the process of theory refinement proposed by Pawson and Tilley (1997, p.165). These interviewees were asked to comment on whether they thought the diagram was accurate and complete and also to define what they thought it was about IOM that made it “work”; what they thought were the generative mechanisms in play.
Focused on a small, targeted group of prolific offenders, regardless of their statutory status or position in the CJS (e.g. whether in prison or in the community).

**Context**
- Motivated to change
- In stable accommodation
- Willing to engage in supervision and (where appropriate) substance misuse treatment
- Chaotic
- Continuing to offend
- Not willing to change or unable to meet the greater requirements of IOM
- Perhaps homeless or in inappropriate accommodation

**Pathways**
- Complying
- Not complying

**Activities**
- Support, guidance, motivation, offence focused work and practical help along the reoffending pathways
- Provided regularly, in a number of different settings, from a number of different agencies based within small teams, with regular information and intelligence exchange
- In a tailored and individualised way e.g. employing bespoke licence conditions, sequenced appropriately
- Additional attention from enforcement police (IOM teams and beyond) e.g. bail checks, enforcement of warrants, surveillance, intelligence gathering
- Through the use of attending offender homes, patrolling, surveillance
- Swift breach action and recall
- Swift and stricter response to further offending

**Outcomes**
- Reduced reoffending (amount, severity, speed)
- Increased compliance
- Movement along reoffending pathways

**Mechanisms**
- Intensity and structure of the contact – opportunities to discuss and work with practitioners and for feedback of progress to family or other agencies
- Offenders managed through multi-agency teams – increasing the information available to all agencies and understanding between them
- Caring and trusting relationships with staff – motivating and supporting offenders

**Context**
- Affected by changes in the lives of individuals, both positive and negative
  - e.g. growing up / maturing, moving away, starting or ending a relationship, becoming a parent, family breakdown / bereavement

**Activities**
- Affected by changes of provision from other agencies outside of IOM teams
There are some key differences between this and the initial diagram. Most importantly it features the three mechanisms identified in this research and shows them operating between the activities and outcomes. In this diagram multi-agency working is defined as a mechanism, not an activity. This revised diagram also labels the other aspects of the approach with realistic evaluation terms to show the operation of the CMOC. In addition the activities undertaken were made more specific. For example, it was noted that IOM is impacted upon by changes in the other services involved in providing support to offenders, such as job centres or local authorities. The activities they are able to contribute can be affected by changes to their aims and objectives, funding arrangements or geographical coverage.

Secondly, the enforcement activity, such as warnings, breaches and return to custody are not considered as ends in themselves. Instead, the enforcement activities are intended to move offenders back into engagement with the approach, hence the feedback arrow from enforcement activity into the pathways side of the approach, labelled ‘enforcement action as supportive’. This reflects the view of practitioners that it is the effect of both sides of the programme working together that can best support offenders, as one interviewee noted, it is the pathways work that brings about the change, stating, ‘[f]rom the IOM perspective you prevent the crime in the first place by having good pathways teams who the offenders will comply with which will stop them reoffending’ (Staff Interview 11- IOM Police Manager). The enforcement work supports this; it is not an end in itself.

Thirdly, it was noted by practitioners that the movement of offenders between the enforcement and pathways side of the approach is important. This is described in more detail on the revised diagram, because it means that offenders do not experience only one side of the approach, but are managed using both support and control, to move towards a successful outcome.
Figure 6.2 presents an ideal version of the operation of IOM, as do the CMOCs presented by Pawson and Tilley in their research. However, Table 6.14 below, that updates Table 6.1 presented at the start of the chapter, presents both an ideal and confounding understanding of IOM. This is not the typical way in which Pawson and Tilley outline the CMOCs of their research. As discussed in the previous chapter, those who have employed realistic evaluation in their work have used different ways to represent their findings. Furthermore, other researchers have faced problems distinguishing between the activities of a programme, its mechanisms and outcomes. This research and its research questions, led by the aims of IOM, are focused upon the effect of IOM upon individual offenders and their rehabilitation. Therefore Table 6.14 focuses on just this one level of context, unlike the initial CMOC presented above. This is also reflected in the mechanisms that are focused on how IOM is experienced by offenders, and the outcomes, that are concerned with the effects upon offenders.

These mechanisms were identified through the fieldwork. In the initial CMOC the multi-agency nature of IOM was conceived as both a context and a mechanism. The fieldwork revealed multi-agency working to be a key mechanism in the operation of IOM, and to influence outcomes. Thus, the mechanisms identified here, and labelled as such, all operate, but to a greater or lesser extent: IOM is a more intense provision than standard supervision, but can have negative effects for those who are not yet ready for it; multi-agency working occurs, but to different degrees and so is experienced differently; and relationships with offenders are in evidence and are important, but are useful at different stages of readiness.

Pawson and Tilley recognise the existence of two different types of mechanism; problem mechanisms already present and the focus of an intervention or programme and blocking or solution mechanisms that are activated by the intervention or programme (1997, p. 75). Therefore, the
confounding issues identified in this research could be conceived of as instances of problem mechanisms having not been successfully blocked. This could be because the blocking mechanism has unintended consequences, or because it does not resolve the problem mechanism completely. It is these instances that can highlight issues in need of improvement and indeed recommend solutions, and as such are presented separately in Table 6.14.

With regard to outcomes, the table, like the diagram does not define these as being a simple reduction or cessation in offending, but rather composed of intermediate steps. This reflects the views of practitioners locally and the literature on desistance and rehabilitation, both of which stress the difficulties of this process and the limits of what an approach like IOM can achieve.

Whilst this revised CMOC table reflects the reality of the IOM approach more closely, by including a “confounding” section, the format may still make it seem that the interactions between the context, mechanisms and outcomes (the cells and rows) are mutually exclusive. They are in fact, mutually supportive and reinforcing. This is reflected both in Figure 6.2 above and in the findings outlined in this chapter, that at various points demonstrate interactions between the three mechanisms. Furthermore, the focus on individual level context, as justified above and its position as the first column in the table may imply that the operation and outcomes of IOM are solely due to the context of the offenders subject to it. This is also not what has been found and reported in this chapter. As the above findings have shown, all three elements of the CMOC interact. It is therefore important to note when reading the table that it is context plus the mechanisms that produce the outcomes. All of which alter between the ideal and confounding versions of IOM.
Table 6.14: Revised IOM CMOC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>=</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenders at a point where they are willing or able to change, supported by social bonds / maturation process</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Intensity and structure of the contact providing opportunities to offenders</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>Offenders able to progress along the reoffending pathways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenders at a point where they are willing or able to change, supported by social bonds / maturation process</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Good multi-agency working enables colocation, communication and collaboration so that offenders receive close attention</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>Increased information available to all agencies regarding circumstances, risk, needs and strengths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenders at a point where they are willing or able to change, supported by social bonds / maturation process</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Caring and trusting relationships with staff, motivate individuals supported by continuity of staff</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>Offenders able to use relationships to build an alternative, non-offending self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Confounding</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenders unwilling, unmotivated or unable to move away from offending due to age, lack of social bonds or individual attitude/decision</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Intensity and structure of the contact placing stress on both offenders and their families and other relationships undermining useful social bonds, lack of recognition of offender strengths and no formal end to IOM marked</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>Offenders more likely to be returned to prison for breach for failure to attend or comply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenders unwilling, unmotivated or unable to move away from offending due to age, lack of social bonds or individual attitude/decision</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Multi-agency working interrupted by unilateral decisions by one agency, the lack of a strategic lead and key non-criminal justice agencies missing</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>Offenders less likely to receive support along all re-offending pathways, less information about them and their circumstances available to agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenders unwilling, unmotivated or unable to move away from offending due to age, lack of social bonds or individual attitude/decision</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Risk of a lack of continuity in relationships and previous encounters with agencies, especially the police, influencing any future relationships</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>Offenders less able to use supervision as a way to move out of current behaviour or circumstances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Transforming Rehabilitation

As outlined in the previous chapter, local practitioners, team leaders and managers, and those with a national IOM portfolio, were asked about the effect of the *Transforming Rehabilitation* changes to the probation service on the operation of IOM. Given the timing of this research these views were speculative and were not the primary focus of this research, concerned with evaluating IOM as it existed at the time. However, as a considerable change to the organisation and operation of one of the key IOM agencies it was an important issue to explore.

As outlined in Chapter 2, the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014 that enacted these changes had two key elements: firstly, it prescribed a period of statutory post release supervision for all offenders sentenced to custody. This ends the situation introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 1991 where those sentenced to 12 months custody or fewer received no statutory post release supervision. In order to fund this expansion of supervision the second element was to split the probation service between a state owned National Probation Service and a series of Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs). The ownership of these CRCs was contracted out under competitive tender to a range of private and third sector organisations. These are paid for their work in part through a payment by results (PbR) mechanism, which only pays providers in full if targets to reduce reoffending are met (Ministry of Justice, 2013c; 2013d). These CRCs were made responsible for the majority of post release supervision, including that provided within IOM.

Overwhelmingly those interviewed in this research expected these changes to adversely affect the operation of IOM and each of the generative mechanisms identified and discussed above (Evans, 2015). The first mechanism, regarding the intensity of supervision, is likely to be undermined by the use of a PbR system. Due to their higher risk of reoffending IOM offenders were thought to
be an unattractive group for the CRCs; it was thought more likely that the CRCs would focus on the less prolific offenders, who could more easily contribute to the reoffending targets. Evidence of this “parking” of harder to help groups has been found in a review of the Work Programme that aims to improve employment levels and also operates a PbR system (National Audit Office, 2014, p. 7).

The second mechanism, the close multi-agency working underpinning IOM, was thought likely to be affected by the fragmentation of the probation service into a National Probation Service and a number of CRCs. The way responsibilities are divided between these organisations means that there will be additional stages in decision making that can slow processes down, making the multi-agency work less efficient (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2015, p. 10). In addition the introduction of new providers will demand the creation of new working relationships. This research has shown these are not easily created, even amongst those mandated to work together.

Finally, regarding the relationships between staff and offenders, these were also thought likely to be affected by the fragmentation of the system. Offenders are supervised by either the National Probation Service or the CRCs depending on their level of risk of harm that is subject to change. Therefore, the responsibility for supervision can be passed back and forth between different practitioners during a supervision period undermining the relationships established. In addition, there is no requirement for the employees of the new CRCs to be trained probation officers (Ministry of Justice, 2013d, p. 41). Both of these factors were reported to be likely to affect the nature and quality of these important relationships.

The Transforming Rehabilitation changes are therefore expected to bring significant change to the operation of IOM. It risks undermining, or at least interrupting, each of the three generative mechanisms found in this research.
to underpin the IOM approach. In addition it will increase the workload of all criminal justice agencies involved by making all offenders sentenced to custody subject to statutory supervision post release. The IOM approach in the research site is expected to struggle to continue to operate as it did during the fieldwork period. Whilst the details of the impact of this could not be known in detail by the researcher, this is likely to adversely affect the outcomes for the offenders subject to it. Further research in the site is therefore suggested in the next chapter.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented the findings of this research, utilising the realistic evaluation CMOC as a framework. It began with an initial CMOC, then presented the research findings regarding context, mechanisms and outcomes, and finally presented a revised configuration.

With regard to the context of individual offenders, the research has highlighted how the importance of the readiness of offenders for IOM was recognised locally, and how such an intervention could work with offenders to alter and improve readiness. However, the assessments made of it by the probation service are not used in IOM’s formal processes that rely almost exclusively on quantitative assessments of current and historical offences and arrests. This is compounded by the somewhat narrow focus of IOM on the individual offender, instead of a more holistic contextual assessment.

With regard to the first of the three mechanisms, the intense and structured nature of IOM, the research noted how this was considered to be one of the key differences from standard probation supervision and to be an important aspect of IOM allowing the provision of more bespoke or personalised support. This regular contact provided IOM staff with opportunities to feedback to other agencies or family members on progress. However, the
intensity of IOM was also found to be a source of stress for offenders, and to risk relationships with family, partners or employers. In addition, the fact that IOM can operate throughout and across the criminal justice process, makes it difficult to mark the end of involvement for an offender that could be a useful process of de-labelling offenders. This is partly for logistical reasons and partly because IOM lacks a statutory status.

The second mechanism discussed was the close multi-agency working and communication that underpins IOM. This increases the amount and timeliness of information available to all agencies and reduces the opportunity for offenders to disengage and return to offending, or if they do increases the likelihood of them being caught. There were found to be structures and processes, both formal and informal in place to support multi-agency working and a long history of it locally. However, this extends only to the three core IOM agencies, as opposed to those that lie outside of the criminal justice system. In addition, this way of working also faces problems when the actions or priorities of the wider organisations conflict with those of IOM, especially given the lack of strong strategic governance locally, and goal congruence nationally.

The final mechanism identified, that links together the previous two, relates to the caring and trusting relationships established between offenders and staff. Offenders reported that their interactions with IOM staff, particularly police officers, are different from those with other practitioners. These are supported by maintaining a continuity of staff. There were found to be different institutional understandings of these relationships, that reflect the different skills and experience the different practitioners bring to IOM and a lack of the blurring of roles into a ‘polibation’ officer. However, the organisation of police resources, spilt formally between pathways and enforcement did not necessarily support the IOM approach of providing both control and support to offenders.
The analysis of the quantitative cohort regarding outcomes showed differences in the number of offenders and number and type of offences 12 months post IOM compared to 12 month pre IOM. These differences were over and above the reduction predicted and observed in the same crime types locally and nationally. The changes in the circumstances of offenders measured through OASys suggested the particular ways in that IOM can support offender change. The further analysis of the three key factors in desistance age, social bonds and mindset found some evidence from both the quantitative and qualitative data of the importance of the last of these, and also of the interplay of all three. This underlines the related nature of all three and suggests both the importance of personal offender readiness for IOM to be effective, and that IOM can support changes in material circumstances that can reinforce and be reinforced by readiness.

This chapter has provided a programme theory of how IOM operates, and the particular aspects that make it “work” as well as ways in that IOM fails to work as well as it could. This suggests that in general the theory of IOM is sound, but that it suffers from confounding issues; ways in which mechanisms are not able to operate fully. Some of these are practical or operational and are for the local practitioners to consider. Some however are more fundamental, and these are discussed in the next chapter that concludes this thesis.
Chapter 7. Concluding Discussion: IOM a Partnership for Desistance?

This final chapter discusses further the findings outlined in the preceding chapters and answers the research questions posed at the start of this thesis. This chapter demonstrates how this research has contributed to the literature regarding IOM specifically and offender rehabilitation, desistance and partnership working more generally. It will also discuss how this research contributes to the literature on realistic evaluation and its application, and to policy and practice regarding IOM. Finally it will consider the implications for further research.

This research concerned IOM, a multi-agency approach to the management of a group of particularly prolific offenders that has been recognised and promoted by government since 2009. The review of literature presented in the first three chapters demonstrated that whilst often proposed and implemented, the evidence for the effect of such approaches on offender rehabilitation and desistance is limited and contradictory and where available, is not always followed. The review of evaluation approaches in Chapter 4 concluded that realistic evaluation would be the most appropriate and useful given the subject of the evaluation. These findings informed the focus of this research, the overall aim of which has been:

To evaluate IOM as a means of supporting desistance amongst prolific offenders and so inform IOM policy and practice.

To achieve this, the overall research question was:

To what extent and in what circumstances can an IOM approach support desistance amongst prolific offenders?
In order to answer this question the following supplemental research questions that underpinned and guided the scope and approach of the study were posed:

1. How and why do (prolific) offenders desist or reduce their offending?
2. What is IOM and how does it operate as a partnership?
3. To what extent does IOM reduce the reoffending, and support the desistance efforts of the offenders subject to it?
4. How useful is the realistic evaluation methodology to research in this area?

The first of these supplemental questions is answered in the following section.

Desistance processes

Supplemental Research Question 1: *How and why do (prolific) offenders desist or reduce their offending?*

Regarding why offenders come to desist from offending or reduce their involvement, the findings from this research reflect those from the desistance research in Chapter 2. The chapter outlined three interlinked explanations for why offenders desist from crime related to age, social bonds and personal mindset. Offenders, prolific or not, come to withdraw from crime because as they age and mature they build links with social institutions such as employment and relationships. These links or bonds can support and be supported by decisions to alter behaviour away from offending. There is therefore an interplay between these three factors that can explain why the majority of offenders, in time, withdraw from offending (McNeill, 2012a; Rocque, 2015; Gadd and Farrall, 2004; Farrall, 2002; Farrall and Bowling, 1999).

This interplay was present in the findings of this research. Both offenders and staff members interviewed recognised these factors in the process of desistance, and spoke of them as one process that explained how individuals
withdraw from crime. Analysis of the data available on the quantitative cohort revealed a clearer link between mindset and desistance than the other two factors. Whilst this finding was affected by the data available, it does suggest that an individual willingness to change is needed as a catalyst for the other factors to have an influence.

Regarding how offenders come to desist, and how this process might be supported, the literature review in Chapter 2 concluded that there were three key elements of interventions that could support desistance. These were, firstly that interventions were well structured and clearly explained to offenders, secondly that supportive relationships were established with offenders, and finally that interventions responded to the complex personal and social processes involved in desistance. These findings are drawn from different research traditions. These include research that took place within the “what works” approach, associated with the risk-need-responsivity approach to interventions, research into the nature of and compliance with probation supervision, and the small literature on assisted desistance that is associated with the Good Lives Model of rehabilitation. The extent to which this research confirmed these findings, and ways in which these factors were found to be undermined, is discussed below.

Regarding the first of these findings, this research confirms the need for interventions to be well structured and intense, and for offenders to be told what will be expected of them during such an intervention. As outlined in the previous chapter, one of the three generative mechanisms identified as underpinning IOM is its intense and structured nature. Practitioners interviewed stressed the importance of having defensible reasons for moving offenders on and off IOM, and there being clear agreements in place regarding supervision and other requirements. Work with offenders regarding their attitudes and thinking about offending and also their personal
circumstances could then be undertaken within the bounds of such agreements.

The findings of this research echo a consistent finding of the “what works” research; that structured interventions focused on offenders’ ways of thinking and acting had positive effects on reoffending (McGuire, 1995, p. 16; Robinson and Raynor, 2009, p.109; McGuire, 2002, p. 21-22). This was reflected in the findings of the more recent evaluation of the Citizenship programme that employed such an approach (Pearson et al, 2011, 2014). It was noted in this research however, that this way of working with offenders can be confounded in two ways. Firstly, the content of supervision needs to focus on both needs and strengths. The former has more often been the focus of interventions such as IOM developed during the “what works” era. For example the OASys system provides less scope to record the strengths of offenders than it does their needs. Without a similar focus upon strengths, the ability of offenders to be actively engaged in desistance can be limited. In this research any focus on strengths was found primarily within the work of the Education, Training and Employment workers. Secondly, the intensity of the supervision under IOM can confound supportive relationships with others, such as family members. Whilst supporting the establishment of such relationships was reported in this research to be one role of IOM staff, some offenders reported that these can suffer under the requirements for home visits often made at unsociable hours.

The second key finding from the previous research reviewed is the importance of the working or therapeutic relationships established between practitioner and offender (Harper and Chitty, 2005, p. 28; Annison et al, 2008, p. 267; Ward and Brown, 2004, p. 254; McNeill, 2012b, p. 10; Williams, 1992, p. 273), which echoing the findings above, provides a social bond or a stake in society and a reason to avoid offending (Sampson and Laub, 1993; Laub and Sampson, 2003). This was found to be important in the findings of this
research, with effective working relationships defined as a second generative mechanism underpinning IOM. Practitioners interviewed reported that the more frequent contact they had with offenders enabled them to establish effective working relationships. These, in turn, afford offenders access to bespoke and personalised support regarding both practical issues as well as motivation and hope during the complex process of offender rehabilitation.

Interviews with offenders found that these relationships existed despite the coerced or pressured circumstances of IOM. Offenders knew they had to comply with the requirements to attend appointments and knew that as members of criminal justice agencies, practitioners would enforce the rules if not complied with. Despite this, offenders were still able to see benefits in relationships established with IOM team members. A number of offenders also commented on the politeness of the IOM police officers that contrasted with encounters with non-IOM police officers. This reflects the findings of previous research that underlines the importance of the provision of good levels of information about the intervention, its rules and the reasons for its application (Day et al, 2004, p. 266; Tyler, 2003, p. 293; Ugwudike, 2011, p. 252; Hawken and Kleiman, 2009, p. 9).

In this research practitioners from different organisations were found to understand these relationships differently. This difference was observed primarily between police officers and probation and drugs workers and considered to be due to practitioners maintaining their own organisational identity rather than developing a merged ‘polibation’ role (Nash 1999, 2004, 2008; Mawby and Worrall, 2004, 2011a; Mawby et al, 2007). Maintaining such a distinction is recommended in the recent IOM inspection report that considered this merging of roles a risk to IOM (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p.50; Worrall and Mawby, 2011a, p. 89). As a locally defined approach not all IOM approaches are organised in the same way (College of Policing, 2013, p. 65). As a result other IOM approaches have experienced this
merging of roles to a greater degree. For example police officers have been found to be responsible for the supervision and management of offenders, especially non-statutory offenders (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p.30; Annison et al, 2015 p. 398). In this research a clear distinction was found between the roles of pathways and enforcement police officers. This was supported by some staff interviewed because a dedicated enforcement team ensured that enforcement action took place in a timely fashion. However, it also creates more of a risk of merged roles for the pathways police officers. As noted above, this was not in evidence in the research site, but without clear role definitions and boundaries such a role could more easily merge with that of a probation service officer, as opposed to making use of the distinct skills and powers that these police officers have.

The third key finding from previous research into offender rehabilitation is that it is a complex process comprised of various elements concerning both individual offenders, their resources and status, and the community in which they live (McNeill, 2012b, p. 14). Therefore, interventions in this field need to attend both to the skills and circumstances of the individual offender and their relations with and opportunities within the wider community through support and reparation (Robinson et al, 2013, p. 332; Carlen, 2013, p. 89; Farrall, 2002, p. 219).

The importance of interventions being comprehensive was recognised by local practitioners interviewed and is reflected in the revised IOM diagram presented in the previous chapter. However, the extent to which this was in evidence in the practice of IOM was limited. This evaluation found that the primary focus of work undertaken was the needs of individual offenders as opposed to their wider social needs. This is due to the nature of the agencies involved, all of whom are drawn from the criminal justice sector, and the way that IOM developed from “what works” era interventions, such as the PPO programme. These were primarily concerned with developing good
interventions for individuals, as opposed to more comprehensive routes to desistance. This can in part explain the findings from this research, that whilst some of the circumstances of offenders improved over their time on IOM, most of the circumstances measured remained defined as a problem. The ways and extent to which IOM was found to operate as a partnership are discussed in the next section.

IOM as a partnership

Supplemental Research Question 2: How does IOM operate as a partnership?

The IOM approach is distinctly multi-agency with the importance of partnership working written into its government policy statement (Home Office, Ministry of Justice 2009, p. 8, 2015a, p. 4). This is mirrored in the IOM manual of the research site (2013, p. 1), and this research identified the multi-agency nature of IOM as the third generative mechanism underpinning its effective operation.

The previous chapter outlined that the research site has a long history of partnership working predating the national interest in IOM and the national roll out of the previous PPO programme. Interviews and observations also showed that practitioners were supportive of the IOM approach. This mirrors the support for the approach found amongst practitioners in previous evaluations of IOM (Senior et al, 2011, p. iv; Annison et al, 2015, p. 395). This is to be expected given that these sites have chosen to implement IOM; government policy statements have recommended its use, but it has not been mandated in the same way as the PPO programme. IOM was a “bottom-up” creation, developed by local practitioners and then acknowledged nationally (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p.17; Wong, 2013, p. 59).

Chapter 3 outlined how multi-agency approaches have become increasingly common since the 1980s, and especially since 1997, in a range of public policy
fields, including criminal justice. This can be explained by the nature of the public policy problems faced during this time in fields including criminal justice, the “wicked problems” described by Rittel and Webber (1973). This research therefore explored the ways in which partnership working operated within IOM.

Interviews with and observations of staff members showed that actively maintained working relationships between the key agencies were in place. Co-located teams used both formal meetings and informal information exchange to manage offenders, in a way that was different from that undertaken by the individual agencies alone. There was found to be interdependence between the partnership agencies and trust between their workers. Furthermore, offenders interviewed were aware of multi-agency nature of their supervision and often commented that this experience of supervision was different from previous ones both, as noted above, in its intensity and in the nature of their contact with practitioners, particularly police officers.

In this way IOM in the research site utilises a number of the mechanisms identified by Berry and colleagues (2011) to support effective partnership working. The local IOM approach employs regular data sharing and face-to-face contact, open communication and co-location amongst practitioners who apply to be part of IOM teams that are based on long experience of partnership working. However, these mechanisms operate at the more tactical day-to-day level of IOM. This research identified ways in which the operation of the IOM partnership is confounded and in which the mechanisms of Berry and colleagues are not in evidence, that are linked to problems at the more strategic level.

The first confounding issue regarding the IOM partnership concerns the relationships between the IOM teams and their wider organisations. The
location of IOM teams, physically removed from more generic probation teams and outside of police stations, can mean that IOM staff find themselves isolated from their colleagues. Furthermore, it was found that staff outside of IOM teams, especially police officers, do not understand the work done, nor view it as ‘real’ police work (Murphy and Lutze, 2009, p. 69). As a result, the work of IOM teams can be undermined by the activities of other teams within the police (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p. 40). It has been noted that like many organisations engaged in partnership working, the police is ‘full of divisions and contradictions’ (Sampson et al, 1988, p. 484) that can cause difficulties for joined up working.

Despite the issues created for police officers by the IOM approach, this research found it to be an approach driven by, and primarily invested in, by the police. For example, the local IOM strategy lists the police service as the lead agency for IOM. A similar lead role for the police was found in a number of the sites visited by the IOM Inspection (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p. 20) and in previous research of multi-agency working (Sampson et al, 1988, p. 483). This may be a result of the ability of the police to respond more quickly to new arrangements and provide resource to it (McCarthy and O’Neill, 2014 p. 248). However, it risks a partnership being used to achieve the aims of one organisation, as opposed to those of the partnership as a whole (Squires and Measor, 2001, p. 228).

As noted above, in this research site these issues are primarily caused by the lack of a strategic approach to IOM across the key agencies, making it difficult to protect IOM from the competing demands on the agencies involved. Interviews with IOM team leaders and managers and observations of meetings showed that the line management of IOM police officers in particular was confused and created competing demands on their time. In addition the governance structure for IOM was not clear, lacking clear monitoring or reporting processes. McGuire notes that ‘the most effective
agencies will locate programmatic interventions within wider organisational arrangements’ (2004, p. 342). Without this IOM in this site reflects the findings of Balloch and Taylor (2001, p. 6-7), that partnerships tend to exist on the edges of home organisations and do not affect their core activities (Hughes and McLaughlin, 2002; Barton and Quinn, 2001). This is similar to the findings of Murphy and Lutze’s research into police-probation partnerships in America, from which they recommend that:

‘... organizational leaders from the police department and the probation agency must actively collaborate for purposes of planning and applying specialized training for officers, developing appropriate officer performance criteria, and applying mechanisms to keep officers from drifting away from the goals of their individual agencies or their shared partnership’ (2009, p. 75).

These recommendations could apply equally to the local IOM approach. In the case of IOM these difficulties are compounded by the differences in the aims of the police and probation services nationally.

Flynn notes that crime prevention is a ‘policy objective beset with conflicting aims and objectives as well as contentious relationships at national, regional and local levels’ (2011, p. 89). In the case of IOM the issue at the national level is the difference between the police, overseen by the Home Office, concerned with crime reduction, and the probation service overseen by the Ministry of Justice, concerned with a reduction in reoffending rates. Both a reduction in crime and reoffending are stated aims of IOM (Home Office, Ministry of Justice, 2015a, p. 2) and whilst it may seem that the two aims are mutually supportive, when managing prolific offenders who are likely to reoffend, it can create instances of goal incongruence. For example, a reduction in the overall number of crimes does not necessarily imply a reduction in the number of offenders. Furthermore, if the offending of those managed on IOM is more likely to be detected by the police, this can result in poor reoffending results for the probation service. Whilst this does not lead to the inappropriate management of individual offenders, it does lead to
difficulties in each organisation justifying their performance on the selected measures of success. It is for this reason that Rittel and Webber argue that in the case of “wicked problems”, ‘one should try to settle the problem on as high a level as possible’ (1973, p. 165).

In the case of IOM these issues were found to be further confounded by a lack of statutory status for IOM. Currently local partnerships are able to define and operate IOM arrangements to suite local situations, flexibility that can be lost when they become formalised by government (Burke, 2010). However, this lack of statutory status was found to create difficulties locally for those working in IOM (Kemshall and Maguire, 2001, p. 256). In particular it can create difficulties drawing in other agencies to IOM partnerships, which in this research was found to involve formally only the three core agencies of the police, probation and drug treatment services. The key agencies missing from this formal partnership were reported to be housing providers and agencies linked to employment provision. These agencies, as was outlined above, can be key to the success of an intervention such as IOM (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p. 10).

Therefore, IOM operates successfully as a partnership on a day-to-day tactical level, but faces difficulties operating at a strategic level involving all relevant agencies. Practitioners were found to experience the problems with partnership working long recognised from previous research. Regarding the mechanisms identified by Berry and colleagues (2011), IOM was found to lack strong leadership, vision and accountability, to be integrated into mainstream work only to a limited extent, and to lack the involvement of some relevant agencies. This evaluation therefore demonstrates the precarious nature of multi-agency working and multi-agency teams. This can undermine the work of practitioners, and set agencies against each other, especially when trying to solve “wicked problems” (Rittel and Webber, 1973), that have no obvious or universally agreed solution.
Chapter 3 also outlined the lack of evidence for the effectiveness of multi-agency working upon the issues they are formed around and the results regarding reduced reoffending and desistance have been mixed from the IOM evaluations undertaken to date (Dawson et al, 2011; Williams and Ariel, 2013; Hallam Centre for Community Justice, 2013). The findings of this research on the effect of IOM on desistance are discussed in the following section.

**IOM and desistance**

Supplemental Research Question 3: *To what extent does IOM reduce the reoffending, and support the desistance efforts of the offenders subject to it?*

The answer to the first supplemental research question above has demonstrated that it is possible for interventions such as IOM to support desistance. This section is concerned with whether, and to what extent the IOM approach studied in this research was found to be supporting this process.

The outcomes presented in the previous chapter demonstrated post-IOM reductions in the numbers of the cohort offending and the number of offences committed, with differences between the pre and post IOM periods found to be statistically significant. In addition, reductions in the numbers of arrests and the seriousness of offences were observed along with an increase in the time at liberty during the post period. Offender levels of risk as assessed by the OGRS tool at the one year point also decreased and the level of actual reoffending was lower than that predicted by the tool. However, as noted in the previous chapter in assessing a complex process such as desistance, it is also important to consider intermediate outcomes, in addition to those related to reoffending.
The circumstances of offenders’ lives as measured by OASys saw changes, most notably in the more practical issues that primarily concern only the offender, such as accommodation, education training and employment and drug misuse. The exception was alcohol misuse, where the circumstances of offenders worsened. When interviewed about what has been of use to them during their time on IOM, offenders tended to focus on the practical help received, such as finding employment or housing.

Some offenders also commented that IOM had been the trigger or catalyst to make other changes, because of the opportunities it presented. However the OASys data showed that measures of an individual’s attitudes or thinking about offending, or measures that involve others, such as relationships and associates, improved less and in the case of attitudes actually worsened. These outcomes could be the result of a more accurate assessment in the post period due to the increased contact with practitioners. They could also be due to the more entrenched nature of such attitudes that are more difficult to alter in the short term, and by practitioners operating within the criminal justice system.

The extent to which offenders were able to make use of the opportunities presented by IOM was found to depend upon their individual context, understood through the concept of “readiness”. Interviews with both practitioners and offenders, and analysis of the IOM cohort, found that the motivation and capability of offenders affected the extent to which IOM was of use to them. This mirrors the findings from previous research into the effect of probation that subsequent offending, judged on both self-reported and officially recorded data, was less likely in those assessed as more ‘hopeful’ defined as those having the will and means to achieve their goals (Burnett and Maruna, 2004, p. 395; Kozar, 2010, p. 213).
Practitioners reported that motivating offenders and keeping them engaged with supervision was a key element of their role and that the frequent contact they had with offenders provided opportunities to do this. Thus, the success of IOM depends upon, but can also influence, the readiness of an individual. This reflects the findings from Farrall’s long term tracking study of probationers (2002; Farrall and Calverley, 2006; Farrall et al, 2014) that probation supervision does effect offenders, through processes of consciousness raising or ‘planting seeds’ (Farrall and Calverley, 2006, p. 66; Farrall et al, 2014, p. 281-2). The effects of these processes can take years to emerge and for offenders to be aware of them, for example, Farrall and Calverley state:

‘Key phrases, key moments from supervision and so on somehow get ‘lodged’ in the minds of probationers and are recalled sometimes long after supervision has ended, creating a slow ‘chipping away’ of attitudes’ (2006, p. 65).

Therefore, interactions between practitioners and offenders can, in an indirect and contingent way, bring about effects over the long term. Referring specifically to projects like IOM working with prolific offenders, Farrall, Mawby and Worrall reach similar conclusions:

‘... projects working intensively with prolific offenders might be best regarded as being of a maintenance nature – of buttressing primary desistance – rather than a short sharp intervention that acts as a cure-all. Accordingly they should be assessed primarily on how well they maintain and motivate participants during the ‘on project’ period. The extent to which projects contribute to secondary desistance is a different but related issue and projects also need to be judged on how they affect participants over time – which might involve several relapses and returns to the project’ (2007, p. 358-9).

This echoes the findings of King’s recent study of assisted desistance that found that probation supervision can be a support to primary desistance (King 2013a, p. 147), that can run alongside, rather being a separate discreet stage to secondary desistance (King, 2013b, p. 150).
This way of conceiving of IOM and similar interventions reflects the findings from the previous chapter, that IOM is less a series of “carrots” and “sticks”, rewarding and punishing offenders (Home Office, Ministry of Justice, 2015a, p. 3; Local IOM Manual, 2013, p. 1) and is instead a constant process of using the tactics of control and support to manage offenders. This characterisation is perhaps subtly, but importantly, different and is reflected in the revised IOM diagram presented at the end of the previous chapter. This showed that enforcement action is not considered an end in itself, but is rather intended to support offenders back into engagement.

Therefore, IOM can reduce reoffending and support desistance to the extent that offenders are ready to undertake such change. Chapter 2 outlined how desistance research has found that most offenders, in time, come to withdraw from offending, and that the impact of the criminal justice system upon this process is ‘controversial’ (Farrington, 2005, p. 8; Piquero et al, 2003, p. 390), with a lack of clear evidence that the system can support offenders away from offending. This research has shown that IOM can support desistance processes, to the extent that offenders are ready for it, and to the extent of the resources available and the agencies involved.

**IOM: A Partnership for Desistance?**

Overall Research Question: *To what extent and in what circumstances can an IOM approach support desistance amongst prolific offenders?*

The discussion in the sections above has answered the first three supplemental research questions. This section discusses how this research has answered the overall research question. This is encapsulated in the revised IOM diagram and revised context mechanism outcome configuration presented in the previous chapter. The IOM approach can support the desistance of prolific offenders to the extent that those offenders are ready to desist and where all three generative mechanisms identified are operating,
such that offenders experience an intense and structured intervention, provided by a multi-agency team employing caring and trusting working relationships.

The research site for this evaluation was a good example of IOM; well-resourced with a long history of joint working. The IOM teams were committed to and supportive of the approach, with subtle understandings of its operation, and no evidence of a move towards merged or probation roles. It therefore was able to show the possibilities of the IOM approach; that it can be part of a solution to the “wicked problem” (Rittel and Webber, 1973) of crime and reoffending and can buttress primary desistance and prepare offenders for secondary desistance.

The way in which offenders are supervised on IOM echoes older approaches to offender supervision and rehabilitation. Worrall and Mawby argue that over time both probation and police officers have become removed from local communities, with the police increasingly patrolling larger areas in cars and probation officers becoming more office based due to an increase of risk assessment and report writing work (2011a, p. 89). Similarly, Annison and colleagues note that in probation the development and implementation of the “what works” Effective Practice Initiative also moved probation officers away from the one-to-one casework model of work towards the management of defined groups (2008, p. 259).

IOM can be seen as a return to more traditional ways of working for both agencies. Under IOM locally based teams are able to spend more time in face to face contact with offenders offering personalised and bespoke support that includes contact with family members and partners (Murphy and Lutze, 2009, p. 65). As an approach that has developed out of earlier “what works” interventions, such as PPO, it retains the risk-need-responsibility logic. Therefore, the prolific and high risk nature of the offenders supervised by
IOM, entitles them to this additional, traditional style support. This support also mirrors a number of the features recommended by those from the desistance field of research (Annison et al, 2008, p. 267). Indeed the revised policy statement for IOM specifically cites long term desistance from crime as an aim of IOM (Home Office, Ministry of Justice, 2015a, p. 3).

However, Burnett warns against romanticising probation’s past and excluding what has been learnt from the “what works” approach and the RNR model of rehabilitation (2004, p. 193). Indeed Flynn has questioned the extent to that IOM signals a shift away from supervision concerned with public protection, and towards that which re-prioritises older social work methods (2011, p. 85). For example, the aims of IOM are also to reduce reoffending and crime in order to improve local communities, reduce the numbers of victims and improve confidence in the criminal justice system (Home Office, Ministry of Justice, 2015a, p. 2). These concerns echo the managerial, rehabilitative and punitive visions of probation described by Robinson and colleagues in Chapter 2 (2013, p. 325). IOM is a managerial approach, targeted at a defined group of offenders and based on assessments of their level and type of offending. IOM seeks to rehabilitate offenders both for the benefit of the public and individual offenders. IOM is also punitive, increasing the requirements placed on offenders and for some a source of concern and worry.

Furthermore, the involvement of both the police and probation service in IOM ensures that the additional requirements of IOM can be enforced; a defining feature of this generation of prolific offender projects as noted by Worrall and Mawby (2004, p. 270). In this way IOM is an example of the type of ‘lighter but tighter’ punishment outlined by Crewe (2011, p. 524; Foucault, 1991, p. 296), in which individual offenders become more responsible for complying with conditions and moving through a process of rehabilitation.
This evaluation therefore also identifies the limitations of the IOM approach. Despite IOM’s increased ability to support offenders, it is focused primarily upon their personal rehabilitation, as opposed to the wider social and moral rehabilitation outlined by McNeill (2012b, p. 15). In particular IOM has no formal means of working with the community to which offenders return and so is limited in its ability to enable offenders to rehabilitate in a holistic way (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p. 24; Flynn, 2011, p. 9; Byrne and Hummer, 2004, p. 62). As a result of similar findings from their research, Murphy and Lutze recommend that the police promote a philosophy that conceives of offenders as a part of the community, not just a threat to it (2009, p. 74). This implies a change to the way performance for approaches such as IOM is measured, that in turn, requires a more strategic approach to IOM both in local sites and nationally. Without this, IOM will remain, as in this evaluation, a limited partnership that can only support desistance to, at most, a limited degree.

This research into IOM and the other previous studies were commissioned by local agencies or national government. This suggests a demand for evidence to inform and improve this approach that continues to be promoted in government policy statements. This research, unlike previous IOM studies, has employed a realistic evaluation approach. This aims to identify those aspects of an intervention that explain the outcomes observed. These aspects are applicable beyond the research site and so can aid this apparent demand for evidence regarding IOM. The experience of using it in this research is discussed in the next section.
Realistic evaluation methodology

Supplemental Research Question 4: How useful is the realistic evaluation methodology to research in this area?

This section discusses the findings regarding the final supplemental research question that concerns the use of the realistic evaluation methodology in this research. As outlined in Chapters 4 and 5 this approach, like theory-led evaluation more generally, has rarely featured in research to date. This is in part due to the orthodoxy of experimental evaluation that is still present in the field of criminal justice (Raynor, 2008; Hollin, 2008; Hough, 2010; Hedderman et al, 2011). This research is the first evaluation of IOM to employ the approach, and one of only two studies of assisted desistance to use it, the other being Farrall’s long term probation study (2002, p. 32).

The realistic evaluation approach of Pawson and Tilley (1997) was developed within the field of community safety and criminal justice and was specifically recommended by Wong for evaluating IOM (2013, p. 73). It was considered to be the most applicable in the case of this research for two reasons. Firstly because of the theoretical overlap between realistic evaluation and desistance theory around generative causation. The realistic evaluation approach therefore recognises the need for evaluations to pay close heed to the internal operation of a programme. Secondly the recognition within realistic evaluation that conducting research in open and complex systems means there is a need to understand how and why any changes observed may have been brought about in a specific context. Thus, as Farrall and colleagues state, ‘desistance does not fit neatly into the linear, billiard-ball models of causality found most acceptable to criminologists’ (2007, p. 360).

This research found the realistic evaluation approach to be a useful and applicable methodology. Regarding its application during the fieldwork, it was found that explicitly asking interviewees to reflect on and discuss why and
how they thought IOM worked; what was important about it, was useful in
developing a model of IOM. Furthermore, using the teacher-learner approach
to discuss the suggested mechanisms and proposed model of IOM with team
leaders and managers was useful in the creation of a refined model and a
revised CMOC.

Chapters 4 and 5 noted that there has been debate amongst evaluation
theorists and researchers as to the terms context, mechanisms and outcomes
used within realistic evaluation and their application. In common with the
difficulties identified by Astbury and Leeuw in applying the terms during data
analysis (2010, p. 367), this was found to create some difficulties in this
research when developing the IOM model and CMOC. However, applying
these terms was found to be a useful discipline as it enabled to the research
to be clear about how IOM was conceptualised. In particular, the need to
define a particular level of context, in this case at the level of the individual
offender, proved a useful way to frame the findings. This research therefore
rejected the idea of defining various different types of mechanisms as used in
previous research (Kazi, 2003; Davis, 2005). Instead, the notion of
confounding factors was used, that are not separate mechanisms or different
levels of contexts, but instances of mechanisms prevented from fully
operating (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 75).

A particular difficulty faced in this research was the presentation of findings
using the Context + Mechanism = Outcome structure. This was found to be
restrictive, and led to the use of the IOM diagram to represent the complex
operation of IOM, and the presentation of both an ideal and confounding
CMOC. This enabled the research to highlight areas of risk and difficulty for
the IOM that was considered to be important in research designed to have a
real-world effect.
This research therefore found realistic evaluation to be a useful methodological framework, in particular in the fieldwork and analysis stages, to understand why and how an intervention is having an effect. It confirms the usefulness of the core CMO components of realistic evaluation and their usefulness in understanding interventions. Regarding the presentation of findings, this research concludes that the Context + Mechanism = Outcome format could be developed to highlight areas of risk or improvement of an intervention. These are likely to be of particular concern to those practitioners currently delivering such an intervention, or those who implement it in the future.

**Research contributions**

This evaluation of IOM has, in answering the above research questions, made three key contributions. These are discussed in this section.

Firstly, this research contributes specifically to the literature and theory on IOM and to the literature regarding assisted desistance and the effect of partnership working in this field more broadly. As has been outlined in this thesis the research evidence on IOM to date has been mixed (Annison et al, 2015, p. 401) with no definitive body of research (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p. 50). Furthermore, the ways in which desistance can be supported or assisted is little researched (Shapland et al, 2012, p. 20 and 22; McNeill and Weaver, 2010, p.11; McCulloch, 2005, p. 12), and none of the previous studies have considered a multi-agency intervention.

This research contributes to this literature and provides an in-depth understanding of the operation and effect of IOM through the development of a CMOC for IOM. This allows this research to understand both the operation and effect of IOM in the research site, and more widely. By employing a mixed methods approach this study has been able to identify
both how the intervention is operating and its effects. These findings have been further strengthened by the use of interviews of and observations of a range of different groups and the use of a range of different outcome measures.

Secondly, this research makes an empirical contribution to offender management practice and policy. Authors on desistance have noted specifically the implications of desistance research findings for the practice of probation supervision and offender management (McNeill, 2006; McNeill and Weaver, 2010). As a commissioned piece of research the findings from this evaluation have been provided to the local site with a set of recommendations that seek to improve the operation of IOM locally. These recommendations were as follows:

- Work to better inform home organisations about IOM and continue to provide opportunities for the promotion of IOM
- Provide opportunities for IOM teams and other colleagues to meet and exchange information and good practice
- Draw other partner agencies into the formal processes of IOM, particularly those concerned with housing and employment
- Consider the introduction of an IOM training or induction package for new practitioners
- Consider ways in which the successful completion of IOM can be formally marked with offenders
- Consider assessments of offender readiness, perhaps drawn from Probation data, when bringing offenders onto IOM
- Ensure the governance structure for IOM is clear, jointly agreed and able to support its work
- Develop commonly agreed goals for IOM around which a performance framework can be constructed. This needs to be agreed upon by all relevant agencies, and the impact upon their own performance measures considered

These recommendations were presented to the stakeholder group for the research and to the local Reducing Reoffending Board. At a subsequent meeting of this board, the IOM police lead reported that some of these recommendations had been implemented in the local site. For example, local IOM managers reported that they had taken steps to promote IOM better
within home organisations, particularly the police, using electronic and face-to-face methods and to provide IOM practitioners themselves more opportunities to meet. The local reducing Reoffending Board was being used to draw other agencies into IOM, and was identified as the formal group to which performance would be reported. In addition, processes to ensure offenders were more formally de-labelled as prolific offenders were developed and linked to the introduction of a new information management system. Finally, a wider set of indicators, including those that measured motivation, were to be used in offender selection.

The research makes a final contribution regarding the use of the realistic evaluation approach. As noted above, the approach was found to be highly relevant to research in the field of rehabilitation and desistance and to have particular strengths in the fieldwork and analysis stages of the evaluation. The CMO framework helps to clarify how and why an intervention operates and in turn makes findings relevant beyond the particular research site. It was found that the presentation of results could be supported by use of different formats beyond that of Context + Mechanism = Outcome.

As an intervention that has survived two changes of government and is still promoted and supported by the relevant government departments (Wong, 2013, p. 75; Home Office, Ministry of Justice, 2015a) evaluating IOM, especially an established example of it, is a useful and relevant undertaking. This is especially the case in the light of current changes to the probation service under the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014. As noted in the previous chapter it is likely that the mechanisms that make IOM “work” will be undermined by these changes. This is discussed further in the next section.
Implications for future research

As outlined above, towards the end of the fieldwork period of this research the far reaching changes to the probation service enshrined in the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014 were introduced. Interviews with local and national staff outlined the far reaching effects these are likely to have upon the operation of IOM (Evans, 2015). As a result, further research in how IOM in the research site is altered would be informative. One recent example (Robinson et al, 2015) has considered the impact of these changes upon the identities and practices of employees; further research considering the effect on the experience and outcomes for offenders would also be of use.

In addition, it would be informative to follow up the cohort of offenders on whom data has been collected in this research to assess outcomes beyond the one year follow up period. As noted previously, desistance is a long term process and so this is too short a period to assess whether this group have fully desisted, especially when as a prolific group they are likely to find this process complicated (Farrall et al, 2007, p. 358-9).
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Appendices

Appendix A - Phase one staff interview topic guide

- What is your role within IOM?
  - How did you come to be working IOM
  - How long have you worked in IOM
  - Has working in IOM changing your working style / is it different from previous role

- Talk me through the background and context to IOM here
  - Its origins, its developments since, the reasons for these

- What does IOM look like here today?
  - How does it operate on a day-to-day basis (case meetings (fortnightly tactical advisory group, four weekly selection meetings?), staff training, links with the prison, interaction with offenders)
  - Geographical coverage (diff schemes / arrangements in the county and city?)
  - What services does it provide? For what period of time?
  - Who is it aimed at (types of offenders e.g. serious acquisitive crimes? NSOs?), use of a matrix? Impact of the end of NIs and PSAs on selection and agreement between agencies.
  - What are the aims of the programme? What does success look like on the scheme?
  - Caseloads (current and over the lifetime of the project)
  - (How) are NP staff involved?
  - Which partners are involved, at what level, how many staff?
  - How well do these relationships work?
  - How are staff (from all agencies) assigned to IOM
  - How is it overseen/governed? What is the role of the Crown Prosecution Service?

- Any previous work done to assess its impact?
  - (Part of Sheffield Hallam process evaluation)

- Why has the current project been commissioned?
  - What are its aims?

- Data available to the project
  - Use of case management software?
  - National reporting of figures to National Offender Management Service / Home Office? (Any centrally held data / league table data, for comparison sites)

- People available to the project
  - Staff and offenders
Appendix B - Phase two staff interview topic guides

IOM practitioners & team leaders

Introduction to the interview

- Including who I am, why the work is being conducted and what it consists of.
- Taking the interviewee through the information sheet and consent form.

Interviewee Background

- Roles and responsibilities
- Length of service, overall and time in IOM

Outline of IOM

- To what extent IOM is used as a term, versus PPO/Prolific, why?
- How does IOM in THE RESEARCH SITE operate including – how is IOM introduced to offenders, the types of pathways and enforcement work done – how this is selected, focus on needs or strengths, and what control offenders have in these decisions – by what standards is it governed, how is IOM followed through in prison and to what end, the relationships formed with offenders, including exploring the range of workers offenders meet with, how offenders are transferred between officers/teams
- The movement of individuals on and off IOM – how does IOM finish, what is considered success within IOM
- The extent to which IOM differs from ‘normal’ probation supervision – in what ways IOM provides a ‘premium’ or intensive service?
- Experiences of working on IOM including the operation and implications of multi-agency working – such as relationships between police and probation and other agencies (Education Training and Employment, substance misuse workers), pathways and enforcement, different levels of staff, does working on IOM change your role, make different demands?
Assessment of IOM

- Assessments of IOM’s effect – for whom do you think it works best? For whom do you think it is not suitable? Can they provide examples of cases?
- Advantages and disadvantages of IOM. Where are the gaps?
- The extent to which the IOM structure fits with their own knowledge / experience of offender behaviour, change and desistance – where does it overlap, where does it depart, does IOM (and PPO) ‘make sense’.
- Extent to which IOM provides or is based upon – individualised and diverse support, maintaining motivation and hope, work to build up personal and social resources (through family relationships etc.)
- Views of desistance research – whether they feel any of the following has or might affect offending: Age, social circumstances, such as employment, relationships, children (social bonds), ways in which they view themselves – as offenders, as ex-offenders (narrative understanding of themselves)
- Any resource constraints affecting IOM
- Are there ways in which IOM has changed in the time you have been involved with it / it has been running?
- Ideas for improvement

Future Changes

- Extent to which, and ways in which they envision the changes to the provision of Probation Services outlined in the Transforming Rehabilitation proposals will affect the provision of IOM? For example how it will affect relationships with OMs, support and services provided and partnership working arrangements.
- Extent to which such changes will bring advantages and disadvantages to those subject to IOM

Any other comments? Very many thanks for your time and comments.
IOM Management

Introduction to the interview

- Including who I am, why the work is being conducted and what it consists of.
- Taking the interviewee through the information sheet and consent form.

Interviewee Background

- Roles and responsibilities
- Length of service, overall and time in IOM

Outline of IOM

- Discussion of the IOM diagram – focus on the mechanisms which make IOM ‘work’
- Experiences of working on IOM
  o the operation and implications of multi-agency working – such as relationships between police and probation and other agencies (Education Training and Employment, substance misuse workers)
  o does working on IOM change your role, make different demands?
- What is considered success within IOM

Assessment of IOM

- The extent to which the IOM structure fits with their own knowledge / experience of offender behaviour, change and desistance – where does it overlap, where does it depart, does IOM (and PPO) ‘make sense’.
- Extent to which IOM provides or is based upon – individualised and diverse support, maintaining motivation and hope, work to build up personal and social resources (through family relationships etc.)
- Views of desistance research – whether they feel any of the following has or might affect offending: Age, social circumstances, such as employment, relationships, children (social bonds), ways in which they view themselves – as offenders, as ex-offenders (narrative understanding of themselves)
- Assessments of IOM’s effect – for whom do you think it works best? For whom do you think it is not suitable?
- Advantages and disadvantages of IOM.
- Gaps in current IOM provision?
- Any resource constraints affecting IOM
- Are there ways in which IOM has changed in the time you have been involved with it / it has been running?
• Ideas for improvement

**Future Changes**

• Extent to which, and ways in which they envision the changes to the provision of Probation Services outlined in the *Transforming Rehabilitation* proposals will affect the provision of IOM? For example how it will affect relationships with Offender Managers, support and services provided and partnership working arrangements.

• Extent to which such changes will bring advantages and disadvantages to those subject to IOM

*Any other comments? Very many thanks for your time and comments.*
Appendix C - Phase one offender interview topic guide

Explanation of the research and my role

Information sheet

Consent form

Questions:

• How did you come to be here (subject to IOM)?
• Tell me of your previous offending
• Tell me about your experiences of IOM
  o Your relationship with your Offender Manager and others, the way IOM was introduced
  o What sort of things have you done as part of it?
  o What effect do you think it is having? Have you reduced/stopped offending?
  o How does it compare to previous experiences of probation / police attention?
• How do you see the future?
  o What are you aiming for now? During rest of time on IOM
  o How do you see your future specifically regarding offending?

Any other comments? Very many thanks for your time and comments.
Appendix D - Phase two offender interview topic guide

Introduction to the interview
• Including who I am, why the work is being conducted and what it consists of.
• Taking the interviewee through the information sheet and consent form.

Background
• Exploration of their current circumstances – living arrangements, employment/training, family relations, substance misuse, etc.
• Previous experiences of offending and the criminal justice system
• Previous experiences of PPO system

Offending and Desistance
• Attitudes towards their offending
• Views of desistance research – whether they feel any of the following has or might affect their offending:
  o Age – growing up
  o Social circumstances, such as employment, relationships, children (Social bonds)
  o Ways in which they view themselves – as offenders, as ex-offenders (Narrative understanding of themselves)
• Assessment of what other things they feel would support an end to their offending

Experiences of IOM (PPO)
• Do you think being put on IOM (PPO) was fair?
• Outline of the work/activities undertaken whilst on IOM – what did they/you do / what did they try to do?
• Explore the relationship built up with offender manager and other staff – how long have they known them, how regularly do they meet with them, for how long, have they been transferred between officers / teams? Differences between probation and police roles?
• Experiences with the ‘enforcement’ side of IOM - have they had any, what triggered them, how were they experienced
• Assessment of IOM’s effect - both on the likelihood of reoffending, and in other intermediate ways, advantages and disadvantages of IOM
• Ideas for improving support on IOM and more generally

Future
• What plans do you have for the future?
• How confident are you that you will be able to stop offending?

Any other comments? Very many thanks for your time and comments.
## Appendix E - Information Sheet and Consent Form for Research Participants

Thank you for agreeing to participate in the research project. Your participation in this research is voluntary, and you may change your mind about being involved in the research at any time, and without giving a reason.

This information sheet is designed to give you full details of the research project, its goals, the research team, the research funder, and what you will be asked to do as part of the research. If you have any questions that are not answered by this information sheet, please ask.

### What is the research project called?

An Evaluation of Integrated Offender Management in ONE ENGLISH COUNTY

### Who is carrying out the research?

Emily Evans  
PhD Research Student, Business School

### What is the research about?

To evaluate the Integrated Offender Management (IOM) programme provided across THE RESEARCH SITE, to assess its processes and outcomes, and to provide ideas of how the programme can be improved.

### What groups of people have been asked to take part, and why?

Members of the police and probation service and other organisations working on and managing IOM and clients of IOM

### What will research participants be asked to do?

- Take part in interviews regarding the IOM programme  
- Allow me to observe the workings of the IOM programme, in meetings and other settings.  
- Allow me access to data on those subject to IOM

This should involve no risks of harm and the research should help improve the operation of the programme locally. No incentives are offered for participation in the research. Participation in the research is voluntary and participants can withdraw at any time, with no negative consequences and do not have to provide a reason for withdrawing.

### What will happen to the information I provide?

Recordings and notes of interviews, observations and other fieldwork activities will be kept securely by myself – I will not share the content of these
with anyone else and only I will have access to them. The only access others will have to this data will be in the transcription of recorded interviews. This will be undertaken by an independent, University recommended transcription service. They will be provided with anonymous recordings and will abide by the usual rules of non-disclosure.

Data collected or generated by the project is required to be retained for at least seven years. Following the end of this period the records will be destroyed.

Individuals will not be identified in the research. Direct quotes will be used, but in attributing them I will ensure the anonymity of respondents is preserved.

Only if the researcher becomes aware of significant harm to a child/young person up to the age of 18 years, or other child protection concerns will confidentiality be breached. Confidentiality will not be breached if disclosure of involvement in other previously undisclosed offences is made.

**What will be the outputs of the research?**

The primary output will be a PhD thesis. In addition, I will provide updates on the research to the services providing IOM, including summaries of work done. This fieldwork may also be used in the production of articles and conference papers during and following the research.

[CONTACT DETAILS PROVIDED FOR THE RESEARCHER AND SUPERVISORS]

**Complaint procedure**

If you wish to complain about the way in which the research is being conducted or have any concerns about the research then in the first instance please contact [THE RESEARCHER, OR THEIR SUPERVISORS].

Or contact the School’s Research Ethics Officer: [CONTACT DETAILS PROVIDED]
An Evaluation of Integrated Offender Management in ONE ENGLISH COUNTY

In signing this consent form I confirm that:

I have read the Participant Information Sheet and the nature and purpose of the research project has been explained to me.  

Yes ☐ No ☐

I have had the opportunity to ask questions.  

Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand the purpose of the research project and my involvement in it.  

Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand that my participation is voluntary and I may withdraw from the research project at any stage, without having to give any reason and withdrawing will not penalise or disadvantaged me in any way.  

Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand that while information gained during the study may be published, any information I provide is confidential (with one exception – see next point), and that no information that could lead to the identification of any individual will be disclosed in any reports on the project, or to any other party. No identifiable personal data will be published.  

Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand that the researcher may be required to report to the authorities any significant harm to a child/young person (up to the age of 18 years) or other child protection concerns that she becomes aware of during the research. I agree that such harm may violate the principle of confidentiality.  

Yes ☐ No ☐

I agree that extracts from the interview may be anonymously quoted in any report or publication arising from the research.  

Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand that the interview will be recorded using electronic voice recorder.  

Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand that data will be securely stored.  

Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand that an independent external transcription service may listen to the interview, but that they will be duty bound not to disclose anything they hear.  

Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand that I may contact the researcher or their supervisor if I require further information about the research, and that I may contact the Research Ethics Officer of the Business School, University of Nottingham, if I wish to make a complaint relating to my involvement in the research.  

Yes ☐ No ☐

I agree to take part in the above research project.  

Yes ☐ No ☐

Participant’s name (BLOCK CAPITAL)  
Participant’s signature  
Date

Researcher’s name (BLOCK CAPITAL)  
Researcher’s signature  
Date
Appendix F - National actors interview topic guide

Introduction to the interview

- Including who I am, why the work is being conducted and what it consists of.
- Taking the interviewee through the information sheet and consent form.

Assessment of IOM

- Their understanding of IOM and the reasoning behind it
- The extent to which IOM fits with their own knowledge / experience of offender behaviour, change and desistance – where does it overlap, where does it depart, does IOM (and PPO) ‘make sense’.
- Views of desistance research – whether they feel any of the following has or might affect offending: Age, social circumstances, such as employment, relationships, children (social bonds), ways in which they view themselves – as offenders, as ex-offenders (narrative understanding of themselves)
- Extent to which IOM provides or is based upon – individualised and diverse support, maintaining motivation and hope, work to build up personal and social resources (through family relationships etc.)
- For whom do you think IOM works best? For whom do you think it is not suitable?
- Differences the IOM approach has made
- Advantages and disadvantages of IOM
- Gaps in current provision?

Future Changes

- Extent to which, and ways in which, they envision the changes to the provision of Probation Services outlined in the Transforming Rehabilitation proposals will affect the provision of IOM? For example how it will affect relationships with OMs, support and services provided and partnership working arrangements.
- Extent to which such changes will bring advantages and disadvantages to those subject to IOM

Any other comments? Very many thanks for your time and comments.
Appendix G - Coding examples

Excerpt from staff interview 41, enforcement police officer

**Key:**

\[ EE = \text{researcher} / I = \text{interviewee} \]

EE: So in the role that you have now within this team, what are your kind of roles and responsibilities or your duties?

I: Well as I say we’re the enforcement side, so we don’t really ... although we have a lot of contact with the pathways officers who are there to support these people, our main job is generally day-to-day trying to locate them and arrest them, either for serious acquisitive crime offences for the CID Department or if they fail to appear in court, it might be a more minor shop theft ... because we also include there’s a team dealing with shoplifters primarily...

\[ \text{[CODE: Roles]} \]

EE: Okay.

I: Yeah, so really the idea is every morning, obviously things change daily for who’s wanted and when, and recalls to prison they’re a priority for us as well, so we get tasked daily really, we come into work and who do we look for today and then that’s it, we do some research and we go out and try and find them basically.

\[ \text{[CODE: Roles]} \]

EE: Okay.

I: And hopefully arrest them. That’s our general day-to-day. And that may take several forms, it may be quite straightforward and it may be someone who’s on a G4S tag for example, so we know they’re in, we know where they are and it’s quite straightforward to go and get them.

EE: Yeah.

I: Or it may involve some lengthy plain clothes observations you know, it just depends on the circumstances and how difficult it is to locate the person we’re looking for really.

EE: Right.

I: And we will travel outside the county if needs be, depending on what information we’ve got and how good it is. We’ve done that a few times. So it’s quite a varied role you know, it is quite good; it’s quite good in that respect.

\[ \text{[CODE: Roles]} \]

...
EE: Okay. Is that always the case that you would in some sense kind of get to introduce yourself to ...?

I: We try to you know, we try to within the first week of being notified that they’re ours we will try and get to go and see them and just introduce them and give them my card and explain what we’re about.

EE: Okay.

I: The idea being that if we can sort of forge some kind of relationship with them ... and there’s a little bit of trust in there you know, I try to be very straight with them and say you know, if you’re not wanted and I say I’m going to see you I will just come for a chat. If you are wanted, I’ll be telling you that you’re wanted and I’ll be arresting you, you know and I try and be open and honest with them. The idea being that it will prevent them sort of going on the run and I can almost make a phone call and it’s not just them, it might be they’re a juvenile and it could be their parents as well and it’s trying to build that relationship so that when we do need to look for them, there’s some sort of cooperation there.

[CODE: Roles / work done with offenders / relationships with offender]

... 

I: So as I say, most days we are tasked in the morning when we come on you know, we don’t exactly know what we’re doing. And very often we try and assist CID as well, even if they’re not one of our nominals but they are nevertheless sort of fairly prolific or they’re an associate of one of our nominals, again you know we’ll try and assist. So we do a lot of arrests for them and searches you know, so we work quite well with them.

[CODE: roles]

EE: Okay. Are they also based here?

I: [CID?] Yes, they’re downstairs, which works very well actually.

EE: Yeah.

I: It works better than at some stations. We’ve got quite a close relationship with the DS downstairs, [NAME]; yeah, it’s very good, very good working relationship. Because I mean the nice thing is for us they are involved in serious acquisitive crime a lot of them and for us you know, we go out and find a body and sort of track them down and then somebody else deals with them for us, which is a nice working relationship.

[CODE: Multi-agency working / organisation]

...
EE: Yeah, I was going to ask because you know, given that you will have people that you’re looking to see if they’re out and about, presumably then that stuff then gets reported back?
I: Yeah, very often if we’re struggling to find something, to be honest we are very often reliant on a phone call from someone or a text message to say go to this address now.
EE: Right.
I: And that’s what we try to build that relationship with people as well to get that information because it’s ... I’d say looking for a needle in a haystack (laughs) but it can be that way you know.

[CLOSED: Relationships with offender / roles]

Excerpt of Offender 12 Interview Transcript:

Key:

EE: Interviewer / I: interviewee

EE: ... I wonder what you might link your offending to is it
I: it was linked to alcohol at first years ago and then it’s started into drug misuse
EE: ok what sort of substances?
I: heroin and amphetamine
EE: ok and then that’s what’s been linked to your offending up until now?
[CLOSED: Cause of offending]

...

EE: and you’re no longer involved in offending?
I: no.
EE: ok, I wonder what you put that down to?
I: what
EE: the fact that you’re not involved in offending anymore and your substance misuse has dropped off
I: my son is one of my main things
EE: ok
I: I just stayed away from drugs, just used them once and that’s it
EE: so it’s getting that under control means that you’re not involved in offending anymore
I: yeah
[CLOSED: Effect of IOM / Interplay / social bonds]

...
EE: really, no that make sense. I wonder if you feel that being made a PPO and being on PPO licences was fair?
I: yeah, yeah
EE: how come?
I: it just gives you a kick up the backside to do something about your drug use and that

[CODE: Fair]

EE: in what way
I: well they give you them drug tests and that and if you don’t pass them, you go back to prison, and they just help you through and help you find and do things like your CSCS cards and stuff like that, I did my forklift licence while I was PPO they paid for it and that and all that

[CODE: Effect of IOM / Experience of IOM]

... 

EE: ok, has it changed since you’ve gone on to being voluntary, has it, is different now
I: yeah, its not so tense, do you know what I mean
EE: really
I: like before you were always worried about going to your appointments not making them, to the appointment and stuff like that
EE: yeah cos I guess if you don’t
I: if you miss your appointments they send you back to jail so it really it adds to your worry
EE: really?
I: it helps, it helps you in one aspect but then it don’t help you in an other
EE: yeah
I: it helps you because if you don’t stick to rules and regulations and that you just get sent back to prison, but on other hand they help you with staying out of trouble and that

[CODES: Experience of IOM]

...

EE: yeah, no that’s fair enough, but it’s sort of less tense now
I: yeah yeah hell of a lot less tense, a lot better now

[CODE: Experience of IOM / L1and2 Vs 3]

...

[interruption]
I: I forgot what we were on about now
EE: about them coming to your house and
I: oh yeah, when they first started coming to house, people were looking because they have to wear those blue tags and it says THE RESEARCH
SITE police on it and people wondering why they kept coming to house all the time, I told everyone they just come to drugs test me and that EE:

Yeah, really? And then people were all right with it?

I:

Yeah

CODE: Experience of IOM

...

EE:

Ok and do you are you intending to keep going with it for a while

I:

Yeah I’m up for it, I’m not planning on stopping just yet

EE:

How come it sounds like

I:

It’s just um, mainly it’s for drug tests to prove my family and my ex-partner that I am drug free so that she can, cos I’m looking for a place of my own at the minute do you know I need to prove to her that I am drug free so she’ll keep me letting me see my son

CODE: Effect of IOM

Example of Team Meeting Observation Field Notes

Week 4

Attendees: Sergeant, 3xProbation Officers, 3x Probation Service Officers, pathways police officers x 3, mentor, drugs worker, Inspector

9.30 – 10.40am

Location: meeting room in team building

Notes:

- Drugs worker commented that the substance misuse column on the team sheet has gone, so there is no info on their script
  CODE: Organisation / Multi-Agency working
- Case currently NFA/sleeping rough – Housing provider refusing to house to due to risk of possible future offending – left with Probation officer/police to check
  CODE: Organisation / Multi-Agency working
- Case being recalled – asked not to be arrested at work as he may be able to take holiday from work
  CODE: Work done with offenders / Relationship with offender
- Case close to recall but probation decision made not to do so – is close to end of licence and considered of more use to him to stay out than return for 28 days – police agree
  CODE: Multi-agency working
• Sgt feedback from seeing a case in custody who he described as ‘broken’ – is now in prison and considers it a good time to get in to see him – agreement made to do so with probation officer

[CODE: Work done with offenders / Introduction]

• Reported that a local (non-IOM) Inspector is not happy about the presence of a halfway house on his patch, attracting offenders – IOM team are asking for local offender to stay there to keep their local connection – agreement of the team as whole that there is a need for housing and so they would not want house moved.

[CODE: Pressures / Separation]

• Update on domestic violence in relation to one case – but came from non-IOM police and so took a while to come through

• Discussion of case who has moved from L3 to L2 and have been taken back in by his parents. He is no longer on a curfew and PSO asked that police not visit at night, as his parents will throw him out if they are disturbed

[CODE: Differences in approach / Work done with offenders]
## Appendix H - List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CJS</td>
<td>Criminal Justice System – composed of the various agencies which oversee the investigation, prosecution and punishment of crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Context Mechanism Outcome Configuration – element of the realistic evaluation approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIP</td>
<td>Drugs Intervention Programme - precursor to IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLM</td>
<td>Good Lives Model - approach to offender rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>Integrated Offender Management – approach to the management of prolific offenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>Modus Operandi - method of a crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOMS</td>
<td>National Offender Management Service - part of the Ministry of Justice, oversees the prisons and probation services</td>
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<tr>
<td>OASys</td>
<td>Offender Assessment System - used by the probation service to assess and manage offenders</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGRS</td>
<td>Offender Group Reconviction Scale - assessment of the likelihood of an offender reoffending within a set time period</td>
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<tr>
<td>PbR</td>
<td>Payment by Results - approach to the payment of service providers based on outcomes achieved</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>Police National Computer</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPO</td>
<td>Prolific and Priority Offenders Programme - precursor to IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCT</td>
<td>Randomised Controlled Trial - methodological approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNR</td>
<td>Risk Need Responsivity – approach to offender rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utos/ UTOS</td>
<td><em>unit</em> (of analysis), <em>treatment</em> (or programme), <em>observations</em> (of various inputs and outputs), <em>setting</em> (context of the programme) – from Cronbach’s approach to evaluation</td>
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