The ‘Singapore Fever’ in China: policy mobility and mutation

Kean Fan Lim*
School of Geography
University of Nottingham
Sir Clive Granger Building
University Park
Nottingham
NG7 2RD, UK
Email: keanfan.lim@nottingham.ac.uk

and

Niv Horesh
China Policy Institute
University of Nottingham
Si Yuan Centre
Jubilee Campus
Nottingham
NG8 1BB, UK
Email: Niv.Horesh@nottingham.ac.uk

7 January 2016

* Corresponding author

Abstract

The ‘Singapore Model’ has constituted the only second explicit attempt by the Communist Party of China (CPC) to learn from a foreign country following Mao Zedong’s pledge to contour ‘China’s tomorrow’ on the Soviet Union experience during the early 1950s. This paper critically evaluates policy transfers from Singapore to China in the post-Mao era. It re-examines how this Sino-Singaporean regulatory engagement came about historically following Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Singapore in 1978, and offers a careful re-reading of the degree to which actual policy borrowing by China could transcend different state ideologies, abstract ideas and subjective attitudes. Particular focus is placed on the effects of CPC cadre training in Singapore universities and policy mutation within two government-to-government projects, namely the Suzhou Industrial Park and the Tianjin Eco-City. The paper concludes that the ‘Singapore Model’, as applied in post-Mao China, casts institutional reforms as an open-ended process of policy experimentation and adaptation that is fraught with tension and resistance.

Key words: China; Singapore; lesson drawing; policy transfer; policy mutation
内容提要

'新加坡模式'是1950年代早期毛泽东誓言以苏联经验塑造'中国的明天'后中国共产党第二次明确表明学习的外国对象。本文评价后毛时代中国对新加坡经验的学习和政策的传送。著者重新审视邓小平1978年到访新加坡后中国在监管领域上借鉴新加坡经验的历史起源，而重新诠释新加坡对中国实际的政策传送可否跨越意识形态，抽象理念和主观态度的差异。本文仔细分析新加坡大学培训对中共党员回国后的影响和中新政府在苏州和天津合作项目中的政策传送和突变。分析结果显示'新加坡模式'应用于后毛时代中国反映了中共制度改革上的开放性和实验性，也凸现改革过程中的张力和阻力。

关键词：中国；新加坡模式；政策传送；政策突变；借鉴经验

This is the accepted version for publication by The China Quarterly. Copyright has been assigned to the journal, and the paper will appear in a revised form subsequent to editorial input by the journal's proprietor.
Introduction

Much has been made of the significance of the 1992 ‘southern tour’ of the-then ‘Paramount Leader’ of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Deng Xiaoping, in instituting a new round of socioeconomic reforms in China. Relatively underplayed but not lacking in historical significance was his ‘southern tour’ of Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore in November 1978. Recounting this visit, the former Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, described Deng’s tour “shocked him [Deng] because he expected three backward cities. Instead he saw three modern cities and he knew that communism – the politics of the iron rice bowl – did not work”¹. This “shock” jumpstarted a deepening engagement with the regulatory regime in Singapore, previously labelled the “running dog of imperialism” (diguozhuyi zougou 帝国主义走狗) by the CPC propagandistic machine. Delegations began to visit Singapore informally in the 1980s, including Jiang Zemin, who succeeded Deng as China’s next leader, and a ‘Singapore fever’ (xinjiapo re 新加坡热) quickly developed across Chinese policymaking circles after Deng’s imploration to CPC cadres in 1992: “Learn from the world, especially from Singapore. There is good social order there. They govern with discipline. We should draw from their experience – and we will do even better than they.”²

More delegations were deployed to Singapore in the 1990s. The current Chinese president, Xi Jinping, went on one of these visits as a city-level official. A bilateral agreement was signed in February 1994 in Beijing to facilitate expertise transfer in the realm of urban and industrial management – portrayed by Singaporean policymakers as a government-to-government (G-to-G) ‘software transfer’ – to the ancient city of Suzhou. Subsequent G-to-G collaborations were launched in Tianjin (2008) and Chongqing (2015). The regulatory engagement became further institutionalized with the signing of two agreements in 1997 and 2001 to facilitate short attachments to key regulatory agencies in Singapore and longer-term enrolment in Master-degree programs offered by the Nanyang Technological University

(NTU) and the National University of Singapore (NUS). More recently, the CPC’s enchantment with Singaporean neo-authoritarianism appears to have transcended the domains of urban public administration and industrial policy. This is interesting – if not also surprising – as it comes after reported concerns about the “cracks in the Singapore model” following the ruling People’s Action Party’s (PAP) weakest ever electoral performance in 2011. With the PAP’s landslide electoral victory of September 2015 suggesting it managed to reduce the socioeconomic problems that triggered a loss of confidence in its governance, it appears there are new lessons to be drawn on addressing social discontent.

This paper evaluates the emergence and effects of lesson drawing and policy transfers from Singapore to China in the post-Mao era. It has two objectives. First, it re-examines how this Sino-Singaporean regulatory engagement – only the second overt attempt to learn from a particular country after Mao Zedong pledged during the 1950s to contour ‘China’s tomorrow’ on the Soviet Union prototype – came to be. Second, the paper provides a twofold evaluation of the concrete policies and ideas drawn from Singapore. It begins by assessing the CPC’s annual cadre training and exchange programs through critical observations from Chinese scholars and policymakers. The constraints of implementing G-to-G policy transfers are then illustrated through a critical review of policymakers’ comments and existing research on the Suzhou and Tianjin G-to-G ‘software transfers’.

Placed within a broad historical framework, this spectrum of evidence shows how Singaporean-derived lessons and policies mutated when rolled out across Chinese shores. Indeed, inflows of ideas and policies continue to be refracted – if at times actively resisted – by all levels of the party-state apparatus. At one level, this reinforces Huff’s contention that the Singaporean experience “is unlikely to be replicated elsewhere, not only because the Republic is a city-state, but also because few others can develop services exports reliant on location, because of the unacceptability in many other polities of a heavy foreign economic presence, and because of difficulties in effecting the same degree of government control as

in Singapore.” At another level, the mutation and, in the case of the G-to-G projects, territorial containment of policies, ideas and philosophies from Singapore reinforces Shambaugh’s observation that foreign ideas/practices have been proactively re-adapted to local contexts in China. Viewed as an aggregated process over time, however, existing research remains unclear whether the overt ‘learning’ engagements with Singapore-based institutions and firms are of more political rather than practical value for current and future rounds of institutional reforms across China. This paper will address this lacuna.

The discussion is organized in four parts. Section 2 reviews extant research on lesson drawing and policy transfers and establishes the conceptual parameters that frame the empirical analysis. The geographical-historical conditions that underpinned the China-Singapore strategic engagement are presented in section 3. Section 4 lists and evaluates the different dimensions of Sino-Singaporean lesson drawing and policy transfers over the past three decades. The relationship between policy mutation and Chinese policymakers’ persistence in learning from the Singaporean experience is assessed in the conclusion.

**Conceptualizing lesson drawing and policy transfers**

National policymaking is a multi-dimensional and an increasingly cross-border process. This phenomenon is widely connoted by the concepts of ‘lesson drawing’ and ‘policy transfer’. Rose identifies five different degrees of ‘lesson drawing’. Copying is the “adoption more or less intact of a programme already in effect in another jurisdiction”6. It does not consider cultural, historic and socio-political contexts that could be highly variegated within and between countries. A step removed from copying, emulation involves adapting foreign policies to domestic conditions. Hybridization is a “combination of elements of programmes from two different places”7. Inspiration is not directly linked to drawing lessons; rather, policies implemented elsewhere are used as stimuli for formulating new domestic programs.

---

4 Huff 1995a, 753.
These five degrees constitute varying dimensions through which ideas, policies, institutions and ideologies move between places.

First developed by Dolowitz and Marsh, policy transfer refers to a “process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting”\(^8\). Where case studies on ‘lesson drawing’ focuses on assessing shifts in policy content as they are implemented in new locations, the related but relatively differentiated policy transfer literature illustrates how specific actors enable policies and practices to move across different jurisdictions. Dolowitz and Marsh highlight three factors that impede successful transfers, namely insufficient information in the importing location, incomplete transfer of policy content and inappropriate transfer of policies without regard to context\(^9\). This corresponds with geographical work that demonstrate how place-specific conditions are more “than mere background scenery to the policy actors’ performance”; policies “may be crossing borders ever more ‘freely’, but this is not yielding a flat earth of standardized outcomes or some socio-institutional monoculture”\(^10\). What typically ensue, instead, are *mutations* in ideas, attitudes and policies.

Research has further demonstrated how cross-border flows of ideas and policies do not always follow a seamless state-to-state pattern. As Stone cogently argues, “policy transfer takes place in a multi-organisational context. The transfer of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas happens within regional associations and between international organisations”\(^11\). Relations between different contexts in the form of multi-actor policy networks and “policy assemblages” in and through city-regions also strongly impact outcomes of lesson drawing and policy transfers\(^12\). These observations largely apply to Chinese policymakers’ ‘learning process’ from Singapore: multiple domestic transfer agents and TNCs are involved, as are different levels of the party-state apparatus in China. Some of

---

\(^8\) Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 5  
\(^9\) Dolowitz and Marsh 2000  
\(^10\) Peck 2011, 780, 781; see also Peck and Theodore 2010; Prince 2012.  
\(^12\) Evans and Davies 1999; Temenos and McCann 2013; cf. McCann and Ward 2011.
these “regional associations” have gone on to form quasi-autonomous arrangements with government-linked firms from Singapore, such as the production of the Guangzhou Knowledge City, the Singapore-Sichuan High-Tech Innovation Park in Chengdu and the Jilin Food Zone. The Sino-Singaporean lesson drawing and policy transfer process must thus be evaluated in terms of its geographical-historical variegation.

Aligning with and developing these conceptual and empirical contributions, the next two sections will explore how specific political and economic actors developed favourable conditions for lesson drawing and policy mobility between China and Singapore. However, the existence of different types of lesson drawing and the mutation of policies in the territorially-contained G-to-G projects exemplify the constitutive – if at times constraining – impacts of inherited institutions and practices within China. This multi-dimensional process in turn offers an important prism through which to evaluate socioeconomic reforms in post-Mao China.

The geopolitical backdrop to policy mobility
The picture often portrayed of ‘feverish’ China-Singapore lesson drawing and policy transfers in the 1980s starkly contrasts bilateral relations of the 1960s. Just as Singapore attained independence in 1965 after leaving the Malaysian federation, Mao Zedong was about to launch the ‘Great Cultural Revolution of the Proletariat’ across China. At the time, the CPC still officially subscribed to the Leninist internationalist logic that a complete transition to a Communistic end-state was premised on ‘liberating’ the entire international community from capitalistic-imperialistic exploitation. To attain this objective, the CPC launched its own version of policy transfer through supporting insurgent movements across Southeast Asia. In the Malay peninsula, this process was to be facilitated by the Communist Party of Malaya.

13 See Yu 2015.
(CPM), termed by a recently-declassified US government document as “the agent of the Communist Party of China”\textsuperscript{14}.

The CPM first embarked on campaigns to overthrow the British colonial government between 1948 and 1960, a period also known as the Malayan Emergency\textsuperscript{15}. When this failed, its leader, Chin Peng, fled to China in 1960 and began directing operations from Beijing. The CPM operated a radio station in Hunan province known as the \textit{Suara Revolusi Malaya} (Voice of Malayan Revolution). Broadcasts aimed at Malaya complemented clandestine local cells that worked to expand loyalty to communist China through guerrilla and psychological warfare\textsuperscript{16}. A particular target audience was a group of ethno-nationalistic Chinese in Malaya who, in Wang’s observation, refused assimilation and “wanted all Chinese to be completely and passionately dedicated to the welfare of China and China alone”\textsuperscript{17}.

Opposing this warfare was Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister of Singapore. After witnessing the destruction caused by Japanese colonialism and then communistic radicalism in the 1940s and 50s, Lee became a staunch nationalist and strongly opposed communism. His primary political goal was to create a meritocratic ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ when Singapore was a part of Malaysia from 1963 to 1965, and following enforced separation, for an independent Singaporean identity\textsuperscript{18}. To ensure that newly-independent Singapore could survive without an economic hinterland, the Lee administration worked at attracting and embedding transnational capital. This stance was summarized in no uncertain terms: “Singapore will survive, will trade with the whole world and will remain non Communist”\textsuperscript{19}. Lee’s proclamation effectively integrated the city-state within the very expansionary system of capitalism that the CPC, then at the apex of ultra-leftist fervor, sought to negate. In addition, this integration process would have nothing to do with “communism”, which meant the exclusion of political economies like China and the Soviet bloc. Unsurprisingly, Radio

\textsuperscript{15} Stockwell, 1993; Ramakrishna, 2002.
\textsuperscript{17} Wang 1970, 11); cf. Chang 1980.
\textsuperscript{18} Singapore Ministry of Culture, 31 May 1965.
\textsuperscript{19} Press Conference, City Hall; 26 August 1965.
Beijing and the CPM broadcasts began to label Lee and his “clique” as imperialist “running dogs”\(^{20}\). Sino-Singaporean relations were tense, to say the least, and Singaporean policymakers viewed Chinese foreign policy with immense suspicion.

This frosty standoff thawed gradually after the US President Richard Nixon visited Beijing in 1972 and met with the-then CPC Chairman, Mao Zedong. Prior to that, as a recently declassified “Outline Plan of Operations” from Washington reveals, the US government implored its representatives to impress on “local Chinese” in Malaya and Singapore that “help from ‘Mother China’ would be inviting a fate such as Hungary, North Korea and Viet Minh; that Russia and China impose special harsh treatment upon their colonies, and upon home grown communist leaders after the takeover; and that being drawn into a communist system will lower present living standards and enslave the people”\(^{21}\). With the US taking the lead in engaging this “communist system”, the Lee administration began to respond to these foreign policy shifts. "We thought it would be foolish", recounts former Home Affairs Minister Wong Kan Seng, “not to go and see what China had to offer. So we sent our people there…to understand what was going on”\(^{22}\).

Despite this newfound enthusiasm, Lee was keen from the outset to emphasize Singapore was neither an ethnic nor a geopolitical outpost of China. Underpinning this emphasis was sensitivity to Southeast Asian geopolitics: the CPM remained an active – albeit fragmented – secessionist force in the Malay peninsula, while the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had just been brutally purged (which led in turn to the collapse of the Sukarno administration). And as Lee observed at a 1973 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Ottawa, Singaporean policymakers had to overtly allay international concerns that the city-state was not a territorial extension of China\(^{23}\). Lee further affirmed the distinction between ‘Chinese’ and ‘Singaporeans’ in his historic meeting with Mao Zedong in May 1976 (ref. Figure 1). Former politician Lee Khoon Choy, one of several Chinese-

\(^{20}\) Ref. Latif 2007, 52; Ong 2015, 87-88.
educated personnel to be co-opted as Lee Kuan Yew’s ‘lieutenants’, puts the latter’s position in clear perspective:

In 1976, when I arranged for Lee to visit China…we saw Mao Zedong, who was already mentally and physically frail. Lee’s delegation consisted of 17 members. Other than Rajaratnam [then Foreign Minister] and me, the group included Malay Parliamentary Secretary Ahmad Mattar. It was to show that the visit was not meant to be a “kinsmen Chinese” visit of Singapore ministers. The mixed group served to allay fears or suspicion by Singapore’s neighbours.²⁴

Figure 1. Mao Zedong (third from right) meets Lee Kuan Yew (second from right): the first time a Chinese leader received a foreign leader of Chinese ethnicity (People’s Daily, 13 May 1976)

Source: People’s Daily Archive.
Although no significant foreign policy breakthrough emerged from the Mao-Lee meeting, it softened the Sino-Singaporean standoff and generated gradual modifications in Singapore’s foreign policy towards the so-called ‘Communist spectre’ in Southeast Asia. A new position was subsequently presented by then Singaporean Foreign Minister, S. Rajaratnam, in an address to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July 1977:

Within our own countries we must continue to fight our communists because in every one of the ASEAN countries the people have made it abundantly clear that Communism is not for them. But outside of ASEAN the question of whether a government is or is not Communist is irrelevant. The only test is whether it is friendly or unfriendly; whether it is under a compulsion to liberate us from ourselves or leave it to each of us to seek the better life our own way…I think today and in the future great powers will seek friends and allies not on the basis of increasingly irrelevant ideological affinities but on the basis of national interests.25

This shift from ideological internationalism to political realism established the platform for a “friendly” Deng Xiaoping to launch the previously mentioned visit to Southeast Asia in 1978. The Singapore media, as was Lee Kuan Yew in several subsequent interviews, was keen to portray Deng’s visit as an eye-opening experience (ref. Figure 2). Judging from Deng’s October 1979 address to domestic policymakers, this portrayal might be largely correct: while plans to launch the SEZs were proposed by key cadres such as Xi Zhongxun and Yang Shangkun as early as 1977, the Singapore visit arguably catalysed the involvement of foreign capital in new rounds of socioeconomic reforms:

I went to Singapore to understand aspects of how they utilized foreign capital. Foreigners established factories in Singapore and Singaporeans reaped several benefits…We must develop this resolve, weigh and be clear about the pros and cons, and do it even if it means suffering some minor losses.26

---

Figure 2. The portrayal of Deng's visit to Jurong Industrial Park in Singapore (The Straits Times, 14 Nov 1978)
Source: Singapore Library Archives
The commitment to learn from Singapore entailed a policy about-turn that illustrated Deng’s chameleon-like approach to governance. As the memoirs of Chin Peng, then leader of the CPM, reveal, it was Deng who, in 1961, instructed Chin to not only maintain but intensify military struggle in the Malay peninsula when the CPM was planning to wind up its operations. The goal was twofold. Apart from spreading communistic revolution to other parts of Asia, the CPC also tried to drive and draw on ethno-nationalism; following Lee Kuan Yew’s request, however, it was the same Deng who mandated Chin to cease the CPM radio broadcasts immediately. This sharp reversal underscored the classic ‘black cat, yellow cat’ instrumentalism Deng first promulgated in the 1960s – any cat that is capable of catching mice is a good cat. And the “mice” Deng really wanted since the early 1960s was economic rejuvenation. After phasing out communistic internationalization, the Deng administration intensified a process that was unthinkable just a decade earlier – global economic integration.

Most prominent of Sino-Singaporean exchanges in the 1980s was the 1985 appointment of Goh Keng Swee, the former Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, as the advisor on coastal development and tourism to the State Council of China. Despite this engagement, lesson drawing from Singapore remained largely on the ‘inspiration’ realm throughout the 1980s (ref. section 2). Concrete policy transfers to particular cities, if and when they occurred, were neither tailored by Singapore-based agencies nor intended for nationwide adaptation. This was due primarily to the legacy of the urban-rural dual structure: 80% of the population were categorized as ‘rural’ at the onset of the 1978 ‘reform and liberalization’, and Deng’s domestic emphasis was to increase both productivity and enthusiasm through reforming rural production.

---

27 Chin 2003.
29 Desker and Kwa 2011; Zheng and Wong 2013.
30 Oi 1999; Bramall 2007.
The year 1989 proved to be the crucial watershed of transformative change in Sino-Singaporean relations. For the leaders of Singapore and other ASEAN political economies, lingering suspicions of China eased following the surrender of the CPM in southern Thailand and the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In view of this underlying concern with the ‘communist spectre’ in Southeast Asia, Singaporean foreign policymakers opted not to establish formal diplomatic relations with China until October 1990, two months after the Suharto government of Indonesia did likewise31. Within China, the massive social instability leading up to and after the military crackdown on civilian protesters in Tiananmen Square on 4 June triggered strong reflections on the effects and future trajectories of post-1978 socioeconomic reforms. The conjuncture was thus characterized by a strange mix of improved foreign relations with domestic socioeconomic chaos: as foreign fears of the ‘China threat’ were allayed and laid new foundations for cross-border collaborations, a growing range of social problems in both rural and urban areas demanded resolution. Specifically, Deng Xiaoping and his successor, Jiang Zemin, urgently needed new approaches to manage the intensifying urbanization that accompanied market-oriented reforms and, consequently, assuage concerns by the strong conservative faction that deepening reforms would exacerbate political dissent.

Against this backdrop, Deng reaffirmed the regulatory experiences of Singapore as a potential developmental prototype during his 1992 ‘southern tour’. What he sought was a pragmatic resolution to the domestic crisis, and as Huff argues, Singapore offered a “reliable” model for emulation: “Perhaps the most important reason why interventionism succeeded in Singapore was because of a pragmatism – the test of what works – rather than rigid ideological commitment to a free market or to state direction”32. Contrary to the more informal learning of the 1980s, what followed since the 1990s were successive waves of lesson-drawing campaigns and policy transfers that collectively constituted the ‘Singapore fever’. These were accompanied by a consistent rhetorical commitment from the Chinese party-

---

32 Huff 1995b, 1435.
state to learn from Singapore, even as both the PRC and Singapore’s strategic and economic circumstances evolved and changed at the global scale\textsuperscript{33}. The Chinese party-state, it appeared at the time, was very serious in formulating a Singapore-styled reform blueprint.

The realities of lesson drawing and policy transfers

_Institutionalized learning in Singapore: effectiveness & constraints_

The first concrete expression of lesson drawing from Singapore arguably began in 1992 with the introduction of bespoke programmes for Chinese public servants in the Nanyang Technological University (NTU). The choice of NTU as the first institution of teaching-cum-learning for visiting CPC cadres is interesting: it occupies the site of what had been formerly known as Nanyang University, the first university outside China (including Taiwan) that offered Chinese-language tertiary education for ethnic-Chinese from Southeast Asia. First driven by Tan Lark Sye and launched in 1955 with the assistance of private donors, Nanyang University had in fact become a hotbed of pro-communist activism in the mid-1960s\textsuperscript{34}. Concerns over communist-ideology slippage into mainstream society prompted the Singapore government to ultimately terminate the exclusively Chinese-based educational system in Nanyang University in 1980\textsuperscript{35}.

Yet, one might speculate that the subsequent Singaporean choice to pitch NTU as an attractive training ground for Communist Party cadres from China was connected precisely to that vexed heritage from the 1960s. Indeed, the then-NTU president, Su Guaning, even proposed renaming NTU as Nanyang University in the mid-2000s. The CPC on its part did not specifically indicate they wanted to engage NTU until an official agreement on lesson drawing’ was drawn up in April 2001. While the renaming bid proved unsuccessful, the symbolism of NTU’s collaboration with the CPC should not be lost on observers of Sino-Singaporean relations: it revived and fulfilled one core objective of the original Nanyang

\textsuperscript{33} cf. Huang and Lou 2014
\textsuperscript{34} van der Kroef 1964, 1967.
University – the use of Chinese-language syllabi for advanced studies outside China – almost four decades after its establishment.

As enrolment in these courses expanded, NTU developed the first overseas Master’s programme for higher-ranked Chinese officials in 1998. While the medium of instruction for most courses in NTU is English, the two Masters programs for Chinese officials – namely the Master of Science in Managerial Economics (MME) and Master of Public Administration (MPA) – are both taught predominantly in Mandarin. Both programmes are dubbed the 'Mayor's Class' (shizhang ban 市长班) in China today. As these programs became popular, NTU set up the Nanyang Centre for Public Administration (NCPA) in December 2009 to offer executive training for senior Chinese civil servants. By 2014, more than 1200 mid- and senior-level government officials from China have been trained, with many receiving promotions upon their return to China.36

This longstanding relationship took on more concrete institutional expressions after the Chinese Central Organisation Department and various municipal party committees named NTU the best overseas institution for the training of Chinese government officials. In 2011, NTU was certified by The People’s Republic of China’s State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs (SAFEA) as an overseas expert organisation and training institution. With this certification, NTU was authorised to conduct personnel exchange programmes for Chinese officials. In 2010, the NUS joined NTU in receiving Chinese officials to its professional program at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. Only senior CPC cadres that are section chiefs with at least 10 years of working experience can be accepted. These strengthening linkages between the Chinese party-state and Singapore-based academic institutions collectively exemplify a sustained preference on the part of the CPC for emulating and drawing inspirations from Singaporean regulatory policies (cf. section 2).

The intensification of knowledge exchange and formalized learning positively impacted CPC cadres across the party-state structure. For instance, cadres of the municipality of Shanghai and the city of Qinhuangdao published a two-volume book reflecting

36 NTU 2014; for an overview of the demographic makeup of the officials, see Yu, Rubin and Wu, 2012.
on their experience in Singapore and how they could adapt best practices. This corresponded with discussions on the connections between the Singapore experience and the importance of the rule of law; the lessons to be drawn from the Singaporean Central Provident Fund; and the factors of benevolent governance. In 2007, the-then Party Secretary of Guangdong, Wang Yang, called on Shenzhen municipal officials to “be daring in matching up to the model of Singapore” (叫板新加坡). A large number of delegates were subsequently mobilized on learning visits to the city-state, and in November 2008 Shenzhen University launched a new centre on Singapore studies. When Lee Hsien Loong visited Shenzhen in 2014, the Shenzhen Mayor, Wang Rong, proudly proclaimed the results of this ‘matching up’: “amongst the cities across China trying to learn from Singapore, Shenzhen is one of the closest and the best.”

At the national level, the current Xi Jinping administration has established a consensus to emulate and hybridize Singaporean policies. Citing an unnamed political theorist who consulted the CPC on new ways to emulate Singaporean policies, the New York Times reported that Xi had a low profile meeting with Lee Kuan Yew at the beach resort of Beidaihe in October 2010 after learning he was to assume the next Chinese presidency. Lee, then Minister Mentor in the Singapore parliament, had met earlier with Jiang Zemin, the CPC leader who oversaw the first wave of ‘software transfers’ in the 1990s. According to the report, Xi and Jiang agreed after meeting Lee “to try to adopt the Singapore model down the road.” Xi visited Singapore a month later, and in 2011 General Liu Yazhou, an advocate of party reform, dispatched a team of military officers to live in Singapore and prepare a study.

---

37 Shanghai Municipal People’s Procuratorate 2003; Ma 2006a, 2006b.
38 Li 2008; Yang 2009.
39 Wang and Ren 2008; Han and Li 2012.
40 Kuang 2013; Wu 2014.
44 Ibid.
Following these initial visits, a policy agenda developed by the Development Research Centre of the Chinese State Council (DRC) for the first Third Plenum to be chaired by Xi (in November 2013) explicitly recommended state asset management reforms (guozi gaige) to be modelled on Temasek Holdings, one of the two holding-cum-investment vehicles financed directly by the Singapore government. It was soon announced that this recommendation will be adopted⁴⁵. A cryptically-named “Small Learning Group” (xuexi xiaozu 学习小组) affirmed the potential of the ‘Singapore model’ through an editorial in the party mouthpiece People’s Daily:

The leadership team of Xi Jinping is currently searching for an effective developmental model. To China, the Singapore model allows for more liberal economic policies to coexist with one-party governance, this point is very attractive. In addition, Singapore has shaken off the ‘middle income trap’ successfully, this is another area especially worthy of learning.⁴⁶

In spite of these concrete engagements and rhetorical commitments, analysts have documented strong obstacles to actualizing lessons drawn from Singapore. According to Fan Lei, a researcher at the Charhar Institute in Inner Mongolia, CPC cadres found it difficult to accommodate the Singaporean experience in China:

Context is an important factor to consider when learning from Singapore. More than 50,000 government officials have been trained in Singapore over the past 20 years. This is a considerable figure; on average every township would have an official who has been to Singapore. Yet it has been more than 20 years since the first batch of officials returned from Singapore, and the impact of ‘learning’ is not at all clear. Why is it that so many officials were sent in search of ‘holy scriptures’ (qujing 取经) for dissemination at home, only to have them return and revert to their old ways?⁴⁷

Zheng Yongnian, a Singapore-based political analyst of China-Singapore relations, offers a similar observation:

Take the social housing construction in China for instance, it is an example of failed learning from Singapore. Although housing reforms in China are always portrayed as learning from Singapore’s housing institution, that is to allow the majority of the people to buy their own housing, in practice what goes on is land-financed development, it is to rule through real estate development. The same situation [of failed learning] can be said of the provident fund institution.⁴⁸

---

Underpinning “failed learning” was arguably the short-termist developmental outlook known colloquially as ‘GDP-ism’. Following the gradual implementation of market-like rule, local CPC cadres gained more autonomy in driving growth. They were then impelled to increase extra-budgetary fiscal revenue after the 1994 national fiscal reforms granted a larger apportionment of locally-collected taxes to the central government. The consequent prioritization of capital-friendly initiatives over social service provision (especially for migrant workers) became a *structural barrier* for the successful implementation of Singapore-styled development.

Obstacles to direct borrowing are also shaped by the politics of scale within the administrative structure. This is made clear in a candid reflection by the Singapore PM, Lee Hsien Loong, on attempts in Shanghai to adopt Singapore’s compensation strategy to deter corruption:

> I think China’s circumstances are very different from ours. Your scale is much different from ours. I mean, we are the equivalent of one small city. Even Shanghai has 20 million people, four, five times the size of Singapore. So what we do in Singapore is not so easy to do all over China. I once had a discussion with a vice mayor in Shanghai, and he said to me, ‘You pay your ministers well, and your civil servants well, properly. And if we were Shanghai, all by ourselves, we could do that also. But if I did that, people to the west of me would have a view, people to the north of me would have a view, the people to the south of me would have a view, the people in the center would have a view. So it is not so easy for me to move, and it’s a real problem, it’s a different situation.’ But in Singapore, what we have tried to do is have strict rules, to have transparent systems, so if there is an exercise of discretion, it cannot be completed without checks and balances.49

These three preceding accounts highlight a distinct trait within the party-state apparatus in China, namely the need for *reciprocal accountability* between different administrative jurisdictions.50 As such, one jurisdiction (Shanghai, in this case) could not act autonomously – which, as Lee’s account implies, refers to the implementation of “strict rules” and “transparent systems” across the country – without the agreement of actors located at other administrative levels. By extension, Singapore’s capacity to respond swiftly to global economic shifts (including the 2008-2009 global financial crisis) contrasts the multi-tiered,

---

50 Shirk, 1993.
consensus-driven administrative system in China. Singaporean policymakers' ability to micro-manage social and economic affairs and simultaneously 'scale up' the regulatory outcomes to the global scale (as opposed to the provincial and central governments in China) has been predicated on an 'urba-national' entity that Olds and Yeung term the 'global city-state':

In global city-states, the (national) state has virtually direct access to the global economy. State policies can be shaped to develop the city-state into a global city-state...the political power and control of a developmental city-state distinguishes it from municipal governments in most global cities because it is able to bypass national-state/provincial-city politics typical in many global cities.

This tangible difference underscores three contrasting aspects of Chinese politico-economic regulation, namely the demands of maintaining a unified party-state apparatus despite increasing differentiation between party and bureaucratic functions; the challenge of aligning bottom-up initiatives after greater regulatory autonomy was delegated to local governments; and the increased emphasis on policy experimentation in the post-Mao era.

Beyond the tangible realm, the historian Fei Yong attributes the constraints to effective lesson drawing and policy transfers to a 'big country mentality', namely the tendency to assess others from the self. Underpinning this 'mentality' are two schools of thought. One is termed 'neo-authoritarianism' (新权威主义), and the other 'neo-Confucianism' (新儒家思想). The former explores possibilities for the concentration of political power to drive market-based reforms, and many Chinese intellectuals and policymakers regard Singapore as an exemplar in this aspect. 'Neo-Confucianism' was a movement predominantly driven by Tu Weiming from Harvard University. Paralleling Max Weber, Tu postulated that Confucianism had the same effect on the economic 'rise' of Japan and the four Asian dragons [South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore] in the same way Protestant ethics impacted the rise of capitalism. As such, mainland policymaking and academic circles erroneously believed Singapore was founded

52 Olds and Yeung 2004, 508, 512.
53 Shirk 1993; for a geo-historical overview of central-local relations since 1949, see Lim, 2016.
on Confucian principles\textsuperscript{55}. Uniting these two camps, Fei argues, is a distinct lack of interest in the Singaporean experience, but rather a tendency to advance inward-looking agendas through making references to Singapore. This further explains why lessons and policies drawn from Singapore mutated after reaching China.

\textit{G-to-G projects: are geographically-targeted policy transfers effective?}

Apart from academic-based learning, specific policy transfers were and continue to be instituted through territorially-contained G-to-G projects. Primarily involving the integration of industrial park development with the provision of social amenities in targeted cities, these projects emerged out of a ‘software transfer’ initiative mooted by the Singapore government in the early 1990s. Fundamental to this arrangement is the deepening of economic relations through promoting policies that have proven effective in Singapore.

In February 1994, the governments of China and Singapore signed a landmark collaborative agreement that formally allowed Singaporean state-linked and private agencies to transfer their economic management experiences with Chinese partners. These experiences encompass land-use planning, building control, environmental regulation, planning and management of industrial estates, public utilities management and labour management. The first designated “microcosm” was the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CS-SIP), a 70km\textsuperscript{2} industrial park and residential community in Suzhou. Estimated to cost US$20 billion upon completion, the goal of the CS-SIP was to consolidate Chinese capacities to create investor-friendly environments for foreign capital. A consortium of Singapore government-linked companies took a 65% stake and a Chinese consortium the remaining 35%. According to Zhang Xinsheng, the-then Suzhou mayor, Suzhou was selected over other economic regions in China because it successfully lobbied for the support of the Chinese central government\textsuperscript{56}.

Despite this support, the project was unable to meet original objectives. After the SIP plan was approved, the Suzhou City government re-started the development of a dormant project, the Suzhou New District Industrial Park (SND). This was clearly a competitive, if not cannibalistic, measure: the SND was geographically-proximate to the SIP. With a majority stake in the SND, the Suzhou City largely ignored the SIP and concentrated on promoting the SND instead. The-then Suzhou vice-Mayor, Wang Jinhua, went to Germany and advised investors to invest directly in the SND rather than the SIP because it was not only more cost-effective, but also because the-then Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, did not favour the G-to-G project in the first place. This aggressive approach reportedly caused the CS-SIP to lose US$77 million between 1994 and 2001. After repeated requests for assurances that local Suzhou officials were not undercutting the G-to-G project, Lee Kuan Yew went on CNN in June 1999 to announce the Singapore consortium would be pulling out. Shortly after this interview, Lee elaborated on the Singapore pullback:

"We would have liked to stay, but not in the way events have developed. It isn't worth our while to go on with it and have constant friction. And it's not just over costs – it's over ways of doing things...The problem was to change work styles, work habits and systems. So, I think it's best that they decide what to pick and choose and adapt to their systems."  

The friction was officially resolved in 2001. The Singapore consortium lowered its stake to 35%, raised the Chinese consortium’s stake to 65%, and reduced its involvement in the construction from a planned 70 km² to just 8 km². Yet a part of Lee arguably felt point-to-point transfer and subsequent nationwide adaptation was possible had the Chinese central government ensured the project received absolute "special attention." This setback triggered reflections by key Singaporean policymakers involved in the project, which in turn revealed the difficulties confronting CPC attempts at emulating, hybridizing or transplanting policies from Singapore. To George Yeo, the-then Singapore Minister for Trade and Industry, the primary impediment of successful policy transfers was cultural differences:

---

57 Teng 1998, 1.  
59 Unedited transcript, Singapore Ministry of Information and the Arts (MITA), 7 June 1999.  
61 Lee 1994, 110.
Fundamentally, the problem of Suzhou is a cultural problem. To a certain extent, for China to modernise, some of its cultural characteristics must change. But will China become like Singapore? That’s impossible... There are some things that China can benefit from studying the Singapore experiment, but there are many things which are irrelevant because conditions are different. The difficulty of the Suzhou project, I think, has proved that we are different from the Chinese. This also gives us some comfort that the success formula of Singapore is not easily copied. If we're so easily copied, then we'll be under competitive pressure very quickly. But because the Singapore model is not easily copied, what we have is an enduring advantage, not an ephemeral thing.\textsuperscript{62}

For Lim and Chan Soo Sen, the first CEO of CS-SIP, differences in perceptions of contracts and policies – and by extension, the rule of law – were a major issue:

The way we look at a contract or an agreement is quite different from how the Chinese look at it. Once signed, we have every intention to stick to the contract but they don't. They are quite happy to come back and see what they can do to re-negotiate some terms or to get out of some obligations. But you can't change the Chinese mentality and Chinese system overnight\textsuperscript{63}.

In Singapore, policies are very explicit, down to the last detail. But China is too big. If a policy is too explicit and not open to interpretation, it becomes useless because every province will have exceptions and need to be exempted at different points. Therefore, Chinese policies are more general. Far better to state the spirit of the policy rather than to document the exact details.\textsuperscript{64}

Of particular interest is the gradual success of the SIP after the Singapore-based firms engaged in more intense tacit knowledge transfer. As Inkpen and Pien show, the Suzhou policymakers responded competitively because of perceived “asymmetric collaborative incentives”\textsuperscript{65}. It was only after the local consortium was given more control that the SIP began generating profits and became re-emphasized as a policy template for industrial park development across China. This corresponds with Lim Neo Chian’s observation and underscores an important aspect of the policy transfer process: subnational policymakers are not passive agents who respond mechanically to central injunctions. Where their vested interests are not aligned, they could sidestep or undercut existing arrangements.

Empirically, the crucial question is whether the Suzhou experience – particularly the “cultural problem”, to re-borrow George Yeo’s term – would re-emerge in the second Sino-Singaporean G-to-G project. Named the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco City (SSTEC), this 30 km\textsuperscript{2} project was launched in 2008 at the eastern border of Tianjin, a centrally-governed


\textsuperscript{63} Lim, \textit{The Straits Times} 2001. “It’s a chess game; move one piece at a time.” 6 May

\textsuperscript{64} Chan, \textit{The Straits Times} 2004. 29 May.

\textsuperscript{65} Inkpen and Pien 2006, 805; cf. Pereira 2007.
municipality of 15 million people. While the total investment remains undisclosed, project officials claim 40 billion yuan (~US$6.5 billion) was invested in fixed assets by 2012.66 Launched against a backdrop of acute environmental pollution and income inequality, the Tianjin Eco-City project represents an ongoing concern with environmentally unsustainable urbanization. Recounting the formation of this project, former Singaporean PM Goh explains:

China at that time was emphasising the environment, green development, urbanisation without too much pollution. So, we had the expertise in Singapore, so I was able to align our expertise with China’s interest of wanting to have a clean environment for its urbanisation.67

Despite these top-level commitments, it remains unclear if transfers between Singapore and Tianjin could, in Goh’s terms, actualize their proponents’ visions of “replication” (fuzhi 复制) and “expansion” (tuiguang 推广)68. Through a comparative study with Dongtan Eco-City in Shanghai, Miao and Lang conclude central governmental support explains why the Tianjin Eco-City kept running while the Dongtan project failed69. Even so, differences in opinions on what constitutes an ‘eco city’ between the Chinese and Singaporean partners became apparent. As an investigative news report reveals, regulatory short-termism endures in the Tianjin Eco-City project. While Singaporean planners would like to have Housing Board-style public housing that catered to low-income Chinese, Tianjin Eco-City officials were reportedly lukewarm to the idea of uncertainty over the costs of subsidizing the apartments70. A Tianjin official whispered in the ear of a Singaporean colleague:

By the time the public housing project is completed, many of us Tianjin officials would likely be promoted elsewhere. Who would still be around to ensure that it is really the poor people who are relocated to this public housing estate?71

As an unnamed staff member of SSTEC adds, policy transfers could succeed only if they were aligned to local officials’ agendas:

We have very strong high-level government links – but not with officials at the lower and provincial levels. It’s the Tianjin officials’ support we need to get things done – be it focusing only on green projects, building a light-rail transit line in the Eco-City or creating a community mix of different income groups.72

---

67  Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 October 2014.
68  Ibid.
69  Miao and Lang 2015; see also Pow and Neo, 2013.
71  Ibid.
72  Ibid.
New research is beginning to demonstrate policy mutation in the Tianjin Eco-City. Comparing the Tianjin project with Masdar City in Abu Dhabi, Caprotti illustrated the importance of probing beneath the association of Chinese eco-cities with functionality, rationality and efficiency. While Goh Chok Tong correctly depicted the Chinese party-state’s concern with environmental quality, Caprotti argues that the “motivation behind new [eco-city] projects seems to be green in the financial sense only.” This finding overlaps that of Miao and Lang: not only were the original objectives of the Tianjin Eco-City revised to more modest levels, they were more closely aligned with economic objectives. Caprotti et al. further demonstrate how this G-to-G project “is discursively constructed as ecologically beneficial for its inhabitants rather than for the broader socio-environmental landscape.” These studies collectively foreground a technocratic, a-political and ultimately economistic approach to lesson drawing and policy transfers in Tianjin Eco-City. Politically-sensitive issues that require urgent attention like intra-urban social polarization, institutionalized social segmentation and entrenched vested interests in pollutive industries have not been explicitly encompassed by the ‘eco’ and ‘sustainable’ concepts.

75 Miao and Lang 2015, 249.
76 Caprotti et al. 2015, 495; contra. Yang and Lye 2009; Chen and Zhao 2014.
Table 1. Sino-Singaporean lesson drawing and policy transfers: an overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy domain</th>
<th>Characteristics &amp; Objectives</th>
<th>Key actors &amp; institutions</th>
<th>Spatial scale of transfer</th>
<th>Type of transfer (ref. section 2)</th>
<th>Constraints to transfer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Industrial park development & management | • Integral aspect of inter-governmental agreement in 1994 to facilitate ‘software transfer’, or expertise in producing a pro-investor climate  
  • Singapore government-linked corporations (GLCs) involved in several other joint-ventures (e.g. Guangzhou Knowledge City & Jilin Food Zone) | • Government of Singapore  
  • Jurong Town Corporation  
  • Multiple state-linked agencies in Singapore (e.g. EDB, URA, HDB, PUB)  
  • Proactive officials from designated local governments in China like Wang Yang, Zhang Gaoli & Huang Qifan  
  • Chinese SOEs | • Intra-urban | • Hybrid: co-driven by state-linked actors in Singapore & specific city-regional governments (except Suzhou Industrial Park) | • Parallel competition by local governments, increasing risks of duplication  
  • Short-termist approach to planning, based on the GDP-focused institution of cadre performance appraisal |
| Management of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) | • Emulate strategies of Temasek Holdings, a government-linked holding company  
  • Enforcement of ‘separation of politics from firms’ (zhengqi fenkai), a principle first introduced in 1988 | • Development Research Centre of the State Council  
  • Temasek Holdings  
  • Centrally- & locally-owned SOEs | • National & provincial | • Voluntary (initiative of Chinese state agencies) | • Place-specific path dependencies  
  • Resistance by established interest groups within SOEs & local governments |
| Public administration | • Increase efficiency & integrity; expand rule of law; reduce resource wastage & corruption | • Nanyang Centre for Public Administration, NTU  
  • Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, NUS  
  • Central & provincial cadres | • National selection, Singapore-based training | • Voluntary (initiative of Chinese state agencies) | • Interlocked & entrenched party-SOE connections  
  • Excessive emphasis on extra-budgetary financing, creating a colossal ‘grey zone’ in fund-sourcing |

Source: Authors’ compilation.
Conclusion
Much has been made within China of the principle of “learning” from Singapore. Yet the aggregation of lesson drawing and policy transfers from Singapore by China within a longer historical framework, as attempted in this paper, complicates the story of state-to-state policy mobility. Embedded herein are simultaneous copying, emulation, inspiration, hybridization and synthesis. That policymakers and planners from both China and Singapore believe some policies – such as those introduced in the G-to-G projects in Suzhou and Tianjin – are replicable across China indicates a belief in the possibility of copying. CPC cadres undergoing training in Singapore are implicitly encouraged to emulate and draw inspiration from key tenets of Singaporean public administration (e.g. minimal corruption, high-efficiency, forward-planning, respect for contractual laws, etc.). Other projects range from emulation (e.g. attempts to introduce the Central Provident Fund (CPF) in cities like Shanghai and Shenzhen) to more hybrid forms of adaptation (e.g. the ongoing attempt to repurpose the practices of Temasek Holdings, the Singaporean sovereign wealth fund and holding company of state-linked enterprises). Within the senior CPC echelon, the overarching characteristic of ‘learning’ is to draw inspiration for devising new regulatory solutions on the basis of one-party authoritarianism and global economic integration (see summary in Table 1).

On the one hand, this multi-faceted attempt at learning from the ‘Singapore model’ indicates an underlying belief that place-specific policies are transferable in different forms. It recalibrates notions of ‘Chinese exceptionalism’ by showing how the dynamic interaction with foreign policies and practices constituted post-Mao reforms. On the other hand, enduring institutional aspects of the Chinese experience arguably became more pronounced after overt and tacit attempts to learn from Singapore. As Table 1 shows, constraints to transfer are evident in each policy domain. This underscores, in turn, how the evolution of the Chinese political economy is not predicated on a fixed playbook of policy and practice. If some commentators claim Chinese policymakers are exporting an internally-coherent developmental ‘model’ to less developed political economies in Africa, Latin America and
central Asia, the Singapore connection actually underscores how post-Mao reforms remain an open-ended process of policy experimentation and adaptation that is fraught with tension and resistance.\textsuperscript{77}

Two defining aspects could be abstracted from this multifaceted process of policy mobility and mutation. First, the ‘authoritarianism’ of the Singapore context has been qualitatively different from its Chinese variant. Socioeconomic regulation in Singapore was and remains predicated on the principle that no entity – including the ruling party – is above the law. Across China, the CPC technically controls the legislative system, which renders it at once within and outside the legal system. This positioning injected significant flexibility in the interpretation and implementation of law amongst cadres. Second, intense competition between Chinese municipal governments has undermined Singapore’s foreign-investor and knowledge-purveyor primacy. Ironically, as the Suzhou and Tianjin cases reveal, local projects launched by the central government in the name of the ‘national interest’ mattered only if such projects could be credited to local officials. In Suzhou, the SIP could show improved results only after more benefits – albeit in the form of tacit knowledge – were offered to local stakeholders. And emerging evidence suggests local officials in Tianjin are behaving similarly.

Given the unclear effects of policy transfers to date, why do Chinese policymakers – from local officials to Xi Jinping – continue to proclaim the importance of learning from Singapore? The most plausible rationale could be political. In the process of policy formulation and/or modification, it may be more palatable to cite an Asian rather than western developmental inspiration, especially when that Asian trajectory includes a positive record of incorporating western best practices. Indeed, while many observers in China recognize Japan as the Asian exemplar of successful ‘westernization’, its bitter historical relationship with China renders politically impossible any overt learning attempt. Whether lessons are truly learnt; whether policies are truly transferred; and, indeed, whether China truly possesses the geo-historical conditions that made possible the Singaporean economic

\textsuperscript{77} cf. Shambaugh 2008.
success since the mid-1960s are arguably secondary considerations. What matters is the appearance that change is coming; that change is not directionless but 'modelled' after global best practices. During the late Qing era, the 'model' was Japan; the Soviet Union represented 'China's tomorrow' to the Mao administration; for Deng and his successors, the explicit 'modelling' focus has shifted to Singapore, a city-state in Southeast Asia no bigger than Shunyi district of Beijing.

References


Caprotti, Federico. 2014b. "Eco-urbanism and the Eco-city, or, Denying the Right to the City?" Antipode, 46(5), 1285-1303.


Chen, Hong. 2007. Zhongguo jingjitequ jianli de qianqian houhou [The before and after of Special Economic Zone construction in China]. Wenshibolan, 12, 4-8.


Shanghai Municipal People’s Procuratorate (2003) Shicheng fazhi guangan [Perspectives on rule of law in Singapore]. Shanghai: Shanghai Municipal People’s Procuratorate Political Department.

Singapore Ministry of Culture. 1965. Report on Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s speech at the 4th anniversary celebrations of Delta Community Centre on Sunday, 30th May.


Temenos, Cristina, and Eugene McCann. 2013. “Geographies of policy mobilities.” Geography Compass 7(5), 344-357.


