Norm elicitation in within-subject designs: testing for order effects

D’Adda, Giovanna and Drouvelis, Michalis and Nosenzo, Daniele (2016) Norm elicitation in within-subject designs: testing for order effects. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 62 . pp. 1-7. ISSN 2214-8051

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We investigate norms of corruption using the norm-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). We use a within-subject design whereby the norms are elicited from the same subjects who are observed making choices in a bribery game. We test whether the order in which the norm-elicitation task and the bribery game are conducted affects elicited norms and behavior. We find little evidence of order effects in our experiment. We discuss how these results compare with those reported in the existing literature.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Social norms; Norm elicitation; Order effects; Within-subject design; Bribery game
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Identification Number: 10.1016/j.socec.2016.02.003
Depositing User: Nosenzo, Daniele
Date Deposited: 06 Apr 2016 07:39
Last Modified: 18 Oct 2017 17:53

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