Reasons, inescapability and persuasion

Sinclair, Neil (2016) Reasons, inescapability and persuasion. Philosophical Studies . ISSN 1573-0883

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This paper outlines a new metasemantic theory of moral reason statements, focused on explaining how the reasons thus stated can be inescapable. The motivation for the theory is in part that it can explain this and other phenomena concerning moral reasons. The account also suggests a general recipe for explanations of conceptual features of moral reason statements.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: expressivism, external reasons, inescapability, moral reasons
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
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Depositing User: Eprints, Support
Date Deposited: 02 Mar 2016 09:55
Last Modified: 26 Jun 2018 12:32

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