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THE ROLE OF THE GERMAN POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

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Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

January 2016
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Abstract

The six German political foundations, backed by substantial public funds, have several hundreds of foreign offices around the globe and more than 2000 staff members. As specific manifestations of the German political landscape, the Stiftungen are affiliated to the German political parties at the German Bundestag.

This thesis researches the international activity of the German political foundations and their position within international relations theory. It juxtaposes the rationalists and constructivists approaches on the state and non-state relationship and the possible impact of transnational actors. After having identified the German political foundations as transnational actors, a model of public diplomacy is used to systematically study the foundations’ transnational interaction processes. The model integrates different public diplomacy approaches and is based on the assumption of public diplomacy as a diplomatic process in a network environment, where transnational actors and states are equally important and where values and ideas are emphasised. At the same time, it considers propaganda activity, a criticism sometimes voiced by foreign governments with regard to the foundations’ undertakings. The foundations’ democracy assistance as well as their conflict management ambitions are explored, as collaborative or catalytic public diplomacy forms. In two case studies, one on the Rule of law program of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Southeast Europe and another on the activities of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Southern Thailand, the strategies of ideational diffusion processes and networking, the soft power resources and social relationship building of the political foundations are investigated.

This theoretically informed empirical study aims at first contributing to the object of the German political foundations’ international undertakings which has been subject to little research so far. Second, it connects IR theory on transnational actors as well as the literature on public diplomacy to these activities. Finally, the thesis identifies the Stiftungen as reproducers of the German civilian power identity by implementing abroad major parts of German policy.
Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible without the support of a number of people. I would like to thank the research participants from the German political foundations and the other interview partners for their willingness to talk to me and for the amount of time and effort to answer my questions. Thanks also to those who suggested potential interview partners to me or helped establish the necessary contacts. I cannot thank enough my supervisors Dr. Andrew Denham and Prof. Dr. Neville Wylie for sharing their wide knowledge of IR theory, public policy, think tanks and political parties with me, for their enthusiasm, their sympathetic ear for all my questions and their confidence. Furthermore, I would like to thank the examiners of this thesis, Dr. habil. Martin Thunert and Prof. Dr. Andreas Bieler for their very helpful advises and for making the Viva a very positive experience to me. I owe particular thanks to Sybille Koch, Head of Protocol of the German Bundestag, for her support and her help to make contact to the foundations’ management level while I was working as a junior lawyer and research assistance at the Bundestag. Rick Ginzs and Alison Ginzs I would like to thank for their friendship, their continuous proof-reading late at night and for driving through the country to pick me up in Nottingham even under extreme weather conditions. As this research project was carried out long distance, I am particularly grateful to Dr. Sara de Jong, Dr. Bernhard Weicht, Dr. Sirisha Hesketh and Dr. Christopher Hesketh for being my link to the Nottingham postgraduate community and for their warm hospitality whenever I came to Nottingham. During the field work in Thailand, Kerstin Winkler und Wolfgang Heinze were important anchors. I strongly appreciate their help in establishing contacts to members of the international community on site. Dr. Julia Hutchinson and Mike Hutchinson I would like to thank very much for hosting me during the days of the Viva and for celebrating with me afterwards. For their proof-reading, last minute help and important remarks but most importantly for their friendship over many years and long talks about life in general, I am very thankful to Alexandra Huber, Dr. Robert Frau, Kristine Franzen, Daniel Iranyi, Deb Ain and Sebastian Kunz. I am also grateful to Gudrun Lohmüller for her cooking and reminding me to eat regularly in summer 2015. I would like to thank Dr. Sabine Wagner for being my older sister and for all which goes along. That I accepted the challenge of this intellectual project, I owe also Dr. Cordula
Jaletzke. I still keep the post card she gave to me almost 30 years ago suggesting to “lead a wild and dangerous life”. To outline all noteworthy things my parents have done for me would go beyond the scope of these acknowledgements. I am grateful to them for having supported my willpower and for having made me aware of the value of education throughout my life. I am very thankful to my mother that she never forgot to express her pride and for encouraging the thought that my father would have been proud of me too. Finally, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my husband Sebastian Lohmüller for the initial idea of this research project, his continuous support and encouragement, the undertaking of the daily tasks especially in the (very long) last phase of this project and for everything else.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Federal Foreign Office</td>
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<td>AAPA</td>
<td>Federal Foreign Office, Political Archive</td>
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<td>AFTA</td>
<td>ASEAN Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>AKBP</td>
<td>German foreign culture and education policy</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>BMF</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>BMJV</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMU</td>
<td>Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conversation, Building and Nuclear Safety</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMVg</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMWi</td>
<td>Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy</td>
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<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>BT</td>
<td>Deutscher Bundestag</td>
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<tr>
<td>BVerfG</td>
<td>Federal Constitutional Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>BVerwG</td>
<td>Federal Administrative Court</td>
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<td>B90/DIE GRÜNEN</td>
<td>Alliance 90/The Greens</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSFP</td>
<td>EU’s Common and Foreign Security Policy</td>
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<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Social Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIE LINKE</td>
<td>The Left</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>F.D.P.</td>
<td>Free Democratic Party</td>
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<td>FES</td>
<td>Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung</td>
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<td>FNS</td>
<td>Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung</td>
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<td>FZ</td>
<td>Financial assistance in German development policy</td>
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<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>German Society for International Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>GONGO</td>
<td>Governmental-Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>HBS</td>
<td>Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>Hans-Seidel-Stiftung</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International relations</td>
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<td>KAS</td>
<td>Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Socialism</td>
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<tr>
<td>QUANGO</td>
<td>Quasi-non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>RLP</td>
<td>Rule-of-law Program of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung</td>
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<td>RLS</td>
<td>Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEECP</td>
<td>Southeast European Cooperation Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Germany</td>
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“Penser ne suffit pas, il faut penser à quelque chose.”

(Jules Renard)

“So steht es denn da, unser Werk, so steinern und fremd, so eigenmächtig, so ein für allemal. Es sieht dich an, ohne zu nicken, ohne zu lächeln, so, als hätte man sich nie gekannt; ohne zu danken und ohne zu verzeihen. Nachdem man es lange betrachtet und auch die ersten Schrecken überwunden hat, sagt man sogar: Es ist nicht schlecht, man kann nicht sagen, es ist schlecht! Es erinnert an dieses und jenes, was uns im Entwerfen, da es noch ein Einfall war, erfreut und beglückt hat.”

(Max Frisch, Bin oder Die Reise nach Peking)
Chapter 1 - Introduction

In 2012 German political foundations received state subsidies totalling of 434 million Euros, a web of 340 foreign offices spanned around the globe and they had around 2000 staff members. Affiliated to the political parties at the German Bundestag they offer considerable educational, advisory and exchange programs in Germany and abroad. They are provided with substantial public funds and situated in a grey area between public and private, offering freedom and room for manoeuvre. Abroad they are assumed to accompany and relieve German foreign policy.¹ Their distinctive political and legal organisation has even been imitated by other countries, such as France, India and Turkey as well as on European level.² However, research on German political foundations has been astonishingly limited.

1.1. Research object

The research project aims at analysing the German political foundations’ role in international relations. In investigating the practice of their international activity, the foundations’ uniqueness as players of global presence and their influential character can be understood. The term “German political foundations” (Politische Stiftungen or Parteistiftungen) is drawn up of six German organisations:

- Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES);
- Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS);
- Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS);
- Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (HSS);
- Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (HBS) and
- Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (RLS).³

The choice of name indicates their political party affiliation at a Federal level. The FES is closely linked to the Social Democratic Party (SPD) but

¹ Pogorelskaja (2009a) p. 7.
³ For their internet representation (in English, if available) see:
also affiliated with the German trade union confederation (*Deutscher
Gerwerkschaftsbund*). The KAS was formed as a close associate of the
conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The smaller FNS is close
to the liberal Free Democratic Party (F.D.P.). The Bavarian HSS is linked to
the right-wing Christian Social Union (CSU). The HBS is affiliated to the
Green Party (*Bündnis90/Die Grünen*), while the RLS is connected to the
left-wing *Die Linke*, formerly the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)
which succeeded the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

The political aims and objectives of the German political foundations circle
around the strengthening of democracy, the support of civil political
commitment, dialogue and cooperation among different socio-political
stakeholders as well as research and knowledge transfer. Despite the
democratic consensus, each foundation is committed to a certain normative
background that determines activities in Germany and abroad. The FES is
engaged in social democracy, freedom, justice and solidarity. It promotes
political participation, social cohesion and promotes a fair social and
economic order and furthers political dialogue with trade unions. The KAS
takes as a basis a Christian conception of human being created by God in its
equality, diversity and imperfection. It promotes liberal democracy, social
market economics and strengthening of the value consensus. It commits
itself to liberty, justice and solidarity. The FNS is committed to liberalism
and wants to encourage the principle of freedom in human dignity in all
aspects of society. The HBS feels bound to ecology, sustainability,
democracy, human rights, self-determination and justice. It has a special
focus on gender equality, minority rights and active peace policy. The
RLS considers itself as part of democratic socialism focused on critical
thinking and political alternatives. The HSS more broadly feels bound to

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5 Party affiliated political foundations exist also in the *Land* level.
7 FES at: [https://www.fes.de/de/?id=232](https://www.fes.de/de/?id=232).
8 KAS at: [http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.4972/](http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.4972/).
9 FNS at: [https://www.freiheit.org/content/50-jahre-stiftung](https://www.freiheit.org/content/50-jahre-stiftung).
10 HBS at: [https://www.boell.de/de/navigation/ueber-uns-519.html](https://www.boell.de/de/navigation/ueber-uns-519.html).
11 RLS at: [http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung.html](http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung.html).
democracy, peace and development emphasising Christianity and historical roots.  

The scope of the foundations’ domestic and international activities is enormous. Originally, the German political foundations’ activities concerned political or civic education in Germany. In the first study of the German political foundations in 1976 Watson gave a short introduction to the German political foundations in a report published by the Anglo-American Foundation. He described the original intention of the establishment of the Stiftungen to encourage democratic structures in post-war Germany against the background of the National Socialist era. Nowadays, political education is still the core of the Stiftungens’ domestic activity. It includes the maintenance of educational institutions offering seminars, workshops and discussions. The KAS, for instance, has an educational institution (Bildungsforum) in every Federal country. Its activities address citizens interested in politics, and subjects range from fundamental issues concerning democracy, to international-relations and day-to-day politics. Other domestic activities concern the award of prizes, mainly dedicated to writers and journalists, the organisation of exhibitions to further art and culture, as well as dialogue forums on emerging policy issues between political and economic stakeholders and those from civil society. Moreover, the foundations give educational grants to gifted German and foreign students. Graduate and post-graduate programs support all fields of studies. They contain financial support but also regular seminars and advice services. The KAS, for example, annually gives around 3500 grants to students. In 2014 the FES supported around 2.800 young people

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12 HSS at: http://www.hss.de/stiftung.html.
14 The report also considered the establishment of British political foundations according to the German model (Watson [1976] p. 18).
18 Interview 18.
19 KAS annual report 2014 p. 87.
with scholarships (of which 320 abroad).\textsuperscript{20} Scholars are not necessarily political adherents of the donor body.\textsuperscript{21} However, the list is long of prominent German politicians having been supported by a political foundation in former times.\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, every political foundation does research in the fields of politics and social science. The research activity is often carried out in collaboration with external research institutes. In addition, the foundations organise specialists’ conferences and discussion groups as well as lectures, and constantly publish books, articles and reports. Historical research is done with the help of the foundations’ own archives, libraries and documentation facilities.\textsuperscript{23} The FES, for example, maintains a specialised library with 1.000.000 volumes on labour movement.\textsuperscript{24}

Nearly three quarters of the expenditure of the German political foundations is devoted to projects in foreign countries.\textsuperscript{25} The international activities started in the 1960s. They have continuously adapted to the international political developments and geo-political focal points. The two major cornerstones of the foundations’ international activities are work in the development and transition countries and their dialogue-based undertakings in the EU countries and in North America. The first activities aim at “implementing humanitarian projects and programs and assisting the establishment of free democratic and constitutional-based structures in being committed to human and civil rights”.\textsuperscript{26} They are mainly part of the German bilateral development policy. According to the Ministry of Development and Cooperation (BMZ), it “involves strengthening the key institutions in a democratic social order, such as parliaments, political parties and an independent judiciary, as well as promoting good governance and

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{20} FES annual report 2014 p. 62. \\
\textsuperscript{21} Interview 18; differently Pinto-Duschnisky (1991a) p. 204. \\
\textsuperscript{22} KAS former scholarship holders are, for instance, Uwe Barschel (Prime Minister for Hesse, 1982-1987), Thomas de Maizière (Federal Interior Minister) and Christian Wulff (Federal President, 2010-2012). \\
\textsuperscript{23} FES/KAS/FNS/HSS/HBS (1998). \\
\textsuperscript{24} FES annual report 2014 p. 64. \\
\textsuperscript{25} See 1.8.3. \\
\textsuperscript{26} FES/KAS/FNS/HSS/HBS (1998). 
\end{flushleft}
opportunities for civil society participation”. Projects and activities are generally implemented together with partner organisations on site. In Europe the foundations focus specifically on “the European unification process and international understanding through information and international meetings”. In the industrialised countries the Stiftungen are mainly active with the interlinking of transatlantic and European elites. In 2013 the Stiftungen had offices all over the world. The KAS maintained 69 offices abroad, the FES had 107 offices, the FNS 33, the HBS 30, the HSS 57 and the RLS had 16 international offices. Recent works on the Stiftungen assume that their activities nowadays circle around promoting approximation ambition in the Southeast European countries to the EU, the management of crises, and dealing with the danger of states’ fragility and terrorism. Systematic analysis of most of these aspects is missing, however. Moreover, considerations which take into account the respective foreign and development political concepts of the German government are almost non-existent. This is necessary, however, in order to understand the relationship between the foundations and the state as well as their extensive public funding.

The research project concentrates on the activities of the German political foundations in developing and transition countries where the major part of their international activity takes place. It will connect transnational and constructivist-inspired international relations’ (IR) theory to these undertakings by looking at the process of public diplomacy which includes democracy assistance and the newer conflict management. This will help to position the Stiftungen in international relations as either independent political actors or instruments of state power. It will also offer some explanation on what the foundations change and why they are supported by massive funds. Finally, this research project is neither financially supported

30 See Ch. 5 fn. 167 on the sources.
32 Exceptionally see Pogorelskaja (1997).
by one of the German political foundations nor has it been suggested by them.

1.2. Theory

The research is informed by several theoretical assumptions which will be outlined and systematised in detail in the following chapters.

International relations can no longer be defined as only covering relations between states. The dominant rationalist approaches of neorealism and neoliberalism discuss, whether transnational actors matter. Both see the state at the centre of their analysis, though. Constructivist theory, however, best explains the importance of transnational actors in international relations, as it concentrates on transnational interaction processes among different actors. Rather than debating whether transnational actors matter, constructivism does not assume that one type of actor is more important than the other. In looking at social interaction, ideational diffusion processes and perceptions, constructivist thinking can help uncover important issue neglected by neorealism and neoliberalism. It focuses more directly on the question of the international role of political foundations maintaining links with the German government, the political party landscape as well as politicians and civil societies abroad. However, the German political foundations cannot be easily identified among the transnational actors, since due to their public funding the organisational characteristics of private and public are blurred. There have also been attempts to describe the activity of German political foundations as “movement on the threshold between governments and civil society”.

Although we expect that the German political foundations can operate as transnational actors, it will finally depend on whether the foundations are state-controlled or active on behalf of the German government.

With the help of an integrated model on public diplomacy, transnational activities can be studied systematically. The model includes constructivist-led considerations on transnational interactions in the international sphere.

34 Bartsch (1998); Czempiel (1993).
which are not guided by state-centrism. The diplomatic process can be conceived without bias as taking place in a network environment, comprising various actors and different resources. In this way, we regard public diplomacy as an important - if not as the main - transnational interaction process. We do not assume that diplomacy is a formalised negation process only. Rather, transnational interactions take place in a less structured environment. The foundations’ international activities are incidentally perceived as diplomatic undertakings. Systematic analysis is missing, however. We expect that most of what the Stiftungen do internationally can in fact be understood as public diplomacy. We also expect that the German political foundations as important parts of the domestic political culture in Germany\textsuperscript{35} mainly diffuse those values which correspond to the narratives of official policy. This correspondence, still, might not keep the Stiftungen from being transnational actors with independent power resources, including access to foreign figures, information channels and knowledge resources.

Democracy assistance and conflict management have been identified as different modes of how public diplomacy can be practiced. Increasingly, they are fields where transnational actors find their niche. Although some literature on the German political foundations considers their support of democracy, it has never been connected to a diplomatic activity nor to the literature on transnational actors. As regards conflict management, the literature has almost completely ignored the undertakings of the German political foundations. We assume that the Stiftungen are predominantly active as transnational actors in democracy assistance as well as in conflict management.

1.3. Research questions

I am mainly interested in the following central question:

What role do the German political foundations have in international relations? Are rationalists correct in saying that states are the key international actors, or can it be demonstrated, as constructivists argue, that

through the interaction with many different actors, the German political foundations as transnational actors have a significant impact? If the latter is the case, what is the reason for their substantial public funding?

Several sub-questions are necessary in order to address the central questions. They can be grouped into three areas:

(1) **Public diplomats?**

To what extent can German political foundations be considered as public diplomats? Are they independent generators of public diplomacy or do they work on behalf of the German government? Does their work substitute, supplement or conflict with traditional diplomacy? Who benefits and who loses from these activities? Do the foundations have advantages (e.g. resources) in comparison to other diplomatic actors? Are transnational networks established? If yes, who controls them?

(2) **Democracy assistants?**

What makes the German political foundations democracy assistants? Do they follow a developmental or a political conception of democracy assistance? What ideas are diffused and are they different from those of official German policy? What do the foundations change? Are prerequisites established by the foundation for German companies?

(3) **Conflict management?**

Is conflict management implemented by the Stiftungen? If yes, what ideas are diffused and are they different from those of official German policy? What do the foundations change? Are prerequisites established by the foundation for German companies?

This study does not include recommendations for action for the German political foundations. Their activities were analysed and assessed to the established systematisations.
1.4. State of research

The academic focal points of the few existing pieces of literature on the German political foundations changed over the decades and adjusted to political realities. While in the first publications 40 years ago, academic authors concentrated more on the organisation of the Stiftungen in itself, subsequently researchers and also the Stiftungen in their publications gave further attention to the foundations’ activities and their effects abroad. The literary process can therefore be described as from the inside out. Literature published from the 1970s to the 1980s discussed organisational matters of the Stiftungen concerning the foundations’ party affiliation and financial matters, while the foundations’ international activity remained in the background.\(^{36}\) The literature written in the 1980s and 1990s showed increased interest in the foundations’ international activities. Authors agreed that the German foundations were highly political organisations.\(^{37}\) From the 1990s onwards, literature became more complex and less descriptive. We can identify four major themes treated in the literature: Firstly, the publications considered development policy governed by the literature on democracy assistance. Case studies happened to be carried out in the transforming countries of the Eastern Bloc whereas before they had focused more on Latin America and Africa.\(^{38}\) Secondly, literature treated foreign policy on a national and European level.\(^{39}\) A third body of literature considered the foundations’ adaptations to globalisation processes.\(^{40}\) Finally, scholars looked at domestic themes, such as legal and financial conditions as well as civic education.\(^{41}\) The foundations’ descriptions of themselves published over the decades represent a literature type of their own. Despite advertising character, they show improved self-reflection in recent times.

\(^{36}\) See Vieregge (1977a), (1977c), (1980); Papst (1982).
\(^{37}\) See Werner (1982); Krieger (1983); Forrester (1985); Kress (1985); Schürmann (1989); Pinto-Duschinsky (1991a); Wagner (1994).
\(^{38}\) Mehlert (1996); Mair (1997), (2000); Philippis (1999); Hearn/Robinson (2000); Pinto-Duschinsky (2002); Erdmann (2006a), (2006b); Egger (2007); Mohr (2010).
\(^{40}\) See Bartsch, (1998), (2007); Ronge/Pascher (1999); Optenhögel (2002); Pascher (2002); Mohr/Webels/Beyers/Kerremans (2005); Burnell (2006); Grävingholt/Hofmann/Klingebiel (2007).
\(^{41}\) See Pinto-Duschinsky (1991b); Langguth (1993); Prechtl (1995); Hellwig (1998); Leuthold (2000); Pogorelskaja (2002b); Beyer (2002). See 1.8.4. on legal literature.
offering an additional source for researchers.\textsuperscript{42} Present day academics, however, face the problem of sparse literature. Despite an increase in publications in the last years the amount of monographs is limited. Recent works often tend to throw in keywords like “diplomacy” of the foundations or their “conflict prevention” without taking the time or having the possibility for a thorough analysis. As far as the research questions are concerned, the respective chapters review the literature in more detail.

1.5. Case selection and methodology

The research project was conducted as a case study design. It is based on qualitative research methods, as some deeper understanding on the social phenomenon and the socially constructed nature of reality is intended with priority to perceptions, meaning and ideas.\textsuperscript{43} Quantitative research could not offer these insights. Moreover, I made use of systematisations deriving from the respective bodies of literature to operationalise the processes of public diplomacy, democracy assistance and conflict management. I carried out a collective case study, where several cases were examined mainly to investigate some general phenomenon.\textsuperscript{44} The cases of the two major party-affiliated political foundations, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung were used. Both are comparable as regards size, funding and staff members. They work in a wide international sphere and were able to offer enough relevant data to answer the research questions. With regards to the KAS, I considered their democracy assistance activities in the Southeast European countries focusing especially on EU accession of these countries, while for the FES, I looked at conflict management in Southern Thailand. Although different in their focus, both fields of activities are assumed to be part of public diplomacy allowing some generalisation on their transnational interaction. Taking into account the foundations’ normative backgrounds, variations could be stressed. The cases were not chosen on structural similarities of the involved countries/regions. The


\textsuperscript{43} Silverman (2005) p. 10.

\textsuperscript{44} Stake (2000) pp. 437f.
region of Southeast Europe offered an interesting case on how democracy assistance is carried out in the European context. Conflict management was particularly apt to be studied in Thailand, since interviews could be taken in the relatively safe environments of Bangkok and Chang Mai. Moreover, the field of the foundations’ conflict management, relatively new in the foundations’ activity portfolio, did not offer too many cases to be studied, as activities with an exclusive focus on conflicts rarely take place.

Data was collected by multiple methods, which included the appraisal of the existing academic literature, official documents, archival material and those published by the German political foundations as well as in-depth interviews.

**Method 1: Analysis of academic, official, archival and other material**

Various textual data was examined. The sparse academic literature, mostly published in German, was investigated and served as a starting point. However, studies connected neither public diplomacy nor transnational activity to the German political foundations. An exception as regards the latter is Pascher’s doctoral thesis of 2002 analysing the foundations’ adaptation to globalisation processes. She deals with the loss of state sovereignty, governance processes and the growing international influence of non-state actors and investigated the relations of the FES to the UN in the 1990s. Furthermore, I took into account the political foundations’ annual reports, evaluations and other material published by the Stiftungen. The foundations made several unpublished internal documents available to me. Also information on the foundations’ internet representations was taken into consideration. In contrast to earlier works, which had almost completely relied on secondary literature as primary literature was missing, the material available from the German political foundations was sufficient. Still, details on funding of single projects or (complete) evaluations of activities were veiled from public. Moreover, various official documents

45 Pascher (2002).
46 The foundations’ annual reports were inspected ever since the first report, as far as they were available. They are indicated in the footnotes as “[Stiftung] annual report [year]". They were not listed separately in the bibliography.
from the German Bundestag and relevant material from the Federal Foreign Office (AA), the Ministry for Cooperation and Development (BMZ) as well as other ministries were investigated. This was important, since the latter are the main financial backer of the political foundations’ international activity. Their political concepts as regards the areas studied (public diplomacy, democracy assistance and conflict management) as well as the regions and countries studied (Southeast Europe and Thailand) were explored. In 2014 I spent several days at the political archives of the AA and the German Bundestag to identify official primary sources and data on the beginnings of the foundations’ international undertakings. The material which is under a vesting period of 30 years due to its confidentiality, offered insights on the initial intention for the foundations’ public funding and the foundations’ relations to public bodies. In this context, the intensive efforts of the archives’ staff members to make specific relevant material available, needs to be highlighted. Finally, media and press coverage in Germany and abroad was analysed as well as the wealth of relevant information available on the internet.48

Method 2: In-depth interviews and others

The highly qualitative nature of interviews was used to overcome the hurdle of the sparse literature. Moreover, the individual beliefs of the Stiftungens’ staff members as well as the values they attach to their activities were important for this work. Between 2009 and 2015 I carried out several in-depth and semi-structured expert interviews in Berlin, Bangkok and Chang Mai which took between 2 to 3.5 hours. I used an open-ended questionnaire which allowed deviation from the questions posed and to respond flexibly to the topics raised during the interview. In addition, I also used unstructured interviews in the form of conversations where two or three questions were posed more generally. They lasted around 1 to 2 hours and were conducted at the beginning of the research project. The interviews were taken in person and either recorded using an audiotape recorder or notes were taken during the interview. Both types of interviews were transcribed afterwards. One

48 Online resources and websites have been accessed on 24/01/2016 unless specified differently.
The interview was conducted as a telephone interview and another as written interview. The interviewees were foundations’ staff members in the German headquarters including members of the executive boards, department heads, heads of divisions and foundations’ representatives in the chosen countries. Also persons from the foreign ministry, experts who had cooperated with the foundations as well as scholarship receivers were involved. The interviewees were given the opportunity to stay anonymous due to the sensitivity of the information provided. An interview’s code number is mentioned in the footnote of the texts in order to create transparency. The interview transcripts can be made available to the reviewers of this project if desired. The possibility of interviewing foundations’ partner organisations on site was not given to me, as travelling to them was either not possible due to the security situation (Thailand) or a language barrier existed. In light of the research question, these interviews, however, were not particular suitable on producing relevant data. I tried to use triangulation entailing multiple methods and different sources to ensure credibility and the accuracy of my interpretations.\(^{49}\) In the Southeast European case study, I referred to an extensive evaluation of the KAS’s activities, which had been carried out by an external evaluator in 2013. In the Thailand case study, I had interviews with the staff members from all active foundations as well as other persons more directly involved in the activities of the FES, in order consider other opinions.\(^{50}\) However, the special role of the foundations’ representatives in the context of the undertakings on site should not be underestimated. They are very much in control of information on the work. We will discuss the representatives’ role later on.\(^{51}\) The cooperation of the interviewees was very positive as was the amount of time and effort spend responding to interview questions, establishing further contacts and providing additional material even beyond the interview situation. As part of the data analysis I used coding, whereby I connected the responses to the theoretical models and systematisations developed in this study.\(^{52}\) During the research project I was given the opportunity to participate in discussions

\(^{50}\) Becker (1998) p. 91.
\(^{51}\) Ch. 7.
and conferences organised by the foundations. Systematic observation was not carried out, since limited knowledge was expected to be gained from it for the answering of the research questions. Nonetheless, it helped to understand more broadly the environment in which the foundations operated. Furthermore, I could make some observations on the relations between the foundations and the members of parliament/government as well as the embassies, when working as a research assistant at the Protocol of the German Bundestag between 2007 and 2009, and as an intern at the German embassy in Nepal in 2005. I could draw upon these experiences in the research project.

1.6. Organisation of the chapters and specific interest in knowledge

The study consists of nine chapters. After having defined the study’s overall theoretical frame and methodology of this study, I specify some characteristics of the German political foundations. They are important for general understanding and analysis.

In chapter 2 and chapter 3 we consider the theoretical background of this study. Chapter 2 offers definitions and concepts of transnational actors, their activities and impact by referring to IR theory. Chapter 3 focuses on the concepts of public diplomacy which can be understood as a transnational interaction process in a network environment. It is particularly apt to integrate the main thoughts on transnational relations, as outlined before. It connects the different approaches into an integrated model of public diplomacy which serves as a framework to study the activities of the German political foundations in the chapters that follow. Chapter 3 also introduces briefly public diplomacy as practiced by the Federal Foreign Office in order to make some claims on the possible involvement of the German political foundations later on.

Chapter 4 applies the integrated public diplomacy model to the international activities of the German political foundations. It estimates whether the German political foundations are transnational actors and puts a special focus on the network environment in which transnational activity takes place while focusing on parts of the research sub-questions (1).
In chapter 5 and 6 the study looks at democracy assistance and conflict management of the German political foundations. Both are forms which have been identified as how public diplomacy can be practically conducted by transnational actors. Since the public diplomacy literature remains rather vague on both concepts, the chapters start with systematisations of the concepts. They then briefly introduce the German official ambitions in the fields, before reviewing the existing literature on the German political foundations and subsume their activities more generally under the systematisation. Finally, differences and commonalities as regards the official ambitions in the fields are indentified. These chapters concentrate on the research sub-questions (2) and (3) respectively.

Chapter 7 and chapter 8 consider the two cases of the KAS’s democracy assistance in Southeast Europe as well as the FES’s conflict management in Southern Thailand and connect them to the integrated model of diplomacy. German official ideas and narratives are also considered. Specifically, we look at what values are diffused within the established network environment. Both chapters finally try to make some claims on the political impact of the foundations addressing all sub-questions.

The final chapter links the main findings to the central research question on the role of the German political foundations in international relations. It discusses whether state-centric assumptions of rationalists are right in that the German political foundations are sheer instruments of state power or whether constructivists are correct in assuming that the Stiftungen as transnational actors have their independent position and “reason for being” in the international environment. It also tries to explain the tremendous public funding of the Stiftungen.

Overall, the research provides a much needed analysis of the international activity of the German political foundation and its uniqueness. The literature relating to the phenomenon of political foundations - especially published over the last 10 years – is sparse. There is little German literature and even less foreign literature available. The literature published recently, consists of articles and very few monographs.
1.7. Use of language

The notion of the “developing country” is used in this study by referring collectively to those countries whose economic-technical and social standard of living is low in comparison to industrialised countries. However, I am aware that the notion as well as the synonymous term of “third world” is problematic due to the historical connotation. The definition dates back to the 1950s and, from the perspective of industrialised countries, refers predominantly to post-colonial regions. Development was linked here with the understanding of a capitalist economic model akin to that of the USA and contrasted to socialism.\textsuperscript{53} Despite the doubtfulness of the term we use the notion of developing countries as many other academics have done before. An in-depth and critical discussion on this matter would lead away from the original research question. Furthermore, we use the term “international” not as referring to state-to-state interactions between sovereign states only but from its original understanding of \textit{inter} (between) \textit{national} (nations). This can include interactions beyond the national border of public, societal and economic actors among others. By “global” we refer to trans-border interactions which can take place in the entire world system.\textsuperscript{54}

1.8. Characteristics of the German political foundations

The following section introduces some characteristics of the \textit{Stiftungen} which are important for the overall understanding of the research object and the following chapters.

1.8.1. Origins

The beginnings of the German political foundations’ activities, domestic activities then only, date back to 1925.\textsuperscript{55} Founded by members of the social democratic parties the oldest of the political foundations is the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. \textit{Friedrich Ebert} (1871-1925) a saddler from Heidelberg became member of the German Reichstag for the Social Democratic Party in 1912. After the revolution of 1918 he was one of the new government’s

\textsuperscript{54} Hale/Held (2011) p. 5.
\textsuperscript{55} On the history of the foundations’ international activities see 5.3.1.
chairmen and became the first German head of state democratically elected in 1919. Ebert himself had proposed the establishment of a foundation aiming at political education and international understanding. The foundation’s funds came from funereal donations following his death. Before the FES was banned by the Nazis in 1933, it had provided almost 300 bursaries for talented young people. The creation of political foundations after World War Two happened mainly for historical reasons and aimed at strengthening the German democracy, since the experience of the Weimar Republic’s democratic destructiveness finally led to the criminal dictatorship of National Socialism. In 1947, the FES was re-established and later compensated for the confiscation of its assets by the Nazi regime. The FES served as a model for the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung which was founded in 1957. Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919) a protestant theologian was elected member of the German Reichstag in 1907. Re-elected in 1919 he became chairman of the German Democratic Party (DDP) which he co-founded. Naumann elaborated the part on fundamental rights and duties of the constitution of Weimar Republic. He is considered as the founder of modern liberalism. The creation of the FNS was instigated by the then Federal President Theodor Heuss. He considered the establishment of the FNS as a support for the F.D.P in crisis at that time. Supporters of the ruling Christian Democratic Party (CDU) soon set up a counterpart to the FES. The KAS, initially a society for Christian democratic education established in 1956 emanated from a political association, the Politische Akademie Eichholz e.V. and the “Institute for international solidarity”. It changed its name to Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in 1964. The lawyer Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967) was elected Lord Mayer of Cologne in 1917. When the Nazis came to power in 1933 he was replaced. In connection with the assassination attempt on Hitler in 1944 he was held prisoner by the Gestapo. After being Chairman of the Rhineland CDU, Chairman of the British Zone’s CDU (1946) and President of the

56 FES at: https://www.fes.de/de/?id=233.
58 FNS at: https://www.freiheit.org/content/geschichte.
60 Pinto-Duschinsky (1991a) p. 183.
Parliamentary Council (1948), *Adenauer* was elected Federal Chancellor (1949-1963). He assumed, in addition, the office of the foreign minister (1951-1955). The Bavarian Hans-Seidel-Stiftung was created in 1967. *Hanns Seidel* (1901-1961) studied law and economics. One of the founding fathers of the Bavarian Christian Social Union, he became Minister of state for Economics in Bavaria (1947-1954), Party Chairman of the CSU (1955-1961) and Bavarian Prime Minister (1957-1960). In 1988 the *Stiftungsverband Regenbogen*, an association of several foundations (*Buntstift e.V.*, *FrauenAnstiftung e.V.* and *Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung e.V.*) affiliated to the Greens, was set up. Each foundation had its own field of activity until they fused to become the new Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung in 1997. *Heinrich Böll* (1917-1985) published novels, short stories, radio dramas and (television) plays and worked as a translator from 1947 onwards. He was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1972. The youngest of the German political foundations is the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung. Founded as *Verein Gesellschaftsanalyse und Politische Bildung e.V.* in 1990, it became the RLS in 1999. *Rosa Luxemburg* (1871-1919), a Polish Jew and participant in the Russian Revolution of 1905, was one of the founders of the Social Democratic Party in the joint kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, one of the most important representatives of the German Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) left wing next to *Karl Liebknecht*, and later co-founder of the German Communist Party (KPD). In 1919 *Luxemburg* and *Liebknecht* were murdered possibly by extremists of the *Freikorps*.

The attempt to create a political foundation affiliated to the right-wing political party “*Die Republikaner*” was abolished in 1995. The German administrative court mainly substantiated its decision against the set up of the Franz-Schönhuber-Stiftung by declaring it a “danger for public welfare”. However, in 1996, the Gottlieb-Fichte-Stiftung was created. Still, it is different from the other political foundations since it is not close to

62 KAS at: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.3717/.
63 HSS at: http://www.hss.de/stiftung/hanns-seidel.html.
64 HBS at: https://www.boell.de/de/geschichte-der-stiftung.
65 Fülle (1992) p. 11.
67 BVerwG of 12/02/1998 (3 C 55/96); Merten (1997).
a political party of a “permanent and significant political mainstream”. Given that it does not receive public funding, it could only develop activities on a small scale. According to press reports, in 2005 also the National Democratic Party (NPD) also failed to establish a party-affiliated foundation on the Land level in memory of Walter Bachmann, a former volunteer at the Waffen SS. Currently, the organisation operates in Saxony under the name “Bildungswerk für Heimat und Nationale Indentität e.V.” observed by the Saxon office for protection of the constitution.

1.8.2. Legal classification and organisational structure

The German political foundations carry the term “foundation” (Stiftung). In most cases, however, this is legally incorrect as the Stiftungen hold the form of a registered society (eingetragener Verein: e.V.). Only the FNS is indeed a “foundation under private law” (§ 1 charter of the FNS) making applicable §§ 80ff. BGB and the corresponding law. Foundations are institutions that are set up by the founder himself. They are supposed to constantly serve the specific and fixed object of the foundation with the help of the trust fund. Since 2002 foundations need to be recognised officially. In compliance with §§ 54ff. BGB the other five political foundations are non-profit registered societies. When legally registered (§ 21 BGB) the freedom of association (Article 9 German Basic Law) is applicable to them. For these political foundations the term “foundation” is misleading. Although the law still allows to them to carry the term as part of the society’s name, the name affix e.V. has to be borne permanently (i.e. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.). Some authors assume that the Stiftungen decided to become a registered society as it is less bureaucratic compared to being an actual foundation. We will return to other explanations later on. After the movement of the German Bundestag from Bonn to Berlin in 1999 the German political foundations set up headquarters in Berlin. Additionally,

70 LfV Sachsen (2005) p. 33.
71 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code).
72 Rawert (2011) Vorbm. 3 zu § 80ff.
75 Vieregge (1977a) pp. 31ff.
the FES, the KAS and the HSS kept their respective offices in Bonn, St. Augustin and Munich. Furthermore, all political foundations maintain offices abroad. The five political foundations organised as registered societies have a similar administrative structure consisting of a board of members (Mitgliederversammlung) and an executive board (Vorstand) elected by its members. The FNS, in contrast to the Mitgliederversammlung, has a board of trustees (Kuratorium). The FES and the KAS both have a Kuratorium as well, including stakeholders from society, politics and culture to advise the Vorstand in important matters. Compared to the Kuratorium of the FNS, however, it is legally insignificant.\textsuperscript{76} Within the political foundations’ different boards, the composition of members is very much affected by the foundations’ party affiliation. Members of the foundations are parliamentarians of the German Bundestag, the German federal countries’ parliaments or the European parliament as well as former members of the government and functionaries of political parties.\textsuperscript{77} The executive board of the KAS, for instance, has prominent members like the Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, the President of the German Bundestag Norbert Lammert and the President of the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pöttering.\textsuperscript{78} The foundations generally have divisions of political education, research, international cooperation and administration including finances and human resources subsections. Other sections, such as archives, libraries, and political consultancy as well as the communication and press offices are either integrated into these divisions or independent divisions. In 2014, the Stiftungen had around 2200 staff members in total of which 15% worked abroad.\textsuperscript{79}

\subsection*{1.8.3. Sources of finance}

The German political foundations obtain significant public funds which come mainly from the Bund (around 95%) but also from the Länder and

\textsuperscript{76} Kress (1985) p. 25.
\textsuperscript{77} Pinto-Duschinsky (1991a) p. 196.
\textsuperscript{78} KAS at: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.4892/.
\textsuperscript{79} In detail: FES: 612 (of which 99 abroad); KAS: 579 (of which 94 abroad); FNS: 203 (of which 35 abroad); HBS: 249 (of which 28 abroad); HSS: 283 (of which 34 abroad); RLS: 256 (of which 45 abroad) (c.f. foundations’ annual reports of 2014: FES [p. 73], KAS [p. 93], HBS [p. 85], HSS [p. 69], RLS [p. 69]. For FNS data was only available at annual report 2013 [p. 67]). For data on 2012 see Bundesrechnungshof (2014) p. 162.
international organisations. The federal funds can be divided into three types: Projektmittel (project funds) the foundations receive for special projects for which they need to apply. Other organisations, such as NGOs active with projects in developing countries, obtain such funds as well. Project funds come from the Foreign Office (AA), the ministry for development and cooperation (BMZ) and other ministries. The AA funds social policy measures in North America, Europe and other industrial countries as well as the provision of scholarships to foreign students while the BMZ finances measures important to development. The means of the BMZ are higher than those of the AA. In 2014 the ratio between AA funding was 6% (AA) to 94% (BMZ). The second type of funding is Globalmittel the Stiftungen receive from the interior ministry for their statutory aims, such as educational measures, research projects, archival activities as well as personnel and administration expenses. Approximately a quarter of their funding is given to the foundations via Globalmittel. A third minor group of funds from the ministry of interior, the Bauglobalmittel, is received by the foundations for investments. The distribution of funds among the foundations follows a quota. It is politically negotiated, defined by the Budget Committee and fixed by the statutory budget law following the proportion of the political parties in the parliament. In 2015 the following quota existed: the FES received 30,29%, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 29,57%, the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung 10,21%, the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 10,51%, and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung 9,71%. The Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung received 9,71%. Apart from public funding the foundations have some limited income from donations, attendance fees, fund raising, fixed assets and inheritances.

C.f. foundations annual reports; extensively on the foundations’ funding see Geerlings (2003); Meertens/Wolf (1996); Günter/Vesper (1994); Von Arnim (1992), (1993); Pinto-Duschinsky (2002), (1991b); Barth (1986); Vieregge (1977b), (1990).

Since 2015 this concerns EU member states and candidates.

Federal budget, Kapitel 0502 Titel 68727.

Federal budget, Kapitel 2302 Titel 68704.

Cf. comparison with the data from federal budget of 2014 without foreign scholarship funding.


KAS at: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.3712/

C.f. foundations annual reports.
In the 1990s the German political foundations endured significant budget cuts. However, in the last years funding was considerably increased. In 2012 the Stiftungen received around 328.4 Mio. Euro Projektmittel, 98 Mio. Euro Globalmittel and 7.7 Mio. Euro Bauglobalmittel. This was an increase of public funding by 35% compared to 2003.

1.8.4. The political party links

A pivotal point in the discussion on German political foundations remains their party affiliation and independence from their “parent” party. The legal literature in particular adds to the debate. The conceptual diversity of whether the German organisations should be called “political foundations” (politische Stiftungen), “party-affiliated foundations” (parteinahe Stiftungen) or “party foundations” (Parteistiftungen) already shows the complexity of the subject and the positioning of the author. Overseen by the Federal Constitutional Court, the issue is passionately debated to this day. The political parties act (Gesetz über die politischen Parteien) of 1997 (last amended 2011) governs the relationship between the Stiftung and the political party as follows: the chairman and the treasurer of a party are not allowed to exercise comparable functions in the political foundation (§ 11) and political parties are not allowed to receive donations from political foundations (§ 25). Still, the crux of the discussion is the public funding of the foundations via budget funds (Globalmittel). Historically, the public financial support of the Stiftungen results from a ruling of the German constitutional court in 1966. The court concluded that public subsidies for political parties for “civic education” were unlawful. By 1967, the federal budget had already assigned the amount of 9 million Deutsche Mark of Globalmittel to the political foundations, thus bypassing the limitations on state aid to parties resulting from the ruling. The HSS was established specially for the purpose of receiving these subsidies. In 1986, the constitutional court finally had to decide about the legitimacy of the

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90 Nolke, Deutschlandfunk, 29/03/2015.
92 BVerfGE 20, 134 (143) of 19/07/1966 (Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court).
93 Pinto-Duschinsky (1991b) p. 186.
foundations’ public financing. The process was initiated by the Green Party at that point still without a foundation counterpart. The party considered the Stiftungens’ public funding via Globalmittel as hidden party financing. However, the court upheld the constitutionality of the funding on the grounds that the political foundations were “independent enough from their affiliated party in matters of organisation and personnel”. The judgement became henceforth the “Magna Carta” for the political foundations’ financing. In 1992 the discussion resumed when the constitutional court overruled its previous decision on political party financing. Political parties were again allowed to receive public funding for the whole scope of their duties, even for “civic education”. Since that time, critics agree that the foundations’ funding should be integrated into the funding of political parties. They campaign for transparently standardising and regulating the amount and kind of foundations’ public funding. Initiatives and draft laws have, however, not yet been successful. The question in dispute remains how to define the relation of the political foundations to their parent parties. In 1996, the political foundations (except for the RLS) made a joint declaration on their public funding outlining their public benefit, and the fact that they publicise their use of funds (in the form of annual reports). They were not obliged to do this.

Lawyers discuss whether the political foundations are (part of) political parties. Some authors assume that the political foundations are parties and Article 21 GG (German Constitution) is applied to them. Article 21 GG defines that that “(1) political parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people. They may be freely established. Their internal organization must conform to democratic principles. They must publicly account for their assets and for the sources and use of their funds”. Others claim that the Stiftungen have rights and duties of Article 21 GG but they do

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95 BVerfGE 73, 1 of 14/07/1986 (Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court).
96 BVerfGE 73, 1 (31) of 14/07/1986 (Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court).
not count as parties.\textsuperscript{102} A third group sees only the foundations’ funds as equivalent to party funds but does not consider the foundations as parties or parts of them.\textsuperscript{103} According to Born, Article 21 GG is not applicable to the Stiftungen.\textsuperscript{104} However, the discussion does not clarify the actual relationship between both organisations. From the perspective of activities, it is wrong to qualify the main activities of the political foundations as exclusively party activities. According to Pinto-Duschinsky, the “foundations and parties are distinguished by the fact that much of their work is different, though often complementary”.\textsuperscript{105} However, it is the effect of the foundations’ party links that the parent party can benefit from the activities.\textsuperscript{106} The foundations are central carriers of the political education for political parties but are autonomous concerning the planning and the carrying out of the events.\textsuperscript{107} The consulting the foundations offer to the parent party, shows a strong connection between both organisations and the foundations are often considered as a testing ground for new ideas. However, their recommendations are often ignored by politicians.\textsuperscript{108} The foundations’ research and the maintaining of archives are of public as well as party interest.\textsuperscript{109} Furthermore, strong personnel links exist between the political parties and the Stiftungen, as already outlined.\textsuperscript{110} The constitutional court’s ruling in 1986 did not change this. Thunert estimates that important posts at the foundations are often given to “deserving but retired or even failed politicians.”\textsuperscript{111} Although the foundation is “headed by senior party figures” it exchanges relatively few staff with the party.\textsuperscript{112} Party aims and those fixed in the foundations’ charters often vary.\textsuperscript{113} Moreover, the ruling of the constitutional court in 1986 inhibited financial contributions from the foundations to the parties.\textsuperscript{114} Both financing operations are strictly

\textsuperscript{102} E.g. Merten (1999) p. 159.
\textsuperscript{105} Pinto-Duschinsky (1991b) p. 217.
\textsuperscript{106} Von Arnim (1993) p. 293.
\textsuperscript{110} Vieregge (1977a) p. 35.
\textsuperscript{111} Thunert (2004) p. 80.
\textsuperscript{112} Pinto-Duschinsky (1991b) pp. 217ff.
\textsuperscript{113} Born (2007) p. 114.
\textsuperscript{114} BVerfGE 73, 1 of 14/07/1986 (Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court).
separated. Nonetheless, an indirect influence of the party on the financing of the Stiftungen exists through the members of parliament as the parliamentarians decide on the amount of the foundations’ budget funds.

In summary, the Stiftungen have a dilemma: On the one hand, they have to be legally independent from the parent parties in order to receive public funding, according to the constitutional court. On the other hand, the foundations have to be close to a political party to secure their public funding.\textsuperscript{115} In consequence, the foundations can be considered a governmental and party “hybrid” of “relative autonomy”.\textsuperscript{116} Some assume that the foundations are active in the “pre-political” sphere not involved in political competition and winning elections.\textsuperscript{117} However, the funding of the Stiftungen depends indirectly on the success of the political party owing to the distribution quota. Whether they are indeed only active in pre-politics will be analysed in detail in the following chapters. Certainly, the Stiftungen have long ago acquired a right to exist which is not based on the efforts of the affiliated party.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{115} Günther/Vesper (1994).
\textsuperscript{117} Langguth (1993) p. 41.
\textsuperscript{118} Naschler (1993) p. 239.
Part I
Theoretical framework
Chapter 2 – Transnational actors in IR theory

The following chapter will offer a theoretical framework for explaining the role of the German political foundations in international relations (IR). For this purpose transnational actors will be conceptualised first. Furthermore, the theory of constructivism and the rationalist theoretical approaches of neorealism and neoliberalism will be juxtaposed. Their views on the significance of transnational actors in IR will be outlined. It will be shown how they explain the occurrence and importance of transnational actors in the international system, whereby the explanatory strength of the constructivist will be considered. In order to understand what these actors characterise and what they actually do, it will be referred to constructivist inspired existing analysis on the role of transnational actors in the last section. Since constructivism highlights transnational interaction and communication processes while taking network environments into consideration, it can help explaining comprehensively the position in IR of transnational actors and the German political foundations alike.

2.1. Defining transnational actors

Defining transnational relations is relatively easy. Still, defining transnational actors presents us with a challenge. Numerous types of actors are included whose definitions partly overlap. This study follows Risse-Kappen in defining transnational relations as “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organisation”.¹ The definition builds upon but slightly modifies the definitions of Kaiser and Keohane/Nye. Kaiser stresses the existence of transnational societies as a condition for transnational politics which he defines as those political processes between national governments and/or between transnational societies and governments, which result from interactions within transnational societies. Transnational societies develop through interaction between different societies in specific areas.² According

¹ Risse-Kappen (1995a) p. 3.
to Keohane and Nye transnational relations are “contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of government.” Transnational interactions are “the movement of tangible and intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or an intergovernmental organisation.” These items can be, for instance, money, information or people but also political ideas and policy proposals. Transnational interactions are distinguished from interstate interactions, or in other words, traditional diplomacy, which are started off and maintained by governments including interaction in intergovernmental organisations. Transnational interaction, by contrast, “may involve governments but it may not involve only governments.” It is therefore necessary that a non-state actor is involved in this process and plays an important role. In their work, Nye and Keohane concentrate on the activities of transnational organisations, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), transnational companies and international trade unions. Transnational relations also include “the activities of transnational organisations, except within their home states, even when some of their activities may not directly involve movements across state boundaries and my not therefore, be transnational interactions as defined above.” Proceeding from the transnational actors’ standpoint transnational interaction can arise with foreign governments, foreign societies and intergovernmental organisations whereas vis-à-vis its home state the actor is connected by domestic politics. Risse-Kappen’s definition leaves out the extension of Keohane and Nye to include indirect movements across state boundaries. Although it is possible that foreign actors can operate abroad from their home base and not necessarily cross state boundaries, it is still beneficial to think of transnational actors to directly engage over their own national border and to narrow the definition in favour of precision. Otherwise the definition embraces virtually even those interactions with marginal international contexts. Risse-Kappen also

5 Willeits (2011b) p. 338.
7 Keohane/Nye (1971) p. 335.
restricts transnational relations to “regular interaction”. This can include coalition building and contacts, if subsumable under the term of interaction, but simple encounters alone are not sufficient. Since we look at relations, it is important to consider more frequent interaction.

There is not much unity in the definition of non-state actors and how it relates to the definition of transnational actors. Both terms are often used alternatively or transnational to avoid implying that states are more important than other actors. Others bring into play “transnational non-state actors”. According to Risse-Kappen, transnational actors are either “non-state agents” or “actors which do not operate on behalf of government or an intergovernmental organisation”. Consequently, the notion excludes IGOs and governments whereas it covers transnational companies (TNCs), multinational companies (MNCs), non-legitimate groups and liberation movements as well as (international) NGOs. Risse-Kappen’s definition also comprises transgovernmental actors as long as they are independent enough from the national government’s policy. Reinalda further unravels the distinction and differentiates between transnational and international actors. The latter are INGOs, internationally active national NGOs, MNCs, governments and IGOs which do not pursue national views and try to influence processes on the international level. Apart from that and the inclusion of NGO variants, Reinalda’s definition of transnational actors is consistent with that of Risse-Kappen. Reinalda views non-state actors as the sum of transnational and international actors, excluding only governments and transgovernmental actors. His differentiation between transnational actors and international actors, however, seems problematic since the criteria rather refer to the actor’s role. In practice, it will be difficult to differentiate between the actor’s national and international position which

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11 Risse-Kappen (1995a) p. 3n. State is understood as a construct of three elements, that is state territory, state people and state power. The latter is legitimised by the people and is the exercise of power by the state organs and institutions of the legislative, executive and judicative (Jellinek [1900]).
14 Reinalda (2001) pp. 12ff. Transgovernmental actor refers to “cross-border relations between representatives of (semi-)governmental institutions below governmental level” (p. 13).
likely overlaps. The actor even might have a mixed role varying from case to case. The term transnational actor makes clear that it includes activities across national boundaries and contains an element of movement. This characteristic cannot be derived from the notion of non-state actor which instead sets the actor in reference to another actor (i.e. the state).

Similar to non-state actors, NGOs are not defined consistently. Even the United Nations (UN) providing for NGOs to be accredited for consultative reasons (Art. 71 UN Charta) does not define the term. Some requirements can be derived from UN Resolution 1996/31: NGOs are not formed by a government or an intergovernmental agreement and operate on the basis of their own constitutional arrangements.\textsuperscript{15} The UN also accepts that various NGOs have both non-governmental and governmental members, “provided that such membership does not interfere with the free expression of views of the organisation”.\textsuperscript{16} NGOs are domestic actors. They become transnational actors when they operate across national boundaries. An INGO is established when various NGOs from three or more countries establish an international non-governmental organisation.\textsuperscript{17} NGOs are furthermore expected to be independent societal actors originating from the private sector because they are primarily financed by donations and membership contributions.\textsuperscript{18} Increasingly, NGOs have become heterogeneous and the premise “non-governmental” has been watered-down. Reinalda contradicts the above definition as he considers NGO variants that act on behalf of a government as transnational actors. For state-sponsored NGOs the term “QUANGO” was coined. It refers to a “quasi NGO” i.e. an independent actor receiving the majority of their resources from public bodies and which therefore cannot be clearly assigned to the state or the private sector.\textsuperscript{19} Moreover, despite its formal independence it is often assumed to undertakes activities on behalf of a government as it is supposed to fulfill duties which

\textsuperscript{17} Reinalda (2001) p. 12.
\textsuperscript{19} Reinalda (2001) p. 14; Nohlen (2005) pp. 614f.; UN (1996) considers the possibility of government funded NGOs in which case the NGO has to declare to the UN (see §I.13). Still, the NGO needs to be independent in its expression of views (§I.12).
are in fact those of the government.\textsuperscript{20} Glagow and Schimank look at QUANGOs from an administrative sciences’ perspective involving in their consideration the original motivation for the organisation’s establishment. According to them, both NGOs and QUANGOs accomplish “public” tasks. But in contrast to the NGO’s private origin, the QUANGO is an attempt of the public administration to perform public duties in a non-sovereign form.\textsuperscript{21} State-sponsored NGOs are therefore not necessarily QUANGOs and, might the amount be little, can be relative autonomous from the funding governments.\textsuperscript{22} Their relations with funding governments can be further defined according to the distribution of resources. The relation is stable when the resources are balanced, labile when the state’s resources outweigh or formal when the resources of the organisation prevail.\textsuperscript{23} Glagow and Schimank consider information, finances and legitimate power as resources crucial for political decisions and their implementation.\textsuperscript{24} For formally independent NGOs which are financially dependent on state funds the term GONGO\textsuperscript{s} (governmental-non-governmental organisations) has been coined.\textsuperscript{25} In the consequence of these considerations, QUANGOs should not be considered as transnational actors while for other forms of publicly funded organisations the dependency needs to be analysed on a case-to-case basis. The equivalent term for QUANGO in the German foreign political context is Mittlerorganisation,\textsuperscript{26} which can also be translated as “mediating organisation”. The German Mittlerorganisationen aim at deepening bilateral relations with other countries through civil activities, events and publications. They impact on relevant elites and establish contacts with similar organisations abroad. Reasons for the activity can either be the importance of the bilateral relations with the specific country for Germany, the burdened relations with countries in the past or the future importance of the country due to political or economic reasons. Mittlerorganisationen can

\textsuperscript{20} Schubert (2005) p. 802.
\textsuperscript{22} Glagow/Schimank (1983) p. 159.
\textsuperscript{23} Glagow/Schimank (1983) p. 162.
\textsuperscript{24} Glagow/Schimank (1983) pp. 155f. with further citations.
\textsuperscript{25} Reimann (2007) p. 93; elsewhere GONGO\textsuperscript{s} (governmentally organized NGOs) have been defined as NGOs founded on government initiative (Reinalda [2001] p. 14); Naím (2007) applies GONGO\textsuperscript{s} to government-sponsored NGOs which are governmentally initiated and controlled. Both definitions are misleading as they show overlaps with QUANGOs as applied here.
\textsuperscript{26} Witte (1993) p. 197.
complement German foreign affairs as they fulfil tasks official foreign policy is unable to.\textsuperscript{27} Most of the implementing agencies (Durchführungsorganisationen) of German development cooperation are QUANGOs.\textsuperscript{28}

Transnational actors can furthermore be distinguished according to their dimension. The first dimension concerns the structure according to which the transnational actor is part of a formal organisation or is loosely connected to others in the form of networks. The second dimension relates to the motivation of the transnational actor, whether the actor is focused on its wellbeing or whether it promotes the common good which equates to the distinction between profit and not-for-profit actors.\textsuperscript{29} This is similar to Reinalda’s distinction between non-governmental public-interest-oriented “PINGOS” and non-governmental profit-oriented “BINGOS”.\textsuperscript{30}

\textbf{2.2. Theoretical perspectives on transnational actors}

Explicit analytical work on transnational actors and relations started in the late 1960s although neither transnational relations nor theorising about transnational actors is new.\textsuperscript{31} The explosion in the number of NGOs over the past three decades, the end of the Cold War and globalisation processes have been catalysts for the interest in studying transnational actors.\textsuperscript{32} However, theoretical considerations are still missing. Reasons for this are seen in political science and its traditional differentiation between a domestic and a foreign sphere. Domestic policy theories rarely take into account transnational political processes and activities by transnational actors, such as political parties, which are then threatened to fall into “conceptual no-man’s-land.” Foreign and international political literature, in turn, hardly ever deals with transnational actors, since scholars mainly

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{27} Kaiser/Mildenberger (1998) pp. 199f.
\textsuperscript{28} Glagow/Schimank (1983) pp. 150f.; see 5.2.1. on these organisations.
\textsuperscript{31} Risse names family businesses like the Medicis and Fuggers dating back to medieval times and expanding their production across Europe and campaigns to end slavery in the USA starting in the early 19th century; similar Halliday (2001) who regards it as possible that IR in its entire 500 years development has been shaped and driven by non-state actors (pp. 27f.).
\end{footnotesize}
proceed from the assumption of a sovereign nation state as central actor in world politics and focus on the relations between governments. Although transnational activities challenge the latter assumption most of the international relations’ approaches have adopted this state-centrism.\textsuperscript{33}

In the following sections we will examine how the role of transnational actors in IR can be explained. For this purpose, the rationalist and constructivist thinking as the conventional IR traditions will be contrasted. This will help to understand what both theories hold with regards to interactions of transnational actors. The theories’ selection is oriented towards the major debates between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism starting in the 1970s and between rationalism and constructivism in the 1990s. Although the constructivist framework has its explanatory strength borrowing from the rationalist approaches can be fruitful. The considerations will be added by transnationalist thoughts as they put prominently to the centre cross-border relations between societies and states. Although it is not denied that other approaches, such as Marxist and critical theory could have added value for this work, the look is limited at the causal theories of the neo-neo synthesis and the constitutive constructivist approach to avoid an overload catch-all theoretical framework. While causal theories try to answer “why” questions and focus explanatorily on causal logic and the existence of laws, constitutive theories try to understand how structure forms social kinds by asking “how” questions. Constitutive theories provide explanations which are not necessarily causal\textsuperscript{34} and refuse laws in support of generalisations.\textsuperscript{35} Normative theories which focus on the moral dimension of IR and address the ethical nature of relations between actors,\textsuperscript{36} are not considered. Still, some thoughts will be lend from Gramsci and Bourdieu in the following sections to establish a plausible and enriched framework.

\textsuperscript{36} Brown (1992) pp. 2f.
2.2.1. Rationalist approaches

Since the beginning of IR at the end of World War One and until the end of the Cold War, the research agenda was dominated by rationalist approaches.\(^\text{37}\) They assume the nation-state to be the key actor in international relations (IR) acting rationally in the pursuit of pre-given national interests. In application of methodological individualism, pre-given means that states’ interests are unaffected by interaction with others.\(^\text{38}\) Rationalism is characterised by a number of disagreements regarding these interests’ nature and whether cooperation or conflict is the predominant mean of attaining them.\(^\text{39}\) In the third great debate dominating the academic scholarship in international relations since the 1970s, neo-realists focus on the limits of cooperation and the possibility of conflict among states whereas neoliberals concentrate on the possibilities for cooperation and the limits to conflict.\(^\text{40}\)

Neoliberalism (or neoliberal institutionalism) connects the theories of interdependence and institutionalism. Interdependence, a concept developed by Keohane and Nye, exists when one state depends on another in order to reach its goals. To avoid costly effects it needs to cooperate. Cooperation can be increased through and gains a permanent structure within institutions, such as international regimes and international organisations.\(^\text{41}\) Interdependence and international regimes are believed to diminish insecurity (created by anarchy), the use of military force and power struggles.\(^\text{42}\) Neoliberalism drops the realists’ assumption of a power seeking state and assumes that states operate self-interested. In the consequence of

\(^{37}\) The term “rationalism” was coined by Keohane (1988) in order to demonstrate the similarities between neorealist and neoliberal theories. They share with each other the assumption of rationality and tend to apply the rules of positivism. Keohane contrasts rationalism with “reflectivism” which relates to theories critical of mainstream rationalist approaches, such as constructivism, critical theory, poststructuralism, and feminism (p. 2).


\(^{39}\) Chandler (2005) p. 149.

\(^{40}\) There are four important debates (Wæver [1996]). While the first two great debates in the 1950 and 1960s largely discussed the construction of an IR discipline and scientific methods, the abovementioned inter-paradigm third debate treats how best to explain and understand international process. The fourth great debate emerging in the mid-1980s looks at what should be studied and how it should be studied. Sometimes the fourth debate is called the third debate (e.g. Fearson/Wendt [2002]) when the inter-paradigm debate is not considered as great (Kurki/Wight [2013] pp. 20f.).

\(^{41}\) Keohane/Nye (1989) pp. 8f.

interdependence and cooperation, states are able to look for absolute gains i.e. mutual advantages from which everyone benefits instead of concentrating on the loss of power.\textsuperscript{43} According to Krasner’s foundational definition, international regimes are identified as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”.\textsuperscript{44} Rittberger and Zürn consider necessary some minimal level of effectiveness and durability to qualify as regime.\textsuperscript{45} Regimes allow interactions in issue-areas and facilitate for actors to pursue their interests collectively.\textsuperscript{46} They are also assumed to foster peace and have a “civilizing effect” which improves conflict situations through confidence building.\textsuperscript{47} Regimes, although connected to them, are different from organisations. As institutions regimes are part of the social structure but, in contrast to organisations, they are not capable of acting. With a basis on functional institution theory, neoliberals assume that regimes perform functions useful to states helping them to maximise their gains: Depending on whether regimes are strong or weak they can implement precise rules and interpret them, collect information on the behaviour of regime members, make it available to the states and sanction violation of rules.\textsuperscript{48} Neoliberals take microeconomic and game theory to explain regime formation which, in short, starts from the premise of two actors having the possibility either to cooperate or to compete. States fail to cooperate (in regimes) when they imagine other members of the anarchic system to adopt a competitive strategy. Neoliberals therefore concentrate on aspects that will strengthen reciprocity among actors which furthers regime establishment and maintenance.\textsuperscript{49} Although neoliberals acknowledge that not only governments interact but also IOs,

transnational actors and individuals they see states in the centre while those other actors are mostly not treated as playing a significant role.\textsuperscript{50}

All forms of realism which has been the dominant theory of world politics since the beginning of IR theorising subscribe to statism as the state characterised by sovereignty is the only relevant actor in the international system.\textsuperscript{51} Due to the anarchic structure of the international system (viz. the absence of a central authority) states are interested in gaining or preserving power in order to maintain national sovereignty. Waltz’s neorealist theory developed in the 1970s emphasises the importance of structure of the international system as a primary determinant for states’ behaviour. Insecurity of the international system makes states to seek power in order to defend themselves.\textsuperscript{52} The power of one state is relative to the power of others, leading to competition where states try to gain more power than others.\textsuperscript{53} Power in the neorealist view is understood as capabilities i.e. economic and military strength, resources, size of population and territory among others.\textsuperscript{54} Hegemonic states are those with high concentration and wide diffusion of power.\textsuperscript{55} The distribution of power among states is the dominant explanatory factor for international cooperation.\textsuperscript{56} Neorealists rationalise the development of regimes with the interest of most powerful states since regimes depend on the power structure. Regimes are therefore epiphenomenal\textsuperscript{57} and internationally institutions “have mattered rather a little”.\textsuperscript{58} Neoliberals in contrast argue that regimes are able to create a stable international structure even in absence of hegemony since regimes often persisted when hegemony declined.\textsuperscript{59} They stress that regimes enable states to collaborate whereas neorealists believe that regimes allow states to

\textsuperscript{51} Dunn/Schmidt (2011) p. 93.
\textsuperscript{52} Waltz (1979) p. 104.
\textsuperscript{53} Mearsheimer (2011) p. 80.
\textsuperscript{54} Waltz (1979) p. 131.
\textsuperscript{55} Lentner (2006) p. 91. Hegemony can also be associated with leadership, dominance and control (Gilpin [1981] p. 29), the “preponderance of material resources” and their control (Keohane [1984] p. 32) or military resources (Mearsheimer [2001] p. 40).
\textsuperscript{56} Lamy (2011) pp. 116ff.
\textsuperscript{57} Arts (2000) p. 518.
\textsuperscript{58} Mearsheimer (1994) p. 49 referring to the examples of the failure of the Leage of Nations to stop aggression of Germany and Japan in the 1930s.
coordinate.\textsuperscript{60} Also neorealists look at game theory but highlight that actors follow a common strategy in order to avoid unwanted outcomes on both sides due to opposing strategies.\textsuperscript{61} Similar to institutions also transnational actors are marginalised as they are not part of the structure.\textsuperscript{62} Neorealists claim that US post-war foreign policy and US economic hegemony enabled the rise of MNCs and economic independence in the first place.\textsuperscript{63} Others stress the limitations of IOs and NGOs through their exploitation and instrumentalisation by states.\textsuperscript{64} While neoliberalis rejected the neorealist assumption that states are the sole important actors on the international stage and added a focus on institutions they concede, even in regimes, that states are in fact the dominant actors.\textsuperscript{65} Both neorealists and neoliberals furthermore neglected the possibility that political activities may be shifting away from the state.\textsuperscript{66} In sum, neorealism and neoliberalism share several core assumptions about actors, values, issues, and power arrangements in the international system: (1) due to international anarchy, states have to pursue self-help strategies, limiting the nature of international cooperation and making the international sphere one of strategic interaction in which security concerns are paramount; (2) the interest of states as rational actors is to maximise their power and influence by pursuing their self-interest; (3) states are the key subjects in international relations.\textsuperscript{67}

What these theories lack is the possibility to explain the role of transnational actors in the international environment. As will be outlined in the following section, the constructivist approach challenges the core assumptions of the rationalist theory. In doing so, it takes convincingly into account how transnational actors affect the sphere across national boundaries. The constructivist approach will be enhanced further on by transnationalist considerations. Some assumptions of the neo-neo synthesis on states and

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\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Little} (2011) p. 306.
\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Little} (2011) pp. 304ff.; neoliberals and neorealist game theoretical considerations on regimes are not mutually exclusive as cooperation and coordination can follow upon each other, see \textit{Stein} (1983) p. 128.
\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Gilpin} (1971), (1975).
\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Drezner} (2007) pp. 73, 88, 205ff.; \textit{Donini} (2012) with regards to humanitarian aid.
\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Lamy} (2011) p. 125.
\textsuperscript{67} Summed by \textit{Chandler} (2005) p. 150.
institutions will be applied to networks later on. It has been a recurring idea to combine some rationalist and constructivist explanations as both traditions have connecting points. In particular, it will be returned to the neorealist emphasis on power resources and the possibility of transnational actors being instrumentally used by states, and the neoliberal thoughts on regime functions. Chapter 3 considers furthermore the competitive and cooperative arrangements among different actors.

2.2.2. The explanatory power of constructivism

In the early 1990s constructivism developed as a reaction to the postpositivist debate in the 1980s and the failure of traditional international relations theory to predict or initially explain the end of the Cold War. Constructivists challenge the assumptions of rationalism in arguing that the social world is constructed. They focus on the centrality of ideas, i.e. norms, values and knowledge, as well as discourses which form political identities and interests. In his famous article “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics” Wendt refers to Onuf who is usually credited with coining the term “constructivism” in 1989. Wendt’s basic assumption is that politicians interpret world affairs. These interpretations (i.e. constructs) begin to falter when the conditions change in which they had demonstrated validity. Wars, for instance, end with the revaluation of the world view. Constructivist theory points out to the variety of views and images of society, to tradition, religion and established social practices which can offer solutions to some puzzles regarding the differences of politics in Europe, North America, East-Asia and the Arab world. According to Wendt, constructivism makes the following core claims related to the deviating rationalist views: “(1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key structures in the state system are intersubjective rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures rather

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than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics".  

In responding to the first and second core assumption of rationalism constructivists argue that it is not the structure of anarchy creating the conditions of possibility and structural limitations for states and state interests. Rather, states reproduce anarchy by mutually constituting themselves as self-interested and power seeking. Rationalists follow rational choice theory in the focus on strategic interaction in which egoistic actors with given interests intent to maximise these interests and for this reason allow cooperation. The constructivist assumption is, instead, that actors are not uniform and not rational. They have particular identities which are characterised by cultural, social, political and material circumstances they are anchored to. State identities can be understood as “varying constructions of nation- and statehood” and are affected by international and domestic environments. According to Wendt, states do not have identities and perception of self and other, apart from or prior to interaction with others. Identities are the basis of interests and shape them. Interests and identities are not pre-given or “exogenously constituted” outside of the international sphere. They are constructed endogenously through the process of international interaction. Intersubjective knowledge created through interaction constitutes the interest and identity of the subject rather than the subject itself or the structure. Knowledge as a causal idea shapes how social reality is interpreted and constructed. Intersubjective knowledge is the result of social acts of signalling, interpreting and responding within interaction. Intersubjectivity therefore develops through social communication. The continuing interaction between states builds agreement, regularity and misunderstanding and creates structure in

78 Katzenstein (1996) p. 30; Wendt (1992) pp. 398, 401 giving the fitting example: “If society forgets what a university is, the power and practices of professors and students cease to exist” (p. 397).
international relations. The structure manifests itself in norms which regulate states’ behaviour and in institutions which are stable sets of identities and interests. Other constructivist scholars consider norms of international society as defining the identities and interests of states instead of interaction. Norms are intersubjectively “shared expectations about appropriate behaviour hold by a community of actors”. In both strands, unlike in the rationalist view, interests are therefore not fixed but adaptable. The focus on interaction processes and norms allows constructivism to explain change, which the structural fixity of neorealism and neoliberalism does not. While scholars of the rationalist theories failed to predict or initially explain the end of the Cold War, constructivists emphasis the social dimensions of international relations: while the sovietisation of East and Central Europe after World War Two had established a permanent sense of threat and let to revival of the USA and the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the socialist state system resulted in a reconstruction of the world’s image. In the Western perception the Soviet Union lost its threatening character. Whereas rationalists assume strategic security and peace as “high politics” questions connected to defence and sovereignty to be on the top of states’ agendas and “low” political economic and social issues as secondary, constructivists counter with the concept of issue saliency. What actors regard as important depends on the importance attached to values discussed in a political debate and the extent to which the actor expects to be affected by the outcome. Priorities therefore can vary from actor to actor and over time. Values are “elements of a shared symbolic system which serve as criteria or standard for selection on the alternatives of orientation which are intrinsically open in a situation”. Constructivists believe that it is not power which shape the behaviour of states but ideas that determine the meaning of power. Both

85 Finnemore (1996).  
91 Willetts (2011a) p. 129.  
neorealism and -liberalism subscribe to materialism believing that the structure constraining behaviour is determined by material factors such as technology, military hardware and other resources which they view as power.\footnote{Hurd (2008) p. 300; Barnett (2011) p. 151.} Constructivism emphasis that ideas and communicative processes determine at first which material factors states perceive as important and how they impact the interests’ understanding.\footnote{Risse/Sikkink (1999) pp. 6f.} Ideas are “mental constructs held by individuals, set distinctive beliefs, principles, and attitudes that provide broad orientations for behaviour and policy”.\footnote{Tannenwald (2005) p. 15.} One can differentiate between causal beliefs, such as knowledge and principled ideas, such as norms and political values.\footnote{Schimmelpfennig (2010) pp. 164f.} Power can therefore not only be understood in material terms but also in ideational.\footnote{Hopf (1998) p. 177.} In contrast to rational actors following the logic of consequences, constructivists assume that actors behave according to the logic of appropriateness. Appropriateness in this view is seen as action that follows in a specific situation the rules, norms, social roles or the cultural values of that actor’s community.\footnote{Olsen/March (1989) pp. 160f.} Ideas are therefore the key variables for constructivist to explain political behaviour.\footnote{Hale/Held (2011) p. 21.}

Power in the constructivist view does not only concern to change other actors behaviour it also exists when knowledge and the construction of identities allocate capacities.\footnote{Barnett (2011) p. 157} With the power of social practice constructivists refer to the capacity to reproduce the intersubjective meaning constituting social structures and actors which can create predictability and diminish uncertainty among actors in a socially constructed community.\footnote{Hopf (1998) p. 178.}

The ability of constructivism to grasp change becomes also clear when looking at the impact of institutions and transnational actors in the international system. The third core assumption of the rationalist approaches shows their state-centrism as state actors are the key ontological object and point of departure making it difficult to explain the presence and role of
transnational actors. Neoliberals see the impact of institutions on international relations in expanding gains through cooperation. Neorealists view such impact in terms of coordination. Constructivists believe, instead, that the institutions’ significance lies in the intensification of interaction.

Although granting that non-state actors are participants within regimes neoliberalism generally does not consider transnational actors as taking the lead or even establish such regimes. It is only logical that regimes cannot change identities and interests when both are assumed to be pre-given. Constructivists emphasise ideas, arguments, problem perceptions and social identities of the involved actors for explaining regime creation. They stress that the composition of states’ identity also shapes regimes as being part of interstate normative structures. Regimes are believed to “embody a degree of collective identity.” Collective identity is understood as the “positive identification with the welfare of others, such that the other is seen as the cognitive extension of the self” leading to empathetic interdependence among actors as the foundations for collective interests. They are therefore assumed to be intersubjective. Regimes are social institution in which actors practice communication and argumentatively develop their interests oriented towards the principles and norms of the respective regime. Some variants of constructivism can still be conceived of as state-centric. For Wendt, for instance, the state is the subject of analysis. Others extend constructivist theory to give a prominent role to transnational agents highlighted in the concept of transnational or global relations as will be shown below. In Haufler’s study on private regimes defined as “integrated complex of formal and informal institutions that is a source of governance in an economic issue area as a whole” non-state actors are

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113 See above Ch.2 fn. 73 on Wendt’s first claim.
key and states have a minor role in the establishment and maintenance of regimes. According to her, there is no reason for thinking that private actors are unable to establish principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures.\textsuperscript{116} From a functional theoretical point of view, private regimes have additional service provision function. Originally in the states’ responsibility the service was transferred to private organisations due to a lack of capacity or for reasons of efficiency.\textsuperscript{117} According to Willetts NGOs should be put in the centre of regime analysis as their “prime activity […] is the mobilization of support for values.”\textsuperscript{118} Others highlight the normative concerns when public functions are attributed to private actors due to the erosion of the public and private distinction.\textsuperscript{119} Haas argues that professional knowledge communities (epistemic communities) are able to develop and form regimes.\textsuperscript{120} An epistemic community is a “network of professionals with recognised expertise and competences in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area”. Experts having different academic backgrounds share “a set of normative and principled beliefs”, “causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices”, intersubjective “notions of validity” of knowledge and “a common policy enterprise” i.e. a common understanding of a problem and its solution.\textsuperscript{121} Changed understanding in the epistemic community can lead to regime reform.\textsuperscript{122} With the focus on epistemic communities Haas considers non-state actors as being important for learning processes in international institutions.\textsuperscript{123} According to Chandler, “the international sphere is no longer seen as one in which states project their national interests, instead the process is reversed – through participation in international and transnational relations the national interests of states are constituted and reconstituted”.\textsuperscript{124} In this context, Risse and Ropp highlight Western liberal values diffused by transnational actors

\textsuperscript{116} Haufler (1993) p. 97.
\textsuperscript{117} Börzel/Risse (2005) p. 208.
\textsuperscript{118} Willetts (2011a) p. 125.
\textsuperscript{119} Cutler (2002) pp. 33f.
\textsuperscript{121} Haas (1992) p. 3; others stress the necessary similarity of discipline, see Holzer/Marx (1979).
\textsuperscript{122} Hopkins (1992).
\textsuperscript{123} Haas (1993) pp. 188, 201.
\textsuperscript{124} Chandler (2005) p. 154.
which partly influenced the Gorbachov leadership.\textsuperscript{125} Although constructivism assumes that, for the foreseeable future, the world will remain a world of states, it accepts that the international agenda has been transformed since the end of the Cold War and that non-state actors have become increasingly involved in policy-making at the state and inter-state level.\textsuperscript{126} Taking ideas at least as equal important as military or economic power, transnational actors can be influential through their “communicative capabilities”\textsuperscript{127} and “power of persuasion”.\textsuperscript{128} Both are connected to soft power and its key instrument of public diplomacy as will be introduced in chapter 3. Soft power is about the attraction of the way of life and the values of a society towards the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{129} According to \textit{Nye}, soft power is “(…) getting others to want what you want [and] might be called direct or co-optive power behavior. It is in contrast to the active command power behavior of getting others to do what you want. Co-optive power can rest on the attraction of one’s ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences that others express”.\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Nye} states that “NGOs and network organisations have soft-power resources and do not hesitate to use them”.\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Wallace} notes that “intellectual soft power” can also be found when looking at the activities of U.S. think tanks.\textsuperscript{132} The framework where states and non-state actors communicatively interact is often referred to as global civil society.\textsuperscript{133} Global civil society can be termed as “the global process through which individuals debate, influence and negotiate an ongoing social contract or a set of contracts with the centres of political or economical authority”\textsuperscript{134} and “through voluntary associations,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{125} \textit{Risse/Ropp} (1999) p. 268.
\item \textsuperscript{127} \textit{Willetts} (2011a) p. 128.
\item \textsuperscript{128} \textit{Chandler} (2005) p. 153. Power of persuasion concerns communication functions of NGOs and includes the creation of international standards and mechanisms to implement norms, shaming techniques against abusers, the set-up of institutions and the provision of documentations to institutions (\textit{Korrey} [1990] pp. 173f.).
\item \textsuperscript{130} \textit{Nye} (1990) pp. 31f., (2004) p. 5; originally the concept builds on the “second face of power” of \textit{Bachrach/Baratz} (1963) (\textit{Nye} [2004] p. 5 fn. 5).
\item \textsuperscript{131} \textit{Nye} (2004) p. 94.
\item \textsuperscript{132} \textit{Wallace} (2004) pp. 286f.
\item \textsuperscript{133} \textit{Chandler} (2005) p. 157. The existence of global civil society is highly contested (see \textit{Chandler/Baker} [2005]).
\item \textsuperscript{134} \textit{Kaldor} (2003b) p. 79.
\end{itemize}
movements, parties, unions, the individual is able to act publicly”. Since public and private actors play an equal part constructivists do not concentrate on whether one is more important than the other. Rather they highlight that it does not make sense to consider the world of transnational actors as opposed to the world of states since transnational work often conforms to the interest of states and international organisations and both actor types reciprocally influence each other. As we have seen above, transnational actors can depend on state funding. International development and humanitarian assistance originates to a large extent from public sources. Transnational actors also often performed tasks that states and IOs could not or did not want to undertake. In foreign and humanitarian aid non-state actors often are subcontracted to offer assistance less bureaucratically and cost intensive as well as more flexibly. Transnational actors also supply monitoring and information to states. Constructivism allows focusing on the question of transnational actors as instruments of state power. This resembles neorealism in its marginalisation of transnational actors. However, in contrast to neorealism, it might be true for some cases but less so for others. Constructivism therefore allows moving beyond the question of whether the transnational actors matter. In the following section we will examine how constructivism can help to examine the role of transnational actors in international relations by looking at constructivist inspired models.

2.3. Transnational-constructivist explanations for the role of transnational actors in international relations

Theorising about transnational actors and their impact on world politics remains complicated. Transnational actors are rarely alike as they differ in structure, scope of activities and the issues they concentrate on. As a consequence, theoretical assumptions often lack generalisability since the scientific statements relate to certain types of actors and the findings cannot

137 See 2.1.
be transferred to others.\textsuperscript{140} Constructivist-inspired research, however, was able to develop some explanations on the role of transnational actors in international relations.\textsuperscript{141}

When constructivism and non-state actors encountered after the end of the Cold War, transnationalism revived leading to an idealist-constructivist approach comprising a pluralist and a globalist strand.\textsuperscript{142} In an early pluralist work \textit{Risse-Kappen} focuses on the institutional conditions for the impact of transnational actors on the behaviour of states. In his complex model, a combination of the domestic structure and the institutionalisation of the international environment, conditions the access and possible policy impact of transnational actors. In contrast, neorealism and neoinstitutionalism separate both structures of governance.\textsuperscript{143} He compares cases in which transnational coalitions and actors aim at influencing state behaviour in the foreign policy arena. \textit{Risse-Kappen} argues that the impact of transnational actors and coalitions on state policies is likely to vary according to the institutional structure. He first considers the differences in domestic structure referring to the structure of the state (i.e. the political institutions, centralised vs. fragmented), the society (strong vs. weak) and the policy networks (consensual vs. polarised). The domestic structure determines the access of the transnational actors to domestic institutions and their policy impact in case of access which can vary from profound to unlikely. In state-controlled domestic structures the access is most difficult although the impact can be profound while in fragile domestic structures access is easy and impact unlikely.\textsuperscript{144} In a second step \textit{Risse-Kappen} looks at the degrees of international institutionalisation, i.e. the extent to which the specific issue-area is regulated by bilateral agreements, multilateral regimes, and/or international organisations. Highly regulated and cooperative structures of international governance tend to legitimize transnational activities and to increase their access to the national polities as well as their

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{140} Nölke (2010) p. 398.
  \item \textsuperscript{141} Nölke (2010) p. 389, apart from the constructivist approach there is a second body of literature pointing out normative issues in dealing with the democratic legitimacy of transnational actors.
  \item \textsuperscript{142} DeMars/Dijkzeul (2015) p. 11.
  \item \textsuperscript{143} Risse-Kappen (1995b) p. 283.
  \item \textsuperscript{144} Risse-Kappen (1995a) p. 28.
\end{itemize}
ability to form “winning coalitions” for policy change. In sum, domestic and international governance structures interact in conditioning the access to institutions and policy impact of transnational actors. Differences in domestic structures affect state autonomy “from below”, variations in international institutions can equally influence state capacities “from above”. While Risse-Kappen’s model is able to explain the structural conditions under which transnational actors can have a policy impact, it cannot explain how transnational actors work, i.e. how micro-mechanisms of persuasion and communication strategies influence outcomes or how ideas are diffused transnationally. In his summary and in later works Risse-Kappen highlights that domestic and international structure determines not only the transnational actors’ impact on policies but also their characteristics, their strategies and tactics. However, his work does not systematically scrutinize transnational actors’ properties in terms of strategies or power resources. Furthermore, the model itself is not able to explain why different transnational actors in one country are not equally successful. It is also not the case that transnational activity only takes place in a more or less institutionalised international environment. Finally, what transnational actors actually do, remains nebulously. Notwithstanding these drawbacks, Risse-Kappen’s work renewed the interest in transnational actors and led to increased theorising on transnational actors’ impact.

For future research Risse-Kappen proposes network analysis to study the different interactions between transnational and state actors within international institutions. Drawing from his work in assuming that political contexts as “opportunity structures” need to be taken into account for the emergence and success of transnational advocacy networks, Keck and Sikkink focus on the impact of transnational actors through the so-called “boomerang effect” model analysing from an actor-centred view the ideational situation of domestic groups and how they influence the interests

of political decision makers. A boomerang pattern of influence exists when domestic groups in a repressive state bypass their government and directly search out international contacts. These contacts pressure their states or international organisations which again pressure the blocking state from outside to achieve the desired policy goal. The involved transnational actors are members in transnational advocacy networks (TAN) which can be defined as “actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and a dense exchange of information and services”. In order to describe what the network does, Keck and Sikkink use the term “persuasion” which refers to several tactics of network members. These tactics are: (1) Information politics: This is the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically usable information and move it to where it will have the most impact; (2) symbolic politics, i.e. the ability to call upon symbols, actions, or stories that make sense of a situation for an audience that is frequently far away; (3) leverage politics refers to the strategic use of information in order to make more powerful states and IOs cut off military and financial assistance for the pressured state (material leverage) or when the activities of the pressured state are internationally scrutinised and a “mobilization of shame” takes place (moral leverage); and (4) accountability politics, i.e. to hold powerful actors to their previously stated policies and principles. Within this context, Keck and Sikkink highlight the competition between various problems, ideas and interests of domestic and political actors in interactions. The problem with the boomerang approach is that the process can only be successful when target states are “sensitive to leverage”. Dependency on economic or military assistance will not be found in the industrialised countries and moral leverage only will work when the practices of the target state vary from

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154 Keck/Sikkink (1998) pp. 12ff.; Willetts (2011a) presents a revisioned version of the boomerang approach with more routes for the boomerang effect by adding transnational advocacy networks which obviously do not have to include the involved NGOs (p. 133).


those asserted.⁵⁹ Chandler outlines that the reliance on state actors in the process could also be read as the states’ centrality and that power relations are downplayed.⁶⁰ Notwithstanding, Keck and Sikkink established a sound explanation of transnational actors’ undertakings stressing the idea that interactions between different actors take place aside from states’ relations.⁶¹ Furthermore, they added networks as the source of new ideas to the concept of transnational politics. Network environments are of particular importance for the view presented here. We will return to this aspect further on.

What is visible in the work of Keck and Sikkink can also be found in other pluralist perspectives stressing global civil society’s independence from the government and picturing non-state actors as the mouthpiece of the weak on the grassroots level where power emerges from the bottom up.⁶² Such positions are often characterised by optimism regarding the potential of global civil society assuming that states which were long in the centre of international relations are increasingly restricted by transnational actors and networks.⁶³ Often global civil society is described as an emancipation possibility for humans and citizens.⁶⁴ Others criticise that these standpoints repeat the moral claims of transnational actors rather than considering what actors actually do.⁶⁵ Transnational actors are also not per se critical and have different views on political outcomes instead.⁶⁶ The neomarxist approach of Gramsci makes the valid reproach that the pluralist conception on global civil society is overconfident. In Gramsci’s hegemonic model of civil society the state makes use of civil society, its organisations and networks to secure the states’ hegemonic project by diffusing a particular way of life through norms and values. It is more than sheer manipulations as a social consensus is created. In this case, civil society becomes part of an

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⁶⁵ Reinalda (2001) p. 27.
extended state feigning openness.\textsuperscript{167} According to Cox it was US hegemony that made possible the rise of transnational relations after World War Two.\textsuperscript{168} These considerations resemble the state-centric claims of neorealists. Since transnational actors often depend on the funding of states or IOs which even set up their own NGOs to push through certain ideas or to access additional funding it does not make sense considering neither global civil society nor transnational actors as against the state world.\textsuperscript{169} Private influence can at times be an “(inter)governmental political strategy” especially useful when interference should be avoided and an alternative to official political engagement is needed.\textsuperscript{170} As already outlined, a less anticipating model is necessary where states or non-state actors are not per se considered as taking the lead or are normatively heightened.

Scholars increasingly look at communication practices of transnational actors (and others) and connect it to the constructivist emphasis on norms and values taking Risse-Kappen’s former suggestions into account to study these micro-mechanisms. Pluralist perspectives consider, for example, the lobbying activities of pressure groups vis-à-vis governments and propaganda in relation to the general public.\textsuperscript{171} Finnemore and Sikkink look in detail on the policy change through norms in their “norm life cycle”. They consider norm entrepreneurs supporting the development of new norms mainly through persuasion. Norm entrepreneurs are actors with an organizational platform: mainly NGOs, their networks or IOs. They pressure target states to adopt the new norm and monitor outcomes. When the norm reaches a critical mass of supporters (i.e. states) and a tipping point the norm cascades and achieves prevalent support within the population. This is when norm change happens. When the norm is no longer contested, it is internalized. At this stage professions and bureaucracy are the most important agents which “practice” the norm.\textsuperscript{172} On the basis of Finnemore and Sikkink’s work, Willetts suggest that NGOs as significant norm

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{168} Cox (1987) pp. 263, 266.
\textsuperscript{171} Reinalda (2001) p. 18.
\end{flushleft}
entrepreneurs win support for values by persuasion through various linkages thereby exercising influence on global politics: (1) actor linkages i.e. linking the support to their UN status, whereby high status NGOs will receive more attention than low status NGOs;¹⁷³ (2) linking goals to a value with widespread support, such as security, freedom and justice; (3) bargaining linkages by forming alliances with others which leads to change own value preferences in favour of those of other actors; (4) and finally functional linkages where NGOs emphasis positive effects of their goals independent from the policy process. Willets assumes that NGOs have the strongest impact through value and functional linkages.¹⁷⁴ Persuasion takes place in two steps: first, the salience of a policy issue needs to be enhanced and second, values need to be redefined.¹⁷⁵ Risse considers the process of argumentation, deliberation and persuasion, which “constitute a distinct mode of social interaction to be differentiated from strategic bargaining and rule-guided behavior” as highlighted by rationalist scholars.¹⁷⁶ He draws from Habermas’s theory of communicative action to conceptualise the logic of arguing and connects it to IR. Actors try to convince each other to change their causal or principled beliefs in order to reach a reasoned consensus about validity claiming.¹⁷⁷ Arguing implies that actors try to challenge the validity claims inherent in any causal or normative statement and seek a communicative consensus about their understanding of the situation. The logic implies that participants in a discourse are open to be persuaded by the better argument. Arguing is therefore as goal oriented as strategic interaction but the goal is not to attain ones fixed preference but to seek a reasoned consensus.¹⁷⁸ Arguing increases the influence of actors with less material power and successful arguing beats material bargaining power.¹⁷⁹ We will return to the aspect of communicative practice in chapter 3.

The globalist strand of the idealist-constructivist approach lays emphasis on global processes taking place above the state in international organisations,

¹⁷³ See 4.1. on the UN categorisation. High status refers to the UN general status (Willetts [2005] p. 436).
¹⁷⁴ Willets (2011a) pp. 139ff.
¹⁷⁵ Willets (2011a) pp. 141.
¹⁷⁶ Risse (2000) p. 1
most considered the UN. Obviously, mixed pluralist-globalist positions exist as Willetts’s work shows. Globalists concentrate on global governance defined by “policy-making and -implementation in global politics systems through the collaboration of governments with actors from civil society and the private sector”.\footnote{\textit{Willetts} (2011a) p. 148.} Transnational actors play important roles in this context. Their power results from several sources: the mobilization of individuals to raise awareness for certain issues,\footnote{\textit{Nuscheler} (2006) p. 558.} the ability to frame and define issues in order to exert pressure on political decision makers (IGOs and states), their specialist knowledge and expertise allowing them to support decision makers with accurate information and data and their personal commitment. Thereby, they are important for the drafting of political proposals and for the policy implementation monitored by them.\footnote{\textit{Koch} (2011) pp. 203f.; similar \textit{Rucht} (1996) p. 37; \textit{Willetts} (1982) pp. 185f.} Others stress the activity of transnational actors as executing agents for the UN and the performance of public relations’ tasks on behalf of the UN.\footnote{\textit{Williams} (1990) p. 265.} Transnational actors are assumed to have decision-making authority in hybrid international organizations and transnational regimes.\footnote{\textit{Willetts} (2011a) pp. 123ff.} Hybrid organizations are joint organizations of governments or their agencies on the one hand and transnational actors on the other hand. Both groups are formally equal and have full rights in the policy making process and have usually the obligation to jointly fund activities.\footnote{\textit{Willetts} (2011a) p. 337, (2011a) p. 73.} Global governance characterises different forms of political activity in diverse policy fields, whose needs stem from global issues which can only be targeted through the cooperation of different actors (state and non-state) as a global authority is missing. There are three types of global problems: first, transboundary or cross-border problems concerning for instance drug trafficking or pollution; second, common property problems referring, for example, to the oceans or Antarctica; and finally, simultaneous problems of states regarding the areas of education, health, welfare and other.\footnote{\textit{Stone} (2008) p. 25.} Global governance perspectives in contrast to state-centric assumptions have the benefit of considering many
different actors. However, they do not look at their internal functioning.\textsuperscript{187} Moreover, non-state actors are often viewed as sheer executive bodies of the UN implementing and enforcing global norms developed by the UN or in multilateral negotiations. Finally, as power affects states from above by norms or institutions\textsuperscript{188} the considered processes take place exclusively above the national state which reflects only some part of the activities of transnational actors.

Both pluralists’ and globalists’ perspectives are focused on private actors’ participating in the international policy process and/or cooperation and steering performances that is political influence.\textsuperscript{189} This is problematic. Many transnational actors and networks aim at consciousness-raising instead of shaping policies directly.\textsuperscript{190} In this context, Stone points out that “influence is a word that is itself open to a variety of interpretations”. She describes the tendency of some think tanks to also claim (non-existing) influence over policy in order to convince their decision-making targets, members or financial backer.\textsuperscript{191} Moreover, direct political impact of think tanks could not be found as one-to-one policy implementations of think tank policy ideas barely exist.\textsuperscript{192} Also Chandler notes that it is rather difficult to first establish criteria for the policy-success measurement and trace back achievements to a particular factor (i.e. the transnational actors’ activities) alone.\textsuperscript{193} As for constructivist explanations in general, they are frequently criticised to concentrate far too often on the success stories of certain transnational actors’ activity by studying retrospectively specific policy adoption in order to demonstrate that transnational actors matter. Moreover, the problem of measuring the influence of transnational actors in certain cases is held to reveal that only their ideas are crucial for the result.\textsuperscript{194} Evaluating effectiveness is methodological difficult because it needs to be imagined how the case might have differed under varying conditions.\textsuperscript{195}

\textsuperscript{187} Dijkzeul/DeMars (2011) p. 211.  
\textsuperscript{190} Risse (2002) p. 268.  
\textsuperscript{192} Stone (2004) p. 11.  
\textsuperscript{193} Chandler (2005) p. 162.  
\textsuperscript{195} Hale/Held (2011) p. 25 with regards to global governance institutions.
From this point of view it makes sense to study transnational actors simply because they exist. Whether they matter is irrelevant as it depends on the research question and how the assessment criterion of “importance” is defined.196

Most transnational actors do not constantly operate as parts of formal international organisations or institutions. Rather they interact with others transnationally in policy networks.197 This refers to the dimension of transnational activity as introduced above.198 Similar to their considerations on institutions, constructivists highlight the development of intersubjective knowledge in terms of common understanding and shared identities in order to explain change through networks being part of global civil society.199 Rather than seeing transnational actors as rule enforcers, their activities can be spontaneous and without planning them beforehand which makes it difficult to study single organisations at a time. Often they are not clearly bound entities.200 Still, there are several forms of networks which can be distinguished. We will look at their practice afterwards.

2.3.1. Forms of networks

Various international networks can be summarised under the umbrella term of transnational policy network.201 The already presented transnational advocacy networks (TAN) mainly contain different NGOs central in providing information and other actors, like media, churches and politicians.202 Transnational actors are active in both fields, they can try to impact domestic policies and internationally they are active with ideas.203 A particular problem is that Keck and Sikkink focus on campaigns204 when studying networks. They assume that bonding with members of the network

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198 See 2.
204 Keck/Sikkink (1998) define campaigns as “a set of strategically linked activities in which members of a diffuse principled network (… ) develop explicit, visible ties and mutually recognized roles in pursuit of a common goal (and generally against a common target).” (p. 6). Campaigns are also temporarily and thematically finite which differentiate them from other forms of communication (Jarren/Donges [2011] p. 218).
must be visible as each actor has a certain role within the campaign. However, networking occurs often among actors that do not have anything to do with each other. Partners might be hidden, manipulative or have contradictory strategies, opinions and values.\textsuperscript{205} Moreover, information is not the only possible resource that network members can exchange. A second type of transnational policy network is the transnational executive network.\textsuperscript{206} Sometimes termed as transgovernmental network, it contains government officials with a dual domestic and international function trying to tackle global issues through networking governments.\textsuperscript{207} They are of minor interest for this study as they cannot be subsumed under the definition of transnational interaction as applied here as these officials are active on behalf of a government. A third form of transnational policy network is the global knowledge network (KNET). It may “incorporate professional bodies, academic research groups and scientific communities that organise around a special subject matter or issue”. Also think tanks can operate in KNETs.\textsuperscript{208} Think tanks are “non-profit private and public organisations devoted to examining and analysing policy-relevant issues and producing research outputs in terms of publications, reports, lectures and workshops, in most cases targeted to identifiable audiences with the hope of influencing decision-making and public opinion”.\textsuperscript{209} Inclusion in KNETs rests upon professional and officially recognised expertise. The network intents to create, advance and share knowledge and at times to inform policy about this knowledge.\textsuperscript{210} In contrast to the other networks described above, networking itself is an essential goal and the proceeding is assumed to be disinterested. It takes place in the forms of research, study, publications, intellectual exchanges and international financing among others. Often KNETs can overlap with other network forms.\textsuperscript{211} KNETs can be analysed as epistemic communities, as outlines above, or discourse coalitions and communities. Experts i.e. consultants, NGO executives, scientists, members

\textsuperscript{206} Stone (2008) p. 32.
\textsuperscript{210} Maxwell/Stone (2005) p. 11.
of research institutes and think tanks are expected to give advice in the policy-making process. Some authors stress that their power stems from neutrality and impartiality based on their expertise. Conceptualising experts as “neutral” is difficult, however, as scientific knowledge is never free of value and may be even used instrumentally to convince others and legitimise certain actions. According to Haas, networks of scientists can produce usable knowledge contributing to social learning. The greater their autonomy from the political environment the more scientists are able to influence the respective policy. Usable knowledge encompasses “a substantive core that makes it usable for policy-makers” and an element that enables the transmission from the scientific community to the policy world. Sometimes experts are termed as transnational policy professionals being part of a transnational policy community whose status of being public or private is unclear as the experts or their networks can be contracted and funded by public bodies. His power is then assumed to stem from his semi-official position, his information resources and international experience. KNETs can also take the form of discourse coalition and communities “created by professionals through a boundary drawing discourse that defines who and what is to be considered inside and outside the community, establishing a distinction between professionals and non-professionals, and between good and bad professionals”. Symbols, language and policy narrative serve here as a source of power. Transnational identities, in contrast to national identities and views, are enhanced by international interactions. In the tradition of Foucault discursive practices are used to maintain and establish power relationships. In sum, TANs limit the look on advocacy actors provided with information resources while KNETs incorporate professionals having mainly knowledge resources. However, we expect that connecting links can be established between different types of

212 Koch (2011) pp. 204f.
219 Risse (2007a) pp. 131f., an example for a neoliberal discourse is the Thatcher Slogan TINA (“there is no alternative!”) to rationalise her policies of neoliberal economic reforms and cuts in social services in the mid 1990s (p. 132).
actors bringing various resources to the networking process. It is therefore useful not to narrow the network concept too much since otherwise linked actors and their resources cannot be identified. Rather, it should be looked at “all those actors that share a common partner” which includes normatively deviating and hidden partners. The forth form of a transnational policy network, the global public policy networks (GPPNs), is a quasi-public or semi-private mixed meta-network which can include other forms of networks and various public and private actors whose mix is determined by the specific policy issue. Generally it is trisectoral as it incorporates members of three types of transnational policy community: the “internationalised public sector official” such as judges, legislators or regulators, the “international civil servant” who is an employee of an international organisation as well as the “transnational policy professional” who can be, for instance, a consultant, a business leader, a scientific or think tank expert or a NGO executive. Actors cooperate due to a problem existing over cross-boarders enabling forms of “soft authority” in these networks. Being dependent on resources and bargaining is what characterise their interactions. GPPNs resemble tripartite global governance networks including state actors, firms and advocacy groups. Still, in the GPPN profit and not-for-profit actors belong to the same sector. The core feature of the GPPN is a public-private partnership which in its transnational form can be defined as “institutionalized cooperative relationships between public actors and private actors beyond the nation state for governance purposes” i.e. “the making and implementation of norms and rules for the provision of goods and services”. For such joint activity also the term multi-stakeholder initiative was coined. In sum, GPPN and its variants have the

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227 Hale/Held (2011) pp. 16f. There have been identified other forms of supranational networks but they include NGOs only: Information networks make possible the communication among different actors without being politically active together; issue caucuses temporarily focus on single UN or IGO fora where NGOs hold strategic meetings; and governance networks which are not engaged in advocacy and have a supportive or organizational function (Willets [2011] pp. 120ff.).
advantage to incorporate public and private actors without assuming that one is more important.

In order to avoid a premature anticipation of a certain network character it is suggested to start from the lowest common denominator of a policy network definition: “a set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve common goals”.\textsuperscript{228} As will be shown in the following chapter, this definition needs some adaptations with regards to homogeneity of interests, the assumed cooperation among network members and the relationships’ stability.\textsuperscript{229}

2.3.2. Towards the practice of transnational actors in networks

The significance of networks is evaluated differently. Some scholars highlight that they help developing regimes and the effectiveness and efficiency of international cooperation: Costs are cut when NGOs participate in international conferences for countries which cannot afford to take part. Furthermore, the monitoring of international negotiations and rule compliance through network members. Moreover, networks are assumed to help decreasing the deficit of democracy in international cooperation through the creation of transparency of international processes and through the increased participation of actors other than state delegates.\textsuperscript{230} However, although networks open up policy-making to some stakeholders, they also exclude those not getting access to the network for multiple reasons. Networks like TNAs are permeable to social partaking while epistemic communities and GPPNs are more exclusive and restricted. Helping the democratic deficit in the global sphere therefore depends on the above inclusion.\textsuperscript{231} Transnationalists believe that density and symmetry of

\textsuperscript{228} Börzel (1998) p. 254.  
\textsuperscript{229} See 3.1.1.  
\textsuperscript{230} Raustiala (1997) pp. 724ff.; e.g. Reinicke/Deng (2000) assume that GPPNs can close the participatory gap in international decision-making due to the facilitation “of social interaction among people and organisations” (p. 62); Reinicke (1999) p. 51; Risse (2007a) pp. 139f.  
transnational networks increase the possibility for peace and cooperation.²³² Through their configuration, networks have an independent impact on the power of network members and international policy results.²³³ As already outlined, focusing on political outcomes is problematic rather the “building of international networks by NGOs themselves is an outcome and example of mattering.”²³⁴ In this way, it is the establishment and fostering of networks among a variety of actors which is an essential function of transnational actors.²³⁵ Although networking neither boosts political influence nor should it be confused with it,²³⁶ Stone points out that “the network [itself] is a site and form of power”.²³⁷ As already outlined, concentrating on policy results does not produce knowledge of the internal functioning of networks or networks parts. Hence, “organisational agency” needs to be taken into account.²³⁸ Moreover, possible informality of such interactions needs to be looked at which governance scholars barely analyse. In order to describe best the “intuitional reality” of transnational actors and their relevance to IR a more constructivist perspective needs to be taken which focuses on interaction processes in broad networks.²³⁹

DeMars and Dijkzeul assume that NGOs engage in two simultaneous anchoring practices: first they claim to pursue a public purpose which generates bridging effects, namely between the division of the state and society as they are private actors with a public purpose.²⁴⁰ This anchoring practice leads to power dynamics which can have many different forms. It is not restricted to power from below or above and it considers that states may use the power resources of NGOs. Second, NGOs link with social and political partners in several countries. This generates again bridging effects. NGOs, for instance, cannot only mobilize the movement of information and norms but also those of material resources. Also this anchoring practice can

²³⁸ Dijkzeul/DeMars (2011) p. 211.
²⁴⁰ There are seven divisions which NGOs bridge: between state/public and society/private, family and market, normative and material, religious and secular, agency and structure, conflict and cooperation and national and international (DeMars/Dijkzeul [2015] p. 5).
generate complex power relationships. In sum, DeMars and Dijkzeul suggest to pay more attention to the partner relationships and study NGOs in practice. Practice is viewed as a process which they term as “NGOing”.²⁴¹ On the basis of these considerations, it is suggested to concentrate on the networks’ operating which might have different forms and which can include various actors, especially public and private actors interacting transnationally through communication and the exchange of ideational but also material resources. This resource exchange can be traced back to the originally outlined movement of items which constitutes transnational interactions.

**Conclusion**

For neorealism the state theoretically remains most important. Neoliberalism accepts this view although taking into account the role of international institutions. Constructivist theory attaches importance to transnational actors in international relations as it concentrates on interaction process among different actors. It does not assume that one actor is more important than the other and focuses on ideational and other resources of these actors. In looking at networks and communication processes, constructivism is creating the opportunity to uncover important issues, neglected by neorealism and neoliberalism. It focuses more directly on the question of the role of the German political foundations in international relations maintaining links with the German government and political party landscape, as well as governments and civil societies abroad.

So as to tackle the criticism that constructivists are too focused on success stories detailed process tracing can help. Instead of concentrating on policy implementation results, this study will focus on the process of communication and on how transnational interaction among actors takes place. The concept of public diplomacy will allow looking at these processes in a systematic manner. Diplomacy refers to a process of communication and negotiation between states and other international actors. Public diplomacy, in a constructivist manner, is about ideas and

values and can involve transnational actors. Introduced in the following chapter the concept will combine a network approach with communication practices and interactions among different actors. By this, it will be possible to study thoroughly the German foundations’ “power of persuasion” and to take into account the multiple communication tracks between them, their partners abroad as well as the German state.

Melissen (2007a) p. xxi.
Chapter 3 - Interactions in a networked environment: Public diplomacy

In the last chapter the role of transnational actors in IR theory has been illuminated. The increasing conceptualising of these actors’ undertakings can also be recognized when looking at the literature on diplomacy. The recent transformation of diplomacy has lead to a shift away from state-centred forms. Diplomacy has become a complex space incorporating different relationships and various actors. From a constructivist starting point which emphasises these interactions public diplomacy can be understood as networked process focusing on values and perceptions. It constitutes a framework for systematically analysing the German political foundations’ power and their position in the international political arena. Chapter 2 discussed different network images and the transnational actors’ political impact which is not necessarily a policy impact. Public diplomacy can be combined with these considerations and allows operationalising the described interaction process.

The chapter starts with several diplomatic forms which might be relevant in the context of the German political foundations’ undertakings. The literature on public diplomacy will then be investigated by presenting the main approaches in detail. Subsequently, a closer look will be taken at the different concepts related to public diplomacy. The considerations will be summarised and integrated in a model which will serve as a framework for the analysis of the diplomatic activities of the Stiftungen in the next chapters. Finally, German public diplomacy as practised by the Federal Foreign Office will be outlined.

3.1. Non-traditional diplomacy

Traditional diplomacy has been increasingly challenged by recent developments in the international arena. Due to increasing direct contacts between political leaders on the international level the original role of diplomats has been reduced. Through modern forms of media and information technology, former diplomatic channels are circumvented. With regards to the changing matters of war, intra-state rather than inter-state
conflicts grew after the end of the Cold War delimiting traditional diplomacy. The future of the sovereign state is often called into question. Consequentially, this also concerns the workspace of traditional diplomacy as a state instrument. For this work, the subject of a changing international order due to the increasing number of different actors is most relevant.\(^1\) Several forms of non-traditional diplomacy can involve transnational actors such as unofficial or informal, private, citizen, track two and public diplomacy. All these forms are distinct from track one or traditional diplomacy in which the main actors are always states or international organisations. Montville was first to define track-two-diplomacy as “unofficial informal interaction of members of adversary groups or nations that aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflicts.”\(^2\) Track two, second track and citizen diplomacy are often used interchangeably but the term citizen diplomacy is older. The combination of track one and track-two-diplomacy is called twin-track or two-track-diplomacy.\(^3\) Multi-track-diplomacy is characterised by several different negation tracks involving transnational actors and private individuals.\(^4\) Multi-track-diplomacy was applied at the end of the Kosovo war in 1999.\(^5\) As track two is mainly limited to the aim of conflict resolution or confidence-building in conflict situations a wider approach will be necessary to analyse the whole spectrum of possible interactions. Informal or unofficial diplomacy is mostly used in differentiation to traditional diplomacy and involves a non-governmental actor. Parmar describes this type of diplomacy as a method of institutes of foreign affairs which “unofficially” discuss matters of their own governments with their overseas counterparts.\(^6\) Stone summarises by the term track two ambitions and its

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\(^2\) Montville (1990) p. 162.
\(^3\) Davies/Kaufman (2002); partly citizen diplomacy is assumed to be a component of public diplomacy referring to exchange programs and social relationship building which later becomes important in official negotiations (Mueller [2009] p. 102).
\(^4\) McDonald (2002) defines seven additional tracks to track one and track two, i.e. media, citizen exchange programs, private-sector business, education and training, peace activism, religion and funding (p. 55).
variants. Although secrecy is an interesting aspect in this context the informality of this process does not help understanding the interaction. In returning to the consideration of chapter 2, the relationship between state actors and transnational actors is particularly important and whether the latter can be considered as independent diplomatic actors.

Theoretical perspectives on diplomacy are connected to the increased conceptualising of transnational actors. While earlier works were state-focused concentrating on interstate diplomacy and not conceding much importance to transnational actors in this process, globalist perspectives, upcoming in the 1980s, stress the growth of non-state diplomacy marginalising the state in the process. Post-globalist approaches look at the relationships between states and transnational actors and the specific roles and functions performed by both actors emphasising public diplomacy as a concept which is able to grasp these interactions. Public diplomacy is often associated with global civil society since public diplomacy aims at “building a public sphere in which diverse voices can be heard in spite of their various origins, distinct values, and often contradictory interests.” As already outlined in chapter 2, global civil society concepts often problematically present transnational actors as opposed to state actors. They also focus on global issues managed by new forms of governance and international processes. Betsill and Corell in their study on NGO diplomacy, for example, concentrate on international (environmental) negotiations. They highlight the similarities of diplomatic functions of non-state diplomats and state delegates and determine conditions under which NGOs influence the process and outcome of these negotiations. As already outlined, interactions can unlikely be limited those negotiations which are conducted above the nation state. Rather, public diplomacy will mostly take place in a less formalised process.

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8 Tuch (1990).
Values are key elements in public diplomacy and the primary currency of soft power.\textsuperscript{12} Some authors predict that diplomacy as a whole will increasingly be about ideas in the future.\textsuperscript{13} Others differentiate public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy in such a way that public diplomacy is about the building of relationships and dialogue with foreign audiences by concentrating on values while traditional diplomacy treats issues.\textsuperscript{14} Although IR theories consider diplomacy as important, they rarely study the social process of relationship building. Constructivism, however, highlights norm and value diffusion through dialogue and persuasion, social interaction and perceptions.\textsuperscript{15} Public diplomacy therefore fits well with it. As we have seen, constructivism as a point of departure offers insights on how images are constructed and reproduced.\textsuperscript{16} Public diplomacy is “the projection in the international arena of the values and ideas of the public”.\textsuperscript{17} The concept can be combined with transnational networks allowing transnational actors to become vital but not necessarily on states’ expenses. It offers a comprehensive analysis of transnational interactions.

3.1.1. Public diplomacy: Different approaches and definitions

Public diplomacy is often associated with many different activities, such as image cultivation, nation branding and propaganda. Although the interest on public diplomacy increased immensely after 9/11 it is not a new phenomenon and almost as old as diplomacy itself. The scientific discussion around the concept is very heterogeneous. Still, the basic distinction between conventional and public diplomacy is that the former concentrates on the official relationships between the representatives of states whereas the latter aims at foreign societies, such as non-official organisations and individuals.

The different approaches and definitions to public diplomacy have various roots. Although they all stem from social sciences, contributions come from IR theory, communications and public relations. Often the approaches vary

\textsuperscript{12} Nye (2004) p. 31.
\textsuperscript{13} Riordan (2007) p. 188.
\textsuperscript{14} Van Ham (2008) p. 135.
\textsuperscript{16} On IR theory and public diplomacy see Van Ham (2008), Scott-Smith (2008).
\textsuperscript{17} Castells (2008) p. 91.
according to process and actor level. Especially earlier concepts did not include transnational actors and considered states as the only actors pursuing public diplomacy. According to Tuch, for example, “public diplomacy is a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and cultures, as well as its national goals and current policies”.18 Even recent works, still, stick to state-centrism. In analysing the public diplomacy of the German embassies Ostrowski argues that public diplomacy can merely be generated by states and diplomats are per definition officials of the foreign ministry.19 Nye, in contrast, differentiates between three dimensions of public diplomacy whereby picking up Leonard and Smewing’s categorisation of “news management”, “strategic communication” and “relationship building”.20 Firstly, daily communication explains the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions to the foreign press. Secondly, strategic communication conveys a set of simple themes over a year involving political and advertising campaigns. Finally, long-lasting relationships with key individuals abroad are developed through scholarships, exchanges, training, conferences and access to media channels.21 As generators of public diplomacy Nye assumes that non-state actors are at times involved in what he calls “indirect” public diplomacy as publics often view authority with scepticism. Governments therefore often efface and turn to widely trusted, even if hardly controllable private actors which are important communication channels.22 Also Manheim considers several forms of diplomacy. Traditional diplomacy would take place between governments and personal diplomacy between diplomats defined as officials of the foreign ministry. Public diplomacy either involves communication between governments and people of other countries or is conducted in the form of “people-to-people” communication where it is necessary that the state initiated the activity of the semi-official transnational actor.23 Similarly, Signitzer differentiates between hard public

18 Tuch (1990) p. 3.
23 Manheim (1994).
diplomacy conducted in the short-term by foreign ministries focusing on political information and influencing foreign target groups via persuasion by daily or weekly newspapers, radio and television and soft public diplomacy carried out by culture departments and ministerial foreign sections sometimes outsourced to semi-autonomous organisations (British Council, German Goethe Institut). It concentrates on long-term cultural communication and aims at mutual understanding and a presentation of the population on a whole by films, exchanges and art exhibitions among others.\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Scott-Smith} also treats this contracting out of activities by governments to the private sector when dealing with exchange programs. He points out that the communication channels are generally used to achieve some foreign political objective; hence, their establishment has a political intent which is either the promotion of mutual understanding or has a propagandistic and psychological warfare purpose. Mutual understanding aims at awareness and tolerance of other points of view leading to less conflict and contributing to the exchange of ideas and goods. Propaganda and political warfare refer to cultural-psychological characteristics and use the communication system of a target audience in order to reach an ideological, political or military goal. \textit{Scott-Smith} regards the mutual understanding as “the public face” despite the continuous presence of propaganda and warfare which non-state actors help to make appear politically neutral.\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Simon} observed that experts of epistemic communities are utilized by governments to deal with overly sensitive political issues in the context of track two.\textsuperscript{26} All these approaches include actors other than governments. However, they proceed from the assumption that actors are appointed by governments and used in order to conduct a “state’s” public diplomacy rather than pursuing their own independent strategy. This is similar to the rationalists’ belief assuming that states are the main driving forces in international processes using transnational actors for their purposes. Manipulation of transnational actors by states and utilizing them

\textsuperscript{24} Signitzer (1995) p. 74.  
\textsuperscript{25} Scott-Smith (2008) pp. 175ff.  
\textsuperscript{26} Simon (2002) p. 168.
as a cloak for their own activities furthermore fits with the outlined Neogramscian approach.\textsuperscript{27}

\textit{Melissen} deviates from the assumption of the governments’ supremacy and introduces the term “new public diplomacy” referring to \textit{Sharp’s} definition of public diplomacy as “the process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented.”\textsuperscript{28} This wider definition of public diplomacy considers governmental activities but also those of transnational actors.\textsuperscript{29} Since diplomatic processes have changed, \textit{Melissen} suggests a collaborative course of action in which various actors are necessary and is essential for a “democratisation of diplomacy”.\textsuperscript{30} New public diplomacy is therefore not a one or two way information flow but a process of engagement in which learning takes place. Concerning good practices \textit{Melissen} advocates a model where public diplomacy is not too closely tied to the foreign policy of a country since it works best when it builds trust and is unbound to the short-term moods of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{31} Critics stress that the theoretical aspects of new public diplomacy, such as networks and narratives, rather have translated into the official arguments to justify public diplomacy as practice of statecraft instead of transforming public diplomacy practice.\textsuperscript{32} Similar to \textit{Melissen}, \textit{Gilboa} takes a wider approach towards public diplomacy and the involved actors. He developed three conceptual models.\textsuperscript{33} The \textit{Basic Cold War model} was originally applied by the two super powers during the Bloc confrontation in order to influence the other societies in the long run by international broadcasting. Today, it is applied in cases of autocratic regimes. In the \textit{Domestic Public Relations model} a government makes use of external professionals in the target country, such as PR firms or lobbyists, in order to support its cause. This model also bases on scientific knowledge and methods of public opinion research for which \textit{Manheim} has coined the

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\textsuperscript{27} See Ch. 2.
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Melissen} (2007b) p. 12.
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Melissen} (2007b) pp. 14f.
\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Hayden} (2013) p. 197.
\end{flushleft}
term “strategic diplomacy”. The Kuwaiti monarchs in exile, for example, hired a US PR firm during the second gulf war in order to receive support from the American public for the removal of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The Non-state Transnational model looks at NGOs and other actors, like individuals pursuing public diplomacy using global news channels or media events to receive assistance for their matters. An opposition group in China, for instance, used this strategy to cultivate support for a pro-democratic campaign aiming at reforms of the Chinese government. This model has similarities with Keck and Sikkink’s transnational advocacy model as presented before. Non-state actors are not necessarily viewed as instruments for the state to conduct public diplomacy. Like Melissen’s model, it thus differs from the way Signitzer, Nye and Manheim see transnational actors in the process of public diplomacy. As Nye and Leonard, Gilboa picks up the dimensions of public diplomacy in terms of news management, strategic communication and relationship building. He links these elements to the involved actors. While news management is mainly led by governments, strategic communication is most effective when governments and nongovernmental agencies work together. Relationship building is best carried out by NGOs only as these actors are well suited to conduct long-term tasks.

For the implementation process of public diplomacy McClellan established a 5-phase-model starting with creating awareness in the target country for the interest of the advocate country via hard or soft public diplomacy. Secondly, a part of the population will gain interest in the subject and will build up knowledge through research and information events. Learning the language of the advocate country can be an essential element at this stage. Fourthly, these people can serve as disseminators in case the generated knowledge reflects their own interest or the interest of their country. Finally the target country might take the actions desired by the advocate country if the position is sufficiently popular in the target country. Public diplomacy is hence a “strategy of communications that is goal-oriented, focused on

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34 Manheim (1994).
36 See 2.3.
results both short-term and long-term, and aimed at building a positive image of a country that will resonate in foreign public opinion.”38 These considerations resemble the norm diffusion model of Finnemore and Sikkink.39

Cowan and Arsenault describe three layers of public diplomacy: monologue, dialogue and collaboration. Each mode has specific advantages for particular situations. Monologues in terms of one-way communication flows are often used for mass audiences in other countries. Although often treated with suspicion monologues are important at critical moments and for daily communicating about policy. The Berlin speech of John F. Kennedy in connection with the construction of the Berlin Wall ending with the words “Ich bin ein Berliner!” is an example for this layer. Dialogue defined as “myriad situations in which ideas and information are exchanged and communication is reciprocal and multidirectional” is at times more productive and helps improve relationships across social boundaries. Germany’s international broadcaster “Deutsche Welle”, for example, launched an initiative which included dialogic communications. The “Dialogue of Cultures” transmitted discussions by prominent thinkers in Germany and the Arab World.40 The third layer of public diplomacy concerns cross-national collaboration which is an “initiative ranging from short to long-term in which participants from different nations participate in a project together”. It includes dialogue but also contains a structure enabling lasting relationships. While collaboration is often praised as useful in conflict resolution, it is also beneficial for democracy building, for increased social and political trust and for bridging racial, ethical and political divides.41 Similarly, Riordan assumes that the new security agenda makes necessary a collaborative approach to foreign policy requiring dialogue-based public diplomacy by looking at international terrorism and nation-building. Moreover, he views collaboration as relevant in other cases of global problems which cannot be resolved by single countries and require different actors operating transnationally. While public diplomacy has

38 McClellan (2004).
39 See 2.3.
always been associated with selling policies, values and national images. Riordan assumes that public diplomacy will not just be “presentational”. Rather, it will become part of the policy making process. This claim derives from the finding that Western values and norms are not unproblematic. Often associated with US hegemony they are perceived as tools by the target audience to preserve Western political and economic dominance. Involved actors therefore need to enjoy access and credibility to solve problems. Riordan considers non-state actors playing a key role in this process as they, when perceived as distant from a government can be more effective. Furthermore, dialogue allows different ideas to be valid and engages at eye-level instead of imposing values and practices from the top-down. A building block in Riordan’s approach to public diplomacy is networking as opposed to a hierarchical approach showing similarities to Hocking’s network approach as presented below. In assuming that collaboration in the practical manifestations of democracy assistance and conflict management is part of dialogue-based public diplomacy Riordan differs from Cowan and Arsenault, who differentiate between collaboration and dialogue. Although collaboration, in their view, includes dialogue, collaboration intends to establish long-lasting relationships. However, the definition of “long-lasting” is questionable and semantic as in most cases it will be difficult to anticipate how and if a relationship will develop. Dialogue with the one sided intention to avoid relationship building rather appears to be monologue then. Although in the future much of the diplomatic work will be done by non-state actors, Riordan expects traditional diplomats and governments to contribute to coordination and to a larger strategy. Moreover, governments could possibly offer financial and technical support. The diplomat posted in the specific country could provide expert knowledge on the country. He could also identify and facilitate opportunities representing a node in the established networks.42

Cull’s approach treats the perceived proximity of the public diplomatic activity from the government and the credibility that can stem from it. Cull established a taxonomy of public diplomacy distinguishing five elements.

“Listening” which has always been part of traditional diplomacy and intelligence work refers to “an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by collecting and collating data about publics and their opinions overseas and using the data to redirect its policy or its wider public diplomacy approach accordingly.” “Advocacy” is defined as “the attempt to manage the international environment by undertaking an international communication activity to actively promote a particular policy, idea, or the actor’s general interest in the minds of a foreign public.” “Cultural diplomacy” is regarded as an “actors attempt to manage the international environment through making its cultural resources and achievements known overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmission abroad.” Cull equates cultural diplomacy and cultural relations. “Exchange diplomacy” he defines as “an actors attempt to manage the international environment by sending its citizens overseas and reciprocally accepting citizens from overseas for a period of study and/or acculturation.” Finally, “international news broadcasting” is the “actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by using the technologies of radio, television, and the internet to engage with foreign publics.” It can overlap with the other public diplomacy elements. All types of public diplomacy have different time frames and information flows: Listing can be short- and long-term. The flow of information is inward to analysts and the policy processes. Advocacy is a short-term activity with an outward information flow. Cultural diplomacy has a long-term time frame and an outward information flow. Exchange diplomacy is practiced on a long-term basis. And the information flows inwardly and outwardly. Finally, international broadcasting has a medium-term time frame and the information flows outwardly but from a news bureaucracy. Cull considers listening as the most important duty of a public diplomat with the new media facilitating these efforts. For the credibility of advocacy government proximity is suggested, whereas cultural diplomacy works better when perceived as distant. The state-centrism in Cull’s approach is problematic. However, similar to Riordan’s findings, it is interesting that perceived distance from a government can be helpful in certain cases. This implies from a governmental perspective that certain

43 Cull (2011) p. 5.
activities could be “outsourced” to transnational actors in order to create a governmental distance. In *Cross’s* approach the credibility rather stems from whether the public diplomatic strategy is consistent with the identity of the sender. She defines the process of public diplomacy as “the communication of narratives that embody key norms about society”. Narratives, i.e. “stories of the temporal character of human experience” become legitimate when they stem from the identity of the people involved. As already outlined, identities are social constructs. They perform the important function of telling you and others who you are (or want to be).\(^4^5\) *Cross* expects a “continuous feedback loop” between the external image and the identity. Public diplomacy is perceived as credible only when it mirrors the identity of the people it represents. Narratives shape these perceptions and convey norms reflecting greater values within society. Public diplomacy therefore is a diffusion process of norms by entrepreneurs (public diplomatic actors) to a foreign audience. These constructivist-lead considerations allow making some claims about the successfulness of public diplomacy strategies: if the external audience finds the norms appealing and understands the narrative it might act favourably with policies towards the public diplomacy generator.\(^4^6\) It will be necessary to determine whether transnational actors transmit their own values when generating public diplomacy or rather repeat the values and policy ideas of their home state.

*Hocking* identifies several components offering a complex perspective on public diplomacy.\(^4^7\) The first thread is democratic accountability in terms of believing in the necessity for direct public involvement in diplomacy. In line with this idea *Castells* assumes that states may also transfer power and resources to lower political levels and NGOs in order to further integrate civil society into the political process.\(^4^8\) The second component of public diplomacy can be associated with the claim for open diplomacy referring to the spanning of global networks, the expansion of social relations including financial markets and terrorist groups as well as the compression of time and space. The state-centred view of diplomacy is thus increasingly

challenged by forms of multilateral diplomacy involving state actors, international and NGOs among others.49 Others stress that this is not a recent trend. Melissen points out that already in 1917-1918 Wilson and Lenin were competing on what he calls “soft power level” before both their countries did the same in military and economic fields. “The battle of values and ideas that dominated international relations in the second half of the twenties century evolved into the competition in the sphere of hard power, and not vice versa.” During the Cold War the United States, the Soviet Union and the three European major powers pursued traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy on parallel tracks. However, due to the domination of international relations’ theory by realist thought in viewing international relations in terms of economic and military power, scholars have given, until recently, little attention to the systematic study of public diplomacy.50 These considerations reflect the assumption of constructivism seeing ideas, if not as more important than certainly as equal to hard power. As per Hocking, a third piece in the public diplomacy debate is the growing impact of communication and information technology linked to foreign policy and diplomacy. These three threads are related and allow a redefinition of public diplomacy with respect to an “active role for publics rather than as passive objects of government foreign policy strategies.”51 The fourth thread in the public diplomacy debate is the impact of the media acting in a complex manner as agenda-setter in international politics and as gate-keeper determining and regulating flows of information to publics. The fifth thread concerns the possibility of states “rebranding” themselves in the global marketplace and the image of states in international politics. Regarding the matter of what is meant by “public” in public diplomacy, Hocking states that “contemporary analysis of public diplomacy rests on different perceptions of what constitutes the public and where it fits in diplomatic practice”. The public can be viewed as a target of influence and a generator of pressure. Moreover, public diplomacy can be increasingly defined as diplomacy by rather than of publics while others see the public as a consumer of

50 Melissen (2007b) p. 4.
diplomacy referring to the twin forces of tourism and terrorism.\textsuperscript{52} Hocking refers to Nye’s soft power concept.\textsuperscript{53} While hard power refers to the threat or use of military force, soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.\textsuperscript{54} The sources of soft power are culture, values and policies. Mead added “sticky power” as the power of economic attraction, which can be referred to the economic well-being of the USA resulting from free trade and the Bretton Woods institutions.\textsuperscript{55} While some equate soft power with public diplomacy, Hocking suggests instead that there is a public diplomacy of hard, sticky and soft power.\textsuperscript{56} Some authors oppose this. In their view, public diplomacy in contrast to soft power intends a cultural dialogue between different social communities on the hope of shared meaning and understanding. Public diplomacy aims at communicating and listening while soft power convinces and declares.\textsuperscript{57} This opinion ignores, however, that the involved actors might have differing intentions when pursuing public diplomacy. It also cannot explain for what purpose the sharing of meaning and understanding should happen and why it should always have an end in itself. These considerations can also be connected to whether public diplomacy is viewed in being in the national interest only or in the common interest.\textsuperscript{58}

\textit{Hocking} sees “two worlds” of public diplomacy colliding or cooperating referring to a state-centred, hierarchical model and a network model. Although both models rest on arguments about the significance of soft power, they imply different understandings of soft power and its relationship to public diplomacy. The first model stresses the centrality of intergovernmental relations, in which foreign ministries act as gatekeeper, monitoring interactions \textit{between} domestic and international policy environments and funnelling information between them by using top-down information flows. Particularly after “9/11” public diplomacy arrangements referred to this model including programs of foreign exchanges, and such to

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{52} Hocking (2007) p. 32.
\textsuperscript{53} Nye (1990) pp. 193ff.; see 2.3.2.
\textsuperscript{56} Hocking (2007) p. 34.
\textsuperscript{57} Castells (2008) p. 91.
\textsuperscript{58} Melissen (2013) p. 442.
\end{footnotesize}
improve public-private collaboration. However, this model rests on established realist considerations and “remains a technique for achieving policy objectives”. The application of the network imagery in the context of public diplomacy is relatively new. It overcomes the public-private distinction. Regarding both actors as equally important is a constructivists’ thought. Network perspectives recognise the usefulness of labour division between actors in specific policy settings and understand actor advantages. We return to the basic network definition outlined in chapter 2 as “a set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve common goals.” Hocking refers to Reinicke’s concept of global public policy networks (GPPN) for describing the public-private relationship. Other network forms might be included in the GPPN. These “conglomerates” should be considered when analysing the network structures of public diplomacy. The outlined network definition needs some adaptation with regards to the network members’ cooperation, the assumed stability and the non-hierarchy of relationships. Hocking’s model does not per se support a “conflict stereotype” between state and non-state actors. The relationship among these actors is rather characterised by “co-opetition” describing the duality of competition and cooperation and originating from market economy. According to Esty and Geradin competition between governmental and NGOs takes place when the latter acts as intellectual competitor in the policy making process coming up with creative solutions and “selling” them to the public via the media. Transnational actors and governments cooperate, on the contrary, when transnational actors provide certain resources to governments contributing to the decision making process, such as information. The basic policy network definition

60 See 2.3.1.
63 See 2.3.1.
furthermore assumes a common interest among network members and relative stability. Some authors raise the possibility that networks do not need to be very constant and self-contained but rather diffuse with unplanned participations and activities.\textsuperscript{66} Networks can be specified according to the degree of governmental presence. Coleman and Perl differentiate between multilevel governance, intergovernmental negotiations, private regimes and “loose couplings”.\textsuperscript{67} The interaction between transnational and governmental actors decreases from type to type. In the loose couplings variant “the network often resembles an ‘issue network’ based on mutual interest in pooling knowledge and ideas rather than a highly developed sense of shared values.”\textsuperscript{68} Networks are also not necessarily uniform in perusing a certain objective and conflicts can occur among network members.\textsuperscript{69} Falkner analyses various public-private constellations and particularly the development of a corporist policy community at the European level.\textsuperscript{70} According to her, issue networks, policy communities and corporatist policy communities vary according to the degree of formal inclusion of the private actors into the policy making process. Issue networks are characterised as open for admitting new participants and permeable involving different types of private actors with competence in certain policy relevant questions whose integration into the policy making process is not fixed. Informal consultation among network actors takes place.\textsuperscript{71} This “permeability” and “fluidity” is what differentiates the activity environment of non-state actors from that of international organisations.\textsuperscript{72} While all network members might want to collaborate, they

\textsuperscript{67} Coleman/Perl (1999) pp. 701ff.; Hocking (2011) p. 231. Multilevel governance Coleman/Perl (1999) define as “the complex patterns of relationships between supranational and national institutions (…)”. Civil society actors, civil servants and politicians work here together. It emerges in the EU but also in other international surroundings (p. 701). In intergovernmental negotiations, heads of governments cooperate to find an agreement at the supranational level in the absence of autonomous supranational institutions (p. 704). See 2.2.2. on private regimes.
\textsuperscript{68} Hocking (2011) p. 231.
\textsuperscript{69} Smith (1990) pp. 279-81; Reinicke (2000) xvi.
\textsuperscript{70} Falkner (1998) p. 1.
\textsuperscript{71} Falkner (1998) pp. 43ff.; While in corporatist policy communities actors are fully involved in the legislative and executive policy process, in policy communities consultation between private and public actors is still stable but less formal. It takes place, for instance, in committees. The term “issue network” goes back to Heclo (1978) p. 102.
might not share the reason for participating.\textsuperscript{73} In the issue network case, it is thus less a common objective that the network actors try to achieve. Rather, they profit from the network for different reasons. In issue networks politicians and officials are assumed to have low presence.\textsuperscript{74} This is problematic. The domination of NGOs jars with the assumption of an equal understanding of public and private actors assumed by constructivist thought. The resources brought by actors to the networking process might be ideational or material. They can vary according to the involved actor. While public actors are regarded to have authority over the implementation and enforcement of rules as well as the ability to generate financial resources, civil society actors have neither. Their most important resources are information on the international political situations in diverse problem areas, knowledge on reasons and solutions of such problems as well as recognised professional or moral authority reflecting in the credibility of their information.\textsuperscript{75} Post-Marxist add social and cultural resources. Bourdieu who coined the term “social capital” regards as resources education, being well connected with others and having a key role in a network.\textsuperscript{76} Others mention the access to information channels and being able to establish networks and relationships.\textsuperscript{77} Supply and demand of a resource result in different power relationships among actors.\textsuperscript{78} Economists stress that several conditions can lead to an actor’s competitive advantage or a key position in the network. The resource should be valuable, rare, and inimitable and cannot be substituted.\textsuperscript{79} This is the case in exchange networks but not all resources are exchangeable. In influence and communication networks power can result from the high number of relationships and the power of the connected actors as well as from the centrality and the prestige of the network member. Some network members might be unable to communicate directly and others might control communication channels giving them

\textsuperscript{73} Fisher (2013) p. 145.
\textsuperscript{74} Coleman/Perl (1999) p. 706.
\textsuperscript{75} Schimmelpfennig (2010) p. 122.
\textsuperscript{76} Bourdieu (1983) pp. 190f.
\textsuperscript{77} Jansen (2006) p. 29.
\textsuperscript{78} Schimmelpfennig (2010) pp. 121f.
“bridging functions”. Although networks differ from hierarchical structures they might therefore not be hierarchy free.\(^{80}\)

For the operation in a network environment *Hocking* suggests a “multi-stakeholder” diplomacy where state and non-state actors are brought together in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic processes and where non-state actors are not viewed as *consumers*, as statist diplomatic models suggest, but as *producers* of diplomacy. In this context, the establishment of multidimensional networks are assumed containing multitudinous forms of actors and relationships in which “audience”, “collaborator” or network “participant” are rather fluid. These images can also include strong ties between governments and transnational actors.\(^{81}\) “Representational” difficulties can occur when governments have to decide with whom to engage in the diplomatic process. Moreover, traditional rules such as the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of the host country (Article 41 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Article 2[7] UN Charter) can be in the way when it comes to public diplomacy strategies demanding relationships with foreign non-state actors.\(^{82}\) The process taken place within the networks *Hocking* describes as catalytic diplomacy.\(^{83}\) Firstly, in cases of agenda setting, non-state-actors help states to frame the agenda and encourage their action by providing knowledge resources. Secondly, non-state actors support in international peace-building, peace maintenance and development-assistance activities as states delegate activities to them. And lastly, joint-management takes place between NGOs and governments when it comes to institution-building in developing countries.\(^{84}\) Modes two and three correspond with *Cowan* and *Arsenault’s* layers of the public diplomacy and *Riordan’s* model in terms of cross-national collaboration in conflict management and the development of institutions.\(^{85}\)


In sum, most of the approaches to public diplomacy presented above are consistent with each other as they shed light on different characteristics. Hence, they are able to be integrated in a model which will serve as a framework of analysis for the German political foundations’ transnational interaction in the following chapters.

3.1.2. Related concepts to public diplomacy

Often propaganda is defined in such way that public diplomacy is included.\(^{86}\) According to Manheim, strategic public diplomacy is “the practice of propaganda in the earliest sense of the term, but enlightened by half a century of empirical research into human motivation and behaviour”.\(^{87}\) Propaganda is seen as a one-way information flow generating publicity and different from two-way communication or the dissemination of information.\(^{88}\) It is also viewed as the reinforcement or change of public opinion, domestic or foreign. “White propaganda” showing openly the source is distinguished from “black propaganda” concealing the source. Whether propaganda is anti-diplomatic depends on its content.\(^{89}\) The political intention in public diplomacy is often assumed to be propaganda or psychological warfare. Propaganda as practiced by the USA within the context of World War Two identified opinion leaders as targets for information campaigns and disseminators of information.\(^{90}\) Others differentiate public diplomacy from propaganda as the first has a dialogue, liberal communication and listening element whereas the latter manipulates, lacks credibility and tends to close the audience’s perspectives. Both try to persuade the addressee.\(^{91}\) Although one might find that propaganda is different in its key features, it should be included in a model of public diplomacy. Certainly, propaganda has a manipulative connotation. It is less about informing truthfully than about the clever positioning of information. It has a pejorative character due to its monopolisation in dictatorships. Still, drawing a line between different forms of communication is problematic.

\(^{90}\) Scott-Smith (2008) p. 177.
and a broader concept of public diplomacy is more useful. Especially
neutrality as a main criterion of demarcation is difficult to handle as it
depends on the intention of the actor and on the perception of the addressee.
Therefore, equating public diplomacy and propaganda is just as inadequate.
Similar to traditional diplomacy having different characteristics, propaganda
can be one of several public diplomacy components.

Nation-branding and public diplomacy frequently overlap. Nation-branding
mainly focuses on international marketing and is much more extensive than
public diplomacy. It concentrates on the mobilisation of all of a nation’s
forces in order to promote its image abroad and to project its identity. Thus,
it is more holistic than public diplomacy which instead focuses on the
promotion and maintenance of international relations.\textsuperscript{92} Nation-branding
makes use of agenda setting theory originated in communication science by
proactively influencing the media agenda using concepts like framing or
priming.\textsuperscript{93} Branding and diplomacy are similar in terms of combining
foreign policy goals with internal soft power strategies. Both focus on
personal and institutional relationship building and dialogue with foreign
audiences by concentrating on values while classic diplomacy gives
attention to issues.\textsuperscript{94} Nation-branding mainly concentrates on economic
goals, such as export promotion, foreign direct investments and tourism.\textsuperscript{95}
Reputation and image of a country Anholt measures annually in the Nation
Brands Index.\textsuperscript{96} Branding has gained increasing significance on the national
agendas.\textsuperscript{97} German variants in this field are the marketing campaigns
“Deutschland – Land der Ideen” (“Germany – Country of ideas”) and “Du
bist Deutschland” (“You are Germany”). Both started in the mid-2000s.
The “Deutschland – Land der Ideen” offensive was originally initiated by
the German government and the industry for the World Football
Championship in Germany in 2006 and was later extended to a long-term

\textsuperscript{92} Melissen (2007b) pp. 20f.
\textsuperscript{93} Ostrowski (2010) p. 36 with citations.
\textsuperscript{94} Van Ham (2008) p. 135.
\textsuperscript{95} Olins (2007) pp. 172ff.
\textsuperscript{96} Anholt (2005).
\textsuperscript{97} Olins (2007) p. 178.
initiative in order to strengthen Germany as economic and research location.\textsuperscript{98}

Cultural diplomacy or cultural communication is a part of the public diplomacy spectrum.\textsuperscript{99} Cultural diplomacy is the “exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and the people to foster mutual understanding”.\textsuperscript{100} It has a long-term component not focused on the explanation of short-term policies.\textsuperscript{101} Its instruments are exchanges with writers and artists, the support of literary and scientific publications as well as the dissemination of music and art. During the Cold War cultural diplomacy was intensely practiced by the USA and Germany as a weapon against communist ideology.\textsuperscript{102}

Public diplomacy is often considered a foreign variant of public relations.\textsuperscript{103} Although public diplomacy comprises much more aspects, public relations can be a component of it.\textsuperscript{104} From a PR prespective, Hunt and Grunig developed the press agentry/publicity model purposing propaganda and the public information model aiming at the dissemination of information. Both use one-way communication. The two-way asymmetric model focuses on scientific persuasion, while the two-way symmetric model purposes mutual understanding.\textsuperscript{105} In sum, they give impetus to the public diplomacy debate. The clear differentiation between the concepts is often difficult and it can only be estimated on a case by case basis.

3.2. The integrated model of public diplomacy

The presented approaches of public diplomacy and related concepts will now be integrated into one model of public diplomacy without repeating the single approaches in detail. The systematisation will serve as a framework for studying the international activities of the German political foundations in the following chapters.

\textsuperscript{99} Cull (2008); differently Stone (2011) p. 244.
\textsuperscript{100} Cummings (2003) p. 1.
\textsuperscript{101} Ostrowski (2010) p. 35.
\textsuperscript{102} Schneider (2007) pp. 157f.
\textsuperscript{103} Kunczik (1989) p. 169.
\textsuperscript{104} Gilboa (2008).
\textsuperscript{105} Hunt/Grunig (1994) p. 9.
3.2.1. Generators

In order to analyse the public diplomacy of the German political foundations, a model is necessary, which includes actors other than governments. Those models can therefore be dropped where governments are the only generators of diplomacy. This is the case when underlying the public diplomacy definition of Tuch, the basic cold war model and the domestic PR model of Gilboa as well as Hocking’s hierarchy model. A constructivist starting point allows taking an unbiased look at the interaction of states and transnational actors by not assuming that one actor is more important than the other. Moreover, it acknowledges an independent policy making by transnational actors but also the exploitation of these organisations for states’ purposes. In several public diplomacy models governments use transnational actors as tools for their own policies. The government might even use rhetorically the contemporary narratives on the new public diplomacy to justify its strategic public diplomacy. It cannot be anticipated whether transnational public diplomacy is conducted for the state or whether transnational actors pursue their independent strategy as Melissen and Gilboa assume in their transnational public diplomacy model. As dependence of these actors might vary from case to case, Hocking’s network model where the roles of actors are not fixed is most appropriate to analyse the possible complexity of relationships among actors.

3.2.2. Types, dimension and layers

Following Signitzer, public diplomacy can be divided into two types: hard public diplomacy conducted by governments and soft public diplomacy undertaken by non-state actors. The focus of this analysis will therefore be on the second type. Connecting theses types of diplomacy to Nye’s dimensions of daily communication, strategic communication and long-

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lasting relationships, daily communication which mainly concerns press work is part of hard public diplomacy. This also conforms to Gilboa’s framework of analysis which regards news management including advocacy and international broadcasting as closely linked to the practicing government. Strategic communication can be conducted by public and private actors whereas relationship-building is fostered by non-governmental actors only. We therefore divide soft power public diplomacy into one-way communication and two-way communication. Others deny that one-way communication flows are part of public diplomacy. However, the wider approach taken in this study includes propaganda into the framework. Following Cowan and Arsenault’s, monologue can be part of the model but also two-way dialogic communication. Two-way communication can be asymmetric in the case of persuasion and symmetric in terms of collaboration and mutual understanding.

3.2.3. Addressees and networks

The addressees of public diplomacy differ according to the involved public diplomacy instruments and belong to the general public, journalists and media as well as specific disseminators, i.e. stakeholders of political, economical, scientific, cultural or civil societal influence. Among them are business leaders, youth groups, students, artists and non-governmental organisations. They may also include official representatives of the target state, such as members of parliaments, regional and local authorities or municipal institutions. Target audiences of public diplomacy may vary according to the structure of the target country, the possibility to access specific groups, windows of opportunity as well as the intended objective of the generator. Hocking’s network model allows analysing the interchange between transnational and various public levels. It will be looked at whichever is more central or dominant in the public diplomacy process and

113 Gilboa (2008).
114 Melissen (2007b).
117 Hocking (2007).
how resources are exchanged. Actor positions in the network, actor advantages as well as cooperation and competition among actors will be taken into account as far as data is available. Whether the connection between the actors is rather loose and resembles an “issue network” or is highly developed will be evaluated.

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<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Generators</th>
<th>Instrument/ Sample activity</th>
<th>Information flow</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
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<tr>
<td>Soft Public diplomacy</td>
<td>Governmental and non-governmental actors</td>
<td>• Political campaigns</td>
<td>Monologue, one-way</td>
<td>Strategic communication, Propaganda</td>
<td>Mid-term (between few weeks and few months)</td>
<td>Proactive, dissemination of information</td>
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<td>• Advertising campaigns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soft Public diplomacy</td>
<td>Mainly non-governmental actors</td>
<td>• Scholarships</td>
<td>Dialogue, two-way: asymmetric and symmetric</td>
<td>Long-lasting relationships, Establishment of networks</td>
<td>Long-term (years)</td>
<td>Building favourable relationships and collaboration</td>
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<td>• (Academic) Exchanges</td>
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<td>• Conferences</td>
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<td>• Press Trips</td>
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<td>• Media Seminars</td>
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<td>• Cultural diplomacy</td>
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<td>• Think Tank events</td>
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<td>• Receptions</td>
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Table 3.1: Integrated model of public diplomacy

3.2.4. Collaborative public diplomacy

While the model so far focuses on public diplomacy in monologue and dialogue form, it is necessary to also look at the practical aspects of public diplomacy and how it can be undertaken. This is often termed as cross-national collaboration. In contrast to Cowan and Arsenault’s assumption it is not a third form of public diplomacy however, but rather as Riordan points out part of dialogue-based public diplomacy. It can be especially found in projects of democracy building and conflict resolution and corresponds to the catalytic diplomatic activity described by Hocking.

The following section will introduce official German public diplomacy concentrating on the Federal Foreign Office, the Auswärtiges Amt (AA). It is the main state actors of German public diplomacy and operates alongside

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118 Author’s diagram.
the *Stiftungen*. It touches upon the question of who the originator of public diplomacy is and whether transnational actors are involved in the implementation of the public strategy. On this basis, we will analyse in the following chapter whether the German political foundations are involved in this strategy.

### 3.3. German public diplomacy: The Federal Foreign Office

German public diplomacy is regarded as less developed compared to the public diplomacy ambitions of other states. The historical burden of terms such as propaganda and marketing during the time of National Socialism are seen as reasons for the German reluctance.\(^{120}\) Notwithstanding, the Federal Republic was active in the field of public diplomacy from its establishment onwards.

The German lack of approval in other Western countries after World War Two and the setup of *politische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit* (political public relations) the German variant of public diplomacy accompanied the federal foreign relations from the beginning in 1949.\(^{121}\) Government subsidised institutes were created with the intention to win back credibility and to re-establish foreign contacts remaining the main objective of German foreign cultural policy until the 1960s.\(^ {122}\) From the late 1950s onwards, the AA integrated also the German political foundations as intermediary organisations for their foreign cultural policy.\(^ {123}\) However, they never became proper mediating organisations (*Mittlerorganisationen*) as the official partner organisations for the AA in its implementation of cultural relations and education policy (*Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik [AKBP]*)\(^ {124}\). The construct of the *Mittlerorganisation* stems from the idea that cultural policy should be decentralised and pluralistic.\(^ {125}\) Among them are the *Goethe-Institut*, the *Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD)*, the *Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung* and the *Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen*. A successful example of exchange diplomacy is the

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\(^{121}\) *Melissen* (2007b) p. 9.


\(^{124}\) See 4.1.2.; on the *Mittlerorganisation* and transnational actors see 2.1.

Franco-German rapprochement which started in 1945 with the exchange of school children, later included town twinning, student exchanges, the proliferation of the *Goethe Institutes* and the *Instituts français* and the launch of the Franco-German TV channel, ARTE (Association Relative à la Télévision Européenne).\(^{126}\) Another important element of German foreign cultural policy in the early times was the anti-communist activity against the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Soviet ideology.\(^{127}\) Nothing less than a public diplomacy campaign was the *Hallstein Doctrine* and its supporting information initiative. During the Cold War the two German states competed for recognition in countries around the world and where “preoccupied by their Cold War en miniature”.\(^{128}\) Developed as a West German foreign policy concept in 1955 the doctrine stated that the establishment of diplomatic relations of third countries with the GDR was seen as “unfriendly act”. Less a doctrine than a collection of emergency methods it included a wide variety of responses, such as economic sanctions and the termination of diplomatic relations. According to Bonn, the Federal Republic was the only legitimate representative of the German state as the GDR had no democratic legitimacy.\(^{129}\) It cannot be ruled out that German transnational actors where not only used to win back credibility but also to support the “cultural Cold War”. Partnerships between governments and the private sector focused against communism and private organisations helped to give the illusion of political neutrality.\(^{130}\) While in the 1950s West Germany had hold the better position by enjoying diplomatic relations with the main European Countries, East Germany had to be satisfied with the unofficial levels of diplomacy such as chambers of commences.\(^{131}\) At the end of the 1950s the competition for diplomatic contracts shifted towards the developing countries of which many became independent from the colonial powers at that time. A trigger was the economic and development aid promised by both states. Although charitable thoughts were motives for


\(^{129}\) Gray (2003) p. 5; the term “Hallstein-Doctrine” goes back to the then state-secretary at the Federal Foreign Office Walther Hallstein, who is not the founder of the doctrine. It was created by Wilhelm Grewe, at that time head of the AA’s political section.


the West Germany development aid, it was still used as a method to gain influence and friends due to the fear that population growth and poverty could promote communism.\textsuperscript{132} Still, the concept of giving aid attached less value to ideology at that time and did not ask for political benefits in return. The politicisation of development assistance finally took place in 1961 shortly after the establishing conference of the non-aligned states in Yugoslavia. By cutting back development aid for states recognising the GDR, the \textit{Hallstein Doctrine} was for the first time intensified.\textsuperscript{133} In 1961 the Federal Republic, moreover, established the Ministry for Economic Cooperation back then provided with little power compared to the AA and the Ministry of Economics. By 1964 the AA had devised a strategy to link development aid and the \textit{Hallstein Doctrine} more effectively by not just threatening to break the diplomatic contact but by involving “flexible measures” to withhold aid. However, in the following time the doctrine was applied less and less. It came to an end by the late 1960s due to the hesitation to use it. After 1970 the \textit{Hallstein Doctrine} was given up completely.\textsuperscript{134}

Against the background of “9/11”, the troubled relations with the Islamic world and the “War on Terror” as well as the downturn of foreign perceptions public diplomacy became more important in Germany and other countries in recent times.\textsuperscript{135} In 2000 ambassador Paschke inspected 14 German embassies in Europe in order “to determine how the demands on our embassies in EU countries have changed”.\textsuperscript{136} The “\textit{Paschke Report}” concludes that “embassies face new, additional challenges, particularly in the realm of public diplomacy” which targets foreign publics for explaining the German position in the European integration process and promoting Germany as an investment and business location. According to Paschke, public diplomacy was a number one priority and was “reaching out to people in the host country, actively communicating through ongoing dialogue with all sections of the informed public in order to generate interest

\textsuperscript{132} AAPA B58-IIIB1 Bd. 387 23/10/1963, 26/10/1964, 20/05/1965; critically AAPA B58-IIIB1 Bd. 651 15/03/1965.
\textsuperscript{135} Maaß (2011) p. 593; Melissen (2007b) pp. 6ff.
\textsuperscript{136} Paschke (2000); AA (2002), author’s translation.
in and understanding for both our European and bilateral concerns”.

From 1998 onwards, the German government began to focus on the medial representation of Germany abroad which also concerned the AA’s role and the involvement of new media and the internet. As one of the ministry’s core tasks it stressed the shaping of public opinion concerning decision makers in politics, economy and civil society of partner countries as well as in international organisations. Also the *Mittlerorganisationen* should take part in this process. Media politics as part of AKBP aimed at the development of global networks and at the promotion of dialogue, exchange and cooperation. It also had the objective to prevent conflicts, promote democracy and free media.

From 2003 onwards the AA conducted a more systematic public diplomacy approach supported by several organisational modifications, such as the incorporation of the department of foreign press work into the AA as well as the establishment of a department for culture and communication mainly responsible for the German image cultivation abroad. Nowadays, the AA’s public diplomacy aims at “positioning Germany widely and as holistically as possible in the mind of the world population. A good image gives Germany political and economical (...) options. (...) To promote Germany means underlining important strengths without exaggeration and fraudulence. Hence, public diplomacy is only successful on a long term basis when it has authenticity and is convincing.”

Next to the economic objectives, such as representing Germany as research and investment location and the promotion of German products, Germany should be presented as reliable partner. Moreover, values should be furthered such as democracy and freedom. The public diplomacy of the AA mainly addresses countries of strategic importance, not by the need for an image correction. Its geographic concentrations have changed over time. While in 1980 Western Europe was the most important target region, the AA focused in the last decade on Middle-, East- and South Europe. China, India and

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Japan and other strategic partners in Asia became new economical focal points. In the Arab and Islamic world the Foreign Office concentrated on political and cultural dialogue. Addressees of public diplomacy are foreign governments and diplomats and broad levels of foreign population such as journalists, scientists and other opinion leaders of civil society serving as disseminators. The main public diplomatic methods of the Auswärtiges Amt are political public relations, AKBP as well as location marketing and promotion of investment.\textsuperscript{142} Political public relations, contains the analysis of the German image abroad which subsequently finds its way into the media work of the AA’s headquarter and the missions abroad. This includes, among others, the provision of information on Germany via print publications or online as well as journalists’ exchange programmes.\textsuperscript{143} AKBP focuses on imparting the German culture abroad and on promoting tolerance and democratic values as well as the prevention of conflict. This comprises activities such as international cultural dialogue, cultural exchange programs, and the promotion of the German language and of Germany as research location.\textsuperscript{144} German cultural policy concentrates hence on culture as an end in itself but also on the promotion of other policy areas and image cultivation. Some mediating organisations differentiate between the two fields. Their attitude towards public diplomacy is often not very positive.\textsuperscript{145} This might stem from the general idea that foreign cultural policy should rather be independent from authorities and distant from policy.\textsuperscript{146} The German government names five strategies of AKBP: a dialogue approach, cultural understanding and value orientation, target group orientation, networking and public-private partnerships.\textsuperscript{147} The AA but mainly the Federal Ministry for German Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) are active in location marketing and promotion of investment advertising Germany as a site for business. German Trade&Invest a

\textsuperscript{142} AA (2012a); Karten (2008) pp. 178ff.
\textsuperscript{146} Harnischfeger (2007) p. 719.
\textsuperscript{147} AA (2014) p. 8.
government initiative and private company deals with attracting foreign investors, marketing and communication.  

In sum, despite its public diplomacy experience in the Cold War context, Germany is still a fairly new actor in this field and its ambitions are still relatively understudied. The AA’s rhetoric shows an explicit stance towards new public diplomacy emphasising network environments, dialogues and greater values which exceed mere interests. Still, the ambitions are also led by access to material resources and strategic importance. As Pamment outlines, Germany presents itself as a “benign mediator creating partnerships and dialogues in support of its policy goals.” A high amount of non-governmental actors is involved in the implementation of its public diplomacy.

Conclusion

Nowadays the general public as well as politicians are increasingly critical of hard power’s utility. The soft tackling of issues involving ideas has become more and more accepted and pushed forward. As Hocking states few actors nevertheless possess this power which makes others want what you want. Public diplomacy whose key elements are values is thus one of the central instruments of soft power. The concept offers a wider explanation of how diplomacy is undertaken in the 21st century. Still, little research has been conducted so far. Many empirical cases concentrate on the United States during the Cold War being therefore too one-sidedly focused and outdated. Research on actors other than governments has been even more limited. Taking a constructivist starting point helps focus on the public diplomacy as a process which includes various types of actors. We thereby return to what was originally defined as transnational

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149 For case studies see e.g. Pamment (2013); Ostrowski (2010); Zöllner (2008); Lange (2007); Gerz (2005).


152 Melissen (2007b) p. 4.

interaction. Operations can take place in a network environment where actors bring various resources. Public diplomatic undertakings can be value-based and can include long-term relationship building, dialogue and collaboration. Constructivism allows here to consider ideational diffusion processes as the essence of public diplomacy. However, we do not assume that public diplomats only behave with integrity and further the common good. They might also be morally corrupt and manipulative in conducting questionable propaganda activities.

The next chapter applies the integrated model of public diplomacy to the international undertakings of the German political foundations. It looks at the question of whether the Stiftungen can be considered as public diplomats by analysing their independence and activities abroad. In chapter 5 and chapter 6 we reflect on the foundations’ support in democracy and their conflict management as different modes how public diplomacy can be practiced correlating with the second and third mode of Hocking’s network model and Riordan’s findings on collaborative public diplomacy. Though core activities of the Stiftungen, they have never been analysed systematically in a public diplomatic context. The subsequent case studies connect these insights to concrete cases of democracy assistance of the KAS in Southeast Europe and conflict management of the FES in Southern Thailand. The diffused values and policy ideas of the Stiftungen will be related to the official German policy and its rhetoric shedding lights on ideational differences and accordance.
Part II

Public diplomacy and practice
Chapter 4 - The German political foundations: Public diplomats?

In the past, academic literature occasionally has set the German political foundations’ undertakings in context within diplomatic activities. However, it remained very vague what form of diplomacy is conducted, how the Stiftungen undertake this activity or how it fits into the wider debate on public diplomacy. In being an under-theorised and disputed object in the IR discipline, diplomacy might as well have caused this lack of attention. Still, several different authors already suggested a closer look at the Stiftungen’s diplomatic activities assuming a broader notion of diplomacy involving states and transnational actors alike.

In the following chapter the model of public diplomacy as presented before is applied to the foundations’ foreign activities. First, the chapter analyses whether the Stiftungen are indeed generators of public diplomacy or rather tools of the German state or other institutions. In a second step it is explored which public diplomatic instruments the German foundations make use of. Thirdly, in terms of a public diplomacy dimension, the chapter discusses possible propaganda activities and examines the foundations’ operation in a network environment. The chapter addresses sub-research question 1 and tries to analyse more generally the potential of the German political foundations as public diplomats.

4.1. Generators

Who generates public diplomacy is closely connected to the question of whether the foundations are transnational actors or whether they are active on behalf of the German state (i.e. the ministries and parliament) or the political parties. It also touches upon the issue of the foundations being integrated in the political sphere as instruments of German foreign policy.

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2 See 3.2.
The literature often emphasises the autonomy of the German foundations from the state. Still, reasons for this assumption are rarely given. On the contrary, when the associated party is in government the foundations are often perceived erroneously as semi-official bodies by many outside observers. As we have seen above, the German political foundations are mainly state-sponsored. The possibility is likely that they implement only projects in the interests of the funder. In case of a direct control by means of binding specifications and monitoring, one can hardly speak of a particular Stiftung’s public diplomacy. Rather, they would be tools or instruments of a state public diplomacy and could, moreover, not count as transnational actors. Subsuming the German political foundations under the transnational actors’ definition is difficult. Whereas their “regular interactions across national boundaries” are clearly visible, their relationship with the German government poses problems. The FES, the FNS, the HBS and the RLS were registered NGOs at the United Nations in 2014. To the first three the “Roster” category was granted in 1979 (FES), 1993 (FNS) and 2004 (HBS). The RLS received the special consultative status in 2013. The fact that government or political party members are often members at the affiliated Stiftung, does not contradict the UN’s NGO definition. While earlier works assumed that the foundations simply ranked among the NGOs, increasingly authors considered them as QUANGOs. As we have seen above this not only implies the dependence on state funds but also a heteronomous activity on behalf of the German government. Consequentially, the foundations were precluded from being transnational actors. Moreover, the affiliated political parties could exercise power over the Stiftungen. They are situated in the transition area between state and society and of great importance under

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5 See 1.8.3.
6 See 2.1.
7 UN (2014); the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) recognises three categories of NGOs: (1) general consultative status NGOs concerned with most of the Council’s work; (2) specialist NGOs concerned with a few fields and (3) “Roster” NGOs make occasional contributions to the Council (UN at: http://csonet.org/index.php?menu=30).
8 See 1.8.2., 2.1.
11 See 2.1.
German constitutional law.\textsuperscript{12} In case of their control a foundations’ public diplomacy “generatorship” would be inhibited. Both aspects need to be considered in the following subsection.

4.1.1. The Ministry of Development and Cooperation (BMZ)

For their foreign activity the German political foundations receive around 90 percent of their international funding from the BMZ aiming at their projects in the developing countries.\textsuperscript{13} Still, the ministry’s possibility to approve the foundations’ activities is relatively limited. German development policy is implemented by different actors whose independence from the ministry varies tremendously. On the one hand, the German government initiates, funds and organises the development cooperation by making use of dependent implementing agencies (\textit{Durchführungsorganisationen}) which belong to the QUANGOs.\textsuperscript{14} They are so-called \textit{verselbständigte Verwaltungseinheit} meaning “administrative unit made independent” which enjoy limited independence as to human and material resources and decision-making. The BMZ, however, has a conditioning control over the development political decision making of these organisations as it pre-selects the possible projects and can object to the final projects’ selection.\textsuperscript{15} Such organisations are among others the \textit{Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit} (GIZ) and the \textit{KfW Entwicklungsbank}. On the other hand, development projects are initiated and organised by independent NGOs partly backed by BMZ’s funds. The latter includes the German political foundations, the church organisations as well as other NGOs.\textsuperscript{16} In contrast to the implementation organisations, the German political foundations were not created to take on governmental tasks initially. Even though the beginnings of the foundations’ international engagement partly coincided with the idea of the German government to support the foundations financially, their

\textsuperscript{13} See 1.8.3.
\textsuperscript{14} BMZ at: http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/approaches/bilateral_development_cooperation/players/implementing_organisations/index.html; see also 5.1.
\textsuperscript{15} Glagow/Schimank (1983) p. 151.
international activities followed several years after their (re)establishment.\textsuperscript{17} The international activities were initiated by political party members or, in case of the FES also by trade unions developing international relationships at that time.\textsuperscript{18} The BMZ has a selecting control over their projects: The organisation first chooses the possible projects which the ministry then can reject. However, the ministry is not able to determine contentwise binding requirements.\textsuperscript{19} During the implementation of projects the foundations write mid-year and annual reports to the BMZ.\textsuperscript{20} They are also supposed to constantly coordinate their activities abroad among each other and shall inform the BMZ of the results.\textsuperscript{21} As the ministry points out, the Stiftungen are not active on behalf of the German government but with the approval of the government. The foundations are also mostly independent from agreements resulting from bilateral development cooperation.\textsuperscript{22} Still, the autonomy of all organisations from the ministry depends, as Glagow and Schimank point out, on its demand of funding and their availability of other resources. The Stiftungen do not have sufficient self-funds and the ministry finances their projects almost completely. However, the BMZ does not check the political imperative of projects. It is only responsible for the pluralist distribution of funds among the foundations. The quota is determined by the German Bundestag.\textsuperscript{23} Each foundation has a certain amount of funding, literally on demand. In reality, the rejection of project proposals rarely happened in the history of the foundations’ international activity.\textsuperscript{24} Like the other independent NGOs receiving funding from the BMZ, the foundations are therefore relative autonomous. However, compared to the other NGOs the foundations are least dependent. Their relationship with the funding ministry is formal as the foundations do not have to negotiate their funding

\begin{itemize}
  \item See 5.3.1.
  \item E.g. for the FES see \textit{Von zur Mühlen} (2007) pp. 48ff.; for the KAS see \textit{Beaugrand} (2003) pp. 43f.
  \item BMZ (1973) p. 64; \textit{Glagow/Schimpank} (1983) pp. 152, 154f.
  \item BMZ (1973) p. 65; interview 3; critically \textit{Schürmann} (1989) p. 55.
  \item BMZ (1973) p. 64; BMZ at: \url{http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/wege/bilaterale_etz/akteure_etz/polstiftungen/index.html?follow=adword}.
\end{itemize}
with the BMZ. They decide how and where to be active.\textsuperscript{25} This formal independence permits to consider the foundations as GONGOs.\textsuperscript{26} Elsewhere the \textit{Stiftungen} have been termed as “mediation-NGOs”. They acquire funds from the Northern donor and use them either for their own activity in cooperation with Southern NGOs or act as a donor in relation to the Southern NGOs.\textsuperscript{27} The term is misleading, however, as intermediary or mediation organisations are viewed as German \textit{Mittlerorganisations}.

\section*{4.1.2. The Federal Foreign Office (AA)}

In the last years the German political foundations received the remaining 10 percent of their international funding from the AA for projects in the industrialised countries and scholarships to foreign students. In 2015 the ratio between AA and BMZ has slightly shifted in favour of the AA since it is also responsible for EU candidates.\textsuperscript{28}

The German political foundations are at times perceived as actors in German cultural relations and education policy (\textit{AKBP}). As already outlined, the AA implements its AKBP with the help of \textit{Mittlerorganisations} defined as QUANGOs.\textsuperscript{29} Some criterions of the \textit{Mittlerorganisations} can also be assigned to the \textit{Stiftungen}: They are not obliged to follow implementation instructions and their projects are evaluated and monitored.\textsuperscript{30} However, in contrast to the \textit{Mittlerorganisationen}, the foundations are not bound by framework contracts and target agreements. Their independence in the projects’ implementation is greater although also the \textit{Mittlerorganisations} are partly autonomous.\textsuperscript{31} The German foundations are possibly not among the \textit{Mittlerorganisationen} due to the understanding that cultural policy is rather non-political.\textsuperscript{32} This criterion does not apply to the \textit{Stiftungen}.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{26}] See 2.1.; Reimann (2007) p. 93.
\item[\textsuperscript{27}] Fahrenhorst (2007) p. 72 fn.
\item[\textsuperscript{28}] See 1.8.3.
\item[\textsuperscript{29}] See 3.3. and 2.1.
\item[\textsuperscript{31}] AA (2011a) p. 19; Renvert (2011) p. 32; Schreiner (2008) p. 5.
\item[\textsuperscript{32}] Harnischfeger (2007) p. 719.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
However, an “intermediary”-function in AKBP is conceded to the foundations and the AA views them as “partners”.\(^3^3\)

The AA also needs to agree to the projects authorised by the BMZ. The reason for the approval of the AA is rooted in the original issues of whether development aid was considered as part of foreign affairs.\(^3^4\) The foundations’ projects are examined regarding potential foreign political objections and overlapping with other German organisations’ projects. Since the beginning of the foundations’ international activities the AA established certain general rules in order to avoid that undertakings negatively affect the relations between Germany and the specific country. As a result, inner party debates of the specific affiliated German party are not supposed to be shifted abroad. Furthermore, the German foundations should not interfere abroad in political disputes on governmental power.\(^3^5\) These guidelines, however, leave enough room for the Stiftungen to plan and implement their projects independently from the AA. Objections to projects are rarely made.\(^3^6\) Despite regular meetings the coordination between the ministry and the Stiftungen is assumed to be not very formal.\(^3^7\)

Despite their independence it is sometimes attested to the foundations to be instruments in German foreign policy. In his speech on the FES’s 70th anniversary then German President Herzog noted that “the foundations’ commitment for the development of democratic and rule-of-law structures makes them one of the most effective and proven instruments of German foreign policy”.\(^3^8\) Nuschler considered the foundations as “diplomatic auxiliary forces” practicing a complementary “side foreign policy”.\(^3^9\) In several of her works, Pogorelskaja investigated the foundations’ actor and instrument characteristics. She checked activities of the KAS and HSS in CSI and the Baltic States against the AA’s concepts. According to her, the foundations contribute to the bilateral relations between Germany and the

\(^3^3\) AA (2015) pp. 23, 164ff.; peripherally mentioning the foundations AA (2013) pp. 76, 88; see 4.2.3.
\(^3^4\) AAPA B58-IIIB2 Bd. 304 7/03/1963.
\(^3^7\) Interview 4; Pogorelskaja (2009a) p. 42.
\(^3^8\) Herzog (1995) p. 324; author’s translation.
studied states and helped form new foreign political concepts.\textsuperscript{40} As instrument they were recognised because they complemented official foreign policy by pre-political activities.\textsuperscript{41} Some stress the realisation of long-term political goals where the foundations as instruments offer advantages.\textsuperscript{42} While all these aspects might have an added value in the eyes of those conducting foreign policy they are, however, only helpful when the instrument can be controlled. Ultimately, also Pogorelskaja concedes that due to the impossibility to directly influence them the foundations are not instruments in a classic sense.\textsuperscript{43} To associate the foundations’ with “instruments” is therefore misleading. In fact, they offer different resources from which others profit which will be considered below.

4.1.3. The German parliament, the political parties and others

The German \textit{Bundestag} controls the German political foundations as it is in charge to provide the public funding to the foundations, which is distributed to the foundations via the ministries afterwards. The \textit{Bundestag} also fixes the funds’ allocation formula.\textsuperscript{44} However, it only determines the amount conceded to the foundations but do not specify requirements for their activities. The pluralism of the foundations’ affiliation to different political parties makes governmental control difficult. Still, it does not preclude from the possibility that the party exercises control over the affiliated foundation’s activities or that the foundation only implements what is in the interest of the party. Some authors assume that the \textit{Stiftungen} are merely execution organs for a political party’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{45} Since the foundations are important foreign political organisations for the political parties,\textsuperscript{46} it is likely, though impossible to prove that the foundation conducts certain activities in the service of the affiliated party. However, this does not occur through coercion and would contradict the ruling of the Constitutional Court terming the foundations’ independence and autonomy from the political parties.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{40} Pogorelskaja (1997) pp. 167f.
\textsuperscript{41} Pogorelskaja (2002a) pp. 33f.
\textsuperscript{42} Mohr (2010) p. 279.
\textsuperscript{43} Pogorelskaja (2009a) p. 26; (2002a) pp. 33f.
\textsuperscript{44} See 1.8.3.
\textsuperscript{47} BVerfGE 73, 1 of 14/07/1986 (Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court).
Exertion of influence rather takes place informally and particularly through the personnel intertwining between party and foundation.\footnote{See 1.8.2.} In this respect, \textit{Pinto-Duschinsky} gave the glaring example of Chancellor \textit{Kohl} and a CDU committee prohibiting a KAS publication which described emerging political groups in East Berlin in the early weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall.\footnote{\textit{Pinto-Duschinsky} (1991b) p. 223.} Today, the informal interfering of the party seems to be rather restrained.\footnote{\textit{Egger} (2007) p. 68 fn. 191.} Also the party’s funding and that of the foundation are strictly separated.\footnote{See 1.8.4.} Foundations’ projects and events are planned and carried out independently.\footnote{Langguth (1993) pp. 40f.; \textit{Prechtl} (1996) p. 181.} Some authors assume that especially the foundations’ consulting activity prevents the foundations from becoming party instruments.\footnote{\textit{Mohr} (2010) p. 280.} This is convincing as the foundation, compared to the affiliated party, has an advantage in knowledge and expertise on international subjects. Therefore, it is more likely that the party has to trust the recommendations of the foundations than vice versa. Others assume that foreign topics are rather uninteresting in terms of influence exertion as these do not help the domestic influence of the political party.\footnote{\textit{Egger} (2007) p. 68.} The prevailing ideational conformity of the foundation and the affiliated party in policy issues nonetheless remains but does not establish a link of control.\footnote{Adam (2012) p. 14; \textit{Pascher} (2002) pp. 127ff. on a case of conformity of the FES and SPD on developmental political matters; differently \textit{Wewer} (1987) p. 218.} However, there are cases when the foundations’ political position and that of the party were different. In 1999 the then government GREEN party supported the military intervention in Kosovo while the HBS opposed it.\footnote{\textit{Bartsch} (2007) p. 282.} In sum, the actual party’s power of control over the foundation’s foreign activities might be only slightly pronounced due to the personal ties. However, this does not rationalise to view the \textit{Stiftungen} as simple party instruments.\footnote{Similar \textit{Egger} (2007) pp. 64ff.; \textit{Pogorelskaja} (2002a) p. 30; \textit{Nuscheler} (1993) p. 293; \textit{Borchard} (2004) p. 95; \textit{Bartsch} (2007) p. 282 with examples; differently \textit{Werner} (1982) p. 31.} Rather the political party might profit from valuable foundation’s resources outside of the party’s sphere of influence. Finally, the
hybrid structure\textsuperscript{58} of the \textit{Stiftungen} in having connecting points to the affiliated political parties makes them not only relative-autonomous from the public bodies but also, in reverse, from the political parties.

There are several other means of control of the foundations’ activity. The funding ministries control whether the financial support complies with the purpose of funding. The tax office verifies the public utility of the foundations’ appropriations. Public utility, for example, is denied when foundations’ funds are transferred to a political party. A statutory auditor, as prescribed by the funding ministries, reviews and certifies the regulatory and economic efficiency of the used funding used.\textsuperscript{59} However, these means do not deprive the foundations of their independence. Even when public funding is missing the foundations are able to finance some projects on their own. This was the case of the FNS’s Tibet conference in Bonn in 1996, when funding was cut by the AA due to its supposed negative effects on the German Chinese relations. Ultimately, the FNS used other funding to hold the conference nonetheless.\textsuperscript{60}

In sum, the German political foundations are generally able to generate their own public diplomacy as they are relative autonomous from the state institutions as well as the affiliated political parties. They are NGOs with the particularity to be state-funded which allows terming them as GONGOs or as organisations “sui generis”.\textsuperscript{61} At the same time, they are different from QUANGOs as activity on behalf of the German government is missing. Since they regularly interact across the German national boarder, they belong to the transnational actors.

\textbf{4.2. Addressees and instruments}

Since 1962 the German political foundations’ international activity is generally organised as project work and in cooperation with partner organisations.\textsuperscript{62} The foundations deviate from this principle only for projects in the industrialised countries funded by the AA, when activities in the

\textsuperscript{58} See 1.8.4.
\textsuperscript{59} KAS at: \url{http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.3712/}.
\textsuperscript{60} Der Spiegel, 24/1996 pp. 28f.
\textsuperscript{61} Bartsch (2007) p. 280.
\textsuperscript{62} BMZ (1973) p. 69; BT (1973) p. 41.
transition or developing countries are just about to be developed, when possible partner organisations lack or when a specific development political mandate for their activity is missing (Regieprogramme). In 1973 the involved partners in the developing countries were, according to the German Bundestag, trade unions, cooperatives, political parties, youth organisations, farmers’ associations, journalists’ associations and public institutions, such as broadcasting corporations, universities, governments and international organisations. Targets of the foundations’ measures abroad were “political and social key groups”.

The partner and target spectrum since then has hardly changed. Some new partner groups and individuals have been added, such as NGOs, think tanks and women’s groups, business leaders and junior executives. Partners and targets are not differentiated uniformly and often overlap. Partners termed as the “primary targets” pave the way for reaching a “secondary target audience”. While in the past most of the foundations primarily targeted social and political elites, increasingly actors of civil society became a new focal point since the 1990s. This shift coincided with growing use of funding from international organisations which possibly triggered the new primary target choice due to the organisations’ imposed project conditions. Today, the Stiftungen also increasingly target supranational and international organisations.

Disputed aspects of the foundations’ partner approach are the collaboration with political parties and high level politics as practised from the very beginning of the foundations’ international activities. In the 1970s and 1980s the Stiftungen conducted almost aggressively the promotion of affiliated political parties, especially in Spain, Portugal and Latin-America. Sometimes the German foundations supported even parties devoid of any affiliation. Such activities have decreased since then. For the activities in Eastern

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64 BT (1973) p. 41.
65 E.g. FNS (2013b) p. 19; FES at: http://www.fes.de/sets/s_fes_i.htm.
68 Only the HBS had already targeted actors of civil society from the beginning of its international activities, (Pascher [2002] pp. 65, 70); on cooperation with elites see KAS (2008a) p. 14.
71 Pogorelskaja (2009a) p. 45.
Europe in the 1990s the foundations targeted committees of the national parliaments and the respective fraction instead of the political party whose ideas did not match with the opinion of the respective foundation. They also seek proximity to other party affiliated organisations, such as the British Westminster foundation as well as the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. However, political parties are still the key partners and targets for the majority of the German foundations and their “common denominator”. Although less practiced in the developing countries, the German political foundations try as well to cooperate with governments even in countries where civil society partners could be found. The collaboration is particularly close when a political party previously supported by a foundation comes into power. According to some authors, it is this desire to work with high level politicians differentiating the foundations from other non-state-organisations. In this respect, they resemble lobby organisations. Apart from that, each foundation has a certain partner focus according to its political background. The FES explicitly cooperates with trade unions, NGOs as well as academic and political consulting institutes. The KAS refers to young professionals, media and public administration. The FNS names regional networks, think tanks and NGOs. The HBS concentrates on NGOs, women’s organizations and other civil society actors, such as civil rights campaigners, the art scene and media. The RLS gives attention to trade unions, women’s organizations, social movements, research and educational institutions as well as international organizations, while the

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72 Schneider-Deters (2005) p. 112.
74 FES at: [http://www.fes.de/sets/s_fes_i.htm](http://www.fes.de/sets/s_fes_i.htm); KAS at: [http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.3756/](http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.3756/); FNS at: [http://www.freieheit.org/Internationale-Politik/199c78/index.html](http://www.freieheit.org/Internationale-Politik/199c78/index.html) (accessed on 28/09/2015); RLS at: [http://www.rosalux.de/weltweit.html](http://www.rosalux.de/weltweit.html); HSS at: [http://www.hss.de/internationale-arbeit/internationale-beziehungen.html](http://www.hss.de/internationale-arbeit/internationale-beziehungen.html); KAS even stressing political parties as partners for their media program: [http://www.kas.de/wf/de/21.32/](http://www.kas.de/wf/de/21.32/); lacking liberal and green parties led to a different partner focus of the FNS and the HBS in many countries. The RLS often faces the problem that many parties are already in cooperation with the FES (Bartsch [2007] p. 285).
75 Pogorelskaja (2009a) p. 47.
76 See 5.3.
77 FES at: [http://www.fes.de/sets/s_fes_i.htm](http://www.fes.de/sets/s_fes_i.htm); FES annual report (1968) p. 12 on cooperatives and trade unions.
78 KAS at: [http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.3756/](http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.3756/).
80 C.f. HBS annual report 2012 pp. 4, 7, 8, 20, 45.
81 RLS at: [http://www.rosalux.de/weltweit.html](http://www.rosalux.de/weltweit.html).
HSS focuses on associations and public administrations. In the industrialised countries, the German political foundations do not apply the partner approach. Still, they remain focused on political, cultural as well as economic elites such as leaders of political parties, ministers, members of parliaments, economic decision makers, and important stakeholders from civil society, journalists and think tanks’ experts. The list of international partners, as outlined, is not exhaustive and depends, evidently, on the involved instrument.

The German political foundations use several different medium- and long-term public diplomacy instruments when being internationally active. Abroad, the foundations carry out conferences, workshops, round tables, educational and expert seminars as well as discussion rounds. Moreover, they provide scholarships, organise exchanges, visitors’ programs and deployments of experts to other countries. They also use certain media like publications and films and they organise receptions. To a little extent, the German foundations support their partners financially. However, this direct institutional funding is used less and less. Financial resources are nowadays made available, almost exclusively, via project financing. These instruments, often overlapping, are generally used by all political foundations. What type of instrument is chosen depends on the country and what best serves the respective project’s objective.

4.2.1. Political dialogue

“Political dialogue” is an important foundations’ work approach. Its establishment coincided with the claim to create better economic, political and social framework conditions since in the 1970s many programs in the developing countries had failed. Understanding political dialogue as a

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82 HSS (2014).
84 BMZ (1973) p. 70.
85 Interview 8.
86 Almost every political foundations maintains a division of political dialogue and analysis (c.f. KAS at: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/42.60/); Pogorelskaja (2009a) p. 40; Pascher (2002) p. 60.
87 Lachmann (2010) p. 265; see 5.1.
process of mutual exchange of information and ideas about options and activities in the development political arena,\textsuperscript{88} it aims at locating development bottlenecks and hindrances as well as finding suitable and necessary policies.\textsuperscript{89} While these dialogue processes are expected to generally take place at the highest political levels in the form of intergovernmental negotiations and discussions,\textsuperscript{90} Böhler, on the contrary, assumed that the German political foundations’ activities complement these bilateral processes on an “operative level”. Through the promotion of democracy aiming at developing political systems, the strengthening political parties, law and order, social and economic systems, the role of media, free elections, participation of minorities, regional integration and global governance, the 	extit{Stiftungen} participate in political dialogue.\textsuperscript{91} Treating the foundations’ activities in East- and Central Europe, Schneider-Deters stressed the replacement of the former political and civil education programs by political dialogue from the 1990s onwards targeting parliamentary, social and academic elites from other countries and in Germany. Political education had a negative connotation in the post-socialist states and signified ideological indoctrination.\textsuperscript{92} For others these dialogues are epitomes of the foundations’ methods in the industrialised world.\textsuperscript{93} The foundations offices in the industrialised countries are mostly so called “International-political-dialogue-offices” (IPD). The IPD-departments interlink different aspects of the foundations’ activities where regional solutions are not appropriate, such as global and complex issues involving different partners and stakeholders.\textsuperscript{94} Still, political dialogue even plays an important role for the national work of the foundations where it concentrates on the dialogue between the general public and political actors.\textsuperscript{95} In fact, political dialogue is a meta-level activity taking place in almost every country of activity focusing on the exchange of

\textsuperscript{88} Böhler (1991) p. 129.
\textsuperscript{89} GTZ (1987) p. 2.
\textsuperscript{90} Lachmann (2010) p. 265.
\textsuperscript{91} Böhler (1991) p. 130, (2005) p. 8; KAS at: \url{http://www.kas.de/wf/de/42.60/}.
\textsuperscript{93} Nuscheler (1993) p. 230; FES at: \url{http://www.fes.de/sets/s_fes_i.htm}.
\textsuperscript{94} Mohr (2010) p. 80.
\textsuperscript{95} FES at: \url{http://www.fes.de/politischebildung/}.
thoughts and experiences about political and social framework conditions and developments on national, regional and international level.\footnote{Pascher (2002) p. 60.}

4.2.2. Media programs

In the developing countries the German political foundations undertake media promotion programs considering media as part of a functioning democracy.\footnote{Krämer/Lehrke (1996); c.f. KAS at: \url{http://www.kas.de/wf/de/21.32/}; FES at: \url{http://www.fes.de/sets/s_fes_i.htm}; FNS (2013a) p. 26.} Like political dialogue, media support coincided with the arising claims to improve the effectiveness of development cooperation in the 1970s. Since then it has been an instrument of the foundations’ international activity.\footnote{C.f. FNS (2013a).} Media seminars, journalists’ trainings, radio programs, publications on media law or political opinion surveys, exchange programs for media professionals and the provision of grants are part of the foundations’ media activities. In case of the KAS the instrument includes also the consulting of media providers, politicians and judges.\footnote{KAS (2011) p. 5.} The KAS and the FES maintain regional media offices in addition to their country offices.\footnote{KAS at: \url{http://www.kas.de/wf/de/21.32/}; FES at: \url{http://www.fesmedia.org/}.}

4.2.3. Cultural diplomacy and scholarships

The German political foundations are also active in the field of cultural diplomacy. However, in the context of German AKBP (\textit{Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik}) coming closest to cultural diplomacy, other organisations, such as the Goethe-Institutes.\footnote{See 3.3., 4.1.2.} According to Pogorelskaja, the foundations are only significant cultural actors when culture is understood broadly. However, they were in charge of foreign cultural political tasks from the very beginning of their activities.\footnote{Pogorelskaja (2009b) p. 299.} In the \textit{Konzeption 2000}, the framework for last decades’ AKBP, the \textit{Stiftungen} played a key role through the development of transatlantic and European cooperation, the support within the European unification process, the rapprochement of Central and Eastern Europe to theses structures, and the
performance of superregional and conflict prevention tasks.\textsuperscript{103} Moreover, the foundations are active in several of AKBP’s work fields: They support professional and educational development through the provision of exchanges and seminars and establish intercultural dialogues.\textsuperscript{104} A small part of the foundations’ activities comprises typical cultural programme work, such as art exhibitions and readings.\textsuperscript{105} Finally, the foundations award about 10-20\% of all granted scholarships to foreign students from developing and transition countries.\textsuperscript{106} A small amount of scholarships is given to foreign researchers.\textsuperscript{107} In contrast to other AKBP actors, the foundations do not primarily pursue to transfer German culture. Still, through their activities they impart German political culture abroad.\textsuperscript{108}

4.2.4. Think tank activities and consulting

Around the world, the German foundations organise think tank events in partnership with other institutes and they are themselves considered as think tanks. Differentiating think tank activities from other foundations’ activities is difficult. Typical think tank tasks are in-house academies, research and consulting units and study groups focusing on different types of policy and research. Moreover, the foundations lecture, publish articles and books and organise conferences targeting research institutes and universities.\textsuperscript{109} Heisterkamp indentified four qualities of the Stiftungen: their hybrid character, their multifunctionality (i.e. think tank activity is not their only activity), their ideological orientation and a pluralistic labour division between the foundations resulting from the ideological background.\textsuperscript{110} The Stiftungen are considered as advocacy think tanks although there are similarities with academic think tanks. Advocacy think tanks are characterized by thematic specialization, a smaller number of permanent

\textsuperscript{104} AA (2011b) p. 40.
\textsuperscript{105} C.f. KAS annual report (2013) p. 79.
\textsuperscript{106} See 1.1.
\textsuperscript{107} FES (2012a) p. 1.
\textsuperscript{110} Heisterkamp (2014) pp. 466ff.
researchers, their networking with other experts and their activity as idea brokers instead of doing basic research.\textsuperscript{111}

Closely related to the think tank activity, is the foundations’ consulting activity often assessed as their core competence. While the think tank activities mainly take place in Germany, consulting is relevant at home and abroad. Consulting activities in the developing countries concern the drafting of law, and the strengthening of public administrations, parliamentary committees and the judiciary.\textsuperscript{112} This is closely connected to democracy assistance.\textsuperscript{113} Consulting is also practiced in the industrialised countries and related to political dialogue.\textsuperscript{114} On European level the foundations consult members of the EU parliament. The KAS, for instance, has been especially active in the drafting process of the EU Constitution by organising joint meetings with the EVP-ED Fraction at the EU Parliament helping to coordinate and find a position in the process.\textsuperscript{115} The foundations’ political orientation is surprisingly regarded as advantageous since the consulting foundation is expected to know the subject and those in receipt of advice. On the other hand, the foundation is not, in contrast to the party or fraction, devoted to actual trends.\textsuperscript{116}

4.2.5. Political campaigning, advertisement and monologue instruments

The German political foundations are not involved in political or advertising campaigns. Their activities abroad are also not limited to a short period of time which becomes particular apparent in the establishment of international offices. In terms of monologue instruments the foundations publish books, articles, studies, conference papers and other material. The treated national and international topics arise from the specific political focus of the foundation and do not aim at advertising Germany directly. The material is introduced through seminars, conferences and consulting activity to the respective audience and does not, in this way, remain completely monologue.

\textsuperscript{112} BMZ at: http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/wege/bilaterale
\textsuperscript{113} See Ch. 5.
\textsuperscript{114} Thunert (2007) p. 346.
\textsuperscript{115} Pogorelskaja (2009a) pp. 128f.
In sum, the German political foundations are mainly active with dialogue public diplomacy instruments and cover the full range of activities as defined in the systematisation. This includes asymmetric communications, such as consulting but also symmetric communication in the form of political dialogue and cultural diplomacy.

4.3. Dimensions

Of the public diplomacy dimensions the Stiftungen are often confronted with the accusation of promoting propaganda. In addition, networking is associated with their international activity.

4.3.1. Propaganda

In the developing and emerging countries the criticism of interference is voiced from time to time. It can even manifest itself in investigations against the Stiftungen and their staff members or the disposed closing of offices. Recent cases are the questioning of KAS’s and FES’s staff members in Moscow by the Russian prosecution and tax investigation in 2013 as part of President Putin’s action against NGOs, “Western influence” and “foreign agents”. Search of premises of the KAS’s office in Egypt were carried out in 2011, when the then Egyptian government incriminated the Stiftung and several other NGOs to be foreign financed illegally. In 2012 the government reproached the KAS and other institutions for being involved in a conspiracy against Egypt with the result that several KAS’s staff members were prohibited to travel and, in 2013, convicted in absentia to several years of imprisonment. Also the closure of the office was ordered. The impediment of the foundations’ activities has also taken place in other places like Abu Dhabi. Of criminal infiltration and subversive activities the KAS, FES, FNS and HBS were accused by the Turkish prosecution in 2002 as they had been supported the prevention of gold mining in the region of Bergama. The Turkish court finally acquitted them in 2003. Difficulties occur no matter whether Germany and the respective country are friendly states. For

117 Brössler, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 05/04/2013 and 26/03/2013.
118 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30/12/2011.
119 Ehrhard/Hermann, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 06/02/2012; Die Welt, 04/06/2013.
120 Pöttering, Financial Times Deutschland, 11/06/2012.
121 HIP 13/11/2002; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 04/03/2003.
example, Israel discussed a maximum tax rate of 45 percent for political NGOs receiving money from foreign governments in 2012 which was traced back to a feeling of intrusion into internal affairs by Israel.\textsuperscript{122}

Conversely, the German foundations rationalise their interference. Chairman of the KAS \textit{Pöttering} deemed necessary the external intervention of the \textit{Stiftungen} in terms of cooperative partnerships with members of civil society. The prevention of the foundations’ work by foreign governments would therefore direct against the country’s own civil society. With the activities of the \textit{Stiftungen} in the 1970s in Spain, Portugal and Greece as well as later in Eastern Europe and with the successful development of these countries, \textit{Pöttering} rationalised the foundations’ course of action.\textsuperscript{123}

In the academic literature the problem of propaganda is rather discussed under the premise of transparency and control. Most of the authors criticize the lacking clearness of projects, the partly obscure financing and the missing parliamentary control of the foundations’ undertakings.\textsuperscript{124} Although in the last two decades the publication of annual reports with balance sheets, articles and background information increased, vagueness still exists in terms of detailed information on single projects as well as objectives, partners and financing. The FES, for instance, publishes some of their project evaluation reports, a conclusive list of reports is missing, however.\textsuperscript{125}

The \textit{Stiftungen} make no secret of this secrecy. The FNS, for instance, published in 2013 on their homepage that the reform process in Burma increasingly allowed them to work \textit{openly} in the country, which implies that undercover activities had been taken place before.\textsuperscript{126} The foundations rationalise the imprecision regarding project details and information on partners with the sensitivity of their work as increased transparency could lead to loss of trust and governmental implications for partners. Furthermore,

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Von Mittelstaedt/Neukirch et al.}, Der Spiegel, 06/02/2012.
\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Pöttering}, Financial Times Deutschland, 11/06/2012.
\textsuperscript{125} FES at: \url{http://www.fes.de/international/inhalt/evaluierung.htm}; an author’s request on the availability of other reports was denied pointing to their public inaccessibility (12/03/2014).
\textsuperscript{126} FNS at: \url{http://www.freiheit.org/Stiftung-fuer-die-Freiheit-verstaerkt-Praesenz-in-Myanmar/617c21369i/} (accessed on 28/09/2015).
the maintained contacts generally established over several years or even decades could suffer from the publicity.\textsuperscript{127} In some regions the foundations’ activity might only be possible because of discretion and nondisclosure. Nonetheless, it conflicts with their public financing and control over funds. The foundations’ reluctance leads also to the fact that conducting interviews is often the only source for research.\textsuperscript{128} In former times, the AA had pointed out to the foundations that they should avoid giving the information to their partners that their financial means stem from German public resources.\textsuperscript{129} Today, this practice cannot be confirmed anymore. As an interview partner assured, project partners generally knew about the sources of funds.\textsuperscript{130}

According to the AA’s requirements of non-interference, the \textit{Stiftungen} must not get involved into internal political battles abroad which include the assistance in electoral campaigns.\textsuperscript{131} Especially their Latin-American activities in the 1970s and 1980s are viewed as examples of this requirement’s violation.\textsuperscript{132} In Chile the first democratically elected president after the \textit{Pinochet} era in 1990, \textit{Patricio Aylwin}, had close relations to the KAS.\textsuperscript{133} From time to time, the subject is still a matter of discussion.\textsuperscript{134} In some countries the \textit{Stiftungen} seem to work underground when they do not receive the respective permissions, like in Belarus.\textsuperscript{135} Also the foundations’ support of underground organisations fighting against the respective foreign government is officially proscribed by the AA.\textsuperscript{136} However, it cannot be ruled out that in autocratic regimes the foundations seek contacts and assist groups that are politically outlawed by the respective government. Moreover, the foundations’ project secrecy would not make sense if partners must not fear reprisals from the government for cooperating with the foundations. Despite the ministry’s binding rule of non-interference the \textit{Stiftungen} are institutions of a Western democracy. As Pogorelskaja precisely summarised,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{127} Indicated by the findings from the conducted interviews; e.g. HBS annual report (2012) p. 14 on activities in Belarus.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Authors’ personal experience; similar \textit{Mohr} (2010) p. 297 fn. 832.
\item \textsuperscript{129} BMZ (1973) p. 65.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Interview 8.
\item \textsuperscript{131} BMZ (1973) p. 69; Federal budget of 2015, Kapitel 2302 Titel 68704.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Pogorelskaja (2009a) p. 46.
\item \textsuperscript{133} \textit{Von Mittelstaedt/Neukirch et al.}, Der Spiegel, 06/02/2012.
\item \textsuperscript{134} E.g. on an assumed KAS’s election campaign support in Nicaragua in 1990 (BT [1990]).
\item \textsuperscript{135} \textit{Von Mittelstaedt/Neukirch et al.}, Der Spiegel, 06/02/2012.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Pogorelskaja (2009a) p. 41.
\end{itemize}
most of their foreign activities can be ultimately viewed as interference into internal affairs.\textsuperscript{137} It depends on the involved states and their relations to the Western World whether they regard the activities as propagandistic. From time to time, the foundations were even suspected of being henchmen of the Federal Intelligence Service. At the end of the Franco dictatorship in Spain in the 1970s the German political foundations financially supported political parties. It is assumed that for this purpose the intelligence service had created a secret fund, which was allocated by the Federal Chancellery.\textsuperscript{138} Although such practices cannot be confirmed they are difficult to rule out. Still, they rationalise suspicion and mistrust. On the contrary, their relative autonomy and heterogeneity impede an instrumental use of the foundations for propaganda purposes. Moreover, there are generally several foundations active in one country, each promoting different objectives, partners and groups in society. This pluralistic approach and the fact that the foundations mainly support dialogue instruments speak against the assumption of propaganda.

4.3.2. Networks

The literature on German public diplomacy, so far, has not considered the network building of the \textit{Stiftungen}. The foundations, on the contrary, are aware of their network operations. However, they mainly focus on their international contacts only.\textsuperscript{139} Also the Foreign Office considered from the very beginning of the foundations international activities the foundations’ capabilities to establish contacts in a German and foreign networking environment.\textsuperscript{140} The foundations’ networking has also been increasingly acknowledged by researchers studying the \textit{Stiftungen}, but in most works it usually remained a side-effect. The findings either focused on the international relationships\textsuperscript{141} or referred to cooperation with link-minded civil society organisations.\textsuperscript{142} Others found networking among political, economic and cultural elites only relevant for the foundations’ transnational

\textsuperscript{137} Pogorelskaja (2009a) p. 47.
\textsuperscript{139} C.f. FES at: \url{http://www.fes.de/sets/s_fes_i.htm}; KAS at: \url{http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.3756/}.
\textsuperscript{140} AAPA Zwischenarchiv 118163 30/11/1973.
and European activities. Very rarely, the foundations’ networking was mentioned in the context of democracy assistance, like in case of the foundations’ activities in Middle, East and Southeast Europe. In a diplomatic context Renvert mentions public diplomacy and transnational networking of the foundations in the USA. Also Schneider-Deters concedes to the German foundations an important role in “civil diplomacy” when establishing networks in the framework of the political dialogue instrument.

4.3.2.1. Relationships

The German political foundations have strong foreign interlinks as they address various levels of society and politics ranging from foreign governments and administrations, political parties, civil society organisations, researchers, students and executives. Each foundation is part of an international party organisation or a similar umbrella organisation connecting members with a common political background. Furthermore, the Stiftungen liaise constantly with the German embassies and the other foundations’ representatives in order to coordinate their activities. At times, the foundations cooperate with other German organisations abroad, such as the Goethe Institute or the GIZ. Further relationships, for example with EU or UN bodies, are established on supra-national level. In Germany, the German political foundations are first of all linked with their affiliated party on organisational and personnel level. If the political party is in power the foundation also maintains contacts to the highest political level ranging from the ministries to the chancellery. Similar contacts exist on the Land level. Interaction also occurs with the German Bundestag and the responsible departments in the funding ministries. The German universities and external researchers are interlinked with the foundations: Several foundations’ researchers teach at universities. Research is also contractually

144 Pogorelskaja (2009a) pp. 127f.
148 Interview 2, 4; Pogorelskaja (2009a) p. 40; Schmidt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23/03/2011.
150 See 1.8.2.
outsourced by the foundations to other researchers. Relationships between the foundations and German students are, similar to those with international students, established through the provision of scholarships. Also mentoring programs between former and current fellows are organised and contacts exist to the advising professors of the supported students. Public events in Germany organised by the foundations also help to link the German general public and interested civilians to the network of relationships. Due to different thematic work focus and affiliation to partners who are poles apart, each foundation establishes dissimilar relationships.

The stability of the relationships in Germany stems from the fact that the foundations are an integral part of the German political landscape resulting mainly from the time factor. The Stiftungen were mostly (re)created in the early years of the Federal Republic and could develop and adapted simultaneously to Germany’s political conditions. Also their abroad activities are almost as old as the foundations themselves. With their world-wide offices at least one foundation can always be found in a region. Continuity of projects and long-term partnerships are regarded as very important by all political foundations and estimated as the key to trusting and firm relationships. Stability and personal contacts are further enhanced by the foundations’ overseas representatives. They generally stay several years in one place, which allows coordinating projects intensively. It is also a main task of the offices establishing contacts with future partners and keeping follow up contacts with former partners. The international offices usually employ local staff members, who further provide valuable entry points into the foreign societies contributing to stability.

Despite their public funding, the Stiftungen enjoy a great amount of independence from the public bodies and political parties in Germany as we have seen above. Partner organisations abroad may be financially dependent

153 See 1.8.1., 5.3.1.
156 BMZ (1973) p. 71.
on the foundations although financial dependence has decreased in the last decades.\textsuperscript{157} Also scholarship holders are financially dependent on the foundations. The dependency is yet relativised as there are generally several different foundations offering scholarships. The influence of the foundations also ends with the selection procedure. In the party internationals or similar organisations the German foundations hold a strong position due to their financial basis which is more solid than that of other members.\textsuperscript{158}

While the majority of relationships between the foundations and others is characterised by cooperation, competition has been especially relevant in former times. In 1982 Werner stated that the foundations often competed with the official German diplomats abroad which then caused irritations in the partner country. Moreover, the reputation as well as the influence of the foundations was sometimes assumed to be higher than that of the official diplomats.\textsuperscript{159} The archival material of the 1960s shows a great scepticism of the embassies in Latin America towards the activities of the political foundations. They overly indicated possible conflicts of interferences since the foundations worked with high-level politics and the opposition.\textsuperscript{160} Also later material shows that embassies were concerned about the activities of the foundations from time to time. In 1980, for example, the German embassy criticised a conference with leftwing and revolutionary organisations which was organised by the FES in El Salvador.\textsuperscript{161} Furthermore, critiques outlined that the foundations competed abroad.\textsuperscript{162} Their support of different political groupings would lead to political confusion and pointless development actions neutralising each other.\textsuperscript{163} The foundations are supposed to coordinate their activities on site.\textsuperscript{164} Today, it seems that both relationships embody fewer contests. The foundations and the embassies seem to depend on each other. Both have access to different resources of which the other is in need. Projects are sometimes even implemented as joint-projects.

\textsuperscript{157} See 4.2.
\textsuperscript{158} Pinto-Duschinsky (1991a) p. 42; Mohr (2010) p. 147.
\textsuperscript{160} AAPA B58/1 Bd. 872.
\textsuperscript{161} AA (1980a).
\textsuperscript{162} Schürmann (1989) pp. 55f.
\textsuperscript{164} BMZ (1973) p. 65.
Conflicts between the foundations and the funding ministries are rarely known. The actors seem to share a common sense about political usefulness and allowance of projects. The foundations’ different partner focuses and the distinct party-affiliation generally leads to separate spheres of activities and little relations among the foundations. At times, the foundations even collaborate. Also funding competition does not take place due to the fixed allocation formula. The relations to the German GIZ are ambivalent. They are marked by cooperation as well as competition. Conflicts resulted recently from the extension of the GIZ’s activities. Despite some common declaration intending a clear dividing line between the activities of both, the foundations’ mistrust did not fully dispel.

In sum, the German political foundations maintain a large number of relationships to public and private actors, abroad as well as in Germany. The relationships are generally stable and primarily independent characterised by competition and cooperation.

### 4.3.2.2. Resources, values and interests

In the context of the established relationships we can identify various resources which the foundations’ provide to other network members and from which they profit in turn. This includes financial resources, knowledge, information, moral authority and networking capabilities.

Financial resources are assigned to the German political foundations from the German Bundestag and allocated through the funding German ministries. Further capital is given to them by supranational organisations. The Stiftungen make these financial resources available for their activities. Limited direct financial support is given to some partners.

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165 Similar Pogorelskaja (2009a) p. 42.
168 See 1.8.3; Egger (2007) p. 70.
169 See 5.2.1.
172 See 1.8.3.
From partners abroad as well as their observations and experiences the foundations access information on the country and its political, social and economic situation. The foundations’ international offices all over the world provide the necessary infrastructure for this task. In this gathering of information the foundations are similar to embassies. The foundations’ representatives prepare regular country reports which do not only concern the project but also information on the country’s political, economic and social development which is also sent to the BMZ.\(^\text{173}\) Research and country information provided by the foundations are also sources of information when official travelling and foreign visits to the German Bundestag are prepared.\(^\text{174}\) Furthermore, the foundations’ abroad offices produce material concerning current political topics published on the foundations’ websites. Information is processed and knowledge is used for the foundations’ think tank and consulting activities. Research is also provided by the foundations’ scholarship holders and often publicised on the foundations’ websites.\(^\text{175}\) Through their coordination abroad all foundations exchange experiences and information informally.\(^\text{176}\) As outlined above, the German embassy and the foundations’ country offices are in close contact on the projects. The foundations are able to offer information on aspects that are generally not available to the German embassies due to the partners they cooperate with. The foundations can maintain contacts with various actors of civil society and to even doubtful opposition groups without being bound to official diplomatic guidelines. For other activities, the foundations buy expertise from others, who are not foundations employees but indentured for the specific task.\(^\text{177}\) Expertise that the foundations need sometimes comes from other German organisations, such as the GIZ.\(^\text{178}\)

The regular meetings of the foundations with the German ministries do not only concern the foundations’ international projects but also conceptual

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\(^{174}\) Author’s personal experience.

\(^{175}\) FES (2012a) p. 2.

\(^{176}\) Interview 3.

\(^{177}\) Interview 1; c.f. FES at: http://journalistenakademie.fes.de/trainer.php; Ch. 8.

questions of development policy. While foundations staff members participate at conferences and departmental meetings of the ministries, ministerial staff members are also regular participants in working groups initiated by the foundations. Moreover, foundations’ staff members often are invited to committee meetings of the German Bundestag when their practical experience or special knowledge as expert on a country’s or region’s matter is necessary. Finally, the political party profits from the affiliated foundation’s expertise, research and collected information presented in elaborated form. This becomes particularly valuable for political parties in opposition since their access is closed to such information resources the ministries provide to governing parties. This processing of information and knowledge from abroad to actors in Germany has been described as “feedback effect” and international knowledge transfer.

The Stiftungen possess furthermore significant networking resources, which include not only being nationally and internationally well connected but also the capability to establish and moderate such networks. For the partners abroad not only funding and expertise of the foundations are important, but also the contact network that the foundations created. Official travels of German parliamentarians, parliamentarian groups as well as of committees and of the presidium of the German Bundestag often include visits with the foundations’ representatives abroad. Regularly the foundations’ representatives are referred to regarding information on suitable interlocutors abroad. Also the members of the affiliated political parties are interested in the networks established by the foundations. They are guests and speakers at conferences and seminars organised by the foundations abroad. Still, the foundations do not only focus on networks among politicians or on

179 BMZ at: http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/wege/bilaterale_ez/akteure_ez/nros/index.html.
181 Author’s personal experience; Bartsch (1998) p. 186.
182 Interview 4; Weilemann (2000) p. 185.
187 Interview 8; Pascher (2002) p. 92.
connecting politicians with other actors. They are able to multidirectionally interlink various levels of politics and society formally or informally: Foreign elites, think tanks and civil society groups are brought together with German experts, members of civil society and politicians in visit or educational programs. At the same time, the foundations also try to connect similar partners from different countries. Partners from developing and transformation countries are also brought together with actors from the industrialised countries. The instrument of political dialogue is the epitome for this networking. But also the other instruments implemented by the foundations, not necessarily abroad, contribute explicitly or implicitly to the establishment of these networks. Also the think tank activity “adds up to a widely diversified network.” Similar to the information and knowledge resources, the affiliated party profits from these contact possibility and channels of communication especially when being in opposition. Moreover, the foundations seek to constantly extend their network of contacts but also to involve contact persons more closely in the network even when their actual interaction is terminated. The FES, for example, tries to establish researchers and young professionals who received a scholarship as experts in their home countries or region afterwards. Foreign scholarship holders are also relevant as they often become future decision makers. The then Nepali prime minister Sher Bahadur Deuba was, for instance, a former FES’s scholarship holder. The disseminator approach as practiced by the foundations helps to broaden the network and integrate new participants and scholarship holders can function as “door-openers”. The establishment and expansion of the network adds furthermore to the knowledge and information resources, as described above. Finally, the foundations seemed to be aware of their networking competence when they

192 Interview 4.
193 FES (2012a) p. 2.
changed their educational provisions to political dialogue measures. Their potential of being well connected has also been realised by other international actors. Its access to foreign partners and political actors was, according to the FNS, its comparative advantage when recently carrying out projects in cooperation with the EU, the UN and the GIZ.

Another important resource that the foundations provide is their moral authority. From the very beginning of the foundations’ establishment, they used the term “foundation” despite its legal incorrectness. This affix creates a false appearance about the financial situation but it is also beneficial for the foundations image. It is likely, that the philanthropic representation is helpful when working with groups which are rather critical of states’ structures. As the fact of state funded foundations is not even much known to the German public, it can be expected that the origins of funds are not always a matter of discussion when establishing contacts abroad. We can assume that the foundations profit from the perceived governmental independence which contributes to a larger network and increasing information as civil society actors can be involved.

The exchange of resources among the foundations and the different actors is not necessarily caused by a common interest. It can match but it can also be diverse. The Stiftungens’ activities broadly aim at fostering social stability and the improvement of political circumstances in the developing and transition countries. With most of their partners abroad as well as with the affiliated political party in Germany the foundations evidently share a highly developed sense of value which roots in a common political attitude. Whether these common values and policy interests are shared as well with the German government needs to be assessed for the field of activity as well as the specific region the foundations are active in. Glasgow characterised the relation between the ministries and the Stiftungen as led by conformity of

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195 See 4.2.  
197 See 1.8.2.; Vieregge (1977a) p. 31.  
interest. The ministry cannot influence these interests as they are “domestically opportune”.\textsuperscript{200} We will come back to this assumption later on.

In sum, we can see that the foundations largely operate in a cooperative networking environment where ideational and material resources are exchanged. This is a preliminary inventory. We have not found answers to the type of transnational network the foundations’ mainly operate in nor to the ideas diffused by them. This will be analysed in the following chapters.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The German political foundations are transnational actors. As public diplomats they mainly implement dialogue instruments and establish relationships with various foreign and domestic actors with which they exchange resources. In contrast to propaganda, creative communication accepts pluralism.\textsuperscript{201} It is this overall pluralistic context of various political preferences and different ideas in which the political foundations have to be seen. We will return to these ideas in the following chapters.

We also saw that the foundations are relatively independent actors. When the foundations started their international activities in the 1960s and public funding was granted to them it had happened at the expense of public control. Today, even the limited existing abilities to exercise influence on the foundations’ work are mostly not performed by the German ministries. In particular the evaluations of projects do not serve as instrument of control but rather seem to help gathering information on the country. The political parties, in contrast, are not allowed to control the foundations’ activities officially. Recently, the foundation’s independence was further enhanced when starting to acquire additional funds from other supranational donors which originally resulted from diminishing national funding. As a consequence, the \textit{Stiftungen} cannot be considered as tools of a “public” public diplomacy. Still, the foundations’ organisational autonomy was granted intentionally by the public bodies. As we have seen above, German public diplomacy is characterised by many different semi-public and private

\textsuperscript{200} \textit{Glagow} (1990) p. 174.  
\textsuperscript{201} \textit{Melissen} (2007b) pp. 18f.
actors. Although they are involved in German public diplomacy, they do not have to implement the AA’s public diplomacy strategy.\textsuperscript{202}

We can assume that the outsourcing of certain undertakings to the \textit{Stiftungen} had happened since only the foundations were able to fulfil certain tasks or at least to fulfil them more easily. The proposed network image where resources are exchanged and which is characterised by labour division offer an explanation on the advantages which result from it, especially for the German government. The establishment of contacts and the dissemination of information between civil society actors abroad and actors in Germany would rarely be possible if the foundations were not a node in the network structure. Since a wide variety of actors could not be reached and this could not be compensated by other actors, the German political foundations have a gate keeper function. In this context, each foundation establishes its own network. International partners of other foundations are generally respected and not headhunted.\textsuperscript{203} Moreover, in cases of a power shift in a certain country already established contacts between former opposition groups and the German foundations can be helpful for the official German diplomacy.\textsuperscript{204} An interview partner gave a concrete example: After the political change in Indonesia in 1998/9 when President \textit{Suharto} was ousted from power the Federal Foreign Office did not have sufficient contacts to the following \textit{Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie}. Regular meetings with the \textit{Stiftungen} and the German embassy took place to fill the gap.\textsuperscript{205} Certainly, the foundations depend on the fact that partners abroad can be found. However, they are flexible enough to find them other partners and work fields when originally desired connections cannot be established in the first place. Recently this problem has been experienced by the German political foundations in some countries participating in the Arab Spring from 2011 onwards. Here, the greater transformation processes led to gaps in the desired partner landscape.\textsuperscript{206} While the foundations network connections and resource exchange is visible, the actual use of information and communication

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{202} See 3.3.; \textit{Karten} (2008) p. 178.
\item \textsuperscript{203} \textit{Pascher} (2002) p. 77.
\item \textsuperscript{205} Interview 4.
\item \textsuperscript{206} \textit{Schmidt}, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, p. 3, 23/03/2011.
\end{itemize}
channels resulting from the network can hardly be verified. There are cases in which such pathways can be confirmed. Pinto-Duschinsky is giving the drastic example where Chancellor Kohl (CDU) circumvented the Foreign Minister Genscher (FDP) in the months before the German reunifications by using KAS’s representatives in some foreign capitals as “alternative channels of high-level politics” due to tensions between the foreign ministry and the chancellery.\footnote{Pinto-Duschniksky (1991b) p. 222.}

In the literature on the practical aspects of public diplomacy, it is suggested that the promotion of civil society as well as the struggle against terrorism and the prevention of conflict present apt examples of how public diplomacy can be undertaken.\footnote{See 3.2.4.} They are collaborative forms of dialogue public diplomacy. In the following chapters we will analyse the activities of the Stiftungen in the context of both concepts.
Chapter 5 - The German political foundations: Democracy assistants?

Public diplomacy has several practical aspects. As already outlined, development assistance in transition and developing countries can be regarded as one such initiative aiming at the building of social relationships.\(^1\) Also institution-building has been mentioned.\(^2\) Moreover, a “soft” nation-building approach can be among such activities described as a long-term process where the creation of civil society and a strong middle class is enhanced.\(^3\) In such practical forms of public diplomacy transnational actors are central as they either perform a supporting role or are part of state-non-state joint initiatives leading to a catalytic diplomatic activity.\(^4\) Sometimes the involvement of official diplomats is even considered inappropriate and the participating of transnational actors as simply more effective especially when civil society is promoted.\(^5\) Also the literature on non-state actors has highlighted these comparative advantages.\(^6\) Both, the public diplomatic and the non-state perspective consider the establishment of networks in the development political context.\(^7\)

The German political foundations have been identified as being involved in democratisation processes. The literature on public diplomacy mentions briefly their networking activities in this context.\(^8\) However, the diplomatic literature does not systematically introduce the development political concepts. Thus, the following chapter starts from the concept of democracy promotion in the form of democracy assistance as this comes closest to the activities of the \textit{Stiftungen}. It also takes up the connected concepts mentioned by the diplomatic literature. In order to understand the overall position of the \textit{Stiftungen} in the framework of these activities, German development policy and its democracy promotion component is briefly

\(^8\) Riordan (2007) p. 191.
introduced. Afterwards, the undertakings of the *Stiftungen* are analysed as regards the preceding considerations. We conclude with the actor advantages and benefits for the German government that stem from the construct of the foundations’ international activities.

### 5.1. Democracy promotion and assistance

Defining democracy directly is almost impossible. It refers broadly to the form of government in which all eligible citizens participate equally. It has various forms.\(^9\) The promotion of democracy in many countries has been policy rhetoric for the last 100 years.\(^{10}\) According to the modernisation theory dominating the development policy debate in the 1950s and 1960s democracy was, in short, an automatic result of economic growth. Development policy therefore concentrated on the latter. In the 1990s it was discussed that democracy was reversely a condition for development although this was not entirely supported by scientific evidence. Nonetheless, the support of democracy and human rights in the following time became a central goal of the development and foreign policy of the OECD and of most democratic states, including Germany. It based on an ethical and normative understanding of development policy and the peaceableness of democratic states among each other.\(^{11}\) Since then, aiding countries mainly use three instruments for the promotion of democracy abroad:\(^{12}\) The first mechanism is political conditionality which either sanctions the violation of human rights or democratic principles by refusing the award of payments (negative approach) and rewards positive developments by dept reliefs and favourable loans (positive approach). The second instrument is the use of positive measures, namely democracy assistance. It encompasses methods by transnational actors to help the electoral process, to assist democratic state institutions and to support civil society. The latter focuses on free and fair election (campaigns), the ability for citizens to vote, a party system where few major parties are bound to

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\(^{10}\) Carothers (2006) pp. 3f.


\(^{12}\) Burnell (2008) p. 283 with details; Burnell (2000a) pp. 6-10 on the definitional distinction of democracy promotion and assistance.
democratic values and moderate ideological affiliation, a written constitution, the separation of powers and the rule of law, an active and diverse civil society articulating interests as well as independent media and trade unions (see table 5.1). Examples for this instrument are the sensitizing of public employees, such as policemen, military, security forces and judges for human rights, the support of NGOs being active in the fields of democracy or human rights, the assistance of journalists and vulnerable groups. It also includes the support of democratic parliaments, the building up of political parties and the monitoring of elections. Often these political activities are viewed as intrusion into the sovereignty of the state. The third instrument of promoting democracy is the imposition of democracy by force. It is not very popular due to few successful examples, such as post-war Germany and Japan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
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<td>Electoral process</td>
<td>• Free and fair elections</td>
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<td>• Strong national political parties</td>
<td>• Political party building</td>
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<td>State institutions</td>
<td>• Democratic constitution</td>
<td>• Constitutional assistance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Independent, effective</td>
<td>• Rule-of-law aid</td>
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<td>judiciary and other law-</td>
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<td>oriented institutions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Competent, representative</td>
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<td>• Responsive local government</td>
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<td>• Pro-democratic military</td>
<td>• Civil-military relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>• Active advocacy bodies and NGOs</td>
<td>• Building civil-society</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Politically educated citizenry</td>
<td>organisations and NGOs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Strong independent media</td>
<td>• Civic education</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Strong independent unions</td>
<td>• Media strengthening</td>
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Table 5.1: Democracy assistance objectives and modalities

15 Schmidt (2013a) p. 281.
16 Schmid (2002).
In democracy assistance a distinction is made between the developmental and the political approach. The first conception understands democracy broadly which is achieved through incremental and long-term change processes on various political and socioeconomic levels. The political approach, in contrast, mainly looks at elections and political liberties. It hopes to gain dominance over nondemocratic trends and to become a catalyst in focusing on central political processes and institutions.\footnote{Carothers (2009) p. 5.}

Democracy promotion has points of contact with good governance, a contested reference concept in development policy first coined by the World Bank in the 1990s. It defines governance “as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources of development. Good governance, (…) is synonymous with sound development management”.\footnote{World Bank (1992) p. 1.} After 1990, different international organisations refined the concept. Until today the term is used non-uniformly. It centres on the characteristics of the rule of law, the accountability of governments, the effectiveness and efficiency of governance, transparency and participation.\footnote{Rule of law has the following requirements: the law accordance of the government, an independent court system, constitutional rights to investigate and supervise the executive and administrative powers and equality before the law (OECD [1995] p. 14). Accountability concerns those of governmental institutions (and the private and civil-society sector) to the public and their institutional stakeholders. Effectiveness and efficiency ensure that processes and institutions achieve results that satisfy the societal needs using the available resources in the best way. Efficiency also covers the sustainable use of environmental resources. Transparency means that decisions are taken and enforced in a manner that follows rules and regulations. Information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions. Participation is the partaking in the governance process of men and women either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions (UN [2009a]). Good governance can also include the controlling of corruption and the reduction of excessive military expenditure (OECD [1995] pp. 14-22).} Good governance is, on the one hand, a condition for development cooperation but also its aim.\footnote{Schmidt (2013b) pp. 285f.; Seifert (2009) pp. 16f.} In fact, it tries to establish universally structural characteristics historically developed in the West. As this can collide with the developed structural traits in the recipient countries, it is often pleaded for a “bottom-up”-understanding centering on civil society which presents the root for the democratic “super-structure”.\footnote{Lapins (2007) pp. 19f.; Schmidt (2013b) pp. 288f.} This requirement is also reflected in the
democracy assistance model as presented above (see table 5.1). Capacity development as a flexible process to build and enhance organisational and professional competencies in third countries is closely connected to democracy assistance when it comes to the furthering of political institutions and civil society organisations.

The definitional separation of democracy assistance from state-building is difficult. Although democracy assistance has a stronger focus on the support of civil societies whereas state-building is more directed to reforms and the establishment of non-existing but essential state functions, both modalities mostly overlap. State-building is more holistic in contrast to democracy aid for the state sector. It does not concentrate on “democratic” state structures only but also on welfare state and security components. It can involve the construction institutions from scratch, while democracy assistance tries to reshape existing institutions. Democracy assistance does not particularly aid the executive state power. Authoritarian or totalitarian countries often have an overly powerful executive which is suppose to be counterbalanced. The modernization of the executive, in contrast, is a state-building component. The main difference is that state-building focuses on failed and fragile states only. It aims towards the following targets: the stabilising of existing structures and institutions, their reform if not transformation or their (re)construction. This is why it is often

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25 On the modalities see Schneckener (2007) p. 10. State-building is sometimes assumed to be a part of nation-building (Hippler [2004] p. 23). Stütz (2008), however, convincingly argues that both are different strategies: while state-building focuses rather on the “visible, organisational and technical side of the state”, nation-building comprises the support of civil society, culture and patriotism (p. 21).
28 Lambach (2014); Smith (2008). State-building originally focused on failed states. In 2008 it was extend by the OECD (2008b) to fragile states (Grävingholt/Gänzle/Ziaja [2009] p. 5). Neither fragility nor failure is used uniformly (Preuß [2013] p. 310). In general, fragility exists when states institutions have lost or insufficiently developed in central remits their control, allocative functions and their capability to act which often causes a rapid or creeping process of the loss of legitimacy (Schneckener [2007] p. 7). A fragile region or state has weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society (OECD [2014b] p.18). State failure refers to circumstances of less than a complete state collapse where basic state functions are not fulfilled anymore. (Doornbos [2008] pp. 251f.). It is therefore situated between state collapse and fragility.
discussed in the context of peace-building and viewed as being at the interface between security policy and development policy.\(^{30}\) In contrast to a state formation happening directly or indirectly on the impulses of the respective population, state-building involves external actors which implement measures straightly.\(^{31}\) The range of measures and the influence of external actors on the process vary from mere consulting activities to a complete state function’s substitution.\(^{32}\) For the aim achievement state-building concentrates on short periods of time.\(^{33}\) This is different from a political approach of democracy assistance focusing on longer periods and from democracy assistance as “whatever helps democratisation directly or indirectly, sooner or later”.\(^{34}\)

Although democracy is until today on the development political agenda of most countries, the subject was not treated with priority by the main international forums from 2000 onwards.\(^{35}\) The “war on terror” in the aftermath of 9/11 also relativised U.S. ambitions in democracy promotion and led to a primacy of military and security policy including friendly relationships with non-democratic states.\(^{36}\) Although it is assumed that democracy can help combating terrorism in the long run, its promotion may cause conflicts due to changes unintended by the established elite.\(^{37}\) Another challenge to the promotion of democracy is that some donor countries often do not intent political reforms and therefore diminish the efforts of the democracy focused donors.\(^{38}\)

\(^{30}\) See Ch. 6; c. f. Debiel/Lambach/Pech (2007) p. 15.
\(^{34}\) Burnell (2000a) p. 12.
\(^{36}\) Burnell (2010a) p. 12.
\(^{38}\) A prominent example is the cooperation between the oil-rich Angola and China (Schmidt [2013a] p. 282).
5.2. Promoting democracy in the context of German development policy

The promotion of democracy is a component of German development policy which is influenced by various different actors and in the responsibility of a range of ministerial departments. As a cross-border policy, development policy is an integral part of foreign policy and therefore undoubtedly associated with its diplomatic, strategic and normative goals and instruments. Through the involvement of non-state actors in the policy implementation, it also takes place on the transnational level.39

5.2.1. Germany’s development policy

German development policy in terms of an overall conception did not start before 1956, while development aid to third countries was already given right after the establishment of the Federal Republic in 1949. In contrast to other countries, such as the USA, Great Britain and France, Germany was rather late coming. Colonial policy could not result in development policy.40

In 1952 Germany for the first time contributed to the UN’s “Extended support program”. In 1956 the German Bundestag established a fund of 50 million Deutsche Mark at the Foreign Office (AA) for the assistance of the developing countries. The federal ministry for economic cooperation and development (BMZ) was established in 1961.41

Over time German development policy followed the international trends.42 In the beginning development policy was understood as a diplomatic instrument only and used for the containment of communism. It aimed at hindering the recognition of the GDR in the developing world.43 As the treaties with the countries of Eastern Europe (Ostverträge) and the termination of the Hallstein Doctrine diminished the need for this kind of policy, trade became a new focal point in times of the German “economic miracle”. From 1969 onwards, development policy showed some innovations and gained some

40 Dennert (1968) pp. 26f., especially experts and knowledge on the developing countries were missing (p. 31).
41 BMZ on its history at: http://www.bmz.de/de/ministerium/geschichte/index.html#1.
43 See 3.3.
independence from the foreign political agenda. In times of the first oil crisis, development policy stagnated first and finally focused increasingly on conflict management. With the end of the Cold War, security political interests and geo-strategy became temporarily less important. The changed political situation in the 1990s triggered several international conferences and allowed to concentrate further on the conditions in the developing countries. Especially the requirement of good governance came to the centre of attention. At the same time, the budget made available to the BMZ shrank while private direct investments increased. In 2000 the UN members ratified the Millennium Declaration including development political core objectives (MDG) defined by the OECD, the World Bank, the IWF and the UN. It focused on the fight against poverty, peacekeeping and environmental protection. As a national support program the German government adopted the Aktionsprogramm 2015 in 2001 aiming among others at more coherence between the different policy areas. Finally, globalisation and the events of 9/11 led Germany to concentrate recently on global structural policy. Development policy is understood in such way that it is incorporated in global processes and has increasing responsibility. Subjects like capacity and institution building in order to strengthen the developing countries’ ability to act have been put in the centre. Also cooperative solutions with the help of non-state actors and global policy networks are preferred. A recent focal point has also become the dealing with fragile states.

German development policy is a cross-cutting subject with many different actors involved. The ministry of finance (BMF) is responsible for the developing countries’ dept relief and partly for the multilateral development cooperation funds. The ministry of economy (BMWi) administers the

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policies of trade and raw material. The AA is mainly in charge for representing German development policy abroad and emergency assistance, while the competence for global environmental policy lies at the federal ministry for the environment, nature conservation, building and nuclear safety (BMU). The main actor is the BMZ. It administers around half of the public development cooperation funds. Its core tasks concern program work, international consultations and negotiations with the developing countries about projects carried out by implementation organisations. The work of the BMZ is controlled by the German Bundestag where the technical competence lies at the Committee for economic cooperation and development (AwZ). For 2014 the BMZ had 6.44 Billion Euro available. In 2013 it received 6.29 Billion Euro which equaled 2.03 percent of the federal budget. In 2013 it received 6.29 Billion Euro which equaled 2.03 percent of the federal budget.

German development policy is roughly divided into financial (FZ) and technical cooperation (TZ). FZ is capital assistance and comprises financial resources given to the developing countries for their economic and social development. It is the most important development political tool in terms of volume and is mainly in the responsibility of the KfW Entwicklungsbank (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau). TZ aims at capacity development and the transfer of technical, economic and organizational knowledge to a large part implemented by the GIZ (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) which involves the preparation, further

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54 Andersen (2005) p. 57; 4.1.
55 Despite the official control of the AwZ, in reality the federal budget committee restrains the work of the ministry (Nuscheler [2007] p. 673).
56 German federal government at:
57 German federal budget law.
58 For the relationship between FZ and TZ was in 2011 at around 61 (FZ) to 38 (TZ) percent measured in terms of BMZ’s ODA-payments (BMZ [2013] p. 30f).
59 The KfW founded in 1948 originally aimed at giving loans for the reconstruction Germany after World War II. It has several different branches. Since 1961 the KfW is responsible for German financial cooperation abroad. The KfW Entwicklungsbank mainly cooperates with foreign state institutions (https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/Internationale-Finanzierung/KfW-Entwicklungsbank/Aufgaben-und-Ziele/Unsere-Arbeitsweise/), while the DEG (Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft) a subsidiary of KfW assists the private sector in developing and transition countries.
training and posting of development aid workers. The other actors in this field are the Stiftungen, the church organizations, many NGOs as well as certain ministries on the Land-level. The following figure shows the payments in thousand Euros and the distribution in percent of BMZ’s official development assistance (ODA) funds among actors of TZ of 2010:

![Figure 5.1: Bilateral BMZ’s ODA-funds to actors of German TZ in 2010](image)

Germany has a prominent donor position. Internationally it ranks among the top three donors of development assistance. However, it continuously spends only a small part its national income on ODA. Moreover, the

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60 BMZ at: http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/wege/bilaterale_ez/akteure_ez/durchfuehrungsorga/index.html; the GIZ was founded in 2011 and is a merger of the GTZ (Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit), the DED (Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst) and InWEnt (International Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH); it was intended to improve the cooperation between technical and financial assistance (Goldmann [2006] p. 1010; c.f. Die Zeit of 28/12/2006).

61 See BMZ for details on the involved actors at: http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/wege/bilaterale_ez/akteure_ez/index.html; most of the NGOs as well as the church organisations active in development cooperation are joint together in VENRO (Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen e.V.) which has 120 members (as of 4/09/2015) (http://venro.org/mitglieder/mitgliederdatenbank/). The Stiftungen are not part of VENRO.

62 BMZ (2013b) pp. 30f.

63 OECD (2014a) p. 226. In 2009 Germany spend 0,35% of its GNI on ODA. It promised to increase the ODA payments to 0, 7% in 2015 (OECD [2010] p. 53). This was reconfirmed in the current coalition contract of December 2013 (CDU/CSU/SPD [2013] pp. 89, 181).
amount of actors leads to an exceeding fragmentation of development cooperation.\textsuperscript{64} Others understand, in contrast, the number of actors as a German particularity giving a lot of flexibility and enabling a differentiated approach of development work.\textsuperscript{65} In the aftermath of the \textit{Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness} in 2005 determining the main conditions for effective development cooperation,\textsuperscript{66} Germany merged several implementation organisations.\textsuperscript{67} However, problems of coherence still exist.\textsuperscript{68} Moreover, a lack of strategy and an over-reliance on the implementation organisations has been attested to the BMZ.\textsuperscript{69} Furthermore, the term “projectitis” was coined for the lack of geographical foci and too many single projects.\textsuperscript{70} Recently, Germany began to concentrate on certain topics and reduced the number of cooperating countries.\textsuperscript{71}

\textbf{5.2.2. Promoting and assisting democracy in the German context}

Little research on German democracy promotion has been conducted so far and the German ambitions have generally not been described as very ambitious.\textsuperscript{72} However, from the 1990s onwards, Germany has developed an “increasingly explicit stance” towards democracy promotion.\textsuperscript{73} In 1991 the BMZ determined five indicators political conditionality should be orientated towards which were kept up by the following German governments (\textit{Spranger} criterions).\textsuperscript{74} It included the respect of human rights, citizens’ participation in political processes, granting of legal security, market-oriented economic order and the orientation of the state

\textsuperscript{65} BMZ at: \url{http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/wege/bilaterale_ez/akteure_ez/durchfuehrungssorga/index.html}; \textit{Nuscheler} (2007) p. 678f.
\textsuperscript{66} The declaration was further specified in the Accra Agenda For Action from 2008 (\url{http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm}; OECD [2008]).
\textsuperscript{67} BMZ at: \url{http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/ziele/ziele/parisagenda/paris/index.html}; OECD (2010) p. 13f.
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Nuscheler} (2007) p. 678.
\textsuperscript{69} OECD (2010) pp. 20, 66ff.
\textsuperscript{71} BMZ at: \url{http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/ziele/ziele/parisagenda/paris/index.html}; OECD (2010) p. 13f.
\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Wolff} (2013) pp. 478ff.
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Spranger} was than Minister of the BMZ (BT [1991] p. 3873); \textit{Betz} (1996) p. 204; \textit{Schmidt} (2013a) pp. 280f.
towards development. In 1992 the AA created a democracy promotion facility focusing on election observer missions.\textsuperscript{75} In its defence policy guidelines of 1992, the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) considered the promotion of democracy in “Europe and world-wide” as one of the “vital security interests”.\textsuperscript{76} From 1992 onwards the BMZ began to prefer democracy assistance over imposing sanctions.\textsuperscript{77} According to the German government, democracy assistance became a foreign political focal point in 1998.\textsuperscript{78} From 2006 onwards, democracy and the rule of law finally received a prominent role in the overall German political agenda.\textsuperscript{79} Priorities were electoral aid, educational work, the promotion of political participation and media as well as the support of constitutional bodies.\textsuperscript{80} In 2008 “Democracy, civil society and public administration” became one of the 11 areas for the BMZ’s technical and financial development cooperation.\textsuperscript{81} As of 2014, 33 developing countries have agreed on this field of activity focusing on long-term political reform processes.\textsuperscript{82} The defence policy guidelines of 2011 define the fostering of democratic values as a security interest.\textsuperscript{83} This is also in line with Germany’s “value-oriented” foreign policy referring to the values and norms of international law and human rights law.\textsuperscript{84} Also the German government’s coalition treaty of 2013 stresses the strengthening of democracy.\textsuperscript{85}

The multitude of actors, typical for German development policy in general, can also be found as regards to the promotion of democracy: for the support of elections and parliaments, international democracy conferences, human

\textsuperscript{75} Rüland/Werz (2002) p. 81.
\textsuperscript{76} BMVg (1992) II. 8 (7).
\textsuperscript{77} Betz (1996) p. 208.
\textsuperscript{79} Lerch (2007) pp. 9f. with details; in the security political context see BMVg (2006) p. 16.
\textsuperscript{82} BMZ at: http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/themen/goodgovernance/demokratie/arbeitsfelder/index.html.
\textsuperscript{83} BMVg (2011) p. 5.
\textsuperscript{84} AA at: http://www.auswaertiges- amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Schwerpunkte/Schwerpunkte_Aussenpolitik_node.html.
rights diplomacy, political dialogue, sanctions and coordination in the European CSFP (common foreign and security policy) the AA is responsible. The BMZ is in charge of the long-term democracy assistance measures.\textsuperscript{86}

Since the 1990s also good governance plays a major role in the German promotion of democracy.\textsuperscript{87} As regards to democracy, the BMZ promotes the following approaches: (1) the enforcement of the political systems’ capacity such as the (regional) parliaments in their legislative; (2) control and representative functions; (3) the support of the preparation and conduction of elections; (4) the strengthening of democratically legitimised institutions on all levels; and (5) the promotion of the institutionalised participation of civil society in political processes.\textsuperscript{88}

The German democracy assistance is characterised as retentive as towards a political approach. As regards political conditionality Germany prefers a “soft” course of action focusing on consultations, dialogue and long-term approaches for the exertion of influence. In the past, only few sanctions have been practiced.\textsuperscript{89} This course of action is very much in line with Germany’s role as a “civilian power” and the normative guidelines stemming from it. Democracy promotion by an ideal-type civilian power has four features: (1) it follows an “abstract and broad notion of universal values and rights”; (2) it views democratization as a long-term and complex process; (3) it prefers “pragmatic strategies of (institutional) cooperation and inclusion”; and (4) it is restrained in interfering in other countries affairs. At the same time, democracy assistance complies with what is

\textsuperscript{87} BMZ (2009) pp. 11ff: These areas are: the protection, respect and guaranty of human rights, democracy, rule of law and media support, gender equality, administrative reforms and decentralisation, good financial governance, transparency in the raw materials area, and the fight against corruption; BMZ at: \url{http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/themen/goodgovernance/index.html}.
\textsuperscript{88} BMZ (2009) p. 13; BMZ (2010); BMZ at: \url{http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/themen/goodgovernance/index.html}.
perceived to be Germany’s material interest as regards an export-oriented economy.\textsuperscript{90}

5.3. Democracy assistance of the German political foundations

The German political foundations play a key role in democracy assistance. Authors have highlighted that even European democracy assistance was driven by the activities of the German \textit{Stiftungen}.\textsuperscript{91} Others outlined that the overall origins of democracy assistance lay with the German foundations which were equipped with many offices all over the world already in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{92} Often the German \textit{Stiftungen} are termed as institutions of democracy assistance par excellence,\textsuperscript{93} as they are “the oldest, most experienced and biggest actors in international democracy assistance”.\textsuperscript{94} Their activities differ principally from that of other German developmental actors in TZ, whose activities are mainly socially oriented, impartially and driven by altruistic motives. In their joint declaration of 1998 the \textit{Stiftungen} determined to give developmental aid with their projects and programs and to contribute to development of democratic, liberal and constitutional structures committed to human and civil rights.\textsuperscript{95}

5.3.1. Historical overview

The history of the German political foundations’ international activities went through the same phases as German development policy in general. Their international activity started properly with the establishment of the BMZ in 1961.\textsuperscript{96} In 1957 the FES had already cooperated with the organisation of anti-communist trade unions (ORIT) in Latin America. The impulse for these activities came from SPD party members and the trade unions.\textsuperscript{97} From 1962 the BMZ granted public funds to the FES, the KAS and the FNS on a regular basis for projects in the developing countries concerning civic education (\textit{gesellschaftspolitische Bildung}) and the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{90} Wolff (2013) pp. 487, 479; see also 6.2 for details on Germany as a civilian power.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Carothers (2010) p. 13.
\item \textsuperscript{92} Burnell (2000b) p. 36.
\item \textsuperscript{93} Erdmann (1996) p. 143; Philipps (1999) p. 80.
\item \textsuperscript{94} Mair (2000) p. 128; van Wersch/de Zeeuw (2005) p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{95} FES/KAS/FNS/HSS/HBS (1998) p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{96} Mair (2000) p. 129; Pinto-Duschinsky (1991a) p. 33.
\item \textsuperscript{97} Von zur Mühlen (2007) p. 49.
\end{itemize}
promotion of social structures (*Sozialstrukturhilfe*). Some grants already came from the AA at that time.\(^{98}\) As reasons for the establishment of the foundations’ international activity were considered the long-tradition of foreign political funding dating back to *Bismarck*, the German practice to outsource governmental tasks to non-public bodies and the approval of the U.S. when German foreign political possibilities were still limited.\(^{99}\) In the aftermath of the Nazi-dictatorship, it was more innocuous for German politics to internationally operate by means of non-governmental organisations than on governmental level avoiding the impression of imperialistic nostalgia.\(^{100}\) While in the beginning the foundations mainly implemented individual projects, the international and developmental activities systematically expanded in the following time.\(^{101}\) Due to limited resources the foundations’ activities were restricted to the short-term sending of German representatives abroad, invitation of representatives from the developing countries to Germany and training measures in Africa, Asia and Latin America. It was not until 1964 and 1965 that offices abroad were established.\(^{102}\) In 1973 the principles between the German government and the *Stiftungen* defined several development political task of the *Stiftungen*. They were supposed to contribute to social equality, political participation and the strengthening of economic independence though the cooperation with partners in the developing countries.\(^{103}\) Although development aid at that time was rather technical, it aimed at gaining the upper hand in the Bloc confrontation. In this hustle the foundations were useful to the German government.\(^{104}\) They pursued an approach to support social justice, national independence and to improve the economic and social conditions. Political participation was rather not part of their ambitions. At that time already, the political foundations began to move outside of the defined limits. In the 1980s several foundations supported

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\(^{98}\) *Pinto-Duschinsky* (1991a) p. 34. The other political foundations were not established at that time. The HSS started its international engagement in 1973, the HBS, than *Stiftungsverband Regenbogen*, followed in 1989 and the RLS in 2000. The AA’s funding for the activities in the industrialised world started in 1974.

\(^{99}\) *Pinto-Duschinsky* (1991a) p. 34.

\(^{100}\) *Wagner* (1994) p. 220.

\(^{101}\) *Böhler* (2005) p. 4.

\(^{102}\) *Von zur Mühlen* (2007) pp. 66f. highlighting the than pioneering role of the FES (p. 69).

\(^{103}\) BMZ (1973) p. 63.

\(^{104}\) See also 3.3.; *Von zur Mühlen* (2007) p. 71; on former technical development cooperation of the FES see annual report (1969) p. 18.
different political groups and governments in South Africa during apartheid and in the political struggles in Latin America.\textsuperscript{105} The end of the Cold War brought a stronger political focus and more independence since the foundations were now “no longer part of the great game”. Similar to international development policy focusing on good governance and political conditions in the early 1990s, the foundations paid increased attention to the promotion of political participation.\textsuperscript{106} A new regional focal point at that time became East Europe. In this context the foundations’ international work was extended from the developing and industrialised countries to the transition countries.\textsuperscript{107} Some assumed that the foreign political importance of the \textit{Stiftungen} diminished with the fall of the iron curtain due to the lack of instrumental use by German foreign policy.\textsuperscript{108} Others, on the contrary, assumed that the German foundations helped to maintain Germany’s role as civilian power.\textsuperscript{109} We will return to these considerations in the following chapters.

5.3.2. Literature review

The early literature on the German political foundations did not treat their international activities or still less their democratisation activities. An exception is Watson’s work of 1976 mentioning that “the new German democracy intends to teach democracy to autocratic countries”.\textsuperscript{110} With the increase of studies on the foundations’ international activity from the 1980s onwards, development became the focal point. Moreover, the significance of the \textit{Stiftungen} for the German foreign affairs was a matter of discussion. The first work focusing exclusively on the \textit{Stiftungs’} international activity by Werner in 1982, looked at the relevance of the \textit{Stiftungens’} international activity for both the political parties and German politics.\textsuperscript{111} In 1985 Forrester concentrated on the geographical distribution of development projects and showed for each foundation some regional preference, target

\textsuperscript{105} Mair (2000) pp. 132f. with details.
\textsuperscript{106} Mair (2000) p. 133.
\textsuperscript{107} Nuscheler (2005) p. 466; Egger (2007) p. 6; like other NGOs, the foundations were also integrated in CSZE-processes (Pogorleskaja [1997] pp. 29f.).
\textsuperscript{108} Mair (2000) p. 133.
\textsuperscript{109} Wolff (2013) p. 488, see 5.2.
\textsuperscript{110} Watson (1976) p. 3.
\textsuperscript{111} Werner (1982) p. 22.
group and fields of activity. While the literature written in the 1980s was initially more descriptive, detailed case studies on the foundations’ activities in the developing countries came up in the following years. Kress’s substantial analysis of 1985 looked at the FES’s and KAS’s cooperation with political partners abroad and compared their activities in Venezuela. In 1989 Schürmann analysed the KAS’s activity in India. However, these works did not contain cross references between German policies and the activities of the German foundations. Wagner, in contrast, investigated the German foundations’ foreign and development policy in Latin America in 1994. He looked at conditions, advantages and disadvantages describing the foundations’ autonomous activities as “semi-official” and concluding that the Stiftungen were of elementary importance for German Latin-American relations. He lastly predicted a shift of the foundations activities from South America to East Europe in the future, which matched with the actual development.

From the 1990s onwards, the literature on the Stiftungens’ international undertakings began to focus on the up-coming democracy promotion. In 1991 Pinto-Duschinsky dealt with U.S. and German foreign political aid. In this context he investigated the German foundations’ activities and some US organisations set up in the 1980s on the German model. According to Pinto-Duschinsky, political aid was the building of democracy. It forwarded donor government’s interests, impacts on the donor country’s political life and is highly cost-effective, unlike economic or military assistance. In the increasing use of non-governmental organisations by development and foreign ministries and the up-coming of public diplomacy he saw a reaction to the changing forms of international relations. The considerable number of independent states and the influence of political parties, unions and pressure groups made it essential for governments to enter the political arena in

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112 Forrester (1985).
115 Pinto-Duschinsky (1991a). Another article of 1991 dealt with the German foundations and party finance in Germany. Extensively Pinto-Duschinsky analysed the foundations’ role within the German party system while illustrating aspects of the foundations’ party links. He also studied the legislation governing the political funding in Germany (Pinto-Duschinsky [1991b]).
116 Pinto-Duschinsky (1991a) pp. 54ff.
foreign countries.\footnote{Pinto-Duschinsky (1991a) p. 62.} He concluded with the prediction that “payments for foreign politics will be increasingly significant instruments of modern diplomacy and development aid”.\footnote{Pinto-Duschinsky (1991a) p. 63.} In 1996 Mehl\textsc{e}r published a short article on chances of support programmes for democ\textsc{r}atisation in West Africa and the Stiftungens’ contribution.\footnote{Mehl\textsc{e}r (1996); see also Eyinla (1999) surprisingly titled the “West German political foundations” 9 years after the reunification although not taking a historical perspective.} Erdmann looked at the foundations’ democracy assistance activities in South Africa and Chile.\footnote{Erdmann (1996) pp. 157ff.} In his work in 2000 Mair, resuming the results of his cross-sectional comparison on democracy assistance carried out three years before, took a close look at the foundations’ democracy assistance in sub-Saharan Africa\footnote{Mair (2000), (1997).} supporting Pinto-Duschinsky’s argument\footnote{Pinto-Duschinsky (1991a) p. 38.} that foundations’ projects were often more political than they seemed.\footnote{Mair (2000) p.135.} In 2002 Pinto-Duschinsky mapped foreign sources of political funding in Latin America, focusing on the activity of the KAS giving grants to partner organisations.\footnote{Pinto-Duschinsky (2002) pp. 248-50.} He dealt with the legitimacy of giving money to politicians in foreign countries and established the link between democracy promotion and interference.\footnote{Pinto-Duschinsky (2002) p. 227.} In the following time, authors happened to be interested also in certain aspects of democracy assistance. In 2006 Erdmann published two analyses on political party aid. One dealt extensively with the German foundations’ party aid in Africa,\footnote{Erdmann (2006a).} while the other one looked more generally at issues in international party promotion.\footnote{Erdmann (2006b).} Erdmann understood party aid as synonym of party assistance which is part of the democracy assistance spectrum.\footnote{Burnell’s article forged links between globalisation and democratisation through international party aid referring to the Stiftungen among others.\footnote{Bohler (2006b) p. 123.} Moreover, Böhler discussed the foundations’ political dialogue activities, in his view, virtually a synonym for democracy.
assistance. He outlined especially the networking function of the foundations as well as their value orientation when promoting democracy.

Several studies took account of the foundations’ turn towards the countries in East and Central Europe. At the same time, more researchers happened to be interested in how the Stiftungen contributed to German and European foreign relations and how they practiced diplomacy in the transition countries. In 1999 Philipps treated the foundations’ activities of in Central-East Europe as “ideal-typical activities” in the field of democracy assistance though concluding with mixed results and supporting a rather limited ability of the foundations to “export” democracy. As already mentioned, in 1997 Pogorelskaja investigated the foundations’ activities in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Baltic States. She connected them to aspects of German foreign policy concluding that the foundations improved the bilateral relations with these states while party interests were rather secondary. Also the instrumental and actor characteristic of the Stiftungen in German foreign policy Pogorelskaja discussed in 2002. Due to the current process of denationalisation interdependences Pogorelskaja presumed that the role of the German Stiftungen in German foreign policy was about to increase. In 2006 Progorelskaja explored the German political foundations’ role in the EU policy towards the East European Countries (CEECS) and the CIS presenting exemplary the foundations’ activities in Russia. Pogoreskaja assumed that the German foundations could enrich European foreign and security policy, if they got deeper involved into the European neighbourhood policy. In 2009 she also treated the foundations’ activities

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130 See 4.2.1. for details.
131 Böhler (2005); on the German foundations’ political dialogue in Latin America, see (1991) p. 128.
132 An exception is the work of Renvert (2005) treating the non-developmental activities of the foundations in the U.S.A, for details see 6.3.1.
135 For details see 4.1.2.; Progorelskaja (2002a); Pogorelskaja (2002b) dealt with the foundations’ activity as part of the German domestic and foreign policy as well as their activity in the new German Federal Countries.
in the context of German foreign cultural policy\textsuperscript{139} and conflict prevention\textsuperscript{140}. In 2002 Dakowska studied the impact of the EU enlargement process on the identity of Polish political elites providing case studies on the activities of the KAS and the FES particularly active in the field of transnational communication. Dakowska considered the foundations as transmitter of political culture since they enable contacts between the CEEC and European parties which played an important role in the pre-accession period\textsuperscript{141}. In 2005 she concentrated on the foundations’ civic education in Poland\textsuperscript{142} and treated the FES’s activity in Poland between 1971 and the “peaceful revolution” accompanying the German policy towards East Europe.\textsuperscript{143} In 2007 Egger analysed in detail the activity of the FES in Mexico and Poland and their adaption to the transformation in East Europe highlighting that the foundation became successfully accustomed to the new contexts.\textsuperscript{144} As already outlined, Schneider-Deters treated the shift of the foundations’ activities away from civil education towards political dialog and civil diplomacy in East and Central Europe.\textsuperscript{145} The specific potential of the foundations he saw in the promotion of the convergence of Russia and the former Soviet republics at the European Union. He compared the foundations’ democracy assistance to US NGOs’ activity in this area.\textsuperscript{146} The work of Mohr of 2010 offered several regional case studies of the foundations’ democracy assistance addressing extensively the current issues around theses activities.\textsuperscript{147} In 2012 Renvert outlined in a short article the difficulties of the foundations’ democracy assistance in the Arab world and in the recent transformation processes.\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{139} Pogorelskaja (2009b), see 4.2.3.
\textsuperscript{140} Pogorelskaja (2009a); see 6.3.
\textsuperscript{141} Dakowska (2002) pp. 287, 288, 290; However, in this work the spotlight is rather on European politics and less on the German foundations. The same can be said for Dakowska (2005a).
\textsuperscript{142} Dakowska (2005b).
\textsuperscript{143} Dakowska (2005c); for a short portrait of the foundations’ activities in East Middle Europe after 1989 see also Pratsch-Hucko (2004).
\textsuperscript{144} Egger (2007) p. 362.
\textsuperscript{145} See 4.1.
\textsuperscript{146} Schneider-Deters (2005) p. 108. A similar comparison was conducted by Koschel (2005) on democracy assistance in Serbia.
\textsuperscript{147} Mohr (2010). Short case studies on the foundations’ democracy assistance in Russia, Bolivia and Turkey can be found at Wolff (2013) pp. 484ff.
\textsuperscript{148} Renvert (2012).
In the last decade there has been an increasing amount of descriptions of themselves by the German Stiftungen treating their international activity which are more self-reflected than earlier publications. In 2003 Beaugrand chronicled the founding of the KAS with the help of contemporary witnesses’ reports giving detailed historical insights.\(^{149}\) Von zur Mühlen, a historian who had worked for the FES from 1975 onwards dealt with the beginnings of the FES’s international activity and treated the period until the Cold War. It is a substantive work von zur Mühlen with several years of research in the FES’s archive.\(^{150}\) His work is part of a series of books published since 2007 on the history of the FES’s international work offering numerous country case studies and including internal documentation.\(^{151}\) In 2005 and 2006 the KAS treated its media encouragement and the rule of law support.\(^{152}\) Other publications treated its party cooperation in Middle, East and Southeast Europe providing a helpful overview on the party support activities in fourteen countries.\(^{153}\) An extensive presentation of the FES’s cooperation with political parties and liberation movements in Africa gave Vinnai in 2007.\(^{154}\) The foundations’ integration in foreign and development policy in the context of globalisation was also recognised by authors of the FES.\(^{155}\)

\(^{149}\) Beaugrand (2003); see also on this matter Beaugrand (2005), Hennig (1998).
\(^{150}\) Von zur Mühlen (2007).
\(^{151}\) See Adam (2012) concerning the FES’s democracy assistance in the developing countries in general; more specifically Muñoz Sánchez (2013) studied the activities of the FES at the end of the Franco dictatorship in Spain; Ehrke/Römpczyk (2013) concentrated on the activities in Serbia and the Baltic States; Hofmann/Vinnai/Benzing (2011) looked at Indonesia, Tanzania and Central America, Werz/Hofmann/Bussiek (2014) studied the cases Venezuela, Vietnam and Zimbabwe which posed challenges to the FES’s democracy assistance; the FES’s activities in the emerging countries of Chile, India and South Africa were the subject of Wille/Treydte/Vinnai (2010); Spanger/Reddies (2011) treated the FES’s undertakings in USSR/Russia and China. The activities in Turkey were discussed by Schumacher (2012); two thematic areas of democracy assistance were treated: Ritter-Weil/Treydte (2013) looked at the FES’s promotion of gender and media policy, while Eckl/Hofmann (2012) studied the FES’s cooperation with trade unions and the promotion of economic and social development; Veit (2013) constituted an exception to the above works. He treated the FES’s non-developmental activities in the northern hemisphere from 1989 onwards.
\(^{152}\) KAS (2005), (2006).
\(^{153}\) Fischer-Bollin (2006); KAS (2007d).
\(^{155}\) Hillebrand/Optenhögel (2001).
Until today the literature on the *Stiftungen* is still sparse and mostly written in German. Some authors assume that the foundations prefer to keep a low profile as they operate in very sensitive surroundings. This is an impression which the author can confirm as regards the conducted case studies.

### 5.3.3. Geo-political regions

In former times the *Stiftungen* seemed to “distribute” countries amongst each other. The FES in the 1980s had its regional focal point of the activity in Southeast Asia (ASEAN-countries) and the Iberian Peninsula. The KAS focused on Latin America. The FNS concentrated mainly on Africa and Latin America. The HSS, back than new in the international field, initially gave attention to Africa and became then active in the Pacific and Latin America complementing the work of the KAS. Despite these key regions the foundations had offices in other countries. In the 1990s the FES concentrated mainly on sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia. The KAS named Latin America as regional focal point, while the FNS focused on East Europe and Southeast Asia and the HBS on East Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. These indications by the foundations also corresponded with the regional distribution of the foundations international offices. In 2013, the regional dissemination was only partially consistent with that of the 1990s. The FES had most of their offices in Europe (29 offices). So did the KAS (22 offices). The focal points of the FNS in the 1990s could still be confirmed as regards East Europe (6 offices) and Asia (9 offices) though the Middle East/North Africa (6 offices)

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158 See Ch.7 and 8.  
162 It is difficult to receive information on the distribution of funds per region as the foundations’ annual reports generally do not outline such information with exception of the FNS (c.f. FNS annual report [2013] p. 66) and the HBS (c.f. HBS annual report [2013] p. 3). In former times such information had been included in the annual reports (see c.f. KAS annual reports 1977-1993); van Wersch/de Zeeuw (2005) p. 22 gave the annual project expenditure for all political foundations by region: 23 % to Eastern Europe and Euro-Asia, 22% to Central and South America, 21% to Asia, 20% to Africa and 14% to North Africa and the Middle East.
was also important. The former HBS’s focus on East Europe was still obvious in the spread of offices (8 offices) while in sub-Saharan Africa there was almost the least number of HBS’s bureaus. The regional distribution of the youngest of the foundations, the RLS, was relatively balanced. The HSS had a regional focus on Asia regarding the distribution of offices (21 offices). The shifted focus towards the countries in East, Southeast and Central East Europe, which had already been noted by the literature, could be thus confirmed. A comparison between the numbers of offices in West, Middle and South Europe and those in Southeast, East and Central-East Europe showed about twice as many offices in the latter region (see figure 5.2). Besides their country offices the foundations often had regional offices. This allows especially the smaller foundations to ensure project work in countries where they do not have a local office. Several foundations can be generally found in one country.

![Figure 5.2: Number of foundations’ offices in European countries in 2012/13](image)

164 The FNS, for example, was active in 72 countries (FNS annual report [2013] p. 58) although the actual amount of offices was at 47 country offices and 7 regional offices (FNS [2013a] p. 9).
165 Author’s diagramm, see for the sources Ch. 5 fn. 166. The region Southeast, East and Central-East Europe includes Russia, Belarus and the Caucasus.
The overall distribution of all foundations offices is relatively balanced (see figure 5.3). Most of the total numbers of foundations’ offices are in Europe (26%) followed by Asia (25%). In sub-Saharan Africa the proportion of foundations’ offices is at 18%, in Latin-America at 16% and in the region North-Africa/Middle East at 12%. The share of offices in North-America is at 3%. Also the ODA grant distribution provided to the foundations by the BMZ in 2010 per region confirms this finding (see figure 5.4).

Figure 5.3: Regional distribution of all German political foundations’ international offices in 2012/13.

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166 Author’s diagram, sources: KAS annual report (2013) p. 100; FES annual report (2012) pp. 80f.; FNS at: http://www.freheit.org/Internationale-Politik/199c78/index.html# (accessed on 28/09/2015); RLS at: http://www.rosalux.de/weltweit.html; HBS annual report (2013) p. 3; HSS annual report (2013) pp. 84f. The region “Europe” includes Russia, Belarus and the Caucasus. Turkey counted for the Middle East. It was not differentiated between different types of offices and includes regional and thematic offices alike as long as they are not in the same place with other offices of the same foundation. The foundations’ headquarters are not considered.
5.3.4. The Stiftungen’s democracy assistance objectives

The Stiftungen assist democracy in the developing, emerging and transition countries using, as outlined, consulting and dialogue-oriented instruments.\textsuperscript{168} According to the BMZ, the foundations’ developmental tasks are “the sustainable promotion or establishment of democracy and civil society. That involves strengthening the key institutions in a democratic social order, such as parliaments, political parties and an independent judiciary, as well as promoting good governance and opportunities for civil society participation”.\textsuperscript{169} As a consequence, foundations’ international activities can be found in every democracy assistance sector.\textsuperscript{170} According to the above definition, the foundations are thus “ideal-types” of democracy assistants.\textsuperscript{171}

\textsuperscript{167} Author’s diagram on the basis of BMZ (2013b) pp. 30f. The BMZ chose slightly different regions than the foundations and did not give any further specifications.


\textsuperscript{169} BMZ at: http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/approaches/bilateral_development_cooperation/players/political_foundations/index.html.

\textsuperscript{170} It is impossible to define how much of the assistance is allocated for which sector as neither the Ministries nor the Stiftungen provide data on such aspects; similar Erdmann (2006a) p. 191.

\textsuperscript{171} See definition at 5.1.
Until the 1990s democracy assistance was not the only developmental activity of the *Stiftungen*. Around one third of funds were dedicated to the support of social structures which the BMZ financed from an additional budget title.\(^{172}\) The participation of broad levels of society was purposed by means of supporting self-help-organisations and cooperatives.\(^{173}\) Especially at the outset of activities in a country, it enabled contacts and acquired some insights on the country before working with higher political levels.\(^{174}\) It was mainly due to the financial cutbacks in the 1990s that the foundations refrained from this approach.\(^{175}\) In 1997, the payments for social structural projects were ceased. Ongoing and new projects in this field are since then funded by the BMZ’s regular budget item available to the *Stiftungen*. These funds allow tackling development political objectives beyond democracy assistance, such as the fight against poverty, as long as projects intent to change political structures.\(^{176}\) The support of social structures though still important for German development policy, is generally assigned to other organisations.\(^{177}\)

Since the beginning of the *Stiftungen*’ international activities, the specific focus on democracy assistance sectors has often changed and was determined by the geo-political regions.\(^{178}\) Although each foundation’s partner focus influences the used measures, there is no clear distribution of sectors among the foundations. The improvement of the electoral process has always been on the agenda of the German political foundations and is mainly evidenced by their party aid. The foundations’ intense cooperation with political parties, a unique characteristic in comparison with other German actors in this field, was already touched.\(^{179}\) The *Stiftungen* generally practice a “partisan approach” when supporting political parties which implies the assistance of ideologically affiliated political parties.\(^{180}\) Since the beginning of their international activities, the *Stiftungen* supported

\(^{172}\) *Erdmann* (2006a) p. 189; BMZ (1973) p. 67; Federal budget, Kapitel 2302 Titel 68703.


\(^{175}\) *Böhler* (2005) p. 9.

\(^{176}\) BMZ (2011a) p. 7.


\(^{178}\) See 4.2.

political parties dating back to the late 1950s in Spain. In 1973 the FES was even involved in the establishment of the Portuguese socialist party. In the 1970s party collaboration was at the foundations’ agenda in Africa. In the decades that followed, the foundations paid less attention to party aid in Africa until it became a primary focus from the mid-1990s onwards. In the 1980s the foundations supported heavily political parties in Latin America. From 1989 onwards then flourishing political parties in Central-East Europe were assisted. Soon afterwards the foundations focused on fraction and members of parliament. Nowadays, the direct financial support of political parties abroad as well as the financing of election campaigns is, however, not permitted for the German Stiftungen according to the Federal budget law. Nonetheless, some authors noted the direct funding of political parties’ institutes in order to circumvent this regulation. Also campaigns were supported indirectly. In Central-East Europe, for example, the foundations offered programs to affiliated party members in order to learn about successful campaigning as well effective media for the respective affiliated partners. Moreover, activities of the foundations have also been noted as regards electoral aid. During the 1990s the AA collaborated with the Stiftungen in Africa which were in charge of the technical preparation. Today, there are also cases when the foundations monitored elections with local partners. Moreover, the Stiftungen assist state institutions abroad. They help to professionalise key democratic institutions and concentrate on constitutional advice, on the support of legislators, and the judiciary. The foundations also focus on

183 Philipp (1999) p. 83, they chose also social and economic partners in addition.
184 Schneider-Deters (2005) p. 112.
185 Federal budget, Kapitel 2302 Titel 68704.
186 Pogorelskaja (2009a) pp. 44f.; Mair (2000) p. 142; Philipp (1999) is giving the example of the Czech Klaus foundation only founded to implement projects with the KAS (p. 83).
189 FES (2005c) p. 28 referring to the presidential election in Madagascar in 2001.
minority rights. The promotion of the rule of law is a priority of the KAS. In Chapter 7 we will analyse these activities in detail. Also the other foundations implement rule of law measures. Moreover, the foundations improve professionalism in communal politics and public administration. Although civil-military relations are rarely mentioned in the literature and the foundations’ publications, the activities of the FES in Thailand as presented in Chapter 8 show such aid. Also Mohr noticed an explicit focus of the HSS on military issues and their role in democracies. Finally, the German political foundations are active in the civil society sector. In the early 1990s, similar to the international trend in democracy assistance, the foundations focused on civic education. While some authors observed a shift from the promotion of self-help organisations to the enhanced support of elites by focusing on managers, decision makers and disseminators from the mid-1990s onwards, this trend cannot be confirmed. As already outlined, the support of NGOs and other civil target groups is part of all foundations’ partner portfolios. Moreover, they also back young professionals, women’s and youth organisations, academics, medium companies and economic associations among others. Despite the tendency to work with governments, the conducted interviews showed a substantial flexibility regarding the choice of partners which also depended on the available partner structure in the country. As already outlined, the support of the free press and media is part of the foundations international activity. In the beginning the support of trade unions was practiced by most foundations. Today, it is a key component in the FES’s democracy assistance due to their affiliation with the Federation of German trade

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197 Pascher (2002) p. 65 and Pogorelskaja (2009b) p. 297 assuming, on the contrary, a shift towards the cooperation with civil society organisations and broad levels of society.
198 See 4.2.; see Merz (2006) for activities with youth organisations in Palestine.
unions (DGB).\textsuperscript{200} However, direct financing of unions as well as of labour disputes are prohibited for the foundations.\textsuperscript{201}

The overall politicisation of foundations’ activities abroad is what differentiates the foundations from other actors in this field. While \textit{Forrester} in the 1980s still differentiated between the “foundations’ political activity” and their “developmental activities”,\textsuperscript{202} from the 1990s onwards, most of the foundations’ activities were finally considered as political. Even projects seemingly or declared non-political often have political intent.\textsuperscript{203} “Civil education” is the label and budget item for all foundations’ activities financed by the BMZ, hence, mainly all types of democracy assistance apart from electoral aid which is financed by the AA.\textsuperscript{204} The foundations do not strictly separate between the democracy assistance sectors. The KAS rule of law support, for instance, also includes the support of NGOs.\textsuperscript{205} There are also meta-aspects which are relevant for all work areas. The FES, for instance, focus on the promotion of women and gender equality as a cross-cutting issue.\textsuperscript{206} Also the foundations’ IPD-departments in the industrialised countries serve indirectly the democracy assistance program, as they include stakeholders from the developing countries in dialogue processes.\textsuperscript{207}

The foundations characteristics in development cooperation are the long-term presence of the foundations’ field representatives, the long-term partnerships and short term initiatives as well as their value orientation.\textsuperscript{208} They also undertake activities that go beyond the democracy assistance spectrum and are rather part of a state-building approach. It includes, among others, approaches for decentralisation and the modernisation of public administration,\textsuperscript{209} security sector reforms,\textsuperscript{210} economic strengthening,\textsuperscript{211} and

\textsuperscript{200} FES annual report (2012) p. 84; FES (2005c) p. 68.
\textsuperscript{201} German federal budget law.
\textsuperscript{202} \textit{Forrester} (1985) pp. 55, 59.
\textsuperscript{203} \textit{Pinto-Duschinsky} (1991a) p. 38; \textit{Pogorelskaja} (2009a) p. 29.
\textsuperscript{204} German federal budget law: The budget item is named “politische Bildung” which can be translated as “civil education”.
\textsuperscript{205} KAS (2013d).
\textsuperscript{206} FES (2005c) pp. 33ff.
\textsuperscript{207} \textit{Mohr} (2010) p. 238; see 4.2.1.
\textsuperscript{209} BMZ (2010) p. 22 on KAS’s activities; this is also a focal point for the HSS (2014b).
\textsuperscript{210} See 6.3.2.
the support of human rights. Nonetheless, the foundations’ undertakings do not only take place in fragile or post-conflict states and have a strong focus on the support of civil societies which speaks against an emphasis on state-building. Despite their short-term measures, the foundations expect actual changes to happen in a long period of time. They thus support, like the German government, a developmental approach to democracy assistance as they concentrate on long-term processes of political development.

**Conclusion**

Certain actor advantages and benefits for German politics stem from the construct of the German political foundations’ democracy assistance. Moreover, the foundations also have comparative advantages over other actors in the field of democracy assistance. Already in 1982 Werner judged that the foundations’ independence lead to a wider frame of action for the foundations. While governments were obliged to work together with other governments, the foundations could chose from a wide range of partners to cooperate with. High versatility and flexibility have been attested to the foundations for their developmental activities. They are able to take advantage of windows of opportunity and to work in difficult political surroundings, like in Sudan or Myanmar. They enable the establishment and the keeping of contacts with opposition leaders and members of liberation movements which might come into power and which cannot be achieved by official diplomats which are too sensitive for the formal arms of government and which could be undoubtedly viewed as intrusion. This ability to operate in “a grey zone” as well as to cultivate lasting and close partnerships has been stressed as a major advantage. Moreover, the ability

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211 In line with their liberal tradition the FNS supports cooperatives and self-help organisations and similar to the KAS enterprise federations. (Mohr [2010] p. 116); the support of market economy was a focus in East Europe (Bartsch [1998] p. 189); critically Schneider-Deters (2005) p. 118.
213 Rüland/Werz (2002) p. 84.
214 See also conclusion Ch. 5.
to choose either political or civil society partners is advantageous for the foundations. In case the countries’ political development does not allow the cooperation with political actors or is politically difficult, the withdrawal to civil society actors helps to keep a “foot in the door”.  

A recent example is the democracy assistance activity of the Stiftungen in Tunisia in 2011. Despite the foundations long-standing presence in Tunisia before the start of the Arab Spring in 2010, the KAS, HSS and FNS had problems to find partners as the existing political parties were mainly leftist. In contrast to the FES, which collaborated with Mustapha Ben Jafaar, founder and leader of the *Forum démocratique pour le travail et les libertés* (FDTL) and since 2011 president of the constituent assembly, the other foundations concentrated on enterprises and market economic matters, and in case of the KAS, additionally on interreligious dialogue. At the same time, the foundations’ ability to rapidly react to short-term political changes becomes apparent. With little administrative effort and with additional means from a German governmental fund ad hoc created for the democracy assistance in North Africa, the subject became immediately part of the foundations’ international portfolio.

Since different foundations’ representatives usually complement each other’s activities by focusing on different political parties, Germany advantageously “can hope to gain a friend as head of the government no matter who wins”. At the same time, this construct contributes to a pluralistic society enabling the exchange of different views and productive political discussions. The foundations also focus on different values: The FES is dedicated to social democratic values, the FNS to liberal values and both, the KAS and the HSS to Christian and federal democratic values. The HBS feels bound to ecological and emancipatory values and the RLS on

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221 Pinto-Duschinsky (1991a) p. 45.

222 Wagner (1994) p. 170 f.; Pogorelskaja (1997) refers to a „bridging function” of the foundations in this context (p. 28).
social and participatory values. In this respect the legitimate support of democratic pluralism is a positive outcome. Furthermore, the outsourcing of activities which are originally tasks of the ministry to the foundations is advantageous as regards efficiency. The costs of government employees are generally higher in contrast to staff members of the foundations. Moreover, the parliamentary control of the ministry does not apply to the foundations undertakings. Another benefit deriving from the foundations international activities is the protection of international relations on a long-term basis.

A change of government in Germany does not lead to the termination of successful foundations’ projects abroad. This bears comparison with the concept of public administrations in relation to the varying governments. In contrast to other organisations active in democracy assistance, the foundations’ budget is assumed to be the highest. While the fact that Germany had not been among the colonial powers was at the beginning of development policy a disadvantage, for the democracy assistance activities it is helpful as activities appear rather “neutral”. According to the then Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Dirk Niebel, the German political foundations are the important backbone of the German development work. At the same time, they are considered as “Germany’s most powerful diplomatic asset.” Development policy is a multi-purpose system including various interests. It allows that actors take different roles. It is highly political and can be therefore easily made subject of a public diplomacy portfolio. As ideal types of democracy assistants the German political foundations simultaneously support a collaborative public diplomacy approach which focuses on values and dialogue processes. The above consideration on democracy assistance will be connected to public

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227 Interviews 13, 14; Schürrmann (1989) p. 178.
228 See 1.8.3.
230 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30/12/2011
diplomacy in the case study on the KAS’s rule-of-law program in Southeast Europe.  

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234 Ch. 7.
Chapter 6 - The German political foundations: Conflict managers?

The literature on the practical aspects of public diplomacy does not only highlight democracy assistance as one such form. It also looks at transnational actors’ supportive role in peace-building and other peace-maintenance activities in international conflicts as a catalytic diplomatic activity. Public diplomacy’s mediating role has also been stressed when it comes to conflicts among different values such as Western and Islamic ideals. Moreover, the bridging of social and political divides and the transformative strength of dialogue in conflict management processes through trust-building collaborative activities has been highlighted. In these cases, the affinity of public diplomacy and track two diplomacy, in which third parties can operate as facilitators or mediators, is striking. The idea that dialogue processes can help to mitigate, prevent and solve conflicts can furthermore be found in concepts of foreign cultural policy.

While conflicts until the end of the Cold War were mainly such clashes between states or alliances, the security situation of the 21st century’s multipolar system is much more complex, ranging from transnational and regional conflicts to various intra state disputes and classic two-state-conflicts. The prevailing opinion assumes that these situations require comprehensive and networked proceedings which are based on military and civil components and the involvement of various state and non-state actors. Current conflict management consequently faces a broad range of tasks and

1 See Ch. 5.
2 Hocking (2011) p. 230. At times the connection between public diplomacy and international conflicts is understood differently. Pratkanis (2009), for instance, analyses the use of public diplomacy in terms of social influence and strategies used to legitimise activity or to change the enemy’s opinion among others (p. 111).
4 Cowan/Arsenault (2008).
6 See 3.1.; Cowan/Arsenault (2008) p. 26. Track two diplomacy as the unofficial representative’s interaction which aims at conflicts’ transformations refers mainly to three different processes: to problem-solving workshops and meetings among conflicting parties, the influence of public opinion and cooperative economic development to support the peace process (Montville [1990] pp. 163ff.; Boleski [2007] pp. 39ff.).
covers a long period of time. The modern conflict situation and the assumed dependence between development, peace and democracy also renewed interest in development cooperation as democracy assistance can help to stabilise a conflict situation. Instability, in turn, is often viewed as a central reason for missing development successes. The international community frequently discusses this interdependence in connection to its own security. High competence and flexibility has been attributed to transnational actors when dealing with the recent conflict situations. In some fields, such as humanitarian aid and early warning, governments and IOs almost completely depend on non-state actors.

Supportive functions have been increasingly but still rarely attributed to the German political foundations. As will be shown, they undertake a wide range of conflict management activities. The chapter’s first section offers a systematisation of the management of international conflicts shedding light on the establishment of complex approaches and defining transnational actors’ general activities and concrete measures along the conflict management cycle. The following section summarises the official German ambitions in this field. Finally, the German political foundations are put in these contexts. Their activities are analysed according to the established framework and illustrated with several examples.

6.1. Crisis and conflict management

Since the end of the Cold War the security field has enlarged revealing space for transnational actors to become involved. From their traditional humanitarian and developmental role they expanded their position to the

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9 C.f. UN Secretary General (2011), see also 5.1. Peace can be defined as the “facilitation of non-exploitative, sustainable and inclusive social relationships free from direct and indirect violence and the threat of such violence” (Mac Ginty [2008] pp. 15ff., 24).
10 See 6.1.2; Burnell (2000a) p. 12.
management of conflicts corresponding with the increase of liberal peace building, the finding of dependence between development and conflict, a greater interest in the affected society and a modified definition of state sovereignty.\textsuperscript{15}

6.1.1. Comprehensive approaches

Comprehensive approaches emerged in the last decade to successfully manage conflicts internationally assuming that civil, political and military instruments need to be used together or sequentially.\textsuperscript{16} They are supposed to ensure legitimacy and coherence among the expanded number of actors involved. While comprehensive approaches are used on the international level, the coordination of different interdepartmental policy areas on the national level is termed as whole-of-government approach.\textsuperscript{17}

The establishment of comprehensive approaches coincided with an expanded concept of security: While security during the Cold War mainly referred to that of states, individual security has increasingly come to the fore becoming particularly apparent in the principle of human security.\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, the averting of danger made way for precaution and risk management often highlighted in preventative crisis management concepts. While before the 1990s security mainly referred to military threats, humanitarian aspects became central in the following time relating to human rights. Security was furthermore extended from the national territory to the international space, often referring to global security as world society’s security.\textsuperscript{19} Moreover, internal and external security became increasingly connected.\textsuperscript{20} Internal security, generally very institutionalised by means of cooperation among security services, refers to the political system’s

\textsuperscript{15} Goodhand/Walton (2012) pp. 430ff. Due to the non-uniformly application, I use conflict and crisis interchangeably. Conflict inherent in every social relationship is a socially constructed reality created through interaction inseparable from the cultural frameworks in which it has emerged (Lederach [1995] p. 9). In accordance with the peace definition (Ch. 6 fn. 9) it can be defined as a system or action of exploitation, exclusion, and of limited opportunity and direct violence (Mac Ginty [2008] p. 59).
\textsuperscript{17} Major/Pietz/Schöndorf/Hummel (2011) p. 43.
\textsuperscript{19} Daase (2010).
\textsuperscript{20} Endreß/Petersen (2012).
protection against internal enemies while external security relates to outside threats. The multilateral cooperation of states and various other actors in order to avert to various threats is termed as “co-operative security”.

Comprehensive approaches and the broad notion of security are also relevant in the international discussions on the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) aiming at protecting human beings from strong violations of human rights and humanitarian law. In 2001 the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty defined R2P as a principle formulating three responsibilities: to prevent such a situation, to react to it and to reconstruct. Subsequently, the UN outlined a list of situations, such as genocide, war crimes and ethnic cleansing in which R2P applies. UN General Secretary Ban Ki Moon added three pillars of R2P in 2009: (1) the responsibility of the state to protect its own population, (2) the responsibility of the international community to help states meet this requirement through international assistance and (3) the timely and decisive response in case of the state’s failing including military intervention and, as ultimate rationale, the use of force. Since then the UN Security Council referenced R2P in several cases, such as South-Sudan, Syria and Libya, but only in the context of pillar one.

The application of comprehensive approaches becomes apparent in the international dealing with fragile states combining democracy assistance and military intervention. Complex approaches can also be found in the literature on diplomacy, assuming that state diplomacy alone is not able to transform conflicts and stressing the importance of transnational actors. This is particularly apparent in Hocking’s catalytic diplomacy model.

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23 R2P is part of the debate on humanitarian interventions defined as the protection of human rights of people who are nationals and/or residents of a country by another country or a group of countries through threats or the use of force (EP [1994] p. 3). R2P is wider as it includes components of prevention, reconstruction and non-military reaction. On the discussion whether R2P is a principle, concept or norm, see Rudolf (2013) pp. 12ff. China and Russia generally reject R2P referring to Article 2(7) UN Charta (Masala [2008] p. 23). On R2P as great powers’ instrument see Mallavarapu (2013).
26 UN (2009b) pp. 8f.
Collaborative approaches focus on long-term and dialogue processes, the building of capacity in civil society, the enhanced public support and structural development.\footnote{Davies/Kaufman (2002); Cowan/Arsenault (2008).} Also approaches which combine development, diplomacy and defence have been identified aiming at stabilising the recipient country and gaining its acceptance while donors pursue military interests.\footnote{Amos (2014) p. 147.}

6.1.2. Transnational actors’ instruments in conflicts

In conflict situations transnational actors take various peace-supporting activities comprising some general tasks and concrete measures along the conflict management cycle. Civil approaches, collaborative public diplomacy and track two diplomacy generally stress transnational actors’, advocacy networks’ and epistemic communities’ establishment of trust-based and communicative relations, dialogic interactions and information and ideas exchange among conflict parties.\footnote{Heinrich/Lange (2009) p. 254; Azar (2002) p. 23; Cowan/Arsenault (2008); Hocking (2011) p. 230; Mbabazi/MacLean/Shaw (2005); Simon (2002); Bolewski (2007) coined the term soft-track-two diplomacy (p. 39).} Moreover, the informal diplomatic function of think tanks was highlighted offering neutral spaces of interaction for those searching for conflict resolution policies which can cover public and private actors’ networks.\footnote{Stone (2011) pp. 244f.} Also transnational actors’ policy work in conflicts was mentioned aiming at winning over governments and international institutions. It comprises agenda-setting, campaigning, coalition building and the generating of knowledge through analytical skills and information accessed on-site.\footnote{Hocking (2011) p. 230; Goodhand/Walton (2012) pp. 434f. A typical example is the successful International Campaign to Ban Landmines (Stephenson [2011] pp. 399f.).} The latter is also relevant in the non-state actors’ involvement in early warning defined as the methodical gathering and analysis of information on the crisis in order to foresee violent developments offering policy options to decision makers and institutions.\footnote{Bakker (2001) pp. 264f., 267, 272.} Capacity building in affected civil societies, the promotion of public support
for the peace processes and the encouragement for justice were furthermore identified as transnational engagement in conflicts.\textsuperscript{34}

All of these transnational actors’ general tasks are also conspicuous in concrete measures along the conflict management cycle. According to the ideal-typical model of Major/Pietz/Schöndorf/Hummel, there are four different phases of a (potential) crisis to which actors can react with specific measures (see table 6.1).\textsuperscript{35} In the first phase crisis prevention measures are involved as the situation is peaceful or at least armed conflicts do not occur. In the second period, actors can react to the crisis with mediation and intervention instruments. In the following phase, in which an armed conflict has broke out, crisis management refers to conflict transformation measures, while the later fragile post-conflict phase makes tools of peace consolidation necessary. Measures can often be used in several phases and at times overlap.\textsuperscript{36} As the conflict’s process is circulating, the last phase potentially leads into the first period. In practice, the phases are difficult to determine and frequently in the same region the peace and conflict situation varies tremendously.\textsuperscript{37} The whole conflict management cycle is ideally guided by certain principles, such as R2P, human security, do-no-harm, local ownership and UN resolution 1325 on the involvement and protection of women in conflict processes.\textsuperscript{38} There are several actors involved in the management of crisis: The EU and the UN are potentially active in all phases of a conflict. While the OECD implements measures in the field of crisis prevention and peace consolidation, NATO can step in when it comes to escalation and armed conflicts.\textsuperscript{39} Moreover, states are multilaterally and bilaterally involved in the management process as well as transnational

\textsuperscript{34} Goodhand/Walton (2012) pp. 433ff.
\textsuperscript{35} Major/Pietz/Schöndorf/Hummel (2011) p. 6; for a similar systematisation on transnational actors’ instruments see Fischer (2006) pp. 6ff.
\textsuperscript{36} In Afghanistan (as of 11/2014) the multilateral peace enforcement ISAF mission is for example combined with the political United Nations Assistance Mission mainly active in peacebuilding. Parallel to this, the Operation Enduring Freedom US-led and without a UN mandate is active.
\textsuperscript{37} Schaller/Schneckener (2009) p. 10.
\textsuperscript{38} See 6.1.1. “Do-no-harm” refers to the necessary conflict sensibility as external intervention might cause negative effects. “Local ownership” stresses the importance of local actors to be involved in the crisis management phases in order to ensure sustainability (Major/Pietz/Schöndorf/Hummel [2011] pp. 10ff.).
\textsuperscript{39} NATO, however, assumes its activity even “before and after the crisis” (NATO [2010] pp. 7f.). On the problematic relationship between these IOs see Giegerich (2012) pp. 95f., 102; Yost (2007) pp. 88f.
actors whose activities and available instruments are particularly important for the analysis of the German political foundations’ conflict management.

The conflict prevention instruments implemented in the first phase of the conflict attempt to resolve conflicts with peaceful measures and low costs. Despite the importance of conflict prevention for most international actors’ agendas timely action is often missing as seen in Rwanda and Kosovo in the 1990s and in Darfur in 2004 and 2005. A positive case is the implementation of the UN preventative deployment force in Macedonia in 1995. In the prevention phase transnational actors implement the instruments of small arms control, political missions, reforms of the security sector (SSR), and election observation. Small arms control comprises measures to prevent illegal access to small weapons and to improve the control of legal arms trade. Political missions are a collective term for primarily civilian missions by international organisations including a wide variety of different measures such as humanitarian action, human rights monitoring, development work, peace-building and traditional diplomacy. Often political missions follow peace-keeping operations. SSR aims at transforming the dysfunctional bodies responsible for internal and external security and involving primarily military and police institutions, the respective political levels, the jurisdiction and the intelligence services. Election observation, closely connected to democracy assistance (see 5.1), refers to the monitoring of the electoral process by external and local actors stemming from the idea that elections help democratically stabilise conflictive situations.

During the conflict’s second phase transnational actors mediate and intervene through multidimensional peace-keeping and conflict resolution.

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40 It is disputed whether conflict prevention only applies to situations in which the conflict is not yet broken out (Gareis [2006] pp. 208f.) or also when the conflict’s reoccurrence should be avoided (Varwick [2002] p. 5). The latter assumption is convincing when, as outlined, the conflict’s process is understood as a cycle.
Peace-keeping involves international troops stationed in the conflict region. In contrast to peace-building, where certain actors are supported to strengthen capacity locally, it is a neutral approach.\(^{47}\) Traditional peace-keeping bases on Chapter VI of the UN Charter and requires the conflicting parties’ approval. There are several other forms like peace enforcement and observer missions.\(^{48}\) In multidimensional approaches traditional peace-keeping is supplemented by a civil component, such as election monitoring or the training of police forces. For traditional and multidimensional peace-keeping, UN troops (Blue helmets) are deployed using force for their self-defence.\(^{49}\) Transnational actors’ conflict resolution covers activities trying to diplomatically and dialogically end the conflict through mediation and good offices. Mediation is the structured, results-oriented decision-making process for a mutually agreed solution. Good offices provide the logistical prerequisites for direct talks of the conflicting parties.\(^{50}\) Both are also part of track two diplomacy.\(^{51}\) As outlined by the public diplomacy literature, part of conflict resolution is also collaboration in which participants from different (conflicting) countries work together on projects of general interest.\(^{52}\)

In the transformational conflict phase, civil actors offer humanitarian aid and can participate in multidimensional peace-keeping and civil-military co-operations (CIMIC). Humanitarian aid is defined as a life-saving activity in armed conflict focusing on the short-term relief to those in need including the provision of shelter, food and health services.\(^{53}\) It bases on the principles of non-interference, neutrality, impartiality and independency.\(^{54}\) CIMIC was defined in the context of NATO missions and has three core functions: the


\(^{48}\) Peace enforcement, frequently a UN-led mission regulated by Chapter VII UN Charter allowing the use of weapons, aims at the termination of fighting by use of compulsive acts, at the separation of the parties of conflict even against their will and at securing the respect of the ceasefire (Schaller/Schneckener [2009] pp. 10f.). The forces are not UN troops and come from the involved countries. Observer missions are typically smaller unarmed operations.


\(^{50}\) Liese (2005) pp. 549f. For transnational actors active in conflict resolution the term CROs (Conflict resolution organisations) was coined (c.f. Amos [2014] p. 146).


\(^{52}\) See 3.1.1.


\(^{54}\) Kloke-Lesch/Poeschke (2013) p. 300.
establishment of civil-military relations in general, the civil forces’ support through insights into the civilian situation, and the support of civil institutions and actors to increase the acceptance of the forces on-site.\textsuperscript{55}

The last phase of the conflicts’ peace consolidation offers the most instruments for non-state agents. An important task is peace-building as a cross-cutting measure comprising other means which can also be used independently.\textsuperscript{56} It was first mentioned in 1992 in the UN Agenda for Peace of the then general secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali referring explicitly to the consolidation phase after the armed conflict ended. This temporal determination has gained ground in the literature and political practice.\textsuperscript{57} In 2005 the UN created the Peace-building Commission elaborating strategies for conflict-affected countries and coordinating the funding members.\textsuperscript{58} The Peace-building Fund established in 2006 provides financial resources to countries emerging from conflict.\textsuperscript{59} Peace-building aims at the removal of wars’ political, economic, social and psychological consequences and focuses on the conflicts’ structural reasons. It mixes security-political and development-political approaches with a central focus on local capacity-building.\textsuperscript{60} The security dimension of peace-building includes the measures of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and the establishment of efficient political, legal and penal structures including SSR. While disarmament and demobilisation generally make a military component necessary, the reintegration of former combatants is part of civil actors’ long-term engagement.\textsuperscript{61} Peace-building’s political dimension attempts to build political institutions focusing on the rule of law, the observance of human rights, free elections and the establishment of political parties. The socio-economic dimension includes economic recovery, the rebuilding of infrastructure, the promotion of the economic, health and

\textsuperscript{55} Paul (2008) p. 3.  
\textsuperscript{56} Major/Pietz/Schöndorf/Hummel (2011) p. 6.  
\textsuperscript{57} UN (1992) Sec. 55ff. Peacebuilding is partly used as a generic term for peace enforcement, peacekeeping (Doyle/Sambanis [2000] p. 781) and peacemaking (Berridge/James [2003] pp. 200f.).  
\textsuperscript{58} UN at: \url{http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/mandate.shtml}.  
\textsuperscript{59} UN at: \url{http://www.unpbf.org/who-we-are/}.  
\textsuperscript{60} Schaller/Schneckener (2009) pp. 10f.  
educational sectors and the combat of criminal structures. In the context of the psycho-social dimension, the reintegration of refugees and war victims, the dealing with war crimes, reconciliation and transitional justice processes can be initiated. Reconciliation has several linked components, such as the healing of survivors, retributive or restorative justice and the seeking for publicly recognized truth and reparations. Transitional justice embraces judicial and non-judicial measures against the violation of human rights including institutional reforms, truth commissions and the establishment of victims’ organisations. Partly the literature assumes a fifth dimension of peace-building, integrating the neighbouring regions into the peace process and promoting the conflict countries’ (re)integration into the international structures and markets. Part of the conflict’s consolidation phase are furthermore democracy assistance, the establishment of international tribunals and police missions as well as the before mentioned political missions, conflict resolution, small arms control, election observation and CIMIC. International tribunals cover the international criminal court (ICC) and other tribunals limited in time and region. They are not completely recognised by the international community. Transnational actors often lobby for the tribunals’ establishment or offer networked support. Police missions assist the security forces in crisis states and help creating internal security. Their scope has been continuously extended in the last decades to consulting and training for police forces, prosecution, frontier protection, and SSR.

66 See 5.1.; Major/Pietz/Schöndorf/Hummel (2011) mentioned “democracy promotion” (p. 25) but refer to democracy assistance.
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Table 6.1: Conflict management cycle and transnational actors’ instruments

6.2. German conflict management

German security policy from the unification onwards referred to a “transfer of stability”. It purposed the export of security and focused on conflict management as the violation of the German territorial integrity was no longer at risk. In 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling which followed the “out of area debate” on the German Armed Forces’ deployment outside the NATO territory regarding the 1991 Gulf War, brought significant changes. The ruling, in short, confirmed under constitutional law the German participation in combat and armed UN and NATO missions with parliament’s approval. While Germany had already

69 Major/Pietz/Schöndorf/Hummel (2011) p. 6. The systematisation originally included possible instruments of all involved actors.
70 BVerfGE 90, 286 of 12/07/1994 (Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court) so called “Blue-helmet-ruling”; Der Spiegel 29/1994 pp. 23ff. According to Article 24(2) German
participated in smaller UN-lead missions since the 1960s, its involvement in international military operation increased from 1994 having a strong focus on the determent of violence in Southeast Europe. As a consequence, the role of the German Armed Forces changed from a deterring to an intervention force while politically Germany followed the strategy of integrating its Eastern neighbours into the international structures. The most important missions regarding size and amount of involved German soldiers are the ISAF mission in Afghanistan of 2001 and the KFOR mission of 1999, both on-going, UN-mandated, and NATO-led peace enforcement missions.

Despite this increasing military course of action Germany has been partly characterised as a “through and through pacifist nation” which is, however, not convincing. As already touched, Germany is a classic civilian power which aims at civilising politics accepting cooperation, preferring non-military over military means and striving for supranational structures to deal with obstacles. In Germany, this is rooted in the experiences of the Second World War and National Socialism, the German division and the connected foreign political guidelines of the allies. Before and after the unification, Germany felt bound to the normative principles of the Western democracies, its foreign political predictability and the reliability to its partners. It is more oriented towards economic growth and social prosperity.
and less towards territorial expansion and becoming a great power.\textsuperscript{77} Since the end of the Cold War and until recently Germany has been repeatedly criticised by its partners for its military reluctance.\textsuperscript{78} The German reserve towards the Iraq War led to a tremendous crisis in German-U.S. relations. Although this reluctance was consistent with the civil power concept,\textsuperscript{79} other approaches interpreted the situation differently. According to the realist idea of Germany as the European central power, due to its geographic position, the size of its population, the strong economy and its cultural influence, Germany preferred an open conflict with the U.S. and increasingly militarised in the last two decades.\textsuperscript{80} This perspective, however, overlooks that German politicians, journalists and researches generally tend to avoid using the term “power” when referring to Germany.\textsuperscript{81} Also the German public is generally sceptical about military interventions.\textsuperscript{82} In 2013 \textit{Guido Westerwelle} still referred to a “culture of military reluctance” as the core of Germany’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{83} From a constructivist perspective \textit{Risse} argues that civilian power, multilateralism and European and pro-Western orientation are components of the German foreign political identity guiding the political preferences.\textsuperscript{84} Consequently, \textit{Risse} views the debates on the German rearmament and the participation in international military operations as debates on the German identity.\textsuperscript{85} The German support of international military operations is not a break with the civilian power concept since it is different from a pacifist policy renouncing the use of military means. Moreover, Germany has always preferred political over military solutions. \textit{Risse} convincingly regards the confrontation with the U.S. as a clash of the two components, civilian power and Western

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{77} \textit{Maull} (2007) p. 76.
  \item \textsuperscript{78} \textit{Gathmann/Medick/Weiland/Wittrock}, SPIEGEL Online, 27/08/2013; \textit{Braun}, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 25/08/2014; \textit{Joffe}, Die Zeit, 30/01/2014.
  \item \textsuperscript{79} \textit{Maull} (2007) pp. 79, 81.
  \item \textsuperscript{81} \textit{Bender} (2008) p. 4; \textit{Hacke} (1993) termed Germany a “world power against its will”.
  \item \textsuperscript{83} \textit{Friedrichs}, ZEIT Online, 15/01/2013.
  \item \textsuperscript{84} \textit{Risse} (2007b) pp. 50, 55 referring to \textit{Wendt} (1999); similar \textit{Hellmann/Wagner/Baumann} (2014) pp. 200f. \textit{Risse} (2007b) defines national identity as a sense of belonging to an imaginary community in a concrete territorial space which refers to the community’s characteristics and the differences vis-à-vis other groups (p. 52).
  \item \textsuperscript{85} \textit{Risse} (2007b) p. 54.
\end{itemize}
orientation, with the first prevailing. Others recently stressed that Germany develops towards a “civilian-military” power taking account of the increasing military involvement in the last decades. However, the German abstention to the resolution of a no-fly-zone in Libya in 2011 throws doubts on this assessment.

In line with its foreign political identity Germany is mainly multilaterally engaged in international conflict management taking as a basis a broad notion of security. It follows the peace imperative, as peace enjoys a priority position in the German constitution. Its preamble outlines that the adoption of the basic law is “inspired by the determination to promote world peace”. The government perceives state conflicts, cross-border organised crime and terrorism, poverty, struggles for resources, and the effects of climate change as threats and prefers a comprehensive approach coordinating the relevant areas of foreign, security, developmental, economic, financial and environmental policy. It understands conflict according to the conflict cycle. Multifaceted crisis management with emphasis on the civil component is outlined in the government’s action plan for “civil crisis prevention, conflict resolution and peace consolidation” (Aktionsplan) of 2004. Moreover, the “networked security” approach is summarised in the “White paper on security policy and the future of the German armed forces” (Weißbuch) published by the Ministry of Defence in 2006 assuming that military and civil means are equally important and multilaterally used for the achievement of broad security. Aktionsplan and

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Weißbuch are not coherent, however. The Aktionsplan does not refer to military means whereas “networked security” seems to include measures across departments but is often rejected by civil society actors due to its military origin. In practice, undertakings are not sufficiently coordinated among the different ministerial departments.\textsuperscript{96} Civil components are mostly financially and personally underequipped and subordinated to the military missions\textsuperscript{97} which in turn lack evaluation and legitimacy as the parliamentary decisions deviate from public opinion.\textsuperscript{98} Often Germany offers compensation for its military nonparticipation to partners being involved in battles.\textsuperscript{99} The Aktionsplan outlines 161 civil activities with long-term implementation scope,\textsuperscript{100} recognises the “Do no harm” concept\textsuperscript{101} and establishes connections to democracy assistance.\textsuperscript{102} However, it does not use notions uniformly. Prevention, for example, refers to the whole conflict cycle.\textsuperscript{103} Moreover, it lacks concrete measures\textsuperscript{104} and includes too many aspects not necessary part of a conflict prevention portfolio, such as the reactive fight against terrorism.\textsuperscript{105} Despite these issues and although Germany turned to conflict management rather late, it has continuously expanded its policy.\textsuperscript{106} In summer 2014 the Bundestag agreed to an increase of appropriations in the field of conflict prevention.\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{97} Nachtwei (2008) p. 6.
\textsuperscript{99} Bittner/Geis/Lau/Bernd/Wurmb-Seibel, Die ZEIT, 01/04/2013.
\textsuperscript{100} Bundesregierung (2004). Three reports were published on the Aktionsplan’s implementation: Bundesregierung (2006), (2008) and (2010).
\textsuperscript{101} Bundesregierung (2004) pp. 6f.
\textsuperscript{102} Bundesregierung (2004) p. 37. Already in 1980 the independent German North-South Commission had outlined the interdependence between development and stability (Brandt et al. [1980] p. 13)].
\textsuperscript{103} Bundesregierung (2004) p. 6; similar BMZ (2013c) p. 31.
\textsuperscript{104} Major/Schönfeld (2011) p. 3.
\textsuperscript{106} Bundesregierung (2012a) p. 22; Dückers/Mehler (2011) p. 266.
\textsuperscript{107} More than one third of the AA’s budget is assigned to the protection of peace and stability and covers 1,46 Billion Euro, an increase of 120,35 Million Euro compared to 2013. Almost 400 million Euros alone are provided for the subsection “humanitarian aid and crisis prevention” (Federal budget 2014, Kapitel 0501 Titelgruppe 03); Hausding, Das Parlament, 30/06/2014.
Apart from the general support of UN missions through membership dues and civil personal, its contribution to the UN peace-building fund\textsuperscript{108} and its engagement in the Peacebuilding Commission which it chaired in 2010,\textsuperscript{109} the AA additionally backs conflict management measures implemented by other IOs and NGOs. Since 1999 the government-supported Ifa-project (\textit{Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen}) “Zivik” constitutes the interface between the government and the implementing NGOs.\textsuperscript{110} The AA’s conflict management focus is on the rule of law, transitional justice, the support of women and the reintegration of child soldiers and former combatants.\textsuperscript{111} Concrete measures are the training of police forces, the formation of judges, SSR and the reinforcement of the civil society.\textsuperscript{112} Moreover, the AA supports single democracy assistance projects concerning constitutional bodies, election aid and election monitoring.\textsuperscript{113} Additional funding is provided for projects supporting the democratic transition in North Africa and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{114} German AKBP\textsuperscript{115} was assigned the role to mediate between cultures through dialogue processes, to be active in early warning and to establishment intercultural competence.\textsuperscript{116} The AA gives a special emphasis to the intercultural dialogue with the Islam.\textsuperscript{117}

The BMZ complemented to the \textit{Aktionsplan} and outlined its cross-sectoral concept on crisis prevention, conflict management and peace support in

\textsuperscript{108} AA at: \url{http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Friedenspolitik/Krisenpraevention/Massnahmen/Massnahmen_node.html}.
\textsuperscript{109} AA (2012b) pp. 35f. It was partly viewed as consolation for the permanent seat on the UN Security Council see Schneckener/Weinlich (2006) p. 21.
\textsuperscript{111} AA at: \url{http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Friedenspolitik/Krisenpraevention/Massnahmen/Massnahmen_node.html}.
\textsuperscript{112} AA at: \url{http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Friedenspolitik/Krisenpraevention/Massnahmen/Rechtsstaatlichkeit_node.html}.
\textsuperscript{113} AA (2010a) p. 32; AA at: \url{http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Friedenspolitik/Krisenpraevention/Massnahmen/Wahlbeobachtung_node.html}.
\textsuperscript{114} AA at: \url{http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/NaherMittlererOsten/Umbrueche-TSP/Projekte/111125_TP_Foerderung_node.html}.
\textsuperscript{115} See 3.3.
\textsuperscript{117} AA (2010b) p. 3.
which was replaced by the concept on “Development for peace and security, Development political commitment in the context of conflict, fragility and violence” in 2013. In 2008, crises prevention and peace development were termed as focal points of Germany’s development policy. So was the promotion of democracy and civil society. Projects of the BMZ focus on democracy, rule of law, good governance, human rights, promotion of the economy, protection of the resources and the environment, education, SSR and strengthening of the civil society. Along the conflict’s phases the BMZ promotes dialogue processes on various levels, government consulting, peace conferences, local peace projects, economic recovery and reconciliation. The BMZ-funded Civil Peace Service (ZFD) established in 1999 internationally seconds civil experts to partner organisations for conflict resolution tasks. Crisis management was also connected to a cultural and dialogue dimension in terms of intercultural acceptance and understanding.

Since 2005 the German government explicitly supports R2P and is member of the “group of friends” an informal union of states at UN headquarters supporting R2P as a principle whereas the literature criticises the German reluctance and a lack of coherence in this field. Moreover, the German government feels bound to UN resolution 1325. In 2012 it adopted an action plan for the resolutions’ implementation establishing the principle as cross-cutting theme and continuously

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119 The BMZ referred to the whole-of-government approach on fragile states (see 5.2.1) and on the peace and state-building goals of the High Level Forum on Aid effectiveness in Busan in 2011, see BMZ (2013c) p. 11.
120 BMZ (2008) p. 9; OECD (2010) p. 36; see 5.2.2.
121 BMZ at: http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/themen/frieden/krisenpraevention/index.html.
122 BMZ at: http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/themen/frieden/friedensfoerderung/index.html, http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/themen/frieden/konfliktbearbeitung/index.html.
126 BT (2011a) p. 17750.
129 Bundesregierung (2012b).
reported on respective German measures. Furthermore, it focuses on the concept of human security highlighting human rights and the security of people in conflict regions.

For the management of conflicts Germany established certain national structures. Since 2004 the inter-ministerial steering group on civil crisis prevention (Ressortkreis Zivile Krisenprävention) coordinates activities and ensures the Aktionsplan’s implementation. The advisory board for civilian crisis prevention (Beirat für zivile Krisenprävention) created in 2005 involves civil stakeholders from the fields of human rights, developmental and security policy. The parliamentary subcommittee on civilian crisis prevention, conflict management and integrated action established in 2010 enables the study of the subject in the Bundestag. It cooperates with the steering group. Moreover, the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) set up in 2002 strengthens German civilian capacities for international peace operations including the recruiting, training and deploying of civilian specialists and election observers as well as some academic activity. The Working Group on Peace and Development (FriEnt) founded in 2001 includes the BMZ and eight non-governmental members seeking to pool information and capacities through public events, expert meetings, publications, training measures and advice.

### 6.3. Conflict management of the German political foundations

Since the beginning of their international undertakings, the German political foundations have been active in countries of latent or acute conflicts. Scholars, however, did not become interested in this matter until the late 1990s. The attention grew simultaneously to the topic of civil conflict

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130 Most recently Bundesregierung (2014).
131 Bundesregierung (2004) p. 57; BMZ at: [http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/themen/frieden/friedensentwicklung/index.html](http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/themen/frieden/friedensentwicklung/index.html); Kloke-Lesch/Poeschke (2013) p. 293.
132 AA at: [http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Friedenspolitik/Krisenpraevention/NationaleStrukturen_node.html](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Friedenspolitik/Krisenpraevention/NationaleStrukturen_node.html).
134 FriEnt (2011).
management on the German political agenda.\textsuperscript{135} Conflict prevention, civil conflict management, the fight against terrorism and the dealing with fragile states are tasks increasingly assigned to the Stiftungen and mostly compatible with the existing foundations’ approaches. New strategies have been partly adopted as well. In this context, the foundations also profited from additional funding made available by the German government.\textsuperscript{136}

\textbf{6.3.1. Literature review}

Since the late 1990s the German political foundations’ conflict management and peace activities appear more often in the literature selectively and mainly in context of democracy assistance.\textsuperscript{137} In 1999 Ronge and Pascher’s article treated the foundations’ contribution to peace assuming that interaction on multiple levels builds trust.\textsuperscript{138} According to them, the foundations are able to modify and compensate foreign policy when working in countries of underdeveloped official diplomacy due to dictatorships or revolutionary regimes. The foundations furthermore mediate in cases of violent situations within one country, exemplified in Latin America, or in conflicts between two or several states, such as Israel and Palestine. Moreover, through the active participation in UN summits, the foundations influence a global peace policy.\textsuperscript{139} In 2000, however, Mair still identified a foundations’ disinterest in conflict management when many other actors had entered the domain already. He mentioned lacking capacities as a reason but stressed that the foundations’ democracy assistance, such as the provision of dialogue and discussion floras, already covered much of conflict management.\textsuperscript{140} In 2005 Renvert studied the foundations’ activities as regards the crisis between Germany and the USA due to the intervention in Iraq.\textsuperscript{141} Renvert saw an “early warning system” in the work of the foundations allowing to harmonise political tensions and to identify ways of cooperation.\textsuperscript{142} An increased significance of the

\textsuperscript{135} Schmidt (2007) p. 542.
\textsuperscript{138} Ronge/Pascher (1999) p. 190f.
\textsuperscript{139} Ronge/Pascher (1999) pp. 192ff.
\textsuperscript{140} Mair (2000) p. 148.
\textsuperscript{141} Renvert (2005) p. 3; see 4.3.2.
\textsuperscript{142} Renvert (2005) pp. 9, 23.
foundations in preventing intrastate and regional conflicts was noticed by Pogorelskaja in 2006.\footnote{Pogorelskaja (2006) p. 16.} In 2007 the foundations’ activities were mentioned briefly in the context of development cooperation with non-state armed groups exemplified by activities of the KAS in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of the HBS in Afghanistan.\footnote{Grävingholt/Hofmann/Klingebiel (2007) p. 83.} In 2009 Pogorelskaja identified foundations’ conflict management as a trend in the foundations’ international activity mentioning negotiations, mediation and “structure-oriented” long-term conflict prevention defined as democracy assistance.\footnote{Pogorelskaja (2009a) pp. 140ff. Prevention in her definition, however, seems to cover also dispute settlement and conflict transformation.} She noted a dense network of offices in the conflict regions of the Middle East and North Africa.\footnote{The findings of 5.3.3. on the offices’ distribution do not particularly support this argument although the territories’ size was not set in relation.} Other regional focal points are Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Caucasus. She concluded with a case study on the foundations’ activities in Uzbekistan lacking, however, specific measures in conflict management.\footnote{See 5.3.4.} Some descriptions of themselves by the German \textit{Stiftungen} have mentioned their peace-supporting activities. Hennig referred to the KAS’s contribution to discussions on security structures and conceptions and their democracy assistance in conflict regions such as Cambodia, Thailand, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Indonesia and Nigeria.\footnote{Hennig (1998) pp. 398, 400.} In 2005 Wahlers showed the intention to strengthen the KAS’s support of peace and security in the future.\footnote{Wahlers (2005) p. 49.} Gerster outlined the KAS’s support of the reconciliation processes between Israel and Germany which started in 1980 mainly through media and educational projects and later through think tank and consulting activities.\footnote{Gerster (2005).}

\section*{6.3.2. The conflict management objectives of the \textit{Stiftungen}}

The German political foundations’ democracy assistance in conflict regions has always supported peace on an overall level.\footnote{Interview 14.} Nonetheless, projects with a clear conflict perspective increased from 2000 onwards.\footnote{C.f. FES (2002) pp. 8f.} In 2007

\footnotesize{\begin{flushright}143 Pogorelskaja (2006) p. 16. \end{flushright}144 Grävingholt/Hofmann/Klingebiel (2007) p. 83. \end{flushright}145 Pogorelskaja (2009a) pp. 140ff. Prevention in her definition, however, seems to cover also dispute settlement and conflict transformation. \end{flushright}146 The findings of 5.3.3. on the offices’ distribution do not particularly support this argument although the territories’ size was not set in relation. \end{flushright}147 See 5.3.4. \end{flushright}148 Hennig (1998) pp. 398, 400. \end{flushright}149 Wahlers (2005) p. 49. \end{flushright}150 Gerster (2005). \end{flushright}151 Interview 14. \end{flushright}152 C.f. FES (2002) pp. 8f.}
the KAS outlined a stronger focus in their international work on security threats caused by fragile states and terrorism among others.\textsuperscript{153} However, it did not become a central task.\textsuperscript{154} The FES recently emphasised the importance of its conflict management\textsuperscript{155} and regards peace and security as a cross-cutting field\textsuperscript{156} and strategic goal.\textsuperscript{157} Also the FNS has more explicitly integrated conflict prevention and resolution to its activity portfolio in the last decade.\textsuperscript{158}

The foundations’ conflict management is closely related to the German official ambitions. The government recognised the important role of the \textit{Stiftungen} and referred to them in several documents. In 2005 the BMZ stressed the long-standing experience of the foundations (and other organisations) and their independently developed peace-building strategies.\textsuperscript{159} In 2013 it highlighted the foundations’ active shaping of peace and security referring to their network and partner structures.\textsuperscript{160} The foundations are also integrated in the respective national conflict management structures. Since its establishment in 2005 representatives of every political foundation participate in the \textit{Beirat für zivile Krisenprävention} offering expert advice to the \textit{Ressortkreis Zivile Krisenprävention}. Moreover, the FES and the HBS are founding members and part of \textit{FriEnt} established in 2001.\textsuperscript{161} The FNS joined \textit{FriEnt} in 2003, resigned from an institutional activity a couple of years later but still cooperates on a project basis.\textsuperscript{162}

The foundations’ conflict management activities concerns three broad areas: general peace-supporting activity on the international and regional level as well as in Germany, concrete measures along the conflict management cycle

\textsuperscript{153} KAS (2008c) p. 13.
\textsuperscript{154} Interview 12.
\textsuperscript{155} Interviews 11, 13, 17; FES (2009a) p. 1.
\textsuperscript{156} FES (2012f) p. 1
\textsuperscript{158} FNS (2013b) pp. 21, 23.
\textsuperscript{159} BMZ (2005) p. 15.
\textsuperscript{160} BMZ (2013c) pp. 25f.
\textsuperscript{161} BMZ (2013c) p. 26; FriEnt at: \url{https://www.frient.de/frient/mitglieder.html}.
\textsuperscript{162} FNS (2013a) p. 73. Also the KAS is not a FriEnt member but the FriEnt homepage refers to some KAS’s activities and publications.
of conflicts between two or several countries or within one country, and crisis management which involve Germany as a conflicting party.

6.3.2.1. General tasks

First of all, the **Stiftungen** initiate political dialogue on security policy and peace support and channel information on international and national discussions.\(^{163}\) One such example is the German-Chinese symposium on global security issues and cooperation organised by the KAS and its Chinese partners in 2007 in Beijing.\(^{164}\) At the recurring Asia-Europe Roundtable co-organised by the FES since 2000 ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) members discuss cooperation in conflict management and other global aspects.\(^{165}\) At the annual European Strategic Forum, politicians and experts exchange on developments in European security policy. Security dialogue is also initiated by several foundations between the USA, Europe and Russia.\(^{166}\) In 2011 the KAS, the FES, the HBS and the FNS organised a joint program for Afghan civil society actors prior to the International Foreign Ministers’ Conference on Afghanistan which aimed at formulating policy recommendation. The results were presented on the Civil Society Forum in Bonn.\(^{167}\) Information from these international fora is channelled in national and regional debates through the foundations’ country offices. They feed back regional and national perspectives to the foundations’ supranational offices.\(^{168}\) Peace and security dialogues among politicians and researchers and scholarship holders are also offered by the foundations in Germany.\(^{169}\) The **Stiftungen** are furthermore involved in policy work. An early example is the foundations’ cooperation with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in the mid-1990s when NGOs were allowed to participate in the process.\(^{170}\) The foundations’ participation in UN summits

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\(^{168}\) FES at: [http://www.fes.de/GPol/inhalt/sicherheitspolitik.htm](http://www.fes.de/GPol/inhalt/sicherheitspolitik.htm).

\(^{169}\) See also 4.2.1.; FES (2012f) p. 2.

was already mentioned.\textsuperscript{171} They are also involved in lobbying for conflict management in Germany.\textsuperscript{172} In 2008, the KAS, for example, intended to convey more intensely the necessity of the international deployment of German Armed Forces and to help produce respective arguments.\textsuperscript{173}

The foundations are also involved in conflict analysis, knowledge-generating and the processing of information. The offices in the industrialised countries monitor and analyse the developments on the international level, such as the UN and the EU.\textsuperscript{174} On the occasion of the German membership in the UN Security Council in 2010/2011 the FES, for instance, started a series of publication on matters of the Council.\textsuperscript{175} The country offices in the conflict regions offer analysis and studies on concrete cases, such as the study on decentralisation conducted by the FNS and Centre for Policy Alternatives after the civil war in Sri Lanka in 2010.\textsuperscript{176} Furthermore, findings in the form of policy papers and outcomes from the dialogues are published on the website and disseminated to decision-makers.\textsuperscript{177} The FES, for example, channelled the results of the experts interchange in Afghanistan in 2012 and 2013 to the respective politicians on-site, in Germany and Europe.\textsuperscript{178} Experiences from their conflict management are also treated in seminars with politicians, researchers and business experts in Germany.\textsuperscript{179} Already in the mid 1990s the FES was a founding member of the UN initiative “Lessons Learned and Best Practice Unit” in New York which elaborate best practices in UN peace missions. Since then the FES focused on the creation of interregional networks to transfer conflict experiences.\textsuperscript{180} In partnership with the Stockholm international peace research institute the FES also organises research-

\begin{thebibliography}
  \bibitem{171} See 6.3.1.; \textit{Ronge/Pascher} (1999) pp. 194f.
  \bibitem{172} Bundesregierung (2006) p. 93.
  \bibitem{173} KAS (2008c) p. 13.
  \bibitem{174} FES (2012f).
  \bibitem{175} FES annual report (2011) p. 33; FES at: \url{http://www.fes.de/gpol/inhalt/unsc.htm}.
  \bibitem{176} FNS (2013a) p. 61.
  \bibitem{177} C.f. BMZ (2007) p. 44.
  \bibitem{178} FES at: \url{http://www.fes-afghanistan.org/pages/projects/reinforcing-peace-and-security.php}.
  \bibitem{180} FES (2002) p. 78, experiences from Macedonia and Kosovo were transferred to the Middle East’s conflict (p. 79).
\end{thebibliography}

The foundations also further the establishment of regional early warning systems.\footnote{182}{C.f. FES (2010).} However, early warning on-site is surprisingly not assigned to the foundations. The Aktionsplan mentioned explicitly the German embassies,\footnote{183}{Bundesregierung (2004) pp. 59, 64.} whereas the potential of the German Stiftungen in terms of analysis capacity, the necessary access to the civilian population and the embassy-like infrastructure was not highlighted.

The foundations are finally active in capacity-building. In 2014 the KAS and its partners offered a capacity-building program in Senegal for stakeholders from the public, the non-public and the academic sector being involved in conflict management. It was part of the AA-supported ifa-program “zivik”.\footnote{184}{See 6.2.; KAS at: http://www.kas.de/senegal-mali/de/publications/30574/.} The KAS also organises a recurring academic training module on conflict management together with Bar-Ilan University in Akko, Israel.\footnote{185}{KAS at: http://www.kas.de/israel/de/publications/38011/; KAS (2014c).} Also the RLS focuses on conflict management capacity-building in the Middle East.\footnote{186}{RLS annual report (2005/2006) p. 49.} In 2005 the FES, the AA and a local NGO organised a project treating the tolerance of religious and non-religious teachers and students\footnote{187}{Bundesregierung (2006) p. 45.} and a summer school on conflict prevention and religion for girls of a Koran school in Tadzhikistan.\footnote{188}{BMZ (2007) p. 45.} Seminars in conflict management are also offered by the foundations to individuals in Germany.\footnote{189}{C.f. FNS (2013b) p. 28.} Apart from these general tasks the foundations make use of other methods as well. The RLS, for instance, regularly organises festivals and cultural events to support peace in the Middle East and Bosnia-Herzegovina.\footnote{190}{RLS annual report (2005/2006) p. 49; RLS at: http://www.rosalux.de/news/40519/kultur-des-friedens.html.}
6.3.2.2. Concrete measures

The Stiftungen implement most of the outlined transnational actors’ instruments along the conflict management cycle. However, it cannot be confirmed that instruments are strictly implemented in the respective conflict management phases. Often instruments are combined or overlap. Especially the FES and the HBS are very active in this field but also the other foundations undertake such tasks, even if mainly in a democracy assistance context. The establishment of the KAS’s rule-of-law program in Southeast Europe, for example, was originally initiated to help peace and secure consolidation.191

The principles which ideally guide conflict management activities are also important for the Stiftungen. Explicitly mentioned is the do-no-harm tenet192 which is particularly apparent in the FES’s PCIA (Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment) methodology, applied since 2002 and in accordance with the BMZ’s strategy.193 PCIA focuses on conflict sensitivity and the monitoring of the impact of activities. The conflict is analysed first and the project work is adapted to the findings. Afterwards, the conflict dynamic is monitored and project adjustments are made. On the basis of long-term case studies also methodical guidelines were established.194 Furthermore, the foundations critically monitor the international coordination processes in the context of human security.195 Moreover, the foundations’ partner approach furthers the principle of local ownership.196 The foundations also focus on R2P and the protection and involvement of women in conflict regions. In 2007 the FES and FriEnt, for example, organised a workshop on R2P.197 A discussion on the Asian and European perspective on R2P was organised by the KAS in Shanghai in 2011.198 In 2014 the HBS held a conference together with other organisations as regards the safety of women in

191 Auga (2007) p. 8; see Ch. 7.
193 BMZ (2005) pp. 20f.; see also Ch. 8.
195 Interview 11; FES at: http://www.fes.de/GPol/inhalt/nichtstaatliche-gefahrtdungen.htm; see 8.2.1.
196 Interview 10; see 4.2.
198 KAS at: http://www.kas.de/china/de/events/47323/.
countries of the Arab Spring. In 2004 it supported an Israeli women NGO in their activities to integrate gender mainstreaming in the Israeli conflict management. In 2002 the FES organised an international women peace conference in Angola. The subject is also continuously treated in a symposium in Germany. The HBS and the FES are also founding members of the German Women’s Security Council, a network of German women organisations and researchers to further the implementation of UN resolution 1325 in Germany.

Of the instruments in the conflict prevention and peace consolidation phase the Stiftungen undertake small arms control, SSR and election observation. The FES made disarmament and arms control a special focus in their peace support activities and supports UN and regional programs in this field. In 2010, for example, it co-organised a conference on small weapons control together with the UN Institute for Disarmament Research and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and arranged a conference on humanitarian disarmament in 2014. Regarding SSR, the FES supports the democratic integration of the security sector and targets political decision makers to implement reforms. The foundations’ activities also include educational programs for police forces and civil-military dialogues which show overlaps with the instruments of police missions and CIMIC. The KAS, for example, organized a dialogue program between military officers and politicians in West Africa in 2007. A continuous program educates officers in rule-of-law. Election observation is mainly covered by other German actors. Nonetheless, it is closely connected to the foundations’ democracy assistance. Examples can be found in the monitoring of elections with local

partners and capacity-building. In 2014 the KAS, for instance, co-organised several workshops for poll watcher in Tunisia. Participants were supposed to further train other poll watchers subsequently leading to several thousands of trained individuals. In 2001 the FES supported a radio and TV campaign in the run-up of the presidential election in Benin which was directed against election corruption and aimed at mobilising voters.

Of the transnational instruments which are ideally implemented in the conflict escalation and consolidation phases, the Stiftungen undertake conflict resolution through dialogue creation, track two diplomacy and collaboration. Particularly important in this context is the foundations’ political dialogue instrument and the establishment of vertical relationships and horizontally among different types of actors. Moreover, the foundations act as mediators in bringing together the conflicting parties or offering exchange platforms. In 2012 the FES furthered the Afghan experts’ dialogue including the neighbouring countries on peace policies for the time after the withdrawal of the ISAF-troops. Four policy groups of ambassadors, civil servants, military generals, parliamentarians, leading civil society figures, researchers and media people from Afghanistan, Central Asia, India and Pakistan were formed. Additional expertise came from China, Turkey, Iran and Russia. The different stakeholders within one group and the different regional groups interacted with each other. The results were outlined in a joint declaration presented at the UN headquarters in 2013. For many years the HBS and the FNS have been active in fostering dialogues between the ethnically and territorially conflicting

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209 See 5.3.4; Bundesregierung (2006) p. 118.
212 See 4.2.1.
213 C.f. FES at: [http://www.fes.de/GPol/inhalt/projektbeispiele.htm](http://www.fes.de/GPol/inhalt/projektbeispiele.htm); FES (2012f) on security political “trialogues” between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (p. 1); FES (2002) on the creation of intra-state dialogues among youth organisations in Nigeria (p. 16) and among conflicting parties in Sudan (p. 17).
214 FES (2012e). On regional dialogue initiation in Mali see FES annual report (2013) p. 25. In this context the FES also mentioned Track 1.5 ([http://www.fes-asia.org/pages/reinforcing-peace-and-security.php](http://www.fes-asia.org/pages/reinforcing-peace-and-security.php)). Track 1.5 bridges track one and two. It is defined as “unofficial intervenors working with official representatives of the conflict parties’ (Nan/Druckman/El Hori [2009] p. 66). This applies largely to the foundations’ dialogue initiation in conflicts as government members are often involved.
groups and societies in the Southern Caucasus.\(^{216}\) In 1998 the HBS supported a women-NGO and the environmental ministry in Somaliland. Both thereafter cooperated horizontally in the form that the ministry was allowed to use the NGO’s technical infrastructure and in turn defended the NGO from other ministries’ tutelages.\(^ {217}\) An interesting early example is a trilateral conference between politicians from the U.S. State Department, the AA and a Cuban delegation including Ricardo Alarcón, then vice foreign minister of Cuba organised by the FNS in 1987 in Germany which treated the different political positions and cooperation possibilities. According to the FNS, the Cuban side had contacted the FNS in order to win them over to the conference organisation and to establish a contact to the U.S. side with the help of the then Foreign Minister Genscher, a member of the FNS-affiliated Free Democratic Party.\(^ {218}\) The KAS is particularly active in Asian ethic-religious conflicts.\(^ {219}\) In cooperation with the Philippine Centre for Islam and Democracy, for instance, it publishes academic works on the subjects.\(^ {220}\) The FNS organised study trips for Israeli and Palestine parliamentarians and staff officers to create channels of communication between them.\(^ {221}\) FES’s activities can furthermore be found in collaboration where conflict parties’ experts cooperate on specific technical projects of general interest and regional cooperation is furthered.\(^ {222}\) Between 2001 and 2006 the FES organised the Jerusalem Berlin Forum where Israeli, Palestinian and German experts worked out common solutions in water management and regional planning among others.\(^ {223}\) In 1999 it initiated an EU-funded joint agreement on public administrative cooperation, such as health, education and fight against crime in the West Bank’s and Israel’s boarder region. Further consulting was offered to the parties from the region of “RegioTriRhena” at the Southern Upper Rhine where France,  

Switzerland and Germany cooperate in the field of communal policy.\textsuperscript{224} In 2002 the FES facilitated the exchange among governments, parliamentarians and researchers of the conflicting Azerbaijani, Georgian and Armenian to foster economic cooperation in the South Caucasus.\textsuperscript{225} Also consulting is offered by the FES. Since 2004 it advises the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) Initiative on a common democratic security architecture.\textsuperscript{226}

The \textit{Stiftungen}, as regards instruments in the peace consolidation phase, are active in democracy assistance and peace building, in particular DDR, SSR, reconciliation and transitional justice and economic recovery. They also lobby international tribunals and advocate small arms control and monitor elections, as already outlined. The foundations’ democracy assistance was extensively presented previously.\textsuperscript{227} To differentiate strictly between democracy assistance in conflict regions and such in the rest of the world is difficult as it generally aims at eliminating structural conflict causing deficits. The \textit{Aktionsplan} of 2004 and the subsequent reports stress the foundations’ long-term relations with politics, political elites and civil society actors and their media promotion helping to stabilise a peaceful situation.\textsuperscript{228} In the context of conflict it mainly involves the capacity-building.\textsuperscript{229} Measures are the foundations’ fostering of civil society structures, to be empowered for mediating in conflicts, their rule of law engagement and constitutional assistance.\textsuperscript{230} Also, the foundations’ media-strengthening is relevant, aiming at deactivating or defusing conflicts.\textsuperscript{231} In 2004 and 2005 the FES supported the elaboration of several radio programs by Iraqi journalists on the elections in Iraq and its broadcasting all over Iraq.\textsuperscript{232} Workshops for Afghan parliamentarians were also offered to overcome ethical divides.\textsuperscript{233} Democracy assistance in conflict regions

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{224} FES (2002) pp. 19f.
  \item \textsuperscript{225} FES (2002) p. 30.
  \item \textsuperscript{227} See 5.3.
  \item \textsuperscript{229} Major/Pietz/Schöndorf/Hummel (2011) p. 25.
  \item \textsuperscript{230} C.f. Pascher (2006) p. 16.
  \item \textsuperscript{231} FES at: \url{http://www.fes.de/GPol/inhalt/projektbeispiele.htm}.
  \item \textsuperscript{232} FES (2009a) p. 2.
  \item \textsuperscript{233} FES (2009a) p. 2, (2002) on activities in Bosina-Herzegovina and Croatia (pp. 40f.)
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
covers most of peace-building’s political and security dimensions. The foundations’ activities in the context of DDR can also be found. Since 2012 the HSS has been engaged in dialogue programs in Columbia between the FARC-guerrilla fighters, the Columbian government and the peace commission focusing on demobilisation, and reintegration of former fighters. Also minority rights are strengthened. The FES’s regional office in Southeast Europe monitors such rights and furthers consulting activities of local organisation towards the respective public bodies. Although the foundations are not active in economic recovery as such, they, however, help strengthening the economic sectors as already outlined. Closely connected are the foundations’ activities in environmental protection. In 2002 the FES, for example, furthered economic and environmental regional cooperation among conflicting parties in Central Asia where a conflict over water was expected. The HBS organised several conferences on the connection between nature conservation and crisis management in 2002 and 2003 in Berlin. Regarding the psychological and social dimension of peace-building foundations’ undertakings in the field of refugee reintegration, reconciliation and transitional justice can be found. Together with the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in South Africa the FES held a workshop with UN mediators, governmental and nongovernmental participants at the international conference “Building a Future on Peace and Justice” in 2007 on the importance of reconciliation. Reconciliation is also combined with SSR or media capacity-building when integrating public security forces or journalists. The FES, for example, initiated dialogues and used media work to facilitate the return of refugees in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia after the Balkan war. The foundations also organise transitional justice conferences, are active in human

238 Bundesregierung (2006) p. 53
rights and further truth commissions. In 2005 the FES’s annual human rights award honoured the heads of the Chilean and Peruvian truth commissions. The Columbian truth commission was supported with monitoring and the Indonesian truth commission was encouraged with a study trip to South Africa. As already outlined, the foundations are active in integrating neighbouring countries in peace processes. The foundations furthermore lobby international tribunals. In 2010 the FES, the International Centre for Transnational Justice (ICTJ) and the Moroccan Centre for Human Rights conducted a training session on the International Criminal Court with members from the Moroccan Coalition for the ICC and journalists. In 2008 the ICTJ and the FES organised a series of events aiming at raising awareness for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

There are only few transnational activities along the conflict management cycle where the foundations’ engagement is completely missing. The Stiftungen are neither involved in humanitarian aid as they do not carry out short-term life-saving tasks, nor in cases of multidimensional peacekeeping, presumably because the foundations’ activities are not politically neutral.

6.3.2.3. Conflicts in German foreign relations

The Stiftungen are also involved in managing political conflicts which involve Germany as a conflicting party. The foundations’ maintaining of relations with foreign opposition groups outside of the Federal Foreign Ministry’s reach and official adequacy and with countries of underdeveloped diplomatic relationships was already mentioned. Furthermore, the foundations foster dialogue processes between Germany and Israel. In this context the HBS also focuses on cultural events, exhibitions and readings. Moreover, the foundations establish

244 FES (2005a).
245 FES (2009a) p. 2.
250 See 4.3.2.2.; Ronge/Pascher (1999) p. 192.
251 HBS at: http://www.boell.de/de/navigation/naher-mittlerer-osten-5289.html.
intercultural dialogue with the Islam. Some authors observed an increase in the foundations’ activities in the Middle East from 2005 onwards coinciding with an intensified German political interest in the region and dialogues with the Muslim world. For many years, the KAS has been particularly active in establishing religious dialogues in Germany and internationally. Since 9/11 the engagement has been further enhanced. Often these dialogue processes are put in the context of democracy and political participation. In 2013 the KAS implemented the project “Muslims in state and society worldwide” which brought together workshop participants from different countries in Istanbul, Singapore and Casablanca discussing the relationship of religion, culture and politics and including activities with the Muslim community in Germany. Since 2006 the office of the KAS in Turkey organises trainings for imams of the Turkish religious authority. They are prepared for their work in German Muslim communities. Finally, the Stiftungen as already outlined, helped smoothing the U.S. German relationship during the political crisis from 2002 onwards.

**Conclusion**

The potentials which stem from the German political foundations’ activities in conflict management are mainly congruent with those outlined for development assistance. This includes high flexibility and the opportunity to establish contacts and work with groups unreachable for official diplomats. Especially the foundations’ diverse partner structures on-site and their duality between the state and non-state sphere makes them being accepted by different types of conflicting actors. This is ideal, since the difference between state and non-state actors in conflict regions is often blurred. Not being bound to work with one type of actor only, allows the

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254 KAS (2007b) p. 16.
258 See conclusion Ch. 5; c.f. BMZ (2005) p. 15; FES (2002) p. 12 on the establishment of unofficial contacts and the completion of official diplomacy.
259 See 4.2.
establishment of trustful and communicative relations horizontally and vertically. According to the FES, conflicts can only be managed when the political level is integrated in the process as it needs to enable the necessary reforms.\textsuperscript{261} The FES activities in Central Asia in 2005 and 2006 therefore concentrated on such conflicts which the governments themselves wanted to avoid.\textsuperscript{262} At the same time, conflict management extends the foundations’ foreign working relationships as it allows integrating governments in complex conflict management approaches which are rather unwilling to take part in democracy assistance programs.\textsuperscript{263}

The foundations’ democracy assistance as practiced for several decades equips them well for taking on conflict management tasks. For the foundations it is rather old wine in new bottles as most of their developmental activities easily fit in the new context. Nonetheless, they added additional conflict-focused activities. As the review on the foundations’ conflict management has shown, most of the transnational instruments used in conflicts are covered already. In its focus on civil conflict management also the German government has identified the foundations’ potential in peace and security. It highlights their long-term international experience and global networking.\textsuperscript{264} The foundations have hence expanded their sphere of activity and influence from development to security policy.\textsuperscript{265} Since it is to be expected that war and violent conflicts will increase in the future\textsuperscript{266} equally the foundations’ role in effective conflict management will continue to gain importance.

For overall development policy, authors observed a movement towards conflict-relevant humanitarian aid in the 1990s, an increased politicisation and its integration in broad security concepts.\textsuperscript{267} The “securitisation” of development\textsuperscript{268} and the fact that transnational actors are taken in for

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{261}{FES (2002) p. 12.}
\footnote{262}{BMZ (2007) p. 43.}
\footnote{263}{Pogorelskaja (2009a) p. 150.}
\footnote{264}{BMZ (2013c) p. 26.}
\footnote{265}{Grimmel/Jakobeit (2009) p. 216.}
\footnote{266}{Gareis (2006) p. 225.}
\footnote{267}{Roth/Klein (2007) p. 9.}
\end{footnotes}
different strategic purposes might be one side of the coin.\textsuperscript{269} The renewed interest in development, on the contrary, led to an increase in necessary initiatives.\textsuperscript{270} Finally, these changes paved the way for conflict management to become part of collaborative public diplomacy approaches. In chapter 8 we will connect conflict management to public diplomacy.

\textsuperscript{269} Roth/Klein (2007) p. 13 quoting former US foreign minister Powell on NGOs’ strategic purposes in Iraq.
\textsuperscript{270} Gareis (2006) p. 221.
Part III

Case studies
Chapter 7- Practising public diplomacy through democracy assistance: The rule of law program of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Southeast Europe

In the following chapter I look in detail on the rule of law program (RLP) of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) in Southeast Europe. The case aims at illustrating how public diplomacy in the catalytic and collaborative form of democracy assistance is practised by the Stiftung. In particular, it allows getting some detailed insights into the status of the network surroundings and on the common values of network members as it compares the objectives and activities of the RLP against German policy formulations. More generally, it reflects on the KAS’s impact as a transnational actor.

The chapter starts with an overview on the framework in which the RLP operated before I shed light on the KAS’s public diplomacy in the context of the RLP. The chapter bases mainly on an in-depth interview conducted in 2014, an evaluation of the RLP in 2013 as well as other material which the KAS kindly made accessible to me. The evaluation was carried out on behalf of the KAS by Otto Luchterhandt, professor for public and Eastern European law at the University of Hamburg.¹

7.1. Southeast Europe and Germany

The KAS’s RLP in Southeast European² covered the former Eastern Bloc countries of Rumania, Bulgaria and Moldova (as part of the USSR), the former Yugoslavian states and Albania. The following subsection outlines perceptions of the political situation, the region’s deficits and the KAS’s relations to the aid organisations on site. It then looks at German policy towards the region which is often similar to European policy. Afterwards, the ambitions of the German political foundations in Southeast Europe are briefly outlined, while the last subsection introduces the KAS’s RLP in Southeast Europe followed by an excursus on the overall RLPs’ conception.

¹ Luchterhandt (2013).
² The region is not clearly defined. Sometimes it is used interchangeably with the countries of the Western Balkan or includes Turkey and Ukraine.
7.1.1. Political situation and aid organisations

In 2014, the political conditions in Southeast Europe the interview partner at the KAS described as diverse: Albania was very isolated in the region before the 1990s. Bulgaria and Rumania were geostrategically significant and hence the first to be integrated into the EU (European Union). Moldova had declared its independence even before the break-up of the Soviet Union, while the Yugoslavian countries experienced conflicts during the 1990s. In common these countries underwent political, social and economical transformative processes. The interview partner stressed the astonishing progress in the last decades. It included democratic constitutions, elections and institutions. He mentioned the long-term and complicated processes which were necessary for the proper parliaments’ functioning, the constitutional jurisdiction to fight for recognition, and the difficulties in executive institution-building. As challenging, he regarded the economies’ transformation due to missing management experience and the old elites often gaining advantage from the privatisation at the general public’s cost. Furthermore, political parties which could have been addressed by the KAS or other organisations were nonexistent. The political parties already developed were little ideologically programmatic, oriented towards the interests of certain groups and hence differed considerably from Western parties. Despite major advances, the transformation process was, according to the interview partner, not completed and substantial deficits, especially regarding the rule of law were still persisting.\footnote{Interview 8; similar Luchterhandt (2013) p. 48.} These deficits were: a weak civil society and an underdeveloped media sector due to former state’s oppression of private initiative; high demands towards the state and low individual political and social engagement paradoxically combined with renouncing the state and political parties, having few members, a strong leader fixation and a weak democratic structure; underdeveloped political oppositions as counter-elites to the Communist Party regimes and a low propensity to deal with the past; the former state bureaucracy with a rather “tactical” attitude to democratic principles and the rule of law which enriched itself during the transformation processes and; problems to establish
rule of law principles as elites lacked conviction; and political clientelism
due to the ruling political parties’ tendency to fill posts in the executive with
their adherents.⁴

Many international organisations were active in Southeast Europe in 2014. Partly they were state-controlled, like USAid, which consulted with large expenditures. Although the interview partner stressed the indispensability of many organisations, he gave rise to the concern that they did not send consistent messages. U.S. organisations, for instance, had different ideas than the KAS. At times, too much aid was available and strange and “patchwork-like” solutions were developed originating from US and European influence. To partners on site the KAS communicated to follow the European advice rather than what was recommended by the Americans since they desired the integration into the European Union. The situation among the organisations was described as competitive.⁵ The main rule-of-law-focused international organisations active in the region were USAid, the American Bar Association, the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, the EU and the OECD. Other German organisations were the GIZ (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), the IRZ (Deutsche Stiftung für international rechtliche Zusammenarbeit e.V.), and the other Stiftungen.⁶

7.1.2. Germany’s policy

In the past, German foreign policy towards the Southeast European countries was characterised by the German division and the East-West conflict. While the GDR already had economic and military relations with the region before the Berlin Wall Fall, intense policy of the unified Federal Republic yet had to develop.⁷ The relocation of the German Parliament from Bonn to Berlin in 1991 was viewed as swing towards the region.⁸ The relationships with Bulgaria, Rumania and Moldova developed smoothly. Rumania had a significant German minority which for the most part left the country after 1989. Still, it was challenging to remove the Eastern neighbours’ fears of a

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⁵ Interview 8.
unified and powerful Germany, to advocate their interests and, simultaneously to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union/Russia.\textsuperscript{9}

Until today, the Eastern EU integration and affiliation leads to tensions.\textsuperscript{10} German-Yugoslavian relations were already intense before the Wall Fall: Germany was the most important Yugoslavian trading partner, many foreign workers in Germany came from Yugoslavia, which was also a popular German travel destination and supported by the German government.\textsuperscript{11} In the Yugoslavian crisis starting in 1991 Germany took an active role. Since the situation increasingly required military engagement it finally led to a redefinition of German foreign and security policy and to foreign political identity changes.\textsuperscript{12} Also the German-Albanian relations were characterised as sympathizing since the 1990s including cooperation, active governmental exchanges and German assistance in the Albanian transformation and Euro-Atlantic integration.\textsuperscript{13}

Over the last decades German policy supported all efforts to integrate or link the countries of Southeast Europe into the EU and to expand the NATO eastwards in order to secure a peaceful neighbourhood,\textsuperscript{14} reduce migratory pressure and tap new sales markets.\textsuperscript{15} With the focus on trade, aid and integration Germany also exhibited the characteristics of a civilian power.\textsuperscript{16} Its political and economical motivations in Southeast Europe consequentially coincided.\textsuperscript{17} Nowadays, German foreign policy is mainly driven by EU


\textsuperscript{10}Caspari, ZEIT Online, 28/08/2014.


\textsuperscript{12}Calic (2007) p. 480; see 6.2. In the Bosnian War between 1992 and 1995 Germany showed strong involvement, especially in the elaboration of the Dayton peace agreement. In 1992 it supported the international airlift to Sarajevo as part of the UN Protection Force and was involved in measures to control the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro and in patrolling the Bosnian airspace in 1993. The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 brought legitimisation for the German involvement in international peace missions and a reorientation regarding a German military engagement. The NATO operation “Allied Force” in 1999 was Germany’s first combat mission. Germany became an equal partner in the following NATO-lead KFOR mission, the UN-lead UNMIK mission and in other stabilisation missions on the Balkan from 2000 onwards (Calic [2007] pp. 470-9).

\textsuperscript{13}Milo (2008) p. 70.


\textsuperscript{15}Colschen (2010) p. 188.

\textsuperscript{16}Daunderstädt (2007) p. 435; Tewes (1997) speaks of civilian power with Gestaltungsmacht (creative drive); see also 5.2, 6.2.

\textsuperscript{17}Staack (2007) p. 95.
politics and the stabilisation and association process (SAA).\textsuperscript{18} It supports the European Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) helping financially the accession efforts and supporting all in all reforms, capacity building, development, employment, education, agriculture and regional cooperation since 2007. Of the countries covered by the RLP the resources are available to Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.\textsuperscript{19} Also German foreign cultural relations and education policy (AKBP) supports the EU integration process.\textsuperscript{20} A particular emphasis the AA puts on regional cooperation in Southeast Europe in order to avoid the former reactive crisis management.\textsuperscript{21} On the German EU Council and G8 presidency’s initiative in 1999 the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe was established covering the former Yugoslavian countries, Bulgaria, Rumania and Moldova and allowing for an EU membership prospect.\textsuperscript{22} It was replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) in 2008 and is now part of the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP).\textsuperscript{23} Bulgaria and Rumania became EU member states in 2007. In 2013 Croatia accessed the EU. However, the European Commission still systematically asses the Bulgarian and Rumanian progress in judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption (benchmarking).\textsuperscript{24} Since 2009 Moldova is part of the EU’s Eastern Partnership policy. As component of the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood policy it aims at politically associate and economically integrate the former countries of the USSR with the EU.\textsuperscript{25} In this context, the German government particularly supports civil society organisations and their interlinking with NGOs in the EU.\textsuperscript{26} Although Moldova is not a key

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{EU Regulation No 231/2014, Article 3.1 and Annex I.}
\footnote{AA (2014) p. 11.}
\footnote{BT (2011c) p. 5.}
\footnote{Calic (2007) p. 479.}
\footnote{BT (2011c) p. 5. As of January 2015 it covered 46 members, organisations and institutions (RCC at: http://www.rcc.int/pages/14/structure).}
\footnote{On this so-called “Cooperation and Verification Mechanism” see EC at: http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/index_en.htm; for Croatia the EC renounced benchmarking mechanisms (Palokaj, euobserver 16/11/2010).}
\footnote{Council of the EU (2009) p. 6.}
\end{footnotes}
state for German politics, the relations have been recently intensified, according to the AA.

During the early transformation processes the German government offered multilateral assistance and bilateral credits to Southeast Europe. Under the coordination of the BMZ, it also provided advice to Rumania and the Yugoslavian countries which had been recognised developing countries. The consulting first focused on economic activities. This is why critics assumed the elaboration of a German trade facilitating social market economy. Over time, it was replaced by the political cooperation of the German political foundations. Legal advisory comes also from the IRZ, a Justice Ministries’ initiative in 1992 and funded governmentally and by the EC. It supports rule of law based and democratic constitutional structures and the harmonizing of national with EU law. For the non-developing countries in the region, such as Bulgaria, the AA and the BMWi coordinated the consulting assistance between 1994 and 2005 in the so-called “TRANSFORM” program. Today, Germany’s bilateral development cooperation covers Albania, Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina and Moldova. Much assistance takes place in European development cooperation formats. Overarching developmental objectives in the Southeast Europe are EU orientation, good governance, conflict prevention, the fight against corruption, and job creation. Political focal points are the promotion of economic activity, public administrative and judiciary reforms and the infrastructure’s modernisation. In the context of judicial foreign affairs, the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection (BMJV) promotes rule of law and democratic structures in the

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29 Dauderstädt (2007) pp. 430ff; see 7.1.3.
31 BMZ at: http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/laender_regionen/Mittel-Ost-und-Suedosteuropa/transform/index.html. Since 2005 the TRANSFORM successor program concerns Russia, Belarus and Ukraine (BMWi at: http://www.bmwii.de/DE/Presse/pressemitteilungen.did=201520.html).
32 BMZ (2013b) p. 27.
33 For details see BMZ at: http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/laender_regionen/Mittel-Ost-und-Suedosteuropa/index.html.
34 BMZ at: http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/laender_regionen/Mittel-Ost-und-Suedosteuropa/index.html; BT (2011c) p. 20.
region including expert exchanges, legislative support, conferences and seminars for foreign jurists. Thematically it concentrates on the spread of human rights and criminal law principles and in light of the German economy on commercial and corporate law. In the “Alliance for German law” the BMJV and the major German professional organisations advertise Germany as a legal location mainly through the initiative “Law – Made in Germany”.36

The CDU (Christ-Democratic-Union) the KAS is affiliated to and ruling party since 2005 supports EU orientation and stabilization in the region. It welcomes the former EU enlargement and highlights the EU’s responsibility towards the Balkan and East European countries. Although stressing also the EU’s integration ability, it emphasizes the necessity of good neighborly relations, cooperation agreements and partnership treaties.37

7.1.3. Landscape of the German political foundations

In 2014, all of the German political foundations were active in the countries of Southeast Europe with partly overlapping work fields. Apart from the RLS, they all focused on the EU integration process next to other thematic areas.38

The KAS aimed at bringing the Southeast European countries closer to the Euro-Atlantic structures and supported accession strategies through specific measures. It gave assistance in the democratic and economic transformation processes and focused on political and socio-political dialogue as well as regional cooperation.39 It maintained offices in all countries of the region except for Montenegro which was supported from the Serbian office.40

38 On the Stiftungs’ activities in East Europe compared to other regions see 5.3.
39 KAS at: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.4785/.
addition, it had a regional media program and a rule of law program. The latter will be analysed extensively in the following sections.

The activities of the FES in Southeast Europe focused on a just society, innovation, progress and democracy. Important work fields were elections and parliaments, economic and social policy, working relationships and social dialogue, education and media policy, communal policy and regional development, protection of minorities, foreign and security policy and challenges of globalisation. It fostered regional dialogue on these subjects. With view to the SEECp it promoted the European integration, good neighbourly relations and cooperation. The FES held as many country offices in the region as the KAS and an additional regional office.

Contacts of the FNS to the region already dated back to the 1970s. With its consulting, dialogue and educational activities the FNS focused on the economic transformation and liberal conceptions. It assisted the rapprochement with the EU, furthered cooperation and concentrated on freedom, human rights, democracy and market economy. The FNS supported among others liberal parties, associations, institutions, disseminators, individuals and media representatives. The regional office in Sofia coordinated the activities in Central, East and Southeast Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia. In the sub-regions offices in Bulgaria and Serbia were responsible for Southeast Europe and the Western Balkans.

The HBS mainly supported democracy and the rule of law. It assisted the development of civil society, the dealing with the past and the countries’ European integration. A particular focus was on the economies’ environmental transformation, urban development and the protection of

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43 FNS (2013a) p. 62.
44 FNS (2013b) pp. 20f.
45 FNS (2013a) p. 66.
46 FNS at: http://www.msoe.fnst.org/webcom/show_article.php/_c-1559/i.html; The Bulgarian office was also responsible for Macedonia, Rumania and Moldova (FNS at: http://www.freheit.org/webcom/show_article.php/_c-218/i.html [accessed on 29/09/2015]). The Serbian office also covered Montenegro, Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina und Croatia (FNS at: http://www.freheit.org/webcom/show_article.php/_c-221/i.html [accessed on 29/09/2015]).
common resources. It targeted journalists, jurists and political scientists. Methodologically the HBS initiated media debates and workshops. It consulted reform-minded political parties and focused on the consolidation of the Green political spectrum. It also offered analysis and education measures and supported regional networking. In Southeast Europe the HBS had offices in Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia. The office in Belgrade also coordinated activities in Montenegro and Kosovo.\(^{47}\)

The RLS was committed to trade union representation of interests, antifascism, feminism, democratisation of the education system, strengthening of alternative political discourses and the support of critical research. Primarily, its activities targeted civil society organisations and social movements, trade union initiatives, schools and educational institutions, leftist academic and cultural institutions and researchers.\(^{48}\) It also aimed at transnational networking of leftist initiatives, the critical coming to terms with the past of the left-leaning political parties and academic discussions on the redefinition of a modern leftism. The activities of the RLS in Southeast Europe started in 2002 and were further expanded to almost all Southeast European countries coordinated by the regional office in Serbia.\(^{49}\)

The activities of the HSS primarily focused on EU integration and crisis’ prevention. They directed to the establishment and consolidation of democratic, rule of law based and civil society institutions targeting public administrations, police forces and judiciaries. Methodologically, the HSS offered education, seminars, trainings and interregional cooperation facilitating conferences. The HSS had five offices in Southeast Europe and activities in all countries of the region.\(^{50}\)


\(^{50}\) HSS (2015); HSS at: [http://www.hss.de/internationale-arbeit/regionen-projekte/europa.html](http://www.hss.de/internationale-arbeit/regionen-projekte/europa.html).
7.1.4. The rule of law program of the KAS

The KAS’s RLP in Southeast Europe started its work in 2006. Originally it concentrated on five countries and was extended successively. As of May 2015 it covered Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Republic Moldova, Rumania and Serbia. The office was located in Bucharest and existed alongside the KAS’s country offices. In 2014, it comprised a director and four Rumanian local employees. In 2012 its annual budget amounted to 419.000 Euros.

Since the beginning the RLP had a strong European perspective concentrating on EU integration and the resolution of democracy and rule of law deficits. It was clear to the KAS that the countries of the Western Balkans only had an integration prospect in case they overcame these deficiencies. The program was supposed to send a signal of assistance to the Southeast European countries in their transformative processes. Since the RLP had already been established in other parts of the world, a program in the immediate sphere of European influence appeared necessary to the KAS. The program was organized regionally due to the comparability of the countries’ rule of law issues and in order to improve the respective information exchange among them. Rumania’s importance in the region, its forthcoming EU accession and its stability in contrast to the former Yugoslavian states were reasons for establishing the office in Bucharest.

The overall objective of the RLP was therefore the EU integration and EU corresponding legal orders and cultures. Sub-targets oriented towards the RLP’s objectives world-wide were the consolidation of democratic institutions through cooperation with constitutional courts and consulting of democratic institutions’ representatives, the modernization of constitutions, constitutional jurisdictions, substantive and procedural laws, the

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51 The initial countries covered by the RLP were Rumania, Serbia-Montenegro, Macedonia and Croatia (Luchterhandt [2013] p. 28). For the RLP’s website see: http://www.kas.de/rspsoe/en/
52 Interview 8.
54 Interview 8.
56 KAS at: http://www.kas.de/rspsoe/en/about/
57 See excursus.
strengthening of the public administration, judicial independence, human and minority rights, the counteraction of corruption and the dealing with the past.\footnote{Interview 8.} Moreover, the RLP focused on the promotion of the European ideal and the strengthening of regional cooperation and law-oriented networks.\footnote{Luchterhand (2013) p. 19.} Several aspects were considerably different in Southeast Europe from the other regions the KAS’s RLPs were active: the high level of political conflict, the post communist or post socialist transformation processes and the efforts to join the EU.\footnote{KAS (2008b) p. 25; Luchterhand (2013) p. 17.}

The RLP generally pursued long-term goals although some activities had medium- or short-term objectives, such as the revision of a certain law.\footnote{Similar KAS (2014a).} Although it was an internal requirement that equal weight needed to be given to the objectives, the matter of dealing with the past had never played a significant role, not every objective was equally important in each country and activities in Rumania were more strongly developed.\footnote{The evaluation mentioned as reasons for the imbalance limited resources, political issues, a low propensity to participate in some countries and inequalities in the countries’ development (Luchterhand (2013) pp. 18, 28). Croatia’s integration in the program, for example, was weak (ibidem p. 28). Little interest in the RLP was also attested to Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro (ibidem p. 39).} The RLP’s directors also had some flexibility with regard to the choice of activity which recently had led to an increase in regional projects. Still, the types of activities were relatively steady and those of 2013 and 2014 were almost identical.\footnote{Interview 8.}

**Excursus: rule of law programmes**

In 1991 the KAS established the first RLP in Latin America. In 2006 the RLPs for Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Europe and Asia started their work.\footnote{KAS annual report (2006) p. 36.} In 2013 the RLP in North Africa and the Middle East followed.\footnote{KAS annual report (2013) p. 13.} The programmes were designed as regional sector programmes complementing the other KAS’s international undertakings. They were supervised by fully qualified German lawyers at offices in Bucharest,
Nairobi, Mexico City, Bogota, Singapore and Beirut coordinated from the KAS’s headquarters in Berlin. The KAS defined four general objectives of the RLPs: (1) promoting rule of law structures and institutions; (2) the division of powers including a strong and independent judiciary and an executive bound to the law; (3) strengthening fundamental and human rights; and (4) reinforcing respective regional cooperation and networks.

The regional approach was driven by the insight that rule of law reform processes often ran regionally parallel, such as the Southeast European constitutional reforms after 1998 and those of Latin-American criminal proceedings in the mid-1980s. A catalyst for the set-up of the RLPs were the Spranger criterions of the German government which had highlighted the rule of law, among others. According to the KAS, the approach across countries also helped to work on topics which could not be addressed publicly on the national level and regional networking among experts also strengthened the self-help. The rule of law support had a high priority in its international work since development and security needed stable democracies as said by the KAS. While the KAS’s guidelines nonetheless did not mention the rule of law, the foundations’ common declaration considered rule of law engagement.

The instruments involved in the RLPs did not deviate from those generally used by the Stiftungen and included conferences, seminars, workshops, panel discussions, trainings, the publication of research, studies and other material, visiting programs in Germany, scholarships and consulting. As target groups and partners the KAS mentioned private and public-sector individuals such as legal practitioners including judges, lawyers, prosecuting attorneys and judicial staff officers, legal scholars, members of the parliaments, legislative committees, ministers and civil servants from the ministries’ of justice and internal affairs. The KAS also sought cooperation with

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68 Interview 14; see also 5.2.2.
69 KAS (2008b) p. 10.
70 KAS (2015a).
professional associations of lawyers, political parties, NGOs, church associations and media representatives.\textsuperscript{73}

Next to the RLPs, the KAS maintained several other regional sector programs, such as media and regional dialogue programs mostly developed in 2010. As of 2015, the KAS had 19 such programs world-wide.\textsuperscript{74}

7.2. The practice of public diplomacy through democracy assistance?

The following section looks in detail on how the KAS is public diplomatically active in the context of its RLP in Southeast Europe whilst applying the integrated public diplomacy model.\textsuperscript{75} I trace the communicative process either taking place as one-way communication or within a network surrounding where connected actors bring various resources and share values and interests. Afterwards, it is set in connection to the collaborative and catalytic public diplomacy form of democracy assistance adopting the systematisation of chapter 5. Finally, I consider the impact of the KAS as a transnational actor in the region.

7.2.1. Generator

In the context of the RLP in Southeast Europe the KAS showed the ability to generate public diplomacy. The KAS was autonomous in the decision over measures and their implementation and the case did not reveal a dependence link on German state institutions or the affiliated CDU. The RLP, like the other foundations’ activities was funded over the Federal Budget. In 2014, it did not receive international backing and was therefore not bound by respective requirements. Although the KAS’s RLP office had contacts with the German embassies in the region, they were not allowed and had not tried to give instructions. At times, the KAS consulted with the embassies as regards a measure.\textsuperscript{76} One example, however, was found where the Stiftungen became part of an AA’s public diplomacy initiative: In 2013 the German embassy in Sofia held together with the KAS, the FNS and other German organisations a series of cultural events in North Bulgaria with the intention

\textsuperscript{73} KAS (2015a).
\textsuperscript{74} See KAS’s annual reports between (2009) and (2013); (2014) pp. 100f.
\textsuperscript{75} See 3.2.
\textsuperscript{76} Interview 8.
to present a multifaceted image of Germany and to highlight cooperation.\textsuperscript{77}
The example is still not appropriate to prove the KAS’s instrumental use by the AA’s public diplomacy initiative measured by the overall amount of KAS’s activities.

The KAS’s headquarter left the RLP free reign over decisions and it acted independently from the KAS’s country offices in the region. The decision on implementing a measure was taken by the RLP’s director and the whole implementation procedure was in his hands.\textsuperscript{78} Although in all measures the KAS cooperated with local partner organisations,\textsuperscript{79} activities were conducted as \textit{Eigenmaßnahmen} implying the KAS’s involvement in some form, for instance through the provision of seminar’s speakers, and the measures’ (partially) financing. Each measure’s costs generally did not exceed 15,000 Euros.\textsuperscript{80} The RLP’s office collected project proposals until the 30\textsuperscript{th} of September of each year and selected 30. Afterwards it submitted them for the headquarter’s approval which normally consented. Partly, the director of the office had promoted certain measures to be implemented by partners. But he also appreciated the proposals of the partners often having more exact information on issues on-site. Follow-up measures were implemented in the subsequent year when the KAS considered their appropriateness.\textsuperscript{81}

The interview partner estimated that partners perceived the KAS neither as part of official diplomacy nor as an extension of the state but as civil society organisation. He associated the term public diplomacy with the KAS but objected that it was a term known to insiders.\textsuperscript{82}

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\textbf{7.2.2. Addresses and instruments}
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Of the three groups public diplomacy can target, that is the general public, the media and specific disseminators, the RLP in Southeast Europe addressed mostly the last group. Its work mainly focused on a law-oriented audience.\textsuperscript{83}

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\textsuperscript{77} AA (2014) p. 56.  \\
\textsuperscript{78} Interview 8.  \\
\textsuperscript{79} KAS at: \url{http://www.kas.de/rspsoe/en/about/}.  \\
\textsuperscript{80} Luchterhandt (2013) pp. 25, 37.  \\
\textsuperscript{81} Interview 8.  \\
\textsuperscript{82} Interview 8.  \\
\textsuperscript{83} See excursus; KAS at: \url{http://www.kas.de/rspsoe/de/about/} on target groups, \url{http://www.kas.de/rspsoe/de/about/partners/} on concrete partners.
\end{flushleft}
The evaluation described the target group as broad and the activities as elite-focused.\textsuperscript{84} For the media sector’s support the KAS had established a specific regional program in 2005 located in Sofia.\textsuperscript{85} The instruments involved in the RLP only slightly differed from those generally used by the foundations.

The RLP was organised as project work in cooperation with partner organisations. Civil society actors were important partners. In 2014, the ratio of civil society partners and partners from the state was relatively balanced with a slight preponderance of the non-state sector.\textsuperscript{86} The overall partner choice was considered as challenging and the KAS had to assess potential partners closely. Selection criteria were the potential partner’s rule of law support and reliability. The interview partner also referred to the foundations’ public funding why partners had to ensure correct accounting. It was often difficult to estimate whether potential partners pursued serious targets or whether they depended on invisible actors.\textsuperscript{87}

The RLP showed particularities regarding the cooperation with political parties and high level politics which were different from the general findings made before.\textsuperscript{88} Cooperation with high-level politics was “legitimized” in the RLP as for rule of law topics they were the natural target group. Furthermore, it was difficult for the KAS to find suitable political parties to cooperate with and even to alternatively cooperate with parliament’s committees and fractions. Political party structures were not comparable to those of German political parties. Legal-policy or domestic affairs spokesperson were missing to be supported systematically and the strong parties’ hierarchy hindered the development of expertise.\textsuperscript{89} The often changing committees’ compositions furthermore impeded the

\textsuperscript{84} Luchterhandt (2013) p. 18.
\textsuperscript{85} For details see KAS at: http://www.kas.de/medien-europa/en/.
\textsuperscript{86} Interview 8; similar Luchterhandt (2013) pp. 20, 26.
\textsuperscript{87} Interview 8.
\textsuperscript{88} See 4.2.
\textsuperscript{89} Interview 8; a similar experience was made by other foundations in the region: The FNS originally tried to support liberal parties. Since they often did not have continued existence, it started to focus on a broader target group (FNS [2013a] p. 66). An evaluation on the HBS’s activities even highlighted the advantage of missing political partners as partners perceived the Stiftung as neutral, unbiased and pluralistic possessing the ability to bring together people of different social background (Fischer [2011] p. 4).
parliamentarians’ responsibility for respective issues.\textsuperscript{90} Rule of law structures, moreover, could not be discussed on a party-political basis having the effect that the KAS even cooperated with rather left-leaning organisations. The KAS was nonetheless pleased with partners being politically affiliated.\textsuperscript{91}

The RLP’s instruments corresponded to the medium- and long-term public diplomacy instruments and were broadly situated within dialogues, discussions and the transfer of knowledge. The RLP organized around 30 conferences, seminars and workshops per year which took place successively in the Southeast European countries. Activities in Germany of the RLP did not happen except for some part of the Rumanian junior lawyers program. Parallel measures were not carried out as the RLP’s director attached importance to sit in on every activity.\textsuperscript{92}

The political dialogue instrument was most important for the RLP and a meta-level work approach which included the other instruments. The RLP followed a political, value- and dialogue-based approach in contrast to a rather technical and advisory method when promoting the rule of law.\textsuperscript{93} It thereby focused on the political fields of law such as combating corruption, the dealing with the past and minority rights. With value orientation it meant the focus on peace, freedom, equality, democracy and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{94} The approach was highlighted as the KAS’s “unique selling position” and contrasted with the capacity building and training measures of other actors in the field.\textsuperscript{95} Only one example was found where the RLP had offered technical support: In 2012 together with the GIZ it supported the Serbian parliament in publishing a manual about how to draft legislation. According to the KAS it had wanted to push the cooperation with Serbia difficult to be integrated into the RLP.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{90} The evaluator already had suggested further integrating chairman of the parliamentary committees into the RLP (Luchterhandt [2013] p. 21).
\textsuperscript{91} Interview 8.
\textsuperscript{92} Interview 8.
\textsuperscript{93} Interview 8.
\textsuperscript{95} Interview 1.
\textsuperscript{96} Luchterhandt (2013) p. 20.
Elements of cultural diplomacy were visible in the RLP. It organised cultural events and an annual human rights festival. Scholarships were granted to students in the region by the country offices but the RLP organised certain events for former and current legal scholarship holders. Moreover, it can be believed that the RLP imparted German legal culture in the region as the German legal system was a framework of reference in activities and high-ranking German lawyers and legal institutions were integrated in the program. The KAS also linked its rule of law engagement to an assumed world-wide interest in German legal culture.

The RLP was also active in think tank events and consulting. It organised conferences with think tank partner organisations, such as the Romanian Centre for European politics (CRPE), the Romanian Expert Forum (EFOR) and the Serbian Centre for Advanced Legal Studies (CUPS). Some cooperation took place with universities, such as with the Serbian Singidunum University’s affiliated faculty of European law and political science. The RLP also offered on its website serial country reports and analysis of political events connected to the rule of law. The KAS’s RLP was also involved in legal consulting of democratic institutions’ representatives focusing on EU corresponding legal orders. Consulting could also be found as regards the regions’s stabilization: In 2012, the RLP organized advisory meetings with Kosovan and Serbian actors on rule of law solutions for the relations between them.

Due to the regional media program the RLP did not undertake media activities. However, one workshop on media and transitional justice in 2013 was found. Also monologue public diplomacy instruments were rare. The RLP produced certain material, such as studies and books as well as the above mentioned serial publications but mostly as result of a dialogue.

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98 See 7.2.3.1.
99 KAS (2008b) pp. 5f.
100 KAS at: http://www.kas.de/rspsoe/de/about/partners/; the evaluation, however, noted some underrepresentation of legal professors in the RLP’s activities (Luchterhandt [2013] p. 21).
101 KAS at: http://www.kas.de/rspsoe/de/publications/.
102 Interview 8.
103 KAS (2012).
104 KAS (2013b).
instrument. One monologue example is the translation of significant decisions of the German constitutional court into some of the regional languages.\textsuperscript{105} Other monologue instruments, such as political campaigning and advertisement could not be found.

7.2.3. Dimensions: Propaganda and network

The promotion of the rule of law and the direct cooperation with judicial institutions as practised in the KAS’s RLP was highly political. The KAS was aware that rule of law aid could be perceive as propagandistic or international intrusion. It had also dealt with manipulations, the tendency to mendacity and the lack of credibility, aspects the literature often connected to propaganda.\textsuperscript{106} According to the KAS, its political affiliation and value-based dialogue approach created credibility on site.\textsuperscript{107} It also assured that it did not force the German legal culture onto the countries, put bluntly German interests and avoided hidden agendas.\textsuperscript{108} In this context it outlined that “rule of law helps the recipient country to improve their development opportunities. At the same time, it is in the German economic and security political interest when counting on stable and democratic partner countries under the rule of law.”\textsuperscript{109} KAS’s involvement in internal political battles or criticism by the recipient countries could not be noted. The promoted EU affiliation was mostly also intended by the governments of the Southeast European countries. This was different from other regions where the political ideas of the KAS and those of the respective countries collided. According to the interview partner, the RLP did not cooperate with secret services and transparently presented its partners and events on its website. Also the KAS’s affiliation to the CDU was known to the partners. Despite missing financial information former activities could at least be found several years past. During the conducted interview the atmosphere was very cooperative and the requested information was disclosed. What finally spoke against a propaganda dimension in the KAS’s RLP was what has been generally noted for the Stiftungen: the KAS’s relative autonomy, the implementation of

\textsuperscript{106} KAS (2008b).
\textsuperscript{107} KAS (2008b) p. 4.
\textsuperscript{108} KAS (2008b) p. 6.
\textsuperscript{109} KAS (2008b) p. 5, author’s translation.
mostly dialogue instruments and the pluralistic approach of several \textit{Stiftungen} offering different solutions to rule of law issues.\textsuperscript{110}

The networking dimension, in contrast, was well recognizable in the RLP’s case. It also enjoyed a prominent position in the RLP’s activity portfolio although it referred to the linking of actors in the region only and did not consider the KAS as an important node. The following subsections analyse the relationships as well as the exchanged resources and common values and interests of the network participants. We conclude with the attempt to specify the overall network surrounding (7.2.3.3).

\textbf{7.2.3.1. Relationships}

In 2014, diverse relationships to local, foreign and German actors existed in the context of the RLP. Most of them were stable, independent, characterized by cooperation. Although the local relationships mainly concerned the legal sector in the Southeast European countries, diverse state actors, NGOs, students, academics and professional organizations were included. Relationships with media people and political party members were underdeveloped, yet.\textsuperscript{111} Intensive contacts on site existed also to the KAS’s country offices and the regional media office, to German embassy members, to the other \textit{Stiftungen} and German organisations, such as IRZ, GIZ and the German church organisations as well as to foreign organisations.\textsuperscript{112} With the US think tank Freedom House in Rumania the RLP, for instance, had held a workshop on the fight against public procurement criminality in 2012.\textsuperscript{113} It also cooperated with the Chinese Scheherazade foundation.\textsuperscript{114} The KAS had contacts and cooperated with foreign embassies and supranational levels.\textsuperscript{115} Examples were a round table event in Rumania on the inclusion of Roma people organised by the RLP, the Slovakian embassy and the EU commission in 2014\textsuperscript{116} and a speech of the RLP’s director on the UN anti-

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{110} See Ch. 4.
\textsuperscript{111} See 7.2.2.
\textsuperscript{112} Interview 8.
\textsuperscript{114} KAS at: \url{http://www.kas.de/rspsoe/de/publications/39331/}.
\textsuperscript{115} Interview 8.
\textsuperscript{116} KAS (2014b).
\end{footnotesize}
corruption strategy for Central and Eastern Europe at the US embassy to Rumania in 2015.\footnote{KAS (2015b).}

The RLP profited from the wide variety of contacts which existed between actors in Germany and the KAS. German politicians of the CDU at the federal and the state level participated in the RLP’s conferences and events and senior officials of the German ministries showed interest in the program.\footnote{Interview 8; see exemplarily KAS at: \url{http://www.kas.de/rspsoe/de/publications/22880/}: In Rumania the parliamentary state secretary at the interior ministry Ole Schröder hold a lecture on the fight against corruption in Germany in 2011.} The RLP’s director had also political contacts on the German local level due to his former membership at the Lübeck parliament and the \textit{Landtag Schleswig-Holstein} for the CDU. These contacts were also used for the RLP.\footnote{Interview 8.} A particular conspicuous aspect in the RLP was the integration of high ranking German lawyers and German institutions in the RLP’s activities. Judges of the Federal Constitutional Court had been, for instance, guest speakers at the Rumanian and Moldavian Courts during book presentations of significant German decisions translated to Rumanian.\footnote{See Schluckebier (2013); Kessal-Wulf (2014).} The Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency’s director, Christine Lüders, visited the RLP in the context of conference on the 10\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Rumanian Anti-Discrimination Agency.\footnote{KAS at: \url{http://www.kas.de/rspsoe/de/publications/31288/}.} NGOs in Germany, moreover, occasionally established contacts to the RLP and German academics participated in activities on site.\footnote{Interview 8; KAS (2012) p. 1.} Initially the RLP’s relationships depended on the KAS’s country offices. The RLP was even directed by the Rumanian office in the first year. Afterwards it increased its activities and independence. Additionally, it referred to the existing links of the country offices to actors on site.\footnote{Luchterhandt (2013) pp. 27f.; most of the country offices in the region existed since the 1990s. The Albanian and the Moldovan offices both started their work in 2009 (KAS annual report 2009 p. 77).} The relationships’ stability was central since the KAS considered important continuity and long-term partnership prospects. In Rumania and Bulgaria the KAS remained active beyond 2007 although the aim of the EU membership was already
achieved. According to the evaluation the partners highly acknowledged it, especially because other international organisations prevailingingly had left the country. Furthermore, the RLP’s office in Rumania was an important guarantor of stability. It was an important point of contact for the partners. RLP’s undertakings were also easier to be organised than in other countries leading to a preponderance of activities in Rumania. Moreover, the employment of local staff members and the permanent German representative contributed to the stability of contacts.

Although the overall situation among donor organizations on site and especially with USAid was characterized as competitive, the KAS’s relationships with other actors were mainly cooperative. Joint-measures were implemented with the German embassy. Intensive cooperation could also be found with the KAS’s country offices and the media office in Southeast Europe. The country offices were supposed to generally focus on all aspects of the countries’ political development while the RLP specifically directed to legal issues for which extensive legal knowledge of a person being in the law was deemed necessary. Still, both showed conceptual similarities in the support of the countries’ rapprochement with the EU, the dealing with the communist past, political party cooperation or parliamentary assistance, the consulting in constitutional reform processes (in Bosnia Herzegovina) and the explicit cooperation with rule of law actors (in Albania). To avoid activity overlaps, coordination took place. Direct, e-mail and telephone contacts with the other directors were frequent. Annually the offices’ staff members in the region met to discuss the KAS’s

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125 Interview 8.
126 Interview 8; although USAid had more general program focusing on democracy, human rights and governance future overlapping was expected (Luchterhandt [2013] p. 31).
127 Interview 8.
129 Interview 8.
130 This information stems from the KAS’s country offices’ websites in Albania (http://www.kas.de/albanien/de/about/), Bosnia Herzegovina (http://www.kas.de/bosnien-herzegowina/de/about/), Kosovo (http://www.kas.de/kosovo/de/about/), Croatia (http://www.kas.de/kroatien/de/about/), Macedonia (http://www.kas.de/mazedonien/de/about/), Rumania and Moldova (http://www.kas.de/moldau/de/about/). Information on this matter was missing for Serbia/Montenegro (http://www.kas.de/serbien/de/about/) and Bulgaria (http://www.kas.de/bulgarien/de/about/).
131 Interview 8.
overall activities. Also the other German political foundations’ activities on site and those of the RLP partly corresponded as they equally circled around EU affiliation, stabilisation, democratisation and the rule of law.\(^{132}\) However, the RLP’s in-depth and explicit specialisation on the rule of law stood out. The KAS exchanged views with other German Stiftungen and occasionally met with them. One such instance was the German embassy periodically inviting the foundations.\(^{133}\) The FES in Rumania and the RLP both maintained a partnership with the National Association of Judges but a particular competitive situation between them the interview partner did not confirm. Several times in the past the KAS and the FES even had organised joint conferences in the field of justice.\(^{134}\) According to the evaluator also the other Stiftungen were willing to cooperate with the RLP.\(^{135}\) Remarkably, the missing approach of different political partners in the region did not equally result in increased competition among the foundations. Also the relations with the other German organisations the interview partner described as cooperative. Projects were carried out together with the German catholic and protestant churches. With the GIZ the RLP had a joint-project in Serbia at the time of the interview and the IRZ was an occasional conversation partner.\(^{136}\) Both, the IRZ and GIZ followed a technical and advisory approach and the GIZ concentrated on civil and commercial law which led to activities and partners other than those of the RLP. In case of overlapping, for example with the IRZ in supporting public law reforms in Moldova and with the Venice Commission regarding constitutional reform processes activities were coordinated.\(^{137}\)

7.2.3.2. Resources, values and interests

Within the framework of the aforementioned relationships the RLP and the other actors exchanged resources and to a high degree shared values and policy interests.

\(^{132}\) See 7.1.3.

\(^{133}\) Interview 8.

\(^{134}\) Luchterhandt (2013) p. 31.

\(^{135}\) Luchterhandt (2013) p. 22.

\(^{136}\) Interview 8.

\(^{137}\) Luchterhandt (2013) pp. 31f.
Financial resources received over the Federal Budget the RLP used for the activities on site. One fourth was made available directly to the partner organisations on side.\textsuperscript{138} Partners often had some financial means and contributed moreover with human resources and labour. Financial support of political parties was not allowed and did not take place, whereas the cooperation with politicians or party foundations was possible.\textsuperscript{139} The evaluator attested to the RLP a shortage in human, physical and financial resources.\textsuperscript{140}

Information resources were accessed by KAS through the partners on site and from its own experiences. Partners generally had an advantage in knowledge on the local situation. All RLP’s exchanged experiences at regular meetings in Berlin. Information was also exchanged with the German embassies and the other foundations.\textsuperscript{141} The KAS’s country offices provided logistical resources and information through the monitoring of the political situation and indentified suitable partners for the RLP especially for measures in other countries than Rumania. In turn, the country office benefitted from the RLP’s measures in its country.\textsuperscript{142} Necessary expertise was also bought from other actors.\textsuperscript{143} The information collected was further processed in analysis of the situation on site and was used for the reports to the KAS’s headquarter and the German ministries. The headquarter assessed and compared the information to that of other RLPs.\textsuperscript{144}

The RLP, moreover, had significant networking resources. Promoting the cooperation between the Southeast European countries was one of the RLP’s objectives and viewed as condition for the program’s sustainability. According to the evaluation, the KAS was able to interlink actors at the constitutional and other courts, rule of law oriented NGOs, qualified junior

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\item \textsuperscript{138} Luchterhandt (2013) p. 25.
\item \textsuperscript{139} Interview 8; see also 5.3.4.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Luchterhandt (2013) p. 29.
\item \textsuperscript{141} Interview 8.
\item \textsuperscript{142} Luchterhandt (2013) pp. 27f.
\item \textsuperscript{143} Exemplarily, the KAS and the Bulgarian interior ministry commissioned the Max Planck Foundation for international peace and the rule of law to carry out a study on best practices for fighting corruption in the Danube region (Hensgen [2013]). The RLP’s supported also a study of Zenith, a Macedonian think tank, on the European political conditionality in the region (Nechev et. al. [2013]).
\item \textsuperscript{144} Luchterhandt (2013) p. 33.
\end{itemize}
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lawyers and former scholarship holders in the region. Many nodes already potentially existed through the country offices and before the RLP’s establishment.\textsuperscript{145} Challenging was considered in this context to arouse the countries’ interests in each other.\textsuperscript{146} The evaluation also mentioned the linguistic differences between them.\textsuperscript{147} The KAS also connected partners from the different RLPs world-wide.\textsuperscript{148} As outlined, the KAS invited German politicians and legal actors to the region, established connections to their foreign counterparts and tried to furthered political cooperation. Also the KAS’s visit and educational program in Germany and the RLP’s Rumanian junior lawyer program focused on the relationship building between actors from both countries. The KAS’s approach of its own participation in the measures and the inclusion of local partner ensured the necessary contacts on site and the integration of German actors. Since the director of the RLP attended the measures he also had some control over the establishment of contacts. Furthermore, the office located on site was obviously important for the networking as the RLP had most of its local contacts and activities in Rumania, whereas in other countries the RLP depended on the country offices and the integration of actors was more challenging.

The KAS furthermore provided moral authority in the context of the RLP. The KAS’s affiliation to the CDU was known to the partners and therefore often associated it with Chancellor Angela Merkel. At the same time, it was perceived as civil society organisation. The interview partner saw an advantage of promoting rule of law as a German organisation as the highly respected German Constitutional Court, the good institutional set-up, the professional parliament and the profound substantive and procedural law allowed “products to sell well” and increased credibility when advocating these aspects in Southeast Europe. He also stressed that Germans were considered on site as competent and reliable.\textsuperscript{149} According to the KAS, Germany also served as a role model owing to the successful GDR’s legal

\textsuperscript{146} Interview 8.
\textsuperscript{147} Luchterhandt (2013) p. 29.
\textsuperscript{148} KAS (2008b) p. 11.
\textsuperscript{149} Interview 8.
integration.\textsuperscript{150} Often this German model character was viewed in dissociation to the US model.\textsuperscript{151}

Apart from the exchange of resources, the RLP’s network was characterised by shared policy interests and values of the involved actors. As already outlined, values were particularly highlighted in the RLP’s work approach. The RLP’s objectives moreover fitted almost “template-like” with the German and EU integration policy towards the region. Also the KAS traced the RLPs’ initiation world-wide to the beginnings of German development policy’s conditionality and the emphasis on political criteria in the aiding countries\textsuperscript{152} as well as the international agendas attaching increasing importance to the rule of law from the 1990s onwards.\textsuperscript{153} In Southeast Europe these considerations were reflected also in the EU enlargement policy.\textsuperscript{154} With the take over of the BMZ’s consulting assistance in the region, the \textit{Stiftungen}, as outlined, became an integral part of the German policy.\textsuperscript{155} The interview partner explained the RLP’s engagement by the desire to assist the countries in meeting the admission conditions and becoming equal members.\textsuperscript{156} Concrete accordance can be found with the policies of the BMZ and of the European’s IPA in the support of public administrations’ and judiciaries’ reform processes, the fight against corruption (BMZ) and regional and territorial cooperation (IPA). The RLP’s objectives were also consistent with the BMJV’s policy although the ministry emphasised civil and economic law while the RLP did not promote economy-related legal fields and focused on public law. Both furthered standards in criminal law. Moreover, the countries covered by the RLP were those of the EU’s Stability Pact, largely consistent with the IPA countries and with the EC’s benchmarking as regards Bulgaria and Rumania. Moreover, the German government meant exactly the countries covered by

\textsuperscript{151} See Ch. 5 conclusion; Schneider-Deters (2005).
\textsuperscript{152} Known as the “Spranger-criterions”, see 5.2.2.
\textsuperscript{153} KAS (2008b) p. 3.
\textsuperscript{154} In 1993 the European Council had outlined rule of law as one of the conditions for the EU’s eastward enlargement of the EU in its “Copenhagen Criteria” (European Council \textsuperscript{1993} §7A.iii).
\textsuperscript{155} See 7.1.
\textsuperscript{156} Interview 8.
the RLP when referring to Southeast Europe. The engagement of the KAS was furthermore in line with the CDU’s political program stressing cooperation treatments and EU membership prospects. With the visiting German politicians the RLP also shared conservative values. With actors from German legal institutions the RLP had in common the worthwhile goal of the rule of law. German and international organisations on site either shared the political interest in EU integration or the focus on the rule of law. Local partners the RLP chose when they supported the rule of law. Although it is uncertain whether other local actors and addressees associated with the network shared these mutual values and interests, the governments of the Southeast European countries largely supported the EU integration.

7.2.3.3. Types of transnational policy network

The network in which the RLP operated in 2014 did not corresponded to the outlined ideal-typical forms of transnational policy networks. Although it came closest to the global public policy network, attributes of other network types could be found and led to a mixed character. The network resembled a transnational advocacy network (TAN) only in terms of the common issues circling around the rule of law deficits in the region. The prerequisite of a campaign was missing as the situation’s improvement could not be achieved in a foreseeable period. Contrary to TANs, the network also linked actors on site which often did not have anything to do with each other, included the public sector and exchanged more resources than information only. Furthermore, the connections furthermore resembled a transnational executive network due to links with civil servants on site and in Germany. However, the KAS was not part of the German public administration and, according to the interview partner, was not perceived on site as government official. Moreover, due to the integrated professionals and experts the network was similar to a global knowledge network (KNET). Knowledge generation, the informing of policy, its application and networking itself played an important role. Also the measures involving research, networking, advice and consulting in the policy making process were consistent with those of the RLP. German public bodies supported the RLP leading to a

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157 See BT (2011c).
158 See 2.3.1. and 3.1.1.
semi-official position. The RLP also controlled resources and was internationally experienced. However, experts and professionals were not the only network’s participants. The KAS also lacked scientific neutrality particularly highlighted in its value-based approach and combined political affiliation which was, though secondary but still important for the KAS. Finally, the RLP’s network was trisectoral, as it included public sector officials, civil servants and civil society professionals similar to a global public policy network (GPPN). Still, the included individuals, such as students and scholarship holders did not appear in the GPPN terminology. Due to the missing economic sector, the network could not be termed as a tripartite global governance network. GPPNs consider international actors while the current case involved mainly national and local actors and did not have a particular supranational character. Whether the deficit in the rule of law was a shared problem existing over cross-borderers according to the GPPN’s definition depended on the perspective of the involved actor. For the KAS it was a regional phenomenon and part of the supranational integration policy why it furthered regional cooperation. The national countries, in contrast, were often not interested in it. They obviously deemed the processing of the rule of law deficit as something to be managed on the national level which complied with the EU’s practice of integrating national countries in contrast to regions.

Loose couplings and issue networks have been suggested forms of interaction between state and non-state actors in the context of public diplomacy. Unlike these types, the public sector presence in the current network was relatively high and interaction between the non-state and the state actors was strong. In contrast to the issue network, it existed among most actors a common policy objective and the permeability of the network in terms of new actors’ inclusion was rather low due to the RLP’s selection procedure. The integration of the established network into the policy making process was ambivalent as several processes came into question: In the Southeast European countries the influencing of partners directly involved in policy making was difficult due to the lack of collaborating political parties.

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159 See 3.1.1.
and chairmen of parliamentary committees. This and the fact that the KAS as a transnational actor dominated the setting spoke for the issue network. In Germany, the KAS was strongly involved in the policy making process. As outlined in Chapter 4, it consulted formally with the respective German ministries and delivered expert opinion at the parliamentary committees. It also actively implemented the policy of the BMZ in Southeast Europe. In this respect the network appeared to be a policy community actor.\textsuperscript{160} The internationalized policy environments of multilevel governance and self-regulatory, private regimes, where the public sector is more strongly involved compared to the loose coupling were still not appropriate to characterize the current case’s interactions. Both assume a highly institutionalized form of cooperation among actors and a certain degree of formality, which neither in Germany nor in Southeast Europe could be found.

7.2.4. Assisting democracy?

In the model of democracy assistance the state institutions’ support allows for rule of law aid directed at other countries’ legal systems. It aims at an independent and effective judiciary and other law-oriented institutions.\textsuperscript{161} In this context, Carothers itemises firstly the reforming of institutions including judicial reforms, legislative strengthening, retraining of prosecutors, police and prison reform, bolstering public defenders and introducing alternative dispute resolution; secondly, the rewriting of laws, such as modernizations in criminal, civil and commercial laws; thirdly the upgrading of legal professionals including the strengthening of bar associations and legal education; and finally the increasing of legal access and advocacy aiming at the support of law-oriented NGOs, public interest law reforms, legal media training and the support of legal aid clinics.\textsuperscript{162}

The RLP’s activities in 2014 focused on all four fields of rule of law assistance: It aimed at the consolidation of institutions and furthered

\textsuperscript{160} See 2.3.1.
\textsuperscript{161} See 5.1., for a definition of the rule of law see 5.1.
\textsuperscript{162} Carothers (2006) p. 168. Legislative strengthening is often treated as separate aid category (see 5.1). Carothers included it here, as it has a dual position serving both the rule of law situation and the political process.
constitutional jurisdiction. In the public sector the KAS mainly cooperated with constitutional courts and association of judges. Its collaboration with parliaments also intended the legislatives’ strengthening. It also focused on the modernization of public and procedural laws and on legal education as it targeted legal scholars and professional legal organizations.\textsuperscript{163} In 2015 it had also initiated a program to further the knowledge transfer on the rule of law in grammar schools.\textsuperscript{164} Through its partnerships with law-interested NGOs the RLP was also active in assisting the advocacy sector.

The RLP’s democracy assistance ambitions were not restricted to rule of law aid only, although aid in the state institutions’ sector prevailed and the judiciary’s support was most significant.\textsuperscript{165} The RLP irregularly supported electoral processes. It had, for instance, organized penal discussions in order to confront politicians with critical questions of the audience. However, election aid was rather a country offices’ task and elections were not supported technically. In the context of the democracy assistance’ political party building, the KAS looked for contacts to them and acted as an advisor, although, as already outlined, it proved difficult.\textsuperscript{166} The modernization of constitutions and the furthering of the division of power were RLP’s objectives and part of democracy assistance’s constitutional aid. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, the RLP had helped elaborating a constitutional commentary available in the local languages and in English and drafted by domestic and foreign experts in 2010.\textsuperscript{167} The RLP also focused on local political development. The office had established contacts between Serbian mayors and the association of German cities and towns.\textsuperscript{168} The RLP’s cooperation with NGOs and other civil society actors finally can be viewed as aiding democracy assistance’s civil society sector.

The RLP’s long-term involvement and the focus on long-term political and social reform processes in the region were in line with the developmental democracy promotion approach. Still, the RLP’s activities even

\textsuperscript{163} Interview 8.
\textsuperscript{164} KAS at: \url{http://www.kas.de/rspsoe/de/publications/40687/}.
\textsuperscript{165} Interview 8.
\textsuperscript{166} Interview 8; see 7.2.2.
\textsuperscript{167} Steiner/Ademović (2010); KAS at: \url{http://www.kas.de/rspsoe/de/publications/19629/}.
\textsuperscript{168} Interview 8.
approximated the wider approaches of state-building and conflict management. The RLP’s objectives of human rights protection, of comprehensively supporting transformation processes and the strengthening of public administrations were part of a state-building approach. Also the RLP’s focus on combating organised crime complied with the state-buildings’ security component and peace-building. According to the interview partner, the KAS cooperated with police forces in this context which referred to the instrument of security sector reforms. The RLP’s dealing with the past regarding war crimes and totalitarianism complied with peace-building, reconciliation and transitional justice. Also the RLP’s strategy to further integrate the region into the EU and the fostering of regional cooperation corresponds to peace-building. According to the partner organisations, the RLP was able to bring together political and legal actors of different views to talk to each other in cases of domestic tensions which can also be viewed as dialogic interaction among conflicting parties. Although state-building is generally focused on a short-term aim achievement and the RLP, in contrast, adopted a long-term approach integrating elements of both state-building and conflict management was justified as the stability of most of the countries in the region was not sufficient.

7.2.5. Impact of the KAS

In chapter 2 I reflected on the difficulty of measuring the impact of transnational actors by policy outcomes and their influence on the policy making process. To causally link the RLP’s activities to political results in the Southeast European countries was equally impossible. I found one such success story the KAS credited itself with: During the Rumanian political crisis in 2012 the constitutional court, which had cooperated with the KAS for many years, had held a key position to end the conflict between the

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169 See 5.1.
170 See 6.1.
172 According to the World Bank (2015), Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina were fragile states. In the Fund for Peace’ fragile states index of 2014 Serbia, Moldova and Bosnia ranked as “high warning” fragile states, in Macedonia and Albania the situation was “warning”, while Montenegro, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia counted as “less stable” (see http://ffp.statesindex.org/).
political camps as it had to decide about the referendum on the president’s removal. It was not awed by the intimidation attempts of one of the political camps what was virtually celebrated as the victory of the rule of law. Still, to trace back this success to the RLP’s engagement only is doubtful. Although the interview partner believed that the RLP had initiated social reform processes and positive changes he also regarded as particular difficult to change and encourage thought processes and to become one of the crucial socialisation factors among all the other aspects of influence. Also the evaluation stressed the RLP’s positive effect on the region’s modernisation and EU integration. However, to fully meet the needs in rule of law activities the funds had to be increased by ten times or more. Cooperation with political parties and parliamentary committees also showed the difficulties of the KAS to offer expertise and exercise influence on the agenda setting process. The interview partner and the evaluation both concluded that it was all about a progress towards the defined RLP’s objectives and not about the actual aim achievement by the RLP’s activities alone. Nonetheless, the evaluation regarded the RLP as the most important external rule of law program, at least in Rumania. The KAS tried to overcome this difficulty of measuring causal results by focusing on the proper implementation of measures. The interview partner referred to the concept of sustainability including the subject’s relevance for the respective country and the production of a certain result. In the follow-up of a conference, for example, an academic work, a these paper or the initiation of a network was a necessary requirement.

As a consequence, considering the KAS’s impact in the region in light of policy changes or development effects did not lead to results. While it was

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174 Interview 8.  
177 Luchterhandt (2013) p. 23. During the monitoring failed project were not found. The evaluation identified several beneficial factors for target achievement: the KAS’s long-term presents, the experiences of the country offices with potential partner organisations before the RLP started, the manageable size of the measures, the integration of local staff members and their insights into the societies on site among others (see Luchterhandt [2013] pp. 24f. for details).  
179 Interview 8.
also methodological difficult to trace back how information and experiences gathered in the context of the RLP influenced German policies towards the countries in Southeast Europe, the RLP was, as demonstrated, strongly involved in implementing parts of the German policy. Furthermore, with its focus on aid and EU integration it supported indirectly Germany’s role concept of a civilian power. To view the RLP as a sheer executive organ for German politics, however, is misleading since its activities often went beyond the respective policy implications. In 2014 the BMZ, for example, was only partially active in Southeast Europe due the focus on specific countries and the fact that some states were not defined as developing countries. In these cases, the ministry relied on other actors, such as the Stiftungen. Especially in rule of law aid, state actors were not aped for the task and the Stiftungsens’ undertakings were often the only possibility when the claim of interference was to be avoided.\textsuperscript{180} Still, the fragmented German foreign policy making process which included different departmental responsibilities\textsuperscript{181} also apparent towards Southeast Europe does not allow speaking of the KAS as a vicarious agent for the German policy. Interests of economic policy, for example, promoted by the BMJV could not be found in the RLP.

According to the point of view taken here and understanding impact as the establishment of communication channels and operation in networks, sheds a completely different light on the KAS’s impact. Within the established RLP’s network, the KAS took a central position as it controlled the exchange of resources and was therefore more dominant than the involved state actors. The KAS was also mainly involved in the network’s building and maintained a bridging function which can be viewed as an “example of mattering” itself.\textsuperscript{182} The case showed furthermore a high flexibility of the KAS to adapt its activities to the domestic conditions in the region. With abandoning its world-wide practised approach of predominantly working with affiliated partners and focusing on law-oriented addressees instead the KAS bypassed the problem of missing partners with a political background akin to the KAS.

\textsuperscript{180} Similar KAS (2008b) p. 4.
\textsuperscript{182} Noortmann/Arts/Reinalda (2001) p. 302.
From a more general perspective, the RLP also intensified the links between Germany and the countries of Southeast Europe on different levels. Also the interview partner believed that the activities of the RLP contributed to the bilateral relations. Whether the RLP positively impacted the image of Germany and its law in the region as assumed by the evaluator is difficult to verify, in contrast. Although the KAS did not plan in the near future the establishment of other RLPs world-wide and the progress in Southeast Europe was slow, the interview partner was cautiously optimistic regarding future developments in the rule of law field and pleaded for a committed continuation of work in the region.

**Conclusion**

With the case of the KAS’s rule of law program in Southeast Europe I tried to illustrate the public diplomatic undertakings of the *Stiftungen*. It showed that the KAS predominantly planned activities for the long-term, mainly used dialogue instruments and purposed in particular the building of favourable relationships.

The RLP was organised as a sector program. It showed several particularities which translated into the public diplomacy approach. Due to the focus on the rule of law the public diplomacy’s addressees were limited to specific disseminators while simultaneously the target groups were extended to politically non-affiliated partners and high-level politics. It secured the KAS’s own ability to act in countries where political partners were missing as partnerships were defined through the specific topic. It also legitimized the cooperation with state actors on site, something actually desired by the *Stiftungen*. The balance between the German political foundations, on the contrary, was disrupted. Although competition between the KAS and the other foundations could not be noted, the adopted target group concept neutralised the unwritten partner pluralism among the foundations which I consider at least partly as a guarantor against propaganda activity.

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183 Interview 8.
184 *Luchterhandt* (2013) p. 34.
185 Interview 8.
186 See 4.2.
The network surrounding mainly determined the KAS’s impact on site. Not only exchanged the KAS resources with various actors, it also actively build networks, mainly controlled the links between actors and acted as a gate keeper. Especially the RLP’s office in Rumania and the long-term KAS’s activities in the region positively impacted the network building. The network was characterised by a mixed character and features of different transnational policy networks. It showed a high degree of shared values and policy interest among actors but German and European policy interests were put to the fore. Although the KAS acted independently from governmental guidelines, it implemented large parts of German policy in the region and indirectly extended the official margin for manoeuvre through its cooperation with a wide variety of actors which otherwise could have never been reached by governmental actors. This also happened fully intentional as the KAS frequently referred to German politics when justifying its undertakings on site. Although the KAS appeared as a civil society organisation on site, it disguised neither its affiliation to the German ruling party nor the fact that it was a political organisations purposing political changes. Finally, the case of the RLP showed moreover that the KAS mixed several catalytic and collaborative public diplomacy forms. Neither did it limit its democracy assistance to rule of law aid only nor did it strictly differentiate between democracy assistance and conflict management task. Activities were rather adapted flexibly to the perceived necessities and possibilities on site.
Chapter 8 - Practising public diplomacy through conflict management: The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Southern Thailand

The following chapter aims at illustrating how German political foundations are active in the field of conflict management. This is shown in the case of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and its ambitions to further peace in the Southern regions of Thailand where violence, without much international perception, is the order of the day. The chapter is based mainly on fieldwork conducted in Thailand in 2009. It also includes more recent material. The chapter starts with an overview of the framework in which the FES operated in Thailand in 2009. Afterwards, we look more closely at the FES’s public diplomacy ambitions in the context of its conflict management in Thailand’s deep South.

8.1. Thailand and Germany

The kingdom of Thailand is the only Southeast Asian state without a colonial history. The revolution of 1932 led from absolute to constitutional monarchy as well as to power struggles between concurring groups of armed forces and of social elites. Since World War II, Thailand has seen all manner of different forms of government, ranging from military dictatorships to electoral democracy. Seventeen constitutions and charters have been in power since that time. They all approved the monarchy. Most of Thailand’s numerous post-war governments were controlled by the military and periods of parliamentary democracy alternated with military governments.¹ King Bhumipol Adulyadej has been ruling Thailand since 1946. He is the world’s longest-serving monarch and is assumed to be the world’s richest royal.² He is the head of state, the supreme commander of the armed forces and the highest Buddhist dignitary. He also confirms the prime minister, who is elected by the House of Representatives.

The 1997 constitution was widely hailed as a landmark in democratic political reform. It included electoral innovations, an increase in checks and

² CIA (2010).
balances, the establishment of the constitutional court and the explicit recognition of human rights.\(^3\) At the time of the interviews, Thailand's constitution was that of 2007, which had replaced an interim constitution formed in 2006 after an army-led coup. It provided for a bicameral parliament. Members of the House of Representatives were elected on a proportional party list by popular vote. The Senate consisted partly of representatives of the 76 Thai provinces; the other part was appointed by a committee and consisted of members who were not allowed to be political party members and mainly belonged to the social and military elite.

In the 1980s, Thailand experienced an economic boom and became one of Southeast Asia’s economically leading countries, making the leap from a developing to a threshold country.\(^4\) It managed to recover from the 1997 Asian financial crisis by 2001.\(^5\) In 2002 the Federal Foreign Office (AA) considered Thailand a small “tiger economy”.\(^6\) Thailand is a founding member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). In 2009, at the time of the interviews, the political situation in Thailand was one of conflict; this situation grew out of control soon thereafter.

The following sections will give an overview of the political situation in Thailand and challenges faced by the German political foundations, the situation in the Southern provinces, the official relations between Germany and Thailand, and the landscape of the German political foundations on site. They take into account the perceptions of the interview partners.

8.1.1. Political situation and aid organisations

In 2009 Thailand experienced conflicts between the political camps of Thaksin Shinawatra, former prime minister of Thailand (the “Reds”) and the conservative elite in Bangkok (the “Yellows”). Thaksin, a telecommunications businessman and one of the wealthiest people in

\(^3\) Banpsirichote (2004) p. 244.
\(^6\) AA (2002b) p. 3.
Thailand, ruled from 2004 to 2007, a time dominated by gross violations of the rule of law and by clampdowns on Muslim dissenters in the Southern provinces. The “Reds” were mainly rural workers supporting the pro-Thaksin People Power Party (PPP) led by Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej. Thaksin fled from Thailand in 2008. The “Yellows”, supporters of the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), were for the most part a loose grouping of royalists, businessmen and the urban middle class, led by media mogul Sondhi Limthongkul and Chamlong Srimuang, a former general with close ties to the king. During the 2008 PPP government, protests and violence did not relent and led to the occupation of the two international airports by members of the PAD. From late 2008 onwards, Abhisit Vejjajiva was prime minister and leader of the opposition Democrat Party (DP), associated with the “Yellows”. Political instability continued in 2009. The pro-Thaksin United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) stormed the ASEAN Conference in Pattaya and violence escalated in Bangkok. In the months that followed, the internal affairs situation calmed down after the government initiated a military intervention, but protests resumed in 2010. The military intervened several times. In 2013, during the governmental term of Thaksin’s sister Yingluck, who had been elected in 2011, protests flared up again and were ended by a military coup in 2014.

Although most Thais see the king as the source of stabilisation and modernisation, the king’s political role is not undisputed. Since the beginning of his reign, a coup d’état has taken place every six years. Most of them were supported by the throne when the acting civilian government became too democratic or its independence seemed to be no longer tolerable for the monarchy. The “Yellows” fear for their privileges since the king is too ill to exercise his authority, whereas the “Reds” act with increasing confidence, supported with money and video messages by the exiled

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8 BBC Profile, 13/07/2012.
12 Handley, Die Zeit, 16/04/2009.
At the time of the interviews, the human rights situation in Thailand was characterised by limits on freedom of expression and assembly curtailed by emergency decrees issued after violent demonstrations in 2008. Restrictions on the media had also increased. Moreover, the number of people charged with lese majesty had augmented substantially in 2008 and 2009 with drastic sentences of imprisonment.

In 2009 the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (HBS) and the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS) had offices in Thailand. They faced several challenges. Firstly, it was complicated to openly address problems, as this was not part of Thai culture. Communication of unpleasant, negative or conflictive issues was avoided and often meant a loss of face. Thais tended to prefer indirect communication, which set hurdles for the aid organisations. However, the occupation of the airport in Bangkok in 2008 and the storm of the ASEAN conference in 2009 damaged Thailand’s international reputation, which in turn opened up the situation for assistance from abroad. Secondly, working conditions were very restrictive. Only nine international organisations were accredited at the TICA (Thailand International Development Cooperation Agency), a department in the Thai ministry of foreign affairs. Of the Stiftungen only the FES and the KAS held accreditation, whereas the other German foundations, bilateral actors and NGOs had to work in a grey area. The German foundations which were not accredited at the TICA regretted not having official status. They had to re-register every second year at the Thai Ministry of Labour. In the beginning a lot of persuasion had been necessary to become registered. Over the years, the relationship to the authorities had improved, but comprehensive reporting to the public bodies was still necessary. Thirdly, the political crisis in Thailand created different framework conditions every couple of months. The organisations were forced to constantly adapt to the changing

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15 Interviews 1, 2, 3.  
16 Interview 1.  
17 Interview 3.  
18 Interviews 1, 2, 3.  
19 Interview 1.
situations and new governmental actors. During times of military governments, it was more difficult for the Stiftungen to maintain their activities as they were often restricted. Fourthly, the political crisis had led to a severe polarisation within the party landscape and society at large, which made the work of the Stiftungen more complicated. It was often not known which side the local partner supported and partners refused to enter dialogue with the other camp. Being viewed as partial, getting caught between the camps and being forced to adopt a clear position was considered as challenging. Finally, the language barrier was considered a major challenge for finding partners. Only the Thai elite spoke English. It was therefore necessary to have an office in Thailand with Thai staff members.

Apart from the four political foundations, several other German aid organisations were active in Thailand in 2009. Technical assistance came from the Deutscher Entwicklungsdiensst (DED), the Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH (InWent) and the Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). All three became the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in 2011. Some consulting organisations which were assumed to be spin-offs of the GTZ also worked on site. For German financial assistance, the Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG) was active.

8.1.2. The conflict in Southern Thailand

In 2009, the conflict in Thailand’s Southern provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, Pattani, Satun and Songkhla, mainly inhabited by Muslims of Malay ethnicity, smouldered. Between 2004 and 2009 thousands of people were killed in bombing attacks and confrontations between Muslim insurgents and the Thai government. Whether the insurgents were separatists, terrorists

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20 Interview 3.
22 Interviews 1, 3, 4, correspondingly 2.
23 Interview 3.
24 See 5.2.1.
25 Interviews 2, 3.
26 For a detailed timeline see Wagner (2007) pp. 36ff.
or criminal groups was unknown. In 1902, after Siam, the former Thailand had already annexed the independent Muslim Sultanate Patani when violent excesses took place. In the 1970s and 1980s militant groups fought for separation. In the 1990s violence slackened but in the middle of 2001 several assassinations of policemen led to an upsurge in violent behaviour. Experts began speaking out about an escalation of violence in 2004; that year 18 schools were set on fire and several bombs exploded in Narathiwat. Moreover, several insurgents who had attacked police and military stations were shot by the Thai military when a mosque in Pattani was stormed. One hundred and seven militants were killed. Furthermore, 78 protesters suffocated to death while being moved to a military camp handcuffed and stacked on top of each other in a van.27 By 2010 the number of deaths had reached around 4000 with another 6500 injuries.28 Targets belonged to all different kind of groups, such as policemen, soldiers, officials, teacher, students, farm workers, local businessmen, monks and Muslim clerics.29 The rhetoric around the conflict was charged with conspiracy theory.30 Several reasons behind the conflict can be identified, however. Firstly, the culture, language (Jawi, a Malay dialect) and ethnicity of the Thai Muslims had not been taken into account by the Thai government, which provided a breeding ground for separatist movements. In the 16th and 17th century the Muslim Sultanate Pattani was the centre of Islam in Southeast Asia and particularly important both politically and economically. Armed conflict with Siam had occurred in earlier centuries. Despite the reign of Siam, Pattani had kept its political and economical structure until the early 20th century. Some scholars therefore connected a historical reason to the conflict.31 Secondly, the social, economic and educational situation in the Southern regions was viewed as a reason for the conflict. It was characterised by poverty and unemployment as well as a lack of subsidies for educational institutions.32 One interview partner assumed that economic

29 AA at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Thailand/Innenpolitik_node.html
interests such as the access to oil and gas fields as well as smuggling in the border regions to Malaysia could be a catalyst. Thirdly, the Southern provinces were often exposed to radical policies of assimilation in the last decades and Thaksin’s policy had furthered this by dissolving the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC), the responsible authority for the Southern regions and a stabiliser, and attributing the responsibility to the police. Thaksin also closed ranks with the Bush administration, which inspired sympathy for Al-Qaeda among young people in the Southern provinces, according to some observers. Finally, the unclear legal situation, the lack of legal security and the violations of human rights were blamed for the smouldering of the conflict. In 2004 the government had proclaimed martial law in numerous Southern districts, which was still in force in 2009, giving impunity to soldiers and police officers. The government did not take disciplinary action in cases of violation of the law. Arbitrary arrests, detentions, torture, and killings of people in the Southern regions seemed to be carried out systematically. Also, the Act on Internal Security of 2008 gave wide powers to the Thai military and security forces. Its application to the insurgency in Southern Thailand remained unclear but it restricted fundamental rights, the overriding of civilian administration, and did not require the declaration of a state of emergency. In 2009, there was limited access to the Southern regions. The AA issued a travel warning, as attacks against state institutions and private individuals happened on a daily basis. The conflict was believed to be one of the most dangerous in Southeast Asia.

Of the German political foundations, the FES, the KAS and the FNS were active in Southern Thailand. Activities were kept low-profile in order to avoid appearing as interfering actors from abroad. The Thai government

33 Interview 3.
38 AA at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Laenderinformationen/Thailand/Sicherheitshinweise.html (accessed on 16/05/2010).
39 Interview 3.
was assumed to have no interest in conflict handling through the UN or other international actors. However, foreign actors were tolerated within a limited framework.\footnote{Interviews 3, 4.} Other international organisations such as the ASIA Foundation were also involved in managing the conflict. The military putsch in 2006 had opened up the situation in the Southern regions for foreign actors and an increase of actors was noticed.\footnote{Interviews 3, 6.}

\subsection*{8.1.3. Germany’s policy}

Political cooperation between Germany and Thailand dates back to 1858 when the hanseatic cities signed commercial contracts with the kingdom of Siam. Over the following decades, German merchants and experts wielded great influence in Siam’s economic life and occupied influential positions in developing a modern infrastructure.\footnote{AA at: \url{http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Thailand/Bilateral_node.html}.} During World War II the Thai prime minister had sympathy for the German \textit{Reich} and supported Japan and the Axis in order to regain land taken by France and Great Britain in 1919. However, the following \textit{Thai Seri} movement joined the Allies in 1944. During the Bloc confrontation Germany’s policy towards the Southeast Asian countries was first characterised by winning back its political ability to act and, until the early 1970s, by the \textit{Hallstein doctrine}.\footnote{Stoffers (2014) p. 185f.; Rüland (2007) pp. 560f.; see 4.3.} With the end of the Cold War, normative principles became increasingly important in German and other Western foreign policies, leading to conflicts in the EU-ASEAN dialogues of the 1990s.\footnote{Rüland (2007) p. 563.} In its Southeast Asia concept of 2002 the AA stressed democracy, rule of law and human rights as preconditions for internal and external stability and development and as central objectives. Instruments of the German government in the region were consulting and supporting institutions, civil society organisations and the security sector. According to the AA, the government was directly active through public relations and development policy, and indirectly via support for German NGOs and the \textit{Stiftungen}.\footnote{AA (2002b) p. 7.} Furthermore, the AA emphasised peace and regional stability. It showed interest in convincing the ASEAN states of the
importance of regional confidence building and collective conflict prevention referring to a broad notion of security, with Thailand and Singapore playing leading roles.\textsuperscript{46} As instruments the AA suggested imparting German experiences in dialogue, civil and military training programmes, conferences for conflict prevention, and institutional consulting for the civil control of armed forces, as well as the support of structural reforms. Further key objectives in the strategy were advancing environmental cooperation and continuing development assistance although financial aid to Thailand had already been stopped due to Thai economic development. Finally, the AA stressed cultural and academic relations, mentioning in particular the awakening of interest in Germany and conveying an up-to-date image of Germany. In this context, it highlighted the support of the \textit{Stiftungen} and other organisations. The strategy also emphasised the development of regional security structures, the \textit{Stiftungen’s} consulting assistance, political dialogue and development cooperation.\textsuperscript{47} The German government’s political concept of 2012 on partnership with new players mentioned further confidence-building measures in regional security organisations such as ASEAN.\textsuperscript{48} This increased focal point on regional security also corresponds with the ambitions of the EU in Southeast Asia. While in the 1990s the EU’s political focus was on trade, security political aspects increasingly came on the agenda from 2000 onwards. Since then, cooperation between the EU and ASEAN on this matter has improved.\textsuperscript{49}

Between 2005 and 2015 some cooperation between Germany and Thailand existed in terms of military and police training as regards the role of the military in a democracy.\textsuperscript{50} The German government withdrew from the cooperation in 2006 and resumed activities in 2008.\textsuperscript{51} Diplomatic contacts were also restricted during the time of the military coup; high-level political and economic dialogue was continued when Thailand returned to

\textsuperscript{46} See 6.1.1.
\textsuperscript{47} AA (2002b) pp. 8ff.
\textsuperscript{48} Bundesregierung (2012a) pp. 24, 65: it referred to the Aquis of the OSCE (Organisations for Security and Co-operation in Europe) and included mainly military information exchange. It defined new players as economic motors and key regional players (p. 5).
\textsuperscript{50} Rüland (2007) p. 565.
\textsuperscript{51} BT (2010b) p. 8.
In 2009, German-Thai relations were considered to be very good. According to the German government, along with its EU partners it kept an eye on democratic deficits and the political situation and broached the issue of political participation at a higher political level. It also referred to the *Stiftungen* for the long-term accompanying and furthering of the democratic process. In 2012 both countries celebrated the 150th anniversary of their bilateral relations, leading to further intensification of contacts, cooperation, academic exchanges and cultural events.

With the Thai economic upswing, foreign trade with German grew steadily from the 1980s onwards. The Southeast Asia strategy of 2002 highlighted German foreign economic interest in the region although it was less dominantly articulated than in the preceding Asia concept of 1993. The German economic interest in Southeast Asia declined after the financial crisis and shifted to East Asia. Culture relations between the two countries are based on an agreement signed in 1984. The main organisations active in Thailand are the Goethe Institute, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. The development cooperation between Germany and Thailand started in the 1960s. In 2004 the BMZ considered Thailand as an “anchor country”, a term referring to states with a special regional impact in terms of economy and politics and increasing importance in the management of global challenges and international processes. The assistance approach combined elements of development cooperation and foreign policy. Although Thailand increasingly transformed itself from a recipient into a donor and German development assistance ended in 2011, Germany still finances technical cooperation projects in Thailand focusing on climate change and energy, sustainable consumption and production, regional integration in Southeast

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53 Interviews 1, 3, 6, 7; Rüland (2007) p. 570
54 BT (2010b) p. 2.
56 AA (2002b) p. 5.
58 Interviews 3, 2; Rüland (2007) p. 568; AA at: [http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Thailand/Bilateral_node.html](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Thailand/Bilateral_node.html).
Asia, and joint development cooperation for third countries. Still, Thailand is not among the 57 partner countries of German development assistance and therefore lacks the opportunity for intensive cooperation. In 2011 the BMZ’s fields of cooperation in Asia were economic and ecological development, education, good governance and health. It planned to further integrate German civil society organisations as dialogue partners and critical catalysts. In this context, it stressed the particular role of the Stiftungen and their consulting and dialogue instruments on the political level to further democratic and rule-of-law-based institution-building.

8.1.4. Landscape of the German political foundations

In 2009, the FES, the KAS, the FNS and the HBS maintained offices in Thailand and determined the political landscape of the Stiftungen. In addition to their offices in Thailand, most of them maintained regional offices in Southeast Asia concentrating on regional issues and organisations such as ASEAN. Activities of both offices usually did not overlap. In the case of the HBS and the FNS, the location of the regional offices and their Thai offices coincided. The landscape of the Stiftungen was therefore considered as more significant compared to other countries. The Hans-Seidel-Stiftung (HSS) and the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (RLS) either worked from an office in Singapore in the Thai rural areas (HSS) or had no declared activities in Thailand (RLS). All of the German foundations held workshops and seminars and issued publications. Some of the Stiftungen intensified their activities in the field of organising conferences and training sessions. They all implemented measures mainly in collaboration with local partners.

60 AA at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Thailand/Bilateral_node.html
64 The following sections use deviating interview codes. This takes account of data’s sensitivity.
65 Interview 5.
66 Interview 7.
Activities in Thailand of the FES dated back to the early 1970s, coinciding with the start of its international activity. In the very beginning, the FES did not have an office on site. As was the case in other Southeast Asian countries, its activities started with the support of newly formed trade unions and in the field of employment and social policy. In the 1980s the main emphasis was on gender issues and Thailand became one of the FES’s offices working with gender issues. Furthermore, so-called “WISO-projects”, grassroots-oriented advisory projects in the field of economy and social policy, took place. From 1992 onwards and parallel to Thailand’s democratisation process, activities increased concerning the democratisation of institutions. They remained the focus until the time of the interviews. In 2009, the FES was active in three main areas: (1) The promotion of democratic institutions and processes based on social and progressive democracy with social elites taking a key role in shaping it. Within this working area one project line supported the access of women and young people to politics, and another project line dealt with the role of the media in democracy; (2) the contribution of instruments and methods to conflict transformation and the promoting of knowledge on the Southern conflict and its parties; and (3) the implementation of economic and social human rights. This area included the promotion of trade unions and also addressed the interests of employees and economic migrants from Burma. As regards the second focal point of conflict management, the FES had implemented an extensive EU-funded project in addition to its regular activities. In 2009, the FES office regularly consisted of seven people (six Thai, one German), with four working on content-related matters. In addition, three persons were working on the EU project. One of them was an external German consultant.67

The KAS had been active in Thailand for almost as long as the FES. In 2009, one of the KAS’s areas of interest was the promotion of the people’s political participation. In collaboration with the secretary of the national assembly and the senate, local political leaders were trained to improve their exchange with voters. Furthermore, the KAS promoted the rule of law by

67 Interview a.
encouraging the Thai administration and constitutional court. Both courts were still relatively new achievements. Study programmes were offered to Thai administrative law judges in Germany and German lawyers offered short-term training courses. The German administration court served as a model. In the case of the constitutional court, consulting took place on the constitutional complaint and decisions were translated into English. Moreover, the topics of regulatory policy and security policy had become focal points for the KAS in 2009. In addition to public bodies, partners of the KAS were civil society organisations and Thai universities. In the absence of Thai think tanks, the KAS supported academic projects. Around 200 measures were implemented annually. The Bangkok office and its partners decided annually which measures to carry out. The plan was then adjusted quarterly. The KAS’s headquarters in Berlin had to approve measures. However, a rejection had not occurred in recent years. In earlier times, programmes were tailored to people in rural areas and Bangkok’s elite. In 2009, the KAS focused on the Thai middle class and political development was given priority over rural development. In addition to a German representative, the KAS’s office employed six Thai staff members.\footnote{Interview d.}

The FNS’s activities in Thailand began in 1975. In 1999 the office moved from Singapore to Bangkok. In 2009, it was one of seven regional offices that the FNS maintained worldwide and covered the region of Southeast and East Asia including Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Cambodia, Indonesia, South Korea and North Korea. Moreover, projects in China and Burma were managed from there. For a period of three to five years liberal political principles were formulated by the FNS’s headquarters in Berlin. From 2008 to 2011, the FNS’s work focused on “freedom and property”, “freedom and civil society” and “freedom and the rule of law”. In Thailand, the main fields of interest were democracy, rule of law and economic freedom, with democracy as the key topic. It concerned mainly cooperation
with political parties, e.g. the Thai Democrat party.\textsuperscript{69} It also covered activities with the Thai electoral commission, the council of civic education, the municipality of Bangkok and civil society organisations. As for rule of law and economic freedom, the FNS undertook activities with the Thai legal reform commission and cooperated with local think tanks. Conflict management in Southern Thailand was also a topic. Over the years, the activities of the FNS in Thailand changed. In the beginning, projects were more driven by “classic” development policy. The first project of the FNS in Thailand, for instance, involved water buffalo banks in Chiang Mai. Political dialogue, though part of the FNS’s prior activities, was further developed and a “strategy for the promotion of organised liberalism and liberal thought” was adopted in the early 1990s. The desire to stand out from activities that could also be undertaken by the GTZ was one of the reasons for changing the portfolio. From then on, technical assistance was only given when there was a political context or when it was the only possibility to be active at all. In 2009 the FNS’s activities in border regions between Thailand and Burma, for example, concerned ethnic minorities. They were considered as very basic, including the fight against poverty, infrastructure development and the organisation of village communities. In earlier times, political assistance had included more institutional assistance and financial backing for partners. At the time of the interviews, the emphasis was on collaboration with networks and action groups. In their partner choice, the FNS attached importance to ideological affiliations. Measures were planned annually with partners. Cooperation also took place with other organisations, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Union, the GTZ, and the British embassy. In 2009, the FNS’s office had between 20 and 25 staff members.\textsuperscript{70}

In 2009 the HBS worked from Chiang Mai, a city in the north of Thailand. The regional office was founded in 2000 to implement projects in Thailand and Burma. At the time of the interview, it was about to move to Bangkok. The idea for the office in Chiang Mai was derived from the HBS’s wish for

\textsuperscript{69} Between 2000 and 2010 the percentage of costs for measures with the DP or partners affiliated to the DP was however, only at around 14\% compared to all measures of the FNS in Thailand (see BT [2010b] p. 11).

\textsuperscript{70} Interview b.
decentralisation as the other Stiftungen were active in Bangkok. Moreover, Chiang Mai was considered an intellectual centre. However, the HBS remained very isolated, which prompted the decision to move to Bangkok. Regional cooperation with partner organisations had already started in the 1990s. In 2009, the main areas of interest were democratisation, climate, ecology and sustainable development. As regards democratisation, the HBS supported information democracy, media, and people’s opportunity to select from a diverse range of non-monopolised information services. Concerning climate, ecology and sustainable development, the HBS furthered reform efforts that aimed at overcoming institutional problems and providing greater transparency. A special focal point was nuclear energy, which was partly introduced in Thailand as clean energy, whereas the HBS tried to counteract this trend. At the time of the interview, the area of climate was expanded while democracy was hardly emphasised. The HBS did not work directly with Thai political partners and did not support a political party. There was no Green political party counterpart. The HBS mainly worked with civil society organisations and cooperated with the GTZ. Similar to the FNS, the HBS had started more as a sponsor and had focused on basic development cooperation. It was also considered part of the Green ideology to give money and let partners decide what to do with it. This had changed due to imposed conditions by the BMZ and the work had become more political. The interview partner used “cross-linker” and “bridge-builder” to describe the role of the HBS at that time. Methodologically, the HBS conducted more meetings, events and publications and less capacity building measures like trainings and seminars. In 2009, the office had 12 staff members of whom two were German/Austrian.71

In sum, the German political foundation in Thailand had very different focal points, which mainly was a result of different political backgrounds. Some overlaps existed as regards activities in the Southern conflict. We also saw that activities focused less on institutional funding and had become more political over the time, although affiliated political parties were mostly missing. Technical development assistance and direct financing remained an

71 Interview c.
area of retreat when other activities were not possible. Apart from the HBS, all foundations worked with political actors in Thailand.

8.2. The practice of public diplomacy through conflict management?

The following sections apply the integrated model of public diplomacy to the FES’s ambitions to further peace in the conflict in Southern Thailand.\footnote{See 3.2.} It will shed light on whether the FES’s was a generator of public diplomacy. Moreover, it will identify the instruments used and targets addressed. It then takes a close look at the network environment, including resources and sharing values and interests. Subsequently, we connect the activities to collaborative and catalytic public diplomacy practised as conflict management. Finally, we consider the impact of the FES as regards these activities.

8.2.1. Generator

In the context of the activities concerning the Southern conflict in Thailand the FES appeared as a generator of public diplomacy as it implemented its projects autonomously and independent of the German ministries and the affiliated SPD.

The FES had been active in Southern Thailand since 1990. In the beginning, the focus of its undertakings was on democratic development and political education. Cooperation took place with an informal network of Muslim opinion leaders. Activities in the form of seminars were not too intense and did not concern the conflict. The established contacts were helpful when the conflict flared up in 2004. The FES first focused on the protection of human rights. Depending on the approval of TICA the FES organised some human rights activities in the following time. After an interruption of the work, FES resumed the activities in 2005. At that time, the Southern activities of the FES were not very systematic. Thereafter, the FES arranged seminars with women and youth organisations as well as the university. These groups were selected in order to avoid political sensitivity and to reach civil society beyond the Muslim and male-dominated partner network. In 2006 the
conflict was systematically analysed using the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) methodology. The analysis took the methodological guidelines for socio-political cooperation programmes in the context of conflicts developed by the FriEnt Group at the BMZ as a starting point.\textsuperscript{73} From 2007 onwards, several of the identified topics and measures were chosen to work on the conflict. In 2008, the FES and the FNS were selected to implement an EU-funded project in the Southern region lasting 18 months. The FES had been invited by an EU office/delegation in Bangkok to submit a proposal for the project. The funds were part of the EU instrument for stability (ifs) launched in 2007, which aimed at reacting to political crisis in third countries in the short-term and warding off global threats in the long run.\textsuperscript{74} For the FES, the office in Thailand was the first to apply for ifs funds. By the end of 2009, the project was nearly complete. In addition to the EU project, the FES kept up its former activities funded by the BMZ, which had, in part, already concerned the conflict.\textsuperscript{75} The funding period for the BMZ project lasted three years. In this timeframe, particular objectives had to be achieved. According to the BMZ’s guidelines, the foundation’s activities had to be monitored and evaluated. Although some financing for activities in Thailand can generally come from the AA, in 2009 those funds were not issued to the \textit{Stiftungen.}\textsuperscript{76}

In contrast to other German organisations in Thailand, the \textit{Stiftungen} did not operate under the auspices of the embassy. Meetings and coordination between the German embassy and the \textit{Stiftungen} took place but the \textit{Stiftungen} were not accountable to the embassy regarding project details. The relationship between the foundations and the German embassy was considered to be good.\textsuperscript{77} According to the interview partner, the FES also operated independently of the affiliated SPD. The main areas or overall objectives were suggested by the office in Thailand and discussed with the specific country section at the FES’s headquarters in Berlin. These objectives were further substantiated by specific targets that were defined

\textsuperscript{73} Interview a; Wagner (2007) p. 5 referring to Hasemann/Hübner-Schmid/Dargatz (2005); see 6.3.2.2 on PCIA and 6.2 on FriEnt.
\textsuperscript{74} See Ifs at: \url{http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/index_de.htm}.
\textsuperscript{75} Interview a; see 8.1.3.
\textsuperscript{76} Interviews 1, 2, 3, 6.
\textsuperscript{77} Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4, 7.
annually. The regional office was not involved in this process, concentrating instead on regional issues.\textsuperscript{78} The national office was autonomous although synergy effects between the regional work and the national work were supposed to be enabled. In 2009, the FES had departed from the procedure of having partners hand in annual activities since several years. It consulted with partners and defined measures itself. The main motivation behind the shift was to improve the overall quality of projects, for instance considering conflict sensitivity and gender integration. The measures were conducted as \textit{Eigenmaßnahmen} and involved contributions of the FES.\textsuperscript{79}

According to the interview partner, the organisations on site did not consider the FES as a governmental instrument but rather as an academic organisation. Its public funding was not concealed. The activities of the FES were associated with civil diplomacy and track two diplomacy. According to the interview partner, civil diplomacy concerned the activities which had a foreign political dimension, such as consulting and official visits from Germany. Track two was understood as an informal track used parallel to official diplomacy that targeted decision makers and those having an impact on them.\textsuperscript{80}

\textbf{8.2.2. Addressees and instruments}

The FES’s activities were characterised by a broad approach and were focused on all three target groups of public diplomacy: the general public, the media and specific disseminators. The main groups were civil society organisations, individuals with a key social role, academics, journalists and members of trade unions. Civil society in Thailand was assumed to be weak and state-controlled. Its organisations did not have enough resources to work independently, and so the FES often undertook tasks which in other countries were conducted by partners. In the Southern regions, the FES could hardly fall back on existing partners when it started the activities based on the conflict analysis. Furthermore, the FES addressed public actors, such as personnel from the Thai ministries and parliamentarians as

\textsuperscript{78} Interview 5.

\textsuperscript{79} Interview a; see 7.2.1. on \textit{Eigenmaßnahmen}.

\textsuperscript{80} Interview a.
well as stakeholders from the military and security sector. The FES considered the latter two to be crucial for a conflict solution. In the Southern region the FES also worked with women, young people and journalists. Methodologically the FES used trainings, seminars, workshops, events and publications. In 2009, the FES conducted 60-70 measures annually in the context of the BMZ project. As regards the EU project it implemented around 20 measures, including small training sessions of 15-20 people and large events with up to 300 participants.  

The FES’s activities concerning the conflict consisted of several broad areas which could be mainly subsumed under public diplomacy’s political dialogue and media instruments. Firstly, the FES created dialogue forums, mainly between the Southern partner network and decision makers in Bangkok. This interchange concerned the Thai government’s Southern policy and conflict resolution strategies. Often the FES established first contacts. This component was funded by the BMZ. The second field of activities concerned woman and young people from the South and their role in conflict transformation. Organised female communities, their leaders and other interested women participated in meetings and programme development where their role as de-escalators was taken into account. These activities also had some capacity building and educational elements and included study tours where women from the South could engage in exchange with other women leaders and organisations and experience multicultural environments. Young persons were important addressees for the FES as their potential for radicalisation was high because of trauma, frustration and unemployment. Through youth camps, the FES intended to further community involvement, life skills, confidence building and mutuality. Networking was also enabled, bringing youth groups of different backgrounds together. The third field of the FES’s activities was the application of participatory dialogue methods. Thai institutions and organisations focused on programmes in the South, such as the King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI) and the Peace Academy, were trained by the

81 Interview a.
82 Interviews a, 6; FES (2009b) pp. 17ff.
83 Interviews a, 6; FES (2009b) pp. 21ff.
FES and an external consultant in participatory dialogue methods such as “Open-space”, “Worldcafé” and “Future Search”. These measures were supposed to enhance capacity for dialogue and further the focus on common issues and mutual understanding, as well as to find a consensus. In 2009 these measures were the unique feature of the FES and differentiated them from the other Stiftungen and organisations in Thailand. The second and the third activity components were part of the EU-funded project. In all three fields of activities the FES operated as a dialogue facilitator between different social and political groups in Thailand. Dialogue was often combined with capacity building. Another component, which can be considered political dialogue but had points of contact with consulting, was about to be developed by the FES in 2009. It was part of the FES’s democracy assistance working line and concerned dialogue forums on security sector governance amongst the Thai military, the police, civil society, the Thai National Security Council, the senate and stakeholders from the South. Activities were organised with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). The FES offered political assessments and contacts while DCAF provided the expertise on the matter. As regards the public diplomacy instruments, media activity could be identified. The FES’s activities had a strong focus on objective media coverage and the de-escalating role of the media. The FES cooperated with both the mass media in Bangkok and with local reporters in the South. The activities consisted of trainings for journalists and study trips where journalists were sent abroad. One group, for instance, was sent to India in order to experience a diversified multilingual media landscape free from control and mostly uncensored. Cultural diplomacy as well as think tank activities could not be identified in the context of the FES’s conflict management. Few monologue instruments could be found in the form of publications, such as a handbook with guidelines on conflict-sensitive journalism published in Thai.

84 See FES (2009b) pp. 32f. with details.
85 Interviews a, 6.
86 FES (2009b) p. 10f.; interview a.
8.2.3. Dimensions: Propaganda and network

Propagandistic or strategic communication in terms of advertising or campaigning in the activities of the FES could not be identified. However, the case showed how the assessment of interference depended on the perception of the host country. In 2009, the FES enjoyed relatively wide-ranging trust of decision makers at all political levels in Bangkok. It was the first organisation to be officially permitted to work in the South. In former times, the Thai government had been more suspicious, as already outlined. For decades, the FES had also worked with trade unions, which were perceived as subversive by the Thai authorities. Furthermore, there was no interest in international supporting measures and foreign activities in the Southern regions had always been mistrusted. The Thai government was mostly displeased that foreigners interfered in internal problems. This was also reflected in development cooperation: topics such as gender, HIV and technology were welcomed, while politically sensitive issues like statehood, democracy, sovereignty, internal political processes and the role of the monarchy were very difficult to address.\(^{87}\) This also included the Southern conflict. After having won the trust of the authorities, the FES had tried to be active without much publicity. According to the interview partner, it was not the intention of the FES to tell Thai society how to resolve the conflict but instead to enable dialogue. In other areas, the FES was sometimes asked to “postpone” seminars, although measures were not vetoed. The FES also knew that it was under constant observation by the authorities. In 2009 the political situation was very tense and insecure.\(^{88}\) As outlined by an interview partner, foundations’ political activities were viewed as relatively undesirable by the Thai authorities, and so the word “political” of “political foundation” often remained silent.\(^{89}\)

In contrast to the propaganda dimension, the networking dimension in the activities of the FES could be recognised. However, it was limited to actors from Thailand. Actors in Germany were hardly included.

\(^{87}\) Interviews a, 2, 6.  
\(^{88}\) Interview a.  
\(^{89}\) Interview 2.
In 2009, various stable and independent relationships existed between the FES and local and foreign actors on site that were mainly characterised by cooperation and coordination. As already outlined, the FES interacted strongly with various Thai public bodies and higher political strata. The relationship between TICA and the FES in 2009 was described as friendly and cooperative. TICA regularly arranged information events for the accredited organisation. Organisations generally had to notify of their work in advance and to report afterwards. The weak civil society and political party landscape made it difficult for the FES to establish partnerships and develop relationships. Civil society organisations had no clear vision about their issues and aims. It was difficult to find partners with capacities at the average European or international level. Smaller organisations in particular were missing. The interview partner explained this state of affairs by citing a lack of financial resources and complicated approval procedures. Particularly in 2009, partners practiced increasingly strong self-censorship. During the measures FES’s staff members were generally present, thus contributing to the stability of the relationships on site.\footnote{Interview a.}

In 2009 the FES also had relationships with German actors on site. All of the German foundations participated in regular coordination meetings organised by the GTZ; the atmosphere was described as very good and strong information exchange existed. A representative of the German embassy also attended those meetings.\footnote{Interview 1.} Although the KAS and the FNS were also active around the Southern conflict, the topics of interest and activities were different from each other. However, when partners overlapped, coordination took place. Cooperation among the foundations hardly ever occurred.\footnote{Interview a.} According to one interview partner, the raison d’être for each of several different foundations was otherwise not justified.\footnote{Interview 1.} The relationship between the FES and the German embassy was considered to be good.\footnote{Interviews a, 7.} In the years before the interview, the embassy seemed to have
reduced its prejudices against the *Stiftungen*. In the past, German ambassadors had interfered in stronger ways. The interviewee traced this development back to the work of several high-ranking German politicians who had emphasised the role of the *Stiftungen* abroad, and several studies which focused the attention to the *Stiftungen* and their importance as instruments of foreign affairs. However, contacts with the embassy often depend on the political position of the ambassador.

German politicians and members of the government rarely came to the FES’s office in Thailand. Contacts between 2004 and 2009 were limited to several committees of the German *Bundestag* and a state secretary. The conflict was not in the focus of the visits. According to the interview partner, it had not found its way into their general consciousness. At the time of the interviews, the first official visit to the region had been initiated by the Thai foreign ministry for the ambassadors of the EU. Other interview partners reported a lack of interest from the German side. Although German officials and institutions requested information about Thailand from the *Stiftungen*, inquiries to the offices were not numerous. In many cases, they concerned the whole Southeast Asian region. One interview partner assumed that the lack of interest was related to the German government’s Asia strategy, which focused on China. However, the interest of other German actors in the activities and assessments of the FES was relatively strong. Visits and enquiries came from academics, other organisations active in development cooperation, policy consultants, and educational institutions. German media showed increased interest when the political situation changed. The interview partner estimated that there were about 50 to 60 annual visits to the office. The FES did not foster business contacts. At times, interchange occurred in the context of the trade union activities. Strong relationships also existed between the FES’s office in Thailand and other FES offices and divisions working in fields where Thailand was affected. This included global issues, EU politics, the

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95 Interview 7.
96 Interview 4.
97 Interview a.
98 Interviews 1, 2.
99 Interview 4.
international trade union activity of the FES and bilateral measures which concerned Thailand and other countries. Here the FES in Thailand cooperated with the respective country offices.

The aforementioned relationships were mainly cooperative or, in case of the other foundations, coordinative, at least. However, the situation for aid organisations in the Southern regions was characterised by strong competition. An interview partner even mentioned an overload of measures for the local population.100 At the end of 2009, USAID announced that it planned to invest 36 million US dollars for conflict resolution activities in the Southern regions in the following years. It was suspected that trust which existed towards the FES and other foreign actors would diminish and the large US investment would be considered as interference by the authorities. On the other hand, it was feared that FES’s partners were poached with higher remuneration.101

In the context of the relationships various resources were exchanged. The findings did not deviate significantly from the general findings on the foundations’ resource exchange.102 The FES obtained financial resources from the BMZ and the EU, which were used for the measures on site. The guidelines were strict and the foundations were not allowed to conduct institution building. The FES received a wide range of information resources from civil society and political partners. As regards the conflict, the FES was able to maintain contact to the local population in the Southern regions as well as to Thai stakeholders of the military and the police. Both groups were unreachable for the German embassy, as it had to be selective in its cultivation of contacts.103 In 2009, the German embassy was not active in the Southern regions but planned small-scale projects for 2010.104 The German embassy had asked the FES for its advisory skills to help with these activities. Moreover, the FES also monitored its activities and information was fed back into the FES’s headquarters. Furthermore, the networking

100 Interview 6.
101 From 2010 onwards the USAid program SAPAN was active in the Southern provinces (see USAid [2012]).
102 See 4.3.2.2.
103 Interview 7.
104 Interview 7.
resources of the FES were enormous. As already outlined, various communication channels were established horizontally and vertically within Thai society. The FES’s contacts depended in part on partners establishing contacts with other actors or securing the audience of the seminars. Political players and members of the executive were brought together with civil society actors. Similar groups were connected with the intention to bridge ethical and religious divides. Some interview partners assumed that the political foundations were better networked than the German embassy.\textsuperscript{105} However, in the context of the activities in the Southern provinces, the FES did not connect German actors with Thai counterparts. The FES did not bring other actors, such as journalists or academics (German or foreign), to the Southern regions. As explained by the interview partner, the people in the South are often sceptical towards foreigners. It was hard to win their trust and they often feared being politically exploited.\textsuperscript{106} Even some of the foundations’ representatives had never been to the Southern regions.\textsuperscript{107} Apart from the networking resources, the FES’s moral authority resources were perceived as very strong. In 2009, the FES received support from the Thai government for their conflict management activities in the South. In the time that followed, even Thai public authorities like the Thai foreign ministry had asked the FES for training in the new dialogue methods of communication. Training took place with the Southern Border Province Administrative Centre (SBPAC) in Krabi, for example. The interview partner also felt that the FES benefited from the long-standing and firm relations between Thailand and Germany. The \textit{Stiftungen} could generally organise activities and address ideas which other organisations were not allowed to do. Germany was considered neutral in contrast to the USA and the EU. Along with those of the Nordic countries, Germany’s basic model was in demand in Thailand due to its culture of political education and the welfare state. Although participants of the programmes in Southern Thailand were not very much interested in Germany, for them it was important that the FES was a German organisation. The USA, in contrast,

\textsuperscript{105} Interviews 4, 6.
\textsuperscript{106} Interview a.
\textsuperscript{107} Interview 4.
was viewed with deep distrust from the Muslim side.\textsuperscript{108} More radical and fundamentalist Muslims often connected the activities of American organisations with the CIA and the “war on terror”. The FES’s credibility also profited from the long tradition of its activities in the Southern regions. The interview partner had experienced that in the interchange with the \textit{Stiftungen}, members of the Thai political level often felt freer than in official communication since it had less formal consequences.\textsuperscript{109}

The network environment in which the FES operated was partly characterised by shared values and policy interests. This was not surprising as the FES mainly connected conflicting parties in the context of the studied activities. The FES generally chose its activities and focal points against the background of social democratic values but also considered the situation in the specific country. Social democracy highlights the political participation of socially weaker population. The political background of the Thai partners in terms of social democracy did not play a role for the FES, as political parties were not significant. Political parties were mostly oligarchic and characterised by vested interest and charismatic leaders. It was therefore not possible for the FES to define which Thai political parties could be either connected to the values supported by the SPD. Consequently, the specific political affiliation of the partner receded into the background, although the political attitude remained important. The FES felt bound to work with democratic, progressive and reform-oriented partners.\textsuperscript{110} Its peace activities in the Southern region as well as its security political dialogues fit largely with the German government’s Asia strategy and its emphasis on peace and regional stability.\textsuperscript{111} In this context, the AA not only referred to the democracy assistance activities of the \textit{Stiftungen} but also to their dialogues, consulting, and training measures in conflict prevention. The EU’s security political focus in Southeast Europe is also visible in the FES’s conflict management activities. The German political foundations have been mentioned as giving their constructive support as non-state actors in this

\textsuperscript{108} Interviews a, 6.
\textsuperscript{109} Interview a.
\textsuperscript{110} Interview a.
\textsuperscript{111} See 8.1.3.
context. The activities of the FES also corresponded with the SPD’s pleas for strong cooperation between German foreign, security and development policy and the Asian countries as well as the overall political objective to prevent conflict and create peace in the international arena.

8.2.3.2. Types of transnational policy networks

The network in which the FES operated in the context of its conflict management activities was mixed. The observations are fairly similar to those made previously. The common issue that the activities circled around was the conflict in the Southern region but a lack of campaigning meant that the network could not qualify as a transnational advocacy network (TAN). Thai civil servants were connected to the network but the FES was not a ministerial staff member, and so a transnational executive network was also out of the question. Although knowledge generation played an important role in the activities of the FES, the majority of actors were neither experts nor professionals, thereby disqualifying the network for global knowledge network (KNET) status. The network was trisectoral, including public sector officials, civil servants and civil society professionals; however, large groups of individuals—such as members of the general public—which were included in the activities of the FES are missing in the Global Public Policy Network (GPPN) typology. As already outlined, the network members were mainly national actors and did not operate on the international level, which speaks against the GPPN. Furthermore, in 2009 the regional conflict was not a shared problem that existed across borders, making it even more difficult to speak of a GPPN.

The case largely confirmed the suggested forms of interaction between public and private actors as regards loose couplings and issue networks. The number of non-state actors in the network was relatively high and it can be expected that actors had different opinions on policy objectives. Furthermore, the permeability of the network in terms of new actors’ inclusion was high as the FES generally integrated interested individuals.

\[112\text{ Dosch (2004) p. 13.}\]
\[113\text{ SPD (2007) pp. 19ff.}\]
\[114\text{ See 7.2.3.3.}\]
\[115\text{ See 2.3.1. and 3.1.1.}\]
An assessment of the network’s integration into the policy making progress in Thailand was not possible. As outlined, the political situation in Thailand was fragile and characterised by a constant change of decision makers. We do not know if ideas from the activities of the FES were translated into the policy making process. In turn, we saw that the FES actively implemented parts of the AA’s Asia strategy and of the EU’s security policy. In this respect the network resembled a policy community actor.

8.2.4. Managing conflicts?

The FES’s activities in the context of the conflict in Southern Thailand corresponded to all general tasks of transnational conflict management as outlined in the systematisation.\textsuperscript{116} They addressed trust-based communicative activities, dialogue on the security policy level, conflict analysis, knowledge generation on the conflict, and capacity building. Furthermore, several concrete conflict management instruments were visible in the FES’s activities. The instruments were not clearly applied according to the conflict management cycle. This is not surprising as the smouldering conflict did not fit to the defined typical conflict phases. We could identify FES’s ambitions in the field of Security Sector Reforms (SSR) when dialogues on security sector governance between the military, police forces and the political level were furthered together with the DCAF. Moreover, conflict resolution and track two were applied by the FES. Since we do not know how structured the dialogues between the decision makers in Bangkok and the community leaders from the South had been and whether the FES provided mainly logistical prerequisites for the direct talks, either mediation or good offices were applied. The commitment to several international principles was visible in FES activities. It supported local ownership by integrating local actors in the conflict to ensure the sustainability of the conflict management process. It also paid tribute to do-no-harm by being aware of the sensitivity of the activities. Finally, it furthered the principle outlined in UN resolution 1325 on the involvement of women in conflict management and their protection in conflicts. We furthermore noticed that the elements of conflict management and democracy assistance were linked

\textsuperscript{116} See 6.2.
in the approach of the FES. Conflict management activities in the South, for example, started under the premise of political development and education and became proper, more systematic conflict management later on.

8.2.5. Impact of the FES

The impact of the FES as regards the management of conflict is difficult to estimate. Similar to the prior findings, the impact of the FES on the policy process in Thailand in terms of influence on peace furthering policies was neither found nor measurable. The same applies to measuring the FES’s contribution to a conflict solution. According to the interview partner, it had not been the objective of the FES to resolve the conflict but rather to improve the framework conditions and further the motivation for a political solution of the conflict. In terms of success, the FES had been able to identify target groups which were working closely together with the FES and which had previously been uninvolved. Moreover, it had opened channels of communication between stakeholders that were necessary for a solution to the conflict. One concrete example of success was given by the interview partner. A delegation from the South had held talks in Bangkok with the university, the human rights commission and other institutions. It had criticised the fact that 170 young men had been released from an education camp but had not been allowed to return to their villages as they were considered a “security risk”. Before the delegation went back to the Southern region, the grant permission was given for the return to the young men. However, it does not lead to results if the FES’s impact is considered in terms of policy results and improvement of the conflict situation. On the other hand, we saw that the FES was involved in implementing German and European policy in Thailand. Moreover, the activities fit with the German civilian power concept in preferring non-military solutions to conflicts and in applying a broad notion of security.

We also saw that the activities largely went beyond the broad policy formulations and that official reliance on the Stiftungen was already announced. German official activities through the embassy, for instance,

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117 See 7.2.5.
118 Interview a.
119 See 6.2.
had never been possible in the form of the FES’s activities since the risk was already very high that activities would be viewed as interference.

Estimating the impact of the FES in terms of communication, network operation and resources we saw the confirmation of prior findings.\(^{120}\) The FES had a central position within the network and was mainly involved in its establishment. It often built a bridge between actors who were otherwise not connected. The target group, which included Thai public and private actors, was broad, although it did not include political party members. The desire of the German political foundations to also work with political and public levels\(^ {121}\) was beneficial for the conflict management activities as it allowed the establishment of respective communication channels. We also saw that the FES adapted flexibly to a dearth of political partners by choosing members of the executive instead. It was also able to conduct activities with less political content, such as study trips for women and youth camps, if required. German politicians, members of the government, and ministerial staff members, on the contrary, were not included in the network. From the conflict management perspective concerning dialogues between conflictive parties, this was consistent. FES’s contribution to the relations between Thailand and Germany through the intensification of social-political links could therefore not be noted.

In 2009, at the end of the EU-funded project, the FES wanted to keep contact to the stakeholders in the South and did not want to set them adrift. Intensive work on the conflict, however, was not planned due to a lack of resources. Most of the interview partners were pessimistic about the development of the conflict.\(^{122}\) They claimed that political solutions and concepts barely existed. The conflict was completely left to the military. As long as Thailand faced inner political problems and the conflict remained limited to the Southern regions, politicians would not care for solutions.\(^ {123}\) There was hardly international attention for the conflict since Thailand was

\(^{120}\) See 7.2.8.
\(^{121}\) See 4.2.
\(^{122}\) Interviews 1, 3, 4, 6.
\(^{123}\) Interviews 1, 4.
‘far away’ and violence did not concern tourist areas. In 2015 the conflict in the Southern provinces still smouldered and had not transformed into peace, and the political situation had become more unstable. In follow-up interviews, the FES outlined that activities in the Southern region had not taken place in the last couple of years. In 2015, the FES office focused on political transformation (e.g. the facilitation of dialogue on the political basic order), media, and political education in schools and with teachers as well as on socio-economic transformation in terms of progressive economic and social policy. Security sector related activities had been suspended due to the tense political situation. The situation in the Southern regions had neither changed nor improved. Some contacts existed to the former partners in the Southern regions and some Thai organisations were still active, such as the academic institute of human rights and peace studies in the region. In 2015, the FES did not plan to take up activities in the Southern region due to the complexity of the conflict and respective missing resources.

Conclusion

The case of the FES’s activities in the context of the conflict in the Southern region of Thailand exemplified the public diplomacy ambitions of the German political foundations. It illustrated how the activities were connected to the catalytic and collaborative form of transnational conflict management. The current case substantiated the autonomy of the FES from the funder BMZ, the German embassy and the affiliated SPD in their activities on site. Presumably the funds from the EU had further enhanced its independence. The ambitions showed the primary use of dialogue instruments and the operation in a widely branched and mixed network environment which, however, mainly included relationships in Thailand. In this context, the FES operated as a gatekeeper and dialogue facilitator, encouraging different types of actors to address their ideas on the conflict solution. The absence of partners from affiliated political parties and political decision makers was overcome by the integration of ministerial staff members and those from other authorities into the network. Partners of

\[124\] Interview 3.
\[125\] Interviews 15, 16.
\[126\] Interview 15.
the FES were supposed to have a progressive political background. Social democracy, though important for the FES in its decision on which objectives to pursue, did not play a role in partner selection. German actors participated only in part in the network environment. Interest of German politicians was minor, the conflict was too dangerous and the confidence environment too fragile to promote visits in the Southern regions. Still, high ideational correspondence was found with regards to German and EU policies for which the FES acted as a translator. Funding for the foundation’s activities in Thailand had even been kept up when development assistance declined and although there was no specific economic interest.

The activities of the FES as regards the conflict largely confirmed the general tasks of transnational conflict management and the support of the underlying international principles, such as do-no-harm, local ownership and the UN resolution 1325. Moreover, the specific tasks of SSR and conflict resolution were identified. We also observed the ability of the FES to connect its democracy assistance activities with conflict management.

The FES had several advantages compared to other international actors, such as the ability to work with actors from the social and political levels in Thailand as well as its moral authority. However, we also saw that such advantages are time-bound. They depend on a window of opportunity which had obviously been open in 2009 but was closed in 2015.
Chapter 9 - The role of the German political foundations in international relations

In this final chapter we summarise the evidence of this study regarding the transnational interaction of the German political foundations, as far as we have not yet done so in the conclusions of each chapter. We then connect these findings to the main research question on the role of the German political foundations in international relations by returning to the constructivist and rationalist assumptions on transnational actors. Finally, an explanation on the public funding of the German political foundations will be given.

The German political foundations are involved in transnational relations. We studied these relations in terms of transboundary interaction processes with the help of a public diplomacy model. While scholars generally observed increased transnational activities with the end of the Cold War, the international activities of the German political foundations date back to the 1960s. We identified the German political foundations as non-profit and public-interest-oriented transnational actors and more specifically as Governmental-non-governmental-organisations (GONGOs). They are non-state actors since they are not active on behalf of the German government. They are not, as their public funding and their party political affiliation might have originally indicated, tools of state power used to influence or manipulate foreign politics and civil society. The inability of the German government to control the foundations’ international activities became particularly clear through the chapters.

In the context of these transnational interactions, the Stiftungen operated as public diplomats. At the same time, they targeted foreign populations, among others. Hocking’s distinction between public diplomacy conducted by the public and public diplomacy targeting the public could therefore not be found.¹ The Stiftungen neither declared public diplomacy as an objective nor did they practice it intentionally. Public diplomacy was considered more as a side effect. Furthermore, the foundations’ public diplomacy was not

¹Hocking (2007), see 3.1.1.
presentational. Its main intention or objective was not to present a positive image of Germany abroad. Consequentially, we did not identify public relation or national branding components in the foundations’ activities. For East Asia the German foreign office had announced that the German political foundations would actively assist the German image cultivation but we did not find such “indirect” public diplomacy.\(^2\) Certainly, the foundations helped mediate German culture. However, they were not comparable to other German organisations active in German foreign and cultural policy. Although the foundations’ public diplomacy approach included elements of mutual understanding in terms of two-way symmetric communication, such as cultural diplomacy and exchanges, their ambitions utilized persuasive asymmetric two-way communication practiced mainly with the help of consulting and a value-based political dialogue. The foundations’ main objective was to convince the target audiences of their underlying values and norms. In the case of the KAS’s RLP in Southeast Europe, this was democracy and more specifically rule of law, while in the case of the FES’s program in Thailand it concerned the creation of a peaceful situation and the sensitisation of the parties in conflict. The Stiftungen followed their independent agenda. Thus, their activities resembled diplomacy in its original understanding in terms of information gathering, policy advice and communication. Whether the public diplomacy of the German political foundations diminished the role of traditional diplomacy is not known. We saw that the foundations largely operated in network environments and were provided with various resources. These resources can be considered as soft power since they were not possessed by the other actors in the network who needed these resources. The German political foundations had generally more ideational and social resources than members of the German government, the parliament, personnel from the German ministries and other institutions. In comparison to foreign actors in the network the Stiftungen possessed more material resources and partly more ideational and social resources. Moreover, we saw that the foundations had a high number of relationships and great centrality within the network. They had access to foreign political and civil society levels which could not

be reached either by personnel from German ministries, embassies or other institutions or by German government officials or parliamentarians. With regards to its program in Southeast Europe, the KAS established relations between foreign members of the network and those in Germany. In case of the FES, it connected actors in Thailand. The networking resources were hence employed differently by the foundations. While networking was something the foundations were very aware of, they did not consider themselves as part of the network and their considerations did not include (possible) relationships with German actors. As transnational actors with a hybrid status, the Stiftungen were able to establish horizontal links to political actors and vertical connections to other non-state actors. In most cases the foundations did not differentiate between collaboration with an international partner and a contact person in the network which is why we can assume that the contact was nearly as important as the partnership. In both cases it was a unique characteristic of the foundations that they are able to establish these connections and to maintain mostly direct links to members of the network giving them a “bridging function” and a particular control of communication channels. This can be termed as communicative power or structural autonomy power.³ On the other hand, German public funding, i.e. material resources, made the foundations’ activities possible in the first place. The environment between the political foundations and the German government was not characterised by a conflict-stereotype and public and private actors in the network generally needed each other. The network therefore embodied cooperation and absolute gains as members had mutual advantages. This derived from labour division and specific actor advantages which stemmed from the public or private characteristic of the specific actor. Although the foundations relied on public funding, their relative autonomy did not support the assumption of a states’ primacy over transnational actors stated by the rationalist approaches. It instead substantiated our initial claim and the premise of constructivist thought of considering state actors and transnational actors as equally important.

In considering the network environment we could observe that the typologies of transnational networks mostly did not fit to the foundations’ undertakings. Although we could observe mixed networks including public and private actors in both case studies, the global issue was missing to qualify as a Global public policy network (GPPN). The subjects treated in the networks were national or regional problems. Certainly, they also appeared more broadly on the international agendas in terms of political development and peace. However, in this way almost every issue can be interpreted as a global problem. Furthermore, we did not see the involvement of international actors in the network, which goes against being described as GPPN. Although the Stiftungen might build such networks in global contexts, for example through the involvement of regional offices and those in industrialised countries, we have not studied these activities. Moreover, we have not analysed how the German political foundations interacted more structurally in international negotiation processes or within international organisations or institutions. Although we do not deny the foundations’ participation in these environments, we observed that structured interactions neither took place regularly nor did they represent the foundations’ every day practice. Moreover, not all of the Stiftungen were members in international organisations. Finally, the building of regimes or interaction within them could be observed neither for the KAS in Southeast Europe nor for the FES in Thailand. In contrast, multi-stakeholder diplomacy which Hocking considered a wise version of how governmental and non-governmental public diplomacy could be practiced,\(^4\) was already employed in Germany with the help of the German political foundations as long as we do not assume that these activities only concern diplomatic negotiations only. Moreover, the activities of the Stiftungen did not support the assumption that “the advent of new actors has also given rise to new, unconventional modes of diplomacy.”\(^5\) Their international practices have existed for several decades and the current public diplomacy instruments were largely those of 1973.\(^6\)

\(^4\) Hocking (2011), see 3.1.1.
\(^6\) See BMZ (1973) pp. 65ff.
The German *Stiftungen* acted as democracy assistants and conflict managers. In both cases they primarily made use of dialogue public diplomacy instruments to undertake these activities and operated in similar public diplomacy dimensions. They were therefore largely involved in collaborative and catalytic public diplomacy. The catalytic form of public diplomacy in terms of agenda-setting by transnational actors has only been touched upon.\(^7\) In this context, it would have been necessary to study a certain foundation’s activity and its objective over a longer period of time and analyse the development of the issue on the foreign and German political agendas. We cannot therefore take a final position on these aspects. However, we saw that the foundations’ transferred information and knowledge resources to German parliamentarians, the committees of the German *Bundestag* and the ministries on foreign and development political issues which then became part of the policy making process. Moreover, we noticed that the foundations were involved in implementing German foreign and development policy abroad.

Social interaction, values and norms accented by constructivists became particular important for explaining how the foundations worked and what distinguished them from other actors. In their transnational interaction with foreign governments and civil society they tried to diffuse values and acted as norm entrepreneurs towards foreign societies. Also the building of networks by the German political foundations was norm and value driven. Moreover, in both cases the concrete party political background was substituted by an emphasis on a larger framework of Western political values, such as democracy and freedom. In both cases the political foundations shared the political ideas of the German government as towards the two regions but also, more generally, as towards democracy assistance and conflict management. The implementation of German policies was the most likely reason that German politicians thought the *Stiftungen* were effective and reliable instruments of German foreign policy despite their contradicting relative autonomy. In both case studies the foundations tried to target specific social or political disseminators that could support their

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\(^7\) Hocking (2011), see 3.1.1.
cause. It caused difficulties when partners who shared these principled ideas were missing. In turn, the missing cooperation with politically affiliated partners was mostly substituted by working with members of the public administration. It was therefore not surprising that according to one interview partner, the partners of the foundations in one country seemed to be interchangeable. Moreover, the involvement of the German political foundations in German policy implementation and the fact that several German ministries pursued different types of policies in the same region and toward the same subject showed the German foreign policy fragmentation. It also spoke against the unitary actor hypothesis of rationalist thought. Although this positively led to a pluralisation of policy, others criticised that the fragmented nature followed several interests to the detriment of the community. Contrary to the rationalist approaches, questions of high level politics in terms of peace and security were handled by transnational actors, i.e. the FES in Southern Thailand. Finally, a German economic interest in the region was only stated for Southeast European and Stiftungen’ activities promoting the economy could not be noted. To simply rationalise the continuous financial support of the foundations’ international activities with German economic interests was therefore insufficient. Economic interest also could not explain the comprehensive network of foreign offices the foundations built up over decades. The support of these activities showed instead that the German state sought to spread Western values and peace even in areas where concrete interests were missing. In contrast to the assumptions of the rationalist approaches, we saw that in the international activities of the Stiftungen - public and private - were not two separate spheres as the rationalist approaches assume. What Stone observed with regards to networks of think tanks is a rather “mythical separation” of public and private diplomacy which is maintained because it is useful to governments to make believe seemingly independent expertise and legitimacy of knowledge “outside” the state. This resembles the incorporation of NGOs by states and their “perpetuation” due to official

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8 Interview 7.
funding. Read from a Gramsci perspective, the foundations’ democratic assistance activities could particularly be part of the states’ ambition to diffuse Western values and norms by pretending that the foundations as “civil society organisations” are norm entrepreneurs whereas they are indeed a state’s extension. Neo-Gramscian historical materialism criticises constructivism by focussing on the usefulness or good nature of transnational actors and stresses the connectivity between the ideational and material dimension. Wigger outlines that behind the “allegedly independent expert knowledge lurk important political questions that pertain to the distribution and concentration of power and economic wealth in society”. This is connected to the question of why a particular set of ideas became dominant instead of asking how these ideas became important as constructivism does. In the current case this means looking at why the Federal Republic found it more important to spread these values with the help of the foundations instead of following material interests. We have tried to shed light on these aspects by looking in the respective chapters at the historical development of German public diplomacy, its development assistance and conflict management. The recurring focal point was the German civilian power identity which particularly emphasises values instead of hard material interests. Since military power was not an option for post-War Germany it prioritised soft power in particular and focused from the 1960s onwards on economic and technological competence, social stability and other aspects of “peaceful” foreign policy. It included cultural and political charisma as well as a foreign policy that is based to a large extent on civil society components and non-governmental actors. The conscious turn towards the Western democratic and liberal values system which found its normative ground in German Basic Law was important for Germany to win back credibility and to be able to develop politically and economically. Identity needs recognition i.e. a socially constructed category that others acknowledge as a certain kind worthy of respect and

15 Gareis (2006) p. 82.
which depends on the consistency of words and actions in the process of interaction.\textsuperscript{17} In this context, the German political foundations have been mentioned as contributing to the socialisation of German foreign policy.\textsuperscript{18} The German political foundations helped Germany to maintain its civilian power identity. Through the support of German political foundations the characteristic of “value drivenness” was expressed to the outside and manifested the Federal Republic’s focus on soft power. It reproduced the perception of being a civilian power in terms of social practice and created predictability and diminished uncertainty especially for those countries in and outside Europe carefully watching German foreign ambitions. With the continuous support of the \textit{Stiftungen}, even when the possibility for hard power politics became increasingly possible after reunification, Germany practiced the logic of appropriateness as it followed the values, norms and social role of its civilian power identity. This led to a blurred distinction between foreign and domestic policy and the projection of the domestic environment into the international environment. The assumption that the German state identity is conditioned by historical, cultural, political and social contexts\textsuperscript{19} is the only thing that can explain why the German parliament and government constantly furthered the German political foundations international activities even into regions where material interests were absent and why it did not turn self-interested and egotistically to hard power instead. In summary, the role of the German political foundations can therefore be best described as functional providers of ideational and social resources, as transnational value and norm diffusers as well as German identity reproducers.

A point of critique toward the constructivist framework is that it does not pose the question of \textit{cui bono}, for whom activities take place.\textsuperscript{20} Consequentially, we need to look at who benefits from the undertakings of the German political foundations. Chapter 5 and 6 have outlined the advantages for the German government which lie in the foundations’ democracy assistance and conflict management activities. This included an

\textsuperscript{17} Fierke (2005) p. 182.
\textsuperscript{18} Schneider-Deters (2005) p. 108.
\textsuperscript{20} Bieler/Morton (2008) p. 113.
extended room for manoeuvre though the foundations work with various
types of actors, their economic efficiency and their protection of
international relations on a long-term basis. The historical overview on the
motivation of equipping the German foundations with significant funds
produced a mixed situation: While the outsourcing of activities to the
Stiftungen had happened purposefully the foundations were on the other
hand provided with great autonomy. The activities of the foundations today
do not exclusively benefit the German government. However, as the
network model showed, political actors, civil society organisations and
individuals abroad and in Germany gained from these undertakings as well.
Especially the Thailand case showed that the activities of the FES were
largely designed to further the peacefulness of foreign societies while
German actors were mostly not involved. The activities of the Stiftungen
largely created a win-win situation for the foreign and German network
members. The impulse of where and how to be active was taken by the
foundations alone and concepts were independently developed.

What we did not analyse in this study is whether the spreading of values and
norms by the foundations was successful and whether it indeed caused
social change over a longer period of time. Likewise, we cannot take a final
position as regards the soft power of the German political foundations in
terms of ideational persuasion power, preferences’ shaping, setting the
political agenda and “getting others to want what you want”. As already
outlined, it is difficult, to measure norm or value diffusion effects or how
they impact on public attitudes and policy results. The interview partners
found it particularly difficult to estimate the success of the Stiftungen. They
either had a mixed impression on the success or outlined that they were not
working towards an overall successful result. In Thailand we witnessed that
the FES’s could not and did not want to continue its conflict management
although the conflict was not resolved. Returning to Cross’s explanation we
could try to draw the conclusion that the ideas the FES and their partners
transmitted were not appealing to the audience that could react to it with
respective policies (at the official levels) or to those unknown actors who

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21 See 2.2.2 and 3.1.1.
22 Risse-Kappen (1995) p. 8
are fuelling the conflict. Alternatively, the narrative used was not understood by those actors.\textsuperscript{23} However, we do not know whether the FES’s narratives even reached both groups. In the words of \textit{Scott-Smith} “constructivism offers useful insights into the diffusion of ideas and helps to investigate when, why, and how ideas travel and change occurs. Admittedly, countless other channels besides public diplomacy exist through which ideas travel.”\textsuperscript{24} We also observed that the existence of soft power resources did not necessarily translate into actual soft power in terms of a desired result. Moreover, we should not confuse links to policy makers with influence on the political agenda. Finally, we have not systematically analysed how the network environment of transnational interaction developed over time and we cannot say whether the network became denser eventually. The Thailand case did not support the assumption. It showed instead that explanations, as constructivism highlights, were time bound\textsuperscript{25} and depended largely on political circumstances.

This study was a first step to generate knowledge on the transnational interactions of the German political foundations. Still, to study profoundly every single aspect of the integrated public diplomacy model was impossible due to its complexity of many different thoughts and ideas. Rather the intention was to do preliminary inventory on this neglected subject. Particularly, in-depth knowledge still needs to be produced on the moral authority resource of the \textit{Stiftungen} as well as their perceived credibility abroad. Data from the foundations’ partner organisations was not available and we had to fall back on opinions of other actors on these perceptions which obviously cannot substitute the original view. As regards the credibility of the German political foundations abroad we could observe that the \textit{Stiftungen} had some flexibility as to how they presented themselves towards their partners and audience. If they thought that a proximity to the German government was helpful, they put this characteristic to the fore. If they wanted to keep their distance from public bodies or even the affiliated political party, they were able to emphasise their “non-governmentalness”

\textsuperscript{23} Cross (2013), see 3.1.1.
\textsuperscript{24} Scott-Smith (2008) p. 186.
\textsuperscript{25} Barnett (2011) p. 158.
implied by the use of “foundation” in their name. Future research should include interviews with the partner organisations of the German political foundations abroad. For the data collection it should be considered that the foundations are partly reluctant about their contacts and access to partners is often not possible. Researchers therefore should proceed with patience and allow some time for it to be accepted and trusted by the foundation. Finally, we have not discussed the legitimacy of public diplomacy and whether the foundations’ activities undermine political accountability or open up the political process to the public. According to Jönsson, representation in terms of “acting on behalf of” is “a key function of diplomacy and is recognised by most observers, regardless of theoretical background”. The question remains whom the foundations represent. In their eyes they might embody the common good. However, they largely diffuse Western values and implement German foreign policy. Therefore they are not, as some authors assume, only active in the “pre-political” sphere. Problems can occur when contacts are maintained with autocratic regimes, such as the HSS sponsoring Gnassingbé Eyadéma in Togo. During his military dictatorship between 1967 and 2005 several violations of human rights were committed. Future research needs to consider these representational issues.

Around the turn of the Millennium, Mair identified three threats for the German political foundations’ international activities: Firstly, the growing competition in the field of the promotion of democracy; secondly, the reduction of public funding; and thirdly, the new focus on conflict prevention in which the foundations were not active. Nowadays, the situation is different. After a decrease of public funding in the 1990s, the state subsidies for the foundations have been significantly increased in the last years. As we have seen, the foundations also managed to largely integrate conflict management into their activities and to even connect it to their undertakings in democracy assistance. The competition with other actors is still visible. Both case studies showed a strong competition with U.S. government sponsored aiding organisations on site. However, we

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observed that the German political foundations encountered this situation with an excess of moral authority. The only current threat for the German political foundations’ international activities might be the turn away from Germany’s civilian power concept.
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Interview partners

The indicated function refers to the time of the interview.

* Audiotaped personal interview
** Notes were taken during the personal interview

Assistant general manager of the KAS, Personal interview in Berlin on 21/02/2008**

Consultant, Cooperation with several foundations in Thailand, Personal interview in Bangkok on 10/12/2009**

Desk officer democracy and development of the KAS, Personal interview in Berlin on 24/05/2008**

Department for Near/Middle East and North Africa, division for international cooperation of the FES and Catrina Schläger, Department for Near/Middle East and North Africa, division for international cooperation of the FES, Personal interview in Berlin on 11/01/2008**

FES Phd scholarship holder, Personal interview in Berlin on 2/03/2008**

Former resident director of the FES office in Thailand, Written interview on 19/06/2015

Head of division for Southeast Europe and coordinator for the rule of law programs of the KAS, Personal interview in Berlin on 8/05/2008**

International director of the FES, Personal interview in Berlin on 18/12/2007**

Resident director of the FES office in Thailand, Personal interview in Bangkok on 4/11/2009*

Resident director of the FES regional office in Singapore, Telephone interview on 5/11/2009**

Resident director of the FNS regional office for Southeast and East Asian Regional, and Resident Director of the FNS office in Thailand, Personal interview in Bangkok on 17/12/2009*

Resident director of the KAS office in Thailand, Personal interview in Bangkok on 19/11/2009*

Resident director of the HBS regional office for Southeast Asia, Personal interview in Chiang Mai on 20/11/2009*

Resident director of the rule of law program Southeast Europe of the KAS, Personal interview in Berlin on 5/08/2014*

Resident director of the FES office in Thailand, Written interview on 1/07/2015

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Representative of the political and protocol division, German embassy in Bangkok, Personal Interview in Bangkok on 17/12/2009**

Team leader for fundamental issues of the KAS, Personal interview in Berlin on 24/05/2008**