In defence of moral error theory and moral abolitionism

Dimmock, Mark (2016) In defence of moral error theory and moral abolitionism. PhD thesis, University of Nottingham.

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Abstract

In this thesis I present a challenge to anyone who continues to engage in moral thinking – that is to say, I present a challenge to most people currently alive. In the first three chapters, I defend the idea that no non-negative moral proposition is ever true ('Moral Error Theory'). On the back of this defence, I then provide arguments in support of the related - but not entailed – Moral Abolitionist account. According to this view, moral thought, moral talk and morally-coloured motivations should be abolished in favour of an entirely non-moral assessment of the world and the options that face us when we deliberate on questions regarding to ‘how to act’ or ‘how to live’.

Item Type: Thesis (University of Nottingham only) (PhD)
Supervisors: Fisher, Andrew
Sinclair, Neil
Keywords: Morality, Error Theory, Moral Abolitionism, Moral Error Theory
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Faculties/Schools: UK Campuses > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities
Item ID: 31237
Depositing User: Dimmock, Mark
Date Deposited: 12 Jul 2016 06:40
Last Modified: 14 Sep 2016 07:45
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/31237

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