Moral deliberation and ad hominem fallacies

Leibowitz, Uri D. (2015) Moral deliberation and ad hominem fallacies. Journal of Moral Philosophy . ISSN 1745-5243 (In Press)

PDF - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
Download (233kB) | Preview


Many of us read Peter Singer’s work on our obligations to those in desperate need with our students. Famously, Singer argues that we have a moral obligation to give a significant portion of our assets to famine relief. If my own experience is not atypical, it is quite common for students, upon grasping the implications of Singer’s argument, to ask whether Singer gives to famine relief. In response it might be tempting to remind students of the (so called) ad hominem fallacy of attacking the person advancing an argument rather than the argument itself. In this paper I argue that the “ad hominem reply” to students’ request for information about Singer is misguided. First I show that biographical facts about the person advancing an argument can constitute indirect evidence for the soundness/unsoundness of the argument. Second, I argue that such facts are relevant because they may reveal that one can discard the argument without thereby incurring moral responsibility for failing to act on its conclusion even if the argument is sound.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Ad hominem; Moral deliberation; Fallacies; Moral reasoning; Critical reasoning; Moral rationality
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham UK Campus > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Identification Number:
Depositing User: Leibowitz, Dr. Uri D.
Date Deposited: 26 Nov 2015 08:40
Last Modified: 14 Sep 2016 15:06

Actions (Archive Staff Only)

Edit View Edit View